The China Questions 2: Critical Insights into US-China Relations 9780674287495

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THE CHINA QUESTIONS

•

2

THE

CHINA

QUESTIONS 2 Critical Insights into US – C ­ hina Relations Edited by

Maria Adele Carrai Jennifer Rudolph Michael Szonyi

Cambridge, Mas­sa­chu­setts London, ­England 2022

 Copyright © 2022 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College All rights reserved Printed in the United States of Amer­i­ca First printing Jacket design: Graciela Galup 9780674287518 (EPUB) 9780674287495 (PDF) The Library of Congress has cataloged the printed edition as follows: Names: Carrai, Maria Adele, editor. | Rudolph, Jennifer M., editor. | Szonyi, Michael, editor. Title: The China questions. 2 : critical insights into US-­China relations /  edited by Maria Adele Carrai, Jennifer Rudolph, and Michael Szonyi. Other titles: China questions. two : critical insights into US-­China relations Description: Cambridge, Mas­sa­chu­setts : Harvard University Press, [2022] | Includes index. Identifiers: LCCN 2022001817 | ISBN 9780674270336 (cloth) Subjects: LCSH: United States—­Foreign relations—­China. | United States—­ Foreign relations—21st ­century. | China—­Foreign relations—­United States. | China—­Foreign relations—21st ­century. Classification: LCC E183.8.C6 C56 2022 | DDC 327.73051—­dc23 / eng / 20220210 LC rec­ord available at https://­lccn​.­loc​.­gov​/­2022001817

 In memory of Ezra Vogel, devoted advocate for better US-­China relations

CONTENTS

Introduction Maria Adele Carrai, Jennifer Rudolph, and Michael Szonyi

1

I . C O N T E X T U A L I Z I N G C H I N A -­U S

R E L AT I O N S

1. US-­China Relations: How Did We Get ­Here, Where Can We Go?

21

Joh n Pomfret



2. Is Engagement Still the Best US Policy for China?

31

El i zab eth Economy



3. Why Is China America’s Favorite Threat?

38

Ch e ng xin Pan



4. How Does China See Amer­i­ca?

45

Xi aoy u Pu



5. How Is US Policy ­toward China Made?

53

Ryan Hass



6. Who Gets into the Chinese Communist Party, and Who Rises up the Ranks? Vi c tor Shih

61

viii Contents

II. GLOBAL ORDER

7. ­Will the World Make Room for China in the New Global Order?

71

Su san  A. Thornton



8. Is China Trying to Undermine the Liberal International Order?

81

Alastair Iain Johnston



9. Is China Changing the International Humanitarian Intervention Regime?

89

Courtney  J. Fung



10. Has China’s Economic Success Proven That Autocracy Is Superior to Democracy?

96

Yue n Yue n Ang

I I I . C H I N A I N T H E W O R L D

11. What Are the Implications for the United States as China Reshapes Its Overseas Image?

109

Nai ma Gre e n-­R i ley



12. How Can the United States Live with China’s ­ Belt and Road Initiative?

119

Mi n Ye



13. What Does China’s Increased Influence in Latin Amer­i­ca Mean for the United States?

127

O l ive r Stue nke l



14. Does the Rise of China Threaten the Transatlantic Partnership? Ph i l i p pe Le Corre

136

Contents



ix

15. Is China Competing with the United States in Africa?

144

Mari a Re pnikova



16. Should Western Nations Worry about the China-­Russia Relationship?

151

Ly le Goldstein

I V. S E C U R I T Y

17. How ­Will China’s National Power Evolve vis-­à-­vis the United States?

161

Andrew   S. Erickson



18. How Does China Think about National Security?

171

Sh e e na Che stnut Greite ns



19. Is China a Challenge to US National Security?

177

O ri ana Skylar Mastro



20. How ­Will Emerging Technologies and Capabilities Impact ­Future US-­China Military Competition?

185

E l sa  B. Kania

V. F L A S H P O I N T S

21. Where Do Divergent US and Chinese Approaches to Dealing with North ­Korea Lead?

195

Joh n Park



22. How Does Taiwan Affect US-­PRC Relations? Sh e l ley Rigge r

204

x Contents



23. Why Should Americans Care about Hong Kong?

211

De ni se Y. H o and Je ffrey Wasse r st rom



24. What Should Americans Know about ­Human Rights Violations in Xinjiang, and What Are US National Interests ­There?

219

Jam e s  A. Mi llward



25. Why Did China Build and Militarize Islands in the South China Sea, and Should the United States Care?

230

Bonnie  S. G ­l ase r

V I . E C O N O M I C S

26. Who Wins and Who Loses in the US-­China Trade War?

241

Yukon H uang



27. How Does Party-­State Capitalism in China Interact with Global Capitalism?

250

Margaret  M. Pear son, Meg Rithm ire, and Ke lle e  S. Tsai



28. ­Will the Renminbi Rival the Dollar?

258

E swar Prasad



29. How Can the United States Protect Its Intellectual Property from China’s Espionage?

265

Margaret   K. Lewis



30. Is China Catching Up with the West? Or, Why Should We Care about China’s ­Middle Class? 274 Te rry Sicular

Contents

xi

V I I . P U B L I C H E A LT H , S C I E N C E ,

TECHNOLOGY

31. Is US-­China Climate Action Pos­si­ble in an Era of Mistrust?

283

Ale x Wang



32. What Can the United States Learn from China about Infrastructure?

294

Se l i na Ho



33. What Is at Stake in the US-­China Technological Relationship? 302 Graham We bste r



34. Has China Positioned Itself as a Leader in Big Tech Regulations?

311

Wi n ston Ma



35. What Does It Mean That China Is the First Country to Land on the Dark Side of the Moon?

321

Carla   P. Fre eman



36. Is US-­China Global Health Collaboration Win-­Win?

330

Wi nni e Yip and Wi lliam Hsiao

V I I I . S O C I E T Y

37. What’s #MeToo in China All About?

339

Leta Hong Finche r



38. Why Should the United States Support Civil Society in China and How? Di ana Fu

348

xii Contents



39. Do Confucius Institutes Belong on American Campuses? 355 Mary Gallaghe r



40. Should American Universities Engage with China? 365 Mar k Elliott and Dan Murphy

I X . C U LT U R E

41. Why Is Chinese Popu­lar Culture Not So Popu­lar Outside of China?

377

Stanley Ro se n



42. What Can Western Audiences Learn about China from Its Twenty-­First-­Century Writers?

387

Xudong Zhang



43. How Does the Rising Chinese Market Reshape Global Art?

395

Noah Kupfe rman



44. Does Religion ­Matter in Bilateral Relations?

403

Ian Johnson



45. Does Race ­Matter in US-­China Relations?

410

Ke i sha Brown



46. How Does the Past Serve the Pre­sent in ­ Today’s China?

415

Wang Gungwu

Contributors 423 Acknowl­edgments 431 Index 433

THE CHINA QUESTIONS

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Introduction Maria Adele Carrai, Jennifer Rudolph, and Michael Szonyi

Open any major newspaper or news site or listen to any news broad-

cast on almost any day and you w ­ ill likely encounter a story about US-­China rivalry. Skepticism and suspicion between the two countries are rising, and the relationship has entered tense new territory. Economic and military modernization has transformed China into a major world power, and its be­hav­ior affects a broad spectrum of US interests both directly and indirectly. China now challenges American leadership in many dimensions of world affairs. At the same time, China’s participation has also become essential to addressing many global concerns such as climate change, cybersecurity, and public health. In the face of myriad critical issues, some preexisting and ­others newly emerging, the two sides are fundamentally rethinking their relationship. WHY THIS BOOK?

­ hese changes in US-­China relations are already affecting American T lives and w ­ ill continue to do so for the foreseeable f­uture. It is critically impor­tant that Americans have a clear understanding of developments inside China and the US-­China relationship. In our age of 24 / 7 news cycles and pervasive social media, it is easy to get information. But much of the information about China that is available to the general reader is one-­d imensional or partisan. Despite the obstacles that Beijing imposes on its own and foreign journalists, ­there

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is still much high-­quality reporting. But even in balanced coverage, the broader significance of the latest news event is not always easy to grasp. T ­ here are few sources for the general reader seeking well-­ informed, nonpartisan insights into the many critical issues in the US-­China relationship. The China Questions 2: Critical Insights into US-­China Relations can be one place to start. More than fifty leading scholars, analysts, and journalists with expertise spanning politics, national security, economics, science, technology, public health, history, culture, and society have contributed to the book. We asked each to identify a pressing question that readers outside China, especially Americans, should know more about, and then provide an answer in a short, accessible essay. Naturally, such difficult questions cannot be comprehensively answered in a few pages. But our authors explain them clearly and provide information that readers should have when thinking about ­these issues for themselves. The authors offer insights based on years and sometimes de­cades of thinking, researching, and writing about t­ hese issues. For readers who wish to delve deeper, additional resources for each topic are provided on the book’s web page at https://­fairbank​.­fas​.­harvard​.­edu​/­china​-­questions2. Most of our authors are US-­based. This is deliberate. No single volume can describe all the issues or perspectives in US-­China relations. Therefore, we offer a cross-­section of key areas, presenting analyses from the US perspective or aimed at lessons for the United States. (­A fter discussions with Chinese colleagues, we also worried that participation in this proj­ect might be difficult for academics in ­People’s Republic of China [PRC] universities.) We recognize that counter­parts from China might have very dif­fer­ent views, and thus we pre­sent the book not as a balanced repre­sen­ta­tion of views from both sides of the Pacific but instead as a reflection of the critical environment of ­today and as a response to some impor­tant questions. Of course, we hope that readers from China and elsewhere w ­ ill find

Introduction

3

this book in­ter­est­ing and that it ­w ill contribute to greater understanding in China of US perspectives and thereby facilitate better relations. ­Because our contributors come from dif­fer­ent fields and pre­sent dif­fer­ent viewpoints, readers ­w ill encounter both overlaps and disagreement among them. This reflects the open debates in the field. Some essays include policy proposals; o ­ thers do not. Regardless, each chapter provides, explic­itly or implicitly, an informed perspective on the bilateral relationship. That the more than fifty authors hold such an array of dif­fer­ent opinions is itself noteworthy. We are quite confident that they would not argue that their par­tic­u ­lar characterization of a specific issue should be extrapolated to describe the entire relationship. Americans need to consider the possibility that all of them are right in their own terms and ask what this means for the United States. Trying to understand t­hese diverse and complex perspectives is crucial for Amer­i­ca’s f­uture. Failure to do so ­w ill lead to policy ­m istakes that w ­ ill harm US interests. Perhaps the best-­k nown recent example of misunderstanding is the Trump administration’s launch of a trade war that rested partly on the mistaken belief that China is primarily an export-­oriented manufacturing economy and thus vulnerable to American tariffs. But underestimating and misconstruing China’s ­Belt and Road Initiative, which has led to years of missed American opportunities, may prove even more significant in the long run. Americans need accurate and sophisticated knowledge of China to better understand the issues at stake. THE US-­C HINA RELATIONSHIP

The recent downturn in the bilateral relationship may have come as a surprise to many, but its roots can be traced back de­cades. A ­ fter the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established the PRC in 1949,

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THE CHINA QUESTIONS 2

the United States and most of its allies did not grant the PRC diplomatic recognition, choosing instead to continue to recognize the Republic of China, which had by then moved to Taiwan, as the legitimate government of China. This arrangement only began to change in the 1970s. Though initially motivated by Cold War goals of countering the Soviet Union, the normalization of relations between the United States and China proved to be one of the most impor­tant events of the twentieth c­ entury. The remarkable developments in the bilateral relationship since US president Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to Beijing w ­ ere enabled by a policy framework known as “constructive engagement” that has ­shaped China policy for both Republican and Demo­cratic administrations for the past half ­century. The policy maintains that US domestic and international interests are best served if China is stable and meets the needs of its own p­ eople, is increasingly integrated into the world economy and adopts international rules and norms, and perceives the United States as neither hostile nor seeking to undermine the CCP regime. Constructive engagement has also meant the maintenance of the One China policy (which acknowledges but does not accept PRC claims to Taiwan) and the assumption that a continued US presence in Asia is required to ensure a peaceful and prosperous region. Engagement was intended to promote stability and prosperity in China and the region while gradually integrating China into the existing liberal world order, thereby protecting US priorities and leadership. W ­ hether eventual po­liti­cal liberalization and democ­ratization in China was also a core goal of US constructive engagement policy— as some of its critics charge t­oday, therefore implying that the policy has been a failure—­remains a highly contentious debate. On the China side, when Deng Xiaoping and the post–­Mao Zedong leadership launched the PRC on its current path of “opening up and reform,” they recognized that the stability of the US-­led world

Introduction

5

order and China’s integration into it supported their goals as well. In this regard, no nation has done more in the last half ­century than the United States to assist China’s rise and global integration. China has benefited tremendously from Pax Americana and the system it created. In return, China has contributed to American prosperity through investments, workers and students, and exports of products for American consumers. And China’s participation in the system implicitly acknowledged US leadership in it. But Chinese leaders recognized that the benefits of engagement also came with peril. Distrust persisted alongside cooperation due at least partly to the clash between China’s authoritarian rule and US support for demo­cratic liberal norms at home and abroad. During the 2000s, China and the United States became top trading partners. Chinese factories became integral to global supply chains, and products with a “Made in China” label became ubiquitous in American ­house­holds. US investments in Chinese industry helped expand China’s domestic market. Overall, engagement created strong interdependence and successfully kept the relationship ­free from threats to US fundamental interests. Yet as early as the first years of the twenty-­fi rst ­century, Americans ­were increasingly thinking about the need to adjust imbalances built into the relationship that had become more pronounced over time, such as continued barriers to Chinese markets and state support of industry. However, major efforts to address t­ hese and other areas w ­ ere delayed as the US-­driven global war on terrorism and the ­Great Recession of 2007–2009 diverted US attention and resources. With the recovery well u ­ nder way, in the 2010s the Obama administration tried to reassert US leadership in Asia in the face of China’s growing influence, launching a broad “pivot” to East Asia that involved economic, diplomatic, and security dimensions. For instance, on the economic front, the United States led the negotiations for the

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Trans-­Pacific Partnership trade agreement, which u ­ ntil it was abandoned by the Trump administration would have let the United States remain the main rule setter of the international economic l­egal order, pointedly excluding China from the agreement. Donald Trump leveraged a bipartisan consensus to get tougher on China that was driven in part by growing pessimism about ­whether it was pos­si­ble to fully integrate China into the existing international liberal order. He took popu­lar anxiety about China’s rise to a new level, using unpre­ce­dented vocabulary and seeking to enflame ethno­ nationalism. The rhe­toric helped hasten a worsening view of China on multiple levels. The 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States for the first time labeled China a revisionist power and a peer competitor. Trump had centered his campaign around the accusation that China was stealing American manufacturing jobs, and he promised to bring them back. Yukon Huang and Ryan Hass explain in their chapters how wrong he was. Trump’s campaign themes blossomed into racist rhe­toric that reached new heights as the United States grappled with the COVID-19 pandemic. The rhe­toric fueled an alarming increase in anger and vio­lence ­toward Asian American fellow citizens as well as millions more visitors to the United States. On the Chinese side, Xi Jinping, secretary-­general of the CCP and president of the PRC since 2012, has presided over the emergence of a China that is not only stronger but also bolder. ­Today China asserts its interests through a national industrial strategy, power projection abroad, and a willingness to exert economic coercion on trade partners. Beyond its borders, China more aggressively pushes its claims in territorial disputes with India and Bhutan; to the east it has expanded into the South China Sea. From the perspective of Beijing, ­these are legitimate actions to protect and assert its sovereignty. The repression of Uyghur and other minorities, including reeducation and internment, and the suppression of po­liti­cal freedoms in

Introduction

7

Hong Kong and the crackdown on h ­ uman rights activism have generated outrage and alarm in the United States and elsewhere. Domestically China has successfully used populist and nationalist arguments to respond to t­ hese concerns, build support and legitimacy for the CCP, and ­counter any challenges to Xi’s personal authority. Propaganda efforts are matched by new forms of surveillance that use advanced technologies, such as facial recognition and artificial intelligence, and stricter controls over the internet. Many of ­these tactics illustrate fundamental differences between the United States and China about the proper relationship between a government and its citizens. In the economic realm, u ­ nder Xi the CCP has been bringing many sectors of the economy ­under direct control, even as it continues its established tradition of long-­term strategic planning that differs significantly from a f­ ree market approach. In the background of ­these developments appears to be a strongly held view by China’s leadership that the United States is in decline and therefore that the time is ripe for China to advance. China has declared its goal of becoming a global technology, military, and economic leader by 2050, putting an end to US supremacy though not necessarily replacing it. This is not entirely a surprise. For years China has complained that it was tired of hearing Washington tell it what to do. Even prior to the United States raising tariff barriers, China was taking steps to limit and better control interactions between its citizens and Americans, decouple the two economies in a controlled way, and transition its military from a primarily defensive force to one capable of projecting power beyond China’s borders. In 2015 the Chinese legislature passed the National Security Law of the ­People’s Republic of China, designed in part to create a parallel digital world sealed off from US influence. The following year China put all nongovernmental organ­izations u ­ nder police administration, negatively impacting ­those organ­izations operating in China and the

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Americans and other foreigners employed by them. And China is increasingly emphasizing the importance of indigenous innovation and reduced reliance on the United States, especially for critical components necessary for technological modernization that are increasingly tied to military advancements. China has also started promoting its own visions for the ­future global order through new organ­izations for economic integration and ­legal standards such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Built on a strikingly similar model as the US-­led financial institutions with which it aims to compete, the bank serves at least in part as a vehicle to enable China to participate in international infrastructure financing with due recognition and with input into the terms. Most significantly, China also launched the ­Belt and Road Initiative, a global development strategy to make it a dominant actor in the international economic and po­liti­cal systems. On the military front, as Andrew Erickson’s chapter notes, the United States still enjoys an absolute military advantage, but China’s rapidly growing military capabilities have narrowed the gap considerably, particularly in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and other regions of par­tic­u­lar concern to China. This inevitably increases the risk of armed conflict. The rising tension between China and the United States in the diplomatic and security realms is mirrored in the media and in popu­lar perceptions. In 2022, roughly two-­t hirds of Americans across the po­l iti­cal spectrum view China negatively. While the explanation for this lies partly with US domestic politics, the deterioration in US perceptions of China is not simply a m ­ atter of the election cycle. It is also a product of China’s international conduct as well as broadly held concerns about ­human rights in China. ­Today ­there is also broad agreement among US corporations and government officials that Beijing’s industrial and economic policies provide unfair advantages

Introduction

9

that undermine US (and other foreign) per­for­mance in China, with state subsidies and intellectual property theft challenging cap­i­t al­ist norms and rules. As China has become more assertive at home and nearby, its narratives about the United States have also changed. Some Chinese diplomats, popularly known as “wolf warriors,” now state openly the view that the United States meddles in China’s internal affairs in ways that threaten its domestic unity and stability, something unpre­ce­ dented in the history of engagement. The official line contends, for instance, that the United States instigated the 2008 riots in Tibet and the 2014 Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong. And China’s narrative about the United States goes beyond painting it as a meddler. For instance, China questions the validity of the United States as a model in areas such as public health, noting the sustained chaos caused by COVID-19 in the United States as opposed to the disciplined approach taken by Beijing. China now pre­sents itself to the world as an alternative model for economic development and po­l iti­cal and social organ­ ization vis-­à-­vis the previously dominant American-­led order. Relations w ­ ere made even more difficult by heated nationalist rhe­toric from both Donald Trump and Xi Jinping. Their use of nationalist pop­u ­lism makes it even more impor­tant that the two sides understand each other. The costs of this approach make the need for a course correction that is more mea­sured and clear-­eyed even more pressing. Demonizing China as not just a rival but also as an ­enemy and using racist tropes can carry a heavy cost. It can lead to bad national policy, misunderstandings, and also bigotry and racism. Likewise, Chinese patriotic education and nationalist social media campaigns jeopardize the manifold people-­to-­people exchanges that have in past years broadened cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. ­These campaigns may also pose a danger to ethnic or other groups in China who are not seen as sufficiently nationalistic

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or Chinese and thus forced to conform to the dictums of the Chinese nation. The deteriorating relations of recent years now extend into virtually all domains, including the ideological one. Some pundits argue that a new cold war is beginning. Many blame the Trump presidency for this. But as we have seen, the deterioration of relations actually reflects trends that have been ­under way for years, with both sides sharing some responsibility. An altered distribution of power and global changes in politics and economics are shifting the world away from a US-­led order and ­toward a bipolar or perhaps multipolar one. Other broad trends, such as technological advances and the rise of populist and antiglobalization movements, also contribute to ­these tensions. This is certainly not the first time in history that an established power has had to consider the question of how best to accommodate a rising power. The United States navigated its own rise through a combination of economic might and a breakdown of Eu­ro­pean power networks in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Japa­nese leaders in the early twentieth c­ entury believed that the Western powers actively excluded them from achieving first-­power status, and this view ultimately led to a disastrous war in Asia. Can the existing world order make room for China? W ­ ill China try to create an alternate system, or ­w ill it try to make the existing system adjust so that norms are not based primarily on what Xi Jinping terms “Western values”? It’s obvious that China is no longer satisfied with the status quo and that the United States is necessarily worried about what China’s rise might mean. Despite the growing friction, the two countries are deeply intertwined. Bilateral trade in goods and ser­vices reached nearly $660 billion by 2020, and the two countries have become major sources of foreign direct investment in each other, with supply chains entwined for good and bad as the COVID-19 pandemic has clearly demon-

Introduction

11

strated. In short, interdependence defines the relationship. But interdependence does not determine the relationship. ­There is much to gain if the two powers can tame their animus and engage productively. The economic stakes clearly are high, as is the potential and need for collaboration on such critical issues as climate change and global health. The United States could learn from the Chinese experience in areas such as infrastructure and poverty reduction, while China could continue to benefit from the dynamic US educational system, innovative business practices, and more. The real­ity is that China and the United States cannot simply walk away from each other. They share too much history and too much of the global stage. But engaging productively must include grappling with divergent views and managing competition. It ­w ill take time to develop a new postengagement policy, but finding ways to connect and tackle shared prob­lems while still pursuing national interests is a necessary goal. CHARACTERIZING THE US-­C HINA RELATIONSHIP T­ ODAY

Secretary of State Antony Blinken laid out the key aspects of President Joe Biden’s China policy in one of his first public speeches in March 2021. “Our relationship with China ­will be competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be,” said Blinken, adding, that “the common denominator is the need to engage China from a position of strength.” Some observers ­were surprised that t­here was no formal break with the Trump administration’s policy, but in real­ity t­ here was almost no possibility of a reset in US-­China relations. T ­ here is a broad bipartisan consensus that the old policy of constructive engagement has failed. While Trump’s departure from existing norms of the relationship w ­ ere startling in terms of their rhe­toric and the lack of strategic coherence

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b­ ehind individual decisions, the relationship had already entered a new phase. T ­ here’s no g­ oing back to pre-­Trump engagement not ­because of Trump’s rhe­toric but instead b­ ecause the relationship was already compromised. The Biden administration’s task is to assess and prioritize US interests in a complicated post-­engagement landscape where China is pushing its interests assertively and at times at cross-­ purposes with ­those of the United States. What are the lessons of The China Questions 2 for US policy in this new era? Endless streams of rhe­toric in the last de­cade have argued about how best to characterize the relationship: partnership, competition, and, increasingly, threat or ­enemy. Finding the existing vocabulary inadequate, some analysts have even coined new terms, such as “Chimerica,” “G2,” and “co-­opetitor.” Reading this book should make clear that no single label adequately describes the entirety of this crucial relationship b­ ecause it is much too complex and contradictory. While the bilateral relationship is too complicated to be reduced to a single characterization, it is still impor­tant for academics and prac­ti­tion­ers to try, for in the absence of a s­ imple description, politics ­w ill fill the empty space, and in the current po­liti­cal dynamic, the term that ­w ill most likely be ­adopted is “­enemy.” Old ways of defining policy options are similarly outdated. It no longer makes much sense to speak of China “doves” and “hawks.” Recognizing the limitations of ­these categories and current policies, Rush Doshi, director for China on the US National Security Council, argues that the United States needs to reframe its policies in terms of a distinction between strategies intended to accommodate or reassure China and strategies intended to change China’s be­hav­ior through deterrence or subversion. The essays ­here pre­sent a dif­fer­ent way of thinking about the complexity. Most of the authors focus on one or more of the following aspects: US-­China interdependence, the implications of a changing China, and US-­China competition. Plausible

Introduction

13

policy choices could be drawn from each of them, though not necessarily exactly as the individual authors would f­avor. The authors who focus on interdependence implicitly or explic­ itly ask the question of ­whether close links to China are good, bad, or neutral for the United States. What opportunities and risks does interdependence create? China has many ­things the United States desires, including markets and skills. Interdependence can be positive if it gives the United States access to such t­ hings, and thus an appropriate policy might be to maximize American access to China. But interdependence also creates risks, so some authors explore how to minimize ­these risks without damaging the opportunities. China and the United States share interests in addressing common challenges, including global public health, counterterrorism, and combating climate change. In t­hese areas, policy makers must find ways to work constructively with China in support of shared interests while minimizing costs or new risks. Some of our authors frame their analyses largely in terms of changes inside China rather than on the relationship between the two countries. For some, China’s rise in and of itself does not pose a direct challenge to US interests or it is not clear what that challenge may be. E ­ ither way, ­these authors argue, it makes no sense to adopt a policy of constraining China just for the sake of ­doing so. Carla Freeman’s chapter on space exploration is a good example of this approach. For ­others, internal developments in China—­such as the ­human rights crisis in Xinjiang—do demand a strong US response. Most of our contributors think primarily of the two countries as competitors. That this view predominates among more than fifty leading China experts is a strong indicator of a truly fundamental shift in the academic world in recent years. Only five years ago this view was not the dominant one. Within that shift we can find some patterns. For some of the authors who see the two countries as competitors, the

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THE CHINA QUESTIONS 2

game is essentially a fair one and therefore should be allowed to continue. Some within this group argue that the United States has real advantages and is therefore likely to prevail in the competition. A small group, exemplified by Selina Ho’s essay on infrastructure, argue that China has certain advantages and therefore that the correct policy is for the United States to learn from China in ­these areas. This is another largely unpre­ce­dented development in the study of US-­China relations. A variant of this approach, also quite novel, sets aside the issue of competition. As China becomes wealthier and more technologically advanced, it ­faces challenges similar to ­those in the United States. In response, as Winston Ma writes about technological governance, the two should learn from one another. It can also be argued that the two countries compete in a game in which China does not play by the rules or changes the rules in its ­favor. In such cases, the appropriate policy may be to strengthen the rules or sanction China to produce compliance. A third approach, exemplified by Margaret Lewis on intellectual property, acknowledges that China is not playing by the rules—by incentivizing and even at times directing violations of US law—­but seeks ways to mitigate the threat this poses. Some authors focus on the core competition and worry that it is dangerous in and of itself. Alex Wang’s essay on climate change takes the view that US-­China competition could actually benefit both countries and the world. Fi­nally, though it is not argued h ­ ere by any of our contributors, one position contends that China is both a competitor and a threat and that the threat cannot be mitigated. So, the only right policy is to weaken or constrain China or force it to change—an increasingly widespread public view. One might read the chapters in this volume as rebutting this position as both wrong and dangerous.

Introduction

15

One common ­factor to policy implications across all t­hese approaches is the need to think about how to maximize benefits while minimizing costs; deciding what is best depends on ­whether one focuses on China itself, on interdependence, or on competition. But for an overall China policy, the United States needs to combine and balance ­these perspectives without letting any of them dominate. If one thinks that a specific issue ­really does override all o ­ thers, then a ­simple policy might work. But once the complexity involved is acknowledged, that approach is simply untenable. If the United States has a compelling interest in working with China on any issue, its policy simply ­can’t focus exclusively on mitigating perceived threats. The downturn in the relationship is further complicated by the way options open to the United States are sometimes presented as mutually exclusive alternatives: ­either China changes and profoundly reforms its policies or the countries should decouple. Neither of ­these is v­ iable or realistic, and for that ­matter, neither serves the interests of ­either country. Although the book’s focus is to inform rather than argue for specific policies, ­there is one obvious conclusion to draw. Failure to recognize the complexity of China and the US-­China relationship can harm US interests. No one-­size-­fits-­all policy makes sense. An appropriate policy needs to recognize that the relationship is dif­fer­ent in dif­fer­ent spheres. Reciprocity may be the right policy in the commercial realm, as John Pomfret argues—if China d­ oesn’t allow foreign firms to operate in certain sectors, then Chinese firms should be excluded from ­those sectors in the United States—­but this ­doesn’t make reciprocity the right princi­ple everywhere. In education, as Mary Gallagher argues, banning Chinese student organ­izations on US campuses ­because American students ­can’t or­ga­nize in China would begin a race to the bottom that would erode, not strengthen, Amer­i­ca’s advantages.

16

THE CHINA QUESTIONS 2

This is a book written by leading experts on China, not on the United States itself. Few of them take US domestic policy as their primary focus, but it is implicit in many of the essays. Our authors mostly agree that ­whether one sees China as a partner, a competitor, or a threat, one essential part of any answer to the question of how best to deal with a rising China is to rebuild and strengthen the United States. LOOKING FORWARD

Promises and threats have continuously characterized the US-­China relationship. Despite rumblings about decoupling, China and the United States are bound together even as they imagine radically dif­ fer­ent ­f utures. Immigration, education, investment, trade, economic interdependence, and cultural exchanges connect them. Despite divergences, they cannot afford to separate or develop parallel systems. Simply put, mutual dependence and peaceful coexistence are vital to their ­futures and to the world. As a result, readers looking for another simplistic label to replace existing ones may be disappointed. We simply reject the view that the relationship can be reduced to a single characterization. China is indeed si­mul­ta­neously a competitor, a threat, and a potential partner, and Americans must face this real­ity. While many contributors focus on the negative aspects of the relationship, t­here are also strong reasons not to be fatalistic about its f­ uture. US-­China relations have seen worse. In the first de­cades a­ fter the PRC was founded, the two countries had no diplomatic relations, fought on opposite sides of the Korean War, and embargoed trade with the other. Rhe­toric on both sides was dominated by real Cold War divisions. Even so, China and the United States eventually ­were able to come together in surprising ways in response to a shared

Introduction

17

threat from the Soviet Union. Who would ever have ­imagined, for instance, that a meeting between Chinese and US players at the 1971 World T ­ able Tennis Championship in Japan would lead to the diplomatic breakthrough that inaugurated forty-­plus years of constructive engagement? As ­we’ve shown, the US-­China relationship is multifaceted; it is also at least somewhat unpredictable. What we have done in this volume is try to cover what is impor­tant now in the hope that we create a platform for informed discussion of policy options and for understanding the most impor­tant bilateral relationship of ­today’s world—­and tomorrow’s. We take inspiration from our friend and colleague Ezra Vogel, who had agreed to contribute an essay to this volume but sadly died before he could complete it. In his fifty years of engagement with China, Ezra was a constant advocate for people-­to-­people diplomacy, for promoting interaction not just between statesmen but also among scholars, students, businesspeople, journalists, and ordinary folk. This type of interaction has suffered from the current downturn to the detriment of both nations. The COVID-19 pandemic has only exacerbated the challenges. Many prob­lems in the US-­China relationship are difficult, even intractable, but we hope that this one aspect of it—­cultural, educational, and business exchanges—­can soon be restored. While state-­to-­state relations are currently rocky, the people-­ to-­people relations that Ezra embodied and that occurred throughout the de­cades of engagement give us some optimism that relations can improve if channels remain open. If this book contributes to Americans being better informed about the complex US-­China relationship, it w ­ ill have served its purpose.

I Contextualizing China-­US Relations

1

US-­China Relations How Did We Get H ­ ere, Where Can We Go? John Pomfret

It is hard to imagine a more dramatic change in the tangled tale of

the United States and China than the convulsive drama that tran­ spired since the election of Donald Trump in 2016. Led by former president Trump and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secretarygeneral Xi Jinping and intensified by a global pandemic, the two countries entered a period of conflict and reassessment in US-­China relations. Not since the years ­a fter World War II when China, in flames, became a communist state had Amer­i­ca’s relations with China been in such flux. The competition between Amer­i­ca and China deepened just as the dogmas of their leaders dovetailed. In a profound break with American presidents before him, Trump embraced ethnic nationalism, combining self-­dealing corporatism and pop­u ­lism with an appeal to the white working class. Xi’s China echoed Trump with its xenophobic, Han nationalism, although China’s ­human rights violations in Xinjiang and elsewhere made Trump’s moves to confine refugee kids to cages look like child’s play. With his victory, Trump blew up the bipartisan consensus on China that had held since the days of Richard Nixon. The old consensus was that the United States had no choice but to embrace its

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historic mission to pull China into the world and, through constructive engagement, try to fashion a G ­ reat Harmony with Beijing. As Nixon noted in 1967, China is just too big to be allowed “to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors.” Trump’s victory marked the terminus—at least temporarily—of that approach to China. ­There’s no doubt that Trump deserves credit for forcing the United States to acknowledge the failures of its old China policy. Amer­i­ca’s habit of paying ­today for the easily broken promise of better be­hav­ior tomorrow h ­ adn’t produced a China amenable to Western values. In the words of former se­nior State Department official Richard Armitage, Amer­i­ca’s China policy had instead “taught the dog to piss on the rug.” The prob­lem, however, was that Trump d­ idn’t replace the old policy with a new functional paradigm. Gone, thankfully, from the intellectual arsenal was the fantasy that underlay G2, that the United States and China w ­ ere destined to solve the world’s prob­lems together. But gone too in Trump’s manhandling of Amer­i­ca’s allies was the strategic alternative of embedding US-­China relations in the web of Amer­i­ca’s alliances in Eu­rope and Asia. Trump’s team correctly saw China’s system as an intolerably predatory one. Led by Matthew Pottinger, a clear-­eyed former journalist in China and US Marine Corps intelligence officer who served on Trump’s National Security Council, the administration broke with the previously accepted view of China as a country evolving, in fits and starts, in a more liberal direction. Instead, the administration understood China as a determinedly unalterable Leninist state. As a po­liti­cal philosophy, Leninism advocates strug­g le and seeks domination. In the view of Trump administration officials, Beijing had sought to vanquish Amer­i­ca geostrategically, commercially, and scientifically. Meanwhile, the United States had naively sought

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23

peaceful coexistence with China. When Amer­i­ca said “win-­w in,” according to this view, the Chinese thought “­Great, that means ­we’ll win twice.” In China’s Leninist-­capitalist version of authoritarianism, Trump’s team perceived, in the words of po­liti­cal phi­los­o­pher Timothy Garton Ash, “a systemic rival to liberal democracy, just as fascist and communist regimes ­were for much of the 20th ­century.” China’s model offered, Ash wrote, “developing socie­ties in Asia, Africa and Latin Amer­i­ca an alternative path to modernity.” This perspective on China was codified in December 2017 with the release of a national security strategy that for the first time labeled China as a revisionist power and a peer competitor. A subsequent report by the US trade representative in March 2018 argued that China’s policy of forced technology transfer aimed to mine the West, specifically the United States, of its industrial gems so that Chinese firms could destroy, not simply compete with, Western firms. Amer­i­ca’s turn from China spread far beyond the US government; it was societal wide. In 2020, roughly two-­thirds of Americans polled by the Pew Research Center registered a negative opinion of China, the highest percentage recorded since Pew began asking the question in 2005. Only about a quarter of the population in the United States reported a favorable attitude ­toward China, the lowest ever. Once again, the cycle of Amer­i­ca’s relations with China swung back to recrimination and fear.

In china too, the pendulum inclined t­oward hatred and mistrust

and something more. Trump’s amplification of the divisions within American society and his woeful mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic reinforced a narrative of triumphalism that had first emerged in China during the G ­ reat Recession of 2007–2009. Amer­i­ca and the

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liberal demo­cratic system, China’s state-­r un media told its p­ eople, ­were in a state of unstoppable decline. ­Every night China’s state-­r un nightly newscast compared the number of daily coronavirus infections in the United States as they soared above 150,000 with China’s, which often sank to zero. Trump was given a cheeky nickname on Chinese social media, the Trump Who Builds China. To many Chinese, the Beautiful Country—as Amer­i­ca is called in Chinese—­was not so beautiful anymore. CCP chief Xi Jinping also accelerated his rollback of the positive changes that had given so many ­people so much hope about China’s evolution into a freer, more open society. U ­ nder Xi, the CCP returned to its totalitarian roots and sought to exorcize, once again, the hold of American ideas on China’s society. The CCP stuck its tentacles deep inside the private sector. China intensified the oppression of dissidents and ­lawyers, squeezed charities and environmental groups, and on the borders of its empire, in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, threw p­ eople in jail for their beliefs. Overseas, despite a promise to the United States not to militarize the South China Sea, China turned rocks and reefs into island-­sized aircraft carriers as it sought to dominate the one million–­square-­m ile waterway. China misused the largesse and openness of US universities to steal industrial technology and strengthen its military. In addition, China broke an agreement to end cyberespionage operations against US corporations and continued to threaten demo­cratic Taiwan with invasion. With increasing boldness, China’s government sought to proj­ect its “values” throughout the globe and deep into the heart of American culture. For almost a ­century, American movies and American basketball had been vessels through which American soft power flowed into China. Chinese filmgoers ­were so transfixed by Hollywood movies that communist authorities in 1950s Shanghai pleaded with Party Central in Beijing to go slow on cutting access to American

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25

films. Basketballs came to China in the handbags of American missionaries and ­were central to the image of the early twentieth ­century’s Young China as sporty, Western-­educated team players ready to remake China in Amer­i­ca’s image. ­Under Xi, China was determined to reverse the tide of influence, using its vast market to force the change. China’s censors ensured that Tinseltown bent to China’s w ­ ill and that American movies portrayed China in only the most positive light. And when the general man­ag­er of the Houston Rockets fired off a tweet in October 2019 in support of prodemocracy protests in Hong Kong, Beijing cut off the National Basketball Association from its billion-­dollar business in China. While the National Basketball Association was at the forefront of the 2020 movement for racial justice in Amer­i­ca, a­ fter the offending tweet its players, coaches, and general man­ag­ers went ­silent on China. For more than a ­century, Americans had embraced the mission of transforming China. Now they confronted the possibility that China was transforming them. At the highest echelons of the CCP, ­there was no public recognition that China had contributed to the deteriorating relationship with Amer­i­ca. The party took a page out of its 1989 playbook when, following the Tian­anmen Square massacre, Deng Xiaoping had the temerity to accuse the United States of fomenting the demonstrations and causing a crisis in Sino-­A merican relations. De­cades ­later, Chinese officials disinterred ­those allegations and presented them to both the Trump administration and the Biden administration. True to form, some old China Hands in the United States internalized China’s position. In July 2019, a group of scholars and former government officials published an open letter titled “China Is Not an E ­ nemy.” Like Barbara Tuchman had in the 1970s with her theory that a cold war with China would have been averted if the United States had only reached out to Mao Zedong during World War II,

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the letter denied agency to the CCP for the crisis in US-­China relations. Fundamentally, the letter argued, Trump was to blame. The letter nodded to China’s misbehavior but emphasized the “many US actions” that w ­ ere “contributing directly to the downward spiral in relations.” Blaming Amer­i­ca for a rocky relationship with Beijing was redolent of a paternalistic view of China that had been around since the days of Christian missionaries. China was a tabula ra­sa on which Americans could write the f­uture and was “plastic,” malleable in the hands of Americans. It was as if the CCP had no role to play in the drama of its relationship with Amer­i­ca at all.

Despite laying the foundation for a new approach to China, Trump

pursued a shambolic China policy. His imposition of tariffs on a broad array of China’s products resulted in no significant change in Beijing’s mercantilist trade practices. His administration slapped sanctions on a series of officials from Hong Kong and Xinjiang for violating ­human rights, but at the same time Trump became the first president in US history to actually encourage China to violate ­those rights. On June 29, 2019, on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Osaka, Trump, according to his national security advisor John Bolton, told party leader Xi Jinping that he approved of his decision to incarcerate hundreds of thousands of Uyghur Muslims in what have been confirmed to be concentration camps. Trump rightly advocated that US corporations move to decouple high-­tech supply chains from China, and due to security concerns his administration tried to block Huawei Technologies from the build-­out of 5G across the globe. But the president also tried to claw back sanctions against Huawei and another firm, ZTE, a­ fter personal phone calls with Xi Jinping. Trump ­couldn’t stop himself, Bolton wrote, from granting “personal f­avors to dictators he liked.”

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27

Trump moved to bolster Amer­i­ca’s ties to Taiwan; he signed legislation and approved large weapons sales. Still, the president was a feckless supporter of the island democracy. “One of Trump’s favorite comparisons,” Bolton wrote, “was to point to the tip of one of his Sharpies and say, ‘This is Taiwan,’ then point to the Resolute desk and say, ‘This is China.’ ” The COVID-19 pandemic amplified Trump’s worst instincts. To be sure, China’s leadership deserved censure for their failure to warn the world and China’s p­ eople of the virus’s danger. However, in referring to the disease as the “China virus” and the “Kung Flu,” Trump resuscitated decades-­old American prejudice against Chinese ­people as the font of pestilence and disease. It was as if the United States was again being haunted by ugly slurs from the late nineteenth c­ entury, when Americans w ­ ere told that the Chinese version of syphilis was more virulent than the Anglo strain. The Trump administration also became the first administration in recent history to roll back programs of engagement, breaking with the assumption that t­ hese bonds could only deepen with time. During President Barack Obama’s eight-­year tenure, t­here ­were more than one hundred government-­sponsored bilateral dialogues. The Trump administration discontinued them. The Trump administration’s argument was ­simple and, on the surface, correct: China was benefiting far more from ­these dialogues than the United States. But in dismantling instead of reimagining them, the Trump administration walked away from an opportunity. Trump lost another opening when he left the Paris Climate Accord and refused to back the Trans-­Pacific Partnership trade deal. In so ­doing, he made it harder for the United States to pressure China into limiting the production of green­house gases and aligning its trade practices with internationally accepted norms. Amer­i­ca First became Amer­i­ca alone.

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Contextualizing China-­US Relations

The election of Joe Biden in 2020 gave the United States a chance

to right the balance of its relationship with China. While some looked at Biden’s election as a way to return Amer­i­ca’s relations with China back to “normal,” such a decision would be as wrongheaded as it would be impossible. Instead, Biden had the opportunity, if he borrowed Pottinger’s more clear-­eyed view of China, to “build back better” the relationship between Washington and Beijing. As a first step, the single most impor­tant t­ hing the United States could do to prevail in its competition with China would be what it did during the Cold War with the Soviet Union: make its own society prosperous, dynamic, and a renewed exemplar of demo­cratic values. As Timothy Garton Ash wrote, “We must try to do the same again, hold true to the cause of persuading ­others that liberal socie­ ties offer a better way to live, and, importantly, keep faith with ­those in unfree socie­ties who share our values.” Amer­i­ca is not a useful teacher or a friend especially to China, which watches so closely, if it is perceived as hypocritical or weak. A second goal would be to realize that Amer­i­ca must try to have it all with China. The United States can stand up for the rights of ­people in Hong Kong and Taiwan and pursue cooperation with China to combat climate change, pandemics, and global economic disorder. Trump’s solution to this conundrum was to cut off contacts; Obama’s solution was to ­favor climate change over every­thing ­else. Neither policy worked. China ­w ill cooperate on the existential issue of our time ­because it’s in China’s interests, not ­because someone at the State Department soft-­pedals criticism of China’s h ­ uman rights or the US Navy stops freedom of navigation exercises in the South China Sea. A crucial goal of any American China policy should also be to avoid permitting the challenges in the relationship to slip into war. But preserving peace should not mean ceding the western Pacific to

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29

China’s military and commercial control or giving in to Chinese demands to stop supporting Taiwan. In fact, keeping the demo­cratic beacon bright in Taiwan is in the fundamental interests of the United States and is a culmination of two centuries of American engagement with the Chinese world. What’s more, China’s leaders are primed to view any American retreat not as solicitude but instead as a sign of weakness that would tempt them to grab for more. Amer­i­ca is a superpower ­because, not despite of, its alliances and its friends. T ­ hose friendships in Asia—­ with Japan, Australia, South K ­ orea, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Taiwan—­should form the bedrock of Washington’s approach to China. The friendship should be strengthened, not weakened by outbursts such as Trump’s petulant threats to withdraw American troops from South ­Korea, Japan, or even Germany. A key princi­ple for China and Amer­i­ca g­ oing forward is reciprocity. If the Chinese d­ on’t allow foreign firms to operate freely in China and compete against their own firms, then they should be barred from American markets as well. The same goes for reporters, researchers, scientists, and the like. American policy makers have tied themselves in knots over the last few de­cades trying to explain why they fashioned a playing field that tilted ­toward China. It’s time to right the balance. Fi­nally, engagement needs to be retrieved from its Trump-­imposed exile back into the vocabulary of US-­China relations. Engagement has rightly gotten a bad name ­because successive American administrations focused more on the cosmetics of the pro­cess than the content. Engagement for engagement’s sake ruined engagement. But muscular or even subversive engagement is r­eally the only way forward. Without backing off from confronting China’s attempts to extend its power regionally and globally, engagement on a broad

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array of issues, including climate, the military, public health and controlling pandemics, ­human rights, and trade, is key to fashioning a productive relationship. China is indeed too big and now too power­ful to be allowed “to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors.” Despite a very troubled relationship that is destined to get more troubled, the pursuit of ­Great Harmony is still worth it. But rapturous enchantment or g­ oing through the motions w ­ ill not get us ­there; only realism ­w ill. At the writing of this essay, the Biden administration has been in power for one year. So far, it has yet to clearly elucidate its China policy. But ­there are signs that the architecture of a new relationship is slowly being assembled. In November 2021, the United States and China jointly agreed to boost cooperation on climate change. That same month, a state-­owned Chinese com­pany signed a twenty-­year deal to buy liquid natu­ral gas from the United States that ­w ill turn the United States into China’s number one gas supplier. At the same time, tariffs on Chinese goods remain, as do restrictions on the export of advanced semiconductors to some Chinese companies. President Biden announced that the United States would not send diplomats to the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympic Games, but he encouraged US athletes to participate. In short, many of the policies seem contradictory, but that appears to be the idea. The challenge g­ oing forward w ­ ill be in managing this messy mix of competition and cooperation, which is destined to become the new normal between Washington and Beijing.

2 Is

Engagement Still the Best US Policy for China? Elizabeth Economy

At the heart of engagement is a ­simple belief: integrate China into

the system of international organ­i zations and agreements that underpin the liberal international order, and China w ­ ill become a pillar of that order and embrace its values such as freedom of navigation, ­human rights, and ­f ree trade. Moreover, this integration, along with the development of China’s economy, ­will facilitate the country’s domestic po­liti­cal and economic liberalization. China’s domestic governance system and foreign policy priorities ­w ill ultimately come to resemble ­those of the United States and its allies. This belief in the power of the US model and the liberal international order underpinned US policy t­oward China for almost forty years. But in the end China lost interest, and the United States lost faith. Engagement is no longer a credible, much less the best, US policy for China. THE PROMISE OF ENGAGEMENT

Engagement as an ideal is deeply rooted in the con­temporary American foreign policy psyche. Richard Nixon, even before becoming president, asserted in a 1967 Foreign Affairs article that “the world cannot be safe ­until China changes. Thus our aim, to the extent that we can influence events, should be to induce change.” Successive US presidents and their top foreign policy lieutenants put their own stamp

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on the concept. President Bill Clinton, for example, marking a high point in engagement with the accession of China in 2001 to the World Trade Organ­ization (WTO), stated in a March 2000 speech at Johns Hopkins that “of course the path that China takes to the f­uture is a choice China w ­ ill make. We cannot control that choice; we can only influence it. But we must recognize that we do have complete control over what we do. We can work to pull China in the right direction, or we can turn our backs and almost certainly push it in the wrong direction. The WTO agreement w ­ ill move China in the right direction. It ­will advance the goals Amer­i­ca has worked for in China.” And Robert Zoellick, who served as President George W. Bush’s deputy secretary of state, provided a fulsome articulation of engagement in a 2005 speech before the National Committee on US-­China Relations annual gala, calling on China to become a responsible stakeholder. “Our goal . . . ​is to help o ­ thers find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way. . . . ​Closed politics cannot be a permanent feature of Chinese society. It is simply not sustainable. China needs a peaceful po­liti­cal transition to make its government responsible and accountable to its ­people.” ­Were successive US presidents and their administrations simply naive in their belief that engagement would lead to the transformation of China into a model of market democracy and a stalwart supporter of the liberal international order? History suggests that such an evolution was pos­si­ble, even plausible. With American encouragement and pressure, many other authoritarian nations, including China’s neighbors Japan, Taiwan, and South ­Korea, had previously managed such a transition. And in several re­spects, China appeared to be following in their footsteps. Beginning in the early 1980s, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping opened the Chinese economy to market forces, foreign capital, and foreign ideas, an effort bolstered by the country’s integration into the World Bank and the International

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33

Monetary Fund. Both organ­izations played critical roles in providing financial support and technical assistance for China’s economic reform pro­cess. China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 exerted a similarly profound effect on the country’s domestic economic reforms. The requirements for China to join the WTO forced the government to open its market to greater foreign competition, diminish the role of state-­owned enterprises, relax its control over agricultural trade, and expand the space for private enterprise. China’s participation in international regimes also had direct and tangible implications for its po­liti­cal reform pro­cess. The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, for example, helped persuade the Chinese government to permit the establishment of nongovernmental organ­izations (NGOs). China established its first NGO, Friends of Nature, in 1994, and civic organ­izations devoted to issues such as environmental protection, mi­g rant c­ hildren’s education, and poverty alleviation soon flourished. For over a de­cade, US and other western NGOs and foundations ­were the largest source of financial support for Chinese civil society organ­izations. By the early 2010s, t­ here ­were tens of thousands of Chinese NGOs. One even started training ambitious Chinese citizens to run as in­de­pen­dent candidates in local district council elections, posing a direct challenge to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Wealthy entrepreneurs hosted salons with reform-­m inded scholars and l­awyers to discuss the potential for po­liti­cal reform. Chinese citizens taking advantage of new access to information, in some cases provided by t­hese NGOs, took to the streets to demand better air quality, protection from land grabs, and opposition to corruption. By 2010, the number of protests exceeded 180,000. Engagement was far from an unimpeded success, however. Periods of reform and opening w ­ ere punctuated with long periods of ­little pro­g ress, regression in po­liti­cal and economic reform, and

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devastating setbacks such as the 1989 Tian­anmen Square massacre. The Chinese government resisted embracing full market opening and remained concerned that po­liti­cal reform could lead to the CCP losing power. China also often fell short in its adherence to the international norms embodied in organ­izations and agreements, such as the WTO and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). (The United States never ratified UNCLOS but generally adheres to its princi­ples.) And China’s ­human rights practices remained well outside t­hose embraced by the United Nation’s International Covenant on Civil and Po­liti­cal Rights, which Beijing signed but never ratified. Nonetheless, US leaders retained their commitment to engagement, only articulating an alternative approach ­after China turned away. THE DEATH OF ENGAGEMENT

The end of engagement unfolded over a period of almost a de­cade and was marked by three distinct events. The G ­ reat Recession of 2007–2009 triggered the first public rethinking of the basic premise of engagement in Beijing. The collapse of the US economy and the relative resilience China’s economy led se­n ior Chinese officials to question the viability of the US model. As Vice Premier Wang Qishan famously told US trea­sury secretary Hank Paulson, “You ­were my teacher but look at your system, Hank, we ­aren’t sure we should be learning from you anymore.” And China’s central banker Zhou Xiao­ chuan suggested that the world move away from the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. This initial shift in Chinese leadership sentiment was cemented by the se­lection of Xi Jinping as CCP secretary-­general in 2012. Po­liti­cal and economic reform and opening ground to a halt. Xi enacted strict new laws and regulations that constrained civic action and

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35

the f­ree flow of information via the internet and media, established a massive digital surveillance system, and detained upwards of 1 million Uyghur Muslims in l­abor and detention camps in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. And new initiatives such as Made in China 2025 ­adopted targets, subsidies, and regulations in ten areas of cutting-­edge technology to protect Chinese industry and limit opportunities for multinationals. Xi understood tighter integration with the West and its values and norms as being dangerous to CCP authority and Chinese po­liti­cal stability. He reduced the opportunity for Chinese NGOs to interact with their foreign counter­parts through a highly restrictive law that resulted in a decline in the number of foreign NGOs working in China from over 7,000 in 2016 to 529 in 2020. In the pro­cess, Xi weakened the ability and enthusiasm of US civil society for cooperating with Chinese partners, thus undermining one of the most impor­tant pillars of support for a proactive US strategy of engagement. At the same time, speaking in June  2018 before the Central Conference on Work Related to Foreign Affairs, Xi made clear that China had assessed the state of the current liberal international order and found it wanting. He called for China to “lead in the reform of the global governance system.” Working through the United Nations and other international governmental organ­izations, he moved to introduce Chinese values and norms around h ­ uman rights, internet governance, economic development, and military alliances in ways that reflected Chinese policy preferences. He also exported ele­ments of China’s po­liti­cal and economic development model by training officials in other countries on party building and real-­t ime censorship of the internet. Confronted with the many changes u ­ nder way in Chinese domestic and foreign policy, the United States strengthened its presence in the Asia Pacific as a hedge against growing Chinese assertiveness

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but nonetheless clung to the promise of engagement throughout the Obama administration. Washington and Beijing notably cooperated to energize global climate change negotiations, which resulted in the Paris Climate Accord and China’s first public commitment to domestic targets for reduction of green­house gas emissions. Ultimately, however, it was the United States that summoned the third and final blow to engagement. ­A fter almost four de­cades of engagement, the Trump administration offered a fresh assessment of China as a strategic competitor and a “revisionist power,” one committed to undermining demo­cratic norms and the rules-­based order. Trump also viewed international institutions as constraints on US power and interests and withdrew the United States from the United Nations ­Human Rights Council, the World Health Organ­ization, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, among other international agreements and organ­izations. He displayed ­little interest in US participation in international institutions, much less in trying to integrate China into them. A NEW DAY, A NEW DAWN

Engagement no longer reflects the realities of the US-­China relationship. China’s leaders do not want to emulate the US governance model and are only selectively interested in supporting the liberal international order. They also want to reform the current system so as to align international norms and values with Chinese policy preferences. The United States now confronts a China that challenges fundamental US values and norms at home and on the international stage. Although the United States has l­imited ability to influence China’s domestic po­liti­cal and economic policies, it does possess the capacity to help shape the external environment in which China operates. To begin with, the United States must shore up its own governance

Is Engagement Still the Best US Policy for China?

37

model, ensuring that it reflects the values of openness, transparency, and the rule of law that inform the rules-­based order. A United States that models the best attributes of market democracy is the most power­ful c­ ounter to China’s normative challenge. In addition, the United States should ensure that its competition with China is presented in the context of the rules-­based order as opposed to a bilateral competition for power and influence. For example, China’s assertive be­hav­ior in the South China Sea should be framed as disregard for UNCLOS and a normative challenge to freedom of navigation. This ensures that all parties to UNCLOS, even t­ hose without a direct stake in the South China Sea, ­will help bring pressure to bear on China to change its be­hav­ior. Moreover, given the global nature of China’s challenge, the United States should work to bolster the rules-­based system not only through partnership with its traditional Eu­ro­pean and Asian allies but also with still-­developing economies in Africa, Latin Amer­i­ca, and the M ­ iddle East, where China possesses significant and growing influence. As the United States and its allies develop new initiatives around internet governance, technology standards, and clean supply chain networks, they should ensure that developing economies are also included. Fi­nally, within China vari­ous interest groups, such as liberal intellectuals and entrepreneurs, continue to quietly support po­liti­cal and economic reform. The United States should support ­these actors by maintaining its openness to China; encouraging continued exchange between Chinese and American students, scholars, and officials; and taking advantage of even small opportunities to share US values through American business. To the extent pos­si­ble, the United States should also partner with China to address global challenges such as climate change and pandemics. Po­l iti­cal change is a long game, and the United States should keep the door open to ­f uture engagement.

3

Why Is China america’s Favorite Threat? Chengxin Pan

T­h ere is no prize for guessing which country right now ranks among

the least favorite in American public opinion. The answer seems obvious. If recent Pew and Gallup polls are anything to go by, favorable views of China have sunk to historic lows. Yet China outperforms o ­ thers as Amer­i­ca’s favorite in one area: Washington’s threat assessment. Federal Bureau of Investigation director Christopher Wray calls China a “whole-­of-­society threat”: it is “engaged in a broad, diverse campaign of theft and malign influence, and it can execute that campaign with authoritarian efficiency. ­They’re calculating. ­They’re per­sis­tent. T ­ hey’re patient. And t­hey’re not subject to the righ­teous constraints of an open, demo­cratic society or the rule of law.” During the 2020 presidential election, no fewer than four Demo­cratic candidates called China the “greatest geopo­liti­cal threat” to the United States. In October 2021, Central Intelligence Agency director William Burns announced the creation of the China Mission Center to c­ ounter “the most impor­tant geopo­liti­cal threat we face in the 21st ­century.” In a bitterly divided and pandemic-­ravaged United States, the China threat pre­sents a rare Washington consensus. To many, this is not surprising. China simply ticks all the boxes for a clear and pre­sent danger: an authoritarian po­liti­cal system now ­under the perhaps lifelong reign of Xi Jinping, chronic ­human rights

Why Is China America’s Favorite Threat?

39

violations, heavy-­handed crackdowns on protesters in Hong Kong, state-­driven mercantilist capitalism and unfair trading practices, aggressive wolf warrior diplomacy, massive military buildup, increasing assertiveness in its neighborhood (most notably the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait), and unbridled global ambitions through the ­Belt and Road Initiative, to name only some. Given this, the existence and magnitude of the China threat seem all too real. A rising China certainly poses many challenges, from sustainable development to regional power balance. But the long list of China’s real or perceived wrongs and menaces do not by themselves explain why China is Amer­i­ca’s favorite threat. In international relations, threat is rarely a transparent phenomenon clearly signified by mea­sur­able capabilities. It is contingent on changing mutual intentions, which often cannot be objectively known with adequate certainty a priori. As a result, the uncertain gap between a real threat and a potential one is often filled by threat perception. As with all perceptions, threat perception has as much to do with the perceiver as with the perceived. Most perceptions are linked to aspects of real­ity to varying degrees. However, given that ­human sense organs receive up to one million bits of information from the real world for e­ very single bit of information that becomes part of our consciousness, h ­ uman perception is inevitably incomplete, selective, and necessarily mediated through culturally and po­liti­cally accepted narratives. Other­w ise, a given real­ity would proj­ect the same image and perception for every­one, which seldom happens. This suggests that perception, including threat perception, while related to and ­shaped by real­ity, does not identically correspond to it. According to social identity theory, threat perception is influenced by social identity in general and the demarcation between in-­g roups and out-­g roups in par­t ic­u ­lar. Like “stranger danger,” fear

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of the Other, irrespective of capabilities or intentions, can by itself convince the self of the danger of that Other. In this sense, our conception of who we are and the associated differentiation between self and Other play an often overlooked but key role in the social construction of threat. The US perception of China as a favorite threat is no exception; it is bound up with how Amer­i­ca sees itself. One dominant form of US self-­imagination is characterized by a virtuous self-­image of a chosen ­people with a manifest destiny to lead the world b­ ecause, as Woodrow Wilson put it, American princi­ples w ­ ere “not the princi­ples of a province or of a single continent. . . . ​[T]hey w ­ ere the princi­ples of a liberated mankind.” The long-­held belief that American po­ liti­cal values are universally applicable has provided the necessary glue to an other­wise disparate ­people with diverse ethnic backgrounds, cultural roots, and religious beliefs. According to Henry Kissinger, “Amer­i­ca would not be true to itself if it did not insist on the universal applicability of the idea of liberty.” Defining what Amer­i­ca is and what it stands for, its values of democracy, freedom, ­human rights, and the rule of law si­mul­ta­neously help define Amer­i­ca’s Other or what Amer­i­ca is not. Mea­sured against this exceptional US self-­identity, China comes up short and in need of po­liti­cal change. Without that change China becomes threatening, and its values and po­liti­cal system become anathema to American identity. The China threat is thus defined not primarily by what China does to the United States but also on what the United States is and what China is not. To the extent that Amer­i­ca’s values-­based self-­imagination provides an overarching sense of American identity, a threat to that shared identity offers national unity and common purpose especially in times of internal discord and polarization. Financial Times columnist Janan Ganesh describes China as “Amer­i­ca’s best hope of hanging

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together.” Without it, “the nation turns on itself.” Indeed, a few years ­after the demise of the Soviet Union, Samuel Huntington pondered “if being an American means being committed to the princi­ples of liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property, and if ­there is no evil empire out ­there threatening t­ hose princi­ples, what indeed does it mean to be an American, and what becomes of American national interests?” In other words, the American self might not survive as we know it without a threatening Other. The United States is not alone in being susceptible to the politics of fear and threat. Metus hostilis, or fear of the e­ nemy, helped keep the Roman Republic unified. The French po­liti­cal phi­los­o­pher Jean Bodin observed that “the best way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion, and civil war is . . . ​to find an ­enemy against whom they can make common cause.” The way the United States imagines itself, however, demands a par­t ic­u ­lar e­ nemy. In the eyes of many Americans, the United States is endowed with both universally applicable moral princi­ples and global military superiority. As the leader of the f­ ree world, Amer­i­ca’s ­enemy is the world’s ­enemy. Some threats, such as regional instability, can be contained locally or outsourced to “deputy sheriffs” to manage. ­Others, such as global poverty, hunger, and climate change do not seem to invoke an epic ­human ­battle between good and evil. Still other threats, such as terrorist networks and pandemics, prove to be elusive and cannot be easily pinned down to a clear target on the map. While Rus­sia remains a serious ­enemy candidate, in terms of capability it is now a shadow of its former self. Iran and North K ­ orea may qualify as conventional geopo­liti­cal irritants, but they do not have the necessary weight to capture the imagination of American society, let alone the world’s attention. Enter China, a one-­stop threat on a global scale. “China is big, it’s large on the map, it’s yellow, . . . ​and it fits very

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nicely an obsessive state of mind. . . . ​China is big enough to sustain this obsession,” thus wrote former US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in the 1990s. To be sure, the China threat to US global leadership is not merely an i­magined chimera. To some extent, China’s rise does disrupt the liberal order. With Beijing offering an alternative for economic development and po­liti­cal governance, the United States and its Western allies have found it increasingly difficult to lecture, control, and discipline the rest of world. And the erosion of US global primacy challenges the very security of its national security apparatus, whose main purpose is to sustain that primacy. Therefore, while China is not the only challenge to US global dominance, it is arguably the most con­ve­n ient and convincing justification for the continued support of the military-­industrial complex. As chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley put it, “The world is a dangerous place and is becoming more dangerous by the day. Pass the [defense] bud­get.” And to get that job done, no danger seems more effective than the specter of China, the kind of archetypical g­ reat power threat for which the military-­industrial complex was created in the first place. In the absence of an almost continent-­sized threat such as China, requests for large fleets of nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, or stealth fighters would become harder to justify. This is not to suggest that all the expensive weapons in the US arsenal have been dubiously justified on the pretext of some ­imagined ­great power enemies. Some basic level of military preparedness for national defense is necessary even without a clearly identifiable threat. However, for the United States to maintain a level of military spending almost equal to that of the next eleven countries combined, its global industrial-­scale projection of military power requires the continued existence of an ­enemy of equivalent scale. If such an ­enemy did not exist, it would need to be in­ven­ted. In this context China comes in

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handy, since it does not have to be in­ven­ted anew. It is a ready-­made threat. For de­cades, it has firmly lodged in the American imagination as a bogeyman thanks to a large and rich repertoire of Orientalist and Cold War tropes and narratives, including Dr. Fu Manchu, the Yellow Peril, and the Red Menace. Again, threat perceptions about con­temporary China are not pure historical ste­reo­t ypes. China’s increasing presence in the South China Sea poses challenges to the region, and its display of force in the Taiwan Strait clearly aims at deterring in­de­pen­dence, which Beijing considers a threat to its territorial sovereignty. But for such challenges to be extrapolated as direct military and moral threats to the United States, one would need to uncritically accept both the universality of the values-­based US self-­identity and the legitimate, benign, and nonthreatening nature of US global dominance, which sees any rising power as a threat. One would also need to disregard that threat dynamics are almost always bidirectional; not only is China capable of posing a threat to the United States, but the United States can also pose a threat to China. Does US threat perception have anything to do with China’s be­ hav­ior since the early 2010s? Absolutely. But as noted ­earlier, perception of China as a threat predates the 2010s. Could China’s recent threatening be­hav­ior also be contributing to long-­standing US threat perception and its corresponding China policies? You bet. Of all perceptions, threat perception is arguably the most prone to self-­ fulfillment. The frequent refrain and policies of countering the China threat, which go back at least to President Barack Obama’s Asia pivot in 2011, can and have been seen by China as threatening to its own interests, and some of China’s aggressive be­hav­ior should be seen in this interactive context. Threat perception not only drives ­g reat power politics but also poisons people-­to-­people relations. As China and anything Chinese

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are framed through fear and suspicion, many Chinese Americans (and Americans of other Asian heritages) face the real threat of surging anti-­Asian hate crimes. And from the government, they can encounter groundless and racially motivated accusations of espionage and intellectual property theft ­under the China Initiative (now renamed “A Strategy for Countering Nation-State Threats”) launched by the US Department of Justice, eliciting parallels to the Red Scare and McCarthyism of the 1950s. The self-­fulfilling consequences of threat perception and the fundamentally reciprocal dynamics in the US-­China hostility should prompt us to reflect on the fact that threats, ­whether from China or the United States, are socially constructed and often based on assumptions about identity and unquestioned dichotomies of self and Other. In this sense, China as Amer­i­ca’s favorite threat does not necessarily mean that it is the most relevant or most serious threat. It means that China is a threat that is tempting to invoke and easy to understand. However, an obsession with one’s favorite threat can itself become a threat ­because of not only the consequent dangerous security dilemma involving two nuclear superpowers but also the opportunity costs of failing to respond to genuine and more pressing challenges. What if the China threat has already become real? This is a good question, but it is worth remembering that as social constructs, most identity-­based threats can be disarmed through new perceptions, new discourses, and new ways of constructing identity and difference. Normalization of US-­China relations at the height of the Cold War, when China was much more authoritarian, much more communist, and much less cap­i­tal­ist, testifies to this possibility. It would be tragic and potentially catastrophic if the United States fails to learn from the lessons of its own past and continues to conflate its own threat perception of China with China itself.

4 How

Does China See Amer­i­ca? Xiaoyu Pu

The united states and the ­People’s Republic of China have arrived

at a turning point. Four de­cades ­after establishing a formal diplomatic relationship, the two countries face rising tensions related to trade, technology, cyberspace, and growing competition in East Asia. Some fundamental ideas, such as engagement, that once guided their relationship are being called into question. Many ­people worry that the two countries might be trapped in a new cold war. As American politicians take an increasingly tough attitude ­toward China, public perception of China has become negative, with more Americans viewing China as a competitor, even as a threat, rather than a partner. Moreover, as the relationship has become increasingly difficult, Chinese perceptions of Amer­i­ca have deteriorated as well. Thus, how do Chinese elites and the public see Amer­i­ca? The Chinese have long held an ambivalent attitude t­oward the United States. For many Chinese, Amer­i­ca has been a source of both admiration and resentment. They see Amer­i­ca as the most influential and power­ful country globally and both love and hate it for dif­ fer­ent reasons. In the Chinese language Amer­i­ca is called “Meiguo,” meaning “the beautiful country,” and for de­cades the Chinese have held a positive perception of Amer­i­ca, admiring it as an innovative and prosperous country. However, the Chinese have also had deep resentments about Amer­i­ca, especially its foreign policy, and often

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complain about its hegemonic tendency. This attitude has changed from the Mao Zedong era to that of the con­temporary period. Back then, strong anti-­A merican sentiment ran across the entire Chinese society for both ideological and geopo­liti­cal reasons. In the subsequent reform era, China took a more pragmatic approach, emulating some aspects of Amer­i­ca while cautioning against ­others. The book Beautiful Imperialist by George Washington University scholar David Shambaugh wonderfully catches the complex and contradictory nature of Chinese perceptions of the United States. In recent years, some Americans have complained that US engagement should have changed China into a liberal democracy but failed. However, from a long-­term perspective, Amer­i­ca has still ­shaped China in fundamental ways. China has long regarded the United States as the dominant power and admired it for being prosperous and advanced. China’s strug­g le for modernity has often been mea­sured against that of Western countries, especially the United States. In the early twentieth ­century, many Chinese regarded science and democracy as essential tools for making China a modern nation. By bringing scientific and modern ideas to China, Americans contributed to building its universities, hospitals, churches, and professional organ­izations in the early twentieth ­century. Despite Sino-­American hostility in the early Cold War period, Chinese leaders viewed Amer­i­ca as an impor­tant benchmark of China’s modernization aspirations. In the late 1950s, Mao’s disastrous ­Great Leap Forward policy was aimed at a rapid industrialization of China ­under the ambitious slogan “surpass Britain and catch up with Amer­i­ca.” In the following opening and reform era, China learned from the United States more directly. It was not by coincidence that Deng Xiaoping started the reform era just as the P ­ eople’s Republic of China began building a formal diplomatic relationship with Washington in the late 1970s. This opening brought in refreshing ideas of market

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47

economy, business management, and advanced technology. In the 1990s, Chinese reformers such as Premier Zhu Rongji used external pressures (including ­those from the United States) as an internal incentive to push forward economic reform that made it pos­si­ble for China to join the World Trade Organ­ization in 2001. In the 1990s, the slogan “linking up with the international track” was one of China’s most influential guiding princi­ples. While many commentators often assume that the Chinese po­liti­cal economy has challenged dominant Western ideas, a more nuanced understanding of the so-­called China model indicates that China does not reject all Western ideas. It has selectively and pragmatically accepted vari­ous ideas from the West, including some from the United States. Amer­i­ca’s influence extends beyond economics. For example, the Chinese for years have admired the American higher education system. Since the late 1970s, millions of China’s students have studied in Amer­i­ca, including the c­ hildren and grandchildren of top Chinese elites. As a result, the United States has trained generations of Chinese entrepreneurs, scientists, engineers, l­awyers, and even high-­ level officials. This has caused some American politicians to won­der if ­those educational ties have harmed American interests. They argue that American universities have trained Chinese experts, who have ultimately helped turn China into a superpower and Amer­i­ca’s major rival. But Sino-­A merican educational exchanges have been beneficial for both countries. The returnees have helped China improve its science and technology and its understanding of Amer­i­ca, while Amer­i­ca has benefited from its openness to them. As the world’s leading science and technology power, Amer­i­ca has traditionally attracted some of the world’s most talented students working in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathe­matics. In recent de­cades, China has become a significant source of such talent for the United States, with many Chinese choosing to remain ­a fter

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receiving advanced degrees. ­These new immigrants have added new force to the American innovative ecosystem, contributing to technological growth, educational strength, and entrepreneurship. T ­ hose Chinese students who do return have typically played a positive role in the bilateral relationship. While advancing China’s modernization, they also have become bridge builders between the two socie­ties. Some of China’s top economic officials hold gradu­ate degrees from the United States, and their educational experiences might have helped them develop a deep understanding of economic relations between the two nations. In Chinese society, American culture also has ­g reat influence. Basketball is the most popu­lar sport in China, and the National Basketball Association has hundreds of millions of Chinese fans and followers. The Julliard School, Amer­i­ca’s top ­music, dance, and drama school, has established its only international campus in Tianjin, China. Many Hollywood movies and American pop singers have also attracted millions of Chinese fans. According to a survey conducted by Peking University in 2019, 56.7  ­percent of city residents and 77 ­percent of experts reported thinking that American culture positively influences Chinese society. However, cultural and economic ties between the United States and China are shaken by po­liti­cal tensions and ideological differences. Regarding po­liti­cal issues from Hong Kong to Xinjiang, Beijing seems to use its market access to impose its po­liti­cal w ­ ill on American companies and organ­izations. However, freedom of expression and ­human rights are Amer­i­ca’s core values. The National Basketball Association, Hollywood, and many American companies are frequently put into a clash of contrasting po­liti­cal correctness: by accommodating Beijing’s po­liti­cal position, American companies might be criticized in the United States, and by defending American values against Beijing’s w ­ ill, American companies might potentially lose

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market in China. Furthermore, Chinese officials sometimes might overreact to American cultural influence. In April 2021, the Chinese-­ born Chloé Zhao became the first Asian w ­ omen to win an Oscar for best director. Instead of celebrating her history-­m aking achievement, Beijing heavi­ly censored Zhao’s Oscar news. The censorship was reportedly due to her critical comments about China in a 2013 interview. Though admiring its culture and educational system, many Chinese strongly disagree with some aspects of American foreign policy. While US elites are increasingly concerned about a perceived China threat, their Chinese counter­parts have an enormous sense of vulnerability. For Beijing policy makers, almost all their security concerns are somewhat related to Amer­i­ca. According to former top Chinese diplomat Dai Bingguo, regime security is Beijing’s first priority when defining the national interest. Next come territorial integrity and developing the economy. While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) often highlights nationalism as the basis of its domestic legitimacy, Chinese elites constantly fear that Amer­i­ca could damage both national unity and po­liti­cal stability. According to China’s leading “Amer­i­ca Watcher” Wang Jisi, Chinese leaders are especially worried about pos­si­ble domestic disorder caused by foreign threats, giving them long-­term concerns about the United States ultimately threatening their security interests. The sense of anti-­ Americanism is often tied to the historical narrative of the “­Century of Humiliation,” which describes the period of foreign intervention and subjugation of China during the Qing dynasty and the Republic of China eras. Even as t­oday’s China has emerged as the second-­ largest world economy and an influential g­ reat power, the CCP emphasizes its historical and po­liti­cal mission to continue defending China’s sovereignty and national honor. Thus, the Chinese often highlight the victimhood narrative whenever they have disputes with

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Amer­i­ca. They tend to see vari­ous issues, including Taiwan, trade wars, and ­human rights, from a long historical perspective. While American elites generally assume that the United States should defend ­human rights in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong, their Chinese counter­parts typically see this as the latest example of an American attempt to disrupt China’s internal order. Many Americans tend to think it is crucial to support Taiwan as a demo­cratic partner in Asia. But Chinese typically view American support of Taiwan as a major obstacle to China’s national reunification. Regarding the South China Sea and the East China Sea, American leaders assume that defending the interests of treaty allies in the area is essential to the rules-­based regional order, but Chinese strategists see this as a threat to their own security interests. While tensions between the two nations are certainly driven by dif­fer­ent national interests, t­hese divergent perceptions ­will affect Sino-­American relations for years to come. The Chinese traditionally ambivalent attitude ­toward the United States has turned more negative in recent years. According to a 2021 opinion survey, 72 ­percent of Chinese respondents hold unfavorable views of the United States. Some Chinese have started to doubt if Amer­i­ca, the “beautiful country,” is still beautiful. Many more seem convinced that American hegemony has become more relentless, and this changing perception might be caused by the changing real­ity of the bilateral relationship, including the more exaggerated propaganda from Beijing and tougher US policy ­toward China. Beijing often highlights and even exaggerates American po­liti­cal dysfunction and social unrest, with official media often stressing polarization, party politics, and occasional government shutdowns in Washington. Amer­i­ca’s social prob­lems, such as racism and gun vio­ lence, have also been widely reported. By highlighting the adverse issues of a liberal demo­cratic Amer­i­ca, the CCP can justify the importance of China’s one-­party system in maintaining national stability.

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On h ­ uman rights issues, China is also no longer a passive recipient of American criticism and has gradually begun using the same concepts to criticize Amer­i­ca. For years China has issued its own report on ­human rights in the United States, citing gun vio­lence, racial discrimination, and economic in­equality. China’s negative perception of Amer­i­ca has also been fueled by the legacy of the Trump administration. Its trade war has strengthened Chinese nationalistic sentiment, causing more Chinese to believe that Amer­i­ca w ­ ill not accept China’s rise. ­There is also a diminishing belief that China should rely so much on the United States. As Chinese policy makers worry about its technological de­pen­dency on the United States, they have started to adjust Chinese policy to emphasize self-­reliance and indigenous innovation. They have grown confident that China can thrive despite any American pressure, and the propaganda system occasionally promotes China’s tough international image for domestic consumption. For instance, Chinese leaders sometimes compare the current trade war to strug­gles between the two countries during the Korean War. Furthermore, Donald Trump’s mishandling of the COVID-19 crisis and vari­ous social prob­lems have further added ammunition to Beijing’s propaganda efforts. Overall, the US-­China relationship has changed in fundamental ways. The Biden administration offers an opportunity to rethink ­these relations. On the one hand, Sino-­A merican relations have become more competitive and ­w ill not return to ­those of the recent past. On the other hand, the United States and China must manage their competition responsibly and also cooperate to deal with common challenges such as climate change. Between a liberal engagement approach and a confrontational approach, the Biden administration could potentially explore a third way. Conceptualized as competitive coexistence by some Biden officials, this approach emphasizes that the United States could both compete and coexist with Beijing

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while defending American interests and values. While the US-­China relationship ­w ill remain competitive, it does not have to be confrontational. American and Chinese socie­ties are both resilient, and the two ­g reat nations must find ways to cope with each other in the long term. President Joe Biden correctly identifies domestic renewal as his top priority; for him, the best way to promote democracy is to make it work well at home. China also ­faces enormous domestic challenges, including an aging population, environmental degradation, and social in­equality. If both the United States and China could prioritize domestic renewal while managing their competition prudently, both countries could build a durable relationship g­ oing forward. The ultimate competition between the United States and China should be about how each country can become a better self.

5 How

Is US Policy ­toward China Made? Ryan Hass

Crafting effective policy on China has never been more impor­

tant or more complex. ­There are few issues in ­today’s world where China does not ­factor in ­either as a partner or a prob­lem. Chinese actions intersect with US efforts on each continent e­ very day. This creates the need for a sprawling set of policy decisions on a continual basis, many of which have profound consequences for American and Chinese citizens as well as p­ eople around the world. Making China policy has thus become the strategic equivalent of conducting a never-­ending orchestra. On any given day and in multiple dif­fer­ent time zones, US and Chinese development experts may be debating the merits of dif­fer­ent proj­ects, diplomats may be locked in hard-­nosed negotiations, trade negotiators may be haggling over a dispute, and fighter pi­lots may be flying in close proximity to each other over the Pacific Ocean. Neither the president nor any empowered individual could possibly adjudicate each talking point or ensure that ­every American action sends a properly calibrated message to Beijing of American intentions and of Amer­i­ca’s evaluation of Beijing’s. Yet in the absence of policy coherence, ­there is the risk of sending chaotic signals and in so d­ oing generating miscommunication and miscalculation with potentially dangerous consequences.

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SETTING A GOVERNMENT-­W IDE FRAMEWORK ON CHINA

To ensure coherence, t­here needs to be a framework that provides direction and clarity to the thousands of American officials who touch on the US-­China relationship on a daily basis. This must come from the president. Nobody ­else in the American po­liti­cal system is elected by the American ­people and capable of setting the tone and direction of Amer­i­ca’s relations with China. For this reason, it is critical that the president establish a set of guiding princi­ples for relations with China early in an administration. This enables officials throughout the government to have a compass for navigating how to deal with issues relating to China that arise in their day-­to-­day work. The president can do this through public statements, the publication of the National Security Strategy, classified presidential policy directives, and discrete decisions on specific policy questions. Such efforts also can be aided by proactive outreach from White House staff to departments and agencies to explain the president’s thinking and how it relates to their agenda. When serving as White House National Security Council (NSC) China director from 2013 to 2017, for example, I regularly visited departments and agencies to consult their leadership teams on how their priorities related to the president’s vision for China policy. I quickly learned that virtually e­very government institution, from the Department of ­L abor, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency to the Department of Transportation, saw its policy portfolio as including issues involving China.

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BUILDING A COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON THE NATURE OF US-­C HINA RELATIONS

It also is essential for policy makers to build a shared understanding of the power dynamics between the United States and China and of Washington’s points of leverage with Beijing. As a cautionary example, the Trump administration based its initial trade policy decisions on an outdated evaluation of China. Administration officials viewed China as an export-­dependent manufacturing economy and concluded that Beijing needed trade with the United States to sustain rapid growth and preserve the Chinese Communist Party’s per­for­mance legitimacy. As a consequence, the Trump administration believed that it could use access to the American market as leverage to compel Beijing to make economic reforms. Trump administration officials failed to appreciate that much of Beijing’s economic growth was generated by rising domestic consumption and growing trade with the rest of the world, while exports to the United States ­were of diminishing importance. When the Trump administration ratcheted up unilateral pressure on China through tariffs and other means, Beijing retaliated in kind rather than capitulate to American pressure. The net result of this overestimation of American leverage was a trade war that cost the United States 245,000 jobs, diverted $28 billion of taxpayer funds to keep Amer­i­ca’s agricultural sector afloat, saw a nearly 90 ­percent decline in Chinese inbound investment from 2017 to 2020, and shaved 0.7  ­percent from Amer­i­ca’s gross domestic product, all without solving the under­lying prob­lems in China’s economic model that the trade war was designed to address. IDENTIFYING CONCRETE OBJECTIVES

A disciplined policy pro­cess should push policy makers to identify achievable goals and form plans to attain them. The pro­cess should

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involve all actors with issues at stake to ensure that trade-­offs between options are properly weighed and also to achieve full buy-in from across the government for decisions that ultimately are reached. While specific actions and messages directed t­oward China are impor­tant, not all ele­ments of an effective China policy relate directly to China. For example, the Biden administration has determined that technology issues ­will be at the core of US-­China competition in the coming years. What the United States does at home and with its allies to strengthen its innovative capacity w ­ ill have as much of an impact, if not more, on Amer­i­ca’s ability to outpace China as any decision the United States takes t­oward China or any of its companies. This includes expanding access to training in science, technology, engineering, and math; improving high-­technology infrastructure; attracting overseas capital and talent to Amer­i­ca; investing more in basic and applied research and development; and pooling talent and resources with partners. Thus, an effective China strategy requires integration across policy areas. Economic policy decisions cannot be firewalled from security policy decisions. ­Human rights concerns cannot be isolated from trade and investment policy considerations. And domestic spending priorities cannot be set without awareness of Amer­i­ca’s requirements for outpacing China. WHITE HOUSE AS THE POLICY HUB

The only pos­si­ble way to integrate such diverse agendas is when the White House acts as the central node within government for setting priorities and coordinating actions. When the policy pro­cess works well, it is ­because the NSC staff runs an inclusive and efficient policy pro­cess. Such a pro­cess should define concrete objectives rigorously, develop recommendations for presidential decisions, communicate

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the president’s decisions transparently, and then oversee their implementation across departments and agencies. To be effective, such a pro­cess should allow inputs and recommendations to flow in both directions. If NSC meetings are seen by policy participants only as a means of transmitting top-­down directives whereby the agenda is set and inflexibly driven from the White House, the policy pro­cess over time w ­ ill lose vitality, decisions w ­ ill strug­g le to generate government-­w ide support, and disgruntled participants w ­ ill begin to leak their grievances to the media on m ­ atters of substance and pro­cess. When such leaks occur, they erode trust, invite backbiting, and cause participants to become more guarded in offering counsel in meetings. An NSC-­led policy pro­cess works best when it stays focused on the impor­tant over the urgent. Whenever se­n ior officials meet, t­ here often is an impulse to focus on the latest crisis or prob­lem requiring immediate action. The NSC official chairing the meeting, typically ­either the national security adviser or the deputy national security adviser, must be able to strike a healthy balance between addressing the urgent without allowing it to crowd out the impor­tant longer-­ term decisions that policy pro­cesses are designed to adjudicate. Another ingredient of effective policy making is when departments and agency representatives are designated to address issues within their area of expertise. Traditionally, the Department of Commerce ensures that policy decisions consider implications for the business community, the Department of State weighs decisions across broader diplomatic goals and ensures that the top priorities and concerns among Amer­i­ca’s allies are considered, the Department of Defense focuses on security dimensions, and the Department of the Trea­sury offers perspective on impacts for Amer­i­ca’s macroeconomic health and its global economic agenda. The intelligence community often plays a helpful role in evaluating how Beijing and other

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foreign actors might interpret and respond to policy options u ­ nder consideration. Expecting policy participants to provide first thoughts in their areas of responsibility helps push them to develop their own institutional viewpoints on questions for decision. The cross-­fertilizing discussions that flow from such a division of l­abor help ensure that ideas are stress-­tested and that second-­and third-­order effects are considered while options are being developed for presidential decision. AVOIDING POLICY PITFALLS

This prioritization on pro­cess helps guard against the emergence of the single-­issue syndrome, such as when China policy becomes hostage to the prob­lem of the day. It is not healthy for US policy to become defined exclusively by any single issue w ­ hether it is the trade balance, nuclear negotiations with North ­Korea, h ­ uman rights concerns, or any other prob­lem, given the many affirmative and defensive priorities the United States must address in its daily relationship with China. Effective decision making in China also requires the White House to preserve a healthy balance between policy and politics. Amer­i­ca’s previous two presidents have occupied opposite poles on this question. The Obama administration’s NSC operated by the man­tra that good policy would generate good results that would produce good politics. With a few notable exceptions, President Barack Obama sought to shield China policy from the glare of politics, in part to try to keep it steady and long-­term oriented, rather than having it influenced by the mood of the moment. Critics of Obama’s approach, notably Donald Trump, argued that this approach failed to embody the urgency and anger that many Americans w ­ ere feeling t­oward China in relation to, for example, job losses, synthetic opioids, theft of intellectual property, and cyberespionage.

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Former president Trump and his team gave greater weight to po­liti­cal calculations to inform decision making. The risk of this approach, though, is that when policy decisions become guided by po­liti­cal calculations, ­there is diminishing demand for an orderly policy pro­cess. So, for example, the decision to conclude the Phase 1 trade deal was not reached b­ ecause of a breakthrough in negotiations or a resolution of under­lying prob­lems but instead ­because the exigencies of the 2020 presidential election calendar called for an end to the trade war. Similarly, the Trump administration’s decision to begin characterizing COVID-19 as “Kung Flu” and the “China virus” was not made to advance a specific objective with China but rather to deflect anger to China for the devastation wrought by the uncontrolled spread of the virus. Given how directly China’s actions now touch American lives and how much attention China attracts in American media, it is unrealistic to expect that all policy decisions w ­ ill be made with monastic detachment from po­liti­cal considerations. By the same token, it is dangerous to relinquish China decision making entirely to prevailing po­liti­cal winds. T ­ here are times when po­liti­cal expediency does not align with national interests. And when China policy is evaluated solely through a po­liti­cal lens, this creates an incentive to proj­ect toughness and guard against perceptions of weakness. Thus, policy decisions must be made with consideration of both short-­term po­liti­cal impacts and long-­term strategic interests. Such a balancing act is easier said than done.

In conclusion, policy on China is made through an accumulation

of thousands of smaller decisions in support of the president’s priorities. Pro­g ress is quantified by incremental steps in pushing Beijing in Amer­i­ca’s preferred directions and preventing outcomes that could

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harm American interests and values. The success of policy decisions often is not mea­sur­able in the moment. As a consequence, patience, wisdom, calm, and confidence are required in order to develop coherent and effective strategies for contending with Amer­i­ca’s foremost nation-­state competitor. Ultimately, the United States and China are locked in a long-­ term systems competition to determine which governance model w ­ ill deliver better results for its p­ eople. Prestige on the world stage ­w ill be derived by per­for­mance. The more that US policy decisions improve the lives of American citizens and strengthen Amer­i­ca’s global leadership, the more effective the United States ­w ill be as it tries to outcompete China.

6

Who Gets into the Chinese Communist Party, and Who Rises up the Ranks? Victor Shih

Today’s chinese communist party (CCP) is an enormous organ­

ization with some 91 million members who control the most impor­ tant government and nongovernment institutions in China. Despite its enormous size, both the party rank and file and the elite remain surprisingly homogeneous, composed mainly of college-­educated Han males from north of the Yangtze River. Among all of the 19th Party Congress (PC) full Central Committee members, 61 ­percent shared this profile. More alarmingly, this situation likely ­will persist through 2030 at the top of the party. This homogeneity limits the regime’s perspectives as it considers domestic and foreign policy priorities. ­Because of the g­ reat deal of control the ruling CCP exerts on China’s society, politics, and economy, the makeup of the party, especially at its apex, shapes the policy preferences of the Chinese government to a large degree. PARTY RECRUITMENT ­T ODAY

Since the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP in 1978, party recruitment has shifted from one focused on

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workers and peasants to one increasingly focused on the intellectual and economic elite. The effort to recruit college gradu­ates into the party accelerated ­after 1989, when the CCP realized the value of cultivating loyal followers among the country’s best educated. By 2012, 33 ­percent of new party members held at least an associate degree. By 2019, that ratio had reached 45 ­percent. As the intellectual elite share ­rose, the share of workers and farmers among the newly recruited declined, dropping from 27 ­percent in 2012 to 23 ­percent in 2019 according to official party statistics. Even ­these figures likely reflected classifying some P ­ eople’s Liberation Army recruits from the countryside as farmers. The CCP’s increasingly elitist orientation has conspired with its long-­standing recruitment biases to produce a fairly homogenous membership. Despite recent efforts to add more w ­ omen, they still only made up 42 ­percent of new members in 2019 and still constituted only 28 ­percent of the entire party. A genuine effort to improve gender balance in the party would have seen the share of new ­women members rise above 50 ­percent, as has been the case for many other organ­izations. The share of ethnic minorities among new recruits and in the party overall has been controlled at around 7 ­percent, which fundamentally limits the role of minorities below even their 8.5 ­percent share of the population. Moreover, as Daniel Koss points out in Where the Party Rules, even Han party members still come primarily from areas in northern and central China, where the CCP had major base areas in the 1930s and 1940s. Thus, despite some effort to improve gender balance, the biggest change in recent years has been the increasing education level of party members while retaining many preexisting biases such as gender and ethnic discrimination. This sets the stage for a continued homogenous party leadership.

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CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TOP ECHELON: NOW AND IN THE F ­ UTURE

The comparison below is carried out on two key cohorts: ­those born between 1952 and the end of 1961 (henceforth the post-52 cohort) and t­ hose born ­after January 1, 1962 (henceforth the post-62 cohort). The under­lying data for this analy­sis comes from the CCP Elite Database compiled by a University of California, San Diego, team led by the author that contains biographical and c­ areer data of over 5,000 CCP officials. Members of the post-52 cohort are the current leaders of China, including the entire Politburo Standing Committee except for Li Zhanshu, who was born in 1950. By the 20th PC in 2022, even younger members of this cohort ­w ill enter their final ­career years, while older members, except for the top few, w ­ ill depart as they reach the normal retirement age of sixty-­five. Meanwhile, the post-62 cohort is expected to fill many Central Committee seats at the 20th PC. Even the oldest among them can expect to serve in positions of real power for five or so years a­ fter the 20th PC, while ­those born in the early 1970s might be able to hold se­n ior positions for close to another ten years. As ­t able 6.1 reveals, the CCP elite continue to give the party one of the world’s worst gender imbalances. Within this power­ful elite, which includes all Central Committee members and provincial standing committee members, the share of ­women has risen from a dismal 7.4 ­percent in the post-52 cohort to a still dismal 8.4 ­percent in the post-62 cohort. To be sure, as more cadres in the l­ater cohort reach the vice provincial level, the share of ­women may rise, but it would be surprising if that level had more than 10 ­percent of ­women in the end, which is exceptionally low when compared to similar groups in other middle-­income countries. At the Politburo level, only one of the twenty-­five members is a w ­ oman, and of course the party

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­Table 6.1.  Share of Females, Share of Ethnic Minorities, and Average Education Level of the Two Cohorts

Post-52 cohort Post-62 cohort

Share of Females

Share of Minorities

7.4% 8.4%

9% 8.6%

Average Education Level 2.74 (less than a master’s degree) 3 (master’s degree)

Data source: Victor Shih, Jonghyuk Lee, and David Meyer, “CCP Elite Database.” Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation, San Diego, 2020.

never had and likely ­w ill not have a female party head in the foreseeable ­f uture. The small share of ­women among the more promising members of the post-62 cohort suggests that the current gender pattern w ­ ill continue with the status quo of one female Politburo member at each congress plus ten or so Central Committee members and a handful of alternate members. This situation may well persist u ­ ntil the 22nd PC in 2032, based on current trends. The CCP equally has made no pro­g ress in recruiting and promoting ethnic minorities. In fact, their share has fallen slightly between the two cohorts. Much of this decline can be explained by the precipitous fall in the number of Uyghur cadres. While the post-52 cohort has six Uyghur cadres, the post-62 cohort only has one, Hubei provincial standing committee member Erkenjiang Tulahong. With the rise of absolute repression in Xinjiang, the party may feel less need for their repre­sen­ta­tion and thus has abandoned cultivating even a few such cadres. Between the two cohorts, the average education level ­rose slightly from below master’s level to master’s level, suggesting that a bachelor’s and even a master’s degree are now required qualifications for promotion. Some of this was driven by the massive jump in education level of ­women from an average of 2.7 to 3.19 (i.e., from below

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master’s level to above master’s degree), while the male education level r­ ose from 2.77 to 3.0 from one cohort to the next. This suggests that ­women are not only drastically underrepresented but also have to earn higher degrees to make it into the club, even more so than was true ten years ago. Surprisingly, neither cohort is dominated by gradu­ates of China’s elite universities, not to mention elite foreign or US universities. In the post-1952 cohort, less than 7 ­percent of the 600 or so elite members had obtained bachelor’s degrees from Peking University, Tsing­hua University, or Renmin University, three of the top universities in China. In the post-1962 cohort, that number ­rose to only 8.7 ­percent. The vast majority had graduated from provincial universities or specialized schools for party cadres or military officers. Although the party elite is more educated than the overall party membership, its members are not gradu­ates of the best-­known elite universities. Despite some heterogeneity in alma maters, ­there is remarkable homogeneity in terms of home provinces. Of ­those at the 19th PC, close to 50 ­percent came from northern and northwestern Chinese provinces. If one ­were to include the central Chinese provinces of Henan, Jiangsu, Hubei, and Anhui, the rate rises to 70 ­percent, while cadres from southern and southwestern China accounted for only 30 ­percent. Guangdong, one of China’s economic power­houses, only produced thirteen provincial-­level or higher cadres, or 1.2 ­percent of the total. Together t­ hese f­ actors produced a fairly homogeneous group at the top, as 61 ­percent of the 19th PC Central Committee consisted of college-­educated Han males from north of the Yangtze River. At the Politburo Standing Committee level, few have deviated from this profile ­after the Deng Xiaoping–­Jiang Zemin transition of the early 1990s except for the recent rise of Zhejiang natives since Xi Jinping, who has personal ties to that province, became secretary-­general.

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EMERGING STAGNATION

Not only are CCP elite members surprisingly homogeneous, they are also increasingly unable to rise through the ranks, especially above the provincial level. In brief, although members of the post-62 cohort now fill provincial standing committee positions in large numbers, they have not moved up into the Central Committee to the same degree as their post-52 counter­parts had done ten years ago. This suggests that the Central Committee already has become an older body than it was a de­cade ago and w ­ ill continue to be composed of older officials ­unless a large number of post-62 cadres can join the Central Committee at the 20th PC. The analy­sis below reveals that mass promotion is an unlikely scenario. Although the post-62 cohort has taken up 228 positions in provincial standing committees, its mobility is slow compared to the ­earlier post-52 cohort. Essentially, the c­ areer pro­g ress of post-62 members at the 18th and 19th PCs is comparable to pro­g ress achieved by the post-52 cohort at the 16th and 17th PCs. While the 17th PC saw 38 members of the post-52 cohort take full Central Committee seats, the 19th PC only saw 27 members of the post-62 cohort do the same, a meaningful decline given that total membership r­ose from only 204 to 205. ­Because the e­ arlier cohort dominated the full committee at the 19th PC (holding 158 out of 204 seats, or 77 ­percent of the total), it would take a massive retirement wave for the younger group to achieve similar dominance assuming that the Central Committee stays roughly the same size. More precisely, for the post-62 cohort to achieve similar dominance at the 20th PC, roughly 121 members of the post-62 cohort ­will need to be added to the Central Committee, replacing the 9 members remaining of the pre-52 cohort and 112 members of the post-52 cohort. This is not pos­si­ble, ­because the total number of post-62 alternate

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Central Committee members stood at only 103 at the 19th PC. This means that even if all of them w ­ ere to be promoted, another 18 candidates from outside the committee would need to be promoted directly to full membership. Such a mass rejuvenation is highly unlikely for two reasons. First, Secretary-­General Xi w ­ ill not f­ avor promoting all 103 alternate members ­because not all of them come from his faction or are familiar to him. More importantly, the current post-52 full Central Committee members have kept their seats ­because they are Xi’s friends and associates. As long as Xi remains the leader, many ­w ill remain in the Central Committee and the Politburo even if they reach the retirement age of sixty-­five before 2022. The recent reappointment of Xia Baolong, who is sixty-­eight, to the power­ful position of the Hong Kong Macau Affairs Office is a case in point. This sluggish mobility inside the party means that the homogeneous makeup of its elite likely ­w ill not be altered through the 22nd PC in 2032. IMPLICATIONS

The preceding analy­sis shows that both the CCP as a w ­ hole and the elite in par­t ic­u ­lar remain surprisingly homogeneous, dominated by college-­educated Han males from the northern half of China. Sluggish promotion at the top likely means that a homogenous group ­w ill remain in place through the 2032 22nd PC. At a time when ­women, minorities, and other previously marginalized voices have successfully won new repre­sen­ta­tion and power around the world, the relatively homogeneous group in China’s authoritarian system and its top ranks ­w ill prob­ably continue to drive the policy agenda, likely focusing on a narrow range of policy issues related to national defense, economic growth, and technological superiority. The urgent concerns of large segments of China’s population ­w ill continue

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to be neglected or even meet hostility from the rulers. In addition to policy priorities of this elite, major segments of China’s population may be more concerned with issues such as gender equality, religious freedom, and integration of mi­g rant workers into urban welfare ser­v ices. Instead of engaging with China on a wider range of issues with shared interests, such as gender equality and welfare provision, the United States and other democracies can only engage with China on issues that its leadership cares about: technological competition, industrial policies, and trade. This relatively narrow range of issues restricts the bargaining space between China and other major economies and makes long-­lasting cooperation more difficult. Even the economic concerns of the vibrant entrepreneur class of southern China may be neglected by the leadership. Tragically for ­these segments of China’s population, the party bosses have no incentive or even institutionalized channels with which to drastically diversify repre­sen­ta­tion in the CCP.

II Global Order

7 ­Will

the World Make Room for China in the New Global Order? Susan A.Thornton

In 1967, richard nixon wrote in Foreign Affairs that Asia was un-

dergoing a remarkable transformation, that the region half the world’s population called home was emerging as po­liti­cally and eco­nom­ically vibrant. He pointed to wariness over China’s long shadow, noting that China “needed to change,” to turn from fomenting revolution externally to resolving its internal challenges. And he warned that the United States could not succumb to isolationism but must promote an Asian community based on Asian strengths in the ser­v ice of American prosperity and security. He also warned that China, a nation of a billion able-­bodied ­people, could not be kept outside the community of nations; that regional and global interests would not abide an isolated China; and that the United States alone would be unable to bear the “unconscionable burden” of “containing China.” More than fifty years ­later, this stable and dynamic Asia is charging ahead. With 60  ­percent of the world’s population contributing more than two-­thirds of global growth annually, Asia is the planetary center of gravity in the twenty-­fi rst ­century. As Nixon foresaw and then helped enable with his 1972 “opening,” changes in China have played a central role in this rapid evolution. By switching focus to address internal prob­lems, Chinese leaders since Mao Zedong’s

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death have unleashed a modernization drive for the history books, taking per capita income from less than $100 to over $10,000 in the space of just fifty years for over a billion p­ eople. ­These dynamics have engendered power shifts that are now roiling an international system that has promoted peace, stability, and prosperity since World War II. The economic power of Asia and China has helped drive globalization and growth that has left no economy unfettered by interdependence and specialization. This interdependence has created a sense of vulnerability among some as China’s military power and interests expand and its intentions come increasingly into question. Beijing’s perceived canniness in skirting or ignoring international rules meant to constrain the damaging impulses of major powers only amplifies concerns. But having concerns about a major world power and thinking to excise it from an intricate fabric woven over the last seventy years are quite dif­fer­ent ­things. Unraveling a proj­ect that has maintained peace and prosperity for so long is not only dangerous but also foolhardy. EMBEDDED IN THE GLOBAL ORDER

In an objective view of the international system, Beijing is clearly a major player. Since becoming a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council in 1971 (replacing the Republic of China, or Taiwan), the ­People’s Republic of China has accepted almost all UN treaties and conventions, joined the World Trade Organ­ ization, and become a major provider of global public goods. China has the second-­largest UN dues assessment ­behind the United States, holds major shares in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (although still underrepresented), is the largest contributor of peacekeepers of the five permanent UN Security Council members, contributes to international peacemaking efforts (e.g., Iran, Af­ghan­

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i­stan, Iraq, North ­Korea, South Sudan, and counterpiracy), and is currently the largest provider of infrastructure development finance in the world. Beijing has been a driver of global poverty alleviation and a consistent advocate for developing countries on the world stage. In recent appearances, se­n ior Chinese officials have said that China’s foreign policy and vision for international order are based on the UN Charter and international law, open and inclusive multilateralism, and the need for major powers to work together and shoulder their responsibilities to maintain global peace and prosperity. And yet, t­here is a current of opinion claiming that it was a ­m istake to “let China in” to the international system. China, in this view, was supposed to adapt and liberalize both eco­nom­ically and po­liti­cally to fit into the current rules-­based system devised largely by Western developed democracies a­ fter World War II. China made this bargain when it joined the World Trade Organ­ization in 2001 ­after fifteen years of negotiations, goes this thinking. Now, however, China threatens that system and seeks to upend it or create a parallel, illiberal system. US-­China relations have become so toxic that Chinese infrastructure proj­ects in developing countries are seen as a threat to be “countered,” and Chinese efforts to develop a vaccine against COVID-19 are viewed through the lens of a geopo­liti­cal competition, as opposed to a humanitarian global good. It is true that the liberal international order that grew from ­those post–­World War II institutions did not envision accommodating a huge, authoritarian state cap­i­tal­ist juggernaut such as China and is not built to do so. Now that China, ­under Xi Jinping, has shown itself not only slow to liberalize as some in the West envisioned but also resists liberalization, ­there is worry that China is bent on molding the system in its image or at least fitting that image for its own purpose at o ­ thers’ expense. Some suspect that China’s win-­w in description of compromise is ­really a cover for “heads I win, tails you lose”

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zero-­sum competition. Many suggest that China must be excommunicated or at least strug­gled against to preserve the rules-­based system that has underpinned comparative global peace and prosperity. The Trump administration’s strategy ­toward the “Indo-­Pacific,” a term to describe ­water rather than land, implies a China aloof from Asia, outside and separate from its own region and the international system. ­These views fail to take adequate account, however, of changes in the international system, the global power structure, and the extent to which Beijing is already inside. The last thirty years of globalization have produced a system that is too deep and dynamic to be dominated by one large power. Global value chains, integrated communications and transportation technology, and scientific research ecosystems ­w ill not be contained by national borders. Other powers of varying size with influence in the international system have initiated or ­shaped rules, conventions, and institutions. Co­a li­t ions of states have created ad hoc groupings to address issues of common or regional concern. The international system itself has expanded and diverged into multiple overlapping and intersecting o ­ rders. China is a key participant in all ­these ­orders, and while it is true that it seeks to change or undermine some ele­ments, it is also seen as a leading and constructive player in many ­others. AREAS OF CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN GLOBAL O ­ RDERS

In his exploration of the extent to which Beijing is a revisionist power bent on challenging the international system, Harvard’s Alastair Iain Johnston identifies a number of dif­fer­ent global ­orders: constitutive (the UN Charter and multilateral institutions), military (arms control, peacekeeping), po­liti­cal development (democ­ratization, ­human rights), and a complex of economic and social ­orders (development, trade,

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finance, e­ tc.). In studying China’s support for them, he categorizes Chinese support as “low” only in the case of the po­liti­cal development order, while China’s support for international norms in ­others, although varied, ranges from medium to high. In several cases, China’s support has increased over time, including for arms control, nonproliferation norms, and peacekeeping operations in the last twenty-­ five years. In other cases, such as international development and trade, China supports the order in princi­ple, but its adoption in practice has been incremental. As China’s influence has grown, other countries have commensurately increased their estimation of its role. For example, China is widely viewed as a heavyweight in the economic international ­orders due to its large and expanding market, rapid modernization, and excess foreign reserves. The Chinese gross domestic product doubled between 2010 and 2020 and ­w ill double again by 2035, provided it maintains growth at 5–6 ­percent. China has lifted hundreds of millions of its citizens from poverty in the last forty years, managed wrenching economic reforms without major social instability, moved up the production value chain, and spawned world-­class private companies. The resulting impression of technocratic competence in economic management is no doubt attractive to other developing countries. Beijing’s consistent practice of aligning itself with the developing world and the Non-­A ligned Movement, continuous promotion of the Five Princi­ples of Coexistence, and recent track rec­ord of economic modernization while avoiding major wars may frustrate the West but intrigues many UN member states seeking to navigate increasing pressures. Although Beijing was previously the most reticent of UN Security Council permanent members, often abstaining on difficult votes, trying to keep international contributions to a minimum, and free-­riding as it focused on its own modernization, it has evolved

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over the last de­cade into a global goods provider of security, finance, technology, and know-­how, all previously provided mainly by the United States and other developed democracies. It is true that China has done much of this, as one Eu­ro­pean trade official put it, “abiding by the letter, but not the spirit of the liberal trading system.” Certainly, issues such as currency manipulation and soaring trade imbalances, barriers to promised market access, subsidies, and intellectual property and technology theft have presented ­others with an unlevel playing field. Many are frustrated at the slow pace of Chinese market openings and worry that Beijing is turning away from the global norm of ­free (but fair) trade. This view tends to neglect the pro­g ress that has been made on the above complaints, however, and in any case does nothing to shore up the global system in the face of evolving challenges. The system w ­ ill have to find a way to hold Beijing accountable for its systemic evading of rules and change or devise new multilateral rules to patch loopholes and catch up to modern prob­lems. This can and must be done. The result ­w ill not provide a zero-­r isk or perfect solution but ­w ill prevent a damaging breakdown and can promote and more fairly disseminate benefits from new industries. The international order for regulating information and data flows is particularly nascent and contested, with no international consensus yet generated around h ­ andling cross-­border information flows. That said, China advocates UN-­centered governance in this sphere based on sovereign control of information within borders and a developed regulatory structure, which it is pursuing in domestic law. Several significant players are sympathetic in ­whole or part to China’s perspective, which is based on both the desire for more surveillance and control of its own population as well as a push to improve governance and be responsive to popu­lar concerns about information technology. The severe mistrust in this domain, caused by conflicting

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interests in commercial, military, espionage, and law enforcement realms, may yet outweigh the obvious overlapping interests in maintaining a common global communications and internet infrastructure. In that case, the likely outcome of a contest between a Western-­and a Sino-­centric information domain is not clear, but the ramifications for international business, transport, and communications systems would be significant. The area where China’s lack of support looms largest is in its misgivings about—­even opposition to—­the po­liti­cal development order. The gap between China’s domestic po­liti­cal structures and norms of democracy and ­human rights protection are at the heart of Western angst over China’s impact on f­ uture international order, particularly as China grows more repressive internally. It is reasonable, even incumbent upon o ­ thers, to anticipate that abuse of China’s own citizens, such as the jailing of activists, ­lawyers, and critics and the mass imprisonment and repression of Tibetan and Uyghur ethnic minorities, ­w ill be extended to ­those beyond China’s borders as the country assumes a more dominant role on the world stage. Beijing’s recent moves in Hong Kong have given new impetus to such fears. While international institutions cannot intervene to alter China’s domestic po­liti­cal system, they must continue to hold governments, especially major powers such as China, to high standards for protection of their own citizens’ basic rights as articulated in the UN conventions. It is difficult for international bodies to police internal policies or be­hav­iors, but it is clear that arbitrary detention and disappearance, w ­ hether in the name of eradicating extremism or investigating corruption, are not acceptable norms of be­hav ­ior for any leading world power. The good news is that while some claim that China is attempting to overturn norms in the po­liti­cal development order to “make the world safe for autocracy,” t­here is l­ittle risk of it succeeding. Rights protection is popu­lar, including in China, and the

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International Covenant on Civil and Po­liti­cal Rights has been a­ dopted by all but five UN member states, with China the only major country left out. This d­ oesn’t mean that ­others necessarily meet t­hese high standards, but ­there is a clear consensus around the aspiration; rather than stand apart from this consensus, we can expect China to continue to try to justify its policies in terms of ­these aspirations even as it may try to expand or shape their definition. COEVOLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL ORDER

As we see from the foregoing, China is already firmly embedded in the international order and plays a leading role in many of its suborders. Although it is current Washington fashion to deny it, the last forty years have brought radical improvements in Beijing’s approach to the external world, increased institutionalization of Chinese Communist Party governance, and vastly improved well-­being for most (not all) Chinese citizens. Having committed to and benefited from the international system, China ­will continue to invest in and value it. In fact, this was a goal of the international community in bringing China in. The prob­lem is that China now can write and influence rules of the system itself, and o ­ thers worry that China is too big, not like-­minded, and w ­ ill tilt the system in its ­favor. T ­ hese are valid concerns. To address them, the United States and its partners ­w ill need to accommodate Beijing’s contributions in areas where it has competence, press for pro­g ress in areas where China lags, and continue to oppose China in its areas of transgression. ­These ­w ill all be difficult, but ­there is ­really no choice. When Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick said in a major 2005 address that China should become a “responsible stakeholder in the international system,” Chinese ­were immediately suspicious, claiming that they w ­ ere not prepared to assume such steep burdens. Fifteen years ­later, China is more prepared

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to contribute and lead but is not used to ­doing so and is regarded with skepticism by t­ hose who say the “responsible stakeholder” moment has passed. The West says that China has to prove that it is responsible, not just self-­interested; China says it has more than demonstrated responsibility and that the West has a double standard. But while we continue to point fin­gers, the nature of our global challenge is changing. Even now, our urgent (trans)national crises include a raging pandemic, weather-­related disasters and climate change, and the inability to prevent (mis)information and technology from tearing our socie­ties apart. In this sense, promoting ­g reat power competition is not only the pursuit of tactics with no strategy but is also a dead end. The prob­lems of the f­ uture w ­ ill only be exacerbated by major power confrontation and can only be addressed and solved by governments with the capacity and the w ­ ill to work together. Consensus on new norms in areas such as technology, data, travel and migration, environment, health, weapons, and trade must be developed with China at the ­table, not banished to a separate room. One potential silver lining of the COVID-19 pandemic is that as Washington and Beijing have both lost stature, other actors have found agency and took leadership roles. ­There is no more talk of a so-­called G2, and Trump’s four years of disdain for the international system caused member states to look elsewhere for leadership. Eu­ro­ pean nations galvanized vaccine efforts through the World Health Organ­ization’s COVAX fa­cil­i­t y. Rus­sia developed an effective vaccine and is rolling it out to other countries. ­Korea, which effectively minimized its own outbreak, was able to quickly share domestically produced test kits and other medical manufactures. This ability of ­m iddle powers to step up and take leadership w ­ ill be essential to international system reform and transition in turbulent times. Of course, the United States and China w ­ ill continue to be, respectively, the architect and most active newcomer in the system.

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US insecurities over China’s challenge to its primacy and Chinese testing of the constraints on its growing power w ­ ill spur tensions and mistrust. But both w ­ ill continue to change as the international system evolves in the face of coming crises. Given the impressive capacities of ­these two states, their interdependence, and the dependence of the rest of the world on their coming together to solve prob­lems, t­here is e­ very reason to hope and expect that their coevolution ­w ill not only help avoid the worst case outcomes but also contribute to addressing shared challenges.

8 Is

China Trying to Undermine the Liberal International Order? Alastair Iain Johnston

Policy discussions are full of unquestioned, taken-­ for-­ g ranted

memes and narratives. At base, ­these can constrain how ­people talk about a prob­lem and can signal to o ­ thers w ­ hether an individual should be considered inside or outside of certain discursive communities and how authoritative their voices should be considered. If you d­ on’t use the group’s terminology then you are not considered qualified, and this can limit dissent. In some cases, by defining the nature of the policy prob­lem, t­ hese discourses can constrain how p­ eople think and thus a priori limit the options considered. The concept of liberal rules-­based order (RBO) has gained the status of influential conventional wisdom in the policy, media, and think tank worlds. The dominant narrative is that the RBO was set up by the United States a­ fter World War II and embodies norms of po­liti­cal liberalization, economic ­free markets, and the use of international law to resolve interstate disputes. It is common in the US policy world to hear p­ eople say that this singular system has helped maintain regional and global peace and prosperity since 1945. Less commonly realized, though, is that the RBO narrative also categorizes states as ­either status quo or revisionist. Status quo states uphold the RBO, while revisionist states challenge it. Status quo states are virtuous, while revisionist states are malevolent.

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­There are a c­ ouple of major conceptual and empirical prob­lems with that narrative, however. First, contrary to usage, the idea of such a liberal order is relatively new. The specific term “rules-­based order” entered the US policy vocabulary in 2010 when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Australian foreign minister Kevin Rudd used it in a joint statement (the term came from Rudd). Its original use referred to the aspiration of building a rules-­based order in the Asia-­ Pacific. Within a ­couple of years, however, its meaning shifted; it then was referred to as being set up by the United States ­after World War II and over time providing seventy years of regional and global stability. At the same time, extrapolating from its militarization of land features in the South China Sea, China was identified as the order’s main challenger. This narrative made the United States the status quo state and China the revisionist actor and was eventually codified in Washington’s 2017 National Security Strategy. As I suggest below, this division sets the stage for simplistic characterizations of the approaches of China (and the United States) to dif­fer­ent international norms and institutions. Second, the RBO is based on a weak empirical claim that a single international order exists. The idea that a single international order created by the United States brought peace and stability to the world for seventy years explains very ­little of what we actually saw international actors creating, ­doing, saying, supporting, or opposing. The conventional view lumps into a singular US-­dominated liberal order many policy domains of differing norms and institutions. The RBO narrative thus ­can’t explain the often competing, contradictory, or contested norms and institutions that exist ­today. That narrative ignores the role of non-­A merican actors in creating many of the economic, military, and h ­ uman rights norms and institutions that constrain the be­hav­ior of states. Eu­rope, for example, has been a driver of managed globalization and strongly supports such institu-

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tions as the World Trade Organ­ization (WTO) and the G20 grouping of major economies. Eu­rope, not the United States, has also been the primary supporter of most ­human rights innovations in recent de­ cades, such as treaties protecting the rights of ­women, ­children, and the disabled. The United States has only ratified five of the eigh­teen major h ­ uman rights treaties and protocols, while major Eu­ro­pean states, by contrast, have ratified most of them. Canadian and Eu­ro­ pean constitutional ideas also are more influential in the design of demo­cratic constitutions around the world than ­those of the US Constitution. The Global South (along with China) has driven the notion that socioeconomic development rights are part of the broader ­human rights order. I propose that instead of a single liberal order ­there are in fact many o ­ rders. T ­ hese result as an emergent property of the interaction of myriad state bureaucracies, nongovernmental actors, individual norm entrepreneurs, multinational corporations, and international organ­izations. They tend to be specialized, focusing on discrete domains (trade, social and h ­ uman development, h ­ uman rights, arms control, climate change, and information, among o ­ thers). As noted, sometimes the norms and institutions of one may conflict with ­those of o ­ thers. The po­liti­cal development order that tries to limit how states can restrict an individual’s demo­cratic po­liti­cal expression, organ­i zation, and participation, for instance, can clash with what I call the dominant “constitutive order” that recognizes states as the primary actors in international relations and stresses national sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs. Empirically, therefore, it makes ­little sense to develop foreign policies on the assumption that ­there is a single consistent order against which states can be judged as status quo or revisionist, upholders of or challengers to the order. B ­ ecause ­there are multiple o ­ rders, many states—­particularly major powers—­can support some ­orders and

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oppose ­others. For this reason, the current narrative of China as a fully revisionist state challenging a singular international order misses the variation in China’s approach to them. To illustrate, I w ­ ill briefly discuss China’s varying approach to four distinct ­orders. At one extreme is the “constitutive order,” the rules and norms that constitute the nation-­state system. At its core are norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity. If ­these did not exist or ­were not constantly emphasized, then the interstate system would not exist. The core institution that has promoted and embodies them is the United Nations. As a general rule, since entering the institution in 1971, the P ­ eople’s Republic of China has been a strong supporter of the United Nations and of moving global governance issues ­under its auspices. As one indicator of its conservative approach, China—­ like the United States—­opposes any fundamental restructuring of the United Nations Security Council system that might undermine the dominance of the major nuclear powers. Other institutions that only exist ­because sovereign territorial states exist include institutions requiring statehood for membership (e.g., the World Bank and most arms-­control institutions). All states are proponents of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and China is no exception. Perhaps the best overall predictor of what foreign policy position China is likely to take on most issues is ­whether the position undermines or reinforces its own sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the other extreme, the one order that the ­People’s Republic of China has consistently opposed and has proactively tried to c­ ounter could be called the “po­liti­cal development order.” This order is constituted by rules and institutions that frame how states should treat their own citizens’ po­liti­cal interests and activities. Arguably, at this moment in time its dominant norms and institutions are liberal and demo­cratic. They are embodied in vari­ous international treaties and commitments that not only promote standard liberal demo­cratic

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practices (e.g., f­ ree speech, freedom of association, f­ ree press, and periodic elections) but also defend the po­liti­cal and cultural rights of minorities, ­women, c­ hildren, and persons with disabilities. During the Cold War, this order was not nearly as developed as it is t­oday. Only in the post–­Cold War era have liberal democracies become a small majority of states. Other countries—­not just China— have long argued that their right to develop eco­nom­ically should take pre­ce­dence over po­liti­cal ­human rights. And the rise of authoritarian right-­w ing nationalist movements in Western democracies suggests that contestation over the norms of this order exists within individual countries as well as between them. But as a general rule, the macrohistorical trend line is ­toward more rather than less protection of the po­liti­cal rights of individuals and social groups. However, since 1949 China’s treatment of po­liti­cal dissent and the rights of ethnic, religious, and social minorities has consistently ­v iolated the dominant norms, institutions, and treaties of this order even during periods of minor internal liberalization in the post–­Mao Zedong era. According to the Va­r i­e­ties of Democracy data set, the variation in the degree of liberalization between the Mao and post­Mao eras is very small compared to, say, the difference between an authoritarian and postauthoritarian South ­Korea or a pre– ­and post–­ Voting Rights Act of 1965 in the United States. ­Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party’s per­for­m ance in the protection of po­liti­cal rights has regressed, particularly with regard to the forced cultural assimilation of minorities and the suppression of po­liti­cal dissent. Yet in comparative terms this is a relatively limited decline in the party’s long history of rejecting the evolving po­liti­cal development order. In between ­these two extremes stands China’s approach to the global trade order. T ­ oday this order is based on freeish trade norms and is embodied in several institutions such as the WTO and regional

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f­ ree trade agreements. Despite current discourse in the United States about an increasingly mercantilist and closed Chinese trade policy, the data suggest a much more complex picture. For example, China’s formal tariff rates have dropped consistently over time, especially ­after China joined the WTO. The eleven-­indicator trade facilitation index of the Organ­ization for Economic Co-­operation and Development shows that from 2017 to 2019 China’s per­for­mance improved (e.g., became more facilitating) in eight indicators and regressed in only one. According to the Design of Trade Agreements data set, the bilateral and multilateral f­ree trade agreements that China joined in recent years have become increasingly intrusive as they cover more and more nontariff barriers and are considered higher-­quality agreements. China has used (and misused) the WTO in ways that are not significantly dif­fer­ent from actions by other major economies. That said, despite ­these consistencies with the trade order, China also has one of the least open of the major economies due to a range of nontariff barriers, local level protectionism, and government support for state-­owned enterprises. Overall, then, when it comes to the trade order, China’s support is mixed. Another example of l­imited support concerns what one might call the “military order.” This is constituted by norms and institutions that constrain how force can, or should, be used across state borders. This order would include rules against wars of aggression, arms control agreements that limit certain military capabilities, and confidence-­ building mea­sures (CBMs) to reduce misperceptions about intentions and capabilities. China’s approach is again mixed. On the one hand, China has not invaded the uncontested territory of a sovereign state since its 1979 invasion of Vietnam. In addition, China has signed most arms control agreements that it is eligible to join, including the all-­important Non-­Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban. Thus far ­there is no evidence of major breaches or

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breakouts from most of ­these commitments (though China’s inaction in the face of possible recent Russian nuclear threats against nonnuclear weapons states may be a violation of China’s security assurances policy). China has also signed CBMs with countries around its periphery, including India, Rus­sia, and other Central Asian states, plus the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea. T ­ hese border CBMs have, of course, not eliminated conflicts and clashes, but they appear to have helped restrain conflict escalation and limit military interactions. And according to a recent statement by the commander of the US Carrier Strike Group 9, interactions between the US and Chinese navies in the western Pacific have generally been “very predictable and professional.” On the other hand, China has often used ­l imited force and coercive diplomacy around its periphery against other claimants for contested territorial spaces such as in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and along the Sino-­India border. China has also rejected a major ­legal ruling by an arbitral tribunal of the international Permanent Court of Arbitration that limits the maritime rights that all disputants can claim in the South China Sea. The frequency of this type of coercive diplomacy, particularly in the South China Sea, has increased since around 2007. In summary, the notion that t­here is a single liberal order that the United States supports and China challenges is empirically and conceptually problematic. If ­there ­were a single order, we would expect China to oppose all the norms and institutions the United States supports and also expect the United States to oppose all ­those that China supports. Real­ity, however, is much messier. T ­ here are many norms and institutions that the United States and China both support or both oppose in addition to ­others that one opposes while the other supports. This distribution is not what one would expect if ­there ­were a single liberal rules-­based order that the United States upheld and that China opposed.

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Does this m ­ atter? Yes, in two ways. First, complexity m ­ atters. One cannot characterize a forest without knowing what the trees actually look like. Presumably, policy benefits from a more accurate characterization of the policy prob­lem. To be sure, the evidence suggests that the “China challenge” in some ­orders, such as the po­liti­cal development order, is severe. W ­ hether policy should stress countering China’s challenge to the evolution of demo­cratic po­liti­cal norms above cooperating on, say, arms control or climate change depends on one’s normative perspective and on ­whether one believes ­there are trade-­offs across o ­ rders. To the extent pos­si­ble, po­liti­cal leaders in democracies need to be up front about the complexities and difficulties of ­these trade-­offs. Second, discourse ­m atters. In the United States, the simplistic notion of a single order populated by status quo states (friends) and revisionist states (adversaries or enemies) in most cases (not all) contributes to the othering of China. Likewise, Beijing’s simplistic notion of an inherently peaceful China being contained by an inherently hegemonic United States contributes to its othering of the United States. Indeed, ­these are interactive discourses ­because they set up self and other as exceptional, exceptionally virtuous and exceptionally malign. As I have noted elsewhere, the one ­thing we know about beliefs in national or ethnonational exceptionalism is that they can lead to exaggerated beliefs about threat and competition, that is, to militarism. Thinking in terms of complexity and shades of gray, not in blacks and whites, can slow down the pro­cess of mutual threat construction.

9 Is

China Changing the International Humanitarian Intervention Regime? Courtney J. Fung

The us-­c hina relationship at the United Nations (UN) Security

Council is tested by the fact that the two powers have sharply contrasting views on the bound­aries of humanitarian intervention, actions that sometimes pose exceptional challenges to state sovereignty whenever the Security Council seeks response to humanitarian needs. While the United States is traditionally viewed as willing to challenge state sovereignty on behalf of mass ­human rights abuses, China is a much more cautious player and resists what it calls “interference” in domestic affairs. Despite China’s veto-­empowered permanent seat at the Security Council, it remains concerned about setting pre­ce­dents that could lead to finding itself targeted for its own domestic policies in, for example, Tibet or Xinjiang. China identifies itself as a member of the Global South, developing states that are traditionally underrepresented at the highest level of international politics. China’s multilateral engagement is particularly impor­tant in making certain examples of humanitarian intervention pos­si­ble. Beyond the veto, China can have unique diplomatic influence among its permanent member peers as well. For example,

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its relations with so-­called pariah states have successfully aided UN efforts in response to mass atrocities in Darfur and Sudan and to North Korean nuclear proliferation. China maintains that humanitarian intervention should occur only with Security Council authorization, with the host state consenting to the efforts and with regional support for such intervention. China insists that missions should re­spect sovereignty and not override host state controls. In addition, China is consistent in the view that using force should be a last resort ­because it is an in­effec­t ive means of resolving conflicts and seriously violates the basic princi­ple of state sovereignty. In recent de­cades, however, China has made remarkable changes in how it addresses humanitarian intervention. This evolving position is largely viewed as progressive. The ­People’s Republic of China assumed its Security Council seat in 1971 and initially avoided voting altogether, though Cold War dynamics largely stymied most multilateral action. China cast its first yes vote for traditional consent-­based peacekeeping in 1981. Beijing faced a post–­Cold War push to intervene against gross domestic ­human rights abuses in order to right wrongs. For much of the 1990s and through the first de­cade of this ­century, China shelved its misgivings about Security Council activism that affected local governance, typically preferring a passive role by abstention votes—­neither supporting nor blocking efforts— or by voting yes when justified by exceptional circumstances. China’s steady trajectory of gradual, increased engagement with the humanitarian intervention regime moved it long past its initial years as a reactive, passive player in Security Council debates. Key cases during the immediate post–­Cold War period reset the bound­aries for humanitarian intervention by setting new examples for the motivation, means, and context of humanitarian intervention. China abstained when the UN authorized the US-­led expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in the Persian Gulf War (1991) and the sub-

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sequent establishment of no-­fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. China acknowledged that humanitarian concerns existed in Iraq, including the growing refugee flows into Turkey and Iran, but did not want to set a pre­ce­dent for humanitarian intervention that might violate its key princi­ple of defending state sovereignty. In regard to the civil war and 1991 coup in Somalia, where the Security Council fielded multiple missions into the country (spanning UNOSOM I, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II), China supported humanitarian intervention without host state consent due to the extreme condition of a failed state, as ­there was no functioning government to offer consent or object. Such logic enabled Beijing to avoid a real compromise of its consent-­based princi­ples. When the 1991 coup d’état in Haiti led to a refugee crisis, China supported the Security Council’s imposition of a 1993 embargo and sanctions but again underscored t­hese as domestic m ­ atters. China abstained from setting up a US-­led multinational force with the authority to return democracy by unseating the usurpers, citing requests from the exiled government and regional players as legitimate ­causes. Facing the 1994 Rwandan genocide, China voted for a mission to protect refugees and civilians at risk due to humanitarian needs. In addition, China stressed the exceptional nature of the ­later Bosnian humanitarian intervention and cited the limitations of nonconsensual action and also accepted induced Indonesian consent for a UN-­led intervention to address postreferendum vio­lence in East Timor. The post–­Cold War period showed China as a pragmatic player, able to compromise on humanitarian intervention standards when it deemed ­doing so to be necessary. China’s flexibility is explained by a combination of Beijing weighing its interests in an ad hoc fashion, learning that it could protect its principled position and interests while accepting occasional compromises, plus a deeper belief that serving as a leading state in international affairs includes an obligation to

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respond to mass ­human rights abuses. China also continued sending small deployments on UN peacekeeping missions, dispatching assets to Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMiBH), the Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), and operations in Burundi (ONUB), among o ­ thers. China used its veto sparingly, only twice in this period, both motivated by its concerns regarding China’s sovereignty over Taiwan. Thus, in 1997 China vetoed sending military observers to Guatemala to observe the peace accords due to Taiwan’s close relations with Guatemala. China did retract its veto and vote for the observer mission following significant regional pressure and Guatemala’s agreement to halt its Taiwan-­related outreach. In 1999, China also voted against extending the UN Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia b­ ecause Macedonia had recognized Taiwan diplomatically. The initial post–­Cold War enthusiasm for humanitarian intervention waned due to the mixed results of that period. When the UN regrouped for new ambitious, large-­scale missions at the turn of the ­century, China was willing to vote in support of humanitarian intervention efforts and also added more of its troops to these peacekeeping missions with humanitarian mandates as far afield as Sudan, Lebanon, Liberia, the Demo­cratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan. At the same time, China vetoed a 2007 censure of Myanmar and a 2008 sanction and arms embargo of Zimbabwe on the grounds that ­these ­were domestic affairs and not a threat to international security. Most recently, China has become increasingly active in shaping humanitarian interventions to ensure they are kept clearly separate from foreign-­imposed regime change efforts, defined as altering a host state’s fundamental po­liti­cal institutions through military or ­legal means that could depose an existing government. Post-9 /11 foreign-­ imposed regime change became a US foreign policy goal targeting

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leaders in Af­ghan­i­stan, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan, for example, and as a domestic policy goal of street-­led movements demanding po­liti­cal change during 2011’s Arab Spring. China remains cautious as the UN Security Council has gained new means to intervene in host states, even when the state itself conducts mass abuse against its citizens. The Security Council has tools to prosecute and hold heads of state accountable for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, including the use of targeted sanctions, no-­fly zones, peace enforcement, and international criminal tribunals or referrals to the International Criminal Court. China’s concerns about mission creep of humanitarian intervention leading to support for foreign-­imposed regime change grew following the 2011 Libyan intervention. China cast a yes vote for a unan­i­mous referral of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi to the International Criminal Court and shortly a­ fter abstained from a vote about applying sanctions and a no-­fly zone on the regime. China did not view its votes as supporting the slide from protecting civilians in Benghazi to backing Libyan rebel opposition groups. The experience of having been a handmaiden to making foreign-­imposed regime change in Libya feasible hardened China’s caution moving forward. China is slowly pushing its own vision of what the humanitarian intervention regime should be, with stricter interpretations of when the international community must stay out of domestic affairs and focus only on issues of international peace and security. China emphasizes that the COVID-19 pandemic should remain off the Security Council agenda as a “threat to international peace and security” and remains cautious about placing cyberissues on the formal work agenda. In addition, China has made efforts to sharpen the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN, w ­ hether through secretary-­general–­led efforts to restructure bud­gets or streamline guidance to the field. China also f­ avors pro­g ress on the Action for Peacekeeping Initiative,

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which stresses maintaining peacekeeping per­for­mance within bud­get by, for example, seeking opportunities to trim h ­ uman rights–­related posts on mission. China’s focus is not just on limiting more expansive interpretations of humanitarian intervention but also on showing its willingness to firmly demarcate humanitarian intervention from foreign-­imposed regime change efforts. This has put China in direct opposition to the United States regarding a number of key Security Council cases: China vetoed a resolution addressing the unfolding Venezuela crisis in 2019 and cast multiple vetoes about the decade-­long Syria crisis. China’s consistent stance that state sovereignty trumps alleged state-­led mass h ­ uman rights abuses contrasts with the US position in ­these two cases. China clearly rejects the US position that such leaders lack the authority and legitimacy to remain in power. China has also sought to prevent humanitarian intervention from seeking unlawful foreign-­i mposed regime change, with multiple statements in the Security Council warning against such danger. While China has become accustomed to and even supportive of humanitarian intervention u ­ nder certain conditions at times, regime change remains off limits. China also works to shift standards so that efforts to protect civilians as a humanitarian interventionist response do not evolve into a foreign program designed to impose regime change. In rejecting the more expansive definitions of humanitarian intervention offered by the United States, China aims to secure policy outcomes (using vetoes to halt Security Council involvement if necessary) and to prevent the Security Council from addressing mass abuse by governments by using humanitarian intervention to carry out backdoor regime change. China’s position is broadly supported by other developing states and rising powers, which often are skeptical about motivations for intervening ­because of alleged abuses of humanitarian needs. For

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example, Rus­sia, India, and Brazil all criticized the North Atlantic Treaty Organ­ization’s support for Libyan regime change. Moreover, China relies on Rus­sia to share global condemnation and diplomatic pressure when it applies its veto. Harnessing such skepticism has enabled China to challenge and slow the emerging proaccountability, pro–­human rights status quo. China is changing the international humanitarian regime through its actions at the Security Council. It is feasible that for the immediate ­f uture at least, China ­w ill continue this conservative trajectory regarding humanitarian intervention, especially as continuing international interest in China’s domestic and foreign policy actions earns it additional scrutiny.

10 Has

China’s Economic Success Proven That Autocracy Is Superior to Democracy? Yuen Yuen Ang

From the beginnings of reform in 1978 to 2018 China recorded an

average annual growth rate of 9.5 ­percent, an achievement that the World Bank describes as “the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history.” And although the Chinese economy ran into strong headwinds near the end of 2021, it remains a global juggernaut. In 2020, China was not only the world’s top destination for new foreign direct investment but also the world’s largest overseas investor. For ­those who believe that Western-­style democracy is a prerequisite for prosperity, China’s rise pre­sents an unsettling abnormality: never before in the modern world has such a large economy existed ­under a single-­party authoritarian regime. Has China’s economic success proven that autocracy is superior to democracy? For many observers, the answer is obviously “yes.” At one end of the spectrum are Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propagandists who want to convince domestic audiences that democracy is undesirable. The party’s mono­poly rule, they boast, has delivered results. On the other end of the spectrum are ­those who

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see themselves as defenders of democracy. They fear that China’s model of authoritarian capitalism ­will undermine the appeal of liberal values. As the National Endowment of Democracy pronounced, China “aims to portray the country as a successful example of economic development without demo­cratic po­liti­cal institutions.” T ­ hese activists seek to rally demo­cratic nations to ­counter China’s malign and stealthy efforts to sway global audiences through what they call “sharp power.” Although their po­liti­cal views appear diametrically opposed, CCP propagandists and their opponents have certain t­hings in common. Both assume that China’s economic rise has indeed demonstrated the advantages of authoritarian rule. Critics of Chinese “sharp power” condemn the implications of this narrative but do not think it is factually wrong (or at least they cannot offer an alternative account of China’s rise). Indeed, they fear the narrative’s influence precisely ­because they accept that it holds some truth. Furthermore, both narratives are also fixated on ­g reat power competition, that is, w ­ hether the United States or China w ­ ill “win” a contest for hegemony. On this g­ rand stage, the agency and lived experiences of hundreds of millions of grassroots actors in China’s development pro­cess barely register. Neither side grasps the real po­liti­cal foundation of China’s rise. Tracing the winding path of reforms and observing changes on the ground reveal that in fact, the secrets b­ ehind China’s cap­i­tal­ist success are many of the same princi­ples that one finds in functional democracies: accountability, competition, limits on power, bottom-up participation, and honest debate. ­After market opening, Deng Xiaoping injected t­ hese princi­ples—­ which I call “demo­cratic characteristics”—­into a single-­party dictatorship, thereby freeing up p­ eople’s initiative and creativity while preserving regime stability. When ­these po­liti­cal conditions ­were

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married with China’s integration into a global economy through export-­driven mass industrialization, the result was explosive. But the story ­d idn’t end ­there. Since becoming the top leader in 2012, President Xi Jinping has progressively abandoned many of Deng’s reforms in ­favor of autocratic rule and statist economic control. T ­ hese changes coincided with simultaneous disruptions in the United States during the Donald Trump presidency, which exposed deep cracks in American democracy. In other words, from 2016 to 2020, China ­under Xi and Amer­i­ca ­under Trump underwent concurrent demo­cratic backsliding, creating a new, confusing phenomenon: g­ reat power competition between a personalist dictatorship and an illiberal democracy. Although some see Joe Biden’s election as a reversion to the status quo, the danger of nationalist pop­u ­lism lingers, and Trump-­like candidates may still win office in f­uture elections. THREE CHINAS SINCE 1949

Since the founding of the ­People’s Republic of China in 1949, one party, the CCP, has ruled the nation. T ­ here are no national elections or constitutional protections for po­liti­cal freedoms. The party has cracked down on dissidents, protestors, and religious minorities. But while the CCP’s grip on power has been continuous, the nature of governance has drastically changed, producing not one but at least three dif­fer­ent Chinas since 1949. China ­under Mao Zedong was a personalist dictatorship. Mao installed a personality cult that raised him to the level of unimpeachable godlike figure. No modern Chinese leader held more individual power than Mao, yet his absolute authority led only to disaster. During the G ­ reat Leap Forward, Mao’s silencing of opposition and indulgence in a crazed vision to “catch up with the United States” led to

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the mass starvation of an estimated 30 million p­ eople. ­Later, to keep his hold on power, Mao stirred radicalized followers to attack his rivals and state officials during the Cultural Revolution. Deng, who took over the reins of power ­after Mao’s death, had personally suffered the effects of Mao’s personality cult and knew that power must be checked. Thus, in addition to liberalizing the economy, Deng also pursued significant po­liti­cal reforms—­but not in the manner that Western observers wished or expected. Instead of instituting multiparty elections, he introduced collective leadership, institutionalized succession, and term limits. He replaced dogma with pragmatism, encapsulated in folksy axioms such as “seeking truth from facts” and “it d­ oesn’t ­matter if the cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice.” He also spurned the cult of personality. Although Deng was the chief architect of China’s current prosperity, it is still Mao who appears on China’s hundred-­y uan bill. ­Under Deng, China practiced an adaptive governing system that I call “directed improvisation” whereby Beijing transformed from dictator to director and delegated authority to local governments that competed eco­nom­ically with one another. Partnering with entrepreneurs, local officials kick-­started development by making use of local resources and tailoring policies to local conditions. Far from being monolithic, the result was a diverse array of China models within China, varying across regions and evolving over time. To fully appreciate the pro­cess of transformation ­under Deng, one must look beyond overly abstract, politicized accounts of the China model and instead pay due attention to the lives ­people on the ground. One memorable character I interviewed during my research was a real estate tycoon. Born during the Maoist period to a poor farmer, he was hungry throughout his youth. L ­ ater in life, he was discharged from the army and transferred to the post of a lowly township bureaucrat. One day ­after a tiff with his boss, he quit his

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job in a fit of spite. Forced into business, he aspired to make 500,000 yuan over the course of his lifetime. To his surprise, he earned this sum within a year. Stories such as this reveal that it was not top-­down control but rather the unleashing of individual aspiration that catapulted China out of poverty and into the ranks of middle-­income nations within one generation. The most successful ele­ments of the Chinese economy, such as e-­commerce, emerged in the private sector and caught central planners by surprise. But China’s heady growth was not all rosy. As the property tycoon went from rags to riches, millions of other Chinese remained poor, including farmers who sold their land cheaply to developers and workers who scraped by on minimum wages. Similar to Amer­i­ca’s Gilded Age in the late nineteenth c­ entury, rising wealth brought with it corruption, in­equality, and financial risks. When Xi came to power in 2012, he inherited China’s Gilded Age. Compared to his pre­de­ces­sors, Xi presides over a country that is much wealthier and more power­f ul, but he also confronts a host of prob­lems that come with a crony-­capitalist economy. Vowing to restore the party’s “original mission” of equality and justice, Xi distinguished his po­liti­cal platform with two signature domestic policies: fighting corruption and eliminating poverty. In the final months of 2021, Xi stepped on the accelerator, launching a sweeping regulatory onslaught on the excesses of capitalism. He reined in tech g­ iants, punished rich celebrities, and clamped down on excessive debt in the real estate sector. His slogan “common prosperity” is the latest zeitgeist. Propelled by the challenges of his times and his personal ambition, Xi is attempting to summon China’s own Progressive era through force. Xi’s reign marks a structural break in Chinese po­liti­cal economy. Step by step, he has departed from the liberalizing norms that Deng

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laid down. On the po­liti­cal front, Xi centralized personal power while also enforcing ideological conformity and cracking down on po­liti­cal freedoms. Eco­nom­ically, he expanded the state sector at the expense of the private sector. And in the realm of foreign policy, he departed from Deng’s axiom of “keeping a low profile” and projected lofty ambitions for China to become a world leader. ­Under Xi China has regressed from a party-­based dictatorship that was moderated by partial limits on power and partial openness to a personalist dictatorship. Xi is hailed as the “helmsman,” a title once reserved for Mao. But Xi is not Mao. Xi does not incite impressionable youths to revolt; far from it, he demands absolute control and order. Nor does he want to relinquish cap­i­tal­ist prosperity. For him, the dilemma is how to rein in ­free markets and private entrepreneurs without crushing them. Whereas Deng aspired to make China rich, Xi wants to make China strong, clean, and fair too. TELLING CHINA’S STORY BADLY

As part of his ambitions to elevate China’s global standing, Xi urged his compatriots “to tell China’s story well.” Chinese media and commentators responded to this clarion call by boasting about China’s staggering achievements. One climatic expression of ­these efforts was a 2018 CCTV documentary with a chest-­thumping title, “Bravo, My Nation!,” that showcased China’s bridges, dams, highways, and rec­ord tall skyscrapers. On the softer side, the propaganda machinery enlists commentators, both local and foreign, to praise Confucian values and champion the CCP’s “meritocracy” as an alternative to democracy. State media proudly prints quotes from visitors who swoon over ­these ostensibly impressive traits.

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While t­hese narratives might win over some naive fans, they play into Western perceptions that the China model is simply top-­ down investment paired with authoritarianism. The obsession with infrastructure is motivated by the belief that physical might ­will dazzle foreigners. The trope about meritocracy is contradicted by Xi’s own admission of China’s corruption crisis. This propaganda evinces a lack rather than abundance of confidence. Real confidence must be grounded in values and real­ity, not muscles and myths. Paradoxically, both Beijing’s propagandists and their Western critics perpetuate a simplistic understanding of Chinese development. In real­ity, China prospered u ­ nder Deng ­because it took a demo­cratic turn while maintaining po­liti­cal stability. Moreover, China’s economic boom came with a host of costs and risks, just as it did when Western powers ­were developing. Other developing countries who interpret China’s economic success as simply a validation of authoritarian rule—­w ithout appreciating its profound changes in ideology, governance, and economic management—­w ill run the risk of replicating Maoist versions of China. T ­ hose who blindly emulate China’s high-­g rowth model without appreciating its toll (e.g., environmental degradation) w ­ ill be condemned to suffer similar costs down the road. Especially in the face of climate change, replicating the path of “industrialize and pollute first, then clean up ­later” w ­ ill bring devastation. LESSONS FOR ALL TIMES

President Biden frames the US-­China competition as an epic ­battle between autocracy and democracy. At his first press conference in March 2021 the president said, “I predict to you your ­children or grandchildren are ­going to be ­doing their doctoral thesis on the issue

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of who succeeded, autocracy or democracy, b­ ecause that is what is at stake, not just with China.” The president is correct that t­ here is a high-­stakes b­ attle between autocracy and democracy, but the cast is not made up of villains in one nation and heroes in the other. The real contest is between, on one hand, Americans and Chinese who cherish demo­cratic values and, on the other, t­hose who diminish them in practice. Each team is competing with the other side while battling greater foes from within. Whereas the old Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union was a clear-­cut contest between a f­ ree market democracy and a communist dictatorship, the Sino-­A merican rivalry t­ oday is confounded by the fact that both China and the United States defy ­simple binaries. Democracy as a regime type—­defined by multiparty elections and l­egal protections of individual freedoms—­should be distinguished from what I term “demo­cratic characteristics” such as in­de­pen­dent thinking and bottom-up participation. ­These are the benefits that functional democracies deliver. When Deng implored his comrades in his historic speech in 1978 to “liberate your mind” and “boldly express your honest opinions,” he injected demo­cratic characteristics into a po­liti­cal system that remained authoritarian. Although the changes he made fell far short of Western expectations of formal democ­ratization, they w ­ ere sufficient to bring about revolutionary results. With this in mind, we might also say that demo­cratic backsliding has occurred not only in electoral democracies but also in China ­under Xi. My argument that Deng’s era contained “demo­cratic characteristics” should not be misread as a justification of Xi’s reign—­ that would be like using quotes about Barack Obama to characterize Donald Trump. In fact, Xi has reversed liberalization.

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Across the Pacific, Trump—­and the chauvinist nationalist forces that he represents—­introduced autocratic characteristics into American democracy. Trump ignored bureaucratic autonomy, used his power to benefit his businesses, and incited insurrectionists to stall the peaceful transition of power. No foreign dictator could trample (literally) on Amer­i­ca’s Capitol Hill and its cherished demo­cratic traditions in the way Trump and his followers have done. Insisting on a black-­a nd-­white view of the world w ­ ill lead to absurdity. For example, some of Trump’s most fanatic supporters include anti-­CCP voters, who helped spread lies about “the stolen election” in 2020. They believed that only Trump was hawkish enough to liberate China from autocracy, even though he acted like an autocrat in a democracy. In the global arena, when Trump administration officials lambasted China’s authoritarianism while indulging Trump’s similar tendencies at home, their hy­poc­r isy only undercut the credibility of American democracy. Likewise, when overreaction ­toward China’s “sharp power” stirs paranoia about influence operations in ways that heightens suspicions of Asians in Amer­i­ca, this undermines demo­cratic princi­ples. Accepting the real­ity of a mixed world opens up not only understanding but also opportunities. Instead of bashing China indiscriminately, US politicians should recognize that China ­under Deng is a story of partial po­l iti­cal liberalization, while that ­under Xi is not. Americans should have faith in the intrinsic benefits of po­liti­cal freedom and not lose confidence just b­ ecause an authoritarian China has prospered. Furthermore, as Anne-­M arie Slaughter argues in Proj­ect Syndicate, when President Biden promises to lead the world again, his pledges should include a clear admission of past failings and per­sis­tent fractures in American society. Such honesty ­will distinguish Amer­i­ca as a f­ree society from the CCP’s strug­g le to confront its fraught past.

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The “­children and grandchildren” Biden imagines writing ­future t­heses ­w ill look back on our times as a period of ambiguity. Deng showed that demo­cratic qualities can be planted inside a single-­party autocracy, while Trump demonstrated that authoritarian forces can corrupt a mature democracy. If ­there is a point to this bizarre mix-­ and-­match, it is to teach us to look beyond the banners of democracy and instead home in on its practice and substance.

III China in the World

11

What Are the Implications for the United States as China Reshapes Its Overseas Image? Naima Green-­Riley

In recent years, the ­People’s Republic of China (PRC) has com-

mitted enormous resources to elevating its international image. This chapter examines how the PRC seeks to shape that image in the eyes of Americans and describes the larger implications of this image proj­ect for the United States. China’s image-­focused efforts inside the US are myriad. They range from cultural and educational public diplomacy programs intended to reach ordinary citizens to networking and lobbying efforts aimed at influential businesspeople and po­liti­cal elites. They involve efforts to amplify voices of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials through state-­owned media platforms and social media manipulation via information operations. They also include institutional relationships between think tanks and universities designed to influence intellectual discourse. While ­these efforts do not appear to have made marked changes in American public opinion ­toward China, US policy makers continue to grapple with ele­ments of Chinese outreach in the United States that run ­counter to US princi­ples such as transparency, academic freedom, and freedom of the press.

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Further implications for the United States of China’s global image proj­ect s­tem from competing US and PRC narratives to other parts of the world. Across the globe, the PRC has invested billions in image enhancement through its B ­ elt and Road Initiative (a complex and costly infrastructure program involving roughly 140 nations worldwide), given tens of thousands of annual scholarships so foreign students can study at Chinese universities, and promoted a rhetorical campaign calling on other nations to join its “community of shared f­uture for mankind.” The question of how much traction China’s narratives are gaining internationally has become a key concern to US policy makers, especially given that ­these narratives could influence global values, economic trends and the setting of international standards moving forward. NATIONAL REJUVENATION AND THE THEORETICAL UNDER­P INNINGS OF CHINESE IMAGE BUILDING

Let us first consider the policy rationale ­behind China’s larger international image proj­ect before zooming in on PRC activities in the United States. At the foundation of CCP leader Xi Jinping’s grandiose po­liti­cal vision is a call for the “national rejuvenation of the ­great Chinese nation.” While such po­liti­cal slogans often seem opaque to foreigners, they can evoke emotional images in the minds of the Chinese public. The national rejuvenation narrative paints con­ temporary China as a country preceded by a rich five thousand–­year history; indeed, CCP officials often point to the successes of pre-­PRC dynasties in public remarks. In par­tic­u ­lar, the specter of a resplendent Qing empire with a profitable trade network, intercontinental diplomatic ties, and far-­reaching cultural influence looms large within the historical memory tied to Xi’s narrative and serves as the paragon for a successful outcome of the rejuvenation proj­ect. (The oft-­

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mentioned “­century of humiliation” between the 1840s and the 1940s, during which China suffered defeat at the hands of the British, the Japa­nese, and several other foreign nations—­reinforces the sentimentality surrounding the preceding years.) The “rejuvenation” narrative makes clear that China hopes to gain greater leadership, esteem, and authority on the international stage and, arguably, also to garner greater deference from other states. How do Chinese leaders hope to do this? In addition to calls to strengthen China’s soft power, Chinese intellectuals have long promoted the idea of increasing China’s “international discourse power.” In other contexts, the Chinese term for “discourse power” (huayuquan) is used to describe whose voice m ­ atters in a society. For example, one might use this term to indicate that the younger generation in China has gradually gained greater cultural and societal influence as compared to elders and elites. In international terms, this concept refers to the ability of countries to influence global opinion and action and thus shape agendas via spoken and written discourse. The Chinese government has mostly cornered the market for domestic po­l iti­cal discourse power, but internationally it must compete to prove the credibility of its narrative. Chinese intellectuals who are suspicious of US power lament the fact that Amer­i­ca’s words—be they proclamations, rallying cries for international action, or even depictions of the world portrayed by US news outlets—­tend to carry considerable weight internationally. Thus, proponents of “discourse power” seek to increase international regard for and reliance on Chinese official rhe­toric and, further, to boost global perceptions of the authoritativeness of Chinese sources of information. Nadège Rolland, a se­nior fellow at the US-­based National Bureau for Asian Research, has written that frustrations caused by the extensive international ac­cep­tance of Western po­liti­cal thought have led many Chinese scholars to seek uniquely Chinese theories of global leadership.

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In fact, many Chinese intellectuals argue that to strengthen the nation’s discourse power, China w ­ ill have to influence the values and norms that underpin the international community. For example, Tsing­hua University dean and international relations scholar Yan Xuetong, a sometimes controversial writer who penned a 2011 op-ed in the New York Times titled “How China Can Defeat Amer­i­ca,” contends that China should develop a reputation for “humane authority.” According to a 2018 article by Yan, humane authority is a concept derived from the writings of the ancient Chinese phi­los­o­pher Xunzi that calls for leaders to “adopt a benevolent foreign policy t­owards their weaker neighbors in expectations that recipients of said benevolence ­will express gratitude for the benefits ensuing from such leadership.” This strategic outlook is apparent in China’s global outreach proj­ects. Since 2013, Beijing’s oft-­repeated appeal to other nations to join it in a “community of shared f­ uture for mankind” has characterized the CCP’s vision for the world. To increase China’s influence, Chinese diplomats have worked hard to insert the phrase into official documents in international forums such as the United Nations. The call for a “community of shared f­ uture” has often been accompanied by comments from Chinese leaders that it is time for a new multipolar order rather than an international order led by the United States. For example, Wang Yiwei, a Renmin University professor and public intellectual, has written that “the result of the United States’ abuse of long-­arm jurisdiction, abuse of force, and financial hegemony is to promote more and more countries to seek autonomy in their destiny, strive to achieve de-­A mericanization, and advance the pro­cess of building a community with a shared ­future for mankind.” ­There is reason to doubt that China wishes to play a merely equal role among ­others in its “community of shared ­future.” During his 19th Party Congress address in 2017, Xi declared the coming era as one that “sees China moving closer to center stage.” Furthermore, a

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March  2020 commentary article published by the Xin­hua News Agency was titled “Let the Sun of the Community of Shared ­Future for Mankind Shine on the World.” The article went on to cast China as the “sun,” providing needed guidance and support to other countries. CHINA’S IMAGE PROJ­E CT IN THE UNITED STATES

For de­cades and especially since the beginning of China’s geopo­liti­cal rise, Chinese public diplomacy prac­ti­tion­ers, journalists, and scholars have considered the United States and other Western countries impor­tant polities in which to shape a more favorable image of their nation. Chinese intellectuals express par­tic­u ­lar disdain for what they call the “China threat theory,” which they characterize as an unfair, predominately Western view that China’s rise poses a threat to the world. For this reason, the PRC has invested heavi­ly in influencing opinion within the United States. Since US-­China tensions began to rise during the Trump administration, US officials have become increasingly wary of ­these efforts. Specific types of outreach that have drawn scrutiny from US authorities include:

• Confucius Institutes. More than 100 of the nearly 550 Confucius Institutes opened worldwide have been established in the United States. ­These are Chinese language and cultural centers that are usually set up in partnership with universities. Once opened, institutes can offer language courses through “Confucius Classrooms” for local K–12 students. Congressional representatives such as Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, and Seth Moulton as well as some public intellectuals have expressed concerns about both the institutional and

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individual-­level effects of Confucius programs, arguing that they impinge upon universities’ academic freedom and risk instilling unduly pro-­China attitudes in the minds of students. In August 2020, the State Department declared the Confucius Institute US Center a foreign mission, a designation that increased its required reporting to US authorities. Moreover, congressional pressure has led many universities to end ­these partnerships. As of January 2022, over ninety-five US partner institutions had closed (or planned to close) their Confucius Institutes.

• State-­controlled media outlets. China seeks to increase its international influence through a profusion of state-­ controlled news outlets targeting foreign audiences. ­These outlets broadcast or publish content in En­g lish (and many other foreign languages). The list includes newspapers such as the ­People’s Daily (known as an official mouthpiece of the CCP), the China Daily, and the Global Times as well as the Xin­hua News Agency, the China Global Tele­v i­sion Network, and China Radio International. Though some Chinese media outlets ­were already monitored through the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the Trump administration in 2020 designated fifteen of them as foreign missions, requiring them to reduce staff and make additional reports to the US government about their activities.



• Social media accounts. Though China restricts access to Western social media sites within its borders, a growing number of official Twitter accounts for Chinese embassies, consulates, and diplomats have rapidly appeared since 2019. Through ­these new accounts, Chinese officials have not only propagated topline talking points

What Are the Implications for the United States as China Reshapes Its Image?

but also occasionally engaged in heated public quarrels with Western officials. In 2020, several social media companies began labeling content from countries commonly considered to be sources of state-­sponsored information operations. Each com­pany has a slightly dif­fer­ent policy, but both Facebook and Twitter began labeling content from China, Rus­sia, and selected other countries.

• Disinformation campaigns. Not all of China’s attempts to shape its image in the United States have been overt. In 2020, multiple social media companies and US officials made announcements linking disinformation campaigns to Chinese government-­affiliated agents. For example, in 2019 and again in 2020, Twitter announced suspensions of fake accounts posting po­liti­cally divisive information about the Hong Kong protests a­ fter detecting waves of coordinated, inauthentic be­hav­ior. (Most of ­these accounts ­were tweeting in Chinese, but some used En­glish.) In June 2020 the Twitter Safety team, which shut down over 20,000 “highly engaged” accounts as well as a wider network of roughly 150,000 amplifier accounts, expressed confidence that ­t hese ­were state-­backed efforts based on their similarity to past PRC operations. In December 2021, Twitter removed more than 2,000 Chinese accounts being used to extend the reach of CCP narratives about the Uyghur population as well as 112 accounts linked to a private company with ties to the Xinjiang regional government. Moreover, in April 2020 the New York Times reported that six US officials from dif­fer­ent government agencies found evidence that “Chinese agents” had been involved in promoting text messages with false information about the US government’s response to the coronavirus.

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IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S IMAGE PROJ­E CT FOR THE UNITED STATES

­ hese anecdotes beg the question of ­whether China is succeeding at T improving its image in the United States. Given recent events, most indicators point to no. The vast majority of Confucius Institutes opened in the United States ­were closed by the end of 2021, and my research in 2019 and 2020 showed that American high school students taking classes in Confucius Classrooms actually developed less favorable views of China during the school year. Chinese media outlets in the United States have been subject to considerable monitoring ­after being declared foreign missions by the Department of State. Social media companies have labeled the content of state-­a ffiliated Chinese profiles and pulled down thousands of accounts suspected to be instruments of PRC disinformation campaigns. Moreover, Pew Research Center data indicates that Americans’ favorable views of China in 2021 reached an all-­time low since such polling began in the early 2000s. Nevertheless, t­here are further implications of China’s image proj­ect in the United States for ­f uture US policies. While the PRC’s efforts to enhance its image may not be improving US public opinion, the jury is still out on some other questions. For example, systematic detail regarding the par­t ic­u ­lar arrangements of most US institutions with Confucius Institutes has often been kept confidential as a condition of the memoranda of understanding governing the agreements. If any Confucius Institutes survive the enormous wave of closures across the US, requiring greater transparency in t­hese relationships could pave the way for new policies that safeguard US universities from certain risks, such as limiting academic freedom or inhibiting the civil liberties of Chinese students vulnerable to PRC surveillance on US campuses. Moreover, some of the PRC’s online information operations—­ many focused on Chinese-­speaking areas such as Taiwan and Hong

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Kong—­have taken advantage of US-­based social media platforms. To date, individual social media companies have created their own policies about how to address prob­lems such as coordinated, inauthentic be­hav­ior and misinformation, techniques also used by other state actors (notably Rus­sia and Iran) and domestic po­l iti­cal actors. ­W hether US policy makers can and should govern how US-­based tech platforms can be used is a complex question that involves broad issues of ­f ree speech, government censorship, and tech regulation. More generally, many intellectuals in the United States point to the imbalance in informational access within the US-­China relationship, arguing that while Chinese journalists and scholars have long enjoyed significant access to information in the United States, American scholars and journalists regularly face serious obstacles when seeking similar access inside China. Some have used this argument to justify visa and media restrictions that were implemented during the Trump administration and persisted during the initial year of the Biden administration. In the end, though, restrictions placed by both countries on visas and media outlets from the other country pose risks: without the ability to observe life in the other country firsthand, journalistic and scholarly writing is likely to become less nuanced and thus less able to contribute to mutual understanding. After the Xi-Biden virtual summit of November 2021, the United States and China announced plans to implement reciprocal measures that would ease restrictions on journalists. As they seek to do so, the challenge of reconciling greater access with the mistrust of these journalists that each government has demonstrated through past actions will continue to hang over policy makers in both countries. Fi­nally, China’s broader image proj­ect has implications for the ­future of US relations with other parts of the world. The PRC’s global vision encourages decreased reliance on US leadership and shifts in international values, standards, and institutions that would give China

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a larger international role. Countries more beholden to the PRC, such as states within China’s immediate periphery and eco­nom­ically strapped nations with much to gain from China’s support, may turn ­toward Chinese leadership in ways that alter norms for global h ­ uman rights or empower illiberal technological and industrial standards. Concerns about these possibilities have motivated the Biden administration to pursue a strategy of group-based opposition to certain Chinese initiatives, appealing to allies and partners on the basis of shared democratic values. The US-­China talks in Anchorage in March 2021, which marked the first US diplomatic meeting with China u ­ nder the Biden administration, put the competing narratives of the United States and China on full display. At the summit, Chinese official Yang Jiechi said bluntly, “I ­don’t think the overwhelming majority of countries in the world would recognize that the universal values advocated by the United States could represent international public opinion.” US secretary of state Antony Blinken countered, “I have to tell you, what I’m hearing is very dif­fer­ent from what you described. I’m hearing deep satisfaction that the United States is back, . . . ​[and] I’m also hearing deep concern about some of the actions your government has taken.” Given continued US-­China friction since that meeting, the narrative contest between the United States and China on the global stage may only grow louder in the coming years.

12 How

Can the United States Live with China’s ­Belt and Road Initiative? Min Ye

The ­b elt and Road Initiative (BRI) is arguably the most ambitious

and most debated globalization strategy in China, aiming to connect the country with the world in infrastructure, trade, investment, policy, and culture. Since this global program was launched in 2013, the United States has tried to resist, contain, and c­ ounter it—­w ith mixed results. In spite of criticism and backlash, the BRI has remained China’s basic globalization platform, sustained by its internal priorities of expanding the economy, improving diplomacy, and managing geopo­liti­cal tensions. In coming years, the United States needs to recognize its domestic logic and continuing appeal to recipient countries. Like it or not, the United States should prepare to live with the program and devise a “complex competition” strategy to address varying challenges from China’s out­going activities. US PERCEPTIONS AND OPPOSITIONS TO BRI IN THE PAST

The BRI has become the most studied Chinese foreign policy in the United States, with shifting perceptions shaping Washington’s response since it began. From 2013 to 2015, US analysts ­were dismissive of the BRI’s significance. Based on Beijing’s “hollow” wording,

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Washington concluded that the initiative had l­imited substance, causing policy makers to brush aside Beijing’s invitation to join its new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, initially proposed in one of the two BRI founding announcements. The United States also advised its allies not to participate. But from 2016 to 2018, as it became clear that China was pursuing the BRI forcefully in Asia and beyond, with growing outbound investment and infrastructure contracts, US observers gave the initiative hyperattention and deemed it a leading example of a Chinese expansionist foreign policy designed to undercut US geopo­liti­cal interests. Washington began describing the BRI proj­ects as “debt traps” and Chinese “economic statecraft” as being dangerous to nations that joined. Unintentionally, the US critique helped Beijing adjust BRI implementation, adding new provisions to prevent risky and irresponsible proj­ects. Moreover, studies of BRI proj­ects in recipient countries challenged the US characterization. The host countries generally found them useful and began describing the US charges as self-­serving and patronizing. In 2019 and 2020 as US-­China geopo­liti­cal competition intensified, particularly ­after the COVID-19 outbreak, US descriptions of the BRI became even more negative and alarming. They underscored China’s “weaponization” of BRI, emphasizing its military involvement in proj­ects. But such characterization is both inaccurate and dangerous. As a key part of China’s globalization, the BRI incorporates financiers, builders, and trading companies in both China and abroad. Portraying it as promoting military proj­ects makes it pos­si­ble for the United States to penalize a wide range of commercial actors ­under the pretense of defending national security. But ­doing so reinforces the image of the United States as an arbitrary bully and undermines the country’s ability to gain broader support domestically and internationally.

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It is time for the United States to understand the multiplicity of the BRI’s domestic ­drivers and the complexity of its effects abroad. ­W hether we like it or not, we ­w ill have to live with China’s BRI for years to come, and only a complex and continuously applied competition strategy can address its challenges to American and global interests. THE BRI’S DOMESTIC LOGIC AND DURABILITY

The BRI was motivated by internal imperatives in China, including geopo­liti­cal, diplomatic, and economic needs, and has been implemented by major po­liti­cal and economic players ­there. Such domestic logic and policy dynamics characterize impor­tant Chinese globalization policies, and the BRI reflects several of China’s long-­term goals and interests. First, the program was an urgent effort to address geostrategic competition with the United States, a deteriorating diplomacy with regional countries, and economic stagnation due to industrial overcapacity. In 2020 with the COVID-19 pandemic ­under way, similar motivations persisted, and China’s policy specialists argued for continuing the BRI into the f­uture. By this time, US-­ China competition was more tense, and China’s ambition for global leadership had become more pronounced. Thus, a­ fter a short pause China’s rhe­toric and momentum in support of the BRI recovered. Second, like other globalization initiatives, the BRI has involved impor­tant Chinese po­liti­cal and economic groups who played dif­ fer­ent roles in varying ways during the policy-­making pro­cess. The nation’s po­liti­cal leadership was the official launcher, using nationalist rhe­toric to mobilize the government and its capital. Bureaucracies wrote policy guidelines and formulated plans for policy implementation. Prompted by incentives and opportunities unleashed by the strategy, Chinese companies and local governments have been

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active implementers of assorted proj­ects and investments. Furthermore, social groups, scholars, and scientists also got on the bandwagon and participated in expanding the program. This broad inclusion has made the BRI able to adjust to changing conditions at home and abroad. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, however, both domestic and external circumstances shifted, and expensive infrastructure faced new challenges. Nonetheless, “soft” and scientific BRI proj­ects and programs, such as university consortia, e-­commerce logistics, and medicine cooperation, are being strongly promoted. Third, like any major Chinese policy, the BRI illustrates a dynamic pro­cess with multiple steps and stages, not a one-­shot approach. In dif­fer­ent contexts, its policy priorities and contents may shift. For example, at the BRI’s launch, China faced severe economic, diplomatic, and geostrategic pressure. The po­liti­cal leadership employed nationalist rhe­toric to mobilize its ac­cep­tance by the government. During implementation, Chinese state bureaucracies provided vague stipulations, while state companies and local governments pursued their own economic expansion flexibly. Then as the BRI faced external criticism and backlash, Beijing recalibrated its implementation and launched multilateral cooperation mechanisms to address financial and environmental risks. ­A fter 2017 as investment flows slowed, Beijing emphasized less costly proj­ects such as the digital silk road and health silk road more strongly, the former focusing on e-­commerce and digital infrastructure and the latter on medicines and health ser­ vices. Less intrusive and less costly scientific proj­ects have become prominent in BRI negotiations during the COVID-19 pandemic. THE BRI AND ITS RISKS

The BRI is China’s basic globalization strategy, sustained by its internal priorities of expanding the economy, improving diplomacy,

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and managing geopo­liti­cal tensions. First, as long as China continues to remain globally engaged, the BRI ­w ill persist in one form or another. Therefore, the United States should first abandon the belief that it can stop the BRI or contain China’s outbound globalization. Past portrayals of the BRI as creating dangerous “debt traps” and military presence in recipient countries do not have enough factual basis or earn sufficient backing from the hosts, ­whether it is Pakistan or Sri Lanka. Second, although the principal driver of the BRI is commercial and most BRI proj­ects do not have strategic ele­ments, their security impact ­w ill increase as China pursues BRI proj­ects across Asia and elsewhere. On the one hand, China’s growing investments and personnel abroad require that Chinese and local security forces be involved for their protection. Consequently, t­ here have been increased police cooperation, more military exercises, and increased use of surveillance technology from China. On the other hand, w ­ hether they involve railways, ports, 5G networks, or satellites, some infrastructure proj­ects have the potential for both civilian and military use by China or adversary powers. At the minimum, some pockets of China-­built infrastructure are likely to c­ ounter or neutralize US strategic moves in the ­future. Third, the BRI risks go beyond US national concerns. Its proj­ects can have real impact and threat on the ground, economic benefits notwithstanding. For example, China lacks effective institutions that regulate investment be­hav­ior of Chinese companies overseas. Their be­hav­ior can disrupt local communities, incur environmental costs, and bring financial burdens to host governments. Consider ecological concerns as an example. Chinese companies may disregard or even expand their polluting activities abroad as they face increasing scrutiny and restrictions at home. In the meantime, Chinese investment and infrastructure are sorely needed in many countries to speed their

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own industrialization and economic development. Therefore, addressing the BRI’s social and environmental costs does not mean denying them a presence or an expansion. HOW SHOULD THE UNITED STATES RESPOND?

The BRI w ­ ill continue as long as China’s globalization continues, and the risks it imposes ­w ill require complex and continuously active responses from the United States. First, to anticipate and meet its geostrategic threats, the United States should maintain accurate intelligence, conduct scenario analyses, and work with allies in dif­ fer­ent regions. Thus, while BRI proj­ects may link strategic Chinese assets abroad, the United States and its partners can c­ ounter and disrupt ­these linkages and strengthen the security apparatus that works for the United States. In areas essential to American security, the United States and its allies should focus on denying China-­constructed infrastructure or diversifying the proj­ects’ stakes. In areas less critical, the allies should provide alternative proj­ects and keep close watch on BRI proj­ects. Second, to address environmental and social risks, the United States needs to foster vibrant research communities and collect useful information on BRI proj­ects in host countries. Global and regional organ­izations can play decisive roles, and the United States can be the locus for international discussion and discovery of solutions to such risks. More importantly, the United States and its allies, whenever feasible, should offer alternative infrastructure and investment possibilities. By setting higher standards and offering other choices, recipient countries can profit more from the BRI and China’s associated investment and infrastructure. Fi­n ally, by understanding dif­fer­ent state actors in China, the United States can work with them to shape the BRI from inside. The

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BRI’s strategic importance, heterogeneous actors, and open-­ended policy implementation can work for the United States. To start with, since the BRI reflects China’s basic policy of seeking national rejuvenation and a peaceful global rise, the United States can object to the security ramifications of specific proj­ects to Chinese leaders, cautioning against intensifying security issues that might risk military conflict. On balance, Beijing could well decide that building a single seaport or one 5G contract is not worth endangering the stable external environment needed for China’s continuous globalization. The United States could raise such implementation issues stemming from the BRI and call on Beijing to develop open and transparent regulations that minimize any such risks. Such persuasion could work for a Chinese bureaucracy that is deeply concerned about any external backlash and wants to retain control over the country’s outbound investments. As a w ­ hole, however, for the US and global community to have sound intelligence and knowledge of overseas BRI proj­ects, they need to work closely with proj­ect builders, financiers, and implementers. ­These are Chinese banks, state and private companies, and local governments. US researchers and policy specialists need to be in China to evaluate BRI proj­ects and shape their actions and be­hav­iors on the ground. While the US “engagement policy” to de­moc­ra­t ize the Chinese po­liti­cal system has failed, US-­led globalization has succeeded in influencing China at functional and professional levels. Therefore, established international norms and institutions have the potential to be ­adopted by Chinese implementers who are sometimes novices at operating abroad. The United States also should invite the Chinese in. One way to do this is to reverse its current anti-­China impulse and the recent push for “decoupling” in business, education, and travel. Instead, the United States should be open to visitors from Chinese companies and

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governments who can share their experiences and also take back norms and practices prevalent h ­ ere. Chinese students are a vital part of such exchanges and exposure. Many ­will return to work on China’s globalization programs. What they learn in the United States helps them anticipate and address external concerns and risks. The assumption that the Chinese presence inside the United States represents a threat to national security is exaggerated. The US system is far more resilient than that. Instead, US discrimination and exclusion pre­sent a greater danger by diminishing the US moral authority and discouraging Chinese investors, visitors, and students.

The BRI is the latest and most robust Chinese globalization strategy

and addresses China’s geopo­l iti­cal, diplomatic, and economic priorities. ­Unless that trajectory shifts fundamentally, it ­w ill continue as a primary foreign policy platform. Like other Chinese globalization initiatives, the BRI involves China’s po­liti­cal leadership, bureaucracy, state companies, local governments, and scholars, scientists, and social groups. As a globalization platform for advancing China’s interests, the BRI pre­sents geopo­l iti­cal challenges to the United States and potential social and environmental risks in recipient countries, despite offering considerable commercial and infrastructure gains. However, Washington’s characterization of the BRI as China’s “debt traps” and “weaponization” of infrastructure is unlikely to work. Instead, the United States should provide complex and continuous competition, involving direct and vigilant pushback against strategic and military concerns while encouraging professionals and policy experts in China and globally to monitor and manage what­ever risks and disruptions the BRI may pose.

13

What Does China’s Increased Influence in Latin Amer­i­ca Mean for the United States? Oliver Stuenkel

Washington is struggling to adapt to Beijing’s growing clout in

Latin Amer­i­ca, traditionally seen as the backyard of the United States. No single event has had a more transformative impact on Latin Amer­i­ca in recent de­cades than the rise of China. Latin Amer­i­ca’s economy t­oday is deeply intertwined with that of China, and Beijing has become a decisive po­liti­cal and economic actor in the region, be it as an investor, a provider of loans and buyer of commodities, or, most recently, the source of COVID-19 vaccines and 5G technology. Washington continues to maintain a strong presence in the region, but Beijing is t­ oday in many ways at least as influential as the United States. Not counting Mexico, China has become the region’s most impor­tant trading partner, and Brazil, Latin Amer­i­ca’s largest economy, exports nearly three times more to China than to the United States. China has also become the most impor­tant trading partner of Chile, Peru, and Uruguay and has become the largest lender in Latin Amer­i­ca. Even in Mexico, where the United States remains the largest trading partner by far, Beijing has recently

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strengthened its influence, wooing the Mexican government by promising to supply tens of millions of COVID-19 vaccines and making inroads in the country’s energy sector. Latin Amer­i­ca’s relationship to the rest of the world has been ­shaped during much of the twentieth c­ entury by its dependence on the United States, and its foreign policy makers’ main challenge was always how to manage a profoundly asymmetrical relationship that offered opportunities but also pos­si­ble threats to their sovereignty. Since the turn of the c­ entury, however, the shift of power away from the West and ­toward Asia has made itself felt, as Chinese demand for commodities created a once-­in-­a-­generation economic boom and mitigated the negative impact of the G ­ reat Recession of 2007–2009. Beijing has successfully turned its economic clout into po­liti­cal influence. Unlike the United States, China sought to remain u ­ nder the radar as long as pos­si­ble and only recently became the subject of public debate across the region. Compared to traditionally widespread anti-­A merican sentiment routinely exploited by nationalist leaders for po­liti­cal gain, anti-­China sentiment is far more recent, and not u ­ ntil 2018 did a leading Latin American politician make attacks on China a key theme of his overall po­liti­cal narrative. That came when presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro visited Taiwan and promised, if elected, to end Brazil’s alliances with communist regimes such as China. Yet it speaks volumes that even Bolsonaro, a staunch ally of Donald Trump, once in office embraced a relatively pragmatic stance vis-­à-­v is China and declared during a meeting with President Xi Jinping in 2019 that China was “increasingly part of Brazil’s ­f uture.” Bolsonaro also remained part of the China-­led BRICS (Brazil, Rus­sia, India, China, and South Africa) grouping, walked back on his promise to Trump to ban the Chinese com­pany Huawei from the country’s telecommunication networks, and sought to mend ties to Beijing when it became a key provider of COVID-19 vaccines.

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Even though anti-­China rhe­toric is now a staple of Brazilian politics and Sinophobia is evident in far right groups across the continent, China’s quiet approach has brought it major benefits and l­imited the overall po­liti­cal and public re­sis­tance to its rise. Over the past years, China has deepened its influence in Latin Amer­i­ca in almost e­ very aspect. Against US pressure, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Panama severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan and recognized Beijing. Pressure is growing in Paraguay to do the same. While the United States convinced fifty countries, mostly in the West, to join its Clean Network, an initiative to exclude Huawei from the construction of 5G networks, in Latin Amer­i­ca only three—­the Dominican Republic, Ec­ua­dor, and Brazil—­agreed to join. Yet in a humiliating turnaround, President Bolsonaro ­later toned down his rhe­toric against the Chinese telecommunication com­pany and de­c ided against limiting Huawei’s role in an effort to avoid delivery delays of Chinese-­made vaccines. Likewise, not a single Latin American country joined Washington in condemning Beijing’s repression in Hong Kong or h ­ uman rights abuses in Xinjiang. Policy makers across the region privately agree that most Latin American governments would not take sides if a crisis involving Taiwan broke out. The Trump administration responded by seeking to aggressively reclaim geopo­liti­cal control over Latin Amer­i­ca and embraced an explicit anti-­China policy. Virtually all leading US policy makers who visited the region while Trump was president—­ranging from former secretaries of state Rex Tillerson and Mike Pompeo to former vice president Mike Pence and former national security adviser John Bolton, warned their counter­parts of China’s growing influence. Across the region, US ambassadors have frequently warned host governments that allowing Huawei to build their 5G networks could damage their ties to the United States.

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Trump’s anti-­China policy, however, was gravely undermined by his belligerent approach to Latin Amer­i­ca’s left-­w ing dictators in Caracas, Havana, and Managua, whom the US administration dubbed the “Troika of Tyranny” and vowed to replace. When Trump refused to rule out military intervention in Venezuela to oust President Nicolás Maduro in 2019, even staunch US allies, such as Colombia’s Iván Duque Márquez and Brazil’s Bolsonaro, reluctantly sided with the man they no longer recognized as Venezuela’s legitimate president. Both despise the Venezuelan leader, but the specter of having US troops in a neighboring country was seen as a deeply worrisome pre­ce­dent and a threat to the sovereignty of nations that have long chafed u ­ nder US dominance. This dynamic was aggravated by Trump officials’ inexplicable insistence on referring positively to the Monroe Doctrine. “­Today, we proudly proclaim for all to hear: the Monroe Doctrine is alive and well,” Bolton said in April 2019, citing the policy ­behind the long and traumatic history of US intervention in Latin Amer­i­ca. Embracing a concept rejected across the region’s ideological spectrum—­ from Venezuela’s Bolivarian socialists to far right ele­ments in Brazil’s armed forces—­talk of the Monroe Doctrine helped forge a rare agreement that keeping Beijing close would be crucial to balancing US influence, a role that China was glad to play. Yet even without the aggressive rhe­toric vis-­à-­v is Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, the Trump administration failed to grasp two key aspects that shape how Latin Americans think about China. First, it is undeniable that despite highly uneven terms of trade, China’s rise has produced enormous benefits, and US warnings create the impression that Washington is primarily concerned about weakening China without caring much about helping Latin Amer­i­ca. Particularly when China began to play a growing role in providing COVID-19 vaccines, US criticism of Beijing was met with deep cynicism.

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Second, Washington’s call to Latin American countries to think about growing tensions between Washington and Beijing as a fight between democracy and dictatorship fails to take into consideration that US value-­driven foreign policy was often inconsistent outside of Eu­rope for most of the post–­World War II era. It is thus no surprise that US rhe­toric about the liberal international order is generally seen through a historic lens that profoundly differs from how policy makers in countries such as Germany and France viewed it; the US-­led order before Trump was generally considered by them to be beneficial. While most Latin American countries are committed to an international order ­shaped by rules and norms, they see them more as a means to protect themselves from outside intervention rather than as a tool to influence ­others. While the Biden administration embraced a less aggressive anti-­China rhe­toric in Latin Amer­i­ca, its main under­lying concern in the region remains the same: containing Beijing’s growing influence. While democracy does count in Latin American foreign policy—­indeed, several regional organ­izations such as Mercosur and the Organ­i zation of American States possess democracy clauses—­ governments in the region are traditionally skeptical about dividing countries between democracies and nondemocracies. They fear that such an approach might justify intervention into weaker countries’ internal affairs. This explains why even Latin American leaders with impeccable demo­cratic credentials, such as Brazil’s former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, declined to support the initiative of former secretary of state Madeleine Albright to create a league of democracies in the late 1990s. While the vast majority of Latin Americans are far more attracted to US culture and its po­liti­cal system than to the Chinese alternatives, Beijing adroitly has used this asymmetrical situation to promote itself as a fellow developing country that re­spects their concerns about

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sovereignty. Cooperation with the United States, overexposed and often seen as overbearing, can carry a po­liti­cal cost for Latin American policy makers, while t­hose working with China are less often accused of being submissive to a foreign power. Indeed, when Chinese companies acquired about a third of Brazil’s electricity sector in 2016, a step of tremendous strategic consequences, it was barely noticed in the country’s public debate. A similar move by a US firm would have caused public outcry and accusations against t­hose responsible as being entreguista, literally “someone who hands over,” a term that refers to Brazilians supposedly acting in the interest of the United States rather than Brazil. This does not mean, however, that Latin American governments prefer China to the United States. But it does explain why most regional policy makers have called for equidistance and neutrality in the face of growing tensions between Washington and Beijing. According to the dominant view across the ideological spectrum, given Latin Amer­i­ca’s geographic proximity to the United States, growing economic dependence on distant China, and historic aversion to establishing long-­standing alliances that would limit strategic autonomy, Latin Amer­i­ca should be neutral and maintain friendly ties with both Washington and Beijing. For example, both Mauricio Macri, Argentina’s former center-­ right president, and his center-­left successor, Alberto Fernández, have been keen to si­mul­ta­neously deepen ties with both nations, while Chilean president Sebastián Piñera actively sought to pre­sent himself as the region’s trusted interlocutor between them. In Colombia, the Duque administration continued Bogotá’s traditionally close security cooperation with the United States but also made clear that it had no plans to exclude Huawei, a move that most Latin American governments fear could negatively affect ties to Beijing. With few

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exceptions, policy makers across the region have pursued similar strategies—­after all, why side with one superpower if it is pos­si­ble to maintain productive relationships with both? Therefore, Washington’s response to Beijing’s growing influence in Latin Amer­i­ca should consist of five ele­ments. First, the US strategy in Latin Amer­i­ca should not be primarily about China, and US policy makers in the region should not speak much about China. Even if Washington expresses legitimate concerns about China’s influence—­and t­here are many, ranging from the environmental impact of Chinese investments to Brazil’s growing dependence on commodity exports—­they come across as paternalistic and arrogant and should be left for Latin American policy makers to discuss. China’s growing influence across the Amer­i­cas is a natu­ral phenomenon given its increasingly dominant po­liti­cal and economic role on a global scale. Rather than seek to undermine or reduce China’s regional influence, the United States should adjust to it. What­ever the United States does, China’s role in Latin Amer­i­ca ­w ill increase markedly in the coming years given how eco­nom­ically complementary the two sides are. The United States, by contrast, competes directly with agricultural power­houses such as Brazil, which temporarily benefited from the trade war between Washington and Beijing when China ­limited soy imports from the United States. Second, the United States should not attempt to compete in areas where China is clearly superior. One of them is 5G technology, where Huawei offers a pricing advantage that is likely to be decisive for developing countries around the world. ­Unless the United States is willing to compensate Latin American countries for losses that banning the Chinese provider could incur, merely warning about Huawei is counterproductive—­after all, the alternative to Huawei-­built 5G for the developing world would be no 5G at all.

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Third, the United States should instead emphasize policy areas where China is unable to play a key role, ranging from support for civil society to constructive support for governments in the fight against or­ga­n ized crime to a more humane and effective way to address increasingly power­ful drug traffickers. The United States can also offer more tangible support to help Latin Amer­i­ca address its migration crisis, given the US stake in this debate. Fourth, the United States has the capacity to engage Latin Amer­ i­ ca in the realm of strengthening democracy in ways that China cannot. Paradoxically, the near-­death experience of American democracy at the end of the Trump presidency allows the Biden administration to speak with greater legitimacy on the challenges that face Latin American democracies. Trump’s rise and the new strategies ­adopted by US far right conspiracy groups had a significant impact on the public debate in Latin Amer­i­ca, and thus new mechanisms by the Biden administration to combat such tendencies ­will resonate with democracy-­ minded actors across the Amer­i­cas. Fi­nally, the United States undoubtedly can play a crucial role in promoting regional cooperation, where hard-­won pro­g ress has been lost in recent de­cades. T ­ oday, Latin Amer­i­ca is deeply fractured and has ideological divisions that make dialogue between heads of state about major challenges or the region’s role in global affairs all but impossible. The Union of South American Nations has essentially disbanded; Prosul, a grouping of center-­right and right-­w ing governments, was unable to survive for more than one election cycle given its dependence on ideological alignment; and the Organ­ization of American States lacks regional credibility. This creates an urgent need for new platforms to encourage better regional coordination. Particularly if it is pos­si­ble to avoid sensitive topics such as Cuba, Venezuela, and 5G, t­ here is tremendous potential for better cooperation

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on issues including migration, the environment, the rule of law, and fighting or­ga­n ized crime. Adapting to a multipolar order ­w ill be a challenge for Washington everywhere including in Latin Amer­i­ca, where China’s role ­will increase no m ­ atter what US policy may be. Yet if it plays its cards right, the United States retains the capacity to play a highly constructive role across the region.

14 Does

the Rise of China Threaten the Transatlantic Partnership? Philippe Le Corre

The end of the Trump administration was meant to bring fresh

momentum to the transatlantic relationship two years ­a fter he rebuked French president Emmanuel Macron when the latter tried to discuss China’s global rise. “China is bad, but the Eu­ro­pean Union is worse” was, in essence, the Trump comment. This plus other snubs led to a virtual freeze in the relationship between the White House and the main Eu­ro­pean leaders on this foreign policy topic and many ­others in the final year of the Donald Trump presidency. With Joe Biden’s US administration embracing multilateralism, it is fair to ask if the rise of China still threatens the transatlantic partnership. The short answer is that many differences remain, but some common ground is also appearing more clearly. China has become more assertive and plays an increasing role on the world stage, pushing strategies such as its B ­ elt and Road Initiative infrastructure program, getting involved in multilateral forums, and raising its profile at the United Nations and other international organ­izations. At the end of a troubled 2020, China was seen by many as the world’s most successful economy, while the pandemic was still

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ravaging the United States and Eu­rope. Beijing was allowed to take advantage of a much-­weakened transatlantic relationship thanks to the power vacuum left by Trump’s actions and the pandemic aftermath that had massive global repercussions. China increased its diplomatic efforts vis-­à-­v is Eu­rope especially in central, eastern, and southern Eu­rope, where it tried to build areas of influence such as the 17 + 1 group of countries. Biden’s 2020 election brought hope that transatlantic cooperation was ­going to take new shape in light of his goal of uniting “like-­ minded countries,” including Eu­ro­pe­ans. Still, the Eu­ro­pean Union (EU) u ­ nder the leadership of German chancellor Angela Merkel made a bold move by signing the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) with China a day before Germany’s six-­month presidency of the Eu­ro­pean Council ended on December 30, 2020. This ignored a previous call during the transition by national security adviser designate Jake ­Sullivan that the upcoming administration would “welcome early consultations on our common concerns about China’s economic practices.” While the new US administration started to affirm strongly its China policy (President Biden early described the relationship as “extreme competition”), both Merkel and Macron concurred to stress that “no decoupling with China” was on Eu­ro­pean leaders’ minds. “A situation to join all together against China, this is a scenario of the highest pos­si­ble conflictuality. This one, for me, is counterproductive,” added Macron. WHAT’S NEXT?

Although the EU’s investment agreement with China appeared sudden to some across the Atlantic, it had indeed been ­under negotiations for nearly seven years. Eu­ro­pean companies had been quietly lobbying

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for better access to the Chinese market and a level playing field. Eu­ro­pean leaders ­were kept informed by the Eu­ro­pean Commission, and in the end Merkel put her weight b­ ehind the deal, not only responding to a call from German industries (at least part of them) but also putting into action her own thinking. Unlike many other Western leaders, Merkel, who retired in late 2021 a­ fter sixteen years in office, appeared to have been impressed with China’s economic achievements since the start of the Chinese open-­door policy in 1979. Raised in East Germany during the Cold War, Merkel came to balance her distaste for communism with China’s successful economic pragmatism. During her chancellery years she visited China twelve times, usually accompanied by a strong business del­e­ga­tion. It is somewhat paradoxical for a leader, whose government asked southern Eu­ro­pean countries to privatize some state assets during the ­Great Recession debt crisis, to forcefully engage with an economy that u ­ nder President Xi Jinping has become dominated by state capitalism. With regard to transatlantic trust, Trump’s dismissive discourse on the EU did the rest. In spite of a Eu­ro­pean public with increasingly negative views on China, even more so since the COVID-19 virus appeared in Wuhan and spread throughout the world in 2020 and 2021, Merkel and Macron went ahead with what they call the “tools box” vis-­à-­v is China. In other words, signing an investment deal with Beijing does not mean that the EU ­w ill shift its global China policy as explained by the spring 2019 triad statement. Brussels then described China as “a negotiating partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rival.” The EU’s ongoing policy includes a foreign direct investment screening mechanism; directives on state subsidies, procurement, and 5G (on the economic front); cooperation on climate, sustainable development and health issues; and a clear language on issues such as forced l­abor, Hong Kong, and repression of the Uyghur minority by the Chinese state. While trade negotia-

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tors discuss market access for Eu­ro­pean businesses with China, statements by Josep Borrell, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, repeatedly stress the bloc’s “strong concerns about the ongoing pressure on democracy and fundamental rights in Hong Kong, the treatment of ­human rights defenders, as well as the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities, in par­tic­u ­lar in Xinjiang.” Such tight-­rope diplomacy remains a far cry from the US approach, reinforced from the very beginning by the Biden administration. Admittedly, Trump was “right to take a tough line on China,” said Secretary of State Antony Blinken, but it “did not produce results.” The proper approach is “first and foremost” from a position of strength—­including close cooperation with allies and partners. “When we are in the business of picking fights with our allies instead of working with them, that takes away from our strength in dealing with China.” Sadly, the announcement in September 2021 of a new Indo-­ Pacific trilateral alliance between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) was seen as a blow to transatlantic co­ operation on the region, to the detriment of Eu­ro­pean countries including France. Unlike Eu­rope, the United States sees China from the point of view of a Pacific power with a heavy military presence in the Indo-­ Pacific and long-­lasting alliances with countries such as Japan and South ­Korea. Eu­ro­pe­ans have mainly economic concerns about China, including forced technology transfers, procurement, state subsidies, intellectual property issues, and cyberespionage. By and large, t­hese are shared with the United States, but the EU—­especially Germany, which is the EU’s largest exporter—is much more dependent on Chinese markets than Amer­i­ca (especially its car industry). Geo­ graph­i­cally, China and Eu­rope may belong to the Eurasian continent, but distances ­matter.

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EU leaders are not willing to engage in a cold war with Beijing. Eco­nom­ically, t­here is too much at stake for Eu­ro­pean countries, including Eu­ro­pean jobs that are part of supply chains in central and Eastern Eu­rope, for example, facilitated by the EU. On the other hand, forums such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organ­ization, much closer to the United States, may soon appear on the anti-­China frontline among Western nations. In 2020, the EU and China became each other’s largest trading partners as China overtook the United States. Although EU companies often found that they could not compete on a level playing field against Chinese companies, cumulative EU foreign direct investment flows to China over the past twenty years and Chinese investments in the EU have reached similar levels (€140 billion vs. €120 billion in the past twenty years). TOUGHER EU LANGUAGE ON CHINA

Diplomatic language on China has become tougher in recent years (especially on the part of EU institutions, though not so much from national governments), but the Eu­ro­pean continent has welcomed a wide range of Chinese investments while also relying on rising numbers of Chinese tourists and visitors pre–­COVID-19: two million of them just for France in 2019. China even has a close ally at the heart of the EU: Hungary, which may host a campus affiliated with one of China’s top universities (Fudan) and has already welcomed a China-­ sponsored think tank in addition to the traditional Confucius Institutes that have spread across Eu­rope. In this postpandemic environment, Europe—­according to its leaders—­cannot afford to decouple from China, where so many multinationals continue to sell their products and use cheaper production lines. Industrial relocation is a slow

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pro­cess, and it has not been happening in a significant way due to the lack of alternatives. THE REAL QUESTION IS ­W HETHER THE UNITED STATES AND EU­R OPE CAN WORK TOGETHER DESPITE THEIR DIFFERENCES

The United States and Eu­rope may be long-­term allies, notably through the North Atlantic Treaty Organ­ization, but they are also economic competitors and have had disagreements over the years on trade and taxation policy regarding US companies such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft. Besides, Eu­ro­pe­ans have become distrustful of the United States ­after four unpredictable years of the Trump presidency. AUKUS did not help. ­Future cooperation w ­ ill require an effort by both sides to learn to work together again. It seems that both are willing to try. President Joe Biden has repeatedly called for collaboration between democracies, and in the EU’s December 2020 transatlantic agenda, one reads about a Brussels proposal for “a new, forward-­looking transatlantic agenda for global cooperation [that] reflects where global leadership is required and is centered on overarching princi­ples: stronger multilateral action and institutions, pursuit of common interests, leveraging collective strength, and finding solutions that re­spect common values.” This could especially apply to China-­related issues. On disruptive practices such as cybertheft, state subsidies, and forced technology transfers, ­there is no question that both sides of the Atlantic see eye to eye. They may not trust each other completely, but they trust China even less. Weeks ­a fter signing the preliminary CAI in late 2020, China almost immediately initiated new national security rules for foreign companies willing to invest in China, raising eyebrows in Brussels and elsewhere. In 2021, the EU imposed sanctions on four

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Chinese officials who held office in the Xinjiang autonomous region during the repression against the Uyghur ethnic minority. This led to a furious counterattack by China against EU officials and scholars. Still, this was the first time Brussels imposed sanctions on China since the 1989 Tian­anmen massacre sanctions, while it was also a joint effort by the EU, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. In the field of screening foreign direct investments, the United States is better structured than the EU through its Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States and its Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), passed by Congress in 2018. For example, FIRRMA, incorporated into the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, created four categories of “covered transactions,” expanding the definition of “critical technology” to include “emerging and foundational technologies.” On its part, the EU ­adopted a (nonbinding) foreign direct investment screening mechanism in 2019 that has been in effect since October 2020 but should be reinforced through member state, national mechanisms. Only sixteen member states out of twenty-­seven have now done so. During 2020, the Eu­ ro­pean Commission was keen to protect EU companies and critical assets, notably in areas such as health, medical research, biotechnology, and infrastructure. Eu­ro­pean Commission president Ursula von der Leyen thus issued stronger guidelines to ensure “a strong EU-­wide approach to foreign investment screening in a time of public health crisis and related economic vulnerability.” ­There are other issues such as international governance, nonproliferation, and even technology where the United States and Eu­rope can cooperate. In addition, the United States has now rejoined the Paris Climate Accord, making pos­si­ble renewed cooperation on issues such as climate change and biodiversity, which carry enormous weight in the transatlantic relationship.

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Fi­nally, t­here is the stated US position of “standing for demo­ cratic values,” something that Eu­ro­pe­ans should also do albeit in the context of a twenty-­seven-­member ­union with individual interests. The EU-­China CAI debate is revealing as local politicians, especially members of the Eu­ro­pean Parliament that must ultimately vote its ratification, reflect their electorates’ shifting views about China. Vari­ous surveys have repeatedly stressed rising public concern about China’s ­human rights rec­ord and authoritarian policies. Just as in the United States, where China has somewhat unfairly become a scapegoat for many domestic issues, Eu­rope may see similar outcomes in a troubled post–­COVID-19 economic and social environment. In the coming months and years, China may well become a contested domestic po­liti­cal issue (interests vs. values) in highly polarized Eu­ro­pean politics, caught between left-­w ing radicals, right-­w ing populists, and increasingly power­ful Green parties. Eu­ro­pean leaders, especially ­those planning to remain in politics much longer, would be well advised to keep in mind t­hese demo­ cratic values so engrained in Eu­rope’s recent history. In this sense, American and Eu­ro­pean leaders may have much to share on how to address the global emergence of a new undemo­cratic superpower called China. Beijing’s tacit support for Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 may make the need to work together to respond to China’s rise even more apparent to American and European leaders.

15 Is

China Competing with the United States in Africa? Maria Repnikova

China’s reengagement with Africa over the past two de­cades has

sparked critical reaction from the United States as well as other Western nations including former colonial powers. While the Chinese government describes its African relations as ­those of solidarity and mutual gain, Western media and officials often portray them as exploitative. China’s economic deals are called extractive, nontransparent, and manipulative, leaving African nations with insurmountable debt, poorly constructed infrastructure, and unequal trade agreements, among other prob­lems. More recently, China is also seen as exporting its authoritarian governance model to Africa—­something that stands at odds with US attempts to promote democracy. The American foreign policy community increasingly calls for competing with China in Africa and articulates its Africa policy through the lens of broader US-­China relations. This, however, obscures the complex realities of China’s presence on the continent. China’s appeal and reception in Africa over the past twenty years has let it position itself as the more accessible and arguably the more reliable partner. Its appeal is rooted in the scale of the opportunities it pre­sents for African elites and publics and the relative ease of participation in them. And yet, this accessibility also

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comes with reputational costs, as China’s vis­i­ble influence has sparked friction and mistrust across the continent. From capital to infrastructure to elite training, university scholarships, and media access, China has positioned itself to be both engaged and flexible in dealing with Africa. As for capital, where foreign direct investment (FDI) from the United States to Africa has consistently declined since 2009, Chinese FDI has increased dramatically. Even at its lowest, it topped $2.7 billion in 2019, compared to negative FDI of $2.4 billion from the United States. Most Chinese economic assistance, however, comes in the form of loans. According to some estimates, t­ hese comprise about 20 ­percent of total external debt of African states. Unlike World Bank and US government loans that come with detailed economic and sometimes po­liti­cal preconditions, Chinese loans tend to be granted more swiftly though often without transparency. Many of them are for large-­scale infrastructure proj­ects built by Chinese state-­owned enterprises and sometimes by Chinese workers, in contrast to smaller-­scale proj­ects financed by the World Bank that rely more often on domestic l­abor. T ­ hese large infrastructure proj­ects offer po­liti­cal gains for African officials, as they can showcase rapid development through building roads, railways, stadiums, and airports. In response to US government critique of China’s predatory practices, African elites have asked me “Where is the United States?,” suggesting its notable absence. The scale and speed of China’s infrastructure development, combined with large loans, make China an attractive partner. More recently, Beijing has also intensified its soft power in Africa by luring elites, youths, and lay citizens with large-­scale tangible benefits. At the elite level, China has become the main overseas training destination, with 50,000 new training opportunities pledged at the 2018 Forum on China-­A frican Cooperation, though this number was downgraded to 10,000 at the 2021 meeting. Thousands

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of officials plus many journalists have already been trained in China (in En­g lish typically via translators). This often provides their first opportunity to travel overseas, showcases China’s state-­driven developmental successes, and facilitates network building between Chinese and African elites and media professionals. China’s sixty-­one Confucius Institutes in Africa offer ­ f ree or low-­ cost Chinese-­ language instruction and in some cases employment introductions and preparation for translation work at Chinese companies. Many students I interviewed in Ethiopia are enticed by the practical opportunities gained from their Chinese studies. China also has attracted many African students to its own universities, some on scholarships and some for relatively low-­cost tuition fees. Over 80,000 African students are currently studying t­here. The training and educational experiences in China yield a mix of acknowl­edgment and admiration for what China has accomplished as well as some critical reflections, discussed l­ater in this chapter. By contrast, the United States has been much more selective. The Young African Leaders Initiative, run by the US State Department, offers about 700 scholarships a year and involves a highly competitive se­lection pro­cess. The Fulbright program offers another 200 fellowships, and ­there are a ­little ­under 3,000 other annual scholarship and exchange opportunities administered by the State Department and the US Agency for International Development. Unlike government-­ managed scholarships to Chinese universities, American scholarships are administered by individual universities and require applicants to exert more effort to find and secure them. At pre­sent, about 40,000 Africans study in the United States per year, half the number of ­those in China. As one former US embassy official has explained, the Chinese government deliberately provides large-­scale accessible opportunities, while the United States attempts to narrowly target and identify the best. As another official put it, “The very skilled

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­ ill still find their way to Amer­i­ca,” suggesting that t­ here is no need w for the United States to compete with China by expanding the scale of its educational offerings. Beyond economic and educational development, the Chinese government has been actively competing in the sphere of media and communication, or what Chinese leader Xi Jinping often calls “discourse power.” While foreign bureaus and external broadcasting of US major media outlets, including CNN and Voice of Amer­i­ca, have shrunk, China established new tele­v i­sion headquarters in Nairobi in 2012 and had expanded the number of Xin­hua News Agency bureaus in Africa to twenty-­eight by 2018. In 2012, the English-­language China Daily also launched an African edition for distribution across the continent. ­These outlets appeal to African audiences by presenting a positive or what many Chinese experts call “constructive” coverage of Africa, in contrast to the more negative framing of Western media. Many of the stories are also told by African journalists as Chinese outlets increasingly localize their operations. Chinese media content is also affordable. The China Daily is f­ ree, and the Xin­hua News Agency has signed agreements with many African news agencies that give ­free access to its database. Beyond the software of communication access, Chinese companies now also dominate the hardware of communication infrastructure development across the continent. From providing digital TV access via Star Times Group, a Beijing-­based private pay TV com­pany, to building 5G networks via Huawei and ZTE and to selling cheap smartphones made in China specifically for the African market, communications generally are dominated by Chinese products and ser­v ices. China’s positioning of itself as accessible and willing to cooperate in many ways makes it competitive vis-­à-­v is the United States in Africa, but this visibility has also brought some controversy and mistrust. Ironically, the accessibility of Chinese sources has led to

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widespread questioning of their quality. T ­ hese quality concerns regularly appear in large-­scale public opinion surveys about African perceptions of Chinese influence. They also are pre­sent in more granular fieldwork, such as the kind I have conducted in Ethiopia. In many conversations with Ethiopian urban residents, where Chinese proj­ects and products are widely available, I found a mix of appreciation and criticism. Taxi d­ rivers would mention that roads built by Chinese companies are flooded during rainy seasons, ­hotel employees complain about Chinese tele­v i­sion sets, and Ethiopian officials often joke about Africa receiving Chinese goods rejected by Chinese consumers. In my research on Ethiopian students’ experiences with Chinese education e­ ither in Ethiopia or in China, I also found complaints about teaching quality. And Chinese media content, despite being easily available and positive in its portrayal of Africa, is not widely consumed outside of elite circles. ­These concerns about quality are in part rooted in the fact that they tend to be perceived as strategic deals rather than as altruistic gifts. Since much of China’s assistance involves some financial input or commitment from recipients, t­ here are questions as to w ­ hether the terms are appropriate. Some Chinese proj­ects, such as large-­scale infrastructure construction, while accessible, come at a high long-­ term cost. The debt trap diplomacy trope, or the idea that China is deliberately loading African nations with debt in order to take over their assets, thus far has no empirical backing. And yet, public opinion surveys find that respondents aware of Chinese assistance are very concerned about loan repayment. This sentiment is especially common in countries that have large Chinese debts, including Ethiopia, K ­ enya, and Angola. T ­ hese worries also can be amplified by the vis­i­ble Chinese physical presence in some countries, including large mi­g rant communities that are often viewed with suspicion, at times bordering on xenophobia, by local residents. “Chinese are never

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g­ oing to leave,” a professor at Addis Ababa University told me when he heard about my research topic. Chinese engagement in Africa therefore is a complex phenomenon that should not be considered only as a threat to US interests. China is at once a competitive and contested presence. It offers large-­ scale access to resources, experience, and products, and yet ­these are also negotiated and at times resisted by the African public. Rather than acting as passive aid recipients, Africans are active consumers and dealmakers. Moreover, despite China’s vis­i­ble and active presence, ­there are signs that many African countries also want to engage more intensely with the United States. The 2019–2020 surveys conducted by Afrobarometer, a nonpartisan Pan-­A frican research institution based in Ghana, across eigh­teen African countries show that most still prefer the US development model over that of China. In my interviews with students and elites in Ethiopia, I found that if granted a choice, most would prefer education or training in the United States rather than in China. And US investments and grants remain largely welcomed and appreciated. But African opinion leaders strongly oppose a reenactment of ­g reat power competition t­here and resist pressure to pick sides between the two countries. The presence of multiple powers, now including Rus­sia, Turkey, and India, among ­others, gives African politicians and entrepreneurs greater negotiating power. Most Ethiopian officials I have interviewed tend to prefer having more rather than fewer foreign partners. They can readily accept a training invitation from China, for instance, while at the same time seeking funding from the United States. The two are often seen as complementary rather than as conflicting. If the United States wants to compete with China, it should first reengage with Africa on its own terms rather than solely through the lens of rivalry with China. The United States could emphasize the

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high quality of its programs and focus on providing complementary support for entrepreneurship, civil society, and Africa’s burgeoning tech industry, among other t­ hings. At the moment, the US presence is concentrated in security, with the US Africa Command hosting twenty-­seven military bases and 6,000 military personnel. According to the United States Agency for International Development, American military aid to Africa in 2019 was more than double that of education-­related aid ($640 million vs. $310 million). Shifting some resources from security to education would be one productive step. Encouraging more US companies to risk investment in Africa through initiatives such as the Build Act, a bipartisan bill that created the US International Development and Finance Corporation, a new US development agency, is another. In some areas, such as health development, China and the United States could also collaborate more often. Chinese authorities often cite as a successful example joint US-­China efforts to combat Ebola. As US-­China relations bilaterally and globally face significant tension, the inflammatory rhe­toric of the China threat can seem con­ve­n ient and popu­lar but ­doesn’t necessarily reflect on-­the-­g round real­ity. For now, while China might not constitute the first choice by African leaders and publics, it is often the only choice easily available to them. This leaves ample room for both ­future constructive competition and cooperation.

16 Should

Western Nations Worry about the China-­ Russia Relationship? Lyle Goldstein

Scholars have differing views about the nature of China-­Russia

relations ­these days. On its face, this is a bit puzzling since that relationship has been on a steady upward trajectory for more than three de­cades. Still, many specialists argue that its concrete achievements are minimal, that culture and history pull Moscow and Beijing in opposite directions, that points of divergence have ever greater salience, and fi­nally that the only real ballast holding the two ­g iants together is simply Western pressure on them, from the United States in par­t ic­u­lar. If the above analysts can be termed “skeptics,” they are opposed by more and more “optimists.” This second group sees step-­by-­step improvement and increased institutionalization as well as myriad examples of coordination and greater trust between Moscow and Beijing. They contend that significant pro­gress occurs across all aspects of China-­Russia relations, from trade to diplomacy to the military-­ strategic realm. Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has stunned the world community and the Russia-China relationship will be tested as a result. Just how significant this relationship is for Western nations may well depend on its true nature. In other words, if one is rather skeptical

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of its depth, that could be a reason to e­ ither ignore it or attempt to drive a wedge between the two Eurasian powers. But if one believes the arguments of the “optimists” that the relationship has significant substance, this raises impor­t ant questions about the f­ uture of world politics, including ­whether a dynamic and also stable China-­Russia relationship could tilt the global balance of power against the West. ECONOMIC COOPERATION

The pandemic has taken a major toll on China-­Russia economic relations, and skeptics have long noted that both are much more dependent on Western commercial ties than with each other. Rus­sia ­doesn’t rank among China’s top trading partners, trailing well ­behind Japan, South K ­ orea, and the United States. In addition, ­there are obvious tensions between them over China-­sponsored infrastructure proj­ects ­u nder its B ­ elt and Road Initiative. Fi­n ally, many complain that China-­Russia trade continues to focus on commodities and lacks substantive integration. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Chinese leaders will confront the economic dilemma of how to balance allegiance to Russia without sacrificing Chinese economic interests, due to the severe sanctions against Russia that could damage the business of various Chinese companies. Optimists contend that impressive changes are afoot in this trading relationship and that it was finally developing real momentum before the Russia-Ukraine War. Earlier rounds of Western sanctions had caused both sides to put extra emphasis on their trade relationship and had previously opened new market niches. For example, US-­China trade restrictions have created new possibilities for Rus­sian farmers. Likewise, Washington’s targeting of the Chinese Huawei communications com­pany has caused it to go on a major hiring spree in Rus­sia. ­Needless to say, the dearth of Western capital inside

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Rus­sia has precipitated an ever-­increasing involvement of Chinese investors to fill the need. On certain high-­profile proj­ects in Rus­sia, such as the massive Yamal gas proj­ect, Chinese investment and technical competence appears to have made a major positive impact. While cognizant of downside risks, some Chinese investors appear to already be searching for bargains in the new economic order that is emerging after the start of the Russia-Ukraine War in early 2022. The war and resultant sanctions are also likely to spur greater use of the RMB in global trade. DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION

China has not condemned Russia for its 2022 invasion of Ukraine and seems to have adopted a stance of pro-Russian neutrality. Chinese media have responded to the crisis with coverage friendly to Russia and have generally adhered to the notion that the war was caused by NATO’s eastern expansion—a key contention of the Russian president. Their diplomatic coordination starts at the impor­tant United Nations Security Council, where ­there has been near congruence in voting and vetoes with experts terming this a kind of “P2 Alliance.” This coordination has grown especially close on such global flashpoints as North K ­ orea. Since both China and Rus­sia share borders with North ­Korea, they share concerns about the ongoing crisis ­there. During 2016–2019 this diplomatic cooperation intensified, and the partners si­mul­ta­neously chastised Washington for its so-­called bloody nose threats to use force. More to the point, they brought about a modest stabilization by jointly advocating a “double freeze” solution in which Pyongyang halted the most provocative missile and nuclear tests in exchange for the United States and South K ­ orea curtailing their joint military exercises. While that hardly solved the prob­lem, it did allow an active round of summitry with the potential to do

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more, though results to date are minimal. While signs of diplomatic coordination have been evident in other crises from Venezuela to Syria, a major test emerged in mid-2021 with the precipitous US withdrawal from Af­ghan­i­stan. In general, it seems that to the surprise of many in the West, China and Rus­sia have already agreed on a stable modus vivendi in central Asia. The mid-2021 decision to make Iran the ninth member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organ­ization suggests that this pattern is holding. To be sure, Chinese and Rus­sian diplomats do not agree on all issues. They can differ, for example, on policies ­toward India, Vietnam, and Eastern Eu­rope. Beijing is not e­ ager to see Rus­sia selling billions of dollars of advanced military hardware to rivals Hanoi and New Delhi. Still, it is somewhat remarkable to see how well aligned their worldviews have become. T ­ he 2022 Russia-Ukraine War is set to increase Beijing’s influence in Moscow and, therefore, the cohesion of the two powers in diplomatic settings is bound to increase. MILITARY COOPERATION

The Russia-­China military relationship has seen ups and downs since the Cold War ended, but ­there has been a reasonably steady upward trajectory in its intensity. And the relationship has received new dynamism since the earlier Ukraine crisis of 2014. With both sides openly pledging that this cooperation has no upper boundary, much speculation has followed, particularly in the West, about w ­ hether it w ­ ill lead to a formal military alliance. To date, both nations consistently deny that a formal alliance is in the offing. Russian military difficulties in the war with Ukraine may have prompted Moscow to request some forms of military assistance from China, possibly including the replacement of lost equipment.

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The core of this military relationship involves arms sales and training. Starting in the 1990s, the relatively backward Chinese military has benefited greatly from the enormous Soviet legacy of weapons design and military doctrinal development. Meanwhile, Rus­sia was able to retain its robust military research system largely due to its intensive export strategy. This lasted for years and had an extensive impact on all branches of the Chinese armed forces. The ­People’s Liberation Army Navy benefited from importing Rus­sian submarines and destroyers. China has relied for de­cades on Russian-­ made transports, refueling aircraft, he­li­cop­ters, and, most critically, fighter interceptors based on the highly successful Sukhoi (NATO designation Flanker) design. While this trade slowed considerably a­ fter 2010, it has somewhat revived since 2015, with recent major purchases of he­li­cop­ters, fighters, and surface-­to-­a ir missile systems. The 2022 Russian invasion of  Ukraine could usher in a new era in which Moscow makes military purchases from Beijing—a reversal of the traditional arms sales relationship. Training and joint exercises also have increased in recent years. Training events have become extremely common, involving a wide variety of military specialties. Joint exercises have occurred in nearly all areas close to China and Rus­sia ranging from the Baltic to the South China Sea. Their size and sophistication also have increased. In October 2021, for example, their joint naval exercises incorporated some of China’s most advanced surface combatants. In a somewhat surprising maneuver, the exercise morphed into a “first joint naval patrol,” and ten warships of the combined naval squadron cruised through Japan’s Tsugaru Strait and into the wider Pacific. Recently ­these naval exercises have tackled complex subjects, such as amphibious landings and antisubmarine warfare. They also spread into new territory as 2019 witnessed China-­Russia exercises in

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tandem with both South Africa and Iran. Over the long term, the fact that hundreds of Chinese officers are studying in Rus­sian military academies (and vice versa to some extent), each year may have a more lasting impact on bringing their military elites even closer. It remains to be seen ­whether this high level of military cooperation can be sustained or expanded, especially in the wake of Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. Cyber cooperation has been elevated, and t­here are strong hints of l­imited collaboration within the realm of strategic weapons; President Vladimir Putin remarked at the Valdai Conference in 2019 that Beijing and Moscow ­were working together on early-­warning capabilities. While the current Russia-Ukraine war might temporarily pause some China-Russia military cooperation, the pattern of ever closer military ties is likely to persist. MULTIPOLARITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS

Undoubtedly, the Russian invasion of Ukraine forms a major test for the Russia-China relationship. Skeptics of that relationship in the West who have continuously characterized it as a “marriage of con­ve­n ience” are ever more pressed to explain Beijing’s seemingly durable tilt toward Moscow, despite major pressures. Yet, it is true that much about it remains unknown, and Beijing may seek to recalibrate if the Russia-Ukraine military conflict persists over the long term. Even if a consensus emerges that Russia-­China relations are more than a passing fad and not simply a temporary, reactive alignment, academics and other experts are likely to remain starkly divided about its policy implications and policy recommendations. Some see an “axis of authoritarianism” that poses a grave threat to the West and thus demands the most forceful pos­si­ble response, namely enhanced deterrence and a closing of ranks among Western states. O ­ thers argue that the West must endeavor to split the Eurasian ­g iants by wooing

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one or the other away from their current embrace. After the UkraineRussia War, many will likely call to improve China-US relations in the hopes of further isolating Moscow. Yet, it is likely that too much damage has accumulated in US-China relations over the last two decades to make that a feasible approach. A third alternative may also exist: accepting strengthened Russia-­China relations on the possibility that they might answer Western restraint by jointly pursuing policies that broadly help stabilize the emerging multipolar world. Such an approach might seem far-fetched at this moment of escalating Cold War–like tensions. However, it is instructive to return to the example of the Korean Peninsula. Many Western commentators have decried increasing China-­Russia coordination, but it must be admitted that the joint “double freeze” proposal helped to stabilize this fraught crisis from 2017 to 2019. One can imagine similar contributions in a variety of flashpoints around the world if one steps away from the too conventional bipolar framing of such issues. Indeed, it is even quite conceivable that China could play a leading role in mediating an end to the Russia-Ukraine war. Given the overwhelming predominance of the West (broadly defined to encompass North Amer­i­ca plus Eu­rope, Japan, and South ­Korea) in all aspects of po­liti­cal, military, economic, and cultural affairs around the world, it hardly seems reasonable to posit that the coziness of Moscow and Beijing poses a threat to the overall global balance of power. And yet China’s continued growth has been astonishing, while Rus­sia has been underrated as a power. Concern is warranted, for sure, but for now the West should act with confidence, restraint, and flexibility. Such an approach is even more important now, as escalatory pressures mount in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. More specifically, the West should avoid dangerous mea­sures that might cause Moscow and Beijing to seek a more formal and threatening alliance posture. We should not yearn for a return to the tension-­fi lled 1950s.

IV Security

17 How

­ ill China’s National W Power Evolve vis-­à-­vis the United States? Andrew S. Erickson

The united states and china increasingly differ in their national

systems, interests, and objectives. Never before have they been power­f ul si­mul­ta­neously. China’s leaders scrutinize trends in relative comprehensive national power and attempt to finely calibrate policies accordingly. China’s economy is already at least the world’s second largest and funds the world’s second-­largest defense bud­get. While the United States leads in overall military quality, sophistication, and coordination, China’s armed forces enjoy increasing advantages. Much is at stake in their ­g reat power competition, including regional and global security, governance of all domains beyond national bound­aries, and international rules, institutions, and order. All this makes how China’s national power w ­ ill evolve with re­spect to Amer­ i­ca’s among this era’s greatest questions. TALLIES, TARGETS, AND TRENDS

Precise national power calculations are problematic. It is more productive to compare national goals and the required capabilities with forces affecting efforts to meet them.

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Tallies

Comprehensive national power can be defined as a nation’s ability to exert or resist influence in all major dimensions of the international system. For the US government, this is often divided into diplomatic, information, military, and economic categories. Mea­sur­ing national power, however, has proven elusive. Empirically rich attempts to systematically quantify ­these vari­ous components can be extremely complex yet often miss critically impor­tant intangibles, such as “soft power” influence and the potential for innovation and transformation. As a result, analysts, w ­ hether in the United States or the ­People’s Republic of China (PRC), have produced widely divergent estimates for the ranking of nations’ relative power. A more realistic approach to assessing comprehensive national power involves considering a range of potential ­future scenarios and surveying and weighing key dynamics that ­will likely inform the ­great powers’ trajectories across them. Targets

The United States avoids long-­term central planning. Broadly stated, its overall strategic goal is preserving the existing rules-­based international order, in part by remaining the leading power within it. Increasingly this entails resisting and countering PRC efforts to revise both aspects. Beijing’s official documents and statements reveal with striking clarity that China has the grandest and most strategic plan of ­today’s major powers. Xi Jinping wants to make China g­ reat again, with Chinese Communist Party power and policies unchallenged at home and abroad. He has codified an ambitious plan for “national rejuvenation,” articulating major goals out to 2049, with a key milestone—­

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completion of military modernization—­targeted for accomplishment by 2035, and key aspects advanced to 2027. Related aims, including resolving sovereignty disputes in Beijing’s f­avor, currently lack an explicit public timeline but are clearly impor­tant. Having coercively enveloped Hong Kong, Beijing seeks control of Taiwan as its leading military goal. Xi doubtless aspires to oversee such a historic achievement. But this and some of his other ambitions face concerted opposition from the United States as well as its allies and partners. Hence, the speed and extent to which China realizes t­hese leading objectives hinges in large part on its power trajectory relative to the United States. Trends and Ele­ments of Power

Structural trends are useful for assessing power trajectory prospects; ­these include demographics, environment and technology, and economic and military ele­ments of power. Demographics, Environment, and Technology

Population is one of the most consequential, predictable ­factors influencing national power and priorities. ­Here China’s prospects are bleak: fertility fell below replacement level in the early 1990s, working-­age population peaked in 2015, total population ­w ill peak at no more than 1.44 billion no l­ater than 2028, and new entrants into the workforce w ­ ill halve by 2030. By 2040, typical marriage-­ aged males may outnumber females by 30 million, China is projected to have 340 million p­ eople over age sixty-­five, more se­n ior citizens than the total current population of the United States, and China’s overall population ­w ill be shrinking by 4 million annually. China ­w ill soon have more retirees than any society in history, with an ever smaller working population supporting them. By 2100, China may

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have half the population it does ­today. No ­g reat power has ever risen with such an inverted population pyramid. China’s One-­Child Policy, which ended in 2015, prematurely and permanently depressed birth rates below replacement. The policy also resulted in a growing proportion of “kinless families” of single ­children of single ­children with no aunts, ­uncles, or cousins, only ancestors and a child or two of their own at most. With potentially sole responsibility for as many as four parents and eight grandparents, ­couples ­w ill face unpre­ce­dented eldercare obligations. This abrupt curtailment of 2,500 years of extensive Confucian ­family networks ­w ill also severely undermine resilience and entrepreneurship. China’s dramatically aging and shrinking society represents uncharted ­waters. The welfare programs that China develops to fill this growing void w ­ ill consume considerable resources that might other­w ise fuel economic growth and defense and foreign policy efforts. And the prospect of single-­child soldiers’ deaths causing widespread lineage extinction could well influence military planning. The PRC is encountering unpre­ce­dented extremes in long-­term challenges common to developed socie­t ies. Another fundamental f­ actor decidedly working against China is environmental degradation. China suffers some of the world’s worst air, ­water, and soil pollution. This combined with its low per capita arable land heightens food insecurity risks. Pollution weighs heavi­ly on the quality and quantity of China’s growth, health care, productivity, and overall national prospects. Fi­nally, technology holds considerable potential for China but is not a panacea. First, it cannot fully offset other challenges. Second, China’s sophistication and capacity for innovation remains mixed at best. The ­limited effectiveness of its self-­developed coronavirus vac-

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cines offers a consequential example of the PRC’s inability to innovate on demand. Third, societal aging and kinship shrinkage ­don’t preclude technological innovation but undermine it overall. Economics

A ­g reat potential advantage for China is its arguable return to being an East Asian economic center of gravity and driver of international economic expansion, as it was during much of its long dynastic period. As recently as two centuries ago, China produced roughly 30 ­percent of global wealth. The US National Intelligence Council proj­ects that China w ­ ill become the world’s largest economy by 2040 with 22.8 ­percent of global gross domestic product, slightly larger than the United States at 20.8 ­percent. But growth is slowing, debt is growing, and reforms are stalling. Some impressive investments, such as g­ rand infrastructure development proj­ects within China and throughout the global B ­ elt and Road Initiative, appear to be financially draining. The economic model that propelled China through three-­plus de­cades of catch-up growth appears unsustainable. China risks getting stuck in the middle-­income trap that plagues developing economies and keeps them from attaining the economic levels of developed countries. Leadership, however, is unlikely to achieve its goal of transitioning to a domestic consumption-­based economy that can support a new growth model. A true transition from government investment and manufacturing t­ oward an innovative ser­v ice economy would require reforms that power­ful vested interests steadfastly oppose. For the Chinese Communist Party, breaking this policy logjam is too po­liti­cally risky. China’s leaders know what is required from an economic standpoint, but acting accordingly would undermine

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their authority. Faced with this dilemma, they pursue short-­term stability to preserve existing power structures at the cost of further slowdown. Military

The power of China’s armed forces ­w ill be a key determinant in achieving both Xi’s overarching national objective and its subgoals. This is one of China’s areas of greatest relative advantage. By prioritizing and concentrating its efforts on strongly held goals in close geographic proximity, China’s military is making pro­g ress vis-­à-­v is the globally committed United States. Beijing’s decisions might conceivably spur transformative actions that could overturn American security commitments and the regional order, particularly vis-­à-­v is Taiwan. Accordingly, this has emerged as a leading focus for analysts and policy makers alike. China’s military capability and presence possess a comprehensiveness rivaled only by the United States. Supported by both indigenous efforts and a massive system for acquiring and applying foreign military technology, China’s armed forces are improving rapidly across the board on an unmatched scope and scale. While hardware capability leads that of software, both are advancing. China has the tactical flexibility to accept the “good enough” solutions for t­oday while strategically funding many megaprojects to exploit the technologies of tomorrow. The Pentagon’s 2020 annual report to Congress contends that China’s recent meteoric military modernization has not only narrowed the US lead across the board to varying degrees but has even, broadly speaking, surpassed the United States in shipbuilding, land-­ based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, and integrated air defense systems.

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­These achievements ­w ill not necessarily translate well over space and time, however. The closer China approaches leading-­edge capabilities, the more expensive, complicated, and difficult advancing further ­w ill become. Potential Dynamics and Net Effects

China ­u nder Xi has arrived as an undeniable ­g reat power but ­faces long-­range obstacles to fully realizing its ambitious goals. Achieving further gains vis-­à-­v is the United States entails diminishing returns on traditional development approaches. This already demanding treadmill may well be steepening further in a world that is aging, fragmenting, and restructuring socially; encountering technological disruption; facing growing disparities and volatility from climate change; and confronting instability from h ­ uman displacement and migration. At an unusually early stage, China ­faces the mounting costs and diminishing returns that have plagued previous rising powers. Beijing has likely already reached the zenith of its power to mobilize national resources for repression at home and abroad. Its rate of national power growth is slowing across the board. Shifts in citizens’ priorities to emphasize their individual welfare, a seemingly unavoidable consequence of development, ­w ill exacerbate t­ hese trends. Uncertainties, Advantages, and Adaptability

Scenario modeling should include both internal and external ele­ ments. Internal variables drive under­lying national power trends. This chapter thus focuses substantially on vis­i­ble, albeit often underappreciated, domestic risks. Yet, history is s­haped by contingent or emergent events that are not foreseeable or at least cannot be predicted accurately but nonetheless become likely turning points.

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And when points consistently turn in the same direction, they produce fundamental trends themselves. The ­Great Recession of 2007–2009 and the COVID-19 pandemic are cases in point; both strengthened PRC nationalist resolve (and possibly relative power) and caused Sino-­A merican distancing. Emerging wild card ­factors and events could transform ­things dramatically to the benefit or detriment of any given nation, including the United States and China. T ­ hese include international disasters both natu­ral and artificial; relations among state and nonstate actors, with power diffusing away from the former; and disruptive technologies. Impactful breakthroughs may materialize in such areas as alternative energy, w ­ ater purification, space and hypersonics, biometrics and biotechnology, and robotics and artificial intelligence. ­Here China’s long-­term focus on science, technology, economics, and math education and planning as well as its well-­funded h ­ uman capital and facilities infrastructure and its utilization of the world’s largest state apparatus for acquiring, incorporating, and developing technologies all offer undeniable advantages. Overall, however, both internal and external ­factors ­w ill tend to privilege resilience and adaptability over long-­range, state-­directed planning and implementation. China’s repressive, brittle po­liti­cal system and its subordination to Xi’s personalist leadership impose tremendous vulnerabilities and risks. The United States may thus retain significant advantages over China. ­These include abundant resources, cutting-­edge universities and research institutions enjoying the creative dynamism of academic freedom, an innovative economy, the world’s largest and most advanced military, a diverse and adaptable democracy, a robust and reasonably efficient l­egal and regulatory system, attractive cultural soft power, exceptional demographic possibilities, and a diverse network of allies, friends, and partners poised for cooperation.

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OUTLOOK

Even as the United States remains unsurpassed in overall power and influence, China has reclaimed its historical status as a ­g reat power. China’s relatively short periods of acute weakness during its ­Century of Humiliation (1840–1945) and economic isolation ­under Mao Zedong’s rule appear an aberration. The question now is how ­g reat a power China w ­ ill become, particularly vis-­à-­v is Xi’s goals and the United States, and with what implications. The ultimate answers remain uncertain, but consideration of the aforementioned dynamics can yield insights and indicators. Most broadly, China’s rate of national power accumulation is slowing considerably and is poised to slow still more, yet China remains far from surpassing Amer­i­ca in overall power and influence and far from achieving key transformational objectives, such as absorbing Taiwan. Regarding both current difficulties and long-­term trends in national power, the world is acutely aware of Amer­i­ca’s well-­publicized challenges. They have been fully assessed already and perhaps exaggerated. Meanwhile, China f­ aces its own mounting challenges, which arguably remain far from being sufficiently factored in. Even a slowing China, however, may attempt significant revisionist achievements in specific areas of priority and strength. H ­ ere one of Amer­i­ca’s greatest advantages may be that it seeks to uphold the status quo; whereas China’s objective of gaining control of the many disputed territories it claims may be far riskier and more difficult to pursue in practice. Of course, t­here ­w ill be more to the international system in coming years than g­ reat power competition between the United States and China. Larger dynamics and uncertainties ­w ill affect them and other nations alike. One megatrend looms particularly large: the unpre­ce­dented, irreversible aging of China, northeastern Asia, and

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the rest of the developed world including, to some extent, the United States. Perhaps following an initial period of heightened tensions, crises, and risk of conflict among the g­ reat powers, ­there ­w ill be growing tendencies t­ oward a “geriatric peace.” Of course, aging, deteriorating states could also increase latitude for nonstate actors to contest norms and promote disorder and danger. Perhaps such contingencies could ultimately recalibrate US-­China relations away from rivalry.

18 How

Does China Think about National Security? Sheena Chestnut Greitens

President Xi Jinping’s approach to security in the People’s Republic

of China—­both domestic security and foreign security policy—­has emerged as a defining feature of his leadership. Most commonly, when Chinese sources talk about ­these questions, they use the term “national security.” But what does China mean by that term? How does understanding it help us explain recent Chinese be­hav­ior both at home and abroad? Signs emerged early in Xi’s tenure that he planned to pursue a dif­fer­ent direction for China’s security policy. A brief mention appeared in November 2013 at the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress, but it became clearer in April 2014 when he presented something called the zongti guojia anquanguan, which Chinese sources translated as “comprehensive national security concept.” Another way to translate it would be as a “holistic state security concept.” This concept’s debut occurred in tandem with the launch of the Central National Security Commission (CNSC), designed to oversee implementation of the new concept across the party-­state. In January 2015, the Politburo approved China’s first-­ever national security strategy. The strategy was not publicly released, but from official media summaries it appeared to reflect the princi­ples outlined in Xi’s e­ arlier speeches. Commentators acknowledged at the time that it was “a new t­hing for China,” describing it as “an

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impor­tant theoretical innovation” and “a national security theory with Chinese characteristics.” The Politburo approved an update to this national security strategy in late 2021. American analysts initially anticipated that the CNSC might look more like the US National Security Council, which focuses on foreign policy. That turned out to be wrong for several reasons. First, China’s conception of national security has a much more prominent role for internal security questions, and the center of gravity for national security work is explic­itly internal. Therefore, most CNSC meetings have involved internal ­matters, such as Xinjiang and the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Chinese strategic thought has a long history of seeing internal and external security as interconnected, as indicated by the popu­lar phrase nei luan wai huan, which can be translated as “internal disorder and external calamity/disaster,” with the implication that the former invites the latter. Most recent Chinese sources, however, differentiate Xi’s focus on internal, nontraditional, and emergent threats from past leaders’ primary focus on traditional external security questions. In the new strategy, external threats are refracted through the prism of how they w ­ ill affect social stability and po­liti­cal security at home. Beyond that, the framing of “security” is very broad. Xi’s original concept lists eleven types of security that fall u ­ nder the comprehensive national security concept: po­liti­cal, territorial, military, economic, cultural, social, science and technological, information, ecological, financial, and nuclear. Other articles sometimes fit ideological security (described as a hybrid between po­liti­cal and cultural security) and health security into the framework. This breadth means that almost anything can be considered a security threat and addressed via the national security tools that China is developing. At the most basic level, however, the goal of the new strategy is to preserve the leadership role of the Chinese Communist Party

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(CCP) and of Xi himself. Chinese writings call po­liti­cal security the “foundation” of national security, and they define po­liti­cal security as “safeguard[ing] the party’s leadership, the socialist system, and the authority of the Central Committee with Xi Jinping as the core.” This is partly why some analysts argue that “state security” is a better translation than “national security,” b­ ecause the core goal is r­eally about regime protection. Even Chinese rhe­toric sometimes translates the term guojia as “state” instead of “national”—­for example, it’s the word that appears in the name of the Ministry of State Security, which ­handles po­liti­cal policing in China. Threats to po­liti­cal security are not just material or threats of physical harm; they also involve threats of ideological contamination. Chinese scholars have written about “ideological security” and the need for mechanisms for early detection of ideological threats it may face. This definition of threat dates back in part to the CCP’s attempts to analyze the fall of the Soviet Union; Xi Jinping appears to believe that corruption from within, a lack of ideological fidelity, and insufficient control over the coercive apparatus ­were among the principal ­factors that doomed Soviet communism. The worldview reflected in this comprehensive national security concept is also one that pairs opportunities and threats in almost dialectical fashion. The phrase “changes in the world unseen in a ­century” appears frequently, especially since 2017, and indicates a pair of ideas: that China is indeed approaching the center of the world stage and that risks and difficulties become greater as the party-­state nears its goal of national rejuvenation. Thus, it d­ oesn’t make sense in China’s framing to speak only of increased opportunity abroad; that side of the concept is almost always paired with a corresponding increase in risk, uncertainty, instability, and danger. The answer, according to the new security concept, is for China to become more proactive and preventive in its approach to all threats.

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Many of the dominant meta­phors are medical: po­liti­cal threats are described as “viruses” and “tumors,” and se­n ior leaders have spoken of the need to “immunize” the Chinese body politic against the kind of po­liti­cally problematic thinking that leads to threatening or destabilizing be­hav­ior. As a result, China has moved away from the language of “stability maintenance” and t­oward a discourse centered on “prevention and control,” which addresses potential security risks to the CCP before they emerge. Official directives since 2015 have discussed the party-­state’s goal of constructing a “multidimensional information-­based prevention and control system for public-­social security.” This is not mere rhe­toric. Adoption of the comprehensive national security concept, the new national security strategy, and the enhanced focus on prevention and control of po­liti­cal security threats explain many steps China has taken since 2013—­steps that might other­w ise appear disconnected and unrelated. To implement this strategy in a world where internal and external security threats are deeply interconnected, Xi has reor­g a­n ized the military and domestic security forces (particularly the command structure of the P ­ eople’s Armed Police) and consolidated and elevated the discipline and supervision apparatus to ensure tighter party control. Alongside the creation of the CNSC, t­hese structural and orga­n izational changes are explic­itly justified by pointing to the inadequacy of China’s old bureaucratic structures to deal with ­today’s security environment. The National P ­ eople’s Congress has passed or amended almost twenty pieces of security legislation that give the party-­state enhanced power to deal with both internal and external challenges. The Hong Kong National Security Law passed in the summer of 2020, which asserts significant extraterritorial authority over individuals and companies, is the latest of ­these, but o ­ thers have tackled intelligence,

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counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and other cross-­border and nontraditional threats. Local and provincial bud­gets for domestic security spending have increased substantially; as media reports have noted, this spending has begun to exceed China’s rapidly growing expenditures on the military and national defense. Much of the increase has been for surveillance technology and data integration tools to facilitate the aim of early warning and “prevention and control.” T ­ hese technologies have had not only a domestic impact but also a global one, as they had been exported to at least eighty countries as of 2019. We saw many of ­these systems operating during the pandemic. “Prevention and control” has a dual discursive history in both public health and public security; it appears, for example, in the full name of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. China’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic depended a lot on the broader surveillance and security infrastructure that the CCP had already for social control. Tools such as grid management, which divides cities into grid areas and assigns teams to collect data to monitor them, ­were used to enforce lockdowns, as w ­ ere big-­d ata platforms that could be used for predictive and “intelligence-­led” or “informatized” policing. Pandemic response, in turn, allowed Chinese authorities to further strengthen these tools. Xi’s anticorruption campaigns, which have targeted the military and the political-legal system in par­tic­u­lar, appear aimed at defending po­liti­cal security by ensuring that corruption does not erode the CCP’s “ruling foundation” or make its personnel vulnerable to bribery and compromise by outside intelligence agencies. The securitization of anticorruption efforts, along with the idea that external developments can contribute to social instability at home, has also brought a noticeable increase in the pursuit of international cooperation by Chinese law enforcement.

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This new security approach has also produced significant changes in specific regions and policy issues, most notably in Xinjiang, where the CCP has escalated a campaign of collective repression against the Uyghur Muslim population. One way to understand this escalation, which began in the spring of 2017, is to see it as motivated not only by domestic factors, but also by China’s sensitivity to the potential for small changes in the external environment to heighten the risk of internal destabilization, as the comprehensive national security strategy suggests. In this case, Chinese leaders appear to have focused on a perceived need to prevent terrorism from diffusing back into China via radicalized transnational Uyghur networks and links (however tenuous) to terrorist groups in Southeast Asia, Syria, and the broader ­M iddle East. This is one variant of the internal-­external security nexus that Xi’s comprehensive concept called on officials to scrutinize. When combined with the preventive logic of “immunization,” it has produced the sharp escalation in collective repression and grossly disproportionate violations of civil, po­liti­cal, and other ­human rights that the world has witnessed in Xinjiang. In sum, the Chinese approach to “national security” has changed ­under Xi with the introduction of his comprehensive national security concept. Unlike the United States, where national security is external and homeland security deals with internal questions, China’s concept includes both and gives a prominent role to internal threats and destabilizing forces. The new strategy calls on China to become more active in preventing threats from emerging at all, which in turn can explain much of its more proactive—­and more repressive—­ be­hav­ior at home and abroad.

19 Is

China a Challenge to US National Security? Oriana Skylar Mastro

The belief that China pre­sents a challenge, if not an outright threat,

to US national security is increasingly prevalent in elite and public discourse. While serving as secretary of state, Mike Pompeo labeled the Chinese Communist Party “the central threat of our times,” and his successor, Antony Blinken, confirmed that “­there is no doubt that [China] poses the most significant challenge of any nation-­state in the world to the United States.” The American public seems to agree. According to Pew Research Center 2020 polling, 66 ­percent of Americans hold unfavorable views of China, and 62 ­percent see Chinese power and influence as a major threat. The main points of contention lie in the degree to which China threatens US national security, how exactly China may challenge US national security, and uncertainty about how the answers to ­these questions may change over time (which is fundamentally a debate about the ­drivers of Chinese strategy). I focus ­here on the direct and indirect ways the ­People’s Republic of China poses a threat to US national security t­oday. Two caveats are in order. First, this focused discussion on challenges and threats may distort the degree to which China threatens the United States. On aggregate, the discussion pre­sents a malign influence from the perspective of US national security. But it could be much worse. China has resolved many of its territorial disputes peacefully. Beijing

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has relied mainly on economic and po­liti­cal tools to blunt US influence beyond its immediate region. China is an active member of the vast majority of international institutions. Even though faced with a conventionally superior US military, China has yet to change its minimal no-­first-­use nuclear doctrine. Second, while I pre­sent information on trends and trajectories, my focus is on t­ oday’s challenges. T ­ hese are likely to expand in scope and increase in intensity over the next five to ten years. Still, much depends on continuity and change in Chinese strategy, US strategy, and domestic ­factors in both countries. For example, how the United States perceives its national security is a main f­actor determining the degree of the Chinese threat. T ­ here is no explicit definition. The concept has varied over time from defensive conceptions such as protecting against military attack and po­liti­cal coercion to broader attempts to blunt US influence. The 2017 US National Security Strategy document lists four main goals: protect the homeland, the American ­people, and the American way of life; advance American prosperity; preserve peace through strength; and enhance American influence. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the main threats come from terrorism, espionage, proliferation, economic espionage, targeting of the national information infrastructure, targeting of the US government, perception management, and foreign intelligence activities. The Obama administration often also included in national security conceptions threats related to the global commons, cybersecurity, climate change, and energy. Two de­cades ago, a RAND report by Ashley Tellis and Michael Swaine posited that China was a direct challenge to the US military’s freedom of action throughout East Asia; US economic access to East Asia and beyond; the privileged po­liti­cal relations with most Asian powers enjoyed by the United States; and the overall US emphasis on specific formal and informal alliances as a way to ensure

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peaceful and stable development in Asia. ­These challenges remain. But to help keep both old and new challenges in context, I categorize them by the degree of directness. CHINA’S DIRECT THREAT TO THE US HOMELAND

China does not pre­sent a terrorist threat to the United States or its ability to control its borders. Moreover, China does not have the military capability (or desire) to invade and occupy any US territory. However, China has options to target US physical territory, disrupt its domestic institutions, and other­w ise reduce the freedom of action of the US government, citizens, and corporations. Given its ­g reat power status and significant military reform program over the past two de­cades, many casual observers may be surprised to hear that China has very ­limited ability to hold the United States at risk with conventional systems. China’s bombers and fighters cannot reach the United States, and China does not have the support infrastructure needed for its surface fleet and submarines to conduct sustained operations close to US shores. This also means that China cannot conduct surveillance and reconnaissance with conventional military platforms and thus relies heavi­ly on getting information through h ­ uman intelligence, satellites, and intercepting and exploiting information systems’ weaknesses. China does have the most advanced ballistic and cruise missile program in the world, but its conventional systems can only range out to 4,500 kilo­meters (barely to the tip of Australia). For this reason, some observers argue that China does not pre­sent a significant national security threat to the United States. But China can threaten the United States through nonconventional means. China has an estimated nuclear stockpile with warheads numbering in the low two hundreds. The US Department of Defense’s 2020 report to Congress Military and Security Developments

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Involving the ­People’s Republic of China estimates that the number of warheads on China’s land-­based intercontinental ballistic missiles that can threaten the United States is likely to grow to approximately two hundred by 2025. Technically t­hese missiles could be repurposed to carry conventional payloads, but this makes ­little sense strategically ­because the physical damage would not have a significant operational or po­liti­cal effect, and repurposing would cost China its nuclear deterrent. Instead, China is actively conducting research in hypersonics and boosting glide vehicles that, once developed and operational, would fi­nally provide its leadership with feasible options to attack the US homeland conventionally. China also has significant offensive cyber and counterspace capabilities that can threaten military, commercial, and civilian activities. It could attack US logistics, base-­related civilian infrastructure, and command and control through cyberattacks. China also has strong computer network exploitation skills, which refers to the use of information derived from penetrating other networks for intelligence purposes. In terms of counterspace, China can disrupt, disable, or destroy US satellites, impacting every­thing from the missile early-­ warning systems and weather forecasting to the Global Positioning System. This would directly impact the US ability to respond to attacks on the homeland and, more likely, against our allies in the region. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, China is also developing its own “robust and capable space ser­v ices, including space-­based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Moreover, they are making improvements to existing systems, including space launch vehicles and satellite navigation constellations. ­These capabilities provide their militaries with the ability to command and control their forces worldwide and also with enhanced situational awareness, enabling them to monitor, track and target US and allied forces.”

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China has even more ways to target less hardened civilian systems, including hacking energy grids, disrupting cellular communications, and using malware to steal sensitive data from US companies. An estimated $1.6 trillion of annual US business revenues depend on satellites, according to a 2015 Department of Homeland Security report. But while t­here is ample evidence that China plans to hold military targets at risk, t­here is l­ittle evidence to suggest that Chinese strategic cyber or space attacks against purely commercial and civilian targets are a key component of its strategy. National security includes protecting and preserving institutions and governing pro­cesses from external disruption. Chinese po­liti­cal interference and espionage activities are two ways that China poses a direct threat to US national security. Or, in the words of the FBI, “the counterintelligence and economic espionage efforts emanating from the government of China and the Chinese Communist Party are a grave threat to the economic well-­being and demo­cratic values of the United States.” According to FBI director Christopher Wray, Chinese espionage cases increased by 1,300 ­percent over the past de­cade. Many of ­these activities are eco­nom­ically motivated: China attempts to steal US intellectual property and other commercial secrets. Americans, states Wray, “are the victims of what amounts to Chinese theft on a scale so massive that it represents one of the largest transfers of wealth in h ­ uman history.” Similarly, Beijing has stepped up its po­liti­cal interference against Washington. During the 2020 elections, Microsoft stated that Chinese groups attempted to hack personal email accounts of Joe Biden’s campaign affiliates and an individual with ties to the Trump administration. The last category of national security threat is the broadest and most nebulous but also the most common: to be ­free from foreign coercion. Beijing has ­limited tools of military coercion against the

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US homeland and thus relies mainly on economic coercion to reduce freedom of action of the US government and its citizens. Given that China is the number-three US trading partner and largest foreign holder of US debt, many worry that this leverage could be used to harm US national security interests. China has demonstrated a ­g reat willingness to use trade as a weapon, and its officials have made vague statements about using financial mechanisms such as debt holdings to damage the US economy. Chinese attempts to punish Americans and US-­based companies—such as the National Basketball Association for speaking out against China’s ­human rights violations in Hong Kong—limit, in practice, rights to f­ree speech. CHINA’S THREAT TO US ALLIES AND US REGIONAL PRESENCE

While China does not pre­sent a significant conventional military threat to the US homeland, the same cannot be said of American bases and assets in Asia. T ­ here are about 100,000 US military personnel stationed t­ here, most notably in Japan and South K ­ orea, with a smaller presence in Australia and the Philippines. The number of Americans at risk almost doubles when you take into account defense civilians and the dependents of US military personnel. Additionally, the US Seventh Fleet, which encompasses 60–70 ships and submarines, 140 aircraft, and approximately 20,000 sailors, had 57 ships deployed in the region as of December 2020. Over a million Americans who live and work in Asia could find themselves in harm’s way if war breaks out between China and other countries with which it has territorial disputes, such as Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Japan, South K ­ orea, North K ­ orea, and Singapore. While space constraints prohibit a comprehensive analy­sis of the many ways China can threaten American bases, assets, and persons in the region, suffice to say that its military modernization has been

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geared to fighting the US military in Asia. China can take out US bases, shoot down US aircraft, and sink US ships. Only China has an operational antiship ballistic missile capable of hitting moving ships at sea. Its military strategy and doctrine, in addition to leadership speeches and its activities, clearly support the conclusion that China wants to coerce the United States into reducing its Asian military presence. China ­w ill also try to prevent the United States from interfering if a conflict breaks out between Beijing and one of the five US treaty allies in Asia ( Japan, South ­Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia). The United States abrogated its official treaty commitment to Taiwan upon normalization of relations with Beijing in 1979, but the congressionally passed Taiwan Relations Act of the same year created the domestic and international expectation that Taiwan would be defended if Beijing w ­ ere to attack unprovoked. China also has ongoing territorial disputes with Japan and the Philippines and supports North K ­ orea, all of which could bring the United States and China into a hot war. In addition to the significant conventional military threat, the same nontraditional tools China could use against the United States—­ cyber, counterspace, and nuclear weapons—­could also be used against US allies and partners. China has shown a greater willingness to use tools of po­liti­cal interference, espionage, and economic coercion against them than against the United States directly, most likely ­because American alliance commitments tend not to extend beyond defense against military attack. In one prominent example, Beijing banned Chinese tourists from visiting South ­Korea, shut down Korean-­owned businesses in China, and encouraged boycotts of Korean goods when Seoul deployed terminal high-­a ltitude area missile defenses. More recently, China, once Australia’s largest wine market, introduced extremely high tariffs on its wines a­ fter the Australian government called for investigations into COVID-19’s origins.

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China also uses economic incentives to buy countries’ silence on ­human rights. Once the Czech Republic s­ topped criticizing China’s ­human rights violations, a strategic partnership was quickly signed, and Norway and China normalized trade relations once Norway abandoned high-­level support for Chinese ­human rights activists. The US alliance system is traditionally thought of as a key source of power and influence and a means of protecting both national and global security. The American economy depends on ­free trade and the ability to efficiently access natu­ral resources from around the world. If China dominates Asia, Beijing would have im­mense power to hurt the US economy, a vulnerability no US president is willing to risk, especially given Beijing’s track rec­ord of using economic coercion when it has the upper hand. In sum, China pre­sents a threat to the US homeland largely through unconventional means such as cyber, counterspace, and nuclear weapons in war­time and through disruptive and coercive activities such as po­liti­cal interference and espionage. China also poses a significant conventional military threat to US bases and assets in the region and to American regional allies and partners, which could bring the two countries into direct conflict.

20 How

­ ill Emerging W Technologies and Capabilities Impact ­Future US-­China Military Competition? Elsa B. Kania

The p­ eople’s liberation army (PLA) on parade can be an impressive,

even foreboding spectacle. Take, for instance, the massive military parade in October 2019 showcasing Chinese military might, which commemorated the seventieth anniversary of the founding of the ­People’s Republic of China. The parade and the propaganda surrounding this event sought to convey modern China’s strength, displaying weapons developed through indigenous innovation and featuring researchers from the PLA’s premier military scientific institutions. Prominent in the parade was an array of unmanned weapons systems, which the PLA has deployed across all ser­v ices and domains of warfare to support a range of missions from logistic support to electronic warfare or more high-­end scenarios of war fighting. The unmistakable message, w ­ hether in the parade or from headlines in state media, was that the PLA has come a long way since its origins as the Red Army in the Chinese Civil War and is now prepared to “fight and win” in ­future wars.

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­Today, the PLA pre­sents itself as a force for world peace that is also at the forefront of ­future warfare. This apparent contradiction can be notionally reconciled by the recurring insistence of Chinese leaders, up to Secretary-General Xi Jinping of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), that China “would never seek hegemony,” claiming instead to contribute to a “shared ­future for mankind.” Such claims about intentions only offer l­imited consolation. China’s strategy of “active defense” includes pos­si­ble offensive action to defend national interests that have become more expansive and international in scope. As China seeks to “win the ­f uture,” its rise challenges a status quo in which the US military had maintained unquestioned dominance. The CCP believes that “profound changes unseen in a ­century” are occurring as a result of a new industrial and technological revolution that could determine the ­future of power on the world stage. Certainly, the long-­term outlook for the US and Chinese economies may prove far more consequential than the military balance at any par­tic­u­lar moment in time. Yet the military capabilities underpinned by a strong economy are a critical and concerning dimension of the competition. On this front, US-­China rivalry is fierce and intensifying. Overall, Chinese military modernization has advanced at a historically unpre­ce­dented pace, and the pro­g ress has frequently exceeded outsiders’ expectations. Certain breakthroughs in new areas of national security and emerging technologies could have strategic consequences. For instance, growth of the PLA Navy’s arsenal of antiship ballistic missiles and the dramatic expansion of its nuclear arsenal have provoked justified concerns. The increased display of Chinese military power, w ­ hether in training for combat or continuing confrontations in the South China Sea, constitutes a serious challenge. However, American anx­i­eties about military rivalry distract from recognition of the competition’s fundamentals. While a

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g­ reat power conflict could be unimaginably devastating—­and thus merits serious attempts to mitigate such risks through deterrence and confidence-­building measures—­great power competition more likely ­w ill occur across virtual domains and subtler strug­g les for influence. Indeed, Beijing has sought to increase its influence and ability to shape global discourse while using economic statecraft and informational instruments for po­liti­cal leverage and coercion. For the United States and China, the current and intensifying competition is occurring across the spectrum of po­liti­cal and military strug­g le that lies somewhere between peace and warfare, with looming concerns about the prospects for conflict. For de­cades, the PLA has concentrated on creating capabilities designed to target American vulnerabilities, developing weapons systems that remain untested in operations but could prove formidable. Xi, who also chairs the Central Military Commission, the CCP institution that has ultimate authority over the PLA, has exhorted Chinese forces to become a “world-­class military” by midcentury. This objective implies equaling and perhaps surpassing the United States. Chinese military modernization has been deeply influenced by trying to learn from a “power­f ul adversary,” namely the US military. American antecedents have s­haped the PLA’s development of information technology, and that learning continues as the PLA looks to emulate aspects of US efforts, including in artificial intelligence. In the pro­cess, Chinese military strategists have feared that the US military could reestablish American dominance through its recent initiatives in defense innovation, relegating the PLA back to a position of relative inferiority. Thus, the PLA’s goal is to disrupt and offset American advantages in ways that could ultimately undermine US military power. The PLA has prioritized reform and innovation as strategic imperatives. Xi has declared that “­under circumstances of increasingly

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fierce military competition, only innovators win.” Chinese military strategists and scientists believe that a “revolution in military affairs” is unfolding, which could necessitate major changes in force structure and training. Seeking to understand changes in the form of warfare, Chinese military scientists and strategists are carefully evaluating how technological developments may affect f­ uture warfare. This exploration also involves foreign military studies, including developments within the US, Rus­sian, and other major militaries. The PLA believes that “technology determines tactics” and expects that each major advance in science and technology ­w ill transform the exercise of military power. The PLA’s initiatives in military science includes not only cutting-­edge research but also exploring new theories and concepts for ­future operations. In par­tic­u ­lar, the PLA appears to be pursuing the prospect of ­future unmanned warfare with a certain enthusiasm while looking to ­future “intelligentized” warfare in which artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies ­w ill be decisive to victory. The PLA has sought to demonstrate that China is at the forefront of the latest advances in military technology, displaying and introducing new capabilities. The GJ-2 (Attack-2) unmanned aerial vehicle, which entered ser­v ice with the PLA Air Force in 2018, is equipped with an array of sensors and precision weapons. The GJ-2 has also been described by its designer as capable of operating with a level of autonomous capability. To the surprise of many observers, a new unmanned underwater vehicle, the HSU-001, was introduced during the 2019 parade, the first undersea drone of such large size and potential capability to be disclosed and displayed by the PLA Navy. However, l­ittle is known about this system other than that its role was reported to involve e­ nemy surveillance and battlefield environmental reconnaissance. And China’s ongoing research on hypersonic weapons, which could be autonomous or designed to operate

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as a swarm, has been the subject of par­tic­u ­lar anx­i­eties within and beyond the United States, since such systems could overcome current defenses and perhaps enhance drastically the PLA’s deterrence and war-­fighting capabilities. Meanwhile, ongoing confrontations often occur within new virtual domains. The Strategic Support Force (SSF), a critical ele­ment of the PLA created during its latest reforms, has advanced and established its significance despite the relative secrecy around its missions and activities. The SSF, which combines and integrates PLA space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities, ­w ill serve as the tip of the spear for Chinese military power in any ­future conflict. This new force is intended to realize doctrinal concepts and frameworks for PLA information operations, which focus on an approach that includes “integrated reconnaissance and detection, integrated network and electronic warfare, [and] integrated soft and hard strikes.” To date, the PLASSF has achieved notable pro­g ress in force construction and has started to contribute to training for joint operations that involve more sophisticated preparations for a contingency of ­future conflict against such a power­ful adversary as the US military. The PLA expects that the contest for information dominance or superiority ­w ill be critical in any f­uture military strug­g le. Indeed, Chinese military strategists want to create new paradigms of military power, seeking to seize the strategic commanding heights of space and cyberspace, while also seeking to establish a favorable position as a polar power and explorer of deep seas and deep space. Looking forward, the metrics and paradigms of ­future military power are expected to differ greatly as well from t­hose of the past. Increasingly, Chinese military strategists are concerned with efforts to design ­future warfare. The notion of “war design” is believed to be the domain of a power­f ul military that defines the terms of ­f uture battlefield play. The claim that “the third-­rate military imitates war,

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the second-­rate military deals with war, and the first-­class military designs war” is often cited by China’s strategists. The implication of assuming that only first-­class militaries can achieve positions of advantage is that lesser forces must reckon with the consequences of ­those advances. Therefore, Chinese military strategists have urged that the “military must get rid of the thinking of ‘follow-up development.’ ” That is, the PLA must not continue to trail the US military but must develop approaches that are more genuinely innovative, ones with Chinese characteristics. Such a proactive attitude requires a greater capacity to predict the direction of f­ uture warfare in ways that are intended to make the PLA superior when compared to any adversary. China’s agenda to leverage innovation to achieve military advantage continues to confront significant challenges. PLA success is hardly guaranteed, and pro­g ress w ­ ill depend on talent, training, and doctrinal developments that are progressing but face a range of impediments. Typically, military organ­izations tend to resist change and can be bureaucratic in character, especially in peacetime, though an external threat can spur change. The PLA in par­t ic­u ­lar has encountered additional obstacles due to f­actors that include the demands to adhere to CCP control within the ideological orthodoxy of “Xi Jinping thought,” the legacies of de­cades of systemic corruption, and technical impediments that can pre­sent chokepoints. The pro­cess of peacetime innovation without recent combat experience compounds ­these challenges. The PLA is aware of this prob­lem, expressing concern about the risks of so-­called peace disease. Ultimately, the ­f uture balance of power between China and the United States w ­ ill hinge more decisively on new frontiers and domains, but that balance remains uncertain. Moreover, any effort to design warfare in a manner that is supposedly scientific may come at the expense of recognizing the fog and friction of war. ­There are also ­human limitations that

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impose serious impediments perhaps not fully appreciated due to sometimes excessive enthusiasm over technology. As this rivalry continues and perhaps intensifies between the US and Chinese militaries, t­ here are reasons for concern about the risks of misperception. In such rivalries, ­g reat powers tend to view each other through the lens of worst-­case assessments regarding intentions and capabilities. The misinformation, sometimes deliberate disinformation, about China and the United States gives the rivalry added complication. While ­there is a potential for deception, misdirection, and manipulation, the two also tend to see each other in ways that are obscured by mistrust, history, and dif­fer­ent strategic cultures. The United States can tend to make sweeping generalizations about China or Chinese strategy and intentions based on flimsy or distorted evidence. Similarly, Chinese perspectives may well exaggerate American intentions and capabilities. While misperception is hardly a recent phenomenon of their relations, it can be heightened as this competition continues. Such mistaken assessments and expectations could bring risky responses or decision making in crisis scenarios. The uncertainty can heighten mistrust and misperception, which may be exacerbated by the disruption that new technologies may introduce. In a typical security dilemma, one side’s actions to enhance its own security tend to be seen by the other as threatening, thus intensifying the rivalry and often provoking responses in kind. Pursuing new technologies and capabilities may exacerbate security concerns and perceptions about threats from an adversary. That is perhaps inevitable b­ ecause many technology advances are not just for military use but can also be applied in other ways, l­imited only by imagination and primarily constrained by values and policy choices. Remembering this dual-­use potential is impor­tant in assessing the ­future trajectory. When the implications of a given technology are uncertain, m ­ istakes can produce worst-­case conclusions. Each side

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could misread the other’s intentions or misjudge the military balance and the credibility of commitments in ways that could erode deterrence, perhaps increasing the likelihood of conflict. The issues are complex, technical, and uncertain and cannot be addressed in such tired terms as “artificial intelligence arms race” and “tech cold war.” Ultimately, evaluating China’s advances in new domains and emerging technologies ­w ill remain a high-­stakes endeavor with analytic and academic challenges.

V Flashpoints

21

Where Do Divergent US and Chinese Approaches to Dealing with North ­Korea Lead? John Park

After testing new capabilities in 2017, North Korean leader Kim

Jong Un defended his nuclear weapons program as a “trea­sured sword” ensuring the country’s in­de­pen­dence. In light of ­these advancements, the United States and China continue to share the goal of the peaceful denuclearization of North ­Korea. The two countries, however, have employed vastly dif­fer­ent approaches to achieving that goal. For the United States, the dominant approach has been economic coercion. Following prior nuclear agreements that did not reach full implementation, Republican and Demo­cratic administrations’ use of targeted sanctions has grown significantly since the mid-2000s. They used t­ hese sanctions as the central policy tool to shape the North Korean regime’s decision making and block its procurement of items to advance its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Despite applying stringent sanctions, the United States has been in­effec­tive in convincing North K ­ orea to give up its nuclear arsenal in return for a brighter economic and diplomatic f­ uture. The myriad US sanctions have also failed to halt major pro­g ress in North ­Korea’s nuclear

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and missile programs. However, t­hese setbacks have not caused the United States to change its strategy of economic coercion. On the contrary, the United States has considerably increased its use of this economic statecraft tool. In contrast, China has deepened its economic engagement with the North Korean regime since the late 2000s. Through the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its counterpart the Workers’ Party of K ­ orea (WPK), China has cultivated and monetized po­liti­cal ties. ­Doing so has provided a power­ful mechanism through which the Kim ­family regime—­leaders of North ­Korea’s ruling and prosperous 1 ­percent—­has shored up stability and thrived. (Since Sino–­North Korean relations are centered on the party-­to-­party relationship, both governments can interact with each other in a streamlined and effective manner.) At the invitation of the CCP, the WPK created sophisticated commercial networks that it has embedded inside the Chinese economy. Beijing’s Sunshine Policy with Chinese Characteristics—an ongoing CCP policy of granting the Kim regime access to the Chinese marketplace as a way for North ­Korea to follow a development path that gradually lowers the priority focus on the nuclear card—­h as created a host of unintended consequences. First and foremost, it creates a sanctions loophole. By free-­r iding off of China’s financial and domestic marketplace systems, North K ­ orea can conduct vital commercial transactions beyond the reach of American sanctions. China consistently declares its adherence to United Nations (UN) Security Council sanctions but adamantly opposes implementing a foreign country’s laws (e.g., US sanctions) within Chinese jurisdiction. Second, this lifeline allows North ­Korea to bide its time and creates options for the regime. As a country possessing a nuclear arsenal and full access to the Chinese marketplace, North ­Korea can have its nuclear cake and eat it too.

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THE SOURCE OF THIS DIVERGENCE

The United States and China are currently on dif­fer­ent paths, but that has not always been the case. T ­ here are four key phases in the US-­China relationship vis-­à-­v is North K ­ orea since the early 2000s that cover the transition from cooperation to divergence. Phase 1 (2003–2008): Traveling the same road in a coordinated manner. The Six-­Party Talks, which w ­ ere most active during 2003–2007, captured a moment in time when the United States and China coordinated their respective policies ­toward North ­Korea. Although ­there ­were pauses and starts during the vari­ous rounds, it remains remarkable that the United States, China, North ­Korea, South ­Korea, Japan, and Rus­sia committed considerable po­liti­cal capital to negotiations. Three key features mark this unique phase. First, the talks w ­ ere multi­lateral, with China as chair. Second, the six parties made early pro­g ress implementing the September 2005 Joint Statement, which outlined agreed steps t­ oward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula “in a phased manner in line with the princi­ple of commitment for commitment, action for action.” Third, North ­Korea surprisingly remained a member of the Six-­Party Talks u ­ ntil negotiations began to stall in 2008 over how to verify denuclearization inside the country. North ­Korea did not return to the Six-­Party Talks following Kim Jong Il’s health crisis in August 2008. ­There was a period of uncertainty about Kim’s condition ­until he reemerged in January 2009 to receive a high-­level CCP International Liaison Department del­e­ ga­t ion visit. As the Six-­Party Talks collapsed, CCP-­WPK ties began to deepen. China became increasingly concerned about the ailing Kim Jong Il and the accelerated leadership succession to his third son, Kim Jong Un. China used its CCP-­W PK relationship a­ fter the Six-­Party Talks collapsed to shore up the stability of the North Korean regime.

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High-­level CCP del­e­ga­tion visits to Pyongyang during the late 2000s facilitated a dramatic increase in North K ­ orea’s coal exports to China. Building on the fifty-­year concessionary leases on North Korean mines that the two countries signed in the early 2000s, the coal trade significantly transformed their relations. The CCP framed this period as a time of investing po­liti­cal capital in the WPK’s f­uture rather than into the third generation of the Kim f­amily regime. It was an impor­tant distinction that differentiated institution building from merely propping up another Kim. Phase 2 (2009–2015): Beginning of divergence and stalemate. The October 2009 visit by Wen Jiabao, premier of the P ­ eople’s Republic of China, marked a critical inflection point. Wen led one of the highest-­ level Chinese del­e­ga­tions to North K ­ orea in recent years and concluded agreements ­under the innocuous-­sounding titles “economic development,” “education,” and “tourism.” In practice, they represented the ­legal gateways through which the two ruling parties deepened their po­liti­cal and economic relationships. Amid increasing international sanctions on North ­Korea, the message to the Chinese marketplace was clear: it was l­egal to do business with North Korean entities. China closely watched the arrival of the Obama administration. Chinese leaders perceived that President Barack Obama prioritized nonproliferation—­leading a global effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons—­over North K ­ orea’s denuclearization. As a result, China leaned into a two-­party configuration and spent more time, effort, and po­liti­cal capital in rebuilding the WPK. Lacking confidence that the Obama administration could broker a nuclear deal with North ­Korea, China stepped up to protect its national interest, calculating that it could get more done directly. The CCP accelerated its investment of po­liti­cal capital in the WPK a­ fter the sudden death of Kim Jong Il in December 2011. Beijing realized that absent

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the institutional support of the CCP, North ­Korea ­under the new leadership of Kim Jong Un would be an unstable neighbor if a sudden leadership succession crisis occurred. In February 2012, US interest in negotiating with North K ­ orea collapsed with the demise of the modest Leap Day Agreement, a North Korean moratorium on long-­range missile and nuclear tests as well as nuclear activities at the Yongbyon complex in return for US provision of nutritional supplements. A long period of stalemate between the two countries ensued. Phase 3 (2016–2017): Breakaway divergence during the Korean missile crisis of 2017. The stalemate ended abruptly in 2016. North K ­ orea escalated tensions with a series of missile tests that culminated in the demonstration of intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities during the Korean missile crisis of 2017. In response, the Trump administration applied a maximum pressure campaign. This combination of intense economic and military pressure on North ­Korea was designed to dissuade it from continuing its escalatory actions. In 2017, China severely reduced the flow of petroleum products into North K ­ orea. However, rather than marking a moment of convergence with the United States, the announcement by China that it would not completely shut off the oil showed that it viewed economic pressure as a l­imited tool. With increasing reports that China was easing its implementation of UN Security Council sanctions, the divergence between the United States and Chinese approaches became more pronounced. Phase 4 (2018–2021): A fork in the road, with the United States and China on dif­fer­ent paths as an unconstrained North K ­ orea expands its nuclear arsenal. A burst of South Korean–­led diplomacy helped facilitate a historic summit in Singapore in June 2018 between President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un. However, the season of summitry fizzled out quickly. At a subsequent summit in Hanoi in February 2019,

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the two leaders parted ways a­ fter failing to reach agreement on Kim’s proposal of dismantling the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex—­North ­Korea’s main nuclear fa­cil­i­ty—in return for lifting the sanctions clauses in five UN Security Council Resolutions. ­A fter the summit’s collapse, the United States and China pursued paths that w ­ ere far apart. While diplomacy cooled between the United States and North ­Korea, the level of CCP-­W PK interaction expanded as the Kim regime turned to interact solely with China. Sino–­North Korean trade continued despite the Kim regime’s expansion of its nuclear arsenal. The greatest shock to the Kim regime has been its early and drastic response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In January 2020 North ­Korea sealed its borders, cutting access to the Chinese marketplace. Confronting a difficult trade-­off, the Kim regime chose to preserve po­liti­cal control by preventing the spread of the virus. This choice caused a severe economic shock as trade with China sharply plummeted and North ­Korea slid further into dependence on China for aid. Worsening hardship in North ­Korea raises the likelihood of an internal economic crisis and puts China in a unique position to bail out the Kim regime again. In the meantime, the North Koreans consistently rebuffed the Biden administration’s efforts to restart negotiations in 2021. THE NORTH KOREAN RESPONSE

Divergence between the United States and China creates impor­tant maneuvering space for North ­Korea. Specifically, North ­Korea, Inc.—­the regime’s network of elite state trading companies—­can thrive inside the Chinese economy with no strings attached to denuclearization pro­g ress. By prioritizing regime stability, China has unintentionally disincentivized the North Korean leadership from returning to the Six-­Party Talks. Stated differently, why would a

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North Korean leader return to the Six-­Party Talks to negotiate away his regime’s nuclear arsenal in return for uncertain po­liti­cal, economic, and security guarantees from the United States and its allies when he enjoys access to the Chinese economy without any linkage to denuclearization? A key dilemma for Kim is economic. While US-­China divergence provides valuable room to maneuver, it is only a ­limited coping mechanism for him. The lack of a nuclear deal means that the United States w ­ ill not lift denuclearization-­linked sanctions, which in turn means no ­v iable opportunity for the Kim regime to build up the national economy. Kim, ­whether ill-­prepared or overconfident, sought at the Hanoi Summit the lifting of five of the eleven UN sanctions resolutions that would have reportedly benefited the civilian economy and ­people’s livelihood. In the aftermath of that failed attempt, pathways to large-­scale economic expansion remain firmly blocked. The self-­imposed national quarantine severely compounded this predicament. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US-­C HINA RELATIONSHIP AND THE NORTHEAST ASIAN REGION

The first implication is that China’s strategic economic engagement with North K ­ orea w ­ ill increase friction between Washington and Beijing. In the ­m iddle of this tug of war, the North Korean regime ­w ill both retain its nuclear weapons arsenal and feel fewer severe effects of ­these sanctions. For the northeast Asian region, the status quo ­w ill be de facto coexistence with a nuclear North ­Korea. The second implication is that China w ­ ill have greater economic influence on the Korean Peninsula. China w ­ ill become the sole consistent provider of major economic inducements to North K ­ orea, an unintended consequence of South K ­ orea’s continued support of the

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US sanctions-­first approach. For North ­Korea, the inability to play one country off another considerably reduces its bargaining power. China is also central to South ­Korea’s long-­term investment and trade policies. While the US–­South ­Korea alliance continues to provide enduring stability in the region, its core direct benefits reside in the security lane in this re­spect. The third implication is that the divergence w ­ ill drive a wider gap between the US–­South K ­ orea alliance and the US-­Japan alliance. The US-­China divergence puts South ­Korea in a delicate position where its patchwork of policy decisions ­w ill require ever more qualifications and careful explanations in its relations with Beijing and Washington. Pro­gress in one bilateral relationship ­will create gaps that Seoul w ­ ill have to manage in the other. For the northeast Asian region, this ­w ill result in the US–­South ­Korea alliance remaining Korean Peninsula–­centered while the US-­Japan alliance looks outward and continues to expand its efforts to bolster a ­free and open Indo-­Pacific region. THE ROAD AHEAD FOR THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA

The space for sustained US–­North ­Korea negotiations has narrowed, and the chances of a peacefully denuclearized North K ­ orea have become more remote. For the United States, sanctions no longer are a potent policy tool within a carefully calibrated negotiation strategy. Sanctions have become the strategy. For China, lost confidence in the United States and North ­Korea ­because of their inability to broker a comprehensive nuclear agreement raises concerns about the instability of a neighbor ruled by a millennial with a nuclear arsenal and an increasingly fragile economy. Allowing North K ­ orea, Inc. to operate inside China’s economy has become the Chinese strategy for

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shoring up stability of the Kim regime, all without linkage to North Korean pro­g ress with denuclearization. This Chinese approach puts the United States in a weak bargaining position. US lifting of sanctions with large strings attached—­ full denuclearization along with stringent verification—­provides a pathway for the Kim regime to build a far stronger economy but at a high cost in terms of dismantling its “trea­sured sword” and opening its country to intrusive nuclear inspections. In comparison, muddling along with Beijing’s Sunshine Policy with Chinese Characteristics lets Kim retain his nuclear arsenal; enjoy the expansion of North ­Korea, Inc. inside the Chinese economy; and preserve internal control. Divergent US and Chinese approaches to the Kim ­family regime have contributed to this quandary. Prospects for North Korean denuclearization are now more remote, and an arms control approach is more realistic. The United States ­w ill avoid using the term “arms control” b­ ecause of concerns about implicitly recognizing North ­Korea as a nuclear weapons state. In practice, however, a v­ iable US approach would be to develop threat and risk reduction arrangements with the Kim regime. Overall, the main divergence in US and Chinese approaches ­w ill endure and lead to a nuclear North ­Korea that is stuck between coping mechanisms for the top 1 ­percent and blocked economic prospects for the remaining 99 ­percent.

22 How

Does Taiwan Affect US-­PRC Relations? Shelley Rigger

One of the most popu­lar clichés of con­temporary global politics—­

ranking alongside The Princess Bride’s admonition to “never get involved in a land war in Asia”—is that “the Taiwan Strait is the most dangerous flashpoint in US-­China relations.” Like most clichés, it contains a smidgen of truth but oversimplifies a complex situation. The Taiwan Strait is less a flashpoint than a simmering pot. The temperature has risen and fallen many times over the past seventy years, but it has never boiled over. Why not? ­Because the three parties that are most directly involved—­Taiwan, the ­People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the United States—­have moderated the temperature. Managing the Taiwan issue is a necessary task for policy makers in the United States and the PRC. It’s difficult ­because the two sides’ interests are opposed, but they make the effort b­ ecause managing the issue is a prerequisite for constructive relations on ­every other issue. Austronesians, an indigenous ­people who inhabit several southern Pacific islands, arrived in Taiwan 5,000 years ago. Han ­people from mainland China began arriving in the seventeenth ­century, leading the ruling Qing dynasty to a loose administration of the island. By the late nineteenth c­ entury the Qing had incorporated Taiwan formally, but in 1895 the Qing ceded the island to Japan as the spoils of a lost war. Post-­Qing Chinese leaders repudiated this agreement,

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characterizing it as a settlement imposed by force, but Taiwan remained ­under Japa­nese control ­until the end of World War II, when troops and administrators from the Republic of China (ROC) took over. The United States was a key player in delivering Taiwan to the ROC. The ROC, ­under Chiang Kai-­shek’s Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) was a US ally during the war. Granting Chiang’s demand to receive Japanese-­occupied territories claimed by China was not a difficult decision at the time, but it set in motion seven de­cades (and counting) of sensitive and at times perilous regional dynamics. Four years a­ fter Chiang’s government occupied Taiwan in 1945 it found itself stranded on the island, having been driven from the mainland by communist forces. With the PRC ensconced on the mainland, the ROC’s jurisdiction was ­limited to Taiwan and a few nearby islands. Nonetheless, the Nationalists continued to claim sovereignty over all of China; Chiang never abandoned his goal of “recovering” the mainland. The PRC government shared his view that Taiwan was part of China and should be unified with the mainland but ­under the PRC state. From the Qing dynasty to the Cold War, Taiwanese never w ­ ere consulted about what they wanted. ­A fter Chiang’s government decamped to Taiwan, the United States considered leaving it to face the PRC alone, but when the Korean War began, Washington made Taiwan a frontline ally in the fight against communist expansion. The United States and the ROC signed a mutual defense treaty in 1955, and the United States continued to support Chiang’s claim to represent China internationally. Washington overlooked the fact that Chiang was r­unning an authoritarian state that repressed the 85 ­percent of its ­people who lived on the island before his forces arrived. As long as the United States and the PRC remained on opposite sides of the Cold War chasm, Washington’s alliance with Taiwan had

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l­ittle effect on US-­PRC relations. But when President Richard Nixon initiated a rapprochement in the early 1970s, Taiwan emerged as a stumbling block to closer ties. The United States understood that normalizing relations with Beijing would require acknowledging the PRC, not the ROC, as the legitimate government of the Chinese nation. Some US leaders w ­ ere unfazed by the prospect of derecognizing Taiwan, but ­others—­especially in Congress—­opposed abandoning Taiwan. The Nixon administration worked with Chinese leaders to define shared understandings that would enable normalization. ­These ­were codified in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. The PRC said it was the sole ­legal government of China, Taiwan was a province of China, and the “liberation of Taiwan” was an internal m ­ atter in which “no other country has the right to interfere.” The United States acknowledged “that all Chinese on e­ither side of the Taiwan Strait maintain ­there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.” The ambiguous US position—­neither agreeing or disagreeing with the Chinese view—­enabled normalization to proceed but left leaders and publics on both sides of the Taiwan Strait feeling betrayed. In the mainland, the Shanghai Communiqué and the similarly worded 1979 Normalization Communiqué are interpreted as the United States accepting Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. Taiwanese saw them as a betrayal and so did Taiwan’s friends in Congress: at the same time the Car­ter administration was wrapping up normalization with Beijing, Congress was passing legislation to safeguard Taiwan from attack. The resulting Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) allowed the United States to continue interacting with Taiwanese a­ fter derecognizing their government. It created new institutions to conduct officially “informal” diplomacy. It instructed the government to treat the Taiwanese ­people and entities as if Taiwan w ­ ere a state. It directed the

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executive branch to report on Taiwan’s defense needs and maintain the capacity to defend Taiwan. The United States continued to sell weapons to Taiwan, even ­after it terminated the 1955 mutual defense treaty. The fact that US-­Taiwan relations barely changed ­after normalization irritated Beijing. Declassified documents from the negotiations tell us why: Nixon’s representative Henry Kissinger hinted to Zhou Enlai that normalization would ease the path to unification. He said, “As a student of history, one’s prediction would have to be that the po­liti­cal evolution is likely to be in the direction which Prime Minister Zhou Enlai indicated to me.” In other words, Kissinger implied the United States would not prevent the PRC’s eventual annexation of Taiwan. In Beijing’s view, continued arms sales ­were the worst betrayal of Washington’s normalization promises. In 1982 the Reagan Administration, weary of Beijing’s complaints and worried that the relationship would implode, agreed to a third communiqué. In it the United States said “it does not seek to carry out a long-­term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan w ­ ill not exceed, ­either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of ­those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution.” Elsewhere in the document the United States highlighted the context for this policy: Beijing’s adoption of a policy committing the PRC to “peaceful unification” with Taiwan. Like the previous communiqués, the 1982 communiqué was open to interpretation. The United States stressed “peaceful unification,” as a precondition for reducing arms sales. As long as the PRC threatens force against Taiwan, the logic goes, the United States can keep selling more and better weapons. The PRC, not surprisingly, sees this

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interpretation as perfidious. Meanwhile, the Taiwanese government was alarmed that it might lose access to military purchases, so Washington dispatched an official to give Taiwan “Six Assurances.” The gist of the message was that the United States would not trade Taiwan’s vital interests for better ties with Beijing. When it comes to Taiwan, US-­China relations are guided by bilateral agreements—­mainly the three communiqués—­and domestic commitments. For Beijing, that means adhering to a series of policy statements regarding Taiwan, including the foundational 1993 “White Paper on the One-­China Princi­ple and the Taiwan Issue.” For the United States, the primary domestic commitment is the TRA. It must be obvious by now that the two sides’ domestic commitments are not easily reconciled with their bilateral agreements. The United States accuses Beijing of violating its “peaceful unification” promise when it threatens military force to push Taiwan ­toward unification; the PRC accuses Washington of using arms sales to enable Taiwan’s continued separation, which it sees as a violation of all three communiqués. In other words, US-­China relations are built on a shaky foundation in which neither side has full confidence. But given the circumstances, this was the only foundation that could be accepted on both sides—­the sole option for normalizing US-­China ties—so both tried to keep it intact. One way to do so is by treating the documents—­the Three Communiqués (or in US parlance, the Three Communiqués plus the TRA, plus maybe the Six Assurances)—as a magic talisman, a man­tra that every­one chants to keep the relationship safely centered. That is why Beijing is so quick to call out US actions that are not consistent with its interpretation of the documents, and it is why American officials (in most administrations) periodically affirm their commitment to the documents. Many ­people expected the normalization of US-­PRC relations to be the beginning of the end for a self-­g overning Taiwan. The

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ROC’s raison d’être was its claim to be the legitimate state representing the Chinese nation; when the world (even the United States) rejected that claim t­here seemed l­ittle room for this repressive, authoritarian husk on the global scene. Given the opportunity to establish itself separately by, for example, pursuing a parallel seat in the United Nations when the PRC was admitted, the Kuomintang-­led ROC government declined (Chiang’s representatives walked out of the UN rather than seeking repre­sen­ta­t ion alongside the PRC). But just as it seemed the curtain was coming down on the ROC, Taiwan came out for a second act. Taiwanese activists had been pushing for democ­ratization since the early 1970s, po­liti­cal pressure made pos­si­ble in part b­ ecause the ROC’s external support was flagging. When Chiang Kai-­shek died in 1975, his son Chiang Ching-­kuo succeeded him. But unlike the elder Chiang, an unrepentant authoritarian locked in a fight to the death with the Chinese Communist Party, Chiang Ching-­kuo was open to a dif­fer­ent ­future for Taiwan. Democ­ratization was not his preference and he never gave up on unification, but he yielded to the demands of Taiwan’s ­people. By the time he died in 1988, Taiwan’s evolution into a liberal democracy was irreversible. Taiwan’s demo­cratic transition gave it a new claim on US support, one that made sense in a post–­Cold War moment when anticommunism was no longer enough to excuse domestic authoritarianism. Instead of “letting nature take its course” as Kissinger had suggested the United States would do, American policy makers—­ again with Congress in the lead—­reconstituted their enthusiasm for Taiwan on a new foundation. Instead of an anticommunist bulwark, Taiwan became a demo­cratic beacon. Allowing Beijing to coerce it into an unwanted unification was less appealing than ever. Taiwan’s value to the United States as a demo­c ratic partner in a strategically impor­tant region has only increased as the PRC has

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become more power­f ul and ambitious, which means that the Taiwan issue remains an irritant in Sino-­A merican relations. Beijing’s goals have not changed: in the short run, prevent Taiwan from claiming formal in­de­pen­dence; in the long run, absorb Taiwan into the PRC. While so far Taiwan has been dissuaded from the former, achieving the latter appears more difficult than ever thanks to Taiwan’s demo­ cratic consolidation and the PRC’s intensifying authoritarianism. As for Taiwan, t­ here is no appetite for unification u ­ nder the PRC system, but the risk of war deters moves ­toward formal in­de­pen­dence. ­These dynamics vastly complicate the already difficult US-­China relationship. Beijing r­ eally wants unification, and without US support—­ including military protection—­Taiwan would have a much harder time resisting. In Beijing’s view, the United States is blocking the unification of the Chinese nation in order to keep China from becoming its peer competitor. To Washington, allowing the PRC to seize Taiwan and impose its po­liti­cal system against the w ­ ill of the Taiwanese p­ eople would be a gross violation of h ­ uman rights. It would also weaken the ability of other states in the region, including US allies such as Japan and South ­Korea, to resist Chinese pressure. In short, t­here is a stalemate in the Taiwan Strait. Beijing wants to control Taiwan. Taiwan wants self-­determination. The United States wants Taiwan to remain self-­governing without pulling the United States into a confrontation. The possibility that this wobbly equilibrium ­w ill break down makes Taiwan a flashpoint. Still, the fact that the equilibrium has held for more than seven de­cades suggests that it may not be as fragile as it looks.

23

Why Should Americans Care about Hong Kong? Denise Y. Ho and Jeffrey Wasserstrom

In 2014, international media cast Hong Kong’s Umbrella Move-

ment as a David versus Goliath b­ attle. An unpre­ce­dented seventy-­ nine-­d ay street occupation provided a power­ful visual spectacle: colorful tents filled the central business district and two other neighborhoods, and t­here was a flowering of popu­lar art including a “Lennon Wall” adorned with handwritten Post-­It notes of protest. The scene was captivating sonically as well, including popu­lar songs from Cantopop ballads to “Do You Hear the ­People Sing?” from Les Miserables. It was notable for the prominence of youths, especially eloquent prodemocracy activists, schooled in civil disobedience and fluent in social media. But above all the Umbrella Movement, named for the umbrellas that protestors used against pepper spray and tear gas, was a po­liti­cal spectacle. The citizens of the former British colony—­which was handed over to Beijing rule in 1997—­stood up to the Chinese Communist Party. At issue was the election of Hong Kong’s leader, or chief executive, with demonstrators arguing that he or she be directly elected, not selected by a small group of voters from a slate of Beijing-­ vetted candidates. But despite a protracted second series of protests in 2019 involving some marches that drew more than a million onto the streets, no one likens Hong Kong to David anymore. Perhaps another ancient allusion

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is now more apt: the story of the Greek island of Melos in 416 BCE. During the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BCE), Melos found itself caught between a rising Athenian empire and Sparta and its allies. In what has become known as the Melian Dialogue, the historian Thucydides describes a negotiation between Athenian envoys, who threaten to lay siege to Melos if it does not join Athens, and Melian commissioners, who appeal to what is “fair and right,” arguing that Melos should be able to remain neutral and in­de­pen­dent. In Richard Crawley’s translation, the Athenians reply in the language of realpolitik: “Hope, danger’s comforter, may be indulged in by ­those who have abundant resources. . . . ​Let this not be the case with you, who are weak and hang on a single turn of the scale.” Confident that the gods would ­favor “just men fighting against the unjust,” the Melians refuse to submit. A ­ fter a summer siege that stretched into winter, Melos surrendered and became a colony of Athens. Like all analogies, Melos and Athens to Hong Kong and Beijing is imperfect. ­There was never any question that Hong Kong would be part of China; with the British handover in 1997, it became a Chinese “Special Administrative Region.” Hong Kong was to be governed by its own miniconstitution, the Basic Law, which provides for both a pro­cess of democ­ratization and a degree of autonomy. Hong Kong ­people ­were promised both participation in government and protections for their territory’s tradition of rule of law and its vibrant civil society. Post-1997 Hong Kong is described with the phrase “One Country, Two Systems,” which acknowledges the authority of Beijing in issues of diplomacy and defense while suggesting autonomy in local m ­ atters, including Hong Kong’s cap­ i­tal­ist system. But ­these promises have been increasingly undermined. Some activists now say that the structure is “One Country, One System,” pointing out that the chief executive is unable to act in­de­pen­dently of Beijing. Where the comparison to the Melian

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Dialogue holds is in its portrayal of might versus right. A world power ascendant, China has been able to control interpretation of Hong Kong’s constitution, claiming its politics sovereign over Hong Kong’s rule of law. For the p­ eople who took to the streets in 2019, theirs was an existential strug­g le for survival, as was the case for the Melians. The precipitating event was a bill proposed by Hong Kong’s government that would have allowed extradition to China, which is not known for either judicial in­de­pen­dence or protection of h ­ uman rights. The news outraged the public, including the business and ­legal communities, and hundreds of thousands took to the streets on June 9; an estimated two million followed on June 16. Over the course of the next five months, frontline protesters challenged the Hong Kong police with increasingly radical action. Though crowd vio­lence, which usually took the form of attacks on property and state symbols rather than ­people, was not always condoned by the population at large, it was seen by the majority as less egregious than acts of police vio­ lence that harmed bodies. In September the proposed extradition bill was withdrawn, but by then the protest movement included other demands that w ­ ere not met, including a call for an in­de­pen­dent investigation into police brutality. Public support for the protests was voiced in elections for the local District Councils. In November 2019, voters delivered a resounding victory to the prodemocracy camp: seven in ten eligible voters went to the polls, and prodemocracy candidates won some 86 ­percent of the seats. But while the world was captivated by a seeming reprise of the 2014 David and Goliath b­ attle, the 2019 demonstrations in Hong Kong—­taking on slogans such as “revolution of our times”—­was testing Beijing’s patience with “One Country, Two Systems.” As po­ liti­cal scientist Edmund Cheng has argued, Beijing has implemented three related changes in its treatment of Hong Kong: cultivating

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pro-­Beijing local organ­izations, mobilizing counterprotesters to intimidate prodemocracy activists, and using Hong Kong’s l­egal system to prosecute prodemocracy leaders and disqualify prodemocracy candidates from standing for or taking office. Thus, the Hong Kong government responded to protests with a combination of police force and ­legal action: applications for protest gatherings ­were denied, making the demonstration illegal; the government attempted to ban the masks worn to protect the anonymity of frontline protesters; and thousands of p­ eople w ­ ere arrested, including on the charge of rioting. As of late 2021 more than 10,000 ­people had been arrested and over 2,500 charged, primarily youths but also respected se­nior leaders in the community and local politicians, including some who w ­ ere elected in the 2019 District Council election and ­those who hoped to run for a Legislative Council seat in September 2020 in an election that was postponed ostensibly due to the pandemic. The culmination of Beijing’s use of ­legal means for po­liti­cal ends was its swift introduction on June 30, 2020, of the National Security Law. While international attention was absorbed by the COVID-19 pandemic, China’s National P ­ eople’s Congress Standing Committee drafted and promulgated the new law, which targets activities related to “secession,” “subversion,” “terrorism,” and “collusion with foreign and overseas forces,” all terms that are loosely defined. The National Security Law has been criticized by many, including the ­legal scholar Michael C. Davis, for the way it was implemented from above and amended and how it superseded Hong Kong’s own Basic Law. Further, while representatives of Beijing in Hong Kong initially claimed that the National Security Law would be narrowly applied, its vague language opens it up to broad implementation. Following a series of moves in 2019, including the disqualification of prodemocracy candidates even before the Legislative Council elections w ­ ere called off, the National Security Law has turned out

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to be a blunt instrument. In waves of arrests over the first fifteen months totaling 154 ­people with 96 charged, the Hong Kong police have gone ­after prodemocracy activists, media outlets, and elected officials. Among t­hose arrested w ­ ere members of an organ­ization that held Hong Kong’s annual Tian­a nmen Square vigil, students who provided necessities for the detained, and journalists for the prodemocracy newspaper Apple Daily. Hong Kong’s civil society has been thoroughly gutted, with associations, l­abor u ­ nions, and po­ liti­cal parties disbanded. Thus, unlike Athens, which menaced the island of Melos with ships full of archers and hoplite soldiers, China is prosecuting Hong Kong citizens with their own law. Why should Americans, indeed the world, care about the National Security Law, the latest and most power­ful weapon wielded in what local ­lawyer and writer on protest Antony Dapiran and ­others have described as an ongoing “lawfare” campaign against Hong Kong activists? First, the National Security Law’s provisions outlawing the promotion of “separatism” are defined so broadly that anyone anyplace in the world who might advocate for Hong Kong’s “high degree of autonomy” could fall into its dragnet. Even actions by Americans in the United States could lead to arrests and long prison sentences if and when they passed into Chinese territory or a place with an extradition treaty with Beijing. Realistically, the National Security Law would be unlikely to directly affect the vast majority of American citizens. Yet, an early list of p­ eople identified as violators of it included Samuel Chu, an American citizen of Hong Kong birth who founded the Hong Kong Democracy Council in Washington, D.C. Chu’s work, lobbying his own government to take steps in defense of Hong Kong, is seen as foreign collusion ­under the National Security Law. And ­those arrested in Hong Kong so far include the locally based American ­lawyer John Clancey, chairman of the Asian ­Human Rights Commission.

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Second, Americans should care about Hong Kong ­because the National Security Law has implications beyond politics and h ­ uman rights. Hong Kong is impor­tant to Americans ­doing business in Asia, and part of the reason Hong Kong’s business community opposed the extradition bill was Chinese pre­ce­dents in detaining foreign businesspeople, what l­egal scholar Thomas E. Kellogg describes as “state-­sponsored kidnapping.” If anything, the National Security Law makes it even less safe for ­people to travel to or even transit through Hong Kong. In addition to businesses, American universities collaborating with academic institutions in Hong Kong are affected, as the law has implications for every­one from study-­abroad students to visiting researchers. Perhaps the group most u ­ nder threat are journalists. Already the New York Times has shifted many Hong Kong–­based personnel to Seoul, but the threat extends beyond practical operations. Historically, Hong Kong news media has been at once freer than China’s domestic media and better connected to the mainland than international media and thus has been crucial in bringing to light other­w ise censored stories. To give just one example to which COVID-19 has given added poignancy, SARS might have become a more widespread health crisis had Hong Kong reporters not immediately raised the alarm. Fi­nally, beyond the specific effects of the National Security Law, Americans have general reasons to care about Hong Kong. Its prodemocracy movement reflects rights and values that we espouse, and Hong Kong’s fate sheds light on Beijing’s commitment—or lack thereof—to upholding international agreements and maintaining ­human rights norms. In 2019 the United States passed the Hong Kong ­Human Rights and Democracy Act, linking Hong Kong’s special trade status to an annual State Department review that would assess its continued autonomy. Among the items for review are Hong Kong’s “civil liberties, including freedom of assembly and freedom of the

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press.” In this and other acts, Amer­i­ca joins other entities—­including the United Kingdom and the Eu­ro­pean Union—in supporting Hong Kong’s prodemocracy movement. When Hong Kong’s Basic Law was ratified in 1990, Margaret Thatcher asserted in a BBC interview that “China ­will honor the commitments that she has made with us about the ­future of Hong Kong ­because I think s­he’ll wish to be seen to honor them in the forum of the world.” In this way, Hong Kong has long been a test case of ­whether Beijing ­w ill keep its promises, and for the following three de­cades it did in large part b­ ecause it was in China’s interest to preserve Hong Kong as an engine for the mainland’s economic miracle. But ­today China’s economy is strong, and its state is even stronger. Many analysts, including the intellectual historian Sebastian Veg, have argued that Beijing is willing to sacrifice Hong Kong’s role in international finance and business for the sake of increased po­liti­cal control. The extent to which the National Security Law violates the Basic Law calls into question ­whether China, as Thatcher suggested, cares to honor commitments before the “forum of the world.” We should care about Hong Kong b­ ecause its fate reveals the nature of the Chinese regime. If Hong Kong is a barometer of what the Chinese state is and a test case of what Beijing is willing to do, then what do we do with its mea­sure? The Melian Dialogue is an example of might prevailing, with Athens the victor ­because of its strength. We recall that Athens was not just a city-­state but one with imperial ambitions, and in the same way that Melos was an example for o ­ thers, what happens in Hong Kong is also a signal to Taiwan, once the audience for the policy of “One Country, Two Systems.” Since the Umbrella Movement, Hong Kong has increasingly been subsumed into a larger nexus that China calls the “Greater Bay Area,” a network of cities in South China. Among ­these cities, it is Hong Kong and not its mainland neighbors such as Shenzhen where protests have been l­egal and po­liti­cal satire is

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pos­si­ble; it is Hong Kong and not even former Portuguese colony Macau, the region’s other special administrative region, where the Legislative Council could hold boisterous debates and attempt to block government actions. How long ­w ill Hong Kong, which has lost so many of its distinctive features during the last two years, remain a place apart? The history of the Peloponnesian War is seminal b­ ecause it is the account of two empires and their alliances. Melos fell ­because Athens was the stronger, but it was also defeated b­ ecause the Melians’ wish for “help from men, that is, of the Spartans” did not materialize, a failure that the Athenian envoys themselves predicted. Thus, the fate of Melos is not just a story of might versus right but instead is a tale of the insufficiencies of right alone. As Americans consider the f­uture of our place in the world, we w ­ ill have to consider how to use our influence: how could our might be used for right, not in a b­ attle between two superpowers but in a con­temporary strug­gle waged through policy, international organ­izations, alliances, and lawfare? In this way, Hong Kong is not just a test case for China but is also a barometer for the United States. Americans should care about Hong Kong ­because how we respond to its changing politics is a mea­sure of who we are ourselves.

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What Should Americans Know about ­Human Rights Violations in Xinjiang, and What Are US National Interests ­There? James A. Millward

The chinese communist party (CCP) policies in Xinjiang since 2017

have imprisoned some 300,000 and interned approximately a million more indigenous non-­Han central Asians in educational transformation camps; razed or damaged thousands of mosques, shrines, and old neighborhoods; actively suppressed indigenous birth rates far below Han levels; illegalized core ele­ments of Uyghur and Islamic culture; and pushed tens of thousands of non-­Han adults into forced factory ­labor and ­children into state institutions. The revelation of ­these policies has contributed to the worst crisis for foreign policy in the ­People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 1989. Moreover, b­ ecause the CCP requires declarations of loyal support from citizens and officials for its Xinjiang policies, this also comprises a Cultural Revolution–­type domestic crisis in which no one can say no to a dictatorial leader despite the clearly destructive nature of that leader’s policies. The Xinjiang atrocities join the list of major

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self-­inflicted CCP disasters along with the ­Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the massacre of protestors in Tian­anmen Square and elsewhere in 1989. One difference, however, is that the current policies primarily target ethnic groups other than the Han and thus evoke comparisons to colonialist and genocidal events elsewhere in the world. THE ATROCITIES IN XINJIANG

PRC intolerance of the ethnic diversity of Uyghurs and other non­Han groups in Xinjiang has been ongoing for de­cades, but in 2017 authorities vastly ramped up the scale of the repression, employing technology in frightening new ways to intensify state terror. A ­ fter first denying the existence of the internment camps, the PRC launched a propaganda campaign alternately describing the carceral regime as counterterrorism and a poverty-­a lleviation mea­sure. Yet the indiscriminate and excessive response is clearly grossly disproportionate to four relatively small in­de­pen­dent incidents in 2013–14, the first unambiguous terrorism involving Uyghurs since 1997 and for which ­there is no evidence of any orga­n izational involvement, domestic or international. Although Xinjiang has in recent years seen other vio­lence, especially popu­lar altercations with police and other state agents, the PRC has not convincingly shown how such unrest differs from similar mass incidents that occur by the tens of thousands annually elsewhere in China but are never labeled “terrorism” and for which Hans are not collectively punished. The repressive mea­sures against indigenous non-­Han ­people in Xinjiang include the following:

• Intense physical and digital surveillance and biometric data gathering.

What Should Americans Know about Human Rights Violations in Xinjiang?



• The use of artificial intelligence algorithms to predict so-­called extremism and that subject over a million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other non-­H an ­peoples of Xinjiang to extralegal detention in a network of prison-­ like “concentrated educational transformation centers” purportedly to cure them of a “thought virus.” O ­ thers tagged by the system have been confined to their homes or required to attend indoctrination programs without being confined.



• Prosecution and imprisonment of an additional several hundred thousand p­ eople via the l­egal system. Xinjiang, with 1.5 ­percent of the national population, in 2017 saw 21 ­percent of all criminal prosecutions in the PRC.



• Labeling of common religious and ethnic customs, past foreign travel, relatives residing abroad, communicating with ­people abroad, and other normal be­hav­ior as “extremist” activities used to justify arbitrary detention, internment, or imprisonment. Despite PRC claims that its internment program was aimed at educating poor farmers who could not speak Chinese, it was highly educated multilingual academics, writers, artists, and entrepreneurs—­the accomplished leaders of non-­Han society—­who ­were the first detained or imprisoned without cause.



• Physical and psychological torture, rape, and sexual abuse within internment camps, detention centers, and prisons.



• Separation of families due to mass internment and incarcerations and placement of Uyghur c­ hildren in

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orphanages and boarding schools where Uyghur language is forbidden.

• Physical destruction of cultural patrimony, including ancient mosques, shrines, cemeteries, and neighborhoods. This began around 2010 with the destruction of old Kashgar but greatly expanded with the de­mo­li­t ion of domes and the bulldozing of graveyards from 2017.



• Erasure of the Uyghur script and language from public spaces.



• Housing CCP cadres in Uyghur homes for extended periods, sometimes in ­house­holds where the husband has been detained, thus placing unrelated Han men alone with Uyghur ­women and ­children.



• State incentivization of marriages between Han and non-­H an ethnic groups, especially between Uyghur ­women and Han men. A new regulation declares parental opposition to such marriages to be “extremist”; with the camps system punishing non-­Han ­peoples for so-­called extremism, this constitutes state coercion of non-­Han to marry Han.



• Zealous birth suppression resulting in plummeting birth and natu­ral population growth rates in Xinjiang over the past few years. Birth rates in predominantly non­Han areas of Xinjiang fell by between 30 and 56 ­percent between 2018 and 2019, while birth rates across the PRC as a ­whole fell by only 4.2 ­percent. Birth rates in densely Uyghur areas of southern Xinjiang dropped by even higher percentages.

What Should Americans Know about Human Rights Violations in Xinjiang?



• Prevention of freedom of movement or communication by non-­Han ­peoples and extraterritorial surveillance and threats against Uyghurs and Kazakhs in diaspora, including in the United States, the Eu­ro­pean Union, Turkey, Australia, and other nations.



• Coercive transfer of Uyghurs from internment facilities or place of residence to factories sometimes far from their homes. In Xinjiang and elsewhere in China, Uyghur transfer workers are often confined u ­ nder military-­style supervision and denied ­free movement outside of factory grounds.

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GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORY

Xinjiang, officially the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, well over twice the size of Texas, is situated in the far northwest of the PRC. Xinjiang is geo­g raph­i­cally and ethnically central Asian, and advocates who wish to stress this non-­Chinese character use another historical name, East Turkestan. Northern Xinjiang is mountainous, while southern Xinjiang consists mainly of desert with several oasis cities. Although the entire region is ethnically diverse, the southern part of the region is more densely populated by Uyghur ­people, while more Han, Kazakh, and Hui p­ eople live in the north. Most of Xinjiang’s petrochemical and mineral extraction takes place in the north, which is more eco­nom­ically developed than the south. Uyghur areas have been denied the benefits of the market-­based agricultural reforms that since the 1980s dramatically raised standards of living in rural parts of eastern China. The population of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region as of 2021 is roughly 25 million, with Uyghurs and Han each comprising some 40 ­percent, Kazakhs 6–7 ­percent, Hui around 4 ­percent, and

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several other indigenous ethnicities in smaller percentages, including Kyrghyz, Tajiks, and Mongols. While many of ­these ethnic groups are historically Muslim, many individuals are secular or follow other faiths. As the Qing Empire expanded in the seventeenth and eigh­teenth centuries, it incorporated Xinjiang, Mongolia, Tibet, and Taiwan along with China. When the empire collapsed in 1911 and revolutionaries attempted to create a Chinese republic from the ruins of the Qing, Tibet and Mongolia declared in­de­pen­dence. The situation in Xinjiang grew chaotic, but over three de­cades among vari­ous in­de­ pen­dent warlord and Soviet-­sponsored regimes that vied for control, three local non-­Chinese states in Xinjiang likewise declared in­de­pen­ dence from China. In 1949, when the CCP took control of Xinjiang, it accepted the surrender of a co­a li­tion government consisting of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) and the Eastern Turkestan Republic (ETR). The ETR had formed with Soviet support to resist the imposition of Kuomintang rule in 1944 and nearly defeated the Kuomintang militarily, but in the final months of World War II the United States urged the Kuomintang and the Soviet Union urged the ETR leaders to reach a cease-­fire. The Kuomintang and the ETR subsequently shared administrative portfolios and held elections to ensure proportionate non-­Han repre­sen­ta­t ion in the Xinjiang government. ­A fter occupying Xinjiang, the CCP replaced the former ETR leaders with its own handpicked native officials. The CCP settled 80,000 demobilized Kuomintang troops in Xinjiang, where they formed the Xinjiang Production Construction Military Corps (XPCC), a paramilitary organ­ization dedicated to increasing Han demographic presence in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region by opening state farms and building new cities. Thus began the PRC settler colonial proj­ect in the central Asian region, which increased

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the percentage of Han from about 5 ­percent in the early 1950s to over 40 ­percent t­ oday. The XPCC, which is also known as the Bingtuan, is now a highly subsidized corporate conglomerate deeply involved in ­running Xinjiang prisons and camps, dominating the region’s cotton production and thoroughly entangled with supply chains for solar panel raw materials. Bingtuan additionally manages a network of global subsidiaries, including companies supplying Nike, Calvin Klein, and Patagonia. PRC ETHNICITY POLICIES AND RECENT HAN-­S UPREMACIST ASSIMILATIONISM

Like the Soviet Union a­ fter 1917, the PRC from 1949 was a socialist state ruling a former empire. For a dedicated opponent of imperialism, this legacy of imperial diversity posed a practical prob­lem as well as an image prob­lem: how to rule an empire without looking like a colonialist. The PRC thus implemented a modified version of the Soviet nationalities policies and officially recognized fifty-­six ethnic groups in China: the Han and fifty-­five groups whom the state designated “minority nationalities.” Through t­hese mea­sures, Uyghurs, Tibetans, Mongolians, and other ­peoples ­were at a stroke minoritized in their native lands. The designation of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and three other autonomous regions, each nominally self-­governed ­under a titular ethnic group, along with many so-­called autonomous prefectures and counties, is the territorial ele­ment of that original PRC approach to ethnicity. We may call this the PRC’s diversity regime. This original diversity regime made ethnic identity a building block of state administration. The regime supported language, education, and cultural expression of each officially recognized group; in theory and at times in practice, it protected non-­Han groups from

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discrimination and cultural erasure by the Han majority and assured each group repre­sen­ta­t ion within the authoritarian government and party. Although dif­fer­ent from diversity regimes of liberal democracies, the PRC diversity system, when actually implemented, proved popu­lar among non-­Han ­people. It was notably more pluralist and inclusive than Jim Crow Amer­i­ca, for example. The Cultural Revolution of the 1960s–1970s brutally persecuted non-­Han p­ eople, but non-­Han groups in the PRC look back to the subsequent 1980s as a golden age of PRC diversity policies. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, some PRC scholars and CCP ideologues began to worry that Soviet nationalities policies themselves had contributed to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Some called for a second-­generation Chinese ethnicity policy that would promote “melding” and “fusion” of diverse groups rather than continue state and party support for the fifty-­five non-­Han categories and their nominally autonomous territories. When Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, he embarked on a radical revision of the PRC diversity regime. He moved the bureaucracies dealing with ethnicity and religion out of the government and placed them ­under direct CCP control. He announced in 2014 that prob­lems in Xinjiang would require attention not just to “material” mea­sures (i.e., economic development) but also to “psychological issues,” thus foreshadowing the use in Xinjiang of the type of coercive indoctrination techniques previously visited by the CPP on prostitutes, drug users, and Falun Gong adherents. Xi also launched a campaign to “Sinicize” religion in China. In a subtle shift of emphasis away from the princi­ple that China is a multinational state consisting of fifty-­six distinct groups, Xi Jinping’s government has recently promoted the concept of a unitary, all-­ encompassing, homogeneous Chinese identity, labeled “Zhong­hua,” as an ideological centerpiece closely related to his China Dream. One current po­liti­cal catchphrase enjoins officials to take “forging

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a Zhonghua collective consciousness” for all p­ eoples in China as their main po­liti­cal goal. Though “Zhonghua” was used in a po­ liti­cal sense in the past, the word is composed of two Chinese characters that each individually mean “Chinese,” and now the officially promoted cultural characteristics of Zhonghua identity are indistinguishable from t­hose of the Han. The current state promotion of Zhonghua identity is thus in effect a top-­down effort to Hanize, or Sinicize, non-­Han ­peoples. And while perhaps reminiscent of the outdated American melting pot notion, the meta­phor of the forge suggests CCP intent to deploy industrial-­strength tools to fuse ethnicities into its idealized Zhonghua amalgam. Some uses of the Zhonghua concept even hearken back to early twentieth-­century racial arguments that claimed that the non-­Han ­peoples of the Qing Empire ­were primordially Chinese ­whether they knew it or not. In a September 2020 speech, Xi said that “­every ethnic group of Xinjiang is a ­family member linked to Zhonghua bloodlines.” Accompanying such rhe­toric are promulgations falsely claiming that the Uyghur language is Chinese, not Turkic, and that Uyghurs are historically descended not from central Asian Turkic p­ eoples but rather from an imaginary ancient Zhonghua ­people. WHY SHOULD GOVERNMENTS, CORPORATIONS, OR P ­ EOPLE CARE?

The moral abhorrence of the Xinjiang policies is self-­evident, and broad popu­lar condemnation requires no justification. W ­ hether the many-­faceted repression of non-­Han ­peoples of Xinjiang cumulatively meets l­egal definitions of genocide u ­ nder the United Nations Convention on Genocide or the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is to some extent a semantic question, given the difficulty of actually prosecuting such a case in ­either international body amid the chorus of compliant authoritarian states that the PRC has been able to assem­ble. However, “not quite genocide” hardly amounts

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to a global vote of confidence in the CCP. The case that Xinjiang policies comprise crimes against humanity or cultural genocide is more easily made. Besides the moral imperative, governments, businesses, and ­people also have practical reasons to worry about what the PRC is ­doing to Uyghurs and other Xinjiang non-­Han ­peoples. The PRC has been using Xinjiang as a laboratory to fine-­tune artificial intelligence and other technology for the purposes of social control. The PRC packages this technology for export to interested countries, but the same technology exists in liberal democracies, albeit more explic­ itly employed by corporations than by governments. It is in every­ one’s interest to recognize what the surveillance state can become and the malign purposes to which it can be put. The Xinjiang atrocities pose practical prob­lems for US and multinational corporations. Transfer l­abor by Uyghur and other non-­Han detainees, against the backdrop of mass detention and “antiextremism” laws, can only be considered coerced. The creation of this compliant low-­wage ethnic underclass is central to PRC economic policy for Xinjiang and, moreover, involves the nineteen provinces and cities of eastern China that are mandated as “partners” to finance development in Xinjiang u ­ nder the Pairing Assistance Program. International businesses can thus become entangled with Xinjiang atrocities at many points: ­doing business in Xinjiang, dealing with the XPCC or the local Xinjiang government, partnering with Chinese companies involved in Xinjiang or with Xinjiang administrations, and dealing with Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, or sixteen other ­sister cities and provinces that fund, build, and manage aspects of the Xinjiang carceral and forced ­labor regime through the Pairing Assistance Program. Such connections along opaque supply chains expose international brands, especially t­hose sourcing cotton (raw or spun) and polysilicon (used in solar technology), to the risk of import blocks, fines, and reputational damage.

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WHAT CAN GOVERNMENTS, BUSINESSES, AND P ­ EOPLE DO?

Collectively in international co­a li­t ions, governments can implement targeted sanctions to inflict economic pain and shame individuals and entities involved in the Xinjiang cultural genocide. Governments can expand their scrutiny beyond Xinjiang itself to include the nineteen participants in the Pairing Assistance Program. In addition, governments can investigate international finances of the XPCC and other entities implementing the Xinjiang policies, keep the Xinjiang atrocities prominent in conversations with PRC interlocutors, and grant safe haven and asylum to Uyghurs and other Xinjiang ­people fleeing PRC persecution. Corporations should demand open access to and unrestricted auditing of their supply chains in China. Also, corporations must make clear to Chinese companies and officials that pos­si­ble complicity in the Xinjiang repression renders their business in China untenable. Corporations should transmit their alarm through communication channels into China’s party-­government system. The Xinjiang policies are not fodder in a Sino-­US spat but instead are a humanitarian disaster reminiscent of the worst past colonialist depredations against indigenous p­ eoples as well as ethnic pogroms, the Holocaust, and South African apartheid. ­People should voice their concerns about PRC assimilationism and Han-­supremacy through social and other media and highlight parallels to the Black Lives ­Matter and indigenous rights movements. In addition, p­ eople should demand transparency from Chinese and global brands about textiles, electronics, solar panels, and other products linked to Xinjiang. ­People should show support and solidarity by learning about the Uyghur and other non-­Han cultures as well as Chinese culture and should demand that governments and corporations take seriously the Xinjiang crisis and its challenge to h ­ uman values.

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Why Did China Build and Militarize Islands in the South China Sea, and Should the United States Care? Bonnie S. G­laser

Beginning in december  2013, China transformed seven coral reefs

in the South China Sea into artificial islands, expanding the area by 3,000 acres. A ­ fter completing the reclamation, China militarized the land features, deploying weapons systems and building lengthy air strips on three of the largest reclaimed islands: Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef. The vast construction proj­ects ­were born of Chinese insecurity, opportunism, and ambition. The massive undertaking surprised and alarmed the countries of the Indo-­Pacific region, including the United States. Beijing’s scheme to create islands by dredging sand and turning them into military outposts served multiple objectives. First, it was intended to strengthen China’s extensive territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea. Chinese claims are depicted as a nine-­ dashed or U-­shaped line covering an area located in the western Pacific Ocean of about 1.4 million square miles. The land features and ­waters that comprise China’s claim are contested wholly or partly

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by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The islands China built are in the Spratly Islands chain, which is in the southern portion of the South China Sea. In Beijing’s view, China was playing catch-up with several of the other claimants who had taken steps over several de­cades to enhance their positions in the disputed area. Vietnam, for example, had conducted small-­scale reclamation missions and built military facilities on some of the twenty-­seven features it occupies in the Spratlys. The Philippines had similarly bolstered its presence on the nine features it holds. Occupying only seven small reefs, some of which ­were submerged, put China in an inferior position. In addition, other claimants such as Vietnam ­were seen as encroaching on Chinese sovereignty and interests by adopting domestic maritime laws aimed at strengthening their own sovereignty claims, harassing Chinese fishermen, developing hydrocarbon resources, and conducting military exercises with the United States. The island building campaign signaled Beijing’s resolve to defend China’s fundamental rights and interests and deter ­future challenges from its smaller neighbors. Second, by enhancing its presence in the South China Sea, China aimed to strengthen its hand to use diplomacy to create a regional environment favorable to Chinese interests. By the early 2010s, ­there was a widely shared assessment in China that the country’s approach to ­handling the South China Sea dispute had been in­effec­tive. The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed by China and the ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2002, had failed to preserve stability on terms advantageous to China. Moreover, Beijing’s policy of “shelving the territorial disputes to pursue joint development” of energy had not been successful. Other claimants ­were unilaterally exploiting oil and gas in areas within China’s nine-­d ash line. China’s self-­restraint ­a fter

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signing the declaration was perceived to have been exploited by the other claimants for their own interests and at China’s expense. The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea committed all eleven states to eventually conclude a binding code of conduct. The Chinese believed that by shoring up its position in the South China Sea, China would increase its leverage in negotiations on a code of conduct. Recognizing the inexorable growth of Chinese power and influence, ASEAN member states would be more likely to accommodate to Chinese interests, ensuring that the agreement would serve Beijing’s twin objectives of maintaining stability and protecting Chinese rights. Third, China’s actions ­were driven by security concerns and a desire to employ its expanding capabilities to protect and promote Chinese interests. The ­People’s Liberation Army (PLA) argued that protecting China’s sea lines of communication, which are vital for the nation’s economic development, and safeguarding its expanding overseas interests required a stronger foothold in the South China Sea. Establishing military outposts in the Spratlys would also enable China to carry out military and law enforcement activities more effectively, increase the PLA’s power-­projection capabilities, and enhance the reliability and effectiveness of China’s retaliatory nuclear capability by protecting Chinese nuclear submarines homeported at nearby Hainan Island. Creating strategic depth to defend China from potential attacks via the South China Sea was likely another PLA goal. China’s history of foreign invasions, beginning with the Opium Wars in the nineteenth ­century that led to what the Chinese Communist Party dubbed the “­Century of Humiliation,” has prompted the military and the broader public to support strong defense capabilities and assertive policies to defend Chinese sovereignty claims.

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The Obama administration’s active attention to the region, captured in its Pivot to Asia policy launched in the fall of 2011, likely strengthened the PLA’s case. A key event was Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s assertion at the July 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum that the United States has impor­tant national interests in the South China Sea. The episode was interpreted by Beijing as a signal of US intent to increase its interference in what had formerly been disputes between China and the other claimants. Ensuing US actions, including support for some of the other claimants in sporadic clashes, was likely another f­actor in the ultimate decision to proceed with the island-­building plan. The reclamation and militarization proj­ect had been proposed by the Chinese Navy no l­ater than 2009 but was rejected by Chinese president Hu Jintao. Xi Jinping, a more risk-­acceptant leader, apparently approved the plan in late 2013. Several events that occurred in 2012 and early 2013 likely influenced Xi’s decision to give the green light. In the spring of 2012 a confrontation took place between China and the Philippines at Scarborough Shoal, a chain of reefs and rocks located only 140 miles from Manila. The standoff was defused by the United States, which mediated the dispute. US diplomats involved say that at Washington’s urging, the Philippines withdrew its vessels with the understanding that China would do the same. However, Beijing denied the existence of an agreement and instructed its maritime law enforcement vessels to take control of Scarborough Shoal. Chinese officials ­later justified their actions by insisting that they had pledged only to remove Chinese maritime ships from the lagoon, not from the area around Scarborough Shoal. China’s success in outsmarting the United States and changing the status quo at Scarborough Shoal in its ­favor without paying a cost may have emboldened Xi to implement the Chinese Navy’s plan.

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Fourth, a relevant event that may have affected Chinese decision making was the Philippine decision to bring a ­legal case against China over its expansive claims and activities in the Spratlys by invoking a tribunal through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The case was initiated in January 2013 a­ fter China won the standoff at Scarborough Shoal and prevented Filipino fishing boats from operating in the area. Angered by Manila’s audacity and determined to deter other countries from supporting the Philippine case or launching their own cases, Xi may have opted to give the go-­ahead to execute the reclamation and militarization plan. Fi­nally, Beijing may have concluded that the Obama administration was unlikely to take action to stop it from realizing its objectives and seized the opportunity to change the status quo in the South China Sea in China’s f­avor. A ­ fter drawing a red line for Syria in 2012—­that if Syrian president Bashar al-­Assad used chemical weapons, the United States would make a military response—­President Obama refrained from using force when the Syrian military used chemical weapons against civilians in August 2013. The episode may have been interpreted by Xi as suggesting that the US president was reluctant to employ the US military to defend American interests and would not intervene to block China’s South China Sea advance. Had Beijing calculated that the island building would trigger a US-­China military confrontation, it might not have proceeded with the plan. In early 2016, China allegedly abandoned an effort to conduct reclamation at Scarborough Shoal ­after the Obama administration signaled it was willing to use force to prevent Chinese militarization of Scarborough Shoal. Although some observers maintain that Beijing’s decision to build military outposts in the South China Sea was driven entirely by defensive motives, it is evident from the above analy­sis that China’s massive undertaking was the result of a combination of insecurity, oppor-

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tunism, and ambition. Taken together with Xi’s statements and China’s policies in recent years t­ oward regional countries, it increasingly appears that China’s plan to exert greater control over the South China Sea is part of a broader strategic decision to pursue regional hegemony. One early but notable sign of Beijing’s ambition was Xi’s push in 2014 for the establishment of a new regional security architecture. Calling for “the ­people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the prob­lems of Asia, and uphold the security of Asia” at a meeting of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-­Building Mea­sures in Asia, China’s leader left no doubt that Beijing seeks to dilute American influence and create a Sinocentric regional security architecture. What is at stake for the United States in the South China Sea? Why should Amer­i­ca care if China controls the area? The United States has numerous interests in the South China Sea. Ensuring freedom of navigation is a long-­standing US global interest that includes unimpeded lawful trade and commerce as well as the exercise of high seas freedoms consistent with UNCLOS. To prevent countries from enforcing excessive and unlawful maritime claims, the US Navy conducts freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) globally as part of a program established in 1979. The Obama administration carried out four FONOPs in the South China Sea between May 2015 and October 2016. The Trump administration increased the pace of FONOPs, conducting twenty-­seven FONOPs over four years. The Biden administration conducted only four FONOPs in the South China Sea in its first year in power. The South China Sea is an essential waterway for trade. An estimated $3.4 trillion of shipping trade passes through the ­waters of the South China Sea e­ very year. While just over 14 ­percent of US maritime trade traveled through t­hose w ­ aters in 2016, nearly 42 ­percent of Japan’s trade took place in the busy maritime throughway.

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China’s reliance on the South China Sea for trade is even greater: over 64 ­percent of China’s maritime trade transited the waterway in 2016, including 80 ­percent of its oil imports. It is therefore unlikely that China would disrupt commercial shipping, although dire circumstances may justify such actions. The United States also has a strong interest in the peaceful resolution of disputes over sovereignty and maritime entitlements. Should Beijing perceive that the United States is willing to cede the South China Sea to Chinese influence, China is likely to employ coercion and even military force to dislodge other claimants from features they occupy and exert control over the vast maritime area. The resulting loss of confidence by Asian nations in the United States would be harmful to US interests. China would become the dominant power in the area, and with no reliable outside power to provide a counterbalance, regional countries would accommodate Chinese interests and fall u ­ nder Chinese sway. Amer­i­ca’s position and influence in the western Pacific would be severely undermined. The United States has a defense treaty with the Philippines, one of the South China Sea claimants. If China ­were to attack a Philippine naval or coast guard vessel, use force against members of the Philippine armed forces, or shoot down a Philippine military aircraft, the United States would be required to “act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional pro­cesses.” The credibility of Amer­i­ca’s commitments to the Philippines and potentially to its other treaty allies is therefore at stake and could be put to the test in the South China Sea. The United States also has an abiding interest in the maintenance of a rules-­based regional order and re­spect for international law. Although the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, it abides by the convention as a ­matter of customary international law and domestic policy. Security and economic prosperity in the region depend on

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common rules and norms, and the United States prefers that ­those rules and norms are set by democracies, not authoritarian governments. In addition, the US advocates for the protection of the rights of all countries, large and small. This includes rights to resources such as fish and hydrocarbons within their exclusive economic zones and continental shelf as permitted ­under UNCLOS. Therefore, the United States has called for China to abide by the case the Philippines won against China in 2016 and bring its claims into alignment with the ruling. China built and militarized islands in the South China Sea to bolster its territorial and maritime claims, strengthen its ability to use diplomacy to shape a regional environment favorable to Chinese interests, and increase control over a large maritime area that Beijing deems crucial to the country’s military and economic security. The massive undertaking was driven by a combination of insecurity, opportunism, and ambition. US interests in the South China Sea include protecting freedom of navigation, ensuring the peaceful resolution of disputes, maintaining the credibility of its alliance commitments, preserving a rules-­based regional order, and ensuring that all nations can access resources that are rightfully theirs ­under international law.

VI Economics

26

Who Wins and Who Loses in the US-­China Trade War? Yukon Huang

In march 2018, US president Donald Trump launched a trade con-

flict with China with the tweet “Trade wars are good and easy to win.” But who wins and who loses depends on where one sits. The Trump administration’s most publicized salvo was a 25 ­percent tariff levied against $250 billion worth of Chinese imports. Beijing retaliated in kind. This led to a truce ­under the January 2020 Phase One agreement, with China promising to import an additional $200 billion in goods and affirming intentions to reform its trade practices. But bilateral trade is only one part of the US-­China economic relationship. The more contentious structural issues, such as China’s restrictive investment policies, w ­ ere left for ­future negotiations. ­Later in 2018, the Trump administration sanctioned two Chinese telecommunications firms: ZTE for dealing with Iran and North ­Korea and then Huawei as a security threat for its prominence in providing 5G ser­vices. Subsequently, hundreds of Chinese firms ­were added to the US Commerce Department’s Entity List, limiting their access to Amer­i­ca’s high-­tech products through export restrictions and controls. Together with other mea­sures, ­these punitive actions have been characterized as the decoupling of the two economies. Several aspects of that decoupling, including restrictions on foreign investment, curtailment of academic collaboration, and access to US financial markets, clearly go beyond any short-­term tensions over trade.

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­A fter Joe Biden became president in January 2021 he vowed to reverse many of Trump’s policies, but in regard to China t­here was relatively l­ittle change during the first year of his presidency. Instead, President Biden has added to anti-­China sentiments by characterizing the US-­China confrontation as a b­ attle between the utility of democracies and autocracies in the twenty-­first c­ entury. ECONOMIC TENSIONS DRIVEN BY THREE CONSTITUENTS

What exactly Washington wants is complicated by the contrasting concerns among three dif­fer­ent constituencies. Trump idiosyncratically fixated on bilateral trade deficits with China, which he blamed for Amer­i­ca’s job losses. The business community is more concerned about China’s unfair investment practices, theft of intellectual property (IP), and accessing its gargantuan market. Fi­n ally, the US foreign policy establishment sees China as a rising technological power that threatens Amer­i­ca’s global economic and military dominance. Trump, motivated by his po­liti­cal base, defined winning as getting China to buy more agricultural and industrial products. However, his logic was flawed, and the mechanics w ­ ere unworkable. Governments cannot simply legislate what another country’s ­house­holds or firms should buy. Amer­i­ca does not produce the high-­end consumer goods that China’s rising ­middle class desires or the transport equipment that its firms need. Moreover, China is barred on security grounds from buying many of the high-­tech American products that it covets. Thus, it was no surprise that the outcome of the tariffs was the opposite of what Trump intended. In both 2020 and 2021 China fell far short of its import commitments, while Amer­i­ca’s trade balance deteriorated. Meanwhile, China’s trade surpluses increased as it found alternative export markets.

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The concerns of American firms about China’s business environment ­were hardly addressed since tariffs are not effective tools for this purpose. So, US firms ­were losers too, suffering reduced profitability as tariffs raised costs. The only winners have been the security hawks who ratcheted up assertions that China constitutes a strategic threat. Their advocacy for decoupling intensified t­ oward the end of Trump’s tenure and ­were intensified with President Biden’s repeated criticisms of China’s repression of the protests in Hong Kong and the Uyghur community in Xinjiang. IMPACT OF THE TRADE WAR AND THE PANDEMIC

For years economists excoriated Trump’s preoccupation with trade deficits, which have no direct links to the welfare of US citizens and firms. The US Federal Reserve found that Americans paid for most of the cost of the tariffs, contradicting Trump’s assertion that China would foot the bill. Further, according to a US-­China Business Council study, some 245,000 American jobs ­were lost ­because the tariffs increased the costs of imported materials and components needed for manufacturing other products. Having its industrial champions placed on the US Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security’s Entity List is a major blow to China’s technological ambitions. But the consequences are not one-­sided. Amer­i­ca’s leading high-­tech firms earn as much as 20–50  ­percent of their revenues in China. The losses arising from their inability to sell to China’s listed firms w ­ ill crimp the capacity of American firms to expand. This has impelled even the US Defense Department to warn about the unintended consequences of export restrictions.

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­Others argue, however, that it is worth incurring t­hese costs to pressure Beijing to reform its policies, particularly IP protection. Creating a strong IP regime takes de­cades, and China is a late comer, having passed its first patent law only in 2001 when it joined the World Trade Organ­ization. But ­there has been pro­g ress. The American Chamber of Commerce China 2020 Business Climate Survey reported that nearly 70 ­percent of its members felt that China’s enforcement of IP rights had improved compared with 47 ­percent in 2015. Economic arguments, however, m ­ atter ­little for American politicians who are sensitive to the anti-­China sentiments among their constituents or are inclined to stoke such emotions for po­liti­cal purposes. Pew surveys indicated that over 70 ­percent of the American public have unfavorable views of China, up from one-­third a de­cade ago. Emotions have been further exacerbated by Trump repeatedly blaming China for the COVID-19 pandemic and escalating concerns about China’s authoritarian policies and intentions regarding Taiwan. China’s effective, if draconian, h ­ andling of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, facilitated a sharp industrial recovery. Strong demand in the West for China’s medical supplies and products that other countries could not manufacture ­because of supply disruptions led to a doubling of China’s trade surplus in 2020, making it the first major economy to pull out of the pandemic-­induced global recession. This has made it less likely that US firms w ­ ill relocate out of China ­because of the pandemic, despite concerns about being overly reliant on China for essential products. Moreover, despite US restrictions, foreign investment flows into China have surged in line with it economic recovery. China’s response to Trump’s decoupling mea­sures ­were low-­key, exemplified by promulgating its own Unreliable Entities List and a vague Export Control Law. Beijing is now waiting to see how Biden’s policies w ­ ill evolve. Meanwhile, the leadership has been promoting

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indigenous innovation and relying more on domestic suppliers, which is accentuating the decoupling pro­cess. COSTS OF DECOUPLING

The broadening scope of sanctions on economic, security, and ­human rights grounds means that the consequences of decoupling are now felt widely across the United States and the world. But the damage cuts both ways. Banning Huawei’s telecoms equipment means higher prices for American and Eu­ro­pean consumers. Delisting from US equity markets and restrictions on investment flows has curbed China’s access to US sources of capital, but American investors lose out on profits. The research efforts and finances of US universities have been harmed by the visa restrictions imposed on Chinese students and scholars. The ultimate cost, however, is the damage to long-­term growth prospects for both sides by impeding the creation and transfer of knowledge. Most frontier innovations take place in wealthy countries with strong institutions. Then, global supply chains facilitate their spread across borders. This allows countries to pool skills and specialize, making their collective efforts worth more than the sum of the parts. Restructuring of supply chains is normally driven by firms, not by governments. Thus far, any shift of supply chains out of China has been less than what was initially envisaged. China’s huge reservoir of skilled ­labor, reliable infrastructure, networks of suppliers, and probusiness government discourage large-­scale relocation of production elsewhere. Another American Chamber of Commerce China survey of US companies conducted during the pandemic found that just 2 ­percent of respondents w ­ ere considering leaving the Chinese market in the next three to five years.

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Decoupling has dif­fer­ent implications for the two nations given the nature of their dependencies. China’s vulnerability lies in its reliance on imported high-­tech components, especially semiconductors. Amer­i­ca’s vulnerability takes the more diffuse form of $600 billion in annual revenues that American companies earn operating within China’s borders. In short, the economic consequences of total decoupling would be catastrophic for both sides. ­W ILL CHINA CHALLENGE AMER­I ­C A’S TECHNOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP?

Ignoring efficiency arguments, the US security establishment defines winning as impeding China’s efforts to become more advanced technologically. A de­cade ago, most observers believed that China would have difficulty in challenging the United States as an innovative superpower. The argument was based on supposed flaws in China’s state control of resources and information flows, weak IP protection, and an environment characterized as stifling creativity. But China’s sustained economic achievements now suggest that it could rapidly narrow its technological gap with the West. Global experience points to five key f­actors driving innovation: learning, ­human capital, competition, scale, and owner­ship structures. China scores well on the first four of ­these ­factors, and though its state owner­ship may be suboptimal, it is unlikely to be crippling. Foreign investment and participation in global value chains have driven China’s adoption of hard and soft technologies. China now boasts more researchers than the United States. But what sets China apart is its huge market and exceptional competitive pressures driving innovation, despite lingering socialist dogma. A huge home market means that Chinese companies can achieve economies of scale before having to venture abroad and that global firms cannot resist investing in China.

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Competition arises both externally, from trade, and internally, from interprovincial rivalries. A relatively homogeneous culture combined with curious consumers willing to embrace new products makes China an attractive market for innovation especially in digital activities, where Chinese companies are now ahead of their American counter­parts in such areas as mobile financial ser­v ices. Still, China has not yet been able to produce its own globally competitive car and is struggling to produce next-­generation semiconductors, which require design skills and specialized equipment that China has been unable to replicate. This illustrates the limits to leapfrogging up the technology ladder, even with strong state support. Furthermore, recent highly publicized state-­driven initiatives to regulate and tame China’s internet g­ iants, notably Alibaba and companies exhibiting anticompetitive practices, could dampen innovative spirits. ­W ILL BIDEN’S ADMINISTRATION H ­ ANDLE T­ HINGS DIFFERENTLY?

The Biden administration needs a more coherent China strategy than Trump’s chaotic decoupling. Recent pronouncements indicate that depending on the issue, China is viewed as a partner, competitor, and rival all at the same time. But security concerns now dominate the agenda, making the realization of mutually beneficial economic gains more difficult. Biden, unlike Trump, is less concerned with trade deficits but unlike his pre­de­ces­sor wants to work with allies in confronting China. But Biden has similar protectionist sentiments in elevating the interests of workers above both consumers and Wall Street firms seeking better access to China. He has promoted “Buy Amer­i­ca” programs, incentives to encourage domestic production, and industrial policies to support innovative industries and green technologies, an approach that meshes well with his climate change agenda.

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Thus far, Biden’s administration seems unwilling to alter Trump’s Phase One purchase commitments or eliminate the related tariffs even if ­these actions made ­little sense to begin with. Biden also has been hesitant to highlight publicly any significant softening of policies in the run-up to the 2022 midterm elections. But his administration seems more inclined to find ways to moderate tensions exemplified by statements suggesting that some form of recoupling or selective tariff exemptions might be considered. Moreover, Biden’s advisers, unlike Trump’s, have not been publicly denigrating multilateral institutions but instead have indicated a willingness to push for reforms and cooperate with agencies such as the World Trade Organ­ization and World Health Organ­ization. For de­cades, the guiding princi­ple underpinning US relations with China was that economic and security issues could be addressed separately. But President Xi’s more assertive foreign policies and tightening grip on civil liberties have fueled anti-­China emotions. So, economic issues have become deeply intertwined with security concerns, transforming bilateral relations into a zero-­sum game. Finding a more constructive approach begins with altering attitudes about ­great power rivalries and establishing a regional or broader global consensus to mediate concerns. Regarding Asia, President Biden has thus far focused more on security than economic issues as exemplified in strengthening defense arrangements with Australia by offering nuclear-­powered submarines in September 2021. In contrast, he has shown no inclination to overcome domestic re­sis­tance to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-­Pacific Partnership even though China has indicated an interest in joining. Working with Eu­ro­pean powers to mitigate economic differences may offer an alternative path. Eu­rope shares the same ideological concerns as the United States but is not as enmeshed in ­g reat power politics. However, Eu­rope is more closely intertwined with

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China’s economy. Eu­rope is China’s largest trading partner and has been investing much more in China than the United States. Thus, the tentative agreement reached in late 2020 between the Eu­ro­pean Union and China on a bilateral investment treaty could provide a framework for Biden’s administration to scale back punitive tariffs and export restrictions. Eu­rope may be worried about China’s technological ambitions but is also concerned about US dominance in digital ser­v ices and technological sovereignty. On the sensitive Huawei 5G issue, for which both the United States and the Eu­ro­pean Union have expressed security concerns, one option is for Huawei to partner with a Eu­ro­ pean firm such as Nokia to supply key components and monitor data ser­v ices. Ultimately, an international agreement such as the Nuclear Non-­Proliferation Treaty may be needed for managing trade and technology-­related risks more generally. Dealing with US-­China economic tensions w ­ ill be a long-­term affair. The under­lying f­actors preceded Trump’s administration and ­w ill endure well beyond Biden’s. If the US-­China trade war bears a lesson, it is this: when security concerns trump economic imperatives, bilateral relations become zero-­sum. Then, one cannot win without the other losing.

27 How

Does Party-­State Capitalism in China Interact with Global Capitalism? Margaret M. Pearson, Meg Rithmire, and Kellee S.Tsai

Concerns about the nature of the Chinese economy figure prom-

inently in global suspicion about Chinese power, especially in the recent souring of Sino-­US relations. Arguments for bringing China into global markets ­under the assumption that economic competition and institutional commitments would push it ­toward cap­i­tal­ist economic practices legible to Westerners have given way to concerns that the state’s role and power in the economy make competing with China unfair or impossible and make collaboration dangerous. China is frequently labeled a case of “state capitalism,” a term loosely used to describe systems in which the government dominates the economy through state owner­ship, financial intervention, and heavy-­handed industrial policy. Although some of ­these features are found in many demo­cratic countries, including Brazil, India, and Norway, the term takes on a more ominous connotation when applied to autocracies in general and China in par­tic­u­lar as it has become a global economic power­house.

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China’s po­liti­cal economy is increasingly or­ga­n ized to facilitate the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) dominance and is directed ­toward managing domestic and international risks. This marks a departure from more common variations of state capitalism mainly intended to promote domestic economic growth or help domestic firms compete globally. China’s system also has t­hese functions, but its increasing focus on po­liti­cal stability and party dominance makes its version of party-­state capitalism a distinct form of economic organ­ization. In this chapter, our description of “party-­state capitalism” stresses the importance to the regime of risk management plus three prominent features of China’s po­liti­cal economy not found in other economies. ­These three features are the rise of widespread state shareholding, blurred bound­a ries between the state and private firms, and increasing demands on both domestic and foreign firms to accede to CCP po­liti­cal demands. Ironically, the prominence of party power and interests generates self-­undermining dynamics. The central goals of party-­state capitalism are to consolidate po­liti­cal power and maintain stability, yet implementing ­these goals has generated alarm both at home and abroad. Domestically, the bolder CCP role may alienate cap­i­tal­ists whose entrepreneurship and innovation have led Chinese growth for forty years. Internationally, the party-­state’s centrality and the perception of political-­economic fusion sow distrust, generate po­liti­cal blowback, and limit the maneuverability of Chinese firms globally. WHAT IS PARTY-­S TATE CAPITALISM?

State capitalism typically refers to state economic intervention or owner­ship of firms with the goal of promoting growth and bolstering

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geostrategic or economic competition, or both, particularly in globalized industrial sectors. Party-­state capitalism is distinct from state capitalism ­because regime survival is the overarching priority. Economic goals still feature prominently in the state’s interventions, but the po­liti­cal purpose is uppermost, making regime survival the prime aim of economic policy. This po­liti­cal bottom line is illustrated by several recent trends. One trend is the increased party-­state role as shareholder or investor in a wide swath of Chinese firms. The regime has extended its stake in businesses that are not majority-­owned by the state-­owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, the main agency of state owner­ship since 2003. For de­cades, economists have distinguished between state-­owned enterprises and private firms on the assumption that private enterprises operate in a more market-­oriented and in­de­pen­dent manner. In recent years, however, state entities motivated by po­liti­cal considerations have assumed greater financial and corporate governance roles in nonstate firms. Party cells have expanded in private and foreign firms, and government officials have been given se­n ior posts, including in some of China’s best-­k nown companies abroad such as the automaker Geely and the e-­commerce ­g iant Alibaba. Expanding state investment in private firms is part of China’s current push to upgrade its industrial base through the Made in China 2025 program. Hundreds of “industrial guidance funds” w ­ ere established to direct state and private capital into innovative firms in frontier and strategic sectors such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and ­others. Since 2012, the CCP has become increasingly worried about relying on global supply chains for critical and dual-­use (military and civilian) technologies. Other state investments are less eco­nom­ically and globally strategic and more clearly prompted by worries about risk management. When a crisis

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in China’s stock market seemed to threaten overall financial stability in 2015, for example, the state intervened in domestic equity markets so heavi­ly that it eventually held half the shares of all listed firms. This willingness to use state funds to manage economic risk reflects the CCP’s goal of maintaining po­liti­cal stability by preventing potentially disruptive market swings. The conventional public-­private dichotomy is further eroded by Beijing’s use of large private firms to take on governance roles and pursue po­liti­cal objectives. For example, private firms have become involved in domestic security programs, especially to manufacture and manage big data and surveillance technology that monitors China’s large population. Large private firms also have been given welfare-­oriented assignments by investing in infrastructure to expand rural commerce u ­ nder the umbrella of CCP secretary-­general Xi Jinping’s antipoverty campaign. The fixation on risk management means that when private firms face prob­lems, the party-­state increasingly feels compelled to take action. In recent years, several large firms have entered state receivership due to excessive debt or even criminal malfeasance. Meanwhile, the government has targeted vari­ous high-­profile cap­i­t al­ists who have expressed po­liti­cally sensitive opinions. In 2020, the property tycoon Ren Zhiqiang was sentenced to eigh­teen years in prison for graft ­after calling Xi “a clown” for his ­handling of the COVID-19 outbreak. The same year, Beijing abruptly suspended the sale of Ant Financial shares in what would have been the world’s largest initial public offering ­after Alibaba’s founder, Jack Ma, publicly criticized regulators for stifling financial innovation and accused state banks of operating with a “pawnshop mentality.” U ­ nder party-­state capitalism, entrepreneurs are expected to demonstrate po­liti­cal loyalty—or e­ lse. This demand for obedience extends beyond China’s borders. The global reach of party-­state capitalism is evident in the CCP’s pressure

254 Economics

on foreign firms to adhere to its own po­liti­cal narratives. Institutions ranging from the National Basketball Association, punished for showing support for Hong Kong protesters, to airlines that list Taiwan as a country of destination have been forced to backtrack and apologize ­under threat of losing access to China’s lucrative market. In t­ hese instances, the party-­state wielded leverage to ensure recognition of its territorial claims. In a short time, Chinese capitalism has shifted from courting foreign investors to placing po­liti­cal conditions on their market access. HOW DOES PARTY-­S TATE CAPITALISM INTERACT WITH GLOBAL CAPITALISM?

For some time, especially before Xi’s era began in 2012, debate about China’s global economic role focused on issues typical to state capitalism: how preferential policies t­ oward state-­owned firms may distort competition, limits on foreign participation in sectors of strategic importance, and so forth. As the party-­state’s po­liti­cal objectives have superseded developmental ones, however, the concerns of trade partners and host governments have moved beyond critiques of China’s economic practices to security concerns. And though China’s external investments are only a fraction of ­those of Western multinationals around the world, they have given rise to anxiety and coordinated po­liti­cal re­sis­tance outside of China. China’s global economic engagements are thus constrained due to concerns about its form of po­liti­cal economy. Above all, China’s economic model makes it difficult to disentangle the state’s strategic motives from the commercial motives of Chinese firms. The high-­profile case of Huawei, a technology conglomerate registered as a private com­pany, is indicative. Is Huawei’s attempt to expand its technology network abroad a smart market play,

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an effort by the Chinese party-­state to intrude into foreign networks for espionage reasons, or both? Similarly, although Hikvision, a producer of video surveillance technology, was founded by private entrepreneurs, its global market dominance has inspired similar questions, leading to the 2019 US blacklisting of its products. Although the stated reason for the ban was h ­ uman rights abuses in Xinjiang, concerns about a Chinese com­pany having access to sensitive surveillance data was a key motive for the American decision. Chinese conglomerates’ rapid increase of investing and contracting abroad has reinforced ­these suspicions, particularly as they are often backed by state policy banks such as the Export-­Import Bank of China. Private technology companies such as Hikvision and Huawei now supply “smart city” surveillance networks to over a hundred countries, including some with repressive regimes. Leaders of wealthy industrial countries have speculated that this is an effort to “export the China model” u ­ nder the veil of smart city construction, perhaps b­ ecause China seeks to demonstrate the benefits of authoritarian domestic control combined with cap­i­tal­ist practices. The ­Belt and Road Initiative, an international infrastructure program established in 2013, is frequently cast in this light, emphasizing China’s presumed desire to convert development proj­ects into broader po­ liti­cal influence, such as support for China in the United Nations. Within the developing world, overseas activities by Chinese conglomerates, both state-­owned and private, have spurred domestic backlash in some recipient countries. For example, upon his return to power in 2019, Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad vowed to renegotiate or cancel what he termed “unfair” Chinese infrastructure deals, warning of “debt trap diplomacy.” In 2020 the Thai government cancelled a major Chinese proj­ect to build a 120-­kilometer canal through the Kra Isthmus, replacing the Chinese plan with its own. In Pakistan, Baloch separatists have attacked Chinese citizens,

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claiming that the Chinese-­fi nanced and -­built Gwadar Port is a colonial effort to pillage Balochistan’s natu­ral resources. T ­ hese examples show how the widespread perception that Chinese capitalism reflects the strategic interests of the party-­state poses challenges for the country’s external investments. To be sure, many leaders of developing countries welcome Chinese overseas activities as positive contributions to economic development. Rwandan president Paul Kagame, for example, frequently praises China’s infrastructural investments in Rwanda. Nevertheless, high-­profile incidents of backlash have captured Beijing’s attention. ­Whether financed by state or private capital, Chinese firms increasingly face po­liti­cal risk when operating abroad. Meanwhile, the party-­ state itself is reevaluating the sustainability of its e­ arlier developmental model. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DOMESTIC TRENDS AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM

Over the past de­cade, a more globally recognizable expression of state capitalism in China has evolved into a form of po­liti­cal economy better captured by the term “party-­state capitalism” due to the overarching prioritization of regime survival u ­ nder the leadership of the CCP. Ironically, in response to slower growth rates and a less welcoming global environment, China’s policy shift to promoting self-­sufficiency and self-­reliance through industrial policy has only deepened international skepticism about ­whether private Chinese companies operate in­de­pen­dently or as instruments of the party-­state. Beijing’s recent promotion of a “dual circulation” strategy explic­itly calls for stimulating domestic consumption to reduce its long-­standing reliance on export-­led development. If realized, a Chinese decoupling from international markets could disrupt global supply chains.

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The party-­state’s strategy poses a dilemma domestically. On the one hand, internally driven growth requires the cooperation of domestic entrepreneurs. They need to be at the forefront of technological innovation. On the other hand, the party-­state’s shrinking tolerance for maverick chief executive officers and out­spoken cap­i­tal­ists runs the risk of alienating ­those who lead innovation. Although stringent capital controls to stem capital flight remain in place, China’s growing ranks of billionaires have diversified their assets abroad and found exit options. As the boundary between state and private economic entities has become blurred, party-­state capitalism interacts with global capitalism by generating a vicious cycle of mutual distrust. Evidence of po­liti­ cally motivated economic intervention provokes external backlash and negative headlines. Anti-­China sentiment in turn confirms the party-­state’s sense of threat, thereby reinforcing its mindset of risk management and the perceived necessity of po­liti­cal interventions. This self-­reinforcing loop exacerbates tension both at home and abroad.

28 ­Will

the Renminbi Rival the Dollar? Eswar Prasad

China’s economy is now the second largest in the world. It has be-

come the key driver of global growth since the G ­ reat Recession of 2007–2009, a pattern that was reinforced in the economic recovery following the pandemic-­induced worldwide recession of 2020. But the prominence of its currency, the renminbi (RMB), lags b­ ehind China’s importance in the world economy. The RMB is not used widely for payment and settlement of cross-­border trade and financial transactions. The US dollar, meanwhile, remains the main international payment currency (followed by the euro) and also the dominant reserve currency, one that is held by foreign central banks as protection against balance of payments crises and to offset volatility in exchange rates. A country that issues a widely used international currency gains not only prestige but also a number of substantive benefits. Its exporters and importers can use their country’s currency for trade transactions, reducing their exposure to exchange rate volatility. A country that issues a reserve currency can typically borrow from the rest of the world in its own currency often at cheap interest rates, as the United States has been ­doing for many years now. Why has the RMB not made greater pro­g ress as an international currency despite China’s fast-­g rowing weight in global GDP and trade? W ­ ill the nationwide rollout of a digital version of the RMB

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change this trajectory, perhaps even challenging the US dollar’s dominance? The short answer is that it depends on other reforms the Chinese government undertakes in a variety of areas. Let us start with some recent history. Around 2010, the Chinese government began to promote the international use of its currency through a variety of policies. For instance, it increased RMB availability in offshore markets, authorized a number of foreign RMB trading centers, and made it easier for foreign investors to access China’s bond and equity markets. ­These mea­sures, along with China’s increasing weight in the world economy, helped put the currency on a path to what seemed to be an inexorable rise to global dominance. The RMB quickly became the fifth most impor­tant currency in international payments (­behind the US dollar, the euro, the Japa­nese yen, and the British pound sterling). In 2016, the International Monetary Fund included the RMB in an elite basket of currencies that comprise the institution’s Special Drawing Rights, making it an official reserve currency. Since then, however, the RMB’s ascendance as a global currency has not advanced. Its share of international payments has fallen below 2 ­percent, and the share of global foreign exchange reserves held in RMB-­denominated assets has plateaued at about 2 ­percent. Other quantitative indicators of the currency’s use in international finance, including to s­ettle trade transactions and issue bonds offshore, all point to signs that the RMB’s advance as an international currency has stalled. Now the Chinese central bank is taking steps to digitize its currency, which could have both domestic and international implications. In 2020 China launched ­trials of its central bank digital currency, the e-­CNY (often referred to as the digital RMB and the digital yuan), making it one of the first major economies to do so. The e-­CNY is designed to complement the use of physical cash,

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making it easier to use central bank money for digital payments. ­Trials of the e-­CNY started in four cities, and the government subsequently expanded them to other major metropolises such as Beijing and Tianjin as well as Hong Kong and Macau. The e-­CNY could be rolled out nationwide as early as 2022 or soon thereafter. ­Will the e-­CNY be a game changer that elevates the RMB’s role in international finance? China has already leapfrogged the United States and other advanced economies in the technological sophistication of its retail payment systems. Alipay and WeChat Pay have increased the efficiency and con­ve­n ience of digital retail and business-­to-­business payments in China, in addition to bringing down costs to customers and businesses. So, in parallel, it seems plausible that the digital RMB ­w ill give China a boost in the tussle for global financial market dominance. The real­ity is more sobering. The e-­CNY ­w ill initially only be usable for payments within China, although this could change over time. For all the hype about the e-­CNY, China’s separate Cross-­ Border Interbank Payment System is a more impor­tant innovation that makes it easier to use the RMB for international transactions. This payment system also has the ability to bypass the Western-­ dominated SWIFT messaging system for international payments. This could potentially be a way to get around US financial sanctions, a tempting prospect for many governments. Russia—or for that ­m atter Iran and Venezuela—­w ill now find it easier to get paid in RMBs for their oil exports to China. As the RMB becomes more widely used, other smaller and developing countries that have strong trade and financial links with China might start to invoice and s­ ettle their trade transactions directly in that currency. The e-­CNY could eventually be linked up to the cross-­border payments system, further digitizing international payments.

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­These mea­sures have helped the internationalization of the currency, signifying its greater use in denominating and settling cross-­ border trade and financial transactions, that is, its use as an international medium of exchange. Indeed, with China’s rising weight in the world economy and global trade, this is only to be expected. However, the e-­CNY by itself ­w ill make l­ittle difference to ­whether foreign investors see the RMB as a reserve currency. Even though the International Monetary Fund has officially anointed the RMB as a reserve currency, financial market participants’ views are more impor­tant in determining a currency’s status, and they seem to have reservations about the RMB’s viability in this role. One reason is that cross-­border capital flows into and out of China are still subject to many restrictions. Another is that the RMB’s exchange rate continues to be managed by China’s central bank, although much less so since 2018. Reserve currencies are typically issued only by countries that have no restrictions on capital mobility and have market-­determined exchange rates. ­A fter all, investors in a reserve currency—­including foreign central banks—­want assurances that they can move money easily into and out of a country they are investing in and at market exchange rates. Neither of ­these policies is, however, likely to change fully anytime soon in the case of China. The Chinese government has indeed reduced restrictions on capital flows and signaled its plans to eventually allow an open capital account. Moreover, the central bank has committed to reducing its intervention in foreign exchange markets and letting market forces have their say in determining the external value of the RMB. However, foreign investors, including central banks, remain wary about changes in policies that could restrict the unfettered movements into and out of China’s capital markets at market-­driven exchange rates.

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It is likely that the RMB w ­ ill gradually become a more significant player in international financial markets, yet its full potential ­will remain unrealized ­unless the Chinese government undertakes a broad range of economic and financial system reforms. In the long run, what the RMB’s ascendance means for the global financial system depends to a large extent on how China’s economy itself changes in the pro­cess of elevating its currency. ­There are a number of pos­si­ble reforms that could increase the RMB’s prominence in global finance and also help in China’s own economic development. One is the liberalization of financial markets, including further development of fixed-­income and secondary (derivatives) markets. Another is further opening up of the capital account by removing restrictions on both inflows and outflows in a calibrated manner. Fixing the banking system so that it operates on more commercial princi­ples and with better governance structures is also impor­tant. A more flexible, market-­determined exchange rate should accompany capital account opening. This would provide a foundation for a more autonomous monetary policy regime that emphasizes price rather than quantity instruments. Fi­n ally, a more comprehensive and robust regulatory framework that enhances rather than attempts to serve as a substitute for market discipline would help build confidence in China’s financial markets. In any event, the RMB is unlikely to be seen as a safe haven currency, a special type of reserve currency that foreign and domestic investors turn to in times of global financial turmoil. The US dollar is the dominant safe haven currency; anytime ­there is turmoil in global financial markets, investors move their money into dollar-­ denominated assets for safety of their investments. A key attribute of a safe haven currency is that it has the trust of both domestic and foreign investors.

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Investors’ trust, in turn, is built on a system that adheres to the rule of law, which even the government is subject to, and a po­liti­cal system that has built-in checks and balances. Some have argued that China does have the rule of law, and while it has a one-­party nondemo­cratic system of government, ­there are sufficient self-­correcting mechanisms that prevent the government from ­r unning amok with its policies. This is not a credible or durable substitute for an institutionalized system of checks and balances such as that in the United States, where the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the judiciary have in­de­pen­dence from and serve as constraints on the unbridled exercise of powers by the other branches. The Trump administration inflicted significant damage on Amer­i­ca’s institutions, undercut the rule of law, and eroded the Federal Reserve’s in­de­pen­dence. But in international finance, every­thing is relative. Given US economic dominance, deep and liquid financial markets, and still robust institutional framework, the US dollar by far remains the major reserve currency. What implications does the RMB’s ascendance have for the configuration of the international monetary system, especially the dollar’s dominance? Any gains the RMB has made in recent years, as both a payment currency and a reserve currency, have come mostly at the expense of currencies such as the euro and the British pound sterling. Even when the International Monetary Fund inducted the RMB into the Special Drawing Rights basket of currencies, its weight of 10.9 ­percent in that basket came largely at the expense of the other currencies in the basket—­the euro, the pound sterling, and the Japa­nese yen—­rather than the dollar. ­There seems ­little prospect of the RMB’s growing prominence rivaling that of the dollar. In short, the RMB is on its way to eventually becoming a more widely used currency in international trade and finance. So long as

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China continues to make pro­g ress on financial-­sector and other market-­oriented reforms, it is likely that the RMB ­w ill become a more impor­tant reserve currency within the next de­cade. For the RMB to become a safe haven currency, however, would require not just economic and financial reforms but also significant institutional reforms. The likelihood of such reforms is minimal. If China’s government continues to reform and develop its financial markets and remove restrictions on capital flows, the e-­CNY and the Cross-­Border Interbank Payment System ­w ill together enhance the RMB’s role as an international payments currency. But they w ­ ill hardly put a dent in the US dollar’s status as the dominant global reserve currency.

29 How

Can the United States Protect Its Intellectual Property from China’s Espionage? Margaret K. Lewis

Much has changed in the US-­China relationship since I watched

the treads of a Chinese tank crush a fake Beanie Baby toy in the late 1990s. Only my Chinese colleagues at our law firm in Beijing ­were allowed to attend live, but the video captured the strike-­hard spirit ­toward a flood of pirated toys. It is no coincidence that this took place in the run-up to China’s accession to the World Trade Organ­ization and accompanying push to show stronger enforcement of laws protecting intellectual property (IP). The raids of factories producing counterfeit toys and of stalls selling them in the then open-­air Silk Alley gave at least glimmers of hope for enhanced protection of foreign companies’ IP. Fast-­forward two de­cades: the concern over stuffed toys looks quaint and the bilateral cooperation fleeting. THE CONCERN

­ oday IP is a central issue in a tense bilateral relationship, with ChrisT topher Wray, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, stating that “China often steals American intellectual property and then uses it to compete against the very American companies it victimized—in

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effect, cheating twice over.” It is thus common to hear variants of the question “How can the United States protect its IP from China’s espionage?” Criminal law is one mechanism. Before determining how to use criminal law, the nature of the threat requires explanation. In addition to guarding against traditional espionage of government secrets, increasing attention is on economic—or “industrial”—­ espionage, meaning trade secret theft when the intended beneficiary is a foreign government or its instrument. The US government has stressed the roles of academics, students, businesspeople, and other actors who are not typically the protagonists of spy novels (commonly called “nontraditional collectors”). Scrutiny focuses on talent-­ recruitment plans that provide incentives to p­ eople who have expertise beneficial to China’s goal of indigenous innovation, even if no ­actual transfer or attempted transfer of protected IP to China occurs. To be clear, ­there is evidence that the ­People’s Republic of China (PRC) party-­state is incentivizing and even directing activities that violate US laws. My use of the term “party-­state” is deliberate, ­because talent-­recruitment plans and other efforts to boost China’s competitiveness can be situated in ­either the formal PRC government or the Chinese Communist Party with which it is intertwined. Participation in a talent-­recruitment plan is not illegal u ­ nder US law. But failure to disclose involvement or funds received therefrom on government forms can be a crime. Whether IP theft occurred is a distinct question from charges centered on lies of omission or commission. The US Department of Justice (DOJ) can prosecute economic espionage and offenses involving failure to disclose ties to the PRC party-­state even if the IP at issue i­sn’t tied to the US government. Privately owned IP ranging from corn seeds to robot arms has been at the center of high-­profile cases: the “its” in “how can the United States protect its IP” is a broad concept. The “IP” of “how can the United States protect its IP” can include vari­ous forms of IP, such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks.

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Economic espionage requires that t­here be a trade secret, meaning information the owner has tried to guard and is valuable b­ ecause it is not generally known. By contrast, the US government need not prove that a trade secret or other form of IP exists when prosecuting crimes concerning nondisclosure of funds or other support connected to the PRC party-­state. The major laws governing IP theft and disclosure requirements have not changed significantly in recent years, but the DOJ’s enforcement priorities have. Researchers have voiced a growing sense of vulnerability to government scrutiny. The open science model is essential to how US research is conducted, yet scientists fear federal authorities may view their work to be m ­ atters of national security and find themselves u ­ nder investigation. Even when protectable IP is at issue, criminal punishment is far from inevitable just ­because an entity with ties to the PRC party-­ state benefits from IP infringement. Prosecutorial discretion is vast. Opinions vary about which violations of privately held IP—­more often m ­ atters handled in civil courts—­should be considered violations of criminal law based on a US government decision that the situation triggers broad societal concerns, not just private business interests. And the more often IP is called critical to Amer­i­ca’s economic strength and, in turn, to national security, the more likely the DOJ ­w ill use criminal prosecutions to protect it. The meaning of “China’s espionage” also lacks clear definition. Although the terms “United States” and “China” fit the realm of state-­to-­state relations, they can be an uncomfortable fit when applied to individual prosecutions. The phrasing of “China” as able to commit espionage or other crimes paints a picture of an anthropomorphic threat that “China” itself is stealing the corn seed or robot arm even though individuals or l­egal entities are ultimately the defendants in criminal cases. A key question is what kind of connectivity must exist between the person committing the illegal act and

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the governing structure of the PRC to turn the case into one of economic espionage. IP theft without a government connection is still a crime, albeit one subject to less severe punishment and of less urgent concern to the US government. Some types of illegal conduct are directly connected to official Chinese institutions, such as allegations that p­ eople failed to disclose their positions in the PRC military on US visa applications. Yet US government discussion of IP protection commonly uses “China” in terms that extend beyond the PRC party-­state. The United States needs greater clarity as to what kinds of academic institutions and business entities situated in China are of US security concern. This imprecision exacerbates questions about the dollar amounts concerned. The annual cost of IP theft by “China” is frequently cited in the hundreds of billions. While t­ hese numbers are often presented with ­limited evidence, ­there is widespread agreement that the transfer of US-­based IP to China-­based entities in contravention of US laws is a valid concern. The magnitude and significance of ­these concerns is what’s hotly debated. Increasingly fierce US-­China economic competition indicates that regardless of the exact numbers involved, efforts by the PRC party-­state to siphon IP and recruit t­hose who create it w ­ ill remain a US government focus even though, as explained below, the Biden administration in February 2022 ended the Trump administration’s China Initiative. THE INITIATIVE

The DOJ’s 2018 China Initiative was a response to an alleged increase in economic espionage. The crimes charged u ­ nder it were not, however, ­limited to this core concern: they also included wire fraud, false statements to government agencies, grant fraud, acting as agents of

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the PRC without notifying the US government, and other charges related to connections to PRC-­linked entities that have compromised or might compromise US-­linked IP. Cases involving nondisclosure or false statements by academics took on an increasingly vis­i­ble role. For example, in January 2022, the US government dropped charges against Mas­sa­chu­setts Institute of Technology professor Gang Chen for wire fraud, failing to file a foreign bank account report, and making a false statement in a tax return. The DOJ ended the case a year ­after announcing charges, explaining that their ongoing evaluation of the evidence led prosecutors to conclude that they could no longer meet their burden of proof at trial. The crimes for which Professor Chen was charged are not China-­ specific. The China Initiative focused on stepping up use of existing laws rather than seeking the creation of new ones. The crimes for which Chen and other defendants with alleged links to the PRC were charged can carry with them penalties of up to de­cades ­behind bars. Even without a conviction and punishment, being subject to a criminal investigation can take a severe financial, emotional, and even physical toll. Beyond the DOJ, Washington is scrutinizing policy involving inbound Chinese investments and other facets of the US-­China relationship that involve economic interests, with economic security increasingly being viewed as a key component of national security. For example, the US trade representative emphasized in an October 2021 speech that the Biden administration would take “all steps necessary to protect ourselves against the waves of damage inflicted over the years through unfair competition.” The China Initiative was thus just one facet of the US government’s broader response to China’s economic rise, but it was a particularly potent one with re­spect to the impact it has on individuals’ lives.

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THE CRITIQUE

From inception in late 2018 to its end in early 2022, the China Initiative resulted in dozens of indictments, with thousands of China-­related cases in the investigatory pipeline, according to US government statements. The initiative also created significant controversy, including by this author, over w ­ hether it swept with too broad of a brush and relied on severe criminal sanctions when a less harsh approach may deter harmful conduct without discouraging productive collaboration. The language of a “China threat” used during the Trump administration helped stigmatize ­people of Chinese nationality, national origin, or ethnicity or with other connections to “China.” Statements by DOJ officials emphasizing the “communist” in “Chinese Communist Party” and questioning the loyalty of defendants such as naturalized US-­citizen Professor Chen depicted a menacing foreign threat. That the China Initiative coincided with COVID-19 further exacerbated negative views of ­people seen as linked to China by nationality or ethnicity. The Biden administration dialed back the Trump administration’s rhe­toric but remained adamant that, throughout the life of the Initiative, there was only the “perception” (not the reality) that DOJ “in some way view[s] people with racial, ethnic or familial ties to China differently.” The DOJ did not explain how it reached this conclusion, nor did it grapple with how a “China threat” framing can infuse unconscious bias into decisions. When, for example, a jury deadlocked on wire fraud and false statements charges against Professor Anming Hu in the summer of 2021, the DOJ’s pursuit of a retrial came to a halt ­after the judge dismissed all charges b­ ecause the government failed to meet its minimum evidentiary burden. Instead of using Professor Hu’s case as a cause for reflection on the question-

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able investigatory practices that led to his prosecution, the government doubled down on the charges with only extraordinary judicial intervention clearing Hu. ­There is no documented evidence that the US government is systematically targeting ­people such as Hu ­because of their nationality or ethnicity. And disproportionate effects alone do not prove discrimination, but the dramatically high percentage of ethnically Chinese defendants coupled with the crumbling of high-profile cases undermined the government’s assurances. Even if data scientists cannot obtain the needed information to prove or disprove intentional discrimination, ­there is a palpable sense of stigma among Chinese Americans and PRC nationals who live in the United States. And the DOJ’s assertions that the China Initiative was not discriminatory have not been accompanied by explanations of how it strives to avoid bias—­both explicit and implicit—in its work. That the Federal Bureau of Investigation special agent’s investigation into Professor Hu was based on unfounded suspicions that he was engaged in economic espionage on behalf of the PRC government is paradigmatic of ­these concerns: conscious and unconscious f­actors wrongly focused the special agent on Hu as a national security threat. THE ­F UTURE

The China Initiative raised the security consciousness of researchers who have connections to that country. The pendulum, however, swung too far ­toward emphasizing security concerns. Protecting and creating US IP would be better served by a more carefully calibrated approach. The decision in February 2022 to scrap the “China Initiative” was a critical first step. The DOJ, as the lead on the replacement “Strategy for Countering Nation-State Threats,” should take the following steps.

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First, put guardrails in place to protect against future cases like that of Professors Chen and Hu. Only with improved oversight of investigations and prosecutions will researchers gain confidence that the adoption of a strategy with a country-neutral name is a genuine shift to protecting critical interests from threats wherever they emanate from, and not a veiled “China Initiative 2.0.” Proportionally more cases involving IP violations ­will in all likelihood still be linked to China, but changing the government’s practices, along with the name change, can build trust that people are indeed being judged based on their acts, not where they or their ancestors were born. Second, expand coordination across the executive branch, further drawing on country-­specific expertise in other agencies such as the State Department as well as technical expertise in the office of the now cabinet-­level presidential science adviser. Third, deepen nascent cooperation with nongovernment experts from three categories: scientists who best understand the open science model and can work with the government to explore adjustments to research security; p­ eople who study China’s laws, politics, and economy to refine understanding of which ties to PRC-­based entities might trigger national security concerns; and criminologists who can help find a better spot—­even if ­there is no one sweet spot—­for using criminal sanctions to deter crimes while not squelching beneficial international collaboration. Fourth, work with universities to clarify and streamline grant procedures including disclosure requirements related to foreign grants. The clearer and less onerous the paperwork, the more apparent it ­w ill be when noncompliance is due to intentional evasion rather than relatively benign ­m istakes. Fifth, collaborate with Asian American and PRC citizen communities to understand how they experience discrimination and establish programs within the US government to enhance diversity

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and reduce bias. Ultimately, the United States gains the most if ­there is a continuing stream of new IP to protect. This goal requires training, recruiting, and retaining the best minds regardless of where they ­were born or what their personal characteristics may be. When I was writing this chapter in early March 2022, the DOJ was embarking on its new “Strategy for Countering Nation-State Threats,” having concluded that the China Initiative was “not the right approach.” Communities that had criticized the China Initiative were, however, yet to be convinced that the government had committed to making more than cosmetic changes. Thus while the story of the formal China Initiative is now written in the past tense, the question is left for a future volume whether the spirit of the China Initiative will also be relegated to history in ­favor of a more circumspect approach to using criminal law in support of innovation.

30 Is

China Catching Up with the West? Or, Why Should We Care about China’s ­Middle Class? Terry Sicular

Is china’s economy catching up with or possibly even overtaking

that of the United States? Most discussion of this question has focused on catch-up in terms of economic size, specifically w ­ hether China’s gross domestic product has caught up with that of the United States. But economic size ­doesn’t tell the ­whole story. Instead, consider the question from a dif­fer­ent perspective: are Chinese ­house­holds and individuals catching up with middle-­class Americans? The answer is an emphatic yes. The speed and scale of catch-up in personal incomes has been astonishing. The share of China’s population with income equivalent to that of middle-­class Americans has ballooned. Although this group is still a minority of China’s population, the group’s absolute size now exceeds the entire population of the United States. Rising h ­ ouse­hold incomes in China are transforming the global m ­ iddle class, with worldwide implications. The emergence of a global m ­ iddle class in China also has significant domestic implications and is central to China’s current development strategy, which emphasizes common prosperity and the expansion of domestic demand in order to sustain ­future economic growth.

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HOW LARGE IS CHINA’S GLOBAL M ­ IDDLE CLASS?

Recent research by Xiuna Yang, Björn Gustafsson, and myself provides estimates based on a ­simple definition of “global ­m iddle class”: having ­house­hold income per person that is neither rich nor poor in high-­income countries. Income does not capture all facets of what it means to be ­m iddle class but is straightforward and strongly correlated with standards of living. We use high-­income countries as our benchmark ­because ­house­hold incomes in high-­income countries are associated with prosperity and ­because we are interested in ­whether Chinese h ­ ouse­holds are catching up with their counter­parts in the United States and Eu­rope. We classify ­house­holds as ­m iddle class if their income per person falls between 60 and 200 ­percent of median income in the Eu­ro­pean Union in 2018. For ­earlier years we adjust ­these numbers for inflation so that the real purchasing power of our income cutoffs remain constant over time. We refer to the population that enjoys t­hese income levels as the “global” m ­ iddle class. So defined, a f­ amily of two adults and two ­children is classified in the global ­m iddle class if its total h ­ ouse­hold income falls between about US$30,000 and $100,000 (equivalent to 120,000 to 400,000 renminbi, based on the 2018 purchasing power parity exchange rate). For comparison, in the United States in 2018, median income for such a ­house­hold was $74,000. We apply ­these cutoffs to Chinese data to obtain estimates of the size of China’s global m ­ iddle class. We do so using the 2002, 2007, 2013, and 2018 surveys of the China House­hold Income Proj­ect (CHIP). The CHIP surveys cover large nationwide samples and provide consistent information over the years, making analy­sis of long-­term trends pos­si­ble. Our estimates reveal dramatic growth, as shown in ­table 30.1. In 2002 less than 1 ­percent of China’s population belonged to the global

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­Table 30.1.  China’s Global ­M iddle Class, 2002–2018

2002 2007 2013 2018

Share of China’s Population (%)

Size (millions)

0.6 2.0 13.8 24.7

7.5 26.7 187.9 344.2

Data source: Terry Sicular, Xiuna Yang, and Björn Gustafsson, “The Rise of China’s Global ­M iddle Class in International Perspective,” IZA Institute of ­Labor Economics, Discussion paper series No. 14531, July 2021, https://­docs​.­iza​.­org​/­dp14531​.­pdf.

­ iddle class; by 2018, only sixteen years l­ater, nearly 25 ­percent bem longed. The average annual growth rate of China’s global m ­ iddle class during t­hese years was 27 ­percent. By comparison, growth of the middle-­class populations of the United States and Eu­rope during this period, which includes the 2007–2009 ­Great Recession but predates the COVID-19 pandemic, was slow or negative. Consequently, China’s middle-­class catch-up was rapid and indeed faster than its gross domestic product catch-up. In 2018 China’s middle-­class population was 344 million, exceeding in size the entire population of the United States (330 million) and equivalent to two-­thirds of the population of the Eu­ro­ pean Union (510 million, including the United Kingdom). China has thus emerged as a major player in the global ­m iddle class. WHO BELONGS TO CHINA’S GLOBAL M ­ IDDLE CLASS?

China’s global ­m iddle class is overwhelmingly urban. More than 90 ­percent live in cities, and this growth has led to a startling transformation of China’s cities. In 2007 less than 5 ­percent of urban residents belonged to this group; by 2018 its share of China’s urban population

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had reached almost 40 ­percent. Assuming continued growth, most Chinese city dwellers ­w ill soon have incomes comparable to middle-­ class ­house­holds in the United States and Eu­rope. The same cannot be said of rural China, where in 2018 less than 5  ­percent of the population had achieved ­these levels of income. For rural ­house­holds the main pathway to the ­middle class is via migration to the cities. Rural-­to-­urban mi­grants have, like the urban-­born, seen rapid income increases, enabling many to enter the global ­middle class. A few characteristics of China’s global ­m iddle class are noteworthy. First, it is relatively well-­off compared to the rest of China’s population. Our lower cutoff for the global m ­ iddle class exceeds China’s median income, putting ­those who have reached this status in the upper half of China’s income distribution. Second, this group has considerable spending power. China’s middle-­class ­house­holds own many of the same consumer durables found in middle-­class American ­house­holds, including refrigerators, washing machines, and electronic devices such as cell phones and computers. They spend on entertainment, travel, and other leisure activities. Most are homeowners. They also are well educated and invest in their ­children’s education. The majority of middle-­class adults are high school gradu­ates, and many have postsecondary education. Third, their incomes come mainly from wages and salaries (or pensions from previous employment), and their jobs are disproportionately in state or quasi-­state organ­izations such as the civil ser­v ice, state-­owned enterprises, and education. Relatively few members of China’s global m ­ iddle class are entrepreneurs or o ­ wners of private businesses. This is not to diminish the importance of China’s small and medium-­sized business sector, but that sector is more relevant to the rural population and lower-­income class than to China’s global ­m iddle class.

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Fourth, although their income is comparable to that of middle-­ class Americans, the global m ­ iddle class’s wealth—­the value of owned housing, investments, and other assets—­remains relatively low. Virtually none have inherited wealth. This reflects past policies in China that strictly prohibited private owner­ship. With the relaxation of such policies and the development of financial and real estate markets, however, the wealth of China’s global ­m iddle class ­w ill become increasingly impor­tant. WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT CHINA’S GLOBAL M ­ IDDLE CLASS?

Studies in other countries have found that the m ­ iddle class can have significant economic and po­liti­cal impacts. From an economic standpoint, middle-­class h ­ ouse­holds have incomes that are high enough to allow more discretionary spending on higher-­quality goods and ser­v ices. The expansion of the m ­ iddle class thus can induce demand­led innovation and growth. Middle-­class ­house­holds also have income sufficient to invest in physical and ­human capital and so can provide key inputs to raise productivity. Some studies highlight the contributions of middle-­class businesspeople and entrepreneurs whose innovation and risk-­taking spark economic growth. With re­spect to po­liti­cal impacts, an expanding ­m iddle class can reduce social polarization and promote social consensus and po­ liti­cal stability. Some argue further that the m ­ iddle class is a force for demo­c ratic change. It is educated and autonomous, has po­liti­cal consciousness, and demands a po­liti­cal voice. Historical studies of Eu­ro­pean countries generally confirm this view, but evidence on the relationship between the ­m iddle classes and democracy in late-­ developing countries is mixed. Do t­hese characterizations apply to China? China’s ­m iddle class indeed consumes more, better-­quality goods and ser­vices. This is well

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understood by China’s leaders, who have promoted the creation of a “well-­off society” and “common prosperity” and seek to rebalance the economy away from investment-­driven, export-­led growth and ­toward growth driven by domestic demand. That said, the impact of China’s m ­ iddle class on consumption is less than expected ­because it saves a large portion—­roughly one-­third—of its income. Its savings rate is higher than that of China’s larger lower-­income class and also higher than that of the ­m iddle classes in high-­income countries such as the United States. China’s m ­ iddle class saves ­because of barriers in the domestic financial system. Chinese families cannot borrow easily, so they must save to pay for major ­house­hold expenditures such as housing and education. They have few ways to insure themselves against risks such as illness and job loss, so they must also save for precautionary reasons. Due to incomplete pension coverage, lack of safe long-­term investment vehicles, and changing relationships between parents and ­children, they must save for retirement. In princi­ple their savings could contribute to economic growth, but they have few good investment options, and the domestic financial system does not channel their savings into the most productive sectors and firms. With re­spect to the Chinese m ­ iddle class as a source of innovation and entrepreneurship, its contribution is ­limited ­because it contains relatively few innovators and entrepreneurs. So long as the regime maintains policies that f­avor state-­owned businesses and discourage the private sector, this is unlikely to change. More broadly, without further reforms to China’s financial, ­legal, and social welfare institutions, the potential economic contributions of the ­m iddle class ­w ill not be realized. What is the po­l iti­cal impact of China’s global ­m iddle class? It has grown large enough to have po­liti­cal influence, and its interests are reflected in an array of government policies and programs, such as,

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subsidies for public-­sector employment and expenditures on urban pension and welfare programs. Studies of China’s m ­ iddle class generally conclude that it supports the po­liti­cal status quo rather than demanding demo­cratic reforms. It has benefited from China’s rapid economic growth and is dependent on the current regime for employment and other benefits. With re­spect to po­liti­cal participation, in some late-­developing countries the po­liti­cal elites have brought the m ­ iddle class on board by inviting its members into the ruling party. This has happened in China. Using the CHIP 2018 survey data, we estimate that 25 ­percent of China’s global middle-­class ­house­holds contain a Communist Party member. Why should the rest of the world care about China’s global ­middle class? U ­ ntil recently, consumers in North Amer­i­ca and Eu­rope have been the dominant source of worldwide demand. Their consumption has ­shaped the world economy and created opportunities for export-­led growth in lower-­income countries. The rapid expansion of China’s global ­m iddle class constitutes a tectonic shift in this equation. Although its impacts on global consumption, investment, and production are not yet fully realized and its continued rapid expansion is not guaranteed, in the f­ uture China’s global m ­ iddle class has the potential to reshape the global economy. This ­w ill create challenges—­and opportunities—­for the rest of the world.

VII    Public Health, Science, Technology

31 Is

US-­China Climate Action Pos­si­ble in an Era of Mistrust? Alex Wang

The world ­can’t meet the challenge of climate change without ag-

gressive action from both China and the United States, the world’s two largest emitters of green­house gases. Together they accounted for nearly 45 ­percent of total global carbon dioxide emissions in 2019, and any climate solution ­w ill benefit from their joint action. However, with US-­China relations at the lowest point in de­cades, competition rather than cooperation increasingly defines the relationship. Despite the friction, the United States and China could have a positive impact on climate change outside of a formal cooperation framework. Specifically, the evolving dynamics around climate action w ­ ill increasingly foster conditions u ­ nder which constructive competition can drive needed action by both as they pursue national self-­interest. What’s more, some forms of cooperation ­will still be feasible even if tensions remain high. MILESTONES AND DYNAMICS IN US-­C HINA CLIMATE COLLABORATION

US-­China collaboration played a major role in achieving the historic 2015 Paris Agreement in which 196 countries agreed to long-­term goals to limit global warming to 2°C above pre­industrial levels and

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aim for 1.5°C. Between late 2014 and early 2016, Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping issued three joint presidential statements intended to promote completion of the Paris Agreement text in late 2015 and its entry into force in 2016. Back then, the two countries referred to climate change as a “pillar of the US-­China bilateral relationship.” Other components of their climate cooperation included creating the Climate Change Working Group and the Clean Energy Research Center. Obama and Xi cohosted vari­ous climate summits, including the Climate-­Smart / Low-­Carbon Cities Summits in 2015 and 2016. Obama’s climate envoy, Todd Stern, reportedly communicated with China’s climate negotiator, Xie Zhenhua, monthly in the run-up to the Paris climate meeting. This cooperation was “never easy,” according to Stern, but in the end was quite robust. What’s more, it contrasted starkly to extraordinarily public US-­China acrimony at ­earlier climate negotiations, such as the failed 2009 Copenhagen summit. China’s interest in climate cooperation with the United States is arguably driven by an interest in playing (or appearing to play) a constructive negotiating role. Such cooperation has allowed China to influence global climate change agendas in recent years ­after playing a more reactive role in the 1990s and early 2000s. Beijing typically has allied itself with developing countries and sought greater commitments from the United States and other developed countries on funding and other support for the developing world. During the Donald Trump presidency US-­China climate collaboration was non­ex­is­tent, given the administration’s opposition to any action. Trump, who famously claimed that “the concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make US manufacturing noncompetitive,” withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement and engaged in aggressive environmental rollbacks at home.

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In the vacuum created by this retreat, it became remarkably easy for China to claim leadership. China’s role in promoting clean energy technology is often cited as evidence of this, for in recent years China has been by far the leading investor in renewable energy. Its industrial policy and manufacturing innovation have contributed to dramatic declines in the costs of renewable energy and battery storage. China already has more electric vehicles in ser­v ice than any other country—­more than 3 million. In September 2020 President Xi unilaterally announced a 2060 target for carbon neutrality, surprising even close observers and transforming the global conversation on climate action. Additional announcements followed in the months ­a fter. At the April 2021 Leaders Climate Summit, Xi mentioned China’s intention to “strictly control coal-­fi red power generation proj­ects and strictly limit the increase in coal consumption over the 14th Five-­Year Plan period [2021–25] and phase it down in the 15th Five-­Year Plan period [2026–30].” In September 2021 before the UN General Assembly, Xi announced that China “­w ill not build new coal-­fired power proj­ects abroad.” President Joe Biden’s 2020 election revived discussion about pos­ si­ble US-­China cooperation. The new administration has made climate change a policy priority and announced its intent to take an “all-­of-­government” approach to the issue. In the administration’s early days, this has meant combining climate expertise and policy priorities in an unexpectedly broad range of areas: economic, military, national security, transportation, energy, agriculture, and environment, among o ­ thers. As of this writing in late 2021, the Biden administration’s ability to meet its stated climate objectives, such as a goal to reduce green­house gas emissions by more than 50 ­percent by 2030 from 2005 levels, remains uncertain. T ­ here has been some pro­gress. On November 5, 2021, Congress passed a bipartisan infrastructure bill that contains $150 billion for clean energy and adaptation and $73 billion for modernizing the US electricity grid, the

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largest climate change investment in US history. The Biden administration also announced plans to take executive action through the Environmental Protection Agency and other agencies such as by issuing rules to reduce methane emissions from oil and gas operations by 74 ­percent from 2005 levels by 2035. But other climate action is still pending. A separate bud­get bill containing $555 billion for climate-­ related initiatives, known as the Build Back Better Act, remains in limbo as this chapter goes to press. Climate advocates also worry about the potential for Supreme Court decisions or Republican victories in upcoming elections to limit or reverse climate action. Attempts to revive climate cooperation w ­ ill, however, face a more complicated po­liti­cal environment given rising US-­China tensions. The United States u ­ nder Biden has continued to take a confrontational approach: “Extreme competition” but guided by rules and alliances, President Biden has said. US concerns about China’s rise have led to potential friction on many issues, such as trade, Taiwan, h ­ uman rights, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, the South China Sea, foreign influence, and cybersecurity. Critics have argued that John Kerry, named Amer­i­ca’s international climate “tsar,” ­will face pressure to soften US positions in other areas to garner China’s cooperation on climate. Chinese officials, for their part, have essentially argued in this vein, warning that US intervention on “redline” issues such as Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan would hinder climate cooperation. T ­ hese issues sometimes overlap directly, such as in allegations of forced l­abor in Xinjiang solar-­grade polysilicon production (42 ­percent of the global supply is made ­there). At the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference (October 31–­November 12) in Glasgow, the United States and China issued a surprise joint declaration that included a renewed commitment to climate cooperation and with it the promise of reduced geopo­liti­cal tensions and accelerated climate pro­g ress. At the same

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time, ­there are reasons to decenter cooperation in discussions of climate action and to pay more attention to the ways in which US-­China competition ­will affect global climate pro­gress in coming years. THE EVOLVING DYNAMICS OF CLIMATE ACTION

The dynamics surrounding climate change are evolving in ways that support unilateral action motivated by national self-­interest rather than collective action requiring alliance building. From seeking agreement to implementation. The focus of climate action has shifted from framework building (e.g., the Paris Agreement) to implementation. The premium is now on prob­lem solving and on-­the-­g round action at a speed commensurate to the scale of the prob­lem. Country-­level actions are now coalescing around midcentury carbon neutrality (or net-­zero) targets. China is aiming for carbon neutrality by 2060. The United States and the Eu­ro­pean Union announced 2050 targets. More than 130 countries have followed suit with a midcentury target or are exploring such a possibility. Much of this work ­w ill require domestic action rather than international coordination. From collective action to self-­interest. The major emitters have also begun to see climate policy as a means of achieving a broader range of national priorities, including strengthening economic growth, creating jobs, and developing new industries. The “green new deal” and “Eu­ro­pean green deal” framings reflect this approach. China’s eco-­civilization concept arguably integrates the idea of environmental policy as a tool for economic transformation as well. Climate change is also seen as a threat multiplier that can exacerbate national security risks. It can worsen economic instability, exacerbate ethnic tensions and forced migration, heighten competition for natu­ral resources, sharpen food and ­water insecurity, and

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threaten military infrastructure and operations. The perception of climate change as a security threat has grown as natu­ral disasters linked to a warming climate, such as wildfires, extreme storms, flooding, and drought, have become more prevalent and vis­i­ble. ­These shifts increase the sense that climate action is in countries’ self-­interest and that action is needed despite uncertainty about other countries’ intentions. From burden to opportunity. Advances in clean technology and improving economics of climate change action have made policy implementation more likely. Renewable energy and battery storage costs, for example, have declined by 70–90 ­percent over the last de­cade, and the cost of wind and solar power is less than coal-­fired electricity in some places. Studies show that decarbonization can generate broad economic benefits, such as growth in the gross domestic product, reductions in the cost of living, and job growth. T ­ hese shifts have made decarbonization in the electricity sector, for example, more feasible. As for transportation, electric vehicle technologies are maturing and poised for rapid dissemination. The advent of widespread carbon neutrality targets promises to generate greater research and development spending and long-­term policy conditions more conducive to zero-­carbon technological breakthroughs. CONSTRUCTIVE COMPETITION AS A DRIVER OF CLIMATE ACTION

­ hese evolving dynamics are focusing US and Chinese policy makers, T companies, and advocates on new opportunities. Efforts to take advantage of them w ­ ill in turn be increasingly ­shaped by US-­China competition in three areas: economic opportunities, international alliances, and governance approach. Each has the potential to generate more action as the two countries seek competitive advantage.

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Competition for economic opportunities. China and the United States now both link climate action to economic aims: growth in gross domestic product, job creation, and developing new industries. This ­w ill create competition on several fronts. While green industrial policy has been a staple of Chinese policy, the United States and the Eu­ro­pean Union are also debating options. The expanded clean technology markets created by, say, renewable portfolio standards, energy efficiency requirements, expanded electric vehicle charging infrastructure, or green government procurement targets ­w ill generate economic opportunity and allow green companies to expand. Each country thus w ­ ill have gained incentive to create better policy and fiscal support for its own climate-­friendly industries, and expanded demand for low-­and zero-­carbon technologies ­will create greater demand for green industries. As more companies, workers, and governments benefit, this ­will generate a virtuous cycle of further growth in such industries. The US Innovation and Competition Act, aimed at improving US research and technological competitiveness with China, is a product of the current US-­China dynamic. Approved by the Senate in June 2021 (and awaiting further congressional action as of this writing), the act contains support for research on vari­ous advanced technologies, including green technology. Competition for international alliances. China has earned much criticism for the environmental impact of its outbound investment by Chinese state institutions and private companies. While Chinese officials talk of the need to green the ­Belt and Road Initiative (China’s flagship outbound investment strategy), Chinese entities have long continued to support fossil fuel energy proj­ects and other environmentally harmful proj­ects. Biden administration officials have already expressed an intention to compete with China to provide green development

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finance in developing countries. US officials see this as a strategy that supports climate goals while also strengthening relationships with allies and offering an alternative to Chinese support. This competition in the developing world is another arena in which US-­China rivalry could have a positive impact on climate change: by pressing China to honor its pledges on green outbound investment and development finance and by motivating the United States to green its own engagement with other countries (e.g., by halting natu­ral gas and other fossil fuel exports and investments). Xi Jinping’s 2021 announcement that China would “not build” new coal-­fired power proj­ects is arguably influenced by this competitive dynamic. Competition for governance legitimacy. The third arena of competition involves the legitimacy of the two nations’ governance models. Although abstract, this nonetheless has the potential to push each to outdo the other on practical per­for­mance. Jake S­ ullivan, Biden’s national security adviser, cited this competition publicly in January 2021: “China is essentially making the case that the Chinese model is better than the American model. They are pointing to dysfunction and division in the United States and saying . . . ​[the US] system d­ oesn’t work. Our system does.” Chinese officials and media also make this argument with regard to ­handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. Climate change ­will become another arena where they compete to show that their model works better. Commentators have compared this to a “moonshot,” but the stakes are in many ways higher, involving competition for energy security, economic supremacy, technological superiority, and national reputation. At issue in this competition are both the ability of each country to meet climate targets and the par­tic­u­lar way in which each country achieves its goals. As to its ability to meet its climate commitments, critics note that China continues to build coal power plants at home

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and (­u ntil its September  2021 announcement) abroad. As of this writing, China is helping finance or build some 250 gigawatts of new coal-­fired facilities, more than in the entire existing American power industry. COVID-19 stimulus has been no better, with fossil fuel investment three times larger than for low-­carbon proj­ects. What’s more, carbon neutrality ­w ill require a significant commitment to keeping fossil fuels in the ground. Chinese officials have said ­little about this. Announcements from their leading researchers suggest that the timing of China’s climate action ­w ill be too slow to meet official goals. Preliminary modeling indicates that China may not push deep decarbonization ­u ntil ­a fter 2030, a timeline that would then require extraordinary (and perhaps unrealistic) rates of decarbonization to meet the 2060 carbon neutrality target. Many in the global community also worry about China’s state-­ dominated manner of achieving its environmental goals. This top-­ down approach has drawn criticism for being excessively coercive while lacking transparency and public participation. T ­ hese critiques arise out of sharply divergent notions of legitimate governance and dovetail with broader concerns about China’s rise in other areas. The United States, for its part, has had an uneven commitment to climate action from administration to administration, and American climate politics have been rife with division, misinformation, and passivity. The United States has an opportunity to show that it can generate greater support for action and that more can be done consistent with American values. This may now be more po­liti­cally feasible than before, as recent polls show that two-­thirds of Americans, including most Republicans, now believe that the government should do more on climate. If the United States cannot overcome po­liti­cal divisions, however, this would likely be seen as an abject po­liti­cal failure, a further blow to American legitimacy and a gift to Chinese leaders as they seek a more expansive role overseas.

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While each country’s implementation of climate policy ­will depend primarily on domestic po­liti­cal and socioeconomic f­ actors, ­these international dynamics also ­matter. It’s pos­si­ble that China’s setting of a 2060 carbon neutrality target two months before the US 2020 presidential election was influenced by the potential of a Biden victory and a US return to global climate negotiations. China’s unilateral move sent an unmistakable signal that it exerts climate leadership as compared to the United States during the Trump administration. Could such competition actually influence climate change action? Beijing’s top-­down approach to target setting, enforcement, and other aspects of policy implementation makes it more plausible that international competition could have substantial influence on domestic Chinese action. US politics and institutions are more fragmented, but a sense that Amer­i­ca is in decline while China is ascendant could generate greater po­liti­cal ­w ill to mobilize resources and outcompete China on climate change. ­These competitive dynamics have the potential to push the United States and China forward even if cooperation between them proves difficult.

Achieving carbon neutrality ­w ill not be easy. Evolving competi-

tive dynamics, however, likely w ­ ill play a greater role in moving climate action forward than commonly assumed. The key w ­ ill be to ensure that competition remains constructive without devolving into modes that obstruct climate pro­gress, such as trade wars, protectionist moves on rare earth metals, overuse of national security protections, and the like. In this regard, it w ­ ill still be impor­tant for the United States and China to attempt cooperation. Even amid rising tensions, cooperation remains feasible where interests are aligned or the politics less

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fraught. Technical cooperation on climate policy and technology continued among private actors and subnational governments even during the Trump years when US-­China relations ­were at a low. This included work on power sector reform, electric vehicles, building decarbonization, industrial transformation, and land-­use change. Adaptation, support for worker transition, and environmental justice are other areas ripe for f­ uture cooperation. Bilateral, multilateral, and unofficial dialogue can play an impor­tant role in information sharing and pressing each country t­oward greater action. Sectoral cooperation can generate greater trade, investment, and deployment of clean technologies. Cooperation or coordination, where pos­si­ble, can accelerate climate action in both countries but can also play a role in ensuring that competition remains constructive. Ultimately, US and China action is necessary for global pro­g ress on climate change. Public debate has emphasized the need for collaboration, but ever-­intensifying competition may in the end do much more of the work.

32

What Can the United States Learn from China about Infrastructure? Selina Ho

Infrastructure plays a critical role in China’s strategic competi-

tion with the United States. Specifically, China’s megainfrastructure vision, the B ­ elt and Road Initiative (BRI), has been touted as a game changer not only eco­nom­ically but also strategically. Infrastructure as a significant source of power in international politics is not new; historically, roads and railroads have been critical for winning wars and building empires. But the manner in which China wields its infrastructure power is unpre­ce­dented in terms of scale and ambition. The BRI aims to extend Chinese influence abroad by constructing a logistics, trade, and strategic system with China as its heart. Washington’s initial reaction to China’s overseas infrastructure push was skepticism and indifference. The BRI was dismissed as a flash in the pan as questions arose over its long-­term viability and sustainability. However, as the BRI progressed and made substantial headway in Asia, Africa, Latin Amer­i­ca, and even Eu­rope, alarmist views started to emerge in the United States and other Western countries. The Trump administration began signaling in 2017 and 2018 that it took China’s BRI challenge seriously. In October 2018 the United States passed the Better Utilization of Investment Leading to

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Development Act, a bipartisan bill to a create a new US development agency tasked with “crowding-in” (higher government spending attracts higher private-­sector investment) American private investment in low and lower-­m iddle income countries. In 2019 the Trump administration initiated the Blue Dot Network that enables the United States to work with allies in the Indo-­Pacific, specifically Japan and Australia, on infrastructure development in third countries, offering quality proj­ects that meet high standards of transparency and sustainability as a c­ ounter to the BRI. China’s infrastructure drive ­matters for the United States for both economic and strategic reasons. US trade and investment are the basis of US power and global standing. American economic primacy in Asia undergirds its security relationships with allies, particularly Japan and South ­Korea, as well as with the Philippines and Thailand. For the United States to maintain regional economic and military primacy, it must mount a strong response to China’s infrastructure initiatives. To be effective, the United States may want to consider lessons from the Chinese experience in infrastructure development at home as well as abroad. In this chapter, I put forth three key lessons for the United States. LESSON 1: GOVERNMENT SUPPORT IS ESSENTIAL

It starts at home. The Council of Foreign Relations reported in September 2020 that domestic US infrastructure is overstretched, with more than $2 trillion in investment needed by 2025. The American Society of Civil Engineers gave it a grade of C− in its 2021 report. The nation’s transportation systems, w ­ ater and energy networks, and broadband system are u ­ nder significant stress, as evidenced by repeated crises and breakdowns such as the contaminated w ­ ater supply crisis in Flint, Michigan (2014–2019); the Amtrak derailment

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in Philadelphia in 2015; and the breakdown of Texas’s power grid in January 2021. Robust investments in infrastructure set the foundation of the US economy. In the 1860s, for instance, constructing Amer­i­ca’s first transcontinental railroad not only facilitated supply chains and economic growth but also helped make the United States a Pacific power. In the aftermath of World War II, robust investments in infrastructure enabled the United States to become an economic power­house. Infrastructure investments not only generate growth by providing a multiplier effect on gross domestic product (GDP) but also create jobs, ensure the well-­being of citizens, and boost the legitimacy of governments. However, the United States now lags ­behind its developed peers in infrastructure quality and standards. According to the Council of Foreign Relations report, in terms of projected infrastructure spending by 2040 among G20 countries, the United States ranked nineteenth. China tops the list. While the United States spends roughly 2.4 ­percent of GDP on infrastructure (and this percentage has been declining), China spends about 8  ­percent of its GDP on the same and is expected to further boost its spending due to COVID-19. The United States needs to step up funding to refurbish and upgrade existing infrastructure proj­ects and build new ones. President Joe Biden’s Build Back Better Plan to overhaul the nation’s infrastructure is a step in the right direction but would require bipartisan support and would need to be sustained beyond his administration. China offers the United States impor­tant lessons in this regard. I have argued elsewhere that a public goods–­providing ethos is embedded in the Chinese state, of which infrastructure development is a major component. The Chinese state takes a forward-­looking view of development, anticipating demand and creating supply before ­actual demand takes place. This is ­because infrastructure proj­ects are

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often multiyear undertakings that require long-­term planning and early investment. They catalyze growth, increase employment, foster frontier industries, engender tourist flows, and provide opportunities for both Chinese state-­owned enterprises and small and medium-­ sized enterprises. This development model resembles Western countries’ own modernization story. In this endeavor, the government plays a critical role. China relies heavi­ly on public-­private partnerships for infrastructure investment and construction. According to the World Bank, East Asia and the Pacific received the highest level of private participation in infrastructure investment among all regions, accounting for 39 ­percent of the global total. China accounts for the lion’s share at 69 ­percent of ­these investments. While public-­private partnerships are controversial and not the panacea for all prob­lems, they are nevertheless a critical source of investment, technology, and management skills that can yield substantial consumer benefit. Strong government oversight and regulation is crucial for realizing ­these partnerships. An impor­tant lesson that the United States can draw is that while the Chinese government leans heavi­ly on public-­private partnerships, it does not relinquish control to the private sector and continues to maintain an active role in such partnerships. For overseas infrastructure proj­ects, the fundamental challenge is financing t­ hese proj­ects. With high risks and uncertain profits, the US private sector is unwilling to get involved in overseas infrastructure proj­ects. The government’s role in risk mitigation and credit support is thus essential. The Chinese government and banks underwrite many of the bank loans so that China’s state-­owned and small and medium-­sized enterprises in the infrastructure industry can venture overseas. While the US government wants to set higher standards in underwriting risks than does the Chinese government, it

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could use other methods to support private-­sector investment in overseas proj­ects, such as issuing special bonds, streamlining regulatory review pro­cesses that currently take years, and increasing investment opportunities in areas where US companies have a distinct advantage, including building smart cities and digital technology. LESSON 2: ­T HERE IS POWER IN INFRASTRUCTURE

The United States needs to do more to get into the international market for infrastructure proj­ects; t­here is a huge demand b­ ecause many developing countries are infrastructure-­starved. According to the Asian Development Bank, Asia needs to invest $1.7 trillion in infrastructure per year u ­ ntil 2030. This is an enormous sum that neither the Asian Development Bank nor the World Bank can provide on their own. To help meet this need and also increase its influence, the Chinese government established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to serve as an additional source of funds. Infrastructure is impor­tant domestically but can also be a source of power internationally. As an instrument of the state, infrastructure serves po­liti­cal, economic, and military purposes. The Eu­ro­pean railway system, for instance, connects the markets, economies, and ­peoples of Eu­rope. Ports also serve as impor­tant centers of global trade and commerce while at the same time providing logistical support for navies. Infrastructure is also critical for power projection and war making. Railroads, for instance, w ­ ere central to Prus­sian / German and Rus­sian war plans in the second half of the nineteenth ­century and the first half of the twentieth ­century. Infrastructure connectivity is essential for empire building; Eu­rope and North Amer­i­ca ­were able to extend their influence in the late nineteenth c­ entury by building railroads.

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Equally impor­tant are the nonmaterial dimensions of power embedded in infrastructure. China has successfully wielded structural and discursive power using such proj­ects, particularly in Southeast Asia. Po­liti­cal and social theorist Steven Lukes described structural power as “supreme and most insidious”; without having to exert coercion, the dominant state is able to get the subordinate state to accept its asymmetrical disadvantages. China thus can exercise structural power through infrastructure ­because cross-­border proj­ects give rise to asymmetric relations. Recipient countries of China’s BRI rely on Chinese technology, technical standards, finance, skilled l­abor, and construction materials. The greater the degree of dependence on China, the greater the likelihood that the recipient country ­w ill subordinate its interest to that of China even when Beijing is not necessarily coercing it. For instance, during meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, some members reportedly take into account China’s likely reactions to issues sensitive to its national interest even when China is not pre­sent. Discursive power is the use of discourse to create meaning, with a dominant narrative constituting and constraining alternative narratives. For instance, t­ here is substantial buy-in from beneficiaries of China’s BRI that infrastructure w ­ ill lead to pro­g ress and modernization. Counternarratives of po­liti­cal, social, and environmental risks, nonviability of proj­ects, and threats to national sovereignty and territorial integrity have been shunted aside as nations jumped on China’s BRI bandwagon. The United States needs to harness its own infrastructure power. Countries use infrastructure not only to enhance and proj­ect material power but also to influence social relations and dominate discourses. China ­under President Xi Jinping has increasingly emphasized the power of social relations and discourses, and the BRI is a major vehicle

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for wielding such power. Yet, ­there is room for the United States and its allies to compete with China in infrastructural politics. While countries are willing to subordinate their interests to China’s for long-­term benefits due to the belief that infrastructure brings pro­ gress and growth, they si­mul­ta­neously have concerns and re­sis­tance prompted by China’s rapid rise. Its aggressive foreign policy ­under Xi has intensified t­ hese fears. Annual surveys by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore have shown a rising distrust of China among Southeast Asian countries. The desire for diversity and balance in the region also implies that opportunities exist for the United States and its allies to strengthen their presence in this international market. LESSON 3: LOCAL CONTEXT M ­ ATTERS

One of the hardest lessons China has had to learn as it ventures overseas is that local context ­matters. As Chinese companies expand their operations to other parts of Asia, Latin Amer­i­ca, and Africa, they face a steep learning curve as they encounter varied operational contexts. Obstacles can be so ­great that some proj­ects have been abandoned. For instance, the construction of the first high-­speed railway in Latin Amer­i­ca, the 468-­kilometer Tinaco-­Anaco line in Venezuela, was canceled in 2015 a­ fter the Venezuelan government could not pay for it. ­There have also been substantial delays in railroad proj­ects in Southeast Asia, such as in Indonesia and Malaysia. The construction of the Chinese-­built Jakarta-­Bandung high-­speed railway encountered obstacles as democ­ratization and decentralization in Indonesia since 1998 increased the number of veto points in politics and society. Studies show that in developing countries, a large portion of demand making and repre­sen­ta­tion by interest groups occurs at the

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implementation stage of a large proj­ect. In Indonesia, regional governments strengthened by decentralization helped veto construction of the Jakarta-­Bandung railway. Even though Indonesian president Joko Widodo revised the national spatial plan in 2017 to incorporate the railway, local authorities who had not been consulted resisted, resulting in land acquisition becoming a prob­lem. Indonesia’s strong land tenure laws favoring individuals and local regencies compounded the difficulty. As a result, construction of the Jakarta-­Bandung route has been repeatedly delayed. Po­liti­cal upheavals in host countries also can throw a monkey wrench into China’s plans. In Malaysia, Prime Minister Najib Razak championed infrastructure proj­ects and closer economic ties with China. When he unexpectedly lost power in the 2018 general elections, such proj­ects as the East Coast Rail Link lost a power­ful patron. The new government suspended the rail link even though it was already ­u nder construction, only reviving the proj­ect months ­later ­after securing better terms from the Chinese. Local context m ­ atters, and host countries have agency. The Chinese government and companies have had to learn this hard lesson as they ventured overseas. Likewise, the US government and American companies ­w ill benefit if they learn to be sensitive to local context and bear in mind the peculiarities of local politics and society and the importance of public opinion. A significant aspect of interactions between states is that states learn from and emulate each other. This is true not only among allies but also between rivals. In order for the United States to maintain strategic and economic primacy, it needs to learn from China’s positive experiences as well as m ­ istakes in investing in and developing infrastructure proj­ects both at home and abroad. This chapter highlighted three key takeaway lessons: government support is essential, ­there is power in infrastructure, and local context m ­ atters.

33

What Is at Stake in the US-­China Technological Relationship? Graham Webster

For both the united states and china, the benefits of a deeply

integrated technological ecosystem—in which research, business, and manufacturing occur across borders—­have been clear since the turn of the twenty-­fi rst c­ entury. As digital and connected technology spread worldwide the two countries benefited eco­nom­ically, and their leading firms and technologists worked in close collaboration. Fundamental research that occurred disproportionately at US universities and corporate research centers, with elite talent drawn from around the world, combined with prototyping and manufacturing capabilities located disproportionately at Chinese industrial centers, where workers from China’s less industrialized regions ­were joined with know-­how from the world’s top hardware producers. Especially since the smartphone and mobile internet era began, the online experience for t­hose able to connect has in a real sense been a joint US-­China production. Apple’s pathbreaking iOS and Google’s broadly customized Android systems combined with Chinese manufacturing might and regional and global supply chains to put connectivity in billions of p­ eople’s hands. But even as this US-­China fusion took root in hardware and software—­encompassing design, production, innovation, and rein-

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novation—­a long-­developing fissure widened in terms of the ser­vices ­people used in the two countries. US e-­commerce platforms such as eBay largely failed to break into the Chinese market, whereas domestic offerings such as Alibaba that addressed China’s specific conditions began to thrive. The leading Chinese search engine, Baidu, was ahead of the global g­ iant Google, which had initially complied with Chinese censorship rules in seeking to compete. But Google left China’s search market ­after the Chinese government was discovered trying to break into the Gmail accounts of activists. The fissure runs deep, especially in China. Since the 1980s, Chinese scholars had advocated developing a homegrown operating system to replace Microsoft Win­dows to both address security risks and encourage domestic high-­tech development. Chinese industrial planners at least since 1986’s “863 Plan” had championed visions of a more technologically in­de­pen­dent nation not ­limited to heavy industry and manufacturing and capable of globally significant breakthroughs in at least some areas. In more recent years, especially a­ fter the 2013 revelations by the former US intelligence information technology expert Edward Snowden, Chinese concerns about using US technology included the unknown extent to which the US government was able to use US tech products to spy on or undermine Chinese entities. While policy thinkers in the two countries perceive dif­fer­ent types of vulnerability stemming from their technological integration, both governments heightened their concerns with the advent of the technological paradigm shift now u ­ nder way. That shift combines advances in artificial intelligence through machine learning (AI / ML) enabled by custom semiconductors, large data sets, and algorithms, with the spread of high-­speed connectivity to more automated systems through fifth-­generation (5G) wireless and the so-­called internet of ­things (IoT). Together, the prospect of increasingly automated

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AI / ML-­driven systems across the IoT, from medical devices to self-­ driving cars, fuels innovators’ imaginations and poses ever more security challenges. Security-­m inded ­people in the United States and China already had concerns about network switches, operating systems, and hardware vulnerabilities in the technology of 2000 (when China had only about 20 million internet users) or 2010 (when smartphones ­were ­really taking off ). ­Today, they have all the more reason to be alarmed by the many new risks in a vastly larger and more autonomous network. Still, as more diverse and increasingly elaborate technological systems take root, the benefits of sharing ideas, optimizing for efficiency, and maintaining interoperability are similarly remarkable. Overall, Chinese concerns about technological interdependence can be said to center around four categories: espionage, sabotage, dependence, and governance. And in recent years, US policymakers have shown remarkably similar concerns about technology linked to China. To understand what’s at stake, it is helpful to review t­hese four main areas. Both sides legitimately perceive risks that require addressing, and for better or worse, po­liti­cal ­factors, cost-­benefit analyses, and technical innovations w ­ ill determine the outcomes. First, it’s no secret that the US and Chinese governments target one another for espionage. US officials have attributed massive data breaches at the government’s Office of Personnel Management, the credit rating agency Equifax, Marriott h ­ otels, and other entities to Chinese hackers. During both the Obama and Trump administrations, the Justice Department indicted individual Chinese military ser­ v ice members for allegedly hacking the US private sector. Snowden’s revelations made clear that the US government has used access to internet infrastructure, US-­m ade devices intercepted en route from manufacturer to user, and US tech firms to spy on its adversaries. Chinese systems of all kinds generally run Win­dows, and

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nearly all Chinese-­branded smartphones have historically used forms of Android. In the secret world of spies and counterintelligence, ­these concerns are long-­standing. With the AI / ML and 5G / IoT phase shift, they ­w ill only intensify. Everyday online ser­vices collect more and more data for algorithmic functionality or monetization that could in turn be analyzed by spy agencies using similar tools. More and more sensors connected to the internet on poorly secured devices—­who, ­after all, ­will update the firmware on their refrigerator?—­mean ­there’s more for hackers to exploit. In the language of cybersecurity, the attack surface that defenders must protect has grown exponentially, just as hacking tools are ever more advanced. Second, while network intruders often seek to gain access to information, they can also enable sabotage of vari­ous levels of severity in connected systems. US and Chinese national security planners are acutely aware that they may one day face each other in contingencies up to and including nuclear war. They plan both to prevent the worst outcomes and to ensure victory if the worst happens. Short of armed conflict, planners also worry about disruptions to critical infrastructure that could wreak havoc in many ways. And the less confidence governments have in understanding what might cause a disruption, the more likely they are to miscalculate in ways that could lead to escalation. With advanced automation, IoT, and 5G networks, ­these concerns only intensify. Technologists working to realize the potential of ubiquitous, high-­speed connectivity envision distributed networks that perform split-­second calculations, rather than losing crucial milliseconds sending tasks to central servers for computation. This would enable systems such as autonomous vehicles that communicate with each other and with networked roadways to route traffic and prevent accidents. A galaxy of sensors, each with potential vulnerabilities,

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would drive software and hardware with yet more risks to life-­ critical systems. National security, economic stability, and h ­ uman life would be at stake. No country has yet devised a comprehensive plan to ensure that all the relevant risks are handled, but ­those who build and maintain the software and hardware systems under­lying ­these functions have an edge in both offense and defense. This explains the US and other governments’ deep concerns about relying on the Chinese network infrastructure ­g iant Huawei for the hardware-­software systems that underlie 5G—­the very systems that technologists hope ­w ill be making ­those crucial calculations in the field. While trust and risk management go beyond vendor se­lection, US officials believe that Huawei could be leveraged for Chinese sabotage or spying, while Chinese officials could reasonably believe the same if the ­tables ­were turned. Indeed, Chinese state media in 2013 branded a group of key US technology companies as the “Eight Guardian Warriors” and compared them to the “Eight-­ Nation Alliance” that invaded Beijing at the turn of the twentieth ­century. The eight companies—­Cisco, IBM, Google, Qualcomm, Intel, Apple, Oracle, and Microsoft—­remain a presence in China, though many of their prospects have darkened amid bilateral technological tensions. Third, while the risks of espionage and sabotage have been heavi­ly emphasized by US national security authorities when it comes to evaluating Huawei and 5G, China’s government has long emphasized the risk of dependence on foreign technology. This concern is related to espionage and sabotage, but it goes further. Along with the gains to innovation and rapid rollout from access to diverse centers of leading technology, the global supply chains that both nations relied on to build ­today’s technological ecosystem also give countries the ability to deny each other access to key components. Beginning during the Trump administration, the US government has demon-

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strated a willingness to cut off major Chinese tech firms from essential supply lines—­most crucially in advanced semiconductors—­that are subject to US export controls. The initial restrictions on Huawei, for example, w ­ ere officially justified based on alleged violations of sanctions related to Iran, but other penalties exist for sanctions violations, and key officials used any available tool to undermine the com­ pany. For surveillance technology companies, blacklisting has been linked to their products’ use in Xinjiang, where the US government in 2021 designated the atrocities being committed against Uyghurs and other Muslims as genocide. Regardless of the justification, ­these actions use Chinese companies’ dependence on open trade with the United States against them. The opposite of dependence is technological in­de­pen­dence, and the Chinese government ­under Xi Jinping has emphasized “indigenous innovation” and “self-­reliance” as countermea­sures to US-­ controlled industrial bottlenecks. This goal has long been part of China’s official rhe­toric on its overall industrial and economic advancement, but its emphasis is particularly acute t­ oday. In the United States, the discussion has revolved around “decoupling,” which generally refers to severing close technological relationships, developing alternatives to Chinese suppliers, and encouraging other countries to do the same. Fourth, the massive and expanding scale of data collection by tech companies and governments and the advance of automated decision making deeper and more broadly throughout society mean that regardless of any foreign ­factors, socie­ties everywhere are confronting governance challenges. The United States and China have so far taken very dif­fer­ent paths. Before the internet was global, it was largely designed and governed to reflect US laws and norms. Vari­ous ­battles over censorship, copyright, and surveillance have played out since then, but the original largely laissez-­faire regulatory model still prevails. This

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remains true even as US interests across the po­liti­cal spectrum have more and more complaints about the role of private companies such as Facebook and Twitter in the governance of the public sphere, especially a­ fter manipulation of the tools that platforms make available to advertisers led many p­ eople to question the integrity of the past two presidential elections. Internationally, the US government has championed freedom of speech and the f­ree flow of data for commercial purposes, and domestically it has so far eschewed comprehensive privacy regulation, creating tension even with friendly jurisdictions such as the Eu­ro­pean Union. China at first considered the internet—­from its open protocols to its global domain name system and the hardware under­lying connectivity—to be a foreign import. However, government authorities and domestic businesses swiftly adapted and ­shaped t­hose technologies to local goals. This included the gradual but now pervasive development of censorship and content control capabilities that President Bill Clinton in 2000 thought would be like “nailing Jell-­O to the wall”—in other words, impossible. In contrast to the relative free-­ for-­a ll in the United States, where civil lawsuits and regulatory penalties discipline industry lightly, the Chinese government since 2014 has developed a highly detailed l­egal framework for cybersecurity, censorship and propaganda, and data protection. And its surveillance capabilities for everyday law enforcement and state security purposes, including the targeting of po­liti­cal dissent, have advanced rapidly. At the center of the governance challenge for both countries is data: how to collect it, protect it, and set bound­aries for its legitimate use. While both countries have companies that provide advanced data-­driven surveillance technology, the ways ­those capabilities can be used by the government and the private sector vary widely. Chinese experiments with data collection and surveillance for everyday governance raise both long-­standing and novel h ­ uman rights con-

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cerns. Both governments see adoption of the other’s model as a potential threat to their own form of government. And to some extent, governance decisions are baked into the defaults, capabilities, and limitations of products developed for their respective markets. ­Today’s technological changes raise new concerns and risks for all countries. Espionage poses challenges for anyone with secrets to keep, as does sabotage for anyone with systems they rely on. Dependence can empower a potential rival to disrupt everyday life, slow technological advancement, or gain economic or po­liti­cal leverage. As automated systems perform ever more functions traditionally reserved for state bureaucracies, aligning technological governance with one’s po­liti­cal community is a priority for all nations. In all four areas of concern the United States and China are significantly at odds, and a degree of technological untangling is already ­under way. Yet a total decoupling would be neither feasible in the short term nor desirable in the long term. Interdependence, a­ fter all, is broadly considered a bulwark against open conflict, and numerous other countries would prefer not to navigate a world with one technological ecosystem for China and friends and another for the United States and friends. If the two countries somehow overcome that re­ sis­tance and pursue total mutual separation, it would be enormously costly both in the lost efficiency of duplicating supply chains and knowledge systems and in heightened competition over natu­ral resources that could increase the risk of war. The question is w ­ hether the United States and China can untangle from one another enough to ease their sense of mutual vulnerability in the technological sphere while maintaining the right kinds of integration to cooperate for mutual and global benefit—­and indeed to butt heads over economic, security, ­human rights, and other issues with a foundation of mutual knowledge. Regardless, neither country ­w ill address the im­mense and evolving challenges presented by

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changing technology merely by walling themselves off from the other. They w ­ ill both face network intrusions and disruptions from a wide variety of actors—­some of them targeting both countries—as well as from ­simple failures of engineering. As with other global challenges such as climate change, the US and Chinese governments might just find that a combination of competition and common cause best serves their respective interests.

34 Has

China Positioned Itself as a Leader in Big Tech Regulations? Winston Ma

In 2020 mark zuckerberg of facebook, Jeff Bezos of Amazon,

Google’s Sundar Pichai, and Apple’s Tim Cook testified together for the first time before Congress. At the US House Judiciary Committee hearing on July 29, t­hese CEOs sent a clear message: ­don’t regulate us or we c­ an’t compete with China. This was not new to the lawmakers. When Zuckerberg testified before Congress in early 2018 about Facebook’s data practices, he warned that regulating its use of personal data would cause the United States to fall ­behind China when it comes to data-­intensive innovation, such as artificial intelligence (AI). Zuckerberg’s argument reflects the conventional wisdom that the Chinese internet industry has accumulated a tremendous amount of user data for AI research thanks to China’s lax regulation on data collection. In other words, so this argument goes, Chinese companies would have an edge if US companies such as Facebook are constrained by data protection regulation. To some extent, Zuckerberg is correct. But personal information (PI) and data breaches are becoming hot-­button issues in China, and the government is taking major steps to enact data-­related regulations.

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China’s critical advantage in AI research is its data resources, as the density of data is proportional to the density of ­people. With over 900 million internet users, along with widespread adoption of mobile applications during the mobile economy boom, ­there has been a surge in data growth in China’s consumer market. In this “mobile first” and “mobile only” environment, ­people use their mobile phones heavi­ly to shop for consumer goods, order meal deliveries, buy tickets, and pay for almost all daily activities, leaving vast amounts of data on digital platforms. The year 2018 could be hailed as the year when the Chinese public started awakening to privacy concerns. As if echoing Zuckerberg’s testimony, Robin Li, the founder of Baidu, China’s leading search engine, said in a 2018 interview that if Chinese ­people “are able to exchange privacy for safety, con­ve­n ience or efficiency, in many cases they are willing to do that. Then we can make more use of that data.” Ironically, Li’s remark was not accepted by the Chinese public. Baidu was sued that year by a consumer rights protection group in Jiangsu Province for collecting user data without consent. The lawsuit was ­later withdrawn a­ fter Baidu removed the function that monitors users’ contacts and activities. In the same year a Chinese user challenged another internet ­giant, Alibaba, on personal data privacy. Ant Group, Alibaba’s fintech (financial technology) arm, had launched Zhima (Sesame) Credit, an online credit scoring ser­v ice that offers loans based on users’ digital activities, transaction rec­ords, and social media presence. Users discovered that they had been enrolled in the credit scoring system by default and without consent. U ­ nder pressure, Alibaba apologized. Therefore, Chinese consumers are increasingly standing up to internet ­g iants for their digital privacy in an unpre­ce­dented way, and China is in the early stages of setting up a data protection regulatory

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system. The new Cyber Security Law, effective June 1, 2017, included for the first time a set of data protection provisions in the form of national-­level legislation. In addition, the 2018 E-­Commerce Law incorporated data privacy protections for consumers such as the “right to be forgotten,” similar to the Eu­ro­pean Union’s (EU) General Data Protection Regulation. China passed the new Civil Code in May 2020 that took effect in January 2021. This marks a key step forward in developing a l­egal framework governing individual data privacy. Among a sweeping package of numerous civil laws, for the first time privacy is defined statutorily as a personality right, which is a property right as opposed to a personal right. The Civil Code devotes an entire chapter to addressing personality rights, covering p­ eople’s rights to control the commercial use of their name, title, portrait, reputation and privacy while adding new articles on protecting PI. However, the ongoing pandemic that started in 2020 creates novel data and privacy controversies. Data are being created at the fastest rate ever, since the virus made every­one’s life largely virtual. For example, governments collect a vast amount of individual information to keep close tabs on population health and location data. ­Under ordinary circumstances sensitive patient-­linked medical rec­ ords should be kept private, but during the extraordinary COVID-19 crisis governments must constantly collect such data often through private internet platforms, raising concerns about data breach, loss, or unauthorized use. As such, China’s Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) and Data Security Law w ­ ere enacted in 2021 to address t­hese complex issues in more detail. The legislature faced tough challenges in balancing the considerations of individuals’ personal privacy, enterprises’ business development, and national and public security. The addition of ­these two laws is a major step t­oward regularizing this

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­Table 34.1.  China’s Data Law Framework Laws Governing Data Privacy and Security 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Cybersecurity Law E- ­Commerce Law Cyberspace Administration of China Mea­sures on the Administration of Data Security Civil Code Personal Information Protection Law Data Security Law

patchwork affair of PI protection into an integrated, comprehensive framework. China’s PIPL came into effect on November 1, 2021. The PIPL lays out for the first time a comprehensive set of rules around data collection and protection in China’s digital economy. Widely viewed as the Chinese counterpart to the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, the PIPL provides for a set of rules regulating personal data pro­cessing activities across all industries and operations such as collecting, utilizing, pro­cessing, sharing, and transferring PI inside and outside of China. For example, regarding internet users’ consent and opt-­out, the PIPL provides very broad language in ­favor of data subjects’ right to be sufficiently informed of the collection, pro­cessing, use, and transfer of their PI. PI pro­cessors are obligated to enable opt-­outs by data subjects at any stage and pro­cessors cannot decline to provide ser­v ices to the data subjects on the grounds of their rejection of PI pro­cessors’ requests for consent, ­unless such PI is necessary for the provision of products or ser­v ices. In addition to data privacy protection (how private data is collected), another aspect of data regulation is control of major platforms’ power by antitrust and data security regulations (how collective data

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is used), ­because their power mostly comes from vast databases of user data. Thanks to advanced data analytics, Chinese tech companies are turning into business ecosystems in which sectors that once seemed disconnected are now integrated seamlessly by user data. They are increasingly assuming power­ful positions in banking, finance, advertising, retail, and other markets that force smaller businesses to rely on their platforms to reach customers. It is no coincidence that the antitrust crusades in China have accelerated during the pandemic. A locked-­down world has come to rely on tech companies more than ever, with many racking up gains at the expense of smaller competitors. For example, Meituan’s platform dominates online-­to-­offline life ser­v ice such as food delivery and mobility ser­v ices. With every­one ordering takeout meals during the coronavirus outbreak, Meituan and Ele.me cultivated a clan of virtual restaurants that operate only out of kitchens by providing targeted consumer marketing, as the online-­to-­offline platforms manage what is prob­ably the most sophisticated location-­based technologies in the market. Of course, the heavyweights charge a significant commission rate for the ser­v ice. Meituan has gained market share and turned a profit, becoming in 2020 the third Chinese internet firm, ­after Alibaba and Tencent, to exceed $100 billion valuation in the public market. On the other hand, small restaurants that rely on the e-­commerce platform have found it hard to prosper. U ­ nder pressure, Meituan was forced to apologize a­ fter a restaurant association accused it of abusing its dominance during the outbreak by requiring merchants to sign exclusive agreements and charging restaurants commissions as high as 26 ­percent. In November 2020, the State Administration of Market Regulation (SAMR) issued the “Draft Anti-­Monopoly Guidelines for Platform Economy.” T ­ hese guidelines w ­ ill target anticompetitive

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be­hav­ior in the internet sector, such as big data price discrimination and exclusive cooperation agreements. This draft followed the abrupt suspension of a $37 billion stock offering by Alibaba’s fintech arm Ant Group, partly due to new regulations relating to the use of consumer data for small personal loans. Sesame Credit, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, is the main big data analytics tool of Ant Group. In January 2021, ­Reuters reported that China plans to push tech ­g iants including Ant Group, Tencent, and JD​.­com to share consumer loan data to prevent excess borrowing and fraud. Chinese regulators, including the P ­ eople’s Bank of China (China’s central bank), plan to instruct internet platforms to feed their vast loan data to some of the nationwide credit agencies. Further to the SAMR guidelines and regulatory actions, China is amending its Anti-­Monopoly Law, for the first time since it came into force in 2008, to incorporate more digital economy considerations. For instance, large internet platforms have tended to resist handing over their data, a crucial asset that helps them run operations more efficiently and lure new customers at low cost. They d­ on’t share customer data with business rivals, giving them what some call an unfair, monopolistic advantage in their core markets. As such, the amendment to China’s Anti-­Monopoly Law is beefing up antitrust penalties in an explicit push to address the risk of emerging network monopolies. A draft amendment of the law was submitted to the Chinese legislature for a first reading in late 2021, with the final version expected to be rolled out sometime in 2022. The draft significantly increases penalties, expands the discretionary power of the SAMR, and sends a clear signal of tightening control over tech firms. The Anti-­Monopoly Law Amendment specifically refers to enforcement in the digital economy by making it clear that undertakings s­ hall not

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exclude or restrict competition by abusing the advantages in data and algorithms, technology and capital, and platform rules. Together with the new PIPL and the Civil Code, the new Antitrust Law and the Data Security Law have formed a complete data regulation framework to cover the complex relationships between individual users, tech corporations, and the government. All t­ hese rising regulations in China signal the end of an era of so-­called wild growth of Chinese tech companies. For China’s technology firms, the era of f­ree data collection and usage in China—­“freely” (no consent), “­free of responsibilities” (no liability), and “for f­ree” (no cost)—is over. Companies such as Alibaba, Tencent, and ByteDance ­w ill have to rethink their business models and how they collect and use data. No doubt, China has effectively ended the government’s laissez-­ faire approach to the internet industry and is reining in the country’s technology champions. At the end of 2020, the focus on regulating areas such as internet finance, AI, and big data was highlighted in the Chinese Communist Party’s detailed blueprint to overhaul the country’s ­legal system as part of a broader five-­year plan. Therefore, a comprehensive ­legal framework for China’s digital economy can be expected in the coming years. But that does not mean the government is slowing down the data flow. Instead, it is promoting data flow across industry sectors in a regulated way, and the pace has accelerated since 2020, when “data” became recognized as one of the “­factors of production.” In 2020 China’s central government issued an economic policy guideline to include “data” in “­factors of production,” where it joined the traditional ele­ments of land, ­labor, capital, and technology. The government reasoned that China is at a pivotal stage of innovation-­ driven development and that data can have a multiplier effect on the efficiency of other ­factors. U ­ nder this framework, unified industry

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data standards and public and private data sharing, among other key issues of the “industry internet,” are seeing accelerating development. The industry data market, individual data privacy protections, and antitrust regulations applied to antitrust regulations of internet platforms form the three pillars of China’s data and internet governance framework, ­under which the big tech companies remain big players in the world’s largest data-­driven economy. In summary, China, the largest mobile internet user market, is accelerating its digital economy regulations. China’s data privacy and security framework has profound global implications. China has already built a significant capacity in data centers and AI pro­cessing capacity and has become the world’s second-­largest market in cloud computing. China stores about one-­fi fth of the world’s data and, given its commitment to investing in the “new infrastructure” (the infrastructure of the digital economy), its share in global data is likely to continue to increase. ­Because foreign internet ­g iants operate online in China and Chinese companies operate globally, China’s cyberspace laws and policies have relevance and carry repercussions worldwide. For Eu­rope, the General Data Protection Regulation is not explic­itly tied to more far-­reaching goals of national security and social stability. However, the EU in February 2020 unveiled a plan to restore what officials called “technological sovereignty,” which aims to boost its digital economy and avoid overreliance on non-­European companies. As such, new EU laws to reflect more data sovereignty can be expected. Furthermore, China’s framework may also provide a reference point for major emerging economies such as India, Brazil, and Southeast Asian countries when they look to regulate cyberspace activities and emerging technologies. By contrast, the United States has lagged way b­ ehind Eu­rope in drafting privacy regulations. The Chinese data laws give more power

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to the Chinese consumers against the Chinese internet platforms, as compared to American consumers in front of Facebook, Google, and Amazon. China’s new data privacy laws may stimulate the United States, which still has no national-­level position on data protection, to expedite relevant ­legal mea­sures. On antitrust, China’s actions against Ant Group shows that it has more power to curb the dominance of tech companies than does the United States, which has done l­ittle to rein in Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google—in spite of their CEOs’ appearance at congressional hearings. (What the EU has accomplished is likely not enough. Even high EU fines imposed on Google have not significantly changed the market dynamics or facilitated new entry, for example.) In this new antitrust era, the Chinese cases may prompt a new breed of US antitrust experts who look beyond the hoary concept that higher prices are the primary gauge of competitive harm. The old focus on pricing power no longer applies, ­because several of the biggest tech companies have established trillion-­dollar monopolies by charging consumers next to nothing. In fact, many platforms often dole out cash rebates to netizens to incentivize their use of mobile applications. China’s new antitrust thinking suggests that consideration should be given to data privacy, data usage, and the overall impact on smaller companies. ­Because the cyberspace and digital economy remains largely undefined, data law framework has become a geopo­liti­cal issue. Whichever country takes the lead in achieving breakthroughs in legislation or its model of development can provide a model for the next-­generation internet. Subsequently, it can have more leadership power when a digital economy version of World Trade Organ­ization rules is formed. That is why the China model has become a hot topic of discussion. China’s latest actions fit with an increasing global trend of regulators taking action against big tech companies. Regulators

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from around the world are intensifying their scrutiny of big tech and reining in their potential anticompetitive practices, especially relating to user data. For the United States, the good news is that ­there is at least one issue where the two countries see eye to eye: the regulation of big tech companies. Top priorities of the Biden administration include continuing the Justice Department’s mono­poly abuse suit already ­under way against Google as well as considering the pos­si­ble separation of Facebook from Instagram or WhatsApp or both. In a reversal from a general embrace of tech ­g iants, the Biden administration must put three pieces—­comprehensive privacy reform, transparency in regard to the collection and use of PI, and a robust new competition policy regime—­together as national policy. If the two tech superpowers together could develop a regulatory framework on big tech companies, it would be extremely positive for the global digital economy. At the January 2021 Davos meeting, President Xi Jinping called for the world to work together to tackle global challenges. For that, regulating big tech is critical to keep the momentum of global tech innovation ­going and ensure that new technologies w ­ ill work for the good of ordinary users; as Google once famously said, “do no evil.” Contrary to Zuckerberg’s characterization, China no longer provides a con­ve­n ient counterargument against more regulation. Instead, Chinese market practices may accelerate US l­egal actions against companies such as his.

35

What Does It Mean That China Is the First Country to Land on the Dark Side of the Moon? Carla P. Freeman

On january 3, 2019, China became the first country to successfully

land a spacecraft on the far side of the moon, with its lunar rover Chang’e 4 sharing with the world the first pictures from the “dark” unknown lunar surface. Early in the space age, feats in space shifted paradigms on Earth. Six de­cades ago the Soviet Union’s successful launch of Sputnik, the world’s first man-­made satellite, was sobering and galvanizing for the United States. Amid an intensifying Cold War, leaders in Washington understood the damage done to the image of global American leadership by Moscow’s achievement and what it could mean for how ­people would interact in outer space. American leaders also recognized Sputnik’s significance for concrete calculations of the scientific, technological, and military balance between the United States and its Soviet rival. Sputnik’s success catalyzed what historian Walter McDougall describes as a veritable “saltation” in American science and technology policy. The United States resumed its World War II program of what he likens to the Soviet system of “command technology,” transfusing the newly established National Aeronautics and Space Administration with a level

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of federal funding for research and development second only to the US Department of Defense. American taxpayers liked the “taste of space” beverage Tang that astronauts drank more than the price tag of the US space program; nonetheless, they supported developing capabilities in space that would put the United States ahead of the Soviet Union. For Beijing, Sputnik’s success affirmed that the East wind would prevail over the West wind. But Moscow’s outer space achievement also raised the bar for China’s revival as a leading power. Mao Zedong reportedly lamented, “How can we be considered a g­ reat power? We ­can’t even put a potato in space?” By 1970, Mao’s own command technology for outer space would bear fruit with the launch of Dong Fang Hong (East Is Red), a satellite that at 178 kilograms was heavier than the combined weight of the first satellites launched by the Americans, French, Japa­nese, and Soviets. No less committed than Mao to the development of space capabilities as a marker of ­g reat power, Mao’s successors funded China’s outer space complex even as they dismantled China’s command economy. True to form, the pragmatic Deng Xiaoping set his outer space priorities according to their potential to accelerate national development. At the top of Deng’s wish list was satellite communications. By 1984, a Chinese communications satellite enabled live nationwide news broadcasts from Beijing to Ürümqi in China’s far west for the first time. Since then, both the civilian and military dimensions of China’s space program have grown. China’s outer space plans align with Xi Jinping’s vision for China’s global ascendance. Xi has linked a “space dream” to the “China dream for China’s national rejuvenation” and has made clear that he sees transforming China into a space ­g iant as essential to in­de­pen­dent or self-­reliant technological innovation, with attendant economic and military benefits. Speaking to the space sci-

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entists and engineers who worked on the Chang’e 4 mission a­ fter its success, Xi was jubilant, declaring that it “displayed the innovative spirit just as making the first move in chess or taking the initiative in ­battle.” A SPUTNIK MOMENT?

Yet, if Chang’e 4 was a dramatic demonstration of China’s space capabilities—­and its ambitions—­landing on the moon’s far side was not in and of itself a Sputnik moment. In 1957 Sputnik stunned the American public, who knew l­ittle about the Soviet’s accelerating technological wherewithal in space, and spurred radical shifts in US policy. China’s space objectives w ­ ere widely publicized in Chinese and international media. Chang’e 4 followed Chang’e 3, the first spacecraft in nearly four de­cades to have made a lunar landing. Moreover, the solution China deployed to reach the far side of the moon was first conceived of by American scientist Robert Farquhar in the late 1960s. Farquhar proposed a communication relay satellite between Earth and the moon’s far side as part of his Stanford PhD dissertation about making a controlled lunar far-­side landing. Of course, it was the merger of this concept with the twenty-­first-­ century design of the satellite with Chinese space engineer Zhang Lihua and his team’s innovative communication antennae as well as the orga­n izational infrastructure supporting the mission that ­were critical to its ultimate success. A de­cade or two ­earlier Queqiao, the communications satellite supporting the Chang’e lunar missions, might have been celebrated as an example of US-­China cooperation. Indeed, US scientists engaged Chinese colleagues on scientific research, leading some to consider the mission the first US-­China cooperation in space since the 2011 congressional ban on such activities. In 2019 in Washington,

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however, most construed the Chang’e 4 mission, viewed through the lens of US-­China economic and security competition, as an example of China’s exploitation of American technological ingenuity and the threat China posed to both US military and economic security. Thus, if Chang’e 4 did not have the shock effects of Sputnik, its impact was potent nevertheless. It led space technology experts to shorten the timeline for China’s catch-up with the United States in space from two de­cades to just one. Many in the US media saw it as the beginning of a “new space race” requiring a rethinking of American defense priorities and a need for a concerted national effort to preserve American technological leadership. In the months ­after Chang’e 4, members of both ­houses of Congress held hearings on China’s role in outer space. Testimony drew attention to the risks of some Chinese activities for the growing American commercial space sector and the dangers posed to the United States by China’s expanding counterspace programs. The positioning of Queqiao at Lagrange Point 2 seemed a first chess move in a strategic competition with the United States for space resources by establishing a Chinese presence in a strategically valuable position in space. Lagrange Point 2 is a particularly desirable orbital position for satellites or spacecraft b­ ecause it is quite stable and allows movement in unison with Earth’s orbit. Moreover, it is near enough to Earth to facilitate communications while also offering a clear view of deep space. Some American space security experts speculate about how Chinese access to impor­tant strategic points in orbit such as Lagrange Point 2 could be exploited by China for military reconnaissance and the associated ability to put US space assets at risk. Some worry that China seeks to create a chokepoint at Lagrange Point 2 to exclude other countries from an advantageous gateway to cislunar space, the part of outer space between Earth and the moon optimal for new space-­based global economic activity and as a launch zone for deeper

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space exploration. In late 2019, the US Congress’s US-­China Economic and Security Commission devoted a chapter in its annual report to China’s investment in outer space, exploring the ways in which China’s ambitions in space could reduce American economic opportunity and constrain its military capabilities in the “final frontier.” When at the end of 2019 the United States Space Force Act established the world’s first in­de­pen­dent space ser­vice force, the United States Space Force, it did so to “provide for freedom of operations in, from, and to the space domain for the United States.” While the Washington policy community has largely seen China’s far-­side lunar landing as a threat to its interests and t­hose of its allies, other space powers or aspirants have instead sought greater outer space cooperation with Beijing. Some of ­these countries are unfriendly to the United States; however, ­others are US allies or security partners. Moscow, for example, is trading its deep expertise in space for Chinese engineering manpower and Beijing’s deep pockets for research and development. Not only have the two countries formalized collaboration on lunar exploration, but their cooperation also extends to the security arena. In 2019, China and Rus­sia formally agreed to deepen technical cooperation t­oward the interoperability of China’s then nearly completed Beidou and Rus­sia’s GLONASS satellite navigation systems to rival the US Global Positioning System, a move with implications for joint military command and control. They have also engaged in surprisingly deep cooperation in aerospace defense and are both si­mul­ta­ neously developing advanced antisatellite systems. That China and Rus­sia are cooperating in space is not surprising. The two countries’ global security relationship looks much like an alliance, and the Soviet role in China’s embryonic space program before the Sino-­Soviet split in 1960 is now recalled in Beijing with appreciation. However, China’s space successes also appeal to some American allies, including ­those in Western Eu­rope. A key ­factor in

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China’s plans for an international space station of its own is the US plan to end support for the International Space Station in the next few years. Perhaps not surprisingly, not long a­ fter Chang’e 4’s success and despite US secretary of state Michael Pompeo’s calls on Eu­ rope to halt the integration of advanced Chinese technology into their communications systems, members of the Eu­ro­pean Space Agency called for more Sino-­European space cooperation. China’s pro­g ress in space has also proved attractive to hopeful space actors among emerging economies and the developing world. China’s Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organ­ization, established in 2005, is drawing new observers. Adding allure to participation in China’s B ­ elt and Road Initiative is the “­Belt and Road Space Information Corridor” or “Space Silk Road,” which gives countries taking part support from China’s Beidou global positioning system as well as extensive remote-­sensing satellites, weather satellites, and communications satellites. The fourteen African countries with space programs have expanded space cooperation with China; eight countries in Latin Amer­i­ca also have agreements with China on space cooperation. For developing countries, partnership with China promises expanded access to satellite networks that enhance situational awareness with re­spect to weather events, natu­ral disasters, and capacity for emergency response while also opening the door to new commercial opportunities. It also offers them the potential for advanced technology transfer and capacity building ­toward improved indigenous capabilities. Their growing use of China’s space technology adds to strategic tensions between the United States and China, as many countries increase their reliance on Chinese rather than American space and attendant communications and digital systems. Also worrying for ­those countries engaged in international security competition with China are the satellite ground stations China is establishing in potentially strategically significant locations, often with l­imited

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oversight from host countries. ­These satellite systems increase China’s own capacity to surveil its investments in ­Belt and Road countries, with potential military security implications. AN EXTRATERRESTRIAL TERRITORIAL GAZE?

Chang’e 4 also raises questions about how China is ­going to use the privilege conferred on explorers who arrive in t­ hose rare spaces that previously have been beyond humanity’s reach. China’s pioneering landing on the moon’s far side has opened up luna incognita, the part of the moon ­humans had not yet explored. Like the United States and the Soviet Union, China has made the most of the naming rights that obtain to t­hose who get somewhere first. In addition to Statio Tianhe (the Chinese word for “Milky Way”) where the Chang’e 4 lander alighted, the moon’s far side now has a mountain called Mons Tai, ­after a mountain in Shandong Province, as well as craters called Zhinyu, Hegu, and Tianjin. At the height of its own firsts in space, the United States bolstered its prestige and assuaged concerns about its own rising power by working with the Soviet Union to craft an international regime for outer space governance. Its goal was to mitigate the risk that a technological race to the heavens would become a race to exclude other nations from them and to prevent activities such as further high-­ altitude nuclear testing that would degrade the space environment and its f­uture uses. Washington lent its support for formal international agreements rendering outer space, like the high seas, an open-­ access domain. For the United States, an outer space arena f­ ree from sovereign bound­aries also offered an ideal environment for the globe-­ spanning technologies that amplified its global power. As China’s stakes in outer space grow, it is unclear how its ascending influence may affect international space regimes, including

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the ­legal framework that preserves it as an open access domain. By landing a spacecraft where none had gone before, China occupied a share of the high ground reserved for leaders in space. China’s approach to the South China Sea ­causes concern in this regard. As its interests in extending a strategic maritime buffer into the South China Sea grew and its capabilities for d­ oing so improved, it began exerting more jurisdictional control over navigation within its exclusive economic zone. This challenge to long-­established princi­ples of freedom of navigation that undergird the high seas commons has been an acute source of friction between China and other maritime powers. In addition, China has extended its effective control over a widening expanse of the sea through so-­called gray zone activities, principally through paramilitary deployments and fishing activities. China is a party to the Outer Space Treaty, which designates outer space as open for ­f ree exploration and use, prohibiting national appropriation by sovereignty claims through use or other means. However, the treaty is vague on a number of points, including offering l­ittle guidance on the activities of commercial actors in space. This leaves the door open to resource claims that are de facto territorial claims. Xi Jinping has labeled outer space, along with a number of other global domains to which all countries now enjoy universal access, as a strategic new frontier. China’s position on freedom of navigation on the high seas indicates that it lacks a principled commitment to the preservation of the global commons and could seek to territorialize or appropriate outer space or other­w ise constrain international access to it. And China is not alone. The Trump administration also challenged the idea that the Outer Space Treaty designates outer space as a global commons. W ­ ere China to move in the direction of claiming portions of outer space, it would alter radically the nature of space as an environment for planetary connectivity and make it a zone defined foremost by geostrategic rivalries. The first

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space race appears to have validated Senator Lyndon Johnson’s 1959 claim that “men who have worked together to reach the stars are not likely to descend together into the depths of war and desolation.” It is too soon to tell ­whether this ­will remain true in a second space race. FINAL REFLECTIONS

Sixty years ago while the space race raged, images of Earth from outer space altered perceptions of our planet. This made Earth’s vulnerability poignantly clear and erased po­liti­cal borders between nations. Speaking at the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson would describe Earth as a fragile “­little space ship.” The image helped give rise to a “­whole Earth perspective” that led to new thinking about the limits to growth and the need for sustainable approaches to life on the planet. But the view from the far side of the moon is of the universe. China now looks out via its lunar lander ­there to what seems a limitless unknown. How does this view alter how China’s sees Earth? Is Earth a “­little space ship” to be prudently tended, or has it become a stop on a longer journey to the stars?

36 Is

US-­China Global Health Collaboration Win-­Win? Winnie Yip and William Hsiao

In the tense and evolving relationship between the United States

and China, what positive opportunities exist for collaboration between the two nations in the health sector? Health and education— on account of their humanitarian and social impacts—­possess a special status in international relations that is distinct from ­every other policy area. ­Every person, no ­matter their nationality, shares a strong common desire to live a long, healthy life; for that, good health care that prevents the onset of illness, appropriately manages chronic disease, and effectively treats injuries and other acute conditions is an absolute necessity. This basic ­human desire could unite Americans and Chinese ­people around a shared interest in advancing biomedicine and health care. The recent COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of US-­China collaboration on effective response to and control of emerging infectious diseases. In addition, while the United States is ahead of China in many areas of medical science and health care delivery, China is more advanced in the utilization of health data and digital health care, and its larger population size and higher prevalence of certain diseases enable it to carry out biomedical research into questions that cannot practically be studied inside the United States. Furthermore, many biomedical researchers in US laboratories

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are Chinese nationals, and China is a large and growing market for American medical products and ser­v ices. RESPONSE TO COVID-19 AND GLOBAL PANDEMICS

The first way in which US-­China collaboration can benefit citizens of both countries (and beyond) is by creating global public goods, particularly ­those related to infectious disease surveillance and pandemic response. The COVID-19 pandemic has thrown the importance of common, global norms on reporting and managing novel outbreaks into stark relief. Common disease surveillance infrastructures and transparent early reporting provide countries around the world with more advanced notice before a virus hits their shores, making them more prepared when it arrives. Such mea­sures also allow for global scientific collaboration on developing tests, treatments, and vaccines to ramp up much faster. The United States and China can work together to ensure that the global outbreak surveillance and monitoring system established by the World Health Organ­ ization’s International Health Regulations is fully implemented. If the United States and China could, through their collaborative diplomatic efforts, ensure universal compliance with the regulations’ reporting requirements, the improvements in early disease detection and understanding would mean significantly more effective outbreak response worldwide. Coordinated global response is necessary ­because ­until a critical mass of the world population is vaccinated (or herd immunity is achieved), international travel means that failure to control the incidence of infection inside any one country leaves ­every other country vulnerable to new outbreaks. The failure of travel restrictions to halt the spread of COVID-19 made this fact abundantly clear, and it is

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particularly pertinent to the US-­China relationship. In 2002, the year before the devastating outbreak of SARS-­CoV-1, over 350,000 p­ eople from China visited the United States. In 2019 that number was nearly 2.9 million, and more than 1.5 million Americans visited China. The United States and China can work together to promote best practices in outbreak containment and mitigation around the world and can support frameworks for international coordination of appropriate and useful mea­sures such as carefully targeted and scientifically informed travel restrictions. As epidemiologists predict that the world ­w ill confront a new global pandemic on average ­every few de­cades and that the pandemic risk ­w ill only rise over time, such collaborations are critical. US-­China collaborations in biomedical research and health data science ­w ill also be beneficial for control of COVID-19 and f­uture pandemics. BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH

The United States is more advanced than China in most areas of basic biomedical science, phar­ma­ceu­t i­cal and clinical innovation, patient-­ centered health care delivery, and health care management. So, it may not be obvious what the United States would stand to gain from partnering with China on advancements in biomedicine. Nonetheless, opportunities do exist for win-­w in collaboration. For instance, US-­ China collaboration could allow clinical ­trials to run faster at larger scale and with lower cost, thus accelerating the advancement of biomedical science. This is ­because China has four times the US population for participating in clinical t­ rials, a lower cost structure, and a large number of scientists who are well trained and well equipped to carry out such research. US research efforts could also benefit from differences in the prevalence and comorbidity patterns of many diseases between the

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American and Chinese populations. For instance, China has much higher rates of stomach, liver, and esophageal cancer; outbreaks of hand, foot, and mouth disease; and 16 million patients with less common diseases, including Alzheimer’s, making large-­scale cohort studies uniquely feasible t­ here. Advancing our understanding of ­these conditions requires sizable patient populations on which epidemiological and biomedical research can be conducted. In contrast, China suffers significantly less premature mortality due to ischemic heart disease than the United States. Research into why that is the case could unlock more effective means of prevention, diagnosis, and treatment than currently exist in the United States. Fi­nally, China represents a uniquely impor­tant context in which to study the pathology, epidemiology, and infection dynamics of zoonotic viruses, as both SARS-­CoV-1 and SARS-­CoV-2 first made the leap to ­humans within its borders. China’s rapid sequencing of the SARS­CoV-2 genome is evidence that its scientists and laboratories are well positioned to conduct such research effectively. This work has since proven indispensable in the global effort to develop tests and vaccines for the virus. HEALTH DATA SCIENCE AND DIGITAL HEALTH CARE

The United States and China could benefit from working with each other on health data science and digital health care. While the United States is ahead of China in innovation in this area, China leads the United States and prob­ably the world in the application of ­these technologies at scale. For instance, China has leveraged its unified medical data infrastructure to deploy artificial intelligence tools that aid physicians in making diagnosis and treatment decisions. Such tools can also assist patients in self-­a ssessment and selecting appropriate medical specialists from whom to seek care.

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Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed a slew of new use cases for health data science and digital health care. Mobile phone applications can facilitate large-­scale, highly effective contact tracing and exposure notification, and mobility, internet search, and retail transaction data make pos­si­ble vastly more informed evaluations of the efficacy of nonpharmaceutical interventions—­such as closing businesses and schools and ordering residents to shelter at home—at reducing the incidence of infection. The United States can learn from China’s success at rolling out such technologies, and the Chinese can learn from the US rec­ord of innovation in developing ­these technologies. COVID-19 has drawn fresh attention to the importance of telemedicine in both the United States and China, sparking advancements in both countries that would only be accelerated through greater collaboration and knowledge sharing. Similarly, facilitating the at-­home administration of urgent diagnostic screenings, dialysis, chemotherapy, and treatment for other acute conditions has become a priority in both the United States and China in light of the pandemic and pre­sents a further domain in which collaboration would bear significant fruit. Developing structures for maintaining continuity of care for patients in need through the next pandemic must be on our agenda when it comes time to consider how we can do better during ­future global infectious disease outbreaks. THE EXCHANGE OF TALENT AND TECHNOLOGIES

Both the United States and China also benefit from open exchange of biomedical talent. Most notably, its open education policy provides the United States with a steady supply of well-­trained health researchers and health care prac­ti­tion­ers, ranging from highly valued immigrant scientists to practicing physicians. ­These professionals form

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the backbone of premier hospitals and biomedical laboratories across the United States. In 2016, about 18  ­percent of physicians in the United States w ­ ere born or trained somewhere in Asia. Chinese nationals staff many leading biomedical research institutions such as Harvard, MIT, and MD Anderson, to name a few. Many top US and Eu­ro­pean medical centers already have ongoing training agreements with Chinese tertiary, or advanced specialty, hospitals that allow physicians to share cutting-­edge knowledge about the treatment of cancer, cardiovascular diseases, and other complicated conditions. The transnational physician relationships that t­hese partnerships build proved indispensable during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, when the medical staff of top American hospitals relied on the advice of their Chinese counter­parts to help them manage the growing wave of coronavirus cases. MARKET EXCHANGE

China has been a major export market for the United States in new medical devices, phar­ma­ceu­ti­cals, and treatment models. As China has grown into an upper-­m iddle–­income nation with an increasingly affluent population, demand for state-­of-­the-­a rt therapies, diagnostics, phar­m a­ceu­t i­cals, and surgical procedures has skyrocketed. As a result, many American medical centers have established satellite facilities in China and treatment partnerships with Chinese providers. Over time, this business w ­ ill only grow. While China is already home to a greater proportion of the wealthiest 10 ­percent of the global population than the United States, China’s middle-­income population is expected to exceed 550 million p­ eople in 2022. By 2023 China, already the second-­largest phar­ma­ceu­ti­cals market in the world, is expected to make up 30 ­percent of the industry’s global business.

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Collaboration in all of the above areas would yield material benefits to the United States far in excess of their costs. Even in the case of global infectious disease surveillance, where a relatively small portion of the total benefit would accrue to the US population, that portion alone would still exceed the cost. The benefits to ­others, however, merit consideration as well and not just in the case of containing nascent pandemics in their early stages. When Chinese researchers uploaded the SARS-­CoV-2 genome to public databases such as GenBank and GISAID in early January 2020, they massively increased the total benefit that would come of their work. Similarly, papers by American scientists in publications such as the New ­England Journal of Medicine ­were instrumental in informing early COVID-19 responses in countries around the world. It is often hard to predict who ­w ill benefit most from making a specific piece of knowledge publicly available upon its discovery, but we can be confident that the benefits of strong norms of open intellectual and technological exchange far outweigh the costs to each of the norms’ individual participants in the long run. For any of the above to be feasible, however, steps must be taken to build shared expectations and a sense of trust between the United States and China. In the research domain, norms of scientific practice would have to be harmonized between the two countries. Regulatory standards need to be transparent and aligned. Rules for the protection of intellectual property rights need to be observed with good faith. In addition, the United States and China, the two leading economies in the world, should collaborate to ensure global access to effective vaccines, especially for low-­and middle-­income countries, for the benefit of the citizens of the United States and China and for humanity.

VIII     Society

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What’s #MeToo in China All About? Leta Hong Fincher

Almost five years ­a fter the Me Too movement took off in more

than eighty-­five countries, China’s version of the movement against sexual harassment continues to have momentum in spite of aggressive internet censorship and the frequent persecution of activists. China’s Me Too movement is one manifestation of the emergence of a broader feminist awakening that has begun to transform young ­women in cities across China. T ­ hese young ­women all want similar ­things: freedom to make their own decisions about their bodies and their lives and freedom to work, travel, and live without being sexually assaulted, beaten, or killed. The Chinese government ­today perpetuates traditional gender norms and state media routinely reduce w ­ omen to their roles as dutiful wives and m ­ others in the home. Yet feminism has played a key but forgotten role in China’s revolutionary history. At the end of the nineteenth ­century, the cross-­dressing Qiu Jin left her husband and two ­children to write and give speeches in Japan, calling on Chinese ­women to rise up against patriarchal, Confucian traditions. She was beheaded in 1907, accused of conspiring to overthrow the Qing empire. Another anarchist feminist, He-­Yin Zhen, wrote brilliantly prescient essays at around the same time decrying China’s patriarchal oppression, recently translated in the volume The Birth of Chinese Feminism, edited by Lydia H. Liu, Rebecca E. Karl and Dorothy

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Ko. The emancipation of ­women was a central goal not just for turn-­of-­the-­century revolutionaries and activists in the May Fourth movement of 1919, but also throughout the communist revolution, culminating in the founding of the P ­ eople’s Republic of China in 1949. During the early communist era, the government used the rhe­ toric of gender equality to mobilize masses of ­women into the workforce to boost industrial production. Publicly, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders enshrined “the equality of ­women and men” (nannü pingdeng) in the Constitution of the P ­ eople’s Republic of China, even as sexism remained deeply entrenched among male officials and ­women cadres ­were subjected to double standards. Never­ theless, by the end of the 1970s, the ­labor force participation rate for urban w ­ omen in China had reached more than 90  ­percent as the state established the largest female workforce in the world. With the onset of market reforms and the dismantling of the planned economy in the 1980s and 1990s, however, many dif­fer­ent forms of gender in­ equality came roaring back. ­Women’s ­labor force participation rate dropped precipitously. In 1990, 73 ­percent of Chinese w ­ omen ages fifteen and older ­were in the workforce, but by 2020 that figure had plummeted to just over 61 ­percent, according to the World Bank. The gender income gap also widened significantly, and the reform­era media began aggressively promoting traditional gender norms. China’s propaganda apparatus began a campaign in 2007 to stigmatize single college-­educated w ­ omen in their late twenties, mocking them as “leftover w ­ omen” (sheng nü) to push them into marrying and having babies for the good of the nation. But as rec­ord numbers of Chinese w ­ omen attended universities both at home and abroad, they began to challenge widespread sexism and gender discrimination. Against the backdrop of the resurgence of gender in­equality driven

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by breakneck economic development, a new feminist movement was born. A pivotal moment for ­women’s rights occurred in March 2015 when Chinese authorities jailed five feminist activists for planning to celebrate International ­Women’s Day by handing out stickers against sexual harassment on subways and buses. News of the arrest of the five ­women—­who became known as the “Feminist Five”—­ spread swiftly around the world, sparking an international outcry from rights organ­izations and world leaders. The w ­ omen ­were released a­ fter thirty-­seven days, but the term “feminism” (nüquan zhuyi) became po­liti­cally sensitive and subject to frequent censorship online. Since then, ever more young ­women—­some of them only in high school—­began signing up as volunteers for the fledging feminist movement. Some ­women who had previously avoided po­liti­cal discussion now de­cided to identify themselves publicly as feminists on social media, forcing the government’s internet censors to work even more aggressively to shut down new feminist content. In May 2017 the website of the ­People’s Daily, the official mouthpiece of the CCP, warned that “Western hostile forces” w ­ ere using “Western feminism” and the notion of “putting feminism above all ­else” to attack China’s views on ­women and the country’s “basic policies on gender equality.” The vice president of the All-­China ­Women’s Federation, Song Xiuyan, was quoted as saying that CCP officials working on ­women’s issues ­were in the midst of a “serious po­liti­cal strug­g le” and urgently needed to follow President Xi Jinping’s instruction to guard against Western ideological infiltration. Months ­later in October 2017 in the United States, the hashtag #MeToo, created by the African American civil rights activist Tarana Burke, went viral a­ fter the publication of in-­depth investigative reports on the sexually predatory be­hav­ior of Hollywood movie

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producer Harvey Weinstein, but in China the news media w ­ ere barred from conducting similar investigations. Nonetheless, in January 2018 feminist activists seized on the global momentum of the Me Too movement and adapted it for use in China, demonstrating the extraordinary resilience of a feminist movement that has posed a unique challenge to CCP leaders in an era of global connectivity. A US-­based gradu­ate of Beihang University, Luo Xixi, was inspired by Me Too in Amer­i­ca and posted a personal essay online about being sexually assaulted by her former professor. As other activists distributed her essay, they set off a cascading series of Me Too–­related actions online and on university campuses in China. Thousands of students and alumni in China—­women as well as men—­signed Me Too petitions at dozens of universities, demanding action against sexual harassment. But many of the petitions ­were deleted by censors soon ­after being posted on social media. Late on the night of International ­Women’s Day, March 8, 2018, Weibo banned the influential social media account Feminist Voices (nüquan zhi sheng), founded by leading feminist activist Lü Pin. The following day, the group messaging app WeChat banned the Feminist Voices account as well. Not only was the Weibo account shut down, but WeChat erased many essays readers had written demanding that the Feminist Voices Weibo account be reopened. The #MeToo hashtag on sexual harassment was one of the top ten censored topics in 2018 on China’s popu­lar messaging app, WeChat, according to a study by the University of Hong Kong’s WeChatScope. Since the jailing of China’s Feminist Five in 2015, Lü Pin has lived in self-­exile in the United States and started a new organ­ization for Chinese feminists to communicate more freely and sustain the momentum of the movement back home. Although they live in dif­fer­ent parts of China and the world, many of ­these ­women have formed close bonds of solidarity. Core activists in the movement look out

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for each other’s safety, keep track of when police are harassing their fellow activists, and try to outmaneuver online censors for hours or even minutes at a time. Despite the internet clampdown, in April 2018 tenacious students at several dif­fer­ent Chinese universities circulated Me Too petitions, demanding that university officials stop whitewashing charges of sexual harassment and assault. At Peking University, China’s most renowned academic institution, a group of students called on the university to release information about the case of Gao Yan, a lit­er­a­t ure student who killed herself in 1998 ­after she told friends and ­family she was raped by a professor, Shen Yang. Shen had left Peking University by then and denied the accusations, but the university admitted that it had given the professor a warning in 1998 over his “inappropriate student-­teacher relations.” Yue Xin, one of the Me Too activists on campus, said that her adviser brought her distraught ­mother to her dorm room at Peking University’s School of Foreign Languages late on the night of April 22 to warn her to stop speaking out about the twenty-­year-­old rape case. Yue was sent home with her ­mother, but she posted a widely circulated online statement about the intimidation she had experienced. “At 1 a.m., my advisor abruptly came to my dormitory with my ­mother, woke me up, and demanded that I delete all data related to the freedom of information request from my phone and computer,” Yue wrote. The adviser warned Yue that her activism might be seen as “subversive” and that she could face criminal charges due to her involvement with “foreign forces.” Yue wrote that her ­mother had been so frightened by the encounter with university officials that she had threatened to kill herself, according to China Digital Times. Other Peking University students, enraged by the unjust treatment of their classmate, posted large handwritten big-­character posters (dazibao) on a campus bulletin board in solidarity with Yue

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Xin. The students wrote “We ask you gentlemen in charge of the school, what are you actually afraid of?” and said their classmate was acting in the spirit of the historic May Fourth movement of 1919. Their actions evoked memories of the Democracy Wall movement of 1978–79 and the Tian­anmen Square uprising of 1989. Campus security guards quickly removed the student posters, and the following day Peking University installed new surveillance cameras pointing at the location where the big-­character posters had appeared. Undaunted, Yue graduated and joined other elite university gradu­ates—­such as Shen Mengyu, who had a degree in mathe­matics and computational science from Sun Yat-­sen University and had documented the violation of pregnant ­women workers’ rights—to ­u nionize workers at a Jasic Technology factory in southern China. Both of them ­were among dozens of activists who dis­appeared a­ fter a police raid in August 2018. Although Chinese authorities have cracked down on ­women’s rights activism, vari­ous government agencies have attempted to demonstrate that they are responsive to some of the activists’ key demands. The Ministry of Education stated in November 2018, for example, that all universities ­were required to set up mechanisms to prevent and deal with sexual harassment on campus. While prominent male ­human rights activists have emerged over the years (most notably the Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, who died in custody in 2017), very few ordinary Chinese citizens knew about them or could relate to their abstract goals. By contrast, feminist activists ­today take up ­causes that are not directly confronting CCP rule but have broad resonance with millions of young urban ­women across China, such as sexual harassment, intimate partner vio­lence, and gender discrimination in employment and university admissions. The feminist activists have cultivated a networked community numbering in the thousands revolving around university students

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and gradu­ates. They have become highly effective organizers and arguably pose a larger, more complicated challenge to the communist regime than the male activists who preceded them. The Me Too movement has spread from university campuses to the media, religious groups, technology, and other sectors. In 2021, the Me Too movement led to the detention of a famous, Canadian Chinese pop singer, Kris Wu, on suspicion of raping young w ­ omen. In spite of the government crackdown on feminist organ­izing, ordinary w ­ omen are increasingly sharing information and voicing their anger about sexism on the internet, even if they do not embrace the label of “feminist.” Although the government persecutes activists, shuts down w ­ omen’s rights centers, bans feminist social media accounts, censors Me Too accounts of sexual harassment, and tightens controls on gender studies programs at universities, China’s feminist networks have actually grown in recent years instead of being wiped out. ­Women continue to come forward courageously regardless of their extremely slight chance of ever finding justice. One of the most prominent voices in the Me Too movement in 2020 was Zhou Xiaoxuan, known by the nickname “Xianzi,” a former intern at China’s state-­r un tele­v i­sion agency who accused a famous TV host, Zhu Jun, of forcibly groping her. Rather than backing down when Zhu sued her for defamation, Zhou de­cided to file a ­counter lawsuit, charging the TV host of hurting her right to “personal dignity.” On December 2, 2020, around a hundred supporters, mostly ­women, gathered outside a Beijing court for Zhou Xiaoxuan’s suit against Zhu Jun. They chanted “Xianzi jiayou [Go Xianzi])!” and held signs that read, for example, “We demand an answer from history” and “We are not walking reproductive organs.” The court ruled in September 2021 that Zhou did not provide sufficient evidence for her case and at the time of writing, she planned to appeal. Chinese

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courts have rarely heard cases brought by sexual harassment victims prior to that of Zhou Xiaoxuan. But the government announced in December 2021 that it would revise a major law on w ­ omen’s rights and protections for the first time in de­cades to provide a comprehensive definition of sexual harassment, among other proposed changes. In another sign of growing awareness about misogyny and vio­ lence against ­women, the celebrated pop star Tan Weiwei released a song in December 2020 about domestic vio­lence titled “Xiao Juan,” an alias often given to ­women who are victims of violent attacks. Tan’s song sparked heated discussions on Weibo, with one trending topic, “Tan Weiwei’s lyr­ics are so bold,” attracting over 320 million views in a few days. Listeners drew parallels between some of Tan’s lyr­ics and chilling cases of ­women who ­were killed in acts of intimate partner vio­lence, such as the Tibetan farmer Lhamo, who was doused with gasoline and set on fire by her ex-­husband, and a ­woman in Hangzhou whose husband killed and dismembered her, and flushed her body parts into a septic tank. The widespread discontent among a critical mass of young Chinese ­women has developed into a level of influence over public opinion that is highly unusual for any social movement in China. Growing numbers of ­women are rejecting the state’s relentless efforts to coerce them into heterosexual marriage and child rearing. New statistics point to an estimated 15 ­percent drop in registered newborn babies in 2020 compared with the previous year. The government announced a new, “three-­child policy” in June 2021 but the overall trend of declining or low birth rates ­will likely continue. Marriage rates are also declining sharply. It is no won­der, then, that China’s all-­m ale rulers feel threatened by young feminist activists who are calling for the emancipation of ­women. In November 2021, Chinese tennis champion Peng Shuai posted a lengthy account of

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how former vice premier Zhang Gaoli had sexually assaulted her, bringing the first Me Too accusation against a se­n ior CCP official. Peng Shuai’s post and any discussion of it ­were promptly scrubbed from the internet and the fate of the tennis star was unclear at the time of writing. As feminist and Me Too activists continue to disrupt the patriarchal, authoritarian order, the government ­w ill inevitably find new ways to persecute them. However, the forces of re­sis­ tance they have unleashed ­w ill be extremely difficult to stamp out.

38

Why Should the United States Support Civil Society in China and How? Diana Fu

For de­cades, the united states has sought to promote gradual so-

cietal change within China by supporting civil society. This has included funding and capacity building for advocacy organ­izations, universities, critical journalists, h ­ uman rights l­awyers, religious and ethnic minorities, and other disadvantaged groups. Successive US administrations hoped that d­ oing so could promote a more open and ­f ree China or, at the very least, draw China into international organ­ izations and abide by global norms. Such support declined precipitously, however, during the Trump administration, which ­adopted an anti-­China and isolationist attitude in foreign policy. Trump’s “Amer­i­ca First” agenda entailed slashing foreign aid and cutting the bud­get of democracy promotion organ­izations such as the National Endowment for Democracy. Although the total bud­get for foreign aid in the United States constitutes only about 1 ­percent of the federal bud­get, it nevertheless has had symbolic resonance in terms of promoting demo­cratic values abroad.

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The Biden administration has a chance to redeem the American image abroad by assuring change agents in China and elsewhere that its po­liti­cal values—­freedom and ­human rights—­are indeed universal values and that the US government ­w ill support organ­izations and individuals who work actively on behalf of freedom of speech, press, assembly, religion, and other civil liberties. Supporting civil society abroad is key to promoting t­ hese values. WHY SUPPORT CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHINA?

Why should the United States do this at a time when Amer­i­ca itself is wracked with internal unrest, systematic racism, partisan strife, and a hurting economy? ­There are several reasons. First, to convince the world that freedom and basic h ­ uman rights o ­ ught to be embraced by all, the United States must demonstrate “the power of our example,” as Biden has declared. Democracies face an unpre­ce­dented challenge from China about po­liti­cal values and norms, particularly when US promotion of ­those values and norms externally can seem hypocritical, given repeated police killings of African Americans and the rise of white supremacists in the United States. Yet, supporting Chinese civil society is an impor­tant part of upholding liberal demo­cratic values, especially now when the Xi administration actively claims that its po­liti­cal values are superior to ­those of the United States. U ­ nder Xi Jinping’s leadership, Beijing has ramped up its global campaign to persuade ­others that its authoritarian system, which values economic welfare over po­liti­cal freedoms, is both more pragmatic and more legitimate. As part of this propaganda campaign, Xi directly questions the positive contributions of civil groups, which traditionally promote public accountability, ­human rights, and the rule of law. In fact, a thriving civil society has

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been designated as one of seven dangerous Western values that could undermine his policies, along with constitutional democracy, neoliberalism, freedom of the press, and universal values of freedom, democracy, and h ­ uman rights. It is this global strug­g le over values that gives the United States a chance to redeem itself. The Biden administration must reestablish the legitimacy of demo­cratic values not only through exemplifying freedom but also by giving concrete support to grassroots actors in China and other authoritarian states. The United States must show through funneling money and disseminating know-­how that ­those on the front line of Chinese social change ­m atter and that Washington, with its allies, w ­ ill back t­hese social change agents when they face repression. The power of example is only as strong as the depth of American commitment to their efforts inside China and elsewhere. Values aside, supporting Chinese civil society can also promote constructive dialogue on thorny issues such as global health and climate change. Civil society includes a vast array of actors and organ­ izations such as the media, academic institutions, businesses, and nongovernmental organ­izations (NGOs). If the United States and China can engage in what Chinese vice foreign minister Fu Ying has called “cooperative competition,” civil society can play a role on its cooperative side by facilitating people-­to-­people exchange and knowledge sharing. In the area of global health, bilateral cooperation can and should be accompanied by knowledge sharing and exchanges between health experts. Civil exchanges around clean energy can also add a constructive ele­ment to competition between American and Chinese firms. Such exchanges involving environmental groups can facilitate constructive dialogue among local governments rather than distant national ones. International organ­izations such as the Natu­ral Resource Defense Council, the Energy Foundation, and the World

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Resources Institute can spearhead people-­to-­people exchanges on the environment, helping China achieve Xi’s pledge that China w ­ ill be “carbon neutral” by 2060. WHAT ARE THE CHALLENGES?

The United States f­ aces several challenges in engaging Chinese civil society. The first is devising a strategy in support of once-­v ibrant grassroots organ­izations. Since coming to power in 2012, the Xi administration has launched campaigns against such organ­izations and activists that have decimated their efforts. The first targets included ­labor activists who promoted the ­legal rights of China’s 280 million mi­g rant workers. Such increased state repression has left Chinese grassroots civil society in dire straits. It w ­ ill be difficult for the United States and its allies to figure out how to revive a grassroots civil society forced by the state into dormancy. A second challenge involves Beijing’s regulation of foreign NGOs in China, which have provided financial and technical support to domestic organ­izations. China’s 2017 overseas NGO law made it more difficult for American and other foreign or international NGOs to operate legally in China. Previously, only some foreign NGOS officially found professional supervisory units and registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. ­Others operated in a ­legal gray zone by remaining unregistered or by registering as commercial entities. The 2017 law requires all foreign NGOs to register with the Ministry of Public Security, a move signaling that the government sees them as a potential threat to domestic security. International NGOS also are subject to a dual management system requiring them to find a supervisory organ­ization willing to assume responsibility for their presence before opening a Chinese office. Although some, such as the Ford Foundation, Oxfam, and Save the ­Children, have done so, their

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funding activities had to first be reported to and preapproved by public security officials. In effect, the international NGO law has granted clearer l­egal status to many of China’s foreign NGOs but has also subjected them to greater scrutiny by the security forces. Moreover, a­ fter the US Congress acted in support of Hong Kong’s democracy movement, Beijing sanctioned other American NGOs with democracy-­promotion agendas, including the National Endowment for Democracy, H ­ uman Rights Watch, Freedom House, the National Demo­cratic Institute, and the International Republican Institute, preventing them from operating in Hong Kong in 2019. In addition, in 2020 Beijing sanctioned four individuals from ­these organ­izations, barring them from entering China. This shift does not bode well for US engagement in Chinese civil society. Whereas Hong Kong used to be a territory in which US-­based organ­izations could operate a base, that is no longer the case. A third challenge concerns the severed channels of people-­to-­ people exchanges ­under Xi and Trump. In a climate of competing po­liti­cal values and mistrust, both sides have sought to restrict communication between civic groups. American policy makers continue to be suspicious of Chinese organ­izations such as the Confucius Institutes, which provide Chinese-­funded language and culture instruction at American colleges, and associations that operate on American soil but seem to advocate the po­liti­cal interests of Beijing. But even American organ­izations have come ­under fire; Trump cancelled the Fulbright program in China and Hong Kong that had promoted academic exchanges between the two nations ever since diplomatic relations ­were normalized in 1979. Likewise, the Peace Corps also severed ties to China, ending twenty-­seven years in that country. Beijing responded in kind, cutting people-­to-­people exchanges from its side and expelling many American journalists, sanctioning US-­based NGOs, and imposing new visa restrictions.

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FROM UNIDIRECTIONAL SUPPORT TO MUTUAL EXCHANGE

Despite t­hese challenges, the United States should continue to engage with civil society in China. However, this should take the form of mutual exchanges rather than one-­way support from the United States. With the world’s second-­largest economy, China’s domestic philanthropic sector has blossomed. In this changing landscape, American money may not only be considered too “po­liti­cally sensitive” to receive but may also seem minimal when compared to domestic contributions from g­ iant corporations such as Tencent and Alibaba. In this new geopo­liti­cal terrain, the United States needs a strategy for rebooting people-­to-­people exchanges with China on a more equal footing. While American organ­izations seek to operate in China and fund organ­izations ­there, the United States should also revive people-­to-­people exchanges promoting Track II diplomacy, dialogue between nongovernmental experts that can help advance diplomatic goals of their governments. This can be done by engaging with local officials, businesses, universities, social organ­izations, and mass organ­izations such as the All-­China Federation of Trade Unions. In addition, the United States should reinstate the Fulbright program and the Peace Corps even though this might be difficult po­liti­cally. US senator Rick Scott of Florida was quick to praise the Peace Corps for cancelling the China program and coming “to its senses” by seeing “Communist China for what it is: the world’s second largest economy and an adversary of the United States.” Scott may have rightly diagnosed China’s place in the world, but his strategy is wrong. Rather than cut ties to a repressive and aggressive communist regime, the United States should restore many of them. The goal ­isn’t necessarily to “change China” from within but rather to educate ourselves about the vastly diverse cultures and

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subcultures that exist ­there ­today, sowing the seeds for a smarter China policy in years just ahead. Enhanced exchanges ­will also promote insightful journalism and scholarship on China, impor­tant for any kind of f­uture relationship the two nations may have. In addition, Washington should rephrase its accusatory rhe­toric about “Chinese influence operations,” which casts suspicion on all Chinese civilian organ­izations in the United States, with awareness that Chinese organ­izations carry­ing out goals of the Chinese Communist Party should be supervised in a more targeted manner. Fi­n ally, encouraging more people-­to-­people exchanges would also promote cooperation on common goals such as tackling climate change and global health. Such exchanges depend on at least one party’s willingness to extend an initial olive branch. Beijing and Washington engaging in visa wars and tit-­for-­tat sanctions leave l­ittle chance for a new ping-­pong diplomacy to emerge to smooth difficulties as in the 1970s. The American ping-­pong team—­a civil society group—­went to China at the invitation of Mao Zedong in 1971. ­These Americans, including a college professor, a Guyanese immigrant, and two high school students, helped thaw relations at the height of the Cold War. The United States then reciprocated by inviting the Chinese ping-­pong team in 1972, an exchange aided by an American civil society group. Notably, this happened when the United States did not recognize the ­People’s Republic of China or have diplomatic relations with it. However tense bilateral relations are presently, the United States and China are much more intertwined now than fifty years ago. When the right po­liti­cal opportunity beckons, the United States should be prepared to make overtures to usher in a renewed era of people-­to-­people diplomacy. Facilitating citizens-­driven dialogue at both the national and subnational levels may help bring an end to a thorny period in US-­China relations.

39 Do

Confucius Institutes Belong on American Campuses? Mary Gallagher

T­h ere are clear benefits to having Chinese students in American

universities. In 2019 more than 360,000 students from China w ­ ere studying in the United States, most of them seeking degrees. The majority are self-­funded and self-­selected into the American higher education system in search of a superior academic environment and an open po­liti­cal and social environment. T ­ here are also clear benefits to and indeed a need for research collaboration and exchanges among gradu­ate students, faculty, and visiting scholars. The challenges posed by educational exchange and collaboration with China are due not primarily to individual students or scholars, but rather to the orga­n izational forms and tactics the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses to extend its influence abroad, manage Chinese citizens overseas, and suppress discussion of topics that put the CCP in a negative light. Organ­izations such as Confucius Institutes (CIs) and Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs) are tied to the CCP through its United Front Work Department, the institution within the party responsible for managing relations with nonparty entities and individuals. ­These organ­izations violate basic princi­ples of American education. Their presence on campus diminishes Chinese students’

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and scholars’ exercise of ­these princi­ples and increases the potential for coercion and constraints on expression for students and scholars of both nations. This challenge should be met through enforcement of Amer­i­ca’s own princi­ples of academic freedom. Reciprocity (treating Chinese individuals and organ­izations in the United States the same way Americans are treated in China), which some argue should be the main guiding princi­ple for dealing with China, is the wrong approach. A reciprocity argument would ban CIs in the United States on the grounds that Americans c­ an’t establish similar organ­izations in China. But a policy based on reciprocity would have perverse effects on our own institutions, making the United States more closed and more like China. A better approach is one that protects our own princi­ples by rejecting censorship and government oversight of academic programs and curricula. Such an approach might restrict CIs to off-­campus status as standalone organ­izations, such as the Alliance Francaise and the British Council. The goal of any restrictions should be to protect our comparative advantage in academic freedom, not to mimic the restrictive environment of Chinese higher education. The key prob­lem with t­ hese groups is their origins in the United Front, the linchpin connecting the CCP to overseas influence operations. Chinese leader Xi Jinping, who in 2015 lauded the United Front as one of the CCP’s “magic weapons,” has taken steps to enhance the United Front Work Department’s power, making United Front work more impor­tant than ever. In evaluating the pros and cons of CIs and CSSAs on American campuses, it’s impor­tant to understand how they work and how United Front operating procedures are baked into them. ­These include party guidance rather than party leadership, distinguishing friends from enemies and amplifying and rewarding the voices of friends while minimizing ­those of enemies. CCP guidance rather

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than party leadership is particularly impor­tant overseas, where party leadership is po­liti­cally impossible. In general, the Chinese government tends to de-­emphasize (and even hide) the CCP’s presence in organ­izations that interface internationally. But its guidance is often evident in by-­laws of associations, memoranda of understanding (MOUs), approval pro­cesses for program decisions, and the se­lection of association leaders. Ever since Mao Zedong developed the concept of United Front work, it has been oriented ­toward “friends” and “potential friends,” which requires making a key po­liti­cal distinction between friends and enemies. “Make more nonparty friends” is even a stipulation in the 2015 United Front Law, which exhorts local CCP leaders to include United Front work in all their activities. Making friends also implies identifying enemies and deciding which voices should be encouraged and which should be suppressed. Successful United Front work should amplify the voices of friends while drowning out and demonizing t­hose who are not friendly to China, which in practical terms often simply equates to being critical of China. In the context of identity politics and antiracist movements in many Western socie­ties, the CCP can try to delegitimize its critics by labeling them racist or anti-­Chinese. The presence of groups affiliated with the ­People’s Republic of China on American campuses can shape opinion about China, curtailing activities and programs that are not friendly while amplifying ­those that are. Drowning out other voices and occupying space can be as impor­tant as the substance (of the activity or programming). The substance is t­here not necessarily to persuade but rather to simply take up space and crowd out o ­ thers. When substance is immaterial or secondary, it becomes impor­ tant to reward friends with patronage. This can include financial or reputational benefits and benefits of access. U ­ nder Xi’s leadership, giving or withholding benefits has become a more obvious tool of

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Chinese power, what Financial Times journalist Jamil Anderlini has called “punishment diplomacy.” China’s attempts to cancel its critics include entire countries (Norway a­ fter Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Prize), universities (University of California, San Diego, ­after a commencement speech by the Dalai Lama), organ­ izations (the National Basketball Association ­after a team executive tweeted support of the Hong Kong democracy movement), corporations (H&M and Nike a­ fter they condemned P ­ eople’s Republic of China actions in Xinjiang), and individuals (academics barred from China ­after contributing to a book about Xinjiang). The CIs w ­ ere founded in 2004 to enhance China’s soft power abroad, develop ties to foreign institutions of higher education, and promote Chinese-­language study. More than 500 have been established globally. By 2021 with the sharp downturn in US-­China relations, most CIs in the United States had closed, including at the University of Michigan (2018) and the University of Mary­land (2020). Compared to other organ­izations that promote foreign languages and culture abroad, CIs have some distinctive features. ­These are understandable from a United Front perspective. Unlike the Japan Foundation, the K ­ orea Foundation, the Alliance Française, and the Goethe Institute, CIs are embedded within universities. They typically require matching funds from the partner university, are located on or near campus, and use signage and log­os that rely on the prestigious university brand. CI leadership is shared, with the director being a faculty member of the host university and the associate director coming from China and approved by the Hanban, the office in the Chinese Ministry of Education in charge of Chinese-­language teaching abroad. This is a classic United Front tactic for infiltrating nonparty entities, enhancing their prestige while preserving ave­nues for CCP guidance.

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CI Chinese-­language teachers are vetted by CI headquarters. A teacher at McMaster University in Ontario was dismissed a­ fter she was discovered to be an adherent of Falun Gong, a religious organ­ ization banned in China. (She sued on grounds that this ­v iolated her religious freedom, and McMaster closed its CI.) But such cases seem rare, prob­ably ­because the Hanban is careful when hiring and b­ ecause teachers self-­censor in order to remain employed. Systematic study of self-­censorship is difficult. However, b­ ecause CIs are affiliated with both their host university and the Chinese Ministry of Education, it’s likely that their activities and programs foster pervasive self-­censorship by faculty and staff. One study of the topic concluded that CIs “adhere to government narratives without explicit instructions or threats.” It seems that CI programs stick to topics and discourses that are broadly favorable to the CCP. As a director of another university unit in Chinese studies from 2008 to 2020, I was frequently told that faculty members relied on our department for funds ­because the campus CI would not finance anything on topics deemed sensitive or critical. Faculty sought CI funds only for topics considered apo­liti­cal or even favorable to China. Thus, the presence of a CI on campus can not only restrict programs of affiliated faculty and staff but also redirect certain subjects to other departments, making them appear more critical or un­ balanced than they might other­w ise be. In campuses that do not have or cannot afford programs in Chinese studies and Chinese language, CIs can simply monopolize content. CIs often become conduits for patronage and co-­optation of affiliated faculty and staff. Their budgets—­impor­t ant to the departments concerned—­are often opaque. Compared to US Department of Education programs at US universities that sponsor area studies, the Hanban is more interventionist. CI bud­gets often include large

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line items for faculty travel to China, participation in large-­scale conferences and events at their institutes, and research funds for faculty advisers. ­These benefits go to ­those who support the CI and signal to the Chinese state who are friends, potential friends, or enemies. This is why CIs have been criticized by US government officials and many have been closed. Unfortunately, much of the criticism has confused the CI prob­lem with other issues such as nontraditional espionage, conflicts of interest and commitment, and intellectual property theft. New congressional initiatives to punish universities with CIs by withholding federal funds likely ­w ill bring further closures. CSSA organ­izations have also been named as conduits for United Front work and arguably are more impor­tant to campus life, especially for students. Chinese overseas have long been a United Front target, but the focus on overseas students increased a­ fter the 1989 Tian­anmen Square student movement and subsequent violent crackdown across China and with the massive increase in the numbers of students studying abroad. Xi has made students a key part of his broader strategy, elevating organ­izations for returned students to greater prominence within the United Front Work Department. In 2016, the department created a new bureau for young social elites in which Chinese students and scholars studying abroad receive special attention. Or­g an­i­z a­tion­a lly, outreach to students is channeled through CSSAs, now the leading official organ­ization of Chinese students and scholars on many American campuses, though some smaller specialized groups do exist. In recent years, ties between CSSAs and the Chinese government have been standardized through consular relations, finances, and attempts to develop umbrella structures of regional or national associations. CSSAs have also filled a gap in mentoring and assisting incoming Chinese students, espe-

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cially undergraduates. In some cases universities have even delegated this work to CSSAs, further enhancing their importance and influence particularly for students who may feel adrift in their new environment. CSSAs have existed for many years on American campuses, but their presence and structure have been growing more standardized and their links to the consulates and embassies strengthened. They exemplify the corporatist characteristics of Chinese social organ­ izations. They are hierarchical, monopolistic, and subject to CCP oversight and control via affiliation with the Chinese embassy and consulates. The 2017 constitution of the University of Michigan’s CSSA states that it is “the only University of Michigan Chinese not-­ for-­profit student organ­ization accredited by the Consulate of the ­People’s Republic of China in Chicago.” Many CSSAs in the United States highlight the financial support received from diplomatic missions. The Michigan CSSA, for example, names its two sources of financial support as the university itself and the Chicago consulate. A 2018 report by Bethany Allen-­ Ebrahimian found similar structures and financial ties at other universities. The Southwest CSSA, for instance, was established in 2003 and oversees university programs in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Hawaii; the Los Angeles Chinese consulate has the power to approve elected leaders at CSSAs, which enjoy tax-­exempt charity status. While the pluralist setting in the United States does not prevent other Chinese student organ­izations from existing on campus, they do not enjoy this official status and approval from the Chinese government. Since 2016 CSSAs have become more impor­tant to spreading the CCP message, though some CSSA members resist influence operations and consider them inappropriate. In 2015 while directing the Center for Chinese Studies at Michigan, I was invited by a visiting

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Chinese scholar to participate in a joint event of the CSSA and other campus groups titled “The China Dream in My Eyes: Celebrating the 65th  Anniversary of the Founding of the PRC.” It included breakout sessions with such assigned topics as “Secretary-­General [Xi], I want to tell you. . . .” The invitation closed with a recommendation that “if the atmosphere is good, you can end with singing ‘Song for the Motherland.’ ” Although it is not clear who or­ga­n ized and financed the event, it was clearly intended to join the CSSAs with students and local residents from Hong Kong and Taiwan to discuss topics directly related to the policies and goals of Xi, including the China Dream and national resurgence. To give the appearance of pluralism, it also encouraged singing some popu­lar Taiwanese songs. On many campuses, CSSA activities are aimed at not just Chinese students but also ­others, such as by an annual China Forum aimed at local students, business leaders, and university officials. Their large bud­gets are at least partially funded by Chinese diplomatic offices, sometimes with consular officials as keynote speakers. The CSSA’s near-­monopolization of Chinese-­language–­related activities has been accelerated by the power of WeChat, the primary social media platform for mainland students and scholars. WeChat’s dominance facilitates the connections that international students crave when living abroad separated from ­family and friends, but it can also reinforce divisions between mainland students and other groups on campus—­since Chinese-­speaking students from Hong Kong and Taiwan often eschew WeChat for Facebook, Line, or WhatsApp— as well as extend the ubiquitous censorship and self-­censorship of China’s domestic social media overseas. ­There is nothing wrong with mutual assistance among Chinese students and scholars or in seeking to maintain a sense of common identity and community. An official organ­ization that ties Chinese

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students to their diplomatic missions may even be necessary, given their large numbers. Such links could prove helpful in case of a natu­ral disaster or a crisis that requires quick communication. However, the CSSAs’ monopolization of student organ­izations on campuses is problematic, especially when they call themselves the “official” or “only accredited” organ­ization for Chinese students. This designation amplifies their messages, such as opposing invitations to speakers such as the Dalai Lama, while drowning other Chinese voices, such as that of students who are not mainland citizens. Official affiliation helps them mobilize students for pro-­China demonstrations and creates an environment encouraging peer pressure to join in while sometimes serving as a venue for surveillance and harassment of ­those who ­won’t. A ­ fter a Chinese student made critical remarks about China at a University of Mary­land commencement, the university’s CSSA participated in her subsequent online vilification, for which it was publicly lauded by a Chinese embassy official. American universities should adhere to policies and norms that preserve the princi­ples of academic freedom, ­free expression and association, and tolerance of diverse views. Pluralism should guide associational life at universities, especially regarding registration, financial support, and recognition of student groups. While upholding ­these princi­ples, universities should also state plainly that Chinese students are ­free to protest, or­ga­n ize, and be po­liti­cal on campuses. Chinese government support of students, campus programs, and funding for travel or study in China can be encouraged, provided it is done transparently and in compliance with university regulations and federal guidelines. As an operating princi­ple, both the US government and university administrators should focus on how to improve and protect the environment for t­hese princi­ples while constraining Chinese

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overreach. A princi­ple of reciprocity is insidious and counterproductive when it encourages the United States and American campuses to become more closed and more restrictive. Reciprocity, applied recklessly, damages the US reputation, undermines our own princi­ples, and diminishes our comparative advantage in f­ ree speech and association that make our system of higher education the envy of the world.

40 Should

American Universities Engage with China? Mark Elliott and Dan Murphy

The Chinese Communist Party is poisoning the well of our higher education institutions for its own ends. —­Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, December 9, 2020 ­ here are t­hose in the Congress who believe, and I am among them, T that we should be seeing what influence the Chinese . . . ​[have] in terms of their undue influence at universities in our country. —­House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, December 10, 2020

In recent years, a consensus view has emerged among many Amer-

ican think tanks, policy makers, and pundits that Chinese students and scholars in the country pose a risk to Amer­i­ca and American higher education. The sentiments quoted above, spoken one day apart by prominent figures from opposite sides of the po­liti­cal aisle, testify to the bipartisan nature of the concern over suspected Chinese influence operations on institutions of higher learning. The extreme form of this position is that many of the more than 350,000 Chinese students and researchers in the United States are “nontraditional actors” in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strategy to achieve world domination. They are ­here not to study but instead to exploit

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the openness of US universities and purloin advanced American know-­how and technology. Fears of infiltration have led some to argue that American universities should be wary of bringing students and scientists holding Chinese passports into classrooms and laboratories; even naturalized US citizens born in China cannot fully be trusted, they say. Still ­others have questioned the idea of collaboration between American and Chinese scientists at all. Such rhe­toric has been backed up by government actions that directly affect higher education, including restrictions and delays on visas, the cancellation of the Fulbright program in China, and heightened procedures for Chinese students and scholars at US ports of entry. In 2018 the Department of Justice launched the China Initiative, a counterintelligence operation intended, among other t­hings, to review the activities of scientists at American universities for evidence of espionage. The scale of this operation was considerable: at one point, it was announced that a new China-­related case was being opened e­ very ten hours. However, the ­actual number of cases that were successfully prosecuted is small, while the vast majority were dismissed, raising questions about the efficacy of the initiative. Even with the ending of the China Initiative in early 2022, ­these shifts in attitude and policy have had a chilling effect on US-­ China academic relations. Arrests of prominent scientists for alleged illegal activities, some ethnically Chinese, some not, have heightened anxiety on all sides. Increasingly, students and scholars of Chinese origin in the United States are feeling unwelcome; some are asking themselves w ­ hether, like Qian Xuesen (a Caltech aerospace engineer famously driven away by McCarthy-­era persecution), they are better off returning to China. Likewise, scientists at American universities who have hosted Chinese students or worked with partners in China are ner­vous about what ­these collaborations might mean for their f­utures.

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The demonization of Chinese students and scholars and the push to pry apart the dense network of connections between scholars in the United States and China—­a web of personal, intellectual, and institutional ties developed over roughly fifty years—­must be seen in the context of the effort to “decouple” Amer­i­ca and China and as such reflects the demise of the late twentieth-­century consensus in US China policy around engagement. Other chapters in this volume explain how we have gone from seeing China as a potential partner to seeing it as a competitor, a rival, or even an ­enemy. Within this context, this chapter reflects on an impor­tant aspect of US-­China relations once thought to be mostly above politics. We agree that a reframing of the academic relationship between the United States and China is in order. However, beating the red-­ baiting drum does not move us in the right direction. Red-­baiting not only flirts with racist tropes but also distorts the facts and neglects a full accounting of the benefits that Chinese students and institutional collaborations bring to higher education and American national interests. Our view is that American universities should continue to remain open to Chinese students and scholars and that collaborations between international academic teams must continue to be supported, lest irrevocable damage be done to the US higher education enterprise and to global scientific research. We believe that ­these goals can be achieved while still managing national security risks. We also recognize that Chinese academic institutions can make changes that ­w ill help optimize this relationship for all involved. BENEFITS AND RISKS OF ACADEMIC ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA

We acknowledge that some claims about illegal activities of Chinese students and scholars at US universities are genuine and should be investigated in accordance with the law. We would note that the

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number of cases that has led to the filing of charges is so far small. More cases may emerge, of course. Nonetheless, we suggest that to keep a proper perspective it is vital to give sufficient weight to the very real benefits that Chinese students and scholars—­and international students and scholars generally—­bring to American universities. Without fully considering both the risks and benefits, we cannot make optimal choices. Our universities benefit in many ways from the talent, creativity, and hard work of Chinese students and scholars on our campuses. Their presence contributes to the diversity of life experience that our students tell us they value highly; their discoveries as gradu­ate students push the frontiers of knowledge. The achievements of Chinese-­ born scholars and scientists trained at US universities are among the ­things that make our science the best in the world. In addition, giving Chinese students and visitors access to American colleges and universities opens a critical pathway to mutual understanding: t­hose coming from China can experience real academic freedom for themselves, and they get an up-­close look at American society and politics, warts and all. At the same time, American-­born students and faculty have more chances to understand the China where their classmates, students, and colleagues grew up and where, in many cases, their families still live. It’s not just about t­ hose who come to stay, ­either. According to a January 2020 report in Scientific American, research collaborations between American and Chinese universities have flourished in the last de­cade, boosting productivity of scientists at American universities. This highly transnational pattern conforms to what we know about how scientific research is carried out t­oday. In contrast to twenty or thirty years ago, at leading US research universities international teams of investigators are publishing an ever greater share of coau-

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thored papers. Repeated studies confirm this trend across e­ very field and show that it is intensifying with time. Chinese scientists are frequently key players on ­these teams—­not b­ ecause of “Chinese influence” but instead b­ ecause they are good scientists motivated, like scientists everywhere in the world, by a commitment to advancing their fields and their c­ areers. In a world where global research collaborations dominate, it follows that competition for partnerships is itself intensifying. Limiting the ability of American university researchers (the vast majority of whom are engaged in basic research, not classified work) to freely participate in ­these collaborative networks is to shackle our scientific ­future unnecessarily. If, as the data appear to show, open countries have strong science, then introducing a politics of exclusion w ­ ill weaken science at our universities to the unequivocal detriment of the national welfare. Indeed, that is the real threat we should be worried about. It may be modish in some circles to attack globalism, but to attack global science is merely foolish. It is also wrong to assume that Chinese students discouraged from attending American colleges ­will give up their studies or only pursue them at home. Many w ­ ill seek alternatives in Canada, Eu­rope, Australia, or elsewhere in East Asia, as indeed they are already ­doing. As English-­language higher education becomes increasingly available as a global commodity, American dominance in this sector is ­under ever greater pressure. ­There is no need to add to this pressure by rashly discouraging Chinese students from coming h ­ ere. While our main concern involves the intellectual loss of cutting ties with Chinese academic institutions and scholars, the economic ramifications should not be ignored. At $41 billion, higher education was Amer­i­ca’s third-­largest export industry a­ fter phar­m a­ceu­ ti­cals and automobiles in 2018–2019, before the pandemic. With

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Chinese students comprising around a third of all foreign students in the United States, it is evident that they make a very big contribution to the economy. Fi­nally, it is a m ­ istake to imagine US universities and colleges as passive receptors of influence or as “wells” that are being poisoned. One need only glance at the research proj­ects of China specialists at American universities or the roster of campus speakers and events to see that on topics from po­liti­cal legitimacy to developments in Xinjiang, American scholars are busy pursuing research on “sensitive” topics and publishing analyses quite at odds with the views of the CCP. Surely if “Chinese influence” ­were as power­ful as many allege, this sort of academic activity would not be taking place. We should of course be watchful as regards the possibility of CCP interference in American institutions of higher education. But our understanding of ­these intentions should be considered in tandem with an evaluation of how American colleges and universities manage such efforts. We argue that they are more a­ dept at h ­ andling ­these issues than is often perceived. MAXIMIZING BENEFITS AND MINIMIZING RISKS OF ENGAGING CHINA

We have made a case that when it comes to engaging Chinese students and scholars, the benefits to the American system of higher education far outweigh the risks. The question that remains is given the ongoing reset of the US-­China relationship, what strategies might universities employ to minimize the attendant risks? Finding good answers to this question is essential if American universities are to remain world-­class institutions and, as in any new policy environment, ­w ill require collaboration, agility, and adaptability over time to get it right. To guide thinking around this m ­ atter, we suggest the following five princi­ples.

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1. Academic freedom. American universities are strong b­ ecause of a commitment to unbiased and open inquiry. A constant consideration in evaluating our international engagements should continue to be ­whether they ­w ill enhance or detract from ­free inquiry of the full range of academic topics. Within t­hese bounds, universities should welcome international students and scholars in addition to creating programs that make it easier for international collaboration. This is to the benefit of our academic enterprise and ultimately in the national interest of the United States. 2. Collaboration. The proliferation of internationally coauthored academic papers shows that especially in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathe­matics, discovery is now much more commonly achieved through the work of investigators from multiple countries, frequently including China. Collaboration facilitates impor­tant scientific discoveries. Indiscriminately severing or threatening to sever American university ties with Chinese institutions ­w ill diminish our ability to pursue new knowledge. 3. Support for students, faculty, and administrators. It would be wrong to claim that collaboration with China does not put new burdens on students, faculty, and administrators. Students, particularly ­those from China, may fear that what they say in class is being reported back to Beijing with consequences for their ­future ­careers; faculty may legitimately worry that their academic work on sensitive topics may jeopardize their visa status, access, or relatives in China; and administrators may fear that one or another decision w ­ ill put their institution at risk for having unintentionally run c­ ounter to China. Universities have an obligation to make the rules of campus engagement explicit to all concerned while providing assur-

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ances to students, faculty, and administrators that the institution has their back so long as their actions are lawful and consonant with f­ree academic inquiry. This is a crucial, if at times challenging, pro­cess that demands ongoing attention. 4. Partnership at home. It is imperative that universities maintain robust communications with the US government and with federal funding agencies. ­There is no American university that does not believe that national security constitutes a critical interest or that faculty must adhere to established ethical standards. Indeed, more stringent mea­sures are being taken at many schools to tighten reporting requirements. Absent specific guidance, however, vague calls to be “vigilant on China” (or with any other country) are of ­limited value. Greater clarity from the intelligence community on the precise nature of risk in potential collaborations would help ensure that academic research can advance without compromising national security. Stakeholders from the research, intelligence, and policy communities should meet at regular intervals to calibrate expectations as to where responsibilities begin, end, and overlap. Members of the China studies community should be included in t­hese meetings to provide context and input on this pro­cess. 5. Partnership abroad. We do not expect e­ ither country to refrain from trying to collect intelligence on the other. Nor are we naive as to the power­ful po­liti­cal role the CCP plays at Chinese universities. But we also know from experience that ­these realities need not fully constrain the Chinese side in making choices that can enhance openness and exchange between our academic institutions. Indeed, Chinese universities have a critical role to play in collaboration with American universities, not least in certifying that students and scholars sent to the United States are h ­ ere for genuine teaching and research. We

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might call upon the institutions in a group of elite universities referred to as the “Chinese 9” to reaffirm their commitment to the 2013 “Hefei Statement on Ten Characteristics of Con­temporary Research Universities,” which includes “a dedication to the highest standards of research integrity and its associated ethical obligations.” Further, the Chinese government could remove restrictions that make it difficult for some American academics to obtain visas, conduct interviews, and have access to libraries, archives, and other resources to do their academic work in China—­access that is freely granted to Chinese students and researchers in the United States. Some may argue that American academics should first be assured of reciprocal treatment in China before Chinese scholars receive similar treatment in the United States. We agree that reciprocity should be a goal. But to prioritize reciprocity at the cost of weakening our universities is simply to shoot ourselves in the foot.

Chinese students and scholars bring enormous intellectual and

creative strength to American universities and to the research enterprise. Rejecting t­ hese students and scholars just to appear “tough on China” risks weakening American higher education and research and undermines our national interests. Even as we take the necessary steps to shore up security concerns, we should have confidence that the values that built American higher education—­academic freedom, collaboration, and re­spect for the individual—­w ill be the same values that make us strong in the f­uture. American strength comes from openness, not in spite of it. We should not compete with China over whose universities can be more closed; we should compete to be the most open and conducive to original and pathbreaking scholarly work.

IX      Culture

41

Why Is Chinese Popu­lar Culture Not So Popu­lar Outside China? Stanley Rosen

Officials in charge of cultural policy often complain that China

has welcomed foreign popu­lar culture, such as Hollywood films and South Korean tele­v i­sion series, but that the reverse has not been true. By contrast, Chinese popu­lar culture has not found a market overseas. Japan has gained international cultural recognition through anime and manga, India through Bollywood, and South K ­ orea through K-­pop, the Korean Wave, and Squid Game. But when foreigners think of representative Chinese cultural brands, they often think of more traditional forms, including martial arts, cuisine, the ­Great Wall and pandas. China is admired b­ ecause of its rapid economic growth as “the factory of the world” and is an object of commercial desire due to its large consumer market but has strug­gled to compete overseas in high-­ profile forms of popu­lar culture such as m ­ usic and film. This has been particularly frustrating ­because it is conservatively estimated that China spends over $10 billion a year on its soft power efforts. In contrast to hard power that derives from military force and economic strength, soft power seeks to create positive impressions of a country through its culture and values, including extensive advertising supplements in major newspapers all over the world.

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Yet as shown in recent public opinion surveys in industrialized democracies, China appears to have generated l­ittle positive goodwill. How can we understand this disconnect between effort and results? Which strategies have been employed to promote Chinese cultural products and overcome the obstacles that have impeded the country’s lack of soft power success, and why have they failed? The very ­limited success of Chinese cultural products abroad can be traced to several ­factors, some of which derive from prob­lems beyond China’s control and some of which are self-­imposed. Since Chinese authorities have focused on promoting China’s film industry and have had some success at vari­ous times, the primary focus ­here ­w ill be on Chinese film. First, Chinese popu­lar culture, including film, is created almost exclusively for a domestic audience so that it is far more appealing to the Chinese diaspora, particularly students studying overseas, than to non-­Chinese. Second, while Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials would love to see foreigners embrace Chinese films, as mea­ sured by strong box office results, that is less impor­tant than the message they convey. ­There is a fundamental contradiction pitting the desire to succeed abroad against the necessity to control the message, which is intended to promote po­liti­cal and social stability at home including the impor­tant tasks of po­liti­cal socialization and instilling patriotism into Chinese youths. This contradiction was highlighted in dramatic fashion ­after the recognition of Chloé Zhao for her film Nomadland at the Golden Globes (best director and screenplay) and the Acad­emy Awards (best director and best film) in 2021. Zhao was originally lionized on Chinese social media following her success at the Golden Globes in February. However, ­a fter zealous netizens discovered comments she made in an interview back in 2013 where she referred to China, her home u ­ ntil her departure for the United States during her high school

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years, as a place “where ­there are lies everywhere,” she quickly went from being the pride of China to disgracing China. Most references to Zhao and her film ­were removed from search engines by the censors. In her ac­cep­tance speech at the Acad­emy Awards in April—­ which was not shown in e­ ither mainland China or Hong Kong—­ Zhao seemed to offer an olive branch when she cited, in Mandarin, the first line from the Three Character Classic, familiar to every­one in China, that “­people are inherently good,” noting the continuing influence of traditional Chinese culture in her life. Once again, social media platforms lit up with pride, at least for a few hours, ­until every­ thing was deleted by the censors and journalists at official media outlets ­were told not to report on Zhao’s success. The contradiction in this case was between wanting to claim credit for someone born in Beijing who has succeeded in the West in a creative field and wanting to control the message about the greatness of China and the success of the CCP, particularly since 2021 was the one hundredth anniversary of the founding of the CCP, which required no distractions from the patriotic message that completely dominated the cultural field in that anniversary year. Given such priorities, it is not surprising that more than half of the all-­time top ten Chinese films at the domestic box office have patriotic themes. The most successful film in China’s domestic market is the $200 million–­budgeted Korean War film The B ­ attle at Lake Changjin, which celebrated Chinese heroism against the villainous, invading Americans. The final box office total for the film, released in October 2021 at a time when Sino-­A merican relations had soured, reached over $902 million, surpassing Wolf Warrior 2, another patriotic film, that had earned $867 million. However, only $3 million of Lake Changjin’s total box office earnings came from outside mainland China, and most of that was from Hong Kong. Wolf Warrior 2 takes place in an unnamed African country during a civil war and sends

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the message that no m ­ atter where Chinese citizens may be and how difficult their circumstances, the Chinese government has their backs and w ­ ill rescue them. By contrast, art­house films that win awards at major international film festivals such as Cannes, Berlin, and Venice but typically show the gritty underside of Chinese society and the ­human cost of China’s rapid economic development are often banned, censored, or given a very l­imited release within China. This contradiction is often openly expressed in official rhe­toric. For example, when Wang Xiaohui, executive deputy director of the Central Propaganda Department and director of the National Film Bureau, spoke at the first nationwide film industry symposium in March 2019, he bemoaned China’s lack of film success internationally, encouraging its leading filmmakers to reverse that situation. At the same time, however, he made clear that they should take “the Chinese dream of the g­ reat rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” as their theme and have “patriotic plots” and “must have a clear ideological bottom line and cannot challenge the po­liti­cal system.” Left unsaid and unquestioned was the obvious issue of why anyone outside China would find this theme and such plots compelling. While Wang’s contradictory admonition was nothing new—­similar appeals have been made by previous propaganda officials who insist that Chinese films must emphasize “socialist core values”—­h is words carried extra weight since a bureaucratic reor­ga­ni­za­tion in 2018 assigned film management, including censorship, to the Propaganda Department of the CCP’s Central Committee. Third, ­there is recognition overseas that any Chinese cultural product must first have been vetted and approved by the CCP. In film this takes the form of a dragon seal shown at the beginning of each film. When Zhang Yimou’s film Not One Less, which focused on rural education and student retention, was dismissed as “propaganda” at a prescreening and denied entry into the 1999 competition at

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Cannes, Zhang wrote an op-ed for the Beijing Youth Daily castigating foreign film festivals for assuming that Chinese films must e­ ither be “antigovernment” or “propaganda.” But the Chinese government has contributed to this perception by denying exit permits for “controversial” films, as has happened several times to Zhang, and pulling films out of festivals, often at the last minute, citing “technical reasons” and generating negative press speculation about their po­liti­cal prob­lems. Most recently this happened to Zhang’s One Second, a film set during the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), which was pulled from Berlin on the eve of the festival in February 2020. The entire Berlin jury went on stage before a packed h ­ ouse to express disappointment at China’s decision. While Chinese films have not been successful overseas in recent years, from 2001 to 2006 they ­were far more successful in the major markets of North Amer­i­ca and Eu­rope. Ang Lee’s Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon—­which, it should be noted, won the Oscar for best foreign-­language film u ­ nder the Taiwan label—­led the way, and its success ushered in a brief golden age for similar films in the martial arts genre, including Hero, House of Flying Daggers, Kung Fu Hustle, Jet Li’s Fearless, and Iron Monkey, a 1993 Hong Kong film that was rereleased to take advantage of the martial arts boom. Even though it was released twenty years ago, Crouching Tiger’s box office of $128 million is still twice as much as any other foreign-­language film marketed in North Amer­i­ca and remains the most successful Chinese film in most West Eu­ro­pean countries. Moreover, five of the top fifteen all-­t ime foreign-­language box office hits in North Amer­i­ca are Chinese martial arts films from this period. Unfortunately, that craze ended ­after Jet Li’s Fearless; thus, when Feng Xiaogang’s The Banquet played at the Venice International Film Festival, some film critics complained that they had already seen this in Crouching Tiger and Hero and wondered if China had any other stories to tell.

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China has attempted several strategies to make its films more appealing overseas. Lacking movie stars with an international following, leading directors and producers have hired, at considerable expense, a number of Hollywood stars including Christian Bale in Zhang Yimou’s Flowers of War (2011) and Tim Robbins and Adrien Brody in Feng Xiaogang’s Back to 1942 (2012). Neither of ­these period films on Chinese tragedies did well abroad, which is not surprising given the depressing subject ­matter—­the Nanjing Massacre of 1937 and the Henan famine of 1942—­about events l­ittle known or understood by foreign audiences. This approach reached its zenith with The G ­ reat Wall (2016), which was expected to become China’s breakthrough into the international market. Given the film’s production bud­get of over $150 million, a worldwide promotion and advertising bud­get of $110–120 million, dazzling special effects, an international star in Matt Damon, with Willem Dafoe and Pedro Pascal in impor­tant secondary roles, dialogue that was 80 ­percent in En­g lish, an A-­list director in Zhang Yimou, leading Chinese stars, backing by a Chinese-­owned Hollywood studio (Legendary), and featuring Chinese historical themes and a story that was more Chinese than any previous US-­China coproduction, the prerelease hype and buzz w ­ ere unpre­ce­dented for a Chinese film. The reception outside China quickly lowered such high expectations. Even before its release, based solely on the trailer, journalists and commentators attacked the film for “whitewashing,” noting that Matt Damon should not be the one saving China; that should be done by the Chinese themselves or at least by actors of color. This criticism mystified the Chinese audience, with director Zhang arguing that “this was the first time a film deeply rooted in Chinese culture, with one of the largest Chinese casts ever assembled, is being made at tentpole scale for a world audience.” He added, “Matt Damon is not playing a role that was originally conceived for

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a Chinese actor.” Ironically, in contrast to the whitewashing charge, the film shows how an illiterate mercenary, Damon, is saved by his exposure to Chinese culture and its emphasis on trust (xinren), which is a more prominent theme than Damon’s role in saving China. The relatively disappointing box office results both in China and overseas ($45.5 million in North Amer­i­ca, 13.6 ­percent of the total worldwide box office; $171 million in China) showed the difficulty of si­ mul­ta­neously appealing to both Chinese and international audiences and has subsequently made such expensive coproductions deeply rooted in Chinese culture too risky to undertake. A second approach was that taken by leading entrepreneurs of private enterprises—­most notably Wang Jianlin, the founder and CEO of Dalian Wanda, and Jack Ma, the founder and then CEO of Alibaba, two of China’s richest billionaires—to buy Hollywood assets such as film studios or production companies to promote China’s soft power. Both Wang and Ma have lobbied strenuously, but unsuccessfully, within China to remove state regulations that hinder their freedom of maneuver. As Wang put it, Wanda is the only Chinese com­pany that can compete with “multibillion-­dollar media and culture-­related enterprises” overseas, and government backing and deregulation would allow China to develop the media g­ iants it needs to position itself to “lead the world when it comes to soft power.” Wang asserted that Wanda can best represent the “Chinese cultural brand” to the world, calling it his “historical responsibility.” Although Wang had already purchased AMC Theaters and Legendary Pictures, he and Ma ­were targeting one of the six major Hollywood studios and generating impressive publicity, including a cover story in Time (“How China Aims to Take Over Hollywood”) and stories in other major news outlets. However, Wang’s hubris brought pushback from both the Chinese and American governments. Chinese leaders saw his overpriced

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purchases of overseas cultural assets as unproductive at a time when they w ­ ere giving higher priority to funding the ­Belt and Road Initiative and did not want a private entrepreneur to speak for China. His purchases also attracted the attention of the US Congress, which now viewed Hollywood’s cultural assets as a national security issue. Far from being too big to fail, Wang and Ma, among o ­ thers, have been disciplined for being both too big and too in­de­pen­dent of CCP leadership, reinforcing the fact that po­liti­cal control overrides all other objectives, including the promotion of soft power. The po­liti­cal issue has resurfaced in other ways as well. Perhaps the most successful recent cultural export from China is the TikTok app, which has won fans all over the world. However, it became vulnerable to larger po­liti­cal issues. Just as China has punished countries such as Australia, Norway, South ­Korea, and Canada by denying market access to their products, India has banned TikTok and many other Chinese apps following their border dispute, and Donald Trump attempted to do the same with both TikTok and WeChat. Since virtually all of China’s efforts in soft power are driven by the Chinese party-­state, it is easy for other nations to argue that t­ here are no real Chinese private enterprises b­ ecause all are subject to state control and must act accordingly in response to disputes with China. China does not appear likely to succeed in promoting its films to foreign audiences, acknowledging the worldwide preeminence of Hollywood. Indeed, of the one hundred most successful films of all time, ninety-­seven are from Hollywood, with only China’s ­B attle at Lake Changjin at number sixty-­three, Wolf Warrior 2 at number seventy-­three, and Hi, Mom at number eighty-­six breaking the mono­ poly, despite a minimal presence outside China. However, given the primary emphasis on film for po­liti­cal socialization at home and the expansion of the domestic market, which was on track to overtake North Amer­i­ca as the world’s largest film market even without the

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help of the pandemic, China has been more focused on competing with Hollywood films within China, ensuring that its films gain a market share of at least 60 ­percent. By 2019 that figure had reached 64 ­percent, in contrast to Hollywood’s 30 ­percent, which had dropped to 12 ­percent in 2021 as China denied entry to American blockbusters such as Spider-­Man: No Way Home, Shang-­Chi and the Legend of the Ten Rings, and Eternals (directed by Chloé Zhao). With Spider-­Man earning over $1.5 billion as of mid-­January 2022 without a showing in China, t­ here was increasing talk about how much Hollywood still could or still needed to rely on the China market. Moreover, China can take some comfort from the fact that nine of the top ten all-­time most successful films internationally that are not in En­g lish are Chinese, with virtually their entire box office within China. That mono­ poly was broken only by Mel Gibson’s The Passion of the Christ. As long as Beijing continues to prioritize politics and the domestic audience—­and t­here is no reason to doubt that continuation—­this situation is unlikely to change. China has a large cultural bureaucracy dedicated to formulating and implementing cultural policies that regulate cultural exchange and promote state-­sanctioned values. Thus, while this chapter has focused on the Chinese film industry, some of the same arguments would apply to other areas of Chinese popu­lar culture, including ­music. In a similar manner to the control of films, China has taken steps to limit edgy Chinese musicians influenced by the West from developing a domestic audience, as in the crackdown on hip-­hop in 2018, and to impede such “under­g round” musicians from distributing their m ­ usic overseas. For example, in February 2021 the in­de­pen­dent ­music and streaming com­pany Bandcamp, where Chinese artists could directly upload and sell their ­music abroad, thus providing a bridge linking Chinese indie bands and their DIY labels with international audiences, was blocked in China. In the same month, at the production com­pany Renren

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Yingshi (Every­body’s Film and TV)—­which runs China’s largest and most popu­lar subtitling website YYeTs​.­com and had been operating since 2007, providing foreign-­language cultural products for a Chinese audience in an uncensored form—­offices w ­ ere raided and key personnel w ­ ere arrested, ostensibly as part of a campaign to combat online piracy. In September 2021 the National Radio and Tele­vi­sion Administration issued a notice on the need to manage the “chaos” of fan clubs, including a ban on “vulgar internet celebrities” and feminine-­ looking men, stressing the importance of “loving the party and loving the country in artistic creations,” leading immediately to Weibo banning twenty-­two K-­pop fan accounts for one or two months. Despite ­these mea­sures, foreign cultural content in pirated form still readily makes its way into China using virtual private networks and downloading. The ultraviolent Squid Game was streamed on more than sixty illegal Chinese websites and became the most downloaded show and among the most popu­lar topics for discussion on the microblogging platform Weibo. Thus, while this chapter has suggested that politics and control of the message, both domestically and internationally, remains in command in China, control remains far from absolute.

42

What Can Western Audiences Learn about China from Its Twenty-­ First-­Century Writers? Xudong Zhang

Most prominent writers in China ­today are veterans of post–­Mao

Zedong Chinese lit­er­a­ture, now in its fifth de­cade of continuous, though winding, development. This chapter ­w ill focus on four of them: Wang Anyi, Mo Yan, Yu Hua, and Liu Zhenyun. T ­ here are, to be sure, o ­ thers whose talent and visibility are comparable, especially when we include popu­lar genres such as science fiction and so-­ called internet lit­er­a­ture. However, in terms of social-­intellectual impact, stylistic innovation, and overall literary energy and productivity, it is safe to suggest that t­hese four are leaders of the literary Long March of post-­Mao China. Throughout the first two de­cades of the Chinese reforms (roughly overlapping with the last two de­cades of the twentieth c­ entury), ­there had been an earnest longing for “the epic,” which reflected a collective appetite for g­ reat stories, dramas, images, and figures worthy of the profound changes in Chinese society. Yet nothing even modestly epic arrived in the literary realm. Rather, as the nation frantically disengaged the old and embraced the new, Chinese lit­er­a­ture seemed preoccupied with a self-­imposed mission to modernize its aesthetic

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sensibilities and technical skills, all while absorbing and pro­cessing the shocks of challenging times. In place of an epic depiction of a ­g reat era, one witnessed something comic (in the Aristotelian sense of imitation of ­people worse than yourself ), whose emblematic image is a lone individual in search of new social and ethical norms amid the fragmentation of collective experience. As China entered the twenty-­first c­ entury, two de­cades of dizzying change had produced a steady accumulation of experience, memory, wisdom, and technical knowhow that could now act as the breeding ground for new imagination and expression. A ­ fter joining the World Trade Organ­ization in 2001 and as Amer­i­ca’s strategic focus shifted to the M ­ iddle East following the September 11 terrorist attacks, China entered an explosive period of industrialization and urbanization; by 2014, it had become the world’s leading manufacturing power. This period of rapid economic growth did not directly translate into new possibilities or accomplishments in lit­er­a­t ure. But it may very well have encouraged ambition, gathered energy, and created excitement, all of which, in intangible ways, led to a heightened quasi-­epic repre­sen­ta­tion of Chinese real­ity with a collective self-­image, with its historically endowed promise (or curse) at the center. In Yu Hua’s ­B rothers (2005), Mo Yan’s Life and Death Are Wearing Me Out (2006), Liu Zhenyun’s Someone to Talk To (2009), and Wang Anyi’s Heavenly Scent (2011, En­g lish translation forthcoming), the reader encounters a wide-­angled, sustained manner of storytelling held together and propelled forward, confidently and powerfully, by the writer’s individual consciousness and personal style. As fiction, ­these works transcend conventional restraints and break new artistic grounds for a critical mapping of con­temporary China as a form of earthly life and a historical world. Through t­hese works, Western audiences can gain insights into Chinese real­ity, beneath, besides, above, and beyond politics and media headlines, by following and

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even participating in the moral, emotional, and imaginative strug­ gles and strivings of the characters in a foreign land but as fellow ­human beings. Yu Hua’s ­B rothers tells the story of two stepbrothers and their troubled journey through China’s last four de­cades of the twentieth ­century. The central character, Baldy Li, is a protocapitalist. Driven and animal-­like, he lives for the moment and pursues money and ­women with selfless honesty, clarity, and abandon. While transforming his hometown and its residents, he leaves b­ ehind a trail of creative destruction that turns the mystery of rural or small-­town China into a transparent allegory of the new frontier of primitive capitalism, complete with gaudy fashions (he imports used suits from Japan) and outrageous spectacles (he convenes the Liu Town International Virgin Beauty Competition, which quickly turns into a black market for artificial hymens and a sexual hunting ground for Baldy Li and the judges). He eventually succeeds in his ultimate goal of sleeping with his stepbrother’s wife, the town beauty, as his stepbrother steadily falls into despair and eventually commits suicide. Baldy Li is then found sitting on a gold-­plated toilet, lost in contemplation and transcendental solitude, while planning a flight to outer space on a Rus­sian spaceship to place his stepbrother’s ashes in an orbit of immortality. The presumed innocence and bluntness of the story offended many readers on the Chinese Left and the Right alike, as ­Brothers pre­sents a devastatingly unflattering picture of both Mao’s and Deng Xiaoping’s Chinas. To ­those who still turn to lit­er­a­ture for the immediately beautiful, Yu Hua’s language can be crude and scandalous. Yet one cannot overlook its penetrating insight into history as Baldy Li’s animal instincts lay bare the ironclad and ice-­cold laws of commodity exchange. This is illustrated when, as a starving child, he gives a detailed description of his visual encounter with the buttocks

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of the town beauty in exchange for a bowl of “triple-­delicacy noodles.” The storm called “pro­g ress” that sweeps across China is symbolized by this character, whose speech and conduct, while unapologetically profane, forces out a critical awareness with emotional and figurative clarity. Not yet hope per se, the reaction to the historical change embodied by Baldy Li turns an absurd truth with all its nihilistic intensity on its head, paving the way for a more epic—­and more remorseful—­w isdom. Mo Yan’s Life and Death Are Wearing Me Out is the tale of reincarnation of a landlord who, executed at the height of the Land Reform Movement in the early 1950s, goes on to live through five cycles of animal forms during the ensuing half c­ entury. Borrowing loosely the Buddhist notion of reincarnation but only as a practical narrative proxy, the story describes con­temporary Chinese history and social experience from several perspectives, modes of experience, and states of consciousness: that of the Donkey, the Ox, the Pig, the Dog, the Monkey, and the Big Head Infant, which by design loop back and overlap neatly with the initial narration of the Old Landlord, or “me.” Each life cycle corresponds to a sociohistorical period anchored by a major po­liti­cal movement of Maoist or post-­M ao China, such as the rural collectivization movement (the 1950s), the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), and reform and opening (1979–). As the Old Landlord “lives on,” his consciousness offers a privileged perspective and memory to witness, endure, and narrate changing times. The growing chaos in the social world is vividly imitated by a diminishing ­human sensibility and consciousness, as the inner pendulum keeps swinging ­toward the pole of the animalistic. “Real­ity” is thus si­mul­ta­neously told in one breath as a continuous disaster and is arrested and restructured as “facts” but only through the fantastical prism of the ongoing strug­g le between the h ­ uman and the animal, the body and the soul. While cruelty and absurdity become the

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norm, the animals’ witness and endurance bring their actuality into focus, aided ironically by the decline of ­human cognitive and emotional faculties. Throughout the story, the compromised ­mental state of the h ­ uman is reduced to mere sensation and forgetfulness and pre­ sents itself as an objective form of “understanding” or allegorical truth. One memorable line in the “Jolly Pig” or Cultural Revolution chapter goes like this: “As a man I am all confused, but as a pig I am sober and clear-­headed.” Alongside changing life-­forms, one also finds the successive transfer of l­egal rights or owner­ship of farmland from mono­poly by the prerevolutionary landlord class to poor farmers; from ­these farmers to the cooperatives, the communes, and the state; and eventually from state mono­poly back to rural ­house­holds (in the form of seventy-­year leases) in Deng’s New Era. Mo Yan may want to conceal his own po­liti­cal attitude regarding property owner­ship, but his narrative voice reveals moral and aesthetic judgments about Chinese real­ity that underlie this material, institutional, and l­egal state of affairs. At the novel’s end, land as a mythic being revered by Mo Yan’ s favorite peasant character persists but only in its crudest commercial form: as a tourist theme park to be developed, a cultural wasteland with former villa­gers dressed in historical costumes to dramatize po­liti­cal movements of the recent past. Liu Zhenyun’s Someone to Talk To encompasses two separate historical periods, the late imperial–­early Republican period and the reform era. The storyline is as plural as it is diverse, building on a plethora of interactions and relationships between husbands and wives, ­fathers and sons, neighbors and rivals, promises kept and promises broken, faith and faithlessness, love and betrayal. This ocean of ­human interaction is presented with rage, depth, and subtlety in a continuous, if also tortuous, linguistic-­syntactic flow—­a continuum of reasoning, arguments, quarrels, and empty chatter seamlessly knit

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into one piece of colorful cloth. The predominant action is both physical and symbolic, driven by the search for someone to talk to—­ someone who w ­ ill listen and care, to whom one’s words and thoughts, both spoken and unspoken, w ­ ill not be in vain. This search for meaning and identity reaches a parable level with the portrayal of an unsuccessful (in terms of recruiting Chinese peasants for conversion into believers) Catholic priest from Italy, who doggedly pursues the dream of building a cathedral comparable to that in Milan in the war-­ torn Chinese countryside. In the novel’s second half, the theme of exile is replaced by that of return but with an equal desire for and obsession with the search for belonging, purpose, dignity, and love. The chaos-­ordering power of speech and the eloquence and conviction with which the characters engage each other make the narrative dynamic and productive. They create coherence from incoherence and reason from unreason, which combine to make a deep-­seated rationale and emotional logic of the ordinary ­people evident and palpable. In the last sense the novel represents a self-­assured form of life and a resilient value system in­de­pen­dent of the official facade of China as we know it. In this “deeper real­ity,” speech animated by storytelling becomes the most vivid and memorable action for self-­ preservation and self-­realization. Wang Anyi’s Heavenly Scent is set in the late Ming dynasty (1368– 1644) but is not a conventional historical novel. The story follows three generations of wives and daughters-­in-­law in a gentry-­literati ­house­hold in the prosperous Yangtze Delta (near t­oday’s Shanghai), a region known for affluence, de­cadent excess, and indifference to imperial politics and its attendant bureaucratic mannerisms. It’s also an area known for its affinity for business and commerce and an openness to early Western influences. As the male masters’ indulgence in ­women, gardens, and other expensive hobbies leads to financial ruin, the female characters step up to support the f­amily by engaging in

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the production and exchange of domestic embroidery from the inner chamber. By turning what is private, feminine, and thus pre­industrial and anticommercial into something both useful and valuable, ­these wives and daughters-­in-­law also generate something new and morally reinvigorating, thus creating an ethical order and a value judgment that transcend their personal unhappiness and misfortune. The interfemale and intergenerational bonds appear utopian as the w ­ omen protagonists rise to the status of educators and learners, makers and builders, and thus masters of their own fate and found­ers of a beloved and respected artisanal, artistic, and cultural tradition. As samples of the long narrative form in early twentieth-­fi rst ­century China, ­these works have much to offer to readers and observers who might occasionally get frustrated or puzzled by the unruly real­ity of the country and its po­l iti­cal culture, which leave them uncertain about what and how the Chinese think. The four authors, representative of all ­those who take their vocation seriously and with honor, are masters in mobilizing the power of language and storytelling to name the unnamed while obliterating the hardened shell of the existing system of naming and meaning. With amazing fidelity and vividness, ­these works bring about an inspiring touch of real­ity and a reassuring moral honesty albeit only transmitted stylistically, that is, through characterization, plot, speech act, and so forth. In ­doing so, their freedom, irreverence, and subversiveness undermine the suffocating (self-)censorship, stifling conformism and the formulaic media coverage. Like a spinning gyro rotating on an invisible axis, their work points to an aesthetically determined North Star, constant and free-­standing, all the while attentive to and capable of absorbing the sound and fury, sighs, and laughter around this single-­ minded movement. Erupting with creative energy and formal inventiveness, t­hese works blast asunder monolithic, ideologically rigid notions of China

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with a riot of figurative imitations, distortions, and absurdities, which follow a higher poetic truth all the way to the end. Thus, t­ hese writers are worthy inheritors of Lu Xun (1881–1936), the pioneer and moral conscience of the vernacular literary revolution, which ended classical Chinese as the universal medium of high culture in the late 1910s. They are, however, also worthy descendants of China’s classical tradition whose canonical authors ­were mostly reformers, critics, satirists, dissidents, exiles, hermits, and bohemians while being first and foremost storytellers. If looking for a faithful mirror that a nation must hold before itself, one should look no further than lit­er­a­ ture of this kind for knowledge, sympathy, and understanding.

43 How

Does the Rising Chinese Market Reshape Global Art? Noah Kupferman

The rapid pace of china’s economic development since the 1980s

has had transformative effects both inside and outside China. Although the emergence and growth of China’s domestic art market is a more recent phenomenon (essentially during the past two de­cades), the “China rising” evolution has begun transforming the global art ecosystem. Two events occurring well outside of China—­one in Paris and the other near London—­illustrate the tectonic change that has been set in motion and demonstrates the power­ful influence that China is now having on the art market. The first episode occurred in 2009 when two Qing dynasty bronze animal heads (one depicting a rabbit and the other a rat) w ­ ere included in Christie’s Paris auction of property from the estate of designer Yves Saint Laurent. They are thought to have been part of a twelve animal set of the Chinese zodiac dating from the eigh­teenth ­century reign of the Qianlong Emperor. The sculptures w ­ ere cast for the gardens of Yuanmingyuan, the imperial Summer Palace, just outside Beijing. In an act of military retribution, the palace was looted and then destroyed by British and French forces in 1860 during the Second Opium War and burned to the ground. The responsible British commander was James Bruce, the eighth earl of Elgin and

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son of the notorious Lord Elgin who collected the so-­called Elgin marbles now in the British Museum—an in­ter­est­ing, if unfortunate, example of a son following in the ­father’s footsteps. T ­ oday’s Chinese government considers all relics looted then to be significant parts of China’s cultural heritage and a particularly painful symbol of Eu­rope’s historical violation of Chinese sovereignty. Christie’s resisted significant Chinese pressure and refused to withdraw the two items from the sale; meanwhile, Pierre Bergé (Yves Saint Laurent’s partner and the owner of the bronze heads) made ­m atters even more acrimonious when he declared in a preauction interview that “all they [the Chinese government] have to do is to declare they are g­ oing to apply h ­ uman rights, give the Tibetans back their freedom and agree to accept the Dalai Lama. . . . ​If they do that, I would be very happy to go myself and bring ­these two Chinese heads to put them in the Summer Palace in Beijing.” To put it mildly, the Chinese government did not appreciate Monsieur Bergé’s comments. But neither Christie’s nor Bergé bowed to its pressure, and on February 25, 2009, both bronzes w ­ ere sold by telephone bid for 31.5 million euros to Cai Mingchao, an adviser to the National Trea­sure Fund of China. Soon ­after the sale, Cai held a Beijing press conference to declare that he would not pay for the items ­because “as a Chinese collector and art advisor, I’m willing to rescue looted artworks.” This episode clearly illustrated the power that art continues to wield and the extent to which Chinese collectors and even the Chinese government can exercise their growing economic and po­liti­cal power globally when issues of cultural patrimony are involved. The second illustration of China’s growing influence took place on the outskirts of London the following year as Peter Bainbridge searched through the cache of antiques, collectibles, and fine art that came into his eponymous auction ­house from homes in and around

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the Ruislip neighborhood where his business was located. The monthly assortment generally included a diverse array of objects culled from ­house clearances that provided the bulk of what he sold at his auctions. As he sifted through items that had arrived that eve­ ning, a porter carefully placed a porcelain vase aside for inspection by his ceramics con­sul­tant, Luan Grocholski, a former Sotheby’s specialist who had worked with Bainbridge for years. The vase came in with mahogany furniture and other ­house­hold items from the former home of Patricia Newman, an el­derly ­woman who had lived nearby and recently died. Grocholski’s first inspection led him to an un­ expected conclusion; if au­then­tic, the vase was a rare and exquisite example of Chinese imperial porcelain from the late eigh­teenth ­century. A ­ fter more careful inspection and discreet consultation with experts, Grocholski and Bainbridge de­cided to include the vase in their upcoming sale as “A Superb and Very Rare yang cai Reticulated Double-­Walled Vase, six-­character mark in underglaze blue of Qianlong and of the period.” They gave it an auction estimate value of £800,000–1.2 million. Just before six ­o’clock on the eve­n ing of November 11, 2010, Bainbridge paused as a porter carefully placed it—­now called the Bainbridge Vase—on the auction block. It had been given the auspicious number of Lot 800 for appeal to tradition-­m inded Chinese buyers. When brisk bidding ended and the hammer fell, the price had reached £53.1 million, the highest auction price ever achieved for a Chinese antiquity. L ­ ater it became known that the winning bidder was Wang Jianlin, a mainland Chinese billionaire entrepreneur and real estate developer. Just how that vase arrived in a dusty attic near London remains uncertain; perhaps it was a trea­sure looted by British and French troops when they sacked the imperial Summer Palace in 1860. But one t­ hing is quite certain: the exodus of China’s artistic heritage during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries

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has been reversed dramatically. This repatriation of Chinese art and antiques a­ fter more than a ­century of being away from home has become one of the most significant developments driving the art market over the past twenty-­five years, something made pos­si­ble by the increasing economic and po­liti­cal might that China now exercises. For all the mystery, intrigue, and looting involved, ­these events represent a repeating cycle of the art market’s history. Historical research has repeatedly shown that the prices of and geographic market for art follow the economic and po­liti­cal development of nations. No ­matter where art is created, its market is nurtured wherever economic development is most obvious and customers can be found. This has happened in Eu­rope over many centuries. To find the market, simply follow the money. This track has led from the dawn of the Re­nais­sance in Florence during the second half of the fifteenth ­century to the northern Eu­ro­pean cities of Bruges and Antwerp and on to Amsterdam, where art auctions first appeared. As France gained power in the seventeenth and early eigh­teenth centuries, Paris became the center only to give way to London just before the nineteenth ­century. Fi­n ally, a­ fter World War II the center moved to New York. It is this ­simple but fundamental concept—­the art market exists and grows wherever economic development is most apparent—­that not only explains the demand for both the Bainbridge Vase and the Summer Palace bronze heads but also continues as a driving force in the art market t­oday. An emerging class of wealthy Chinese collectors has entered the art and antiques markets of China and to some extent globally. The market’s growth throughout the twentieth c­ entury and into the twenty-­first has been nothing short of phenomenal. In 2005 its total value was approximately $36 billion; by 2014 it exceeded $68 billion, reflecting overall economic, po­liti­cal, and technological trends

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throughout the world. Whereas auction sales of art and antiques used to be somewhat drowsy affairs attended mostly by art dealers and gallery o ­ wners—­k nown in general simply as “the trade”—­they have become newsworthy events given worldwide coverage. Indeed, reviews of the priciest and most impor­tant sales of the main auction ­houses (generally understood to be Christie’s, Sotheby’s, and Phillips, all established in eighteenth-­century London) are covered not only by the art media but also in more general interest publications such as the Financial Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the New York Times. Thus, two of the world’s most prestigious art fairs—­the Eu­ro­ pean Fine Art Fair and Art Basel—­now publish annual market reports that have become required reading for t­hose interested in understanding the depth and breadth of this expanding market. In addition, art business conferences have sprouted throughout the world where art market cognoscenti discuss topics previously not considered relevant, such as finance, risk management, investment, and other decidedly nontraditional art world topics. The Chinese art market has been a primary driver of this growth. In 2000 it accounted for less than 1 ­percent of total market sales. Within a de­cade, however, it became the world’s largest art market, peaking in 2011 when it accounted for 32 ­percent of global sales. A ­ fter 2011, as the US and UK economies began recovering from recession, the American market rebounded significantly and has held its dominant market share ever since. Meanwhile, the Chinese market has held an approximately 20 ­percent market share, about the same as the United Kingdom. This development speed is extraordinary, especially ­because the internal Chinese market for the most part does not include much Western art. Elsewhere the market appeals to a ­g reat diversity of collecting categories, but inside China sales are almost exclusively of Chinese art. This is illustrated in figure 43.1.

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Figure 43.1. ​Share of global art market value by country. Data sources: TEFAF Art Market Report and UBS Art Basel Report.

As figure 43.1 shows, in 2000 the US and UK markets together accounted for a full 80 ­percent of global art market value, while China was basically at a rounding error at less than 1 ­percent. But by 2011 it accounted for nearly one-­third of the global market. In addition, Chinese art collectors no longer stop shopping at the border. As Christie’s Paris and Bainbridge’s auctions demonstrated, they have become a global force willing to spend large sums at auctions everywhere. Affluent individuals and even the Chinese government are willing to exercise their economic and sometimes po­liti­cal power to achieve collecting goals and in some cases pursue an extragovernmental cultural agenda. This voracious demand for Chinese art and antiques, mostly from inside China, and the seriousness that the Chinese government gives to issues of cultural patrimony have been most evident in the wake of China’s economic and po­liti­cal global emergence in recent de­cades.

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As emphasized, this explosive growth has been based almost exclusively on sales of Chinese art. Research by Benjamin Mandel, executive director of J. P. Morgan Asset Management, makes it more specific: the categories responsible for most recent growth are Chinese modern and con­temporary painting. The two leading ones, modern works on paper and postwar and con­temporary paintings and works on paper, accounted for nearly 25 ­percent of global market growth between 2000 and 2014. Over this period the Chinese domestic art market grew by more than 700 times (just to be clear, that is an extraordinary 70,000 ­percent), a concentration typical in a young and developing market. Presumably, as the Chinese market matures its growth rate w ­ ill become more balanced and less extreme, resembling more closely the already mature and relatively slower-­g rowing markets of the United States and Eu­rope. For centuries Western collectors have had g­ reat interest in Chinese art, which partially explains the steady outflow of Chinese items over time. But t­here has been l­ittle reciprocal interest by most Chinese collectors in acquiring Western art from before the late twentieth c­ entury. But now an increasing number of Chinese collectors are building collections outside of traditional Chinese art and acquiring the works of Eu­ro­pean Old Master paint­ers as well as Impressionist, modern, and postwar con­temporary artists. Not surprisingly, this trend has brought rising demand and higher prices to the market for Western art. Yet growth of the Chinese market has had negligible influence on the taste and demand of collectors elsewhere and even less influence on art production outside China. While a few con­temporary Chinese artists have achieved prominence worldwide, it remains true that Western artists still command the highest prices. Indeed, a key goal of international auction h ­ ouses remains the establishment of a commercial foothold inside China, giving them a presence that lets

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them cultivate relationships with wealthy collectors whose ­favor they seek. Indeed, this must be what François Pinault was thinking (and hoping) when in 2013 his ­family acquired and then offered to donate the aforementioned Yuanmingyuan bronzes to the Chinese government. Kering, the Pinault ­family com­pany, owns a host of very high­end luxury and design businesses, including Gucci, Stella McCartney, Alexander McQueen, and Yves Saint Laurent, plus the Christie’s auction ­house. Shortly ­after the com­pany offered to return the bronze objects to Beijing as “an expression of friendship t­oward the Chinese ­people,” Christie’s became the first international fine art auction ­house to gain a license for operations on the mainland. It would appear that Pinault well understood this fundamental concept driving the art market—­that it follows the money—­when he donated the previously looted Qing dynasty bronzes. If the past is indeed prologue and history once again repeats itself, we may well see the next center of the global art market take root in Beijing, Shanghai, or Hong Kong.

44 Does

Religion ­Matter in Bilateral Relations? Ian Johnson

Freedom of religion is guaranteed by the Constitution of the

­ eople’s Republic of China, but in practice religious adherents face P many constraints: churches are closed, the hajj pilgrimage and many basic Muslim practices have been sharply curtailed, Tibet’s spiritual leaders have been sidelined, and folk places of worship are regularly shuttered. Do t­hese restrictions on religious freedom m ­ atter to US-­ China relations? On the face of it, the question is easily answered: yes, it does ­matter. But the deeper answer is that it unfortunately ­matters in ways that ­don’t always help us understand China or support positive change ­there. A practitioner of realpolitik would find the question bewildering. Perhaps religious freedom is a useful concept as a cudgel to bash countries that one d­ oesn’t like. But the only sensible way to approach foreign relations is to focus on trade and strategic issues and let countries sort out their own issues. Religious persecution is bad, but in the end it has ­little to do with us. ­These sorts of answers are impossible to defend in a demo­cratic country. While mercantilism and moral relativism still influence how many countries treat China, countries whose ideologies are based on some form of rights c­ an’t gloss over religious persecution

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in China without being guilty of hy­poc­risy. That’s especially so in the US context, where religious freedom is a founding princi­ple of the nation. Ignoring it is a moral and po­liti­cal impossibility. I think we can all come up with the usual bromides for why this ­isn’t just the right t­ hing to do but is also in our self-­interest. It should be obvious to any well-­informed person that countries that persecute religious minorities have other prob­lems as well. Without drumming up a lot of po­liti­cal science charts and graphs, it’s clear that they tend to be authoritarian states with deep-­seated social and economic prob­lems. It’s also a truism of history that such countries, especially nuclear-­armed ones with a nationalistic population and expansionist foreign policy agenda, ­aren’t good long-­term neighbors or partners. So, religious freedom in China should m ­ atter to any self-­interested, enlightened, open society, especially the United States. However, the way we focus on religious freedom m ­ atters. And in the partisan po­l iti­cal environment of twenty-­fi rst-­century Washington, D.C., that has led to serious prob­lems. Before we get into that, let’s make a few ­things clear: China has a serious prob­lem with how it treats all religions. It is true that the state in China has long played the role of arbiter of what is orthodox and heterodox. This has led to successive Chinese governments over the past c­ entury taking a huge—­a nd unhealthy—­interest in how religion is practiced. Starting in the nineteenth c­ entury, for example, Chinese elites began to see indigenous religious practices—­Buddhism, Taoism, and folk religion—as backward, superstitious belief systems that w ­ ere holding China back from modernity. One movement in the late nineteenth ­century called for ­temples to be converted into schools, while in the 1930s the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) listed many indigenous religious practices as social ills, on par with opium smoking, foot binding, and taking concubines.

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The communists w ­ ere part of this top-­down modernizing proj­ect. When they took power they labeled many practices, including fortune-­ telling, the worship of local deities, and spirit mediums, as “feudal superstition.” In the Mao Zedong era they ­were banned outright (as ­were almost all religious practices, including Islam and Chris­tian­ity). Over the past few de­cades, controls have slowly been lifted. Despite the relative easing of policies, the government ­today plays a role unpre­ce­dented in Chinese history. The state penetrates into the smallest and remotest village in China in ways unimaginable in traditional society. In addition, the state has a very rigid view of what are acceptable faiths, limiting them to Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, and Chris­t ian­ity (which for administrative purposes in China is divided into two faith groups: Protestant and Catholic). Every­thing ­else is in theory illegal, and if it attracts official attention, it is often labeled an “evil cult.” Whereas in centuries past few in officialdom had any idea of what was g­ oing on in the countryside, t­ oday ­every t­ emple fair, e­ very pro­ cession, e­ very pilgrimage, and e­ very place of worship is supposed to be—­and very often is—­registered with the government. So, while ­there are in­ter­est­ing parallels between the past and the pre­sent, the scale of government involvement ­today is many times greater. The state’s power­ful role is exercised through mechanisms that require all religions to be or­ga­n ized into state-­controlled patriotic associations. As it does with other branches of civil society, such as nongovernmental organ­ i zations, the state enforces compliance through a series of regulations and laws. Thus, religion as an in­de­ pen­dent force in society hardly exists. In the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, this strong state control was mitigated by more pragmatic policies that turned a blind eye to the existence of under­g round churches and mosques. The state also allowed overseas Buddhist organ­izations to set up missionary work and

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largely allowed folk religious groups to do what they wanted. But over the past de­cade, a spirit of legalistic authoritarianism has taken hold. Added to this are assimilationist policies based on Han chauvinism. Especially Muslims are taken to task for praying too much, wearing certain clothes, fasting, wanting to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, and even having pictures of Mecca on their living room wall. The reeducation camps in Xinjiang and the forced modernization of Tibet are the clearest examples of this destructive policy. Religion, especially for minorities, is seen as something the state can tolerate but only as a kind of hobby, something that is practiced once a week as an empty tradition. If the analy­sis of China’s religious situation stops h ­ ere, t­ here is only one pos­si­ble approach to take: absolute condemnation of China followed perhaps by sanctions or some sort of punitive mea­sures. But this would be an incomplete view of China’s religious life. While the government has launched fierce crackdowns on Chris­ tian­ity and religions practiced in minority areas, it has allowed other forms of religion to flourish. That’s especially true of China’s only indigenous religion, Taoism, and most forms of Buddhism as well as folk religious practices. Once condemned in the twentieth ­century as superstitious, ­these traditions are now booming and are practiced by the majority of Chinese who are religious. The reason for this is that the government, especially over the past de­cade, has been trying to promote pride in Chinese traditions. In addition, it has noticed that Chinese p­ eople are searching for values and that only a small percentage w ­ ill buy into communism. In the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s this spiritual vacuum, combined with a relatively laissez-­faire policy ­toward religion, let other faiths, especially Protestant Chris­t ian­ity, boom. But this troubled the government on several levels. One was that for many Chinese, Chris­t ian­ity is still seen as a foreign religion that

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was imposed on the country by missionaries during the age of imperialism, even though this is not how Chinese Christians see it. They view their faith as a universal religion that is no more foreign to China than Buddhism (which was founded in India). The other more pressing reason is that Chris­t ian­ity expanded outside of government control, with large unregistered urban churches that w ­ ere popu­lar among China’s white-­collar ­m iddle class. Some of ­these churches had kindergartens, daycare centers, bookstores, and even seminaries. Alarmed, the government began cracking down. But the flip side is that during this period the government also allowed Taoism, Buddhism, and folk religions a freer hand to expand ­temples, recruit followers, hold events, and spread their beliefs. The rationale was that t­hese religions, even Buddhism, ­were indigenous or had been indigenized and, except for Tibetan Buddhism, had few overseas ties. In other words, they w ­ ere easier to control than Chris­ tian­ity, and so they have expanded rapidly. The government’s changing policy has been especially dramatic for folk religious practices. This includes worshipping local deities who ­aren’t easily pigeonholed as Taoist or Buddhist, such as the seafaring goddess Mazu, the God of Wealth, the warrior god Guandi, and hundreds of local deities. Many of ­these practices have now been redefined as “intangible cultural heritage,” a designation that allows them to apply for government grants and largely protects them from persecution. This ­doesn’t mean that the very real persecution visited upon Chris­tian­ity and Islam is less significant. It is real and deserves condemnation. So too should we be concerned with efforts to co-­opt Catholicism through a 2018 agreement struck with the Vatican on how to appoint bishops. However, t­ hese very real prob­lems are only part of a complex picture that might be analogous to a Eu­ro­pean country a hundred years ago: some religions get state backing, ­others are tolerated, and some are persecuted.

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Unfortunately, Americans d­ on’t get t­hese nuances in large part b­ ecause religion is filtered through the lens of right-­w ing Christian activism. This has its most potent expression in the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). This body was set up in 1998 with the best of intentions. New York Times columnist A. M. Rosenthal is often seen as its spiritual godfather b­ ecause he often wrote impassioned articles in support of persecuted Christians, Muslims, Buddhists and Jews around the world. The resulting legislation was supported by Republicans and Demo­crats, with the idea being that it would be a nonpartisan watchdog in­de­pen­dent of the US Department of State. The latter also issues reports on religious freedom, but the USCIRF focused on key “countries of concern” and was theoretically ­f ree from a par­t ic­u ­lar administration’s policies. In real­ity, the USCIRF has been dominated by what­ever party happens to control the White House. That’s b­ ecause the USCIRF is made up of nine volunteer commissioners from the private sector: three appointed by the president, two by the president’s party in Congress, and four by congressional leaders of the party not in the White House. The dominance of the Republican Party over the twenty-­odd years since the USCIRF was founded has meant the party has appointed most commissioners. And that’s largely meant appointing ­people who come from the Republican Party’s conservative Christian base, including wealthy businesspeople who dabble in issues of religious freedom. None are trained in comparative religions or have competency in par ­t ic­u ­lar countries. ­There’s nothing inherently wrong with amateurs studying an issue. Many conservative Christians are concerned about faith in general and not just their own religion’s trou­bles. But the prob­lem is that t­hese appointees have tended to be po­liti­cal supporters rather than mea­sured, well-­informed p­ eople who happen to be Christian.

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Thus, u ­ nder the Trump administration, the USCIRF had p­ eople such as Gary L. Bauer and Tony Perkins of the F ­ amily Research Council, a conservative Christian lobby group. The USCIRF’s only staffer who (according to its website) has Chinese-­language competency is Chen Mingzhi, a gradu­ate from a conservative theological seminary that has trained a generation of activist Christian pastors. Demo­crats have shown similar tendencies. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, for example, nominated Nury Turkel, a Uyghur activist, to one slot. Even if fair-­m inded and qualified, a commission dominated by ­people from the advocacy arena makes it hard to avoid the appearance of bias. That’s certainly true when looking at the USCIRF’s reports on China. The USCIRF has never in any serious way tried to look at the scope of religious life in China and come up with a fair analy­sis, including useful recommendations. Instead, it issues blanket denunciations without any recognition of the freedoms that the majority of religious believers enjoy. More broadly, this reflects the disproportionate role that religion plays in US policy. B ­ ecause religious ­people are seen as more likely to vote, politicians often cater to their wishes. Thus, President George W. Bush hosted a meeting with Chinese Christians in the White House. The reason was that one of the p­ eople ­behind the meeting was a Chinese Christian activist from Texas who was close to the president. While religion does m ­ atter and should m ­ atter, it has helped turn China into the closest t­hing the United States has had to an e­ nemy since the Soviet Union collapsed thirty years ago. And so, no ­matter how sympathetic one is to persecuted believers, one c­ an’t help but wish that religion was less of a cudgel and more of a way to understand the complexities of ­today’s China.

45 Does

Race ­Matter in US-­China Relations? Keisha Brown

In 2020 the COVID-19 pandemic and protests against h ­ uman rights

abuses, such as racial vio­lence and police brutality, illuminated existing fractures within socie­ties and governmental systems globally. The issues of in­equality, systemic inequity, racism, anti-­Blackness, and other related issues w ­ ere magnified as we, as global citizens, w ­ ere forced to confront uncomfortable truths that we con­ve­n iently have failed to address historically. As a scholar who studies issues of race and ethnicity in what I term Sino-­Black relations, I was interested in examining how the mounting pressures around ­human rights issues such as racial injustice would intersect with the changing landscape of US-­China bilateral relations. Now that the issues and prob­lems are made bare, what w ­ ill we do to address t­hese ­human rights concerns? How do we move from a performative politics to one of action and sincerity in terms of both domestic and foreign policy? In terms of how racial constructs function within US-­China relations, this chapter explores historical legacies of race to underscore how it has been weaponized as a tool within foreign relations and demonstrate critical junctures that are reminiscent of the current moment. How do we wish to create change within the current po­liti­cal landscape as it relates to h ­ uman rights issues such as racial discrimination and systemic racism? In this chapter, I discuss the role and legacies of race within t­hese bilateral relations in terms of po­liti­cal

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culture, national values, and society to demonstrate how they both shape and support each other. Race is a social construct. Phenotypical differences between dif­ fer­ent groups of ­people, such as skin color, are imbued with meaning and significance, thereby creating a false racialized hierarchy. This difference with distinction and preference is what not only makes race and racialized constructs of identity integral to ideals of identity and peoplehood but also leads to the creation of another framework p­ eople use to understand, interpret, and navigate the world around them. For many of us who work in China studies, regardless of position we are more times than not navigating, at minimum, two worlds. We find ourselves functioning as translators, deciphering each world we inhabit and making it intelligible for ­others. In this role, who we are impacts our interpretation. Our identity, especially that of race, usually precedes our talent, impacting how ­others see us. In the US-­ China space, discussions about bilateral relations are usually framed in terms of geopolitics and therefore tend to privilege geopo­liti­cal concerns. Yet by emphasizing statecraft or industry over issues of identity when discussing policies, economic cooperation or competition, or technological developments, we strip t­hese pressing concerns of their humanity. This allows for the conversations in t­hese spaces to remove, obscure, or sidestep having to confront an uncomfortable undercurrent: the role of race with US-­China relations. Understandings and ideas about race are ever-­present participants that may show themselves in the form of microaggressions, erroneous assumptions about the foreign other, language spoken, or even more overt actions. Race has always been a part of US-­China relations. Rather than beginning in 1972 ­after the reestablishment of a formal state-­to-­state relationship between two nations, this chapter ­w ill begin with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. Not only was it the first federal

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legislation to ban a singular group of ­people, Chinese laborers, from immigrating to the United States, but it was passed during a time when ­these two empires ­were at a critical juncture in their respective domestic development. Connected by the po­liti­cal, social, and geopo­liti­cal changes that the Industrial Revolution ushered in, the United States and the Qing Empire w ­ ere each grappling with the ­future direction of their respective empires. While the Qing dynasty was grappling with domestic unrest, po­liti­cal instability, and Western imperialism, American exceptionalism and imperialism w ­ ere the vehicles by which the young country was expanding its reach and global influence. American attitudes about immigration range from welcoming to xenophobic. Chinese ­people, specifically laborers, immigrating to the United States throughout the nineteenth ­century experienced this firsthand as ideas about their fitness or ability to understand American values and willingness to assimilate to White American society ­were intertwined with ideas of economic stability. As late as 1869, we see the active recruitment of Chinse laborers as indentured laborers to the United States. For the former planter class in the American Southeast, creating a direct ­labor pipeline between the port of New Orleans and China was more advantageous than reforming the exploitative sharecropping system and repealing Jim Crow laws to create a more equitable society in the former Confederate states. In the reports from and coverage of the Chinese ­Labor Convention held in Memphis, Tennessee, Chinese laborers ­were praised for their work ethic and docile temperaments. How did the United States shift from recruitment to exclusion within two de­cades? Answer: citizenship. While Amer­i­ca was happy to benefit from Chinese ­labor, it was not as willing to expand the ideas of citizenship and all the perceived benefits and rights. What group of p­ eople could be the site for expression of white rage and frustration over not being able to easily access

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the American Dream? When white supremacy, patriarchy, and prosperity are threatened, ­there must be a scapegoat. Throughout the nineteenth ­century especially in cities with a large Asian immigrant population, individuals witnessed, participated in, or benefited from the flourishing of “Yellow Peril” propaganda. The text of the 1882 law is an expression of racial scapegoating as white males blamed Chinese laborers for a perceived lack of employment opportunities ­after the American Civil War, construction of the transcontinental railroad, and the gold rush. While the initial law aimed at curbing the immigration of Chinese workers was for a ten-­year period, it was extended by the Geary Act of 1892 and was not repealed ­until 1943. Why is this relevant ­today? The intersection of statecraft, values, and society led to the creation and perpetuation of a narrative about China and its ­people that ­shaped both domestic and international policy. In the same vein that a law can set l­egal pre­ce­dence, t­hese racist and xenophobic attitudes about China in the late nineteenth ­century are a con­ve­nient narrative for Amer­i­ca to fall back on in moments of crisis. Individuals are socialized by the culture and environment in which they live. As such, racial biases can become so entrenched that they are normalized, mediating all of our interactions, ­either consciously or subconsciously, from the local to the global. In terms of US-­China relations, the question of race, especially as it relates to Black Americans, has a history. We only have to look to the Cold War era to find examples of the Chinese Communist Party ­under Chairman Mao Zedong making critiques of the American government’s treatment of Blacks and its response to the calls for action levied by ­those involved in the civil rights movement. For instance, Mao’s speeches advocating support for African Americans in the strug­g le against American imperialism w ­ ere strategically issued in August 1963 and April 1968, landmarks dates in the modern civil rights movement: the eve of the March on Washington and the

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assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., respectively. During the Cold War era, Beijing, similar to Moscow, amplified how race and racism w ­ ere Amer­i­ca’s Achilles’ heel. The weaponization and deployment of critiques against race relations and systemic racism in the United States have not gone away. On the surface one may find comfort in the remarks by Chinese official Zhao Lijian and Hua Chunying that appear supportive of the Black Lives ­Matter movement. But how can we begin to unpack and understand how ­these sentiments can coexist alongside public acts of anti-­Blackness, such as discrimination aimed at Black residents in Guangzhou in June 2020 and the per­sis­tence of performers donning blackface in nationwide cele­brations such as the Spring Gala? One perspective, as argued by Ho-­f ung Hung in “As US Injustices Rage, China’s Condemnation Reeks of Cynicism,” is that Beijing’s amplification of systemic racism and racial in­equality in the United States is a means of justifying and defending China’s own domestic ­human rights issues. This tactic is not unique to China. Washington, D.C., is also guilty of engaging in the same actions as evidenced by critiques aimed at ­human rights issues in the ­People’s Republic of China, with the most recent being the appalling treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang and the state response to the Hong Kong protests. If the prob­lem of the twentieth c­ entury was that of the color line, the prob­lem of the twenty-­first ­century is our failure to consistently confront the pervasiveness of race. Returning to my initial set of questions, how do we utilize the historical legacies illuminated above to recognize and address how race m ­ atters within US-­China relations?

46 How

Does the Past Serve the Pre­sent in Today’s China? Wang Gungwu

Who is reclaiming what and why is it happening are questions about

Confucianism that have been asked ever since it took a severe beating in the May Fourth Movement of 1919, an early student uprising against traditional ideas and institutions. In the ensuing de­cades even individual Confucians faced skepticism if not ridicule for their beliefs. ­A fter 1949 the ­People’s Republic of China (PRC) was dismissive of ­these and other ancient teachings, while its phi­los­o­phers and historians agreed that Confucianism would have to be reconciled with Marxist philosophy to become worthy of further attention. When an even more thorough rejection followed in the name of communism and continuous revolution, what was left to reclaim? ­Today, nearly fifty years ­after the death of Mao Zedong, many Chinese think that reclaiming the Confucian past could benefit socialism with Chinese characteristics, which has become national policy. This would let it return quietly as a good brand name; no fanfare needed. But the larger question still needs an answer. The current regime knows that Confucian thought and practice had a distinguished role in China’s long history. To restore it, the regime can reject what it considers useless and select the parts to be reclaimed and applied. To understand how that past might serve China t­oday,

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the debates have had to revisit ­earlier efforts to reassess Confucianism’s modern value. What is being considered is not the w ­ hole of the Confucian past. ­Earlier generations of Chinese who wanted to modernize China had agreed that many traditional values should be left largely as subjects for academic study as guoxue (national learning) or hanxue (Sinology). ­Today’s challenge is to pin down which bits of that past may be adapted to serve a power­ful industrialized society. ­There are still disagreements about how much is worth keeping and how selected portions can help ensure the ­future of Chinese civilization. Much depends on who does the reclaiming. Scholars and believers who wish to keep faith with Confucian teaching consider it their duty to preserve what­ever would be best for China. Some are convinced that their goal should be to do so for use by the modern national state. ­Those who hold cadre status in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) expect that they alone should determine which parts of the past have the greatest impact within and outside China. They seem to believe that most Chinese p­ eople have never given up a cultural heritage in which Confucian ideas had long held sway. Values pertaining to f­ amily ties, the trust expected in social and commercial relations, and the belief that good governance could be provided by an authoritarian state are examples of ideas that w ­ ere never lost. They are also aware that “the Confucian state” had been rejected many times before but never successfully. Rebellions led by a variety of Buddhist and Daoist sects early in the nineteenth c­ entury had reached a climax when a distinctly Chinese interpretation of Chris­ tian­ity inspired the Taiping Rebellion. T ­ hose efforts to destroy established institutions aroused a passionate reaffirmation of Confucian princi­ples by Qing dynasty mandarins. Although briefly successful, ­these efforts failed to prevent further foreign intervention. It was

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therefore not surprising that this form of Confucianism was rejected by younger educated elites. FROM SUN TO MAO

Deciding how to replace Confucianism was more difficult than anyone expected. The followers of the twentieth-­century nationalist leader Sun Yat-­sen began by thinking that China’s best way forward was to learn from the West. However, o ­ thers chose to place the blame for past failure on complacent and greedy elites who had abused the Confucian values they had been trained to follow since youth. The pre-1949 Kuomintang elites placed their faith in a mix of Western institutions acquired from the United States, Japan, and Germany and also believed that much of Eu­rope’s post-­Enlightenment philosophy could be reconciled with the best in Confucian thought. Sun’s “Three Princi­ples of the P ­ eople” could then serve as a new official canon that combined Confucian ideals with a paternalistic democracy. In opposition, the communists saw liberal capitalism as a tool of imperialism that was dismembering the country. Instead, they embraced the Leninist-­Stalinist model of socialism that ruled through authoritarian control. When the CCP came to power, it found ridding China of all vestiges of liberal capitalism to be relatively easy. Surprisingly, ­after Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953, Mao accused Soviet successors of revisionism, leading him to challenge the Soviet Union for leadership of the communist world. All Western models w ­ ere rejected, and Mao proceeded with his mission to replace the Confucian past with his own revolutionary utopian vision. That appeal to creative destruction focused on the bureaucratic corruption and privilege inherited from ­earlier years. Mao therefore began a series of campaigns to force the educated classes “to learn from the p­ eople” and follow his own teachings. Thus, he dragged

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the PRC away from foreign models back to China’s own history while denying any role for Confucianism. Mao substituted his own notions of the spirit of the peasant majority that he ­imagined had ­shaped China’s past. At the same time, he compared his revolutionary leadership to the Legalist unification of the empire ­under Qin Shi Huang more than 2,200 years ago and boasted that he had done even more to make China ­g reat. Given that Confucian officials served the Han emperors and ­shaped the dynastic state for the next 2,000 years, it was prob­ably unavoidable that history-­m inded CCP leaders would look to the role of Confucianism for guidance. FROM DENG XIAOPING TO XI JINPING

The dramatic changes of the twentieth c­ entury did not leave enough time to develop new ideas to replace t­hose that had deep roots in Chinese society. Maoist China had managed to paint Confucius as worthless, but most p­ eople continued to go along with past ideas and practices. When Deng Xiaoping, who became China’s dominant leader, saved the CCP from Maoist turmoil and restored some freedoms for sidelined scholars and their students, it was not surprising that when rethinking their country’s ­future many ­people turned to the cap­i­tal­ist victors of the Cold War. O ­ thers, however, looked to the traditionalists who had survived Mao’s Cultural Revolution, men such as Liang Shuming, Feng Youlan, and He Lin. The fact that Confucian values ­were given credit for economic success in Japan and the Four Asian Tigers—­Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South ­Korea—­between the 1960s and the 1990s unexpectedly gave their common heritage a fresh perspective. International recognition that ancient wisdom could contribute to modern development did not represent a complete reclaiming of that past. It merely encouraged two generations of silenced scholars

How Does the Past Serve the Present in Today’s China?

419

to regain the confidence to reread the classics and remind the nation what t­ hese texts had done for Chinese history. Images of Confucius as teacher and sage reappeared, popu­lar editions of books about Confucianism w ­ ere published, and traditional books for c­ hildren came in use again, making it apparent that many parts of the Confucian past had never gone away. In the early 1980s even as the PRC was seeking models to emulate, many CCP leaders noted that the Singapore that had so impressed Deng Xiaoping taught Confucian ethics in its schools. This came as China was establishing the Confucius Foundation, prob­ably its first move t­oward a new normal in which Confucianism could be resurrected to serve the new leaders just as it served ­those who ruled China in the past. The CCP elites, of course, continued to stress “the ­people’s heroic past” as more impor­tant than that of emperors and their mandarins. But the nation’s opening to the outside world ­after 1978, however tentative, was greeted with extraordinary enthusiasm. Students responded with astonishing speed as curbs ­were lifted on all kinds of scientific learning. Compared to the readiness to learn new ideas and methodologies from the West, the cautious welcome they gave to the Confucian past was feeble. Indeed, the appeal of the modern West was so strong that it led to divisions within the ruling party itself. The 1989 student protests at Tian­anmen Square ­were a mea­sure of an apparent loss of ideological direction that followed the turning away from Maoism. At that juncture just before the end of the Cold War, the break with the first thirty years of the PRC was never greater. However, the challenge to Deng’s neosocialism forced the winning side within the CCP to review its relations with Western thought. This gave the Confucian community a chance to offer a gentler indigenous alternative. In 1984 the Confucius Foundation, which had started as a quiet assembly of the like-­m inded, went on

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to inspire numerous centers of Confucian learning to spring up in ­every province and also in major universities. Of special interest is the way the past provided safe shelter for a greater variety of debates, for it left individual believers f­ ree to offer differing interpretations of Confucian texts. At one end w ­ ere purists such as Zhang Qizhi, Chen Lai, and Yang Rongguo, who insisted on authenticity and on returning to the universality that early Confucians had claimed for the sage’s ideas. At the other end ­were modern phi­los­o­phers such as Li Zehou, Xiao Qifu, and Tang Wenming, who argued that Confucian thought contained ethical values that could match the universal claims in Western philosophy. None of this amounted to a complete reclaiming of the Confucian past. Most of the new centers engaged in Confucian studies stayed clear of ongoing debates about the role of the party-­state in the country’s economic transformation. Theirs w ­ ere moderate efforts to find a basis for the cultural and social cohesion needed in the face of rapid change, not least due to a growing Western distrust and hostility. However, in the 1990s during the reeducation of the young who had been attracted to Western creative freedoms, CCP leaders began to search China’s heritage for a usable defense of their own core values. The popu­lar practices among Daoists and Buddhists had ­l ittle appeal to CCP officials, but Confucian traditions of centralized governance and po­liti­cal continuity w ­ ere directly relevant. Leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, who succeeded Deng, both used policy language that was recognizably drawn from the classics, and CCP theorists openly searched for past institutional successes that could help them define the f­uture socialist PRC. This began to look like reclaiming a Confucian past, a trend that has gained further prominence since Xi Jinping became the CCP leader in 2012. Conservatism now prevails, with conservatives calling for re­spect for China’s early CCP intellectuals who had long been

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reaching out to philosophical schools in the West. By examining the origins of dif­fer­ent strands of po­liti­cal thought from the ancient Greeks and Romans to the modern critics of fascism and Soviet communism plus debates between Western liberals and conservatives, they believe they better understand the po­liti­cal strug­gles in twentieth-­ century China. They can see how traditional ideas about winning on the battlefield conferred legitimacy on the CCP and that the ancient quest for order and stability is consistent with Marxist ideas of pro­g ress and the modern socialist society that the CCP is trying to build. Tradition could also be made to support current reformers such as Wang Hui, Gan Yang, and Wang Shaoguang, who are determined to consolidate the CCP’s revolution of 1949. Identified with the New Left, current reformers believe that modern China owes much to Mao as well as to the system that served China for more than 2,000 years, and this makes them ready to reclaim much of that past. By reconnecting Deng’s economic achievements with Mao’s cultural cleansing and reeducation of corrupt elites, Xi Jinping’s new round of reforms appears to be consistent with Maoism. What remains is for the pre­sent order to be linked to China’s ancient civilization-­state. It is not clear if this China Dream requires a socialist canon to replace the Confucian classics. As the dream embodies the CCP’s control of the past, it could keep Confucius as the ancient sage whose creative use of history laid the foundations of China’s po­liti­cal heritage. Combining the teachings of Confucius with the progressive ideas of Karl Marx as the modern sage, CCP leaders could proclaim their governing system as entirely appropriate for China.

CONTRIBUTORS

the author of How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (2016) and China’s Gilded Age: The Paradox of Economic Boom and Vast Corruption (2020). YUEN YUEN ANG   is

KEISHA BROWN   is

an assistant professor of history at Tennessee

State University. MARIA ADELE CARR AI   is

an assistant professor in global China studies at New York University Shanghai and an associate at the Harvard University Asia Center. ELIZABETH ECONOMY   is

a se­n ior adviser (for China) to the secretary of commerce and was previously the C. V. Starr se­n ior fellow and director for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. MARK ELLIOT T   is

vice provost of international affairs and the Mark Schwartz Professor of Chinese and Inner Asian History at Harvard University. ANDREW S. ERICKSON   is

a professor of strategy in the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, which he helped to found, and a visiting scholar in full-­t ime residence at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. CARLA P. FREEMAN   is

a se­n ior expert in the China Program at the United States Institute of Peace and a se­n ior fellow and adjunct

424 Contributors

professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. DIANA FU   is

an associate professor of po­liti­cal science at the University of Toronto and a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution. She is the author of the award-winning book Mobilizing Without the Masses (2017) COURTNE Y J. FUNG   is

an associate professor in the Department of Security Studies and Criminology at Macquarie University and the author of China and Intervention at the UN Security Council: Reconciling Status (2019). MARY GALLAGHER   is

a professor of po­liti­cal science and the director of the International Institute at the University of Michigan. BONNIE S. GLASER   is

the director of the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States and an expert on Chinese foreign policy and US-­China relations. LYLE J. GOLDSTEIN   is

director for Asia engagement at Defense Priorities and a visiting professor at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University. NAIMA GREEN-­R ILE Y   is

an instructor and an incoming assistant professor in the Department of Politics and the School of Public and International Affairs at Prince­ton University. SHEENA CHESTNUT GREITENS   is

an associate professor of public affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, director of UT’s Asia Policy Program, and a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Contributors

425

RYAN HASS   is

the Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy Studies and the Chen-­Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies at the Brookings Institution. DENISE Y. HO   is

an assistant professor of twentieth-­century China at Yale University and the author of Curating Revolution: Politics on Display in Mao’s China (2018). SELINA HO   is

an assistant professor at the National University of Singapore and the author of Thirsty Cities: Social Contracts and Public Goods Provision in China and India (2019) and a coauthor of Rivers of Iron: Railroads and Chinese Power in Southeast Asia (2020). the author of Leftover W ­ omen: The Resurgence of Gender In­equality in China (2014) and Betraying Big ­Brother: The Feminist Awakening in China (2018). LETA HONG FINCHER   is

WILLIAM HSIAO   is

the K. T. Li Professor of Economics emeritus in the Department of Health Policy and Management and the Department of Global Health and Population at Harvard University’s T. H. Chan School of Public Health. YUKON HUANG   is

a se­n ior fellow at the Car­ne­g ie Endowment for International Peace and a former World Bank country director for China. IAN JOHNSON   is

a Pulitzer Prize–­w inning writer focusing on society, religion, and history and is the author of The Souls of China: The Return of Religion ­after Mao (2017). ALASTAIR IAIN JOHNSTON   is

a professor in the Government Department at Harvard University.

426 Contributors

ELSA B. K ANIA   is

a PhD candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard University and an adjunct se­n ior fellow in the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. NOAH KUPFERMAN   is

the global head of business development at Athena Art Finance and formerly department co-­head of Chinese Works of Art at Christie’s and program director of art business at Christie’s Education. PHILIPPE LE CORRE   is

a research fellow at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, Mossavar-­Rahmani Center for Business and Government, and the Ash Center for Demo­cratic Governance and Innovation. MARGARET K. LEWIS   is

a professor of law at Seton Hall University.

WINSTON MA   is

a managing partner and cofounder of CloudTree Ventures and an adjunct professor at the New York University School of Law. He is the former managing director and head of the North Amer­i­ca office at China Investment Corporation and is the author of Investing in China, China’s Mobile Economy, The Hunt for Unicorns, and The Digital War (2021). ORIANA SK YLAR MASTRO   is

a tenure-track center fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University and a nonresident se­n ior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. JAMES A. MILLWARD   is

a professor of history at Georgetown University and the author of Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (2nd ed., 2021).

Contributors

427

DAN MURPHY   is

executive director of the Mossavar-­Rahmani Center for Business & Government at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. CHENGXIN PAN   is

an associate professor of po­liti­cal science at the University of Macau and is the author of Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Repre­sen­ta­tions of China’s Rise (2012) and a co-­editor of China’s Rise and Rethinking International Relations Theory (2022). JOHN PARK   is

director of the K ­ orea Proj­ect at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. MARGARET M. PEARSON   is

Dr. Horace V. and Wilma E. Harrison Distinguished Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Mary­land, College Park. JOHN POMFRET   is

an author and former Beijing bureau chief for The Washington Post. ESWAR PR ASAD   is

a professor at Cornell University, a se­nior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and the author of The F ­ uture of Money: How the Digital Revolution Is Transforming Currencies and Finance (2021). XIAOYU PU   is

an associate professor of po­liti­cal science at the University of Nevada Reno and the author of Rebranding China: Contested Status Signaling in the Changing Global Order (2019). MARIA REPNIKOVA   is

director of the Center for Global Information Studies and an assistant professor in global communication at Georgia State University.

428 Contributors

SHELLE Y RIGGER   is

the Brown Professor of East Asian Politics at Davidson College and a se­n ior fellow in the Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. MEG RITHMIRE   is

F. Warren MacFarlan associate professor in the Business, Government, and International Economy Unit at Harvard Business School. STANLE Y ROSEN   is

a professor of po­liti­cal science and international relations at the University of Southern California. JENNIFER RUDOLPH   is

a professor of history and international and global studies and director of the China Hub at Worcester Polytechnic Institute. VICTOR SHIH   is

the Ho Miu Lam Chair in China and Pacific Relations and an associate professor of po­liti­cal science at the University of California, San Diego. TERRY SICULAR   is

a professor of economics and the C. Robinson Distinguished Ser­v ice Fellow at Western University in Canada. OLIVER STUENKEL   is

an associate professor at the School of International Relations at Fundação Getulio Vargas in São Paulo. MICHAEL SZONYI   is

the Frank Wen-­hsiung Wu Professor of Chinese History and director of the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University. SUSAN A. THORNTON   is

a former acting assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs and is currently a se­n ior fellow at Yale Law School.

Contributors

429

KELLEE S. TSAI   is

the dean of humanities and social science and a chair professor of social science at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. ALE X WANG   is

a professor of law at the UCLA School of Law and a faculty codirector of the Emmett Institute on Climate Change and the Environment. WANG GUNGWU   is

a professor at the National University of Singapore and the author of China Reconnects: Joining a Deep-­rooted Past to a New World Order (2019). JEFFRE Y WASSERSTOM   is

a chancellor’s professor of history at the University of California, Irvine, and the author of six books, including Vigil: Hong Kong on the Brink (2020). GR AHAM WEBSTER   is

a research scholar at the Stanford University Cyber Policy Center and editor in chief of the Stanford DigiChina Proj­ect. MIN YE   is

an associate professor at Boston University’s Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies and author of Diasporas and Foreign Direct Investment in China and India (2014), and The B ­ elt Road and Beyond: State-­Mobilized Globalization in China, 1998–2018 (2020). WINNIE YIP   is

a professor of global health policy and economics and the faculty director of the Harvard China Health Partnership at Harvard University’s T. H. Chan School of Public Health. XUDONG ZHANG   is

a professor of comparative lit­er­a­t ure and East Asian studies at New York University.

ACKNOWL­E DGMENTS

The editors wish to thank all of the contributors for their commitment to the proj­ect of better understanding US-­China relations as well as William Yee for his tireless administrative assistance, Robert Keatley for his invaluable editorial assistance, and Kathleen McDermott and her team at Harvard University Press for their overall support of The China Questions endeavor. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the following institutions: Department of History, Harvard University; Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University; China Hub, Worcester Polytechnic Institute; The Global School, Worcester Polytechnic Institute; New York University Shanghai; and Columbia-­ Harvard China and the World Program, Columbia University.

INDEX

Action for Peacekeeping Initiative, 93–94 Active defense strategy, 186 Af­g han­i­stan, 154 Africa, 144–150, 326 African Americans, 349, 413–414 Aging population, 169–170 Al-­A ssad, Bashar, 234 Alibaba, 253, 303, 312, 316, 353 AMC Theaters, 383 Anderlini, Jamil, 358 Ant Financial, 253 Ant Group, 312, 316, 319 Anticorruption campaigns, 175 Anti-­Monopoly Law (2008), 316–317 Antiques, 395–398, 400 Antitrust, 315–317, 319 Apple, 302, 306, 311, 319 Armitage, Richard, 22 Arms control, 74, 75, 83, 84, 86, 88, 203 Arms sales, 155, 207 Artificial intelligence (AI), 303–304, 305, 311–312 Ash, Timothy Garton, 23, 28 Asian Americans, 49, 104, 272, 413; hate crimes against, 6, 44 Asian Development Bank, 298 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 8, 298 Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organ­ ization, 326

Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, 252 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 231, 232, 233, 299 Australia, 139, 141, 183, 248, 295 Australia, United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS), 139, 141 Automated systems, 303, 305, 307, 309 Back to 1942 (film), 382 Baidu, 303, 312 Bainbridge, Peter, 396–397 Bainbridge Vase, 397 Bandcamp, 385 Banquet, The (film), 381 Basic Law (Hong Kong), 212, 214, 217 Basketball, 24–25, 48. See also National Basketball Association (NBA) ­Battle at Lake Changjin, The (film), 379, 384 Beidou, 325, 326 ­Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 3, 8, 119–126, 152, 255, 294, 299–300 ­Belt and Road Space Information Corridor, 326 Bergé, Pierre, 396 Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development Act (Build Act, 2018), 150, 294–295 Bezos, Jeff, 311

434 Index

Biden, Joe, administration, 11, 12, 28, 30, 51–52, 56; on autocracy versus democracy, 102–103; freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), 235; infrastructure, 296; protection of intellectual property, 269, 270; support for Chinese civil society, 349; technology competition, 56; technology regulation, 320; transatlantic partnership, 136, 137, 139, 141; US-­China climate action, 285–286, 289–290. See also China-US relations; Trade war Biomedical research, 330–331, 332–333, 334–335 Birth rate, 164, 222, 346 Black Americans, 413–414 Blinken, Antony, 11, 118, 139, 177 Blue Dot Network, 295 Bodin, Jean, 41 Bolsonaro, Jair, 128, 129, 130 Bolton, John, 26–27, 129, 130 Borrell, Josep, 139 Bosnia, 91 Brazil, 128–129, 132, 133 ­Brothers (Yu Hua), 388, 389–390, 393–394 Bruce, James, 395–396 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 41–42 Buddhism, 390, 405–406, 407, 416, 420 Build Act (2018), 150, 294–295 Burns, William, 38 Bush, George W., 409 Cai Mingchao, 396 Capitalism, 100, 138, 250–257, 417

Carbon neutrality / decarbonization, 287, 288, 291, 292–293 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 131 Central National Security Commission (CNSC), 171–172 ­Century of Humiliation, 49, 110–111, 169, 232 Chang’e 4 lunar rover, 323–324, 327 Chen, Gang, 269, 273 Cheng, Edmund, 213 Chen Lai, 420 Chen Mingzhi, 409 Chiang Ching-­kuo, 209 Chiang Kai-­shek, 205, 209 China. See ­People’s Republic of China (PRC) China Daily, 147 China Dream, 226, 322, 362, 421 China House­hold Income Proj­ect (CHIP), 275 China Initiative (2018–2022), 44, 268–273, 366 China in the world: China and Rus­sia, 151–157; China and transatlantic partnership, 136–143; China’s overseas image, 109–118; influence in Latin Amer­i­ca, 127–135. See also ­Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); Global order China model, 23, 47, 97, 99, 118, 160, 181, 254, 306, 319 “China threat” theory, 38–44, 113, 136–143, 177–184 China-­US relations, 1–3; Biden administration, 28, 30; China as US

Index

favorite threat, 38–44; China’s perception of US, 45–52; competition, 13–14, 21, 28, 37, 51–52, 73–74, 102–103, 120, 144–150; current, 11–16; engagement, 29–30, 31–37; ­future, 16–17; history, 3–11, 21–22, 24–26; interdependence, 10–11, 13; making of US policy to China, 53–60; multifaceted nature, 16–17; race in, 410–414; reciprocity, 29; Taiwan’s impact on, 204–210; Trump administration, 21–24, 26–27, 36. See also Competition (China-US); Decoupling (US-­China) Chinese Communist Party (CCP): changing nature of governance, 98–101; characteristics of top echelon, 63–65; and China’s economic growth, 96–97, 98; control of Xinjiang, 224–225; emerging stagnation, 66–67; homogeneity, 61, 62, 67; International Liaison Department, 197; membership, 62–65; party-­state capitalism, 251, 252, 253–254; policies in Xinjiang, 219; po­l iti­c al rights ­u nder, 85; po­liti­c al ties with North K ­ orea, 196, 197–199, 200; Propaganda Department, 380; recruitment, 61–62 Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), 411–413 Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs), 355–357, 360–363 Chris­t ian­ity, 405, 406–407, 416 Chu, Samuel, 215

435

Cinema, 24–25, 48, 378–385 Cisco, 306 Civil Code (2020), 313 Clancey, John, 215 Clean energy, 285 Clean Energy Research Center, 284 Clean Network, 129 Climate change, 1, 14, 28, 37, 46, 95, 99, 102, 104, 155, 194, 247, 310, 370; US-­China cooperation, 46, 52, 67, 159, 283–293, 300 Climate Change Working Group, 284 Clinton, Bill, 32, 308 Clinton, Hillary, 82, 233 Cloud computing, 318 Colombia, 132 Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), 142 “Community of shared ­future,” 112–113 Competition: China-­US, 13–14, 21, 28, 37, 51–52, 73–74, 102–103, 120, 144–150; emerging technologies’ impact on, 185–192 Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), 137–138, 143 “Comprehensive national power” concept, 161, 162 “Comprehensive national security” concept, 171–174 Confidence-­building mea­sures (CBMs), 86, 87 Confucianism, 415–421 Confucius Foundation, 419–420 Confucius Institutes, 113–114, 116, 146, 352, 355–364

436 Index

Constitutive order, 74, 83, 84 Constructive Engagement, 4, 11, 29–30, 31–37. See also Decoupling (US-­China) Cook, Tim, 311 Counterspace, 180, 183, 184, 324 COVID-19 pandemic, 23–24, 27, 59, 79, 93, 175, 200, 244, 313, 330, 331–332, 334, 336 Criminal law, 266–277 Cross-­Border Interbank Payment System, 260, 264 Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (film), 381 Cruz, Ted, 113–114 Cuba, 130 Cultural Revolution, 220, 226, 235, 391, 397, 406, 418 Culture: American, 24–25, 48–49; international interest in Chinese popu­lar culture, 377–386; lessons from twenty-­first-­century Chinese writers, 387–394; religion in bilateral relations, 403–409; rising Chinese market’s impact on global art, 395–402 Cybersecurity, 1, 175, 194, 302, 305, 308, 314 Cyber Security Law (2017), 313 Czech Republic, 184 Dai Bingguo, 49 Dalian Wanda, 383 Damon, Matt, 382–383 Dapiran, Antony, 214 Data, 76–77, 307, 308–309, 314–315, 317, 318

Data Security Law (2021), 313–314, 317 Davis, Michael C., 214 Debt traps, 120, 123, 126, 148, 255 Decarbonization / carbon neutrality, 287, 288, 291, 292–293 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (2002), 231–232 Decoupling (US-­China), 7, 15, 26, 137, 147, 241, 243, 244–246, 256, 307, 309, 366–367 Democracy: compared to autocracy, 96–105; Hong Kong prodemocracy movement, 211, 213–215, 216–217; ­m iddle class as force for demo­cratic change, 278 Demographics, 52, 163–164, 222, 346 Deng Xiaoping, 4, 25, 32–33, 46, 97–98, 99, 102, 103, 105, 321–322, 418, 419 Department of Justice (US), 44, 266–271, 273, 304, 320, 366 Detention, extralegal, 219, 220, 221–222, 228 Digital currency, 259–261 Digital health care, 333–334 Discourse power / discursive power, 111–112, 147–148, 299–300 Disinformation, 115, 116 Domestic vio­lence, 346 Dominican Republic, 129 Doshi, Rush, 12 “Draft Anti-­Monopoly Guidelines for Platform Economy” (2020), 315–316 Drones, 188 Duque Márquez, Iván, 130, 132

Index

East China Sea, 50, 87 East Coast Rail Link, 301 Eastern Turkestan Republic (ETR), 224. See also Xinjiang East Timor, 91 E-­CNY (digital RMB / yuan), 259–261, 264 E-­Commerce Law (2018), 313 Economy: China’s m ­ iddle class, 274–280; Chinese growth, 85, 377, 388; Chinese party-­state capitalism’s interaction with global capitalism, 250–257; higher education as export industry, 369–370; national power calculations, 165–166; protection of US intellectual property, 265–273; renminbi versus US dollar, 258–264; rising Chinese market’s impact on global art, 395–402; US-­China trade war, 241–249. See also Trade and investment Education: American universities’ engagement with China, 356–373; China’s perception of US, 47–48; China-­US competition in Africa, 146–147, 149; Chinese Communist Party cadres, 64–65; Confucius Institutes, 113–114, 116, 146, 352, 355–364 863 Plan, 303 “Eight Guardian Warriors,” 306 Eldercare, 164 Ele.me, 315 El Salvador, 129 Energy crisis, 152

437

Engagement. See Constructive Engagement; Decoupling (US-­China) Espionage, 181, 265–273, 303, 304–307, 309 Ethiopia, 148, 149 Ethnicity: and makeup of Chinese Communist Party, 62, 64; PRC’s diversity regime, 225–226. See also Race and racism, in China-­US relations; Uyghurs Eu­rope: data privacy protection, 318; in global order, 82–83; rise of China as threat to transatlantic partnership, 136–143; US-­China trade war, 248–249 Extradition bill (Hong Kong), 213, 216 Facebook, 115, 311, 319 Falun gong, 226, 359 Farquhar, Robert, 323 Feminism, 339–347 Feminist Five, 341 Feminist Voices, 342 Feng Xiaogang, 381, 382 Fernández, Alberto, 132 Feudal superstition ( fengjian mixin), 405 Fiery Cross Reef, 230 Film, 24–25, 48, 378–385 5G (fifth-­generation wireless) technology, 129, 133, 249, 305, 306 Flashpoints: Hong Kong, 211–218; North ­Korea, 195–203; South China Sea, 230–237; Taiwan, 204–210; Xinjiang, 219–229 Flowers of War (film), 382 Foreign aid, 348–354

438 Index

Foreign direct investment, 145 Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), 142 Freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), 235 Friends of Nature, 33 Fulbright program, 146, 352, 353, 366 Fu Ying, 350 Gaddafi, Muammar, 93 Ganesh, Janan, 40–41 Gao Yan, 343 Garland, Merrick, 271 Gender, 62, 63–65; gender equality, 340 General Data Protection Regulation, 318 GJ-2 (Attack-2) unmanned aerial vehicle, 188 Global financial crisis (2007–2009), 5, 23, 34, 128, 138, 168, 258, 276, 399 Global order: areas of convergence and divergence, 74–78; Chinese goals, 7–8; Chinese involvement, 72–73, 81–88; humanitarian intervention regime, 89–95; room for China, 71–80; superiority of autocracy versus democracy, 96–105 Google, 303 Greater Bay Area, 217 ­Great Leap Forward, 46, 98–99 ­Great Powers, 162, 170, 191 ­Great Recession (2007–2009), 5, 23, 34, 128, 138, 168, 258, 276, 399 ­G reat Wall, The (film), 382–383 Grocholski, Luan, 397

Guatemala, 92 Gustafsson, Björn, 275 Haiti, 91 Han chauvinism, 406 Hanoi summit (2019), 199–201 Health, 330–336 Heavenly Scent (Wang Anyi), 388, 392–394 “Hefei Statement on Ten Characteristics of Con­temporary Research Universities,” 373 Hero (film), 381 Hikvision, 255 Hollywood, 24–25, 383–385 Hong Kong, 25, 115, 163, 211–218 Hong Kong H ­ uman Rights and Democracy Act (2019), 216–217 Hong Kong National Security Law (2020), 174–175 House of Flying Daggers (film), 381 HSU-001 unmanned ­water vehicle, 188 Hu, Anning, 270–271 Huawei Technologies, 26, 129, 133, 152, 241, 249, 254–255, 306, 307 Hu Jintao, 233, 420 Humane authority, 112 Humanitarian intervention regime, 89–95 ­Human rights, 26, 34, 35, 51, 77–78, 83, 85, 89–95, 219–229, 410 Hung, Ho-­f ung, 414 Hungary, 140 Huntington, Samuel, 41 Hypersonic weapons, 188–189

Index

IBM, 306 Immigration, 411–413 Indonesia, 300–301 Industrial espionage, 265–266 Information control, 76–77 Infrastructure, 145, 294–301, 305. See also ­Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Innovation, 245, 260; indigenous (China), 8, 51, 164, 165, 185, 266, 307, 322; military, 187, 190 Innovation and Competition Act (2021), 289 Intel, 306 Intellectual property (IP), 244, 265–273 Intelligentization, 188 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), 180, 199 Interdependence, 10–11, 13 International Criminal Court, 93 International Monetary Fund, 32–33, 259, 263 Internet, 307–308, 311–320. See also Social media Internet of ­things (IoT), 303–304, 305 Iran, 41, 154 Iraq, 90–91 Iron Monkey (film), 381 Islam, 405, 406, 407. See also Uyghurs Jakarta-­Bandung high-­speed railway, 300–301 Japan, 197, 202 Jet Li’s Fearless (film), 381 Jiang Zemin, 420

439

Johnson, Lyndon, 329 Johnston, Iain, 74–75 Joko Widodo, 301 Kagame, Paul, 256 Kellogg, Thomas E., 216 Kerry, John, 286 Kim Jong Il, 197 Kim Jong Un, 195, 197, 199–200, 201, 203 Kissinger, Henry, 40, 207, 209 Korea. See North Korea; South Korea Korean missile crisis (2017), 199 Koss, Daniel, 62 Kung Fu Hustle (film), 381 Kuomintang (Nationalist Party), 205, 209, 224 Lagrange Point 2, 324–325 Latin Amer­i­ca, 23, 37, 127–135, 153, 294, 300, 326 Leap Day Agreement (2012), 199 Lee, Ang, 381 Legendary Pictures, 382, 383 Leninism, 22–23 Li, Robin, 312 Liberal democracy, 23, 32, 46, 62, 85, 98, 209 Liberal rules-­based order (LRBO). See Rules-­based order (RBO) Libya, 93 Life and Death Are Wearing Me Out (Mo Yan), 388, 390–391, 393–394 Lit­er­a­t ure, 387–394 Liu Xiaobo, 344 Liu Zhenyun, 388, 391–392, 393–394 Li Zehou, 420

440 Index

Lukes, Steven, 299 Lunar landing, 321–329 Luo Xixi, 342 Lü Pin, 342 Lu Xun, 394 Ma, Jack (Ma Yun), 253, 383 Macedonia, 92 Macri, Mauricio, 132 Macron, Emmanuel, 136, 137, 138 Made in China 2025, 35, 252 Maduro, Nicolás, 130 Mahathir, Mohamad, 255 Mandel, Benjamin, 401 Manifest Destiny, 40 Mao Zedong, 46, 98–99, 322, 413, 417–418, 421 Marriage, 222, 346 Mazu, 407 McDougall, Walter, 321 Mecca, 406 Media: Chinese, in Africa, 146–148; journalists, 1; National Security Law’s impact, 216; state-­controlled, 114, 117 Meituan, 315 Melian Dialogue, 212–213, 217 Melos, 212–213, 217, 218 Meritocracy, 101, 102 Merkel, Angela, 137, 138 Me Too movement, 339–347 Mexico, 127–128 Microsoft, 141, 181, 303, 306 ­M iddle class, China, 274–280 Military aid, 150 Military bases and assets, US, 182–183

Military order, 86–87 Military power: American, 42; China-­ Russia, 154–156; Chinese growth, 8; emerging technologies’ impact, 185–192; national power calculations, 166–167 Milley, Mark, 42 Mischief Reef, 230 Mobile phones, 334 Modernity / modernization, 46, 48 Mongolia, 224 Monopolies, 315–317, 319 Monroe Doctrine, 130 Moon, 321–329 Moulton, Seth, 113–114 Mo Yan, 388, 390–391, 393–394 ­Music, 385 Najib Razak, 301 National Basketball Association (NBA), 25, 48, 254, 358 Nationalist (Kuomintang) Party, 205, 209, 224 National rejuvenation, 110–113 National security. See Security National Security Council (NSC), 56–57 National Security Law (China, 2015), 7 National Security Law (Hong Kong, 2020), 174–175, 214–217 National Security Strategy (China), 171, 172, 175, 176; “Prevention and control” approach, 174, 175 National Security Strategy (United States, 2017), 6, 23, 54, 82, 178 Navigation, freedom of, 235

Index

Nicaragua, 130 Nixon, Richard, 21–22, 31, 71, 206 Nongovernmental organ ­izations (NGOs), 33, 35, 351–352 Normalization Communiqué (1979), 206 Normalization Communiqué (1982), 207–208 North ­Korea, 41, 153–154, 195–203; 2005 Joint Statement, 197; denuclearization, 195–196, 202–203 North K ­ orea, Inc., 200, 202–203 Norway, 184 Not One Less (film), 380–381 Nuclear weapons, 179–180, 195–203 Obama, Barack, 5–6, 27, 58, 178, 198, 233, 234, 235, 284 Olsen, Matthew, 271 One-­Child Policy, 164 One Country, Two Systems, 212, 213, 217 One Second (film), 381 Open science, 267, 272 Oracle, 306 Organ­ization of American States, 134 Other, 41; and American identity, 40–41; fear of, 39–40 Outer Space Treaty, 328 Pairing Assistance Program, 228, 229 Pakistan, 255–256 Panama, 129 Pandemic response, 331–332. See also COVID-19 pandemic Paraguay, 129 Paris Agreement (2015), 283–284

441

Party-­state capitalism, 250–257 Payment systems, retail, 260 Peace Corps, 352, 353 Peace disease, 190 Peking University, 48, 343–344 Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE), 212–213, 218 Pelosi, Nancy, 365, 409 Peng Shuai, 346–347 ­People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 155, 185–186, 187–190, 191–192, 232 ­People’s Republic of China (PRC): in Africa, 144–150; as Amer­i­ca’s favorite threat, 38–44; approach to national security, 171–176; approach to North ­Korea, 195–203; civil society, 348–354; diplomatic recognition, 3–4; diversity regime, 225–226; economy, 96, 99–100; evolution of national power, 161–170; in global order, 7–8, 71–80; impact on global order, 81–88; impact on international humanitarian intervention regime, 89–95; innovation, 8, 51, 164, 165, 185, 187, 190; Me Too movement, 339–347; ­m iddle class, 274–280; moon landing, 321–329; othering of, 39–43, 88; perception of US, 45–52; po­l iti­c al inter ference against US, 181; power projection, 6–7, 232; propaganda, 51, 220, 340, 349–350, 380–381; relationship with Rus­s ia, 151–157; religion, 226, 403–409; reshaping of overseas

442 Index

­People’s Republic of China (PRC) (continued) image, 109–118; rise and global integration, 4–5, 42, 97; technology regulation, 311–320; as training destination, 145–146; US-­ China trade war, 241–249. See also China in the world; China-­US relations; Chinese Communist Party (CCP) People-­to-­people exchange, 17, 350–354 Persian Gulf War (1991), 90–91 Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) (China, 2021), 313–314 Pew surveys, 23, 38, 116, 177, 244 Philippines, 231, 233, 234, 236, 237 Pichai, Sundar, 311 Pinault, François, 402 Piñera, Sebastián, 132 Ping-­pong diplomacy, 17, 354 Po­liti­cal development order, 75, 77–78, 83–85, 88 Pompeo, Mike, 177, 326, 365 Population, 163–164 Pottinger, Matthew, 22, 28 Privacy, 311–320 Private firms, state investment in, 252–253 Propaganda, 101–102 Prosul, 134 Public diplomacy, 109, 113 Public opinion, 301, 378; Africa, 148; China, 346; international, 118; US, 23, 38, 109, 116, 118, 177, 244, 357 Punishment diplomacy, 357–358 Putin, Vladimir, 156

Qian Xuesen, 366 Qing dynasty, 110–111, 204, 224, 227, 339, 412, 416; bronze animal head sculptures, 395–396, 402 Qiu Jin, 339 Qualcomm, 306 Quantum technology, 252 Queqiao satellite, 323, 324 Race and racism, in China-­US relations, 410–414. See also Ethnicity Railroads, 296, 298, 300–301 Regime change, 92–93, 94 Religion, 226, 403–409. See also Buddhism; Chris­t ian­ity; Islam Renren Yingshi (Every­body’s Film and TV), 385–386 Ren Zhiqiang, 253 Republic of China (ROC), 204–210. See also Taiwan Reserve currencies, 258–262, 264 Retail payment systems, 260 Revisionist states, 81–82, 88 Risk management, 57, 251, 252–253 Rolland, Nadège, 111 Rosenthal, A. M., 408 Rubio, Marco, 113–114 Rudd, Kevin, 82 Rules-­based order (RBO), 37–38, 50, 73–76, 80–82, 87, 162, 236, 237 Rus­sia, 41, 151–157, 197, 325. See also Soviet Union Rwanda, 91, 256 Sabotage, 304, 305, 306, 309 Saint Laurent, Yves, 395–396

Index

Sanctions: China Initiative, 270, 272; denuclearization of North ­Korea, 195–196, 200–203; ­human rights violations, 26, 141–142; United Nations Security Council, 91, 93; US-­C hina trade restrictions, 152–153; US-­China trade war, 241, 245, 307; Xinjiang ­human rights violations, 229 SARS, 216, 332, 333, 336 Satellites, 180–181, 321–322, 323–324, 325–326 Scarborough Shoal, 233, 234 Scientific research, 330-336, 368–369 Scott, Rick, 353 Security: China as threat to US, 177–184; China’s approach to national security, 171–176; China-­US relations, 8–9; evolution of Chinese national power, 161–170; freedom of navigation, 235; impact of emerging technologies, 185–192; South China Sea, 236–237; technology, 305–307 Sesame (Zhima) Credit, 312, 316 Sexual harassment, 339–347 Shambaugh, David, 46 Shanghai Communiqué (1972), 206–208 Shanghai Cooperation Organ­ization, 154 Shen Mengyu, 344 Shen Yang, 343 Six Assurances, 208 Six-­Party Talks, 197–198, 200–201 Slaughter, Anne-­Marie, 104 Smart cities, 255, 298 Snowden, Edward, 303, 304

443

Social media, 109, 114–115, 116–117, 341, 342, 362, 378–379, 384. See also Internet Society: American universities’ engagement with China, 355–373; Confucius Institutes on US campuses, 355–360; Me Too movement in China, 339–347; US support for Chinese civil society, 348–354. See also United Front Soft power, 24–25, 145–146, 162, 358, 377–378, 380–386 Somalia, 91 Someone to Talk To (Liu Zhenyun), 388, 391–392, 393–394 Song Xiuyan, 341 South Amer­i­ca, 127–135 South China Sea, 50, 87, 230–237, 328 South ­Korea, 183, 197, 199, 201–202, 377 Soviet Union: national security and fall of, 173; nationalities policies, 225, 226; as Other, 41; revisionism, 417–418; space program, 321, 322, 323, 325, 327. See also Rus­sia Space Silk Road, 326 Spider-­Man: No Way Home (film), 385 Spratly Islands, 231–234 Sputnik, 321, 322, 323 Squid Game (TV series), 386 State capitalism, 250–257 State-­owned sector (China), 144, 252, 254, 255, 277, 279, 297. See also State-capitalism Status quo states, 81–82, 88 Stern, Todd, 284 Stevenson, Adlai, 329

444 Index

Strategic Support Force (SSF), 189 Students, 47, 48, 110, 113, 114, 116, 118, 126, 146, 148–149, 215, 216, 245, 342–344, 355, 360–373 Subi Reef, 230 ­Sullivan, Jake, 137, 290 Sunshine Policy with Chinese Characteristics, 196, 203 Sun Yat-­sen, 417 Supply chains, 5, 10, 26, 37, 140, 225, 228–229, 245, 252, 256, 296, 302, 309 Swaine, Michael, 178 Syria, 94, 234 Taiping Rebellion, 416 Taiwan, 4, 24, 27–29, 32, 50, 72, 92, 116, 128–129, 163, 166, 182, 183, 204–210, 217, 224, 231, 244, 254, 286, 362, 381, 418 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, 1979), 183, 206–207, 208 Taiwan Strait, 8, 39, 204–210 Tang Wenming, 420 Tan Weiwei, 346 Technology, 302–310; biomedical, 330, 332–333, 334–335; clean energy, 285; domestic security spending, 175; health care, 332, 333–334; impact on ­f uture US-­China military competition, 185–192; lunar exploration, 321–329; and national power calculations, 164–165; regulation, 117, 311–320; Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM), 47, 56, 371; stakes in US-­China

technological relationship, 302–310; US-­China trade war, 246–247 Telecommunications, 114, 128, 129, 133, 147–148, 242, 302, 305, 306 Telemedicine, 334 Tellis, Ashley, 178 Terrorism, 5, 13, 178, 179, 214, 220 Thailand, 183, 255 Thatcher, Margaret, 217 Three Communiqués, 206–208 Thucydides, 212 Tibet, 9, 50, 77, 90, 224, 225, 286, 406–407 TikTok, 384 Trade and investment: China-­Russia relationship, 152–153; China’s involvement in global order, 75–76, 85–86; China’s threat to US allies and partners, 184; China-­US relations, 5, 10–11; South China Sea, 235–236; tariffs, 3, 26, 30, 55, 183, 242–243, 248, 249; as tool of coercion, 182; Trump policy, 55; US-­China trade war, 241–249. See also Belt and Road Initiative; Economy; Trade war Trade war, 3, 50, 51, 55, 59, 133, 241–249; costs to US, 263; under­lying ­causes, 242–246; US electoral calendar, 59 Trans-­Pacific Partnership trade agreement, 5–6, 27, 248 Trump, Donald: balance between China policy and politics, 59; “China threat” rhe­toric, 270, 272; China­US relations, 11–12, 21–24, 26–27, 36; demo­cratic backsliding, 98, 104, 105, 134; impact of administration,

Index

263; infrastructure, 294–295; nationalist pop­u­lism, 9; North K ­ orea, 199–200; Outer Space Treaty, 328; strategy ­toward “Indo-­Pacific,” 74; trade policy, 55; transatlantic partnership, 136, 138, 139; US-­China climate action, 284; US-­China trade war, 241–243, 244, 248; US perception of China, 6; US support for Chinese civil society, 348, 352 Turkel, Nury, 409 Twitter, 114, 115, 308 Umbrella Movement (2014), 9, 211, 217 Union of South American Nations, 134 United Front, 356–357, 358, 360 United Front Law (2015), 357 United Nations, 34, 35, 36, 72, 84, 112, 136, 209, 255, 329 United Nations Climate Change Conference (2021), 286 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (1992), 33 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 34, 37, 234, 235, 236 United Nations Security Council, 72, 84, 89–95, 153, 196 United States: approach to North ­Korea, 195–203; and B ­ elt and Road Initiative, 119–126; China as threat, 38–44, 49, 73, 113, 136–143, 150, 157, 177–184, 243, 267, 270–272; China’s ­m iddle class catching up with US, 274–280; China’s perception, 39–40, 45–52; competing

445

in Africa, 144–150; data privacy protection, 318–319; demo­cratic backsliding, 98; evolution of national power vis-­à-­v is China, 161–170; global health collaboration with China, 330–336; Hong Kong’s importance, 211–218; implications of China’s influence in Latin Amer­i­ca, 127–135; lessons from China on infrastructure, 294–301; making of policy ­toward China, 53–60; national interests in Xinjiang, 219–229; protection of intellectual property, 265–273; race, 410–414; space program, 321–322, 324, 325, 327; support for Chinese civil society, 348–354; technological relationship with China, 302–310; technology regulation, 311, 320. See also China-­US relations; Department of Justice (US); Economy; Trade and investment; Trade war Universities: American universities’ engagement with China, 356–373; Confucius Institutes, 113–114, 116, 146, 352, 355–364 US-­China talks (Anchorage, 2021), 118 US-­China Trade War. See Trade war US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), 408–409 US Entity List, 241, 243 US Space Force, 325 Uyghurs, 35, 64, 176, 219, 220–223, 225, 227–229, 307, 414

446 Index

Veg, Sebastian, 217 Venezuela, 94, 130, 134, 154, 260, 300 Vietnam, 29, 154, 183, 231 Von der Leyen, Ursula, 142 Wanda, 383 Wang, Qing, 273 Wang Anyi, 388, 392–394 Wang Jianlin, 383–384, 397 Wang Jisi, 49 Wang Qishan, 34 Wang Xiaohui, 380 Wang Yiwei, 112 WeChat, 260, 342, 362, 384 Weibo, 342, 346, 386 Wen Jiabao, 198 White House, 54, 56–58, 136, 408–409 Wilson, Woodrow, 40 Wolf Warrior 2 (film), 379–380, 384 “Wolf warrior” diplomacy, 9, 39 ­Women, 62–65, 222, 339–347 Workers’ Party of K ­ orea (WPK), 196, 197–199, 200 World Bank, 32–33, 72, 84, 97, 145, 298, 340 World Trade Organ­ization (WTO), 32, 33, 47, 72–73, 83, 85, 86, 244, 265, 319, 388 Wray, Christopher, 38, 181, 265–266 Wu, Kris, 345 Xia Baolong, 67 Xiao Qifu, 420 Xie Zhenhua, 284 Xi Jinping: approach to national security, 171–176; call for new security

architecture, 235; CCP stagnation, 67; China-­US relations, 6–7, 21, 24–25, 34–35; Chinese past, 421; community of shared f­ uture, 110, 112, 113, 186; demo­c ratic backsliding ­u nder, 98, 100–101, 103, 147; discourse power, 111–112, 147, 299–300; economy u ­ nder, 98, 100–101, 244–246, 250–257, 258–264, 274–280; military competition, 185–192; nationalist pop­ u­l ism, 9; national power targets, 162–163; national rejuvenation ­under, 110–113, 125, 162–163, 173, 322–323; po­l iti­cal rights ­under, 85; propaganda ­under, 101–102, 220, 349–350; punishment diplomacy, 357–358; reversal of American influence, 25, 290–291; space program, 321–329; technological in­de­pen­dence, 51, 244–245, 307; United Front, 355–360; US-­C hina climate action, 283–287, 288–293; US-­China trade war, 248. See also China in the world Xin­hua News Agency, 113, 147 Xinjiang, 176, 219–229, 307, 358, 370, 406 Xinjiang Production Construction Military Corps (XPCC, Bingtuan), 224–225, 228, 229 Xunzi, 112 Yang, Xiuna, 275, 276 Yang Jiechi, 118 Yang Rongguo, 420

Index

Yan Xuetong, 112 Yellow Peril, 43, 413 Yongbyon Nuclear Complex, 200 Young African Leaders Initiative, 146 Yuanmingyuan bronzes, 395–396, 402 Yue Xin, 343–344 Yu Hua, 388, 389–390, 393–394 Zhang Gaoli, 347 Zhang Lihua, 323 Zhang Qizhi, 420 Zhang Yimou, 380–381, 382–383

447

Zhao, Chloé, 49, 378–379 Zhen, He-­Yin, 339–340 Zhima (Sesame) Credit, 312, 316 Zhonghua (China), 226–227 Zhou Enlai, 207 Zhou Xiaochuan, 34 Zhou Xiaoxuan (Xianzi), 345–346 Zhu Jun, 345 Zhu Rongji, 47 Zoellick, Robert, 32, 78 ZTE, 26, 147, 241 Zuckerberg, Mark, 311–312, 320