The European Union and the Global South 9781685851262

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The European Union and the Global South

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THE

EUROPEAN UNION AND THE

GLOBAL SOUTH EDITED BY

Fredrik Söderbaum Patrik Stålgren

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

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Published in the United States of America in 2010 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU  2010 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The European Union and the Global South / Fredrik Söderbaum and Patrik Stålgren, editors. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 978-1-58826-301-8 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. European Union—Developing countries. 2. European Union countries—Relations—Developing countries. 3. Developing countries—Relations—European Union countries. I. Söderbaum, Fredrik. II. Stålgren, Patrik. JZ1570.E93344 2010 341.242'2—dc22 2009026978 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5 4 3 2 1

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Contents

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Preface 1

The EU and the Global South Fredrik Söderbaum and Patrik Stålgren

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Part 1 The EU’s Interregional Model

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EU Foreign Policy: The Interregional Model Björn Hettne

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EU Policies Toward the Global South Sven Grimm

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Part 2 Economic Cooperation

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From Lomé to Economic Partnership Agreements in Africa Mary Farrell

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The Ups and Downs of Interregionalism in Latin America Sebastian Santander

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A Move Toward Hybrid Interregionalism in Asia Mary Farrell

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Part 3 Development Cooperation

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The Limits to Interregional Development Cooperation in Africa Fredrik Söderbaum and Patrik Stålgren

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The Nature of Interregional Development Cooperation in Latin America Anne Haglund Morrissey

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Development Cooperation as a Building Block for Interregional Relations in Asia Sven Grimm

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Part 4 Conflict Management

10 Unassertive Interregionalism in the Great Lakes Region Stefaan Smis and Sevidzem Stephen Kingah

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11 The Impact of EU Conflict Management in Colombia Philippe De Lombaerde, Geert Haghebaert, Socorro Ramírez, and An Vranckx

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Part 5 Conclusion

12 Reflections on the EU and the Global South Björn Hettne, Fredrik Söderbaum, and Patrik Stålgren

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations References The Contributors Index About the Book

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his book draws on the experience gained during a research project funded by the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS). We originally set out with the intention of analyzing internal dynamics within the European Union (EU) in terms of policy coordination between EU institutions and the member states in the field of development cooperation in Africa. We soon realized, however, that the internal dimensions of the EU were closely interwoven with its role in the world. We also realized that to obtain robust answers we were forced to go beyond one single policy field (development cooperation) and one regional counterpart (Africa). This resulted in a more comprehensive and comparative book that seeks to understand variations in the EU’s role as a global actor in a range of policy areas (economic cooperation, development cooperation, and security cooperation) and across different counterpart regions in the Global South (Africa, Asia, and Latin America), with particular emphasis on interregional relations. The growth of literature in this field during the past few years shows the great relevance of the subject. Many of the contributors to this book are based at or have some affiliation with either the School of Global Studies (SGS) at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden or the United Nations University’s program on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS) in Belgium. First drafts of all chapters were discussed at a workshop organized by UNU-CRIS. The participants and commentators at that meeting are gratefully acknowledged. Most authors have met on other occasions, as well, over the past few years to discuss the chapters. The comments from two anonymous reviewers have been invaluable in improving the book.

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Preface

We also wish to extend our gratitude to Mikael Weissman for his editorial assistance, Stuart Roberts for help with language, and Libby Barstow for her copyediting skills. Last but certainly not least, we are deeply indebted to Elisabetta Linton and Shena Redmond at Lynne Rienner Publishers for supporting this project from the beginning and for their enduring patience and understanding of the problems we faced with completing the manuscript after the tragic loss of one of our family members. —Fredrik Söderbaum and Patrik Stålgren

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1 The EU and the Global South Fredrik Söderbaum and Patrik Stålgren

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his book contributes to the burgeoning debate on the European Union (EU) as a global actor in world politics. The external activities of the European Community (EC), now the EU, have expanded dramatically since its inception in 1958.1 The EU has become a force on the world scene and its presence is felt almost everywhere, albeit more in some policy areas and counterpart regions and countries than in others (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Hill and Smith 2005a). Differing views abound about what type of political animal the EU is and about the nature and impact of its external relations. Although the EU is, to an increasing extent, referred to as one of the two superpowers of the world, it is not a “state.” Skeptics argue that the EU has diffuse and ineffective foreign policies and that it is divided between the interests of its member states, implying that the EU is seen merely as a potential actor in world politics. More positive observers have varying views about the EU as a global and international actor and about the logic behind its external relations. In short, the EU is often perceived as an ambiguous polity and its foreign policy profile appears to be a moving target. In order to obtain legitimacy as a global actor, from member states and in the international community, the EU must acquire some degree of “actorness,” which can be defined as conscious efforts to shape the external world in accordance with the values, interests, and identity of the actor. Actorness brings attention to the close relationship between the EU’s internal development and its external policies (Hill and Smith 2005b: 5). This link has become increasingly evident in the EU’s official policy documents and treaties, which repeatedly stress that without a 1

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coordinated external policy the legitimacy of the EU as a global actor will be called into question. The EU can act as a collective actor in international affairs and be seen as “one” by outsiders, for instance, when signing a trade agreement or when disbursing aid. Being a global actor is more demanding, however, than simply being a regional organization or being a “region.” The fact that the European Commission does “something” is not enough for a claim to actorness. The extent to which EU is a genuine actor is more complicated. Notwithstanding, much of the discussion about the EU’s role as an actor is implicitly or explicitly framed within rather conventional statecentric notions about world politics, which we seek to transcend. Two assumptions underlie this book: states are not the sole potential actors in world politics, and “coordination failure” within the EU does not automatically disqualify it as an actor. The second of these assumptions is supported by analogy with states: because a region is not unified does not mean that we dismiss it as an actor.2 The overarching question addressed in this collection is to what extent and under what circumstances the EU should be seen as an actor in its relations with different counterparts and in different policy areas in the Global South. Without neglecting the increasing complexity of the notion of the Global South,3 the book explores the EU’s engagements with Africa, Latin America, and Asia,4 focusing on three controversial policy areas: economic cooperation, development cooperation, and conflict management. We make a methodological contribution to the research field by undertaking a series of in-depth empirical case studies. Hence, in contrast to much of the previous research in this field, our focus is not simply on the policy strategies of the EU and what its member states say they are going to do. Instead we try to make in-depth assessments of the power relations and decisionmaking processes “on the ground” in the various policy areas and in the counterpart regions. Another unique feature of this book is its focus on the role of interregionalism in the shaping of the EU’s external relations and in its strategy of becoming a global actor. Although interregionalism is not explicitly mentioned as an objective in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), it is deeply rooted in the European Commission’s and the EU’s foreign policies and external relations (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004a; Hänggi, Roloff, and Rüland 2006; Söderbaum and van Langenhove 2006). There is a long history of a rather loose form of interregionalism between the EU and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group of countries, and this interregional policy has been partly revised under the

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new Cotonou Agreement and other frameworks. Since the 1990s, interregional cooperation has been further consolidated as a key feature of the EU’s foreign policies with other counterpart regions, at least in official declarations. Indeed, we are witnessing a trend whereby the European Commission and other European policymakers seek to promote interregional relations and partnerships with the Global South, albeit not always with a consistent formulation. For instance, the former Belgian prime minister, Guy Verhofstadt, then president of the European Council, suggested in 2001 that the current G8 should be replaced by a G8 based on more adequate regional representation: We need to create a forum where the leading continental partnerships can all speak on an equal footing: the European Union, the African Union, the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), etc. (Verhofstadt 2001)

This collection explores the link between interregionalism and regions as actors on the world scene. From the EU’s perspective, interregionalism not only justifies and promotes the EU’s own existence and efficiency as a global actor; the strategy also promotes the legitimacy and efficiency of other regions, which in turn promotes further interregionalism in the world system: “Inter-regional cooperation offers support to processes of regional cooperation in other regions and enables the counterpart groupings to respond to globalization, thus improving their profiles as global actors” (Alecu De Flers and Regelsberger 2005: 318). The strength of interregionalism in the EU’s relations with the Global South, and why it occurs, remain contested in the academic literature and policy analysis. As a result, this book addresses research questions such as: Is interregionalism prevailing in some policy areas but not in others? Is the EU pursuing interregionalism only toward particular regions and not toward others? Is interregionalism challenging or strengthening multilateralism, the EU’s bilateral relations, and old-style state-to-state foreign policy relations? Does the EU act differently toward weaker and less powerful partner regions as opposed to relatively more powerful ones? Is the vision of interregional “partnership” simply a new instrument for enforcing asymmetric-style compliance? These questions about interregionalism need to be linked to questions about the EU as a global actor. Whereas the EU often speaks with one voice, for instance in commercial policy, EU policies toward the outside world tend to be more ambiguous and pluralistic in other policy

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areas, such as development cooperation and security policy, where decisionmaking is either “shared” between EU institutions and EU member states or is based on national and intergovernmental policies. Nevertheless, some momentum for coordinated policy has been generated by the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and more recently through an intensification of discussion regarding a common European Development Policy. It is not surprising that key policymakers, especially from the European Commission, emphasize that the making of the EU as an efficient and legitimate global actor across all areas of foreign policy, including development policy and security, calls for a strengthening of the EU’s central institutions, instruments, and policies, where the Commission must, so the argument goes, play a leading role (Bretherton and Vogler 2006). Such attempts at centralization and communitarization of decisionmaking and policy are contested, and there is a real need to analyze the tensions and paradoxes between the central EU institutions and those of the individual EU member states. Sometimes the EU’s external policies are supranational and common, whereas in other cases they are intergovernmental. In other cases still, there appears to be little in the way of articulated EU policy, and the member states pursue their own national policies outside of the EU framework. Thus, there are complex interrelationships between the EU’s external relations and those of the member states, and this book explores the fact that this “coordination game” varies across and between different policy areas and counterparts. Therefore questions need to be asked about the EU’s nature as an actor and where power lies within the EU. How much of an actor is the EU in its relations with different counterpart regions in the Global South and across policy areas? Do the large powers within the EU determine the Union’s foreign policies toward the South? Or are smaller member countries able to shape outcomes? Are central EU institutions able to decide the agenda and enforce compliance and enforce their “interests”? How are different EU actors’ foreign policy preferences and perceptions coordinated within the Union? How coherent is the EU in its policies toward the Global South?

Conceptualization

This book’s unique features include a systematic and in-depth assessment of interregionalism in a number of specific cases and what this tells us about the EU’s role as a global actor in the South. There is some ambiguity surrounding the concept of interregionalism. In the broadest

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sense interregionalism refers to the process whereby two specified regions interact as regions, that is, region-to-region relations. The deepest form of interregionalism, so-called pure interregionalism, develops between two clearly identifiable regions (often two regional organizations) within an institutional framework. Pure interregionalism captures, however, only a certain part of contemporary region-to-region relations. This is because many “regions” are dispersed and porous, without clearly identifiable borders, and reveal only a low level of regional agency. The problem is that a significant part of the literature on interregionalism has a tendency to favor pure interregionalism, resulting in the same bias as in the literature on regionalism, which is heavily geared toward the study of regional organizations and “visible” formal interstate frameworks. This book’s premise is that a broader conceptual toolbox is required for understanding the emergence and logic of interregionalism, as well as how this phenomenon is linked to other forms of activity on the world scene, such as multilateralism and classical bilateralism. The concepts of hybrid interregionalism and transregionalism are useful for such broader analysis (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004b: 5). Hybrid interregionalism refers to a framework where one organized region negotiates with a group of countries from another (unorganized or dispersed) region. For instance, in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) the Mediterranean countries negotiate individually with the EU. Aggarwal and Fogarty (2004b: 5), referring specifically to commercial relations, take the Lomé Agreement as a similar example of hybrid interregionalism, where the EU has trade relations with a set of countries that are not grouped within their own customs union or free trade agreement. Hänggi goes beyond formal frameworks and refers to a hybrid interregionalism in which a region, such as the EU, interacts bilaterally with single powers. Formally, this can be thought of as a “region-to-state” relation, but it may also come close to or give way to interregional relations in those cases where the single power has a dominant position in its own region; examples are the United States in North America, India in South Asia, and China in Asia (Hänggi 2006: 41ff). Needless to say, such region-to-state relations are not unequivocal, and as Karen Smith (2006) correctly points out, under certain conditions such relations may also prevent interregionalism from taking place. Transregionalism has been employed as a concept in order to go beyond the narrow region-to-region processes between two institutionalized regions within a formal and mainly intergovernmental framework (i.e., pure interregionalism). Transregionalism is even more open-ended than hybrid interregionalism and refers to region-to-region relations

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where both regions are dispersed and have weak actorship. Hence, where an accord links countries from two regions even though neither of these two regions negotiates as a region, this can be referred to as transregionalism; an example is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Transregionalism has also been used in order to cover so-called transnational (nonstate) relations, again for the purpose of moving beyond conventional statecentrism: “Any connection across regions— including transnational networks of corporate production or of nongovernmental organizations—that involves cooperation among any type of actors across two or more regions can in theory also be referred to as a type of transregionalism” (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004b: 5). The generic concept of bilateralism describes an interaction between actors. This concept is of course related to a broader discussion of what is (and is not) an “actor.” Conventionally, bilateralism is above all used to denote activities between two nation-states, but if the EU is perceived as a part in a bilateral relationship, it is per definition seen as an actor. Hence, bilateralism can be a means for regions to be seen as actors in world politics. Since a bilateral relationship between two regions (as actors) is synonymous with interregionalism, it is necessary to reflect on what constitutes a regional actor. In the next chapter, Hettne reflects on the question of how regions can become actors in world politics. Being an actor, or having “actorship,” is not necessarily the same for a region as for nation-states, although there are of course certain similarities. The fundamental issue is instead whether regions have the capacity to act and to pursue coordinated, coherent, and consistent policies toward the outside world while having a significant impact on the external environment and the behavior of other actors. Coordination and coherence are of direct relevance for the analysis of such regional agency. A variety of modes of coordination is at work in the making of the EU’s foreign policies, such as the community method, the open method of coordination between the EU and the member states, the intergovernmental method, or a strictly national system of foreign policies, which takes place outside the EU’s structures (Bomberg and Stubbs 2003; Telò 2006). Coordination differs from policy divergence and differentiation, and in the literature it is sometimes used interchangeably with coherence (Forster and Stokke 1999). Whereas coordination here refers to cross-national adjustment of policies and strategies to other actors, coherence refers to a policy and action in one field being made to work for, rather than against, the policies and actions in other fields of activity—for instance, between trade and development cooperation. Normally the concept of coherence refers

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to the internal policy coherence of a specific agent, such as an individual EU member state or the European Commission. As a result there is a certain conceptual overlap between coordination and (cross-national) coherence when analyzing a multicountry actor such as the EU.

Organization of This Book

This book is structured in five parts. The first part describes the emergence of the EU as a global actor, the emergence of the EU’s interregional model, and the various instruments and mechanisms at its disposal. The three subsequent parts focus on economic cooperation, development cooperation, and conflict management, respectively. Within each of these parts there is a historically informed case study concerning the EU’s relations with each of the counterpart regions: Africa, Latin America, and Asia. This research design opens up the possibility for comparison between policy areas and between counterpart regions, which we undertake in the final part of the book. Chapter 2, by Björn Hettne, describes the historical development of a European actor and the construction of actorship, focusing on both European identity formation and the worldwide role of the EU. The more recent development of the European system in the context of the EU is described as a result of regionalization from below as well as harmonization and coordination from above. With this as a basis, Hettne describes the EU’s Foreign Policy Complex (FPC), which is seen as the intricate institutional machinery through which actorship is being realized. Hettne then analyzes the EU’s worldwide role toward new candidates, the “near abroad,” the great powers, and the further afield regions of Africa, Latin America, and Asia, before reconnecting with the three policy areas that are the central pillars of this book: economic cooperation, development cooperation, and security cooperation. Sven Grimm, in Chapter 3, focuses specifically on more recent changes and dynamics in the EU’s relationship with the Global South in the three policy areas covered in this book. Grimm provides a detailed account of the instruments and mechanisms in each of the policy areas, such as trade agreements, aid instruments and mechanisms for financing development, the European security strategy, and the role of regional organizations in conflict management. Mary Farrell sets out, in Chapter 4, an analysis of the EU-Africa relationship in the field of economic cooperation. The historical focus in the EU-Africa partnership has been on a special aid-trading relationship

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with former colonies. Even if earlier interregional accords were officially designed to promote development, the results were not convincing. The new Cotonou Agreement places a stronger emphasis on reciprocal trade, which is compatible with the World Trade Organization (WTO) trading system, political conditionalities, regional economic cooperation and integration, human rights and democracy, and the “war on terror.” In Chapter 5, Sebastian Santander deals with the European Union’s Latin American strategy and especially the interregional relationship with the Common Market of the South (Mercosur). Interregional cooperation between the EU and Mercosur was initiated on trade but has gradually expanded to emphasize other forms of economic cooperation and development cooperation as well as political dialogue and common “values.” Santander highlights the fact that this interregional partnership takes shape in the context of economic globalization and economic competition with the United States, not least because the EU’s aim is to become a global actor. It is intriguing that these factors both give rise to and undermine interregionalism at the same time. In Chapter 6, Mary Farrell analyzes EU interregionalism in Asia. This region has seen interregional cooperation over many years, mainly within the framework of EU and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) dialogue. The mid-1980s saw a variety of new developments, particularly the launch of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), which indicated a more active agenda for interregional cooperation. A wide range of issues is included within the ASEM framework, but the agenda tends to be ad hoc and flexible. Over the years, the scope of dialogue within ASEM and through EU-ASEAN meetings has expanded to include an array of issues such as concerns with human rights, international crime and terrorism, and environmental degradation. At the same time the EU has continued bilateral negotiations with individual Asian countries, particularly with China, Japan, and India. The second policy area dealt with in this book, international development cooperation, is particularly interesting owing to the coexistence and so-called complementarity of Community aid and the development cooperation pursued by the individual EU member states. In Chapter 7, Fredrik Söderbaum and Patrik Stålgren deal with EU-Africa relations, highlighting the divergence between the EU’s official policy, as formulated in discourse and in Brussels, and development cooperation as it takes place on the ground in Africa. The pattern is twofold. First, even if the EU’s official goal is to promote EU-Africa interregional cooperation, the main pattern is a number of overlapping and sometimes competing region-building programs among a series of donors. The donors

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are seldom coordinated, and the EU is not performing as a unified actor apart from the specific programs of the European Commission. This reveals the limits to the EU’s interregional development cooperation in Africa. The second pattern is related to the fact that countries continue to be the most important counterparts in international development cooperation. But the EU is not really performing as a unified actor here either. Donor coordination is not taking place within the framework of the EU but through multilateral mechanisms, such as the Paris Agenda, the UN framework, or through more flexible budget support mechanisms and lead donor mechanisms. Anne Haglund Morrissey, in Chapter 8, describes the fact that interregionalism has become a key ingredient of the EU’s development cooperation with Latin America. At the same time, the EU has engaged in a variety of hybrid interregional and country-level relationships, as well as working through classical bilateralism. The European Commission has taken a leading role in the relationship with Latin America, among other things, owing to lack of interest in the region on the part of many EU member states. The emphasis on interregional development cooperation in combination with the leadership of the European Commission has strengthened the perception of the EU as a global actor in Latin America in this policy area since the early 1990s. Sven Grimm, in Chapter 9, describes the changes in the EU’s relations with Southeast Asia. The interregional relationship began in the late 1960s and was loosely structured around ASEAN. In the 1980s the relationship was largely driven by geopolitics, which among other things resulted in a dramatic increase of aid. In the early 1990s the relationship between the EU and Southeast Asia changed again, with a renewed role for interregionalism through the EU’s Asia strategy and the establishment of the ASEM. Country-specific and bilateral aid programs are dominant, however, and development cooperation on the regional level is largely limited to a variety of ASEAN programs. This results in multiplicities of overlapping and sometimes competing aid programs at different levels in Southeast Asia, signaling that the EU does not present a collective view on how to approach the region in the field of aid. Stefaan Smis and Sevidzem Stephen Kingah, in Chapter 10, analyze the EU’s approach to conflict management in the Great Lakes region, with a particular focus on the conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The regional nature of this conflict has resulted in a series of conflict management strategies from outside as well as from within Africa itself. The authors show that the EU-led Operation Artemis can be seen as a limited, unassertive, and only partly successful interregional

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conflict management response. Obstacles are both internal to the EU (for example, lack of coordination and poor policy formulation) and related to the nature of the conflict itself and the conflicting interests among African states and other vested corporate interests. Philippe De Lombaerde, Geert Haghebaert, Socorro Ramírez, and An Vranckx, in Chapter 11, underline the national, regional, and international ramifications of the Colombian conflict as well as the contradictions in the EU’s conflict management approach. Part of the answer why the EU fails to speak and act as “one” lies in competing national interests, the failure within the EU to understand the regional character of the conflict, and the failure to agree on plausible conflict management strategies. Another important factor is the failure of the Andean Community to deal with the Colombian conflict. Hence there is no functioning regional counterpart on the Latin American side, which illustrates the lack of both regional actorness (both within Europe and Latin America) and assertive interregionalism. Chapter 12, by Björn Hettne, Fredrik Söderbaum, and Patrik Stålgren, draws comparative conclusions about the EU as an actor in the Global South across the three policy areas and across the three counterpart regions. Like many other publications in this research field, this book confirms the view that the EU is a strong and recognized economic actor. Indeed, many of the EU member states have subordinated themselves to the EU’s common economic and trading agenda. But our study also underscores the fact that national interests do influence the process. This is most evident in cases where economic and commercial policies intersect with other policy areas. The book also draws attention to the EU’s multifaceted and diverse policy mix based on multilateralism, bilateralism, and various kinds of interregionalism. Although the EU seeks to be portrayed as an actor within the field of development cooperation, the case studies in this book highlight the ambiguous nature of the EU as an actor within this policy field. Donor coordination is rapidly improving at the country level, but these processes are usually centered upon a variety of largely multilateral or ad hoc country-based mechanisms, whereas the EU remains malfunctional as a coordination mechanism, especially in Africa. There is a trend for regions to emerge as counterparts to countries in international development cooperation. Most donors pursue individual region-building programs in isolation from other donors, however, resulting in a multitude of overlapping and sometimes competing region-building programs. Hence, it becomes evident that the EU does not present a unified approach in this regard either; the clearest example of EU interregional-

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ism in the field of development cooperation is in Latin America (which is the result of rather weak national interests and the relatively strong position of the European Commission). The EU is, in general, a somewhat poorly coordinated actor in the field of conflict management, often failing to develop a coordinated response at both the country level and the interregional level. The EU’s response to the conflict in the Great Lakes region is mixed. The EU managed to lead Operation Artemis, but this was a limited response, and there is a lack of coordinated action on the part of the EU. Whereas the case of the Great Lakes region draws attention to divergent interests among EU member states, the Colombian conflict underlines that there are no clearly defined interests among major powers within the EU at all, which explains the weak degree of EU actorness as well as interregionalism in this case.

Notes 1. The European Union was established through the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Technically it is still possible to speak about the European Community for first-pillar activities, but we use the term EU in order to enable comparison in time and between policy areas. The term EU can also be used to refer to the EU as an institution plus the member states, hence as a political system or a polity. This broader and more open-ended meaning of the EU is particularly important in the discussion about the EU as a global actor, explaining why it is the preferred label in this book. 2. Thanks to Karen Smith for emphasizing this point. 3. The book’s scope encompasses the EU’s relationships with a large part of the world. The two major exceptions are North America and Central and Eastern Europe, which to a considerable extent can be seen as “special cases” of the EU’s foreign policies (Söderbaum and van Langenhove 2006). The transatlantic relationship is special for a number of reasons, characterized as it is by “big power” interaction and North-North relations as well as the particular relationship between the United States and Europe (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2006). The EU’s relations with Central and Eastern Europe are also unique, perhaps most importantly because all countries in the latter region define their relations in terms of EU enlargement and whether and how soon to become EU members (Smith 2006). 4. Although some individual countries, such as Japan or South Korea, are neither part of the South in geographical terms nor part of the “developing world,” they are typically integrated within their regional contexts and may be included in an eclectic understanding of the Global South.

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2 EU Foreign Policy: The Interregional Model Björn Hettne

International developments and the growing concentration of power and responsibility in the hands of a very small number of great powers, mean that Europe must unite and speak increasingly with one voice, if it wants to make itself heard and play its proper role in the world. —The Declaration of European Identity, 1973

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he statement from 1973 on the need for stronger European Union (EU) capability to act in the external world has not lost its relevance, notwithstanding undeniable improvements in EU actorness. The current book deals with the role of the EU in the Global South, which raises the problem of actorship. This concept refers to the general phenomenon of possessing the capacity to act toward the outside world. Such capacity can increase or decrease over time, depending on changes in particular underlying variables that may, independently of each other, move in different directions. An actor can thus also lose its actor capacity, a complex phenomenon depending on the interplay of internal and external dynamics. In this chapter actorship includes subjective, institutional, historical, and structural dimensions, in order to give a more comprehensive view on regional agency as distinct from state action. Thus a multidimensional approach to the study of regionally based actorship is developed, built around what are seen as the three components of regional actorship: internal integration or regionness, international presence, and the capacity to act purposively or actorness. The book as a whole focuses mainly on actorness—its internal and external dynamics. This chapter, however,

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tries to provide a broader picture of the EU’s actorship in the external arena, and subsequent chapters focus specifically on EU actorness in the Global South. External action depends on internal cohesiveness. If there is an internal actor identity, there is also external actorship, having more or less external impact, depending on the strength of regionness, presence, and actorness in various policy areas and in relation to various counterparts. The question is to what extent the EU’s international presence is actually transformed to purposive capacity to shape the external environment by influencing other actors and ultimately world order. It is argued that the very meaning of the new Europe is in fact the nonexistence of a clear borderline between internal and external. The implication of this is that Europe is shaping world order by means of inclusiveness, by treating the external as if it were internal, in a significant departure from traditional power politics (also born in Europe). Historically, we can identify a process in which increasing regionness is translated to presence, which in turn provides the basis for actorness. This process is not simply linear but contains backlashes, such as the recent referenda on the European constitution. This chapter deals, first, with the issue of actorship: the mutually supportive relationship among regionness, presence, and actorness and the links to interregionalism. Second, it outlines the historical development of a European actor: the formation of a European regional international order and a European identity within this order. Third, it describes the intricate machinery through which actorness is being institutionalized, referred to here as the EU’s Foreign Policy Complex (FPC). Fourth, I analyze the various Foreign Policy Relations (FPRs)—enlargement, stabilization, bilateralism, and interregionalism. Finally, I explore three Foreign Policy Issue Areas (FPIAs)—trade and economic cooperation, development cooperation, and security/conflict management.

Dimensions of Actorship

In comparing the external actions of the EU and the United States, it is important to address a primary distinction; although the United States operates as a nation-state, the EU is a different kind of political animal: a regional institutionalized polity (Hettne 2003). The question is how such a polity can be an actor in world politics. Actorship for a region does not normally imply a legal personality of the type characterizing nation-states. The question raised here is whether macroregions or world

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regions can assume properties and qualities similar to those of larger nation-states, namely to pursue coordinated, coherent, and consistent policies toward the outside world while having a significant impact on the external environment and the behavior of other actors. This potential depends primarily upon our definition of region. Normally a region is not associated with actorship but rather is seen as an “arena” or “level” of action or as a regional organization. Not so here. Regions are here understood as processes; they are not geographical or administrative objects but potential subjects, and thereby actors in the making (or unmaking); their boundaries are shifting, and so are their actorship and capacity as actors. Our recent history in the Westphalian era has been completely dominated by national actors. Thus, according to the dominant paradigm in international relations (realism), the nationstate is seen as the main, if not the only, relevant actor in the international system. The “nation-centric paradigm” is being overtaken, however, by the “post-national paradigm” (Nicolaidis and Lacroix 2003: 125) or “methodological nationalism” by “methodological cosmopolitanism” (Beck 2004: 2). A region exhibits a similarity to a nation, in that a region is an “imagined community,” and like a nation it has a territorial base. But there are also differences, such as the variety of interests and the problem of coordination in a Foreign Policy Complex like the one formed by the EU. Actorship for a region is thus a complex phenomenon consisting of three dimensions: regionness, presence, and actorness. An increase in the level of regionness leads to a more distinct presence, which in turn actualizes the question of actorness, owing to expectations flowing from various forms of presence. Regionness

When different processes of regionalization in various fields and at various levels of society intensify and converge within the same geographical area, the cohesion and thereby the distinctiveness of the region in the making increase. A regional actor takes shape. This process of regionalization can be described in terms of levels of “regionness” (Hettne 1993, 2003; Hettne and Söderbaum 2000). In general and abstract terms, one can speak of five levels of regionness. The first, regional social space, is a geographic area, delimited generally by natural, physical barriers and populated by largely nonrelated local groups of people. The region is thus objectively rooted in territory; in social terms, it is organized by human inhabitants, at first in relatively isolated communities, and later

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creating some kind of translocal relationship. This increased density of contacts implying durable relations is what creates the second level, a regional social system, or in security terms, a “regional security complex” (Buzan and Weaver 2003: 4). The third level, the region as international society, or “anarchical society” (Bull 1977: 1), implies a set of rules that makes interstate relations more enduring and predictable (less anarchic) and thus more peaceful or at least less violent. It can be either organized (de jure) or more spontaneous (de facto). In the case of a more organized cooperation, the region is constituted by the members of the regional organization. As demonstrated in the case of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), this does not necessarily imply a peaceful community. States are still dominant actors, but the pattern of relations is becoming increasingly regulated and more and more “societylike.” The Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century provides one example, as does East Asia today. The relative calm does not exclude the potential for hostility. The region as community or “security community” (first conceptualized by Karl Deutsch), the fourth level, takes shape when an enduring organizational framework (formal or less formal) facilitates and promotes social communication and convergence of values, norms, and behavior throughout the region, which implies identity formation on the regional level. Thus emerges a transnational civil society characterized by social trust at this level. The crucial test is whether warfare to resolve conflicts is conceived as possible or not. The Nordic region and the EU are cases in point. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) are often mentioned as non-European cases of regional security communities. At the fifth level, region as institutionalized polity has a more fixed structure of decisionmaking and therefore stronger acting capability. This regional polity does not have to be characterized by the normal terminology used to describe political systems but can be sui generis, as in the case of Europe, or Europolity. Increasing regionness normally implies that a geographical area is transformed from a passive object (an arena or a strategic theater) to an active subject—an actor—increasingly capable of articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region. It may be more accurate to refer to the articulation of transnational interests in the region, since in reality the various interests are articulated and concerted and ultimately expressed with one voice at the regional level. The concept of regionness defines the position of a particular region in terms of its

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cohesion. This can be seen as a long-term endogenous historical process, changing over time from coercion—the building of empires and nations in history—to voluntary cooperation—the current (and unique) logic of regionalization. The political ambition of establishing regional cohesion and identity has been of primary importance in the ideology of the regionalist project (regionalism), but a convergence of values may take place even if this is not the explicit purpose of the project itself. Regionalization may, in other words, also evolve without the support of regionalism, that is, in the absence of a regionalist project. The approach of seeing region as process implies an evolution of deepening regionalism, not necessarily following the idealized, staged model presented above, which mainly serves a heuristic purpose. Since regionalism is a political project, created by human actors, it may not only move in different directions but might indeed also fail, just as a nationstate project might. Seen from this perspective, decline would mean fragmentation, decreasing regionness, and dilution of identity. Enlargement or “widening” also implies decreasing regionness, at least initially, before full convergence. Throughout the EU’s history this trend has been countered by reforms aimed at “deepening.” Widening and deepening can thus be seen as a dialectic of loss and gain with regard to regionness. As the EU grows as an institutionalized polity, its presence in the world naturally increases, since size is one of the dimensions of presence. Each enlargement creates a new neighborhood, often defined in security terms. Enlargement does thus solve a security problem by internalizing it, at the same time as the problematic security complex is transformed. The secret behind the EU’s success in this regard is its transformative power: to invite the other to become a partner, rather than imposing its own will. What is enlarged is not “Europe” but a particular economic and political system, or even a community of values (Leonard 2005: 110). With continuous enlargement, the internal cohesion and consistency may become compromised, creating a confidence crisis, which was for instance about to happen as Turkey was to start negotiating for membership in October 2005. The deepening process is supposed to prevent such crises, whereas the enlargement process should prevent security crises in the “near abroad.” Expansion means dilution and loss in regionness but increased potential in terms of presence. Presence

Europe as external actor is more than the EU’s foreign policy, and more even than the aggregate of the EU’s policies across all areas of its activi-

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ty. Simply by existing, and due to its relative weight (demographically, economically, and ideologically), the Union has an impact on the rest of the world. Its footprints are seen everywhere. This also provokes reactions and creates expectations from outside. Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler (2006) use the concept “presence” to signify this phenomenon, which constitutes the bridge between endogenous and exogenous factors, or between regionness and actorness. A stronger presence implies more capacity to act, unless we are dealing with a sleeping giant (which anyhow must wake up sooner or later). The actor must be subjectively conscious about its presence and prepared to make use of it in order to achieve higher levels of actorness. In the “near abroad,” presence is particularly strong and can develop into outright absorption of new territory (enlargement). To the extent that an enlarged region can retain the same level of actorness, its presence will increase because of sheer size. The original European Economic Community (EEC) contained 185 million people; today that number is in excess of 450 million. European integration has in fact become the unification, and even extension, of Europe. Presence is thus a complex and comprehensive variable, depending on the size of the actor, the scope of its external activities, the relative importance of different issue areas (so far, trade and economic cooperation have, for instance, been more in focus than conflict management, particularly in relation to military means), and the relative dependence of various regions upon the European market (Africa being more dependent than Asia). A stronger presence means more repercussions and reactions and thereby a pressure to act, in the absence of which action presence itself will diminish. Actorness

Actorness—usually referring to external behavior—implies a scope of action and room for maneuver, in some cases even a legal personality. The idea of international actor capability (with respect to the EU’s external policies) was first developed by Gunnar Sjöstedt (1977) and further elaborated by Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler (2006) as “actorness.” Purposive ability to act is of course also relevant internally; an example is the cases of what have been referred to as security regionalism, development regionalism, and environmental regionalism—three areas in which increased regional cooperation may make a difference in the region itself (Hettne 2001). In the EU, actorness is closely related to the controversial issue of “competences,” ultimately determined by the member states.

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Actorness is thus a phenomenon closely related to regionness; the latter implies an endogenous process of increasing cohesiveness, whereas the former suggests a growing capacity to act that follows from the strengthened “presence” of the regional unit in different contexts as well as from the actions that follow the interaction between the actor and its external environment. Actorness with reference to the outside world is thus not only a simple function of regionness but also an outcome of a dialectic process between endogenous and exogenous forces. Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler (2006: 30) identify four requirements for actorness: (1) shared commitment to a set of overarching shared values and principles; (2) domestic legitimation of decision processes, and priorities, relating to external policy; (3) the ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate consistent and coherent policies; and (4) the availability of, and capacity to utilize, policy instruments (diplomacy, economic tools, and military means). Obviously, these requirements are fulfilled in different degrees in different FPRs and in different FPIAs: from the “near abroad” to faraway regions and from the areas of trade (in which the EU is a strong actor) to security (where the responsibility given to the EU is contested and highly controversial). In other words, actorness is shifting over time, between policy areas, and between counterpart regions. This has to do with the peculiar nature of the EU as an actor and the complexity of its foreign policy machinery. A strong national power, like the United States, of course possesses these four requirements of actorness and can use them to rule either by what is called hegemonic power (defined as accepted and thereby legitimate power) or by dominance (based on the use of coercion or open force). A weaker position necessitates more of a bargaining attitude. The most problematic requirement of actorness appears to be that of domestic legitimation, in view of the muchdiscussed democratic deficit of the EU. This is posing a severe challenge to EU actorness. To this second requirement should be added the requirement of justification to outsiders (Hill and Smith 2005a). The unique feature of regional (as compared to national great power) actorness is that it must be created by voluntary processes and therefore depends more on dialogue and consensus building than on coercion. This mode of operating is the model Europe holds out as the preferred world order, since this is the way the new Europe (as organized by the EU) has developed in its more recent peaceful evolution, in contrast with its historically more violent development. With increased levels of actorness in different fields of action and different parts of the world, Europe will be able to influence the world order toward its own

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preferred model of civilian power: multilateralism; international law; dialogue; and respect for different interests within an interregional, pluralist framework built on democracy, social justice, and equality (Telò 2006). Regional Actorship and Interregionalism

The concept of regional actorship is not specifically related to the EU as a global actor but is meant to serve as an analytical framework in studying the transformation of any region from object to subject, that is, with a certain actor capacity in its external relations. For two regions to establish a functioning interregional relationship, it is essential that both regions have achieved a certain degree of actorship, that is, internal cohesion, external presence, and organized actorness. The greater the difference in actorship of two interlinked regions, the greater the asymmetries. The policy of interregionalism is pursued energetically by the EU, whereas other regions, even if they are organized as regions, have little say. This situation creates an asymmetrical relationship. Interregionalism can thus be described as a relationship between actors provided with the various components of actorship: regionness, presence, and actorness. These components can compensate for each other’s weaknesses. A weak presence, for instance, can be compensated for by stronger internal cohesion or effectively organized actorness. Even the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, a “region” (or counterpart) completely constructed by the EU, have been able to exercise some leverage in negotiations with the EU. On the other hand, a strong presence does not necessarily lead to regional actorship. North America as organized in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for instance, is strong in terms of presence but weak in terms of regionness and actorness. In fact NAFTA cannot be considered a regional actor, since it is lacking an external dimension. The Southeast Asia region as organized by ASEAN and increasingly East Asia as organized in ASEAN Plus Three (APT), as well as the Southern Cone of Latin America organized in Mercosur, are increasing their actorship. Other regions completely lack actorship; for instance, the Mediterranean is a construction by the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy and Central Asia can be described as a “pre-region.”

The Shaping of Europe as a Regional Actor

The historical perspective applied in this analysis is that the current world order is in transformation from a regional international system,

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which originated in Europe in the first part of the seventeenth century and was fully globalized in the twentieth century. The time of its birth was a messy period, as one political order was in decay while a new order was about to emerge. The typical premodern political order, not only in Europe but also in most parts of the world, was the more or less centralized empire. The immediate pre-Westphalian experience of the Europeans, however, was an extremely decentralized political order called “feudalism”—essentially a collapsed empire. How this came to be a uniquely European world order, with Europe as an actor with a particular identity and a higher level of regionness, is discussed below in terms of the five levels of regionness. Regional Social Space

Regional social space is the lowest degree of regionness. In the regional social space that came to be called Europe, empire was a distant memory but also an impelling political ideal when the continental polity became fragmented and was replaced by microunits such as tribes, feudatories, and emerging small kingdoms. The first European polity that showed some resemblance to classical empire was the territory under the control of Charlemagne in the ninth century—considered by many to be the core of “Europe.” Under the subsequent period of high medievalism, this space became a more consolidated cultural area, based on Latin Christendom as the integrative ideology. Peoples began to share a number of cultural practices, including a common experience (for the elites) of higher education, received from universities established throughout Europe. The pre-Westphalian order was a multilevel system with diffuse and constantly shifting authority structures without clear territorial borders and with no absolute authority. This system was not systematic but rather a bewildering mixture of often incompatible elements: the Christian Church represented by the pope, an empire project with the purpose of unifying Europe under one emperor, feudal lords ruling over a subjugated peasantry, emerging kings who originated from the major feudal lords and who controlled pieces of territory, longdistance trading networks that covered most of Europe and linked it with the outside world, local marketplaces, and an emerging bourgeoisie in semi-independent cities. Regional Social System

Attempts to transform this decentralized and periodically chaotic (“dark age”) polity into an empire, built on the ideal of the Roman Empire,

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were frustrated. After hundreds of years this contradictory structure exploded in the seventeenth century in an equally contradictory war (a war with many actors operating at different levels of the system and pursuing different goals). Ultimately, a new political order—Westphalia— was born. It resulted in the sovereign, territorial state, which in turn implied the end of local power as well as of continental, all-European political and economic structures. All power was now monopolized by the state. This also meant that there was no overarching regional or world power, that is, a situation of “anarchy” as it was later termed by political theorists of the so-called realist school. The more successful nation-states not only competed in Europe but also took their struggle to other continents. Europe thereby came to rule the world, not as a single actor but through the process in which its major nation-states divided the world among themselves. The European regional system of states became a world system (Bull and Watson 1984). Governance functions were monopolized by the emerging kingdoms; absolutism, a sort of compromise between centralization (imperial order) and decentralization (feudal order), emerged. There was therefore a certain loss of regionness at the continental level, as the new territorial states became economically introverted (through mercantilism) and later trapped in an assertive ethnic identity (through nationalism). Through growing internal social and economic relations, Europe had become a regional social system. In security terms this system was mostly violent, but complexity was reduced as “state” became identical with “territory,” and wars became territorial rather than religious (Heffernan 1998: 17). The number of actors was reduced and the modern political map took form. The statebuilding in Europe was violent, so people gradually learned to conceive of their “own” state as protector and the rest of the world as “anarchy,” a threat to their security. Europe was still a dangerous place—a violent regional security complex (Buzan and Waever 2003). Regional International Society

Throughout European modern history there have been several efforts to create geopolitical hegemony or dominion, provoking “antihegemonic” wars. These attempts at continental control have come from the dominant nations. Progress was for military reasons identified with economic development, which in the nineteenth century meant industrialization. The state ultimately became responsible for what came to be called “development,” and the nation-state territory became the privileged

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space (container) in which development was to take place, security to be guaranteed, and welfare to be created. The world order was a regional European system, stabilized by what became known as the Concert of Europe. The “anarchy” thereby became a regional international society or an “anarchical society” (Bull 1977). The European Concert provided peace in the nineteenth century, but in spite of economic integration facilitated by “the long peace,” the continent was plagued by increasing tensions toward the end of the century and by destructive wars in the first half of the twentieth century. A new Europe had to be built on new foundations. Regional Community

The second half of the twentieth century saw the emergence of a regional community: the EEC/EU. The Europeanization of Europe is a complex term if it is taken to mean the existence of a model Europe toward which real processes converge. No such master model ever existed. The process is more complex, combining forces from above and from below. Europeanization implies increasing sameness of the units in a system to the extent that the units experience a shared destiny, without necessarily giving up their individuality. A distinction can be made between regionalization from below in the larger, “real” region and harmonization of the formally organized region, steered from above through a political/bureaucratic system (regionalism). The two processes are interlinked, however, so a strict distinction cannot be maintained. It is typically the case in “the community method” that harmonization attempts are premature, leading to backlashes. The regionalization process was constituted by different forms of convergence in terms of (1) political regimes, (2) economic homogenization, and (3) the way in which security arrangements were organized. Regime convergence implies the reduction of differences within a particular political space, in this case an emerging region. The homogenization of essential features of the political system can be seen as a precondition for joining the EU and thus as a factor explaining enlargement. Normally a country Europeanizes before being adopted as “European” and forming part of the EU, whereby regionalization from below changes into harmonization and coordination from above. The recent (post-1957) process of political homogenization in Europe has gone through three phases: (1) in the south, the disappearance of military dictatorships in the mid-1970s; (2) in the west, the more widespread self-assertion of the European Atlantic partners in the field of security,

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beginning in the early 1980s; and (3) in the east, the fall of the communist regimes in the late 1980s and the Soviet collapse in 1991. The process of economic homogenization, associated with uniform national adaptations to globalization, has led to a state of liberal hegemony in Europe, although at the beginning the policy of state interventionism was widespread. The first economic regional institutions in postwar Western Europe were the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and the European Community (EC) in 1957. Behind the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1959 were, first, the traditional British national interest of avoiding involvement in any supranational European scheme and, second, diverse national security interests of minor states expressed in different forms of neutrality. In Eastern Europe the context for regionalization was also geopolitically determined. In the case of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), formed in 1949, the national interests involved seem to have reflected the principle of “the less integration, the better.” In fact, most cooperation within the bloc was simply bilateral and the CMEA was a hindrance to, rather than an instrument of, regional integration. A more relaxed security situation signaled its dissolution. Much the same can be said of EFTA, which, as neutrality disappeared from the security agenda, gradually became a “waiting room” for the EU membership candidates. Security is the third field of convergence and coordination. The two postwar military blocs, albeit with a group of neutrals in between, manifestly expressed Europe’s political subordination to the superpowers. It was an era of hegemonic regionalism, imposed from above and from the outside. From the viewpoint of economic organization, the security imperative imposed a more or less corresponding cleavage pattern. In periods of détente it became evident that economic contacts tended to follow a logic of their own. In periods of high tension, economic relations, in contrast, had to adapt to the political imperatives built into the security arrangement. All this underlines the predominance of the security factor. In spite of this, the security factor was not expressed in institutional and policy terms until recently. Here, the breakup of Yugoslavia was the major learning process. Regional Institutionalized Polity

Thus far, the EU is, in terms of regionness, the only example of a regional institutionalized polity. At present it is hovering between intergovernmentalism and supranational governance, but it faces an

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uncertain future, owing to a new wave of euroskepticism and the decreased coherence and consistency following the inflow of new members. The main controversies have been in the fields of economic policy and security. As the EU started to become an institutionalized polity in the 1990s, the economic foundation became more liberal than earlier owing to domestic political changes in the member states. The economic regionalization of Europe arising out of the intensification of the internal market project has thus so far been fully consistent with market-led economic globalization. Indeed, both processes have been founded on the same neoliberal paradigm. The economic convergences contributing to increasing regionness occurred in a context of liberalization, deregulation, and orthodox anti-inflationary policies that were built into the constitutional future of Europe, as spelled out in the Maastricht Treaty. In the subsequent years the European Monetary Union (EMU) became the main route to integration. The convergence criteria of the EMU illustrate a process of regionalization (or regionalism) directed from above (harmonization) and in accordance with a strict schedule, although occasionally and selectively generous in its application due to public resistance to financial orthodoxy. Clearly, it is difficult to distinguish the politics from the economics of monetary integration. More recently the problems of the European Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) underlined the dangers of political divergence within a monetary bloc, raising doubts about the viability of the EMU. With a single currency, fiscal indiscipline in one state clearly has implications for others. We may, however, also face a more complicated situation in which there is genuine disagreement about the correct economic policy. Regime convergence has preceded the formal integration process, since only democratic, market-oriented polities can merge with the European polity. The adaptation to a political order, compatible with European values, has been—and to some extent continues to be—a major source of change in greater Europe. This process is far from finished. The former Eastern Europe has been successfully integrated on the basis of liberalism, but in the Balkans the EU has faced a major security crisis. The fundamental problem is that the EU institutions were originally designed around a limited number of countries, in a different age, and with a different purpose. The European project grew out of a Cold War context and a transatlantic alliance and was intended to create a coherent and homogeneous capitalist core out of the competing great powers of Europe. The process of deepening (institution building) is now lagging far behind enlargement, threatening all dimensions of actorship and ulti-

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mately dependent on how “Europe” is subjectively conceived by its inhabitants, who increasingly are attracted by the politics of identity.

The EU’s Foreign Policy Complex: The Institutionalization of Actorness

Actorness implies mechanisms for policymaking and implementation. For a state this is relatively simple to account for—we turn to the ministry of foreign affairs. For a regional actor it is a different story. The foreign policy system of the EU is so complex that it may be more appropriate to refer to it as the EU’s Foreign Policy Complex. The complexity derives from many factors. First, there are two political levels: the level of the individual nation-states (twenty-seven ministries), insisting on their right to pursue their own foreign policies; and the union level, divided between the Community—where the European Commission is driving—and the Council—where the governments of the member states can make collective decisions. The Council thus formally belongs to the level of the member states, but to the extent that qualified majority voting takes place, it will constitute a level of its own above the member states. Much theorizing is devoted to the nature of these levels and their interrelations in different policy areas. Second, the FPC contains three distinct areas characterized by different responsibilities with regard to decisions: the so-called pillars of trade and economic cooperation, security and defense, and justice and home affairs. Through their external implications (presence) they are each important for the EU as a global actor. A brief elaboration follows (and should also be read in the context of Chapter 3). The Treaty of Rome in 1957 was above all concerned with the international trade regime and also provided for a customs union, which was subsequently established in 1968. This “first pillar” made the EC a global actor in trade negotiations, with presence and actorness mutually supporting each other. The “second pillar” is understood to encompass cooperation among the member states in the foreign policy and security fields. It is mildly paradoxical that this cooperation is extremely sensitive and controversial, at the same time that the entire integration project is officially described as a historical peace project. Thus, security is described as the core of the EU project, but it seems instead to be an indirect effect of cooperation and should not be seen in explicitly direct terms. The “third pillar”—cooperation in justice and internal affairs—commenced in the 1970s, during a period of heightened terrorism throughout Europe.

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Owing to sensitivities about national security this cooperation took place discreetly, without formal binding agreements (Smith 2003: 31, 47ff). The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 gave this cryptic area the highsounding name “area of freedom, security, and justice” (AFSJ), fulfilling the promise of bringing the EU “closer to the citizens.” In spite of this promise, the Amsterdam Treaty moved many items to the first pillar. Thus, the AFSJ is an area of cross-pillar operation. In fact, a large number of issues would be more effectively handled by more such cross-pillar operation, or a complete abandoning of the pillared approach—which was in fact a key purpose of the Treaty of Lisbon. The problem of implementing this treaty has been a main setback for the pursuit of coherence and consistency, affecting the various components of actorship. As a third component of the FPC, there are several institutions with different mandates and sometimes differing views: the European Council, the Council (different constellations of national ministers), the Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice. The proceedings in the European Parliament sometimes reflect “European” interests and sometimes, since there are parties critical of the European project, rather parochial nationalist interests. Numerous special agencies and policy instruments are operating in various issue areas, depending on which pillar is activated. Most effective instruments are located within the first pillar, where the EU presence is strongly manifested, but need to be applied in the second and third pillars in order to give them more strength. To do so is often complicated because of the bureaucratic cultures and diverging interests that have developed in different institutions, creating what is called bureaucratic politics. These institutions and instruments are further discussed in Chapter 3 and in the case studies. Finally, various objectives, a mixture of interests and norms, are pursued within the FPC: for instance, regional cooperation, human rights, democracy and good governance, conflict prevention, sustainable development, security, and fighting international crime (Smith 2003). Ultimately, the greater objective of the FPC is multilateral global governance and a regionalized world order, but this is only achievable to the extent that the objectives form a consistent whole.1 These objectives are subject to the criteria of coherence and consistency. Coordination to satisfy these criteria takes place both vertically between member states and the Union and horizontally between the member states (consistency) and between the pillars and objectives (coherence). The consistency/coherence imperative drives the FPC

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toward more effective coordination, which to some extent implies supranational centralization. Thus with time the FPC may lose some of its complexity. But it should be recognized that the FPC itself changes over time, and in different FPIAs and FPRs, owing to a number of endogenous and exogenous factors: organizational changes, a growing number of members with shifting interests and norms (endogenous factors), and responses to external expectations and challenges (exogenous factors).

Foreign Policy Relations

The four FPRs—enlargement, stabilization, bilateralism, and interregionalism—lead to four types of counterparts: prospective members, neighbors, great powers, and more faraway regions (Africa, Asia, and Latin America), constituting the South in conventional terms. Enlargement policy covers candidate countries (Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey) and potential candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia). The enlargements have concerned either well-integrated European countries, whose entries were, for various reasons, delayed, or less developed and politically turbulent countries, integrated into the European mainstream mainly for security reasons. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) offers a privileged relationship with the EU’s neighbors (distinct from enlargement).2 A crucial component of the ENP is its commitment to promote democratization and human rights in combination with the principles of good governance, rule of law, market economy, and sustainable development, with the aim of stabilizing the EU’s neighborhood. There are no obvious criteria indicating what is to be regarded as non-Europe, other than geographical distance. The boundary is ultimately politically determined. In the remainder of the post-Soviet area—essentially the European part (except of course the Baltic subregion that is now part of the EU) and the Caucasus/Central Asia—the EU presence is weak, and there is little leverage for influence (Dannreuther 2004). The neighborhood area coincides to a large degree with Russia’s Near Abroad. Russia has claimed the role as stabilizer in this area but in comparison with the EU seems to lack a coherent security policy, except for the simple policy of control, with some neoimperialist overtones, strengthened by the antiterrorist objective. The neighborhood also plays an important role in the EU’s more coherent and comprehensive security strategy (Charillon 2004). In a similar fashion, the Barcelona process is

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a strategy of cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbors, where peace is the first priority, in accordance with the basic concern for stability. The Mediterranean “region” does not exist in a formal sense but is rather a purely social construction shaped by the EU’s own security concerns. The EU has developed a series of bilateral relationships with the United States, Russia, Canada, Mexico, China, Japan, India, and South Africa. In some cases this completes, and in other cases replaces, genuine region-to-region (interregional) links. Among the bilateral partners, the United States is the most powerful. In fact the challenges and problems posed by its military superiority cannot be balanced, and its imperial policy cannot be influenced, according to the old realist recipe of balance-of-power politics. What remains is what has been called “soft balancing,” which can be seen as a form of civil power, implying different kinds of nonviolent resistance. This policy was practiced by both small and large powers in connection with the Iraq War and may increase in importance if the United States maintains its commitment to “imperial” policies. In spite of a tremendous degree of contact on the level of civil society, the formal interregional transatlantic links (EUNAFTA) are institutionally weak or nonexistent (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2006). The relations between the EU and Russia are similar to those between the EU and the United States, in the sense that Russia also prefers bilateralism and takes a realist, power-oriented approach. Nevertheless the EU maintains a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia that covers human rights, the economy, trade, security, and justice. It is emphasized in this book that, since the 1990s, interregional cooperation has become an increasingly important component of the EU’s FPRs. That is a perception strongly linked to the Commission, however, and barely exists on the level of the member states, who stick to their own foreign policies. The regionalist policy is realized through a large number of interregional arrangements, particularly those with faraway counterparts in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where EU interests often clash with those of the United States (especially in relation to Latin America, which is seen in Chapter 5 by Sebastian Santander). That the EU constitutes the hub of these interregional arrangements is in full accordance with its regionalist ideology, encompassing not only trade and foreign investment but also political dialogue and cultural relations among the regions. The EU’s ambition is also to formalize the relations as being between regional bodies and regions (“pure” interregionalism) rather than the more diffuse transregional, hybrid interregional, or bilat-

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eral contacts. For pragmatic reasons, however, interregional relations take on a bewildering variety of forms. In the cases of Japan and China (and to some extent Brazil), the EU bilateral relation complements the interregional relations (the Asia-Europe Meeting [ASEM] and Mercosur) (see Chapters 5 and 6). Interregionalism thus forms a part of the EU’s foreign policy, the EU being the hub of a global pattern of interregional relations. On the other hand, if regionalism is a global phenomenon—and there are different regionalisms in different parts of the world—it is reasonable to expect that these emerging regions, to the extent that they develop actorship (with varying degrees of actorness), establish some forms of links with each other. Thus interregionalism can also be explained from the point of view of the transformation of the global system (Hänggi et al. 2006). This point is reinforced by the fact that southern regions (ASEAN, Mercosur, and the Southern African Development Community [SADC]) also establish interregional relations, encouraged by the EU. Of course these regions, albeit harboring the potential for precipitating structural changes in world governance, are still embryonic, and therefore it is possible to read into them trends of theoretical significance. In fact interregionalism can be seen as one of the more regulated forms that globalization may be taking. Compared with market-led globalization in a Westphalian world of nation-states, it is more rooted in territory, and in contrast with traditional multilateralism, it is a more exclusive relationship, since access to regional formations is limited by the principle of geographical proximity. Interregionalism (and indeed multiregionalism) is a long-term, nonlinear, and uncertain trend that is certain to include setbacks and the outcome of which we cannot know.

Foreign Policy Issue Areas

Three FPIAs are emphasized below and indeed throughout this book: trade and economic cooperation, international development cooperation, and the foreign and security policy, with a focus on conflict management. Economic cooperation belonged to the first pillar of supranational responsibility and constituted the rationale for the formation of the EEC. Development cooperation, from its origins, was also a supranational issue but involved shared competence as new members were integrated and the development challenge became more dispersed. The third FPIA, concerning security, has remained a closely guarded intergovernmental

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policy area within the second pillar but is also in many respects linked to the third pillar. Economic Cooperation

By becoming a customs union in 1966, the EC emerged as a significant actor in global trade and the most effective proponent of trade liberalization while at the same time acting as a protectionist in several fields. This shows the importance in terms of actorness of a common instrument of external policy—a Europe speaking with one voice. This is certainly the case as far as goods are concerned, and the competence of the Commission has been questioned in some other types of issues linked to trade (such as services, investment, and intellectual property rights). As noted above, trade was the main concern for the EEC. The customs union’s primary remit was of course to stimulate intracommunity trade. This it did, although it is difficult to assess how effective it was in this as more countries became members and external trade became redefined as internal trade. The entry of the UK was of course particularly important here. The significance, over time, of the EU in global trade has equaled that of the United States, at present 20 percent of world trade in volume of goods.3 This of course gives the EU international presence, measured by international dependence on the EU market. To this presence should be added financial flows, direct investment, various kinds of economic and technical cooperation, and development aid. This worldwide presence, of particular importance in the South, is exploited by the Commission through its exclusive jurisdiction over trade relations and negotiations. There is thus no EU “trade council” composed of national trade ministers. Nor has the European Parliament any (formal) role in the Common Commercial Policy (CCP). The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) rests on very different (protectionist) principles and has now become gargantuan, swallowing a significant part of the Union’s financial resources used to support European agricultural production (in certain countries). The United States has retaliated with its own system of subsidies, driving down world prices and worsening the terms of trade for countries depending on agricultural exports. The external presence here is largely conflictive, but of course the scrapping of the CAP could be used in the bargaining process. Turning to the EMU, the relevant institution is no longer the Commission but the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN). Monetary regionalism has nevertheless become an external instrument of power, and the euro is of course also a very concrete and visible form of presence, even

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threatening the position of the dollar. Indeed, “the introduction of EMU and a single currency will in all likelihood constitute the most significant strengthening of the Union’s position as an economic actor since the development of the CCP” (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 73). Most foreign policy instruments—and the most effective—come from the economic field. But when they are used in other issue areas, such as security, there is a structural conflict between pillars, revealing a lack of coordination, coherence, and consistency. At the same time, the global trade regime, which the EU has been active in creating, has made the pyramid of privilege outdated, at least in its original form (see the next section). Instead the EU has established various kinds of agreements that span almost the entire globe, broadening the range of items covered. There has been a broad adoption of the neoliberal hegemonic regime in the world economy, thus diminishing the role of traditional neomercantilist and socialist values characterizing the “social capitalism” of Europe. The result of the 2005 referendum on the EU constitution in France can be interpreted as a defense of these values against the “Anglo-Saxon” form of capitalism. Development Cooperation

Historically, Europe is largely responsible for having shaped the world system, through its colonial empires. Decolonization occurred in two waves: nineteenth-century Latin America and twentieth-century Asia and Africa. At the time of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 this process of decolonization was still ongoing, and it was, above all, the colonial relations of France that constituted the origin of the EU’s development policy. Former colonial powers (including the UK) still saw the world through an imperial lens, countered by the United States and above all the UN. In 1963, when most of Africa had become independent, reciprocal preferential trade access between EEC member states and associated states (former colonies) was established through the Yaoundé Convention, which also formed the European Development Fund (EDF). The arrangements continued in the Lomé system, first established in 1976. This complex postcolonial structure and legacy became a worldwide network of interstate relations, continuously in transformation owing to changes in the size of the EU, the number of developing countries in the network, the changing global political economy, and shifts of dominant economic ideology (or development paradigm). As demonstrated in Part 3 of this book, concerning development

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cooperation, the EU is a large actor in development and its actorness changes over time, as do the various arenas in which EU presence is felt. The number of policy areas in which the EU is concerned constantly increases, and these policy areas have a reciprocal impact on each other (trade, aid, security). The EU harbors an ambition to coordinate these areas, to create coherence and consistency. The development cooperation policy is one of the oldest within the EC/EU and has thus seen more marked change than other policy areas. The change in this policy area exemplifies the dialectic between internal integration and external action. The successive enlargements in EU membership have had a number of implications for development policy. For instance, the UK brought with it its set of Commonwealth relations, and Portugal and Spain entered with a strong interest in Latin America. The eastern enlargement implied another internal “North-South” dimension (the first came with Greece), involving a reallocation of resources creating a new pyramid of preferences. To the extent that former Eastern Europe has any significant third world contacts, these are confined to countries that were close to the former Soviet bloc (such as Vietnam). In terms of development ideologies, there has been an evolution from “associationism” (1960s) toward an increasingly radicalized Lomé system (1980s), to a more neoliberal approach (post-Lomé) (see, for example, Chapter 4). The EU’s relations with the ACP group of countries are rooted in colonial and neocolonial relations, which are now described in more symmetric terms as “partnerships,” for instance in the Cotonou Agreement (June 2000). The background to this evolution is the gradual abandoning of the “pyramid of preference” implied in the Yaoundé and Lomé frameworks that, since the mid-1960s, defined the relationship between the EU and peripheral regions, originally selectively favored in accordance with former colonial interests. Over the years the ACP countries have been marginalized in the European-led interregional system, but it is interesting that these countries have made efforts to act as a collective unit, whereas the EU makes efforts to regionalize and differentiate the group based on two principles: the first based on territorial criteria and the other on developmental criteria (least developed countries [LDCs], landlocked countries, island countries, and so on). On the whole the postcolonial world has been marginalized, and the “pyramid of preference” has shifted to the benefit of the “near abroad.” An additional factor is the fact that the meaning of development has not remained static from Yaoundé to Cotonou, coinciding with the slow process of dissolution of the North-South system. The key concept today is “global development,” often defined to imply “good governance,”

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human rights, and democracy as well as conditionalities. Order seems more important than justice. The poverty issue remains in the EU’s rhetoric, however, which states its mission as helping to reduce and ultimately to eradicate poverty in the developing countries and promoting sustainable development, democracy, peace, and security. The nature of the European external relations approach can be seen in the role that development policy plays, or is supposed to play, in the overall foreign policy arrangement according to the European Consensus on Development (European Union 2005). The main objective is said to be eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Poverty is defined as multidimensional, which places combating poverty on the same priority level as development. Development is closely linked to security, and for this reason conflict prevention is another prominent objective. Coherence (between global development objectives) and consistency (between various European actors) are therefore seen as essential. Furthermore, the EU expresses a strong commitment to “effective multilateralism.” Regional integration is seen as an important, if not necessary, means of development. Multilateralism is seen as consistent with interregionalism, which is the European contribution to world order. Security and Conflict Management

Regional integration has become the main approach to conflict management in Europe. Interstate conflicts appear to have been consigned to history, in a continent that has been transformed through regional cooperation from a security complex, largely defined by historical tension and war-prone conflict between Germany and France, into a security community, where war is no longer an option in resolving conflicts. This process took shape in a postwar environment under superpower influence. There remain some old and new instances of intrastate conflicts, representing mixtures of different forms of political rationality (preWestphalian, Westphalian, and post-Westphalian) and different types of conflict: the Basque and Catalonia provinces in Spain, Italy’s northsouth problem, the Ulster conflict, the Wallonia-Flemish conflict in Belgium, the recent devolution of power from Westminster to Scotland and Wales, the breakup of Czechoslovakia, the Magyar diaspora, the breakup of and civil wars in former Yugoslavia, gang wars in Europe’s great cities, neofascist violence against immigrants, and fundamentalist sectarianism. Thus there remain many security problems in and around

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Europe. Apart from this area, the EU is also taking on responsibility for conflict management in the Global South. The regional approach to conflict management contains various dimensions. The existence of the EU in itself has an indirect effect on the pattern of conflict. The goal of ascending to serious candidacy on the waiting list for EU membership constitutes a strong incentive for hopeful states to keep potential intrastate and interstate conflicts to a minimum, since internal disorder would imply exclusion from “Europe,” in spite of being part of the European security complex. The very existence of the EU makes it unlikely that conflicts close to the core could be permitted to escalate. The European approach to security is often described as a postmodern, post-Westphalian approach of civilian or soft power, rather than the conventional view of power as based on military strength and capacity with the purpose of defending national sovereignty. Europe is not threatened by conventional security risks but by internal disintegration and societal security risks—the risk society. There is now a European Security Strategy (ESS) that states: “large scale aggression against any member state is now improbable. Instead Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable” (European Council 2003: 3). The key threats mentioned are terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. Several of these are linked, although belonging to different pillars, and they together constitute a “radical threat.” Furthermore the document states that the EU should be ready to act before a crisis occurs: “Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.” The EU claims to be well equipped to respond to such multifaceted situations (European Council 2003: 7). Europe’s approach to conflict management is of course influenced by the nature of different FPRs. According to the ESS discussed above, “Even in an era of globalization, geography is still important” (European Council 2003: 7). The neighborhood therefore plays a central role in the EU’s security strategy (Charillon 2004). Owing to securitization of the development issue, an increasing portion of development aid is redirected from the Global South to the neighborhood region. The frontier between “Europe,” as organized by the EU, and surrounding areas is unclear and problematic; as countries within some of these areas become new members or applicants, others are defined (through a political discourse) as being “non-Europe” (but nevertheless “near abroad”). There is no consensus behind these labels. The area of this contentious space is large and includes much of the post-Soviet

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space, Eastern and Central Europe, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean nonmembers. The general method involved in the foreign policy toward the “near abroad” is a soft form of imperialism (asymmetric partnership) based on conditionalities, the prize ranging from development assistance over association agreements to full membership (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005). The success story is the transformation and integration of Central and Eastern Europe, which in fact implied a large number of resolved and prevented conflicts. But this success is related to “potential Europe” rather than an internal European success story. A distinction must therefore be made between integration and stabilization. For countries excluded from potential membership the policy of stabilization constitutes a de facto and rather weak form of influence, particularly as the resource issue becomes more problematic. Thus, actorness shifts from one context to another, and a stabilization policy can shift to association and, in some cases still, integration. For the real South, especially Africa, the relative weight of Europe—its presence—is formidable. The question is whether these experiences and realities will make Europe a more efficient security actor in out-of-area operations in the Global South. Recent geopolitical changes have enforced one particular world order alternative: a US-driven project to change the world in accordance with its perceived “national interest.” This project would be incompatible with regionalism and interregionalism, pursued above all by the EU, and increasingly supported by other regions as well. To understand the future world order is thus to consider the relative strength of these two competing world order projects. This is not a question of power balance in the traditional Westphalian sense. Both projects go beyond power balance and aim to restructure the world in accordance with a certain set of values. They are transformative but rest on incompatible principles: neoimperialism and “hard” power of the remaining superpower versus interregionalism and “soft,” “civilian,” or normative power of the European regional formation.

Conclusion

At present Europe’s performance as a global actor is not particularly impressive. Its presence is of course still important, but the other dimensions of actorship—regionness and actorness—are in decline. Since the negative referenda in 2005 on the proposed European constitution, the European integration process has been in deep crisis. In 2007 the EU

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members agreed to make a new effort in line with the tradition of growing through crises. The internal weakening will nevertheless impact on Europe as a global actor, since the two processes of internal integration and external influence are strongly entwined. The Union has lost momentum, as far as purposeful regional integration is concerned. At the same time various problems, which need to be managed jointly, continue to accumulate: security, environment, refugee migration, and economic recession. The fundamental problem is that the EU institutions were originally designed around a limited number of countries, in a different age and with a different purpose. The project grew out of the context of Cold War and a transatlantic alliance and was intended to create a coherent and homogeneous capitalist core out of the competing great powers of Europe. The process of deepening is now lagging far behind enlargement, threatening all dimensions of actorship. The EU is, in terms of regionness, thus far the only example of an institutionalized regional polity—at present hovering between intergovernmentalism and supranational governance—but with an uncertain future, due to a new wave of euroskepticism and the decreased coherence and consistency following the inflow of new members. Regime convergence has preceded the formal integration process, since only democratic, market-oriented polities can merge with the European polity. The adaptation to a political order, compatible with European values, has been and to some extent continues to be a major source of change in greater Europe. The EU has dealt with the external world in a different manner than that of an ordinary great power driven by geopolitical interests. This is because the civilian power employed in the EU’s own region building is also being projected in its external relations as the preferred world order model (Linklater 2005; Telò 2006). Some would call this a kind of imperialism—“soft imperialism” (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005: 535). It is clear that the policies have failed to instill confidence in the partners, whether Arab, Indian, Latin American, African, or otherwise. The outcome is, in spite of all contradictions, a pattern of global governance with its own distinctive characteristics and with the potential of becoming a world order characterized by a horizontal, institutionalized, multipolar structure of regions cooperating in a spirit of multilateralism. Such a regionalized, multilateral world order could be called “multiregionalism.” The question is to what extent this potential is realized by today’s European politicians and other decisionmakers as well as by the skeptical European public. This is a question of future European regionness and actorness, and in case of decline even presence can be turned into a vacuum.

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Returning to the four preconditions of actorness discussed in the first section, the conclusion must be drawn that actorness, at present, is not expanding. The enlargement to twenty-seven countries represents, by itself, a loss of actorness, particularly as the new eastern members tend to sympathize more with US positions than with “old” Europe. Regime convergence cannot be taken for granted. Divergence between various regimes and thus a dilution of the European mainstream are a distinct possibility. Many Europeans feel uneasy about the direction in which the EU is heading. A positive view in relation to this might also, however, interpret the explicit criticism emerging from below as the first step toward a European public debate on European issues, which is necessary for reasons of credibility and legitimacy, with implications also for external impact. It has been mentioned here that most of the FPRs contain strong elements of “South” dimensions: fighting poverty, promoting human rights, stabilization, and intervention in acute conflicts. The connections among the three issue areas—trade, development, and security— have also been emphasized. Enlargement and neighborhood policies are both driven by the need for stabilization in the EU’s border areas. The purpose of bilateralism is global stability. Interregionalism, by definition covering various issue areas, is a consequence of the EU’s policy of creating and relating to regions as the preferred counterparts in the Global South. The EU has again reached a point of crisis, at which the components of actorship are showing decline. This chapter suggests that changes in the endogenous preconditions (regionness) affect the exogenous preconditions (presence and actorness), and together they form either a negative or positive spiral. The question is whether the current negative spiral can be broken. The fact that the EU retains a strong presence suggests that the political crisis will be overcome. But in reality this presence varies significantly across the various regions discussed in this book.

Notes 1. The kind of foreign policy carried out by the EU, through the multidimensional machinery of the FPC, has been termed “structural” by Mario Telò (2006: 228). This policy (1) is concerned with long-term gains, (2) tries to modify the basic structural conditions in which all actors operate, (3) aims to influence the ideas and behavior of the partners, and (4) is implemented through peaceful and civilian means. The concept of structural foreign policy is a prod-

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uct of the liberal, institutionalist, constructivist, and normative critique of neorealist theory and the anarchy model of international relations. It expresses a post-Westphalian logic. 2. The ENP encompasses Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, and the Palestinian Authority. With regard to the Mediterranean, the ENP builds on the Barcelona process and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership from 1995. Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm.htm (accessed March 31, 2008). 3. See the European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, website. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/index_en.htm (accessed May 31, 2008).

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3 EU Policies Toward the Global South Sven Grimm

T

he capacities of the European Union (EU) for acting on the global stage have developed over the past decades, albeit unevenly and with some setbacks. Methods of policy formulation have differed across policy areas. Although foreign policy remains a largely intergovernmental area, development policy should be complementary with member states’ policies; both therefore require a high degree of coordination. Other policy areas that are critical for relations with Africa, such as trade, fisheries, and agricultural policy, are largely communitized—actors interact directly with the Commission or Brussels-based committees. Thus, which area drives EU relations with a particular region depends upon both the specific challenges for the EU in the region and the power play in Brussels among different sets of actors in different policy areas as well as on the interaction between different policy areas. Given this uneven landscape, coherent European external relations pose a significant challenge (Hill and Smith 2005a), and Europe’s actorness varies. Despite the prevailing fragmentation of competences, European coordination has improved, mostly at the level of policy clarification but also with regard to implementation; its actorness has thus overall been strengthened. A degree of dynamism can be discerned, not least in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), whose High Representative Javier Solana was appointed in 1999, and notwithstanding the CFSP’s unfinished business in many spheres, such as the European constitution, and its recent cumbersome internal negotiations, mostly on overall financial planning for the years 2007 to 2013. The main thrust of reform since 2000 has been in relation to high-level policy documents, streamlining principles, and objectives in policy areas. 43

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Excellent examples are the development policy statement (2000, revised in 2005) and the European Security Strategy (ESS) (2003). Both of these important high-level policies on development and security have implications for major policies in the area of interregional relations and thus for existing regional agreements and cooperation programs. Regional agreements or consultation processes are usually substantiated by “packages” of policy measures. EU relations with the South can thus only be understood when at least three main elements of its external relations (trade, aid, and foreign policy) are considered and their different modes of operation are kept in mind. In addition, on a more practical policy level, questions of policy implementation are addressed in both Brussels and partner countries. Some examples include the creation of a European aid implementation agency, EuropeAid, in 2001, devolution (“deconcentration”) of decisionmaking to delegations in partner countries (2003), and the establishment of country and regional strategy papers for both CFSP and development cooperation since the inception of reforms. Although much of the dynamic plays out in Brussels and “on the ground” in partner countries, interregional relations still prevail, however, possibly less prominently than in the 1980s and 1990s (Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger 2005). Agreements signed by the EU with regional bodies represent the legal basis of most interactions. The EU’s regional programs—incrementally grown in a specific historical context—often do not correspond with boundaries of regional organizations, however, and are instead designed according to EU interests (for example, the Asia-Europe Meeting [ASEM]; see Chapter 6). These programs therefore often reflect asymmetrical interregionalism. Cooperation with some organizations—such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) (see Chapters 5 and 6) or subregional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—is consistent with broader regional programs and region-to-region cooperation. At times, overlapping regional agreements have been concluded, however, which can be at odds with existing programs. This is most obvious in Africa, where developments since 2001 have created new regional bodies, such as the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The EU does not have tailor-made continental answers to these new dynamics within the framework of its existing instruments. In 2005 the Union formulated a regional strategy for Africa that evolved into a joint Africa-EU strategy, aiming at greater coherence across regional programs and across policy areas (Grimm and Kielwein 2005; Chapter 7 by Fredrik Söderbaum and Patrik Stålgren).

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This chapter predominantly focuses on more recent changes and dynamics in the EU’s relationship with developing countries in the three policy areas emphasized in this book: economic cooperation (trade), development cooperation (aid), and foreign policy (security). The historical background in the relationship will not be explored in depth; this can be found in the respective chapters of this book and elsewhere (Hill and Smith 2005a; Grimm and Woll 2004; Grimm 2003; Holland 2002; Nuttall 2000; Grilli 1993).

Economic Cooperation: The EU’s Trade Relations

Trade certainly is a key dimension of the EU’s external relations; regional economic integration (including trade) is, after all, one of the central tasks of the Union. The EU is one of the world’s largest trading blocs. In the mid-2000s it accounted for about 20 percent of world trade and is consequently an important import and export market for developing countries. In 2003, EU trade with ASEAN accounted for 5.8 percent of total EU trade, and 14 percent of ASEAN trade took place with the EU. In a similar fashion, EU trade with Mercosur accounted for 2.3 percent of EU trade in 2004, and the EU received 23 percent of all Mercosur trade.1 Even though the EU is an important global trade partner, its significance is in decline. Parallel with the rise of some developing countries, not least East and Southeast Asia, the EU has, since the 1980s, steadily been losing share of world trade. In contrast with dynamic developments elsewhere, exports from former European colonies in the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states to the EU have, in absolute figures, stagnated since the 1980s. The ACP states have not only reduced their trading volume with the EU, but have in fact become increasingly marginal in world trade overall. Clearly, given its market size, any EU action (or inaction) in the area of trade will have consequences for developing countries’ trade and will have repercussions for other policy areas, not the least for foreign policy, if it cannot meet the expectations of partners (Ginsberg 1989). Trade as the Core of the EU’s Interaction with the South

From the institutional point of view, trade is of particular importance, as it is one of the policy areas in which the EU is truly “speaking with one voice”; the EU’s Commissioner for Trade is also the institution’s

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spokesperson in international negotiations. The Commissioner for Trade’s mandate for negotiations is formulated by member states and closely followed up in the so-called Article 133 Committee (named after the EU treaty article providing for it). Given its overall importance for European economies, trade is a crucial instrument of the EU’s external relations and has at times been used to foster “soft issues” such as human rights, although not consistently. In 2000 the EU declared trade as one of the six priority areas for European Community (EC) development cooperation, and it is engaging in the Doha Development Round of trade talks. The EU is not without self-interest in these negotiations: “Doha has also to secure better access for European suppliers of goods and services in a world where new markets are growing at a speed no one would have anticipated ten years ago” (Mandelson 2005a). In some regions and countries, EU trade interests are increasing. Particularly striking is the inevitable rise of China in world trade, which is also reflected in EU trade statistics: China has become the third-biggest trading partner of the EU, after the United States and Japan, accounting for 3 percent of all EU imports (Mandelson 2005a). The use of trade for “soft” foreign policy goals (for example, sanctions in relation to human rights concern) has consequently come under pressure in a number of cases. In 2005, for instance, the EU argued internally over arms trade with China. In respect to sanctions related to concerns about democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—mostly applied throughout the 1990s—these were overwhelmingly exercised against smaller ACP states rather than against economically thriving Asian countries (Holland 2002). The EU has more recently demonstrated a tendency to move away from trade sanctions and instead to impose more specific “targeted sanctions” such as travel bans, in cases of gross human rights violations. The EU’s concern for its own trade position and its concern for the development of other regions must not be necessarily mutually exclusive and might in fact well be complementary. Yet, the question is, can the EU use trade as an instrument for development, and if so, how does it use this instrument? In some regions outside Asia, trade is increasingly recommended as a “tool for development.” The EU treaty provides for “smooth and gradual integration of developing countries into the world economy” as one of the goals of EU development cooperation. With regard to Africa, for instance, it must be acknowledged that most producers are not competitive. Historically, the EU has granted nonreciprocal preferences to former colonies, without a significant effect on growth in trade, as outlined above. The theory in play here was that

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opening up the markets of former colonial states should liberate productive forces and create conditions for improved competitiveness. The EU emphasizes the combination of trade and development in a “rules-based, multilateral system” (Mandelson 2005b). Following the assumptions underlying this theory, asymmetric sequencing of opening up African markets would be crucial. The EU’s trade relations in general are changing, and a number of new agreements have created a web of trade relationships with different degrees of preferential treatment. Once described as a “pyramid of preferences,” with the ACP states traditionally having the best conditions for market access to the EU, Europe’s trade regime with the world now resembles more of a patchwork blanket (Gillson and Grimm 2004). Economic Partnership Agreements as Tools for Development and Regional Integration Elsewhere?

The EU’s traditional one-sided trade preferences for products from the ACP states do not differentiate between levels of development but are instead based on regional agreements. They are thus not granted based on a certain level of development being reached and are therefore considered to be incompatible with the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), established in 1995. A “waiver” allowed for the nonreciprocal regime to be continued until 2008; the EU did not seek a renewal of this exception, however. The trade regime with the ACP states must therefore be renegotiated, based on the provisions for Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), as stated in the Cotonou Agreement of 2000. EPAs would have the advantage of consisting of contractual provisions rather than the current nonreciprocal EU concessions. They additionally have the potential to cover trade in services, which might be particularly beneficial for some of the more advanced ACP states, particularly the Caribbean, which is shown by the fact that the EU signed the first full EPA with CARIFORUM in 2008. The other EPA groups are still being negotiated and it is not yet possible to predict exactly what form EPAs will take or what impact they will have on partner countries (Stevens and Kennan 2005; Grimm and Brüntrup 2006). In 2001, the EU granted tariff- and quota-free market access to all products produced by the least developed countries (LDCs) under the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative. Exempted from this initiative for a limited period are bananas, rice, and sugar. This initiative granted, for the first time, preference to states based on income group. It thereby cut across existing regional programs. In practice, both the blanket approach

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for the heterogeneous group of LDCs and other trade barriers, such as strict rules of origin and technical and sanitary standards, cast doubts on the value of this market access (Page and Hewitt 2002). In addition, changes in the trade regime for protected goods—for example, with preferential market access for some ACP countries—will create winners and losers among developing countries and among different types of producers within these countries (for the case of sugar, see Gillson, Page, and Hewitt 2005; Brüntrup 2005). It remains to be seen whether EPAs generate more favorable conditions for the LDCs regarding rules of origin, nontariff trade barriers, and trade in services. The EU has, since 2003, conducted negotiations with four regional blocs in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, with a view to strengthening regional integration. The aspiration is to foster the creation of regional blocks as partners for interregional agreements. The negotiating groups do not necessarily correspond with existing regional organizations, however. As a result of overlapping membership of African regional organizations, EPAs also affect non-ACP countries with which the EU has existing separate trade agreements. This is the situation, for instance, for the group of countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The SADC includes the Republic of South Africa, which has special trade and aid conditions with the EU. The negotiation group ESA (Eastern and Southern Africa) overlaps with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the latter including Egypt—a non-ACP country. EPAs therefore present both opportunities and risks, particularly for LDCs. Alternatives to EPAs, such as relying on Everything But Arms, would hinder regional integration among developing countries, as regional groups comprise both LDCs and non-LDCs, and trade with the EU would thus differentiate between members of the same regional grouping. This would undermine attempts to formulate a common trade regime for regions. In order to enable developing countries to progressively open up their markets to competition and to create incentives for WTO-compatible agreements, trade-related assistance has entered the debate and thereby created an explicit link to funds for development aid (Mandelson 2005b).

Development Cooperation

Since its foundation, the EU (then the European Economic Community [EEC]) has maintained relations with former colonies of its member

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states. These relations, however, were deliberately maintained under the auspices of intergovernmental negotiations. The Commission’s role was, for a long period, quite limited. It was only with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 that the Community/Union was explicitly ascribed competences in development cooperation and foreign policy. The treaty outlines fundamental guidelines and names several (potentially competing) goals for development cooperation. Mismanagement of quickly growing funds in the 1990s resulted in the commencement, in 1999, of an overall reform of the system. In 2000, the Council of Ministers and the Commission formulated for the first time the principles and objectives for the Commission’s development policy in a joint statement (European Union 2000) that prioritized poverty reduction in development policy. This document was assessed and revised in 2005 (European Union 2005). Following a Commission proposal, the EU’s development policy statement since November 2005 has adopted a “European consensus” position, which was agreed upon by the Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament. It is formulated for different levels of development policy and explicitly includes member states’ bilateral assistance in its section on principles and guidelines. As a political strategy, rather than legislation, the policy statement does not replace regional programs. Rather, it outlines guidance in the field of development policy, which is a shared competency of EU member states and the European Commission. This high-level document is important for the EU’s development policy, as a number of new member states are presently engaged in the process of formulating their development policies—a requirement of the EU accession, since development policy was part of the acquis communautaire (the accumulated body of law of the EU). At the same time, the European Consensus on Development of 2005 provides a reference point in the absence of the approval of the Constitutional Treaty, which was rejected by the electorates of France and the Netherlands in May and June 2005, respectively, and which is—after a reincarnation as the Lisbon Reform Treaty—still in limbo after rejection in an Irish referendum in mid-2008. The constitutional provisions concerning development are largely consistent with the current Treaty of Nice; development cooperation should remain a complementary task of the Commission rather than replacing bilateral cooperation of member states. The constitution envisages slightly rectifying some ambivalences, however; for example, by putting poverty reduction at the center of EU development cooperation instead of having it as one competing goal among others

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(see the EU Constitution, Article III-193, and Article III-218). The European Consensus therefore remains the paramount reference document beyond the regional programs, clarifying and expanding on provisions of Articles 177 to 180 of the EC treaty (development cooperation) in its Nice manifestation. It is interesting to note that the EU and Africa in December 2007 agreed on a joint strategy that is meant to be key for a strategic partnership between the EU and the African Union. The joint Africa-EU action plan foresees eight areas of partnership—from governance over trade, energy, and climate change to cooperation in science and technology— that make for a more symmetric partnership between two regional bodies than previous asymmetric interregionalism between the EU and the group of the ACP. Other interregional strategies have been formulated for the Caribbean and the Pacific regions. Financing for Development

The EU (including both member states and the Commission) provided more than half (55 percent) of the world’s official development assistance (ODA) in 2004—€34.3 billion, two-thirds of which was given in the form of grants. Besides the twenty-five member states’ bilateral ODA, about a fifth of all European development aid (€6.9 billion in 2004) was channeled through the European Commission (European Union 2005). The European Consensus on Development of November 2005 reconfirmed the EU’s commitment to increasing finance for development assistance, made in May 2005 when the member states agreed on a plan for the eventual de facto doubling of their ODA. The “old” member states undertook to set aside 0.51 percent of their respective gross domestic products (GDPs) for ODA by 2010 and 0.7 percent by 2015. In 2006 the ODA ratio in the EU averaged 0.41 percent, with only Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg reaching the UN target of 0.7 percent. Targets for the “new” EU member states are 0.17 percent by 2010 and 0.33 percent by 2015; most currently provide around 0.1 percent of their respective GDPs toward ODA via their still-nascent bilateral ODA programs. Given the tight budgetary situation in many member states, and the rapid pace of expansion that the achievement of these targets would require from many of them (see Table 3.1), this collective target is a substantial challenge, and we have already seen a dip in the aid increase since 2005. Some member states intend to meet their commitments with new financing mechanisms, such as taxes on airfares,

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Table 3.1 Net ODA 2004 and 2005 (US$ million, as reported to DAC)

Country EU-15 France UK Germany Netherlands Sweden Italy Spain Denmark Belgium Portugal Austria Finland Ireland Greece Luxembourg EU-10 Poland Czech Republic Hungary Slovenia Slovak Republic Malta Lithuania Latvia Estonia Cyprus

Net ODA 2004 (% GNI)

Net ODA 2005 (% GNI)

8,473 (0.41) 7,883 (0.36) 7,534 (0.28) 4,204 (0.73) 2,722 (0.78) 2,462 (0.15) 2,437 (0.24) 2,037 (0.85) 1,463 (0.41) 1,031 (0.63) 678 (0.23) 655 (0.35) 607 (0.39) 465 (0.23) 236 (0.83)

10,026 (0.47) 10,767 (0.47) 10,082 (0.36) 5,115 (0.82) 3,362 (0.94) 5,091 (0.29) 3,018 (0.27) 2,109 (0.81) 1,963 (0.53) 377 (0.21) 1,573 (0.52) 902 (0.46) 719 (0.42) 384 (0.17) 256 (0.84)

118 (0.05) 108 (0.11) 55 (0.06) 31 (0.10) 28 (0.07) 10 (0.18) 9 (0.04) 8 (0.06) 5 (0.05) 5 (0.04)

205 (0.07) 135 (0.11) 100 (0.11) a

56 (0.12) a a a a a

Source: Mürle 2007: 8. Notes: a. The order of 2004 is used because 2005 data are not available for all countries. The DAC points out that the strong increases in 2005 are for many countries an effect of exceptionally high debt relief. ODA = official development assistance; DAC = Development Assistance Committee; GNI = gross national income.

such as those introduced by France on January 1, 2006. Half of this additional ODA is to be spent on sub-Saharan Africa. Geographical Distribution of EU Development Funding

The assistance administered by the Commission covers a broad geographical range (140 countries) and thus potentially includes all developing and middle-income countries. The geographical distribution of Community-administered aid has changed markedly after the end of the

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Cold War, since European policy shifted its attention toward “neighbors” in the East and South. European developing countries (such as Serbia-Montenegro, Moldova, Albania, and so on), Northern Africa, and the Middle East received an increasing share of EC ODA (from around 9 percent in the early 1980s to almost 17 percent in 2004) while the share received by Africa decreased (from around 60 percent in the early 1980s to approximately 40 percent in 2004) (Table 3.1). There are indications, however, of a reversal of this decline in Africa’s ODA share. With an ODA share of about 50 percent, the EU is the largest donor in sub-Saharan Africa (including the member states’ bilateral programs). Community ODA for the ACP countries is primarily financed by the European Development Fund (EDF), established in 1958. The EDF is renegotiated every five years and replenished by members’ contributions. In contrast, cooperation with the other developing countries, including those of North Africa, is financed from the EU budget, the contributions to which are calculated on the basis of member states’ populations and their respective economies. If the EDF were budgetized, some EU states (such as the UK, Germany, and Spain) would be required to make higher contributions than their current EDF commitments, whereas others (such as France, Denmark, and Sweden) are contributing more than their economic weight would suggest. The Commission’s draft Financial Perspectives for 2007–2013 in fact proposed to integrate the next EDF into the EU budget (“budgetization” of the EDF). This would have increased political transparency on the EU side and would have implied a larger role for the European Parliament. It was not pursued further, however, for lack of political will in a number of member states. Budgetization could have meant abandoning the special position enjoyed by the ACP countries, which participate to some degree in the planning of the EDF and have a planning period of five years rather than annual funding periods. Some states prefer that the EDF remain separately funded, as it predominantly serves cooperation with Africa’s poor countries. These states have argued that inclusion of the EDF in the budget would increase the danger of further eroding Africa’s shares in European ODA, as funds would be at risk of being “raided” for new geographical priority areas. Aid Instruments and Effectiveness

There are very few case studies of “successful” development aid (where graduation from ODA could be taken as an indicator of success); most Asian success stories were never large development aid recipients,

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whereas most of sub-Saharan Africa remains mired in a high degree of aid dependency. Contemporary issues under discussion are the choice of development partners, the channels through which aid should be disbursed, and governance in Africa. Governance looks into internal management of development processes, with resource-rich countries and in particular the management of their resources an obvious focus. High oil prices and other commodity prices (such as copper) in 2005—influenced at least in part by burgeoning Chinese demand—provided a number of African commodity producers with additional windfall revenue, which could be used as additional funding for poverty reduction measures (Warner 2005) or to address inequality in those societies. This kind of discussion relates to debates on the overall level of ODA and the assumed need for general increases in distributed funds. One country’s gains may also represent another’s losses, however. For non-oil-producing developing countries, high oil prices imposed an additional burden on their development. Given this uneven and highly fragile economic situation, debates in development cooperation continue to focus on allocation criteria of aid, its effectiveness, and modalities of aid disbursement. Commission-administered funds are no exception in this context. In addition, new interest in Africa from other international actors—China in particular, which has overtaken the UK as a trade partner with Africa—marks a new challenge to the EU’s actorness on this continent (Fues, Grimm, and Laufer 2006). A particular historical problem for EU development funding was the slow speed of disbursement of funds, although this has improved since the early 2000s.2 The modalities of aid—that is, the way aid is disbursed—have also come under discussion. Some authors claim that aid structures established by donors parallel to developing countries’ institutions have undermined capacities in aid-receiving countries (van de Walle 2005; Bräutigam and Knack 2004). Concerns about the speed of disbursement and the impact of parallel donor structures on the existing capacities of developing countries could be seen as reasons for the rapid expansion of budget support by the EU to developing countries—that is, aid channeled through the state budgets of recipient countries. Within the ACP group, 30 percent of funding was given as budget support in 2004, up from 7.9 percent in 1999 (European Commission 2004b), and the declared target for Africa is 50 percent of aid given as budget support. Despite recently conducted large-scale evaluations, however, there remains an absence of conclusive evidence about whether this mode of aid delivery, through partner countries’ budgets, improves the development performance (Schmidt 2005).

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Debates are ongoing about required minimum standards for this form of aid intervention. Despite the fact that it enhances “ownership” of development in partner countries, guarantees are sought against the misuse of funding, and conditions are attached to the switch to aid being channeled through country systems (Schmidt 2005). The discussion about negative conditionality in development assistance in the form of sanctions has not been particularly prominent in the 2000s; it has instead focused on rewarding “good performers.” The Commission appears to be driving discussions on budgetary support toward more difficult environments, however, such as states labeled “fragile” (Grimm and Kielwein 2005). The fragmented responsibilities within the EU are an obvious disadvantage in its interactions with the outside world. Fragmented actions potentially hinder effectiveness, particularly in countries with weak institutions (which, for example, render their coordination of donors ineffective), in large or economically stronger partner countries (which may be unwilling to accept donors’ standards), and where alternatives present themselves with seemingly fewer political demands attached to aid. Coordination of aid-related departments is important at every level, starting with member states’ administrations. At the national level, too, coherence must be achieved among foreign, development, trade, migration, and other policies. At the European level, however, there are additional difficulties. First, the distribution of powers between the Commission and the member states varies from one European policy area to another. For example, although the Commission speaks for member states in the area of trade policy, in “shared competences” such as development cooperation the Commission should take action that complements the programs of the twenty-seven member states. The second difficulty consists in the geographical division of responsibilities for external relations within the Commission, particularly with respect to Africa. Responsibilities toward the continent of Africa are divided by policy and geographically—the geographical divide distinguishing North Africa and Africa south of the Sahara. So administration of one policy issue (aid) must be coordinated between different entities: EU Development Commissioner Karel de Gucht is responsible for development cooperation with subSaharan Africa, whereas North Africa is EU Foreign Affairs Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner’s responsibility. The average income levels of recipient countries of EC ODA tend to be higher than the average for beneficiaries of EU member states’ cooperation programs. In 2002, low-income countries accounted for 37 per-

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cent of all disbursed aid, lower-middle-income countries received 38 percent of all EC aid, and 9 percent of aid went to upper-middle-income countries3 (Grimm 2004a; Berlin and Resare 2005). EU enlargement is likely to further impact aid allocation to middle-income countries, as new EU member states have links to their eastern neighbors. The relatively high levels of aid to European and Mediterranean countries—not among the world’s poorest nations—cannot be explained by an emphasis on poverty reduction but are rather a function of foreign policy interest in neighboring regions. The potential for institutional controversies therefore also stretches across European institutions, since foreign policy largely remains the remit of member states. Javier Solana, the High Representative of the CFSP, is responsible for coordination in this field—the formulation of common interests by member states relies on the persuasiveness of his personal authority.

Foreign and Security Policy

European foreign and security policy is the area of European external relations that has witnessed the most dynamic development in recent years. This is, at first glance, surprising, since European CFSP is driven by the intergovernmental mode of decisionmaking and thus requires high degrees of agreement among member states. This consequently creates a serious risk of coordination lapses, as the Iraq War of 2003 illustrated. Despite this disagreement—or rather because of the previous political disaster (Toje 2005)—the EU countries, in December 2003, adopted a common ESS under the ambitious title “A Secure Europe in a Better World” (European Council 2003). Toje (2005) rightly points out that the document falls short of any requirement for a “strategy”: it neither prioritizes goals, attributes instruments, nor defines conditions of their use in order to achieve goals. European Security Strategy as a Reaction

The ESS states the EU’s intentions and discusses the EU’s understanding of what constitutes security, in reaction to, and in implicit delineation of, the US national security strategy of 2002. Threats identified by the ESS include terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime (European Council 2003). The ESS is thus broader than the US national security strategy. It does not replace self-interest with altruistic policy.

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Yet, it puts security into the larger context of concern about human needs: In much of the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns. . . . In many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict. Security is a precondition of development. . . . A world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union and its citizens. (European Council 2003: 2, 10)

The notion of “human security”—in contrast to security of states— deliberately blurs the focus of the term security and offers some bridges between development and security. This corresponds with the ideas inherent in a “responsibility to protect,” as Kofi Annan refers to the concept in his report In Larger Freedom (Annan 2005: 2). It is a larger concept of security than that promoted by the United States in its concept of “homeland security.” Exploring this link between development and security was particularly high on the agenda of the Irish EU presidency in 2004. The tricky question remains, however, of how to coordinate different agendas with different time frames on the ground under this broad conceptual umbrella. Choices remain to be made about how close the coordination should be (Klingebiel and Roehder 2004). The most likely candidates for initiatives to operationalize the ESS are “failed” or “fragile” states, which have been identified as one of the challenges to security (European Council 2003). The election support provided in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in late 2006 was an example of one of these new interventions by European armed forces designed to address issues of conflict management. Although the phenomenon of states with limited control over their externally defined territory is not new, addressing problems by running military and development cooperation programs in parallel—rather than running strictly sequenced actions—is a relatively recent phenomenon. This development is partly explained by the fact that aid workers have increasingly become “soft targets” in armed conflicts when working “on conflict” (conflict management within country) rather than “around conflict” (conflict prevention—for example managing the effects of conflict on neighboring countries). The search for coherent action across portfolios is the common feature of a number of diverse exercises. Interventions in Somalia in the early 1990s were organized under the term humanitarian military intervention and resulted in failure. Meanwhile the short-term EU intervention in DRC’s Ituri province in 2004, which was of much more limited

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scope (see Chapter 11), and the election support given by EU troops in Kinshasa in late 2006 were considered successes. Some EU member states have tried various methods of cross-ministerial coordination in pursuing interventions in “failed states,” for example, the UK intervention in West African Sierra Leone or German operations in Afghanistan. This is contrary to US methodology, which has seen the United States insert integrated provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan, with US development experts who are under military command. Currently, the EU is strengthening its military capacities by establishing EU battle groups, providing for thirteen groups of 1,500 soldiers each, deployable within ten days for a minimum of thirty days within a radius of 3,730 miles. In additional, civilian crisis reaction units are to be established that will comprise experts in the areas of police, civilian administration, rule of law, and civilian protection. The relationship between these battle groups and their civilian counterparts to UN missions is not yet fully elaborated; the latter have not yet been mentioned in the ESS. The Role of Regional Organizations for Security

The ESS pivots on the creation of “effective multilateralism,” that is, on strengthening the UN and also simultaneously strengthening regional organizations such as the AU. With the latter, the EU signed a strategic partnership in December 2007 at the Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon. This provides a conceptual dovetailing of development and security policy within these institutions (Messner and Faust 2004): “Regional organisations also strengthen global governance. . . . Regional organisations such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union make an important contribution to a more orderly world” (European Council 2003: 9). Consequently, members of the EU and AU Commissions have held frequent meetings since March 2004 to discuss potential strategic partnerships between the two continental institutions. Various policy areas have been on the agenda, such as regional integration, the ongoing negotiations for EPAs between the EU and African regions, and cooperation on issues such as water, energy, and commodities. The cooperation between the EU and the AU also explicitly includes peace and security, primarily by providing funds via the EU’s African Peace Facility (APF), endowed with €250 million for three years and “replenished” in the tenth EDF with €300 million for three more years (2008–2010). 4 African countries agreed to dedicate 1.5 percent of the (unused) funds from the EDF to the APF. The major share of the funds (€200 million)

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was dedicated to African-led peacekeeping operations, conducted by the AU or subregional organizations with an AU mandate—for example, in the Sudanese province of Darfur. To date, missions have demonstrated little success, owing to severe capacity shortcomings of the AU observer mission and to inherent constraints of the mandate. The APF, however, attempts to build on more successful missions like those prosecuted by ECOWAS peace operations, such as those in Liberia since the mid1990s and in Guinea-Bissau in the early 2000s. Consequently, the EU conducts a regular dialogue with subregional organizations, such as ECOWAS and the Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD) in eastern Africa, mindful of the impact of regional institutions on conflict resolution and the Commission’s traditional focus on conflict prevention through regional cooperation. Other regional cooperation endeavors, such as the hybrid interregionalism with ASEM or even pure interregionalism with ASEAN, do not explicitly focus on security cooperation and, at first glance on a more parochial level, are predominantly geared toward trade and investment cooperation. They do, however, involve groupings of states that cultivate a traditional rivalry (see Chapter 6 by Mary Farrell in respect to Asia). Ultimately, the European Union itself is a project to provide security based on regional economic cooperation, thus creating interconnections and the “habit” of peaceful cooperation between rivals. The EU is, often implicitly, inclined to “export” this successful model based on its own experience to other regions (see Chapter 7 by Fredrik Söderbaum and Patrik Stålgren).

Conclusion

By default, trade will remain a dominant tool in the EU’s interaction with the South. The European Commission often points out that the EU is the most open market for developing countries’ produce, with free market access for LDCs and trade preferences established in a generalized system and in specific regional agreements. Yet a deeper analysis raises more detailed questions about the actual impact of these agreements—for example, with regard to rule of origin (particularly, which products qualify as being made in LDCs)—or the effects of technical or sanitary standards as trade barriers for producers from developing countries. Given its weight in international trade, the EU is key to many countries’ trade relations and to their strategies for increasing their national wealth, despite the emerging influences of other countries. At the same

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time, the EU’s trade policy is primarily focused on fostering the EU’s position in world trade. Member states do not always agree on the way forward in this endeavor, at times positioning themselves nearer to free trade and at other times (or rather in some sectors) closer to controlled market access, state subsidies, and restricted competition. Conflicts about these policy choices are thus structural and will therefore be ongoing. Yet the EU’s highly integrated institutional setup leaves it relatively well equipped to negotiate with the outside world. Once a mandate for negotiations has been agreed upon, the EU speaks with “one voice” and can assert its actorness. In development cooperation, the EU has established a multilevel system; arguably, the EU has developed less actorness in this policy area and has, instead, emphasized its presence. Development cooperation programs are conducted by all twenty-seven member states and by the European Commission. A complete communitarization of development cooperation is not politically desirable for many EU member states and would presumably be of questionable value for a number of developing countries. 5 Nevertheless, the high number of actors involved in European development cooperation creates enormous challenges for coordination. As much as “ownership” is promoted and “putting developing partners into the driver’s seat” is seen as a laudable rationale, the burden of implementing this rhetoric might be too much for the capacities of many developing countries and regional bodies if the responsibility falls squarely on their shoulders. Better donor coordination is thus donors’ primary responsibility. The EU has made recent progress on this issue, with aid administration reforms, increased emphasis on country strategies, and international commitments to increase aid and improve its delivery (for example, the Monterrey Conference of 2002, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, or the new EU Development Policy Statement of November 2005). The EU as a whole thus participates in the mainstream of development assistance debates at the level of policy formulation— particularly through emphasizing the UN Millennium Development Goals—and some member states and the Commission are leading in certain discussion areas, such as aid modalities. EU actorness in development policy is therefore increasing, albeit unevenly. Most dynamic institutional change, however, is to be found in the field of CFSP. In this policy area, the EU operates like a multilateral organization, under little to no influence from its supranational bodies (Commission, Parliament, and the Court of Justice), which are advocates of joint European interests. Policy in this realm will thus remain a

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compromise between sometimes opposing member states’ positions. Yet, the multilayered EU political system requires compromises in positions and should not therefore produce outcomes at either extreme end of the spectrum. The very fact that the EU discusses military options and has already conducted military operations (small scale to date) demonstrates some movement away from the stance of a politically neutral “trade bloc” with presence in the world toward a more self-assertive actor in global affairs. Paraphrasing the former EU Head of Delegation in Washington, Günther Burghardt: the hammer has become one instrument in the EU’s toolbox—but not every problem is a nail. The EU’s “founding myth” as a multilateral organization, however, leaves it prone to asserting strong characteristics of a “civilian power,” employing a broad range of instruments as an actor on the international stage (Toje 2005). The EU has increased its capacity in many policy areas. The most significant potential benefit of the EU, however, is arguably its ability to “package” policy instruments (Berlin and Resare 2005). This potential has not yet been fully developed, although steps have been taken in the direction of increased coherence, for example with the Africa strategy agreed upon in 2005 and even more so with the joint Africa-EU strategic partnership of 2007. This has at least two implications for the Commission. First, high-level policies cannot be detailed action plans, and therefore much debate (and resources) will need to be expended on policy formulation. Second, some epistemic communities (for example, around trade, development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, or security) will have difficulties reaching internal consensus. It is doubtful whether the Commission will ever operate as a genuine “government in waiting.” Instead it is more likely to act as an integrationist pole in a volatile institutional balance with the Council and member states. The often deplored, and debilitating, fragmentation of competences is likely to persist, and the EU is yet to develop an appropriate modus operandi to navigate these institutional tensions. It appears that the EU is aiming at sailing through these difficult waters in cooperation with other regional bodies, such as the AU, as much as possible—aiming at building capacities on the partner’s side and demanding ownership from the partners at the same time.

Notes 1. See the European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade, website. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/index_en.htm (accessed May 31, 2008).

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2. Nevertheless, the European Commission has stated that the slow speed of EDF disbursements and the anticipated accelerated pace of liberalization under the proposed EPA would have to be synchronized (European Commission 2004b). 3. Another 13 percent was unallocated, and 3 percent went to Malta and Slovenia. Both were reclassified as nondeveloping countries as of January 1, 2003 (Grimm 2004a: 2). 4. The APF was an EU reaction to a suggestion by the AU summit in Maputo in 2003. 5. A big partner can also constitute a big cartel. On matters of disagreement with smaller or weaker partners, the EU would have more political leverage. Although this prospect is understandably appealing to policymakers in Europe, it could be a threatening vision for a number of politicians in the South.

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4 From Lomé to Economic Partnership Agreements in Africa Mary Farrell

F

rom its inception, the European Community (EC) and its member states established a framework for cooperation with the African countries, in large measure prompted by the European founding member states seeking to retain collaborative ties with former colonies while creating new arrangements for the conduct of (largely economic) relations with other newly independent African states. Thereafter, interregional cooperation was conducted through the successive Lomé Agreements and, from 2000 on, under the framework of the Cotonou Agreement (Lister 1997; Mahler 1994). This chapter examines the economic cooperation between Europe and Africa in the contemporary era and seeks to establish the degree to which policy coordination among the member states is evident. The second concern of this contribution is to assess the nature of this interregional cooperation, to consider whether and to what extent the evidence points to enhanced interregionalism. A key consideration of the chapter is to attempt to identify the causal forces driving interregional cooperation and to determine the counterforces that might inhibit enhanced interregionalism. The long history of interregional cooperation between Europe and Africa, characterized by formal political structures as well as informal economic links, provides a very useful backdrop against which to examine the changing nature of Europe’s role and presence in African regionalism (Ojo 1996). Is there evidence of a growing influence by the European Union (EU) in African regionalism? To what extent can the EU be considered an actor in the evolving interregionalism? Does the EU model of regionalism have an impact on African regionalization processes? These questions are relevant to understanding 65

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the nature of the EU as an international actor and to defining its capacity to exert influence or as a minimum to understanding the degree to which the EU has presence in this arena of interregionalism.

Background

The Lomé Agreements brought together seventy-nine countries in the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) with the member states of the European Union in an institutionalized relationship that allowed the ACP group to sell their primary products in the European Union market without the requirement of granting reciprocal market access in return. The original partnership arrangement implicit in the Lomé Accords was substantially modified through the Cotonou Agreement signed by the EU and the ACP states in 2000. Alongside the institutionalized frameworks for interregional cooperation embodied in the successive Lomé Agreements, the European member states retained their respective national policies toward Africa in general and in particular toward individual countries with which they had special interests and agreements. Essentially, EU-Africa relations have continued to function at national and supranational levels simultaneously, ranging across the respective policies of individual member states to the European Commission initiatives on development policy, its declaration on the Millennium Development Goals, the Cotonou Agreement, the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) negotiated between the European Commission and groups of African countries, and the EU’s Africa Strategy. Until the 1990s it was generally accepted by the national governments and the European Commission that this approach to interregional economic cooperation was appropriate, in view of the shared competences in the European Union and the limited advance toward a common foreign policy. Shared competences reflect the reality of European integration, where sovereign states pursue common goals through collective action while at the same time retaining policy autonomy in the pursuit of diverse national goals and interests. With the agreement on the Maastricht Treaty, however, came a new and broad-ranging emphasis on policy coordination within the European Union. The emphasis on policy coordination was at once a declaration of the intention to strengthen the internal integration project work and to better coordinate the positions and policies of the individual member states in external relations, in foreign policy, and in international organizations. But distinct differences in processes of policy coordination can

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be identified in relation to internal and external policies. Internal policy coordination measures to strengthen the European internal market and monetary integration were explicit, with detailed and comprehensive sets of rules and guidelines that generally left little room for ambiguity and often incorporated specific incentives or threats to encourage compliance by the member states.1 In contrast with the explicit measures for internal policy coordination, coordination in external relations did not carry the same degree of formality nor did it reflect the same directive influence on the part of the European institutions. Although harmonization of external trade relations was achieved through the common commercial policy, other policy areas were characterized by diverse national actions, individual positions, and often little policy coordination. There is no common European policy on foreign direct investment, and member state governments continued to pursue foreign direct investment strategies according to various national interests and preferences, whereas the foreign investment strategies of the European firms were dictated by economic considerations such as proximity to market, access to natural resources, lower production costs, and transport costs. Although conventional wisdom does recognize the significance of public policy in influencing the decisions of firms, it is equally cognizant of the need not to overstate such influence. So it is safe to assume that if the early phase of EUAfrica economic cooperation suited the interests of both European political and economic actors, later phases of cooperation saw a divergence in motivations as European firms looked to other investment locations.

The Lomé Approach: Hybrid Interregionalism

Before the European Community was established with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, several West European countries, including France, Germany, the UK, and Belgium, had colonial ties in Africa.2 The establishment of the European Community presented a problem for those countries that had initiated various preferential trading and other arrangements with the newly independent ex-colonies, since under the Treaty of Rome the members were required to give each other free market access and to extend the common commercial tariff on trade with nonmembers. It was the desire to retain preferential links with former colonies that led, however, to the eventual decision to establish a framework for cooperation between the European Community and the ACP countries under the Yaoundé and Lomé Agreements.3

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Building upon the colonial legacy, provisions for EU-Africa relations can be found in a number of Treaty of Rome clauses, including treaty articles 131 and 136, which allowed for the inclusion of the then colonies of the six founder members in the customs union. Following the granting of independence, the new states were granted preferential access to the common market under the Yaoundé Convention. The Lomé Agreement of 1975 was represented as the successor to Yaoundé, offering market access, without the requirement of reciprocity, to the primary products originating in the ACP group. The Lomé Agreement supported the conduct of Europe-Africa economic cooperation and facilitated political dialogue within a grouping characterized by an extremely asymmetrical distribution of power. The cooperation framework included mechanisms for interregional dialogue at several levels: a joint parliamentary assembly, meetings of organizations representing civil society, and intergovernmental meetings. Over time, as successive accords were signed by the participating states, an institutional framework for regular dialogue between the political representatives of the two regions emerged, with ultimately five different joint EU-ACP institutions. Decisionmaking authority lay with the ACP-EU Council of Ministers, and day-to-day matters were dealt with by the ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors. Three other institutions completed the structure upon which partnership was based. The ACPEU Joint Assembly, comprising representatives from the ACP states and an equal number of representatives from the European Parliament, was a forum in which to exchange views, defend interests, and lay open opposing perspectives for discussion. In addition, two technical institutions—the Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation and the Centre for the Development of Industry—were intended to support the development of the agricultural and industrial sectors in the ACP countries (Ravenhill 2004). As a preferential arrangement, the Lomé Accord offered the ACP countries the highest level of privileged access (that is, the lowest tariff rates) compared to the other preferential agreements between the EU and trading partners. Moreover, the political dimension, with its provision for regular dialogue at the highest level, made the agreement distinctive (Holland 2002). Although the first Lomé Agreement related primarily to trade cooperation, subsequent agreements were broadened in scope to include clauses on such issues as human rights; the rule of law; economic, social, and cultural rights; and good governance. This early example of European interregionalism contained both political and economic elements of the cooperation strategy, based upon

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a highly institutionalized and hierarchical network of relations to support political dialogue between two groups of countries with divergent economic structures, different levels of development, and varying systems of governance and capacities for governance. On the European side, the EU was a tightly knit and increasingly integrated political community, a formal regional organization with a supranational governance structure and one whose member states were able and willing to negotiate internally, identify common interests, and represent a unified cohesive position in external (economic) negotiations. In contrast, the ACP was a loosely knit organization of seventy-nine states, with no strong unifying ties or formal organizational structure, bound together by their evident weaknesses rather than their capacity for purposive and joint action (i.e., a lack of actorship). The Europe-Africa hybrid interregionalism did not suggest a model for future European strategy, and it would eventually face challenges from both sides of the partnership in the very different context of the post-Cotonou agreement.

Economic Cooperation Under Cotonou: EPA Style

The Cotonou Agreement was drawn up in response to pressures for a change in the European preferential regime in the context of global trade liberalization and in response to growing criticisms of the longstanding Lomé arrangements. In Europe, the existing arrangements covering Europe-Africa cooperation were considered adequate neither to promote trade nor to support developmental objectives and were viewed as a drain on resources by a policy community and a European public experiencing donor fatigue and increasingly skeptical about whether this form of public policy could have any positive impact on growth and development. The neoliberalism that had permeated much of European public policy since the 1980s, most spectacularly in the consensus among the member states to establish the single market, came through once more to shape the design of the new interregional framework. Economic cooperation would be more closely linked to trade liberalization, and the European model of integration—with its characteristics of internal market liberalization, capital and labor movement, and competition—dominated the new approach to interregionalism. The Cotonou Agreement centered on reciprocal trade liberalization (dropping the nonreciprocity of the predecessor Lomé Accords), with the specific proposal for regional economic integration agreements

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between the EU and groups of countries within the ACP on the one hand and, on the other hand, the establishment of regional integration among countries of the ACP bloc. Negotiations between the European Commission and the ACP grouping began in September 2002,4 with the intention of concluding the negotiations by the end of 2007 (when the World Trade Organization [WTO] waiver on the Lomé preferential agreements would end); the new agreements would enter into force in 2008, but in 2009 they were still under negotiation. The interregional economic integration agreements (now commonly referred to as EPAs) constituted a significant point of departure from previous policy. The negotiations between the EU and the ACP group to liberalize trade between the two blocs reflected the provisions on economic and trade cooperation outlined in the Cotonou Agreement, which explicitly provided for the coverage of standard market access issues for goods, commodities, and services (with particular reference made to maritime transport, information and communication technologies, and tourism). The Cotonou Agreement also included provisions for cooperation in trade-related areas, such as competition policy, the protection of intellectual property rights, standardization and certification, trade and environmental considerations, trade and labor standards, consumer policy, and the protection of consumer health—all of these areas would dominate the subsequent negotiations between the European Commission and the ACP group. The EPAs must be compatible with WTO rules, and this requires the commitment of the signatory states to ensure liberalization of trade affecting substantially all products and services and covering all sectors. Although the EU could have sought a waiver from the WTO rule to cover its preferential arrangements with Africa (which the United States sought successfully in the case of its Caribbean Basin initiative), it did not try to protect the Lomé model in its negotiations with the WTO, nor did the EU seek special rules governing North-South cooperation (Raffer 1998). The EPA negotiations reflected the shift away from treating the ACP as a unified bloc, instead resorting to negotiations with groups of countries with a view to creating regional economic agreements (at the same time not ruling out bilateral agreements, such as the EU agreement with South Africa). The negotiations were conducted in two phases: phase one was an interregional negotiation of general principles, definitions, and approaches; phase two involved the negotiations between the European Commission and the six sub-ACP regional groupings—West Africa, Central Africa, East and Southern Africa, Southern African Development Community, Caribbean, and the Pacific (see Figure 4.1).

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Figure 4.1 The EPA Regions

West Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo Central Africa: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, São Tomé and Principe East and Southern Africa: Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe Southern African Development Community: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago Pacific: Cook Islands, Federation of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

The Cotonou Agreement departed from the past practice of fiveyear agreements to cover a twenty-year period from 2003. It also reflected a significant departure from previous practice in emphasizing the role of economic partnership agreements in facilitating the integration of African countries into the global economy. In effect, through this program of EPAs, the EU-Africa “partnership” proposed to secure what the preceding Lomé Agreements had manifestly failed to do: to correct the marginalization of Africa in the global economy (Hurt 2003). 5 Economic liberalization was a cornerstone of the proposed new partnership arrangement, and interregionalism would link up the external EU goals on global liberalization with the general normative objectives on the promotion of democracy, the preservation of the rule of law, and human rights.

Economic Cooperation: The Promise and the Reality

Despite the formalized interregional arrangements that characterized Europe-Africa relations, the evidence points to limited integration and significant weakness in the pattern and growth of economic cooperation between Europe and Africa. From the early days of European integration through the start of the new millennium, foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade flows were concentrated in a small number of sectors, with the emphasis on primary production, a reliance on imported tech-

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nology, and limited linkages and spillover effects for the local African economies. It is not surprising that there was little reinvestment of profits and that foreign direct investment flows reflected the instability inherent in the sometimes volatile nature of the oil and mining sectors generally. In the decades following the end of colonialism, Africa’s participation in the world economy declined, and its share of world exports fell from 4.6 percent in 1980 to 1.8 percent in 2000, and the share of world imports declined from 3.6 percent to 1.6 percent over the same period (Dupasquier and Osakwe 2003: 28).6 However, the renewed growth in Africa over the seven years from 2000, particularly the 2006–2008 commodities boom, contributed to an improvement in Africa’s trade position, with the region’s exports reaching 3 percent of global exports in 2007 (World Bank 2009a: 111). Yet Africa has been singularly unsuccessful in attracting global FDI flows, continually taking less than 2 percent of the total, until the volume of inward investment flows attracted by the commodities boom brought Africa’s share of global FDI to 3 percent. Within Africa, the distribution of foreign direct investment has always been uneven, with a small number of countries attracting foreign investment in natural resource sectors (UNCTAD 2009: 63). The figures for FDI stocks also show a downward trend in the decades since the 1960s. Further, foreign investment has generally lagged behind official development assistance, according to figures for the period from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2005). This picture of Africa’s low share of foreign direct investment is not surprising when considered in the broader economic context of global output and trade. Over the last three decades of the twentieth century, Africa’s share of world output declined from 3.1 percent in the 1970s to 1.8 percent in 2000. The continent’s share of world trade also fell over this period, from a level of 6 percent in 1980 to around 2 percent in 2000 (UNCTAD 2005: 6). By 2008, with the global financial crisis deepening in the advanced countries, African countries were witnessing falling demand and a slowdown in the growth rate of earlier years. Both geography and history have influenced the patterns of African investment and trade, with economic flows tending to reflect the countries’ resource endowments and colonial ties, often in complex ways unrelated to the predictions of economic theory. Geography has determined the African continent’s possession of mineral wealth, including vast endowments (and, in some cases, near monopolies) of platinum, chromium, diamonds, gold, cobalt, man-

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ganese, coal, uranium, copper, and nickel. Oil reserves are estimated to be higher than those of any region other than the Middle East, with Angola, Nigeria, Chad, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Sudan significant producers. It is this endowment of natural resources that prompted the early interest of the European countries in maintaining economic ties with their former colonies. Of the six European Community founding states, four had colonial interests, and the British accession in 1973 brought an additional former colonial power to the Lomé arena. Then, as now, the attraction of Africa’s natural resources explained the uneven spread of FDI flows across the continent, with a concentration of investment in a small number of sectors, mostly connected to natural resources (UNCTAD 2008: 65). There was little change in the pattern of trade from the ACP countries, and most exports remained concentrated in raw materials, agricultural products, and minerals. EU imports were concentrated on petrol, diamonds, aluminum, cocoa and coffee beans, wood, and cane sugar. Finished products accounted for just under 20 percent of total ACP products by 2000, principally concentrated in textiles and clothing and in prepared foodstuffs (UNCTAD 2005: 56). Table 4.1 shows the change in ACP and regional groupings’ share of EU trade between 1970 and 2003. Colonial history also explains the pattern of investment in the postcolonial years, and the continent depended heavily on a small number of donor countries for foreign investment inflows. International trade patterns similarly mirrored the geographic ties established by foreign investment linkages. Between 1980 and 2000 three countries (France and the UK—the two major former colonial powers—and the United States) accounted for close to 70 percent of total investment flows to the continent (Eurostat 2009: 61). Until 1995, France and the UK accounted for well over half of the total investment inflows (see Table 4.2). From 1996 on, the UK and France were no longer the dominant investors on the continent, with the United States becoming more prominent as a source country. These three countries also accounted for the majority of the stock of foreign investment in the final decade of the last century (UNCTAD 2008: 135). With the emergence of China, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, as a new source of foreign investment and trading partner for Africa, the European countries also faced a challenge to their already waning influence on the continent (UNECA 2009: 87; Financial Times 2006). The ACP grouping’s falling share of global and European markets was not compensated for by greater economic integration and an

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Table 4.1 EU-ACP Economic Cooperation, 1970–2003

Share of ACP countries in world exports

1970

1980

1990

2000

2003

4.4

3.2

2.1

1.6

1.8

32.1

36.3

30.7

31.4

58.6 60.3 54.1

44.4 43.8 55.0

34.2 31.4 32.9

30.2 34.2 30.1

57.6 46.0

51.8 35.6

37.9 20.9

37.3 20.1

19.9

24.6

16.9

16.6

41.6

32.3

34.2

46.0 49.2 67.0 42.4 60.1

34.2 41.6 55.3 27.0 32.5

32.7 39.9 50.9 26.6 37.2

16.8 8.0

14.0 3.4

17.5 3.1

Share of regional groupings’exports to EU-25 as % of group’s total exports ACP countries 48.3 LDCs among ACP countries 60.1 West Africa (ECOWAS) 67.8 Central Africa (CEMAC) 70.7 East and South Africa (ESA) 54.3 Southern Africa (SADC) 57.9 Caribbean (CARIFORUM) 21.7

Share of regional groupings’ imports from EU-25 as % of group’s total imports ACP countries 50.4 39.2 LDCs among ACP countries 56.0 47.3 West Africa (ECOWAS) 61.8 54.3 Central Africa (CEMAC) 74.1 70.2 East South Africa (ESA) 51.1 43.3 Southern Africa (SADC) 57.3 51.3 Caribbean (CARIFORUM) 28.4 15.4 Pacific 13.4 9.0 EU-25 exports to ACP group as % of total

5.0

4.3

1.9

1.4

1.4

EU-25 imports from ACP group as % of total 5.1

4.5

2.2

1.5

1.5

Sources: Kimungi 2005: 6; Eurostat 2009; author’s calculations. Notes: ACP = African, Caribbean, and Pacific; LDCs = least developed countries; ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African States; CEMAC = Central African Economic and Monetary Community; ESA = Eastern and Southern Africa; SADC = Southern African Development Community; CARIFORUM = Caribbean forum.

increase in intraregional trade. Even within the African subregional economic organizations, there was limited economic interdependence and no significant evidence of the gradual shift of trade patterns to reflect a strengthening of economic and trade ties within specific African regional economic communities. Table 4.3 shows there was little impact on

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Table 4.2 Sources of FDI Flows to Africa, 1991–2000 (US$ millions)

Country Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Italy Netherlands Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States

1991–1995 7 –47 1 3 2,066 402 213 297 145 96 50 4 452 2,376 278

1996–2000 221 242 340 8 4,362 2,475 678 816 –148 1,560 476 197 69 3,269 9,249

Source: Dupasquier and Osakwe 2005: 8–9.

intra-African trade from geography or regional political dynamics— members of the subregional organizations traded more with countries outside the regional community and Africa generally. In 2006, intraregional trade could be measured in single-digit percentage figures in most African trade blocs (UNECA 2009: 80). The corresponding figure in the EU was around 60 percent. Despite the promise of the successive Lomé Agreements, the African partners had little success in turning the offer of free market access under nonreciprocal conditions to their advantage, or in translating the commitments made by the European side into an enhanced share of the European market. By 2000, ACP countries’ share of the EU market had declined to half the level of the 1970s, whereas imports from the EU continued to rise (see Table 4.1). Economic cooperation between Europe and Africa largely took the form of foreign direct investment, by a few European firms, in selected natural resource sectors, in a few resource-rich African countries. Although the Lomé Agreements offered the framework for interregional dialogue at the political level, the economic cooperation took place in a largely unregulated space—since neither the EU nor the international governance system (specifically the WTO) had formulated a system of rules for the conduct of foreign direct investment. Yet, there was a widespread and growing consensus among the

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Table 4.3 Share of Intraregional Trade in Total African Trade (in percentage)

1996–2006 Average

2006 Group Intragroup Total Share of Trade Trade Intragroup Growth Growth Trade Rate Rate Africa East Africa Central Africa North Africa Southern Africa Western Africa CEMAC COMESA ECCAS ECOWAS SADC WAEMU AMU

8.33 14.33 0.53 2.72 — 8.41 0.90 4.22 0.57 8.30 9.05 13.07 2.01

17.59 18.85 23.59 23.04 — 8.57 23.59 21.81 23.35 8.37 11.77 11.13 24.59

21.34 20.62 31.74 26.49 — 22.44 22.25 29.81 31.66 22.02 13.66 13.84 26.12

Intragroup Share of Trade Intragroup Growth Trade Rate 10.57 9.11 6.93 9.51 — 11.78 6.81 9.12 7.00 11.83 8.71 8.79 8.11

11.22 7.52 6.18 12.26 — 14.29 6.60 10.82 6.48 14.43 7.38 8.28 10.06

Group Total Trade Growth Rate 12.94 6.99 18.24 16.80 6.59 12.82 16.08 14.72 18.06 12.91 9.33 6.07 15.75

Source: UNECA 2009: 80. Notes: CEMAC = Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa; COMESA = Common Market for East and Southern African States; ECCAS = Economic Community of Central African States; ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African States; SADC = Southern African Development Community; WAEMU = West African Economic and Monetary Union; AMU = Arab Maghreb Union.

African countries that the solution to the continent’s disappointing economic progress (low economic growth rates, falling per capita incomes, declining share of global foreign direct investment, and declining share of global trade and output) was to be found in further liberalization. Even when countries did not accept this orthodoxy, they nonetheless concluded few other alternatives were realistically open to them. From the mid-1990s on, there was a general shift in favor of outward-looking development policies, amid a renewed interest in regional and subregional integration and the espousal of a range of public policies conducive to investment and trade. The asymmetrical trading relationship was mirrored in the unbalanced nature of political dialogue between the two partner regions. The ACP group never had the necessary political weight to exercise influence within the partnership, and the group’s bargaining strength was clearly limited to what could be negotiated with the EU countries by appealing

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to the consciences of individual countries or by embarrassing the EU into extending the agreement. It was a relationship based less on partnership than on inequality and general institutional inertia, described by one commentator as a form of “collective clientelism” (Ravenhill 2004).

Dissenting Voices and Pressure for Reform

Even before the end of the Lomé IV Agreement, the pressures for reform of this EU-Africa cooperation framework were coming from a variety of sources. The reformist positions were to be found among the member states (particularly the net contributors to the European budget), in the European Commission, and across European public opinion. Additional pressures came from the international arena, in particular the WTO, which had reacted unfavorably to the operation of a preferential arrangement in contravention of the rules governing the global trading system. Thus, external pressures from the WTO and the growing role and influence of the European Commission in external economic relations (and particularly trade) combined to ensure a coordinated European position that was essentially based upon the supranational Community method. Individual European member states enjoyed the advantages offered by the successive Lomé Agreements: continued access to essential natural resources, the maintenance of economic ties established in the colonial era, cheap raw materials, and markets for the products of European industry in those African countries with rising income levels and the capacity to purchase. By the 1980s, however, the interests of the core European member states, especially those that were net contributors to the European Union budget, had changed quite considerably. The subsequent collapse of the former Soviet Union, and the eventual decision to admit the former states of the Soviet Union into the EU, ensured that the developments in Eastern Europe would take on strategic and political significance for the European Union countries. EU enlargement would also have significant implications for the budget, with allocations being required to support the costs of the transition to democracy and the costs involved in the preparations for accession. Net contributor countries such as Germany (with less interest in Africa than other members), the UK, and the Netherlands did not want to continue with the same arrangements. The “value for money” argument resonated with member states. It was a particularly persuasive argument among the more vocal elements of European public opinion, where the perception of corrup-

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tion and waste on the part of African elites discouraged support for this form of Europe-Africa cooperation. Such “economic” arguments for a change in cooperative relations dovetailed neatly with the change in the EU’s geostrategic interests, where the Lomé Agreements were no longer useful or relevant. After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, it was no longer imperative to preserve the ideological commitment (or neutrality) of former colonies, and the pressure to integrate them into a Western sphere of influence abated. For the European colonial powers, the significant ties of the 1950s and 1960s were weakened dramatically, even in France where these realities were often acknowledged more slowly than in the other countries (White 2005). The enlarged EU-27 comprises a group of countries with ever more diverse interests: none of the new member states has significant economic or historical ties with Africa, and indeed many old and new states have new priorities in the global economy and are keen to seek out new political alliances and markets to serve national as well as European collective interests. By the 1980s, the European Commission had become a major player in European integration, playing a leadership role far beyond what it would have been able to exercise under previous Lomé Agreements. Although decisionmaking is in the hands of the European Council (effectively the member states) and shared with the European Parliament in areas of policy related to the internal market, the European Commission can exercise influence through its designated role in proposing legislation and in implementing policy. The mid-term review of the Lomé Agreement conducted by the European Commission in the 1990s was a reflection of the new priorities for the European countries and at the same time vocalized the stance of the Commission itself. In essence, the European Commission’s green paper on EU-ACP relations had already hinted at how the European perspective on relations with Africa had shifted, and the EU responsibilities lay in “actively support[ing] the moves towards more openness that started when the cold war came to an end in the second half of the 1980s and in particular help[ing to] anchor the democratisation process, which is still precarious in many ACP countries” (European Commission 1996: iii). But as the green paper also suggested, the EU demanded an increased level of commitment on the part of the African countries to push through institutional reforms and to implement policies in the economic, social, and environmental arenas arising out of the undertakings agreed to at international conferences. In effect, demands made by the European Union on its partners would be strengthened.

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The final decade of the twentieth century also witnessed a shift in EU policy on development and aid, to reflect the belief that “trade not aid” was the route toward development. Moreover, the EU had shifted its position toward the approach long adopted by international institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with conditionality clauses attached to agreements on aid and trade-related development programs. In 1999, an internal reorganization of the European Commission meant that responsibilities for matters relating to ACP trade were moved from the Development Directorate to the Trade Directorate (Ravenhill 2004). For many European commercial interests, the Lomé Agreement threatened to compromise their own special interests, and disputes over the protective regimes offered to such products as bananas, rum, sugar, and cotton showed just how complex these commercial relations had become and how difficult it was to disentangle the web of interests. Perhaps the greatest pressure for a change in the EU-Africa partnership came from the WTO, with a rules-based trading system supporting a global open trading order. The EU-ACP agreement clearly contravened the WTO rules, since it offered preferential access to selected countries and discriminated against nonsignatories to the agreement—a fact acknowledged by the European Commission in its green paper on EU-ACP relations (European Commission 1996: 570). The Lomé trade preferences were contrary to the principle of multilateralism and to the most-favored-nation clause embodied in the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT)/WTO agreement, which requires that any trade concession offered to one country should be extended automatically to all trading members of the WTO. Article XXIV is the exemption clause that allows for regional trade agreements among a small group of countries under certain specified conditions— one condition being the requirement that the signatories to the agreement agree to remove tariffs on trade covering substantially all goods.7 When it came to the negotiation of the new trade agreements, the European Commission interpreted the WTO clauses to mean that 90 percent of the trade between the EU and the ACP should be liberalized over a period of ten to twelve years, and it would use this interpretation for the first time in the EU–South Africa negotiations in 1999.

Policy Coordination Challenges

European member states offered little opposition to, or criticism of, the Cotonou Agreement and the EPAs. This was partly because there was no

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strong cause to challenge the premise of economic liberalization and because the European Commission’s role in external economic relations and in managing the European-African interregional dialogue was largely recognized and accepted. Having accepted the economic logic of the European Single Market Programme, the member states could not question the same logic in the proposed new interregional framework for Europe-Africa cooperation. As a major global economic actor, the EU relies upon worldwide markets in which to sell its output and to source the necessary materials and inputs for European industry. The continued existence of unfettered global markets is key to the ongoing growth of European economies, and global market access is increasingly seen as part of the wider strategy of building the EU’s role as an international actor. But even in EU external economic relations the supranational coordination rests upon a common stance by the member states, worked out in a process of coordination of diverse national interests and actors. When external economic relations have increasing political (and even security) dimensions, the need for European cooperation and coordination becomes crucial to EU policymaking. According to Michael Smith (2004), the degree of national adaptation to European coordination depends upon changes in elite socialization, bureaucratic restructuring, constitutional changes, and changes in public perceptions about the desirability and legitimacy of this cooperation. As the EPA negotiations got under way, opposition emerged from a variety of elites within and across member states, with the critical voices of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) frequently in consort with their African counterparts in challenging the legitimacy of the EPAs for the neglect of developmental issues. Economic liberalization was not in itself accepted without question as an adequate basis for interregionalism. Effective opposition to the EPAs was mounted through an international movement by a number of nongovernmental organizations in the Stop EPA coalition, supported by more than 170 groups in Europe (mostly from the EU-15 member states) and Africa. The opposition case was based upon the neglect of development, the likelihood of exacerbating poverty, the loss of government revenue in those African countries as a result of tariff reductions, and the threat of competition for African agriculture. Even as Germany took over the EU presidency in January 2007, German NGOs launched a campaign against unfair international trade policies and called for the national government to aim for fairer rules in the EPA negotiations. The members of the European Parliament (MEPs)

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in the European Parliament’s Trade Committee called for the European Commission to make the EPA conditions less onerous. They also called for safeguard measures for African states against European agricultural imports and, in the case of liberalization of key services such as water, transport, and energy, for allowing each ACP country to freely regulate its public services. Oxfam criticized the European proposals for the limited gain to ACP countries, the unequal market access that favored EU exporters at the expense of the ACP exporters, and the EU’s attempt to push for the inclusion of competition policy, investment, trade facilitation, and transparency in government procurement (the so-called Singapore issues, which developing countries had succeeded in removing from the WTO trade negotiations). It also highlighted the risk that EPAs would splinter existing regional groups and regional integration arrangements as countries became caught up in the negotiations with the European Commission (Oxfam 2006). In Britain, a report by the UK parliamentary committee for international development declared that “we share the belief that fair trade can be a vital force in the fight against global poverty. We are unconvinced, however, that the current EPA negotiations will produce such an outcome” (International Development Committee 2005: 3). The UK parliamentary committee went further, criticizing the European Commission’s failure to give the ACP countries a choice in the trade deal: We are concerned that in presenting the alternatives as a second-best option, with no developmental component, the Commission is going against the spirit of what was agreed in Cotonou. It places the ACP in the position of having no real choice, and reinforces their unequal position in the negotiating process. Development should be integral to any trade options presented to the ACP, even when they are not the first choice of the EU. The UK government should continue to work to ensure this is the case. (International Development Committee 2005: 14)

The UK government added its voice to the swell of criticism when it announced a new policy on EPAs (DTI/DFID 2005), proposing to double the transition phase for liberalization from ten to twenty years and rejecting the inclusion of certain clauses on investment, competition policy, and government procurement (again, the so-called Singapore issues) in the negotiations. It also advocated that the European Commission should offer an alternative to the EPA if asked to do so by any African country, on the basis that any alternative should provide no worse market access to the EU than was currently enjoyed under

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Cotonou preference. In March 2007 the House of Commons Select Committee on International Development noted its concern that the EU was abusing its position to persuade ACP countries that these new issues were essential for development. Meanwhile the Danish parliament adopted its own resolution in January 2007 calling for EPAs to allow ACP countries to pursue tariff reductions at a pace that was socially acceptable and that did not compromise state finances. Already there are indications showing how rapid liberalization (not linked to national development plans) is affecting the agricultural sectors in countries still largely reliant on agriculture as a mainstay of the national economy. In Ghana, for example, imports of rice and chickens have displaced local producers, with a consequent negative impact on output, employment, and welfare (ACP Civil Society Platform 2004). If ACP producers cannot diversify into more value-added production or are discouraged from investing in new productive capacity owing to uncertain domestic and regional markets for products competing with EU imports, this will result in greater constraints on development. The UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) conducted a quantitative study of the effects of the EPAs and concluded that trade liberalization under these agreements would generate substantial costs for the African countries, in terms of the loss of customs revenues, the adjustment costs of deindustrialization, and the undermining of regional integration processes already under way on the continent (Karingi 2005). The UNECA study concluded that the reciprocal market-opening processes would benefit the EU—in terms of access to the African markets—much more than the ACP countries. Not only would European producers gain a foothold in African markets, but they would do so at the cost of greater trade diversion, both from the rest of the world and from within the EPA groupings that are configured around existing African regional economic communities (Perez 2006). The African Union’s trade ministers mirrored the recommendations of the UNECA study in urging more focus on deepening intra-African trade over a gradual period to allow the countries to build competitiveness (African Union 2006). The Commission for Africa, established by then British prime minister Tony Blair, recommended that new trade agreements should be constructed in a way that “reduces reciprocal demands to a minimum,” with individual African countries allowed to “sequence their own trade reforms, at their own pace, in line with their own poverty reduction and development plans” (Commission for Africa 2005). Some critics went further, suggesting that better alternatives potentially available to ACP

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countries included the EU’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)— a nonreciprocal system of preferences for all LDCs; a “GSP+,” introduced in 2005 and available to all countries that apply (provided they meet two criteria: vulnerability and the ratification and implementation of some twenty-seven international conventions on human and labor rights, the environment, and governance); and the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative—a special arrangement for the least developed countries (LDCs) offering duty-free and quota-free access to all exports from LDCs (apart from armaments) (Bilal 2006; ODI 2007).

The EU, ACP, and Interregionalism

The European Commission pushed ahead to conclude the EPA negotiations by the agreed-upon date (the end of 2007), making little change to its negotiating stance in the face of European public opposition and the reluctance of many ACP states on reciprocal economic liberalization and taking little account of tensions between this policy and national policies that prioritized the development aspects of economic cooperation. What kind of actor is the EU in this process, and what influence does the European Union have on the interregional processes? There is broad acceptance of the EU as an international actor in contemporary international relations literature; it possesses the capacity and the will to act deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system. Actorness as a process can be discerned in the interconnection among presence, opportunity, and capability. The EU has considerable presence in the international arena, particularly in its size as a global economic bloc and in the fact that its internal policies (agriculture, competition) affect other international actors. Its record in regional integration and as a governance system stands as a possible model for international cooperation among sovereign states. Opportunity relates to the condition of the external environment that constrains or facilitates action. Capability is the capacity for action. In the case of EU-African interregionalism, the actual pattern of economic cooperation and trade combined with the historical institutionalized framework for dialogue to establish an EU presence, and the supranational structure gave the European Commission a leadership role that facilitated the pursuit of a proactive policy agenda. Since the Community method is well established in trade and economic cooperation, there is a strong consistency in the policies of the member states and in their commitment to the external impact of the EU. In the EPA

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negotiations the EU will inevitably be in a position of strength, with the technical, legal, and political expertise to shape outcomes and to influence the perceptions and expectations of others. It is therefore not surprising that, although criticism of the interregional strategy has increased (on the part of European member states and the African actors), there is still no demand for a reversal of the strategy or a change of direction. For the ACP states the goals of (European) market access and regional integration (African) remain strong driving forces in the external environment. For the European member states, market access and multilateralism in general are desired characteristics of the international system, which the European Commission strives to secure on behalf of the EU-27. Returning to the questions posed in the introduction to this chapter, the evidence points to growing EU influence on African regionalism. The tenacity shown by the European authorities in the EPA negotiations indicates that the European preference is for a regionalism constructed upon regional economic liberalization, which is somewhat at odds with the developmental path of European regionalism, where political cooperation and institution building preceded much of the economic liberalization. In Africa, the four negotiating regions are Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The membership of these EPA negotiating groups does not directly correspond, however, with the membership of the regional economic communities.8 Instead, the EPA negotiating groups constitute arrangements and institutions that run parallel to the recognized regional economic communities. The EU conducted negotiations with each one individually, rather than collectively, and the groups did not negotiate on the basis of a common negotiating mandate or road map. Inevitably, the regional groups proceeded at different speeds in the negotiations, as each group separately prepared its negotiating mandate and separately launched negotiations with the EU (African Union 2006). It remains to be seen whether this structure can add up to the sum of its parts and form the building blocks for African regionalism and an African Economic Community. By July 2009, only one full EPA had been concluded, with the Caribbean forum (CARIFORUM), and nineteen African countries had initialed individual “interim agreements” so as to meet the deadline (UNECA 2009: 94). Although the European Commission argued that this provided a legal basis for continued negotiation and the conduct of trade, African countries remained skeptical about the benefits, and even

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more so about the motivations of the European negotiators. The interim agreements were considered to have undermined regional negotiating positions, with the European Commission effectively concluding agreements with individual countries and with distinct variation in the clauses and conditions in the individual bilateral agreements (even when these were concluded with countries within the same regional grouping) (Stevens 2008). For now, economic cooperation between the majority of the African countries and the EU remains covered by the GSP and (for the poorest countries) the EBA initiative. Although the EU presence in African regionalism is unquestioned, a much longer-term perspective will be required in order to judge the impact of this presence on the internal processes of regionalism in Africa—not least because such processes are shaped by national and subregional political dynamics and the vision, strategies, and commitment of the political actors within the region.

Conclusion: From Interregionalism to Global Strategy

EU-Africa cooperation in the economic arena remains characterized by asymmetrical relations, which rhetoric and discourse on partnership cannot obscure. No amount of declarations from the European Commission on the importance of maintaining the partnership between the EU and the ACP group of countries and the significance of EPAs in promoting the integration of the African economies into the global economy can hide the fact of unequal interregional relations in trade and investment. Africa remains heavily dependent upon the European market for its exports and has a trade deficit with the EU, whereas only a very small proportion of global foreign direct investment flows finds its way to the African continent. It was this dependence upon the European market that prompted the African countries to accept the Cotonou Agreement and to begin the negotiations on EPAs with the European Commission. Caught up in the momentum of the negotiations and the pressures from the European side to complete the agreements, the African countries were swept along by the promise of the greater investment and trade with Europe that the EPAs would bring. It is not surprising that the trade-negotiating capacity (built up over several decades and honed in the global trade negotiations) of the EU has played a significant role in shaping the outcomes in favor of the EU, whereas the African states remain at a distinct disadvantage in terms of both national and collective negotiating strength. Economic dependency and the political vacuum

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created by weaknesses in leadership and other political resources combined to produce the perception that there was no alternative for the African countries. For Africa, with many economic sectors that are less competitive than other developing countries, maintaining a special discriminative access to EU markets was indispensable. From the European side, the Cotonou Agreement and the EPAs fit the mold of the EU’s external relations policy, its support for economic liberalization, and the use of political conditionality in many international agreements. The principles that lie behind the EPAs are imbued with the ideals of neoliberalism and the role that liberalization can play in development. But absent from the equation is any consideration of how to link poverty reduction with development promotion and any discussion of the still-pressing problem of settling conflict and maintaining peace—all ultimately obstacles to economic progress and growth (CIDSE 2003; Maxwell and Christiansen 2002; Schuurman 2000; Van der Hoeven 2000). In a broader sense, the current European policy toward cooperation with Africa, based upon this blend of economic liberalization and political conditionality, is part of the restructuring of North-South relations generally. The result of this transformation is that international economic relations, as well as economic policies and development strategies, in the South are increasingly determined by the developed countries’ liberalist regime. In the case of the EU, this is evident in the way that European policies (including those of the member states) have become compatible with the policies of the IMF, the WB, and the WTO. The continued insistence of the EU on including the so-called Singapore issues (agreements on investment, government procurement, and competition policy) in the EPA negotiations, even though the ACP countries had already rejected such agreements in WTO talks, can be seen as a part of this now global strategy. In adopting a position that makes it seem more WTO-like than the WTO itself, the EU has taken on the role of international liberalizing agent to promote a regulatory regime in its own interest (if not completely in its own image). What does the EU seek to achieve by this strategy? Clearly, there are important benefits for European investment in the emerging African market, particularly if the host country can be seen to have a regulatory regime in tune with the preferences of major corporations (limited state regulation, low taxes, and a favorable investment climate). In the EPAs the EU has the opportunity to export a model of governance that reflects the broader strategic interests of the Union. Although the EU has itself promoted economic liberalization through the deepen-

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ing European integration since the early 1990s, this has taken place in the context of voluntary commitments by states relatively equal in their economic development and power relations. The investment of political capital by all the member states and the interest in making cooperation work were fundamental to binding the countries into the cooperative arrangements. Taking this same cohesion to its external policy, the EU ambition is to play a greater role in international and global governance. One way to secure this goal is by defining a regulatory regime that it has perfected internally (although reflecting the interests of the member states) and taking it to the global arena, where many of the elements of the European governance model have yet to be determined in a substantive way. At the global level there are no rules on investment or on competition policy, two areas where the EU has clearly defined regulatory frameworks.

Notes 1. The approach toward policy coordination is best exemplified in the case of monetary integration, and particularly in the requirement that any member state seeking to adopt the euro had to comply with the convergence criteria and move toward balanced budgets. The Employment Guidelines issued by the European Commission can also be seen as an attempt to coordinate the individual national employment strategies, with the requirement that member states submit annual national employment strategies to the Commission for scrutiny. 2. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the “scramble for Africa” had brought the entire continent under the colonial rule of the European countries that were engaged in a competitive struggle for territory, natural resources, and strategic advantage (see Pakenham 1991). The UK took control over areas on the east coast, in pursuit of Cecil Rhodes’s vision of a “Cape to Cairo empire,” linking the British-controlled area in Southern Africa (South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zambia) with territory in East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Sudan) and north up to the Nile River and Egypt. French occupation began in West Africa and covered, at the height of its imperial rule, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, Chad, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal; in North Africa, French rule covered Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. German colonial rule was largely in the east, extending across Burundi, Rwanda, and Tanzania and also to Togo and part of Cameroon in the east. At the start of World War I, the UK controlled 30 percent of the population on the African continent, France 15 percent, and Germany 9 percent; once the war began, the African colonies became embroiled in the fight as well (Pakenham 1991). 3. For discussion of these agreements, see Ravenhill (2004), Arts and Byron (1997), Crawford (1996), and McQueen (1998). 4. The regions involved were Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Central African

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Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 5. According to Kunibert Raffer (2001), the term partnership was mentioned fifty-two times in 100 articles and nine times in the annexes. 6. The share of world exports of sub-Saharan Africa (population 689 million) is less than half that of Belgium (population 10 million) (UNCTAD 2009; Eurostat 2009). 7. Article XXIV of the GATT sets out WTO rules on regional trade agreements. These rules allow countries to derogate from the most-favored-nation (nondiscrimination principle) rule that is central to the WTO, stating that whatever deal a country offers to another country must be offered to all WTO countries. Countries can exempt themselves from this provided they set up a customs union or free trade area under Article XXIV. There are three key provisions in Article XXIV. Rule 5(c) states that “any interim agreement shall include a plan and schedule for the formation of such a customs union or of such a free trade area within a reasonable length of time.” The “Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV” states that the reasonable length of time referred to in paragraph 5(c) of Article XXIV should exceed ten years only in exceptional cases. In cases where members party to an interim agreement believe that ten years would be insufficient, they shall provide a full explanation to the Council for Trade in Goods on the need for a longer period. Rule 8(b) states that “a free trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIV, XV, and XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such territories.” 8. The SADC EPA group is not made up of all the member states of the SADC regional economic community. The Republic of South Africa is an observer only. Other SADC member states are in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) EPA group, which is known as the ESA negotiating region. In West Africa, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and ECOWAS formed the ECOWAS EPA. In central Africa, the CEMAC is the negotiating group, rather than the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) (see Figure 4.1).

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5 The Ups and Downs of Interregionalism in Latin America Sebastian Santander

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his chapter deals with the European Union’s (EU’s) interregional strategy with Latin America, with particular emphasis on the Common Market of the South (Mercosur). The relations that the EU started to develop with the Southern Cone region since the early 1990s are part of a broader strategy of rapprochement with the entire Latin American subcontinent. This chapter argues that both the relaunching of regionalism and the return of democracy in Latin America in the aftermath of the Cold War era boosted relations between the two sides of the Atlantic. The 1990s would become a fertile ground for the interregional relationship between Europe and Latin America. The role played by the Commission and by some European states, in particular by Spain, has been determinant. The EU has focused special attention on Mercosur, where European companies are very active. The stated goal of the EU is to conclude an interregional association agreement with Mercosur that includes a free trade area for goods, services, and investment as well as increased leverage for political dialogue and cooperation. This chapter argues that the EU’s relationship with Mercosur is as much economic as political. The EU has taken the initiative of developing interregional relations with South America as part of its increased external activities since the end of the Cold War. This initiative is played out in a context of economic and political competition with other world leading actors, primarily the United States, which has its own regional strategy toward the Americas. The EU’s aim is not only to conquer new markets for European business but also to represent the EU as a political union in relation to its external partners and to increase the European influence in a geographical area 89

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that has for a long time been under the influence of the United States. This chapter will show that the reason why it is so difficult for the EU to achieve this goal is not only the economic and trade issues at stake but even more significantly the strong vested interests within EU member states. The first section in this chapter shows that the consolidation of the EU as an international actor and the emergence of “open regionalism” in Latin America have provided the conditions for the “return” of Europe to Latin America. The second section concentrates on EU-Mercosur relations and shows that the Southern Cone region has become, for the Europeans, one of the most attractive partners of Latin America, both for economic and political reasons. The third section analyzes the EUMercosur interregional framework for cooperation agreement and the Commission’s support for the construction of the regional integration process in South America. The fourth section reviews the EU’s internal obstacles to interregional relations and particularly to the negotiation of a free trade area between Europe and South America. The fifth section analyzes the impact of EU-US competition in the Southern Cone upon the European strategy toward Mercosur. The final section assesses the prospects for a EU-Mercosur free trade area, especially, in light of the evolving political and economic situation on the South American subcontinent.

The International Role of the EU and New Regionalism in Latin America

The fifth summit between the heads of state and governments of the European Union, Latin America, and the Caribbean, held in Lima, Peru, in May 2008, enabled the EU to reiterate its willingness to play a role on the world stage with a single voice and especially on the Latin American political scene. This summit was in line with the thinking associated with the “Rio Process” (Santander 2004: 369–388) that, according to the Rio de Janeiro Declaration of June 1999, aimed to create a “strategic biregional partnership” between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean (European Parliament 1999: 1), supported by a political dialogue and by cooperation and trade issues. In attending this summit, the EU was embarking upon its strategy of increased cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean, a subcontinent that for decades had been subject to the dominance of the United States. The initial attempts of the European Community (EC) at increasing

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cooperation with countries or regional groupings in Latin America were made in the 1970s. It was not until the 1990s, however, that the EU adopted a strategy for all of Latin America and the Caribbean (European Commission 1994a). This strategy was a European initiative made possible by changes in the international context. The European bloc began, in the mid-1980s, to strengthen its internal structures and to adopt instruments consolidating its visibility and external action. The revival of European integration was part of the growing interdependence movement that resulted from globalization and the new regionalist wave. The end of the Cold War bipolar system offered the EU new international roles and a space in which to play them. The 1990s allowed the Union— its opening up internationally no longer conditioned by bipolar rivalry— to embark on the way of a clearer affirmation of its identity as a global actor. The member states focused on a larger role than that of mere coordination foreseen under European Political Cooperation (EPC). Through the Maastricht Treaty, they gave themselves a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) allowing “the definition in the long term of a common defence policy, which would result, at the right time, in a common defence” (Remacle 2000: 487). Moreover, the instrument of political dialogue conducted with the external partners was strengthened (Gonzalez Sanchez 1997).1 This initiative enabled the EU to present itself to others with a single voice, to make frequent and constructive contacts with third countries and regional groups, to establish links, and to exchange respective views on international issues. Following Europe’s inability to move beyond a mainly declarative diplomacy when it came to acting effectively and with one voice in “high politics” arenas (such as ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, genocide in Rwanda, or the war in Iraq), serious doubts were expressed, however, by realist scholars about the EU’s capacity to become a genuine international actor. By institutionalizing the CFSP, the European heads of state and governments raised expectations that they were ultimately not able to meet, owing to a lack of compromise. This situation gave rise to the notion of a “capability-expectations gap” (Hill 1993: 305–328). Believing that strategic issues are essentially based on postbipolar international relations, the realist critics focus as much attention on the status of the EU as on its instruments for carrying out political and strategic actions. The realist view is that, since the EU is not a sovereign state but rather an entity subordinate to member states (that is, lacking a centralized decisionmaking authority and having no real military capacity of its own), it lacks this key characteristic for it to be considered an international actor.

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By concentrating on a state-centered and strategic conception, realist scholars reduce the EU’s international sphere of activity to the CFSP alone (see Santander 2008: 153–189). Yet in other fields (“low politics”), such as foreign trade and cooperation with other countries or regional spaces, the Union has a genuinely influential worldwide role. The EU carries considerable weight in world trade, in 2005 accounting for around 20 percent of the world’s total volume of imports and exports. This compares with 18 percent for the United States and 10 percent for Japan (La documentation Française 2009: 200). By 1999, after more than forty years of trade integration, the Union figured among the world’s leading trading powers. Given that the EU plays a crucial role in drawing up rules for trade multilateralism and globalization in general, it has a genuine world leadership role to play in the trade negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Smith and Woolcock 1999: 439–462). That is because, with some exceptions, 2 the European Commission’s mandate to negotiate is granted by the Council of Ministers with a qualified majority. The mandate empowers the Commission to draw up a proposal document, to defend member states’ trade interests at the WTO, and to routinely manage trade policy. European trade policy, therefore, acts as a real Community-level lever. This policy has allowed the Union to simultaneously develop a network of new agreements—for economic cooperation, association, or partnership—such as those already negotiated or in the process of being concluded with countries or regions in Latin America. Following the Treaty of Maastricht, the new cooperation programs have included a chapter on political dialogue. Besides the “traditional” chapters on cooperation (technical, economic, trade, or assistance), these programs also focus on policy that gives a major role to democratization, human rights, and democratic principles. Many EU cooperation agreements are now distinguished by their “democratic principles” clauses. Such clauses are linked to the setting up of a democratic conditionality, which could be interpreted as an increasing politicization of economic cooperation (de Wilde d’Estmael 1998). The new cooperation programs will become an important platform for developing interregional projects with different regional schemes, as they have been with Mercosur. Europe’s Return to Latin America: The Importance of Regionalism

Relations between the European Community and Latin America, in their present form, date back to the 1980s, and also to the early stirrings that

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can be seen as the beginning of the end of the Cold War. It was the armed Central American conflicts and the difficulties encountered by the processes of regional integration in this region and in the Andes that led to the more coherent structuring of relations between the two sides of the Atlantic. Until then the Community’s strategy toward the Latin American subcontinent appeared confusing. Above all, the strategy was lacking in political interest and was conditioned by the Cold War’s bipolar system. The conflicts that broke out in the Central American isthmus, however, led the European Community and its member states to play a major coordinated political role as an international intermediary, at the same time as the EPC was being sketched out. There are two main reasons for this European commitment. The first stemmed from the fear, from within the Community and its member states, that events in Latin America would result in a confrontation between the United States and the USSR, with serious repercussions for Western Europe. The second had to do with the interface position occupied by the Iberian countries—especially Spain—between Latin America and the Community. In fact, the accession to power, in 1982, of the Spanish socialist party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) coincided with both the negotiation process for Spain’s adherence to the EEC and the Central American conflicts. The PSOE became increasingly active in support of pacification and democratization of the Central American societies. This commitment was coherent with the growing transnationalization of the European political parties, particularly the socialist and social democratic parties, which had become increasingly active in the 1970s in support of the transition to democracy in Spain and Portugal (Roett 1995: 181–182).3 When the PSOE came to power, Spain reinforced its strategy of rapprochement with Latin America. The foreign policy of the Spanish socialist government of Felipe González had a twin priority: European integration and relations with Latin America (Montobbio 1998; Sberro 2003). Spain would then try to play a leading intermediary role in the peaceful resolution of the Central American conflicts while completing its membership in the European Community. The Spanish administration then pushed for the European Community and member states to show more commitment in the Central American isthmus (Schumacher 1995). From the mid-1980s on, the foreign affairs ministers of the EC, Spain, and Portugal started a regular political dialogue—better known as the San José Process—with their Central American colleagues (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Salvador), with members of

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the Central American Common Market (CACM), and with the Latin American mediator, the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela). The EU (in particular the Council, Commission, Spain, and Portugal) had agreed beforehand on a series of values and principles to promote in Central America, such as the rejection of authoritarianism, the institution of democracy and the defense of human rights, and the promotion of regionalism. The European authorities were particularly interested in reviving the Central American integration process. Taking inspiration from its own experience, the European Community and the Council saw regionalism as the best way for Central American nations to develop and consolidate cooperation that would ensure stability and development. In 1985 the EC signed an interregional cooperation agreement with the CACM. The Commission then assisted Central American regional integration with the provision of European know-how, aimed at assisting regional development, boosting the process of regional economic integration, and developing intraregional trade (Rubio 2004). In order to ensure that Europe would make Central America a cornerstone of its policy strategy, the Spanish and Portuguese authorities pressed the EU to insert a specific clause in their respective accession treaties. Adherence to these clauses was tied to a declaration of the Community that expressed its intention and will to develop and intensify its relations with Latin America. After considering the state of relations between the EC and Latin America, the European Council, in June 1986, asked the Commission to present a document in accordance with the objectives included in the declaration annexed to the Treaty of Accession. Although this document added little in terms of concrete commitments, it nevertheless represented a considerable political signal. Indeed, the Commission and the Council together decided to adopt the first strategy paper encouraging the Community to develop a sustainable relationship with Latin America. The document laid out commitments for the reinforcement of Community aid, assistance to the increase of intraregional trade, the development of the regional integration project, and support for democracy. Meanwhile, Spanish authorities continued their activism in order to accelerate the transposition of Latin American priority at the Community level. In pursuit of this strategy, the González government urged Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission (1985–1994), to appoint the Spaniards Abel Matutes and Manuel Marín as Commissioners responsible, respectively, for North-South relations and the Mediterranean and for ACP countries. The leadership of Matutes brought an institutional sea change to the

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Community’s relations with Latin America: the number of delegations of the Commission in Latin America trebled; the Commission acquired observer status in the Organization of American States (OAS) and established mechanisms of cooperation with the Latin American Economic System (SELA), the Latin American Association of Integration (ALADI), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Schumacher 1995: 121–122). In addition to its traditional development policy, the EC set up new instruments in order to support trade and investment, such as the European Community Investment Partner (ECIP) program and AL-INVEST (see Chapter 8 by Anne Haglund Morrissey). Last, since the early 1990s, the Community’s authorities have granted the Andean and Central American countries access to the European market through a general system of preferences. This has been the only nonreciprocal commercial concession granted to Latin American countries, instituted to assist the region following extended periods of civil war and in its struggle against drug trafficking. Furthermore, the ministerial meetings of the San José dialogue have been fixed as annual events, and the political dialogue started with the Rio Group in 1987 became institutionalized in 1990,4 following the Rome Declaration. By formalizing relationships with the Rio Group, the Commission widened the geographical field of political dialogue— which had been carried out up to that point with Central America—in order to extend Community policy to the rest of Latin America. The Rio Group, which had aspired to become the voice of Latin America in international affairs, rose as both an alternative to the OAS—since that body was dominated by the United States—and a permanent mechanism of political consultation and coordination among the Latin American countries. The dialogue with the Rio Group allowed the parties to approach topics as varied as trade, the environment, human rights and democracy, multilateralism, and European support for the regional integration processes in Latin America. In order to reinforce the European strategy toward Latin America, Spain and Portugal launched the Ibero-American dialogue with the Latin American countries in 1991. This annual headsof-state summit became a place of preliminary discussions and coordination across the Atlantic between the Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking countries (Sberro 2002: 152). So, the 1990s became fertile ground for the interregional relationship between Europe and Latin America. The relationship between the two continents has substantially evolved since the early 1990s. Over a short space of time, the EU has become a relatively important economic partner for Latin America. The EU is now the leading donor in the

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region (see Chapter 8 by Anne Haglund Morrissey), the main foreign investor, and the second-most important trading partner after the United States. Moreover, several countries, such as Chile and Mexico, and regional blocs in Latin America have engaged with the EU to negotiate ambitious association agreements. It is in this context that the first EU–Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) Summit took place in Rio de Janeiro in June 1999, where both sides committed themselves to further develop what they called a “strategic relationship.” In other words, the main aim of the Rio Process is, according to the official statements, “to strengthen the political, economic and cultural understanding between the two regions in order to encourage the development of a strategic partnership, establishing a set of priorities for future joint action in the political and economic fields” (Europa 1999: 2).

EU Relations with Mercosur

As already mentioned, the EU has developed bilateral relations with Chile and Mexico as well as interregional relations with Central America, the Andean Community, and Mercosur. EU authorities have paid particular attention to Mercosur, however. Relations between the EU and Mercosur began in the aftermath of the signing of the Treaty of Asunción (1991), which created the South American bloc (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay5). The EU was motivated to develop relations with the Mercosur countries following their political and economic evolution. The region began to democratize in the late 1980s. Argentina and Brazil, keen to move beyond their long-standing rivalry for regional leadership, also engaged in an unprecedented process of political and economic dialogue and cooperation, which served as a platform for Mercosur’s creation. Before the establishment of Mercosur, cooperation between Argentina and Brazil evolved through two important stages. The Integration and Cooperation Program (PICE) of 1986 established the first link in pursuit of further economic integration. In 1989, Argentina and Brazil reached a new agreement: the Integration, Cooperation, and Development Treaty (PICAB), which aimed to abolish tariff barriers and to coordinate macroeconomic policy and other specific policy areas (for example customs, science, and technology). In 1990, modifications to PICAB were introduced with the Buenos Aires Act, which aimed at facilitating the setting up of the common market in 1994. One year later, the Treaty of Asunción extended the Buenos

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Aires Act to Paraguay and Uruguay and established Mercosur. The Treaty of Asunción was later amended and updated by the 1994 Treaty of Ouro Preto, which created new institutions and gave Mercosur a legal status in international law. Mercosur came into force on January 1, 1995. Its aims are both political and economic: to stabilize democracy, to develop the economies in the region, to provide global insertion of national economies, and to reinforce the power of its members in the international system (Santander 2001). With regard to economic issues, one of Mercosur’s most important goals is to be a mechanism for “open integration.” The world’s leading economic powers took notice when the region became politically stable and began adopting economic policies characterized by long-term strategic interests. They saw in Latin America, and especially in Mercosur, an opportunity for new outlets for their domestic companies. The enthusiasm for this “emerging market” owed much to the race to privatize public enterprises as well as to deregulation and liberalization of economic activities, stabilization of macroeconomic policies to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and a far-reaching reform of the states in the region. These policies coincided with the creation of a new regionalism in the Southern Cone, which enabled member states to strengthen their neoliberal reforms—a key component of their international economic policies (Cammack 1999: 103). With a combined population of 210 million in 2000, a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of US$1,000 billion, and a strong growth in intraregional trade, Mercosur quickly became the world’s fourth-largest trading bloc, behind the EU, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries, and Japan. The democratic and economic reform programs, in combination with the emergence of new regionalism and economic growth in South America, were, according to the European Commission, important factors in the deepening of its relations with Mercosur (European Commission 1995a: 5–6). Moreover, by developing a stronger relationship with Mercosur, EU authorities aimed to counteract US influence in the Southern Cone region. A communication from the Commission emphasized in the mid-1990s that the need has become apparent for a more ambitious relationship with this region [Mercosur]—for a new framework of partnership which reflects the position the grouping has taken up on the world scene and in relations between the Union and Latin America. The Commission has therefore been authorized to negotiate an interregional framework agreement on trade and economic cooperation with Mercosur as the

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first step towards political and economic association between the two regions. (European Commission 1995c: 9)

So, the Commission, with the support of the Council, developed a strategy to institutionalize the growing links between Europe and Mercosur countries. “Third-generation” agreements, signed between 1990 and 1992 with each of the four countries of Mercosur, replaced the “empty-shell” agreements of the 1970s and 1980s. The new agreements are notable for their attention to regional integration and cooperation. They are also unique for the inclusion of two clauses in particular: the “democratic principles” clause, which calls for respect for the basic principles that stem from a heritage of common values, and the “future developments” clause, which enables the contracting parties to move beyond trade alone (European Commission 1995c: 8). EU Assistance to Mercosur

Behind these new agreements stood an EU eager to develop interregional relations with Mercosur. In 1992 the EU responded to the interest expressed by Mercosur by signing an agreement for interinstitutional cooperation. The main goal of such agreement was to allow Mercosur to benefit from European experience in regional integration, so that Mercosur could eventually become the EU’s main representative in relations with the southern Common Market countries. Following this agreement, the EU began to offer assistance to Mercosur in the form of technical norms, tariffs, and agriculture. The EU provides Mercosur’s secretariat with technical assistance in fields such as training, computer networks, documentation, and archives. It also supports the Mercosur presidencies in promotional activities such as seminars and conferences. Mercosur also benefits from a program establishing a customs code, which has resulted in Europe-based training courses for Mercosur’s customs officials and missions of European experts to Mercosur’s customs administrations. Cooperation has also involved assistance from the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) in drawing up technical and quality standards (courses, international meetings, training, and annual conferences) and help with agricultural projects (institutional aspects, veterinary and phytosanitary sectors). This cooperation has enabled the EU to export its regional governance model and to increase its reputation as an international actor. Furthermore, the interregional strategy encouraged the harmonization of economic rules at the regional level, so that Mercosur

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could create its own customs union, enabling European companies to eventually trade without customs barriers and to enjoy economies of scale (Santander 2008). European technical assistance to Mercosur, with the accompanying political and institutional dialogue, proved essential during the period of uncertainty experienced in the South American bloc in 1992 and 1993. During that period Brazil, led by President Fernando Collor, experienced a serious economic, political, and institutional crisis. Argentina, under President Carlos Menem, was dissociating itself from its Brazilian neighbor and grasped the offer from the United States to join NAFTA negotiations. The US proposal endangered Mercosur’s objective of establishing a free trade area and customs union. Throughout this period of uncertainty the EU supported Mercosur and developed a significant political and diplomatic dialogue. The US proposal was consistent with its “dual-track strategy” of trade liberalization (Payne 1996). While pressing for progress in multilateral trade, the United States envisioned, at the turning point between the Cold War and post–Cold War eras, a strategic network of trade agreements. Its aim was to integrate all nations into a framework inspired by the US market’s democracy. To that end, the United States became actively involved in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). In 1990 it launched the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), to create a free trade area (FTA) from Alaska in the North to Tierra del Fuego in the South. The EAI was followed by a hybrid agreement with the four countries of Mercosur under the name 4+1, then by the NAFTA and later the launch of the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Contrary to the European vision, the US authorities have considered the Latin American regional space as a merely temporary trading bloc that must ultimately be absorbed into the broader spaces envisioned by the United States (see the statements of Bergsten 1996). The integrationist project under development in South America was viewed with suspicion by the United States, as the project was seen as a barrier to the FTAA. The United States proposed that proAmerican Argentina (then under President Menem) join its project, hoping this would destabilize Mercosur and gradually enlarge the NAFTA to incorporate the rest of the Americas. The EU was aware of the threat posed by the US project to its interregional strategies with Asia, Latin America, and, of course, Mercosur. In a European Commission communication, the EU outlined the extent to which the signing of trade agreements with third countries or groups was economically and strategically important for the Union:

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FTAs are economically beneficial, especially where they help the EU to bolster its presence in the faster growing economies of the world, which is our overriding interest. . . . This direct economic justification has also been supplemented by strategic considerations regarding the need to reinforce our presence in particular markets and to attenuate the potential threat of others establishing privileged relations with countries which are economically important to us. (European Commission 1995b: 7)

The fear of being squeezed out of South America prompted a Union reaction, the need for which was highlighted in the fact that, in capturing 60 percent of the investments made by European enterprises in Latin America in the late 1990s, Mercosur had become a leading partner of the EU in Latin America (Giordano and Santiso 2000: 59). Commissioner Manuel Marín, who was responsible for the Latin America portfolio under the Santer Commission (1995–1999), proposed that the economic and trade links be strengthened in two stages. The first would be through the setting up of an interregional framework agreement for economic and trade cooperation. The second would be through the implementation of an interregional association of a political and economic nature, aimed at encouraging interregional flows, promoting private enterprise investment, and reinforcing political cooperation at the international level through convergence of the position of the EU and Mercosur in international bodies (European Commission 1994b). By approving this strategy, the Essen European Council, in December 1994, decided to set up “a new and extended partnership between the two regions” (European Council 1994: 16). Concurrently, the four presidents of Mercosur member states, meeting at the Ouro Preto summit (Brazil), approved this strategic move. On December 22, 1994, in Brussels, a “joint formal declaration of the Council of the European Union and the European Commission, on the one hand, and the member states of the Mercosur, on the other hand,” stipulated that the parties were committed to “concluding an interregional framework agreement concerning economic and trade cooperation” during 1995 and would “set up a closer political cooperation” (Official Journal of the European Communities 1994: 1–2). The European Parliament (European Parliament 1995: 10) and the Economic and Social Committee (European Economic and Social Committee 1996: 135–140) supported the strengthening of relations between the EU and Mercosur. For the European Parliament, these developments were in accordance with the EU’s trade role and prevented the Southern Cone from falling under the US umbrella. Last, the Cannes European Council, in June

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1995, gave the Commission a mandate to complete the negotiations of an interregional framework agreement with Mercosur; the Mercosur heads of state gathered in Asunción in August 1995 to confirm the mandate for negotiations.

The EU-Mercosur Interregional Framework for Cooperation Agreement

At the Madrid European Council, in December 1995, the EU and Mercosur signed the fourth-generation EU-Mercosur Interregional Framework for Cooperation Agreement (EMIFCA), which includes the democratic and future developments clauses of the third-generation agreements.6 The signing of this framework agreement between two regions was only possible because Mercosur was given legal status in international law, following a demand made by the EU, allowing it to sign international agreements and trade conventions. The hope of gaining access to the European market after the signing of a trade agreement with the Union boosted the development of Mercosur, dispelling the prospect of a weakened bloc in the continental liberalization movement launched by the United States. This development confirms that the EU has a role as an “external federator” for new regional experiences, through its interregionalist projects (Rüland 2006: 308). The EMIFCA, which is a transition agreement to prepare the ground for an FTA, is based on three pillars. The first institutionalizes a regular “political dialogue” for interregional—or “biregional”—consultation and coordination of the positions on multilateral questions in international bodies. The second foresees cooperation in fields such as the war against drugs and its consequences, culture, information and communication, and training in regional integration with a focus on the social dimension. Mercosur has also requested that some cooperation concentrate on regional integration, to help the body benefit from European experience in integration. The third pillar focuses on strengthening economic and commercial relations, which should include a liberalization of all trade in goods and services, aiming at free trade, in conformity with WTO rules (European Commission 2002h). For the EU, this type of agreement should act as a lever for multilateral trade liberalization, since the EU believes that “FTAs promote the principle of open regionalism and can generate trade liberalisation that subsequently spreads to the multilateral field” (European Commission 1995b: 7). In reality, the FTAs must be “WTO-plus” agreements. In other words, the trade nego-

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tiations at the interregional level should aim to achieve more than those at the multilateral level. By effectively supporting the economic and trade harmonization of the other regional spaces and then signing interregional trade agreements with them, the EU seeks to drive forward the multilateral liberalization programs. In this process of deepening engagements between the EU and Mercosur, transnational companies progressively, and of their own accord, started to play a dynamic role. Over a short period of time the flows of private capital and commercial trade increased exponentially, making Europe the leading investor and trading partner with the Southern Cone, ahead of the United States. European enterprises benefited from the regional integration efforts and the privatization and macroeconomic stability policies that resulted from the Argentine convertibility plan (1991) and the Plan Real in Brazil (1994). The most active European investors in the Southern Cone are German, Spanish, French, Dutch, and Italian. In the race to acquire markets, Spain has quickly moved to the head of the European group (ECLAC 2000). Argentina and Brazil now account for more than half of the European capital stock accumulated in Latin America. Within Mercosur, 75 percent of the EU’s investment flows go to Brazil and 24 percent to Argentina, compared with just 1 percent each to Paraguay and Uruguay. The European investments are particularly concentrated in the service sector (finance, telecommunications, energy) (Giordano and Santiso 2000: 59–66). Since the launch of Mercosur, the Southern Cone economies have become a magnet for European transnational companies’ strategies. These companies consider the South American market as a new financial horizon, a way of opening up to global competition and staking the EU’s place among competitors. European enterprises wanting to see a free trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur created a powerful lobby in early 1999—the Mercosur-European Business Forum (MEBF)—with the support of the European Commission (European Commission’s Enterprise Desk 2004a). A business forum, whose influence springs from regular meetings organised by the negotiators, often accompanies the new trend of interregionalism. To increase their visibility, coordinate their position so as to better promote their interests and to apply pressure on the decisionmakers (governments and supranational institutions), these enterprises link up in fora. They can then follow the negotiations and are well positioned to submit their proposals to working groups and policymakers. (European Commission’s Enterprise Desk 2004b)

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These developments were followed by considerable growth in goods trade but also by a major trade deficit for the Southern Cone economies. From 1990 to 1998, EU exports to the South American bloc increased by 375 percent, whereas the EU’s share of imports of Mercosur exports rose from 14.4 percent to 21.6 percent (IRELA 1999a: 11–13). The sharp rise in European exports to Mercosur was mainly the result of unilateral trade liberalization policies adopted by the South American governments from the early 1990s on. But this trade imbalance led to a trade dependence—the Southern Cone national economies became substantially more dependent on the European market than the European market was on the Southern Cone. Although the EU represented 23 percent of Mercosur’s external trade in 2003 and had thus become its leading trading partner, Mercosur accounted for only 2.9 percent of EU external trade (Europe & Globe 2004). On the structure of trade, Southern Cone countries have reduced their exports of raw materials to European countries since the 1970s but continue to export a large volume of processed foodstuffs. Some 51 percent of EU imports are agricultural goods, whereas agricultural products account for only 4.5 percent of EU exports to Mercosur. Forty-nine percent of EU imports are industrial goods, whereas 95.5 percent of EU exports are industrial goods (Cienfuegos Mateo 2003: 262). Unlike South American exports to the EU, European exports have a high valueadded content. The trade structure between Mercosur and the EU has strong parallels with North-South relations.

EU Internal Obstacles to Interregional Relations: The Case for Policy Coordination

The external trade structure between the EU and Mercosur is to some extent complementary and favors further integration between the two regions. Nevertheless, South American agricultural exports to the European market face serious obstacles, emanating from the EU’s internal politics and vested interests. A major obstacle is that there exist numerous European nontariff barriers, which serve to protect so-called sensitive sectors, such as beef, cereals, and sugar. These sectors are subject to specific policies under the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which aims to protect European agricultural production. The Mercosur countries believe they are put under a particular disadvantage by the CAP—a policy that has proved instrumental in widening the Mercosur trade deficit with the EU since 1995, as many of the “sensi-

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tive” products make up substantial components of Mercosur manufacturing capacity (IRELA 1999b: 6). The CAP has highlighted the almost irreconcilable positions of Mercosur and France, with the latter believing that it is “inconceivable” for the EU to be even more open to the agricultural products of the Southern Cone. Yet it was the former French president, Jacques Chirac, who, during a trip to the Mercosur countries in March 1997, encouraged the South American bloc to organize a Europe-Mercosur summit. This event later developed into a European, Latin American, and Caribbean summit. In setting out his “vision of a multipolar world” and warning of “the temptations of American unilateralism” (Chirac 1999: 804), Chirac hoped to offer the Latin Americans a counterweight to the United States’ ambitions of setting up the FTAA, whose second summit was already scheduled for April 1998. The first Europe–Latin America/Caribbean summit was then fixed for June 1999, with a view to launching negotiations for a free trade area with the Mercosur. To commence talks with the South American bloc, the European Commission needed a negotiation mandate from the Council. But major differences arose between and among the Council’s member states regarding the delivery of the negotiation mandate to the Commission. It was established that an interregional FTA with the Mercosur could seriously harm at least four sectors: agriculture (and fisheries), the economy, industry, and external relations (IRELA 1999a: 9). The majority of the ministers for industry, economy, and foreign affairs from EU member states appeared to support the negotiations with Mercosur. The French, Irish, and Dutch ministers for agriculture and fisheries, under pressure from their respective lobbies, were opposed to this mandate. The UK held the view that negotiations with Mercosur should not begin before the end of the following WTO round. There was also disagreement within the Santer Commission (1995–1999). The Agriculture Commissioner, Franz Fischler, supported by his colleagues from France (Commissioners Yves-Thibault de Silguy and Edith Cresson) and Ireland (Padraig Flynn), also opposed the project. Further support for this position came from the European agricultural lobby COPA-COGEGA (Committee of Agricultural Organizations in the European Union–General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives in the European Union), which was opposed to any kind of trade agreement with Mercosur (COPA 2004). Those opposed to trade liberalization based their position on the “multifunctional” nature of agriculture in Europe—the idea that agricultural production also takes account of food security, landscape conservation, the protection of ani-

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mals, employment, and so on (Laurent 2001). The Mercosur countries considered this a postponing tactic. The project was supported by Commissioner Marín, holding the German presidency of the EU (in the first six months of 1999), and by the Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese governments. It was also supported by the MEBF, which was set up in February 1999 specifically to assist the interregional negotiations, through a daily dialogue between the entrepreneurs and public authorities of each region (European Commission’s Mercosur Desk 2000: 4). The compromise between various European interests eventually gave the Commission a mandate to commence negotiations with Mercosur on nontariff barriers, but any discussions on the lifting of customs duties were pushed back to July 2001. These discussions were not to be completed prior to the end of the WTO round, allowing the EU to avoid tackling the question of subsidies for agricultural exports at the interregional level. In any case, the European Union preferred to handle negotiations about subsidies only at the WTO level. The Commission therefore attended the EU-Mercosur summit (held alongside the Rio Summit) with a limited negotiating mandate. It took four years from the signing of EMIFCA for the representatives of the two regional blocs to come to grips with the trade situation and to commence negotiations on the nontariff barriers in isolation. The negotiations were launched in 2000, during the first meeting of the Biregional Cooperation Council (BCC), which defined the structure, methodology, and schedule for the negotiations and created the Biregional Negotiations Committee (BNC). This committee has become the main body for negotiation between the EU and Mercosur; a Subcommittee on Cooperation (SCC), three subgroups on specific cooperation areas, and three technical groups (TGs) dealing with trade matters are linked to the BNC. The first four meetings of the BNC, held in 2000 and 2001, were limited to questions of methodology, exchange of information, and analysis of the basic prerequisites for starting the tariff negotiations. No substantial progress was made, highlighting an underlying impasse in the relations within the BNC. The question is not technical anymore but political. Since 2004, decisionmakers have repeatedly tried to restart trade talks. Brazil is quite disappointed with regard to WTO negotiations. According to Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim, negotiations between Mercosur and the EU are now a “greater priority than the commercial liberalization debates of the WTO” (Leo 2009: 1). According to Angel Moratinos, the Spanish foreign minister, Spain hopes to reach an interregional agreement in the first half of 2010, when it is set to hold the EU presidency (Radowitz 2009).

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EU-US Competition in the Southern Cone

In pursuing US president George W. Bush’s desire to put in place an FTAA, his administration set up the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), with an executive holding far-reaching mandates to negotiate international trade agreements. At about the same time, Argentina plunged into an economic crisis that precipitated a domestic debate about the raison d’être of Mercosur, and in particular about whether it should become more closely aligned with the United States and its ambitions to create an FTAA. In light of these factors, and in view of the fragility of Mercosur, the United States seized the opportunity to propose, in 2001, another trade agreement with Argentina. The United States hoped to reactivate conflicts among the members of Mercosur and to destabilize the bloc, because the United States considered that the FTAA should be brought into being through country-to-country agreements and by the expansion of NAFTA rules (Santander 2002: 494–497). If it accepted such a proposal, Argentina would risk weakening its international negotiating position, to the benefit of the United States— the same fate that befell Mexico when it joined NAFTA (Carranza 2004: 323). For the EU, a trade agreement between Argentina and the United States would represent the end of the South American bloc, threatening the EU’s interregionalist strategy toward Mercosur and reinforcing the FTAA project. The EU feared a possible trade-diversion effect from the FTAA on EU economies, following the pattern set when Mexico joined NAFTA and European companies lost about half of the Mexican market. European leaders were also aware that if the US project became a reality, it would mean an opening of markets and the creation of new standards and rules that would govern international trade. They feared the emergence of a US-led pan-American bloc, which could shape the rules of the worldwide economy (European Economic and Social Committee 2004). Such projects or agreements are often in competition, because they allow state or regional actors to redress their lack of international influence or to increase their global political presence. The current strategy of the EU toward South America was in response to this US proposal to create the FTAA. The EU wanted to avoid being ousted from that continent. It also wanted to avoid losing access to, and participation in, the development of new international trade rules. In order to avoid being excluded from the shaping of these new rules, Europeans tried to relaunch the interregional process in the early 2000s by setting up a €48 million package to deepen the Mercosur (European Commission 2002c: 5). The Union also made a more signifi-

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cant trade proposal during the fifth meeting of the BNC in July 2001, making it clear to South American leaders that if Mercosur broke down, the EU would not sign a trade agreement with individual countries. The European proposal included all sectors: fishing, services, market access, industry, and agriculture. The EU proposed gradual liberalization over ten years, covering 100 percent of manufactured goods and 90 percent of agricultural produce. Through this proposal the EU again contributed to the survival of Mercosur and encouraged its member countries to formulate a counterproposal on behalf of their regional bloc. European persistence in recognizing and supporting the regional groups as international actors in their own right has contributed to the strengthening of their internal structures and the reinforcement of their negotiation power internationally. That does not mean, of course, that the differences thrown up by the trade negotiations have been entirely resolved. In its proposal, the EU did not foresee cuts in subsidies, but it did foresee greater liberalization for products in which Mercosur is interested, through the increase in preferential tariff quotas. Mercosur member states were disappointed with the EU package, however, and this was reflected in their counterproposal. The Mercosur countries proposed a gradual liberalization over ten years, covering 86 percent of manufactured goods and 100 percent of agricultural produce. The car industry, which is a sensitive issue for Mercosur and a priority for the EU, was not included in Mercosur’s proposal. Moreover, the Mercosur countries, especially Brazil, were reluctant to open advantages to external competitors in the areas of services, investment, and public procurement. Although the proposals of the EU and Mercosur reflect differences of opinion, they formed an important platform for the negotiators from the two regions and allowed them to make progress in the talks. Pascal Lamy, European Trade Commissioner at the time, was determined to conclude an agreement before the end of the Prodi Commission’s legislature in 2004 (1999–2004), and he was given a date for the finalization of the negotiations by the European Council. In November 2003 the European Commission, with the support of the MEBF, drew up an ambitious working plan—within the limits of the mandate it received from the Council in June 1999—known as the Brussels Programme. This working plan set out five negotiating sessions and two ministerial meetings before October 2004. To ensure that the failure of the 2003 WTO Cancun meeting did not jeopardize these developments, the Commission tried to improve market access conditions for agricultural products from South America. The innovative aspect of the Commission’s proposal lay

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not in the quota system as such, which was set out at the fifth meeting of the BNC in July 2001, but rather in the fact that the proposal increased exports from the Mercosur countries. In fact, since the Commission has no authority to liberalize these “sensitive” products, it drew up what is known as the “single pocket principle” to be applied to this quota system. This principle would allow for immediate liberalization of a proportion of export quotas and would have made the remainder dependent on the outcome of the Doha Round of trade talks. This novel idea was conceived by the Commission to avoid confrontation with the Council, particularly with member states having significant agricultural interests to defend.7 During the 2004 Guadalajara summit between the Heads of State and Governments of the EU-LAC countries, the Europeans officially announced that the agreement would be concluded in October 2004. In conjunction with the failure of the 2003 Cancun WTO meeting, and the deadlock in US negotiations for an FTAA, the increased political will on the parts of both EU and Mercosur thus led to a deepening of these interregional developments. The chapters concerning political dialogue and cooperation have been concluded. This acceleration in negotiations owes much to the failure of the September 2003 Cancun WTO Ministerial Conference as well as to the race to reach bilateral trade agreements, which were launched by the United States after the deadlock in multilateral talks, in order to make progress with the FTAA. The European Commission also decided, within the limits of its mandate, to move forward swiftly along the interregionalist road in order to conclude a WTO-plus agreement with the South American bloc. Such an agreement would allow the EU to forestall the G-20 front, of which Brazil is a leader, and therefore to move ahead more easily in terms of multilateral liberalization. Again, this EU move must be interpreted as a response to the US drive to reach bilateral trade agreements with Latin American countries.

Prospects for an EU-Mercosur FTA?

Subsequent to these efforts of the Commission in pursuit of a WTO-plus agreement with Mercosur, the prospects for the conclusion of such an agreement have dimmed. There are three principal reasons for this. First, the small group of European member states that oppose an agreement has grown and been strengthened with the EU’s enlargement to countries from Eastern Europe. The European Commission went to

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some lengths not to upset some Council members. Despite renewed affirmations at the 2004 Guadalajara Summit by many EU member states of their desire to finalize an agreement, many other member states have contested the Commission’s proposals. Some EU member states, including Germany, Austria, Finland, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, believe that the proposal to allow into the European market the equivalent of four times the current level of EU production of ethanol could ruin this burgeoning industry. Moreover, the proposed quota increases for poultry, bananas, cereals, and beef—supported by new member states such as Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia—have prompted major criticisms from old member states (France, Italy, Spain, and Ireland) (Europe Daily Bulletin 2004: 8). Criticisms have also been voiced by COPA, which believes that granting preferential access to the European market for “countries classed as being among the world’s major producers of agricultural products would threaten not only the European agricultural model but would also prevent the poorest countries from reaping the benefits afforded by trade” (COPA 2004). The second reason for the reduced prospects of a WTO-plus agreement with Mercosur is another development relating to the FTAA. In a ministerial dispute between Brazil and the United States—who were cochairing the final phase of negotiations, in Miami in November 2003—Brazil succeeded in convincing others, including the US authorities, of the need for a small-scale and à la carte FTAA (dubbed “FTAAlight”) (Moreira Garcia 2004: 42). By opting to negotiate the agricultural dossier solely within the WTO, the Bush administration therefore found itself bound to accept the Brazilian demand to refer negotiations on investment protection, the liberalization of services, intellectual property, and government procurement to the WTO. The Miami compromise allows the thirty-four participating countries to choose the sectors and products in which they would like to participate. Consequently, the project that was being proposed by the United States in the FTAA has been abandoned. This blow to the FTAA negotiations has dented the motivation of European states to find a solution to their own hurdles in Mercosur negotiations. It has also significantly weakened the European Commission’s political desire to find a solution to the obstacles to trade negotiations with Mercosur. So long as the FTAA project does not threaten European economic and trade interests, the Commission prefers to concentrate its energies on the multilateral trade negotiations. The third and last issue that is affecting EU-Mercosur relations is related to Latin America’s current political developments. The new

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Latin American political context is having a double effect, as could be seen at the two most recent EU-LAC summits, held in Vienna in 2006 and Lima in 2008. The growth in Latin America of political radicalization and the return of economic nationalism have soured relations between the continent and the EU. These trends are also creating divisions within Latin America itself, for there is a growing ideological struggle and political rivalry among Latin American states. Moreover, the new governments there are developing autonomous external strategies and very different visions of regionalism, which are affecting the current regional integration projects. The continental rivalry between Presidents Hugo Chávez and Luiz Lula is a good example of this. They are developing very different regional projects. Thanks to the money flowing into national coffers from petrodollars, Chávez is building the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA). Lula, on the other hand, is supporting the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Unlike Chávez’s regional project, Lula’s is based on free trade and is market oriented. The EU fears President Chávez’s economic and political radicalism as well as his foreign policy, especially as Venezuela has been accepted as a member of Mercosur. The Venezuela of Chávez, which is waiting to get its status as a full member of Mercosur, is seeking to change the “neoliberal” nature of the South American bloc. As a result, given Chávez’s increasingly radical stance, the Lula government is seen in Brussels (and Washington) as a reasonable and serious administration, one that needs external political support in order to counteract Venezuela’s regional ambitions and the spread of political radicalism in Latin America. These three elements (reinforcement of EU internal opposition, failure of the FTAA project and relaunch of US bilateralism, and the political radicalization of some Latin American countries) have made the EU aware of the need to adapt its interregional strategy. Yet, one of the most fundamental changes in the EU’s post–Cold War Latin American strategy is the Europeans’ growing willingness to develop a closer relationship with Brazil. The latter is considered an emerging economic power of particular interest, since it has developed, according to the EU, serious macroeconomic policies that favor external investments, and it has entertained important relationships with both the US and the EU. The EU has since July 2007 developed a new “strategic partnership” with Brazil, including a political dialogue about regional and international political and economic issues. This new partnership implies neither the end of the EU-Mercosur relations nor the negotiations of an interregional free trade agreement (Santander 2007: 57–73). The EU is legally

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bound to conclude an association agreement with the South American regional bloc, since the mandate the Council gave the Commission in June 1999 only empowers the European executive to negotiate an interregional agreement. In fact, closer bilateral relations with Brazil are considered by the EU as a way to foster interregional trade negotiations—a means of facilitating the conclusions of an association agreement with Mercosur. So, in spite of closer relations with Brazil, the EU is still committed to interregionalism in South America and does not seek to conclude a bilateral free trade agreement with Brazil. In order to underline its commitment to South American regionalism, in December 2007 the EU decided to allocate €50 million to support the further development of Mercosur’s common institutions (parliament, court of justice, and secretariat) and strategies. Furthermore, as noted above, at least Spain hopes that the EU will soon be able to reinvigorate interregional trade negotiations. Hence, EU-Brazilian relations could be seen as a further incentive fueling the EU-Mercosur process.

Conclusion

With the end of the Cold War, increasing economic interdependence, the emergence of new regionalism, the deepening of European integration, and the adoption of new instruments (through the Maastricht Treaty) to consolidate the EU’s external action, the EU was able to develop a series of new agreements with third countries and regional blocs. This is the background against which one should attempt an understanding of the European strategy for more intense cooperation with Mercosur and the rapid institutionalization of the interregional relations that have taken place since the early 1990s. Through its external relations and trade departments in particular, the European Commission has spearheaded this strategy, with the encouragement of the European Council, the European Parliament, and the European Economic and Social Committee. So long as the interregional relationship was limited to European technical, logistic, institutional, and diplomatic support for developing the integration of Mercosur, the relationship enjoyed unanimous member support, because this relationship reinforced European influence in South America. The Commission attempted to spearhead the negotiations concerning free trade, but the 1999 mandate from the Council left it with little room to maneuver. Nevertheless the Commission made strategic use of its

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mandate, and it was able to negotiate quotas but could not fully liberalize agriculture. Moreover, each time the EU’s Latin American strategy was threatened (for example, when it seemed that the FTAA might be concluded), the Commission found ways of improving its offerings to Mercosur. Tensions surfaced within the EU, however, when member states were faced with making a decision on the Commission proposal, in particular with regard to negotiations with Mercosur for an association agreement that included an interregional FTA. Worried about the US-led FTAA project, Chirac’s France initially led a major political campaign in the Mercosur countries. The campaign aimed to persuade them to draw closer to Europe, to promote the development of a less asymmetric, multilateral system. Before long, however, France aligned with those in the Council fervently opposed to interregional trade liberalization. The French government, with the support of its national agricultural lobby, was concerned that the highly competitive agricultural produce of the Mercosur countries could disrupt French agriculture. This opposition grew stronger after the admission to the EU of Eastern European countries focused on agricultural production and benefiting from the CAP. Those pushing back against this opposition, calling for the conclusion of an FTA, included the European Commission, a European industrial lobby, and several member states, including Germany, Spain, Portugal, and the Scandinavian countries. As a result, the EU found itself torn between its strategic ambitions on the world stage and the realities of internal European politics. This lack of coordination and agreement among EU member states regarding free trade with Latin America contrasts with the successful negotiations about development assistance as discussed by Anne Haglund Morrissey in Chapter 8. There is currently little chance of an association agreement’s being concluded in the medium term, primarily because the conclusion of an FTAA as a WTO-plus agreement has been blocked by the Miami compromise of November 2003. The Commission intends to use this blockage to focus on the Doha Round. The suspension of multilateral trade talks in July 2006 has not relaunched interregional trade negotiations with Mercosur. Any conclusion of an agreement with the Mercosur will depend upon the results of the multilateral trade negotiations. In the meantime, relations between the EU and Mercosur will continue to be determined by the EU-Mercosur Interregional Framework for Cooperation Agreement. Finally, the political radicalization and the increasing economic nationalism in some South American countries constitute an additional obstacle to the reaching of an EU-Mercosur association agreement.

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Notes 1. The political dialogue alludes to actions and common positions, declarations, and diplomatic management. In practice, this dialogue allows the EU to establish diplomatic contacts with third parties. 2. An example of possible exceptions would be services in the areas of education, health (including social services), and culture as well as questions to do with investment, where the Council makes unanimous decisions. 3. In addition to the political parties, European nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) played a role in the pacification process of the region. Their agendas (social justice and human rights) complemented those of the parties on the left and in the center of the political spectrum. 4. The Rio Group consists of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 5. On July 4, 2006, Venezuela was accepted as a member of Mercosur. Venezuela is not a full Mercosur member yet, however. In fact, the country’s entry has not yet been ratified by the Brazilian and Paraguayan congresses owing to subsequent tensions between the Ch á vez government and the Brazilian Senate. 6. Fourth-generation agreements are more ambitious than prior ones. They aim to establish a free trade area in conformity with the WTO rules. 7. Interview with Miss Jonsson, European Commission, DG Agriculture, April 27, 2004.

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6 A Move Toward Hybrid Interregionalism in Asia Mary Farrell

I

n contrast to the formal and institutionalized framework that the European Community (EC) constructed for European Union (EU)–Africa cooperation, the EC established few similar structures to support political dialogue and closer economic cooperation between the European and Asian regions. Instead, the EC concentrated largely on deepening internal integration, with external economic relations conducted through the Common Commercial Policy (CCP). The Asian economies meanwhile focused upon a diversity of growth and exportled strategies that, for some, led to metamorphosis into leading industrialized economies and major competitors of the EU by the time the Single Market Programme was launched in the mid-1980s. A formal structure for cooperation between the two regions was initiated when the EC–Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Cooperation Agreement was signed in March 1980 at the second ECASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. This agreement provided the institutional and legal basis for closer interregional economic and trade cooperation and launched a process of regular ministerial dialogue that would subsequently evolve into a broad agenda covering political dialogue on security, human rights, development, and cooperation in technical, energy, and environmental matters. From the mid-1990s on, the European Commission embarked upon a range of initiatives, including the publication of regional and country strategy papers covering the Asia region. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), launched in 1996 as a forum for informal dialogue and cooperation among the EU-15, the European Commission, and the Asian states (Brunei, China, Indonesia, Japan, 115

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South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam), proposed the creation of a new partnership between Asia and Europe, built on enhanced political dialogue, reinforced economic cooperation, and cooperation in the cultural and social arenas. It was apparent that a new dynamism permeated EU-Asia interregionalism and cooperation in the closing decade of the twentieth century. The EU-Asia partnership is characterized by greater equality and more evenly balanced power relations than the history of EU-Africa cooperation attests to. Above all, this interregionalism is based on growing economic and trade cooperation that has continued to strengthen the interdependence of these two regions. The Asia region includes a number of powerful states with the resources and effective bargaining capability to shape the range of options open to European states in their search for enhanced market share in the region. There is also the issue of what room for maneuver exists for the EU to establish a presence within the region and to develop a role and identity as an actor within the Asian region. The two regions are generally considered to be quite different in their respective historical origins and development, region-building processes and identity formation, and degrees of integration and preferences for institutionalization (Beeson 2005). These are real differences that can fundamentally affect the processes and hence the form and substance of interregionalism. This chapter seeks to identify the nature and processes of interregionalism, to assess the strength of interregionalism in the particular context of the economic cooperation between the European and Asian regions, and to consider what role the Community method of integration and coordination has played in these processes and ultimately in Asian regionalism. The first section provides a brief historical overview of the European engagement in Asia, followed by an outline of the contemporary economic cooperation and trade between the two regions. The chapter goes on to look at the differing national positions on economic cooperation before identifying the issues and challenges of policy coordination. The chapter concludes with a critical assessment of the nature of EU interregionalism and speculates on the influence and actorness of the EU in Asia. Although European strategies are aimed at making the EU a global actor—and its share of global trade undoubtedly marks it as a global trade power—a key test is its capacity as a political actor in wider areas and the recognition given by other actors, particularly the emerging powers in Asia.

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Historical Background

European colonialism spread throughout Asia during the course of the nineteenth century. Even earlier, the traders and ships owned by Spanish, Dutch, and Portuguese businesses and rulers had found their way to the region—in search of minerals, metals, and agricultural products—consolidating an expanding web of territorial control. In time, colonialism left its mark on the region’s political and social institutions, and by the end of the nineteenth century most of East Asia had been integrated as a colony or within some form of European sphere of influence. Once the Opium Wars ended in the defeat of China (1842), Britain secured its victory by forcibly opening the Chinese markets; and soon France, the United States, and other European countries followed. The United States concentrated on Japan, whereas the European countries sought to build respective spheres of influence in various other locations across the Asian region, such that there were effectively several centers of power rather than a single pole of influence. From the end of the nineteenth century on, Japan’s successful industrial and economic expansion strategies enabled the country to move forward economically and to develop its own regional empire building, which brought it into conflict with China and Korea, ultimately creating tensions with the European imperialist states. Paradoxically, it was Japanese imperialism that eventually propelled the countries in the region to seek political independence; and with the defeat of Japan and the end of World War II in 1945, independence emerged to top the political agenda across East and Southeast Asia. The European colonial presence in Asia was at its peak during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the competitive market-seeking activities of the Europeans were played out in the ensuing imperial rivalries and resulting spheres of influence. It was largely ended with the expulsion of France from Vietnam in 1954, after a lengthy period during which the French were reluctant to disengage and allow for a peaceful transition to political independence. In the subsequent period, it was the United States that retained the predominant presence in Asia, seeing the region as part of the geostrategic rivalries of the Cold War and seeking to establish a regional security community to counter the spread of communism. Thereafter none of the European states maintained strategic interests in the region that were sufficiently well defined to call for an institutionalized framework of cooperation similar to that developed for Europe-Africa cooperation (see Chapter 4 by Mary Farrell). Consequently, the absence of a strategic imperative on the part of the EU generally, and most of its member states, meant that Europe (and

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specifically the EU) did not have a significant presence in Asia until the close of the twentieth century (Camilleri 2003). This is not to suggest that Asia was unimportant for the individual member states, and indeed trade between Europe and a number of Asian countries grew steadily in the last three decades of the twentieth century. Japan, and the newly industrializing countries of Southeast Asia, were important in terms of trade and foreign investment (in both directions), and soon came to be regarded by European actors as serious competitors. European countries had continued to engage in bilateral economic and technical cooperation with the Asian countries, and Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, in particular, had significant economic interests in the region. By the early 1980s, the populous Asian and AsiaPacific region accounted for 56 percent of the world’s population and 25 percent of world gross domestic product (GDP) (Bos et al. 1991: 38), and with the economic revival of Japan in the 1980s and the subsequent emergence of the East Asian tiger economies, European governments and the private sector were once more attracted by the commercial opportunities that the region offered. Camilleri provides a succinct summary of the various reasons for the new European interest in Asia: The competitive search for new markets was the most powerful catalyst for the emerging Asia-Europe dialogue, but several other factors, including the end of the Cold War, China’s rise as a major centre of power, Britain’s imminent departure from Hong Kong, Europe’s conspicuous exclusion from APEC, and US ambivalence towards trade liberalization and global multilateralism made the idea especially attractive to Europeans. (Camilleri 2003: 229)

Although economic advantages held an evident appeal for European governments and the business community, there can be no doubt that the emerging European political economy was equally attractive for the Asian region. An integrated European market and financial integration offered strategic opportunities for Asian business, and within Asia the new geostrategic and regional configuration exposed possible challenges and potential rivalries for the political actors and governments of the region. The following section reviews the economic cooperation between the two regions.

Economic Cooperation and Interregionalism

Economic cooperation between Europe and Asia grew slowly from the 1960s on, before picking up the pace quite considerably from the 1980s

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on. On the Asian side, the export-led growth strategies of Japan and the East Asian economies were instrumental in strengthening the volume of trade and foreign investment flows to Europe. On the European side, there was a significant shift in policy direction and market behavior toward the development of international markets, and both trade and investment strategies were shaped by the opportunities and the challenges of the global economy. From the 1980s on, the European Commission talked up the need for competitiveness and embraced trade liberalization as both a goal and a strategy for dealing with developing and developed countries alike. European trade with Asia was conducted under several different sets of rules (preferences regimes). The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the GSP+ offered preferential market access to imports from many of the Asian developing countries, including China; the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative was made available to the least developed countries (LDCs) from 2001 on, with the aim of granting duty-free and quota-free access to the EU’s market.1 Many Asian countries now find themselves subject to the GSP+ arrangement, under which the EU offers trade liberalization, while encouraging regional cooperation, and matches the preferences granted to the target (developing) country in return for the commitment to sustainable development and good governance (including respect for human rights and the rule of law). Asia as a whole now accounts for around 22 percent of the EU’s exports and is the EU’s third-largest regional trading partner (European Commission, DG Trade 2008); it also accounts for a significant share of EU foreign investment flows, thus making interregional cooperation of great significance for both regions (Eurostat 2008a). By 2004 the EU was running a deficit with the Asian ASEM countries.2 Of total EU imports, 29 percent originated from the Asian ASEM, whereas just under 16 percent of total EU exports went to the region (Eurostat 2008b: 14–16). The Asian ASEM ran a surplus with the EU over the 2000–2004 period, continuing a pattern that had started several years earlier. Unlike the case of EU-Africa interregionalism (see Chapter 4), trade relations were based upon secondary production, including such products as machinery and equipment, chemicals, minerals, and other manufactured products. The significance of each region for the other in 2004 is demonstrated in Table 6.1, which shows that the Asian ASEM grouping was just as important a regional trade partner for the EU as was the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and an important partnership for the newly enlarged EU. Although the Asian ASEM regional group was a principal trade part-

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Table 6.1 EU Trade with Main Partners (imports and exports), 2004

Partner Regions World NAFTA Latin America EU candidates EFTA Mediterranean countries ASEAN Asian ASEM

In US$ Millions 1,993,035 451,476 104,404 125,489 228,921 97,922 111,846 450,465

As Percentage 100.0 22.7 5.2 6.3 11.5 4.9 5.6 22.6

Source: Eurostat 2008b: 47. Notes: NAFTA = North American Free Trade Agreement; EU = European Union; EFTA = European Free Trade Association; ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations; ASEM = Asia-Europe Meeting.

ner for the EU, the reverse did not hold. Table 6.2 indicates that in 2004, for the Asian ASEM countries, the EU’s significance as a regional trading partner was ranked lower than the NAFTA group. Although somewhat of a generalization, the evidence suggests that the Asian group is very important for the EU countries, whereas the EU grouping, although important, is not the most important partner for the Asian region. Although the regional aggregation of data provides an interesting overview of the significance of EU-Asia cooperation for the respective regions, certain Asian countries are particularly prominent in economic cooperation. In 2007, China was the EU’s second-largest import partner (after the United States) and fourth-largest export partner, with Japan

Table 6.2 Asian ASEM Trade with Main Partners (imports and exports), 2004

Partner Regions World NAFTA Latin America EU candidates EFTA Mediterranean countries ASEAN EU

In US$ Millions 2,838,924 528,692 75,877 11,383 22,392 18,160 421,362 422,385

As Percentage 100.0 18.6 2.7 0.4 0.8 0.6 14.8 14.9

Source: European Commission/DG Trade 2005: 64. Notes: NAFTA = North American Free Trade Agreement; EU = European Union; EFTA = European Free Trade Association; ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations; ASEM = Asia-Europe Meeting.

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ranked fourth and fifth respectively. For India, trade with the EU accounted for more than 20 percent of the country’s exports and imports, making the EU bloc India’s largest trading partner. The EU is also the main source of inward foreign investment, mainly in the power/energy, telecommunications, and transport sectors. Overall, India ranks twelfth as an EU trading partner (with Australia just behind). EUIndia trade increased at an annual average of 11.1 percent between 2001 and 2005, however, and the commercial opportunities have prompted policy initiatives to foster greater trade and investment cooperation, leading to a proposal for an EU-India trade agreement made in 2006 as part of the Global Europe strategy (European Commission 2006d). Table 6.3 summarizes the major trading partners for the EU and the Asian ASEM groupings as of 2004. The Asia region has several formal and semiformal regional economic/security groupings, including ASEAN, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as well as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) security group.3 With a combined population of 503 million people, ASEAN is one of the largest regional markets in the world and a major trading partner for the EU. This degree of economic interdependence is a mark of how far interregionalism has developed since the 1980 Cooperation Agreement between the EC and the then seven ASEAN member countries. With both the EU and ASEAN in favor of closer cooperation, the issue of a free trade deal between the two blocs was once more raised during the German presidency of the EU in the first half of 2007.

Table 6.3 The Major Trade Partners of the EU and Asian ASEM, 2004

Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

EU United States China Switzerland Russia Japan Norway Turkey Korea Canada Taiwan

Source: European Commission/DG Trade 2005: 68.

Asian ASEM United States EU Japan China Hong Kong Korea Malaysia Singapore Thailand Australia

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SAARC is the only regional organization in South Asia and, although in existence since 1985, has been dogged by the economic disparities among the member countries, continued instability, the political rivalry between India and Pakistan, and the generally limited interest on the part of the larger states in making it work. The organization’s aim of promoting peace, trade, and development in the region through dialogue and cooperation has been thwarted by the ongoing political tensions, although the EU has consistently affirmed its interest in deepening links with SAARC as a regional organization by providing technical assistance and raising awareness of the benefits of regional cooperation. In sum, EU-Asia interregionalism in the area of economic cooperation can be characterized as a shifting mix of pure interregionalism (EU-ASEAN, EU-SAARC, EU–Asian ASEM) and hybrid interregionalism (EU-China, EU-India, EU-Japan). From the European side, economic cooperation (trade) tends to be initiated under the framework of the commercial policy, given the nature of the European regime. The patterns and structure of economic cooperation (trade and investment) suggest, however, that the simple distinction of “pure interregionalism” and “hybrid interregionalism” does not quite capture the complex and diverse nature of the economic ties between the European countries and the Asian partners. Clearly, China has become a significant EU partner in its own right, as an emerging regional power and a new member in the World Trade Organization (WTO); it is also a potentially influential political force in the ASEM grouping and a competitor to the EU in the Asian regional market. India is an important trade partner for the EU, and there is increasing interest on both sides in strengthening economic cooperation; the weak state of EU-SAARC relations stands in stark contrast to the dynamism of the EU-India or EUASEAN interregionalisms. Stronger economic ties between Europe and Asia were driven by economic logic—the profit potential of large markets and competition in a globalizing economy, as the business sector in both regions sought out new opportunities or resources. There was also the political logic— global liberalization, European liberalization, and the change in geostrategic realities, including the end of the Cold War and the emerging powers in Asia. Even so, the story of EU-Asia interregionalism must also take account of how Europe (the member states and the EU entity) found its way back to Asia postcolonialism and how Asia now regards the EU as an international actor. The following section sets out the geostrategic context, before going on to look at the European Commission’s new framework for EU-Asia interregionalism.

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What Strategy for Asia? Strategic and Geostrategic Factors

The origins of Europe-Asia interregionalism can be found in the political developments and uncertainties surrounding what kind of global/regional order might follow the end of the Cold War. The alternatives seemed to range between a unipolar world, revolving around the remaining superpower, or a multipolar world, with the United States, the EU, and East Asia at the core. In Asia, various regional cooperation initiatives were being launched or discussed, including a proposed Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA), and the first meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was held in 1993. The prospect of competing regional blocs in Asia posed a possible threat to the European Single Market. But in Europe there was also the fear that the European countries would miss the opportunity to be part of an emerging order, and the “Pacific Century” seemed to be part of that emerging order. European concern about being left out of an Asian resurgence coincided with the possible fear that the United States would shift its orientation away from the transatlantic alliance and toward a more transpacific alliance. Even the trade figures for 1995 indicated that around 66 percent of US trade was conducted within the Asia-Pacific area (albeit including Canada) (World Bank 2000). Although the European countries considered Asia important, it was not immediately apparent how to articulate a strategy for Asia as a region, not least because of the existing hierarchy and diversity of cooperative relations between the European countries and the countries in Asia. Martin Holland identifies three groups in Asia and locates European relations along a spectrum— from benevolent humanitarianism to competitive disinterest. At one end of the spectrum, South Asia (including India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) was economically underdeveloped and eligible for European humanitarian aid, although not for preferential trade arrangements; in the middle, the ASEAN countries were mostly developing economies, and some (especially Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand) were bound by the earlier political (anticommunist) agenda; at the other end of the spectrum, the newly industrializing countries (particularly South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) had emerged to pose a competitive threat to European industry (Holland 2002). A second difficulty in defining a strategy for Asia stemmed from the very diversity of the Asian countries, particularly in development levels, poverty rates, economic structures, social indicators, and population (UNESCAP 2009). In contrast to Africa, where most countries were

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underdeveloped and thus might arguably be treated on a similar basis under a common framework, Asia presented a kaleidoscope of development levels, contradictory patterns of growth and poverty even within the same state (such as India and China), and large disparities in such human development indicators as life expectancy, education, adult literacy, and infant mortality. Between East Asia and South Asia, the development gap was particularly acute, with several countries in the East Asian region showing levels of development comparable to those of the most advanced Western countries. A number of countries in Asia were actual or potential sources of regional instability, adding a further challenge for any European strategy. The countries that give rise to concern either to their immediate neighbors or to the wider international community make a long list. North Korea is a source of instability for its neighbor, South Korea, and the intense rivalry between India and Pakistan is an ever-present impediment to the prospects for future cooperation among the other member countries in close proximity and restricts the emergence of an environment conducive to deeper cooperation within the framework of the SAARC. Afghanistan remains unstable, and internal political and ethnic divisions continue to hamper potential statebuilding and reconstruction of the public infrastructure destroyed during the Afghan civil war and the years of conflict with Russia. Tensions between China and Taiwan are never far below the surface and threaten to spill over whenever escalating demands for independence by China’s small neighbor prompt reaction from the mainland, with the subsequent uncertainty over how China might respond to what it sees as a threat to internal cohesion and the government’s one-China policy. Central Asia (encompassing Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) has its own series of tensions and conflicts with neighbors, and the five states have been “hesitant and inconsistent in formulating regional agendas or structures for security cooperation” (Allison 2004: 463). Since the European Commission treats Central Asia separately from the rest of Asia, under the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) strategy paper, this chapter will not deal with the Central Asian subregion directly; however, its significance for the other Asian countries is clear, not least due to the economic ties and resource supplies from Central Asia to resource-dependent countries in other parts of Asia.

The Community Method to Interregionalism

The European Commission’s 1994 publication, “Towards a New Asia Strategy,” emphasized the benefits of interregional cooperation and

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highlighted the costs of failure to engage with Asia as an emerging economic powerhouse (European Commission 1994c). Not for the first time, the European Commission sought to convince the individual member states that global pressures and international competition required a response by the Union as a whole. In fact, the Commission had relied upon similar arguments in the 1980s to convince the countries to support the Single Market Programme. The proposed strategy did acknowledge Asia’s diversity and suggested that the term Asia was in fact an oversimplification. Instead, it was proposed to distinguish among the countries according to three subregions: East Asia (encompassing China, Japan, North and South Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau); Southeast Asia (the ASEAN grouping of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam); and South Asia (including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives, and Afghanistan). The Asia strategy had four objectives—a mix of the economic, political, and aspirational in equal measure. Easily the most palatable for all the member states was the intent to strengthen the EU’s economic presence in Asia and thus to promote the Union’s leading role in the world economy. The other three objectives—promotion of stability in Asia through international cooperation and understanding, economic development of the less prosperous countries, and making a contribution to the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law and of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Asia— were consistent with the general principles defining European external relations since the Maastricht Treaty and reflected how the EU sought to represent itself internationally. In keeping with the normative agenda, the strategy paper also advocated greater political dialogue in such areas as arms control, nonproliferation, human rights, and drug trafficking. The 1994 strategy also advocated that the EU should seek to make a positive contribution to regional security dialogues, even though internal consensus among the European member states on security policy had certainly not been reached at that point. A revised strategy for Asia, published in 2001 under the title “Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships,” was more comprehensive both in geographic scope and in the issues covered. Instead of specifically defining the region Asia, it was considered to include “the countries stretching from Afghanistan in the west to Japan in the east, and from China in the north to New Zealand in the south, plus all points between” (European Commission 2001: 6). Australia and New Zealand were therefore also included. The rationale

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for the strategy was rooted in the discourse of globalization and particularly the global environment characterized by uncertainty, instability, and global interdependence. The strategy paper was more explicit when it came to identifying the core objective of the new Asia strategy: to strengthen the EU’s political and economic presence across the region and to raise this to a level commensurate with the global weight of an enlarged EU (European Commission 2001: 3). Market access was of key concern to all EU member states and particularly attractive for the newer member states in search of economic expansion for their competitive industries. Without any significant presence in the region, and in the absence of historical ties, any unilateral actions spearheaded by national governments would have much less impact than actions undertaken as part of an EU strategy. China’s rapid rise as a regional power prompted a European response, and with much to gain from closer cooperation with the world’s most populous and fastest-growing nation, China was identified as a strategic partner (European Commission 2002a). A second EU strategy on China, covering the period 2007–2013, marked the shift in the European Union’s recognition of the change in China’s situation—no longer a developing country eligible for development assistance and aid, but an increasingly strong economic force eager to take on more international responsibilities. What, in particular, does the EU want from China? There are three primary motives: market access, a higher European profile within China, and an ally in international fora. The European Commission also expressed the desire to support China’s transition to an open society based upon the rule of law and respect for human rights. On these two latter points, the EU’s success will largely depend upon the extent to which China allows external interference and is willing to go along with the EU proposals and the extent to which a set of shared values can emerge. China is the EU’s second-largest trading partner; the EU is China’s third-largest trading partner and with a trade deficit that the EU would now happily assist in correcting. A striking feature of the new Asia strategy is the emphasis given to forms of hybrid interregionalism, involving the EU as a regional organization and individual Asian countries. Although the European Commission advocated strengthening the long-standing partnership with ASEAN, it advocated a two-level approach based upon stronger dialogue with ASEAN and increased relations with key ASEAN actors, with ASEM, and with regional powers, including China, India, Australia, and South Korea. The geographic and structural configuration

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of Asia—with its mix of rapidly growing economies such as China and India; advanced economies such as Japan, South Korea, and Singapore; and the other developing economies of Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia—proved it would not be possible to devise a simple interregional strategy along the same lines as the EU–African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries (ACP) model. Inevitably, the strategy favored economic cooperation, putting the emphasis on trade and investment with the more developed countries of the region, whereas the remainder of the region could benefit from various EU financial and technical assistance programs. Table 6.4 illustrates this hybrid interregionalism of the EUAsia strategy. The EU-Asia strategy operated as a coordinating program for existing activities between EU member states and the individual Asian countries, including trade and investment, development activities, aid, and humanitarian and technical assistance. This raises the question of whether individual EU member states could not simply continue with national policies of economic cooperation and development assistance toward Asia outside the framework of the EU-Asia strategy. In fact, they can and do—but the real benefit of the EU-Asia strategy for the member states lies in the economies of scale implicit in EU-level action and the ultimately bigger reward of closer links with Asia’s emerging economic powerhouse.

National Positions on EU-Asia Cooperation

Present EU-Asia strategy can be seen as an instance of the Community method toward economic policy coordination, with EU member states still free to pursue their respective national interests and policies (on investment, technical assistance, aid, and humanitarian assistance in particular). The hybrid supranational-intergovernmental nature of the EU can still give rise to tensions between the national and Community positions on interregionalism, however, even in the area of economic cooperation and trade-related issues (where the Community method is long established and mostly unchallenged). This is particularly true in the case of economic issues that have a foreign policy or security dimension, impinge upon a country’s national or strategic interest, or impact upon a country’s image of itself and its role in the world. Evidently, the interconnection among economic, political, and security issues is already recognized in the institutional framework for EUASEAN cooperation, where the foreign ministers of the EU member

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Table 6.4 Hybrid Interregionalism

EU-Asia Economic Cooperation (2005–2006)

EU Objectives

1. Multicountry programs: Trade, investment, education, environment

Trade and investment; peace and security; environmental protection; awareness and understanding of EU; higher education

2. ASEAN: Trade integration, antiterrorism

EU position: What is the likelihood of deeper economic integration? EU as model? EU-ASEAN closer cooperation (TREATI and READI initiatives)a

3. SAARC: Trade integration

EU position: Closer economic integration? Market access for SAARC in EU; technical support for SAFTA; harmonization of SAARC standards

4. “Bilateral” programs (EU-state)

Includes programs to support education, health, and good governance

5. National programs

Initiatives of EU member states (development, aid policy, humanitarian assistance)

6. ASEM

Periodic heads-of-state meetings. The European Commission also contributes to three ASEM projects: the ASEM Trust Fund, the Trans Eurasia Information Network, and the Asia Europe Foundation

In addition, Asian countries receive support under general EU programs such as the Research and Technology Development Programme, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, Aid to Uprooted People, the Support to NGO action, other budgetary lines that support environment and tropical forests, and treatment of HIV/AIDS. Source: European Commission/DG External Relations 2004. Notes: a. TREATI was introduced under the new partnership with ASEAN to expand trade and investment flows, and establish an effective framework for dialogue and regulatory cooperation on trade facilitation and investment issues. READI refers to the framework for dialogue on nontrade issues, including development, energy, and environment. EU = European Union; ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations; SAARC = South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation; ASEM = Asia-Europe Meeting; TREATI = Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative; READI = Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Initiative; SAFTA = South Asian Free Trade Agreement.

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states meet with the foreign ministers of the ASEAN states, together with the European Commissioner for External Relations and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) High Representative. Since the EU introduced political conditionality clauses, and given that international agreements with third countries now generally contain provisions on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, member states are also required to ensure that national agreements do not conflict with the European policy (in content or in spirit). Human rights issues arise frequently in EU-Asia dialogue—in the discussions with China, in the case of the political regime in Myanmar, in Tibet, and elsewhere—and shape the policy discussions and actors’ expectations in more complex ways; indeed, possibly constraining forms of interregional cooperation. 4 The first ASEM meeting was shunned by the Danish and Swedish heads of state because the governments were strongly critical of China’s human rights record, although the respective foreign ministers did attend. Security concerns have broadened beyond the traditional conception of military security and state survival to include terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, people smuggling, and environmental threats. Where these issues are linked to economic cooperation, European states will seek to frame discussion and policy actions in a broader foreign and security policy context to reflect national concerns and interests. National positions on EU-Asia cooperation are affected by the strategic interest in Asia generally and in specific countries or groups of countries within the region. It is reasonable to assume that the European states with a strong interest in maintaining or establishing a presence in Asia will support the Community method and align national policy with the European strategy on interregionalism, whereas member states with little economic or military interest (or historical ties) in Asia will tend to assign limited priority to policy coordination. Former colonial powers such as Britain and France have extensive cooperation with many Southeast Asian countries and tend to view the European (and multilateral) structures as additional and complementary to their own. Germany has a growing economic involvement in the region and favors the European stance toward multilateralism and interregionalism. Scandinavian countries have particular interests in the Asia region, although not specifically economic- and trade-related. The newer member states from East and Central Europe have a different set of interests, as they seek to consolidate the gains of membership, and their orientation is more toward Russia and (to some extent) the Central Asian states. Economic cooperation between the UK and the Asian region is

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shaped by economic and diplomatic considerations. For many years Singapore and Hong Kong have been magnets for inward investment from the UK, particularly in the financial services sector, construction, and media and advertising. The countries of South Asia (particularly Nepal, Bangladesh, and India) were targeted for technical assistance and infrastructure projects, cultural cooperation programs, and education and health projects, and India and Pakistan were also major partners in bilateral trade and investment-related activities; many of these activities were undertaken to support British exporters (Dent 1997). The historical ties between the UK and both India and Pakistan provided some basis for the continuation of economic and diplomatic ties in the postcolonial era, although the UK also faced the challenge of how to manage its separate relationships between two neighboring countries with their barely suppressed and potentially explosive rivalries. From the British perspective, particular sectors of interest for economic cooperation included textiles, aerospace, and defense, whereas market access and new defense technologies were among the priorities for both India and Pakistan. France’s policies toward Asia were driven by commercial motives, particularly in East Asia (Godement 1995; Wellons 1994). Geostrategically, there are two main French strategies with respect to Asia—France’s historical obligation to support the rule of law in the world and the recognition of economic interdependence. The French foreign policy has variously been explained in terms of the country’s position as a medium European power with clear foreign policy goals linked to security and independence (Bozo 1997; Grosse 1989), or as a Gaullist state situating itself as a great power and using the EU to project French influence in the wider world (Hoffman 2000), or finally, as the product of domestic decisionmaking by a rational, self-interested state, where decisions are the outcome of mediation by a variety of actors and institutional influences.5 Each of these interpretations can throw light on the pattern of economic ties between France and the Asian countries. The French government has been particularly active in seeking out markets for its major firms in the defense and security sectors; in banking, steel, energy, transport, and communications; and in areas of advanced manufacturing and construction; and France’s membership in the Asian Development Bank has positioned the country to continue its influence in such countries as Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. French mercantilist ambitions have strengthened in the face of the rapidly growing markets in China and India, and policy has accordingly shifted toward deepening the economic ties with Asia’s emerging eco-

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nomic powers. Like Germany, France has increasingly been motivated by pragmatic considerations in its policies toward Asia generally, with market access being given a priority in the political dialogue, whereas human rights discussions have tended to adopt a more diplomatic tone to recognize the significance of Asian values and cultural traditions (rather than focusing solely on universalist and, by implication, European values). Germany’s commitment to supporting interregional dialogue is long-standing, and the first meeting of the foreign ministers from the EC and ASEAN in 1978 owed much to the efforts of Germany’s then foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. More recently, the success of the 1994 ministerial meeting held in Karlsruhe, Germany, was also attributed to German diplomatic efforts in pushing the economic issues (the preference of the ASEAN countries) at the expense of other, more political, matters such as human rights and democracy. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Germany’s principal concern was in finding new markets for its manufactured goods in the dynamic economies of East Asia and subsequently in the fast-growing Chinese and Indian markets. The intermediate goods output of German manufacturing sectors was precisely what the new Asian economies needed for their own development, and with a decline in the traditional European markets, Germany’s interest in Asia found a ready-made counterpart (Dosch 2004). Amongst the EU-27, there is a significant variation in member states’ interest in, and commitment to, economic cooperation with Asia, covering a range of aid priorities, foreign policy strategies, historical trade ties, humanitarian issues, and market access (Davison 2004). By the 1990s the realization that the Asian region had become the major export destination and source of imports for the EU crystallized the priorities of individual countries and the Union as a whole (Forster 1999). Newer member states, particularly the East European states that joined the EU in 2004, have had to reorient their policies in line with the acquis communautaire and the acquis politique. And, as the policy on interregional cooperation evolves, these states face the dual challenge of penetrating the EU market and finding niches in Asia under the EU framework.

Coordination Challenges

In the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the European member states agreed to promote greater coordination of national policies, based upon a set of

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fundamental principles to guide the European policies toward developing countries: coordination, complementarity, and coherence, with a fourth principle (consistency) added in the Amsterdam Treaty.6 It must be recognized that “new generation” agreements with third countries (or groups of countries) are more complex than the simple trade agreements entered into in the past, incorporating trade and political issues as well as the clauses and conditions on governance and human rights. This means that the European Commission will negotiate in much closer collaboration with EU member states (many defending or promoting strong national interests), and the final agreement will also require the approval of the European Parliament (EP). The case of EU-Asia cooperation examined in this chapter suggests a number of implications with wider applicability. First, the application of principles (devised internally by the EU) in interregional cooperation agreements will not succeed without the political commitment of the other “regional” partner. The proposed EU-India trade pact—part of an ambitious agenda set at the EU-India summit in Helsinki in October 2006—was criticized by the Indian government because it contained the standard human rights and democracy clause, prompting the Indian commerce minister to say: “This is meant to be a specifically targeted trade and investment agreement, which it will not be if other elements come into it.”7 Where the weight of the partners is more evenly balanced, it is more difficult for the EU to impose conditionality on the other partner (Szymanski and Smith 2005). Second, when interregional cooperation spans a wide range of issues and policy domains, there is a greater need to secure consensus among all interests on both sides—in the case of the EU, this means coordinating with the EP, the European Commission, and the member state governments as well as responding to various lobbies and interest groups. There is also the external issue of recognizing the context and regional dynamics within which a country or group of countries interacts. In the case of EU-India interregionalism, the likely outcome will, in part, depend on how India defines its own role in relation to other emerging powers in the region—particularly China and Japan—as well as on India’s ability to sustain economic growth and maintain political stability (Bava 2007). Third, policy coordination may prove difficult to maintain against the weight of dominant or contradictory economic or political interests. How likely is it that the EU will always insist upon observance of human rights and the rule of law in its emerging China strategy?8 More generally, in the context of EU-China cooperation, the EU could be crit-

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icized for its failure to act strategically in carrying out a long-term and systematic plan to accomplish its objectives.9 The divisions among the European member states over lifting the EU embargo on arms trade with China (imposed in 1989) provide a practical illustration of a policy coordination problem. Germany and France supported a reexamination of the arms embargo policy on the basis that a new relationship, based upon the EU-China Strategic Partnership, required the European side to move on and lift the embargo. The opposition from other member states was based on differing reasons; the UK and new member states were concerned about the reaction of the United States to any proposed removal of the arms ban, whereas the Nordic countries raised the argument of China’s human rights record. Fourth, to what extent is it possible for the EU to insist upon good governance, human rights, and democracy when its own record shows it has failed to achieve the highest standards in these areas? The EU may have unintentionally created a credibility gap in the reversal of its policy toward Myanmar, wherein the EU suspended ministerial-level talks and refused, for three years, to meet the ruling military junta under the normal course of EU-ASEAN discussions, before deciding in 2000 not to allow the Myanmar issue to hold the EU-ASEAN dialogue hostage. Fifth, there is an inherent tension in applying the “four Cs” to external relations and to interregional cooperation agreements in particular. The four principles are intrinsically connected to improving the internal dynamics of EU politics and policymaking and cannot easily be translated to the external level. Consider the example of coherence in, say, security and development policy. In the current state of international relations and the fight against terrorism, security (in its traditional sense, rather than the newer conception of human security) has come to dominate the agenda at national and international levels. The preoccupation with security has marginalized development policy, squeezing out financial resources and the commitment necessary to conduct policy and to manage development projects. Even the ASEM process has been driven by the September 11 agenda over the past couple of years. Sixth, there is real difficulty in measuring the impact of these principles on policy outcomes. In fact their origins in the institutional power politics and bureaucratic self-interest and survival within the EU suggest a set of principles that may be inappropriate or even irrelevant to external relations, even more so if the outcome is likely to have a significant and adverse effect on domestic political choices (in the third country). Although principles and norms have been part of the international governance system for some time, these principles should serve a higher

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purpose that can be beneficial for all parties and measurable in terms of outcomes and results. Finally, there is a difficulty in implementing the four Cs in practice, particularly where European member states fiercely defend their sovereignty and autonomy over certain policy areas and are not willing to permit greater interference from the European Commission intent upon coordination. Ultimately, the necessary conditions for successful adoption of these principles include the commitment and political will of member state governments, and at all policymaking levels, with continued openness and transparency in both policy formulation and implementation in order to foster more objective assessment and evaluation.

EU Interregionalism: Toward a Global Actor?

EU-Asia cooperation constitutes a form of hybrid interregionalism, interspersed with elements of pure interregionalism (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004b; see also Chapter 1). Over the years, the scope of dialogue has expanded to include an array of issues such as concerns for human rights, international crime and terrorism, and environmental degradation. These issues appeared on the ASEM agenda, and in other forums where the European Union engaged with Asian partners, such as the EU-ASEAN meetings and the bilateral negotiations conducted between the EU and individual Asian countries. Three particular points highlight the specific approach of the EU toward cooperation with Asia: (1) there is no preference for one particular model of cooperation; the EU uses a variety of formal and informal arrangements through which to foster deeper cooperation with the Asian countries; (2) the resulting institutional arrangements have tended to reflect the Asian preferences for informality rather than the traditional EU approach to cooperation, based upon highly integrated, complex supranational institutions; (3) although the EU has combined pure interregionalism with forms of hybrid interregionalism, there is a growing preference for the hybrid interregionalisms. This may be explained in part by the difficulty of negotiating over very complex and politically contentious issues with disparate groups of countries. The EU has found that the difficulty of completing such negotiations, and the subsequent problems in implementation and compliance, make different forms of region-to-state treaties a more effective instrument for economic cooperation. Does interregional cooperation enhance the role of the EU as a

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global actor? Raising the profile of the EU in Asia, and particularly in China, has been a key objective. But a higher profile is not in itself sufficient to make for international actor status. The literature on international actorness suggests that actor capability in international affairs depends upon (1) the recognition by outsiders of the actor’s competence, (2) authority (the legal competence to act), (3) autonomy (distinctiveness and independence from other actors), and (4) cohesion (the extent to which the actor acts in a unitary way externally) (Ginsberg 1989; see also Chapter 2). In the area of trade, the EU does well on all four measures of actorness. In other areas of political dialogue, however, there is much less evidence of capacity to influence outcomes. Although the EU exhibits some degree of internal cohesion in the European Consensus among the Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council, with respect to the need for the EU to increase its presence in Asia, once the interregional dialogue is expanded beyond the trade area to encompass security, the internal consensus breaks down. The absence of a common foreign policy remains an obstacle to enhanced actorness, limiting the EU’s authority to act with one voice. Also, there is the issue of autonomy, and particularly the independence to act even in opposition to European domestic interests (either political or economic) and to act independently of the United States—a country with entrenched interests across Asia and one that is unwilling to give up its hegemonic position in the region. The recognition of the EU by others in the international system is an important prerequisite for exercising influence. Recent research suggests that the EU is portrayed in the Asian media as an external actor and not necessarily as an actor with local relevance (that is, with presence) in the country or regional group (Holland 2006). Although the EU is generally acknowledged as a trading bloc (and hence as powerful), the EU has also been represented in the guise of the EU3 (Britain, France, and Germany) because this group took the lead in the dialogue with Iran about its nuclear program during the 2006–2009 negotiations. Media coverage and representation of the EU may be interesting for what it tells us about the public perception of the EU, but there is also the bias inherent in the media’s inaccurate knowledge and understanding of the EU’s function, role, and capabilities. The perceptions of other major countries and regional powers about the EU, and its capacity to influence outcomes, are relevant. If Russia considers that the EU will refrain from criticizing its domestic human rights policy, or if Japan considers that a strong relationship with the United States is a higher priority within its national foreign policy and continues to prefer dealing

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with individual countries on a bilateral basis, then the potential for the EU to influence outcomes will be undermined.

Conclusion

Whether the proclaimed shared interests of the European Union and Asia (respect for multilateralism, security and order in Asia, and economic liberalization) are strong enough to translate into collective action has yet to be proven. Certainly, the evidence so far is not conclusive. EU-Asia cooperation has not been able to produce agreement on how to move the global trade agenda forward and to conclude the current Doha Round of trade negotiations. Even the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 failed to generate the necessary collective endeavor on global monetary or trade governance. Nor is there any consensus about how to resolve current challenges, such as the instability on the Korean peninsula, the question of Iran’s nuclear program, China-Taiwan relations, changes in crossStraits relations, and the “global war on terrorism.” The European Union’s move toward hybrid interregionalism in EUAsia cooperation is a pragmatic one, enabling the European countries to pursue economic interests with certain countries in the region while working within the constraints of the EU polity and also allowing Europe to take account of the shifting alliances across the Asian region. The EU has been described variously as a civilian power and as a normative power. It is, at this point, more accurate to identify the European Union as a “conflicted” trade power (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006), caught between the diverse national interests of the member states and the growing ambition to be a global player, and this is how it has represented itself in developing its Asia strategy. The model of cooperation that prevails in EU-Africa relations would not work for the EU’s relations with Asia—powerful countries such as China or India, or the advanced economies of Southeast Asia, will find negotiations that are accompanied by conditionality provisions unpalatable (Ba 2006; Eaton and Stubbs 2006). Asian regionalism is evolving and fluid, but national preferences still dictate the direction and pace of change, and even then economic integration is the main focus of Asian regional cooperation (Jayasuriya 2003; Ravenhill 2003). Europe’s stature as an economic bloc offers the best hope for the future of EU-Asia cooperation, although this still leaves the question of whether the EU can dislodge the United States from its pole position as influential actor in the region. As the EU is ultimately a trading bloc, it relies heavily on a stable

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international regime, and the current model of EU-Asia cooperation clearly serves the European need for stability. It is less certain that the EU-Asia cooperation model is suited to the particular needs of developing countries in the pursuit of development. Further, from the European side, profile raising is still only one part of the process in becoming an international actor. There remains the question of how to deal with the power politics in the international system, both within the European Union and globally.

Notes 1. Preferences for LDC and non-LDC countries under the GSP scheme were subject to periodic renewal, whereas the special arrangements provided for in the EBA initiative (modifying the GSP) with regard to market access for LDCs would be maintained for an unlimited period of time. The EBA initially excluded three “sensitive” products from immediate liberalization—bananas, rice, and sugar. In the EPA’s negotiations, however, the European Commission made an offer to extend the EBA provisions to all products. 2. The Asian ASEM countries were Brunei, China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Subsequently, in 2004, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar—already members of ASEAN—were accepted into ASEM. The ASEM 6 Summit, held in September 2006, decided to admit India, Mongolia, Pakistan, and the ASEAN Secretariat to the ASEM process (as well as Bulgaria and Romania, upon their accession to the EU). 3. ASEAN has ten Southeast Asian members: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. SAARC is a group of eight countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is a loose grouping of six countries: China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, set up initially to deal with border and security issues and now also with economic matters. 4. Member states can respond in different ways to the human rights condition—for instance, the EU has been criticized for refraining from criticizing Russia for human rights violations in view of the need to keep a functioning relationship with the political authorities to enable advancement of reforms in the economic sector. 5. France was the first major Western country to open diplomatic and military representation in China, in 1964. 6. Complementarity implies that the Commission and member states should work together so as to avoid duplication of effort and policy and to avoid contradictory objectives; coordination refers to the mechanisms for coordinating the administrative actions of the Commission, the member states, and the target (third) countries; coherence refers to the requirement that all areas of EU policy are compatible with EU development objectives; consistency involves linking all of the EU’s external policies (economic, development, CFSP) in a consistent and logical manner.

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7. Financial Times, “Rights Obstacle to EU-India Trade Pact,” March 4, 2007: 12. 8. Both Germany and France argued in 2004 for lifting the arms embargo imposed by the EU (and the United States) on China in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Square killings; they were hampered in this goal by the lack of support from other member states and eventually conceded to pressure from the United States not to remove the ban. The Franco-German case in favor of removing the embargo was firmly lodged in economic logic and the wish to strengthen economic and business ties with the Asian powerhouse—against the US concern that China might upset the balance of power in the region. 9. The reversal of the EU position of sponsoring a motion against China annually in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights is instructive. After nine years, France decided in 2000 not to continue with the practice—supported by Italy, Germany, Spain, and Greece, it refused to sponsor the antiChina resolution (which, if carried, would imply UN scrutiny of China’s actions to protect human rights). In the following year, the EU opted to follow the French line and not propose or endorse any resolution of censure against China at the United Nations.

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7 The Limits to Interregional Development Cooperation in Africa Fredrik Söderbaum and Patrik Stålgren

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he EU’s relations with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group of countries is testimony to a history of rather loose interregionalism based on colonial relations, which is now being redefined under the Cotonou Agreement. When entering into force in 1993, the Maastricht Treaty formally introduced development policy as an EU competence. The treaty forms the basis for the idea that the development engagements of the European Union (EU) should be coordinated and coherent and that the Commission should have a complementary role to the member states. The ongoing reform process within the EU aims to arrive at this idea and is closely related to the coherence of aid and the broader international discussion about aid effectiveness and the promotion of donor coordination. Several EU member states and the European Commission emphasize the view that the EU should be seen as a global actor in this policy field and as a donor coordination mechanism in and of itself that, in turn, can promote multilateral processes of donor coordination and aid effectiveness. The most advanced step in the direction of a more coordinated and coherent EU development policy is the joint statement by the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament in 2005, known as the European Consensus on Development Policy (European Union 2005). The Consensus establishes that the European Commission and the member states should coordinate their policies and programs in order to maximize their impact, pursuing a coherent approach and enhancing coordination and complementarity within the EU and with all other donors and partner countries. This chapter explores the EU’s relations with Africa in the field of 141

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international development cooperation, focusing on the EU as a global actor and the implications for interregionalism in Africa. Although the European Commission attempts to become a coordination hub for the EU as a whole (promoting the EU as a global and more unified actor) in this policy area, it also seeks to promote EU-African interregional cooperation. These two processes—that is, the combined attempts to consolidate the EU as a region and to promote interregional development cooperation—are tightly linked. To the extent that this move by the EU is successful, it signifies an important shift from classical countrybased development assistance toward region-building and interregionalism. The objective is not to offer an overview of the Commission’s or the Community’s development programs but to explore the EU’s actorness in a deeper sense. Crucial in this regard is whether central institutions of the EU, especially the Commission, and the EU member states are working together and coordinating their activities and policies. This is a prerequisite for the EU to emerge as a region and as a global actor, and tightly linked to this is the question of whether the EU responds to regions (interregionalism) or countries as counterparts.1 The analysis is organized in five sections. First, we review the evolution of the EU’s development cooperation with Africa, highlighting the promotion of regional cooperation and interregional relations as well as the EU’s quest to become a more unified and coordinated development actor. The two subsequent sections move beyond official rhetoric in giving empirical accounts of ongoing processes (or the lack of such processes) concerning the role of regional and interregional donor programs in the fields of natural resource management in the Lake Victoria region and the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) in Southern Africa, respectively. These two cases are selected because both donors and recipients have adopted regional approaches in these two fields, thus implying that the potential for interregionalism can be assumed to be high. The fourth section is a detailed assessment of whether the EU performs as a collective actor on a country level. This focus is relevant owing to the fact that most development cooperation is with countries rather than regions as counterparts. The point is that if the EU performs as one entity and as a “region” toward recipient countries, it represents not only a unique form of development cooperation, but it is also crucial for understanding the emergence of interregionalism. The conclusion offers some possible theoretically based explanations of unfolding events.

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Trends in the EU’s Development Cooperation in Africa

Historically, the EU’s partnership with ACP has emphasized humanitarian issues and trading relationships with former colonies, but it is now being redefined in a variety of ways. Policymakers in the EU lately described EU-ACP relations in symmetric terms, as cooperation between equal partners, trying to achieve a common agenda. The EU’s official policy on interregionalism with Africa, through the Cotonou Agreement and the more recent Joint Africa-EU Strategy, is designed to promote Africa’s development and to eradicate poverty on the African continent (European Commission 2005). Article 28 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement outlines the main objectives of these relations: Cooperation shall provide effective assistance to achieve the objectives and priorities which the ACP States have set themselves in the context of regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration, including interregional and intra-ACP cooperation.

The EU’s policy is based on the principles of helping the ACP countries to integrate with their regional neighbors as a step toward global integration, to build institutional capacities, and to apply principles of good governance. The EU also intends to continue to open its markets to products from the ACP group and from other developing countries (European Commission 2004i: 10). A stronger integration of the African countries and regions with the global economy is, according to the official EU view, the optimal trade and development strategy, which it claims is mutually beneficial (European Commission 2004i: 3). In other words, the EU pursues a strategy of consolidating regional integration arrangements among developing countries because regional integration is “an important step towards their integration in the world economy” (European Commission 2004e: 10; also see Chapters 3 and 4). In addition to “helping” developing countries to integrate into the world economy and among themselves, it is believed in EU circles that regional and interregional cooperation is useful for a series of other purposes, such as peacebuilding, conflict prevention, cross-border problem solving, and better use and management of natural resources. Consequently, in Africa and elsewhere, there is a broadening of the scope of the interregional partnership to include more political issues and norms. Although norms, and issues such as human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and good governance, were mentioned in earlier agreements, they have now been emphasized in explicitly strong terms in the Cotonou Agreement.

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A crucial ingredient for understanding the EU’s relations with Africa and its support of both regionalism and interregionalism is its self-identity as “the most advanced regional integration project in the world” (European Commission 1995a: 8). Indeed, the EU views itself as the natural point of reference for regional initiatives throughout the world, particularly in Africa but elsewhere also (European Commission 2004i: 3). The Commission pronounced with confidence: There are a number of lessons that can be drawn from the experience of regional integration in various parts of the world. Probably the most important lesson can be derived from the European experience, not only on account of its long history but also because, to a large extent, it can be considered as the only successful example of regional integration so far. (European Commission 1995a: 8)

The EU member states have been engaged in ongoing internal dialogue since the early 1990s regarding a more coordinated, common, and unified development policy. These discussions have been manifested particularly in the Joint Declaration by the Council and the Commission in April 2000 and in the more recent European Consensus from 2005 (see Chapter 3). But the EU’s coordination initiatives have been spurred on as much by efforts to consolidate the EU internally (the endogenous factor) as by global and multilateral developments (the exogenous factor). In fact, the two are closely related. Attempts to move toward a coordinated and coherent EU development policy in Africa need to be understood within the context of a more general discussion of coherence of aid and aid effectiveness. A number of mechanisms for aid coordination in Africa are already in place, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Paris Agenda, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), and a variety of budget support mechanisms and Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs). The European Commission’s official brief is to systematically and constructively exploit the potential for complementarity and synergy within the EU and to assist the member states in developing their own aid systems and the Union’s joint position in the international aid architecture. The EU coordination arrangements should include a common framework for aid delivery, including analytical work, planning, and implementation (European Commission 2004e; European Union 2000, 2005). The debate over the common EU development policy carries a particular emphasis on the delineation of roles between the EU and member states. The “value added” of the Commission is an important, but also contested, element in the discussion about the EU’s develop-

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ment policy. According to the Commission, “Community action is more neutral than action by the Member States, which have their own history and are bound by a specific legal system. Community solidarity and the Community’s integrated approach to cooperation are undoubtedly major assets” (European Commission 2000b: 4). Moreover, the size of Community aid provides leverage to increase coherence between disparate policy areas, such as humanitarian aid, trade, and security. The Commission also claims to provide “added value” through its ability to formulate and defend a common European position globally (European Commission 2004c: 7). From this picture emerges the Commission’s priority of promoting a common European position within global and multilateral coordination initiatives, such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the MDGs. The EU’s official view is that it should strive toward being a single unified actor at all “levels of governance” in the development community (multilateral, interregional, regional, and country level). As our analysis will demonstrate, however, the role of the EU and the Commission is undeniably ambiguous.

Natural Resource Management in the Lake Victoria Region

This section is an analysis of the EU’s role in the promotion of natural and water resource management in the Lake Victoria region in East Africa. This case is selected because the European Commission has identified it as a forerunner in the efforts to enhance a common EU approach, which increases the chances of concrete results being visible on the ground (European Commission 2002f, 2004d). Lake Victoria is the second-largest freshwater lake in the world, and both riparian states and donors stress the need for transboundary resource management. In addition, the trade and social interaction around the lake has often been held out as the basis for a functionally driven integration process, not dissimilar to the European integration experience (European Commission 2006e). By implication this is a case with strong potential for interregional development cooperation. The European Commission has initiated a series of regional projects to address the environmental degradation of the lake. Parallel to the Commission’s initiatives, many donors—including several EU member states—have also initiated transboundary programs in the region. The Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project (LVEMP) is one of

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the most comprehensive regional programs in the region. It began in 1994 to promote the rehabilitation of Lake Victoria’s ecosystem, with funding from the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and the International Development Association (IDA). An evaluation of LVEMP identified a weak connection between this program and similar initiatives within the Lake Victoria region as well as larger East Africa. Following renegotiations with the member states of the East Africa Community (EAC), a follow-up project, LVEMP II, was launched in 2005, with the stated objective of feeding into the regional integration agenda defined by the governments within the Lake Victoria basin and its development partners. In an attempt to strengthen its role in regional integration in Africa, the World Bank and GEF stated that LVEMP II should be further integrated with the World Bank’s Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) as a means of increasing economic transactions and peaceful cooperation among the ten states situated along the Nile, from Egypt to Burundi. But this initiative is widely seen as asymmetric: cooperation with other regional donors is welcomed but conditional upon the preparedness of these donors to contribute to the NBI platform. Even more problematic are the uncertainties surrounding how the regional integration process within the EAC and in the Lake Victoria region is reconciled within the NBI framework, involving states with long histories of resentment and conflict. The Swedish Lake Victoria Initiative (LVI) is another example of a bilateral but rather isolated region-building initiative, with the aim of supporting the ecosystem of the Lake Victoria region. It has a comprehensive agenda, stressing coherence among various sectors influencing the Lake Victoria ecosystem. The official view held by Sweden and by the countries around Lake Victoria is that the LVI is closely tied to EAC policies and that its role is to provide a vehicle for donor coordination. The implementation of this initiative has been marked, however, by difficulties in identifying the regional counterpart, problems in linking with the EAC agenda, and uncertainties about how to integrate Swedish initiatives in the three riparian states (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania) with the regional approach of LVI. In spite of these problems, the LVI has been promoted as a “flagship” in Swedish development policy. The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) has officially proclaimed LVI as “the most important challenge for Sida during the coming 20 years” (Sida 2002). Given this book’s emphasis on internal factors in the construction of external relations, it is worth noting that the LVI is modeled on Sweden’s experience from the Baltic Sea Cooperation (BSC) and reflects Sweden’s view of itself as the key driv-

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er of this process. Sweden even officially declared that it wanted to export the “unparalleled success” of the BSC to the Lake Victoria region (Sida 2002). Many donor agencies are involved in natural resource management in the Lake Victoria region and the broader Nile Basin, but there is weak coordination and, at times, even competition between various donors. Of particular interest is the lack of coordination mechanisms among LVI, LVEMP I and II, and other similar initiatives by the European Commission and the EU member states. There is also a similar lack of coordination among donors on the country level. In Tanzania, for instance, Sweden, Norway, France, the East African Development Bank (EADB), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the World Bank are all engaged in “transboundary natural resource management,” but they lack a forum for coordination (United Republic of Tanzania and European Community 2002). In an attempt to remedy this situation, the riparian countries established the Lake Victoria Development Programme in 2001, with the stated ambition of increasing donor coordination within the basin. This resulted in the signing of a Protocol for Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria (intended to regulate all actors’ interactions related to the lake), the initiation of the Lake Victoria Basin Commission, and the launch of LVEMP II within the Programme. However, six years after the launch of the Programme, the level of donor coordination remained at a rhetorical rather than a practical level. Practical modalities of joint planning and programming of interventions were still to be developed, and donors remained unaware of co-donors’ activities around the lake.2 To sum up, there is a pluralism of donor-driven programs for natural resource management in the Lake Victoria region. This is an interesting feature of international development cooperation, which tends to be increasing. There is weak coordination among the donors, however. Different donors sometimes support and fund overlapping or competing regional organizations and transboundary projects. Of particular importance for the purposes of this book, the EU is not a unified actor in this field. There is no or little coordination within the EU and nothing that distinguishes the European Commission from other donors. Even if the riparian countries are tied together into what can be understood as an ecological region, Lake Victoria is not an organized regional counterpart (weak regional actorship). The riparian countries often conduct their

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affairs bilaterally with specific donor agencies in a classical bilateral rather than interregional fashion.

HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa

It has become increasingly clear that the fight against HIV/AIDS has strong transboundary dimensions. Even if national strategies continue to dominate, African countries as well as donors have set up a variety of regional programs, which makes it relevant to investigate the role and logic of interregionalism in this field. The regional programs among donors take different forms. A survey conducted by Lawrence Gelmon (2004) reported that at least eight donor agencies have set up separate regional programs or representatives in the fight against HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa. This group includes the European Commission and a number of bilateral donors, such as the Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden, and Norway. The Delegation in Botswana carries the European Commission’s responsibility for fighting this pandemic in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, and a regional health adviser in Pretoria gives technical input to other Community Delegations.3 A striking feature is that the various regional donor programs to fight HIV/AIDS throughout Southern Africa operate largely independently from another. There is little division of labor among them, resulting in a lack of coordination, increased transaction costs, and a loss of efficiencies of scale (Gelmon 2004). There are a few exceptions worth mentioning. One is the joint HIV/AIDS secretariat for Southern Africa, established by Sweden and Norway in 2001. The remit of the secretariat is limited to channeling funding to regional HIV/AIDS programs and supporting Swedish and Norwegian national programs in Southern Africa in their activities to integrate HIV/AIDS into development cooperation. This approach is a novel effort to better link regional and national donor strategies and programs, which often tend to be isolated from one another. Another interesting exception to the general lack of coordination in donor activities is an initiative by a group of donor officials who set up an informal regional platform in 2003 for coordination among the European Commission, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Ireland, the UK, and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). Some issues on the agenda are how to cofinance regional programs (for example, through common basket funds), how to develop common plan-

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ning and report systems, and a joint study on coordination potentials at community levels. The group is loosely composed and meetings are held irregularly, however. Interviews reveal that the group’s initiatives are driven by the enthusiasm of a small group of individuals and that it has no formal terms of reference, official work plan, or formal institutional support4 (Sida 2004). One advanced example of donor coordination at the regional level is the Soul City Regional Programme, in which several donors—the European Commission, the UK, Ireland, and the Netherlands—have managed to coordinate regional media initiatives in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Soul City is a large multimedia nongovernmental organization (NGO) that supports health and HIV/AIDS-related programs on a regional level in Southern Africa. The donor funding is channeled through a basket fund.5 The memorandum of understanding that regulates this initiative indicates that its aim is to “facilitate joint working and cooperation between the donors and between the donors and the beneficiary” while maintaining one work plan, one reporting system, one set of evaluation procedures, and one audit jointly commissioned by all stakeholders (Soul City 2004). It is worth noting that the format for reporting, evaluation, and audit is based on the European Commission’s standard. Cooperation among the donors is quite formalized, and there is an explicit division of labor, as the donors meet regularly with Soul City management in the Joint Donors Forum. The forum is chaired by a Soul City official, who oversees a collectively set agenda. Donors have the right to represent each other at these meetings, and one appointed donor representative directs and organizes all formal communication between the donors and Soul City. Our interviews indicated that there are also more informal modes of coordination between the donors, parallel with the more organized donor coordination mechanisms—for instance, at various social gatherings and through after-hour activities. Summing up, many donors have adopted regional programs as part of their portfolio in the field of HIV/AIDS. The European Commission has no special role, however, and there is only very limited coordination on the basis of EU membership. Hence, the EU is not a coordinated or unified actor in this field. The analysis furthermore reveals that the regional donor programs are designed first and foremost to support national donor programs and strategies rather than to support the regional programs developed by the African countries, such as SADC’s HIV/AIDS strategy (Kingah 2008). Looking at the counterpart, there are few functioning programs on the regional level. SADC is a weak regional organization and its HIV/AIDS strategy is basically a series of paral-

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lel national strategies, among other things, due to the lack of visible benefits of and failure of the donors to support regional and interregional approaches (Kingah 2008). With this said, there are large potential benefits of increased donor coordination, both on a national and a regional level.

EU as Actor on a Country Level

Countries are still the most important counterparts in international development cooperation. This section draws on a general overview from a number of countries in Africa and then analyzes ongoing processes of donor coordination (or the lack of such coordination) in Tanzania. The Tanzanian case is often referred to as a success story for donor coordination, and it is therefore relevant to analyze the EU’s role in this process. The focus on countries (rather than regions) is motivated by the fact that we need to know to what extent the EU acts as “one” entity on the country level, given the limits to interregional development cooperation revealed in the foregoing sections. Such region-to-state relationships are worth studying in their own right, but they can also be assumed to be a forerunner of interregional relations. Under certain conditions such relations can be understood as hybrid interregionalism. Although the trend is toward increased donor coordination on country levels throughout many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, it is a process marked by significant problems, many of which can be attributed to the EU and the European Commission. It is widely recognized that there are tensions between the EU member states and the Commission as well as among individual EU member states. Stephen Dearden “identifies the conflicting objectives for development policy amongst the member states as lying at the heart of the EU’s development policy problems” (Dearden 2003: 105). A recent review by the Commission similarly shows the weak progress of donor coordination within the EU (European Commission 2004d). In fact, in 2004 only about 30 percent of member states used the EU’s Common Framework for Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) as a tool for bilateral programming (half of the old EU-15 use CSPs). As an indication of the prevailing challenges, in 2004 only around half of the member states (thirteen of EU-25, six of EU-15) have indicated a willingness to use one common EU multiannual strategic programming document per partner country (European Commission 2004d). Notable among the EU member states not giving an affirmative response to the Commission’s call for coordi-

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nation were France, the UK, and the Netherlands (European Commission 2004d). This picture of a low degree of coordination within the EU is sustained in a comparison of the policy declarations coming out of the Commission and EU capitals with the role attributed to the EU in the authors’ interviews with field officers in Eastern and Southern Africa. The official aspiration of the EU is that the Delegation should work closely with the diplomatic missions of the EU Member States, particularly the one representing the EU Presidency. . . . [The Delegation is] a natural point of contact between the EU and the Mozambican authorities as well as others in this country. (European Commission 2006c)

The situation “on the ground,” however, tells a different story. Rather than performing as a platform for coordination among EU member states, the role of the Delegations was concisely summarized by the Head of Delegation of the European Commission in Kenya, who described the Commission as “just another donor.”6 Notwithstanding some scattered examples of the EU troika and the Council president acting as a coordination mechanism, those interviewed further asserted that the EU does not function as a hub for coordination between EU member state initiatives and the Commission. Indeed, tensions are apparent between Brussels and the EU member states and also between Brussels and the Commission delegations in the field.7 The lack of EU-driven coordination on the country level should not distract from the general trend toward increased donor coordination in Eastern and Southern Africa and in large parts of Africa as a whole. These coordination processes are not centered on the EU or the European Commission but instead revolve around a series of other mostly multilateral and sometimes loosely organized coordination mechanisms, such as the Paris Agenda, the MDGs, the PRSPs, countrybased mechanisms for budget support, and SWAPs. Just like any other large donor, the Commission occasionally takes on the role of “lead donor” in a particular sector under a SWAP, but it typically falls short of its declared commitment to be involved and push for EU-based coordination. As a senior official of the Delegation of the European Commission in Mozambique pointed out, describing the Commission’s role in the field of HIV/AIDS, The Commission is almost a Byzantine bureaucracy in certain respects. . . . All the others harmonize including the Norwegians, the

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Dutch, the Irish. And they ask me that as we have agreed in principle on so many things, why can’t you also take part in this? I try to tell them that it is not because we don’t want to, but we have rules. But I know they still think this is an odd position.8

This problematic role of the European Commission is shared by other bilateral donors. One donor representative described the Delegation of the European Commission as “probably the most difficult donor to cooperate with because of its unique and bureaucratic administrative routines and funding mechanisms.”9 Another EU member state representative described the Commission as “someone who likes to go his own ways and always follows the dictates from Brussels instead of supporting existing coordination efforts.”10 Addressing the reasons for the lack of coordination, this interviewee also suggested that many donor officials regard coordination as “an extra burden that takes away focus from the ordinary work [and from] their own programmes.”11 Regarding the case of Tanzania, for a number of years this country has been a testing ground for various coordination attempts, and it is often held out as a success case for donor coordination and alignment. It is one of a relatively small number of recipient countries for which an action plan for coordination has been completed, and its implementation is under way (OECD/DAC 2005b). The European Commission’s program, together with the individual EU member states, accounts for more than half of the external aid to Tanzania (European Commission 2006b: 1). The European Commission runs its own program of support to Tanzania, and eleven EU member states have bilateral programs. Tanzania is seen as one of the prime countries targeted by the Commission for an increase in EU coordination (Lehtinen 2003). One of the Commission’s official aims is to coordinate “closely with the Embassies of the EU Member States in Dar es Salaam, to ensure that European Aid makes a coherent and effective contribution to Tanzania’s development efforts” (European Commission 2006b: 1). Efforts to increase coordination in Tanzania date back at least to the mid-1990s, when the Tanzanian government and some of its longeststanding partners from the Nordic countries established a National Poverty Eradication Strategy, which was to provide a common platform for identifying and prioritizing action, formulating policy, and conducting joint evaluation and monitoring missions. The Tanzanian government also presented a number of key documents—in particular the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS) and the Development Vision 2005—indicating its commitment to poverty reduction, which donors

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were invited to support. During the late 1990s a number of European donors (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK) jointly contributed more than US$85 million for establishing a Multilateral Debt Relief Fund (MDF). The funds were disbursed into a special account, and payments were made when debt obligations were due. The stated aim was to create a budget surplus to be used in the social sector and to qualify Tanzania as a Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC). According to Terhi Lehtinen (2003), the coordination efforts put in place during the 1990s were beginning to show some progress when they were “interrupted” by the Bretton Woods institutions in the late 1990s, when the PRSP was introduced as the main platform for donor coordination. Lehtinen argues that there was a lack of compatibility regarding both process and content between earlier initiatives and the PRSP. Nevertheless, multilateral and bilateral donors rapidly lined up behind the PRSP initiative, and following the adoption of a full PRSP in October 2000, this has served as the main platform for coordination in Tanzania. As a result of the priority accorded to the PRSP and the HIPC, in 2001 the European Commission joined forces with other donors in an effort to transform the MDF into a Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS). The aim of the PRBS was to support sectoral budgets with strong links to poverty reduction and at the same time increase both the predictability of donor flows and the level of ownership by the recipient. To this end donors began providing budget support either directly to the national budget (through the Ministry of Finance) or earmarked to specific sector baskets within the framework of different SWAPs. Progress in the use of budget support as a means to increase coordination was reported in a review undertaken jointly by the Tanzanian government and a group of development partners (Government of Tanzania and Development Partners 2004). The report recognized increasing “trust and continued dialogue” between Tanzania and the donors, which is important in furthering aid effectiveness. There was also genuine progress in donor coordination and alignment. For example, reforms in the mid-2000s have considerably raised the level of predictability of aid procurements. Increased cooperation between donors has resulted in a project to develop a common calendar of project cycles to be synchronized with the government’s budget system, which will provide the Tanzanian government with periods of “quiet times” to enable it to focus on budgetary processes rather than engaging with donors.

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In parallel to the increasing use of budget support, a series of mechanisms and institutions for donor coordination has been initiated. The hub within this structure is the Development Partners Group (DPG) in Tanzania, which comprises more than thirty bilateral and multilateral agencies, including the European Commission and all EU member states active in Tanzania (DPG 2007). Voluntary consensus is the basis of the DPG’s work, and explicit goals are to identify common positions on certain policy issues and to entrust a “lead donor” to be the main voice in relations with the Tanzanian government in most fields of development cooperation, such as agriculture, private sector development, financial sector, transport, energy, education, health, governance, legal sector, local government, public services, HIV/AIDS, environment, water, and sanitation. Linked to the DPG are a number of SWAP groups that address technical sectoral (or thematic) issues and then report back to the DPG. Efforts are made to link up sectoral initiatives to key processes at the national level (such as budget planning) and to encourage the use of joint reviews and information sharing. The success of coordination varies across sectors and themes. The Commission is active in some of the SWAPs where the most progress has been observed—for instance, in primary education, where the Commission cooperates with Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden through a system of pooled funding (GDPRD 2005: 57). The Commission is also engaged, together with Denmark, Japan, Ireland, and the World Bank, in setting up a SWAP in agriculture. There are therefore a number of donor coordination initiatives at the country level in Tanzania. Despite the European Commission’s stated ambition, however, of forging a common and coordinated EU development policy, where the Commission is a hub for coordination among the EU member states, there is little or no evidence of this in situ. As the Tanzanian case shows, this situation does not reflect a lack of demand for donor coordination but rather reflects the lack of effectiveness and legitimacy of the EU in these processes. One donor official in Tanzania made a statement similar to that of the aforementioned Kenyan Head of Delegation: “The European Commission representation is just like any other bilateral or multilateral donor agency acting on policy issues.”12 In some cases the European Commission representative or acting EU Chairman could act as chairman in donor meetings on practical issues where the EU member states try to act together, but “the European Commission does not have a bigger influence than any of the member states in these discussions.”13

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Conclusion

This chapter focuses on the EU-Africa relationship in the policy area of international development cooperation. The empirical analysis discloses that, in contrast to official policy declarations, the EU is neither a coherent and coordinated development actor nor a coordination hub for the member states, at least not in the cases of natural resource management in East Africa, HIV/AIDS management in Southern Africa, or countrybased development coordination throughout Eastern and Southern Africa. There are a large number of regional donor programs throughout Africa in various fields of activity, which increases the chances of interregionalism. There is neither a regional agent on the donor side nor one on the recipient side, however. The few initiatives that exist for coordination of regional aid programs are driven by bilateral engagements or multilateral organizations rather than by the EU and the European Commission. Furthermore, many donor programs on the regional level tend to be designed for particular donor interests rather than African interests, which at least to a certain extent undermines African regionalbuilding processes. How should we understand these developments? We contend that the EU has failed to enact its officially desired role within the field of development cooperation in Eastern and Southern Africa as a result of its inappropriate balancing between two elements in pursuing its policies: functionalism and identity. There is a strong emphasis in the donor community on aid effectiveness, donor coordination, and joint and functional problem solving. Functional coordination can be seen as a response to prevailing resource ineffectiveness and duplication of aid. The predicted outcome for actors engaged in a functionalist mode of collaboration is increased specialization and a functional division of labor, whereby each donor gives up its engagement in some areas in order to focus on specific sectors or programs where it has a comparative advantage (for example, roads, urban water management, legal sector reform). In these selected issue areas, donors coordinate their efforts and engage in joint missions based on shared goals, hoping to achieve economies of scale and increased effectiveness through mutual learning and specialization. Functionalism thus helps to explain the general trend toward donor coordination as part of the Paris Agenda for aid effectiveness and donor coordination around the MDGs. It also prevails in much of the policy discourse around the European Consensus on Development, particularly in the search for comparative advantage by the Commission and the EU member states.

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Although a functionalist perspective underpins much of the policy debate and official proclamations of how EU policy should look, it does not, however, explain the general lack of donor coordination occurring on the ground, where it is really needed. This chapter shows that the EU’s largely ineffective region-building and coordination strategies in Africa have not been primarily driven by a concern to increase aid effectiveness according to a functional dynamic but are instead driven by political and identity concerns. When policies are driven by identities rather than by functional objectives, the opportunities for compromise and for reaching common ground are reduced. A donor’s identity is strengthened by increased visibility in development cooperation (including symbols, “status,” and flag-waving) (Stålgren 2006). As one donor official put it: “A donor who does not give is not a donor.” 14 Functionally oriented actors trying to solve concrete problems often consider coordination as a “win-win” situation. In contrast, a donor driven by the need to manifest its own identity tends to see coordination as a “zero-sum game,” at least to the extent that the increased visibility and profile of one donor come at the direct expense of the profiles of other donors. This pattern tends to reinforce a conventional nation-state logic and prevent a post-Westphalian tendency toward interregionalism and increased coordination. The analysis in this chapter suggests that the EU’s ambition in development relations with Africa is driven by the effort not only to increase aid effectiveness but also to build the EU’s identity and reputation as a global actor. In fact, much of what the Commission does is ultimately aimed at consolidating the EU as a global actor, establishing presence and building actorness. A senior policy adviser of an EU member state concurred: “Development policy is a tool for the Commission to build the EU as a global actor.”15 The Commission seeks presence not simply as “just another donor” but as a collective and global actor, thereby representing both the EU as a regional polity and the EU member states. The Commission’s failure to achieve this goal in the field of development cooperation (beyond the Commission’s own aid programs) reflects its inability to present to EU member states its comparative advantage and a coherent “value-added” proposition relative to other coordination mechanisms or national programs. From a functional perspective it is not clear what the EU can do more effectively than other donors and coordination mechanisms, or why it should take on a leading role in development cooperation, either at the regional or the country level. At the same time, the field of development cooperation remains a scene for the manifestation of interna-

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tional identities, not only for the Commission but for most donors. This explains why most member states are not overly enthusiastic about a common EU development policy: it simply competes with their identity as donors. To increase its actorness, the Commission must embark on the double mission of convincingly demonstrating its comparative advantage to functionally oriented actors and of creating a European donor identity that breaks the present zero-sum logic as donors pursue their nationalistic self-manifestation in Africa.

Notes 1. In order to analyze how these processes are played out in the field, a number of field trips were conducted throughout Eastern and Southern Africa during the period from 2001 to 2007. All respondents have remained confidential. The research assistance provided by Andréas Godsäter on the HIV/AIDS issue is gratefully acknowledged. 2. Interviews with representatives of Sida, Stockholm, March 2007. 3. Interview with development policy official at the Delegation, Lusaka, Zambia, March 2005. 4. Interviews with donor representatives, Lusaka, Zambia, March 2005. 5. Interview with representative of Soul City, Maputo, March 2005. 6. Interview with Head of Delegation, Nairobi, Kenya, May 14, 2004. 7. Interviews with EU donor representatives in Southern and Eastern Africa, Dar-es-Salaam, January 2003; Nairobi, May 2004; Maputo, February 2005. 8. Interview with senior official of Delegation of the European Commission in Mozambique, Maputo, February 2005. 9. Interview with donor representative, Maputo, February 2005. 10. Interview with EU member state representative, Maputo, February 2005. 11. Ibid. 12. E-mail correspondence with Swedish donor official in Tanzania, January 13, 2003. 13. Ibid. 14. Interview with Swedish donor official, Harare, Zimbabwe, May 14, 2001. 15. Interview with senior policy adviser, Stockholm, January 22, 2007.

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8 The Nature of Interregional Development Cooperation in Latin America Anne Haglund Morrissey

R

egional cooperation and strengthened interregional relations have become, in the last two decades, a key foreign policy objective of the European Union (EU) and a preferential platform in its general development policy. The EU’s promotion of strengthened regional cooperation in various parts of the globe is sometimes based on the demands for such support by regional groupings, but it is increasingly coming from the EU itself. Aside from being seen as a more efficient way to deal with the outside world rather than treating each state individually, this support is also based on the belief that regional cooperation will strengthen security, stability, and good neighborly relations as well as bring increased development and sustained economic growth to the particular region. This connection between regional cooperation and development is made explicit in the European Consensus on Development presented by the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament in December 2005 (European Union 2005). The EU (the member states and the Commission) is today the leading donor of development aid to Latin America, even outstripping the United States. The Commission provides an estimated €450 million a year on average (cf. European Commission 2007: 8). Despite this fact and existing cultural, religious, historical, and trading ties, Latin America has always taken a rather marginal position in the European Community’s (EC’s) interregional development cooperation, and the focus for the EC’s foreign economic aid has, since its launch, been on the French, Belgian, and British ex-colonies in the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) group of countries. The interregional development cooperation that currently exists between the EU and Latin America is 159

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of a rather complex nature, since Latin America does not constitute one single regional organization. Instead, as discussed in this chapter, the EU’s interregional cooperation takes place at both the regional and the subregional level. As well as channeling development assistance to those two levels, EU financial aid is distributed bilaterally to individual states of the region. The main aim of this chapter is to explore the nature of EU interregional development cooperation with Latin America by looking at its constituent levels. As the Union’s development cooperation is seen as complementary to the one conducted at the national level by the twentyseven EU member states, it also seems essential to address the policy coordination between the European actors involved, both EU members and EU institutions. A closer coordination among the Commission, the member states, and the principal donors involved is also stressed in the above-mentioned European Consensus on Development, with the aim to achieve a greater complementarity of aid (see European Union 2005: 8, 12–13). In this context, it is interesting to explore whether there is a regional dimension in the Union’s development assistance to Latin American states and whether the Union’s support for regional cooperation constitutes a significant thread in its development activities in Latin America. Among the three levels involved in Latin American development cooperation—the bilateral, subregional, and regional—is any one of them more dominant than the others? This chapter first provides an overview of the state of play in EU interregional relations with Latin America, with a particular focus on development cooperation. It reviews the development cooperation and financial assistance at the regional, subregional, and bilateral level. A particular emphasis is placed on the horizontal programs directed to the entire region of Latin America. As the main aim of these programs is to promote a higher level of regional cooperation in Latin America and stronger interregional relations between the EU and Latin America and to contribute to an increased level of development in the region, they are especially pertinent to study in the task of exploring the level of interregionalism in EU development cooperation with Latin America.

From a Limited Focus to a Strategic Interregional Partnership

Despite the fact that the Community introduced financial and technical cooperation and surpassed the United States as the main donor of offi-

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cial development assistance (ODA) in the region in the mid-1970s, most Latin American countries received marginal emphasis in the foreign policies of the EC and its member states—in comparison with other developing states—up until the 1980s (cf. Grugel 2004: 612; InterAmerican Development Bank 2002: 1–2).1 Latin American states were seen as being too developed in relation to the ACP countries to be a target of European assistance, but not developed enough to warrant much consideration as political and economic partners. It was not until the mid-1980s, and after the end of the Cold War, that a number of developments promoted the emergence of a concerted interregional engagement with this region. First, the EC together with the Rio Group (see “Characteristics of the EU–Latin America Interregional Strategic Partnership”), made a major commitment to the resolution of the Central American crisis, related to the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, through the so-called San José Process. Second, the EC accession of Spain and Portugal increased the attention directed toward their former colonies. Third, the relaunch of the integration process and the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), together with the democratic transition and economic liberalization undertaken by almost all Latin American countries, contributed substantially to developing relations. European policy coordination also appeared to be favorably positioned, as there were no major national interests directly at stake in Latin America and none of the member states was in a dominant position relative to others (Freres 2000: 69; Rubiolo 2002: 25; García-Seyán 2004: 47; Smith 2003: 83–85). In the 1990s, at the bilateral level, the EU signed third-generation Framework Co-operation Agreements with every Latin American state, except Cuba. Today, Association Agreements with Mexico and Chile have been implemented. At the subregional level, the EU started to promote integration initiatives as part of its development policy, namely the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), the Andean Community, and Central America (Inter-American Development Bank 2002:4; CEC 1992). At the regional level, annual meetings of European and Rio Group foreign ministers were institutionalized. In June 1999 a first summit between Heads of State or Government of the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), held in Rio de Janeiro, sought to establish an interregional “strategic partnership” in which EU development cooperation was seen as a key element (EU-LAC Summit 1999). From the EU side, the partnership was driven primarily by a desire to enhance its political, economic, and cultural presence in Latin America and to regain the ground lost as a result of a change in US policy since the end

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of the Cold War, such as its support for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The summit demonstrated that the EU was capable of harmonizing the distinct interests of its member states into common political and economic positions, hence achieving increased policy coordination (Crawley 2000: 16–19). The parties gave priority to “overcoming poverty, marginalisation and social exclusion, within the framework of sustainable development promotion” (EU-LAC Summit 1999: 18). At the second EU-LAC Summit, held in Madrid in May 2002, an Action Plan was presented to bring EU-LAC relations closer in accordance with the motto of the Summit: “A Strategic Partnership for the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century” (EU-LAC Summit 2002a, 2002b). In May 2004 a third summit, held in Guadalajara, focused on multilateralism and social cohesion; and the fourth EU-LAC Summit in Vienna in 2006 also placed social cohesion to the forefront (EU-LAC Summit 2006: Article 37). The fifth summit, in Lima, Peru, in May 2008, focused on giving a new momentum to the interregional partnership. Attention was brought to two interrelated challenges: (1) poverty, inequality, and inclusion, and (2) sustainable development, the environment, climate change, and energy (EU-LAC Summit 2008: Article 10). The sixth summit will be held in Madrid in May 2010 with the theme “Towards a New Stage in Biregional Partnership: Innovation and Technology for Sustainable Development and Social Inclusion.”

Characteristics of the EU–Latin America Interregional Strategic Partnership

The EU typically uses the term biregional to describe its relations with Latin America in a way that corresponds with the intersecting concepts of interregionalism, hybrid interregionalism, and transregionalism (see Chapter 1). Such biregional activities are understood as those originating in one or various EU member states, in the European Commission, in one or various LAC countries, or in an integration organization belonging to one of these parties and, further, involving the participation of more than one country of both regions. In this context, the EU aims at promoting activities that have a multiplier effect over the entire region or in subregions and that are seen as strengthening the biregional strategic partnership (see EU-LAC Summit 2002a: par. 12). In addition to its focus on interregionalism, the EU has, since the 1990s, tended to address the developing world in terms of “partnership.” This model is visible, not least, in the EU’s “strategic” partnership with

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Latin America. Jean Grugel (2004: 608) argues that partnership can be understood to represent an “idealized relationship based around notions of equity and cooperation that ignores or transcends the underlying power inequalities.” In Latin America, the biregional strategic partnership is composed of (1) an enhanced political dialogue, for instance at the EU-LAC summits; the annual EU–Rio Group foreign ministers’ meetings; and the dialogues with the subregional associations in Latin America; and (2) the implementation of programs that have been mutually agreed upon by the two regions, seen, for instance, through the horizontal partnership networks (see “Community Assistance at the Regional Level”). The partnership should be reflected at three coordinated levels: regional, subregional, and bilateral. In addition, the EU has sought to broaden the social bases of its relationship with Latin America to include not only elites and governments but also civil society actors to which funds are directly channeled, as we can see in the horizontal programs described below. Nonstate actors are thus conceived by the EU as playing a significant role for development in the region (see Grugel 2004: 612, 617–618; European Commission 2003b: 5; EU-LAC Summit 2008: Article 18). In the interregional partnership, the European partner is well defined, in the form of the European Union. There are various actors involved in the management and implementation of the Union’s development assistance. Given that the Council and the European Parliament rarely deal with Latin America, the EU policy toward this region is substantially directed by the Commission. In 2001 the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AidCo) was established within the Commission to consolidate expertise in project and program management. It oversees the implementation of all external assistance in third countries (with the exception of preaccession assistance) such as the horizontal programs in Latin America (see “Community Assistance at the Regional Level”), humanitarian activities, macrofinancial assistance, and the CFSP. Since January 2001 the Directorate-General (DG) for External Relations and DG Development in the Commission has been responsible for multiannual programming and AidCo for the remainder of the project cycle, allowing for policy coordination and a separation of responsibility between the political and strategic issues on the one hand and project identification and implementation on the other. DG External Relations is responsible for the Regional Strategy Papers (which for Latin America involve one directed toward the entire region and one toward each of the subregional associations), Country Strategy Papers, and National Indicative Planning. AidCo’s activities are based on the content and ori-

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entations in these Strategy Papers. The worldwide budget lines that up until 2006 were divided into various themes (such as environment, gender, energy, human rights) have been under the responsibility of DG Development and DG External Relations, and AidCo has managed their concrete implementation. Although the EU partner is well defined, the Latin American counterpart in contrast is not composed of one single dominating organization that represents all states within the region. The organization that comes closest to fulfilling such a role is the Rio Group—a political discussion forum created in 1986 with yearly summits and a rotating and temporary secretariat that lacks permanent bodies—which encompasses all eighteen Latin American states.2 The EU also involves the Caribbean states in its interregional dialogue through the EU-LAC summits. Three associations operate at the more institutionalized, subregional level. First, Mercosur was established by the Treaty of Asunción, signed by Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, in 1991.3 The EU’s relations with Mercosur are the most developed of the three subregional associations. The main focus is on trade and economic cooperation, and negotiations are currently taking place on an EU-Mercosur Bi-Regional Association Agreement. The EU is the largest supporter of assistance to Mercosur through its 2007–2013 Regional Program adopted in August 2007 (European Commission 2002c: 3; EU-LAC Summit 2008: Article 2). Second, the economic integration of Central America was formally initiated with the General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration, signed by El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua in 1960, with Costa Rica joining in 1963.4 The EU has, since 1984, supported efforts to bring peace, democracy, and development to Central America (European Commission 2002g: 4–5). Negotiations on an EU–Central America Bi-Regional Association Agreement were launched in 2007 to build on the EU–Central America Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement of 2003. Since then, seven full rounds of negotiations have been undertaken but there is still no conclusion due to both the difficulties of Central America to define common regional priorities and the slow process of regional integration (European Commission 2009b). Third, the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) is based on the Cartagena Agreement of 1969; it comprises four countries of the Andean region—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru—as well as the bodies and institutions of the Andean Integration System (AIS).5 In April 2006, Venezuela withdrew from CAN in order to join Mercosur, and since December of the same year, Chile has participated in CAN as an associ-

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ate member. CAN has, since the 1970s, been supported by EC development cooperation, with a focus on the construction of the common market, human rights, humanitarian assistance, and the fight against drugs. Negotiations started in 2007 on an EU-CAN Bi-Regional Association Agreement (European Commission 2002e: 6, 11; EU-LAC Summit 2008: Article 2; see Philippe De Lombaerde, Geert Haghebaert, Socorro Ramírez, and An Vranckx in Chapter 11). When addressing the biregional level, it is important to bring attention to the most recent development in the region. On May 23, 2008, a Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) was officially launched by the Third Summit of Heads of State in Brazil. When the UNASUR Constitutive Treaty is ratified by all member states, UNASUR will unite the two customs unions of Mercosur and CAN. UNASUR is modeled on the European Union with both supranational and intergovernmental features, involving headquarters in Quito, Ecuador; a parliament in Cochabamba, Bolivia; and a bank in Bogotá, Colombia (UNASUR 2008). Finally, apart from its activities at the regional and subregional levels, the EU is also conducting bilateral cooperation with Mexico and Chile, two Latin American states that do not take part in the subregional associations.6

The Nature of European Aid Flows to Latin America European Official Development Assistance to Latin America

Since the late 1990s the Commission, together with the EU member states, has been the leading source of ODA to Latin America, providing a total of more than 45 percent of the region’s inflows (Inter-American Development Bank 2002: 47). Despite this, the region does not figure highly in most European donors’ geographical priorities, and it does not feature as a priority concern of the Commission. In 2003, Latin America received €329 million—only 6.6 percent of total EU development assistance (Valderrama 2004b: 92). Only Spain, which directs a majority of its development assistance to Latin America, is placing the region first in its development assistance priorities. Since the early 1990s, an important feature of European ODA to Latin America has been the steady emergence of the Commission as a leading source of European assistance. As we can see in Table 8.1, during the 2003–2007 period, the Community has bypassed the previous leading

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donor, Spain. However, among the twenty-seven EU member states, Spain is the leading donor of bilateral ODA to Latin America, followed by Germany, France, and the Netherlands. Among these states, only Spain directs a majority of its aid to Latin America (see also Gratius 2004: 5). Important to stress is that only the former fifteen member states of the EU are Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries, and only a minority of the twelve Central, Eastern, and Southeastern EU members (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic) give any development assistance to Latin America (OECD 2009). In Central America, Nicaragua has been the prime target of European ODA, receiving 10.6 percent of European ODA to LAC between 1991 and 2000. European assistance to the Andean subregion has declined; this region received 25 percent less aid in 2005 than a

Table 8.1 Gross Bilateral ODA from the 15 EU DAC Countries to Latin America, 2003–2007 (in US$ millions)

Country

2003

Austria 17.66 Belgium 67.85 Denmark 79.32 Finland 24.53 France 213.21 Germany 473.25 Greece 0.47 Ireland 11.19 Italy 55.15 Luxembourg 23.76 Netherlands 195.15 Portugal 0.53 Spain 517.37 Sweden 139.44 United Kingdom 131.74 Total all EU DAC members 1,950.62 EC 558.69

2004

2005

2006

2007

Total

21.27 82.09 78.40 30.58 343.25 662.81 0.68 14.13 82.12 20.63 288.99 2.02 631.51 188.51

22.60 83.66 94.28 23.68 250.13 433.48 1.96 14.03 121.88 23.84 272.53 2.20 584.17 170.76

24.09 86.68 86.76 36.14 305.13 446.98 1.60 19.37 65.22 27.52 167.83 2.60 783.71 187.37

27.46 84.83 101.15 43.82 359.57 474.34 4.79 26.53 86.24 34.71 268.81 4.93 1,181.46 203.05

113.08 405.11 439.91 158.75 1,471.29 2,490.86 9.50 85.25 410.61 130.46 1,193.31 12.28 3,698.22 889.13

129.29

132.15

35.79

–609.02

–180.05

2,576.28 663.51

2,231.35 754.96

2,276.79 826.07

2,292.67 1,063.63

1,1327.71 3,866.86

Source: Compiled from data collected from OECD 2009. Note: The following countries in the Americas have received ODA from the EU DAC countries: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Montserrat, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Caicos Islands, Uruguay, Venezuela.

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decade before. Only Bolivia has experienced steady European ODA flows, receiving 10 percent of European assistance for the subregion between 1991 and 2000. Brazil is the only Mercosur country for which European ODA flows have remained relatively steady, growing from US$572 million between 1991 and 1995 to US$678 million between 1996 and 2000. For Chile and Mexico—the two relatively more prosperous Latin American countries—European ODA programs have declined sharply after briefly rising at the turn of the millennium (Inter-American Development Bank 2002: 51–52). Community Assistance at the Bilateral and Subregional Level

As we have seen, the Commission constitutes the leading European donor of development aid to Latin America. Its development activities are, however, difficult to classify: some projects overlap sectoral definitions, resist clear classification by budget line, or seek to meet multiple development goals. Despite the fact that the interregional political dialogue between the EU and Latin America today also involves the Caribbean region at the EU-LAC summits, the states in Latin America and the Caribbean were at an early stage divided into two groups, with different institutional structures and implementation mechanisms. Most of the financing of the relations between the EU and Latin America has traditionally fallen under the Asian and Latin American Developing Countries (ALA-DC) Regulation, governing Community financial and technical assistance to, and economic cooperation with, developing countries in Asia and Latin America (CEC 1992; see also European Commission 2002d: par. 1). In contrast, the Caribbean countries (with the exception of Cuba) form part of the ACP group and have therefore been treated under the Yaoundé Conventions, then under the Lomé Conventions, and today under the Cotonou Agreement. In December 2006, the Regulation (EC) No. 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council established a new financing instrument for development cooperation—the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)—for the period 2007–2013. With the overall aim of improved development cooperation, this regulation replaces a range of geographic and thematic instruments that have been created over time, including the ALA-DC regulation.7 Through the DCI regulation, community aid is implemented through geographic and thematic programs and through the program of accompanying measures for the ACP Sugar Protocol countries. When it

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comes to geographic programs, these encompass cooperation with partner countries and regions determined on a geographical basis (such as Latin America). Community assistance in this field supports the implementation of policies aimed at poverty eradication and the achievement of the MDGs; the essential needs of the population; social cohesion and employment; and governance, democracy, human rights, and institutional reforms. The thematic programs cover a specific area of activity of interest to a group of partner countries not determined by geography, or cooperation activities focusing on various regions or groups of partner countries, or an international operation that is not geographically specific. Their scope is wider than that of geographic programs, encompassing not only the countries eligible for geographic cooperation under the DCI but also the countries and regions eligible under the European Development Fund (EDF) and under Regulation (EC) No. 1638/2006. There are five thematic programs: investment in human resources, the environment and the sustainable management of natural resources, nonstate actors and local authorities, the improvement of food security, and cooperation in the area of migration and asylum.8 Two broad categories of programmed development assistance have since the early 1990s dominated EU development cooperation with Latin America: financial and technical assistance and economic cooperation. This aid has been distributed through three levels: (1) bilaterally to individual countries, (2) to subregional associations, and (3) regionally through the horizontal programs for the entire region. EU development assistance to Latin America continues to be directed to these levels under the DCI. Financial and technical assistance has been the largest Commission budget line for development cooperation, and it accounted for 37 percent of its commitments to Latin America in 2000. It has involved the direct application of Commission financial resources and technical expertise, mainly to the sectoral areas of social (education, health) and economic (energy, transport, communications) infrastructure and services, and natural resources. The budget line has also encompassed peacekeeping techniques, debt relief, and “horizontal” projects, and nearly 35 percent of it has been used to promote regional integration (European Commission 2002g: 18). Economic cooperation emerged in the 1990s, and some 17 percent of all Commission commitments to Latin America consisted of such cooperation in 2000. Based on the notion of mutual benefits among donors and recipients, economic cooperation seeks to make economic, legislative, and administrative institutional structures more conducive to development. It is applied to fields such as supporting regional integra-

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tion, strengthening trade and investment links between the two regions, improving the competitiveness of companies, and the transfer of expertise (Inter-American Development Bank 2002: 33–34). Because of the particular aims of economic cooperation, such assistance features a number of what are termed “horizontal programs” to promote contacts between European and Latin American social society actors (see “Community Assistance at the Regional Level”). The two categories of financial and technical assistance and economic cooperation together accounted for more than 50 percent of the Commission’s development resources committed in Latin America before the introduction of the DCI in 2007. When we look at how EU assistance from these two categories was distributed among the Latin American states during the 2002–2006 period (see Table 8.2), it is evident that Nicaragua, Honduras, and Bolivia were the largest beneficiaries, closely followed by Peru and Ecuador. All are members of either

Table 8.2 Programmed Bilateral EU Assistance to Latin America, 2002–2006 (financial and technical cooperation and economic cooperation, in millions of euros)

Country Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Total

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

0 13.3 7.5 4.6 5.0 11.0 17.0 13.6 10.0 39.9 4.0 10.0 9.0 21.7 10.0 5.5 20.0

26.20 12.00 8.00 16.90 28.00 0 0 0 26.00 28.00 35.00 35.00 6.65 0 36.00 3.00 0

13.1 44.0 17.0 7.4 21.2 11.0 10.0 10.0 20.0 34.0 0 36.0 0 6.0 10.0 0 0

13.1 36.7 11.0 0 0 0 28.0 33.0 0 0 10.0 46.0 0 11.0 10.0 5.4 0

13.1 20.0 7.5 5.5 16.0 0 26.0 4.0 21.0 36.0 7.2 49.5 0 13.0 20.0 2.45 8.5

Total per Country 65.50 126.00 51.00 34.00 70.00 22.00 81.00 60.60 77.00 138.00 56.20 176.50 15.65 21.70 86.00 16.35 28.50 1,126.00

Source: Compiled from data collected from EuropeAid Cooperation Office, “External Cooperation Programmes,” available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index_en.htm (accessed December 8, 2007).

Total

Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela

Panama

Nicaragua

1,838

117 132 31 40

38

214

55

121 135 223

34 137

61 41 160

234

65

Millions of Euros

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Mexico

Education/vocational training (32.9%); economic competitiveness (35%); strengthening EU-Argentina relations (32.1%) Generating economic opportunities (41%); action against drug production and trafficking (33.5%); sustainable management of natural resources (25.5%) EU-Brazil relations (70%); sustainable development (30%) Social cohesion (40%); education (20%); innovation and competitiveness (40%) Peace and stability (70%); rule of law, justice, and human rights (20%); productivity, competition, and trade (10%) Modernization to promote social cohesion (75%); regional integration (25%) Boosting social measures (54%); creating sustainable economic opportunities and improving regional integration (46%) Social cohesion and public safety (70%); economic growth, regional integration and trade (30%) Social cohesion and public safety (35%); economic growth and regional integration (65%) Social cohesion (50%); management of forestry resources (30%); improving the legal system and public safety (20%) Social cohesion and dialogue on which policies to implement (40%); sustainable economy and competitiveness (35%); education and culture (25%) Governance and democracy (17.5%); education (35%); macroeconomic support (44.5%); institutional support for programs in specific economic sectors (5%) Modernizing and strengthening institutions to promote social cohesion (75%); integration with Central America (25%) Education (81.2%); regional and international economic integration (18.8%) Rule of law and governance (20%); integrated social development of specific regions (80%) Social and regional cohesion (60%); innovation, research, and economic development (40%) Modernizing and decentralizing the state (50%); sustainable economic growth and diversified production (50%)

Area

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El Salvador Guatemala Honduras

Costa Rica Ecuador

Brazil Chile Colombia

Bolivia

Argentina

Country

Table 8.3 Programmed Bilateral EU Assistance to Latin America, 2007–2013

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Central America or CAN. If we compare these figures with the programmed EU aid to Latin America in the 2007–2013 period, the three largest beneficiaries seem to remain the same, followed by Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru (see Table 8.3). At the subregional level, the programmed EU assistance to subregional groupings was the most extensive toward Central America, which received €55.3 million in the area of financial and technical cooperation for the 2002–2006 period (see Table 8.4). This amount was distributed to the fields of strengthened subregional integration, participation of civil society in the integration process, and reduction of vulnerability. Mercosur was the second-largest beneficiary during the same period, accounting for €42.7 million in the areas of statistics, technical norms, arbitrage, support for the institutionalization of Mercosur, technical and scientific assistance, support to the completion of the Internal Market, agriculture, information society, education, and the social dimension of Mercosur (European Commission 2002c: 3–4, 20–21). Of the three beneficiaries, the least assistance was given to the Andean Community, which had a budget of €29 million, financing five different projects: statistics, trade-related technical assistance, interaction with Andean civil society, the prevention of natural disasters, and civilian aviation (European Commission 2004a 3, 11; 2002e: 29). In the programming period of 2007–2013, Central America seems to become the largest beneficiary of EU funding (€75 million) compared to Mercosur and the Andean Community (€50 million each). The focus during the current period is clearly on the integration processes related to the subregional groupings (see Table 8.5). Besides the categories of financial and technical aid and economic

Table 8.4 Programmed EU Assistance to Subregional Groupings in Latin America, 2002–2006 (financial and technical cooperation and economic cooperation, in millions of euros)

Subregional Grouping

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Total

Mercosur 7.41 Andean Community 5.00 Central America 0

6.95 10.00 25.00

10.0 4.0 10.0

15.5 10.0 10.0

2.84 0 10.30

42.7 29.0 55.3

Source: Compiled from data collected from EuropeAid Cooperation Office, “External Cooperation Programmes,” available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index_en.htm (accessed December 8, 2007).

175

50 75

50

Millions of Euros

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Total

Andean Community Central America

Supporting Mercosur institutions (10%); extending the scope of Mercosur and implementing its association agreement with the EU (70%); boosting the role of civil society in Mercosur (20%) Regional economic integration (40%); social and economic cohesion (40%); drug control (20%) Strengthening the institutional framework for regional integration (26.5%); strengthening customs unions and the related common policies (62.5%); strengthening regional governance and improving public safety (11%)

Area

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Mercosur

Subregional Grouping

Table 8.5 Programmed EU Assistance to Subregional Groupings in Latin America, 2007–2013

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cooperation, Latin American states have also benefited from other Commission programs, in particular food aid and humanitarian assistance, accounting for 30 percent of the Commission’s assistance. In addition, Latin America has benefited from worldwide horizontal budget lines, which are not region specific, such as aid to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), democratization and human rights, and rural development. From these nonprogrammed budget lines, Community resources directed toward the regional level have included projects in the areas of gender, migration, human rights and torture, the fight against drugs and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), the environment and tropical forests, education and culture, energy, and research and development (European Commission 2002b: 15–16). As part of the reform of EU financial instruments and since the adoption of the DCI in 2006, these budget lines have now been replaced by the five global thematic programs mentioned above that are open for countries, territories, or regions eligible for assistance under a geographical program (such as the one toward Latin America) (European Parliament and the Council 2006: Articles 12–16). Latin American states can also benefit from programs under more general Community policies such as technological research and development: Coopener (energy), which concerns eight of the poorest countries in Latin America, and the Erasmus Mundus program (higher education scholarships), which in the 2005–2006 period granted 137 scholarships to students in Latin America. Also, the European Investment Bank (EIB) has since 1993 supported development and investments in Latin America. From 1993 to 2007, the EIB provided loans totaling €5.2 billion to more than twenty Latin American states. The new 2007–2013 EIB mandate adopted in November 2006 includes €2.8 billion for Latin America facilities (see European Commission 2007: 15). Community Assistance at the Regional Level

Turning now toward EU-financed projects directed toward the regional level (covering all Latin American states), in 2009 there are two EU projects in the field of financial and technical cooperation, accounting for €15.2 million, and eight horizontal programs, accounting for €355.5 million (see Table 8.6). The interregional development cooperation between the EU and Latin America is implemented primarily through these latter “horizontal” (meaning that they seek to meet a variety of development goals) programs or partnership networks (see Inter-

information society

education education public policies: taxation, justice, health, education, employment think tank energy policy and administration reserve

@LIS

ALFA II ALBAN EUROsociAL

Source: European Commission 2007: 10. Notes: @LIS = Alliance for the Information Society; OBREAL = Observatorio de las Relaciones EU-AL.

Natural disasters Total amount 2001–2010

studies and seminars development of projects

pilot projects meetings between companies pilot projects, regulatory dialogue exchanges in good practice high-level scholarships exchanges of experience in policymaking

Activities

2004–2007 2006–2010

2000–2006 2002–2010 2004–2009

2002–2006

2001–2006 2003–2007

Duration

387.5

32.0

1.5 24.0

52.0 88.5 30.0

46.0 63.5

50.0

Millions of Euros

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universities rural communities

universities, NGOs, organizations universities (teaching) students/universities public administration institutes and ILO

urban areas companies

Beneficiaries

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OBREAL Euro-Solar

urban development trade/investment

Sector

URB-AL II AL-INVEST III

Program

Table 8.6 Horizontal Programs of the European Commission, 2001–2010

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American Development Bank 2002: 54). Their aim is to enable a transfer of know-how and best practice between actors in both regions, in the economic and commercial fields and in urban policies, education, and university research, in order to develop the capacities of civil society partners in all Latin American countries, to intensify their exchanges, and to promote sustainable development and regional integration within and between the two regions. The programs are intended to bring economies of scale and to establish better synergies between the various levels of cooperation (bilateral, subregional, and regional) (see European Commission 2006a: 3, Country Briefing Argentina). The programs are managed centrally and are operated by local networks in the EU and Latin America, with the intention of contributing to a strong sense of ownership of those partners involved. Each program and project is cofinanced by the beneficiaries. The partners come from the public sector, local actors (municipalities), economic operators (enterprises, chambers of commerce), and the academic world (universities, research and training centers). Thus, civil society organizations in Latin America and Europe are the main actors, something that is consistent with the emphasis in the European Consensus on Development on civil society actors having a “vital role” in sustainable development (European Union 2005: 6). All of the horizontal programs listed in Table 8.6 belong to the three areas in focus in the EU’s Regional Strategy Paper for Latin America 2007–2013, namely social cohesion, regional integration and economic development, and human resources and mutual understanding. They also give visibility to the political priorities of the EU-LAC Strategic Partnership as expressed during the summits, which are translated, through the horizontal programs, into concrete actions (see European Commission 2002b: 14; 2003b: 1; 2007: 2). In 1993 the Commission initiated the first interregional cooperation program, AL-INVEST. It encourages European small and medium-sized enterprises to invest in technological modernization and management of Latin American undertakings. The aim is to strengthen interregional relations through a transfer of European technology and to enhance the cooperation between undertakings in both regions. By directly funding projects for organizations that represent and promote private sector development (PSD), such as chambers of commerce, trade associations, and exportpromotion agencies, the AL-INVEST Program aims at facilitating the process of internationalization of Latin American small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Since its launch, more than 30,000 organizations have taken part in the program. The program has proceeded through four

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phases: AL-INVEST I (1995–1999), AL-INVEST II (2000–2003), ALINVEST III (2004–2007), and AL-INVEST IV (2009–2012). ALINVEST III included the previous horizontal programs of ALURE9 and ATLAS10 (European Commission 2002b: 14; 2003b: 2; 2004g: 25). Two networks of organizations constituted the foundation of the program in this phase and implemented its activities—Coopecos in Europe and Eurocentros in Latin America. In 2008, there were Latin American participants in sixty-seven Eurocentros. Up until the end of AL-INVEST III, there have been 564 cases where the principal operator of a project has been Latin American, and 949 activities have been organized by ALINVEST (European Commission 2006a: 4, Country Briefing Argentina). On the issue of LAC state participation, it is evident that the largest number of participants and the most activities have been concentrated in the Mercosur members, Argentina and Brazil, and in Mexico. The fewest participants and activities are found in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Cuba, and Venezuela. Thus, the less developed countries from Central America and the Andean Community have not benefited from the program as much as countries in Mercosur. The ambition with AL-INVEST IV is to address these shortcomings. AL-INVEST IV is implemented through three groups of business organizations (consortia), belonging to three distinct geographical areas in Latin America, with the consortia leaders located in Mexico, Bolivia, and Brazil (AL-INVEST III Consortium 2009). The ALFA Programme on higher education came into operation in 1994. The program promotes academic cooperation and dialogue between higher education establishments in both regions. The program has developed through three phases: ALFA I (1994–2000), ALFA II (2000–2006), and ALFA III (2008–2012). ALFA II comprised two components: (1) participative and academic management and (2) scientific and technical cooperation (mobility). There were 214 approved projects in which 450 different higher education institutions participated. The projects were especially dominated by participants from Spain, Argentina, Brazil, and Portugal and, to a somewhat lesser extent, by participants from Chile, Italy, Mexico, and Cuba. The least participation was in Paraguay, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama. The third phase of the program—ALFA III—was launched in 2008. The URB-AL Program was launched in 1995. It aims at developing direct and lasting partnership relations between European and Latin American local authorities through the dissemination, acquisition, and application of best practices relating to urban policies. Activities include thematic networks (such as the fight against urban poverty, promoting the role of women in local decisionmaking bodies in towns and in the

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information society, and citizens’ safety), with various joint projects and two biannual political and technical meetings between mayors and representatives of towns in the two regions. The program activities are proposed, implemented, and managed by the participants themselves. In the second phase of the URB-AL Programme (2001–2006), more than 800 different local authorities were represented, involving thirteen thematic networks (six of which were coordinated by a Latin American local authority) and 2,000 cases of participation (European Commission 2003b: 3–4). The most active participants were located in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Peru, and the smallest number of participants came from El Salvador, Colombia, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Panama. Since 2008, URB-AL has been in its third phase, URB-AL III. The Alliance for the Information Society Programme (@LIS) was launched in 2002, for the 2002–2006 period. Since the Commission decision of October 2008, it is now in its second phase, @LIS II. The program aims at reducing the digital divide between those Latin American citizens who have access to the new information and communication technologies and those who do not. The objective is to meet the needs of local communities, stimulate the dialogue on policies and regulation, and increase the interconnection capacity between research circles. The activities have been organized around three areas of intervention: dialogues, networks (the Network of Researchers and the Network of Regulators), and demonstration projects. Within these three areas, five horizontal actions and nineteen demonstration projects (individual participation in four sectors: e-Education, e-Inclusion, e-Governance, and e-Health) were developed during its first phase, in which some 212 organizations from both regions took part (European Commission 2006a: 3, Country Briefing Argentina). In 2002 the ALBAN Programme (2002–2010) was launched. It promotes, through scholarships, education projects for Latin American students at master’s and doctorate levels wishing to study in the EU and specialized training of professionals or future decisionmakers in highlevel EU institutions. It is expected that at least 3,900 ALBAN scholarships will be awarded during the period of the program. The first group, selected for the 2003–2004 academic year, comprised 251 students from Latin America. The ALBAN Programme is now in its second phase, 2006–2010 (European Commission 2003b: 9–11; European Commission 2006a: 4, Country Briefing Argentina). However, since the last call for applications to ALBAN scholarships in December 2006, no more calls will be opened. Instead, the new cooperation program in the field of higher education between the EU and Latin America in the framework

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of the Erasmus Mundus program will replace the calls of ALBAN. From its inception, most scholarships have been awarded to Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Argentina; the smallest number have been awarded to Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. In September 2003 the Observatorio de las Relaciones EU-AL (OBREAL) was approved by the EU member states for the period 2004–2007. It sought to identify and develop all opportunities for partnership between the two regions. The program, which was based on the expertise available in the networks of European and Latin American institutes, aimed to achieve a better understanding of regional and sectoral issues and common challenges affecting policymaking and to promote the spread of relevant information relating to relations between the two regions (European Commission 2004f: 24). The program consisted of twenty-three universities from the EU and Latin America, led by the University of Barcelona. In 2004, EUROsociAL was established—a four-year program aimed at strengthening social cohesion and narrowing the wide gap between rich and poor in Latin America by developing the capacities of national authorities in the region to devise coherent policies to fight social inequalities. It has had the ambition to facilitate the transfer of experience and know-how between the public services of both regions in the fields of health, education, taxation, justice, and employment. For the first time in the context of horizontal programs, the targets have been public administrations, with the aim of training policymakers in social cohesion. In 2005, the Commission selected four consortiums to be in charge of the implementation of the program in the sectors of education, health, justice administration, and taxation (employment policy is not included, as it has been implemented by the agencies of the International Labour Organization in Turin and Lima) (European Commission 2004f: 27–29; 2004h: 6, 17). The European participants have represented Spain, France, Italy, Hungary, Germany, and the UK. All four sectors have been coordinated by European public authorities, in particular French and Spanish. Spain has also been in charge of the general coordination of the program. Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, and Colombia have been the most active Latin American participants, whereas a number of LAC states have not participated at all. The program was supposed to conclude in the second half of 2009. In May 2006 the most recent interregional program, Euro-Solar, was adopted, for a duration of four years. The objective is to promote the use of renewable energy sources in the poorest LAC countries and improve living conditions by combating poverty, particularly that of indigenous

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groups. It focuses on giving those in the poorest rural areas, who have no access to the national grid, access to a source of electricity generated by sun and wind. It provides these communities with a hybrid system of photovoltaic panels and small wind panels in order to generate electricity and other applications for community use. The installation of a maximum of 600 such facilities is planned (European Commission 2006a: 5, Country Briefing Argentina). Besides those horizontal programs focusing on the region of Latin America, in the current 2007–2013 programming period, the regulation establishing the DCI (based on Article 179 of the EC Treaty) is the main legal and financial instrument governing EU interregional development cooperation with Latin America. The following interregional cooperation areas are stressed in relation to the region: promoting social cohesion, encouraging greater regional integration, supporting the reinforcement of good governance and public institutions and the promotion of human rights, supporting the creation of a common EU–Latin American higher education area, and promoting sustainable development (European Parliament and the Council 2006: Article 6). One can notice that the horizontal programs are very much in line with these priority areas.

Conclusion

After decades of maintaining a somewhat marginal role in Latin America, the EU today constitutes the most important donor in the region. It has launched a series of horizontal programs that, together, contribute to the concrete implementation of the interregional strategic partnership, which can be seen as an example of the Union’s increasing actorness on the global arena. Indeed, the EU is perceived by Latin America as a regional actor, which cannot be said about the counterpart. Developing countries in this region are still accorded significantly less attention by the EU than it gives to the ACP states, and with some exceptions, the member states seem to have a limited interest in the region. Regarding the form and extent of Community development aid given to Latin American states, it is evident that the traditional development aid of financial and technical assistance has been geared toward the poorest countries. It has been the more common form of aid for states in the Andean region and in Central America (in particular Bolivia, Peru, Nicaragua, and El Salvador). The more recent economic

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cooperation mainly targets more advanced developing countries or regions—in particular, Mercosur, Mexico, and Chile. Thus, even though states in Central America and the Andean Community receive more European ODA (including from both the Commission and EU member states), the states comprising Mercosur (together with Chile and Mexico) benefit more than others from horizontal partnership networks, trade agreements, and scientific and technical cooperation. Considering the regional level, and the horizontal programs that figure in this study, some EU members and Latin American states are better represented than others. The degree of participation of EU member states can be seen as being based upon an interest in the region, whereas the participation of Latin American actors is based more upon capabilities, as each program and project is cofinanced by the beneficiaries. Within the EU, Spain appears to be the dominant country in this area, and France, Germany, Portugal, the UK, and Italy are also active. Among the LAC states, most participants are from Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and Colombia. Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru are also well represented. The least active participant states include Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Panama, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. Indeed, as observed above, the horizontal programs are directed more toward advanced developing subregions and countries, such as Mercosur, Mexico, and Chile, whereas the participation of less developed states in programs such as AL-INVEST has been more limited. At the subregional level, the lack of support by EU member states toward the integration process and development cooperation is remarkable. This has a negative impact on policy coordination between the activities of the Commission and the member states. In Central America, the involvement of EU member states in supporting subregional integration is small-scale and financially insignificant. Certain member states, such as Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK, Denmark, and Finland, along with the Commission, have supported programs on human rights and democratization. Sweden has also identified the health sector as a priority at the subregional level, and Spain has combined a program of regional cooperation with initiatives at the subregional level (see European Commission 2002g: 16, 26). In the Andean region, the Commission is the main source of funding for subregional projects and integration. The EU member states do not engage at this level; their projects are entirely bilateral, with the exception of Spain, which provides training courses and seminars on the fight against illegal drugs. In relation to Mercosur, EU member states do not donate to this level at all; all European assis-

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tance supporting subregional integration derives directly from the Commission (European Commission 2002c: 21). At the bilateral level, despite the fact that the EU constitutes the major donor of development assistance to Latin America, developing countries in this region receive far less attention from the EU than it gives to the ACP states. Very few of the twenty-seven member states place the LAC region high in their development cooperation priorities, with the important exception of Spain. Regarding the various forms of policy coordination identified in Chapter 1, the “Community method” applies to both the political level (the EU-LAC summits and the ministerial meetings) and the implementation level of interregional relations, seen through the horizontal programs. The Commission, together with AidCo, plays the most significant role in the establishment and shaping of the programs and in guiding their implementation. As already noted, however, the main actors in the horizontal programs are located within civil society, which makes policy coordination between the EU and the member states more complex than in other cases. Yet the participation of nationals from different states might say something about the various governments’ regional priorities. It is possible that those member states that provide many participants across various programs conduct a more proactive Latin America policy than others. If civil society actors are influenced and pushed by the policy of the state, this could illuminate policy coordination. Among the member states, Spain’s policies appear to be those most coordinated with the Commission’s priorities. This is evidenced through Spain’s high contribution of ODA to the region, the active participation of Spanish civil society actors in various horizontal programs, Spain’s support for subregional integration, and the designation of the region as a foreign policy priority of the Spanish government. Elements that characterize the “open method of coordination” (OMC) as another policy coordination variant are also visible in the implementation of the interregional relations through the horizontal programs. In these programs, important elements are characteristics such as the systemic comparison of national policies, best practices and benchmarking between different authorities, and the transfer of know-how in various fields between the actors involved. It is important to note, however, that although the OMC in general is associated with the coordination between the EU member states, in the case of EU-LAC cooperation we instead refer to the coordination between EU member state practices and those of LAC states. In Latin America, it seems as if the EU member states are letting the

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Commission act, as there is a lack of strong member state interests involved; in other cases, member states might urge the Commission to act because of conflicting national interests. Within the EU, intergovernmental bargaining seems to play a less important role in EU–Latin America relations, perhaps owing to the fact that few national interests are directly involved and that most member states place the Latin American region in a diminished position in their development policies. It appears that those countries that give the most development assistance to the region, however, are also those that are able to influence the Union’s position in the region. Development cooperation with Latin America is thus characterized by Community interests rather than by contesting national interests of the member states, which therefore facilitates a coordinated policy. As the Commission is the primary European donor in the region and the main actor in interregional programs—a position that is entirely accepted by the member states—policy coordination has become relatively strong since the early 1990s. A common thread, however, which may also reflect on the level of policy coordination, is that Latin America maintains a relatively marginalized position in both EU priorities and member states’ national policies. So, what do the flow of development aid and the level of policy coordination tell us about the strength of interregionalism? The interregional relations between the EU and Latin America in the field of development cooperation are composed of a number of elements. “Pure interregionalism” (see Hänggi 2006: 41ff) is involved with two variants. First, the EU as a regional organization cooperates with three (sub)regional organizations in Latin America—Mercosur, CAN, and the Central American Common Market (CACM). The interregional strategic partnership between the EU and LAC covers the entire Latin American region and also affects the Union’s relations with these three organizations. The Commission supports subregional integration and is convinced that stronger political and economic integration has a positive effect on development. When it comes to Community assistance and member state involvement, however, it can be argued that this subregional level is given less attention than the regional one, particularly by the individual EU member states. Second, the EU also cooperates with Latin America as a regional group—through the horizontal programs, the EU-LAC summits, and the ministerial meetings between the EU and the Rio Group—which is also a form of pure interregionalism. We can see that the Community interest lies primarily behind the all-inclusive grouping of states that participate at the EU-LAC summits—not only states in Latin America but also in

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the Caribbean region. The ministerial meetings between the EU and Latin American states are based, however, on a regional grouping that already exists, albeit not in a particularly institutionalized form—the Rio Group. Although subregional integration has advanced in Latin America owing to internal dynamics seen not least through the recent UNASUR initiative, cooperation at the regional level is perhaps more favored by the EU than by the Latin American states themselves. 11 Accordingly, it can be argued that the EU is, through its interregional cooperation, endeavoring to “construct” a continent-wide region, instead of focusing solely on the existing, firmly institutionalized subregional associations. In addition to pure interregionalism, there is “hybrid interregionalism”—state-region relations. Here, a state (such as Spain) acts toward Latin America as a member of the EU but may also, through its actions, accelerate interregional relations. In addition, the EU as a regional organization acts toward, for instance, Mexico and Chile, two countries that form part of the Latin American regional grouping but apart from the three subregional organizations. In recent years, horizontal programs have become a dominating feature in EU–Latin America cooperation. These horizontal programs indicate that the form of interregional development cooperation is more informal—a case of “transregionalism” as discussed in Chapter 1—as it is neither state-led nor intergovernmental and as the partner region of Latin America is not formally organized in a region-wide organization. Transregionalism involves a broader set of actor relationships than just intergovernmental. Despite the fact that interregional relations are formalized through EU-LAC summits and ministerial meetings between the two regions based on intergovernmental relations, interregionalism is also based on civil society interaction. Indeed, the European Commission and various civil society participants are central actors in EU-LAC development cooperation.

Notes 1. Some European states, such as Germany and the Netherlands, have had relatively important bilateral programs with Latin America since the 1970s, however (Freres 2000: 69; Carranza 2004: 319). 2. Cuba is not involved. Guyana is representing the Caribbean community, however. 3. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru currently have associate member status. Venezuela signed a membership agreement on June 17, 2006,

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but before becoming a full member its entry has to be ratified by the Paraguayan and Brazilian parliaments. 4. This treaty established a free trade area and a common external tariff, known as the Central American Common Market (CACM). After some years of conflicts and politicomilitary problems, the integration process was revitalized in 1990 with the signing of the Central American Economic Action Plan. In 1991 the Central American Integration System (SICA) was created, which also includes Panama. Four countries, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, are currently going through a process of political, cultural, and migratory integration and have formed the CA4 (the Central America Four) union, which has introduced common internal borders. The CA4 is joined by Costa Rica in matters of economic integration and regional friendship. 5. Since October 1992 four of the Andean countries have established a free trade area, which Peru joined in 2006, and there is a common external tariff. In 2001 political cooperation began, and a security policy has been developed. There is also a supranational legal system comparable to that of the EU. In 2005, with the new cooperation agreement with Mercosur, the Andean Community gained four new associate members: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Further information about CAN is available at www.comunidad andina.org. 6. These two countries were joined by Venezuela in April 2006, when it decided to leave the Andean Community. 7. In additional to the ALA regulation, Article 39 of the new regulation repeals, for instance, the following regulations: development cooperation with South Africa, access to Community external assistance, the AENEAS program, aid to uprooted people in Asian and Latin American developing countries, cofinancing with European nongovernmental organizations, food aid policy, and food aid management. 8. The financial framework for the implementation of the DCI Regulation over the period 2007–2013 is €16.897 billion: €10.057 billion for the geographic programs (60 percent of the total), €5.596 billion (33 percent of the total) for the thematic programs, and €1.244 billion for the ACP Sugar Protocol countries (7 percent of the total). This can be compared to the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) with a funding of €11.181 billion and the European Development Fund (EDF) with the amount of €22.7 billion for the same period. 9. ALURE (1996–2002) supported efforts by Latin American countries to find greater quantities of better-quality energy supplies—promoting minimum environmental impact—while promoting access to this energy by the most underprivileged section of the population. 10. ATLAS (2001–2003) aimed to support relations between chambers of commerce in both regions and to facilitate the transfer of know-how and benchmarking among the 200 chambers of commerce and industry concerned. 11. The lack of a more concerted Latin American coordination can be seen at the EU-LAC summits. At both the Madrid and Guadalajara summits, the European Commission delivered most of the substantive guidelines for the political agenda, which were mostly passively accepted by the Latin American representatives (Gratius 2004: 2).

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9 Development Cooperation as a Building Block for Interregional Relations in Asia Sven Grimm

C

ompared to the relationship with European former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP), Asia can be seen as a latecomer to European Union (EU) external relations. The marginal position of Asia in this direct comparison of regions is striking, since a number of EU member states had former colonial ties to the region. Indochina, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar (formerly Burma), and Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor) are territories formerly controlled by France, the Netherlands, the UK, and Portugal (in the case of Myanmar and Timor-Leste), respectively. A number of factors can be identified on the European side that were fostering mutual interest in the region but also stifling European ambitions of becoming an international actor in Asia. First, decolonization of Southeast Asia occurred before the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957; Africa was included, however, owing to its status as an overseas territory of European powers. There were no special economic links with Asia that would have required particular institutional settings, in contrast with the case of African overseas territories and other dependencies. Asia was the first region after World War II to gain independence from colonial powers, which fanned ambitions in other colonies; Asia thus had little appetite for a postcolonial relationship to its former occupying power. Second, decolonization in Asia had left scars on European powers; it carried a particular “loss of face” for some European states. The military withdrawal from Indochina was experienced as a humiliating defeat for France, licking its wounds after its defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam (1954). The Netherlands finally ceded independence to Indonesia after 185

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four years of struggle, in 1949. In brief, Asia was clearly a case for international diplomatic relations—and this policy area was out of bounds for the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1950s and 1960s. Foreign policy in its broader understanding, and as used in this book, has only become prominent on the EU agenda since the end of the Cold War. Third, geographical distance has played an additional role in delaying European engagement and determining the relatively low position of Southeast Asia on the EU’s agenda. Asian states were—and are still— secondary in importance and priority to the EU’s immediate neighborhood. Other states, such as Japan and the United States, have a more immediate security interest and consequently more weight in the region. The EU’s position as an actor from outside the region—that is, the potential for balancing regionally dominant powers—and its size as an outlet market were the major appeal of Europe for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Yeo 2003: 103).1 At the same time, both regions embarked on processes of regional integration relatively early, albeit under different political and economic conditions and consequently at different velocities and in different directions. The desire for regional integration therefore motivates the two regions toward region-to-region cooperation, more so since both are significant trade blocs. Considerations of market outlets, it can be argued, have been a constant feature in the relationship between Europe and Southeast Asia. The relationship is asymmetric, with the EU being the bigger partner, but a number of Southeast Asian partners were rapidly gaining strength in the 1980s. While the EU was dithering between enhancing cooperation with a dynamic region and fighting reflexes to fend off new competition, ASEAN was structurally more interested in international cooperation, since external markets have been much more important for its economies than trade within the group. This mix of motivations makes Europe and Southeast Asia difficult partners. In a setting with such a mix of motivations, what is the role of development policy? What does assistance to development with a declared rationale of poverty reduction mean in Euro–Southeast Asian relations? Does this declared goal stand a chance against the given mixture of interests beyond altruistic motives on both sides? This chapter first examines the evolution of the EU’s relations with Southeast Asia and then turns to the role of development cooperation in the EU’s policy mix in the region. The understanding and practice of development cooperation with the prime goal of poverty reduction, and its relevance, are further explored with the example of the Philippines. This country—a

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founding member of ASEAN—has not experienced the same rapid development as a number of its neighbors have, including the muchaided newcomer Vietnam. The Philippines has a high incidence of poverty and mostly stagnant economic development, and on these factors it serves as an example of the potential role of development cooperation in the region.

Evolution of Interregional Relations

The first phase of EU–Southeast Asian relations (1967–1980) saw an informal and largely unstructured relationship. In 1967, ten years after the EEC’s formation, ASEAN was founded. 2 In 1972 the European Community (EC) informally became the first dialogue partner with the ASEAN group. Apparently the prospect of the first enlargement of the EEC (Denmark, Ireland, and the UK) gave external relations of the Community a new geographical span: soon after the EC enlargement in 1973, a formal proposal was made to extend cooperation beyond the ACP states to Asia and Latin America. The political will on both sides was not sufficient to see Asian countries included within the newly created special, and asymmetric, relationship of the ACP, nor was there any ambition on either side to create a similar framework for hybrid interregionalism. Cooperation programs between the EU and Southeast Asia evolved out of ad hoc minor agreements that were financed through the EC/EU budget. In 1976, a small program of financial and technical cooperation was established, which successively widened in scope (Cox and Chapman 1999: 84). It was not until 1980 that the EC and ASEAN signed a formal cooperation agreement and thus embarked upon proper interregionalism. This second phase of relations, which lasted until 1994, was largely driven by geopolitics—ASEAN countries were anticommunist in their orientation. Ministerial meetings were introduced between the two bodies in 1978. Geopolitical interest did not, however, mean an increasing participation of Community bodies in policymaking regarding Asia. European institutions, as Anthony Forster (1999: 744) pointed out, had a certain degree of self-interest in trying to lift relations from the state-to-state level to the region-to-region level. The then European Commission President Roy Jenkins explained the engagement as follows: “We have always sought to treat ASEAN as a region, since we from our own experience have learnt that an external stimulus can often support internal cooperation” (quoted in Forster 1999: 744). The

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“promotion of regionalism through inter-regionalism” (Yeo 2003: 111) can be understood as a motivation on both sides. Aid relations with Southeast Asia during these years saw a rapid expansion. Internal and external events of the early 1990s again changed the relationship between the EU and Southeast Asia. The Commission established a regional strategy for cooperation with Asia soon after it had been given the mandate for external relations. The establishment of the European Union in 1993 provided the European institutions with a mandate for external policy that was clearly going beyond previously communitarized trade relations, including development and foreign policy. In issuing its document “Towards a New Asia Strategy” in 1994, the Commission, on the one hand, took an opportunity that arose owing to internal change within the EU. On the other hand, it reacted to a substantial setback in the EC’s Asia policy in the previous year; in 1993 the EC had failed to gain observer status in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The exclusion from APEC led to fears in the EU that the United States and Japan would gain strong positions in accessing the markets of a vibrant region. With the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) the EU initiated a broader framework for its policy in the Asian region, which on the Asian side includes ASEAN Plus Three: China, Japan, and South Korea (see Chapter 6). Within the ASEM framework, the most striking fact about development policy is the absence of the very term in any official document. There is no provision for a meeting of ministers concerned with economic or social development (Holland 2002). Rather, the documents speak of cooperation in trade policies, research and technology, and culture; the EU uses development policy as a diplomatic tool and in relation to regime creation (Yeo 2003). Interregional cooperation in the field of development cooperation is largely limited to ASEAN. The EU’s strategy on Southeast Asia claims that “regional approaches will be chosen when economies of scale are evident, where the development of country-neutral toolboxes makes sense (support to private sector development, matching local authorities from both regions, promoting university networks, etc.) or in support of dialogue conducted at regional level” (European Commission 2003a). Even in the relatively institutionally advanced ASEAN region, however, interregionalism does not supplant bilateral EU-state relations, as the Southeast Asia strategy points out: “Most of EC development assistance shall be implemented through bilateral channels, which allow for a real policy dialogue and reform in social sectors” (European Commission 2003a). This means that hybrid interregionalism exists alongside interregionalism for the Europe–Southeast Asia relationship.

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Furthermore, the traditional bilateral state-to-state relations continue in parallel to both forms. The overall size of the cooperation program within the EU’s cooperation funds is limited, however; in 2008 less than 13 percent (€58.36 million) of total aid for the Asia region was supplied to ASEAN states. This was equivalent to about half of the assistance to Afghanistan. The two main recipients within the ASEAN group were Myanmar (€23.4 million) and Thailand (€10 million), followed by the Philippines (€6.7 million) and Indonesia (€5.6 million) (European Commission 2009a).

Why Put Poverty Reduction on the Agenda of Cooperation with Southeast Asia?

Development policy involves multiple targets and dimensions. As an overarching goal, however, the international community has formulated “poverty reduction” as a consensus that became the paramount goal for EU policymaking in this area in 2000. If we understand development policy narrowly, to be primarily about poverty reduction—that is, support to regions that lack the capacity for this purpose—we must ask questions about how intense a development cooperation is needed and in which sectors donors should engage. Discussions about the poverty focus of assistance to middle-income countries (MICs) reveal a somewhat limited potential for aid leverage to poverty-relevant sectors. Low- and middle-income countries are classified by the World Bank according to their per capita income. The classification is a rather imprecise scale, with MICs spanning a broad range of per capita income—between US$726 and US$9,075, according to the 2004 classification. With regard to aid to MICs, we can make two very general qualifications of principle. First, MICs should receive less aid than low-income countries (LICs), as they naturally have more domestic resources on which to draw. Second, donors must pay particular attention to the most appropriate form of assistance to MICs (Anderson, Grimm, and Montes 2004; ODI 2004a). The statistics on Southeast Asia’s levels of development reveal substantial differentials across the region. The average per capita income ranges widely, from US$208 in Cambodia to US$20,690 in Singapore.3 The classification of countries therefore ranges from least developed (for example Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia) to middle-income countries (for example, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand) and highincome or newly industrialized countries (Singapore, Brunei). But even

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within the rough income groupings, per capita income and human development levels vary widely. So too does aid dependency: the official development assistance (ODA) ranged widely, from the equivalent of 14.6 percent of Laos’s gross national income (GNI) to that country, to the 0.2 percent of Thailand’s GNI to that country, to the negligible amounts to Malaysia and Singapore (see Table 9.1). The low level of aid flowing to the region is arguably due to political logrolling within the EU, which reflects the linkage between aid levels to Latin America and Asia: the informal understanding within the ALA program4 is a 60:40 ratio division of funding, with 60 percent allocated to Asia and 40 percent to Latin America.5 We must recall that cooperation between Europe and Southeast Asia gained momentum when the economic dynamic of the Asian countries peaked. Low levels of aid can in turn also be explained by periods of European perception of an “Asian economic threat” (Richards and Kirkpatrick 1999: 689). Aid troughs might also, to some extent, be the result of political hesitation on the Asian side to enter into aid relationships with the EU. The emphasis of cooperation between Europe and Asia has thus been in the area of trade cooperation and competition rather than in financial support, as economic development was visibly and dynamically taking place on its own momentum. More particularly, the focus of both sides was on access to (emerging) markets, not assistance to the creation of (local) markets.

Table 9.1 Development Indicators for Southeast Asian Countries

Country Singapore Brunei Malaysia Thailand Philippines Indonesia Vietnam Cambodia Myanmar Laos

HDI Rank in 2004 (of 175) 25 33 59 76 83 111 112 130 132 135

GNI per Capita in 2002

ODA (2001) in US$ million

ODA as % of GNI in 2001

20,690

1 0 1 281 577 1,501 1,435 409 127 243

0 0 0 0.2 0.8 1.1 4.4 12.4 n.a. 14.6

a

3,540 1,980 1,020 710 430 280 n.a. 310

Source: World Bank 2004c: Ch 2, 4; UNDP 2004. Notes: a. GNI per capita in 2002 data for Brunei were estimated to be high income. HDI = human development index; GNI = gross national income; ODA = official development assistance.

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From a theoretical perspective, the argument above about aid to MICs addressed the level of aid and its form. Despite the point made for less aid to MICs than to low-income countries, aid interventions with the goal of poverty reduction cannot neglect MICs; they often account for a large proportion of people living in absolute poverty, a fact that the EC and others continue to emphasize. Debates about pro-poor growth and its understanding and various debates about what constitutes “poverty” characterize one aspect of engagement with MICs (Ravaillon 2004; Pernia 2003). Addressing inequality is regarded as both an ethical issue and as instrumental to the overall growth of an economy, as some authors argue. Additionally, some MICs are of overall importance to their region and thus act as anchors in the development of neighboring countries. This means of course that endeavors aimed at global poverty reduction will fail if these countries fall by the wayside. The economic and political weight of such countries in their respective regions is such that they can either provide for a certain degree of stability and growth or destabilize their neighborhood and thus also impact positively or negatively on the conditions for poverty reduction in their region (Stamm 2004; European Union 2005). The role of regional organizations is often overlooked in this discussion, and in many regions the institutional capacity of regional agreements is very limited. ASEAN has some institutional strength, however, which supports hopes that it would play a decisive role in the region. As the differences in levels of economic performance have already indicated, the levels of absolute poverty in Southeast Asia also vary greatly (World Bank 2004b). Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam have a high proportion of people living on less than one US dollar a day and also have the highest proportions of people within the two US dollars a day poverty threshold, followed by Indonesia and the Philippines. All except the Philippines have low levels of per capita income. Even isolating the poor countries, the need for development cooperation with these countries will be undisputed. Simple transfers of resources will be likely to be less effective if directed toward MICs (or to regional bodies including high-income member states); “the role of donors will be [rather] to work with governments, civil society and business in order to facilitate the formation of alliances in favour of redistributive and anti-poverty policies” (ODI 2004a: 4). The Philippines, like other MICs or the region as a whole, requires a more complex analysis (World Bank 2004b). The Philippines, consistent with the region, has a relatively high level of absolute poverty, with 14.6 percent of the Philippines’ population living on less than one US dollar a

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day. The relatively advanced level of per capita income combined with the rather large proportion of people living on less than two US dollars a day suggests relatively high levels of inequality in the Philippines. Consequently, the Philippine Gini index is relatively high, whereas in Vietnam and Laos, people are relatively “equal in poverty”; that is, the general level of income is much lower. Within Southeast Asia, the Philippine Gini index is exceeded only by that of Malaysia, for which data were available only for 1997 (the value of information about Malaysia is therefore limited).

Rationale for Interregional Cooperation: What Role for Development in the Policy Mix?

What instruments are used in Europe’s relationship with Southeast Asia? And what is their rationale? The EU’s external assistance administration was reformed in a process that began in 2000. The reform attempted to overcome the incremental growth of cooperation programs and referred to all developing countries but fell short of changing existing legislation such as the ALA program. It declared poverty reduction the overall goal of development policy (ECDPM/ICEI/ODI 2005), a consensus that was confirmed by the EU’s new development policy of 2005. The 2005 European Consensus on Development now defines global principles for both community programs and bilateral policies. For Asia in general, reference to poverty reduction is far more explicit at the level of overall staff documents within the Commission than in the previous Country Strategy Papers (CSPs). There are a number of possible reasons for this. One reason could be internally rooted in a structural deficit of the Commission. The development policy statement was established under the aegis of the Directorate-General for Development (DG Dev), which is responsible for the overall development policy but geographically de facto limited to the ACP region. The overall development policy analysis might be felt to be too ACP-focused to be applicable for Asia. In other words, ownership of the policy beyond DG Dev would be limited. Another possible reason, this time external, could be the adverse attitude of partner countries in being considered targets for development policy, as being such a target might imply inequality in the relationship. The rationale for emphasizing poverty reduction in staff documents rather than (public) strategy papers would be to pursue this aim without embarrassing or offending the relevant target by being explicit.

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With its reform of external relations administration, the Commission initiated the publishing of CSPs, which are intended to provide strategic direction for EU cooperation. They should include the Commission’s activities and an overview of EU member states’ interventions. Within the Asia region, the Commission finalized and published seventeen CSPs in 2003. For 2007–2013, Cambodia, Laos, and the Philippines had CSPs; negotiations about partnership agreements were ongoing with Vietnam and pending for Thailand. All of the previous CSPs (assessed in the following) acknowledged—at least rhetorically—national development plans of the partner countries. Most papers, including the Philippines CSP, covered the period 2002–2006, with more detailed funding suggestions for the first half of a CSP’s life span. These strategy papers were reviewed mid-term, and changes to the “national indicative program,” that is, the allocation of funding, could be undertaken on the basis of these reviews.6 Of the sectors defined, trade-related technical assistance has become a priority in most EU country strategies in Asia. The European Commission, in its Southeast Asia strategy, speaks about “broadening the cooperation agenda” rather than narrowing it to poverty reduction (European Commission 2003a), despite the goals of the development policy statement. Past experiences in cooperation make “poverty reduction” as an explicit overarching goal in any EU-ASEAN partnership quite unlikely. It is not surprising that poverty reduction and development assistance are not top priorities in the EU’s region-toregion cooperation with Southeast Asia. This lack of priority is evidenced in the Southeast Asia strategy—support for the development of less prosperous countries appears as point five in a list of six strategic priorities of the European Commission in its Southeast Asia paper (European Commission 2003a: 6). Other issues feature higher on the agenda of both partners; two important areas—trade and security—will surely remain on the agenda. Trade has been a key issue since the 1980s and has gained importance through the experiences of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The issues most closely related to the trade and development nexus—that is, on the development agenda—are traderelated assistance and support for administrative structures in partner countries (this also features in the EU–Southeast Asia paper). Security, on the other hand, has moved higher on the agenda since the bomb attacks on the Bali night clubs in October 2002. In a 2003 European Commission communication, “A New Partnership with South East Asia,” the first point listed under strategic priorities is “supporting regional stability and the fight against terrorism” (European

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Commission 2003a). The “Bali bombing” in 2002 raised the profile of the topic further still. Within its development cooperation program, the EU provides assistance to the Philippines in the areas of money laundering and border control and to Indonesia in the field of “judicial capacity building” and the fight against the financing of terrorism. “Essential element clauses” on issues of good governance, human rights, and the rule of law have been implemented in the cases of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam (European Council 2004b). The absence of the wealthier or larger ASEAN countries in this list is notable. Discussion about values is similarly ubiquitous within the Commission’s program, although its content is more contested. The promotion of human rights, democratic principles, and good governance feature prominently on the Commission’s agenda, which was reconfirmed in the 2005 Consensus on Development. Further, the communication on governance and development links aspects of good (and bad) governance to experiences surrounding the Asian financial crisis. The involvement of the European Parliament (EP) in Southeast Asia before the major reform of the Maastricht Treaty created its own challenges for relations with Southeast Asia: 7 the EP in particular referred to the value-basis of Europe’s foreign policy, emphasizing human rights, democracy, and “fair trade” (that is, work standards)8 and, in particular, insisted on sanctions against the regime in Myanmar. The Southeast Asian side understood this new agenda as a means for an economically defensive Europe to safeguard its “supremacy” and reacted strongly against it (Forster 1999: 748, 750). Then Malaysian prime minister Mahatir Mohamad and Singapore’s late Lee Kwan Yew were the two most outspoken politicians to assert equality of “Asian values” with “European values,” if not the supremacy of the former over the latter. Discussions about some of the more sensitive issues—one of which was governance—were held on the EU’s insistence, but they were conducted in a low-key forum and below the level of public accusations (Holland 2002: 63). A high-profile debate centered on the contested participation of Myanmar in regional meetings. The EU wanted to insulate the regime in Rangoon over its severe human rights abuses and was therefore opposed to Myanmar’s participation in interregional meetings. Even though asymmetric interregionalism leaves room for the freezing of relations with individual states, interregional relations make it difficult to single out individual “rogue states” if they are accommodated by their respective regional organizations. This is the case in ASEAN with Myanmar, so consequently the EU had no choice but to defer in this debate. Difficult discussions over values might also have contributed to a lower priority for

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cooperation with Europe on the ASEAN side. Key actors in the EU—such as the European Parliament and some member states, as argued above— also tried to put political values on the agenda of ASEM, but they did not succeed in this in the second ASEM meeting. This demonstrates the contentious nature of the issue. Issues and debates such as these have contributed to erosions in relationships and highlight the need for reinvigoration of EU-Asia relations. Given the difficult discussions at the regional level, the European Council consequently supports “rebalancing the overall relationship with South East Asia by offering the possibility of bilateral agreements with interested countries” (European Council 2004b). As bilateral agreements with countries in the region are identified as the main vehicle of the cooperation, European development cooperation with Southeast Asia is explored in the following section, examining the example of the Philippines in more detail.

EU Development Cooperation in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Philippines

The 2002–2006 EU CSP serves as a starting point for the analysis of engagement of EU donors; that is, the Commission and several member states (European Commission CSP 2002). In considering the EU’s development cooperation with the Philippines, it is important, as with the region overall, to keep in mind the limited role of European aid. The EU (including the European Commission, the member states, and the European Investment Bank [EIB]) accounted for 8.2 percent of overall ODA to the Philippines between 1992 and 2000. The EU as a whole was the fourth-ranked donor. Considering only the grant element of ODA, Japan is by far the largest donor, followed by the United States. The European Commission administered 20 percent of the overall EU contribution, and the remainder was channeled bilaterally. Given that the Philippines’ total receipts of ODA made up 0.8 percent of its GNI, the influence of the EC and individual EU member states, and in particular their impact on poverty levels via direct resource transfers, were very limited in the Philippines, much in line with the argument made above. What Role for Poverty Reduction as a Goal in EU-Philippine Cooperation?

Poverty reduction is a key goal of the Millennium Development Declaration and one of the key goals of EU development cooperation as

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defined in that treaty. The fight against poverty in the Philippines has stagnated after some initial progress. As the CSP (2002–2006) notes, between 1991 and 1997 economic development in the Philippines contributed to a fall in the poverty rate, from 34 percent to 25 percent (European Commission CSP 2002: 9). Since the onset of the Asian financial crisis, even though the Philippines was much less affected than other countries in the region, the incidence of poverty has risen slightly again. Income inequality (measured by the Gini index) did not significantly change between 1997 and 2000 and in 2003 stood at 46.1 percent. As could be observed in other regions, the incidence of poverty was far higher in rural areas than the national average (37 percent, compared to 12 percent, based on one US dollar a day). The available data on indicators of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) confirmed the Philippines’s slow, or stagnant, progress. The rate of child mortality decreased in the first half of the 1990s. Environmental problems are, inter alia, reflected in statistics indicating a reduction in forest area. A high population growth rate implies additional efforts are necessary to improve living conditions; population growth was at 2.1 percent in 2000—one of the highest rates in the region. Within this environment, progress in poverty reduction was slow and marginal. The CSP did not explicitly refer to the MDGs.9 In relation to the country’s challenges, however, the EU did mention the right issues in its Country Strategy Paper, noting that peace in the Philippines, particularly in Mindanao, “depends—inter alia—on the Government’s capacity to address poverty” (European Commission CSP 2002: 7). The analysis of economic policies notes the difficulties in export industries, very low savings rates, and decreasing foreign direct investment (FDI). Prices for some domestic food products exceed world market prices, thereby “harming, in particular, the poorest families” (European Commission CSP 2002: 10). High income inequalities, even by regional standards, were noted. Poverty was a rural problem, and access to social services such as health care was a problem. Positive aspects included a relatively good public education system and gender equality. The paragraph within the CSP dealing with sustainability of current policies stressed the importance of economic growth for poverty reduction, along with the need for greater elasticity (liberalization and enforcement of competition rules). Infrastructure was identified as a priority of the Philippine government; upgrading was recommended. The key challenges identified for the medium term were rural development, the provision of basic social services, macroeconomic stability, infrastructure development, and governance (concerns were raised about corruption).

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Overall, the Philippine country analysis in the EU CSP focused mainly on macroeconomic policies and government programs. As argued above, the transfer of resources (that is, funding with the direct concern of poverty) was neither the sole, nor arguably the most urgent, issue for EU interventions in the Philippines as a middle-income country. Rather, dialogue and cooperation with the government to achieve pro-poor growth might have been the best way forward in EUPhilippine cooperation, as argued elsewhere (Anderson, Grimm, and Montes 2004). Cooperation included poverty alleviation efforts, but not all sectors were convincingly linked to poverty reduction. Governance Issues

Key to interventions in MICs is the question of improving governance. The case of the Philippines is an illustration of why the governance issue appeared on the agenda of donor countries. Even though the Philippine government committed itself to reform programs, the impact of these programs has in the past been quite low. The Philippine government’s effectiveness and regulatory quality are ranked well below those of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. Given its relatively low level of economic development, this is not surprising. Compared to its regional and similar income groups, the Philippines ranks around average but has shown a declining tendency since the start of the century (World Bank 2009a). The capacity for policy implementation is apparently weak; land reform is particularly slow. Governance issues have increasingly attracted the attention of donors (the United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] and the Asian Development Bank were leading this issue), as poor implementation and bad management were seen as causes of the slow poverty impact of aid. Eleven percent (€6 million) of the indicative budget for EU-Philippine cooperation was aimed at good governance as a crosscutting sector. Governance was seen as a link between “improving the quality of life for the poorest sectors of society and creating a business environment favourable to enhancing EU-Philippine economic relations” (European Commission CSP 2002: 58). For aid policy, this would mean a serious engagement in political dialogue and support for administrative implementation capacity—for example in the case of land reform. The Philippine government’s will to address corruption and economic oligopolies was and is crucial with regard to implementation capacity; on the basis of past performance, the extent of political commitment to these issues might be questioned.

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The issue of governance tended to be highly contested in interregional political dialogue, as it was perceived as a vague term and as an attempt to impose conditions on the cooperation; that is, to introduce an element of inequality. With regard to EU member states’ bilateral programs in the Philippines, projects in relation to governance accounted for just 3 percent of all assistance. The sector did not feature among the five most important sectors of EU aid interventions (which account for around 43 percent of the overall EU assistance to the Philippines), even though governance was a stated priority in EU cooperation with the Philippines. Other Interventions and Their Poverty Impact

The so-called poverty markers of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD are a statistical tool for assessing the poverty impact of interventions in partner countries. Values attributed to interventions range between zero and two, according to their perceived impact on poor population groups.10 Water supply and sanitation is a sector with a clear impact on MDGs and with potential benefits to the poor population; according to the OECD-DAC, however, less than a third (30 percent) of the EU’s programs or projects in this sector showed poverty markers of one or more. The assistance to environmental protection responded to one of the Philippines’ problematic areas (and is also one of the MDGs). The assistance to the agricultural sector potentially targeted the poorest regions in the Philippines. Even if the pro-poor impact of these programs and projects was not immediately self-evident, donors attributed them to higher poverty markers than projects in the area of water supply and sanitation—half of them have poverty markers; 44 percent of these have values of one or two (European Commission CSP 2002). Identifying the EU’s policy priorities by interrogating the overall amount of development assistance administered by the European Commission to any one-partner country remains a relatively complex endeavor. This is so partly because aid programs change over time; the difference between commitments and disbursements remains relevant here. The Philippines-EC Rural Development Programme, with overall foreseen funding of €22 million, was cancelled due to low performance and the lack of agreement with the government (European Commission CSP 2002). Instead, funding was increased in a number of other projects and programs. The overall funding of ODA to the Philippines decreased after the mid-term review from €51 million to just €18 million.

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Grasping the overall picture of cooperation funding was further complicated by the fact that the Philippines received a high proportion of assistance through non-country-attributed budget lines (almost half of its assistance). Activities funded through the general budget lines for nongovernmental organization (NGO) cooperation (at least 10 percent funded by NGO partners), funding for refugees, a budget line for tropical forests, and the like amounted to a further €17.4 million (European Commission CSP 2002). The time frames for these funds were not always identical to the National Indicative Programme for the Philippines, however; they reflected EU priorities and were not negotiated with the partner government. Pinning down EU priorities in the Philippines, however, remains a difficult task, as the Community policy on development cooperation exists alongside bilateral cooperation programs of EU member states. Complementarity within the EU system—that is, between the Commission and the member states—still appears to be a remote ideal in practice. In the annex to the Philippines CSP 2002–2006, a donor matrix lists projects of EU member states, Japan, the United States, Australia, Canada, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and UN agencies (European Commission CSP 2002). The average figures for EU member states, however, concealed the actual size (sometimes minimal) of individual engagements. The range of projects by member states listed in the Country Strategy varied from a Finnish engagement of approximately ten annual microprojects (€0.2 million) to a Spanish “soft loan” of €12.33 million for the upgrading of hospitals among several other Spanish projects. Germany was another relatively large donor to the Philippines. Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK (with small projects the size of the Finnish) were also present, and, it was noted, Austria was planning to provide a soft loan. With regard to non-EU donors’ priorities, some were also identified in the EU’s country strategy. Although poverty reduction was one priority among several others for Japanese assistance (providing, inter alia, loans for the training of sailors—an important employment sector for Philippine workers), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) identified poverty reduction as one of its main criteria for support. Sixty percent of Canadian resources were classified as providing poverty alleviation, as the CSP noted. Good governance was also an area of ADB interventions and for other donors, specifically the United States, the World Bank, and Canada. Both sectors also appeared on the list of priorities in the EU Philippines Country Strategy. If coordination of donors was carried out according to areas of intervention and size of engagement—both pre-

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sumably important criteria for the Philippine government—donor coordination in the Philippines was more likely to transcend the limited circle of EU member states currently present in Manila.

Conclusion

Internal constraints and demands from the international context are determining actors’ behavior in the field of international relations. In this respect, development assistance does not differ from any other aspect of international relations. This also holds true for EU cooperation with other regions, even though the EU might be particularly pathdependent in its regional programs and particularly limited by legal considerations in its maneuverability. The internal structural challenges of decisionmaking, arising from the complex and acephalous political structure, make the EU largely reactive in its external relations. And this leaves the area ripe for lack of coordination and administrative turf wars. With regard to development policy, the MDG agenda, and the EU’s attempt to prioritize goals in cooperation with the reforms in its development policy, the EU has substantially improved its policy formulation but has demonstrated less progress at the level of action. Coherence of international action is a challenge for any national administration and is an even greater task for a multilevel international political system such as the EU. Coordination of member states and coherent decisionmaking, including dynamics of supranational institutions in an area of “shared competence,” remain a challenge. The EU is a system under construction—some would argue “under permanent construction.” Relatively small adjustments to national processes, however, could make a difference to its present effectiveness. For instance, European donors do not currently draw up their Country Strategy Papers in parallel. The CSPs of the Commission and of various member states therefore refer to their own discrete time frames; coherence within the EU and integration of partner countries (governments and the nonstate actors) are both particularly difficult tasks within this setting. In the particular case of Southeast Asia, there might be good reason to be wary of any preeminence of a simplistic rationale of “poverty reduction”; the Philippines is a good illustration of this caution. Even here, however, cooperation requires a solid underlying rationale, despite a more difficult partnership setting than elsewhere. Southeast Asia as a country grouping arguably exhibits a higher level of “sovereignty” than,

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for example, African regions. The least developed countries (LDCs) in Southeast Asia (Myanmar, Cambodia) can seek the reassurance of their regional group to ward off what is perceived as European interventionism.11 Engagement with these societies, even when motivated by development concerns, therefore requires a different mind-set than policy toward LDCs in other regions. The discussion about what is actually meant by poverty reduction and how best to go about it in MICs—or in regions comprising countries with diverse income classifications— needs to be pursued. Finally, this raises the question of the degree to which development policy in some regions can be regarded as a mere tool of external relations, as described for instance in the first draft of the European Security Strategy (draft of June 2003). The wording that suggested this so baldly was ultimately toned down in the final version (December 2003). A European foreign minister might improve the international “visibility” of the Union and act as a facilitator of decisionmaking. He or she cannot, however, be a complete panacea for the structural problems within the Commission. The EU is facing challenges in becoming a fully developed international player, particularly in Southeast Asia, where development policy needs to be systematically coordinated with trade and foreign policy goals—and this holds true throughout most of the region, including the Philippines. The EU is obviously driven both by shifts in policies within member states and by the actions of EU institutions attempting to bundle the focus. For countries on the receiving end of small Commission development cooperation programs and of activities of a small number of member states (illustrated by the Philippines), focusing development cooperation is particularly important to maximize the opportunities for structural changes toward development. Joint EU action in Southeast Asia, however, is not the norm, particularly for development cooperation with its various parallel structures. It must be acknowledged that the EU has embarked on the journey toward more coherence and has improved in this area since 2001. It has much ground still to traverse.

Notes 1. In a realist perspective of international relations on regional cooperation, partners beyond the region are less prone to dominate and might be used as support in strong regional imbalances. Cooperation partners in the region, such as Japan and China, were regarded with suspicion by the ASEAN countries, the former for historical reasons and the latter with regard to the large

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ethnic Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia (in particular in Malaysia and Indonesia). 2. ASEAN was established on August 8, 1967, in Bangkok by the five original member countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Since then, five new members have joined: Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia (1999). 3. Singapore, as a significant exception, has a higher gross national income (GNI) per capita than more than half of the EU member states; its GNI is far higher than that of all ten of the new member states in 2004 and also exceeds that of Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy. No data were available for Brunei. 4. The ALA program embraces thirty-four countries, ranging geographically from Brazil and Argentina to Yemen, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and to Indochina and the Philippines. It appears to be a “residual category,” embracing everything outside the ACP that is not the European “near abroad” (that is, beyond the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe). 5. This has slightly shifted to a two-thirds/one-third distribution (Cox and Chapman 1999: 82) and is at times “distorted” by allocations via nonregionally attributed budget lines (Eva-EU 2002) and by differences due to the varying speed of disbursements. The basic informal agreement of a “pegging” between the two regions remains in place, however. Several attempts by the Commission to reform the program have stalled. 6. In Asia, changes to the programs have been made in the cases of China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The latter is examined in more detail later in the chapter. 7. The European Parliament was involved in EU–Southeast Asia relations early on, because cooperation with Asia evolved from within the EU budget, rather than out of ACP cooperation. 8. Among the member states, Portugal was a strong lobbyist toward Indonesia because of the human rights situation in Timor-Leste. 9. Commission staff in Manila would like to have seen the MDGs more central in the cooperation, as they felt that this would have helped to focus interventions and provide better incentives to harmonize and improve the baseline data. It was felt, however, that the MDGs did not provide (appropriate) indicators with regard to trade, investment, human rights, and governance (email correspondence with staff, September 2004). 10. It should be emphasized that these values do not necessarily reflect the actual impact on poverty in countries, and the system has its methodological shortcomings. The values are used as mere statistical “supports” to assist in making standardized qualifications. 11. Regional solidarity was arguably also supporting the regime in Myanmar when it refused to open the country for humanitarian assistance after the devastation of a cyclone in 2008, despite public pressure from the UN and NGOs as well as from Brussels.

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10 Unassertive Interregionalism in the Great Lakes Region Stefaan Smis and Sevidzem Stephen Kingah

It is true that the business of reaching unified positions is sometimes painful. But this is just a fraction of the pain felt when a common position is not reached. And, when we don’t agree, the pain is not just felt by ourselves, but often far beyond. —Javier Solana, “From Cologne to Berlin and Beyond”

A

rticle 11(1) of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) (CPA 2000, 2005) that regulates relations between the European Union (EU) and the group of African, Caribbean, and Pacific states (ACP) provides, inter alia, that the “parties shall pursue an active, comprehensive and integrated policy of peace-building and conflict prevention and resolution within the framework of the Partnership.” It further stipulates: “This policy shall be based on the principle of ownership. It shall in particular focus on building regional, sub-regional and national capacities, and on preventing violent conflicts at an early stage by addressing their root causes.” The strengthening of regional and subregional capacities is equally an objective of, as well as a principle that underlies, the CPA (Articles 2 and 3). From the preceding legal premises one may be led to assume that the EU is keen on forging interregional partnerships with ACP subregions in a bid to address situations of conflict. Before the signing of the CPA in 2000, the European Commission issued a communication on ACP countries involved in conflicts. The document highlighted the need for adopting a robust approach to containing conflicts in those areas where there has been an escalation so as

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to avert the spread of chaos (European Commission 1999: 7). In 2001 the Council adopted a common position on conflict prevention, management, and resolution in Africa (European Council 2001). The central planks of the document included a pledge to coordinate the actions of EU actors involved in security issues in Africa (Article 1) and the identification of subregional blocs such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as partners in efforts aimed at addressing conflicts in Africa (Article 5: 3). Three years later the common position on conflict prevention was renewed (European Council 2004a). The Council promised to fully support the efforts of regional bodies such as SADC and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in facing up to conflict zones in Africa (Article 6: 4). This chapter analyzes the EU’s interregional approach to conflict management in the Great Lakes region with particular emphasis on Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). DRC is a member of SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States (COMESA), the Economic Community of the Great Lakes States (CEPGL), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). This chapter focuses on SADC because, unlike the other subregional blocs, it has formal ties with the EU in the field of security. SADC has also a breadth of instruments in terms of enhancing security, and many SADC member states were involved in the war in DRC in 1998. It is argued that the EU has adopted a cautious interregional approach in siding with SADC in dealing with the conflict in DRC. This is attributable in part to an absence of sufficient policy coordination within EU as well as between African states. That being said, it is also postulated that the reasons for the EU’s unassertive interregional approach to conflict management in DRC goes beyond the failure of coordination. These explanations are addressed in greater detail in the second section. Thereafter we discuss the regional nature of the challenges that face the DRC and the reasons why the EU needs to adopt a more robust interregional approach. Before moving on, the role of the EU and its member states in the conflict needs to be contextualized.

The Role of the EU and Its Member States in the Conflict in DRC: 1996–2006

The post–Cold War era has been a challenging one for the people living in Africa. It has been harrowingly so for those living in DRC (Gegout 2005: 427, 430). It has been particularly challenging for Congolese because they have been witness to marked political changes, a declining

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economy, and a weak state that has proven inept at providing even the most basic social services. Before the death of President Mobutu Sese Seku in 1997, there had been unheeded calls for genuine political reform. Demands for greater pluralism were shunned as the country was left in a tailspin, led by an ailing leader unwilling and unable to effect long-term needed changes. The second part of the 1990s was marked by a rebel assault on Kinshasa from the eastern part of the country. The rebels were led by a group of relatively unknown figures, including Laurent Kabila. The appearance of Laurent Kabila marked the commencement of the first segment of a three-part episode, which is described below, with an emphasis on the role of European actors. The first part in this episode commenced in 1996. It was marked by the ousting and subsequent death of President Mobutu in 1997. President Mobutu had enjoyed support from many governments in the West. In his final years he came to be despised by his erstwhile mentors, however, who did not hesitate to embrace Kabila, who came to power upon Mobutu’s ousting. Kabila’s nature soon led him on a collision course with African states such as Rwanda and Uganda, which had assisted him in toppling Mobutu. The main reason offered by Rwanda and Uganda for their displeasure was Kabila’s inability and unwillingness to deal with Rwandan and Ugandan rebels who were launching attacks against both governments from bases in the eastern part of DRC. In 1998 both countries backed rebels who led an assault, and seized many towns, in DRC. The Kabila government sought, and was granted, military assistance from SADC members such as Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. The support that Kabila received from these countries allowed him to hold on to power. European nations such as the United Kingdom and Germany were quite reticent in their response to this situation and did not take any meaningful action to check the actions of Rwanda and Uganda, even though these states had clearly infringed on the rules of international law in their involvement in incursions into DRC. The United States also refused to condemn Rwanda and Uganda (Zeilig 2004: 5). Kabila’s attitude, on the other hand, put him at odds with Western nations and companies that did not trust him in upholding mining concession deals that they had struck with him as the rebels marched into Kinshasa. The second part of the episode opened with the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in 1999. The agreement brought about a lull in the conflict. In spite of this there were intermittent skirmishes between the Rwandan-backed rebels of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Goma/Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCDGoma) (led by Azarias Ruberwa) and the Mouvement pour la libération

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du Congo/Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) (led by Jean Pierre Bemba) supported by Uganda, on the one hand, and government forces on the other. In 2001 Laurent Kabila was killed by one of his own guards. He was replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila, with whom he had fought in the rebellion that ousted Mobutu. The final part of the decade-long episode in this recent history of DRC commenced with the signing of the Pretoria Agreement on power sharing within the transition government in 2002, pending elections. The agreement ensured that all of the main belligerents held important cabinet positions. The arrangement was known as the “1+4” agreement, whereby President Joseph Kabila would run the country alongside four vice presidents. The vice presidents were to be the representatives of the main political constituencies. The four vice presidents were Jean Pierre Bemba of the MLC, Azarias Ruberwa of the RCD-Goma, Abdoulaye Yerodia of the governing Peoples’ Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD), and Arthur Zahidi N’goma, who represented the civilian political opposition as well as civil society. The power-sharing arrangement in itself would not guarantee enduring peace. It was not surprising that the United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) deployed troops in parts of the country to ensure effective and peaceful implementation of the Pretoria Agreement. In spite of the fact that MONUC forces (composed of a maximum of 17,000 soldiers) were present in the country, ethnic skirmishes persisted in eastern Congo. While renegade military forces from the east threatened to lead a wider rebellion, Hema and Lendu militias from the Ituri region also continued to stoke instability in the region. To quell the mounting tensions, the EU led a military operation in June 2003, at the behest of the United Nations, to bring about peace. The Independent Electoral Commission was established in the following year. In January 2005 presidential elections that had been slated for June were postponed to November 2005. This led to violent scenes in the country.1 In December 2005 the EU financially supported the organizing of a constitutional referendum in the country. It outlaid €89 million for the task (Rosa 2006: 3). Eighty-four percent of those who voted across the 32,000 polling stations concurred with the terms of the new constitution. This paved the way for the organizing of presidential elections in 2006. President Joseph Kabila defeated Jean Pierre Bemba in a tightly contested runoff; some predicted that the aftermath would be chaotic.2 Yet the elections themselves were relatively peaceful. It is notable that one of the factors that ensured a relatively peaceful runoff was the presence in DRC of EU troops led by Germany. Although

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the decision to send the troops was criticized as “shameful and petty,”3 member states came around to the fact that they had to act in light of the European Defence and Security Policy.4 They agreed to send more than 2,000 troops to patrol the streets and ensure a peaceful electoral process. The troops proved to be a deterrent to those who might have desired to foment turmoil after the final results were released.5 After expending about €165 million in the election effort in Congo (Europa 2006), the EU pledged a further €33 million to strengthen governance in the country. The strategy of backing long-term peacebuilding efforts through sustainable methods such as transparent elections is directly compatible with Article 11 of the CPA. This approach was backed by European Commissioner of Development Louis Michel, who advocated a comprehensive new strategy for addressing African conflicts, encompassing prevention, management, resolution, and postconflict reconstruction (Michel 2005: 2). The importance of this approach cannot be underestimated; although elections might have brought a semblance of peace, constant efforts must be made to encourage demobilization of former combatants, some of whom (including child soldiers) are vulnerable to the whims of warlords.6 In summary, during the first and second parts of the episode, between 1996 and 2002, the EU and its member states were not particularly active in the DRC conflict. As revealed above, their contributions have, however, been vital during the third part of the historical episode—spanning the period 2002–2006—culminating in relatively peaceful elections in the country that have secured a legitimate transition to democracy (Solana 2007b: 2). During the first and second parts the EU and member states deferred the tasks of conflict resolution to South Africa or to SADC. It was therefore not surprising that President Nelson Mandela of South Africa worked hard, albeit in vain, to reconcile the rebel leader Laurent Kabila and the ailing President Mobutu during the final months of his reign. President Frederick Chiluba of Zambia also served as a mediator in achieving the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999. The EU backed this effort with limited financial assistance. Cooperation with SADC has been rather comprehensive in certain fields, albeit not in the field of conflict management, in the strict sense of that term. The following section turns to an explanation of why this has been the case.

Explaining Unassertive EU-SADC Interregionalism

The reasons for the absence of a more robust EU-SADC interregional approach to conflict management in the DRC are both directly and indi-

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rectly related to the EU. The indirect reasons are also related to the lack of a clear African regional response. Direct Reasons

The direct reasons are the result of diverging interests within the EU and failed policy coordination among the members of the Union. This is not the sole reason for the absence of a stronger interregional relationship with SADC in terms of conflict management in DRC, however. Other reasons include the unwillingness of the EU to upset South Africa’s role as a principal power in the subregion; the evolving and gradual preference toward the CEPGL in recent years; a general neglect of Africa, especially after the end of the Cold War and apartheid; the absence of clarity and consistency in the expressed wishes and actions of the EU; and the lack of sufficient money to mount a sustainable interregional peacekeeping force. Uncoordinated policies of the EU and its member states as a result of divergent interests. In 2001 former UK prime minister Tony Blair noted:

“The state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world. If the world as a community focused on it, we could heal it.” 7 This statement notwithstanding, the EU and its member states have not always focused on the problems of Africa as one. This is attributable to the divergent interests of states (Farrell 2004). As a result, no concerted action to back SADC in an interregional framework to manage the conflict in DRC was contemplated. Whenever there were signs of cooperation in addressing Africa’s woes, these related to the efforts of France and the UK coming together to pledge closer ties in addressing Africa’s problems (as in St. Malo in 1998) or a decision to defer the solution of Africa’s problems to Africans (as in le Toucquet in 2003). Even in these embryonic endeavors to enhance a cooperative spirit, it has been argued, the underlying interests were never really based on moral compunction or a genuine concern to assuage Africa’s plight. The real impetus for these efforts was to defend the disparate interests of European powers such as France and the UK (Lee 2003: 206; Gegout 2005: 438). Given France’s deep interest in many parts of Africa, it is quite easy to understand why efforts to forge a genuine partnership with SADC in addressing the DRC conflict were muted at best. The debilitating effects of the defense of insular and parochial interests by some member states in Africa have not been limited to DRC. In Sudan, for instance, even though the international community has reiterated the need for the

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Bashir government to rein in the Janjaweed militia and stop the killings in Darfur, France “has been lobbying for ten years to stop any sanctions against Sudan” as a result of the interest it has in securing Sudanese oil. This position has prevented the EU from taking a firm stance against the atrocities in the country.8 To achieve success in future efforts to bring peace to conflicted parts of Africa, EU member states may need to speak with one voice by coordinating their efforts more in terms of addressing conflicts (Ferreira, Lehtinen, and Haccius 2001). Indeed suggestions have been made for the appointment of a special coordinator of EU actions in Africa for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Higazi et al. 2003). Such an individual would need to work with other EU special envoys to Africa such as Aldo Ajello (the EU’s former Special Representative for the Great Lakes region), who has also highlighted the need for states to better streamline their interests so as to allow special representatives the leeway to do a better job (Ajello 2001: 126). One of the factors that has stymied a coordinated approach on the part of the EU has been the role of African actors who have grown adept at playing one European state against the other (Gnesotto and Grevi 2006: 135). That the UK sided more with Rwanda and Uganda, whereas France adopted a more cautious approach, corroborates this suggestion. Such a scenario reveals a lack in coordination of the approach of the member states that has compounded the underlying conflicts that have plagued African countries such as DRC (Lucy 2000). The situation could have been turned around if the EU and its member states had forged a common coordinated strategy with SADC in addressing the underlying causes of the conflict in DRC. Such an approach would have reversed the uncoordinated approach that has hitherto been the norm, an approach that has had negative effects on regional integration in Africa as a whole (Nnoli 1985: 131). At the regional level in Southern Africa, only Belgium and Denmark have policies that relate to the direct support for regional integration, and conflict prevention, respectively, in the subregion. None of the member states has a policy that targets both regional integration and conflict management cumulatively (SADC 2002: 23–24). More is needed in terms of coordinating the foreign policies of the states within the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) (ECDPM and Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales 2006: 62–63). The member states could take their cue from the experience of the peacekeeping Operation Artemis in DRC in 2003. The operation was led and

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coordinated by France, with the participation of many EU as well as non-EU states (with frequently diverging views on a number of issues). Although the operation was limited in time and space, EU member states demonstrated at least a semblance of working together (Ulriksen, Gourlay, and Mace 2004: 508). From the analysis above it is arguably reasonable to conclude that there was no coordinated policy on the part of the EU to forge a robust relationship with SADC in addressing the conflicts within DRC. But this factor in itself does not sufficiently account for the EU’s unassertive interregional approach in addressing conflict in the DRC. Another reason is that the Union exhibited a preference for deferring the task to South Africa. The lack of clarity and consistency in the expressed wishes and actions of the EU. It has been contended that the EU’s conflict-related policy

toward sub-Saharan Africa is “weak and inconsistent” (Bayart 2004: 453)—weak because it is not bold enough and betrays a lack of thought and seriousness in comparison with its approaches to conflicts in the Middle East and Eastern Europe; inconsistent because it pledges to support democracy in African countries while at the same time blocking political revolutions in Africa that might lead to a sustainable transformation of African societies (Bayart 2004: 456). In addition, although the Union insists on the need for democratic principles and peace in countries such as Sudan, none of its member states is poised or even willing to send troops to quell such problems, even though the Sudanese government has consented to such a move.9 Notwithstanding these criticisms, from an economic point of view the Union has promised to support regional integration in Southern Africa. Whatever the state of the configurations (Desta 2006: 1378) of the current Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) for the subregion, it operates at cross-purposes to the EU’s declared goal of regional integration promotion. This is because SADC states fall into two groups in the negotiations with the EU, the SADC, on the one hand, and the remaining SADC-COMESA members that are negotiating within the framework of the EPA for Eastern and Southern Africa, on the other. In fairness to the EU, this state of affairs can be fully imputed to the African countries themselves, who voluntarily join multiple subregional blocs. Nonetheless, the point remains that the EU proposed the approach toward the EPAs, and this approach has undermined regional integration within SADC, thereby contradicting the declared goal of supporting SADC’s regional integration efforts.

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A general neglect of Africa after the Cold War and apartheid. There is

no question that Africa played an important role during the Cold War, albeit primarily as a battleground for the United States and the USSR. President Mobutu of Zaire and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) leader Jonas Savimbi of Angola were important US allies, whereas leaders such as José Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, Mathieu Kérekou of Benin, and Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo (Brazzaville) touted their admiration for Marxist-Leninism. Yet after the Cold War, most of the African leaders who had leveraged their power off the bipolar geopolitics of the region found that their international leverage quickly evaporated. Africa’s strategic role therefore waned as the Berlin Wall fell (Guest 2004b: 70). In the same regard, the international response to apartheid was so firm and sustained that, after its demise between 1990 and 1994, many Western nations tempered the attention that they had, until then, paid Africa (Bayart 2004: 454). Since the thawing of the Cold War and the demise of apartheid, Africa has fallen back as a priority for European countries (Ajello 2001: 125) as they have increasingly turned their attention to addressing problems in Eastern Europe. Southern Africa, for example, has received very little attention from the EU in general terms (Gibb 2002: 113). This broad neglect of the continent partly accounts for the fact that the EU did not forge an assertive relationship with SADC in dealing with the conflict in DRC. It is arguable that the Union has begun to reverse this approach since 2005, however, by working with the African Union (AU) in dealing with the crisis in Darfur. Nevertheless, and as argued later, the increasing role of the AU also contributes to the EU’s neglect of SADC. Lack of sufficient funds. It makes little sense for the EU to aspire to a

stronger role on the international stage in terms of addressing conflicts if it remains frugal in backing the CFSP. Compared with other international actors such as the United States (Solana 2007a: 5), the money that is used by the Union in its external military actions is limited. For the greater part of the period 1995–2005, the budget for the CFSP hovered between €30 million and €40 million. In 2005 the amount was €62.5 million. 10 For the year 2006 Solana was promised €102 million, although he had asked for €120 million to meet the challenges of the day.11 So the scarcity of funds has been one of the factors that have constrained a strong interregional approach to conflict management with

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SADC. Although the EU provided €1.65 million to support the Chilubaled mediation efforts in DRC in 1999, a clear and durable interregional initiative for conflict management was still absent. Even though the Union has not been engaged in a firm interregional arrangement for conflict management in DRC, it has nevertheless mobilized funds for longterm peacebuilding in the country. In 2001 the Union (as the Principal Authorizing Officer) replaced the government of DRC as the National Authorizing Officer in terms of using the EU’s aid directed toward DRC (Kobia 2002: 434). So the EU has striven to build peace in DRC, albeit without aligning its efforts in a durable way to those of SADC. Unwillingness to distort South Africa’s role in the subregion. The eco-

nomic leverage of the Republic of South Africa dwarfs that of all other countries in SADC (Oden 2001: 95). Its economic influence serves as a fillip to its increasingly assertive role on the international political pedestal.12 Economically, the country commands an unassailable lead in Africa. It has extensive investment projects in many African countries, notably in DRC. Politically, South Africa has been active in sending peacekeeping troops to Burundi and also participated in the EU-led Operation Artemis in DRC in 2003. But South Africa’s role as a regional power has been questioned because of its stance regarding the government of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. That notwithstanding, the EU does recognize South Africa’s importance in ensuring economic and political stability in Africa in general and in Southern Africa in particular. So the Union has been wary not to overemphasize the role of SADC in conflict management in DRC to the detriment of the regional power. It must also be stated that although the South African government has adopted a pro-regional integration stance within SADC (Lowe 2000: 44), the initiative has attracted criticism from such diverse interests as big business and the union movement (Hentz 2005: 43). In this regard, therefore, South Africa’s general approach to SADC is driven mainly by national interests, and it may be poised to shun its subregional partners in pursuing these interests. This situation is understood outside of the subregion (including by the EU) and partly explains why the interregional approach of the EU in addressing the conflict in DRC was somewhat muted. Competition with the CEPGL. The CEPGL was created on September 20, 1976, after the signing of the Gisenyi Agreement by the leaders of Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire (as it then was). The organization was established to ensure the security of the states, to enhance trade among

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them, and to foster their development. In striving for these goals they set up a community bank, a chamber of commerce, an agronomic research institute, an organization for energy cooperation, and a research center for development of mineral resources in Central Africa. But for many years the organization remained in limbo and was overshadowed by other dominant subregional blocs such as the ECCAS and what is now COMESA. As the members of the Great Lakes did not prioritize the activities of the bloc, donors such as the EU states turned their backs on CEPGL. Although the group has been dormant and has widely been considered functionally defunct, this has begun to change since the mid2000s. There is an increased assumption within the EU that the CEPGL can play a vital role in addressing the conflicts and their causes in the countries of the Great Lakes. Former Development Commissioner Louis Michel was the main advocate for this strategy. He considered the CEPGL as a linchpin for peace for member countries. Indeed he believed that the CEPGL could serve as a link to seal the often-gaping rifts between countries of West, Central, and Eastern Africa (Michel 2006). The Union has therefore released an initial €5 million to support the activities of the CEPGL secretariat in Gisenyi, Rwanda. It has also promised €45 million for a number of preliminary projects. The former Development Commissioner was one of the main engines behind the efforts to forge an EU-CEPGL interregional relationship (however embryonic) in the Great Lakes. The Commissioner, who is a former foreign minister for Belgium (the main erstwhile colonial power in Central Africa), is famous for his declarations on the need for the international community to accord more attention to the conflicts in the Great Lakes. It can be asserted that the recognition that the CEPGL could play a key role in assuaging the conflict in DRC may partially account for the reticence of the EU in adopting a firm interregional approach with SADC. If the current actions of the Commission are a guide, then SADC will be even further sidelined as a partner in conflict management in the foreseeable future in the Great Lakes. The analysis above reveals that the lack of a functional regional counterpart undermined interregional conflict management in the case of the DRC. Indirect Reasons

The indirect reasons for the EU’s unassertive position refer mainly to the justifications for a weak interregional approach to conflict manage-

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ment that are not directly attributable to the EU. Rather, they can be ascribed more to African actors, for example, certain African states and (sub)regions. The reasons include the uncoordinated, divergent, and often conflicting interests of African countries; confused and overlapping regional configurations; the increasingly assertive and visible role of the African Union; the role of third-party states that do not prioritize a regional approach in their Africa-related policies; and the role of vested corporate interests. These are addressed in turn. Divergent, uncoordinated, and often conflicting interests of African states. Even though African leaders may display an ostensible willing-

ness to cooperate with neighbors, they lack the determination to address the nucleus that underlies persistent conflicts in the region, both within and across borders. This lack of commitment has dampened the credibility of African leaders abroad in making viable claims that they support regional integration in Africa. For instance, SADC has the capacity to address the problems of some of its member states such as DRC, but past tensions have compromised any meaningful steps in this regard (Jenkins and Thomas 2001: 166). The unwillingness to address key issues upfront is compounded by the lack of coordination of national policies at the regional level. Each state is keen to look after its own interests, and efforts to cooperate are timid, at best (Kennes 1999: 33; SADC 2001: 4–5). Furthermore, the governance records of some of the states are poor (Malan 1999; Rotberg 2006: 17), and neighbors often remain cocooned in isolated inaction, reluctant to adopt clear positions against others. It often requires protracted, and often meaningless, negotiations for states to agree on modalities and steps for forging further regional integration as a result of divergent and often conflicting interests. In terms of conflict management, the picture has been even more dysfunctional. This is because subregional capabilities for conflict management remain weak. In those cases where SADC intervened to address conflicts, such as in DRC and Lesotho in 1998, it did so as a cover for the operations that were mounted by a small number of countries. For instance, the intervention in DRC by Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe was presented as a regional effort, but it is common knowledge that the action was disputed by South Africa (Nathan 2002: 77). This “fire brigade” approach to conflict management has been criticized (Malan 1998; Van Langenhove 2004: 45) and justifiably, because it depletes the credibility of the region as a unified actor that is clear in its goals and principles. As long as regional integration efforts are driven

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by vested interests, Africa will remain divided, a legacy with which postindependence first-generation leaders had to grapple (Nyerere 2006: 22). Given this reality, many African states often turn to outside actors for assistance in addressing their problems. In the case of SADC, the tensions that had been stoked by the actions of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe in DRC only contributed to deterring the EU from adopting a clear interregional approach to the conflict. Confused and overlapping regional configurations. Africa has more than

200 intergovernmental arrangements. In Southern Africa, the problem of configuration is acute because there are a number of blocs within the subregion that are relatively viable. In many instances, countries seek to participate in more than one subregional body as a means through which to gain more funds from donors. The issue of overlapping bodies is acute between SADC and COMESA, which has led to sour relations between the two. SADC has called for COMESA to be split into SADC North and SADC South, whereas COMESA has called for SADC to be incorporated into COMESA as COMESA South (Mwale 1999: 36). DRC, for example, belongs to SADC, COMESA, CEPGL, and ECCAS. This makes it difficult for donors to address the problems of the country in a targeted and coordinated fashion. From an economic perspective, it is difficult to imagine how a country may lead a coherent trade policy if it belongs to more than one customs union. This is a dilemma increasingly faced by countries belonging to the East African Community (EAC) and to the future COMESA customs union. From a security perspective, DRC may benefit from the security protocol within ECCAS (the protocol relating to the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa [COPAX]) or from the seminal security structure of COMESA. Angola and Rwanda are members of ECCAS and COMESA. So both blocs were suitable bodies to address the conflict in DRC in a balanced way. But Laurent Kabila instead turned toward SADC for support. Given this ill-defined nature of subregional blocs, it is understandable that external actors such as the EU have adopted a rather muted interregional response (European Community–ESA/IOC 2002: 6). Since 1994 the EU has maintained convivial ties with SADC within the framework of the Berlin Initiative, but this has been a forum where issues of good governance and broader aspects of conflict prevention are addressed, rather than conflict management (Arts 2005: 174–175). The Berlin Initiative may well serve as a template on which prospective ties between SADC and the EU for conflict management may be forged, but

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it is too early to be clear if this will eventually happen, particularly as current indications are that the Union is increasingly turning toward the African Union in terms of conflict management in Africa. The role of the African Union. The AU was created in 2002 to replace the

Organization of African Unity (OAU). The Constitutive Act of the AU ordains, as one of its principles, direct intervention in a state where there has been a perpetration of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity (Article 4[h]). This represents a monumental departure from the approach of the OAU, which was that of nonintervention and respect for the sacrosanct nature of sovereignty. Since its creation in 2002 the AU has worked hard to give teeth to the demands of the Constitutive Act. It is leading the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Although there are logistical problems facing the AU, it is on track (in terms of having the will) to face the many security challenges of Africa. The EU has been forthright in its support for the AU. The EU has backed the AU’s political and security goals by funding the African Peace Facility (APF).13 In terms of economic development, the EU has been a vocal supporter of the AU’s flagship economic program within the framework of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). So, a hypothesis could be advanced that, in a bid to give a chance to the AU in asserting itself at the international podium, the EU actively diluted any firm and robust interregional approach with SADC in terms of conflict management in DRC. Through this approach it will have increased the visibility of the AU as a rising credible international actor. It has been argued that the AU may be Africa’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Gowon 2004: 42; Collier 2006: 13). Realists, however, dissent from this view. They might interpret the recent emphasis on the AU on the part of the EU as a means for the latter to subcontract, and distance itself from, Africa’s imbroglios (Gegout 2005: 432; Gnesotto and Grevi 2006: 135). Notwithstanding these arguments, the fact remains that the increased attention to the AU has heightened its assertiveness, although to the detriment of subregional blocs such as SADC. The EU’s approach of backing the AU, even to the detriment of the subregional blocs, seems to gain increased prominence in the foreseeable future, because the EU has expressed a desire to move toward a “One Africa” policy that integrates its cooperation with ACP countries within the framework of the CPA; its Trade, Development, and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with South Africa; and its ties with North African countries within the Barcelona Process (European Commission 2005: 2). It appears that the AU is poised to step up to the challenge outlined by Kwame Nkrumah

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when he noted that Africa needs “a common defence system with an African High command to ensure the stability and security of Africa” (Nkrumah 2006: 30). The role of third-party countries. As a continent of immense natural and

mineral wealth and energy resources, Africa has become a trade target of countries such as China (De Burgh 2006: 48–49), India, and other emerging markets. The United States, for its part, remains keen on securing oil supplies from African states (Carafano and Gardiner 2003: 2).14 It is also poised to engage in a concerted strategy of rooting out terrorist cells from the Horn as well as the north of the continent.15 So Africa constitutes a strategic target for many non-EU countries. It is interesting, however, that these third-party countries do not prioritize regional integration in their ties with Africa. Although the United States may maintain specific military bases in areas such as Botswana and Djibouti, it still lacks a clear regional security strategy for Africa. It is only in the broader context of the global war on terror that the idea of creating an African Command within the Pentagon’s regional commands has been seriously considered. Even the talks on such an initiative have been held in abeyance. From an economic perspective, the United States has forged a free trade agreement with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Yet the United States still lacks a clear regional economic strategy for the continent or its subregions. This situation is further reflected in the approach adopted by the US government toward the African Growth and Opportunity Act. Eligibility for the benefits is based strictly on national criteria, and no clear effort is made to forge regional integration, unlike what is occurring under the CPA. So third-party countries such as the United States and China instinctively opt for a nation-to-nation relationship. This, in turn, has tempered any regional efforts for fostering conflict management mechanisms at the subregional level. As African countries scramble to attract foreign investment from China and the United States, the obvious repercussion is a weaker subregional bloc. Vested corporate interests. Regional integration entails a widening of markets. Therefore, in this sense, companies doing business in Africa may benefit from fewer barriers to cross-border trade. But companies with vested interests, such as those engaged in the arms trade, have contributed significantly to fomenting instability in many African countries, stoking suspicion among Africans, and undermining trust—an important condition for durable regional integration. European companies based in nations such as France, Germany, Italy, and the UK have exported approx-

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imately €8 billion worth of conventional light weapons to developing countries such as those in Africa (Hughes 2006: 2–3). With the enlargement of the EU toward Central and Eastern Europe, the number of companies that engage in arms trade in Africa has increased. Despite the fact that the EU has fashioned a code of conduct on arms export control, national approaches remain divergent (Anders 2004: 29). Since 2005 the institutions of the EU have taken a number of steps to regulate the arms industry. It is important to note that the issue of arms cannot be laid solely at the doorsteps of EU actors. Weapons that are used in Africa also come from China, from Arab countries, and from African countries themselves. The key issue is that all of these countries contribute substantially to undermining any long-term and credible regional agenda. With a weaker subregional bloc, external partners become wary of any durable or robust partnership for conflict management. No nation is prepared to send its forces to countries and regions awash with AK-47s. Having addressed some of the reasons for failing to adopt a robust interregional approach to conflict management in the DRC, it is worthwhile to consider three reasons why a more robust interregional cooperation in terms of conflict management in DRC was an appropriate approach.

The Appropriateness of a More Robust Interregional Approach

The arguments considered above reveal that there are both direct and indirect factors explaining the Union’s reluctance in forging stronger ties with SADC and in addressing the challenge of conflict management in DRC. There are many arguments that may be proffered to argue why the EU needed to adopt a more robust interregional approach in the DRC. The following sections consider three of these. They relate to the political nature of the realities of the countries in Central and Southern Africa, the economics of such intervention, and social concerns that ought to have compelled a firmer interregional strategy for conflict management. The Political and Security Realities of Central and Southern Africa

In restating the essence of the regional security complex theory, within international relations theory, Barry Buzan notes that a complex relates

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to “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both, are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan 2003: 141). What is of interest here is not the character of the security complex but simply the fact that the security situation in DRC undoubtedly affects the security situation in each of its neighbors and those of nations beyond. Rwanda and Uganda remain concerned that rebels fighting the governments of both countries are based in DRC. The regional conference that was held in Kenya in 2006 on the security realities of Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa, attended by all the countries that have been implicated in the conflict in DRC, takes on critical importance in this context.16 The conference participants promised to commit the sum of US$2 billion in ensuring peace across borders. Initiatives such as this regional conference are entirely consistent with the observations of one keen student of African affairs, who notes: “Regional security and regional development as a whole are intimately locked into deep-seated problems of African state formation and maintenance which continue to defy solution. The future of Africa for better or for worse will be determined regionally” (Clapham 2001: 68). The key question remains about whether, in order to manage the conflict in DRC, the EU should have adopted stronger ties with SADC. The answer to this is yes, for two reasons. First, such a robust EUSADC interregional force could have increased the legitimacy of any external intervention in DRC and enhanced the credibility of SADC internationally. Second, SADC was the subregion that was gravely affected by the conflict in DRC in terms of both refugee outflow and economic disruption. So it would have made sense to align with SADC for a robust interregional operation. But as noted in the earlier analysis, this scenario was hamstrung by closer ties among Rwanda, Uganda, and some EU states. In addition, it is doubtful that SADC and DRC would have openly embraced any interregional effort, given that Laurent Kabila had come under increasing criticism from some Western countries at that time. Economic Reasons

It was noted above that one of the factors explaining the EU’s failure to join with SADC in managing the conflict in DRC was the absence of sufficient funds for the CFSP initiatives. This factor may, in turn, demonstrate why the EU in fact needed to engage with SADC. By pulling their resources together the two blocs could have reached an

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agreement whereby clear mandates and tasks for both sides would ultimately have been more cost-effective than a unilateral intervention. Economists such as Paul Collier and Anki Hoeffler have noted that when external forces intervene in a forceful and productive way to reverse an unfolding conflict, this results in huge cost savings, compared to a situation of unraveling chaos.17 Using the example of the United Kingdom’s intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000, they demonstrated how US$4.8 billion expended in peacekeeping yielded US$400 billion in benefits. Although these figures may seem implausible, they nonetheless illustrate that constructive intervention to reverse escalating wars not only makes security sense but is cost-effective in the long term. The Social Factor

The Central and Southern African subregions not only must cope with realities of insecure borders but also must grapple with a social tragedy that has unfortunately assumed security dimensions: human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). HIV/AIDS is a serious problem for countries such as Botswana, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe (Ngubane and Solomon 2002: 63). The free flow of factors of production that is otherwise a welcome economic element has also facilitated the easy movement of carriers of the virus. The story of the connection between HIV/AIDS and the conflict in DRC is a tragedy. Rape was persistently used as a weapon, and many victims, often women and children, also fell prey to the virus. The EU has been supporting efforts to fight HIV/AIDS in Africa through its contributions to the Global Fund. Here it would have been opportune for the EU to join with SADC in a forceful way to root out belligerents on both sides who callously deployed this despicable weapon to victimize innocent people. In its Regional Strategy Paper for SADC, the Union consistently reiterates that HIV/AIDS has become a security issue. It has good reason for believing so (SADC 2002).

Conclusion

More than any other international actor, the EU has been fervently active in forging peace in DRC through both civilian and military means. It has promised a doubling of aid to DRC within the framework of the Tenth European Development Fund (EDF). DRC will be entitled to more than €400 million from 2008 to 2013 (Michel 2006).

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Furthermore, DRC is the beneficiary of the funds under the governance initiative promised by EC Commissioner for Development Louis Michel. The efforts of the EU (backing those of the United Nations) to secure long-term peace through the organization of elections in DRC are commendable. In terms of military intervention in the country, the EU led an operation in 2003 and, despite controversies surrounding that operation, led another in 2006 to secure a peaceful poll. It had the opportunity to work with a subregional bloc such as SADC to forge a robust partnership for peace in the DRC conflict. It failed to do so, for the reasons analyzed above. Although the EU has formal (institutiondriven) relations with SADC that one could characterize as “pure interregionalism,” the ties have been underexploited as a means of addressing conflicts. Although the elections may be over, peace in DRC is not guaranteed, and conflict escalated again in early 2009. Meaningful and sustainable peace needs to be forged within a durable interregional framework. A lack of coordination and insufficient funds, among other factors, did not allow such a durable framework to develop. To secure the gains made in DRC in recent times, it is important that the EU forge close and coordinated ties, not only with DRC’s neighbors within the CEPGL but also with SADC.

Notes 1. Financial Times, January 14, 2005, 5. 2. Economist, October 28, 2006, 56. 3. European Voice, March 30, 2006, 14. 4. European Voice, July 27, 2006, 4. 5. Wall Street Journal, November 21, 2006, 15. 6. Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2006, 13. 7. BBC on Air Magazine, February 2003, 10. 8. European Voice, March 17, 2005, 19. 9. European Voice, November 9, 2006, 14. 10. Financial Times, October 27, 2005, 6. 11. European Voice, March 9, 2006, 16. 12. Economist, January 27, 2007, 37. 13. European Voice, October 13, 2005, 3. 14. Newsweek, July 28, 2003, 20. 15. Wall Street Journal, April 25, 2006. 16. The International Conference on the Great Lakes, held in Nairobi, Kenya, December 14–15, 2006. 17. Economist, March 5, 2005: 40.

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11 The Impact of EU Conflict Management in Colombia Philippe De Lombaerde, Geert Haghebaert, Socorro Ramírez, and An Vranckx

T

his book is concerned with the overlapping processes of interregionalism and actor coordination as crucial ingredients in the European Union’s (EU’s) external relations toward the Global South. By focusing on specific EU policy areas or issues where concrete interregional interaction is taking place, the purpose is to establish actor qualities and modalities of interregional interaction ex post, on the basis of detailed empirical analysis. The approach here contrasts with much of the literature on interregionalism, which takes the regional actors and their institutionalized interaction, easily labeled as interregionalism, as starting points. This might be misleading. The complex reality of interregional relations requires, it is contended, a more nuanced view, based on the acknowledgment of the complexity of regional actorship and the multiplicity of interregional relations, both in form and in substance. Interregional relations cannot necessarily be confined to one particular category of the typologies, as proposed by Heiner Hänggi and others (Hänggi 2006; see also Chapter 1). This does not, however, preclude questions about, for instance, the relative importance of pure interregionalism, hybrid interregionalism, and transregionalism. This chapter is concerned with a case study of EU policies toward the Colombian conflict, which serves the purposes described above. The case is attractive and relevant for at least two reasons. First, the conflict has not only a national dimension but also a regional and even international one. From the perspective of the EU, this means that it enjoys certain degrees of freedom to choose the extent of its actions and whether or not, for example, to recognize the regional dimension 225

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(with its implications), independently from the question of whether appropriate regional counterparts exist in the Andean region. Second, the Colombian conflict is a phenomenon with different aspects and dimensions cutting across different policy areas and competences. From an EU perspective, this means that competencies are spread over both the national and Community levels. This again provides some degree of freedom, to the extent that European policies can be designed at different levels, with varying degrees of coordination. This complexity suggests that we need to go beyond the notion of pure interregionalism. It is only since the mid-1990s—and more specifically since Ernesto Samper’s administration (1994–1998)—that the Colombian political situation has become more complicated and the international community has shown a growing interest in the Colombian conflict. This increased interest has been related to a series of factors, including changes in the international political agenda; a renewed interest by the United States in Latin America; the growing interlocking of Colombia’s sociopolitical conflict with issues such as human rights, the drugs trade, indigenous populations, and ecology; the regional spillover of the conflict; an increase in the emigration of Colombian citizens; and cases of victims among the foreign community that received media attention in their home countries. Urgent requests for an international presence were launched, which attracted the attention of the international community, and it was during the subsequent administration of President Andrés Pastrana (1998–2002) that international intervention accelerated. The growing presence of Europe also started to gain momentum from the mid-1990s on, particularly, for example, the EU’s official presence in Bogotá, as measured by the increasing numbers of high-level visits and official declarations (Ramírez 2004b). The next two sections of this chapter briefly sketch the characteristics of the conflict and the institutional development and context of EU policies toward Colombia, respectively. We then address the overarching questions underpinning this book, related to actor coordination and interregionalism, in this particular case. A fourth section focuses on the multiplicity of actors that stand behind the abstract notions of “Europe” and the “EU” and the challenges that this poses for actor coordination. The fifth section looks more deeply into the dynamics of actor coordination in the case of EU policy toward the Colombian conflict; this is followed by the conclusion. The empirical data mainly cover the periods corresponding with the Pastrana (1998–2002) and Uribe I (2002–2006) administrations.

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The Colombian Conflict

The current constellation of the conflict emerged in the 1960s, when two armed groups were formed—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). FARC was created in 1966 after government forces attacked a leftist rural militia, aligned with the Liberal Party, during the La Violencia period. FARC formed a political organization, the Patriotic Union, but this movement was practically defunct by the end of the 1980s. ELN was created in 1964 and has been supported by the Cuban government. It is significantly smaller than FARC.1 Both FARC and ELN adhere to a Marxist ideology. A third guerrilla movement (the M-19) and several smaller groups laid down their arms in 1990, and many of the members of these groups are currently active politicians. The paramilitary (self-defense) groups originated at the end of the 1970s, but only in 1997 was a representative organization established, involving most of these groups—the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC). These groups built their strength on their connections with the drug trade in the second half of the 1980s. It was only after they had gained this power that they began to develop a political agenda. The Colombian conflict is difficult to categorize (McLean 2002). It could be said that, at least initially, it belonged to what Paul Rogers (2002: 216) has called the category of “anti-elite insurgencies and rebellions often stemming from the development of radical social movements” as a result of socioeconomic divisions. Ethnic, religious, or (sub)nationalist drivers are indeed absent in the Colombian case. It was not inconceivable, in one of the more pessimistic scenarios, that the internal conflict might gradually move toward a so-called regional security complex (Buzan 1991). To fall within the definition of a civil war, the conflict, apart from being predominantly internal, should show two additional characteristics: a minimum scale and a sufficient level of socialization. The scale of the conflict was initially, and until the 1980s, very limited. According to a common criterion for characterizing civil wars—causing a minimum of 1,000 conflict-related casualties per year—the Colombian conflict was not a civil war for many years (Singer and Small 1982). After the intensification of the conflict from the end of the 1980s on, the number of annual casualties began rising above 1,000. Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas (2003) estimate an annual average of about 3,150 conflict-related casualties in the 1988–2002 period. According to the State Failure Task Force (Gurr et al. 1998), the conflict should still not be characterized as

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a civil war but rather as a war of guerrillas of low intensity (causing between 1,000 and 10,000 political casualties per year). The predominant view appears to be that the conflict demonstrates low levels of socialization. Although it objectively affects the majority of the population in some way, the illegal armed groups have not succeeded in mobilizing important sectors of the population and in polarizing society (Posada Carbó 2001). It would therefore not be accurate to call the Colombian conflict a civil war (Pizarro Leongómez 2002; cf. Ramírez Tobón 2002). The low levels of socialization of the conflict are linked to its apparent coexistence with relatively solid institutions and a considerable degree of state legitimacy. It is on this basis an atypical conflict, when placed in a global and comparative perspective.2 The long duration of the conflict contributes to its complexity, because elements of autosustainability, such as action-reaction patterns and the institutionalization of violence as a way to settle differences, have been generated. The conflict has acquired new characteristics since the 1980s. On the one hand, there was a move from a “war of guerrillas” to a “war of positions.” On the other hand, the modes of financing of this “war” have changed and increased in volume, owing to increasing involvement with the illegal drug trade and the rise of the “kidnapping industry.” This corroborates Paul Collier’s analysis of civil wars over the 1965–1999 period and his conclusion that the financial viability of organizations in conflict, often related to the existence of natural resources, is a major variable in explaining the existence of today’s conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler 1998). The regional dimension of the conflict is related not only to the regional spillover of some of its components (drug traffic, arms traffic, border incidents, possible use of Venezuelan territory, and so on) but also to the fact that the conflict generates direct and indirect negative effects for the whole Andean region in terms of trade flows, foreign direct investment (FDI), tourism, and so on. Finally, a survey of foreign intervention aimed at ending internal conflicts (Walter 1997) shows that few conflicts that ended in the second half of the twentieth century were brought to a close at the negotiation table. Those conflicts that did end through negotiations tended to do so through the intervention of a third credible country. This leads us to two considerations. First, it is likely that given the type of conflict in Colombia, a role can be played by external actors in bringing the conflict closer to its end, even taking its distinctive characteristics into account. Second, given the considerable degree of legitimacy of the (weak) state in Colombia, the meaning of “neutral” intervention by third

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countries in the context of this conflict should be carefully analyzed. Interventions by third countries that systematically bypass the state might be counterproductive because they contribute to further weakening of the state and to reducing citizen confidence in public institutions.

The Making of a European Interregional Approach Toward the Colombian Conflict

Since the formation of the Andean Pact in 1969, interregional relations have developed through various types of agreements, exhibiting growing complexity and diversification. Although the initial agreements with the EU focused on trade, more recent agreements and common declarations are much wider in scope. The political dialogue in the context of the Rio Group was institutionalized in 1990. Five agreements on chemical precursors for narcotics production were signed in 1995. The Declaration of Cochabamba (1996) focuses on both drug producers and consumers and was followed in the same year by the Declaration of Rome on Political Dialogue. A new EU–Andean Community of Nations (CAN) Framework Agreement was signed in 1998. Late in 2001 the EU launched the Andean program on human rights and democracy for the 2002–2005 period. The second summit of Madrid, held in May 2002, opened space for a new EU-CAN strategy for the 2002–2006 period. Resources were allocated in different areas, including notably an initiative for Andean Regional Stability, supporting CAN in the field of conflict prevention. This was congruous with the EC Regional Strategy paper, which declared the challenge of peacebuilding in Colombia as a main issue, along with measures to stop drug trafficking. Resources were also foreseen for controlling the trade in chemical precursors amenable to the production of illegal drugs. Most of the programs were implemented through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Concrete examples of intervention in Andean conflicts are almost nonexistent. The vast majority of European resources are destined for bilateral cooperation, with only a minority going to interregional projects.3 The fast reaction mechanism of the EU—designed at the Helsinki Council of December 1999 to strengthen its civil intervention capacity in crisis situations and forming part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) agenda approved in February 2001—has only been mobilized in Bolivia thus far. On October 15, 2003, the Commission, on behalf of the EU member states, and the Andean Community finalized negotiations over a new

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Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement. The agreement included counternarcotics endeavors, regional integration, governance, poverty eradication, and migration issues, but it also included topics on security and terrorism. The Andean partners, it should be said, felt that the EU’s interest in negotiating such a regional agreement was only rekindled after the Doha Trade Round failed to conclude a global arrangement (Fernández de Soto 2004: 363–444). The arrangement was endorsed by the Declaration of Guadalajara of May 2004 and may be upgraded in the future to an association agreement, which is to incorporate a free trade area.4 The main EU policy objective, according to the EU’s Colombia Country Strategy Paper (CSP), is “to support the Peace Process in order to be able to contribute to the stability of the region.” This key strategic document, approved in May 2002, clearly links the EU’s objectives in Colombia with the broader objectives based upon the European Community (EC) Treaty, Article 177: the Community development cooperation in which an economic focus prevails. In the CSP these objectives also incorporate elements that can each be linked in one way or another with the conflict in Colombia. This includes not only the general “developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and encouraging the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms” but also the more detailed areas mentioned in the statement on development cooperation and in regulations5 and in several communications on Latin America (European Commission 1995c, 2000a). Elements that are relevant for this study of the making of EU policies in conflict management for Colombia include the promotion of equitable access to social services, food security, sustainable rural development, conflict prevention, drug trafficking, terrorism, human rights, and promotion of poverty alleviation. Naturally, in these documents EU involvement in the peace process is also “stepped up,” and several international meetings have been organized with “the Support Group for the Peace Process in Colombia.”6 Coherence seems evident in linking and comparing all of these EU documents, and it is also observable in member states’ strategic papers. An excellent summary of the relevant explanatory models in the different EU documents and declarations is found in Sweden’s Country Strategy Paper for Colombia: The escalating internal armed conflict in Colombia poses a serious general obstacle to development in Colombia. The unequal distribution of political and economic power, increasing poverty, weak democratic institutions, widespread impunity, crimes against human rights and

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international humanitarian law, the unequal distribution of land, and drug trafficking are obstacles to development that are linked to and mutually reinforce one another. They must be addressed to make it possible to achieve sustainable peaceful development in Colombia and regional stability. (Swedish Government 2003: 3)

The changing modalities of interregional cooperation reflect changing trends in the international environment, rather than a substantial increase in or a deepening of the relations between the two regions. Neither of the regions is a priority for the other. A combination of factors plays a role in explaining the limited development of interregionalism in this case. One element is the difficult political situation in the Andean countries and the weakness of CAN institutions. A second element is US bilateralism and its growing political, economic, and military presence in the region, especially since the launch of Plan Colombia in 2000 and the Andean Regional Initiative in 2001. In Europe, divergent views exist about what would or should be an appropriate European (counter)strategy.7 A third element is the low level of objective economic interdependence between the two regions and Europe’s priority attention toward the enlarged EU.

Coordination Among Whom?

In considering the policy coordination issue in this particular case, it is important to acknowledge that the map of actors is quite complex, making the coordination of EU policy within the current institutional architecture difficult. Even focusing solely on the European side, a fluid panorama of actors appears; next to the official actors at the regional and national levels, a series of actors appears at the (blurred) borderline between state and nonstate actors and where certain proximities between European and Colombian actors (clustered around “Brussels,” on the one hand, and “Bogotá,” on the other) are relevant. EU support is also part of an ongoing and more collaborative international community endeavor to help resolve the conflict in Colombia. This endeavor is steered at donor conferences or is channeled through international organizations such as the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS). This implies that Europe is in reality a heterogeneous actor, operating through different modalities and on different levels. The coordination issue cannot be reduced to a simple coordination exercise between “Europe” and its member states. The European actors clustered around Brussels include the institu-

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tional actors at the supranational level: the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament (EP), and its political factions. Their policies cover not only political but also economic and developmental aspects, such as humanitarian assistance and longer-term programs for vulnerable populations, and are therefore spread over the three pillars of European policies (see Chapter 3 by Sven Grimm). A whole range of programs and projects is in place, and the institutional gravitation point (in Brussels) shifts according to the type of policies concerned: sometimes the Commission takes the lead, sometimes the European Council, the European Parliament, national governments, and so on. Political activities of EU actors are difficult to pinpoint in budgetary terms, but as far as aid is concerned, from the mid-1990s on, the Commission and separate EU member states began increasing their budget allocations to multilateral agencies, humanitarian programs, university cooperation, and civil society organizations in Colombia. Colombia stood out as the main zone of operations in South America for the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). The EU and its member states, together, are the largest humanitarian aid and development cooperation donors to CAN countries,8 and the Andean region is the only region in the world with which the EU has a special high-level dialogue on drugs (since 1995). In that cooperative framework, precursor agreements were signed between the EU and each Andean country separately, and a process was installed to monitor the implementation of these agreements.9 National state actors develop their activities from their respective capitals and from Bogotá alongside EU actors. European efforts to cooperate over security—and indeed the task of “combating terrorism”— remain a matter that resides largely in the hands of national governments. In this respect, European governments foster individual policies in accordance with political affinities, traditions, and other singularities. The same holds for conflict-related development aid at the national level, although efforts to coordinate aid packages have been made and have sometimes been successful. Spain, Sweden, Italy, France, and the Netherlands appear to be the more active EU member states in Colombia. Spain assumes a de facto leadership role in EU–Latin America policy, for historical, cultural, and economic reasons. This is the case not only for Spanish governmental policies toward Latin America but also within the European institutions in which Spanish nationals are particularly active. Colombia and Spain have, moreover, extensive security cooperation agreements. Further, particular Spanish expertise concerning Euskadi Ta Askatasuna/Basque Homeland and

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Freedom (ETA) has been made available to Colombian enforcement agencies as well as British expertise that stems from dealing with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). On the basis of detailed information about project cooperation, there does not appear to be a clear pattern, however, indicating a division of labor according to policy areas, sectors, or geographical subregions among EU donors. Some countries (Spain being the primary example) are more willing to collaborate with government agencies than others. Other examples of bilateral initiatives include the signing by France of a separate security cooperation agreement with Colombia in July 2003. Practical enforcement cooperation in combating the flow of drugs, generally seen to be the main source of funding feeding the conflicts in Colombia, is provided for in port control agreements concluded with the Netherlands. Many member states channel their cooperation funds through UN agencies, which dilutes the influence these states have on policymaking but increases their potential impact by pooling resources. Apparently there has been a tendency, since the 2000 Madrid meeting, to refer activities and funding in relation to humanitarian aid to the EU level, in a “philosophy of unifying efforts and of complementarity”—with an important impact on coordination in the field.10 European policymaking toward the Colombian conflict is strongly influenced by nongovernmental actors, not only as lobbyists in the policy preparation phase but also as subcontractors in the implementation phase. European civil society actors with an interest in Colombia include (1) large international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs); (2) medium-sized NGOs, and other nonprofit outfits that are based in one of the European member states and there gather private and governmental budgets for funding their own activities in Colombia or for funding the activities of Colombian partner organizations; and (3) lowbudget organizational constructs that support special-interest advocacy work. From a political-party perspective, European politicians labeled as “progressive” are targeted most consistently by nongovernmental lobbyists, both in national politics and in the European Parliament. In the EP, advocacy work with a special interest in a certain interpretation of the human rights problematic issue tends to focus on the socialist group and the smaller group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left. Business groups with an interest in Colombia, meanwhile, lobby to right-wing members of the same Parliament. As to the contents of noncommercial civil society activity, European NGOs support socioeconomic development activities and humanitarian aid in Colombia. They tend to do this by sending over their own people and transferring money

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and technology to Colombia. These European “development” NGOs also financially support their Colombian partners’ endeavors of local civil society capacity building. Concern for human rights violations in Colombia is manifest in many European civil society activities. That concern is articulated in advocacy activity performed in Europe by networks and special interest groups, such as the Colombian Action International Office for Human Rights (OIDHACO), which is funded by a significant number of European NGOs. In the politically inspired approach to Colombia’s human rights problem, OIDHACO activity does not differ from that undertaken by Colombia desks at large international nongovernmental human rights organizations; nor is all European advocacy work on Colombia orchestrated by OIDHACO. It is one of a number of actors operating in this area. Some networks are even seen to obstruct the activities organized by other NGOs in Europe, such as the spring 2002 launch of the Pax Christi Holland campaign to advocate a coherent European policy in relation to kidnapping (of Europeans) in Colombia. What appears is thus a conglomerate of radical political activity on the one hand, and on the other, several politically neutral arrangements that promote “constructive” socioeconomic cooperation activity and politically disinterested academic work, such as the Network of European Academics for Colombia. Colombia-related activity around Brussels is not just the province of European organizations and networks, however. Representatives of several Colombian organizations—some of which are funded by European NGOs—have become regular fixtures on the European human rights scene from the late 1980s onward. An important move in that direction was made in 1988, when a Colombian Commission of Jurists was set up as a branch of the Geneva-based International Commission of Jurists. The José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers’ Collective is another example of a Colombian lawyers’ organization that gained high visibility in the European human rights community. As has been the case with the organizations mentioned earlier, this was achieved largely with the aid of certain European NGOs. In this diverse landscape, coordinating endeavors exist, although they do not encompass the entire civil society spectrum.11 Turning now to the Bogotá cluster, most of the EU-15 and some of the accession countries have diplomatic representation in Colombia, alongside the official Commission Delegation. This means that common or coordinated positions on the conflict in Colombia transmitted by the diplomatic delegations do not necessarily involve all EU member states.

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As funds for humanitarian assistance are mainly channeled through the ECHO office, often member states’ embassy staff that are involved in the humanitarian sector focus instead on cultural and environmental issues and small-scale social projects. There is a de facto division of labor between the national and community delegations in the field. For human rights– and terrorism-related issues, information-sharing and coordination mechanisms have been put in place, although this does not necessarily mean that Europe has become less reactive, and more proactive, to events. Particularly for smaller member states, standing behind common declarations has proved to be important. The presence of NGOs in Colombia, meanwhile, increased when the conflict escalated as of the mid-1990s, through projects, declarations, and other initiatives (El Espectador 1997: 13A). Not only in Brussels or Strasbourg, but also in Colombia, well-coordinated NGO forums intervene directly with the EU (OIDHACO 2004). Few European NGOs operate directly in Colombia, however. The majority of these operate with the intermediation of a local partner that receives part of the resources obtained from public and private sources in the relevant European NGO’s countries of origin. European NGOs operating directly in Colombia come mainly from Spain and Sweden, followed by Italy and France.

The Dynamics and Effectiveness of EU Policy Coordination

In order to assess the extent and quality of European policy coordination since the Pastrana government, this section analyzes the development of the conflict, and European policies and actions toward it, over the 1998–2004 period (also see Vranckx 2004; Ramírez 2004b, 2004d). This period has been marked by (1) Pastrana’s initiative for a dialogue with FARC and the (so-called) Caguan peace process; (2) the launching of Plan Colombia;12 (3) the debacle of the Caguan process; (4) the 2002 presidential elections, won by Álvaro Uribe; (5) the agreement of Santafé de Ralito on a conditional cease-fire between the government and the AUC, signed in 2003; and (6) the inclusion of Colombian organizations in the list of terrorist organizations by the Council. As already suggested when mapping actors in the previous section, European policy toward the Colombian conflict appears to be the result of the functioning of a complex machinery that operates according to neither a set of simple coordination rules nor clear policy guidelines. Rather, it functions as a multilevel governance system, with moving

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decisionmaking centers and overlapping jurisdictions, although not without the capacity to learn and coordinate. It is also apparent that nongovernmental actors manage to influence the policy process. Several factors appear to drive actor coordination. As mentioned earlier, for a combination of historical, political, or economic reasons, certain member states (Spain in particular) tend to assume leadership roles, and it is these states that are driving European opinion and forging a common stance on political issues. The makeup of these coalitions of leading member states varies over time or according to the specific issue of concern. France, Spain, and Sweden, for example, pushed for active participation of European diplomatic delegations in the dialogues between the Colombian government and FARC (1998–1999), sending a strong political signal to the parties in the conflict (El Espectador 1999). When the 2002 Donor Conference failed to reach agreement about formal EU commitments, Swedish and Belgian government officials were heard to be explicit in their opposition to Plan Colombia. Later, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Germany took the lead in committing support to the OAS mission to accompany the Colombian government’s negotiation with paramilitary blocks and to verify the paramilitary cease-fire. This occurred just a few months after the EU’s initial cool reaction to the Uribe administration’s endeavors to initiate a formal negotiation process with a section of the paramilitary self-defense groups in 2004.13 A second factor concerns the role of the European Parliament. Although it is often assumed that the EP’s power and influence are limited, European foreign policy coordination appears enhanced when the EP emits clear signals. For example, some of the European issues and concerns about Plan Colombia were articulated in a debate at the EP, after which the EP voted its February 1, 2001, Resolution on “Plan Colombia and support to the Colombian peace process,” with an overwhelming 474 votes to 2 (and several abstentions). From that point forward, policy coordination on this issue proceeded much more smoothly and coherently.14 A third exogenous factor is the role played by US policies and specific measures as catalysts for European policy coherence. A clear example of this was the occasion when the US Congress decided to allocate budgets for Plan Colombia in June 2000, after which Washington pledged US$1.3 billion, only US$238 million of which was not earmarked for military aid. This US announcement was not met with universal approval. Some saw it as promoting “further militarization” of the Colombian situation, for which strong criticism emanated from certain

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circles within the United States, Colombia, and Europe. In this respect, Plan Colombia’s positive reception in Washington ultimately undermined the possibility of obtaining European funding for Colombian endeavors. Despite these driving factors for actor coordination, at times certain member states prefer to act alone, or at least to differentiate their behavior while formally adhering to a common European position. Preceding Europe’s refusal to back Plan Colombia, both British prime minister Tony Blair and Spanish president José María Aznar made commitments to President Pastrana to support the plan, for which they were heavily criticized afterwards (Independent 2000). Later, Spain organized an international Donor Conference on July 10, 2000, to seek funding for a nonmilitary part of Plan Colombia. The EU, and its member states other than Spain, abstained from making formal pledges, notwithstanding the fact that the EU CFSP High Representative had already demonstrated his willingness to accommodate Pastrana’s requests. In fact, Javier Solana—EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy—came under fire for making these commitments, about which EU institutions had not been properly duly consulted. After the EU officially rejected Plan Colombia, divisions over this issue continued and were even exacerbated. Several European diplomats in Colombia questioned the radical rejection of the plan. They questioned whether this rejection neglected the need to strengthen Colombia’s institutional capacity and, more particularly, to modernize the armed forces and security apparatus as one of the necessary conditions for reaching a solution to the conflict (Massé 2003). When some of the EU countries that had accompanied the dialogues between the government and FARC began moving toward a mediating role, they were heavily criticized by other members and came into collision with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (whose office is predominantly financed by Europe). Another example relates to arms exports. There has been little European support in response to President Uribe’s repeated calls for military aid from Europe. Assistance in this field falls to the national governments, and consequently, decisions at this level are likely to be marked by political considerations and affinities. Indeed, several European states would even be precluded from allowing commercial military exports to Colombia, both by their domestic laws and by the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports that prohibits the export of military equipment to a country engaged in armed conflict or that has already been rejected by another European exporter.15 Nonetheless, Spain donated military aid to Colombia, although the content of that aid has become

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expressly restricted to “nonoffensive” material (ambulance planes) and training (such as in land mine eradication). The veto right in the Council is an example of explicit recognition of the right to act unilaterally. In the lead-up to the May 2002 meeting of the EU, Latin America, and the Caribbean, organized under the Spanish presidency (the Madrid Summit), controversy arose over intentions to add FARC to a European terrorist list. At that time, the list already included the Colombian paramilitary AUC.16 FARC’s inclusion on that list would remove prerogatives that FARC spokespersons enjoyed in European countries (such as visas, refugee status). Sweden, later joined by France, initially vetoed the inclusion of FARC on the European terrorist list.17 They argued that the proposed inclusion would obstruct the ability of the incoming Colombian president to begin new negotiations with FARC. The failure of European governments to reach an agreement regarding the inclusion of FARC on its terrorist list attracted bitter criticism of Europe in Colombia.18 This situation was inflamed because the controversy coincided with the May 2002 mass killing in Bojayá, Chocó, where more than 100 people died in a church that was bombed by FARC. Swedish UN High Commissioner Anders Kompass restricted his criticisms to the Colombian government, for having failed to prevent the tragedy, and to the paramilitary troops assumed to have provoked FARC to detonate the bomb. In Colombia, this statement provoked a severe backlash, and European “antimilitarism”—which some Colombians also took to have blocked substantial European funding for Plan Colombia—was set against human rights concerns and other considerations presumed to be on European agendas. The Swedish government effectively changed its view in the aftermath of the Bojayá tragedy and after President Pastrana met with the late Anna Lindh, then Swedish minister of foreign affairs. After this “Swedish turn” the inclusion of FARC on the common EU terrorist list was decided expeditiously, at a meeting of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), and formalized at the next Council meeting, in Luxembourg on June 13, 2002. In a surprise move, in early 2003, France announced that it would be willing to receive and harbor FARC guerrillas, “were these to be liberated in a humanitarian agreement.”19 That commitment, which was later repeated, corresponds at least in part with overt and covert French governmental endeavors to negotiate the liberation of the kidnapped French-Colombian former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt.20 The fact that individual member states sometimes endeavor to push

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their (minority) position through the EU does not necessarily mean that country policies are consistent over time. The Belgian government, for example, was seen to have pushed for the inclusion of FARC on the European terrorist list, an action that was certainly not “on demand” of the dense civil society networking in Europe. Weeks after the inclusion of FARC, however, Belgium was reported to have successfully prevented the inclusion of the ELN on that same list. By mid-2002, the ELN was no longer talking with Colombian representatives in Havana. It was therefore expected that the inclusion on the European terrorist list of this second Colombian guerrilla organization would become a fact when the list was next revised, despite the fact that Belgium had expressed reservations on the matter. These and other reservations appeared to have been more problematic than anticipated, as it would be almost two more years, in 2004, before the European Council could include the ELN on the list (Official Journal of the European Union 2004: L 99/28). In contrast, a German change of approach was the outcome of a parliamentary debate that had lasted seven months, after which the Bundestag approved an eighteen-paragraph motion that set out the lines of a new German policy regarding Colombia. In a crucial first paragraph to the motion, the German government urged the government to support president Álvaro Uribe in his task to have the public forces restore the monopoly of military force in his country. In this aspect, the motion could not have contrasted more starkly with a certain previous German policy, under which private German entities and citizens, and the government, entered arrangements with armed nonstate actors that undermined the Colombian state’s monopoly on military force, in order to facilitate the release of kidnapped citizens or to avoid kidnappings. Moreover, Germany sent Claudia Roth (of the European Green Party, Bundnis 90), its parliamentary commissioner for human rights, to Bogotá in October 2003. In Bogotá, Roth announced that Germany would urge the EU to appoint a High Commissioner, in line with the parliamentary motion. In the meantime, the German government gave its full support to the Colombian government’s request that Europe settle the long-running issue over the ELN and delineate the ELN as a terrorist organization. Such instances when member states’ positions do not correspond with the majority or common European position could be characterized as “policy differentiation” that facilitates pursuing a distinctive policy within the broader agreed-upon framework. This characterization was applied when, in the months following the February 2001 EP resolution, EU member states were to put forward their pledges to complement the

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Commission’s aid commitment. A third meeting of the support group for the peace process was organized jointly by the European Commission and the IDB in April of that year. Swedish state secretary Gun-Britt Andersson formally declared the EU’s concerted support for Colombia’s peace endeavors. She stated that, for the EU, the first objective of the meeting was “to grant full political support for the peace-efforts of President Pastrana.”21 Some European countries had, by then, already become facilitators of the presidential talks with guerrilla groups and had been asked to become more deeply involved in the near future. The EU presented a multiannual and overall support package worth more than €330 million. The External Relations Commissioner at the time, Christopher Patten, confirmed the contribution, which the EC had announced a few months earlier, and had topped up in the meantime to €140 million. The remaining €190 million was pledged by various European member states. The more significant contributions came from Spain, Sweden, France, and Germany. Smaller countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands also made relatively substantial pledges. The UK declared in its country profile on Colombia that it was “contributing to an EU package” and would “continue to support the work of the EU”22—in direct reference to the decisions made in the third meeting of the support group for the peace process held in Brussels. In practice, many of these European pledges and programs could be recognized as a refocusing—and in some cases a mere relabeling—of the support that Colombia had been receiving until that stage, through “nonconcerted” European aid strategies. Apart from peace laboratories, the concerted European aid package provided for resources to “combat violence and human rights violations” and to “relieve the social impact of conflict (displaced people, children involved in conflict, and alternative development in areas where manual eradication of drug crops takes place).”23 The so-called actions to increase the respect for human rights and stimulate a peace culture would come to be funded by Sweden, Finland, the UK, and Belgium. A final remark relates to Europe’s capacity to learn. It should be recognized that recent years have seen progress, particularly related to the coordination of European actors in Colombia. Regular meetings are now organized among the Delegation, the presidency, and the diplomatic missions, together with officers responsible for cooperation, human rights, and security, and policy papers have been prepared. In this process, and with the consensus reached at the donor meetings, the EU has been able to act in a more coordinated way and to assume common positions on crucial issues, at crucial moments. Concrete and far-reaching experiences

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such as the (failed) Caguan peace process with FARC under President Pastrana, between 1998 and 2002, which obliged member states’ representatives to coordinate effectively and to work closely together, have certainly contributed to this evolution.

Conclusion

We will assess the case of EU policymaking toward the Colombian conflict both specifically and in general terms that are relevant for the broader discussion of the EU as a global actor and interregionalism. Although perhaps not a clear demonstration of the lack of effectiveness of EU policies, the results of the Latino barometer related to Colombian perceptions of EU policies are illuminating. In 2004, Colombian citizens perceived the United States as more helpful than the EU in promoting democracy, defending peace, and promoting development (Focus Eurolatino 2004). Europe’s discourse on peaceful conflict settlement, democracy, justice, and development was not perceived as necessarily reflecting the reality and effectiveness of its policies. Although it has been shown that the EU learns from coordination and coherence failures (Everts and Keohane 2003), in this case, as in many other cases, European national policies provide little evidence of evolving toward a more coherent and coordinated EU policy, notwithstanding the fact that some learning is observed in the field, for example, in the area of humanitarian aid. When policy coordination takes place, it is not necessarily based on positive motivations (effectiveness, efficiency): controversial US positions on issues such as the way to combat drug trafficking and illegal armed groups operating in Colombia have also been a driving force toward EU common positions. It should be possible for the EU, with its potential as a global power, to be more influential and effective (Ramírez 2004a, 2004c). For this to occur, several preconditions must be met. First, interregionalism requires higher levels of actor coordination than have been established to date. As shown in the previous sections and confirmed by observers such as the International Crisis Group (IGC 2004; Ramírez 2004b), EU policy with respect to the Andean region has been characterized by isolated initiatives and counterproductive rivalries—a situation attributable to divergent interests and relatively weak policy coordination. The energies committed to seeking confrontation and visibility tend to work against the effectiveness of European policy and presence in the Andean region, as in the cases of the Plan Colombia and the Caguan peace

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process. Mechanisms should be installed to guarantee more consistency and coordination in relation to antidrug policies, security, migration policies, and judicial cooperation. Second, effective interregionalism would benefit from a working interparliamentary dialogue, as demonstrated by the contribution of such a dialogue to democracy and peace in Central America. The scale, urgency, and critical nature of the situation in the Andean region suggest that the exchange of information, intra- and interregional confidence building, and the gestation of new proposals and initiatives could be of great benefit in the resolution of this conflict. Third, and related to the coordination issue, there is an apparent need to develop a stronger analytical capacity on the European side, which should permit a better understanding of the complexity of the conflict and its context. Decisions related to defining a European position toward the conflict in Colombia have on occasion been taken—both at the European and national levels—on the basis of lacking, partial, or biased information. This perception is held strongly by many Colombian and external observers. A greater pooling of resources would strengthen the analytical capacity of the EU (through economies of scale), especially for complex cases that are ascribed relatively low (political and economic) importance by the EU. This should allow the EU to focus more on border zone problems, revising antinarcotics policies and recognizing the changing nature of the conflict and of the linkages between the socioeconomic and political situation in the region and the problematic insertion of the region’s economies into the world economy. It would also allow for a more balanced evaluation of the role of the actors involved so as to formulate realistic demands (for example, with regard to justice and reparation in a negotiated peace scenario), to better monitor the impact of European policies and the role of EU-subsidized NGOs in Colombia, and to reduce Europe’s conceptual dependence on the UN and various NGOs. Fourth, more effective policies could be developed if the regional linkages of the conflict were recognized. As mentioned above, the Colombian conflict is increasingly linked with the sociopolitical situation in neighboring countries, through illegal trade circuits (drugs, arms), certain proximities between the guerrillas and certain sectors in these neighbors, border-crossing by rebel groups and displaced populations, and so on (Cubides 1998). The development of conflict-related activities—such as securing strategic corridors—in the geographically complicated but resource-rich border zones fuels the conflict and makes

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it more difficult to control, especially since income inequality is rampant in these areas. The weakness of regional institutions in the Andes and the consequent low levels of trust and cooperation strain Colombian-Venezuelan relations. These factors, together with traditional US bilateralism, all lead to the conclusion that there is an important space for action by the EU. The EU has not seized upon multilateral and biregional events as a privileged opportunity to help the countries of the region move beyond fundamentally individual and reactive postures and to stimulate mutual rapprochement, the exchange of views, and coordination. The EU may not have been sufficiently insistent on a regional cooperative perspective. Dialogues and interviews with various European diplomats accredited in Bogotá have not disclosed that interregionalism is perceived as a means to conflict resolution; rather it is circumscribed to trade issues. In the dialogues on Andean integration, internal border issues are not adequately addressed. It is striking also, for example, that the joint evaluation of Andean integration, which was initiated after the Guadalajara Summit, focuses almost entirely on trade integration. This passive stance contrasts with the role Europe has played in Central America in assisting neighbors to resolve conflicts. Fifth, a more coherent policy to combat drug trafficking should be a high priority for Europe as part of an effective contribution to the peace process in the Andean region. Thus far, the interregional political dialogue has been ineffective. Although the EU has pronounced itself in favor of a joint fight against drugs with multilateral commitments and global strategies involving both producing and consuming countries, the practical consequences of this discourse (alternative solutions to fumigation, tackling consumption in Europe, tackling trafficking and money laundering) are not clear. Sixth, a critical evaluation of the role played by NGOs in the EU’s external policies, in the gray area between the public and private spheres, is needed. The case study here has shown the important role of NGOs in the policy cycle and their capacity to monopolize certain policy niches. Diversity and dissent marking civil society activities have been mirrored in EU policies on Colombia for a considerable period of time. Although it is generally recognized that the work of NGOs is valuable, Colombian governmental observers criticize the activities of certain sectors of European NGOs and their Colombian counterparts. Often, NGOs do not limit themselves to their declared work program related to socioeconomic or political development. Conflicts among NGOs have occurred over resources and prestige, undermining the

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effectiveness of their operations because they do not always succeed in establishing a functional relationship with local authorities and actors and because their lack of confidence in the local institutions tends to be exaggerated. The choice of location of a project is not always coordinated with local actors, projects do not always contribute to community building, and relevant information is rarely passed on to the authorities. European aid that is channeled through NGOs consequently does not always contribute to strengthening Colombia’s public sector institutions. Some further general conclusions can be drawn from the specific case study here. First, the design of European institutions and the distribution of competences across governance levels are not well suited to acknowledging the links between different policy areas. The Colombian conflict, and the socioeconomic and political crises in the Andean countries in general, cannot be probed independently from their problematic insertion in the world economy. Market access, although important, is not the only issue that should be settled. The EU could contribute to a more harmonious insertion of the Andean economies in the global economy, for example, in the context of the World Trade Organization negotiations. Second, the case study shows that an analysis in terms of the three pillars is not sufficient to capture the reality of EU foreign policy. The empirical evidence suggests that the choice of modality of European intervention is rarely based on effectiveness criteria but rather on what constitutes the least institutional resistance: at the European level, aid and trade, which are more easily managed by the EC, tend to replace foreign policy. Third, another characteristic of EU external policymaking is that the Europeanization and coordination of external policies are not a unidirectional process. Sometimes, when a common position is (finally) reached—such as in the case of declaring the armed groups terrorist organizations—policymakers return to their respective national levels to voice discontent and question the consensus reached at the European level. It is important to illuminate the internal functionalism of the existing EU external policy machinery; the multiplicity of official actors on different levels is a convenient structure to enable responses to different (internal) political pressures. In cases where the cost of noncoherence or noncoordination is not really felt in the member states, the machinery is unlikely to be replaced soon. Finally, and with respect to linkages between actor coordination and interregionalism, the case study illustrates a two-way relationship. On the one hand, improved policy coordination sets in motion interregional dialogue and negotiation and the definition of policies with a regional

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scope. On the other hand, interregionalism (imposed by the regionalization of the issues at stake) has a positive effect on the demand for increased policy coordination and the pooling of European resources.

Notes The authors are grateful to the Dutch Embassy in Bogotá for allowing one of the authors to participate in an EU coordination meeting, to our interviewees, to Marie Zazvorkova and Harvey Ferrer for their help with the data collection, and to Fred Söderbaum and Patrik Stålgren for their comments. The usual caveats apply, and the authors are responsible for the contents of this chapter. 1. As of 2000, estimates of FARC’s strength, in terms of numbers of combatants, fluctuated between 15,000 and 20,000. Although figures are not very reliable, it is possible that the number was about half that by 2008 owing to the combined effect of victims and deserters (Wieland 2008). At one stage ELN numbered 5,000 combatants, but it is also believed to number far fewer today. 2. Colombia scores better than the lowest score available for the EU on indicators of state legitimacy, such as participation rates in national elections, legal opacity, corruption perceptions, or corruption (see the following websites: http://www.electionworld.org; http://www.opacity-index.com; http://www .transparency.org). The legal environment and the freedom of the press are comparable to Italy’s (Deutsch 2004). Colombia scores significantly below the EU benchmark on the Gini coefficient, however, demonstrating the limited redistributive capacity of the Colombian state (UNDP 2004). 3. Region-to-region cooperation includes projects aimed at the creation of the Andean common market (quality standards, tariffs, competition policy), the strengthening of the integration process, democracy, human rights, and prevention of natural disasters. A coordination office is located in Bogotá. 4. Joint communiqué from the meeting of the EU troika and the heads of state of the Andean Community, issued at the Guadalajara Summit on May 29, 2004. 5. November 2000 Statement of the Commission and the Council, Regulation (EEC) N. 443/92 of February 25, 1992. 6. Support Group of the Peace Process, available at http://europa.eu.int /comm/external_relations/colombia/intro/index.htm, p. 2 (accessed August 13, 2004). 7. On the Colombian side most political forces support diversification of Colombia’s external relations and favor closer relations with Europe (De Lombaerde 2002). 8. See European Union @ United Nations, “Summary: January 25, 2005: EU–Andean Community: Regional Integration Assessment Launched,” available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/andean/intro/index.htm (accessed June 7, 2008). 9. See “The External Policy on Drugs,” http://ec.europa.eu/external_ relations/drugs/index_en.htm (accessed September 11, 2009). 10. “Cooperación Española en Colombia,” Memoria 2001–2003, pp. 83–84, available at http://ww.aeci.es. This document explains that Spain used its role as

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the EU Presidency in Colombia as a mechanism to propose and start up coordination meetings between the EU and the responsible member states (monthly) and among NGOs (bimonthly), including contacts with UN and national authorities as well as a shared web-based project database: http://ww.acci.gov.co. 11. Examples of these endeavors are Coordination of French NGOs, Belgian Coordination for Colombia, and the Dutch Development Cooperation Policy Bureau. 12. The so-called Plan Colombia refers to President Pastrana’s endeavor to obtain financial support from the international community related to his presidential program (multiannual development plan), which was approved by the Colombian Congress in 1998. The program was budgeted at US$7.5 billion and aspired to instigating a peace process with Colombian guerrillas while at the same time strengthening state institutions and curbing the drug economy. For a critical perspective, see Estrada (2001). 13. “Declaration of the Presidency on Behalf of the EU on the Occasion of the Formal Start of Talks Between the Government of Colombia and the AUC Paramilitary Groups,” Brussels, June 20, 2004, 10167/04 (Presse 194); “Llegó la hora cero para el inicio del proceso de desmovilización de los paramilitares,” El Tiempo, July 1, 2004; “La Unión Europea saluda proceso con paramilitares, pero no asiste a él,” El Tiempo, June 30, 2004. 14. See, for example, “Cooperación Española en Colombia, Memoria 2001–2003, p. 83. 15. For more information on military exports, see “European Arms Exports to Latin America,” available at http://www.ipisresearch.be. 16. The EU “terrorist list” was introduced in December 2001 in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and included AUC from the onset. Spain and Belgium are reported to having pushed the idea to include FARC (El Tiempo, May 16, 2002). 17. Decisionmaking on the terrorist list is a CFSP issue, which the Treaty of the European Union defines as an intergovernmental Pillar II scheme: policy formulation takes place within the context of the Council of Ministers and its Working Groups, almost exclusively on the basis of unanimity. 18. El Tiempo, May 5, 2002. 19. El Tiempo, January 9, 2003. 20. In July 2003, the envoy of the then French foreign affairs minister Dominique de Villepin was, in an embarrassing incident, found aboard a French Hercules airplane that had landed in Manaus without previous notice to the Brazilian authorities. The occupants of the plane refused to give the authorities permission to inspect the plane, claiming diplomatic status. It was alleged that the Hercules was equipped to enable a medical examination of Ingrid Betancourt, whom the French expected to be liberated in Brazil at that time. 21. “Third Meeting of the Support Group of the Peace Process: Overview,” available at http://www.europe.eu.int/comm.external_relations/colombia/ 3msg/index.htm (accessed March 3, 2008). 22. “Foreign and Commonwealth Office Country Profile Colombia,” available at http://www.fco.gov.uk (accessed August 13, 2004). 23. Material is from the “Preparatory AMLAT Group Meeting” (April 24, 2001) distributed at the donors’ meeting on April 30, 2001 (obtained from the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

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12 Reflections on the EU and the Global South Björn Hettne, Fredrik Söderbaum, and Patrik Stålgren

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he forces that created what today is known as the European Union (EU) did not envision that body as a future global actor. Following the devastation and tragedy of World War II, the main concern for the European Community (EC) was to unite the nations and peoples of Europe in order to avoid another war on the continent. But as the Community expanded and came to take on successively more functions within Europe, the need for a comprehensive and coherent external approach became evident. As this book has shown, today’s EU has a wide range of economic, political, social, and also, increasingly, cultural relations with virtually every country and region in the world. Reflecting the haphazard transformation of the EU into a global actor, there is interminable discussion about what kind of actor it is or will be or should become. Despite a growing literature on the topic, especially in fields such as international relations, EU studies, comparative politics, and foreign policy analysis, the EU’s role as a global actor remains weakly theorized. The first two chapters of this book stated that this work aims to move beyond a simple dichotomy between the EU’s internal development and its external relations by emphasizing the concept of regional actorship, built around three interacting components: (1) internal cohesion and identity formation, or regionness; (2) international presence in terms of territorial and population size, economic strength, diplomacy, military power, et cetera; and (3) capacity to act purposively in an organized fashion in order to shape outcomes in the external world, or actorness. Throughout this book the focus has mainly been on the third component, but in order to grasp the phenomenon of regional agency in a comparative light it is important to remember that 249

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the effectiveness of actorness also depends on the quality of regionness and the relative weight of presence. Furthermore, the concrete experiences of actorness will also impinge on regionness and presence. The concept of actorship is not simply confined to the EU but can also be seen as a comparative tool for studying the transformation of any region with a certain actor capacity in its external relations. One of our contributions has been to show that functioning interregionalism requires that both regions have achieved a certain degree of actorship. This collection has looked into the links between the EU on the one hand and Africa, Latin America, and Asia on the other hand in order to pinpoint the basis for interregional structures to emerge. Given the rather limited theoretical foundation upon which to build, another important contribution of this book has been to provide historically grounded evidence from distinct policy processes and case studies. This final chapter seeks to draw together the perspectives presented in the preceding chapters to make comparative conclusions about the multifaceted actorship the EU displays in its various policy areas and toward different regions. There is a need for an overall assessment of EU actorship, since it operates in contrasting fashion among policy areas and among counterpart regions. We present this assessment in the following sections dealing with the problems of actorship and policy areas and with the pattern of the EU’s interregional relations with the Global South. In the final section we draw further conclusions from these comparative reflections and from contrasting theoretical perspectives regarding the future of the EU as a global actor.

Actorship and Policy Areas

Since its inception, the EU’s relations and foreign policies have become increasingly comprehensive and complex, spanning most regions and countries in the world and most fields of activity. The number of policy areas dealt with by the EU appears to increasingly correspond with the EU’s internal cohesion or regionness. This book has dealt with three policy areas in which the EU displays varying actor behavior. Some explanations for this variation in actorship may be found in the ways that the EU executes foreign policy. In Chapter 2 Björn Hettne referred to the intricate machinery through which the EU’s actorship is realized as the EU’s Foreign Policy Complex (FPC). Understanding the EU in terms of FPC provides an institutional account of increasing or decreasing actorship and its interacting components. The complexity of this

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FPC derives from a variety of factors, such as (1) the nature of and interaction between the supranational and the intergovernmental levels of decisionmaking, (2) the pillar system and the different competences with regard to where decisions are taken, (3) the multiplicity of common institutions (such as the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, and special agencies) and policy instruments, and (4) the multiplicity of foreign policy objectives—for instance, regional cooperation, human rights, democracy and good governance, conflict prevention, sustainable development, security, and fighting international crime. The notion of the FPC reveals that the reality and practice of the EU’s external relations are more complex, multidimensional, and ambiguous than the EU acknowledges in its official policy discourse. Furthermore, the case studies presented in this book reveal that the FPC changes over time, owing to a number of endogenous and exogenous factors, with different implications for presence and actorness. This also implies a constantly changing perception of the EU’s cohesion or regionness. Trade and Economic Cooperation

Like many publications before it in this research field, this book confirms the view that the EU is a strong and recognized economic actor with significant presence in most of the Global South. Although history elicits numerous examples of national interests overriding economic considerations and potential trade relations, the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) is a triumph of “the community method” over the national interests of individual EU member states. Nevertheless, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and occasional concessions to “national” commercial interests in the EU trade policy positions highlight the continuing linkages between the internal and external dimension of the EU’s relations with the outside world. The picture is further complicated by the intricate relations between economic cooperation and other policy areas. Trade agreements with partners in the Global South are increasingly linked to a series of political concerns and conditionalities (good governance, human rights, the environment) falling outside of “community competence.” The EU should be understood as a global actor in the field of trade, and interregionalism plays an important role in the fostering of the EU’s relations within this field. To be recognized as a more complete actor in world politics, however, the EU must move beyond mere trade and economic cooperation. In response to this imperative, policymakers have attempted to broaden the EU’s foreign policy portfolio to develop for

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the organization a persona akin to a “light” nation-state or at least to emerge as some form of global political actor. But there are obvious conflicts in the FPC; the tension between the supranational level (especially the Commission’s visions and interests) and the national level (the desire of many EU member states to maintain their autonomous decisionmaking) is strong. There is little evidence that this structural conflict between the supranational and the national level will be easily resolved in policy areas outside of trade and economic policy. It is apparent that the EU’s power resources reside within the first pillar, in particular within the CCP. To move beyond these contradictions the EU must employ these resources in other pillars or policy areas, such as development and security, both of which express the EU’s ambition to shape the external world but also illustrate a low level of actorness in this field. International Development Cooperation

Rooted in the historical colonial relations of its member states, development policy was formally introduced as an area with (complementary) EU competence with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. Following nearly a decade of dubious performance in this area, negotiations between the Council and the Commission resulted in a joint policy statement in 2000 stipulating the principles and objectives of the EU’s development policy. After the European Parliament was brought into discussions, these principles and objectives were revised in 2005—also reflecting external events such as the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York in September 2001 and the adoption by state leaders of the Millennium Development Goals—referred to as the European Consensus on Development (European Union 2000, 2005). A review of experience at country and regional levels in the South evinces little or no convincing empirical evidence, however, that the highly proclaimed development policy has begun to take tangible form in actual engagements. This book highlights the ambiguous nature of the EU as an actor within this policy field. Donor coordination is rapidly improving at the country level, but these processes are usually centered upon a variety of largely multilateral or ad hoc country-based mechanisms rather than the EU. In fact, arguably, the European Commission can in this capacity be regarded as “just another donor,” and the Union remains malfunctional as a coordination mechanism. Indeed, the institutions of the EU (the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament) have been largely unsuccessful in developing a

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common EU development policy, representing the member states and the EU as a whole. The European Consensus is, as one interviewee put it, “ice thin.” Since aid and development policy is one of the areas of EU action subject to shared competence, individual EU member states can and do continue to conduct international development policy according to national priorities and preferences. Sven Grimm argues in Chapter 3 that a complete communitarization of international development cooperation is not politically desirable for many EU member states and would presumably be of questionable value for a number of developing countries. The evidence presented in this book suggests that the much-vaunted “value-added” aspect of the Commission’s development policy is ambiguous in countries and regions where there is a history of engagement by the EU member states (especially in Africa). The Commission has listed nine specific sectoral areas in which it claims to have a comparative advantage over other development actors (these include trade and regional development, environment, infrastructure development, and democracy and human rights). This list is clearly motivated by reference to the EU’s own historical genesis in terms of peace and welfare, rather than by its track record in developing coherent policy toward the South. In our view, the rhetoric represented by the European Consensus appears to be, above all, a device to boost the Commission’s legitimacy. The fragmented administrative responsibility within the EU’s institutions is another factor that severely limits the EU’s actorship. The geographical division of responsibilities for external relations within the Commission is indeed problematic, with an unsustainable overlap between the mandates of the Directorate-General (DG) Development and the DG External Relations (see Chapter 3). Furthermore, interviewees from various member states with practical experience working with the Commission testify to its inflexible bureaucracy and a lack of willingness to cooperate with other agencies and EU member countries, indicating a lack of commitment to representing a unified EU. Notwithstanding these limitations, as Anne Haglund Morrissey emphasizes in Chapter 8, development cooperation in Latin America shows that the European Commission is capable of playing a more substantive role in regions where the EU member states lack prior engagements or strong commitments. This is indeed boosting interregionalism between the EU and Latin America in the field of international development cooperation. Nevertheless, the Commission’s ability to assert its position where there are few competing actors contributes only marginally to the EU’s

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actorship in a broader sense. For actorship to increase, the European Commission as well as the member states must take the European Consensus on Development more seriously, improve the coherence between its policy areas, and pursue greater coordination among actors under a common EU umbrella. Such measures would contribute to promoting a role for the EU in the development field. Conflict Management

For the more problematic field of security and conflict management, the EU’s challenge revolves around how to react to insecurities facing the continent. Here, the complexities of the intergovernmental mode of decisionmaking would appear to be fundamentally at odds with EU actorship. Literature in this area frequently posits the view of the EU as an economic giant (high presence) but a political dwarf (low actorness), with the conclusion that its security policy is weak. In Chapter 3, Sven Grimm points out that the EU has nevertheless begun to demonstrate a considerable amount of activity in the security field. One reason for this lies in the contemporary conceptualization of security, which goes well beyond conventional large-scale military presence to include, for example, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and state failure. In the face of the multiplicity of new threats, the EU member states have been able to overcome some of their internal differences, which has led to a consolidation of the EU as a global actor. Similarly, the philosophy that “conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early” (European Council 2003: 7) has precipitated an EU proactivity that has given the intergovernmental machinery of decisionmaking adequate time to respond. This also includes the possibilities of linkage between different policy areas with different degrees of presence and actorness. Furthermore, the EU has leveraged its image as a “civilian power” to engage in a securitization of much of its external relations, thereby making economic and development policies two of its most effective “power instruments.” The EU’s most urgent security problem is the “near abroad.” Here, lingering membership in the EU has had a stabilizing effect. Drawing on its arsenal of conditionality and nontariff trade barriers, the EU has similarly developed a “postmodern” approach to evident and potential threats originating in the Global South. Once again, that the EU’s more elaborate security policy toward the South is a recent development is clear from current engagements, especially in Africa.

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The EU’s involvement in the regional conflict configuration in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) is an important test case for the EU’s conflict management capacity. The EU’s limited and short-term intervention in Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC’s) province of Ituri in 2004 (Operation Artemis) is quite often cited as a success. As a consequence of divergent member states’ interests in the region, however, the EU only managed a halfhearted response to the conflict (Stefaan Smis and Sevidzem Stephen Kingah, Chapter 10). Despite repeated declarations in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) that conflict resolution in the GLR was a top priority, the Union’s weak degree of actorness was apparent in its slow progress toward a clear response to the conflict. In a similar fashion, the EU played only a marginal role in the case of the Colombian conflict configuration, which according to Philippe De Lombaerde, Geert Haghebaert, Socorro Ramírez, and An Vranckx (Chapter 11) should be understood as a reflection of weak presence and a lack of genuine historical connections to the region on behalf of major powers within the Union. The Colombian case study illustrates a two-way relationship between actorness and interregionalism. On the one hand, better coordination within the EU would facilitate interregional dialogue and the definition of policies with a regional scope; on the other hand, the regionalization of the issues at stake would have a positive effect on policy coordination within the EU and enable the pooling of resources. Cross-Pillar Relations

This book has argued that the EU functions reasonably smoothly as an economic actor. It is difficult to identify major conflicts concerning economic and trading relations toward the Global South, and many of the individual EU member states have subordinated themselves to the common commercial agenda. This coincides with the European Commission’s strong role and competence and with majority voting in the Council. But although economic cooperation is the most distinct example of EU presence and actorness, the Commission’s ability to present a unified EU in this area is compromised by this area’s complex relations with other policy fields, especially development cooperation and security. It cannot be denied that violent conflict carries heavy development costs. Development may also, at least indirectly, contribute to the prevention of conflict. Since these connections have become more and more visible and obvious, there is a policy convergence between the fields of international development cooperation and conflict management.

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As noted earlier, the disparate competences and institutional solutions in other policy areas complicate the EU’s objectives of policy coherence and coordination (actorness). In this regard, the EU’s ambition of becoming a global actor beyond trade and commercial policy is severely hampered by its pillar structure. As elaborated in Chapter 2 and then empirically verified in many chapters of this book, there is a structural conflict between pillars, revealing a lack of coordination, coherence, and consistency. Many issues would therefore be more effectively handled by more cross-pillar cooperation or even by a complete abandoning of the pillared approach. To the extent that intersubjective structures of meaning are central in providing avenues for change, actually achieving such change is increasingly difficult the more actors are involved, and the greater the diversity among them.

The EU’s Interregional Relations with the Global South

Interregionalism has become a strong component of the EU’s relations with Africa, Asia, and Latin America even if the pattern of relations is highly varied. This also explains why the problem of conceptualization, discussed in Chapter 1 of this book, arises. Interregionalism is still a poorly understood phenomenon in international relations; there is no consensus over a definition. Some use the concept broadly to describe the EU’s relations with other regions: group-to-group dialogue (Edwards and Regelsberg 1990). Interregionalism has more recently been used to signify a systemic international phenomenon, namely linkages built among regions in general: the new interregionalism (Hänggi 2006). It is not necessary for the various interregional relations constituting an emerging structure of global governance to take a single form, which also hampers attempts to settle clear and unambiguous definitions. We argue that it is important to distinguish between interregionalism as a formalized relation between two distinct regional intergovernmental organizations (pure interregionalism) and relations among regions in a more general and eclectic sense, including other forms of interregionalism, such as hybrid interregionalism and transregionalism. These concepts include relations between numerous kinds of regional actors (including formal regional organizations), on the one hand, and other diverse actors, state and nonstate, on the other hand. Bilateral relations encompass state-to-state relations as well as relations between the EU and other countries (state-to-region relationships). Under certain cir-

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cumstances, the latter can be understood as, or at least give rise to, hybrid interregionalism (Hänggi 2006). A growing and increasingly dense global network of interregional, transregional, and hybrid interregional links ultimately implies a regionalized world order, which can be termed regional multilateralism (or simply multiregionalism). This presupposes that interregionalism is inherently symmetric, which appears to be the case at a rhetorical level. Experience presents a far more complex and diverse picture, however. One of the novelties of this book is that it links actorship and interregionalism. For two regions to establish a functioning interregional relationship, it is essential that both regions have achieved a certain degree of regional actorship. The EU energetically pursues a policy of interregionalism, but other regions, even if they are organized as regions, often have little say, which tends to create an asymmetrical relationship. The point is that the greater the difference in actorship of two interlinked regions, the greater the asymmetries. As will be further elaborated below, this is particularly clear in the now historical relationship between the EU and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries (ACP)—the former colonies in those three areas. In the following sections we discuss the relations between actorship and interregionalism and the problem of asymmetry with regard to the EU’s current relations with Africa, Latin America, and Asia. EU-Africa

The EU’s relations with the ACP group of countries are testimony to a long history of “interregionalism,” in a somewhat embryonic and “hybrid” form. The EU-ACP partnership has historically focused on humanitarian issues and a particular trading relationship. This is now being redefined, however. Despite the developmental orientation of previous interregionalism between the EU and the ACP group, especially under the Lomé Agreements, the ACP bloc failed to achieve any noticeable improvement in levels of development. The Cotonou Agreement reflects a stronger emphasis on aspects such as reciprocal trade, political conditionalities, the support of region-based economic cooperation and integration (both multilateralism and interregional integration through the EPAs), human rights and democracy, and the so-called war on terror (see Chapter 4 by Mary Farrell). We are facing a major transformation of a historical pattern of interregionalism, in many ways heading toward more pure interregionalism, although the outcome still lacks a concrete shape.

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EU-Africa relations, in particular, illustrate the complexity of interregional relations and the question of symmetry versus asymmetry. The EU’s official rhetoric emphasizes that a closer integration of the African countries and regions into the global economy is the future for trading relations as well as a development strategy in itself, which the EU asserts should be of mutual gain (European Commission 2004i: 3). According to Mary Farrell (Chapter 4), however, Africa is attractive to Europe for its markets and natural resources, and the EU’s interregionalism is not solely driven by the ideal and norm-laden values so often emphasized by political leaders and policymakers in the EU’s official discourse. The same author is also critical of the shift of emphasis in the interregional partnership from aid to trade and toward increased political conditionality and the interregional political dialogue, which are seen as means for the EU to establish “hegemonic control.” The new type of interregionalism with Africa is, Farrell claims, reinforcing the power asymmetries between the African group of countries and the EU. In this context it is significant that the EU differentiates among ACP countries, and it is establishing Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with geographically more focused subregions of Africa as well as the other ACP regions. This can be seen as not only a strengthening of formal interregionalism, but even a novel form. This interregionalism is only in its infancy, however, and in some instances the EU is in fact undermining existing regional organizations; the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is the most prominent example in this regard, since the EU negotiates with two groups within SADC. The EU’s international development cooperation in Africa is particularly interesting due to the coexistence of EU development cooperation policy and policies pursued by the individual EU member states. This results in a rather complex relationship between the EU and Africa in this field. For instance, in Chapter 7, Fredrik Söderbaum and Patrik Stålgren show that there is a significant contrast between the EU’s official policy discourse and the logic of development cooperation taking place in practice, both in terms of the promotion of regions and in country-based assistance. Officially the policy of the EU claims to promote EU-African interregional cooperation and regional cooperation in Africa and to build a common EU development policy. Although there is a trend for regions to emerge as counterparts in development cooperation, most donors (including the European Commission) have their own individual programs for supporting region building in Africa, resulting in a series of overlapping and sometimes competing donor-driven region-building programs. The few initiatives that exist for donor coor-

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dination of regional programs are driven by bilateral actors or by multilateral organizations, rather than by the EU, which means that there is at best only embryonic interregionalism in the field of international development cooperation in Africa. Countries continue to be the most important counterparts in international development cooperation, and the EU does not function as a platform for coordination among the member states. Hence, the Commission simply acts as “the twenty-eighth” member state, conducting its own aid policies, rather than serving as the hub for donor coordination within the EU as a whole. Thus, the EU demonstrates weak actorship in this policy field in Africa. The most important mechanisms for donor coordination are instead taking place within multilateral frameworks, such as the Paris Agenda or the UN framework, or in more flexible budget support mechanisms and lead donor mechanisms, severely curtailing the perception of the EU as a collective actor. In other words, there is a long way to go before we can speak of a common EU approach to Africa in the field of development cooperation. Moving to the security field, the case study of Africa in this book analyzes the EU’s approach to conflict management in the Great Lakes Region, with a particular focus on the conflict in DRC. The regional nature of this conflict has resulted in a series of African and externally induced conflict management strategies. Although Stefaan Smis and Sevidzem Stephen Kingah suggest in Chapter 10 that the EU-led Operation Artemis can be seen as a somewhat successful, although limited, interregional response, the authors’ main argument is that the EU has adopted an unassertive interregional approach to conflict management in the Great Lakes Region. The reasons for this are both internal and external to the EU. The internal factors include, for example, a lack of coordination and poorly defined policies within the EU, poor funding, and a general neglect of African crises. The external factors are related to the nature of the conflict itself and the roles and interests of other actors, for example, conflicting interests among African states, competing regional configurations and regional organizations, the role of third countries, and vested corporate interests. EU–Latin America

In diplomatic relations between Europe and Latin America there has been a strong emphasis on shared culture, which obviously is somewhat rhetorical. Europe’s relations with Latin America were intensified in the 1990s after a long period of neglect or simply focusing on individual countries.The EU has developed interregional partnerships with most

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relevant subregions in Latin America, such as the Andean region, Central America, and above all the Common Market of the South (Mercosur). The latter is a case of pure interregionalism, as there exists an agreement between two regional organizations (the EU-Mercosur Interregional Framework for Cooperation Agreement [EMIFCA]). This interregional framework is built on three pillars: a political dialogue, substantive financial support to Mercosur’s institutional development, and economic and commercial cooperation. The origins of the partnership are in trade relations, and this aspect remains particularly strong, through an interregional free trade agreement that maintains quotas only in agriculture and some other sensitive goods. Gradually, interregional cooperation has spread to emphasize other sectors, such as economic cooperation, development cooperation and political dialogue, and common “values.” In his case study in Chapter 5, Sebastian Santander reveals a picture of the EU-Mercosur partnership similar to that of EUAfrican relations as far as trade is concerned. The value-laden motive of win-win cooperation through free interregional trade is emphasized, together with the economically self-interested objective of bolstering the EU’s presence and access to fast-growing economies. The EU interregional partnership with Mercosur is developing in the context of economic globalization and economic competition with the United States. The EU’s aim is not only to conquer new markets for European business but also to build the EU’s strength as a global actor. The barriers to strengthening EU-Mercosur interregionalism lie not only in the economic and trade issues at stake but even more so in the strong vested interests within EU member states and a lack of coordination within the EU. Santander notes that the EU is highly committed to free trade in its official rhetoric, but that it maintains its high nontariff barriers for agricultural products, where the weaker partners would otherwise have the most to gain. Hence, on this account, the EU-Mercosur cooperation is an interregional relationship built primarily on the interests of the stronger. The EU has served as a regional model, however, and the two regions share similar motives for regionalization related to the overall world situation. The case study by Anne Haglund Morrissey (Chapter 8) on the EU’s interregional development cooperation in Latin America describes how the latter’s previously marginal role in the EU’s development policy has changed, so that today the EU constitutes the most important donor in the region. The EU, through the Commission, has been involved in a series of interregional relationships with various regional and subregion-

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al organizations in Latin America, often involving a range of civil society actors. At the same time the EU has engaged in country-level relationships through hybrid interregionalism and region-state relationships as well as through classical bilateralism. With some exceptions, many EU countries have shown a limited interest in the region. The Commission has stepped in, however, to act on behalf of members as a collective representative. On some occasions the Commission has been a broker between competing national interests. The EU’s role in sustaining various forms of interregionalism in Latin America in combination with its role in facilitating coordination within the EU has strengthened the perception of the EU’s actorness since the early 1990s. The Colombian case study carried out by Philippe De Lombaerde, Geert Haghebaert, Socorro Ramírez, and An Vranckx (Chapter 11) draws attention to the national, regional, and international dimensions of this conflict, in combination with the fact that it cuts across several policy areas and competences within the EU. The case study illustrates the multiplicity of actors that lie behind the abstract notions of “Europe” and even the “EU,” and the challenges that this poses for the EU as a unified actor. Much of the explanation behind the failure of the EU to act as one lies in competing (or lack of) national interests, combined with the underdeveloped analytical capacity on the European side to enable both an understanding of the regional character of the conflict and an agreement on appropriate conflict management strategies. An additional obstacle is the fact that the EU has no regional counterpart to relate to, other than the Andean Community, which has proven to be dysfunctional in dealing with the Colombian conflict (hence, weak regional actorship). This reveals once again that functioning interregionalism depends on regional actorship of both regions. EU-Asia

In Asia, the EU has had a long-standing relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Sven Grimm’s case study in Chapter 9 describes three phases of the EU’s relations with Southeast Asia. The first phase (1967–1980) was informal and loosely structured around ASEAN. The second phase (1980–1994) was largely driven by geopolitics, and aid relations with Southeast Asia increased rapidly during these years. Internal and external events in the early 1990s again changed the relationship between the EU and Southeast Asia, leading to the emergence of the EU’s Asia strategy in 1994 and the establishment of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) framework a few years later.

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The EU’s first Asia strategy from 1994 was a late reaction to the rise of Asia. Similarly the ASEM initiative came from the Asian side as a consequence of the economic rise of post-Maastricht Europe. Thus there was a changing perspective of geopolitics involved. There are several competing regionalisms in the larger region, that is, Southeast Asia and East Asia (increasingly referred to as East Asia). There are also expressions of a more exclusivist Asian regionalism within this larger region. Malaysian prime minister Mahathir bin Mohamad once proposed an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). This was meant to be a sort of Asian response to the threat of European and North American “fortresses.” The EAEC proposal slowly gained support among other ASEAN countries and to some extent China, whereas Japan took a more skeptical attitude, reflecting US negativism against Asian regionalism. In 2009 EAEC was not on the agenda, but neither was the general idea dead and buried. ASEM can be seen as an intermediate position as it provides opportunities for Asian cooperation. ASEM is seen by both partners as a welcome opportunity to discuss controversial issues in an informal but nevertheless slightly institutionalized context. “Larger East Asia” is dominated by the two rival great powers, China and Japan; the EU maintains bilateral relations with both of them. This region therefore presents a complex mixture of conventional stateto-state bilateralism, EU bilateralism, and various types of transregional and interregional relations. As with EU-African relations, EU-Asia interregionalism is comprehensive and multisectoral, spanning trade and investments, politics, security and antiterrorism, culture, technology and science, drug trafficking, environmental protection, and so on. ASEM, involving the EU and ASEAN Plus Three (APT; the “three” consisting of China, Japan, and South Korea), represents a new type of interregionalism, combining interregionalism, bilateralism, transregionalism, and hybrid interregionalism to accommodate the relative influence of China and Japan. An impressive variety of issues are included within the ASEM framework, but the agenda tends to be ad hoc. The uniqueness of ASEM is that it is one of the few major international frameworks of political importance in which the United States is not a member. It should be noted that one of the reasons behind ASEM was that the EU was denied association status in APEC. ASEM is on paper a comprehensive, multidimensional type of collaboration in spite of limited formalization (the EU-ASEAN relationship constitutes the backbone). Much of this comprehensiveness is still unfulfilled, and among the three pillars—economic, political, and cultural relations—the economic pillar (especially trade and investment) has been the focus.

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The danger of a too ritualized diplomacy is obvious from reading the official documents emanating from ASEM meetings. The lack of institutionalized relationship works against an accumulation of shared stakes. It is a partnership where the level of institutionalization of the respective partners is highly uneven. As Julie Gilson shows in an intriguing study, ASEM provides a mechanism for institutionalizing not only a partnership but also the partner per se (Gilson 2006: 74). The point here is that a regional identity is created by participating in an interregional process. Thus APT is emerging as a new regional actor in the wake of crises in ASEAN and APEC. The possibility that this body may develop into a new regional formation is at least under discussion. The US unilateral war against terrorism is creating doubts both in Europe and in Asia, where regional and multilateral approaches are much preferred. Thus the EU explicitly shares China’s concern for a more balanced international order based on effective multilateralism (European Commission 2003a). The ASEM process shows that the institutionalizations of interregional relations and of multiregionalism are very slow processes, and their emergence here is susceptible to sudden changes in the geopolitical environment. Indeed, interregionalism itself aims to make this environment more stable and predictable. This is not possible without a much deeper institutionalization, drawing on the European experience. This institutionalization, however, cannot go deeper than the Asian model of informal consensus building allows. This results in what has been called “soft institutionalization” (Acharya 2001). The EU’s Asia Strategy states that “there is no single ‘European model’ of social governance” (European Commission 2001: 17). One interpretation of this is that the EU places considerably less emphasis on good governance and human rights in its relations with Asia than it does in relation to Africa. In its relations with Asia, the EU accepts different Asian views about the freeing up of markets and trade. This again contrasts sharply with the EUAfrica relationship, where the EU emphasizes both economic and market-based liberalization as well as political conditionality. Asymmetries in EU-South Relations

Our analysis of the EU’s foreign policy and external relations with Africa, Latin America, and Asia suggests that the EU uses a variety of instruments and models of engagement to foster relations with countries and regional partners. As we have seen, EU-driven interregionalism tends to be multifaceted, with different issues and themes receiving different emphasis among regions. Interregional policy is, therefore, not a

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fixed set of guidelines but rather is subject to adaptation. A comparative assessment suggests a variation in the way the EU conducts its foreign policies toward different regions in which the EU presence differs. This implies that the EU has no preference for one particular model of cooperation. It is evident that the EU tends to be pragmatic in its various relationships with the Global South. In this regard, the EU increasingly behaves as an actor on a variety of levels in world affairs, hence displaying a global strategy. Far from being locked into a specific foreign policy doctrine (such as interregionalism), the EU uses any type of policy that it has at its disposal and that appears to be most suited to a given objective. For instance, Sebastian Santander shows in Chapter 5 that as long as European economic interests are not threatened, the EU concentrates its energy on the multilateral negotiations within the World Trade Organization (WTO), instead of further deepening the interregional relationship between the EU and Mercosur. In EU-Asia relationships there is a growing preference for hybrid interregionalism due to the difficulty of negotiating over politically contentious issues with a number of countries. As Mary Farrell points out in Chapter 6, the difficulty of completing such negotiations makes regionstate treaties a more effective instrument for economic cooperation. Hence, despite many official declarations about the EU’s preference for interregional relations, a closer empirical review reveals a complex pattern of intersecting, complementing, and at times competing models of external relations, resulting in a mixture of bilateral, multilateral, and interregional policies. Our analysis thus reveals that the EU’s policy mix depends very much on who the counterpart is. We argue that this variation in interregional relations is linked to questions of relevance and power. The EU cannot deny the contemporary relevance and power of key East Asian states, which results in partnerships that are symmetric in nature. The symmetry contrasts with the more unbalanced EU-ASEAN interregional partnerships (Gilson 2006: 74). Looking beyond Asia, this also contrasts sharply with the EU-Africa relationship, which, although officially designated as an equal partnership, at least for now clearly remains asymmetrical. A similar asymmetry, although not as one-sided, can be detected in the EU’s relationship with Latin America. This suggests that, although much of the EU’s interregional relations are conducted under the pretext of mutual benefit, the distribution of these benefits appears to be a function of the power position of the EU relative to its counterparts. The stronger the counterpart in terms of actorship, the more concessions are

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made by the EU. With weaker “partners,” the EU dictates far more of the conditions for interregional cooperation. The relatively stronger East Asian region benefits from access to European markets, and the regional organizations are generally invited to participate in equal or symmetric partnerships with the EU. There is little conditionality attached to East Asian cooperation, which reflects the EU’s response to an increasingly powerful region. In contrast, the EU attaches economic, trade, and political conditionalities in its dealings with Africa. The EU’s dealings with Latin America appear to lie somewhere between these extremes.

Conclusion

This book has presented a complex and sometimes contradictory account of the EU’s external relations with Africa, Asia, and Latin America under the general labels of actorship and interregionalism. The emerging picture is that of a highly unusual species in the jungle of international politics, which displays multifaceted behavior in its relations with the Global South. Any interpretation of the EU as a global actor is highly dependent upon theoretical perspective. A distinction can be made among various rational approaches (such as realism, liberalism, and Marxism), which tend to look for constant interests behind actor behavior, and constructivist approaches, which tend to analyze norms and interests as continuously changing in the course of action and conceive of societies as historical structures in permanent transformation. Constructivism also allows more room for purposive change and conceives of the failures of European coordinated action as incentives for renewal of action and reconsideration of objectives, rather than as signs of timeless fragmentation and incompetence. Even if official declarations reek of empty rhetoric, through these pronouncements a door is opened for at least considering change. Credibility and identity require some consistency between words and action. The contributors to this book have taken different positions regarding the fidelity of certain official pronouncements depending on their theoretical preferences. After all, the empirical evidence is receptive to more than one interpretation. This collection shows that the EU uses a variety of instruments and models of engagement to foster relations with country and regional partners. In a realist light this implies that the EU has no preference for one particular model of cooperation. It is evident that the EU tends to be pragmatic in its various relationships with the Global South. The EU

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acts pragmatically and flexibly enough to employ a mixture of bilateral, multilateral, and interregional policies, showing the permanence of interests in an ever-changing world. The asymmetric pattern revealed above only reinforces the realist emphasis on power variables as determining international politics. From a constructivist perspective, and in the longer term, the role of explicit preferences and long-term objectives in shaping intersubjective structures should not be dismissed too easily. We have tried to argue that the EU’s external relations can be characterized as an FPC that is structured around different modes of decisionmaking, the outdated pillar system, a multiplicity of common institutions and policy instruments, and conflicting objectives within an ever-increasing number of policy areas. These components of the EU’s policy machinery were never designed to create a unified global actor, and in consequence they have not done so. The EU’s currently patchy external relations result from its unique historical development and the often competing interests of actors both outside and inside the Union, which have been institutionalized in organizations and legal prescriptions that have taken on lives of their own. Thus the pattern of interests is bound to change. Attempts to boost the EU’s legitimacy in global politics, particularly by the Commission but also by certain EU member states and the European Parliament, evince an increasing emphasis and rhetoric centered on the EU as a “civilian power,” its “superior” normative foundation, and the “value added” contribution of the EU beyond individual member states’ capabilities. The EU’s official policy stance is that interregionalism constitutes a crucial component of a more equal and trustworthy world order. In reviewing the EU’s policies across three continents and in three of its most important policy areas, this book concludes that much remains to be done before this benevolent European actor can present itself credibly to the Global South. Much like other global actors, including the most powerful EU member states, the EU’s actions are characterized by the pursuit of power and the manifestation of national identities. The nation-state logic is still active. Going beyond the EU’s official strategies and policy statements (which invariably contain a strong, but perhaps misleading, egalitarian flavor), this book suggests that its deeds are strongly concerned with establishing itself as a global actor and with gaining political power in a realist sense. From this perspective, the EU is therefore a familiar species in international relations. This can, to some extent, be explained by the contradictions inherent in the FPC, where increasingly strong national interests counter a much weaker supranational policy. A new treaty plac-

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ing more emphasis on the supranational level would at least remove some obstacles to realizing the EU’s explicit and most central external policy objectives: achieving coherence, coordination, and consistency. Even though this book has argued that the actorness of the EU is dependent upon the internal development, affecting the other actorship dimensions (regionness and presence), it is equally true that its legitimacy and actorship depend at least partly on the existence of other regional bodies. From a world order perspective, the EU’s fundamental problem is that in a Westphalian world dominated by nation-states, it will always remain a special and somewhat isolated case. Powerful nation-states (such as the United States) will continue to do business with individual European nation-states and in doing so will undermine the deepening of the European integration process. In a post-Westphalian, postsovereign world order in which regions may ascend to a level of recognition and actorness similar to nation-states, the EU would be less isolated as a regional polity. To the extent that the EU acts as one unified actor and that other regions deal primarily with the EU rather than with individual member states, this will further spur regional cooperation as well as interregionalism around the world. Hence, from this perspective, the EU’s bid for interregionalism is driven by an intraregional need to manifest its experience as a globally accepted regional polity. The emphasis above on a regionalized world order may thus be described as a way for the EU to “act itself into being,” largely by acting in relation to what it perceives to be other regions (Gilson 2006: 75). According to this constructivist view, interregionalism creates a global public reality that not only structures international relations but also has a constitutive role in the formation of regions in different parts of the world. In this sense, interregionalism creates and legitimizes regional actors, including perhaps most significantly, the EU itself. Here internal and external factors are clearly in complex interaction. It is likely that the EU will continue to pursue interregional relations as an important and sometimes even preferred model for its external relations, at least toward the Global South. But taking the realist approach, the EU must meanwhile face the realities of globalization, which requires a nuanced response. Interregionalism is therefore likely to continue as a pragmatic strategy rather than a programmatic doctrine, but interregionalism can nevertheless be seen as something going beyond the EU’s foreign policy. Interregionalism is a long-term and nonlinear trend, the future of which is far from certain. It is possible that interregionalism has become a systemic feature of the world order, however, and that this dynamic may continue even without the support of EU group-to-group dialogue.

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It is often assumed that the EU is on a perpetual path toward enhanced actorship, through some sort of historical necessity. It of course remains possible, however, that the EU will in the future lose aspects of coherence and cooperation as well as presence and in consequence lose leverage as a global actor. The external challenges will not disappear. On the contrary, it will be imperative, in any circumstance, for the EU to coordinate action with other emerging global actors, including the United States, in order to achieve its central objectives. Without internal unity, Europe is liable to turn inward, including a return to the sterile pillared approach, frustrating Europe’s external expectations, and compromising its credibility as a global actor (losing in actorship). The internal and the external factors are deeply interrelated, but the ways that these factors will manifest themselves remain unclear. It is increasingly clear, however, that Europe cannot afford to be solely concerned with Europe.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

@LIS ACP ADB AFSJ AFTA AidCo AIDS AIS ALA ALA-DC ALADI ALBA AMIS APEC APF APT ARF ASEAN ASEM AU AUC BCC BIMSTEC BNC BSC CACM

Alliance for the Information Society African, Caribbean, and Pacific group of countries Asian Development Bank area of freedom, security, and justice Asian Free Trade Area EuropeAid Cooperation Office acquired immunodeficiency syndrome Andean Integration System Asian and Latin America Asian and Latin American Developing Countries Latin American Association of Integration Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas African Union Mission in Sudan Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation African Peace Facility ASEAN Plus Three ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations Asia-Europe Meeting African Union United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia Biregional Cooperation Council Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation Biregional Negotiations Committee Baltic Sea Cooperation Central American Common Market

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CAECM CAN CAP CARIFORUM CCP CEMAC CEN CEPGL CFSP CIS CMEA COGEGA COMESA COPA COPAX COREPER CPA CSP DAC DCI DG DG Dev DPG DRC EAC EADB EAEC EAI EBA EC ECCAS ECHO ECIP ECOFIN ECOWAS ECSC EDF EEC

Central African Economic and Monetary Community Andean Community of Nations Common Agricultural Policy Caribbean forum Common Commercial Policy Central African Economic and Monetary Community European Committee for Standardization Economic Community of the Great Lakes States Common Foreign and Security Policy Commonwealth of Independent States Council for Mutual Economic Assistance General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives in the European Union Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States Committee of Agricultural Organizations in the European Union Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa Committee of Permanent Representatives Cotonou Partnership Agreement Country Strategy Paper Development Assistance Committee Development Cooperation Instrument Directorate-General Directorate-General for Development Development Partners Group Democratic Republic of Congo East African Community East African Development Bank East Asian Economic Caucus Enterprise for the Americas Initiative Everything But Arms European Community Economic Community of Central African States European Community Humanitarian Office European Community Investment Partner Economic and Financial Affairs Council Economic Community of West African States European Coal and Steel Community European Development Fund European Economic Community

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EFTA EIB ELN EMIFCA EMP EMU ENP ENPI EP EPA EPC ESA ESS ETA EU FAO FARC FDI FPC FPIA FPR FTA FTAA GAERC GATT GDP GEF GLR GNI GSP HDI HIPC HIV IDA IDB IGAD IMF INGO IRA

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European Free Trade Association European Investment Bank National Liberation Army EU-Mercosur Interregional Framework for Cooperation Agreement Euro-Mediterranean Partnership European Monetary Union European Neighbourhood Policy European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument European Parliament Economic Partnership Agreement European Political Cooperation Eastern and Southern Africa European Security Strategy Euskadi Ta Askatasuna/Basque Homeland and Freedom European Union Food and Agriculture Organization Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia foreign direct investment Foreign Policy Complex Foreign Policy Issue Area Foreign Policy Relation free trade area Free Trade Area of the Americas General Affairs and External Relations Council General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade gross domestic product Global Environmental Facility Great Lakes Region gross national income Generalized System of Preferences human development index Highly Indebted Poor Country human immunodeficiency virus International Development Association Inter-American Development Bank Intergovernmental Agency for Development International Monetary Fund international nongovernmental organization Irish Republican Army

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LAC LDC LIC LVEMP LVI MDF MDG MEBF MEP Mercosur MIC MLC MONUC NAFTA NATO NBI NEPAD NGO OAS OAU OBREAL ODA OECD OIDHACO OMC PCA PICAB PICE PPRD PRBS PRSP PSOE QWIDS RCD-Goma READI

Latin America and the Caribbean least developed country low-income country Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project Lake Victoria Initiative Multilateral Debt Relief Fund Millennium Development Goal Mercosur-European Business Forum member of the European Parliament Common Market of the South middle-income country Mouvement pour la libération du Congo/ Movement for the Liberation of Congo United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo North American Free Trade Agreement North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nile Basin Initiative New Partnership for Africa’s Development nongovernmental organization Organization of American States Organization of African Unity Observatorio de las Relaciones EU-AL official development assistance Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Colombian Action International Office for Human Rights Open Method of Coordination Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Integration, Cooperation, and Development Treaty Integration and Cooperation Program Peoples’ Party for Reconstruction and Democracy Poverty Reduction Budget Support Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Partido Socialista Obrero Español Query Wizard for International Development Statistics Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie–Goma/ Congolese Rally for Democracy Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument

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SAARC SACU SADC SAFTA SCC SCO SELA SGS SICA Sida SIEPS SPG SWAP TACIS TAS TDCA TEU TG TPA TREATI UK UN UNAIDS UNASUR UNC-CRIS UNCTAD UNDP UNECA UNITA UNU-CRIS USAID USSR WAEMU WB WTO

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South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Southern African Customs Union Southern African Development Community South Asian Free Trade Agreement Subcommittee on Cooperation Shanghai Cooperation Organization Latin American Economic System School of Global Studies Central American Integration System Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies Stability and Growth Pact Sector Wide Approach Technical Assistance of the Commonwealth of Independent States Tanzania Assistance Strategy Trade, Development, and Cooperation Agreement Treaty on the European Union technical group Trade Promotion Authority Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative United Kingdom United Nations Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS Union of South American Nations United Nations University’s Comparative Regional Integration Studies United Nations Conference on Trade Development United Nations Development Programme United Nations Economic Commission for Africa National Union for the Total Independence of Angola United Nations University–Comparative Regional Integration Studies United States Agency for International Development Union of Soviet Socialist Republics West African Economic and Monetary Union World Bank World Trade Organization

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United Republic of Tanzania and European Community (2002). “Country Strategy Paper 2001–2007.” Dar-es-Salaam. Valderrama, Mariano (ed.) (2004a). Development Cooperation, European Union, Latin America: Overview and Prospects. Santiago: RIMISP–Latin American Center for Rural Development. ——— (2004b). “Development Cooperation Between the European Union and Latin America: Evaluation and Prospects.” In Mariano Valderrama (ed.), Development Cooperation, European Union, Latin America: Overview and Prospects. Santiago: RIMISP–Latin American Center for Rural Development. ——— (2004c). “Policies and Practices of Cooperation Between the European Union and Latin America.” In Mariano Valderrama (ed.), Development Cooperation, European Union, Latin America: Overview and Prospects. Santiago: RIMISP–Latin American Center for Rural Development. Van de Walle, Nicholas (2005). Overcoming Stagnation in Aid-Dependent Countries. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. Van der Hoeven, Rolph (2000). Assessing Aid and Global Governance: Why Poverty and Redistribution Objectives Matter. Geneva: ILO. Van Langenhove, Luk (2004). “Regionalising Human Security in Africa.” UNUCRIS Occasional Paper 8. Bruges. Verhofstadt, Guy (2001). “The Paradox of Anti-Globalisation.” Guardian, September 28. Vranckx, An (2004). “EU Policies on Colombia.” IPIS Report. Antwerp. Walter, Barbara (1997). “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement.” International Organization 51, no. 3: 335–364. Warner, Michael (2005). Does the Sustained Global Demand for Oil, Gas and Minerals Mean That Africa Can Now Fund Its Own MDG Financing Gap? Extractive Industries Sector Briefing Note no. 6. London: Overseas Development Institute. Wellons, Patricia (1994). “Sino-French Relations: Historical Alliance vs. Economic Reality.” Pacific Review 7, no. 3: 341–348. White, David (2005). “France Strives to Recast Its Role in Africa as the Past Comes Calling.” Financial Times, December 2, p. 6. Wieland, Carsten (2008). “El comienzo del fin de las FARC.” KAS-Länderbericht. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, June 5. Available at www.kas.de/kolumbien (accessed September 9, 2009). World Bank (2000). World Trade Indicators. Washington, DC. ——— (2004a). PRSP information. Available at http://ww.worldbank.org (accessed January 2005). ——— (2004b). World Development Indicators. Washington, DC. ——— (2004c). World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People. Washington, DC. ——— (2006). Africa Development Indicators 2006. Washington, DC. ——— (2009a). Africa Competitiveness Report. Washington, DC. ——— (2009b). Governance Matters 2009. Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996–2008. Washington, DC. Available at http://info.worldbank.org/ governance/wgi /index.asp (accessed June 8, 2009). Yeo, Lay Hwee (2000). “ASEM: Looking Back, Looking Forward.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 1: 113–144.

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——— (2003). Asia and Europe—The Development of Different Dimensions of ASEM. London: Routledge. Zeilig, Leo (2004). “The Congo: Speculators and Thieves 1994–2000.” The Voice of the Turtle. Available at http://www.voiceoftheturtle.org (accessed October 1, 2008).

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The Contributors

Mary Farrell is director of the International Politics Research Programme, University of Greenwich, and associate senior research fellow, Centre d’études et de recherches internationales, Sciences Po (Paris). Sven Grimm, Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Overseas Development Institute in London and at the German Development Institute in Bonn, Germany. Geert Haghebaert is an international consultant and former representative of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in Bogotá, Colombia. Björn Hettne is professor emeritus at the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. Sevidzem Stephen Kingah holds a Ph.D. in law at the Institute for European Studies of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. He is also associate researcher at the United Nations University–Comparative Regional Integration Studies, Bruges, Belgium. Philippe De Lombaerde is associate director at the United Nations University–Comparative Regional Integration Studies, Bruges, Belgium, and a member of the Observatorio de las Relaciones EU-AL. Anne Haglund Morrissey is senior lecturer in political science and director of the European Studies Programme at Linnaeus University

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(Sweden). She is also a research associate of the Europe in the World Centre—a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence—at the University of Liverpool. Socorro Ramírez is professor at the Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, in Bogotá (Colombia). Sebastian Santander is professor in political science and head of the International Relations Research Unit at the Department of Political Science of the Faculty of Law, Criminology, and Political Science, University of Liège, Belgium. Stefaan Smis is professor in the Faculty of Law and Criminology of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and reader at the School of Law of the University of Westminster. He is also vice president of the Brussels Centre of African Studies. Fredrik Söderbaum is an associate professor at the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, and a senior associate research fellow at the United Nations University–Comparative Regional Integration Studies, Bruges (Belgium). Patrik Stålgren, Ph.D., is a researcher at the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg (Sweden). An Vranckx is a researcher at the International Peace Information Service in Antwerp and a lecturer at the University of Ghent (Belgium).

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Absolutism, 24 Actorness, 20–22; Colombian conflict, 228–229; components of regional actorship, 15–16; defining and characterizing, 1–2; dependence on other regional bodies, 267; EU, ACP, and interregionalism, 83; EU actorship in cross-pillar relations, 255–256; EU as global actor for development cooperation, 142; EU as global actor in Asia, 134–136; lack of expansion, 40; policymaking and implementation, 28; regional actorship and interregionalism, 22 Actorship: actorness, 1–2, 20–22; bilateralism and, 6; components and dimensions of, 15–22, 249; conflict management, 254–255; cross-pillar relations, 255–256; international development cooperation, 252–254; interregionalism and, 257; presence, 19–20; regional actorship and interregionalism, 22; regionness, 17–19; trade and economic cooperation, 251–252. See also Actorness; Presence, international; Regionness Afghanistan, 57, 124 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries: aid structures, 53; asymmetry in EU-South relations, 44, 265; conflict policy, 205–206; Cotonou Agreement, 70; development policy, 35; EPA regions,

71(fig.); EU-ACP economic cooperation, 1970–2003, 74(table); EUAfrica partnership as hybrid interregionalism, 257–259; EU trade figures, 45; history of EU interregionalism and, 2–3; internal pressure for economic policy reform, 79–83; Lomé Agreement offering privileged access, 66, 68; natural resource management in the Lake Victoria Region, 145–148; nonreciprocal trade regime, 47–48; objectives and trends in EU development cooperation in Africa, 143–145; regional actorship and interregionalism, 22; sources of FDI flows to Africa, 1991–2000, 75(table); trade sanctions, 46; weakness in pattern and growth of economic cooperation, 71–77. See also Cotonou Agreement; individual countries African Growth and Opportunity Act, 219 African Peace Facility (APF), 57–58, 61(n4), 218 African Union (AU), 44, 50, 213, 218–219 Agriculture: Common Agricultural Policy, 33, 103, 251; effect of rapid liberalization on, 82; EPAs, 47–48; EU-Mercosur economic cooperation and policy coordination, 103–105, 260

299

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Ajello, Aldo, 211 ALBAN programme, 174(table), 177–178 ALFA program, 174(table), 176 Algeria, 41(n2) AL-INVEST, 95, 174(table), 175–176, 180 Alliance for the Information Society Programme (@LIS), 174(table), 177 ALURE, 184(n9) Amorim, Celso, 105 Amsterdam Treaty (1997), 29 Anarchical society, 18, 24–25 Andean Community of Nations (CAN): conflict management in Colombia, 229–230; establishment and function of, 164–165; EU-Andean Community of Nations Framework agreement, 229; free trade area, 184(5); programmed EU assistance to Latin American subregions, 171(table)–172(table) Andean Pact (1969), 229 Andean Regional Initiative, 231 Andersson, Gun-Britt, 240 Angola: DRC conflict support, 207, 216–217; EPA regions, 71(fig.) Anti-elite insurgencies, 227 Antigua and Barbuda: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Area of freedom, security, and justice (AFSJ), 29 Argentina: economic crisis, 99; European capital stock in Latin America, 102; Mercosur establishment, 96, 164; programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2002–2006, 169(table); programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2007–2013, 170(table); Rio Group, 113(n4). See also Mercosur Armenia, 41(n2) Arms embargo, 138(n8) Arms exports, 237–238 Artemis, Operation, 11, 211–212, 214, 255, 259 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations): ASEM trade with main partners, 2004, 120(table); asymmetry in EU organizations and

programs, 44, 264–265; EC-ASEAN agreement, 115; establishment of, 202(n2); EU-Asia relations and strategy, 126–127, 261–263; EU economic interdependence, 121–122; European economic integration, 186; EU trade figures, 45, 120(table); founding of, 187; member countries, 137(n3); Myanmar issue, 194–195; national positions on EU-Asia cooperation, 128(table); regional actorship and interregionalism, 22; security cooperation, 58; strategic and geostrategic factors for EU-Asia relations, 123 ASEAN Plus Three (APT), 22, 188, 262–263 ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting): EU Asia strategy, 261–263; EU trade with main partners, 2004, 120(table); launching of, 115–116; major trade partners of EU and Asian ASEM, 2004, 121(table); member countries, 137(n2); national positions on EUAsia cooperation, 128(table), 129; political issues in Southeast Asia strategy, 195; security cooperation, 58; trade deficit, 119–120; trade with main partners, 2004, 120(table) Asia: community method to interregionalism, 124–127; EC-Asia economic cooperation, 115–116; economic cooperation and interregionalism, 118–122; EU-Asia policy coordination, 131–134; history of European colonialism, 117–118; hybrid interregionalism, 134–136; national positions on EU-Asia cooperation, 127–131, 138(n8); strategic and geostrategic factors, 123–124. See also ASEAN; ASEM; Central Asia; Southeast Asia; individual countries Asian and Latin America (ALA) program, 192, 202(n3) Asian and Latin American Developing Countries (ALA-DC) Regulation, 167 Asian Development Bank (ADB), 197, 199 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

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Index (APEC), 6, 99, 188; EU-Asian relations, 263 Association Agreements, 161 Associationism, 35 Asunción, Treaty of (1991), 96–97, 164 Asymmetry: EU-Africa interregionalism, 258; EU-Africa trade, 75–77; EU-South relations, 263–265; EU’s regional organizations and programs, 44; realist model of cooperation, 266; regional actorship and interregionalism, 22; security and conflict management, 38 ATLAS, 184(n10) Australia: Asia strategy, 125–127; major trade partners of EU and Asian ASEM, 2004, 121(table) Austria: EU-Mercosur free trade area, 109; gross bilateral ODA from EU15 countries to Latin America, 168(table); net ODA, 51(table); sources of FDI flows to Africa, 1991–2000, 75(table) Azerbaijan, 41(n2) Aznar, José María, 237 Bahamas: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Balance-of-power politics, 31, 38 Bali bombing, 193–194 Baltic Sea Cooperation (BSC), 146–147 Barbados: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Barcelona process, 30–31, 41(n2) Basket funds, 148–149 Belarus, 41(n2) Belgium: Colombian policy, 236, 239–240; colonial ties in Africa, 67; DRC conflict, 211; gross bilateral ODA from EU-15 countries to Latin America, 168(table); net ODA, 51(table); sources of FDI flows to Africa, 1991–2000, 75(table) Belize: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Bemba, Jean Pierre, 208 Benin: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Berlin Initiative, 217–218 Betancourt, Ingrid, 246(n20) Bilateral relationships: bilateral and subregional community development assistance in Latin America, 167–173; defining and characterizing, 6; EPA negotiations, 70; EU-East

301

Asia relations, 262; EU interregional relations with the Global South, 256–257; EU-Latin America relations, 181, 261; hybrid interregionalism, 5; interregional links and, 31; Latin American interregional development partnership, 161; “South” dimension, 40; Southeast Asia, 195 Biregional Cooperation Council (BCC), 105 Biregional Negotiations Committee (BNC), 105 Biregional relations with Latin America, 162–165 Blair, Tony, 82, 210, 237 Bolivarian Alternative for the Americans (ALBA), 110 Bolivia: Andean Community of Nations, 164; Mercosur membership, 183(n3); ODA flows to Latin America, 167; programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2002–2006, 169(table); programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2007–2013, 170(table); Rio Group, 113(n4) Botswana: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Brazil: economic crisis, 99–100; EUMercosur free trade agreement, 109–111; European capital stock in Latin America, 102; Mercosur establishment, 96, 164; ODA flows to Latin America, 167; programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2002–2006, 169(table); programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2007–2013, 170(table); Rio Group, 113(n4). See also Mercosur Brunei, 115–116, 202(n2); development indicators for Southeast Asian countries, 190(table) Brussels Programme, 107 Budgetization of the EDF, 52 Buenos Aires Act (1990), 96–97 Burghardt, Günther, 60 Burkina Faso: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Burundi: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Bush, George W., 106 Caguan peace process, 235, 241–242

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Cambodia: development assistance strategy, 194; development indicators for Southeast Asian countries, 190(table); poverty reduction, 191, 193 Cameroon: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Canada: major trade partners of EU and Asian ASEM, 2004, 121(table) Cannes European Council, 100–101 Capability-expectations gap, 91 Cape Verde: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Caribbean Basin initiative, 70 CARIFORUM (Caribbean Forum), 47, 84; EU-ACP economic cooperation, 1970–2003, 74(table) Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC): EU-ACP economic cooperation, 1970–2003, 74(table); increasing regionalism in Africa, 84, 88(n8); share of intraregional trade in total African trade, 76(table) Central African Republic: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Central America: economic integration, 164; EU-Central America BiRegional Association Agreement, 164; EU-Latin America interregional strategic partnership, 179–180; history of EU assistance, 171–172; programmed EU assistance to Latin American subgroupings, 171(table)–172(table); San José Process, 93–94 Central American Common Market (CACM), 184(n4) Central and Eastern Europe: EU enlargement, 35; nature of EU relations, 11(n3); regionalization, 26; security and conflict management, 38 Central Asia, 124 Centralized empire, 23 Centre for the Development of Industry, 68 Chad: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Chavez, Hugo, 110 Chile: Andean Community of Nations, 164–165; EU-Latin America interregional strategic partnership, 180; Mercosur establishment, 96; Mercosur membership, 183(n3);

ODA flows to Latin America, 167; programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2002–2006, 169(table); programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2007–2013, 170(table); Rio Group, 113(n4) Chiluba, Frederick, 209 China: arms embargo, 138(n8); ASEAN Plus Three, 188; ASEM, 115–116; Asia strategy, 125–126; DRC conflict, 219; EAEC proposal, 262; EUAsia policy coordination, 132–133; EU bilateral relations, 262; European colonial presence in Asia, 117; Generalized System of Preferences, 119; hybrid interregionalism, 5; increasing trade with Africa, 53; major trade partners of EU and Asian ASEM, 2004, 121(table); national positions on EU-Asia cooperation, 129, 138(n9); regional instability, 124; rise in world trade, 46; Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 137(n3); trade partnerships, 120–121 Civil society actors: Colombian conflict, 233 Civil war, 228 Clientelism, collective, 77 Cochabamba, Declaration of (1996), 229 Coercion: creating actorness, 21 Coherence, 6–7; Colombia strategy, 230–231; development policy, 36; economic development cooperation, 35; EU-Asia policy coordination, 133; Foreign Policy Complex, 29–30; regional strategies for improving, 44 Cohesion: regionness and, 17, 19. See also Regionness Cold War: Asia’s strategic and geostrategic factors, 123–124; European presence in Latin America, 93 Collor, Fernando, 99 Colombia: Andean Community of Nations, 164–165; dynamics and effectiveness of EU policy coordination, 235–241; EU policy recommendations, 241–245; European interregional approach to conflict,

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Index 229–231; FARC strength, 245(n1); history and political context of conflict, 227–229; Mercosur membership, 183(n3); multiplicity of EU actors, 261; national, regional, and international dimensions of conflict, 225–226; Plan Colombia, 246(n12); policy coordination, 231–235; programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2002–2006, 169(table); programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2007–2013, 170(table); Rio Group, 113(n4); state legitimacy, 245(n2) Colombia Country Strategy Paper (CSP), 230 Colombian Action International Office for Human Rights (OIDHACO), 234 Colombian Commission of Jurists, 234 Colonialism: Africa’s natural resource wealth, 73; decolonization and development cooperation, 34–36; European presence in Asia, 117–118, 185–186; FDI patterns, 73; framework for cooperation arising from, 65; interregional development cooperation in Latin America, 159–160; Lomé Agreements and hybrid interregionalism, 67–69; pressure for reform of EU-Africa economic cooperation, 77–79; “scramble for Africa,” 87(n2); trade as tool for development, 46–47 Commissioner for Trade, 45–46 Commission for Africa, 82 Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), 238 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 33, 103, 251 Common Commercial Policy (CCP), 33, 115, 251 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): conflict management in the Great Lakes region, 255; DRC conflict, 211, 213–214; improving coordination, 43–44, 55; institutional change, 59–60; Latin American interregional development partnership, 161, 163; new regionalism in Latin America, 91–92; policy coordination, 4

303

Common Framework for Country Strategy Papers (CSPs), 150 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), 48, 88(n8), 206, 215, 217–218 Common Market of the South. See Mercosur Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 124 Communications technology, 177 Community: region as, 18 Community policy coordination, 181 Comoros: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Competences, 20–21 Conditionality, 54, 79 Confidence crisis, 19 Conflict management: Africa’s overlapping regional configurations leading to weak approach to, 217–218; categorizing Colombia’s conflict, 227; Cotonou Agreement terms, 205–206; development policy, 36; ESS, 56–57; EU conflict management capacity, 259; EU regional actorship, 254–255; EU’s DRC policy, 206–209; EU’s weak interregional approach, 215–220; poor coordination, 11; region as community, 18; strengthening interregional approach in Africa, 220–222; third-party involvement in DRC, 219. See also Colombia; Security and conflict management cooperation Congo: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Congo, Democratic Republic of (DRC): African Union role in conflict management, 218–219; corporate interests in, 219–220; EPA regions, 71(fig.); ESS, 56–57; EU conflict management capacity, 212, 255, 259; EU policy during conflict, 206–209; EU’s weak interregional approach to conflict management, 215–220; lack of EU policy coordination, 210–212; need for robust interregional approach to conflict management, 220–222; South Africa’s role in the conflict, 214; subregional bloc, 206; third-party involvement in conflict, 219 Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCDGoma), 207–208

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Consistency: development policy, 36; economic development cooperation, 35; Foreign Policy Complex, 29–30 Constitutional referenda, 16 Constitutional Treaty, 49–50 Constructivism, 265–266 Contadora Group, 94 Convergence, 25–26 Cook Islands: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Cooperation, international: asymmetry in EU-South relations, 263–265; EU Foreign Policy Relations, 31; models of, 265–266. See also Development cooperation; Security and conflict management cooperation; Trade and economic cooperation Coordination, 6–7; conflict management, 11; coordination failure, 2; donor coordination, 59; dynamics and effectiveness of EU policy coordination in Colombia, 231–241; EU-Asia policy coordination, 131–134; EU-Mercosur policy coordination, 103–105; EU’s weak presence in Colombian conflict resolution, 244–245, 255; foreign policy and development policy, 43; HIV/AIDS in southern Africa, 148–149; international development cooperation, 10; lack of EU development coordination in Africa, 150–157; lack of EU policy coordination in DRC conflict, 210–212; Lake Victoria resource management, 147; Maastricht Treaty shifting the emphasis toward policy coordination, 66–67; overall lack of EU donor coordination, 252; policy coordination in Colombia, 231–235; security, 26 COPA-COCEGA (Committee of Agricultural Organizations in the European Union–General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives in the European Union), 104–105 Corporate sector: Colombian conflict, 233–234; DRC involvement, 219–220; transregionalism, 6 Costa Rica: economic integration, 164; programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2002–2006, 169(table); programmed bilateral EU

assistance to Latin America, 2007–2013, 170(table); Rio Group, 113(n4) Côte d’Ivoire: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Cotonou Agreement (2000), 3; bilateral and subregional development assistance, 167; development ideologies, 35; EPAs, 47–48; EU-Africa partnership as hybrid interregionalism, 257; EU development cooperation in Africa, 143; member states’ acceptance of, 79–80; peace-building terms, 205–206; postcolonial cooperation, 65; redefining colonial relations, 141; terms and goals of, 69–71 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), 26 Council of Ministers, 49 Country Strategy Papers (CSPs), 192–193, 195–197, 199 Cresson, Edith, 104 Cuba, 239 Customs union, 28 Cyprus: net ODA, 51(table) Czech Republic, 166; net ODA, 51(table) Decentralization, 24 Declaration of European Identity, 15 Decolonization, 34 Deepening, 19, 27–28 Delors, Jacques, 94 Democracy: Colombia strategy, 230, 241; democratic deficit, 21; democratic principles clauses, 92; EUAsia policy coordination, 133; promoting in Latin America, 93–94 Denmark: development cooperation in Tanzania, 153–154; DRC conflict, 211; financing for development, 50; gross bilateral ODA from EU-15 countries to Latin America, 168(table); national positions on EUAsia cooperation, 129; net ODA, 51(table); pressure for reform of EUAfrica economic policy, 82; sources of FDI flows to Africa, 1991–2000, 75(table) Dependence, trade: Mercosur, 103 Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 198

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Index Development cooperation, 34–36; aid instruments and effectiveness, 52–55; ASEAN founding, 187–189; bilateral and subregional community assistance in Latin America, 167–173; conflict management, 37; conflict management and, 254; development indicators for Southeast Asian countries, 190(table); EU ambiguity, 10; EU as country-level actor, 150–154; EU as global actor, 142; EU focus, 59; EU interregionalism in Africa, 79, 143–145, 155–157, 258–259; EU-Latin America interregional strategic partnership, 160–165, 179–183, 260–261; EULatin America relations, 260–261; EU regional actorship, 252–254; European ODA to Latin America, 165–167; financing for development, 50–51; geographical distribution of development funding, 51–52; HIV/AIDS in southern Africa, 148–152; horizontal programs in Latin America, 2001–2010, 174(table); interregional cooperation in Southeast Asia, 192–195; natural resource management in the Lake Victoria region, 145–148; Philippines, 195–200; policy coordination, 44; postcolonial conditions, 48–50; poverty reduction in Southeast Asia, 189–192; programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2002–2006, 169(table); programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2007–2013, 170(table); programmed EU assistance to Latin American subregions, 171(table)–172(table); regional and subregional development cooperation in Latin America, 159–160; regional-level community assistance in Latin America, 173–179; security as precondition, 56 Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), 167–168, 179, 184(n8) Development indicators, 190(table) Development Partners Group (DPG), 154

305

Development regionalism, 20 Development Vision, 152–153 Disease, 56, 148–150, 222 Diversity, political and economic, 123–124 Djibouti: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Domestic legitimation: actorness requirements, 21 Dominance, 21 Dominica: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Dominican Republic: EPA regions, 71(fig.); Rio Group, 113(n4) Dominion: Europe as regional international society, 24–25 Donor Conference (2002), 236 Drug trade, 229, 233, 240, 243 Dual-track strategy, 99 East Africa Community (EAC), 146, 217 East African Development Bank (EADB), 147 East Asia: asymmetry in EU-South relations, 264–265; community method to EU-Asia interregionalism, 125; European colonial presence in Asia, 117; EU trade figures, 45; regionness, 18. See also China; Japan; South Korea; Taiwan East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), 262 Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) group, 48, 84 Eastern Europe. See Central and Eastern Europe Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN), 33–34 Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 217 Economic Community of the Great Lakes States (CEPGL), 206, 214–215, 217–218 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 58; EU-ACP economic cooperation, 1970–2003, 74(table); increasing regionalism in Africa, 84, 88(n8); share of intraregional trade in total African trade, 76(table) Economic cooperation. See Trade and economic cooperation

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Economic homogenization, 26 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), 47–48; asymmetry in, 85–87; Cotonou Agreement, 69–71; EU-Africa interregionalism, 258; external pressure for reform of EUAfrican policy, 77–79; internal pressure for reform, 79–83; regions, 71(fig.) Economic policy: controversy in the regional institutionalized polity, 27; national interests influencing, 10 Ecuador: Mercosur creation, 164, 183(n3); programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2002–2006, 169(table); programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2007–2013, 170(table); Rio Group, 113(n4) Education, 23, 173 Effective multilateralism, 57 Egypt, 41(n2), 48 Election support, 56–57; DRC, 208–209 El Salvador: Central American economic integration, 164; programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2002–2006, 169(table); programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2007–2013, 170(table); Rio Group, 113(n4) Empire, 23 Endogenous factors, 30 Enlargement: Central and Eastern Europe, 11(n3); FPR and counterparts, 30; implications for development cooperation, 35; loss of actorness, 40; pressure for reform of EU-African economic cooperation, 77–78; regional institutionalized polity, 27–28; regionness and, 19; security and conflict management implications, 37 Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI), 99 Environmental issues, 145–148 Environmental regionalism, 20 Equatorial Guinea: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Erasmus Mundus programs, 173 Eritrea: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Essen European Council, 100 Estonia: net ODA, 51(table)

Ethiopia: EPA regions, 71(fig.) EU-Andean Community of Nations (CAN) Framework agreement (1998), 229 EU-Central America Bi-Regional Association Agreement, 164 EU-Mercosur Interregional Framework for Cooperation Agreement (EMIFCA), 101–103, 105, 260 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), 5 EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AidCo), 44, 163–164, 181 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 26 European Commission, 29; centralization of EU decisionmaking and policy, 4; Colombian intervention, 229–230; community method to EUAsia interregionalism, 124–127; EPA negotiations, 83–85; EU-Africa relations and international development cooperation, 259; EU as countrylevel development cooperation actor, 150–154; EU-Asia policy coordination, 132; EU-Latin America relations, 94–95, 97–98, 163–165, 260–261; financing for development, 50; international development cooperation, 49, 252–253; natural resource management in the Lake Victoria Region, 145–148; ODA to Latin America, 165–167; policy coordination in Colombia, 232; pressure for reform of EU-African economic cooperation, 78; promoting EU as global actor for development cooperation, 142, 144–145; Southeast Asia development strategy, 193 European Community (EC), 26; ASEAN founding, 187–188; Colombia strategy, 230; increasing relations with Latin America, 90–91; original goals and concerns, 249; return to Latin America, 92–96 European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), 232 European Community Investment Partners (ECIP), 95 European Concert, 18, 25

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Index European Consensus on Development, 36, 49–50, 135, 141, 144, 252–253 European Council, 29; Central American integration, 94; Foreign Policy Complex, 28; international development cooperation, 252–253; policy coordination in Colombia, 232 European Court of Justice (ECJ), 29 “Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships,” 125–126 European Defense and Security Policy, 209 European Development Fund (EDF), 34, 52, 57–58, 168 European Economic Community (EEC), 20 European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 120(table) European Investment Bank (EIB), 173, 195 Europeanization of Europe, 25–26 European Monetary Union (EMU), 27, 33–34 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 30–31, 41(n2) European Parliament (EP), 29; Colombian policy coordination, 236; development cooperation, 49; EUAsia policy coordination, 132; EUMercosur rapprochement, 100; international development cooperation, 252–253; policy coordination in Colombia, 232; pressure for reform of EU-African economic cooperation, 80–81; Southeast Asia strategy, 194, 202(n7); trade and economic cooperation, 33 European Security Strategy (ESS), 44, 55–57 European Single Market, 123 European Standardization Committee (CEN), 98 EUROsociAL, 174(table), 178 Euro-Solar, 174(table), 178–179 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna/Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA), 232–233 Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, 47–48, 119, 137(n1)

307

Exogenous factors, 30 Expansion, regionness and, 19 External actorship, 1–2, 16, 228–229. See also Security and conflict management cooperation External policy: policy coordination processes, 67 Failed states, 56–57 Feudalism, 23 Fiji: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Financial Perspectives for 2007–2013, 52 Financing for development, 50–51 Finland: Colombia strategy, 240; EUMercosur free trade area, 109; gross bilateral ODA from EU-15 countries to Latin America, 168(table); Multilateral Debt Relief Fund for Tanzania, 153; net ODA, 51(table); sources of FDI flows to Africa, 1991–2000, 75(table) Fischler, Franz, 104 Flynn, Padraig, 104 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 147 Foreign direct investment (FDI): Africa’s unequal acquisition and distribution, 71–73; Mercosur, 97, 102–103; sources of FDI flows to Africa, 1991–2000, 75(table); strategies for, 67 Foreign policy: EU-Asia, 135; institutionalization of actorness, 28; structural, 40(n1) Foreign Policy Complex (FPC), 28–30; structural foreign policy, 40(n1). See also Development cooperation; Security and conflict management cooperation; Trade and economic cooperation Foreign Policy Issue Areas (FPIAs): actorness, 21; development cooperation, 34–36; Foreign Policy Complex, 30; security and conflict management, 36–38. See also Conflict management; Development cooperation; Security and conflict management cooperation; Trade and economic cooperation Foreign Policy Relations (FPRs): actor-

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ness, 21; conflict management, 37; Foreign Policy Complex, 30; “South” dimension, 40; types and counterparts, 30–32 Fragile states, 56–57 Framework Co-operation Agreements, 161 France: Africa’s investment flows, 73; Colombian policy, 232, 235–236, 238, 240; colonial presence in Africa, 67; colonial presence in Asia, 87(n2), 137(n5), 185–186; DRC conflict, 211–212; economic interests in Asia, 118; EU-Mercosur free trade area, 109; EU-Mercosur policy coordination, 104; EU-SADC policy in DRC conflict, 210–211; gross bilateral ODA from EU-15 countries to Latin America, 168(table); Lake Victoria Management Project, 147; Latin American EUROsociAL program, 178; national positions on EUAsia cooperation, 129–130, 138(nn8,9); net ODA, 51(table); ODA to Latin America, 166; sources of FDI flows to Africa, 1991–2000, 75(table); Southern Cone investment, 102; Treaty rejection, 49 Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), 99, 162 Free trade areas: Andean countries, 184(5); EU-Mercosur, 108–111; EUUS competition in the Southern Cone, 106–108; Latin America, 99–100 FTAA-light, 109 Functionalism in development policy, 155–157 Gabon: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Gambia: EPA regions, 71(fig.) General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), 211–212 General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), 79, 88(n7) Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), 119 General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration, 164, 184(n4) Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 131 Geographical area of region, 17–18

Geographic assistance programs, 168 Georgia, 41(n2) Germany: bilateral relations with Latin America, 183(n1); Colombia policy, 239–240; colonial ties in Africa, 67, 87(n2); DRC peacekeeping operation, 208–209; economic interests in Asia, 118; EU-Mercosur free trade area, 109; gross bilateral ODA from EU-15 countries to Latin America, 168(table); Latin American EUROsociAL program, 178; national positions on EU-Asia cooperation, 131, 138(n8); net ODA, 51(table); ODA to Latin America, 166; pressure for reform of EUAfrican economic cooperation, 77–78, 80–81; response to Kabila, 207; sources of FDI flows to Africa, 1991–2000, 75(table); Southern Cone investment, 102 Ghana: effect of rapid liberalization on agriculture, 82; EPA regions, 71(fig.) Gini index, 192 Gisenyi Agreement, 214–215 Global Environment Facility (GEF), 146–147 Globalization, 26; EU-Asia economic ties, 122; EU-Latin America economic cooperation, 260; EU leadership role, 92; interregionalism and, 32; realist approach, 267 González, Felipe, 93 Governance: Philippines’ development strategy, 197–198 Great Lakes Region (GLR), 145–148; EU conflict management capacity, 255, 259. See also Congo, Democratic Republic of (DRC) Greece: EU enlargement, 35; gross bilateral ODA from EU-15 countries to Latin America, 168(table); net ODA, 51(table) Green Paper on EU-ACP relations, 78 Grenada: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Guadalajara summit, 108–109, 162, 230 Guatemala: Central American economic integration, 164; programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2002–2006, 169(table); programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin

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Index America, 2007–2013, 170(table); Rio Group, 113(n4) Guerrilla movements, 227–228 Guinea: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Guinea-Bissau: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Guyana, 113(n4); EPA regions, 71(fig.) Haiti: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Harmonization, 27 Health: HIV/AIDS in southern Africa, 148–150 Hegemonic power, 21; economic, 26; EU-Africa interregionalism, 258; Europe as regional international society, 24–25 Helsinki summit, 132, 229 High politics, 91–92 HIV/AIDS in southern Africa, 148–152, 222 Homogenization, economic, 26 Honduras: Central American economic integration, 164; programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2002–2006, 169(table); programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2007–2013, 170(table); Rio Group, 113(n4) Hong Kong: major trade partners of EU and Asian ASEM, 2004, 121(table); national positions on EU-Asia cooperation, 130 Horizontal development programs in Latin America, 173–180 Humanitarian military intervention, 56, 239–241 Human needs, 56 Human rights issues: Asian interregionalism, 129; Colombian conflict, 233–234; EU-Asia policy coordination, 133; EU member states’ responses to, 137(n4); Southeast Asia, 194 Human rights violations, 46 Human security, 56 Hungary: EU-Mercosur free trade area, 109; Latin American EUROsociAL program, 178; net ODA, 51(table); ODA to Latin America, 166 Hybrid interregionalism, 5; Asia strategy, 126–127; EU-Africa partnership, 257–259; EU-Asia interregionalism,

309

122, 134–136; EU interregional relations with the Global South, 256–257; EU-Latin America relations, 183, 261; Lomé Agreement, 67–69; national positions on EUAsia cooperation, 128(table); security cooperation, 58 Ibero-American dialogue, 95 Identity: in development policy, 155–157; EU as interregional and international development actor, 144; influencing EU actions, 266; region as community, 18 Identity politics, 28 Imperialism, 38 Implementation: need for coordination, 43–44 Inclusiveness, 16 India: EU-Asia strategy, 126–127, 132; EU trade partnership, 121; hybrid interregionalism, 5; national positions on EU-Asia cooperation, 130; regional instability, 124 Indochina, 185–186 Indonesia: ASEM, 116; Asia strategy, 127; development assistance strategy, 194; development indicators for Southeast Asian countries, 190(table); establishment of ASEAN, 202(n2) Industrialization, 24–25 Information technologies, 177 Instability, regional, 124 Institutional cooperation with Mercosur, 98–99 Institutionalization of interregional relations: ASEM process, 263 Institutionalized polity, 18–19, 39 Integration: Central America, 94, 164; conflict management through, 38; EMIFCA terms, 101; EU-Mercosur interregional agreement, 98; European Monetary Union, 27; monetary integration, 87(n1); security and conflict management, 36 Integration, Cooperation, and Development Treaty (PICAB), 96–97 Integration and Cooperation Program (PICE), 96

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Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 95, 240 Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD), 58 Internal cohesiveness, 16, 28–29, 103–105 Internal development: actorness, 1–2 International Development Association (IDA), 146 International Labour Organization (ILO), 178 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 79 International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), 233 Interregionalism: asymmetry in EUSouth relations, 263–265; constructivist view of, 266–267; defining and characterizing, 5, 256–257; EU-Asia relations, 261–263; history of EU’s foreign policy and external relations, 2–3; regional actorship and interregionalism, 22 Iraq War, 31 Ireland: EU-Mercosur free trade area, 109; EU-Mercosur policy coordination, 104; gross bilateral ODA from EU-15 countries to Latin America, 168(table); HIV/AIDS in southern Africa, 148–149; Multilateral Debt Relief Fund for Tanzania, 153; net ODA, 51(table); Treaty rejection, 49 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 233 Israel, 41(n2) Italy: Colombian policy, 232, 235; EUMercosur free trade area, 109; EUMercosur policy coordination, 105; gross bilateral ODA from EU-15 countries to Latin America, 168(table); Latin American EUROsociAL program, 178; net ODA, 51(table); sources of FDI flows to Africa, 1991–2000, 75(table); Southern Cone investment, 102 Jamaica: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Japan: ASEAN Plus Three, 188; ASEM, 116; Asia strategy, 125; EAEC proposal, 262; EU-Asian economic cooperation and interregionalism, 119; EU bilateral relations, 262;

European colonial presence in Asia, 117; EU trade partnership, 120–121; major trade partners of EU and Asian ASEM, 2004, 121(table); as part of the Global South, 11(n4); world trade figures, 92 Jenkins, Roy, 187 Joint Declaration by the Council and the Commission (2000), 144 Joint Donors Forum, 149 Jordan, 41(n2) José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers’ Collective, 234 Justice: institutionalization of actorness through FPC, 28–29 Kabila, Joseph, 208 Kabila, Laurent, 207–209, 217 Kazakhstan, 124, 137(n3) Kenya: EPA regions, 71(fig.); Lake Victoria Management Project, 146 Kidnapping, 234, 239 Kiribati: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Kompass, Anders, 238 Kyrgyzstan, 124, 137(n3) Lake Victoria Initiative (LVI), 146 Lake Victoria Management Project (LVMP), 145–146 Lake Victoria region, 145–148 Lamy, Pascal, 107 Laos: ASEAN membership, 202(n2); development assistance strategy, 194; development indicators for Southeast Asian countries, 190(table); poverty reduction, 190–193 Latin America: ASEM trade with main partners, 2004, 120(table); asymmetry in EU-South relations, 264–265; bilateral and subregional community development assistance, 167–173; development cooperation, 253; EU enlargement, 35; EU-Latin America interregional strategic partnership, 162–165; European aims for a strategic biregional partnership, 90–96; European return to, 92–96; EU trade with main partners, 120(table); horizontal programs of the European Commission, 2001–2010, 174(table);

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Index international development cooperation, 11; ODA to, 165–167; regional and subregional development cooperation, 159–160, 173–179; strategic interregional development partnership, 160–162. See also Colombia; Mercosur; individual countries Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) Summit, 96 Latin American Association of Integration (ALADI), 95 Latin American Economic System (SELA), 95 Latvia: net ODA, 51(table) Lawyers’ organizations, 234 Least developed countries (LDCs): EPAs, 47–48 Lebanon, 41(n2) Lee Kwan Yew, 194 Legitimacy, state, 1–2, 245(n2), 267 Lesotho: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Liberalization, trade, 69–71, 99, 101, 119 Liberia, 58, 71(fig.) Libya, 41(n2) Lima summit, 90, 162 Lindh, Anna, 238 Lisbon, Treaty of (2007), 29 Lithuania: net ODA, 51(table) Lomé Agreement: background and terms of, 66–67; bilateral and subregional development assistance, 167; hybrid interregionalism, 5, 67–69, 257; postcolonial cooperation, 34, 65; pressure for reform, 77–79 Low politics, 92 Lula, Luiz, 110 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (1999), 207, 209 Luxemburg: financing for development, 50; gross bilateral ODA from EU-15 countries to Latin America, 168(table); net ODA, 51(table) Maastricht Treaty (1992), 11(n1), 49, 66–67, 91, 131–132, 141, 252 Madagascar: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Madrid Summit (2002), 238 Madrid Summit (2010), 162 Mahathir bin Mohamad, 194, 262 Malawi: EPA regions, 71(fig.)

311

Malaysia: ASEM, 116; Asia strategy, 127; development indicators for Southeast Asian countries, 190(table); establishment of ASEAN, 202(n2); major trade partners of EU and Asian ASEM, 2004, 121(table); poverty reduction, 190, 192 Mali: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Malta: EC aid, 61(n3); net ODA, 51(table) Marín, Manuel, 94–95, 100, 105 Marshall Islands: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Marxist ideology, 227 Mass killing, 238 Matutes, Abel, 94–95 Mauritania: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Mauritius: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Menem, Carlos, 99 Mercosur: asymmetry in EU-South relations, 264; creation of, 96–97; EMIFCA, 260; EU assistance to, 98–101; EU-Mercosur free trade area, 108–111; EU-Mercosur Interregional Framework for Cooperation Agreement, 101–103; EU partnership, 96–101, 164, 180; EU political and economic goals with, 89–90; EU trade figures, 45; EU-US competition, 106–108; horizontal development programs, 176; internal EU obstacles to interregionalism, 103–105; programmed EU assistance to Latin American subregions, 171(table)–172(table); regional actorship and regionalism, 22 Mercosur-European Business Forum (MEBF), 102, 107 Methodological cosmopolitanism, 17 Methodological nationalism, 17 Mexico: association agreements, 96; bilateral cooperation with, 165; EULatin America interregional strategic partnership, 180; ODA flows to Latin America, 167; programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2002–2006, 169(table); programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2007–2013, 170(table); Rio Group, 113(n4) M-19 guerrilla movement, 227 Michel, Louis, 215

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Micronesia, Federation of: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Middle-income countries (MICs), 189–192 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 36, 144, 195–196, 252 Mineral wealth, 72–73 Mobutu Sese Seku, 207, 209 Modalities of aid, 53 Moldava, 41(n2) Monetary integration, 87(n1) Moratinos, Angel, 105 Morocco, 41(n2) Most-favored-nation status, 79, 88(n7) Mouvement pour la liberation du Congo (MLC), 207–208 Mozambique: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Mugabe, Robert, 214 Multilateralism, 36, 57–58, 257 Multiregionalism, 257 Myanmar, 133, 190(table), 194–195, 202(n2) Namibia: DRC conflict support, 207, 216; EPA regions, 71(fig.) National interests: competing world order projects, 38; FDI strategies, 67; influencing economic policy, 10; trade negotiation, 46 Nationalism, 24, 109–110 National Liberation Army (ELN; Colombia), 227 Nation-centric paradigm, 17 Nation-state: Europe as regional international society, 24–25; EU’s Foreign Policy Complex, 28; regional social system, 23–24; regionness of, 16–17 Natural resources, 72–73; EU development cooperation in Africa, 143; natural resource management in the Lake Victoria Region, 145–148 Nauru: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Neighbors: conflict management, 37; FPR and counterparts, 30–31; FPRs’ “South” dimensions, 40 Neoimperialism, 38 Neoliberalism, 35, 69, 97 Netherlands: bilateral relations with Latin America, 183(n1); Colombia strategy, 232, 236, 240; colonial presence in Asia, 117, 185–186; eco-

nomic interests in Asia, 118; EUMercosur free trade area, 109; EUMercosur policy coordination, 104; financing for development, 50; gross bilateral ODA from EU-15 countries to Latin America, 168(table); HIV/AIDS in southern Africa, 148–149; Multilateral Debt Relief Fund for Tanzania, 153; net ODA, 51(table); ODA to Latin America, 166; pressure for reform of EUAfrican economic cooperation, 77–78; sources of FDI flows to Africa, 1991–2000, 75(table); Southern Cone investment, 102; Treaty rejection, 49 Network of European Academics for Colombia, 234 Neutral intervention in conflict, 228–229 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 44, 218 New regionalism, 97–98 New Zealand: Asia strategy, 125–126 N’goma, Arthur Zahidi, 208 Nicaragua: Central American economic integration, 164; EU-Latin America strategic partnership, 161; ODA flows, 168; programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2002–2006, 169(table); programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2007–2013, 170(table); Rio Group, 113(n4) Nice, Treaty of, 49 Niger: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Nigeria: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), 146 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 229, 233; Colombian conflict, 234–235; HIV/AIDS in southern Africa, 149; Latin American pacification, 113(n3); Philippines’ development assistance, 199 Nonreciprocal trade, 47–48, 73–75; Latin America, 95 Nontariff barriers to trade, 103–105, 260 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 99; ASEM trade with main partners, 2004, 120(table); EU trade with main partners, 120(table);

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Index regional actorship and interregionalism, 22 North Korea, 124 Norway: HIV/AIDS in southern Africa, 148; Lake Victoria Management Project, 147; major trade partners of EU and Asian ASEM, 2004, 121(table); Multilateral Debt Relief Fund for Tanzania, 153; sources of FDI flows to Africa, 1991–2000, 75(table) Observatoria de las Relacions EU-AL (OBREAL), 174(table), 178 Official development assistance (ODA): EU contribution, 50; geographical distribution of, 51–52; gross bilateral ODA from EU-15 countries to Latin America, 168(table); Latin America, 160–161, 165–167, 180; net ODA in 2004 and 2005, 51(table); Philippines, 195 Oil resources, 53, 73 Open method of coordination (OMC), 181 Open regionalism, 90 Opium Wars, 117 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 198 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 218 Organization of American States (OAS), 95, 236 Organized crime, 37, 55 Ouro Preto, Treaty of (1994), 97, 100 Oxfam, 81 Packaging policy instruments, 60 Pakistan: national positions on EU-Asia cooperation, 130; regional instability, 124 Palau: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Palestinian Authority, 41(n2) Panama: programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2002–2006, 169(table); programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2007–2013, 170(table); Rio Group, 113(n4) Papua New Guinea: EPA regions, 71(fig.)

313

Paraguay: Mercosur establishment, 96, 164; programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2002–2006, 169(table); programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2007–2013, 170(table); Rio Group, 113(n4). See also Mercosur Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), 93 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), 31 Pastrana administration (Colombia), 235, 237–238, 240, 246(n12) Patten, Christopher, 240 Pax Christi Holland, 234 Peacekeeping operations, 58, 208 Peru: Andean Community of Nations, 164; Andean free trade area, 184(5); Mercosur membership, 183(n3); programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2002–2006, 169(table); programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2007–2013, 170(table); Rio Group, 113(n4) Philippines: ASEM, 116; development assistance strategy, 194–200; development indicators for Southeast Asian countries, 190(table); establishment of ASEAN, 202(n2); governance as development issue, 197–198; poverty reduction, 186–187, 191–193 Pillar system: EU actorship in cross-pillar relations, 255–256; EU-ASEAN relations, 262–263; EU regional actorship and, 251; structural conflict between pillars, 34 Plan Colombia, 230–231, 235–238, 241–242, 246(n12) Poland, 166; EU-Mercosur free trade area, 109; net ODA, 51(table) Policy differentiation, 239–240 Political dialogue, 92, 98–99, 101, 113(n1) Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement, 230 Portugal: colonial presence in Asia, 117; EU enlargement, 35; EU-Mercosur policy coordination, 105; European commitment in Latin America,

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93–94; gross bilateral ODA from EU-15 countries to Latin America, 168(table); net ODA, 51(table); sources of FDI flows to Africa, 1991–2000, 75(table) Post-national paradigm, 17 Poverty reduction: ESS, 56; EU development plan, 49–50; EU rhetoric, 36; EU strategy in Africa, 152–153; Philippines, 195–197; Southeast Asia, 189–192 Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS), 153 Power characterizing EU actions, 266 Power-sharing agreement, Congolese, 208 Preferences regimes, 119, 137(n1) Presence, international: actorship, 19–20; components of regional actorship, 15–16; development cooperation, 59; EU actorship in conflict management, 254–255; EU actorship in cross-pillar relations, 255–256; EU’s weak presence in Colombian conflict resolution, 255; regional actorship and interregionalism, 22 Pretoria Agreement (2002), 208 Private sector development (PSD), 175–176 Prodi Commission, 107 Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 37, 55 Protectionism, 33 Pure interregionalism, 5; EU-Africa interregionalism, 257; EU Foreign Policy Relations, 31–32; EU interregional relations with the Global South, 256–257; EU-Latin American development partnership, 183 Pyramid of preference: EU enlargement, 34–36; trade relations, 47 Quota system, 107–108 Rational model of cooperation, 265 Realist model of cooperation, 265–267 Regime convergence, 25, 27, 40 Region, nation-state and, 17 Regional actorship. See Actorship Regional community, 25–26, 228–229 Regional conflicts, 37, 55, 93

Regional economic agreements, 70 Regional institutionalized polity, 26–28 Regional international society, 24–25 Regionalism, 19 Regional security complex, 18 Regional Strategy Papers (Latin America), 163–164 Region-building: EU-Africa relations and international development cooperation, 258–259 Regionness: components of regional actorship, 15–16; Europe as regional international society, 24–25; five layers of, 17–19; regional actorship and interregionalism, 22; regional community, 25–26; regional institutionalized polity, 26–28; regional social space, 23; regional social system, 23–24 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), 227, 235–238, 241, 245(n1) Rio Group, 95, 113(n4), 161, 229 Rio Process, 90, 96 Risk society, 37 Roman Empire, 23–24 Rome, Treaty of (1957), 28, 67–68 Roth, Claudia, 239 Ruberwa, Azarias, 207–208 Russia: bilateral links, 31; major trade partners of EU and Asian ASEM, 2004, 121(table); neighborhood, 30–31; regional instability, 124; Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 137(n3) Rwanda: DRC relations, 207, 217; EPA regions, 71(fig.) St. Kitts and Nevis: EPA regions, 71(fig.) St. Lucia: EPA regions, 71(fig.) St. Vincent and the Grenadines: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Samoa: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Samper administration (Colombia), 226 Sanctions, 46, 54 San José Process, 93–94, 161 Santer Commission, 100, 104 São Tomé and Principe: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Sector Wide Approach (SWAP), 154

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Index Security: contemporary conceptualization of, 254; controversy in the regional institutionalized polity, 27; convergence and coordination, 26; development policy, 36; EU-Africa relations, 259; EU-Asia policy coordination, 133; institutionalization of actorness through FPC, 28–29; neighborhood, 30–31; policy coordination, 44; structural conflict between FPIAs, 34; structural conflict between pillars, 34 Security and conflict management cooperation, 36–38; actorness, 21; creation of CEPGL, 214–215; DRC conflict, 209, 213–214; enlargement internalizing security, 19; ESS as a reaction, 55–57; Europe as regional social system, 24; EU-SADC interregionalism in DRC, 209–220; regional security complex, 18; role of regional organizations, 57–58. See also Conflict management Security community, 36 Security complex, 36 Security regionalism, 20 Senegal: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Seychelles: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 137(n3) Sierra Leone, 57, 222 Silguy, Yves-Thibault de, 104 Singapore: ASEM, 116; development indicators for Southeast Asian countries, 190(table); establishment of ASEAN, 202(n2); GNI, 202(n3); major trade partners of EU and Asian ASEM, 2004, 121(table); national positions on EU-Asia cooperation, 130; poverty reduction programs, 190 Singapore issues, 86 Single Market Programme, 125 Single pocket principle, 108 Slovak Republic: EU-Mercosur free trade area, 109; net ODA, 51(table); ODA to Latin America, 166 Slovenia: EC aid, 61(n3); net ODA, 51(table) Socialist party (Spain), 93 Socialization, 228

315

Social space, 17–18, 23 Social system, 18, 23–24 Society, regionness and, 18 Soft balancing, 31 Soft imperialism, 38–39 Soft institutionalization, 263 Soft power, 37 Solana, Javier, 43, 205, 237 Solomon Islands: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Somalia, 56 Soul City Regional Programme, 149 South Africa: DRC conflict, 214, 216; EPAs, 48; SADC, 88(n8) South African Customs Union (SACU), 219 South Asia: community method to EUAsia interregionalism, 125 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 18, 121–122, 124, 128(table) Southeast Asia: community method to EU-Asia interregionalism, 125; development indicators, 190(table); development strategy in the Philippines, 195–200; European colonial presence in Asia, 117; EU trade figures, 45; evolution of interregional relations, 187–189; interregional development cooperation, 192–195; poverty reduction, 189–192; three phases of EU relations, 261–263. See also ASEAN Southern African Development Community (SADC), 258; African regionalism, 84, 88(n8); DRC conflict, 206–207, 209, 212; EU-ACP economic cooperation, 1970–2003, 74(table); EU regional integration plan, 48; HIV/AIDS strategy, 149–150; need for robust interregional approach to conflict management, 220–222; share of intraregional trade in total African trade, 76(table); unassertive EU-SADC interregionalism in DRC conflict, 209–220; weak approach to conflict management, 216–218 Southern Cone, 22, 97. See also Argentina; Chile; Mercosur; Paraguay; Uruguay South Korea: ASEAN Plus Three, 188;

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ASEM, 116; Asia strategy, 126–127; major trade partners of EU and Asian ASEM, 2004, 121(table); as part of the Global South, 11(n4); regional instability, 124 Sovereign, territorial state, 24 Soviet Union, 93 Spain: Colombian policy, 232–233, 235–236, 240, 245(n10); colonial presence in Asia, 117; EU enlargement, 35; EU-Mercosur free trade area, 109, 111; EU-Mercosur policy coordination, 105; European commitment in Latin America, 93–95; gross bilateral ODA from EU-15 countries to Latin America, 168(table); net ODA, 51(table); ODA to Latin America, 166; sources of FDI flows to Africa, 1991–2000, 75(table); Southern Cone investment, 102 Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), 27 Stabilization: conflict management through, 38; enlargement and neighborhood policies, 40; neighborhood, 30–31 State failure, 37, 55. See also Colombia; Congo, Democratic Republic of (DRC) State Failure Task Force, 227–228 Structural conflict, 34 Structural foreign policy, 40(n1) Sudan, 71(fig.), 210–211, 213 Supranational level, 267 Surinam: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Sustainable development, 36 Swaziland: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Sweden: Colombian policy, 230–232, 235–236, 238, 240; financing for development, 50; gross bilateral ODA from EU-15 countries to Latin America, 168(table); HIV/AIDS in southern Africa, 148; Lake Victoria Initiative, 146–147; Multilateral Debt Relief Fund for Tanzania, 153; national positions on EU-Asia cooperation, 129; net ODA, 51(table); sources of FDI flows to Africa, 1991–2000, 75(table) Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), 146–147

Switzerland: major trade partners of EU and Asian ASEM, 2004, 121(table); sources of FDI flows to Africa, 1991–2000, 75(table) Syria, 41(n2) Taiwan: Asia strategy, 127; major trade partners of EU and Asian ASEM, 2004, 121(table); regional instability, 124 Tajikistan, 124, 137(n3) Tanzania: EPA regions, 71(fig.); EU development cooperation, 150, 152–154; Lake Victoria Management Project, 146–147 Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS), 152–153 Targeted sanctions, 46 Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation, 68 Terrorism, 37, 55, 193, 232, 238, 246(n16), 252 Thailand, 116; Asia strategy, 127; development indicators for Southeast Asian countries, 190(table); establishment of ASEAN, 202(n2); major trade partners of EU and Asian ASEM, 2004, 121(table); poverty reduction, 193 Thematic assistance programs, 168, 173 Tonga: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Trade, Development, and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA), 218 Trade and economic cooperation: actorness, 21; Africa’s declining share of world output and trade, 72–73; bilateral and subregional cooperation in Latin America, 168–169; community method to EU-Asia interregionalism, 124–127; conflict management and, 254; as core of EU-South interactions, 45–47; Cotonou Agreement, 69–71; EC-Asia relations, 115–116; EPAs as development tools, 47–48; EU, ACP, and interregionalism, 83–85; EU-ACP economic cooperation, 1970–2003, 74(table); EU-Asia policy coordination, 118–122, 131–136; EU emergence as global actor, 33–34; EU focus, 59; EULatin America relations, 95, 260;

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Index EU-Mercosur policy coordination, 89–90, 96–101, 103–105; EU regional actorship and, 251–252; EU trade with main partners, 120(table); EUUS competition in the Southern Cone, 106–108; EU world trade figures, 92; external pressure for reform of EU-African policy, 77–79; institutionalization of actorness through FPC, 28; internal pressure for reform of EU-African policy, 79–83; Maastricht Treaty shifting emphasis toward policy coordination, 66–67; monetary integration, 87(n1); national positions on EU-Asia cooperation, 127–131; preferences regime, 137(n1); share of intraregional trade in total African trade, 76(table); weakness in pattern and growth of, 71–77. See also Mercosur; Trade and economic cooperation Trade barriers, 47–48, 254 Trade liberalization, 69–71, 99, 101, 119 Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), 106 Transatlantic links. See United States Transnational civil society, 18 Transnational relations, 6 Transregionalism, 5–6, 256–257 Trinidad and Tobago: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Tunisia, 41(n2) Turkey: enlargement process, 19; major trade partners of EU and Asian ASEM, 2004, 121(table) Turkmenistan, 124 Tuvalu: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Uganda: DRC relations, 207–208; EPA regions, 71(fig.); Lake Victoria Management Project, 146 Ukraine, 41(n2) UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 82 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 237 Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), 110, 165 United Kingdom: Africa’s investment flows, 73; Colombian policy, 240; colonial ties in Africa, 67, 87(n2); economic interests in Asia, 118; EU-

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Mercosur policy coordination, 104; EU-SADC policy in DRC conflict, 207, 210; gross bilateral ODA from EU-15 countries to Latin America, 168(table); HIV/AIDS in southern Africa, 148–149; implications of enlargement for development cooperation, 35; Latin American EUROsociAL program, 178; national positions on EU-Asia cooperation, 129–130; net ODA, 51(table); pressure for reform of EU-Africa economic policy, 81–82; robust approach to African conflict management, 222; sources of FDI flows to Africa, 1991–2000, 75(table); trade and economic cooperation, 33 United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), 208 United States: actorness requirements, 21; Africa’s investment flows, 73; agricultural protectionism, 33; bilateral relationships, 31; Colombia strategy, 241; colonial presence in Asia, 117; competing world order projects, 38; Cotonou Agreement, 70; development aid to Latin America, 159; DRC conflict, 207, 219; ESS and US security policy, 55–57; EU-Colombia policy coordination, 236–237; EU-Latin America economic cooperation, 260; EUMercosur free trade area, 109; EU political and economic competition in Mercosur relations, 89–90, 97–98, 106–109; EU-US competition in the Southern Cone, 106–108; external actions, 16; hybrid interregionalism, 5; Latin American trade strategy, 99–100; major trade partners of EU and Asian ASEM, 2004, 121(table); sources of FDI flows to Africa, 1991–2000, 75(table); world trade figures, 92 URB-AL program, 174(table), 176–177 Uribe, Alvaro, 235, 239 Uruguay: Mercosur establishment, 96, 164; programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2002–2006, 169(table); programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America,

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Index

2007–2013, 170(table); Rio Group, 113(n4). See also Mercosur USAID, 147 Uzbekistan, 124, 137(n3) Value-added aspect of EU policy, 253, 266 Values and principles, 194; actorness, 21 Vanuatu: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Venezuela: Mercosur membership, 113(n5), 183(n3); programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2002–2006, 169(table); programmed bilateral EU assistance to Latin America, 2007–2013, 170(table); Rio Group, 113(n4) Verhofstadt, Guy, 3 Vietnam: ASEAN membership, 202(n2); ASEM, 116; development assistance strategy, 194; development indicators for Southeast Asian countries, 190(table); poverty reduction, 191–192 Villepin, Dominique de, 246(n20)

West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), 88(n8) Westphalia, 24 Widening, regionness and, 19 World Bank, 79, 147 World Trade Organization (WTO): asymmetry in EU-South relations, 264; Cotonou Agreement, 70; EMIFCA terms, 101–102; EPA negotiations, 47, 86; EU leadership role in globalization, 92; EU-Mercosur policy coordination, 105; EU-US competition in the Southern Cone, 107–108; GATT provisions, 88(n7); pressure for reform of EU-African economic cooperation, 77, 79 Yaoundé Convention, 34, 67–68, 167 Yerodia, Abdoulaye, 208 Zambia: EPA regions, 71(fig.) Zimbabwe: DRC conflict support, 207, 216; EPA regions, 71(fig.); South Africa’s stance, 214

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About the Book

T

he development of coherent and effective relations with other regions and countries is one of the most challenging tasks faced by the European Union. This original volume explores the EU’s engagement with the Global South, focusing on three controversial policy areas: economic cooperation, development cooperation, and conflict management. A discussion of the EU’s interregional model—which promotes interaction with regions rather than nation-states—provides a backdrop for case studies of EU policies with regard to Africa, Asia, and Latin America. While disclosing the tensions and overlaps between the EU’s foreign policies and those of its member states, the authors also highlight an increasing trend toward successful policy coordination.

Fredrik Söderbaum is associate professor in the School of Global Studies at the University of Gothenburg. Among his numerous publications are Theories of New Regionalism and The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa. Patrik Stålgren is a research fellow in the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. He is author of Worlds of Water, Worlds Apart: How Targeted Domestic Actors Transform International Regimes.

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