The Albanian national awakening, 1878-1912 9780691623368, 9781400847761, 9780691650029

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THE ALBANIAN NATIONAL AWAKENING

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THE ALBANIAN NATIONAL

AWAKENING 1878-1912 by Stavro Skendt

PRIN ag _ J ERSEY

Copyright © 1967 by Princeton University Press ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Library of Congress Card Number: 66-17710

Printed in the United States of America BY [CHE MAPLE PREss Co., INc.

To the Memory of My Parents

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Preface SOME YEARS AGO, while engaged in a project on the history of

Albania, I found myself at a loss to cover the period from the collapse of the Albanian League (1881) to the declaration of

the Young ‘Turk Revolution. Neither the general books on Albania—and most of the books on that country are general in character—nor the few existing historical studies treated of that period: they jumped from generalities regarding the Congress of Berlin to generalities about the Albanian revolts during the Young Turk regime. When a publication dealt with the period at all, interest was concentrated on the rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Italy in the Adriatic. The need to fill the gap was also recognized—following the

- publication of several of my articles on Albanian nationalist trends in the period under study—by two very different his-

torians, both of world-wide reputation. One was the late Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes at Columbia University; the other, Professor W. N. Medlicott, formerly at Oxford Un1versity and now at London University. Both scholars encour-

aged my efforts, Professor Hayes urging me to write a book ; “with stress on Albanian nationalism.” There were, however, several difficulties in carrying out the

project. The first step was to dig out the facts from the archives. Because of Austria-Hungary’s special interest in Albania, after the Congress of Berlin, the first archives to be in-

vestigated were those in Vienna. While on a trip from the USSR to Yugoslavia, I stopped for a week in the Austrian capital to examine the Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv and concluded that the material preserved there justified a study of the Albanian national awakening (1878-1912). ‘Two years later I spent a summer doing research in those archives. Since Italy had been the rival of Austria-Hungary in Albania at that

time, it was also necessary to study the Italian archives in Rome—Archivio Centrale dello Stato and Archivio Storico del Ministero deglt Affart Esteri—mostly to check on the facts and to reach a more balanced judgment. In order to round

Vill PREFACE out the research, the archives of a third power, France—Archives du Ministére des Affaires Etrangéres, Paris—came under examination, especially since they were rather rich in in- |

_ formation in Albanian domestic affairs. |

But archival material alone, however essential in this instance, could not convey a complete picture of the developments during the period under consideration. I have also studied pertinent published material, especially contemporary periodicals and political pamphlets. Further difficulty was encountered in the treatment of the material. ‘There was a substantial difference in development between the southern and northern parts of Albania. More-

| over, the division of the population into three religious groups, each with its own particular cultural orientation and political interests, rendered the picture more complex. The interests of the great powers—in this case Austria-Hungary and Italy—and the neighboring states, which had their own aims, added to the complexity. The editors of the documents on medieval Albania maintained that during the Middle Ages that country was a “monad” in which the Balkan world was reflected.* As will be seen in the present study, there is strong reason to hold that in the period 1878-1912 Albania was even more of a Balkan

“monad.” :

A matter for investigation was whether in the meantime the Russians or the Albanians had written anything signifcant on this subject. In 1959 a book by I. G. Senkevich on the liberation movement of the Albanian people in the years 1905-1912 (Osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie albanskogo naroda v 1905-1912g¢g., Moscow) was published by the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Although bear-

ing the name of one writer, it is undoubtedly a collective work, written with the aid of Albanian scholars. It is based preponderantly on material of the Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv, which Tirana has had microfilmed and to which it has given *L. Thalldczy, C. Jiretek, and E. Sufflay, eds., Acta et Diplomata res Albaniae mediae aetatis Illustrantia, Vienna, 1913, I, Vi.

| PREFACE 1X

its own classification. Apart from the Marxian slant, which was to be expected, the Soviet book contains certain misinterpretations, which have been pointed out in the present work. In 1961 Albanian historians prepared for the students of the State University of Tirana two short mimeographed volumes: one covering the period 1839-1900; the other, the period 1900—

1919. Both of them are devoid of footnotes, but one who is familiar with the documents of the Haus-Hof-und. Staatsarchiv can easily discover which documents were used. For the period 1905-1912, there is a striking similarity, indeed often identity, between the Tirana mimeographed volume and I. G. Senkevich’s book, which testifies to the collective character of the latter. However, the Tirana volumes, having been published after the Albanian-Soviet conflict, manifest a certain departure from Moscow influences and a more nationalist

tendency than previous Albanian historical studies. I have | not ignored these works by Communist historians, but have made critical use of them. The Turkish references in I. G. Senkevich’s book or in the Tirana volumes are not founded on Ottoman archival material. The archives of the Ottoman empire regarding Albania have not yet been studied. The difficulty appears to lie not so much in their bulk as in the lack of classification and of

competent scholars to do the needed research. When exploited, the Ottoman archives will contribute to the completeness of Albanian history in the years 1878—1912, especially if compared with the archival material found in the capitals of Western Europe. I wish to thank the officers of the various archives who were helpful to me, particularly Dr. Anna H. Benna of the HausHof-und Staatsarchiv, who was always ready to lend her assistance.

While engaged in this project, I benefited from the encouragement of Professor Philip E. Mosely of Columbia University, to whom I wish to express my warm thanks. Special

appreciation is due to Dr. John C. Campbell of the Council on Foreign Relations, a Balkan specialist of long standing,

X PREFACE who read the manuscript with care and gave his evaluation. I am also deeply indebted to my wife, whose comments helped

to improve this book. The project could not have been carried through had it not

been for the generous grants, both for research and writing, | provided by the Joint Committee on Slavic and East European Studies, of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council, to which I wish to express my gratitude. Thanks also go to Columbia University for defraying the cost of typing the manuscript.

Institute on East Central Europe STAVRO SKENDI Columbia University May 19605

Note on Transcription and Toponymies I. PRONUNCIATION

I. Albanian spelling is phonetic. Except for the following letters, the rest are pronounced like their English counterparts:

C “ts” cats ¢ “th? | “ch” church | | dh father ég“y” first (but less rounded) | “ge” girl g) o] g’ (palatalized LETTER{S| PRONOUNCED LIKE AS IN

j “ye!I (soft) yes leaf

I] I (hard) lord nj “on” ligne (French) qthk’“th” (palatalized thin k)

x “ds” gods xh “yy jam y “U” huile (French) zh “8” pleasure

2. As for the reading of words in Turkish, the following letters are pronounced differently than in English:

LETTER PRONOUNCED LIKE AS IN

C “y John C “ch” church

S “sh” shop 6 “ew” peu (French)

Yy)

ti “u” lune (French) or Ture (German) & y (palatal) = saying or gh (velar;

3. Whereas Albanian employs mostly digraphs in the alphabet, Serbocroatian makes use primarily of diacritical marks. The pronunciation of the following letters should be noted:

dz x | jj

Xi TRANSCRIPTION AND TOPONYMIES

C ¢ dz xh

LETTER PRONOUNCED LIKE ALBANIAN

5 sh (the same as English “sh’’) |

nj nj (w) Z zh

C q (palatalized t or k)

d or gj -- gy (palatalized d or g) II. TOPONYMIES

The place names have various spellings, both in the Balkan languages and in the Western ones. The following are those more

frequently used in the book: |

| AS SPELLED OTHER SPELLINGS 1. Lowns

Cetinje Cettigné, Cettigne Dibér Dibra or Debar

Durrés Durazzo | Gjakové Jakova, Dakovica

Gjirokastér (Gjinokastér in Argyrokastro, Argyrocastro,

Geg dialect) Argirocastro

Ipek (Turkish) Ped, Pejé | Janina Joannina, Yannina Korcé Korcha, Kortcha, Koritsa, Korytza, Corizza

Krujé (Krue in Geg dialect) Croya

Lesh (Lezhé “ “ “ —) Alessio

Monastir Bitolj, Bitola

Pérmet Premeti Prishtiné | Prishtina, PriS$tina

| | Medua

Sarandé Santi Quaranta

Shéngjin Shén Gjin, San Giovanni di - Shkodér Scutari (Scutari d’Albanie, Scutari d’Albania), Skutari, Skadar

TRANSCRIPTION AND TOPONYMIES Xill

Tetové Kalkandelen (Turkish), Tetovo Uskiib (Turkish) Skoplje, Skopje, Scopia, Uskub 2. Rivers and Regions

Bojané (Buené in Geg) Bojana, Boyana

Caméri _ ‘Psamouria, Chamouria, | Ciamouria

Dukagyjin | Ducagini

Shkumbi (Shkumbin in Tosk) Shkumbini

Vijosé Voyoussa

In keeping with the form commonly used in the Albanian maps, the indeterminate form was chosen for the toponymies in Albanian: Shkodér and not Shkodra, GCaméri and not Caméria,

Elbasan and not Elbasani, Ipek and not Ipeku. Only for Albania’s capital the English form Tirana was preserved. NOTE ON THE SPELLING OF PROPER NAMES IN ‘TURKISH

There is a tendency in Turkish (and in Albanian also) to pronounce the written voiced consonant at the end of a proper | name (or a word) as unvoiced. Owing to this, with the adoption

of the Latin alphabet for Turkish, an inconsistency ensued in spelling. One finds both forms of a proper name, as it was originally written and as it is actually pronounced: Hamid and Hamit, Necib and Necip, and so on. However, since in Osman Turkish one Arabic letter stood at times for more than one sound (phoneme), the inconsistency spread to comprise other positions

and other letters. This explains the various spellings for the name of two generals mentioned in this text: Dorgud, Durgud, Torgud, ‘Turgut, Dorgut, Durgut.

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Preface vii Contents

Abbreviations | 2 Introduction: Albania’s Legacy 3

Note on ‘Transcription and ‘Toponymies Xi

Berlin 31 Congress 54

PART I © THE GROUNDWORK (1878-1881)

I. ‘The Albanian League and ‘The Congress of

IJ. Resistance to the Decisions of the Berlin

II. ‘The Struggle for Administrative Autonomy 88

(1881-1908) IV. Cultural Affirmation lll |

PART II «© THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

V. Problems in National Education 129

VI. Role of Societies and Press Abroad | 145

VIL. Political ‘Thinking 165

VIII. Diffuse Revolutionary Activity 190 IX. Contribution of the Italo-Albanians to the

National Movement 215

| , and Italy 298 and Albanian Reaction 257 X. ‘The impetus to this movement was given by an influential leader of Gusinj, Ali Bey (later Pasha) Gucija.1® Barely a month later, Prince Nicholas of Montenegro informed the consulates of the great pow-

ers in Shkodér, particularly the French consulate, that in addition to the “league formed by the inhabitants of Gusinj, Plavé and other places,’”’ a movement was being organized among the people of Grudé, Klemend, Hot and other parts of Malésia (Catholic mountains), in order to bring about a conflict along the frontier.1 14Cf. Histort e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900 (History of Albania, 1839-1900), Tirana, 1961, p. 58; hereafter cited as Historie Shqipérisé, 1839-1900. Green to Salisbury, Scutari, 3 May 1878, No. 40, A and P, 1878, Vol.

LXxxl, Turkey, 31 (1878), p. 60. |

1%Ceccaldi to Waddington, Scutari, 4 May 1878, No. 214, AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Scutari, 1878-1879, Vol. xx1.

“Copy of telegram signed by Prince Nicholas, Cetinje, 5 June 1878, as annexe No. 1 to the Dépéche, 9 June 1878, No. 218, in ibid.

36 I. THE GROUNDWORK _ As the date of the Congress of Berlin was approaching, the Albanian leaders became more aware of the need for united

action. The Porte not only did not hinder these efforts, it even encouraged them. They decided to meet at Prizren on June 10, 1878. At short notice, representatives from many parts of the country, especially from the northeast and the east, convened there. Most of them were landowners, Moslem

clergymen, and chieftains. From the south, owing to lack of time, only two delegates were able to attend, one of them being Abdul Frashéri, who was destined to play the most important role in the whole movement.?® Abdul Frashéri was born in 1839 in the south and belonged to a family of beys which had lost its lands but still held positions in the Turkish administration. He had studied in the Greek gymnasium of Janina (Zdsimaia Skholé) and in 1877, when he was elected a deputy of Janina to the first Ottoman parliament, he was Director of Finance of the vilayet whose capital that city was.?® "The meeting was held in a medrese of Prizren, and was

attended by some Moslem landowners from Bosnia, Hercegovina, and the sandjak of Novi Pazar, interested in fighting together with the Albanians against the detachment of their lands from Ottoman rule. It was opened by Abdul Frashéri, who invited the Albanians to unite for the defense of their country which was in danger. Abdul Frashéri was there as the representative of the secret committee, of which he was president, which was formed in Istanbul after the San Stefano ‘Treaty and was called ““The Central Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Albanian Nationality.” The committee was composed of the most prominent Albanian leaders, intellectuals, and government officials in Istanbul, both Mos| lems and Christians. It was kept secret in order to avoid pressures on the part of the Turkish government. On the other Cf. Histori e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 60. See, for the list of delegates, S. Kiilge, Osmanlt tarthinde Arnavutluk (Albania in Ottoman History), Smyrna, 1944, pp. 249-250. This book has value only for the few Turkish

documents it contains and for what the author himself had witnessed.

19Flistori e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 5s. ,

THE ALBANIAN LEAGUE AND BERLIN CONGRESS 37

hand, the fact that the Porte also was interested in the opposition to the San Stefano Treaty made its task less difficult. On the basis of the memoranda, especially that of May 30, 1878, the program of the Istanbul committee was to live in peace with the neighboring countries but at the same time to defend resolutely Albanian territory.”° The meeting at Prizren decided on the creation of an organization for the defense of the rights of the Albanian people with a central committee having its headquarters at Prizren. It elected as president Sheh Mustafa Tetova, and as members Ali Bey Gucija, Ijaz Pasha Dibra,? Mejderiz Omer Effendi Prizreni, Sulejman Vokshi from Gjakové, and others. Committees were to be established in the various parts of Albania which would be in touch with the headquarters in Prizren, and controlled by it. These committees would enroll men, _ collect tithes, buy food, and distribute arms and ammunition to their forces. All able men, except one per family, would be armed. ‘The number of troops to be raised was also determined. ‘The sandjak of Shkodér together with the highlands was to provide 30,000 men, while 30,000 others from Tirana,

Elbasan, Mat, Ohrid, and Dibér would join with them to constitute a corps. Other corps were to be formed, having as rallying points Prizren, Ipek, Kosovo, and Novi Pazar. A tax on noncombatants would be levied on the population by the

various provincial committees. At the proposal of Abdul Frashéri, the meeting at Prizren adopted a protest to the Berlin Congress and the Porte against the partition of Albanian territory. It was also resolved that, in the event that the Congress of Berlin ceded Albanian territory to Montenegro and Serbia, the Albanians would ask these two princi-

palities to evacuate the positions they occupied; if they 20See tbid., pp. 57-58; K. Frashéri, Rilindja kombétare shqipiare (Albanian National Renaissance), Tirana, 1962, p. 18. *111jaz Pasha Dibra is mentioned in T. Ippen, “Beitrage zur inneren Geschichte Albaniens in xix. Jahrhundert,” I[llyrisch-albanische Forschungen, 1, 370, as president of the northern branch of the League with headquarters at Prizren.

38 I, THE GROUNDWORK | refused, the Albanians would employ force to throw them back. Death would be the punishment for any Albanian who did not respond to the appeal of the respective committee to take up arms or who fled before the enemy. At the same time a general besa (the term has also the meaning of truce, for the word of honor has been given for its preservation), prohibiting vendettas, was proclaimed.”

Thus was founded what was later called the “Albanian League” or the “League of Prizren.’’ All the delegates at Prizren favored the maintenance of the sovereignty of the Sultan over Albania as a guarantee against partition, but, as the territories menaced by the forthcoming decisions of the Berlin Congress were inhabited preponderantly by Moslems,

_ the union took the aspect of an Islamic league. The French consul in Shkodér, who spoke of the league as a fait accompli,

also regarded it as constituted by the Moslem inhabitants of high Albania.”* It must be pointed out here that the dominant forces in the gathering at Prizren were Moslem con-

servatives and through them the Porte could exercise an influence in its own interest. ‘This explains why at the outset the Albanians at Prizren made common cause with the Moslem Bosnians. In Shkodér, on the other hand, because of different religious composition and more advanced political thinking, the movement assumed from the outset a more nationalistic direction. ‘The committee formed in this city was composed of Moslems and Catholics, Prenk Bib Doda, the Captain of Mirdité, being one of the main leaders.?+ Before its formation, Catholics and Moslems had already cooperated and signed a protest to the delegates of the great powers in Berlin against the cession of Antivari, Dulcigno, Podgoricé (Titograd), and *2Ibid., and Pons to Waddington, Scutari, 14 July 1878, No. 222, AMAE, ‘Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Scutari, 18781879, Vol. XXI.

8Pons to Dufaure, Scutari, 13-17 June 1878, No. 219, in ibid. **Cf. Pons to Waddington, Scutari, 14 July 1878, No. 222, in ibid.

THE ALBANIAN LEAGUE AND BERLIN CONGRESS 39

Shpuz (Spuza) by the San Stefano Treaty.2> On July 7 the delegates of Shkodér returned from Prizren to their city and held a public gathering.?® The committee of Shkodér had taxed Moslems and Catholics alike for the support of the troops it was raising.??7 When the vali (Governor General) of the city summoned the Albanian committee and told it not to rely on the assistance of the Porte,?° it was an indication that

Istanbul disapproved of the national policies of the committee.2® But the Porte was unable to restrain the movement which it had favored until then. During the whole period of the Russo-Turkish war Greece had hesitated between entering the war on the side of Russia and remaining neutral. ‘The Western powers had advised her to stay out of it; only Russia from time to time urged Greece to join the war, avoiding, however, the conclusion of a formal | alliance with Athens.?° When Plevna fell in December 1877, the Greek government circles were deeply impressed. After some hesitation in the cabinet, the Greek armies on February 21, 1878 marched into Turkish territory, but nine days later they were ordered to recross the frontier, owing to pressure from the Western powers.*1

Yet the disturbances continued in many regions, particularly in Thessaly and Epirus. A significant landing of Greek bands was made on the shores of Albania, north of Sarandé Text in dépéche télégraphique to the French Ministry of Foreign , Affairs, Scutari, 16 June 1878, and with signatures as annexed to the dépéche, 17 June 1878, No. 219, in ibid. 26Pons to Waddington, Scutari, 14 July 1878, No. 222, in ibid. 27Pons to Waddington, Scutari, 11 August 1878, No. 225, in ibid. See also S. Goptevic, Oberalbanien und seine Liga, Leipzig, 1881, p. 99. *8Dépéche télégraphique de Pons, Scutari, 23 August 1878, in ibid. 2°Pons to Waddington, Scutari, 9 September 1878, No. 228, in ibid. s0Cf. S. IT. Lascaris, La politique extérieure de la Gréce, avant et apres le Congrés de Berlin (1875-1881), Paris, 1924, pp. 85-89. 31The best and most complete account of this period is contained in E. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Gréce de 1821

a nos jours, Paris, 1925, I, 413-460. |

40 I. THE GROUNDWORK (Santi Quaranta). A proclamation was soon published by their

commander appealing to the Albanian population to rise in the name of fatherland and independence, and in Licoursi (Lékurés) a violent struggle occurred. Emissaries were dispatched to towns of southern Albania for this purpose, but they were met with opposition.” ‘The battles became very bloody in Thessaly, where the population was mixed, Greeks and Moslems, and the district bordered on Greece. As the situation was deteriorating from day to day, England intervened in order to put a stop to the hostilities, assuring the insurgents _ that “the Greek cause would not be injured and that Great Britain would try to obtain that Greece be fully and favorably heard in the Congress.” *° When peace was reestablished in the vilayet of Janina, the Porte announced its intention to inaugurate reforms. In a proclamation dated April 1878, after referring to “the perverse men” at the head of bands who endeavored to instigate the people to insubordination and revolt, the Ottoman government stressed its readiness to guard the security of the province. It also stated that the administration of the vilayet of Janina would be reorganized, on the basis of civil and political equality, so as to achieve “the participation of the population in the administration of the country without distinction of cult, language or nationality, the decentralization of all the services, to the extent that such a decentralization can be carried out without damaging the unity of the state.” Mentioning the reforms the Porte had decided to introduce without delay, the proclamation regarded as the only obstacle in its way the state of disorder. For this reason the inhabitants of the province of Janina, whether Christians or Moslems, were urged to remain faithful to the Sultan and his governs2P. Chiara, L’Epiro, gli Albanest e la Lega, Palermo, 1880, p. 232. See also Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 26 April 1878, No. 134, and

the long report on Lékurés in the letter of 31 May 1878, No. 142, AMAE, ‘Turquie, Correspondance politique de consuls, Janina, 18771878, Vol. Ix. 335. T. Lascaris, op.cit., pp. 119 and 122.

THE ALBANIAN LEAGUE AND BERLIN CONGRESS 41

ment and to repulse those foreigners and rebels who would attempt to destroy their tranquillity, security, and honor, on the pretext of leading them to liberty.*4 _ This Turkish proclamation was important, first, because of the reforms it promised. It seemed to be in part an answer to the memorandum which the southern Albanian leaders, convened in Janina in the spring of 1877—as a result of the | 1876 Istanbul Conference of the great powers, which drew the frontier line so as to cede Albanian territory—sent to the Porte, calling for a united Albanian province and for reforms which would lead to virtual autonomy.®® Perhaps even more

significantly it was a reflection of the existing conditions in

the vilayet of Janina immediately after the San Stefano Treaty.

The threat of territorial losses in the southern part of Albania was not great. Nothing had been granted to Greece by the San Stefano ‘Treaty. Here union for action was not as urgently needed as in the north. Still the south felt that it should have solidarity with the meeting of Prizren. After the meeting of Prizren, when the delegates left for their respective districts, toward the middle of July, in order to create committees and organize local military forces to be employed for resistance,?® Abdul Frashéri returned to his native village, Frashér. He immediately got in touch with the well-known Bektashi tekke (monastery) there. He knew that he could have the majority of the Moslem Albanians of the south on his side if he won the Bektashi babas (abbots) to the cause. Himself a Bektashi, Abdul visited the various tekkes, and thanks to the support of baba Alush of Frashér, he persuaded the Bektashi order to help the Albanian movement §¢Turkish Proclamation to the Inhabitants of the Vilayet of Janina (Albania), Announcing the Intention of the Porte to Inaugurate Reforms in that Province without Delay, Constantinople, April 1878, British and Foreign State Papers (Foreign Office), 1877-1878, LXIX,

1104-1106. , *°Cf. Histort e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, pp. 54-55.

Tbid., p. 65.

42 I. THE GROUNDWORK and exercise influence on the Albanian notables.’* The Bektashis were not well regarded by the Turkish government, which favored the Sunnis. In fact, after the 1826 massacres of the Janissaries, with whom the Bektashis were connected, they were persecuted.°* Not identifying themselves with the official religion of the state, Sunnism, the Bektashis were more nationally minded. It was at the tekke of Frashér that Abdul called a meeting of the representatives of the various districts of southern Albania.*®

In accordance with the spirit of the decisions of Prizren, the

gathering of Frashér resolved that branches of the Albanian League, with local committees, be founded in the various parts of the south, in order to raise troops for the defense of the southern districts which would go to the assistance of the north, if they were in need. In Frashér, where both Orthodox

Christians and Moslems took part, the more enlightened elements prevailed, and the patriotic group, headed by Abdul, could act more openly than in Prizren. This group presented

to the meeting a program which, besides the resolve not to yield even a slice of land to Greece, contained claims for an autonomous Albania within the framework of the Ottoman empire.*? However, the whole program of Frashér was not made public. Apparently the patriotic leaders wanted to keep it for another occasion, when they could present it as that of all the Albanians and give to the League of Prizren the character of an organization representative of the whole country. As a center for the branches of the south the committee of s’F. Konitza, “Mémoire sur le mouvement national albanais,” Brussels, January 1899, p. 4, written for the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, HHStA, PA x1v/18, Albanien x11/2. 38After 1826 the Bektashi order in Albania was compelled to withdraw

from the military administrative centers and started building its tekkes in mountainous regions for security; see F. W. Hasluck, Christianity and Islam under the Sultans, Oxford, 1929, 1, 160, and M. Hasluck, ‘“The

Non-Conformist Moslems of Albania,” Contemporary Review, cxxvu (May 1925), 600.

“FHistort e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 65. |

*0Cf. ibid.

THE ALBANIAN LEAGUE AND BERLIN CONGRESS 43

Janina was chosen, but the relationship between them was loose.*! In the course of events other centers emerged: Preveza

and Gyjirokastér. | - Meanwhile the Congress of Berlin had convened. The Treaty of San Stefano, although binding for Turkey, was too bold a challenge for the great powers, particularly for England and Austria-Hungary, which were interested in preserving ‘Turkey in Europe. They refused to accept the provisions of the treaty. Yet England and Austria-Hungary were unable to combine forces until early in June.** When the representatives of the great powers met on June 13, 1878, to consider the revision of the San Stefano Treaty, it was Bismarck who presided. Fearful that the forthcoming decisions of the Congress of

Berlin would be detrimental to the territorial integrity of Albania, the League of Prizren became active. Its action was

supported by the Turkish government, which hoped that Albanians might exert some pressure on the great powers to reconsider the whole Near Eastern question and impress them with the dangers of the discords which would result from further extension of the privileges of the Balkan states.*? For the first time Albania became an international problem. In the north, the center of Shkodér had come to promi-

nence. It became better known in the outside world than

Prizren, because it was the see of Albanian Catholicism and because its geographic position brought it closer to the West. This resulted in the confusion of regarding the leaders of Shkodér—Prenk Bib Doda and Hodo Bey—as those of the whole Albanian movement.** Prizren, because it lay in territory which was compelled to put up the strongest resistance, soon grew into the most powerful center, however, and was *Tbid.

“Cf. W. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After, p. 12. 48Cf. Federal Writers’ Project of the Works Progress Administration of Massachusetts, The Albanian Struggle in the Old World and New, Boston, 1939, p. 35. — #21, Skendo, ‘Liga e Prizrenit” (The League of Prizren), Hyllt 1 Drités (Star of Light), Shkodér, x (1922), 467.

44 I. THE GROUNDWORK | gradually recognized as such byall the other branches, whether in the north or in the south.*® Less than a week after the opening of the Congress of Ber-

lin, on June 18, 1878, a memorandum from Shkodér in the name of all the Albanians was addressed to Lord Beaconsfield,

Great Britain’s chief delegate to it.*® The question may be asked why the memorandum was directed to the British Prime Minister and not to Bismarck or Andrassy. ‘The reason was

contained in the document itself. First, of all the powers England was most interested in not replacing the Turkish empire by a “more dreadful domination” and regarded it as

vital to prevent the Slavic advances toward the Adriatic. Secondly, as the Albanians could not represent themselves in the Congress and the Ottoman empire could not fittingly be their spokesman, they needed the support of a great power, and this could be only Great Britain, which posed no threat to them. ‘The memorandum had to define next the land of the Albanians: ‘From the banks of the Boyana to the gate of Janina one is the aspect, one is the temperament of the populations which present themselves in a homogeneous and compact nucleus for the unity of type and the identity of race. “From this city to the Ambracian gulf, the Greek element with religious and lay propaganda contends the ground with

the Albanian race which is maintained there preponderant, if not in number, certainly in vigor and attitude to resistance.”

The document contains no attacks on Greece. The claims of this power to Epirus had not yet officially been presented. ‘The Slavic peril was as grave for her as for the Albanians. Above all Great Britain, although Turcophile, was not anti“Cf. ibid., pp. 468-469.

“See for the complete text in Italian—there was also a French and an Albanian text—P. Chiara, op.cit., pp. 159-176. The copy found in the HHStA of Vienna is also in Italian; cf. A. Novotny, op.cit., entry 57> P- 85.

THE ALBANIAN LEAGUE AND BERLIN CONGRESS 409

Greek in the arrangement imposed by Russia. ‘Thus the Albanians expressed the desire to see Greece as an ally. They even suggested a confederation, but discarded the idea of a union: “Albania cannot be united with Greece; deep differences of race, language, customs, and civilization make union impossible.”

The next step was to affirm Albanian nationality. “As we are not and don’t want to be ‘Turks, so we will oppose with all our might any one who would like to make us Slavs, or Austrians, or Greeks.

“We want to be Albanians.

“, . . Albania will never stand the Slavic domination whether it comes from the frontiers of Bulgaria, or those of Montenegro; Albania will never be ‘Turkish, and the proof is more than four centuries of struggles in order to preserve intact the character, traditions, and national aspect.” Then the Shkodér memorandum asked for an independent Albania. What it really meant was an autonomous Albania which would be a bulwark against Slavic invasion and an element of political and commercial equilibrium in the Balkans. It suggested that the great powers confirm the status quo— the principle of the integrity of the Ottoman empire—but change the form of the political and administrative organism, concentrating in one single power the supremacy exercised by the chieftains of the independent tribes, which at times had constituted Albania’s force, but had often been the cause of her weakness.

At the end the Albanians urged that the reconstitution of their country not be entrusted to the Turkish government, but to an international commission, which would proceed in the same manner as for Bulgaria, and should not impose on them a non-national government. It is obvious that the memorandum to Lord Beaconsfield was based on the principle of nationality and fatherland, quite an advance from the regionalism of former protests. Chiara, the Italo-Albanian writer who published the memorandum as early as 1880, writes that it was composed by the most authori-

46 | I. THE GROUNDWORK | tative Albanians and was an act of the Albanian League.** In Albania, too, it is often believed to be such. However, it was probably the product of the Shkodér committee of the League, on which the Catholic influence had prevailed, not simply because it was signed “the Albanians,” instead of “the Albanian League,” and was dispatched from Shkodeér, but because of the contents. Although the League of Prizren on June 15, 1878 wired the Porte, “Cursed be he who thinks of his own interest when the fatherland calls us” and ‘“We have decided in our League to declare that we are Albanians and that religion is of no consequence,” *® on account of the Mos-

lems of Kosovo, it would have been more restrained in its attacks on ‘Turkey. Furthermore, in defining Albania geoeraphically, the document assigns as the northern boundary the Boyana river and does not extend it to the east, thus excluding the lands of the Kosovars. Such an omission on the part of the League of Prizren would have been inconceivable. On June 20, 1878, ten well-known Albanians, members of the Central Committee of Istanbul, addressed from the Turkish capital another memorandum to Bismarck, Andrassy, and Lord Beaconsfield, expressing the desire that Albania enjoy autonomy within the framework of the Ottoman empire and

protesting against any intention to put her under the rule of any other country.*®

During the whole month the Congress of Berlin was in session, a flood of protests and petitions poured in from the Albanians. Some aimed at preventing the incorporation of Albanian territory in Bulgaria, Montenegro, or Greece.®° Others expressed the desire to come to an understanding with the Porte about the intended reforms in the country, refusing

to recognize another government to deal with them.®! But

““P, Chiara, op.cit., p. 141. | *8Turkish text in S. Kulce, op.cit., p. 250. A. Novotny, op.cit., entries 89 and 1250, pp. go and 267, respectively. *°Cf. zbid., entries 123, p. 97; 133, P- 99; 152, p. 102; 182, p. 108; 297, p- 121.

“lbid., entries go, p. 91; 112, p. 94.

THE ALBANIAN LEAGUE AND BERLIN CONGRESS AT

toward the end the petitions for the autonomy of Albania decreased conspicuously.>* The situation had now changed. With the marching of the Austro-Hungarian armies into

Bosnia-Hercegovina on July 22, 1878, the prospect of an imminent occupation of Novi Pazar by Austria-Hungary seemed to have upset a part of the Albanian population. In the middle of August 1878 the news spread that Bosnian insurgents turned to the League for help and that 20,000 Albanians were on the way from Prizren to Bosnia.®? ‘The rumor was not completely unfounded, although Albanian fighting troops did not go to their rescue. In the statutes of the League of Prizren the defense of Bosnia-Hercegovina was included,** but the League thought at this time that it would need its forces for the defense of Albanian territory. Yet Zichy

had always maintained that it was possible to win the Albanian League over to Austria with a friendly policy. Already with the Reichstadt Agreement of 1876 AustriaHungary had made it clear that she would oppose the formation of a great Slavic state in the Balkans.®® ‘This was reaffirmed in the secret Austro-Russian Convention of January 15, 1877, where the creation of an independent Albanian state was mentioned as possible in the event of a territorial remaniement or a dissolution of the Ottoman empire.*? The San Stefano Treaty not only created a Great Bulgaria but also provided for the enlargement of Serbia and Montenegro, | bringing these two countries into close contiguity and facili-

tating thereby their eventual union, which would block Austria-Hungary’s expansion to the Aegean Sea. Austro-Hungarian policy at the Congress of Berlin consequently endeavored to keep to a minimum the annexation of Albanian terr1=I bid., p. 42. 8Ibid., pp. 42-43. “4Cf. M. Frashéri, op.cit., p. 23; Hustort e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 60. 5A. Novotny, op.cit., entries 1514, p. 310; 1668, p. 335; 1707, p. 341. Cf. B. H. Sumner, op.cit., pp. 586, 588, 601.

S7Article 11 of the Additional Austro-Russian Convention of 15 January 1877, ibid., pp. 284 and 601.

48 I. THE GROUNDWORK tory by the South Slavs. It is interesting to note in this connection that, when the Archduke Johann in 1835 visited

Turkey and Greece and held the collapse of the former | power inevitable, he proposed that Austria should acquire Bosnia, Hercegovina, and northern Albania.®8 The importance to Austria-Hungary of northern Albania as a counter‘poise to Slavism is also shown in the memorandum of 1877 by F. Lippich.®? The representatives of ‘Turkey also went to

| the Congress with instructions to hold back Montenegro and Serbia from Albania.®° When they became aware that, regard-

less of their wishes, Austria-Hungary would occupy BosniaHercegovina, one of the two points of their program, approved also by the Porte, was to seek Austria-Hungary’s support on Montenegro not receiving anything from the Albanian side.*! As for Italy, in the summer of 1877, when the then presi-

dent of the Italian parliament Francesco Crispi met with Bismarck and later with Derby, the latter two had proposed Albania as a possible compensation for Italy, in the event that Austria-Hungary acquired Bosnia. But the Italian statesman was not interested in the offer; instead he desired the annexation of Italian Alpine regions occupied by the Dual Monarchy. However, Count Corti went to the Congress of Berlin ready to pursue a policy of dignity and peace. By that he meant a reaction against Crispi’s angling and the acceptance of an Austrian occupation (though not annexation) of Bosnia and Hercegovina “without compensation” to Italy. ‘The Germans, who feared that Italy would press claims for a 8H. v. Srbik, Metternich, der Staatsman und der Mensch, Munich, 1925, Il, 578; note for p. 65.

*°“Denkschrift tiber Albanien,” Vienna, 20 June 1877, pp. 15-18, HAStA, PA x11/256, Tirkei tv. “°Carathéodory Pacha, Le Rapport secret sur le Congrés de Berlin adressé a la S. Porte, ed. B. Bareilles, Paris, 1919, p. 83. “1bid., pp. 134-135.

SCf. The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi, ed. Thomas PalamenghiCrispi, New York and London, 1912, 11, 64, 73-74, and I, 279-81; G. Salvemini, La politica estera di Francesco Crispi, Rome, 1919, pp. 13, 20-21.

THE ALBANIAN LEAGUE AND BERLIN CONGRESS 49

quid pro quo in Albania, were assured that she would not do so.*° Obviously, Italy considered her security in the Adriatic adequate so long as Albania remained under Turkish rule. Under the resolutions of the Congress of Berlin, Bulgaria did not incorporate any Albanian lands, because Macedonia remained in Turkish hands. As for Serbia, after her intention to acquire Ada Kale did not materialize and the partition of Novi Pazar was prevented, she remained with the territories she occupied during the war. But the boundaries of Montenegro became a serious problem. On June 28 Mehmed Ali Pasha, one of the Ottoman representatives, explained at the Congress that, on the basis of the Adrianople armistice, an increase of territory equivalent to that which the fortunes of war allowed to fall in the hands of the Montenegrins was to be accorded to them. According to the San Stefano Treaty, however, not only all those districts, with the exception of the small district of Zubci, were ceded

_ to Montenegro, but also an enormous extent of country, which had never been entered by any Montenegrin under arms. here was a contradiction.** At the sitting of July 1, Carathéodory Pasha, the chief ‘Turkish plenipotentiary, indicated the great importance attached by his government to the question of the Montenegrin boundaries and elaborated on the reasons which induced it to desire that the line should not be extended too much in the direction of Albania. Passing to the cession of Antivari to Montenegro, he held that the Montenegrins would be able to stay there only by force, against the wishes of the population. He then alluded to incessant

reciprocal attacks between Albanians and Montenegrins, announcing that on this point the Porte had received disquieting telegrams. Three days later the question of the Montenegrin boundaries came up again and a plan for their 68B. H. Sumner, op.cit., p. 509; L. Salvatorelli, La Triplice Alleanza, storia diplomatica, 1877-1912, Milan, 1939, pp. 39-40. 64Annex 2 to Protocol No. 8, A and P, 1878, Vol. Lxxxin, Turkey, No. 39 (1878), pp. 123-124. 65See Protocol No. 10—Sitting of 1 July 1878, ibid., p. 156.

30 | I. THE GROUNDWORK | delimitation, agreed upon between the Austrians and Russians, was submitted to the Congress and adopted. On the basis of this plan, Antivari would be incorporated in Montenegro, whereas Dulcigno would be restored to ‘Turkey.®° Mehmed Ali Pasha proposed that Montenegro annex territories inhabited by people of the same race and predom1nantly of the same faith as the Montenegrins. He considered it an injustice that lands like the districts of Plavé and Gusinj,

and the cities of Podgoricé and Antivari, the inhabitants of which were Moslem and Catholic Albanians, should be allotted to Montenegro. He traced another boundary line and added that he would have no objections if, instead of the Albanian territories, an equivalent were given the Montenegrins on the side of Hercegovina.®? Yet Article xxvu of the

Treaty of Berlin (July 13, 1878) read with regard to the Albanian Montenegrin frontier: ... From there [the village of Sekulare] the new frontier passes along the crests of the Mokra Planina, the village of Mokra remaining to Montenegro; it then reaches the point 2166 on the Austrian Staff Map, following the principal chain and the line of the watershed between Lim on the one side, and the Drin as well as the Cievna on the other.

| It then coincides with the existing boundaries between the tribe of the Kuci-Drekalovici on one side, and the Kucka-Krajna, as well as the tribes of the Klementi and Grudi, on the other, to the plain of Podgorica, from whence it proceeds towards Plavnica, leaving the Klementi, Grudi,

and Hoti tribes to Albania. Thence the new frontier crosses the lake near the Islet of Gorica-Topal, and, from Gorica-Topal, takes a straight line to the top of the crest, whence it follows the water8’The Marquis of Salisbury to her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of

State, Berlin, 4 July 1878, No. 23, zbid., pp. 138-139. a 6’Protocol No. 12—Sitting of 4 July, zbid., p. 182; G. Effendi

Paris, 1902, IV, 109. a

Noradounghian, Recueil dactes internationaux de ’Empire Ottoman,

THE ALBANIAN LEAGUE AND BERLIN CONGRESS D1

shed between Megured and Kalimed, leaving Mrkovi¢ to

Montenegro, and reaching the Adriatic at V. Kruci. On the northwest the frontier will be formed by a line passing from the coast between the villages of SuSana and ©

Zub¢i, and terminating at the extreme southeast point of the existing frontier of Montenegro on the Vrsuta Planina. Antivari and its seaboard were annexed to Montenegro on the condition that the districts situated to the south of that territory as far as the Buené, including Dulcigno, be restored to Turkey.® Thus the Berlin Treaty, although it did not permit Montenegro to retain much of the Albanian territory ceded to her by the Treaty of San Stefano, still accorded her, in addition to Antivari, the town of Podgoricé and the districts of Plavé, Gusinj, Kuc, and Triepsh. ‘The only question connected directly with Albania which was raised at the Congress of Berlin was that of the “privileges of Mirdité.”’ ‘This mountainous region in northern Albania, inhabited by Catholics, had revolted against ‘Turkey in 18477, but its revolt had soon been quelled.®® ‘The question was raised by Austria-Hungary and supported by France, both Catholic powers interested in the Catholics of the Ottoman empire. Austria’s interest went beyond religion; she wanted to have a base in northern Albania from which to exercise her influence. In the sitting of July 5, 1878 Count de SaintVallier proposed in the name of the representatives of AustriaHungary and France that “the Mirdité population shall continue to enjoy the privileges and immunities of which they have been in possession ab antiquo.” A discussion ensued in which Salisbury was rather reluctant to accept the proposal and the Ottoman delegates opposed it. Finally the representatives of France and Austria-Hungary imposed its acceptance, 66See Article xx1x of the Berlin Treaty, A and P, 1878, Vol. Lxxxm, Turkey, No. 44 (1878), p. 22. 8°Cf. B. H. Sumner, op.cit., p. 264; Histori e Shgipérisé, 1839-1900, PPp- 52°54-

o2 I, THE GROUNDWORK the Ottoman plenipotentiaries confining themselves to their declaration that ‘‘the Sublime Porte does not intend to make, for the moment, any change in the state of things in the Mir-

dité mountain.”

Though Greece could be of use to England as a counterweight to the Slavs, the British representatives did not go beyond obtaining permission for her to be present at the sessions at which were discussed the provinces north of Greece.“1 The British were more concerned with Turkey. Salisbury even proposed that for the sake of clarity the words “Greek provinces’ should be substituted for “bordering provinces of the Kingdom of Greece,” proposed by the French plenipotentiary Desprez.7? On June 29, 1878 Greece’s case was presented before the Congress by her Foreign Minister, T’. Deliyannis, who made demands for Crete, Thessaly, and Epirus." Waddington, the chief representative of France, who was the cultural leader in the Near East, sought to win | for Greece the whole of Thessaly and Epirus. ‘To this end, he proposed a frontier rectification of the line of Salamyrias (ancient Peneus)—Kalamas rivers, cutting off a large slice of what the Albanians considered their territory. France proposed further that Turkey and Greece should come to a direct agreement on the rectification of the frontier.’4 ‘This was the first time that the Epirus question had assumed real European importance. The Italian delegate supported the French proposal, but the Turkish plenipotentiaries declared that they did not have the consent of their government and reserved their answer. Protocol No. 13—Sitting of 5 July 1878, A and P, Vol. Lxxxur (1878), pp. 590-591 or Turkey, No. 38 (1878), pp. 198-199. — “Driault and Lhéritier, op.cit., 11, 496-498.

“Protocol No. 3—Sitting of 19 June 1878 in G. Effendi Noradounghian, op.cit., Iv, 17; Driault and Lhéritier, op.cit., m1, 498. ‘8Protocol No. g—Sitting of 29 June 1878, in G. Effendi Noradoun-

ghian, op.cit., Iv, 75-78; Driault and Lhéritier, op.cit., m, 492-493, 501-502.

“Protocol No. 13—Sitting of 5 July 1878, in G. Effendi Noradounghian, op.cit., tv, 117; Driault and Lheritier, op.cit., m1, 504-505.

THE ALBANIAN LEAGUE AND BERLIN CONGRESS 993

Following Lord Beaconsfield’s remark that he would not rec-

ommend coercive measures, the great powers adopted the French proposal,” and Article XXIV of the Treaty of Berlin read:

“In the event that the Sublime Porte and Greece should not be able to reach an agreement on the rectification of the frontier indicated in the thirteenth Protocol of the Congress of Berlin, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia reserve for themselves the offer of mediating

between the two Parties in order to facilitate the negotiations.” Thus the Congress of the great powers in Berlin terminated

its work regarding Albanian territory. Although the boundaries of the San Stefano Treaty were pushed back, Albania did not escape serious territorial amputations. ‘The two decisions, annexation of Albanian territory in the north and proposed frontier rectification in the south, became the next concern of the Albanians. Both were to be challenged by

them. |

Cf. Protocol No. 13—Sitting of 5 July 1878, A and P, 1878, Vol.

Lxxx1l, Turkey, No. 39 (1879), pp. 194-199.

II Resistance to the Decisions of the Berlin Congress THE Concress of Berlin, interested primarily in preventing the outbreak of a war between Russia and England and perhaps Austria-Hungary, paid too little attention to the troubles of the various nationalities in the Balkans to avoid the emergence of new difficulties. Bismarck told the Ottoman plenipotentiaries that the “Treaty of San Stefano would have remained as it had been stipulated between Turkey and Russia, if it had not touched certain European interests.” 1 As far as Albania was concerned, the frontier decisions of the Congress could not but be opposed by the Albanian League. The time of petitions and memoranda alone was over for the League. It was compelled now to pass to action in order to defend Albanian territory. As was natural, the League manifested itself most powerfully in towns which were lo-

cated in the vicinity of the adjoining Balkan states, as in Prizren, Shkodér, and Dibér, near the Slavs, and in Preveza and Janina, near the Greeks. But a center from which one leadership could be exercised was actually lacking. Albanian forces brought the League into being and Albania had to be its fundamental support. In the north, where a man’s “best friend” was his gun, the order was that each house should provide a fighter at the time of the call.2 The beys in the south were asked to be ready, together with their

armed following, for the moment of attack; some of the wealthiest among them were called upon to contribute large sums.° As the preservation of Albanian territory was in the interest of ‘Turkey as well, this power not only encouraged 1Carathéodory Pacha, Le Rapport secret sur le Congrés de Berlin adressé a la S. Porte, ed. B. Bareilles, Paris, 1919, p. 76.

“Waldhart to Haymerle, Prizren, 21 July 1880, No. 65/res., HHStA, PA xvui/35, Montenegro Varia, Gusinje Frage 1879.

°F. Konitza, “Mémoire sur le mouvement national albanais,” p. 5, Brussels, January 1899, HHStA, PA xiv/18, Albanien xu1/2.

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS OO the Albanian League, but assisted it, at the outset more cautiously and later more openly.* But Turkey’s interest in the League, whether in the northern or southern branch, does not mean, as has sometimes been maintained, that she was its originator or creator.® Recently more light has been shed on this question. The Greeks have published the secret discussions which took place in 1877 between representatives of the Greek government and Albanian leaders. These discussions, about an understanding for union and collaboration between the Greeks and the Albanians, started in July in Janina and were pursued in December in Istanbul; in both instances Abdul Frashéri was the protagonist on the Albanian side.® They reveal that for a long time the Albanian leaders had been concerned with the fate

of their country. In opposing union with Greece, Abdul | Frashéri plainly told Skouloudis, the Greek delegate, in Istan-

bul, that the only desire “of us Albanians is to save the Albanian nationality.’’ He also stressed that the ideas which he expressed were not the result of hasty thinking or recent events, but the outcome of many years of reflection and discussion, during which Albanians had become aware of the dangers to which their existence as a nation was exposed.’ The League did not clash with Serbia, for this power had already occupied the lands accorded to her by the treaty of 4M. Frashéri, Liga e Prizrenit edhe efektet dipllomatike te saz (The League of Prizren and Its Diplomatic Effects), ‘Tirana, 1927, pp. 22-23;

A. Novotny, Osterreich, die Tiirket und das Balkanproblem im Jahre des Berliner Kongresses (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des Berliner Kongresses 1878), Graz-K6ln, 1957, entry 1464, pp. 301-302; Wald-

hart to Haymerle, Prizren, 21 July 1880, No. 65/res. HHStd, PA xv11/35, Montenegro Varia, Gusinje Frage 1879; Berczencovich to Hay-

merle, Janina, 13 August 1880, No. 9/p, Geheim, HHStA, PA xv | 35. Montenegro-albanesische Liga.

‘Cf. Lippich to Zichy, Scutari, 27 January 1879, No. 5, HHSiA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. 6See “Expositions Mavromati” and “Expositions Skouloudi” in Ho Neos Kouvaras (New Scroll), Athens, 11 (1962), 140-77.

Ibid., p. 156.

o6 I. THE GROUNDWORK Berlin. But when Montenegro’s turn came to annex Albanian regions, the situation became strongly explosive. Montenegro claimed their transfer soon after the Congress of Berlin, justifying her haste because of growing Albanian resistance.® In August 1878 the great powers established the Commission for the Delimitation of the Turco-Montenegrin Frontier.® All these events gave impetus to the Albanian movement in Shkodér. The branch of the League there began to recruit

volunteers and collect arms and contributions. ‘he mhabitants of Plavé and Gusinj, who were predominantly Albanians, resolved to defend their soil to the last. Gatherings and preparations took place in Kosovo, especially in Gyjakové, which was close to Plavé and Gusinj.?° Istanbul endeavored to exploit the Albanian movement in

order to show the inapplicability of the resolutions of the Berlin Congress. At this time in ‘Turkey a party headed by Gazi Osman Pasha, advocating war against Austria-Hungary,

had been formed, which the Sultan seemed to favor. While the Porte officially proclaimed that it would abide by the Berlin ‘Treaty, the war party secretly instigated the Albanians to come into conflict with Austria-Hungary in Bosnia. Urged by this party, the Turkish authorities in the vilayets of Kosovo and Shkodér not only distributed arms among the AIbanians, but also allowed the various local branches of the League to collect the tithe and other taxes for themselves." In Prizren a session of representatives of the notables from various parts of eastern and northeastern Albania opened on August 19, 1878, and the question of military help to Bosnia was discussed. ‘he opinion of the patriots finally prevailed: the Albanian forces could not go to the assistance of Bosnia because they were needed for the defense of Albania.!2 The Central Committee of the League began to be activated; Sheh

8M. Frashéri, op.cit., p. 29. | °Cf. Histori e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900. WT bid.

#2See tbid., p. 66. ,

“Tbid., pp. 65-66.

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS ov Mustafa ‘Tetova wired to the branch of Shkodér to delegate one of their members to the headquarters at Prizren.'® The League was rendering difficult the job of the Delimitation Commission for the Turkish-Montenegrin boundary. In order to avoid new international complications and give proof of willingness to carry out the obligations of the Berlin Treaty, the Porte sent to northern Albania one of its representatives at the Congress, Mehmed Ali Pasha. He was probably chosen because he had many friends among the Albanian notables of the north and was in favor of a conciliatory policy toward the great powers. His task was to quiet the Albanians and persuade the League to yield to the decisions of the Congress.14 Vasa Effendi (later Wassa Pasha), a Catholic Albanian

from Shkodér who held high positions in the Turkish administration, was invited to accompany him but refused. The Turkish marshal arrived at Prizren on August 25, 1878 and applied pressure on the Central Committee of the League to accept the Berlin decisions, but he was not successful. Agitation among the Albanians was mounting and hostility toward the emissaries of the Sultan was openly expressed. When

Mehmed Ali Pasha went to Gjakové, a delegation of the League visited him, on September 2, and invited him to leave the city, while the people outside were demonstrating against

his presence. On September 6 new outbreaks occurred and the marshal was killed, together with several ‘Turkish officers and approximately two companies of soldiers who were pro-

tecting him. Among the victims was Abdullah Pasha Dreni, a prominent leader of northern Albania who had been Mehmed Ali Pasha’s host.1® Referring to Abdullah Pasha’s death, 18Pons to Waddington, Scutari, 5 November 1878, No. 234, AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Scutari, 1878-1879, Vol. xXx1.

entry 1388, p. 290. !

4Cf. Historie e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 66; A. Novotny, op.cit., Tbid., entry 1394, p. 290.

16Tbid., entries 1434 and 1450, respectively on pp. 297, 300; Huestori e

Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, pp. 66-67. The murder of Mehmed Ali Pasha is

often placed in the month of August and on a date which even if

58 I, THE GROUNDWORK Vasa Effendi accurately conveyed the feelings of his compatriots at that time: “Suspected of having accepted the views

| of Mehmed Ali Pasha and of working to the detriment of national honor and dignity, he was the first to be killed by his

compatriots, and I think that any chief who would attempt to damage or modify the national sentiment would have the same fate as Abdullah Pasha and the others who perished together with Mehmed Ali.” 1%

The occurrences at Gjakové echoed throughout the whole of Albania and impressed the outside world. Attention was drawn to the problem of the relations between the Albanians and the Porte. ‘Ihe distinction became sharper between the moderates, who supported Turkey, and the true nationalists, who found in the spontaneous reaction of the people some basis for further demands to be presented to ‘Turkey. The Albanian ‘Turcomans were disturbed because the movement was going too far and ‘Turkey viewed with uneasiness the anti- Turkish manifestations taking place in the various towns of the Gegs.}8

The events of Gjakové apparently disturbed Montenego considered according to O. S., would not correspond to the correct one. Cf. L. Raschdau, ed., “Durchfihrung der Berliner Kongressakte (188081), aus dem literarischen Nachlass des Unterstaatssekretars Dr. Busch, Deutsche Rundschau, 147 (April-May-June 1911), 226, note 2; W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe, London, 1956, p. 73. From the correspondence of ambassador Zichy with his

Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, it comes out clearly that the exact date is 6 September 1878. In fact, Mehmed Ali Pasha’s last telegram from Gjakové to the Porte carried the date of 4 September (cf. A. Novotny, op.cit., entry 1450, p. 30).

"Text of memorandum in Zichy to Andrdassy, Constantinople, 22 October 1878, No. 82E, Geheim, HHStA, PA xvui/35, Montenegro Varia, Gusinje Frage 1879. In the national epic of the Albanians, Lahuta e Malcis (The Lute of the Mountains), by Gjergj Fishta, canto x 1s dedicated to Mehmed Ali Pasha’s murder, more in order to explain

the custom of hospitality, for he was Abdullah Pasha’s guest, than to describe the murder. For a German translation of the canto, see M. Lambertz, Die Laute des Hochlandes, Munich, 1958, pp. 66-73. 8Fistori e Shqipdrisé, 1839-1900, pp. 67-68.

| RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS o9 as well. Prince Nicholas in a note recommended action by the

Porte, first of all in Podgoricé and its surroundings, with a view to weakening the Albanian movement.!® The Montenegrin note was strongly supported by Russia and Germany. On November 25, 1878, Shuvalov, the Russian ambassador in London, told Salisbury that what prevented Russian evacuation of ‘Turkey outside Eastern Roumelia was the ‘Turkish

occupation of Podgoricé and Shpuzé, and that the Russian Ambassador in Istanbul had been instructed to propose to the Porte a simultaneous withdrawal. All the powers concurred in this proposal.?° But it was not easy for the Porte to deliver Podgoricé and

Shpuzé to Montenegro. It was greatly concerned about the situation in Shkodér, the Governor General of which had requested that the news about the appointment of Mazhar Pasha as delegate to the Turkish-Montenegrin Delimitation Commission be denied, lest his life be imperiled.*! At the same time the Porte did not have enough troops to decide the matter in favor of Montenegro; at one point it even made an offer of an indemnity in money.2? On December 29, Zichy informed Andrassy that the ‘Turkish Foreign Minister, Cara-

théodory Pasha, pleaded with him that Austria-Hungary intervene to prevent the Prince of Montenegro from employing force. The Porte was resolved to surrender Podgoricé, he stated, but at the same time wanted to avoid bloodshed, an Albanian revolt or perhaps a war which would jeopardize the whole work of the Berlin Congress.*? A day later Carathéodory Pasha communicated that the ‘Turkish Commissioners ~ were leaving for Shkodér in order to persuade the Albanians to yield.74 Yet it was not until the beginning of February MA, Novotny, op.cit., entry 1462, p. 301. | 20Cf. W. N. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After, London,

1938, pp. 162, 192, 221. , 21A. Novotny, op.cit., entry 1490, p. 306. 22Tbid., entries 1499 and 1587, respectively pp. 307 and 322. *3Tbid., entry 1759, Pp. 350.

4Tbid., entry 1761, p. 351.

60 I, THE GROUNDWORK

tenegro. | | |

1879 that Podgoricé and Shpuzé were surrendered to MonAs far as the cession of other territories was concerned, the

Ottoman Commissioners refused to do anything, on the grounds that these areas were occupied by Albanians. They declared, however, that they were ready to deliver to Montenegro those lands which were in the vilayet of Shkodér.?®

- Although the Delimitation Commission met at Cetinje on April 30, no progress was made with regard to Plavé and Gusinj, because of the attitude of the Ottomans. The Porte held that the frontier line of the Congress of Berlin was drawn without topographical knowledge of the region and that it was necessary, before the surrender was carried out, for another survey to be made on the spot. Its aim was to make the Delimitation Commission a direct witness to the Albanian

character of those two districts and to the Albanian fighters, whom Montenegro was not in a position to oppose.?® When the Commission resumed its work, the Albanian League notified it that any demarcation of the Montenegrin boundary could not be effected without its assent.27 By September 8 the Commission had defined the limits of Kudi-Kraina and Klemend, and had reached a point within sight of Gusinj—the whole frontier from the sea to Gusinj.?° Although professing its intention to fulfill the treaty obligations, the Porte pursued delaying tactics. It gave as a reason the need for time to handle the Albanians judiciously. The Prince of Montenegro had proposed that Plavé and Gusinj should be ceded to him on December 12; Gazi Muhtar Pasha, the ‘Turkish commander, was going to evacuate them on that day. At the last moment the Porte announced that, owing to the fear of Albanian resistance, the cession could not be carried out at the time stated, and that the Turkish troops might

Text in M. Frashéri, op.cit., p. 30. |

«*®Ibid.; W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 352. ,

27Protocol No. 23 of the Montenegrin boundary, 22 August 1879, in

| Sir E. Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty (1814-1891), London, 1891, Iv, 2895. 28W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 352.

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS 61

side with the Albanians if the Prince attempted to seize Gusinj.”° The Montenegrin government then mustered troops

on the frontiers of the Gusinj district in order to occupy it militarily. It placed them under the command of Vojvod Bozo

Petrovic. The Albanian League also gathered forces which were led by Ali Pasha Gucija,®° who had previously written to the Sultan: “Until this moment I had you in place of a father; but since you have separated me from you, yielding me to Montenegro, I have ceased to be yours any longer. .. . Therefore, now that you have abandoned me and you don’t have me with you any more, if you come to force me to submit to Montenegro, I will see myself as between two enemies who want to fight against me at any cost.” 3! Battles between the opposing parties took place, each one claiming victory. The result, however, was that Montenegro could not occupy Plavé and Gusinj.*? The Albanian bravery and patriotism demonstrated in the battlefield gave rise to many songs about the Albanian commander sung by the mountaineers of the

north.

In January 1880 the Porte suggested to Count Corti, the Italian representative, that the part of the district of Gusinj inhabited by Christians should be surrendered to Montenegro, together with an area comprising the district of Kuci-—

Kraina, and bounded by the river Zem and the mountain heights as far as the Gulf of Kastrat on the lake of Shkodér.*4

Corti seized the opportunity and proposed a compromise, which on April 12 was adopted by the interested parties *°Tbid., p. 353-

8°Cf. T. Ippen, “Beitrage zur inneren Geschichte Albaniens im xix. Jahrhundert,” Illyrisch-albanische Forschungen, 1, 372-373.

81See for complete text, G. Schird, Gli Albanesi e la questione balkanica, Naples, 1904, pp. 60-61. °T. Ippen. op.cit., pp. 372-373.

38Canto vill of G. Fishta’s The Lute of the Mountains is devoted to Ali Pasha Gucija. s4W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 353.

s5Protocol between Turkey and Montenegro consenting to the cession of certain portions of territory by the Sultan to the Prince of Montenegro, in lieu of the districts of Gusinja and Plava, Constantinople, 12 April 1880, in Sir E. Hertslet, op.cit., pp. 2952-2954.

62 I. THE GROUNDWORK and a week later by the great powers.*® In offering the compromise, Corti apparently desired to diminish Austrian influence in northern Albania by including a part of the Albanian

Catholics in Montenegro.37 But the Albanian League regarded it as no less unjust than the previous decision on Plavé and Gusinj and turned it down. For the League, the struggle was now on a national plane, and religious overtones were of less consequence. Catholic and Moslem leaders

went to Izet Pasha, the Governor General of Shkodér, and inquired of him whether the news which had been spread

| that the Porte had resolved to surrender Hot, Grudé, and other territories to Montenegro was true. The bajraktar of Hot had been entrusted to declare to the Governor General, in the event that he confirmed the news, that from that time on the tribes of those regions were freed from any allegiance _ to the Porte, as they would not consider themselves Ottoman subjects any longer, and that they would defend the mountains with their own weapons in order to win their independence.®® ‘The situation was becoming grave, and the great pow-

ers began to understand that the Albanian League possessed a vital force of its own and was not an artificial organization created by Turkey.®® On April 22, 1880, when the Turkish army withdrew from the territories, so that they could be occupied by the Montenegrins (Protocol of April 12), the forces of the League took possession of them. ‘The Albanians were 86Protocole relatif 4 la démarcation des frontiéres Turco-Monténégrines et Memorandum annexe, 18 April 1880, in G. Effendi Noradounghian, Recueil d’actes internationaux de lEmpire Ottoman, Paris, 1902, Iv, 260-262; also Sir E. Hertslet, op.cit., pp. 2955-2956. 8’Cf. M. Frashéri, op.cit., p. 31.

8French Livre Jaune, April 1880, No. 62, pp. 82-89, as quoted in ibid., p. 32. See also Le Rée to Freycinet, Scutari, 8 April 1880, No. 36 and g April 1880, No. 37, in AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Scutari, 1880-1883, Vol. xx11.

8°Cf. Le Rée to Freycinet, Scutari, 17 April 1880, No. 39, dépéche télégraphique, 21 April 1880, as well as reports: 25 April 1880, No. 40; 27 April 1880, No. 41; 20 May 1880, No. 44 (together with the Albanian memorandum from Shkodér, dated 6-18 May 1880—all in ibid.

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS 63

prepared for the clash, but the Montenegrins avoided it.* The “Corti Compromise” was abrogated, and Hot and Grudé were left within the Ottoman empire. In fact, all real progress on the Turkish-Montenegrin frontier question was delayed until the accession to office of the new Gladstone government. The new cabinet gave fresh impetus to the treaty negotiations and made possible the powers’ united pressure upon the Porte. By this time Gladstone had taken an interest in Albania. During the summer he had been studying Albanesische Studien (1853-54) of J. G. von

Hahn, the former Austrian consul in Janina, and felt that Albania had a “‘special title to have its case put forward in return for good behavior.”’ *

Just before the Conference of Ambassadors in Berlin, in the latter half of June, 1880, a new plan, with greater prospect of success, originated in discussions between the British Consul General, Green, and his Austro-Hungarian counter_ part, Lippich, in Shkodér. It involved the cession to Montenegro of territory to the west of the lake of Shkodér, so as to include Dulcigno and the seacoast as far as the mouth of the Buené (Bojana) river.*? ‘The plan had been mentioned to some north Albanian leaders, who had intimated that they would not be reluctant to agree to it if the powers would guarantee to them some form of local self-government.* Green and Lippich thought that this should be restricted at the outset to the vilayet of Shkodeér. ‘They were of the opinion

that the Governor General should be an Albanian Moslem, to be chosen, if possible, in the vilayet; the Governor, on the 40Le Rée to Freycinet, annexe a la dépéche du 6 May 1880, No. 42,

in ibid., T. Ippen, op.cit., pp. 373-374. | | 41W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladsione, and the Concert of Europe,

P- 77:

“Granville to Goschen, Foreign Office, 2 October 1880, in Sir E. Hertslet, op.czt., p. 2999.

483A year before, Lippich had reported to his government on the desire of Catholic highlanders for extensive autonomy (Lippich to Andrassy, Scutari, 29 March 1879, No. 27, HHStA, PA x11/256, Tiirkei Iv).

| 64 I. THE GROUNDWORK | other hand, should be a Roman Catholic. A Christian kaymakam (sub-prefect) of the Roman Catholic tribes of the Malésia e Madhe (Great Mountains), north of Shkodér, should

be appointed to reside in Tuz. The proposed form of administration was to be submitted for consideration to the north-

ern Albanians.* | The Dulcigno arrangements were accepted by the great

powers. The Prince of Montenegro, after some hesitation, gave his assent also; he objected only to the local self-govern-

ment of Albania. A note on the Dulcigno proposal was addressed to the Porte. The Turks would have to surrender Moslem Albanians now instead of Roman Catholics; they would lose what they called the port of Albania and would

able.*® |

see the strategic safety of Shkodér menaced. For all these reasons they considered the “Corti Compromise” less objection-

The powers were compelled, therefore, to examine plans for some demonstration of force. Gladstone was firm in pursuing such a policy. He also thought to use Albania as a means

of pressure on the Sultan, whom he considered a master of procrastination. On June 30 he suggested that Granville send to the British ambassador in Istanbul, Goschen, a telegram to let the Turkish government know that ‘we have our eyes upon the desires of Albania for self-government, which are so strong that they have even found expression to us in unusual forms.” *® Busch, Germany’s Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, noted in his diary that the British consuls had been ordered to let the Albanians know that, if they remained quiet, England would act in favor of Albanian autonomy.*7 When the possibility of a naval demonstration on the part of the powers leaked out, the ‘Turks were preparing plans to meet the new situation. They relied on the difficulties of “Granville to Goschen, Foreign Office, 2 October 1880, in Sir E.

Hertslet, op.cit., pp. 2999-3001. | *®W.N. Medlicott, op.cit., pp. 136-137.

“From the Gladstone Papers, as quoted in ibid., p. 139. *"L. Raschdau, ed., op.cit., p. 236.

| | RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS 65 the Albanian problem. The Sultan Abdul Hamid asked Hobart Pasha, his admiral of the fleet—obviously jokingly— whether any ships had been designed that could climb mountains, as such ships alone would avail against the Albanians.‘

The project of the transfer of Dulcigno to Montenegro brought about a split in the Albanian League. The moderate elements were of the opinion that any further opposition to the great powers would be futile. The extremists from Shko-

dér, however, turned down the proposal and decided not to yield without war.*® ‘To the ambassadors at the Conference of Berlin they protested against the enlargement of Montenegro at Albanian expense and pointed out that Dulcigno, controlled by Montenegro, would be an advance seaport of Russia and would serve as springboard for new annexations.®°

Under the command of Jusuf Aga Sokoli they immediately occupied the hills above Dulcigno and prepared trenches for battle.* The great powers deemed it wise to be patient and persuade the Porte to surrender the territories by itself. ‘They addressed

to it three notes, the last (August 3, 1880) worded harshly.” On August 27, 1880 the French ambassador at Istanbul, Tissot, informed his government that the conduct of the Albanians was such that the Porte had no confidence in itself and was not in a position to promise a territorial cession which was opposed by the Albanian League. Nor was the Porte willing to employ force against the League.® In the meantime the powers had completed their arrangements for the naval demonstration, and their combined fleets were assembled at Ragusa (Dubrovnik), under the command of Vice-Admiral B. Seymour.54 When the Dulcignots heard about the naval demonstration, they addressed a protest to the great powers: 48W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 144.

*9Cf. T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 374. | 50See text in M. Frashéri, op.cit., p. 33. , Cf. T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 374.

2W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., pp. 144-145. *8See text in M. Frashéri, op.ctt., p. 34. SW. N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 149.

66 I. THE GROUNDWORK With great sorrow we learned that within some days the fleets of the European powers will arrive in our waters in order to force us to leave the beloved city in the hands of the Montenegrins. We the inhabitants of Dulcigno, who for centuries have been under the rule and protection of the Ottoman state, cannot adapt our customs, language, and religion to those of Montenegro which are completely different from ours _ and perhaps contrary. For this reason we have decided to repulse every attack which might come from Montenegro and we prefer to see the disappearance of our city and ourselves than to obey Montenegro.” °®

On September 28 the allied fleet appeared off Dulcigno. Before inviting the Prince of Montenegro to occupy the port, Vice-Admiral B. Seymour had drawn up the plan of the demonstration and eventual occupation,®* while the great powers had presented a note to the Turkish government “protesting unanimously against the resistance to their legitimate demands” and holding it responsible for the consequences.*" But a gesture from the ‘Turks brought about a standstill. Riza Pasha, the commander who had been sent to Shkodér in August in order to deliver Dulcigno to the Montenegrins, apparently under Albanian pressure,°® announced that if the Montenegrins entered the city he would attack them.5® The Text in Albanian in M. Frashéri, op.cit., p. 34. *6Vice-Admiral Sir B. Seymour to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 25 September 1880, and 27 September 1880, in A and P, 1881, Vol. c,

No. 124. ,

Turkey, No. 2 (1881), Enclosure 1 in No. 129, and Enclosure 2 in *7Goschen to Granville, 27 September 1880, in tbid., No. 125.

*8See Le Rée to his Ministry, dépéche télégraphique, Scutari, 7 September 1880, Albanian memorandum as annexe to 18 September 1880, No. 52, and again dépéche télégraphique on 29 September 1880 and 11 October 1880, in op.cit. Le Rée, however, does not exclude Turkish instigation.

Cf. W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 154.

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS 67 Russian press then assailed Albania as “the cradle of the future anti-Slav power.” © The failure of the naval demonstration upset Gladstone and a cabinet meeting was summoned for the end of September. In the process of preparing the demonstration, he had been considering certain possibilities in connection with it for consultation with the other powers. In a telegram to Granville, he mentioned one of these: “In the last resort to offer

Albania to the Kalamas (where the country inhabited by Greeks begins) its formal or practical independence.” ** When

the cabinet met on September 30, however, it decided that, if the Porte did not take steps to compel its subjects to yield, the occupation of Smyrna by the allied fleet should be proposed to the powers—and this decision was transmitted. Upon the news of this proposal the Porte stated that it was determined to surrender Dulcigno at once. It sent Dervish Turgut (Dorgut) Pasha with reinforcements to Shkodér, where he arrived at the beginning of November. He took over the command of the troops from Riza Pasha, and announced to the businessmen of Shkodér and to the mountain chieftains that Dulcigno must be given up. Other discussions ensued, the Albanians striving to postpone the surrender indefinitely by employing delaying tactics.6* The inhabitants of Dulcigno, however, took a resolute stand. ‘They sent to the consuls of the great powers in Shkodér a telegram in which they made clear that they would oppose by arms any occupation of their city, even Turkish: “. .. we have all decided without distinction of religion ... to oppose, to resist with arms in the hands, the occupation of our territory by whatsoever armed force, whether Moslem or any other, and we would 6°Pluncket to Granville, 6 October 1880, in op.cit., No. 222. 61Gladstone Papers, as cited by W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 158. 62Granville to Her Majesty’s Embassies at St. Petersburg, Paris, Rome,

Vienna, and Berlin, 4 October 1880, in op.cit., No. 182. There follow several letters as to the reactions of the various governments to the

British proposal. , S8W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., pp. 162-168.

68 I. THE GROUNDWORK hold completely responsible for the fatal events which could occur, the government of the vilayet of Shkodér.’’** When on November 22 Dervish Pasha, with 10,000 regular troops under his command, marched toward Dulcigno to execute his plan, the Albanians opened fire on the Turkish soldiers near the Lake of Sas and numerous casualties were incurred.© The Turks fired back and dispersed the Albanians. It was the prelude to the Albanian-Turkish conflicts which were to follow. Dervish Pasha advanced to Dulcigno and by the end of November the whole of the district, with one exception which was settled later, was in the possession of the Montenegrins.®

Turkey had pledged that during the cession of the district “The Ottoman troops should disperse all gatherings of armed Albanians who would disturb the order and oppose the march

of the Montenegrin troops.’’*’ Dervish Turgut Pasha then _ exiled both leaders of the Shkodér branch of the Albanian League, Hodo Pasha and Prenk Bib Doda, and arrested many

notables of Shkodér and chiefs of the mountaineers.® Although with the surrender of the Dulcigno district the Montenegrin question ceased to interest Europe, the frontier continued to be discussed between Turkey and Montenegro for many years.®

While the northern branch of the Albanian League was ®4See text of the telegram in French (Dulcigno, 12/24 October 1296 [1880]), as annexe to dépéche of Le Rée to Saint-Hilaire, Scutari, 29 October 1880, in op.cit. S°See annexe to dépéche of Le Rée to Saint-Hilaire, Scutari, 19 No-

vember 1880, No. 56, and dépéches, 24 November 1880 and again 24 November 1880, in zbid. “SCf. W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., pp. 162-168. For a thorough treatment

of the Dulcigno affair, with regard to the great powers among themselves and with Turkey, based on British sources, see ibid., pp. 135-169. ““Article 7 of Acte de cession du district de Dulcigno au Monténégro, 25 November 1880, in G. Effendi Noradounghian, op.cit., Iv, 282. S8Le Rée to his Ministry, dépéche, Scutari, 13 December 1880, and Le Rée to Saint-Hilaire, 23 December 1880, No. 57, in op.cit. S°See various agreements in Sir E. Hertslet, op.cit., August-September 1883 (Iv, No. 6030), December 1884 (iv, No. 605), and July 1887 (rv, No. 621).

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS 69 resisting Montenegrin encroachments, the southern branch was occupied with the problem of the Greek frontiers. Greece was not less anxious than Montenegro to begin negotiations about the boundaries as decided upon by the Berlin treaty. Greece invited Turkey to a meeting for that purpose, only four days after the termination of the work of the Congress. The Porte did not answer the Greek note; instead it wrote a memorandum refuting Deliyannis’s arguments at the Berlin Congress. The French government then took up the matter in its circular of October 21, 1878 proposing that the powers should call on Turkey to abide by the principle of the rectification of the Greek frontier and appoint commissioners to meet those of Greece.7? Late in December the Porte finally made up its mind to send as its commissioners Gazi Muhtar Pasha, Commander-in-Chief of the troops in Epirus, Vahan Effendi, adviser to the Ministry of Justice, and Abeddin Bey Dino, an Albanian from Epirus, who was the Commissar of

Brusa in Istanbul. Their duty was to see that a frontier line be drawn which could be easily defended by ‘Turkey.” The Greeks appointed, for their part, General Skarlatos Soutzos and artillery major Panos Colocotronis, as well as George Zinopoulos, who was Secretary General of the Ministry of Justice.** After some misunderstanding about the location of the meeting, the representatives of both states finally met in _ Preveza on February 5, 1879." Meanwhile the southern branch of the League had begun to move. Gatherings of leaders took place in Janina to conCf. W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 202; M. Frashéri, op.cit., pp. 37-40. "[bid., p. 41; Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 3 January 1879, No. 176, AMAE, ‘Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Janina, 1879-1900, Vol. x.

@A, Novotny, op.cit., entries 1740 and 1743, p. 347.

S$. T. Lascaris, La politique extértieure de la Gréce, avant et apres le Congres de Berlin 1875-1881), Paris, 1924, p. 156.

“Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 31 January 1879, No. 180, op.cit. See the strange story about the confusion of the meeting place, as reported in a circular to the Greek legations by Deliyannis, in S. T.

Lascaris, op.cit., p. 157. ,

10 I. THE GROUNDWORK sider the danger threatening Epirus. They wired from that city to Muhtar Pasha that they were ready to sacrifice everything, their lives and property, in order to defend Albanian territory.”5 On the other hand, they dispatched two of their

members, Mehmed Effendi Kalaja and Shejh Hutbi, to Frashér, the headquarters of Abdul Frashéri, where a large meeting was to be held.”* Most active, however, was the Com-

mittee of the League at Preveza, where Abeddin Bey Dino was a very influential leader. Numerous Albanian leaders were heading for this city, coming from all parts of Epirus, “some with a mandate from their clan, others without any mandate, but speaking loudly in the name of Albania as a whole,” in order to provide Muhtar Pasha and his colleagues with conclusive arguments that they would not cede to Greece

even an inch of Epirus. At the same time Muhtar Pasha was | spreading rumors that the great powers had modified their | viewpoint as to the extension of the territory which Turkey should yield to Greece; it was a question only of a pure and simple border rectification—insignificant cessions in Thessaly.77

Preveza was full of Albanian pashas, beys, and agas. Abdul Frashéri, too, had gone there.*8 In the house of Abeddin Bey Dino and in that of Vesel Bey Dino, another prominent Albanian in Preveza, numerous gatherings were held. On January 11, 1879 the Albanian leaders, after examining the situation, decided: To address the powers represented at the Congress of Berlin expressing the refusal of the Albanians to surrender Epirus to Greece; while the Albanians would not pose any difficulties to the cession of a part of Thessaly, they would

oppose to the utmost the annexation of Epirus; if no agreement could be reached on the frontier question, fully armed Albanians would be mustered and maintained at the expense Text of the telegram is as annexe to Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 17 January 1879, No. 178, in op.cit. ®M. Frashéri, op.cit., p. 38. “Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 10 January 1879, No. 177, in op.cit.

“Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 31 January 1879, No. 180, and 7 February 1879, No. 181, in op.cit.

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS 71

of the League; in this event the most important depots of weapons, powder, and supplies would be strengthened, and this should not be difficult, since Albanians and Turkish soldiers would fraternize; also the fortresses of Arta and Preveza had to be better fortified and hidden quarters had to be prepared for the Albanian chiefs in Preveza.” It is evident that all these resolutions aimed at armed resistance on the part of the Albanian League. A force of 30,000 men was said to have been ready in southern Albania to oppose any Greek advance, while other support was promised from the north.®°

The Greek authorities were right when, referring to the delay of the first Preveza meeting of the Turkish and their own commissioners, they maintained that it was employed by

Abeddin Bey to call Albanian leaders to Preveza and make

them sign petitions against the annexation of Epirus to - Greece.*! They omitted to add, however, that the Preveza meeting dominated all other interests and had almost exclusively absorbed the minds of the Albanians of Epirus.®? ‘The

French consul in Janina wrote that the sentiments of the Albanians toward the territorial questions were to resist any concessions, and that circumspection and ability to handle the battalions recruited in the vilayet of Janina were required, for they had been penetrated by the same sentiments. It was even believed that, in the event the Porte gave in and ordered the evacuation of territories allotted to Greece, the soldiers of the Albanian battalions would not obey the commands. In secret, men had already been chosen to replace the Turkish officers.** On the other hand, the appointment of an influential Albanian, Abeddin Bey Dino, as an Ottoman commis“Gsiller to Andrassy, Corfu, 20 January 1879, Bericht No. 2, HHSiA, PA xv11/35, Montenegro, albanische Liga.

— 80Cf. M. Frashéri, op.cit., p. 29; Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 15 February 1881, No. 10E, HHStA, PA x11/263, ‘Tirkei vim B.

81See Report on the Turkish-Greek Frontier Negotiations in 1879, ACS, Carte Crispi, Memorie manuscritte sulla situazione nei Balcani, 5 April 1878-1879; S. T. Lascaris, op.cit., p. 156. 82Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 10 January 1879, No. 177, op.cit. 883Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 17 January 1879, No. 178, tbid.

72 I. THE GROUNDWORK sioner and his free movement at Preveza are indicative of the support given by the Porte to the Albanian League. Most of the discussions held at Preveza by the commission-

ers of Greece and Turkey hinged on the validity of Protocol No. 13 of the Congress of Berlin, closely connected with Waddington’s proposal (article 24 of the Treaty of Berlin). The Turks held that the protocol was subordinated to the agreement of the two parties and contained no obligation for Turkey toward Greece. They further stated that the Porte, on account of inconveniences which would result from a dismemberment of Albania, could not but regard the boundaries of Protocol No. 13 as inadmissible: the sentiments which an1mated the populations of the country, of which they became aware upon their very arrival at Preveza, allowed them to affirm that a rectification of boundaries, drawn in the conditions indicated by Waddington, would open an era of conflicts in the provinces claimed by Greece.* Finally, at the sitting of March 18, 1879, the Ottoman commissioners offered to Greece a narrow strip of land parallel with the existing frontier, giving as a reason for the Kalamas line the extreme excitement reigning in Albania. ‘The Greeks rejected the offer and the negotiations were broken off.® The Greek frontier was of great concern to the southern branch of the League. When the French consular representative, Formier, went to Preveza, the chiefs of the League paid him a visit. ‘They declared to him that he could write Waddington that the Albanians were deternmiined not to yield to Greece even a piece of the territory of Epirus and would oppose by force of arms any decision of the commissioners relating to Epirus.8® After the rupture of the Greek-Turkish negotiations, the League chose Abdul Frashéri and Mehmed 848. T. Lascaris, op.cit., p. 158. 8°See the five protocols of the conferences between the commissioners

of Greece and Turkey, in Sir E. Hertslet, op.cit., pp. 2852-2853; S. T. Lascaris, op.cit., pp. 159-160; W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 77.

Confidential letter of the French consular agent in Preveza (23 January 1879), Bosio, included in Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 31 January 1879, No. 180, op.cit. —

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS 73 Vrioni, another former deputy and a member of the leading family of Berat, as its delegates for the defense of the terri-

torial integrity of Albania before the governments of the great powers. Prior to their departure for the European capi-

tals, the delegates visited their consuls in Janina. Abdul Frashéri’s declarations to the French consul Moreau, whom he asked for a letter of introduction to Waddington, are significant. Frashéri told Moreau that it was doubtful that the delegation would be admitted by the French government, as they could not be introduced by the head of the Ottoman diplomatic representation, inasmuch as the Albanians had stated that their attitude would be hostile if the Porte consented to a territorial concession to Greece in Epirus. Moreover, under the existing conditions, they would be refused admission with the pretext of international forms and customs, although the reception accorded at that time to Greek, Bulgarian, and Armenian delegations had created a precedent. As the French consul could not give the requested letter of introduction for his Minister, because it would seem as if he were encouraging the Albanians, Abdul Frashéri, who was well aware of the consul’s difficult position, answered that he knew that they would be isolated in Paris: “Mats ayant accepté une mission qué nous savions d’avance étre trés ardue sous tous les rapports, nous sommes tenus @honneur a la remplir. Nous trons donc a4 Paris... nous frapperons a toutes les portes sans nous décourager.” ®” ‘The delegation that went

to Europe delivered to the cabinets of the great powers a memorandum in which they complained that from the day of Greek independence hellenism had been trying to prepare the ways and means for the conquest of Epirus.** ‘They main87Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 26 March 1879, No. 184, tbid. 88It is significant to note, in this connection, that the correspondent of the Times (London) at Athens had reported a few months back that

the avowed reasons given by the Greeks for the annexation of Janina were not the real motives which prompted them to insist with such firmness on it: “The object they [the Greeks] have in view is the hellenization of Albania. The whole of the southern portion carries its commerce through Janina, and the inhabitants regard this town as their

74 I. THE GROUNDWORK | tained that Epirus was of vital importance to the southern part of their country because of the ports (Preveza, Arta, Gumenicé, Parga) and the pasture lands for the cattle in the winter season. To yield to Greece the territories she claimed would be to fail in the desire every people has to defend its own country and nationality. The Albanian people, composed of two million and three hundred thousand souls,®® the memorandum continued, were united against the covetousness of their neighbors and the dangers which threatened them. They

would defend with all their power, under the protective authority of the Ottoman Empire, their fatherland, nationality and language. The memorandum concluded that the Albanians had sworn to perish rather than surrender to Greece the territories of Preveza, Arta, Janina, and other districts of Albania.°° The attempt of the Christians of Janina who were advised by Athens to counteract the activity of the Albanian delegation failed, because the vali of Janina menaced the two persons who had been elected—Manaris and Hachiottis— and obliged them to give up their trip to Europe.*! The negotiations between Turkey and Greece were resumed on August 23, 1879 in Istanbul under the mediation of the ambassadors of the great powers, but the Turks again insisted that Protocol No. 13 was not binding. Proposals and counterproposals were made until November 17 when the Greeks proposed a frontier line following the extreme northcapital. ‘hey fraternize easily with the Greeks. ... As yet, their aspira-

tions to form a distinct nationality are thought to be weak and illdefined, so that the Greeks hope with the possession of Janina to amalgamate the two races and gain over to the cause of hellenism the finest and most warlike race in South-Eastern Europe.” Cf. The Times (London), 31 January 1879.

The Albanian population here is higher because the territorial cessions had not yet been made to Montenegro and Greece.

See French text in Hylli 1 Drités (The Star of Light), Shkodér, 11 (October 1922), 476-481; also in Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 June 1879. Cf. declaration in G. Schiro, op.cit., pp. 58-59. **Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 18 April 1879, No. 187, AMAE,

op.cit. |

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS 75 ern watershed of the valleys of Kalamas and Salambria, which would have given them Janina and Metzovo. ‘The Turks of-

fered an alternative line running much to the south of the two towns.®? Since no agreement could be reached, Greece referred the question to the arbitration of the powers. Eng-

land and France did not like the proposed Greek line, although they could not agree on an alternative. Waddington thought that the line in Epirus should run along the southern limit of the basin of Kalamas, while Salisbury objected to it because it gave Greece considerably more than the area suggested at Berlin, and “did not entirely escape from the Albanian difficulty.” 9% Further negotiations to bring about an understanding failed. When the ambassadors of the great powers were about to convene in Istanbul, the Albanians of Janina, with the counsel of their compatriots in the Ottoman capital, chose two of

their members to represent them during the negotiations regarding the demarcation line between Greece and ‘Turkey. The two representatives were Mustafa Bey and Kamil Effendi,

the first a deputy in the last parliament of Turkey and the second a very influential notable of Janina. On the basis of similar instructions to the sandjak of Preveza, Vesel Bey Dino,

brother of Abeddin Dino, and Kadi Hasan Effendi were elected as representatives for the negotiations in Istanbul. In the meantime Greek guerrillas had attacked ‘Turkish soldiers in Thessaly, while others were in Agrapha.® The Greek band that landed in Himaré failed to attain its aim.*%® Turkey was compelled to transfer some battalions from northern Albania to Epirus.®*’

- The fall of the government of Lord Beaconsfield and the *2See the various protocols, including that of 17 November 1879, in Sir E. Hertslet, op.cit., pp. 2941-2943. ®Cf. W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 78.

**Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 27 June 1879, No. 196, and 15 August 1879, No. 204, in op.cit. _ ®Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 16 May 1879, No. 192, tbid. Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 27 June 1879, No. 196, ibid. *7Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 11 July 1879, SP No. 108, ibid.

76 I. THE GROUNDWORK advent to power of the liberals in England had repercussions in southern Albania. The spirits of the Grecophiles were reanimated, while the Albanians were apprehensive of the Christian pietism of Gladstone and the ardent philhellenism of Sir Charles Dilke, the new undersecretary for Foreign Affairs. The Albanians feared that in the International Commission

| for the rectification of the boundaries the British would support the Greek claims. The Albanian leaders of Gaméri then wired the Sultan as follows: “. .. It has been proposed for some time that Preveza, Arta and Janina with its environs, our dear fatherland, be annexed to Greece. It is impossible for us to be detached alive from our sacred country and our great Ottoman caliphate; we are prepared, therefore, for all sacrifices in order to safeguard these two great goods, and we appeal, once for all, to your kindness and magnanimity.”’ This

telegram formulated the resolutions of the Gams to pursue eventually the example given by the Albanians of Plavé and Gusinj in the north.*8 Significant at this time, for the relations between north and

south, is the appearance in Janina of two delegates of the northern branch of the Albanian League. They were from Shkodér and they had come to collect the contribution in money to which the Albanians of Epirus had subscribed as a subsidy for the needs of the Albanians fighting against Montenegro.*® ‘The Geg delegates went also to other important towns of Epirus and were received warmly everywhere, although it does not seem that they were very successful in their

collection.1© |

In June 1880 the Greek frontier question was presented to the Conference of Ambassadors in Berlin which was to discuss the Montenegrin-Turkish boundary line. The Conference received memoranda from Berat, Vloré, Gjrokastér, Margarit, Janina, Preveza—ain other words, from the whole of See Moreau to Freycinet, Janina, 7 May 1880, No. 241, ibid. The

to this report. | ,

telegram of the Gams (Chamuriots)—a French translation—is as annexe *°Moreau to Freycinet, Janina, 21 May 1880, No. 243, ibid. 1°Moreau to Freycinet, Janina, 4 June 1880, No. 244, ibid.

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS 17 Epirus of that time 1°! —requesting it to draw the boundary in such a way as not to cede Albanian territory to Greece.!” In collective notes, the following month (July 15) the new

demarcation line was communicated to the Turkish and Greek governments.1® It did not agree either with the ‘Turkish proposal or with the Greek, but it was nearer to the latter: it accorded Greece half of Gaméri. ‘The Greeks accepted it

promptly, but the Turks rejected it. ‘The ‘Turkish Foreign Minister, Abeddin Pasha (the former Abeddin Bey Dino), having stated in his reply that the Porte did not expect a wish of the powers to receive the form of a proposal, took up the Albanian difficulties: How would it be possible to consent to the cession of Janina which the Albanians (who think of themselves, like the other nationalities of the Empire, as a separate race and not less interesting) have always considered

as the capital of southern Albania? If the Porte sacrificed such an important city, it would create complications which would jeopardize the peaceful exercise of its authority in this part of European Turkey. It would not be possible either for Turkey to dispossess the Albanians in certain other places belonging to their race, and especially in Gaméri,1 inhabited exclusively by Albanians whose majority profess the Moslem faith. The Turkish note concluded by saying that what indicated that the political side of the rectification of the frontier deserved special consideration was the fact that Waddington himself did not hesitate later to exclude from the territory to be surrendered to Greece both Janina and Gaméri, undoubtedly because he considered the complications which might arise from the well-known resistance of the Albanians.?% ‘The Greeks, however, believed that the change in Waddington’s 101The province of Epirus comprised then four sandjaks: Berat, Gjirokastér, Janina, and Preveza; see Wiet to Freycinet, Janina, 14

August 1880, No. 2, ibid. | 102°T’, Ippen, op.cit., p. 375.

108See text of Collective Note in A and P, 1880, Vol. 81, ‘Turkey, No.

13 (1880), Enclosure 1.

104A beddin Pasha himself was from Gaméri. 105A nswer of the Porte to the Collective Note, 26 July 1880, A and P, 1880, Vol. Lxxx1, Turkey, No. 13 (1880), Enclosure 4.

78 I. THE GROUNDWORK | attitude was due to his hope of flattering Beaconsfield’s. turcophilism and the Albanophile inclinations of Depretis, the

Italian Prime Minister.’ One would not expect Abeddin Pasha, an Albanian by birth who had played such an important role in organizing Albanian demonstrations at the conferences of Preveza, to favor the idea of territorial cessions to Greece or Montenegro. Perhaps this was one of the reasons the Sultan chose him as his Minister of Foreign Affairs, although Dino himself held

that his appointment was due to the Sultan’s desire to conciliate the British.1°? There were also rumors that the ‘Turkish note itself was dictated by Albanians, whose influence both in

Epirus and in Istanbul was predominant.’ Shortly before the ‘Turkish reply to the collective note was

handed in, the southern branch of the League held a large gathering in Gjirokastér (July 23, 1880), which had now become its center,!° attended by Moslem and Christian leaders from all over Albania.1?° ‘he League made decisions on many

important questions,’4! among which was the opposition to the dismemberment of Epirus, even if Janina and Metzovo were to remain in Turkey. As to Thessaly, they did not commit themselves seriously, stating only that they would go to the assistance of ‘Turkey, if the Greeks crossed the frontier.1” It was further decided that the fortifications of Preveza, Larissa, and Metzovo be improved, and specific sums were allocated for the purpose.'#? At the end of July at a meeting in Kusereci, south of Berat, some seventy-two Bektashi babas 106S. IT’. Lascaris, op.cit., p. 169. 107Cf. W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 94.

10°Rémy-Berczencovich to Haymerle, Janina, 13 August 1880, Bericht

No. 9/P, Geheim, HHSiA, PA xvit/3, Montenegro-albanesische Liga. °Wiet to Freycinet, Janina, 5 August 1880, No. 1, op.cit. 110Wiet to Freycinet, Janina, 14 August 1880, No. 2, ibid.; Histori e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 85.

111See next chapter for resolutions on Albanian autonomy. z2Wiet to Freycinet, Janina, 14 August 1880, No. 2, op.cit. 118Dembicki to Rémy-Berczencovich, Preveza, 7 August 1880, HHStA, PA xvu1/35, Montenegro-albanesische Liga.

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS 79 had participated and had affirmed energetically their will to resist with arms the entrance of foreign troops. These babas had a great influence on almost the whole Moslem population in Epirus.1* Another meeting followed in Frashér.1® _ Under these circumstances, the Governor General of Janina was in favor of arming the Albanians, but the Commander-inChief there was opposed to it, because he was afraid that the weapons would later be turned against the Sultan. For this reason the Commander-in-Chief was disliked by Abdul Frashéri and other influential Albanian leaders. Abeddin Dino, however, had appointed his own men as governors in the various centers. In Preveza he had appointed his brother-inlaw, Kazim Bey, who told the French consul in Janina that the Albanians would not oppose the surrender of Thessaly, but were resolved to defend with arms the integrity of Epirus; if the Sultan were to give in, Albania would be separated

from the Ottoman empire and would ask for a European prince; it was in the interest of both Albania and Greece to

live in agreement.11¢ | Although the League continued to persist in its decision to

punish severely every misdeed and crime perpetrated against the noncombatants in the event of a war, its members disagreed as to action. There was the party headed by Abdul Frashéri, which favored action, and the moderate party of the feudal beys, which was hesitant about it. Abdul tried to inculcate among the Tosks those ideas of insubordination to the

Ottoman authorities which were prevalent in the north. It was natural that these authorities should fight his influence. His relationship with the moderate party also had its ups and downs.#!7 When a rumor was diffused from a Greek source that the powers, especially England, had accorded territory in Epirus to Greece, and that armies from Istanbul were dis14Wiet to Freycinet, 14 August 1880, No. 2, op.cit. 15Wiet to Freycinet, Janina, 19 August 1889, No. 3, ibid. 116Wiet to Freycinet, Janina, 25 August 1880, No. 4, ibid.

“MWiet to Freycinet, Janina, 11 September 1880, No. 7, and 18 September 1880, No. 8, zbzd.

80 I. THE GROUNDWORK patched to carry out the surrender, the Albanian agitation grew. Forces were concentrated in the sandjak of Berat.*"® Greece, on the other hand, was endeavoring to foment insurrection in Epirus. A Greek boat had unloaded arms and am-

munition in places between Gumenicé (Igoumenitsa) and Murto, opposite Corfu.1!® There was no doubt that if resistance were to be put up Abdul Frashéri would play the principal role. He had not fulfilled the promise to go to Istanbul, where he had been invited; he continued to reside in Frashér and had come to terms with the moderate party, which was

still strong. The French consular representative in Janina summed up the situation in southern Albania thus: in order to avoid expenses, the Albanians had retreated to their homes; every hostile demonstration against Greece was to be avoided; but, at the first danger, the authority of the Governor General

was to be ignored, if it went contrary to the views of the Albanians, and the party of action would assume the leadership.12°

Meanwhile the Albanians were completing the preparations for an eventual mobilization. A list of the forces which the League of the vilayet of Janina could muster—prepared by the French consulate of that city—gives the names of the

chiefs, together with their respective approximate forces. They amounted in all to 72,000 men. All the chiefs were Moslem. The agreement was that the Christian leaders would not

go to war but would contribute money. Three were mentioned by name: Petro Meksi from Gjirokastér, Dhimitri Harito from Tepelené, and Lazaraki Luivano from Pérmet.!*1 On October 31 a general gathering of Albanian leaders was ™8Tbid.; Dembicki to Rémy-Berczencovich, Preveza, 7 August 1880,

HHStA, PA xvui/35, Montenegro-albanesische Liga; T. Ippen, op.cit., P- 375:

“9Wiet to Freycinet, Janina, 18 September 1880, No. 8, op.cit. °Wiet to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Janina, 28 September, 1880, No. 9, ibid.

“1Wiet to Saint-Hilaire, Janina, 15 October 1880, No. 11 and 22 October 1880, No. 12, ibid.

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS 81 held in the main mosque in Janina; it was resolved that they should be ready to defend their land against Greek aggression.?*? By then the whole of Epirus was in the hands of the Albanians, who had also received assurances from the Committee of the League at Shkodér of assistance, as soon as the Greeks crossed the frontier.122 Compared to that of the Albanian League the sovereignty of the Porte was weak. It was doubted whether the Porte alone could surrender Arta and

Preveza.1*4 oe

However, Europe had been too much involved in the Greco-Turkish frontier to abandon it. The initiative fell upon the French, who had made it their special concern. Arbitration was proposed by them, but Turkey turned it down, calling on the powers to negotiate directly with her. A second Conference of the Ambassadors was convened in Istanbul. On February 21, 1881 the Conference requested the Porte to set forth its proposals. After the usual delays, the Turkish delegates met with the ambassadors and proposed their line of demarcation, which excluded Janina, Metzovo, and Preveza, on the familiar ground of the difficulty in surrendering Albanian districts.1°> A proposal to exchange Epirus for Crete was suggested by Bismarck and became known as “‘the policy of compensation.” #26 Russia supported it energetically, apparently because she desired to push Greece away

from the continent and make her more insular, that is, less dangerous for Slavic interests.12” ‘The proposal failed.

The Turks feared a Greek offensive. In addition to their regular army, they now had four battalions of reserves from —-2Wiet to Saint-Hilaire, Janina, 5 November 1880, No. 14, ibid. 28Wiet to Saint-Hilaire, Janina, 5 December 1880, No. 19, 1bid. 1247, Raschdau, ed., op.cit., p. 241. 125For a detailed account of the Greco-Turkish frontier question during 1880-1881, as connected with the great powers, see W. N. Medlicott, Op.cit., pp. 190-240.

126A. D. Elliot, The Life of G. J. Goschen, First Viscount Goschen, 1831-1907, London, 1911, I, 214. 127Cf. L. Raschdau, ed., op.cit., p. 244.

82 I. THE GROUNDWORK Elbasan and six others from the contingent of Albania, while another battalion arrived from Shkodér.??® The ‘Turkish au-

thorities were distributing arms to the Albanians and the Albanians were readily enrolling in Janina. In the ‘Turkish army there were 8,ooo0 Albanians and the 10,000 volunteers; they would form the center of the resistance.1*9 ‘The Greeks,

on the other hand, subsidized bands of insurgents whose mission was to make the people rise in favor of Greece. ‘They

distributed proclamations to the Albanians, urging them to make common cause with Greece, but without effect.!°° The Greek archbishop of Janina confessed to the French consul that only two-fifths of the Christians in the vilayet of Janina favored the cession to Greece.14 In the meantime the Turkish delegation slightly modified its proposal, and the great powers accepted it. The boundary line now ran along the heights of Salambria as far as Mount Krachevo, then followed the thalweg of the Arta to its mouth. On May 24 the Conference of Ambassadors in Istanbul drew the demarcation line, cutting from Albania the region of Arta,’ the city of Arta being surrendered to Greece on July 6, 1881. The contest with Greece thus ended with one small territorial loss for the Albanians. During the period the Greeks strove to acquire Epirus, proposals were made from time to time to solve the GrecoAlbanian question by bringing the two neighboring peoples Close together. ‘They aimed generally at some sort of union —rarely a confederation—and came from various sides. Such an idea was cherished by Sir Charles Dilke. He wanted *SWiet to Saint-Hilaire, Janina, 21 January 1881, No. 24, op.cit. *°Wiet to Saint-Hilaire, Janina, 11 February 1881, No. 27, and 8 April 1881, No. 34, ibid. 89Wiet to Saint-Hilaire, Janina, 30 March 1881, No. 32, translation in

French of a proclamation from Athens as Annexe B to 27 April 1881, No. 36, and 7 May 1881, No. 39—all in ibid. *?Wiet to Saint-Hilaire, Janina, 22 February 1881, No. 28, ibid. 2Cf. Article 1 of Convention relative 4 la rectification des frontiéres Turco-Grecques, 24 May 1881, in G. Effendi Noradounghian, op.cit., IV, 292-293.

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS 83 to combine Albanian independence and union with Greece, “finding that the Albanians were willing to accept the King of the Hellenes, provided they succeeded in obtaining privileges for the Roman Catholic Church, to which great numbers of them belonged.” 1°3 He hoped that this personal union might ultimately grow into a closer tie, “bearing in mind the friendly cooperation of Greeks and Albanians in the War of

Independence against Turkey, and the fact that a strong Albanian element already existed in the Greek Kingdom.” 14 On June 4, 1880 he had a talk with King George of Greece in

London on this subject and found him “a good talker, but academic.” 13°

Another prominent statesman who at the outset took an interest in a union between Greece and Albania was the ItaloAlbanian Francesco Crispi. He was the initiator of a philhel-

lenic committee in Rome which worked toward this end. Greek Epirot delegates visited him and letters were addressed

to him in order to explain “certain erroneous information” that the Italian public held about Epirus and Janina. A letter (Athens, 21/ May 3, 1879) from one of them stated: “‘Accord-

ing to us, the Albanian question is a deception of which the Albanians are the victims. ‘There is no doubt that the city of Janina and its surroundings are Greek territories.” °° A different view was held, however, by ‘Thimi Mitko, an Orthodox Christian from Korcé who lived in Cairo and was engaged in Albanian patriotic activity not unfavorable to Greece. In a

reply to an extensive article on Epirus and Janina in La Riforma, which Crispi himself had forwarded to him, Mitko regarded the Greek claims as “pedantic and imaginary.” The Greeks of Janina were hellenized Albanians, he declared, and

the pronunciation and use of Greek (an acquired learned 1885. L. Gwynn (completed and edited by G. M. Tuckwell), The Life of the Ri. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke, New York, 1917, 1, 328. 84Tbid., I, 250-251. 1357 bid., I, 329.

1367 etters of Epirot Delegates to Crispi, ACS, Carte Crispi, Politica Estera 1878-1887, Dos. tv, Fasc. 61.

84 I. THE GROUNDWORK | Greek) testified to it. A union between Albania and Greece

through a confederation, or some other form, would be excellent, Mitko believed, but if Albania were to lose Janina it would be “an incurable wound.” 437 On January 30, 1881 a pamphlet addressed to the Albanians was published in Athens by K. Phrearitis as the representative of a Greek “National League.” Considering the eventuality of a war between Greece and ‘Turkey and that sooner or later an upheaval would occur in the Balkans, as a consequence of which Turkey would be unable to keep herself in Europe, he gave four solutions to the Albanian question. One of them, which he warmly supported, was union with Greece, which would give to the Albanians the same rights and privileges as the Greeks. He maintained that the difference in religion was not an obstacle, because in the period in which they lived, the two peoples were united by race—‘‘Pelasgians were our noble and common ancestors’’—civilization, common interests and goals.1%°

Let us now examine briefly these various plans. Sir Charles

Dilke gave as an argument for the personal union with Greece, which he supported, that Albanians had cooperated with the Greeks in the Greek War of Independence. Evidently he was not aware that Moslem Albanians fought, during that very war, on the side of the Turks and against the Greeks. He also laid stress on “‘the great numbers” of Catholics, who in reality constituted a small minority as compared with the Moslem Albanian population. Phrearitis and other Greeks spoke in favor of union on the grounds that the two peoples had common ancestors (Pelasgians) and civilization.

There were Albanians, on the other hand, who held the opinion that they were a different people with a different 137Mitko to Crispi, Cairo, 21 June 1879, in ibid.

88K. Phrearités, “Ho Ethnikos Desmos pros tous andreious Sképetarous” (The National League to the Brave Albanians), Athens, 1881, pp. 3, 6-8; for a French summary of it, see Berczencovich to Haymerle, Janina, 24 March 1881, No. 13/P, HHStA, PA xu1/263, Tirkei vi B, and Wiet to Saint-Hilaire, Janina, 27 April 1881, No. 36,

op.cit. |

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS 85

civilization.1*® If Crispi at one time favored the union, it appears to have been principally because he thought that Greece together with Albania could better serve as a basis of action not only against slavism but also against Austrian invasion.?#°

All the proposals mentioned above remained merely projects. They were not based on enduring realities but on momentary needs: a solution had to be found which would satisfy the Greeks, without antagonizing the Albanians, and at the same time would strengthen the forces opposing slavism. They had the serious fault of overlooking one fundamental fact: the majority of the Albanians were Moslems. As Moslems they fitted best in the Ottoman empire, where they en-

joyed the rights and privileges of the Turks. Union with Greece, in any form, could not have been attractive to them.

Religion, which had separated them from the Greeks, had engendered in the course of time a mutual hostility. ‘The Mos-

lem Albanians knew that within a Greco-Albanian union they would lose the privileged position they held in the Otto-

man empire. Goschen, the British ambassador to Turkey at that time, wrote that he favored the union, but he added that the ‘Turks would struggle hard to outbid the Greeks and that the Albanians were very strong in the Palace, and were trusted

all over the empire.1* If the Moslem Albanians did not remain within the empire, preferably as an autonomous unit, the other alternative for them would be independence, but not union with Greece, which would reduce them to inferior citizens. When Abdul Frashéri was in Rome in 1879, he was met by Marco A. Canini, an Italian liberal who had traveled in the Balkans and had often been entrusted with delicate missions by his government. Canini endeavored to induce the Albanian leader to develop more friendly relations with Greece. Abdul’s answer revealed the feelings of his compatri189See text of the memorandum to Lord Beaconsfield, in P. Chiara, L’Epiro, glt Albanest e la Lega, Palermo, 1880, pp. 165-169. 140Cf. S. T. Lascaris, op.cit., p. 183. 1416. L. Gwynn, op.cit., 1, 328.

86 I, THE GROUNDWORK ots: “The agreement you recommend us is impossible; the. Greeks do not want to recognize our rights; they want subjects and not equals.” 142

Two opinions expressed at the time, with respect to relations between Albanians and Greeks, show considerable soundness. One was in the Journal des Débats (March 26, 1879). It advocated taking Albania into account: “and one was greatly mistaken to assume that there was no Albanian nation. There is a very real one, thinking undoubtedly about its autonomy.” Albania could have common interests with Greece, but she would not let herself be absorbed or partitioned without resistance. It would be more useful to Greece if she handled Albania well. ‘They would reach a point when they could live together to their great mutual profit, like Sweden and Norway in the north. ““This should be the Greek viewpoint.” ‘The other opinion was expressed by Bismarck, who had previously denied the existence of the Albanian nationality.*43 In February 1881, when clashes between the Turks and Albanians began in the north, he declared that Greece’s interest was to be on friendly terms with the Albanians, as they were her natural allies against the Slavs and the ‘Turks.'*4

In addition to Montenegro and Greece, the Albanian League had to oppose another enemy—the Bulgarians. In November 1878 Bulgarian guerrilla bands became active near Salonica and gave the signal for the creation of other bands in the districts of Képrilii (Veles), Prilep, Vodena (Edessa), Kastoria, and Monastir, which lay on the eastern frontiers of Albania.**° On December 12, 1878, Ilijas Pasha, as representa-

tive of the Albanians of Dibér, wired to Zichy in Istanbul, asking that the European powers intervene and stop the atrocities of the Bulgarians so that the people themselves 142G, Schiro, op.cit., p. 78.

18Cf. A. Mousset, L’Albanie devant l'Europe (1912-1929), Paris, 1930, p. 7; Federal Writers’ Project, Massachusetts, The Albanian Struggle in the Old World and New, Boston, 1939, p. 35. M4L. Raschdau, ed., op.cit., p. 244. 140Cf. T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 371.

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS «87

would not be obliged to fight in self-defense.14* The Albanians of these districts, and particularly those of Dibér, saw in this Bulgarian uprising a move for the realization of the Great Bulgaria of San Stefano, which included Albanian territories. They energetically opposed the Bulgarian movement, which was soon abandoned.1*7

The resistance to the decisions of the Congress of Berlin, which consisted not only of protests and memoranda, but also

of armed force in defense of their territories, even when Turkey was ready to surrender them, made the Albanians more aware of their nationality and of a separate place within the Ottoman empire. 146A. Novotny, op.cit., entry 1728, p. 345. 47T. Ippen, op.cit., pp. 371-372.

Ill The Struggle for Administrative Autonomy ALBANIAN LEADERS were becoming more aware every day of

the shaky structure of the Ottoman empire, supported only by interested powers for political motives. They feared, should

the empire collapse, that a disunited Albania would be partitioned. On the other hand, they thought that union of the Albanian people could be achieved by remaining for some time within the framework of the Ottoman empire.? Their

demand was, therefore, for administrative autonomy. | The tendencies toward administrative autonomy were first manifested in the south, where education was more widespread than in the north. Here there was a group of Albanian leaders, headed by Abdul Frashéri, to whom the nationalist movements of Europe and the Balkans were not unknown. Janina was a cultural center, and every new principle and movement were followed there with practical curiosity.?

In the spring of 1877 a meeting of notables of southern Albania was held in Janina, as mentioned previously, and a memorandum was adopted and presented to the Porte. It drew attention to the bad situation of the Albanian provinces,

and asked for their unification in a single vilayet, with an administration composed of Albanian employees and schools and courts in the Albanian language.’ Since the Russo-Turkish war broke out soon afterward, the Porte remained silent on the memorandum, and a year later promised reforms for only the vilayet of Janina.* Turkey’s state of war, however,

made the Albanian leaders feel more urgently the need to 1Cf. Wassa Effendi, La vérité sur ’Albanie et les Albanais, Paris, 1879, pp. 94-95; L. Skendo, “Liga e Prizrenit” (The League of Prizren), Hylli 2 Drités (Star of Light), Shkodér, 111 (October 1922), 470.

*See M. Frashéri, Liga e Prizrenit edhe efektet dipllomatike té saj (The League of Prizren and Its Diplomatic Effects), ‘Tirana, 1927, pp. 22-23; L. Skendo, “Lidhja e Prizrenit” (The League of Prizren), Diturija (Knowledge), Tirana, mr (July-August-September 1928), 323. SHistort e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 5h. *See Chapter 1, pp. 40-41.

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY 89 take up the salvation of their country themselves. The Central

Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Albanian Nationality, founded in Istanbul immediately after the San Stefano Treaty, had as its task not only to prevent the dismemberment of Albanian territory but also to ask for autonomy.°

The program for the administrative autonomy of Albania became more clear-cut after the Congress of Berlin, where the Albanian petitions and memoranda were disregarded and Albania was treated more or less as a geographic expression. — Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin obliged Turkey to apply to Crete the 1868 organic regulation for autonomy and stated that similar regulations, adapted to local needs, would be introduced in other parts of European Turkey, for which a particular organization was not foreseen by that treaty. With this article in mind, the Albanian leaders of the south met in Frashér and, under the leadership of Abdul Frashéri, drew up on November 10, 1878 the program for the administrative autonomy of Albania.®

The Turkish government, which from time to time changed the administrative division of the provinces in the empire, had at the time of the Congress of Berlin divided the Albanian lands into four vilayets: Janina, Monastir, Uskub, and Shkodér. This was an obstacle to Albanian unity. ‘The Albanians desired unification of all of them into one vilayet, with Ohrid (later Monastir) as the capital, owing to its central position. In this way Albania would receive definite frontiers, officially recognized, which in another partition of ‘Turkey would be a safeguard for her rights. As the centralistic policy of the Porte had installed high Turkish officials in the provinces, the southern branch of the League demanded that the high officials should be Albanians. ‘Turkey had acknowledged

that education throughout the empire was an indispensable part of the program of reforms. ‘The declarations of Hatt-t Humayun (art. 8) allowed the teaching of the mother tongue 5Histori e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, pp. 55-58. 6M. Frashéri, op.cit., p. 24; Histort e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, pp. 63, 65.

90 I. THE GROUNDWORK to Ottoman citizens, but Albanian was forbidden. All the nationalities in the empire, except the Albanians, had their own schools. The schools which were functioning in that country at the time of the League were Turkish for the Moslems and Greek for the Orthodox Christians. ‘The southern

Albanian leaders consequently stipulated that Albanian schools should be opened and that the language of the administration should be Albanian. Both the Albanian schools and the public works were to be supported by a part of the direct taxes, which would not be forwarded to Istanbul. ‘The pro-

gram naturally included the provision that all religions should be free to exercise their cult, since the Albanian population consisted of Moslems and Christians. A council, chosen by the people and convening four months during the year in the capital of the vilayet, would control the execution of the various new regulations." The program for the autonomy of Albania, as formulated in Frashér, undoubtedly had the approval of the Albanian Istanbul committee. On November 26, 1878, Zichy wrote from the Turkish capital to his Ministry in Vienna that some Albanian notables had visited him and strengthened his impression that Albania also strove for autonomy, seeking to

lean for its attainment on a great power, namely, AustriaHungary. Yet it was not until the beginning of October 1879 that a meeting was held in Prizren and the representatives of the north discussed and accepted the southern program for auton-

omy.® Few among them, however, were as broad in their thinking as Vasa Effendi, who considered ‘‘of capital interest the union of Albania into a single vilayet in order to give to "For the points of the program, see T. Ippen, “Beitrage zur inneren Geschichte Albaniens im x1x. Jahrhundert,” TIllyrisch-albanische Forschungen, 1, 372; M. Frashéri, op.cit., p. 24; Hustori e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 65; Knapitsch to Andrassy, Monastir, 6 February 1879, No. 3, HHStA, PA xvu1/35, Montenegro Varia, Gusinje Frage 1879. 8A. Novotny, Osterreich, die Tiirket und das Balkanproblem im Jahre des Berliner Kongresses, Graz-Kéln, 1957, entry 1668, p. 335.

°T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 3972. i

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY 91 it a simple, compact, and strong organization.” 1° The majority of the northern leaders were much absorbed by the events of the Montenegrin frontiers and little understood the efforts of the southerners.

As long as the aim was to defend Albanian territorial integrity, there was union in the League. When autonomy of

the country became more pressing, the split within it was inevitable. ‘The conservative trends which existed within the League, while apparent from the start, were brought to the foreground by the question of autonomy. An English traveller, who visited northern Albania a year or so after the formation of the League, observed: “That Turkey at first secretly assisted and encouraged the movement, I think there can be

no doubt ... But the League has waxed too strong for the government. ... Ihe Leaguesmen, feeling their strength, have extended their program. Defence of their native land against foreign invasion is not now their only cry, but autonomy and the shaking off of the Turkish yoke are boldly discussed in the Bazars of the garrisoned towns.” 11 We may say that, during the period of the League’s activity, the two aims

—preservation of territorial integrity and introduction of administrative autonomy—coexisted, autonomy becoming paramount as the territorial questions were being solved in one way or another. The two trends which divided the League with respect to autonomy were intensified at the Conference of Gjirokastér © (July 23, 1880), attended by representatives from all over the

country, where Abdul Frashéri presented a detailed program for the organization of an autonomous Albania. It was substantially the program that had been formulated in the meeting of Frasher some two years before: only the Governor General of Albania would be appointed by the Sultan and Albania would not have obligations toward the Porte other than the payment of a yearly tribute and military service of 10Wassa Effendi, op.cit., p. 98.

NE. F. Knight, Albania: a Narrative of Recent Travel, London, 1880, Pp. 258-259.

92 I, THE GROUNDWORK her men in the event of war. But while the delegates were agreed as to the main goal, autonomy, they differed as to the time and manner of action to achieve it. The most progressive elements thought that they should act immediately, profiting by Turkey’s difficult situation when even the Turkish army could not move against them. They represented the “radicals.” “(The others, mostly feudal beys, insisted upon waiting for a more favorable time. They were the “moderates.’ At the end the conference agreed that its resolutions should be carried out as soon as aggression against Albanian territories occurred in the north or in the south: the forces of the north would come to the assistance of the south and vice versa.’? It was quite a significant step forward in the political thinking of the Albanians. The Albanian movement had not left the foreigners unimpressed, particularly the British. Great Britain’s ambassador to Turkey, Goschen, had correctly appraised the situation, when he wrote on July 26, 1880 to the Secretary of the Foreign Office: “Whatever the history of the movement may be, I venture to submit to your Lordship, as I have done before, that the Albanian excitement cannot be passed over as a mere

manoeuvre conducted by the Turks in order to mislead Europe and evade its will.” +3 An attempt was made by E. Fitzmaurice, British representative on the Eastern Rumelian Commission,* to create a large Albania comprising all the Albanian-inhabited lands of the four vilayets.1> He seSee Histort e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, pp. 86-87; Wiet to Freycinet, Janina, 14 August 1880, No. 2, and Wiet to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Janina, 28 September 1880, No. 9, AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Janina, 1879-1880, Vol. x. *8Goschen to Granville, Therapia, 26 July 1880, A and P, Vol. Lxxx1, 1880, ‘Turkey, No. 15 (1880), No. 81. “The Commission was created by the Treaty of Berlin (Articles 13 and

18) in order “to elaborate, in agreement with the Ottoman Porte, the organization of Eastern Rumelia,” as a province endowed with administrative autonomy. Fitzmaurice to Granville, 21 June 1880, A and P, Vol. Lxxx1, 1880, Turkey, No. 15 (1880), Nos. 33, 70, 71.

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY 93 cured the support of Ambassador Goschen, who argued the

political value of a large Albania as follows: “If a strong Albania should be formed, the excuse for occupation by a foreign power in case of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire would be greatly weakened. A united Albania would

bar the remaining entrances to the north, and the Balkan Peninsula would remain in the hands and under the sway of the races who now inhabit it. . . . I consider that, in proportion as the Albanian nationality could be established, the probability of European intervention in the Balkan Peninsula would be diminished.” 14

Although in the beginning the members of the Eastern Rumelian Commission were not hostile to Fitzmaurice’s proposal for the projected union of all Albanian districts, they eventually objected to it.17 They were satisfied only to make a declaration on August 23, 1880 that if ‘the Sublime

Porte found it opportune to unite the Albanian lands into one vilayet,” they would have no objection at all. However, the representative of Russia, Khitrovo, abstained from signing even this declaration.}®

When Turkey yielded to the pressure of the great powers in the surrender of Dulcigno, the Albanian patriots thought that

the moment had come to put into effect the resolutions of Gjirokastér. A meeting was held on October 20, 1880 in Dibér, where, besides the group of the autonomists, many powerful feudal beys and pashas participated. ‘They had been

upset by the situation of Dulcigno and were eager that decisions regarding Albania should not be made without their consent. On the basis of the resolutions of Gjirokastér, the patriots presented the necessity for prompt declaration of autonomy and for action to defend Dulcigno. For this purpose, they proposed that all the forces of the country should

16Goschen to Granville, ibid. , , 17Fitzmaurice to Granville, 1 August 1880; 17 August 1880; 20 August 1880; and 24 August 1880—in ibid., Nos. 71, 109, 130, 134. 18Fitzmaurice to Granville, Buyukdéré, 23 August 1880, A and P, Vol. LxxxI, 1880, Turkey, No. 15 (1880), No. 132, Enclosure a.

94 I. THE GROUNDWORK be mobilized to prevent the arrival of new ‘Turkish troops and at the same time attack the Turkish armies in Shkodér and Dulcigno. The divergences immediately came into the open. The battle was between the pro-government party of Dibér and Mat, headed by Sadik Pasha Dibra and Djemal Pasha Mati, and the pro-League party (autonomists), led by Ali Pasha Gucija, Esad Pasha Tetova (Kalkandelen), and Ilijas Pasha Dibra. The pro-government party opposed both the sending of forces to Dulcigno and the declaration for autonomy. They feared that they would jeopardize their positions now that the Sultan had decided to deliver Dulcigno to the Montenegrins. In the voting which followed, the pro-League party was beaten (130 as against 150 votes). Still it prepared a resolution reiterating the desire for the creation of an autonomous province of Albanian territories

and communicated it to the Porte in a document which Djemal Bey Dibra, the son of Ilijas Pasha Dibra, took to Istanbul. It was their last effort to solve the question of autonomy in understanding with Turkey. The pro-government party also voted upon a resolution and sent its own man to Istanbul with it.1®

When the League was created, both branches, northern and southern, had arranged to meet through their men of confidence in Elbasan, in central Albania.*° But this plan had not worked well, because the various committees in the south and the north were in loose relationship with each other. When the idea for autonomy was spreading and the interest of the great powers in the Albanian question was. increasing, before the conference of Gjirokastér, Abdul Frashéri intensified his efforts to revive the ties and bring the

committees of the various regions closer.*1 Following the meeting of Dibér, new attempts were made. In order to popu19See Lippich to Haymerle, Scutari, 20 November 1880, No. 139, HHStA, PA xvi1/35, Montenegro Varia, Gusinje Frage 1879; T. Ippen,

op.cit., p. 337; Histori e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, pp. 89-90. ,

2T., Ippen, op.cit., p. 371. : |

10f. Histori e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 86. . oo

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY 95 larize the unification of Albania and strengthen the relations between the southern and northern branches of the League, delegates from the south travelled in northern Albania, and those of the north visited the towns of southern Albania.”?

The duality of purpose of the Albanian patriots made collaboration with ‘Turkey precarious. ‘The Austrian consul in Janina, Berczencovich, had grasped the situation when he

reported to his government that, although it seemed that there was a complete agreement between the ‘Turks and the Albanians, they tried to deceive each other as to their ultimate ends. ‘Turkey used the Albanians in a general opposi-

tion to the decisions of the great powers and made the solutions of the frontiers, whenever possible, dependent on »

them. The Albanians, on the other hand, made use of the difficult position of ‘Turkey and of her proffered help to secure their frontiers and attain autonomy. Both parties were aware of each other’s ends.”?

The turning-point in the relations between the Albanians and Turkey was brought about by the cession of Dulcigno to Montenegro. ‘This act produced a deep impression all over Albania.** It put an end to the long agitation that had developed in that country for a defensive war against Montenegro and directed the attention of the Albanians mainly toward relations with Turkey, toward the question of autonomy. The Porte had not taken into consideration the various Albanian petitions for autonomy, even the last one from the meeting of Dibér; it had only been generous in promises, as long as it needed Albanian support and feared interna-

tional complications. But now that the conflict with Montenegro was over and the way was open to a favorable

22°T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 377. | 28RBerczencovich to Haymerle, Janina, 13 August 1880, No. 9/P, Geheim, HHStA, PA xvu1/35, Montenegro, albanesische Liga.

24See Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 7 January 1881, No. 2, confidential Beilage from Betriebsdirection der Ott. Eisenbahnen, Salonich, 23 December 1880, HHSitA, PA x11/263, Turkei vin B; Greneville to Haymerle, Salonica, g March 1881, No. 31, ibid.

96 I. THE GROUNDWORK solution in the frontier question with Greece, the policy of

Istanbul changed.?> __ | . The Albanian movement had disturbed both the Sultan

and the ruling caste in Istanbul. ‘The Sultan had long been hesitant to take action against the League. The Albanian problem had a wider interest for him: it was his first serious encounter with Moslem nationalism within the empire. It came at a time when he was attempting to turn the emerging revival of Islam to political advantage. An Afghan teacher, Sayyad Jamaluddin, who became internationally known

during his stay in Egypt (1871-1879), preached that the Islamic revival sought essentially to adapt Moslem religion to modern life. In his opinion, Moslem countries should free themselves from foreign domination—Hamidian despotism was not any better—undergo religious reform and enjoy free political thinking. Abdul Hamid’s purpose, however, was to use the office of Caliph to strengthen his authority as a Sultan,

and a challenge to it, whether from inside or from outside, would be detrimental. While in Tunis in 1880 there was some hope that the religious confraternities of Islam could be mobilized against the French, in Albania it was almost certain that resistance to foreign pressure would develop into resistance to the Sultan-Caliph. Abdul Hamid had to

| _ weigh, therefore, to what extent the suppression of the Albanian movement would damage his prestige in the Moslem

world, while strengthening his direct authority over the country.”® As to the Porte, it was more ready for action. Most of the high officials and principal advisers feared that auton-

omy would harm the caste of the Turkish functionaries and particularly those who were in Istanbul. It advocated centralization and the rejection of every concession to autonomy.?"

It entrusted Dervish Pasha not only with the mission to deliver Dulcigno to the Montenegrins, but also with that of dispersing the Albanian League. ‘The Turkish government Cf. Histort e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 91.

26Cf. W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe, London, 1956, pp. 76-77.

Cf. T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 377.

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY 97 understood, however, that the suppression of the Albanian movement needed a greater army than the one at the disposal of Dervish Pasha. In the beginning of December 1880 it called him to Istanbul in order to prepare the plan of a great expedition to Albania.?8 The centralistic attitude of the Porte could not but produce discontent in Albania, where prior to the Congress of Berlin several revolts against efforts to impose

Turkish centralization had already occurred. | _ In the meantime changes took place in the leadership of the League of Prizren. The central committee was reorganized and commanding positions passed into the hands of resolute autonomist elements, such as Sheh Omer Prizreni, Suleyman Vokshi, Shuaip Agé Spahiu, and others.?® ‘The League then decided to remain in opposition to the Porte, denying the authority of its officials and refusing to send

recruits.°° |

The Albanian resistance began in Prizren. The League ousted the mutesarrif of the city and his functionaries and placed in their stead its own members, namely, Kadi Nazif Kffendi as acting governor, Redjeb Jakova in charge of taxes, and Dervish Bey as chief of police. It also announced to the

inhabitants of the districts of Prizren, Gjakové, and Ipek that all males from 7 to 70 years of age were to be ready for battle, in case the Turkish army should approach.*! Already in December 1880 the Albanians of Usktb let Galib Bey and

the Mufti, the Turks most powerful and friendly to the Porte, know that they were not desirable and ought to leave the city, for in the Council (Mecelis) they had supported the

recruitment of the Albanians.*? On January 4, 1881 the Prizren contingent, under the command of Suleyman Vokshi, occupied Uskiib. ‘The Governor had been recalled to Istan*8Histort e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 92. 29T bid. :

s0Cf. IT. Ippen, op.cit., p. 377. 31Waldhart to Haymerle, Uskiib, 19 December 1880, No. 108/res.,

HHStA, PA x11/263, Tirkei vi B. 82Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 7 January 1881, No. 2, Con-

fidential Beilage from the Betriebsdirektion der Ott. Eisenbahnen, Salonica, 23 December 1880, in zbid.

98 I. THE GROUNDWORK bul, but the newly appointed one was not acceptable to the Albanians. As long as there was no governor, the League functioned as the only authority, through its member Jashar Bey, and did not care much about the Porte.** On January 10 the local committee of the League ordered the director of

the railway station of Usktib not to receive any military transportation to and from Mitrovicé.** From Uskib Sule}man Vokshi occupied Mitrovicé, extending the government of the League into other parts of the Sandjak of Novi Pazar.*® On January 18, 1881 the forces of the League took hold of Prishtiné, the capital of the vilayet of Kosovo, and the Governor General, who was at the same time the military commander, was recalled to Istanbul. All the districts of Prishtiné and Uskiib were brought under the control of the League.*® In February 1881 Dibér followed the example of Prizren. Here Abdul Frashéri played an important role. In December 1881 he had left Istanbul, where he was secretly kept under surveillance.?”7 He landed in Sarandé (Santi Quaranta) and proceeded to Dibér on his way to Prizren, where he intended to exercise his influence on the government of the League. When an attempt against his life was made in Dibér, on the part of the supporters of the Porte, he exploited it cleverly and succeeded in arousing the people against the ‘Turkish government, its adherents, and the mutesarrif, whom they expelled.%®

33Cf. ibidem; T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 378; Montlong to Haymerle, Telegram, Salonica, 6 January 1881, No. 4387, and Waldhart to Haymerle, Scopia, 13 January 1881, No. 2/res., HHStA, PA x11/273, Tirkei vi B. 84Montlong to Haymerle, Telegram, Salonica, 10 January 1881, No. 7179, In tbid. s5Waldhart to Haymerle, Uskiib, 29 January 1881, No. 13/ res., in tbid.

Waldhart to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Telegram, Usktib, 21

January 1881, No. 5888, in tbid.; T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 378. | s™Wiet to Saint-Hilaire, Janina, 11 February 1881, No. 27, AMAE, op.cit.

xu/263, “‘Lurkei vu B. |

38Lippich to Haymerle, Scutari, 8 April 1881, No. 51, HHStA, PA

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY 99 Although written from Istanbul, a letter by Sami Frashéri (known in ‘Turkey as the scholar Semseddin Sami Bey), the

brother of Abdul Frashéri, to the Italo-Albanian poet De Rada sheds much light on the situation in Albania at this time and the hopes of the Albanian patriots. Its contents were

in part as follows: Perhaps the achievements of the League in the last month in northern Albania had not been learned in Italy because the newspapers did not speak much about them, as on the one hand Turkey did not permit that the news be propagated, and on the other, the enemies of the Albanians tried to minimize their value. ‘The League of Prizren many times had asked, during the last three years for the unification of Albania into one province with autonomy, but the empire until now had deceived it with promises, and had been unwilling to do anything for Albania. ‘This time the Albanians understood very well that the empire did not want to do anything for them, and the League of Prizren

found it necessary to unite Albania into an autonomous unit, and perhaps independence, according to the developments; thus the League has been called Provisional Govern-

ment, and has expelled the administrators from all the vilayet of Kosovo.” Ten thousand armed Albanians were getting ready to go to the south. In a little while one would hear of a great insurrection in Albania.*® The part of Albania which went quickly into action against

the Turkish government was the northeast. Shkodér was not

in a position to move. Dervish Turgut Pasha, after the cession of Dulcigno, destroyed its League committee by deporting its leaders, among them Prenk Bib Doda.* Before

December 1880 Prenk Bib Doda had already had some troubles with the Porte. In October 1879 the Turkish government, in opposition to declarations in the Congress of 8°Sami to De Rada, Constantinople, 20 February 1881, text in Albanian, Buletin i Shkencave Shogérore (Bulletin of Social Sciences), Tirana, No. 2, 1954, p. 115. “0Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 8 February 1881, No. 8 A-G, HHStA, PA xu1/263, Turkei vu B.

100 I. THE GROUNDWORK | Berlin, had appointed Mahmud Aga from Podgoricé as kaymakam (sub-prefect) of Mirdité.*! It was pursuing a centralistic policy, trying to turn Mirdité into a district of the Ottoman empire with a kaymakam.*” ‘The Austro-Hungarian government intervened and called on the Porte to recognize -Prenk Bib Doda as the legitimate ruler of the territory, while the Kapidan himself requested of the Grand Vizier that he

be authorized to administer and govern Mirdité with the privileges and customs which the Sultan “‘had always granted

and recognized from the time of the conquest” and with the rank and title of his deceased father Bib Doda Pasha.*? Now,

as the movement led by Ali Pasha Gucija, who was the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the League, had assumed

great proportions—the inhabitants of Prizren, Djakové, Ipek, Dibér, and the highlands followed him—the Catholics of the north anxiously watched the developments and waited for a favorable opportunity to make common cause with Ali Pasha. The well-informed inhabitants of the Shkodér province saw in the movement a tendency on the part of its leader to ac-

quire control of the north, and thus prepare himself for a more efficient defense against eventual aggressions. These might come especially from Montenegro; profiting by eventual troubles, Montenegro might attempt a coup de main in

Shkodér.*4 ,

order to extend her frontiers to include Prizren and The big landowning families of middle Albania—Berat, Elbasan, Krujé, ‘Tirané, and Vloré—had almost dissolved their loose connections with the Albanian League. Their “1Schmucker to Haymerle, Scutari, 24 October 1879, No. 91, HHStA, PA x11/256, ‘Turkei Iv.

“Lippich to Andrdassy, Scutari, 29 March 1879, No. 27, in ibid. “8See copy of the letter of Prenk Bib Doda to Said Pasha (Scutari, 24 November 1879) in Schmucker to Haymerle, Scutari, 24 November 1879, No. 104, and Kosjek to Haymerle, Constantinople, 19 December 1879, No. 112 B, in tb1d.

**Thoemmel to Haymerle, Cetinje, 10 March 1881, No. 127 res., Beilage 1 (letter of the Acting Consul in Antivari, Signor Depolo, Antivari, 1 March 1881, No. 18/res.), HHStA, PA x11/263, Tiirkei vir B.

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY 101 lands were not near the frontiers and they did not feel the outside pressure to make them aware that Turkey was not in a position to defend them. When they exchanged opinions with the delegates of the northern districts, they were convinced that the program for autonomy of the League would not only lead to conflict with ‘Turkey but would also harm their interests. ‘They were prompt to yield the rights they enjoyed to the Christians in theory but not in practice. When the northern delegates expressed the opinion that they could not ignore the Catholic highlanders and that they were ready

to grant them all that they needed, so that Shkodér would not be separated from Prizren, the beys of central Albania answered that conditions in their own districts were different: the Christians were the serfs of the beys, and this relationship could not be changed in one stroke. ‘They justified their stand on the ground that it would be unwise to give the Christians

promises which could not be kept. Having relatives in high positions in the Turkish army and civil service, these feudal beys knew how Istanbul thought and they expected at any moment the use of force to suppress the Albanian movement.*°

As for the southern Albanians, although the frontier question with Greece was still pending, they remained faithful to the program of autonomy. At times they would even oscillate between autonomy and quasi-independence under the tutelage of a foreign power, such as Austria-Hungary, which was often so mentioned.*® When Abdul Frashéri went to Prizren

and urged the League to occupy with armed forces the Kaéanik pass and officially proclaim the autonomy of Albania,

his plan was that then the southern branch of the League would occupy Janina, defining thus the borders of autonomous Albania.** One is inclined to believe that the petition 45Stranz to Haymerle, Corfu, 14 March 1881, No. 6, in tbid. 46Wiet to Saint-Hilaire, Janina, 11 February 1881, No. 27, AMAE,

Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Janina, 1881-1884, Vol. XI.

4™M. Frashéri, op.cit., p. 58.

102 I. THE GROUNDWORK sent (April 3-15, 1881) to the Austrian Embassy (perhaps to other embassies as well) in Istanbul by the League of Prizren itself was inspired by Abdul Frashéri. The document gave as reason for the union of the Albanian people the fact that parts of the Albanian territory were submitted to the domination of foreigners and that the rest of Albania was in a very uncertain situation. In order to confront the danger and safeguard their future well-being, the Albanian people as a whole had taken the following decisions: (1) Located in Europe, Albania should participate in its civilization and preserve herself and the nationality of her people; (2) ‘The Albanians should remain, as until then, under the government of the Sultan; (3) Albania, then divided in four vilayets,

should be united into one and bear the name “Albania.” The League of Prizren appealed to the Austro-Hungarian government to support its claims in the name of human rights, giving the assurance that it had no other goals except those mentioned in the petition and that it desired to live in peace with Albania’s neighbors.*®

It was natural for the Ottoman empire to view with concern the growing Albanian movement which challenged its rule and created conditions for foreign intervention. Many cabinet meetings were held at the palace and in the Porte. The Sultan feared that Austria-Hungary was playing her

hand in the movement in order to use it as a pretext to invade the territory because peace was threatened. He intended also to employ the services of the Bosnian refugee Mufti of Tashlidja, on whose faithfulness he could rely, in order to calm down the Albanians.*9 Moreover, the Porte was afraid that Greece might reach an understanding with ‘8The League of Prizren to the Austro-Hungarian Embassy in Constantinople, Prizren, 3-15 April 1297 (1881), German translation included in Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 3 May 1881, No. 32H,

HHStA, PA x11/263, ‘Turkei vi B. , ,

*°Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 25 January 1881, No. 6B, in ibid. The Mufti of Tashlidja had organized and headed the strongest resistance against the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia. Calice had intervened with the Porte not to be sent back to Albania from which country he had been recalled to Istanbul.

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY 103 the Albanians. Its attitude was to oppose the movement by force, while at the same time trying to win over the Albanians by testimonies of sympathy, as the press had been inspired to do.®° ‘The appeasement efforts were planned with the view

of gaining time and diverting the attention of the Albanians to the development of the Greek question. There was the tendency also of making the consideration of their claims dependent on their attitude toward that question.®! Turkey was aware that the Albanians would give up their resistance to her if she were attacked by Greece. Indeed, the Austrian consul in Usktb, Waldhart, reported that the League put at

the disposal of the Sultan 20,000 men to be used against Greece. ‘The press in Istanbul—that part which was inspired

by the Sultan’s entourage—reported that many Albanian

notables in the Turkish capital wired to their friends in Prishtiné, Ipek, Prizren, and Gyjakové that it would not be patriotic to make difficulties for Turkey by demanding the introduction of reforms in Albania, before the solution of the Greek question. They urged that the whole force of the League be sent to the Greek frontier and there await the

order to be issued by the Porte.*? |

Meanwhile the Sultan had ordered the constitution of a special committee to study the affairs of Albania; it decided on the unification of all Albanian lands in one vilayet.®* But,

when the first alarm had been overcome, he paid less attention to the Albanian movement and did not regard as urgent the satisfaction of the Albanian claims.®* At the same time Dervish Pasha, one of the exponents of centralization, had arrived in Istanbul. He advised the government not to make any concessions to the Albanians, but to repress their movement by force of arms.®> The influence of the marshal and the S0Tbid; see also Vakut (Time), Istanbul, 21 and 22 January 1881, and

Tercuman-t Hakikat (Interpreter’s Truth), Istanbul, 22 January 1881. ACalice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 15 February 1881, No. 10C,

HAStA, PA xi1/263, Turkei v1 B. |

*2Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 15 February 1881, No. 10E. 8Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 8 February 1881, No. 8 A-G. *4Cf. Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 15 February 1881, No. 10C.

Cf. T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 378.

104 I, THE GROUNDWORK prevailing opinion in the Turkish capital that he would be able to master the Albanian movement contributed to the reluctance of the Porte to yield to the Albanian demands.*® The Porte decided to dispatch Dervish Turgut Pasha “to pacify” Albania.

While the marshal was getting ready to leave for the Albanian campaign, the commander of Usktb, Ibrahim Pasha, on orders from Istanbul, on March 23, 1881 arrested the members of the League committee of that city and deported them to the island of Rhodes.5’ Some days later Dervish Pasha entered Usktib, and from there informed the Gegs of his mission in a proclamation: He was entrusted by the Porte, which was interested in the welfare and the peace of the people, to suppress any insurrection; the times were critical, because Turkey was surrounded by enemies, and he was prepared to be ruthless in his repression of their movement.*®

The marshal then proceeded to Prizren with an army of 10,000 and two batteries.°® The League committee of that city called some 5,000 men to arms and occupied the pass leading through Crnoljeva to the plain of Kosovo. The battle

began on April 20, 1881, the Turks making use of their mountain artillery. After a strenuous resistance on the part of the Albanians, the ‘Turks were victorious. Two days later Dervish Pasha occupied Prizren. The marshal made no reprisals against the northern leaders *°Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 15 February 1881, No. 10C, HHStA, PA x11/263, ‘Turkei vim B. *?Pietschka to Haymerle, Smyrna, 15 April 1881, No. 56 res., as Beilage

a letter from the Vice-Consulate of Rhodes, 8 April 1881 in ibid.; T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 378. *8Creneville to Haymerle, Salonica, 16 April 1881, No. 59, a copy of the translation in German of the proclamation is included, HHStA, PA x11/263, Turkei vir B; Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 22 April

ibid. | 1881, Beilage, zbzd.

Dervish Pasha operated against the League with thirty-one bat-

talions. Cf. Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 19 April 1881, No. 27C,

60Cf. T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 379. a |

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY __ 105

who had participated in the movement of the League. Instead he followed a policy of exhortation. He summoned the chiefs to Prizren and endeavored to persuade them that they

had erred, asking them to renounce the idea of autonomy and to remain faithful to the Sultan.*t One of the prominent members of that League, Hasan Pasha from Kalkandelen, was made mutesarrif of the city; Ali Pasha of Gusinj was promised that Ipek would be elevated to the see of a mutesarrif—and so it happened.® At the same time the marshal

did not refrain from promising the Albanians that they would obtain special privileges which would preserve their national existence, that their recruits would remain in their own country to protect it and that the officers serving there

would be of Albanian origin up to the rank of colonel.® But he took every possible step to seize Abdul Frashéri, the principal promoter of the idea of union, who had fled from Prizren to the coast. He even put up a reward for his arrest. Abdul Frashéri was captured, toward the end of April 1881, in the neighborhood of Elbasan, when he was about to cross the river Shkumbi. He intended to leave for England. He was brought to Dervish Pasha in Prizren, where he was kept under heavy guard. The arrest of Abdul Frashéri produced a depressive effect over all Albania, and there are several

reports of Austrian consular representatives about it, referring sometimes to Abdul Frashéri as “der ‘Toska” (the southerner).®°* From Prizren he was taken to Istanbul and sentenced to life imprisonment. After five years of detention in Balikesir, in Asia Minor, he was released, and died in the Turkish capital in 1894. ‘I'wo other leaders of the League, ST bidem. 6*Creneville to Haymerle, Salonica, 30 April 1881, No. 67, HHStA, PA x11/263, Ttirkei vir B; Schmucker to Haymerle, Prizren, 20 September 1881, No. 177 and 7 October 1881, No. 198, zbid. ®Creneville to Haymerle, Salonica, 30 April 1881, No. 67, ibid. ®4Cf. for arrest and imprisonment, Lippich to Haymerle, Scutari, 30

April 1881, No. 59, and 7 May 1881, No. 63; Waldhart to Haymerle, Uskiib, 5 May 1881, No. 67/res.; Greneville to Haymerle, Salonica, 8 May 1881, No. 72—all in tbid.

106 I, THE GROUNDWORK its. president, Hadji Ymer Effendi, and the miiderris (professor of theology) of Kalkandelen, Rauf Effendi, escaped. By order of Dervish Pasha, their families were deported to

Salonica.® ,

On May 5, 1881 the city of Gjakové was occupied by Dervish Pasha’s armies.®* The fis-es of the mountains had in principle submitted to him and had promised to fulfill part of his requests, insofar as they were compatible with their ancient rights and privileges.® In Prizren and its surroundings spirits were very low. ‘The exaction of taxes, the venality of Dervish Turgut Pasha, the

high cost of living, and the restriction of former freedoms had caused deep discontent among the population. They looked forward to the marshal’s departure which they regarded as liberation from oppression.®§ ‘The mood of all the

other northeastern Albanians was no different. The faith in the capacity of the Porte to hold the possessions which remained in Europe or give Albania the necessary security against her enemies had vanished.® Although Assim Pasha could say to Calice, the Austrian ambassador in Istanbul, that Dervish Pasha had completely broken the influence of the League and had restored ‘Turkish authority in the whole of Albania,” the Porte itself was doubtful about the durability of his “pacification.” It wanted to bring to Istanbul as sort of hostages the sons of the most prominent Albanian chiefs, bestowing upon them the title of Guard of Honor of the Sultan. Dervish Pasha asked for one hundred “volunteers”

from Prizren and another hundred from Gjakové for the

palace service of the Sultan.” | ®Lippich to Haymerle, Scutari, 20 May 1881, No. 67, and 28 May 1881, No. 71, ibid.; Waldhart to Haymerle, Uskiib, 5 May 1881, No. 67/res., ibid. 8°T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 379.

67Schmucker to Haymerle, Prizren, 20 September 1881, No. 177, HHASitA, PA x11/263, ‘Turkei vu B. S87 bid.

‘°Lippich to Haymerle, Scutari, 24 June 1881, No. 79, «bid. Calice to Haymerle, Buyukdere, 19 July 1881, No. 53G, ibid. “Schmucker to Haymerle, Uskiib, 9 June 1881, No. 97, ibid.

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY 107 In September 1881 the marshal proceeded through Lumé to Dibér in order to introduce his reforms, which were called islahat-s (improvements). He had to make certain concessions in order to achieve the desired appeasement. Pressure could be used only in the plains and the towns; the mountains held fast to the status quo ante. Upon Dervish Pasha’s order, notables of Dibér and Prishtiné were arrested and exiled to Istan-

bul. From Dibér the marshal returned to the Turkish capital, where he was held in esteem as an authority on

Albania and was consulted on all questions about the country.” When Istanbul sent Dervish Pasha to northeastern Albania, it also considered how to destroy the southern branch of the League. It gave orders to the Governor General of Janina, Mustafa Assim Pasha, to divide the Albanians. Spreading the news that Janina was saved, the Governor General won over some of the notables. Using the same policy as Dervish Pasha, with whom he was in touch, he had Mehmed Ali Bey Vrioni,

one of the pillars of the League, appointed mutesarrif of Berat, and Neki Pasha Libohova to the corresponding postition in Gjirokastér. In May 1881 he invited several of the main leaders—Mustafa Nuri Pasha from Vloré, Ymer Bey

Vrioni from Berat, Sulejman Bey Dino from Margarit, Mustafa Bey from Janina, as well as Kiazim Bey from Preveza

—to meet him in Preveza, where he had them arrested and deported to the Dardanelles. There they remained until November 1883.4 Thus the southern branch of the Albanian League, too, was destroyed.

It was natural that the struggle for the unification of the Albanian provinces into one vilayet with administrative autonomy should begin in the south. Here the population was 72Cf. Schmucker to Haymerle, Prizren, 9 October 1881, No. 200; Schmucker to Kallay, Prizren, 9g November 1881, No. 220 and g0 November 1881, No. 221, «bid.

TT. Ippen, op.cit., p. 380. 74Wiet to Saint-Hilaire, Janina, 3 June 1881, No. 42, AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Janina, 1881-1884, Vol. x1; M. Frashéri, op.cit., p. 58; T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 380.

108 I, THE GROUNDWORK more advanced and the leaders more aware of the imminent collapse of ‘Turkey. Still the movement had its ups and downs,

depending on the extent of fear of Greek invasion and the influence of the feudal beys. In the north, the idea of an autonomous Albania spread later. ‘The population there was more backward and the need to defend Albanian territory more urgent. However, once the moment came to ask for the application for autonomy, it was the north that took action. ‘The northerners had enjoyed certain local autonomies and resented the centralistic policy of the Porte more than the southerners, who had already made certain accommodations to it. While in the south the movement of the League was primarily Moslem—most of the Orthodox Christians being under Greek influence—in the north both Moslems and Catholics had made common cause. The north was in a better position to ask for autonomy and oppose ‘Turkey with arms.

This opposition and the demand for autonomy—armed or unarmed—was an affirmation of Albanian national aspirations.

The Albanians called the League Milet, the ‘‘nation.” For them the League was not a mere political party which wielded power, but rather a movement of the whole nation, though its organization was loose. ‘Turkey destroyed the League, but could not destroy the spirit it created. The program for autonomy, which embodied Albanian political thinking, continued to influence the generations to come.

PART II

The Struggle for National Affirmation (1881-1908)

BLANK PAGE

Cultural Affirmation THE NATIONAL SPIRIT aroused by the Albanian League con-

tinued to grow. Albanian patriots now turned their attention from the preservation of national territory to the preservation and development of national culture. Among Albania’s Balkan neighbors, religion and nationality coincided. Since

this was not true for the Albanians, their leaders tried to develop those aspects of national culture which were of a non-religious nature, for only in this way could union be | achieved. Consequently, emphasis was placed on the common language, which could serve as a link among the various regional and religious groups. We do not possess many documents written in Albanian in

the distant past. The first reference to Albanian writing dates from 1332, when a Dominican friar, Brochart, presented to Philippe de Valois, king of France, a report in which he spoke about his experiences in the various countries he had visited, in order to induce the king to undertake a crusade. Referring to the Albanians of the north, he wrote: “. . . although the Albanians have a language quite different from

that of the Latins, they use the Latin letters in all their books.’ 1 The first records, however, date from the fifteenth century. They are a baptismal formula in the Roman Cath“Advis directifs pour faire passage d’outre-mer,” par le frére Brochart,

in Documents pour servir a Vhistowre des provinces de Namur, de _ Hatnaut et de Luxembourg, Brussels, 1846, Iv, 294. The Latin original, Directorium ad passagium faciendum, is now attributed to the southern Frenchman and Dominican Guillelmus Adae, archbishop of Antivari, and friar Brocardus has become pseudo-Brocardus; cf. G. Schiro, Jr., Storia della letieratura albanese, Milan, 1951, p. 10. However, this fact does not diminish the significance of the passage; on the contrary, it increases it, for the Albanian Catholic dioceses of the north depended on the Archbishopric of Antivari, with which they joined, in the first half of the fourteenth century, in the fight against Slavic Orthodoxy; cf. M. Sufflay, “Die Kirchenzustande im vortiirkischen Albanien. Die

orthodoxe Durchbruchszone im katholischen Damme,” I[Ilyrisch-

albanische Forschungen, 1, 201 and 214. |

112 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION olic rite from 1462, written in Latin script,? and a fragment of the New Testament, accompanied by an Eastern chant of the Orthodox rite, written with Greek letters and antedating the former record by perhaps half a century, or longer according to some scholars.? These documents testify to the two cultural influences which prevailed in Albania before her conquest by the Turks: Latin-Catholic to the north of the Shkumbi river, Greek-Orthodox to the south of it. Some writings in Albanian appeared during the first four and a half centuries of Turkish domination. A few of them

were lexical and the rest ecclesiastical in nature. ‘These writings were more numerous in the north, where the Catholic clergy, using the mother tongue, tried to edify their fol-

lowers so that they would not succumb to conversion to Islam. Pjetér Budi in his Christian Doctrine (1618) endeavored to stimulate the cultivation of the Albanian language; he taught that God did not hear him who prayed in a foreign language and repeated words he did not understand.* The writings from the Orthodox south are of a much later

period, from the 18th and igth centuries, but similar in character to those of the north. Archpriest ‘Theodore Kavalioti and master Dhanil from Voskopojé (Moskhopolis) left two polyglot dictionaries, while Grigor Argjirokastriti (from Gjirokastér), Orthodox bishop of the Greek island of Eubea, supervised the translation of the gospels into Albanian, published in 1827 at Corfu.® Although the works in the Orthodox “The manuscript, which is preserved in the Laurential Library of Florence, was first published by N. Jorga, Notes et extraits pour servir a Vhistoire des croisades au XV® siécle, 4° série (1453-1476), Bucharest, 1915, pp. 194-198.

8See text of the original, which is housed in the Ambrosian Library of Milan, in N. Borgia, Pericope evangelica in lingua albanese del secolo XIV da un manoscritto greco della Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Grottaferata, 1930, p. 26.

*Cfi. G. Schiro, “Della lingua albanese e della sua letteratura anche in rapporto alle colonie albanesi d'Italia,” Stud: Albanesi, 1 (1932), 105.

5Cf. F. Konitza, “Mémoire sur le mouvement national albanais,” Brussels, January 1899, in HHStA, PA xiv/18, Albanien x11/2, p. 1; E. Cabej, Elemente té gjuhéstsé e té literaturés shqipe (Elements of Albanian Linguistics and Literature), ‘Tirana, 1936, p. 32.

CULTURAL AFFIRMATION Als south were not always devoid of hellenizing tendencies, the use of the vernacular in them helped to keep alive the feeling of national individuality. As for the Albanian Moslems, there are only some manuscripts in Arabic script dating from the eighteenth century on, dealing with subjects which are religious and worldly in inspiration, but influenced by Oriental culture.® Religion also characterized most of the works of this period written in the Albanian language by the ItaloAlbanians.?

To the Albanian patriots such monuments, lexical and ecclesiastical, had the primary merit of testifying to the antiquity of the Albanian people and their language. This antiquity, an important factor in building up the national pride of a people, was revealed more effectively from another side: the works of foreign scholars. The German philosopher G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716) was the first to refer to the Albanian language, but his knowledge consisted of only a few words, which did not enable him to express an opinion about the origin of the Albanian people.® The interest really began with J. Thunmann’s Untersuchungen uber die Geschichte der oestlichen europdischen Volker (1774), in which he maintained that the Thracians had a share

in the formation of the Albanian people. Apart from F.C.H.L. Pouqueville, French Consul in Janina, who in his Voyage dans la Gréce (1820/1821) included a small Albanian

- vocabulary and some grammatical observations on the language, and W. M. Leake’s Researches in Greece (1814), which contained an Albanian-Greek-English vocabulary and an Albanian grammar, the scholar who drew the attention of the learned world to the Albanian language and the problem of the origin of the Albanians was J. Xylander with his ‘The most extensive treatment of Moslem Albanian literature in

249-301. |

Arabic letters 1s contained in D. S. Shuteriqi and others, eds., Historia e letérsisé shqipe (The History of Albanian Literature), Tirana, 1959, 1, ‘Concerning their literature, see ibid., pp. 196-201, 325-349; G. Schird, Jv., op.citt., pp. 101-110.

®See the passages in Leibniz, referring to Albanian, in “L’opinion de Leibniz sur la langue albanaise,” Albania, 1 (1897-1898), 41-43.

114 Il, NATIONAL AFFIRMATION _ Die Sprache der Albanesen oder Schkipetaren (1835). It was the time of comparative philology, and interest in Albanian

erew. Xylander was followed by J. G. v. Hahn, Austrian Consul in Janina, considered the father of Albanology, who published Albanesische Studien (1853/1854), comprising historical notes, a description of Albania and the customs of her population, a grammar, a quite rich folklore, and a vocabulary. The German physician of the Greek navy, C.H.T-. Rheinhold, published Noctes Pelasgicae (Athens, 1855), a collection of folk songs from the Greco-Albanian sailors of the islands of Poros and Hydra. It is interesting to note that one of his studies bears the title Pelasgika, Dialektos tou stolou (Pelasgic [meaning Albanian], Dialect of the Fleet). But it was F. Bopp who first affirmed in his Uber das Albanesische in seinen verwandtschaftlichen Beziehungen (1854)

that Albanian occupied an independent place within the Indo-European family of languages. Indeed, the origin of a people is closely connected with the origin of their language,

and an independent language means also a separate and individual people. Deeper studies of the Albanian language were made in the last quarter of the nineteenth century—when more material in the Albanian language became available. G. Meyer (1850— 1900) of the University of Graz, who during the period 1880

to 1896 produced such significant works as Albanesische Studien, Albanesische Grammattk, Etymologisches Worterbuch der albanesischen Sprache, held that Albanian was a dialect of ancient Illyrian. It was he who demolished the theory of A. Schleicher (1821-1868) about the Pelasgian origin of Albanian. According to this theory, the old IndoEuropean languages such as Greek, Latin, Illyrian—and connected with the latter Albanian—had their origin in the language of the ancient inhabitants of the Balkan peninsula and the Mediterranean basin, that is, the language of the Pelasgians.® It thus placed Albanian in an especially close *The Pelasgians are often mentioned by the Greek writers, but the conceptions the Greeks associated with this name were rather indefinite.

CULTURAL AFFIRMATION 115 relationship with Greek. The writers of the Albanian revival on both sides of the Adriatic embraced this theory, which showed the antiquity of the Albanians and employed it as an argument in the struggle for the defense of Albanian rights. The Greek propagandists, on the other hand, used it in order to attract the Albanians to their side. G. Meyer was followed by other eminent philologists, some of whom held different views from his, for example, that Albanian stemmed from Thracian.1° However much the various scholars differed in their views about the origin of the Albanian language, their works revealed one significant fact: the Albanians were descendants of a great and ancient Indo-European people in the Balkans who had various names at the dawn of history. Influenced by the interest of foreign scholars in the Albanian language and people and by romanticism in the first half of the nineteenth century, a number of Italo-Albanian intellectuals began to write about Albanian history, language, and folklore. In 1848 Vincenzo Dorsa published Daglt Albanest, ricerche e pensiert, which he dedicated to “my nation divided and dispersed but one.”’ However, it was not until the latter half of the nineteenth century that an Albanian literature with nationalistic tendencies emerged. It could not and did not originate inAlbania proper, where Turkish occupation had transformed the religious picture. An Albanian literature of nationalistic character, however, did appear in Italy. Living in separate communities and preserving a liturgy that was Orthodox, the Italo-Albanians had maintained the language, customs, and traditions of their fatherland. Since some of them were deThe name was given to several peoples who inhabited or had inhabited Greece and her immediate neighborhood. To judge by these facts, writes the Danish philologist, H. Pedersen, Pelasgian was not an Indo-European

language. See H. Pedersen, Linguistic Science in the Nineteenth

Century, Cambridge, Mass., 1931, p. 11, note. 10See for linguistic information, E. Gabe], op.cit., pp. 19-22; “Kathe-

drat e gjuhésé shqipe né vénde té huaj dhe albanologjija ose dituri e shqipesé” (The Chairs of Albanian Language Abroad and Albanology),

Diturija, Tirana, 5 (1 March 1927), 161-166; Histori e Shqipérisé

(History of Albania), Tirana, 1959, 1, 28-32.

116 II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION scended from the ruling families of Albania which had fought

against the Ottomans, they also preserved the memories of the glories and defeats of their forefathers. They extolled in song the resistance of the Albanians to the Turkish invaders and the exploits of George Kastrioti Skenderbeg, although such songs remained unsung in Turkish-dominated Albania. The Albanians of Italy were also able to found schools for their own education, and as early as 1794 they possessed an excellent institution, Collegio S. Adriano, in San Demetrio Corone, Calabria, where the Albanian language was taught."? The two great initiators of the Albanian nationalist cultural movement in Italy in the second half of the 19th century were Girolamo De Rada (1814-1903) and Demetrio Camarda (1821-1882). In the Rhapsodies of an Albanian Poem, based on Italo-Albanian folk songs, De Rada told of the freedom of the Albanians prior to the Turkish conquest, their wars against the Ottoman invaders, and their surrender and exile. In Skenderbeg (1872) he sang nostalgically of the heroic past—history and legend blended together—of the Albanian ancestors from which Skenderbeg emerged as the great hero, raising hopes for Albanian revival. In Serafina Thopia he again drew upon the past, but here the poet la-

mented the fate of his compatriots who lived under the Turks: “Divided and with forces dispersed / is the Albanian race / on people’s earth. / Without flag! Without books! / And yet it has a noble language. / It is alone, and adverse fate whips it... .” 12 From 1883 to 1887 De Rada published 11Cf. A. Scura, Gli Albanesi in Italia e 1 loro canti tradizionali, New York, 1912, p. 75; A. Galanti, L’Albania, Rome, 1901, p. 234. It is maintained that the school was founded by Pope Clement XII Corsini, whose mother was of Albanian descent, for the instruction, then exclusively ecclesiastical and classical, of the youth of the Albanian colonies. See Conte Donato Sanminiatelli to Alberto Pisani, “Appunti per un promemoria sulle cose d’Albania,” April 1900, ACS, Carte Pisani-Dossi (1866-1907), No. carte 671, No. Fasc. 40, No. Busta 14. 2G. De Rada, Uno specchio d’umano transito (the title given Serafina Thopia in its later edition), Naples, 1897, p. 37, as quoted by G. Schiro,

Jr., op.cit., p. 134.

CULTURAL AFFIRMATION 117 in Albanian and in Italian a periodical entitled Fjamuri Arbérit (The Flag of Albania), which strove to make known to the West the existence of an Albanian nation that, with its own language and its own national tradition, could well aspire to liberty and independence. The periodical included writings by De Rada himself and other Albanian authors. Michele Marchiano, an Italo-Albanian scholar, observed that the favor enjoyed by De Rada’s review was due “‘to the idea of Albanian nationality, which for the first time was being formulated, and the diffusion of Albanian literature, which until then was vulgarly believed to be a myth.” #8 Camarda’s stress was on language. In his Saggio di grammatologia comparata della lingua albanese (1864), he made a scientific study of the Albanian language, demonstrating its

antiquity. Having espoused the Pelasgian theory, he attempted to show the close relationship between Greek and Albanian.** In the Appendice to this work, Camarda included

specimens of prose and particularly folk songs from Sicily and Calabria, Albania proper and Albanian settlements in Greece. He also tried to give the first example of a common Albanian written language by drawing upon the various dialects.

Another important name was added later to the nationalist activity of the Italo-Albanians, Giuseppe Schiro (18651927), perhaps the greatest of their poets. He, together with De Rada and Camarda, contributed much to cementing the ties between Albanians on both sides of the Adriatic. In 1887 Schird began publishing Arbri i ria (The Young Albanian), which replaced De Rada’s Fyamuri Arbérit. This review,

predominantly literary, aimed at furthering the national union of Albania. Like De Rada, Schiro turned to the glories 18As quoted by G. Petrotta, Svolgimento storico della cultura e della letteratura albanese, Palermo, 1950, p. 61. 14G, Meyer wrote in this connection that “even an accurate scientific analysis of the Albanian language does not solve at all this problem.”

See G. Meyer, “Della lingua e della letteratura albanese,”’ Nuova Antologia, L (15 April 1885), 590.

118 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION of the Albanian past in asserting the rights of Albania to independence. In 1887 he published Albanian Rhapsodies, stating somewhat vaguely that he had taken them from cer-

tain old, forgotten manuscripts. ‘The rhapsodies were in reality his own creations, so well written in the spirit of popular poetry that even Albanologists were deceived. ‘The first part of this work deals with the siege of Krujé (Croya), Skenderbeg’s capital, by Sultan Mehmed II in 1446. In the Foreign Land (1900) he sings of the origin of the Albanians from the ancient Pelasgians, their warlike virtues, especially during Skenderbeg’s period, their conversion to Islam, the time of Ali Pasha ‘Tepelena, the constitution of the League of Prizren. When in 1900 the Italian government established a chair of Albanian language and literature in the Instituto Orientale di Napoli, Schird was appointed to occupy it. The Italo-Albanians found a supporter in Elena Ghika. Under her pen name Dora d’Istria, this Rumanian princess

of Albanian descent, published a study of the Albanian nationality on the basis of folk songs, which showed the Albanians’ love of liberty.1* Using as examples mostly De Rada’s rhapsodies, in which Skenderbeg is the central figure, she pointed out in this and in other studies that the Albanians, although divided by religion, formed one nation and had the right to enjoy freedom and progress. Undoubtedly the movements for the liberation and unification of Italy served as a stimulus to the nationalist cultural

activities of the Italo-Albanians. It was in the liberated Naples of 1848 that De Rada published his patriotic political and literary newspaper, L’Albanese d’Italia.** Similarly, the °G. Petrotta, op.cit., p. 59; Revue d’Orient et d’Hongrie, 2eme année,

No. 15 (571), Budapest, 11 April 1897. *6“La nationalité albanaise selon les chants populaires,” Revue des Deux Mondes, Lx (1866), 382-418. Dora d’Istria was the pseudonym of Elena Kolzow Massalsky, daughter of the Rumanian Prince Michael Ghika. She was born in Bucharest in 1829 and died in Florence in 1888.

Cf. G. Petrotta, op.cit., p. 174. , ,

“%G. Volpe, “Formazione storica dell’ Albania,” Nuova Antologia,

ccccvi (16 December 1939), 327.

CULTURAL AFFIRMATION _ 119 formation of the Albanian League gave an impetus to na-

tionalist cultural trends within Albania. | While the League was actively opposing with arms the encroachments upon Albanian territory, a cultural-educational society, called the Society for the Printing of Albanian

Writings (Shogéri e té shtypuré shkronja shqip),1® was founded on September 30, 1879 in Istanbul, with the aim of ©

promoting publications in the Albanian language. At the head of it was Sami Frashéri, and its membership was composed of adherents to the three faiths in Albania. The signatures to the constitution of the society show that the charter members were prominent Albanians.1® The name of Naim Frashéri, brother of Sami, often mentioned as one of the founders of the society, is not among the signatories; he was, in fact, not yet in Istanbul at that time, but joined the society

later.2° The Society for the Printing of Albanian Writings strengthened the work of the Albanian League; it may even be said that it was its cultural branch. On the other hand, 18This writer has come across the name of this society as Drita (Light),

“Society for the Development of the Albanian Language,” Dituria (Knowledge), and “Society for the Printing of Albanian Letters.” It may be stated with certainty, on the basis of the constitution of that society (Kanonizmé e shogérisé té shtypuri shkronja shqip, Istanbul, 1879, reprinted in Diturija, 1 [1 December 1926], 70-75), that the name given in the text is the correct one, when we translate shronja as “writings,” the - meaning it had when the constitution was written, and not as “letters,” the present meaning. The confusion with Drita, used by such prominent Albanian scholars as F. Konitza, Professor K. Gurakuqi of the University

of Palermo, and Professor G. Schird, Jr., of the University of Rome, seems to have resulted from the fact that the books written in the 1880's by members of the Istanbul society, primarily Naim Frashéri, were published by its Albanian branch in Bucharest, which took the name Drita,

after the appearance of the homonymous review of the society in Istanbul. 18Some of the Moslem members were Mehmed Ali Vrioni, Ibrahim Dino, Abdul Frashéri; among the Catholics were Pashko Vasa Shkodrani

and Nikollé Bonati Shkodrani; among the Orthodox, Koto Hoxhi, Anastas Kostandin Frashéri, Joan Vreto Postenani. See complete list of names in Diturzja, u (1 December 1926), 75. 20“Shogéri e Stambollit” (The Society of Istanbul), zbid., 69.

120 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION the fact that such a society could be formed is evidence that

it met with the consent of the Porte. | In the preamble of its constitution the society stressed enlightenment through one’s own language: “All enlightened

nations have been . . . civilized by writings in their own language. Every nation that does not write its own language and has no works in it is in darkness and barbarian. And the Albanians, not writing their own language and having no [present] works in their own language, are in the same state.

,.. Therefore, those who think and see this great calamity are also aware of the great need to write their language and read works in it.” ?4 The society then declared that it would publish educational works written originally in Albanian or translated from foreign languages; it would create branches wherever there were Albanians; it would also endeavor to publish a weekly, and if its income were substantial, it would open schools in Albania. However, it was not easy for the society to work in Istanbul. In a letter to De Rada, Sami Frashéri complained that progress was slow because there was no liberty in Turkey; the society could not carry out its task, which was not only to print books, as stated in the constitution, but also to revive

the Albanian language and unify its dialects, for which purpose the collaboration of the intellectuals, both in the Ottoman empire and abroad, was needed. “The Albanian language” he wrote, ‘“‘should be one and indivisible just as Albania should be.” ?? Further obstacles to Albanian initiative were created when the conservative circles of the Porte denounced the “soft policy” of the Grand Vizier, Ali Pasha, because he recognized the national principle where the Mos-

Pp. 70. |

lem principle had been in force, thus opening the way to 21““Kanonizma e Stambollit” (The Statutes of Istanbul [Society]), ibid.,

22See Sami Frashéri to Girolamo De Rada, Constantinople, February 20, 1881, Buletin 1 Shkencave Shogérore (Bulletin of Social Sciences), Tirana, No. 2, 1954, p. 115.

CULTURAL AFFIRMATION 121 national claims of other Moslem nationalities.22 The hindrances were increased by 1881, when Turkey began to lose confidence in the Albanians and looked upon them as enemies.”* Yet the society of Istanbul did not stop its activity and several of its members published works in Albanian.

Already before the creation of the Istanbul society, Naum

Veqilharxhi (b. 1797) emphasized the importance of the mother tongue and of education. Vegilharxhi came from a village of Korcé, and at an early age he had emigrated to Rumania, where he had come in contact with the progressive ideas of the West. He preached that a people without education are like slaves and that no nation could acquire knowledge in another language than its own. “Culture,” he wrote, “could be gained only in the mother tongue.” ”® Interest in the oral literature of the Albanian people was not confined to the Italo-Albanian writers. Under their influence and that of foreign scholars, native Albanians had published collections of folklore even before the creation of the League of Prizren. In 1871 Zef Jubani from Shkodeér,

secretary of the French consul in that city, published in Trieste a collection of popular songs of northern Albania, Raccolta di canti popolari e rapsodie albanest, in the introduction to which he held that what bound the Albanians together was common blood, language, customs, and common

aspirations.*® In 1878 ‘Thimi Mitko from Korcé published the Albanian Bee, a collection of folk songs, tales, and proverbs, mainly from southern Albania. In introducing his work, Mitko confessed that his intention was to show, through the material he had collected, the origin, character, and customs of the Albanian “race.” The heroic songs testified that the 8 Histori ¢ Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 43.

24Sami Frashéri to Girolamo De Rada, op.cit., p. 115. | 25N. Vegilharxhi, “E parthénme mbi djelmt e rinj shgiptaré”’ (Foreword to the Young Albanians), in D. S. Shuteriqi, Antologyji e letérsisé shgipe (Anthology of Albanian Literature), Tirana, 1955, pp. 85-88.

6See Histori e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 47. |

122 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION Albanian loved his country and his countrymen, even if they belonged to other religions. He further urged his compatriots to study their mother tongue, “which is the first and common food reviving the people.” 2? The Albanian Bee proved that among the Albanians the memory of various events in their national history was kept alive in their songs.?8 One of the followers of Mitko was Spiro Dine, who compiled the collection Waves of the Sea (1908). Inherent in these collections of folklore, which revealed the treasures of the people and their long tradition, was the desire for national affirmation. As Dine acknowledged, his aim in presenting the work was to tell the life and history of the Albanian people through folklore.”®

Native Albanian writers appreciated the fact that the mother tongue, in order to be more efficient as an instrument of national awakening, should be elevated to the level of a cultivated and literary language. Before 1878 Konstandin Kristoforidhi (1830-1895) from Elbasan, in central Albania, while in the service of the British Bible Society, had already published translations from the Old and New Testaments in a literary prose that had become classical. He had been urged by J. G. v. Hahn, whose teacher in Albanian he was, to devote himself to Albanian studies °° and had come to the conclusion that the Albanian language was of great significance as an expression of the existence of the Albanian nation and its rights. As he wrote subsequently:

“Tf the Albanian language is not written, in a short time there will be no Albania on the surface of the earth nor will

the name Shqiptar [Albanian] appear on the map of the world.’’3! Kristoforidhi continued his literary and linguistic 27E. Métkos, Alvaniké melissa (Albanian Bee), Alexandria, 1878, pp. lll-v. 28G. Meyer, op.cit., 601. *°Cf. F. Cordignano, “Proucavanje narodne poezije u Albaniji’” (The

Study of Popular Poetry in Albania), Prilozi proucavanju narodne poezije (Contributions to the Study of Popular Poetry), v1 (1939), 173. 30S. Shuteriqi, Jetéshkrimi 1 Konstandin Kristoforidhit (The Life of Konstandin Kristoforidhi), Monastir, 1911, pp. 11, 12, 16, 18, 21. 81As cited in Histori e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 37.

CULTURAL AFFIRMATION 123 activity after the League of Prizren. In order to study the dialects of his country, he went from town to town and from village to village, and came into direct contact with the people.*? ‘The material he gathered was published posthumously as the Dictionary of the Albanian Language (1904), a fundamental work. The tendency toward a purified language was also manifested by J. Vreto, a member of the Istanbul society, who, though not a gifted writer, transcribed and published in 1888 the short novel, Erveheja, written by Muhamed Cami (17831844) in Arabic characters, and at the same time purged it of many Arabic, ‘Turkish, and Persian words. However, purity of language alone was not a sufficiently effective incentive to national awakening; patriotic content was also needed. Indeed, a fusion of the two was considered

ideal. Naim Frashéri (1846-1900) excelled in this art. In Bagétt e Bujqést (Cattle and Land), published in 1886, he exalted in poetry the beauty of Albania and the simple life of her people, expressing gratitude that she had bestowed on him “the name Albanian.” His love for the fatherland shines forth in Skenderbeg (1899), a long poem in which the battles of the Albanians against the ‘Turks are described. Like the Italo-Albanians, the Albanians of Albania proper began to revive the glorious past. ‘The Moslems appeared to forget that Skenderbeg had fought against the Ottomans as a Christian. What mattered for them was that he was of their blood—an Albanian—and had fought for the liberation of the country. He was made a symbol of unification and became a national hero. In the Notebook of the Bektashis (1896), Frashéri, who was himself a Bektashi, manifests such a great desire for the

purity of language that he translated even the established Oriental terms of the order. Nor does he mention the mother monastery of the Bektashis, Pzr-evz, in Asia Minor. As explained by his nephew, Midhat Frashéri: “He [Naim] tried hard to convey to the Bektashis that we need a Dede-baba (supreme abbot) from whom the babas (abbots) should receive 32Cf. E. Gabe], op.cit., p. 45.

124 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION their consecration and not go to Pir-evi [for that purpose]; and this Dede-baba should be recognized by all the babas of Albania as their spiritual head.” *° The fact that Pir-evi was ignored by Naim Frashéri seems to betray his intention of creating an independent Bektashi order for Albania.** In his poem “Our Language,” Naim exhorts his compatriots to honor their nation and write their language, exclaiming: “Look, what a language! / What a taste and what a grace / How beautiful and how free / Like God’s language.’”’ And in

“Feja” (Religion) he advises the Albanians not to make a distinction between Christians and Moslems but to let each believe as he wants for they have the same origin and they speak the same language.*°

The conflicts of the Albanians of the north with the neighboring Slavs inspired Gjerg] Fishta (1871-1940), a Franciscan

brother, to write his powerful epic Lahuta e Malsisé (The Lute of the Mountains),?® a poem in thirty cantos. In the volume which appeared at the very outset, At the Bridge of Razhnica (1905), the poet extols, in pure and manly language, the fight of the Albanians against the Montenegrins—for the

defense of Albanian territory which came about as a result of decisions at the Congress of Berlin. Another volume, Vranina, which was published a year later, described the battle between Albanian highlanders and Montenegrins in 1858, with Oso Kuka as the principal hero. Although with Mois Golemi, another historical figure, he too turned to Skenderbeg’s world, his great interest lay in the efforts, revolts, and battles of the Albanians to achieve their independence. He continued his main work after Albania’s liberation, and as he himself wrote in 1935: “There are more than thirteen thousand verses of the Lahuta e Malsisé—published 88Mali Kokojka (pen name of Midhat Frashéri), Naim Be Frashéri, Sofia, 1901, p. 36. | *¢Cf. N. Jokl, “Die Bektashi von Naim Be Frashéri,” Balkan-Archiv,

II (1926), 228. — ©" Feja,” in Albania, 1 (1897), 66.

*6As mentioned before, there is a translation of the complete work in German by M. Lambertz, Die Laute des Hochlandes, Munich, 1958.

CULTURAL AFFIRMATION 125 up to now—which, in bloody battles with the Slavs, at the time of the Congress of Berlin and later, and against the Young Turks, show the revival of national consciousness among the Albanian people and their ‘happy’ triumph in the freedom and independence of Albania.” 37

In 1907 Fishta published a satirical work, The Wasps of Parnassus, inveighing against the Albanians who placed priv-

ate interests above national ones and against those intellectuals who were too lazy to study the mother tongue and disdained it: ‘“Today that the Albanian has disavowed his father / As well as tradition and does not speak Albanian: / He seems vile .. . completely ashamed / Like he . . . who does not know who his father was” (116). And in “The Language of Instruction” he is proud to add: “All the world will know your race / By your most noble language.”’ Another writer of the post-League period was Anton Zako

Cajupi (1866-1930), an Orthodox of southern Albania who spent most of his life in Egypt. He studied law in Switzerland, but he practiced it little. In 1902 he published a collection of poems, Baba Tomovi (Father ‘Tomori), ‘““Tomori’ being the name of a mountain in central Albania, written in the simple language of the people. Gajupi divided his collection in three parts, one of which was the ‘“‘Fatherland,” which he loved as it was, “but when I will see you free / I will love

you still more.” 3§ And in order to see it free he burst out into acry: ‘““Moslems and Christians / We are badly off! / We should rise all / Young and old!” *°

In speaking about Albanian national cultural affirmation, one should not forget the powerful figure of Faik Konitza. He was not a creative writer like those previously mentioned, but a man of wide culture, versed 1n the languages and literatures of the West, whose standards were high and whose influence 87G.. Fishta, ““Vjersha heroike shqyptare” (The Albanian Heroic Song),

1957, P. 50. | |

Hylli 1 Drités (Star of Light), Shkodér, x1 (1935), 146. | 8°The poem entitled “Slavery,” in Gajupi’s Vepra (Works), Tirana, 3°The poem entitled “Albanian,” in ibid., p. 42.

126 II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION among the intellectuals was great. Born in 1876, a Moslem Tosk in a well-to-do family, he had specialized in classical and

romance philology in France. While still young, upon his own initiative he had begun to cultivate his Albanian and had formed a small library composed of the books of foreign Albanologists.*® In 1897 in Brussels he began to publish the

periodical Albania. Faik’s articles were written in fine style and were rich in expressions. He was a master of the Albanian language in all its refinements and of its various dialects. He tried to enrich the vocabulary with words found among the people and in folk songs, and succeeded in raising the language to such a degree that it could treat of difficult subjects. ‘There was a striking difference between the language of an article in Albania and the religious books published at the time in Shkodér or even the more carefully written works by Naim Frashéri.

Not only through language did Faik contribute to the development of national sentiment among the Albanians, but

also through the selection of subjects treated in Albania. Folklore, as a patrimony of the people irrespective of religion,

found its proper place in his journal. He popularized the figure of Skenderbeg and his flag, which he discovered in his

library researches. His journal even printed an Albanian translation of the poems of Skenderbeg contained in Razgovor ugodni narodna slovinskoga (Agreeable Discourse of the Slavic People, Venice, 1756) by the Croat poet Andrija Kaci¢-Miogi¢c. He discovered or publicized Albanian writers like Kristoforidhi, Mitko, Fishta, Gajupi, F. Shiroka, Asdreni, and others.

In contrast to the Italo-Albanians, we find among the Greco-Albanians only one, Anastas Kullurioti, from the isCf. F. Konitza, Albania: the Rock Garden of Southeastern Europe and Other Essays, edited and amplified by G. M. Panarity, Boston, 1957, pp. xxill-xxiv; Federal Writers’ Project of the Works Progress Adminis-

tration of Massachusetts, The Albanian Struggle in the Old World and

New, Boston, 1939, p. 46; Albania, vil (1902), 152-153.

CULTURAL AFFIRMATION 127 land of Salamis, who took part in the struggle for national cultural affirmation. He published in Athens in 1882 Abavatart arberor (Albanian Primer) and Milk for Babies in order to teach his compatriots their mother tongue.*! But they paid no heed to him. ‘The Albanians of Greece, having the same religion as the Greeks, were more inclined toward assimilation. ‘They did not flee Albania from the Turks; they were in Greece when the Turks occupied that country. Their forefathers carried with them language and traditions, but not the heroic exploits of Skenderbeg. Besides, their settlements were

not as large and compact as those of the Italo-Albanians. In 1883 Kullurioti went to southern Albania to propagate his Albanian Primer and his ideas that Greeks and Albanians should help each other so that they could exist as nations. Through the intervention of the Greek consul in Gjirokastér (or Janina),** he was arrested in that town, his Primer confiscated and he himself sent back to Athens.‘ Significant is correspondence from Gjirokastér published on that occasion by a Greek paper in Athens: “Last week the Albanophile Koulourioti came here . .. who intends to create in Athens an Albanian society . . . He began to speak about politics and expound most unwise ideas. . . . Everyone was astonished that from Athens, the center of our hopes, a man came here who is called Greek to preach those ideas which we fight with all our power to keep them from taking roots in this land.” *4 Panayotis Koupitoris (1821-1881) from the island of Hydra was more scholarly but less active. He was interested in the language spoken by the Albanians of Greece, particularly by his compatriots, the Hydriotes. In 1879 his Albanian Studies

appeared, comprising a historical and philological treat“1Cf. “Shqipétarét né Greqi’” (The Albanians in Greece), Dituria mm (1 January 1927), 86; E. Gabe], op.cit., pp. 32-33. *2It is not clear in the articles of Albania and Paliggenesia; see footnotes 43 and 44. Cf. Albania, Iv (1900), 56. **Paliggenesia (Renaissance), Athens, August 22, 1883; a rather free Italian translation of the text is in G Schird, Gli Albanesi e la questione balkanica, Naples, 1904, p. 80.

128 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION ment of the Albanian language and nation. He left unpub-

lished a dictionary of the Albanian language.*® | The collections of folklore and the literary works were published abroad. As the writing of Albanian was forbidden by the ‘Turkish government, Albanian authors living within the empire either used initials, as N.H.F. for Naim H. Frashérl, or wrote under assumed names, like Mali Kokojka for Midhat Frashéri. Faik Konitza used the pseudonym Trank Spiro Bey.*® All the books, however, found their way into Albania. Secret societies formed in the various towns of the country, in both the north and south, smuggled in the books and disseminated them.** *“Koupitorés, Panayotés,” Megalé Helleniké Egkyklopaideia (Great

Greek Encyclopedia), Athens, 1931, Xv, 65.

“It was borrowed from a French historical novel by Léon Cahun, Hassan le Janissatre, 1516, Paris, 1891. Trank Spiro was the name of a Catholic Albanian, whose son had been recruited during the devsirme, reaching a high position in the Janissary corps as Hassan-Aga. Cf. ibid., PP. 2-3.

“Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 1, HHStA, PA xtv/28, Albanien xx/3.

V|

Problems in National Education

THE PROBLEM of schools in Albanian was of great concern to

the Albanian patriotic leaders in the post-League period. It was connected with the language question, and also with that of the alphabet. Sami Frashéri put it succinctly in his book on Albania, which was published toward the end of the century:

“Albania cannot exist without the Albanians, the Albanians cannot exist without the Albanian language, and the latter cannot exist without its own alphabet and without schools.” +

Among the Catholics of the north the question of schools had found a certain solution through the Austrian Kultusprotektorat. ‘This represented the privileges accorded by ‘Turkey to Austria some three centuries back in the Treaty of Vienna (1616), and renewed and expanded by later treaties and decrees, which in the case of Albania meant the building and reparation of Catholic churches, religious institutions and schools.2 On July 4, 1863 the Austrian Consulate of Shkodér

informed its Ministry that “since 1855 there has been in Shkodér an elementary school. It was run before by lay teach-

ers, but then the need of teachers from the Franciscan Missionaries was felt... This institution is aided by the kindness : 1§. Sami Bey Frascheri, Was war Albanien, was ist es, was wird es werden?, aus dem Tiirkischen iibersetzt von A. Traxler, Vienna and Leipzig, 1913, p. 46.

*See for Kultusprotektorat, T. Ippen, “Das religidse Protectorat Osterreich-Ungarns in der Tiirkei,” Die Kultur, 1 (1902), 298-310; Anna H. Benna, “Studien zum Kultusprotektorat Osterreich-Ungarns in Albanien im Zeitalter des Imperialismus (1888-1918),” Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchtvs, Lxxu (1954), 13-46. The specific articles in the treaties between Turkey and Austria which relate to the Kultusprotektorat are included in a letter of Avarna to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 11 February 1913, No. 228/93, ASMAE. A good

summary of what constituted the Kultusprotektorat is found in the article “Das Kultusprotekorat Oesterreich-Ungarns in der Tiirkei,” Politische Correspondenz, No. 31, 1 February 1913, p. 3.

130 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION of our august government with 1,260 Austrian florins.” * In subsequent years the number of students and teachers increased, but until 1902 the directors of the schoo] remained Franciscans of foreign nationality. In that year Pater Gjerg] Fishta became its director, and the program of instruction, based on national principles, was intensified. New higher classes were gradually added, and the school was changed into a lower secondary school, after the Austrian model,* later becoming a full gymnasium. The Jesuits, too, who came to Albania late—in 1841 for the first time—were interested in opening schools. After two attempts to build a seminary in Shkodér in which they were frustrated by the opposition of the Moslem population of the city, they succeeded, through the intervention of the Austrian government, in obtaining a decree from the Porte which allowed the establishment of a seminary in 1860, known as The Albanian Papal Seminary. A special concordat had previously been concluded (August 15, 1855) for this purpose, between emperor Francis Joseph

of Austria and the Vatican. The printing plant which the Jesuits had installed in Shkodér was soon put in operation, and the first book in Albanian to come out of it was the Christian Doctrine (1876), followed four years later by Father Jak Jungg’s Regole grammaticali sulla lingua albanese, which he needed for his courses in Albanian. In 1877 the Jesuits opened

a secondary school in Shkodér, the College of St. Francis Saverius (Kolegjt 1 Shén Francisk Saverit). Although the language of instruction was Italian, Albanian was also taught.® In time other schools run by the Catholic clergy—particularly the Franciscans, for to them was entrusted education in

the countryside—were opened in the province of Shkodér *From the Franciscan Archives in Shkodér, as published in K. Gurakugqi, “Franciskanét né Shqipéri’” (The Franciscans in Albania), Diturija, 11 (January 1928), 93. *Tbid., p. 95.

°Cf. A. Galanti, L’Albania, Rome, 1901, pp. 221-222. °Cf. F. Cordignano, S.J., “Veprat e Eténvet Jesuité né Shgipnin e Veriut, 1841-1928” (The Work of the Jesuit Fathers in Northern Albania, 1841-1928), Diturija, v1 (April 1928), 218-226. , -

NATIONAL EDUCATION 131 because the policy of the Dual Monarchy, as often repeated in the reports of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was to support the development of Albanian consciousness through national

culture in order to form a united Albania as a counterpoise to the Slavs.?

In order to counteract Austrian influence, Italy toward the

end of the nineteenth century began to found schools in Shkodér and in the coastal towns, where Albanian was taught. As early as 1888 Italy opened two lay elementary schools in

Shkodér, one for boys and one for girls, with Italian as the

language of instruction.® |

With respect to the Moslem and Orthodox population, the problem of the Albanian schools was extremely difficult. Petitions were addressed to the Sultan, sometimes even to the

great powers, for the opening of Albanian schools, but in vain.® A bitter protest was sent by Dibér to Istanbul in 1898:

“The repulse given to our request has no basis of reason at all.... Unfortunately we must say that the greatest enemy of Albania is the Sublime Porte! The Government permits in the territory of Albania the foundation of Bulgarian, Serbian, and Greek schools, and denies them to us, who in these lands have been born and live. ‘Thus our sacrosanct rights are trampled on by those who should reward us for the blood we have shed and are shedding for the Ottoman empire.” ?° F. Guicciardini, an important Italian political figure who "Cf. “Memorandum,” Szomolany, 4 October 1907, unsigned, pp. 1-2, HHStA, PA xiv, 28, Albanien xx/7-8; “Mémoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905,” pp. 1, 2, 13-19, HHStA, PA x1v/28, Albanien xx/3. ®Guys to Goblet, Scutari, 23 December 1888, No. 200, AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Scutari, 1884-1889, Vol. xx; Albania, m1 (1899), 97. *See G. Schird, Gli Albanesi e la questione balkanica, Naples, 1904, pp. 105-106, 185; C. Libardi, I primi moti pairiottic: albanesi nel 19101911-1912, Trent, 1935, 1, Document No. 4, pp. 228-231; also E. b. V.

(lora], Die Wahrheit tiber das Vorgehen der Jungtiirken in Albanien,

Vienna and Leipzig, 1911, p. 43. 10In G. Schird, op.cit., p. 185.

132 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION visited Albania in 1901, found that there were not schools for all the citizens. The centers of Greek language possessed schools of their nationality, but they had to pay for their maintenance. The centers of Albanian language were completely deprived of national schools because the Sultan, “on account of anomalies for which it is impossible to have a_ sufficient explanation, while he allows Greek schools, does not allow Albanian schools.” 14 The Albanian patriots also considered unjust, at the time of the Macedonian reforms, the Porte’s refusal to permit the Albanians to found national schools like those of the Macedonian communities.” It is true that there were many anomalies in the Ottoman empire. Though arbitrary, the regime was also flexible. But the “anomaly” of the prohibition of Albanian schools of which Guicciardini spoke could be explained. The Sultan was opposed in principle to any nationalist movement of the Albanian population, particularly of its Moslem section. In the interests of the empire, he imposed Turkish or Arabic education upon the Moslems, irrespective of their national origin. It was hoped that a uniform spirit of religion and state

language would create a barrier between the Christian and Moslem elements. ‘To allow this to break down would have grave consequences for his authority, especially if nationalist tendencies among the Albanians were intensified.** The Italian statesman, Giuliano, who visited Albania in 1909 as a deputy, appreciated the situation, when he wrote that ‘Turkey treated the Moslem Albanians worse than the Christians, because she did not want the unity of Islam to be broken, or a national consciousness to be formed in any part of the Moslem world which would in the end prevail over religious solidarity. For this reason, Turkey, while tolerant with other nation1F, Guicciardini, ‘“Impressioni d’Albania, II,” Nuova Antologia, XCIV (1 July 1901), 25.

Ledoux to Hanotaux, Monastir, 8 January 1897, No. 1, AMAE,

Turquie, Politique intérieure, Albanie, 1897, Vol. 1. , 18Cf. “Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 2; Calice to Goluchowski, Constantinople, 16 November 1898, No. 40B, HHStA, PA xiv, 24, Albanien xIv/4.

NATIONAL EDUCATION _ 133 alities, was not so with the most faithful and favorite, and extended her policy of prohibition of the use of national language and schools to the Christian Albanians, in contrast to the policy toward other Christians. ‘Turkey was aware how intimate the relations between Christian and Moslem Albanians were, and that this relationship would be furthered by common language and by national sentiment.'* In the policy of separation pursued by the Porte, the Patriarchate of Constantinople concurred. It opposed an Albanian language and education for the Orthodox because this would mean a loss of its influence and perhaps the establishment of

an independent Albanian church. Thus the schools were Turkish for the Moslems and Greek for the Orthodox Christians. Some statistics will throw light on the school situation in the vilayet of Janina, where there was a concentration of the Orthodox population. In 1882 the Orthodox community there, composed of 532,000 persons, had a total of 23,368 students in 665 Greek schools, while in a Moslem population ~ of 104,239 of the male sex—Moslem girls did not go to school

—there were only 559 students. Not until the period between the Congress of Berlin and the Young Turk Constitution (1908) were some Albanian schools established in Korcé and its surroundings; they were alternately opened and closed. This was due, on the one hand, to the influence which certain Albanians could exercise in the Turkish capital, and on the other, to the domestic policy of the Porte, which oscillated between reform and conservatism in response to European

pressure. ,

Barred from teaching Albanian openly, the Albanian patri-

ots attempted to teach it in secret. Koto Hoxhi (1824-95) a member of the Istanbul group, was appointed in 1873 as a teacher of the Greek teachers school in Qestorat, near Gjirokastér. There he secretly taught Albanian to his students and 14See G. Schiro, op.cit., pp. 428-429.

15See the detailed annexes A, B, and E in Wiet to Freycinet, Janina, 3 June 1882, No. 81, AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, 1881-1884, Janina, Vol. x1.

134 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION inspired in them a love for their mother tongue and fatherland. He also applied to the Governor General of Janina for the opening of an Albanian school, but was not successful. This activity put K. Hoxhi in trouble with the Greek consul in Janina and with the bishop of Gjirokastér, who excommunicated him. Yet from the school of Qestorat came patriots like Pandeli Sotiri and Petro Nini Luarasi, who followed in the footsteps of their master.?®

The first Albanian school for boys was founded in Korcé in 1885. Influential Albanians in Istanbul, those in the society for the printing of Albanian books, especially Sami Frashéri, managed to obtain permission for such a private school from the Porte.1*7 The Albanian society of Bucharest, Drita (Light),

had undertaken financial support of the school, and the Albanians of Istanbul had found a director in the person of Pandeli Sotiri, who at that time lived in the Turkish capital. Both parties had previously agreed that they should not antagonize the notables of Korcé, who were under Greek cultural influence, by trying to found Albanian schools. ‘Thim1 Marko, a member of Drita and a native of Korcé, was entrusted with this mission. Upon his arrival in Korcé, he met with the Metropolitan and his council (d@émogerontia) and discussed the matter, but the Patriarchate of Constantinople refused to introduce Albanian in the already existing Greek schools of the Orthodox community. Then Pandeli Sotiri was called to Korcé and he opened the Albanian school. It must have been reassuring to him that the Turkish mutesarrif of the city was Mahmud Pasha Elbasani, an Albanian who supported the national cause.1®

During the first years, the number of pupils who attended Cf. Histort e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, pp. 46 and 77. “Cf. F. Konitza, “Mémoire sur le mouvement national albanais,” p. 11, Brussels, January 1899, HHStA, PA xiv, 18, Albanien x11/2.

8See N. Naci, “Shkolla shgqipe né Korcé (The Albanian School in Korc¢é), Diturija, v (1 March 1927), 166-169; Zwiedinek, “Die albanesische Action des k. and k. Ministeriums des Aeussern im Jahre 1897,” Vienna, 11 January 1898, p. 8, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. 7

| NATIONAL EDUCATION 135 the school was relatively high, approximately 200. They belonged to the two denominations; the school was therefore truly national. However, the Moslems later were forced to withdraw on account of Turkish pressure. At the same time the Metropolitan and most of the Orthodox notables, who started the attacks on the Albanian school from the day of its foundation, intensified them. In 1887 Pandeli Sotiri was constrained to leave Korcé—his wife was Greek—and the school was left in the hands of Thanas Sina, a gentle person, and Petro Nini Luarasi, a dynamic revolutionary.’® By threaten-

ing excommunication, the church forced many parents to withdraw their children from the school, so that by 1890 their number was drastically reduced. ‘Toward the end of the 18g0’s

and in the early 1900’s the assaults on Albanian education became more violent. At the outset of this period (November 13, 1898), a school congress was held in Bucharest, where some of the most important members of the Albanian colony there participated. After long discussions a telegram was dispatched to the Sultan, requesting him to order the creation of courses in the Albanian language in all the existing schools in Albania. ‘The telegram pointed out that although one-sixth of the taxes which the Turkish government received from Albania was allocated to the maintenance of schools, there were only one or two Albanian schools, while schools in foreign languages numbered 5,000.2° Most of the latter were ‘Turkish and Greek schools.

_ The patriots in Albania were confronted with another difficulty: they could not raise funds for the support of the school of Korcé. The pro-Patriarchate party falsely accused them of raising funds for the comitadjis, who were in revolt 19N, Naci, op.cit., 167-168, 170; “Apercu itiber die albanesische Knabenschule in Kortscha und die Notwendigkeit ihrer Weiterentwicklung,” written by Orhan Bey and Athanas Sina in November 1899,

in Kral to Goluchowski, Monastir, 4 January 1901, No. 2, Geheim, Beilage v, HHStA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xvt/4. 204 lbania, 11 (1898), 145.

136 | Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION against Ottoman rule. The new Governor of the city, Mehmed

Ali Pasha Delvina, although an Albanian, was against the nationalist movement and was an instrument of the Porte. The Turkish Governor General of Monastir, on the other hand, leaned toward it and supported Nuci Nagi, the newly appointed director of the Albanian school. He wrote to the Governor of Korcé: “This school has now been opened, let it remain so. See to it only that no other schools are opened.” 7! But the Porte thought differently, and Mehmed Delvina was now directly in touch with it. At this point, the Sultan’s mis-

trust of the Christians increased; he feared that the concept of Albanian nationality and unity to which Albanian education would contribute, might be used as an instrument for foreign interests. The reports of his authorities and the devious insinuations nourished these suspicions.?? In 1902 Nuci Naci was arrested and imprisoned in Salonica, while in 1903 the trustees of the school—Thimi Marko, Orhan Pojani, Vani and Spiro Kosturi—were also seized and deported to that city. Orhan Pojani, as a Moslem, was exiled to Asia Minor.?8 The first Albanian school for girls was founded in 1891, again in Korcé, by Gjerasim D. Qirias, with financial help from some Albanians but mostly from the American and English religious missions. ‘The chief members of the teaching

staff had an American education: Sevastia Qirias had been educated at the Istanbul Girls’ College; Grigor M. Cilka had studied first at the Samokov American School in Bulgaria and later at the Union Theological Seminary in New York.** The

Rev. P. Kennedy, the first American missionary teacher to Albania, served the school with devotion. English was also

21N. Naci, op.cit., 173. | ,

22Calice to Goluchowski, Constantinople, 16 November 1898, No. 49B, HHStA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xiv/4. 73N. Naci, op.cit., 174-176; Kral to Goluchowski, Monastir, 6 August 1902, No. 56, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xiv/4. *4Cf. Kral to Goluchowski, Monastir, 4 January 1901, No. 2, Geheim,

Beilage v, HHStA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xvi/4; Monastir, 14 January 1902, No. 8, Beilage, in ibid.; E. Durham, Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle, London, 1920, pp. 103-104.

| NATIONAL EDUCATION 137 taught in this school for girls. At the end of 1898 the number of pupils had reached forty-five. ‘The Moslem students among them were later compelled to leave the school because of an order from the Sultan.?> But the school was not closed by the

Turkish authorities, and it continued to function with an increase in the number of pupils and teaching staff. Obviously, this success was largely due to its connections with the American Board of Missions in Monastir, which protected it

from the anti-Albanian policy of the Turkish government.” The school was officially closed on February 4, 1904, following the arrest of its director, Cilka, but it had virtually ceased to exist some two years before with the abolition of Albanian

as a language of instruction.?" | In the meantime, a few Albanian schools were created in villages not far from Korcé. ‘They were all short-lived. Those in the district of Kolonjé 78 became better known because of the activity of the founder, Petro Nini Luarasi. In 1890 this pioneer of Albanian education visited various Albanian colonies abroad, and with the funds he was able to raise and the promises he received he opened schools upon his return.?® He encountered great obstacles on the part of the church authorities. IIluminating 1s the circular letter against him and his collaborators in 1892 which Philaretos, Archbishop of Kastoria, addressed to the Orthodox population of a group of villages, called Vakéfe, where Luarasi had been active. Referring to Luarasi’s visits to them to recruit teachers of the

Albanian language, the Greek prelate stated that such a language “does not exist” and that Luarasi’s real aim was to distort the conscience of the Orthodox Christians, proselytize them to “free masonry and protestantism,” and destroy the — Report by Zwiedinek, Vienna, December 1901, p. 5, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422; “Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 2. *6Prochaska to Goluchowski, Monastir, 9 January 1905, No. 3, Geheim, and Beilage to it, HHStA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xv1/4. 27Cf. “Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 3. 28In the villages of Luaras, Selenicé, Vodicé, and Treské. -

°Cf. N. Nagi, op.cit., 170; G. Schiro, op.cit., p. 88.

138 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION foundations of Orthodoxy. Philaretos accused the Albanian educator and his adherents of insulting the sacred icons, disdaining the saints, dishonoring the holy cross, not keeping the fasts—all charges to which the Albanian peasant was sensitive,

for they constituted his religion—and propagating the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles (protestant version) which “our Mother Church of Christ, the Patriarchate, has condemned.” The Archbishop then forbade all, “small and big, poor and rich, men and women,” to believe the words and promises of the damned renegade, and appealed to them to remain faithful to the ancestral religion, which “you have already been preserving for 1892 years.” Every Christian who accepted money from the accursed Petro Luarasi and his collaborators, became a teacher of Albanian, or received “masonic’ and “protestant’”’ books, Philaretos continued, would be anathematized by God omnipotent.*° These were strong threats to all Orthodox Albanians. As to the inclusion of the terms “‘mason”’ and “protestant”’ in such a letter, it should be remembered that, among the Orthodox Christians in Albania, ‘“‘free mason’’ had retained the meaning of “protestant” even in the early twentieth century. Secondly, every departure from Greek was held by the Orthodox clergy to be instigated by “‘the enemy of the faith.” As the Foreign and British Bible Society and the American Board of Missions had been instrumental in translating the holy books into the Albanian language, as well as teaching that language, protestantism, which they represented, was regarded as “the enemy of the faith.” However, these were not the only difficulties the patriots had to face. he Albanian schools were also technically at a serious disadvantage: they could not compete with the superior Greek culture. Moreover, the Greek schools had long been established in the south and Albanian education was 80See circular letter in Greek, addressed by Archbishop Philaretos to the priests and the population of Vakouphokhoria, Korytsa (Kor¢é), 20 September 1892, in HHStA, PA xiv/21, Albanien x111/18.

NATIONAL EDUCATION 139 still in its infancy. However, the strong fight waged by Albanian patriots in defense of the Albanian schools in Korcé gave a new stimulus to the national movement. The creation of Albanian schools gave urgency to the question of texts, and in turn to that of the common alphabet. The need of a common alphabet was keenly felt as early as 1825 by Naum Veqilharxhi. Perhaps because he believed that the Greek, Latin, and Arabic alphabets not only did not cor-

respond to the Albanian sounds, but for religious reasons would not be accepted by all Albanians, he began to prepare a special alphabet of his own. He was also of the opinion that Albanian as an independent language should have its own script so that foreign scripts would not be carriers of foreign political influences. Borrowing elements from old alphabets, Veqilharxhi formed a new Albanian alphabet, which he also

used for a primer he published in 1844 under the title Evetor.** It was welcomed in Korcé.*”

A few years before the creation of the League of Prizren, several Albanian intellectuals met to decide on the alphabet,

but they could not agree. The pashas favored the Arabic script. Another party, with Jan Vreto at the head, wanted the Greek alphabet, because, on the basis of the prevailing Pelasgian theory, there was a close relationship between Albanian and Greek. Support for the Latin alphabet came from Vasa Effendi and Ismail Kemal, a prominent official in the Ottoman government who was destined to play an important role for Albania; his advocacy was based not only on historicalpolitical grounds but also on practical ones—the Latin letters were easily available for printing. Another solution was proposed by Hasan Tahsini, who, like Veqilharxhi, maintained that in Albania a totally new alphabet was needed, for which 31A facsimile of the title page (edition of 1845) and a passage, transcribed in Latin letters and translated in French, are included in E. Legrand, Bibliographie albanaise, complétée et publiée par H. Gays, Paris and Athens, 1912, pp. 79-80. 32Cf. Histori e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 8.

140 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION he had invented the letters. But the committee interrupted its

work.*3 , The alphabets which were employed until then—that of the Catholic north, Hahn’s or Kristoforidhi’s, those of the Italo-Albanians, and others **—-were restricted in scope and inconvenient. Sami Frashéri then devised a new alphabet on

the basis of the Latin script, with certain Greek characters and some of his own invention for sounds which the Latin alphabet could not convey. It was founded on the principle of one letter for one sound. The Istanbul Society for the Printing of Albanian Writings adopted it, and in 1879 the first ABC (alfabetare) was published. It spread widely in a brief time, since several educational books were printed in it. F. Konitza, an opponent of this alphabet, wrote in 1898 that it was in use everywhere, especially among the Moslems.%5 The reports of the Austrian Consuls in Albania show that by

1905 the Istanbul alphabet was used by the majority of the population, Orthodox and Moslem. It had even extended northward beyond Durrés, as far as Dibér and the region south of Prizren.*®

Yet this fact did not end the discussions, the question of the alphabet remained a burning issue. The writer Cajupi, aware of the political influence alphabets can exercise, participated

in the controversy. In a series of articles he appealed to his countrymen to give up all prejudices and put their mother tongue and their fatherland above all. He advocated an entire Latin alphabet as the basis of the unified Albanian one, and attacked vehemently the idea of a Greek or Turkish script: “Let us therefore say to the Greek or ‘Turkish alphabets: you too are very much interested in our affairs; you have often been written in blood instead of ink; you have often been used

8Ibid., p. 45. —84See S. Skendi, “The History of the Albanian Alphabet: A Case of

XIX (1960), 263-284. | , ,

Complex Cultural and Political Development,” Stidost-Forschungen,

Albanien x11/2. |

*>Konitza to Zwiedinek, Brussels, 15 April 1898, HHStA, PA xIv/18

°See “Mémoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 14.

NATIONAL EDUCATION 141 to express the lie, the intrigue, and public wickedness; you are still for us a means of division and quarrel; therefore, you do not inspire any confidence in us to choose you, and you will

not have the honor to be the alphabet of our language.” 3 The Catholics of the north employed the complicated “AIphabet of the Ancient Writers of the North” (Budi, Bardhi, Bogdani), referred to at times as the “Catholic Alphabet,” as only the Catholic part of the Albanian population wrote in

it. In 1899 an Albanian literary society, Bashkimi (The Union), was created in Shokdér by Monsignor Preng Doci (Dochi), abbot of Mirdité, in collaboration with the Albanian Catholic clergy, particularly the Franciscan brothers. It set as _ its first task the formation of a simpler alphabet, its composer being the abbot himself. ‘The alphabet was based totally on Latin characters, representing the special sounds by digraphs, the second letter of which was h.** It was named the Bashkimi alphabet, and several textbooks for the Catholic schools were printed in it, subsidized by the Austro-Hungarian government.

But in 1901 a new literary society, Agimi (The Dawn), was constituted in Shkodér by another Catholic clergyman, Dom Ndre Mjeda, a philologist and a poet, who devised another script. Mjeda, too, founded it on the Latin letters, but contrary to Doci, he followed the principle of one letter for one sound, making use of diacritical marks for sounds peculiar to Albanian.?® Mjeda’s alphabet had found approval in the 1902 International Congress of the Orientalists, held in Hamburg, and in the meetings of May 1902 the majority of the higher Catholic clergy in Shkodér expressed themselves in favor of it.4° As textbooks were published in this alphabet, subsidized again by Austria-Hungary, which was inclined to abandon the STA, H. Zakua, “Duke kérkuar njé alfabet” (Looking for an Alphabet),” Shqipéria (Albania), Bucharest, Nos. 49-53, 31 August-1 November 1898, as republished in D. S. Shuteriqi, ed., Gajupi, Vepra (Works), Tirana, 1957, pp. 313-323. Ihe quotations are from p. 317. 38For instance, dh (§), th (6) xh (dz), ch (¢) gh (gj), ete.

8°For instance, g’ (gj), &’ (kj), n’ (nj), ete. *Alric to Delcassé, Scutari, 22 May igog, No. 177, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1902-1903, Vol. Iv.

142 ll, NATIONAL AFFIRMATION Bashkimi alphabet, a conflict arose: the Agimi alphabet vs. the Bashkimi alphabet.*! The fight continued between them, but both were restricted to the province of Shkodér. This situation left the field open to other individual alphabets, and chaos ensued. Pater Gjergj Fishta, himself a member of the Bashkimi society, made it the object of satire in his Wasps of Parnassus (1907). ‘The following are some of the verses, translated freely: With every mushroom springs forth a man of letters, Who, with brain fevered by tales and newspapers,

Composes at last and gives birth toan ABC. Yes, a mule’s offspring. But again poor Albania By them will be divided into as many chunks and pieces

As there are letters from A to Z. |

The books used in the few Albanian schools in the south were printed in the alphabet of Istanbul, which was also adopted by various publications of the Albanian colonies.

The books were published principally in Bucharest, for Turkey “did not once permit the printing of the smallest brochure’ and the ‘Turk regarded as an enemy the Albanian who wrote and read in his own language.*? ‘The books were usually written by members of the society of Istanbul, particularly Naim and Sami Frashéri. Some of the books were: ABC of the Albanian Language, Arithmetic, Reader for Boys, Knowledge for Elementary Schools, Geography, St. Matthew’s Gospel, History of Skenderbeg.*® Similar were those printed

in the Bashkimi alphabet in Shkodér: ABC, First Reader, Second Reader, Grammar, Arithmetic.** By 1906 even the prudent Jesuits began to pay more attention to the teaching “See “Mémoire uber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 16; Monsignor Dochi to Zwiedinek, Vienna, 16 February 1906, HHStA, PA xiv/7, Albanien v/. #25. Sami Bey Frascheri, op.cit., p. 35.

“For a list of books with authors and dates of publication, see “Aktiviteti i Shqiptarévet né Rumani” (The Activity of the Albanians in Rumania), Diturija, 1 (1 January 1927), goff.

*44lbania, vi (1901), 127.

NATIONAL EDUCATION 143 of the Albanian language in their schools,** employing books perhaps in the Agimi alphabet. ‘Toward the end of the nineteenth century, among the Moslems of the south and the center there was a lively movement

for the learning of the Albanian language. They asked for readers, and the consuls of Austria-Hungary were requested to introduce them in great numbers from Bucharest. Secret societies were formed which with their own funds supported the teaching of Albanian in buildings put at their disposal by patriots. In such matters there was a noticeable collaboration between Moslem and Christian notables in central Albania, especially in places under Bektashi influence, as for instance, around Krujé.*® In general, the tekkes of the Bektashis were centers for the cultivation of the Albanian language, although

at the outset with Arabic characters.*7 The Bektashis were also instrumental in smuggling and distributing books in Albania. Cavasses of the Bektashi order employed in foreign consulates had the prohibited publications dispatched to them from abroad under cover of the inviolability of the consulates.4® Dervishes even acted as carriers.*®

A fairly complete account of education in the vernacular among the Albanians in 1899 was made by F. Konitza. Among the Albanian functionaries in the country many knew how to

read and write their language. In the districts of Korcé, KoFerté to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 24 November 1906, No. 51, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1906-1907, Vol. vi. 46See Zwiedinek, ‘‘Die albanesische Action des k. und k. Ministeriums

der Aeussern im Jahre 1897,” Vienna, 11 January 1898, p. 9, and report of December 1901, Geheim, p. 5, in HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel,

Fasz. 422; Ledoux to Hanotaux, Monastir, 16 January 1897, No. a2, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1897, Vol. I. “"Cf. Histori e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 46; Malaspina to the French

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Janina, 16 January 1905, No. 1, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1904-1905, Vol. v. *8Prochaska to Goluchowski, Monastir, 24 May 1906, No. 21, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/14, Albanien x1/2. 49M. Hasluck, ‘““The Noncomformist Moslems of Albania,” Contemporary Review, cxxvu (May 1925), 601.

144 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION lonjé, Berat, almost all the beys cultivated the Albanian language, and in Elbasan and Monastir quite a few of them. The youth of the schools were greatly interested in the national

question. The mass of the people, and especially the gendarmes, especially in the vilayet of Monastir, almost all knew how to read. Among the Albanian Moslems of the north few even knew that their language had begun to be written. How-

ever, among the Moslems of Dibér, Mat, ‘Tirané, and the towns of the littoral, writing had been diffused. Almost every-

where the people were ready to welcome Albanian schools. The towns where they were ardently desired were: Elbasan, Kolonjé, Vloré, Pérmet, Tepelene, Vércé, Dibér, Ohrid, T1-

rané, Mat and many smaller towns. Elsewhere there was

thy.®° oO

indifference which would soon be transformed into sympa-

The patriots had learned that to stimulate interest in the

mother tongue in the broad layers of the Albanian population they must awaken a feeling of kinship. Through their efforts, the knowledge of reading and writing Albanian spread considerably, and it did so at a time when the new Turkish orders (from 1902 on) made punishable not only the possession of an Albanian book but even the use of the Albanian language in correspondence.*! OKaik Konitza, “Mémoire sur le mouvement national albanais,’” Pp. 27.

‘Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 1; Kral to Calice, Monastir, 18 July 1902, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422.

_ VI Role of Societies and Press Abroad

IN THE NATIONAL REVIVAL of the Balkan peoples under ‘Turk-

ish rule an important role was played by their colonies in foreign lands. Albanian colonies were established in Rumania, Bulgaria, Egypt, and the United States. ‘They took an active part in the national movement, but lacked the cohesion

which uniformity of religion had brought to the other striving Balkan peoples. ‘Those who migrated were mostly Christian Orthodox, the Moslems as well as the Catholic mountaineers having less reason to move, and they tended to settle in Christian lands. The earliest and most significant Albanian colony was founded in Rumania. Naum Veqilharxhi, one of the pioneers of Albanian emigration, was followed by many Albanians from the district of Korcé, almost all Christian Orthodox, the majority of whom settled in Bucharest. ‘They were not intellectuals; most of them became small tradesmen, or were craftsmen and workers,! but over the years, some of them acquired great wealth. Living in a land that was Orthodox but not pro-Greek, not only because of unpleasant memories of Phanariot domination but also because of the hellenizing propaganda among the Vlakhs of Macedonia and the Pindus mountains, the Albanian immigrants began to free themselves from Greek cultural influence and direct their attention to Albanian language and culture, although not totally untinged by Christian Orthodoxy. The first Albanian society in Rumania was an offshoot of the Society of Istanbul. In 1880 the Society of Istanbul, which was determined to survive even if the Albanian League were destroyed, sent one of its members, J. Vreto, to Bucharest to organize a branch there. A year later an Albanian society was 1Sch6nburg to Aehrenthal, Bucharest, 18 April 1907, No. 19G, HHStA,

PA xiv/14, Albanien x1/3; F. Konitza, ‘Mémoire sur le mouvement national albanais,” Brussels, January 1899, p. 13, HHStA, PA xiv/18, Albanien x1I/2.

146 II, NATIONAL AFFIRMATION founded in the Rumanian capital.? It was some time, however, before it became independent, for the Society of Istanbul was still active and maintained close relations with it. It had applied for permission to publish a cultural review in the Ottoman capital, but the authorities were reluctant to grant it until the summer of 1884, when they were disturbed by Greek propaganda which was inciting the Albanians to revolt. ‘The review, called Drita (Light), appeared in August of that year,

under the nominal editorship of an Orthodox, Petro Poga, because the Porte still considered the Moslem Albanians as

Turks; but the real editor of the publication was Naim Frashéri. When P. Poga was compelled to resign, owing to pressure from the Greek Patriarchate, Drita continued to be printed but with another name, Dituria (Knowledge), this time, too, under the nominal editorship of an Orthodox, Pandeli Sotiri. Like its predecessor, it was short-lived. It was then that the headquarters of the Istanbul Society were transferred to Bucharest, where in January 1885 its branch became the fullfledged society Drita, with Anastas Avram Lakshe, one of the wealthiest members of the colony, as its president. Two years later the society was re-formed under the name Dituria.® ‘This identity in the names of the reviews and societies often caused

confusion in the writings of Albanians. Dituria became very active after 1895, under the presidency of the capable Pandel1 Evangyjeli,* who in the interwar period served as Albania’s

Prime Minister. In 1902 a branch of it was established in Constanza.

Most of the members of the two societies were residents of 2J. Vreto, ‘““Mbi lévizjen e Rilindjes’ (On the Revival Movement), in D. S. Shuterigi, ed., Aniologyji e letérsisé shqipe (Anthology of Albanian Literature), Tirana, 1955, pp. 177-178; S. Sami Bey Frascheri, Was war Albanien, was ist es, was wird es werden? Aus dem Tiirkischen tibersetzt von A. Traxler, Vienna and Leipzig, 1913, p. 35. 8See J. Vreto, op.cit., p. 178; “Aktiviteti i Shgiptarévet né Rumani”

(The Activity of the Albanians in Rumania) Diturija (Knowledge), 1 (1 November 1926), 23-25. C. A. Dako, Albania—The Master Key to the Near East, Boston, 1919, p. 83. *F, Konitza, op.cit., p. 17.

SOCIETIES AND PRESS ABROAD 147 Bucharest, and the funds came from dues and donations. The main aim of the societies was to serve the national movement by printing and distributing books in Albanian as well as by supporting the boys’ school in Korcé. The close ties between them and the Istanbul society were also manifested in a special article of their statutes, which made the use of the Frash-

Eri alphabet obligatory for anything they printed. It was in Bucharest that the works of Naim Frashéri, Sami Frashéri, Jan

Vreto, and others first saw the light. ‘They were, as a rule, smuggled into Albania.® When the patriot Idhomene Kostur1 from Korcé returned in 1902 from a visit to Bucharest, he reported to his compatriots that the principal concern of Dituria was to improve the boys’ school in Korcé by the addi-

tion of higher grades, the introduction of new subjects, and

the selection of better teachers.® |

It was no easy matter to help the Albanian schools. ‘The pro-Greek notables of Korcé, under the guise of Orthodoxy, interfered in the affairs of the Albanian colony in Rumania. The following is an instance. In 1888 Anastas A. Lakshe sent a

copy of his will to his native town. He had bequeathed to the

Albanian schools in Korcé a substantial sum and had appointed as executors, along with co-religionist notables, Ohran + Bey Pojani, a Moslem, known for his activity in favor of the

Albanian educational movement. The Orthodox executors met and decided, evidently at the instigation of the Greek Metropolitan and his adherents, to turn down their appointment on the ground that Lakshe had associated them with a Moslem. Intrigues followed which in effect split the Albanians in Bucharest.’

Disagreements had broken out in the colony of Bucharest even before the incident of Lakshe’s testament. Nikolla Naco, a native of Korcé who had been active in the national moveCf. “Akitiviteti i Shqiptarévet né Rumani,” op.cit., 24-25; F. Konitza, op.cit., p. 17. 6Kral to Goluchowski, Monastir, 31 May 1902, No. 45, HHStA, PA xiv/14, Albanien x1/3. 7G. Schird, Gli Albanesi e la questione balkanica, Naples, 1904, p. 88; F. Konitza, op.cit., p. 15.

148 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION | ment in Egypt, arrived in 1884 in the Rumanian capital and became a member of the society Drita. He did not approve of the political platform of the society, and in 1886 he leveled a series of criticisms against its leadership. He attacked it for being very slow in the cultural field, for not yet having published the periodical upon which a resolution was passed in January 1885, and for the wavering attitude of some of its members toward the Greek Orthodox Church. Being an orator and a dynamic person, Naco succeeded in winning over to his side some members of the society and created a splinter sroup. Soon, however, it became apparent that, behind his criticisms of the council of the society Drita, Naco concealed suspicious political views. Whereas the societies of Bucharest and Istanbul insisted that the Albanian national movement should rely on Albanian forces alone and avoid the interference of foreign powers, Naco thought the liberation of Albania required external support. He called for the collaboration of the Albanians with the Vlakhs of Albania, Macedonia and the Pindus. ‘Thus, he urged, they would enjoy the political and material aid of Rumania, which was interested in the fate of the Vlakhs and would enlist the sympathy of the Triple Alliance to which Rumania had adhered in 1883. In order to obtain the greatest support from Rumania, Naco even proposed the fusion of the Albanian and Vlakh national movements, implying the creation of a common Albanian-Vlakh state which would be able to oppose the covetous plans of

Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro. | The majority of Albanian patriots did not agree with Nago’s criticisms and still less with his political views. Naco then created with his splinter group a new society, which he

named the Society of the Albanians “Drita” (January 9, 1887).° His society had as honorary trustees Rumanian per"See Histori e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, pp. 113-114; Aktiviteti Shqiptaré-

vet né Rumani” (The Activity of the Albanians in Rumania), Diturija, mt (1 December 1926), 50.

*The second source of footnote 8 gives the date of its founding as 1 November 1892. This does not seem to be correct, because in the period 1887-1892 Nago’s society was active. See Histori e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. I15.

SOCIETIES AND PRESS ABROAD 149 sonalities, and prominent in its program was the AlbanianVlakh collaboration in the political and cultural fields. Naco was an opponent of the Istanbul alphabet, insisting that a completely Latin alphabet was necessary for the unification of the Albanians,!° and had adopted for his publications an alphabet based on that of the Rumanian language. Both his society and his organ were subsidized by the Rumanian gov-

ernment.

Naco also attempted to win the support of Italy and Austria~Hungary. In 1892 he addressed a letter to Humberto I, King of Italy, about the many obstacles confronting the Albanians in their national development and requested Hum-

berto to intervene with Turkey in order to remove these obstacles.!* In 1904 he sent a report to the Austro-Hungarian

representative in Bucharest, Pallavicini, stating that in the period 1892-1894 he had subsidized the Albanian schools in the villages of Kolonjé and appealing for aid to open them again,}8

_ The fight between the societies of Bucharest continued for some time. Naco’s Drita was composed of a few Albanian and Vlakh members; in the political field it had no success, and

in cultural matters its accomplishments were slight. The society Dituria, on the other hand, was supported by the preponderant majority of the Albanian patriots and cooperated with other Albanian organizations, avoiding collaboration with any foreign power.'* Nevertheless, Naco continued his activities, and the Society of the Albanians “Drita’”’ was identified with him until his death in 1912. A third cultural organization was founded on September 12, 1900 in Bucharest. It was called Shpresa (Hope) and was *0See copy of letter of N. Naco to Mgr. Mieda, Bucharest, 19 June 1902, included in Pallavicini to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Vienna), Sinaia, 5 August 1902, No. 101 Res., HHStA, PA x1v/14, Albanien x1/3. 11FTistort e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 114.

?2N. N. Nacio to Humberto I, Bucharest, 27 July 1892 (O. S.), in Albania, ASMAE.

#8Pallavicini to Goluchowski, Bucharest, 14 February 1904, No. 6C, Beilage, HHStA, PA xiv/16, Albanien x11/4. *Histori e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 115.

150 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION composed primarily of university students. Owing to lack of funds, it could not begin to function until the beginning of 1902, when its membership rose to 150. The president was a well-to-do but uneducated businessman, while its vice-president was the lyric poet Asdren, and its secretary, the soul of the society, was Kristaq Daku, a student of literature at the University of Bucharest. ‘The aim of Shpresa was the enlight-

enment of the Albanian people.® Prior to the merger of Shpresa and Dituria, Kristaq Daku represented both societies in the Congress of the Subjugated People of ‘Turkey, which was held in Vienna in 1902. There he presented the following proposals: (1) Creation of Albanian schools in all Albania and in localities of Turkey where the majority of the population was Albanian, the schools to be maintained by taxes in the respective districts. (2) Religious services in all the Orthodox churches of Albania conducted in Albanian. (3) A general amnesty for political prisoners.1® Shpresa also appealed to Delcassé, the French Foreign Minister, to intervene in urging

Turkey to grant the Albanians that which she had already accorded to the other nationalities: the learning of their language.1* ‘The members of Shpresa were enthusiastic nation-

alists. Pallavicini, however, considered them too young and immature for any support from his government.!® As a more intensive political movement had started in Albania and guerrilla bands (comitadjis) were formed in the mountains, it was natural for the Albanian societies in Bucharest not to remain indifferent. In December 1906 the three Article 2, Statutul Cerculut Cultural al Tinerilor Albanesi din Rominia “Shpresa,” Bucharest, 1900. See statutes of “Shpresa” in French, as annexe to Henry to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Paris), Bucharest,

26 February 1903, No. 9, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1902-1903, Vol. Iv. 16Sch6énburg to Goluchowski, Bucharest, 20 December 1902, No. 73C,

HHStA, PA xiv/14, Albanien x1/3.

La société “Shpresa” a Delcassé, Bucharest, 10 February 1903, AMAE, op.cit.

_ 48Pallavicini to Goluchowski, Bucharest, 1 April 1903, No. 19B,

vertraulich, HHStA, PA x1v/14, Albanien x1/3. :

SOCIETIES AND PRESS ABROAD 151 societies—Dituria, Drita, and Shpresa—merged and formed a new society, Bashkimi (The Union). Although article 2 of the statutes of Bashkimi stated that the purpose of the society was to print books, to found schools in Bucharest and in Albania, and to publish or subsidize Albanian literary periodicals, it was chiefly engaged in politics.’ ‘There were several other Albanian organizations in Rumania, like The Albanian Youth (1904) in Braila, but they were short-lived. ‘They all had as their principal objective the

printing of books and the propagation of Albanian literature.?°

The creation of Albanian societies in the colonies was accompanied by the publication of newspapers and periodicals. Not all were written entirely in Albanian, several con-

tained articles in other languages as well. Their role was mainly political, although they did not neglect the cultural. In Rumania, the oldest Albanian newspaper was Shqiptart (lhe Albanian), founded in 1888 by N. Naco and published weekly. Written in Albanian, Rumanian, and French, it ap-

peared for several years, although with long intervals of interruption. It attacked primarily Greek chauvinists and Albanian Grecomans, as obstructing the national interest. _ The Star of Albania, organ of the Albanian nationalists, was published for the first time in 1898, in Bucharest. In 1903 the fortnightly Albanian Renaissance made its appearance, under the editorship of ‘Thoma Avrami, a teacher of Albanian and French, with the motto “Albania to the Albanians.” Meanwhile, in June, 1900 an Albanian paper written in Rumanian and ‘Turkish was issued in Bucharest. ‘The editors were two Albanian students from the University of Istanbul, Dervish Huma and Jashar Erebara. ‘The paper had no connection with any of the societies. Its program was the independence of Albania under a foreign prince and the protection of the great powers. It soon folded up because of lack of funds and a pro1°Cf. “Aktiviteti i Shqiptarevet ne Rumani,” Diturija 1 (1 November 1926), 27-28. 20Cf. Albania, 1X (1904), 177.

152 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION test on the part of the Turkish embassy in Rumania.”! Shqvpéria (Albania), organ of the society Dituria, seems to have been an influential newspaper, published under the direction

of Viské Dodani, a rich man and an honest patriot from Bucharest.?? In 1898 this paper opened its columns to the discussion of the Albanian alphabet, which was a burning _

question.”3 |

Early in 1882 Jan Vreto left Bucharest for Egypt in order to develop nationalist propaganda in the Albanian colony

there. The Albanians in Egypt were predominantly from southern Albania and lived in Cairo, Alexandria, and the cities of the Nile Delta. There were not only wealthy businessmen among them but also intellectual patriots, like Thimi Mitko, Gajupi, Spiro Dine, and others. They were fewer in number than their compatriots of Rumania but more broad-minded, partly because they lived in a rather cosmopolitan environment. As the country was ruled by an AIlbanian Moslem dynasty, the colony also comprised Moslem Albanians. Dr. J. Adhamidhi, an Albanian physician in Cairo, tried to effect collaboration between the colony of Egypt and the Albanians of Bucharest, but failed.?4 ‘Toward the end of the nineteenth century the Albanians of

Egypt were better organized and in 1894 they founded in Cairo a society called Véllazéria Shqiptare (Albanian Brother-

hood). Its president was Milo Duci, a merchant from Korcé, and it counted among its members Filip Shiroka (alias Gegé Postripa) from Shkodér, a designing engineer and one of the most appreciated Albanian lyric poets.?° In October 1900

| Duci issued the newspaper Besa-Besén (Word of Honor) to | be replaced a year later by Toska (Tosk). He wrote in the 1Pallavicini to Goluchowski, Sinaia, 21 July 1900, No. 35, D, HHStA, PA xiv/16, Albanien x11/1-7. *2Cf. “Aktiviteti 1 Shqiptarévet né Rumani,” Dituriyja, Ww (1 February 1927), 147; F. Konitza, op.ctt., p. 30. *8See Cajupi, Vepra (Works), ed. D. S. Shuteriqi, Tirana, 1957, p. 313. 4Ct. “Aktiviteti i Shqiptarévet né Rumani,” Diturzja, u (1 November

*Tbid., pp. 30, 36. , |

1926), Op.cit., pp. 25-26.

SOCIETIES AND PRESS ABROAD 153 first issue that it was “the organ of national thought” and had as its purpose “the flourishing of the [Albanian] language.” Toska lasted only until 1903, owing to scarcity of funds and of capable collaborators.*® Referring to Besa-Besén,

the only newspaper written in the Tosk dialect to employ the Bashkimi alphabet, T. Ippen, Consul General of the Dual Monarchy in Shkodér, wrote that he had greater trust in it than in those Albanian or Albanophile papers, published in Egypt and written partly in Italian or Turkish, which vanished as soon as they reached their goal, which was to blackmail the Yildiz Késk.?7 Apparently he had in mind the newspaper Bashkimi 1 Shqiptarévet (Union of the Albanians), which appeared for sometime in Cairo under the direction of Ismail Hakki Bey, an Albanian political exile from Dibér. Although suspect because he had been in the secret police of the Sultan,?® he was the moving force in a group of other

Albanian exiles, mediating in their behalf for Turkish reforms and collaborating with the Young Turks and Greeks. Many copies of his paper were dispatched to Janina and Salonica and from there smuggled into Albania.2® ‘Thimi Mitko contributed at first to Bashkimi 1 Shqtptarévet, which had pro-Greek propensities,®° but he soon stopped, and in _. Faik’s Albania one reads several complaints of Mitko against Ismail Hakki. The Toska of Duci was replaced in 1904 by Besa (Word of Honor), edited by Fogion Turtulli and Thoma 26See “Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” Vienna,

April 1905, p. 15, HHStA, PA xiv/28, Albanien xx/3; D. Fullani, “Milo Duci—si patriot dhe si shrimtar” (Milo Duci as a Patriot and as a Writer), Bulletin « Universitetit Shtéteror té Tiranés, Serta shkencast shogerore (Bulletin of the State University of ‘Tirana, Social Sciences Series,) No. 4, 1963, pp. 98-112.

27Ippen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 2 January 1901, No. 1B, HHStA, PA xiv/16, Albanien x11/1-7. *8Konitza to [Zwiedinek], Brussels, 18 November 1900, HHStA, PA xiv/14, Albanien x11/2. 29Valics to Goluchowski, Cairo, 15 March 1901, No. 21, vertraulich, and 21 June 1901, No. 56, Beilage, HHStA, PA xiv, 16, Albanien x11/1-7. S°T bid.

154 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION Avrami, the latter having come from Bucharest.*1 ‘Two other pioneers of the Albanian national movement in Egypt were Jani Vruho and ‘Thanas ‘Tashko, who for three years (1906-

1909) published a newspaper called Shkopi (Stick), which was distributed free of charge. It championed the cause of Albanian independence ” and “flogged the Grecomans.”’ 38 ‘Two other newspapers which came into being at about the same time in Egypt were Zgjim: (Awakening) and Pellasgu (Pelasgian).4

The Albanian Orthodox of Egypt could not very well get rid of Greek influences. The Greeks in the Egyptian cities, toward the turn of the century, were numerous and had a developed cultural life. ‘hey seem to have had considerable influence on the Albanians, whom they claimed as members of their own family, on the basis of a supposed common Pelasgian origin. ‘Chis created confusion in the ranks of the Orthodox Albanians.®®

The Albanians of Rumania were more successful in establishing connections with those of Bulgaria than with those

of Egypt. In 1901 the colony of Sofia numbered some 200, most of them southern Albanians of the Orthodox faith. They were workers, the majority stone-cutters and masons. In 1893 they established the patriotic society Déshira (Desire), the stated objective of which was to spread the knowledge of the __ Albanian language and to open and support Albanian schools first in Albania and later in Sofia.3* Relations between the 3\““Mémoire iber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 15. 8*See Metropolitan F. S. Noli, compiler, Fiftieth Anniversary of the

Albanian Orthodox Church in America, 1908-1958, Boston, 1960, PP. 95-96.

88 Dépéche of the French Vice-Consul at Usktib to his Ministry, 21 May 1907, annexe, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 19061907, Vol. VI. $47 bid.

35Valics to Goluchowski, Cairo, 15 March 1901, No. 21, vertraulich, and 21 June 1901, No. 56, Beilage, HHStA, PA x1v/16, Albanien x11/1-.

"See art. 2 of the statutes in K. Frashéri, Rilindja kombétare shqiptare (Albanian National Renaissance), Tirana, 1962, p. 45.

SOCIETIES AND PRESS ABROAD 155 society and the Albanians of Bucharest and Istanbul soon became close. The president of Déshira was Kristo P. Luarasi, a lumber merchant who at the same time ran a printing house,

Mbrothésia (Progress) (1896), which used the letters of the Istanbul alphabet. Here his publications, like Kalendart Kombiar (National Calendar), the editor of which was Midhat Frashéri, were printed and books printed in Bucharest were also sold.?7 Mbrothésia arranged for the secret conveyance of publications to Albania and established contacts with patriotic

groups in the mother country.*® |

Of all the Albanian publications which appeared abroad the one which enjoyed the greatest popularity in southern Albania and as far north as Tirané and Durrés was Drita of Sofia. It was a fortnightly, first issued in November 1901. Its editor, Shahin Kolonja, was held in high esteem by Moslems and Christians alike. He was a graduate of Mulkiye (School of Public Administration) in Istanbul and had served as professor and director in ‘Turkish secondary schools and as

kaymakam in several centers in the Balkans. But the popularity of Drita was due more to the subjects it treated, which were topical, and to the ‘Tosk dialect, which was more widely

understood by the reading public. Among its readers were Albanian officers of the Turkish army and high government officials, who received it cautiously but read it regularly.*®

Drita had an uplifting influence on Albanian official opin- | ion through its pure national program, which laid stress on union. In its first issue, which carried as its motto, “Work for yourselves—Do not work for others and for foreigners,”’ Shahin tackled the problem of language and religion. In a passage reminiscent of Lessing’s famous play, Nathan the s7Cf. Miller to Goluchowski, Sofia, 2 May 1901, No. 21D, streng vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/14, Albanien x1/3. 38See Histort e Shqipérisé, 1900-1919 (History of Albania, 1900-1919),

Tirana, 1961, p. 12. Hereafter cited as Histori e Shgipérisé, 1900-1919.

89Cf. Ranzi to Goluchowski, Valona, 17 April 1904, No. 24/res.; Bornemisza to Goluchowski, Durazzo, 14 May 1904, No. 9; Kwiatkowski to Goluchowski, Scutari, 17 September 1904, No. 108—all in HHSi#A, PA xiv/16, Albanien x11/1-7.

156 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION Wise, he stated that “the Albanian was an Albanian before he

became a Christian or a Mohammedan.” He then put the questions to those who prevented the Albanian from learning

his own language: ‘Did the Prophet know Turkish? Has he said that we should learn that language and abandon ours?

.. . Has not Christ ordered you [Orthodox and Catholic clergy] to enlighten men, make them understand, show them

the right way in their own language, in order to gain salvation and eternal life? Now what are all these incomprehensible languages with which you divide and confuse us? Why

don’t you hear the word of God, instead of propagating the ideas of the Patriarchate and the Exarchate, which are the tools of Athens and Sofia? What can a clergyman who is not Albanian but Greek, Italian, or Austrian do in Albania? How is he going to make this [Albanian] nation understand rel1gion, when he does not talk to him in Albanian?” 4° Shahin’s Drita was, therefore, the appropriate periodical to publish the protest of the Albanian society Shpresa of Bucharest, calling on the Patriarchate to forbid the clergy to anathematize those

who learned the Albanian language.*! © | |

When Gligor Cilka, one of the teachers of the girls’ school

in Korcé, returned in 1906 to Monastir from a trip he had taken in Bulgaria, he reported that four groups of Albanians had been formed in Sofia in order to support the nationalist efforts of Shahin Kolonja and Kristo Luarasi and that he him-

self had entrusted people with the organization of similar groups in Plovdiv and Rus¢cuk (Ruse).”

An Albanian from abroad who was not a member of a

colony or society but played a significant role was Faik Konitza. While in Paris in 1895, he first learned about the existence of an Albanian national movement and the books in 4o°K vérteta” (The Truth), Drita (Light), Sofia, 1-14 November 1901, - 2.

, “See text in 1bid., 12-25 October 1902, p. 3. *2Prochaska to Goluchowski, Monastir, 24 May 1906, No. 21, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/14, Albanien x1/2.

SOCIETIES AND PRESS ABROAD 157

Albanian printed in Bucharest. He attempted to go there to publish a daily, but the project did not materialize. He then decided to publish in Brussels his own review, Albania, the first issue of which appeared on March 25, 1897.*8 Issued as a monthly and sometimes a bimonthly and written in Albanian and French, its publication, first in Brussels and later in London, lasted until 1909, something of a record for an Albanian periodical of this era. The interest of the Dual Monarchy in the development of the national consciousness of the Albanians convinced Faik

that a collaboration with it would be profitable to the AIbanian national cause. He expressed his opinion to Khevenhiiller, Austro-Hungarian Minister to Belgium, and in November 1897 he visited Vienna, presenting to Baron Zwie-

dinek of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry, who had formerly served as consul in Janina, his program. Its aim was to develop Albanian national feeling, and make the Albanian Moslems completely aware that they were different from the Turks. Several means should be employed to attain this goal: (1) the review, written in Albanian (Tosk and Geg dialects) and French, would publish folk songs, historic chronicles, patriotic poems, discussions of economic questions, etc. ;

(2) a general society (the Albanian Renaissance) would be formed, the members of which would put into action the ideas advocated in the review; (3) schools would be the object

of most active concern. Faik considered as obstacles to the program the mistrust of the Porte, the hatred created by confessional division, foreign propaganda, and the influence of Albanians abroad.** Zwiedinek had emphasized, during the conversation, that Albania should not provoke an agitation against the Turkish government—Faik had previously at*F, Konitza, “Mémoire sur le mouvement national albanais,” pp. 15-16.

#4See Konitza to Ippen, Brussels, 18 August 1897, in tbid.; Ippen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 3 September 1897, No. 41, in tbid.; Konitza to Zwiedinek, Vienna, 26 November 1897, in ibid.

158 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION — tacked both Turkey and Greece—and that it should be willing to publish articles which the Austro-Hungarian govern-

ment would present to it.45 — | Konitza wrote a constitution for the proposed society, which

read in part: “The Albanian Renaissance has no center anywhere; not being a committee of action but of intellectual relations, an exchange of views will consequently be suffcient. However, in the towns where there are many members, the latter will form a friendly circle in order to come together

often and converse.” #6 Such a loose organization could scarcely attain its objectives. This society did not in fact materialize.

However, in the literary field, Faik made significant contributions. Albania was much sought after by Albanian intel-

lectuals, both in the south and in the north—in the north because it contained articles in the Geg dialect and used an alphabet which was close to that of the Bashkimi of Shkodér.

In 1899 Faik also started the publication of the fortnightly Albania e Vogél (Little Albania), which comprised news of special political interest and noteworthy events. In addition, he published a calendar and a primer for adults. Albania, welcomed everywhere in the beginning, experienced a decline after some years. An inquiry made in 1903—

1904 by the representatives of the Dual Monarchy in Albania on the situation of the Albanian press found that Konitza’s review had a relatively restricted number of patrons.** Shahin’s Drita far surpassed Albania in popularity. Some of the “Cf. copy of a letter [by Goluchowski] to Khevenhiiller (Brussels), Vienna, 7 December 1897, No. 96C, in zbid.; “Notre Programme,” Albania, 11 (1898), 64-65.

““Konitza to Zwiedinek, Brussels, 2 June 1898, and as a Beilage Statuts de la société culturelle ‘La Renaissance Albanaise”’; Zwiedinek, “Die albanische Action des k. k. Ministeriums des Aeussern im Jahre 1897,” [Vienna], 11 January 1808, p. 12, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422 (NVA/iv 96C, Aqf). *7Cf. Kral, uber den Brief vom 5. 12. 1905 Faik Bey’s, des Heraus-

gebers der “Albania,” an Seine Exzellenz Freiherrn von Zwiedinek, Scutari, January 1906, HHStA, PA xiv/ig, Albanien xu1/2.

SOCIETIES AND PRESS ABROAD 159 reasons given by Faik for this situation, like the hostility of the Porte and the caution of the Albanian cultivated class,** would seem to have been more valid for Drita than for his publication. The real reasons were to be found in Faik’s personality and the nature of Albania. Faik was irritable by temperament, had an inclination for polemics, and was selfrighteous in his attitude. Relegating politics to the background, Albania had little topical interest to offer, and when it did have, its timeliness diminished because it was amonthly,

and at times appeared irregularly. But there is something to

be said for Faik’s argument that he failed to increase the number of collaborators and readers because the Albanian patriots of the south thought that Albania needed particularly to make known her rights to “Europe” and the task of an Albanian publication should be in that direction.*® Konitza

did not neglect this aspect of the Albanian question. His

| articles or translations in French served that purpose; but his affirmation of the culture, nationality, and the rights of the Albanian people was regarded as too indirect an approach to the question. In retrospect Faik Konitza’s work in Albania, which he always called the organ of the Albanians of Albania, at a time when the Albanian movement was in its infancy, may be said to have been patriotic in its motives and a highly valuable contribution. At the beginning of the twentieth century a small Albanian colony emerged in the United States. Gradually it grew, and became the most important of all the Albanian settlements abroad. The immigrants were from the south, chiefly from the district of Korcé, which maintained supremacy even later when others from Gyirokastér began to arrive. They were mainly Christian Orthodox and settled for the most part in Massachusetts, with Boston as their center.®° 48K onitza to Baron [Zwiedinek], London, 17 January 1903, in ibid. *°Tbid.

5oThe first immigrant was from Korcé and arrived in 1876, but he soon left for Argentina. Others followed, and at the turn of the century,

160 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION The leaders of the Albanian national movement began now to turn their attention to the new colony, trying to convert it to their cause. Their task was not easy because the immigrants were an uneducated and confused group, who worked in the factories. But the Albanian leaders enjoyed in America a freedom of action which they could never find in any other country. ‘Their activity was made easier also because the Albanians in America, living among so many ethnic minorities, became more conscious of their own national individuality. Although the immigration was mixed, the opposition between the ruling Moslem and the ruled Christian

| which existed in the Ottoman empire no longer prevailed here. Besides, the economic opportunities enabled the immigrants to support the national movement financially. Conditions in the United States were consequently very favorable for the Albanian leaders to work for union and nationalism. As early as 1905 an Albanian society had been founded in Buffalo. It was called Malli i Mémédheut (the Longing for the Fatherland), and its founder was Petro N. Luarasi, who had left Albania after the closing of the Albanian school for boys in Kor¢é. It was to this society, composed of a few members, that Fan S. Noli, who was to play a very significant role in the Albanian colony of the United States, was sent in 1906 from Egypt. ®4 Other societies, such as Koha e Lirisé (Time of Freedom) (1906) in New York, Besa-Besén (Word of Honor) (1907) in Boston, and Lidhja (Union) (1907) in St. Louis were of less importance.™

The publication of a weekly, Kombi (Nation), in Boston, in June 1906, laid the cornerstone of the national movement.

This first Albanian newspaper in the United States was

pp. 5-6. |

there was a substantial influx. ‘The Albanians expressed their gratitude

to these early settlers in some of their songs. See Federal Writers’

Project of the Works Progress Administration of Massachusetts, op.cit., *iCf. Metropolitan F. S. Noli, compiler, op.cit., p. 100.

*2Cf. Albania, X (1906), 127.

SOCIETIES AND PRESS ABROAD 161 owned, edited, and published by Sotir Peci from Dardhé of Korcé, a middle-aged intellectual who had studied at the University of Athens.°? ‘The weekly supported the program laid | down by the nationalist leaders in Albania and abroad which at this time was chiefly cultural. It emphasized the demand for the use of the Albanian language and the opening of Albanian schools. Next to Shahin’s Drita, Kombi was the most influential Albanian publication.®4

The establishment of an Albanian Orthodox autocephalous church had been one of the principal objectives of the patriots since 1880. Sami Frashéri rated it next to the Albanian language in importance. He urged the Albanians to rid themselves of their dependence on the Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian churches—especially the Greek church—and create their own church with Albanian priests and a liturgy in Albanian.*° As it was impossible to reach this goal in Albania, on account of the opposition of the Patriarchate and the ‘Turkish government, an attempt was also made to introduce only the AI-

banian language in the church services. When this effort failed, the patriots turned their thoughts to the constitution of an Albanian church outside Albania and ‘Turkey. Bucharest seemed at the moment best suited for the purpose.°® The church movement in Bucharest appears to have started

at the outset of the century. On May 27, 1900 Naco’s Drita

| had as the first point in its program the separation of the Albanian church from the Greek Patriarchate and the introduction of the Albanian language in its liturgy.® ‘Chere are also ‘minutes of a meeting held in the headquarters of the society Shpresa on March 12, 1903. A decision was made to build ‘8Cf. Federal Writers’ Project of the Works Progress Administration of Massachusetts, op.cit., pp. 37-38. 54Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 12 April 1907, No. 51 Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/16, Albanien x11/1-7. 55See S. Sami Bey Frascheri, op.cit., p. 49.

6“Aktiviteti i Shqiptarévet né Rumani,” Diturija, m (1 February 1927), 87-88. — 74 lbania, iv (1900), 107.

162 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION an Albanian church in Bucharest and a committee for that purpose was elected. Obviously the decision was not carried out, for two years later another fruitless attempt was made.*®

It was in the United States of America that the first Albanian Orthodox Church was founded. On March 22, 1908 in the Knights of Honor Hall, in Boston, the first liturgy in Albanian was celebrated.®® An incident expedited it. In 1907 a young Albanian died in Hudson, Mass., and the local Greek

priest refused to officiate for the funeral services, on the ground that the young man was an Albanian nationalist and as such “automatically excommunicated.” No other Orthodox priest being available in the neighborhood, the deceased was buried without any religious service. ‘The incident provoked indignation among the Albanians of Massachusetts, who called a meeting and decided to have an Albanian priest ordained. ‘They invited Fan S. Noli to undertake the mission, and he hastened to accept it. Platon, the Russian archbishop of New York, ordained him priest on March 8, 1908, at the age of twenty-six. Fan Stylian Noli was born in 1882, in Ibrik-Tepe (Alb. Qytezé), an Albanian settlement south of Adrianople, in Eastern Thrace. He received his elementary and secondary education in Greek schools. After having lived for some time in Athens, doing odd jobs, he moved in 1903 to Egypt, where he taught in Greek community schools. It was in Egypt that he met Albanian members of the colony, who brought him in contact with the national movement. They persuaded him to sail to America, where later in life he completed his higher education, first at Harvard, and in 1945 at Boston University with a Ph. D. in history.® The Albanian Orthodox Church of America, which was established with the ordination of Fan S. Noli as priest au8Dituriya, 1 (1 December 1926), 88-89. *°Metropolitan F. S. Noli, compiler, op.cit., p. 108.

6°fbid., pp. 104-108. |

SICf. ibid., pp. 35-110; Federal Writers’ Project of the Works Progress Administration of Massachusetts, op.cit., p. 38.

SOCIETIES AND PRESS ABROAD 163 thorized to conduct services in Albanian, was a missionary

church under the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox _ Church. It was organized as an independent diocese in 1919, and it has been an independent branch of the Eastern Ortho-

dox Church ever since.®? The Albanians, however, have con- | sidered it as their own independent church from the very start.

The creation of the Albanian Orthodox Church in America | was a powerful incentive to the growth of Albanian national feeling. With the introduction of Albanian in the liturgy, the church assumed a national character. Fan S. Noli translated the service from Greek and used it immediately after his ordination. He later translated many liturgical books in a clear and beautiful language. If national character could be preserved in the church, why not in the activities of daily lifer Fan S. Noli turned the pulpit into a tribune for nationalist preaching.® The other priests serving Albanian congregations followed his example, for they were not at the service of the Greek church, but nationalistic-minded Albanians. The func-

tion of the Albanian Orthodox Church did not remain religious; it also became patriotic. As a religious institution, the Church interested only the Orthodox Albanians. As an institution established in order to detach them from the Patriarchate

of Constantinople, whose policy was to hellenize them and unite them with Greece, it acquired a broader and national significance. This second aspect of the Albanian Orthodox Church of America concerned not only the Orthodox Albanians but also their Moslem and Catholic compatriots. ‘The activity of the Albanian colonies in the United States was intensified in the period following the creation of the Church —after 1908.

Other societies formed in distant Albanian colonies were Lidhja Shqiptare (Albanian Union) in 1907 in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and Pérlindja (Renaissance) in 1908 in Odessa, 62Metropolitan F. S$. Noli, compiler, op.cit., pp. 9 and 22.

63Federal Writers’ Project of the Works Progress Administration of

Massachusetts, op.cit., p. 43. |

164 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION Russia.** Although they did not play a significant part in the national movement, they were indications of the rise of Albanian national consciousness. Despite the various conflicts among members of colonies and societies—sometimes because of personal ambitions and sometimes because of external forces which tried to divide or influence them—and lack of coordination of their activities, their movement was helpful at a time when conditions in the mother country were adverse to the manifestation of the national sentiment.

“*Histort e Shqipérisé, 1900-1919, p. 12. ,

Vil. Political Thinking THE PROGRAM Of the League of Prizren exercised a powerful

influence on Albanian political thought for three decades after its formation. This is evident in the writings of nationalist leaders and in the various appeals and memoranda written by Albanian committees and societies. Among the first Albanian leaders to express political opin-

ions about their country were the three Frashéri brothers. Abdul’s fundamental idea of an autonomous Albania remained the same, but he saw it within the framework of the changing conditions. Revealing in this respect is a letter he addressed in 1890 to Francesco Crispi, at that time Prime Minister of Italy. The ideas he expressed were shared by the Albanian notables in Istanbul. If they did not sign the letter, it was, as Abdul put it, because of “V’etat génant dans lequel nous vivons.” +

The Albanian leader maintained that the Eastern Ques— tion could not be solved unless Europe took into consideration the fate of Albania, which occupied an important place in the Balkans. Peace in the peninsula was precarious; if the

great powers tried to partition Albania among the small neighboring states, peace could not be achieved, for the AIbanians would fight to the end. ‘There was only one solution: the satisfaction of the just and legitimate desires of the Albanian nation. Abdul did not depart from the principle of administrative autonomy, but he was realistic enough to accept other forms of government which would preserve it. He made it clear that what the Albanians desired and demanded was that European justice should put an end to their state of oppression, and make their country an autonomous province or a small kingdom, in accordance with the new organization of the peninsula. ‘The Albanians would be willing to be part of a Balkan Confederation or to recognize the supremacy of tAbdul Frashéri to Francesco Crispi, Constantinople, 16 September 1890, ASMAE, Fasc. 1493.

166 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION a big state on condition that they be given administrative autonomy and be allowed to maintain the natural and ethno-

graphic frontiers of their motherland. Having traced the boundaries of what he believed to be Albania, Abdul said of Macedonia—“‘the vilayet of Salonica together with the southeastern part of the sandjaks of Monastir and Usktib”—that if Europe wished to give this territory a similar autonomy, the Albanians would have no objections. Macedonia and Albania could then be placed together advantageously under the same prince as a dual state. The Albanians, he further declared, favored a European organization and European laws.?

Union of the Albanians was the deep concern of Naim Frashéri, the apostle-poet of Albanian nationalism, whose credo was expressed in his “Eternal League of the Albanians”:

‘‘All of us have as religion God and mother and father Albania. Let each worship God as he likes. But this should not divide us.” ? He stressed this theme again in his Notebook of the Bektashis: “The Bektashis are brothers not only among themselves but with all humanity as well. ... But above all they love their fatherland and their countrymen, this being the highest of all virtues.” * Owing largely to his influence, Bektashism in Albania followed a patriotic and nationalistic trend. The same theme of union is stated very simply in “Religion,’”’ a poem published in 1897 in Albania: “All of us are brothers, /We have the same blood and the same language; / Don’t say Turks and Giaurs,/Never say this.” > Naim’s political thinking did not go beyond the desire for Albanian brotherhood and patriotism. Union was also the objective of Abdul’s youngest brother, Sami Frashéri, but his approach was more political. As early *T bid.

3See D. S. Shuteriqi, ed., Aniology: e letérsisé shqipe (Anthology of

Albanian Literature), Tirana, 1955, p. 216.

*N. Frashéri, Fletore e Bektashinjet (Notebook of the Bektashis), as republished in Balkan Archiv, 11 (1926), 231-232. °N. [aim] F. [rashéri], “Feja,” Albania, 1 (1897-1898), 66.

POLITICAL THINKING 167 as 1881 he replied to Girolamo De Rada, who had recommended a division of Albania, on the basis of religion, into three units of a federative state,® that the plan was neither good nor feasible. In the first place, Sami argued, the Albanians did not want to be divided but wanted to be more closely united. Secondly, Albania was not split according to religion, and Albanians of different religion did not live in separate regions but mixed with one another, except in the south where there were no Catholics. There were tribes composed of Christians and Moslems, and a Christian was closer to a Moslem of the same descent than to a Christian of another origin. Despite all efforts of foreigners—Turks, Greeks, and Slavs—to divide Albanians, the brotherhood among them |

had not been destroyed. Any division among Albanians on account of religion must be remedied. Sami emphasized that confessions should be left to the church and the mosque and that all Albanians should become brothers as intended by nature and as they had been of old.” But Sami Frashéri’s main political ideas were expressed in his booklet, Albania: What She Has Been, What She Is, What She Shall Be (1899).8 He protested against the identification of Albanian Moslems as Turks and Albanian Ortho_ dox Christians as Roums. He bitterly resented the Greek attempt to hellenize and separate the Albanian Orthodox Chris6De Rada’s letter has not been discovered yet. In reality there are two letters: one from November 28, 1880, and the other from February

2, 1881. His opinion about the federative state is revealed in Sami Frashéri’s reply: Constantinople, February 20, 1881. Complete text in Buletin pér Shkencat Shogérore (Bulletin for Social Sciences), Tirana, II (1954), 114-116.

Ibid.

8First written in Albanian and published in Bucharest, it was translated in 1901 in Turkish by Shahin Kolonja, and in 1913 A. Traxler translated it from Turkish into German. The references are from the German translation, the only one available to the author. A few passages of the original are found in Kolonja’s Drita, Sofia, 14 December 1901, No. 1.

(168 II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION tian so that at the convenient moment Toskéria could be

incorporated into Greece.® |

Sami was a deeper political thinker than his brother Naim, and developed his ideas further. He believed that Albania

| and Turkey could no longer live together, even if Turkey were to have another period of prosperity. Albania would not

be able to preserve her nationality and language if ‘Turkey continued to prevent the Albanians from founding their own schools and developing their own language, while she allowed

other nationalities, her own and Albania’s enemies, to act as they pleased. If ‘Turkish rule were to continue, there would eventually remain no trace of Albania, Sami Frashéri believed,

for she would be partitioned by the Greeks and the Slavs. Albania’s fate, therefore, was in the hands of the Albanians themselves.?°

Yet Sami Frashéri did not advocate revolt against ‘Turkey

for the freedom of his fatherland. He appealed to the Albanians to form a union, a besa, and demand the recognition of Albanian rights by Europe and Turkey. The Porte would finally be compelled to yield to the pressure brought to bear on it. Sami knew that Turkey would not grant administrative autonomy of her own accord; he had expressed this con- _ viction long before, in his letter to De Rada. The besa would be preserved until the national rights of autonomous administration of Albania under the sovereignty of the Sultan were assured. He did not propose that Albania break away from Turkey as long as ‘Turkey remained in Europe. However, feeling that ‘Turkey’s position there would not long endure, he thought the Albanians should be prepared to create an independent state.*? Although Sami’s proposed besa bears strong resemblance to the League of Prizren, conditions at that time were different. When the League was created Albanians were forced to °S. Sami Bey Frascheri, Was war Albanien, was ist es, was wird es werden?, Vienna and Leipzig, 1913, pp. 29-30.

7 bid., p. 41. Oe “Ibid., PP. 44, 47°49.

POLITICAL THINKING 169 unite in order to defend their territory, and the movement was supported by Turkey, whose interests coincided with that.

of the Albanians: preservation of lands within the Empire. Sami Frashéri advocated a union of all Albanians at a time when they felt no real outside pressure—only some suspicions —and when Turkey herself opposed it. Furthermore, the distinction between local privileges and national rights was not

clear to the majority of the inhabitants. In fact, in the north, local privileges were predominant. Living in Istanbul for many years and wishing to see the Albanians emerge as a united nation, Sami idealized the situation. Although noble and patriotic, his proposal was not practical at that time. Abdul Frashéri was realistic and willing to accept any form of government, as long as Albania could keep her ethnic boundaries and enjoy administrative autonomy. His brother Sami, on the other hand, was an opponent of monarchy. An independent Albania, he held, did not need Moslem or Christian princes who would rob her. She should be ruled as a democracy of elders, the form of government which the Albanian highlanders had. He envisaged the future independent state of Albania as a sort of republic, composed of 15 sandjaks, each divided into 3 or 4 kazas. Its capital would be a new city

in the center of the country, called Skender Begas (the city of Skenderbeg). The republic would have a president at the head and a senate. The legislative body would be the parliament, and all the organs of the administration would be chosen by the people. The government would look after the economic development of the country and the education of the people.” Another learned patriot of the circle of the Frashéri brothers was the Catholic Vasa Pasha. His writings in Albanian are

few. He is remembered mostly for a poem, “Oh! Albania,” published posthumously in the National Calendar for 1899 in Sofia, in which he shows deep concern about the lack of union of his compatriots: “Albanians, you are killing your brothers, / You are divided into a hundred parties: /Some say 12For details, see :bid., pp. 50-64.

170 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION I am a Christian, others Iam a Moslem/ One: I am a Turk, the other: I am a Latin [Catholic]; / Some say: I am a Greek; Slav, some others;/ But you are brothers all, you unfortunate ones!/ The priests and the hodjas have confused you/ In order to divide you.”’ And toward the end he cries: “Awaken, Albanians, from the slumber! / All of you like brothers unite in one faith! / Don’t pay attention to churches and mosques, / The faith of the Albanian is Albaniandom!”’ **

Vasa Pasha, going beyond the brotherhood of the Albanians, actually proposed the unification of Albanian territories into one vilayet. Being a high official of the empire— he died in 1892 while Turkish governor of Lebanon—he took into account the interest of ‘Turkey as well. He attacked the division of the vilayets, which lacked the criterion of homo-

geneity, and maintained that it was to the interest of all, indeed of paramount interest, to unite Albania into a single vilayet with a simple organization, compact and strong, to give Albanians a large part in the public administration, and “to inaugurate under the scepter of H.I.M. the Sultan an era of union, concord, and fraternity, for all beliefs and all religions.”’ 14

Another Catholic of the north, the most active and pollitically minded, was Monsignor Prenk Doci (Dochi), who devised the Bashkimi alphabet. Born in 1849 in a village near Lesh (Alessio), he studied in Collegium Urbanum of the _ Propaganda Fide, in Rome, and in 1875 was appointed priest in Mirdité, where he developed a close friendship with Prenk Bib Doda. Involved in the uprising of that district against the Turks in 1877, he was arrested and exiled to Istanbul. He then travelled for ten years abroad on various Vatican missions, returning to Rome in 188%. A year later he came back to Albania, as abbot of Mirdité, by way of Vienna.’ 8D. S. Shuteriqi, op.cit., pp. 181-182.

4Wassa Effendi, La vérité sur lAlbanie et les Albanais, étude historique et critique, Paris, 1879, p. 98.

Cf. Ippen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 31 January 1901, No. 2A-B, Beilage, PA x1v/7, Albanien v/1; Maissa to [Italian] Minister of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 9 March 1892, No. 57/25 confidential, ASMAE.

POLITICAL THINKING 171 In March 1897, Monsignor Doci presented to the AustroHungarian Foreign Office, with which his relations were close, a memorandum on the means for the development of the autonomy of Albania. Like Sami Frashéri, he proposed the formation of a union, besa, of the northern tribes for the defense of the country against any outside attack. ‘This besa would be welcomed by Turkey, as Albania’s territorial integrity and nationality were threatened by the neighboring states. The besa would choose an executive committee which would preserve good relations with the Porte, the Sultan being regarded as the rightful sovereign. It should also work in such a fashion that gradually the government of the land would | pass from the hands of the Turks to those of the native Albanians. The will for national defense should be kept alive, distinguishing between friends and enemies. ‘The besa should be on guard as far as the Balkan states and Italy were concerned, but should try to cultivate friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, the only power which had the desire and interest to support and defend Albania. However, Doci was not as broad-minded as Sami Frashéri. His thinking was regional and Catholic. ‘The besa he advocated was restricted to the north and had as its next task the creation of a Catholic principality. For this purpose he proposed that Prenk Bib Doda, who was in exile, be appointed governor of the Christians (Catholics) of the vilayet of Shkodér, on the basis of the resolutions of the Congress of Berlin, where Austria-Hungary and France had supported the privileged position of Mirdité.1° ‘The next step would be to attempt to bring together the various Catholic tribes, fusing them at the end into one large tribe, that of Mirdité. ‘The

unification of the mountain tribes with the Catholics of Shkodér and its surroundings would create the principality of the Catholics of northern Albania—“‘without revolt and 16France, Ministére des Affaires Etrangéres, Documents diplomatiques (Paris), Série A. Vol. Lxxxvi1 (1878), pp. 206-207; or Protocol No. 13—

Sitting of 5 July 1878, in A and P, Vol. Lxxxi 1878, Turkey, No. 38 (1878), pp. 198-199.

172 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION without blood.” In this small state there would be 160,000 Catholics and 50,000 Moslems. With the establishment of this

principality, the abbot believed, Montenegro’s aggrandizement at the expense of Albania would be thwarted for good; the new state would be in a position to oppose Montenegro by its own forces alone. Serbia also would not occupy any Albanian territory, because the principality would be an ally of the Albanians of the Kosovo vilayet. The new state would be considered inwardly Austrian, since its formation would depend on Austria-Hungary as the only power that could sup-

port and protect it. |

_ Dogi envisaged at the same time the creation of four other small states in Albania—Kosovo, Krujé, Toskéri, and Epirus —which would follow but not precede the formation of the Catholic principality. ‘The Catholic principality would also exercise a significant influence on the constitution of one single government for the whole of Albania, which would be a sort of confederation. For this purpose allies would be necessary, and Doci proposed that, by using the Italo-Albanians, a party for the unity and independence of Albania should be formed among the Orthodox Christians of Epirus.1” Doci’s detailed political program was more of a logical construction than a plan of action corresponding to the realities of Albania at that moment. There seem to have been two leading principles: (1) to make the Catholic north the nucleus of an Albanian state, with Shkodér as its center; (2) to attract the support of Austria-Hungary for that Catholic state. Concentrating on the Catholic world, he did not take into account sufficiently two weighty factors: the reaction of the Albanian Moslems and the reaction of the Turkish government. The 50,000 Moslems in the province of Shkodér whom he mentioned would have resented from the very start their inclusion in a Catholic state. Nor were they alone; the Turkish gov7See “Promemoria Monsignore Primo Dochi’s tiber Albanien,” Vienna, 14 March 1897, pp. 1-15, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz.

422,00 - |

POLITICAL THINKING 173

mistic tendencies. | |

_ ernment had made it plain that it would oppose any autonoThe developments envisaged in Doci’s plan seem to take place in a vacuum. He proposed the creation of small states, without indicating how these states were to be constituted, and their unification, without pointing out the links which would bind them. His proposal to attract the Italo-Albanians in order to exercise their influence on the Orthodox Christians of the south, when he previously had regarded Italy as an enemy, was also unrealistic. ‘The sound political thoughts are set forth at the beginning of the project, where he speaks about the attempt to stop the vendettas among the tribesmen, the conclusion of bésa in a restricted area, and autonomy un-

der the sovereignty of the Sultan. | The Austrians at the outset lavishly subsidized Doci’s proeram, but they still had doubts about its materialization. Referring to it in a telegram to Pasetti, its ambassador in Rome, the Ballhausplatz stated: “It is certainly very questionable whether the far-reaching plan of a confederation of the Albanian tribes in northern, middle, and southern Albania, in the manner suggested by Mgr. Docchi, would be realized.” 1° Doci’s influence was only in Mirdité and among part of the Catholic clergy, which was active in trying to awaken the national consciousness among the Catholic highlanders.!® By | 1903 Ippen was constrained to report that Dogi had not been able to unite Mirdité and had antagonized the Catholic bishops, even Mer. Mjeda. At this time, according to the Austrian consul, Doci was thinking in terms of a liberation war, with guerrilla bands, and all the rest.2° Doci’s project was

relinquished. |

Meanwhile, Ippen, who had visited the highlanders and

lived long among the Catholics of Shkodér, sent to Vienna an 18Aussenministerium to Pasetti in Rome, Vienna, 16 June 1897, No. 785 (Depesche), HHStA, PA xiv/¥7, Albanien v/1, 2. 18Tppen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 28 June 1900, No. 21B, in zbid. 20°Ippen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 3 June 1903, No. 35A-B, ibid.

174 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION enlightening, though not flattering, report on his province. He believed that among the Catholic mountaineers, who constituted the bulk of the population of the province, the national idea could hardly take root, because another idea, that of tribal particularism, was closer to their hearts. As for the Catholics of the city of Shkodér, the Austrian consul wrote that almost all pretended to be patriots, but their patriotism was “limited only to talk and phrases and succumbs easily to gain and money.” 2?

In 1897 there occurred in Shkodér the famous incident of the ‘“‘slain pig” in the mosque—the pig is taboo for the Moslems—as a retaliation for the profanation of the cross in a Catholic cemetery.*? It gave vent to fanaticism on both sides.?3

The desire of the Catholics was to free themselves from Turkish domination, especially from the arbitrariness of the

beys and the agas of Shkodér. By 1903 the Catholics of Shkodér and their clergy, tired of the anarchy and supremacy

of their Moslem compatriots, wanted to do away with the Turkish regime.*4

The political thinking of the Orthodox Albanians was divided into two categories. ‘Those who lived in Albania were dominated by Greek influence. The majority of them—especially notables—desired union with Greece. The Orthodox Christians in general had an intense hatred of Ottoman rule. Although this feeling was shared by their co-religionists who

lived in the colonies abroad, their political thinking was different. *1Tppen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 31 January 1901, No. 1A-B, HHStA, PA xiv/7, Albanien v/1; see also Zwiedinek, “Die Albanesische Action

des k. und k. Ministeriums des Aeussern in Jahre, 1897,” Vienna, 11 January 1898, HHStA, Ges. Arch Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. “Degrand to Hanotaux, Scutari, 27 March 1897, No. 78, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1897, Vol. 1. There is a long correspondence on this subject in AMAE.

*8See Degrand to Hanotaux, Scutari, 23 May 1898, No. 113, ibid.,

Albanie, 1898-1899, Vol. 11. |

*4Ippen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 3 June 1903, No. 35A-B, HHSiA, PA xiv/7, Albanien v/s.

POLITICAL THINKING 175 _ Two of the best known Orthodox patriots in Egypt, Thimi Mitko and Spiro Dine, were at first of the opinion that the time had come for a revolution and complete detachment from ‘Turkey. But Mitko thought that the new Albanian state would be too weak to oppose Turkey and proposed formation with Greece of a dual kingdom, like Austria-Hungary.” However, he had his reservations, and in writing in June 1879 to Francesco Crispi, who had taken the initiative in founding a Philhellenic Committee to support Greece and Albania, Mitko, while expressing himself in favor of a union between these two countries in the form of a confederation or in any other form, stipulated at the same time that “it was absolutely necessary... that [Albania’s] natural frontiers be guaranteed.” ‘This the Greeks would never accept, for it would mean relinquishing Preveza and Janina.?® Later he became more aware of the obstacles to a union with Greece. De Rada wrote that all the copies of Mitko’s Albanian Bee that the Greeks could lay hands on were burned in Athens,?? and what mattered most to Mitko were language and nationality. When De Rada published Fiamur: Arbérit (Flag of Albania), in the period 1883-1887, Mitko declared himself wholeheartedly for the policy pursued by that periodical: for Turkey against the - common external enemies.”® Much of group political thinking was embodied in memoranda and petitions, but these could not be expected to appear soon after the collapse of the Albanian League. Some time was needed for the national movement to recover. On the other hand, ‘Turkey was passing through a period of relative tranquillity, disturbed only by the Crete insurrection in | 1896 and the following year by the Greco-Turkish war. It was 2Flistort e Ssqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 48. *6’'Thimi Mitko to Francesco Crispi, Cairo, 21 June 1879, ACS, Carte

Crispi, Fasc. 61, Politica Estera 1878-1887, Dos. 1v. See also Chapter II, pp. 83-84.

*7Cf. G. Schird, Gli Albanest e la questione balkanica, Naples, 1904, . 81.

° *8See “I] testamente politico di Girolamo De Rada,” Shéjzat (Le Pleiadi), Rome, vit (1964), 181-182.

176 II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION times of danger, when the territorial integrity of European Turkey was at stake, that were a stimulus to Albanian nationalism.

The petitions and memoranda are not numerous. Although collective manifestations, they usually lack the specification

of the groups supporting them. The signers are vague: an Albanian committee or an Albanian society about which no details are given. One must know the societies which had been established in the places from which the memoranda were issued, as well as references to them in publications of the period, in order to make out the elements behind them. The lack of specific signatures was a precautionary measure —to avoid reprisals on the part of the Turkish authorities. For political reasons the Orthodox Christians were often confused with their neighboring co-religionists. An Albanian reform committee dispatched a memorandum to the Grand Vizier in July 1896, in the name of both Christians and Moslems, protesting against the prevailing confusion in the ‘Turkish Empire whereby Orthodox Christian Albanians were considered Greeks or Slavs, depending on whether they were born in the south or in the north. In this way the number of AIbanians living in the vilayets was decreased and that of the neighboring populations was increased.”® _ As if to confirm this confusion between religion and nationality and dispel it, the Italian Consul General at Corfu, De Gubernatis, wrote to his Ministry: “. . . It 1s necessary to recognize that among the Albanians [he referred to those of Epirus] the sentiment of race is much more alive than the religious sentiment, and that being Christians and under the rule of Moslems does not constitute for them a sufficient motive to be separated from their compatriots.’ °° In October 1896 an Albanian appeal, addressed to the great powers from Monastir (Bitolj), advocated the unification of

°C. Libardi, I primi moti patriottici albanest nel rgro-rgrr1912, Trent, 1935 1, Document No. 3, pp. 225-228. *°De Gubernatis to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Corfu, 17 April 1902, No, 207/45, ASMAE.

POLITICAL THINKING 177 the vilayets of Kosovo, Monastir, Salonica, Janina, and Shkodér in one vilayet, with Monastir as capital, maintaining that the populations of all these vilayets were preponderantly AI-

banians. Aware of the aspirations of the Balkan states, the Albanians requested that the soldiers furnished by the Albanian provinces be incorporated in the regiments of European ‘Turkey charged with the defense of the Bulgarian, Serbian, Montenegrin, and Greek frontiers, and proposed that all their inhabitants, irrespective of religion, be drafted.*? On January 1, 1898, the Societa Nazionale Albanese of the Italo-Albanians, representing also the Albanian societies D1turia of Bucharest, Albanian Brotherhood of Egypt, Déshira of Sofia, and the Albanian Committee of Istanbul, launched

an appeal, which declared: “All the Albanians who are on earth, in whatever part of it black fate has dispersed us, to whatever religious creeds we belong, all of us unanimously ask H.I.M. the Sultan Hamid Khan II [to grant] administrative autonomy to the lands of Albania.” ‘The demands for Albanian governors, Albanian schools, Albanian as an official language next to ‘Turkish, were reiterated.*”

| When the Special Commission in charge of reforms in Macedonia, headed by Hilmi Pasha, which represented all the ethnic groups of European Turkey except the Albanians, met in Monastir, a petition of the society Drita of N. Naco in Bucharest was sent on October 1/14, 1903 to the Sultan and the great powers. Signed by many persons of the three faiths, it asked that the Albanian nationality be officially recognized, that the vilayets of Janina and Shkodér be included in the reforms of Macedonia, and that an Albanian represent the interests of his compatriots on the Special Commission.** One is struck by the omission in this document of the de81C. Libardi, op.cit., u, Document No. 4, pp. 228-231. s*7bid., Document No. 6, pp. 238-241. 88See “Appel,” Bucharest, 1-14 October 1903, in ASMAE; annexe a la dépéche politique de l’Agence Diplomatique de France en Bulgarie, Sofia, 23 October 1903, No. 68, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure,

Albanie, 1902-1903, Vol. IV. ,

178 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION mand for the formation of a single Albanian vilayet. It should

be remembered, however, that the reforms agreed upon by Austria-Hungary and Russia for Macedonia excluded the vilayets of Shkodér and Janina. A rift had been produced, and the Albanians were concerned about how to mend this rift, how to bring all the vilayets where Albanians lived together within the same Ottoman territory.

The political thinking of the Albanian leaders in the United States was not fundamentally different from that of the other patriots. Kombi of Boston demanded an autonomous Albania within the framework of the Ottoman empire, as well as the adoption of the Albanian language in the administration.** It also took upon itself to inspire in those Albanians who were not yet interested “that divine warmth which is called patriotism,” in short, to be a deffender, supporter, counselor, and fighter of the interests of the Albanian nation.*®» In 1907, when the guerrilla movement began in Albania, Kombi gave its support.®® Although the 1907 Hague Conference did not have the task

of regulating the relations of a state toward its subjects, the Albanians addressed a number of memoranda to it. Expressing their desire to remain within Turkey, they also protested against the status quo policy of the great powers, requesting them, if they really desired peace in the Balkans, to use their influence so that administrative autonomy be accorded to Albania.*" ‘Turkey’s delegate at the 1907 Hague Conference was an Albanian, Turkhan Pasha. On July 8, 1907, the Albanian societies of the United States sent a memorandum to that Conference, urging these fundamental claims, along with | others, like economic development.%§ The Albanians of the colony of Egypt followed suit. Stressing unity in their memo$Federal Writers’ Project of the Works Administration of Massachusetts, The Albanian Struggle in the Old World and New, Boston, 1939) P- 38.

*°See Kombi's leader, ‘“‘A Few Words in Place of a Program,” as republished in Albania, X (1906), 21. 8°Federal Writers’ Project ..., op.cit., p. 44. 8G, Libardi, op.cit., 11, Document No. 14, pp. 252-257. 88See text of their memorandum in Albania, x (1906), 193-197.

| POLITICAL THINKING 179 randum, they asserted: ‘““We belong to the Orthodox religion

and all, sons of the same country, affirm that there is not among us hatred or misunderstanding with our Moslem or Catholic brothers.°® ‘The various memoranda made the Albanian question better known in the international world. Despite the protests in the various Albanian memoranda that religion should not be confused with nationality, despite the efforts of patriots for union, and their emphasis on common blood and language, religious division among the Albanians appears to have been a serious stumbling block to the national movement in the first decade of this century. This is borne out by the questions raised and the solutions proposed.

Most concerned seem to have been the Orthodox nationalist leaders, because of the suppression of the Albanian language not only by the Turkish government but also by the Greek ecclesiastical authorities. The question was put: Should

they espouse another branch of Christianity in order to get rid of Greek influence and win protection of the powers and people of the West? Two answers were offered. Kombi proposed the conversion of the Orthodox Albanians into Uniatism, which preserved the Orthodox liturgy but recognized the Pope as its supreme spiritual head; Shqipéria (Albania) of Egypt favored conversion to protestantism, which not only had powerful adherents in the West but also, being

new to Albania, might attract the followers of the three faiths.4° Some of the patriotic heads, attempting to find a general solution, proposed the deification of Albania, just as the French had deified La Raison, at the time of the French Revolution.*! Fan S. Noli, who had just been ordained priest, approached 39See text of memorandum in Prince A. Ghica, L’Albanie et la Question d’Orient, Paris, 1908, pp. 241-243. 49See Kombi’s “Njé bisédim pérmi céshtjen fetare” (A Discussion on

the Religious Question), and about Shqipéria’s article, as well as F.

spectively. ,

Konitza’s editorial, ‘““Géshtja fetare ne Shqipéri” (The Religious Question

in Albania), in Albania, x (1906), 148-149, 181-182, and 144-147 re“See Albania, x1 (1907), 36.

180 Il, NATIONAL AFFIRMATION the problem from a more realistic angle. In his message to the Albanians, he deplored the difference in religion which still

kept them under the Turks and made the Christian Orthodox “look upon our brother Moslems and Catholics as enemies.” He considered as another misfortune the fact that none of the recognized confessions of Albania was practiced in the Albanian language, and the clergymen were foreigners,

hostile to each other. Referring to suggestions made for the desired union—the propagation of Bektashism among the Moslems, the Uniate church or Protestantism among the Orthodox Christians—Fan §S. Noli declared that “the misfortune was not so much in the religious difference as in the religious heads. They must not be foreigners, but Albanians and patriots.” # Not all the national leaders lived in the colonies. Some of them, the most independent and perhaps the most capable, were active in other lands. One of them was Faik Konitza. Faik started as a revolutionary. In the first issue of Albania, he violently assailed the ‘Turks, and in the original program he presented to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry he called his review “organ of the autonomistic-revolutionary party.” 4% If he gave up the attacks on the Turks, he continued

those on the attempts at centralization of their government and on the efforts of hellenization on the part of the Greeks. Like other leaders before him, he considered union of the Albanians indispensable for their progress and constitution as a nation.** In “Our Program,” Faik lay down the guiding political principles for the collaborators of his review. ‘They were evolutionary. He held that it would be most advantageous for Albania to remain under the sovereignty of the Sultan, but with a reformed and improved administration, more righteous and more intelligent, leaving to “the instinct and the discernment” of the nation to trace the road which “The text of the message is contained in zbid., x1 (1907), 35-37*Tppen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 3 September 1897, No. 41, HHStA,

PA xiv/i8, Albanien x11/2. | “Albania, 1 (1897-1898), 121.

POLITICAL THINKING 181 would be most compatible with its interests, at a time when it would be well prepared. It was not those who fed the AIbanians with “oratory” who were their real friends, he said, but those who wished them the benefits of national schools and education. Economic improvement was the most immediate and pressing need of the country. Stressing that it had been the tendency among the Albanians to be attached to individuals and not to ideas, he proclaimed as the last principle of his program: ‘“To try with all our might to cure the Albanians of the love for individuals. ‘They must learn to love Albania—not in order to please this or that Albanian, even if he were Pyrrhus—but to love her because she is Albania.”’ *

When the Albanian guerrillas appeared in the mountains in 1907, Faik Konitza disapproved because be believed that, even if the Albanians were victorious in the battle against Turkey, the Albanian people were not yet ready to form a state. The other Balkan people, too, were not prepared for statehood, but they had powerful protectors. The Albanians should first be civilized. As he wrote in Albania: ‘““We have _ before us perhaps twenty years ... if we use the time which remains, not civilizing the Albanian nation, but putting it on the road to civilization, we will have put it then on the way to liberation, and we may hope that it will fare well.”’ * One may disagree with Faik’s attitude toward the guerrilla movement in Albania. Living in London, in a peaceful and civilized environment, he could not fully appreciate the diffi- | cult conditions of his compatriots. Macedonia was infested with bands belonging to nationalities unfriendly to Albania, and assassinations were frequent. Under such circumstances, the Albanians could not remain passive—they had to defend themselves and their rights. Furthermore, the Albanian movement now needed vitality and action; patriotic propaganda, by word of mouth or pen, was not sufficient. To accuse Faik Konitza, because of his opposition to revolutionary activity—what he called “the school of assassination Albania, 1 (1898), 64-65. *6“Udha e ¢lirimit’”’ (The Road of Liberation), Albania, x (1906), 200.

182 IL NATIONAL AFFIRMATION and massacres,” #7—-of being “‘the most distinguished ideolo-

gist” of the feudal class and Austro-Hungarian imperialism, as some Albanian Communist historians do,*8 is unfair. Al-

| though descended from the old Moslem feudal aristocracy, Faik was far from being not only its “‘ideologist” but even its representative. He expressed disdain for the Albanian feudal beys, businessmen, and upstarts. ‘I serve only the interests of

our people: the workers, peasants, the majority of the Al_ banian people... . I try with the little power I have to remove the many dangers which surround them.” *® The names of the contributors to Albania are not those of feudal beys, but Albanian patriots, from all layers of society, bound together by their love of the fatherland. If Faik favored the AustroHungarian policy toward Albania, it was because he himself regarded linguistic and cultural development as a prerequisite for the political education of the people. He did not pursue blindly the policy of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; his correspondence with the responsible officials of the Austro-

Hungarian Foreign Ministry is marked by resoluteness in putting the interest of Albania above everything else. One instance is illustrative. In 1903 Vienna apparently asked him —because of its new policy toward Russia—to soften his att1tude toward the Slavs. He refused to do so, answering that if he had until then accepted Austrian support, it was because Austrian policy was favorable to the interests of Albania.®° Another Albanian leader whose thinking was similar to

that of Faik Konitza was Ismail Kemal Vlora. He too descended from the old feudal nobility. Born in 1844 in Vloré,

he studied first at the Greek gymnasium in Janina, and graduated from the ‘Turkish law school in Istanbul. He 4™Té dy shkollat” (Ihe Two Schools), 1bid., x1 (1907), 62. | Cf. A Buda, “Rruga e popullit shgiptar drejt 28 néndorit 1912”

pp. 58, 80. | Albanien x11/2. : | (The Road of the Albanian People toward 28 November 1912), Rruga e

Partisé (The Road of the Party), 11 (November 1957), 35. ,

®4lbania, vil (1902), 57. Faik expresses similar opinions in ibid.,

°Konitza to Baron [Zwiedinek], 3 May 1903, HHStA, PA xiv/19,

POLITICAL THINKING 183 | reached high government positions in European and Asiatic Turkey. A liberal who always stood for reforms, he had been a close collaborator of Midhat Pasha, who prepared the 1876 Turkish constitution. It was not easy to be a liberal in Sultan Hamid’s Turkey. As Ismail wrote: “. . . those who espouse such thoughts [in Turkey] run the risk of losing position and even their lives.” *? In 1900 he was appointed vali of Tripoli, but he knew that that high post was meant to be an exile. He fled ‘Turkey and went to live abroad, “where I could in the first place enjoy some measure of personal liberty, and secondly, I could follow the course of events in order to do something useful for my native country of Albania.” »? At the first stop, which was Athens, Ismail drew up several proclamations, which he addressed to the chief centers of Albania, explaining why he abandoned his service with the empire “to which we were all attached, and whose maintenance and glory we all wished to see continued.” 5° Until then Ismail had taken a rather limited interest in the Albanian question. His participation in the Albanian movement was a

ereat asset, and Faik was the first to acknowledge it. He thought that if Ismail remained with the Albanian movement even a short time, his prestige would influence the Moslem Albanians to give support to that movement.®* In fact, the Turkish government was deeply upset by his flight, because of the growing Albanian national movement. The two leaders met at Brussels, where Ismail settled for some time. Faik published for him a special edition of Litile The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, ed. S. Story, London, 1920, Pp. 173.

S2Ibid., p. 292.

S87 bid., p. 296. | 54Cf. Faik Konitza to Zwiedinek, Brussels, 2 October and 18 November 1900; HHStA, PA xiv/18, Albanien x11/2. 55Cf. Kral to Calice in Constantinople, Monastir, 18 July 1902, Bericht No. 51, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422; G. Schiro, op.cit., p- 325; Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, pp. 300-301; Kraus to Aehrenthal,

Albanien v/6. |

Valona, 26 September 1908, No. 47, vertnanlich, HHStA, PA xiIv/9,

184 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION Albania. In one of its articles, Ismail made known that the aim of the newspaper was to render the Albanians conscious of the impending danger. He expressed his desire to see them united and culturally advanced in order to oppose those who wanted to subjugate them. Albanian schools, economic development, progress—above all progress—were imperative. He also stated that he did not favor disturbances in the Balkans.5* However, the collaboration between the two leaders was short-lived. For Faik, Ismail was too much of a politician and he disapproved of his pro-Greek policy; Ismail found Faik a difficult person to get along with. Furthermore, Ismail had served forty years in the Ottoman Empire and had become an international political figure. It was hard for him to give up his interest in the empire of which the Albanian

problem was but a part. | _ Following the break with Faik, Ismail published the paper Selamet (Salvation) in ‘Turkish, Albanian, and Greek. Apart from the common cause of the Oriental people, he defended particularly, in this new organ, the interests of the Albanian

people, which he found in certain respects identical with those of the Greeks.®” Because of this identification of inter-

ests he was viewed rather suspiciously by many Albanian patriots of that time, some of whom went as far as to regard him as an instrument of Greek policy. When in July 1907 Ismail Kemal visited Rome, La Tribuna published an interview with this “prominent Balkan personality.”” It referred to him as the stanchest advocate of the status quo in the Balkans, as long as the Ottoman empire would be able to maintain itself, and the most authoritative supporter of a peaceful cooperation of the Balkan peoples. Asked about

the Albanian question, Ismail replied that, as it presented itself then, it was one of nationality. “Albania which boasts of her own language, her own literature, and her own history and traditions, has certainly the right to call for her national affirmation, in accordance with the new ideals of liberty and See reproduction of the article in Albania, v (1900), 56-58. The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, pp. 303, 305.

POLITICAL THINKING 185 independence.” He expressed himself for friendly relations with Italy and for a Greco-Albanian entente. The understanding between the Greeks and the Albanians, he maintained, should have as a basis their parallel development within their national spheres. When he was asked whether the Albanians would agree with him about a Greco-Albanian entente, he responded that “. . . he would not be surprised if | many writers denied such a truth and hindered the entente.” Ismail Kemal declared himself in favor of the status quo, but he could not conceive of it without reforms. He believed that Bulgaria was threatening the rights of Greece and northern Albania in Macedonia, and warned the Albanians not to have faith in the Bulgarian-Macedonians who welcomed the Albanian insurrectionist movement only because it drained off their forces and thus facilitated the success of the BulgaroMacedonian dream.*®

Following in the footsteps of his father Abdul and his two learned uncles, Midhat Frashéri (alias Lumo Skendo) took an active part in the Albanian national movement. While still young and an employee of the Porte, he began the publication of a yearly almanac, Kalendart Kombiar (National Calendar), printed in Sofia and distributed from there. ‘The pub-

lication held a moderate position. It called for unity and struggle for reforms, organization of schools, and propaganda

for the Albanian language and literature. It did not favor a collaboration between the Macedonians and the Albanians in the field of armed resistance against Turkey, but advocated a joint demand for administrative reforms: “We should demand reforms for our country together with the Macedonians.” 5° Kalendart Kombiar vehemently opposed the meddling of European powers in the fate of Albania. In the article ““Until When Are We Going to Sleep?,” the Albanians 58See Ismail Kemal’s long interview with A. Lalia Paternostro in La Tribuna, 27 July 1907. 59Kalendart Kombiar (National Calendar), Sofia, 1902, p. 20, as quoted

in I. G. Senkevich, Osvoboditel’noe duizhenie albanskogo naroda v

1905-1912 gg., Moscow, 1959, p. 85.

186 II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION were warned that they should not expect any help from Europe; they must decide themselves on the fate of their country. “Europe was an assembly of kingdoms, the governments of which think only of their own interests.” °° I. G. Senkevich’s view that Kalendari Kombiar carried on a propaganda of enlightenment externally but “in reality its major aim was the defense of the important demand of the

Albanian bourgeoisie for freedom of market and enter_ prise,” * distorts the truth. In this respect the Soviet historian of 1956 appears more reasonable than the one of 1959. Firstly, Midhat Frashéri came from a family of educated beys who had never been engaged in commercial enterprises and had devoted their lives to the Albanian cause. Secondly, one can hardly speak of a bourgeoisie in Albania at that time. Thirdly, if he appealed to the young Albanians to study agriculture and engineering in order to be prepared to exploit the wealth of the country, Midhat Frashéri did not think in class terms but for the good of the country as a whole and the exclusion of foreign exploiters.® A dynamic and progressive political thinker was Shahin Kolonja. Before joining the Ottoman civil service, he had applied for permission to publish an Albanian newspaper in Turkey, but obviously it was not granted, for soon afterward he was appointed kaymakam in Mount Athos.® In principle, there was no difference between Shahin Kolonja’s political convictions and those of Faik Konitza. Both wanted the awakening of their people and the security of their national existence, based on a better and sounder constitutional relation- — ship with the Ottoman empire.** But Shahin’s attitude toward 8°Kalendart Kombiar, 1906, p. 42, as cited in I. G. Senkevich, ‘“‘Natsional’no-osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie albanskogo naroda v nachale XX veka,” Voprosy Istoriz, 1956, No. 6, p. 53. 61], G. Senkevich, Osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie. .., p. 67. 62Cf. ibid., where “‘the exclusion of foreign exploiters” is mentioned.

8Cf. Kral to Goluchowski, Monastir, 10 December 1900, No. 73, Geheim, Beilage 1, HHStA, PA xiv/7, Albanien v/1,2. _ Cf. Kral to,Goluchowski, Monastir, 6 January 1902, No. 3, Geheim,

HHStA, PA xiv/16, Albanien xu/1-7, 00

POLITICAL THINKING 187 Turkey was aggressive and, when the organization of the Albanian guerrilla bands began, he was all for it. He was

more of a man of action than Faik Konitza. | Shahin fought not only the external enemies of Albania, but also the internal ones. He introduced the social-economic

aspect in the Albanian national movement. Although himself a bey, he did not spare his class. He wrote in his Drita that, when the beys ceased to reap benefits as sipahis or condottieri, there remained no other way for gains but to rob the common people by threats and tithes. ‘They became friends of

the Turkish government in order to acquire power and grab more easily, thus bringing Albania to her present lamentable condition.®

His attacks provoked a reaction. Nuri Villa-Frashéri, a young bey who had embraced the Albanian cause and had gone to Brussels for higher studies, answered in Albania that all hope for the salvation and liberation of Albania was provided by the aristocracy. ‘““The people are like a machine,” he wrote, ‘““which does not move or work without a mechanic; they do not understand the words which come from a distance

from persons they don’t know; they have faith only in the aristocracy, together with which they have fought in wars, without sparing their blood.” & The young bey neglected to mention, however, that the large following of the Albanian nobility was founded on the great expanses of land it owned (in 1907 some three-fourths of the arable land in the district of Tirana belonged to it) and the feudal rights it exercised not only over peasants of its own lands but also over free peasants. As it obtained the lease of tithes from the ‘Turkish government, it also possessed another means of pressure.® This article drew a response from the poet Asdren of Bucharest, published again in Albania under the title ““I'wo Words 65See N. b. Villa-Frashéri, “Oxhakésia e Shqipérisé” (Albania’s Aristocracy), Albania, vil (1902), 9. SSTbid., pp. 9-10.

87Cf. Boznemisza to Aehrenthal, Durazzo, 19 March 1907, No. 12, HHSiA, PA x1v/7, Albanien v/1,2.

188 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION on the Aristocracy.” Now political thought transcended union

and autonomy, revolution and evolution. Democratic principles and class struggle emerged. Asdren held that “If Albania is to win her independence... may she not ever win it, if all the Albanians are not going to enjoy their rights; and if we want to follow the great ideas: equality, fraternity, liberty —then what need is there that the nation be divided into erades, with lords and slaves? ‘The Albanians should be equal

before the laws. The titles should be abolished. ... Do you believe that the nobility should order then as it does nowr”’ If

some wanted to defend the aristocracy, the poet declared, there was more reason that he and others should defend the common people, for not the aristocracy but the common people were the pillars of the nation. It was they who always risked danger, while the aristocracy watched from far. The aristocracy had been subservient to the Turks. However, he was willing to admit that there were some beys who were “true patriots .. . who behaved themselves very well with

everybody.” ® | In 1905, Drita resumed its attacks on the beys, indeed on

all the Moslem privileged social classes: ““Oh! you, who con-

sider yourselves as aristocrats, beys, effendis and agas, in reality you are bandits and robbers, servants of the Turks and Greeks! For the sake of profit you turn today into Turks and tomorrow into Greeks, and when you have no use of this, you become Albanians, you go to London and Paris, begin to write pamphlets, proclaiming that you are fiery patriots.” °° SAlbania, vil (1902), 54-56. It was a letter by Asdren, dated March 6, 1912, addressed to Faik Konitza, who published it as an article in his review.

°Drita, 11 February 1905, as quoted in I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 82. This passage has been quoted also by A. Buda, op.cit., p. 33, but differently: “Oh! you, who consider yourselves beys, effendis, archonts, and

in reality are... .” In Buda’s quotation, “aristocrats” and ‘‘agas’” are absent, while a new word, “‘archonts,” was introduced. “Archonts” is a

Greek term used in Albania for the Christian notables, the closest counterparts to the beys. The veracity of either quotation could not be

POLITICAL THINKING 189 Although prior to the accession of the young Turks to power, there was a certain variety in the political thinking of the Albanian leaders, with groups or sections of the country influenced at times by religion and at other times by class interests or regionalism, there were some constants shared by all: union, reforms, and administrative autonomy within the Ottoman empire. The Italo-Albanian publicist A. Lorecchio

wrote in 1904: “There is no memorandum .. . sent to the Sultan or the powers, there is no newspaper or review . . . there is no committee, congress, assembly, or any other collective manifestation of Albanian will in which the highest

and dominant note is not one and the same: reforms and administrative autonomy of the people of Albania.” “° checked because this issue of Drita 1s not available. Under such circumstances, it would have been logical to accept Buda’s quotation, which is supposed to be the original Albanian passage. It was decided to choose the Russian translation, because the word “archonts’ seemed an addi-

tion of the author for the purpose of including the whole class, irrespective of religion, for reasons of domestic policy. Moreover, if the original text contained the term “‘archont,” there was no reason for I. G.

Senkevich to omit it. The use of the word “Greeks” is somewhat

perplexing. 7A. Lorecchio, Il pensiero politico albanese in rapporto aglt interesst

italiani, Rome, 1904, p. 27. |

Vill Diffuse Revolutionary Activity AFTER the abolition of the Albanian League, a period of quietness ensued. The expedition of Dervish Pasha had dispersed the Albanian forces. Even after their release, some of the exiled Albanian leaders were not allowed to return to their homeland; they were given government positions in remote parts of the empire or in Istanbul. Such was the case, for instance, with Prenk Bib Doda, who was brought from Asia Minor to be Brigadier General in the palace of the Sultan Abdul Hamid.? Although the mountaineers of the north possessed only a rudimentary national consciousness, regional patriotism was powerful among them. The tribes of Kastrat, Hot, Grudé, and Shkrel opposed with arms, in May 1883, the definitive delimitation of the Turco-Montenegrin frontier, which was detrimental to their interests.* ““The frontiers drawn by the Treaty of Berlin,’ wrote a well-known British authoress, “were so impossible that in many places they could not be defined much less enforced. As the borderers themselves described it, “Ihe frontier floated on blood.’ ”’? Turkey succeeded in suppressing the agitation two months later, but the highlanders took their revenge on the Ottoman army that game year in a battle near Kastrat.* Some years later four of the leaders of this uprising were interned in Mesopotamia, and Austria-Hungary intervened for their amnesty.® 1Cf. Memorandum of the Albanian Committee, November 1899, in C. Libardi, I primi moti patriottict albanest, nel 1910-1911-1912, ‘Trent, 1935, Document No. 10, pp. 247-249; R. Pinon, “La question albanaise,” Revue des deux mondes, LIv (1909), 809-810. 2A. Galanti, L’Albania, Rome, 1901, p. 232; G. Schird, Glt Albanest e

la questione balkanica, Naples, 1904, p. 74; Le Rée to Ferry, Scutari, 3 February 1885, No. 132, AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Scutari, 1884-1889, Vol. xxi. 8M. E. Durham, The Struggle for Scutart, London, 1914, p. 159.

| 4G, Schiro, op.cit., p. 75. *Ippen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 24 August 1897, No. 39, HHStA, PA x1v/14, Albanien Ix, x.

REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY 191 ‘Toward the end of 1884 there was unrest in Prizren because

the authorities wanted to register the population.® In February 1885 it became more intensive and expanded in the northeastern part of Albania. ‘The Kosovars demanded exemption from taxation and asked for the liberation of political prisoners and internees, whose number must have been considerable in a district like Prizren, which had been the center of

activity during the period of the Albanian League. For a people who had not been used to paying taxes, or to paying very low ones, the sudden increase was deeply resented. Furthermore, only a small part of the taxes was spent for local needs; according to official ‘Turkish data, at the end of the nineteenth century two-thirds of the taxes of the sandjak of Prishtiné went to the state treasury.” A fight broke out on the road from Prizren to Ferizovicé between the insurgents and the ‘Turkish army, in which the former were forced to retreat to the mountains, not without heavy losses.® The revolt of Prizren stirred up the regions of Lumé, Mitrovicé, Prishtiné, Vucitrn, Ipek, and Gjakové, which also opposed the census and the taxes.® A union was formed to put up strong resistance to the government. Only the plain regions south of Prishtiné, as far as the mountains, did not join it; they were inclined to pay the taxes perhaps because of their more vulnerable position.” Apparently the Albanians did not resort to force, because

the Porte tried to placate them, though it did dispatch to Kosovo, in September 1885, an army under Vesel Pasha, an ®6Le Rée to Ferry, Scutar1, 4 November 1884, No. 128, AMAE, Turquie,

Correspondance politique des consuls, Scutari, 1884-1889, Vol. xx. J. G. Senkevich, Osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie albanskogo naroda v

1905-1912 gg., Moscow, 1959, p. 40. ,

8G. Schiro, op.cit., p. 75. ®See Le Rée to Ferry, Scutari, 10, 16 March 1885, Nos. 133, 134, and 6 April, 12 September 1885, Nos. 135 and 147, respectively, in AMAE, Correspondance politique des consuls, Scutari, 1884-1889, Vol. xxi. Copy of a confidential letter from Usktib, 16 May 1885, in Szdgyény to

Calice in Constantinople, Informationsbiro Vienna, 28 May 1885, ZI. 1325/4, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422.

192 II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION Albanian by origin, who had distinguished himself during the

Russo-Turkish war. At this time Eastern Roumelia was annexed to Bulgaria (September 18, 1885). This put Turkey in a difficult position,

and compelled her to postpone the policy of centralization toward Albania. Turkey permitted the mountaineers to carry © arms, freed the Albanian chiefs, including those of the League

Albania.” |

of Prizren, from the prisons and from exile, and at the end promised to allow the use of Albanian in the schools of

Yet injustices were frequently committed in the collection of taxes. Since the local authorities were not Albanians but ‘Turks who had bought their positions in Istanbul, they endeavored to enrich themselves. Zadrimé, a Catholic region between the Drin river, Mirdité, and the sea, was one of their victims. This region was at first included in the vilayet of Ipek and was in the area of the Tanzimat (Reforms), subject to the taxes established by that regime. Later it passed to the vilayet of Shkodér, which was recognized as a privileged territory (miuistesna), paying some taxes and being relieved of others. The ‘Turkish local authorities claimed that the inhabitants of Zadrimé should pay all the old taxes of the Tanzimat area and, in addition, those of the privileged one. Because in 1889 they sought legal recourse in protests to the Grand Vizier

and the consuls in Shkodér, their chieftains were maltreated and imprisoned. To secure release they had to submit and declare that they accepted the double system of taxation.” The taxes were found to be heavy in southern Albania as well. F. Guicciardini wrote in 1901 that it was estimated that the vilayet of Janina with half a million people dispersed over an area of approximately 8,500 square miles (22,000 square kilometers) paid ten million francs to the treasury.1* In 1903 1G, Schird, op.cit., p. 76. “Cf. Histort e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 111. *8Finzi to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Italy), 27 February 1890, No. 54/24, accompanied by a petition of the inhabitants of Zadrimé to the Grand Vizier and the consuls in Shkodér, dated 16 March 1889, ASMAE. **F, Guicciardini, “Impressioni d’Albania. II,” Nuova Antologia, xciv (a July 1901), 27.

REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY 193 an insurrection broke out in the district of Berat, vilayet of Janina, the population calling for a reduction of taxes and the replacement of government employees, civil and military, by native Albanians. There was also great unrest among the inhabitants of the districts of Vloré and Filat, in Gaméri.¥® Nevertheless, whenever ‘Turkey was involved in hostilities with the Greeks or the Slavs, the Albanians were ready to defend her. ‘There were common interests: a defeat of the Ottoman empire would result in amputations of Albanian territory. Both Tosks and Gegs fought on the side of ‘Turkey during the Greco-Turkish war of 1897, which followed the insurrection of Crete.?® It was Albanian battalions that pushed

back the Greeks from Pentepigadia, in Epirus, and penetrated into Thessaly. The Greeks, who had imagined that the

Orthodox Albanians had been won over to hellenism and wanted annexation, were disappointed to see that not a single

battalion of the “bilingual” (Orthodox) Albanians came to the rescue of the Greek army.**

While the Greco-Turkish war was not yet at an end, the Albanians raised their claims to administrative autonomy, and the southerners refused to lay down their arms and return home without assurances that they were going to be fulfilled. In the beginning of October 1897 clashes occurred in Prizren

and other places between the Turkish troops and the insurgents. Murad Bey Toptani of Tirana and Marka Gjoni of Mirdité were arrested and exiled, while Hasan Pasha Mesareja and Naim Bey Kolonja from the south were summoned to Istanbul. Simultaneously ammunitions were dispatched to the north from Janina, and Tevfik Pasha, a special envoy of the Sultan, arrived in Shkodér in October 1897 in order to hear the grievances of the Albanians. Eighty Albanian chiefs, Moslems and Christians, after lengthy discussions with him, promised to continue to recognize the sovereignty of the Sul5G. Schird, op.cit., pp. 371-372. 16F, Guicciardini, ‘““Impressioni d’Albania. I,” Nuova Antologia, xcu1 (16 June 1901), 583-584; A. Galanti, op.cit., p. 232.

7e Gubernatis to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Italy), Corfu, 17

April 1902, No. 207/45, ASMAE. | ,

194 II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION tan on condition that the long-awaited reforms be introduced. Tevfik Pasha promised formally that their desires would be

satisfied.1® On the other hand, he attempted to collect the weapons of the Albanians, which had increased because the Greco-Turkish war had necessitated the heavy arming of the tribes.1° The mountaineers refused to deliver their arms, stating that they were needed for the defense of their country. The leaders of Shkodér did not conceal from ‘Tevfik Pasha that they had resolved to send their own representatives to Istanbul to present to the Porte a memorandum, the reply to which would affect the tranquillity of the city and of the whole vilayet. What ensued was the exile of several chiefs.?° In November 1897, while discussions were being carried on in the south as to the measures to be taken in order to obtain the return of the exiles and improve the bad conditions of the country, a revolt took place in the vilayet of Kosovo. Gjakové was besieged; Prizren expelled the ‘Turkish

authorities; and Usktib was threatened with occupation by the insurgents.”1 The leaders of the movement were Riza Bey Gjakova and Haxhi Mulla Zeka, a landowner from Ipek, and

the aim was the reduction of taxes and the opening of Albanian schools.*? The uprising lasted until January 1898, when Riza Bey Gjakova was invited to Istanbul. On January 15, 1898, he made the following politically astute statement to

the press of the Turkish capital: “I do not represent in Istanbul only the Moslems of my country, but also the Christians, _ since Christians and Moslems are the same. We recognize only race, and religions, consequently, do not divide us.” ?3 Reporting to his government, the Italian Consul in Janina, Millelire, made known the great dissatisfaction of the population of the vilayet of Janina. The news about northern Al18 Albania, 1 (1897-1898), 119.

*See de la Bouliniere to Hanotaux, Péra, g December 1897, No. 279, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1897, Vol. 1.

*0Albania, 1 (1897-1898), 119. ,

— #ICf. G. Schird, op.cit., pp. 112-113. *2 Albania, 1 (1897-1898), 204, and 1 (1898), 153.

- Text in La Nouvelle Presse Libre as reproduced in G. Schird, op.cit., Pp: 115.

REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY 195 bania had resounded among the Christian and Moslem Albanians in the south, and if they were not repressed, wrote Millelire, they could create trouble. If Turkey and Europe really desired tranquillity, it was necessary that they think about “these countries where there is need for radical and serious reforms, not like those adopted until now, which have increased discontent.” 24

The Albanian disturbances accelerated the signing of the Greco-Turkish peace treaty. ‘The Greek Prime Minister, Alexander Zaimis, had been informed that the Sultan would have to hasten the conclusion of the treaty partly on account of the difficulties which had arisen in Albania. Indeed, the Porte had already dispatched a part of the troops destined for Thessaly to Ipek, where unrest prevailed.?® Soon atferward (December 4, 1897), the peace treaty was signed in Istanbul.

Once the pact with Greece was concluded, the Porte changed its policy. It gave orders to the valis to keep an eye on the moves of the Albanians and forcibly suppress any attempt whose objective was to obtain the promised reforms.”®

Albanian concern about the situation began to increase. The Macedonian movement had been intensified. ‘The Moslems of the northeast, surrounded by Slav neighbors, felt that their own existence was at stake. This prevented them from revolting against Ottoman rule, in spite of their discontent, as they preferred not to dissipate their forces.

Toward the end of January 1899 a meeting was held in Ipek. It was attended by more than thirty representatives of various Albanian towns in the vilayet of Kosovo, most of them from Gjakové and Ipek.?” Shkodér and its surroundings had *4Millelire to Visconti Venosta, Janina, 2 December 1897, R. 359/117, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 11, No. 293. *5Avarna to Visconti Venosta, Athens, 5 December 1897, R. 1758/8832, ibid., No. 299.

2G. Schird, op.cit., p. 108. 27The representatives were from: Sjenicé (2), Bjelopolje (2), Mitrovicé (2) Gusinj (1), Rozhaj (2), Vutitrn (2), Prishtiné (1), Ipek (9), Gjakové (6), Prizren (4), and Tetové (3); cf. Ippen to Calice in Constantinople, Scutari, 11 March 1899, Bericht No. 13, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. For the names of the representatives, see Beilage to it.

196 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION been invited to participate, but did not send any delegates.”* On January 28, 1899, the assembly concluded its resolutions: The purpose of the meeting was to form a union (besa) for the protection of their Moslem religion, the Sultan, to whom loyalty was proclaimed, and their fatherland. A threat was directed toward foreign governments—meaning Bulgaria, Serbia, eventually Montenegro and perhaps Austria-Hungary —which might have been tempted to attack their country. The news that Macedonia was under oppression was declared to be false and propagated by foreigners, who hoped to reach their goals by sending units of “bandits” 2° across their frontiers. If the foreigners were to threaten Macedonia or their fatherland, the union would dispatch an adequate part of the 15,000 volunteers for protection and resistance. While the Porte must have been satisfied with these resolutions, the remaining resolutions, pertaining to organization, could not have pleased it, as they betrayed autonomous am_ bitions. In every kaza a Moslem Committee was to be created whose task would be to look after the formation of another force, in addition to that of the volunteers. In time of need, the committees, in agreement with the government authorities, would assume the duty of quelling violence, and securing peace and order in the land. Any Moslem or other believer, be he even a government official, who infringed upon the Divine Law (Seriat) or the customary law would be punished.

At the end of the resolutions, it was stated that the union could be extended to include the vilayets of Shkodér, Monastir, Salonica, and Janina.°*°

One cannot completely agree with Faik Konitza’s Albania when it calls the Assembly of Ipek “truly national” and tries to minimize its Moslem character.*! On the other hand, as it 8Ippen to Calice in Constantinople, Scutari, 4 February 1899, Bericht No. 5, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. “These are the comitadjis, as they were called by the Turks.

8°See German translation of the Turkish text of the resolutions in Beilage of footnote 27. 814 lbania, 3 (1899), 47-48.

REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY 197 was a gathering of Albanians, held in Albania, where the discussions on the means to defend their native land were carried out in Albanian, one is inclined to recognize that it had a “certain” national character. On February 27, 1899 a similar meeting was held in Dibér, where the principal leaders of Mat and the sandjak of Dibér took part.?* The decisions passed there were not permeated with the Moslem religious spirit as were those of Ipek. The convening notables cared more about the preservation of the liberties and customs they had enjoyed. Still, as far as the Sultan was concerned, they too manifested their loyalty to

him and put at his disposal all the men who could carry arms. ‘The resolutions of Dibér dealt mostly with the truce among the Albanians of that district and the punitive measures against the violators. The most significant item was the formation of a committee, composed of Dibrans, which virtually appropriated the power of the government authorities, reducing them to the role of supervisors: all measures for the enforcement of the resolutions were to be taken by the government in conjunction with the committee. ‘The committee _ was called a “Reform Committee” (paragraph 11), and the Dibrans meant by reforms a thorough participation on their part in the government affairs of their district. In both assemblies, that of Ipek and that of Dibér, the more progressive elements did not step forward with a reform program for schools in the Albanian sense. Although they had been engaged for many years in such a project, on account of government opposition, it was still far from realization. It seems, however, that they secretly discussed the problem and tried to find a solution. According to Hafiz Ibrahim, a notable 82See, for names of the leaders, Kral to Calice in Constantinople, Monastir, 5 March 1899, Bericht Nr. 10, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422.

387 bid. |

84Kral to Calice in Constantinople, Monastir, 22 March 1899, Bericht No. 15, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. As a Beilage to it

are the resolutions of the Dibér meeting, translated in German.

198 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION from Mitrovicé, it was to be brought up in the general meeting of the leaders of all the Albanian vilayets which had been planned for Ipek.** It appears that in the private meetings the problem of autonomy and the means to be employed in order to have an independent national governor for Albania were also tackled.3* However, the Turkish government, which until

then had favored the formation of a union among the AIbanians for the defense of their fatherland, believing that it could serve as an instrument for its own purposes, began to see the union as a means for which the Albanian national movement could best be promoted.*? Subsequent assemblies

for union, therefore, were forbidden without previous permission by the government authorities.*®

Nevertheless, after April 1901, especially through the activity of Haxhi Mulla Zeka, meetings were held in various parts of the north, with the aim of uniting the Albanians so they could face the coming events and resist the Ottoman government as much as the outside enemies.® In May 1901 approximately 8,ooo armed men held an assembly in Shkodér

and decided to oppose any attempt against the territorial integrity of the country.*® In July of that year some of the bands raised by the Security Committees clashed with the Turkish soldiers of the Kosovo vilayet, while many of the communities refused to pay the taxes and enroll for military service.*}

Earlier, in 1900, in southern Albania, Maliq Bey Frashéri, %>Para to Calice in Constantinople, Uskiib, 7 May 1899, Bericht No. 51 reservat, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422.

86See report of Mashkovo (Russian consul in Uskiib) to Zinoviev (Russian Ambassador in Istanbul), 27 January 1899, included in the report of Choublier to Delcassé, Uskub, 18 September 1902, No. 4, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1902-1903, Vol. Iv. 87Ippen to Calice in Constantinople, Scutari, 4 January 1900, Bericht No. 1, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422.

88Cf. Kral to Calice in Constantinople, Monastir, 27 Marz 1899, Bericht No. 18, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422.

*°Tbid., “Tbid. , | p. 335. ,

8G, Schiro, op.cit., pp. 335, 370-371.

REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY 199 _a landowner, raised the banner of revolt against the Ottoman

authorities. He took to the mountains with a band of 100, disregarding the war preparations being made against him by Osman Pasha, the Governor General of Janina, who was his personal enemy. Once in the mountains, Malig Bey, who in

his civilian life was little concerned about anything but his own personal interests, began to pose as a champion of the Albanian national movement.*? This pose was strengthened by the authorities of Janina who presented his uprising to the Porte as if it were political, while it was in reality a personal vendetta.*?

In February 1903 the inhabitants of Mirdité, together with the highlanders of Puké, rose against the Turkish government. Joined by other tribes, they addressed a memorandum

to the vali and the consuls of the great powers in Shkodér, | demanding the return to Mirdité of their exiled chieftain, Prenk Bib Doda, and declaring: “The Sultan will never be recognized as our lord; the Crescent will not wave any longer on our mountains; we want to be free, we want our nationality recognized, like that of other people. From now on our flag will be that of George Kastrioti Skenderbeg which is already

flying on the snowy peaks of St. Paul, in the clear sky of Mirdité, flown by the wind of liberty.” #4 This was considered too daring a challenge to Turkey to have come from as small a region as Mirdité without outside support. Austria-Hungary

was suspected of being the instigator. In April 1903, the Albanians of Ipek attacked the central government building, arrested all the functionaries, and wired to the Sultan that *2Cf. ibid., pp. 335, 403; Albania, 5 (1900), 44; Faik to Zwiedinek, Brussels, 18 November 1900, HHStA, PA xiv/18, Albanien x11/2; Alric to Delcassé, Scutari, 2 May 1903, No. 241, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1902-1903, Vol. Iv. 48See Kral to Calice in Constantinople, Monastir, 18 July 1902, Bericht

No. 51, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422; A. di San Giuliano, Briefe tiber Albanien, Deutsch von D. Schulz und W. Wichmann, Leipzig, 1913, p. 154. ““G. Schiro, op.cit., pp. 369-370.

“Cf. ibid., p. 370. ,

200 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION their people who were being held prisoners must be released. Very serious disorders occurred also in Novi Pazar, Mitrovicé, and Prishtiné.*®

Around the turn of the century Albania was in a State of anarchy. The rule of the Sultan was only nominal, and his representatives, deprived of all effective authority, were lim- | ited to appeasing the very strong unrests which would attract the attention of Europe. In order to fulfill this task, the Ottoman authorities did not command, but implored, promised, and yielded.*7 Though the disturbances and revolts in Albania were motivated by regional interests, they were often combined with national aspirations, though not clearly conceived. “Although [the Albanians] desire that ‘Turkey live, they can foresee the day when she will cease to exist... . They think of being able to constitute an independent Albania.” #8 It was the Albanian disturbances that drew the attention of Europe, but the European powers began to take an active interest only when the agitation spread in Macedonia and the Macedonian movement acquired menacing proportions. Administratively, Macedonia at the time of the disorders was part of the ‘Turkish empire. From the point of view of the

Porte, there was no Macedonia, but only “the three vilayets of Roumelia’’: Salonica, Monastir, and Kosovo.*® When they were instituted, the T'urkish government was careful to divide _ them in such a way that the Moslem element had the preponderance in every vilayet. ‘The vilayet of Salonica was formed

of a part of Macedonia, properly speaking, and a part of Thessaly. ‘The vilayet of Monastir was made up partly of Macedonia and partly of Albania. Another section of Macedonia, coupled with another part of Albania and Old Serbia, constituted the vilayet of Kosovo.®° By such an arrangement,

**T bid. ,

*Tbid., pp. 371-372.

| 7See Choublier to Delcassé, Usktib, 15 September 1902, No. 6, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1902-1903, Vol. Iv.

“Cf. J. Larmeroux, La politique extérieure de lAutriche-Hongrie,

1875-1914, Paris, 1918, 1, 391. , |

Tbid., p. 439. |

REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY 201 the Turkish government also partitioned the Albanians and created a serious obstacle to the formation of a homogeneous and united Albania. With the people of Macedonia belonging to so many nationalities—Bulgarians, Serbs, Vlakhs, Greeks,

Albanians, and ‘Turks—*! and to various independent churches, at odds with each other, it was inevitable that Macedonia should be a permanent source of conflict. Most active among all the nationalities were the BulgarianMacedonians. They were numerous and had formed a Revo-

lutionary Committee, which had organized guerrilla bands, fighting for “Macedonia to the Macedonians,’ meaning by Macedonians Bulgarian-Macedonians.®2 ‘The Greeks created | their own guerrilla bands, supported by the Greek government and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and so did the Serbs. But whereas the “Macedonian” bands were composed of

native inhabitants of Macedonia, the Greek and Serbian bands included aliens (Cretans or Montenegrins).®? All the three groups fought against the Turks, and against each other,

for the liberation of Macedonia. : , In order to hamper the extension of the Macedonian movement, Turkey could rely on the Albanians, who were hostile to the Slavs. In May 1901, Albanian bands pillaged and partly set fire to Novi Pazar, Sjenica, and Prishtiné. ‘They attacked the Slavs everywhere. ‘The Serbian populations suffered most, because of their proximity to the Albanians. The Albanians occupied KolaSin and massacred a considerable number of Serbs. Following this, Russia intervened and demanded that the Albanian raiders and the ‘Turkish gendarmes be punished

while the “Christian” population be permitted to keep the necessary arms for protection. Astria-Hungary, on the other hand, tried to attenuate the effect of the KolaSsin massacre, ‘Interesting statistics on these various nationalities, revealing their respective chauvinistic tendencies, are given in T. v. Sosnosky, Die Balkanpolitik Osterreich-Ungarns seit 1866, Stuttgart and Berlin, 1914,

II, 120, note 1. 27 bid., p. 124. ,

‘34. Rappaport, ‘Mazedonien und die Komitadschis,” Berliner

Monatshefie, vit (1930), 741.

202 Il, NATIONAL AFFIRMATION maintaining that the events had been considerably exaggerated.®4

Turkey seemed unwilling to introduce any reforms in Macedonia, even those she had promised,®* and the rebellion

in that land was prolonged. In order to quash it, the Turkish

authorities appealed, in January 1902, to the baszbuzuks (irregular troops), most of whom were Albanians, ‘They also distributed arms to the Moslem populations. ‘hese measures

excited the Christians still more and in a few months, particularly in September and October 1902, the Macedonian movement acquired disquieting proportions. New massacres were also perpetrated.*®

Both Europe and ‘Turkey presented the participation of the Albanians in the suppression of the Macedonian movement

as that of Moslems against Christians. It is true that the Albanians of Kosovo, who were preponderantly Moslem, identified themselves religiously with the Turks, and on that basis were identified with the empire. Christians, being enemies of Turkey, were naturally regarded by them as their own enemy. However, as far as the Slavs were concerned, the hatred of the

Kosovars was not founded on religion—although religion intensified it—but on ethnic difference: they fought the foreigner (the Shkja*") because he coveted their land. The AIbanian Moslems of the south, on the other hand, did not participate in the repression of the Macedonian movement; neither can it be said that they helped it. When B. Sarafoff, one of the prominent leaders of the Macedonian movement, asked for Albanian support (through F. Konitza) to import arms through the coast of Albania, stressing that Albanians “Cf. J. Larmeroux, op.cit., 1, 411-412.

Cf. Décret Impérial relatif aux réformes pour les vilayets de Roumélie, 22 April 1896, No. 977, in G. Effendi Noradounghian, Recueil d’actes internationaux de ’Empire Ottoman, Paris, 1903, IV, 538-541.

Cf. J. Larmeroux, op.cit., 1, 412, 414.

Shkja—plural Shkje—is the word the Albanians use for the Slavs. The derivation is from Latin sclavus in the meaning of Slav.

| REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY 203 and Macedonians had the same enemy, the Turk, and that Albanians should feel only friendship toward a free Macedonia, the Albanians turned a deaf ear.5® It was in the interest of ‘Turkey to attempt to show that the Albanians were fighting only as Moslems against Slavic Christendom, thus hindering their recognition as a nation.®® Since all the other nationalities

of Macedonia were Christians, it was easy for Europe to be

deceived and to confuse the Moslem Albanians with the Turks. In this situation the great powers could not remain disinterested, particularly Austria-Hungary and Russia, because they had ambitions in the Balkans. In September 1902, the reform project was elaborated by Calice and Zinoviev in Istanbul, and was delivered to the Grand Vizier. One of the proposals recommended that the security forces—gendarmerie and police—should also include Christians, their number to be proportionate to the Christian population of the region. The Kosovars, conservative by inclination and suspicious

that foreign interference favored the Slavs, opposed the Austro-Russian program of reforms for Macedonia, in which their own lands were involved. ‘They could not tolerate the idea of having Christian Slavs as gendarmes in their territories. In March 1903, they revolted, occupied Vucitrn and proceeded to Mitrovicé, assailing the ‘Turkish garrison there. ‘The Porte dispatched various commissions to conciliate them, but

they would not listen. Ihe Russian consul in Mitrovicé, Shcherbin, was assassinated on March 31 by an Albanian. The

disorders spread in Prishtiné and the sandjak of Novi Pazar,

and unrest reigned in the northern part of the vilayet of Shkodér. Turkey was forced to take steps to suppress the 58On March 11, 1902, in a letter from Geneva, B. Sarafoff reiterated his promises to Faik Konitza. See Albania, x1 (1907), 40, note 1.

5°Cf. Kral to Calice in Constantinople, Monastir, 5 March 1899, Bericht No. 10, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422.

6°For the most important conditions, see ‘I’. v. Sosnosky, op.cit., I,

131.

204 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION movement. Unable to do so, she made a truce with the

Albanians.* |

Although Turkey was greatly increasing her armed forces in Macedonia, the Bulgarian-Macedonian guerrillas were not discouraged. On the contrary, the fact that the Turks were busy with the Albanians incited them to stronger action. The Bulgarian-Macedonian Committee had decided on a general revolution against the Turkish domination and had fixed the _ date: August 2, 1903 (Ilinden). Istanbul had been informed of these plans in time and the uprising did not succeed in becoming general. Acts of violence, however, on both sides were frequent.® As there was fear of a clash between Bulgarian and Turkish armies which could ignite Europe, the emperors of Russia and Austria-Hungary met, on October 2-3, 1903, at Miirzsteg, in Austria, and made a series of proposals for reform, embodied in the so-called “Muirzsteg program.” These proposals were approved by the other great powers and were delivered to ‘Turkey on October 22, 1903. On the basis of article 3 of this agreement, the powers would ask the Ottoman government, following the appeasement of the country, to modify the territorial delimitation of the administrative units, with a view to a more regular grouping of the various nationalities.** This article also concerned the situation of the Albanians. In April 1904, when the partition of the reform area occurred—placing in each part an officer of the great powers for the organization of the gendarmerie and the police—the sandjaks of Novi Pazar, Dibér, Prizren, and parts of the sandjaks of Korcé, Ohrid, and Ipek, which were inhabited mostly by Albanians, were not included in the area of reforms, because a stanch resistance on their part was feared.*4 S1Cf. zbid.; Coustans to Delcassé, 7 April 1903, and 21 May 1903, DDF (Paris, 1905), Série A, Vol. txvi, Nos. 4 and 11; J. Larmeroux, op.cit., 1,

433-434- }

6&2T., v. Sosnosky, op.cit., I, 132. | :

88See the articles of the “Miirzsteger Programm,” in 1bid., pp. 133-134

and in J. Larmeroux, op.cit., 1, 441. 6¢T. v. Sosnosky, Op.cit., pp. 134-135.

REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY 205 After the expedition to Albania of the Ottoman army under

the command of Marshal Omer Rushdi Pasha to crush the revolts of the spring of 1903, some 140 Albanian leaders had been arrested and exiled to Asiatic provinces, particularly in the vilayets of Kastamuni and Adana. With a decree from the

Sultan in 1905 amnesty was granted to a large number of them from Prizren, Gjakové, and Ipek, and they had begun to return.®©

But the revolutionary spirit against the injustices of the Turkish administration persisted among the Gegs. In May 1905 the inhabitants of Elbasan, in central Albania, rose up against the illegal acts of the local authorities. Having asked the Porte to change the authorities and having received no answer, the insurgents expelled from the town the governor and the commander of the gendarmerie. Istanbul, apparently afraid of strengthening and expanding the revolt, tarried at first, and only three weeks later dispatched forces to sup-

press it.® |

From 1905 to the declaration of the Turkish Constitution in 1908 the Albanian revolutionary movement took another turn. The field of operation shifted to the south and its character became more clearly national. But it was still rudimentary, and concerted action was absent. Revolutionary propaganda, on the other hand, was intensified. Before World War II nothing was heard about the influence of the 1905 Russian revolution on Albania. Soviet and Albanian Communist historians have tried hard to show that the influence of the ‘“‘first Russian bourgeois democratic

revolution of 1905-1907” on the Albanian recolutionary movement was great—in fact, they have attempted to create 65Stranieri to the [Italian] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Uskiib, 31 July 1905, No. 211/30, ASMAE.

66]. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 78-79. Here there must be a printing mistake: in the text the date is 1907 and the sources are Drita (The Light), Sofia, 27 May 1905 and 15 July 1905, which is an inconsistency. Since this could not be checked, it seemed more logical to choose the date of the source.

206 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION a myth around it.*? Such a treatment is understandably a part

of Soviet historiography: It aims to enhance the prestige of the Russian people and strengthen the ties between the Soviet Union and Communist Albania. There is a fundamental difference, however, between the Russian revolution of 1905—

1907 and the Albanian movement of this period. The Albanians were fighting for national rights—schools, language, recognition of their nationality, administrative autonomy— against an alien power, which dominated them; the Russian

people, on the other hand, enjoyed these national rights within their own state and their struggle was for political rights, such as representation in the duma, the lack of which _ made the tsarist regime oppressive. If a few Albanian newspapers, published abroad, pointed to the Russian revolution of 1905 as an example of how people should act in order to win their freedom, that does not mean its influence on the Albanian people was great. Perhaps the majority of the people of Albania proper did not hear anything at all about this

revolution. To maintain that under the influence of the Russian revolution of the period 1905-1907 “the Albanians

began to prepare for the armed revolution against the ‘Turks’ °° is certainly far-fetched.

It was the situation in Macedonia that prompted the Al-

banians to form guerrilla bands for the defense of their national rights. In the south, the Greek guerrillas were active and tried to suppress the Albanian movement by persecuting its supporters. In 1905 they assassinated the Albanian priest Papa Kristo Negovani because he taught Albanian and had , 87Cf. I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 72-81; A. Buda, “Rruga e popullit shqiptar drejt 28 nénorit 1912” (Ihe Road of the Albanian People toward 28 November 1912), Rruga e Pariwsé (The Road of the Party), Tirana, U1 (1957), 33; St. Pollo, Revolucioni i paré rus t 1905-1907 dhe lufta e popullit shqiptar per pamvarést (The First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907 and the Struggle of the Albanian People for Independence), Tirana, 1955; more restrained is Histori e Shqipérisé (1900-1919), Tirana, 1961, pp. 9-10, referring to it as an “echo.” 68], G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 88.

REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY 207 published books in Albanian.® “On the one hand, the Turks persecuted the Albanians and the Albanian language,” wrote _ Mihal Grameno, one of the post-1905 leaders of the Albanian revolution, ‘‘on the other, the Greek antartes (guerrillas) had terrorized the Albanian people.” 7 For the southern Albanian it was not the Slav who was the enemy, but the Greek. Furthermore, the Miirzsteg program, which promised a change in the territorial delimitations of the administrative units, based on the population of each nationality, served as an added incentive to the hostilities. ‘The activity of the bands was used to this end: to bring more territory under their control and impose their nationality on the inhabitants.7! At the same time, the Albanian patriots created the guerrillas because they wanted to be prepared to defend vigorously their national

rights in the event that European reforms were applied or

decisive political changes occurred.” |

In the spring of 1906 a secret committee, the Committee for the Liberation of Albania, was formed in Monastir. Its original members were Colonel Halil Bey, chief of the pharmaceutical service of the 3rd army corps; Fehim Bey Zavalani, a landowner from the district of Kolonjé; Bajo ‘Topulli from Gjirokastér, vice-director of the ‘Turkish secondary school (tdadiye) in Monastir; George Kyrias, an educated Christian from Korcé, who served as interpreter in the Austro-Hungarian consulate in Monastir; and Dr. Sejfedin, the veterinarian of that city.77 The origin of the Monastir committee 6°See D. Fullani, “Papa Kristo Negovani,” Buletin 1 Universitetit Shtetéror té Tiranés, Seria Shkencat Shogérore (Bulletin of the State University of Tirana, Social Sciences Series), No. 2 (1960), 188-216; Albania, X (1905), 6; Notizen by Vice-Consul Kwiatkowski, 26 April 1906,

Geheim, HHStA, PA/xiv/14, Albanien x1/2.

7M. Grameno, Kryengritja shqiptare (The Albanian Revolution), Tirana, 1959, p. 143. 71Cf. E. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Gréce de 1821 4 nos jours, 1926, Iv, 561; T. v. Sosnosky, op.cit., p. 138.

7Cf. Prochaska to Goluchowski, Monastir, 21 April 1906, No. 10, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/14, Albanien x1/2. Tbidem; M. Grameno, op.cit., pp. 144-145.

208 | II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION went back several years before, when patriots of that vilayet discussed the creation of societies in all Albania to be brought

into contact with each other later on. The first such effort was made in Elbasan, but it remained the only one, for fear of

persecution. The goal of the Monastir Committee was to organize the Albanian political movement and begin the strugele against Turkish domination, using guerrilla bands.” According to its constitution, each member would know only four others, who together with him would constitute a group of five; each new member of the second group was expected to win in turn five others.”* Everyone who became a member of

| the Committee, which sometimes was simply called the “Society,” for it had expanded, took an oath and was obliged to carry out unconditionally all the orders communicated to him, attend the meetings of his group, and pay the dues.” The Monastir Committee did not lose time in contacting men in various parts of Albania. Bajo Topulli, the most revolutionary among the members, was sent for agitation to Korcé and Prespé; Nuci Naci, the former director of the boys’ school in Korcé, went for propaganda to the district of Florina; Idris Jakova, a teacher, was directed to the vilayet of Kosovo, with Gjakové as the chief target; Shahin Kolonja undertook to recruit members—or at least to secure material assistance— among the Albanians of Bucharest, Sofia, Constantza, and

Egypt. The Committee was especially successful in Kosovo. ‘The 74Kral to Goluchowski, Scutari, 5 July 1906, No. 48 Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/14, Albanien x1/2.

Art. 1 of the Constitution, in Prochaska to Goluchowski, Monastir,

, 21 April 1906, No. 10, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/14, Albanien x1/2. 6It seems that this organization of members in groups of five was adopted from the Young Turks. See E. E. Ramsaur, Jr., The Young Turks, Prelude to the Revolution of 1908, Princeton, 1957, p. 16, note 7; I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 88. “Following articles of the constitution, in Prochaska to Goluchowsk,

ofIbid.footnote 75. |

REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY 209 Austro-Hungarian consul in Uskiib, Rappaport, wrote on May 1, 1906 that many of the Albanians in high military and civil positions, as well as those who had returned from exile,

| had been won over to the national idea. The emissaries of the Committee had displayed tact with respect to the religious feelings of the Kosovars. They were very successful in Gjakové, where they founded a branch of the Committee for the

Liberation of Albania, with the participation of the most influential beys and Bajram Curri,’® who was later reckoned among the pure patriots. ‘he Monastir Committee also established connections with the vilayets of Janina and Shkodér.®°

The Turkish government apparently learned about the activity of the Albanian leaders in Monastir, and in July 1906 made a sudden and energetic move against them. It removed all the members of the Central Committee who were in that

city, except Fehmi Bey Zavalani. As a result, the Albanian national movement started by the Committee was crippled for months. ‘There could no longer be a Central Committee in Monastir, and the execution of the plan was entrusted to the Albanians in Bucharest. In Monastir there remained only a local committee, which worked cautiously, preparing the field for more propitious times.*}

In the meantime, Bajo ‘Topulli had left for the district of Kolonjé, with the intention of creating a guerrilla band. ‘The question of the organization of Albanian guerrillas was first raised in 1897 at a meeting in Bucharest, when Faik Konitza and Murad Toptani, an influential bey from ‘Tirana, visited the Albanian colony there. Murad proposed that guerrillas should be constituted to fight against the Turks, the BulgaroMacedonians, and the Greeks. ‘The Albanians of Bucharest favored the proposal, but on condition that the guerrillas “Rappaport to Zwiedinek, Uskiib, 1 May 1906, vertraulich, private letter, HHStA, PA xiv/14, Albanien x1/2. ®0Prochaska to Goluchowski, in op.cit., of footnote 75. 81Prochaska to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 26 January 1907, No. 8, Geheim,

HHStA, PA x1v/14, Albanien x1/2.

210 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION attack only the Turkish functionaries. As a result, nothing was concluded.*2 When Bajo Topulli reached Kolonjé in March 1906, he was joined by some peasants of that district and by several of his students, who abandoned the school in Monastir. Thus the first Albanian “nationalist” guerrilla band came into being. Similar efforts were made again in Kolonjé by the brothers Gani and Sali Butka.** The field of operation of the guerrillas during the spring and summer of 1906 was Pérmet-Leskovik-Kokonjé-Korcé-Devoll. On Sep-

tember 22, 1906 men of Bajo Topulli’s band murdered the Metropolitan of Korcé, Photios. The intention was to assassinate the Metropolitan of Kostur, Philaretos, who had been an active persecutor of the Albanian movement, having anathematized even the Albanian language. Because the true assassins could not be seized, the Turkish authorities imprisoned several well-known patriotic leaders in Korcé, among them Jovan Kosturi, Grigor Cilka, and Orhan Bey Pojani.% A few months later the Greeks retaliated by assassinating in Salonica Spiro Kosturi, the son of Jovan Kosturi. His murder | made a deep impression: meetings were held, resolutions were drafted, and the emigré press, particularly Drita of Sofia and Kombi of Boston, endeavored to arouse the national spirit.® Spiro Kosturi became a martyr to the Albanian national cause in the fight against the Greeks. With the advent of the winter of 1906-1907, the activity of the guerrillas was temporarily interrupted. Its main leaders —the brothers Bajo and Cercis ‘Topulli—spent the winter in Bucharest and in Sofia. Here they continued their agitation and called for assistance to oppose the enemy. It was in Bucha-

rest that Mihal Grameno became a member of the bands,

(1898), 92.

82F, Konitza, “Mémoire sur le mouvement national albanais,’”’

Bruxelles, janvier 1899, HHStA, PA xiv/18, Albanien xu/2; Albania, u 83Prochaska to Goluchowski, Monastir, 24 May 1906, No. 21, Geheim, HHStA, PA xtv/14, Albanien x1/2; M. Grameno, op.cit., p. 145.

®*ITbid., p. 146; Prochaska to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 26 January 1907, , No. 8, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/14, Albanien X1/2. ST bid.

REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY 211 which were to resume their operations in the summer of 1907.88 When abroad, Gercis Topulli published in Shpresa e Shqypnis ** (Hope of Albania) of March 1, 1907, which appeared in Dubrovnik, an appeal to all the Albanians to cast

off the Turkish yoke. “We hope,” he wrote, “that in the summer we will attain our aims by rising all of us—Gegs and ‘Tosks.’’ 88

In Sofia Albanian patriots formed a new band which on May 18, 1907 landed on the Albanian coast south of Vloré. It was a small guerrilla force, with an able propagandist, Mihal Grameno, and a brave commander, Gercis Topulli. They crossed the countryside, propagating their aims and distributing books in Albanian. Some peasants were eager to join them, but the commander turned them down, for they were still far from the envisaged great insurrection.®® Giving

an account of their activity for 1907, Gercis Topulli and Mihal Grameno wrote: “All our activity in 1907 was directed to the popaganda for the development of national consciousness in all Albania, which, to the joy of our compatriots and to the disappointment of our enemies, took root in the heart

of every Albanian.” *° |

The Albanian revolutionary activity was often carried out in connection with the Macedonian movement. General problems of war brought them closer. Gercis ‘Topulli’s guerrillas met with the Bulgarian-Macedonian comitadjis, under Peter Germani, in the neighborhood of Lake Prespé, and together they crossed that district. Still more friendly to them were the comitadjis around the town of Kostur, with whom they spent a few days, struck by their good organization and discipline.*! The friendly attitude of the Bulgarian-Macedonian guerrillas 86MI. Grameno, op.cit., p. 148. | 8"This paper was published by N. Ivanaj from Shkodér. 88As quoted in I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 89. 89M. Grameno, op.cit., pp. 150-155. Drita, No. 1-2, February 1908, as quoted by I. G. Senkevich, op.cit.,

p-go.

°M. Grameno, op.cit., pp. 161-162. —

212 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION toward the Albanian guerrillas may be explained principally

by their common hostility toward the Greeks. | When in the spring of 1908 the bands resumed their operations, they had increased in number. The new guerrilla units were composed primarily of young intellectuals and peasants, but that of Gercis ‘Topulli, because of seniority, was always the most respected—it was called “‘the old band” (¢eta plaké). One of the first acts of “the old band” was the assassination of the Turkish commander of the gendarmerie in Gyjirokastér,

who was ruthlessly persecuting the nationally minded Albanians.** ‘The Turkish government dispatched military forces in the pursuit of the band, which was surrounded in the

village of Mashkulloré, near Gjirokastér. ‘The guerrillas managed, following a harsh battle, to break through the encirclement and take to the mountains. The battle of Mashkulloré (March 18, 1908) had a resounding effect in Albania.®

The Turkish government, afraid that a great revolt was in _ preparation, took steps to exterminate all the bands, especially “the old band.” % The guerrillas were well received by the peasantry everywhere, but they found their strongest support among the Bek-

tashis. In 1905 the Bektashis of a village near Gjirokastér made a public demonstration against the Turkish authorities, protesting against the unfair detention in Janina of the dervishes of the tekke of Baba Hajdar, accused of nationalist activity: they opened fire on the Turkish gendarmes sent against them.®° Many Bektashi monasteries like those of Melcan, Qesaraké, and Kreshové—all in the south—were known

even to foreigners as centers of patriotic activity.°* Their doors, wrote M. Grameno, were always wide open to the Albanian guerrillas.* 2Tbid., p. 188. Cf. tbid., pp. 190-196.

*Tbid., pp. 201-202. , Millelire to Imperial, Janina, 13 July 1905, No. 320/41, ASMAE. *6Prochaska to Goluchowski, Monastir, 24 May 1906, No. 21, Geheim, Beilage, HHStA, PA x1v/14, Albanien x1/2.

7M. Grameno, op.cit., pp. 171, 177, 220. ,

| REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY 213 In 1907 the Society Bashkimi of Bucharest dispatched Bajo

‘Fopulli to Boston. His mission was to visit the various Albanian centers in the United States in order to collect funds and persuade young men to return to Albania and join the bands, as a general uprising was to take place the following summer. In the spring of 1908 a group of volunteers left for Albania by way of Sofia.% ‘They must have been the group of twenty-five, headed by Petro N. Luarasi, who reached Albania on the eve of the declaration of the Young Turk Constitution, and had not had the opportunity to participate in guerrilla activity.®°

The guerrillas continued their activity in the early summer of 1908 and gradually intensified it as preparations were made to occupy the city of Korcé. But on July 24 the Young Turk Constitution, which promised recognition of the rights of the nationalities in the empire, was proclaimed and the guerrilla bands were dissolved.

It can be said that the Albanian insurrections of the first twenty-five years after the abolition of the League of Prizren remained local in character. ‘They occurred mostly in the north, especially in the vilayet of Kosovo. ‘Their objectives were the preservation of the privileges which the centralistic policy of the Porte strove to destroy. However, while defending those privileges, the Albanian insurgents often made de-

mands for the opening of Albanian schools, the use of the Albanian language, withdrawal of Turkish officials, and administrative autonomy in general, all of which were national in nature. The revolts were rudimentary and lacked coordination. The newspaper Drita of Sofia described the real situation effectively and succinctly, when it wrote: “Gjakové fights

and dies, while Ipek is in ignorance. In Lumé houses are in flames, while other places hear nothing about it.” 1° Federal Writers’ Project of the Works Administration of Massachusetts, The Albanian Struggle in the Old World and New, Boston, 19309, Pp- 44-45-

Cf. Petro Luarasi—Jeta dhe Vepra (Life and Work), ed. S. Luarasi, Tirana, 1958, pp. 81-82. 100D rita, 11 March 1906, as quoted by I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 79.

214 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION As previously noted, the truly national resistance came with the creation in 1906 of the Monastir Committee for the Liberation of Albania. The Austrians saw in its foundation a development of the Albanian national thinking.?© In 1907—the same year that saw a new rise in the general

Macedonian guerrilla movement—the guerrilla bands intensified their activity, stretching their field from the Adriatic to Macedonia. ‘They did not raise the banner of revolt against new taxes or military service, as in the north, but against the enemies of the rights of the Albanian nation. ‘They

stood up to the Turks, who oppressed the Albanian people and refused to grant them administrative autonomy, and to the Greeks, who coveted their land. The bands were composed in large part of idealistic young men, both Moslem

and Christian. Since they considered the Turks and the Greeks as their enemies, they had transcended religion and their fight was waged on an ethnic level. The guerrillas were for the people living examples of the assertion of Albanian nationality. ‘hose who fell in the battlefield were the martyrs to the Albanian cause and a contributing factor in the development of national consciousness. Kral to Goluchowski, Scutari, 5 July 1906, No. 48, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/14, Albanien x1/2. 12Cf. T. v. Sosnosky, op.cit., p. 138.

[XxX Contribution of the Italo-Albanians to the

| National Movement ‘THE INTENSIVE national activity developed among the Italo-

Albanians was due in part to political reasons. There is no doubt that the movements for the liberation and unification of Italy served as a stimulus. The events in the Balkans and Italy’s position as a great unified power which called for increase in prestige and territory in the Mediterranean also played an important role. In addition, as part of Italy’s Eastern policy, Premier Francesco Crispi had inaugurated a policy ~ toward Albania which aimed not at Albania’s occupation by Italy but at preventing a strong power from entrenching itself on Albanian territory.? The Austrians believed that it was Crispi who, toward the end of the 1870’s, conceived the idea of reviving the relations between the Italo-Albanians and the mother country, and in

this way permitting Italy to influence the political opinions of the Albanians.? ‘his, however, is not completely true. ‘The literary-cultural movement of the Italo-Albanians had already begun to revive those relations before Crispi. In the 1860’s a group of the Italo-Albanians had established contact with Albanian patriots—with G. Jubani in Shkodér, ‘Thimi Mitko in Egypt, and others—whom it encouraged in their political and literary activity in favor of the national cause. The group had even thought of creating a Pan-Albanian literary society, which would publish a newspaper, called Flamuri 1 Skenderbeut (Flag of Skenderbeg).2 What Francesco Crispi did was to stimulate and intensify the relations between the Albanians of the two coasts of the Adriatic. 1Cf. G. Volpe, ‘‘Formazione storica dell’Albania,” Nuova Antologia,

LxxIv (December 16, 1939), 330-331. ,

2Zwiedinek, ‘Die albanesische Action des k. und k. Ministeriums des Aeussern im Jahre 1897,” Vienna, 11 January 1898, p. 3, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422.

| 8Cf. Histori e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 41.

216 Il, NATIONAL AFFIRMATION For many years the Italo-Albanian patriots were engaged in individual activities. They first entered the field of collective action with the two linguistic congresses of 1895 and 1897. Although linguistic and literary in appearance, these congresses revealed the will of the Albanians of Italy to take part in the national political movement of their compatriots. With the initiative of De Rada, Schiro, and Anselmo Lorecchio, a publicist and lawyer by profession, who proved to be extremely energetic in the Albanian question, the first congress was held in Corigliano Calabro in October 1895. Francesco Crispi was elected honorary president. In accepting the - honor, he wired to the congress that as “an Albanian by blood and heart’’—he was an Italo-Albanian from Sicily—he rejoiced in the initiative, which he hoped would be useful for the history of the civilization of Albania and for the progress of her literature.* ‘The second congress took place in Lungro in Calabria in February 1897. The program of the two con| gresses called for: (a) a unified alphabet; (b) compilation of a dictionary; (c) foundation of an Albanian national society; (d) opening of relations on a broad scale with the mother country.® As an outcome of the first congress, the review Ili 2 Abreshévet (Star of the Albanians) was published in 1896 under the editorship of the archpriest Antonio Argondizza, a man of broad culture and a student of the Albanian language; the congress of Lungro replaced it by the fortnightly La Nazione Albanese (1897-1924), directed by A. Lorecchio,

; and made it the organ of the Societa Nazionale Albanese, formed at the previous congress.* Whereas in the constitution (art. 10) of the congress of Corigliano Calabro political dis*See text of telegram in A. Lorecchio, Il pensiero politico albanese in rapporto agli interesst ttaliani, Rome, 1904, p. Ixxviii. ‘See statutes of the two congresses, ibid., pp. Ixxv-Ixxvi, cxix-cxxi; K. Kamsi, “Shqiptarét e Italisé” (The Albanians of Italy), Leka, Shkodér, special issue, vil-x11 (28 November 1937), 445-446; Revue d’Orient et

d’Hongrie, Budapest, No. 15 (571), 11 April 1897; G. Petrotla, Svolgimento storico della cultura e della letteratura albanese, Palermo, 1950, p. 59.

6Cf. ibid., p. 61.

ITALO-ALBANIAN CONTRIBUTION 217 cussions were barred from the society and the review, in the constitution of the second congress that article was abolished, on the ground that there could be no linguistic and literary discussions without political discussions.’ In La Nazione Albanese writers of Albania proper and of the colonies collaborated. Like the Albanians of the mother country, the Italo-Albanians felt the need for a unified alphabet. On November 15, 1895, Lorecchio issued a proclamation, in the name of the Societa Nazionale Albanese, in which he said: “We are in Italy 200,000 Albanians ® dispersed in the fertile land of Sicily and the provinces of southern Italy .. . We speak the same language as our brothers across the Adriatic, the language spoken by the divine Pelasgians. . . . In order to relate the happy memories of our greatness . . . it 1s necessary that we understand each other through writing.” ® Soon after the coneress of Lungro, on May 1, 1897, Lorecchio, as president of the society, appealed to the Albanians of Albania proper. He stressed union, a prerequisite for any effective action, reminding them that they were all of the same blood, spoke the same language, had the same traditions and aspirations. “‘He who tells you, brothers of Epirus, that you are Greeks, insults your blood. ... Let us unite all, Albanian brothers, in calmness,

which is the supreme virtue of the strong; our right helps us... .’’ He then stated that the causes of division were not religions but foreigners, whom they should not believe: “Let us not believe all the false ministers of religion who have made use of the names of Christ and Mohammed in order to keep us divided. God and Allah, Mohammed and Christ point out to us only one road: to keep our fatherland united and respected.”’ 1° TA. Lorecchio, op.cit., p. cxvili and revised constitution on pp. CX1X-CXX.

SAccording to the 1886 census, there were 181,738 Italo-Albanians in Italy and on the basis of the 1907 census, 208,410. Cf. F. Gilbert, Les pays d’Albanie et leur histoire, Paris, 1914, p. 188. *Text of proclamation in Leka, op.cit., 447-448. 10See complete text in A. Lorecchio, op.cit., pp. 199-201.

218 Il, NATIONAL AFFIRMATION There was greater freedom in Italy than elsewhere for Albanians and the Italian government considered the Italo-Albanians as its citizens. The Societa Nazionale Albanese was therefore in a better position than the Albanian societies in Rumania, Egypt, or Bulgaria to send memoranda and pettitions to the Sultan or the great powers. ‘The memorandum

of January 1, 1898 which it addressed to the Sultan, jointly with other Albanian societies abroad, expressed the desire that in the Albanian vilayets the Albanian language be recog-

nized by a fundamental law as a national language and that it be used in the schools and in the churches: “... A law of the Empire concedes to us the power to ask for the opening of our schools, as it concedes this to other nationalities, subjects of the Sublime Porte; and we will not tire of demanding that this law be applied to us as well. The Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian schools should not remain any longer in the sacred lands of Albania.” 14 The Societa Nazionale Albanese also appealed to the Pope to draw the attention of the Cath_ Olic clergy to “the observance of the Divine Law,” stating that in the vilayet of Shkodér they served interests contrary to those of the Albanian people and fomented discord between Christians and Moslems, causing bloodshed.” The society of the Italo-Albanians in Italy began to be politically more active. In a petition of June 1899 to the Sultan it proposed that for the vilayets of Shkodér, Kosovo, Monastir, Salonica, and Janina a “Regional Commissariat for the Imperial Possessions in the Balkan Peninsula” be instituted, with a General Commissioner residing in Monastir and special commissioners, dependent on him, in the capitals of the other vilayets. The official language between the Regional

Commissariat and the central government in Istanbul would be ‘Turkish, but the official language to be employed in the five vilayets would be Albanian.’® “Text in C. Libardi, I primi moti patriottic: albanesi, nel 1910-1911912, Trent, 1935, 11, Document No. 6, pp. 237-241.

“7 bid. '

137bid., Document No. 8, pp. 245-247.

ITALO-ALBANIAN CONTRIBUTION 219 The political thinking behind these proposals does not seem

to be clear. In interpreting them, we find much that is unsound. The concept of the unification of the existing vilayets and their administration is a European version of the Albanian unified vilayet, the vali, and the kaymakams proposed by the Albanians of Albania proper and the colonies. ‘The only new feature is the title, which eliminates ““Albania’”’ and substitutes “Imperial Possessions of the Balkan Peninsula.” However, the important thing at this time was that Albania should not remain a geographic expression but should be recognized

as a country with defined frontiers. ‘The proposed title rendered Albania still more vague. Apparently, the Italo-Albanians thought that by introducing Albanian as the official language of the five vilayets they at the same time defined Albania as a territory. This was an illusion. In the vilayets of Monastir and Salonica there were large non-Albanian ethnic groups, which considered the parts they occupied their own. ‘The imposition of Albanian as an official language could not

alter this situation; it could not make them Albanian and would certainly be less effective than the official recognition of the vilayet of Albania, with well-determined boundaries. Moreover, it would be impossible for ‘Turkey, which was reluctant to permit the opening of Albanian schools, to accept Albanian as an official language. This could only happen in the event that Albanian became an official language next to ‘Turkish in the territories comprised within the unified vilayet

of Albania. |

In the meantime, on April 9, 1897, an Albanian Political Committee was founded, with headquarters in Naples, under the presidency of Marchese d’ Auletta, who claimed to be a direct descendant of Skenderbeg. Its organ was La Nuova Albania, a fortnightly publication.1* In November 1897, this “Cf. A. Lorecchio, op.cit., p. 69; Zwiedinek, “Die albanesische Action

des k. und k. Ministeriums des Alussern im Jahre 1897,” Vienna, 11 Janner 18098, p. 13, HHSiA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422; Degrand to Hanotaux, Scutari, 12 May 1897, No. 87 and enclosure, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1897, Vol. 1.

220 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION committee, interpreting Italo-Albanian sentiments, upon re-

ceipt of news that their brothers under Turkish rule had revolted and were demanding their autonomy, called on the Italian government to remember the mutual interests of the Albanians and Italians and intervene in order to obtain that autonomy, as it had already begun to do for Crete. In April 1900 a similar committee was constituted in Rome, but 1t was short-lived.1¢ That year also witnessed the founding of the — National Albanian League with branches in almost all the Italo-Albanian settlements, the most important of which had their own organs.?" The Porte began for the first time to fear the activity of the Italo-Albanians. It wired its ambassador in Rome to furnish precise and detailed information on all the principal members of the Societa Nazionale Albanese who resided in the Italian capital. It gave as a reason that, despite the assurances presented by that society, there was no guarantee that it would not attempt to promote its political goals by arousing the population of Albania against Turkey.1® The movement of the Italo-Albanians was gradually expanding and strengthening. On June 15-18, 1903, a congress was held in Naples in order to bring about a greater cohesion in their federation and to promote cultural and political ties with the rest of the Albanians. In the congress of Lungro it had been decided to request the Italian government to es-

tablish a chair of Albanian language and literature at the Oriental Institute of Naples. In 1900 the poet Guiseppe Schiro was appointed to it and began to lecture.!® At this conTI] Comitato Politico Albanese a Napoli al Ministro degli Esteri, Visconti Venosta, Naples, November 30, 1897, T. 3863, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 11, No. 2go.

6A. Lorecchio, op.cit., pp. ccclix, 70.

Report by Zwiedinek, Vienna, December 1ig01, Geheim, p. 12, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. Text of telegram in Pansa to Visconti Venosta, Therapia, 11 September 1897, R. 844/237, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 11, No. 205. MA. Lorecchio, op.cit., p. Ixxix; “Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901

bis Anfang 1905),” Vienna, April 1905, p. 13, HHStA, PA xiv/28, Albanien xx/3.

ITALO-ALBANIAN CONTRIBUTION 22:1 gress of Naples establishment of a new Albanian chair in the University of Palermo was proposed. Several other resolutions were taken: (1) the granting of more stipends to Albanians in the mother country for studies in the Italo-Albanian Collegio S. Adriano, in San Demetrio Corone; (2) the introduction of the teaching of the Albanian language in the public schools of the Albanian communities in Italy; (3) the autonomy of Albania, that is, the unification of the five vilayets

with an Albanian Governor General in Shkodér; (4) the development of communications between the Italo-Albanian federation and the Albanian societies in Rumania and Bulgaria; (5) equal rights for all faiths in Albania; (6) the foundation of a central newspaper of the federation to be published in Rome in French, Italian and Albanian; (7) a request to the Porte that the Albanian leaders who had been arrested during the latest Macedonian disturbances be released.*° ‘The resolutions show the will of the Italo-Albanians to assume all-Albanian tasks. Among the Giolitti Papers, there is a Memorza on the Italo-

Albanian movement in Italy which is significant because it shows how Italian political figures viewed it. ‘The document bears no date, but on the basis of facts mentioned in it, may be placed in the late spring of 1903, when Giovanni Giolitti was Minister of Interior Affairs. ‘The document mentions that there were some 80 settlements of Albanians in Italy (reaching a population of more than 200,000) which had not given

up the cultivation of the language and literature of the land of origin. “Transmitted from father to son the hatred against the Turks, all yearn for the day on which Albania will be able to free herself from the Turkish domination, and to this even the most humble peasant adheres and cooperates with great enthusiasm. After four centuries, the race 1s marvelously preserved, also in the fighting spirit, thanks to which they [the Italo-Albanians] are capable of the most daring enterprises.” Fach of the 80 colonies, the document continues, had a committee corresponding with the major centers, Naples and *°Pasetti to Goluchowski, Rome, 1 July 1903, No. 47H, vertraulich, Beilage, HHStA, PA x1v/26, Albanien x1x/3.

222 Il, NATIONAL AFFIRMATION Palermo, where the society of the Italo-Albanians was in its

full vigor.?% |

Despite the semblance of unity, it would be incorrect to assume that there were no disagreements among the ItaloAlbanians. It seems that another aim of the congress of Naples

in 1903 had been to consider, in a reserved manner, to what extent a fusion of the various tendencies was possible.”? Although all the Italo-Albanians had the liberation of Albania as their ultimate objective, two opinions prevailed in their ranks as to the methods to be used. One was represented predominently by G. Schiré, who advocated revolution to speed up the independence of Albania.*? He believed in 1896-1897 that the moment had arrived for a general revolt and had talked the matter over with several friends and patriots who

were willing to collaborate in helping it to break out. He appeared to have been encouraged also by the sympathy which almost the whole disinterested European press had manifested toward the Albanian people, which raised his hopes that pub-

lic opinion would influence European diplomacy to intervene in favor of the revolution. Schiro rejected the idea of those Albanians or Italo-Albanians who thought that ‘Turkey would feel it necessary to accord independence to the Albanian nation in order to have Albanian support in the difficult days to come. He also considered naive those who believed that a people could achieve a free life “by begging for concessions.” ‘The only road to salvation, according to Schird, was to take up arms against the Turks as soon as the other nationalities under them revolted. For the Albanians, who had been employed by Turkey in the repression of insurrections, would run the risk of being dragged down with her to the ruin which

| was imminent.”* It was at that time (1897) that Schird published his Battle Songs, in which he called the Albanians to 21“Memoria—I1 movimento albanese in Italia,” ACS, Carte Giolitti, Busta 2, Fasc. 27, hereafter cited as Memoria Giolitit. 22Cf. bid. 8G. Schird, Gli Albanesi e la questione balkanica, Naples, 1904, p. 106; A. Lorecchio, op.cit., p. 71. 4G. Schird, op.cit., p. 107.

ITALO-ALBANIAN CONTRIBUTION 223 arms against ‘Turkey for the liberation of their country.”> His following was small, as his train of thought did not fully take

into account the desires of the Albanian people.”* | De Rada, whose policy was to side with ‘Turkey against the

common enemies,?” did not approve of the partial insurrections which were taking place in Albania. He disapproved of them especially when he believed that they were due to foreign influences: “We cannot still say consciously whether the moment has come to take up arms, or whether our brothers are determined to do so, owing to instigations of the foreigners who surround them. We only know that the swords have been drawn out in defense of justice.’’ After considering the claims of the Albanians as just, De Rada added: “We would

like this to be the hour in which the Ottoman Porte, surrounded by so many enemies who hate it, would spare the blood and grant to the unfortunate Albanians, who have not

yet abandoned it, what it promised in Berlin, that is, the autonomy of their own homes, rejoiced by the return of their chiefs. Gratifying them thus, it will dissipate the greedy foreign plots.” 28 What De Rata regarded as foreigners were primarily the Greeks and the Slavs, against whose intentions he warned his compatriots again at a later date.?° A. Lorecchio was an even stronger exponent of this approach. He considered the Ottoman empire “a temporary political formula’ and its right to territorial integrity dependent on the designs of Austria-Hungary and Russia.®° He advocated reforms and autonomy. ‘This trend of thought, which did not run contrary to Italian official policy, had many adherents. See G. Schird, Kénkat e luftés (I canti della battaglia), con note e osservazioni sulla questione d’Oriente, Palermo, 1897.

26See Relazione del conte Donato Sanminiatelli nel XI congresso della “Dante Alighieri” in Verona (26-28 settembre 1907), ACS, Carte PisaniDossi (1866-1907), No. carte 671, No. Fasc. 40, No. Busta 14. 27“Tl testamento politico di Girolame De Rada,” Shéjzat (Le Pleiadi), Rome, vill (1964), 181-182. 28G, Schird, op.cit., p. 76.

20Testamento politico di Girolamo De Rada,” op.cit., p. 183. 830A. Lorecchio, op.cit., p. 5.

224 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION | It was Lorecchio, more experienced in political questions and

possessing a better knowledge of the situation in Albania, who criticized G. Schird’s proposal for a revolution and called it ‘“a mere parricide.” He argued: “Either the revolution will

be victorious (and do you believe that the Albanians are in a condition to constitute an independent state?), and then the consequences are evident. Or the revolution will be repressed, and suffocated, and in such a case it is still worse.” Apart from the blood that would be shed, Lorecchio feared that European diplomacy, with the excuse that peace was con-

_ tinuously disturbed and ‘Turkey was impotent, would interfere and entrust certain powers with the role of gendarmes. The consequences would be the division of Albania among Austria, Greece, and the Slavs, and the loss of the Albanian language and nationality. He then outlined what seemed to him to be the best line of conduct under the circumstances. ‘They should ask for those reforms and internal regulations which would enable Albania to be in a position to have relations with the civilized world. They should continuously call for the assistance of Italy and the other powers to reach

that end. They should assert that they did not want their nationality to be affected in any way, and when “we Albanians

of Italy will succeed in having relations with our brothers on the other side of the Adriatic, escaping the arrogant vigilance of the Austrian ports, then only we will be able to combat with equal arms the Greek, Slavic, and Austrian influences, as well as those of the Propaganda Fide, which go hand

in hand with the latter.’ 1 In order to achieve the reforms for the unification of Al-

banian lands, Lorecchio continued to raise his voice for the revision of the treaty of Berlin, along the lines proposed by _ Lord Fitzmaurice at the Conference of Istanbul in 1880.%? He maintained that the revision of that treaty was a necessity 31Letter of A. Lorecchio to G. Schird, 24 September 1896, in G. Schird, Op.cit., pp. 106-107.

82Cf. A. Lorecchio, op.cit., pp. 10, 31. ,

ITALO-ALBANIAN CONTRIBUTION | 225 imposed not only on the Albanians but also on the Italians.*%

Taking into account Italy’s interests in the Adriatic, he proposed an action on her part in favor of the Albanian nationality. She should champion at least the constitution of the administrative autonomy of Albania, in the same manner as other powers had done with the autonomy or independence of other Balkan nationalities.*4 It may be said that, whereas Lorecchio was the representative of the moderate party, Schird was the representative of the party of action. A Committee of Action, composed mostly of young men, was formed in the beginning of this century. Its motivating forces was not SchirO but Manlio Bennici, a _ young publicist. ‘The directing mind seemed to be his father, Professor Giuseppe Bennici, a man of much experience and learning, still ardent in spirit and daring in his conceptions.*° ‘The members of this committee came in touch with the republican and the irredentist movement in Italy, which in 1902 had suddenly gained a new impetus.*®

The Committee of Action had already established contacts with General Ricciotti Garibaldi, the son of the Italian revolutionary hero, who followed the tradition of his father. ‘The Italo-Albanians had participated in the landing of the Mille at Marsala, and Giuseppe Garibaldi had an affection for the Albanians. In 1864 he wrote to Dora d’Istria that the cause

of the Albanians was his; that he certainly would be very glad to use what remained of his life for the advantage of that “valiant people. European diplomacy, which weighs upon the

Oriental Question, does not want insurrection; but if this is successful, the diplomacy will accept not only the accomplished facts, but under the pressure of the universal opinion of the Christians, it will even be obliged to favor them.” 3” 337 bid., p. 31.

241 bid., p. 37. sSMemoria Giolitiz.

8Cf. G. Salvemini, La politica estera dell’Italia del 1877 al 1915,

Florence, 1950, and edn., pp. 144-146. s7See text in G. Schiro, op.cit., p. 236.

226 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION In 1900, when revolts broke out in Albania, Ricciotti Garibaldi was looking forward to an expedition to that country, and funds were being raised for that purpose.®* Later the relations of some of the Italo-Albanians with the General became closer. With letters from him, Manlio Bennici went early in 1903 to Milan, where he had various discussions

party.°? |

about the Albanian question with leaders of the republican | The republican center of Milan, which represented the most active continuation of the Mazzinian traditions, took advantage of the Albanian question and not only made an agitation against Austria and the ‘Triple Alliance, but also used it as a means to carry back the republican initiative to the precedents of Mazzini and Garibaldi. ‘Their idea was: “Let us show that we know how to put ourselves at the vanguard. .. . Let us show that we are capable of action and sacrifice even if it [the government], scared or servile, abandoned the cause of civilization.” 4° It was the idea of fare at any cost. The possibility of an Italo-Albanian expedition to Albania was tackled in the leading action section of Milan. If the resistance of the Albanian vilayets against the ‘Turks continued and expanded, as seemed likely, one could foresee

an expedition of Calabro-Sicilian Albanians to help their brothers. For this eventuality studies were made, as a result of which the port of Vloré and the gulf of Salonica were - given up, as too conspicuous for landing, and the choice fell on the ports of Sarandé, Gumenicé, and Preveza, in southern Albania. If Austria then were to descend to Durrés or Salonica, or any other place, it would be possible to foment, through

the anti-Austrian groups active in Italy, a revolt in one or two points of the Austro-Italian frontier, and even a move38See il Direttore Generale della Pubblica Sicurezza, Leonardi, to Visconti Venosta, Rome, 26 May 1goo, L. Riservata 6904, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 111, No. 405; il Sotto secretario agli Affari Esteri,

Fusinato, al Presidente del Consiglio e Ministro dell’Interno, Pelloux, Rome, 2 June 1900, N. 225291323, 1bid., No. 408.

“Tbid. !

9°Memoria Giolitts. :

ITALO-ALBANIAN CONTRIBUTION 227

ment aimed at an uprising in Trieste. Thus the Albanian question was connected, through the Italo-Albanians, with the question of Italian irredentism.

The project for an immediate campaign in Albania arose in April 1903. At that time the situation in Macedonia had become very grave. The overtures, which already existed with

Ricciotti Garibaldi, came closer to action. The General accepted the leadership of the expedition under the following conditions: (1) that a thousand Albanians of Italy be given to him with the necessary provisions and that the means for the

embarcation of the expedition be reinforced; (2) that an agreement be guaranteed with the Albanians of Epirus; (3) that measures be taken to make possible the embarcation of the expedition without trouble from external or internal au-

thorities.* |

A few days later, General Garibaldi was informed that the conditions were going to be met,* but the expedition did not materialize. ‘he reason is obscure. Apparently, the organization of the forces was not adequate and the international situation was not propitious. Nevertheless, the project was not abandoned. In 1904, General Garibaldi, in the capacity of delegate of

the Federation Pro Italia Irredenta, took the initiative in organizing the Albanian movement in Italy. He invited the most distinguished personalities of the Albanian colonies in that country to form a Consiglio Albanese in Rome. Among those who responded to his initiative were persons like the lawyer Gennaro Luis, editor of Nuova Albania; Prof. Michele Marchiano; Francesco Musacchia, president of the Albanian Association of Sicily; Dr. Agostino Ribecco, president of the Albanian Committee of Spezzano; General Domenico Damis;

~ Colonel Giuseppe Sgro; and some fifteen others. Not all of them attended the meeting held on March 24, 1904 in his home in Rome, which drew up the constitution of the Consislio Albanese d’Italia, with Ricciotti Garibaldi as its president. The program of the Council was “Albania for the Al-

“Ibid. “Ibid. Ibid.

228 IL NATIONAL AFFIRMATION banians,” and its aim was an organization of the Albanians of Italy, to work with the Albanian societies abroad, to establish closer relations with the Albanians of the mother coun-

try, and to ask that Italy support the aspirations of the Albanian people. General Garibaldi received the mandate to carry out what had been resolved.** Other meetings were held and the real objectives of the Consiglio Albanese d’Italia became clearer. It was felt that the organization of the Italo-Albanians must be ready for any eventuality, because the equilibrium in the Balkans might at any moment be upset. Local sub-committees were formed to look after the creation of volunteer troops, ready to take up arms at the first call, and to open subscriptions for collection of funds. The revolutionary Manlio Bennici was chosen as Secretary General of the Council.*

In San Paolo, in Argentina, a Pro Patria committee of _ Italo-Albanians was formed, connected with that of Naples. It promised that the Italo-Albanians of South America would send money and men for a program whose goal was to reconstitute the Albanians into a nation, without any protectorate, even Italian. ‘The Pro Patria committee also claimed that it was in touch with the Albanians of North America.4* The San Paolo committee indicates how far the Italo-Albanian movement had expanded and how strongly it influenced the sentiments of its partisans. The Italo-Albanians were active not only among their own people. ‘They tried to establish links with the Albanian col“Cf. Communicato N. 1, La delagazione della Federazione Nazionale

Popolare “Pro Italia Irredenta,” comunica: I] Consiglio Albanese d'Italia, Roma 1904; “Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1907 bis Anfang 1905), p. 12, HHStA, PA xiv/28, Albanien xx/3. “Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ASMAE, No. 15156 Rome, 18 July 1904; also speech by Conte Luigi Gaetani di Laurenzana delivered on 14 May 1904, in the Italian Parliament, in Kral to Goluchowski, Monastir, 15 July 1904, No. 57, Beilage, HHStA, PA x1v/25, Albanien x1x/1.

“Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 18 July 1904, No. 15156, and 27 July 1904, No. 15557, ASMAE.

ITALO-ALBANIAN CONTRIBUTION 229

onies abroad and exert influence on the inhabitants of Albania proper. They propagandized about the Albanian question with newspaper articles, speeches by their followers, and _ letters. Advancing a vague prospect of great events and advan-

tages for the Albanian people, they won many adherents among the Catholics of Shkodér.** La Nazione Albanese, with its articles on Balkan politics and the creation of an Albanian

nation, increased the circle of its readers in the towns of the north. It was read not only in Shkodér, but also in Durrés and partly in Elbasan and Kavajé.*® A. Lorecchio was active in recruiting Albanians for new

political publications. The first was Mehmed Frashéri, a southern Albanian of Young Turk convictions, who, in 1889,

in Rome, helped him publish The Voice of Albania. It was written in Albanian, French, and Turkish, but it soon ceased publication, because of disagreement in policy between Lorecchio and Mehmed Frashéri.*® In June 1904, Lorecchio, together with Don Gasper Jakova Merturi, an ex-Jesuit from northern Albania, began to issue the daily Agenzia Balcanica ed Italiana, a bulletin of political, financial, and commercial information, written in Italian. ‘““The aim,” as stated in the publication, “was to enlighten the European public opinion on the rights, the exigencies, and the necessary reforms for the five vilayets of Shkodér, Janina, Monastir, Uskub, and Salonica.” 5° On September 15, 1904 Don Gasper Jakova Mer-

turi published in Rome a fortnightly, The Herald of Albania. It was written mostly in Italian, and its program was unity

and independence, without saying how they could be attained.®! 47ITppen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 10 November 1898, No. 45A, HHStA, PA x11/303, Tirkei xxx, 1808.

*8Cf. Kwiatkowski to Goluchowski, Scutari, 17 September 1904, No.

108, HHStA, PA x1v/16, Albanien x11/1. , 4°Petrovich to Goluchowski, Valona, 11 February igoo, No. 5/res., HHSiA, PA xi1v/16, Albanien x11/1-7.

See notes in the file on Albanian publications 1897-1913, HHStA, PA xiv/16, Albanien xm1/1-7. WT bid.

230 II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION Manlio Bennici had his own organ, the newspaper Corriere dei Balcani, the first issue of which appeared on March 20, 1906 in Rome. Its program was broader: promotion of a fed-

| eration of the small Balkan countries as a bulwark against Pan-Germanism, which in Italy meant expansion of AustriaHungary. The newspaper was written in French and Italian, and contained a special section with the title Gazzetta Albanese; * it pursued the program set forth by General Ricciotti Garibaldi. The Italo-Albanian leaders made efforts to concentrate the Albanian publication movement in Italy. They came in touch with the various representatives of the Albanian press dispersed abroad, and proposed settlement in Italy to Shahin Kolonja, Kristo Luarasi, Nikolla Ivanaj, a journalist from Shkodér who published in Dubrovnik The Hope of Albania, and some Albanians who were active in Egypt. The offers made to the first two proposed not only the transfer of Drita of Sofia but also the transportation of the printing and publishing house Mbrothésia to Italy. It was suggested that Lua-

rasi establish in Frascati, near Rome, a sort of Albanian central printing house, where all the Albanian newspapers _ published in Italy, as well as other Albanian publications, would be printed.*? Such a project obviously stemmed from the political idea of bringing the Albanian publication movement under the influence of the Italo-Albanians. As long as the movement of the Italo-Albanians was pri-

marily on a cultural plane, the Albanian national leaders welcomed it; when it became too active in politics, many of the Albanian leaders were not willing to collaborate. After the Italo-Albanian linguistic congress of 1895, Faik Konitza was among the first to express his congratulations on the foundation of Societa Nazionale Albanese to A. Lorecchio, who was then its vice-president. He wrote that it would help “‘to *¢Kral to Goluchowski, Scutari, g0 April 1906, No. 33, HHStA, PA xIv/16, Albanien x11/1-7. *8Kral to Goluchowski, Scutari, 29 January 1906, No. 15, HHStA, PA x1v/16, Albanien x11/5.

ITALO-ALBANIAN CONTRIBUTION 231 diffuse not only the great idea,” but also the taste for Albanian studies.°* However, when he later began to publish Albania, Faik became suspicious of the Italo-Albanian movement, and

soon a polemic ensued between his organ and La Naztone | Albanese. He wanted to deprive the Italo-Albanians of any right to be engaged actively in the fate of Albania, not so much because five centuries had separated them from the Albanians and their “blood had been mixed and their language corrupted,” as he put it, but mostly because of their quality as “Italian citizens.” His target was Lorecchio, because of his concern about the union of the Albanians. Interpreting Lorecchio’s union, Faik posed three ironical alternatives: “1) Either the Albanians of Italy want to annex Calabria and Sicily to Albania; 2) or they want to annex Albania to Calabria and Sicily; 3) or they want to rise and emigrate en masse to Albania.”’ Unless one of these conditions were met, Faik maintained, there could not be any union. The Albanians would be glad to have intellectual relations with the Italo-Albanians but they should not engage in politics, or speak any more of union. When General Garibaldi made the declaration about the constitution of Consiglio Albanese d’Italia Faik Konitza ques-

tioned whether an Italian patriot like Garibaldi could see the interest of Albania as it was seen by the Albanians themselves. In order to undermine the General’s position on the Albanian question, Faik pointed out that in 1897 Ricciotti Garibaldi had taken part in the Greco-Turkish war in order to help the Greeks occupy southern Albania and in 1902 had proclaimed to the world that he was ready to go and assist Macedonia, which meant that he would lend a helping hand to the Slavs in order to subjugate half of Albania.* The case of Ismail Kemal was different. He was on good 54Faik Konitza to A. Lorecchio, Brussels, December 1896, in A. Lorecchio, op.cit., pp. 1xxx-]xxx1.

Albania, 1 (1898), 66-67. 8*Garibaldi dhe Shgiptarét” (Garibaldi and the Albanians), Albania, IX (1904), 37-

232 II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION terms with the Italo-Albanians and, during the years of his exile, he visited them several times. He was always well received, whether it was in Calabria or in Sicily, where he took part in meetings and banquets given in his honor. He also stood for friendly relations with Italy. While in London, Ismail had presented a memorandum to the King of Italy and his Prime Minister, Zanardelli. He requested them to include Albania among the Balkan countries being considered for the reforms of the Berlin treaty, to be carried out through _ an international diplomatic commission.®*” His role must have

been significant, especially during the talks with M. Bennici regarding Garibaldi’s expedition to Albania. It was supposed

| that the choice of Malta as the embarcation point of the first thousand Italo-Albanians who would take part in the campaign was a proposal made in agreement with Ismail.°* In 1907, when asked whether Italian policy was in conformity

| with the program of the Albanian people, Ismail Kemal did not hesitate to reply in the affirmative: “Precisely: and this has been revealed in the last acts of the Consulta which have dissipated the fears of those who until yesterday believed that its action signified wishes of conquest and propaganda in the Orient.®?

Although not aggressive like Faik Konitza, Shahin Kolonja also was not inclined to cooperate with the Italo-Albanians. In announcing the formation of Consiglio Albanese d’Italia, M. Bennici wrote to him that there were two enemies of liberty and independence, ‘‘the dominating Turk and the invading Austrian.” General Garibaldi, in abiding by the program,

“Albania for the Albanians,’’ would connect the Albanian movement with all the organizations in the Balkans in order

8Ibid.

to form a coalition against Austria, which attempted to occupy

Macedonia and Albania. For Bennici, Austria was a worse

’Memoria Giolittt. ,

“La politica nei Balcani” (Una conversazione con Ismail Kemal Bey), La Tribuna, 27 July 1907.

ITALO-ALBANIAN CONTRIBUTION 233

enemy than the Turk, with whom it would be possible to come to an understanding the day “our national rights would be recognized and our territorial integrity affirmed, with a broad autonomy which would permit us to develop Albanian culture.” ® Shahin Kolonja was mistrustful of the Italo-Albanians; he considered all, except for G. Schiro, Italianized.*

The reluctance of the Albanians to collaborate with the Italo-Albanians was partly explained by Faik Konitza. They were Italian citizens and as such they could not go against the interest of Italy. However, not all citizens see the interest of

their country alike. It is true that the Italo-Albanians regarded the interests of Albania as coinciding in the main with

those of Italy: they wanted an autonomous or independent Albania, freed from any Austrian influence, and on friendly terms with Italy. On the other hand, the Italo-Albanians were not always in accord with the Italians or the Italian government. ‘he clergyman Gerardo Conforti, one of the principal Italo-Albanian leaders in Naples, confided to Mgr. Doci that

the Italian authorities were suspicious of their activity. Lorecchio had stated openly that two basic principles guided the political endeavors of the Italo-Albanians. One was “Albania for the Albanians,” which coincided with Italian policy, and the other was that “the Adriatic was an Italian and Albanian sea’’; to this the Italians would not subscribe, desiring

the Adriatic an Italian sea.® |

Later, in their cooperation with Italian irredentism, which was revived by the Albanian question, the Italo-Albanians were accused of creating trouble for the government. They did not shrink from the responsibility, considering irredent°°Manlio Bennici to Shahin Bey [Kolonja], Rome, 8 April 1904, in HHStA, PA xiv/16, Albanien x11/1-7; “Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),”’ p. 12.

®'Kral to Goluchowski, Monastir, 17 May 1904, No. 41, HHStA, PA x1v/16, Albanien x11/1-7. *?Ippen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 10 November 1898, No. 45A, HHStA, PA xi1/303, Turkei xxx, 1898.

8A. Lorecchio, op.cit., pp. 35-36, 61, 84.

234 II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION ism ‘“‘as a subsidiary means to the development of the principal thesis: Albania for the Albanians.” But there must have been other reasons which prevented Albanian cooperation with the Italo-Albanians. ‘he Moslem Albanians, who were the majority in Albania, would view with suspicion and perhaps with resentment a national movement whose leadership would be in the hands of Christians supported by a relatively great power, Italy. Moreover, the Orthodox Christians of the south would not be inclined to join a movement headed by Christians who recognized the

Pope as their supreme spiritual chief. However, the most decisive reason should be sought in the rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Italy in Albania. ‘Those Albanian leaders, like Faik Konitza and Shahin Kolonja, who had sided with Austro-Hungarian policy because they found it compatible

with the interests of their country, could not conceivably work with a movement which opposed Austria-Hungary and favored Italy. ‘The reverse would be the case for leaders like Ismail Kemal, who considered a friendly Italy beneficial to the interests of Albania and were suspicious of the aims of the Dual Monarchy. This accounts also for the split among the Catholics of Shkodér. Those who sided with Italy were

| favorable to a collaboration with the Italo-Albanians. Despite instances of friction, and even distrust, it would be

unrealistic to think that there was no cooperation between the Italo-Albanians and the Italian government. They needed each other. Already in August 1897 A. Lorecchio wrote to Visconti Venosta, Minister of Foreign Affairs, that, in conformity with his promises, he had begun his efforts to find a way of giving a more vigorous impulse to the commercial rela-

tions in the Adriatic Sea between the Albanians in Italy and those of the mother country. He declared that the society he headed was at the disposal of the government, holding that only the Italo-Albanians were in a position, because of common blood and language with the Albanians on the other side of the Adriatic, to render useful services to the Italian comS47 bid., pp. 38-39.

ITALO-ALBANIAN CONTRIBUTION 235 merce in that sea.® Giulio Prinetti, Minister of Foreign Affairs, although careful not to hurt the Triple Alliance, manifested sympathy for the Italo-Albanian movement. He had several discussions with the revolutionary Manlio Bennici, when the latter was interested in a trip to southern Albania. He seems to have told him in 1902 that if Bennici brought him a document from some businessmen—even if this were fictitious—which indicated that he was travelling on business, he would secure for him all the consular protection he needed during his trip in Albania.6* On May 14, 1904, in the Italian Parliament, Count Luigi Gaetani di Laurenzana spoke extensively on the needs of Albania and Italian policy. Praising the Italo-Albanians, who had then formed the Consiglio Al-

banese d'Italia, he proposed that they should have a fair representation of their own in the Italian Parliament; that Italy should make use of them in the Italian schools, posts and consulates in Albania; that instead of emigrating to America they could work in the lands of the Albanian landowners in Macedonia; and that an Albanian chair be instituted in the University of Rome.” In short, the Italian deputy wanted the Italo-Albanians to serve as a link between Albania

and Italy. :

While the Austrians, as members of the Triple Alliance, complained about the reports of the Italo-Albanian papers because they inspired in Albania a hatred for Austrians—and no doubt with the approval of the Italian consular representatives in that country ®’—the Italo-Albanians protested against

Italy’s attitude toward the Albanian question. ‘They pointed | 65J] Presidente della Societa Nazionale Albanese Lorecchio al Ministro degli Esteri, Visconti Venosta, L. P. Pallagorio (Catanzaro), 18 August

1897, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. u, No. 174. 66See Memoria Giolittt.

67Cf. the text of the whole speech contained in an appeal “A gli Albanesi d'Italia,” by Ricciotti Garibaldi and included as Beilage in Kral to Goluchowski, Monastir, 15 July 1904, No. 57, HHStA, PA xiv/25, Albanien xIx/1. 68K ral to Goluchowski, Scutari, 10 November 1898, No. 45A, HHStA,

PA xu1/303, Ttirkei xxx, 1898. | |

236 II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION out that Italy was confronted with a dilemma: either to assist the development of Albanian political thought as manifested,

| and as it was in its essence, or to “put her soul at rest” and comply with the inevitable consequences of the treaty of Berlin, continuing to represent before Russia and Austria-Hungary the same old role.®® When the Austro-Russian note about reforms in Macedonia was delivered to ‘Turkey in 1903, it was

a proof for the Italo-Albanians that the Near Eastern Question had entered a new phase, which ought to be studied on the basis of criteria different from those of the Congress of Berlin. It was held that for European diplomacy in 1878 the Albanians did not count, that it was as if they had vanished from the face of the earth, or had been absorbed by the Greeks and the Slavs. It was further maintained that the Balkan con-

flict then had no other cause or manifestation to the Europeans but that of a contest between different and opposing faiths. ‘The situation was different at the beginning of the twentieth century. ‘The Albanian nationality had asserted itself, and in the Balkan peninsula there were not only Greeks and Slavs but also the Albanian people, who, although belonging to different faiths, were of the same nationality.” Consequently, when the Mirzsteg reforms were proclaimed, the Italo-Albanians protested, because they divided Albania and excluded the vilayets of Janina and Shkodér from the area of reforms.” _ Both Austrians and Italians were quick to acknowledge the development of the Italo-Albanian movement. L. von Chlumecky, the expert of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy, wrote that at the outset the Italo-Albanians found little response and understanding for their intentions on the part of the Italians. ‘The people who were at the head of the movement were not

disappointed by the failure. They doubled their efforts to win over Italian public opinion, without abandoning their main aim: “to awaken the national consciousness in Albania

— Ibid., 2-4. “Tbid., pp.pp. 19-20, 30. |, ,- | 8°Cf. A. Lorecchio, op.cit., p. 31.

ITALO-ALBANIAN CONTRIBUTION 237

and to provide there for the introduction of their political program.” 7? The Italians themselves were ready to admit that

within five years the Italo-Albanian movement in Italy had made ‘tenacious propaganda with the press, with motions in the parliament, with meetings and conferences.” 7 _ The activity of the Italo-Albanians, on the one hand, was a strong incentive to the Albanian national movement and, on the other, by mobilizing Italian public opinion and causing concern to Austria-Hungary, made the Albanian question better known in the world. It is only fair to say that the contribution of the Italo-Albanians to the Albanian national

334. |

movement was also politically substantial.

727,, v. Chlumecky, “Die Italo-Albanesen und die Balkanpolitik,”

Oesterreichische Rundschau, v (November 1905—-January 1906), 332 and

®Memoria Gioltitt. |

Xx

and Italy

Albania’s Importance to Austria-Hungary

| WHEN Austria was expelled from Germany in 1866, her interests turned more and more to the Balkans, the only area where there was still a possibility of expansion. What form

| this expansion should take was a matter of much dispute, the military men for the most part supporting the idea of terri-

torial expansion. |

While the Russo-Turkish war was going on (1877), F. Lippich, the Austro-Hungarian consul in Shkodér, was asked by his Ministry to present a memorandum on Albania. The im-

portance of this country for the Orientpolitik of the Dual Monarchy was one of the main topics discussed in it. Considering the eventuality of the creation of new Slavic states, partially or totally sovereign, on the southeastern frontiers of Austria-Hungary, Lippich was of the opinion that the Albanians and their territory could serve as a bastion against Slavic expansion. He limited his primary interest to northern and northeastern Albania. If the Albanians remained alone,

he maintained, they would naturally be too weak to withstand the collision with Slavism. However, if they were part of a great power like Austria-Hungary, they could become valuable allies, “‘as they are not only a strong people, through and through anti-Slavic minded, but they also occupy a region which extends, on the one hand, up to the borders of the Serbian principality, and on the other, as far as the Bulgarian Morava.” ‘They would substantially restrict the Serbo-Bulgarian expansionist desires, and, in the hands of the Mon-

archy, they could acquire a position that would make it impossible for Russian-protected slavism to fight in the West-

ern Balkans which were within the sphere of interest of Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary could make use of the 1Cf. W. L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890, New York, 1950, pp. 69-70.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND ITALY 239 Albanians and their country because the Catholics were on her side and the Moslems too were sympathetic to her, being convinced that Austria-Hungary’s task was to frustrate Russia’s plans in the peninsula and thus upholding the authority of the Sultan in the European provinces. In the event of occupation of Albania by the Monarchy, the Austro-Hungarian consul favored not a partial occupation of the coast or of northeastern Albania, but occupation of the whole northern part, for both the coast and the northeastern section had the same political, military, and commercial significance for Aus-

tria-Hungary. He also favored the idea of converting the northern Moslem Albanians to Catholicism so as to unite the country into a Catholic bloc opposing an Orthodox Slavic one.?

Lippich’s desire to convert the Moslem Albanians in the north was wishful thinking. Although the tradition of conversion was still strong among the Moslems of northern Albania and there were crypto-Christians in their midst, mass conversions were not likely to occur. Count Greneville, Lippich’s colleague in Salonica, was more realistic. He advised his Ministry in a memorandum four years later, after the collapse

of the Albanian League, that if Austria-Hungary wanted to profit from the situation, a sine qua non was to assure the continuation of the Moslem faith. Having witnessed the efforts of the eastern Albanians for autonomy and their battles against the Turks, he did not even hint at Austrian possession of the country. He did, however, suggest that the Dual Monarchy, having come closer to eastern Albania with the occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, should try to win the Albanians to her side. She should persuade them that AustriaHungary alone was in a position to secure for them political autonomy. Greneville concluded that “the friendship of a strong eastern Albania assures our plans regarding a Turkey about to come to an end, while an autonomous Albania is *“Denkschrift tiber Albanien” von k. und k. Consul F. Lippich, Vienna, 20 June 1877, HHStA, PA xu1/256, Tuirkei 1-v.

240 Il, NATIONAL AFFIRMATION a powerful bulwark against extravagant desires of the Serbs

, and Bulgarians.” ® Events in the Balkans and the need of Italy, as a unified great power, to regain some of the ground she had lost in the Gulf of Venice and in all of the old mare nostrum naturally led her to formulate a policy toward Albania. Francesco Crispi was the initiator of this policy. In March 1880 he declared in the Italian parliament: “By the treaty of Berlin Austria acquired with Bosnia and Hercegovina an invulnerable frontier toward the Orient; and she should be satisfied. We, without envying the unjustly obtained possession, should

desire and ask that she remain there, and that she does not call for anything more than the treaty grants her. We, in our interest and in accordance with the principles of our great revolution, should be the protectors and the friends of the | small states in the Balkans.” #

Crispi had long been aware of the problem of the security of Italy, which was dependent on a settlement concerning the opposite shore. This, he thought, ought to be brought about, on the one hand, by raising Italy’s prestige there and, on the other, by guaranteeing to Albania an autonomous regime and territorial integrity,” that much of territorial in-

tegrity which, without thwarting substantially legitimate exigencies and aspirations of the Balkan nationalities, would place Albania—in the framework of the ‘Turkish empire or,

eventually, as a state by herself—in condition to live and develop herself.” ®

In 1881 France occupied ‘Tunisia, and the national reaction in Italy, which had been eying that North African country, was strong. France’s occupation of Tunisia was Italy’s primary motive for concluding an alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary, the so-called Tripie Alliance of May 20, 8V. Greneville, “Ostalbaniens Bedeutung,” Vienna, 25 August 1881, HHStA, PA x11/263, ‘Turkei vis. 4As quoted in G. Salvemini, La politica estera di Francesco Crispi, Rome, 1919, p. 35. °G. Volpe, “Formazione storica dell’Albania,” Nuova Antologta, ccccvi (16 December 1939), 330.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND ITALY LAI

1882,° which aimed at protecting the signatories against France and against Russian expansion in the Balkans.’ During the negotiations of the pact, Vienna declared that it would not oppose an extension of Italian influence in the Mediterranean, provided Italy adhered strictly to the status quo in the Adriatic. Haymerle, the Foreign Minister of the Monarchy, told an agent of the Italian government in 1881 that Austria-Hungary had no intention of pushing forward to Salonica or into Albania.’ But she was not willing to admit Italy to the Balkans until the renewal of the Triple Alliance, some five years later, when she was compelled to yield because of Russia’s dubious behavior as an ally (in the Three Em-

perors’ Alliance) and because of pressure on the part of Germany.® Yet Germany had reservations; Bismarck had ex-

_ pressed doubts as to the advisability of meeting the wishes of Italy, especially since “in view of Italy’s well-known aspirations toward Albania,” no faith could be placed in the sincerity of the promises she had given regarding the maintenance of the status quo in the Adriatic.1° When the Triple Alliance was renewed on February 20, 1887, it was accompanied by a separate Austro-Italian treaty, whereby the two parties pledged themselves to preserve the status quo in the Balkans, the coasts, and the Turkish islands in the Adriatic and the Aegean. If this were not possible, they would consult each other and agree as to the steps to be taken, according to the principle of “reciprocal compensation” for every terri-

torial or other advantage." Thus the monopoly of Austrian | and Russian influence in the peninsula was broken. SCf. L. Salvatorelli, La Triplice Alleanza, storia diplomatica, 18771912, Milan, 1939, pp. 11, 71; L. v. Chlumecky, Osterreich-Ungarn und Italien, Leipzig and Vienna, 1907, p. 6. "A. F. Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914, Cambridge, Mass., 1921, Il, 33-34.

8See W. L. Langer, op.cit., p. 324. |

8Cf. A. F. Pribram, op.cit., pp. 5aff. Telegram from Széchényi to Kalnoky, 27 July 1886, as quoted in ibid., p. 47.

See Art. I of the separate treaty in A. F. Pribram, op.cit., 1, 109, and i, 77-78.

242 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION The renewal of the Triple Alliance did not dispel the mistrust which existed between Italy and Austria-Hungary. In fact, the points of friction multiplied with the recognition of Italy’s right to a new role in the Balkans. At Crispi’s request, the Italian ambassador in Belgrade, Galvagna, presented in 1890 a report on Albania, in which he expressed fears about the occupation of that country by the Dual Monarchy. If Austria were to become the mistress of Albania, wrote the ambassador, Italy should renounce for good predominance

in the Adriatic, “which is her secular aspiration.’ It was of the greatest importance, therefore, to prevent such an event, “fatal as much to Italy’s political interest as to her commerce.”

For the Italians, Galvagna continued, the task should be to paralyze the action of Austria-Hungary in Albania and to prepare the field for an eventual Italian protectorate, which might be attained by initiating a simultaneous political and economic action.” The ‘Triple Alliance was renewed for another six years on May 6, 1891. ‘The article on the Balkans of the separate Austro-Italian pact was included in the treaty.18 ‘The pact was

tacitly prolonged until June 28, 1902, when it was renewed a fourth time.'* It was during this period of renewals that the Albanian question became more important both for Italy and Austria-Hungary. In February 1897, while the Cretan war was going on, the Austro-Hungarian government took under study the future of the Ottoman empire. ‘The reason for this, wrote Goluchowski to Calice in Istanbul, was the weakness of the Porte and the demands of the peoples of the European provinces of Turkey. Although the Monarchy regarded the preservation of the status quo of ‘Turkey as the best foundation for the maintenance of peace, it could not neglect preparations for the time when internal disturbances would terminate Turkish “’Galvagana to Crispi, Belgrade, 24 November 1890, No. 414/229. ASMAE, Albania, rapporti politici, 1889-1890, Fascicolo 1493. 18Cf. A. F. Pribram, op.cit., 1, 155 and note 4 on the same page. M47bid., UW, 112, 192.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND ITALY 243 domination in Europe and give rise to new state formations.

‘The Monarchy was concerned above all that its position should not be jeopardized by changes in the vicinity of its frontiers. It would be dangerous if Serbia or Bulgaria extended their boundaries as far as the Adriatic, or if Italy, to the detriment of Austria-Hungary’s maritime position and freedom of movement, occupied the eastern coast of the Adri-

atic, from which she could threaten Dalmatia and its hinter-

land. “From this point of view,’ Goluchowski argued, “present Albania is for us of extreme particular importance. Austria-Hungary has a vital interest that this land should not fall under a foreign influence, and as we don’t intend ourselves to occupy Albania, so we are decided to favor, in case of a breakdown of the ‘Turkish empire, the creation of a sep-

arate, autonomous Albania, at all events under a foreign prince, yet under our own protectorate.” To prepare the way for such an eventuality in Albania, secret discussions took place in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

in Vienna, attended also by Kallay, the common Minister of Finance of the Monarchy. The general points of view, which were communicated to Calice by Goluchowski, were as follows: (1) The constitution of our consular representation in Albania, with respect to occupation of offices, by persons capable of carrying out their important mission; (2) revision of our Church policy and of the manner of distribution of subsidies in Albania; (3) preparation for concerted action with Greece in that part of Albania which, as a consequence of its advanced hellenization, belongs to the Greek sphere of influence and might at some time fall to Greece. ‘Though a program of policy, it was not definitive, for it depended to

a certain extent on information to be obtained about the

realities in Albania.*®

Shortly thereafter, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Rome, Pasetti, paid a visit to the Italian Foreign Minister,

16Tbid. :

15Goluchowski to Calice, Vienna, 18 February 1897, Weisung No. 658, Geheim, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422.

244 ll. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION Visconti Venosta. He communicated to him orally that if the troubles in the Balkans—the Cretan war of 1897—spread as far as the Austrian borders and endangered them, his government would reserve its liberty of action; but in that case it

would take account of the engagements toward Italy, and would contact the cabinet of Rome, and it was convinced that Italy would in turn act likewise.1”

The captivity of the responsible statesmen continued in Vienna. On April 19, 1897 the question of the future of the Ottoman empire was again discussed in a conference. This time the chief of staff Beck took part. ‘They were all of the opinion that it was necessary to prevent any power from establishing itself on the eastern shores of the Adriatic. Then | with a map before them they discussed and traced the future boundaries in the Balkans. Although tentative, their division of Balkan territory reveals the Austro-Hungarian thinking at the time. It was to distribute Ottoman territory among the Balkan states and create an independent Albania, but designate as desirable for Austria-Hungary the ports of Durrés and Vloreé."®

That similar conferences took place in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome is doubtful. Italy had no common fron-

tiers with ‘Turkish-ruled territory, and as an extra-Balkan country, could not be concerned as much as Austria-Hungary

about the collapse of Ottoman rule in the Balkans. In fact, in the Cretan affair of 1897, Italy took a position contrary to that of her allies: she supported the autonomy of Crete and favored Greece.’® The policy of the Italian government was to support the principle of nationality in the event of a dis“Oral communication of the ambassador of Austria-Hungary in Rome,

Pasetti, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Visconti Venosta, Rome, 1 March 1897, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 1, No. 379; see also the Italian ambassador in Vienna, Nigra, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Visconti Venosta, Vienna, 11 March 18977, confidential in ibid., No. 391.

Cf. E. C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 19121913, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1938, pp. 167-168. Cf. L. Salvatorelli, op.cit., p. 223; A. F. Pribram, op.cit., pp. 115-116; L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., pp. 16-17.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND ITALY 245 integration of Turkey, but its concern was primarily Albania, which it did not want to see in the hands of Austria-Hungary.

policy.*° |

The influential circles thought that the defense of Italy’s “rights and interests” in Albania should be the axis of Italian

A memorandum on the Albanian question from this period shows how Italian intellectuals viewed Austria’s political activity. Addressed to Visconti Venosta, the memorandum was

written by Professor Antonio Baldacci, a teacher of botany at the University of Bologna, who by 1897 had made eight study trips in Albania, from the Montenegrin boundaries to | Preveza, and was regarded in Italy as an authority on Albania.*} His memorandum stated that Austria-Hungary had been active from the confines of Bosnia as far south as the gulf of Ambracia, but more directly up to Vloré, which she held as an invulnerable key to the lower Adriatic. The Dual Monarchy had not lost time in infiltrating among the Serbs and Bulgarians, as well as among the Vlakhs and Greeks on , both slopes of the Pindus mountains. Certainly, the location of Salonica necessitated the protection of the banks of the Vardar river, for the Macedonian chaos was inimical to the Habsburgs. Baldacci also maintained that Vienna’s intentions were to replace Venice in the Adriatic and Ionian seas, and one day she would be able to plot against the unity of Italy: it would be easy for her to cross from the island of Sasseno to Puglia. Furthermore, if Austria-Hungary were successful in Albania, the future of Montenegro would be at stake. Baldacci proposed that Italy’s policy should be to compete with Austria-Hungary and to demonstrate that Italy could not remain disinterested in the fate of Albania, in case of a ‘Turkish breakdown. Italy should absolutely exclude any Austrian occupation of that country, Baldacci insisted, especially for reasons of national security; the Adraitic should be an Italian °Tbid., p. 20.

21Prof. A. Baldacci continued his interest in Albania, publishing a number of books, and in the 1920’s he attained the reputation of being the foremost Italian authority on that country.

246 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION sea. He suggested the establishment of a Montenegrin-Albanian principality, comprising only the northern part of Albania. As for Epirus, Baldacci considered it a question for study, but was inclined to regard it as an Italian protec-

torate.?? |

It is evident that already before the meeting of November 1897 at Monza between Goluchowski and Rudini, the Italian Premier, accompanied by Visconti Venosta, the government of the Dual Monarchy had made up its mind on the policy to be followed with respect to Albania. ‘The same was true about | the Italian government. When Goluchowski told the Italian statesmen at Monza that the Austrian government had no thought of occupying Albania but was at the same time determined not to permit another power to set foot on Albanian soil, he found Visconti Venosta ready to assure him that Italy, too, had no intention of conquering Albania. The two parties then agreed that, if ‘Turkey lost Macedonia, they would constitute Albania either as a “privileged province” within the framework of the Turkish empire or would raise her to an independent principality.*? Lanza, the Italian ambassador in Berlin, who had read the report on the Monza conference which Goluchowski had sent to Sz6gyeny, his Austrian colleague in the German capital, wrote that the most important point in it, stressed by Goluchowski himself, was Albania.?4 *2Baldacci to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Visconti Venosta, L. P., Bologna, 27 October 1897, DDI, ‘Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 11, No. 21. *8Aufzeichung tiber die Unterredungen des Grafen Goluchowski mit

dem italienischen Ministerprasidenten Marchese di Rudini und dem italienischen Minister des Aussern Marchese Visconti Venosta in Mailand

und Monza, November 1897. Wiener Staatsarchiv, Geheim, xxx/39 | (vi), as reproduced in E. Walters, “Austro-Russian Relations under Goluchowski, 1895-1906,” Slavonic and East European Review, xxx (1953), 191-192.

*4L.anza to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Visconti Venosta, Berlin, 27 November 1897, R. riservato 1672/6593, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 1, No. 286. With respect to Italy, despite researches in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the files of the Archivio Vis-—

conti Venosta, it has not yet been possible to find the minutes of the conversation Visconti Venosta—Goluchowski in Monza, or even a docu-

ment of the period referring to it. Cf. ibid., note 2 of No. 286.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND ITALY 247 ‘Three years later, on December 20, 1900, during an interpellation in the Italian parliament on the subject of Albania, Visconti Venosta replied that the Italian and Austro-Hungarian governments had agreed on the maintenance of the status quo of “‘the Ottoman coasts of the Adriatic.’’ Subsequently he put in writing the understanding of Monza in a note to Goluchowski: 1. ‘To maintain the status quo as long as circumstances permitted; 2. In case the present state of affairs could not be preserved, or in case changes should be imperative, to use our efforts to the end that the modifications relative thereto should be in the direction of autonomy; 3. In general, and as a mutual disposition on both sides, to seek in common, and as often as there is a reason for it, _ the most appropriate ways and means to reconcile and to safeguard our reciprocal interests.

Visconti Venosta’s note was acknowledged with complete agreement by Goluchowski in his reply note of February 9, 1901.7

With the Austro-Italian agreement, Albania was excluded

from the general Balkan pact of the Triple Alliance and could not be subject to any eventual game of territorial compensations. It was a special pact, which Goluchowski used to call “nol: me tangere.” *° Although the ‘Triple Alliance was the axis of the foreign policy of the Italian governments, public opinion in the country became increasingly averse to the continuance of friendly relations with Austria-Hungary. ‘Ihe demand for an extension of Italy’s sphere of influence on the eastern side of the Adriatic was reinforced after the failure of the colonial plans. Since this could be achieved only against Austria-Hungary’s will, the demands for a break with the existing policy and an open union with the Western powers multiplied. Every step 25See texts of exchanged notes in A. F. Pribram, Op.cit., I, 196-201.

Cf. G. Salvemini, La politica estera dell’Italia dal 1877 al rgr5, Florence, 1950, end edn., p. 115.

248 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION taken by the Austro-Hungarian government in Albania was watched with jealousy and distrust. Politicians and journalists warned the Italian government not to be deceived by promises and agreements, for the intention of the Monarchy was to swallow up Albania.??

In April 1900, Count Donato Sanminiatelli, an influential member of the Societa Dante Alighieri, a society for the propagation of Italian culture, sent notes for a memorandum on Albanian matters to Alberto Pisani, a public figure close to Crispi. It was folly, he maintained, to think about the occupation of Albania by Italy: “our program should be simply negative, aimed at fighting and counterbalancing advances of the Austrian influence in Albania.” The error committed with regard to ‘Tunisia should not be repeated in Albania. In Goluchowski’s declarations to Ambassador Nigra, “Nous n’avons pas Vintention doccuper VAlbanie, mais nous ne permetrons pas quaucun autre Voccupe,” he discerned the echo of sentiments voiced by the French ambassador, De Noailles, to deceive the Italian Prime Minister, Cairoli. ‘‘It is in Our interest to increase the difficulties in the way of Austria,” urged Sanminiatelli, “if for nothing else but to persuade her, with the force of facts, that we would not tolerate her political intrusion in Albania without an adequate compensation for our security. We must persuade the ruling circles of Italy assiduously to watch our interests across the Adriatic.” 28 Until this time the Italo-Albanians had complained that

the Italian parliament either completely ignored the Albanian question or touched upon it only superficially. Now, with the sudden change in public opinion in Italy, the Albanian question found a substantial expression in the parliamentary debates which followed. 7A, F. Pribram, op.cii., , 134-135; see also T. v. Sosnosky, Die Balkanpolitik Osterretch-Ungarns seit 1866, Stuttgart and Berlin, 1914,

Il, 254-255. **Conte Donato Sanminiatelli, “Appunti per un pro-memoria sulle

cose d’Albania,”’ April 1900, ACS, Carte Pisani-Dossi (1866-1907), No.

Carte 671, No. Fasc. 40, No. Busta 14. ,

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND ITALY 249 _ An important deputy in the Italian parliament who later became Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Francesco Guicciardini, gave the alarm on December 18, 1900 against Austria-

Hungary’s advance in Albania.?® He paid a visit to Albania and in the summer of 1901 published two articles and delivered a speech in the parliament (June 7, 1901). For him the uncertainty of Albania’s geographic demarcation was not so much the result of historical changes as of the political competition which was developing in the Balkans. Some of the competitors were interested in extending the frontiers of Albania, others in restricting them.®® ‘The diverse propaganda

had created an explosive situation, the solution to which would be the recognition of the Albanian nationality. “One could say of this nation what has been said of Austria: if it had not existed, it should have been invented.” Guicciardini advocated the autonomy of Albania as the logical solution. It would guarantee the equilibrium of the Adriatic and would produce stability in the internal affairs of Albania. It would not imperil or damage Montenegro, Austria-Hungary, or Italy. It would also harmonize with the legitimate wishes of

Greece, as it would not exclude annexation by Greece of the | districts of southern Epirus, inhabited by populations of Greek language, religion, and aspirations. Although respecting the supreme sovereignty of the Sultan, Albania would be, under the proposed arrangement, an autonomous state under the temporary protectorate of the concert of Europe.*? Following Guicciardini’s speech, De Marinis, later Minister of Education, stated on June 8, 1901 before the Italian © parliament: “On the future of Albania will depend the rights and interests of Italy in the Adriatic. Whoever possesses the port of Vloré will be the absolute ruler over the Adriatic.” * 2°Cf. L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., p. 21. —

8°F, Guicciardini, “Impressioni d’Albania. I,” Nuova Antologia, xciu (16 June 1901), 592.

31F, Guicciardini, “Impressioni d’Albania. II,” tbid., xciv (1 July 1901), 52, 56. See also for Giucciardini’s ideas the editorial “Italien und die Albanesische Frage,” Die Grenzboten, LX (1901), 289-295. 324s quoted in L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., p. 21, note xx.

250 Il, NATIONAL AFFIRMATION Another Italian political personality who visited Albania for the first time in 1902 was Marquis A. di San Giuliano, | future Minister of Foreign Affairs. He approved of the accord reached between Italy and Austria-Hungary concerning A\lbania, but he questioned whether the course of events could be forced into the rigid diplomatic formula contained in the asreement.®* He stressed that Italy should try to prevent any disadvantageous change in the existing situation and power relationship of the Adriatic between herself and AustriaHungary.** As he did not believe in Albania’s capacity to create an autonomous state at that time, he thought the longer the territorial status quo in the Adriatic area was kept the better it would be for both Italy and Austria-Hungary. He also stated that the only solution of the Adriatic problem for Italy was the preservation of the inviolable supremacy of the Sultan, together with the necessary and appropriate reforms, for the lawful application of which efficient guarantees should

be given. Only on this basis and within these boundaries could Italy expand and secure her influence and commerce in

Albania.” *° San Giuliano, being a realistic statesman, was aware of the superior forces of the Dual Monarchy and he certainly could not advocate the seizure of Albania. In the meantime, he recommended that Italy should broaden and intensify her economic and cultural ties with Albania.*® Toward the end of September 1901 the XIIth Congress of the Societa Dante Alighieri was held in Verona and Count Sanminiatelli, in the name of its central committee, gave a report on Albania. He expressed his agreement with F. Guicciardini in maintaining that Italy should never allow Albania to become a possession of a primary power, not even of a state 388A. di San Giuliano, Briefe tiber Albanien, Deutsch von D. Schulz und W. Wickmann, Leipzig, 1913, p. 12. His opinions were expressed in articles, in the form of letters, published first in Giornale d’ Italia and later collected in a book, under the title Lettere sull’Albania, which was

not available to the author.

*Tbid., pp. 99 and 105. , *6Cf. ibid., p. 10. 47 bid., p. 10.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND ITALY 251 of secondary rank which belonged to a political system of a primary power. He favored the administrative autonomy of the Albanians, which was compatible with the sovereignty of

the Sultan. Moved by these considerations the Congress adopted an order of the day which expressed, among other things, the wish that the Italian government: proceed to a technical examination of the convenience of railway lines in the Balkan peninsula with a view to coordinate them with the economic interests of Albania and Italy; extend the consular representation of Italy in the vilayet of Kosovo; attempt in a friendly manner to persuade the government of the Sultan that the Italian interests in Albania and the administrative autonomous progress of the Albanians were in perfect harmony with the interests of the Turkish empire. ‘The Congress expressed the desire to see Italian action in Albania assume a new and more practical direction in order to oppose and neutralize Austrian efforts.*" Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, was also distrustful of Italy. A strong anti-Italian party existed in Vienna, an important member of which was the heir presumptive, Francis Ferdinand. For this party the alliance with Italy was more a liability than an asset. Should Austria become involved in a war, this party thought that Italy, in order to remain neutral, would claim the ‘‘unredeemed areas’; if Austria lost the war, Italy would surely invade those districts.*® “he new orientation of Italian policy toward France, which resulted in the Italo-French treaty of 1902, caused a certain anxiety in the Austrian capital, where not only Italian irredentism but also Balkan repercussions were feared.®® At this moment there was much talk about Austro-Italian rivalry in the Adriatic, 87Relazione del conte Donato Sanminiatelli nel XII Congresso della “Dante Alighieri” in Verona (26-28 September 1901), ACS, Carte PisaniDossi (1866-1907), No. Carte 671, No. Fasc. 40, No. Busta 14; see also G. Schird, Gli Albanesi e la questione balkanica, Naples, 1904, pp. 277-278. 388A. J. May, The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914, Cambridge, Mass.,

1951, p. 303. |

89]. Salvatorelli, op.cit., pp. 246-247; see also A. F. Pribram, op.cit., 01,

117-118.

252 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION especially in Albania. Ambassador Nigra wrote to Rome that, during the last months, public opinion in the Monarchy had

been preoccupied with the Albanian question and that the

propaganda about it had been intensified.*° |

The Albanian question was soon connected with the Macedonian reforms, rendering relations between Austria-Hungary

and Italy still more tense. When, in April 1903, the Italian government proposed to Goluchowski that the two allies study the possibility of mitiating for Albania a program of reforms similar to that granted Macedonia by Russia and Austria-Hungary, the proposal met with no response.*! At the same time the insurrection of the Albanians in Old Serbia gave rise to the prospect of an Austro-Hungarian occupation

of the sandjak of Novi Pazar. It was believed that AustriaHungary had fomented the troubles as a pretext for occupation, for conferences were held in Vienna between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and military chiefs.*? Italy, maintain-

ing that there was fear that the Albanian disorders might spread in other vilayets, requested the Austro-Hungarian government for an exchange of views. Vienna answered that there was no Albanian question, and that the suppression of the Albanian movement, which Russia and Austria demanded of Turkey, had as its only aim the nationally mixed sandjak.

As for Albania proper, Austria-Hungary held fast to the policy of the status quo.* Mistrust between Italy and Austria-Hungary became more striking following the Miirzsteg agreement in the fall of 1903. Afraid that the division of spoils between Russia and Austria would leave them empty-handed, Italian politicians and pub“Nigra to Foreign Minister Prinetti, Vienna, 19 June 1902, No. 872/429, confidential, ASMAE.

“Cf. Richthofen to Kaiser Wilhelm II, Berlin, 9 April 1903, and Wedel to Auswartige Amt (telegram), No. 61, Vienna, 29 April 1903, GP, Vol. xvur, respectively Nos. 5522 and 5539. “QL. Salvatorelli, op.cit., p. 268; A. Lorecchio, Il pensiero politico

albanese in rapporto agli interessi italiani, Rome, 1904, p. Ixiv. , “Wedel to the Auswartige Amt, Vienna, 29 April 1903, GP, Vol.

xvii’, No. 5539. ,

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND ITALY 253 licists began to attack Austria more violently.44 When the distribution of the Macedonian sectors among the various gendarmerie contingents took place, Austria-Hungary assigned to herself the vilayet of Kosovo, but opposed Italy’s request for the vilayet of Monastir because it bordered on Albania.*® Goluchowski even referred to Italy’s covetousness with respect to Albania.*® As Italy was supported by France

and England, and the Russian attitude toward her became benevolent, Austria-Hungary agreed that the vilayet of Monastir be allotted to Italy, provided that the purely Albanian districts—sandjak of Dibér and parts of the sandjaks of Korcé and Ohrid—were excluded.** On her part, Austria-Hungary had left out of her sector the sandjak of Prizren and parts of the sandjak of Ipek. Although the reforms were to be applied, in a general manner, to the three vilayets of Salonica, Monastir, and Kosovo, it was agreed by the great powers that the

regions inhabited principally by the Albanian populations, from which an energetic opposition was expected, should remain outside the field of action of the officers who would organize the gendarmerie.* The acceptance by Austria-Hungary of the Monastir sector for the Italian gendarmerie prepared the way for the meeting of Abbazia (Opatija) (April 9, 1904) between Goluchowski and Tittoni, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Both parties reiterated declarations in favor of the status quo in the Balkans and preservation of Albanian intergity.*® As there were at that time rumors about General Ricciotti Garibaldi’s Cf. L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., p. 41. Cf. L. Salvatorelli, op.cit., p. 282; Marschall to the Auswartige Amt (telegram), No. 87, Geheim, Pera, 3 March 1904, and Wedel to Biilow, _ & March 1904, No. 100, GP, Vol. xxu, respectively Nos. 7397 and 7399. 6See L. Salvatorelli, op.ctt., p. 283. 47Cf. Miihlberg to Marschall, telegram, No. 64, Berlin, 23 March 1904,

and Wedel to Biilow, Vienna, 30 March 1904, No. 141, GP, Vol. xxi,

respectively Nos. 7417 and 7419. |

48Cf. T. v. Sosnosky, op.cit., pp. 134-135; Col. Lamouche, Quinze ans dhistoire balkanique (1904-1918), Paris, 1928, p. 44. #7. Salvatorelli, op.cit., p. 284.

254 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION expedition to Albania, Tittoni in the Italian parliament discounted talk of Italian expeditions in Albania and of Austrian occupation of Macedonia. The two states, he declared, did not think of occupations or partition of spoils. They sincerely wanted the maintenance of the political status quo; and if this, despite their efforts, were not possible, they stood for the principle of autonomy on the basis of nationality.®°

Only a month or so after the meeting of Abbazia F. Guicciardini asked in the Italian parliament that in the interests of Albanian autonomy the administrative units of Macedonia should be modified so that Albanian districts included in them would be attached to Albanian vilayets and proper reforms applied to the latter.*! For San Giuliano territorial status quo did not mean that the condition of the Albanians should not be improved. He was of the opinion that

| the reforms required for Albania, which Italy should energetically champion, were substantially different from those which could be useful to Macedonia. He proposed steps which

could contribute to the gradual formation of a true national consciousness among the Albanians.5* Goluchowski, too, in his meeting with ‘Tittoni in Venice (April 29-30, 1905) recog-

nized the necessity of developing the national sentiment among the Albanian people. He said that, as soon as the gen-

darmerie was reorganized and the financial reforms were carried out, the districts in the three Macedonian vilayets in which the Albanian element was preponderant were—in view of the Murzsteg program for a more regular grouping of the nationalities—to be separated and attached to the vilayets of Shkodér and Janina.®** When on May 12, 1905 the Italian Foreign Minister responded to Guicciardini, he declared that

it was true that, by uniting to Macedonia certain Albanian OT. Tittoni, Ser anni di politica estera (1903-1909). Discorsi pronunciati al Senato del Regno ed alla Camera dei Deputati, Rome and Turin, 1912, pp. 78-79. 1K, ‘Tommasini, L’Iialia alla vigilia della guerra. La politica estera dt Tommaso Tittont, Bologna, 1935, 1, 125. 2Cf. G. Schiro, op.cit., p. 429.

°8F. Tommasini, op.cit., 11, 67. ,

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND ITALY 255 districts, the importance of Albania was reduced. He then added, referring to the agreement with Goluchowski, that with the new organization of Macedonia they would be detached and joined to Albania.** The two powers were suspicious of each other and relentlessly watched each other’s activities, particularly in Albania, but their public statements were always in favor of the main-

tenance of the ‘Triple Alliance. The preservation of the alliance was the message of Aehrenthal, Goluchowski’s succes-

sor, to the Delegations in December 1906; * and Tittoni’s speech in the Italian parliament that month was in the same vein.®® Since there was no denunciation of the treaty of the Triple Alliance by July 8, 1907, the treaty was tacitly prolonged for another period of six years, that is, until July 8, 1914.°%

While the question of Macedonian reforms was encounter-

ing great difficulties, Aehrenthal announced (January 27, 1908) the plan for the construction of the railway line Sarajevo-Uvac-Mitrovicé-Salonica. ‘This would give a powerful impetus to Austria-Hungary’s Orientpoliizk.*® Italy responded with a project to build a railway line from Vloré to Monastir,

following for the most part the ancient Via Egnatia. This would be dangerous for Austria-Hungary for it would establish for Italy a sphere of interest in southern Albania, which could be “perhaps the forerunner of an occupation.” ©® Neither plan materialized because of the Young ‘Turk revolution of 1908.

Although the formula of the two powers—status quo and, in the event of the collapse of Turkey, the autonomy of an Albanian province or state—corresponded to their fundamental wish, there were differences in their particular inter“'T, Tittoni, op.cit., p. 167; cf. also F. Tommasini, op.cit., 11, 129.

A. F. Pribram, op.cit., , 141.

ST. Tittoni, op.cit., pp. 248-267. | TA. F. Pribram, op.cit., U, 142. oO 8T. v. Sosnosky, op.cit., 1, 141-142; L. Salvatorelli, op.cit., pp. 326-327. °L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., p. 201; T. v. Sosnosky, op.cit., 1, 147, note 2.

256 | Il, NATIONAL AFFIRMATION terests. For Italy the Albanian question reduced itself to the port of Vloré and the island of Sasseno, which controlled the Strait of Otranto, upon which her security and freedom in the Adriatic depended. She wished them to remain in the hands of a small and harmless state. Whether that state was a large or a small Albania was not of great concern to her. AustriaHungary, on the other hand, while desiring that Durrés and Vloré be in Albania’s possession so that she could enjoy freedom of action in the Adriatic, was also interested in Albania

as a non-Slavic country, which could be used as a check against slavism. The size of Albania was not immaterial to her. She wanted the northern part at least to be within the Albanian state, for in this way the exit of the Slavs to the —

Adriatic would be blocked. |

It is understandable then that various projects to partition Albania, corresponding to the specific interests of Italy and Austria-Hungary, were proposed by journalists and publicists. Some of them were of the opinion that the Dual Monarchy

should occupy the part north of Durrés and Italy the part south of that port; others held that Austria-Hungary should acquire the eastern part, while Italy should possess the littoral.©° Obviously, similar suggestions were made to Tittoni, which provoked him on December 18, 1906 to declare in the

Italian parliament that he rejected the advice to propose to the Dual Monarchy “partitions of territories and urge it to occupations, besides those consented to by the Treaty of Berlin, asking for territorial compensations for ourselves.” ® | The two powers, Austria-Hungary and Italy, were agreed to preserve the status quo in Albania because neither of them was in a position to occupy her. It was inevitable, therefore, that their rivalry should grow, as each one tried to increase her influence in that country. Cf. A. Lorecchio, Il pensiero politico albanese in rapporto agli interesst italiani, Rome, 1904, pp. 33-34. S*T. Tittoni, op.cit., p. 261.

XI .

Rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Italy and Albanian Reaction ALTHOUGH the Goluchowski-—Visconti Venosta agreement con-

stituted the avowed Italian and Austrian policy toward Albania, the two members of the Triple Alliance, distrustful of each other, carried on a policy of peaceful penetration in the country. his took various forms. The field where the two powers first confronted one an-

other was education. Austria, as previously mentioned,} showed an interest as early as 1855, when she undertook to pay two-thirds of the construction costs of the Jesuit Albanian Pontifical Seminary in Shkodér and to grant a substantial sum for the maintenance of students, the rest to be contributed by the Propaganda Fide.? The following decades witnessed the establishment of two secondary schools in Shkodér, one run by the Jesuits and the other by the Franciscans, and several elementary schools around Shkodér, in Vloré, Durrés, Prizren, and elsewhere—all with Austrian help and administered by Catholic orders. Vienna made it clear to the Albanian Cath-

olic clergy that it was their duty to support its efforts in Albania.®

Austria initiated her educational activity with the Catholics

of the north because she enjoyed greater freedom of action there, owing to the Kultusprotektorat. At the outset this activity proceeded slowly, so as not to create any troubles for Turkey or give the Russians occasion to intervene in the Balkans. But the Cretan affair made Austria aware that time was running out and that Turkey was on the verge of collapse, *See Chapter v, pp. 129-131.

2F, Condignano, “Veprat e Etenvet Jesuite ne Shqipnin e Veriut, 1841-1928” (The Work of the Jesuit Fathers in Northern Albania, 1841-1928), Diturzja (Knowledge), 111 (April 1928), 220. | 3See Zwiedinek on his conversation with the Scutarin priest Don G. Sereggi, Vienna, 23 November 1898, HHStA, PA xiv/7, Albanien v/2.

258 II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION while Italy was demonstrating a growing interest in Albania.‘

| A program of action with regard to Albania was then formulated in the Austrian capital, its aim being “to strengthen the national consciousness of the Albanians and insure for themselves [Austrians] a leading influence on a future autonomous Albania.” > In order to achieve these goals it was necessary that Austria first found schools under her patronage in Albania. In fact, by 1897 a significant point in Austria’s program of action was the opening of schools with Albanian as the language of instruction in the Moslem districts of the country as well.®

Italy swiftly counteracted these moves. In 1888 the first Italian schools were opened in Shkodér, at the initiative of Francesco Crispi.7 Although in 1891, during the Ministry of

Rudini, the Italian schools of Preveza, Vloré, and Durrés were closed, the schools of Shkodér, which were elementary, continued to function. ‘They competed with the schools estab-

lished by Austria-Hungary, for they were supported by an Albanian pyro-Italian party. The archbishop of Shkodeér, Guerini, a Croat and an Austrian subject, attempted to suppress even these schools in 1897. Under the pretext that they were creations of Crispi, who was considered a Freemason, and that the Italian government kept the Pope prisoner in the Vatican, he pronounced an interdict against them, excommu*Goluchowski to Calice, Vienna, 18 February 1897, Weisung No. 658, Geheim, HHStA, Gesandtschaftsarchiv Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. It does

not appear accidental that the Balkankommission of the Academy of Sciences in Vienna was constituted on 3 February 1897. See C. Patsch, “Bericht tiber deutsche und auslandische Siidost-Europa Vorschung,” Leipzger Vierteljahrsschrift fiir Stidosteuropa, 11 (1939), 248-251. “Foreign Ministry to Pasetti in Rome, Vienna, 16 June 1897, Depesche

No. 785, HHStA, PA xiv/7, Albanien v/2. |

6See Zwiedinek’s report, “Die albanesische Action des k. und k. Ministeriums des Aeussern im Jahre 1897,” Vienna, 11 January 1808,

pp. 19-20, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. "Ibid., p. 14; see also text of a letter in Albania, 11 (1899), 97. _ ®Degrand to Hanotaux, Scutari, 22 September 1897, No. 99, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1897, Vol. 1.

_ RIVALRY AND REACTION 259 nicating the parents who sent their children to those schools.®

The interdict was not withdrawn until the spring of 1899, after the Rome government intervened at the Vatican.!° In that year an Italian commercial school was founded in Shkodér, followed by elementary and night schools, and kinder-

gartens and trade schools in other Albanian towns, like Durrés, Vloré, Janina, and even Gjirokastér. The two ItaloAlbanian Congresses of 1895 and 1897 and the Italo-Albanian colonies had given an impetus to the movement. There were

scholarships for graduates of the Italian schools in Albania to pursue their studies in Collegio S. Adriano where a chair of Albanian had been installed. Italy’s educational efforts were concentrated on Catholic Shkodér not only because that city was the center of Austrian propaganda, but also because Italy apparently hoped that Albania would one day follow the trend dictated from there."} Here a distinction should be made between the Austrian and Italian schools. The former were confessional, under the Kultusprotektorat, and were run by members of Catholic orders. The latter were government schools (regie scuole) directed by laymen and controlled by the General Inspectorate of the Schools Abroad, which was part of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.1* Another difference was that the Austrian-subsidized schools, which stressed religious educa*Tbid.; Leoni to Visconti Venosta, Scutari, 12 September 1897, ‘I’. 3197 ore 14, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 11, No. 207.

Conte Donato Sanminiatelli to Alberto Pisani, [Rome], April 1900, ACS, Carte Pisani-Dossi, 1866-1907.

“See report by Zwiedinek, Vienna, December 1901, Geheim, p. 12, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422; Para to Goluchowski, Salonik, 16 October 1906, No. 48, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xIv/25,

Albanien x1x/1; “Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905), p. 9, Vienna, April 1905, HHStA, PA xiv/28, Albanien xx/3; L. v. Chlumecky, Osterreich-Ungarn und Italien, Leipzig and Vienna, 1907, pp. 164-165.

12See Para to Goluchowski, Salonica, 16 October 1906, No. 48, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/25, Albanien x1x/1; L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., p. 166.

260 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION tion, were not as up to date as the Italian schools, which were organized exactly like those of the Italian Kingdom. However,

the Italians fully understood that, as long as the clergy was not with them, they could not, in the domain of education, exercise as much influence on the Catholics of Albania as

could Austria-Hungary.?® | The Austrians thought that the Italians were not interested in the national uplifting of the Albanian people, but in the

creation of colonial institutions, with the hope of one day taking possession of Albania.‘* This is not altogether true. The Italians were also interested in the development of Alba-

nian national consciousness. ‘They could not well compete with Austria on Albanian territory if they neglected this side of the question. F. Guicciardini, following his visit to Albania in 1901, expressed the conviction that Turkey was opposed to the opening of Albanian schools. He favored the teaching of Albanian and felt that education was necessary for the growth of Albanian national consciousness. He even believed that the ground was fertile for its development. “As for the Albanian sentiment of nationality,” he wrote, “one may say that ° it is in its latent state and manifests itself in jerky movements and with indeterminate objectives, but the smallest educative work will make it conscious in movements and aims.” © Di San Giuliano, who visited that country in 1903, when he was a deputy, also stressed the importance of schools in Albanian for the formation of a gradual and true national consciousness. For this purpose, he also called for the revocation of the ban on Albanian by the Porte.1® _

Not only prominent Italians but also Italian cultural bodies advised the support of Albanian culture. At the XIIth Congress of the Societa Dante Alighieri in September igo1 18“Mémoire uber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 9. M4Cf. ibid.

*F, Guicciardini, “Impressioni d’Albania, II,” Nuova Antologia, xciv (1 July 1901), 56.

16A, di San Giuliano, Briefe tber Albanien, Deutsch von D. Schulz und W. Wichmann, Leipzig, 1913, pp. 77, 101.

| RIVALRY AND REACTION 261 the desire was expressed that the government of Rome examine the possibility of reopening the government schools in Durrés, Vloré, and Preveza. At the same time, the Congress entrusted its General Council to assist as far as possible in the diffusion of Italian culture in Albania and the development of Albanian culture there and in Italy.” In addition to schools, both Austria and Italy built welfare institutions such as hospitals, ambulances, and orphanages, in order to enhance their prestige among the Albanian people. The competition in the domain of education was not restricted to schools in Albania proper. In September 1901 in the Albanian settlement of Borgo Erizzo (now Arbanasi), near Zadar in Dalmatia, a course in Albanian was initiated by the Austrian government. The inhabitants were descendants of Albanians from north of Shkodér who, fleeing the persecution of the Turks in the beginning of the eighteenth century, abandoned their homeland and were settled in the 1730’s

in Borgo Erizzo by the Venetian Republic. Pater Pashko Bardhi, a Franciscan brother from northern Albania, taught the course in Albanian.*® A chair of Albanian language and literature having been established at the Oriental Institute of Naples, the Austrian government countered in 1903 with a course in Albanian in the Institute of Oriental Languages in Vienna, which was put in charge of G. Pekmezi, a southern Albanian who had graduated in philology in the university of that city.19 As the Italians were sending stipendiaries to Collegio S. Adriano the Austrians began to provide fellowships for Albanians to study in the teachers’ schools of Klagenfurt, Wahring, and Vienna. The purpose was to develop a competent Albanian teaching staff and thereby further the nationRelazione del conte Donato Sanminiatelli (relatore per Consiglio , Centrale della “Dante Alighieri’) nel XII Congresso della “Dante Alighieri” in Verona (26-28 September 1901), ACS, Carte Pisani-Dossi (1866-1907), No. Carte 671, No. Fasz. 40, No. Busta 14. 18Zwiedinek’s report, Vienna, December 1901, Geheim, p. 14, HHStA,

Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422; Albania, vi (1901), 66-67. 19"Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” pp. 17-18; Albania, 1X (1904), 19.

262 II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION alization of the Catholic schools of northern Albania, which would mean the replacement of Italian by Albanian as the language of instruction.?° The Italian language, it must be remembered, had strong historical roots in this area. When Austria-Hungary opened the confessional schools in Albania, the language of instruction in them was Italian. The littoral of Albania and Shkodér had in the past been under Venetian influence, if not completely under Venetian domination, and Italian was the only Western language spoken there. ‘The Catholic population of Shkodér in the latter half of the nineteenth century preferred to educate their youth in Venice.” At the same time the foreign clergy that Austria found in Albania and that could be employed in the schools were Italians; Italy for centuries had furnished Catholic Albania with religious elements.?? When Italy appeared on the educational scene as Austria’s rival, the

| latter became aware that the continuation of Italian as a lan- |

| gsuage of instruction in the confessional schools was to her detriment. San Giuliano remarked with irony that through her religious propaganda Austria took care at her expense to diffuse the Italian language as the best means of transmitting ideas and sentiments—a result which was the exact opposite of her intentions.?? Austria, therefore, began to lay more stress on Albanian language and culture both in order to develop Albanian national consciousness and to oppose the spread of Italian language and culture. For this purpose she was interested in preparing qualified Albanian teachers and also textbooks for secondary schools. As a language for trade,

German was introduced later in the commercial school and

the Franciscan school in Shkodér, but Italian could not be totally supplanted, for it was the language of the Levant. In 20“Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” pp. 18-19. 21Cf. F. Lippich, “Denkschrift tiber Albanien,” Vienna, 20 June 1877,

HHStA, PA xur/256, ‘Turkei rv. ,

22Cf. Calvagna to Crispi, Belgrade, 24 November 1890, No. 414/229. ASMAE, Rapporti politici, 1889-1890, Fasc. 1493. "8A. di San Giuliano, op.cit., p. 49.

RIVALRY AND REACTION: 263 the Jesuit schools Italian was preponderant and Albanian held only a secondary place.”*

In exercising the Kultusprotektorat the consulate of the Monarchy in Shkodér, which was established as early as 1832, employed discretion and wisdom. It allowed the bishops and clergymen to deal directly with the Ottoman authorities even in matters related to their ministry.”° ‘The prerogatives of the

Austrian consul in Shkodér, according to a study made by © Nigra, the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, were to exercise action on the Catholics in Albania in the following cases: (1) in demanding from Istanbul the decree (berat) of investiture for the Catholic bishops in Albania, whatever the nationality of the bishops; (2) in the protection and jurisdiction to be exercised over the Albanian Pontifical Seminary and over the

Catholic schools in Albania, run completely or in part by Italian clergymen and subsidized by the Austro-Hungarian government; (3) in the protection by the Austro-Hungarian consul of other religious institutions composed of Italians but not subsidized by the Austro-Hungarian government; (4) in the protection by the consul of missionaries, or other Italian clergymen, considered individually.”®

The Austrian Kultusprotektorat could not be a matter of indifference to Italy, for it placed her at a disadvantage with the Catholics of Albania. Guicciardini maintained in the Italian parliament that Austria exercised in northern Albania a “sovranita religiosa.” But things were not exactly as the - Italian statesman saw them, if we take into account the revelation made by Ippen, the Austrian Consul General in Shkodeér. Of the seven heads of the dioceses, in 1901, on which Guic-

ciardini’s “sovranita religiosa’ rested, three bishops did not | favor at all Austria’s intentions in Albania, which were di74Cf. “Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” pp. 18-19.

2>Maissa to Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 9 July 1892, Riservatissimo, No. 152/751, ASMAE. **Niora to Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 3 August 1892, Riservato Prot. Gen. 1743, Rapporto, 674, ASMAE, Pacco 573, Pos. 350.

264 Il, NATIONAL AFFIRMATION rected to the national strengthening of that country. They would have found more comprehensible Austrian intentions of occupying Albania. Archbishop Troksi (Trochsi) was often hostile to the Austrian government, while Archbishop Bianchi “speaks as a friend but acts as an enemy.” There remained

only two Albanians, Bishop Mjeda and Abbot Dogi, “who have adopted and are inclined to promote our desires for national unification, for cultural progress, and for keeping at a distance foreign influences from the Albanians.” ** In order

to fight the Kultusprotektorat, Italy and the Italo-Albanians strove for the establishment of a ‘Turkish diplomatic representation to the Vatican which would make Austrian protectorate over the Albanian Catholics superfluous.?® Italy also attempted to change its old structure by using the Florentine Societa per le Missioni Italiane all’Estero, whose secretary, Schiaparelli, endeavored, during repeated visits in Shkodér, to give the Catholic clergy the direction of some welfare estab-

lishments founded by Italy, on the one condition that they accept Italian consular protection instead of Austro-Hungarian. When this effort failed, Italy sent to Shkodér pure Italian | Catholic orders for the administration of the Italian orphanage and hospital. After the explanation by Propaganda Fide in May 1903 that the Kultusprotektorat in Albania belonged to Austria, Italy did not pose any more objections to it.?° Nonetheless, the subsidizing of Albanian priests through Associazione Nazionale Italiana per Soccorrere 1 Missionari 27Ippen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 27 June 1901, No. 21A-C, HHStA, PA xiv/7, Albanien v/1, 2.

81. v. Chlumecky, “Die Italo-Albanesen und die Balkanpolitik,” Osterreichische Rundschau, v (November 1905—January 1906), 345, and

Osterreich-Ungarn und Italien, Leipzig and Vienna, 1907, p. 170. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that in 1888 Crispi launched at the Vatican the plan of the establishment of an Apostolic Nunciature in Istanbul for representation of the interests of the Catholic church in Turkey. It aimed chiefly at curtailing France’s influence in the Orient. See A. H. Benna, “Studien zum Kultusprotektorat Osterreich-Ungarns in Albanien im Zeitalter des Imperialismus (1888-1918),” Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs, Vienna, XII (1954), 16-17. *9“Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” pp. 7-8.

RIVALRY AND REACTION 265 Italiani all’Estero was assuming greater dimensions, and it seemed to have substantial funds at its disposal.° _ Another means of peaceful penetration in Albania by the two powers was commerce and navigation. The position of Austria in the beginning was more advantageous, but soon Italy began to make great progress. In the 18q90’s Italian trade was a “quantité negligeable’’; in the 1900’s it increased stead-

ily, particularly in the south, in the vilayet of Janina, after Italy created a commercial agency in 1900.*1 In the period 1900-1904, while Italy had quadrupled her exports to the vilayet of Janina, those of Austria had declined by 15 per cent.2? Yet the Italian competition had not yet seriously

impaired Austrian trade with Vloré and Durrés, and in

Korcé Austria had won the market.**

‘The Austrians seemed to be more concerned about Shkodér. Here the percentage of participation in the general maritime traffic had risen greatly in favor of Italy: while in 1901 the percentage for the Austrian Lloyd was 46, for Ragusea (Austrian) 40, and for the Italian Puglia 14, by 1905 that of Lloyd had fallen to 8.9 and that of Ragusea to 14.9, while that of Puglia had gone up to 56.7.34 ‘The competition for commercial predominance in Shkodér was not so much for pecuniary gain but to make the city and its highlands dependent upon one or the other power.*® Italy’s increasing interest in Albania can be gauged by the various agreements between the Italian government and the shipping company Puglia. ‘The agreement of 1893 showed light traffic between Italy and Albania; in the 1904 agreement the traffic had become heavier; and with the agreement of 1906 the weekly connections between the two coasts had gone 80Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 6 March 1907, No. 27, HHStA, PA xIv/25, Albanien xIx/1. 317. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., p. 190. 82See table in ibid., p. 191.

8Tbid., p. 192; “Mémoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905), Pp. 23. —-84Cf. tables in L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., p. 194.

S°Tbid., p. 195. ,

266 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION up to three, while the government subsidy to Puglia had been

augmented by more than 300,000 lire.*° | The Chamber of Commerce of Vicenza in the autumn of igo2 dispatched a trade mission to Albania, which recommended the foundation of a big Italian commercial company. A year later it appeared under the name Societa Italiana d’ Esportazione e d’Importazione col Montenegro e coll’ Albania, with headquarters in Milan. It provided many facilities to Albanian businessmen who travelled in Italy, thus strengthening the Italian market in Albania.?” In many parts of Albania, especially on the coast, the han-

dling of mail from abroad was granted by Turkey as a con-

cession to Austria. “As an old privilege, consecrated by treaties, Austria has the monopoly of the postal service in Albania and Epirus, using it for political purposes.” 38 Later Italy was able to obtain from the Porte a similar concession. Both powers erected their own postal offices in the country. The Italian post service in Shkodér was well organized, and new Italian post offices were opened in Durrés and Janina. Austria-Hungary and Italy used their post offices also for their propaganda: they introduced printed material from abroad favorable to their respective aims.*®

The problem of recruiting supporters for their policies became important for the two rival states. Austria-Hungary was more successful in this respect, having supporters both inside and outside the country. ‘The Austrians believed that in an underdeveloped country like Albania—with tribes and a patriarchal or feudal regime—public opinion did not exist, but that certain prominent men exercised influence.*® They also thought it was the duty of the Monarchy to develop con86Tbid., pp. 197-198.

s7“Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 10.

*®Conte Donato Sanminiatelli to Alberto Pisani, “Appunti per un promemoria sulle cose d’Albania,” April 1900, ACS, Carte Pisani-Dossi, 1866-1907, I, 14.

°See L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., p. 196; “Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende

1901 bis Anfang 1905), p. 10. ,

*°Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ippen, Vienna, 12 June 1897, Ref. 1, No. 780, Geheim, HHStA, PA x1v/7, Albanien v/a.

RIVALRY AND REACTION 267 nections with the leaders of the Albanian national movement and assist in every way the intellectual development as well as the material welfare of the Albanian people.*! The first two prominent supporters of the Monarchy were Mer. Doci (Dochi), abbot of Mirdité, whose influence was great on the Catholic clergy, and Faik Konitza, the young intellectual from the south, whose reputation as a promoter of the Albanian national consciousness had begun to spread. Both saw the interest of their country bound to that of Aus-

tria. The only power, wrote Doci which was not trying to annex Albania was Austria. She did not desire a subjugated but a friendly and allied Albania. He feared Italy more than any other power, because she strove to occupy and annex the

country. Italy was in need of an outlet for her increasing population; she would endeavor to neutralize her losses in gold and prestige in Africa by the conquest of Albania. ‘The

abbot, therefore, held that it was in Austria’s interest that Albania be powerful and independent and it was to the advantage of the Albanians to have confidence in Austria and win her support, for only she would protect Albania from her enemies.** Konitza told the Austrians that he could see in a union of Albania with Italy only economic decline and mis-

ery, while in a union with Austria there would be free economic and intellectual development for Albania. He regarded Austria as the only power which would support the racial individuality and the language of the Albanians, for she had already given a tangible proof of this in Bosnia. He even thought it would be fortunate for Albania, in the event that complete political autonomy were impossible, to have an autonomous administration under a political and military union with Austria.4? Attacked for his friendship toward *1Cf. Zwiedinek’s report, Vienna, December 1901, Geheim, p. 15, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422.

42Promemoria Monsignore Primo Dochi’s uber Albanien,” pp. 7-8, HHSiA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422.

. *Konitza to Ippen, Brussels, 18 August 1897, HHStA, PA xiv/18, Albanien x11/2; Khevenhiiller to Goluchowski, Brussel, 20 August 1897, No. 12, vertraulich, HHStA, PA x1v/18, Albanien x11/2.

268 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION Austria by the Italo-Albanian paper La Nuova Albania, Konitza publicly gave his reasons: that Austria for a long time

protected the Albanian Catholics, who were responsible for the preservation of Albanian nationality; that had it not been for the fear of Austrian interference the Greeks and the Slavs would have occupied Albania in 24 hours; that Austria had

given proof that she wanted the Albanians to learn their national language and be enlightened; and that in the schools

subsidized by Austria the Albanian language was taught, while in those maintained by Italy only Italian was taught. Indeed, one of the requests of the Austrian government, when it came to an understanding with Konitza, was that his activity should be directed toward creating among his compatriots,

regardless of religion, a feeling of unity of their national interests.*5

The other prominent intellectuals who joined the Austrian camp—like Shahin Kolonja, Sotir Peci, Kristo Luarasi and Dervich Hima—were fundamentally in agreement with Doci and Konitza. For them, too, of all foreign assistance that of

Austria was the most advantageous for Albania.4* Naim Frashéri, the apostle-poet of Albanian nationalism, might have also favored Austrian policy had he not died in 1900. He

wrote sometime in 1897 to Konitza that “what can be most fortunate for the Albanian nationality is the annexation of Albania by Austria, the whole of Albania.” 47

Although Italy tried hard to recruit Albanian patriots, her success was slight. ‘he Albanian patriots could not trust her. There was too much talk in Italy about the “invading Austrian” and the liberation of Albania, whether it came from the Italians themselves or from certain circles of the ItaloAlbanians. The Albanian patriots believed that Italy wanted “4Albania, u (1898), 137-138.

*Goluchowski to Khevenhiller, Vienna, 7 December 1897, No. g6c, HHStA, PA xiv/18, Albanien x11/2.

“Kral to Goluchowski, Monastir, 6 January 1902, No. 3, Geheim,

HHStA, PA xiv/16, Albanien xur/1-7. oo

*"Faik to Zwiedinek, Brussels, 16 May 1900, HHStAd, PA xiv/18, Albanien x11/2.

RIVALRY AND REACTION 269 to occupy the country. Among the Albanian clergy Italy re-

cruited a talented writer, a former Jesuit, Don Gasper Jakova. | He worked for the Italians first as an instructor in Collegio S. Adriano and then as a publicist in Italy, editing in Albanian, among other things, a newspaper, the Herald of Albania (1904).*8 Ismail Kemal first approached Austria as the great power whose help Albania needed in order to develop gradually the national consciousness of her people through the founding of schools, cultivation of language, and acquisition of autonomy.*® Soon after, however, his relations with the Italo-Albanians became close and his leanings turned toward Italy. It appears that he found a greater field for action on the Italian side. ‘Che fact, however, that he declared in 1907 that the acts of the Consulta had dispelled the fears of those who believed that its action had “intentions of conquest and propaganda in the Orient’ °° justifies the susp1cions which surrounded Italian policy toward Albania. The Italians also constituted in Corfu an Italo-Albanian action committee, the initiator of which was the Italian Consul General in that island, De Gubernatis,°! and which by 1907 was still active.*”

It was natural for the two antagonistic powers to intensify their consular activity in Albania. In December 1896 Vienna had decided to send to Albania extremely capable consular officers, who knew the language of the country.®® It advised its consuls to contact Albanians of all social levels and con| 48"Meémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 15. 49K hevenhiiller to Goluchowski, Brussels, 6 June 1901, No. 14, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/16, Albanien x11/7.

0La politica nei Balcani (una conversazione con Ismail Kemal Bey),” La Tribuna, 27 July 1907. , 1Greneville to Goluchowski, Corfu, 3 April 1902, and 30 March 1904,

respectively No. 7 Res., vertraulich, and No. 11c, HHStA, PA xiv/14, Albanien x1/4. 52Mittag to Aehrenthal, Athens, 21 July 1907, No. 28c, vertraulich, in tbid.

*8See Zwiedinek’s report, Vienna, December 1901, Geheim, p. 2, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422.

270 II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION fessions in order to be informed about their views and the existing conditions in the land. The consuls should particularly seek to meet Moslem personalities whose influence could be used on their following. They had to be careful not to give

rise to any suspicions that Austria was interested only, or at least primarily, in Catholic propaganda. The consular ofhcials should also endeavor to destroy the idea that the Monarchy intended to occupy Albania, an idea which had begun to gain ground among Albanian circles and leaders. Their task was further to instruct the Albanians that Austria was interested in the development of their country and in the unity of its people, and so acquire an influence on their national efforts. The consuls should leave no doubt that Austria was ready to aid the promotion of the national interests of the Albanian people, but they should also make it clear that she would not lend her hand to movements against the existing order.**

In August 1896, Ippen paid a visit to the Catholic mountaineers on the Turkish-Monenegrin border—Kastrat, Hot, Grudé, Klement, and Shkrel. He learned about their grievances against the Turkish government and Montenegro’s efforts to make use of them for her own interests. He suggested to his government that immediate help was needed to improve their situation. From 1898 to 1903 Austria distributed corn to the mountaineers, thus winning them to her side.*> In October 1897 Ippen undertook a trip in central Albania which brought him in contact with influential beys of ‘Tirana and Elbasan. He came to know then the activity of an organized national Albanian party, whose endeavors were directed toward the enlightenment of the people through the ‘4Ministry to Ippen, Vienna, 12 June 1897, Ref. I, No. 780, Geheim, HHSiA, PA xiv/7, Albanien v/2; Zwiedinek, “Die albanesische Action des k. und k. Ministeriums des Aeussern im Jahre 1897,” Vienna, 11 January 1898, p. 2, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. ‘5Jppen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 16 March 1899, No. 12c, HHStA, PA x1v/14, Albanien x; Zwiedinek, “Die albanesische Action des k. und k. Ministeriums des Aeussern im Jahre 1897,” p. 3, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422.

RIVALRY AND REACTION 27] cultivation of the Albanian language and the establishment of schools. After his departure, the Turkish authorities arrested two of the patriotic beys—Murad Toptani and Dervish Elbasani—who had been his hosts. ‘This act limited the move-

ments of the Austrian consuls in Albania and made them more cautious in the future.°¢ The Moslem Albanians who bordered on Serbia and were near southern Bosnia were as important for the Dual Monarchy as the Catholic tribesmen of the vilayet of Shkodér.

The Austrian consuls of Uskiib and Prizren had reported various attempts made by individual beys of those districts to approach them. They testified to the good reputation the Austrians enjoyed among the Albanians of the occupied provinces, as well as to the power of attraction Vienna exercised

on the bordering Turkish districts. The influential leader of the districts of Ipek and Gjakové, Hadji Molla Zeka, was reported to have repeatedly offered his services fora union of | Albania with Austria-Hungary, but the close relations he maintained at that time with the Sultan’s entourage and the “unreliability of his character,” according to the Austrian reports, did not render advisable the acceptance of his collaboration.°”

In order to expand her activity, Austria-Hungary thought of establishing three new consular offices: in ‘Tirana, Elbasan, and Berat. All three towns were considered politically significant, as they were the seat of several prominent Albanian families devoted to the Albanian cause. Since it was not easy to obtain the consent of the Porte for the opening of new consular offices, it was decided, for the time being, that the titulars of Durrés and Vloré adopt as their summer residences Tirana and Berat respectively.®® As for Elbasan, based on Ippen’s report that it would acquire great commercial weight in the event of the construction of a Monastir-Durrés railway

Tbid., pp. 7-8. , SSI bid., p. 4.

8Zwiedinek’s report, Vienna, December 1901, Geheim, p. 2, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422.

272 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION line, Vienna was preparing to install an effective consular office. The creation of another office was proposed for Ipek, but in order not to arouse the suspicions of the Ottoman government, the execution of the project was postponed. In Janina Austria had increased the staff of her consulate.® On the basis of the information from its consuls and other reliable sources, Vienna could say in 1901 with some assurance that the idea of an independent national development of Albania had been firmly rooted and showed promise of growth. But this growth could not take place uniformly, as the

formation and history of the various parts of the country would favor or hinder its development.* The Porte, however, was opposed to any steps which would further the cultural development of the Albanians, and Austrian action was restricted where the right of the Kultuspro- | tektorat did not make possible independent measures.™ It was thought in Vienna that Austria should try to convince Turkey that a divided and dissatisfied Albania would be constantly vulnerable to intrigues and a source of dangerous disturbances. A united, culturally developed Albania, on the other hand, would strengthen the Ottoman empire; with her warlike people she could be a bulwark against any possible Serbian or Montenegrin attacks and thus help to preserve the status quo in the Balkans, desired by both Vienna and Istanbul.® Such frank talk would perhaps eliminate the Porte’s mistrust of the Austrians. The same attention might then be paid to the wishes of the Albanians as to those of the other populations of the Ottoman empire. Such a stand on the part Zwiedinek, “Die albanesische Aktion des k. und k. Ministeriums des Aeussern im Jahre 1897,” pp. 4-5, in ibid. ®°Millelire to Visconti Venosta, Janina, 15 November 1897, Riservato 347/113, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 1, No. 265. *tSee Zwiedinek’s report, Vienna, December 1901, pp. 2-3, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. See Zwiedinek, “Die albanesische Action des k. und k. Ministeriums

des Aeussern im Jahre 1897,” Vienna, 11 January 1898, pp. 17-18, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422.

“7bid., p. 18.

RIVALRY AND REACTION 273 of Austria would win her the sympathies of the Albanians and enhance her prestige. The Albanians would look to Austria with confidence, for even fervent patriots in Albania who strove for autonomous rule were aware that their people did not have the capacity to achieve such a political organiza-

tion without foreign help. They would welcome such help from Austria-Hungary.* Italy’s activity in the consular field was rather unsystematic; it seems to have been a reaction primarily to what Austria was

doing. Austria’s creation of new consular offices in Albania

had disturbed the Italians. Millelire, the Italian consul in Janina, wrote that the Austrian vice-consul in Vloré, Petrovich, who knew Albanian, had begun an active propaganda to

develop among the Albanians the national sentiment. ‘This | was a significant admission on the part of an Italian consul, for it confirms that Austria’s policy was in reality the growth of Albanian national consciousness. On the other hand, Millelire had no doubt that Austria was trying to prevail in order

to prepare her hegemony in Albania: she carried on the biggest trade, had almost monopolized the postal service, had

the Catholic Church under her wing, and was endeavoring to win over the Moslem Albanians, who constituted the dom1-

nant element in the south. He proposed that the Italian consular offices in Albania be raised to the level of their rivals. When the vice-consulates of Italy were opened in Durrés and in Vloré, their titulars followed the example of their Austrian counterparts, spending their summers first in Tirana and then in Berat.® An impressive number of travellers and missions were sent from Italy to investigate Albania more closely. One of the early Italian travellers was A. Baldacci. His suggestions to the

{Cf ibid. |

Italian Foreign Ministry appear to have been taken into ®Millelire to Visconti Venosta, Janina, 15 November 1897, Riservato 347/113, and 21 February 1898, Riservato 46/15, DDI, Terza serie 1896-

1907, Vol. 1, respectively Nos. 265 and 379. | 66“‘Mémoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 11.

274 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION account in the policy toward Albania. Baldacci proposed: (1)

improvement of the services of Puglia along the Albanian littoral; (2) elevation of the existing consulates in Shkodér and Janina to consulates-general in order to counterbalance the positions of the Austrian representatives; (3) establishment in the Italian schools of Shkodér of the technical-commercial branch in order to counteract the influence of similar schools maintained by the Jesuits, and for this reason by Austria, as well as the restoration of the Italian schools of Vloré; and (4) nomination of career vice-consuls in Durrés and Vloré, where Austrian functionaries of this rank resided.**

A sensation was created in 1902 by the trip of Marchese Carlotti, then secretary of the Italian embassy in Istanbul. He crossed Albania from Monastir to Shkodér, seeking contacts with native notables.°* But for contacts with the Albanians

Rome tried to use the Italo-Albanians, whose attitude was overtly anti-Austrian. “Austria, allured by the successes she reached in the Berlin Congress,” stated the Societa Nazionale Albanese in a declaration (January 1, 1898), “dreams of making Albania a continuation of Bosnia and Hercegovina.” © The Italian consulates in Albania distributed Italo-Albanian publications. Protracted visits were made in the vilayets of Shkodér and Janina by such Italo-Albanians as the Albanologist Francesco Chinigo, the poet and publicist Antonio Argondizza, Ettore Melis, and others. ‘Their trips were allegedly for the purpose of historical-ethnographic and linguistic studies.”° As an obvious demonstration of force and interest in Albania, Italy almost every year dispatched a squadron of her fleet to visit the Albanian ports and remain anchored there for some weeks.”

At the beginning of the century, the efforts of Italian S7Baldacci to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Visconti Venosta, L. P., Bologna, 27 October 1897, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 1, No. 251. 68“Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 10.

89See C. Libardi, I primi moti patriottici albanesi, nel r910-r19111912, specie net Ducagini, Trent, 1935, U, 238.

Cf. “Mémoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 10. [7bid., p. 11.

RIVALRY AND REACTION 275 | diplomacy began to be directed toward obtaining a decree (trade) from the Porte revoking the ban on visits by Moslem Albanians to foreign schools; the intention was to attract them to the Italian schools.” A. di San Giuliano even proposed that permission should be secured to open schools with Albanian as the language of instruction and that vocabularies, grammars, alphabets, and textbooks in that language should

be printed.” The conflict over alphabets between the followers of Agimi

and those of Bashkim1,™ which broke out in Shkodér, was bound to affect the two opposing powers. It involved the clergy. ‘The Bashkimi alphabet, invented by Mgr. Doci, was supported by the Franciscans; the Agimi alphabet, the creation of Dom Mijeda, had the support of the Catholic episcopate in Shkodér and the majority of the priests. It was evident that the Monarchy’s concern was greater than that of Italy. The policy of Austria-Hungary was to strive to bring about the adoption of an Albanian alphabet which would serve by its uniformity to consolidate her influence in Albania. Even before the outbreak of the fight, she had raised the question of a unified alphabet for both dialects, at the time when the

Albanian demands for the use of the national language and | its cultivation in the schools had drawn her attention.” The Austrian government considered Mjeda’s alphabet representa-

tive of a certain progress and closer to the Istanbul alphabet than that of Bashkimi, with its “inherent Italian character.”’ Moreover, the followers of Mjeda and those of the Istanbul alphabet were inclined to make concessions to arrive at a unified alphabet, but not the abbot of Mirdité. In May 1902 the Catholic higher clergy held several meetings and a majority decided to adopt Mjeda’s alphabet. The Austrian government, which had first subsidized the publication of Al77. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., p. 170. 74. di San Giuliano, op.cit., p. 101.

74See Chapter vi, pp. 164-165. ,

™Zwiedinek’s report, Vienna, December 1901, Geheim, pp. 8-9, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422.

276 Il, NATIONAL AFFIRMATION banian textbooks in the Bashkimi alphabet, transferred its favor to the Agimi alphabet of Myjeda.”®

The problem of the alphabet was important to the Monarchy also from the point of view of Church policy. Consul Kral put it accurately to his Ministry: ‘The unification of the alphabet, which is pressing on national and linguistic erounds, is furthermore a necessity from the viewpoint of our policy and especially of our Church policy, for without it the peace in the Albanian episcopate and the quiet devel-

opment of our schools can hardly be maintained.” The adherents of Mjeda in the episcopate were in the majority and

would regard the support of the minority as an act of unfriendliness. In the event of a vacancy for a bishop, if the Monarchy were to support a follower of Dogi, the rest of the bishops would turn vehemently against its candidate; 1t would not be in a position to impose him and friction would be inevitable. Kral thought that it was in the supreme interest of the consolidation of Austrian influence that a unification of the adverse parties be brought about.*8 The Italians had already been using the Bashkimi alpha-

bet in their schools in Shkodér, but at this juncture they seemed to manifest a special interest in it. Doci maintained that the Italian consul, Leoni, had told him that the Italian schools in Shkodér would undoubtedly employ the Bashkim1 alphabet, “in order not to bring about confusion in the language of the same country.”’ Doci acknowledged that he had worked for the introduction of Albanian in the Italian schools 76Kral to Goluchowski, Scutari, 23 March 1906, No. 30, sehr vertraulich, HHSitA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xiv; Dochi to Zwiedinek, Vienna, 16

February 1906, HHStA, PA xiv/7, Albanien v/2; “Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 16; Alric to Delcassé, Scutari, 22 March 1902, No. 177, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie,

1902-1903, Vol. 1v; Alric to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

1904-1905, Vol. v. ,

Scutari, 18 March 1904, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie,

Kral to Goluchowski, Scutari, 23 March 1906, No. 30, sehr vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xiv.

Ibid.

RIVALRY AND REACTION 277 of Shkodér and even in the Italo-Albanian communes in Italy, convinced that Italy would lose in the Italianization of her school programs and Albania would gain in the propa-

gation of her language. He expressed fear that the Italian party might profit by the situation.”® The fight between the Bashkimi and the Agimi alphabets

continued, but it was restricted to the province of Shkodér, with only slight effects on other parts of the country where the alphabet of Istanbul was predominant. Austria proceeded cautiously in order not to alienate both sides.*°° In the meantime, Austria’s interest in Albanian publications was intensified. In 1902 the Austrian government took steps to acquire the manuscript of Kristophoridhi’s Dictionary of the Albanian Language, which had fallen in the hands of the Greek government. After two years of efforts and pressures on the part of Albanian patriots, the dictionary was published, at the end of 1904.34 In July 1905 Albanians studying in the teachers’ schools in Vienna and Klagenfurt, as well as many Shkodrans engaged in various enterprises in Austria, formed a society called Dija (Knowledge), the aim of which was the cultivation and propa-

gation of the Albanian language. It published an Albanian calendar each year. Dija also created a branch in Dubrovnik.™

The Austrian government subsidized at the same time two important works, Pekmezi-Manek-Stolz’ Albanesische Bibliographie and Pekmezi’s Albanesische Grammaitk.®*

A newspaper appeared in Trieste toward the end of 1907 79See Dochi to Zwiedinek, Vienna, 16 February 1906, PA x1v/7, Albanien v/2 (Text in Italian); ““Kongresi i Shqipétaréve Xhon Turq né

Magedhoni” (The Congress of the Young ‘Turk Albanians in Macedonia), Albania, x11 (1909), 24 and 33. 80See Kral to Zwiedinek (iiber den Brief vom 5.12.1905 Faik Bey’s),

Scutari, January 1906, HHStA, PA xiv/ig, Albanien xu1/2. — 81“Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 17. 82Notiz, 3 November 1906, by Seksionsrat Baron Schlechta, HHStA, PA xiv/14, Albanien X1/5. 83Notiz concerning Albanian bibliography, 5 June 1907, HHStA, PA x1v/14, Albanien x1/5.

278 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION entitled Dashamiri (Well-Wisher). It was different from the

other newspapers published abroad in that it was not the product of an Albanian fugitive, but the organ and testimony of certain circles in Albania. Its founders were the members of the society Agimi and its program was the development of culture by scholarly articles, the awakening of interest in the Albanian language and literature—if possible apart from politics—and a solution of the alphabet question through propa-

ganda for a common alphabet.* | In this period of rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Italy, when international events were of importance, it was natural for the Albanian attitude toward them to fluctuate. Soon after the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina by the Monarchy, the Kosovars feared that this power would advance south of Mitrovicé and that life under the rule of the Monarchy would be hard, for they would not be allowed to abide by their own customs and habits.®° It was learned gradually, however, that the treatment of the Moslem element in the occupied provinces was in every respect considerate, and the Albanians became more sympathetic to Austria.®® A more general reason that turned the Albanians toward Austria was the need to keep up with the other Balkan na-

tions. They had not been able to bridge the antagonisms among the clans—usually forgotten when territorial integrity was at stake—and present to the world an image of a unified Albanian nationality. The main cause for this backwardness lay perhaps less in their national immaturity than in the feeling that they were weak, that in relation to the enemies who surrounded them they could not win their national independence alone. ‘The overwhelming majority of the patriotic Albanians hoped that outside support could 84Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 16 January 1908, No. 9, HHStA, PA x1v/16, Albanien x11/7. 85Cf. Szdgyény to Calice in Constantinople, Informationsbiiro, Vienna, 28 May 1885, Zl. 1325/4 (copy of confidential letter enclosed, Uskiib, 16 May 1885), HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. 86“Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” pp. 3-4.

RIVALRY AND REACTION 279

tity of interests.8” |

come above all from Austria, with whom they saw an idenEven the feudal lords seem to have favored Austria-Hungary. Syreja Vlora, a prominent bey of the south who held high positions in Istanbul, reasoned characteristically: “We Albanians know too well that Turkey’s domination in Europe must end in the near future. But what will happen to us Albanians? As far as the opinion of my compatriots is known to me, they would best welcome the formation of an autonomous province under the protectorate of Austria-Hungary. And if we Moslems were compelled to recognize a foreign gsovernment—we are not yet sufficiently mature for the independence of Albania—then we would prefer Austria-Hungary to all other powers.” §° However, during the Greco-Turkish war of 1896, when the

people of Gjirokastér were afraid of Greek territorial expansion, they expressed the opinion that, in view of an imminent collapse of ‘Turkey, ““The eyes of all true Albanians, whether Moslem or Christian, are incessantly turned across the Adri-

atic toward Italy ... all their expectations and desires are concentrated on their brother Italians, at whose head is the worthy person of His Excellency Crispi, whose energy, ability, and Albanian heart they already know.” ®® Three years later

a similar opinion was expressed by an influential landowner of Gjirokastér, Servet Bey Libohova.*° Mistrust of Italy began to grow with the intensification of her activity in Albania. It was felt that her warm “‘interest’’ concealed her final goal, which went beyond the professed autonomy of the country. In this respect, the remarks of A. Lorecchio, the Italo-Albanian who supported so ardently an active Italian policy in Albania, are enlightening. He wrote 87Cf. abid.

88“Memoire uber Albanien, 1896,” p. 9, as quoted in I. G. Senkevich, Osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie albanshogo naroda v 1905-1912 gg., Moscow, 1959, p- 66.

8°F. Crispi, Question: Internazional, Milan, 1913, p. 239. *Millelire to Canevaro, Janina, 6 March 1899, R. Riservato 68/19, DDI, YVerza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 1, No. 180.

280 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION that Italy’s advance had given rise to a distrust on the part of the Albanians of the Italians and the Italo-Albanians which was to a certain degree justified: “‘. . . the Italians with their mania to found schools, new consulates, new commercial agencies in Albania, regarded this land as an Italian prov- — ince.” ‘They did not consider the Adriatic as an Italian and Albanian sea, but only as an Italian sea.® In fact, A. Baldacci expressed the desire of many Italians, when he asserted to Visconti Venosta: “Jl mare Adriatico dev’essere mare italtano.” 2 It could have no other meaning than domination or occupation of Albania by Italy.

The Macedonian reforms disturbed the attitudes of the Albanians toward the two interested powers. ‘There was a widespread dissatisfaction with Austria which, in agreement with Russia, had introduced the reforms in the Macedonian vilayets. Some of the Albanians saw in the application of the reforms a way of aiding the Christians, particularly the Slavs.

They also believed that it was the pressure on the part of Austria-Hungary and Russia that caused the Turkish expedition of 1903 in the vilayet of Kosovo. Begun under the pretext of punishing the opponents of the administative innovations ordered by the Sultan, the campaign had as an outcome, they held, the weakening of the Albanians, which benefited the Serbs. Moreover, the Turkish government, left with a free hand, endeavored to get rid of those elements which, from _ the national viewpoint, appeared dangerous, confusing them with the opponents of the reforms.®? Some Albanians, on the other hand, complained that the Macedonian reforms were "A. Lorecchio, Il pensiero politico albanese in rapporto agli interesst italiani, Rome, 1904, p. 81. **Baldacci to Visconti Venosta, L. P., Bologna, 27 October 1897, in

op.cit.

See Para to Goluchowski, Uskiib, 8 July 1904, No. 120, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/16, Albanien x11/1-7; “Mémoire tber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 5; Kral to Zwiedinek (iiber den Brief von

5.12.1905 Faik Bey’s), Scutari, January 1906, HHStA, PA xiv/109,

Albanien x11/2. :

RIVALRY AND REACTION 281 not applied to Albania as well. Austria tried to justify her stand on the ground that the very special character of the country did not render such reforms useful. In order to appease the Albanians, Zwiedinek wrote to Doci that the time would come when it would be possible for Austria “to take into account also the material and intellectual needs of the Albanian people” for reforms. For this to materialize, it was necessary that the persons who enjoyed a special confidence among the Albanians should use their influence to calm them and prevent premature movements which could only jeopardize the future of the Albanian nation.” Italy capitalized on the inclusion within the area of Macedonian reforms of large regions inhabited by compact Albanian populations. ‘The Italian politicians proposed and furthered their administrative detachment from the vilayets of Monastir and Kosovo and their unification with the Albanian

vilayets (Janina and Shkodér). In this way, they felt, they would prepare the creation of an autonomous Albania, although perhaps an autonomy under Italian leadership. Italy was also in a more advantageous position in Albania

with respect to Turkey. Turkey’s attitude toward Austria was suspicious. She regarded the occupation of Bosnia-Herce-

govina as the first stage of an intended Austrian advance in the Balkans. As Austrian activity expanded in Albania, owing to the rivalry with Italy, the mistrust of the Porte and the Sultan increased, thus weakening Vienna’s position in Istanbul.®* Italian activity in Albania, on the other hand, did not meet with any opposition on the part of the Turkish government. In fact, it was secretly supported, for the Porte saw See “Mémoire ber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 6; Zwiedinek to Dochi, Vienna, 14 December 1904, HHStA, PA xiv/¥, Albanien v/1, 2. See L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., pp. 120, 214. %Zwiedinek’s report, “Die albanesische, Action des k. und k. Ministeriums des Aeussern im Jahre 1897,” Vienna 11 January 1898, p. 3. HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422; Memorandum, Szomolany,

4 October 1907, p. 6, HHStA, PA xiv/28, Albanien xx/7-8.

282 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION in it a counterpoise to Austria’s influence and regarded the Italo-Austrian rivalry as profitable.®’ Italian statesmen also advocated a friendly policy toward ‘Turkey in Albania.®®

A serious complaint about Austrian policy came from the Moslem Albanians, especially the beys. ‘They reproached the Austrians for having generously donated the Catholic clergy, whom they considered as having done little toward national unification, and for having neglected the Moslems. Yet in the summer of 1898 the dissatisfaction of the Catholics of Prizren with Austrian policy was communicated to the Vatican. Austria was accused of being concerned “more about politics than about the good of the soul.” ‘The Vatican, how-

ever, paid no attention to the charge.’ Although Austria was trying to give the impression that she was interested in all the confessional groups by supporting Orthodox and Moslem patriots, Italy was using her advantage as a neutral power in religions matters to conciliate the non-Catholic population, which was “‘30 times more numerous than their Catholic compatriots.” 1°? As is usually the case with rival powers, suspicion distorts reality. ‘(hey saw concealed aims where none existed and magnified each other’s activities.

The Italians and the Italo-Albanians accused Austria of making use of her Kultusprotektorat to open the way to future seizure of Albania. Italy’s diplomatic representative in Belgrade, referring to the Albanians who were sent to study “Mémoire uber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),”” pp. g-10.

. *8See A. di San Giuliano, op.cit., pp. 29-30. See “Mémoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 4. 100See A. Lorecchio, op.cit., pp. ccxxiv-ccxxvil; Degrand to Delcassé,

Scutari, 14 September 1898, No. 119, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1898-1899, Vol. 11; Ambassade de France prés le St. Si¢ge to Delcassé, Rome, 6 February 1900, No. 30, in zbid., 1900-1901, Vol. 11; Alric to Delcassé, Scutari, 10 May 1900, No. 48, confidentiel, in ibid. See also on this question and archbishop Troksi of Prizren, Leoni

to Canevaro, Scutari, 10 August 1898, R. 184/92, DDI, Terza serie,

1896-1907, Vol. 111, No. 40. ,

161Konitza to Zwiedinek, London, 5 December 1905, HHStA, PA xiv/19, Albanien x11/2. Konitza’s ‘‘g0 times more numerous” is certainly an exaggeration.

RIVALRY AND REACTION 283 in Catholic seminaries in Austria, wrote that “They returned to their country in order to exercise the sacred ministry and propagate the ideas which were inculcated in them in the Austrian seminary.’ ?°? Conte Sanminiatelli regarded the means of Italian propaganda in Albania as mezzucci (contemptible), useful only to legitimate the de-

cisive action of Austria and not to impede it.1° For A. Baldacci “nothing is more false’ than what was published in Austria about the extraordinary intensity Italian propaganda

had reached in Albania. The creation of the two Italian

consulates in Shkodér and Janina, the schools, and the services of Puglia served only, in Baldacci’s opinion, to whet the

desires of Austria and invigorate her propaganda in Albania |

in order to counterbalance “the invented Italian intrigues.” 1° A sober voice was that of Ambassador Nigra. Responding to a report by Leoni, Italian consul in Shkodeér, he stressed that Austria had in Albania the protection of the Catholic clergy and Italy could not contest it. He did not think that Austria had abused it for hidden ends hostile to

Italy. He then warned against what he called “‘morbus consolaris, complicato di daltonismo politico,” which could create serious inconveniences.?® He was, however, somewhat more moderate in his reply to a report by the Consul General of Janina: “Mz pare che tl Cavaliere Millelire osservi le cose con una lente un po grande.” *°° The Austrians thought that Italy, under cover of strength102Calvagna to Crispi, Belgrade, 24 November 1890, No. 414/229, ASMAE, Rapporti politici, 1889-1890, Fasc. 1493.

20Donato Sanminiatelli to Alberto Pisani, “Appunti per un promemoria sulle cose d’Albania,” April 1goo, ACS, Carte Pisani-Dossi, 18661907, I, 14. 104Baldacci to Visconti Venosta, L. P., Bologna, 27 October 1897, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 11, No. 251. 105Nisra to Viscounti Venosta, Vienna, 4 May 1897, R. confidenziale 1448/380 and 17 May 1897, L.P, in DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. uy, Nos. g and 56 respectively.

| 106Nigra to Canevaro, Vienna, 2 July 1898, R. confidenziale 2205/47, | tbid., Vol. 11, No. 2.

284 Il, NATIONAL AFFIRMATION ening Albania nationally, worked for the Italianization of the land so that she could later set foot on it.°7 Chlumecky found the successes of Italy astonishing. He held that in 1906 Albania was seized by total Italianization and that sympathies reached across the straits of Otranto.1% The successes of Italy were attributed mainly to the sympathetic interest with which

the Italian press, parliament, and government responded to the Albanian question.!° Public disinterest was considered the crux of Austria’s lack of success. Kral held responsible the

Austrian newspapers, which did not take any notice of the Austrian “‘action” in Albania, did not understand it, and were

misled by the Serbian and Bulgarian presses to picture the Albanian people as brigands, while the Italian papers pointed up all that would enhance the prestige of the Albanian nation, create sympathies for it and secure its claims.'?° Chlumecky accused the Austrian government of not telling the Austrian public about Italy’s activity, of silencing the attacks of the Italian press and mentioning only the flattering remarks made in it about the Triple Alliance—of pursuing, in other words, an “ostrich” policy.™? It was one of Ippen’s wishes that Italian rivalry would raise questions about the usefulness of the Catholic clergy and the identification of Shkodér and the Catholic north with the whole of Albania. He considered both to be errors of Austrian policy.14* In the next decade the criticisms came from many sides and became more violent. Kral confessed that the Austrians had for a long time been in the habit of regarding 107See Memorandum, Szomolany, 4 October 1907, HHStA, PA xiv/28, Albanien xx/7-8. 1087. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., pp. 160-161.

Kral to Zwiedinek (liber den Brief vom 5. 12. 1905 Faik Bey’s), Scutari, January 1906, HHStA, PA xiv/19, Albanien x11/2. °T bid. 117. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., pp. 227, 232. T. v. Sosnosky later accused Goluchowski of a passive and faint-hearted policy. Cf. Die Balkanpolitik Osterreich-Ungarns seit 1866, Stuttgart and Berlin, 1914, 0, 257.

27Tppen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 10 November 1898, No. 45A, HHStA, PA x11/303, Turkei xxx/1898.

RIVALRY AND REACTION 285 Albanian relations from the point of view of Shkodér and believing that what Austrian policy did for Shkodér—or for

the clergy there—was being done for Albania and the Albanians. “We thought that we worked for the national cause and for the Albanian people and had basically served the interests of the spoiled Catholic clergy.’’ He then asked that Austria should think about the welfare of the Albanian people and her own material interests, for the influence of the Catholic clergy was restricted to a small corner, the northwestern corner of Albania.1!*

But it was not an easy matter for the Austrian government to give up its Kultusprotektorat in Albania, although it was a financial burden and had disadvantages for its political aims. The Kultusprotektorat was a question of honor. Any direct and radical break with Austrian action in Albania could be construed as a renunciation of the right of protectorate and as a sign of political weakness. It would open wide the door to Italian propaganda. ‘The Austrian government decided not to abandon the Kuliusprotektorat, pending future reconsideration of its usefulness. If it continued to prove useless, the government would concentrate on areas more favorable to the consolidation of its position in Albania.‘

It was at this time that Chlumecky came out for a new and more positive policy toward Albania. He called on the Austrian statesmen to act so as to reserve Albania for “peace-

ful penetration” by Austria and to push back any foreign influence prejudicial to the present and future interests of the Monarchy. Austria should no longer pursue merely a religious-cultural policy. Her policies in Albania—as long as Italy’s actions continued—should be in the direction of political and national actions, in the completely Albanian sense. In conferring attention on the Catholics, she should not forget that they constituted barely 15 per cent of the population 113Kral to Zwiedinek (iber den Brief vom 5.12.1905 Faik Bey’s) Scutari, January 1906, HHSitA, PA xtv/9, Albanien x11/2. 114Memorandum, Szomolany, 4 October 1907, HHStA, PA xiv/28,

Albanien xx/7-8, pp. 6-8. |

286 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION and that their voice alone would not be decisive for the fate of Albania. It was also necessary for Austria to carry on intensive commercial and political activity in southern Albania. Italy might then revert to her Mediterranean plans.1®

In this period of rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Italy in Albania, both powers strove to present their intentions and actions as designed for the elevation of the Albanian people and the development of their national consciousness. ‘The reaction of the Albanians varied, according to the time, section of the country, and religious groups involved. On the whole, however, the Albanians favored the policy of Austria-

Hungary which they regarded as a greater stimulus to the development of their national consciousness and a better protection of their interests. 11. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., pp. 245-246.

XII

The Interests of Balkan Neighbors and the

| Great Powers

APART FROM Austria-Hungary and Italy, the other great power

that took a direct interest in the Balkans at this time was Russia. France at the Congress of Berlin had strongly defended the rights of Mirdité, but she was engaged in North Africa and showed little interest in the fate of the Catholics of Albania. Long before 1892 she had left Austria a free hand and her consul in Shkodér abstained from mingling in the affairs of the cult protectorate.t When the Monarchy replaced the French sisters in Prizren by Austrian ones (sisters of Zagreb) and the Catholics together with Mer. ‘Trochsi of that city asked to be put under the protectorate of France, this power declined. because she wanted to avoid trouble.” Albania had meaning for France only insofar as she could be used as a decoy for Italy. The French press frequently encouraged Italy to look for an outlet in Albania, at first suggesting peaceful penetration and later annexation. It pointed to Vloré as a substitute for Bizerte. Even French statesmen tried to foster such a hope in Italy. The speech of the French Ambassador Barrére, on New Year’s day in 1902, and the declarations of his Minister Delcassé, although later belied, proposed Albania to Italy. As for England, she was not as decidedly for the defense of the integrity of the Ottoman empire and the sovereignty of the Sultan as in 1878. The reason was that she 1Maissa to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, July 1892, Riservatissima, No. 152/75, ASMAE. 2See Degrand to Delcassé, Scutari, 14 September 1898, No. 119, AMAE,

Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1898-1899, Vol. 1, and Ambassade de France prés le St. Si¢ge to Delcassé, Rome 6 February 1900, No. 30, 2bid., Albanie, 1900-1901, Vol. I11.

8See Giormale d'Italia (3 January 1902), for Delcassé’s declarations,

and L. v. Chlumecky, Osterreich-Ungarn und Italien, Leipzig and Vienna, 1907, pp. 15-16.

288 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION was losing influence in Istanbul and Germany’s influence there was becoming preponderant.‘ In Janina, the capital of Epirus, she had only an honorary consular agent, whose unique occupation was to obtain from the Turkish authorities hunting permissions for Englishmen.’ Only during the Macedonian troubles did British public interest momentarily revert to Albania. The 1880 Goschen-Fitzmaurice proposal for the formation of an Albania composed of the vilayets of Shkodér and Janina and the Albanian regions of the vilayets of Monastir and Kosovo, was recalled. If this proposal had been accepted by the great powers, it was argued, enough time

would have been assured the Albanians to strengthen their territorial rights and national unity and prepare themselves for independence.® As to Germany, her interest in the peninsula was a function of the relations among the great powers. Thus Russia had to reckon primarily with Austrian interests in the Balkans and in particular in Albania. The Balkan crisis of 1875-1878 had caused a setback in the alliance of the ‘Three Emperors, but it was revived in 1881. Russia and Austria-Hungary recognized each other’s position in the Balkans. ‘They promised each other (Germany included) that any modifications in the territorial status quo of ‘Turkey in Europe could be brought about only by a common agreement between them.’ But this arrangement did not eliminate their antagonism in the peninsula, where Russia’s

interest in Balkan slavism, although it fluctuated, never ceased altogether. When Russia—after the Germano-Russian treaty of 1887 which recognized “Russia’s predominance” in Bulgaria—declared that she would not renew the pact of the “Cf. W. L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902, New York and London, 1935, 1, 632-636. *Podhayski to Flourens, Janina, 24 June 1887, No. 6, AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Janina, 1885-1895, Vol. xu. SWesitminster Gazette, 14 April 1903, as reproduced in Albania, vu (1903), 111.

"See article II of the treaty in A. F. Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914, Cambridge, Mass., 1920, I, 39.

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST 289

Three Emperors,® Austria-Hungary feared an intensification

ofThethat antagonism. oO Turco-Greek War of 1896 over Crete disturbed

Austria-Hungary and Russia, who feared that it might expand to other Balkan territories and lead to a general conflagration. Goluchowski then visited Petersburg (April 27-29, 1897) and reached an understanding with Muraviev. ‘Taking account of the security and vital interests of the two empires and elimi-

nating “the danger of a rivalry disastrous to the peace of Europe,” the two foreign ministers seem to have agreed on arrangements in the event that the status quo in the Balkans could not be preserved. ‘The dispatches they exchanged, however, differed in their contents. In a note of May 8, 1897, Vienna favored the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the sandjak of Novi Pazar; the creation of an Albanian independent state, ‘‘to the exclusion of every foreign domination,” stretching from Janina to Shkoder, “with sufficient

extension on the east side”; and the partition of ‘Turkish territories in the peninsula among the various Balkan states. Petersburg, on the other hand, in its answer of May 17, 1897, while in accord with Vienna as to the maintenance of the

status quo in the Balkans, considered the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the independence of Albania as pre-

mature and, because they touched upon questions of the future, difficult to decide at the time.® One might be inclined to attribute Russia’s reservations to distrust of Austrian aims: i.e., to her suspicion that Austria’s proposals were intended to prevent the formation of a large Slavic state and, with the constitution of an Albanian independent state, to bar Serbia from the Adriatic. However, Russia’s motives appear to have

been different. In a letter addressed on May 25, 1897, to Kapnist, Russia’s ambassador in Vienna, Muraviev asserted that it would be foolish to accept the annexation of Bosnia8GP, V, No. 1096; L. Salvatorelli, La Triplice Alleanza, storia diplomatica, 1877-1912, Milan, 1939, p. 135. ®See copies of dispatches in A. F. Pribram, op.cit., 1, 184-195.

290 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION , Hercegovina and the independence of Albania—which Russia would not oppose—when Austria-Hungary did not

offer reciprocal concessions with respect to the Turkish Straits. Moreover, he added, considerations about future questions could easily lead to entanglements, which it would be better to avoid.** Italy naturally did not welcome the news about the AustroRussian understanding; she regarded it as prejudicial to her Balkan interests. Russia tried to appease Italy. ‘The Italian representative in Petersburg was told that Goluchowski attempted to endow the accord with more significance than it actually possessed in pretending that it would put an end to the antagonism of the two powers in the Balkans. In reporting to Rome, the Italian representative maintained that, once the motives of expediency which determined the agreement disappeared, it was entirely possible that the two powers would return to their previous policies, for their divergencies in the Balkans were many and serious.?° Since the time of Peter the Great, Russia had demonstrated a special interest in Montenegro, Albania’s northern neighbor. Intimate alliance with Holy Russia was the immutable basis of Montenegrin policy, her people regarding Russia as a big sister with the same religion and the same ideals. ‘The Russians, in turn, considered Montenegro a Slavic vanguard in the Western Balkans and a Russian fortress against Austria-Hungary’s objectives.1? ‘They helped her as much as they could at the Congress of Berlin. ‘The friendship of the Russian tsars was for Montenegro a guarantee of long life and security; it was understood that whoever molested Monte-

negro would wound Russia. Alexander III welcomed the See W. M. Carlgren, Iswolsky und Aehrenthal vor der bosnischen Annexionskrise, Uppsala, 1955, p. 14. OMelegari to Visconti Venosta, St. Petersburg, 26 November 1897, R.

6/8/339, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 11, No. 282; Cf. L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., pp. 15-16.

Cf. R. Pinon, “Le Monténegro et son prince,’ Revue des deux

mondes, LvI (1 March 1910), 81-go.

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST 291

prince of Montenegro in Petersburg in 1889 with the toast:

“A Nikita Petrovic, mon unique ami.” ® :

‘Toward the end of the century Italian circles also began to manifest an interest in Montenegro. At that time Ippen wrote

to his Ministry that there were groups in Italy who did not share the national Albanian idea of the Italo-Albanians and were friends of Montenegro. They were concerned about the

present and future situation of Albania from the purely Italian point of view and advocated that the expansion of Italy should gravitate toward Albania, leaving to Montenegro

the northern part of that country as far as Durrés.¥? A. Baldacci, in his report to the Italian Foreign Minister a year before, referring to the eventuality of the collapse of Ottoman rule in Albania, proposed the formation of a MontenegrinAlbanian principality, including in it only the northern part of Albania; the southern part he was inclined to see as an

Italian protectorate.14* However, Italy refrained from any | official promises to Montenegro, in the event of an Ottoman downfall, holding that she favored the preservation of peace

and the status quo. In 1889 the King of Italy, Victor Emmanuel, married Elena, the fourth daughter of the prince of Montenegro. The marriage offered Prince Nicholas an opportunity to make his

son-in-law more interested in the fate of his country.’ Increasingly preoccupied with the “Adriatic equilibrium” and seeking to augment her influence in the Turkish seas, Italy now became a rival of Austria-Hungary not only in Albania *Tbid.; L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., p. 154.

183Jppen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 10 September 1898, No. 45A, HHStA, PA x11/303, Tiirkei xxx, 1898. 14Baldacci to Visconti Venosta, L. P., Bologna, 27 October 1897, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 11, No. 251.

157] Presidente del Consiglio e Ministro dell’Interno, Rudini, al Principe di Montenegro, Nicola, L. P., Rome, 30 June 1894, tbid. No. 111.

1%Castelbianco to Visconti Venosta, Cetinje, 22 May 1goo, L. Riservata, ibid., Vol. 1, No. 403.

292 _ IL. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION | but also in Montenegro. To Italy, as to Russia, Montenegro seemed an obstacle to Austrian expansion. Soon after the royal wedding, an Italian company built and managed the port of

Pristan (Antivari) of Montenegro; the construction of an Italian-Montenegrin railway, joining Antivari to Vir Pazar, was negotiated in 1904; telegraph communications between Bari and Antivari were established; an Italian company was granted the tobacco monopoly in Montenegro; and Italian businessmen visited Montenegro while Montenegrin students studied in institutions of higher learning in Italy. All these ties brought the two peoples nearer, but the establishment of close relations between them was difficult.” Austria-Hungary began to be perturbed by the Montene. grin agitation among the Albanian Catholic mountaineers, whose chiefs the shrewd Prince Nicholas strove to win over to his side by money and gifts of arms. Despite national an-

_ tagonism between Albanians and Montenegrins, owing to great material need and dissatisfaction with the Turkish regime, a considerable number of Albanians seemed to be well disposed toward Montenegro. The Austrians counteracted with material assistance against Montenegrin efforts. They tried at the same time to awaken the national feeling and thinking of the mountaineers through the creation of Albanian schools in their villages.18 At this point Italy’s posi-

tion became awkward. She found herself implicated in both Albania and Montenegro. The Albanians were afraid that

their country was to be divided between Italy and Montenegro, while the Montenegrins became suspicious that Italy’s

objective was to create a great Italian Albania.’ The aspirations of Serbia to Old Serbia (Kosovo) met first with the rivalry of Montenegro. After the signing of an understanding between Serbia and Bulgaria, the so-called Ugodba “R. Pinon, op.cit., p. 92; L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., pp. 175, 183, 188-189.

“Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” HHStA, PA xiv/28, Albanien, xx/3, pp. 21-22.

“Cf. Mirdita, “La politica a doppio fondo dell’Italia in Albania,” L’Italia all’Estero, Rome, 1 (1 January 1907), 8-9.

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST 293

(February 19, 1897), whereby neither party would proceed to

a political or military action without a previous agreement,

Montenegro was invited to participate in it. Her Prince showed willingness to do so, but he raised the question of the delimitation of Montenegrin and Serbian spheres of interest in the Ottoman empire. The strong antagonism between the

reigning houses of Serbia and Montenegro, the Obrenovici and the Petrovici, the former fearing that Prince Nicholas had designs on the Serbian throne, proved a hindrance. When Montenegro laid claims to Gjakové, Dibér, and particularly

Prizren, the Serbs refused to come to an agreement.”° | | The Albanians manifested hostility to the Serbian intentions. ‘The Albanians in Old Serbia constituted not more than 55 per cent of the inhabitants, but they were the lords

of the area.*4 The Serbian propaganda which had been | planned for Old Serbia and Macedonia suffered a setback with the defeat of the Serbs by the Bulgarians in Slivnica in 1885. It was intensified, however, in the next decade, when the Serbs founded a hundred schools in the vilayet of Kosovo with at least 5,000 pupils.” At that time also the Serbo-Albanian conflict began to assume greater importance—particularly during the period of the Djordjevic cabinet (1897-1900) —causing tension in the relations between Serbia and ‘Turkey.?3

The Kosovars who took part in the Greco-Turkish war | now used against the Serbs in Old Serbia the arms which they did not deliver to the Turkish authorities. In 1901 the situation became grave. The Serbs began to smuggle arms to their compatriots with which to defend themselves. In the summer of 1901 the KolaSin “massacre of Serbs” took place, which compelled Russia to intervene at the Porte in defense of the 20Cf. W. S. Vucinich, Serbia between East and West, Stanford, 1954, pp. 27- 30-31, and 114. 41,, v. Chlumecky, op.cit., pp. 104, 108-109. 227 bid., p. 93; L. S. Stavrianos, Balkan Federation. A History of the

Movement toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times, Northampton,

Mass., 1944, P- 133. , *2W. S. Vucinich, op. cit., p. 32. |

294 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION Serbs. ‘The Russian ambassador demanded that the Porte stop making perquisition for arms among the Serbs, release those whom it had imprisoned, and recall the mutesarrif of Prishti-

tiné, whom he apparently considered to be involved in the massacre. The Porte yielded to the Russian demands and persecution soon subsided.**

The Serbian government suspected that this activity of the Albanians was also backed by Austria-Hungary. It was a plausible belief that Vienna desired the elimination of the Serbs in Old Serbia in order to form a compact Albanian region which would prevent a possible Serbian expansion,’ or that it was Austria’s plan to keep northern Albania and Old Serbia in a state of disturbance as a pretext for intervention at the propitious moment.?® However, an examination of the documents of the period does not convey this impression. In fact, when the troubles in Kosovo began to increase in 1903, Vienna became seriously concerned. Goluchowski told the French ambassador that he was more disturbed about the Albanian insurrection than about that of the Macedonians. Although the Sultan had given Calice formal promises to suppress it, Goluchowski feared that he would not be able to free himself from the Albanian influence—he was surrounded by Albanians in the palace and was afraid of an attempt against his life.27 On the other hand, it is true that Austria tried to minimize the importance of the Albanian atrocities. Moreover, she maintained that it was an error to believe that the Albanians were such a wild and disobedient people that they disliked any kind of reforms. ‘They wanted reforms that would be compatible with the character of the population and the

needs of the land. “If they did not desire the Ottoman reforms, it was because they aimed at denationalization, division, and consequently the weakening of their race.” 2° To “Cf. ibid., p. 33. >See ibid.

*6Choublier to Delcassé, Uskiib, 15 September 1902, No. 6, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1902-1903, Vol. Iv. “7Reverseau to Delcassé, Vienne, 9 April 1903, No. 32, in ibid.

*8“Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang),” p. 6. |

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST 295

believe as did the Russian ambassador in Istanbul, Zinoviev, and other observers, that because the Albanians did not molest the Roman Catholic Albanians ?® their attacks must have been inspired by Austria-Hungary, indicated scant knowledge of the situation. Enmity for the Slav existed among both Moslem and Catholic Albanians; moreover, Catholic Albanians in Kosovo were very few. If the Moslem Albanian at- — tacked the Serbs as Orthodox Christians, it was because they resented seeing government positions, owing to the introduction of reforms, pass from Moslems to Christians, who until then had been under their rule—and these Christians had a Serbian state to back them. The instigation then must have come from Sultan Abdul Hamid, who endeavored to make use of these anti-Serbian feelings of the Albanians for his own ends.®° "The fact that the persecution against the Serbs subsided after the Russian intervention was an indication of the Sultan’s complicity. —

The intensification of the struggle in Macedonia stimulated

Bulgarian interests in Albania. The Bulgarian nationalists strove to enlarge Macedonia. In the petition which the Congress of the Bulgaro-Macedonian Committee in Sofia addressed to the Sultan in the summer of 1902, relative to the autonomy of the districts of Rumelia, only the vilayets of Shkodér and Janina were designated as Albanian. ‘The sandjaks of the vilayets of Kosovo and Monastir, inhabited by a substantial Albanian population, were excluded.*? ‘The extension of the Bulgarian boundaries in Macedonia was helped by the activity of the Bulgarian Exarchate, created upon Rus-

sian recommendation by a decree of the Sultan in 1870. In Albania, the most active centers of Bulgarian propaganda had become Ohrid and Dibér, and in the latter the Exarchate had attracted some followers.*” 22See W. S. Vucinich, op.cit., pp. 33, 41-42. “See Chapter VII, pp. 201-204.

*1See J. Larmeroux, La politique exterieure de lAutriche-Hongrie,

1875-1914, Paris, 1918, 1,413, | _

*?Kral to Goluchowski, Monastir, 5 June 1900, No. 37, HHStA, PA xiv/5, Albanien m1; L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., p. 86.

296 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION | The Albanians, who until then had opposed the hellenism of the Constantinople Patriarchate, were now constrained to enter into a battle with the Bulgarian and Serbian churches.

The Serbs, meanwhile, through Russian pressure on the Sultan and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, had succeeded in obtaining permission to name a bishop also in Prizren. In 1894 a memorandum was addressed to the Sultan, in the name of

300 Albanians. It complained that the Porte had given authorization to Bulgarians and Serbs to establish in Albanian territories schools, seminaries, and bishoprics in their language, and appealed that permission be granted to the Albanians, too, to open schools in Albanian in those same territories.°? Shahin Kolonja deplored the fact that the Bulgarian Exarch had obtained from the Porte privileges to found Bul-

garian schools in Dibér and Tetové, “where not a word of Bulgarian is spoken,” in order to turn the Albanians into Slavs.*4 In order to counteract the various ecclesiastical propagandas of their Balkan neighbors, the idea of an independent Albanian Orthodox Church was being promoted by Albanian

patriots. |

At this juncture, the question of the Uniate church arose in Shpat, a region between Elbasan and Berat, in central Albania, composed of 43 villages. TThe inhabitants of these vil-

lages were pseudo-Moslems (or crypto-Christians), that is, they

appeared before the Turkish authorities with Moslem names, while in the intimacy of their families they were Orthodox Christians. ‘The date of this external conversion of the Shpataraks into Islam is not exactly known, but it appears to have occurred in the past, at a time when neighboring Moslems or Turkish authorities exercised a strong pressure. When in 1846, owing to the reforms in Turkey, the capitation tax was abolished to be replaced for the Christians by the tax of milltary service (bedel), the Shpataraks decided to declare their SHistori e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 124. A similar memorandum was

sent to the Grand Vizier in July 1896; C. P. Libardi, I primi moti patriottict albanesi nel rgro-1911-1912, Trent, 1935, I, 225-228.

84Drita, January 5-18 and April 24, 1902. ,

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST 297

true religion.® In 1853, the chief elder of the Shpataraks presented himself before the Turkish authorities of Elbasan and stated officially, on behalf of the inhabitants of Shpat, that they had never been Moslems but had always been Orthodox

Christians. The Turkish authorities arrested him and interned him in Dibér, and looked upon the Shpataraks with disfavor.** In 1897, however, the governor of Elbasan, Jonus Effendi, exerted pressure on them either to serve as soldiers

- in the Turkish army, if they were Moslems, or pay taxes, if they held that they were Christians. His intention was to force them to declare themselves Moslems.*? ‘The Shpataraks

thought that it would be better for them if they became Uniates (Greek Catholics), for then they might enjoy the protection of Austria-Hungary. At the outset the consular | office of this power in Durrés gave no clear and decisive assurance that this could be done. In 1898 the Shpataraks renewed their appeal, and the Catholic clergy in Albania

took an interest.*§ |

A year later Shpat was transformed into a political arena. A letter from Shpat embodying the complaints of the inhabttants reveals a trend toward the growth of Albanian national consciousness. It mentions that the Ecumenical Patriarch was Greek, that he worked for Greece, and that he strove to destroy their language and make them Greeks by force. ‘The Shpataraks thought to turn to the Pope, because he could be in a position to found Albanian schools for them: “Then we %5See J. G. v. Hahn, Albanesische Studien, Vienna, 1853, 1, 18; ‘TI.

Ippen, “Die Landschaft Schpat im mittleren Albanien,” Mitteilungen der kais. K6nigl. geographischen Gesellschaft in Vienna, LIx (1916), 456, 459; P. Aravantinos, Khronographia tés Epeirou (Chronography of Epirus), Athens, 1957, I, 160. 8K, E. Mpiré, Arvanites, hoi Dorieis tou nedterou hellénismou (Albanians, the Dorians of Modern Hellenism), Athens, 1960, p. 345. 87“Njé meshé shgip né Berat mé 1897” (A Mass in Albanian in Berat in 1897), Diturija, 1 (1 December 1926), 48.

*8Bornemisza to Goluchowski, Durazzo, 25 January 1904, No. 2, HHStA, PA xiv/5, Albanien m1; Ledoux to France’s Ambassador in Turkey, Monastir, 4 February 1898; No. 6, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1898-1899, Vol. 11.

298 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION wrote to him to accept us in his faith.”” The Pope responded

to their appeal, the letter continues, and sent to them the Austrian consul. Russia lost no time in dispatching her consul in Monastir to Shpat. He went “from village to village” and,

after his departure, priests arrived and opened “two Greek schools, one in Valesh [Valsh] and the other in Shelcan.” ‘The

Turkish government, on the other hand, ordered the construction of 17 Turkish schools, the letter concludes, in order to suppress the Greek language and “make us Turks.” 3° Russia was careful not to compromise her influence over

the Albanian Orthodox Christians. After the return from Shpat to Monastir of her consul, Rostowsky, the Russian consul in Shkodér, Shcherbin, visited Durrés, Kavajé, and

Tirana in order to investigate the situation.*° ‘The conversion movement spread in nearby Elbasan, where on March 28, 1900 some sixty Orthodox Christians together with the archimandrite, Germanos, passed over to the Uniate church. ‘The Greek archbishop in Durrés, Prokopios, under

whose jurisdiction Elbasan came, attempted through the Turkish authorities, to prevent the Orthodox from embracing Uniatism. ‘The Turkish governor not only did not intervene, but he even seemed to have recognized the converts as “Catholics.” 44 Archbishop Prokopios then proceeded to Monastir to see the Russian consul and it was reported that there was no doubt that “Mr. Rostowsky has again taken over the leadership of the counteraction.” Rostowsky re-visited Elbasan and Shpat, accompanied by Mgr. Prokopios, and with money "Letter (Shpat, October 1899) published in Albania, 4 (1900), 66-68; cf. also G. Schiro, Gli Albanesi e la questione balkanica, Naples, 1904, pp. 326-327, and Kral to Goluchowski, Monastir, 19 May igoo, No. 29 Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv, 5, Albanien m1. *°Ledoux to Hanotaux, Monastir, 2 March 1898, No. 10, and Degrand to Delcassé, Scutari, 12 July 1898, No. 117, in AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1898-1899, Vol. 11.

414 confusion occurs in the documents between Uniates and Catholics—they are used interchangeably. Obviously this is because the . Uniates recognize the Pope as their spiritual head.

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST 299

and promises tried to influence the converts.*? But he was at a disadvantage. As the protector of the Greek Patriarchate, Russia was unable to offer the Albanians the cultivation of their mother tongue. As far as the Shpataraks were concerned,

they believed that by adhering to the Uniate church they would not only be able to manifest their faith openly—until _ then they had been officially Moslems—but might also be

wholly or partially exempted from the military tax.4e The Austro-Hungarian consul in Shkodér, T. Ippen, favored the establishment of a Uniate church in Elbasan, although its membership was only 80. He discarded, however, as untrue the opinion expressed by Mer. Primo Bianchi that the Orthodox Christians ““because of special love for Austria wanted to return to the Catholic church.” ‘The real cause of the conversions, for Ippen, was the aversion of the Albanian Orthodox Christians toward the hellenizing tendencies of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.*+ On the nationally minded AIbanians of Elbasan the conversions had made a favorable impression. The patriotic beys of that town and ‘Tirana even encouraged them.** The number of the converted Albanian Orthodox Christian families seems to have risen by the end of 1900 to 55. At the bottom of this Uniate movement was the hope that the Albanians would win the protection of the Dual Monarchy, and hoped that through the Catholic clergy 42Steiy [?] to Delcassé, Salonica, 30 May 1goo, No. 15, AMAE, ‘Tur-

quie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie 1900-1901, Vol. I11. , 48See Kwiatkowski to the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram, Durazzo, 30 March 1900, No. 8158, HHStdA, PA xiv/5,

Albanien 1; Kral to Goluchowsk, Monastir, 11 April 1900, No. 20, ibid.; Kwiatkowski to Goluchowski, Durazzo, 16 April 1900, No. 6/res., and Durazzo, 15 May 1900, No. 9, and Kral to Goluchowski, Monastir,

19 May 1g00, No. 29, Geheim, tbid. 44Tppen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 21 June 1go0, No. 20D, HHSi4,

PA xiv/5, Albanien 111.

45Kral to Goluchowski, Monastir, 29 March 1900, No. 15, sehr ver-

traulich, and Monastir, 11 April 1900, No. 20, HHStA, PA xiv/5, Al- |

4/res., tbid. | , | | :

banien 111; Kwiatkowski to Goluchowski, Durazzo, 2 April igoo, No.

300 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION they would be able to enjoy the advantages of the Kultuspro-

tektorat, especially as to the introduction of the Albanian language in church and school, the strengthening of the national sentiment, and the acquisition of a more effective protection. Christians and Moslems saw in it the beginnings of

an expansion of the Catholic church of northern Albania toward the south which, together with the national school, would break the power of hellenism among the Orthodox Albanians.*¢

Soon the question became more involved and passed to the

capitals of the interested powers. It was both a question of principle and of politics. It seems that the most difficult task fell upon Calice, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Istanbul. Immediately, upon learning about the Elbasan conversions, Calice wired Vienna that the Uniate church in Albania was native and that the Austrian protection of it could not derive from any of the treaties with Turkey or from the exer| cise of the cult protectorate. He was afraid that any furthering of the conversion movement would provoke reprisals and hostility toward the status quo of the Austrian Kultusprotektorat, perhaps from the Turks, but especially from the Orthodox Christians and the Russians, who were very sensitive to such matters.*” Preoccupied with such complications, which

in Albania would be highly undesirable for the Monarchy, Calice a few days later elaborated more fully on the question of the Uniate church. He explained that the right of protection of the Austro-Hungarian government over the Catholic church was based on article [IX of the Belgrade peace treaty and concerned only the order (since then abandoned) of the Trinitarians. It gradually extended to all the clergy and institutions of the Roman Catholic church, what was called in Turkey the “Latin nation.” The various Uniate churches of whatever Eastern rite in ‘Turkey were regarded as native and “Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” pp. 20-21,

HHStA, PA xiv/28, Albanien xx/3. *"Calice to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Constantinople, 31 March 1900, telegram, No. 29, HHStA, PA xiv/5, Albanien 11.

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST 301

did not enjoy a foreign protectorate, as for instance, the Bul-

garian Uniate communities. The case of the Elbasan converts, however, was different insofar as they constituted a com-

munity under the Roman Catholic diocese of Durrés and the Turkish authorities pretended to have already recognized it as Catholic. Yet, Calice remarked, the protectorate did not concern the members of the Uniate community, but the clergy —in the specific case, the archimandrite Germanos—and the church.*8 'T. Ippen, on the other hand, well versed in matters of the Kultusprotektorat, held that with the Uniates of Elbasan a Greek Catholic rite came into being which until then had not been represented in ‘Turkey, namely the purely Greek

one. It was different from the Greek Melkitic (Arabic) rite.* As long as the Uniate church of Elbasan had no hierarchy of its own, Ippen argued, the Holy See was compelled to place

it under Latin ordinaries. If the ‘Turkish authorities did not recognize this subordination, then this would involve a violation of the freedom of the Catholic Church in Turkey.*° The Patriarchiate of Constantinople and Russia could not remain indifferent. In a meeting of the Synod of the Patriarchate the Elbasan conversions were discussed and the archimandrite Germanos, held responsible for them, was branded as an intriguer.®! Calice feared that the Patriarchate would ask for the help of the Turkish authorities and had requested Vienna not to complicate matters. Indeed, the ‘Turkish authorities prevented Mgr. Bianchi from going to Elbasan, on the ground that his berat did not include that town within his jurisdiction. But, when Calice received orders from V148Calice to Goluchowski, Constantinople, 4 April igoo, No. 14D, HHStA, PA xiv/5, Albanien 11. 49On the basis of article XIII of the apostolic constitution of November 27, 1897, of Oriental churches, the Greek Melkitic Patriarch had jurisdiction over all the believers of the same rite in the whole of the Turkish empire. See Ippen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 28 August 1900,

, No. 29, HAStA, PA xiv/5, Albanien, II.

| lbid.

‘1Calice to Goluchowski, Constantinople, 9 May 1900, No. 10B,

HHStA, PA xiv/5, Albanien m1.

302 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION enna to intervene so that the Catholic prelate might visit Elbasan, he told the Turkish Foreign Minister, ‘Tevfik Pasha, that his government meant business in the question of the

| _ Kultusprotektorat.* |

As for Russia, she first protested to the Porte. Her Chargé d’Affaires, Shterbachev, as reported by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Tevfik Pasha, sought to represent the whole movement of the Uniate conversions as caused by the vengeance of a priest, Germanos, who had forgotten his duty toward his bishop. He also found fault with the Porte, pretending that Germanos met with such success among the Orthodox Christians because he deceived them that as Catholics they would be protected from further repressions.®? ‘Then Russia took the complaints to Vienna. Her ambassador there, Count Kapnist, brought up the question of the Elbasan conversions at a meeting with Goluchowski. He stated that the Austrian consuls in Albania with their excessive zeal contributed to the conversions. He stressed that his government, owing to

the interest of the Russian people in the followers of the Orthodox Church, was concerned about the matter. Explaining the Austrian side of the conversions, Goluchowski added that “Russia in no way exercises a religious protectorate in these regions.”’ Yet the Austro-Hungarian government was cautious about its conduct in Albania. Its consular representatives were instructed that they should be careful above all not to give rise to suspicions that Austria-Hungary was interested in man-

aging the nationalist movement by supporting the Uniate religious propaganda. It advised them that the task of the Catholic protectorate in Albania was to support the existing institutions of the Catholic Church and not the expansion **See tbid.; Beilage in Calice to Goluchowski, Constantinople, g May 1900, No. 19C, HHStA, PA xvi/5, Albanien 11; Calice to Goluchowski, Constantinople, 16 May 1900, No. 20E, together with two Beilagen, ibid. *8Calice to Goluchowski, Jenik6y [Constantinople], 13 June 1igoo, No. 24, F, HHStA, PA xiv/5, Albanien 11.

) **Goluchowski to Aehrenthal in St. Petersburg, Vienna, 2 August 1900, telegram, No. 233, HHStA, PA xiv/5, Albanien m1.

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST 303

of the Catholic faith. At the same time the consular representatives should be careful not to make the Turks doubt the political motives of the Monarchy, for then they would act against her.®

The Uniate movement in Elbasan and Shpat continued with fluctuations for several years. By 1907 it had petered out.

On the one hand, there were the difficulties which the converts and their priests encountered on the part of the adherents of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the supporters of Russia; on the other, the Austro-Hungarian government, despite repeated efforts of its embassy in Istanbul, could not obtain a firman from the Sultan for the construction of a Uniate church in Elbasan.*®

Coming back to Serbia, we observe that her leaders had become obsessed with the idea of obtaining an exit to the sea—to the Adriatic. Viadan Djordjevic has noted that in his talks with his sovereigns, Milan and Alexander Obrenovic, he had suggested that the Serbs ask Turkey’s permission to construct a railway line from Mitrovicé over Prizren to Shkodér, as far as the port of Shén Gjin (San Giovanni di Medua). He thought that it would not be difficult to persuade

the Sultan that in this way he could become the real master 55>Goluchowski to Kral in Monastir, Vienna, 13 June 1900, No. 161, HHAStA, PA xiv/5, Albanien mI. ‘6Bornemisza to Goluchowski, Tirana/Durazzo, 8 March 1904, No. 19;

Kraus to Aehrenthal, [Monastir?], 8 April 1907, No. 15; Szécsen to Aehrenthal, Rome, 25 June 1907, No. 17F (in it a memo from the Propaganda Fide—Protocollo No. 22707, per gli Affari di Rito Orientale, Rome, 18 June 1907—is included, where the conversion of Papa

Naum and other inhabitants of Shpat is confirmed)—all in HHStA, PA xiv/5, Albanien 11. See also ‘““Memoire uber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 20. With the creation of the Albanian independent

state, the problem of the Shpataraks was solved: they could declare themselves as belonging to any religion they liked. As for the Uniate church of Elbasan, it passed into oblivion to be remembered only on the eve and during the Italian Fascist occupation of Albania. For their own political reasons, the Italians tried to revive it. Yet for a decade the Uniate movement stirred up the nationalist movement of the AlIbanians and stimulated their interest in an Albanian Orthodox Church.

304 Il, NATIONAL AFFIRMATION | of Albania. Without this railway the ‘‘politcial anarchy” in Albania would continue, for the Porte would not be in a position to put sufficient troops there. ‘The Serbian Prime Minister was certain that Austria-Hungary would oppose the

project, but he hoped to have at Istanbul the support of Russia, Italy, and perhaps France.®*” It seems that around this

time the Russians had their own plans about an “Adriatic Railway.”’ When N.V.T. Charykov arrived in Belgrade, in the spring of 1901, as Russia’s Minister, apart from his objective

Of improving relations between Serbia and Bulgaria, he also had to prepare the way for the construction of a railway line which would link the Danube to the Adriatic through Serbia _ and Montenegro,®® passing undoubtedly through Albanianinhabited territory. The Macedonian imbroglio involved the great powers and

Albania’s Balkan neighbors. When Turkey accepted the Miurzsteg Agreement, Austria-Hungary asked that the western part of the vilayet of Kosovo (the sandjaks of Plevlja, Prishtiné, Prizren, Sjenicé, and Novi Pazar) be excluded from the reform

program and that reforms in the eastern part of that vilayet (the districts of Kacanik, Kumanové, Kratova, Palanka, and Uskiib) be entrusted exclusively to her gendarmerie officers. The Serbian efforts to extend the reform program to the western part of the vilayet of Kosovo and to prevent AustriaHungary from acquiring the right to administer reforms in the eastern part failed. Russia, having suffered reverses in the : war with Japan, was not in a position to support Serbia’s protests energetically. She could only achieve an agreement that in the western part of the vilayet of Kosovo “reliable” Turkish officers be employed. ‘The victory of Austria-Hungary meant

that this power was determined to keep the area free from any other influence.®? ‘The Murzsteg agreement made Pa&Si¢c, the Serbian Prime

Minister, change his attitude toward Macedonia. Originally “Dr. V. Georgevitch, Das Ende der Obrenovitch, Leipzig, 1905, as quoted in L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., pp. 177-178. See W. S. Vucinich, op.cit., p. 35. ‘91bid., pp. 127-129.

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST 305

he was against the creation of “another Slavic state and nationality”; now he was ready to accept a separate Macedonia, if it were not created at Serbia’s expense. In the hope that the vilayet of Kosovo would go to Serbia and Montenegro, following a ‘Turkish downfall, he opposed its inclusion into Macedonia.® Despite opposing interests between Serbia and Bulgaria—each having her own views as to the frontiers of Macedonia—the two powers on April 12, 1904, signed a secret Treaty of Alliance. Albania was an object of concern

in this treaty. It was agreed that if the occasion arose the Albanian problem should be treated in such a way as to further an alliance between Serbia and Montenegro, favor_ able to the interests of the latter.*! It appears that in 1906 the

Serbs and Bulgarians reached an understanding as to the spheres of guerrilla activity: the northern part of Kosovo and the district of Prizren-Gjakové was to be within the activity of the Serbian guerrillas, whereas the regions lying to the

south would be under the jurisdiction of the bands of the Bulgarian Committee.*? Yet a rapprochement between Bel-

gerade and Sofia never really materialized. | | After the agreement of the Ambassadors in Istanbul in 1881 it had become evident to the Greeks that their claims to

Epirus depended to a considerable degree on the attitude of the Albanians. For this reason in the year 1883-1884 they carried on a broad political activity, aimed either at neutralizing Albanian armed opposition in the event of a war against Turkey or at drawing the Albanians to the anti-Turkish camp

and exploiting their military force. ‘To bring about deterioration in Turkish-Albanian relations, the Greeks tried to incite the Albanians to revolt against the Porte.* In 1883 a shady committee was formed in Corfu with Albania as its center of interest. The Albanians call it the Al-

87 bid., p. 137. 61See article 5 of the English translation of the text in E. C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, Cambridge, Mass., 1938, Appendix 11. Only the vilayets of Shkodér and Janina were con-

sidered Albanian territory. ,

6Cf. L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., pp. 99-101.

— 8Histori e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 107. |

306 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION banian-Greek Committee: ** the Austrian documents refer to it as the English-Albanian Committee. Officially it was known as Comitato Centrale dell’Alta Albania,®* which by implica-

tion excluded the southern part of Albania. The pretended president of this committee was a certain G. W. Leybourne,

, an insurance employee according to the Austrians, a civil engineer resident in Corfu according to the London Times." This Englishman boasted that he was in touch with Glad_ stone and other British statesmen and personalities, but the English Chargé d’Affaires in Athens considered him an adventurer interested in creating with English capital a company for the exploitation of forests in Epirus. ‘Thus perhaps could be explained his relations with all kinds of people in Albania and the considerable funds at his disposal.® According to the statements of the Corfu Committee, its goal was to liberate the Albanians, the Epirots, and the Macedonians and unite their countries. ‘The first declaration was addressed to the heads of liberal Europe and the second to the civilized people of Europe. Although the second manifesto was issued in the name of the Albanians, Epirots, and Macedonians, it was signed ““The Albanians” and carried the name of Leybourne for the Central Committe at Corfu. In the manifesto these Balkan peoples complained about the oppressive ‘Turkish domination and asked to be liberated, “for the Servians, Bulgarians, Roumanians, and Roumelians are free.”’ Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty they regarded as a dead letter,®® claiming that the Sultan and his followers defied the European powers. ‘The declaration stated: “We have asked S41 bid.

®Notizen tiber Mr. Leighbourn (Leybourn) und das english-albanische Comité in Corfu, HHStA, Gesandeschaftsarchiv Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422.

88Tbid. *’The Times (London), 7 May 1884, 7:1. , *SNotizen tiber Mr. Leighbourn (Leybourn) ..., HHStA, Ges. Arch. © Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. ®'This article refers to non-Turkish populations within the empire for whose regions the Porte was obliged to form committees, on which they would be heavily represented. These committees would compose special

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST 307

the crowned heads of Europe for relief. Now we appeal to such of her peoples as have liberty to espouse our cause and to compel the Turk to let us decide our destiny by a plebiscite. In this way we may obtain our liberty without the aid of fire

and sword. But if we cannot obtain this, then we must by a vigorous attack expel the barbarian, bag and baggage.” ” The fact that the Corfu Committee had its headquarters on Greek soil and that it divided the territories under ‘Turkish rule north of the Kalamas river into Epirus and Albania was a sufficient proof for the Albanian patriots that it was under Greek influence. In the hope of inciting the Albanians to revolt against the Porte, the Corfu Committee repeated the old proposal for the formation of a common Greek-Albanian state, under the crown of the King of Greece. Albanian members of the Committee, like the adventurer Prenk Gjok Curri from Mirdité and Hajredin Bey Mati, who had fled Turkey . for ordinary crimes and had found asylum in Greece, were sent to Albania and Albanian settlements abroad. to propa-

gate these ideas.” |

At this time Athens called upon the Albanians to revolt against ‘Turkey and take part in the federation of the Balkan states which Kharilaos Trikoupis, the Greek Prime Minister, | was trying to form. In this federation, which he claimed would be aided by England and Italy, the Balkan states would assure

territorial benefits at the expense of ‘urkey so as to preserve

the previous relationship of power. But to the Albanians Trikoupis made no concrete commitment.” The reply of the Albanians was given by De Rada, who held that Greece, Ruregulations for each province separately, according to its needs, to assure

autonomous administration. The regulations would be presented to Istanbul, but to be valid, they had to be approved by a committee of the great powers. 7Text in The Times (London), 7 May 1884, 7:1-2; see also Notizen

nopel, Fasz. 422. , iiber Mr. Leighbourn (Leybourn) ..., HHStd, Ges. Arch. Konstanti73Le Rée to Ferry, Scutari, 24 November 1888, No. 129, AMAE,

Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Scutari, 1884-1889, Vol.

xxi; Histort e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 107. ”?Tbid., p. 108.

308 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION _ mania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro, who were independent and had a free hand, could be federated, and given support by England or any other power in case Turkey or any other state opposed them. As for Albania, she would decide for herself after seeing the outcome: ‘‘Otherwise, we will endeavor to uncover the black snake that advises [Albania] to

rise for something that does not exist and to start herself, divided, without funds, without arms, without tactics [mulitary training?], and with a small force, the war on Turkey, who has all these in great quantities and more allies to help her.” ®

Concurrently, the Greek government, with a view to attracting the Albanians, organized an Albanian cultural society in which descendants of Albanians who had settled in Greece before and during the Turkish conquest participated. The society was named Hoi Vlamides Alvanoi (The Bloodbrother Albanians) and was founded on June 6, 1884, under the presidency of Col. Dimitrios Botsaris from Souli. Although the very fact of its creation was a recognition of Albanian culture, its aim was to prevent the spread of the Latin alphabet among the Albanians and introduce the Greek one as an instrument of hellenization. However, the society proved to be a failure, for no work in Albanian was published by it.” It seems that European personalities, influenced by Greek

propaganda, exercised pressure on the Albanian patriots for a Greek-Albanian union. Again De Rada was the Albanian spokesman. In February 1886 he wrote in his organ Fiamuri Arbérit: “Some distinguished foreigners reproach us for detaching the fate of Albania from that of Greece, thus causing the weakening of both countries. They don’t understand that our separate existence today makes us continue [as a people] and that union would put an end to our existence.” 7 ®Fiamurt Arbérit (The Flag of Albania), 30 March 1884; see also G. De Rada, “Testamento Politico,” Shéjzat (Le Pleiadi), vit (1964), 189, note. “Historie Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, pp. 107-108.

As quoted in ibid., pp. 108-100. | |

| BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST 309 When the Rumelian crisis of 1885 broke out, Greek public opinion favored immediate occupation of Epirus. The Deliyannis cabinet opposed it as hazardous; instead it hastened military preparation, hoping that by a show of force Greece could gain territorial concessions.”® ‘The mobilization spurred the Greek element of Epirus and the Grecoman Or-

thodox Albanians to propagandize against the Turks and Albanians. Because of the adherence of Albanian beys to the national movement, they sought to represent it as a masked Turkish movement, whose victory would deprive the Christian Albanians of the protection of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and would impose a yoke harsher than that of ‘Turkey. Meanwhile, ‘Turkey, in order to counteract Greek mobilization, dispatched troops to the Greek frontier, including, as usual, Albanian irregulars. Looting ensued and Albania’s

partition re-emerged. The feudal lords, who had never wanted to be detached from Turkey, and the patriots as well saw no reason now to oppose Turkey.” Pressure on the part of the great powers—the blockade of Piraeus on May 18, 1886 —compelled Greece to demobilize. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century several plans for the federation or confederation of the Balkans were advanced. ‘They originated with both Greek and non-Greek individuals and societies. Albania was often included in them, united either with Greece or with Macedonia.” ‘These various federation projects testify to the complicated situation in the peninsula and to the desire to find a solution. They were all impractical. In 1900 the Greco-Albanians in Greece formed an Albanian Union in Athens, the most prominent members of which were Seho, Botsari, and Dzavella. In March of that year they See M. Lascaris, “Greece and Serbia during the War of 1885,” Slavonic Review, x1 (July 1932), 88-89.

Histort e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 113. 78See L. S. Stavrianos, op.cit., pp. 145-146, 150; R. Pinon, “Une confédération balkanique est-elle possible?,” Revue des deux mondes, LXil

(15 June 1910), 808-809 and note on p. 809. ,

310 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION appealed to the Albanians of Albania proper. Departing from the belief of a common origin of Greeks and Albanians—the Pelasgian theory—and refraining from religious discrimination, they argued that “Greece without Albania and Albania without Greece are half. ... When Greece and Albania unite, then there will be a great Greece and a great Albania. ... As

we are at present we need to lean on the shoulders of a neighbor.” ” A similar line was pursued by the paper Astér-YIl (Star),

_ which appeared in 1901 in Athens. It published articles in Greek and Albanian, using Greek letters for the latter. Its political program was Albanian revival with the assistance of

Greece and Greco-Albanian dualism, although articles appeared which maintained that Albania was not capable of governing herself.8° Dualism, however, meant Greek suprem-

acy and the Tosk beys would not hear of that. ‘They would accept as a precurser of Albanian independence only a great foreign power, not a state whose citizens had but a short time ago been subjects of the ‘Turks.*?

In the rivalry among the powers in Albania, Greek and Italian interests clashed. As Italy was interested in Epirus, she tried to paralyze Greek influence there, and awaken Albanian sentiment among the Moslems. She promised to the beys complete independence in the near future.®* In 1902 the Greeks

wanted to annex not only Epirus but also the southern part of Albania proper, as far as the river Seman, north of Vloré.* The Greek consuls in Berat and Janina—and their number seems to have been greater than that of any other power in MK. E. Mpiré, op.cit., p. 9; G. Schird, op.cit., pp. 97-98. S°Ippen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 22 March 1902, No. 14, HHStA, PA xiv/16, Albanien x11 1/7; Drita, Sofia, 17-31 January and 20 May 1902. 1““Mémoire uber Albanien (Ende 1901 Anfang 1905),” p. 4, HHStA,

PA xiv/28, Albanien xx/3. | ®2Podhayski to Flourens, Janina, g0 April 1887, No. 4, AMAE, Turyuie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Janina, 1885-1895, Vol. xu. 8Cf. “Italien und die albanesische Frage,” editorial, Die Grenzboten, LX (1901), 291-292.

| BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST 311 | southern Albania **—were hostile to the Italians. In Janina,

the archbishop Sophronios issued a circular exhorting. the Orthodox parents not to send their children to the Italian Industrial School in the city. With Austria-Hungary, Greece (if we exclude Trikoupis’s attitude) desired to be on good terms, despite interest of the former in Salonica.** On June 13, 1885 Deliyannis advised the Greek Legation in Istanbul: “We consider this government [the Austro-Hungarian] as our most sincere and natural ally in all questions which might arise in the Ottoman Empire.” §? Austria, on the other hand, became more interested in Greece when Italy entered the Balkan political scene. As Greece and Montenegro were the two Balkan states interested in expanding in Albania, in order to counterbalance Italy’s influence on Montenegro the Monarchy for a time inspired

_ Greek policy.®° |

At the end of 1903 the King of Greece, George I, made a rather prolonged trip in Austria. Rumors started to circulate that a secret treaty had been signed between the two monarchs. Millelire, the Italian consul in Janina, informed his government that it concerned regions which would jeopardize the interests of ‘Turkey, the aspirations of the Albanian Moslems, and Italian influence.®® Tittoni then directed his ambassador in Vienna, Avarna, to investigate the matter. Avarna | replied at length. If such a treaty existed, he argued, it would seem to shake the basis of the sovereignty of the Sultan and

prepare the ground for a change in the status of southern 847 bid.

SSilvestrelli to the Minister of Foreign Affairs [Prinetti], Athens, 11 November 1902, No. 1098/416, ASMAE; see also Greek newspaper — Asty (City), 12-30 October 1902.

8. Driault and M. Lhéritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Gréce, de 1821 ad nos jours, Paris, 1925, Iv, 161, 188-191.

8’Quoted in ibid., p. 200. ,

881 bid., pp. 332-333.

vato, ASMAE. ,

8°See Avarna to Tittoni, Vienna, 24 July 1904, No. 1090/473, Riser-

312 _ IL NATIONAL AFFIRMATION | Albania. If it were evident that the interest of Austria-Hungary was that Greece should pursue a policy, contrary to that of Bulgaria and Serbia, which would contribute to greater stability in the Balkans—and such was her intention in bringing about the rapprochement with Rumania ®°—it was to be questioned what interest she would have in an agreement undermining the order of things she had tried to consolidate. However, given the suspicions of Greece toward Italy, which she accused of having aspirations in southern Albania, Avarna ‘did not exclude the possibility that she could have raised the

dangers which both countries ran if hellenism were not successful. But in that instance Austria would have restricted herself, though assuring Athens of her benevolence, to recom- —

mending that Greece should not bring up matters apt to affect the sovereignty of the Sultan and consequently disturb the peace in the Balkan peninsula. Avarna appears to have been convinced that Austria’s policy at that time was for the status quo.**

In June 1906 the question of the Greco-Austrian treaty came into the open. The Courrier des Balkans, which appeared in Rome, published a sensational article: “Le traité secret entre ’Autriche et la Gréce.” It was said that the treaty had been signed in Vienna in December 1903 by the Emperor of Austria and King George of Greece. Then the text of the alleged treaty was given, which divided the spheres of influence between Austria and Greece in Albania.* In reality, the conversations of King George in Vienna did not result in a written record. He made no commitment. But he recognized

“that the interests of Austria were not in contradiction to those of Greece and that the legitimate ambitions of the latter could not but be served by an understanding between the two countries.” ®? Although no secret treaty between Austria and Fe obviously refers to the treaty of 30 October 1883, between Austria-Hungary and Rumania. %1Avarna to Tittoni, ibid. %See text of article and supposed treaty in L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit.,

note On pp. 243-244. 8%E. Driault and M. Lhéritier, op.cit., p. 332.

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST 313

Greece was signed,® one still finds references to its existence

inThehistorical writings.® | Foreign Minister of Greece, Theotokis, was another

statesman concerned about Italy and Albania. While speaking about Macedonia to the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Athens, he turned proprio motu to the Albanian problem, discussing Greece’s claims to Epirus and mentioning Italy’s aspirations.®** ‘The Greeks regarded an active Italian propaganda in Albania as a greater obstacle to Greek aspirations than the efforts of Ismail Kemal for an autonomous Albania.°’ It is perhaps of interest to note, in this connection, a federative plan of which Ismail Kemal was the author.®* The plan, which was presented in 1892 to Sultan Abdul Hamid, aimed to establish an entente between the Balkan states and ‘Turkey through a defensive and economic agreement. This would be a prelude to the constitution of a Great Eastern State, with Turkey as its center. ‘The entente would be free and the peoples of each state would have the right to settle in any part of the great state thus formed, with the right to engage in any enterprise they wished. ‘Turkey’s advantages would be the *Tbid., p. 479, note 4.

7, Larmeroux in op.cit., 1918, Ul, 390-391 gives prominence to its existence, although he refers to L. v. Chlumecky’s book, where the author says categorically that the information about the Greco-Austrian treaty was “von Anfang bis zu Ende erfundene Nachricht” (note on p. 243). In a survey of Albanian history by Prof. Zef Viezzoli, ‘““Shqipnija né

Gjiré té Diplomacis—Qé prej traktatit té Berlinit deri ne lufté botnore” (Albania in the Whirlpool of Diplomacy—From the Treaty of Berlin to World War I), Leka, Shkodér, Vj, 1x, No. vi-x1r (28 November 1937), 481-503, the treaty is given as extant. Although the writer gives as reference L. v. Chlumecky’s work, it is evident that what he writes in connection with the treaty (p. 486) is based on J. Larmeroux, upon whose work he has drawn extensively, although not referring to its parts. This is one of those errors, intentional or unintentional, which are perpetuated by repetition and should be stopped. ®Macchio to Aehrenthal, Athens, 31 March 1907, No. 10A-C, streng vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/g, Albanien v/6. Mittag to Aehrenthal, Athens, 26 May 1907, No. 20D, vertraulich,

PA xiv/g, Albanien v/6. | 8] have never seen it mentioned, even in L. S. Stavrianos, op.cit. |

314 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION re-establishment of her unity as a state, with the old frontiers,

the increase of her strength resulting from the unity of the peoples for their mutual defense, and the use of their resources for the economic development of the empire. If Al_ bania or Macedonia were not mentioned in the project as _ states, the reason appears to be the fact that they formed part of Turkey and would not feel the need of independence within such a federative arrangement.°®

However, when the situation in Macedonia later became complicated, a tendency emerged to tie that territory closely to Albania. In 1895 the Ligue pour la confédération balkanique was founded in Paris, supported by the Ligue inter- _ nationale de la paix et de la liberté. Its goal was the formation of a confederation of all the peoples of Oriental Europe and Asia Minor, including those of Macedonia and Albanians. According to its statutes, Macedonia and Albania “would form a free and federative state’ (art. 3).1°° In Macedonia the Vlakh question, which affected Greece directly, did not leave the Albanians untouched. ‘The promoter of the Vlakh movement was Aspotol Margariti, director of the Vlakh school in Viakho-Klissoura, Macedonia. He in-

tensified his activity after the Berlin Congress. He tried to open schools and churches in the language of his people (the literary language for the Viakhs was Rumanian) in Macedo-

| nia, Epirus, and ‘Thessaly, but was hindered by the Greek clergy.1° °The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, ed. S. Strong, London, 1920, pp. 216-217. The plan is part of his “Memorandum on the State of the Empire” (pp. 208-219). Ismail Kemal then adds (p. 219): “I learned that the Sultan had already been put au courant with the idea of the formation of a federal Eastern State. After receiving my memorandum, he sent me a study on the same subject which had been presented to him by the King of Montenegro, who had previously spoken to his Majesty about it when he was his guest.”

10R. Pinon, “Une confédération balkanique est-elle possible?,” p. 809 and note 1.

1898, Vol. 1x.

101Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 31 December 1878, No. 175, AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Janina, 1877-

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST 315

‘There were some writers who believed that Italy supported

the Vlakh propaganda in order to unite under her influence

Albania and Rumania.’ Some Greeks thought it was the | Rumanians who stirred it up, seeking in Epirus and Macedonia pawns to exchange for territories they desired to annex in ‘Transylvania. In reality, the Viakh movement, provoked

by Apostol Margariti, was subsidized by the Rumanian gov- | ernment. Timid in the beginning, it became, in the course of time, quite daring. When the trade of May 22, 1905, recognizing the Vlakh communities, was issued, the relations between Greece and Rumania became very tense; they would have waged war had they been neighbors.1°%* Albanians and Vlakhs often supported each other in their efforts, for both people joined in a hatred against hellenism and slavism and a fidelity toward the Sultan.1% These various conflicts of interests of neighbors and great powers, opposing or supporting them, in the late nineteenth

and early twentieth century, could not help but make the Albanian people more aware of their national individuality

and their national interests. ,

t02See L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., pp. 138-141. 108F. Driault and M. Lheéritier, op.cit., p. 516. 1047 bid., pp. 502, 515, 522 and note 1, 550.

105R, Pinon, “La question albanaise,” Revue des deux mondes, LIv (1909), 805; S. Sami Bey Frascheri, Was War Albanien, was ist es, was wird es werden?, Aus dem ‘Tiirkischen tibersetzt von A. Traxler, Vienna and Leipzig, 1913, p. 33; A. Galanti, L’Albania, Rome, 1901, p. 233.

XIII Pretenders to an Imaginary Throne THE DEVELOPMENTS which were taking place rapidly in Eu-

ropean Turkey, particularly in Macedonia, led people to think that in Albania as well political changes were imminent. It was believed that they could lead to the formation of an autonomous vilayet or to a principality. At first the patriots could conceive only of an autonomous

Albania within the framework of the Ottoman empire, as proposed in the period of the Albanian League. By 1890, however, under the pressure of circumstances, their political | thinking began to change, and a range of possibilities as to the

form of government emerged. Indicative is a letter which Abdul Frashéri, the architect of the League of Prizren, addressed in 1890 to Francesco Crispi. It was written on behalf of the group of prominent Albanians who lived in Istanbul and delivered to him personally by Prince Fuad of Egypt.? Abdul urged European justice put a halt to the unbearable situation of Albania by making it an autonomous province or a small kingdom, in keeping with the new organization of the Balkans. He let it be known that the Albanians were willing to be part of a Balkan confederation or even recognize the supremacy of a great power, provided that the administrative

autonomy and the natural and enthnographic frontiers of

their fatherland were preserved. |

But these frontiers were difficult to demarcate. Abdul in his letter drew them as they were visualized by the Albanian patriots of that time. In the north, Albania would border on Montenegro, Bosnia, and Serbia; in the south, on the gulf of Ambracia and Greece. In the east, the natural and ethnographic frontier would be a line from the Serbian frontier near Vrana which would cross the Vardar, between Usktib (Skopje) and Veles, following the summits of the Babuna mountains and a range of other mountains, thus leaving to ‘Abdul Frashéri to Francesco Crispi, 16 September 1890, ASMAE,

Fasc. 1493.

PRETENDERS TO AN IMAGINARY THRONE 317

Albania Prilep, Monastir, Florina, Kastoria and Grevena, as far as the Greek boundary. If to the west of this line there were included some thousands of Bulgarians, Vlakhs, and

Greeks, in return many more Albanians were left on the other side of it. As for Macedonia, that is, the vilayet of Salonica with the southeastern territories of the sandjaks of Monastir and Uskub, if Europe wished to grant her a similar autonomy, the Albanians would have no objections. Macedonia could even be advantageously joined with Albania as a dual state under the same prince. Abdul argued that the Albanians, who as a rule paid little attention to religious differences, would welcome with pleasure European laws and organization. But they would always prefer as a prince one of their own blood, familiar with their customs and capable of guiding them to progress. He proposed, in the name of the Albanian notables in Istanbul, as

the future king of Albania, Fuad Pasha, prince of Egypt, grandson of the famous Mehmed Ali, the organizer of the vice-kingdom of Egypt, who, “remembering the land that gave

birth to his illustrious ancestor and feeling the Albanian blood running in his veins,’”’ decided to serve the cause of his mother country.? Fuad’s European education and his military

capacities acquired in the Italian army, Abdul believed, had

given him a strong affinity for the West.? | The fact that the letter was addressed to Crispi by Abdul Frashéri was evidence that the proposal for Fuad as future king of Albania was a serious one. It seems to have been well thought out by the Istanbul group. Fuad, considered of Albanian blood, would please the Albanians as a whole; being a Moslem prince, he would be especially welcome to the Moslem Albanians. Coming from the Orient, he would not 2Mehmed Ali, the founder of the defunct Egyptian dynasty, was Al-

banian by origin. |

8This author has not been able to find anything about “details and

explanations” which, according to the letter, Fuad Pasha was expected , to give orally to Crispi on the matter of his reaction to the proposal of Abdul Frashéri.

318 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION cause an abrupt break with the Turkish past, and still less if he were to be under Turkish suzerainty. Because he had a European education and military training, he was expected to be more receptive to western ideas and more inclined to reforms. This would make him acceptable to the Western nations, particulary Italy, which had interests in Albania. © England, too, because she was interested in Egypt, might be friendly in her attitude toward the new small kingdom. From

many angles, it could be said, the choice of Fuad was advantageous.

In the 1890’s, the Albanian Society of Istanbul was reorganized and named the Albanian Committee. At the head of it was Sami Frashéri. He seems even in 1890, and especially in light of his subsequent writings, to have thought differ-

ently from his brother Abdul. Certainly the selection of a prince of Albanian blood for the eventual throne of Albania

must have had an attraction for him. But the political prosram of the Albanian Committee, which carried the title “What the Albanians Want,” written probably by Sami, advocated a republican form of government. It asked that the great powers constitute a free Albanian state to be ruled not by a Moslem or Western prince, but by a council composed of representatives of the territorial departments, from which its president would be elected.* It was a substantial departure

from the proposals contained in Abdul’s letter. However, considering that this was the time of powerful monarchies in Europe, Sami’s proposed regime for Albania was unrealistic. Candiates for the future throne of Albania began to appear

in Europe. The first was Don Juan de Aladro y Perez de Valasco, who adopted for himself the Albanian name Prince Gjin Aladro Kastriota. He was born in 1845 in Spain and in 1867 he entered the diplomatic service of that country, climbing the ranks from attaché to minister abroad. Following the death of Alfonso XII, he resigned from the diplomatic service. In 1886 he settled in Paris, where he became president of the international commission of the Spanish Railways in the

*History e Shqipérisé, 1839-1900, p. 131. /

_ PRETENDERS TO AN IMAGINARY THRONE 319

Pyrenees. Up to this point the various accounts about his life agree.” The divergences arise with the question of origin. | Aladro himself claimed that he was a descendant of Skenderbeg, a sister of the Albanian hero having married one of his ancestors. This assertion did not satisfy Faik Konitza, who asked him to prove his origin. On the basis of what Aladro had said and what had been published in the Dictionnaire des contemporains, this ancestor was his great-grandfather, the prince de Aladro, who followed King Charles from Naples to Spain. But the sister of Skenderbeg lived in the fifteenth

century and Aladro’s great-grandfather at the end of the 18th , century, more than 300 years thus separating these two personages.® ‘here were also reports that Aladro was the natural son of a wine merchant, Domecq, from whom he inherited a

great fortune, and that he attached to his name a title of nobility. His mother’s side was completely unknown.” | Perhaps Aladro was attracted by the prospect of the Albanian throne when he was a member of the diplomatic corps in Bucharest, where the Albanian colony was active.* But the idea of working for it was apparently conceived when he settled in Paris. He had certain qualities for it: a title of nobility, diplomatic service, connections, and wealth. As Spain, through Naples, had had contacts with Skenderbeg, his story of descent was plausible. In 1899 he issued a manifesto, hinting at his “royal blood,’ and put himself at the head of the Albanian

national movement. From that time on he worked for the

5See Pasetti to Goluchowski, Rome, 12 February 1902, No. 7J, HHStA,

PA xiv/12, Albanien vui/1; “Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” pp. 24-25, HHStA, PA xiv/28, Albanien xx/3; G. Schiro, Gli Albanesi e la questione balkanica, Naples, 1904, p. 35; Drita, Sofia, 1-14 November 1901; Leoni to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Scutart,

| 16 June 1913, No. 310/150, ASMAE. — SAlbania, vit (1902), 70 and IX (1904), 114. | 7Dubsky to Goluchowski, Madrid, 14 April 1902, No. 35, HHStA, PA x1v/12, Albanien vilt/1.

8See Alric to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 17 January 1904, No. 264, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 19041905, Vol. v.

320 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION liberation of Albania from Turkey and her independence, directing from Paris the action of his Albanian friends.® _

| At the outset, Aladro managed to draw to his side several prominent Albanians, like Faik Konitza and Shahin Kolonja. He was praised for having established a ““Skenderbeg prize”’ of 1000 francs to be awarded every year to an. Albanian who would contribute either to the enrichment of the Albanian language or to the propagation of its teaching. He himself began to take lessons in Albanian. Several poems appeared in his praise; even Geg Postripa (pseudonym for Luigj Gurakuqi), a distinguished intellectual from Shkodér, dedicated to him a poem with the title “A New Star.” 1° Every year Aladro issued appeals and manifestos. ‘They were often repetitious and bombastic. His demands, however, were in accordance with those of the patriots. He asked for the unification of the Albanian vilayets, opposed the foreign schools, and urged the opening of Albanian national schools. He appealed for brotherhood among the Albanians, as dictated by the Koran and the Gospels, and the defense of the integrity of their fatherland. He always concluded as “The humble servant of Albania” and signed “Prince Gjin Aladro

-Kastriota.” 11 He tried to build a cult around his person through the press, the letters of his secretary Viské Babatasi from Korcé, the distribution of portraits, appeals, and postcards, and liberal use of his money.” Aladro found continued support among many of the ItaloAlbanians. It is possible that some of their chiefs thought

that they could exercise control over him and could take advantage of his connections and actions. ‘The pretender, on the other hand, might have regarded their friendship as help*Pasetti to Goluchowski, Rome, 12 February 1902, No. 7J, HHStA, PA xiv/12, Albanien, vut/1; “Mémoire uber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis

Anfang 1905),” p. 25.

104 lbania, VI (1901), 105 and 132; Drita, 1-14 November 1901. , 11See texts of proclamations issued in 1902 and 1903 in A. Lorecchio,

Il pensiero politico albanese in rapporto agli interessi italiani, Rome, 1904, Note e documenti, pp. ccclxx-ccclxxviil. 12Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang (1905),” p. 25.

| PRETENDERS TO AN IMAGINARY THRONE 32] ful in promoting his influence on the Italian party in Albania. He then moved the center of his activity from Paris to Naples and Corfu. One of his staunch supporters was A. Lorecchio, who wrote in La Nazione Albanese that the Albanians should thank God for the appearance of Aladro. “The august speech of the descendant of our greatest hero”

marked the beginning of a new period for the history of Albanian redemption and reanimated the Albanians and made them feel more secure.!* He also took up Aladro’s defense when the latter was accused of being merely an opportunist.‘4 Elsewhere abroad Aladro was supported by Pérlindja Shqiptare (Albanian Revival), organ of the Albanian Society Shpresa (Hope) of Bucharest.1>

However, those who attacked Aladro, accusing him of personal ambition and vainglory, were not only “the enemies of

the Albanian name,” as Lorecchio put it, but also Albanian patriots, who at first had backed him up. In the beginning they may have thought the prestige of his name would inspire confidence and thus benefit the Albanian movement. Moreover, the fact that he came from a country distinterested in Albania, Spain, made him less exposed to the political influences of the neighboring states. But they were soon disillusioned.

One of the first patriots to pass to the offensive was Faik Konitza. He called Aladro insane, but did not accuse him wildly, as did N. Naco in Shqiptari (Albanian), of being a tool

of Russia.1® Konitza published in Albania an article which had appeared in L’Européen under the signature of Guillaume Apollinaire, one of the forerunners of surrealism in poetry in France, entitled “Deux faux princes d’Albanie,” one of whom was Aladro; he ridiculed the research on Aladro’s origin and tried to prove that he could not be a descend18As cited in G. Schird, op.cit., p. 339; see also La Nazione Albanese,

15 December 1901. ,

144A, Lorecchio, op.cit., pp. 75-76. :

15Pallavicini to Goluchowski, Bucharest, 8 January 1904, No. if, HHStA, PA xiv/1i6, Albanien x11/1-7. 16 Albania, vul (1903), 157-157; Shqiptart, 8 June 1903.

322 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION ant of Skenderbeg.'7 Another opponent of Aladro was the Italo-Albanian patriot and poet, Giuseppe Schird. Aladro wrote to him that his efforts were directed toward uniting all the Albanians, wherever they were, and that he had been for some time in Corfu in order to make preparations for a revolution in Albania. He added that he would be the first to march into Albanian territory, when the moment arrived, with the Albanian flag in his hand, and shed his blood for the fatherland. Although Schird belonged to the Italo-Albanian

party that favored a revolution in Albania, he was reluctant to accept Aladro as its leader. In his answer, he contested Aladro’s descent from Skenderbeg. He stressed that the ItaloAlbanians knew that the descendant of Skenderbeg, in direct line, was the nobleman D. Giovanni Kastriota, marquess of Auletta, who lived in Naples and whom they honored as “the most pure seed of the Lion of Albania.” They did not care to know or to examine if “in the veins of Prince Aladro run, at least, some drops of Skenderbeg’s blood.” 18 Lorecchio’s sup-

port of Aladro was due in part to his opposition to the marquess of Auletta.!® Schird was backed by Manlio Bennici, one of the principal organizers of the Albanian Congress of Naples

(1901). On behalf of the National Albanian Committee in Italy, he requested the various Albanian committees abroad to express their decision on the candidature of Aladro and make it known by March 24, 1902, when the Congress of Naples was expected to convene, in order to deliberate on that question.”° The Catholic clergy of northern Albania were not in favor of Aladro either.?} See Albania, Iv (1904), 160-163. The second prince mentioned in the

article was a certain Stiépan Annibal, Venetian monk, who in 1880 pretended to be a prince of Albania and a Kastriota and who, according to Apollinaire, ended in the prison of Amsterdam. [bid., pp. 144-148. 8G. Schiro, op.cit., pp. 342-343. *Alric to Delcassé, Scutari, 3 March 1902, No. 154, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1902-1903, Vol. Iv. *°Passeti to Goluchowski, Rome, 27 March 1902, No. 24E and in-

cluded circular, HHStA, PA xiv/12, Albanien viit/1. | **Leoni to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 16 June 1903, No. 310/150, and enclosed report on Aladro, in ASMAE.

PRETENDERS TO AN IMAGINARY THRONE 323

In order to attain his aim, Aladro could not restrict himself to activity among the Albanians. He got in touch with revolutionary leaders of other nationalities, like the Macedonian B. Sarafoff and the Italian Ricciotti Garibaldi. As a consequence, he aroused suspicions among the Turkish authorities, who took precautionary military measures when it was rumored insistently in 1902 that he was preparing an armed coup against Vloré from Corfu. While the European chanceries did not take Aladro’s movements seriously, the Turkish authorities, which persecuted his followers in Albania, attached exaggerated significance to them.?? On July 8, 1902, Aladro made another attempt. He went to Vienna, where he had a conversation with Count Liitzow, one of the section chiefs of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry. He told the Austrian official that he was being wooed by the Italians but that he was aware that they merely wanted

him “to pick the chestnuts out of the fire” for Italy. They wanted to use him as an instrument to bring about an incident between the Porte and Italy so that Italy could have a pretext for a foothold in ‘Tripoli, for which purpose preparations had already been made. He further declared to Count Lutzow that the reason for his visit was to place himself and _ Albania unconditionally at the disposal of the Austrian Em-

peror and ask for instructions. But he did not succeed in

having an audience with the Emperor.”° |

As a pretender to the throne, Aladro became at times very revolutionary. ‘(he appearance of the Albanian bands must have emboldened him. He had means at his disposal and, as an Austrian consular representative put it, “perhaps age induced him to hurry.” #4 Following the triumph of the Young

Turk Revolution, he issued a statement that the Turkish constitution more or less improved the situation in ‘Turkey, | but that the Albanians could not be satisfied with the kind of 22Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 25. *2Aufzeichnung by Graf Liitzow, 8 July 1902, HHStA, PA xiv/12, Albanien vui1/1. 24Kral to Goluchowski, Scutari, 5 July 1906, No. 48, Geheim, HHStA,

PA xiv/14, Albanien x1/2.

324 Il. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION freedom it conferred. He called for independence, and outlined a program to be followed by the newly-founded Albanian clubs and societies: (1) The national idea should be furthered among Christians and Moslems alike; (2) Schools, printing houses, newspapers, etc., should be founded in the Albanian language; (3) The Albanians should not serve in the army beyond the frontiers of the country; (4) The Albanians should acquire the recognition of their nationality, like the other Balkan nations; (5) An assembly of Albanian dele-

gates should be formed.” |

The marquess whom Schird supported, D. Giovanni Kastriota Skenderbeg d’Auletta, ‘“‘this great lord, noble, and illustrious,” had sure titles of nobility. The King of Italy on April 4, 1897, after a study by the Council of Heraldry, de-

creed that he could use the name and the coat of arms of

George Kastrioti Skenderbeg.?® He had supporters among the |

Italo-Albanians, but not in Albania, where Aladro could boast of a stronger position.2” He was considered a serious candidate,?® but seemingly he was not capable of leading a movement. When in the various congresses of the Italo-Albanians the question of an autonomous Albania and of a ruler (luogotenente) was discussed, political opinion wavered between an Albanian feudal lord and a prince from the house of

Savoy, but the name of the marquess d’Auletta was not mentioned.?®

The other active pretender to the imaginary Albanian throne was Prince Albert Ghika from Rumania. He was a descendant of a princely Rumanian family of Albanian ortgin. Its founder was George I Ghika, Prince of Moldavia (1658-1659) and Wallachia (1659-1660), who was called, according to Prince Albert Ghika, “the Albanian.” ‘The pre2>The declaration is included in ‘Tahy to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 26 October 1908, No. 66, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6. 6 Albania, XII (1909), 6-7. 27Cf. Drita, 7-20 November 1902. *®Alric to Delcassé, Scutari, 30 April 1902, No. 173, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1902-1903, Vol. Iv.

20“Mémoire uber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 12.

| PRETENDERS TO AN IMAGINARY THRONE 325 tender was the great grandson of Prince Gregory III Ghika of Moldavia and Wallachia, who was assassinated in 174747 in

Jassy.2°

Prince Ghika writes that in November 1902 a committee was formed in Paris, composed of Dervish Hima, an Albanian patriot from Strugé, and Captain Dimitri Papazoglou, a Vlakh from Monastir. It offered him the presidency, though he was then only in his mid-thirties. As the aim of the committee was

the special study of the Albanian question, it got in touch with Albanian notables, irrespective of religion, who had been exiled in Europe, America, and Egypt.*! The committee

_ seems to have been Albanian-Vlakh rather than strictly Albanian. The interests of the two peoples, the Albanians and the Vlakhs, were closely related at this time, as explained in the previous chapter, and Prince Ghika attempted to make

use of the situation for his own personal ends, although he always gave prominence to the Albanian question. The political program of the Paris committee, which at the outset pursued a peaceful course, was inaugurated, according to Prince Ghika, by his lecture, “La vérité sur la question d’ Orient,’ which he delivered on February 3, 1904, at the hall

of the Société de Géographie in Paris. In this paper he ex- | pressed views favorable to the relations of the Porte with |

Albania.” |

Prince Ghika’s lecture in Paris had pleased the Turkish

government, and Ferid Pasha, an Albanian who was then the Turkish Grand Vizier, promised to entrust him with an important command in the Macedonian gendarmerie. During his visit in Istanbul, the Prince writes, he became aware that Turkey had great interest in suppressing Albanian national feeling, and was endeavoring to do this by all sorts of promises. He communicated his impressions to the Paris Commit| 30Prince A. Ghica, L’Albanie et la Question d’Orient, Paris, 1908, pp. 1, 225; Pallavicini to Goluchowski, Bucharest, 21 March 1905, No. 10D, HHStA, PA xiv/13, Albanien vitt/2. 31Prince A. Ghica, op.cit., pp. 223-224.

82[bid., see notes on Ghica, HHStA, PA xiv/13, Albanien vit1/2.

326 ' IL NATIONAL AFFIRMATION tee and decided to return to France. In February 1904, the Turkish embassy in London issued a declaration that Prince Albert Ghika had no right to the pretended throne of Albania. He immediately reacted by publishing in the British press that he had no pretentions to the throne of Albania but that he had been elected supreme chief for the independence of Albania and that he would do everything possible to deliver that country from the Turkish yoke.*? If Prince Ghika’s

claims were based on the authority of the Paris committee —as it appears—he had certainly exaggerated its powers and had arrogated to himself non-existent rights.

Yet the young prince continued to make these claims. In November 1904 the Neue Freie Presse of Vienna published the summary of a letter he had sent to it. He maintained that he had been nominated the highest chief of the movement for Albanian independence and had accepted it. He would pursue a peaceful program, but with the motto “Albania for the Albanians,” and the Albanian people would be prepared to defend their independence against any attempt at annexation. Once free, this people would offer the crown to the most worthy person. As for himself, he would be the first to bow to the person who would be elected by the nation.*# | Toward the end of 1904 Prince Ghika was in London with his third wife, a rich Irish lady. He told Dervish Hima that she was doing “miracles” there and that the English press was at her disposal. Allegedly there were many articles which spoke about Albanian independence.*® When Prince Ghika was in London, he tried to interest the headquarters of the Balkan Committee there in his plans and obtain financial assistance.°° 83Prince A. Ghica, op.cit., pp. 224-226; the dates between the Prince’s

lecture in Paris, his visit to Istanbul, and the declarations to the press are so close together as to be confusing. Apparently the last date is an error.

34Carlottio to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 7 November 1904, No. 1730/836, ASMAE.

S>Letter of Ghika to Dervish Hima, London, December 1904, found in HHStA, PA xiv/13, Albanien vut/2. “Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905), p. 26.

PRETENDERS TO AN IMAGINARY THRONE 327

On February 4, 1905, Il Giornale d’Italia published an interview with Prince Ghika. It was at a time when people in Europe believed that something grave was about to happen in the Balkans. The newspapers were full of articles on European Turkey, the governments were jittery, and the revolutionary committees very active. In his interview, the pretender declared that the real enemies of Albania were neither Bulgaria, nor Serbia, nor Montenegro, but Austria. “Our misfortunes,” he said in order to please the Italians, “would stem from Austria, if she were not afraid of Russia and Italy.” - Revealing his megalomania, he emphasized that he was the supreme head of the Albanian movement for independence and that he intended revolution in Albania and total war for liberty. He boasted of the existence of a powerful internal and external organization—another fantasy, no doubt. Prince Ghika stated that he himself would command the revolutionaries, who would be reinforced by more than 12,000 European volunteers. ‘The Vlakhs, he said, would make common cause with the Albanians.?" It is understandable that after such an interview the Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Fusinato, told the Austrian representative in Rome: “Je crots qu'il est un peu fou; nous Vavons fait surveiller pour faire plaisir a VAmbassadeur de Turquie mais ce n’étatt pas vratment la peine.” 88 In Vienna the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was equally unfavorable. Kral told his French colleague in Shkodér that they thought of him as a “vulgar adventurer.” ®° In Rome, Prince Ghika failed to find support for his plans. Nevertheless, he adopted General Ricciotti Garibaldi’s revolutionary program.‘ The young pretender was very energetic. In April 1905, he visited Montenegro, together with his wife and Gasper 37Ta Grande Albania—Intervista col principe Alberto Ghica,” I

Giornale d’Italia, Rome, 4 February 1905.

s8Liitzow to Goluchowski, Rome, 7 February 1905, No. 9G, HHSt4,

PA xiv/13, Albanien vii/2. a

s°Alric to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 23 May 1905, No. 322, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1904-1905, Vol. v. *“Mémoire tiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 26.

328 II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION Jakova Merturi—the unfrocked Catholic priest who was the editor of the Herald of Albania in Rome. He was very well received by Prince Nicholas. He went to Podgoricé (Titograd), where chiefs of the Albanian tribes paid him a visit. It was then rumored that Prince Nicholas offered to permit

the passage of arms through his country to northern AIbania.*1

Arriving in Bucharest the same month Prince Ghika presided over a meeting of Albanians, attended also by some Vlakhs. First Gasper Jakova Merturi spoke in Albanian and then the prince in Rumanian. As presented in Prince Ghika’s book, the resolutions of the assembly, which were taken on April 23, stated that no other meeting held in Europe would have the right to call itself the Albanian National Congress, because even if it were composed of delegates of Albanian nationality, it could never represent as large a number of votes as that of Bucharest, which allegedly amounted to two thousand. Obviously this was a step to acquire the monopoly of the movement by invalidating all other Albanian gatherings, particularly those of his opponent Aladro. ‘The Congress

also resolved that its sole political program was “the independence of Albania, consisting of the provinces of Shkodér,

Uskiib, Salonica, Monastir, and Janina,” and that anyone working against it would be considered ‘a traitor of the fatherland.” It voted “unanimously to take up arms against Turkey or any other invader of Albania,” appointing ‘‘Prince Albert Ghika chief of the insurrection with dictatorial powers.”’ In the resolution of the Congress declaring that no one had the right to be called pretender to the throne of Albania, the target was undoubtedly Aladro, who held such aspirations, and the proposal must have been made by Prince Ghika.#

There are serious discrepancies between the resolutions as presented by Prince Ghika and those in the reports of **Kuhn to Goluchowski, Cetinje, 20 April 1905, No. 24 A-B/J.B., and Notiz dispatched to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary to its diplomatic representatives abroad, April 1905, HHStA, PA x1v/13,

Albanien vu/2.

**See text of resolutions in Prince A. Ghica, op.cit., pp. 227-229, and

J. Larmeroux, who has reproduced it, op.cit., 11, 393-395. i |

PRETENDERS TO AN IMAGINARY THRONE 329

Austrian representatives and other publications of the time. In the Austrian reports from Bucharest an important resolution is the constitution of a Central Committee, called Kombi (Nation), to be chosen by 15 delegates elected by the Congress. These 15 delegates were also empowered to decide on other weighty matters. In the Prince’s text there is no men-

tion at all of the 15 delegates; it is merely stated that the Congress decided on the formation of the Central Committee (art. 2). ‘he Austrian reports refer to a resolution on the publication of an official organ of the Albanian movement, while Prince Ghika’s text is completely silent about it. On the controversial issue of dictatorial powers, in the Prince’s text dictatorial powers are attributed to the president—Ghika— in the execution of the resolutions, whereas the Austrian reports do not even imply such powers. ‘The divergences are greater if one compares the resolutions in the Prince Ghika’s book with those published by the chancery of the Central Committee Kombi in the Herald of Albania.* The date of the resolutions is puzzling. In Prince Ghika’s book it is April 23, 1904, which confuses the events preceding and following _ this date. On the basis of the Austrian reports and other publications, the date would be April 23, 1905, which is consistent with all the events.* Only a few months after the Bucharest Congress its Central Committee declared that it excluded Prince Ghika as a member, depriving him of all official capacity. It stated that the Prince was incapable and did not abide by the commitments he had accepted at the Congress in the presence of the Central Committee.* Shortly after this declaration, Prince “See text in Alric to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 23 May | 1905, No. 322, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 19041905, Vol. v. *4See ibid.; Callenberg to Goluchowski, Bucharest, 27 April 1905, No.

17, HHStA, PA xiv/i3, Albanien vui/2; Universul, Bucharest, 12-25 April, 1905. 45See text of the announcement of the Central Committee, which was

published in Laimtari 1 Schypénies (Herald of Albania), Rome, 1-14 August 1905; also copy following Callenberg to Goluchowski, Bucharest, 27 April 1905, No. »7, HHStA, PA xtv/13, Albanien vu1/2.

330 Il, NATIONAL AFFIRMATION _ Ghika wrote a letter to Ismail Kemal, complaining about the Albanians and the Albanian movement. He was disappointed _ that all his efforts, sacrifices, and expenses “for our poor Albania” ran the risk of being wasted because of the many traitors in Europe who thought only of their purse. He would

~ no longer allow himself to be maltreated by the Albanian press, be robbed by so-called patriots, “and remain chief of an insurrection which cannot take place . . . since, alone, I can do nothing, and ... I cannot create a sentiment of liberation which appears to be paralyzed.’’ He found comforting the news from his agents in northern Albania, who had in-

formed him that they were ready for the revolution but needed ammunition; and believed that Italy would be willing

to help them. But Prince Ghika was bitter against the Albanian colonies in Rumania, which did not respond to his appeal for financial aid.* Although in his letter to Ismail Kemal the Prince expressed

his intention to resign from the Albanian movement, he never gave up as the pretender. Early in 1909, he made an appeal, as president of Kombi, calling for the autonomy of Albania.** In 1911 he reappeared on the political scene with a declaration addressed to the representatives of foreign powers in Albania and abroad, in which he spoke about the Albanian revolution. At the same time he published a draft for the constitution of an autonomous Albania. ‘That the Prince had not yet buried his hopes for the throne is evidenced by article 2 of the constitution draft, proposing that the Governor General of an autonomous Albania should be either an Albanian or a person of “Albanian origin,” as he considered. himself.*®

46A copy of Prince Albert Ghika’s letter to Ismail Kemal from Chateau de Tatomiresci (Rumania), 20 August 1905, is found as Beilage in Kral to Goluchowski, 2 September 1905, No. 73, HHStA, PA xiv/13,

Albanien vit1/2.

“Tirta, Salonica, 14 March 1909. 48Kraus to Aehrenthal, Valona, 12 August 1911, No. 58, and as Beilage the declaration and “Révendications Albanaises,’” HHStA, PA xiv/13,

Albanien vii/2. |

_ PRETENDERS TO AN IMAGINARY THRONE 331

Prince Ghika naturally contested Aladro’s right to regard himself an Albanian or even a distant descendant of Skenderbeg, since Aladro was his rival for the throne and received

more attention than he. When in 19047 the Albanian societies in Bucharest merged into Bashkimi, Prince Ghika

was unfavorably regarded while Aladro seemed to be influential.*®

Added to their own shortcomings, what these pretenders lacked most was the backing of a great power. Albanian pa_ triots ridiculed both pretenders. The poet Gjergj Fishta, taking as an example two comical figures from among the people of Shkodér, the antagonists Jaha Begu and Palok Cuca, poked fun in his Anxat e Parnasit (Wasps of Parnassus) at the fantastic aspiration of Aladro Kastriota and Prince Ghika and at the false patriotism of their adherents who, in order to pay their debts, needed a whole company of adventurous knights. Midhat Frashéri, editor of the newspaper Lirija (Freedom) of Salonica, mentioning Prince Ghika’s appeal in 1909, re-

ferred to him as ‘“‘a certain Albert Ghika, Vlakh from Ru- | mania,’ who called himself president of Kombi. Frashéri noted that the Albanian Club of Salonica—he was then its president—had issued at the time an official statement that people like Prince Ghika and Aladro Kastriota had no relationship with the Albanians, that they were foreigners and not known in Albania.®° A candidate regarded seriously not for the throne but for the Governship General of an eventually autonomous Albania

was Ismail Kemal. His 1900 flight from Turkey rightly disturbed Sultan Hamid’s palace. Although it seems that he himself never openly expressed his aspiration to such a position in an autonomous Albania, the Austro-Hungarian government did not doubt his intention of playing an important . role in his narrower fatherland. In 1903 Ismail wrote a letter to Mer. Doci, soliciting his collaboration in an autonomous *#Schénburg to Aehrenthal, Bucharest, 18 April 1907, No. 19G, HHStA, PA xtv/14, Albanien x1/3.

— °F iria, 14 March 1909. 7

332 ‘IL NATIONAL AFFIRMATION administrative movement.®! His chances for Governor General in an autonomous Albania were great, for the Albanian people had confidence in him and the patriots respected him. At the beginning of his exile, he had no difficulty attracting most of the Albanian societies abroad. The disillusionment came when he began to advocate a Greco-Albanian fraternization and, later, to favor Italian policy. Although he strove to justify a rapprochement between the Albanians and Greece and Italy as a defense against the annexational views of Austria-Hungary, his compatriots began to question whether such | a line was not due to the financial liberality of Athens, and perhaps of Rome, which made possible a more comfortable and prominent life for him. After that his popularity among the Albanians, both inside and outside the country, began to wane.®? But Ismail Kemal had broader interests than AIbania. He was an opponent of Sultan Hamid’s regime and wanted to bring about a change in Turkey. Had he devoted his efforts exclusively to the Albanian question and followed

a different policy, he would certainly have been the ideal leader for the movement. One could not be a pretender to the Albanian throne with-

out at the same time thinking of the union of the Albanian people. Whoever the candidate was, he stressed the common link of nationality—and religion receded. ‘This whole move-

ment of candidates for a future throne or the Governorship General of Albania thus had a beneficial effect on national awakening. The very fact that an Aladro Kastriota or a Prince Ghika appeared on the political scene stirred the national imagination. Although the pretenders were furthering their personal interest, their activity was closely linked to an independent or autonomous Albania. The reaction of the Albanian people to their nationalist propaganda, whether sound or unsound, aroused their national sentiment. *1Tppen to Calice, Scutari, 27 July 1903, No. 59, HHStA, PA xiv/8, Albanien v/3-5. °2“Memoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905),” p. 24.

PART IIL

Toward Independence (1908-1912)

BLANK PAGE

XIV Collaboration Between Albanians and Young Turks IN THE various phases of the Young Turk movement, the roots of which go back to the mid-1860’s,! the Albanians played a significant role. ‘They took part in a dual capacity, as Moslem members of the Turkish empire and as members of the Albanian nationality. This dualism should be kept in mind in order to understand the contradictions which developed in the relations between the Albanians and the Young Turks in the course of the movement and in their final conflict.

The first to organize an opposition group, with the express purpose of overthrowing the despotic rule of Sultan Abdul

Hamid II (1876-1909), was an Albanian from Ohrid (or nearby Strugé) named Ibrahim Temo, or Edhem,? as he was sometimes called. He formed this group in 1889 together with other students of the Imperial Medical School in Istanbul, taking as a model the society of the Italian Carbonari, with which he had become acquainted during a visit in Italy on his way to Albania. Among Temo’s first recruits was another Albanian, Nexhib Draga from Kosovo, who later played an

important role in the Albanian national movement. The society which ‘Temo founded was apparently called Progress and Union and not Union and Progress (Ittthat ve Terakk1),

the name of the committee of the Young Turks that was to become so well known later.®

In 1895 ‘Temo’s group was uncovered by the Turkish authorities and members of it were arrested and exiled. He left Turkey and went to Rumania, where he organized a branch 1Cf. E. E. Ramsaur, Jr., The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution

of 1908, Princeton, 1957, pp. 2-4. |

2Temo is the Albanian equivalent of Edhem or Et-hem. sE. E. Ramsaur, Jr., op.cit., pp. 14-17; see also B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, London, New York, Toronto, 1961, p. 193.

336 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE _ of the society and published a Young ‘Turk paper.* However, Temo did not forget that he was also an Albanian. Besides spreading the Young Turk ideas among the Moslems of Dobrudja, he took an active part in the national Albanian move- ment in Rumania. He was one of the organizers of the Albanian society Bashkimi (Union) in Constantza and became its first vice-president; ° later he took a prominent part, under the name of Dr. ‘Temo, in congresses held in Bucharest.®

When in February 1902 the Young Turks, who were in exile in various parts of Europe, met in Paris in the first Congress of Ottoman Liberals, several Albanians participated in it—Temo, Hodja Kadria, Jashar Erebara—the most outstanding being Ismail Kemal. He sided with the majority of the Congress, headed by Prince Sabaheddin, which agreed upon an appeal to be addressed to the powers demanding a regime in accordance with the principles of the 1876 Constitution, which guaranteed to all the ethnic elements of ‘Turkey justice, liberty, and national rights.” A split then came about on the question of foreign intervention. ‘The group led by the philosopher Ahmed Riza, which insisted on the organization of a central and centralizing power, strenuously opposed the

policy of foreign intervention. Thus two principal trends among the Young Turks began to take shape, one favoring Turkish nationalism and the other Ottoman liberalism.® Ismail Kemal was a Moslem and an Albanian. As a Moslem member of the Ottoman empire, he stood for its preservation, *E. E. Ramsaur, Jr., op.cit., pp. 26 and 49, note 89. His information

on Dr. Ibrahim Temo is drawn from the latter’s book, Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyetinin Tesekkiilti ve Hidematt Vataniye ve Inkildbt Miltye Dair Hatiratem (The Formation of the Society of Union and Progress and My Memories Respecting Services to the Fatherland and the National Revolution), Medjidia (Rumania), 1939. See also B. Lewis, op.ctt., p. 194. *Lirija (Freedom), Salonica, 31 January 1909. *See declaration of the Central Committee Kombi (Nation), included in Alric to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 23 May 1905, No. 322, AMAE, ‘Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1904-1905, Vol. v. ‘The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, pp. 306-308. See also E. E. Ramsaur, Jr., op.cit., p. 74 and note 47. °B. Lewis, op.cit., pp. 198-199; E. E. Ramsaur, Jr., op.cit., pp. 68-70.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK COLLABORATION 337

but as an Albanian, he at the same time supported a decentralized government, which would make possible an autonomous Albania. In the group of Ahmed Riza he saw not only a tendency for a centralized government, but also an urge for predominance of the Turkish element in the empire.® It was thus natural for him to join Prince Sabaheddin’s group. ‘The greater the liberties insured to the Christian minorities in the Turkish empire, the more the chances for the non-Turkish Albanians to win rights as an ethnic group. At this time also Ismail Kemal’s political activity oscillated between the overthrow of the regime of Sultan Abdul Hamid II ?° and the national Albanian movement, which was gradually gaining ground.

In this period Ibrahim Temo was quite busy with the Young Turk circles in exile. It is interesting to note that his views were becoming more liberal. Apparently this was due to his being a non-Turk. When, upon his suggestion, Ahmed Riza organized weekly meetings of a group of Young ‘Turks —a sort of seminar—in order to present papers on the reforms for which they were all striving, ‘temo read a paper on education. He recommended that the state support re| ligious instruction for the minorities. He further pointed out that the Arabic alphabet—which later gave rise to a bitter struggle in Albania—was not suitable for the Turkish language and suggested the adoption of a modified Latin alphabet.11 Ahmed Riza and his associates received his recommendations so coldly that he never voiced them again; because ®Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, p. 308.

10See his Tripolitania project of revolution, tbid., pp. 308-315, and FE. E. Ramsaur, Jr., op.cit., pp. 76-79.

11T¢ is of interest to note that Husein Cahid, a prominent Young Turk, expressed some years later, in 1910, the same opinion in another fashion. Writing in his newspaper, Yent Tanin (New Echo), about the Albanian alphabet question, he said that he preferred the Latin alphabet because it would be easier and would permit an Albanian shepherd to

learn how to read and write in a week whereas one hundred weeks would not be sufficient for a Turkish peasant to learn how to read and write in the Arabic script; Boppe to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Péra, 1 February 1910, No. 39, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1910, Vol. vu1t.

338 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE of his support of the Latin alphabet, he was nicknamed “Latinist.”” ITemo remarked that all his efforts to convince Ahmed Riza that he would never be able to make the minor1ties feel a sense of loyalty to the Ottoman nation, if he were not prepared to make certain concessions, were in vain.?? In 1906 the Young ‘Turk movement began to re-establish itself within the ‘Turkish empire. Salonica became its main center. A secret society was formed there, to be known later as the Committee of Union and Progress. Although subsequently linked to other Young Turk groups, this society was, at the outset, not an offshoot of any of the organizations of

the exiled Young Turks of Europe or a direct heir to any earlier Young Turk group within the Turkish state.* Many Albanians belonged to this society. Its program called for constitutional guarantees and convocation of a parliament where all the races of the empire would be represented, with-

out distinction of religion or nationality—a program with great appeal for the Albanians.1* Monastir soon became another important center of the Committee of Union and Progress, and branches quickly sprang up in the neighboring towns

of Albania. In the south, committees were constituted in Resna, Ohrid, Strugé, Gjirokastér; in the north, in Shkodér, Uskiib, Ferizovic, Mitrovicé, and Prizren.® In some Albanian towns the Young Turks established close connections with national Albanians, as in Gjirokastér, where members of the Young Turk committee were at the same time members of the Albanian local committee. In Dibér the Albanian national committee united in 1907 with the committee of the Young Turks, and the two acted in agreement with each other.1¢ ‘The Young Turks found backers also in the Albanian Bek“Cf. E. E. Ramsaur, Jr., op.cit., p. 92 and note g3.

*Tbid., pp. 93-94; B. Lewis, op.cit., p. 201. | |

*4L. Skendo, “Indipendenca morale” (Moral Independence), Leka,

Shkodér, 1x (1937), 504; J. Larmeroux, La politique extérieure de Vv Autriche-Hongrie, 1875-1914, Paris, 1918, U, 33.

E. E. Ramsaur, Jr., op.cit., p. 114; I. G. Senkevich, Osvobditel’noe dvizhenie albanskogo naroda v 1905-1912 gg., Moscow, 1959, p. 92.

Ibid.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK COLLABORATION 339

tashis, but not, of course, for the reason attributed to the Turkish Bektashis—because they ‘‘were the most Turkish in ©

spirit of all the dervish orders.” 17 On the contrary, the Albanian Bektashis were the most Albanian in spirit. They had been influenced by the writings of Naim Frashéri, the poet of Albanian nationalism, himself a Bektashi, who even tried to Albanianize the hierarchical terms of the order.1® They followed in his footsteps and took active part in the Albanian national movement, suffering persecution by the Hamidian authorities. Another reason seems to have been inherent in their order: they were a branch of Shia Islam. The Bektashis tended toward the Imanate and were not disposed favorably toward the claim of the Ottoman sultans to the Caliphate. It may be then that Abdul Hamid’s attempt to revive the importance of the Caliphate was resented and provoked their oppoistion.!® But the Albanian Bektashis were attracted mainly to the Young Turks because of their liberal doctrine, and they considered the avowed program of the Young Turks as furthering Albanian national development. Moreover, the fact that some of the prominent leaders of the Young Turks, like ‘Talat Pasha and Ahmed Riza (Tevfik), were Bektashis ° might have played a role. If it is true at the same time that the Bektashis “aimed at an ultimate religious supremacy in the countries touched by their propaganda,” and hoped at the time of the 1908 Revolution to establish a Bektashi state in Albania, there was ample justification for a close collabora-

tion between them and the Young Turks.?! By the spring of 1908 the Young Turk propaganda had made great progress in the army, especially among the officers,

a considerable number of whom in Macedonia were Albanians.?? A wave of mutinies spread from Anatolia to Rumelia, WE. E. Ramsaur, Jr., op.cit., p. 109. 18See Chapter Iv, pp. 123-124.

19See E. E. Ramsaur, Jr., op.cit., p. 112. 0Tbid., p. 113 and note 48. 41K, W. Hasluck, Christianity and Islam under the Sultans, Oxford,

1929, 1, 438 and note 4.

221. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. g2. | |

340 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE the army desperately demanding the satisfaction of a few basic needs.*? In Europe, after Austria-Hungary withdrew her support of reform projects in Macedonia and extracted from the

Sultan a concession to build a railway through the sandjak of Novi Pazar, Russia and England announced in June 1908 the Reval program of reforms. The Young Turks were now seriously concerned about the growing threat to the Empire. If the Sultan accepted the Reval project, the Macedonian revolutionaries would possess a powerful weapon to further their propaganda; if he refused it, the European powers would intervene in order to carry out its application and thus would humiliate the Ottomans again.** In either case there was danger, for the reforms would lead to an autonomous Macedonia and ultimately to its loss. But an autonomous Macedonia would jeopardize Albanian national unity, for it would incorporate Albanian lands. The Albanians could not, therefore, favor such a solution. ‘They would, on the other hand, find a constitutional regime to their advantage. It was at this juncture that the Young ‘Turks decided upon a coup in order to overthrow the regime. At the end of June 1908 a young oflicer, Enver Bey, a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, disappeared into the hills. The signal,

| however, was given on July 4, 1908 at Resna, when Major Ahmed Niyazi, at the head of a group of soldiers, took to the mountains. He was an Albanian from that very town, which is situated near Monastir, and he was also an important mem-

ber in the councils of the Young Turks.”> Before his departure, he wrote his brother-in-law: “Rather than live basely,

I have preferred to die . . . either death or the salvation of the fatherland.” *° To the Palace and the high authorities in | Istanbul he declared that he was turning the arms against the regime in order to defend liberty and the cause of reforms, in the general interest of both the Moslem and Christian 2B. Lewis, op.cit., pp. 202-203. 4See J. Larmeroux, op.cit., 0, 36. fi, E. Ramsaur, Jr., op.cit., pp. 134-135; B. Lewis, op.cit., p. 203. 26See text of letter in 7bid., p. 204. |

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK COLLABORATION 341

populations.?” Yet there was no general uprising on orders from Salonica. The uprising simply developed spontaneously as the news was diffused from one unit to another. The various Young Turk committees did not regard themselves as being under the orders of Salonica; they made their own decisions. ‘Che influence of Salonica was a moral one. It appears, however, that among these isolated units “‘a complete though half-unconscious cooperation” did exist.?° Ahmed Niyazi began to move immediately in Albanian ter-

ritory. He visited Dibér, Elbasan, Korcé, and Ohrid. The rev-

olutionary methods he used were to expel the Hamidian officials and the tax collectors and create Albanian militia for the preservation of order. From the very beginning the Albanian committee of Korcé decided to lend its support to the revolution. At the request of the Young Turks, it called upon the guerrillas in the mountains around Korcé to unite with the insurgent Turkish companies. Its example was followed by the Albanian committee of Ohrid.?? When on July 293 Cerciz and Grameno, the Albanian guerrilla leaders, met Niyazi at Resna, the latter expressed his gratification that with the declaration of the Young ‘Turk Constitution the Albanian nation would enjoy advantages.*° While most of the Albanians were on their side, the Young Turks still had to come to an understanding with the bulk of the Moslem population of the northeast, the Kosovars, who were not inclined to abandon the Sultan, whom they called baba mbret (father king). One of the Young Turk appeals, written in the beginning of July 1908, seems to have been directed primarily to them. It called upon them to give their besa and unite with the Young ‘Turks, in order to demand 2"7E. V.[lora], Die Wahrheit tiber das Vorgehen der Jungtiirken in Albanien, Vienna and Leipzig, 1911, p. 7; J. Larmeroux, op.cit., 11, 36-37; Col. Lamouche, Quinze ans @histoire balkanique, 1904-1978,

Paris, 1928, p. 69. Cf. E. E. Ramsaur, Jr., op.cit., p. 135.

291. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 93-94. ,

Tirana, 1959, p. 225- |

36M. Grameno, Kryengritja shqiptare (The Albanian Revolution),

342 III. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE | the establishment of the constitution and the opening of the parliament, which would free the people from unbearable taxation and the injustice of the courts. In order to antagonize them against the regime, the appeal denounced the valis as unjust and corrupt and the ministers and pashas as traitors. Austria and Italy were also targets of the document: “In all the mountains they have opened churches and schools. Gradually all our mountains and forests will fall in their hands.” These powers had as their objective the partition of Albania. In order to incite the Kosovars against Europe and the Porte at the same time, the appeal concluded that Europe dom1nated in Macedonia and the Turkish government was inactive.31

_ In the spring of 1908 Austria-Hungary began to survey the terrain for the construction of the railway line. Rumors were propagated that the ‘Turkish government had in mind to sell the lands of the peasants to the Austrian government for that

purpose. ‘The announcement of the Reval agreement increased the tension. In the first days of July, thousands of armed peasants of the regions of Prizren, Gjakové, Prishtné, and Vucitrn assembled at Ferizovi¢c in order to protest. As a

provocation, they even burned a platform which the Austrians had built near that town.? Young Turks tried to bring the Ferizovi¢ gathering under their control. The first to be active in this direction were the young officers of the local Young Turk committee. Then on July 7 the chief of the gendarmerie of Uskiib, Galib Bey, arrived upon orders of the vali, in order to placate the Kosovars and disperse them. But Galib Bey was a member of the Young Turk committee in Uskiib and before his departure he informed the Salonica 31The original text of the document was written in Turkish. It was translated into Albanian and published in the special issue of Leka, Shkodér, x11 (1940), 9-13. Although it bears no date, on the basis of events mentioned in it, one may very well place it in the beginning of July 1908. The contents of this appeal are found also in I. G. Senkevich,

‘“Mladoturetskaya revolutsiya 1908 goda i albanskoe natsional’noe dvizhenie,” Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie, No. 1, 1958, p. 33. 3@Cf. I. G. Senkevich, Osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie albanskogo naroda U 1905-1912 &&., pp. 96-97.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK COLLABORATION 343

committee about his mission. He was instructed by the latter to persuade the Albanians at Ferizovic to back the Young ‘Turks’ constitutional program. As soon as Galib Bey arrived at Ferizovic, instead of attempting to pacify the Kosovars, he dispatched people and telegrams to the various towns of Kosovo with a view to increasing the number of representatives and the size of the demonstration. In the following days the number reached approximately 30,000 armed men. The delegates of the Committee of Union and Progress, present at the assembly, represented the Constitution to the Kosovars as the only means to prevent the execution of the Reval project and put an end to the meddling of Europe in the affairs of the Ottoman empire.*? Taking into account the Sultantreue of the Kosovars, the Young Turks declared further that the Constitution did not oppose the Koran and that Islam consecrated the right of the parliament to restrict the power of the Sultan.*4 Nevertheless, the Young Turks would not have

won the Albanians at Ferizovi¢ to their side had they not promised to satisfy their demands. ‘They committed themselves to respect the old privileges with regard to taxation, which meant the return to the Seriat; they gave assurances that the Albanians would remain in possession of their arms; they promised the opening of Albanian schools; and they accepted the inviolability of the Sultan.* With the acceptance of the Albanian terms, the gathering at Ferizovic turned into a manifestation in favor of the Young Turks and it wired to Sultan Abdul Hamid II calling for the re-establishment of the 1876 constitution, which he himself

had granted and then repealed, and for the opening of the parliament.*® The telegram was a powerful blow: “It produced a greater impression upon him [the Sultan] than the 337bid., pp. 97-98; R. Pinon, “La question albanaise,” Revue des deux

mondes, LIv (1909), 812; J. Lameroux, op.cit., pp. 36-38. , $41. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 98.

$5See official vilayet communiqué of 30 July 1908 in E. b. V. op.cit., | p. 7; also R. Pinon, op.cit., p. 812. 36See text of the telegram in S. Kiilce, Firzovik toplantis: ve mesrutiyet (The Meeting at Ferizovic and the Constitution), Smyrna, 1943, p. 52, and its Russian translation in I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. gg.

344 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE remonstrances of all the Turks or all the diplomatic representatives of Europe.” *7 After two days of hesitation, following a telegram from Seres in Macedonia and the threat of the

march of an army of 100,000 men on Istanbul, the Sultan yielded and on July 24 announced that the constitution was again in force.?® ‘The Young Turk revolution had triumphed.

The Albanians, like the other peoples of the Ottoman empire, were joyous over the proclamation of the constitution. —

, There were demonstrations and meetings to celebrate it. Christians and Moslems fraternized. Only in Shkodér the Moslems received the news coldly. They feared that with the

reforms and the constitution they would lose the privileges which the old regime had accorded them.?? Among the Albanians abroad, too, the proclamation of the constitution was on the whole acclaimed. Faik Konitza, who laid more stress on l’esprit nouveau than on the written constitution, greeted with sincere pleasure the change which promised an era of liberty and progress. If the Young ‘Turks, he wrote, did not have any hidden motives, they would not find more loyal

allies than the Albanian separatists. “But there should not be a misunderstanding: nationalists, we will be more than ever, and an autonomous province is the minimum it is possible for us to accept.” 4° The beginning of the Young Turk regime saw the Albanians very active. Many of the Albanian patriots thought that

with the declaration of the constitution the ideal conditions for the development of the Albanian national movement had been created. On July 23,41 when at the Olympus Square in Salonica the first speech in Albanian was publicly delivered, it was said that “‘now is the day for us also to say freely that we are Albanians. Until today we could not say this, because “Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, p. 365.

*°B. Lewis, op.cit., p. 205. ,

397. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 102 and 104; Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari,

31 December 1908, No. 166, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6. :

404 lbania, XI (1907), 86. |

“In Salonica the proclamation of the constitution was celebrated before it was officially made by the Sultan.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK COLLABORATION 345

our tongue would be cut, we would be thrown into prison. But now we will say it and we will say it knowingly, with joy and hope in our heart.” 4 In the speeches which followed, on various occasions, the Albanians introduced a patriotic content and terminated them with the greeting “long live liberty, long live Albania.” #2 But the Young Turks did not lag behind in their own activities in Albania. They strove to get control of the Albanian movement, making use of the slogan that henceforth in Turkey there would be no Moslems or Christians, or different peoples, but only Ottoman people. They began to create in Albanian towns the so-called Ottoman Committees of Union. These were composed of local Young Turk committees and representatives of the Albanian population. In Vloré, for instance, in the Ottoman Committee of Union there were three Young Turk officers and twelve

Albanian townsmen. As the national composition of these committees was fundamentally Albanian, they did not accomplish the function for which they were destined: to make the

population swear allegiance to the Young Turk committees. They operated more as national organizations. When in Aueust 1908 the Ottoman Committee of Union sent delegations _ to the neighboring villages to ask for the oath of loyalty, the population did not give it to the Young ‘Turk committee,

but to ‘‘the constitution, Albania, and the Albanian language.” #4 In Kosovo, instead of the Ottoman Committees of Union, the Young Turks formed “mixed commissions,” composed of local notables and members of the Young ‘Turk committees, to obtain the besa of the inhabitants, which was not an easy matter.* Under such circumstances true collaboration was 1mpossible. The contradictions began to emerge and each side, particularly the weaker one, tried in one way or another to cover them up. #2 irija, 14-27 July 1908.

48See I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 104; M. E. Durham, High Albania,

London, 1909, pp. 225-228. , #4Cf. I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 103-104. |

*Tbid., p. 107. | !

346 Il. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE _ Immediately after the proclamation of the constitution, Albanian national clubs were created in the principal towns of the country and in some centers of the Ottoman empire where Albanians resided. These were broad organizations composed of elements from all the various layers of the Albanian society and led mainly by intellectuals. In the literature of the period there is often a confusion between a society and a club; the two terms are employed interchangeably. ‘The

- avowed aim of the clubs was the cultural development of the Albanian people. When in September 1908 the club of Salonica was founded in the presence of 400 Albanians, delegates of Tosks and Gegs, and Midhat Frashéri, who was elected president, presented to them the statutes for approval, he stressed that the clubs were not going to have any political goals, but only humanitarian and educational ones.*® But the clubs in fact became the centers of political activity of the patriots. If they disclaimed political activity, it was in order

to avoid eventual persecutions on the part of the Turkish authorities. Thus, at the Congress of Elbasan, in 1909, the Albanian representatives felt obliged to adopt the resolution that “mingling in political affairs of any kind is forbidden to all the clubs and societies.” 47

In the early period of the constitutional regime the press was very active. It was closely connected with the clubs and propagated the ideas of the national movement. It was also the first time that an Albanian press was permitted to appear in Albania proper. Among the significant newspapers of Korcé were Korcga and Lidhja Orthodhokse (Orthodox [Christian]

Union); Tomorrz (the name of a high mountain in central Albania) was published in Elbasan; Bashkimi i Kombit (Union of the Nation) was issued in Monastir, while Bashkimi

(Union) was the newspaper of Shkodér. In Istanbul were | Para to Aehrenthal, Salonica, 7 September 1908, No. 201, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6; Aehrenthal’s circular to consulates on AIbanian territory, Vienna, 26 October 1908, Nos. 2132-2140, HHStA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/6. ‘Art. 1 of Allgemeines Club-und Vereins Reglement, Beilage 1v, Pésfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 0 September 1909, No. 72, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xtv/15, Albanien x1/17.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK COLLABORATION 347

published Besa (Albanian Word of Honor) and later Shqiptari (Albanian), whereas Salonica had the influential Lirija (Freedom) and the journal Diturija (Knowledge). Their names are

symbolic of the nationalist trends of the time. The national movement at home was also supported by the Albanian press

abroad. Cairo was quite active with the publication of Rrufeja (Thunderbolt), the satirical Shkopi (Stick), and later Shkreptima (Lightning). In Sofia the journal Kalendari Kombiar (National Calendar) continued to be issued and a new newspaper, Shqypeja e Shqypénis (Eagle of Albania), made its appearance. Faik Konitza did not discontinue the publication of Albania until 1909; soon after, he came to the United States and took up the editorship of the Boston weekly, Dielli (Sun), which had already appeared, and raised it to the level of an influential political paper. Not all the programs of the clubs were alike; their special features corresponded to the particular needs of the place in which they had been established. One of the tasks of the club of Janina, for instance, was to free the education and church

of the Albanians from the influence of the Greek Patriarchate.*® In Gjirokastér, where apparently there was a close cooperation between the Albanians and the Young ‘Turks, the

first point of the club’s program was “assistance for the strengthening of the constitution of all the Ottomans and, in compliance with the rising need, compatible actions jointly with the Committee of Union and Progress.” #° The program of the club of Uskiib had as its aim the enlightenment of the people through the cultivation of the Albanian language and the founding of schools, as well as the unification of tribal groups under Ottoman supremacy but with local autonomy.” In the first period after the victory of the revolution, the 48Rregullore e shogérisé sé Shqiptarévet né Janiné” (Regulations of

the Albanian Society in Janina), Janina, 1908, p. 7, as cited in I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 113.

49Kanonizma e Klubit té Gjirokastrés “Drita’” (Regulations of the Club of Gjirokastér “The Light’), Gjirokastér, 1908, p. 3, as quoted in ibid., p. 114. SoLukes to Aehrenthal, Uskiib, 19 November 1908, No. 191, Geheim,

HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6.

348 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE Union and Progress Committee did not hamper the activity of the Albanian clubs. It even encouraged the creation of these clubs, hoping through their help to bring the Albanian movement under its influence and control. Numerous Albanian clubs came into being, hand in hand with some other societies, particularly in the southern part of Albania. By November 1908 twelve Albanian clubs were opened and be| came very active: Monastir, Salonica, Janina, Korcé, Elbasan, Gjirokastér, Berat, Vloré, Filat, Starové, Uskub, and Istanbul.5! Some two months later their number reached twenty. In the north the founding of clubs was difficult. The people were backward and fanatic. In Kosovo there were persons who still believed that the constitution was a bid’at (innovation against religious law).5® Only in Uskiib was it possible to create a club. Two capable patriots, Bajo ‘Topulli and Shahin Kolonja, were sent from Salonica, apparently with the knowl-

edge of the Union and Progress Committee, entrusted with that task. ‘They encountered serious obstacles. ‘The city of Uskiib and the western part of the sandjak were for the most part inhabited by Albanians, but the feeling of belonging to Albania was almost non-existent. In Uskiib itself, even the Albanian language had been neglected, for most of the families of pure Albanian blood living there spoke only Turkish. Another hindrance was the powerful party of the hodjas, the members of which regarded themselves first as Moslems and secondly as Albanians. In the founding of the club the influence of Nexhib Draga played an important favorable role. The Albanian patriots intended to make Usktib the center of national propaganda for northeastern Albania. ‘here were not to be any branches of the club, but the club would be in permanent contact with the Albanian club of Salonica and that of Istanbul, which testifies to the interest of the Young Turks in it.54 In Shkodér the attempt to open a club which ivija, 22 November 1908.

| *2Tbid., 14 February 1909. 37bid., 18 October 1908. , 5¢4Lukes to Aehrenthal, Uskiib, 1 September 1908, No. 140, HHStA, PA

| x1v/15, Albanien x1/6; Posfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 23 November

1908, No. 73, vertraulich, in bid.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK COLLABORATION 349

could function resulted in utter failure. In September 1908, a teacher of the Franciscan school, Mati Logoreci, succeeded in opening an Albanian club, The Albanian Language (Gjuha Shqype). But the members of the club were few. It seems that the Catholics, among whom there was a significant national party, out of fear of the Moslems, were hesitant to join it. ~The Moslems, on the other hand, because of their fanaticism were not inclined to tolerate a club which propagandized the Albanian language; they forced its closing in October 1908, and the Moslems who had become members were pardoned for their participation which was considered a treasonable act. The government of the vilayet of Shkodér, under the pressure

of the Moslem clique, announced that the founding of an Albanian club was superfluous, since it had itself decided to open a place for social entertainment, where the papers from

Istanbul could be read. All future attempts on the part of the nationally minded Albanians to reopen the club were

frustrated. |

The anti-national, pro-Turkish and pro-Islamic attitude of the Moslems of Shkodér, in general, time and again proved an obstacle to national development. One explanation for their position may be found in the long Turkish tradition of the city. Shkodér had been for centuries the seat of a vilayet and therefore greatly exposed to Turkish and Islamic influences. Moreover, the Porte, in an effort to attach the Moslems of the sandjak of Shkodér to the Ottoman empire, granted them privileges (the sandjak was miistesna °°) which Moslems in other Albanian regions did not enjoy. Another reason ap-

pears to have been that the Moslems of Shkodér were a minority surrounded by a Catholic majority which was not submissive like the rayah, because it was supported by the See Fillungen to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 21 September 1908, No. 87,

tober 1908. |

Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 10 October 1908, No. 97 and 16 April , 1909, No. 59—all in HHStA, PA xiv/1i5, Albanien x1/6; Lirija, 18 Oc56See A. di San Giuliano, Briefe tiber Albanien, Deutsch von D. Schulz

and W. Wichmann, Leipzig, 1913, p. 47. Miistesna means in Turkish

“exceptional,” “extraordinary.” In A. di San Giuliano’s book it is written incorrectly “mutesna.”

300 _ Ill, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE armed force of the highlanders and later, to a certain extent, by Austria. In Islam they saw a force for cohesion. Under such circumstances, a religious fanaticism was apt to develop, primarily for political and social reasons, and anything weakening the ties with ‘Turkey was bound to be looked upon as a threat. Among the many clubs which came into being after July 1908, three played a crucial role: Monastir, Salonica, and Istanbul. ‘The club of Monastir was founded shortly after the revolution but it began to function on September 14, 1908. It was called Bashkimi (The Union) and had as its president George Kyrias. From the very outset, it was thought that all

the clubs should constitute a union, in which the club of Monastir should occupy the central place,®” but this did not actually occur until the Congress of Monastir was convened, two months after the founding of Bashkimi. In its sessions long discussions took place, because the Young Turk committee wanted the Istanbul club to be the headquarters. ‘The Monastir club was chosen as the central club for two years, and to it the various clubs and societies were to send their monthly reports, which then would be forwarded in a summary to all the clubs and societies. It was decided, however, that only such matters would go directly to the Istanbul club as necessitated an intervention at the Porte.®§ ‘The question of the headquarters was raised again at the Congress of Elbasan, in September 1909. Midhat Frashéri supported for that purpose the club of Salonica, Shogéri e Shqiptarévet (Society

of the Albanians), of which he was the president, but the delegates turned it down because they feared that since it was at the same place as the headquarters of the Union and Progress Committee, it would be strongly under the influence of the Young Turks. It was resolved then that the club of Mona*"Posfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 31 August 1908, No. 54, HHStA, PA xiv/i5, Albanien x1/6. *8Postai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 23 November 1908, No. 73, vertrau-

lich, and 30 November 1908, No. 75, Geheim, HHStA, PA x1v/15, Albanien x1/6.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK COLLABORATION 301

_ $tir remain as the center for another period of two years.® The club of Monastir played a significant role in the develop- |

ment of the national movement in southern and middle

Albania. :

The Albanian patriots had become aware that in order to work among their people, at least for the immediate future, they had to lean on the new regime and enjoy its support. The national cause would have to pursue a more or less common course with the Young Turks. Thus, when the club of Monastir saw that its special national efforts aroused the mistrust of the Young ‘Turk committee, it made changes in its council. It introduced three Albanians who were known for their Young Turk leanings: Lieutenant Selaheddin Bey, District Attorney Maz’har Bey, and Captain Kamber Effend1. As the ‘Turks of Monastir, according to a special arrangement, paid a personal income tax of 2 per cent in favor of the Young Turk committee, out of which one-fourth went for the needs

of the committee and three-fourths for purposes of general use, Selaheddin Bey proposed that the same tax be levied on the Albanians for the benefit of the Bashkimi club, one-fourth

of it to be paid to the Young ‘Turk committee, and threefourths to be spent for the Albanian schools. ‘The poet Gajupi, who visited the Albanian club of Salonica early in 1909, was struck by its conspicuous Young Turk appearance; he was,

however, too quick to condemn it.® He did not take into account the difficulties under which it functioned in the heart

of Young Turkism. As a Christian Orthodox who had considered the Turk as an oppressor, Gajupi could not reconcile a ‘SPdésfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 20 September 1909, No. 72, vertraulich, and Beilage Iv to it, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/7. S°Cf. Pésfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 December 1908, No. 77, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6. 61 Pdésfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 26 December 1908, No. 83, Geheim,

HHStA, PA xiv/i5, Albanien x1/6. 62See “Klub’ 1 Selenikut” (The Club of Salonica), in Gajupi, Vepra

(Works), ed. D. S. Shuteriqi, Tirana, 1957, pp. 328-331. It was first published as an article in the newspaper, Rufeja (Thunderbolt), Egypt, in August 1909, in ibid., p. 328, note 1.

302 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE Turkish regime with an Albanian national movement, or understand the duality of his Moslem compatriots who lived

within the Ottoman empire. | oe

The Albanian patriots on the whole had no confidence in the durability of the new regime: they wanted it to serve, therefore, for the time of its existence, as a means to an end.® But the surveillance of the clubs by the Young ‘Turks and their frequent intervention prevented the Albanians from carrying out their national activity in the open. They therefore resorted to the formation of secret committees. In the beginning, the attempts at creating secret organizations seem to have been independent. ‘There was such an instance in Vloré. ‘Toward the end of August 1908 a sort of a secret union was founded, called ‘The National League for the Promotion of Albanian Schools, and headed by a committee of twelve. It held frequent meetings, in which school questions were discussed and also political matters. It was certain that the real objective of the League was the development of an energetic action for the formation of an autonomous Albania. Its members were simultaneously members of

the Ottoman committee of Union and Progress in Vloré, which had been previously constituted. ‘They had made their oaths on two opposing political programs: (1) on the consoli-

dation of the Ottoman national state of the Young Turks; and (2) on the separatist and autonomous tendencies of the Albanian patriots and the League. The Austrian diplomat who reported this event ** appeared amazed at this contradiction. He forgot that under such circumstances the later allegiance carried more weight. In the course of time the efforts for the creation of secret units, in the shape of secret committees, were better organized and coordinated. The two clubs which were active in the formation of secret @Pésfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 December 1908, No. 77, Geheim, HHAStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6. 6¢Kraus to Aehrenthal, Valona/Berat, 27 August 1908, No. 34, Geheim, HHStA, PA xitv/15, Albanien x1/6.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK COLLABORATION 353

committees were those of Monastir and Istanbul. The secret committee of Monastir was composed of five persons: Redjeb Hodja, who then had become president of the club Bashkimi; Maz’har Bey, district attorney; Fehim Bey Zavalani, former president of the club; George Kyrias, vice-president of Bashkimi; and Lieutenant Nafiz Effendi. Redjeb Hodja was entrusted with the creation of secret committees in various Al-

banian centers. These committees were to work for the srowth of Albanian national consciousness and the union of the Albanian people, and to be ready for any eventuality,

because of the uncertain political life of Turkey. Redjeb Hodja travelled for the same purpose to Ohrid, Dibér, Prizren, Gjakové, Ipek, Phristiné, and Uskiib.® The headquarters of the secret committees must have been Istanbul. From there was dispatched the plan for their organization. On the basis of it, in every greater locality of Albania, five secretly chosen persons would constitute a committee. These five persons would be bound by besa to work for the national Albanian cause, but they would also back the Young Turks for the present, in order not to arouse suspicion and be fought by them. These secret committees would then send trusted Albanian hodjas to the countryside for national propaganda and the founding of branch secret committees, composed again of five members, which would work in the villages. In every place money would be collected for the strengthening of the committees. At the outset, every branch committee would have the right to use the collected amount for its own needs, but later the unknown committee (i.e., Central Committee) would assign the place where the money that had not been spent was to be deposited. When necessary, a commission would be sent by the central committee to check the activity of a branch committee. However, in order not to provoke any 65Pdsfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 December 1908, No. 77, Geheim,

HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6. 66Pdsfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 30 November 1908, No. 75, Geheim,

HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6.

354 III, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE _ suspicion among the Young Turks, it should be done through

them, employing any convenient pretext and care that the activity of the commission be not surmised as control of the branch committee. Any member found guilty of treason would be condemned to death.® Judging by the obstacles met

by the various emissaries entrusted with the formation of secret committees in principal places of Albania, the organization plan could not be well applied. It was important, however, that the thinking of the Albanian leaders be more along lines of centralization and organization. An early group, which the Central Secret Committee of Istanbul sent for the purpose of founding branch committees in Albania, was headed by Hodja Vildan Effendi from Dibér. It arrived at Monastir on the eve of the closing of the Albanian alphabet congress. ‘The

next day Hodja Vildan Effendi delivered a speech to the delegates in which he attacked the old regime, praised the constitution, and stressed the importance of union among the Albanians, Moslems and Christians, in order to defend themselves and the Ottoman Empire better. At Monastir the group was joined by another Albanian patriot, Abdul Bey Ypi from Kolonjé, a lawyer and writer, who had adhered to the Young

Turk movement. When they left for a tour of Albania in order to establish secret committees, their avowed mission was to make propaganda for the support of the constitution.

| In Dibér they were first received coldly, but later they won the confidence of the inhabitants and they managed to found a club. In Elbasan they were successful in bringing together the two parties, that of the beys and that of the people, but in Tirana they could not eliminate their opposition. ‘They were most enthusiastic about Krujé where they found a nationally minded population. Certainly in Krujé the existence of an important Bektashi tekke must have played an influential role. Their disappointment was great in Shkodér, where they were hostilely received. ‘They regarded the Moslems of that city as the most backward and fanatic of all the Albanian religious 67Pdésfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 December 1908, No. 77, Geheim, HAStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6.

_ ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK COLLABORATION 355

groups.®® Ismail Hakki Bey, a native of Monastir, was also entrusted by Istanbul with propagating the Albanian national idea.*® He was one of the most prominent members of the Istanbul Albanian secret committee. Officially he was sent as an emissary of the Young Turks, with the task of winning the backing of the Albanians for the Young Turk committee. He travelled in the vilayet of Kosovo, where Albanian secret committees were formed only in Usktib and Gjakové.” On April 7, 1910, 1t was decided at the congress of Monastir that the headquarters of the Albanian clubs should pass also to

Istanbul, where deputies and notables would serve in the Capacity of consultants.”!

On October 5, 1908, Austria-Hungary announced the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. At the same time Bulgaria, in agreement with the Dual Monarchy, by which she had been encouraged, proclaimed her independence from ‘Turkey. Crete, which had maintained a nominal dependence on ‘Turkey but had enjoyed an autonomy under the control of European powers, began in the fall of 1908 a struggle for union with Greece. All these were serious blows to the regime of

the Young Turks, and weakened its authority among the populations of European ‘Turkey.

Responding to the announcement of the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Committee of Union and Progress appealed to the populations of Turkey to boycott all Austrian 68See Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 31 December 1908, No. 166, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6; Posfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 23 November

1908, No. 73, vertraulich, in ibid; “Report of the Albanian Congress Held in Monastir 1/14 November 1908,” by George D. Kyrias, Monastir, 20 January 1909, in zbid. 6°F[e seems to have been the brother-in-law of Major Ahmed Niyazi

from Resna to whom the latter wrote the letter, when he took to the hills: the name is the same, he is an Albanian from Monastir, and a Young Turk. Cf. B. Lewis, op.cit., p. 204. 7°Pdsfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 December 1908, No. 77, Geheim,

HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6; Lukes to Aehrenthal, Usktib, 29 November 1908, No. 191, Geheim, in ibid.

™Pousselin (?) to Pichon, Monastir, 7 April 1910, No. 36, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1910, Vol. vu.

356 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE goods. It further strove to use the occasion to arouse panIslamic feelings, forgetting the declarations on equality of Christians and Moslems.”?

The reaction in Albania to the appeal of the Young ‘Turks was not everywhere the same. The leadership of the Albanian club in Istanbul supported the Young Turks and turned to the Albanians with a call to unity against the threat of foreign _ invasion.”® Southern Albania was influenced by the attitude of Lirya, organ of the Salonica Albanian club. The clubs organized demonstrations against the annexation of BosniaHercegovina and favored the boycott of Austrian merchandise.“* Ihe reason for the anti-Austrian attitude of the south

was not that the annexation brought the Dual Monarchy nearer to Albania and that its expansionist policy threatened her existence. ‘There were even some Albanian patriots who considered the evacuation of the sandjak of Novi Pazar as a service to the integrity of Albania. The real reasons were different. ‘The Albanians wanted to be in agreement with the Young Turks because at this time they still enjoyed the constitutional rights and freedom for their national development. They feared the consequences of the independence of Bulgaria, which Austria-Hungary had secretly supported and by so doing had indirectly damaged and jeopardized the territorial integrity of Turkey and Albania. The success of Bulgaria had also stimulated expansionist desires in Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece, which naturally were to the detriment

of Albania.” |

The question of Crete touched the southern Albanians more closely. If a part of the Albanian press, for instance Shkopi (Stick) of Egypt, connected the annexation of Bosnia“Cf. I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 117. ®7 bid.

™“Aehrenthal’s circulars to the consulates in Albanian territory, Vienna, 3 December 1908, Nos. 2604-2613, and Budapest, 22 October 1908, Nos. 2075-2083, HHStA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/6. Cf. Kraus to Aehrenthal, Valona, 25 November 1908, No. 77, streng vertraulich, HHStA, PA xitv/15, Albanien x1/6; Renzi to Aehrenthal, Janina, 7 January 1909, No. a, in zbid.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK COLLABORATION 307

Hercegovina with the separation of Crete from Turkey, two

essentially different questions, it was because they were afraid of Greek expansionism: the union with Crete would strengthen Greece and the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina might give her an excuse to seize regions of southern Alba-

nia.“® At the outset, the Young Turks were successful. They | aroused the Albanian opinion against the expansionism of Greece. On February 4, 1909, they organized a meeting at Tepelené, attended by a large number of Albanians from the vilayet of Janina. The principal question discussed was the increase of Greek guerrillas in Epirus and the formation of

Albanian bands to counteract them. Demands of a purely Albanian nature, such as the opening of Albanian schools, were left in the background by the Young Turk representatives.™”

In Shkodér the news about the annexation of Bosnia-Herce-

govina did not produce among the Moslems the reaction which the government circles wished.’® On the part of the Catholics a hostile reaction to Austria-Hungary could not be expected. ‘The Prince of Montenegro, Nicholas, was even

afraid that, if a war broke out on account of the Bosnian crisis, he would be attacked by Albanian guerrillas subsidized

by Vienna. It was not secret that the Austrian consulate in Shkodér was recruiting Catholic mountaineers for that purpose. Austria seems to have promised the Catholic highlanders “ten thousand rifles.”’ ‘here were rumors that, after the victory, Austria-Hungary would return Dulcigno to Albania. The Montenegrin Prince was striving hard to ward off the danger. His capable consul in Shkodér made great efforts to reconcile the Albanian mountaineers with the Montenegrins. He tried to persuade their chiefs that the time of the old hatreds had passed, and he was partly successful. One of the 6Cf. I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 119-120.

“Kraus to Aehrenthal, Valona, 11 February 1909, No. 14, Geheim,

HHStA, PA x1v/15, Albanien x1/6. . Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 10 October 1908, No. 97, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6. M. E. Durham, The Struggle for Scutart, London, 1914, p. 133.

358 IIL TOWARD INDEPENDENCE chiefs went to Cetinje, where the Prince gave him a most flattering welcome.®*°

It was easy for the Young Turks to inspire a powerful antiAustrian movement in the vilayet of Kosovo. The Albanian population there actively supported the boycott of Austrian

goods, despite the fact that almost the whole trade of the vilayet was carried on with Austria. The population of these districts had always been very anti-foreign. It had hoped, however, that the new regime would have been in a position to defend itself from the menace of invasion from outside. The seizure of Bosnia-Hercegovina by, Austria-Hungary revived that danger. The anti-Austrian attitude of the Kosovars cannot then be regarded as beneficial to the Young ‘Turks. The support they lent to the boycott was an opposition to the foreigner not an indication of loyalty to the ‘Turkish government. Faith in the power and authority of the latter had been shaken and the desire for independent action began to grow.®! This awareness disturbed the Committee of Union and Progress, which, in order to prevent it from growing into an antt-

governmental manifestation, organized, through its local branch in Uskiib, a meeting in Ferizovic¢, as if to remind the

Kosovars of the days when they aided the Young Turks to come to power. Representatives of the Union and Progress Committee accused the Sultan and the old regime of responsibility for the loss of Bosnia.®?

Austria-Hungary was concerned about not alienating the

Albanians, for her policy toward their country had not changed. In a circular prepared for the consular services on Albanian territory, Janina and Kosovo included, Aehrenthal stated his post-annexation policy: Austria’s aim would be to preserve all that she had attained until then in Albania. However, since she herself had no intention of taking possession of Albanian territory—and here he stressed that he considered “°R. Pinon, “Le Monténégro et son prince,” Revue des deux mondes, LvI (1 March 1910), 89-90.

1Cf. I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 118.

87 bid.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK COLLABORATION 359

the Sandjak Albanian land—she would not allow other states

to seize territory at the expense of Albania. If a conference were to be held, Austria-Hungary would oppose the partition

of Albanian territory.®* |

When the question of recognition of the Bosnian annexation came up in Istanbul, the Albanian club had misgivings. Ismail Kemal, who at that time was the leader of the Albanian deputies in the Ottoman parliament, did not oppose it. He held it necessary, however, that the Porte stipulate with Austria-Hungary certain guarantees against a possible attack by Serbia and Montenegro on Turkey. The possibility was not excluded, he told Germany’s ambassador to ‘Turkey, that the recognition of the annexation would incite Serbia and Montenegro to a war against Turkey in order to acquire the

territories to which they aspired. He already observed in Belgrade a sudden change in that direction. But Turkey, he added, should not risk getting two and a half million liras in order to spend ten times that sum on a war.** On the day of the declaration of the constitution the Sultan

promulgated a decree ordering the convocation of a parliament. In September 1908 the electoral law was published. According to it, the electors and the candidates for the chamber should present themselves as Ottomans, abandoning their nationality. ‘he parliamentary candidates should also know Turkish. ‘The Young Turks, with a view to winning a majority in the Chamber, had made artificial divisions in the electoral districts.®

The election campaign in Albania was carried on in an atmosphere of tension. ‘The Albanian clubs developed a broad activity in favor of the Albanian national-minded candidates,

even entering into a clash with the Committee of Union and 883A ehrenthal’s circulars, Budapest, 22 October 1908, Nos. 2075-2083,

and Vienna, 3 December 1908, Nos. 2604-2613, HHStd, PA xiv/9, Albanien x1/6.

8¢Marshall an das Auswdrtige Amt, Pera, 19 January 1909, GP, Vol. xxvi, p. 484. A lira is a Turkish pound. 8°T. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 124-125.

360 Ill, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE Progress, which used all means to have its own candidates elected.8° In Elbasan, the population did not support the Young Turk candidate, but expressed itself for its own.®” In Berat, the electors voted for Ismail Kemal, in spite of the bitter campaign against him by the Young Turks and the

paper Lirija.®® |

| The attacks on Ismail Kemal came after his visit to Athens, where he had made declarations to the press that the Greeks

were the natural brothers of the Albanians, and after the warm reception he had in Vloré, when he arrived in September 1908.89 Midhat Frashéri, the editor of Lirzja, which at that time was very much in favor of the Young Turks, wrote an open letter to Ismail Kemal. He expressed strong disapproval of Ismail Kemal’s policy of friendship with Greece and accused him of being an instrument of that power. He

further denounced him for never having cared about the good of Albania, but having only used her for his own ends. For him, Ismail Kemal was neither an Albanian nor a Turk. Yet he could not deny him his stand against the despotism of Abdul Hamid, adding that what he had done had been good only for the past.°° Midhat Frashéri’s open letter produced a widespread reaction, both favorable and unfavorable, obliging Frashéri to write an answer in which he stressed that he opposed the pro-Greek policy of Ismail Kemal.** In November 1908 Ismail Kemal arrived in Istanbul as a

88K. b. V., op.cit., p. 8. , 871. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 125-126. , s8Cf. Kraus to Aehrenthal, Valona, 21 November 1908, No. 74, Beilage,

HHSiA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/6.

Kraus to Aehrenthal, Valona/Berat, 3 September 1908, No. 37, HHStA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/6. Lirija, October 4, 1908. There is a German translation of the letter in Kraus to Aehrenthal, Valona, 2 November 1908, No. 61, Beilage, HHStA,

PA xiv/9, Albanien v/6. ,

“Livia, 2% October 1908, and German translation of it in Kraus to Aehrenthal, Valona, 21 November 1908, No. 74, Beilage, HHStA, PA

xiv/9, Albanien v/6.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK COLLABORATION 361

deputy for Berat. ‘The Young Turks shunned giving his arrival an official character, but the Albanian club of Istanbul welcomed him brilliantly.°2 When the Turkish parliament convened (December 17, 1908), 26 deputies represented the four Albanian vilayets. Some of the outstanding ones, who later played a role in the political life of Albania, in addition to Ismail Kemal, were Shahin Kolonja for Korcé, Nexhib Draga for Usktib, Hasan Prishtina for Prishtiné, Esad Toptani for Durrés, and Mufid Libohova for Gjirakastér.°* But irregularities occurred in the elections. The Catholics of Shkodér protested against the manner in which the elections were carried out in their city. ‘They stated that, on the basis of the right accorded to them by the constitution, they could vote for the candidates of their confidence, irrespective of their being Moslems or Christians. ‘They warned of serious disorders if the votes were not divided

between a Moslem and a Christian.® This protest was corroborated by a memorandum of the Catholic highlanders.%® Another case of disorderly election was that of Hasan Basri Effendi, considered “a ‘Turkish muhacir (refugee),” as deputy of Dibér. ‘There was bitterness in that town. At the request of the Dibrans, the Albanian club of Monastir took the initiative

to protest to the Young Turks against the irregular election and called on the Albanian clubs to write to their deputies Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, p. 321.

For a list of the Albanian deputies, see Leka, 1x (28 November 1937), 363.

There was also an imperial decree (Hatit Humayun) of 1 August 1908, in which it was stated that “every subject belonging to whatever race and religion should enjoy individual liberty and equality of rights and duties.” ‘Text of decree in J. Larmeroux, op.cit., 11, 40-43. *Memoriale della Comunita Cattolica del Sangiaccato di Scutari al Gran Vizir e al Comitato ‘Unione e Progresso” di Salonicco, inviato a mezzo della Curia Arcivescovile di Scutari, Scutari d’Albania, January 1909, in C. Libardi, op.cit., 1, 257-260; see also R. Pinon, ‘La question albanaise,” Revue des deux mondeés, Liv (1909), 815.

®Memoriale alla Porta e alle Potenze, Dalle Montagne di Albania, January 1909, C. Libardi, op.cit., u, 260-261.

362 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE in Istanbul to bring up the question before the Turkish parliament.®7

The two trends which manifested themselves among the Young Turks in exile re-emerged now in Parliament. On the one hand, there were the liberals, favoring a sort of decentralization and some autonomous rights for the religious and national minorities; on the other, the nationalists, standing more and more for central authority and ‘Turkish domina-

tion. To the first group belonged many of the Albanian deputies; they were joined by a number of other deputies, especially Christians. ‘They thus formed the party of the Liberals (Ahrar), under the leadership of Ismail Kemal, which in the parliament was an opposition party.®®

Illuminating from the viewpoint of the thinking of Ahrar is the interview which Ismail Kemal gave to the Pall Mall Gazette of London in January 1909. He declared that the only salvation of ‘Turkey was to grant broad and complete freedom. Turks, Greeks, Slavs, Armenians, Albanians, Arabs and all the other peoples of the Empire should be on a footing of equality. ‘T’o hold that the ‘Turks should occupy the first place

is “humbug.” The Turks in Europe, if brought together, he stressed, were not as numerous as the population of Liverpool, while the whole population of European Turkey was equal to that of London. He asked that the Young Turks come into the open and give up secrets, masks, and meetings in the middle of the night. ‘The army, the navy, the civil administration, he said, should be open to all the nationalities and creeds and the most capable should occupy the best positions.°® At that time, when Mufid Libohova mentioned in the parliament the name Arnauilar (Albanians), the speaker, Ahmed Riza, interrupted him by saying: “There are no Alba**Pésfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 March 1909, No. 10, Geheim, and as Beilage m1, circular of Monastir club, dated 7 March 1908, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6.

**Cf. B. Lewis, op.cit., pp. 209, 374; I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 126-127.

Text translated in Albania, xu (1909), 33-34.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK COLLABORATION 363

nians; there are only Ottomans.” The Albanian deputy retorted: “Yes, sir, there are Albanians.” 1° | The relations between the Albanians and the Young Turks were deteriorating. ‘There were conflicts between them and the Albanian clubs. In Monastir the club Bashkimi was in open hostility to the Young Turks. The main cause was the Albanian alphabet and the Albanian schools.1°! Already as early as August 1908 there was the conviction that, next to the more or less open Committee of Union and Progress, there existed a secret committee for the liquidation of the enemies of the constitutional regime. In March 1909, it was learned from reliable sources that the Monastir committee of the Young Turks had decided on the assassination of three persons, one of them being the Albanian patriot George Kyrias. Atttempts were planned in Korcé against the life of the publicist Dervish Hima, who was propagandizing the national

idea. Previously, in August 1908, Dervish Hima, son of a landowner from Ohrid who had given up his medical studies in Istanbul to work for the Albanian cause, had been imprisoned by the Young Turks in Shkodér because he had delivered speeches on the union of the Albanian people and on the autonomy of the country. The life of Ismail Kemal was not safe. Telegrams from many parts of Albania, from Vloré as well, asked the club of Monastir to wire a joint protest to

Istanbul.} |

On April 12 the Committee of Union and Progress made it known that it had ceased to be a secret association and had become an ordinary political party. ‘he same night an armed and reactionary uprising broke out which took the form of a mutiny by soldiers, most of them Albanians, of the army sta0Tbid., p. 35. 101See next chapter.

102Pésfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 March 1909, No. 10, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6. See also on Dervish Hima, Director of the I. R. Austrian Museum of Commerce to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 30 November 1908, No. 47305, HHStA, PA x1v/10, Albanien v/7-13 and Pdsfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 25 January 1910, No. 5, Geheim, in ibid.; Col. Lamouche, op.cit., p. 97..

364 Ill, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE tioned in Istanbul. A part was played in the uprising by an extremist religious organization, called Mohammedan Union, which explains the demands of the mutineers: ‘““The Sheriat is in danger, we want the Sheriat.” °° In the cabinet that was constituted after the uprising, Ismail Kemal maintained that

| he was offered the position of Minister of the Interior but turned it down because he wanted to remain a “national representative.” He accepted therefore that of the speaker of the

parliament.1 |

The organizers of the rising of April 13 hoped to find support in Albania. In the north, the hodjas endeavored to incite the mountaineers against the Young ‘Turks, who did not want

to respect their privileges, but the mountaineers did not move. Still less successful was their propaganda in the south,

where the influence of the Albanian clubs was great. Although the Albanians fought the chauvinistic policy of the Young Turks, they did not want the return of Abdul Hamid’s

regime, which had been adverse to any national Albanian cultural development. Even the Albanian deputies of Ahrar, which was favored by the counter-revolutionaries as a party of opposition to the Young Turks, did not desire this. The Albanian clubs in general sided with the Committee of Union and Progress. When the Albanian clubs of Salonica wired to

them to be ready to defend the constitution and assist the army, the answers they sent manifested their readiness to do so.1°6 Since Macedonia, too, did not move, the revolt remained restricted to Istanbul. Soon an army—the IIIrd Turkish army of Macedonia— under the command of General Mehmed Shevket Pasha advanced to Istanbul. With him was Ahmed Niyazi of Resna. The military operations were directed by Ali Pasha Kolonja, a southern Albanian. On April 23 the forces from Macedonia occupied the capital, with little resistance on the part of the

1038. Lewis, op.cit., p. 211. , 14The Memoirs of Kemal Ismail Bey, pp. 332-335, 340. 105R, Pinon, “La question albanaise,” p. 815.

167 ivija, 6 April 1909. | :

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK COLLABORATION 365

mutineers. Sultan Abdul Hamid.was deposed and in his place was put Mehmed Reshad, a tool of the Young ‘Turks.1

The failure of the April uprising had its repercussions among the Albanians. The Albanian club of Salonica, which obviously now had assumed the role of the central club, sent a circular to the Albanian clubs of Gjirokastér, Vloré, and Berat that Ismail Kemal—and together with him Mufid Libohova—had fled to Athens, with the intention of fomenting _ troubles in Albania. They were warned not to pay attention to his instigations, which in the view of the Salonica club,

were detrimental to the Albanian nation.°° A split had occurred among the Albanian patriots, but the majority of them were still on the side of the Young Turks. Matters were rather different in the north. ‘The deposition of Sultan Abdul Hamid and especially the execution of Albanians comprised in the counter-revolutionary movement, such as Halil Bey of Krajina, aroused indignation, particularly in Shkodér, a for-

tress of Moslem conservatism.1° |

If the Albanian patriots, on the whole, were still supporting the Young Turk regime, it was because the alternative would have been worse. But the contrast between the policy of cen-

tralization and Ottomanization of the Young Turks and the aspirations of the Albanians for national development and autonomy was becoming daily more apparent. 107Cf. B. Lewis, op.cit., pp. 212-213; A von Rappaport-Arbengau, “Né Shgipni e pér Shqipni” (In Albania and for Albania), Leka, 1x (November 1937), 436. 108 Journal de Salonique, 26 April 1909.

tR. Pinon, op.cit.

XV

The Struggle for a National Alphabet and National Schools

THE wriTING of the Albanian language, which had been banned for centuries, was permitted after the success of the Young Turk revolution. But not progress could be made without Albanian schools and without a uniform alphabet. The two questions—schools and alphabet—were inextricably connected.

The establishment of Albanian schools was a difficult and

intricate problem. Until 1908, the schools in Albania had been organized along religious lines: Moslem, Orthodox, Catholic. If the Albanian patriots were to unite the Albanians and develop their national consciousness, the new schools had

to be non-denominational. But among the Moslems there existed the ‘Turcomans and among the Orthodox the Grecomans, both of whom stood in the way of the new educational system. Another trouble was that books in Albanian were scarce and there were few teachers who could accomplish their task properly, although the Albanian colony of Sofia put money and effort into dispatching a large number of elementary books, especially primers, from the printing house Mbrothésia. ‘The teaching of Albanian became a question of honor and patriotic duty. Still another problem was that of financial help for the upkeep of the schools; the denominational schools were maintained by the religious communities and partly by subsidies from abroad—Greek or Austrian. In addition, there were the difficulties which were apt to arise between the Young Turk administration and the Albanian clubs, whose job was primarily the establishment of Albanian

| education.

Despite these problems, the clubs were able sooner or later

to open Albanian schools in the various towns. In Elbason, hundreds of students were registered when the school opened. 1Histort e Shqipérisé, 1900-1919, p. 22.

NATIONAL ALPHABET AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS 367

Adults were also enrolled for night courses.” In Korcé, where

a tradition in Albanian education existed, the movement acquired greater impetus. ‘The American protestant school for girls, which used Albanian as the language of instruction,

had a full enrollment, while that for boys, which had been closed by the ‘Turkish authorities, had to expand because of the large number of registered students. ‘There were plans for

the erection and maintenance of an Albanian junior high school and a vocational school by funds coming mainly from the Albanians of Rumania.’ In Monastir an elementary school

for boys was created and George Kyrias was appointed a teacher of Albanian in the Turkish senior high school (tdadiye).* In the sandjak of Berat Albanian schools were opened

in August 1908.° Here something unusual happened. The upkeep of schools had been entrusted to the municipalities, but apparently the budget for that purpose, in Berat, had not taken into account the great expenses involved. In order to raise funds it was decided that the monopoly of petroleum be | introduced and that a new tax of 10 paras be levied on every sheep skin exported from there in considerable quantities.® By November 1908, there were fifteen day schools and five night schools functioning in Albania.? The problem of Albania’s schools was solved in part when

a decree was issued by the Turkish Ministry of Education that Albanian be taught in the elementary and junior high "Ibid. 8Pdésfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 30 November 1908, No. 75, Geheim

HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6. 4Tbid., and Posfai to Achrenthal, Monastir, 26 December 1908, No. 83, Geheim, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6. 5See for other schools Lirija, 4 August and 8 September 1908. SLetter of Gjergj Karbumara to Sotir Kolea, Berat, 2-15 August 1908,

in Archive A. Tashko, Tirana, as cited by I. G. Senkevich, Osvoboditel/’noe duizhenie albanskogo naroda v 1905-1912 gg., Moscow, 1959, Pp.

112. There were 40 paras to a Turkish kurus. 7See complete list in the manuscript by George D. Kyrias, “Report of

the Albanian Congress Held in Monastir, 1/14 November 1908,” | Monastir, 20 January 1909, p. 17, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6.

368 Ill, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE schools (rusdiyes) of Albania.® ‘The Moslems of Shkodér, how-

ever, did not want to hear of Albanian and Albanian schools. Their attitude was no different from that toward the founda-

tion of Albanian clubs. They promptly wired to Istanbul that, because they had lived for 500 years “with Turkey,” they did not want to recognize a language other than Turkish (i.e., Albanian) as an official one.® They totally disregarded the ministerial decree permitting the introduction of Albanian in the Turkish schools. Even an effort to introduce it as a subject in the few elementary Turkish schools in Shkodér would have been in vain.!®° The south, on the other hand, tried to make the most of the decree of the Turkish Ministry of Education, and the school movement would have been

more successful had it not been for the opposition of the Greek Orthodox Church. The Greek Church kept the Albanian students in the Greek schools under threat of excom-

munication. Revealing as to the aspirations of the Albanian patriots, particularly the Tosks, in the early period of the constitutional regime, is that part of the program of Shahin Kolonja, deputy for Korcé, relative to Albanian education. This program, intended to be presented to the Turkish parliament, was discussed at a secret meeting of some Albanian delegates to the Congress of Monastir in November 1908. It was proposed that in all elementary and junior high schools the lan-

guage of instruction should be Albanian, Turkish to be learned from the fourth grade on. ‘The schools, as in the past, should be supported by the state. Considering Greek interference dangerous for the education of the Orthodox Albanians,

the program called for the prohibition of subsidies to their 8Lirija, 4 October 1908. °Lirija, 1 November 1908.

| Cf. Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 16 April 1909, No. 59, HHStA, PA xIv/15, Albanien x1/6.

“Cf, P. Luarasi—Jeta dhe Vepra, mbledhur dhe redaktuar nga Skénder Luarasi (P. Luarasi—Life and Work, collected and edited by _ Skénder Luarasi), ‘Tirana, 1958, p. 83; Letter of Kol Kamsi to Nikolla Ivanaj, Vloré, 2-15 August 1908, in State Archives of the People’s Republic of Albania, ‘Tirana, as cited by I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 113.

NATIONAL ALPHABET AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS 369

schools on the part of the Greek government. The schools were to be maintained partly by the income derived from church property and partly by subsidies from the Turkish state, so that they could eventually turn into national Albanian schools. ‘The foundation of an Albanian university was also envisaged. It was proposed that each year in the educational budget of the state five stipends should be reserved for

Albanians to study abroad, in Europe or America, in order to be trained as university professors. ‘To impede foreign meddling—by Austria, Italy, and Greece—in the educational ©

affairs of the country, the program asked that the Catholic and Orthodox priests be paid by the Ottoman state.1* It was a very ambitious program, but this was still a period of enthusiasm, when the Albanian weekly of Salonica was writing: “It is true that we are free to open as many schools as we like

and where we like.” 1% It does not appear that the program was ever presented to the Turkish parliament. Its value lies in its reflection of the thoughts on education of the patriots of

the time.* |

program. |

12Pdsfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 30 November 1908, No. 75, Geheim, HHStA, PA x1v/15, Albanien x1/6, and Beilage, containing the complete

87 iva, 25 October 1908. 147. G. Senkevich, eager perhaps to attack imperialist powers and the Catholic Church, has given only a part of the content of art. 17 of Shahin

Kolonja’s program and a partial interpretation (see I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 122-123). She has referred to the Albanian Catholic clergy as influenced by the two Catholic powers, Austria and Italy, but she has left

completely out the Greek clergy. Shahin Kolonja was one of those patriots who had supported the cultural policy of Austria-Hungary—his own paper, Drita (Light), was subsidized by Vienna—and knew well that the Catholic clergy could not be dependent, by its very nature, on the

Ottoman state. The services of the Catholic clergy to the Albanian language and education were openly acknowledged at the Monastir Congress by its president, Midhat Frashéri, who was known to be anti-

Austrian and anti-Italian (cf. G. D. Kyrias, op.cit., p. 6). If Shahin Kolonja included the Catholic clergy, it was in order to make his demand

more palatable to the Young Turks, who feared influences of great powers. For him, as a Tosk, the Greek church was important, and his aim was to curtail its influence. It is, therefore, the Greek part of art. 17 that is of consequence and not the Catholic one.

370 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE _ The development of Albanian education was also hampered by the multitude of alphabets. As has already been pointed out, in the Catholic schools of Shkodér, the alphabets employed were those of Bashkimi (Union) and Agimi (Dawn), two literary societies. In the schools of the south, the alphabet

of Istanbul was in use. The question of a unified national alphabet, which had troubled the patriots even before the Albanian League, became most urgent. Its absence was an obstacle to the progress of Albanian education and also to the growth of national consciousness and the union of Tosks and Gegs.

Between November 14 and 22, 1908, an alphabet Congress was held in Monastir. It was organized by the Albanian club

of that city and was attended by delegates from Albanian clubs and societies, towns and schools, both from Albania proper and from the colonies abroad. Some of the prominent

delegates were Midhat Frashéri, president of the club of Salonica and editor of Lirija; Pater Gjerg] Fishta, representing Bashkimi and Dom Ndre Mijeda, representing Agimi of Shkodér; Sotir Peci, editor of the newspaper Kombi (The — Nation) in the United States; Shahin Kolonja; and Gjergj D. Kyrias.1° An intellectual who should have been there was Faik Konitza. It is quite possible, as he maintained, that the invitation to attend the Congress was sent to him late on purpose.?®

It seems that the Albanian patriots, who recognized his outstanding capacities, were also aware of his difficult personality: they were afraid he would create trouble in the Congress.

‘The Congress was chaired by Midhat Frashéri. ‘The speeches of the first two days with regard to the alphabet were general in character, and helped to create a congenial atmosSee, for a complete list of the delegates and the places which delegated them, G. D. Kyrias, op.cit., p. 3, and Posfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 23 November 1908, No. 73, vertraulich, Be:lagen 1 and u, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/16.

Albania, X1 (1907), 98-99, and xiI (1909), 26-27; Faik Konitza to Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, London, 22 January, 1909, as Beilage 11 to Bericht, London, 22 January 1909, No. 7F, HHStA PA xiv/19, Albanien x11/2.

NATIONAL ALPHABET AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS 371

phere in which to carry out the serious work. Although each representative had come resolved to defend the alphabet of his preference—and many spoke their minds—each soon became aware, in that mixed crowd, that it was important to achieve unity, no matter which alphabet was chosen. The delegate who contributed most to the creation of the atmosphere of brotherhood and understanding was Pater Gjerg] Fishta, who extolled the work of the Bashkimi alphabet, but concluded: “I have not come here to defend any one of the alphabets, but I have come to unite with you and adopt that alphabet which the Congress decides upon as most useful for uplifting the people.” 1” ‘The audience was deeply moved by the words of this Franciscan brother, and a Moslem clergy-

man, Hodja Afiz Ibrahim Effendi, from Uskub, rushed to him as Fishta left the platform, and, with tears in his eyes, embraced him. This scene in the presence of more than 300 persons, three-quarters of whom were Moslems, could not but leave a deep impression.’® In all the speeches the union of Tosks and Gegs was stressed as most vital for the nation. The Congress elected an alphabet committee, composed of eleven of the most cultured delegates, with Fishta at its head.?® For three successive days the committee deliberated on the question of a common alphabet, giving the Albanian besa that nothing would be divulged prior to the final decision. As the discussions in the general meeting hinged mostly on the main alphabets—lIstanbul, Bashkimi and Agimi—the alphabet committee limited itself to three questions: (a) should one

of the three alphabets be chosen; (b) should parts of each alphabet be amalgamated for the formation of a new alphabet; and (c) should a new alphabet be created.”°

The committee dwelt long upon the three questions, par-

1G, D. Kyrias, op.cit., p. 7. |

8See ibid., pp. 7-8.

For a complete list of the members, see ibid., p. 8, or Posfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 23 November 1908, No. 73, vertraulich, HHStA PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6.

0Tbid.; G. D. Kyrias, op.cit., p. 11. |

372 III. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE ticularly since letters and telegrams arrived from many parts of Albania and the colonies expressing their preferences for the alphabet. Among them was a telegram from Prenk Bib Doda, captain of Mirdité. He requested that the Bashkimi alphabet be selected as the national one, because it was the most practical for commerce and for communication with foreign countries.*1 Finally two currents emerged. One favored a new alphabet on the basis of Latin letters: 25 letters were chosen, and the rest, corresponding to particular Albanian sounds, were built by diagraphs. ‘The new alphabet was almost identical to that of Bashkimi. ‘The other current supported the adoption of the Istanbul alphabet. It was not easy to discuss some of its letters. The character 6 (th, as in father) alone took up two whole sessions of the committee. Those who were in favor of adopting the Istanbul alphabet were four Moslem ‘Tosks—Midhat Frashéri; Shahin Kolonja; Bajo

‘Topulli; Nyzhet Vrioni, member of an influential feudal family from Berat—and Dom Ndre Mijeda.*? Dom Ndre _ Mjeda supported the Istanbul alphabet, first, because, like his own, it was founded on the principle of one letter for each sound, and secondly, because the Latin alphabet was similar

to that of his rival, the Abbot Preng Doci. At the end the committee resolved that the two alphabets—the Istanbul and the new Latin alphabet—would be the only ones to be used and all Albanian schools were obliged to teach both to their

pupils. |

Midhat Frashéri communicated to the Congress the decision of the committee. Then Pater Fishta, in his capacity as president of the alphabet committee, justified it. He said that the Istanbul alphabet alone would be sufficient to answer the

needs of the Albanian nation, but in order to have books printed abroad and for telegrams a purely Latin alphabet was necessary. As a final touch, he referred to the Germans, 21P6sfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 23 November 1908, No. 73, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6.

, 2G. D. Kyrias, op.cit., p. 19.

NATIONAL ALPHABET AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS 373

who employed two alphabets, the Gothic and the Latin.?* The decision of the alphabet committee was accepted by the Congress.*4

The resolution on the alphabet question at Monastir was a significant step toward the unification of education and the union of the Albanians. Although not the ideal solution, which would have been a single alphabet, it was a wise one. The Istanbul alphabet could not have been discarded, for it had a long tradition and had been widely diffused. However, by eliminating all other alphabets, the Monastir decision rendered easier the communication among Albanians: a paper

or a book published in the south could now be read in the north, and vice versa. It also contributed to making Moslems and Christians more conscious of their common heritage. It is interesting to note that nearly all of the delegates pres-

ent at the Congress expressed their gratitude to the British Bible Society, for, at a time when books written in Albanian were forbidden by the Turkish authorities, only the Bible Society could circulate the sacred books in the Albanian lancuage—a language that was pure, as that of Kristoforidhi.”°

Toward the end of the Congress (November 7/20) a delegation composed of three members of the Albanian club of Istanbul—Hodja Vildan, Fazil Pasha, and Colonel Riza— arrived. They were sent by their club to attend the Congress and then travel all over Albania as an “advisory committee”’ to the Albanian clubs.”®

The purpose and activity of this advisory committee needs an explanation. The opinion has recently been expressed by a Soviet historian that this commission was sent by the Union and Progress Committee of Istanbul; that the speeches of its members in Monastir were received adversely; that its real aim in touring Albania was to undermine the influence of the 27 bid., p. 12.

4Viriza, 8 November 1908. | Cf. G. D. Kyrias, op.cit., p. 20.

*®Tbid., p. 13. 7 ,

374 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE | Monastir Congress; that it carried on agitation for the introduction in the Albanian language of the “sacred Arabic alphabet”; and that the clubs it organized had a pro-Turkish character.” All these allegations have been made by the Soviet historian on the basis of documents which appear not to have been read carefully—or perhaps they had been read by others. The initiative for the sending of this “advisory committee” to the Congress of Monastir and for its trip to Albania was taken by the Albanian club of Istanbul for purely nationalistic reasons and not by the Committee of Union and Progress or by the ‘Turkish government. The duty of the members of the commission was to stimulate national feeling, to found Albanian clubs and secret committees, to encourage the reading of works in Albanian, and help the union of the Albanians. However, in order not to expose its aims and be able to carry out the plan, it was necessary that the Albanian club of Istanbul get in touch first with the official Turkish circles, putting in the foreground as the intention of the commission the making of propaganda in favor of the constitution. In this way they were able to obtain the consent of the Grand Vizier and his cabinet without any difficulties. But the Committee of Union and Progress, because the Albanian club of Istanbul did not come into direct understanding with it, distrusted the commission. From Monastir on, during the whole trip in Albania, it assigned a confidence man, Captain Suleyman Effendi, to accompany the members of the commission and watch every step of theirs, although the captain did not belong to the commission.”®

It is true that when the commission of three arrived from the ‘Turkish capital to Monastir it was thought that it had been sent by the Young ‘Turks Committee,?® and that the 71. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 123-124.

*®Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutatri, 31 December 1908, No. 166, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6, which is the same as HHStA, PA,A. (Donesenie austrijskogo konsula) v Shkodere ot 31 dekabrya 1908 g., in I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 124, note 54.

*°Cf. Posfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 23 November 1908, No. 73, HHStA, PA x1v/i5, Albanien x1/6.

NATIONAL ALPHABET AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS 375

participants of the Monastir Congress feared at the outset that

its purpose was to agitate for the acceptance of the Turkish alphabet for the Albanian language, but Hodja Vildan Effendi’s speech dispelled the fears. After having denounced the despotic rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid and extolled the constitution, Vildan Effendi stressed the importance of union among the Albanians, for united they could better defend themselves and the Ottoman empire. Albania was blessed, he said, because she was now united by the alphabet, which was a powerful tool for her progress. Every nation has the right to choose the alphabet that best suits its language, he stated, and the Albanians chose as such the Latin alphabet. ‘The ‘Turks,

too, did not possess letters to write their language; they adopted those of the Arabs. As to the direction that writing should follow—from left to right or from right to left, from top to bottom or the reverse—that was immaterial. In matters of religion Vildan Effendi did not want to interfere: religion belonged to the heart and everyone was free to hold his own views. His speech made a profound impression on many Mos-

lem fanatics who thought that they should not write like the Christians and should not consider the Christians as their brothers.*°

Hodja Vildan Effendi spoke along the same lines in all other places which the Istanbul commission visited. He emphasized that it was an error to hold that the Koran forbade the writing of Albanian except with Arabic letters—this view had been spread by the fanatic Turkish side—for the letters

were not of divine origin but were man’s creation. It could not be said that Arabic was the only language pleasing to God as there were also many religious books written in ‘Turkish. Consequently, there was no hindrance to use Latin letters for

Albanian.*# |

If we take into consideration that Abdul Yp1, a well-known

patriot and writer, joined the Istanbul commission from 80G. D. Kyrias, op.cit., p. 14. 31K ral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 31 Dezember 1908, No. 166, HHStA, PA

x1v/1i5, Albanien x1/6; Leka, x11 (1940), Document No. 10, pp. 17-18.

376 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE Monastir on,*? and that the commission was most satisfied in

the places where they met with a national understanding,® there remains no doubt about its patriotic motives. Soon after the Monastir Congress obstacles began to arise. The Moslems of northern Albania, especially those in the vilayet of Kosovo, could not understand the cultural efforts of their more emancipated brothers of the south and were

rather reluctant to adopt a script that was not that of the Koran.** But in the kaza of Kolonjé, near Korcé, eight hodjas ~ could not hold services until they received a recommendation

from the club of Monastir, where it was stated that they had attended courses in Albanian.?®> In November 1908 a discussion on the alphabet question took place in the club of Uskub, during which questions such as the following were raised:

“Is it a sin to write from left to right? How are we going

to learn the Koran if we read our language with Latin letters?” 36

The Young Turks tried to make the most of this situation. Standing for the “unity” of the empire and for a centralistic policy, they were afraid that the Latin alphabet, laying stress on common nationality, would unite the Albanians and eventually detach them from Turkey. In fact, the very contrast between the Latin and ‘Turkish alphabets would render the Albanian conscious of being different from the Turks. ‘The principle of religion, Islamism, was still a force in the empire and the Young Turks could not neglect it, although at the outset they endeavored to keep it in the background because of the inter-confessional character of their revolution. ‘They 32Pésfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 23 November 1908, No. 73, HHStA,

PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6. ,

33See Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 31 December 1908, No. 166, in ibid.

84See Lukes to Aehrenthal, Uskitib, 29 November 1908, No. 191, Geheim, in zbid. 3>Consul of Monastir, 7 December 1908, Albanien xu, as cited in I. G.

Senkevich, “Mladoturetskaya revolyutsiya 1908 goda i albanskoe | natsional’noe dvizhenie,” Sovetskoe vostokovedenie, No. 1, 1958, p. 39.

88Tirija, 15 November 1908.

NATIONAL ALPHABET AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS 377

directed their efforts, therefore, to attract the Albanian Moslems to their side by an Islamic agitation, assailing the Latin

alphabet." |

As early as February 1gog the Albanian club of Filat, a

town in Caméri (northwestern Greece of today), wrote a letter to Bashkimi of Monastir, the central club, complaining: “We

have repeatedly written to you that the Young Turk Committee (Cemiet) in Filat is very much biased against the Alba-

nian language. Now it manifests [the bias] quite openly; it gathers the peasants and tells them that the Sultan is an opponent of the Albanian language. ... At the same time it asks them to sign a declaration against the use of the Albanian

script.” 8° The Korcé club, Dituria (Knowledge), was very upset to read in newspapers that “in Istanbul a society had been formed with the aim to propagate [the writing of] the Albanian language with Turkish letters.” 39 In Shkodér, however, the protest was not against the Arabic but against the Latin alphabet. On the instructions of the reactionary party, that of the ulemas and hodjas, as well as the Cemiet, a lively agitation in favor of the Turkish alphabet had developed. The fanatic Moslems did not want to employ anything but

the Arabic script, regarding all the other scripts as antireligious. Hodjas and ulemas were exhorting the people to reject the Latin alphabet, which was the instrument of the ‘infidel’; the proper alphabet for the Moslem was that in which the Koran was written.*° The backing lent by the Young Turks to the Arabic alphabet caused disappointment among the nationally minded A\l87Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 16 April 1909, No. 59, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6; E. b. V., Die Wahrheit tiber das Vorgehen der Jungtiirken in Albanien, Vienna and Leipzig, 1911, p. 16.

88See German translation of the original letter, Filat, 19 February 1909, in Pésfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 March 1909, No. 10, Geheim, Beilage 1, HHSiA, PA x1v/15, Albanien x1/6.

89See German translation of the original letter, Korcé, 23 February 1909, Beilage 11, zbzd.

40Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 16 April 1909, No. 59, in ibid.

378 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE © banians. It was disturbing to them to see the Turkish newspaper in Salonica, Yeni Asr (New Times), incessantly publish articles against the Albanian alphabet and attempt by all means to create trouble and sow dissension among the Albanians.*! The Union and Progress Committee officially tried to dissipate Albanian suspicions. In March 1909 it informed the Albanian club of Salonica that the Albanian language could be taught freely because this would have “good effects on the Christian Albanians who have come under the influence of the pan-Hellenic current’ and that the Albanians could choose any alphabet they liked; *? nonetheless, the rela-

tions between the Young Turks and the Albanians had been shaken. The friendly understanding which had existed between the Albanian club of Monastir and the Young Turks was affected so deeply as to be transformed into open hostility.“8 ‘The minds of the Albanians were now preoccupied with

the efforts of the Young Turks to impose the Turkish al_ phabet. On July 23, 1909 a congress was held in Dibér. On the surface, the initiative for it was taken by an Ottoman Albanian Constitutional Committee (Osmanl: arnaut mesrutiyet komi-

stont) in Dibér; in fact, the whole organization was formed by the Young Turks. The first invitations from Dibér were addressed only to Albanians, thus creating the impression that it was going to be a strictly Albanian assembly. Gradually, however, all other nationalities—except the Greeks—of the Macedonian and Albanian vilayets were invited to send their delegates. As the purpose of the congress was not made known, several suppositions arose: the question of Crete, the Albanian alphabet (a delegate from Monastir was the Mufti Redjeb Nureddin, an ardent defender of the Albanian alphabet with Turkish letters), the question of military service, “Tirta, 14 March 1909. “Teka, Xi1 (1940), Document 11, pp. 19-20.

*8Posfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 March 1909, No. 10, Geheim,

HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6. -

NATIONAL ALPHABET AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS 379

and others.** There were 315 delegates, 95 of whom were Christians, and most of the rest Moslem Albanians, from both the north and the south. Shkodér’s Catholics declined the invitation, although they displeased the ‘Turkish authorities. Among the Young Turks there were numerous officers, many of whom were dressed in civilian clothes.*®

When the meeting opened, the Young Turks tried, through Vehbi Effendi, the Mufti of Dibér, to force upon the delegates the acceptance of their program. There was a revolt among the nationally minded Albanians. Abdul Ypi protested, in a fiery speech, upholding the right of free discussion as guaranteed by the constitution. Divergencies came into the open and clashes occurred. It became necessary for the meeting to recess. ‘The national Albanians went to the tekke of Baba Shahin for consultations, and the Young Turks to the municipality (belediye). As a result, a large committee was constituted to decide on the program.** It became clear that the primary aim of the Young ‘Turks was to use the congress as a demonstration to the European and Ottoman public that the Albanians were for the constitution, were ready to defend it, and did not have separatist tendencies.** ‘Their secondary objective was to compel the Albanians to accept the ‘Turkish alphabet. ‘The discussions on this subject were lengthy. The Young Turks found a great many backers of their viewpoint.*® Finally, a compromise solution was reached as to the schools and the script: “In every part of Albania elementary, second4Pdésfai to Aechrenthal, Monastir, 19 July 1909, No. 53, Geheim, HHSitA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/7, and Betlage; Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 20 July 1909, No. 99, in zbid.

See ibid. 46Pdésfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 2 August 1909, No. 57, HHStA, PA xIv/15, Albanien x1/7. *7See the first five points of the resolution in Vendimet e Kongrestt té Dibrés mé 10 té Korrikut 1909 (Resolutions of the Congress of Dibér on 10-23 July 1909), Monastir, 1909, pp. 1-3. 48Pésfai to Aechrenthal, Monastir, 2 August 1909, No. 57, HHSitA, PA xIv/15, Albanien x1/7.

380 | Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE ary, commercial schools, and lycées should be opened and the native language, that is, Albanian, should be taught—as well as in the official schools—but the manner of teaching it [with

the Latin or Turkish alphabet] is according to one’s choice. The expenses of these schools will be incurred by the government.” * The Young Turks had succeeded at the Dibér Congress not

in obtaining a concession but in virtually ruling out the Latin alphabet. The gain which the vilayets of Monastir and Janina had made only a few days before July 3, 1909 by the permission granted by the Ministry of Education of ‘Turkey

that “the Albanian language be taught in the junior and senior high schools’ suffered a set back.®° ‘The Young Turks

intensified their efforts. They organized demonstrations in various towns in Albania in favor of the ‘Turkish alphabet. Their stand on the question of the alphabet was their last attempt to foster dissension between the Christian and Moslem Albanians and thwart their union. But the Albanian patriots did not retreat.

| Next to Korcé, Elbasan had become a center of Albanian education. The organization and maintenance of schools there lay entirely in the hands of the Albanian club, which enjoyed general esteem. On the committee of the club were such influential patriots as Akif Pasha, Lef Nosi, Dervish Bey, Dhimitraq Buda, and others. ‘The club supported four Albanian schools in the town.*! Elbasan had been selected by the patriots for a congress on Albanian education. Art. 3, Part u, Vendimet e Kongresit té Dibrés mé ro té Korrikut 1909, p. 4; “Spezielle Verwaltungsangelegenheiten,” in Beschliisse der Versammlung von Dibra, as Beilage to Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 5 August 1909, No. 106, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/7 (the German

translation is from Turkish.) -

‘See text of the telegram of the Ministry of Education of the Ottoman Empire to the Government of the vilayet of Janina in Bilifski to Aehrenthal, Janina, 8 July 1909, No. 39, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6. *1Posfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 February 1909, No. 4, Geheim,

HHStA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xiv.

NATIONAL ALPHABET AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS 381

The Congress of Elbasan was held on September 2, 1909, and lasted a little more than a week. Its purpose was to discuss the school question and the foundation of a school for teachers (Normale). Thirty-five delegates attended it, all of them from southern and central Albania. It was said that the north did not participate because of a confusion resulting from the publication of the invitation in Lirija, which was not followed by separate invitations.®* It is probable that this was intentionally done by the southerners, who, after the experience at the Dibér Congress, thought that it would be wiser to keep the northerners far from a meeting in which educational matters were going to be discussed. Dervish Bey of Elbasan was elected president of the congress.

The unfriendly attitude of the Young Turks toward the purely national meeting, in the cultural ends of which they could not believe, was manifested first when the gendarmerie commander of Elbasan, Major Nadji Bey, an Albanian known for his national inclinations, was suddenly recalled to Monastir. Later, when the congress was in session, members of the

Young Turk committee of Elbasan harangued the peasants in the surroundings of the town to pay no attention to the work of the Congress.®*

The Congress decided that it was the duty of the Monastir club to introduce the Albanian language in all the schools of Albania, and that meant in the Latin alphabet.®* It was fur-

ther decided to request of all the Albanian publicists and journalists that they use in the future only the dialect of

Elbasan, as it was intelligible to both the Gegs and the Tosks.5> Evidently it was thought that it would form a link between the north and the south, and would later develop 52See Pdsfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 20 September 1909, No. 72, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/7; in Beilage 1 to it are the

names of the delegates. S87 bid.; Bilinski to Aehrenthal, Janina, 15 September 1909, No. 54,

HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/7.

54Art. 8 of “Beschliisse,” Pésfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 20 September 1909, No. 72, vertraulich, Beilage 1v, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/7.

Art. 11 of “Beschliisse” in 1bid.

382 Il, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE the basis for a literary language. A very significant decision was the establishment of a teachers’ school, composed of six classes, in Elbasan, and supervised by a council made up of 8 Elbasan-born Albanians, elected every two years by the clubs (2) and societies (2) of that town. In the program of the school, religion (Moslem, Orthodox, and Catholic) and history (World, Turkish, and Albanian) were included among the subjects.5* For the maintenance of the teachers’ school and other schools, as well as for the building of new Albanian schools, a society was constituted called Pérparimi (Progress),°” with its headquarters in Korcé. It was the task of this society to also publish books needed for the schools. ‘The administrative council of Pérparimi consisted of seven mem- — bers, residents of Korcé. The contributions from the various societies, clubs, and persons would be made to Pérparim1.®° All clubs were asked to do their best to raise the educational level of the people and work toward the progress of the nation, and to give maximum support to the club of Korcé so it could carry out its task.®° By endeavoring to interfere in their goals, the Young Turks

had alienated the Albanians. Many representatives expressed the conviction that the Committee of Union and Progress was playing a double game: it appeared to have a friendly attitude toward the Albanians, while it left its local committees to hamper and oppose their national efforts. ‘The beys of Elbasan, especially Dervish Bey, who chaired the Congress, let it be known that if the Turkish government did not recognize the legitimate aspirations for national autonomy and tried to suppress them, the Albanians would be compelled to resort to force. At the same time a small group of patriots considered the necessity of organizing better the secret committees of the country.®°

SSchul-Program der Lehrerbildungsanstalt in Elbasan, Beilage 1 in ibid.

“Its complete name was Shogéria Mésonjétorévet Shgipe Pérparimi ndé Korg¢é (Society of the Albanian Schools “Progress” in Korcé). 58Statuten des Schulvereines “Pérparimi” in Korga, Beilage m1, in ibid. Allgemeines Club-und Vereins Reglement, Beilage tv, in ibid. 60See ibid.

NATIONAL ALPHABET AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS 383

The Elbasan Congress gave a stimulus to the Albanian educational movement. New schools were founded. Even in the vilayet of Kosovo, in the towns of Gjilan and Mitrovicé, national Albanian schools were opened. In the senior high school of Uskiib, through the Albanian Educational Club,

the Albanian language in the Latin alphabet was introduced.*! ‘The Young Turks could not remain indifferent to this burgeoning of education and particularly to the propaga-

tion of the Latin alphabet. The Committee of Union and Progress sent from Salonica in January 1910 Arif Hikmet, a young Albanian who came from a wealthy family of Kosovo, for the purpose of propagandizing among the Kosovars in favor of the Arabic alphabet. His activity was upheld by the local Moslem clergy.*2 Then alphabet demonstrations and counter-demonstrations followed in the various towns of Albania. On February 6, 1910, the Young ‘Turks organized in Monastir a meeting of the “partisans” of the Arabic alphabet, in which hodjas were the orators. A resolution was passed calling for the introduction of the Arabic alphabet in the Albanian language. Afraid of molestations, a detachment of Albanian soldiers went to guard the club Bashkimi and the offices of the Albanian newspaper Bashkimi 1 Kombit (Union of the Nation).® In the beginning of the same month a demonstration by the partisans of the Arabic letters against the Albanian club took place in Usktb. It was led by the mollahs. It con-

demned the use of the Latin script as being against the religious law and the interests of Islam.“ But on February 19, 1910 an imposing demonstration took place in Korc¢é in which some 15,000 people protested against

the intended introduction of the Arabic alphabet by force. Many speeches were delivered in support of the “Albanian letters,” and a prayer was said by the hodja, Hafiz Ali, who 61Cf. I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 151. 627 bid.

“Tbid., pp. 150-151. SCalviére (?) to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uskiib, 3 February 1910,

No. 3, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1910, Vol. vitt.

384 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE also blessed them. Telegrams were dispatched to the Albanian deputies in Istanbul, whose answer was an encouragement to stick to the demands.® Gjirokastér followed suit. A meeting was held there from February 20 to March 5, 1910, headed by ulemas and notables. They declared that the Latin alphabet did not do any harm, religious or political, and were resolved not to abandon it.®*®

In Elbasan a demonstration occurred backing the Arabic alphabet. It was led by hodjas, who tried to arouse the fanaticism of the Moslem population, mostly of the environs, by telling them that they would be “infidels” if they used the Latin letters for their language. ‘Iwo days later there was a powerful counter-demonstration favoring the Latin letters. At the head of it were the most prominent members of the Moslem society of Elbasan. Their telegraphic protests were addressed to the Grand Vizier. Elbasan, where the religiously tolerant element met with the fanatic, had become one of the targets of the Young ‘Turks.® In the sandjak of Durrés the relationship between the enlightened and the fanatic Albanians was different. The former, who had also founded the Albanian club of Durrés, had declared themselves partisans of the Latin script. So had the beys of Tirana. Two of them, _ Fadil Pasha and Fuad Bey Toptani, had even got in touch with Vienna, asking for help to open Albanian elementary schools in ‘Tirana and Malcija e Matit (Mountains of Mat) and to send Moslem Albanians to pursue their studies in higher institutions of Austria. The Austrian government promised them the necessary subsidies.** But in comparison **Bornemisza to Achrenthal, Monastir, 1 March 1910, No. 13, Geheim, HFASiA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xiv; E. b. V., op.cit., p. 20.

See text of telegram addressed to the deputy of Gjirokastér, Myfid Bey Libohova, in Leka, x1 (1940), Document No. 41, pp. 48-49. 87Halla to Aehrenthal, Durazzo, 11 March 1910, No. 10, HHStA, PA

xiv/24, Albanien xiv. :

SSA conversation between Consul Kwiatkowski with Fadil Pasha and Fuad Bey ‘optani on the island of Brioni, 20 August 1909, and answer from Vienna, 19 September 1909, pp. 1-13, HHStA, PA xiv/io, Albanien v/10.

NATIONAL ALPHABET AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS 385

with the fanatics, the enlightened elements in the sandjak of Durrés were a minority. For this reason, they did not demonstrate in favor of the Latin alphabet and so a demonstration by the fanatics was avoided.” _ Despite official orders of the Committee of Union and Progress and the Turkish government to remain neutral in the question of the alphabet, the Young Turks agitated more

and more. The mufti of Monastir, Redjeb Nureddin, forwarded to the notables of Janina a pamphlet in which the Turkish letters for transcribing Albanian were recommended. The Albanian club of that city reacted quickly and wired the Grand Vizier and the Minister of Education a protest, stressing that the Tosks were resolved to abide by the Latin alpha-

bet. Being the chief club of the vilayet of Janina, it advised

the other Albanian clubs of the province to do the same.” As the demonstrations in favor of the Turkish alphabet continued, the opposition on the part of the nationally minded Moslems of the south became stronger. Characteristic is the protest of the club of Filat to the Porte, when it learned that

12 hodjas had planned to demonstrate in support of the Turkish script; they ended their telegram: “We will shed the rest of our blood for the Latin alphabet.” 7 The situation in Shkodér was different. ‘The Catholics had their own confessional schools, under the protection of Austria-Hungary, which were private in character and, therefore, not under the jurisdiction of the ‘Turkish educational authorities. ‘They could not be drawn into the arena of the alphabet conflict. In the Catholic schools Albanian had been taught from the very outset with Latin characters; a change in them

was impossible. The same may be said about the Italian schools. ‘The action of the Young Turks in the alphabet ques-

tion concerned the government schools, and in Shkodér it S*Halla to Aehrenthal, Durazzo, 11 March i910, No. 10, HHStA, PA

xiv/24, Albanien xiv. |

Bilinski to Aehrenthal, Janina, 3 March 1910, No. 17, vertraulich,

HHAStA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xXIv. , “Bilinski to Aehrenthal, Janina, 7 March 1910, in tbid.

386 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE could affect only the Moslem Albanians. ‘There was no problem for the Young Turks there. The adherents to the Arabic alphabet—officers and some civil servants—did not think it necessary even to arrange any special demonstrations. Only a meeting was held in the beginning of February, 1910, called by some hodjas, where the Usktib resolution supporting the

Arabic alphabet was adopted.”* Yet toward the end of the same month the Catholics demonstrated in favor of the Latin alphabet.”®

In southern Albania, where the Bektashis played an impor-

tant role, the support of the Latin alphabet was strong. In central and northern Albania, if we exclude Flbasan, the propaganda of the hodjas had been successful.”

It was resolved in the Monastir Congress of November 1908 that after two years a second congress should be held. The Latin-Arabic alphabet struggle, which had pervaded Albanian life, brought about an earlier meeting. Between March 21 and 23, 1910,” a second language congress organized by the partisans of the “national alphabet,” as the Latin alphabet was called, took place in Monastir in order to clarify the whole question. It declared: “The pure linguistic ques-

tion of the Albanian alphabet, which had definitely been solved in the Congress of Dibér, has come up again and has caused crises and contradictory currents of opinion. This question, which interests solely the Albanian element, has even acquired an internal political significance since it regards education in the whole Ottoman empire and the interest of the authorities. The government .. . has encouraged the adherents of the Turkish language [alphabet] to carry “Cf. Zambaur to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 20 March 1910, No. 33, vertraulich, in ibid.

3E. b. V., op.cit., p. 20. | ,

“Cf. Halla to Aehrenthal, Durazzo, 11 March 1910, No. 10, HHStA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xiv. The dates, even when taken as O.S., do not correspond to those given in the reports of the French Consul in Monastir, who gives 30 March to ” April. See his reports: 30 March 1910, No. 31, and 7 April 1910, No. 36,

AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1910, Vol. vi. -

NATIONAL ALPHABET AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS 387

out regrettable acts incompatible with the constitutional regime which we enjoy. .. . The congress unanimously states that the question of the Albanian language, however much it has deviated from its basis, belongs exclusively to the Albanians; and it is desirable, in the true Ottoman interests, that it should not be taken out of its natural sphere.” 7° At this congress it was decided also that in addition to the central club in Istanbul, a central advisory council be created, composed of members of the parliament and other Albanian personalities. It would be the task of this council to elaborate a general program for directing Albanian education in the whole of Albania. The central club of Istanbul would have

charge of inspecting the clubs in Albania and the literary society of Korcé, which had undertaken the maintenance of

the teachers’ school of Elbasan.” |

‘The French consul in Shkodér, Ferté, correctly summarized the situation when he wrote to his government: “On peut dire que l’ Albanie toute entiére s’est soulevée contre la pretention

du Gouvernement de lui imposer un alphabet contre sa volonté, nettement formulé dans la decision du Congres de Monastir.” The columns of the Albanian papers were full of protests from the clubs of the principal towns. Among the signatures the consul could distinguish those of many members of the Moslem clergy, who undoubtedly thought that the adoption of a Latin alphabet would not jeopardize the Islamic faith.”8

The rift between the Young Turks and the Albanian nationalists had deepened. It was useless any longer to make demands to the Istanbul government, for it had taken an inimical attitude. ‘The Grand Vizier, Ibrahim Hakki Pasha, told a prominent Albanian deputy: “The government con7%C. Libardi, I prim: moti patriottic: albanest nel r910-I91I-1912, Trent, 1935, u, Document No. 18, pp. 262-263.

Resolutions of the Congress as communicated by Dervish Hima, Para to Aehrenthal, Salonica, 5 April 1910, No. 75, HHStA, PA xiv/10, Albanien v/8. 78Ferté to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 19 April 1910, No. 6, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1910, Vol. vuu1.

| 388 «1, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE siders the desire to adopt the Latin characters [on the part of the Albanians] as the first step to be detached from Turkey. ... The government must do everything, and will do everything, to prevent the adoption of the Latin alphabet.” * At the instigation of the Turkish government, the Seyh wl Islam, the supreme Moslem authority, sent to all the muftis of Al-

bania on April 5, 1910, a circular letter which read: “We hasten to inform you that on March 22, 1326 [1910], through an official letter to the Ministry of Education, we have drawn the attention of this [Ministry] not to accept the Latin alpha-

bet for the Albanian language and to pay attention that its use in he Albanian schools be strictly forbidden, and we address therefore this circular letter to all the muftis of Albanian cities and districts that they should act accordingly.” °° The Young Turks had also trampled on this promise with respect to the Albanian language and script and had offended Albanian national feelings by founding in April 1910 a club

in Istanbul called the Educational Circle (mahfil-t mearif), under government auspices, for the enforcement of the ‘Turkish alphabet.*! Furthermore, a newspaper in Albanian using the ‘Turkish alphabet, the first and the last one, was published in Istanbul.§* ‘This activity was counteracted by the society

which the Albanian students in the University of Istanbul (some 150) had formed in the beginning of 1910—called the

| Society of Young Albanian Intellectuals—which stood openly for defense of the Latin script.** As the Istanbul government was unable to attain its aims by

propaganda, it resorted to force. It abolished the Albanian clubs and societies, suppressed the Albanian newspapers, and shut the schools, as well as the printing houses in Monastir, Salonica, and Korcé, eliminating at the same time the AlbaText in Pallavicini to Aehrenthal, Constantinople, 16 March 1910, No. 16, vertraulich, HHStA, PA x1v/24, Albanien xv. “Text in E. b. V., op.cit., p. 21. 81See letter of Albanian publicist Dervish Hima in Para to Aehrenthal, Salonica, 5 April 1910, No. 75, HHStA, PA xiv/10, Albanien v/8. 82K. b. V., op.cit., p. 18. ®See Leka, xu (1940), Documents Nos. 36, 347, pp. 39-42, 45-47.

NATIONAL ALPHABET AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS 389

nian language from the program of the government schools. The Albanian colonies abroad became active in protesting these rigorous measures. The colony in Boston even called

upon the Albanian deputies in the Turkish parliament to resign in protest against Turkish inequities.84 The president of the court martial in Elbasan, Colonel Shevket, reported on August 31, 1910 to the commander of the army his view on the situation and the measures to be taken. Referring to the Latin alphabet, which had. been prohibited by the government, he regarded as the most dangerous centers the cities of Korcé and Elbasan. In those cities native policemen and gendarmes should not be in service and the teachers of the elementary and secondary schools should be competent but should not be Albanians. As it was believed that some of the officers were aiding the national Albanian movement, Colonel Shevket recommended that these should not be stationed in Albania but should be transferred to Anatolia. With regard to those who had joined the Albanian clubs, he was of the opinion that they should be dismissed from the army.® In the

meantime the revolts which had started in the north, not originally on the question of the alphabet but against the centralistic policy of the Young ‘Turks, began to spread in the country.

After eight months of oppression, a switch in policy occurred. An important movement of opinion made itself felt rapidly in Istanbul in favor of the reopening of the Albanian schools.°6 In March 1911 a circular from the Ministry of Interior in Istanbul was forwarded to the various Albanian districts. It ordered the reopening of the Albanian schools, 84See protest signed by Joseph Pani, chairman, Boston, Mass., 23 October 1910. A copy of it is attached to Jusserand to Pichon, Washington, 27 October 1910, No. 504, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1910, Vol. viii. 855. Kiilce, Osmanlt Tarithinde Arnavutluk (Albania in the Ottoman History), Smyrna, 1944, pp. 395-397. s’Boppe to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Péra, 27 March 1911, No. 172, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, January—June 1911, Vol. rx.

390 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE as well as the creation of new ones, and allowed the use of the Latin alphabet. But the schools had to comply with article

129 of the Education Act—Education Act of 24 Cimasi tl evveli 1286 (September 2, 1869)—which pertained to the founding of private community schools. Only the teaching of the Koran was to be in Arabic characters.®" ‘This change of policy was so unexpected that the Young Turk club in Vloré

hesitated to believe it. It seemed that it was dictated by the imminent visit of Sultan Mehmed V to Albania: the government wanted to prepare a friendly reception for him. ‘The

Albanians, therefore, believed that it was a temporary measure.8§

‘The measure was to be applied in the fall of 1911. In August 1911 the Grand Vizier addressed a letter to that effect to the Minister of the Interior.8® ‘The government entrusted

inspectors, who were its functionaries, to open schools in Albania. As they would open schools only with the consent of the local populations, the Albanian patriots feared that a division would occur, for there would be localities which would ask for the use of the Arabic alphabet. ‘There were also

some patriots who had become so suspicious of the Young Turks that they believed that the new policy of the government toward the Albanian schools would not continue after the parliamentary elections.®® Indeed, the true aims of the Young ‘Turks, as will be seen in the next chapter, continued to be how to prevent the development of national consciousness among the Albanians and their unification, and how to impose on them centralization and Ottomanization. ®8’Tbid.; Kraus to Pallavicini in Vienna, Valona, 24 March 1911, No. 18,

HHStA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xiv. S5Cf. ibid.

8*Text of the letter in Leka, x11 (1940), Document No. 54, pp. 56-57. See Dervish Hima’s letter to Arthur Rabler, Péra, 23 January 1912, HHStA, PA xt1v/10, Albanien v/8.

XVI The Deepening of the Albanian—Young Turk Conflict ALTHOUGH the Young Turks found supporters of the Arabic

alphabet among the northern Moslems, when they tried to apply their centralistic policy they met with armed resistance. The Young ‘Turks, wrote Ismail Kemal, regarded the Albanians merely as a Moslem people with a slightly developed

political ideal, and believed that by managing them and exerting pressure they could make them docile Ottomans who would serve as an example to the other nationalities.} They asked them to pay taxes like the other subjects of the empire; to obey the government officials sent by the Porte; to deliver their weapons, and to accept the draft.? Although such measures were justifiable from the Young ‘Turk viewpoint of the authority of the state, the times and the area of application were ill-chosen.

The Gegs, especially the Moslems among them, were displeased with the new trends which emerged with the constitutional regime, and which aimed at depriving them of their old privileges. If the Kosovars supported the constitution at Fer1zOvic, it was not because they desired freedom and wanted to enjoy a national life, but because they were lured by false promises of immunities on the part of the Young Turks.? A Kosovar who visited his compatriots in the early period of the constitutional regime and was disappointed with the situation wrote critically: ““But even those who call themselves Albanians in Kosovo have been blinded by fanaticism and do not know what is Albaniandom, or language, or nation.” 4 Only in Gjakové, and particularly in Uskub, did one find a real national Albanian movement. *The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, ed. S. Story, London, 1920, p. 367.

2E. Jackh, Im ttirkischen Kriegslager durch Albanien, Heilbronn, 1911, pp. 247-29; E. b. V., Die Wahrheit tiber das Vorgehen der Jungtiirken in Albanien, Vienna and Leipzig, 1911, p. 14. SLukes to Aehrenthal, Uskiib, 29 November 1908, No. 191, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/i5, Albanien x1/6. *Lirija, 13 December 1908.

392 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE The Kosovars had not been dissatisfied with the rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid, who had behaved toward them like an indulgent father, respecting their laws and customs and permitting them to carry arms and pay low taxes. The Sultan even distributed honors, positions, and titles to their chiefs. When the Kosovars revolted, they did so against the centralistic policy of the Porte, which attempted to withdraw from them the very privileges the Sultan had recognized.> When they became aware that the Young Turks had deceived them about the privileges, they wanted to resort to the old methods

in order to extort them. |

‘The same could be said about the Moslems of Shkodér. They had no understanding of the constitution and the political rights and responsibilities it implied. They were Ham-

idians, because they believed that they could hold their privileges only by the preservation of the authority of the Sultan. Among them, too, the national movement had made little progress. Abdul Ypi, a member of the commission for the founding of the Albanian secret committees, was shocked at the cold reception they had in Shkodér. The commission was deeply impressed by the religious fanaticism of the Mos-

lems of the city.® : ,

The stanchest opposition to the Young Turk regime came from the Kosovars, who even before the fall of Sultan Abdul Hamid had dispatched a delegation to Salonica (September 1, 1908) to remind the Committee of Union and Progress that they wanted to preserve their privileges.*? In May 1909 the Young ‘Turks, now firmly in the saddle, sent a military expedition to Kosovo to stop the growth of hostile attitudes to the government and break the resistance of the peasants, who refused to be registered and pay the taxes which Istanbul °Cf. C. Libardi, I primi moti patriottict albanesi nel rgro-rgr11912, Trent, 1935, 1, 3. ®Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 31 December 1908, No. 166, HHStA, PA xIv/15, Albanien x1/6.

“R. Pinon, “La question albanaise,” Revue des deux mondes, Liv (1909), 812, 818.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK CONFLICT 393

had introduced. Djavid Pasha, the new commander of the division at Mitrovicé, was ordered to make an army demonstration in the mountains. Isa Boletini, a prominent leader often honored by the Sultan—he had been decorated, was on the Sultan’s payroll, had been granted a ¢iftlik 8—, and other chiefs of Ipek and Gjakové attacked the Ottoman army. Ad-

vised by the vali, Djavid Pasha abstained from war actions against the populations of the towns, for the notables had already declared faithfulness to the new Sultan and the constitution. In the mountainous regions, however, the Turkish general demanded that the population hand in the weapons and imposed on it a new tax for the army and the schools. _ ‘The mountaineers refused. On June 7, 1909 Djavid Pasha started for the mountains of Gjakové, pitilessly destroying the houses of the peasants and forcefully recruiting the inhabitants. When he reached the mountain pass, Qafa e Morinés, the fight between the ‘Turkish regiments and the armed Albanian highlanders began. After ten days of fighting, Djavid Pasha was compelled to return to Gjakové.®

In the meantime, in the middle of June, Bedri Pasha, the valt of Shkodér, announced that the government was about to embark on a census, the nofuz,!® as the Albanians called it. Among the Moslems two tendencies were manifested: some, intimidated by the campaign of Djavid Pasha, were inclined to submit; others, fanaticized by the hodjas, shouted that they would receive with bullets the agents entrusted with the census. ‘They all saw in the measure a menace to their privileges and a prelude to obligatory military service. Next the vali ordered the establishment of a record book of real estate to serve as a basis for taxation. ‘The highlanders of the province, who had always been poor, resented taxes, and when the Young Turks decided to take the arms away from them, 8Lirija, 29 November 1908. °Cf. I. G. Senkevich, Osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie albanskogo naroda v 1905-1912 gg., Moscow, 1959, pp. 139-140.

From Turkish tahir-: nufuz.

394 II. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE which they had possessed from time immemorial, unrest vastly increased and resistance became more stubborn." At this juncture the Catholic tribes around Shkodér (Shala, Shoshi, etc.) addressed to the vali a petition, which shows the

situation where Catholics and Moslems lived next to each other and the real dilemma which the Young Turks had to face. It was said that the petition was written by Mgr. Mjeda, coadjutor of the archbishop of Shkodér, who was then touring the mountains. The petition read as follows: “If the new regime is not a fiction, we are ready to enter in the common law; we accept the taxes, the military service, but on condition

that the Moslems of Shkodér, too, should be subjected to them and that the system of Ddliikbasis (commanders of groups of soldiers) and Moslem serguirdehs (Turk. sergerde = chief bandit), consecration of the inequality of rights between the two faiths, be abolished and each tribe choose its magistrates. If the ancient regime should, in another form, remain in force, we claim, as it is fair, the maintenance of our immunities.” 7”

When at the Congress of Dibér the question of recruitment came up, the Shkodrans were reproached for enjoying the benefits of all other citizens without participating in their burdens. ‘The delegates of Shkodér replied that from their point of view it was inacceptable that their province, which

until then had been a privileged one, should suddenly be obliged to submit to recruitment. ‘They were backed in their attitude by Captain Eyub Sabri Effendi, one of the prominent

members of the Committee of Union and Progress, who praised the traditions, the proud history, the courage and patriotism of the Shkodrans. He pointed out that the difficult position of Shkodér required a reconsideration. Apparently, the Young Turks were not decided to extend the principle of equality to all the citizens of Shkodér, because in the fanaticism of the Moslems the Young Turks saw an obstacle to the Cf. J. Larmeroux, La politique extérieure de VAutriche-Hongrie, 1875-1914, Paris, 1918, 11, 406; R. Pinon, op.cit., pp. 815-816. 127bid., p. 816.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK CONFLICT 395

nationally minded Moslems of that city, and an important support for their own pan-Ottoman and Moslem policy.*® In the fall of 1909 a new flare-up of popular agitations occurred, provoked by the collection of tithes. The populations of the towns of Vucitrn, Ipek, and Lumé refused to pay 1/8 of the harvest as tithe, since they had previously paid only 1/10.14 Under the pretext that the Lumjans disobeyed the order to enter the market-place of Prizren without their weapons, Djavid Pasha penetrated in September into their mountainous region. Here he encountered resolute resistance. Following a fierce battle and the burning of several villages, he retreated to Prizren, giving as an excuse the cold weather.’ The disturbances were intensified in Dibér, where many AI-

banians from Kosovo fled from the army of Djavid Pasha. Armed Albanians gathered in the mountains, on the left bank of the Drin river, threatening the rear of the Turkish armies in Kosovo. ‘The ‘Turkish command attempted to come to an agreement with them, but they turned down the ‘Turkish proposal. The agitations in Dibér went on for two months and even spread in the nearby district of Mat. The Turkish command did not deem it wise to pursue its struggle in these regions.?®

In November 1909 in the parliament of Istanbul a drastic “law on the bands” was promulgated. He who carried and kept arms was condemned to six months of imprisonment; ten years in jail was to be the punishment for those who participated in bands; and death for organizers and leaders of guerrillas. The law further stated that if only one member of the family took part in bands, the whole family was subject to punishment and its property was to be confiscated. In spite of its general character, this law was believed to foreshadow ruthless legal measures to crush Albanian resistance. It gave - Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 5 August 1909, No. 106, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/7. 147. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 140. ~2R, Pinon, op.cit., 818; Leka, 1x (28 November 1937), 364.

161, G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 140-141. . a ,

396 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE the Turkish government the right to inflict reprisals on whole villages in Albania, for, owing to the tribal system which prevailed there, it was possible for a whole village to belong to one family.1"

The policy of centralization was also resented by the south-

ern Albanians, not because they wanted to preserve their privileges, for they had none, but because they desired the free development of their nationality. ‘The clash had been foreseen. It was held that Albanians and Young ‘Turks would work together until the former had sufficiently strengthened

their national cause, but that they would part ways later because of the contradiction between the Albanian national efforts and the Ottoman idea of the state.1® While the principle of religion bound Moselem Albanians and Young ‘Turks together, that of nationality separated them. To the newspaper Kom) of Boston, in whose opinions only the principle of nationality mattered, the opposition between the program

of the Young Turks and the Albanian national cause appeared deeper: ““The Young Turks aim at reviving Turkey and the national Albanians endeavor to expel her from their country and govern themselves.” 1° ‘The Committee of Union and Progress did not fail to rec-

| ognize the significance of the religious and theocratic principle. Gradually—from outside and perhaps in a pan-Islamic form—it came again to be appreciated. Islam was used effectively in the alphabet question in Albania. In the beginning, however, this principle was pushed to the background, beCause it was in too open an opposition to the interconfessional character of the July Revolution. Besides, an abrupt return to the direction of Islam would be provocative to the Christian population.”? 17§ee for more details on the law V. Bérard, La mort de Stamboul, Paris, 1913, pp. 395-396; The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, pp. 329, 367. : 48Pésfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 December 1908, No. 77, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6.

Kombi, 24 July 1908. ,

20Cf. Rappaport to Aehrenthal, Salonica, 17 March 1909, No. 27,

vertraulich, p. 1, HHStA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/4. |

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK CONFLICT — 397

All Albanian patriots who stood for unity, and there were none who did not support it, reacted to the pan-Islamic principle, whether they were conscious of it or not. Some, like Faik Konitza, went even further. In an article addressed only to the Moslems, Faik pointed out that there was an imminent danger for them. It seemed certain to him that in a short time the Ottomans would be forced out of Europe and the Moslem Albanians would then run the risk of being expelled, as their country would be partitioned. There remained, therefore, two solutions for his co-religionists: either to return to the

faith of their ancestors, that is, to become Christians, or remain Moslems, but be so closely and sincerely united with the Christians as to give to the nation a semi-Christian character. Since reconversion was not feasible, Failk counseled them to preserve Islam but at the same time to depart from the political evil it entailed: the identification by foreigners of the Moslem Albanian with the Turk. He then proposed the following steps: (1) to drop the use of “Turk” for “Moslem” or “Mohammedan”; (2) to try to gradually reach the point when they would not recognize the seyh-tl-Islam and would create for their religion a Moslem synod, called Council of Ulemas of Albania (Arnautluk meclisi’ulemast), having at the head a director of ulemas (reis-ul ’ulema); (3) this synod should later make some laws in conformity with the Albanian customs; (4) as to the Bektashis, they should be reformed and

better organized. He warned, in conclusion, that these changes would be of no avail, if the Albanian Moslems did not propagate among the people ideas of union and brotherhood with the Christians.”+

One who openly stepped into the fight was Dervish Hima. His fiery speeches against the pan-Islamic influences of the Young Turks and in defense of national unity were enthusiastically received by the audiences. For this reason the Young

Turks tried to assassinate him. Although he encountered the undermining influence of the Young Turks everywhere, 41“Njé lajmérim i shkurtér Muhamedanéve” (A Short Notice to the Mohammedans), Albania, XII (1909), 21-24.

398 Ill, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE the most unsatisfactory impressions were made by Durrés and Tirana, where religious fanaticism held the mass of the popu-

lation prisoner.?? It should not be overlooked also that panIslamism, apart from the danger it presented to the national idea, met with general aversion on religious grounds by the Moslem ‘Tosks, as many of them were Bektashis. The centralistic policy of the Young Turks would inevitably clash with the autonomistic demands of the Albanians, particularly if these contained radical reforms such as those proposed by Shahin Kolonja. In his program, the deputy of Korcé proposed that Albanians should serve as soldiers in their own vilayets, or at least in Albania, except in cases of general mobilization. For a better training of the soldiers, the subaltern officers should be Albanians. Even the gendarmerie officers in Albania should be Albanians and should either be

graduates of military schools or of special gendarmerie schools. In the exploitation of mines and the construction and maintenance of railroads the interest of Albania should prevail and foreigners should be restricted in participation. Shahin further proposed that mayors should be elected by the system of open vote and their authority broadened. The revenues assigned to public works in Albania should be at the disposal of the local administration. In appointing civil servants to Albanian vilayets, Albanians should be preferred. The Albanian language and nationality should be officially recognized by the government and the birth certificates of the Albanians should carry the designation “Christian Albanian” or “Moslem Albanian.” ?3 At the Congress of Dibér (July 1909) autonomistic claims do not appear. Only a few nationalistic demands are contained in the resolutions. Because of the frequent disputes about the Albanian-Montenegrin frontier, it was asked that

the Ottoman government discuss the question soon with 22Cf. Posfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 4 March 1909, No. 10, Geheim, HHSiA, PA xtv/15, Albanien x1/6; Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 16 April 1909, No. 58, HHSitA, PA xiv/10, Albanien v/7-13. 28See text of the program as Beilage to Pdsfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 30 November 1908, No. 75, Geheim, HHStA, PA x1v/15, Albanien x1/6.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK CONFLICT 399

Montenegro (art. 6). As many Albanian soldiers had not returned from expeditions to distant lands and hot climates, it was resolved that the soldiers who would be sent to Hedjas, Yemen, and other tropical lands should be chosen on a proportionate basis, taking into account the Ottoman army as a whole (art. 7). It was further asked that the tithe be a fixed sum and not farmed out (art 8). Also the government employees should be acquainted with the particularities, customs, and character of the inhabitants in places where they would function (art. 5). More prominent, on the other hand, were the resolutions in favor of the Ottoman state. The delegates declared that they were Ottomans and would live and die as such. No contradiction was found between the Constitution and Islam and all attempts to alienate the Albanians were doomed. ‘The Albanians were ready to die for the de-

fense of the Ottoman Constitution. In the event that the

honor of the Ottoman empire would be at stake, because of questions of foreign policy, the Albanian regiments would be ready to go to war. If any revolutionary movements or disturbances, instigated by foreigners, would be directed against the laws of the country and the constitutional government, the people would be called to arms to suppress them, under the orders of the government.** The resolutions of the Dibér Congress seem an artificial compromise between the demands of the Young Turks and those of the Albanians. Both parties

revealed their weaknesses. The Young ‘Turks failed in their objective because they accepted resolutions which brought forth the particular place of Albania; the failure of the Alba-

nians was that they could not eliminate or attenuate the articles which favored the Ottoman state and they did not succeed in making clearer and more nationalistic claims.” 24See Vendimet e Kongresit té Dibrés (The Resolutions of the Congress of Dibér), Monastir, 1909, or ‘‘Beschliisse der Versammlung von Dibra,” as Beilage to Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 5 August i1g09, No. 106, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/7. ‘There are differences between

the Albanian and German versions of the resolutions, both of them translations from the original ‘Turkish, but in essence they are the same.

2°Cf. Rappaport to Aehrenthal, Salonica, 6 August 1909, No. 73, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xtv/15, Albanien x1/¥.

400 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE _ Beginning with the second half of 1909 the policy of the Committee of Union and Progress tended to be more nation- : alistic. But the concept of an “Ottoman nation,” which was created by Midhat Pasha and was adopted by the Young Turks, had nothing in common with nationality. It acquired a national meaning only for those who wanted to preserve the state—the officers and the more intelligent functionaries primarily—and from whom the members of the Young ‘Turk Committee were chosen. This oligarchy, which was the rep-

resentative of the Ottoman national idea, aimed at a strong government for the maintenance of the unity of the empire.”® Although in the press and in the official statements the Young

Turks continued to speak about constitutional freedoms and the unity of all the peoples of the empire, under the name of “Ottomanism,” their actions bespoke the contrary. Gradually they abandoned allusions to national freedoms and rights of the non-Turkish peoples.?? It is true, on the other hand, that the constitutional freedoms had strengthened the centrifugal tendencies of the non-Turkish elements, particularly of those that identified themselves with the neighboring states. The rift between the Cemiet and the political organization of the non-Turkish people was unavoidable. In the Turkish parliament the opposition was intensified. Former members of the Ahrar party constituted a group of | “modern liberals’? under the leadership of Ismail Kemal,?® who at that time had returned from his exile in Athens, as the parliament had cleared him of the accusation that he had been an instigator of the counter-revolutionary movement.?® | With the slogan of national autonomy, this group attracted the non-Turkish deputies, among whom were several Albanians. Fadil Pasha of ‘Tirana told the Austrian consul Kwiatkowski, during their conversation on the island of Brioni, *6Cf. Rappaport to Aehrenthal, Salonica, 17 March 1909, No. 24, vertraulich, pp. 2, 7, HHStA, PA xiv/g, Albanien v/4.

*"Cf. I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 136.

72H. Tunaya, Tiirkiyede siyasi partiler (The Political Parties in Turkey), Istanbul, 1952, p. 283, as cited in I. G. Senkevich, op.cit.,

p- 156. 2°27 iria, 4 July 1909.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK CONFLICT AOI that the Young ‘Turks were jeopardizing the national development of the Albanians; it was necessary for the latter to attach themselves to the liberal party, which did not want to put any

difficulties in their national and perhaps autonomous development.*° "Toward the end of 1909 another group, the Ottoman Democratic Party, became active as an opposition to the Young Turks. Its leader was the Albanian Ibrahim Starova (Temo).*! The program of this party, which was joined too by Albanians, was the democratization of the government and the defense of constitutional liberties, including the right of the subject peoples to receive education in their native language. But it did not stand for national claims of any of the peoples of the Ottoman empire and did not make use of the antithesis between non-Turks and ‘Turks. It had a pan-Ottomman character. Apparently the party believed that a constitutional government should satisfy the national demands of the non-Turkish peoples. It did not ask, therefore, for national autonomy. Herein lay its weakness and the failure to expand its influence in European Turkey.*?

| These oppositions did not make the Young Turks relax their hold on the non-Turkish peoples of the empire; on the contrary, they made it tighter. In November 1909 the “law on associations” was enacted by parliament, despite the objections of the non-Turkish deputies.3* ‘The law declared subject to closure all societies constituted on the basis of “national denomination and distinction.” National societies could exist only as “Ottoman” and only if they were engaged in the fields of education, economics, industry, and agriculture.°4 Thus all national societies and clubs were deprived of the right to engage in political questions. 80Conversation of Consul Kwiatkowski with Fadil Pasha and Fuad Bey Toptani on Brioni, 20 August 1909, and answer of 19 September 1909,

pp. 1-13, in HHStA, PA xiv/1o0, Albanien v/10. | 81H, Tunaya, op.cit., p. 254, as cited in I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 157. 82See I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 157-159. The program of the “Ottoman Democratic Party” in Albanian is in Bashkimi 1 Kombit (Union of the Nation), 17 December 1909.

38V, Bérard, op.cit., p. 392. 34Tbid., p. 393-

402 Il. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE The Albanian patriots felt the impending danger to their societies and clubs. Already rumors had been spread that the Albanian clubs were “insurrectional hearths,” which, infiltrating the sentiment of discord, served the interests of foreigners.*> In the Congress of Monastir of March 1910, the Albanians made clear the position as to their clubs. It was said in the resolution of that congress that, because of their fundamental aim and their general organization, the Albanian clubs, which were literary, should not adhere to any political party. The committees of the clubs could discuss in their meetings only purely literary subjects. However, a member of an Albanian club was free, as an individual, to belong to any political party of his choice. Supporters of all the parties could be found in the clubs. Consequently, the congress rejected unanimously the suggestion—obviously made by the Young Turks—to declare itself for one political party alone.

In order to dispel any error which might arise in public action, the congress further stated that the Albanian clubs could not be engaged in anything but linguistic-literary questions. As long as there was no instance of force majeure, this line of conduct of the clubs could in no way be modified.*®

_ Striving to weaken the Albanian national movement, the Young Turks offered to some of its leaders lucrative posts in the government.*” ‘They did not end the old practice of ignor-

ing the Albanians as a separate nationality in their nofuz record.?® As the majority of the Albanian government employees were also active participants in the national movement, they transferred them to Asia Minor and replaced them with ‘Turks.%®

In the beginning of March 1910, Ismail Kemal paid a visit ®°C, Libardi, op.cit., 0, 364. *Tbid., Document 18, pp. 262-265.

s’Rappaport to Aehrenthal, Salonica, 23 September 1909, No. 83, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien x1/6. _ *8Pésfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 1 February 1910, No. 8, vertraulich, HHSiA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xiv. °°Cf. I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 138.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK CONFLICT 403 to Pallavicini, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Istanbul. The statements he made showed the situation in the empire

and the existing relations between the Albanians and the

Young Turks. He attacked the Committee of Union and Progress for its inclination to make the Turkish nation alldominant, excluding the other nations, even the Moslem ones.

He also condemned the way in which the government dealt

_ with Macedonia, pointing to the use of the “law on the bands.”’ Although he expressed confidence in the consolidation of the ‘Turkish state—perhaps for political reasons—he

_ regretted that with respect to Albania the government did not pursue the right policy. ‘The Grand Vizier, Hakki Pasha,

was a partisan of dividing the Albanian people in two in order to play off one party against the other. He mentioned as a most striking example the alphabet question. Despite the interference of the government and the machinations of the Cemiet, there was no doubt in Ismail Kemal’s mind that the national direction would have the upper hand.*° At about this time a solution of the Albanian question was proposed by the newspaper Flamuri (Flag). It was the changed name of the influential Dielli (Sun), organ of the autonomist party, published in Boston, because the ‘Turkish government

had prohibited its circulation in the empire. The program it espoused was as follows: ‘The goal would be the administrative autonomy of Albania. The method to be used would be

the preparation of electing to the Ottoman parliament a eroup of nationalist Albanians, which would play a similar role there to that of the Irish in England and of the Catalan party in Spain. The justification would be that the geographic situation of Albania was such that that country could be isolated from Turkey at any time and be forced to administer

and defend itself all alone. Administrative autonomy would prepare her to play this role. It was believed that this project was advantageous even for the Turks, and efforts would be made to make them understand its advantage and 40See Pallavicini to Aehrenthal, Constantinople, 2 March 1910, No. 12B, streng vertraulich, HHSiA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/6.

404 Il. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE obtain their support by a conciliatory attitude.*1 Commenting

on this program, the French consul in Shkodér found it the only solution which responded to the double eventuality of the dissolution or the preservation of the Ottoman empire. In the first instance, if this did materialize in the very near future, Albania, trained in self-administration, would be able, without crisis, to take her national place among the Balkan states. In the second case, Albania, grateful to Turkey for satisfying her national aspirations, would constitute for the latter power a precious force and not any longer a permanent trouble.4? But the Young Turks turned a deaf ear to such a sagacious solution of the Albanian question proposed from across the Atlantic.

In retrospect it can be seen that the obstacles to Albanian national development were two-fold. On the one hand, there were the religious divisions among the people and the difference in culture between north and south. Regarding this difference Mr. Graves, financial adviser to the ‘Turkish government, who accompanied Hadji Adil Bey, the Turkish Minister of the Interior, in his reform trip to Albania in the spring of 1912, expressed a pertinent opinion. He held that in the culturally and economically more advanced southern part of the country five years would be sufficient to carry out the necessary reforms; in northern Albania, a whole generation would be necessary to obtain simular results.42 On the other hand, there were the efforts of the Young Turks to deepen the existing divisions and use them in their own interest. Although their various pressures prevented the free national development, the armed and the unarmed resistance of the Albanians, whether it was for privileges or for the national cause, was a unifying factor, which was later intensified. “See Ferté to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 10 April 1910, No. 8, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1910, Vol. vu. “Tbid. “Halla to Berchtold, Monastir, 13 May 1912, No. 3%, vertraulich, HHAStA, PA xiv/39, Albanien xxxIv.

XVII Revolts, Demands, and Interventions IN THE MIDDLE of March 1910 the situation in Kosovo began to deteriorate. ‘The valz ordered that town dues be imposed on

goods imported in Prishtiné. As a protest, some 800 Kosovars

barred the road from Prishtiné to Podjova. Delegates from the city failed to persuade them to disperse. ‘The insurgents demanded the abolition of the town dues and the fulfilment of the Ferizovic promises. A clash with the Turkish army ensued; and the revolt rapidly expanded.! It was accompanied by a meeting at Ferizovic, to which armed men from many parts of Kosovo rushed. Although there were different individual complaints, they all had one complaint in common: “We have been deceived! ‘The Young Turks have broken their solemn agreement.” *? A besa was concluded to oppose the Young Turk regime, which had suppressed their age-old rights and traditions.* In April the Turkish government dispatched General Shefket Turgut to quell the rebellion. He had under his command 16,000 infantry apart from cavalry and artillery. The Albanian insurrectionists, who were fewer in number, had occupied the passes. At Kacanik, the commander was Idris Sefer1; at Crnoleva, the command was in the hands of Hasan Hysen1

and Isa Boletini. In spite of the fact that they were without artillery, the Albanians inflicted heavy losses on the ‘Turkish army in the battle of Kacanik.> On May 2, 1910 the Ottoman Minister of War, Mahmud Shefket Pasha, arrived and the army was increased to more than 40,000 strong, for the Young

Turks were firmly resolved to put an end to the Albanian 1E. b. V. [flora], Die Wahrheit tiber das Vorgehen der Jungtiirken in Albanien, Vienna and Leipzig, 1911, pp. 26-28. 2E., Jackh, Im ttrkischen Kriegslager durch Albanien, Heilbronn, 1911, p. 26. 3Tbid., p. 39. ‘CE. ibid., p. 32. “Cf. Leka, 1x (November 28, 1937), 366.

406 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE insurrection. In the battle of Crnoleva the Turks were again the victors and the road to Prizren was now open to them.° During his whole expedition in Kosovo, Turgut Pasha used harsh measures to disarm and subdue the population. In vain the Albanian deputies protested in the session of April 10, 1910 against his “barbarous advance.” In vain the most influential Albanians in Istanbul presented a report to the Grand Vizier explaining the occurrences in Albania. The government refused to give explanations even in the parliament and declared that there were no grounds to send an investigating commission.’ It further empowered the general in Albania to apply the nortorious “law on the bands.” ® Having disarmed Kosovo, Shefket ‘Turgut Pasha proceeded to Shkodér. On his way he engaged in a serious battle with the forces of Mehmet Shpendi, barjaktar of Shalé, which made him reach Shkodér a few days later (July 26, 1910) than he had

_ planned. Immediately he ordered the inhabitants to turn in their weapons, and asked for execution of the census and the drafting of young men 18 to 26 years of age ®—all steps deeply

resented by the population. The whole of northern Albania, except the northern and northwestern mountains, was occupied by Turgut Pasha’s armies. Having accomplished his mission, the ‘Turkish general left Shkodér on August 22, 1910, destined for Salonica. Passing through Mirdité, he or_ dered his troops to occupy Dibér and disarm the population. His whole campaign in northern Albania lasted five months.’ The repression of the northern insurrection was followed by the war on the cultural movement. The Albanian clubs —on the basis of the ‘“‘law on associations’”—were closed, the SSee E. Jackh, op.cit., pp. 37-39. See L. v. Chlumecky, “Die Jungtiirken und Albanien,” Osterreichische Rundschau, Xxvi (January—March 1911), 270; I. G. Senkevich, Osvobodite’noe dvizhente albanskogo naroda v 1905-1912 gg., Moscow, 1959, p. 169. _ &V. Bérard, La mort de Stamboul, Paris, 1913, p. 395. °Leka, 1x (28 November 1937), 366-367.

See E. Jackh, op.cit., pp. 27-29, 37-42; E. b. V., op.cit., pp. 26-27; Leka, 1x (28 November 1937), 367.

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION 407 authorities considering them as hotbeds of revolt.14 Next came

the suppression of newspapers and the imprisonment of editors and leaders. Fehim Zavalani, the editor of Bashkimi i _ Kombit of Monastir, and his collaborators were arrested, because their paper had published an eye-witness account of the atrocities perpetrated by the Turkish army in northern Albania. As the article had been reproduced in some European papers, it had disturbed the ‘Turkish Minister of War.?? ‘The arrests of the editors Mihal Grameno from Korcé and Lef Nosi from Elbasan followed suit.1? During the perquisition of a house, Sami Frasheri’s booklet on Albania’s future, published in Istanbul many years earlier, was found. ‘The owner of the house was condemned to 15 years imprisonment because he kept writings which revived the historic past and were damaging to a common conception of the state.‘* ‘he court martial of Elbasan sentenced Demir Pasha to a 6-year deportation because his presence “‘could hinder the design of the government.” }° Hodja Hafiz Ali was exiled for 10 years for the simple reason that he had taught Moslem religion in Albanian in the ‘Teachers’ School of Elbasan. Albanian newspapers published abroad were forbidden to enter the country.7°

How much the attitude of the Albanians toward the Young

Turks had changed by this time is shown in the harsh criti-

cism made by the agas of Janina of the unsatisfactory func- | tioning of the parliament, the struggle caused by the alphabet, 1C, Libardi, I primi moti patriottict albanest nel 1910-r1911-1912, Trent, 1935, 1, Document No. 18, p. 264. 12See Bornemisza to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 3 July i910, No. 41, streng

vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xiv; Jousselin (?) to Pichon, , Monastir, 20 July 1910, No. 71, AMAE, ‘Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1910, Vol. viu. 13See “Memorandum of the Central Committee of the Albanian Students to the Public Opinion of the Civilized World,” 10 October 1910, in C. Libardi, op.czt., 11, Document No. 19, pp. 266-267. 14. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., p. 271. WI bid., p. 272. ®Tbid., p. 267.

408 Il. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE and the ruthless suppression of the revolt of the Kosovars by Shefket Turgut Pasha. In conversation with them, wrote the Austrian consul, one could discern disappointment, hopelessness, and hatred for the regime of the Young ‘Turks.!" After a demonstration in Boston, the Albanian colony in the United

States wired to Aehrenthal: “Mass meeting Albanians resolved to humbly beseech his imperial royal majesty as one of most powerful neighbors intervene to moderate Turkish excesses against Albanian nationality.” 1® ‘The Austrians were

concerned from the very outset about the outcome of the expeditions. They saw in the weakening of the Kosovars the strengthening of pan-slavism.?° Shefket Turgut Pasha’s campaign, however, did not put a halt to the rebellion of the north. Ded Gjo Luli, the Catholic

chieftain of Hot, gathered his highlanders and, joined by those of Shalé, under Mehmet Shpendi, decided to defy the orders of the vali of Shkodér to pay taxes and deliver their arms. Pursued by the Turkish troops, the insurgents entered - Montenegro.”° Other Albanian mountaineers, from Grudé and Kastrat, followed in their steps; Podgoricé (Titograd) became the center of the refugee revolutionaries, among whom were Isa Boletini and other leaders of Kosovo. King Nicholas (he had now become a king) intervened with the representa_ tive of Turkey to Montenegro, Sadeddin Bey, and the Albanian refugees to seek a solution. ‘The Albanians stipulated these conditions: (1) return of their weapons; (2) dispensation from the newly ordered taxes; (3) construction of roads and opening of national schools. The Turkish envoy considered ‘Kraus to Aehrenthal, Valona, 3 June 1910, No. 28, Geheim, HHStA, PA x1v/9, Albanien v/6.

Text of telegram sent by Joseph Pani, chairman of the Albanian meeting, to Aehrenthal, Boston, 24 October 1910, HHStA, PA x1v/33, Albanien xxxIv.

Cf. “Memorandum iiber die Riickwirkung der Orientkrise auf die Osterr.-ungar. Politik in Albanien” (by Consul General Rappaport), Herbst 1909, Geheim, p. 12, HHStA, PA xiv/28, Albanien xx/10. *°Cf. Leka, 1x (28 November 1937), 367-368; C. Libardi, op.cit., 1, 173 and II, 119.

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION 409

these claims inacceptable and advised his government to leave

the emigrants to their fate. The movement was assuming larger proportions—the number of Albanian refugees rose to 2,500—and this placed Montenegro under considerable expense and the menace of a conflict with Turkey. The Porte, on the other hand, must have understood that a sharp action in Albania, especially the forceful introduction of reforms, would vex the Catholics, who until then had been relatively quiet and on the side of ‘Turkey, and would aid Montenegro. As the situation of the Albanian escapees in Montenegro was becoming worse, the King appealed to the great powers for a solution.??

King Nicholas informed the Austrian representative in Cetinje, Giesl, that he was willing to return the Albanian refugees to their country, but that he would not do anything contrary to the right of political asylum.” "The Montenegrin Prime Minister, on the other hand, had a talk with the Rus-

sian envoy, Arsenev, who advised him that Montenegro should abstain from any rash step, stressing that, 1f she did not, she would have no support at all from Russia. He pointed out that, in view of the disintegrating situation in Turkey, it

would be folly to start a fight with that power in order to achieve what would shortly fall to Montenegro’s share.*3 Aware that he could not expect from any one of the great powers encouragement for war or even a benevolent neutrality, King Nicholas assumed the role of a peacemaker.** He 21See Gies] to Aehrenthal, Cetinje, g October 1910, No. 92, vertraulich;

Mémoire by Tomanovich, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro, Cetinje, 4-17 October 1910, No. 2/98; Gies] to Aehrenthal, Cetinje, 23 October 1910, No. 94AB, vertraulich—all in HHSitdA, PA xiv/33, Albanien xxxiv; Quennec to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 14 October 1910, No. 26, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie,

1910, Vol. vit. ,

22Gies] to Aehrenthal, Cetinje, 14 November 1910, No. 100-B, vertraulich, in op.ctt. 23Tbid.; Louis to Pichon, St. Petersbourg, 23 November 1910, No. 311,

AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1910, Vol. viu. 24See ibid.; Paul Cambon to Pichon, London, 17 November 1910, No. 424, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1910, Vol. viu.

410 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE received fourteen chiefs of the Malissori (Albanian highlanders), who stated that they would not go back unless the following demands were fulfilled: (1) a general amnesty must be declared through an trade; (2) military service should be performed only in the vilayet; outside it only when sanctioned by Istanbul; (3) the mtidirs (municipal chiefs) of the tribes should be chosen from among the Albanians; (4) the kaymakams (sub-prefects) should be Christian and the Albanian language valid; (5) the value of the confiscated arms should be reimbursed; if the Moslems were to be armed, the Christians should also be armed; (6) sequestrated or confiscated property should be indemnified; and (7) all the abovementioned points should apply to all the Malissori. Strange to say, the Turkish envoy this time found the demands on the whole acceptable and recommended them to the Porte. As it was here a question of Catholic Albanians, he asked for the support of Austria-Hungary at Istanbul.”® On November 18, 1910 the reply of the Turkish government arrived, accepting in general the demands of the Albanian emigrants. ‘here were only a few changes in details: no money would be paid for weapons, but burned-down houses would receive indemnity. As for military service, only the 21-year-olds would go outside the vilayet, and then to Istanbul; the older ones, after 3-month service in the vilayet, would . be in the reserve.?® Following the communication of the note to the Montene-

grin government, King Nicholas assembled the Albanian chieftains and made known to them its contents, at the same time stressing the hospitality in Montenegro and his government’s efforts to assure their fate and future. He then asked the Malissori chiefs to return together with their people to their homes. The vali of Shkodér, Bedri Pasha, was to wait for them in ‘Tuzi and regulate their return.?" 2Telegramm in Ziffern an Ritter von Zambaur in Scutari, Vienna, 19 November 1910, 7 Uhr 30 p.m., HHSiA, PA x1v/33, Albanien xxxIv.

"Tbid. |

“See Gies] to Aehrenthal, Cetinje, 20 November 1910, No. 102,

| vertraulich, in 7bid.

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION All

The return of the Malissori to their homes was followed by another armed demonstration, this time in the mountains of Dibér. ‘Thousands of Albanians mustered there in December 1910 to set forth their claims. They did not appeal for privileges, but for the opening of Albanian schools, free circulation of Albanian publications, amnesty for all Albanians condemned for political activity, government employees to be of

Albanian nationality, the construction of roads, and the spending of taxes within Albania.?8 —

The signs were that disturbances would break out again. In February 1911 Ismail Kemal paid another visit to the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Istanbul and told him that in the spring he expected another Albanian uprising. This opinion was shared by his uncle, the former Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha, with whom the nephew was at odds.?®

The revolt broke out in March 1911 in the mountains north of Shkodér (Mbishkodér). Ded Gjo Luli and his men attacked the ‘Turkish watch-posts along the Albanian-Montenegrin frontier.®? It soon acquired a new vitality. The vali of Shkodér, Bedri Pasha, attempted to use religion in the application of the principle divide et impera. As most of the insurgents—and there were more than 4,000—were Catholics, he appealed to the Moslems on March 27, 1911 to accept arms from the government and pursue those who wanted to destroy the din (Moslem faith). ‘There were some Moslem Albanians who fought against their brothers. Ironically, they were called the followers of hiirriyet (liberty),*1 the first part of the slogan

of the Young Turks, the other two being “justice” and “friendship.” Under the increasing attacks of the ‘Turkish 28C. Libardi, op.cit., 1, Document No. 20, pp. 269-272; J. Larmeroux, La politique extérieure de l Autriche-Hongrie, 1875-1914, Paris, 1918, 0, 407-408.

29See Pallavicini to Aehrenthal, Constantinople, 25 February 1911, No. 8E, Geheim, HHStA, PA x1v/33, Albanien xxxIv. soZambaur to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 27 March 1911, No. 27 and Giesl to

Aehrenthal, Cetinje, 28 March 1911, No. 19B, both in HHStA, PA x1v/33, Albanien xxxIVv. 31S$ee C. Libardi, op.cit., 11, 171; Para to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 27 March

1911, No. 27, HHStA, PA xiv/33, Albanien xxxiIv.

412 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE army, the whole mountainous region north of Shkodér ** was

united, joined by patriots like Luigj Gurakugqi, a Catholic intellectual from Shkodér, who had served as the director of the Teachers’ School in Elbasan from the day of its opening until its closing.*? Podgoricé became again the headquarters of the revolutionaries. On April 27, 1911, after a visit to the revolutionary leaders in Podgoricé, Dr. ‘Terenc ‘Toci (Tocci), an Italo-Albanian nationalist lawyer, gathered the chieftains of Mirdité and Dukagjin, as well as the Moslems from Mat and Dibér, and hoisted the Albanian flag at Kiméz (Ghims), in Mirdité. Toci was 1n touch with General Ricciotti Garibaldi’s Committee, which had promised him assistance. On the day of the meeting at Kiméz a short-lived “Provisional Government of Albania” was proclaimed with Dr. ‘Toci as president, and Albania was declared ‘free and independent with her frontiers in history and language and nationality.” 34

Confronted with the growing proportions of the Albanian uprising, the Porte again entrusted Shefket Turgut Pasha _ with the command of the new expedition. As soon as the General arrived in Shkodér, he issued a proclamation of martial law (May 11, 1911). He promised pardon to Albanian insurgents if they returned home and handed in their weapons within five days. Only the chiefs would not be pardoned, but would be tried by the court martial (Divani Harb).*> The Albanian chiefs gave their answer on May 18, 1911 from Podgoricé. They reminded Turgut Pasha that the previous year they laid down their arms because he had promised them the 32Hot, Kelmend, Grudé, Kastrat, Shkrel and Shalé. “Teka, x (28 November 1937), 374.

“See P. Pal Dodaj, “Shqypnija e Shqyptarve e Qeverija e Pérkohéshme” (Albania of the Albanians and the Provisional Government) FAyllt t Drités (Star of Light), Shkodér, x (1934), 245-255; Leka, op.cit., Pp- 514-515 (text of the declaration is included); C. Libardi, op.cit., u, 37-49, 52-53; Krajewski to Cruppi, Scutari, 4 June 1901, No. 99, AMAE,

Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, January-June 1911, Vol. Ix. “See Italian text of the proclamation in HHStA, PA x1v/35, Albanien xxxIv, and Albanian text in Leka, op.cit., 374-376.

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION 413

constitutional rights. The Turkish government, however, had

responded to those promises with the closing of national Albanian schools, levying of taxes exceeding their power, unjust imprisonments, and other oppressive measures of a despotic regime. They also added that only recently the Turkish authorities provoked an internecine fight by arming the Moslem Albanians and putting them on the front line against the Christian Albanians. They concluded that they would turn from revolutionaries into faithful subjects of the Empire only when the constitution was no longer a dead letter but a living pact.?* In a telegram previously dispatched to the Sultan they had appealed not only for grace and justice,

but also for a delegate with whom they could talk on their terms; otherwise they would not return to their homes.** Podgoricé was once more full of Albanian refugees—insur-

gents ready for war and wounded ones, together with their families—and the battle was raging along the MontenegrinAlbanian frontier. It is strange that Montenegro, a country

against which the northern Albanians had often fought, should offer asylum to Albanian revolutionaries. Her protection and support, for she supplied the Albanians with weapons, was certainly motivated by political considerations. It was no secret that she had helped the Albanian revolt. Her king boasted that he could bring it to an end within twentyfour hours if he so desired. Montenegro wanted war in order to expand her territory, and the Albanian insurrection could be used for that purpose.* The prolongation of the revolt had advantages for Montenegro: on the one hand, it diminished 8°The reply from Podgoricé, signed by approximately 60 Albanian

chiefs, is an Italian translation found as Beilage to the Bericht ddo Scutari, 27 May 1911, No. 52, HHStA, PA xiv/35, Albanien xxxIv; a

French translation of it is an annexe to the dépéche of the French Consul in Scutari, 22 May 1911, No. 89, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, January—June 1911, Vol. ix. 87See Bericht ddo Scutari, 27 May 1911, No. 52, HHSiA, PA xiv/35, Albanien xxxIv.

pp. 217-218. |

38M. E. Durham, Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle. London, 1920,

414 Ill, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE > Albanian fighting power; on the other, it obligated the Albanian mountaineers to Montenegro. If Turkey yielded to the claims of the Albanians, the Turkish army would leave the country. In the event of an invasion on the part of Monte-

| negro, resistance in northern Albania would be weaker. If Turkey continued to use force to quell the insurrection, the mountaineers would think that Montenegro was their friend and Turkey their real enemy. She could then use them for her aims, in case an intervention would be necessary for the peace of the Balkans. The Montenegrin Prime Minister had in fact assured his king the previous year, when the highlanders found asylum at Podgoricé, that the Albanian highlanders would collaborate with Montenegro at the suitable moment.®® It should be remembered also that on several occasions Nicholas, both as a prince and as a king, had expressed directly or indirectly his intention of having as ruler of Albania his son Mirko or himself.*° Before long the situation became embarrassing for Montenegro. ‘The number of Albanian refugees to be taken care of

increased and ‘Turkey concentrated troops on her border. Russia could not refrain from intervening. In a note of May 1911 she reminded the Porte that, when the Albanian uprising began, it assured St. Petersburg that it did not intend to disturb the peace of the world. Montenegro’s military measures near the borders, the Russian note maintained, were only for her protection and Russia would counsel her to be careful. At the same time D. A. Nelidov, Chief of the Near East Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, gave an interview to Novoe Vremya, in which he stated that the Russian note was not a threat or an ultimatum, but that the situation

was so grave that it was imperative to remind Turkey and 38See Giesl to Aehrenthal, Cetinje, 14 November i910, No. 100-B vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/33, Albanian xxxIv. 40Cf. D. Djorjevic, Izlazak Szbije na Jadransko more: Konferencija Ambasadora u Londonu 1912 (The Exit of Serbia to the Adriatic Sea and the Conference of Ambassadors in London 1912), Belgrade, 1956, p. 55; W. S. Vucinich, Serbia between East and West, Stanford, 1954, P- 135-

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION 415

Montenegro of their expressed assurance for peace.*! As a consequence, Turkey gave assurances of her pacific intentions toward Montenegro in the speeches delivered in the Turkish

Chamber by both Rifat Pasha, the Foreign Minister, and the Grand Vizier. In this way Russia, by supporting Montenegro, which in turn was aiding the Albanian insurrectionists, attempted to establish cooperation between Albanian and Slavic elements in order to upset Austrian designs. St. Petersburg also advised Montenegro to observe strict neutrality in the relations of the Albanian revolutionaries with ‘Turkey. As the Albanians were disposed to make common cause with all those who favored their demands, Austria-Hungary was naturally somewhat disturbed. Moreover, the Turks had instituted a regime of terror in Albania, among whose victims were the Catholic highlanders. Because of its cult protectorate over the Albanian Catholics, the Dual Monarchy’s prestige was at stake, particularly as clericalism had just at this time regained power in Vienna. It let the Porte know that a change in ‘Turkish methods was necessary.*? ‘This Austrian step had an immediate effect. The Turkish government, afraid of a new intérvention in its affairs, announced on June 12, 1911, through the press that the Albanians were subdued, and that on the occasion of the trip of Sultan Mehmed V to the Kosovo plain, where Murad I fell during his victory over the Serbs in 1389, a general amnesty would be granted to the revolu-

tionaries.** |

On June 18, 1911 Shefket Turgut Pasha communicated

*'Szilassy to Aehrenthal, St. Petersburg, 27/14 May 1911, No. 16A-B, and the following Beilagen, HHStA, PA xiv/35, Albanien xxxiv. See also St. Petersburger Zeitung, 27/14 May 1911. “Cf. Buchanan to Grey, St. Petersburgh, 26 May 1911, and Lowther to Grey, Constantinople, 30 May 1911, in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. 1x, Part 1, Nos. 472 and 473 respectively.

“Cf. Bompard to Poincaré, Thérapia, 21 September i912, DDF (1874-1914), 3e série, Vol. 11, No. 450; Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, 8 June 1911, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. 1x, Part 1, No. 476.

**Lowther to Grey, ‘Therapia, 14 June 1911, in zbid., No. 479.

416 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE the imperial decree of amnesty to the population. The insurgents should return within ten days and deliver their arms; the Sultan would grant a personal gift of 10,000 Turkish liras as reparation for damages; the government would indemnity the highlanders for property lost or destroyed.** At this time Ismail Kemal was in Cetinje. He had gone there, he says in his Memoirs, “in order to join the chiefs of the Malissori, who had taken refuge with their families in Montenegro before the threats of Shevket Tourgoud Pasha.” *® Had he gone to Montenegro of his own accord? Fazil Pasha ‘Toptani, one of his friends, told an Austrian diplomat (Rappaport) that Ismail Kemal took the trip to Montenegro at the expressed desire and advice of Count Charykov, the Russian Ambassador to Turkey, with whom he was in steady contact.*7 At a meeting at the village of Gerche (Gertche) in Montenegro, on June 23, 1911, a memorandum was drawn up at the instigation of Ismail Kemal, signed by all the delegates of the Malissori. It was their reply to ‘Turgut Pasha’s proclamation of the am-

nesty. Having assailed the regime of the Young Turks as tyrannical and having referred to the destruction incurred by Djavid Pasha in Lumé and the devastation in the north by

Turgut Pasha, the memorandum set forth the Albanian claims. In addition to the usual demands for the opening of Albanian schools and the use of the Albanian language, the following were significant: a guaranty against anticonstitutional actions and abuses; the respect of customs and traditions; the recognition of the national existence of Albania; “Text in C. Libardi, op.cit., 1, pp. 94-95, or, Leka, op.cit., p. 390; see also ‘Tewfik Pasha to Nicholson, London, 14 June 1911, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. 1x, Part 1, No. 480. “The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, p. 368. ‘7Ref. I, attached to Ballhaus (Aehrenthal) to Széczen (Paris), Vienna, 5 December 1911, No. 3121, HHStA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/6. Because of the activity Ismail Kemal was allowed to develop in Montenegro, it is

plausible that he was in touch with Count Charykov. However, it is doubtful that his contact was “steady.” Ismail Kemal’s attitude was in general anti-Slav, and this author has not encountered other references to his relations with Charykov or any other Russian diplomat.

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION 417

full liberty to choose their own deputies; the organization of the vilayets inhabited by Albanians along lines of decentralization; the choice of the valis and high officials from among the most capable of the empire, the rest of the government employees to be selected among the Albanians; the appointment for a given period of a representative of the Sultan as Inspector General; obligatory military service for all Albanians, who would serve in time of peace only in Albania, and

the constitution of a special military organization for the regions bordering on the Balkan states, with Albanians having the right to serve there for the surveillance and defense of the frontiers; taxes to be spent first for the needs of Albania;

the restitution of confiscated weapons with the obligation on the part of their possessors to comply with the regulations.*8

The Gerche memorandum, referred to often as the ‘Red Book,” because of the color of its covers, was of great signifi-

cance for the Albanian national movement. It was not restricted to any one region but applied to the whole of Albania,

and aimed at national autonomy. It exercised a great influence on future demands, whether of the north or the south. Meanwhile the Albanian leaders were becoming more and more anxious as to Montenegrin intentions. Some members of the Albanian Committee asked M. E. Durham, the English writer and relief worker, who at that time was at Podgoricé taking care of the Albanian refugees, if she would advise them

to appeal, in the name of the Albanian people, to the British

nation as a lover of justice and freedom. Although Miss Dur- | ham had less faith than they in British unselfishness, she replied that it could do no harm.*® A letter in French by a 48See complete text in C. Libardi, op.cit., , 134-141, and a faithful extract from the reply itself in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. 1x, Part 1, pp. 482-483; “Mémoire sur la décision prise par l’Assemblée générale des chefs Albanais a Gertche 10-23 June 1911, en réponse a la proclammation de Chewket Tourgout Pacha” and the Albanian original, in AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, January-June, 1911, Vol. Ix, pp. 233-243. 49M. E. Durham, The Struggle for Scutart, London, 1914, p. 54-.

418 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE well-known foreign correspondent, well expressed and moderate, was dispatched to England.®° The letter had been favor-

ably commented on by several papers, and it was then that the Montenegrin government learned of the step which had been taken. King Nicholas was annoyed for “‘as then became evident, he did not wish the Maltsors [Malissori] to be anything but pawns in his own game.” ® When England’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, received the petition from the chieftains at Podgoricé (the Gerche resolutions) and was asked to bring their case before the great powers, he seized the opportunity to step

forth in the role of peacemaker and defender of a small people. He proposed to the great powers that they intervene and call on ‘Turkey to promise to satisfy the claims of the Albanian insurgents in order to “bring rebellion to an end or to avert the serious consequences that may arise from its being prolonged.” *? Grey’s proposal was opposed primarily by Germany on the ground that it constituted an interference in the internal affairs of Turkey.®* In the meantime, Montenegro and ‘T'urkey—under pressure from Russia and Austria, which were not ready for war in the Balkans—had begun talks for the regulation of their frontier differences and the question of the Albanian refugees.®4 In the middle of June Sultan Mehmed V arrived in Kosovo

together with his suite, at the head of which was the Grand Vizier. Although Kosovo had always been known for its faith-

fulness to the Sultan, the reception was cold. In the Kosovo plain, where a large and Islamic manifestation was expected, only people from the suburbs were assembled. The towns of °Tbid., ‘The name of the well-known correspondent is not mentioned. “1Tbid., p. 61.

*2Grey to de Salis (Berlin and other embassies), Foreign Office, 26 June, 1911, Tel. (No. 115), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. 1x, Part 1, No. 498.

De Salis to Grey, Berlin, 28 June 1911, zbid., No. 501. See, for Russia, Nos. 499; 502, Enclosures 1 and 2; 5007; for Austria-Hungary, Nos. 508, 511, 513, in zbrd.

4See I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 190.

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION 419

Ipek, Gjakové and Prizren did not send any representatives,” revealing that a significant change had taken place in Kosovo. On July 3, 1911 the Sultan signed the decree of amnesty.®® But the revolutionaries refused to return. They were too bitter against ‘Turgut Pasha. They held him personally respon-

sible rather than the Istanbul government for all the misfortunes of Albania. It was deemed wise by the Porte to recall

him to Istanbul; he left Albania in July of that year. ‘There was some satisfaction for the Albanian patriots to see the humiliation and departure of the General who, after his expedition against them, had been personally decorated by the Sultan and by the ambassadors of the powers in favor of the status quo for having quelled the Albanian insurrection.*" : Abdullah Pasha, who replaced Turgut Pasha, brought new proposals with him from his government, concessions limited to the Catholic highlanders. Besides according an amnesty and permitting the opening of Albanian schools, these concessions were: military service would be performed in the vilayet of Shkodér, and only the last year in Istanbul; government employees should know Albanian; for a period of two years there would be no draft and no taxes would be paid; after two years the dues on livestock would be greatly reduced; the right to carry arms would be granted; a commission, composed of one representative of the government and one representative of the Catholic Archbishopric of Shkodér, would evaluate the damages to the property of the highlanders which the government would repair, the Sultan himself pledging 10,000 liras; all highlanders who returned from exile would be assisted with food and money.*® 55See Carlier to Cruppi, Uskiib, 18 June 1911, No. 37, AMAE, Turquie,

vich, op.cit., p. 184. a

Politique Intériere, Albanie, January-June 1911, Vol. 1x; I. G. SenkeText in C. Libardi, op.cit., 1, 162-163.

Tbid., pp. 142-144. For this period of the Albanian uprising (30 March-21 October 1911), see British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. 1x, Part 1, Chapter Lxxv, pp. 449-512.

Text in GC, Libardi, op.cit., mu, 175-176; Leka, 1x (28 November 1937)» 393-

420 | Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE _ The Malissori could no longer stay in Montenegro. King Nicholas, seeing that the powers were not willing to support him, had already yielded on July 15, 1911. He informed the foreign powers that he would not permit the Albanians to cross the border and attack the Turkish troops.®® His prohibition was later changed into pressure. He asked the Malissori to accept the new proposals and return to their homes. After

several interventions, including that of the Catholic clergy under Msgr. Seregji (Sereggi), on August 3, 1911 the agreement between the Turks and the Malissori was signed at Podgoricé.®©

The uprising which broke out to the north of Shkodér in the spring of 1911 was followed by resistance in the south. Already in the beginning of the year the central secret committee in Monastir had asked many Albanian notables—Akif — Pasha from Elbasan, Emullah Aga from Strugé, Kiazim Bey

Frashéri from Prespé, and several notables from Dibér—to create guerrilla bands of 50 men each at their own expense.*! On May 15, 1911 an appeal was made from Vloré by the Central Revolutionary Committee © to the Albanians to be ready for the general revolution. ‘The Committee demanded of the government of Istanbul: (1) administrative autonomy within the Ottoman empire; (2) union of the four vilayets (Shkodér, Kosovo, Monastir, Janina) in a single pashalik governed by Albanians, with a separate parliament and a Separate army; and (3) all government employees to be of 59C, Libardi, op.cit., 11, 107; see also for other details, E. C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, Cambridge, Mass., 1938, Pp. 93.

“See Krajewski to de Selves, Scutari, 7 July 1911, No. 143; 11 July 1gi1, No. 145; 10 July 1911, No. 156; 25 July 1911, No. 159; 28 July 1911, No. 163 in AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, July-

December 1911, Vol. x. | ®*Bornemisza to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 26 February 1911, No. 14, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/33, Albanien xxxiv.

It is not clear whether this committee was for the district of Vloré

or for southern Albania. |

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION 421

Albanian nationality. The appeal concluded with the threat that if Turkey did not fulfill the demands, the Albanians would not lay down their arms.** From Korcé Mihal Grameno travelled to Istanbul, where he met with leaders of the Albanian national movement. Upon his return, the Committee of Korcé was constituted, and on June 16, 1911 its first detachment took to the mountains, with Dr. Haki Mborja and Vangyjel Gjika at its head. ‘The organization of committees spread in other parts of the south and new bands were formed. One of the points of the program of the bands was the assassination of beys who opposed the insurrectional movement.®* The Turkish authorities began to arrest and imprison suspected organizers and collaborators. In the town of Korcé about 30 persons were jailed, among them Mihal Grameno.® The bands, which had been growing, were composed of several hundred men: in Frashér, there were 500; in Delviné, 200; in Kurvélesh, 300.66 At the command of the most important ones were ‘Themistokli Gérménji from Korcé, Spiro Bellkameni from the district of Florina, Qamil Panariti

from Korcé, and Musa Demi from Gaméri.% The guerrilla | bands were composed of men from various social layers, and what is more significant, from different faiths. In the districts 68C. Libardi, op.cit., u, Document No. 23, pp. 274-275. A similar declaration by the “Central Albanian Committee,” dated 1 May 1911, is included in Mercier [?] to Cruppi, confidential, Rome, 17 May 1911, No. 143, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, January-June 1911, Vol. 1x.

64Consul of France to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Monastir, 5 July 1911, No. 21, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, JulyDecember 1911, Vol. x.

65M. Grameno, Kryengritja shqiptare (The Albanian Revolution), Tirana, 1959, p. 8. 8See I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 194; Duchesne to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Janina, 24 July 1911, No. 17, AMAE, Turquie, Politique In-

, térieure, Albanie, July-December 1911, Vol. x. s7Cf. A. Buda, “Rruga e popullit shqiptar drejt 28 néndorit 1912” (The Road of the Albanian People toward 28 November 1912), Rruga e Partisé (The Road of the Party), m1 (November 1957), 38.

422 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE of Korcé and Gjirokastér the Bektashis were active in assisting them.®* Their struggle was not for privileges or immu-

nities, as in the north, but for the rights of the Albanian nation: it was on the national level. Typical bands composed of young idealists, both Christians and Moslems, were those of Spiro Bellkameni and Qamil Panariti. Qamil Panariti’s band, which was active in the district of Korcé, had decided in the evening of July 27, 1911 to

attack the prison of Korcé in order to liberate the patriots who were being kept there, but before attempting the assault,

the band was surrounded by the Turkish army at Orman Ciflik, in the neighborhood of Korcé. The next day a fierce battle raged in which several young Albanians fell ®—the martyrs to the rising national movement. It was not in the interest of the Turks to open a second

front while they were engaged in the north. The Turkish government acted with caution in the south. The functionaries were ordered to be restrained in their repressions and the army was in general on the defensive. It also tried to persuade the Albanians to give up demands for autonomy and ask for reforms.”° As a consequence, some leaders of the national movement withdrew temporarily from the battle and intensified efforts to press the Albanian claims by a show of force in “armed meetings.” The secret committee of Janina took such a step: it gave instructions that in the towns of the vilayet, on the occasion of the anniversary of the Young Turk Revolution (July 23, 1911), armed meetings should be held in favor of the autonomy of Albania. At this time in the north the Porte made its proposals to the Malissori insurgents. Some of the Albanian leaders of the south saw danger in the proposals not so much because they did not recognize an autonomous Albania but because they applied only to the revolu®8Consul of France to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Monastir, 5 July

1911, No. 21, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, JulyDecember 1911, Vol. x. 6°See M. Grameno, op.cit., p. 8.

Cf. I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 197.

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION 423

tionary zone of the north—and thus had as an objective the division of the country. In order to counteract this danger they organized on July 21—before the fixed date—an armed assembly in the Orthodox monastery of Cepo (Gardiki) near Gjirokastér. In the resolution of Cepo the harm to national unity by a special administration in the north was stressed and the demand was set forth that Albania should have one and the same system of administration for both the north and the south, in order to assure “the completeness of our nation.”” Another claim was that the schools should be in Alba-

nian and that the national alphabet should be used. ‘The memorandum of Cepo was on the whole of a _ peaceful nature.” The committee of Korcé, however, and its guerrillas did not send any representatives to the Cepo meeting. Its example was followed by Vloré. Both districts stood for autonomy and could not accept the resolutions of Cepo for reforms. In fact, the patriots of Vloré and their guerrillas met on July 31, 1911,

and proclaimed that they stood by the memorandum of Gerche and were ready to fight for the autonomy of Albania.”

Following the agreement of Podgoricé, the Porte wanted to come to an understanding also with the south. A meeting was held at Tepelené on August 18, 1911, where the proposals

made by the Turkish government were considered. The ‘Turkish concessions, which provided for a general amnesty, the opening of the schools and the teaching of Albanian, the appointment of functionaries who knew the customs and language of the country, military service in the Albanian vilayets and taxes according to the capacity of the people, as well as the carrying of arms with special permission, satisfied most of The memorandum was signed by Namik Selim Delvina and 42 other representatives; a copy of it is attached to Duchesne to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Janina, 1 August 1911, No. 21, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, July 1911, Vol. x. See also Histort e Shqipérisé, 1900-1919, p. 40.

72Ibid. See especially Duchesne to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Janina, 3 August 1911, No. 22, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie,

July 1911 Vol. x. _

A424 Il. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE those present. The efforts of the autonomist Albanian patriots

to have the Gerche memorandum accepted failed. And the revolutionary movement in the south suffered a setback.” Although contacts between the north and the south were established during the 1911 revolution, a common leadership which could direct and coordinate the various revolutionary actions could not be created. A secret organization, called the “Black Society,” which was formed in the south for that purpose, not only did not succeed in directing the whole Albanian insurrectional movement,” but it was not even ina position to coordinate that of the south. There were powerful divergent forces within the Albanian society. Yet the revolutionary movement of 1911 proved to be an important step

toward mobilization and organization of forces and the growth of the political consciousness of the Albanians. It | obliged Turkey to enter into political negotiations with the Albanians and made the Albanian question known to the

outside world. | |

The crisis through which the Young ‘Turk regime was pass-

ing became more serious in the period subsequent to the August agreement between Istanbul and the Albanian insurgents. On September 29, 1911, Italy declared war on Turkey. In order to avoid disturbances in Albania while engaged in war with a foreign power, the Porte tried to carry out some of the promises that had been made. It declared, for instance, that Albanian would be introduced in the elementary and secondary schools and that it would give financial support to the Albanian schools. It was suspected that this was to be arranged in such a way as to bring national education under its control and divide the Albanians.” The Porte also released some of the patriots who had been imprisoned in Korcé, but it did not put into effect the general amnesty. Nor did the vali of Shkodér fulfill all the conditions of the Podgoricé agreeHistort e Shqipérisé, 1900-1919, p. 41. 4A. Buda, op.cit., p. 39. “See Dervish Hima to Arthur Rabler, Péra, 23 January 1912, HHStA,

PA xiv/10, Albanien v/8. ae

_ REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION 495

ment.’ The discontent with the Young Turk regime began to spread among other elements of the empire as well. In November 1911 an opposition party was founded, known as Liberty and Entente (Hiirriyet ve Itildf), which had as an important point in its program decentralization of the administration and recognition of constitutional rights to the national provinces of Turkey. This party came in touch with the leaders of the Albanian national movement and in December 1911 began to exercise a decisive influence in the Turkish chamber. The Young Turks then resorted to the extreme measure of dissolving the parliament on January 18, 1912, with a view to assuring an absolute majority in the next elections.” Some two weeks before the dissolution of the chamber, one

of the most influential Albanian deputies, Hasan Prishtina from Kosovo, expressed his views about the Albanian situation to the Austro-Hungarian consul in Salonica. He saw everywhere a deep dissatisfaction with the Young ‘Turk rule. ‘The Union and Progress Committee’s policy of pan-Turkism had been ruinous. He did not expect the ‘Turkish government to meet the Albanian claims and he foresaw another revolt in Albania. The feeling of national identity in northern Kosovo,

he said, had made considerable progress and the Kosovar leaders were working hard to reach an accord with the other parts of Albania for a great uprising. They had left out the Moslems of Shkodér because they could not be relied upon on account of their backwardness and fanaticism. He attributed the development of the national idea in the north —Ipek, Gjakové, Dibér, Prishtiné, Prizren—to the repressive

measures of the Turks and the breaking of their promises. Hasan Prishtina and his friends felt that it would be most advantageous for Albania to develop within a strong ‘Turkish

state, but the Albanians doubted the possibility of this. On the one hand, ‘Turkey was not in a position to hold on but was disintegrating; on the other, she closed her eyes to the ®Histort e Shqipérisé, 1900-1919, pp. 42-43.

See I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 202-203.

426 IL, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE justified desiderata of the Albanians and would not allow them to be prepared for any eventuality.“* This was a clear picture of the situation and revealed the political thinking of most of the national leaders in the year of the general revolution. Meanwhile, the election campaign had started in Albania. | It worsened the relations between the Young Turks and the Albanians. The Albanian press, especially Lirt e Shqipérisé (Freedom of Albania) of Sofia, assailed the Young Turks and appealed to the Albanian people not to believe their promises

and to elect as deputies patriots like Ismail Kemal, Bajo Topulli, Hasan Prishtina, and others. ‘The Young Turks took administrative measures, using money, fraud, even terror, in order to prevent their opponents from being elected. ‘They gave a special weight to Albania because there the spirit of war was alive. The Young Turks succeeded in barring the

re-election of such deputies as Ismail Kemal and Hasan Prishtina, despite their popularity. When the Turkish parliament convened on April 18, 1912, the majority of the deputies were favorites of the Young Turks, although in Albania the elections did not close until the end of May.”® So absolute was

the majority of the Young Turks in the chamber that they occupied 215 out of 222 seats.®?

During the period of the elections, March-April, a Reform Commission was sent to Albania to investigate matters. It was headed by Hadji Adil, Minister of Interior, accompanied by Albanians who were on the side of the Young Turks, in the hope that through collaboration they would obtain recognition of the right to cultural national development of their people. In order to make a favorable impression, in Janina and Shkodér the Commission appointed new valis. Hadji Adil Bey admitted that the government had made grave mistakes. _ In principle, he said, the Porte should not have levied new taxes on the Albanians and should have endeavored to satisfy "8See Kral to Aehrenthal, Salonica, 5 January 1912, No. 6, Geheim, HHAStA, PA x1v/33, Albanien xxxiv. “Historie Shqipérisé, 1900-1919, p. 44; I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 208. 8°F. C. Helmreich, op.cit., p. 94.

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION AQT

their justified claims. The campaigns it had made had been too costly for Turkey. It was at the time the Commission was in Albania that the Albanian schools were reopened, even the ‘Teachers’ school at Elbasan. But the constant aim of the Commission was the strengthening of the administration and the gendarmerie in Albania.*t When upon his return to Istanbul the Minister of the Interior made his declaration to the

chamber on June 6, 1912, he laid stress on the need for schools and roads in that country.®”

Already before the dissolution of the parliament, toward the end of December 1911, on the initiative of Ismail Kemal, a meeting of a group of Albanian political personalities was held in Istanbul. It decided on the organization of a general insurrection in Albania, to begin in Kosovo and expand later to other parts of the country. Hasan Prishtina was entrusted with its preparation in Kosovo. It was further decided that 15,000 guns and funds needed for the revolt should be procured. It was the task of Ismail Kemal to obtain them from governments sympathetic to the Albanian movement. Imme-

diately after the dissolution of the ‘Turkish chamber, Hasan Prishtina left for Kosovo and Ismail Kemal for Europe. In order to strengthen the revolution, Hasan Prishtina came in contact with the leaders of the Bulgaro-Macedonians, who were also discontented with the Young Turk regime. He

proposed to them in Uskiib to revolt at the same time as the Albanians in order to create together an “autonomous Albanian-Macedonian state.” §* But Sofia prevented the BulgaroMacedonians from coming to such an understanding because it had other plans with Belgrade—the Balkan alliance. 81Cf. Halla to Berchtold, Monastir, 13 May 1912, No. 3”, vertraulich,

HHStA, PA xiv/39, Albanien xxxiv. See also, primarily about its activity in Shkodér, M. E. Durham, op.ctt., pp. 137-147; I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 204-206.

8°His declarations are contained in the newspaper Stamboul, 7 June 1912, which is as Beilage to Bericht No. 47, ddo Constantinople, 7 June 1912, HHSiA, PA xiv/39, Albanien xxxIv. 88 Histort e Shqipérisé, 1900-1919, pp. 43-45. %4Cf. ibid., pp. 45-46.

428 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE | The policy of the Young Turks in the period of the electoral campaign and the composition of the new chamber eliminated all hopes for an agreement between the Albanians

| and the Young Turks. However, the information from the members of the group—it is also referred to as the Central Committee—who had travelled in Albania and had established contacts was that, in addition to Kosovo, Vloré, Berat, Tirana, Durrés, and Krujé were ready for the uprising. In April 1912, following the opening session of the new parliament, members of the Central Committee held a meeting in Istanbul and resolved to begin the revolution, the center of which was to be Kosovo.®

Clashes between Albanian insurgents and Turks occurred during the election, but they were intensified, particularly in Kosovo, in the month of May. Now political leaders and members of the Central Committee began to cooperate with the revolutionaries. On May 20 in the village of Junik, near Gjakové, a gathering was held in which, participating along with the chiefs of the insurgents—Bajram Curr, Isa Boletini, Riza Bey, and others—were Hasan Prishtina and Nexhib Draga, one of the most influential leaders of Kosovo. A besa was concluded to wage war on the Committee of Union and Progress and its government.** Within ten days about 3,000

insurgents reached Ipek and the rest Gjakové.®* | The program of the revolutionaries amounted virtually to autonomy: (1) Albania to be constituted as a single vilayet; (2) instruction to be given in Albanian, using the national [Latin] alphabet, the schools to be built with the taxes levied in Albania for education; (3) Albanian functionaries for Al-

bania and the language of the courts to be Albanian; (4) military service in peacetime to be in Albania.®§ 85See I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 212-213.

SHHStA, PA, A. Reports of the Austrian consul in Prizren, 17 and 28 May 1912, and from Mitrovica, 21 May 1912, as cited in I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 217; see also Histori e Shqipérisé, 1900-1919, pp. 47-48. _ §8Ibid., p. 48; I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 217. | 8’Beilage to Heimroth to Berchtold, Uskiib, 11 June 1912, No. 68, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/39, Albanien xXxxIv.

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION 429

_ From the very first days the uprising of Ipek and Gjakové was backed by the Catholics of Mertur and Nikaj. Mirdité quickly joined them. The efforts of the Turks to make use of

the difference of religion and place Mirdité between the Moslems of Shkodér and those of Krujé failed. Krujé and Tirana had been getting ready for the revolt since the end of 1911 and at the end of June they united with the insurgents

of Catholic Mirdité and Zadrimé. The insurrection found support in the city population of Shkodér, which formed a revolutionary committee. ‘The anti-Turkish movement seized not only Catholic towns, known for a long time for their hos-

tility to the government, but Moslem towns as well. The revolt was now intensified in Dibér and the Albanian districts to the southwest of 1t.8° _ ‘The beys in the districts of the south were not kindly disposed to the Turkish government, especially the Committee of Union and Progress. ‘They were aware that grave disturbances were expected to occur in the summer of 1912. The Albanian colonies abroad, composed mostly of southerners,

had also been informed of the impending revolt. ‘They watched with great interest the situation in the fatherland and were ready for material sacrifices. ‘The Bucharest colony

had sent as its representative to southern Albania Pandeli Cale from Korcé, who declared that he would exercise his influence on the Orthodox Christians to join if the Moslems, especially the beys, would rise. He was particular about the

formation of the guerrilla bands: their chiefs should be chosen with great care among the patriots. The colonies of Egypt were collecting contributions and they put Jani Vruho in charge of the purchase of arms for the insurgents. However, he had to first meet with Ismail Kemal in Montenegro. Progress in the coordination of the movement had been made,

although it was still far from satisfactory. Representatives from the south had been sent for talks with the headquarters of the revolt of the north near Ipek. ‘The ‘Turkish government was impressed by the growing national currents in 89Cf. I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 217-220.

430 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE Albania. It attempted, by sending peace delegations and giving promises and gifts, to preserve division among the Albanians, which had been the strongest card in its hand.*° The Kosovars had successfully revolted in Ipek and Gjakové. Denouncing the elections as improper, they called for the dissolution of the new parliament. The ‘Turkish government, although at war with Italy, was obliged to send troops so that the rebellion would not expand to Prishtiné, Prizren, and Uskiib. But this time mutiny broke out in the army dispatched to restore peace. It spread to other parts of Kosovo.” Under the influence of the Albanian national committee in Monastir, Albanian officers and soldiers began to desert. On June 22, a group of 150 Albanian soldiers with their officer,

Tajar ‘Tetova, carrying ammunitions, left Monastir and joined the insurgent forces in southern Albania. Within a few days the soldiers and officers of the garrisons of Dibér, Korcé,

and Ohrid followed suit. ‘he deserters were not only Albanians but also ‘Turkish officers who were discontented with the Young ‘Turk regime, one of the main reasons being its policy toward the Albanians. ‘The Turkish officers belonged to a secret organization, widespread in the army of the Monastir vilayet, which was called “The Saviors of the Nation.” They declared that they supported the Albanian revolutionaries, but only in questions of a general political character: improvement of the administration, resignation of the Young Turk government, and dissolution of the chamber. They declined categorically to recognize the autonomy of Albania. | While the leaders of Kosovo agreed with the officers of the Saviors of the Nation, those of central and southern Albania refused to give up their demand for autonomy. Although no complete accord was attained between the Turkish officers and the Albanians, they helped each other in their war against the Young Turks. ‘The Kosovars strengthened themselves in Kral to Berchtold, Salonica, 25 June 1912, No. 102, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xtv/39, Albanien XxxIv. %1C. Libardi, op.cit., p. 189.

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION 431

the districts of Gjakové and Prizren, and extended the territory of the revolt in the eastern part of Kosovo vilayet.® ‘The men at the top of the government in Istanbul did not

seem to understand clearly the situation in Albania. The Grand Vizier and the Minister of War, Mahmud Shefket Pasha, assured Austria’s ambassador, Pallavicini, that soon the Albanian insurrection would be suppressed. Mahmud Shefket Pasha maintained that among the insurgents—and

he meant the Kosovars—there was no unifying idea and leadership and that the motives of the revolutionary movement changed from place to place. Since the revolutionary action lacked a unified organization, the revolts, separated by space, could be repressed individually. ‘The opinions of the

Grand Vizier and his Minister of War failed to convince Pallavicini, who wrote to Vienna that they should be taken cum grano salis.°?

There was truth in the arguments of the two Ottoman statesmen. What they failed to understand was that there was

a unifying motive in the whole movement, different from those they took into account: the overthrow of the Young Turk regime. It was this motive which linked it with the movement of the army in the Monastir and Kosovo vilayets. The number of deserters was increasing every day and the officers of the 6th Army Corps in Monastir asked the cabinet to resigon.®4 Despite the packed parliament resulting from the

recent elections, Said Pasha’s government was forced to resign. The pressure of the forces outside the parliament was too heavy.

On July 23, 1912 a new cabinet was formed with Gazi — See Halla to Berchtold, Monastir, 25 June 1912, No. 60, vertraulich; Kral to Berchtold, Salonica, 25 June 1912, No. 101, vertraulich—both in HHSiA, PA x1v/39, Albanien xxxiv; also I. G. Senkevich, op.cit.,

pp. 220-226. , *Pallavicini to Berchtold, Jenik6di, 25 June 1912, No. 54, HHStA,

PA xiv/39, Albanien xxxiv.

Halla to Berchtold, Monastir, 27 June 1912, No. 65, vertraulich,

HHStA, PA xiv/39, Albanien xxxIVv.

432 III. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE Ahmed Muhtar Pasha at the head and with the majority of the Ministers opponents of the Committee. It had come to power with some definite tasks, the most urgent being to make peace with the Albanians.® | On the same day the chiefs of southern Albania met at Qaf’e Sinjés (Pass of Sinjé) and prepared a memorandum. After stating that the Albanians had been the earliest supporters of the Young Turk revolution and that they were compelled now to take to the mountains in order to defend their violated rights—for the deputies also were imposed on them—they presented their claims in twelve points similar not only in spirit but in substance to those of Gerche. At the | end they expressed the resolution to remain in the mountains until their demands were satisfied.°® ‘he memorandum was sent on July 29 from Vloré to the vilayet government and the Porte.®? It was important not only because of its national char-

acter but also because it indicated that the southern insurgents had definitely broken away from collaborating with the

Turkish officers of the Saviors of the Nation and stood for autonomy.

About this time a memorandum (July 28, 1912) was prepared by the president of the Albanian Central Committee for Istanbul. It expressed the Albanian desiderata and at the same time explained them as being in the interest of both Albania and Turkey. It attempted to dissipate any misunderstanding that the Albanians were unwilling to live within the framework of the empire. What they all desired, it emphasized, was an administrative autonomy, which would be for the salvation of Albania and the preservation of the Ottoman state. It proposed the same reforms as the other memoranda, but in a milder tone, and it made the concession of a “free choice of Arabic or Latin alphabet.” It is significant that the

| Cf. E. C. Helmreich, op.cit., p. 95. See Mémoire sur la décision prise par l’Assemblée Générale des Chefs de l’Albanie Méridional (sic) au sommet du (sic) montagne Signa, 10-23 July 1912, copy in HHStA, PA xiv/41, Albanien xxxIv. *’Lejhavec to Berchtold, Valona/Berat, 5 August 1912, No. 35, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/39, Albanien xxxiv.

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION 433

boundaries of the territory proposed to constitute the unified Albanian vilayet tended with the passage of time to acquire

a stable form. This territory was to include the following administrative units: (1) the whole vilayet of Janina; (2) the whole vilayet of Shkodér; (3) the sandjaks of Prizren, Novi _ Pazar, Prishtiné, Ipek, and the kaza of Kalkandelen from the vilayet of Kosovo; (4) the sandjaks of Korcé, Elbasan, and

Dibér from the vilayet of Monastir.° |

As soon as the government of Muhtar Pasha assumed power, it entrusted a special commission to deal with the leaders of the Albanians in Prishtiné. The Commission ar_ rived on July 27, 1912. The first Albanian demand, before the discussion began, was the immediate dissolution of the parliament. If this were not brought about, the Albanians would resume their attacks after 48 hours. It was an ultimatum. In his reply by telegram, the Grand Vizier called for

patience and announced the arrival of Marshal Ibrahim Pasha, acting vali of Kosovo, on the ist of August.°? When he came, the leaders of the insurgents and a delegate from each kaza assembled. Hasan Prishtina delivered a scathing attack on the Young Turk regime. After having enumerated all the violent actions of the Young Turks against his country and stressed the devastation they brought about, he pointed to the recent elections as the last straw. Albania, he said, was a unit and demanded immediate dissolution of the chamber, for it did not have a mandate from the people. Ibrahim Pasha answered that the Sultan had dispatched the Special Commission in order to study the grievances of the Albanians and consider their justified wishes.’ ‘Che ‘Turkish government, already in difficulties with the parliament, was compelled to yield to the Albanian pressure and on August 5, 1912, to the **German translation of the memorandum of the President of the , Albanian Central Committee for Istanbul to one of the Ministers (name

is not mentioned) of the Ottoman Cabinet, Constantinople, 28 July 1912, HHStA, PA xiv/41, Albanien xxxIv. %"Tahy to Berchtold, Mitrovitza, 4 August 1912, No. 45, streng vertraulich, HHStA, PA x1v/39, Albanien xxxIv.

1007 bid.

434 — - Wl. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

mortification of the Union and Progress Committee, the chamber was dissolved by imperial decree.1”

The dissolution of the parliament satisfied only one part of the revolutionaries, the followers of Liberty and Entente, the so-called :tildfists, who were relatively strong in Kosovo. Central and southern Albania, which were strongly for autonomy, continued to demand the fulfillment of the program of Gerche. A certain organization between the north and the south was evolving. Elbasan and Shpat, together with the greetings to the new cabinet, reiterated the desiderata which were common to the Gegs and the Tosks. The Albanian Committee of Fier asked the Grand Vizier that they be represented by two delegates in the discussions between the Albanian leaders of Kosovo and the Special Committee, because

there was a community of interests between north and south.’ ‘The towns of Berat, Delviné, and Gjirokastér were agreed on solidarity with the northern Albanians.’ Delegates from Monastir went to Prishtiné to present the claims there, while Elbasan sent its representatives, among whom were the patriots Lef Nosi and Ahmed Dakh. In Preveza, Leskovik and Gjirokastér meetings were held, while notables from Janina wired to the Grand Vizier, making the same demands as those of the other Albanians.’ All these various movements were proof that the national consciousness among the Albanians had grown; they did not think in terms of their own region, but of the whole of Albania. On August 9, 1912, the Albanian leaders of the north, act-

ing on behalf of the four vilayets, were strong enough to The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, p. 369. *0?Kral to Berchtold, Salonica, 5 August 1912, No. 119, HHStA, PA XIv/41, Albanien XxIv. _ **Lejhavec to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cod. teleg., Valona, 7

August 1912, HHStA, PA xiv/41, Albanien xxxiv; see also letter by Dervish Hima, environs of Gjirokastér, 24 July 1912 (0.s.), HHStA, PA x1v/10, Albanien v/8.

“Halla to Berchtold, Monastir, 8 August 1912, No. 89, and 15 August 1912, No. 95; Bilinski to Berchtold, Janina, 15 August 1912, No. 61—all in HHStA, PA xiv/41, Albanien xxxiv.

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION 435

present substantial demands to Marshal Ibrahim Pasha in Prishtiné, who wired them to Istanbul and promised to lend his support. ‘They were made up of fourteen points and they were presented by Hasan Prishtina; they are sometimes called “the, fourteen points of Hasan Prishtina.’”’ ‘These were: a special system of administration and justice in conformity with the requirements of the country; military service to be effected in Albania, except in time of war; appointment of capable and honest government employees knowing the language and customs of the country; the creation of sultaniyes (lycées), in the vilayets and sandjaks of more than 30,000, with

Albanian in the program of instruction; the creation of _ medreses (schools of Moslem religious instruction); protection of habits and customs of Islam; the teaching of Albanian in schools of every grade; absolute liberty to establish private schools; the construction of roads; organization of nahiyes

(communes); impeachment before the supreme court of Hakki Pasha and Said Pasha (fallen Grand Viziers); general amnesty; indemnity for damages suffered during the insurrection; restitution of arms which had been confiscated.* The points appear to have been a compromise between the conservatives and Hamidists like Isa Boletini, on the one hand, and the enlightened intellectuals like Nexhib Draga and Hasan Prishtina, on the other. Such claims as the recognition of local customs, the carrying of arms, and the founding of medreses were included primarily in order to please the conservative mass and its leaders. ‘Those referring to schools must have been introduced by the enlightened Albanians. One is struck by the fact that the question of the alphabet was not mentioned. Obviously it was omitted because a part of the leaders of the fanatic mass of the north did not favor the Latin alphabet. The creation of nahiyes apparently had as its 10Tahy to Berchtold, Mitrovitza, 11 August 1912, No. 48, streng ver-

traulich, HHStA, PA xiv/41, Albanien xxxiv, and for the points in French, as officially published by Agence Ottomane, see Beilage zu politischen Bericht No. “2G, Jenikéi, 25 August 1912, ibid.; see also The Times (London), 13 August 1912 [3:2].

436 Il. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE goal the splitting of governmental authority so that local authorities—local committees or committees composed of elders and baryaktars—could exercise an influence toward an autonomous rule.?° Although on August 2 Istanbul answered the memorandum of Sinjé with the promise that it would send a commission to investigate the situation, the Albanian insurgents of the south entered Fier and Berat. Under the influence of the agitation

for autonomy, in many districts new guerrilla bands were formed. In Korcé the Black Society appealed to the population to intensify the war against the ‘Turks. Albanian forces , entered Pérmet on August 15, expelled the kaymakam, the director of the police, and the attorney of the government, and handed rule over to Albanian officers. Albanian guerrillas occupied Dibér and Elbasan.1°% ‘The whole of southern and central Albania was in the hands of the Albanian revolution-

aries. |

In Prishtiné, while the majority of the Albanian leaders wanted to wait for the acceptance of the fourteen points, Isa | Boletini, Idris Sefer1, Bajram Curri, and above all Riza Bey Gjakova, united among themselves and ordered their forces to advance toward Uskiib, under the pretext that their people could not wait any longer and that in that city one could extract a tangible guarantee—the distribution of arms. Between August 12 and 15 they entered Uskitib, followed by the

other leaders. On August 14 Ibrahim Pasha, who had returned there in the meantime, called the chiefs of the Albanian revolution to his headquarters in order to communicate to them the acceptance of their demands by the Sultan. Only the impeachment of the cabinets of Hakki and Said Pashas could not be fulfilled, such a procedure being the prerogative of the parliament then dissolved, and the demand for regional military service.1° 106 Cf. Tahy to Berchtold, Mitrovitza, 11 August 1912, No. 48, streng vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/41, Albanien xxxIv. 107See I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 227-234.

108Cf. Heimroth to Berchtold, Uskttb, 21 August 1912, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/41, Albanien xxxiv.

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION 437

It was not an easy matter for the leaders to come to an understanding. ‘The arrival of Abdul and Fazli Toptani from Tirana, who introduced the decentralizing and nationalistic program of the south, brought more confusion to the situation. During the negotiations three groups were distinguished among the leaders: (a) those who wanted the return to Abdul Hamid and preconstitutional conditions; (b) those who followed the program of the itildfists and stood for the application of the Constitution; and (c) those who pursued a pro-

gram of autonomy within the framework of the Ottoman State, outstanding among them being Hasan Prishtina, Nexhib Draga, and Ismail Kemal, although at that time he was not present in Usktib.1°? On the night of August 18, a new

meeting of the leaders took place, in which the moderates, | who were more numerous, succeeded in persuading three chief leaders of the first group (Isa Boletini, Bajram Curri, and Idris Seferi) to accept the agreement with Istanbul./? On September 4, 1912 the Turkish government officially _ notified its acceptance of the Albanian conditions, with the two exceptions mentioned above."!

Ismail Kemal was correct in stating that the aggressive policy of the Young Turks was the “leaven that caused their

[Albanians] national sentiment to revive and flourish afresh.” 112 It brought about a feeling of unity which years of

slow national development would not have been able to achieve. Common suffering and common danger constitute valuable links, particularly for a people whose regional discrepancies are quite pronounced. The general Albanian up-

rising was not only a triumph over the Turks, but also a landmark in the struggle for unity of the Albanian people. 109For a list of the principal leaders in each group, see ibid. 110Cf. rbid.

1The Times (London) September 6, 1912 [5:2]. 42The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, p. 367.

XVIII The Attainment of Independence THE CONCESSIONS which the Porte made to the Albanians

were important and opened the way to autonomy. But when would autonomy be achieved and could they wait for it? The patriots saw that the Ottoman empire was in a state of disintegration and that this jeopardized the very existence of their

country. |

The most far-seeing and active patriot at this time was

Ismail Kemal. He was aware that the preservation of Albania

was dependent not only upon the efforts of the Albanians, but also—and perhaps even more—upon the support or rivalry of the great powers. As early as the spring of 1910, when he was a deputy in the Turkish parliament and the chief of the liberal party, he raised with Pallavicini the question of a unified and integral Albania, in the event of a collapse of Turkey. With this in mind, he asked a few months later, through his friend Fazil Pasha ‘Toptani, to visit Vienna.

At this time the Albanian patriots seem to have come to the conclusion that they could expect efficient help only from Austria-Hungary. But the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that, since Ismail Kemal was in Paris, he could see Nemes, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador

in that capital.2 He met Nemes and confessed to him that although originally mistrustful of the policy of the Dual Monarchy toward Albania, he had of late come to understand that the only defender of Albania was Austria-Hungary.

Nemes, according to the instructions he had received from Vienna, answered that the Albanians could rely on the sympathy and the interest of the Monarchy as long as they worked

for the development of their country within the framework of the Ottoman state and in conformity with its interests. 1See Pallavicini to Aehrenthal, Constantinople, 2 March 1910, No. 12B, Streng vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/g, Albanien v/6.

?Ballhaus to Nemes (Paris), Vienna, 11 August 1910, No. 2292, Gebeim Erlass, in ibid.

ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE 439

Ismail admitted that the interest of the Albanians was to strengthen Turkey but that the Young Turks in their folly to build a unified state did not understand the national feeling of the Albanians, and instead of looking for collaboration provoked the Albanians to insurrection by their unjust perse-

cutions. He appealed for a strong backing by Vienna in Istanbul.3

At the beginning of 1911 the situation began to disturb the Albanians more deeply. Prenk Bib Doda, a deputy then in the

Turkish chamber, expressed to Pallavicini his fear of the downfall of ‘Turkey and the partition of Albania among Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria. ‘The Austrian ambassador’s

reply was that the situation of Turkey was not that bad. However, so far as the Albanian people were concerned, they had the sympathy of Austria-Hungary and her interest in seeing Albania remain undivided.* A month later Ismail Kemal again paid a visit to Pallavicini to discuss Albania’s gloomy situation and his fears of an attack by the Balkan

Slavic states on Turkey. In such an event, he wanted to know, if the Albanians arose, could they rely on the support of the Dual Monarchy? The ambassador answered that his government was a friend of both the Albanians and the Turks and advised him that if such an attack occurred the Albanians would side with the Turks against the foreigners. In keeping with this policy he also counselled that the Albanians should not again organize a revolt against ‘Turkey such as that of the preceding year.° At this time the Catholic clergy, or rather some influential members of it like Don Ndre Mjeda and Don Luigj Bumgi, attempted to extend the meaning of the Kultusprotekiorat to

political relations. In an appeal addressed to the Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand, they declared that the actions of the 3Nemes to Aehrenthal, Paris, 1 October 1910, No. 22, A-E, in tbid. 4Pallavicini to Aehrenthal, Constantinople, 5 January 1911, No. 1D, HHStA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/4,5,6. 5Pallavicini to Aehrenthal, Constantinople, 25 February 1911, No. 8E, Geheim, HHSiA, PA xiv/33, Albanien xxxIVv.

440 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE Ottomans infringed daily upon the Kultusprotektorat and that the abolition of age-old privileges with respect to military service and taxes—founded on accords between the free tribes

and the Turkish government—was a breach of agreement. They called for Austrian intervention.® A year later, when the revolution had expanded to the whole of Albania, Zef Seregji, then archbishop of Shkodér, wrote to the AustroHungarian Consul General in Shkodér, requesting that his country occupy Albania, or at least her Catholic part.‘ While many Albanian patriots looked to Austria for assistance, others had turned to Italy, where an active movement was developing. When ‘Toi proclaimed the provisional Albanian government at Kiméz (Ghims), in April 1911, he expected to receive aid from Italy, not from the government but from Italo-Albanians and Italian volunteers. If for the Italians such help was, as a communication of the Italo-Albanian Central Committee read, an act of generosity and chivalry, “for the Italo-Albanians it was a duty not to be neelected.” It was suggested that subcommittees be formed to raise funds and keep on the alert the youth that wanted to serve.® In Italy men of all shades of political opinion found themselves making common cause with the Albanians; a parliamentary committee for Albania, consisting of some 60 deputies, was formed in Rome, and preparations were made for an expedition of volunteers to Albania.® ‘The correspond-

ent of an English newsparer in Rome referred to a Garibaldian Legion for service in Albania being fitted out under the command of Ricciotti Garibaldi. Its force was estimated at 10,000 enlisted men—an apparent exaggeration—ready to °See Zambaur to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 5 May 1911, No. 2093/2 streng vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/35, Albanien xxxiv.

‘Sereggi to Zambaur, Scutari, 19 June 1912, No. 465, HHStA, PA x1v/39, Albanien xxxIVv.

SComunicazione dal Presidente del Comitato Centrale Italo-Albanese (Napoli), Avv. Francesco Mauro, Naples, 28 April 1911. °G. Volpe, ‘‘Formazione storica dell’Albania,” Nuova Antologia, ccvi (16 December 1939), 331.

ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE 44] strike when the moment was judged to be opportune. In his manifesto, Garibaldi said: ‘““We must come to the aid of our — unhappy brethren on the other side of the Adriatic, and prevent the Turks from further venting upon them their ferocious vengeance. In the pro-Albanian movement it is clear that a wide gulf separates Italian policy from the aspirations of the Italian people. Counsels, entreaties, protestations have been of no avail. ‘The Young Turk has been as deaf to these as was the old Turk. ‘The time for action has arrived.” 1° The Italian government was desirous of weakening Turkey

at the time it contemplated its attack on Tripolitania, but feared that an expedition of volunteers to Albania might cause an intervention by Austria-Hungary. Merey, the ambassador of the Monarchy in Rome, having protested against the agitation of Ricciotti Garibaldi and his followers about Albania, the Italian government saw to it that it was dissi-

pated and seized the arms destined for the enterprise.” When an Italian cruiser sailed to Durrés in June 1911, Aehrenthal made serious demonstrations to Rome about violations of the accord on Albania. It was clear that Austria’s policy toward Albania continued to be that of the status quo. Even in January 1912 its Consul General in Salonica, Kral, told Hasan Prishtina that the AIbanians should give up efforts to break away from ‘Turkey and should understand that their security was better preserved within the Ottoman Empire. He also found the tendencies toward autonomy rather premature, owing to the disunity of the Albanians.'* However, the Austro-Hungarian government did not approve of everything that the Young Turk regime had done and continued to advise Istanbul to be cautious and Daily Chronicle, London, 11 May 1911. 119-U.A., 11, No. 2456-57. 12Daily Chronicle, London, 11 May 1911.

13], Salvatorelli, La Triplice Alleanza, storia diplomatica, 1877-1912, Milan, 1939, p. 389.

14Kral to Aehrenthal, Salonica, 5 January 1912, No. 6, Geheim, HHAStA, PA x1v/33, Albanien xxxIv.

442. Il. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE not go to excesses. But it did this in a very confidential and discreet manner.® Regarding official Austrian policy toward Albania, connected with that toward Italy as well, the secret meeting held between Avarna, Italy’s ambassador in Vienna, and Pallavicini, who was then substituting for Aehrenthal, is enlightening. Avarna formed the opinion that the Monarchy until then was not afraid of serious international complications with respect to the Albanian insurrection. Pallavicini told him that the Porte did not intend to make an issue out of the breach of neutrality by Montenegro. He was opposed to an eventual expedition of naval and military forces by Italy and Austria to Albania, motivated by the security of their settlements or for other reasons. He considered it as unworkable and morally very dangerous. ‘The Monarchy, affirmed Pallavicini, did not think of intervening in Albania. It would not be able to find a plausible ground for action even if the Albanian insurrection expanded and became serious, and Montenegro provoked an armed conflict. Under such circumstances, Austria would only confine the conflict and enter into an understanding with Italy and other powers to prevent greater complications. Following this discussion, Avarna counselled his government | to couch its statements in general terms so that Turkey would not believe that in reality there existed for Austria and Italy an Albanian question.* Yet the suspicion and rivalry between the two powers concerning Albania persisted. Avarna regarded Austria’s attitude

toward the Albanian revolt as proof that she desired the preservation of the status quo in the Ottoman empire in general and in the Balkans in particular, and he tried to convince his government of that.’” But the next month, in a private let-

ter to San Giuliano, he made a proposal which, if it had See vertrauliches Privatschreiben des Herzogs Avarna an Marquis di San Giuliano, de dato Vienna, 3o April 1911, Uebersetzung, HHStA, PA xiv/34, Albanien XXXIV. 16See ibid.

“Avarna to San Giuliano, Vienna, 28 July 1911, ACS, Carte Giolitti, Busta 22, Fasc. 59, Sottofasc. c/1.

ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE 443 materialized, would have displayed Italy’s interest in Albania to the advantage of the Albanian people and would have re-

stricted Austria’s possibility of maneuvering. The proposal was that Italy should seize the opportunity of the renewal of the treaty of the Triple Alliance to ask that the accord pertinent to Albania be completed by including the declaration made by Goluchowski to Tittoni, in the meeting of Venice in 1905, namely, that “the Macedonian regions of the vilayet which were inhabited mostly by Albanian populations must be united in due time with Albania proper in order to give her the geographic and ethnographic delimitation of which there is no reference in the agreement itself.’’ 18

This would have been tantamount to the recognition of a territorially unified Albania, for which the patriots had been striving for so long. However, Avarna’s proposal does not appear to have been mentioned to the Austrians, for on August 31, 1911 Aehrenthal reported to his emperor a German communication according to which Victor Emanuel and Giolitti

were disposed to renew the Triple Alliance unchanged. Avarna himself also communicated officially to Vienna on September 26, 1911 that his government was ready for the renewal of the treaty in all secrecy and as it stood—unmodified. Three days later Italy declared war on Turkey.1® San Giuliano did not seem to favor the war against Turkey, and for good reasons relative to the situation in the Balkans. In a secret memorandum of July 28, 1911 he expressed the opinion that it would be preferable to avoid the expedition to Tripolitania. ‘The main reason he gave was the probability (probability, though not certainty) that its success would be a blow to the prestige of the Ottoman empire. It would rouse to action against it the Balkan peoples, inside and outside Turkey, who were more irritated than ever by the foolish centralized regime of the Young Turks, and it would hasten *®Personal letter of Avarna to San Giuliano, Vienna, 12 August 1911, ibid., Sottofasc. c/2. 19L. Salvatorelli, op.cit., p. 391. The fifth treaty of the Triple Alliance was signed on 5 December 1912.

444 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE | a crisis which could influence and almost force Austria to act in the Balkans. Out of this would probably follow modifica-

tions of the territorial status quo in the Balkans and on the Adriatic, in part actually harmful to the interests of Italy, and in part judged to be, although wrongly, by Italian public opinion.”°

The Italo-Turkish war rendered the position of ‘Turkey in the Balkans more precarious. It indicated that the principle of territorial integrity—the status quo—of the Ottoman empire was not to be respected any longer. It became doubtful that the Balkan states would remain quiescent. ‘The Albanian patriots, faced with the possibility of the disintegration of the Ottoman empire, began to be more concerned about the fate of their country. Under pressure of these circumstances, Ismail Kemal visited Szécsen, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Paris, and told him that Albania was not prepared in the event of a collapse of the Ottoman state. She had not been recognized as a province nor her people as a nation. He did not mention the existing division of the vilayets or Albanian aspiration for auton-

omy, but dealt only with what was more urgent, namely, the recognition of the Albanian people as an “ethnographic entity.” He held that the Albanians and their friends, meaning of course the Monarchy, should use the present movement

to extract from the Turkish government “‘the recognition of the existence of the Albanian nation.”’ He expressed the belief that the Albanians, in case of a dissolution of ‘Turkey, would

Oppose a union with Italy and would aspire only for an Austro-Hungarian protectorate. But Vienna was not yet ready to speak about the future.*! At the same time Ismail Kemal had several discussions with a prominent Hungarian political figure, Bela de Rakovszky, who happened to be in Paris, and expressed to him too his opinion about an Austro-Hungarian 2Promemoria San Giuliano, segreto, Fiuggi, 28 July 1911, in ACS, Giovanni Giolitti Carte, B. 17, Fasc. 38. 21$zécsen to Aehrenthal, Paris, 28 October 1911, No. 38-D, HHStA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/6.

ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE 445 protectorate of Albania, adding that she would thus form an integral and constituent part of an expanded Austria-Hungary, which could then confidently push toward Salonica in the event of a dissolution of Turkey. There was fear among the Albanian people, he further stated, of a conflagration in the Balkans, which would bring about Albania’s partition among her neighbors. When Rakovszky commented on the friendly relations between the Albanians and Montenegro, Ismail replied that the Albanians were aware of the intentions of the Montenegrins but that these would never materialize because the Montenegrins were hated in Albania. If at the moment King Nicholas was being treated with consideration, he continued, it was because he had been friendly and had promised to introduce through his country the arms which the Albanians from abroad were supplying to their compatriots.” Indeed, the declaration of war by Italy on Turkey gave rise to an active movement among the Balkan states. Serbia and Russia started to renew their efforts for a Serbian-Bulgarian alliance.2* As the Balkan states aimed at a war on

Turkey and Albanian territory was coveted by them, the | recurrent demands of the Albanians for autonomy had deeply disturbed them. Peace between Turkey and Albania was disadvantageous to them, particularly if it were accompanied by

the recognition of an ethnic Albania; consequently, they fomented revolts.

In the spring of 1912 the Serbian government worked actively with guerrilla bands in Albania so as to be in a position to create difficulties at the proper moment. It was the impres-

sion of Toshev, the Bulgarian Minister in Belgrade, that Pasi¢ and Hartwig, Minister of Russia in Belgrade, thought it advisable to produce as much unrest in Albania as possible, in order to feel the pulse of Austria and Italy. For this pur-

in ibid. | |

*2Letter of Bela de Rakovszky to Aehrenthal, Paris, 2 November 1911,

23E, C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, Cambridge, Mass., 1938, p. 47.

446 - IM. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE pose the “Black Hand,” a Serbian terrorist organization, was

| used. It got in touch with leaders of the Albanian uprising, especially Isa Boletini.** The Serbian government, moreover,

was making use of the presence of some Albanian beys in Belgrade in order to stir up the insurrection by means of money and arms.”> As for Montenegro, as noted in the previous chapter, she rendered assistance to the Malissori. Austria-

Hungary again attributed to Montenegrin instigation the revolt in August 1912 of the Catholic mountaineers, who until then had had a reserved attitude. Montenegrins, dressed as women, allegedly crossed the Turkish frontier into Albania.”® Greece, too, was not inactive, helping the Albanian insurgents with arms.?? The concern about Albanian autonomy on the part of the Balkan states began to manifest itself more openly. The Bulgarian envoy to the Porte, Sarafov, told Pallavicini that the rumors about an eventual unification of the four Albanian vilayets into an autonomous administrative unity were up-

setting. Such a measure, he said, would give an absolute domination to the Albanian element and would jeopardize the vital interests of the other elements—Bulgarians, Serbs, and Greeks—which inhabited those vilayets. If such an autonomous Albania were created, the Bulgarian diplomat expressed the hope that the great powers would approve of the unification of the vilayets of Adrianople and Salonica as a compensation for the Bulgarians.?8 Pallavicini had heard from other sides that the representative of Serbia in Istanbul had voiced similar concerns.?® As to Greece, her guerrilla **[bid., pp. 44-45.

Iv, No. 3675.

2°See telegram in cipher to Thurn in St. Petersburg, Vienna, 8 August 1912, No. 80, HHStA, PA [ax/41, Albanien xxxiv or O-U.A., *6T bid.

"Halla to Berchtold, Monastir, 5 September 1912, No. 108, vertraulich, HHAStA, PA xtv/41, Albanien xxxIVv.

*8Pallavicini to Berchtold, Jenik6i, 5 August 1912, No. 66D, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/39, Albanien xXxxIv. 2°T bid.

ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE 447 bands made their appearance suddenly in Epirus, in response

to fears that the Porte intended to grant to the Albanians a sort of autonomy.*°

The situation which had evolved preoccupied AustriaHungary. She favored the government of Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, which had brought about a standstill in Turkey’s internal crisis and was endeavoring by concessions to put an end to the Albanian revolt. On the other hand, she did not want to damage the interests of the other Balkan nations and

antagonize them. She thought, therefore, that it would be advisable not to exert pressure on the Porte to grant autonomistic privileges to the Albanians or delimit their territory, but to restrict herself to supporting their claim for the preser-

vation of old privileges and equal rights for the Albanian language. Berchtold believed that the nationalities of Rumelia would welcome this first expression of decentralization if the great powers employed their friendly influence, thus preventing the Balkan states from causing disturbance.*! The reception given to Berchtold’s proposal by the powers was not completely in accord with his intentions.® Italy replied that she agreed as far as the influence on the Balkan states was concerned, but she could not exert any influence on the Porte in favor of a policy of decentralization, because she was in a state of war with ‘Turkey.*? Russia was dissatisfied with the Austrian proposal, and expressed the view to Italy that Berchtold’s real objective was the constitution of an Albania dominated by the Dual Monarchy.** Yet Austria-Hungary

continued her efforts to prevent the outbreak of a war be-

tween the Balkan states and Turkey.® | The discussions about a Serbian-Bulgarian alliance, which Telegram to St. Petersburg and other capitals, Vienna, 13 August

1912, O-U.A., Iv, No. 3687. | 31 bid. |

82Cf. T. v. Sosnosky, Die Balkanpolitik Osterreich-Ungarns sett 1866,

Stuttgart and Berlin, 1914, I, 276. , 8Telegrams from Rome, 15 August 1912, O-U.A., Iv, Nos. 3695-96. 34Cf. L. Salvatorelli, op.cit., pp. 445-446.

35See T. v. Sosnosky, op.cit., pp. 276-281. —

448 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE resumed after the declaration of the Italo-Turkish war, found Bulgaria more receptive. What dominated Serbian governmental thinking, during the negotiations, was Serbia’s exit to the Adriatic. Serbia proposed to Bulgaria an alliance which would secure her from a further expansion of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. She was ready to divide Macedonia with Bulgaria, giving to the latter power the greater part of Macedonia, provided she received for herself northern Albania, in order to acquire an exit to the Adriatic and frustrate the Dual Monarchy’s plans.** ‘The treaty between the two powers was concluded on March 18, 1912, and the military conventions followed. ‘The participation of Montenegro was provided for. In the secret annex, clauses of territorial adjustment were included. While Bulgaria was to receive all territory east of the Rhodope mountains and the river Struma, Serbia would acquire all the lands north and west of the Sar mountains, that is, Kosovo and Metohija (Kosmet) of today. The territory between the Sar mountains, the river Struma, and Lake Ohrid was considered as a contested zone. If Serbia and Bulgaria were unable to find a solution for a larger autonomous territory, the arbiter of the question would be the Russian emperor.?’ Although Albania was not mentioned in the secret annex, Albanian land was partitioned, and it opened for Serbia the way to the Adriatic. Russia, which sponsored the Serbian-Bulgarian treaty, had as a principal goal to bar the supposed Drang nach Osten of Austria-Hungary. The Serbian-Bulgarian pact would also’ stop the quarrelling among the small Slavic states and bring _ them directly into the Russian orbit. Russia would establish her hegemony in the Balkans and her word would then carry weight when the impending dissolution of the Ottoman empire came about.?® For Serbia, too, the Austro-Hungarian DPD. Djordjevic, Izlazak Srbije na jadransko more i konferencija : ambasadora u Londonu 1912 (The Exit of Serbia to the Adriatic Sea and the 1912 Conference of Ambassadors in London), Belgrade, 1956, p. 10. 87See E. C. Helmreich, op.cit., pp. 53-55. 88Cf. tbid., p. 56.

ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE 449

aspect of the treay was important. In June 1912 Premier PaSi¢ told Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, in Petersburg that it would be dangerous for the Balkan League “if Austria’s designs for a large Albania were not dissipated,” and the latter agreed that Austria’s plans could not be allowed to materialize.*?

Side by side with the Bulgarian-Serbian negotiations were those between Bulgaria and Greece, which led to the signing of a treaty on May 29, 1912. The pact did not take up claims in Macedonia; it mainly stipulated that if one of the parties were attacked by Turkey the other would come to its aid.*° However, when mobilization was decreed on September 30, 1912, neither the Serbian-Montenegrin nor the BulgarianGreek military conventions were concluded yet.41 A formal treaty of alliance was signed between Serbia and Montenegro on October 6, 1912.* On October 8, 1912 Montenegro opened hostilities. She had tried but failed to win the cooperation of the Catholic clergy of Shkodér in her action against Turkey.** Early in September the King of Montenegro had offered Prenk Bib Doda support to attain his alleged aspirations to establish in northern Albania an autonomous state with Christian pashas and a Catholic as Governor General, provided that the Cap-

tain of Mirdité would help him occupy Shkodér and the northern part of Albania as far as the Drin river.** At this time—in fact, since the visit of Hadji Adil Bey to Albania—

39Cf. ibid., p. 151. 1 bid., p. 76. ““Ibid., p. 125. “Tbid., p. 88. 43Fistors e Shqipérisé (1900-1919), p. 55-

“4The man used as intermediary in this offer was Sokol Baci (in Austrian documents, Nikola Bacci), Albanian chieftain of the clan of Grudé, who at the time was in the service of Montenegro. See Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 14 September 1912, Z.Z]. 9177/M.I, and as Beilage the report of the Director of the Police in Trieste, 8 September 1912, No. 1405/GP.I., in HHStdA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/4,5-6.

450 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE Prenk Bib Doda had been alienated from the Young Turks, on whose Central Committee in Istanbul he was a member.* Finally, Montenegro managed to foment the rebellion of the Catholic highlanders and assure their collaboration against the Turks.*¢

The Turks exploited the cooperation of the Catholic mountaineers with Montenegro in order to incite religious fanaticism in the vilayet of Shkodér and Kosovo. They began

in September to massacre the Catholic population of Zadrimé, a large number of whom were obliged to take to the mountains. In Shkodér itself a state of siege was proclaimed. With their policy of terror, the Turks pushed the Catholic Malissori still closer to Montenegro. Fierce battles took place in September between the Catholic mountaineers, assisted by the Montenegrin army, and the ‘Turks.**

This situation and the preparations of the Balkan states for war put Vienna in a state of agitation. Before this, on March 17, 1911, Conrad, Chief of Staff of the Dual Monarchy, had viewed unfavorably the collaboration between Albanians

and Montenegrins, as well as the continued opposition in Albania to the Young ‘Turk regime.*® Now, at the end of September, Conrad’s successor, Schemua, proposed the occupation of Kosovo, in the event of the undoing of Turkey, in

order to prevent the unification of Serbia and Montenegro and thus assure a connection with Albania, which he considered “unconditionally” within the Austrian sphere of influence.*®

The hostilities which Montenegro started were followed on October 17 by the declaration of war on Turkey by Serbia and Bulgaria and a day later by Greece. Russia tried to prevent the war, but as Poincaré put it: “She perceives today that it is too late to stop the movement which she provoked, and as I was telling Sazonov and Isvolsky, she tries to apply Cf. M. E. Durham, The Struggle for Scutari, London, 1914, Pp. 143. _ Historie Shqipérisé (1900-1919), p. 55. — 87 bid.

*80-U.A., Note des Chefs des Generalstafs, 11, No. 2487.

| *See L. Salvatorelli, op.cit., pp. 446-447.

ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE 451 the brake, but it was she who started the motor.” ®°, In a short

time the Balkan allies dispersed the Turkish forces and entered Albanian territory. Montenegro occupied Ipek and approached Shkodér. ‘The Serbian armies seized Prishtiné, Priz-

ren, and, together with the Montenegrin troops, Gjakové. They then crossed the valley of the river Drin to advance toward Mat, for Serbia was eager to reach the sea. ‘The Greek

army, after the defeat of the Turkish forces in Epirus, marched in the direction of Janina. All the Balkan allied armies declared that they came as liberators.*!

The first Balkan war created a very complicated situation in Albania. On the one hand, there still existed among the people a warlike spirit against ‘Turkish domination; on the other hand, it became clearer every day that the intentions of the Balkan allies were to partition Albania. ‘The problem which the patriots had to face was very grave: the fate of their country. What should their attitude be in the conflict, and what ways and means should they use for their country’s salva-

tion? The situation was still more entangled by (a) the absence of an Albanian central authority recognized by all, able to override independent regional action, and direct an intri-

cate policy and (b) by the disruption of communications as a result of enemy invasion. It has been maintained that a “policy of neutrality’ seemed from every point of view desirable to the Albanian patriots. By following a distinctive policy the Albanians hoped to give tangible proof of their racial individuality.®? This view, which appears so logical, was formerly shared by the present writer. Facts, however, show that the policy of neutrality was neither

advocated by Albanian patriots nor pursued by the people. It is true that a “distinctive” policy was followed but not that of neutrality. The distinctiveness lay not in the policy itself ‘Poincaré to Paul Cambon, Paris, 15 October 1912, DDF, 3rd ser., iv, No. 170; see also Poincaré’s notes on the conversations at St. Petersburg, zbid., 11, No. 264. —51Cf. Historie Shqipérisé (1900-1919), p. 58. 827. Swire, Albania: the Rise of a Kingdom, London, 1929, p. 135.

452 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE but in its motivation: the Albanians fought on the side of Turkey because they believed that by doing so they would

best safeguard their own territory. |

Within Albania, the initiative for political action was taken by the patriotic society, Shogéria e Zezé pér Shpétim (Black

Society for Salvation). On October 14, 1912 it organized a meeting in Usktib which was attended by leaders of the Albanian movement, national patriots and ex-followers of 7tzlaf, who now joined forces with the former because of the inevit-

able defeat of Turkey. Having concluded that the Ottoman empire was going to lose the war, the gathering of Uskub resolved to make known to the great powers that the Albanian people were seizing their arms not in order to strengthen the rule of ‘Turkey in the Balkans but in order to defend the territorial integrity and liberty of Albania. ‘They demanded for the four vilayets one and the same form of government. The declaration was delivered on October 16 to the representatives of the great powers inUsktib. ‘The meeting of Usktib also appointed a delegation whose duty was to go to Malési e Madhe in order to detach the Catholic mountaineers from Montenegro. ‘The delegation was authorized at the same time to get in touch with other Albanian districts in order to organize the resistance to the partition that menaced Albania.* Before the meeting of Uskiib, in the beginning of October, the newspaper Liri e Shqipérisé (published in Sofia) appealed to the Albanians: “... We should take up the arms and defend the borders of our fatherland demanding the autonomy of Albania. We should raise the Albanian flag and claim our rights.” °4 At the same time the Austro-Hungarian representa-

tive in Rumania wired to Vienna that the Albanians in

‘Turkey had decided to serve on the front: those of the vilayet

of Janina against Greece, those of Shkodér against Montenegro, those of Kosovo and the Sandjak (Novi Pazar) against Serbia and those of Monastir against Bulgaria.®

8See Historie Shgipérisé (1900-1919), pp. 57-58. ,

*4As quoted in zbid., p. 57. |

Czernin to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Code Telegram No. 1263, Sinaia, 6 October 1912, HHStA, PA xiv/41, Albanien xxxIv.

ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE 453 As for the Albanians in the United States, in April 1912 they had succeeded in forming the Pan-Albanian Federation of America, called Vatra (Hearth), in order to help the national movement more efficiently. The leaders, Faik Konitza and Fan S. Noh, held that Turkey, although hard pressed, would not be beaten by the Balkan allies. They were also unwilling to believe that Austria’s vague sympathy for Albania would turn into concrete political action. For the sake of Albanian autonomy they proposed to pledge their word and even their military assistance to Turkey.®® On October 7, 1912 Vatra called a mass meeting in Boston, where represen-

tatives from all New England listened with incredulity to their leaders’ demand that they support ‘Turkey. ‘The Reverend Naum Cére, chairman of the meeting, said: ‘““Turkey, by granting to the Albanian insurgents their demands, made the national existence of Albania a possibility. ‘This development

meant a deadly blow to the encroaching ambitions of the Balkan States. ... Therefore our interest evidently lies in a hearty cooperation with the Turkish army against the enemies of the empire, who are chiefly the enemies of Alba-

nia...” 5 |

When the war started, Turkey mobilized the Albanians in her armies. Albanian soldiers and reserves, as well as detachments of volunteers, fought against the Balkan allies in order

to defend their fatherland from the new conquerors. The Turks, however, after the first reverses, attempted to use the

Albanian detachments in order to protect their retreating

armies. ‘This was one of the main causes of the desertion of the Albanians from the front.®®

As the salvation of their country now depended more on the great powers, the activity of the Albanians on the foreign front was intensified. In mid-October 1912, Ekrem Vlora, a member of an influential family of Vloré and well regarded Federal Writers’ Project of the Works Progress Administration of Massachusetts, The Albanian Struggle in the Old World and New, Boston, 1939, pp. 48-49. S7As quoted in ibid., p. 50. See Histori e Shqipérisé (1900-1919), p. 58.

454 III. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE at the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, arrived in Vienna,

having been sent on a mission by the notables—rather the landowning beys—of south central and middle Albania. Between October 15 and 19, he had several talks with responsible

foreign service officers. | On the premise that Turkey would lose the war and that this

- would lead to an international conference, Ekrem Vlora put a number of questions to the Ballhaus: Could there be a guarantee for the coast of Gaméri as far as Preveza and up the

river Kalamas to be included in Albania? Could there be a guarantee for the continuation of Albania as she then existed? Was there a possibility for the demarcation of the part of the territory predominantly inhabited by Albanians to be under

Turkish sovereignty and Austro-Hungarian supervision in organizing the administration, without any autonomy and without reforms after the Macedonian model? If AustriaHungary did not succeed at the expected international conference in defending the integrity of Albania as previously mentioned, would she be ready, through secret delivery of arms and subsidies, to support the organization of a league of national resistance? Would the Monarchy be disinterested in

the developments and leave the Balkan states a free hand with respect to Albania? Would it be advisable to oppose to the utmost the Balkan states with the assurance that at the given moment the rights of the Albanians with regard to Turkey and the Balkan states would be protected? Was there any prospect of an Austro-Hungarian occupation of Albania

and under which eventualities?

It is evident that the questions centered around the territorial integrity of Albania and the help which the Monarchy could give for its preservation. ‘The answers of the Austro-

Hungarian Foreign Ministry were partly diplomatic and partly straightforward. ‘They first stressed that the Monarchy and the other powers held fast to the status quo and that they

had informed the Balkan states about it. Concerning the guarantees for the littoral up to the river Kalamas and the situation of Albania, the reply was that these questions did

ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE 455 not represent actualities. If a broader crisis ensued, the inten-

tion of Vienna was to preserve the integrity of Albania at least up to the Kalamas river. With respect to the delimitation

of the Albanian-inhabited territory under Turkish sovereignty, the answer was that it corresponded to Austro-Hungarian intentions, yet the Monarchy did not pretend a special right for itself. Although the question about Austria-Hungary's failure to defend the integrity of Albania in an inter-

national conference referred to an unlikely situation, the answer was that Austria-Hungary would be inclined to further the national resistance secretly; in no instance would she be

disinterested in Albania. With respect to the question of resistance to the Balkan states and Austrian defense of Albanian rights, the reply was in the affirmative. It was also stated that never had the Monarchy considered the occupation of Albania.*®

During the month of October, several ministerial conferences were held in Vienna in which questions pertaining to Austrian interests were discussed. One of them (between October 25 and 30) dealt extensively with the territorial changes of Albania. As to the fate of Albania, the conference expressed

the opinion that it was in the vital interests of the Monarchy to preserve that country even if it had to resort to war (ulitma ratio). It was imperative that the Monarchy prevent a great power, or even a small one, from setting foot on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, particularly on the Ionian Sea. It was therefore thought desirable that an autonomous Albania or, in the event of the cessation of Turkish sovereignty, an independent Albania should be established. As far as the territory of this entity was concerned, it would be in the interest of its durability and power of resistance to include as far as possible all the Turkish area inhabited by Albanians. But, because of

the complicated ethnographic relations in the vilayets of Kosovo, Monastir, and Janina, Austria-Hungary thought the territorial desiderata would be difficult to realize, and still - 8Ekrem Vilora’s Questions and Answers of the Ballhaus, HHStA, PA xiv/10, Albanien v/13.

456 III. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE | more so at the moment when the Balkan states were victorious. The conference then drew, under the new circumstances, the frontiers—they were conditional—of an Albania capable of an independent existence.® This point of the program, which came out of the discussion, was communicated to Germany on October 30 and to Italy on November 3.% Now that it had become evident that the status quo could no longer be maintained, Berchtold proposed to Rome on November 17 an exchange of views on the delimitation of the

| borders and the internal organization of Albania. Only the creation of an independent Albania and the security of its territory remained the expressed aim of Austria-Hungary’s Balkan policy.** Districts which were exclusively or preponderantly Albanian should be assigned to Albania, but the results of the war should also be taken into account: thus Gjakové, Ipek, and Prizren should be left to Serbia; to the Greeks Berchtold would cede the territory south of the Kalamas river; the Montenegrins would get Shkodér, if they conquered it, but with a rectification of the frontier near Bocche di Cattaro (Kotar). As to the inner organization of the country, it was suggested that Albania be a principality with a prince not belonging to any one of the Albanian confessions. On November 21 Avarna communicated officially to Vienna that San Giuliano was in agreement with the Austrian

program for Albania, but the detailed answer from Rome was dispatched on November 26. On November 30, however,

Berchtold changed his mind about Shkodér and questioned whether it was possible to detach this city from Albania. There was fear that all the Albanian Catholics would defect. San Giuliano agreed with his Austrian colleague that Shkodér was of vital interest for Albania but affirmed that it was difficult to sustain the case against Russia’s claim in favor

| of Montenegro.®

6°See O-U.A., Iv, No. 4170. 61See discussion of it in L. Salvatorelli, op.cit., pp. 450-452.

61477, Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold. Grandseigneur und Staatsmann, Graz, Vienna, Cologne, 1963, p. 324. 8¢See L. Salvatorelli, op.cit., pp. 453-454.

ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE 457 The attitude of Russia toward Serbian and Montenegrin affairs oscillated. On November 8 Sazonov wired to Rome re-

questing it to intervene with Austria-Hungary to secure her agreement to a Serbian port on the Adriatic. On November 20 Sazonov appeared obdurate to the German ambassador, Pourtalés, and spoke of war, but the same day he sent a telegram to Belgrade that was pacific in tone. Indeed, three days later Pourtalés found Sazonov’s behavior conciliatory; the eventuality of a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia supported by Russia posed the question of a European war.® _ In the meantime the Albanian patriots did not slow down their efforts. ‘The situation was too critical for them. On November 12, 1912 the leaders of the region ‘Tirana—Durrés

made an appeal to the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph II. They mentioned the difficult position of their country, as parts of the four vilayets were under the occupation of the Balkan allies. Regarding him as the emperor of a power that through the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina had become Balkan, they appealed to him to insure the preservation of the territorial integrity of Albania and the granting of complete autonomy to her within the Ottoman state. However, if Turkey, as a consequence of the war, were unable to rule in any way over Albanian lands, they asked that an Albanian kingdom be constituted similar to those of the Balkan peoples. If possible, this kingdom should be neutral like Belgium and Switzerland to maintain the equilibrium of the Balkans. They

concluded that their hopes rested with Franz Joseph II. A week later the Albanian notables in Istanbul—and they were many, both Tosks and Gegs, Christians and Moslems— made an appeal to the great powers in the name of the Albanian people. ‘They stated that they were disturbed by the aims of the Balkan states and feared that “the rights and the fuTbid., p. 454. StAppeal to H. M. Emperor Franz Joseph, Shqypnié (Albania), 12 November 1912, the signatures of the leaders follow at the end, as Beilage to Bericht des k.u.k. Konsulates in Durazzo, 13 November 1912, _ Zl. 74/streng vertraulich, HHStA, PA xu1/417, ‘Tiirkei xxxxv/6.

458 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE ture’ of the Albanian people might be sacrificed. If the Eastern question were to receive a just and durable solution, the Albanian people should be taken into account, and it was the duty of the great powers to intervene. Without denying cer-

tain prerogatives to the conquerors, they claimed that all peoples in the Balkan peninsula had the right to exist, and that fair conditions should be created for them. ‘The Albanian people, known for their struggles for independence in the past

and at present, had the conviction that they were worthy of the esteem of the great powers. They declared that the Albanian people would not permit any alterations in the territorial status quo of European Turkey prejudicial to their rights. They would not permit the interference of the Balkan states in the administration of the land which belonged to them. They would keep their own customs, develop according to their social and political conceptions, and remain the master of their own destiny.© The Albanian colony in the United States was not lax in its

efforts to forestall partition of Albania. On November 17, 1912, Vatra called a mass meeting in Boston, at which Faik Konitza was the chief speaker. He acknowledged the defeat of

Turkey: “Turkey is humbled and Albania is invaded and in danger of being partitioned. What are we going to do, we the nationalist Albanians, to save our country?” Resolutions were passed pledging Vatra’s financial resources to save Albania. Cables were sent to the emperors of Austria and Germany, the

king of Italy, the Pope, the Russian and French foreign offices, and President ‘Taft, demanding that partition be prevented.®¢

During these critical days, the Albanian patriot who played

the most important role—the man of destiny—was Ismail Kemal. He himself has written: “When the Balkan Allies declared war on ‘Turkey, and the Bulgarian armies were in S°Appel du Peuple Albanais aux Grandes Puissances, addressed to Pallavicini, as Beilage to Pallavicini’s Bericht, Constantinople, 19 November 1912, No. 88, HHSiA, PA xi1/417, Tirkei xxxxv/6. The Albanian Struggle in the Old World and New, p. 50.

ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE 459 occupation of Kirk-Kilise, while the Serbs had seized Uskiib,

I realized that the time had arrived for us Albanians to take vigorous measures for our own salvation.” ®? Ismail left for Bucharest, together with Luig] Gurakuqi, at the end of September 1912, in order to consult with the patriots of the large Albanian colony in Rumania. Before his departure, he told an Italian journalist that he saw no solution to the Albanian _ problem except an Austrian intervention.®® There is ground to believe that he had been in touch with Pallavicini, for on November 12 the Austro-Hungarian ambassador informed his Ministry that Ismail Kemal had already left for Vienna. On November 5 a meeting was held in Bucharest, where it was decided that “a directing committee should be created which would undertake the government of the country”; a commission should be formed which would go to Europe in order to defend before the governments of the great powers “the national rights of the lands of the Albanian people’; a committee in Bucharest should be established which would coordinate the activities of the committees inside and outside Albania in order to aid the fatherland more efficiently.” The gathering of Bucharest could not decide whether Albania was going to be autonomous or independent, as that depended

on future developments and the attitude of the great powers. | From Bucharest Ismail Kemal went to Vienna, while the members of the commission who would accompany him to Albania, like Luigj Gurakuqi, Pandeli Cale, Don Kacorri, left for Trieste. From the Austrian capital, on November 9, 1912, Ismail sent the momentous telegram to his son Edhem in Vloré: “Avenir Albanie assuré,’ and asked him to wire the good news everywhere in Albania. He recommended fraternal harmony and cooperation, maintenance of order, and

*’'The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, p. 369. | 68}etter of Dervish Hima to Rappaport, Constantinople, 5 November 1912, HHStA, PA xiv/g9, Albanien v/6.

69Pallavicini [to Berchtold], Pera, 2 November 1912, No. 369, Ref. I, in zbid.

See Histori e Shqipérisé (1900-1919), p. 61.

460 Il. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE regular functioning of public affairs. His son answered on November 13 from Vloré, informing him that the countrymen everywhere had been invited to send delegates to Vloré for the assembly. ‘The delegates had already been chosen and were waiting for instructions. Ismail was asked to speed up his

arrival at Durrés, if that port had not yet been blockaded.” On November 12 Ismail Kemal visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, and tried to sound out the Austrians

as to their intentions. He mentioned the future organization of an autonomous Albania, his design to call an assembly of notables and address a memorandum to the powers containing the desiderata of the Albanians, and urge the Turkish government to order the military and civil authorities in Albania to cooperate with the leaders of the national movement. ‘The officials of the Foreign Ministry limited themselves

to generalities. They told him what the semi-official press of the Monarchy had already published, namely, that the Austrian sympathies for the Albanians and their development were profound and that it was their wish that Austria support the national integrity of his country in order to secure peace in the Balkan peninsula. They could not discuss the specific questions, which they said were still premature, owing to the

war situation.” | | |

But Ismail Kemal’s conversation with Berchtold in Budapest must have been more encouraging. Ismail himself says that Berchtold approved his views on the Albanian national

question.”? He wired from there on November 17 to his 71See copies of the telegrams by Ismail Kemal and his son Edhem as Beilage to the Bericht, Valona, 13 November 1912, No. 64, HHStA, PA xu1/417, Tuirkei xxxxv/6. Intriguing is the signature in Edhem’s teleeram: Edhem—Armiku—Hodhitopa. The last two words are Albanian.

Armiku means the enemy; Hodhitopa should be divided into hodhi “fired” and topa “cannons”; the Albanian words would then read: “the enemy fired cannons.” Apparently Edhem wanted to let his father know that the enemy armies, in this instance those of Greece, were near Vloré. 0-U.A., Iv, No. 4398, Tagesbericht tiber einen Besuch des albanischen Notablen Ismail Kemal, 12 November 1912. The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, p. 370.

ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE 461

friends in Vloré about his imminent arrival at Durrés and the convocation of the delegates either in that town or Vloré. He assured them that Albania’s position was secure. The next

day his son Edhem, in accord with the notables of Vloré, telegraphed to all the towns of Albania to send the elected delegates to Vloré immediately. It was supposed that all of them would convene there in a short time. A large number had gathered in ‘Tirana, among them the delegates of Kosovo;

and those of Elbasan were already on the way to Vloré. But

Vloré was threatened by the Greeks, who had landed in Himaré, and there was fear that their armies might increase as the fight between them and the Albanians of the surrounding regions had begun. In order to protect the town, Albanian forces from Vloré left for the passes of Logara.”4 From Budapest Ismail Kemal left for Trieste, where he met “‘the little band of Albanians from Bucharest’ that was waiting for him there. On November 19 they sailed together for Durrés on the boat which Berchtold had put at his disposal.*® On that day the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister had wired his vice consul in Durrés, Ludwig von Rudnay, to welcome Ismail Kemal and his companions and be ready to assist them if any difficulties were to arise. As far as political subjects were concerned, he was instructed not to touch upon the form of government, but only restrict himself to saying that the Austrians would support the independence and integrity of Albania, a viewpoint shared by Italy as well. He was also warned to keep away from the differences which existed among the Albanian politicians and stress the need of unity among them. ‘The content of the telegram was to be communicated to the representatives of the Monarchy in Vloré and Janina.*°

The differences among the Albanian politicians to which Lejhanec to Berchtold, Valona, 20 November 1912, HHStA, PA. x11/417, Tuirkei xxxxv/6. >The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, pp. 370-371.

66-U.A., Iv, No. 4498, Tel. an den Vizekonsul Ludwig von Rudnay in Durazzo, 19 November 1912, No. 26, streng vertraulich.

462 Ill. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE Berchtold referred in his telegram seem to have been between

Ismail Kemal and his followers, on the one hand, and the many landowning beys of central and northern Albania, most

active of whom had been his cousin, Syreja Vlora, on the other. While Ismail was in Vienna and Budapest trying to win

the support of the Austrian government for the national Albanian cause, these landowning beys were attempting to organize a meeting of Albanian representatives themselves. ‘Toward the middle of November Syreja Vlora wired (perhaps

from Durrés) to his son, Ekrem, informing him that the representatives of the northern Albanian towns had assembled in Tirana and asking him at the same time how the preparations in southern Albania were going. Ekrem answered that Vloré

had not yet made up its mind, but that he along with some delegates from that town, Berat, and Elbasan would go to Tirana.” Describing his trip, Ismail Kemal wrote: “As Valona was blockaded by the Greek fleet, I was glad to disembark at Durazzo.” “® However, he did not stay there, perhaps because of the opposition on the part of the landowning beys. Another

obstacle must have been the declaration of the Orthodox Bishop of Durrés, Jakovos, a Greek, that he recognized and honored only one flag, that of ‘Turkey.”? Furthermore, the Serbian armies were not very far from Durrés. Four days after his landing he left for Vloré, accompanied by 27 delegates from various Albanian towns, and arrived there on November 26.°° “Lejhanec to Berchtold, Valona, 13 November 1912, No. 64, HHStA, PA xur/417, Turkei xxxxv/6. The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, p. 370.

See P. Donat Kurti, ‘“Flamuri komtar né krahiné té Shkodrés (The National Flag in the District of Shkodér), Hyll: 1 Drités (Star of Light), Shkodér, xu (November 1937), 515-537. 800-U.A., No. 4716. Bericht des Konsuls Wenzel Lejhanec aus Valona, |

29 November 1912, No. 70. Either the date 15 is a printing error or his memory must have failed Ismail Kemal when he refers to the first sitting in Vloré as lasting from 15 to 28 November (The Memoirs of Ismail Ksmal Bey, p. 372), for he arrived there only on 26 Novem-

ber 1912. re

ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE 463 _ When the group reached Vloré, “A holy fire of patriotism had taken possession of my native town, and public enthusiasm and delight greeted us everywhere. In a short space of time I found myself surrounded by eighty-three delegates, Mussulmans and Christians, who had come from all parts of Albania, whether or not they were occupied by the belligerent armies.’ §1 "There was no time to allow for the arrival of other

delegates. The situation was rapidly changing with the advance of the forces of the Balkan allies. On November 28 an extraordinary national assembly convened, presided over by Ismail Kemal. In a short speech depicting the situation created in Albania as a result of the Balkan war, he said: “The Albanians had taken part in the war not so much as soldiers but as masters of the land in order to save themselves.” He proposed that measures be taken to proclaim Albania’s inde-

pendence, form a provisional government, elect a senate to | control and aid the government, and constitute a commission to send abroad for the defense of Albania’s rights. All his proposals were approved and he himself was entrusted with the formation of the provisional government. ‘The Albanian flag was then raised and the great powers, as well as the Porte and the Balkan allies, were notified of the proclamation of

Albanian independence. Thus the independence of Albania was achieved under precarious circumstances, after more than three decades of

efforts in developing national consciousness. |

81The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, pp. 371-372. 82See Histori e Shqipérisé (1900-1919), p. 62, and O-U.A., Iv, No. 4716, Bericht des Konsuls Wenzel Lejhanec aus Valona, 29 November 1912,

No. 70, and in the Beilage to it the names of the Albanian delegates, present and absent.

Conclusion IN THEIR STRUGGLE for national affirmation, the Albanians, as

we have seen, faced obstacles that were greater than those of

their Balkan neighbors—and at times were even unique. Religion was one of the most divisive forces. In the Ottoman empire, religion, not nationality, was the criterion for dividing the rulers and the ruled. The majority of Albanians, being Moslems, enjoyed a privileged position in the empire, from which their Orthodox and Catholic countrymen were barred. This contrast in status between Christians and Moslems constituted a serious hindrance to unification. Another significant obstacle was the product of geography and history. Although the neighboring Balkan countries also had their regional differences, these were not as deep and pronounced as in Albania. In this country, the mountainous north had remained in a backward and tribal state, while the lowlands of the south had evolved into a more progressive,

though still patriarchal society. This situation was clearly reflected in the Albanian League. ‘The Albanians of the south, having better means of communication and a more educated class, formulated the demand for administrative autonomy within the Ottoman empire and were better prepared to understand it in its national aspect; the northern Albanians, living in isolation and leading a more or less autonomous life, laid more stress on exemption from taxation, military service, and payment of taxes—privileges they had enjoyed—and were less capable of thinking of autonomy

in its broad and national sense. Largely because of these regional differences, the Albanian League was incapable of creating a single center of direction and concerted action. When the Ottomans conquered the Balkans, the Balkan peoples lost their leaders; some were eliminated, others fled into exile, and still others were converted to Islam. A leveling of their societies was brought about; peasants in Serbia and Bulgaria; a mixture of peasants, sea-farers, and merchants in

Greece. In Albania, however, with the conversion of the majority to Islam, a new class of leaders gradually emerged,

CONCLUSION 465 the landowning pashas and beys. This feudal nobility, which

represented to a certain extent a cohesive political group among the Albanians, supported the claim to the autonomy of their country mainly because they were opposed to the centralistic policy of the Porte, which curtailed their own power. Although rivalries were not absent among them, vested interests in the empire kept them together as a class. However, not all of the feudal nobility conceived of autonomy in the same terms, and independence was far from their political thinking.

| Among the patriotic leaders—composed of elements from a cross-section of the country—there were some who from time to time raised their voice for independence, but their general political thinking revolved around administrative autonomy within the Ottoman empire, with the four vilayets (Janina, Shkodér, Kosovo, and Monastir) united into one large province. It was necessary that Albania should not remain a vague geographic expression, but should acquire definite frontiers as a territory in order to be protected in an eventual collapse of ‘Turkey. ‘Time was needed to attenuate the differences in the Albanian society and autonomy would serve this purpose best. A greater measure of Albanian unity became imperative. Unity, however, could not be achieved without enlightenment. ‘The other Balkan peoples had labored long for cultural

emancipation before they achieved liberation. For the Albanians, this was a difficult task. The Adriatic did not link them with the West but separated them from it. Western currents of thought scarcely reached them. The majority, as Moslems, were East-oriented. Moreover, enlightenment came slowly because the Albanian language and schools were banned by the Porte, and this ban was backed by the Patriarchate of

Constantinople. Both of these powers tried to hinder the Albanians from becoming aware of their national individuality.

Enlightenment was carried on primarily outside the boundaries of the Ottoman empire. ‘The Albanian colonies played

466 CONCLUSION an important part. It was through them that the Orthodox Christians made their greatest contribution to the national cause. They were better suited for educational and propagan-

distic work than for revolutions, for in the mother country the use of arms had not been their privilege. In the movement for the development of Albanian national consciousness we witnessed the significant contribution of the Italo-Albanians. ‘This was a unique phenomenon. Only the activity of the Serbs of southern Hungary (now Vojvodina) bears a certain resemblance to it. The memories of the distant _ past were kept alive among the Italo-Albanians, and they felt a nostalgia for the land of their forefathers, which they wanted. to see free. But their position was delicate. ‘Theirs was a kind

of double allegiance: a sentimental tie with Albania on the one hand, and their duty as Italian citizens, on the other. ‘The revolutionary party of the Italo-Albanians put official Italy in a difficult position toward Austria-Hungary, and the leader of the moderate party, A. Lorecchio, did not hesitate to make it clear that the Adriatic should be ‘an Albanian and Italian sea,’ which in general was not to the liking of the Italians. We cannot conceive of the liberation of the Balkan peoples without the help they received from the great powers. These countries supported the Christian nationalities of the peninsula but were indifferent to the fate of the Albanians. The position of the Albanians was disadvantageous. Since the majority of the Albanians were Moslems, they were often identified with the Turks by Europeans. Although IndoEuropean in language, the Albanians stood alone. They did not possess common ties with any one of the great powers, such as those existing between the Balkan Slavs and the Russians—ties based on common Slavic patrimony. Quite early they became aware of the indifference of European powers. As Ambassador Goschen observed in a communication to the British Foreign Office: ‘““They [the Albanians] have seen the nationality of these neighboring races taken under the protection of various European Powers, and gratified in their aspirations for a more independent existence. ... Meanwhile,

CONCLUSION ABT they see that they themselves do not receive similar treatment.” +

True, Austria-Hungary and Italy showed deep concern for Albania, but strictly for reasons of political self-interest, each

power striving to prevent the other from becoming entrenched on the Albanian coast. The policy of the status quo, which they formulated, protected Albania from occupation by a foreign power, but at the same time was a hindrance to the efforts of the patriots to bring about changes in her position within Turkey. On the other hand, rivalry between the Monarchy and Italy, by stimulating Albanian reaction, contributed to national awakening. The Albanian League laid the groundwork for future national activity. But the revolts, which continued for a long time after the suppression of the League, were intermittent and sporadic in the north and had as an objective local interests. They did not follow Albanian national political thinking. With the turn of the century, however, there were into-

duced in the insurrections claims which were national in character. National consciousness had begun to evolve among the Albanians, not only in the south but also in the north. A

letter of the French consul in Usktib is indicative of this

trend: ‘“There are almost no longer those periodical gatherings where many chiefs of clans come together to treat of questions which divide them without speaking about an independent Albania, without fixing the frontiers of the future state, without even being concerned about the form of government which will best fit it.” ? A further impetus was given by the Macedonian guerrilla war. The Albanians witnessed then the expansionist aims of their Balkan neighbors and created the first nationalist bands, composed of both Moslems

and Christians. , With the advent of the Young Turks to power in 1908, the

1Goschen to Granville, Therapia, 26 July 1880, A and P, 1880, Vol. LXxxvI, Turkey, 15 (1880), No. 81.

2Choublier to Delcassé, Uskiib, 15 September 1902, No. 6, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1902-1903, Vol. Iv.

468 CONCLUSION Albanian national awakening entered a dynamic phase. Following the proclamation of constitutional guarantees, the Albanian patriots seized the opportunity to put their program into effect. They opened schools in Albanian, founded literary-cultural societies and clubs, and published newspapers and periodicals in their mother tongue. Most significant was the adoption of the Latin script for Albanian. It is easy to understand why the Young ‘Turks mobilized all their efforts to thwart the propagation of the Latin alphabet for the Albanian language. ‘They cherished the hope of keeping the Albanians divided by religion and playing off one party against the other. ‘The Latin script, though innocent in appearance, not only was a powerful factor in unification, but also signified a breaking away from ‘Turkish-Islamic culture and an orientation toward the West. Moreover, the Young Turks feared that the Albanian example—the Moslem detachment from ‘Turkey—would serve as an incentive to other Moslem populations in their empire which were not ‘Turkish. When they failed to substitute the Arabic alphabet for the Latin, they resorted to force. The series of alternating revolts and suppressions which ensued rendered the Albanians increasingly dissatisfied with the policy of centralization and “Ottomanization”’ pursued by the Young Turks. The uprisings expanded and were intensified, and became more national in their objectives. Even the central lowlands, which until then had remained inactive, revolted. ‘The inhabitants of this part of the country were generally peasants, dominated by feudal lords, and fanatic Sunnis. ‘They had not experienced the foreign pressures of either the north (the Slavs) or the south (the Greeks). They felt protected in the central part of Albania, having created a kind of barrier which separated the north from the south. But now their feudal lords were discontented with the regime of the Young ‘Turks. When the central lowlands also joined in the armed opposition, the revolt became general, and was

transformed into a revolution. |

Although the revolution was not well organized—the vari-

| CONCLUSION 469 ous parts of the country were loosely connected—a certain spontaneous union was reached because of the suppressions of the Young ‘Turks. The most important role was played by the Kosovars. It is ironical that the Kosovars who helped the Young Turks to come to power contributed strongly to their loss of power. If the objectives of the various revolutionary groups differed, there were two which remained general and constant: the fall of the Young Turks and the autonomy of Albania within the Ottoman empire. By September 4, 1912, the two aims were virtually achieved. In the struggle for Albania’s national awakening all three religious elements took part, each in its own way and each according to its strengths and weaknesses. For the Orthodox nationalists it was hard to work in Albania proper because their co-religionists pursued the policy of Greece. Although they found ‘Turkish rule as tyrannical as their pro-Greek brothers, their field of activity could be only outside the borders of Greece and Turkey. The Catholics, who were least numerous but compact, were in a different position. ‘They were confronted neither with the difficult alternatives of the Orthodox nor with the divided loyalty of the Moslems. ‘They had lived in the north for centuries, surrounded by Moslems, Orthodox Slavs, and the deep sea. ‘They looked for support from the nearest Catholic powers, which were Austria-Hungary and Italy, but they also had been sufficiently well-armed to defend their rights. ‘They had been brought up as Albanians and they could be nothing but Albanians. Their national consciousness, however, was imbued with Catholicism. Some of their leaders would have been satisfied with a small

Catholic Albania. As to the Moslem Albanians, it was natural that they would play the principal role. ‘They constituted the majority, and without them there could be no Albania. Although feeling as Albanians, it was not easy for them to detach

themselves from Turkey, toward which they felt loyalty as Moslems. Their leaders began to be active when they became aware of the shaky structure of the Ottoman empire, which was supported by interested powers only for political reasons.

470 CONCLUSION The best solution, they thought, would be an autonomous Albania as a steppingstone to independence. When the question was raised about a foreign protectorate, most of them showed a preference for multi-national Austria-Hungary. However, as long as Turkey could still hold her own in the Balkans, they could not abandon her. ‘Thus we see that even when they were opposing Turkey, they were ready to go to her assistance whenever she was in danger of being attacked from outside. Her survival was felt to be essential to their own conservation. When we consider the odds faced by the Albanians in their national awakening, their progress, which at first glance seems

slow, can be regarded as an achievement. Along with the divisive internal and external forces discussed above, we must

bear in mind certain positive factors which helped to make this achievement possible.

The tribal society which existed in the past, and until recently, in the mountains of the north, must have given the Albanians, irrespective of religion, the feeling of common blood. Still more so in regions where the conversions had been of more recent date. In the beginning of our century there were instances in the south when one of the brothers was a Moslem and the other a Christian, and they celebrated together the big holidays of their respective religions (Easter or Bayram). Common folk culture served as another link. Language has always been important in the national movements of nations, but its degree of importance has varied, depending upon the existence of other unifying factors. In Albania, where the divisive forces were so many, the role of common language was of paramount inportance. Language

made the Albanians feel that they were distinct from the | Turks and the Greeks, and for that matter from any other foreigner, and gave them a sense of belonging to one and the same nation. An incentive to the national awakening of the Albanians was the glorification of Skenderbeg and his times. The Alba-

CONCLUSION A471 nians had not inherited ‘the glory that was Greece” or the splendor of the medieval kingdoms of the Serbs and Bulgarians. In Skenderbeg they saw their national hero. The Moslems forgot that he had fought against the Turks as a Christian. What mattered to them was that he was an Albanian by blood and had defended his country. His name also helped to obliterate his religion, since he was known not by his Christian name Gjerg} (George) but by that of Skenderbeg, a good Moslem name. Skenderbeg became a symbol of unification, irrespective of religion, and a Skenderbeg legend was created. Another important factor was foreign danger. Montenegro

coveted northern Albanian lands and the Albanians were forced to take up arms against her. Serbia was eager to annex Kosovo and Metohija (Old Serbia) and acquire an exit to the Adriatic, passing through Albanian territory. She was a potential enemy with whom clashes were inevitable. ‘The Alba-

nians were also under the threat of Bulgaria’s expansionist views in Macedonia including Albanian-inhabited lands. As a protector of all these Balkan Slavic neighbors was a powerful Russia. In the south, the peril came from Greece, which had given sufficient proof that her intention was to incorporate Epirus. For the Albanians then, outside pressure was tantamount to the partition of their country. Islamic culture, with its identification of din (religion) and millet (nation), had served to blur to a certain extent the national distinctiveness of the Moslem Albanians. ‘This distinctiveness began to emerge clearly at the time of the Albanian League, when it became evident that what was in the interest of Tlurkey was not to the advantage of the Albanians. They proceeded to part company and, what was more, found

themselves in opposite camps. The Albanians opposed the decisions of the Berlin Congress, but they also fought against the Porte. The insurrections and suppressions which followed, particularly those of the Young Turk regime, reinforced the awareness of national identity. ‘The last three years

472 CONCLUSION of Young Turk rule did more for the development of Albanian national consciousness than decades of slow cultural endeavors would have achieved. Yet one hesitates to say that the Albanians were ready for independence. The other Balkan nations had a long period of cultural preparation before attaining it. ‘The Albanians who needed it most had the least preparation. National awakening came to them partly in a gradual way and party in bolts and shocks. Even at the end, when the First Balkan War broke out, they had to put up resistance to prevent the dismemberment of their country. But the fate of their country now lay mostly in the hands of the great powers. Thanks to the efforts of Austria-Hungary in the international field and her collaboration with the proper Albanian elements, the independence of Albania was proclaimed. It was imposed on her by the nature of historical events. Although premature, it proved to be her salvation, promising further and freer development of national consciousness among her people in the decades to come.

Selected Bibliography

Index

BLANK PAGE

Selected Bibliography I. PRIMARY SOURCES A. UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS AUSTRIA

Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv (cited as HHStA, PA). From Liassenbuch 1871-1918 the following: Albanien, m1-xxxviu; Griechenland, 1 (1878-1883), 11 (1883), VI (1897-1898); Montenegro, 1 (1879-1882; 1890-1893); Serbien, 1 (1879-1880), 111 (1882-1884); ‘Tiirkei, 1v (1879-1882), vit B (1881),

xu B (1892-1895), xv (1890-1891), xvil (1891), Xxx (1897-1898), XXXIII (1899), XLV (1912-1913); Interna, vil (1881). FRANCE

Archives du Ministére des Affaires Etrangéres (cited as AMAE). Paris. The following volumes: Turquie, Correspondance Politique des Consuls, Albanie (Janina, Scutari d’Albanie), all the volumes

from 1878 to 1901; Turquie, Politique Intérieure, Albanie, 1 (1897)—x (1911); Epire (1896-1914). GREAT BRITAIN

British Museum. London. Additional MSS 39, 149 (Layard

Papers, Vol. CcxIx). , ITALY

Archivio Centrale Dello Stato (cited as ACS). Rome. The fol-

lowing files: several on F. Crispi; Carte G. Giolitti (1875-1928); | Carte L. Luzzatti (1885-1920); Carte Pisani-Dossi (1866-1997).

Archivio Storico, Ministero degli Affari Esteri (cited as ASMAE). Rome. Various documents from 1878 to 1912.

AUSTRIA

B. PUBLISHED OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

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Die Grosse Politth der Europdischen Kabinette 1871-1914 (cited as GP), eds. J. Lepsius, A. M. Bartholdy and F. Thimme. 40 vols. Berlin, 1927.

GREAT BRITAIN | Foreign Office. British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914, eds. G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley. 12 vols. London, 1927———. Only Vol. 1x was used.

Foreign Office. British and Foreign State Papers. London. The following volumes were examined: 68, 69, 71, 72, 74, 77, 78, 84, 91.

Parliamentary Papers. London. Volumes in the series Accounts and Papers (cited as A and P) dealing with Turkey. ITALY

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dei documenti diplomatici. I Document: diplomatici ttaliani (cited as DDI). The three published volumes of the grd series, 1896-1907: I, 10 March 1896-30 April 1897 (Rome, 1953); U, 1 May 1897-23 June 1898 (Rome, 1958); 1, 24 June 1898-29 July 1900 (Rome, 1962). C. OTHER PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS

“Expositions Mavromati” and “Expositions Skouloudi,” Ho N eos

Kouvaras (The New Scroll), Annual Epirotic Chronicler, Athens, 11 (1962) 140-177.

Hertslet, E. The Map of Europe by Treaty, 1814-1891. 4 vols. London, 1891. Only Vol. Iv (1875-1891) was used. Hurewitz, J. C. Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, a Docu-

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| BIBLIOGRAPHY ATT “Kanonizma e shogérisé té shtypurit shkronja shqip” (The Statutes of the Society for Publishing Albanian Writings), Istanbul, 1879, also in Diturtja (Knowledge), Tirana, 1 (1 December 1926), 70-75.

Libardi, C. I primi moti patriottie: albanesi nel 1910-1911-1912. Specie net Ducagini. Trent, 1935. Noradounghian, G. Effendi. Recueil d’actes internationaux de ’Empire Ottoman. 4 vols. Paris, 1897-1903. Novotny, A. Osterreich, die Tiirkei und das Balkanproblem im

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Brailsford, H. N. Macedonia. Its Races and Their Future. London, 1906. Carathéodory (Pacha). Le Rapport secret sur le Congrés de Berlin adressé a la S. Porte. Paris, 1919.

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The Times, London. ,

Index Abdullah Pasha, 419 ship, 97; armed uprising, 97-98; Abeddin Pasha (Bey Dino), 69-71, reactions to uprising of, 99-103;

75, 77-79 petition to Austria-Hungary, 102;

Aehrenthal, 255, 441 elimination by Dervish Pasha, Agimi alphabet, 141-42, 275-77, 370 104-07; release of former leaders Agimi society, 141-42, 278 of, 192

Ahmed Niyazi, 340-41 Albanian National Congress (Bucha-

Ahmed Riza, 336-38 rest), 328-29

Aitdlos, Kosmas, 12; schools founded Albanian nationalist leaders, 1877

by, 17 discussions with Greece, 55

Aladro Kastriota, Prince Gjin, Albanian Orthodox church, in Bos-

318-24, 331 ton, 161-63

Aladro y Perez de Valasco, Don Albanian Papal (Pontifical) Semi-

Juan de, see Aladro Kastriota nary, 130, 257

Albanian Central Committee (Istan- Albanian Political Committee

bul), 1912 memorandum of, (Naples), 219-20

432-33 Albanian publications, see publica-

Albanian-Greek Committee, see tions

Corfu committee Albanian schools, first boys’, 134-35;

Albanian language, suppression by Bucharest congress concerning, Porte, 18; Janina memorandum | 135; first girls’, 136-37; Luarasi’s concerning, 88; Turkish prohibi- activity for, 137-38; Konitza’s tion on, 89-90; first historical ref- 1899 survey of, 143-443 as na-

erence to, 111; early religious tionalist issue, 366ff. See also writings in, 112-13; foreign refer- schools ences to, 113-18; and nationalist Albanian Society of Istanbul, 36-37, identity, 119-24; secret spread of, 318 143-44; and religion, 155-56; Albanian Union (Athens), 309-10 Italo-Albanian promotion of, alphabet question, 139-43, 217, 218—19; promoted by Austria- 275-77, 337-38, 337n, 366ff Hungary, 262-63; as nationalist Apollinaire, Guillaume, 321

issue, 366fT Aranitis, 3, 6

Albanian League, founding of, Arbreshé, see Italo-Albanians 35-38; southern committees of, Argondizza, Antonio, 216, 274 41-43; memoranda to Berlin Con- Asdren, 150, 187-88 gress from, 43-47; initial reaction Associazione Nazionale Italiana per to Berlin Congress, 54-56; secret Soccorrere 1 Missionari Italiani

discussions with Greece, 55; and all’Estero, 264f Montenegrin boundary issue, Austria-Hungary, at Berlin Con60-62; split over Montenegrin gress, 47-48; and transfer of (Dulcigno) issue, 65; and Greek Dulcigno to Montenegro, 63-68; boundary issue, 69—82; and Bul- and Albanian League uprising, garian guerrillas, 86-87; southern 100; and Doci plan, 170-73; and movement for Albanian auton- Macedonian movement, 201-02, omy, 88-91; split over autonomy 204; attitude toward Italo-Almovement, 91-92; votes on auton- banians, 235-37; interest in Alomy at Dibér, 93-94; efforts to bania as anti-Slavic bastion, reunify, 94—95; changes in leader- 238; peaceful activities within

A490 INDEX Austria-Hungary (cont.) proposed by Abdul Frashéri,

Albania, 257ff; Balkan agree- 316-173; as proposed in 1912 by ments with Russia, 288-90; and revolutionaries, 433 Uniate movement, 297-303; al- British Bible Society, 373 leged secret treaty with Greece, Bulgaria, and the Berlin Congress, 312-13, 313n; relations with Al- 49; guerrilla threats to Albania,

banian pretenders, 323, 327; re- 86-87; Albanian interest of, states Albanian policy, 358-59; 295-96; activities on eve of revo-

role in IQII uprisings, 415; re- lution, 445-49 plies to appeals for support, Bushatis, 21

438-40; Albanian policy on eve

of revolution, 441-43, 447, 4503 Cajupi, Anton Zako, 125, 140-41,

on Albanian territorial integrity, 152, 351-52 454-57. See also Kultuspro- Cale, Pandeli, 429, 459

tektorat Calice, 242-43, 300-02

Avrami, Thoma, 151, 154 Camarda, Demetrio, 116-17 Carlotti, Marchese, 274

bajrak, 14-15 Catholics, 4-13; during period of

Baldacci, Antonio, 245-46, 273-74, Tanzimat, 19-20; earliest Al-

280, 283 banian writings of, 112; early Balshas, 3 question, 141-42, 275-76, 385-86; Balkan Committee (London), 326 schools for, 129-31; on alphabet

Bardhi, Pater Pashko, 261 nationalist feelings of, 173—-74; hi-

Barrére, 287 erarchy attempt to suppress first

Bashkimi alphabet, 141-42, 275-77, Italian schools, 258-59; Austro-

370 Hungarian policy toward, 282-86;

Bashkimi society, 141-42 and Uniate movement, 297-303;

Bektashis, 13, 41-42, 166, 386, 422; appeal to Austria-Hungary, and Epirus issue, 78—79; in pa- 439-40. See also crypto-Christians triotic literature, 123; as pro- Central Committee for the Defense

moters of Albanian language, of the Rights of the Albanian Na143; and guerrilla activity, 212; tionality (Istanbul), 89 relations with Young Turks, Cepo (Gardiki) resolutions, 423

338-39 Chiara, 45

Bellkameni, Spiro, 421 Chinigo, Francesco, 274 Bennici, Giuseppe, 225 Chlumecky, 284-85 Bennici, Manlio, 225-26, 228, 230, ciftliks, 19

232-33, 2235, 322 Cilka, Grigor, 156, 210 Bismarck, 81, 86 Code of Leké Dukagjini, 15 Black Society for Salvation, 424, Code of Skenderbeg, 15

436, 452 College of St. Francis Saverius, 130 Bosnia, refused aid, 56 261, 269

Boletini, Isa, 428, 435-36, 446 Collegio S. Adriano, 116, 221, 259, boundaries of Albania, as defined Comitato Centrale dell’Alta Alin 1877 by Austro-Hungarian con- bania, see Corfu committee sul, 31-32; as defined by San Commission for the Delimitation of Stefano Treaty, 32-33; in mem- the Turco-Montenegris Frontier,

orandum to Berlin Congress, 44; 56, 57, 60 with Montenegro in Berlin Committee of Action (Italy), 225-26

Treaty, 49-51; with Montenegro Committee for the Liberation of Al-

in dispute, 59-68; with Greece bania, see Monastir committee

in dispute, 69-82; with Monte- Conference of Ambassadors (Bernegro defended in 1883, 190; as lin), 63, 65, 76—78

INDEX 491 Conference of Ambassadors (Istan- Eastern Rumelian Commission, 93

bul), 81-82, 224 , Elbasan education congress, 380—82

Congress of Berlin, 43; Albanian Elbasani, Dervish, 271, 382 memoranda to, 43-47; work of, Elbasani, Mahmud P asha, 134 47-53; and Mirdité question, émigré, publications, see publications 51-52; on autonomy within Euro- émigré settlements, after Ottoman

pean Turkey, 89 invasions, 6-7; im Greece, 1275

Congress of Naples, 220ff, 322 in Rumania, 145-52; in Egypt,

Congress of Ottoman Liberals, 336 152-54; m Bulgaria, 154-56; in Congress of the Subjugated People the United States, 159-63, 178,

of Turkey, 150 453, 458; in Italy, 221-22; in

Consiglio Albanese d’Italia, 227-28, ; Dalmatia, 261

235 émigré societies: Agimi, 278; AI-

Corfu committee, 305-07 banian Brothernooe of Egy me

Corigliano Calabro congress, 216—17 Teel Tay: Athan inn Reais Corti compromise, ?|' Cret 6 sance (proposed),61-64 157-58;?Bash-

Crispi SP eco 48, 83, 85, 165 kimi (Bucharest), 151, 213; Bash-

? a258; a ee?and kimi (Constantsa),. 336; 175, Italo-Albanians, rrirneBesa?

215-16; policy toward Albania, Besén, 150; Déshira, 154-559 1775 240; receives letter from Abdul Dija, 2773 Dituria, 146-47, 149,

Brashér} 6_ 177; Drita, 134, Kohae rashéri, 316-17 eae146-49; ae Sate

crypto-Christians, 12-12. 206— Lirisé, 160; Lidhja, 160; Lidhja

Chad Bairam 30 > Fe 5 97 Shqiptare, 163; Malli i Méméd» PajTAM, 209, 42%, 43 heut, 005 Perinda, 163; Pro

. atria, 220; Snpresa, 149-51,

ain sarin 434 161; Society of the Albanians

D.e Rada, R 4 "Circl 150 6 “Drita,” 148-49, 161,145-47; 177-78; Girolamo, 99, I10-T7, Society of.Istanbul, Vél67, 216, 223, 307-08 ; » 45747 107, 210, 223, 307 lazéria Shqiptare, 152 nie Gjo a 411 offers London Protocol, elcasse, 207England, 31; as Albanian spokesman at

Demi, Musa, 421 Berlin Congress ; and transfe

Dibér, resolutions of 1899 meeting of Dulcieno to ‘Montenegro, _ in, 197-98; resistance to Young 63-68; and Greek boundaries isTurk regime, 395; 1909 congress sue, 72, 75-77, 79; proposes of, 378-80, 398-99; revolt in, 411 Greco-Albanian union, 82—84; at-

Dibra, Djemal Bey, 94 titude toward Albanian autonDibra, Ilijas Pasha, 37, 86, 94 omy, 92—93: limited Albanian inDibra, Sadik Pasha, 94 terest of, 287-88; proposes Reval Dine, Spiro, 122, 152, 175 reforms, 340; responds to Gerche Dino, Sulejman Bey, 107 petition, 417-18

Dita phe 70, 75 English-Albanian Committee, see javid Pasha, 393, 395 Corfu committee Doci (Dochi), Monsignor Prenk, Enver Bey, 340

| 141, 170-73, 264, 267, 275-76 Epirus, 52; Albanian defense of,

Dodani, Viské, 152 70-82; Greek activity in

Draga, Nexhib, 335, 348, 361, 428, 1883-1884 regarding, 305—09

435 Evangyjeli, Pandeli, 146 Dukagjinis, 6 faré, 16 Dulcigno, loss of, 63-68 Ferid Pasha, Grand Vizier, 411 Duci, Milo, 152-53

Durham, M. E., 417 fis, 14-15, 106

49? INDEX Fishta, Gjerg], 124-25, 130, 142, Gérménji, Themistokli, 421

331, 370-73 | Ghegs, see Gegs

France, and transfer of Dulcigno Ghika, Elena, 118 to Montenegro, 63-68; role in Ghika, Prince Albert, 324-31

Greco-Turkish boundaries nego- Gjakova, Riza Bey, 194, 428, 436 tiations, 69-82; limited Albanian | Gjakové demonstrations, 57-58

interest of, 287 Gjirokastér, committee, 78; con-

Franciscans, 8, 129-31, 141, 261 ference of, 91-93 Frashéri, Abdul, 36; at Prizren Goluchowski, 242-43, 246-47, meeting, 36-37; organizes south- 253-55, 289, 294

ern committees, 41-43; secret dis- | Grameno, Mihal, 207, 210, 211-12,

cussions of 1877 with Greece, 55; 407, 421

and defense of Epirus, 70, 72—73, Greco-Albanians, publishing activity

79-80; on Greco-Albanian union, of, 126-28 85-86; and autonomy movement, Greece, military activity of prior to

88-92; role in 1881 uprising, 98, Berlin Congress, 39-40; and the 101-02; capture and death of, Berlin Congress, 52—53; secret dis105; nationalist ideals of, 165-66; cussions of 1877 with Albanian

letter to Crispi, 316-17 nationalists, 55; boundaries settleFrashéri alphabet, 147 ment, 69-82; and Greco-Albanian Frashéri, Maliq Bey, 198—-99 union proposals, 82-86; and Frashéri, Midhat, 123, 128, 331, Macedonian movement, 201; 346, 350, 360, 369n; nationalist Epirus political campaign of, ideals of, 185-86; at alphabet 305-09; confederation proposals

congress, 370—72 of, 309-10; rivalry with Italy over

Frashéri, Naim, 119, 128, 146, 268, Epirus, 310-11, 313; relations 339; as poet, 123-24; nationalist with Austria-Hungary, 311-13; al-

ideals of, 166 leged secret treaty with Austria,

Frashéri, Sami, 99, 129, 134; founds 312-13, 313n; activities on eve cultural society, 119-20; alphabet of revolution, 446-47, 449 devised by, 140; nationalist ideals Greek Melkitic rite, 301 of, 166—69; republican proposal Greneville, Count, 239-40

of, 318 Gucija, Ali Pasha, 35, 37, 61, 94,

Fuad Pasha, Prince of Egypt, 316-18 100, 105

Guerini, Archbishop, 258-59

Galib Bey, 342-43 Guicciardini, Count Francesco,

Galvagna, 242 131-32, 192, 249, 254, 260

Garibaldi, Ricciotti, 225-28, 323; Gurakuqi, Luigj, 412, 459

Faik Konitza’s opinion of, 231; .

expedition frustrated, 440—41 Hadji Ymer Effendi, 106

Gazi Muhtar Pasha, 60, 69asanFePasha ones 207 105 (Kalkandelen), at Osman P ash, role 36 linein Al foundi Hatt-i Humayun, , 14-15; - | . 25, 89, 361n

, ee oe I ven 2< ima, 3538 Dervish, Ing atts Sherif, 24, 25363, 397 268, 325,

Gerche memorandum, 416-17, Hodja Vildan Effendi, 354, 373, 375

423-24 Hodo Pasha, 68

Germani, Peter, 211 Hoi Vlamides Alvanoi, 308

Germanos, Archimandrite, 298, Hoxhi, Koto, 133-34 301-02

Germany, Balkan role under Triple Institute of Oriental Languages, 261 Alliance, 241; limited Albanian Instituto Orientale di Napoli, 118,

interest of, 288 220

INDEX 493 Ipek resolutions, 195-97 ideals of, 182-85; relations with

Ippen, T., 173-74, 270—71, 284, 301 Italo-Albanians, 231-32; federa-

Ismail Hakki Bey, 153, 355 tion plan of, 313-14; and Prince

Istanbul alphabet, 275, 277, 370, Ghika, 330; considered as future

372 governor-general, 331-32; on

Istanbul committee (of notables), Bosnian annexation, 359; elected

46, 90 over Young Turk opposition,

Istanbul nationalist club, 350-52, 360-61; on Turkey’s future, 362; 387; secret committee of, 353-55; and Istanbul uprising, 363-64; ensends commission to Albania, dorses national autonomy policy,

373—76 400; political views in 1910,

d’Istria, Dora, 118 402-03; and Gerche memo-

Italo-Albanians, 6; early publishing randum, 416-17; prepares for activity of, 18; as originators of general revolution, 427; appeals Albanian nationalist literature, to Austria-Hungary, 438-309, 116-18; and nationalist movement, 444-45; proclaims independence 215-37; number of, 217n; prepare of Albania, 458-63

to help revolution, 440-41 Kiazim Bey, 79, 107 |

Italy, at Berlin Congress, 48—49; Kokojka, Mali, see Midhat Frashéri mediation of Turco-Montenegrin Kolasin massacre, 201-02, 293-94

boundary issue, 61-62; and Kolonja, Ali Pasha, 364

Greco-Albanian union proposals, Kolonja, Naim Bey, 193 83, 85; schools founded by, 131; Kolonja, Shahin, 155-56, 208, 230,

policy toward Italo-Albanians, 268, 320, 348, 361, 370; national233-35; rivalry with Austria- ist ideals of, 186-87; relations Hungary, 235-37; interest in Al- with Italo-Albanians, 232-33; bania for Adriatic security, 240ff ; schools program of, 368—69;

peaceful activities within Albania, autonomistic program of, 398 | 258ff; and Austro-Russian agree- Konitza, Faik, 125-26, 128, 267-68, ments, 290; relations with Al- 370; 1899 educational survey of, banian pretenders, 324, 327; Al- 143-44; as publisher, 157-59, banian policy on eve of revolu- 347; nationalist ideals of, 180-82;

tion, 440-44. and Ismail Kemal, 183-84; rela-

Ivanaj, Nikolla, 230 tions with Italo-Albanians,

, 230-31; and the pretender

Jakova, Don Gasper, see Gasper Aladro, 319-21; on Young Turk

Jakova Merturi constitution, 344; urges brotherJakova, Idris, 208 hood with Christians, 397; calls Jakova, Redjeb, 97 Vatra meetings, 453, 458 Janina, proposal for “armed meet- Kosovo, 1897 revolt in, 1943; and

Ings,’ 422-23 Macedonian movement, 202-03; Jubani, Zef, 121 Turk uprising, 341-43, 345; am-

Jesuits, 130 and Serbia, 292-94; and Young bivalence toward Young Turk

Kadi Hasan Effendi, 75 regime, 348; anti-Austrian attiKadi Nazif Effendi, 97 tude in, 358; growing resistance

Kalaja, Mehmed Effendi, 70 to Young Turk regime, 391-93;

Kamber Effendi, 351 1910 revolt in, 405-06; Sultan Kamil Effendi, 75 Mehmed W’s visit to, 418-19; Kastriota Skenderbeg d’Auletta, D. revolutionary preparations in,

Giovanni, 322, 324 428-31

Kemal (Vlora), Ismail, 139, 260, Kosturi, Idhomene, 147 336-37, 411, 429, 437; nationalist Kosturi, Jovan, 210

494 INDEX Kosturi, Spiro, 136, 210 Mati, Djemal Pasha, 94

Kosturi, Vani, 136 Mati, Hajredin Bey, 307

Koupitoris, Panayotis, 127 Mbrothésia printers, 155, 230, 366 Kristoforidhi, Konstandin, 122-23 Mehmed Ali, 317 Kullurioti, Anastas, 126-27 Mehmed Reshad, Sultan of Egypt,

Kultusprotektorat, 9, 257, 259, 365

263-64, 282-83, 285; early schools Melis, Ettore, 274 founded by, 129-31; jurisdiction Merturi, Gasper Jakova, 229, 269,

over Uniates disputed, 300-02; 327-28

political proposals for, 439-40 Mesareja, Hasan Pasha, 193 Kyrias, George, 207, 350, 353, 363, Midhat Pasha, 183

367, 370 Mirdité uprising of 1903, 199 Mitko, Thimi, 83-84, 121-22, 152,

Lakshe, Anastas Avram, 146-47 153, 175

languages, geographic boundaries as Mjeda, Dom Ndre, 141, 275-76, 370,

of 1877 defined, 31-32; in schools 372, 439-40

under Ottoman regime, 90 Mijeda, Monsignor Ndre, 264, 394

Latin alphabet, 372ff Monastir, committee, 207-11; na-

League of Prizren, see Albanian tionalist club, 350-55; alphabet

League congress of 1908, 370—73; con-

Leybourne, G. W., 306 gress of 1910, 386, 402; sounds Liberty and Entente (Hiirriyet ve call to revolution, 420-21 Itilaf), 425, 434, 452 Montenegro, boundaries in Berlin Libohova, Mufid, 361 a realy: 49° 5 I é boundaries Sette

Libohova, Neki Pasha, 107 MED SITVG> Nussian miterest 10; Ligue pour la confédération balk- 290-91; Italian policy towar d,

anique, 314 291-92; and Serbia, 292-93; be-

Lippich, F., 31, 63; 1877 memo- comes refugee center, 408-10;

randum on Albania, 238-39 role in 1911 uprisings, 413-15;

London role King in revolution, 446, 448-51. on , »Protocol. 3 See 21 also Nicholas Lorecchio, Anselmo, 189, 216-17, Moslems, 4-13; early educational 229, 234-35, 279-80, 3213; pro- and cultural activities of 16-17;

poses autonomous Albania, Albanian, in Ottoman arm and 723725 > and Faik Konitza, 230-31 administration, 20-213 as na-

Luarash, Petro Nini, yeas, 137-38, onalist force, 96; Ottoman

Go. » 134735; 137-3, school policy for, 131-33; attitude TO9, 273 _, toward Italo-Albanians, 234;

Lumo Skendo, See Midhat Frashéri Austro-Hungarian cultivation of

Lungro (Calabria) congress, 216-17 270-71; Italian cultivation of, 282; on alphabet question, 375,

Macedonia, and the Berlin Con- 377, 383-84, 387 gress, 49; revolutionary movement Muhtar Pasha, 70

in, 200-04; reforms affect rela- Muraviev, 289-90

tions between Italy and Austria- Miirzsteg agreements, 204, 207, 236

Hungary, 252; Albanian reactions 252-53, 304 to reforms in, 280—81 ; reforms Mustafa Bey, 75, 107 lead to Serbian-Bulgarian treaty, Mustafa Nuri Pasha, 107

304-05 Muzakis, 6

Mahmud Shefket Pasha, 405 ,

Marchiand, Michele, 117 Nagi, Nuci, 136, 208

Marka Gjoni, 193 Nago, Nikolla, 147-49, 151, 321

Marko, Thimi, 134, 136 Nafiz Effendi, 353

Mashkulloré battle, 212 National Albanian League, 220

INDEX 495 National League for the Promotion Albanian League, 36; duality of

of Albanian Schools, 352 Albanian policies, 95-97; reac-

Nationalism, in reaction to San tions to Albanian League uprisStefano Treaty, 34; in Shkodér ing, 102-04; suppression of Al-

memorandum to Berlin Congress, banian uprising by, 104-07. See 45; as early desire for self-govern- also Porte ment, 63-64; cultural history as

inspiration for, 113-18; of Abdul Panariti, Qamil, 421-22

Frashéri, 165-66; of Naim Papazoglou, Dimitri, 325 Frashéri, 166; of Sami Frashéri, Pasetti, 243

166-69; 1901 Italian view of, 260 Peci, Sotir, 161, 268, 370

Negovani, Papa Kristo, 206f Pekmezi, G., 261, 277

newspapers: Astér-YIl, 310; Cor- Pelasgian theory, 84, 114-15, 117, riere det Balcani, 230; Dielli, 347, 139, 154, 217 403; Drita, 146, 155-56, 187, 188, periodicals: Albania, 126, 157-59, 230, 369n; Kombi, 160-61, 178, 180-82, 187-88, 321, 347; Arbri

396; Lirtja, 331, 347, 356, 360; t rit, 117; Diturtja, 146, 3473 Pellasgu, 154; Shkopi, 154, 356; Fjamurit Arbérit, 117, 175;

Shqiptari (Bucharest), 151 Kalendant Kombiar, 185-86;

Nicholas, King (Prince), 291-93, Nazione Albanese, 216, 229, 321 328, 414, 418, 449; and Bosnian Pérparimi society, 382 crisis, 357-58; negotiates refugees’ Philhellenic Committee, 175 return, 408-10; asks Malissori to | Phrearitis, K., 84

leave, 420 Poga, Petro, 146

Noli, Fan Stylian, 160, 162-63, Pojani, Orhan Bey, 136, 147, 210

179-80, 453 Porte, April 1878 proclamation of,

Nosi, Lef, 380, 434 40-41; and Albanian League after Berlin Congress, 56-58; and

, Orthodox Christians, 5-13; early Montenegrin boundaries issue,

educational and cultural activities 59-68; and surrender of Dulcigno, of, 17-18; during period of Tanzi- 63-68; negotiations on Greek

mat, 19-20; earliest Albanian boundaries, 69, 71-72, 77, 81; writings of, 112-13; Ottoman answers Janina memorandum on school policy for, 131-33; and autonomy, 88; campaign against

first Albanian schools, 137-38; Albanian League, 96~—97 ; demands emigration tendency of, 145; Al- Albanian hostages after uprising, banian church in Boston, 161-63; 106; and question of Albanian

, nationalist feelings of, 174-75; schools, 131-33; and growing Al-

and question of political protec- banian resistance to centralization, 179~80; and Bulgarian-Ser- tion, 191ff; attitudes toward bian rivalry, 296; mass conver- Italian and Austro-Hungarian acsions to Uniatism, 296-303. See tivities in Albania, 281-82; grants

also crypto-Christians amnesty to 1911 revolutionaries,

Osman Pasha, 199 415-17; concessions at Tepelené,

Ottoman Committees of Union, 345 423-24; dissolves parliament, Ottoman Democratic Party, 401 433-34. See also Ottoman empire Ottoman empire, invasions of Al- Prenk Bib Doda, 38, 68, 190, 199, bania by, 3-4; tzmars system of, 372, 449-50; deported, 99-100; 4-5; summary history of early rule appeals to Austria-Hungary, 439 over Albania, 21-27; changing Prishtina, Hasan, 361, 425-26, 428, administrative divisions as policy 433, 441; prepares for general of, 25-27, 89, 200-01; war with revolution, 427; fourteen points

Russia, 31; early attitude toward of, 435-36

496 INDEX Prizren League, see Albanian San Giuliano, Marquis A. di, 250,

League 254, 260, 275, 442-44

Prizren, meeting of 1878, 36-38; San Stefano Treaty, terms of, 31-33;

clashes in, 193-94 . , Prokopios, Archbishop, 298 250-51, 203 pe tax revolt in, 191; 1897 Albanian reaction to, 33-35

Prizreni, Mejderiz Omer Effendi, 37 Sanminiatel™ Count Donato, 248,

publications, early, 18; emergence Saviors of the Nation, 430, 432

of patriotic literature, 123-28; Sayyad Jamaluddin, 96

pseudonymous, 128; first in new Scanderbeg, see Skenderbeg

alphabets, 142; of Bucharest Schird, Giuseppe, 117-18; 216, 220, émigrés, 14.7, 151-52; of Sofia 222-23, 322 émigrés, 155-56; Austro-Hun- schools, Turkish, 16-17; Greek, garian interest in, 277—78; sup- 17-18; Albanian, 88; interdepression by Young Turk regime, pendence with Albanian language,

407. See also newspapers, peri- 129; founded by Kultuspro-

odicals tektorat, 129-31; founded by Puglia, 265-66 Italy, 131; in Porte policy,

131-33; as competitive interest of

Qirias, Gjerasim D., 136 Italy and Austria-Hungary,

257-61; founded by Serbs, 293;

railways, Italian proposals for, 251, founded during Uniate conver255; Austro-Hungarian proposals sions, 297-98. See also Albanian

for, 255; Serbian proposal for, schools

303-04; Russian proposal for, 304 Seferi, Idris, 436

Raut Effendi, 106 Sejfedin, Dr., 207

Redjeb Hodja, 353 Selaheddin Bey, 351

Redjeb Nureddin, 385, Semseddin Sami Bey, see Sami religions, geographic distribution ~ Frashéri under rule, 7-13; Turk; . , : : Ottoman Senkevich, I. G., 186, 369n, 373-74

ish policy of confusing national- . ? .

ities and, 176 Serbia, and the Berlin Congress, 49 ; Riza, Colonel, 373 and Montenegro, 292-93; suspIRussia, war with Ottoman empire, CIOS of Austr o-Hungarian mo31; San Stefano Treaty goals of, tives, 294795 > railway proposal of, 33; on Montenegrin boundaries 303-04 ; activities on eve of revo-

issue, 67; on Greek boundaries lution, 445~5! issue, 81; attitude toward Al- Shejh Hutbi, 70

banian autonomy, 93; and Shiroka, Filip, 152 Macedonian movement, 201, 204; Shkodér, armed assembly of 1901, effect on Albanians of 1905 revo- 198; pro-Turkish bias of, 348-50; lution in, 205-06; Balkan interests distrust of Young Turk regime,

of, 288-91; protest to Porte re- 392; armed outbreaks over census garding Uniate conversions, 302; and taxes, 393-95; 1910 revolt proposes Reval reforms, 340; con- in, 406; 1911 outbreak in, 411-12 cern over IQI1I uprisings, 414-15; Shkodér Mountain Committee, 15;

and Ismail Kemal, 416n; activi- League Committee of, 38-39; ties on eve of revolution, 445, Berlin Congress memorandum

448-49, 457 from, 43-46; growth after Berlin Congress, 56; efforts to defend

Sabaheddin, Prince, 336 Dulcigno, 65-68; collects funds

364-65 | 81-82

Salonica nationalist club, 350-52, in south, 76; and Epirus issue,

INDEX 497 Shogéria e Zezé pér Shpétim, see Treaty of Berlin, 190, 224, 306n

Black Society for Salvation Triple Alliance, 240-42, 24.7, 255

Sina, Thanas, 135. Trochsi (Troksi), Monsignor, 287

Sinjé memorandum, 432, 436 Turgut Pasha, 96-97, 99, 405-06,

sipahis, 18-19 412, 415-16; suppresses Albanian Skenderbeg, George Kastrioti, 3-4; uprising of 1881, 103-07; recall

Code of, 15; extolled in song, of, 419

116; in nationalist literature, 118; Turkhan Pasha, 178 growth of legend about, 123; flag Turtulli, Foqion, 153 of, 126; lineage claims to, 319,

321-22, 324 Uniates, 6, 179, 296-303 Societa Dante Alighieri, 248, 250- Union and Progress, 335, 338-39; 51, 260-61 early attitude toward Albanian

Societa per le Missioni Italiane nationalist clubs, 347-49; reaction

-all’Estero, 264 to Austro-Hungarian annexation 216-19, 220, 274 becomes regular political party,

Societa Nazionale Albanese, 177, of Bosnia-Hercegovina, 355-56; Society of Istanbul (1879), 145-47 363; on alphabet question, 385; Society for the Printing of Albanian on role of Islam, 396; develops

Writings, 119-21, 140, 142 “national” policy, 400

Sokoli, Jusuf Aga, 65 University of Palermo, 221 , Sotiri, Pandeli, 134~35, 146 University of Rome, 235 Starova, Ibrahim (Temo), see

Ibrahim (Edhem) Temo Vahan Effendi, 69 Vasa Pasha Effendi, 57, 58, go—91,

Tahsini, Hasan, 139 139, 169-70

Tanzimat, 25; as continuing basis Venosta, Visconti, 244, 246-47

in 1889 for taxation, 192 Veqilharxhi, Naum, 121, 139; in

Tashko, Thanas, 154 Rumania, 145

Temo, Ibrahim (Edhem), 335-38, Vesel Pasha, 191—92

401 Villa-Frashéri, Nuri, 187

Tepelena, Ali Pasha, 21-23 Viakhs, 314-15, 325

94 Vlora, Syreja, 279

Tetova (Kalkandelen), Esad Pasha, Vlora, Ekrem, 453-54

Tetova, Sheh Mustafa, 37, 57 Vokshi, Sulejman, 37, 97-98

Tevfik Pasha, 193-94 Vreto, Jan, 139, 145, 152

Thessaly, 52, 70, 75, 78 Vrioni, Mehmed Ali Bey, 73, 107

Thopia, Karl, 3 Vrioni, Ymer Bey, 107

giftliks, 19 Toci, Terenc, 412 Committee

timars system, 4—53; conversion to Vruho, Jani, 154, 429

Tittoni, 253-54, 256 Xhibali, see Shkodér Mountain

Toptani, Abdul, 437

Toptani, Esad, 361 Ypi, Abdul Bey, 354, 375, 379, 392

Toptani, Fazil, 437-38 Young Turks, constitution, 213, , Toptani, Murad Bey, 193, 209, 271 343-443 uprising of, 340-44; early

Topulli, Bajo, 207-10, 213, 348 relations with Albanian national-

Topulli, Gercis, 210-12 ists, 344—52; abet anti-Austrian

Tosks, 14 and anti-Greek sentiment,

trade, as competitive interest of 355-58; in 1908 election, 359-62;

Italy and Austria-Hungary, emergence of Liberals (Ahrar)

265-66 among, 362; growing hostility to-

Trank Spiro Bey, see Faik Konitza ward, 363-65; depose Abdul

A98 INDEX Young Turks (cont.) 408—10; dissolve parliament, 425; Hamid, 364-65; agitation against and 1912 elections, 426-27; national alphabet and schools, forced out of cabinet, 431-32 376-90; enact “law on bands,”

395-96; enact “law on associa- Zaimis, Alexander, 195 tions,” 401; suppress Albanian Zavalani, Fehim Bey, 207, 209, 353,

newspapers, 407; make conces- 407

sions to refugees in Montenegro, Zeka, Hadji Molla, 194, 198, 271