The Debate and Confluence between Confucianism and Buddhism in East Asia: A Historical Overview [1 ed.] 9783737010382, 9783847110385

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Global East Asia

Volume 8

Edited by Chun-chieh Huang

Advisory Board: Roger Ames (Hawai‘i), Don Baker (Columbia), Carl Becker (Kyoto), Michael Friedrich (Hamburg), David Jones (Kennesaw), Bent Nielsen (Copenhagen), Jörn Rüsen (Essen), Kirill O. Thompson (Taipei), John Tucker (Carolina), Ann Waltner (Minnesota)

Chun-chieh Huang

The Debate and Confluence between Confucianism and Buddhism in East Asia A Historical Overview

Translated by Jan Vrhovski Foreword by Jana S. Rosˇker

V&R unipress

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available online: https://dnb.d-nb.de. © 2020, V&R unipress GmbH, Robert-Bosch-Breite 6, 37079 Göttingen, Germany All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior written permission from the publisher. Cover image: © 吳怡靜 (Wu Yi-jing): 一葦渡江 yiwei dujiang [Bodhidharma Crossing the River on a Reed]. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Verlage | www.vandenhoeck-ruprecht-verlage.com ISSN 2365-7871 ISBN 978-3-7370-1038-2

Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

1. A Historical Review of East Asian Confucian-Buddhist Debates 1. China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15 15 20 24

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

. . . .

2. Common Topics of the East Asian Confucian-Buddhist Debates and the Buddhists’ Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 The Questions of Family Ethics: Filial Piety and Leaving Home for a Monastic Life (孝與出家) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.) China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.) Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.) Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Questions of Political Ethics: Buddhist Monks and Kingship (沙門 與王權) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.) China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.) Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Questions of the Distinction Between Chinese (Civilized People) and Barbarians (華夷) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.) China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.) Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 The Question of the Relationship Between the Consciousness (Soul) and Body (神識與形體) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.) China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.) Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Questions of Karma and Samsara (因果與輪迴) . . . . . . . . . . 1.) China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29 29 29 33 34 37 37 42 44 44 46 48 48 60 61 61

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Contents

2.) Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.) Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67 71

3. Discursive Strategies in Debate and Confluence between Confucianism and Buddhism in East Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

75

4. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Primary Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Secondary Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85 85 88

Index of Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

Index of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Foreword

Jana S. Rosˇker

Chun-Chieh Huang, the author of the present book, is an extremely prolific writer. He is a Distinguished Chair Professor of National Taiwan University (NTU), and an academic adviser of the Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy at the Academia Sinica in Taipei. He was the National Chair Professor of the Ministry of Education, Taiwan, and the Dean of the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences at the NTU. Over the past 20 years, Professor Huang and his colleagues have edited eight book series in Chinese on Confucian culture, which has been brought to life due to the increasing relevance of these regions on the global level. The present work is a partial translation of his recent Chinese book on the discourse on humanity in the history of East Asian Confucianisms. Professor Huang has been a leading author in the study of “East Asian Confucianisms.” As compared to the 20th century New Confucians, who studied Confucianism on a “state-centric” basis, Professor Huang and his team have promoted the study of “East Asian Confucianisms” from a transnational, multilingual, and transcultural perspective. This new study of Confucianism in 21st century Taiwan has been very much fascinated with two developments in the history of Confucianisms in East Asia, namely, the first one is the emergence of tensions and fusions between Chinese Confucian values and the specific characteristics of other regions such as Korea, Japan and Vietnam in East Asia, and secondly, the duality of cultural and political identity exhibited within East Asian Confucianisms among non-Chinese Confucians. The study of Confucianism in Korea, Japan and Vietnam explores the inseparability and tension between cultural and political identity in the minds of Confucian scholars in these countries. In this work, Chun-Chieh Huang takes us on a long and exciting journey through the landscapes of Chinese and East Asian intellectual history, focusing upon an important question that has – for much too long – been overlooked or

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Foreword

even neglected by the majority of scholars dealing with East Asian history, philosophy and religious studies. As such, this book is elaborating upon the connections and interactions between Confucianism and Buddhism, which represent two of the traditional “three teachings (san jiao 三教)” that have been largely defining the long-lasting development of the so-called “Chinese mind”. The third teaching among these is Daoism, which – in the framework of what is commonly understood as indigenous Chinese thought – mostly served as a complementary antipode to Confucian ethics and philosophy. When Buddhism came to China toward the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty (25–220), it was confronted with a rich spiritual and philosophical life that was completely different from its own conceptual and metaphysical paradigms. While Buddhism originally preached a negation of the physical world, including human beings and their individual selves, presupposing their illusionary nature, Confucianism was completely attuned to the world and life itself, embracing and celebrating its positive connotations for concrete people and their societies and cultures. Therefore, it laid stress upon the systematic development of ethics and interpersonal relations, whereas Buddhism was originally inclined to understand morality and ethics as, at the most, one of the many tools on the difficult path that can lead to enlightenment. This Buddhist view of the empty nature of the world was closer to certain Daoist approaches, which were similarly based upon such concepts as emptiness or selflessness, and which equally laid stress upon the importance of certain mediation techniques. Therefore, in the first centuries during and after the “Buddhist conquest of China”1 as argued by Erik Zürcher (1928–2008) or the “domestication”2 of Buddhism in China as Arthur F. Wright (1913–1976) termed it, Daoism was often used as a valuable and important bridge connecting the basic spiritual approaches of Buddhism with the worldly and positively oriented traditional Chinese worldview. In contrast to such linkages, Professor Huang’s book focuses upon the hitherto much less investigated, but nevertheless “eyecatching” phenomenon, namely the long and winding developmental stream of debates and confluences between Confucianism and Buddhism. The author points to the fact that after its arrival in China, Buddhism first found itself in a severe conflict with Confucianism. The resulting controversies reached their climax between the fourth and the sixth centuries CE. After the beginning of the Tang Dynasty (618–907), however, Mahayana Buddhism had spread and flourished over all of China. 1 This is a reference to the title of Erik Zürcher’s famous book on the expansion and Sinicization of Buddhism in China, see Erik Zürcher. The Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2007). 2 Arthur F. Wright, Buddhism in Chinese History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 42–65.

Foreword

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On the surface, the Confucian and Buddhist positions were clearly separated during these periods. On a certain level, Buddhism was even endangering the dominant social and political position of Chinese Confucianism. Constituting the main material of the rigid and static official examination system, Confucian philosophy gradually became too static and formalised to satisfy the intellectual needs of the educated members of society at the time. While they had to learn the Confucian classics by heart in order to climb up their administrative and political careers, they increasingly tended to seek intellectual satisfaction in the endless depths of Buddhist philosophy. These deficiencies of the official Confucian state doctrine were addressed during the developmental course of the Neo-Confucian philosophies of the Song and Ming Dynasties, in which Mengzi was canonised as the most important follower of Confucius. In this period, NeoConfucian thought, albeit latently and indirectly, integrated numerous conceptual elements of Buddhist thought (and especially of its Sinicised versions) into the newly evolving Neo-Confucian philosophy, which had a lasting impact on Korea and Japan. These indirect, but nevertheless significant elements of Buddhist intellectual legacies later also formed the pinnacle of the Confucian revival in the modern period, i. e. in the intellectual current of the so-called Modern or New Confucianism, which was established in China on the threshold of the 20th century. Buddhism, on the other hand, was gradually also modified and enriched by numerous elements of originally Confucian ethics, which progressively led to its radical transformation from a world-negating escapism to a positive and ethically fulfilling religion. Therefore, it was understandable that Chinese Buddhism was strongly influenced by Confucian values and principles. Instead of concentrating on escapism and negating concrete life in society, which was a common thread of the original Indian teachings, Chinese Buddhism has instead focused on ways to integrate its practices into people’s life and still enable them to maintain strong familial and political responsibilities. Hence, it is by no means coincidental that nowadays many people not only in China and Taiwan, but also all over East Asia, see themselves as Buddhist and simultaneously as followers of Confucianism, and such a personal identity does not imply any kind of contradiction. This is because these dialogues were not limited to the Chinese geopolitical and cultural sphere. They were an important factor in the gradual establishment of a broader East Asian culture, which was based on Sinitic foundations. This is another significant contribution of the present book, for its author offers readers a transparent and easily comprehensible, but simultaneously a highly critical survey over the complex history of Confucian and Buddhist interactions in Korea and Japan. In this way, he manages to posit them into a complex intercultural context, into a network of relations, permeated with various multi-layered his-

10

Foreword

torical, political and conceptual dimensions, and defined by the de- and recontextualisation of numerous important notions. Professor Huang, who is a well-known expert in East Asian Confucianisms, meticulously analyses this process of conflicts, connections and communications. He starts with an investigation of the social and ideational background of the spread of Buddhism from China to Korea and subsequently to Japan, and then centres our attention on the intense debates that arose in Korea in the 14th and 15th centuries, and later in 17th century Japan. The author introduces this process, which led from initial mutual negation, exclusion and conflict, to an ultimate confluence, harmonisation and synthesis between Confucianism and Buddhism, by making good use of textual analyses and by balancing them with a brilliant understanding and depiction of the particular historical periods and the political events that characterised them. First, the author reviews the origins and development of the above-mentioned debates between Confucianism and Buddhism in East Asia. On this basis, he then analyses the central concepts that emerged in these debates. The work also comprehensively elaborates upon various developments of these polemics under the specific social and political circumstances that have defined these regions, contributing to manifold differences between them. By following the coherent and well-founded structure of this book, the reader soon discovers that the depth of research involved in compiling it is outstanding. After introducing the historical background of the East Asian debates between Confucianism and Buddhism, the author focuses on the central topics of their disputes. Proceeding from ethical themes that are derived from the values and virtues defining interpersonal relations, to the various political and ideological contradictions, Professor Huang points to the relevance of political ethics. In this regard, the book focuses on the Confucian and Buddhist discrepancies in their particular views on the relation between the spiritual development or self-cultivation on the one hand, and social and political responsibilities and power structures on the other. Another issue that is subsequently treated in this work is the problem of the classical Chinese dichotomy between the (allegedly superior) Han Chinese culture and the “barbarian” societies. Since Buddhism originated in India, it was certainly understandable that the two discourses collided concerning such questions. In this context, Professor Huang explains the multifarious reasons for the fact that this kind of controversies also arose in Joseon Korea, but never occurred in Tokugawa Japan. In the next step, the author turns to the philosophical differences between the two teachings. Here, the central debate between Confucianism and Buddhism was evolving around the relation between body and soul. In ancient China, people tended to believe that the soul or human spirit resided in the body, and that after

Foreword

11

a person died this spirit disappeared, while the physical body decomposed. Buddhism, in contrast, was marked by its belief in reincarnation, and emphasised the immortality of the soul, established on the basis of the theory of samsa¯ra, a ˙ view that was – at least directly – incompatible with the Confucian this-worldly and agnostic point of view. Therefore, the members of the Chinese Buddhist schools tried to deal with this discrepancy by applying various classical Chinese intellectual resources, through which they aimed to explain the Buddhist philosophy of body and mind. They raised arguments such as that “body and soul have different roots,” emphasising that the former is still, coarse, and static, while the latter is sublime, transformable and dynamic. The body-mind problem, however, was also tightly connected with the questions of karma and samsa¯ra. ˙ Buddhism taught that after one’s death, the soul is not extinguished, and that one’s life is entangled in a continuous circulation of samsa¯ra, guided by the ˙ causal principles of karma. Chun-Chieh Huang points out that although in ancient China there also existed the idea of retribution, this kind of notion was nevertheless still a social concept, which rested on family as the basic unit of communal life. This was a huge conceptual difference, which unavoidably led both discourses to an open conflict, which manifested itself in countless ideological debates taking place throughout the entire East Asian region. These philosophical questions were not easy to solve, because the Buddhist worldview is rooted in a strict division between the realms of phenomena and the transcendent sphere of the spiritual world. The prevailing Chinese (and particularly Confucian) worldview, on the other hand, is rooted in a worldly paradigm, in which the “profane” can simultaneously be transformed into the “sacred”. The contemporary Chinese philosopher Li Zehou denoted this paradigm as a “oneworld-view”, while the Modern Confucian Mou Zongsan preferred to define it with the concept of immanent transcendence. Numerous Chinese Buddhist philosophers, particularly Huiyuan (慧遠, 334–416) and Chi Chao (郗超, 336– 378), have tried to solve this contradiction between the two different worldviews by establishing the necessity of karmic retribution through the application of the infinity of time and space contained in the notion of samsa¯ra. As already noted, ˙ these debates continued to evolve in Korea and Japan. The book shows how and why the Korean scholar Gihwa (己和, 1376–1433) used the Buddhist teaching of the infinite cycle of “three times” (past, present and future) to prove that the necessity of karmic retribution parallels the continuous rotation of day and night. In Japan, on the other hand, the doctrine of karmic retribution was mainly addressed in the debate between the Japanese Neo-Confucian Hayashi Razan (林 羅山, 1583–1657) and the adherent of Nichiren Buddhism Matsunaga Teitoku (松永貞德, 1570–1653). The common thread of all these discussions can be found in the fact that in all these countries the Buddhist treatises written in response to Confucian disputations opened up new perspectives for their Con-

12

Foreword

fucian opponents, which ultimately led to a gradual diminishing of Confucian scepticism regarding Buddhist thought. In the last chapter of the book, the author offers a critical introduction and a detailed analysis of the discursive strategies and debates that led to a final convergence between Confucianism and Buddhism in East Asia. In this chapter, he treated the most significant problems fought over by both sides, as well as the discursive strategies used by the scholars in China, Korea and Japan. The book closes with a conclusion, in which the author points out two most important insights that can be achieved from the underlying analyses. Firstly, he exposes that all the previously mentioned questions emerged repeatedly in the Chinese, Korean and Japanese Confucian-Buddhist debates. These debates reveal how broadly and deeply Confucian culture had infiltrated all three countries. Consequently, when the three regions confronted Buddhism and resisted it, these questions were opened in the resulting arguments, which bore high resemblance to each other, even though the discursive strategies the sides adopted were substantially different. The final and most valuable conclusion, which results from the meticulous analytical work underlying the study, manifests itself in the fact that, throughout the historical developments of these discourses, all Buddhist scholars who were adept in the Confucian classics and the core values they espoused, actively contributed to the mutual fusion and harmonisation of the two teachings. They either applied the approach of “assimilating Confucianism into Buddhism”, or of “illustrating Buddhism by means of Confucianism”. In this way, they ultimately managed to successfully transform the original scepticism of Confucians and to create a synthesis and convergence between Buddhism and Confucianism, contributing thereby to a greater richness and complexity of the unique East Asian cultures. The book as a whole is consistent, well-written and extremely informative. Hence, it doubtless constitutes a milestone in the academic study of the fruitful dialogues and manifold fusions of Buddhism in Confucianism in East Asia. I am delighted to see that this book was translated by my colleague and friend Jan Vrhovski. I expect that this book would be a good addition to our understanding of the interaction between Confucianism and Buddhism in East Asia.

Introduction: The Debate and Confluence between Confucianism and Buddhism in East Asia: A Historical Overview*

Chun-chieh Huang 黃俊傑** Translated by Jan Vrhovski***

One of the most eye-catching and interesting phenomena in the development of East Asian thought, within which so many various currents of thought clashed together causing a great stir, was the debate and confluence between Confucianism and Buddhism. After the arrival of Buddhism toward the end of the Eastern Han dynasty (25–220), it found itself in a fierce conflict with indigenous Chinese thought. The controversies between Confucianism and Buddhism reached their peak in the time of the Northern and Southern dynasties (420–589). By then, these two ideologies had gone through a long period of mutual conflict. At the beginning of the Tang dynasty (618–907), Buddhist teachings flourished, and the schools of Hua Yan (華嚴), Tiantai (天台) and Chan (禪) had become the leading representatives of Mahayana Buddhist teaching in China. This lasted until the 17th century, when in the final years of the Ming dynasty the creed of the “unity of three teachings” (sanjiao heyi 三教合一) became the mainstream ideology of the time. When Buddhism spread East from China and entered Korea and Japan, a wide array of intense debates was aroused in 14th and 15th century Korea and in 17th century Japan that resulted in an ultimate confluence between Confucianism and Buddhism. In the present work, we shall first review the origins and the development of the above-mentioned debates between Confucianism and Buddhism in East Asia, and take a closer look at the most important issues that emerged in these debates. Subsequently, we will also analyze * Translation from the Chinese original: Huang Chun-chieh, “Dongya rufo lunjeng yu huitong de sixiangshi kaocha 東亞儒佛論諍與會通的思想史考察” in his Dongya rujia renxue shilun 東亞儒家仁學史論 (Discourses of Humanity in East Asian Confucianisms: A History) (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2017), chapter 5, section 2, p. 213–272. ** Huang Chun-chieh [Huang Junjie 黃俊傑] is a Distinguished Chair Professor of National Taiwan University. *** Jan Vrhovski is currently working as an independent researcher in intellectual history of modern China.

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Introduction

the differences between how these polemics developed in each of the abovementioned countries, and what kind of tactics the proponents of both sides adopted during these debates.

1.

A Historical Review of East Asian Confucian-Buddhist Debates

1.

China

As Ge Zhaoguang (葛兆光, 1950-) indicates, as soon as the originally Indian Buddhism entered China: “In aspects of the external world, internal spirit, the Nether world, and of human relationships, Buddhism and Daoism expanded into and challenged the originally simple and concise philosophical world of Confucianism.”3 Thus, the conflicts between Buddhism and traditional Chinese thought, represented by Confucianism and Daoism, had erupted already at the earliest stages of their historical meeting. It was during that time that Mou Zibo (牟子博, also called Mou Rong 牟融, date of birth and death uncertain), who served as a governor of Cangwu (蒼梧) during the last years of the Eastern Han, composed a book entitled Master Mou’s Treatise on Settling Confusions (Mouzi Lihuolun 牟子理惑論, also known as Mou Rong bian huo 牟融辯惑).4 Throughout the 37 paragraphs of the treatise, in a succession of questions and 3 Ge Zhaoguang 葛兆光, “Zhou-Kong he yi bu yan: Zhonggu Fojia, Daojiao dui Rujia zhishi shijie de kuochong yu tiaozhan 周孔何以不言: 中古佛教, 道教對儒家知識世界的擴充與挑 戰 [Why did the Duke of Zhou and Confucius not Mention it: Medieval Buddhism and Daoism’s Expansion and Challenges to the Confucian World of Knowledge],” in Shixue yuegan 史學月刊 [Journal of Historical Science], No. 1 (2011), pp. 20–32. 4 Already Hu Yinglin (胡應麟, 1551–1602) doubted the authenticity of Mouzi’s Treatise on Settling Confusions, saying that: “Because among the scholars of the states of Jin and Song of the Six Dynasties there existed a Master Mou, they have forged this treatise in order to influence Buddhism.” See: Hu Yinglin 胡應麟, Gu Xiegang 顧頡剛 eds., Sibu zhengwei 四部正譌 [Correcting Mistakes in the Four Categories of Books](Beijing: Pushe, 1929), p. 65. Liang Qichao (梁啟超, 1873–1929) thought that: “Mou Rong, who lived at the beginning of the Later Han might not necessarily have authored the Lihuolun. But in the last years of the Later Han there existed no person called Mou Rong. This much can be asserted. From the first glance at its literary style, it becomes clear that the work could not have been composed by a person living in a village in the time of the Six dynasties.” See: Huang Xianian 黃夏年 ed., Jinxiandai zhuming xuezhe Foxue wenji: Liang Qichao ji 近現代著名學者佛學文集: 梁啟超集 [Collection of Buddhist Articles by Famous Modern Scholars: Liang Qichao](Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1995), pp. 50–51.

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A Historical Review of East Asian Confucian-Buddhist Debates

answers, Mouzi sets out to refute the disputations against Buddhism that had been raised by the intermediaries of Daoism and Confucianism since Buddhism was transmitted to China. The treatise also provides a detailed exposition of how Buddhist teaching could be considered compatible with Chinese native thought. Mou’s comprehensive survey reveals not only his extreme adeptness in the Daoist as well as Confucian teachings, but also his familiarity with the art of war. He himself said: “Master Mou devoted himself to [studying] classics, commentaries and all philosophers. There was no book, however small or large, that he would not prefer [reading]. And even though he was not fond of the art of war, he would still read that kind of book [as well]. Although he read books about spirits, immortals and immortality, after dabbling with them for a short time he put those books down as he did not believe in them, and considered them empty and boastful.”5 Tang Yongtong (湯用彤, courtesy name Xiyu 錫予, 1893–1964), who ascribed great importance to the Lihuolun within the history of Chinese Buddhism, once noted that:6 The way Mouzi cites Laozi and Zhuangzi in order to explain Buddhism attests to a transformation of the spirit of the epoch. Evidently, it is exactly due to this fact that the thirty-seven paragraphs of Lihuolun truly ought to be considered an important Buddhist scripture.

He also remarked:7 Because Mouzi’s beliefs in the Buddhist way were also compatible with the Laozi, he concurrently professed a firm determination in the Buddhist dao and at the same time also studied the five thousand words of the Laozi. In that way, he had already abandoned the art of the dao and started discussing the mysterious principle. Whereas in the Han dynasty Buddhist religion was still an appendage to the arts of the supernatural, in the Wei-Jin period the Buddha’s disciples already highly esteemed the texts Laozi and Zhuangzi. Because Mouzi was a figure living exactly in the time of transition between these two periods, his Lihuolun turned an important page in the history of Buddhism in China.

His Lihuolun, in which Mouzi set out to explain Buddhism with the help of Confucianism and Daoism, was primarily directed against the contemporary disputations against Buddhist teaching. The questions of Buddhist doctrine addressed by the contemporary critics were, for example, questions of family 5 Mou Zibo 牟子博, Mouzi Lihuolun 牟子理惑論 [Master Mou’s Treatise on Settling Confusions], in Seungyou 僧祐 ed., Liu Lifu 劉立夫, Wei Jianzhong 魏建中, and Hu Yong 胡勇 comment., Hongming ji 弘明集 [Collection of texts on spreading enlightenment](Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2013), BK., p. 6. 6 Tang Yongtong 湯用彤, Han-Wei Liangjin Nanbeichao Fojiao shi 漢魏兩晉南北朝佛教史 [History of Buddhism in Han, Wei, Western and Eastern Jin and Northern and Southern Dynasties](Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press Ltd., 1938 [3rd ed. 2012]), BK. 1, p. 78. 7 Ibid., p. 80.

China

17

ethics (filial piety and the Buddhist concept of charity (dana)), questions of national culture (the distinction between the Chinese and the barbarian tribes (the Hua-Yi 華夷 dichotomy)), and questions about the meaning of life (birth, death, and rebirth). By adopting discursive tactics of assisting Buddhism with Confucianism and of assimilating the latter into Buddhism, Mouzi adamantly argued through one question after another. Between the Han dynasty and the Wei-Jin period, Buddhism underwent a rapid development. As pointed out by Zenryu¯ Tsukamoto (塚本善隆, 1898– 1980): “The characteristic feature of the development of Buddhism from the Han dynasty to the Wei-Jin period, lies in the leap from Buddhist teaching about immortal beings and supernatural arts of foreign monks to Buddhist teaching conceived in the style of Daoist philosophy and based on the Buddhist canon which was transmitted to China in the Han dynasty. Buddhism, which had previously always invested great effort in the society of the masses, who believed in supernatural beings and magic, now borrowed from the Indian holy scriptures and gained access to the Chinese leadership class, whose worship of the Chinese sages and classics served as the foundation of their thought and actions – the socalled scholar-official society.”8 In the time of the Liang dynasty (502–557) in the Southern dynasties period (420–589), following the footsteps of master Mou from the end of the Han dynasty, the Buddhist monk Sengyou (僧祐, 445–518) composed the Hongming ji (弘明集, Collection of Texts on Spreading Enlightenment). “The book contains a collection of 186 chapters of different types of records – such as treatises, letters, imperial orders, petitions, and military proclamations – about domestic and foreign figures who protected the Buddhist teaching from ridicule and propagated its enlightened teaching, as well as about other related matters. These records cover about five hundred years of the history of Buddhist teaching in China, from the Eastern Han up to the time of the kindoms of Qi and Liang of the Southern dynasties. Two chapters are devoted to the Eastern Han, 47 to the Eastern Jin, 39 to the Song of the Southern dynasties, 15 to the Qi, 10 to the Qin and 73 to the Liang dynasty. From many different angles, these records reflect on the contemporary conditions at the time of their writing of Buddhist dogma and its dissemination in China. They also further illuminate the contemporary interconnectedness between Buddhism and native currents of thought, such as Confucianism and Daoism. The author mentions 123 people altogether, among which there are only 19 monks, the majority being

8 Zenryu¯ Tsukamoto 塚本善隆, “Wei-Jin Fojiao de zhankai 魏晉佛教的展開 [The Development of Buddhism in the Wei-Jin period],” in Liu Junwen 劉俊文, Xu Yangzhu 許洋主 trans., Riben xuezhe yanjiu Zhongguo shi linzhu xuanyi 日本學者研究中國史論著選譯 [Selection of Translated Articles of Japanese Scholars’ Research on Chinese History] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1993), Vol. 7, pp. 211–251, esp. p. 216–217.

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A Historical Review of East Asian Confucian-Buddhist Debates

high ranking aristocrats, chancellors and scholars.”9 Hongming ji recorded five hundred years of polemics between Buddhists and Confucians, from the Eastern Han dynasty on. The author delivered portraits of all the high-calibre intellectuals, senior Buddhist monks, monarchs and important ministers, and all the representative protagonists who played a decisive role in the debates. The Hongming ji also mentions an extremely high number of clashes and collisions between Chinese thought and culture on one side, and Buddhist thought and culture on the other. Quite commonly, these clashes were related to questions concerning issues such as family ethics, socio-economic life, political ethics, the relation between the soul and the body, karma and reincarnation. All the questions inherent in the Confucian-Buddhist polemics that can be seen in the Hongming ji, along with all discourses of the Buddhist intermediaries, have also continued their development in later Chinese society. As an example, we can list the case of the Confucian scholar Yan Zhitui (顏之推, courtesy name Jie 介, 531–590 (602)?), who lived at the end of Northern and Southern dynasties period, almost one century after Sengyou. Besides having been a Confucian scholar, he was also a follower of Buddhism. In his work Family instructions of Master Yan (Yanshi jiaxun 顏氏家訓), he summarized the main objections directed against Buddhist doctrine in the 6th century. He described these in the following manner:10 Generally speaking, there exist five kinds of popular slanders of Buddhism: the first maintains that the notions of otherworldly affairs and of the limitlessness of transformations of the divine spirit (of Buddhism) are fantastic nonsense. The second maintains that, contrary to Buddhist teaching, the good and bad, the suffering and happiness in peoples’ lives, do not necessarily have a corresponding retribution, and the notion of karma is just a deceiving trick. The third maintains that many people who serve as monks and nuns are impure themselves, and that these professions are therefore evil and disgraceful. The fourth maintains that Buddhism wastes money and riches, and since the monks do not pay taxes and do not perform active service, they thereby only impair the welfare of the state. The fifth says that even if there are causes and effects of events, where good is also rewarded with good, and bad with bad, how can someone bear hardships today in order that someone else will receive some benefits in the next life? They claim that these two people are not the same.

Yan Zhitui was a native of Linyi prefecture of Shandong province, who served as an official in the Liang (502–557), Northern Qi (550–577), Northern Zhou (557– 581) and Sui (581–619) dynasties. His family’s teaching was rooted in works such

9 I cite the translator’s introduction to Hongming ji, book 1, p. 1. 10 Wang Liqi 王利器, Yanshi jiaxun jijie 顏氏家訓集解 [Collected Commentaries on Family Instructions of Master Yan](Beijing: Shuhua shuju, 1996 [reprinted 2002]), juan 5, pp. 371– 372.

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as the Rites of Zhou and the Zuo zhuan.11 Even though Yan Zhitui lived in Shandong, the five points which his contemporaries used to question Buddhism were still reported in his treatise. This fact shows that, by his time, Buddhism had already undergone an extensive dissemination across the whole country. In one of his poems, the Tang dynasty poet Du Mu (courtesy name Muzi 牧之, sobriquet Fanchuan 繁川, 803–852) describes the following picture: “The 480 temples of the Southern Dynasties have now turned into countless towers and terraces amidst mist and rain.”12 It can be assumed with considerable degree of certainty that, in the Tang dynasty, the reaction to this grand occasion, described in Du Mu’s poem, represented a common view that was often evoked in disputes against Buddhism in contemporary Northern and Southern Chinese society. In the time of the Northern and Southern dynasties, after Buddhism and the native Chinese culture had gone through an intense collision, both sides deepened their understanding of each other. The great abundance of Buddhist writings compiled in that period, which consisted of commentaries, treatises by certain individuals or translations of Buddhist classics, geohistorical compilations, catalogues of Buddhist texts, and so on,13 served as a foundation for the rise of Mahayana Buddhism after the establishment of the Tang dynasty (618–907). The subsequent rise of Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties derived its energy, in turn, from stimulations emanating from Buddhism. The 20th century Chinese historian Chen Yinke (陳寅恪, 1890–1969) noted that the arrival of Buddhism to China “had been a cause for only one major event, namely the emergence of Neo-Confucianism, as well as its extensive spread.”14 Even though Neo-Confucian thought is linked to Buddhism in countless ways, still, on many occasions, the adherents of Neo-Confucianism did not spare any energy in criticizing Buddhism. These critiques persisted till the end of the Ming dynasty when, finally, the unity of the three teachings (sanjiao heyi 三教合一) rose into 11 Mitsuo Moriya守屋美都雄, “Ganshi kakunni tsuite 顏氏家訓について,” in Mitsuo Moriya. Chu¯goku kodai no kazoku to kokka 中国古代の家族と国家 [Ancient Chinese Clans and the State] (Kyoto: Kyoto Daigaku To¯yo¯shi Kenkyu¯kai, 1968), pp. 497–530; Kiyoyoshi Utsunomiya 宇都宮清吉, “Gan Shisui kenkyu¯ 顏之推研究 [Research on Yan Zhitui],” in Kiyoyoshi Utsunomiya, Chu¯goku kodai chu¯sei shi kenkyu¯ 中国古代中世史研究 [Research on Chinese Ancient and Medieval History](Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1977), chapter 11, pp. 451–557. On the fusion of Confucianism and Buddhism in Yan Zhitui’s work, see: Albert E. Dien, “Yen Chiht’ui (531–591+): A Buddho-Confucian,” in Arthur F. Wright and Denis Twitchett eds., Confucian Personalities (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), pp. 43–64. 12 Ge Zhaoguang葛兆光, Tangshi xuanzhu 唐詩選注 [Selected Commentaries on Tang Poetry] (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 2007), p. 255. 13 Tang Yongtong, Han-Wei Liangjin Nanbeichao Fojiao shi, pp. 546–600. 14 Chen Yinke 陳寅恪, “Feng Youlan Zhonguo zhexueshi shencha baogao 馮友蘭中國哲學史 審查報告 [A Review of Feng Youlan’s History of Chinese Philosophy],” in his Chen Yinke shixue lunwen xuanji 陳寅恪史學論文選集 [Chen Yinke’s Selected Articles on History] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1992), p. 510.

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existence. In the fourth section of this writing, we will closely analyze the discursive strategies of both the Confucian and the Buddhist intellectuals. Within the analysis, four of the most senior monks at the end of the Ming dynasty, which included Ouyi Zhixu (蕅益智旭, courtesy name Zhixu, sobriquet Ouyi 蕅益) and Xiyou (西有, alias Babu Daoren 八不道人, 1599–1655), will be considered as representative figures. In that way, we will examine an intellectual trend which emerged in the late-Ming dynasty when Buddhism and Confucianism became interrelated and Buddhist scholars made use of Confucianism by integrating it into Buddhist teaching.

2.

Korea

When Buddhism spread further East and entered Korea, its presence in its new homeland evoked criticism from the local Confucian intellectuals, who had also refuted against its intermediaries. The views and arguments encompassed in the 14th century debate between the Confucian scholar Jeong Dojeon (鄭道傳, 정 도전, courtesy name Jongji 宗之, assumed name Sambong 三峰, posthumous name Muheon 文憲, 1342–1398) and the Buddhist monk Gihwa (己和, 1376– 1433) are representative of the early debates between Confucian intellectuals and Buddhist proselytes in Korea. In the third chapter of this treatise, we will try to expound on the general tendencies of the Korean Confucian-Buddhist debates using the above-mentioned debate as the main example. In the present chapter, we will give a brief account of Jeong Dojeon’s and Gihwa’s life and work. Jeong Dojeon was a Korean Confucian and statesman who lived and worked in the time between the end of the Goryeo dynasty (918–1392) and the beginning of the Joseon dynasty (1392–1910). He was one of the disciples of the famous philosopher Yi Saek (李穡, 이색, courtesy name Yeongsuk 穎叔, pen name Mogeun 牧隱, 1328–1369). In his career as an official, he successively held the following important posts, among others: Assistant Chancellor (munha sirang chansongsa 門下侍郎贊成事), Associate Director of the Office of Royal Decrees and State Records (Yemun ch’unch’ugwan 藝文春秋館), Assistant Chief Pacification Mobile Inspector (Tosonbu sunch’alsa 都宣輔巡察使), Deputy Director of the Royal Lectures Office and the Office of Royal Decrees and State Records, Military Commissioner of the Righteous Flourishing King’s Personal Guards (Uihung ch’in’gunwi 義興親軍衛). By having occupied these important positions, he was deeply involved in the formation of cultural institutions and policies at the beginning of the Joseon dynasty. His participation in political struggles related to this very same process would later cost him his life. Within the framework of academic thought, Jeong Dojeon strongly adhered to Confucian teaching and opposed Buddhism. He wrote a number of treatises, which largely

Korea

21

contributed to the establishment of the foundation of Confucianism in the Joseon dynasty. His opus includes books such as: The Administrative Code of Joseon (Joseon Gyeongukjeon 朝鮮經國典), A Miscellany from the Southern Brocade (Geumnam japji 錦南雜題), Mirror of Governance (Gyeongje mungam 經濟文鑑), Supplement to the Mirror of Governance (Gyeongje mungam byeoljip 經濟文鑑別集), Collected Writings of Sambong (Sambong jip 三峰集), Six Codes of Governance (Gyeongje yukjeong 經濟六典), On mind, Material Force and Principle (Simgiiripyeon 心氣理篇), An Array of Critiques Against Buddhism (Bulssi japbyeon 佛氏雜辨), Heaven’s Answers to Questions of the Mind (Simgiri pyeon 心問天答), and Military Tactics (Jin beop 陣法).15 The ninth volume of Jeong Dojeon’s Collected Writings of Master Sambong (三峰先生文集) includes a work entitled “An Array of Critiques Against Buddhism” (Bulssi japbyeon 佛氏雜辨).16 In the second part of this lengthy discussion, directed against Buddhist doctrine that was spreading to Korea at the time, the author presents a list of 19 points of objection against Buddhism. These are listed as follows: 1. Critique of the Buddhist doctrine of samsara (samsa¯ra) 佛氏輪廻之辨 ˙ 2. Critique of the Buddhist notion of karma 佛氏因果之辨 3. Critique of the Buddhist theory of mind and nature 佛氏心性之辨 4. Critique of the Buddhists’ conflation of function and nature 佛氏作用是性 之辨 5. Critique of the Buddhist notion of the mind and its functions 佛氏心跡之辨 6. Critique of the Buddhists’ obscuration of principles and concrete entities 佛 氏昧於道器之辨 7. Critique of the Buddhists’ abandonment of the basic human relationships 佛 氏毀棄人倫之辨 8. Critique of the Buddhist notion of compassion 佛氏慈悲之辨 9. Critique of the Buddhist notions of the real and the nominal 佛氏眞假之辨 10. Critique of the Buddhist notion of Hell 佛氏地獄之辨 15 On the life and work of Jeong Dojeon see: S.n., “Bunog-sasil 附錄事實 [Appendix: Facts],” see Sambong sonsaeng munjip 三峰先生文集 (Collected Writings of Master Sambong), book 2, juan 14 in Han’guk Munjip P’yonch’an Wiwonhoe ed., Hanguk Yoktae Munjip Chongso 韓國歷代文集叢書 [An Anthology of Korean Historical Works](Seoul: Kyongin Munhwasa, 1999, book 101), pp. 434–488. 16 Jeong Dojeon 鄭道傳, Sambong sonsaeng munjip 三峰先生文集 [Collected Writings of Master Sambong], book 2, juan 9, pp. 152–183. Jeong Dojeon completed his “Bulssi japbyeon” (佛氏雜辨) in the year 1398. However, not long after the publication of his treatise he was killed in the political unrest that swept across the country. Consequently, the “Bulssi japbyeon” was first published only in the year 1456. The debate between Jeong Dojeon and monk Gihwa has already been translated into English. For the English translation of the texts, see: A. Charles Muller, Korea’s Great Buddhist-Confucian Debate: The Treatises of Cho˘ng Tojo˘n (Sambong) and Hamho˘ Tu˘kt’ong (Kihwa)(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2015).

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11. 12. 13. 14.

Critique of the Buddhist notions of calamity and fortune 佛氏禍福之辨 Critique of the Buddhist practice of begging for food 佛氏乞食之辨 Critique of the Seon Buddhist teachings 佛氏禪敎之辨 Critique of the equivalences and differences between Confucianism and Buddhism 儒釋同異之辨 On the entry of Buddhadharma into China 佛法入中國17 Serve the Buddha and reap misfortune 事佛得禍 Abandoning the heavenly way and chatting about Buddhahood 舍天道而談 佛果 Serving the Buddha assiduously, the length of reign considerably shortens 事 佛甚謹，年代尤促 Critique to expose heterodox teachings 闢異端之辨

15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

Fifteen of the above-listed critiques are directed against notions contained in Buddhist doctrine, such as samsara (samsa¯ra), karma, notions of mind and ˙ nature, human relations, and compassion. The majority of these doctrinal notions have been the common topics of Confucian-Buddhist debates in China, Japan and Korea. The remaining four critiques represent doubts raised in relation to certain historical facts. In his writings, Jeong states in a polite and modest voice that the 19 paragraphs were written in hope that the reader would: “become aware that the truth lies in the words of the Confucians, and not in the teachings of the Buddha.”18 Still, Jeong Dojeon’s “An Array of Critiques Against Buddhism,” which touches upon an extensive scope of questions, can be recognized as a representative example of how Buddhism was disputed by Joseon Confucian circles in 14th century Korea. All the above-mentioned questions were addressed in the work Exposition of orthodoxy (Hyeonjeong non 顯正論), written by the Korean Buddhist monk Gihwa, who was 34 years younger than Jeong Dojeon. In his treatise, he refuted the objections raised in contemporary Korean Confucian circles. In addition, he strongly emphasized that Confucianism and Buddhism are of identical views, and gave a detailed exposition on how, in certain regards, Buddhism can be deemed superior to Confucianism. Gihwa was a member of the Korean Seon school of Buddhism. His secular surname was Ryu 劉, and his former given name Su-I 守伊. His assumed name was Deuktong 得通 and his hall name was Hamheo 涵虛. He originated from the city of Chungju in North Chungcheong province. In his early years he had been a student of Confucianism, until at the age of 21 he 17 According to Jeong Dojeon’s own explanation, the content of questions 15 to 18 are quotes from the teaching of Zhen Dexiu (真德秀, courtesy name Jingyuan 景元, later changed to Jingxi 景希, assumed name Xishan 西山, 1178–1235) contained in his work Extended Meaning of the Great Learning (Daxue yanyi 大學衍義). 18 Jeong Dojeon, Sambong sonsaeng munjip, Book 2, juan 9, p. 460b.

Korea

23

experienced the passing away of one of his closest friends and thus suddenly realized that human life is impermanent. This realization drove him to leave home and enter the Buddhist community of the Uisang temple on Gwanaksan mountain (冠嶽山). After that, he received initiation into the essentials of the dharma at the Hoeam temple, and subsequently visited all the important Buddhist mountains and monasteries in Korea. He spent his later years residing at the Pong’am temple (鳳岩寺) on Huiyangsan mountain (曦陽山) and at Jungheung temple. Gihwa’s disciples include the Buddhist monks Munsu (文秀), Hagmi (學眉), Dalmyeong (達明), and Jisaeng (智生). Among his most important works are A Commentary on the Sutra of Perfect Enlightenment (Weongak gyeong hae seorui 圓覺經疏), A Redaction and Subcommentary to Five Famous Earlier Commentaries on the Diamond Sutra (Geumgang gyeong ogahae seorui 金剛經五家解說誼), Exposition of Orthodoxy (Hyeonjeong non 顯正論), Treatise on Questions Between Confucianism and Buddhism (Yusok chirui ron 儒 釋質疑論), Recorded Sayings by the Monk Hamheo (Hamheo hwasang eorok 涵 虛和尚語錄), and A Commentary and Redaction to the Collection of Yongjia (Yonggajip gwaju seorui 永嘉集說誼). However, since all the written versions of the Treatise that were handed down from the past did not contain the author’s signature, the question of whether Gihwa was the original author of the work Treatise on Questions Between Confucianism and Buddhism is still a matter of controversy. It was only after 1928, when the renowned Korean Buddhologist, Kwon Sangno (權相老, 1879–1965), started advocating the connection between the authorship of this book and Gihwa, that the Korean academic circles first started accepting the above-mentioned explanation. However, a great number of scholars retained doubts about this interpretation. They did so mainly because the content of Gihwa’s Exposition of Orthodoxy does not completely match with the content of the Treatise on Questions Between Confucianism and Buddhism. After Pak Haedang, a contemporary Korean Buddhologist, had rejected Kwon’s interpretation, a great number of scholars accepted his new theory, which asserts that the authorship of the Treatise cannot be attributed to Gihwa.19 Nevertheless, 19 See Geum Jangtae 琴章泰, “Joseon chogiui Yu-Bul johwalon 조선초기의儒 · 佛조화론 [On Confucian-Buddhist Harmony in the Early Joseon Dynasty],” in Jonggyo yeongu, No. 18 (Dec. 1999), pp. 91–119; Pak Haedang 朴海鐺, “Hyeonjeong non gwa Yusok chirui ron-ui samgyolon 『현정론』과『유석질의론』의 삼교론 [The Doctrine of the Three Teachings in the Exposition of Orthodoxy and Treatise on Questions Between Confucianism and Buddhism],” in Bulgyohak yeongu, No. 10 (April 2005), pp. 171–201; Yu Jeongyeob 柳正燁, “Hyeonjeong non gwa Yusok chirui ron-ui hobul nonli bigyo 『顯正論』과『儒釋質疑論』 의호불논리비교 [A Comparison Between the Logic Protecting Buddhism in the Exposition of Orthodoxy and Treatise on Questions Between Confucianism and Buddhism],” in Wonbulgyo sasang, Vol. 36 (August 2008), pp. 219–239. For the translation of the above articles I would like to thank my colleague Park Kyoungsuk (朴敬淑), who offered her assistance in deciphering their content.

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A Historical Review of East Asian Confucian-Buddhist Debates

both above-mentioned books are without any doubt representative examples of Buddhist apologetic treatises from the early Joseon period. In the following chapter, where we will engage in a discussion of the Korean Confucian-Buddhist polemics of the Joseon dynasty, Jeong Dojeon’s An Array of Critiques Against Buddhism will be used together with Exposition of Orthodoxy, the confirmed author of which was the monk Giwha. Nevertheless, we will also use the work Treatise on Questions Between Confucianism and Buddhism, the authorship of which is still a matter of controversy. Even though the questions countered in Gihwa’s Exposition of Orthodoxy to a great extent match the questions raised in Jeong Dojeon’s An Array of Critiques, it really was not the case that monk Gihwa’s disputations were raised only after the latter had read Jeong Dojeon’s critiques. It is rather the case that the two writings have no clear-cut and definite causal connection at all. Furthermore, both of the above-discussed Buddhist apologetic treatises can still be considered as representative of the 14th century Korean Buddhists’ answers to the contemporary Korean Confucian scholars’ attacks against Buddhist doctrine.

3.

Japan

In the official confrontations of the Tokugawa period in Japan, a ConfucianBuddhist debate first emerged in the critique of Buddhism brought forward by the 17th century Zhu Xi scholar Hayashi Razan (林羅山, 1583–1657). Later this critique was rejected by the Japanese Buddhist Matsunaga Teitoku (松永貞德, 1570–1653). The focus of the debate was extremely strong and the harshness of the disputes could be described as reaching a tit-for-tat level of intensity. Consequently, the debate is also extremely valuable for research. According to Okuwa Hitoshi’s (大桑齊, 1937-) textual research, in the written correspondence between the two main discussants a total of 18 letters was exchanged. Subsequently, these letters were collected to make up the book Jubutsu mondo¯ (儒佛問答, Questions and responses on Confucianism and Buddhism), which has been printed as volume 12 of a collection of precious cultural documents, published jointly by the National archives of Japan and the Naikaku bunko.20 Recently, Okuwa Hitoshi and Maeda Ichiro have also edited a collection of scientific papers, which offers additional commentaries and insights into the debate under

20 I would like to express my deepest gratitude to prof. Tao Demin (陶德民) of Kansai University who on my behalf contacted the National Archives of Japan and helped me to acquire a copy of a rare old printing of the book Jubutsu mondo¯.

Japan

25

discussion.21 This publication represents a very valuable work of reference. After Hayashi Razan’s and Matsunaga Teitoku’s Confucian-Buddhist debate, in the Japanese intellectual circles various other debates on the very same topic started to emerge one after another, like bamboo shoots following the spring rain. One of the scholars involved in the subsequent discussions was also a renowned Japanese scholar of Zhu Xi’s philosophy, Yamazaki Ansai (山崎闇齋, 1618–1682), who in his early years had left home to become a Buddhist monk, but later left the monastic life and took up the study of Zhu Xi’s philosophy. In turn, he founded a private school in Kyoto where as many as one thousand of his disciples studied. In his later years, Yamazaki Ansai collected Zhu Xi’s critical remarks on Buddhism in a book entitled Refuting the Unorthodox (Heki’i 闢異). Zhu Xi’s critical remarks collected in the abovementioned book were later countered by the work Jubutsu go¯ron (儒佛合論) composed by the Buddhist Inkei Chidatsu (隱溪智脫, 1704–1769). The debate was later also continued by Yamazaki Anasai’s disciple Sato¯ Naokata (1650–1719), who composed the Anti-Buddhist Writings (排釋錄). This was countered by Shin-an-ken’s (心安軒) work Questions on Confucianism and Buddhism (Jubutsu wakumon 儒佛或問), which was directed against Zhu Xi’s and other Song dynasty Confucians’ miscomprehension of Buddhist dharma, divided into 12 separate detailed refutations.22 In this work, we will focus exclusively on the representative example of the debate between Hayashi Razan and Matsunaga Teitoku. We choose to do so, not only with due consideration of the length of the present chapter or because of the earliness of the above-mentioned debate, but also because of the debate’s tendencies and relevance. According to Okuwa Hitoshi’s research, the entire exchange of letters between Hayashi Razan and Matsunaga Teitoku, in which they debated about the differences and similarities between Confucianism and Buddhism, took place in the time between the seventh and the twelfth year of the Keicho¯ era (1602–1607), but was centered mainly around the year 12 of the same era (1607).23 Hayashi Razan was an inhabitant of the city of Kyoto who served as a Confucian official in the early Tokugawa bakufu. Already in his childhood, Hayashi left home to join the Buddhist community of the Kenninji temple (建仁寺), and was assigned the monastic name Michiharu (道春). By the age of 15 he returned to lay life, which 21 Okuwa Hitoshi 大桑齊 and Maeda Ichiro 前田一郎 eds., Razan Teitoku Jubutsu mondo¯ chu¯kai to kenkyu¯ 羅山貞德『儒佛問答』註解と研究 [A Commentary and Investigation of Razan’s and Teitoku’s Jubutsu Mondo¯](Tokyo: Perikansha, 2006). 22 All above-mentioned books are included in Washio Junkyo¯ 鷲尾順敬 ed., Nihon Shiso¯ To¯so¯ Shiryo¯ 日本思想鬪諍史料 [Sources of Intellectual Conflicts in Japan](Tokyo: Meicho Kanko¯kai, 1969), Vol. 1. 23 Okuwa Hitoshi, “Razan Teitoku Ronso¯ no Nendai to Ronten 羅山貞德論爭の年代と論奌 [Age and Arguments in the Debate Between Razan and Teitoku],” in Okuwa Hitoshi 大桑齊 ed., Razan Teitoku Jubutsu mondo¯ chu¯kai to kenkyu¯, pp. 235–264.

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turned out to be an extremely important event of his life. As pointed out in Tsutomu Maeda’s (前田勉, 1958-) research: Hayashi Ryazan’s anti-Buddhist treatise represents the starting point of his thought. Its aim is to carry out a critique of Buddhist teaching so as to clearly express his raison d’etre as a scholar of Zhu Xi’s philosophy. Furthermore, Hayashi Razan’s opposition to Buddhist doctrine was consistent with and identical to the main orientation held by the then current bakufu, which wanted to attain control over all religions.24 Hayashi Razan was also one of the great founding masters of Japanese Zhu Xi learning (Shushigaku 朱子學), and furthermore was a pioneer among the protagonists of the contemporary Japanese anti-Buddhist theory at the time. As such, he had also fallen under the influence of Cheng Fuxin (程復心, courtesy name Zijian 子 見, assumed name Linyin 林隱, 1258–1341), a scholar from the Chinese Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), who viewed Buddhism as a kind of heresy, and who was strongly skeptical about the sanctity of the Buddhist sutras, criticized the Buddhist view on renunciation of the world (nekkhamma), and rejected the Buddhist teaching of “Karma (cause and effect) in the three times” (sanshi yinguo 三世因 果).25 Matsunaga Teitoku, who represented the Buddhist side in the above-mentioned polemics between Confucian and Buddhist thought, was a pious devotee of the Japanese Nichiren school of Buddhism (Nichiren shu¯ 日蓮宗). All the members of Teitoku’s family, starting with his paternal grandfather, had converted to the Nichiren Buddhist school. His father and two of his brothers were not merely believers of the Nichiren school, but even became Buddhist monks. Unlike some of the other members of his family, Teitoku himself remained at home to practice Buddhism as a lay follower of Nichiren, and ultimately attained world-fame as a composer of haiku poetry.26 In their written correspondence, Hayashi Razan and Matsunaga Teitoku touched upon the following 18 points of conflict between Confucian and Buddhist doctrine: 1. Confucian and Buddhist theories of truth and falsehood. 2. Cause-and-effect and transformation. 3. The Memorial of the Buddha Relic (論佛骨表). 24 Maeda Tsutomu 前田勉, “Hayashi Razan no zasetsu 林羅山の挫折 [Hayashi Razan’s Defeat],” in Maeda Tsutomu, Kinsei Nihon no Jugaku to Heigaku 近世日本の儒學と兵學 [Confucianism and the Art of War in Modern Japan](Tokyo: Perikansha, 1996), pp. 83–115. 25 Maeda Tsutomu, “Hayashi Razan no Butsugaku Hihan 林羅山の佛教批判 [Hayashi Razan’s Critique of Buddhism],” in Okuwa Hitoshi ed., Razan Teitoku Jubutsu Mondo¯ Chu¯kai to Kenkyu¯, pp. 235–264. 26 Maeda Ichiro前田一郎, “Jubutsu Mondo¯ no Seiritsu, Ko¯zo¯, Tenkai 《儒佛問答》の成 立、構造、展開 [Establishment, Structure and Develpoment of the Jubutsu Mondo¯],” in Okuwa Hitoshi ed., Razan Teitoku Jubutsu Mondo¯ Chu¯kai to Kenkyu¯, pp. 297–340.

Japan

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

27

Doctrine on home-protection. Doctrine on the cause and effect of disease. Doctrine on permanence and impermanence. Confucian and Buddhist doctrine on the similarity of theft and use. Doctrine on heresy. Doctrine on writing. Doctrine on attaining fame. Doctrine on the divinity of the Buddha. Discussion of the confluence between Confucianism and Buddhism. Views on prince Sho¯toku Taiji (聖德太子). Views on the authenticity and forgery of Buddhist scripts. Doctrine on leaving home and entering the monastic life. Doctrine on the three treasures of Buddhism. Views on the assassination of emperor Sushun (崇峻). Theory of the notion of “principle” (li 理).

At the end of the book Jubutsu mondo¯ (Questions and responses on Confucianism and Buddhism), Matsunaga Teitoku summed up the areas of departure between Confucianism and Buddhism in the following seven examples: 1. Confucian and Buddhist views on [the unity of] water and waves. 2. Confucian and Buddhist doctrine on causes and effects in nature. 3. Views on the relation between grace and animosity. 4. The Buddhist doctrine of the mean. 5. Views on unfilial behavior. 6. Views on the eternal existence of things. 7. Doctrine on the equality of wellbeing and the benefit of the people. Exactly as Ichiro¯ Maeda has remarked, because Hayashi Razan raised his antiBuddhist doctrine in the cultural field of 17th century Kyoto, all the following discourses against Buddhism also emerged in Kyoto. Thus, for example, already in the Kanei era (1624–1644) two more books on the Confucian-Buddhist debate emerged in Kyoto. The first was the book Kiyomizu Narrative (Kiyomizu monogatari 清水物語), written by the Confucian scholar Asayama Irinan (朝山意 林庵, 1589–1664) and published in the year 15 of the Kanei era (1638). The book represents a written account of the author’s time spent worshiping at the Kiyomizu temple. Through a narration in the form of various dialogues between a pilgrim and an elderly man, and between monks and their audience, the book expounds on Confucian and Buddhist thought. These dialogues also discuss questions about political and ethical doctrine, primarily those concerning the three rules and five constant virtues of Confucianism, such as the relation between the ruler and his ministers, wife and husband, man and woman, as well as

28

A Historical Review of East Asian Confucian-Buddhist Debates

questions related to leaving home and becoming a Buddhist monk. The second book, written by an anonymous author in the same context, was the Gion Narrative (Gion monogatari 祇園物語). It is believed that this narrative was written by a monk from the Kiyomizu temple. Its content represents an answer to those who rejected Buddhist dharma, and delivers additional clarifications of Buddhist doctrine.27 To conclude this chapter, we shall remark that the East Asian ConfucianBuddhist debates, which had first emerged in China in the time between the end of the Han dynasty and the Northern and Southern dynasties, reverberated for a second time in 14th century Korea, and finally again in 17th century Japan. From the time of their first occurrence in China, the development and expansion of the Confucian-Buddhist debates from China to Korea and again to Japan resembled layers of ripples arising on the surface of a lake after a stone has been thrown into it. However, if we take a closer look at the content of all the debates that took place in China, Japan and Korea, we can see that they all possess a high level of similarity. This fact illustrates the existence of a common characteristic of East Asian culture. Therefore, we shall devote the next chapter of this writing to an analysis of the common topics of the debates and of the responses brought forward by the proponents of Buddhism.

27 Ibid.

2.

Common Topics of the East Asian Confucian-Buddhist Debates and the Buddhists’ Responses

Within the framework of the East Asian Confucian-Buddhist debates, a great number of different questions was raised. Still, we will briefly examine only a few chosen ones. Among the main questions raised in the debates, there existed at least five common topics. These were the following:

2.1

The Questions of Family Ethics: Filial Piety and Leaving Home for a Monastic Life (孝與出家)

1.)

China

When Buddhism came to China, its greatest collision with native Chinese culture was over questions of family ethics. Since antiquity, Chinese society had been attaching great value to family ethics based entirely on blood relations, in which the notion of “filial piety” (xiao 孝) assumed the role of the core value. Thus, the Classic of Filial Piety (Xiao jing 孝經, chapter “An Elucidation of the Aims and Meaning”) says that: “Filial piety commences with serving one’s parents, proceeds with serving the ruler, and is completed with the establishment of character.”28 The anthropologist Francis L. K. Hsu (Xu Langguang 許烺光, 1909– 1999) claims that, contrary to Western society, where the dominant kinship relationship is represented by the relationship between wife and husband, in Chinese society the dominant kinship relation is that between father and son.29 In traditional Chinese society, interpersonal relationships within the family, society, 28 Li Longji 李隆基 comm. and Xing Bing 邢昺 comm., Xiao jing zhushu 孝經注疏 [Commentaries and Sub-commentaries on the Classic of Filial Piety](Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1999), Vol. 1, p. 4. 29 See Francis L. K. Hsu, “Dominant Kin Relationships and Dominant Ideas,” in American Anthropologist, 68 (August 1966), pp. 997–999; Francis L. K. Hsu auth., Zhang Ruide 張瑞德 trans., Wenhua renleixue xinlun 文化人類學新論 [New Theory of Cultural Anthropology] (Taipei: Lianjing chuban gongsi, 1979, 1983), pp. 135–138.

30

Common Topics of the East Asian Confucian-Buddhist Debates

country and world – from the closest to most distant – were formed in the “differential mode of association” (chaxu geju 差序格局), spoken about by Fei Xiaotong (費孝通, 1910–2005).30 The idea of “love with distinctions”(ai you deng cha 愛有等差), advocated by the Confucians, emphasizes that “[A gentleman] is attached to his parents but is merely benevolent towards the people” and “he is benevolent towards the people but is merely sparing with living creatures.”31 Yü Ying-shih (余英時, 1930-) has called this kind of world view of gradual expansion “the Confucian project,”32 and it was the concept of filial piety, which was this project’s point of origin. However, the Buddhist practice of shaving one’s head and leaving home to become a monk or a nun was in direct opposition with the values of family ethics as postulated in the Classic of Filial Piety. The latter is well represented by the following example from the classic (Xiao jing, “An Elucidation of the Aims and Meaning”): “We have received our bodies, each hair and every piece of our skin, from our parents. Therefore, we must not presume to injure or damage them in any way. This is the beginning of filial piety.”33 It was exactly this practice of Buddhist renunciation of family ties which in the final years of the Eastern Han dynasty aroused great doubt and distrust in the minds of the native Chinese scholars. Master Mou’s Treatise on Settling Confusions refutes this question related to “filial piety,” delivering a response in the manner of a question and answer:34 Question: The Classic of Filial Piety says: We have received our bodies, each hair and every piece of our skin, from our parents. Therefore, we must not presume to injure or damage them in any way. When Zeng Can was facing his own death, [he went like this]: “Uncover my

30 Fei Hsiao-tung 費孝通, Xiangtu Zhongguo yu xiangtu chongjian 鄉土中國與鄉土重建 [Native China and Local Reconstruction](Taipei: Fengyun shidai chuban gongsi, 1993), pp. 22–29; Hsiao-tung Fei, Chih-i Chang, Paul Cooper, and Margaret Park Redfield, Earthbound China: A Study of Rural Economy in Yunnan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945). 31 Mengzi’s definition of how a virtuous gentleman treats other people, in which the limits between close and distant relatives are clearly demarcated, exemplifies this notion. See D. C. Lau trans, Mencius (Hong Kong: the Chinese University Press, 1984), Vol. 2, BK. 7, Part A, p. 285. What Mencius calls “one root” signifies a kinship system, with the patrilinear clan as the main axis, namely what Xu Langguang calls “the remarkable kinship relation” of ancient Chinese society, with the father-son relation as the main axis. (See: note no. 35). 32 Yü Ying-shih 余英時, “Shishuo Rujian de zhengti guihua 試說儒家的整體規劃 [Examining the Confucian project],” in Yü Ying-shih, Song-Ming lixue yu zhengzhi wenhua 宋明理學與 政治文化 [Neo-Confucianism and Political Culture](Taipei: Yunchen wenhua shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 2004), pp. 400 (388–407). 33 Xiao jing zhushu, Vol. 1, p. 3. 34 Mou Zibo 牟子博, Mouzi Lihuolun 牟子理惑論 [Master Mou’s Treatise on Settling Confusions], in Hongming ji, Vol. 1, p. 23.

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31

hands, uncover my feet!” Now the monks shave their heads; [and you ask] how can that be against what the sage said? It is not in accordance with the dao of a filial son! You are always fond of discussing the right and wrong of things, and weighing the curvatures and straight lines, one against the other. Do you now approve of this or not?” Mouzi said: … Confucius said: “a man good enough as a partner in the pursuit of the Way need not be good enough as a partner in a common stand; a man good enough as a partner in a common stand need not be good enough as a partner in the exercise of moral discretion.” This refers to acting when the time is right. Moreover, the Classic of Filial Piety says: “The former kings had fared on the main way of perfect virtue”. But Tai Bo shortened his hair and tattooed his body, naturally following the customs of the kingdoms Wu and Yue, thus violating what is right for his body, hair and skin. And yet, Confucius still called him “someone, who may be said to be of supreme virtue.” He did not criticize him for his short hair. From this point of view, a great virtue will not be constrained by pettiness. The monks discard their family properties, they reject their wives, do not listen to music and do not watch beautiful appearances. Their renunciation of things can be said to be extreme. How can they be transgressing against the words of the sages and be failing to comply with filial piety! Yu Rang swallowed coal and lacquered his body, Nie Zheng cut his face and killed himself, Bo Ji treaded over fire, Gao Xing disfigured his appearance, and the gentlemen considered these actions to be courageous and containing righteousness. I have never heard of anyone ever having criticized these men for self-destructive behavior. If we compare the monks who shave off their beards and their hair with the former four figures, aren’t they still far removed from them?

By bringing forward historical facts about how historical figures, such as Tai Bo (泰伯), Yu Rang (豫讓), Nie Zheng (聶政) and Bo Ji (伯姬), had engaged in selfdestructive behavior, Mouzi wanted to illustrate that Buddhist monks’ shaving off their beards and hair is really just a trivial matter. Furthermore, he also wanted to explain that the Buddhist monks shave their hair to attain salvation, and thus, whenever they perform this act, they act properly. Another concept of virtue, which is related to the notion of “filial piety”, is the matter of the Buddhist monks’ celibacy. In Mouzi’s Treatise on Settling Confusions, one can also find the following argument:35 Question: Among matters of good fortune, none surpasses that of having heirs. Among failures of filial piety, none is greater than not having any offspring. The monks discard having wives and children, and abandon wealth and commodities. There is every chance that they will not get married to the end of their lives. Why do they engage in this behavior, which transgresses against good fortune and filial piety? They cause themselves suffering without any remarkable gains, and they ascend above this world without any extraordinary achievements.

35 Ibid., pp. 25–26.

32

Common Topics of the East Asian Confucian-Buddhist Debates

Mouzi said: A stronger left necessarily has a weaker right, and a larger front has to have a smaller behind. Meng Gongchuo was an outstanding senior scholar in the states of Zhao and Wei, but could not have served as a grand officer and dignitary in the states of Teng and Xue. Possessing wives, children and personal belongings, are all unimportant matters of this world. [On the contrary], to cleanse one’s personality and reside in non-action is the mystery of the dao. Laozi said: “Which one do you hold dearer: the name or the person? Which one counts for more: the person or the property?” And again: When one observes the traditional ways of the Three dynasties, and reads the philosophies (art of the dao) of the Confucians and the Mohists, one can see that they recite from the Odes and the Documents, they cultivate ritual moderation, they worship humanity and righteousness. Recognizing their purity, their fellow countrymen pass on their deeds, and their fame brims over and grows. This practice is cultivated by the mediocre scholar, though he who is at peace with himself does not appreciate that. Therefore, when a beautiful pearl is lying in front of you, and an angry tiger is crouching behind you, you will run away and will not dare to touch the pearl. Why is that? It is because one’s life comes before one’s profit. Xu You roosted in nests and dwelled in trees, Boyi and Shuyi starved in front of mount Shouyang. The sage Confucius praised their worthiness, saying: “They sought humanity and obtained it.” I have never heard people criticizing them for having no descendants and no property. The monks cultivate their dao and their virtues in order to exchange these for worldly joys. They trade the happiness of having wives and children for spiritual purity and moral worth. If this is not wonderful, then what is? If this is not special, then what is?

What Mouzi is stressing in the above argument is that Buddhist monks abandon the domestic bliss of having wives and children, because they are pursuing a simple and peaceful life. Moreover, they abandon the worldly joys to devote themselves to practicing the dao and cultivate virtues. Within the context of the Confucian-Buddhist debates, a dispute over questions about the dao of “filial piety” had also occurred in the Jin dynasty (265– 420), namely in Sun Chuo’s (孫綽, 314–371) treatise titled Clarification of the Way (Yu dao lun 喻道論). Already in the introductory remarks, Sun Chuo declares that worldly people “entangled in the profane teaching are inclined to look at the footsteps of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius. Perfect virtue is said to be exhausted in Yao and Shun, profound words already exhausted in the Laozi and the Book of Change. How can they revert to seeing clearly the wits and mysteries, which are beyond these domains, and illuminate the profound knowledge which lies in the vast expanse [of existence]?”36 In this passage, the author clearly states that the Confucians are situated within the worldly, whereas Buddhism transcends the sphere of the worldly affairs as such. Subsequently, Sun Chuo also disputes statements that condemned Buddhist behavior for being unfilial (buxiao 不孝) and for being “greatly at odds with the worldly teaching” 36 Sun Chuo 孫綽, Yu dao lun 喻道論 [Clarification of the Way], in Hongming ji, Vol. 1, p. 168.

The Questions of Family Ethics: Filial Piety and Leaving Home for a Monastic Life

33

(大乖於世教).37 In his apologetic defense, he cited examples of behavior of some of the well-known figures from the distant past, such as Ying Kaoshu (穎考叔), Shi Que (石碏), Tai Bo, Boyi (伯夷), and Shuqi (叔齊), and he gave a detailed exposition of how, if “filial piety is to become noble, and to be noble is to build up one’s personality and carry out the dao, always to glorify one’s parents,” then the Buddhist practice of leaving home to become a monk indeed is an act of great filial piety.

2.)

Korea

The Confucian questioning of Buddhism that saw its teaching as encouraging people to leave their families and thereby violating filial piety, had also occurred as one of the arguments in the 14th century Korean Confucian-Buddhist debates. By the 14th century, the “Confucianization” of Korean society had already reached such a great degree that Confucian teaching had acquired a status very close to being “the state religion.”38 In his Exposition of Orthodoxy, Monk Gihwa also opposed this very same questioning of Buddhism, prevailing in contemporary Korean society at the time. He responded to it in the following manner:39 Attached love is the root of samsara, and desire is the precondition for receiving life. So, if someone has not yet escaped the fetters of wife and children, how can he eliminate attached love and desire? And if attached love and desire have not yet been eliminated, how can he escape from cyclical existence? If you want to escape cyclical existence, you must first sever attached love and desire. If you want to sever attached love and desire, you must first forsake spouse and children. If you want to forsake spouse and children, you must first leave the secular world. If you do not leave the secular world, you cannot forsake spouse and children, sever attached love and desire, or escape cyclical existence. Without the great expedient example of the great sage who offers his compassion, can ordinary unenlightened people be capable of [living in the world and attaining liberation]? This kind of person is difficult to meet even in a trillion generations and is hard to catch even among a hundred million people. The attraction of attached love is like that between steel and a magnet. If one is deficient in tolerance, it is quite difficult to avoid attached love while living in the secular world. To be able to do as did our founding 37 Ibid., 178–179. 38 Cf. Martina Deuchler, The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Ideology (Cambridge, MA/London: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1992), pp. 3–27. 39 Gihwa 己和, Hyeonjeong non 顯正論 [Exposition of Orthodoxy]. The English translation adopted from A. Charles Muller, Korea’s Great Buddhist-Confucian Debate: The Treatises of Cho˘ng Tojo˘n (Sambong) and Hamho˘ Tu˘kt’ong (Kihwa) (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2015), pp. 87–88.

34

Common Topics of the East Asian Confucian-Buddhist Debates

teacher S´a¯kyamuni… how could he have been lacking in tolerance? Furthermore, the Buddha had fully achieved the three awarenesses and six super-knowledges, the four kinds of wisdom, and eight types of liberation. His virtue would be known to all the world in later generations. Because of this, all in the world in later generations would praise his parents as the parents of a great sage. All of those descendants of his lineage who renounced the world came to be praised as “children of the Buddha.” Who can say that his is not great filial piety?

In the above treatise, monk Gihwa raised two important arguments: 1.) (Attached) love and desire are the source of samsara (samsa¯ra) and of receiving life. ˙ If we want to break away from the suffering of the cycle of rebirth, we must first sever the ties of love and desire. 2.) Because the Buddha’s virtue had spread over the entire world, the world praised his parents. All his descendants have called the Buddha their parent. This indeed is the great filial piety. Based on the above two grounds, monk Gihwa set out to demonstrate the necessity of leaving home and renouncing the world.

3.)

Japan

The dispute over whether leaving home and renouncing the world is a violation against family ethics also emerged in 17th century Japan. Hayashi Razan, the pioneer of Zhu Xi learning in Japan, sent a letter to Matsunaga Teitoku, an adherent of Nichiren Buddhism, in which he fiercely attacked the act of leaving home as practiced in Buddhism, and its consequent violations against filial piety. In his opposition against the Buddhist doctrine of renouncing the world, Hayashi Razan delivered four points of criticism: 1.) The principle of marriage is identical everywhere on the Earth. If all the men of a country left home to become monks, and all women left home to become nuns, then how would one make up and continue the existence of family, society and even a country? 2.) Buddhist renunciation of the world destroys interpersonal relations between the ruler and his ministers, between man and wife, between brothers, etc. Consequently, it can be claimed that Buddhist monks are entirely indifferent toward the five Confucian relationships (ruler-minister, father-son, husband-wife, brother-brother, friend-friend). 3.) Not only the Buddhist monk’s habit of shaving his head, but also his entire apparel, comes from a barbaric country. 4.) When the followers of Buddhism consider their “discipline of tolerance” (ren jie 忍戒) of not killing a sentient being as an important matter, and they release the fish and birds back into the wilderness or give up their blood to feed the mosquitos, they are only “benevolent (towards) birds and animals” (禽獸之仁), and do not uphold and maintain the rest of the three bonds and five relationships (sangang wulun 三綱 五倫), which exist between the ruler and his subordinates, father and son, hus-

The Questions of Family Ethics: Filial Piety and Leaving Home for a Monastic Life

35

band and wife, etc. It is namely the latter, which are the true expression of mercy, and which are also the essence of the Confucian notion of “humanity” (ren 仁).40 Matsunaga Teitoku responded to Hayashi Razan’s critique in a very long text. Its content can be summarized in the following five points: 1.) He contested Razan’s critique of Buddhism which claimed that by leaving home to renounce the worldly life, Buddhist monks and nuns were ending the way of marriage and thus obstructing the development of the state. Matsunaga Teitoku maintained that, if one is to comply with Hayashi Razan’s logic, then one should similarly criticize the Confucians who stress that all people should be ambitious in “literary learning” (xue wen 學文). Nevertheless, he argues, this does not take into consideration the demands of people like farmers and soldiers, and can be said to be somewhat biased. Furthermore, in Matsunaga Teitoku’s opinion, the main reason why the Buddhist religion is against the matter of marriage resides in its having recognized the fact that women possess magical powers, as well as its understanding that an addiction to a woman’s physical beauty can easily create confusion in the mind of those who practice Buddhism, so that they are unable to free themselves from the constraints of the cycle of life and death (samsa¯ra). ˙ Therefore, the Buddhist warnings against female charms contain the very same idea as the Confucian admonitions against being addicted to a female of devastating beauty. 2.) In fact, Confucian and Buddhist views on leaving the worldly life and living in seclusion are not completely contrary to each other. Confucius, for example, says (Analects, “Tai Bo”): “Let yourself be seen when the Way prevails in the Empire, but keep out of sight when it does not.”41 Such was also the example of the Seven sages of the Bamboo grove from the Nan-bei period, who had decided to leave the world of the mortals and live in seclusion. In comparison to that, the decision of the disciples of Buddha to leave the vulgar world and devote their lives to religious practice is based on the recognition that the worldly life is permeated with suffering. By choosing to leave home they can not only achieve the complete repayment of their debts to their ruler and parents, but after they have attained enlightenment, they can save themselves from degeneration towards the infernal world and can bestow a favor on the generations to come. 3.) Teitoku refuted Razan’s numerous critiques of Buddhist monk’s attire and haircut with the following statements: “true monastic renunciation means holding on to nothing and having no attachments” and “he who does not offend [against propriety] outwardly, must be well advanced in his inner understanding.” Matsunaga Teitoku maintained that it is precisely because the outward appearance of the Buddhist monks and nuns does not comply with that of the profane world, that they are able to clearly present the achievements of their inner 40 Okuwa Hitoshi ed., Razan Teitoku Jubutsu Mondo¯ Chu¯kai to Kenkyu¯, p. 141. 41 See D. C. Lau trans., The Analects (Hong Kong: the Chinese University Press, 1992), p. 73.

36

Common Topics of the East Asian Confucian-Buddhist Debates

cultivation and show how distant they are from the cravings of the vulgar world. Furthermore, in the Age of Dharma Decline (mofa shidai 末法時代), a clear distinction should be made between the two reasons why a monk is required to wear apparel different from the vulgar clothes of others when residing in or administering a monastery – one of which is derived from the Buddha’s commandments and the other from his leaving home to become a monk. 4.) By persevering with its precept against killing sentient beings, Buddhism follows the doctrine of karma, on one hand, and its prevention of the act of killing, enables the ascension of the heart of mercy and compassion, on the other hand. In that way, Buddhism ponders on the malicious acts produced by the killing of sentient beings, in order to attain the goal of the cessation of evil and the propagation of good. 5.) Since Confucianism emphasizes etiquette (also proprieity, li 禮), and if we take into account the fact that the Buddhist Vinaya stipulates 10 greater and 48 smaller precepts, then by renouncing family life the Buddhists are putting more emphasis on etiquette than those people who stay at home. Consequently, the Confucians ought not to attack the Buddhist renunciation of family life.42 In Confucian thought, there was another concept related to the value of filial piety that also received much notoriety at the time, namely the hallowing of one’s parents’ names. In his letter, Hayashi Razan cited from Confucian classics, such as the Classic of Filial Piety and the Analects (Xiao jing, chapters “An elucidation of the aims and meaning” and “Spreading one’s name”, and the Analects, chapter “Wei Ling gong”, 20): “The Master said: ‘The gentleman detests not leaving a name behind when he is gone.’”43 Using the above quote, Hayashi wanted to explain that the genuine method of repaying favour to one’s parents would consist in being obedient to them at home, and spreading their good reputation in the outside world. Therefore, the Buddhist institution of forsaking family life, represents the ultimate form of non-filiality.44 Matsunaga Teitoku refuted the above accusation in three points:45

1.) Buddhism advocates the teaching of the karmic connection between past, present and future (sanshi 三世, tryadhvan). Therefore, its implementation of the precedence of rites and music and the idea that the real way comes later makes Buddhist dharma not completely different from the norms of the present life that are stressed in Confucianism. 2.) The “view on attaining fame” in the Classic of Filial Piety describes one way a child can make one’s parents and ancestors make known to the world – by means of receiving social value or praise through one’s own actions. However, this is not the sole method of expressing filial piety in Confucianism. Buddhism does not attach

42 43 44 45

Okuwa Hitoshi ed., Razan Teitoku Jubutsu Mondo¯ Chu¯kai to Kenkyu¯, pp. 142–145. D. C. Lau trans., The Analects, p. 153. Okuwa Hitoshi ed., Razan Teitoku Jubutsu Mondo¯ Chu¯kai to Kenkyu¯, p. 90. Ibid., pp. 90–92.

Questions of Political Ethics: Buddhist Monks and Kingship

37

any value to this manner of repaying one’s parents by achieving fame and glory in one lifetime. In Buddhist teaching, the highest objective is to help relieve one’s parents from their suffering in all their lives and ages. 3.) Observed from the angle of how they esteem filial piety, the Confucian and Buddhist opinions differ only in their method. Their objectives are in no discord with each other at all. One could best describe this situation with Ise Sadatame’s (伊勢貞 為, 1559–1609) words: Even though one possesses many different pairs of chopsticks, they still have only one usage: to pick up food. Thus, according to that point of view, Hayashi Razan’s critique of Buddhism, along with the differences between Confucianism and Buddhism he underlines, cannot hold water.

2.2

Questions of Political Ethics: Buddhist Monks and Kingship (沙門與王權)

1.)

China

The second common topic of the Confucian-Buddhist debates were questions concerning political ethics. In Chinese history, the political concept of universal kingship had reached maturity at a comparatively early stage. Already as early in history as in the Western Zhou dynasty (1043–771 BCE) and in the Spring and Autumn period (722–464 BCE) there existed the saying: “Under the wide Heaven, all is the king’s land; within the sea boundaries of the land, all are the king’s servants.” (Shijing, “Xiao ya”, “Beishan”)46 In the year 221 BCE “the three kings were defeated, and the four seas were united”47 under the Yellow Emperor. From the unification of China under the Qin empire on, the emperor was always the highest political authority of imperial government in China. The first year of Duke Yin of Lu’s rule (722 BCE) was designated in the Spring and Autumn Annals as “spring, the king’s first month” (春王正月). The Gongyang Commentary interprets this sentence in the following manner: “Why does it say the first month of the king? Because [it signifies] the great unity (大一統) of [the empire].”48 Since ancient times, the royal authority of “the great unity” was the highest political and cultural value in China. The Buddhists advocate that after a person 46 See James Legge, The She King or the Book of Poetry, in The Chinese Classics (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), Vol. 4, pp. 360–361. 47 Du Mu 杜牧, “Epanggong fu 阿房宮賦 [Epang palace fu].” in Dong Gao 董誥 et al ed., Quan Tang wen 全唐文 [The Complete Collection of Tang Prose](Beijing: Zhonghua shuju jingyin, 1983), juan 748, pp. 7744–2. 48 Gongyang Shou 公羊壽 coll., He Xiu 何休 comm., Xu Yan 徐彥 comm., Chunqiu Gongyangzhuan zhushu 春秋公羊傳注疏 [Chun-Qiu Gongyang Records Commentaries](Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1999), Vol. 1, pp. 9–10.

38

Common Topics of the East Asian Confucian-Buddhist Debates

“leaves home to study the way, there is no return to his former family.”49 Thus, in the Buddhist view, a person who left home and entered the monastic life ought not to revere the ruler of the vulgar world. Since this view can be considered as posing a challenge to the authority of the emperor, it had consequently also become one of the points of controversy about Buddhism in China. In the years of emperors Cheng and Kang of the Eastern Jin (325–344), chancellor Yu Bing (庾冰, courtesy name Jijian 季堅, 296–344), who assisted the emperor in his governance, handed down an imperial edict on behalf of emperor Cheng of Jin (ruled 325–342), which demanded that the Buddhist monks pay reverence to the ruler. The grounds for the proclamation of the edict included: 1.) Whether the Buddha actually existed is highly dubious. 2.) Reverence to the ruler “originates in the Confucian ethical code (ming jiao 名教), and has not been abandoned for ages.”50 3.) Buddhist monks “are all people of the Jin, and judging by their talent and knowledge, they are also all commoners,”51 and should therefore pay reverence to the emperor. After the edict had been issued, the Director of the Imperial Secretariat He Chong (何充) and five other highranking officials jointly presented a memorial in which they pointed out that Buddhism “has been flourishing from the time of Han up to the present day. And even though its dharma has had some ups and downs, its wrongs conceal no absurdities. Its wonderful path is long-lasting, and none can compare with it.”52 They also contended that “in reality, the prohibitions of the five precepts only help the king’s influence.”53 Therefore, these high-ranking officials chose to oppose the demand that the monks should submit themselves to performing the propriety of kneeling down and worshiping the ruler. “Now, if this system is not put into practice, no harm is done to the laws of the king, and the pattern of disorder might not obstruct them at all.”54 Subsequently, emperor Cheng issued another edict, in which he reiterated that “propriety used to be important, and reverence used to be great. The principles of governance used to be limited to that. If a ruler with ten thousand chariots does not desire veneration and the common folk of the realm do not like to have a humble status, then the inferior and the superior will not be clearly set. The kingly instruction cannot but be only 49 Samghadeva 僧伽提婆 trans., “Kule pin 苦樂品 [Chapter on Pain and Pleasure],” see Zengyiahanjing 增壹阿含經 [Ekottara A¯gama Su¯tra], Vol. 21, in: Dazheng Xinxiu Dazangjing 大正 新脩大藏經 [Taisho¯ Tripitaka], Vol. 2, p. 658. ˙ Di Shamen buying jinjing zhao 代晉成帝沙門不應盡敬詔 [An 50 Yu Bing 庾冰, “Dai Jin Cheng Imperial Order in the Name of the Emperor Cheng of Jin Stipulating that Buddhist Monks Should Not Stop Paying Reverence to the Ruler],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 2, p. 322. 51 Ibid. 52 He Chong 何充 et al., “Shangshuling He Chong deng chongbiao 尚書令何充等重表 [Second Memorial Submitted by He Chong],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 2, p. 835. 53 Ibid., p. 835. 54 Ibid., p. 836.

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39

one. If there were two kings, then chaos would reign. When, in former times, the sages shaped the form of the kingdom, these were the laws they chartered. Hence, it would be best not to doubt these principles.”55 The emperor thus insisted that the Buddhist monks are obliged to pay reverence to the ruler. After emperor Cheng had handed down another edict, He Chong and others responded by presenting the third memorial to the emperor. They still insisted on advocating their standpoint that Buddhist monks need not revere and kneel down before the ruler, because “never before, since the Han and Wei dynasties up to the current Jin dynasty, has one heard of any dissent being raised about it.”56 Moreover, if they were not made to pay tribute to the ruler, no change would befall the law of the king.”57 In turn, Huan Xuan (桓玄, courtesy name Jingdao 敬道, 369–404) sent a letter to eight grand ministers at the court, in which he pointed out that “if by the aid given by the Buddhist monks throughout the cycle of rebirth”58 they really are capable of assisting the ruler, “how can one accept their virtues and omit their courtesy, receive their favor and discard their respect?”59 Still, the eight great ministers insisted that it should not be demanded of the Buddhist monks that they worship the ruler. In the letter sent to the prime minister Wang Mi (王 謐, courtesy name Zhiyuan 稚遠, 360–408), Huan Xuan expressed his worries that “if the monks were to defy the etiquette and behave as equals to the most exalted one, this would naturally lead to unpeaceful sentiments.”60 He thought that Buddhist monks’ disrespect towards the ruler represented “a major political event of the age, and a general discussion should be devoted to determine how to address it.”61 After this, Wang Mi and Huan Xuan exchanged a great number of letters, in which they further discussed the significant question of whether Buddhist monks should or should not worship the ruler.62 In the later development of the controversy over the “Buddhist monks’ irreverence towards the ruler,” Huan Xuan sent a letter to the dharma master 55 Cheng Di 成帝, “Cheng Di chong zhao 成帝重詔 [Emperor Cheng Reissues an Edict],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 2, p. 837. 56 He Chong 何充et al., “Shangshuling He Chong dengsan zou buying jing shi 尚書令何充等三 奏不應敬事 [Director of the Imperial Secretariat He Chong and Three Others Present a Memorial to the Emperor over the Topic of Not Having to Pay Reverence to the Ruler],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 2, p. 839. 57 Ibid. 58 Huan Xuan 桓玄, “Yu ba zuoshu lun daoren jing shi 與八座書論道人敬事 [Discussing the Matter of Monks’ Reverence to the Ruler with Eight Eminent Officials],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 2, p. 842. 59 Ibid. 60 Huan Xuan 桓玄, “Yu Wang Zhonglingshu lun daoren jingwang shi 與王中令書論道人應敬 王事 [Discussing the Matter of Monks’ Reverence to the King with Prime Minister Wang],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 2, p. 845. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid., pp. 846–871.

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Huiyuan (慧遠, 334–416) of Lushan mountain, in which he requested that the master put forward his own opinion on the matter.63 Consequently, the master wrote the treatise “On Buddhist Monks’ Irreverence Towards the Ruler” (Shamen bujing wangzhe lun 沙門不敬王者論). In this treatise he stated that there exist the following reasons why monks are insubordinate to the king: 1.) Buddhist monks’ “work in propagation of the great teaching (弘教) and their encompassing of all beings has merits equal to those of a monarch, and their transformation is equal to that of the true way of governance.”64 Because the “monks are guests from the outer realm, they have ceased to trace material things.”65 2.) Buddhist monks do not obey the rules of the vulgar world. 3.) By attaining the way (道), the monks consequently gain a grasp on “a unique teaching, an unchangeable doctrine, with no parallel in the profane world.”66 4.) The human body perishes, but the spirit is inextinguishable. Therefore, one should not bind himself to one’s physical form, in order to attain the goal of inner cultivation with a concentrated attention on spiritual migration. Consequently, one should elevate one’s will to be irreverent toward ten thousand chariots, and should not bow down before the ruler. Huiyuan completed his manuscript in the third year of the Yuanxing period of the Eastern Jin dynasty (404). He believed that “in the times, when the Son of heaven is blinded by the worldly dust, the sorrows of the people become a hundred times greater.”67 It is for that reason that the treatise reiterates the idea that Buddhist monks should not bow down and pay reverence to the ruler. Later, following his written exchange with Huiyuan, Huan Xuan ordered a reorganization of Buddhist religion, after which all those who “defile fame and rank, who encourage the evasion of labor-service and gather by the tolling of the bells, which resound from hundreds of li away, all those runaways who fill the temples and monasteries,”68 “all, without exception, shall be dismissed (from the monastic order) and reprimanded.”69 Dharma master Huiyuan’s treatise “On Buddhist Monks’ Irreverence Towards the Ruler,” which sets out to expound on the reasons and arguments behind why Buddhist monks do not comply with conventional etiquette and do not obediently revere the ruler, is an extremely important document of the history of 63 Huan Xuan 桓玄, “Huan Xuan shu yu Yuan fashi 桓玄書與遠法師 [Huan Xuan’s Letter to Dharma Master Yuan],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 2, p. 872. 64 Huiyuan 慧遠, “Shamen bujing wangzhe lun 沙門不敬王者論 [On Buddhist Monks’ Irreverence Towards the Ruler],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 1, p. 316. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid., p. 324. 67 Ibid., p. 333. 68 Huan Xuan 桓玄, “Huan Xuan fuzheng yu sha tai zhongseng yu liao shu jiao 桓玄輔政欲沙 汰眾僧與僚屬 [Instruction to Get Rid of Monks and Their Subordinates Issued by Huan Xuan],” in Hongmeng ji, Vol. 2, p. 886. 69 Ibid.

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Buddhism in China. It is also a document, which to a considerable degree settled the relationship between Buddhist monks and the power of the king. As a foreign religion, after Buddhism had arrived in China it had to pay special attention to its relationship with the native politics. In the Han dynasty, as a result of the advancement of the slogan “Dismiss the hundred schools, and revere only the Confucians,” the latter came to provide imperial politics with a theoretical basis. Thus, the dissemination of Buddhism was made even more difficult. However, in the time of the Wei Jin and North-South dynasties, waves of political unrest swept the country. Nomadic people invaded the northern provinces, and outbreaks of war were frequent. In this troubled and turbulent time, Buddhism assumed the task of comforting the wounded spirit of the people. This new role enabled Buddhism to spread at a rapid pace. Furthermore, as Murakami Yoshimi (村上嘉 實, 1906–2005) has so correctly remarked: “The spread of Buddhism, which started in the Wei-Jin period, was closely related to the support it received from the newly rising monarchs and the new aristocratic elite.”70 As Dao’an (道安, 312–385), Huiyuan’s teacher, famously remarked: “Without the support of the sovereign, it would be difficult to sustain the practice of dharma.” (不依國主， 則法事難立) 71 These words reveal why, at that time, Buddhism had to maintain a close relation to the authority in power. In his treatise on Buddhist monks’ non-veneration of the ruler, Huiyuan especially emphasized the view that Buddhism greatly contributes to governance (治道):72 An examination of the fundamental teachings which were revealed to us by the Buddha indicates that there is a general distinction between those who leave their households and those who do not. There are four classes of people who leave their household to become ´sramana. Their propagation of the great teaching (弘教) and their encom˙ passing of all beings has merits equal of those of a monarch, and their transformation is equal to that of the true way of governance. As to influencing the customs and enlightening the vulgar world, there has been no age in which they were not performing the task. But, as chance has it, they sometimes act openly and sometimes stay concealed, thus retiring or appearing as the faith diminishes or prospers. What can be discussed about that, will be stated in short: Those who revere the dharma at home are people who obediently follow change. Their feelings are not inclined to changing the way of the world, hence their course is within 70 Murakami Yoshimi 村上嘉実, Rikucho¯ Shiso¯shi Kenkyu¯ 六朝思想史研究 [Research in Intellectual History in the Six Dynasties](Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, 1976 [2nd edition]), p. 173. 71 Huijiao 慧皎 au., Tang Yongtong 湯用彤 comm., Tang Yixuan 湯一玄 ed., Gaoseng Zhuan高 僧傳 [Biographies of Eminent Monks](Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1992), Vol. 5, p. 178. 72 Huiyuan 慧遠. “Shamen bujing wangzhe lun 沙門不敬王者論 [On Buddhist Monks’ Irreverence Towards the Ruler],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 1, p. 316. The translation adopted and revised from: Leon Hurvitz. “’Render unto Caesar’ in Early Chinese Buddhism,” in SinoIndian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1957), pp. 98–99.

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the common boundaries. Therefore, this way of life includes the affections of natural kinship and the properties of obedience to authority. Propriety and reverence have their foundation herein, and thus they, in turn, form the foundation of the doctrine. That by which they are caused has its merit in the past. Thus, on the basis of intimacy it teaches love, and causes the people to appreciate natural kindness; on the basis of austerity it teaches veneration, and causes people to understand natural respect… Therefore, those who rejoice in the manners of S´a¯kyamuni, always first uphold their parents and venerate their rulers. Those who change their habits and throw away their hairpins must always await the command of their parents and rulers and act accordingly. If their lords and parents have doubts in them, then they retire in hope that their lords’ and parents’ aspirations be achieved, and they all attain enlightenment. This is how the teaching of Buddha attaches importance to the generation of life and assists the king in making changes in his governance.

In the above text Huiyuan repeatedly states how the ´sramana “propagate the ˙ great teaching and encompass all beings,” and also “influence customs and enlighten the vulgar world.” On the other hand, those who practice Buddhism at home, “revere dharma in their household,” “are obedient to authority,” “first uphold their parents and venerate their rulers,” “await the command of their parents and rulers and act accordingly”. Finally, the Buddhist doctrine then can be said to “attach importance to the generation of life and assist the king in making changes in his governance.” But on the other hand, Huiyuan also stressed that the monks should “refuse obedience to the myriad chariots, set their ambitions high, and still not be promoted to the aristocracy.”73 One aspect of Huiyuan’s treatise emphasizes the inseparability of Buddhism and royal power, whereas the other still stresses that Buddhism should resist authority and establish its independence.

2.)

Korea

The problem of Buddhist monks’ resistance to the authority of the king also aroused controversy in Joseon Korea, but never became a subject of ConfucianBuddhist debate in Tokugawa Japan. The main reason for the different treatment of this issue in Korea and Japan may have resided in the fact that the Korean state had a unified kingship, the political power in the kingdom having been relatively centralized. Also, the level of Confucianization of Korean society was much higher than that of Japanese society. In Tokugawa Japan, however, the power was held by the warrior-clan regime (buke seiken 武家政權), which consequently entailed a deterioration of imperial power. Hence, even though Buddhist monks 73 Ibid., 312.

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43

like Tenkai (天海, 1536–1643) in the 16th century had some influence on the bakufu,74 no questions of irreverence of the ´sramana towards the king ever ˙ emerged. In his work Exposition of Orthodoxy, the monk Gihwa addressed the abovementioned question in the form of the following dialogue, where the author both set and answered the question:75 [The Confucians argue,] saying: Those who are born into this world are obliged to be fully loyal to their ruler, to support their state with utmost sincerity. But the Buddhists do not come for an audience with the emperor and do not act in the service of the nobles. Far removed from the concerns of the secular world, they sit and observe its vicissitudes. Can this be called loyalty? [But I] say: In [Buddhism] it is taught that one who would become a ruler must first receive the precepts, purifying his body and mind. Only after this may he ascend to the jewelled throne. The teachings also call for all monks not to fail to light incense in the morning and light the lamps in the evening, praying for the ruler and the state. Can this not be characterized as loyalty? Furthermore, while the ruler encourages goodness through the awarding of rank and emolument and discourages evil by exacting punishments, our Buddha teaches the people that doing good brings happiness and that doing evil invites disaster. When people hear this, they naturally rein in their evil thoughts and arouse good intentions. Our Buddha’s teaching does not encourage [good behavior] through the provisional awarding of rank and emolument nor use authority to enforce penalties. Instead, it leads people to be stimulated toward self-transformation. How could this not be a great help to the ruler and state?

As Gihwa pointed out, when the monks light incense in the morning and light the lamps in the evening, and when they pray for the ruler and the state, they are actually performing “loyalty” (zhong 忠). In addition to that, the Buddhist theory of karmic retribution (yinguo baoying 因果報應) also benefits the ruler and country.

74 See Herman Ooms, Tokugawa Ideology: Early Constructs, 1570–1680 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 173–186. 75 Gihwa 己和, Hyeonjeong non 顯正論 [Exposition of Orthodoxy]. The English translation is taken from A. Charles Muller. Korea’s Great Buddhist-Confucian Debate: The Treatises of Cho˘ng Tojo˘n (Sambong) and Hamho˘ Tu˘kt’ong (Kihwa) (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2015), p. 89.

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2.3

Questions of the Distinction Between Chinese (Civilized People) and Barbarians (華夷)

1.)

China

The third commonly occurring topic of the East Asian Confucian-Buddhist debates was the question of the so-called Sino-barbaric dichotomy (華夷之辨). This question, which first occurred in China, would later also appear in Joseon Korea, though it never saw the light in Tokugawa Japan. The main reason this question was addressed in the individual countries in the above-mentioned succession was that the concept of the “Middle Kingdom” (or “central kingdom”, Zhongguo 中國) was first shaped in China. The earliest source of the concept “Middle Kingdom” was maybe the notion of the “Central Shang” (Zhong Shang 中商), mentioned as one of the “five regions” (wufang 五方) in the Oracle bone inscriptions.76 From the Spring and Autumn period on (722–482 BCE), the word Zhongguo designated a region of the highest cultural level. In that way, the ancient Chinese worldview was actually based on a form of “political solipsism.”77 Since Buddhism originated in ancient India, in Buddhist sutras the word Zhongguo refers either to the land to which Buddhism had been transmitted78 or to India79. Therefore, it was inevitable that, when Buddhism came to China, its 76 Hu Houxuan 胡厚宣, “Lun wufang guangnian yu Zhongguo chengwei zhi qiyuan 論五方觀 念與中國稱謂之起源 [On the Concept of Five Regions and the Origin of the Appellation ‘Zhongguo’],” in Jiaguxue Shangshi luncong – chuji 甲骨學商史論叢初集 [Essays on the Shang History on the Basis of Orcle-bone Inscription, Vol. 1](Chengdu: Qilu daxue guoxue yanjiusuo, 1944), Vol. 2. 77 K. C. Hsiao 蕭公權, Zhongguo zhengzhi sixiangshi 中國政治思想史 [History of Chinese Political Thought](Taipei: Lianjing chuban gongsi, 1982), Vol. 1, pp. 10, 16. 78 The Buddhist sutras illustrate the exquisiteness of studying Buddhadharma through an exposition of the eighteen difficulties (十八難, or “eighteen difficult affairs”); the first difficulty as mentioned in the Buddhist sutras is to get a chance in one’s lifetime to encounter the Buddha abiding in the world; the second difficulty is to be born as a human at a time when the Buddha incarnates in this world; the third is to be able to be born as a human being. However, to be born in the “Middle kingdom,” the abode of the Buddha, is also listed as one of the difficult occasions. For a detailed analysis of the “eighteen difficulties” see: Lokaksema 支婁 ˙ Xinxiu 迦讖 trans., Za piyu jing 雜譬喻經 [The sutra of miscellaneous parables], in Dazheng Dazangjing 大正新脩大藏經 [Taisho¯ Tripitaka], Vol. 4, juan 1, p. 502. There also exist sutras ˙ Kingdom” (Zhongguo 中國) is one of the eight which explain that being born in the “Middle difficult occasions (八難). For example: Buddhayas´as 佛陀耶舍 et al. trans., Chang Ahanjing 長阿含經 [Dı¯rgha-a¯gama sutra], in Dazheng Xinxiu Dazangjing, Vol. 1, juan 9, p. 55; Samghadeva 僧伽提婆 trans., “Ba’nan pin 八難品 [Chapter on Eight Difficulties],” see Zengyi ahan jing 增壹阿含經 [Ekottara A¯gama sutra], juan 36, in Dazheng Xinxiu Dazangjing, Vol. 2, p. 747. 79 Huijue 慧覺 trans., “Dajie-binning pin 大劫賓寧品 [Chapter on the Mahakapphina],” see ˙ Xianyu jing 賢愚經 [Sutra on the Wise and Foolish], Fasc. 7, in Dazheng Xinxiu Dazangjing 大 正新脩大藏經 [Taisho¯ Tripitaka], Vol. 4, p. 398. ˙

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45

perspective would collide with the longstanding and well-established notion of the Sino-barbaric dichotomy in traditional Chinese culture. Hence, in Master Mou’s Treatise on Settling Confusions we can find the following question and answer:80 Question: Confucius said: “When the barbarians (夷) have a ruler, they are still inferior to all the people of Xia (夏) when they don’t have one.” Mencius criticized Chen Xiang for having gone over to the philosophy of Xu Xing’s school. He said: “I have heard of the people of Xia transforming the barbarians, but I have never heard about transforming the Xia with barbarian [culture].” You, master, at a young age studied the way of kings Shun and Yao, the Duke of Zhou and Confucius, yet today you reject all these, having changed your studies to the philosophy of the barbarians. Is that not confusion? Mouzi said: These were all unimportant and redundant words encountered at a time when I had not yet understood the great way. A person like you can be said to have seen the blossoms of the system of rituals, but to be ignorant about the true reality of morality. One could say that you have glimpsed the light of a torch, but you have never seen the light of the midday sun. What Confucius said was a rectification of the customs of his time. As for what Mencius said, he was highly critical of single-mindedness. In the past, Confucius wanted to reside among the nine barbarian people (九夷). He said: “A gentleman resides here; what vulgarity can there be?” In those days, when Confucius found no place in the kingdoms of Lu and Wei, and Mencius found no employment in Qi and Liang, would they ever have taken employment among the Di barbarians? Emperor Yu was of Western Jiang origin, but he was still a sage, Gusou gave birth to Shun, despite being wicked and stupid. You Yu was born in the state of Di, but contributed to the hegemony of Qin. Guan (Shixian) and Cai (Xudu) were of impeccable Chinese origin, yet still spread rumors. The tradition says: “The North star is in the middle of heaven, but still north of the human world.” From this point of view, the realm of the Han people is not necessarily located in the center of the world (heaven). According to what is explained in the Buddhist sutras, all creatures – from those above to those below, from all around to the utmost extremes of the world to those who have blood in their veins – are united under the Buddha. This is the reason we venerate and study him. And still, why should I go on to reject the way of Yao, Shun, the Duke of Zhou and Confucius? Gold and jade do not harm each other, the jing and bo soul do not hinder each other. When you call other people confused, isn’t this in fact because you are confused yourself ?

Master Mou drew from Confucius’ statement that he desired to live among the nine barbarian tribes81 in order to disintegrate the boundaries between the 80 Mou Zibo 牟子博, Mouzi Lihuolun 牟子理惑論 [Master Mou’s Treatise on Settling Confusions], in Hongming ji, Vol. 1, p. 33. 81 In the Chinese classical sources, we usually encounter the term jiu Yi 九夷 (nine barbarians). Thus, we can find the term in the Erya (“Shi Di”), Hanfeizi (“Shuo Lin 1”), Lüshi Chunqiu (“Gu Yue” and “Yue Cheng”) and elsewhere. Sun Yirang (孫詒讓, 1848–1904) noted: “The

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Common Topics of the East Asian Confucian-Buddhist Debates

civilized central kingdom (華) and the barbarians (夷) at the periphery. At the same time, he also declared the Buddhist point of view: “the realm of the Han people, is not necessarily the one located in the center of the world (heaven).” In the 5th century CE, a written debate about the “immortality of the soul” (shen bu mie 神不滅) ensued between native Chinese scholars on one side and Buddhists on the other. In the above-mentioned debate, Zong Bing (宗炳, 375– 443), who opposed the “doctrine of the immortality of the soul” advocated by dharma master Huilin (慧琳, dates of birth and death unclear, late 4th century – early 5th century), remarked in a letter sent to He Chengtian (何承天, 370–447) that: “In myriad lands, the stars are arranged in the great void; how do we know, which one is civilized, and which is not?”82 Using the Buddhist cosmological view and image of the world as his basis, the Buddhist follower Zong Bing set out to deconstruct the image of the world known by the Chinese people since ancient times, and thereby dismantle the boundaries between the civilized Chinese and the barbarian people.

2.)

Korea

Within the context of the Hua-Yi dichotomy, Buddhism was seen as a barbarian religion. This idea also appeared in Korea, possibly due to the fact that since ancient times the Korean people had considered themselves as “small China” (xiao Zhonghua 小中華).

eight countries and the eastern barbarians (東夷) are called ‘the nine barbarians’ ( jiu Yi 九 夷). After the Spring-Autumn period this term covered the officials from the three states of Chu, Wu and Yue. In the Warring States period it referred exclusively to those from the Chu. When the Shuo Yuan (說苑) narrates the story of how king Gou Jian of Yue defeated the kingdom of Wu in a war, it refers to both sides as ‘the nine barbarians.’ /…/ As a matter of fact, the realm of the nine barbarians lay between the rivers Huai and Si, and in the north it bordered the states of Qi and Lu. Therefore, the Analects say: ‘The master wanted to go and live among the nine barbarians.’” See: Sun Yirang 孫詒讓, Mozi xiangu 墨子閒詁 [Intermittent Glosses on Mozi](Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001), Vol. 1, juan 5, pp. 137–138. Some authors have maintained that the term “nine barbarians” denotes the territory of today’s Koreas. In relation to this view see: Liu Baonan 劉寶楠, Lunyu zhengyi 論語正義 [The true meaning of the Analects](Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990), Vol. 1, p. 344. The Japanese Confucian Ito¯ Jinsai (伊藤仁齋, Keisai 維楨, 1627–1705) maintained that Confucius used the term “the nine barbarians” to refer to Japan. See: Ito¯ Jinsai 伊藤仁齋, Rongo kogi 論語古義 [The Ancient Meaning of the Analects], in Seki Giichiro¯ 關儀一郎 ed., Nihon Meika ShishoChu¯shaku Zenshu日本名家四書註釋全書 (Tokyo: Toyo Tosho Kankokai, 1922–1926), Analects 1, juan 5, p. 137. 82 Zong Bing 宗炳, “Da He Hengyang nan Hei bai lun 答何衡陽難《黑白論》 [Reply to He Hengyang’s rebuttal against Treatise on the Right and Wrong],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 1, p. 213.

Questions of the Distinction Between Chinese (Civilized People) and Barbarians

47

In one of the dialogues in his Exposition of Orthodoxy, monk Gihwa stated as follows:83 [The Confucians complain, saying:] The only way in the world that deserves our veneration is that of the five emperors and three kings, and nothing more. Therefore, that which was related by the sagely ancestor Confucius, and has been successively transmitted by numerous worthies, serves as the support for all methods [of governing] and is a standard for statehood that all respect. This way is to be sought in the Middle Kingdom, and is not to be sought among the barbarian tribes. The Buddha was a Western barbarian. How is it that his way came to permeate the Middle Kingdom? The story about Ming Di of the Han seeking the Dharma in the Western regions is vague and unclear. [In response to this, I] say: He who embodies the way is the one whom the people will rely upon. Since the way was embodied by the five emperors and three kings, the people relied upon them, and thus they were the rulers of China. The Buddha’s flourishing in India as a king who turned the wheel of the Dharma is the same sort of thing. The Chinese referring to India as the West is just the same as the Indians’ referring to China as the East. If we want to find the great center of the world, then it would be the place where no shadow can be seen at twelve noon. Since this happens in India and since the Buddha appeared to the world in India, why not regard India as the “great center” of the world? “East” and “West” are nothing more than names applied to this or that place according to the situation. There is no such thing as occupying the center and determining East and West. If we do not respect the way of the Buddha because he is a barbarian, then shall we also not respect the ways of Shun, who was born among the eastern tribes, and king Wen, who was born among the western tribes? Can we disparage a person’s way just on the basis of his being foreign? [It should rather be based on] the results of his works and the way that governed his behavior. However, in observing whether one’s way is to be respected or not, it is better not to be much attached to external appearances.

In his interpretation, monk Gihwa points out that: “He who embodies the way is the one whom the people will rely upon.” These words indeed flawlessly emulate Buddhist teaching. Gihwa’s remark, that “the center [of the world] is the place where no shadow can be seen at noon,” with which he tried to eliminate the Sinocentric theory of the dichotomy between China and the barbarians, has its true foundation in the classics. The so called “center of the world, where no shadow can be seen at noon,” refers to the method of using a gnomon (earth jade-tablet, tugui 土圭) to measure and determine the center of the heavenly firmament, which the ancient people used when building cities. According to this method, if at a certain location the gnomon threw no shadow at twelve noon, this place 83 Gihwa 己和, Hyeonjeong non 顯正論 [Exposition of Orthodoxy]. The English translation adopted from: A. Charles Muller, Korea’s Great Buddhist-Confucian Debate: The Treatises of Cho˘ng Tojo˘n (Sambong) and Hamho˘ Tu˘kt’ong (Kihwa) (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2015), p. 103–104.

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would be considered the center of heaven, also called “the center of the Earth” (dizhong 地中).84 What Gihwa pointed out was that the phenomenon of “no shadow at noon” appears not only in China, but also in India. Consequently, in determining the center of the world one cannot rely solely on this phenomenon. His refutation of the distinctions between China and the barbarians by stressing the historical fact that “Shun was born among the eastern tribes (eastern barbarians, 東夷), and king Wen was born among the western tribes (西夷),”85 was extremely persuasive.

2.4

The Question of the Relationship Between the Consciousness (Soul) and Body (神識與形體)

1.)

China

The fourth topic discussed in the framework of the East Asian Confucian-Buddhist debates was the question of the relationship between consciousness and the body. The relation between body and soul (or the physical and spiritual) is an old topic in ancient Chinese thought. Already in the Warring states period (480–222 BCE) there was a discussion of the relation between body and soul. In the “Tiandi” (天地, “On heaven and earth”) chapter of the Zhuangzi, we can read: “Those whose virtue is complete (德全) will have a perfect form (形全). Those whose form is perfect will be whole in spirit (soul, 神全).”86 Xunzi (“Tianlun” 天 論) says: “When the form (body) is complete, the soul is born.”87 All these examples discuss “body” (or “form,” xing 形) and “soul” (or “spirit,” shen 神). Ancient Chinese people for the most part believed that the “soul” resides in the “body” and that after one has died the “soul” disappears and passes into concealment, and the “body” deteriorates. In his Records of the Grand Historian (Shiji 史記), Sima Qian (司馬遷, 145/135–87 (90?) BCE) quotes from his father Sima Tan’s (司馬談, 165?-110 BCE) work “On the Essence of the Six Schools” (“Lun liujia yaozhi” 論六家要指), saying: “All human beings are begotten 84 Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 comm., Jia Gongyan 賈公彥 subcomm., Zhouli zhushu 周禮注疏 [Commentaries and Subcommentaries on the Rites of Zhou](Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1999), Vol. 41, pp. 1148–1149; See also, Ibid., juan 10, pp. 250–253. 85 This was adopted from the following text in the Mencius: “Shun was an Eastern barbarian; he was born in Chu Feng, moved to Fu Hsia, and died in Ming T’iao. King Wen was a Western barbarian; he was born in Ch’i Chou and died in Pi Ying.” See D. C. Lau trans, Mencius, Vol. 2, BK. 5, part B, p. 153. 86 Guo Qingfan 郭慶藩, Zhuangzi jishi 莊子集釋 [Collected Commentaries to the Zhuangzi] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1961, 1985), “Outer chapters”, Vol. 5, p. 436. 87 Wang Xiaqian 王先謙, Xunzi jijie 荀子集解 [Collected Explanations of the Xunzi](Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1988), Vol. 11, p. 309.

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through the soul, and rely on their body. When the soul is put to great use, it becomes exhausted. When the body has performed great labor, it becomes worn out. Death arises, when the soul leaves the body. The dead [body] cannot be brought back to life; what has departed cannot return back to life again. This was what the sages stressed in the past. (…)”88 This passage clearly demonstrates, how, in the early the Han dynasty, people advocated the view that death is a state, which arises after the soul has left the body. The Buddhists, however, advocate the theory of samsara (“the wheel of life”, samsa¯ra), which assumes that, after one’s ˙ death, the consciousness (神識, “soul”) is not extinguished. Quite naturally, this view aroused critical questions on the side of Chinese scholars. As remarked by Sengyou in his postscript to the Hongming ji, one of the six great doubts people raised against the Buddhist creed at the time maintained that: “The soul perishes after one’s death, [and that] the three times [of samsara] do not exist.”89 The arguments of both sides were first seen in the late Han. Master Mou’s Treatise on Settling Confusions gives three separate examples:90 (1) Question: The Buddhist teaching says that when a man has died, he will be born again. I do not believe that these words are well-founded. Mouzi said: When a person is about to die, the family members will go to the upper storey of the house and call to him. But when he has already died, to whom do they call then? Someone might say: They call to his two souls (hunpo 魂魄). Mouzi said: When the soul returns, there will be birth. But when it does not return, where will it go? It might be said: It becomes a ghost (鬼神). Mouzi said: Exactly. It is definite that the souls (魂神) do not perish. Only the body itself rots away; that is all. The body is like the roots and leaves of the five cereals; the soul (魂神) is like seeds and grains of the five cereals. After the roots and the leaves are born, they are bound to die. But the seeds, do they die in the end? When one attains the way (道), it is the body that is annihilated, and nothing else. (2) Someone might say: If you practice the way, you will die. You will also die, if you do not practice the way. What is the difference then? Mouzi said: This is called good deeds without a single day, and to ask for a reputation for the rest of one’s life. Those who are in possession of the way, even if they die, their spirit returns to paradise (福堂, ‘Hall of Bliss’). The evildoers, when they die, their spirit 88 Sima Qian 司馬遷, Shiji 史記 [Records of the Grand Historian](Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959, 1963), juan 130, p. 3292. 89 Sengyou 僧祐, Hongming ji houxu 弘明集後序 [Postscript to the Hongming ji], in Hongming ji, Vol. 2, p. 995. 90 Mou Zibo, Mouzi Lihuolun, in Hongming ji, Vol. 1, pp. 30–31.

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faces its due calamity. A stupid person is ignorant about accomplishing things; the wise already know in advance about the things which have not yet come to fruition. What is of the way and what is not, is like gold compared to grass. Good and blissful are like light compared to dark. How can they not be different? And yet you ask about the difference. (3) Question: Confucius said: “Not yet being able to serve men, how can you serve ghosts? Not yet being able to understand life, how can you understand death? This is what the wise people have recorded.” Now the Buddhist school keeps explaining the cycle of birth and death, and of the things related to ghosts and the soul. This seems to be dangerous talk, which has nothing to do with the words of the sages. He who treads on the way, must practice emptiness and being at peace, and must turn his aspirations to simplicity. What for do we then talk about birth and death, so as to only confuse the will, and explain the unimportant matter of ghosts and souls? Mouzi said: What you are speaking about is called seeing the external and having no understanding of the internal. When Confucius was ill, Zilu did not ask about the beginning and the end; therefore, he was chastised. The Classic of Filial Piety says: “They built temples for them, for the ghosts to enjoy. In spring and autumn, they performed sacrifices, so as to remember them when the time was proper.” It is also said: “When they are alive, one serves them with love and respect; in death, one serves them with grief.” Does this not teach people to serve the ghosts and souls, and to understand birth and death? The Duke of Zhou asked king Wu for instructions: “Dan has got many talents and skills, he is capable to serve the ghosts.” What is this for? What Buddhism says about the destiny of life and death, is this not akin to that? /…/ The essence of the perfect way truly values being solitary in silence. Why should Buddhist then be fond of speaking? It is just that when some questions arrive, they cannot but answer these. How can bells and drums produce sounds by themselves? Only when you add the mallet will there be sound.

In the above three examples the “question” and “one might say” parts represent the questions asked from the standpoint of Confucianism, whereas the text beginning with “Mouzi said” represents a response to the preceding question as given from the standpoint of Buddhism. The arguments raised by the “questioning” party, such as the one stating that after someone has died, he cannot return to life again (as well as “Not yet being able to understand life, how can you understand death?”) are all derived from the Confucian “this-worldly” (cishi 此 世) view of life. This is in contrast to the latter arguments of Mouzi stating for example that “the soul is imperishable” and that “by possessing the way, one breaks away from death, and his soul returns to paradise,” which all emphasize the Buddhist doctrine of the immortality of the soul, established on the basis of the theory of samsa¯ra. ˙ After the late Han period, a second polemic on the body-soul relationship arose in the last years of the Eastern Jin, taking place approximately between the

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4th and 6th centuries. In the fifth chapter of his treatise “On Buddhist Monks’ Irreverence Towards the Ruler,” entitled “On the Transience of the Human Body, and the Immortality of the Soul” (“Xing jin shen bumie” 形盡神不滅), Huiyuan delivered an exceedingly brilliant proof of the Buddhist doctrine of immortality of the soul, which includes the following question and answer:91 Question: /…/ The receipt of vital energy (qi 氣) is limited to one life. When the life ends, the breath evaporates, and becomes the same as nothing. The soul, though it is subtler than matter, is still only a transformation of yin and yang. Both life and death come from their transformation. When they congregate, a beginning is made; when they scatter, an end ensues. If we derive from that, one must acknowledge that the soul and the body are transformed together. Originally, they are of the same thread. The subtle and the gross are of one vital energy, from beginning to end they reside in the same abode. While the abode is whole, the energy is agglomerated, and the spirit exists. But when the abode is destroyed, the energy scatters and the light perishes. After the energy disperses, what was received is then returned to the Great Origin. What has perished, returns to a state of nothingness. The returning and ultimate waning are all occurrences repeating naturally. Who could have created them? If you assert that [body and soul] are fundamentally different, then their different energies combine randomly; when they combine, they are transformed together. Also, the soul resides in the body, as fire is located in wood. While the body lives, the soul will exist, but when the body is destroyed, the soul will perish. When the body departs, the soul scatters, because it has no dwelling. When the tree rots, the fire is isolated, and has nothing to attach to. This is the suchness of the principle. /…/ Answer: What is soul? It is essence, which has reached its extreme and become spiritual (immaterial). Extreme essence cannot be mapped out by hexagrams and images. Therefore, the sage calls it a subtle thing. Even though one might possess higher wisdom, one still would not be able to determine and define the form of its body, and exhaust its uttermost ends. Yet you, my interlocutor, raise doubts with common knowledge, and much of those seem to be coming from your own confusions. Your errors are excessive. If one wishes to speak of this, one must speak of the unspeakable. Now, in the midst of the unspeakable, together we only approximate the truth.

In the above dialogue, the person who questions Buddhism adopts the cosmology of the doctrine of qi, which has been present in Chinese culture since ancient times. Above all, the sceptic adopted philosophical standpoints of the Daoist thinkers, such as for example Zhuangzi (approx. 399? – 295? BCE).92 Thus, discussing human life and death, the sceptic remarked that: “Agglomeration and 91 Huiyuan 慧遠, “Shamen bujing wangzhe lun 沙門不敬王者論 [On Buddhist Monks’ Irreverence Towards the Ruler],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 1, p. 326–327. 92 Zhuangzi, “Zhi Bei You”: “Human life is a gathering of qi. When qi is agglomerated, there is life; when the qi scatters, there comes death.” See Guo Qingfan 郭慶藩, Wang Xiaoyu王孝魚, Zhuangzi jishi 莊子集釋 [Collected Commentaries to the Zhuangzi](Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1961, 1985), “Outer chapters,” Vol. 7, p. 733.

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dispersion are the general name for the transformations of qi, the birth and death of the myriad changes.” In his response, Huiyuan defined the “soul” (shen 神) as “essence, which has reached it extreme, and become spiritual (immaterial),” and thus belongs to the domain of the “unspeakable.” This also implies that the “body” belongs to the phenomenal world, whereas the “soul” belongs to the domain of the noumenal. Consequently, although the “body” undergoes the transformation from life to death, the “soul” remains everlasting and unaffected by the influence of the generation and cessation of the myriad things, and does not perish together with the body. Subsequently, in the following excerpt, Huiyuan also delivers an exposition of the above-mentioned philosophical position:93 The soul is in perfect accord and has no birth, it is subtle to the limits and has got no name. It moves in response to things, submitting to fate its functions. Even though it is moved by things, it is not a thing itself. Therefore, though the things are going to perish, it does not perish. It submits to fate, but is not a mere occurrence, therefore, though the fate may run its course, it is not terminated. If it has emotions, one can stimulate it by means of things; if it has intelligence, one can seek it in terms of fate. Of fated things there are subtle and gross, therefore their natures are all different. Among intellects there are bright and dull ones; therefore, their light is not always the same. If one reasons from this, then one knows that change is felt by the feelings, and that the soul is transmitted through change. Feelings are the mother of change, and the soul is the root of the feelings. The feelings have a way of uniting with physical things, and the soul has the power of moving imperceptibly. But those who are awakened return to the fundamental, while one who has strayed from the principle merely runs after physical things. /…/ You, my worthy opponent, without inquiring into the doctrine of limitless life and death, misunderstand agglomeration and dispersion to refer to one incarnation. Without thinking that the way of the soul might have a spirit more subtle than matter, you say that the subtle and the gross perish together. Is this not indeed sad? Though the parable of the fire and the wood originates in the canons of the sages, you have run afoul of their track. Therefore, the mysterious ecstasy has remained unsought [by you], and subtle words have finally been immersed in common teachings. This has caused you, my worthy interlocutor, on this account to have no doubts. If the times had not had a master who perceived the source, then none would know of the understanding of him who perceived first, nor would the invisible transmission of the very end of the world have been heard of. Why? Feelings and fate interact, and the changes they occasion have no bounds. Causes and conditions closely interlock, and imperceptibly transmit and transfer. Were it not for those of penetrating vision, who would know of their transformation?

In the above text, Huiyuan expounds on the characteristics of the operations of the “soul” as spoken about in Buddhism. These are as follows: “Even though it is moved by things, it is not a thing itself. Therefore, though the things are going to 93 Huiyuan, “Shamen bujing wangzhe lun,” in Hongming ji, Vol. 1, p. 329.

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perish, it does not perish. It submits to fate, but is not a mere occurrence, therefore, though the fate may run its course, it is not terminated.” What Huiyuan had in mind was, that, although the “soul” is in the domain of material things, it nevertheless is not a part of them, and not among them. In Huiyuan’s words: the “soul” is “essence, which attained its extreme, and turned immaterial,” which is why the “soul” can “move in response to things, and submit its functions to fate.” On one hand, the “soul” does not belong to the world of experience, but on the other hand it still does not entirely transcend it. In the following text, Huiyuan also adopts the metaphor of fire and fuel, to further illustrate this point: “The transmission of fire into firewood, is akin to the transmission of the soul into the body; a transmission of fire into another piece of firewood, is the same as the transmission of the soul into a new body”.94 Hence, in Huiyuan’s view, the relationship between “soul” and “body” equals the relationship between “fire” and “firewood.” Exactly as the “soul” stands a priori and transcendental to the “body,” so is the “fire” before and beyond “firewood.” Actually, the theoretical background of this metaphor lies in the Buddhist theory of dependent origination (yuanqi lun 緣起論, pratı¯tyasamutpa¯da). That “fire” can ignite the “firewood” depends in reality on a harmonious combination of causes (yinyuan hehe 因緣和合). Thus, in Na¯ga¯rjuna’s Treatise on the Middle Way (Zhong lun 中 論, Mu¯lamadhyamakaka¯rika¯) we can read: “When a multitude of causes combine, the lamp is lit. If the many causes are endless, the light of the lamp will not be extinguished. If, however, the causes cease to exist, the light will perish.”95 Such is also the relationship between “soul” and “body.” Between the 4th and 5th century CE, the doctrine of the “mortality of the soul” (神滅論), which Huiyuan spoke so critically against, was a view quite common in Chinese society. Although, the work “Discourse on Equal Excellence” (“Jun shan lun” 均善論, also called “Hei bai lun” 黑白論), composed by dharma master Huilin, does not directly concern and touch upon the doctrine of “morality of the soul,” it nevertheless still contains the following remark: “Emptiness is their existence in its self-nature, though this does not take away from their provisional embodiment… There is no permanence to rise and fall, no authority over causes and conditions…”96 Because people were easily led to making connections be94 Ibid., p. 331. 95 Kuma¯ra¯jı¯va 鳩摩羅什 trans., “Guan xie jian pin 觀邪見品 [Chapter on Contemplation of False Views],” in Dazheng Xinxiu Dazangjing 大正新脩大藏經 [Taisho¯ Tripitaka], Vol. 30, ˙ juan 4, p. 39. 96 Shen Yue 沈約, Song shu 宋書 [History of the Song of the Southern Dynasties](Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975–1981), Vol. 97, p. 2388. This text is also contained in: Yan Kejun 嚴可均 ed., Quan Song wen 全宋文 [The Complete Prose Works of the Southern Song Dynasty], in Yan Kejun ed., Quan shanggu Sandai Qin Han Sanguo Liuchao wen 全上古三代秦漢三國六朝文 [Complete prose from high antiquity, the Three Dynasties, Qin, Han, Three States, and Six Dynasties](Beijing: Zhongghua shuju, 1958), Vol. 63, pp. 2772–9. The English translation is

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tween Huilin’s words and the position that the soul perishes together with the body, contemporary Buddhist scholars ended up believing that Huilin wanted to dismiss Buddhist doctrine. This fact motivated his friend He Chengtian, the governor of Hengyang, to compose a piece of writing entitled “On Attaining One’s Nature” (“Da xing lun” 達性論), where he set out to deduce the meaning of Huilin’s treatise. Thus, He Chengtian stated that: “In life, death is necessary. When the body is harmed, the soul scatters. This is akin to the growth of spring and decline of autumn, and to the change of the four seasons.”97 His reading of Huilin clearly echoed the doctrine of “mortality of the soul.” Countering the doctrine of the “mortality of the soul”, which was in vogue at that time, Luo Han’s (羅含, Junzhang 君章, 292–372) treatise “On Rebirth” (Gengshen lun 更生論) advocated an opposing view: “Now, if the myriad things are transitory, but heaven and earth are boundless, if that being the case, then the transformation of the boundless does not stem from the myriad things. If the myriad things are not reborn, then the heaven and earth must be finite. Since heaven and earth are not finite, the fact that they must be reborn is evident and clear.”98 In that way, Luo gave a detailed exposition of the arguments for the notion that it is really because of the immortality of consciousness (soul) that the myriad things and beings are endowed with the ability to be reborn. Luo Junzhang’s arguments for rebirth of the soul were refuted by his contemporary, the celebrated historian Sun Sheng (孫盛, 302–374), who in a letter sent to Luo asserted that the “bodies [of the myriad things] are destroyed and turn to dust. This is also the case with awareness; it is confused and obscured, mistaking change for another being. Beings all lose their old form, and cannot return back to their former state.”99 Among those who in the 4th century criticized “the doctrine of rebirth”was also Zong Bing (宗炳, 375–443) from the period of the Southern Dynasties, who composed the work “Elucidating Buddhism” (Ming Fo lun 明佛論), in which he suggested the idea that “the essence-spirit is immortal, and a person can attain Buddhahood when his mind becomes universal and reveals the emptiness of all dharmas.”100 He further separately discussed two different kinds of “immortality

97 98 99 100

adapted and revised from: Paul W. Kroll, “Huilin on Black and White, Jiang Yan on Wuwei: Two Buddhist Dialogues from the Liu-Song Dynasty,” in Early Medieval China, No. 18 (2012), pp. 1–24, esp. p. 7. He Chengtian 何承天, “Daxing lun 達性論 [A Treatise on Apprehending Human Nature],” in Hongming lun, Vol. 1, p. 225. Luo Junzhang 羅君章, “Gensheng lun 更生論 [A Treatise on Reincarnation],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 1, p. 290. Sun Sheng 孫盛, “Yu Luo Junzhang shu 與羅君章書 [A Letter to Luo Junzhang],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 1, p. 293. Zong Bing 宗炳, “Ming Fo lun 明佛論 [Illuminating Buddhism],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 1, p. 91.

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of the soul,” the first kind being the immortality of consciousness within the scope of the cycle of life and death (samsa¯ra). He argued that from life to life, ˙ “because of the immortality of the soul, one can retain the memory of what was understood by the emperor Yao, and reveal it again and again, for innumerable kalpas. /…/ What cause would there be for him not to empty himself and with a firm faith pursue the attainment of the way by one transformation?”101 The second kind of “immortality of the soul” refers to immortality of the dharmabody (fashen 法身, dharmaka¯ya): “That, which was not born and has no body, and which, having no body, still has a soul, is called the dharma-body.”102 This theory, which sets up a system of two kinds of immortality of the soul, differs from the former in that the former speaks about the process of samsara of human life, whereas the latter concentrates exclusively on the karmic fruits accumulated through a succession of lives. After the Eastern Jin period, a third debate on the body-soul relationship ensued in China. The debate emerged in the time of the kingdoms of Qi and Liang (479–557), between the philosopher Fan Zhen (范縝, courtesy name Zhen 真, approx. 450–515), on one side, and Xiao Ziliang (蕭子良, 460–494) and Emperor Wu of Liang (personal name Xiao Yan 蕭衍, 464–549, reigned 502–549), on the other. Fan Zhen wrote the “Treatise on Mortality of the Soul” (“Shen mie lun” 神 滅論),103 where in the manner of questions and answers the author, layer upon layer, intensively argued for the treatise’s central purport, which was to advocate the view that the fate of one’s life depends entirely on chance, its ups and downs being entirely random, and that no causes and effects can be found behind them. When the human body dies, the soul follows it, and perishes as well. Hence, Fan concluded that “the soul is mortal.” Fan Zhen’s “Treatise on Mortality of the Soul” is founded on the following two propositions:

(1) Body and soul constitute one integral whole. Fan Zhen remarked: “The soul is the body. The body is soul. Thus, when the body exists, so does the soul. But, if the body withers, so will the soul.”104

101 Ibid., p. 105. The translation is adapted and revised from: Walther Liebenthal, “The Immortality of the Soul in Chinese Thought,” in Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 8, No. 1/2 (1952), pp. 327–397, esp. p. 387. 102 Ibid., p. 106. The so-called “dharma-body” (法身) designates the true body of Buddha. The “Essay on the Meaning of Mahayana (Dacheng yi zhang 大乘義章) says: “The expression fashen 法身 has two different meanings. The first shows the nature of the root dharma. When this forms a body, it is called the dharma-body. The other designates a body, which is constituted by dharmas of all merits and virtues. That is why it is called the ‘dharma-body’.” See: Huiyuan 慧遠, Dacheng yi zhang 大乘義章 [An Essay on the Meaning of Mahayana], in Dazheng Xinxiu Dazangjing 大正新脩大藏經 [Taisho¯ Tripitaka], Vol. 44, juan 18, p. 820. 103 Yao Cha 姚察, Xie Gui 謝炅, Wei Zheng 魏徵, and Yao Silian ˙姚思廉 comp., Liang shu 梁書 [The Book of Liang](Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975–1981), juan 48, pp. 665–670. 104 Ibid., p. 655.

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(2) Body is substance, soul is function (形質神用). Fan Zhen said: “Body is the substance of the soul, and soul is the function of the body. Though the body is called its substance, and the soul the function, the body and soul must not differ from one another.”105

What Fan Zhen wanted to point out was that the body as substance and the soul as function are united in one single entity and cannot be separated from each other. Consequently, “if body withers, the soul perishes.” In the following text, Fan Zhen further explains his theory of mortality of the soul using two different metaphors. First, he points out that the “body” is to the “soul” as “knife” is to “sharpness.” In that way, “if one discards sharpness, there is no knife anymore; if one gets rid of the knife, there can be no sharpness. I have never heard that sharpness would exist without the knife. So, how can it be then, that when the body dies the soul keeps on existing.”106 Secondly, Fan Zhen used the metaphor of the tree to describe a human being, arriving at the conclusion that “the human does not have a substance without awareness, just as a tree does not have a body with awareness.” At the end, Fan Zhen also claimed that his reason for writing the treatise on mortality of the soul at that particular time could be found by observing how “Buddhism is damaging the government and Buddhist monks are corrupting the proper conventions. The winds are jolting, the fog has already arisen, and it is spreading over the country without rest. I am worried about how it deceives people, and I want to save people’s thoughts from being drowned in it. People use up their wealth to run after the monks, they go bankrupt to run after the Buddha. But how come they are not concerned about their relatives, why don’t they pity the poor, who have nothing? /…/”107 As soon as Fan Zhen issued his “Treatise on Mortality of the Soul,” the voice of his critique became of gigantic significance. The first response came from Xiao Chen (蕭琛, Yanyu 彥瑜, 478–529), Fan’s brother in law, who authored a work entitled “Refutation Against the Treatise on Mortality of the Soul” (Nan shenmie lun 難神滅論). In the form of questions and answers Xiao Chen one by one denied Fan Zhen’s statements, and set out to prove his point in a relatively complex manner. His main argument against Fan Zhen, however, focused on his statement that “the body and soul constitute one integral whole, there is no difference between the existence or perishing of one or the other.”108 Concerning

105 106 107 108

Ibid. Ibid., p. 666. Ibid., p. 667. Xiao Chen 蕭琛, “Nan shenmie lun 難神滅論 [Refutation against the Treatise on Mortality of the Soul],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 1., p. 592.

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that claim, Xiao Chen concluded that “when the path of the spirit and the substance separate, the difference is that one flourishes and the other decays.”109 Apart from Xiao Chen’s critique, another refutation against Fan Zhen’s treatise was written by Cao Siwen (曹思文, date of birth and death unknown), an Eastern Palace official. In his critique against Fan Zhen, he pointed out that “body is not the soul, and the soul is not the body. It is only when they are joined that their function is made, but the unity is not them. Life then is the state when they are joined in function, and death is when [only] the body remains and the soul passes on.”110 In the subsequent discussion Cao further expounded on the proposition that “body” and “soul” “join together to make use (function)” by mentioning the past achievements of two historical figures from the Spring and Autumn period, Zhao Jianzi and Duke Mu of Qin. He also criticized Fan’s theory that the temple ceremonies represent a teaching that the ancient sages had established by means of the way of the gods (shendao she jiao 神道設教). The theoretical background of the proposition that “body” and “soul” “join together to make use (function),” which Cao had used in his proof, was taken from the Buddhist view of dependent origination and emptiness. The Samyukta¯gama ˙ sutra (Za’ahan jing 雜阿含經) says: “Three stalks of reed stand in an empty land; in growing and turning they lean on each other, until they all stand erect. If then one stalk were removed, the other two would not stand. If two stalks were removed, the one remaining would not be able to stand upright. In tossing and turning they lean on each other, until they all stand erect. This is also the case with the names and objects conditioned by consciousness (vijña¯na-paccaya¯ na¯maru¯pam, shi yuan mingse 識緣名色). In tossing and turning they lean on each other, and are enabled to sprout and grow.”111 According to the Buddhist view on emptiness (xingkong 性空, ´su¯nyata¯), Cao Siwen thought that it is exactly within a relationship where “soul” and “body” mutually support each other in standing, that they can develop a functional relationship in which both “join together to make use (function).” Immediately after Cao had voiced his critique, Fan Zhen replied by writing a refutation in return. Fan Zhen caught hold of Cao’s words about conjoined 109 Ibid. 110 Cao Siwen曹思文, “Nan shenmie lun 難神滅論 [Refutation against the Treatise on Mortality of the Soul],” p. 618. 111 Gunabhadra 求那跋陀羅 trans., Za’ahan jing 雜阿含經 [Samyukta¯gama sutra], in Dazheng ˙ Dazangjing 大正新脩大藏經 [Taisho¯ Tripitaka], Vol.˙ 2, p. 81. In his masterpiece The Xinxiu ˙ Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Lamrim Chenmo, 菩提道次第廣 論) Tsong-kha-pa (宗喀巴, 1357–1419) conducts a thorough analysis of the concept of “emptiness” (kongxing 空性). For an English translation of the treatise, with an explanation of the concept of “emptiness” see: Guy Newland, Introduction to Emptiness: As Taught in Tsong-Kha-Pa’s Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path (Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 2008), Chapter 9, “Who Am I, Really,” pp. 86–100.

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“body” and “soul” and pointed out that “if [body and soul] join to make use (function), then it is evident, if they are not joined, there is no use (function).”112 With the example of Zhao Jianzi from the Summer and Autumn period, Fan further indicated that after a person had died, the “body” and the “soul” are not the same anymore. Cao Siwen countered this with another refutation against Fan Zhen, reiterating the formula that “the body is mortal, and the soul is immortal.”113 Finally, king Wu of Liang issued an edict in which he proclaimed that “We have no clear understanding of the doctrine on the mortality of the soul.”114 After that, 62 aristocrats and high officials, one after another, echoed his statement. King Wu followed up his edict by writing a treatise entitled “A Note on Establishing the Principle that the Soul Attains Illumination of Buddhahood” (“Li shenming chengfo yiji 立神明成佛義記), in which he outlined the principles of the “immortality of the soul”:115 The mind (心) is the root of function (用). There is only one root and various functions. The many functions have their own flourishing and ceasing, and the nature (性) of the one root does not change. The one root is manifested as both ignorance (wuming 無明, avidya¯) and enlightenment of the soul (神明). Examining the appellation of ignorance, the term is not the ultimate emptiness. Since earth and stones are not sentient (無情), how can they be called ignorant? Therefore, it is through knowing and thinking that one is susceptible to illumination. The body though is inevitably confused. Being confused and unknowing is thus called ignorance. Ignorance is above the body, it lives and dies, and life and death are its different functions. Ignorance does not change the meaning of mind. I am afraid that, seeing that its functions are different, one will say that the mind passes out of existence following its environment. For this reason, along with the notion of ignorance, the term “devilling-place” (zhudi 住地, a¯va¯sabhu¯mi) needs to be added. This illustrates how ignorance is the same as illumination, and the latter’s nature is unchanging.

The above edict by king Wu of Liang truly possesses theoretical profundity. Its central thesis argues that “the mind (心) is the root of function (用); there is only one root and various functions. /…/ The one root, is ignorance (wuming 無明, avidya¯) and enlightenment of the soul (神明)”. King Wu believed that “the mind”

112 Fan Zhen范縝, “Da Cao lushi ‘Nan Shenmie lun’ 答曹錄事〈難神滅論〉 [A Response to the Writing of Cao Siwen on the Matter of ‘Refutation against the Treatise on the Mortality of the Soul’],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 2, p. 622. 113 Cao Siwen 曹思文, “Chong nan ‘Shenmie lun’ 重難〈神滅論〉 [A Repeated Refutation against the Treatise on Mortality of the Soul],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 2, p. 633. 114 Liang Wu Di 梁武帝, “Da Liang Huangdi chi da chenxia shenmie lun 大梁皇帝敕答臣下神 滅論 [An Edict of the Emperor of the Great Liang in Response to his Subjects on the Matter of the Immortality of the Soul],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 2, p. 639. 115 Liang Wu Di 梁武帝, “Li shenming chengfo yiji 立神明成佛義記 [A Note on Establishing the Principle that the Soul Attains Illumination of Buddhahood],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 2, p. 588.

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(or “illuminated soul”) exists in the noumenal world, and that “the mind” can generate the myriad things and living beings of the phenomenal world, yet still not belong to the latter. Consequently, even if the “body,” which is a part of the phenomenal world, perishes, the “mind” does not follow its path, and does not entirely perish. Within the debates on the body-soul relation between Buddhism and native Chinese thought that took place in intellectual circles in China, the resources of native Chinese thought played an important role. As correctly observed by Fang Litian (方立天, 1933–2014): “The Chinese Buddhists’ theory of the immortality of the soul was their realization of the doctrines of karmic retribution and samsara of life and death of Indian Buddhism. It was a general teaching on rebirth and karmic retribution and attaining Buddhahood by ascetic practice, based on a unique elucidation of the native Chinese concept of “soul” (shen 神).”116 The incorporated elements acquired from Chinese native thought encompassed concepts of soul and spirits, ancestor worship, the notion of “soul” (神) from the “Great Commentary” of the Book of Change (周易大傳), Daoist thought, the doctrine of qi (氣), the theory of human nature (人性), and concepts of substance and function (體用), among others.117 Thus, for example, when in the 6th century Yan Zhitui argues that “even when the body (形體) dies, the soul (精神) still goes on existing,”118 he is using the traditional concept of spirits and ghosts, which presupposes a “worldly existence of spirits.”119 In their polemics with the adherents of “mortality of the soul,” the native Chinese Buddhist scholars used these intellectual resources to raise arguments such as that “body and soul have different roots,” “body and soul coincide,” “the body is coarse, and the soul is sublime,” and “the body is still, and the soul is dynamic.” They also borrowed the metaphor of firewood and fire to illustrate the relationship between body and soul.120

116 Fang Litian 方立天, Zhongguo fojiao zhexue yaoyi 中國佛教哲學要義 [The Essentials of Chinese Buddhist Philosophy](Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2002), Vol. 1, pp. 139–140. 117 Ibid., pp. 140–145. 118 Yan Zhitui 顏之推 au., Wang Liqi 王利器 comm., Yanshi jiaxun jijie 顏氏家訓集解 [Collected Commentaries on Master Yan’s Family Instructions](Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1980), Vol. 5, p. 363. 119 Ibid. 120 Fang Litian 方立天, Zhongguo fojiao zhexue yaoyi 中國佛教哲學要義 [The Essentials of Chinese Buddhist Philosophy](Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2002), Vol. 1, pp. 134–138.

60 2.)

Common Topics of the East Asian Confucian-Buddhist Debates

Korea

Now, we will turn to talk about the debate on the body-soul relationship in Joseon Korea. In Exposition of Orthodoxy, Gihwa delivers the following Buddhist response to the Korean Confucians’ disputation:121 [The Confucians] say: Human life comes into being through the combination of yin and yang. We receive our material substance from the yin and receive our material force from the yang. One part yin, and one part yang are distributed as the hun and po souls in the formation of being. Upon dying, the hun rises and the po soul sinks, completely disappearing. That by which human beings have intelligence is the mind. This mind is the master of the body that is formed by the combination of the hun and po souls. At death it separates from the material force: the bodily form becomes non-existent and the spirit ascends to abide in the realm of the darkness. Who is there to be percipient of fortune and calamity? The Buddhists try to encourage people with the concept of a heavenly realm and to scare them with talk of hell. This makes people confused. Heaven is something clear and spacious. It consists of the moon, stars, and other celestial bodies, and nothing more. The earth is made of soil and rock, and those who are supported by it are humans and the myriad beings. To claim that the person who dies does not disappear but continues to exist in heaven or hell, isn’t that nonsense? [I respond to this by] saying: There is no doubt that humans depend upon the forces of yin and yang for their coming-into-existence. It is through the merging of yin and yang that we receive life. It is because of their separation that we die. If humans possess an intrinsic intelligence, then it neither arises not disappears depending on form. Though it passes through myriad transformations it remains still and independent. There are two kinds of mind: the “intrinsically real mind” and the “corporeal mind.” The corporeal mind is the essence of the hun and po souls. The intrinsically real mind refers to the real intelligence. The mind under discussion here is the intrinsically real mind and not the corporeal mind. The mind is the master of the body, and the body is the servant of the mind. The various activities of good and evil are ordered by the mind-lord and carried out by the form-minister. When it comes to the point of receiving karmic retribution for one’s actions, if one is alive, then the lord and minister both receive them. If one is dead, then the form-minister has already passed away and the mind-lord alone receives them. /…/ We should be able to realize that the numinous intelligence does not change following the bodily form. Is it not ignorant to say that at death bodily form together with the spirit both disappear? As far as heaven and hell are concerned, these are not inherently existent places; [rather] they are naturally brought about by people’s karmic activity. /…/ Heaven and hell are not created by someone else. When people hear about heaven, they yearn for it and endeavor in the pursuit of goodness. Wanting to avoid hell, they refrain from evil activities. In this way the teaching of heaven and hell serves to transform people. Is this not of great benefit? 121 Gihwa 己和, Hyeonjeong non 顯正論 [Exposition of Orthodoxy]. The English translation adopted from A. Charles Muller, Korea’s Great Buddhist-Confucian Debate: The Treatises of Cho˘ng Tojo˘n (Sambong) and Hamho˘ Tu˘kt’ong (Kihwa), pp. 97–98.

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In the above writing, the Confucian interlocutor believes that the “mind” (心) acting as the master of the body scatters together with qi and body upon death. In the second part of the dialogue, the exposition of the Buddhist position, the “mind” is identified with “real intelligence” (zhenming 真明). The proponent of the Buddhist teaching thus maintains that, after a person dies, the body fades away, whereas the “mind” does not follow the “body” into a complete extinguishment. In the above text, the monk Gihwa also listed many factual examples, which were intended to prove that the “body” withers and the “soul” survives. In the following chapter we will further discuss Gihwa’s defense of Buddhist doctrine, which involved both the Buddhist teaching of karma in the three times (三世因果) and the view of infinite life, analyzing both aspects in the context of the Confucian-Buddhist debates on karma and samsara.

2.5

Questions of Karma and Samsara (因果與輪迴)

1.)

China

The fifth question of the Confucian-Buddhist debates was closely related to the above-discussed question of the relationship between body and soul. The questions were interrelated through the teaching of karma in the three times and samsara as maintained by the Buddhists, as well as via its extension to the doctrine of heaven and hell. Li Zehou (李澤厚, 1930-) describes Chinese culture as a culture of “a single world” (yige shijie 一個世界).122 And, when Zi Lu asked Confucius about the existence of supernatural beings, the former replied: “You are not able even to serve man. How can you serve the spirit? …You do not understand even life. How can you understand death?” (Analects, “Xian Jin”, 12) 123 The humanist spirit of the Confucians resides in its focus on this world, which turns the “profane” into the “sacred.”124 Thus, even though in ancient China there 122 For additional information the reader can consult Li Zehou’s numerous works on the intellectual history of ancient China. See: Li Zehou 李澤厚, Zhongguo gudai sixiangshi lun 中國 古代思想史論 [On Ancient Chinese Intellectual History](Beijing: Shenghua – dushu -xinzhi sanlian shudian, 2008); Li Zehou 李澤厚, “Chu ni Ruxue shenceng jiegou shuo 初擬儒學深層 結構說 [An Experimental Essay on the Deep Structure of Confucianism],” in Li Zehou, Lishi bentilun – jimao wu shuo (zengdingben) 歷史本體論己卯五說（增訂本） (Historical Ontology – Five Essays from 1999 (Revised and Enlarged Edition))(Beijing: Shenghuo – dushu – xinzhi sanlian shudian, 2008), pp. 270–288. 123 D. C. Lau trans., The Analects (Hong Kong: the Chinese University Press, 1992), p. 99. 124 This is the theory of the American philosopher H. Fingarette. See: Herbert Fingarette, Confucius: The Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); In his analysis of Confucianism, Fingarette sets out from the concept li 禮 (“propriety, ritual”), and maintains

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also existed an idea of retribution – for example, the Book of Change (“Kun”) says: “The family that amasses good is sure to have an excess of happiness; the family that does not accumulate good is sure to have an excess of misfortune”125 – as has already been noted by Kunio Hachiya (蜂屋邦夫, 1938-), this kind of notion was nevertheless a social idea, which rested on family as the basic unit. The very same view stressed that an offspring’s conduct in this life can bring blessings or calamity upon their deceased ancestors.126 Buddhism, however, taught that, after one’s death, the soul is not extinguished, and that one’s life is entangled in a perpetual development of samsara. Consequently, there still was an immense difference between the theory of karmic retribution in the three times (past, present and future incarnations) and the idea of retribution in traditional Chinese thought. A difference which inevitably led both sides to an open conflict. This question had already been addressed at the end of the Han dynasty: Master Mou’s Treatise on Settling Confusions contains two examples of the bilateral argumentation on that topic.127 In both examples, Mouzi’s response is based on the view of infinite life, which is derived from the theories of karma in the three times, immortality of the soul and karmic retribution. By the time of the Northern and Southern dynasties, native Chinese scholars were once more disputing the Buddhist teaching of karmic retribution. The sentiment expressed by Yan Zhitui in the 6th century, namely, “that good and bad luck, fortune and misfortune might not be related to retribution is misleading,”128 is indicative of this fifth point of controversy that contemporary Chinese thinkers had been raising against Buddhism throughout this period. A comparatively representative example of Buddhist responses to the above-mentioned controversy emerged in the 4th century, and was written by Huiyuan as an answer to Huan Xuan’s disputation against karmic retribution. Huiyuan’s “An Explanation of Karmic Retribution, Written in Answer to a Letter of Huan Xuan” (Da Huan

125 126

127 128

that it is by adopting ren 仁 (“humanity”) that Confucius returns to the notion of “propriety.” Wang Bi 王弼 au., Kong Yingda 孔穎達 comm., Zhouyi zhengyi 周易正義 [The True Meaning of the Book of Change](Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1999), Vol. 1, p. 36. Hachiya Kunio 蜂屋邦夫, “Shizen to inga 自然と因果 [Nature and karma],” in Chu¯goku shukyogaku shisoo 中國宗教思想 [Chinese Religious Thought](Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 1990, 1999), pp. 60–73; esp. pp. 68–69. On the concept of bao (“retribution”) in Chinese thought, see: Lien-sheng Yang, “The Concept of ‘pao’ as a Basis for Social Relations in China,” in John K. Fairbank ed., Chinese Thought and Institutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957). See also: Yang, Lien-sheng 楊聯陞, Zhongguo wenhua zhong ‘bao’, ‘bao’, ‘bao’ zhi yiyi 中國文化中「報」、「保」、「包」之意義 [The Meaning of “Retribution,” “Preservation” and “Embrace” in Chinese Thought](Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1987, 2009). See texts no. 1 and no. 3 on p. 25. Wang Liqi 王利器 comm., Yanshi jiaxun jijie 顏氏家訓集解 [Collected Commentaries on Master Yan’s Family Instructions], Vol. 5, p. 371–372.

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Nanjun ming baoying pian 答桓南郡明報應篇), reads in the following manner:129 I suggest the following demonstration: That which is affected by causes and conditions and generated by the changes (of our life), does it not come from the way (道)? Ignorance (avidya¯) is the source from which the net of confusion is weaved; desire (ra¯ga) builds the mansion of entanglement of the masses. Roaming on the path of these two principles obfuscates the manifestation of the soul (神). Good and bad luck – and remorse – are just movement along that trail. Ignorance beclouds [the soul’s] vision, and makes his senses (情) and thought become chained to external things. Desire makes his nature (性) drift astray, and causes the four elements to aggregate and form bodies. When a body thus coagulates, boundaries emerge between the “other” and “me”. When emotions (情) are clogged, the [difference between] good and bad becomes important. When there are boundaries between “me” and the “other,” one becomes selfishly directed towards one’s body, which makes it harder to discard the body. When one focuses on discerning between good and bad, one becomes attached to one’s life and cannot break away from it. Hence, one gets sweetly lulled into the Great Dream, unaware that one has been taken by delusion. Embracing doubt, during the long night we keep to our attachments. Thereupon comes the struggle between loss and gain, calamity and fortune rivalling each other. Then evil deeds accumulate, and the calamity of heaven arrives by itself [upon the deluded]. When sin is conceived, it is punished in hell. This is an inevitable fate, without any doubt. How come? [All that] is rooted in the past, is reciprocated by an obscure law. Though the signs are profound, when the potential is fathomed it arises. Consequently, the mind turns the distinction between good and evil into shape and sound, and retribution turns sin and happiness to shadow and echo. Beginning in emotions, the response follows by itself. Is there an unseen judge? We lose our way because of our own drive. In that case, the karmic response has been aroused only by ourselves; because it is aroused in that way, it is also called “natural.” That it is natural means that it is the shadow and echo of the self. How can these be works by a master (over destiny) you speak about? … I disagree that there are only earth, water, fire and air which, when conjoined, make up a body, which is assumed to be the house of the soul. If it is so, then there is a master of the house. Tell me: Is the master who dwells in the house sentient, or not? If one is to say that he is not, then the conglomeration of the four elements does not affect the master of the house. If the master is not concerned with that, then he does not reside there with emotions, which would mean the soul which lives in the house does not have emotions, and does not know pain and itching. The soul would thus be without any knowledge of that, and the house too would be without pain and itching. Receiving external things would then be like cutting grass and trimming the trees [i. e., entirely painless]. This explanation is senseless. [Now,] assuming that it is sentient, the conglomeration of the four elements would affect the master. In that way, the master would have to have emotions, and the soul would not be able to be unaware of pain and itching. If the soul is aware, the house also experiences pain and itching upon contact with external things… It follows: Though body and soul are different, they 129 Huiyuan 慧遠, “Ming baoying lun 明報應論 [An Explanation of Retribution],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 1, pp. 347–348.

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change together; though what is within truly differs from what is without, they intermingle into one integral body. If not the one who has a broad perspective, who [else] can grasp their boundary? Those who do not know them, get more and more deluded. All who receive form also receive ordainment (fate); there is no one in whom this is not completely natural. Since they receive the two, each of them is bound by selfish attachment. If the root of attachment is not torn out, one becomes more and more settled in this pattern of life. If the cause of desire is not eliminated, preserving it will deepen [its roots]. If one principle goes against our sentiments, our heart breaks into confusion, and how much more so when it comes to the loss of everything. Thus, harmony and discord control each other; together they beget hostility and conflict. As long as the misfortune has not passed from the mind, blame is created ceaselessly. Even if they are pleased, after that they will get angry again, their sentiments will not get rid of regret. When the shape and sound have emerged, the shadow and echo will manifest by themselves. What is to be expected cannot be foreseen; when the time comes, the dues are payed. Who can succeed in escaping this fate? This, then, is what is meant by emotions causing retribution, and by ascending confusion giving birth to response; but what you claim differs fundamentally from that, and therefore I cannot agree.

Huiyuan basically claims that all desire starts in “ignorance” (無明), and that, ultimately, “when evil deeds accumulate, the calamity of heaven arrives by itself [upon the deluded]. When sin is conceived, it is punished in hell.” He further advocates the view that “even though body and soul are different, they change together; though what is within truly differs from what is without, they intermingle into one integral body.” This entails that “retribution being caused by emotions and by response generated from ascending confusion” is a natural law. When Huiyuan makes the interpretation that people’s desires arise from “ignorance,” and that, consequently, karmic retribution is a natural principle, he is relying on the Buddhist doctrine of “the twelve causes” (dva¯das´a nida¯na, shier yinyuan 十二因緣). This was the first type of theory presented in response to the disputations against the notion of karmic retribution. A second kind of response made by the Buddhist scholars was the so-called “Theory of three kinds of retribution” (sanbao shuo 三報說). A treatise bearing the same title was written by Huiyuan in response to Dai Kui’s (戴逵, 331–396) work “On Dispelling Doubts” (Shiyi lun 釋疑論),130 published in the year 19 of the Taiyuan era (394), which called into question the Buddhist doctrine of karmic retribution. In his treatise on “Three Kinds of Karmic Retribution” (Sanbao lun 三報論), Huiyuan proposed the following apology:131

130 Daoxuan 道宣, Guang Hongming ji 廣弘明集 [Expanded Collection of Texts on Spreading Enlightenment], in Dazheng Xinxiu Dazangjing 大正新脩大藏經 [Taisho¯ Tripitaka], ˙ Vol. 52, juan 18, pp. 221–222. 131 Huiyuan 慧遠, “Sanbao lun 三報論 [Three Kinds of Karmic Retribution],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 1, p. 355.

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A sutra says: karma has three kinds of retribution: the first is retribution in the present life; the second is retribution in the next life, and the third is retribution in the lives to follow. In retribution of the present life, retribution for good deeds and bad deeds that have begun within the present body are exacted in the same body. In retribution of the next life, good and bad deeds from the previous life are rewarded or punished again in the current life. In future retribution, they are rewarded or punished in the second, third, hundredth, thousandth. Accepting that retribution through incarnation has no master, its necessity arises due to the mind (citta). The mind has no fixed drive; when it is affected by affairs (of the world), it responds accordingly. Just as there are slow and quick responses, so too do there exist retributions which arrive early and late. Although some responses arrive earlier than others, in each case they correspond (with the deed that elicited them). There are strong and weak responses. Thus, the response is sometimes light and sometimes heavy. This is how nature rewards and punishes: a plan of three retributions.

Huiyuan distinguished between three categories of retribution: “retribution in the present life” (現報), “retribution in the next life” (生報), and “retribution in the lives to follow” (後報). He further pointed out that retribution as such is possible because the human “mind” serves as the subject of such retribution. Huiyuan’s doctrine of three kinds of retribution, which constitutes one of the original creeds of Buddhism, is mutually interrelated with the teaching of the “three times.” His theoretical exposition maintains that in the perpetual samsara of life the soul does not perish, yet “when it is affected by affairs (of the world), it responds” and that “as there are slow or quick responses, so exist retributions that arrive early or late.” Using the above-illustrated theory of “the three kinds of retribution,” Huiyuan set out to dispel doubts the native Chinese scholars had raised in their disputation against the Buddhist doctrine of karmic retribution. The third kind of discourse proposed by the adherents of Buddhism was the doctrine of the “Three Realms” (sanjie lun 三界論).132 Among treatises about or related to that topic was also a text entitled “Essentials of Upholding the Dharma” (Fengfa yao 奉法要)133, written by Chi Chao (郗超, 336–378), a Jin dynasty official whose title was Gentleman of the Palace Writers. Already in the beginning of the treatise, Chi Chao mentions the idea that: “When fasting, the devotee must perform this for the sake of all who have passed away or who are still alive, for his acquaintances and relatives, as well as for all living beings. On all occasions, he must use this (fasting) to extend his sincerity and with hidden thoughts to move

132 Bodhiruci 菩提流志 trans., Dabaoji jing 大寶積經 [Maha¯ ratnaku¯ta sutra], juan 94, says: ˙ “The three times are called past, future and present.” See Dazheng Xinxiu Dazangjing 大正 新脩大藏經 [Taisho¯ Tripitaka], Vol. 11, juan 94, p. 535. ˙ title as “A Convert’s Vademecum” (E. Zürcher, The Buddhist 133 Zürcher also translates the Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China, Leiden: Brill, 2007), p. 17.

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and stimulate (their minds).”134 In the above statement, Chi Chao synthesized the Buddhist precept of fasting with the Confucian way of obedience to one’s parents, which already reveals a development towards the sinification of Buddhism. Furthermore, in the remaining text of his treatise, Chi Chao also gives a detailed exposition of how, in the boundless samsara of life in the five karmic destinations (wu dao 五道, pañcagatika) of the Three Realms (sanjie 三界, trailokya), all conduct and every deed exists entirely in our mind and recollections, and as such also receives appropriate karmic retribution. He asserts that:135 The whole universe taken together is called the Three Realms; within the Three Realms there are five modes of existence (“courses”, dao 道): 1.) gods, 2.) human beings, 3.) animals, 4.) hungry demons, and 5.) [inhabitants of] the hells. Those who fully observe the five rules obtain a human shape. Those who [n addition] perform the ten good works are (re)born in the abode of the gods (天堂), and even those who fully observe one of the five rules still do not fail to become human beings. But among these there are differences between high and low, and between the long-lived and those who die prematurely; all this depends on the number of precepts (戒) which they have observed. The opposite of the ten good works is called the ten evil works, and those who have committed them all will enter Hell. Those who have been violent and oppressive, who have not taken to heart faithful remonstrances, who have had many venomous thoughts, and who have been striving for their personal [well-being] whilst cheating others either fall as low as domestic animals or as snakes and vipers. Those who have been stingy and covetous and only interested in gain, and who have always been anxious lest they would not have enough, descend to [the state of] hungry demons. Those whose sins have been somewhat less serious or numerous, but who have often cherished dark and egoistic [thoughts], and whose feelings have not been honest and fair, all descend to [the state of] demons and spirits; although they may enjoy a little happiness, they cannot avoid suffering and pain. These [three spheres of existence] are called “three paths” (san tu 三塗) and also “three evil courses.” (Visible) matter (se 色, ru¯pa), painful or pleasant sensation, thought-and-memory, birth and passing away and recollection are called “five dark[ening] elements” (wu yin 五陰). In general, all things of the outer world which have form and can be seen are called “matter.” When losing them, one feels distressed; this is “painful sensation.” When obtaining them, one feels happy; this is “pleasant sensation.” To think in anticipation of what has not yet taken place is “thought”; afterwards to recall what has already happened is called “memory.” The rise of a thought is “birth”; when a thought passes into memory and is extinguished, this is “passing away.” Whichever ones have involved the mind in the past are stored away and not forgotten: this is “recollection.” 134 Chi Chao 郗超, “Fengfa yao 奉法要 [Essentials of Upholding the Dharma],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 2, p. 899. English translation taken from Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China, p. 165. 135 Ibid., pp. 901–902. The above quoted translation is a slightly modified and revised version of E. Zürcher’s translation of the text. See Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China, p. 166.

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After having passed through a succession of kalpas, recollection will still sprout again in the heart. Although one is ignorant about its origin, yet it lingers at its root. At first, it secretly develops from something infinitesimal, but in the end it becomes (huge) like mountains and valleys. This is why the student must strive to be attentive in whatever he practices.

If we assume that Huiyuan’s “treatise on three kinds of retribution” is a discourse on temporality, then we can call Chi Chao’s “theory of the three realms” a discourse on spatiality. In that way, the adherents of Buddhism set out to establish the necessity of karmic retribution through the application of infinity of time and vastness of space contained in the notion of samsara.

2.)

Korea

After the Buddhist doctrine of karmic retribution had been imported to Korea, its presence also aroused fierce debates between the local Confucian and Buddhist scholars. The first and the second chapter of the Korean Confucian Jeong Dojeon’s treatise An Array of Critiques Against Buddhism, composed in the second half of the 14th century, bore the titles “Critique of the Buddhist Doctrine of Samsara” (佛氏輪迴之辨) and “Critique of the Buddhist Notion of Karma” (佛氏因果之辨) respectively. First, Jeong presented his critique of the Buddhist doctrine of samsara:136 The unending production and reproduction of human beings, along with the transformations of heaven and earth, operate continually without break. Originally the supreme polarity has motion and stillness, which generates yin and yang. Yin and yang undergo change and recombination, and the five elements are contained within this. The reality of the nonpolar and the supreme polarity and the germinative essence of the five elements of yin-yang mysteriously combine and congeal, and humans and creatures are [thereby] produced and reproduced. That which is born fades away, while that which is not yet born comes forth and endures, [all] without a moment’s interruption. The Buddha says that when people die their spirit is not annihilated; they subsequently take on [new] form. The theory of samsara starts with this. /…/ The space between heaven and earth is like an oven: Even though there are living things, they are all completely burnt away without a trace. How can you possibly say that that which has been dispersed is again joined and that which has passed away can return? We can also test this concept in the case of our own bodies in the moment of a single inhalation and exhalation. When air goes out we call it “one breath.” But that which goes out in the exhalation is not what is taken in with the next inhalation. In this way then, the res136 Jeong Dojeon 鄭道傳, Sambong sonsaeng munjip 三峰先生文集 [Collected Writings of Master Sambong), Vol. 2, juan 9, p. 1; 132–133. The English translation taken from: A. Charles Muller, Korea’s Great Buddhist-Confucian Debate: The Treatises of Cho˘ng Tojo˘n (Sambong) and Hamho˘ Tu˘kt’ong (Kihwa), p. 55.

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piration of people is continually produced without end. The principle of departing of that which goes forth and the continuation of that which comes in can be seen in this. We can also confirm this in other living things in the world. In the vegetation, a single material force penetrates from the root through the trunk, the branches, the leaves, flowers and fruits. During the spring and summer this material force peaks in its activity and flowers and leaves grow thickly. But it is not the case that the fallen leaves return to their roots, back to their origin to be reborn. /…/ This is because human beings and the myriad things are all born from the material force of heaven and earth. Therefore, when the material force is waxing, [the number of all things] increases simultaneously. When the material force is on the wane, [the number of all things] decreases simultaneously. I have had it with the Buddhist’s teaching of samsara, which is nothing but a hideous deception to the people of the world! If we deeply fathom all the transformations of heaven and earth and clearly examine the production of human and creatures, then we cannot but understand it as I have explained here. For those who share my view, let’s reflect on this together.

Jeong Dojeon’s critique of the Buddhist teaching on samsara can be described as vigorous and firm. The theoretical foundations from which he draws in his critique of the Buddhist doctrine of samsara, as well as of the doctrine of immortality of the soul, were based on the doctrine of qi (氣, or “material force”) that prevailed in the Korean Confucian circles at the time.137 As a Korean NeoConfucian scholar, Jeong Dojeon adopted the popular doctrine of qi in order to refute Buddhism, and thus stated that if human life is of “the nature of the transformations of qi,” then his death is also a phenomenon of “scattering together with (the movement) of qi.” By appropriating the “doctrine of qi,” he eliminates the Buddhist body-soul dualism, along with its corollary “doctrine of the mortal body and immortal soul.” Subsequently, Jeong inferred that “the space between heaven and earth resembles an oven,” where after their death all living creatures are incinerated out of existence, and hence unable to reassemble after having been dissolved, return after having departed. Therefore, the assumptions of the doctrine of samsara are hard to establish. From Jeong Dojeon’s critique above, we can learn that, in the Korean intellectual world of the 14th century, the “doctrine of qi” had already been considerably expanded and posed a serious threat to the Buddhist “doctrine of immortality of the soul.” Secondly, Jeong Dojeon also questioned the Buddhist doctrine of karma:138 Now, [in the activity of] yin and yang and the five elements, the twists of fate and the alternations in patterns are uneven and offset. Therefore, in their material force (qi) 137 On the intellectual trend to oppose the Neo-Confucian teaching on qi (氣) see: Yang Rubin 楊儒賓, Yiyi de yiyi: yinshi Dongya de fan Lixue sichao 異議的意義: 近世東亞的反理學思 潮 [Significance of Dissent: Intellectual Trends Against Neo-Confucianism in Modern East Asia](Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2012). 138 Jeong Dojeon 鄭道傳, Sambong sonsaeng munjip 三峰先生文集 [Collected Writings of Master Sambong], Vol. 2, juan 9, pp. 4; 138–139. Translation taken from: A. Charles Muller,

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there are differences of free flow and congestion, imbalance and balance, purity and pollution, substantiality and insipidness, high and low, long and short. And in the production of humans and animals, if the timing is right, they obtain balance and penetration, becoming human beings. If they end up with imbalance and congestion, they become animals. The respective nobility and wretchedness of humans and animals is differentiated in this. Furthermore, while existing as a human, those who attain clarity are the wise and the adept. Those who are turbid are the foolish and the inept. Those who are thick [in virtue] attain wealth and those [whose virtue] is insipid end up in poverty. The high are ennobled and the low are miserable. Those endowed with longevity are long-lived, and those limited to brevity die young. This discussion is greatly abbreviated, yet the case is the same with the creatures. The qilin, the dragon, and the phoenix are spiritual, while tigers, wolves, and snakes are poisonous. The camellia, cassia, bracket fungus, and epidendrum are auspicious, while crowsbreak, aconite, and cogongrass bring suffering. Although these all lie in the category of the congested and imbalanced, there are inequalities in relative good and evil. Yet they do not become so by their own intention. The Changes says, “The Heavenly Way transforms, determining the constitution of each thing.” An earlier scholar said, “This indicates that Heaven’s Way is distributed to the myriad things without intention.” The same principle can be seen expressed in the minor arts of physicians and fortune-tellers. When fortune tellers determine people’s bad and good destinies they must inevitably look back to their basis in the rise and fall of the five elements. For example, some people’s destinies are determined by the element of wood: in the spring they will flourish and in the autumn they will decline. Their appearance tends to be green and tall and their hearts tend to be warm and compassionate. Other people’s destinies are determined by the element of metal: they do well in the autumn and falter in the summer. Their appearance tends to be whitish and square, their minds strong and bright. The same sorts of examples can be drawn from the elements of water and fire; there is no place where they do not have application. Ugliness in appearance and coarseness and dullness of mind are also rooted in imbalances in the endowments drawn from the five elements. When physicians are diagnosing people’s sickness, they also must investigate the root causes of the mutual influences of the five elements. This can be seen in the fact that sickness related to cold will be related to the water-based kidneys, and sickness of heat will be related to the fire-based heart. The treatments given are adapted to the various natures of warm or cool, cold or hot, by prescribing medicine that tastes salty or sour, sweet or bitter, which are in turn categories related to the five elements. In this there are no [remedies] that are not perfectly matched [to the disease and personal constitution]. This is what our Confucian teachers mean when they say that the production of people and creatures occurs based on the attainment of the material forces through yin-yang and the five elements. This is supported by direct testimony that is beyond doubt. If you follow the explanations of the Buddhists, then fortune and misfortune and sickness are unrelated to yin-yang and the five elements. Instead, all are manifested as karmic retribution. [If this is so,] why, when it comes to the divination of fortune/misfortune and the diagnosis of disease, is it that not a single person has abandoned our Confucian yin-yang-fiveKorea’s Great Buddhist-Confucian Debate: The Treatises of Cho˘ng Tojo˘n (Sambong) and Hamho˘ Tu˘kt’ong (Kihwa), p. 57.

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elements paradigm and adopted the Buddhist theory of karmic results? Their theories are nonsensical and error-laden and not worth being adopted. How can you allow yourself to be deceived by such teachings?!

In the above passage, Jeong Dojeon still takes the position of “the doctrine of qi.” Through differences inherent in material force (qi), such as free flow and congestion, imbalance and balance, purity and pollution, substantiality and insipidness, high and low, long and short, the author tries to explain how people and animals differ in value, and also why between people there exist such differences as wise and foolish, rich and poor, noble and lowly, long-lived and shortlived. Finally, Jeong reveals that his main objective lies in disputing “karmic retribution as spoken about by the Buddhist” with the use of “(our) Confucian paradigm of yin-yang and the five-elements.” Jeong Dojeon’s disputation against the Buddhist idea of karmic retribution represented the mainstream opinion in the already deeply Confucianized Korean society that had existed since the 14th century. For the Buddhist monk Gihwa, who was 34 years Jeong’s junior, it was a necessity to respond to this questioning of Buddhist doctrine by his Confucian counterpart. Thus, in section eight of his Exposition of Orthodoxy we can read the following dialogue:139 [The Confucians] say: The birth and death of human beings is exactly their beginning and end. Therefore, Confucius only spoke about what occurs between birth and death and never discussed what comes before and after. But Buddhists speak of the before and after, putting it together with the time of birth and death, referring to this combination as the “three times.” That which comes before life and follows after death is something with which the ears and eyes have never had contact. Who has personally seen these things? Is it not deceptive to confuse people with these ideas? [In response to this, I] say: The birth and death of human beings is just like the transition of day and night. Since there is transition, there is naturally before and after. When it is daytime, then the night that has passed is before and the coming night is after. When it is night-time, then the day that has passed is before and the coming day is after. In this way, day and night, when arranged together, naturally constitute the three divisions of time. Since day and night are like this, the same holds true for months and years. Since months and years are like this, the same holds true for birth and death. The beginninglessness of the past and the endlessness of the future can also be known through this. The Book of Change says, “[The Changes] illuminate the past and interpret the future” and “[Words] clarify the results of loss and gain.” How could the words “going and coming” not imply the same thing as “before and after”? To regard the teaching of the three divisions of time as trickery is beyond my comprehension.

139 Gihwa 己和, Hyeonjeong non 顯正論 [Exposition of Orthodoxy]. The English translation taken from: The English translation adopted from: A. Charles Muller. Korea’s Great Buddhist-Confucian Debate: The Treatises of Cho˘ng Tojo˘n (Sambong) and Hamho˘ Tu˘kt’ong (Kihwa), p. 103.

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In the above text, Gihwa used the Buddhist teaching of the infinite cycle of “three times” (past, present and future) to prove that the necessity of karmic retribution is exactly like the alternation between day and night.

3.)

Japan

The topic of the doctrine of karmic retribution was also addressed in the debate between the Japanese Zhu Xi scholar Hayashi Razan and the adherent of Nichiren Buddhism Matsunaga Teitoku. At the beginning of his disputation against the notion of retribution, Hayashi Razan first quoted from the Fayuan Zhulin (法苑珠林, “Forest of Gems in the Garden of Dharma”). He narrated the story about the poet Yu Xin, who in his lifetime composed a vulgar book which slandered the Buddhadharma by ridiculing Buddhist sutras, and had, after his death, consequently descended to hell and was later reincarnated in the form of a turtle so as to receive due retribution for his sins. Hayashi wanted to show that the parable about the retribution received by the poet in his afterlife merely illustrates the existence of the principle of change, and that it cannot be proven that his punishment was in any way related to karma. He further remarked that the Buddhist doctrine of karmic retribution must have originated in the Confucian books which encourage goodness and virtue. Ultimately, he also drew from Huang Gan (黃榦, courtesy names Zhiqing 直卿 and Mianzhai 勉齋, 1151–1221), one of Zhu Xi’s eminent disciples, who said that: “Defending empty and numinous knowledge, and thus obscuring the truth about the principle of heaven, the teachings of Laozi and the Buddha borrow from the words of the Confucians.”140 Deriving from Huang Gan’s remark, Hayashi Razan thus maintained that the manner in which Buddhists illegitimately misuse Confucianism is in no way different from Yu Xin’s misuse of Buddhist dharma.141 Matsunaga Teitoku’s response to Hayashi Razan’s suspicions towards the teaching of karmic retribution was rather long and tedious. Its content can be summarized in the following five points:142 (1) Matsunaga first explains that the principle of change and karmic retribution are not the same by distinguishing between “the principle of heaven [unveiling] before one’s eyes” (眼前的天理) and “the principle of karma’s unveiling” (因果歷然之 理). The former is the principle of change of Confucianism and is illustrated, for example, by this passage from the Book of Rites 禮記 (“Yue Ling”): “In the second

140 Huang Gan 黃榦, Huang Mianzhai xiansheng wenji 黄勉齋先生文集 [Collected Writings of Mr. Huang Mianzhai](Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), Vol. 8, p. 185. 141 Okuwa Hitoshi ed., Razan Teitoku Jubutsu Mondo¯ Chu¯kai to Kenkyu¯, p. 20. 142 Ibid., pp. 20–24.

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(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

month of spring, the eagle is transformed into a turtle dove. In the last month of autumn, the sparrow enters the flooding water and turns into a clam.” The latter is the Buddhist principle of change that underlies karmic retribution and is a set dharma, the principle of necessary causality, like the eventual retribution of good and evil. Matsunaga then points out that because Hayashi Razan incorrectly assumed in his example of “Yu Xin’s change into a turtle” that Buddhist writings stole their ideas from the Confucian classics (cause), he produced false understanding (effect). Matsunaga further shows that the same was true of Huan Wen or Mother Huang, who suffered the karmic fruits (karmaphala) of being degraded to the mode of animal existence (result), because of having committed wrong deeds (cause). He refutes the claim that Buddhists are stealing from Confucian sources. In his refutation, he argues that Kumarajiva’s translation of the Lotus sutra, which describes the miracle of how all the Buddhas were incarnated in this world bearing the shape of a human, is akin to Na¯ga¯rjuna’s translations of the philosophical treatises of Maitreya Buddha, the philosopher Asanga, Vasubhandu, and others. Matsunaga Teitoku maintains that language and writing are “a tool to penetrate the way.” Although the language of Buddhist scripts is superficially similar to the Confucian writing on encouraging goodness and virtue, their writings convey entirely different theoretical content. He maintains that because the Buddhadharma was transmitted via Western languages, when it was translated into the Chinese language, the “wisdom of Buddhahood” needed to be understood “with the Chinese mind.” Consequently, in the process of translation, the translators needed to borrow from Confucian texts to be able to give more comprehensible explanations of the translated texts. In addition to terms borrowed from Confucianism, Chinese translations of Buddhist scripts also contain a variety of words that were not borrowed from Confucian books, as for example: helile 訶梨勒 (skt. harı¯takı¯, ‘Terminalia chebula’).143 Matsunaga maintains that Kumarajiva’s translation of Buddhist sutras is analogous to the transition that occurred in the writing of Japanese waka poetry when Ki no Tsurayuki of the Thirty-Six Immortals of Poetry started writing his works in Japanese characters (仮名, Kana).

In the above-mentioned response, Matsunaga Teitoku divided the principle of “change” into two different kinds: the first was “the principle of heaven [unveiling] before one’s eyes” and the second was “the principle of karma’s unveiling.”144 He further showed that the first represents the “principle” (理) spoken about in the Confucian classics, such as the Book of Rites. It is a kind of spatial “principle.” The second one, however, represents the Buddhist “principle.” It is the “principle” of mutual interaction and karmic cycle within the “three realms.” 143 “Haritaki” is a Sanskrit word which refers to a tree, one of the five remedies known in Buddhism. Its “leaves can lower qi, its benefits will gain control over you (calm you down)”. See Ding Fubao 丁福保 ed., Foxue da cidian 佛學大辭典[Great Dictionary of Buddhist Terms](Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1991), Vol. 2, p. 2276 (mid.). 144 Okuwa Hitoshi ed., Razan Teitoku Jubutsu Mondo¯ Chu¯kai to Kenkyu¯, p. 21.

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In conclusion, the above review of the Confucian-Buddhist polemics over the doctrine of karmic retribution, which took place in China, Korea and Japan, reveals that the Buddhist treatises written in response to Confucian disputations all opened up new knowledge and perspectives for their Confucian opponents. Huiyuan’s “doctrine on twelve causes” and “theory of three kinds of retribution,” Chi Chao’s “doctrine of the three realms,” the “theory of three times” of the Korean monk Gihwa, and “the principle of karma’s unfolding” of the Japanese Buddhist layman Matsunaga Teitoku, all opened new windows for native scholars in their respective countries, and effectively clarified Confucian scepticism over Buddhist doctrine.

3.

Discursive Strategies in Debate and Confluence between Confucianism and Buddhism in East Asia

On the basis of our preceding discussion, we can now further analyze the discursive strategies applied by both sides in the course of events in the East Asian Confucian-Buddhist debates, as well as the results of their application. We will first take a look at the discursive strategies used by the Chinese, Korean and Japanese Confucian scholars, as attested to by the extant historical material about the Confucian-Buddhist debates. Generally speaking, the proponents of Confucianism used two main discursive strategies:

1.) The most frequently adopted strategy was clinging to the standpoint of national culture, which rigorously distinguished between “self” and “other.” Hence, Buddhism was portrayed as a barbarian religion, which meant that its dogma violates the teachings of the native Chinese sages. As early as at the end of the Han dynasty, when Buddhism first came to China, the native Chinese scholars’ collective voice already resounded its doubts about Buddhist teaching. In Mouzi’s Treatise on Settling Confusions, a native Chinese scholar questioned his Buddhist opponent (Mouzi) in the following manner: “You, master, have at a young age studied the way of kings Shun and Yao, the Duke of Zhou and Confucius, yet today you reject all these, having changed your studies to the philosophy of the barbarians. Is that not confusion?”145 Already since the Spring and Autumn period, the concept of the so called “Sino-barbaric dichotomy” (夷夏之 辨) had been an important value in Chinese culture.146 Consequently, viewing and

145 Mou Zibo, Mouzi Lihuolun, in Hongming ji, Vol. 1, p. 33. 146 The origins of the dichotomy between the barbarians and the Xia (Chinese) can be traced far back in Chinese history. Although the principal doctrine of the Western Zhou dynasty was “Each and every people of the five regions – the Middle kingdom, the Rong and the Yi – possess their own nature.” (The Book of Rites, “Wang Zhi”) See Zheng Xuan 鄭玄, Kong Yingda 孔穎達 comm., Liji zhengyi 禮記正義 [The True Meaning of the Book of Rites] (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1999), Vol. 12, p. 398. The content of the early sources paints a different picture. In these early sources, Shun’s “Man-Yi” (蠻夷) tribes and “the four Yi barbarians which were visiting the king” in the time of Yu mentioned in the Book of Documents. (Kong Anguo 孔安國, Kong Yingda 孔穎達 comm., Shangshu zhengyi 尚書正 義 [The True Meaning of the Book of Documents](Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1999, Vol. 4, pp. 86–97), as well as the “gathering of the wei plant” and “outgoing carriages” in the Book of Poetry (“Xiao Ya”), all praise the military and the people of the Zhou dynasty, and

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portraying Buddhist culture as “other,” which had the potential to incite national feelings in the minds of the readers and listeners, was an extremely efficient discursive strategy to use against Buddhism. In the Han dynasty, Mou Zibo presented the Confucian argument against Buddhism with a quotation from the Classic of Filial Piety, saying: “We have received our bodies, each hair and every piece of our skin, from our parents. Therefore, we must not presume to injure or damage them in any way.”147 This citation was intended to support the following statement: “Now the monks shave their heads; [and you ask] how can that be against what the sage said? It is not in accordance with the dao of a filial son!”148 In the same text, the Confucian scholar questions the Buddhist habit of leaving home and living a life in celibacy, saying: “how could this not go against good fortune and filial piety?”149 All these questions and remarks criticize the fact that the followers of Buddhism practice behavior which disobeys and violates the teaching of the Zhou and of Confucius, who are considered the representative elements of native Chinese culture. The same discursive strategy that derived from the distinction between civilized and barbarian (華夷之辨) also emerged in the arguments expressed by Korean and Japanese Confucians in their critiques of Buddhist teachings. In the 14th century, the Korean monk Gihwa cited the opinion of the contemporary Korean Confucians, who maintained that Buddhist teaching violates the Confucian concept and precept of filial piety, which stipulates that: “The man has his house and the woman has her family in order to perpetuate the family business and not cut off the ancestral sacrifice.”150 In a letter sent to Matsunaga Teitoku, the Japanese advocator of Zhu

147 148 149 150

compose songs in which the self, which represents the “Middle Kingdom,” fights against foreign invaders like the “Xianyun” (玁狁) people. In that way, the content of these books draws a clear boundary between the Chinese (Xia) people and the barbarians, separating all, from their rulers down to their common people. (Mao Heng 毛亨, Zheng Xuan 鄭玄, Kong Yingda 孔穎達 comm., Maoshi zhengyi 毛詩正義 [The True Meaning of the Book of Songs], Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2000, Vol. 9, pp. 687–696; 697–705). By the time of the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period, the dichotomy between barbarians (Yi) and Chinese (Xia) (夷夏之辨) acquired a new meaning. Thus, for example, the Zuo zhuan describes a debate on the posthumous name of king Gong of Chu from the year 560, in which Zi Nang argues in the following way: “[The king] governed over the glorious state of Chu, prevailed over the Man and the Yi barbarians, he started military expeditions extending to the South Sea in which he subdued all the great states of Xia(夏). Yet he still knew his errors. Couldn’t he be named ‘reverent’ (共)?” (Zou Qiuming 左丘明, Du Yu 杜預 comm., Kong Yingda 孔穎達, Chunqiu Zuo zhuan zhengyi 春秋左傳正義 [The True Meaning of the Spring and Autumn Annals], Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1999, Vol. 32: p. 911.) In the above paragraph the meaning of the “Xia” has already been expanded, but the demarcations between the two sides are still as clearly drawn as before. Li Longji 李隆基 and Xing Bing 邢昺 comm., Xiao jing zhushu 孝經注疏 [Commentaries and Sub-commentaries on the Classic of Filial Piety], Vol. 1, p. 3. Mou Zibo, Mouzi Lihuolun, in Hongming ji, p. 23. Ibid., p. 25. Gihwa 己和, Hyeonjeong non 顯正論 [Exposition of Orthodoxy], in Dongguk daehakgyo Hanguk Bolgyo jeonseo byeonch’an wiweonhoe, Bolgyo jeonseo 韓國佛教全書 [Complete

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Xi’s philosophy Hayashi Razan criticized Buddhist monastic life for its violations against the three bonds and five relationships (sangang wulun 三綱五倫) and the robes worn by Buddhist monks as being a barbaric kind of clothing.151 This kind of opinion utilizes the discursive strategy of making an appeal to the cultural nationalism of Confucians. This strategy elevated the persuasiveness of discourse by drawing a clear line between the “self” (Confucianism) and the “other” (Buddhism). 2.) Another relatively common strategy used by the East-Asian Confucians was to adopt the view that life and cosmology constitute “a single world” (一個世界)152. This kind of discursive strategy rests on a “monistic” (一元論) theoretical basis which manifests itself in turning “the profane (customs)” (su 俗) into the dao (道).153 Within the very same framework, by thus establishing the meaning and value of life in the secular world, the measureless wonder and the mystery of Confucian integral apotheosis resided in mundane human relations. Confucian “monism” had also been manifested in the propositions “soul and body are one integral whole” and “body is the substance and soul is its function” (形質神用)154 advocated by the philosopher Fan Zhen. Finally, it was also expressed in the doctrine of qi, which was in vogue in 14th century Korea and Japan. The Confucians forged their weapons of critique in their “monistic” doctrine. Armed with these weapons, they entered the palace of Buddhism, and attempted to destroy the Buddhist world of ideas and values founded on “dualism” with one single blow. In the time of the Northern and Southern dynasties, the native Chinese scholars’ discourse about the relationship between “body” and “soul” rested on a monistic theoretical basis. Among those scholars was also king Wu of Liang, who spoke in the following manner: “The mind (心) is the root of function (用). There is only one root and various functions. The many functions have their own flourishing and ceasing, and the nature (性) of the one root does not change. The one root is [both] ignorance (wuming 無明, avidya¯) and enlightenment of the soul (神明).”155 In king Wu’s words, the mind represents the human soul, the fundamental force which constitutes every living being. Due to that reason, he decided to develop his doctrine “of the immortal soul” (神不滅). The Joseon period Korean Confucians also re-

151 152

153 154 155

Works of Korean Buddhism] (Seoul: Dongguk daehakgyo chulpanbu, 1986 [1st], 2002 [3rd edition]), Vol. 7, p. 218c. Okuwa Hitoshi ed., Razan Teitoku Jubutsu Mondo¯ Chu¯kai to Kenkyu¯, p. 141. Li Zehou 李澤厚, Zhongguo gudai sixiangshi lun 中國古代思想史論 [On Ancient Chinese Intellectual History] and Lishi bentilun – jimao wu shuo (zengdingben) 歷史本體論己卯五 說（增訂本） [Historical ontology – Five Essays from 1999 (revised and enlarged edition)], pp. 270–288. Ito¯ Jinsai 伊藤仁齋 (1625–1705), the 17th century Japanese Confucian, advocated the notion that: “The profane (customs) are the way (dao 道), and there is no other way apart from that.” See Ito¯ Jinsai, Rongo Kogi, Vol. 5, p. 130. Yao Cha 姚察, Xie Gui 謝炅, Wei Zheng 魏徵, and Yao Silian 姚思廉 comp., Liang shu 梁書 [The Book of Liang](Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975–1981), juan 48, p. 665. Liang Wu Di 梁武帝, “Li shenming chengfo yiji 立神明成佛義記 [A Note on Establishing the Principle that the Soul Attains Illumination of Buddhahood],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 2, p. 588.

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garded the mind as the “master of the whole body.”156 However, they still defended the view that after one’s death the soul scatters together with the body, and is thereby incapable of receiving the rewards and punishments of heaven and hell. All these views assumed that in the universe there exists an “ultimate cause” (最終之 因). This discursive strategy is fully saturated with “monistic” color.

Secondly, we shall discuss the strategies used by East Asian Buddhists in their responses against Confucian attacks. Akin to the Confucians, the adherents of Buddhism also used two main discursive strategies: 1.) The first followed suit with the frequently adopted discursive strategy of “illustrating Buddhism by means of Confucianism,” used by the East Asian Confucians in order to attain the objective of portraying Buddhism and Confucianism as mutually interacting and having identical views. When the East Asian Buddhists used this kind of discursive strategy, however, the only functional use displayed by “Confucianism” was to manifest the subjectivity of “Buddhism.” The East Asian Buddhists were quite skilled in using the discursive strategy of “illustrating Buddhism by means of Confucianism.” The most commonly seen way to practice this strategy was to use the Confucian classics in order to prove Buddhist doctrine and in order to move in the direction of a thorough understanding between Buddhism and Confucianism. Thus, in the late period of the Han dynasty, Mou Zibo quoted from the Classic of Filial Piety, saying: “They built temples for them, for the ghosts to enjoy. In spring and autumn, they performed sacrifices, so as to remember them when the time was proper.”157 He was refuting the Confucians who quoted from the Analects: “Not yet being able to serve men, how can you serve the ghosts?” Ultimately, he asked the decisive question: “What Buddhism says about the destiny of life and death, is this not akin to that?”158 Being exceptionally erudite in the ancient classics, the Buddhist Mou Zibo mined the Confucian classics for texts related to ancestor worship and ghosts and was able to extract ample evidence to clearly show that offering sacrifices to the gods and ancestors was a common platform shared by Buddhism and Confucianism. Another example goes back to 17th century Japan, when the Confucian Hayashi Razan drew from the Classic of Filial Piety to show that Buddhist monastic life is an example of unfilial conduct. His Buddhist opponent, Matsunaga Teitoku, also quoted from the same classic. He reinterpreted the meaning of filial piety as contained in the words “to attain fame in order make one’s parents illustrious.” He further pointed out that, in contrast to the above-mentioned, the ultimate goal of the Buddha’s disciples is to save their parents from suffering in all lifetimes; consequently, they do not concentrate only on honoring their parents in one lifetime.159 Through reinterpretation of the Classic of Piety, Matsunaga Teitoku successfully “de-contextualized” (去脈絡化) the idea of “filial piety” (孝) from the Classic of 156 157 158 159

Gihwa , Hyeonjeong non, in Bolgyo jeonseo, Vol. 7, pp. 221b–222a. Li Longji and Xing Bing comm., Xiao jing zhushu, Vol. 9, p. 59. Mou Zibo, Mouzi Lihuolun, in Hongming ji, p. 31. Okuwa Hitoshi ed., Razan Teitoku Jubutsu Mondo¯ Chu¯kai to Kenkyu¯, p. 90.

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Filial Piety as well as from its originally Confucian intellectual context, and replanted it into the intellectual context of the Buddhist view of infinite succession of lives in the “three times” (三世). By having thus “recontextualized” the notion of “filial piety,” in a very delicate manner he accomplished a “contextual turn” (脈絡 性轉化) of the concept of “filial piety” from Confucianism to Buddhism.160 Thus, within a mutual confirmation between Confucianism and Buddhism, he managed to accomplish the work of “illustrating Buddhism by means of Confucianism.” 2.) The second strategy adopted by adherents of Buddhism was to “assimilate Confucianism into Buddhism.” In this strategy, Buddhism served as subject and Confucianism as object. This strategy aims to help Confucianism enter Buddhism, in a manner resembling a visitor being admitted to pass through the main room and enter the inner chamber of the house so that the master (subject, 主) and the host (object, 客) can converse and laugh together in the main hall. It was an attempt to reach the goal of blending Confucianism into Buddhism, so as to attain a mixture where both are well blended into each other to form a state of perfect harmony. The Buddhist scholars used two main methods to execute this discursive strategy: (1) To accept the concepts that make up the core values of Confucianism, yet only by broadening their interpretations. This discursive method can already be seen in Mou Zibo, in the final years of the Han dynasty. In his treatise, Mou cited the Analects, narrating the parable of how Confucius praised Tai Bo for having practiced the highest virtue of “complaisance” (rong 讓). However, Mou also pointed out that Tai Bo shaved his head and had a tattooed body, thus he was exactly like: “The monks [who] discard their family properties, reject their wives, do not listen to music and do not watch beautiful appearances. Their renunciation of things can be said to be extreme. How can they be transgressing against the words of the sages and be failing to comply with filial piety?!”161 By reasoning in that way, Mouzi wanted to appeal to the authority of Confucius, to argue for the notion that the monk’s habit of shaving his head is in accord with the teachings of the sages. He pointed out that Confucius praised Tai Bo and Shu Qi for having sought after and found humaneness (仁), and that the way of “the monks [who] cultivate their dao and their virtues in exchanged for (seeking) worldly joys”162 is exactly like Tai Bo’s and Shu Qi’s striving to attain moral accomplishment. Later in the Jin dynasty, the Buddhist disciple Sun Chuo, also under the premise of accepting the Confucian value of filial piety, created an interpretation of “filial piety [as meaning] to become noble, and to be noble is to build up one’s personality and carry out the dao, [thereby] always glorifying one’s parents,”163 and thus concluding that the Buddhist practice of leaving home to become a monk is an example of great filial piety. (2) The second method of putting to use the strategy of “assimilating Confucianism into Bud160 I have given a detailed analysis of the phenomenon of “contextual turn” in my previous works on intellectual exchange in East Asia. See Chun-chieh Huang, East Asian Confucianisms: Texts in Contexts (Göttingen and Taipei: V&R unipress, National Taiwan University Press, 2015), chapter 2, pp. 41–56. 161 Mou Zibo, Mouzi Lihuolun, p. 23. 162 Ibid., p. 26. 163 Sun Chuo 孫綽, Yu dao lun 喻道論 [Clarification of the Way], in Hongming ji, Vol. 1, p. 178.

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dhism” was to propose the “identity of Confucian and Buddhist teaching” by equating the values inherent in Confucian and Buddhist doctrine. In the 14th century, the Korean monk Gihwa noted that:164 The five precepts and the ten virtuous forms of behavior are the most shallow among the Buddhist teachings [and were] originally designed for those of the weakest of faculties. Nonetheless, if one succeeds in practicing them, it is sufficient to bring about sincerity in oneself and benefit to those around oneself. How much more so in the case of contemplation on the four noble truths and dependent arising? And how much more so again in the practice of the six perfections? The Confucians regard the five eternal principles to be the pivot of the way. The moral precepts of Buddhism are none other than the five eternal principles of Confucianism: [the Buddhist precept of] not-killing is the same as humaneness; not stealing is the same as justice; not engaging in sexual excesses is the same as propriety; not drinking alcohol is the same as wisdom; and not speaking falsely is the same as trustworthiness. However, the way that the Confucian scholars teach people is not through example of virtuous action but through laws and punishments. /…/ “Accomplishing silently, not speaking yet being trusted” is strongly characteristic of the Buddhist method of teaching, where it is used in conjunction with the teaching of cause and effect (karma). If you teach people through reward and punishment then there will invariably be some who still follow you only superficially. If you teach them through the concept of karma, they will be changed – and changed in their inner minds.

Monk Gihwa equated the five precepts of Buddhism with “the five constant virtues” of Confucianism of humaneness, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and trustworthiness. The strategy of comparing the “the five precepts” and “the five constant virtues” in this way was also present in 5th century China in the work of Yan Zhitui and others. In his Family Instructions, Yan Zhitui said: “The inner and the outer teaching are basically one integral whole. Their gradual accumulation makes the difference between them, so that they are different in shallowness and depth. The initial gate into dharma of the inner classics stipulates five precepts; the outer classics speak about humaneness, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and trustworthiness. And they both correspond to each other. Humaneness is the same as the precept of not being allowed to kill. The precept not to steal is equal to righteousness. Not engaging in deviant (sexual) practices is the same as propriety. Wisdom is the same as the precept of not drinking. Trustworthiness is the same as not speaking falsely.”165 Zong Bing from the Northern and Southern dynasties said that the state of the world which Buddhism is in pursuit of is 164 Gihwa, Hyeonjeong non, in Bolgyo jeonseo, Vol. 7, pp. 217b–218a. Translation adopted from: A. Charles Muller, Korea’s Great Buddhist-Confucian Debate: The Treatises of Cho˘ng Tojo˘n (Sambong) and Hamho˘ Tu˘kt’ong (Kihwa), pp. 84–85. 165 Wang Liqi 王利器 comm., Yanshi jiaxun jijie 顏氏家訓集解 [Collected Commentaries on Master Yan’s Family Instructions], Vol. 5, p. 368.

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precisely the Confucian realm “led by virtue, united by propriety, a world which has returned to humaneness.”166 In order to better illustrate how the Buddhists carried out the “contextual turn” by succesfully assimilating Confucianism into Buddhism, we will quote from Ouyi Zhixu, who lived at the end of the Ming dynasty more than two hundred years after the Korean monk Gihwa. Quyi Zhixu reinterpreted the notion “to govern with virtue” (為政以德) from Confucius’ Analects (“Wei Zheng”) in the following manner:167 To rule with virtue is not [saying that] virtue is governance (以德為政). We need to delve deep into its body to understand the veins behind this phrase. In fact, rectifying oneself and the others is always named “[doing] governance” (為政). The [phrase] “with virtue” (以德), [actually means] “[to see] with one mind three aspects” (一心三觀), to see (觀) “three truths in one object” (一境三諦). It is to know that nature possesses three virtues. The three virtues are the hidden ancestor of the myriad dharmas; in the motionless “field of awakening” (bodhimanda 道場) the myriad dharmas conjoin. That is why it is ˙˙ also described with the metaphor of the residence of the North Star (北辰).

Zhixu closely followed the relationship between “virtue” (德) and “governance” (政), and stressed that the original meaning of Confucius’ phrase is “to govern with rules” and not “virtue is governance.” What is called “with virtue” (以德) means to take the Tiantai principles of “the three aspects of one mind” and “three truths in one object” as the “source (ancestor) of the myriad dharmas” that operate in politics. In his new interpretation of the relationship between “virtue” and “governance,” the Buddhist monk Ouyi Zhixu adopted an original approach, unparalleled by any other commentator in two thousand years of Chinese, Korean or Japanese history. Nevertheless, his approach was akin to Wang Fuzhi’s (王 夫之, Chuanshan 船山, 1619–1692) credo: “The Six Classics make it incumbent upon me to break a new path and present a new facet.”168 Since I have already analyzed monk Zhixu’s motto “We must rely on the Four Books, [for] they will help us to reveal the paramount truth”169 in one of my previous works,170 we won’t explore it any further in this work.

166 Zong Bing 宗炳, “Ming Fo lun 明佛論 [Illuminating Buddhism],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 1, p. 164. 167 Ouyi Zhixu 蕅益智旭, Sishu Ouyi jie 四書蕅益解 [Ouyi’s Explanation of the Four Books] (Nantou: Zhong Taishan fojiao jijinhui, 1997), p. 236. 168 Wang Fuzhi 王夫之, Wang Chuanshan shiwen ji 王船山詩文集 [Collected Poems and Prose of Wang Chuanshan](Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1962), p. 546. The translation adopted from Jee Loo Liu, “Wang Fuzhi’s Philosophy of Principle (Li) Inherent in Qi,” in John Makeham ed., Dao Companion to Neo-Confucian Philosophy. (London, New York: Springer Science & Business Media, 2010), p. 377. 169 Ouyi Zhixu, Sishu Ouyi jie, p. 2.

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To conclude: The discursive strategies used by the East Asian Buddhists were persuasive in demonstrating that: “The Duke of Zhou and Confucius are [the same as] the Buddha, and the Buddha is [the same as] the Duke of Zhou and Confucius. In fact, they only signify the outer and inner name [of the same thing], and that is all.”171 Furthermore, they also demonstrated that: “the Buddha, Confucius and the Duke of Zhou have all been explaining that it is auspicious to follow loyalty, filial piety, faithfulness, and obedience, and inauspicious to violate against them.”172 All these strategies made the native scholars accept the Buddhadharma with relative ease. It was also with ingenious application of the above two discursive strategies that monk Gihwa could assert that: “What Confucians call ‘bright virtue’ is none other than what the Buddha has called the ‘subtle, pristine, luminous mind.’ The phrase ‘still and unmoving, [the] changes reach out and penetrate the world’ has exactly the same connotation as the Buddhist ‘quiescent yet luminous.’ The saying ‘only after there is goodness in oneself may one critique the goodness of others; only after there is no evil in oneself can one correct the evil of others’ has the same connotation as our religion’s [phrase] ‘sever evil and cultivate goodness, then work for the benefit of sentient beings.’ How are they different?”173 It was only through the use of the above strategies that Gihwa could reach the conclusion that Confucianism and Buddhism are one and the same thing.

170 Chun-chieh Huang 黃俊傑, Dongya Ruxue: Jingdian yu quanshi de bianzheng 東亞儒學： 經典與詮釋的辯證 [East Asian Confucianisms: The Dialectics of the Classics and Interpretations](Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2007), pp. 279–303. 171 Sun Chuo 孫綽, Yu dao lun 喻道論 [Clarification of the Way], in Hongming ji, Vol. 1, p. 176. 172 Anon, “Zhengwu lun 正誣論 [Treatise on Rectification of False Accusations],” in Hongming ji, Vol. 1, p. 82. 173 Gihwa, Hyeonjeong non, in Bolgyo jeonseo, Vol. 7, pp. 223a. The English translation taken from A. Charles Muller, Korea’s Great Buddhist-Confucian Debate: The Treatises of Cho˘ng Tojo˘n (Sambong) and Hamho˘ Tu˘kt’ong (Kihwa), pp. 109–110.

4.

Conclusion

We have studied the arguments, and their confluences, in the debates between Confucianism and Buddhism that emerged in the East Asian region in the time after Buddhism entered China in the last years of the Eastern Han dynasty. In the framework of the extensive historical material related to the ConfucianBuddhist debates, the focus of this writing was on some relatively important and representative figures and treatises. It analyzed the most important questions contended over by both sides, as well as the discursive strategies used by the contending scholars. Having undertaken the above analysis, we are now able to list the following few conclusions. First: The cultural sphere of East Asia was already deeply permeated by the Confucian cultural tradition when Buddhism was first transmitted to the region in the last years of the Eastern Han from its origins in South Asia. The ConfucianBuddhist debates commenced soon thereafter and thus had surpassed 1500 years by the time they culminated in the 17th century. By that time, the number of topics and issues on which both sides exchanged their views was extremely high, covering areas from society, politics, economics and culture, and touching upon a vast range of thoughts and ideas. The heart of the discussions, however, focused on five major important issues: The first revolved around questions of family ethics in relation to “filial piety” (孝) and “leaving home” (出家) for a monastic life; the second revolved around questions of political ethics concerning the relation between monks and the ruler; the third was the question of the Sinobarbaric dichotomy centered around cultural nationalism; the fourth was the question of separation and union between the “soul” (神) and the “body” (形); and, lastly, the fifth involved questions regarding the Buddhist core values of karma and samsara (samsa¯ra). ˙ All five of these great questions emerged repeatedly in the Chinese, Korean and Japanese Confucian-Buddhist debates. Their repeated re-emergence and their closely-related content reveal how deeply and widely Confucian culture had infiltrated all three countries. Consequently, when the three countries

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confronted Buddhism and contended against it, the questions raised in the consequent polemics also bore high resemblance to each other. Second: Since each party played a different role in these debates, the discursive strategies the two sides adopted were also substantially different. If we only mention the greatest tendencies in the debates, since Confucianism represented the primary ideology in East Asian culture, it usually played the offensive role of the attacker determined to confront the Indian-born Buddhism and defend itself from intrusion. In that way, it targeted the aspects of the core values of Buddhism that were different from those inherent in the Confucian universe of values. Thus, Confucianism led the attack against Buddhism and unleashed upon its doctrines a forceful criticism. Conversely, Buddhism was a foreign religion that had to face a fierce attack from the intermediaries of the Confucian school. Thus, the role it played was a defensive one. Because the roles played by both sides differed, so also did the discursive strategies they adopted. The strategy that was most frequently adopted by East Asian Confucians was one of “cultural nationalism,” which portrayed Buddhism as the “other,” as a religion of the Barbarians. Secondarily, Confucians also adopted the philosophical standpoint of “monism” (一元論), and fought against the Buddhist idea of leaving the family for a monastic life by advocating the slogan “the dao is in the profane (customs)” (道在俗中). They also stressed the maxim that “when the body dies, the soul perishes” to counter the Buddhist “doctrine of the immortality of the soul.” They rejected the Buddhist doctrine of karma and samsara and criticized Buddhist “dualism” with their “qi-monism.” On the other hand, every Buddhist intermediary who was adept in the Confucian classics and the core values they espoused, either adopted the strategy of “assimilating Confucianism into Buddhism” or of “illustrating Buddhism by means of Confucianism.” Ultimately, they managed to successfully transform the hostility of Confucians and accomplished an interblending and confluence between Buddhism on one side and Confucianism on the other.

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Index of Names

Asanga

72

Bo Ji 伯姬 31 Bodhiruci 菩提流志 65f. Boyi 伯夷 32, 33 Buddha 佛陀 16, 22, 26–27, 34–36, 38, 41– 43, 44f., 45, 47, 55f., 56, 67, 71–72, 78, 82 Buddhayas´as 佛陀耶舍 44f. Cao Siwen 曹思文 57–58 Chang, Chih-I 30f. Chen Yinke 陳寅恪 19 Cheng Fuxin 程復心 26 Chi Chao 郗超 11, 65–67, 73 Confucius 9, 15f., 31–32, 35, 45–47, 50, 61, 62f., 70, 75–6, 79, 81–82 Cooper, Paul 30f. Dai Kui 戴逵 64 Dalmyeong 達明 23 Dao’an 道安 41 Daoxuan 道宣 64f. Deuchler, Martina 33f. Ding Fubao 丁 福保 72f. Dong Gao 董誥 37f. Du Mu 杜牧 (Muzhi 牧之, Fanchuan 繁 川) 19, 37f. Du Yu 杜預 76f. Duke of Zhou 周公 15, 32, 45, 50, 75, 82 Emperor Cheng [of Jin] 晉成帝 38–39 Emperor Shun 舜 (King Shun) 32, 45, 47– 48, 75

Emperor Wu [of Liang] (Xiao Yan 蕭衍, king Wu of Liang, Liang Wu Di) 55, 58, 77 Emperor Yao 堯 (King Yao) 32, 45, 55, 75 Fairbank, John K. 62f. Fan Zhen 范縝 (Zhen 真) 55–58, 77 Fang Litian 方立天 59 Fei Xiaotong 費孝通 (Hsiao-tung Fei) 30 Fingarette, Herbert 61f. Ge Zhaoguang 葛兆光 15, 19f. Geum Jangtae 琴章泰 23f. Gihwa 己和 11, 20, 21f., 22–24, 33–34, 43, 47–48, 60–61, 70–73, 76, 78f., 80–82 Gu Xiegang 顧頡剛 15f. Gunabhadra 求那跋陀羅 57f. ˙ Guo Qingfan 郭慶藩 48f., 51f. Hachiya Kunio 蜂屋邦夫 62 Hagmi 學眉 23 Hayashi Razan 林羅山 11, 24–27, 34–37, 71–72, 77–78 He Chengtian 何承天 46, 54 He Chong 何充 38–39 He Xiu 何休 37f. Hsiao, Kung-chuan 蕭公權 44f. Hsu, Francis L. K. 許烺光 (Xu Langguang) 29 Huan Xuan 桓玄 (Jingdao 敬道) 39–40, 62 Huang, Chun-chieh 黃俊傑 7, 11, 13f., 79f., 82f. Huang Gan 黃榦 (Zhiqing 直卿, Mianzhai 勉齋) 71

94

Index of Names

Huang Xianian 黃夏年 15f. Huijiao 慧皎 41f. Huijue 慧覺 44f. Huilin 慧琳 46, 53–54 Huiyuan 慧遠 11, 40–42, 51–53, 55f., 62, 63f., 64–65, 67, 73 Hu Houxuan 胡厚宣 44f. Hurvitz, Leon 41f. Hu Yinglin 胡應麟 15f. Hu Yong 胡勇 16f. Inkei Chidatsu 隱溪智脫 25 Ise Sadatame 伊勢貞為 37 Ito¯ Jinsai 伊藤仁齋 (Keisai 維楨) 77f.

46f.,

Jeong Dojeon 鄭道傳 정도전 (Jongji 宗之, Sambong 三峰, Muheon 文憲) 20–22, 24, 67–68, 70 Jia Gongyan 賈公彥 48f. Jisaeng 智生 23 Kiyoyoshi Utsunomiya 宇都宮清吉 19f. Kong Anguo 孔安國 75f. Kong Yingda 孔穎達 62f., 75f., 76f. Kroll, Paul W. 54f. Kuma¯ra¯jı¯va 鳩摩羅什 53f., 72 Kwon Sangno 權相老 23 Laozi 老子 16, 32, 71 Legge, James 37f. Li Longji 李隆基 29f., 78f. Li Zehou 李澤厚 11, 61, 77f. Liang Qichao 梁啟超 15f. Liebenthal, Walther 55f. Liu Baonan 劉寶楠 46f. Liu Junwen 劉俊文 17f. Liu Lifu 劉立夫 16f. Lokaksema 支婁迦讖 44f. ˙ Luo Han 羅含 (Junzhang 君章)

54

Maeda Ichiro 前田一郎 24, 25f., 26f., 27 Maitreya (Buddha) 72 Mao Heng 毛亨 76f. Matsunaga Teitoku 松永貞德 11, 24–27, 34–36, 71–73, 76, 78

Mencius 孟子 30f., 45 Mitsuo Moriya 守屋美都雄 19f. Mou Zibo 牟子博 (Mou Rong 牟融, Mouzi 牟子, Master Mou) 15–17, 30f., 31–32, 45, 49–50, 62, 75, 76f., 78f., 79 Muller, A. Charles 21f., 33f., 43f., 47f., 60f., 67–68f., 70f., 80f., 82f. Munsu 文秀 23 Murakami Yoshimi 村上嘉實 41 Na¯ga¯rjuna 53, 72 Nie Zheng 聶政 31 Okuwa Hitoshi 大桑齊 24–25, 26f., 35– 36f., 71–72f., 77–78f. Ooms, Herman 43f. Ouyi Zhixu 蕅益智旭 20, 81 Pak Haedang 朴海鐺 23 Park Kyoungsuk 朴敬淑 23f. Redfield, Margaret Park

30f.

S´a¯kyamuni (Buddha) 34, 42 Samghadeva 僧伽提婆 38f., 44f. Seki Giichiro¯ 關儀一郎 46f. Sengyou 僧祐 17–18, 49 Shen Yue 沈約 53f. Shi Que 石碏 33 Shin-an-ken 心安軒 25 Sho¯toku Taiji 聖德太子 27 Shuqi 叔齊 33 Sima Qian 司馬遷 48, 49f. Sima Tan 司馬談 48 Sun Chuo 孫綽 32, 79, 82f. Sun Sheng 孫盛 54 Sun Yirang 孫詒讓 45–46f. Tai Bo 泰伯 31, 33, 35, 79 Tang Yixuan 湯一玄 41f. Tang Yongtong 湯用彤 (Xiyu 錫予) 19f., 41f. Tao Demin 陶德民 24f. Tenkai 天海 43 Tsong-kha-pa 宗喀巴 57f. Tsutomu Maeda 前田勉 26

16,

95

Index of Names

Twitchett, Denis Vasubhandu

19f.

72

Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (Chuanshan 船山) 81 Wang Liqi 王利器 18f., 59f., 62f., 80f. Wang Mi 王謐 (Zhiyuan 稚遠) 39 Wang Xiaoyu 王孝魚 51 Wang Xiaqian 王先謙 48f. Washio Junkyo¯ 鷲尾順敬 25f. Wei Jianzhong 魏建中 16f. Wei Zheng 魏徵 55f., 77f. Wright, Arthur 8, 19f. Xiao Chen 蕭琛 (Yanyu 彥瑜) 56, 57 Xiao Ziliang 蕭子良 55 Xie Gui 謝炅 55f., 77f. Xing Bing 邢昺 29f., 76f., 78f. Xiyou 西有 (Babu Daoren 八不道人) 20 Xu Yan 徐彥 37f. Xu Yangzhu 許洋主 17f. Yamazaki Ansai 山崎闇齋 Yan Kejun 嚴可均 53f.

25

Yan Zhitui 顏之推 (Jie 介) 18–19, 59, 62, 80 Yang Liansheng 楊聯陞(Yang Liensheng) 62f. Yang Rubin 楊儒賓 68f. Yao Cha 姚察 55f.,77f. Yao Silian 姚思廉 55f., 77f. Yi Saek 李穡 이색 (Yeongsuk 穎叔, Mogeun 牧隱) 20 Ying Kaoshu 穎考叔 33 Yu Bing 庾冰 (Jijian 季堅) 38 Yu Jeongyeob 柳正燁 23f. Yu Rang 豫讓 31 Yu Ying-shih 余英時 30 Zenryu¯ Tsukamoto 塚本善隆 17 Zhang Ruide 張瑞德 29f. Zhen Dexiu 真德秀 (Jingyuan 景元, Jingxi 景希, Xishan 西山) 22f. Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 48f., 75–76f. Zhuangzi 莊子 16, 48f., 51 Zhu Xi 朱熹 24–26, 34, 71 Zong Bing 宗炳 46, 54, 80, 81f. Zou Qiuming 左丘明 76f. Zürcher, Erik 8, 65–66f.

Index of Terms

age of dharma decline (mofa shidai) 末法 時代 36 assimilating Confucianism into Buddhism (zai Fo she Ru) 在佛攝儒 12, 17, 79, 81, 84

differential mode of association (chaxu geju) 差序格局 30 dominant kinship relationship (xianzhu qinshu guanxi) 顯著親屬關係 29 dualism 二元論 68, 77, 84

bakufu 幕府 25–26, 43 body; form (xing) 形; (xingti) 形體 18, 31, 40, 43, 48–61, 63–65, 68, 77–79, 81, 83–84 Buddhadharma 22, 44f., 71–72, 82 Buddhist monks (shamen) 沙門 (s´ramana) 17–18, 20, 23, 26–27, 31–32, 34–35, ˙ 37–43, 51, 76–77, 79, 83

East Asian Confucianisms 東亞儒學 7, 10, 13 embodiment 體現 53 emotions; sensation (qing) 情 52, 63– 64, 66 emptiness (xingkong) 性空 (s´u¯nyata¯) 8, 50, 53–54, 57–58 enlightenment [of the soul] 8, 35, 42, 58, 77

Central Shang (Zhong Shang) 中商 44 Chan 禪 13 complaisance (rong) 讓 79 complete (perfect) virtue (quan de) 全德 31, 48 Confucian ethical code (ming jiao) 名 教 38 contextual turn (mailuoxing zhuanhua) 脈 絡性轉化 79, 81 cultural nationalism (wenhua minzu zhuyi) 文化民族主義 77, 83–84 dependent origination (yuanqi) 緣起 (pratı¯tyasamutpa¯da) 53, 57 desire (yu) 欲 (ra¯ga) 33–34, 38, 63–64 dharma (fa) 法 23, 25, 28, 36, 38–42, 46–47, 53–55, 65, 71–72, 80–81 dharma-body (fashen) 法身 (dharmaka¯ya) 55

fate; destiny 50, 52–53, 55, 63–64, 68 field of awakening (dao chang) 道場 (bodhimanda) 81 ˙˙ filial piety (xiao) 孝 17, 29–34, 36–37, 50, 76, 78–79, 82–83 five agents; five elements (wu xing) 五行 67–70 five constant [virtues] (wu chang) 五常 27, 80 five [Confucian] human relationships (wu lun) 五倫 34, 77 five karmic destinations (wu dao) 五道 (pañcagatika) 66 five precepts (wu jie) 五戒 36, 38, 66, 80 five regions (wu fang) 五方 44, 75f. function (yong) 用 21, 56–59, 77

98

Index of Terms

governance (zheng) 政; (zhi) 治 21, 38, 40– 42, 81 great unity (da yitong) 大一統 37 harmonious combination of causes (yinyuan hehe) 因緣和合 53 hell (diyu) 地獄 21, 60–61, 63–64, 66, 71, 78 Hua Yan 華嚴 13 Hua-Yi 華夷 17, 46 humanity; humaneness (ren) 仁 7, 32, 35, 62f., 79–81 ignorance (wuming) 無明 (avidya¯) 58, 63–64, 77 illustrating Buddhism by means of Confucianism (you Ru xian Fo) 由儒顯佛 12, 78, 84 immortality of the soul (shen bu mie) 神不 滅論 11, 16, 46, 50–51, 54–55, 58–59, 62, 68, 84 [inherent] nature (xing) 性 21–22, 27, 52– 54, 58–59, 63, 69, 77 irreverence (bujing) 不敬 39–40, 43, 51 kalpa 55, 67 karma; cause and effect (yinguo) 因果 11, 18, 21–22, 26, 36, 61–62, 65, 67, 68, 71– 73, 80, 83–84 karmic fruits (karmaphala) 72 karmic retribution (yingguo baoying) 因果 應報 11, 43, 59–60, 62, 64–67, 69–73 kingship 王權 37, 42 loyalty; faithfulness (zhong) 忠

43, 82

material force; vital energy (qi) 氣 51–52, 59–61, 68–70, 72f., 77, 81, 84 [visible] matter (se) 色 (ru¯pa) 66 Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo) 中國 44, 47, 75–76f. mind (xin) 心 (citta) 11, 21–22, 43–44, 58– 61, 63–66, 69, 72, 76–78, 80–82 monism 一元論 77–78, 84 mortality of the soul (shen mie) 神滅 53– 56, 58–59

myriad things (wanwu) 萬物 68–69

52, 54, 59,

names and objects conditioned by consciousness (shi yuan mingse) 識緣名色 (vijña¯na-paccaya¯ na¯maru¯pam) 57 Nichiren school of Buddhism (Nichiren shu¯ 日蓮宗) 11, 26, 34, 71 nine barbarians ( jiu Yi) 九夷 45, 45–46f. North Star (beichen) 北辰 45, 81 [to see with] one mind three aspects (yi xin san guan) 一心三觀 81 other (tazhe) 他者 63, 75–77, 84 paradise 49–50 principle (li) 理 21, 27, 34, 38, 51–52, 64, 68, 71–73, 80, 81f. profane [customs] (su) 俗 11, 32, 35, 40, 77f., 84 propriety; ritual; etiquette (li) 禮 35–36, 38–40, 42, 61f., 62f., 80–81 rebirth 17, 34, 39, 54, 59 recontextualization (zai mailuo hua) 再脈 絡化 10, 79 reincarnation 11, 18, 71 renunciation of the world (nekkhamma) 26, 34–36, 79 reverence [towards the ruler] ( jing) 敬 38– 40, 42–43, 51 righteousness (yi) 義 31–32, 80 samsara (lunhui) 輪迴 (samsa¯ra) 11, 21– ˙ 22, 33–35, 49, 55, 59, 61–62, 65–68, 83 self ( ji) 己 75, 77 Seon 禪 22 Sino-barbaric dichotomy (Yi-Xia zhi bian) 夷夏之辨; (Hua-Yi zhi bian) 華夷之 辨 44–45, 75, 76f., 83 six perfections (liu du) 六度 80 soul; spirit (shen) 神; (shenshi) 神識; ( jingshen) 精神; (hunshen) 魂神 10– 11, 15, 40, 45–46. 48–65, 68, 77–78, 83–84 substance (ti) 體; (zhi) 質 56–57, 59–60, 77

99

Index of Terms

temporality (shijianxing) 時間性 67 the Confucian project (Rujia zhengti guihua) 儒家整體規劃 30 theory of three kinds of retribution (sanbao shuo) 三報說 64, 65, 67, 73 the way (dao) 道 16, 31–33, 35, 38, 40–41, 45, 47, 49–50, 52, 55, 57, 63, 66, 72, 75–77, 77f., 79–80, 84 three bonds and five relationships (sangang wulun) 三綱五倫 34, 77 three paths (santu) 三塗 66 three realms (sanjie) 三界 (trilokya) 65– 67, 72–73 three teachings (san jiao) 三教 8, 13 three times (sanshi) 三世 (tryadhvan) 11, 26, 49, 61, 62, 65, 70–71, 73, 79 three truths in one object (yi jing san ti) 一 境三諦 81 Tiantai 天台 13, 81

tolerance (ren) 忍 33–34 twelve causes (shier yinyuan) 十二因緣 (dva¯das´a nida¯na) 64, 73 two souls; hun and po soul (hunpo) 魂魄 49, 60 unity of the three teachings (sanjiao heyi) 三教合一 13, 19 universal kingship (pushi wangqian) 普世 王權 37 virtue (de) 德 10, 27, 31–32, 34, 39, 48, 55, 69, 71–72, 79–82 warrior-clan regime (buke seiken) 武家政 權 42 wisdom (zhi) 智 34, 72, 80 yin and yang 陰陽

51, 60, 67–68