The Albanian National Awakening 9781400847761

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THE ALBANIAN NATIONAL AWAKENING

THE ALBANIAN NATIONAL AWAKENING 1878-1912

by Stavro Skendi

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 1967

Copyright ©

1967

by Princeton University Press

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Library of Congress Card Number: 66-17710

Printed in the United States of America BY THE MAPLE PRESS Co., INC.

To the Memory of My Parents

Preface SOME YEARS AGO, while engaged in a project on the history of

Albania, I found myself at a loss to cover the period from the collapse of the Albanian League (1881) to the declaration of the Young Turk Revolution. Neither the general books on Albania—and most of the books on that country are general in character—nor the few existing historical studies treated of that period: they jumped from generalities regarding the Congress of Berlin to generalities about the Albanian revolts during the Young Turk regime. When a publication dealt with the period at all, interest was concentrated on the rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Italy in the Adriatic. The need to fill the gap was also recognized—following the publication of several of my articles on Albanian nationalist trends in the period under study—by two very different his­ torians, both of world-wide reputation. One was the late Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes at Columbia University; the other, Professor W. N. Medlicott, formerly at Oxford Uni­ versity and now at London University. Both scholars encour­ aged my efforts, Professor Hayes urging me to write a book "with stress on Albanian nationalism." There were, however, several difficulties in carrying out the project. The first step was to dig out the facts from the ar­ chives. Because of Austria-Hungary's special interest in Al­ bania, after the Congress of Berlin, the first archives to be in­ vestigated were those in Vienna. While on a trip from the USSR to Yugoslavia, I stopped for a week in the Austrian capital to examine the Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv and con­ cluded that the material preserved there justified a study of the Albanian national awakening (1878-1912). Two years later I spent a summer doing research in those archives. Since Italy had been the rival of Austria-Hungary in Albania at that time, it was also necessary to study the Italian archives in Rome—Arehivio Centrale dello Stato and Arehivio Storieo del Ministero degli Affari Esteri—mostly to check on the facts and to reach a more balanced judgment. In order to round

viii

PREFACE

out the research, the archives of a third power, France—Ar­ chives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris—came un­ der examination, especially since they were rather rich in in­ formation in Albanian domestic affairs. But archival material alone, however essential in this in­ stance, could not convey a complete picture of the develop­ ments during the period under consideration. I have also studied pertinent published material, especially contempo­ rary periodicals and political pamphlets. Further difficulty was encountered in the treatment of the material. There was a substantial difference in development between the southern and northern parts of Albania. More­ over, the division of the population into three religious groups, each with its own particular cultural orientation and political interests, rendered the picture more complex. The interests of the great powers—in this case Austria-Hungary and Italy—and the neighboring states, which had their own aims, added to the complexity. The editors of the documents on medieval Albania main­ tained that during the Middle Ages that country was a "mo­ nad" in which the Balkan world was reflected.* As will be seen in the present study, there is strong reason to hold that in the period 1878-1912 Albania was even more of a Balkan "monad." A matter for investigation was whether in the meantime the Russians or the Albanians had written anything signifi­ cant on this subject. In 1959 a book by I. G. Senkevich on the liberation movement of the Albanian people in the years 1905-1912 (Osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie albanskogo naroda ν ipo^-ipi2gg., Moscow) was published by the Institute of His­ tory of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Although bear­ ing the name of one writer, it is undoubtedly a collective work, written with the aid of Albanian scholars. It is based preponderantly on material of the Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv, which Tirana has had microfilmed and to which it has given * L. Thall0czy, C. Jireiek, and E. Sufflay, eds., Acta et Diplomata res Albaniae mediae aetatis Illustrantia, Vienna, 1913,1, vi.

PREFACE

ix

its own classification. Apart from the Marxian slant, which was to be expected, the Soviet book contains certain misinter­ pretations, which have been pointed out in the present work. In 1961 Albanian historians prepared for the students of the State University of Tirana two short mimeographed volumes: one covering the period 1839-1900; the other, the period 19001919. Both of them are devoid of footnotes, but one who is familiar with the documents of the Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv can easily discover which documents were used. For the period 1905-1912, there is a striking similarity, indeed often identity, between the Tirana mimeographed volume and I. G. Senkevich's book, which testifies to the collective character of the latter. However, the Tirana volumes, having been pub­ lished after the Albanian-Soviet conflict, manifest a certain departure from Moscow influences and a more nationalist tendency than previous Albanian historical studies. I have not ignored these works by Communist historians, but have made critical use of them. The Turkish references in I. G. Senkevich's book or in the Tirana volumes are not founded on Ottoman archival mate­ rial. The archives of the Ottoman empire regarding Albania have not yet been studied. The difficulty appears to lie not so much in their bulk as in the lack of classification and of competent scholars to do the needed research. When ex­ ploited, the Ottoman archives will contribute to the complete­ ness of Albanian history in the years 1878-1912, especially if compared with the archival material found in the capitals of Western Europe. I wish to thank the officers of the various archives who were helpful to me, particularly Dr. Anna H. Benna of the HausHof-und Staatsarchiv, who was always ready to lend her as­ sistance. While engaged in this project, I benefited from the en­ couragement of Professor Philip E. Mosely of Columbia Uni­ versity, to whom I wish to express my warm thanks. Special appreciation is due to Dr. John C. Campbell of the Council on Foreign Relations, a Balkan specialist of long standing,

X

PREFACE

who read the manuscript with care and gave his evaluation. I am also deeply indebted to my wife, whose comments helped to improve this book. The project could not have been carried through had it not been for the generous grants, both for research and writing, provided by the Joint Committee on Slavic and East Euro­ pean Studies, of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council, to which I wish to express my gratitude. Thanks also go to Columbia Univer­ sity for defraying the cost of typing the manuscript. Institute on East Central Europe Columbia University May 1965

STAVRO SKENDI

Note on Transcription and Toponymies I. PRONUNCIATION

1. Albanian spelling is phonetic. Except for the following letters, the rest are pronounced like their English counter­ parts: LETTER[S]

PRONOUNCED LIKE

c ς dh e g gj

j

I II nj q th χ xh y zh

AS IN

"ts" "ch" "th" "i" "g" g'

cats church father first (but less rounded) girl (palatalized g)

"y"

yes

1 (soft) 1 (hard) "gn" k' "th" "ds" "j" "u" "s"

leaf lord ligne (French) (palatalized k) thin gods jam huile (French) pleasure

2. As for the reading of words in Turkish, the following letters are pronounced differently than in English: LETTER

c ς § δ ii g

PRONOUNCED LIKE

"j" "ch" "sh" "eu" "u" y (palatal) or gh (velar;

ASIN

John church shop peu (French) Iune (French) or Tiire (German) saying

y)

3. Whereas Albanian employs mostly digraphs in the alphabet, Serboeroatian makes use primarily of diacritical marks. The pronunciation of the following letters should be noted:

xii

TRANSCRIPTION AND TOPONYMIES LETTER

I

ς

dz d2

X

xh sh (the same as English "sh")

j

j j

n

ϊ έ

3 or gj II.

PRONOUNCED LIKE ALBANIAN

nj (n') zh q (palatalized t or k) gj (palatalized d or g)

TOPONYMIES

The place names have various spellings, both in the Balkan languages and in the Western ones. The following are those more frequently used in the book: AS SPELLED

OTHER SPELLINGS

i. Towns

Cetinje Diber Durres Gjakove Gjirokaster (Gjinokaster in Geg dialect) Ipek (Turkish) Janina Kor^e

Cettignd, Cettigne Dibra or Debar Durazzo Jakova, Dakovica Argyrokastro, Argyrocastro, Argirocastro Ρεέ, Peje Joannina, Yannina Korcha, Kortcha, Koritsa, Korytza, Corizza Kruje (Krue in Geg dialect) Croya Lesh (Lezhe " " " ) Alessio Monastir Bitolj, Bitola Permet Premeti Prishtina, Pristina Prishtine Santi Quaranta Sarande Shen Gjin, San Giovanni di Shengjin Medua Scutari (Scutari d'Albanie, Shkoder Scutari d'Albania), Skutari, Skadar

TRANSCRIPTION AND TOPONYMIES

xiii

Kalkandelen (Turkish), Tetovo Skoplje, Skopje, Scopia, Uskub

Tetove Dskiib (Turkish)

2. Rivers and Regions

Bojane (Buene in Geg) Qameri Dukagjin Shkumbi (Shkumbin in Tosk) Vijose

Bojana, Boyana Tsamouria, Chamouria, Ciamouria Ducagini Shkumbini Voyoussa

In keeping with the form commonly used in the Albanian maps, the indeterminate form was chosen for the toponymies in Albanian: Shkoder and not Shkodra, Qameri and not Qameria, Elbasan and not Elbasani, Ipek and not Ipeku. Only for Albania's capital the English form Tirana was preserved. NOTE ON TOE SPELLING OF PROPER NAMES IN TURKISH

There is a tendency in Turkish (and in Albanian also) to pronounce the written voiced consonant at the end of a proper name (or a word) as unvoiced. Owing to this, with the adoption of the Latin alphabet for Turkish, an inconsistency ensued in spelling. One finds both forms of a proper name, as it was orig­ inally written and as it is actually pronounced: Hamid and Hamit, Necib and Necip, and so on. However, since in Osman Turkish one Arabic letter stood at times for more than one sound (phoneme), the inconsistency spread to comprise other positions and other letters. This explains the various spellings for the name of two generals mentioned in this text: Dorgud, Durgud, Torgud, Turgut, Dorgut, Durgut.

Contents Preface Note on Transcription and Toponymies Abbreviations Introduction: Albania's Legacy PARTI ·

vii xi 2 3

THE GROUNDWORK (1878-1881)

I.

The Albanian League and The Congress of Berlin II. Resistance to the Decisions of the Berlin Congress III. The Struggle for Administrative Autonomy PAR TII

IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. XI. XII. XIII.

·

31 54 88

THE STR UGGLE FOR NATIONAL AFFIRM A TION (1881-1908)

Cultural Affirmation Problems in National Education Role of Societies and Press Abroad Political Thinking DiffuseRevolutionaryActivity Contribution of the Italo-Albanians to the National Movement Albania's Importance to Austria-Hungary and Italy Rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Italy and Albanian Reaction The Interest of Balkan Neighbors and the Great Powers Pretenders to an Imaginary Throne

PART III

·

111 129 145 165 190 215 238 257 287 316

TOWARD INDEPENDENCE (1908-1912)

XIV.

Collaboration between Albanians and Young Turks XV. The Struggle for a National Alphabet and National Schools XVI. The Deepening of the Albanian-Young Turk Conflict

335 366 391

xvi

CONTENTS

XVII. Revolts, Demands, and Interventions XVIII. The Attainment of Independence Conclusion Bibliography Index

405 438 464 475 489

THE ALBANIAN NATIONAL AWAKENING

Abbreviations (Complete citations in the bibliography) A and P

Accounts and Papers, London.

ACS

Political and other files (Carte), Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome.

AMAE

Archives du Ministfere des Affaires Etrangferes, Paris.

ASMAE

Political correspondence, Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Rome.

DDF

Documents diplomatiques 1914, Paris.

DDI

I Documenti diplomatici italiani, Rome.

GP

Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914, Berlin.

HHStA

Haus-Hof-und-Staatsarchiv, Vienna.

O-U.A

Osterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik 1908-1914, Vienna.

fran^ais

1871-

Introduction: Albania's Legacy ALBANIA was one of the first Balkan countries to be invaded

by the Ottomans. In 1385 the Albanian feudal lord of Durres (Durazzo), Karl Thopia, expelled from his possessions by a ruling house in the north, the Balshas, appealed to the Otto­ mans for support. Balsha II hastened to oppose the Turks, but his resistance was broken near the Vijose (Voyoussa) river.1 It appears that after the victory of the Ottomans the principal Albanian feudal lords recognized the suzerainty of the Sultan.2 Yet, whenever the Turks were in trouble far from Albania, those lords revolted and regained much of the ter­ ritory they had previously lost.3 A great Ottoman invasion took place in 1423, under Sultan Murad II, and it expanded as far as the Adriatic coast, which was controlled to a great extent by Venice.4 The Albanian feudal lords of the central and southern parts of the country attempted to regain their independence; they revolted and their victories, particularly that of the Aranitis (Arianitis) in 1433, attracted the attention of the Christian West.® This attention increased with the resistance of the Albanians under the leadership of George Kastrioti Skenderbeg (Scanderbeg). Skenderbeg was the son of the Albanian feudal lord of Kruje (Croya), a fortified town in upper middle Albania, and its surroundings. He became a Moslem either as a hostage in the Sultan's palace or under his father's persuasion.® After the battle near Nis (1443), where he had fought on the side 1N.

Jorga, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, Gotha, 1908, 1, 255. p. 261. 3Cf. A. Gegaj, UAlbanie et I'invasion turque au XV e siecle, Louvain, 2 Ibid.,

1937. PP- 48-49· 4Cf. ibid., p. 39; E. Rossi, "Saggio sul dominio turco e l'introduzione dell' Islam in Albania," Rivista d'Albania, 111 (194s), 201. 5Cf. C. Jireiek, Geschiehte der Serben, Gotha, 1918, Vol. n, Part 1, pp. 154, 171, and "Albanien in der Vergangenheit," L. v. Thall0czy, ed., Illyrisch-albanisehe Forsehungen, Munich and Leipzig, 1916, I, 81; cited hereafter as Illyrisch-albanisehe Forsehungen. On the Aranitis, see F. Babinger, Das Ende der Arianiteni Munich, i960. eF. S. Noli, George Castrioti Scanderbeg, New York, 1947, p. 30.

4

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIA'S LEGACY

of the defeated Ottomans against the Christians, who were headed by John Hunyadi, king of Hungary, he rushed to Al­ bania and raised the banner of revolt in the center of his father's lands.7 He immediately returned to Christianity, but this act was not just a diplomatic move like that of his father, who had been "converted" several times.8 Skenderbeg invited the Moslem colonists and converts to choose between Chris­ tianity and death; those who did not reject Islam lost their lives.® He thereby declared a Holy War from which there could be no retreat. For twenty-four years Skenderbeg led his countrymen in wars against the Ottomans in defense of their country and of Christianity. He was helped by the Christian West, particu­ larly by the king of Naples, Alphonse V, who continued to represent Western ambitions in the Balkans, and by the popes. Before his death in 1468, Pope Nicholas V called him "Cham­ pion of Christendom," a title which was confirmed by three of his successors.10 After Skenderbeg's death, the Turks gradu­ ally extended their conquests in Albania, Shkoder (Scutari) being the last city to fall (1478). The commander who suc­ ceeded in uniting the Albanians, and who led them in so many victories against the Ottomans, was destined to become their national hero. In the invasions before Skenderbeg's time, the Ottomans pursued a conciliatory policy. They allowed the Albanian feudal lords to maintain their positions, on condition that they pay tribute, send their sons as hostages to the Sultan's court, and furnish auxiliary troops.11 In a record-book of timars (Ottoman military fiefs) in southern and central Al7F. Babinger, Mehmed der Eroberer und seine Zeit, Munich, 1953, p. 56; F. S. Noli, op.cit., p. 31. s Ibid., p. 35. 9 Ibid., p. 36. 10 Ibid., p. 73. 11H. Inalcik, "Timariotes chritiens en Albanie au XVe sifecle, d'aprts un registre de timars ottoman," Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchiv, iv (1952), 120.

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIA'S LEGACY

5

bania for the years 1431-1432, only 30 per cent of the fiefs were held by Turks from Asia Minor; the rest were in the hands of Albanians.12 As in the case of Hercegovina later, it was not obligatory for a Christian Albanian feudal lord to become a Moslem in order to preserve his possessions or part of them as timars. The record-book mentions timariots who maintained their Christian faith for two generations.13 The system of timars, on the whole, prevented the Ottoman conquests from assuming the character of a simple military occupation.14 The extensive use of the system in Albania, however, seems to have been influenced by local considera­ tions. The inhabitants were warlike people, inclined to re­ bellion, and their country was well protected by mountains. Across the Adriatic was the Catholic West, and Venice, a po­ tential enemy, was in possession of a significant part of the Albanian littoral. The Albanian feudal lords were small and more or less independent; with as good an offer as the timar, it was easy for the Ottoman State to come to terms with each one separately. It was not even very difficult for them to be­ come Moslems. Before the coming of the Ottomans, when Al­ bania was the battlefield between Byzantium and the West, the feudal lords had led an amphibious life between Cathol­ icism and Orthodoxy.15 The policy of the Ottoman govern­ ment in Albania in the early period was determined by its interest in maintenance of peace on a vulnerable frontier and recruitment of support. 12The record-book, discovered and edited by H. Inalcik: Hicrx 835 tarihli suret-i defter-i sancak-ι Arvanid (Copy of a Record Book of the Sandjak of Albania Dating from 835 of the Hegira [A.D. 1431-1432]), Ankara, 1954; cf. his "Timariotes chrdtiens en Albanie au XVe sifecle, d'aprfes un registre de timars ottoman," p. 123. l i Ibid., pp. 130-131. 14Cf. H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and The West, London, New York, Toronto, 1950, Vol. I, Part 1, p. 46. 15M. Sufflay, "Die Kirchenzustande im vortiirkischen Albanien. Die orthodoxe Durchbruchszone im katholischen Damme," Illyrischalbanische Forschungen, 1, 241.

6

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIA'S LEGACY

But the long wars between the Albanians and the Otto­ mans upset this situation. Many of the lords who remained in the country espoused Islam in order to preserve their po­ sitions, and a part of the population naturally followed the nobility in its conversion. But some, like the Aranitis, the Muzakis, and the Dukagjinis, fled with their people to south­ ern Italy.1® This great exodus was followed by several other migrations of southern Albanians. Among them were de­ scendants of those Albanians who in the latter half of the fourteenth century had settled in Greece, especially in the Morea, not solely as conquerors but also upon the invitation of local rulers, who needed them as settlers.17 To this day one hears in the Albanian settlements of Greece a southern Al­ banian dialect in its old form.18 Small migrations from Al­ bania proper to Italy continued until 1744, the last to migrate being inhabitants of Himare, on the littoral south of Vlore (Valona).19 In addition to southern Italy, particularly Cala­ bria, Albanian settlements were established in Sicily. Of these Albanian colonists, who call themselves Arbreshe (Al­ banians) but whom the Italians call Italo-Albanians, over the years some became Catholics, while the majority joined the Uniate church, thus preserving the Orthodox liturgy but rec­ ognizing the supremacy of the pope.20 They constituted the main Albanian diaspora. Already after the collapse of the Serbian state of Stefan DuSan (1355), Albanians had penetrated into Old Serbia and leK. Jire£ek, "Albanien in der Vergangenheit," Illyrisch-albanische Forschungen, 1, 83-84. 17Cf. G. F. Finlay, A History of Greece, from Its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Time, Oxford, 1877, vi, 28-29; K. Jireeek, op.cit., pp. 79-80; G. Stadtmiiller, "Die albanische Volkstumsgeschichte als Forschungsproblem," Leipziger Vierteljahrsschrift fiir Siidosteuropa, ν

(!941)' 73-74· 18See the study by G. Weigand, "Das Albanesische in Attika," Balkan Archiv, 11 (1926), 167-225. 18Cf. M. Sufflay, Srbi i Arbanasi (Serbs and Albanians), Belgrade, 1925, p. 80. 20Coneerning the Italo-Albanians, see L. v. Thall0czy, "Die albanische Diaspora," Illyrisch-albanische Forschungen, 1, 330-340.

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIA'S LEGACY

7

a part of western and northern Macedonia.21 In 1388 Alba­ nian emigrants were found as far as Dubrovnik. But subse­ quent to the 1690 exodus of the Serbs to Hungary, Albanians spread further northeastward in present Yugoslavia. They settled in Kosovo (Kosovo-Metohija), Novi Pazar, and even around Nis. Ipek (Pec), which for six centuries had been the see of the Serbian church, became like Gjakove (Dakovica) and Gusinj, an Albanian city.22 From the eighteenth century on the Albanian migration into Macedonia was intensified.23 It was not an Albanian diaspora but an Albanian expansion. When the Ottomans arrived in Albania, they found, as a consequence of the 1054 schism, a Catholic north and an Orthodox south. They introduced their own religion: Islam. As noted, the Turks did not at the outset employ force for conversions. The apostasies occurred after Skenderbeg's death. This was natural, for the Albanian hero's wars had not only been long and bloody but had also borne the stamp of the cross against the crescent. Among the Catholics the new faith does not appear to have made great progress in the sixteenth century. In a document describing the situation of the Albanian Catholic Church in the half century preceding the creation of the Propaganda Fide (1622), we read: ". . . all the Albanians desire naturally to be liberated from the Turkish yoke, and they could do this by themselves, since only one thirteenth of them are Turks [Moslems], and the rest Christians, Catholics and war­ like. . . ." 24 And in a reference of 1610 one reads that the 21Cf. G. Stadtmuller, op.cit., p. 73, and "Die Islamisierung bei den Albanern," Jahrbucher fiir Geschichte Osteuropas, 111 (1955), 412, 420 and note 86, 421. 22M. SufHay, Srbi i Arbanasi, pp. 80, 81-82; K. Jireiek "Albanien in 1 der Vergangenheit," pp. 87-88; J. Cvijic, La Peninsule balkanique, Paris, 1918, pp. 122-123. 23M. Sufflay, op.cit., p. 81; J. Cvijii, op.cit., p. 123. 24The text of the report, which is in the Vatican Archives, has been reproduced in F. Cordignano, Geografia ecclesiastica dell'Albania (dagli ultimi decenni del secolo XVI0 alia meth del secolo XVII0), Rome, 1934, pp. 231-232. Cordignano believes that the document is from the end of the 16th or the beginning of the 17th century.

8

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIA'S LEGACY

Catholic population exceeded the Moslem by a ratio of ten to one.25 Gradually, however, Moslem influences gained converts among the Catholic population. The conversions became more frequent in the large towns. Most of the villages were inhabited by Christians, with a small admixture of Moslems. In fact, the countryside and the mountains from Elbasan to Kelmend, bordering on Montenegro, yielded slowly to Is­ lam.26 The majority of the converts were men. Women, al­ though married to Moslems, often retained their Christian religion, and were a factor in creating a good feeling between the members of the two faiths. In some instances the followers of the Prophet contributed toward the support of the parish priest, as the majority of them had Christian wives.27 But in the course of the seventeenth century the Catholic population began to decline rapidly. Three explanations have been offered for the general lapse to Islam: the desire to avoid the payment of taxes; the attraction of worldly advantages, for in the Ottoman empire the political-economic basis was religion and not nationality; and the insufficient number of intelligent clergy to supply the spiritual needs of the popu­ lation.28 The Franciscan brothers, who first came to Albania in the thirteenth century, were very active in opposing the conversions. Indeed, they saved Catholicism from ruin during the difficult seventeenth century, although several episcopal sees were lost in the north.29 On the other hand, political reasons for the decrease of the Catholic population were not absent. The Ottoman empire saw Catholicism as an adversary with which it could not come to terms. In addition to papal Rome there were the powers 25T.

W. Arnold, The Preaching of Islam1 London, 1913, p. 180. F. Cordignano, L'Albania atraverso I'opera e gli scritti di un grande Missionario italiano, il P. Domenico Pasi1 S. I. (1841-1914), Rome, 26 Cf.

i933-!934. ". 36127See

T. W. Arnold, op.eit., pp. 180-182. p. 182; F. Cordignano, op.eit., 1, 96. 29 Ibid., i, 95, and II, 366. 2s Ibid.,

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIA'S LEGACY

9

of the West, which could organize an attack in the name of Catholicism. When the Turco-Venetian war of 1645 broke out, the Albanian Catholics, instigated by the high clergy, sided with Venice. As the reprisals were harsh, many em­ braced Islam and several joined the Orthodox Church, the adherents of which remained faithful to the Ottoman em­ pire.30 A forced conversion ensued after the revolt of 1689 and the subsequent retreat of the Austrian armies, when the Pasha of Ipek deported inhabitants of northern Albania, who were mostly Catholics, to the plain of Serbia (in planitiem Serviae), and those villages were compelled to pass to Islam.31 In the eighteenth century the Russo-Turkish wars began and the pressure on the Catholics was eased. Austria also, by the treaty of Sistova in 1791, renewed her privileges over the Catholics of the Ottoman empire.32 Yet accessions to Islam— sometimes for trivial reasons—continued up to more recent times; when Evliya Celebi, an Ottoman high official, visited Shkoder in 1668, it had only eleven mosques as compared with twenty-six at the beginning of the twentieth century.33 In the lowlands of central Albania, which encompass both sides of the Shkumbi River, Islam gained the most converts. The inhabitants of this region felt the Ottoman rule more than did the mountaineers of the secluded regions of the north. Moreover, the lowlands had been the borderlands be­ tween Catholicism and Orthodoxy, where religious oscilla­ tions had taken place, and were therefore more vulnerable to the propagation of Islam. Conditions in southern Albania were different from those in the north. The population was Orthodox in faith, and to the Patriarchate of Constantinople the Ottomans accorded special treatment. Following the fall of the city (1453), Meh30T.

W. Arnold, op.cit., p. 188. Cordignano, op.cit., 1, 90; T. W. Arnold, op.cit., p. 196. 32See Article xii of the treaty in T. Ippen, "Das religiose Protectorat Osterreich-Ungarns in der Tiirkei," Die Kultur, m (1902), 300. 83F. Babinger, Ewlija Tschelebi's Reisewege in Albanien, Berlin, 1930, 31F.

pp. 4-5.

10

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIA'S LEGACY

med II sought the allegiance of the Orthodox Christians in the Balkans by proclaiming himself the protector of the Or­ thodox Church and granting to the Ecumenical Patriarch the old rights and privileges.34 Moreover, the Patriarch as­ sumed considerable temporal power over the Orthodox sub­ jects of the Sultan.35 During the first centuries of occupation the Ottomans were at the height of their power and feared no intervention from an external Orthodox Christian state. There appeared to be no reason therefore to use force for apostasy. So long as the Orthodox Christians were not dangerous they could be milked better than the "true believers," and conversion en masse was in no one's interest.36 On the basis of an Ottoman record-book of timars, approximately of the year 151 ο (912 of the Hegira), there were in the district of Vlore 1206 Moslem as against 14,304 Christian families, and in the district of Gjirokaster (Argyrokastro) only 53 Moslem and 12,257 Christian fam­ ilies.37 However, when the Orthodox Albanian embraced Islam, he did so for the same useful reasons as the Catholic of the north. The ignorance and illiteracy of the clergy were con­ tributing factors. But the ignorance of the Orthodox priest was not as important as that of the Catholic, since the tradi­ tionalism of Orthodoxy did not need a rational theological culture. The force of religious conviction among the Ortho­ dox was not dictated by the understanding of dogmas, but by the unshaken belief that they had inherited from their an­ cestors the sole true religion and that they had to maintain 84Cf.

T. W. Arnold, op.cit., pp. 145-146; T. H. Papadopoullos, Studies and Documents Relating to the History of the Greek Church and People under Turkish Domination, Brussels, 1952, p. 17. Although the text of the document to the Patriarch has not been transmitted to posterity, the official confirmation of it as a berat or as a chrysobull has been admitted. Ibid., p. 7. 3 5 Ibid., p. 10. 36F. W. Hasluck, Christianity and Islam under the Sultans, Oxford, 1929, 11, 469. 37H. Inalcik, op.cit., p. 132.

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIA'S LEGACY

11

this religion and transmit it unchanged.38 The traditionalism of the Orthodox Church was undoubtedly a great force against accessions to Islam. Yet the disinterest of the higher clergy, as well as the grad­ ual decline of the Archbishopric of Ohrid (commonly called the Patriarchate of Ohrid in the Ottoman period), on which the Orthodox bishoprics of Durres and southern Albania de­ pended, weakened the resistance of the southern Albanians to the faith of Islam.39 Although in 1767 the Archbishop of Ohrid was brought under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the abuses by representatives of the Church con­ tinued, for simony had expanded. Even the Greeks them­ selves began to strongly oppose the exactions of the Orthodox Church.40 Islamic pressure on the Orthodox Christians started with the decline of the Ottoman empire and the Russo-Turkish wars of the eighteenth century. The officials in the provinces were corrupt and wanted to enrich themselves at the expense of the population. The Christians were naturally more ex­ posed to extortion and ill-treatment, owing to the difficulties that lay in the way of obtaining redress at law, and some of them may have sought relief from their sufferings in a change of faith.41 In the Russo-Turkish war of 1768, when Alexis Orlov's enterprise failed, the Ottomans made reprisals against the Orthodox Christians, whom they considered allies of Russia, and used pressure to convert them.42 The conversions were more numerous around the city of Berat, in south-central Albania, where the Moslems bordered 38Cf.

L. Hadrovics, Le Peuple serbe et son Sglise sous la domination turque, Paris, 1947, p. 22. 39Cf. G. I. Konidare, He hellenike ekklesia 6s politistike dynamis en te historia tes Khersonesou tou Haimou (The Greek Church as a Civilizing Force in the History of the Balkan Peninsula), Athens, 1948, pp. 178-179. 40Cf. T. H. Papadopoullos, op.cit., pp. 48, 133. 41T. W. Arnold, op.cit., p. 115. 42See "Moskhopolis," in Megale Hellenike Egkyklopaideia (Great Greek Encyclopedia), Athens, 1931, XVII, 399.

12

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIA'S LEGACY

on the Christians. Since 1670 this city had been predomi­ nantly Moslem: nineteen of its thirty sections were inhabited by Moslems.43 Several quarters had been compelled to apos­ tasy, and many churches held no liturgies, because of a lack of priests.44 Yet it was the Orthodox Church and the Greek school which strengthened Albanian resistance to the spread of Islam in the south during the eighteenth century. One of the leading figures of this period was Kosmas Aitolos, who traveled and preached over a great part of Albania. He even went as far as Durres and the surroundings of Kruje, an indica­ tion that there were Orthodox Christians in those regions.45 But the center of his activity was Berat, where in 1779 he fell a martyr to his religion.46 Both in the north and in the middle of Albania there ap­ peared a phenomenon, noticed also in other parts of the Balkans—crypto-Christianity. The crypto-Christians lived in regions near those inhabited by Moslems and professed Islam, but satisfied their consciences by practicing Christianity in private. They emerged in periods of outbursts of anti-Chris­ tian fanaticism.47 In the north the crypto-Christians were con­ centrated in the Pashalik of Prizren; they were called Iaramane (motley), and they lived chiefly around Ipek and in the plain of Kosovo.48 In south-central Albania, in Shpat, a region comprising a number of villages between Elbasan and Berat, the inhabitants remained crypto-Christians until the 43Ci.

F. Babinger, Etvlijd Tschelebis . . . , p. 19. I. Konidare, op.cit., pp. 178-179. 45Cf. ibid., pp. 182-183. 48Cf. ibid., p. 179 and F. Mikhalopoulos, Kosmas ho Aitolos (Kosmas from Aetolia), Athens, 1940, pp. 119-120. 47T. W. Arnold, op.cit., p. 182; F. W. Hasluck, op.cit., 11, 471, 474, note a. 723· 48V. Prennushi, Kdnge popullore gegenishte (Popular Geg [northern] Songs), Sarajevo, 1911, note on p. 10; F. Cordignano, L'Albania atraverso I'opera e gli scritti . . . , 11, 134-135. It is interesting to note that in Cyprus the crypto-Christians were called "piebalds," a term similar to that of the Albanian "motley." See R. M. Dawkins, "The CryptoChristians of Turkey," Byzantion, vm (1933), 256 and note 1. 44G.

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIA'S LEGACY

13

turn of the century.49 Whereas the former were Catholic crypto-Christians, the latter were Orthodox crypto-Christians. Bektashism also spread in Albania as nowhere else in the Balkans. This Moslem pantheistic order is believed to have originated in the thirteenth century in a frontier region of Anatolia, where Christianity, Islam, and paganism coexisted.50 It is an offshoot of Shia Mohammedanism and has numerous points of contact with Christianity.51 Bektashism was appar­ ently introduced into Albania sometime in the fifteenth cen­ tury by the Janissaries of the Ottoman army.52 But the great expansion of Bektashism in that country occurred in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, during the time of Ali Pasha Tepelena (Tepedenleli) of Janina, who is believed to have been a Bektashi himself.53 The greater freedom of Bektashism and its relationship with Christianity must have had an appeal for the Albanians, among whom it did not remain an order but became a sect. As a result of the Ottoman conquest, the religious picture of Albania was further complicated. The Catholics remained in the north, confined more or less to an enclave, with Shkoder as the core. The Moslems were spread all over the country, predominantly in the central parts and Kosovo. Except for the Bektashis of the south and the few in the middle regions and Kosovo they were all Orthodox (Sunni) Moslems. Most of the Orthodox Christians lived in territories south of the Shkumbi river, principally in the districts of ΚοΓςε and Gjirokaster. This religious composition was destined to play a pre­ dominant role in Albania's evolution. 49Cf. J. G. Hahn, Albanesische Studien, Vienna, 1853, 1, 18; G. I. Konidare, op.cit., p. 177. 50J. K. Birge, The Bektashi Order of Dervishes, Hartford, 1937, PP- 22>

30-336 1 Ibid.,

pp. a 10, 215-218; F. W. Hasluck, op.cit., n, 568. K. Birge, op.cit., p. 70. It has recently been maintained that the first Bektashi dervishes set foot on Albanian territory between 1644 and 166a; see H. J. Kissling, "Zur Frage der Anfange des Bektaschitums in Albanien," Oriens, Leiden, xv (1962), 285. 63F. W. Hasluck, op.cit., 11, 537, 588; J. K. Birge, op.cit., pp. 72-73. 52J.

14

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIA'S LEGACY

Natural barriers have also divided the Albanians into two main groups, those who live in the mountainous regions north of the Shkumbi river and are called Gegs (Ghegs), among whom are included the Albanians of Kosovo, and those who live south of that river, in the lowlands and plains, and are called Tosks. Their territories are respectively named Gegeni and Toskeri. When the Turks conquered the country, they found among the Geg highlanders an ancient organization, which was tribal. They not only maintained it but were also compelled to grant it self-government. This organization continued to exist until very recently, more or less in its original form. Because it was an anachronism in Europe and often discussed, foreigners usually tended to forget that it was confined to the highlands of the north. There is a strong resemblance between the organization of the Montenegrin tribes and the Albanian fis-es. The fis, considered sometimes as a tribe and at other times as a clan, corresponds more correctly to the Latin gens. The family is the nucleus of the fis and its head is the oldest male of the parental or grandparental generation, the patriarch.54 There is also a territorial-political organization, closely con­ nected with the fis, called bajrak. The bajrak (Turkish word for banner, standard), composed of one or more fis-es, is "a geographical area with some kind of natural unity." It is a political union of one or more fis-es under a single head, the bajraktar (standard-bearer), whose office is hereditary in cer­ tain families. Originally the bajraktar had only the modest office of leading the highlanders to the battlefield; his im­ portance seems to have grown during the time of Kara Mahmud Pasha Bushatij ruler of Shkoder toward the end of the eighteenth century, who needed the armed highlanders in his wars. It may also be said that each bajrak constitutes an 54For the organization o£ the Albanian fis, see F. Cordignano, op.cit., pp. 103-105, and C. S. Coon, The Mountains of Giants. A Racial and Cultural Study of the North Albanian Mountain Ghegs. Cambridge, Mass., 1950, pp. 27-28; for that of the Montenegrin tribes, see J. Cviji£, opxit., pp. 318-332.

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIA'S LEGACY

15

autonomous state governed by customs and other juridical regulations basically common to all the other bajraks. A tribe in the mountains of northern Albania is "an aggregation of bajraks," having at the head an official chosen from a ruling family and bearing a different title in each tribe.55 In order to settle matters of law, assemblies of tribesmen were held under the presidency of elders, using their unwrit­ ten customary law, the Code of Leke Dukagjini, attributed to the local lord Leke III Dukagjini, who lived in the fifteenth century. This code had a juridical value in the mountains of Mbishkoder and Dukagjin, which also comprised Mirdite.56 It is this customary law that has given sanctity to the popular Albanian word besa (word of honor); rather than break it, a mountaineer would sacrifice his life. The prerogative to make laws resided with the General Assembly of the tribe and the Partial Assemblies, which were the governing bodies.57 In the mountains to the south, in Diber, Mat, and Kruje, a slightly different and less consistent customary law, called the Code of Skenderbeg, prevailed.58 In the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century, when Menemenli Mustafa Pasha was Governor Gen­ eral of the vilayet of Shkoder (1856-1858), a new organiza­ tion was established for the fis-es nearest to the city; the Mountain Committee of Shkoder (I$kodra Cibali Komisioni), often referred to briefly as Xhibali in Albanian. Its aim was to bring the fis-es to a closer dependence on the government. The bajraktars were linked with the Committee in Shkoder at the head of which stood a president, invariably a Moslem, appointed by the Governor General and chosen from among the notables of the city.59 55Cf.

C. S. Coon, op.cit., pp. 30-31; F. Cordignano, op.cit., 1, 106, 123. S. K. Gjegov, Kanuni i Leke Dukagjinit (The Code of Leke Dukagjini), Shkoder, 1933, p. xxix. 57See M. Hasluck, The Unwritten Law in Albania, Cambridge, 1954. Chapters xiv, xv. 68 Ibid,., pp. 15, 59. 59Cf. T. Ippen, "Beitrage zur inneren Geschichte Albaniens in xix. Jahrhundert," Illyrisch-albanische Forschungen, 1, 365; S. K. Gjegov, op.cit., p. xxix; F. Cordignano, op.cit., I, 390, 448. 58See

16

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIA'S LEGACY

South of the Shkumbi River, that is, among the Tosks, the tribal organization had disintegrated in the course of time and only remnants of a customary law like that of the Gegs could be found in certain mountain regions, like Kurvelesh. In the south, the control of the Ottoman government, owing to better means of communication, had extended beyond the cities. Yet in the eighteenth century there were villages com­ posed of fare (literally seeds), corresponding to a small clan, headed by elected chieftains.60 As in the north the Catholic and Moslem highlanders en­ joyed autonomy, so in the south the Orthodox of Himare and Suli, the latter in present-day northern Greece, lived in au­ tonomous cantons. In both instances there were no govern­ ment officials and only a small lump sum was paid as a tribute. It is interesting to note that in the north the tribute was col­ lected by the highlanders themselves and was delivered to the Ottoman government "outside the boundary of the Kanun (code)." 61 Both the highlanders of Gegeni and the Himariots were obliged to send soldiers—in Himare by 1868 their number could not exceed 1,000—to the Sultan, when­ ever he was engaged in war.62 In the towns the population was made up of Christians and Moslems, in varying proportion. The Christians, barred from government positions, were engaged in crafts (organized in guilds),63 in business, and in the liberal professions. The towns were also cultural centers. We have evidence that in the latter half of the seventeenth century there existed Turkish schools for boys and medreses (Moslem seminaries).64 60G.

Rem^ramd, Ali de Tebilen, Pacha de Janina, I J 4 4 -1822, Paris, 1928, p. 23. elS. K. Gjegov, op.cit., p. xxviii. 6 2 Ibid.; J. Matl, ed., "Neuer Beitrag zur inneren Geschichte Siidalbaniens in den 6oer Jahren des 19. Jr. s-Bericht des k. k. Consuls in Janina de dato 24 Juni 1868," Siidost-Forschungen, xvi/2 (1957), 439; G. Remiramd, op.cit., p. 21. 63Cf. E. Rossi, op.cit., pp. 209-210. 64See number of schools and medreses in the various towns in F. Babinger, Ewlijd Tschelebis . . . , pp. 5, 16, 20, 25, 27.

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIA'S LEGACY

17

Although Celebi's work mentions no boys' schools and memedreses in Elbasan, the fact that forty-six mosques existed in tha£ city 65 implies that the medreses at least were numerous. Moreover, Elbasan became the most important center of Oriental culture in Albania,66 to be surpassed in the next cen­ tury by Berat and Shkoder. Turkish schools, attended solely by Moslems, continued to function in the following centuries. The Orthodox population of Albania, which with the pre­ vailing concept of the millet among the Turks came under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, at­ tended the Greek schools. Since the sixteenth century a Greek school had functioned in the monastery of St. Nahum, on Lake Ohrid, and Greek schools are mentioned in 1723 in nearby ΚοΓςε. In the seventeenth century there were Greek schools in Zagorie and Himare, and in 1741 in Vlore.67 The number of schools increased after the middle of the eighteenth century, owing particularly to the activity of Kosmas Aitolos, who is believed to have founded more than soo Greek schools in Albania.68 The increase in schools was also encouraged by the Russo-Turkish treaty of Kii$iik Kaynarca (1774); the sit­ uation of the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman empire improved thereafter, as Russia, liberally interpreting that treaty, claimed the protection of the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan.69 In the nineteenth century, when the Greek state was formed, the Greek schools increased in number and ex­ panded northward.70 Two centers of Greek culture exercised great influence on the Orthodox Christian Albanians: Voskopoje (Moskhopolis) and Janina. The population of Voskopoje, primarily Vlakh and Albanian, had grown to more than 40,000 in the eighi s Ibid., p.

36. p. 37. β7Τ. E. Evanghelides, He paideia epi tourkokratias (Education under Turkish Rule), Athens, 1936, pp. 102, 129-130, 137, 173-176, 187, 194. e s Ibid., p. 188. e9Cf. J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, a Documentary Record: 1535-1914, Princeton, 1956, 1, 54. 70G. I. Konidare, op.cit., pp. 190, 191, note 5. e e Ibid.,

18

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIAS LEGACY

teenth century, and the city had become a significant com­ mercial and intellectual center. It carried on trade with the West and had Greek schools dating from the previous pentury. In 1744 there existed a school called the New Academy, which rivaled the best Greek high schools of the time. A great number of books, especially ecclesiastical works, were printed in Voskopoje and distributed in the Orthodox Christian world, enhancing the city's prestige.71 When it began to de­ cline, in the last decades of the eighteenth century, Janina emerged as a Greek cultural center; it had a famous gym­ nasium in the nineteenth century—Zosimaia Skhole—72 at which some prominent Moslem Albanians in the period of national awakening were educated. Although the population of Albania, both Christians and Moslems, spoke Albanian at home and in public, schools in the native tongue were not allowed. Albanian schools were not permitted even after the proclamation of the Hatt-1 Humayun (Imperial Rescript) of 1856, which promised equal treatment in education to all the peoples of the empire.73 It was in the interest of the Porte and the Patriarchate of Constantinople to keep the Albanians divided on the basis of creed. Nevertheless, some publications, printed abroad, did ap­ pear in Albanian; they were, however, ecclesiastical in char­ acter. Only among the Arbresh of Italy did a literature with nationalist tendencies emerge, around the middle of the nine­ teenth century. These people enjoyed cultural freedom in Italy and had been more exposed to the Western ideas of enlightenment and nationalism than Albanians in the mother country. However, indigenous Albanians, who had become aware of the nationalist trends among their Balkan neighbors, had begun to think about the fate of their country in the event of a collapse of the Ottoman empire. In the countryside there were at first the sipahis (cavalry 71See

"Moskhopolis," op.cit., xvn, 399-400. There is considerable literature on this city in Greek. 72See "Ioannina," in ibid., 1930, xn, 379-380. 78See text in J. C. Hurewitz, op.cit., p. 151.

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIA^ LEGACY

19

men who held military fiefs) and the peasants, who cultivated their lands. The Albanian sipahis were renowned in the six­ teenth and seventeenth centuries for their contribution to the military campaigns of the Ottomans.74 In the eighteenth century, however, the army of the sipahis had declined. The empire was no longer conquering new lands to reward mili­ tary prowess and faithfulness; on the contrary, it was losing territory. In this period there originated in Albania the land­ owning beys.75 The military fiefs, in the course of years, had become more and more hereditary, and the sipahis, being far from Istanbul and under a weak government, could affirm more strongly their possession of land. Thus their timars were gradually transformed into giftliks (estates). At the same time the system of farming out the state lands in the lowlands, the coastal plains, and the interior basins, created in Albania a class of big landowners, the ayans.™ The giftliks and the state lands were as a rule cultivated by Christians, whose lot was hard. Even during the period of the Tanzimat (1839-1876), there was no substantial improvement in the situation of the Christian peasants, although small busi­ nessmen and those in the liberal professions could buy small pieces of land in the countryside, as in ΚοΓςε, Gjirokaster and Shkoder.77 J. Zwiedinek, the Austrian consul of Janina, who visited southern Albania from Preveza to Berat, called Epirus in the nineteenth century,78 wrote in 1868: "In the whole of Chamuria [(Jameri],79 for instance, the land is not exclusively the G. Valentini, "La migrazione stradiotica albanese," Rivista d'Albania, π (1941), 233. ljs Ibid. 7e "Arnawutluk" (Albania), Encyclopedia of Islam (new edition). Leiden, London, 1960, 1, 650-658. 77 Cf. I. G. Senkevich, Osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie albanskogo naroda ν 1905-1912 gg., Moscow, 1959, p. 24. 78 See also G. Stadtmiiller, "Landschaft und Geschichte in albanischepirotischen Raum," Revue Internationale des Htudes Balkaniques, HI (1937-1938), 346. 79 Qameri, in Albanian, is the region in the northwestern corner of present Greece. 74

20

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIA'S LEGACY

property of those who till it, but it belongs to the Albanian beys and agas who have embraced Islam, partly also to the government, and the Christian peasants who reside on it have only the relevant usufruct." 80 He further stated that the heavy taxes imposed on the peasant, who was obliged to give to the landlord one-third of the pure produce, in­ duced him to seek abroad more favorable conditions for settlement.81 The Albanian and Bosnian Moslems have been regarded as the pampered children of the Ottoman empire. But whereas the Bosnians became fanatic Moslems, apparently because they were a minority surrounded by Christians against whom they had to fight constantly to defend the empire, the Alba­ nians, being a majority secure in their lands, were rather tolerant. The historical past must have also been influential: in Albania, during the Middle Ages, Catholics and Orthodox shifted from one religion to the other according to momentary interests. Their saying, "where the sword is, there lies reli­ gion" (Ku eshte shpata eshte feja),82 is related to their politi­ cal experience. Among the Albanian Moslems of Kosovo, however, because of Bosnian influence and Slavic pressure, one finds less religious tolerance. The Ottoman empire, based on conquest, offered to the warlike Albanian great opportunity. While using religion in order to differentiate the rulers and the ruled, it placed the Moslem Albanian automatically among the rulers. The Al­ banian distinguished himself from the outset. Most of the renegades who reached high positions during the reign of Mehmed II were Albanians.83 At the periodical levies of un­ married male children of Christian subjects for the Janissary troops, the so-called dev§irme, the strongest and the ablest 80J.

Matl, ed., op.cit., p. 436. ibid., pp. 436-437. 82J. G. Hahn, op.cit., 1, 35; see also A. di San Giuliano, Briefe iiber Albanien, Deutsch von D. Schulz und W. Wichmann, Leipzig, 1913, P- 24· 83Cf. N. Jorga, op.cit., 1909, 11, 202-203. 81Cf.

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIAS LEGACY

21

came from Albania.84 Many of the Ις-oglans, pages for the Sultan's palace, trained not only in the arts of the courtier but also in that of the administrator and commander, were Al­ banians.85 The family of the Kopruliis, members of which during the latter half of the seventeenth century saved the empire from its decline, was Albanian in origin.86 Consider­ ing the small size of the Albanian population, a dispropor­ tionate number of Albanians served in high positions of the Ottoman army and administration: at least thirty grand viziers were of Albanian origin.87 The Moslem Albanian found in the empire a vast field in which to develop his personality and impose his authority. It was natural for him to be absorbed in the larger realm and to neglect his small and primitive country, whose interest he viewed as bound to that of the empire. However, in general, he did not forget that he was an Albanian. Quite early the Ottoman state judged it convenient to entrust the government of Albanian territories to native pashas or beys. But there was never a sole and absolute pasha who ruled over the whole of Albania in the name of the Sul­ tan. The Porte played off one against the other, as it did with the chieftains of the highlands. It was partly in order to pre­ vent the union of the beys and the pashas that the Porte did not at first attempt to stop the growing power of two local dynasts, the Bushatis (Bushatlis) in the north and Ali Pasha Tepelena in the south, who later created hereditary princi­ palities almost independent of the Sultan. It was impossible for them not to come in conflict with the centralizing policy of Sultan Mahmud II (1784-1839). The Sultan destroyed their power; but while Mustafa Pasha Bushati, owing to Aus84A.

H. Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent, Cambridge, Mass., 1933, p. 52; H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen, op.cit., p. 74. 85Cf. ibid., pp. 56-57; A. H. Lybyer, op.cit., p. 74. 86Cf. J. W. Zinkeisen, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa, Gotha, 1857, v, 261-262, 287. 87"Arnawutluk," Encyclopaedia of Islam (new edn.), p. 677.

22

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIA'S LEGACY

trian intervention, was allowed to live unmolested in Istan­ bul, after 1831,88 Ali Pasha Tepelena was decapitated, in 1822. Of the two, Ali Pasha was a more important political figure. In 1788 Ali Pasha Tepelena, who had been a derbenci pasha, guarding the passes of the Pindus Mountains and the Epirotic and Macedonian surroundings, was recognized as governor of Janina by the Porte. Assisted by his sons, he extended his authority over all southern Albania, Greece, and southwestern Macedonia, and for thirty-two years he ruled like a despot.89 Owing to the strategic position of the littoral of southern Albania and Epirus, which he controlled, Ali Pasha played a significant role in the Napoleonic wars. Both France and England needed his alliance or neutrality, as the Ionian islands and certain coastal towns, previously under the con­ trol of the Venetian Republic, were occupied by the French, as a result of the treaty of Campo Formio (1797). He handled the changing situation with dexterity.80 Ali Pasha won a reputation for ruthlessness and persecu­ tion of Christians, primarily because of his expeditions against the Himariots and the Suliots. In reality, he was a lukewarm Moslem and wanted to conciliate the Christians, for he needed the support of an important minority which would otherwise give him trouble, and numerous Christians were in his service.91 If he was harsh with the Himariots and Suliots, it was because they defied his rule. His interest was in imposing his rule. When in 1820 the Pasha was declared a rebel by the Porte and endeavored to get support from the Greeks, he told the Orthodox bishops, in an assembly held in 88T.

Ippen, op.cit., p. 349. ibid., p. 344; K. Jireiek, "Albanien in der Vergangenheit," op.cit., p. 89. 90Cf. G. Remdrand, op.cit., p. 51. For details see A. Boppe, L'Albanie et Napoleon (1J9J-1814), Paris, 1914. 91F. W. Hasluck, op.cit., 1, 590-591; G. Remirand, op.cit., p. 227. 89Cf.

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIAS LEGACY

23

Janina, that if he had to fight against the Suliots it was "be­ cause they never consented to depose their arms." 92 He was not less ruthless toward his Moslem enemies.63 During the domination of the Bushatis of Shkoder and of Ali Pasha Tepelena, the influence of the beys and agas had sunk low. After their disappearance, however, the old power­ ful Moslem families, whether in the north or in the south, tried to regain their positions. It was natural that they too should resist the centralistic policy pursued by the Porte which curtailed their influence and independence. The unrest began in the south, but it became more violent in the north. The agas and beys of southern Albania, who sided with the Ottomans in the Greek Revolution of 1821, abandoned the battlefield when the Sultan's High Command was not in a position to give them the contracted payment. When that revolution and the Russo-Turkish war came to an end (1829), Mahmud II resolved to break the disobedience and independence of the Albanians and force them to obey Istanbul. In 1830 Mehmed Reshid Pasha, Turkish Com­ mander-in-Chief, invited all the southern beys and agas to Monastir, on the pretext that they would be rewarded for the Greek campaign. Five hundred of them were treacherously murdered in one day (August 26, 1830).94 The massacre of Monastir did not end opposition to the new regime. In 1833, some of the agas and the beys who had fled to Greek territory provoked an uprising, in order to harass the government and expel the Ottoman officials dispatched by the Porte. At the head of it were such leaders as Abdul Koka and Tafil Buzi. A few months later a revolt broke out in the district of Gjirokaster and many government employees were killed.95 In March 1834 the southern Albanian leaders arose again, but 92See

speech in ibid., pp. 236-238. the imperial firman issued after his death, "Disa dokumenta historike mbi Ali Pashe Janinen" (Some Historical Documents on Ali Pashaof Janina), Diturija (Knowledge), Tirana, π (1 January 1927), 103. 94Cf. T. Ippen, op.cit., pp. 346-347. m Ibid.., p. 350. 9sSee

24

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIA'S LEGACY

this time they were successful and they forced the Porte to come to terms with them temporarily. 96 Already in the early 1830's the Ottoman government had begun to cripple the power of the northern beys and pashas. It deported a number of them—from central Albania and Kosovo—to Asia Minor and destroyed their fortresses. Yet the resistance to the reforms of Sultan Mahmud II did not stop. In 1835 there was an uprising in Shkoder, because the gover­ nor of that city tried to apply the system of recruiting for a permanent army. In September 1839 the population of Prizren expelled its governor. 97 In both the north and the south, the Albanians resented the Turkish administrative officials. The ideas about reforms, which had been somewhat blurred with Mahmud II, found a clearer expression in the imperial edict, Hatti Sherif of Giilhane (1839), proclaimed by his successor, Abdul Medjid. It was then that the Albanian resistance was intensified, for the edict proposed chiefly re­ forms connected with the formation of the army and the pay­ ment of taxes: "to establish laws to regulate the contingent to be furnished by each locality . . . , and to reduce the term of military service to four or five years"; it was necessary also "that henceforth each member of the Ottoman society be taxed for a quota of a fixed

tax. . . ." 98

The Albanian mountaineers had enjoyed autonomy, paid low taxes, and served as soldiers only when the empire was at war. The application of the reforms infringed on the auton­ omy of their regions. The opposition to centralization and the preservation of autonomy and independent institutions for Albania, which had previously been supported by the in­ terned feudal families for their own interests, was now taken up by the broader layers of the town population. 99 In 1844 a revolt broke out in tiskub (Skopje), Tetove and Prishtine, directed against the new drafting, the new taxes, and the cenm Ibid., 87Cf. 08See

p. 351.

ibid., pp. 352-357.

texts in J. C. Hurewitz, op.cit., pp. 114-115. "9Cf. T. Ippen, op.cit., pp. 355-357.

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIA^ LEGACY

25

tralistic policy of the regime. The next year another uprising broke out in Gjakove, in which the highlanders also partici­ pated.100 The Ottoman government was more successful, during the period of Tanzimat, in southern Albania, although here, too, the drafting and the new taxes were resented. What the south­ erners opposed most was the principle in the centralization policy of not assigning functionaries of Albanian nationality in Albania but sending them to Anatolian provinces.101 In 1847 there was a revolt which took the Porte several months to suppress. Many of its leaders were deported to Asia Minor, some to Salonica and towns of Macedonia, while others were imprisoned in Istanbul.102 The principles expressed in the Hatt-ι Sherif of Gulhane were more extensively confirmed in the Hatt-ι Humayun of 1856. During the twenty years which followed, a series of laws were enacted relating to reforms. Their application was also attempted in Albania. Although in the provinces of Janina and Monastir they gained a firmer foothold, in no other Albanian province could they be applied totally and effec­ tively. In many regions of the north their validity was only nominal.103 The application of reforms during the Tanzimat period in Albania was not carried out at the same time in all parts. The Hatt-ι Sherif was proclaimed in northern Albania as late as 1844. The Turks feared the resistance of the people and pur­ sued their program in various stages and at a slow pace.104 In the course of centuries several changes took place in the administrative division of the Ottoman empire to which Al­ bania was frequently subjected and which were detrimental 100 Ibid.,

pp. 357-358. p. 369. 102 The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, ed. S. Story, London, 1920, pp. 8-9; T. Ippen, op.cit., pp. 360-362. 103Cf. ibid., pp. 363, 369. 104Cf. Z. Shkodra, Shqipnia ne kohen e Tanzimatit (Albania at the Time of Reforms), Tirana, 1959, p. 36. 101 Ibid.,

26

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIA'S LEGACY

to her territorial unity. In 1836, when the most important Albanian feudal lords had been stripped of their power, the Porte introduced the new centralistic-bureaucratic adminis­ tration. The southern part of Albania constituted the eyalet (province) of Janina, which comprised, in addition to the dis­ trict around that city, those of Berat, Gjirokaster, Arta, and sometimes Thessaly. More complex was the administrative division of northern Albania, which formed part of the eyalet of Rumelia, with Monastir as a center. Shkoder, Prizren, and Ipek were each a Iiva (sandjak), a district governed by a mutesarrif—governor, under a general of the regular army; Prishtine, Oskiib, and Tetove were governed by native pashas and they belonged at times to the eyalet of Rumelia and at other times to that of Sofia.105 As for Mirdite, the group of highlands which constituted part of the province of Shkoder, it had an old organization at the head of which was a superchieftain, who carried the title of "Captain" (Kapedan) and stood in a vassal relationship to the Sultan, through the Governor General of Shkoder.106 It was obliged only to contribute volunteers, when the Sultan was at war, and pay a small yearly tribute.107 The other moun­ tainous regions of the north and northeast, whether inhabited by Catholics or Moslems, were only nominally dependent on Shkoder, Ipek, or Prizren, as the case might be, because of their geographic position.108 When the law of 1865 on the organization of the Ottoman administration was applied, Albania was divided into three vilayets (provinces), local gov­ ernments in direct connection with the Porte: Shkoder, Ja­ nina, and Monastir, each composed of a number of sandjaks.109 Next to the local governments were the administrative councils, composed of Albanian notables and professionals.110 los Ibid.,

p. 355. p. 365. 107F. Lippich's report on Mirdite, in "Denkshrift iiber Albanien," Vienna, 20 June 1877, HHStA, PA xn/256, Tiirkei rv. 108T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 368. 109Cf. Wassa Effendi, La viriti sur VAlbanie et Ies Albanais, Paris, 110Cf. Z. Shkodra, op.cit., p. 37. 1879, p. 95: T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 363. 106 Ibid.,

INTRODUCTION: ALBANIA'S LEGACY

27

While in other parts of the empire the changes were usually made for the purpose of a better collection of taxes, in Al­ bania they appear to have had a political aim. The warlike Albanians occupied a strategic position in the Balkans; it was necessary therefore to prevent their unification. This policy of the Porte, particularly in the nineteenth century when nation­ alism was on the rise, in the Balkans, seems to account for the frequent changes in the administrative division of Albania. Just before the Congress of Berlin a fourth vilayet was formed, that of Kosovo, including not only Albanian terri­ tories but others like Nis, inhabited principally by Slavs, or Novi Pazar, which always constituted part of Bosnia, while Larissa in Thessaly was united with southern Albania.111 Obviously, the Ottoman government did not want to create homogeneous Albanian vilayets, still less give a definite de­ marcation to the vague geographic expression "Albania." It was with the burden of such a past, which brought about so many kinds of division, that the Albanians started on the road to national awakening. 111Wassa

EfiEendi, op.cit., pp. 94-95.

PART I

The Groundwork (1878-1881)

The Albanian League and the Congress of Berlin WHEN THE TROUBLES brewing in the Balkans in the mid-1870's

threatened another Near Eastern crisis, the great powers at­ tempted to settle them at a conference in Istanbul (December 23, 1876). The proposed reforms in Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina, aimed at decentralization for the benefit of the people of these regions, were rejected by Turkey. It then became impossible for Austria-Hungary and England to prevent Russia from going to war, particularly as anti-Turkish feeling in Russia ran high after the Bulgarian atrocities of May 1876. When a final attempt to solve the confusion peace­ ably, the London Protocol (March 31, 1877), was turned down, Turkey declaring that she would prefer to be exposed to the peril of war rather than accept humiliating conditions, war with Russia broke out.1 At its conclusion, Russia imposed on the defeated Turks the Treaty of San Stefano (March 3, 1878). The San Stefano Treaty accorded to the Balkan Slavic nations large pieces of Albanian-inhabited land. But what exactly was considered as Albania at that time is not easy to define. The Ottoman censuses are not of much help for this purpose as they were based on religion, and all Moslems, whether Albanians, Bosnians, or Turks, fell in one category. Language was a better criterion. For northern and northeast­ ern Albania, where the territories granted to the Slavs lay, a language boundary has been traced in a memorandum to the Austro-Hungarian government in 1877 by F. Lippich, its consul in Shkoder. It may be held sufficiently reliable on account of the special interest of Austria-Hungary in this 1Cf. W. N. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After, London, !938' P- 1I and Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe, Lon­ don, 1956, pp. 2-3; A Novotny, Gsterreich, die Tilrkei und das Balkanproblem im Jahre des Berliner Kongresses (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des Berliner Kongresses 1878), Graz-Koln, 1957, pp. 12, 20, 22.

32

I. THE GROUNDWORK

portion of Albania and Lippich's personal knowledge of it. According to the memorandum, The northern linguistic frontier runs from west to east, starting from the Adriatic coast somewhat below Antivari, above the mountain ridge and the northwestern corner of the Shkoder lake, following the Sem (Zem) upstream above Fundina through Kuci to Vasojevic and Kolasin; the latter two districts, although Serbian-speaking in the majority, still seem to be in part of Albanian origin—perhaps the only instance of a slavization of Albanians. . . . In its further course, the linguistic frontier moves from Kolasin to Gusinje and Plava, upstream the Ibar river to Rozaj, then from Suhodol and Glugovik to Duga Poljana, on the Rogosna plateau, west and southwest of Novi Pazar, where it climbs the districts of Vucitrn, Kursunli and Prokoplje up to the Serbian border and descends again to the Toplica, reaching its junction with the Bulgarian Morava. From here it follows, on the whole, the course of this river and the Moravica, which is emptied in it, bending westward and running along the southern slope of Karadag through the Lepenec pass. It then crosses the Vardar valley near the junction of the Treska with the Vardar, and pursuing the Treska through the sandjak of Monastir, it runs along its boundary with Dibra as far as the northern shore of the Lake Ohrid, from where it turns westward to the Shkumbi river and pursuing it winds up on the Adriatic Sea.2 From this Albanian-inhabited territory Serbia was allotted a part of the sandjak of Prishtine.3 Bulgaria and Montenegro were especially favored. Part of Article vi of the treaty, defin­ ing the boundary line between Albania and Bulgaria, reads as follows: "... Leaving the new frontier of the Servian Prin­ cipality, the line will follow the western limits of the Cazas of Koumanovo, Kotchani, Kalkandelen [Tetove], to Mount Korab; thence by the River Welestchitza as far as its junction 2F.

Lippich, "Denkschrift iiber Albanien," Vienna, 20 June 1877, pp.

8-9, HHStA, PA xn/256, Tiirkei iv. 8See

text of Art. iii of the San Stefano Treaty, A a n d P , 1878, Vol.

LXXXIH, Turkey, No. 22 (1878), p. 10.

THE ALBANIAN LEAGUE AND BERLIN CONGRESS

33

with the black Drina. Turning towards the south by the Drina and afterwards by the western limit of the Caza of Ochride towards Mount Linas, the frontier will follow the western Cazas of Gortcha [ΚοΓςε] and Starovo as far as Mount Grammos." 4 In terms of Albania before World War II, this would mean that, in addition to Diber, the whole area of the prefecture of Korce (without Kolonje) would be included.® Montenegro, on the other hand, was to annex northern Al­ banian regions extending from Rugove, near Ipek (Pec), to south of Zabljak, as well as the ports of Antivari (Bar) and Dulcigno (Ulcinj), on the Adriatic; while her southern fron­ tier with Albania would run through the Lake of Shkoder and along the Buene (Bojana) river to the same sea.® At Adrianople, the representative of Montenegro, Radonic, advanced claims even to the city of Shkoder, but the Russians pointed out to him the extreme difficulty of his claims and they were abandoned.7 With the Treaty of San Stefano, Russia's goal was to create a Great Bulgaria, retaining therein her influence, and form an independent and larger Montenegro and Serbia. This was in accordance with two fundamental tendencies of Russian policy: to satisfy the Slavophiles, who desired to see as many Slavs as possible liberated; and to establish Russia's domina­ tion over the Straits and expel Austria-Hungary from the Balkans.8 When the San Stefano Treaty was published, the articles concerning Albania caused deep anxiety among her people.9 The movements of the Albanians, which until then had been i Ibid.. 5Cf.

M. Frasheri, Liga e Prizrenit edhe efektet dipllomatike te saj (The League of Prizren and Its Diplomatic Effects), Tirana, 1927, p. 11. 6Article i of the San Stefano Treaty, op.cit., pp. 9-10. 7B. H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880, Oxford, 1937, p. 412. 8M. D. Stojanovic, The Great Powers and the Balkans, ι8η$-ι8η8, Cambridge, 1939, p. 233. 8See Ceccaldi to Waddington, Scutari, 27 April 1878, No. 213, AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Scutari, 1878-1879, Vol. xxi.

34

I. THE GROUNDWORK

primarily against the taxes, the draft, and the centralistic policy in general that the Turkish government was attempt­ ing to impose, took another turn—they began to be nation­ alistic. The Albanian reaction to the San Stefano Treaty was swift and in the course of time was intensified. Spontaneous and independent gatherings were held, particularly in the eastern and northeastern regions, and protests were addressed to the great powers. Toward the end of April 1878, Layard, the British ambassador in Istanbul, and Zichy, his AustroHungarian colleague, received a telegram from the inhabi­ tants of Diber, who protested against annexation of their lands by the new Bulgarian principality. Diber, the telegram declared, had no relationship at all with the land called Bul­ garia; it belonged to Albania. The kaza of Diber was com­ posed of more than 220,000 Moslems and 10,000 Christians, all of them Albanians. Rather than be incorporated into Bulgaria, the people preferred to be annihilated. They ap­ pealed for measures that would exclude their territory from Bulgaria and leave it under the rule of the Ottoman govern­ ment.10 On May 16, Zichy forwarded to Vienna a memoran­ dum of Moslem and Catholic representatives of northern Albania, among them the deputy of Shkoder to the first Otto­ man parliament, asking for support against the annexation of Albanian lands by Montenegro.11 In the same month Al­ banians of Ipek, Gjakove, and Gusinj protested in a memo­ randum against the partition of their territory between Serbia and Montenegro.12 Strong protests against the provisions of the treaty were also made by the inhabitants of the surround­ ings of Prizren.13 10Layard

to Salisbury, Therapia, 4 May 1878, No. 41 and Enclosure, A and P, 1878, Vol. LXXXIII, Turkey, 31 (1878), pp. 60-61; A. Novotny, op.cit., p. 40 and entry 1078, p. 242. See also Ceccaldi to Waddington, Scutari, 4 May 1878, No. 214, AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance poli­ tique des consuls, Scutari, 1878-1879, Vol. xxi. 11A. Novotny, op.cit., entry 1100, p. 246. 12 Ibid., entry 1116, p. 247. 13See ibid., p. 37 and entry 1156, p. 253; text of telegram in A and P 1 1878, Vol. LXXXI, Turkey, 45 (1878), pp. 35-36.

THE ALBANIAN LEAGUE AND BERLIN CONGRESS

35

From the meetings held in the various towns of the Gegs in opposition to the San Stefano Treaty a number of local committees had emerged which undertook to organize the Albanian forces against an eventual attack on the part of Montenegro and Serbia. The committees had begun to collect money for the support of the Albanian refugees from the ter­ ritories which had already been occupied by the Serbs or the Montenegrins.14 In order to defend the country better, the local committees felt the need of close cooperation. On May 3, 1878, Green, the British consul in Shkoder, reported to his Foreign Office: "In the districts of Gussini£, Plava, Berani, Granichi, and most of the eastern slopes of the North Alba­ nian mountains a league has been entered into between the Mohammedans binding themselves collectively and individ­ ually to resist until death all attempts coming either from abroad or from the Supreme Government to change the pres­ ent state of their territory. Steps are being taken by these populations to place themselves in accord with the Albanians further south, near Prisrend, Prishtina, Fandi, Dibra, Ochrida, and even as far as Monastir. . . ." 15 The impetus to this movement was given by an influential leader of Gusinj, Ali Bey (later Pasha) Gucija.18 Barely a month later, Prince Nich­ olas of Montenegro informed the consulates of the great pow­ ers in Shkoder, particularly the French consulate, that in addition to the "league formed by the inhabitants of Gusinj, Plave and other places," a movement was being organized among the people of Grude, Klemend, Hot and other parts of Malesia (Catholic mountains), in order to bring about a conflict along the frontier.17 "Cf. Histori e Shqiperise, 1839-1900 (History of Albania, 1839-1900), Tirana, 1961, p. 58; hereafter cited as Historie Shqiperise, 1839-1900. 15Green to Salisbury, Scutari, 3 May 1878, No. 40, A and P, 1878, Vol. LXXXIII, Turkey, 31 (1878), p. 60. leCeccaldi to Waddington, Scutari, 4 May 1878, No. 214, AMAE, Turquie, Correspondanee politique des consuls, Scutari, 1878-1879, Vol. xxi. 17Copy of telegram signed by Prince Nicholas, Cetinje, 5 June 1878, as annexe No. 1 to the DipSche 1 9 June 1878, No. 218, in ibid.

36

I. THE GROUNDWORK

As the date of the Congress of Berlin was approaching, the Albanian leaders became more aware of the need for united action. The Porte not only did not hinder these efforts, it even encouraged them. They decided to meet at Prizren on June 10, 1878. At short notice, representatives from many parts of the country, especially from the northeast and the east, convened there. Most of them were landowners, Moslem clergymen, and chieftains. From the south, owing to lack of time, only two delegates were able to attend, one of them being Abdul Frasheri, who was destined to play the most important role in the whole movement.18 Abdul Frasheri was born in 1839 in the south and belonged to a family of beys which had lost its lands but still held positions in the Turkish administration. He had studied in the Greek gymnasium of Janina (Zdsimaia Skhole) and in 1877, when he was elected a deputy of Janina to the first Ottoman parliament, he was Director of Finance of the vilayet whose capital that city was.18 The meeting was held in a medrese of Prizren, and was attended by some Moslem landowners from Bosnia, Hercegovina, and the sandjak of Novi Pazar, interested in fighting together with the Albanians against the detachment of their lands from Ottoman rule. It was opened by Abdul Frasheri, who invited the Albanians to unite for the defense of their country which was in danger. Abdul Frasheri was there as the representative of the secret committee, of which he was presi­ dent, which was formed in Istanbul after the San Stefano Treaty and was called "The Central Committee for the De­ fense of the Rights of the Albanian Nationality." The com­ mittee was composed of the most prominent Albanian leaders, intellectuals, and government officials in Istanbul, both Mos­ lems and Christians. It was kept secret in order to avoid pres­ sures on the part of the Turkish government. On the other 18Cf. Histori e Shqiperise 1839-1900, p. 60. See, for the list of delegates, j S. Κϋΐςε, Osmanli tarihinde Arnavutluk (Albania in Ottoman History), Smyrna, 1944, pp. 249-250. This book has value only for the few Turkish documents it contains and for what the author himself had witnessed. 19 Histori e Shqiperise, 1839-1900, p. 55.

THE ALBANIAN LEAGUE AND BERLIN CONGRESS

37

hand, the fact that the Porte also was interested in the oppo­ sition to the San Stefano Treaty made its task less difficult. On the basis of the memoranda, especially that of May 30, 1878, the program of the Istanbul committee was to live in peace with the neighboring countries but at the same time to defend resolutely Albanian territory.20 The meeting at Prizren decided on the creation of an or­ ganization for the defense of the rights of the Albanian people with a central committee having its headquarters at Prizren. It elected as president Sheh Mustafa Tetova, and as members Ali Bey Gucija, Iljaz Pasha Dibra,21 Mejderiz Omer Effendi Prizreni, Sulejman Vokshi from Gjakove, and others. Com­ mittees were to be established in the various parts of Albania which would be in touch with the headquarters in Prizren, and controlled by it. These committees would enroll men, collect tithes, buy food, and distribute arms and ammunition to their forces. All able men, except one per family, would be armed. The number of troops to be raised was also deter­ mined. The sandjak of Shkoder together with the highlands was to provide 30,000 men, while 30,000 others from Tirana, Elbasan, Mat, Ohrid, and Diber would join with them to constitute a corps. Other corps were to be formed, having as rallying points Prizren, Ipek, Kosovo, and Novi Pazar. A tax on noncombatants would be levied on the population by the various provincial committees. At the proposal of Abdul Frasheri, the meeting at Prizren adopted a protest to the Berlin Congress and the Porte against the partition of Al­ banian territory. It was also resolved that, in the event that the Congress of Berlin ceded Albanian territory to Monte­ negro and Serbia, the Albanians would ask these two princi­ palities to evacuate the positions they occupied; if they 20See ibid., pp. 57-58; K. Frasheri, Rilindja kombetare shqiptare (Al­ banian National Renaissance), Tirana, 1962, p. 18. 21Iljaz Pasha Dibra is mentioned in T. Ippen, "Beitrage zur inneren Geschichte Albaniens in xix. Jahrhundert," Illyrisch-albanische Forschungen, 1, 370, as president of the northern branch of the League with headquarters at Prizren.

38

I. THE GROUNDWORK

refused, the Albanians would employ force to throw them back. Death would be the punishment for any Albanian who did not respond to the appeal of the respective committee to take up arms or who fled before the enemy. At the same time a general besa (the term has also the meaning of truce, for the word of honor has been given for its preservation), prohibit­ ing vendettas, was proclaimed.22 Thus was founded what was later called the "Albanian League" or the "League of Prizren." All the delegates at Prizren favored the maintenance of the sovereignty of the Sultan over Albania as a guarantee against partition, but, as the territories menaced by the forthcoming decisions of the Berlin Congress were inhabited preponderantly by Moslems, the union took the aspect of an Islamic league. The French consul in Shkoder, who spoke of the league as a fait accompli, also regarded it as constituted by the Moslem inhabitants of high Albania.23 It must be pointed out here that the domi­ nant forces in the gathering at Prizren were Moslem con­ servatives and through them the Porte could exercise an influence in its own interest. This explains why at the outset the Albanians at Prizren made common cause with the Mos­ lem Bosnians. In Shkoder, on the other hand, because of different reli­ gious composition and more advanced political thinking, the movement assumed from the outset a more nationalistic direc­ tion. The committee formed in this city was composed of Moslems and Catholics, Prenk Bib Doda, the Captain of Mirdite, being one of the main leaders.24 Before its formation, Catholics and Moslems had already cooperated and signed a protest to the delegates of the great powers in Berlin against the cession of Antivari, Dulcigno, Podgorice (Titograd), and 22 Ibid., and Pons to Waddington, Scutari, 14 July 1878, No. 222, AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Scutari, 18781879, Vol. xxi. 23Pons to Dufaure, Scutari, 13-17 June 1878, No. 219, in ibid. 24Cf. Pons to Waddington, Scutari, 14 July 1878, No. 222, in ibid.

THE ALBANIAN LEAGUE AND BERLIN CONGRESS

39

Shpuz (Spuia) by the San Stefano Treaty.25 On July 7 the delegates of Shkoder returned from Prizren to their city and held a public gathering.26 The committee of Shkoder had taxed Moslems and Catholics alike for the support of the troops it was raising.27 When the vali (Governor General) of the city summoned the Albanian committee and told it not to rely on the assistance of the Porte,28 it was an indication that Istanbul disapproved of the national policies of the commit­ tee.29 But the Porte was unable to restrain the movement which it had favored until then. During the whole period of the Russo-Turkish war Greece had hesitated between entering the war on the side of Russia and remaining neutral. The Western powers had advised her to stay out of it; only Russia from time to time urged Greece to join the war, avoiding, however, the conclusion of a formal alliance with Athens.30 When Plevna fell in December 1877, the Greek government circles were deeply impressed. After some hesitation in the cabinet, the Greek armies on February ai, 1878 marched into Turkish territory, but nine days later they were ordered to recross the frontier, owing to pressure from the Western powers.31 Yet the disturbances continued in many regions, particu­ larly in Thessaly and Epirus. A significant landing of Greek bands was made on the shores of Albania, north of Sarande 25Text

in dipeche tildgraphique to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 16 June 1878, and with signatures as annexed to the dipfiche, 17 June 1878, No. 319, in ibid. 2ePons to Waddington, Scutari, 14 July 1878, No. 222, in ibid. 27Pons to Waddington, Scutari, 11 August 1878, No. 225, in ibid. See also S. Gopdevic, Oberalbanien und seine Liga, Leipzig, 1881, p. 99. 28DipSche telegraphique de Pons, Scutari, 23 August 1878, in ibid. 29Pons to Waddington, Scutari, 9 September 1878, No. 228, in ibid. 80Cf. S. T. Lascaris, La politique extdrieure de la Grece, avant et apris Ie Congris de Berlin (18η5-1881), Paris, 1924, pp. 85-89. 81The best and most complete account of this period is contained in E. Driault and M. Lhiritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grece de 1821 a nos jours, Paris, 1925, HI, 413-460.

40

I. THE GROUNDWORK

(Santi Quaranta). A proclamation was soon published by their commander appealing to the Albanian population to rise in the name of fatherland and independence, and in Licoursi (Lekures) a violent struggle occurred. Emissaries were dis­ patched to towns of southern Albania for this purpose, but they were met with opposition.32 The battles became very bloody in Thessaly, where the population was mixed, Greeks and Moslems, and the district bordered on Greece. As the sit­ uation was deteriorating from day to day, England intervened in order to put a stop to the hostilities, assuring the insurgents that "the Greek cause would not be injured and that Great Britain would try to obtain that Greece be fully and favorably heard in the Congress." 33 When peace was reestablished in the vilayet of Janina, the Porte announced its intention to inaugurate reforms. In a proclamation dated April 1878, after referring to "the per­ verse men" at the head of bands who endeavored to instigate the people to insubordination and revolt, the Ottoman gov­ ernment stressed its readiness to guard the security of the province. It also stated that the administration of the vilayet of Janina would be reorganized, on the basis of civil and political equality, so as to achieve "the participation of the population in the administration of the country without dis­ tinction of cult, language or nationality, the decentralization of all the services, to the extent that such a decentralization can be carried out without damaging the unity of the state." Mentioning the reforms the Porte had decided to introduce without delay, the proclamation regarded as the only obstacle in its way the state of disorder. For this reason the inhabitants of the province of Janina, whether Christians or Moslems, were urged to remain faithful to the Sultan and his govern32P. Chiara, L'Epiro, gli Albanesi e la Lega, Palermo, 1880, p. 232. See also Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 26 April 1878, No. 134, and the long report on Lekures in the letter of 31 May 1878, No. 142, AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance politique de consuls, Janina, 18771878, Vol. ix. 33S. T. Lascaris, op.cit., pp. 119 and 122.

THE ALBANIAN LEAGtTE AND BERLIN CONGRESS

41

ment and to repulse those foreigners and rebels who would attempt to destroy their tranquillity, security, and honor, on the pretext of leading them to liberty.34 This Turkish proclamation was important, first, because of the reforms it promised. It seemed to be in part an answer to the memorandum which the southern Albanian leaders, convened in Janina in the spring of 1877—as a result of the 1876 Istanbul Conference of the great powers, which drew the frontier line so as to cede Albanian territory—sent to the Porte, calling for a united Albanian province and for reforms which would lead to virtual autonomy.35 Perhaps even more significantly it was a reflection of the existing conditions in the vilayet of Janina immediately after the San Stefano Treaty. The threat of territorial losses in the southern part of Albania was not great. Nothing had been granted to Greece by the San Stefano Treaty. Here union for action was not as urgently needed as in the north. Still the south felt that it should have solidarity with the meeting of Prizren. After the meeting of Prizren, when the delegates left for their respective districts, toward the middle of July, in order to create committees and organize local military forces to be employed for resistance,36 Abdul Frasheri returned to his native village, Frasher. He immediately got in touch with the well-known Bektashi tekke (monastery) there. He knew that he could have the majority of the Moslem Albanians of the south on his side if he won the Bektashi babas (abbots) to the cause. Himself a Bektashi, Abdul visited the various tekkes, and thanks to the support of baba Alush of Frasher, he per­ suaded the Bektashi order to help the Albanian movement 34Turkish Proclamation to the Inhabitants of the Vilayet of Janina (Albania), Announcing the Intention of the Porte to Inaugurate Re­ forms in that Province without Delay, Constantinople, April 1878, British and Foreign State Papers (Foreign Office), 1877-1878, LXIX, 1104-1106. 35Cf. Histori e Shqiperise 1839-1900, pp. 54-55. 1 u Ibid., p. 65.

42

I. THE GROUNDWORK

and exercise influence on the Albanian notables.37 The Bektashis were not well regarded by the Turkish government, which favored the Sunnis. In fact, after the 1826 massacres of the Janissaries, with whom the Bektashis were connected, they were persecuted.38 Not identifying themselves with the official religion of the state, Sunnism, the Bektashis were more nationally minded. It was at the tekke of Frasher that Abdul called a meeting of the representatives of the various districts of southern Albania.39 In accordance with the spirit of the decisions of Prizren, the gathering of Frasher resolved that branches of the Albanian League, with local committees, be founded in the various parts of the south, in order to raise troops for the defense of the southern districts which would go to the assistance of the north, if they were in need. In Frasher, where both Orthodox Christians and Moslems took part, the more enlightened elements prevailed, and the patriotic group, headed by Abdul, could act more openly than in Prizren. This group presented to the meeting a program which, besides the resolve not to yield even a slice of land to Greece, contained claims for an autonomous Albania within the framework of the Ottoman empire.40 However, the whole program of Frasher was not made public. Apparently the patriotic leaders wanted to keep it for another occasion, when they could present it as that of all the Albanians and give to the League of Prizren the char­ acter of an organization representative of the whole country. As a center for the branches of the south the committee of 37F.

Konitza, "Mimoire sur Ie mouvement national albanais," Brus­ sels, January 1899, p. 4, written for the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, HHStA, PA xrv/18, Albanien xn/2. 88After 1826 the Bektashi order in Albania was compelled to withdraw from the military administrative centers and started building its tekkes in mountainous regions for security; see F. W. Hasluck, Christianity and Islam under the Sultans, Oxford, 1929,1, 160, and M. Hasluck, "The Non-Conformist Moslems of Albania," Contemporary Review, cxxvn (May 1925), 600. s9 Histori e Shqiperise, 1839-1900, p. 65. 40Cf. ibid.

THE ALBANIAN LEAGUE AND BERLIN CONGRESS

43

Janina was chosen, but the relationship between them was loose.41 In the course of events other centers emerged: Preveza and Gjirokaster. Meanwhile the Congress of Berlin had convened. The Treaty of San Stefano, although binding for Turkey, was too bold a challenge for the great powers, particularly for Eng­ land and Austria-Hungary, which were interested in preserv­ ing Turkey in Europe. They refused to accept the provisions of the treaty. Yet England and Austria-Hungary were unable to combine forces until early in June.42 When the representa­ tives of the great powers met on June 13, 1878, to consider the revision of the San Stefano Treaty, it was Bismarck who presided. Fearful that the forthcoming decisions of the Congress of Berlin would be detrimental to the territorial integrity of Albania, the League of Prizren became active. Its action was supported by the Turkish government, which hoped that Albanians might exert some pressure on the great powers to reconsider the whole Near Eastern question and impress them with the dangers of the discords which would result from further extension of the privileges of the Balkan states.43 For the first time Albania became an international problem. In the north, the center of Shkoder had come to promi­ nence. It became better known in the outside world than Prizren, because it was the see of Albanian Catholicism and because its geographic position brought it closer to the West. This resulted in the confusion of regarding the leaders of Shkoder—Prenk Bib Doda and Hodo Bey—as those of the whole Albanian movement.44 Prizren, because it lay in terri­ tory which was compelled to put up the strongest resistance, soon grew into the most powerful center, however, and was i l Ibid. i 2 Ci.

W. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After, p. 1 3 . Federal Writers' Project of the Works Progress Administration of Massachusetts, The Albanian Struggle in the Old World and New, 4 3 Ci.

Boston, 1939, p. 35. 44L. Skendo, "Liga e Prizrenit" (The League of Prizren), Hylli i Drites (Star of Light), Shkoder, χ (1922), 467.

44

I. THE GROUNDWORK

gradually recognized as such byall the other branches, whether in the north or in the south.45 Less than a week after the opening of the Congress of Ber­ lin, on June 18, 1878, a memorandum from Shkoder in the name of all the Albanians was addressed to Lord Beaconsfield, Great Britain's chief delegate to it.4® The question may be asked why the memorandum was directed to the British Prime Minister and not to Bismarck or Andrdssy. The reason was contained in the document itself. First, of all the powers England was most interested in not replacing the Turkish empire by a "more dreadful domination" and regarded it as vital to prevent the Slavic advances toward the Adriatic. Secondly, as the Albanians could not represent themselves in the Congress and the Ottoman empire could not fittingly be their spokesman, they needed the support of a great power, and this could be only Great Britain, which posed no threat to them. The memorandum had to define next the land of the Al­ banians: "From the banks of the Boyana to the gate of Janina one is the aspect, one is the temperament of the populations which present themselves in a homogeneous and compact nucleus for the unity of type and the identity of race. "From this city to the Ambracian gulf, the Greek element with religious and lay propaganda contends the ground with the Albanian race which is maintained there preponderant, if not in number, certainly in vigor and attitude to resist­ ance." The document contains no attacks on Greece. The claims of this power to Epirus had not yet officially been presented. The Slavic peril was as grave for her as for the Albanians. Above all Great Britain, although Turcophile, was not anti45Cf.

ibid,., pp. 468-469. for the complete text in Italian—there was also a French and an Albanian text—P. Chiara, op.cit., pp. 159-176. The copy found in the HHStA of Vienna is also in Italian; cf. A. Novotny, op.cit., entry 4eSee

57. P- ®5-

THE ALBANIAN LEAGtTE AND BERLIN CONGRESS

45

Greek in the arrangement imposed by Russia. Thus the Al­ banians expressed the desire to see Greece as an ally. They even suggested a confederation, but discarded the idea of a union: "Albania cannot be united with Greece; deep differ­ ences of race, language, customs, and civilization make union impossible." The next step was to affirm Albanian nationality. "As we are not and don't want to be Turks, so we will oppose with all our might any one who would like to make us Slavs, or Austrians, or Greeks. "We want to be Albanians. ". . . Albania will never stand the Slavic domination whether it comes from the frontiers of Bulgaria, or those of Montenegro; Albania will never be Turkish, and the proof is more than four centuries of struggles in order to preserve intact the character, traditions, and national aspect." Then the Shkoder memorandum asked for an independent Albania. What it really meant was an autonomous Albania which would be a bulwark against Slavic invasion and an ele­ ment of political and commercial equilibrium in the Balkans. It suggested that the great powers confirm the status quo— the principle of the integrity of the Ottoman empire—but change the form of the political and administrative organism, concentrating in one single power the supremacy exercised by the chieftains of the independent tribes, which at times had constituted Albania's force, but had often been the cause of her weakness. At the end the Albanians urged that the reconstitution of their country not be entrusted to the Turkish government, but to an international commission, which would proceed in the same manner as for Bulgaria, and should not impose on them a non-national government. It is obvious that the memorandum to Lord Beaconsfield was based on the principle of nationality and fatherland, quite an advance from the regionalism of former protests. Chiara, the Italo-Albanian writer who published the memorandum as early as 1880, writes that it was composed by the most authori-

46

I. THE GROUNDWORK

tative Albanians and was an act of the Albanian League.47 In Albania, too, it is often believed to be such. However, it was probably the product of the Shkoder committee of the League, on which the Catholic influence had prevailed, not simply because it was signed "the Albanians," instead of "the Albanian League," and was dispatched from Shkoder, but because of the contents. Although the League of Prizren on June 15, 1878 wired the Porte, "Cursed be he who thinks of his own interest when the fatherland calls us" and "We have decided in our League to declare that we are Albanians and that religion is of no consequence," 48 on account of the Mos­ lems of Kosovo, it would have been more restrained in its attacks on Turkey. Furthermore, in defining Albania geo­ graphically, the document assigns as the northern boundary the Boyana river and does not extend it to the east, thus ex­ cluding the lands of the Kosovars. Such an omission on the part of the League of Prizren would have been inconceivable. On June 20, 1878, ten well-known Albanians, members of the Central Committee of Istanbul, addressed from the Turk­ ish capital another memorandum to Bismarck, Andrassy, and Lord Beaconsfield, expressing the desire that Albania enjoy autonomy within the framework of the Ottoman empire and protesting against any intention to put her under the rule of any other country.49 During the whole month the Congress of Berlin was in session, a flood of protests and petitions poured in from the Albanians. Some aimed at preventing the incorporation of Albanian territory in Bulgaria, Montenegro, or Greece.50 Others expressed the desire to come to an understanding with the Porte about the intended reforms in the country, refusing to recognize another government to deal with them.51 But 47P.

Chiara, op.cit., p. 141. text in S. Κύΐςε, op.cit., p. 250.

48Turkish 48

A. Novotny, op.cit., entries 89 and 1250, pp. 90 and 267, respectively.

Cf. ibid,., entries 123, p. 97; 133, p. 99; 152, p. 102; 182, p. 108; 297, p. 121. 50

si

Ibid.., entries 90, p. 91; 112, p. 94.

THE ALBANIAN LEAGUE AND BERLIN CONGRESS

47

toward the end the petitions for the autonomy of Albania decreased conspicuously.52 The situation had now changed. With the marching of the Austro-Hungarian armies into Bosnia-Hercegovina on July 22, 1878, the prospect of an imminent occupation of Novi Pazar by Austria-Hungary seemed to have upset a part of the Albanian population. In the middle of August 1878 the news spread that Bosnian insurgents turned to the League for help and that 20,000 Albanians were on the way from Prizren to Bosnia.53 The rumor was not completely unfounded, although Albanian fighting troops did not go to their rescue. In the statutes of the League of Prizren the defense of Bosnia-Hercegovina was included,54 but the League thought at this time that it would need its forces for the defense of Albanian territory. Yet Zichy had always maintained that it was possible to win the Alba­ nian League over to Austria with a friendly policy.55 Already with the Reichstadt Agreement of 1876 AustriaHungary had made it clear that she would oppose the forma­ tion of a great Slavic state in the Balkans.56 This was reaf­ firmed in the secret Austro-Russian Convention of January 1 5, 1877, where the creation of an independent Albanian state was mentioned as possible in the event of a territorial remaniement or a dissolution of the Ottoman empire.57 The San Stefano Treaty not only created a Great Bulgaria but also provided for the enlargement of Serbia and Montenegro, bringing these two countries into close contiguity and facili­ tating thereby their eventual union, which would block Austria-Hungary's expansion to the Aegean Sea. Austro-Hungarian policy at the Congress of Berlin consequently endeav­ ored to keep to a minimum the annexation of Albanian terri6 2 Ibid.,

p. 42. pp. 42-43. 54Cf. M. Frasheri, op.cit., p. 23; Histori e Shqiperise, 1839-1900, p. 60. S5A. Novotny, op.cit., entries 1514, p. 310; 1668, p. 335; 1707, p. 341. 6eCf. Β. H. Sumner, op.cit., pp. 586, 588, 601. 87Article 111 of the Additional Austro-Russian Convention of 15 January 1877, ibid., pp. 284 and 601. i i Ibid.,

48

I. THE GROUNDWORK

tory by the South Slavs. It is interesting to note in this connection that, when the Archduke Johann in 1835 visited Turkey and Greece and held the collapse of the former power inevitable, he proposed that Austria should acquire Bosnia, Hercegovina, and northern Albania.58 The impor­ tance to Austria-Hungary of northern Albania as a counter­ poise to Slavism is also shown in the memorandum of 1877 by F. Lippich.59 The representatives of Turkey also went to the Congress with instructions to hold back Montenegro and Serbia from Albania.80 When they became aware that, regard­ less of their wishes, Austria-Hungary would occupy BosniaHercegovina, one of the two points of their program, approved also by the Porte, was to seek Austria-Hungary's support on Montenegro not receiving anything from the Albanian side.61 As for Italy, in the summer of 1877, when the then presi­ dent of the Italian parliament Francesco Crispi met with Bismarck and later with Derby, the latter two had proposed Albania as a possible compensation for Italy, in the event that Austria-Hungary acquired Bosnia. But the Italian states­ man was not interested in the offer; instead he desired the annexation of Italian Alpine regions occupied by the Dual Monarchy.62 However, Count Corti went to the Congress of Berlin ready to pursue a policy of dignity and peace. By that he meant a reaction against Crispi's angling and the accept­ ance of an Austrian occupation (though not annexation) of Bosnia and Hercegovina "without compensation" to Italy. The Germans, who feared that Italy would press claims for a 58H.

v. Srbik, Metternich, der Staatsman und der Mensch, Munich, 1925, π, 578; note £or p. 65. 69"Denkschrift uber Albanien," Vienna, so June 1877, pp. 15-18, HHStA, PA xn/256, Tiirkei iv. eoCarathdodory Pacha, Le Rapport secret sur Ie Congres de Berlin adresse a la S. Porte, ed. B. Bareilles, Paris, 1919, p. 83. 6 1 Ibid., pp. 134-135. 62Cf. The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi, ed. Thomas PalamenghiCrispi, New York and London, 1912, n, 64, 73-74, and Iiij 279-81; G. Salvemini, La politica estera di Francesco Crispi, Rome, 1919, pp. 13, 20-21.

THE ALBANIAN LEAGUE AND BERLIN CONGRESS

49

quid, pro quo in Albania, were assured that she would not do so.63 Obviously, Italy considered her security in the Adriatic adequate so long as Albania remained under Turkish rule. Under the resolutions of the Congress of Berlin, Bulgaria did not incorporate any Albanian lands, because Macedonia remained in Turkish hands. As for Serbia, after her intention to acquire Ada Kale did not materialize and the partition of Novi Pazar was prevented, she remained with the territories she occupied during the war. But the boundaries of Monte­ negro became a serious problem. On June 28 Mehmed Ali Pasha, one of the Ottoman repre­ sentatives, explained at the Congress that, on the basis of the Adrianople armistice, an increase of territory equivalent to that which the fortunes of war allowed to fall in the hands of the Montenegrins was to be accorded to them. According to the San Stefano Treaty, however, not only all those districts, with the exception of the small district of Zubci, were ceded to Montenegro, but also an enormous extent of country, which had never been entered by any Montenegrin under arms. There was a contradiction.64 At the sitting of July 1, Caratheodory Pasha, the chief Turkish plenipotentiary, indi­ cated the great importance attached by his government to the question of the Montenegrin boundaries and elaborated on the reasons which induced it to desire that the line should not be extended too much in the direction of Albania. Passing to the cession of Antivari to Montenegro, he held that the Mon­ tenegrins would be able to stay there only by force, against the wishes of the population. He then alluded to incessant reciprocal attacks between Albanians and Montenegrins, announcing that on this point the Porte had received dis­ quieting telegrams.65 Three days later the question of the Montenegrin boundaries came up again and a plan for their 63B.

H. Sumner, op.cit., p. 509; L. Salvatorelli, La Triplice Alleanza j storia diplomatica, 1817-1912, Milan, 1939, pp. 39-40. 64Annex a to Protocol No. 8, A and P, 1878, Vol. LXXXIII, Turkey, No. 39 (i878)' PP- 123-^465See Protocol No. 10—Sitting of 1 July 1878, ibid., p. 156.

50

I. THE GROUNDWORK

delimitation, agreed upon between the Austrians and Rus­ sians, was submitted to the Congress and adopted. On the basis of this plan, Antivari would be incorporated in Monte­ negro, whereas Dulcigno would be restored to Turkey.ββ Mehmed Ali Pasha proposed that Montenegro annex terri­ tories inhabited by people of the same race and predomi­ nantly of the same faith as the Montenegrins. He considered it an injustice that lands like the districts of Plave and Gusinj, and the cities of Podgorice and Antivari, the inhabitants of which were Moslem and Catholic Albanians, should be al­ lotted to Montenegro. He traced another boundary line and added that he would have no objections if, instead of the Albanian territories, an equivalent were given the Monte­ negrins on the side of Hercegovina.67 Yet Article XXVII of the Treaty of Berlin (July 13, 1878) read with regard to the Albanian Montenegrin frontier: . . . From there [the village of Sekulare] the new frontier passes along the crests of the Mokra Planina, the village of Mokra remaining to Montenegro; it then reaches the point 2166 on the Austrian Staff Map, following the principal chain and the line of the watershed between Lim on the one side, and the Drin as well as the Cievna on the other. It then coincides with the existing boundaries between the tribe of the Kuci-Drekalovici on one side, and the Kucka-Krajna, as well as the tribes of the Klementi and Grudi, on the other, to the plain of Podgorica, from whence it proceeds towards Plavnica, leaving the Klementi, Grudi, and Hoti tribes to Albania. Thence the new frontier crosses the lake near the Islet of Gorica-Topal, and, from Gorica-Topal, takes a straight line to the top of the crest, whence it follows the watereeThe

Marquis of Salisbury to her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State, Berlin, 4 July 1878, No. 23, ibid., pp. 138-139. e7Protocol No. 12—Sitting of 4 July, ibid., p. 182; G. Effendi Noradounghian, Recueil d'actes internationaux de I'Empire Ottoman, Paris, 1902, iv, 109.

THE ALBANIAN LEAGUE AND BERLIN CONGRESS

51

shed between Megured and Kalimed, leaving Mrkovid to Montenegro, and reaching the Adriatic at V. Kruci. On the northwest the frontier will be formed by a line passing from the coast between the villages of Susana and Zubci, and terminating at the extreme southeast point of the existing frontier of Montenegro on the Vrsuta Planina. Antivari and its seaboard were annexed to Montenegro on the condition that the districts situated to the south of that territory as far as the Buene, including Dulcigno, be restored to Turkey.®8 Thus the Berlin Treaty, although it did not permit Mon­ tenegro to retain much of the Albanian territory ceded to her by the Treaty of San Stefano, still accorded her, in addition to Antivari, the town of Podgorice and the districts of Plave, Gusinj, Κυς, and Triepsh. The only question connected directly with Albania which was raised at the Congress of Berlin was that of the "privileges of Mirdite." This mountainous region in northern Albania, inhabited by Catholics, had revolted against Turkey in 1877, but its revolt had soon been quelled.69 The question was raised by Austria-Hungary and supported by France, both Catholic powers interested in the Catholics of the Ottoman empire. Austria's interest went beyond religion; she wanted to have a base in northern Albania from which to exercise her influence. In the sitting of July 5, 1878 Count de SaintVallier proposed in the name of the representatives of AustriaHungary and France that "the Mirdite population shall con­ tinue to enjoy the privileges and immunities of which they have been in possession ab antiquo." A discussion ensued in which Salisbury was rather reluctant to accept the proposal and the Ottoman delegates opposed it. Finally the represent­ atives of France and Austria-Hungary imposed its acceptance, eiSee Article xxix of the Berlin Treaty, A and P, 1878, Vol. LXXXHI, Turkey, No. 44 (1878), p. 22. eeCf. Β. H. Sumner, op.cit., p. 264; Histori e Shqiperise, 1839-1900,

PP- 52-54·

52

I. THE GROtTNDWORK

the Ottoman plenipotentiaries confining themselves to their declaration that "the Sublime Porte does not intend to make, for the moment, any change in the state of things in the Mirdite mountain." 70 Though Greece could be of use to England as a counter­ weight to the Slavs, the British representatives did not go beyond obtaining permission for her to be present at the sessions at which were discussed the provinces north of Greece.71 The British were more concerned with Turkey. Salisbury even proposed that for the sake of clarity the words "Greek provinces" should be substituted for "bordering prov­ inces of the Kingdom of Greece," proposed by the French plenipotentiary Desprez.72 On June 29, 1878 Greece's case was presented before the Congress by her Foreign Minister, T. Deliyannis, who made demands for Crete, Thessaly, and Epirus.73 Waddington, the chief representative of France, who was the cultural leader in the Near East, sought to win for Greece the whole of Thessaly and Epirus. To this end, he proposed a frontier rectification of the line of Salamyrias (ancient Peneus)-Kalamas rivers, cutting off a large slice of what the Albanians considered their territory. France pro­ posed further that Turkey and Greece should come to a direct agreement on the rectification of the frontier.74 This was the first time that the Epirus question had assumed real Euro­ pean importance. The Italian delegate supported the French proposal, but the Turkish plenipotentiaries declared that they did not have the consent of their government and reserved their answer. '"Protocol No. 13—Sitting of 5 July 1878, A and P, Vol. LXXXIII (1878), pp. 590-591 or Turkey, No. 38 (1878), pp. 198-199. 71Driault and Lhdritier, op.cit., in, 496-498. 72Protocol No. 3—Sitting of 19 June 1878 in G. Effendi Noradounghian, op.cit., iv, 17; Driault and Lhiritier, op.cit., in, 498. 73Protocol No. g—Sitting of 29 June 1878, in G. Effendi Noradounghian, op.cit., iv, 75-78; Driault and Lhiritier, op.cit., HI, 492-493, 501-502. "Protocol No. 13—Sitting of 5 July 1878, in G. Effendi Noradounghian, op.cit., iv, 117; Driault and LMritier, op.cit., HI, 504-505.

THE ALBANIAN LEAGUE AND BERLIN CONGRESS

53

Following Lord Beaconsfield's remark that he would not rec­ ommend coercive measures, the great powers adopted the French proposal,75 and Article XXIV of the Treaty of Berlin read: "In the event that the Sublime Porte and Greece should not be able to reach an agreement on the rectification of the frontier indicated in the thirteenth Protocol of the Congress of Berlin, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia reserve for themselves the offer of mediating between the two Parties in order to facilitate the negotia­ tions." Thus the Congress of the great powers in Berlin terminated its work regarding Albanian territory. Although the bound­ aries of the San Stefano Treaty were pushed back, Albania did not escape serious territorial amputations. The two deci­ sions, annexation of Albanian territory in the north and pro­ posed frontier rectification in the south, became the next concern of the Albanians. Both were to be challenged by them. 75Cf.

Protocol No. 13—Sitting of 5 July 1878, A and P, 1878, Vol.

LXXXIII, Turkey, No. 39 (1879), pp. 194-199.

Resistance to the Decisions of the Berlin Congress THE CONGRESS of Berlin, interested primarily in preventing

the outbreak of a war between Russia and England and per­ haps Austria-Hungary, paid too little attention to the troubles of the various nationalities in the Balkans to avoid the emer­ gence of new difficulties. Bismarck told the Ottoman plenipo­ tentiaries that the "Treaty of San Stefano would have re­ mained as it had been stipulated between Turkey and Rus­ sia, if it had not touched certain European interests." 1 As far as Albania was concerned, the frontier decisions of the Congress could not but be opposed by the Albanian League. The time of petitions and memoranda alone was over for the League. It was compelled now to pass to action in order to defend Albanian territory. As was natural, the League manifested itself most powerfully in towns which were lo­ cated in the vicinity of the adjoining Balkan states, as in Prizren, Shkoder, and Diber, near the Slavs, and in Preveza and Janina, near the Greeks. But a center from which one leadership could be exercised was actually lacking. Albanian forces brought the League into being and Al­ bania had to be its fundamental support. In the north, where a man's "best friend" was his gun, the order was that each house should provide a fighter at the time of the call.2 The beys in the south were asked to be ready, together with their armed following, for the moment of attack; some of the wealthiest among them were called upon to contribute large sums.3 As the preservation of Albanian territory was in the interest of Turkey as well, this power not only encouraged 1Carath^odory Pacha, Le Rapport secret sur Ie Congres de Berlin adresse a la S. Porte, ed. B. Bareilles, Paris, 1919, p. 76. 2Waldhart to Haymerle, Prizren, 21 July 1880, No. 65/res., HHStA j PA xvn/35, Montenegro Varia, Gusinje Frage 1879. 3F. Konitza, " Mimoire sur Ie mouvement national albanais," p. 5, Brussels, January 1899, HHStA, PA xiv/18, Albanien xn/2.

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS

55

the Albanian League, but assisted it, at the outset more cau­ tiously and later more openly.4 But Turkey's interest in the League, whether in the northern or southern branch, does not mean, as has sometimes been maintained, that she was its originator or creator.5 Recently more light has been shed on this question. The Greeks have published the secret discussions which took place in 1877 between representatives of the Greek government and Albanian leaders. These discussions, about an understanding for union and collaboration between the Greeks and the Al­ banians, started in July in Janina and were pursued in De­ cember in Istanbul; in both instances Abdul Frasheri was the protagonist on the Albanian side.6 They reveal that for a long time the Albanian leaders had been concerned with the fate of their country. In opposing union with Greece, Abdul Frasheri plainly told Skouloudis, the Greek delegate, in Istan­ bul, that the only desire "of us Albanians is to save the Al­ banian nationality." He also stressed that the ideas which he expressed were not the result of hasty thinking or recent events, but the outcome of many years of reflection and dis­ cussion, during which Albanians had become aware of the dangers to which their existence as a nation was exposed.7 The League did not clash with Serbia, for this power had already occupied the lands accorded to her by the treaty of 4M.

Frasheri, Liga e Prizrenit edhe efektet dipllomatike te saj (The League of Prizren and Its Diplomatic Effects), Tirana, 1927, pp. 22-23; A. Novotny, Osterreich, die Tiirkei und das Balkanproblem im Jahre des Berliner Kongresses (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des Ber­ liner Kongresses 1878), Graz-Koln, 1957, entry 1464, pp. 301-302; Waldhart to Haymerle, Prizren, 21 July 1880, No. 65/res., HHStA, PA xvn/35, Montenegro Varia, Gusinje Frage 1879; Berczencovich to Hay­ merle, Janina, 13 August 1880, No. 9/p, Geheim, HHStA, PA xvii/35, Montenegro-albanesische Liga. 6Cf. Lippich to Zichy, Scutari, 27 January 1879, No. 5, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. 6See "Expositions Mavromati" and "Expositions Skouloudi" in Ho Neos Kouvaras (New Scroll), Athens, 11 (1962), 140-77. 7 Jbid., p. 156.

56

I. THE GROUNDWORK

Berlin. But when Montenegro's turn came to annex Albanian regions, the situation became strongly explosive. Montenegro claimed their transfer soon after the Congress of Berlin, jus­ tifying her haste because of growing Albanian resistance.8 In August 1878 the great powers established the Commission for the Delimitation of the Turco-Montenegrin Frontier.9 All these events gave impetus to the Albanian movement in Shkoder. The branch of the League there began to recruit volunteers and collect arms and contributions. The inhabi­ tants of Plave and Gusinj, who were predominantly Alba­ nians, resolved to defend their soil to the last. Gatherings and preparations took place in Kosovo, especially in Gjakove, which was close to Plave and Gusinj.10 Istanbul endeavored to exploit the Albanian movement in order to show the inapplicability of the resolutions of the Berlin Congress. At this time in Turkey a party headed by Gazi Osman Pasha, advocating war against Austria-Hungary, had been formed, which the Sultan seemed to favor. While the Porte officially proclaimed that it would abide by the Ber­ lin Treaty, the war party secretly instigated the Albanians to come into conflict with Austria-Hungary in Bosnia. Urged by this party, the Turkish authorities in the vilayets of Ko­ sovo and Shkoder not only distributed arms among the Al­ banians, but also allowed the various local branches of the League to collect the tithe and other taxes for themselves.11 In Prizren a session of representatives of the notables from various parts of eastern and northeastern Albania opened on August 19, 1878, and the question of military help to Bosnia was discussed. The opinion of the patriots finally prevailed: the Albanian forces could not go to the assistance of Bosnia because they were needed for the defense of Albania.12 The Central Committee of the League began to be activated; Sheh Frasheri, op.cit., p. 29. Histori e Shqiperise i 1839-1900. w Ibid. 11 Ibid., pp. 65-66. l2See ibid., p. 66.

8M.

9Cf.

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS

57

Mustafa Tetova wired to the branch of Shkoder to delegate one of their members to the headquarters at Prizren.13 The League was rendering difficult the job of the Delimi­ tation Commission for the Turkish-Montenegrin boundary. In order to avoid new international complications and give proof of willingness to carry out the obligations of the Berlin Treaty, the Porte sent to northern Albania one of its repre­ sentatives at the Congress, Mehmed Ali Pasha. He was prob­ ably chosen because he had many friends among the Albanian notables of the north and was in favor of a conciliatory policy toward the great powers. His task was to quiet the Albanians and persuade the League to yield to the decisions of the Con­ gress.14 Vasa Effendi (later Wassa Pasha), a Catholic Albanian from Shkoder who held high positions in the Turkish admin­ istration, was invited to accompany him but refused.15 The Turkish marshal arrived at Prxzren on August 25, 1878 and applied pressure on the Central Committee of the League to accept the Berlin decisions, but he was not successful. Agi­ tation among the Albanians was mounting and hostility to­ ward the emissaries of the Sultan was openly expressed. When Mehmed Ali Pasha went to Gjakove, a delegation of the League visited him, on September 2, and invited him to leave the city, while the people outside were demonstrating against his presence. On September 6 new outbreaks occurred and the marshal was killed, together with several Turkish officers and approximately two companies of soldiers who were pro­ tecting him. Among the victims was Abdullah Pasha Dreni, a prominent leader of northern Albania who had been Mehmed Ali Pasha's host.16 Referring to Abdullah Pasha's death, 13Pons

to Waddington, Scutari, 5 November 1878, No. 234, AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Scutari, 1878-1879, Vol. xxi. 14Cf. Historie e Shqiperise, 1839-1900, p. 66; A. Novotny, op.cit., entry 1388, p. 290. 15 Ibid., entry 1394, p. 290. le Ibid., entries 1434 and 1450, respectively on pp. 297, 300; Histori e Shqiperise, 1839-1900, pp. 66-67. The murder of Mehmed Ali Pasha is often placed in the month of August and on a date which even if

58

I. THE GROUNDWORK

Vasa EfiFendi accurately conveyed the feelings of his compa­ triots at that time: "Suspected of having accepted the views of Mehmed Ali Pasha and of working to the detriment of national honor and dignity, he was the first to be killed by his compatriots, and I think that any chief who would attempt to damage or modify the national sentiment would have the same fate as Abdullah Pasha and the others who perished together with Mehmed Ali." 17 The occurrences at Gjakove echoed throughout the whole of Albania and impressed the outside world. Attention was drawn to the problem of the relations between the Albanians and the Porte. The distinction became sharper between the moderates, who supported Turkey, and the true nationalists, who found in the spontaneous reaction of the people some basis for further demands to be presented to Turkey. The Albanian Turcomans were disturbed because the movement was going too far and Turkey viewed with uneasiness the anti-Turkish manifestations taking place in the various towns of the Gegs.18 The events of Gjakove apparently disturbed Montenego considered according to O. S., would not correspond to the correct one. Cf. L. Raschdau, ed., "Durchfiihrung der Berliner Kongressakte (18808i)," aus dem literarischen Nachlass des Unterstaatssekretars Dr. Busch, Deutsche Rundschau, 147 (April-May-June 1911), 226, note 2; W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe, London, 1956, p. 73. From the correspondence of ambassador Zichy with his Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, it comes out clearly that the exact date is 6 September 1878. In fact, Mehmed Ali Pasha's last tele­ gram from Gjakove to the Porte carried the date of 4 September (cf. A. Novotny, op.cit., entry 1450, p. 30). 17Text of memorandum in Zichy to Andrissy, Constantinople, 22 October 1878, No. 82E, Geheim, HHStA, PA xvn/35, Montenegro Varia, Gusinje Frage 1879. In the national epic of the Albanians, Lahuta e Malcis (The Lute of the Mountains), by Gjergj Fishta, canto χ is dedicated to Mehmed Ali Pasha's murder, more in order to explain the custom of hospitality, for he was Abdullah Pasha's guest, than to describe the murder. For a German translation of the canto, see M. Lambertz, Die Laute des Hochlandes, Munich, 1958, pp. 66-73. l s Histori e Shqiparise, 1839-1900, pp. 67-68.

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS

59

as well. Prince Nicholas in a note recommended action by the Porte, first of all in Podgorice and its surroundings, with a view to weakening the Albanian movement.19 The Monte­ negrin note was strongly supported by Russia and Germany. On November 25, 1878, Shuvalov, the Russian ambassador in London, told Salisbury that what prevented Russian evac­ uation of Turkey outside Eastern Roumelia was the Turkish occupation of Podgorice and Shpuze, and that the Russian Ambassador in Istanbul had been instructed to propose to the Porte a simultaneous withdrawal. All the powers concurred in this proposal.20 But it was not easy for the Porte to deliver Podgorice and Shpuze to Montenegro. It was greatly concerned about the situation in Shkoder, the Governor General of which had requested that the news about the appointment of Mazhar Pasha as delegate to the Turkish-Montenegrin Delimitation Commission be denied, lest his life be imperiled.21 At the same time the Porte did not have enough troops to decide the matter in favor of Montenegro; at one point it even made an offer of an indemnity in money.22 On December 29, Zichy informed Andrassy that the Turkish Foreign Minister, Carathiodory Pasha, pleaded with him that Austria-Hungary in­ tervene to prevent the Prince of Montenegro from employing force. The Porte was resolved to surrender Podgorice, he stated, but at the same time wanted to avoid bloodshed, an Albanian revolt or perhaps a war which would jeopardize the whole work of the Berlin Congress.23 A day later Carathiodory Pasha communicated that the Turkish Commissioners were leaving for Shkoder in order to persuade the Albanians to yield.24 Yet it was not until the beginning of February 19A.

Novotny, op.cit., entry 1462, p. 301. W. N. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After, London, 1938, pp. 162, 192, 221. 21A. Novotny, op.cit., entry 1490, p. 306. 22 Ibid., entries 1499 and 1587, respectively pp. 307 and 322. 23 Ibid., entry 1759, p. 350. 2i Ibid., entry 1761, p. 351. 20Cf.

60

I. THE GROUNDWORK

1879 that Podgorice and Shpuze were surrendered to Mon­ tenegro. As far as the cession of other territories was concerned, the Ottoman Commissioners refused to do anything, on the grounds that these areas were occupied by Albanians. They declared, however, that they were ready to deliver to Mon­ tenegro those lands which were in the vilayet of Shkoder.25 Although the Delimitation Commission met at Cetinje on April 30, no progress was made with regard to Plave and Gusinj, because of the attitude of the Ottomans. The Porte held that the frontier line of the Congress of Berlin was drawn without topographical knowledge of the region and that it was necessary, before the surrender was carried out, for another survey to be made on the spot. Its aim was to make the Delimitation Commission a direct witness to the Albanian character of those two districts and to the Albanian fighters, whom Montenegro was not in a position to oppose.26 When the Commission resumed its work, the Albanian League no­ tified it that any demarcation of the Montenegrin boundary could not be effected without its assent.27 By September 8 the Commission had defined the limits of Kuci-Kraina and Klemend, and had reached a point within sight of Gusinj—the whole frontier from the sea to Gusinj.28 Although professing its intention to fulfill the treaty obli­ gations, the Porte pursued delaying tactics. It gave as a reason the need for time to handle the Albanians judiciously. The Prince of Montenegro had proposed that Plave and Gusinj should be ceded to him on December 12; Gazi Muhtar Pasha, the Turkish commander, was going to evacuate them on that day. At the last moment the Porte announced that, owing to the fear of Albanian resistance, the cession could not be car­ ried out at the time stated, and that the Turkish troops might 26Text

in M. Frasheri, op.cit., p. 30. W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 352. 27Protocol No. 23 of the Montenegrin boundary, 22 August 1879, in Sir E. Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty (1814-1891), London, 1891, iv, 2895. 28W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 352. x Ibid.;

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS

61

side with the Albanians if the Prince attempted to seize Gusinj.29 The Montenegrin government then mustered troops on the frontiers of the Gusinj district in order to occupy it militarily. It placed them under the command of Vojvod Bozo Petrovid. The Albanian League also gathered forces which were led by Ali Pasha Gucija,30 who had previously written to the Sultan: "Until this moment I had you in place of a father; but since you have separated me from you, yielding me to Montenegro, I have ceased to be yours any longer. . . . Therefore, now that you have abandoned me and you don't have me with you any more, if you come to force me to sub­ mit to Montenegro, I will see myself as between two enemies who want to fight against me at any cost." 31 Battles between the opposing parties took place, each one claiming victory. The result, however, was that Montenegro could not occupy Plave and Gusinj.32 The Albanian bravery and patriotism demonstrated in the battlefield gave rise to many songs about the Albanian commander sung by the mountaineers of the north.33 In January 1880 the Porte suggested to Count Corti, the Italian representative, that the part of the district of Gusinj inhabited by Christians should be surrendered to Monte­ negro, together with an area comprising the district of KuiiKraina, and bounded by the river Zem and the mountain heights as far as the Gulf of Kastrat on the lake of Shkoder.34 Corti seized the opportunity and proposed a compromise, which on April 12 was adopted by the interested parties 35 29 Ibid.,

p. 353. T. Ippen, "Beitrage zur inneren Geschichte Albaniens im xix. Jahrhundert," Illyrisch-albanische Forschungen, I, 372-373. 31See for complete text, G. Schir6, Gli Albanesi e la questione balkanica, Naples, 1904, pp. 60-61. 32T. Ippen. op.cit., pp. 372-373. 33Canto ναι of G. Fishta's The Lute of the Mountains is devoted to Ali Pasha Gucija. 84W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 353. i5Protocol between Turkey and Montenegro consenting to the cession of certain portions of territory by the Sultan to the Prince of Montenegro, in lieu of the districts of Gusinja and Plava, Constan­ tinople, 12 April 1880, in Sir E. Hertslet, op.cit., pp. 2952-2954. 80Cf.

62

I. THE GROtJNDWORK

and a week later by the great powers.36 In offering the com­ promise, Corti apparently desired to diminish Austrian influ­ ence in northern Albania by including a part of the Albanian Catholics in Montenegro.37 But the Albanian League re­ garded it as no less unjust than the previous decision on Plave and Gusinj and turned it down. For the League, the struggle was now on a national plane, and religious over­ tones were of less consequence. Catholic and Moslem leaders went to Izet Pasha, the Governor General of Shkoder, and inquired of him whether the news which had been spread that the Porte had resolved to surrender Hot, Grude, and other territories to Montenegro was true. The bajraktar of Hot had been entrusted to declare to the Governor General, in the event that he confirmed the news, that from that time on the tribes of those regions were freed from any allegiance to the Porte, as they would not consider themselves Ottoman subjects any longer, and that they would defend the moun­ tains with their own weapons in order to win their independ­ ence.38 The situation was becoming grave, and the great pow­ ers began to understand that the Albanian League possessed a vital force of its own and was not an artificial organization created by Turkey.39 On April 22, 1880, when the Turkish army withdrew from the territories, so that they could be oc­ cupied by the Montenegrins (Protocol of April 12), the forces of the League took possession of them. The Albanians were relatif έ la demarcation des frontiires Turco-Montencgrines et Memorandum annexe, 18 April 1880, in G. Effendi Noradounghian, Recueil d'actes internationaux de I'Empire Ottoman, Paris, 1902, iv, 260-262; also Sir E. Hertslet, op.cit., pp. 2955-2956. 37Cf. M. Frasheri, op.cit., p. 31. 38French Livre Jaune 1 April 1880, No. 62, pp. 82-89, as quoted in ibid., p. 32. See also Le Rie to Freycinet, Scutari, 8 April 1880, No. 36 and 9 April 1880, No. 37, in AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Scutari, 1880-1883, Vol. XXII. 89Cf. Le Rie to Freycinet, Scutari, 17 April 1880, No. 39, dipfiche tiligraphique, 21 April 1880, as well as reports: 25 April 1880, No. 40; 27 April 1880, No. 41; 20 May 1880, No. 44 (together with the Albanian memorandum from Shkoder, dated 6-18 May 1880—all in ibid. 3eProtocole

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS

63

prepared for the clash, but the Montenegrins avoided it.40 The "Corti Compromise" was abrogated, and Hot and Grude were left within the Ottoman empire. In fact, all real progress on the Turkish-Montenegrin fron­ tier question was delayed until the accession to office of the new Gladstone government. The new cabinet gave fresh im­ petus to the treaty negotiations and made possible the pow­ ers' united pressure upon the Porte. By this time Gladstone had taken an interest in Albania. During the summer he had been studying Albanesische Studien (1853-54) of J. G. von Hahnj the former Austrian consul in Janina, and felt that Albania had a "special tide to have its case put forward in return for good behavior." 41 Just before the Conference of Ambassadors in Berlin, in the latter half of June, 1880, a new plan, with greater pros­ pect of success, originated in discussions between the British Consul General, Green, and his Austro-Hungarian counter­ part, Lippich, in Shkoder. It involved the cession to Monte­ negro of territory to the west of the lake of Shkoder, so as to include Dulcigno and the seacoast as far as the mouth of the Buene (Bojana) river.42 The plan had been mentioned to some north Albanian leaders, who had intimated that they would not be reluctant to agree to it if the powers would guarantee to them some form of local self-government.43 Green and Lippich thought that this should be restricted at the outset to the vilayet of Shkoder. They were of the opinion that the Governor General should be an Albanian Moslem, to be chosen, if possible, in the vilayet; the Governor, on the 40Le

Rie to Freycinet, annexe k la depeche du 6 May 1880, No. 42, in ibid., T. Ippen, op.cit., pp. 373-374. 41W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe,

P- 77· 42Granville

to Goschen, Foreign Office, 2 October 1880, in Sir E. Hertslet, op.cit., p. 2999. 43A year before, Lippich had reported to his government on the desire of Catholic highlanders for extensive autonomy (Lippich to Andrdssy, Scutari, 29 March 1879, No. 27, HHStA, PA xn/256, Tiirkei IV).

64

I. THE GROUNDWORK

other hand, should be a Roman Catholic. A Christian kaymakam (sub-prefect) of the Roman Catholic tribes of the Malesia e Madhe (Great Mountains), north of Shkoder, should be appointed to reside in Tuz. The proposed form of admin­ istration was to be submitted for consideration to the north­ ern Albanians.44 The Dulcigno arrangements were accepted by the great powers. The Prince of Montenegro, after some hesitation, gave his assent also; he objected only to the local self-government of Albania. A note on the Dulcigno proposal was ad­ dressed to the Porte. The Turks would have to surrender Moslem Albanians now instead of Roman Catholics; they would lose what they called the port of Albania and would see the strategic safety of Shkoder menaced. For all these rea­ sons they considered the "Corti Compromise" less objection­ able.48 The powers were compelled, therefore, to examine plans for some demonstration of force. Gladstone was firm in pur­ suing such a policy. He also thought to use Albania as a means of pressure on the Sultan, whom he considered a master of procrastination. On June 30 he suggested that Granville send to the British ambassador in Istanbul, Goschen, a telegram to let the Turkish government know that "we have our eyes upon the desires of Albania for self-government, which are so strong that they have even found expression to us in un­ usual forms." 46 Busch, Germany's Undersecretary for For­ eign Affairs, noted in his diary that the British consuls had been ordered to let the Albanians know that, if they remained quiet, England would act in favor of Albanian autonomy.47 When the possibility of a naval demonstration on the part of the powers leaked out, the Turks were preparing plans to meet the new situation. They relied on the difficulties of 44Granville

to Goschen, Foreign Office, a October 1880, in Sir E. Hertslet, op.cit., pp. 2999-3001. 45W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., pp. 136-137. 46From the Gladstone Papers, as quoted in ibid., p. 139. 47L. Raschdau, ed., op.cit., p. 236.

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS

65

the Albanian problem. The Sultan Abdul Hamid asked Hobart Pasha, his admiral of the fleet—obviously jokingly— whether any ships had been designed that could climb moun­ tains, as such ships alone would avail against the Albanians.48 The project of the transfer of Dulcigno to Montenegro brought about a split in the Albanian League. The moderate elements were of the opinion that any further opposition to the great powers would be futile. The extremists from Shkoder, however, turned down the proposal and decided not to yield without war.49 To the ambassadors at the Confer­ ence of Berlin they protested against the enlargement of Mon­ tenegro at Albanian expense and pointed out that Dulcigno, controlled by Montenegro, would be an advance seaport of Russia and would serve as springboard for new annexations.50 Under the command of Jusuf Aga Sokoli they immediately occupied the hills above Dulcigno and prepared trenches for battle.51 The great powers deemed it wise to be patient and persuade the Porte to surrender the territories by itself. They addressed to it three notes, the last (August 3, 1880) worded harshly.52 On August 27, 1880 the French ambassador at Istanbul, Tissot, informed his government that the conduct of the Alba­ nians was such that the Porte had no confidence in itself and was not in a position to promise a territorial cession which was opposed by the Albanian League. Nor was the Porte willing to employ force against the League.53 In the meantime the powers had completed their arrangements for the naval demonstration, and their combined fleets were assembled at Ragusa (Dubrovnik), under the command of Vice-Admiral B. Seymour.54 When the Dulcignots heard about the naval demonstration, they addressed a protest to the great powers: 48W.

N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 144. T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 374. 50See text in M. Frasheri, op.cit., p. 33. 51Cf. T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 374. 52W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., pp. 144-145. 58See text in M. Frasheri, op.cit., p. 34. 54W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 149. 49Cf.

66

I. THE GROUNDWORK

With great sorrow we learned that within some days the fleets of the European powers will arrive in our waters in order to force us to leave the beloved city in the hands of the Montenegrins. We the inhabitants of Dulcigno, who for centuries have been under the rule and protection of the Ottoman state, cannot adapt our customs, language, and religion to those of Montenegro which are completely different from ours and perhaps contrary. For this reason we have decided to repulse every attack which might come from Montenegro and we prefer to see the disappearance of our city and ourselves than to obey Montenegro." 55 On September 28 the allied fleet appeared off Dulcigno. Before inviting the Prince of Montenegro to occupy the port, Vice-Admiral B. Seymour had drawn up the plan of the dem­ onstration and eventual occupation,56 while the great powers had presented a note to the Turkish government "protesting unanimously against the resistance to their legitimate de­ mands" and holding it responsible for the consequences.57 But a gesture from the Turks brought about a standstill. Riza Pasha, the commander who had been sent to Shkoder in Au­ gust in order to deliver Dulcigno to the Montenegrins, ap­ parently under Albanian pressure,58 announced that if the Montenegrins entered the city he would attack them.59 The 55Text

in Albanian in M. Frasheri, op.cit., p. 34. Sir B. Seymour to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 25 September 1880, and 27 September 1880, in A and P, 1881, Vol. c, Turkey, No. 2 (1881), Enclosure 1 in No. 129, and Enclosure 2 in No. 124. 57Goschen to Granville, 27 September 1880, in ibid., No. 125. 58See Le Rie to his Ministry, d6p£che t£ligraphique, Scutari, 7 Sep­ tember 1880, Albanian memorandum as annexe to 18 September 1880, No. 52, and again dipSche tilegraphique on 29 September 1880 and 11 October 1880, in op.cit. Le Rde, however, does not exclude Turkish instigation. 59Cf. W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 154. 56Vice-Admiral

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS

67

Russian press then assailed Albania as "the cradle of the fu­ ture anti-Slav power." 60 The failure of the naval demonstration upset Gladstone and a cabinet meeting was summoned for the end of Septem­ ber. In the process of preparing the demonstration, he had been considering certain possibilities in connection with it for consultation with the other powers. In a telegram to Gran­ ville, he mentioned one of these: "In the last resort to offer Albania to the Kalamas (where the country inhabited by Greeks begins) its formal or practical independence." 61 When the cabinet met on September 30, however, it decided that, if the Porte did not take steps to compel its subjects to yield, the occupation of Smyrna by the allied fleet should be pro­ posed to the powers—and this decision was transmitted.®2 Upon the news of this proposal the Porte stated that it was determined to surrender Dulcigno at once. It sent Dervish Turgut (Dorgut) Pasha with reinforcements to Shkoder, where he arrived at the beginning of November. He took over the command of the troops from Riza Pasha, and an­ nounced to the businessmen of Shkoder and to the mountain chieftains that Dulcigno must be given up. Other discussions ensued, the Albanians striving to postpone the surrender in­ definitely by employing delaying tactics.83 The inhabitants of Dulcigno, however, took a resolute stand. They sent to the consuls of the great powers in Shkoder a telegram in which they made clear that they would oppose by arms any occu­ pation of their city, even Turkish: ". . . we have all decided without distinction of religion . . . to oppose, to resist with arms in the hands, the occupation of our territory by whatso­ ever armed force, whether Moslem or any other, and we would eoPluncket

to Granville, 6 October 1880, in op.cit., No. 222. Papers, as cited by W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 158. e2Granville to Her Majesty's Embassies at St. Petersburg, Paris, Rome, Vienna, and Berlin, 4 October 1880, in op.cit., No. 182. There follow several letters as to the reactions of the various governments to the British proposal. 63W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., pp. 162-168. elGladstone

68

I. THE GROUNDWORK

hold completely responsible for the fatal events which could occur, the government of the vilayet of Shkoder."64 When on November 22 Dervish Pasha, with 10,000 regular troops under his command, marched toward Dulcigno to execute his plan, the Albanians opened fire on the Turkish soldiers near the Lake of Sas and numerous casualties were incurred.65 The Turks fired back and dispersed the Albanians. It was the pre­ lude to the Albanian-Turkish conflicts which were to follow. Dervish Pasha advanced to Dulcigno and by the end of No­ vember the whole of the district, with one exception which was settled later, was in the possession of the Montenegrins.66 Turkey had pledged that during the cession of the district "The Ottoman troops should disperse all gatherings of armed Albanians who would disturb the order and oppose the march of the Montenegrin troops."67 Dervish Turgut Pasha then exiled both leaders of the Shkoder branch of the Albanian League, Hodo Pasha and Prenk Bib Doda, and arrested many notables of Shkoder and chiefs of the mountaineers.68 Al­ though with the surrender of the Dulcigno district the Mon­ tenegrin question ceased to interest Europe, the frontier con­ tinued to be discussed between Turkey and Montenegro for many years.69 While the northern branch of the Albanian League was 64See

text of the telegram in French (Dulcigno, 12/24 October 1296 [1880]), as annexe to dipfiche of Le Rie to Saint-Hilaire, Scutari, 29 October 1880, in op.cit. 65See

annexe to depeche of Le Rie to Saint-Hilaire, Scutari, 19 No­ vember 1880, No. 56, and dipSches, 24 November 1880 and again 24 November 1880, in ibid. 66Cf. W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., pp. 162-168. For a thorough treatment of the Dulcigno affair, with regard to the great powers among them­ selves and with Turkey, based on British sources, see ibid., pp. 135-169. 67Article 7 of Acte de cession du district de Dulcigno au Montinigro, 25 November 1880, in G. Effendi Noradounghian, op.cit., iv, 282. 68Le

Rde to his Ministry, dip^che, Scutari, 13 December 1880, and

Le R i e to Saint-Hilaire, 23 December 1880, No. 57, in op.cit. 69See various agreements in Sir E. Hertslet, op.cit., August-September 1883 (iv, No. 6030), December 1884 (iv, No. 605), and July 1887 (iv, No. 621).

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS

69

resisting Montenegrin encroachments, the southern branch was occupied with the problem of the Greek frontiers. Greece was not less anxious than Montenegro to begin negotiations about the boundaries as decided upon by the Berlin treaty. Greece invited Turkey to a meeting for that purpose, only four days after the termination of the work of the Congress. The Porte did not answer the Greek note; instead it wrote a memorandum refuting Deliyannis's arguments at the Berlin Congress. The French government then took up the matter in its circular of October 21, 1878 proposing that the powers should call on Turkey to abide by the principle of the recti­ fication of the Greek frontier and appoint commissioners to meet those of Greece.70 Late in December the Porte finally made up its mind to send as its commissioners Gazi Muhtar Pasha, Commander-in-Chief of the troops in Epirus, Vahan Effendi, adviser to the Ministry of Justice, and Abeddin Bey Dino, an Albanian from Epirus, who was the Commissar of Brusa in Istanbul.71 Their duty was to see that a frontier line be drawn which could be easily defended by Turkey.72 The Greeks appointed, for their part, General Skarlatos Soutzos and artillery major Panos Colocotronis, as well as George Zinopoulos, who was Secretary General of the Ministry of Justice.73 After some misunderstanding about the location of the meeting, the representatives of both states finally met in Preveza on February 5, 1879.74 Meanwhile the southern branch of the League had begun to move. Gatherings of leaders took place in Janina to con70Cf.

W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 202; M. Frasheri, op.cit., pp. 37-40. p. 41; Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 3 January 1879, No. 176, AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Janina, 1879-1900, Vol. x. 72A. Novotny, op.cit., entries 1740 and 1743, p. 347. 78S. T. Lascaris, La politique exterieure de la Grhce, avant et aprks Ie Congres de Berlin 1875-1881), Paris, 1924, p. 156. 74Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 31 January 1879, No. 180, op.cit. See the strange story about the confusion of the meeting place, as reported in a circular to the Greek legations by Deliyannis, in S. T. Lascaris, op.cit., p. 157. 71 Ibid.,

70

I. THE GROUNDWORK

sider the danger threatening Epirus. They wired from that city to Muhtar Pasha that they were ready to sacrifice every­ thing, their lives and property, in order to defend Albanian territory.76 On the other hand, they dispatched two of their members, Mehmed EfiFendi Kalaja and Shejh Hutbi, to Frasher, the headquarters of Abdul Frasheri, where a large meeting was to be held.76 Most active, however, was the Com­ mittee of the League at Preveza, where Abeddin Bey Dino was a very influential leader. Numerous Albanian leaders were heading for this city, coming from all parts of Epirus, "some with a mandate from their clan, others without any mandate, but speaking loudly in the name of Albania as a whole," in order to provide Muhtar Pasha and his colleagues with conclusive arguments that they would not cede to Greece even an inch of Epirus. At the same time Muhtar Pasha was spreading rumors that the great powers had modified their viewpoint as to the extension of the territory which Turkey should yield to Greece; it was a question only of a pure and simple border rectification—insignificant cessions in Thessaly.77 Preveza was full of Albanian pashas, beys, and agas. Abdul Frasheri, too, had gone there.78 In the house of Abeddin Bey Dino and in that of Vesel Bey Dino, another prominent Al­ banian in Preveza, numerous gatherings were held. On Janu­ ary 11,1879 the Albanian leaders, after examining the situa­ tion, decided: To address the powers represented at the Con­ gress of Berlin expressing the refusal of the Albanians to sur­ render Epirus to Greece; while the Albanians would not pose any difficulties to the cession of a part of Thessaly, they would oppose to the utmost the annexation of Epirus; if no agree­ ment could be reached on the frontier question, fully armed Albanians would be mustered and maintained at the expense 75Text

of the telegram is as annexe to Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 17 January 1879, No. 178, in op.cit. 78M. Frasheri, op.cit., p. 38. 77Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 10 January 1879, No. 177, in op.cit. 78Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 31 January 1879, No. 180, and 7 February 1879, No. 181, in op.cit.

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS

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of the League; in this event the most important depots of weapons, powder, and supplies would be strengthened, and this should not be difficult, since Albanians and Turkish sol­ diers would fraternize; also the fortresses of Arta and Preveza had to be better fortified and hidden quarters had to be pre­ pared for the Albanian chiefs in Preveza.79 It is evident that all these resolutions aimed at armed resistance on the part of the Albanian League. A force of 30,000 men was said to have been ready in southern Albania to oppose any Greek advance, while other support was promised from the north.80 The Greek authorities were right when, referring to the delay of the first Preveza meeting of the Turkish and their own commissioners, they maintained that it was employed by Abeddin Bey to call Albanian leaders to Preveza and make them sign petitions against the annexation of Epirus to Greece.81 They omitted to add, however, that the Preveza meeting dominated all other interests and had almost exclu­ sively absorbed the minds of the Albanians of Epirus.82 The French consul in Janina wrote that the sentiments of the Al­ banians toward the territorial questions were to resist any concessions, and that circumspection and ability to handle the battalions recruited in the vilayet of Janina were required, for they had been penetrated by the same sentiments. It was even believed that, in the event the Porte gave in and ordered the evacuation of territories allotted to Greece, the soldiers of the Albanian battalions would not obey the commands. In secret, men had already been chosen to replace the Turkish officers.83 On the other hand, the appointment of an influen­ tial Albanian, Abeddin Bey Dino, as an Ottoman commis79Gsiller to Andrassy, Corfu, 20 January 1879, Bericht No. 2, HHStA, PA xvn/35, Montenegro, albanische Liga. 80Cf. M. Frasheri, op.cit., p. 29; Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 15 February 1881, No. 10E, HHStAj PA xn/263, Tiirkei vm B. 81See Report on the Turkish-Greek Frontier Negotiations in 1879, ACS, Carte Crispi, Memorie manuscritte sulla situazione nei Balcani, 5 April 1878-1879; S. T. Lascaris, op.cit., p. 156. 82Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 10 January 1879, No. 177, op.cit. 83Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 17 January 1879, No. 178, ibid.

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I. THE GROUNDWORK

sioner and his free movement at Preveza are indicative of the support given by the Porte to the Albanian League. Most of the discussions held at Preveza by the commission­ ers of Greece and Turkey hinged on the validity of Protocol No. 13 of the Congress of Berlin, closely connected with Waddington's proposal (article 24 of the Treaty of Berlin). The Turks held that the protocol was subordinated to the agree­ ment of the two parties and contained no obligation for Tur­ key toward Greece. They further stated that the Porte, on account of inconveniences which would result from a dismem­ berment of Albania, could not but regard the boundaries of Protocol No. 13 as inadmissible: the sentiments which ani­ mated the populations of the country, of which they became aware upon their very arrival at Preveza, allowed them to affirm that a rectification of boundaries, drawn in the con­ ditions indicated by Waddington, would open an era of con­ flicts in the provinces claimed by Greece.84 Finally, at the sit­ ting of March 18, 1879, the Ottoman commissioners offered to Greece a narrow strip of land parallel with the existing frontier, giving as a reason for the Kalamas line the extreme excitement reigning in Albania. The Greeks rejected the offer and the negotiations were broken off.85 The Greek frontier was of great concern to the southern branch of the League. When the French consular representa­ tive, Formier, went to Preveza, the chiefs of the League paid him a visit. They declared to him that he could write Wad­ dington that the Albanians were determined not to yield to Greece even a piece of the territory of Epirus and would op­ pose by force of arms any decision of the commissioners re­ lating to Epirus.8® After the rupture of the Greek-Turkish negotiations, the League chose Abdul Frasheri and Mehmed 84S.

T. Lascaris, op.cit., p. 158. the five protocols of the conferences between the commissioners of Greece and Turkey, in Sir E. Hertslet, op.cit., pp. 2852-2853; S. T. Lascaris, op.cit., pp. 159-160; W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 77. 86Confidential letter of the French consular agent in Preveza (23 January 1879), Bosio, included in Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 31 January 1879, No. 180, op.cit. 85See

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Vrioni, another former deputy and a member of the leading family of Berat, as its delegates for the defense of the terri­ torial integrity of Albania before the governments of the great powers. Prior to their departure for the European capi­ tals, the delegates visited their consuls in Janina. Abdul Frasheri's declarations to the French consul Moreau, whom he asked for a letter of introduction to Waddington, are sig­ nificant. Frasheri told Moreau that it was doubtful that the delegation would be admitted by the French government, as they could not be introduced by the head of the Ottoman diplomatic representation, inasmuch as the Albanians had stated that their attitude would be hostile if the Porte con­ sented to a territorial concession to Greece in Epirus. More­ over, under the existing conditions, they would be refused admission with the pretext of international forms and cus­ toms, although the reception accorded at that time to Greek, Bulgarian, and Armenian delegations had created a prece­ dent. As the French consul could not give the requested letter of introduction for his Minister, because it would seem as if he were encouraging the Albanians, Abdul Frasheri, who was well aware of the consul's difficult position, answered that he knew that they would be isolated in Paris: "Mais ayant accepte une mission que nous savions d'avance etre tres ardue sous tous Ies rapports, nous sommes tenus d'honneur ά la remplir. Nous irons done a Paris . . . nous frapperons a toutes Ies portes sans nous decourager." 87 The delegation that went to Europe delivered to the cabinets of the great powers a memorandum in which they complained that from the day of Greek independence hellenism had been trying to prepare the ways and means for the conquest of Epirus.88 They mainMoreau to Waddington, Janina, 26 March 1879, No. 184, ibid. It is significant to note, in this connection, that the correspondent of the Times (London) at Athens had reported a few months back that the avowed reasons given by the Greeks for the annexation of Janina were not the real motives which prompted them to insist with such firmness on it: "The object they [the Greeks] have in view is the hellenization of Albania. The whole of the southern portion carries its commerce through Janina, and the inhabitants regard this town as their 87

88

74

I. THE GROUNDWORK

tained that Epirus was of vital importance to the southern part of their country because of the ports (Preveza, Arta, Gumenice, Parga) and the pasture lands for the cattle in the winter season. To yield to Greece the territories she claimed would be to fail in the desire every people has to defend its own country and nationality. The Albanian people, composed of two million and three hundred thousand souls,89 the mem­ orandum continued, were united against the covetousness of their neighbors and the dangers which threatened them. They would defend with all their power, under the protective au­ thority of the Ottoman Empire, their fatherland, nationality and language. The memorandum concluded that the Alba­ nians had sworn to perish rather than surrender to Greece the territories of Preveza, Arta, Janina, and other districts of Albania.90 The attempt of the Christians of Janina who were advised by Athens to counteract the activity of the Albanian delegation failed, because the vali of Janina menaced the two persons who had been elected—Manaris and Hachiottis— and obliged them to give up their trip to Europe.91 The negotiations between Turkey and Greece were re­ sumed on August 23, 1879 in Istanbul under the mediation of the ambassadors of the great powers, but the Turks again insisted that Protocol No. 13 was not binding. Proposals and counterproposals were made until November 17 when the Greeks proposed a frontier line following the extreme northcapital. They fraternize easily with the Greeks. . . . As yet, their aspira­ tions to form a distinct nationality are thought to be weak and illdefined, so that the Greeks hope with the possession of Janina to amalgamate the two races and gain over to the cause of hellenism the finest and most warlike race in South-Eastern Europe." Cf. The Times (London), 31 January 1879. 88The Albanian population here is higher because the territorial cessions had not yet been made to Montenegro and Greece. 90See French text in Hylli i Drites (The Star of Light), Shkoder, 111 (October 1922), 476-481; also in Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 June 1879. Cf. declaration in G. Schir6, op.cit., pp. 58-59. 91Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 18 April 1879, No. 187, AMAE, op.cit.

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS

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ern watershed of the valleys of Kalamas and Salambria, which would have given them Janina and Metzovo. The Turks of­ fered an alternative line running much to the south of the two towns.92 Since no agreement could be reached, Greece referred the question to the arbitration of the powers. Eng­ land and France did not like the proposed Greek line, al­ though they could not agree on an alternative. Waddington thought that the line in Epirus should run along the southern limit of the basin of Kalamas, while Salisbury objected to it because it gave Greece considerably more than the area sug­ gested at Berlin, and "did not entirely escape from the Al­ banian difficulty." 93 Further negotiations to bring about an understanding failed. When the ambassadors of the great powers were about to convene in Istanbul, the Albanians of Janina, with the coun­ sel of their compatriots in the Ottoman capital, chose two of their members to represent them during the negotiations regarding the demarcation line between Greece and Turkey. The two representatives were Mustafa Bey and Kamil Effendi, the first a deputy in the last parliament of Turkey and the second a very influential notable of Janina. On the basis of similar instructions to the sandjak of Preveza, Vesel Bey Dino, brother of Abeddin Dino, and Kadi Hasan Effendi were elected as representatives for the negotiations in Istanbul.94 In the meantime Greek guerrillas had attacked Turkish soldiers in Thessaly, while others were in Agrapha.95 The Greek band that landed in Himare failed to attain its aim.96 Turkey was compelled to transfer some battalions from north­ ern Albania to Epirus.97 The fall of the government of Lord Beaconsfield and the 92See

the various protocols, including that of 17 November 1879, in Sir E. Hertslet, op.cit., pp. 2941-2943. 93Cf. W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 78. 94Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 27 June 1879, No. 196, and 15 August 1879, No. 204, in op.cit. 95Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 16 May 1879, No. 192, i b i d . seMoreau to Waddington, Janina, 27 June 1879, No. 196, i b i d . 87Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 11 July 1879, SP No. 198, i b i d .

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advent to power of the liberals in England had repercussions in southern Albania. The spirits of the Grecophiles were re­ animated, while the Albanians were apprehensive of the Chris­ tian pietism of Gladstone and the ardent philhellenism of Sir Charles Dilke, the new undersecretary for Foreign Affairs. The Albanians feared that in the International Commission for the rectification of the boundaries the British would support the Greek claims. The Albanian leaders of Qarneri then wired the Sultan as follows: ". . . It has been proposed for some time that Preveza, Arta and Janina with its environs, our dear fatherland, be annexed to Greece. It is impossible for us to be detached alive from our sacred country and our great Ottoman caliphate; we are prepared, therefore, for all sacrifices in order to safeguard these two great goods, and we appeal, once for all, to your kindness and magnanimity." This telegram formulated the resolutions of the Qams to pursue eventually the example given by the Albanians of Plave and Gusinj in the north.98 Significant at this time, for the relations between north and south, is the appearance in Janina of two delegates of the northern branch of the Albanian League. They were from Shkoder and they had come to collect the contribution in money to which the Albanians of Epirus had subscribed as a subsidy for the needs of the Albanians fighting against Monte­ negro." The Geg delegates went also to other important towns of Epirus and were received warmly everywhere, al­ though it does not seem that they were very successful in their collection.100 In June 1880 the Greek frontier question was presented to the Conference of Ambassadors in Berlin which was to dis­ cuss the Montenegrin-Turkish boundary line. The Confer­ ence received memoranda from Berat, Vlore, Gjrokaster, Margarit, Janina, Preveza—in other words, from the whole of 98See

Moreau to Freycinet, Janina, 7 May 1880, No. 241, i b i d . The telegram of the (Jams (Chamuriots)—a French translation—is as annexe to this report. 99Moreau to Freycinet, Janina, 21 May 1880, No. 243, i b i d . 100Moreau to Freycinet, Janina, 4 June 1880, No. 244, i b i d .

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Epirus of that time 101 —requesting it to draw the boundary in such a way as not to cede Albanian territory to Greece.102 In collective notes, the following month (July 15) the new demarcation line was communicated to the Turkish and Greek governments.103 It did not agree either with the Turk­ ish proposal or with the Greek, but it was nearer to the latter: it accorded Greece half of Qameri. The Greeks accepted it promptly, but the Turks rejected it. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Abeddin Pasha (the former Abeddin Bey Dino), having stated in his reply that the Porte did not expect a wish of the powers to receive the form of a proposal, took up the Albanian difficulties: How would it be possible to consent to the cession of Janina which the Albanians (who think of themselves, like the other nationalities of the Empire, as a separate race and not less interesting) have always considered as the capital of southern Albania? If the Porte sacrificed such an important city, it would create complications which would jeopardize the peaceful exercise of its authority in this part of European Turkey. It would not be possible either for Turkey to dispossess the Albanians in certain other places belonging to their race, and especially in Qameri,104 inhabited exclusively by Albanians whose majority profess the Moslem faith. The Turkish note concluded by saying that what indi­ cated that the political side of the rectification of the frontier deserved special consideration was the fact that Waddington himself did not hesitate later to exclude from the territory to be surrendered to Greece both Janina and Qameri, undoubt­ edly because he considered the complications which might arise from the well-known resistance of the Albanians.105 The Greeks, however, believed that the change in Waddington's 101The

province of Epirus comprised then four sandjaks: Berat, Gjirokaster, Janina, and Preveza; see Wiet to Freycinet, Janina, 14 August 1880, No. 2, ibid. 102T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 375. 103See text of Collective Note in A and P, 1880, Vol. 81, Turkey, No. 13 (1880), Enclosure 1. 104Abeddin Pasha himself was from Qameri. 105Answer of the Porte to the Collective Note, 26 July 1880, A and P, 1880, Vol. LXXXI, Turkey, No. 13 (1880), Enclosure 4.

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attitude was due to his hope of flattering Beaconsfield's turcophilism and the Albanophile inclinations of Depretis, the Italian Prime Minister.106 One would not expect Abeddin Pasha, an Albanian by birth who had played such an important role in organizing Albanian demonstrations at the conferences of Preveza, to favor the idea of territorial cessions to Greece or Montenegro. Perhaps this was one of the reasons the Sultan chose him as his Minister of Foreign Affairs, although Dino himself held that his appointment was due to the Sultan's desire to con­ ciliate the British.107 There were also rumors that the Turkish note itself was dictated by Albanians, whose influence both in Epirus and in Istanbul was predominant.108 Shortly before the Turkish reply to the collective note was handed in, the southern branch of the League held a large gathering in Gjirokaster (July 23, 1880), which had now be­ come its center,109 attended by Moslem and Christian leaders from all over Albania.110 The League made decisions on many important questions,111 among which was the opposition to the dismemberment of Epirus, even if Janina and Metzovo were to remain in Turkey. As to Thessaly, they did not com­ mit themselves seriously, stating only that they would go to the assistance of Turkey, if the Greeks crossed the frontier.112 It was further decided that the fortifications of Preveza, Larissa, and Metzovo be improved, and specific sums were allo­ cated for the purpose.113 At the end of July at a meeting in Kusereci, south of Berat, some seventy-two Bektashi babas loeS.

T. Lascaris, op.cit., p. 169. W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., p. 94. 108Rimy-Berczencovich to Haymerle, Janina, 13 August 1880, Berieht No. 9/P, Geheim, HHStA, PA χνπ/g, Montenegro-albanesische Liga. 109Wiet to Freycinet, Janina, 5 August 1880, No. 1, op.cit. 110Wiet to Freycinet, Janina, 14 August 1880, No. 2, ibid.; Histori e Shqiperise1 1839-1900, p. 85. 111See next chapter for resolutions on Albanian autonomy. 112Wiet to Freycinet, Janina, 14 August 1880, No. 2, op.cit. 113Dembicki to Rdmy-Berczencovich, Preveza, 7 August 1880, HHStA, PA xvn/35, Montenegro-albanesische Liga. 107Cf.

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had participated and had affirmed energetically their will to resist with arms the entrance of foreign troops. These babas had a great influence on almost the whole Moslem population in Epirus.114 Another meeting followed in Frasher.115 Under these circumstances, the Governor General of Janina was in favor of arming the Albanians, but the Commander-inChief there was opposed to it, because he was afraid that the weapons would later be turned against the Sultan. For this reason the Commander-in-Chief was disliked by Abdul Frasheri and other influential Albanian leaders. Abeddin Dino, however, had appointed his own men as governors in the various centers. In Preveza he had appointed his brother-inlaw, Kazim Bey, who told the French consul in Janina that the Albanians would not oppose the surrender of Thessaly, but were resolved to defend with arms the integrity of Epirus; if the Sultan were to give in, Albania would be separated from the Ottoman empire and would ask for a European prince; it was in the interest of both Albania and Greece to live in agreement.116 Although the League continued to persist in its decision to punish severely every misdeed and crime perpetrated against the noncombatants in the event of a war, its members dis­ agreed as to action. There was the party headed by Abdul Frasheri, which favored action, and the moderate party of the feudal beys, which was hesitant about it. Abdul tried to incul­ cate among the Tosks those ideas of insubordination to the Ottoman authorities which were prevalent in the north. It was natural that these authorities should fight his influence. His relationship with the moderate party also had its ups and downs.117 When a rumor was diffused from a Greek source that the powers, especially England, had accorded territory in Epirus to Greece, and that armies from Istanbul were dis114Wiet

to Freycinet, 14 August 1880, No. s, op.cit. to Freycinet, Janina, 19 August 1889, No. 3, ibid. 116Wiet to Freycinet, Janina, 25 August 1880, No. 4, ibid. 117Wiet to Freycinet, Janina, 11 September 1880, No. 7, and 18 September 1880, No. 8, ibid. 115Wiet

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patched to carry out the surrender, the Albanian agitation grew. Forces were concentrated in the sandjak of Berat.118 Greece, on the other hand, was endeavoring to foment insur­ rection in Epirus. A Greek boat had unloaded arms and am­ munition in places between Gumenice (Igoumenitsa) and Murto, opposite Corfu.119 There was no doubt that if resist­ ance were to be put up Abdul Frasheri would play the prin­ cipal role. He had not fulfilled the promise to go to Istanbul, where he had been invited; he continued to reside in Frasher and had come to terms with the moderate party, which was still strong. The French consular representative in Janina summed up the situation in southern Albania thus: in order to avoid expenses, the Albanians had retreated to their homes; every hostile demonstration against Greece was to be avoided; but, at the first danger, the authority of the Governor General was to be ignored, if it went contrary to the views of the Al­ banians, and the party of action would assume the leader­ ship.120 Meanwhile the Albanians were completing the prepara­ tions for an eventual mobilization. A list of the forces which the League of the vilayet of Janina could muster—prepared by the French consulate of that city—gives the names of the chiefs, together with their respective approximate forces. They amounted in all to 72,000 men. All the chiefs were Mos­ lem. The agreement was that the Christian leaders would not go to war but would contribute money. Three were men­ tioned by name; Petro Meksi from Gjirokaster, Dhimitri Harito from Tepelene, and Lazaraki Luivano from Permet.121 On October 31 a general gathering of Albanian leaders was l l a Ibid.; Dembicki to Rdmy-Berczencovich, Preveza, 7 August 1880, HHStA, PA xvn / 3 5 , Montenegro-albanesische Liga; T . Ippen, op.cit.,

P- 375119Wiet to Freycinet, Janina, 18 September 1880, No. 8, op.cit. 120Wiet to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Janina, 28 September, 1880, No. 9 , ibid. 121Wiet to Saint-Hilaire, Janina, 15 October 1880, No. 11 and 22 October 1 8 8 0 , No. 1 2 , ibid.

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held in the main mosque in Janina; it was resolved that they should be ready to defend their land against Greek aggres­ sion.122 By then the whole of Epirus was in the hands of the Albanians, who had also received assurances from the Com­ mittee of the League at Shkoder of assistance, as soon as the Greeks crossed the frontier.123 Compared to that of the Al­ banian League the sovereignty of the Porte was weak. It was doubted whether the Porte alone could surrender Arta and Preveza.124 However, Europe had been too much involved in the Greco-Turkish frontier to abandon it. The initiative fell upon the French, who had made it their special concern. Arbitration was proposed by them, but Turkey turned it down, calling on the powers to negotiate directly with her. A second Conference of the Ambassadors was convened in Istanbul. On February 21, 1881 the Conference requested the Porte to set forth its proposals. After the usual delays, the Turkish delegates met with the ambassadors and proposed their line of demarcation, which excluded Janina, Metzovo, and Preveza, on the familiar ground of the difficulty in sur­ rendering Albanian districts.125 A proposal to exchange Epirus for Crete was suggested by Bismarck and became known as "the policy of compensation." 128 Russia supported it ener­ getically, apparently because she desired to push Greece away from the continent and make her more insular, that is, less dangerous for Slavic interests.127 The proposal failed. The Turks feared a Greek offensive. In addition to their regular army, they now had four battalions of reserves from 122Wiet

to Saint-Hilaire, Janina, 5 November 1880, No. 14, ibid. to Saint-Hilaire, Janina, 5 December 1880, No. 19, ibid. 124L. Raschdau, ed., op.cit., p. 241. 125For a detailed account of the Greco-Turkish frontier question dur­ ing 1880-1881, as connected with the great powers, see W. N. Medlicott, op.cit., pp. 190-240. 126A. D. Elliot, The Life of G. J. Goschen, First Viscount Goschen, 1831-1907, London, 1911, I, 214. 127Cf. L. Raschdau, ed., op.cit., p. 244. 123Wiet

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Elbasan and six others from the contingent of Albania, while another battalion arrived from Shkoder.128 The Turkish au­ thorities were distributing arms to the Albanians and the Albanians were readily enrolling in Janina. In the Turkish army there were 8,000 Albanians and the 10,000 volunteers; they would form the center of the resistance.129 The Greeks, on the other hand, subsidized bands of insurgents whose mission was to make the people rise in favor of Greece. They distributed proclamations to the Albanians, urging them to make common cause with Greece, but without effect.130 The Greek archbishop of Janina confessed to the French consul that only two-fifths of the Christians in the vilayet of Janina favored the cession to Greece.131 In the meantime the Turkish delegation slightly modified its proposal, and the great powers accepted it. The boundary line now ran along the heights of Salambria as far as Mount Krachevo, then followed the thalweg of the Arta to its mouth. On May 24 the Conference of Ambassadors in Istanbul drew the demarcation line, cutting from Albania the region of Arta,132 the city of Arta being surrendered to Greece on July 6, 1881. The contest with Greece thus ended with one small territorial loss for the Albanians. During the period the Greeks strove to acquire Epirus, proposals were made from time to time to solve the GrecoAlbanian question by bringing the two neighboring peoples close together. They aimed generally at some sort of union —rarely a confederation—and came from various sides. Such an idea was cherished by Sir Charles Dilke. He wanted 128Wiet

to Saint-Hilaire, Janina, 21 January 1881, No. 24, op.cit. to Saint-Hilaire, Janina, 11 February 1881, No. 27, and 8 April 1881, No. 34, ibid. 180Wiet to Saint-Hilaire, Janina, 30 March 1881, No. 32, translation in French of a proclamation from Athens as Annexe B to 27 April 1881, No. 36, and 7 May 1881, No. 39—all in ibid. 131Wiet to Saint-Hilaire, Janina, 22 February 1881, No. 28, ibid. 132Cf. Article 1 of Convention relative & la rectification des fronti£res Turco-Grecques, 24 May 1881, in G. Effendi Noradounghian, op.cit., iv, 292-293. l29Wiet

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to combine Albanian independence and union with Greece, "finding that the Albanians were willing to accept the King of the Hellenes, provided they succeeded in obtaining privi­ leges for the Roman Catholic Church, to which great num­ bers of them belonged." 133 He hoped that this personal union might ultimately grow into a closer tie, "bearing in mind the friendly cooperation of Greeks and Albanians in the War of Independence against Turkey, and the fact that a strong Albanian element already existed in the Greek Kingdom." 134 On June 4, 1880 he had a talk with King George of Greece in London on this subject and found him "a good talker, but academic." 135 Another prominent statesman who at the outset took an interest in a union between Greece and Albania was the ItaloAlbanian Francesco Crispi. He was the initiator of a philhel­ lenic committee in Rome which worked toward this end. Greek Epirot delegates visited him and letters were addressed to him in order to explain "certain erroneous information" that the Italian public held about Epirus and Janina. A letter (Athens, 21/ May 3, 1879) from one of them stated: "Accord­ ing to us, the Albanian question is a deception of which the Albanians are the victims. There is no doubt that the city of Janina and its surroundings are Greek territories." 136 A dif­ ferent view was held, however, by Thimi Mitko, an Orthodox Christian from Κοτςε who lived in Cairo and was engaged in Albanian patriotic activity not unfavorable to Greece. In a reply to an extensive article on Epirus and Janina in La Riformai which Crispi himself had forwarded to him, Mitko regarded the Greek claims as "pedantic and imaginary." The Greeks of Janina were hellenized Albanians, he declared, and the pronunciation and use of Greek (an acquired learned 133S. L. Gwynn (completed and edited by G. M. Tuckwell), The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke1 New York, 1917, 1, 338. i s i Ibid., 11, 250-251. 1 s 5 Ibid., i, 329. 136Letters of Epirot Delegates to Crispi, ACS, Carte Crispi, Politica Estera 1878-1887, Dos. rv, Fasc. 61.

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Greek) testified to it. A union between Albania and Greece through a confederation, or some other form, would be excellent, Mitko believed, but if Albania were to lose Janina it would be "an incurable wound." 137 On January 30, 1881 a pamphlet addressed to the Albanians was published in Athens by K. Phrearitis as the representative of a Greek "National League." Considering the eventuality of a war between Greece and Turkey and that sooner or later an upheaval would occur in the Balkans, as a consequence of which Turkey would be unable to keep herself in Europe, he gave four solutions to the Albanian question. One of them, which he warmly supported, was union with Greece, which would give to the Albanians the same rights and privileges as the Greeks. He maintained that the difference in religion was not an obstacle, because in the period in which they lived, the two peoples were united by race—"Pelasgians were our noble and common ancestors"—civilization, common inter­ ests and goals.138 Let us now examine briefly these various plans. Sir Charles Dilke gave as an argument for the personal union with Greece, which he supported, that Albanians had cooperated with the Greeks in the Greek War of Independence. Evi­ dently he was not aware that Moslem Albanians fought, dur­ ing that very war, on the side of the Turks and against the Greeks. He also laid stress on "the great numbers" of Catho­ lics, who in reality constituted a small minority as compared with the Moslem Albanian population. Phrearitis and other Greeks spoke in favor of union on the grounds that the two peoples had common ancestors (Pelasgians) and civilization. There were Albanians, on the other hand, who held the opinion that they were a different people with a different 137Mitko

to Crispi, Cairo, 21 June 1879, in ibid. Phrearites, "Ho Ethnikos Desmos pros tous andreious Skepetarous" (The National League to the Brave Albanians), Athens, 1881, pp. 3, 6-8; for a French summary of it, see Berczencovich to Haymerle, Janina, 24 March 1881, No. 13/P, HHStA, PA xn/263, Tiirkei vm B1 and Wiet to Saint-Hilaire, Janina, 27 April 1881, No. 36, op.cit. 138K.

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civilization.189 If Crispi at one time favored the union, it appears to have been principally because he thought that Greece together with Albania could better serve as a basis of action not only against slavism but also against Austrian invasion.140 All the proposals mentioned above remained merely proj­ ects. They were not based on enduring realities but on mo­ mentary needs: a solution had to be found which would satisfy the Greeks, without antagonizing the Albanians, and at the same time would strengthen the forces opposing slavism. They had the serious fault of overlooking one fundamental fact: the majority of the Albanians were Moslems. As Mos­ lems they fitted best in the Ottoman empire, where they en­ joyed the rights and privileges of the Turks. Union with Greece, in any form, could not have been attractive to them. Religion, which had separated them from the Greeks, had engendered in the course of time a mutual hostility. The Mos­ lem Albanians knew that within a Greco-Albanian union they would lose the privileged position they held in the Otto­ man empire. Goschen, the British ambassador to Turkey at that time, wrote that he favored the union, but he added that the Turks would struggle hard to outbid the Greeks and that the Albanians were very strong in the Palace, and were trusted all over the empire.141 If the Moslem Albanians did not re­ main within the empire, preferably as an autonomous unit, the other alternative for them would be independence, but not union with Greece, which would reduce them to inferior citizens. When Abdul Frasheri was in Rome in 1879, he was met by Marco A. Canini, an Italian liberal who had traveled in the Balkans and had often been entrusted with delicate missions by his government. Canini endeavored to induce the Albanian leader to develop more friendly relations with Greece. Abdul's answer revealed the feelings of his compatri189See text of the memorandum to Lord Beaconsfield, in P. Chiara, L'Epiro, gli Albanesi e la Lega, Palermo, 1880, pp. 165-169. 140Cf. S. T. Lascaris, op.cit., p. 183. 141S. L. Gwynn, op.cit., 1, 328.

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ots: "The agreement you recommend us is impossible; the Greeks do not want to recognize our rights; they want subjects and not equals." 142 Two opinions expressed at the time, with respect to rela­ tions between Albanians and Greeks, show considerable soundness. One was in the Journal des Debats (March 26, 1879). It advocated taking Albania into account: "and one was greatly mistaken to assume that there was no Albanian nation. There is a very real one, thinking undoubtedly about its autonomy." Albania could have common interests with Greece, but she would not let herself be absorbed or parti­ tioned without resistance. It would be more useful to Greece if she handled Albania well. They would reach a point when they could live together to their great mutual profit, like Sweden and Norway in the north. "This should be the Greek viewpoint." The other opinion was expressed by Bismarck, who had previously denied the existence of the Albanian nationality.143 In February 1881, when clashes between the Turks and Albanians began in the north, he declared that Greece's interest was to be on friendly terms with the Al­ banians, as they were her natural allies against the Slavs and the Turks.144 In addition to Montenegro and Greece, the Albanian League had to oppose another enemy—the Bulgarians. In November 1878 Bulgarian guerrilla bands became active near Salonica and gave the signal for the creation of other bands in the districts of Koprulii (Veles), Prilep, Vodena (Edessa), Kastoria, and Monastir, which lay on the eastern frontiers of Albania.145 On December 12, 1878, Ilijas Pasha, as representa­ tive of the Albanians of Diber, wired to Zichy in Istanbul, asking that the European powers intervene and stop the atrocities of the Bulgarians so that the people themselves 142G.

Schiri), op.cit., p. 78. A. Mousset, L'Albanie devant I'Europe (1912-1929), Paris, 1930, p. 7; Federal Writers' Project, Massachusetts, The Albanian Struggle in the Old World and New, Boston, 1939, p. 35. 144L. Raschdau, ed., op.cit., p. 244. 145Cf. T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 371. 143Cf.

RESISTANCE TO BERLIN CONGRESS

87

would not be obliged to fight in self-defense.149 The Alba­ nians of these districts, and particularly those of Diber, saw in this Bulgarian uprising a move for the realization of the Great Bulgaria of San Stefano, which included Albanian territories. They energetically opposed the Bulgarian move­ ment, which was soon abandoned.147 The resistance to the decisions of the Congress of Berlin, which consisted not only of protests and memoranda, but also of armed force in defense of their territories, even when Turkey was ready to surrender them, made the Albanians more aware of their nationality and of a separate place within the Ottoman empire. 144A. 147T.

Novotny, op.cit., entry 1728, p. 345. Ippen, op.cit., pp. 371-372.

Ill The Struggle for Administrative Autonomy ALBANIAN LEADERS were becoming more aware every day of

the shaky structure of the Ottoman empire, supported only by interested powers for political motives. They feared, should the empire collapse, that a disunited Albania would be par­ titioned. On the other hand, they thought that union of the Albanian people could be achieved by remaining for some time within the framework of the Ottoman empire.1 Their demand was, therefore, for administrative autonomy. The tendencies toward administrative autonomy were first manifested in the south, where education was more wide­ spread than in the north. Here there was a group of Albanian leaders, headed by Abdul Frasheri, to whom the nationalist movements of Europe and the Balkans were not unknown. Janina was a cultural center, and every new principle and movement were followed there with practical curiosity.2 In the spring of 1877 a meeting of notables of southern Albania was held in Janina, as mentioned previously, and a memorandum was adopted and presented to the Porte. It drew attention to the bad situation of the Albanian provinces, and asked for their unification in a single vilayet, with an administration composed of Albanian employees and schools and courts in the Albanian language.3 Since the Russo-Turkish war broke out soon afterward, the Porte remained silent on the memorandum, and a year later promised reforms for only the vilayet of Janina.4 Turkey's state of war, however, made the Albanian leaders feel more urgently the need to 1Cf. Wassa Effendi, La verite sur I'Albanie et Ies Albanais, Paris, 1879, pp. 94-95; L. Skendo, "Liga e Prizrenit" (The League of Prizren), Hylli i Drites (Star of Light), Shkoder, HI (October 1922), 470. 2See M. Frasheri, Liga e Prizrenit edhe efektet dipllomatike te saj (The League of Prizren and Its Diplomatic Effects), Tirana, 1927, pp. 22-23; L. Skendo, "Lidhja e Prizrenit" (The League of Prizren), Diturija (Knowledge), Tirana, HI (July-August-September 1928), 323. 3 Histori e Shqiperise, 1839-1900, p. 55. 4See Chapter 1, pp. 40-41.

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY

89

take up the salvation of their country themselves. The Central Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Albanian Nationality, founded in Istanbul immediately after the San Stefano Treaty, had as its task not only to prevent the dis­ memberment of Albanian territory but also to ask for au­ tonomy.5 The program for the administrative autonomy of Albania became more clear-cut after the Congress of Berlin, where the Albanian petitions and memoranda were disregarded and Al­ bania was treated more or less as a geographic expression. Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin obliged Turkey to apply to Crete the 1868 organic regulation for autonomy and stated that similar regulations, adapted to local needs, would be introduced in other parts of European Turkey, for which a particular organization was not foreseen by that treaty. With this article in mind, the Albanian leaders of the south met in Frasher and, under the leadership of Abdul Frasheri, drew up on November 10, 1878 the program for the administrative autonomy of Albania.6 The Turkish government, which from time to time changed the administrative division of the provinces in the empire, had at the time of the Congress of Berlin divided the Albanian lands into four vilayets: Janina, Monastir, tiskiib, and Shkoder. This was an obstacle to Albanian unity. The Albanians desired unification of all of them into one vilayet, with Ohrid (later Monastir) as the capital, owing to its central position. In this way Albania would receive definite frontiers, officially recognized, which in another partition of Turkey would be a safeguard for her rights. As the centralistic policy of the Porte had installed high Turkish officials in the prov­ inces, the southern branch of the League demanded that the high officials should be Albanians. Turkey had acknowledged that education throughout the empire was an indispensable part of the program of reforms. The declarations of Hatt-i Humayun (art. 8) allowed the teaching of the mother tongue 5Histori eM.

e Shqiperise, 1839-1900, pp. 55-58. Frasheri, op.cit., p. 24; Histori e Shqiperise, 1839-1900, pp. 63, 65.

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I. THE GROUNDWORK

to Ottoman citizens, but Albanian was forbidden. All the nationalities in the empire, except the Albanians, had their own schools. The schools which were functioning in that country at the time of the League were Turkish for the Mos­ lems and Greek for the Orthodox Christians. The southern Albanian leaders consequently stipulated that Albanian schools should be opened and that the language of the admin­ istration should be Albanian. Both the Albanian schools and the public works were to be supported by a part of the direct taxes, which would not be forwarded to Istanbul. The pro­ gram naturally included the provision that all religions should be free to exercise their cult, since the Albanian pop­ ulation consisted of Moslems and Christians. A council, chosen by the people and convening four months during the year in the capital of the vilayet, would control the execution of the various new regulations.7 The program for the autonomy of Albania, as formulated in Frasher, undoubtedly had the approval of the Albanian Istanbul committee. On November 26, 1878, Zichy wrote from the Turkish capital to his Ministry in Vienna that some Albanian notables had visited him and strengthened his im­ pression that Albania also strove for autonomy, seeking to lean for its attainment on a great power, namely, AustriaHungary.8 Yet it was not until the beginning of October 1879 that a meeting was held in Prizren and the representatives of the north discussed and accepted the southern program for auton­ omy.9 Few among them, however, were as broad in their thinking as Vasa Effendi, who considered "of capital interest the union of Albania into a single vilayet in order to give to 7For

the points of the program, see T. Ippen, "Beitrage zur inneren Geschichte Albaniens im xix. Jahrhundert," Illyrisch-albanische Forschungen, 1, 372; M. Frasheri, op.cit., p. 24; Histori e Shqiperise, 1839-1900, p. 65; Knapitsch to Andrdssy, Monastir, 6 February 1879, No. 3, HHStAj PA xvn/35, Montenegro Varia, Gusinje Frage 1879. 8A. Novotny, Osterreich, die Tiirkei und das Balkanproblem im Jahre des Berliner Kongresses, Graz-Koln, 1957, entry 1668, p. 335. eT. Ippen, op.cit., p. 372.

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY

91

it a simple, compact, and strong organization." 10 The major­ ity o£ the northern leaders were much absorbed by the events of the Montenegrin frontiers and little understood the efforts of the southerners. As long as the aim was to defend Albanian territorial integrity, there was union in the League. When autonomy of the country became more pressing, the split within it was inevitable. The conservative trends which existed within the League, while apparent from the start, were brought to the foreground by the question of autonomy. An English travel­ ler, who visited northern Albania a year or so after the forma­ tion of the League, observed: "That Turkey at first secretly assisted and encouraged the movement, I think there can be no doubt . . . But the League has waxed too strong for the government. . . . The Leaguesmen, feeling their strength, have extended their program. Defence of their native land against foreign invasion is not now their only cry, but auton­ omy and the shaking off of the Turkish yoke are boldly dis­ cussed in the Bazars of the garrisoned towns." 11 We may say that, during the period of the League's activity, the two aims —preservation of territorial integrity and introduction of administrative autonomy—coexisted, autonomy becoming paramount as the territorial questions were being solved in one way or another. The two trends which divided the League with respect to autonomy were intensified at the Conference of Gjirokaster Quly 23, 1880), attended by representatives from all over the country, where Abdul Frasheri presented a detailed pro­ gram for the organization of an autonomous Albania. It was substantially the program that had been formulated in the meeting of Frasher some two years before: only the Governor General of Albania would be appointed by the Sultan and Albania would not have obligations toward the Porte other than the payment of a yearly tribute and military service of 10Wassa

EfEendi, op.cit., p. 98. F. Knight, Albania: a Narrative of Recent Travel, London, 1880, pp. 258-259. 11E.

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I. THE GROUNDWORK

her men in the event of war. But while the delegates were agreed as to the main goal, autonomy, they differed as to the time and manner of action to achieve it. The most progres­ sive elements thought that they should act immediately, profiting by Turkey's difficult situation when even the Turk­ ish army could not move against them. They represented the "radicals." The others, mostly feudal beys, insisted upon waiting for a more favorable time. They were the "moder­ ates." At the end the conference agreed that its resolutions should be carried out as soon as aggression against Albanian territories occurred in the north or in the south: the forces of the north would come to the assistance of the south and vice versa.12 It was quite a significant step forward in the political thinking of the Albanians. The Albanian movement had not left the foreigners unim­ pressed, particularly the British. Great Britain's ambassador to Turkey, Goschen, had correctly appraised the situation, when he wrote on July 26, 1880 to the Secretary of the For­ eign Office: "Whatever the history of the movement may be, I venture to submit to your Lordship, as I have done before, that the Albanian excitement cannot be passed over as a mere manoeuvre conducted by the Turks in order to mislead Europe and evade its will." 13 An attempt was made by E. Fitzmaurice, British representative on the Eastern RumeIian Commission,14 to create a large Albania comprising all the Albanian-inhabited lands of the four vilayets.15 He se12See Histori e Shqiperise, 1839-1900, pp. 86-87; Wiet to Freycinet, Janina, 14 August 1880, No. 2, and Wiet to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Janina, 28 September 1880, No. 9, AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Janina, 1879-1880, Vol. x. 13Goschen to Granville, Therapia, 26 July 1880, A and P, Vol. LXXXI, 1880, Turkey, No. 15 (1880), No. 81. 14The Commission was created by the Treaty of Berlin (Articles 13 and 18) in order "to elaborate, in agreement with the Ottoman Porte, the organization of Eastern Rumelia," as a province endowed with adminis­ trative autonomy;— 15Fitzmaurice to Granville, 21 June 1880, A and P, Vol. LXXXI, 1880, Turkey, No. 15 (1880), Nos. 33, 70, 71.

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY

93

cured the support of Ambassador Goschen, who argued the political value of a large Albania as follows: "If a strong Albania should be formed, the excuse for occupation by a foreign power in case of the dissolution of the Ottoman Em­ pire would be greatly weakened. A united Albania would bar the remaining entrances to the north, and the Balkan Peninsula would remain in the hands and under the sway of the races who now inhabit it. . . . I consider that, in pro­ portion as the Albanian nationality could be established, the probability of European intervention in the Balkan Penin­ sula would be diminished." 16 Although in the beginning the members of the Eastern Rumelian Commission were not hostile to Fitzmaurice's proposal for the projected union of all Albanian districts, they eventually objected to it.17 They were satisfied only to make a declaration on August 23, 1880 that if "the Sublime Porte found it opportune to unite the Albanian lands into one vilayet," they would have no objection at all. However, the representative of Russia, Khitrovo, abstained from sign­ ing even this declaration.18 When Turkey yielded to the pressure of the great powers in the surrender of Dulcigno, the Albanian patriots thought that the moment had come to put into effect the resolutions of Gjirokaster. A meeting was held on October 20, 1880 in Diber, where, besides the group of the autonomists, many powerful feudal beys and pashas participated. They had been upset by the situation of Dulcigno and were eager that de­ cisions regarding Albania should not be made without their consent. On the basis of the resolutions of Gjirokaster, the patriots presented the necessity for prompt declaration of autonomy and for action to defend Dulcigno. For this pur­ pose, they proposed that all the forces of the country should 16Goschen

to Granville, ibid. to Granville, 1 August 1880; 17 August 1880; 20 August 1880; and 24 August 1880—in ibid., Nos. 71, 109, 130, 134. 18Fitzmaurice to Granville, Buyukdiri, 23 August 1880, A and P, Vol. LXXXI, 1880, Turkey, No. 15 (1880), No. 132, Enclosure 2. 17Fitzmaurice

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I. THE GROUNDWORK

be mobilized to prevent the arrival of new Turkish troops and at the same time attack the Turkish armies in Shkoder and Dulcigno. The divergences immediately came into the open. The battle was between the pro-government party of Diber and Mat, headed by Sadik Pasha Dibra and Djemal Pasha Mati, and the pro-League party (autonomists), led by Ali Pasha Gucija, Esad Pasha Tetova (Kalkandelen), and Ilijas Pasha Dibra. The pro-government party opposed both the sending of forces to Dulcigno and the declaration for autonomy. They feared that they would jeopardize their positions now that the Sultan had decided to deliver Dul­ cigno to the Montenegrins. In the voting which followed, the pro-League party was beaten (130 as against 150 votes). Still it prepared a resolution reiterating the desire for the creation of an autonomous province of Albanian territories and communicated it to the Porte in a document which Djemal Bey Dibra, the son of Ilijas Pasha Dibra, took to Istanbul. It was their last effort to solve the question of au­ tonomy in understanding with Turkey. The pro-government party also voted upon a resolution and sent its own man to Istanbul with it.19 When the League was created, both branches, northern and southern, had arranged to meet through their men of confidence in Elbasan, in central Albania.20 But this plan had not worked well, because the various committees in the south and the north were in loose relationship with each other. When the idea for autonomy was spreading and the interest of the great powers in the Albanian question was increasing, before the conference of Gjirokaster, Abdul Frasheri intensified his efforts to revive the ties and bring the committees of the various regions closer.21 Following the meeting of Diber, new attempts were made. In order to popu19See Lippich to Haymerle, Scutari, go November 1880, No. 139, HHStA, PA xvn/35, Montenegro Varia, Gusinje Frage 1879; T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 337; Histori e Shqiperisel 1839-1900, pp. 89-90. '20T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 371. 21Cf. Histori e Shqiperise, 18)9-1900, p. 86.

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY

95

larize the unification of Albania and strengthen the relations between the southern and northern branches of the League, delegates from the south travelled in northern Albania, and those of the north visited the towns of southern Albania.22 The duality of purpose of the Albanian patriots made collaboration with Turkey precarious. The Austrian consul in Janina, Berczencovich, had grasped the situation when he reported to his government that, although it seemed that there was a complete agreement between the Turks and the Albanians, they tried to deceive each other as to their ulti­ mate ends. Turkey used the Albanians in a general opposi­ tion to the decisions of the great powers and made the solutions of the frontiers, whenever possible, dependent on them. The Albanians, on the other hand, made use of the difficult position of Turkey and of her proffered help to secure their frontiers and attain autonomy. Both parties were aware of each other's ends.23 The turning-point in the relations between the Albanians and Turkey was brought about by the cession of Dulcigno to Montenegro. This act produced a deep impression all over Albania.24 It put an end to the long agitation that had de­ veloped in that country for a defensive war against Mon­ tenegro and directed the attention of the Albanians mainly toward relations with Turkey, toward the question of auton­ omy. The Porte had not taken into consideration the various Albanian petitions for autonomy, even the last one from the meeting of Diber; it had only been generous in promises, as long as it needed Albanian support and feared interna­ tional complications. But now that the conflict with Montenegro was over and the way was open to a favorable 22T.

Ippen, op.cit., p. 377. to Haymerle, Janina, 13 August 1880, No. g/P, Geheim, HHStA, PA xvn/35, Montenegro, albanesische Liga. 24See Caliee to Haymerle, Constantinople, 7 January 1881, No. 2, confidential Beilage from Betriebsdirection der Ott. Eisenbahnen, Salonich, 23 December 1880, HHStA, PA xn/263, Tiirkei VIII B; Greneville to Haymerle, Salonica, 9 March 1881, No. 31, ibid. 28Berczencovich

96

I. THE GROUNDWORK

solution in the frontier question with Greece, the policy of Istanbul changed.25 The Albanian movement had disturbed both the Sultan and the ruling caste in Istanbul. The Sultan had long been hesitant to take action against the League. The Albanian problem had a wider interest for him: it was his first serious encounter with Moslem nationalism within the empire. It came at a time when he was attempting to turn the emerging revival of Islam to political advantage. An Afghan teacher, Sayyad Jamaluddin, who became internationally known during his stay in Egypt (1871-1879), preached that the Islamic revival sought essentially to adapt Moslem religion to modern life. In his opinion, Moslem countries should free themselves from foreign domination—Hamidian despotism was not any better—undergo religious reform and enjoy free political thinking. Abdul Hamid's purpose, however, was to use the office of Caliph to strengthen his authority as a Sultan, and a challenge to it, whether from inside or from outside, would be detrimental. While in Tunis in 1880 there was some hope that the religious confraternities of Islam could be mobilized against the French, in Albania it was almost certain that resistance to foreign pressure would develop into resistance to the Sultan-Caliph. Abdul Hamid had to weigh, therefore, to what extent the suppression of the Al­ banian movement would damage his prestige in the Moslem world, while strengthening his direct authority over the country.2® As to the Porte, it was more ready for action. Most of the high officials and principal advisers feared that auton­ omy would harm the caste of the Turkish functionaries and particularly those who were in Istanbul. It advocated centrali­ zation and the rejection of every concession to autonomy.27 It entrusted Dervish Pasha not only with the mission to deliver Dulcigno to the Montenegrins, but also with that of dispersing the Albanian League. The Turkish government 25Cf.

Histori e Shqiperise, 1839-1900, p. 91. W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe, London, 1956, pp. 76-77. 27Cf. T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 377. 26Cf.

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY

97

understood, however, that the suppression of the Albanian movement needed a greater army than the one at the disposal o£ Dervish Pasha. In the beginning of December 1880 it called him to Istanbul in order to prepare the plan of a great expedition to Albania.28 The centralistic attitude of the Porte could not but produce discontent in Albania, where prior to the Congress of Berlin several revolts against efforts to impose Turkish centralization had already occurred. In the meantime changes took place in the leadership of the League of Prizren. The central committee was reorgan­ ized and commanding positions passed into the hands of resolute autonomist elements, such as Sheh Omer Prizreni, Sulejman Vokshi, Shuaip Age Spahiu, and others.29 The League then decided to remain in opposition to the Porte, denying the authority of its officials and refusing to send recruits.30 The Albanian resistance began in Prizren. The League ousted the mutesarrif of the city and his functionaries and placed in their stead its own members, namely, Kadi Nazif Effendi as acting governor, Redjeb Jakova in charge of taxes, and Dervish Bey as chief of police. It also announced to the inhabitants of the districts of Prizren, Gjakove, and Ipek that all males from 7 to 70 years of age were to be ready for battle, in case the Turkish army should approach.31 Already in December χ 880 the Albanians of Oskiib let Galib Bey and the Mufti, the Turks most powerful and friendly to the Porte, know that they were not desirable and ought to leave the city, for in the Council (Mecelis) they had supported the recruitment of the Albanians.32 On January 4, 1881 the Prizren contingent, under the command of Sulejman Vokshi, occupied Cskub. The Governor had been recalled to IstanHistori e Shqiperise, 1839-1900, p. 92. Ibid. 30Cf. T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 377. 31Waldhart to Haymerle, trskiib, 19 December 1880, No. 108/res., HHStA, PA xn/263, Turkei vm B. 32Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 7 January 1881, No. 2, Con­ fidential Beilage from the Betriebsdirektion der Ott. Eisenbahnen, Salonica, 23 December 1880, in ibid. 2s

w

98

I. THE GROUNDWORK

bul, but the newly appointed one was not acceptable to the Albanians. As long as there was no governor, the League functioned as the only authority, through its member Jashar Bey, and did not care much about the Porte.88 On January 10 the local committee of the League ordered the director of the railway station of Oskiib not to receive any military transportation to and from Mitrovice.34 From Uskiib Sulejman Vokshi occupied Mitrovice, extending the government of the League into other parts of the Sandjak of Novi Pazar.88 On January 18, 1881 the forces of the League took hold of Prishtine, the capital of the vilayet of Kosovo, and the Gov­ ernor General, who was at the same time the military com­ mander, was recalled to Istanbul. All the districts of Prishtine and Uskiib were brought under the control of the League.86 In February 1881 Diber followed the example of Prizren. Here Abdul Frasheri played an important role. In December 1881 he had left Istanbul, where he was secretly kept under surveillance.87 He landed in Sarande (Santi Quaranta) and proceeded to Diber on his way to Prizren, where he intended to exercise his influence on the government of the League. When an attempt against his life was made in Diber, on the part of the supporters of the Porte, he exploited it cleverly and succeeded in arousing the people against the Turkish government, its adherents, and the mutesarrif, whom they expelled.38 33Cf. ibidem; T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 378; Montlong to Haymerle, Tele­ gram, Salonica, 6 January 1881, No. 4387, and Waldhart to Haymerle, Scopia, 13 January 1881, No. a/res., HHStAj PA xn/273, Tiirkei νπι B. 84Montlong to Haymerle, Telegram, Salonica, 10 January 1881, No. 7179, in ibid. 35Waldhart to Haymerle, tJskiib, 29 January 1881, No. 13/ res., in ibid. 36Waldhart to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Telegram, tJskiib, 21 January 1881, No. 5888, in ibid.; T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 378. 87Wiet to Saint-Hilaire, Janina, 11 February 1881, No. 27, AMAE, op .cit. 38Lippich to Haymerle, Scutari, 8 Apiil 1881, No. 51, HHStA, PA xii/263, Tvirkei viii B.

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY

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Although written from Istanbul, a letter by Sami Frasheri (known in Turkey as the scholar §emseddin Sami Bey), the brother of Abdul Frasheri, to the Italo-Albanian poet De Rada sheds much light on the situation in Albania at this time and the hopes of the Albanian patriots. Its contents were in part as follows: Perhaps the achievements of the League in the last month in northern Albania had not been learned in Italy because the newspapers did not speak much about them, as on the one hand Turkey did not permit that the news be propagated, and on the other, the enemies of the Albanians tried to minimize their value. "The League of Prizren many times had asked, during the last three years for the unification of Albania into one province with auton­ omy, but the empire until now had deceived it with promises, and had been unwilling to do anything for Albania. This time the Albanians understood very well that the empire did not want to do anything for them, and the League of Prizren found it necessary to unite Albania into an autonomous unit, and perhaps independence, according to the develop­ ments; thus the League has been called Provisional Govern­ ment, and has expelled the administrators from all the vilayet of Kosovo." Ten thousand armed Albanians were getting ready to go to the south. In a little while one would hear of a great insurrection in Albania.39 The part of Albania which went quickly into action against the Turkish government was the northeast. Shkoder was not in a position to move. Dervish Turgut Pasha, after the cession of Dulcigno, destroyed its League committee by de­ porting its leaders, among them Prenk Bib Doda.40 Before December 1880 Prenk Bib Doda had already had some troubles with the Porte. In October 1879 the Turkish gov­ ernment, in opposition to declarations in the Congress of s0Sami to De Rada, Constantinople, 20 February 1881, text in Albanian, Buletin i Shkencave Shoqerore (Bulletin of Social Sciences), Tirana, No. 2, 1954, p. 115. 40Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 8 February 1881, No. 8 A-G, HHStA, PA xn/263, Turkei vm B.

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I. THE GROUNDWORK

Berlin, had appointed Mahmud Aga from Podgorice as kaymakam (sub-prefect) of Mirdite.41 It was pursuing a centralistic policy, trying to turn Mirdite into a district of the Ottoman empire with a kaymakam.42 The Austro-Hungarian government intervened and called on the Porte to recognize Prenk Bib Doda as the legitimate ruler of the territory, while the Kapidan himself requested of the Grand Vizier that he be authorized to administer and govern Mirdite with the privileges and customs which the Sultan "had always granted and recognized from the time of the conquest" and with the rank and title of his deceased father Bib Doda Pasha.43 Now, as the movement led by Ali Pasha Gucija, who was the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the League, had assumed great proportions—the inhabitants of Prizren, Djakove, Ipek, Diber, and the highlands followed him—the Catholics of the north anxiously watched the developments and waited for a favorable opportunity to make common cause with Ali Pasha. The well-informed inhabitants of the Shkoder province saw in the movement a tendency on the part of its leader to ac­ quire control of the north, and thus prepare himself for a more efficient defense against eventual aggressions. These might come especially from Montenegro; profiting by even­ tual troubles, Montenegro might attempt a coup de main in order to extend her frontiers to include Prizren and Shkoder.44 The big landowning families o£ middle Albania—Berat, Elbasan, Kruje, Tirane, and Vlore—had almost dissolved their loose connections with the Albanian League. Their 41Schmucker to Haymerle, Scutari, 24 October 1879, No. 91, H H S t A j PA xn/256, Tiirkei iv. 42Lippich to Andrdssy, Scutari, 29 March 1879, No. 27, in ibid. 43See copy of the letter of Prenk Bib Doda to Said Pasha (Scutari, 24 November 1879) in Schmucker to Haymerle, Scutari, 24 November 1879,

No. 104, and Kosjek to Haymerle, Constantinople, 19 December 1879, No. 112 B, in ibid. 44Thoemmel to Haymerle, Cetinje, 10 March 1881, No. 127 res., Beilage 1 (letter of the Acting Consul in Antivari, Signor Depolo, Antivari, 1 March 1881, No. 18/res.), HHStA, PA xn/263, Tiirkei vm B.

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY

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lands were not near the frontiers and they did not feel the outside pressure to make them aware that Turkey was not in a position to defend them. When they exchanged opinions with the delegates of the northern districts, they were con­ vinced that the program for autonomy of the League would not only lead to conflict with Turkey but would also harm their interests. They were prompt to yield the rights they enjoyed to the Christians in theory but not in practice. When the northern delegates expressed the opinion that they could not ignore the Catholic highlanders and that they were ready to grant them all that they needed, so that Shkoder would not be separated from Prizren, the beys of central Albania answered that conditions in their own districts were different: the Christians were the serfs of the beys, and this relationship could not be changed in one stroke. They justified their stand on the ground that it would be unwise to give the Christians promises which could not be kept. Having relatives in high positions in the Turkish army and civil service, these feudal beys knew how Istanbul thought and they expected at any moment the use of force to suppress the Albanian move­ ment.45 As for the southern Albanians, although the frontier ques­ tion with Greece was still pending, they remained faithful to the program of autonomy. At times they would even oscillate between autonomy and quasi-independence under the tute­ lage of a foreign power, such as Austria-Hungary, which was often so mentioned.46 When Abdul Frasheri went to Prizren and urged the League to occupy with armed forces the Kacanik pass and officially proclaim the autonomy of Albania, his plan was that then the southern branch of the League would occupy Janina, defining thus the borders of auton­ omous Albania.47 One is inclined to believe that the petition 45Stranz

to Haymerle, Corfu, 14 March 1881, No. 6, in ibid. to Saint-Hilaire, Janina, 11 February 1881, No. 27, AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Janina, 1881-1884, Vol. xi. 47M. Frasheri, op.cit., p. 58. 46Wiet

102

I. THE GROUNDWORK

sent (April 3-15, 1881) to the Austrian Embassy (perhaps to other embassies as well) in Istanbul by the League of Prizren itself was inspired by Abdul Frasheri. The document gave as reason for the union of the Albanian people the fact that parts of the Albanian territory were submitted to the domination of foreigners and that the rest of Albania was in a very uncertain situation. In order to confront the danger and safeguard their future well-being, the Albanian people as a whole had taken the following decisions: (1) Located in Europe, Albania should participate in its civilization and preserve herself and the nationality of her people; (2) The Albanians should remain, as until then, under the govern­ ment of the Sultan; (3) Albania, then divided in four vilayets, should be united into one and bear the name "Albania." The League of Prizren appealed to the Austro-Hungarian government to support its claims in the name of human rights, giving the assurance that it had no other goals except those mentioned in the petition and that it desired to live in peace with Albania's neighbors.48 It was natural for the Ottoman empire to view with con­ cern the growing Albanian movement which challenged its rule and created conditions for foreign intervention. Many cabinet meetings were held at the palace and in the Porte. The Sultan feared that Austria-Hungary was playing her hand in the movement in order to use it as a pretext to invade the territory because peace was threatened. He in­ tended also to employ the services of the Bosnian refugee Mufti of Tashlidja, on whose faithfulness he could rely, in order to calm down the Albanians.49 Moreover, the Porte was afraid that Greece might reach an understanding with 48The League of Prizren to the Austro-Hungarian Embassy in Con­ stantinople, Prizren, 3-15 April 1297 (1SSi), German translation in­ cluded in Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 3 May 1881, No. 32H, HHStA, PA xn/263, Tiirkei vm B. 49Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 25 January 1881, No. 6B, in ibid. The Mufti of Tashlidja had organized and headed the strongest resistance against the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia. Calice had intervened with the Porte not to be sent back to Albania from which country he had been recalled to Istanbul.

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the Albanians. Its attitude was to oppose the movement by force, while at the same time trying to win over the Albanians by testimonies of sympathy, as the press had been inspired to do.50 The appeasement efforts were planned with the view of gaining time and diverting the attention of the Albanians to the development of the Greek question. There was the tendency also of making the consideration of their claims dependent on their attitude toward that question.61 Turkey was aware that the Albanians would give up their resistance to her if she were attacked by Greece. Indeed, the Austrian consul in Oskub, Waldhart, reported that the League put at the disposal of the Sultan 20,000 men to be used against Greece. The press in Istanbul—that part which was inspired by the Sultan's entourage—reported that many Albanian notables in the Turkish capital wired to their friends in Prishtine, Ipek, Prizren, and Gjakove that it would not be patriotic to make difficulties for Turkey by demanding the introduction of reforms in Albania, before the solution of the Greek question. They urged that the whole force of the League be sent to the Greek frontier and there await the order to be issued by the Porte.52 Meanwhile the Sultan had ordered the constitution of a special committee to study the affairs of Albania; it decided on the unification of all Albanian lands in one vilayet.53 But, when the first alarm had been overcome, he paid less atten­ tion to the Albanian movement and did not regard as urgent the satisfaction of the Albanian claims.84 At the same time Dervish Pasha, one of the exponents of centralization, had arrived in Istanbul. He advised the government not to make any concessions to the Albanians, but to repress their move­ ment by force of arms.55 The influence of the marshal and the i o Ibid; see also Vakit (Time), Istanbul, 21 and 22 January 1881, and Tercuman-1 Hakikat (Interpreter's Truth), Istanbul, 22 January 1881. 51Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 15 February 1881, No. 10C, HHStA, PA xn/263, Turkei vm B. 52Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 15 February 1881, No. 10E. 53Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 8 February 1881, No. 8 A-G. 54Cf. Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 15 February 1881, No. 10C. 55Cf. T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 378.

104

I. THE GROUNDWORK

prevailing opinion in the Turkish capital that he would be able to master the Albanian movement contributed to the reluctance of the Porte to yield to the Albanian demands.58 The Porte decided to dispatch Dervish Turgut Pasha "to pacify" Albania. While the marshal was getting ready to leave for the Al­ banian campaign, the commander of Cskiib, Ibrahim Pasha, on orders from Istanbul, on March 23, 1881 arrested the members of the League committee of that city and deported them to the island of Rhodes.57 Some days later Dervish Pasha entered (Jskub, and from there informed the Gegs of his mission in a proclamation: He was entrusted by the Porte, which was interested in the welfare and the peace of the people, to suppress any insurrection; the times were critical, because Turkey was surrounded by enemies, and he was prepared to be ruthless in his repression of their movement.58 The marshal then proceeded to Prizren with an army of 10,000 and two batteries.59 The League committee of that city called some 5,000 men to arms and occupied the pass leading through Crnoljeva to the plain of Kosovo. The battle began on April 20, 1881, the Turks making use of their mountain artillery. After a strenuous resistance on the part of the Albanians, the Turks were victorious. Two days later Dervish Pasha occupied Prizren.60 The marshal made no reprisals against the northern leaders 56Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 15 February 1881, No. 10C, HHStA, PA xn/263, Tiirkei vm B. 57Pietschka to Haymerle, Smyrna, 15 April 1881, No. 56 res., as Beilage a letter from the Vice-Consulate of Rhodes, 8 April 1881 in ibid.; T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 378. 58Creneville to Haymerle, Salonica, 16 April 1881, No. 59, a copy of the translation in German of the proclamation is included, HHStA, PA xn/263, Tiirkei vm B; Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 22 April 1881, Beilage, ibid. 59Dervish Pasha operated against the League with thirty-one bat­ talions. Cf. Calice to Haymerle, Constantinople, 19 April 1881, No. 27C, ibid. 60Cf. T. Ippen, o p .cit., p. 379.

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY

105

who had participated in the movement of the League. In­ stead he followed a policy of exhortation. He summoned the chiefs to Prizren and endeavored to persuade them that they had erred, asking them to renounce the idea of autonomy and to remain faithful to the Sultan.61 One of the prominent members of that League, Hasan Pasha from Kalkandelen, was made mutesarrif of the city; Ali Pasha of Gusinj was promised that Ipek would be elevated to the see of a mute­ sarrif—and so it happened.62 At the same time the marshal did not refrain from promising the Albanians that they would obtain special privileges which would preserve their national existence, that their recruits would remain in their own country to protect it and that the officers serving there would be of Albanian origin up to the rank of colonel.63 But he took every possible step to seize Abdul Frasheri, the principal promoter of the idea of union, who had fled from Prizren to the coast. He even put up a reward for his arrest. Abdul Frasheri was captured, toward the end of April 1881, in the neighborhood of Elbasan, when he was about to cross the river Shkumbi. He intended to leave for England. He was brought to Dervish Pasha in Prizren, where he was kept under heavy guard. The arrest of Abdul Frasheri produced a depressive effect over all Albania, and there are several reports of Austrian consular representatives about it, re­ ferring sometimes to Abdul Frasheri as "der Toska" (the southerner).64 From Prizren he was taken to Istanbul and sentenced to life imprisonment. After five years of detention in Balikesir, in Asia Minor, he was released, and died in the Turkish capital in 1894. Two other leaders of the League, 6 1 Ibidem. 62Creneville to Haymerle, Salonica, 30 April 1881, No. 67, HHStA, PA xii/263, Tiirkei VIII B; Schmucker to Haymerle, Prizren, 20 Septem­ ber 1881, No. 177 and 7 October 1881, No. 198, ibid. esCreneville to Haymerle, Salonica, 30 April 1881, No. 67, ibid. 64Cf. for arrest and imprisonment, Lippich to Haymerle, Scutari, 30 April 1881, No. 59, and 7 May 1881, No. 63; Waldhart to Haymerle, tjskub, 5 May 1881, No. 67/res.; Greneville to Haymerle, Salonica, 8 May 1881, No. 72—all in ibid.

106

I. THE GROUNDWORK

its president, Hadji Ymer Effendi, and the miiderris (pro­ fessor of theology) of Kalkandelen, Rauf Effendi, escaped. By order of Dervish Pasha, their families were deported to Salonica.65 On May 5, 1881 the city of Gjakove was occupied by Der­ vish Pasha's armies.8® The fis-es of the mountains had in prin­ ciple submitted to him and had promised to fulfill part of his requests, insofar as they were compatible with their ancient rights and privileges.67 In Prizren and its surroundings spirits were very low. The exaction of taxes, the venality of Dervish Turgut Pasha, the high cost of living, and the restriction of former freedoms had caused deep discontent among the population. They looked forward to the marshal's departure which they re­ garded as liberation from oppression.68 The mood of all the other northeastern Albanians was no different. The faith in the capacity of the Porte to hold the possessions which re­ mained in Europe or give Albania the necessary security against her enemies had vanished.69 Although Assim Pasha could say to Calice, the Austrian ambassador in Istanbul, that Dervish Pasha had completely broken the influence of the League and had restored Turkish authority in the whole of Albania,70 the Porte itself was doubtful about the durabil­ ity of his "pacification." It wanted to bring to Istanbul as sort of hostages the sons of the most prominent Albanian chiefs, bestowing upon them the title of Guard of Honor of the Sultan. Dervish Pasha asked for one hundred "volunteers" from Prizren and another hundred from Gjakove for the palace service of the Sultan.71 e5Lippich to Haymerle, Scutari, 20 May 1881, No. 67, and 28 May 1881, No. 71, ibid.; Waldhart to Haymerle, liskiib, 5 May 1881, No. 67/res., ibid. eeT. Ippen, op.cit., p. 379. e7Schmucker to Haymerle, Prizren, 20 September 1881, No. 177, HHStA, PA xn/263, Tiirkei vm B. m Ibid. eeLippich to Haymerle, Scutari, 24 June 1881, No. 79, ibid. 70Calice to Haymerle, Buyukdere, 19 July 1881, No. 53G, ibid. 71Schmucker to Haymerle, Dskiib, 9 June 1881, No. 97, ibid.

ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY

107

In September 1881 the marshal proceeded through Lume to Diber in order to introduce his reforms, which were called tslahat-s (improvements). He had to make certain concessions in order to achieve the desired appeasement. Pressure could be used only in the plains and the towns; the mountains held fast to the status quo ante. Upon Dervish Pasha's order, nota­ bles of Diber and Prishtine were arrested and exiled to Istan­ bul.72 From Diber the marshal returned to the Turkish capital, where he was held in esteem as an authority on Albania and was consulted on all questions about the country.73 When Istanbul sent Dervish Pasha to northeastern Albania, it also considered how to destroy the southern branch of the League. It gave orders to the Governor General of Janina, Mustafa Assim Pasha, to divide the Albanians. Spreading the news that Janina was saved, the Governor General won over some of the notables. Using the same policy as Dervish Pasha, with whom he was in touch, he had Mehmed Ali Bey Vrioni, one of the pillars of the League, appointed mutesarrif of Berat, and Neki Pasha Libohova to the corresponding posi­ tion in Gjirokaster. In May 1881 he invited several of the main leaders—Mustafa Nuri Pasha from Vlore, Ymer Bey Vrioni from Berat, Sulejman Bey Dino from Margarit, Mustafa Bey from Janina, as well as Kiazim Bey from Preveza —to meet him in Preveza, where he had them arrested and deported to the Dardanelles. There they remained until No­ vember 1883.74 Thus the southern branch of the Albanian League, too, was destroyed. It was natural that the struggle for the unification of the Albanian provinces into one vilayet with administrative au­ tonomy should begin in the south. Here the population was 72Cf. Schmucker to Haymerle, Prizren, 9 October 1881, No. 200; Schmucker to Killay, Prizren, 9 November 1881, No. 220 and 20 Novem­ ber 1881, No. 221, ibid. 73T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 380. 74Wiet to Saint-Hilaire Janina, 3 June 1881, No. 42, AMAE, Turquie, j Correspondanee politique des consuls, Janina, 1881-1884, Vol. χι; M. Frasheri, op.cit., p. 58; T. Ippen, op.cit., p. 380.

108

I. THE GROUNDWORK

more advanced and the leaders more aware of the imminent collapse of Turkey. Still the movement had its ups and downs, depending on the extent of fear of Greek invasion and the influence of the feudal beys. In the north, the idea of an autonomous Albania spread later. The population there was more backward and the need to defend Albanian territory more urgent. However, once the moment came to ask for the application for autonomy, it was the north that took action. The northerners had enjoyed certain local autonomies and resented the centralistic policy of the Porte more than the southerners, who had already made certain accommodations to it. While in the south the movement of the League was primarily Moslem—most of the Orthodox Christians being under Greek influence—in the north both Moslems and Catholics had made common cause. The north was in a better position to ask for autonomy and oppose Turkey with arms. This opposition and the demand for autonomy—armed or unarmed—was an affirmation of Albanian national aspira­ tions. The Albanians called the League Milet, the "nation." For them the League was not a mere political party which wielded power, but rather a movement of the whole nation, though its organization was loose. Turkey destroyed the League, but could not destroy the spirit it created. The program for au­ tonomy, which embodied Albanian political thinking, con­ tinued to influence the generations to come.

P A R T II

The Struggle for National Affirmation (1881-1908)

Cultural Affirmation THE NATIONAL SPIRIT aroused by the Albanian League con­

tinued to grow. Albanian patriots now turned their attention from the preservation of national territory to the preserva­ tion and development of national culture. Among Albania's Balkan neighbors, religion and nationality coincided. Since this was not true for the Albanians, their leaders tried to develop those aspects of national culture which were of a non-religious nature, for only in this way could union be achieved. Consequently, emphasis was placed on the com­ mon language, which could serve as a link among the various regional and religious groups. We do not possess many documents written in Albanian in the distant past. The first reference to Albanian writing dates from 1332, when a Dominican friar, Brochart, presented to Philippe de Valois, king of France, a report in which he spoke about his experiences in the various countries he had visited, in order to induce the king to undertake a crusade. Referring to the Albanians of the north, he wrote: ". . . al­ though the Albanians have a language quite different from that of the Latins, they use the Latin letters in all their books." 1 The first records, however, date from the fifteenth century. They are a baptismal formula in the Roman Cath111Advis

directifs pour faire passage d'outre-mer," par Ie fr£re Brochart, in Documents pour servir ά I'histoire des provinces de Namur, de Hainaut et de Luxembourg, Brussels, 1846, iv, 294. The Latin original, Directorium ad passagium faciendum, is now attributed to the southern Frenchman and Dominican Guillelmus Adae, archbishop of Antivari, and friar Brocardus has become pseudo-Brocardus; cf. G. Schir6, Jr., Storia della letteratura albanese, Milan, 1951, p. 10. However, this fact does not diminish the significance of the passage; on the contrary, it increases it, for the Albanian Catholic dioceses of the north depended on the Archbishopric of Antivari, with which they joined, in the first half of the fourteenth century, in the fight against Slavic Orthodoxy; cf. M. SuflSay1 "Die Kirchenzustande im vorturkischen Albanien. Die orthodoxe Durchbruchszone im katholischen Damme," Illyrischalbanische Forschungen11, 201 and 214.

112

II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

olic rite from 1462, written in Latin script,2 and a fragment of the New Testament, accompanied by an Eastern chant of the Orthodox rite, written with Greek letters and antedating the former record by perhaps half a century, or longer accord­ ing to some scholars.3 These documents testify to the two cultural influences which prevailed in Albania before her conquest by the Turks: Latin-Catholic to the north of the Shkumbi river, Greek-Orthodox to the south of it. Some writings in Albanian appeared during the first four and a half centuries of Turkish domination. A few of them were lexical and the rest ecclesiastical in nature. These writings were more numerous in the north, where the Cath­ olic clergy, using the mother tongue, tried to edify their fol­ lowers so that they would not succumb to conversion to Islam. Pjeter Budi in his Christian Doctrine (1618) en­ deavored to stimulate the cultivation of the Albanian lan­ guage; he taught that God did not hear him who prayed in a foreign language and repeated words he did not understand.4 The writings from the Orthodox south are of a much later period, from the 18th and 19th centuries, but similar in character to those of the north. Archpriest Theodore Kavalioti and master Dhanil from Voskopoje (Moskhopolis) left two polyglot dictionaries, while Grigor Argjirokastriti (from Gjirokaster), Orthodox bishop of the Greek island of Eubea, supervised the translation of the gospels into Albanian, pub­ lished in 1827 at Corfu.5 Although the works in the Orthodox 2The manuscript, which is preserved in the Laurential Library of Florence, was first published by N. Jorga, Notes et extraits pour servir a I'histoire des croisades au XVe siecle, 4° sirie (1453-1476), Bucharest, 1915, pp. 194-198. 3See text of the original, which is housed in the Ambrosian Library of Milan, in N. Borgia, Pericope evangelica in lingua albanese del secolo XIV da un manoscritto greco della Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Grottaferata, 1930, p. 26. 4Cf. G. Schiri), "Delia lingua albanese e della sua letteratura anche in rapporto alle colonie albanesi d'ltalia," Studi Albanesi, 11 (1932), 105. 5Cf. F. Konitza, "Mimoire sur Ie mouvement national albanais," Brussels, January 1899, in HHStA, PA xiv/18, Albanien xn/2, p. 1; E. (Jabej, Elemente te gjuhesise e te literatures shqipe (Elements of Albanian Linguistics and Literature), Tirana, 1936, p. 32.

CULTtTRAL AFFIRMATION

113

south were not always devoid o£ hellenizing tendencies, the use of the vernacular in them helped to keep alive the feeling of national individuality. As for the Albanian Moslems, there are only some manuscripts in Arabic script dating from the eighteenth century on, dealing with subjects which are re­ ligious and worldly in inspiration, but influenced by Oriental culture.6 Religion also characterized most of the works of this period written in the Albanian language by the ItaloAlbanians.7 To the Albanian patriots such monuments, lexical and ecclesiastical, had the primary merit of testifying to the an­ tiquity of the Albanian people and their language. This antiquity, an important factor in building up the national pride of a people, was revealed more effectively from another side: the works of foreign scholars. The German philosopher G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716) was the first to refer to the Albanian language, but his knowledge consisted of only a few words, which did not enable him to express an opinion about the origin of the Albanian people.8 The interest really began with J. Thunmann's Untersuchungen iiber die Gesehichte der oestlichen europaischen Volker (1774), in which he maintained that the Thracians had a share in the formation of the Albanian people. Apart from F.C.H.L. Pouqueville, French Consul in Janina, who in his Voyage dans la Grece (1820/1821) included a small Albanian vocabulary and some grammatical observations on the lan­ guage, and W. M. Leake's Researches in Greece (1814), which contained an Albanian-Greek-English vocabulary and an Albanian grammar, the scholar who drew the attention of the learned world to the Albanian language and the prob­ lem of the origin of the Albanians was J. Xylander with his eThe most extensive treatment of Moslem Albanian literature in Arabic letters is contained in D. S. Shuteriqi and others, eds., Historia e letersise shqipe (The History of Albanian Literature), Tirana, 1959, 1,

249-301. 7Concerning their literature, see ibid,., pp. 196-201, 325-349; G. Schiri), Jr., op.cit., pp. 101-110. 8See the passages in Leibniz, referring to Albanian, in "L'opinion de Leibniz sur la langue albanaise," Albania, 1 (1897-1898), 41-43.

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II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

Die Sprache der Albanesen oder Schkipetaren (1835). It was the time of comparative philology, and interest in Albanian grew. Xylander was followed by J. G. v. Hahn, Austrian Consul in Janina, considered the father of Albanology, who published Albanesische Studien (1853/1854), comprising his­ torical notes, a description of Albania and the customs of her population, a grammar, a quite rich folklore, and a vocab­ ulary. The German physician of the Greek navy, C.H.T. Rheinhold, published Noctes Pelasgieae (Athens, 1855), a collection of folk songs from the Greco-Albanian sailors of the islands of Poros and Hydra. It is interesting to note that one of his studies bears the title Pelasgika, Dialektos tou stolou (Pelasgic [meaning Albanian], Dialect of the Fleet). But it was F. Bopp who first affirmed in his Vber das Albanesisehe in seinen verwandtschaftliehen Beziehungen (1854) that Albanian occupied an independent place within the Indo-European family of languages. Indeed, the origin of a people is closely connected with the origin of their language, and an independent language means also a separate and in­ dividual people. Deeper studies of the Albanian language were made in the last quarter of the nineteenth century—when more material in the Albanian language became available. G. Meyer (18501900) of the University of Graz, who during the period 1880 to 1896 produced such significant works as Albanesische Studien, Albanesisehe Grammatik, Etymologisches Worterbueh der albanesisehen Spraehe, held that Albanian was a dialect of ancient Illyrian. It was he who demolished the theory of A. Schleicher (1821-1868) about the Pelasgian origin of Albanian. According to this theory, the old IndoEuropean languages such as Greek, Latin, Illyrian—and connected with the latter Albanian—had their origin in the language of the ancient inhabitants of the Balkan peninsula and the Mediterranean basin, that is, the language of the Pelasgians.9 It thus placed Albanian in an especially close 9The

Pelasgians are often mentioned by the Greek writers, but the conceptions the Greeks associated with this name were rather indefinite.

CLTLTinElAL AFFIRMATION

115

relationship with Greek. The writers of the Albanian revival on both sides of the Adriatic embraced this theory, which showed the antiquity of the Albanians and employed it as an argument in the struggle for the defense of Albanian rights. The Greek propagandists, on the other hand, used it in order to attract the Albanians to their side. G. Meyer was followed by other eminent philologists, some of whom held different views from his, for example, that Albanian stemmed from Thracian.10 However much the various scholars differed in their views about the origin of the Albanian language, their works revealed one significant fact: the Albanians were de­ scendants of a great and ancient Indo-European people in the Balkans who had various names at the dawn of history. Influenced by the interest of foreign scholars in the Albanian language and people and by romanticism in the first half of the nineteenth century, a number of Italo-Albanian intellectuals began to write about Albanian history, language, and folklore. In 1848 Vincenzo Dorsa published Dagli Albanesi, ricerche e pensieri, which he dedicated to "my nation divided and dis­ persed but one." However, it was not until the latter half of the nineteenth century that an Albanian literature with national­ istic tendencies emerged. It could not and did not originate inAlbania proper, where Turkish occupation had transformed the religious picture. An Albanian literature of nationalistic character, however, did appear in Italy. Living in separate communities and preserving a liturgy that was Orthodox, the Italo-Albanians had maintained the language, customs, and traditions of their fatherland. Since some of them were deThe name was given to several peoples who inhabited or had inhabited Greece and her immediate neighborhood. To judge by these facts, writes the Danish philologist, H. Pedersen, Pelasgian was not an Indo-European language. See H. Pedersen, Linguistic Science in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge, Mass., 1931, p. 11, note. 10See for linguistic information, E. , who advocated revolution to speed up the independence of Albania.23 He believed in 1896-1897 that the moment had arrived for a general revolt and had talked the matter over with several friends and patriots who were willing to collaborate in helping it to break out. He appeared to have been encouraged also by the sympathy which almost the whole disinterested European press had manifested toward the Albanian people, which raised his hopes that pub­ lic opinion would influence European diplomacy to inter­ vene in favor of the revolution. Schiri) rejected the idea of those Albanians or Italo-Albanians who thought that Turkey would feel it necessary to accord independence to the Alba­ nian nation in order to have Albanian support in the difficult days to come. He also considered naive those who believed that a people could achieve a free life "by begging for conces­ sions." The only road to salvation, according to Schiri), was to take up arms against the Turks as soon as the other nation­ alities under them revolted. For the Albanians, who had been employed by Turkey in the repression of insurrections, would run the risk of being dragged down with her to the ruin which was imminent.24 It was at that time (1897) that Schir6 pub­ lished his Battle Songs, in which he called the Albanians to 21"Memoria—U movimento albanese in Italia," ACS, Carte Giolitti, Busta 2, Fasc. 27, hereafter cited as Memoria Giolitti. 22Cf. ibid. 28G. Schiri), Gli Albanesi e la questione balkanica, Naples, 1904, p. 106; A. Lorecchio, op.cit., p. 71. 24G. Schiri), op.cit., p. 107.

ITALO-ALBANIAN CONTRIBUTION

223

arms against Turkey for the liberation of their country.25 His following was small, as his train of thought did not fully take into account the desires of the Albanian people.26 De Rada, whose policy was to side with Turkey against the common enemies,27 did not approve of the partial insurrec­ tions which were taking place in Albania. He disapproved of them especially when he believed that they were due to for­ eign influences: "We cannot still say consciously whether the moment has come to take up arms, or whether our brothers are determined to do so, owing to instigations of the foreign­ ers who surround them. We only know that the swords have been drawn out in defense of justice." After considering the claims of the Albanians as just, De Rada added: "We would like this to be the hour in which the Ottoman Porte, sur­ rounded by so many enemies who hate it, would spare the blood and grant to the unfortunate Albanians, who have not yet abandoned it, what it promised in Berlin, that is, the autonomy of their own homes, rejoiced by the return of their chiefs. Gratifying them thus, it will dissipate the greedy for­ eign plots." 28 What De Rata regarded as foreigners were pri­ marily the Greeks and the Slavs, against whose intentions he warned his compatriots again at a later date.29 A. Lorecchio was an even stronger exponent of this ap­ proach. He considered the Ottoman empire "a temporary po­ litical formula" and its right to territorial integrity dependent on the designs of Austria-Hungary and Russia.30 He advocated reforms and autonomy. This trend of thought, which did not run contrary to Italian official policy, had many adherents. 25See G. Schiri), Kenkat e luftes (I canti della battaglia), con note e osservazioni sulla questione d'Oriente, Palermo, 1897. 26See Relazione del conte Donato Sanminiatelli nel XI congresso della "Dante Alighieri" in Verona (26-28 settembre 1907), ACSj Carte PisaniDossi (1866-1907), No. carte 671, No. Fasc. 40, No. Busta 14. 27"I1 testamento politico di Girolame De Rada," Shijzat (Le Pleiadi), Rome, VIIi (1964), 181-182. 28G. Schird, op.cit., p. 76. 29"Testamento politico di Girolamo De Rada," op.cit., p. 183. 80A. Lorecchio, op.cit., p. 5.

224

II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

It was Lorecchio, more experienced in political questions and possessing a better knowledge of the situation in Albania, who criticized G. Schiro's proposal for a revolution and called it "a mere parricide." He argued: "Either the revolution will be victorious (and do you believe that the Albanians are in a condition to constitute an independent state?), and then the consequences are evident. Or the revolution will be re­ pressed, and suffocated, and in such a case it is still worse." Apart from the blood that would be shed, Lorecchio feared that European diplomacy, with the excuse that peace was con­ tinuously disturbed and Turkey was impotent, would inter­ fere and entrust certain powers with the role of gendarmes. The consequences would be the division of Albania among Austria, Greece, and the Slavs, and the loss of the Albanian language and nationality. He then outlined what seemed to him to be the best line of conduct under the circumstances. They should ask for those reforms and internal regulations which would enable Albania to be in a position to have rela­ tions with the civilized world. They should continuously call for the assistance of Italy and the other powers to reach that end. They should assert that they did not want their nationality to be affected in any way, and when "we Albanians of Italy will succeed in having relations with our brothers on the other side of the Adriatic, escaping the arrogant vigi­ lance of the Austrian ports, then only we will be able to combat with equal arms the Greek, Slavic, and Austrian influ­ ences, as well as those of the Propaganda Fide, which go hand in hand with the latter." 31 In order to achieve the reforms for the unification of Al­ banian lands, Lorecchio continued to raise his voice for the revision of the treaty of Berlin, along the lines proposed by Lord Fitzmaurice at the Conference of Istanbul in 1880.32 He maintained that the revision of that treaty was a necessity 81Letter of A. Lorecchio to G. Schir6, 24 September 1896, in G. Schir6, op.cit., pp. 106-107. 32Cf. A. Lorecchio, op.cit., pp. 10, 31.

ITALO-ALBANIAN CONTRIBUTION

225

imposed not only on the Albanians but also on the Italians.33 Taking into account Italy's interests in the Adriatic, he pro­ posed an action on her part in favor of the Albanian nation­ ality. She should champion at least the constitution of the administrative autonomy of Albania, in the same manner as other powers had done with the autonomy or independence of other Balkan nationalities.34 It may be said that, whereas Lorecchio was the representa­ tive of the moderate party, Schird) was the representative of the party of action. A Committee of Action, composed mostly of young men, was formed in the beginning of this century. Its motivating forces was not Schiro but Manlio Bennici, a young publicist. The directing mind seemed to be his father, Professor Giuseppe Bennici, a man of much experience and learning, still ardent in spirit and daring in his conceptions.35 The members of this committee came in touch with the re­ publican and the irredentist movement in Italy, which in 1902 had suddenly gained a new impetus.36 The Committee of Action had already established contacts with General Ricciotti Garibaldi, the son of the Italian revo­ lutionary hero, who followed the tradition of his father. The Italo-Albanians had participated in the landing of the Mille at Marsala, and Giuseppe Garibaldi had an affection for the Albanians. In 1864 he wrote to Dora d'Istria that the cause of the Albanians was his; that he certainly would be very glad to use what remained of his life for the advantage of that "valiant people. European diplomacy, which weighs upon the Oriental Question, does not want insurrection; but if this is successful, the diplomacy will accept not only the accom­ plished facts, but under the pressure of the universal opinion of the Christians, it will even be obliged to favor them." 37 33 Ibid.,

p. 31· p. 37. 3i Memoria Giolitti. 36Cf. G. Salvemini, La politica estera dell'Italia del 1871 al 1915, Florence, 1950, 2nd edn., pp. 144-146. 87See text in G. Schir6, op.cit., p. 236. si Ibid.,

226

Π. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

In 1900, when revolts broke out in Albania, Ricciotti Gari­ baldi was looking forward to an expedition to that country, and funds were being raised for that purpose.38 Later the relations of some of the Italo-Albanians with the General became closer. With letters from him, Manlio Bennici went early in 1903 to Milan, where he had various discussions about the Albanian question with leaders of the republican party.89 The republican center of Milan, which represented the most active continuation of the Mazzinian traditions, took advantage of the Albanian question and not only made an agitation against Austria and the Triple Alliance, but also used it as a means to carry back the republican initiative to the precedents of Mazzini and Garibaldi. Their idea was: "Let us show that we know how to put ourselves at the van­ guard. . . . Let us show that we are capable of action and sacrifice even if it [the government], scared or servile, aban­ doned the cause of civilization." 40 It was the idea of fare at any cost. The possibility of an Italo-Albanian expedition to Albania was tackled in the leading action section of Milan. If the resistance of the Albanian vilayets against the Turks continued and expanded, as seemed likely, one could foresee an expedition of Calabro-Sicilian Albanians to help their brothers. For this eventuality studies were made, as a result of which the port of Vlore and the gulf of Salonica were given up, as too conspicuous for landing, and the choice fell on the ports of Sarande, Gumenice, and Preveza, in southern Albania. If Austria then were to descend to Durres or Salonica, or any other place, it would be possible to foment, through the anti-Austrian groups active in Italy, a revolt in one or two points of the Austro-Italian frontier, and even a move88See il Direttore Generale della Pubblica Sicurezza, Leonardi, to Visconti Venosta, Rome, 26 May igoo, L. Riservata 6904, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. HI, No. 405; il Sotto secretario agli Affari Esteri, Fusinato, al Presidente del Consiglio e Ministrο dell'Intern0, Pelloux, Rome, 2 June 1900, N. 225291323, ibid., No. 408. s a Memoria Giolitti. i a Ibid.

ITALOALBANIAN CONTRIBUTION

227

ment aimed at an uprising in Trieste.41 Thus the Albanian question was connected, through the Italo-Albanians, with the question of Italian irredentism. The project for an immediate campaign in Albania arose in April 1903. At that time the situation in Macedonia had become very grave. The overtures, which already existed with Ricciotti Garibaldi, came closer to action. The General ac­ cepted the leadership of the expedition under the following conditions: (1) that a thousand Albanians of Italy be given to him with the necessary provisions and that the means for the embarcation of the expedition be reinforced; (2) that an agreement be guaranteed with the Albanians of Epirus; (3) that measures be taken to make possible the embarcation of the expedition without trouble from external or internal au­ thorities.42 A few days later, General Garibaldi was informed that the conditions were going to be met,43 but the expedition did not materialize. The reason is obscure. Apparently, the organiza­ tion of the forces was not adequate and the international sit­ uation was not propitious. Nevertheless, the project was not abandoned. In 1904, General Garibaldi, in the capacity of delegate of the Federation Pro Italia Irredenta, took the initiative in organizing the Albanian movement in Italy. He invited the most distinguished personalities of the Albanian colonies in that country to form a Consiglio Albanese in Rome. Among those who responded to his initiative were persons like the lawyer Gennaro Luis, editor of Nuova Albania; Prof. Michele Marchiani»; Francesco Musacchia, president of the Albanian Association of Sicily; Dr. Agostino Ribecco, president of the Albanian Committee of Spezzano; General Domenico Damis; Colonel Giuseppe Sgri>; and some fifteen others. Not all of them attended the meeting held on March 24, 1904 in his home in Rome, which drew up the constitution of the Consiglio Albanese d'ltalia, with Ricciotti Garibaldi as its presi­ dent. The program of the Council was "Albania for the Ali l Ibid.

i2 Ibid..

t s Ibid.

228

II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

banians," and its aim was an organization of the Albanians of Italy, to work with the Albanian societies abroad, to estab­ lish closer relations with the Albanians of the mother coun­ try, and to ask that Italy support the aspirations of the Albanian people. General Garibaldi received the mandate to carry out what had been resolved.44 Other meetings were held and the real objectives of the Consiglio Albanese d'ltalia became clearer. It was felt that the organization of the Italo-Albanians must be ready for any eventuality, because the equilibrium in the Balkans might at any moment be upset. Local sub-committees were formed to look after the creation of volunteer troops, ready to take up arms at the first call, and to open subscriptions for collec­ tion of funds. The revolutionary Manlio Bennici was chosen as Secretary General of the Council.45 In San Paolo, in Argentina, a Pro Patria committee of Italo-Albanians was formed, connected with that of Naples. It promised that the Italo-Albanians of South America would send money and men for a program whose goal was to recon­ stitute the Albanians into a nation, without any protectorate, even Italian. The Pro Patria committee also claimed that it was in touch with the Albanians of North America.46 The San Paolo committee indicates how far the Italo-Albanian movement had expanded and how strongly it influenced the sentiments of its partisans. The Italo-Albanians were active not only among their own people. They tried to establish links with the Albanian col44Cf.

Communicato N . i , La delagazione della Federazione Nazionale Popolare "Pro Italia Irredenta," comunica: Il Consiglio Albanese d'ltalia, Roma 1904; "Mimoire uber Albanien (Ende 1907 bis Anfang 1905)," p. 12, HHStA, PA xiv/28, Albanien xx/3. 45Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ASMAE, No. 15156 Rome, 18 July 1904; also speech by Conte Luigi Gaetani di Laurenzana delivered on 14 May 1904, in the Italian Parliament, in Kral to Goluchowski, Monastir, 15 July 1904, No. 57, Beilage, HHStA, PA xiv/25, Albanien xix/i. 46Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 18 July 1904, No. 15156, and 27 July 1904, No. 15557, ASMAE.

ITALO-ALBANIAN CONTRIBUTION

229

onies abroad and exert influence on the inhabitants of Al­ bania proper. They propagandized about the Albanian ques­ tion with newspaper articles, speeches by their followers, and letters. Advancing a vague prospect of great events and advan­ tages for the Albanian people, they won many adherents among the Catholics of Shkoder.47 La Nazione Albanese, with its articles on Balkan politics and the creation of an Albanian nation, increased the circle of its readers in the towns of the north. It was read not only in Shkoder, but also in Durres and partly in Elbasan and Kavaje.48 A. Lorecchio was active in recruiting Albanians for new political publications. The first was Mehmed Frasheri, a southern Albanian of Young Turk convictions, who, in 1889, in Rome, helped him publish The Voice of Albania. It was written in Albanian, French, and Turkish, but it soon ceased publication, because of disagreement in policy between Lorecchio and Mehmed Frasheri.49 In June 1904, Lorecchio, together with Don Gasper Jakova Merturi, an ex-Jesuit from northern Albania, began to issue the daily Agenzia Balcanica ed Italianai a bulletin of political, financial, and commercial information, written in Italian. "The aim," as stated in the publication, "was to enlighten the European public opinion on the rights, the exigencies, and the necessary reforms for the five vilayets of Shkoder, Janina, Monastir, Oskub, and Salonica." 50 On September 15, 1904 Don Gasper Jakova Mer­ turi published in Rome a fortnightly, The Herald of Albania. It was written mostly in Italian, and its program was unity and independence, without saying how they could be at­ tained.51 47Ippen

to Goluchowski, Scutari, 10 November 1898, No. 45A, H H S t A , PA xn/303, Tiirkei xxx, 1898. 48Cf. Kwiatkowski to Goluchowski, Scutari, 17 September 1904, No. 108, HHStA, PA xiv/16, Albanien xn/i. 49Petrovich to Goluchowski, Valona, 11 February 1900, No. 5/res., HHStA, PA xiv/16, Albanien xii/1-7. 60See notes in the file on Albanian publications 1897-1913, H H S t A , PA xiv/16, Albanien xn/1-7. n Ibid.

230

Π. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

Manlio Bennici had his own organ, the newspaper Corriere dei Balcani, the first issue of which appeared on March 20, 1906 in Rome. Its program was broader: promotion of a fed­ eration of the small Balkan countries as a bulwark against Pan-Germanism, which in Italy meant expansion of AustriaHungary. The newspaper was written in French and Italian, and contained a special section with the title Gazzetta Albanese;52 it pursued the program set forth by General Ricciotti Garibaldi. The Italo-Albanian leaders made efforts to concentrate the Albanian publication movement in Italy. They came in touch with the various representatives of the Albanian press dis­ persed abroad, and proposed settlement in Italy to Shahin Kolonja, Kristo Luarasi, Nikolla Ivanaj, a journalist from Shkoder who published in Dubrovnik The Hope of Albania, and some Albanians who were active in Egypt. The offers made to the first two proposed not only the transfer of Drita of Sofia but also the transportation of the printing and pub­ lishing house Mbrothesia to Italy. It was suggested that Lua­ rasi establish in Frascati, near Rome, a sort of Albanian central printing house, where all the Albanian newspapers published in Italy, as well as other Albanian publications, would be printed.63 Such a project obviously stemmed from the political idea of bringing the Albanian publication move­ ment under the influence of the Italo-Albanians. As long as the movement of the Italo-Albanians was pri­ marily on a cultural plane, the Albanian national leaders welcomed it; when it became too active in politics, many of the Albanian leaders were not willing to collaborate. After the Italo-Albanian linguistic congress of 1895, Faik Konitza was among the first to express his congratulations on the foun­ dation of Society Nazionale Albanese to A. Lorecchio, who was then its vice-president. He wrote that it would help "to 52Kral to Goluchowski, Scutari, 20 April 1906, No. 33, H H S t A PA j xiv/16, Albanien xn/1-7. 58Kral to Goluchowski, Scutari, 29 January 1906, No. 15, H H S t A , PA xiv/16, Albanien xn/5.

ITALO-ALBANIAN CONTRIBUTION

231

diffuse not only the great idea," but also the taste for Albanian studies.54 However, when he later began to publish Albania, Faik became suspicious of the Italo-Albanian movement, and soon a polemic ensued between his organ and La Nazione Albanese. He wanted to deprive the Italo-Albanians of any right to be engaged actively in the fate of Albania, not so much because five centuries had separated them from the Albanians and their "blood had been mixed and their lan­ guage corrupted," as he put it, but mostly because of their quality as "Italian citizens." His target was Lorecchio, be­ cause of his concern about the union of the Albanians. In­ terpreting Lorecchio's union, Faik posed three ironical al­ ternatives: "i) Either the Albanians of Italy want to annex Calabria and Sicily to Albania; 2) or they want to annex Al­ bania to Calabria and Sicily; 3) or they want to rise and emi­ grate en masse to Albania." Unless one of these conditions were met, Faik maintained, there could not be any union. The Albanians would be glad to have intellectual relations with the Italo-Albanians but they should not engage in poli­ tics, or speak any more of union.55 When General Garibaldi made the declaration about the constitution of Consiglio Albanese d'ltalia Faik Konitza ques­ tioned whether an Italian patriot like Garibaldi could see the interest of Albania as it was seen by the Albanians them­ selves. In order to undermine the General's position on the Albanian question, Faik pointed out that in 1897 Ricciotti Garibaldi had taken part in the Greco-Turkish war in order to help the Greeks occupy southern Albania and in 1902 had proclaimed to the world that he was ready to go and assist Macedonia, which meant that he would lend a helping hand to the Slavs in order to subjugate half of Albania.®8 The case of Ismail Kemal was different. He was on good 54Faik Konitza to A. Lorecchio, Brussels, December 1896, in A. Lorecchio, op.cit., pp. Ixxx-lxxxi. 55 Albania, π (1898), 66-67. 6eilGaribaldi dhe Shqiptaret" (Garibaldi and the Albanians), Albania, IX (1904), 37.

232

II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

terms with the Italo-Albanians and, during the years of his exile, he visited them several times. He was always well re­ ceived, whether it was in Calabria or in Sicily, where he took part in meetings and banquets given in his honor. He also stood for friendly relations with Italy. While in London, Ismail had presented a memorandum to the King of Italy and his Prime Minister, Zanardelli. He requested them to include Albania among the Balkan countries being considered for the reforms of the Berlin treaty, to be carried out through an international diplomatic commission.57 His role must have been significant, especially during the talks with M. Bennici regarding Garibaldi's expedition to Albania. It was supposed that the choice of Malta as the embarcation point of the first thousand Italo-Albanians who would take part in the cam­ paign was a proposal made in agreement with Ismail.58 In 1907, when asked whether Italian policy was in conformity with the program of the Albanian people, Ismail Kemal did not hesitate to reply in the affirmative: "Precisely: and this has been revealed in the last acts of the Consulta which have dissipated the fears of those who until yesterday believed that its action signified wishes of conquest and propaganda in the Orient.59 Although not aggressive like Faik Konitza, Shahin Kolonja also was not inclined to cooperate with the Italo-Albanians. In announcing the formation of Consiglio Albanese d'ltalia, M. Bennici wrote to him that there were two enemies of lib­ erty and independence, "the dominating Turk and the invad­ ing Austrian." General Garibaldi, in abiding by the program, "Albania for the Albanians," would connect the Albanian movement with all the organizations in the Balkans in order to form a coalition against Austria, which attempted to occupy Macedonia and Albania. For Bennici, Austria was a worse s7 Memoria

Giolitti.

i8 Ibid. i9"La politica nei Balcani" (Una conversazione con Ismail Kemal Bey), La Tribuna, 27 July 1907.

ITALO-ALBANIAN CONTRIBUTION

233

enemy than the Turk, with whom it would be possible to come to an understanding the day "our national rights would be recognized and our territorial integrity affirmed, with a broad autonomy which would permit us to develop Albanian culture." 60 Shahin Kolonja was mistrustful of the Italo-Albanians; he considered all, except for G. Schir6, Italianized.61 The reluctance of the Albanians to collaborate with the Italo-Albanians was partly explained by Faik Konitza. They were Italian citizens and as such they could not go against the interest of Italy. However, not all citizens see the interest of their country alike. It is true that the Italo-Albanians re­ garded the interests of Albania as coinciding in the main with those of Italy: they wanted an autonomous or independent Albania, freed from any Austrian influence, and on friendly terms with Italy. On the other hand, the Italo-Albanians were not always in accord with the Italians or the Italian govern­ ment. The clergyman Gerardo Conforti, one of the principal Italo-Albanian leaders in Naples, confided to Mgr. Όοςΐ that the Italian authorities were suspicious of their activity.62 Lorecchio had stated openly that two basic principles guided the political endeavors of the Italo-Albanians. One was "Al­ bania for the Albanians," which coincided with Italian policy, and the other was that "the Adriatic was an Italian and Al­ banian sea"; to this the Italians would not subscribe, desiring the Adriatic an Italian sea.63 Later, in their cooperation with Italian irredentism, which was revived by the Albanian question, the Italo-Albanians were accused of creating trouble for the government. They did not shrink from the responsibility, considering irredenteoManlio

Bennici to Shahin Bey [Kolonja], Rome, 8 April 1904, in HHStA, PA xiv/16, Albanien xn/1-7; "Memoire liber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," p. 12. elKral to Goluchowski, Monastir, 17 May 1904, No. 41, H H S t A , PA xiv/16, Albanien xn/1-7. e2Ippen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 10 November 1898, No. 45A, H H S t A , PA xn/303, Turkei xxx, 1898. 83A. Lorecchio, op.cit., pp. 35-36, 61, 84.

234

Π. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

ism "as a subsidiary means to the development of the prin­ cipal thesis: Albania for the Albanians." 64 But there must have been other reasons which prevented Albanian cooperation with the Italo-Albanians. The Moslem Albanians, who were the majority in Albania, would view with suspicion and perhaps with resentment a national move­ ment whose leadership would be in the hands of Christians supported by a relatively great power, Italy. Moreover, the Orthodox Christians of the south would not be inclined to join a movement headed by Christians who recognized the Pope as their supreme spiritual chief. However, the most decisive reason should be sought in the rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Italy in Albania. Those Albanian leaders, like Faik Konitza and Shahin Kolonja, who had sided with Austro-Hungarian policy because they found it compatible with the interests of their country, could not conceivably work with a movement which opposed Austria-Hungary and favored Italy. The reverse would be the case for leaders like Ismail Kemal, who considered a friendly Italy beneficial to the interests of Albania and were suspicious of the aims of the Dual Monarchy. This accounts also for the split among the Catholics of Shkoder. Those who sided with Italy were favorable to a collaboration with the Italo-Albanians. Despite instances of friction, and even distrust, it would be unrealistic to think that there was no cooperation between the Italo-Albanians and the Italian government. They needed each other. Already in August 1897 A. Lorecchio wrote to Visconti Venosta, Minister of Foreign Affairs, that, in con­ formity with his promises, he had begun his efforts to find a way of giving a more vigorous impulse to the commercial rela­ tions in the Adriatic Sea between the Albanians in Italy and those of the mother country. He declared that the society he headed was at the disposal of the government, holding that only the Italo-Albanians were in a position, because of com­ mon blood and language with the Albanians on the other side of the Adriatic, to render useful services to the Italian comei Ibid., pp. 38-39.

ITALO-ALBANIAN CONTRIBUTION

235

merce in that sea.®5 Giulio Prinetti, Minister of Foreign Af­ fairs, although careful not to hurt the Triple Alliance, mani­ fested sympathy for the Italo-Albanian movement. He had several discussions with the revolutionary Manlio Bennici, when the latter was interested in a trip to southern Albania. He seems to have told him in 1902 that if Bennici brought him a document from some businessmen—even if this were fictitious—which indicated that he was travelling on business, he would secure for him all the consular protection he needed during his trip in Albania.66 On May 14, 1904, in the Italian Parliament, Count Luigi Gaetani di Laurenzana spoke ex­ tensively on the needs of Albania and Italian policy. Praising the Italo-Albanians, who had then formed the Consiglio Albanese d'ltalia, he proposed that they should have a fair representation of their own in the Italian Parliament; that Italy should make use of them in the Italian schools, posts and consulates in Albania; that instead of emigrating to America they could work in the lands of the Albanian land­ owners in Macedonia; and that an Albanian chair be insti­ tuted in the University of Rome.67 In short, the Italian deputy wanted the Italo-Albanians to serve as a link between Albania and Italy. While the Austrians, as members of the Triple Alliance, complained about the reports of the Italo-Albanian papers because they inspired in Albania a hatred for Austrians—and no doubt with the approval of the Italian consular representa­ tives in that country68—the Italo-Albanians protested against Italy's attitude toward the Albanian question. They pointed 65Il

Presidente della Societa Nazionale Albanese Lorecchio al Ministro degli Esteri, Visconti Venosta, L. P. Pallagorio (Catanzar0), 18 August 1897, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 11, No. 174. eeSee Memoria Giolitti. 87Cf. the text of the whole speech contained in an appeal "A gli Albanesi d'ltalia," by Ricciotti Garibaldi and included as Beilage in Kral to Goluchowski, Monastir, 15 July 1904, No. 57, HHStA, PA xiv/25, Albanien xix/i. 68Kral to Goluchowski, Scutari, 10 November 1898, No. 45A, H H S t A , PA xn/303, Tiirkei xxx, 1898.

236

II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

out that Italy was confronted with a dilemma: either to assist the development of Albanian political thought as manifested, and as it was in its essence, or to "put her soul at rest" and comply with the inevitable consequences of the treaty of Ber­ lin, continuing to represent before Russia and Austria-Hun­ gary the same old role.69 When the Austro-Russian note about reforms in Macedonia was delivered to Turkey in 1903, it was a proof for the Italo-Albanians that the Near Eastern Ques­ tion had entered a new phase, which ought to be studied on the basis of criteria different from those of the Congress of Berlin. It was held that for European diplomacy in 1878 the Albanians did not count, that it was as if they had vanished from the face of the earth, or had been absorbed by the Greeks and the Slavs. It was further maintained that the Balkan con­ flict then had no other cause or manifestation to the Euro­ peans but that of a contest between different and opposing faiths. The situation was different at the beginning of the twentieth century. The Albanian nationality had asserted it­ self, and in the Balkan peninsula there were not only Greeks and Slavs but also the Albanian people, who, although be­ longing to different faiths, were of the same nationality.70 Consequently, when the Miirzsteg reforms were proclaimed, the Italo-Albanians protested, because they divided Albania and excluded the vilayets of Janina and Shkoder from the area of reforms.71 Both Austrians and Italians were quick to acknowledge the development of the Italo-Albanian movement. L. von Chlumeckf, the expert of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy, wrote that at the outset the Italo-Albanians found little response and understanding for their intentions on the part of the Italians. The people who were at the head of the movement were not disappointed by the failure. They doubled their efforts to win over Italian public opinion, without abandoning their main aim: "to awaken the national consciousness in Albania 69Cf.

A. Lorecchio, op.cit., p. 31. pp. 2-4. 7 1 Ibid., pp. ig-20, 30. 7 0 Ibid.,

ITALO-ALBANIAN CONTRIBUTION

237

and to provide there for the introduction o£ their political program." 72 The Italians themselves were ready to admit that within five years the Italo-Albanian movement in Italy had made "tenacious propaganda with the press, with motions in the parliament, with meetings and conferences." 73 The activity of the Italo-Albanians, on the one hand, was a strong incentive to the Albanian national movement and, on the other, by mobilizing Italian public opinion and caus­ ing concern to Austria-Hungary, made the Albanian question better known in the world. It is only fair to say that the con­ tribution of the Italo-Albanians to the Albanian national movement was also politically substantial. 72L. v. Chlumeck')', "Die Italo-Albanesen und die Balkanpolitik," Oesterreichische Rundschau, ν (November 1905-January 1906), 332 and

334· 7 i Memoria Giolitti.

Albania's Importance to Austria-Hungary and Italy WHEN Austria was expelled from Germany in 1866, her in­ terests turned more and more to the Balkans, the only area where there was still a possibility of expansion. What form this expansion should take was a matter of much dispute, the military men for the most part supporting the idea of terri­ torial expansion.1 While the Russo-Turkish war was going on (1877), Γ. Lippich, the Austro-Hungarian consul in Shkoder, was asked by his Ministry to present a memorandum on Albania. The im­ portance of this country for the Orientpolitik of the Dual Monarchy was one of the main topics discussed in it. Considering the eventuality of the creation of new Slavic states, partially or totally sovereign, on the southeastern fron­ tiers of Austria-Hungary, Lippich was of the opinion that the Albanians and their territory could serve as a bastion against Slavic expansion. He limited his primary interest to northern and northeastern Albania. If the Albanians remained alone, he maintained, they would naturally be too weak to with­ stand the collision with Slavism. However, if they were part of a great power like Austria-Hungary, they could become valuable allies, "as they are not only a strong people, through and through anti-Slavic minded, but they also occupy a re­ gion which extends, on the one hand, up to the borders of the Serbian principality, and on the other, as far as the Bulgarian Morava." They would substantially restrict the Serbo-Bulgarian expansionist desires, and, in the hands of the Mon­ archy, they could acquire a position that would make it impossible for Russian-protected slavism to fight in the West­ ern Balkans which were within the sphere of interest of Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary could make use of the 1Cf. W. L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 18j 1-1890, New York, 1950, pp. 69-70.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND ITALY

239

Albanians and their country because the Catholics were on her side and the Moslems too were sympathetic to her, being convinced that Austria-Hungary's task was to frustrate Rus­ sia's plans in the peninsula and thus upholding the authority of the Sultan in the European provinces. In the event of oc­ cupation of Albania by the Monarchy, the Austro-Hungarian consul favored not a partial occupation of the coast or of northeastern Albania, but occupation of the whole northern part, for both the coast and the northeastern section had the same political, military, and commercial significance for Aus­ tria-Hungary. He also favored the idea of converting the northern Moslem Albanians to Catholicism so as to unite the country into a Catholic bloc opposing an Orthodox Slavic one.2 Lippich's desire to convert the Moslem Albanians in the north was wishful thinking. Although the tradition of conver­ sion was still strong among the Moslems of northern Albania and there were crypto-Christians in their midst, mass conver­ sions were not likely to occur. Count Greneville, Lippich's colleague in Salonica, was more realistic. He advised his Ministry in a memorandum four years later, after the collapse of the Albanian League, that if Austria-Hungary wanted to profit from the situation, a sine qua non was to assure the continuation of the Moslem faith. Having witnessed the ef­ forts of the eastern Albanians for autonomy and their battles against the Turks, he did not even hint at Austrian posses­ sion of the country. He did, however, suggest that the Dual Monarchy, having come closer to eastern Albania with the occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, should try to win the Al­ banians to her side. She should persuade them that AustriaHungary alone was in a position to secure for them political autonomy. Greneville concluded that "the friendship of a strong eastern Albania assures our plans regarding a Turkey about to come to an end, while an autonomous Albania is 2"Denkschrift iiber Albanien" von k. und k. Consul F. Lippich, Vienna, 20 June 1877, HHStA, PA xn/256, Tiirkei i-v.

240

Π. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

a powerful bulwark against extravagant desires of the Serbs and Bulgarians." 3 Events in the Balkans and the need of Italy, as a unified great power, to regain some of the ground she had lost in the Gulf of Venice and in all of the old mare nostrum naturally led her to formulate a policy toward Albania. Francesco Crispi was the initiator of this policy. In March 1880 he de­ clared in the Italian parliament: "By the treaty of Berlin Austria acquired with Bosnia and Hercegovina an invulner­ able frontier toward the Orient; and she should be satisfied. We, without envying the unjustly obtained possession, should desire and ask that she remain there, and that she does not call for anything more than the treaty grants her. We, in our interest and in accordance with the principles of our great revolution, should be the protectors and the friends of the small states in the Balkans." 4 Crispi had long been aware of the problem of the security of Italy, which was dependent on a settlement concerning the opposite shore. This, he thought, ought to be brought about, on the one hand, by raising Italy's prestige there and, on the other, by guaranteeing to Albania an autonomous re­ gime and territorial integrity," that much of territorial in­ tegrity which, without thwarting substantially legitimate exigencies and aspirations of the Balkan nationalities, would place Albania—in the framework of the Turkish empire or, eventually, as a state by herself—in condition to live and develop herself." 5 In 1881 France occupied Tunisia, and the national reac­ tion in Italy, which had been eying that North African coun­ try, was strong. France's occupation of Tunisia was Italy's primary motive for concluding an alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary, the so-called Triple Alliance of May 20, 3V.

Greneville, "Ostalbaniens Bedeutung," Vienna, 25 August 1881,

HHStA, PA xii/263, Turkei VIIIB. 4As

quoted in G. Salvemini, La politica estera di Francesco Crispi, Rome, 1919, p. 35. 5G. Volpe, "Formazione storica dell'Albania," Nuova Antologia, ccccvi (16 December 1939), 330.

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1882,® which aimed at protecting the signatories against France and against Russian expansion in the Balkans.7 During the negotiations of the pact, Vienna declared that it would not oppose an extension of Italian influence in the Mediterranean, provided Italy adhered strictly to the status quo in the Adriatic. Haymerle, the Foreign Minister of the Monarchy, told an agent of the Italian government in 1881 that Austria-Hungary had no intention of pushing forward to Salonica or into Albania.8 But she was not willing to admit Italy to the Balkans until the renewal of the Triple Alliance, some five years later, when she was compelled to yield because of Russia's dubious behavior as an ally (in the Three Em­ perors' Alliance) and because of pressure on the part of Germany.8 Yet Germany had reservations; Bismarck had ex­ pressed doubts as to the advisability of meeting the wishes of Italy, especially since "in view of Italy's well-known as­ pirations toward Albania," no faith could be placed in the sincerity of the promises she had given regarding the main­ tenance of the status quo in the Adriatic.10 When the Triple Alliance was renewed on February 20, 1887, it was accom­ panied by a separate Austro-Italian treaty, whereby the two parties pledged themselves to preserve the status quo in the Balkans, the coasts, and the Turkish islands in the Adriatic and the Aegean. If this were not possible, they would consult each other and agree as to the steps to be taken, according to the principle of "reciprocal compensation" for every terri­ torial or other advantage.11 Thus the monopoly of Austrian and Russian influence in the peninsula was broken. eCf. L. Salvatorelli, La Triplice Alleanza,, storia diplomatica, JS771912, Milan, 1939, pp. 11, 71; L. v. Chlumecky, Osterreich-Ungarn und Italien, Leipzig and Vienna, 1907, p. 6. 7A. F. Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914, Cambridge, Mass., 1921, 11, 33-34· 8See W. L. Langer, op.cit., p. 334. 9Cf. A. F. Pribram, op.cit., pp. 52®. 10Telegram from Szdchdnyi to Kdlnoky, 27 July 1886, as quoted in ibid., p. 47. 11See Art. I of the separate treaty in A. F. Pribram, op.cit., 1, 109, and

11, 77-78.

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Π. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

The renewal of the Triple Alliance did not dispel the mis­ trust which existed between Italy and Austria-Hungary. In fact, the points of friction multiplied with the recognition of Italy's right to a new role in the Balkans. At Crispi's re­ quest, the Italian ambassador in Belgrade, Galvagna, pre­ sented in 1890 a report on Albania, in which he expressed fears about the occupation of that country by the Dual Mon­ archy. IfAustriawere to become the mistress of Albania, wrote the ambassador, Italy should renounce for good predominance in the Adriatic, "which is her secular aspiration." It was of the greatest importance, therefore, to prevent such an event, "fatal as much to Italy's political interest as to her commerce." For the Italians, Galvagna continued, the task should be to paralyze the action of Austria-Hungary in Albania and to pre­ pare the field for an eventual Italian protectorate, which might be attained by initiating a simultaneous political and economic action.12 The Triple Alliance was renewed for another six years on May 6, 1891. The article on the Balkans of the separate Austro-Italian pact was included in the treaty.13 The pact was tacitly prolonged until June 28, 1902, when it was renewed a fourth time.14 It was during this period of renewals that the Albanian question became more important both for Italy and Austria-Hungary. In February 1897, while the Cretan war was going on, the Austro-Hungarian government took under study the future of the Ottoman empire. The reason for this, wrote Goluchowski to Calice in Istanbul, was the weakness of the Porte and the demands of the peoples of the European provinces of Turkey. Although the Monarchy regarded the preservation of the status quo of Turkey as the best foundation for the main­ tenance of peace, it could not neglect preparations for the time when internal disturbances would terminate Turkish 12Galvagana to Crispi, Belgrade, 24 November 1890, No. 414/229. ASMAE, Albania, rapporti politici, 1889-1890, Fascicolo 1493. "Cf. A. F. Pribram, op.cit., I, 155 and note 4 on the same page.

14 Ibid

., 11, 112, 132.

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domination in Europe and give rise to new state formations. The Monarchy was concerned above all that its position should not be jeopardized by changes in the vicinity of its frontiers. It would be dangerous if Serbia or Bulgaria ex­ tended their boundaries as far as the Adriatic, or if Italy, to the detriment of Austria-Hungary's maritime position and freedom of movement, occupied the eastern coast of the Adri­ atic, from which she could threaten Dalmatia and its hinter­ land. "From this point of view," Goluchowski argued, "present Albania is for us of extreme particular importance. Austria-Hungary has a vital interest that this land should not fall under a foreign influence, and as we don't intend our­ selves to occupy Albania, so we are decided to favor, in case of a breakdown of the Turkish empire, the creation of a sep­ arate, autonomous Albania, at all events under a foreign prince, yet under our own protectorate." 15 To prepare the way for such an eventuality in Albania, secret discussions took place in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna, attended also by Kallay, the common Minister of Finance of the Monarchy. The general points of view, which were communicated to Calice by Goluchowski, were as fol­ lows: (i) The constitution of our consular representation in Albania, with respect to occupation of offices, by persons capable of carrying out their important mission; (2) revision of our Church policy and of the manner of distribution of subsidies in Albania; (3) preparation for concerted action with Greece in that part of Albania which, as a consequence of its advanced hellenization, belongs to the Greek sphere of influence and might at some time fall to Greece. Though a program of policy, it was not definitive, for it depended to a certain extent on information to be obtained about the realities in Albania.16 Shortly thereafter, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Rome, Pasetti, paid a visit to the Italian Foreign Minister, 15Goluchowski to Calice, Vienna, 18 February 1897, Weisung No. 658, Geheim, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. l t Ibid.

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Visconti Venosta. He communicated to him orally that if the troubles in the Balkans—the Cretan war of 1897—spread as far as the Austrian borders and endangered them, his govern­ ment would reserve its liberty of action; but in that case it would take account of the engagements toward Italy, and would contact the cabinet of Rome, and it was convinced that Italy would in turn act likewise.17 The captivity of the responsible statesmen continued in Vienna. On April 19, 1897 the question of the future of the Ottoman empire was again discussed in a conference. This time the chief of staff Beck took part. They were all of the opinion that it was necessary to prevent any power from establishing itself on the eastern shores of the Adriatic. Then with a map before them they discussed and traced the future boundaries in the Balkans. Although tentative, their division of Balkan territory reveals the Austro-Hungarian thinking at the time. It was to distribute Ottoman territory among the Balkan states and create an independent Albania, but desig­ nate as desirable for Austria-Hungary the ports of Durres and Vlore.18 That similar conferences took place in the Ministry of For­ eign Affairs in Rome is doubtful. Italy had no common fron­ tiers with Turkish-ruled territory, and as an extra-Balkan country, could not be concerned as much as Austria-Hungary about the collapse of Ottoman rule in the Balkans. In fact, in the Cretan affair of 1897, Italy took a position contrary to that of her allies: she supported the autonomy of Crete and favored Greece.19 The policy of the Italian government was to support the principle of nationality in the event of a dis17Oral communication of the ambassador of Austria-Hungary in Rome, Pasetti, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Visconti Venosta, Rome, 1 March 1897, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 1, No. 379; see also the Italian ambassador in Vienna, Nigra, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Visconti Venosta, Vienna, 11 March 1897, confidential in ibid., No. 391. 18Cf. E. C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 19121913, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1938, pp. 167-168. 19Cf. L. Salvatorelli, op.cit., p. 223; A. F. Pribram, op.cit., pp. 115-116; L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., pp. 16-17.

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integration of Turkey, but its concern was primarily Albania, which it did not want to see in the hands of Austria-Hungary. The influential circles thought that the defense of Italy's "rights and interests" in Albania should be the axis of Italian policy.20 A memorandum on the Albanian question from this period shows how Italian intellectuals viewed Austria's political ac­ tivity. Addressed to Visconti Venosta, the memorandum was written by Professor Antonio Baldacci, a teacher of botany at the University of Bologna, who by 1897 had made eight study trips in Albania, from the Montenegrin boundaries to Preveza, and was regarded in Italy as an authority on Al­ bania.21 His memorandum stated that Austria-Hungary had been active from the confines of Bosnia as far south as the gulf of Ambracia, but more directly up to Vlore, which she held as an invulnerable key to the lower Adriatic. The Dual Monarchy had not lost time in infiltrating among the Serbs and Bulgarians, as well as among the Vlakhs and Greeks on both slopes of the Pindus mountains. Certainly, the location of Salonica necessitated the protection of the banks of the Vardar river, for the Macedonian chaos was inimical to the Habsburgs. Baldacci also maintained that Vienna's intentions were to replace Venice in the Adriatic and Ionian seas, and one day she would be able to plot against the unity of Italy: it would be easy for her to cross from the island of Sasseno to Puglia. Furthermore, if Austria-Hungary were successful in Albania, the future of Montenegro would be at stake. Bal­ dacci proposed that Italy's policy should be to compete with Austria-Hungary and to demonstrate that Italy could not remain disinterested in the fate of Albania, in case of a Turk­ ish breakdown. Italy should absolutely exclude any Austrian occupation of that country, Baldacci insisted, especially for reasons of national security; the Adraitic should be an Italian 20 Ibid.,

p. 20. A. Baldacci continued his interest in Albania, publishing a number of books, and in the i92o's he attained the reputation of being the foremost Italian authority on that country. 21Prof.

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sea. He suggested the establishment of a Montenegrin-Al­ banian principality, comprising only the northern part of Albania. As for Epirus, Baldacci considered it a question for study, but was inclined to regard it as an Italian protec­ torate.22 It is evident that already before the meeting of November 1897 at Monza between Goluchowski and Rudinx, the Italian Premier, accompanied by Visconti Venosta, the government of the Dual Monarchy had made up its mind on the policy to be followed with respect to Albania. The same was true about the Italian government. When Goluchowski told the Italian statesmen at Monza that the Austrian government had no thought of occupying Albania but was at the same time deter­ mined not to permit another power to set foot on Albanian soil, he found Visconti Venosta ready to assure him that Italy, too, had no intention of conquering Albania. The two parties then agreed that, if Turkey lost Macedonia, they would con­ stitute Albania either as a "privileged province" within the framework of the Turkish empire or would raise her to an independent principality.23 Lanza, the Italian ambassador in Berlin, who had read the report on the Monza conference which Goluchowski had sent to Szogyeny, his Austrian col­ league in the German capital, wrote that the most important point in it, stressed by Goluchowski himself, was Albania.24 22Baldacci to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Visconti Venosta, L. P., Bologna, 27 October 1897, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 11, No. 251. 23Aufzeichung iiber die Unterredungen des Grafen Goluchowski mit dem italienischen Ministerprasidenten Marchese di Rudinl und dem italienischen Minister des Aussern Marchese Visconti Venosta in Mailand und Monza, November 1897. Wiener Staatsarchiv, Geheim, xxx/39 (vi), as reproduced in E. Walters, "Austro-Russian Relations under Goluchowski, 1895-1906," Slavonic and East European Review, XXXII (1953). 191-192· 24Lanza to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Visconti Venosta, Berlin, 27 November 1897, R. riservato 1672/653, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 11, No. 286. With respect to Italy, despite researches in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the files of the Archivio Visconti Venosta, it has not yet been possible to find the minutes of the conversation Visconti Venosta-Goluchowski in Monza, or even a docu­ ment of the period referring to it. Cf. ibid,., note 2 of No. 286.

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Three years later, on December 20, 1900, during an inter­ pellation in the Italian parliament on the subject of Albania, Visconti Venosta replied that the Italian and Austro-Hungarian governments had agreed on the maintenance of the status quo of "the Ottoman coasts of the Adriatic." Subse­ quently he put in writing the understanding of Monza in a note to Goluchowski: 1. To maintain the status quo as long as circumstances permitted; 2. In case the present state of affairs could not be pre­ served, or in case changes should be imperative, to use our efforts to the end that the modifications relative thereto should be in the direction of autonomy; 3. In general, and as a mutual disposition on both sides, to seek in common, and as often as there is a reason for it, the most appropriate ways and means to reconcile and to safeguard our reciprocal interests. Visconti Venosta's note was acknowledged with complete agreement by Goluchowski in his reply note of February 9, 1901.25 With the Austro-Italian agreement, Albania was excluded from the general Balkan pact of the Triple Alliance and could not be subject to any eventual game of territorial com­ pensations. It was a special pact, which Goluchowski used to call "noli me tangere." 26 Although the Triple Alliance was the axis of the foreign policy of the Italian governments, public opinion in the coun­ try became increasingly averse to the continuance of friendly relations with Austria-Hungary. The demand for an exten­ sion of Italy's sphere of influence on the eastern side of the Adriatic was reinforced after the failure of the colonial plans. Since this could be achieved only against Austria-Hungary's will, the demands for a break with the existing policy and an open union with the Western powers multiplied. Every step texts of exchanged notes in Α. Έ. Pribram, op.cit., 1, 196-201. Cf. G. Salvemini, La politica estera dell'Italia dal I 8 JI at 1915, Florence, 1950, and edn., p. 115. 25See

2e

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taken by the Austro-Hungarian government in Albania was watched with jealousy and distrust. Politicians and journalists warned the Italian government not to be deceived by prom­ ises and agreements, for the intention of the Monarchy was to swallow up Albania.27 In April 1900, Count Donato Sanminiatelli, an influential member of the Society Dante Alighieri, a society for the pro­ pagation of Italian culture, sent notes for a memorandum on Albanian matters to Alberto Pisani, a public figure close to Crispi. It was folly, he maintained, to think about the occu­ pation of Albania by Italy: "our program should be simply negative, aimed at fighting and counterbalancing advances of the Austrian influence in Albania." The error committed with regard to Tunisia should not be repeated in Albania. In Goluchowski's declarations to Ambassador Nigra, "Nous n'avons pas I'intention d'occuper I'Albanie, mais nous ne permetrons pas qu'aucun autre I'occupe," he discerned the echo of sentiments voiced by the French ambassador, De Noailles, to deceive the Italian Prime Minister, Cairoli. "It is in our interest to increase the difficulties in the way of Austria," urged Sanminiatelli, "if for nothing else but to persuade her, with the force of facts, that we would not tolerate her politi­ cal intrusion in Albania without an adequate compensation for our security. We must persuade the ruling circles of Italy assiduously to watch our interests across the Adriatic."28 Until this time the Italo-Albanians had complained that the Italian parliament either completely ignored the Al­ banian question or touched upon it only superficially. Now, with the sudden change in public opinion in Italy, the Alba­ nian question found a substantial expression in the parlia­ mentary debates which followed. 27A. F. Pribram, op.cit., 11, 134-135; see also T. v. Sosnosky, Die Balkanpolitik Osterreich-Ungarns seit i860, Stuttgart and Berlin, 1914,

n, 254-255. 28Conte Donato Sanminiatelli, "Appunti per un pro-memoria sulle cose d'Albania," April 1900, ACS, Carte Pisani-Dossi (1866-1907), No Carte 671, No. Fasc. 40, No. Busta 14.

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An important deputy in the Italian parliament who later became Minister of Foreign AfiEairs, Count Francesco Guicciardini, gave the alarm on December 18,1900 against AustriaHungary's advance in Albania.29 He paid a visit to Albania and in the summer of 1901 published two articles and deliv­ ered a speech in the parliament (June 7, 1901). For him the uncertainty of Albania's geographic demarcation was not so much the result of historical changes as of the political com­ petition which was developing in the Balkans. Some of the competitors were interested in extending the frontiers of Al­ bania, others in restricting them.30 The diverse propaganda had created an explosive situation, the solution to which would be the recognition of the Albanian nationality. "One could say of this nation what has been said of Austria: if it had not existed, it should have been invented." Guicciardini advocated the autonomy of Albania as the logical solution. It would guarantee the equilibrium of the Adriatic and would produce stability in the internal affairs of Albania. It would not imperil or damage Montenegro, Austria-Hungary, or Italy. It would also harmonize with the legitimate wishes of Greece, as it would not exclude annexation by Greece of the districts of southern Epirus, inhabited by populations of Greek language, religion, and aspirations. Although respect­ ing the supreme sovereignty of the Sultan, Albania would be, under the proposed arrangement, an autonomous state under the temporary protectorate of the concert of Europe.31 Following Guicciardini's speech, De Marinis, later Minis­ ter of Education, stated on June 8, 1901 before the Italian parliament: "On the future of Albania will depend the rights and interests of Italy in the Adriatic. Whoever possesses the port of Vlore will be the absolute ruler over the Adriatic." 32 29Cf.

L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., p. 21. Guicciardini, "Impressioni d'Albania. I," Nuova Antologia, xcm (16 June 1901), 59a. 31F. Guicciardini, "Impressioni d'Albania. II," ibid., xciv (1 July 1901), 52, 56. See also for Giucciardini's ideas the editorial "Italien und die Albanesische Frage," Die Grenzboten, LX (1901), 289-295. 32As quoted in L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., p. 21, note xx. 30F.

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Π. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

Another Italian political personality who visited Albania for the first time in 1902 was Marquis A. di San Giuliano, future Minister of Foreign Affairs. He approved of the accord reached between Italy and Austria-Hungary concerning Al­ bania, but he questioned whether the course of events could be forced into the rigid diplomatic formula contained in the agreement.33 He stressed that Italy should try to prevent any disadvantageous change in the existing situation and power relationship of the Adriatic between herself and AustriaHungary.34 As he did not believe in Albania's capacity to create an autonomous state at that time, he thought the longer the territorial status quo in the Adriatic area was kept the better it would be for both Italy and Austria-Hungary. He also stated that the only solution of the Adriatic problem for Italy was the preservation of the inviolable supremacy of the Sultan, together with the necessary and appropriate reforms, for the lawful application of which efficient guarantees should be given. Only on this basis and within these boundaries could Italy expand and secure her influence and commerce in Albania." 35 San Giuliano, being a realistic statesman, was aware of the superior forces of the Dual Monarchy and he certainly could not advocate the seizure of Albania. In the meantime, he recommended that Italy should broaden and intensify her economic and cultural ties with Albania.86 Toward the end of September 1901 the XIIth Congress of the Societk Dante Alighieri was held in Verona and Count Sanminiatelli, in the name of its central committee, gave a report on Albania. He expressed his agreement with F. Guicciardini in maintaining that Italy should never allow Albania to become a possession of a primary power, not even of a state 33A. di San Giuliano, Briefe iiber Albanien, Deutsch von D. Schulz und W. Wickmann, Leipzig, 1913, p. 12. His opinions were expressed in articles, in the form of letters, published first in Giornale d' Italia and later collected in a book, under the title Lettere sull'Albania, which was not available to the author. 34 Ibid., p. 10. 35 Ibid., pp. 99 and 105. seCi. ibid., p. 10.

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of secondary rank which belonged to a political system of a primary power. He favored the administrative autonomy of the Albanians, which was compatible with the sovereignty of the Sultan. Moved by these considerations the Congress adopted an order of the day which expressed, among other things, the wish that the Italian government: proceed to a technical examination of the convenience of railway lines in the Balkan peninsula with a view to coordinate them with the economic interests of Albania and Italy; extend the consular representation of Italy in the vilayet of Kosovo; attempt in a friendly manner to persuade the government of the Sultan that the Italian interests in Albania and the administrative autonomous progress of the Albanians were in perfect har­ mony with the interests of the Turkish empire. The Congress expressed the desire to see Italian action in Albania assume a new and more practical direction in order to oppose and neutralize Austrian efforts.37 Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, was also distrustful of Italy. A strong anti-Italian party existed in Vienna, an im­ portant member of which was the heir presumptive, Francis Ferdinand. For this party the alliance with Italy was more a liability than an asset. Should Austria become involved in a war, this party thought that Italy, in order to remain neutral, would claim the "unredeemed areas"; if Austria lost the war, Italy would surely invade those districts.38 The new orienta­ tion of Italian policy toward France, which resulted in the Italo-French treaty of 1902, caused a certain anxiety in the Austrian capital, where not only Italian irredentism but also Balkan repercussions were feared.39 At this moment there was much talk about Austro-Italian rivalry in the Adriatic, 37Relazione del conte Donato Sanminiatelli nel XII Congresso della "Dante Alighieri" in Verona (26-28 September 1901), ACS, Carte PisaniDossi (1866-1907), No. Carte 671, No. Fasc. 40, No. Busta 14; see also G. Schiri), Gli Albanesi e la questione balkanica, Naples, 1904, pp. 277-278. 88A. J. May, The Hapsburg Monarchy, 186^-1914, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, p. 303. 89L. Salvatorelli, op.cit., pp. 246-247; see also A. F. Pribram, op.cit., n, 117-118.

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especially in Albania. Ambassador Nigra wrote to Rome that, during the last months, public opinion in the Monarchy had been preoccupied with the Albanian question and that the propaganda about it had been intensified.40 The Albanian question was soon connected with the Mace­ donian reforms, rendering relations between Austria-Hungary and Italy still more tense. When, in April 1903, the Italian government proposed to Goluchowski that the two allies study the possibility of initiating for Albania a program of reforms similar to that granted Macedonia by Russia and Austria-Hungary, the proposal met with no response.41 At the same time the insurrection of the Albanians in Old Serbia gave rise to the prospect of an Austro-Hungarian occupation of the sandjak of Novi Pazar. It was believed that AustriaHungary had fomented the troubles as a pretext for occupa­ tion, for conferences were held in Vienna between the Min­ ister of Foreign Affairs and military chiefs.42 Italy, maintain­ ing that there was fear that the Albanian disorders might spread in other vilayets, requested the Austro-Hungarian government for an exchange of views. Vienna answered that there was no Albanian question, and that the suppression of the Albanian movement, which Russia and Austria demanded of Turkey, had as its only aim the nationally mixed sandjak. As for Albania proper, Austria-Hungary held fast to the policy of the status quo.i3 Mistrust between Italy and Austria-Hungary became more striking following the Miirzsteg agreement in the fall of 1903. Afraid that the division of spoils between Russia and Austria would leave them empty-handed, Italian politicians and pub40Nigra

to Foreign Minister Prinetti, Vienna, 19 June 1902, No. 872/429, confidential, ASMAE. 41Cf. Richthofen to Kaiser Wilhelm II, Berlin, 9 April 1903, and Wedel to Auswartige Amt (telegram), No. 61, Vienna, 29 April 1903, GP, Vol. xviii1, respectively Nos. 5522 and 5539. 42L. Salvatorelli, op.cit., p. 268; A. Lorecchio, Il pensiero politico albanese in rapporto agli interessi italiani, Rome, 1904, p. lxiv. 43Wedel to the Auswartige Amt, Vienna, 29 April 1903, GP, Vol. XVIII1, No. 5539.

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Heists began to attack Austria more violently.44 When the distribution of the Macedonian sectors among the various gendarmerie contingents took place, Austria-Hungary as­ signed to herself the vilayet of Kosovo, but opposed Italy's request for the vilayet of Monastir because it bordered on Albania.45 Goluchowski even referred to Italy's covetousness with respect to Albania.46 As Italy was supported by France and England, and the Russian attitude toward her became benevolent, Austria-Hungary agreed that the vilayet of Monastir be allotted to Italy, provided that the purely Albanian districts—sandjak of Diber and parts of the sandjaks of Kor^e and Ohrid—were excluded.47 On her part, Austria-Hungary had left out of her sector the sandjak of Prizren and parts of the sandjak of Ipek. Although the reforms were to be applied, in a general manner, to the three vilayets of Salonica, Monastir, and Kosovo, it was agreed by the great powers that the regions inhabited principally by the Albanian populations, from which an energetic opposition was expected, should remain outside the field of action of the officers who would organize the gendarmerie.48 The acceptance by Austria-Hungary of the Monastir sector for the Italian gendarmerie prepared the way for the meeting of Abbazia (Opatija) (April 9, 1904) between Goluchowski and Tittoni, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Both parties reiterated declarations in favor of the status quo in the Balkans and preservation of Albanian intergity.49 As there were at that time rumors about General Ricciotti Garibaldi's 44Cf.

L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., p. 41. L. Salvatorelli, op.cit., p. 282; Marschall to the Auswartige Amt (telegram), No. 87, Geheim, Pera, 3 March 1904, and Wedel to Biilow, 5 March 1904, No. 100, GP, Vol. xxn, respectively Nos. 7397 and 7399. 46See L. Salvatorelli, op.cit., p. 283. 47Cf. Muhlberg to Marschall, telegram, No. 64, Berlin, 23 March 1904, and Wedel to Bulow, Vienna, 30 March 1904, No. 141, GP, Vol. xxn, respectively Nos. 7417 and 7419. 48Cf. T. v. Sosnosky, op.cit., pp. 134-135; Col. Lamouche, Qumze am d'histoire balkanique (1904-1918), Paris, 1928, p. 44. 49L. Salvatorelli, op.cit., p. 284. 45Cf.

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expedition to Albania, Tittoni in the Italian parliament dis­ counted talk of Italian expeditions in Albania and of Aus­ trian occupation of Macedonia. The two states, he declared, did not think of occupations or partition of spoils. They sin­ cerely wanted the maintenance of the political status quo; and if this, despite their efforts, were not possible, they stood for the principle of autonomy on the basis of nationality.50 Only a month or so after the meeting of Abbazia F. Guicciardini asked in the Italian parliament that in the interests of Albanian autonomy the administrative units of Macedonia should be modified so that Albanian districts included in them would be attached to Albanian vilayets and proper reforms applied to the latter.51 For San Giuliano terri­ torial status quo did not mean that the condition of the Al­ banians should not be improved. He was of the opinion that the reforms required for Albania, which Italy should ener­ getically champion, were substantially different from those which could be useful to Macedonia. He proposed steps which could contribute to the gradual formation of a true national consciousness among the Albanians.52 Goluchowski, too, in his meeting with Tittoni in Venice (April 29-30, 1905) recog­ nized the necessity of developing the national sentiment among the Albanian people. He said that, as soon as the gen­ darmerie was reorganized and the financial reforms were carried out, the districts in the three Macedonian vilayets in which the Albanian element was preponderant were—in view of the Miirzsteg program for a more regular grouping of the nationalities—to be separated and attached to the vilayets of Shkoder and Janina.53 When on May 12, 1905 the Italian Foreign Minister responded to Guicciardini, he declared that it was true that, by uniting to Macedonia certain Albanian 5°T. Tittoni, Sei anni di politica estera (1903-1909). Discorsi pronunciati al Senato del Regno ed alia Camera dei Deputati, Rome and Turin, 1912, pp. 78-79. ilF. Tommasini, UItalia alia vigilia della guerra. La politica estera di Tommaso Tittoni, Bologna, 1935, n, 125. 62Cf. G. Schiri), op.cit., p. 429. 53F. Tommasini, op.cit., 11, 67.

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districts, the importance of Albania was reduced. He then added, referring to the agreement with Goluchowski, that with the new organization of Macedonia they would be de­ tached and joined to Albania.54 The two powers were suspicious of each other and relent­ lessly watched each other's activities, particularly in Albania, but their public statements were always in favor of the main­ tenance of the Triple Alliance. The preservation of the al­ liance was the message of Aehrenthal, Goluchowski's succes­ sor, to the Delegations in December 1906; 65 and Tittoni's speech in the Italian parliament that month was in the same vein.56 Since there was no denunciation of the treaty of the Triple Alliance by July 8, 1907, the treaty was tacitly pro­ longed for another period of six years, that is, until July 8,

i9 x 4· 57 While the question of Macedonian reforms was encounter­ ing great difficulties, Aehrenthal announced (January 27, 1908) the plan for the construction of the railway line Sarajevo-Uvac-Mitrovice-Salonica. This would give a powerful impetus to Austria-Hungary's Orientpolitik.58 Italy responded with a project to build a railway line from Vlore to Monastir, following for the most part the ancient Via Egnatia. This would be dangerous for Austria-Hungary for it would estab­ lish for Italy a sphere of interest in southern Albania, which could be "perhaps the forerunner of an occupation." 59 Nei­ ther plan materialized because of the Young Turk revolution of 1908. Although the formula of the two powers—status quo and, in the event of the collapse of Turkey, the autonomy of an Albanian province or state—corresponded to their funda­ mental wish, there were differences in their particular inter54T.

Tittoni, op.cit., p. 167; cf. also F. Tommasini, op.cit., 11, 129. F. Pribram, op.cit., u, 141. 5eT. Tittoni, op.cit., pp. 248-267. 57A. Γ. Pribram, op.cit., 11, 142. 58T. v. Sosnosky, op.cit., 11, 141-142; L. Salvatorelli, op.cit., pp. 326-327. SBL. V. Chlumeck^ op.cit., p. 201; T. v. Sosnosky, op.cit., 11, 147, note 2. 1 55A.

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terests. For Italy the Albanian question reduced itself to the port of Vlore and the island of Sasseno, which controlled the Strait of Otranto, upon which her security and freedom in the Adriatic depended. She wished them to remain in the hands of a small and harmless state. Whether that state was a large or a small Albania was not of great concern to her. AustriaHungary, on the other hand, while desiring that Durres and Vlore be in Albania's possession so that she could enjoy free­ dom of action in the Adriatic, was also interested in Albania as a non-Slavic country, which could be used as a check against slavism. The size of Albania was not immaterial to her. She wanted the northern part at least to be within the Albanian state, for in this way the exit of the Slavs to the Adriatic would be blocked. It is understandable then that various projects to partition Albania, corresponding to the specific interests of Italy and Austria-Hungary, were proposed by journalists and publicists. Some of them were of the opinion that the Dual Monarchy should occupy the part north of Durres and Italy the part south of that port; others held that Austria-Hungary should acquire the eastern part, while Italy should possess the lit­ toral.60 Obviously, similar suggestions were made to Tittoni, which provoked him on December 18,1906 to declare in the Italian parliament that he rejected the advice to propose to the Dual Monarchy "partitions of territories and urge it to occupations, besides those consented to by the Treaty of Ber­ lin, asking for territorial compensations for ourselves." 61 The two powers, Austria-Hungary and Italy, were agreed to preserve the status quo in Albania because neither of them was in a position to occupy her. It was inevitable, therefore, that their rivalry should grow, as each one tried to increase her influence in that country. eoCf. A. Lorecchio, Il pensiero politico albanese in rapporto agli interessi italiani, Rome, 1904, pp. 33-34. 61T. Tittoni, op.cit., p. 261.

Rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Italy and Albanian Reaction ALTHOUGH the Goluchowski-Visconti Venosta agreement con­ stituted the avowed Italian and Austrian policy toward Alba­ nia, the two members of the Triple Alliance, distrustful of each other, carried on a policy of peaceful penetration in the country. This took various forms. The field where the two powers first confronted one an­ other was education. Austria, as previously mentioned,1 showed an interest as early as 1855, when she undertook to pay two-thirds of the construction costs of the Jesuit Albanian Pontifical Seminary in Shkoder and to grant a substantial sum for the maintenance of students, the rest to be contributed by the Propaganda Fide.2 The following decades witnessed the establishment of two secondary schools in Shkoder, one run by the Jesuits and the other by the Franciscans, and several elementary schools around Shkoder, in Vlore, Durres, Prizren, and elsewhere—all with Austrian help and administered by Catholic orders. Vienna made it clear to the Albanian Cath­ olic clergy that it was their duty to support its efforts in Albania.3 Austria initiated her educational activity with the Catholics of the north because she enjoyed greater freedom of action there, owing to the Kultusprotektorat. At the outset this ac­ tivity proceeded slowly, so as not to create any troubles for Turkey or give the Russians occasion to intervene in the Balkans. But the Cretan affair made Austria aware that time was running out and that Turkey was on the verge of collapse, 1See

Chapter v, pp. 129-131. Condignano, "Veprat e Etenvet Jesuite ne Shqipnin e Veriut, 1841-1928" (The Work of the Jesuit Fathers in Northern Albania, 1841-1928), Diturija (Knowledge), in (April 1928), 220. 3See Zwiedinek on his conversation with the Scutarin priest Don G. Sereggi, Vienna, 23 November 1898, HHStA, PA xiv/7, Albanien v/2. 2F.

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while Italy was demonstrating a growing interest in Albania.4 A program of action with regard to Albania was then formu­ lated in the Austrian capital, its aim being "to strengthen the national consciousness of the Albanians and insure for them­ selves [Austrians] a leading influence on a future autonomous Albania." 5 In order to achieve these goals it was necessary that Austria first found schools under her patronage in Al­ bania. In fact, by 1897 a significant point in Austria's program of action was the opening of schools with Albanian as the language of instruction in the Moslem districts of the country as well.® Italy swiftly counteracted these moves. In 1888 the first Italian schools were opened in Shkoder, at the initiative of Francesco Crispi.7 Although in 1891, during the Ministry of Rudinl, the Italian schools of Preveza, Vlore, and Durres were closed, the schools of Shkoder, which were elementary, continued to function. They competed with the schools estab­ lished by Austria-Hungary, for they were supported by an Albanian pro-Italian party.8 The archbishop of Shkoder, Guerini, a Croat and an Austrian subject, attempted to sup­ press even these schools in 1897. Under the pretext that they were creations of Crispi, who was considered a Freemason, and that the Italian government kept the Pope prisoner in the Vatican, he pronounced an interdict against them, excommu4Goluchowski to Calice Vienna, 18 February 1897, Weisung No. 658, 1 Geheim, HHStA, Gesandtsehaftsarehiv Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. It does not appear accidental that the Balkankommission of the Academy of Sciences in Vienna was constituted on 3 February 1897. See C. Patsch, "Bericht iiber deutsche und auslandische Siidost-Europa Vorschung," Leipziger Vierteljahrsschrift filr Sildosteuropaj in (1939), 248-251. 5Foreign Ministry to Pasetti in Rome, Vienna, 16 June 1897, Depesche No. 785, HHStA, PA xiv/7, Albanien v/2. eSee Zwiedinek's report, "Die albanesische Action des k. und k. Ministeriums des Aeussern im Jahre 1897," Vienna, 11 January 1898, pp. 19-20, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. 7 Ibid., p. 14; see also text of a letter in Albania, in (1899), 97. 8Degrand to Hanotaux, Scutari, 22 September 1897, No. 99, AMAE t Turquie, Politique Intirieure, Albanie, 1897, 1.

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nicating the parents who sent their children to those schools.® The interdict was not withdrawn until the spring of 1899, after the Rome government intervened at the Vatican.10 In that year an Italian commercial school was founded in Shkoder, followed by elementary and night schools, and kinder­ gartens and trade schools in other Albanian towns, like Durres, Vlore, Janina, and even Gjirokaster. The two ItaloAlbanian Congresses of 1895 and 1897 and the Italo-Albanian colonies had given an impetus to the movement. There were scholarships for graduates of the Italian schools in Albania to pursue their studies in Collegio S. Adriano where a chair of Albanian had been installed. Italy's educational efforts were concentrated on Catholic Shkoder not only because that city was the center of Austrian propaganda, but also because Italy apparently hoped that Albania would one day follow the trend dictated from there.11 Here a distinction should be made between the Austrian and Italian schools. The former were confessional, under the Kultusprotektorat, and were run by members of Catholic orders. The latter were government schools (regie scuole) directed by laymen and controlled by the General Inspecto­ rate of the Schools Abroad, which was part of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.12 Another difference was that the Austrian-subsidized schools, which stressed religious educas Ibid.; Leoni to Visconti Venosta, Scutari, 12 September 1897, T. 3197 ore 14, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 11, No. 207. 10Conte Donato Sanminiatelli to Alberto Pisani, [Rome], April 1900, ACS, Carte Pisani-Dossi, 1866-1907. 11See report by Zwiedinek, Vienna, December 1901, Geheim, p. 12, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422; Para to Goluchowski, Salonik, 16 October 1906, No. 48, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/25, Albanien xix/i; "Mimoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," p. 9, Vienna, April 1905, HHStA, PA xiv/28, Albanien xx/3; L. v. Chlumecky, Osterreich-Ungarn und Italien, Leipzig and Vienna, 1907, pp. 164-165. liSee Pari to Goluchowski, Salonica, 16 October 1906, No. 48, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/25, Albanien xix/i; L. v. Chlumeck^, opxit., p. 166.

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tion, were not as up to date as the Italian schools, which were organized exactly like those of the Italian Kingdom. However, the Italians fully understood that, as long as the clergy was not with them, they could not, in the domain of education, exercise as much influence on the Catholics of Albania as could Austria-Hungary.13 The Austrians thought that the Italians were not interested in the national uplifting of the Albanian people, but in the creation of colonial institutions, with the hope of one day taking possession of Albania.14 This is not altogether true. The Italians were also interested in the development of Alba­ nian national consciousness. They could not well compete with Austria on Albanian territory if they neglected this side of the question. F. Guicciardini, following his visit to Albania in 1901, expressed the conviction that Turkey was opposed to the opening of Albanian schools. He favored the teaching of Albanian and felt that education was necessary for the growth of Albanian national consciousness. He even believed that the ground was fertile for its development. "As for the Alba­ nian sentiment of nationality," he wrote, "one may say that it is in its latent state and manifests itself in jerky movements and with indeterminate objectives, but the smallest educative work will make it conscious in movements and aims." 15 Di San Giuliano, who visited that country in 1903, when he was a deputy, also stressed the importance of schools in Albanian for the formation of a gradual and true national conscious­ ness. For this purpose, he also called for the revocation of the ban on Albanian by the Porte.16 Not only prominent Italians but also Italian cultural bodies advised the support of Albanian culture. At the XIIth Congress of the Societa Dante Alighieri in September 1901 ""Mimoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," p. 9. "Cf. ibid. 15F. Guicciardini, "Impressioni d'Albania, II," Nuova Antologia, xciv (1 July 1901), 56. 16A. di San Giuliano, Briefe iiber Albanien, Deutsch von D. Schulz und W. Wichmann, Leipzig, 1913, pp. 77, 101.

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the desire was expressed that the government o£ Rome ex­ amine the possibility of reopening the government schools in Durres, Vlore, and Preveza. At the same time, the Congress entrusted its General Council to assist as far as possible in the diffusion of Italian culture in Albania and the development of Albanian culture there and in Italy.17 In addition to schools, both Austria and Italy built welfare institutions such as hospitals, ambulances, and orphanages, in order to enhance their prestige among the Albanian people. The competition in the domain of education was not re­ stricted to schools in Albania proper. In September 1901 in the Albanian settlement of Borgo Erizzo (now Arbanasi), near Zadar in Dalmatia, a course in Albanian was initiated by the Austrian government. The inhabitants were descend­ ants of Albanians from north of Shkoder who, fleeing the per­ secution of the Turks in the beginning of the eighteenth cen­ tury, abandoned their homeland and were settled in the 1730's in Borgo Erizzo by the Venetian Republic. Pater Pashko Bardhi, a Franciscan brother from northern Albania, taught the course in Albanian.18 A chair of Albanian language and literature having been established at the Oriental Institute of Naples, the Austrian government countered in 1903 with a course in Albanian in the Institute of Oriental Languages in Vienna, which was put in charge of G. Pekmezi, a southern Albanian who had graduated in philology in the university of that city.19 As the Italians were sending stipendiaries to Collegio S. Adriano the Austrians began to provide fellowships for Albanians to study in the teachers' schools of Klagenfurt, Wahring, and Vienna. The purpose was to develop a compe­ tent Albanian teaching staff and thereby further the nation17Relazione

del conte Donato Sanminiatelli (relatore per Consiglio Centrale della "Dante Alighieri") nel XII Congresso della "Dante Alighieri" in Verona (26-28 September 1901), ACS, Carte Pisani-Dossi (1866-1907), No. Carte 671, No. Fasz. 40, No. Busta 14. 18Zwiedinek's report, Vienna, December 1901, Geheim, p. 14, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422; Albania, vi (1901), 66-67. 19"M£moire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," pp. 17-18; Albania, ix (1904), 19.

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alization of the Catholic schools of northern Albania, which would mean the replacement of Italian by Albanian as the language of instruction.20 The Italian language, it must be remembered, had strong historical roots in this area. When Austria-Hungary opened the confessional schools in Albania, the language of instruc­ tion in them was Italian. The littoral of Albania and Shkoder had in the past been under Venetian influence, if not com­ pletely under Venetian domination, and Italian was the only Western language spoken there. The Catholic population of Shkoder in the latter half of the nineteenth century preferred to educate their youth in Venice.21 At the same time the for­ eign clergy that Austria found in Albania and that could be employed in the schools were Italians; Italy for centuries had furnished Catholic Albania with religious elements.22 When Italy appeared on the educational scene as Austria's rival, the latter became aware that the continuation of Italian as a lan­ guage of instruction in the confessional schools was to her detriment. San Giuliano remarked with irony that through her religious propaganda Austria took care at her expense to diffuse the Italian language as the best means of transmitting ideas and sentiments—a result which was the exact opposite of her intentions23 Austria, therefore, began to lay more stress on Albanian language and culture both in order to develop Albanian national consciousness and to oppose the spread of Italian language and culture. For this purpose she was interested in preparing qualified Albanian teachers and also textbooks for secondary schools. As a language for trade, German was introduced later in the commercial school and the Franciscan school in Shkoder, but Italian could not be totally supplanted, for it was the language of the Levant. In 20"M£moire

uber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)/' pp. 18-19. F. Lippich, "Denkschrift iiber Albanien," Vienna, 20 June 1877, HHStA, PA xn/256, Tiirkei i-v. 22Cf. Calvagna to Crispi, Belgrade, 24 November 1890, No. 414/229. ASMAE, Rapporti politici, 1889-1890, Fasc. 1493. 2sA. di San Giuliano, op.cit., p. 49. 21Cf.

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the Jesuit schools Italian was preponderant and Albanian held only a secondary place.24 In exercising the Kultusprotektorat the consulate of the Monarchy in Shkoder, which was established as early as 1832, employed discretion and wisdom. It allowed the bishops and clergymen to deal directly with the Ottoman authorities even in matters related to their ministry.25 The prerogatives of the Austrian consul in Shkoder, according to a study made by Nigra, the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, were to exercise action on the Catholics in Albania in the following cases: (1) in demanding from Istanbul the decree (berat) of investiture for the Catholic bishops in Albania, whatever the nationality of the bishops; (2) in the protection and jurisdiction to be exercised over the Albanian Pontifical Seminary and over the Catholic schools in Albania, run completely or in part by Italian clergymen and subsidized by the Austro-Hungarian government; (3) in the protection by the Austro-Hungarian consul of other religious institutions composed of Italians but not subsidized by the Austro-Hungarian government; (4) in the protection by the consul of missionaries, or other Italian clergymen, considered individually.26 The Austrian Kultusprotektorat could not be a matter of indifference to Italy, for it placed her at a disadvantage with the Catholics of Albania. Guicciardini maintained in the Italian parliament that Austria exercised in northern Albania a "sovranita religiosa." But things were not exactly as the Italian statesman saw them, if we take into account the revela­ tion made by Ippen, the Austrian Consul General in Shkoder. Of the seven heads of the dioceses, in 1901, on which Guicciardini's "sovranita religiosa" rested, three bishops did not favor at all Austria's intentions in Albania, which were di24Cf.

"Mimoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," pp. 18-19. 25Maissa to Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 9 July 1892, Riservatissimo, No. 152/751, ASMAE. 26Nigra to Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 3 August 1892, Riservato Prot. Gen. 1743, Rapporto, 674, ASMAE, Pacco 573, Pos. 350.

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rected to the national strengthening of that country. They would have found more comprehensible Austrian intentions of occupying Albania. Archbishop Troksi (Trochsi) was often hostile to the Austrian government, while Archbishop Bianchi "speaks as a friend but acts as an enemy." There remained only two Albanians, Bishop Mjeda and Abbot ϋοςχ, "who have adopted and are inclined to promote our desires for national unification, for cultural progress, and for keeping at a distance foreign influences from the Albanians." 27 In order to fight the Kultusprotektorat, Italy and the Italo-Albanians strove for the establishment of a Turkish diplomatic repre­ sentation to the Vatican which would make Austrian protec­ torate over the Albanian Catholics superfluous.28 Italy also attempted to change its old structure by using the Florentine Societa per Ie Missioni Italiane all'Estero, whose secretary, Schiaparelli, endeavored, during repeated visits in Shkoder, to give the Catholic clergy the direction of some welfare estab­ lishments founded by Italy, on the one condition that they accept Italian consular protection instead of Austro-Hungarian. When this effort failed, Italy sent to Shkoder pure Italian Catholic orders for the administration of the Italian orphan­ age and hospital. After the explanation by Propaganda Fide in May 1903 that the Kultusprotektorat in Albania belonged to Austria, Italy did not pose any more objections to it.29 Nonetheless, the subsidizing of Albanian priests through Associazione Nazionale Italiana per Soccorrere i Missionari 27Ippen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 27 June 1901, No. 21A-C, HHStA, PA xiv/7, Albanien v/i, 2. 28L. v. Chlumecky, "Die Italo-Albanesen und die Balkanpolitik," Osterreichische Rundschau, ν (November 1905-January 1906), 345, and Osterreich-Ungarn und Italien, Leipzig and Vienna, 1907, p. 170. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that in 1888 Crispi launched at the Vatican the plan of the establishment of an Apostolic Nunciature in Istanbul for representation of the interests of the Catholic church in Turkey. It aimed chiefly at curtailing France's influence in the Orient. See A. H. Benna, "Studien zum Kultusprotektorat Osterreich-Ungarns in Albanien im Zeitalter des Imperialismus (1888-1918)," Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarehivs, Vienna, xii (1954), 16-17. 29 "Mimoire liber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," pp. 7-8.

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Italiani all'Estero was assuming greater dimensions, and it seemed to have substantial funds at its disposal.30 Another means of peaceful penetration in Albania by the two powers was commerce and navigation. The position of Austria in the beginning was more advantageous, but soon Italy began to make great progress. In the 1890's Italian trade was a "quantite negligeable"; in the 1900's it increased stead­ ily, particularly in the south, in the vilayet of Janina, after Italy created a commercial agency in 1900.81 In the period 1900-1904, while Italy had quadrupled her exports to the vilayet of Janina, those of Austria had declined by 15 per cent.32 Yet the Italian competition had not yet seriously impaired Austrian trade with Vlore and Durres, and in ΚοΓςέ Austria had won the market.33 The Austrians seemed to be more concerned about Shkoder. Here the percentage of participation in the general mari­ time traffic had risen greatly in favor of Italy: while in 1901 the percentage for the Austrian Lloyd was 46, for Ragusea (Austrian) 40, and for the Italian Puglia 14, by 1905 that of Lloyd had fallen to 8.9 and that of Ragusea to 14.9, while that of Puglia had gone up to 56.7.34 The competition for commercial predominance in Shkoder was not so much for pecuniary gain but to make the city and its highlands depend­ ent upon one or the other power.35 Italy's increasing interest in Albania can be gauged by the various agreements between the Italian government and the shipping company Puglia. The agreement of 1893 showed light traffic between Italy and Albania; in the 1904 agreement the traffic had become heavier; and with the agreement of 1906 the weekly connections between the two coasts had gone 30Kral

to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 6 March 1907, No. 27, HHStA, PA xiv /25, Albanien xix/1. 31L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., p. 190. 32See table in ibid.., p. 191. s 3 Ibid., p. 192; "Memoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)" P- 2384Cf. tables in L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., p. 194. ss Jbid.,

p. 195.

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up to three, while the government subsidy to Puglia had been augmented by more than 300,000 lire.3® The Chamber of Commerce of Vicenza in the autumn of 1902 dispatched a trade mission to Albania, which recom­ mended the foundation of a big Italian commercial company. A year later it appeared under the name Society Italiana d' Esportazione e d'Importazione col Montenegro e coll' Alba­ nia, with headquarters in Milan. It provided many facilities to Albanian businessmen who travelled in Italy, thus strength­ ening the Italian market in Albania.37 In many parts of Albania, especially on the coast, the han­ dling of mail from abroad was granted by Turkey as a con­ cession to Austria. "As an old privilege, consecrated by treaties, Austria has the monopoly of the postal service in Albania and Epirus, using it for political purposes." 38 Later Italy was able to obtain from the Porte a similar concession. Both powers erected their own postal offices in the country. The Italian post service in Shkoder was well organized, and new Italian post offices were opened in Durres and Janina. Austria-Hungary and Italy used their post offices also for their propaganda: they introduced printed material from abroad favorable to their respective aims.39 The problem of recruiting supporters for their policies became important for the two rival states. Austria-Hungary was more successful in this respect, having supporters both inside and outside the country. The Austrians believed that in an underdeveloped country like Albania—with tribes and a patriarchal or feudal regime—public opinion did not exist, but that certain prominent men exercised influence.40 They also thought it was the duty of the Monarchy to develop conse Ibid.,

pp. 197-198. liber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," p. 10. 88Conte Donato Sanminiatelli to Alberto Pisani, "Appunti per un promemoria sulle cose d'Albania," April 1900, ACS, Carte Pisani-Dossi, 1866-1907, i, 14. 88See L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., p. 196; "M^moire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," p. 10. 40Ministry of Foreign ASairs to Ippen, Vienna, is June 1897, Ref. 1, No. 780, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/7, Albanien v j t . 37"Mdmoire

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nections with the leaders of the Albanian national movement and assist in every way the intellectual development as well as the material welfare of the Albanian people.41 The first two prominent supporters of the Monarchy were Mgr. Όοςΐ (Dochi), abbot of Mirdite, whose influence was great on the Catholic clergy, and Faik Konitza, the young intellectual from the south, whose reputation as a promoter of the Albanian national consciousness had begun to spread. Both saw the interest of their country bound to that of Aus­ tria. The only power, wrote ϋοςΐ which was not trying to annex Albania was Austria. She did not desire a subjugated but a friendly and allied Albania. He feared Italy more than any other power, because she strove to occupy and annex the country. Italy was in need of an outlet for her increasing population; she would endeavor to neutralize her losses in gold and prestige in Africa by the conquest of Albania. The abbot, therefore, held that it was in Austria's interest that Albania be powerful and independent and it was to the ad­ vantage of the Albanians to have confidence in Austria and win her support, for only she would protect Albania from her enemies.42 Konitza told the Austrians that he could see in a union of Albania with Italy only economic decline and mis­ ery, while in a union with Austria there would be free eco­ nomic and intellectual development for Albania. He regarded Austria as the only power which would support the racial individuality and the language of the Albanians, for she had already given a tangible proof of this in Bosnia. He even thought it would be fortunate for Albania, in the event that complete political autonomy were impossible, to have an autonomous administration under a political and military union with Austria.43 Attacked for his friendship toward 41Cf. Zwiedinek's report, Vienna, December 1901, Geheim, p. 15, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. 42"Promemoria Monsignore Primo Dochi's uber Albanien," pp. 7-8, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. 43Konitza to Ippen, Brussels, 18 August 1897, HHStA, PA xrv/18, Albanien xn/2; Khevenhiiller to Goluchowski, Brussel, 20 August 1897, No. 12, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/18, Albanien xn/2.

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Austria by the Italo-Albanian paper La Nuova Albania, Konitza publicly gave his reasons: that Austria for a long time protected the Albanian Catholics, who were responsible for the preservation of Albanian nationality; that had it not been for the fear of Austrian interference the Greeks and the Slavs would have occupied Albania in 24 hours; that Austria had given proof that she wanted the Albanians to learn their national language and be enlightened; and that in the schools subsidized by Austria the Albanian language was taught, while in those maintained by Italy only Italian was taught.44 Indeed, one of the requests of the Austrian government, when it came to an understanding with Konitza, was that his activ­ ity should be directed toward creating among his compatriots, regardless of religion, a feeling of unity of their national interests.45 The other prominent intellectuals who joined the Austrian camp—like Shahin Kolonja, Sotir Peci, Kristo Luarasi and Dervich Hima—were fundamentally in agreement with ϋοςϊ and Konitza. For them, too, of all foreign assistance that of Austria was the most advantageous for Albania.46 Nairn Frasheri, the apostle-poet of Albanian nationalism, might have also favored Austrian policy had he not died in 1900. He wrote sometime in 1897 to Konitza that "what can be most fortunate for the Albanian nationality is the annexation of Albania by Austria, the whole of Albania." 47 Although Italy tried hard to recruit Albanian patriots, her success was slight. The Albanian patriots could not trust her. There was too much talk in Italy about the "invading Aus­ trian" and the liberation of Albania, whether it came from the Italians themselves or from certain circles of the ItaloAlbanians. The Albanian patriots believed that Italy wanted i i Albania,

11 (1898), 137-138. to Khevenhiiller, Vienna, 7 December 1897, No. 96c, HHStA, PA xiv/18, Albanien xn/2. 46Kral to Goluchowski, Monastir, 6 January 1902, No. 3, Geheim, HHStAj PA xiv/16, Albanien xn/1-7. 47Faik to Zwiedinek, Brussels, 16 May 1900, H H S t A , PA xiv/i8, Albanien xn/2. 45Goluchowski

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to occupy the country. Among the Albanian clergy Italy re­ cruited a talented writer, a former Jesuit, Don Gasper Jakova. He worked for the Italians first as an instructor in Collegio S. Adriano and then as a publicist in Italy, editing in Alba­ nian, among other things, a newspaper, the Herald of Alba­ nia (1904).48 Ismail Kemal first approached Austria as the great power whose help Albania needed in order to develop gradually the national consciousness of her people through the founding of schools, cultivation of language, and acquisi­ tion of autonomy.49 Soon after, however, his relations with the Italo-Albanians became close and his leanings turned toward Italy. It appears that he found a greater field for ac­ tion on the Italian side. The fact, however, that he declared in 1907 that the acts of the Consulta had dispelled the fears of those who believed that its action had "intentions of con­ quest and propaganda in the Orient" 50 justifies the suspi­ cions which surrounded Italian policy toward Albania. The Italians also constituted in Corfu an Italo-Albanian action committee, the initiator of which was the Italian Consul Gen­ eral in that island, De Gubernatis,51 and which by 1907 was still active.62 It was natural for the two antagonistic powers to intensify their consular activity in Albania. In December 1896 Vienna had decided to send to Albania extremely capable consular officers, who knew the language of the country.53 It advised its consuls to contact Albanians of all social levels and con48"Mimoire

iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," p. 15. to Goluchowski, Brussels, 6 June 1901, No. 14, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/16, Albanien xii/7. 50"La politica nei Balcani (una conversazione con Ismail Kemal Bey)," La Tribuna1 27 July 1907. 51Greneville to Goluchowski, Corfu, 3 April 1902, and 30 March 1904, respectively No. 7 Res., vertraulich, and No. 11c, HHStA, PA xiv/14, Albanien xi/4. 52Mittag to Aehrenthal, Athens, 21 July 1907, No. 28c, vertraulich, in ibid. 63See Zwiedinek's report, Vienna, December 1901, Geheim, p. 2, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. 48Khevenhuller

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fessions in order to be informed about their views and the existing conditions in the land. The consuls should particu­ larly seek to meet Moslem personalities whose influence could be used on their following. They had to be careful not to give rise to any suspicions that Austria was interested only, or at least primarily, in Catholic propaganda. The consular offi­ cials should also endeavor to destroy the idea that the Monar­ chy intended to occupy Albania, an idea which had begun to gain ground among Albanian circles and leaders. Their task was further to instruct the Albanians that Austria was inter­ ested in the development of their country and in the unity of its people, and so acquire an influence on their national efforts. The consuls should leave no doubt that Austria was ready to aid the promotion of the national interests of the Albanian people, but they should also make it clear that she would not lend her hand to movements against the existing order.54 In August 1896, Ippen paid a visit to the Catholic moun­ taineers on the Turkish-Monenegrin border—Kastrat, Hot, Grude, Klement, and Shkrel. He learned about their griev­ ances against the Turkish government and Montenegro's efforts to make use of them for her own interests. He sug­ gested to his government that immediate help was needed to improve their situation. From 1898 to 1903 Austria distrib­ uted corn to the mountaineers, thus winning them to her side.55 In October 1897 Ippen undertook a trip in central Albania which brought him in contact with influential beys of Tirana and Elbasan. He came to know then the activity of an organized national Albanian party, whose endeavors were directed toward the enlightenment of the people through the "Ministry to Ippen, Vienna, 12 June 1897, Ref. I, No. 780, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/7, Albanien v/z; Zwiedinek, "Die albanesische Action des k. und k. Ministeriums des Aeussern im Jahre 1897," Vienna, 11 January 1898, p. 2, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. 65Ippen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 16 March 1899, No. 12c, H H S t A PA 1 χιv/14, Albanien x; Zwiedinek, "Die albanesische Action des k. und k. Ministeriums des Aeussern im Jahre 1897," p. 3, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422.

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cultivation of the Albanian language and the establishment of schools. After his departure, the Turkish authorities ar­ rested two of the patriotic beys—Murad Toptani and Dervish Elbasani—who had been his hosts. This act limited the move­ ments of the Austrian consuls in Albania and made them more cautious in the future.56 The Moslem Albanians who bordered on Serbia and were near southern Bosnia were as important for the Dual Mon­ archy as the Catholic tribesmen of the vilayet of Shkoder. The Austrian consuls of Dskiib and Prizren had reported various attempts made by individual beys of those districts to approach them. They testified to the good reputation the Austrians enjoyed among the Albanians of the occupied prov­ inces, as well as to the power of attraction Vienna exercised on the bordering Turkish districts. The influential leader of the districts of Ipek and Gjakove, Hadji Molla Zeka, was reported to have repeatedly offered his services for a union of Albania with Austria-Hungary, but the close relations he maintained at that time with the Sultan's entourage and the "unreliability of his character," according to the Austrian re­ ports, did not render advisable the acceptance of his collabo­ ration.57 In order to expand her activity, Austria-Hungary thought of establishing three new consular offices: in Tirana, Elbasan, and Berat. All three towns were considered politically sig­ nificant, as they were the seat of several prominent Albanian families devoted to the Albanian cause. Since it was not easy to obtain the consent of the Porte for the opening of new consular offices, it was decided, for the time being, that the titulars of Durres and Vlore adopt as their summer residences Tirana and Berat respectively.58 As for Elbasan, based on Ippen's report that it would acquire great commercial weight in the event of the construction of a Monastir-Durres railway x Ibid.,

p. 4. pp. 7-8. 58Zwiedinek1S report, Vienna, December 1901, Geheim, p. a, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. s 7 Ibid.,

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line, Vienna was preparing to install an effective consular office. The creation of another office was proposed for Ipek, but in order not to arouse the suspicions of the Ottoman government, the execution of the project was postponed.59 In Janina Austria had increased the staff of her consulate.60 On the basis of the information from its consuls and other reliable sources, Vienna could say in 1901 with some assur­ ance that the idea of an independent national development of Albania had been firmly rooted and showed promise of growth. But this growth could not take place uniformly, as the formation and history of the various parts of the country would favor or hinder its development.61 The Porte, however, was opposed to any steps which would further the cultural development of the Albanians, and Aus­ trian action was restricted where the right of the Kultusprotektorat did not make possible independent measures.62 It was thought in Vienna that Austria should try to convince Turkey that a divided and dissatisfied Albania would be con­ stantly vulnerable to intrigues and a source of dangerous disturbances. A united, culturally developed Albania, on the other hand, would strengthen the Ottoman empire; with her warlike people she could be a bulwark against any possible Serbian or Montenegrin attacks and thus help to preserve the status quo in the Balkans, desired by both Vienna and Istan­ bul.63 Such frank talk would perhaps eliminate the Porte's mistrust of the Austrians. The same attention might then be paid to the wishes of the Albanians as to those of the other populations of the Ottoman empire. Such a stand on the part 59Zwiedinek,

"Die albanesische Aktion des k. und k. Ministeriums des Aeussern i m J a h r e 1897," p p . 4-5, i n i b i d . eoMiIlelire to Visconti Venosta, Janina, 15 November 1897, Riservato 347/113, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 11, No. 265. 61See Zwiedinek's report, Vienna, December 1901, pp. 2-3, H H S t A , Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. 62See Zwiedinek, "Die albanesische Action des k. und k. Ministeriums des Aeussern im Jahre 1897," Vienna, 11 January 1898, pp. 17-18, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. e 3 I b i d . , p. 18.

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of Austria would win her the sympathies of the Albanians and enhance her prestige. The Albanians would look to Austria with confidence, for even fervent patriots in Albania who strove for autonomous rule were aware that their people did not have the capacity to achieve such a political organiza­ tion without foreign help. They would welcome such help from Austria-Hungary.84 Italy's activity in the consular field was rather unsystematic; it seems to have been a reaction primarily to what Austria was doing. Austria's creation of new consular offices in Albania had disturbed the Italians. Millelire, the Italian consul in Janina, wrote that the Austrian vice-consul in Vlore, Petrovich, who knew Albanian, had begun an active propaganda to develop among the Albanians the national sentiment. This was a significant admission on the part of an Italian consul, for it confirms that Austria's policy was in reality the growth of Albanian national consciousness. On the other hand, Mil­ lelire had no doubt that Austria was trying to prevail in order to prepare her hegemony in Albania: she carried on the biggest trade, had almost monopolized the postal service, had the Catholic Church under her wing, and was endeavoring to win over the Moslem Albanians, who constituted the domi­ nant element in the south. He proposed that the Italian con­ sular offices in Albania be raised to the level of their rivals.65 When the vice-consulates of Italy were opened in Durres and in Vlore, their titulars followed the example of their Austrian counterparts, spending their summers first in Tirana and then in Berat.68 An impressive number of travellers and missions were sent from Italy to investigate Albania more closely. One of the early Italiim travellers was A. Baldacci. His suggestions to the Italian Foreign Ministry appear to have been taken into e4Cf.

ibid.

e5Millelire

to Visconti Venosta, Janina, 15 November 1897, Riservato 347/113, and 21 February 1898, Riservato 46/15, DDI, Terza serie 18961907, Vol. H, respectively Nos. 265 and 379. 6611Mimoire uber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," p. 11.

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account in the policy toward Albania. Baldacci proposed: (i) improvement of the services of Puglia along the Albanian littoral; (2) elevation of the existing consulates in Shkoder and Janina to consulates-general in order to counterbalance the positions of the Austrian representatives; (3) establish­ ment in the Italian schools of Shkoder of the technical-commercial branch in order to counteract the influence of similar schools maintained by the Jesuits, and for this reason by Austria, as well as the restoration of the Italian schools of Vlore; and (4) nomination of career vice-consuls in Durres and Vlore, where Austrian functionaries of this rank resided.67 A sensation was created in 1902 by the trip of Marchese Carlotti, then secretary of the Italian embassy in Istanbul. He crossed Albania from Monastir to Shkoder, seeking contacts with native notables.68 But for contacts with the Albanians Rome tried to use the Italo-Albanians, whose attitude was overtly anti-Austrian. "Austria, allured by the successes she reached in the Berlin Congress," stated the Society Nazionale Albanese in a declaration (January 1, 1898), "dreams of mak­ ing Albania a continuation of Bosnia and Hercegovina." 69 The Italian consulates in Albania distributed Italo-Albanian publications. Protracted visits were made in the vilayets of Shkoder and Janina by such Italo-Albanians as the Albanologist Francesco Chinigo, the poet and publicist Antonio Argondizza, Ettore Melis, and others. Their trips were allegedly for the purpose of historical-ethnographic and linguistic studies.70 As an obvious demonstration of force and interest in Alba­ nia, Italy almost every year dispatched a squadron of her fleet to visit the Albanian ports and remain anchored there for some weeks.71 At the beginning of the century, the efforts of Italian 67Baldacci

to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Visconti Venosta, L. P., Bologna, 27 October 1897, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 11, No. 251. e8"M^moire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," p. 10. e9 See C. Libardi, I primi moti patriottici albanesi, nel 1910-1911ipix, specie nei Ducagini, Trent, 1935, n, 238. 70Cf. "Mdmoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," p. 10. nIbid.., p. 11.

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diplomacy began to be directed toward obtaining a decree (trade) from the Porte revoking the ban on visits by Moslem Albanians to foreign schools; the intention was to attract them to the Italian schools.72 A. di San Giuliano even pro­ posed that permission should be secured to open schools with Albanian as the language of instruction and that vocabularies, grammars, alphabets, and textbooks in that language should be printed.73 The conflict over alphabets between the followers of Agimi and those of Bashkimi,74 which broke out in Shkoder, was bound to affect the two opposing powers. It involved the clergy. The Bashkimi alphabet, invented by Mgr. ϋοςΐ, was supported by the Franciscans; the Agimi alphabet, the crea­ tion of Dom Mjeda, had the support of the Catholic episco­ pate in Shkoder and the majority of the priests. It was evident that the Monarchy's concern was greater than that of Italy. The policy of Austria-Hungary was to strive to bring about the adoption of an Albanian alphabet which would serve by its uniformity to consolidate her influence in Albania. Even before the outbreak of the fight, she had raised the question of a unified alphabet for both dialects, at the time when the Albanian demands for the use of the national language and its cultivation in the schools had drawn her attention.75 The Austrian government considered Mjeda's alphabet representa­ tive of a certain progress and closer to the Istanbul alphabet than that of Bashkimi, with its "inherent Italian character." Moreover, the followers of Mjeda and those of the Istanbul alphabet were inclined to make concessions to arrive at a unified alphabet, but not the abbot of Mirdite. In May 1902 the Catholic higher clergy held several meetings and a ma­ jority decided to adopt Mjeda's alphabet. The Austrian gov­ ernment, which had first subsidized the publication of Al72L.

v. Chlumeck^, op.cit., p. 170. di San Giuliano, op.cit., p. 101. 74See Chapter vi, pp. 164-165. 7SZwiedinek's report, Vienna, December 1901, Geheim, pp. 8-9, HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 42a. 73A.

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banian textbooks in the Bashkimi alphabet, transferred its favor to the Agimi alphabet of Mjeda.76 The problem of the alphabet was important to the Mon­ archy also from the point of view of Church policy. Consul Kral put it accurately to his Ministry: "The unification of the alphabet, which is pressing on national and linguistic grounds, is furthermore a necessity from the viewpoint of our policy and especially of our Church policy, for without it the peace in the Albanian episcopate and the quiet devel­ opment of our schools can hardly be maintained." 77 The adherents of Mjeda in the episcopate were in the majority and would regard the support of the minority as an act of un­ friendliness. In the event of a vacancy for a bishop, if the Monarchy were to support a follower of Οοςϊ, the rest of the bishops would turn vehemently against its candidate; it would not be in a position to impose him and friction would be in­ evitable. Kral thought that it was in the supreme interest of the consolidation of Austrian influence that a unification of the adverse parties be brought about.78 The Italians had already been using the Bashkimi alpha­ bet in their schools in Shkoder, but at this juncture they seemed to manifest a special interest in it. ϋοςϊ maintained that the Italian consul, Leoni, had told him that the Italian schools in Shkoder would undoubtedly employ the Bashkimi alphabet, "in order not to bring about confusion in the lan­ guage of the same country." ϋοςϊ acknowledged that he had worked for the introduction of Albanian in the Italian schools 76KraI to Goluchowski, Scutari, 23 March 1906, No. 30, sehr vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xiv; Dochi to Zwiedinek, Vienna, 16 February 1906, HHStA1 PA xiv/7, Albanien v/2; "Memoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," p. 16; Alric to Delcasse, Scutari, 22 March 1902, No. 177, AMAEj Turquie, Politique Intirieure, Albanie, 1902-1903, Vol. iv; Alric to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 18 March 1904, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intirieure, Albanie, 1904-1905, Vol. v. 77Kral to Goluchowski, Scutari, 23 March 1906, No. 30, sehr vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xiv. la

Ibid.

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of Shkoder and even in the Italo-Albanian communes in Italy, convinced that Italy would lose in the Italianization of her school programs and Albania would gain in the propa­ gation of her language. He expressed fear that the Italian party might profit by the situation.79 The fight between the Bashkimi and the Agimi alphabets continued, but it was restricted to the province of Shkoder, with only slight effects on other parts of the country where the alphabet of Istanbul was predominant. Austria proceeded cautiously in order not to alienate both sides.80 In the meantime, Austria's interest in Albanian publica­ tions was intensified. In 1902 the Austrian government took steps to acquire the manuscript of Kristophoridhi's Diction­ ary of the Albanian Language, which had fallen in the hands of the Greek government. After two years of efforts and pres­ sures on the part of Albanian patriots, the dictionary was published, at the end of 1904.81 In July 1905 Albanians studying in the teachers' schools in Vienna and Klagenfurt, as well as many Shkodrans engaged in various enterprises in Austria, formed a society called Dija (Knowledge), the aim of which was the cultivation and propa­ gation of the Albanian language. It published an Albanian calendar each year. Dija also created a branch in Dubrovnik.82 The Austrian government subsidized at the same time two important works, Pekmezi-Manek-Stolz' Albanesische Bibliographie and Pekmezi's Albanesische Grammatik. 83 A newspaper appeared in Trieste toward the end of 1907 79See Dochi to Zwiedinek, Vienna, 16 February 1906, PA xiv/7, Albanien v/2 (Text in Italian); "Kongresi i Shqipetareve Xhon Turq ne Maqedhoni" (The Congress of the Young Turk Albanians in Mace­ donia), Albania, xn (1909), 24 and 33. 80See Kral to Zwiedinek (uber den Brief vom 5. 1 3 .1905 Faik Bey's), Scutari, January 1906, HHStA, PA xiv/19, Albanien xn/2. 81"Memoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," p. 17. 8 2Notiz, 3 November 1906, by Seksionsrat Baron Schlechta, HHStA, PA xiv/14, Albanien xi/5. 83Notiz concerning Albanian bibliography, 5 June 1907, H H S t A , PA xiv/14, Albanien xi/5.

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Π. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

entitled Dashamiri (Well-Wisher). It was different from the other newspapers published abroad in that it was not the product of an Albanian fugitive, but the organ and testimony of certain circles in Albania. Its founders were the members of the society Agimi and its program was the development of culture by scholarly articles, the awakening of interest in the Albanian language and literature—if possible apart from pol­ itics—and a solution of the alphabet question through propa­ ganda for a common alphabet.84 In this period of rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Italy, when international events were of importance, it was natural for the Albanian attitude toward them to fluctuate. Soon after the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina by the Monarchy, the Kosovars feared that this power would advance south of Mitrovice and that life under the rule of the Mon­ archy would be hard, for they would not be allowed to abide by their own customs and habits.85 It was learned gradually, however, that the treatment of the Moslem element in the occupied provinces was in every respect considerate, and the Albanians became more sympathetic to Austria.86 A more general reason that turned the Albanians toward Austria was the need to keep up with the other Balkan na­ tions. They had not been able to bridge the antagonisms among the clans—usually forgotten when territorial integ­ rity was at stake—and present to the world an image of a unified Albanian nationality. The main cause for this back­ wardness lay perhaps less in their national immaturity than in the feeling that they were weak, that in relation to the enemies who surrounded them they could not win their na­ tional independence alone. The overwhelming majority of the patriotic Albanians hoped that outside support could 84Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 16 January 1908, No. 9, H H S t A , PA xiv/16, Albanien xii/7. 8sCf. Szogyiny to Calice in Constantinople, Informationsbiiro, Vienna, 28 May 1885, Zl. 1325/4 (copy of confidential letter enclosed, tlskiib, 16 May 1885), HHStA1 Ges..Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. teilMimoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," pp. 3-4.

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come above all from Austria, with whom they saw an iden­ tity of interests.87 Even the feudal lords seem to have favored Austria-Hun­ gary. Syreja Vlora, a prominent bey of the south who held high positions in Istanbul, reasoned characteristically: "We Albanians know too well that Turkey's domination in Europe must end in the near future. But what will happen to us Al­ banians? As far as the opinion of my compatriots is known to me, they would best welcome the formation of an autono­ mous province under the protectorate of Austria-Hungary. And if we Moslems were compelled to recognize a foreign government—we are not yet sufficiently mature for the in­ dependence of Albania—then we would prefer Austria-Hungary to all other powers." 88 However, during the Greco-Turkish war of 1896, when the people of Gjirokaster were afraid of Greek territorial expan­ sion, they expressed the opinion that, in view of an imminent collapse of Turkey, "The eyes of all true Albanians, whether Moslem or Christian, are incessantly turned across the Adri­ atic toward Italy . . . all their expectations and desires are concentrated on their brother Italians, at whose head is the worthy person of His Excellency Crispi, whose energy, ability, and Albanian heart they already know." 89 Three years later a similar opinion was expressed by an influential landowner of Gjirokaster, Servet Bey Libohova.90 Mistrust of Italy began to grow with the intensification of her activity in Albania. It was felt that her warm "interest" concealed her final goal, which went beyond the professed autonomy of the country. In this respect, the remarks of A. Lorecchio, the Italo-Albanian who supported so ardently an active Italian policy in Albania, are enlightening. He wrote 87Cf.

ibid.

88"Mimoire

iiber Albanien, 1896," p. 9, as quoted in I. G. Senkevich, Osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie albanskogo naroda ν ipo}-ipi2 gg., Moscow, 1959, p. 66. 89 F. Crispi, Questioni Internazionali, Milan, 1913, p. 239. 90 Millelire to Canevaro, Janina, 6 March 1899, R. Riservato 68/19, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. m, No. 180.

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that Italy's advance had given rise to a distrust on the part of the Albanians of the Italians and the Italo-Albanians which was to a certain degree justified: ". . . the Italians with their mania to found schools, new consulates, new commercial agencies in Albania, regarded this land as an Italian prov­ ince." They did not consider the Adriatic as an Italian and Albanian sea, but only as an Italian sea.91 In fact, A. Baldacci expressed the desire of many Italians, when he asserted to Visconti Venosta: "II mare Adriatico dev'essere mare italiano." 92 It could have no other meaning than domination or occupation of Albania by Italy. The Macedonian reforms disturbed the attitudes of the Albanians toward the two interested powers. There was a widespread dissatisfaction with Austria which, in agreement with Russia, had introduced the reforms in the Macedonian vilayets. Some of the Albanians saw in the application of the reforms a way of aiding the Christians, particularly the Slavs. They also believed that it was the pressure on the part of Austria-Hungary and Russia that caused the Turkish expedi­ tion of 1903 in the vilayet of Kosovo. Begun under the pretext of punishing the opponents of the administative innovations ordered by the Sultan, the campaign had as an outcome, they held, the weakening of the Albanians, which benefited the Serbs. Moreover, the Turkish government, left with a free hand, endeavored to get rid of those elements which, from the national viewpoint, appeared dangerous, confusing them with the opponents of the reforms.93 Some Albanians, on the other hand, complained that the Macedonian reforms were 91A. Lorecchio, Il pensiero politico albanese in rapporto agli interessi italiani, Rome, 1904, p. 81. 92Baldacci to Visconti Venosta, L. P., Bologna, 27 October 1897, in op.cit. 93See Park to Goluchowski, liskub, 8 July 1904, No. 120, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/16, Albanien xn/1-7; "Memoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," p. 5; Kral to Zwiedinek (iiber den Brief von 5.12.1905 Faik Bey's), Scutari, January 1906, HHStA, PA xiv/19, Albanien xn/2.

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not applied to Albania as well. Austria tried to justify her stand on the ground that the very special character of the country did not render such reforms useful. In order to ap­ pease the Albanians, Zwiedinek wrote to ϋοςί that the time would come when it would be possible for Austria "to take into account also the material and intellectual needs of the Albanian people" for reforms. For this to materialize, it was necessary that the persons who enjoyed a special confidence among the Albanians should use their influence to calm them and prevent premature movements which could only jeopar­ dize the future of the Albanian nation.94 Italy capitalized on the inclusion within the area of Mace­ donian reforms of large regions inhabited by compact Alba­ nian populations. The Italian politicians proposed and fur­ thered their administrative detachment from the vilayets of Monastir and Kosovo and their unification with the Albanian vilayets (Janina and Shkoder). In this way, they felt, they would prepare the creation of an autonomous Albania, al­ though perhaps an autonomy under Italian leadership.95 Italy was also in a more advantageous position in Albania with respect to Turkey. Turkey's attitude toward Austria was suspicious. She regarded the occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina as the first stage of an intended Austrian advance in the Balkans. As Austrian activity expanded in Albania, owing to the rivalry with Italy, the mistrust of the Porte and the Sultan increased, thus weakening Vienna's position in Istanbul.ee Italian activity in Albania, on the other hand, did not meet with any opposition on the part of the Turkish gov­ ernment. In fact, it was secretly supported, for the Porte saw 94See "Mdmoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," p. 6; Zwiedinek to Dochi, Vienna, 14 December 1904, HHStA, PA xiv/7, Albanien v/i, 2. 95See L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., pp. 120, 214. 96Zwiedinek1S report, "Die albanesische, Action des k. und k. Ministeriums des Aeussern im Jahre 1897," Vienna 11 January 1898, p. 3. HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422; Memorandum, Szomolany, 4 October 1907, p. 6, HHStA, PA xiv/28, Albanien xx/7-8.

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in it a counterpoise to Austria's influence and regarded the Italo-Austrian rivalry as profitable.97 Italian statesmen also advocated a friendly policy toward Turkey in Albania.88 A serious complaint about Austrian policy came from the Moslem Albanians, especially the beys. They reproached the Austrians for having generously donated the Catholic clergy, whom they considered as having done little toward national unification, and for having neglected the Moslems." Yet in the summer of 1898 the dissatisfaction of the Catholics of Prizren with Austrian policy was communicated to the Vat­ ican. Austria was accused of being concerned "more about politics than about the good of the soul." The Vatican, how­ ever, paid no attention to the charge.100 Although Austria was trying to give the impression that she was interested in all the confessional groups by supporting Orthodox and Mos­ lem patriots, Italy was using her advantage as a neutral power in religions matters to conciliate the non-Catholic population, which was "30 times more numerous than their Catholic com­ patriots." 101 As is usually the case with rival powers, suspicion distorts reality. They saw concealed aims where none existed and magnified each other's activities. The Italians and the Italo-Albanians accused Austria of making use of her Kultusprotektorat to open the way to fu­ ture seizure of Albania. Italy's diplomatic representative in Belgrade, referring to the Albanians who were sent to study 97"Mimoire

iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," pp. 9-10. A. di San Giuliano, op.cit., pp. 29-30. 99See "Mimoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," p. 4. 100See A. Lorecchio, op.cit., pp. ccxxiv-ccxxvii; Degrand to Delcass£, Scutari, 14 September 1898, No. 119, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intirieure, Albanie, 1898-1899, Vol. 11; Ambassade de France prfes Ie St. Sifege to Delcassd, Rome, 6 February 1900, No. 30, in ibid., 1900-1901, Vol. 111; Alric to Delcassi, Scutari, 10 May 1900, No. 48, confidentiel, in ibid. See also on this question and archbishop Troksi of Prizren, Leoni to Canevaro, Scutari, 10 August 1898, R. 184/92, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. in, No. 40. 101Konitza to Zwiedinek, London, 5 December 1905, HHStA 1 PA xiv/19, Albanien xn/2. Konitza's "30 times more numerous" is certainly an exaggeration. 88See

RIVALRY AND REACTION

283

in Catholic seminaries in Austria, wrote that "They re­ turned to their country in order to exercise the sacred ministry and propagate the ideas which were inculcated in them in the Austrian seminary."102 Conte Sanminiatelli regarded the means of Italian propaganda in Albania as mezzucci (contemptible), useful only to legitimate the de­ cisive action of Austria and not to impede it.103 For A. Baldacci "nothing is more false" than what was published in Austria about the extraordinary intensity Italian propaganda had reached in Albania. The creation of the two Italian consulates in Shkoder and Janina, the schools, and the serv­ ices of Puglia served only, in Baldacci's opinion, to whet the desires of Austria and invigorate her propaganda in Albania in order to counterbalance "the invented Italian in­ trigues." 104 A sober voice was that of Ambassador Nigra. Responding to a report by Leoni, Italian consul in Shkoder, he stressed that Austria had in Albania the protection of the Catholic clergy and Italy could not contest it. He did not think that Austria had abused it for hidden ends hostile to Italy. He then warned against what he called " 'morbus consolaris/ complicato di daltonismo politico," which could create serious inconveniences.105 He was, however, somewhat more moderate in his reply to a report by the Consul General of Janina: "Mi pare che il Cavaliere Millelire osservi Ie cose con una lente un po grande." 106 The Austrians thought that Italy, under cover of strength102Calvagna to Crispi 1 Belgrade, 24 November 1890, No. 414/229, ASMAE, Rapporti politici, 1889-1890, Fasc. 1493. 103Donato Sanminiatelli to Alberto Pisani, "Appunti per un promemoria sulle cose d'Albania," April 1900, ACS, Carte Pisani-Dossi, 18661907, i, 14. 104Baldacci to Visconti Venosta, L. P., Bologna, 27 October 1897, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 11, No. 251. 105Nigra to Viscounti Venosta, Vienna, 4 May 1897, confidenziale 1448/380 and 17 May 1897, L.P, in DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 11, Nos. 9 and 56 respectively. loeNigra to Canevaro, Vienna, 2 July 1898, R. confidenziale 2205/477, ibid., Vol. in, No. s.

284

II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

ening Albania nationally, worked for the Italianization of the land so that she could later set foot on it.107 Chlumecky found the successes of Italy astonishing. He held that in 1906 Albania was seized by total Italianization and that sympathies reached across the straits of Otranto.108 The successes of Italy were attributed mainly to the sympathetic interest with which the Italian press, parliament, and government responded to the Albanian question.109 Public disinterest was considered the crux of Austria's lack of success. Kral held responsible the Austrian newspapers, which did not take any notice of the Austrian "action" in Albania, did not understand it, and were misled by the Serbian and Bulgarian presses to picture the Albanian people as brigands, while the Italian papers pointed up all that would enhance the prestige of the Albanian na­ tion, create sympathies for it and secure its claims.110 Chlumecky accused the Austrian government of not telling the Austrian public about Italy's activity, of silencing the attacks of the Italian press and mentioning only the flattering re­ marks made in it about the Triple Alliance—of pursuing, in other words, an "ostrich" policy.111 It was one of Ippen's wishes that Italian rivalry would raise questions about the usefulness of the Catholic clergy and the identification of Shkoder and the Catholic north with the whole of Albania. He considered both to be errors of Aus­ trian policy.112 In the next decade the criticisms came from many sides and became more violent. Kral confessed that the Austrians had for a long time been in the habit of regarding 107See

Memorandum, Szomolany, 4 October 1907, HHStA, PA xiv/28, Albanien xx/7-8. 108L. v. Chlumeck)', op.cit., pp. 160-161. 100Kral to Zwiedinek (iiber den Brief vom 5. 12. 1905 Faik Bey's), Scutari, January 1906, HHStA, PA xiv/19, Albanien xn/2. l w Ibid. 1 1 1 L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., pp. 227, 232. T. v. Sosnosky later accused Goluchowski of a passive and faint-hearted policy. Cf. Die Balkanpolitik Osterreich-XJngarns seit 1866, Stuttgart and Berlin, 1914, 11, 257. 112Ippen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 10 November 1898, No. 45A, HHStA, PA XiI/303, Tiirkei xxx/1898.

RIVALRY AND REACTION

285

Albanian relations from the point of view of Shkoder and believing that what Austrian policy did for Shkoder—or for the clergy there—was being done for Albania and the Albanians. "We thought that we worked for the national cause and for the Albanian people and had basically served the interests of the spoiled Catholic clergy." He then asked that Austria should think about the welfare of the Albanian people and her own material interests, for the influence of the Catholic clergy was restricted to a small corner, the north­ western corner of Albania.113 But it was not an easy matter for the Austrian government to give up its Kultusprotektorat in Albania, although it was a financial burden and had disadvantages for its political aims. The Kultusprotektorat was a question of honor. Any direct and radical break with Austrian action in Albania could be construed as a renunciation of the right of protectorate and as a sign of political weakness. It would open wide the door to Italian propaganda. The Austrian government decided not to abandon the Kultusprotektorat, pending future reconsid­ eration of its usefulness. If it continued to prove useless, the government would concentrate on areas more favorable to the consolidation of its position in Albania.114 It was at this time that Chlumecky came out for a new and more positive policy toward Albania. He called on the Austrian statesmen to act so as to reserve Albania for "peace­ ful penetration" by Austria and to push back any foreign influence prejudicial to the present and future interests of the Monarchy. Austria should no longer pursue merely a re­ ligious-cultural policy. Her policies in Albania—as long as Italy's actions continued—should be in the direction of po­ litical and national actions, in the completely Albanian sense. In conferring attention on the Catholics, she should not for­ get that they constituted barely 15 per cent of the population 113Kral to Zwiedinek (iiber den Brief vom 5.12.1905 Faik Bey's) Scutari, January 1906, HHStA, PA xiv/g, Albanien xn/2. 114Memorandum, Szomoldny, 4 October 1907, H H S t A , PA xiv/28, Albanien xx/7-8, pp. 6-8.

286

Π. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

and that their voice alone would not be decisive for the fate of Albania. It was also necessary for Austria to carry on inten­ sive commercial and political activity in southern Albania. Italy might then revert to her Mediterranean plans.115 In this period of rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Italy in Albania, both powers strove to present their inten­ tions and actions as designed for the elevation of the Albanian people and the development of their national consciousness. The reaction of the Albanians varied, according to the time, section of the country, and religious groups involved. On the whole, however, the Albanians favored the policy of AustriaHungary which they regarded as a greater stimulus to the development of their national consciousness and a better pro­ tection of their interests. 115L.

v. Chlumecky, op.cit., pp. 245-346.

The Interests of Balkan Neighbors and the Great Powers APART FROM Austria-Hungary and Italy, the other great power

that took a direct interest in the Balkans at this time was Russia. France at the Congress of Berlin had strongly de­ fended the rights of Mirdite, but she was engaged in North Africa and showed little interest in the fate of the Catholics of Albania. Long before 1892 she had left Austria a free hand and her consul in Shkoder abstained from mingling in the affairs of the cult protectorate.1 When the Monarchy replaced the French sisters in Prizren by Austrian ones (sisters of Za­ greb) and the Catholics together with Mgr. Trochsi of that city asked to be put under the protectorate of France, this power declined because she wanted to avoid trouble.2 Albania had meaning for France only insofar as she could be used as a decoy for Italy. The French press frequently encouraged Italy to look for an outlet in Albania, at first suggesting peace­ ful penetration and later annexation. It pointed to Vlore as a substitute for Bizerte. Even French statesmen tried to foster such a hope in Italy. The speech of the French Ambassador Barrere, on New Year's day in 1902, and the declarations of his Minister Delcasse, although later belied, proposed Albania to Italy.3 As for England, she was not as decidedly for the defense of the integrity of the Ottoman empire and the sov­ ereignty of the Sultan as in 1878. The reason was that she 1Maissa

to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, July 1892, Riservatissima, No. 152/75, ASMAE. 2See Degrand to Delcassd, Scutari, 14 September 1898, No. 119, AMAE j Turquie, Politique ΙηίέηεΜ·ε, Albanie, 1898-1899, Vol. n, and Ambassade de France prfes Ie St. Sifege to Delcassd, Rome 6 February 1900, No. 30, ibid.., Albanie, 1900-1901, Vol. m. 3See Giormale d'ltalia (3 January 1902), for Delcassi's declarations, and L. v. Chlumecky, Osterreich-Ungarn und Italien, Leipzig and Vienna, 1907, pp. 15-16.

288

II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

was losing influence in Istanbul and Germany's influence there was becoming preponderant.4 In Janina, the capital of Epirus, she had only an honorary consular agent, whose unique occupation was to obtain from the Turkish authori­ ties hunting permissions for Englishmen.5 Only during the Macedonian troubles did British public interest momentarily revert to Albania. The 1880 Goschen-Fitzmaurice proposal for the formation of an Albania composed of the vilayets of Shkoder and Janina and the Albanian regions of the vilayets of Monastir and Kosovo, was recalled. If this proposal had been accepted by the great powers, it was argued, enough time would have been assured the Albanians to strengthen their territorial rights and national unity and prepare themselves for independence.6 As to Germany, her interest in the penin­ sula was a function of the relations among the great powers. Thus Russia had to reckon primarily with Austrian interests in the Balkans and in particular in Albania. The Balkan crisis of 1875-1878 had caused a setback in the alliance of the Three Emperors, but it was revived in 1881. Russia and Austria-Hungary recognized each other's position in the Balkans. They promised each other (Germany in­ cluded) that any modifications in the territorial status quo of Turkey in Europe could be brought about only by a com­ mon agreement between them.7 But this arrangement did not eliminate their antagonism in the peninsula, where Russia's interest in Balkan slavism, although it fluctuated, never ceased altogether. When Russia—after the Germano-Russian treaty of 1887 which recognized "Russia's predominance" in Bulgaria—declared that she would not renew the pact of the 4Cf. W. L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902, New York and London, 1935, 11, 632-636. 5Podhayski to Flourens, Janina, 24 June 1887, No. 6, AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Janina, 1885-1895, Vol. XII. β Westminster Gazette, 14 April 1903, as reproduced in Albania, VIII (1903), 111. 7See article II of the treaty in A. F. Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 18J9-1914, Cambridge, Mass., 1920, 1, 39.

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST

289

Three Emperors,8 Austria-Hungary feared an intensification of that antagonism. The Turco-Greek War of 1896 over Crete disturbed Austria-Hungary and Russia, who feared that it might expand to other Balkan territories and lead to a general conflagration. Goluchowski then visited Petersburg (April 27-29, 1897) anc^ reached an understanding with Muraviev. Taking account of the security and vital interests of the two empires and elimi­ nating "the danger of a rivalry disastrous to the peace of Europe," the two foreign ministers seem to have agreed on arrangements in the event that the status quo in the Balkans could not be preserved. The dispatches they exchanged, how­ ever, differed in their contents. In a note of May 8, 1897, Vienna favored the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the sandjak of Novi Pazar; the creation of an Albanian inde­ pendent state, "to the exclusion of every foreign domina­ tion," stretching from Janina to Shkoder, "with sufficient extension on the east side"; and the partition of Turkish territories in the peninsula among the various Balkan states. Petersburg, on the other hand, in its answer of May 17, 1897, while in accord with Vienna as to the maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans, considered the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the independence of Albania as pre­ mature and, because they touched upon questions of the future, difficult to decide at the time.9 One might be inclined to attribute Russia's reservations to distrust of Austrian aims: i.e., to her suspicion that Austria's proposals were intended to prevent the formation of a large Slavic state and, with the constitution of an Albanian independent state, to bar Serbia from the Adriatic. However, Russia's motives appear to have been different. In a letter addressed on May 25, 1897, to Kapnist, Russia's ambassador in Vienna, Muraviev asserted that it would be foolish to accept the annexation of BosniaV, No. 1096; L. Salvatorelli, La Triplice Alleanza, storia diplomatica, 1871-1912, Milan, 1939, p. 135. 9See copies of dispatches in A. F. Pribram, op.cit., 1, 184-195. 8GP,

290

Π. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

Hercegovina and the independence of Albania—which Russia would not oppose—when Austria-Hungary did not offer reciprocal concessions with respect to the Turkish Straits. Moreover, he added, considerations about future questions could easily lead to entanglements, which it would be better to avoid.9® Italy naturally did not welcome the news about the AustroRussian understanding; she regarded it as prejudicial to her Balkan interests. Russia tried to appease Italy. The Italian representative in Petersburg was told that Goluchowski at­ tempted to endow the accord with more significance than it actually possessed in pretending that it would put an end to the antagonism of the two powers in the Balkans. In report­ ing to Rome, the Italian representative maintained that, once the motives of expediency which determined the agreement disappeared, it was entirely possible that the two powers would return to their previous policies, for their divergencies in the Balkans were many and serious.10 Since the time of Peter the Great, Russia had demonstrated a special interest in Montenegro, Albania's northern neigh­ bor. Intimate alliance with Holy Russia was the immutable basis of Montenegrin policy, her people regarding Russia as a big sister with the same religion and the same ideals. The Russians, in turn, considered Montenegro a Slavic vanguard in the Western Balkans and a Russian fortress against Aus­ tria-Hungary's objectives.11 They helped her as much as they could at the Congress of Berlin. The friendship of the Rus­ sian tsars was for Montenegro a guarantee of long life and security; it was understood that whoever molested Monte­ negro would wound Russia. Alexander III welcomed the ®*See W. M. Carlgren, Iswolsky und Aehrenthal vor der bosnischen Annexionskrhe, Uppsala, 1955, p. 14. 10Melegari to Visconti Venosta, St. Petersburg, 26 November 1897, R. 6/8/339, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 11, No. 282; Cf. L. v. Chlumeck^, op.cit., pp. 15-16. 11Cf. R. Pinon, "Le Montinegro et son prince," Revue des deux mondes, lvi (1 March 1910), 81-90.

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST

291

prince of Montenegro in Petersburg in 1889 with the toast: "A Nikita Petrovic1 mon unique ami." 12 Toward the end of the century Italian circles also began to manifest an interest in Montenegro. At that time Ippen wrote to his Ministry that there were groups in Italy who did not share the national Albanian idea of the Italo-Albanians and were friends of Montenegro. They were concerned about the present and future situation of Albania from the purely Italian point of view and advocated that the expansion of Italy should gravitate toward Albania, leaving to Montenegro the northern part of that country as far as Durres.13 A. Baldacci, in his report to the Italian Foreign Minister a year before, referring to the eventuality of the collapse of Ottoman rule in Albania, proposed the formation of a MontenegrinAlbanian principality, including in it only the northern part of Albania; the southern part he was inclined to see as an Italian protectorate.14 However, Italy refrained from any official promises to Montenegro, in the event of an Ottoman downfall, holding that she favored the preservation of peace and the status quo.15 In 1889 the King of Italy, Victor Emmanuel, married Elena, the fourth daughter of the prince of Montenegro. The marriage offered Prince Nicholas an opportunity to make his son-in-law more interested in the fate of his country.16 In­ creasingly preoccupied with the "Adriatic equilibrium" and seeking to augment her influence in the Turkish seas, Italy now became a rival of Austria-Hungary not only in Albania 1 2 Ibid.;

L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., p. 154. to Goluchowski, Scutari, 10 September 1898, No. 45A, HHStA, PA xn/303, Tiirkei xxx, 1898. 14Baldacci to Visconti Venosta, L. P., Bologna, 27 October 1897, DDI, Terza serie, 1896-1907, Vol. 11, No. 251. 15Il Presidente del Consiglio e Ministro dell'Interno, Rudini, al Principe di Montenegro, Nicola, L. P., Rome, 30 June 1897, ibid. No. i n . leCastelbianco to Visconti Venosta, Cetinje, 22 May 1900, L. Riservata, ibid., Vol. Iiij No. 403. 13Ippen

292

II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

but also in Montenegro. To Italy, as to Russia, Montenegro seemed an obstacle to Austrian expansion. Soon after the royal wedding, an Italian company built and managed the port of Pristan (Antivari) of Montenegro; the construction of an Italian-Montenegrin railway, joining Antivari to Vir Pazar, was negotiated in 1904; telegraph communications between Bari and Antivari were established; an Italian company was granted the tobacco monopoly in Montenegro; and Italian businessmen visited Montenegro while Montenegrin students studied in institutions of higher learning in Italy. All these ties brought the two peoples nearer, but the establishment of close relations between them was difficult.17 Austria-Hungary began to be perturbed by the Montene­ grin agitation among the Albanian Catholic mountaineers, whose chiefs the shrewd Prince Nicholas strove to win over to his side by money and gifts of arms. Despite national an­ tagonism between Albanians and Montenegrins, owing to great material need and dissatisfaction with the Turkish regime, a considerable number of Albanians seemed to be well disposed toward Montenegro. The Austrians counter­ acted with material assistance against Montenegrin efforts. They tried at the same time to awaken the national feeling and thinking of the mountaineers through the creation of Albanian schools in their villages.18 At this point Italy's posi­ tion became awkward. She found herself implicated in both Albania and Montenegro. The Albanians were afraid that their country was to be divided between Italy and Monte­ negro, while the Montenegrins became suspicious that Italy's objective was to create a great Italian Albania.19 The aspirations of Serbia to Old Serbia (Kosovo) met first with the rivalry of Montenegro. After the signing of an under­ standing between Serbia and Bulgaria, the so-called Ugodba 17 R.

Pinon, op.cit., p. 92; L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., pp. 175, 183,

188-189. 18 "M£moire uber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," HHStA, PA xiv/28, Albanien, xx/3, pp. 21-22. 19 Cf. Mirdita, "La politica a doppio fondo dell'Italia in Albania," L'ltalia all'Estero, Rome, 1 (1 January 1907), 8-9.

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST

293

(February 19, 1897), whereby neither party would proceed to a political or military action without a previous agreement, Montenegro was invited to participate in it. Her Prince showed willingness to do so, but he raised the question of the delimitation of Montenegrin and Serbian spheres of interest in the Ottoman empire. The strong antagonism between the reigning houses of Serbia and Montenegro, the Obrenoviiii and the Petrovici, the former fearing that Prince Nicholas had designs on the Serbian throne, proved a hindrance. When Montenegro laid claims to Gjakove, Diber, and particularly Prizren, the Serbs refused to come to an agreement.20 The Albanians manifested hostility to the Serbian inten­ tions. The Albanians in Old Serbia constituted not more than 55 per cent of the inhabitants, but they were the lords of the area.21 The Serbian propaganda which had been planned for Old Serbia and Macedonia suffered a setback with the defeat of the Serbs by the Bulgarians in Slivnica in 1885. It was intensified, however, in the next decade, when the Serbs founded a hundred schools in the vilayet of Kosovo with at least 5,000 pupils.22 At that time also the Serbo-Albanian conflict began to assume greater importance—particu­ larly during the period of the Djordjevic cabinet (1897-1900) —causing tension in the relations between Serbia and Tur­ key.23 The Kosovars who took part in the Greco-Turkish war now used against the Serbs in Old Serbia the arms which they did not deliver to the Turkish authorities. In 1901 the situa­ tion became grave. The Serbs began to smuggle arms to their compatriots with which to defend themselves. In the summer of 1901 the Kolasin "massacre of Serbs" took place, which compelled Russia to intervene at the Porte in defense of the 20Cf. W. S. Vucinich, Serbia between East and West, Stanford, 1954, pp. 27- 30-31, and 114. 21L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., pp. 104, 108-109. 2 2 Ibid., p. 93; L. S. Stavrianos, Balkan Federation. A History of the Movement toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times, Northampton, Mass., 1944, p. 133. 23W. S. Vucinich, op. cit., p. 3 3 .

294

II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

Serbs. The Russian ambassador demanded that the Porte stop making perquisition for arms among the Serbs, release those whom it had imprisoned, and recall the mutesarrif of Prishtitine, whom he apparently considered to be involved in the massacre. The Porte yielded to the Russian demands and per­ secution soon subsided.24 The Serbian government suspected that this activity of the Albanians was also backed by Austria-Hungary. It was a plau­ sible belief that Vienna desired the elimination of the Serbs in Old Serbia in order to form a compact Albanian region which would prevent a possible Serbian expansion,25 or that it was Austria's plan to keep northern Albania and Old Serbia in a state of disturbance as a pretext for intervention at the propitious moment.26 However, an examination of the docu­ ments of the period does not convey this impression. In fact, when the troubles in Kosovo began to increase in 1903, Vienna became seriously concerned. Goluchowski told the French ambassador that he was more disturbed about the Albanian insurrection than about that of the Macedonians. Although the Sultan had given Calice formal promises to suppress it, Goluchowski feared that he would not be able to free him­ self from the Albanian influence—he was surrounded by Al­ banians in the palace and was afraid of an attempt against his life.27 On the other hand, it is true that Austria tried to minimize the importance of the Albanian atrocities. More­ over, she maintained that it was an error to believe that the Albanians were such a wild and disobedient people that they disliked any kind of reforms. They wanted reforms that would be compatible with the character of the population and the needs of the land. "If they did not desire the Ottoman re­ forms, it was because they aimed at denationalization, divi­ sion, and consequently the weakening of their race." 28 To ibid., p. 33. ibid. 2eChoublier to DeIcassi tiskiib, 15 September 1902, No. 6, AMAE, 1 Turquie, Politique Intirieure, Albanie, 1902-1903, Vol. iv. 27Reverseau to Delcassd, Vienne, 9 April 1903, No. 32, in ibid. 28"Mdmoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang)," p. 6. 24Cf.

25See

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST

295

believe as did the Russian ambassador in Istanbul, Zinoviev, and other observers, that because the Albanians did not mo­ lest the Roman Catholic Albanians29 their attacks must have been inspired by Austria-Hungary, indicated scant knowl­ edge of the situation. Enmity for the Slav existed among both Moslem and Catholic Albanians; moreover, Catholic Alban­ ians in Kosovo were very few. If the Moslem Albanian at­ tacked the Serbs as Orthodox Christians, it was because they resented seeing government positions, owing to the introduc­ tion of reforms, pass from Moslems to Christians, who until then had been under their rule—and these Christians had a Serbian state to back them. The instigation then must have come from Sultan Abdul Hamid, who endeavored to make use of these anti-Serbian feelings of the Albanians for his own ends.30 The fact that the persecution against the Serbs sub­ sided after the Russian intervention was an indication of the Sultan's complicity. The intensification of the struggle in Macedonia stimulated Bulgarian interests in Albania. The Bulgarian nationalists strove to enlarge Macedonia. In the petition which the Con­ gress of the Bulgaro-Macedonian Committee in Sofia ad­ dressed to the Sultan in the summer of 1902, relative to the autonomy of the districts of Rumelia, only the vilayets of Shkoder and Janina were designated as Albanian. The sandjaks of the vilayets of Kosovo and Monastir, inhabited by a substantial Albanian population, were excluded.31 The ex­ tension of the Bulgarian boundaries in Macedonia was helped by the activity of the Bulgarian Exarchate, created upon Rus­ sian recommendation by a decree of the Sultan in 1870. In Albania, the most active centers of Bulgarian propaganda had become Ohrid and Diber, and in the latter the Exarchate had attracted some followers.32 29See

W. S. Vucinich, op.cit., pp. 33, 41-42. Chapter vm, pp. 201-204. 31See J. Larmeroux, La politique extirieure de VAutriche-Hongrie, 1875-1914, Paris, 1918, 1, 413. s2Kral to Goluchowski, Monastir, 5 June 1900, No. 37, HHStA, PA xiv/5, Albanien in; L. v. Chlumeck^, op.cit., p. 86. 80See

296

II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

The Albanians, who until then had opposed the hellenism of the Constantinople Patriarchate, were now constrained to enter into a battle with the Bulgarian and Serbian churches. The Serbs, meanwhile, through Russian pressure on the Sultan and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, had succeeded in ob­ taining permission to name a bishop also in Prizren. In 1894 a memorandum was addressed to the Sultan, in the name of 300 Albanians. It complained that the Porte had given au­ thorization to Bulgarians and Serbs to establish in Albanian territories schools, seminaries, and bishoprics in their lan­ guage, and appealed that permission be granted to the Al­ banians, too, to open schools in Albanian in those same ter­ ritories.33 Shahin Kolonja deplored the fact that the Bulgarian Exarch had obtained from the Porte privileges to found Bul­ garian schools in Diber and Tetove, "where not a word of Bulgarian is spoken," in order to turn the Albanians into Slavs.34 In order to counteract the various ecclesiastical prop­ agandas of their Balkan neighbors, the idea of an independent Albanian Orthodox Church was being promoted by Albanian patriots. At this juncture, the question of the Uniate church arose in Shpat, a region between Elbasan and Berat, in central Al­ bania, composed of 43 villages. The inhabitants of these vil­ lages were pseudo-Moslems (or crypto-Christians), that is, they appeared before the Turkish authorities with Moslem names, while in the intimacy of their families they were Orthodox Christians. The date of this external conversion of the Shpataraks into Islam is not exactly known, but it appears to have occurred in the past, at a time when neighboring Moslems or Turkish authorities exercised a strong pressure. When in 1846, owing to the reforms in Turkey, the capitation tax was abolished to be replaced for the Christians by the tax of mili­ tary service (bedel), the Shpataraks decided to declare their s3 Histori e Shqiperise, 1839-1900, p. 124. A similar memorandum was sent to the Grand Vizier in July 1896; C. P. Libardi, I primi moti patriottici albanesi nel 1910-1911-1912, Trent, 1935, 11, 225-228. si Drita, January 5-18 and April 24, 1902.

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST

297

true religion.35 In 1853, the chief elder of the Shpataraks pre­ sented himself before the Turkish authorities of Elbasan and stated officially, on behalf of the inhabitants of Shpat, that they had never been Moslems but had always been Orthodox Christians. The Turkish authorities arrested him and in­ terned him in Diber, and looked upon the Shpataraks with disfavor.36 In 1897, however, the governor of Elbasan, Jonus Effendi, exerted pressure on them either to serve as soldiers in the Turkish army, if they were Moslems, or pay taxes, if they held that they were Christians. His intention was to force them to declare themselves Moslems.37 The Shpataraks thought that it would be better for them if they became Uniates (Greek Catholics), for then they might enjoy the protection of Austria-Hungary. At the outset the consular office of this power in Durres gave no clear and decisive as­ surance that this could be done. In 1898 the Shpataraks renewed their appeal, and the Catholic clergy in Albania took an interest.38 A year later Shpat was transformed into a political arena. A letter from Shpat embodying the complaints of the inhabi­ tants reveals a trend toward the growth of Albanian national consciousness. It mentions that the Ecumenical Patriarch was Greek, that he worked for Greece, and that he strove to de­ stroy their language and make them Greeks by force. The Shpataraks thought to turn to the Pope, because he could be in a position to found Albanian schools for them: "Then we 35See J. G. v. Hahn, Albanesische Studien, Vienna, 1853, 1, 18; T. Ippen, "Die Landschaft Schpat im mittleren Albanien," Mitteilungen der kais. Konigl. geographischen Gesellsehaft in Vienna, lix (1916), 456, 459; P. Aravantinos, Khronographia tes Epeirou (Chronography of Epirus), Athens, 1957, 11, 160. 3eK. E. Mpire, Arvanites, hoi Ddrieis tou nedterou hellenismou (Al­ banians, the Dorians of Modern Hellenism), Athens, i960, p. 345. 37"Nje meshe shqip ne Berat me 1897" (A Mass in Albanian in Berat in 1897), Diturija, π (1 December 1926), 48. 38Bornemisza to Goluchowski, Durazzo, 25 January 1904, No. 2, HHStA, PA xiv/5, Albanien m; Ledoux to France's Ambassador in Turkey, Monastir, 4 February 1898; No. 6, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intirieure, Albanie, 1898-1899, Vol. 11.

298

Π. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

wrote to him to accept us in his faith." The Pope responded to their appeal, the letter continues, and sent to them the Austrian consul. Russia lost no time in dispatching her consul in Monastir to Shpat. He went "from village to village" and, after his departure, priests arrived and opened "two Greek schools, one in Valesh [Valsh] and the other in Shelcan." The Turkish government, on the other hand, ordered the con­ struction of 17 Turkish schools, the letter concludes, in order to suppress the Greek language and "make us Turks." 39 Russia was careful not to compromise her influence over the Albanian Orthodox Christians. After the return from Shpat to Monastir of her consul, Rostowsky, the Russian consul in Shkoder, Shcherbin, visited Durres, Kavaje, and Tirana in order to investigate the situation.40 The conversion movement spread in nearby Elbasan, where on March 28, 1900 some sixty Orthodox Christians together with the archimandrite, Germanos, passed over to the Uniate church. The Greek archbishop in Durres, Prokopios, under whose jurisdiction Elbasan came, attempted through the Turkish authorities, to prevent the Orthodox from embracing Uniatism. The Turkish governor not only did not intervene, but he even seemed to have recognized the converts as "Cath­ olics." 41 Archbishop Prokopios then proceeded to Monastir to see the Russian consul and it was reported that there was no doubt that "Mr. Rostowsky has again taken over the lead­ ership of the counteraction." Rostowsky re-visited Elbasan and Shpat, accompanied by Mgr. Prokopios, and with money 89Letter (Shpat, October 1899) published in Albania, 4 (1900), 66-68; cf. also G. Schiro, Gli Albanesi e la questione balkanica, Naples, 1904, pp. 326-327, and Kral to Goluchowski, Monastir, 19 May 1900, No. 29 Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv, 5, Albanien HI. 40Ledoux to Hanotaux, Monastir, 2 March 1898, No. 10, and Degrand to Delcassi, Scutari, 12 July 1898, No. 117, in AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intirieure, Albanie, 1898-1899, Vol. 11. 41A confusion occurs in the documents between Uniates and Cath­ olics—they are used interchangeably. Obviously this is because the Uniates recognize the Pope as their spiritual head.

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST

299

converts.42

and promises tried to influence the But he was at a disadvantage. As the protector of the Greek Patriarchate, Russia was unable to offer the Albanians the cultivation of their mother tongue. As far as the Shpataraks were concerned, they believed that by adhering to the Uniate church they would not only be able to manifest their faith openly—until then they had been officially Moslems—but might also be wholly or partially exempted from the military tax.43 The Austro-Hungarian consul in Shkoder, T. Ippen, fa­ vored the establishment of a Uniate church in Elbasan, al­ though its membership was only 80. He discarded, however, as untrue the opinion expressed by Mgr. Primo Bianchi that the Orthodox Christians "because of special love for Austria wanted to return to the Catholic church." The real cause of the conversions, for Ippen, was the aversion of the Albanian Orthodox Christians toward the hellenizing tendencies of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.44 On the nationally minded Al­ banians of Elbasan the conversions had made a favorable im­ pression. The patriotic beys of that town and Tirana even en­ couraged them.45 The number of the converted Albanian Orthodox Christian families seems to have risen by the end of 1900 to 55. At the bottom of this Uniate movement was the hope that the Albanians would win the protection of the Dual Monarchy, and hoped that through the Catholic clergy 42Steir [?] to Delcassi, Salonica, 30 May 1900, No. 15, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intdrieure, Albanie 1900-1901, Vol. in. 43See Kwiatkowski to the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Af­ fairs, telegram, Durazzo, 30 March 1900, No. 8158, HHStA, PA xiv/5, Albanien hi; Kral to Goluchowski, Monastir, 11 April 1900, No. 20, ibid.; Kwiatkowski to Goluchowski, Durazzo, 16 April igoo, No. 6/res., and Durazzo, 15 May 1900, No. 9, and Kral to Goluchowski, Monastir, 19 May 1900, N o . 29, Geheim, ibid. 44Ippen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 21 June 1900, No. 20D, H H S t A , PA xiv/5, Albanien HI. 45Kral to Goluchowski, Monastir, 29 March 1900, No. 15, sehr vertraulich, and Monastir, 11 April 1900, No. 20, HHStA, PA xiv/5, Albanien in; Kwiatkowski to Goluchowski, Durazzo, 2 April 1900, No. 4/res., ibid.

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they would be able to enjoy the advantages of the Kultusprotektorat, especially as to the introduction of the Albanian language in church and school, the strengthening of the na­ tional sentiment, and the acquisition of a more effective pro­ tection. Christians and Moslems saw in it the beginnings of an expansion of the Catholic church of northern Albania toward the south which, together with the national school, would break the power of hellenism among the Orthodox Albanians.46 Soon the question became more involved and passed to the capitals of the interested powers. It was both a question of principle and of politics. It seems that the most difficult task fell upon Calice, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Istan­ bul. Immediately, upon learning about the Elbasan conver­ sions, Calice wired Vienna that the Uniate church in Albania was native and that the Austrian protection of it could not derive from any of the treaties with Turkey or from the exer­ cise of the cult protectorate. He was afraid that any further­ ing of the conversion movement would provoke reprisals and hostility toward the status quo of the Austrian Kultusprotektorat, perhaps from the Turks, but especially from the Ortho­ dox Christians and the Russians, who were very sensitive to such matters.47 Preoccupied with such complications, which in Albania would be highly undesirable for the Monarchy, Calice a few days later elaborated more fully on the question of the Uniate church. He explained that the right of protec­ tion of the Austro-Hungarian government over the Catholic church was based on article IX of the Belgrade peace treaty and concerned only the order (since then abandoned) of the Trinitarians. It gradually extended to all the clergy and insti­ tutions of the Roman Catholic church, what was called in Turkey the "Latin nation." The various Uniate churches of whatever Eastern rite in Turkey were regarded as native and 4611Mimoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," pp. 20-21, HHStA, PA xiv/28, Albanien xx/3. 47Calice to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Constantinople, 31 March 1900, telegram, No. 29, HHStA, PA xiv/5, Albanien HI.

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST

301

did not enjoy a foreign protectorate, as for instance, the Bul­ garian Uniate communities. The case of the Elbasan con­ verts, however, was different insofar as they constituted a com­ munity under the Roman Catholic diocese of Durres and the Turkish authorities pretended to have already recognized it as Catholic. Yet, Calice remarked, the protectorate did not concern the members of the Uniate community, but the clergy —in the specific case, the archimandrite Germanos—and the church.48 T. Ippen, on the other hand, well versed in matters of the Kultusprotektorat, held that with the Uniates of Elbasan a Greek Catholic rite came into being which until then had not been represented in Turkey, namely the purely Greek one. It was different from the Greek Melkitic (Arabic) rite.49 As long as the Uniate church of Elbasan had no hierarchy of its own, Ippen argued, the Holy See was compelled to place it under Latin ordinaries. If the Turkish authorities did not recognize this subordination, then this would involve a viola­ tion of the freedom of the Catholic Church in Turkey.50 The Patriarchiate of Constantinople and Russia could not remain indifferent. In a meeting of the Synod of the Patriar­ chate the Elbasan conversions were discussed and the archi­ mandrite Germanos, held responsible for them, was branded as an intriguer.51 Calice feared that the Patriarchate would ask for the help of the Turkish authorities and had requested Vienna not to complicate matters. Indeed, the Turkish au­ thorities prevented Mgr. Bianchi from going to Elbasan, on the ground that his berat did not include that town within his jurisdiction. But, when Calice received orders from Vi48Calice to Goluchowski, Constantinople, 4 April 1900, No. 14D, HHStA, PA xiv/5, Albanien 111. 49On the basis of article XIII of the apostolic constitution of Novem­ ber 27, 1897, of Oriental churches, the Greek Melkitic Patriarch had jurisdiction over all the believers of the same rite in the whole of the Turkish empire. See Ippen to Goluchowski, Scutari, 28 August 1900, No. 29, HHStA, PA xiv/5, Albanien, m. 5 0 Ibid. 51Calice to Goluchowski, Constantinople, 9 May 1900, No. 19B, HHStA, PA xiv/5, Albanien 111.

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enna to intervene so that the Catholic prelate might visit Elbasan, he told the Turkish Foreign Minister, Tevfik Pasha, that his government meant business in the question of the Kultusprotektorat. 62 As for Russia, she first protested to the Porte. Her Chargi d'Affaires, Shterbachev, as reported by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Tevfik Pasha, sought to represent the whole move­ ment of the Uniate conversions as caused by the vengeance of a priest, Germanos, who had forgotten his duty toward his bishop. He also found fault with the Porte, pretending that Germanos met with such success among the Orthodox Christians because he deceived them that as Catholics they would be protected from further repressions.53 Then Russia took the complaints to Vienna. Her ambassador there, Count Kapnist, brought up the question of the Elbasan conversions at a meeting with Goluchowski. He stated that the Austrian consuls in Albania with their excessive zeal contributed to the conversions. He stressed that his government, owing to the interest of the Russian people in the followers of the Orthodox Church, was concerned about the matter. Explain­ ing the Austrian side of the conversions, Goluchowski added that "Russia in no way exercises a religious protectorate in these regions." 64 Yet the Austro-Hungarian government was cautious about its conduct in Albania. Its consular representatives were in­ structed that they should be careful above all not to give rise to suspicions that Austria-Hungary was interested in man­ aging the nationalist movement by supporting the Uniate religious propaganda. It advised them that the task of the Catholic protectorate in Albania was to support the existing institutions of the Catholic Church and not the expansion 62See ibid.; Beilage in Calice to Goluchowski, Constantinople, 9 May 1900, No. 19C, HHStA, PA xvi/5, Albanien HI; Calice to Goluchowski, Constantinople, 16 May 1900, N o . 20E, together w i t h t w o Beilagen, i b i d . 53Calice to Goluchowski, Jenikoy [Constantinople], 13 June 1900, No. 24, F, HHStA, PA xiv/5, Albanien in. 54Goluchowski to Aehrenthal in St. Petersburg, Vienna, 2 August 1900, telegram, No. 233, HHStA1 PA xiv/5, Albanien hi.

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST

303

of the Catholic faith. At the same time the consular repre­ sentatives should be careful not to make the Turks doubt the political motives of the Monarchy, for then they would act against her.55 The Uniate movement in Elbasan and Shpat continued with fluctuations for several years. By 1907 it had petered out. On the one hand, there were the difficulties which the con­ verts and their priests encountered on the part of the adher­ ents of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the supporters of Russia; on the other, the Austro-Hungarian government, despite repeated efforts of its embassy in Istanbul, could not obtain a firman from the Sultan for the construction of a Uniate church in Elbasan.58 Coming back to Serbia, we observe that her leaders had become obsessed with the idea of obtaining an exit to the sea—to the Adriatic. Vladan Djordjevii has noted that in his talks with his sovereigns, Milan and Alexander Obrenovii1 he had suggested that the Serbs ask Turkey's permission to construct a railway line from Mitrovice over Prizren to Shkoder, as far as the port of Shen Gjin (San Giovanni di Medua). He thought that it would not be difficult to persuade the Sultan that in this way he could become the real master 55Goluchowski to Kral in Monastir, Vienna, 13 June 1900, No. 161, HHStA1 PA xiv/5, Albanien in. 56Bornemisza to Goluchowski, Tirana/Durazzo, 8 March 1904, No. ig; Kraus to Aehrenthal, [Monastir?], 8 April 1907, No. 15; Szdcsen to Aehrenthal, Rome, 25 June 1907, No. 17F (in it a memo from the Propaganda Fide—Protocollo No. 22707, per gli AfEari di Rito Orientale, Rome, 18 June 1907—is included, where the conversion of Papa Naum and other inhabitants of Shpat is confirmed)—all i n H H S t A , PA xiv/5, Albanien HI. See also "Memoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," p. 20. With the creation of the Albanian independent state, the problem of the Shpataraks was solved: they could declare themselves as belonging to any religion they liked. As for the Uniate church of Elbasan, it passed into oblivion to be remembered only on the eve and during the Italian Fascist occupation of Albania. For their own political reasons, the Italians tried to revive it. Yet for a decade the Uniate movement stirred up the nationalist movement of the Al­ banians and stimulated their interest in an Albanian Orthodox Church.

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of Albania. Without this railway the "politcial anarchy" in Albania would continue, for the Porte would not be in a po­ sition to put sufficient troops there. The Serbian Prime Min­ ister was certain that Austria-Hungary would oppose the project, but he hoped to have at Istanbul the support of Russia, Italy, and perhaps France.57 It seems that around this time the Russians had their own plans about an "Adriatic Railway." When N.V.T. Charykov arrived in Belgrade, in the spring of 1901, as Russia's Minister, apart from his objective of improving relations between Serbia and Bulgaria, he also had to prepare the way for the construction of a railway line which would link the Danube to the Adriatic through Serbia and Montenegro,58 passing undoubtedly through Albanianinhabited territory. The Macedonian imbroglio involved the great powers and Albania's Balkan neighbors. When Turkey accepted the Miirzsteg Agreement, Austria-Hungary asked that the western part of the vilayet of Kosovo (the sandjaks of Plevlja, Prishtine, Prizren, Sjenice, and Novi Pazar) be excluded from the reform program and that reforms in the eastern part of that vilayet (the districts of Kacanik, Kumanove, Kratova, Palanka, and liskiib) be entrusted exclusively to her gendarmerie officers. The Serbian efforts to extend the reform program to the west­ ern part of the vilayet of Kosovo and to prevent AustriaHungary from acquiring the right to administer reforms in the eastern part failed. Russia, having suffered reverses in the war with Japan, was not in a position to support Serbia's pro­ tests energetically. She could only achieve an agreement that in the western part of the vilayet of Kosovo "reliable" Turkish officers be employed. The victory of Austria-Hungary meant that this power was determined to keep the area free from any other influence.59 The Murzsteg agreement made Pasic, the Serbian Prime Minister, change his attitude toward Macedonia. Originally 57Dr.

V. Georgevitch, Das Ende der Obrenovitch, Leipzig, 1905, as quoted in L. v. Chlumeckf, op.cit., pp. 177-178. 58See W. S. Vucinich, op.cit., p. 35. i Hbid., pp. 127-129.

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST

305

he was against the creation of "another Slavic state and na­ tionality"; now he was ready to accept a separate Macedonia, if it were not created at Serbia's expense. In the hope that the vilayet of Kosovo would go to Serbia and Montenegro, fol­ lowing a Turkish downfall, he opposed its inclusion into Macedonia.60 Despite opposing interests between Serbia and Bulgaria—each having her own views as to the frontiers of Macedonia—the two powers on April 12, 1904, signed a secret Treaty of Alliance. Albania was an object of concern in this treaty. It was agreed that if the occasion arose the Albanian problem should be treated in such a way as to further an alliance between Serbia and Montenegro, favor­ able to the interests of the latter.61 It appears that in 1906 the Serbs and Bulgarians reached an understanding as to the spheres of guerrilla activity: the northern part of Kosovo and the district of Prizren-Gjakove was to be within the activity of the Serbian guerrillas, whereas the regions lying to the south would be under the jurisdiction of the bands of the Bulgarian Committee.62 Yet a rapprochement between Bel­ grade and Sofia never really materialized. After the agreement of the Ambassadors in Istanbul in 1881 it had become evident to the Greeks that their claims to Epirus depended to a considerable degree on the attitude of the Albanians. For this reason in the year 1883-1884 they carried on a broad political activity, aimed either at neutral­ izing Albanian armed opposition in the event of a war against Turkey or at drawing the Albanians to the anti-Turkish camp and exploiting their military force. To bring about de­ terioration in Turkish-Albanian relations, the Greeks tried to incite the Albanians to revolt against the Porte.63 In 1883 a shady committee was formed in Corfu with Al­ bania as its center of interest. The Albanians call it the Al60Ibid.,

p. 137. article 5 of the English translation of the text in E. C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Warsj 1912-1913, Cambridge, Mass., 1938, Appendix 11. Only the vilayets of Shkoder and Janina were con­ sidered Albanian territory. 62Cf. L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., pp. 99-101. 63 Histori e Shqiperise, 1839-1900, p. 107. 61See

306

Π. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

banian-Greek Committee;84 the Austrian documents refer to it as the English-Albanian Committee.65 Officially it was known as Comitato Centrale dell'Alta Albania,ββ which by implica­ tion excluded the southern part of Albania. The pretended president of this committee was a certain G. W. Leybourne, an insurance employee according to the Austrians, a civil engineer resident in Corfu according to the London Times. 6 7 This Englishman boasted that he was in touch with Glad­ stone and other British statesmen and personalities, but the English Charge d'Affaires in Athens considered him an ad­ venturer interested in creating with English capital a com­ pany for the exploitation of forests in Epirus. Thus perhaps could be explained his relations with all kinds of people in Albania and the considerable funds at his disposal.68 According to the statements of the Corfu Committee, its goal was to liberate the Albanians, the Epirots, and the Mace­ donians and unite their countries. The first declaration was addressed to the heads of liberal Europe and the second to the civilized people of Europe. Although the second mani­ festo was issued in the name of the Albanians, Epirots, and Macedonians, it was signed "The Albanians" and carried the name of Leybourne for the Central Committe at Corfu. In the manifesto these Balkan peoples complained about the oppressive Turkish domination and asked to be liberated, "for the Servians, Bulgarians, Roumanians, and Roumelians are free." Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty they regarded as a dead letter,69 claiming that the Sultan and his followers defied the European powers. The declaration stated: "We have asked 6 i Ibid. e5Notizen

iiber Mr. Leighbourn (Leybourn) und das english-albanische Comiti in Corfu, HHStA, Gesandeschaftsarchiv Konstantinopel, Fasz. 422. e e Ibid. e 7 The Times (London), 7 May 1884, 7:1. e8Notizen iiber Mr. Leighbourn (Leybourn) . . . , HHStA Ges. Arch. 1 Konstantinopel, Fasz. 423. 69This article refers to non-Turkish populations within the empire for whose regions the Porte was obliged to form committees, on which they would be heavily represented. These committees would compose special

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST

307

the crowned heads of Europe for relief. Now we appeal to such of her peoples as have liberty to espouse our cause and to compel the Turk to let us decide our destiny by a plebiscite. In this way we may obtain our liberty without the aid of fire and sword. But if we cannot obtain this, then we must by a vigorous attack expel the barbarian, bag and baggage." 70 The fact that the Corfu Committee had its headquarters on Greek soil and that it divided the territories under Turkish rule north of the Kalamas river into Epirus and Albania was a sufficient proof for the Albanian patriots that it was under Greek influence. In the hope of inciting the Albanians to revolt against the Porte, the Corfu Committee repeated the old proposal for the formation of a common Greek-Albanian state, under the crown of the King of Greece. Albanian mem­ bers of the Committee, like the adventurer Prenk Gjok Curri from Mirdite and Hajredin Bey Mati, who had fled Turkey for ordinary crimes and had found asylum in Greece, were sent to Albania and Albanian settlements abroad to propa­ gate these ideas.71 At this time Athens called upon the Albanians to revolt against Turkey and take part in the federation of the Balkan states which Kharilaos Trikoupis, the Greek Prime Minister, was trying to form. In this federation, which he claimed would be aided by England and Italy, the Balkan states would assure territorial benefits at the expense of Turkey so as to preserve the previous relationship of power. But to the Albanians Trikoupis made no concrete commitment.72 The reply of the Albanians was given by De Rada, who held that Greece, Ruregulations for each province separately, according to its needs, to assure autonomous administration. The regulations would be presented to Istanbul, but to be valid, they had to be approved by a committee of the great powers. 70Text in The Times (London), 7 May 1884, 7:1-2; see also Notizen liber Mr. Leighbourn (Leybourn) . . . , HHStA, Ges. Arch. Konstantinopel, Fasz. 432. 71Le Rie to Ferry, Scutari, 24 November 1888, No. 129, AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Scutari, 1884-1889, Vol. liIbid.., p. 108. xxiu; Histori e Shqiperise, 1839-1900, p. 107.

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mania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro, who were inde­ pendent and had a free hand, could be federated, and given support by England or any other power in case Turkey or any other state opposed them. As for Albania, she would decide for herself after seeing the outcome: "Otherwise, we will en­ deavor to uncover the black snake that advises [Albania] to rise for something that does not exist and to start herself, divided, without funds, without arms, without tactics [mili­ tary training?], and with a small force, the war on Turkey, who has all these in great quantities and more allies to help her." 73 Concurrently, the Greek government, with a view to at­ tracting the Albanians, organized an Albanian cultural so­ ciety in which descendants of Albanians who had settled in Greece before and during the Turkish conquest participated. The society was named Hoi Vlamides Alvanoi (The Bloodbrother Albanians) and was founded on June 6, 1884, under the presidency of Col. Dimitrios Botsaris from Souli. Al­ though the very fact of its creation was a recognition of Al­ banian culture, its aim was to prevent the spread of the Latin alphabet among the Albanians and introduce the Greek one as an instrument of hellenization. However, the society proved to be a failure, for no work in Albanian was published by it.75 It seems that European personalities, influenced by Greek propaganda, exercised pressure on the Albanian patriots for a Greek-Albanian union. Again De Rada was the Albanian spokesman. In February 1886 he wrote in his organ Fiamuri Arberit: "Some distinguished foreigners reproach us for de­ taching the fate of Albania from that of Greece, thus causing the weakening of both countries. They don't understand that our separate existence today makes us continue [as a people] and that union would put an end to our existence." 75 n Fiamuri

Arberit (The Flag of Albania), 30 March 1884; see also G. De Rada, "Testamento Politico," Shejzat (Le Pleiadi), vm (1964), 189, note. li Histori e Shqiperise, 1839-1900, pp. 107-108. '5As quoted in ibid.., pp. 108-109.

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST

309

When the Rumelian crisis o£ 1885 broke out, Greek public opinion favored immediate occupation of Epirus. The Deliyannis cabinet opposed it as hazardous; instead it has­ tened military preparation, hoping that by a show of force Greece could gain territorial concessions.76 The mobilization spurred the Greek element of Epirus and the Grecoman Or­ thodox Albanians to propagandize against the Turks and Albanians. Because of the adherence of Albanian beys to the national movement, they sought to represent it as a masked Turkish movement, whose victory would deprive the Chris­ tian Albanians of the protection of the Ecumenical Patriar­ chate and would impose a yoke harsher than that of Turkey. Meanwhile, Turkey, in order to counteract Greek mobiliza­ tion, dispatched troops to the Greek frontier, including, as usual, Albanian irregulars. Looting ensued and Albania's partition re-emerged. The feudal lords, who had never wanted to be detached from Turkey, and the patriots as well saw no reason now to oppose Turkey.77 Pressure on the part of the great powers—the blockade of Piraeus on May 18, 1886 —compelled Greece to demobilize. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the be­ ginning of the twentieth century several plans for the federa­ tion or confederation of the Balkans were advanced. They originated with both Greek and non-Greek individuals and societies. Albania was often included in them, united either with Greece or with Macedonia.78 These various federation projects testify to the complicated situation in the peninsula and to the desire to find a solution. They were all impractical. In 1900 the Greco-Albanians in Greece formed an Alba­ nian Union in Athens, the most prominent members of which were Seho, Botsari, and Dzavella. In March of that year they 76See M. Lascaris, "Greece and Serbia during the War of 1885," Slavonic Review, xi Quly 1932), 88-89. 77 Histori e Shqiperise, 1839-1900, p. 113. 78See L. S. Stavrianos, op.cit., pp. 145-146, 150; R. Pinon, "Une con­ federation balkanique est-elle possible?," Revue des deux mondes, LXII (15 June 1910), 808-809 and note on p. 809.

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appealed to the Albanians of Albania proper. Departing from the belief of a common origin of Greeks and Albanians—the Pelasgian theory—and refraining from religious discrimina­ tion, they argued that "Greece without Albania and Albania without Greece are half.... When Greece and Albania unite, then there will be a great Greece and a great Albania. . . . As we are at present we need to lean on the shoulders of a neighbor." 79 A similar line was pursued by the paper Aster-Yll (Star), which appeared in 1901 in Athens. It published articles in Greek and Albanian, using Greek letters for the latter. Its political program was Albanian revival with the assistance of Greece and Greco-Albanian dualism, although articles ap­ peared which maintained that Albania was not capable of governing herself.80 Dualism, however, meant Greek suprem­ acy and the Tosk beys would not hear of that. They would accept as a precurser of Albanian independence only a great foreign power, not a state whose citizens had but a short time ago been subjects of the Turks.81 In the rivalry among the powers in Albania, Greek and Italian interests clashed. As Italy was interested in Epirus, she tried to paralyze Greek influence there, and awaken Albanian sentiment among the Moslems. She promised to the beys com­ plete independence in the near future.82 In 1902 the Greeks wanted to annex not only Epirus but also the southern part of Albania proper, as far as the river Seman, north of Vlore.83 The Greek consuls in Berat and Janina—and their number seems to have been greater than that of any other power in 79K.

E. Mpire, op.cit., p. 9; G. Schiro, op.cit., pp. 97-98. to Goluchowski, Scutari, 22 March 1902, No. 14, HHStA, PA xiv/16, Albanien XII 1/7; Drita, Sofia, 17-31 January and 20 May 1902. 81"Memoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 Anfang 1905)/' p. 4, HHStA, PA xiv/28, Albanien xx/g. 82Podhayski to Flourens, Janina, 20 April 1887, No. 4, AMAE, Turyuie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Janina, 1885-1895, Vol. xn. 83Cf. "Italien und die albanesische Frage," editorial, Die Grenzboten, LX (1901), 291-292. 80Ippen

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311

southern Albania84—were hostile to the Italians. In Janina, the archbishop Sophronios issued a circular exhorting the Orthodox parents not to send their children to the Italian Industrial School in the city.85 With Austria-Hungary, Greece (if we exclude Trikoupis's attitude) desired to be on good terms, despite interest of the former in Salonica.80 On June 13, 1885 Deliyannis advised the Greek Legation in Istanbul: "We consider this govern­ ment [the Austro-Hungarian] as our most sincere and natural ally in all questions which might arise in the Ottoman Em­ pire." 87 Austria, on the other hand, became more interested in Greece when Italy entered the Balkan political scene. As Greece and Montenegro were the two Balkan states interested in expanding in Albania, in order to counterbalance Italy's influence on Montenegro the Monarchy for a time inspired Greek policy.88 At the end of 1903 the King of Greece, George I, made a rather prolonged trip in Austria. Rumors started to circulate that a secret treaty had been signed between the two monarchs. Millelire, the Italian consul in Janina, informed his government that it concerned regions which would jeopardize the interests of Turkey, the aspirations of the Albanian Mos­ lems, and Italian influence.89 Tittoni then directed his am­ bassador in Vienna, Avama, to investigate the matter. Avarna replied at length. If such a treaty existed, he argued, it would seem to shake the basis of the sovereignty of the Sultan and prepare the ground for a change in the status of southern 8 i Ibid. 85Silvestrelli

to the Minister of Foreign Affairs [Prinetti], Athens, 11 November 1903, No. 1098/416, ASMAE; see also Greek newspaper Asty (City), 12-30 October 1902. 86E. Driault and M. Lhiritier, Histoire diplomatique de la Grkce, de 1821 ά nos jours, Paris, 1925, iv, 161, 188-191. 87Quoted in ibid., p. 200. s s Ibid., pp. 332-333· 89See Avarna to Tittoni, Vienna, 24 July 1904, No. 1090/473, Riservato, ASMAE.

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II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

Albania. If it were evident that the interest of Austria-Hun­ gary was that Greece should pursue a policy, contrary to that of Bulgaria and Serbia, which would contribute to greater stability in the Balkans—and such was her intention in bring­ ing about the rapprochement with Rumania 90—it was to be questioned what interest she would have in an agreement undermining the order of things she had tried to consolidate. However, given the suspicions of Greece toward Italy, which she accused of having aspirations in southern Albania, Avarna did not exclude the possibility that she could have raised the dangers which both countries ran if hellenism were not suc­ cessful. But in that instance Austria would have restricted herself, though assuring Athens of her benevolence, to recom­ mending that Greece should not bring up matters apt to affect the sovereignty of the Sultan and consequently disturb the peace in the Balkan peninsula. Avarna appears to have been convinced that Austria's policy at that time was for the status quo.81 In June igo6 the question of the Greco-Austrian treaty came into the open. The Courrier des Balkans, which ap­ peared in Rome, published a sensational article: "Le traite secret entre ΓAutriche et la Grece." It was said that the treaty had been signed in Vienna in December 1903 by the Emperor of Austria and King George of Greece. Then the text of the alleged treaty was given, which divided the spheres of influ­ ence between Austria and Greece in Albania.92 In reality, the conversations of King George in Vienna did not result in a written record. He made no commitment. But he recognized "that the interests of Austria were not in contradiction to those of Greece and that the legitimate ambitions of the latter could not but be served by an understanding between the two countries." 83 Although no secret treaty between Austria and 90He

obviously refers to the treaty of 30 October 1883, between Austria-Hungary and Rumania. 91Avarna to Tittoni, ibid. 82See text of article and supposed treaty in L. v. Chlumeck^, op.cit., note on pp. 243-244. 93E. Driault and M. Lhiritier, op.cit., p. 33a.

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST

313

Greece was signed,94 one still finds references to its existence in historical writings.95 The Foreign Minister of Greece, Theotokis, was another statesman concerned about Italy and Albania. While speak­ ing about Macedonia to the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Athens, he turned proprio motu to the Albanian problem, discussing Greece's claims to Epirus and mentioning Italy's aspirations.96 The Greeks regarded an active Italian propa­ ganda in Albania as a greater obstacle to Greek aspirations than the efforts of Ismail Kemal for an autonomous Albania.97 It is perhaps of interest to note, in this connection, a federa­ tive plan of which Ismail Kemal was the author.98 The plan, which was presented in 1892 to Sultan Abdul Hamid, aimed to establish an entente between the Balkan states and Turkey through a defensive and economic agreement. This would be a prelude to the constitution of a Great Eastern State, with Turkey as its center. The entente would be free and the peo­ ples of each state would have the right to settle in any part of the great state thus formed, with the right to engage in any enterprise they wished. Turkey's advantages would be the aiIbid.,

p. 479, note 4. Larmeroux in op.cit., 1918, 11, 390-391 gives prominence to its existence, although he refers to L. v. Chlumecky's book, where the author says categorically that the information about the Greco-Austrian treaty was "von Anfang bis zu Ende erfundene Nachricht" (note on p. 243). In a survey of Albanian history by Prof. Zef Viezzoli, "Shqipnija ne Gjire te Diplomacis—Qe prej traktatit te Berlinit deri ne lufte botnore" (Albania in the Whirlpool of Diplomacy—From the Treaty of Berlin to World War I), Leka, Shkoder, Vj, ix, No. VHI-XII (28 November 1937), 481-503, the treaty is given as extant. Although the writer gives as ref­ erence L. v. Chlumecky's work, it is evident that what he writes in con­ nection with the treaty (p. 486) is based on J. Larmeroux, upon whose work he has drawn extensively, although not referring to its parts. This is one of those errors, intentional or unintentional, which are perpetu­ ated by repetition and should be stopped. 96Macchio to Aehrenthal, Athens, 31 March 1907, No. 10A-C, streng vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/6. 87Mittag to Aehrenthal, Athens, 26 May 1907, No. 20D, vertraulich, PA xiv/g, Albanien v/6. 98I have never seen it mentioned, even in L. S. Stavrianos, op.cit. 95J.

314

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re-establishment of her unity as a state, with the old frontiers, the increase of her strength resulting from the unity of the peoples for their mutual defense, and the use of their re­ sources for the economic development of the empire. If Al­ bania or Macedonia were not mentioned in the project as states, the reason appears to be the fact that they formed part of Turkey and would not feel the need of independence within such a federative arrangement." However, when the situation in Macedonia later became complicated, a tendency emerged to tie that territory closely to Albania. In 1895 the Ligue pour la confed£ration balkanique was founded in Paris, supported by the Ligue Inter­ nationale de la paix et de la liberte. Its goal was the formation of a confederation of all the peoples of Oriental Europe and Asia Minor, including those of Macedonia and Albanians. According to its statutes, Macedonia and Albania "would form a free and federative state" (art. 3).100 In Macedonia the Vlakh question, which affected Greece directly, did not leave the Albanians untouched. The pro­ moter of the Vlakh movement was Aspotol Margariti, director of the Vlakh school in Vlakho-Klissoura, Macedonia. He in­ tensified his activity after the Berlin Congress. He tried to open schools and churches in the language of his people (the literary language for the Vlakhs was Rumanian) in Macedo­ nia, Epirus, and Thessaly, but was hindered by the Greek clergy.101 a9 The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, ed. S. Strong, London, 1920, pp. 216-217. The plan is part of his "Memorandum on the State of the Empire" (pp. 208-219). Ismail Kemal then adds (p. 219): "I learned that the Sultan had already been put au courant with the idea of the formation of a federal Eastern State. After receiving my memorandum, he sent me a study on the same subject which had been presented to him by the King of Montenegro, who had previously spoken to his Majesty about it when he was his guest." 100R. Pinon, "Une conKdiration balkanique est-elle possible?," p. 809 and note 1. 101Moreau to Waddington, Janina, 31 December 1878, No. 175, AMAE, Turquie, Correspondance politique des consuls, Janina, 18771898, Vol. ix.

BALKAN AND GREAT POWER INTEREST

315

There were some writers who believed that Italy supported the Vlakh propaganda in order to unite under her influence Albania and Rumania.102 Some Greeks thought it was the Rumanians who stirred it up, seeking in Epirus and Mace­ donia pawns to exchange for territories they desired to annex in Transylvania.103 In reality, the Vlakh movement, provoked by Apostol Margariti, was subsidized by the Rumanian gov­ ernment. Timid in the beginning, it became, in the course of time, quite daring. When the irade of May 22, 1905, recog­ nizing the Vlakh communities, was issued, the relations be­ tween Greece and Rumania became very tense; they would have waged war had they been neighbors.104 Albanians and Vlakhs often supported each other in their efforts, for both people joined in a hatred against hellenism and slavism and a fidelity toward the Sultan.105 These various conflicts of interests of neighbors and great powers, opposing or supporting them, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, could not help but make the Albanian people more aware of their national individuality and their national interests. 102See

L. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., pp. 138-141. Driault and M. Lhdritier, op.cit., p. 516. xoi Ibid.., pp. 502, 515, 522 and note 1, 550. 105R. Pinon, "La question albanaise," Revue des deux mondes, Liv (1909), 805; S. Sami Bey Frascheri, Was War Albanien, was ist es, was wird es werdenf, Aus dem Tiirkischen iibersetzt von A. Traxler, Vienna and Leipzig, 1913, p. 33; A. Galanti, L'Albania, Rome, 1901, p. 233. 103E.

Pretenders to an Imaginary Throne THE DEVELOPMENTS which were taking place rapidly in Eu­

ropean Turkey, particularly in Macedonia, led people to think that in Albania as well political changes were immi­ nent. It was believed that they could lead to the formation of an autonomous vilayet or to a principality. At first the patriots could conceive only of an autonomous Albania within the framework of the Ottoman empire, as proposed in the period of the Albanian League. By 1890, however, under the pressure of circumstances, their political thinking began to change, and a range of possibilities as to the form of government emerged. Indicative is a letter which Abdul Frasheri, the architect of the League of Prizren, ad­ dressed in 1890 to Francesco Crispi. It was written on behalf of the group of prominent Albanians who lived in Istanbul and delivered to him personally by Prince Fuad of Egypt.1 Abdul urged European justice put a halt to the unbearable situation of Albania by making it an autonomous province or a small kingdom, in keeping with the new organization of the Balkans. He let it be known that the Albanians were willing to be part of a Balkan confederation or even recognize the supremacy of a great power, provided that the administrative autonomy and the natural and enthnographic frontiers of their fatherland were preserved. But these frontiers were difficult to demarcate. Abdul in his letter drew them as they were visualized by the Albanian patriots of that time. In the north, Albania would border on Montenegro, Bosnia, and Serbia; in the south, on the gulf of Ambracia and Greece. In the east, the natural and ethno­ graphic frontier would be a line from the Serbian frontier near Vrana which would cross the Vardar, between Uskiib (Skopje) and Veles, following the summits of the Babuna mountains and a range of other mountains, thus leaving to 1Abdul

Frasheri to Francesco Crispi, 16 September 1890, ASMAE, Fasc. 1493.

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Albania Prilep, Monastir, Fiorina, Kastoria and Grevena, as far as the Greek boundary. If to the west of this line there were included some thousands of Bulgarians, Vlakhs, and Greeks, in return many more Albanians were left on the other side of it. As for Macedonia, that is, the vilayet of Salonica with the southeastern territories of the sandjaks of Monastir and Uskiib, if Europe wished to grant her a similar autonomy, the Albanians would have no objections. Macedo­ nia could even be advantageously joined with Albania as a dual state under the same prince. Abdul argued that the Albanians, who as a rule paid little attention to religious differences, would welcome with pleas­ ure European laws and organization. But they would always prefer as a prince one of their own blood, familiar with their customs and capable of guiding them to progress. He pro­ posed, in the name of the Albanian notables in Istanbul, as the future king of Albania, Fuad Pasha, prince of Egypt, grandson of the famous Mehmed Ali, the organizer of the vice-kingdom of Egypt, who, "remembering the land that gave birth to his illustrious ancestor and feeling the Albanian blood running in his veins," decided to serve the cause of his mother country.2 Fuad's European education and his military capacities acquired in the Italian army, Abdul believed, had given him a strong affinity for the West.3 The fact that the letter was addressed to Crispi by Abdul Frasheri was evidence that the proposal for Fuad as future king of Albania was a serious one. It seems to have been well thought out by the Istanbul group. Fuad, considered of Al­ banian blood, would please the Albanians as a whole; being a Moslem prince, he would be especially welcome to the Moslem Albanians. Coming from the Orient, he would not 2Mehmed

Ali, the founder of the defunct Egyptian dynasty, was Al­ banian by origin. 3This author has not been able to find anything about "details and explanations" which, according to the letter, Fuad Pasha was expected to give orally to Crispi on the matter of his reaction to the proposal of Abdul Frasheri.

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cause an abrupt break with the Turkish past, and still less if he were to be under Turkish suzerainty. Because he had a European education and military training, he was expected to be more receptive to western ideas and more inclined to reforms. This would make him acceptable to the Western nations, particulary Italy, which had interests in Albania. England, too, because she was interested in Egypt, might be friendly in her attitude toward the new small kingdom. From many angles, it could be said, the choice of Fuad was advantageous. In the 1890's, the Albanian Society of Istanbul was reor­ ganized and named the Albanian Committee. At the head of it was Sami Frasheri. He seems even in 1890, and especially in light of his subsequent writings, to have thought differ­ ently from his brother Abdul. Certainly the selection of a prince of Albanian blood for the eventual throne of Albania must have had an attraction for him. But the political pro­ gram of the Albanian Committee, which carried the title "What the Albanians Want," written probably by Sami, ad­ vocated a republican form of government. It asked that the great powers constitute a free Albanian state to be ruled not by a Moslem or Western prince, but by a council composed of representatives of the territorial departments, from which its president would be elected.4 It was a substantial departure from the proposals contained in Abdul's letter. However, considering that this was the time of powerful monarchies in Europe, Sami's proposed regime for Albania was unrealistic. Candiates for the future throne of Albania began to appear in Europe. The first was Don Juan de Aladro y Perez de Valasco, who adopted for himself the Albanian name Prince Gjin Aladro Kastriota. He was born in 1845 Spain and in 1867 he entered the diplomatic service of that country, climb­ ing the ranks from attachi to minister abroad. Following the death of Alfonso XII, he resigned from the diplomatic serv­ ice. In 1886 he settled in Paris, where he became president of the international commission of the Spanish Railways in the i History

e Shqiperise, 1839-1900,

p. 131.

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319

Pyrenees. Up to this point the various accounts about his life agree.5 The divergences arise with the question of origin. Aladro himself claimed that he was a descendant of Skenderbeg, a sister of the Albanian hero having married one of his ancestors. This assertion did not satisfy Faik Konitza, who asked him to prove his origin. On the basis of what Aladro had said and what had been published in the Dictionnaire des contemporains, this ancestor was his great-grandfather, the prince de Aladro, who followed King Charles from Naples to Spain. But the sister of Skenderbeg lived in the fifteenth century and Aladro's great-grandfather at the end of the 18th century, more than 300 years thus separating these two per­ sonages.6 There were also reports that Aladro was the natural son of a wine merchant, Domecq, from whom he inherited a great fortune, and that he attached to his name a title of nobility. His mother's side was completely unknown.7 Perhaps Aladro was attracted by the prospect of the Alba­ nian throne when he was a member of the diplomatic corps in Bucharest, where the Albanian colony was active.8 But the idea of working for it was apparently conceived when he set­ tled in Paris. He had certain qualities for it: a title of nobility, diplomatic service, connections, and wealth. As Spain, through Naples, had had contacts with Skenderbeg, his story of descent was plausible. In 1899 he issued a manifesto, hinting at his "royal blood," and put himself at the head of the Albanian national movement. From that time on he worked for the 5See Pasetti to Goluchowski, Rome, 12 February 1902, No. 7J, HHStA, PA xiv/12, Albanien νιιι/i; "M£moire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," pp. 24-25, HHStA, PA xiv/28, Albanien xx/3; G. Schiri), Gli Albanesi e la questione balkanica, Naples, 1904, p. 35; Drita, Sofia, 1-14 November 1901; Leoni to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 16 June 1913, No. 310/150, ASMAE. β Albania , VII (1902), 70 and ix (1904), 114. 7Dubsky to Goluchowski, Madrid, 14 April 1902, No. 35, HHStA, PA xiv/12, Albanien vm/i. 8See Alric to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 17 January 1904, No. 264, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intirieure, Albanie, 19041905, Vol. v.

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liberation of Albania from Turkey and her independence, directing from Paris the action of his Albanian friends.9 At the outset, Aladro managed to draw to his side several prominent Albanians, like Faik Konitza and Shahin Kolonja. He was praised for having established a "Skenderbeg prize" of iooo francs to be awarded every year to an Albanian who would contribute either to the enrichment of the Albanian language or to the propagation of its teaching. He himself be­ gan to take lessons in Albanian. Several poems appeared in his praise; even Geg Postripa (pseudonym for Luigj Gurakuqi), a distinguished intellectual from Shkoder, dedicated to him a poem with the title "A New Star." 10 Every year Aladro issued appeals and manifestos. They were often repetitious and bombastic. His demands, however, were in accordance with those of the patriots. He asked for the unification of the Albanian vilayets, opposed the foreign schools, and urged the opening of Albanian national schools. He appealed for brotherhood among the Albanians, as dic­ tated by the Koran and the Gospels, and the defense of the integrity of their fatherland. He always concluded as "The humble servant of Albania" and signed "Prince Gjin Aladro Kastriota." 11 He tried to build a cult around his person through the press, the letters of his secretary Viske Babatasi from Korςε, the distribution of portraits, appeals, and post­ cards, and liberal use of his money.12 Aladro found continued support among many of the ItaloAlbanians. It is possible that some of their chiefs thought that they could exercise control over him and could take advantage of his connections and actions. The pretender, on the other hand, might have regarded their friendship as help9Pasetti

to Goluchowski, Rome, ia February 1902, No. 7J, HHStA, PA xiv/ia, Albanien, vm/i; "Memoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," p. 25. 1 0 Albania, vi (1901), 105 and 132; Drita, 1-14 November 1901. 11See texts of proclamations issued in 1902 and 1903 in A. Lorecchio, Il pensiero politico albanese in rapporto agli interessi italiani, Rome, 1904, Note e documenti, pp. ccclxx-ccclxxviii. 12"M6moire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang (1905)," p. 25.

PRETENDERS TO AN IMAGINARY THRONE

321

ful in promoting his influence on the Italian party in Alba­ nia. He then moved the center of his activity from Paris to Naples and Corfu. One of his staunch supporters was A. Lorecchio, who wrote in La Nazione Albanese that the Al­ banians should thank God for the appearance of Aladro. "The august speech of the descendant of our greatest hero" marked the beginning of a new period for the history of Albanian redemption and reanimated the Albanians and made them feel more secure.13 He also took up Aladro's de­ fense when the latter was accused of being merely an oppor­ tunist. 14 Elsewhere abroad Aladro was supported by Perlindja Shqiptare (Albanian Revival), organ of the Albanian Society Shpresa (Hope) of Bucharest.15 However, those who attacked Aladro, accusing him of per­ sonal ambition and vainglory, were not only "the enemies of the Albanian name," as Lorecchio put it, but also Albanian patriots, who at first had backed him up. In the beginning they may have thought the prestige of his name would inspire confidence and thus benefit the Albanian movement. More­ over, the fact that he came from a country distinterested in Albania, Spain, made him less exposed to the political influ­ ences of the neighboring states. But they were soon disil­ lusioned. One of the first patriots to pass to the offensive was Faik Konitza. He called Aladro insane, but did not accuse him wildly, as did N. Nago in Shqiptari (Albanian), of being a tool of Russia.16 Konitza published in Albania an article which had appeared in L'Europeen under the signature of Guillaume Apollinaire, one of the forerunners of surrealism in poetry in France, entitled "Deux faux princes d'Albanie," one of whom was Aladro; he ridiculed the research on Alad­ ro's origin and tried to prove that he could not be a descend13As cited in G. Schir6, op.cit., p. 339; see also La Nazione Albanese, 15 December 1901. 14A. Lorecchio, op.cit., pp. 75-76. 15Pallavicini to Goluchowski, Bucharest, 8 January 1904, No. iF, HHStA, PA xiv/16, Albanien xn/1-7. 11 'Albania, vni (1903), 157-157; Shqiptari 8 June 1903. j

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ant of Skenderbeg.17 Another opponent of Aladro was the Italo-Albanian patriot and poet, Giuseppe Schir6. Aladro wrote to him that his efforts were directed toward uniting all the Albanians, wherever they were, and that he had been for some time in Corfu in order to make preparations for a revo­ lution in Albania. He added that he would be the first to march into Albanian territory, when the moment arrived, with the Albanian flag in his hand, and shed his blood for the fatherland. Although Schir6 belonged to the Italo-Albanian party that favored a revolution in Albania, he was reluctant to accept Aladro as its leader. In his answer, he contested Aladro's descent from Skenderbeg. He stressed that the ItaloAlbanians knew that the descendant of Skenderbeg, in direct line, was the nobleman D. Giovanni Kastriota, marquess of Auletta, who lived in Naples and whom they honored as "the most pure seed of the Lion of Albania." They did not care to know or to examine if "in the veins of Prince Aladro run, at least, some drops of Skenderbeg's blood." 18 Lorecchio's sup­ port of Aladro was due in part to his opposition to the mar­ quess of Auletta.19 Schir6 was backed by Manlio Bennici, one of the principal organizers of the Albanian Congress of Naples (1901). On behalf of the National Albanian Committee in Italy, he requested the various Albanian committees abroad to express their decision on the candidature of Aladro and make it known by March 24, 1902, when the Congress of Naples was expected to convene, in order to deliberate on that question.20 The Catholic clergy of northern Albania were not in favor of Aladro either.21 17See Albania, iv (1904), 160-163. The second prince mentioned in the article was a certain Stiipan Annibal, Venetian monk, who in 1880 pretended to be a prince of Albania and a Kastriota and who, according to Apollinaire, ended in the prison of Amsterdam. Ibid., pp. 144-148. 18G. Schiri), op.cit., pp. 342-343· 19Alric to Delcassd, Scutari, 3 March 1902, No. 154, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intdrieure, Albanie, 1902-1903, Vol. iv. 20Passeti to Goluchowski, Rome, 27 March 1902, No. 24E and in­ cluded circular, HHStA, PA xiv/12, Albanien vni/i. 21Leoni to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 16 June 1903, No. 310/150, and enclosed report on Aladro, in ASMAE.

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In order to attain his aim, Aladro could not restrict himself to activity among the Albanians. He got in touch with revo­ lutionary leaders of other nationalities, like the Macedonian B. Sarafoff and the Italian Ricciotti Garibaldi. As a conse­ quence, he aroused suspicions among the Turkish authorities, who took precautionary military measures when it was ru­ mored insistently in 1902 that he was preparing an armed coup against Vlore from Corfu. While the European chan­ ceries did not take Aladro's movements seriously, the Turkish authorities, which persecuted his followers in Albania, at­ tached exaggerated significance to them.22 On July 8, 1902, Aladro made another attempt. He went to Vienna, where he had a conversation with Count Liitzow, one of the section chiefs of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minis­ try. He told the Austrian official that he was being wooed by the Italians but that he was aware that they merely wanted him "to pick the chestnuts out of the fire" for Italy. They wanted to use him as an instrument to bring about an inci­ dent between the Porte and Italy so that Italy could have a pretext for a foothold in Tripoli, for which purpose prepara­ tions had already been made. He further declared to Count Liitzow that the reason for his visit was to place himself and Albania unconditionally at the disposal of the Austrian Em­ peror and ask for instructions. But he did not succeed in having an audience with the Emperor.23 As a pretender to the throne, Aladro became at times very revolutionary. The appearance of the Albanian bands must have emboldened him. He had means at his disposal and, as an Austrian consular representative put it, "perhaps age in­ duced him to hurry." 24 Following the triumph of the Young Turk Revolution, he issued a statement that the Turkish constitution more or less improved the situation in Turkey, but that the Albanians could not be satisfied with the kind of i2"M£moire

iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," p. 25. by Graf Liitzow, 8 July 1902, H H S t A , PA xiv/12, Albanien viii/ 1. 24Kral to Goluchowski, Scutari, 5 July 1906, No. 48, Geheim, H H S t A , PA xiv/14, Albanien xi/2. 28Aufzeichnung

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freedom it conferred. He called for independence, and out­ lined a program to be followed by the newly-founded Alba­ nian clubs and societies: (i) The national idea should be furthered among Christians and Moslems alike; (2) Schools, printing houses, newspapers, etc., should be founded in the Albanian language; (3) The Albanians should not serve in the army beyond the frontiers of the country; (4) The Alba­ nians should acquire the recognition of their nationality, like the other Balkan nations; (5) An assembly of Albanian dele­ gates should be formed.25 The marquess whom Schir6 supported, D. Giovanni Kastriota Skenderbeg d'Auletta, "this great lord, noble, and illustrious," had sure titles of nobility. The King of Italy on April 4, 1897, a study by the Council of Heraldry, de­ creed that he could use the name and the coat of arms of George Kastrioti Skenderbeg.2® He had supporters among the Italo-Albanians, but not in Albania, where Aladro could boast of a stronger position.27 He was considered a serious candidate,28 but seemingly he was not capable of leading a movement. When in the various congresses of the Italo-Albanians the question of an autonomous Albania and of a ruler (Iuogotenente) was discussed, political opinion wavered be­ tween an Albanian feudal lord and a prince from the house of Savoy, but the name of the marquess d'Auletta was not mentioned.29 The other active pretender to the imaginary Albanian throne was Prince Albert Ghika from Rumania. He was a descendant of a princely Rumanian family of Albanian ori­ gin. Its founder was George I Ghika, Prince of Moldavia (1658-1659) and Wallachia (1659-1660), who was called, ac­ cording to Prince Albert Ghika, "the Albanian." The pre25The declaration is included in Tahy to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 26 October 1908, No. 66, vertraulich, HHStAj PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. 2 s Albania, xii (1909), 6-7. 27Cf. Drita, 7-20 November 1902. 28Alric to Delcassi, Scutari, 30 April 1902, No. 173, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intirieure, Albanie, 1902-1903, Vol. iv. 29"Memoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," p. 12.

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tender was the great grandson of Prince Gregory III Ghika of Moldavia and Wallachia, who was assassinated in 1777 in Jassy.30 Prince Ghika writes that in November 1902 a committee was formed in Paris, composed of Dervish Hima, an Albanian patriot from Struge, and Captain Dimitri Papazoglou, a VIakh from Monastir. It offered him the presidency, though he was then only in his mid-thirties. As the aim of the committee was the special study of the Albanian question, it got in touch with Albanian notables, irrespective of religion, who had been exiled in Europe, America, and Egypt.31 The committee seems to have been Albanian-Vlakh rather than strictly Albanian. The interests of the two peoples, the Albanians and the Vlakhs, were closely related at this time, as explained in the previous chapter, and Prince Ghika attempted to make use of the situation for his own personal ends, although he always gave prominence to the Albanian question. The polit­ ical program of the Paris committee, which at the outset pursued a peaceful course, was inaugurated, according to Prince Ghika, by his lecture, "La verite sur la question d' Orient," which he delivered on February 3, 1904, at the hall of the Societe de Geographie in Paris. In this paper he ex­ pressed views favorable to the relations of the Porte with Albania.32 Prince Ghika's lecture in Paris had pleased the Turkish government, and Ferid Pasha, an Albanian who was then the Turkish Grand Vizier, promised to entrust him with an im­ portant command in the Macedonian gendarmerie. During his visit in Istanbul, the Prince writes, he became aware that Turkey had great interest in suppressing Albanian national feeling, and was endeavoring to do this by all sorts of prom­ ises. He communicated his impressions to the Paris Commit30Prince

A. Ghica, L'Albanie et la Question d'Orient, Paris, igo8, pp. 1, 225; Pallavicini to Goluchowski, Bucharest, 21 March 1905, No. 10D, HHStA, PA xiv/13, Albanien vm/2. 81Prince A. Ghica, op.cit., pp. 223-224. 32 Ibid., see notes on Ghica, HHStA, PA xiv/13, Albanien vm/2.

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tee and decided to return to France. In February 1904, the Turkish embassy in London issued a declaration that Prince Albert Ghika had no right to the pretended throne of Al­ bania. He immediately reacted by publishing in the British press that he had no pretentions to the throne of Albania but that he had been elected supreme chief for the independence of Albania and that he would do everything possible to de­ liver that country from the Turkish yoke.33 If Prince Ghika's claims were based on the authority of the Paris committee —as it appears—he had certainly exaggerated its powers and had arrogated to himself non-existent rights. Yet the young prince continued to make these claims. In November 1904 the Neue Freie Presse of Vienna published the summary of a letter he had sent to it. He maintained that he had been nominated the highest chief of the movement for Albanian independence and had accepted it. He would pur­ sue a peaceful program, but with the motto "Albania for the Albanians," and the Albanian people would be prepared to defend their independence against any attempt at annexation. Once free, this people would offer the crown to the most worthy person. As for himself, he would be the first to bow to the person who would be elected by the nation.34 Toward the end of 1904 Prince Ghika was in London with his third wife, a rich Irish lady. He told Dervish Hima that she was doing "miracles" there and that the English press was at her disposal. Allegedly there were many articles which spoke about Albanian independence.35 When Prince Ghika was in London, he tried to interest the headquarters of the Balkan Committee there in his plans and obtain financial assistance.36 ssPrince

A. Ghica, op.cit., pp. 224-226; the dates between the Prince's lecture in Paris, his visit to Istanbul, and the declarations to the press are so close together as to be confusing. Apparently the last date is an error. 84Carlottio to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 7 November 1904, No. 1730/836, ASMAE. 55Letter of Ghika to Dervish Hima, London, December 1904, found in HHStA, PA xiv/is, Albanien via/2. se"M£moire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905), p. 26.

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On February 4, 1905, Il Giornale d'Italia published an in­ terview with Prince Ghika. It was at a time when people in Europe believed that something grave was about to happen in the Balkans. The newspapers were full of articles on Euro­ pean Turkey, the governments were jittery, and the revolu­ tionary committees very active. In his interview, the pretender declared that the real enemies of Albania were neither Bul­ garia, nor Serbia, nor Montenegro, but Austria. "Our mis­ fortunes," he said in order to please the Italians, "would stem from Austria, if she were not afraid of Russia and Italy." Revealing his megalomania, he emphasized that he was the supreme head of the Albanian movement for independence and that he intended revolution in Albania and total war for liberty. He boasted of the existence of a powerful internal and external organization—another fantasy, no doubt. Prince Ghika stated that he himself would command the revolution­ aries, who would be reinforced by more than 12,000 European volunteers. The Vlakhs, he said, would make common cause with the Albanians.37 It is understandable that after such an interview the Italian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Fusinato, told the Austrian representative in Rome: "Je crois qu'il est un peu fou; nous I'avons fait surveiller pour faire plaisir a I'Ambassadeur de Turquie mais ce n'etait pas vraiment la peine." 38 In Vienna the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was equally unfavorable. Kral told his French colleague in Shkoder that they thought of him as a "vulgar adventurer." 39 In Rome, Prince Ghika failed to find support for his plans. Nevertheless, he adopted General Ricciotti Gari­ baldi's revolutionary program.40 The young pretender was very energetic. In April 1905, he visited Montenegro, together with his wife and Gasper 37"La Grande Albania—Intervista col principe Alberto Ghica," Il Giornale d'ltalia, Rome, 4 February 1905. 88Liitzow to Goluchowski, Rome, 7 February 1905, No. gG, HHStA i PA xiv/13, Albanien vm/2. 39Alric to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 23 May 1905, No. 322, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Int^rieure, Albanie, 1904-1905, Vol. v. 40"Mimoire iiber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," p. 26.

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Π. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

Jakova Merturi—the unfrocked Catholic priest who was the editor of the Herald of Albania in Rome. He was very well received by Prince Nicholas. He went to Podgorice (Titograd), where chiefs of the Albanian tribes paid him a visit. It was then rumored that Prince Nicholas offered to permit the passage of arms through his country to northern Al­ bania.41 Arriving in Bucharest the same month Prince Ghika pre­ sided over a meeting of Albanians, attended also by some Vlakhs. First Gasper Jakova Merturi spoke in Albanian and then the prince in Rumanian. As presented in Prince Ghika's book, the resolutions of the assembly, which were taken on April 23, stated that no other meeting held in Europe would have the right to call itself the Albanian National Congress, because even if it were composed of delegates of Albanian nationality, it could never represent as large a number of votes as that of Bucharest, which allegedly amounted to two thousand. Obviously this was a step to acquire the monopoly of the movement by invalidating all other Albanian gather­ ings, particularly those of his opponent Aladro. The Congress also resolved that its sole political program was "the inde­ pendence of Albania, consisting of the provinces of Shkoder, tiskiib, Salonica, Monastir, and Janina," and that anyone working against it would be considered "a traitor of the fatherland." It voted "unanimously to take up arms against Turkey or any other invader of Albania," appointing "Prince Albert Ghika chief of the insurrection with dictatorial pow­ ers." In the resolution of the Congress declaring that no one had the right to be called pretender to the throne of Albania, the target was undoubtedly Aladro, who held such aspirations, and the proposal must have been made by Prince Ghika.42 There are serious discrepancies between the resolutions as presented by Prince Ghika and those in the reports of 41Kuhn to Goluchowski, Cetinje, 20 April 1905, No. 24 A-B/J.B., and Notiz dispatched to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary to its diplomatic representatives abroad, April 1905, HHStA, PA xiv/13, Albanien vm/2. 42See text of resolutions in Prince A. Ghica, op.cit., pp. 227-229, and J. Larmeroux, who has reproduced it, op.cit., 11, 393-395.

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Austrian representatives and other publications of the time. In the Austrian reports from Bucharest an important resolu­ tion is the constitution of a Central Committee, called Kombi (Nation), to be chosen by 15 delegates elected by the Con­ gress. These 15 delegates were also empowered to decide on other weighty matters. In the Prince's text there is no men­ tion at all of the 15 delegates; it is merely stated that the Congress decided on the formation of the Central Commit­ tee (art. 2). The Austrian reports refer to a resolution on the publication of an official organ of the Albanian movement, while Prince Ghika's text is completely silent about it. On the controversial issue of dictatorial powers, in the Prince's text dictatorial powers are attributed to the president—Ghika— in the execution of the resolutions, whereas the Austrian re­ ports do not even imply such powers. The divergences are greater if one compares the resolutions in the Prince Ghika's book with those published by the chancery of the Central Committee Kombi in the Herald of Albania.43 The date of the resolutions is puzzling. In Prince Ghika's book it is April 23, 1904, which confuses the events preceding and following this date. On the basis of the Austrian reports and other pub­ lications, the date would be April 23, 1905, which is con­ sistent with all the events.44 Only a few months after the Bucharest Congress its Cen­ tral Committee declared that it excluded Prince Ghika as a member, depriving him of all official capacity. It stated that the Prince was incapable and did not abide by the commit­ ments he had accepted at the Congress in the presence of the Central Committee.45 Shortly after this declaration, Prince 43See text in Alric to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 23 May 1905, No. 322, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Interieure, Albanie, 19041905, Vol. v. 44See ibid.; Callenberg to Goluchowski, Bucharest, 27 April 1905, No. 17, HHStA, PA xiv/13, Albanien vm/2; Universul, Bucharest, 12-25 April, 1905. 45See text of the announcement of the Central Committee, which was published in Laimtari i Schypenies (Herald of Albania), Rome, 1-14 August 1905; also copy following Callenberg to Goluchowski, Bucharest, 27 April 1905, No. 17, HHStA, PA xiv/13, Albanien vm/2.

330

Π. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

Ghika wrote a letter to Ismail Kemal, complaining about the Albanians and the Albanian movement. He was disappointed that all his efforts, sacrifices, and expenses "for our poor Al­ bania" ran the risk of being wasted because of the many trai­ tors in Europe who thought only of their purse. He would no longer allow himself to be maltreated by the Albanian press, be robbed by so-called patriots, "and remain chief of an insurrection which cannot take place . . . since, alone, I can do nothing, and . . . I cannot create a sentiment of libera­ tion which appears to be paralyzed." He found comforting the news from his agents in northern Albania, who had in­ formed him that they were ready for the revolution but needed ammunition; and believed that Italy would be willing to help them. But Prince Ghika was bitter against the Al­ banian colonies in Rumania, which did not respond to his appeal for financial aid.46 Although in his letter to Ismail Kemal the Prince expressed his intention to resign from the Albanian movement, he never gave up as the pretender. Early in 1909, he made an appeal, as president of Kombi, calling for the autonomy of Albania.47 In 1911 he reappeared on the political scene with a declaration addressed to the representatives of foreign pow­ ers in Albania and abroad, in which he spoke about the Al­ banian revolution. At the same time he published a draft for the constitution of an autonomous Albania. That the Prince had not yet buried his hopes for the throne is evi­ denced by article 2 of the constitution draft, proposing that the Governor General of an autonomous Albania should be either an Albanian or a person of "Albanian origin," as he considered himself.48 46A

copy of Prince Albert Ghika's letter to Ismail Kemal from Chateau de Tatomiresci (Rumania), go August 1905, is found as Beilage in Kral to Goluchowski, 2 September 1905, No. 73, HHStA, PA xiv/13, Albanien vm/2. i l Lirija, Salonica, 14 March 1909. 48Kraus to Aehrenthal, Valona, 12 August 1911, No. 58, and as Beilage the declaration and "Rivendications Albanaises," HHStA1 PA xiv/13, Albanien vm/2.

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Prince Ghika naturally contested Aladro's right to regard himself an Albanian or even a distant descendant of Skenderbeg, since Aladro was his rival for the throne and received more attention than he. When in 1907 the Albanian societies in Bucharest merged into Bashkimi, Prince Ghika was unfavorably regarded while Aladro seemed to be influential.49 Added to their own shortcomings, what these pretenders lacked most was the backing of a great power. Albanian pa­ triots ridiculed both pretenders. The poet Gjergj Fishta, tak­ ing as an example two comical figures from among the people of Shkoder, the antagonists Jaha Begu and Palok Cuca, poked fun in his Anxat e Parnasit (Wasps of Parnassus) at the fan­ tastic aspiration of Aladro Kastriota and Prince Ghika and at the false patriotism of their adherents who, in order to pay their debts, needed a whole company of adventurous knights. Midhat Frasheri, editor of the newspaper Lirija (Freedom) of Salonica, mentioning Prince Ghika's appeal in 1909, re­ ferred to him as "a certain Albert Ghika, Vlakh from Ru­ mania," who called himself president of Kombi. Frasheri noted that the Albanian Club of Salonica—he was then its president—had issued at the time an official statement that people like Prince Ghika and Aladro Kastriota had no re­ lationship with the Albanians, that they were foreigners and not known in Albania.60 A candidate regarded seriously not for the throne but for the Governship General of an eventually autonomous Albania was Ismail Kemal. His 1900 flight from Turkey rightly dis­ turbed Sultan Hamid's palace. Although it seems that he himself never openly expressed his aspiration to such a po­ sition in an autonomous Albania, the Austro-Hungarian gov­ ernment did not doubt his intention of playing an important role in his narrower fatherland. In 1903 Ismail wrote a letter to Mgr. ϋοςϊ, soliciting his collaboration in an autonomous 49Schonburg to Aehrenthal, Bucharest, 18 April 1907, No. 19G, HHStA, PA xiv/14, Albanien xi/3. t o Lirija, 14 March 1909.

332

II. NATIONAL AFFIRMATION

administrative movement.51 His chances for Governor Gen­ eral in an autonomous Albania were great, for the Albanian people had confidence in him and the patriots respected him. At the beginning of his exile, he had no difficulty attracting most of the Albanian societies abroad. The disillusionment came when he began to advocate a Greco-Albanian fraterniza­ tion and, later, to favor Italian policy. Although he strove to justify a rapprochement between the Albanians and Greece and Italy as a defense against the annexational views of Aus­ tria-Hungary, his compatriots began to question whether such a line was not due to the financial liberality of Athens, and perhaps of Rome, which made possible a more comfortable and prominent life for him. After that his popularity among the Albanians, both inside and outside the country, began to wane.52 But Ismail Kemal had broader interests than Al­ bania. He was an opponent of Sultan Hamid's regime and wanted to bring about a change in Turkey. Had he devoted his efforts exclusively to the Albanian question and followed a different policy, he would certainly have been the ideal leader for the movement. One could not be a pretender to the Albanian throne with­ out at the same time thinking of the union of the Albanian people. Whoever the candidate was, he stressed the common link of nationality—and religion receded. This whole move­ ment of candidates for a future throne or the Governorship General of Albania thus had a beneficial effect on national awakening. The very fact that an Aladro Kastriota or a Prince Ghika appeared on the political scene stirred the national imagination. Although the pretenders were furthering their personal interest, their activity was closely linked to an inde­ pendent or autonomous Albania. The reaction of the Alba­ nian people to their nationalist propaganda, whether sound or unsound, aroused their national sentiment. 51Ippen to Calice, Scutari, 27 July 1903, No. 59, H H S t A , PA xiv/8, Albanien v/3-5. 52"Mtoioire uber Albanien (Ende 1901 bis Anfang 1905)," p. 24.

P A R T III

Toward Independence (1908-1912)

Collaboration Between Albanians and Young Turks IN THE various phases of the Young Turk movement, the roots of which go back to the mid-1860's,1 the Albanians played a significant role. They took part in a dual capacity, as Moslem members of the Turkish empire and as members of the Albanian nationality. This dualism should be kept in mind in order to understand the contradictions which devel­ oped in the relations between the Albanians and the Young Turks in the course of the movement and in their final con­ flict. The first to organize an opposition group, with the express purpose of overthrowing the despotic rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909), was an Albanian from Ohrid (or nearby Struge) named Ibrahim Temo, or Edhem,2 as he was sometimes called. He formed this group in 1889 together with other students of the Imperial Medical School in Istanbul, taking as a model the society of the Italian Carbonari, with which he had become acquainted during a visit in Italy on his way to Albania. Among Temo's first recruits was another Albanian, Nexhib Draga from Kosovo, who later played an important role in the Albanian national movement. The society which Temo founded was apparently called Progress and Union and not Union and Progress (Ittihat ve Terakki), the name of the committee of the Young Turks that was to become so well known later.3 In 1895 Temo's group was uncovered by the Turkish au­ thorities and members of it were arrested and exiled. He left Turkey and went to Rumania, where he organized a branch 1Cf.

E. E. Ramsaur, Jr., The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908, Princeton, 1957, pp. 2-4. 2Temo is the Albanian equivalent of Edhem or Et-hem. 8E. E. Ramsaur, Jr., op.cit., pp. 14-17; see also B. Lewis, The Emerg­ ence of Modern Turkey, London, New York, Toronto, 1961, p. 193.

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of the society and published a Young Turk paper.4 However, Temo did not forget that he was also an Albanian. Besides spreading the Young Turk ideas among the Moslems of Dobrudja, he took an active part in the national Albanian move­ ment in Rumania. He was one of the organizers of the Al­ banian society Bashkimi (Union) in Constantza and became its first vice-president;5 later he took a prominent part, under the name of Dr. Temo, in congresses held in Bucharest.® When in February 1902 the Young Turks, who were in exile in various parts of Europe, met in Paris in the first Con­ gress of Ottoman Liberals, several Albanians participated in it—Temo, Hodja Kadria, Jashar Erebara—the most outstand­ ing being Ismail Kemal. He sided with the majority of the Congress, headed by Prince Sabaheddin, which agreed upon an appeal to be addressed to the powers demanding a regime in accordance with the principles of the 1876 Constitution, which guaranteed to all the ethnic elements of Turkey justice, liberty, and national rights.7 A split then came about on the question of foreign intervention. The group led by the phi­ losopher Ahmed Riza, which insisted on the organization of a central and centralizing power, strenuously opposed the policy of foreign intervention. Thus two principal trends among the Young Turks began to take shape, one favoring Turkish nationalism and the other Ottoman liberalism.8 Ismail Kemal was a Moslem and an Albanian. As a Moslem member of the Ottoman empire, he stood for its preservation, 4E. E. Ramsaur, Jr., op.cit., pp. 26 and 49, note 89. His information on Dr. Ibrahim Temo is drawn from the latter's book, Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyetinin Tesekkiilii ve Hidemati Vataniye ve InkiMbi Miliye Dair Hatiratim (The Formation of the Society of Union and Progress and My Memories Respecting Services to the Fatherland and the National Revolution), Medjidia (Rumania), 1939. See also B. Lewis, op.cit., p. 194. 5 Lirija (Freedom), Salonica, 31 January 1909. 6See declaration of the Central Committee Kombi (Nation), included in Alric to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 23 May 1905, No. 322, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intirieure, Albanie, 1904-1905, Vol. v. 7 The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, pp. 306-308. See also Ε. E. Ram­ saur, Jr., op.cit., p. 74 and note 47. 8B. Lewis, op.cit., pp. 198-199; E. E. Ramsaur, Jr., op.cit., pp. 68-70.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK COLLABORATION

337

but as an Albanian, he at the same time supported a decen­ tralized government, which would make possible an autono­ mous Albania. In the group of Ahmed Riza he saw not only a tendency for a centralized government, but also an urge for predominance of the Turkish element in the empire.9 It was thus natural for him to join Prince Sabaheddin's group. The greater the liberties insured to the Christian minorities in the Turkish empire, the more the chances for the non-Turkish Albanians to win rights as an ethnic group. At this time also Ismail Kemal's political activity oscillated between the over­ throw of the regime of Sultan Abdul Hamid II10 and the national Albanian movement, which was gradually gaining ground. In this period Ibrahim Temo was quite busy with the Young Turk circles in exile. It is interesting to note that his views were becoming more liberal. Apparently this was due to his being a non-Turk. When, upon his suggestion, Ahmed Riza organized weekly meetings of a group of Young Turks —a sort of seminar—in order to present papers on the re­ forms for which they were all striving, Temo read a paper on education. He recommended that the state support re­ ligious instruction for the minorities. He further pointed out that the Arabic alphabet—which later gave rise to a bitter struggle in Albania—was not suitable for the Turkish lan­ guage and suggested the adoption of a modified Latin alpha­ bet.11 Ahmed Riza and his associates received his recommen­ dations so coldly that he never voiced them again; because 9Memoirs

of Ismail Kemal Bey, p. 308. his Tripolitania project of revolution, ibid., pp. 308-315, and E. E. Ramsaur, Jr., op.cit., pp. 76-79. 11It is of interest to note that Husein Cahid, a prominent Young Turk, expressed some years later, in 1910, the same opinion in another fashion. Writing in his newspaper, Yeni Tanin (New Echo), about the Albanian alphabet question, he said that he preferred the Latin alphabet because it would be easier and would permit an Albanian shepherd to learn how to read and write in a week whereas one hundred weeks would not be sufficient for a Turkish peasant to learn how to read and write in the Arabic script; Boppe to the Minister of Foreign Af­ fairs, P£ra, 1 February 1910, No. 39, AMAE1 Turquie, Politique Intirieure, Albanie, 1910, Vol. νιπ. 10See

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m. TOWABD INDEPENDENCE

of his support of the Latin alphabet, he was nicknamed "Latinist." Temo remarked that all his efforts to convince Ahmed Riza that he would never be able to make the minori­ ties feel a sense of loyalty to the Ottoman nation, if he were not prepared to make certain concessions, were in vain.12 In 1906 the Young Turk movement began to re-establish itself within the Turkish empire. Salonica became its main center. A secret society was formed there, to be known later as the Committee of Union and Progress. Although subse­ quently linked to other Young Turk groups, this society was, at the outset, not an offshoot of any of the organizations of the exiled Young Turks of Europe or a direct heir to any earlier Young Turk group within the Turkish state.13 Many Albanians belonged to this society. Its program called for constitutional guarantees and convocation of a parliament where all the races of the empire would be represented, with­ out distinction of religion or nationality—a program with great appeal for the Albanians.14 Monastir soon became an­ other important center of the Committee of Union and Prog­ ress, and branches quickly sprang up in the neighboring towns of Albania. In the south, committees were constituted in Resna, Ohrid, Struge, Gjirokaster; in the north, in Shkoder, Uskub, Ferizovii, Mitrovice, and Prizren.15 In some Albanian towns the Young Turks established close connections with national Albanians, as in Gjirokaster, where members of the Young Turk committee were at the same time members of the Albanian local committee. In Diber the Albanian national committee united in 1907 with the committee of the Young Turks, and the two acted in agreement with each other.16 The Young Turks found backers also in the Albanian Bek12Cf.

E. E. Ramsaur, Jr., op.cit., p. 93 and note 93. pp. 93-94; B. Lewis, op.cit., p. 201. 14L. Skendo, "Indipendenca morale" (Moral Independence), Leka 1 Shkoder, ix (1937), 504; J. Larmeroux, La politique exterieure de I'Autriche-Hongrie, 1875-1914, Paris, 1918, 11, 33. 15E. E. Ramsaur, Jr., op.cit., p. 114; I. G. Senkevich, Osvobditel'noe dvizhenie albanskogo naroda ν 1905-1912 gg., Moscow, 1959, p. 92. i e Ibid. 13 Ibid.,

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TtTRK COLLABORATION

339

tashis, but not, of course, for the reason attributed to the Turkish Bektashis—because they "were the most Turkish in spirit of all the dervish orders." 17 On the contrary, the Al­ banian Bektashis were the most Albanian in spirit. They had been influenced by the writings of Nairn Frasheri, the poet of Albanian nationalism, himself a Bektashi, who even tried to Albanianize the hierarchical terms of the order.18 They followed in his footsteps and took active part in the Albanian national movement, suffering persecution by the Hamidian authorities. Another reason seems to have been inherent in their order: they were a branch of Shia Islam. The Bektashis tended toward the Imanate and were not disposed favorably toward the claim of the Ottoman sultans to the Caliphate. It may be then that Abdul Hamid's attempt to revive the im­ portance of the Caliphate was resented and provoked their oppoistion.19 But the Albanian Bektashis were attracted mainly to the Young Turks because of their liberal doctrine, and they considered the avowed program of the Young Turks as furthering Albanian national development. Moreover, the fact that some of the prominent leaders of the Young Turks, like Talat Pasha and Ahmed Riza (Tevfik), were Bektashis 20 might have played a role. If it is true at the same time that the Bektashis "aimed at an ultimate religious supremacy in the countries touched by their propaganda," and hoped at the time of the 1908 Revolution to establish a Bektashi state in Albania, there was ample justification for a close collabora­ tion between them and the Young Turks.21 By the spring of 1908 the Young Turk propaganda had made great progress in the army, especially among the officers, a considerable number of whom in Macedonia were Alba­ nians.22 A wave of mutinies spread from Anatolia to Rumelia, 17E.

E. Ramsaur, Jr., op.cit., p. 109. Chapter iv, pp. 123-124. 19See E. E. Ramsaur, Jr., op.cit., p. 112. 20 Ibid., p. 113 and note 48. 21F. W. Hasluck, Christianity and Islam under the Sultans, Oxford, 1929, i, 438 and note 4. 22I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 93. 18See

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the army desperately demanding the satisfaction of a few basic needs.23 In Europe, after Austria-Hungary withdrew her sup­ port of reform projects in Macedonia and extracted from the Sultan a concession to build a railway through the sandjak of Novi Pazar, Russia and England announced in June 1908 the Reval program of reforms. The Young Turks were now seriously concerned about the growing threat to the Empire. If the Sultan accepted the Reval project, the Macedonian rev­ olutionaries would possess a powerful weapon to further their propaganda; if he refused it, the European powers would in­ tervene in order to carry out its application and thus would humiliate the Ottomans again.24 In either case there was danger, for the reforms would lead to an autonomous Mace­ donia and ultimately to its loss. But an autonomous Mace­ donia would jeopardize Albanian national unity, for it would incorporate Albanian lands. The Albanians could not, there­ fore, favor such a solution. They would, on the other hand, find a constitutional regime to their advantage. It was at this juncture that the Young Turks decided upon a coup in order to overthrow the regime. At the end of June 1908 a young officer, Enver Bey, a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, disappeared into the hills. The signal, however, was given on July 4, 1908 at Resna, when Major Ahmed Niyazi, at the head of a group of soldiers, took to the mountains. He was an Albanian from that very town, which is situated near Monastir, and he was also an important mem­ ber in the councils of the Young Turks.25 Before his de­ parture, he wrote his brother-in-law: "Rather than live basely, I have preferred to die . . . either death or the salvation of the fatherland." 26 To the Palace and the high authorities in Istanbul he declared that he was turning the arms against the regime in order to defend liberty and the cause of reforms, in the general interest of both the Moslem and Christian 23B.

Lewis, op.cit., pp. 202-203. J. Larmeroux, op.cit., 11, 36. 25E. E. Ramsaur, Jr., op.cit., pp. 134-135; B. Lewis, op.cit., p. 203. 28See text of letter in ibid., p. 204.

24See

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK COLLABORATION

341

populations.27 Yet there was no general uprising on orders from Salonica. The uprising simply developed spontaneously as the news was diffused from one unit to another. The vari­ ous Young Turk committees did not regard themselves as being under the orders of Salonica; they made their own de­ cisions. The influence of Salonica was a moral one. It appears, however, that among these isolated units "a complete though half-unconscious cooperation" did exist.28 Ahmed Niyazi began to move immediately in Albanian ter­ ritory. He visited Diber, Elbasan, ΚοΓςε, and Ohrid. The rev­ olutionary methods he used were to expel the Hamidian officials and the tax collectors and create Albanian militia for the preservation of order. From the very beginning the Albanian committee of ΚοΓςε decided to lend its support to the revolution. At the request of the Young Turks, it called upon the guerrillas in the mountains around ΚοΓςε to unite with the insurgent Turkish companies. Its example was fol­ lowed by the Albanian committee of Ohrid.29 When on July 23 ζΙεΓςΐζ and Grameno, the Albanian guerrilla leaders, met Niyazi at Resna, the latter expressed his gratification that with the declaration of the Young Turk Constitution the Albanian nation would enjoy advantages.30 While most of the Albanians were on their side, the Young Turks still had to come to an understanding with the bulk of the Moslem population of the northeast, the Kosovars, who were not inclined to abandon the Sultan, whom they called baba mbret (father king). One of the Young Turk appeals, written in the beginning of July 1908, seems to have been directed primarily to them. It called upon them to give their besa and unite with the Young Turks, in order to demand 27E. V.[lora], Die Wahrheit uber das Vorgehen der Jungturken in Albanien, Vienna and Leipzig, 1911, p. 7; J. Larmeroux, op.cit., 11, 36-37; Col. Lamouche, Quinze ans d'histoire balhanique, 1904-1918, Paris, 1928, p. 69. 28Cf. E. E. Ramsaur, Jr., op.cit., p. 135. 29I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 93-94. 80M. Grameno, Kryengritja shqiptare (The Albanian Revolution), Tirana, 1959, p. 225.

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the establishment of the constitution and the opening of the parliament, which would free the people from unbearable taxation and the injustice of the courts. In order to antagonize them against the regime, the appeal denounced the valis as unjust and corrupt and the ministers and pashas as traitors. Austria and Italy were also targets of the document: "In all the mountains they have opened churches and schools. Grad­ ually all our mountains and forests will fall in their hands." These powers had as their objective the partition of Albania. In order to incite the Kosovars against Europe and the Porte at the same time, the appeal concluded that Europe domi­ nated in Macedonia and the Turkish government was in­ active.31 In the spring of 1908 Austria-Hungary began to survey the terrain for the construction of the railway line. Rumors were propagated that the Turkish government had in mind to sell the lands of the peasants to the Austrian government for that purpose. The announcement of the Reval agreement in­ creased the tension. In the first days of July, thousands of armed peasants of the regions of Prizren, Gjakove, Prishtne, and Vucitrn assembled at Ferizovid in order to protest. As a provocation, they even burned a platform which the Austrians had built near that town.32 Young Turks tried to bring the Ferizovic gathering under their control. The first to be active in this direction were the young officers of the local Young Turk committee. Then on July 7 the chief of the gendarmerie of tJskiib, Galib Bey, arrived upon orders of the vali, in order to placate the Kosovars and disperse them. But Galib Bey was a member of the Young Turk committee in Uskiib and before his departure he informed the Salonica 31The original text of the document was written in Turkish. It was translated into Albanian and published in the special issue of Leka, Shkoder, xn (1940), 9-13. Although it bears no date, on the basis of events mentioned in it, one may very well place it in the beginning of July 1908. The contents of this appeal are found also in I. G. Senkevich, "Mladoturetskaya revolutsiya 1908 goda i albanskoe natsional'noe dvizhenie," Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie, No. 1, 1958, p. 33. 32Cf. I. G. Senkevich, Osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie albanskogo naroda ν 1905-1912 gg., pp. 96-97.

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committee about his mission. He was instructed by the latter to persuade the Albanians at Ferizovic to back the Young Turks' constitutional program. As soon as Galib Bey arrived at Ferizovie, instead of attempting to pacify the Kosovars, he dispatched people and telegrams to the various towns of Kosovo with a view to increasing the number of representa­ tives and the size of the demonstration. In the following days the number reached approximately 30,000 armed men. The delegates of the Committee of Union and Progress, present at the assembly, represented the Constitution to the Kosovars as the only means to prevent the execution of the Reval proj­ ect and put an end to the meddling of Europe in the affairs of the Ottoman empire. 33 Taking into account the Sultantreue of the Kosovars, the Young Turks declared further that the Constitution did not oppose the Koran and that Islam con­ secrated the right of the parliament to restrict the power of the Sultan.34 Nevertheless, the Young Turks would not have won the Albanians at Ferizovic to their side had they not promised to satisfy their demands. They committed them­ selves to respect the old privileges with regard to taxation, which meant the return to the §eriat; they gave assurances that the Albanians would remain in possession of their arms; they promised the opening of Albanian schools; and they ac­ cepted the inviolability of the Sultan.35 With the acceptance of the Albanian terms, the gathering at Ferizovic turned into a manifestation in favor of the Young Turks and it wired to Sultan Abdul Hamid II calling for the re-establishment of the 1876 constitution, which he himself had granted and then repealed, and for the opening of the parliament.36 The telegram was a powerful blow: "It pro­ duced a greater impression upon him [the Sultan] than the s3 Ibid., pp. 97-98; R. Pinon, "La question albanaise," Revue des deux mondes, Liv (1909), 812; J. Lameroux, op.cit., pp. 36-38. 84I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 98. 85See official vilayet communiqui of 30 July 1908 in E. b. V. op.cit., p. 7; also R. Pinon, op.cit., p. 812. 86See text of the telegram in S. Kiilge, Firzovik toplantisi ve me^rutiyet (The Meeting at Ferizovic and the Constitution), Smyrna, 1943, p. 52, and its Russian translation in I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 99.

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remonstrances of all the Turks or all the diplomatic repre­ sentatives of Europe." 37 After two days of hesitation, follow­ ing a telegram from Seres in Macedonia and the threat of the march of an army of 100,000 men on Istanbul, the Sultan yielded and on July 24 announced that the constitution was again in force.88 The Young Turk revolution had triumphed. The Albanians, like the other peoples of the Ottoman em­ pire, were joyous over the proclamation of the constitution. There were demonstrations and meetings to celebrate it. Christians and Moslems fraternized. Only in Shkoder the Moslems received the news coldly. They feared that with the reforms and the constitution they would lose the privileges which the old regime had accorded them.39 Among the Al­ banians abroad, too, the proclamation of the constitution was on the whole acclaimed. Faik Konitza, who laid more stress on I'esprit nouveau than on the written constitution, greeted with sincere pleasure the change which promised an era of liberty and progress. If the Young Turks, he wrote, did not have any hidden motives, they would not find more loyal allies than the Albanian separatists. "But there should not be a misunderstanding: nationalists, we will be more than ever, and an autonomous province is the minimum it is possible for us to accept." 40 The beginning of the Young Turk regime saw the Alba­ nians very active. Many of the Albanian patriots thought that with the declaration of the constitution the ideal conditions for the development of the Albanian national movement had been created. On July 23,41 when at the Olympus Square in Salonica the first speech in Albanian was publicly delivered, it was said that "now is the day for us also to say freely that we are Albanians. Until today we could not say this, because 37 Memoirs

of Ismail Kemal Bey, p. 365. Lewis, op.cit., p. 205. 89I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 102 and 104; Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 31 December igo8, No. 166, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. 4a Albania, xi (1907), 86. 41In Salonica the proclamation of the constitution was celebrated before it was officially made by the Sultan. 38B.

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our tongue would be cut, we would be thrown into prison. But now we will say it and we will say it knowingly, with joy and hope in our heart." 42 In the speeches which followed, on various occasions, the Albanians introduced a patriotic content and terminated them with the greeting "long live liberty, long live Albania." 43 But the Young Turks did not lag behind in their own activities in Albania. They strove to get control of the Albanian movement, making use of the slogan that henceforth in Turkey there would be no Moslems or Christians, or different peoples, but only Ottoman people. They began to create in Albanian towns the so-called Otto­ man Committees of Union. These were composed of local Young Turk committees and representatives of the Albanian population. In Vlore, for instance, in the Ottoman Commit­ tee of Union there were three Young Turk officers and twelve Albanian townsmen. As the national composition of these committees was fundamentally Albanian, they did not accom­ plish the function for which they were destined: to make the population swear allegiance to the Young Turk committees. They operated more as national organizations. When in Au­ gust 1908 the Ottoman Committee of Union sent delegations to the neighboring villages to ask for the oath of loyalty, the population did not give it to the Young Turk committee, but to "the constitution, Albania, and the Albanian lan­ guage." 44 In Kosovo, instead of the Ottoman Committees of Union, the Young Turks formed "mixed commissions," com­ posed of local notables and members of the Young Turk com­ mittees, to obtain the besa of the inhabitants, which was not an easy matter.45 Under such circumstances true collaboration was impos­ sible. The contradictions began to emerge and each side, par­ ticularly the weaker one, tried in one way or another to cover them up. ii Lirija

1 14-27 July 1908. I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 104; Μ. E. Durham, High Albania, London, 1909, pp. 225-228. 44Cf. I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 103-104. t i Ibid.., p. 107. 43See

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Immediately after the proclamation of the constitution, Albanian national clubs were created in the principal towns of the country and in some centers of the Ottoman empire where Albanians resided. These were broad organizations composed of elements from all the various layers of the Al­ banian society and led mainly by intellectuals. In the litera­ ture of the period there is often a confusion between a society and a club; the two terms are employed interchangeably. The avowed aim of the clubs was the cultural development of the Albanian people. When in September 1908 the club of Salonica was founded in the presence of 400 Albanians, delegates of Tosks and Gegs, and Midhat Frasheri, who was elected president, presented to them the statutes for approval, he stressed that the clubs were not going to have any political goals, but only humanitarian and educational ones.46 But the clubs in fact became the centers of political activity of the patriots. If they disclaimed political activity, it was in order to avoid eventual persecutions on the part of the Turkish authorities. Thus, at the Congress of Elbasan, in 1909, the Albanian representatives felt obliged to adopt the resolution that "mingling in political affairs of any kind is forbidden to all the clubs and societies." 47 In the early period of the constitutional regime the press was very active. It was closely connected with the clubs and propagated the ideas of the national movement. It was also the first time that an Albanian press was permitted to appear in Albania proper. Among the significant newspapers of Κοτςε were Korga and Lidhja Orthodhokse (Orthodox [Christian] Union); Tomorri (the name of a high mountain in central Albania) was published in Elbasan; Bashkimi i Kombit (Union of the Nation) was issued in Monastir, while Bashkimi (Union) was the newspaper of Shkoder. In Istanbul were Pari to Aehrenthal, Salonica, 7 September 1908, No. 201, H H S t A , PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6; Aehrenthal's circular to consulates on Al­ banian territory, Vienna, 26 October 1908, Nos. 2132-2140, HHStA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/6. 47Art. 1 of Allgemeines Club-und Vereins Reglement, Beilage rv, P0sfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 20 September 1909, No. 72, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xrv/15, Albanien xi/17. 48

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published Besa (Albanian Word of Honor) and later Shqiptari (Albanian), whereas Salonica had the influential Lirija (Free­ dom) and the journal Diturija (Knowledge). Their names are symbolic of the nationalist trends of the time. The national movement at home was also supported by the Albanian press abroad. Cairo was quite active with the publication of Rrufeja (Thunderbolt), the satirical Shkopi (Stick), and later Shkreptima (Lightning). In Sofia the journal Kalendari Kombiar (National Calendar) continued to be issued and a new newspaper, Shqypeja e Shqypenis (Eagle of Albania), made its appearance. Faik Konitza did not discontinue the publica­ tion of Albania until 1909; soon after, he came to the United States and took up the editorship of the Boston weekly, Dielli (Sun), which had already appeared, and raised it to the level of an influential political paper. Not all the programs of the clubs were alike; their special features corresponded to the particular needs of the place in which they had been established. One of the tasks of the club of Janina, for instance, was to free the education and church of the Albanians from the influence of the Greek Patriar­ chate.48 In Gjirokaster, where apparently there was a close cooperation between the Albanians and the Young Turks, the first point of the club's program was "assistance for the strengthening of the constitution of all the Ottomans and, in compliance with the rising need, compatible actions jointly with the Committee of Union and Progress." 49 The program of the club of Uskiib had as its aim the enlightenment of the people through the cultivation of the Albanian language and the founding of schools, as well as the unification of tribal groups under Ottoman supremacy but with local autonomy.50 In the first period after the victory of the revolution, the 48tlRregullore e shoqerise se Shqiptarevet ne Janine" (Regulations of the Albanian Society in Janina), Janina, 1908, p. 7, as cited in I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 113. 49"Kanonizma e Klubit te Gjirokastres 'Drita' " (Regulations of the Club of Gjirokaster "The Light"), Gjirokaster, 1908, p. 3, as quoted in ibid., p. 114. 50Lukes to Aehrenthal, Uskiib, 19 November 1908, No. 191, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6.

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Union and Progress Committee did not hamper the activity of the Albanian clubs. It even encouraged the creation of these clubs, hoping through their help to bring the Albanian movement under its influence and control. Numerous Alba­ nian clubs came into being, hand in hand with some other societies, particularly in the southern part of Albania. By November 1908 twelve Albanian clubs were opened and be­ came very active: Monastir, Salonica, Janina, ΚοΓςε, Elbasan, Gjirokaster, Berat, Vlore, Filat, Starove, Oskiib, and Istan­ bul.51 Some two months later their number reached twenty.52 In the north the founding of clubs was difficult. The people were backward and fanatic. In Kosovo there were persons who still believed that the constitution was a bid'at (innova­ tion against religious law).53 Only in TJskiib was it possible to create a club. Two capable patriots, Bajo Topulli and Shahin Kolonja, were sent from Salonica, apparently with the knowl­ edge of the Union and Progress Committee, entrusted with that task. They encountered serious obstacles. The city of Oskub and the western part of the sandjak were for the most part inhabited by Albanians, but the feeling of belonging to Albania was almost non-existent. In Oskiib itself, even the Albanian language had been neglected, for most of the fam­ ilies of pure Albanian blood living there spoke only Turkish. Another hindrance was the powerful party of the hodjas, the members of which regarded themselves first as Moslems and secondly as Albanians. In the founding of the club the influ­ ence of Nexhib Draga played an important favorable role. The Albanian patriots intended to make Oskiib the center of national propaganda for northeastern Albania. There were not to be any branches of the club, but the club would be in permanent contact with the Albanian club of Salonica and that of Istanbul, which testifies to the interest of the Young Turks in it.54 In Shkoder the attempt to open a club which 6 1 Lirija,

22 November 1908. 14 February 1909. 5 3 Ibid., 18 October 1908. 54Lukes to Aehrenthal, Oskiib, 1 September 1908, No. 140, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6; P6sfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 23 November 1908, No. 73, vertraulich, in ibid. b 2 Ibid.,

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could function resulted in utter failure. In September 1908, a teacher of the Franciscan school, Mati Logoreci, succeeded in opening an Albanian club, The Albanian Language (Gjuha Shqype). But the members of the club were few. It seems that the Catholics, among whom there was a significant national party, out of fear of the Moslems, were hesitant to join it. The Moslems, on the other hand, because of their fanaticism were not inclined to tolerate a club which propagandized the Albanian language; they forced its closing in October 1908, and the Moslems who had become members were pardoned for their participation which was considered a treasonable act. The government of the vilayet of Shkoder, under the pressure of the Moslem clique, announced that the founding of an Albanian club was superfluous, since it had itself decided to open a place for social entertainment, where the papers from Istanbul could be read. All future attempts on the part of the nationally minded Albanians to reopen the club were frustrated.55 The anti-national, pro-Turkish and pro-Islamic attitude of the Moslems of Shkoder, in general, time and again proved an obstacle to national development. One explanation for their position may be found in the long Turkish tradition of the city. Shkoder had been for centuries the seat of a vilayet and therefore greatly exposed to Turkish and Islamic influ­ ences. Moreover, the Porte, in an effort to attach the Moslems of the sandjak of Shkoder to the Ottoman empire, granted them privileges (the sandjak was miistesna 5e) which Moslems in other Albanian regions did not enjoy. Another reason ap­ pears to have been that the Moslems of Shkoder were a minority surrounded by a Catholic majority which was not submissive like the rayah, because it was supported by the 55See FilIungen to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 21 September 1908, No. 87, Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 10 October 1908, No. 97 and 16 April 1909, No. 59—all in HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6; Lirija1 18 Oc­ tober 1908. 58See A. di San Giuliano, Briefe ilber Albanien, Deutsch von D. SchuIz and W. Wichmann, Leipzig, 1913, p. 47. Miistesna means in Turkish "exceptional," "extraordinary." In A. di San Giuliano's book it is written incorrectly "mutesni."

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armed force of the highlanders and later, to a certain extent, by Austria. In Islam they saw a force for cohesion. Under such circumstances, a religious fanaticism was apt to develop, pri­ marily for political and social reasons, and anything weaken­ ing the ties with Turkey was bound to be looked upon as a threat. Among the many clubs which came into being after July 1908, three played a crucial role: Monastir, Salonica, and Istanbul. The club of Monastir was founded shortly after the revolution but it began to function on September 14, 1908. It was called Bashkimi (The Union) and had as its president George Kyrias. From the very outset, it was thought that all the clubs should constitute a union, in which the club of Monastir should occupy the central place,57 but this did not actually occur until the Congress of Monastir was convened, two months after the founding of Bashkimi. In its sessions long discussions took place, because the Young Turk com­ mittee wanted the Istanbul club to be the headquarters. The Monastir club was chosen as the central club for two years, and to it the various clubs and societies were to send their monthly reports, which then would be forwarded in a sum­ mary to all the clubs and societies. It was decided, however, that only such matters would go directly to the Istanbul club as necessitated an intervention at the Porte.58 The question of the headquarters was raised again at the Congress of Elbasan, in September 1909. Midhat Frasheri supported for that purpose the club of Salonica, Shoqeri e Shqiptarevet (Society of the Albanians), of which he was the president, but the delegates turned it down because they feared that since it was at the same place as the headquarters of the Union and Prog­ ress Committee, it would be strongly under the influence of the Young Turks. It was resolved then that the club of Mona57P0sfai

to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 31 August 1908, No. 54, H H S t A 1 PA xiv/i5, Albanien xi/6. 68P6sfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 23 November 1908, No. 73, vertraulich, and 30 November 1908, No. 75, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6.

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stir remain as the center for another period of two years.59 The club of Monastir played a significant role in the develop­ ment of the national movement in southern and middle Albania. The Albanian patriots had become aware that in order to work among their people, at least for the immediate future, they had to lean on the new regime and enjoy its support. The national cause would have to pursue a more or less com­ mon course with the Young Turks.60 Thus, when the club of Monastir saw that its special national efforts aroused the mistrust of the Young Turk committee, it made changes in its council. It introduced three Albanians who were known for their Young Turk leanings: Lieutenant Selaheddin Bey, District Attorney Maz'har Bey, and Captain Kamber Effendi. As the Turks of Monastir, according to a special arrangement, paid a personal income tax of 2 per cent in favor of the Young Turk committee, out of which one-fourth went for the needs of the committee and three-fourths for purposes of general use, Selaheddin Bey proposed that the same tax be levied on the Albanians for the benefit of the Bashkimi club, one-fourth of it to be paid to the Young Turk committee, and threefourths to be spent for the Albanian schools.61 The poet Qajupi, who visited the Albanian club of Salonica early in 1909, was struck by its conspicuous Young Turk appearance; he was, however, too quick to condemn it.62 He did not take into account the difficulties under which it functioned in the heart of Young Turkism. As a Christian Orthodox who had con­ sidered the Turk as an oppressor, Qajupi could not reconcile a 59P0sfai

to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 20 September 1909, No. 72, vertraulich, and Beilage iv to it, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/7. eoCf. P6sfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 December 1908, No. 77, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. 61 P6sfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 26 December 1908, No. 83, Geheim, HHStA, PA Xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. 62See "Klub' i Selenikut" (The Club of Salonica), in Qajupi, Vepra (Works), ed. D. S. Shuteriqi, Tirana, 1957, pp. 328-331. It was first published as an article in the newspaper, Rufeja (Thunderbolt), Egypt, in August 1909, in ibid., p. 328, note 1.

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Turkish regime with an Albanian national movement, or understand the duality of his Moslem compatriots who lived within the Ottoman empire. The Albanian patriots on the whole had no confidence in the durability of the new regime: they wanted it to serve, therefore, for the time of its existence, as a means to an end.68 But the surveillance of the clubs by the Young Turks and their frequent intervention prevented the Albanians from carrying out their national activity in the open. They there­ fore resorted to the formation of secret committees. In the beginning, the attempts at creating secret organiza­ tions seem to have been independent. There was such an instance in Vlore. Toward the end of August 1908 a sort of a secret union was founded, called The National League for the Promotion of Albanian Schools, and headed by a com­ mittee of twelve. It held frequent meetings, in which school questions were discussed and also political matters. It was certain that the real objective of the League was the develop­ ment of an energetic action for the formation of an autono­ mous Albania. Its members were simultaneously members of the Ottoman committee of Union and Progress in Vlore, which had been previously constituted. They had made their oaths on two opposing political programs: (1) on the consoli­ dation of the Ottoman national state of the Young Turks; and (2) on the separatist and autonomous tendencies of the Albanian patriots and the League. The Austrian diplomat who reported this event64 appeared amazed at this contradic­ tion. He forgot that under such circumstances the later alle­ giance carried more weight. In the course of time the efforts for the creation of secret units, in the shape of secret commit­ tees, were better organized and coordinated. The two clubs which were active in the formation of secret e3P0sfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 December 1908, No. 77, Geheim, HHStA1 PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. 64Kraus to Aehrenthal, Valona/Berat, 27 August 1908, No. 34, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6.

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committees were those of Monastir and Istanbul. The secret committee of Monastir was composed of five persons: Redjeb Hodja, who then had become president of the club Bashkimi; Maz'har Bey, district attorney; Fehim Bey Zavalani, former president of the club; George Kyrias, vice-president of Bash­ kimi; and Lieutenant Nafiz Effendi.65 Redjeb Hodja was en­ trusted with the creation of secret committees in various Al­ banian centers. These committees were to work for the growth of Albanian national consciousness and the union of the Albanian people, and to be ready for any eventuality, because of the uncertain political life of Turkey. Redjeb Hodja travelled for the same purpose to Ohrid, Diber, Prizren, Gjakove, Ipek, Phristine, and Oskub.68 The headquarters of the secret committees must have been Istanbul. From there was dispatched the plan for their organization. On the basis of it, in every greater locality of Albania, five secretly chosen persons would constitute a committee. These five persons would be bound by besa to work for the national Albanian cause, but they would also back the Young Turks for the present, in order not to arouse suspicion and be fought by them. These secret committees would then send trusted Alba­ nian hodjas to the countryside for national propaganda and the founding of branch secret committees, composed again of five members, which would work in the villages. In every place money would be collected for the strengthening of the committees. At the outset, every branch committee would have the right to use the collected amount for its own needs, but later the unknown committee (i.e., Central Committee) would assign the place where the money that had not been spent was to be deposited. When necessary, a commission would be sent by the central committee to check the activity of a branch committee. However, in order not to provoke any e5P0sfai

to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 December 1908, No. 77, Geheim, HHStAr PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. eeP0sfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 30 November 1908, No. 75, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6.

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suspicion among the Young Turks, it should be done through them, employing any convenient pretext and care that the activity of the commission be not surmised as control of the branch committee. Any member found guilty of treason would be condemned to death.67 Judging by the obstacles met by the various emissaries entrusted with the formation of secret committees in principal places of Albania, the organi­ zation plan could not be well applied. It was important, how­ ever, that the thinking of the Albanian leaders be more along lines of centralization and organization. An early group, which the Central Secret Committee of Istanbul sent for the purpose of founding branch committees in Albania, was headed by Hodja Vildan Effendi from Diber. It arrived at Monastir on the eve of the closing of the Albanian alphabet congress. The next day Hodja Vildan Effendi delivered a speech to the delegates in which he attacked the old regime, praised the constitution, and stressed the importance of union among the Albanians, Moslems and Christians, in order to defend them­ selves and the Ottoman Empire better. At Monastir the group was joined by another Albanian patriot, Abdul Bey Ypi from Kolonje, a lawyer and writer, who had adhered to the Young Turk movement. When they left for a tour of Albania in order to establish secret committees, their avowed mission was to make propaganda for the support of the constitution. In Diber they were first received coldly, but later they won the confidence of the inhabitants and they managed to found a club. In Elbasan they were successful in bringing together the two parties, that of the beys and that of the people, but in Tirana they could not eliminate their opposition. They were most enthusiastic about Kruje where they found a nationally minded population. Certainly in Kruje the existence of an im­ portant Bektashi tekke must have played an influential role. Their disappointment was great in Shkoder, where they were hostilely received. They regarded the Moslems of that city as the most backward and fanatic of all the Albanian religious e7P0sfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 December 1908, No. 77, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6.

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groups.68 Ismail Hakki Bey, a native of Monastir, was also entrusted by Istanbul with propagating the Albanian national idea.69 He was one of the most prominent members of the Istanbul Albanian secret committee. Officially he was sent as an emissary of the Young Turks, with the task of winning the backing of the Albanians for the Young Turk committee. He travelled in the vilayet of Kosovo, where Albanian secret committees were formed only in Uskiib and Gjakove.70 On April 7, 1910, it was decided at the congress of Monastir that the headquarters of the Albanian clubs should pass also to Istanbul, where deputies and notables would serve in the capacity of consultants.71 On October 5, 1908, Austria-Hungary announced the an­ nexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. At the same time Bulgaria, in agreement with the Dual Monarchy, by which she had been encouraged, proclaimed her independence from Turkey. Crete, which had maintained a nominal dependence on Tur­ key but had enjoyed an autonomy under the control of Euro­ pean powers, began in the fall of 1908 a struggle for union with Greece. All these were serious blows to the regime of the Young Turks, and weakened its authority among the populations of European Turkey. Responding to the announcement of the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Committee of Union and Progress appealed to the populations of Turkey to boycott all Austrian 68See Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 31 December 1908, No. 166, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6; P6s£ai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 23 November 1908, No. 73, vertraulich, in ibid; "Report of the Albanian Congress Held in Monastir 1/14 November 1908," by George D. Kyrias, Monastir, 20 January igog, in ibid. 69He seems to have been the brother-in-law of Major Ahmed Niyazi from Resna to whom the latter wrote the letter, when he took to the hills: the name is the same, he is an Albanian from Monastir, and a Young Turk. Cf. B. Lewis, op.cit., p. 204. 70Pdsfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 December 1908, No. 77, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6; Lukes to Aehrenthal, Dskiib, 29 November 1908, No. 191, Geheim, in ibid. 71Pousselin (?) to Pichon, Monastir, 7 April 1910, No. 36, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intirieure, Albanie, 1910, Vol. vm.

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goods. It further strove to use the occasion to arouse panIslamic feelings, forgetting the declarations on equality of Christians and Moslems.72 The reaction in Albania to the appeal of the Young Turks was not everywhere the same. The leadership of the Albanian club in Istanbul supported the Young Turks and turned to the Albanians with a call to unity against the threat of foreign invasion.73 Southern Albania was influenced by the attitude of Lirija, organ of the Salonica Albanian club. The clubs or­ ganized demonstrations against the annexation of BosniaHercegovina and favored the boycott of Austrian merchan­ dise.74 The reason for the anti-Austrian attitude of the south was not that the annexation brought the Dual Monarchy nearer to Albania and that its expansionist policy threatened her existence. There were even some Albanian patriots who considered the evacuation of the sandjak of Novi Pazar as a service to the integrity of Albania. The real reasons were different. The Albanians wanted to be in agreement with the Young Turks because at this time they still enjoyed the con­ stitutional rights and freedom for their national development. They feared the consequences of the independence of Bul­ garia, which Austria-Hungary had secretly supported and by so doing had indirectly damaged and jeopardized the terri­ torial integrity of Turkey and Albania. The success of Bul­ garia had also stimulated expansionist desires in Serbia, Mon­ tenegro, and Greece, which naturally were to the detriment of Albania.75 The question of Crete touched the southern Albanians more closely. If a part of the Albanian press, for instance Shkopi (Stick) of Egypt, connected the annexation of Bosnia72Cf.

I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 117.

7 s Ibid. 74Aehrenthal1S circulars to the consulates in Albanian territory, Vi­ enna, 3 December 1908, Nos. 2604-2613, and Budapest, 22 October 1908, Nos. 2075-2083, HHStA, PA xiv/g, Albanien v/6. 75Cf. Kraus to Aehrenthal, Valona, 25 November 1908, No. 77, streng vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6; Renzi to Aehrenthal, Janina, 7 January 1909, No. 2, i n ibid.

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Hercegovina with the separation of Crete from Turkey, two essentially different questions, it was because they were afraid of Greek expansionism: the union with Crete would strengthen Greece and the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina might give her an excuse to seize regions of southern Alba­ nia.76 At the outset, the Young Turks were successful. They aroused the Albanian opinion against the expansionism of Greece. On February 4, 1909, they organized a meeting at Tepelene, attended by a large number of Albanians from the vilayet of Janina. The principal question discussed was the increase of Greek guerrillas in Epirus and the formation of Albanian bands to counteract them. Demands of a purely Albanian nature, such as the opening of Albanian schools, were left in the background by the Young Turk represen­ tatives.77 In Shkoder the news about the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina did not produce among the Moslems the reaction which the government circles wished.78 On the part of the Catholics a hostile reaction to Austria-Hungary could not be expected. The Prince of Montenegro, Nicholas, was even afraid that, if a war broke out on account of the Bosnian crisis, he would be attacked by Albanian guerrillas subsidized by Vienna. It was not secret that the Austrian consulate in Shkoder was recruiting Catholic mountaineers for that pur­ pose. Austria seems to have promised the Catholic highlanders "ten thousand rifles." 79 There were rumors that, after the victory, Austria-Hungary would return Dulcigno to Albania. The Montenegrin Prince was striving hard to ward off the danger. His capable consul in Shkoder made great efforts to reconcile the Albanian mountaineers with the Montenegrins. He tried to persuade their chiefs that the time of the old hatreds had passed, and he was partly successful. One of the 76Cf.

I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 119-120. to Aehrenthal, Valona, 11 February 1909, No. 14, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. 78Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 10 October 1908, No. 97, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. 79M. E. Durham, The Struggle for Scutari, London, 1914, p. 133. 77Kraus

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chiefs went to Cetinje, where the Prince gave him a most flattering welcome.80 It was easy for the Young Turks to inspire a powerful antiAustrian movement in the vilayet of Kosovo. The Albanian population there actively supported the boycott of Austrian goods, despite the fact that almost the whole trade of the vilayet was carried on with Austria. The population of these districts had always been very anti-foreign. It had hoped, however, that the new regime would have been in a position to defend itself from the menace of invasion from outside. The seizure of Bosnia-Hercegovina by Austria-Hungary re­ vived that danger. The anti-Austrian attitude of the Kosovars cannot then be regarded as beneficial to the Young Turks. The support they lent to the boycott was an opposition to the foreigner not an indication of loyalty to the Turkish govern­ ment. Faith in the power and authority of the latter had been shaken and the desire for independent action began to grow.81 This awareness disturbed the Committee of Union and Prog­ ress, which, in order to prevent it from growing into an antigovernmental manifestation, organized, through its local branch in Oskiib, a meeting in Ferizovie, as if to remind the Kosovars of the days when they aided the Young Turks to come to power. Representatives of the Union and Progress Committee accused the Sultan and the old regime of respon­ sibility for the loss of Bosnia.82 Austria-Hungary was concerned about not alienating the Albanians, for her policy toward their country had not changed. In a circular prepared for the consular services on Albanian territory, Janina and Kosovo included, Aehrenthal stated his post-annexation policy: Austria's aim would be to preserve all that she had attained until then in Albania. How­ ever, since she herself had no intention of taking possession of Albanian territory—and here he stressed that he considered 80R.

Pinon, "Le Montinigro et son prince," Revue des deux mondes, March 1910), 89-90. 81Cf. I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 118. ti Ibid.

LVi (i

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359

the Sandjak Albanian land—she would not allow other states to seize territory at the expense of Albania. If a conference were to be held, Austria-Hungary would oppose the partition of Albanian territory.83 When the question of recognition of the Bosnian annexa­ tion came up in Istanbul, the Albanian club had misgivings. Ismail Kemal, who at that time was the leader of the Alba­ nian deputies in the Ottoman parliament, did not oppose it. He held it necessary, however, that the Porte stipulate with Austria-Hungary certain guarantees against a possible attack by Serbia and Montenegro on Turkey. The possibility was not excluded, he told Germany's ambassador to Turkey, that the recognition of the annexation would incite Serbia and Montenegro to a war against Turkey in order to acquire the territories to which they aspired. He already observed in Belgrade a sudden change in that direction. But Turkey, he added, should not risk getting two and a half million liras in order to spend ten times that sum on a war.84 On the day of the declaration of the constitution the Sultan promulgated a decree ordering the convocation of a parlia­ ment. In September 1908 the electoral law was published. According to it, the electors and the candidates for the cham­ ber should present themselves as Ottomans, abandoning their nationality. The parliamentary candidates should also know Turkish. The Young Turks, with a view to winning a major­ ity in the Chamber, had made artificial divisions in the elec­ toral districts.85 The election campaign in Albania was carried on in an atmosphere of tension. The Albanian clubs developed a broad activity in favor of the Albanian national-minded candidates, even entering into a clash with the Committee of Union and 83Aehrenthal's circulars, Budapest, 22 October 1908, Nos. 2075-2083, and Vienna, 3 December 1908, Nos. 2604-2613, HHStA, PA xiv/9, Albanien xi/6. "Marshall an das Auswartige Amt, Pera, 19 January 1909, GP, Vol. xxvi, p. 484. A lira is a Turkish pound. 85I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 124-125.

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Progress, which used all means to have its own candidates elected.86 In Elbasan, the population did not support the Young Turk candidate, but expressed itself for its own.87 In Berat, the electors voted for Ismail Kemal, in spite of the bitter campaign against him by the Young Turks and the paper Lirija. 66 The attacks on Ismail Kemal came after his visit to Athens, where he had made declarations to the press that the Greeks were the natural brothers of the Albanians, and after the warm reception he had in Vlore, when he arrived in Septem­ ber 1908.89 Midhat Frasheri, the editor of Lirija, which at that time was very much in favor of the Young Turks, wrote an open letter to Ismail Kemal. He expressed strong disap­ proval of Ismail Kemal's policy of friendship with Greece and accused him of being an instrument of that power. He further denounced him for never having cared about the good of Albania, but having only used her for his own ends. For him, Ismail Kemal was neither an Albanian nor a Turk. Yet he could not deny him his stand against the despotism of Abdul Hamid, adding that what he had done had been good only for the past.90 Midhat Frasheri's open letter produced a widespread reaction, both favorable and unfavorable, oblig­ ing Frasheri to write an answer in which he stressed that he opposed the pro-Greek policy of Ismail Kemal.91 In November 1908 Ismail Kemal arrived in Istanbul as a 86E.

b. V., op.cit., p. 8. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 125-126. 88Cf. Kraus to Aehrenthal, Valona, 21 November 1908, No. 74, Beilage, HHStA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/6. 89Kraus to Aehrenthal, Valona/Berat, 3 September 1908, No. 37, HHStA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/6. w Lirija, October 4, 1908. There is a German translation of the letter in Kraus to Aehrenthal, Valona, 2 November 1908, No. 61, Beilage, HHStA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/6. 9 1 Lirija, 25 October 1908, and German translation of it in Kraus to Aehrenthal, Valona, 21 November 1908, No. 74, Beilage, HHStA, PA xiv/g, Albanien v/6. 87I.

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361

deputy for Berat. The Young Turks shunned giving his ar­ rival an official character, but the Albanian club of Istanbul welcomed him brilliantly.92 When the Turkish parliament convened (December 17, 1908), 26 deputies represented the four Albanian vilayets. Some of the outstanding ones, who later played a role in the political life of Albania, in addition to Ismail Kemal, were Shahin Kolonja for Korce, Nexhib Draga for LJskiib, Hasan Prishtina for Prishtine, Esad Toptani for Durres, and Mufid Libohova for Gjirakaster.93 But irregularities occurred in the elections. The Catholics of Shkoder protested against the manner in which the elections were carried out in their city. They stated that, on the basis of the right accorded to them by the con­ stitution, they could vote for the candidates of their confi­ dence, irrespective of their being Moslems or Christians.94 They warned of serious disorders if the votes were not divided between a Moslem and a Christian.95 This protest was cor­ roborated by a memorandum of the Catholic highlanders.98 Another case of disorderly election was that of Hasan Basri Effendi, considered "a Turkish muhacir (refugee)," as deputy of Diber. There was bitterness in that town. At the request of the Dibrans, the Albanian club of Monastir took the initiative to protest to the Young Turks against the irregular election and called on the Albanian clubs to write to their deputies m Memoirs 93For

of Ismail Kemal Bey, p. 321. a list of the Albanian deputies, see Leka, ix (28 November

1937). 36394There was also an imperial decree (Hatti Humayuri) of 1 August 1908, in which it was stated that "every subject belonging to whatever race and religion should enjoy individual liberty and equality of rights and duties." Text of decree in J. Larmeroux, op.cit., 11, 40-43. 95Memoriale della Comuniti Cattolica del Sangiaccato di Scutari al Gran Vizir e al Comitato "Unione e Progresso" di Salonicco, inviato a mezzo della Curia Arcivescovile di Scutari, Scutari d'Albania, January 1909, in C. Libardi, op.cit., 11, 257-260; see also R. Pinon, "La question albanaise," Revue des deux mondes, Liv (1909), 815. 9eMemoriale alia Porta e alle Potenze, Dalle Montagne di Albania, January 1909, C. Libardi, op.cit., n, 260-261.

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in Istanbul to bring up the question before the Turkish pai>liament.87 The two trends which manifested themselves among the Young Turks in exile re-emerged now in Parliament. On the one hand, there were the liberals, favoring a sort of decen­ tralization and some autonomous rights for the religious and national minorities; on the other, the nationalists, standing more and more for central authority and Turkish domina­ tion. To the first group belonged many of the Albanian deputies; they were joined by a number of other deputies, especially Christians. They thus formed the party of the Lib­ erals (Ahrar), under the leadership of Ismail Kemal, which in the parliament was an opposition party.98 Illuminating from the viewpoint of the thinking of Ahrar is the interview which Ismail Kemal gave to the Pall Mall Gazette of London in January 1909. He declared that the only salvation of Turkey was to grant broad and complete free­ dom. Turks, Greeks, Slavs, Armenians, Albanians, Arabs and all the other peoples of the Empire should be on a footing of equality. To hold that the Turks should occupy the first place is "humbug." The Turks in Europe, if brought together, he stressed, were not as numerous as the population of Liver­ pool, while the whole population of European Turkey was equal to that of London. He asked that the Young Turks come into the open and give up secrets, masks, and meetings in the middle of the night. The army, the navy, the civil administration, he said, should be open to all the nationalities and creeds and the most capable should occupy the best po­ sitions." At that time, when Mufid Libohova mentioned in the parliament the name Arnautlar (Albanians), the speaker, Ahmed Riza, interrupted him by saying: "There are no Alba97P0sfai

to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 March 1909, No. 10, Geheim, and as Beilage HI, circular of Monastir club, dated 7 March 1908, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. 98Cf. B. Lewis, op.cit., pp. 209, 374; I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 126-127. "Text translated in Albania, xn (1909), 33-34.

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363

nians; there are only Ottomans." The Albanian deputy re­ torted: "Yes, sir, there are Albanians." 100 The relations between the Albanians and the Young Turks were deteriorating. There were conflicts between them and the Albanian clubs. In Monastir the club Bashkimi was in open hostility to the Young Turks. The main cause was the Albanian alphabet and the Albanian schools.101 Already as early as August 1908 there was the conviction that, next to the more or less open Committee of Union and Progress, there existed a secret committee for the liquidation of the enemies of the constitutional regime. In March 1909, it was learned from reliable sources that the Monastir committee of the Young Turks had decided on the assassination of three persons, one of them being the Albanian patriot George Kyrias. Atttempts were planned in Korge against the life of the publicist Dervish Hima, who was propagandizing the national idea. Previously, in August χ 908, Dervish Hima, son of a landowner from Ohrid who had given up his medical studies in Istanbul to work for the Albanian cause, had been im­ prisoned by the Young Turks in Shkoder because he had delivered speeches on the union of the Albanian people and on the autonomy of the country. The life of Ismail Kemal was not safe. Telegrams from many parts of Albania, from Vlore as well, asked the club of Monastir to wire a joint protest to Istanbul.102 On April 12 the Committee of Union and Progress made it known that it had ceased to be a secret association and had become an ordinary political party. The same night an armed and reactionary uprising broke out which took the form of a mutiny by soldiers, most of them Albanians, of the army sta100 Ibid.,

p. 35. next chapter. 102P6sfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 March 1909, No. 10, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. See also on Dervish Hima, Director of the I. R. Austrian Museum of Commerce to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 30 November 1908, No. 47305, HHStA, PA xrv/10, Albanien v/7-13 and P6sfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 25 January 1910, No. 5, Geheim, in ibid,.; Col. Lamouche, op.cit., p. 97. 101See

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tioned in Istanbul. A part was played in the uprising by an extremist religious organization, called Mohammedan Union, which explains the demands of the mutineers: "The Sheriat is in danger, we want the Sheriat." 103 In the cabinet that was constituted after the uprising, Ismail Kemal maintained that he was offered the position of Minister of the Interior but turned it down because he wanted to remain a "national rep­ resentative." He accepted therefore that of the speaker of the parliament.104 The organizers of the rising of April 13 hoped to find sup­ port in Albania. In the north, the hodjas endeavored to incite the mountaineers against the Young Turks, who did not want to respect their privileges, but the mountaineers did not move.105 Still less successful was their propaganda in the south, where the influence of the Albanian clubs was great. Al­ though the Albanians fought the chauvinistic policy of the Young Turks, they did not want the return of Abdul Hamid's regime, which had been adverse to any national Albanian cultural development. Even the Albanian deputies of Ahrar, which was favored by the counter-revolutionaries as a party of opposition to the Young Turks, did not desire this. The Albanian clubs in general sided with the Committee of Union and Progress. When the Albanian clubs of Salonica wired to them to be ready to defend the constitution and assist the army, the answers they sent manifested their readiness to do so.106 Since Macedonia, too, did not move, the revolt remained restricted to Istanbul. Soon an army—the IIIrd Turkish army of Macedonia— under the command of General Mehmed Shevket Pasha ad­ vanced to Istanbul. With him was Ahmed Niyazi of Resna. The military operations were directed by Ali Pasha Kolonja, a southern Albanian. On April 23 the forces from Macedonia occupied the capital, with little resistance on the part of the 103B.

Lewis, op.cit., p. an. Memoirs of Kemal Ismail Bey, pp. 332-335, 340. 103R. Pinon, "La question albanaise," p. 815. l o a Lirija 6 April 1909. j l o i The

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mutineers. Sultan Abdul Hamid was deposed and in his place was put Mehmed Reshad, a tool of the Young Turks.107 The failure of the April uprising had its repercussions among the Albanians. The Albanian club of Salonica, which obviously now had assumed the role of the central club, sent a circular to the Albanian clubs of Gjirokaster, Vlore, and Berat that Ismail Kemal—and together with him Mufid Libohova—had fled to Athens, with the intention of fomenting troubles in Albania. They were warned not to pay attention to his instigations, which in the view of the Salonica club, were detrimental to the Albanian nation.108 A split had occurred among the Albanian patriots, but the majority of them were still on the side of the Young Turks. Matters were rather different in the north. The deposition of Sultan Abdul Hamid and especially the execution of Albanians comprised in the counter-revolutionary movement, such as Halil Bey of Krajina, aroused indignation, particularly in Shkoder, a for­ tress of Moslem conservatism.109 If the Albanian patriots, on the whole, were still supporting the Young Turk regime, it was because the alternative would have been worse. But the contrast between the policy of cen­ tralization and Ottomanization of the Young Turks and the aspirations of the Albanians for national development and autonomy was becoming daily more apparent. 107Cf. B. Lewis, op.cit., pp. 212-213; A von Rappaport-Arbengau, "Ne Shqipni e per Shqipni" (In Albania and for Albania), Leka, ix (Novem­ ber 1937), 436. l o s Journal de Salonique, 26 April 1909. 109R. Pinon, op.cit.

The Struggle for a National Alphabet and National Schools THE WRITING of the Albanian language, which had been

banned for centuries, was permitted after the success of the Young Turk revolution. But not progress could be made without Albanian schools and without a uniform alphabet. The two questions—schools and alphabet—were inextricably connected. The establishment of Albanian schools was a difficult and intricate problem. Until 1908, the schools in Albania had been organized along religious lines: Moslem, Orthodox, Catholic. If the Albanian patriots were to unite the Albanians and develop their national consciousness, the new schools had to be non-denominational. But among the Moslems there existed the Turcomans and among the Orthodox the Grecomans, both of whom stood in the way of the new educational system. Another trouble was that books in Albanian were scarce and there were few teachers who could accomplish their task properly, although the Albanian colony of Sofia put money and effort into dispatching a large number of ele­ mentary books, especially primers, from the printing house Mbrothesia. The teaching of Albanian became a question of honor and patriotic duty.1 Still another problem was that of financial help for the upkeep of the schools; the denomina­ tional schools were maintained by the religious communities and partly by subsidies from abroad—Greek or Austrian. In addition, there were the difficulties which were apt to arise between the Young Turk administration and the Albanian clubs, whose job was primarily the establishment of Albanian education. Despite these problems, the clubs were able sooner or later to open Albanian schools in the various towns. In Elbason, hundreds of students were registered when the school opened. 1 Histori

e Shqiperise j 1900-1919, p. 22.

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Adults were also enrolled for night courses.2 In Korge, where a tradition in Albanian education existed, the movement acquired greater impetus. The American protestant school for girls, which used Albanian as the language of instruction, had a full enrollment, while that for boys, which had been closed by the Turkish authorities, had to expand because of the large number of registered students. There were plans for the erection and maintenance of an Albanian junior high school and a vocational school by funds coming mainly from the Albanians of Rumania.3 In Monastir an elementary school for boys was created and George Kyrias was appointed a teacher of Albanian in the Turkish senior high school ( idadiye).4 In the sandjak of Berat Albanian schools were opened in August 1908.5 Here something unusual happened. The upkeep of schools had been entrusted to the municipalities, but apparently the budget for that purpose, in Berat, had not taken into account the great expenses involved. In order to raise funds it was decided that the monopoly of petroleum be introduced and that a new tax of 10 paras be levied on every sheep skin exported from there in considerable quantities.® By November 1908, there were fifteen day schools and five night schools functioning in Albania.7 The problem of Albania's schools was solved in part when a decree was issued by the Turkish Ministry of Education that Albanian be taught in the elementary and junior high 1 Ibid. 8Pdsfai

to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 30 November 1908, No. 75, Geheim HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. i Ibid., and P0sfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 26 December 1908, No. 83, Geheim, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. 5See for other schools Lirija, 4 August and 8 September 1908. eLetter of Gjergj Karbumara to Sotir Kolea, Berat, 2-15 August 1908, in Archive A. Tashko, Tirana, as cited by I. G. Senkevich, Osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie albanskogo naroda ν 1905-1912 gg., Moscow, 1959, p. 112. There were 40 paras to a Turkish kuru§. 7See complete list in the manuscript by George D. Kyrias, "Report of the Albanian Congress Held in Monastir, 1/14 November 1908," Monastir, 20 January 1909, p. 17, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6.

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schools (ru§diyes ) of Albania.8 The Moslems of Shkoder, how­ ever, did not want to hear of Albanian and Albanian schools. Their attitude was no different from that toward the founda­ tion of Albanian clubs. They promptly wired to Istanbul that, because they had lived for 500 years "with Turkey," they did not want to recognize a language other than Turkish (i.e., Albanian) as an official one.9 They totally disregarded the ministerial decree permitting the introduction of Alba­ nian in the Turkish schools. Even an effort to introduce it as a subject in the few elementary Turkish schools in Shkoder would have been in vain.10 The south, on the other hand, tried to make the most of the decree of the Turkish Ministry of Education, and the school movement would have been more successful had it not been for the opposition of the Greek Orthodox Church. The Greek Church kept the Alba­ nian students in the Greek schools under threat of excom­ munication.11 Revealing as to the aspirations of the Albanian patriots, particularly the Tosks, in the early period of the constitu­ tional regime, is that part of the program of Shahin Kolonja, deputy for ΚοΓςε, relative to Albanian education. This pro­ gram, intended to be presented to the Turkish parliament, was discussed at a secret meeting of some Albanian delegates to the Congress of Monastir in November 1908. It was pro­ posed that in all elementary and junior high schools the lan­ guage of instruction should be Albanian, Turkish to be learned from the fourth grade on. The schools, as in the past, should be supported by the state. Considering Greek interfer­ ence dangerous for the education of the Orthodox Albanians, the program called for the prohibition of subsidies to their s Lirija,

4 October 1908. 1 November 1908. 10Cf. Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 16 April 1909, No. 59, HHStA PA j xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. 11Cf. P. Luarasi—Jeta dhe Vepra, mbledhur dhe redaktuar nga Skender Luarasi (P. Luarasi—Life and Work, collected and edited by Skender Luarasi), Tirana, 1958, p. 83; Letter of Kol Kamsi to Nikolla Ivanaj, Vlore, 2-15 August 1908, in State Archives of the People's Repub­ lic of Albania, Tirana, as cited by I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 113. a Lirija,

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369

schools on the part of the Greek government. The schools were to be maintained partly by the income derived from church property and partly by subsidies from the Turkish state, so that they could eventually turn into national Alba­ nian schools. The foundation of an Albanian university was also envisaged. It was proposed that each year in the educa­ tional budget of the state five stipends should be reserved for Albanians to study abroad, in Europe or America, in order to be trained as university professors. To impede foreign meddling—by Austria, Italy, and Greece—in the educational affairs of the country, the program asked that the Catholic and Orthodox priests be paid by the Ottoman state.12 It was a very ambitious program, but this was still a period of en­ thusiasm, when the Albanian weekly of Salonica was writing: "It is true that we are free to open as many schools as we like and where we like." 13 It does not appear that the program was ever presented to the Turkish parliament. Its value lies in its reflection of the thoughts on education of the patriots of the time.14 12Pdsfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 30 November 1908, No. 75, Geheim, HHStA1 PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6, and Beilage, containing the complete program. 13 Lirija, 25 October 1908. 14I. G. Senkevich, eager perhaps to attack imperialist powers and the Catholic Church, has given only a part of the content of art. 17 of Shahin Kolonja's program and a partial interpretation (see I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 122-123). She has referred to the Albanian Catholic clergy as influenced by the two Catholic powers, Austria and Italy, but she has left completely out the Greek clergy. Shahin Kolonja was one of those patriots who had supported the cultural policy of Austria-Hungary—his own paper, Drita (Light), was subsidized by Vienna—and knew well that the Catholic clergy could not be dependent, by its very nature, on the Ottoman state. The services of the Catholic clergy to the Albanian language and education were openly acknowledged at the Monastir Congress by its president, Midhat Frasheri, who was known to be antiAustrian and anti-Italian (cf. G. D. Kyrias, op.cit., p. 6). If Shahin Kolonja included the Catholic clergy, it was in order to make his demand more palatable to the Young Turks, who feared influences of great powers. For him, as a Tosk, the Greek church was important, and his aim was to curtail its influence. It is, therefore, the Greek part of art. 17 that is of consequence and not the Catholic one.

370

m. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

The development of Albanian education was also ham­ pered by the multitude o£ alphabets. As has already been pointed out, in the Catholic schools of Shkoder, the alphabets employed were those of Bashkimi (Union) and Agimi (Dawn), two literary societies. In the schools of the south, the alphabet of Istanbul was in use. The question of a unified national alphabet, which had troubled the patriots even before the Albanian League, became most urgent. Its absence was an obstacle to the progress of Albanian education and also to the growth of national consciousness and the union of Tosks and Gegs. Between November 14 and 22, 1908, an alphabet Congress was held in Monastir. It was organized by the Albanian club of that city and was attended by delegates from Albanian clubs and societies, towns and schools, both from Albania proper and from the colonies abroad. Some of the prominent delegates were Midhat Frasheri, president of the club of Salonica and editor of Lirija; Pater Gjergj Fishta, represent­ ing Bashkimi and Dom Ndre Mjeda, representing Agimi of Shkoder; Sotir Peci, editor of the newspaper Kombi (The Nation) in the United States; Shahin Kolonja; and Gjergj D. Kyrias.15 An intellectual who should have been there was Faik Konitza. It is quite possible, as he maintained, that the invita­ tion to attend the Congress was sent to him late on purpose.16 It seems that the Albanian patriots, who recognized his out­ standing capacities, were also aware of his difficult personality: they were afraid he would create trouble in the Congress. The Congress was chaired by Midhat Frasheri. The speeches of the first two days with regard to the alphabet were general in character, and helped to create a congenial atmos15See, for a complete list of the delegates and the places which dele­ gated them, G. D. Kyrias, op.cit., p. 3, and P0sfai to Aehrenthal, Mon­ astir, 23 November 1908, No. 73, vertraulich, Beilagen 1 and 11, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/16. l e Albania, xi (1907), 98-99, and xn (1909), 26-27; Faik Konitza to Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, London, 22 January, 1909, as Beilage 11 to Bericht, London, 22 January 1909, No. 7F, HHStA PA xiv/19, Albanien xn/2.

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371

phere in which to carry out the serious work. Although each representative had come resolved to defend the alphabet of his preference—and many spoke their minds—each soon be­ came aware, in that mixed crowd, that it was important to achieve unity, no matter which alphabet was chosen. The delegate who contributed most to the creation of the atmos­ phere of brotherhood and understanding was Pater Gjergj Fishta, who extolled the work of the Bashkimi alphabet, but concluded: "I have not come here to defend any one of the alphabets, but I have come to unite with you and adopt that alphabet which the Congress decides upon as most useful for uplifting the people." 17 The audience was deeply moved by the words of this Franciscan brother, and a Moslem clergy­ man, Hodja Afiz Ibrahim Effendi, from Oskiib, rushed to him as Fishta left the platform, and, with tears in his eyes, embraced him. This scene in the presence of more than 300 persons, three-quarters of whom were Moslems, could not but leave a deep impression.18 In all the speeches the union of Tosks and Gegs was stressed as most vital for the nation. The Congress elected an alphabet committee, composed of eleven of the most cultured delegates, with Fishta at its head.19 For three successive days the committee deliberated on the question of a common alphabet, giving the Albanian besa that nothing would be divulged prior to the final decision. As the discussions in the general meeting hinged mostly on the main alphabets—Istanbul, Bashkimi and Agimi—the alpha­ bet committee limited itself to three questions: (a) should one of the three alphabets be chosen; (b) should parts of each alphabet be amalgamated for the formation of a new alpha­ bet; and (c) should a new alphabet be created.20 The committee dwelt long upon the three questions, par17G.

D. Kyrias, op.cit., p. 7. ibid., pp. 7-8. 19For a complete list of the members, see ibid., p. 8, or P0sfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 33 November 1908, No. 73, vertraulich, HHStA PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. 2 0 Ibid.; G. D. Kyrias, op.cit., p. 11. 18See

372

ΠΙ. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

ticularly since letters and telegrams arrived from many parts of Albania and the colonies expressing their preferences for the alphabet. Among them was a telegram from Prenk Bib Dodaj captain of Mirdite. He requested that the Bashkimi alphabet be selected as the national one, because it was the most practical for commerce and for communication with foreign countries.21 Finally two currents emerged. One fav­ ored a new alphabet on the basis of Latin letters: 25 letters were chosen, and the rest, corresponding to particular Alba­ nian sounds, were built by diagraphs. The new alphabet was almost identical to that of Bashkimi. The other current sup­ ported the adoption of the Istanbul alphabet. It was not easy to discuss some of its letters. The character 8 (th, as in father) alone took up two whole sessions of the committee. Those who were in favor of adopting the Istanbul alphabet were four MoslemTosks—Midhat Frasheri; Shahin Kolonja; Bajo Topulli; Nyzhet Vrioni, member of an influential feudal family from Berat—and Dom Ndre Mjeda.22 Dom Ndre Mjeda supported the Istanbul alphabet, first, because, like his own, it was founded on the principle of one letter for each sound, and secondly, because the Latin alphabet was similar to that of his rival, the Abbot Preng ϋοςϊ. At the end the committee resolved that the two alphabets—the Istanbul and the new Latin alphabet—would be the only ones to be used and all Albanian schools were obliged to teach both to their pupils. Midhat Frasheri communicated to the Congress the deci­ sion of the committee. Then Pater Fishta, in his capacity as president of the alphabet committee, justified it. He said that the Istanbul alphabet alone would be sufficient to answer the needs of the Albanian nation, but in order to have books printed abroad and for telegrams a purely Latin alphabet was necessary. As a final touch, he referred to the Germans, 21P6sfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 23 November 1908, No. 73, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. 22G. D. Kyrias, op.cit., p. 19.

NATIONAL ALPHABET AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS

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who employed two alphabets, the Gothic and the Latin.23 The decision of the alphabet committee was accepted by the Congress.24 The resolution on the alphabet question at Monastir was a significant step toward the unification of education and the union of the Albanians. Although not the ideal solution, which would have been a single alphabet, it was a wise one. The Istanbul alphabet could not have been discarded, for it had a long tradition and had been widely diffused. However, by eliminating all other alphabets, the Monastir decision rendered easier the communication among Albanians: a paper or a book published in the south could now be read in the north, and vice versa. It also contributed to making Moslems and Christians more conscious of their common heritage. It is interesting to note that nearly all of the delegates pres­ ent at the Congress expressed their gratitude to the British Bible Society, for, at a time when books written in Albanian were forbidden by the Turkish authorities, only the Bible Society could circulate the sacred books in the Albanian lan­ guage—a language that was pure, as that of Kristoforidhi.25 Toward the end of the Congress (November 7/20) a dele­ gation composed of three members of the Albanian club of Istanbul—Hodja Vildan, Fazil Pasha, and Colonel Riza— arrived. They were sent by their club to attend the Congress and then travel all over Albania as an "advisory committee" to the Albanian clubs.26 The purpose and activity of this advisory committee needs an explanation. The opinion has recently been expressed by a Soviet historian that this commission was sent by the Union and Progress Committee of Istanbul; that the speeches of its members in Monastir were received adversely; that its real aim in touring Albania was to undermine the influence of the 2 3 Ibid.,

p. 12.

z i Lirija, 25Cf.

8 November 1908. G. D. Kyrias, op.cit., p. 20.

w Ibid,.,

p.

13.

374

ΠΙ. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

Monastir Congress; that it carried on agitation for the intro­ duction in the Albanian language of the "sacred Arabic alpha­ bet"; and that the clubs it organized had a pro-Turkish char­ acter.27 All these allegations have been made by the Soviet historian on the basis of documents which appear not to have been read carefully—or perhaps they had been read by others. The initiative for the sending of this "advisory committee" to the Congress of Monastir and for its trip to Albania was taken by the Albanian club of Istanbul for purely nationalis­ tic reasons and not by the Committee of Union and Progress or by the Turkish government. The duty of the members of the commission was to stimulate national feeling, to found Albanian clubs and secret committees, to encourage the read­ ing of works in Albanian, and help the union of the Alba­ nians. However, in order not to expose its aims and be able to carry out the plan, it was necessary that the Albanian club of Istanbul get in touch first with the official Turkish circles, putting in the foreground as the intention of the commission the making of propaganda in favor of the constitution. In this way they were able to obtain the consent of the Grand Vizier and his cabinet without any difficulties. But the Committee of Union and Progress, because the Albanian club of Istanbul did not come into direct understanding with it, distrusted the commission. From Monastir on, during the whole trip in Albania, it assigned a confidence man, Captain Suleyman Effendi, to accompany the members of the commission and watch every step of theirs, although the captain did not be­ long to the commission.28 It is true that when the commission of three arrived from the Turkish capital to Monastir it was thought that it had been sent by the Young Turks Committee,29 and that the 27I.

G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 123-124. to Aehrenthal, Scutatri, 31 December 1908, No. 166, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6, which is the same as HHStA1 PAyA. (Donesenie austrijskogo konsula) ν Shkodere ot 31 dekabrya 1908 g., in I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 124, note 54. 29Cf. P0sfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 23 November 1908, No. 73, HHStA, PA Xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. 28Kral

NATIONAL ALPHABET AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS

375

participants of the Monastir Congress feared at the outset that its purpose was to agitate for the acceptance of the Turkish alphabet for the Albanian language, but Hodja Vildan Effendi's speech dispelled the fears. After having denounced the despotic rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid and extolled the con­ stitution, Vildan Effendi stressed the importance of union among the Albanians, for united they could better defend themselves and the Ottoman empire. Albania was blessed, he said, because she was now united by the alphabet, which was a powerful tool for her progress. Every nation has the right to choose the alphabet that best suits its language, he stated, and the Albanians chose as such the Latin alphabet. The Turks, too, did not possess letters to write their language; they adopted those of the Arabs. As to the direction that writing should follow—from left to right or from right to left, from top to bottom or the reverse—that was immaterial. In matters of religion Vildan Effendi did not want to interfere: religion belonged to the heart and everyone was free to hold his own views. His speech made a profound impression on many Mos­ lem fanatics who thought that they should not write like the Christians and should not consider the Christians as their brothers.30 Hodja Vildan Effendi spoke along the same lines in all other places which the Istanbul commission visited. He em­ phasized that it was an error to hold that the Koran forbade the writing o£ Albanian except with Arabic letters—this view had been spread by the fanatic Turkish side—for the letters were not of divine origin but were man's creation. It could not be said that Arabic was the only language pleasing to God as there were also many religious books written in Turkish. Consequently, there was no hindrance to use Latin letters for Albanian.31 If we take into consideration that Abdul Ypi, a well-known patriot and writer, joined the Istanbul commission from 80G.

D. Kyrias, op.cit., p. 14. to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 31 Dezember 1908, No. 166, HHStA 1 PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6; Leka., (1940), Document No. 10, pp. 17-18. 31Kral

xii

376

III. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

Monastir on,32 and that the commission was most satisfied in the places where they met with a national understanding,3* there remains no doubt about its patriotic motives. Soon after the Monastir Congress obstacles began to arise. The Moslems of northern Albania, especially those in the vilayet of Kosovo, could not understand the cultural efforts of their more emancipated brothers of the south and were rather reluctant to adopt a script that was not that of the Koran.34 But in the kaza of Kolonje, near Κοτςε, eight hodjas could not hold services until they received a recommendation from the club of Monastir, where it was stated that they had attended courses in Albanian.35 In November 1908 a discus­ sion on the alphabet question took place in the club of tJskub, during which questions such as the following were raised: "Is it a sin to write from left to right? How are we going to learn the Koran if we read our language with Latin letters?" 36 The Young Turks tried to make the most of this situation. Standing for the "unity" of the empire and for a centralistic policy, they were afraid that the Latin alphabet, laying stress on common nationality, would unite the Albanians and even­ tually detach them from Turkey. In fact, the very contrast between the Latin and Turkish alphabets would render the Albanian conscious of being different from the Turks. The principle of religion, Islamism, was still a force in the empire and the Young Turks could not neglect it, although at the outset they endeavored to keep it in the background because of the inter-confessional character of their revolution. They 82P0sfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 23 November 1908, No. 73, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. 33See Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 31 December 1908, No. 166, in ibid. 84See Lukes to Aehrenthal, tlskiib, 29 November 1908, No. 191, Geheim, in ibid. 35Consul of Monastir, 7 December 1908, Albanien xn, as cited in I. G. Senkevich, "Mladoturetskaya revolyutsiya igo8 goda i albanskoe natsional'noe dvizhenie," Sovetskoe vostokovedenie, No. 1, 1958, p. 39. 3 6 Lirija, 15 November 1908.

NATIONAL ALPHABET AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS

377

directed their efforts, therefore, to attract the Albanian Mos­ lems to their side by an Islamic agitation, assailing the Latin alphabet.87 As early as February 1909 the Albanian club of Filat, a town in Qameri (northwestern Greece of today), wrote a letter to Bashkimi of Monastir, the central club, complaining: "We have repeatedly written to you that the Young Turk Com­ mittee (Cemiet) in Filat is very much biased against the Alba­ nian language. Now it manifests [the bias] quite openly; it gathers the peasants and tells them that the Sultan is an opponent of the Albanian language. . . . At the same time it asks them to sign a declaration against the use of the Albanian script."38 The Κοτςε club, Dituria (Knowledge), was very upset to read in newspapers that "in Istanbul a society had been formed with the aim to propagate [the writing of] the Albanian language with Turkish letters." 39 In Shkoder, how­ ever, the protest was not against the Arabic but against the Latin alphabet. On the instructions of the reactionary party, that of the ulemas and hodjas, as well as the Cemiet, a lively agitation in favor of the Turkish alphabet had developed. The fanatic Moslems did not want to employ anything but the Arabic script, regarding all the other scripts as antireligious. Hodjas and ulemas were exhorting the people to reject the Latin alphabet, which was the instrument of the "infidel"; the proper alphabet for the Moslem was that in which the Koran was written.40 The backing lent by the Young Turks to the Arabic alpha­ bet caused disappointment among the nationally minded Al37Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 16 April 1909, No. $g, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6; E. b. V., Die Wahrheit iiber das Vorgehen der Jungtiirken in Albanien1 Vienna and Leipzig, 1911, p. 16. 38See German translation of the original letter, Filat, 19 February 1909, in P0sfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 March 1909, No. 10, Geheim, Beilage 1, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. 39See German translation of the original letter, Korge, 23 February 1909, Beilage 11, ibid. 40Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 16 April igog, No. 5g, in ibid.

378

ΠΙ. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

banians. It was disturbing to them to see the Turkish news­ paper in Salonica, Yeni Asr (New Times), incessantly publish articles against the Albanian alphabet and attempt by all means to create trouble and sow dissension among the Alba­ nians.41 The Union and Progress Committee officially tried to dissipate Albanian suspicions. In March 1909 it informed the Albanian club of Salonica that the Albanian language could be taught freely because this would have "good effects on the Christian Albanians who have come under the influ­ ence of the pan-Hellenic current" and that the Albanians could choose any alphabet they liked;42 nonetheless, the rela­ tions between the Young Turks and the Albanians had been shaken. The friendly understanding which had existed be­ tween the Albanian club of Monastir and the Young Turks was affected so deeply as to be transformed into open hostil­ ity.43 The minds of the Albanians were now preoccupied with the efforts of the Young Turks to impose the Turkish al­ phabet. On July 23, 1909 a congress was held in Diber. On the sur­ face, the initiative for it was taken by an Ottoman Albanian Constitutional Committee (Osmanli arnaut me§rutiyet komisioni) in Diber; in fact, the whole organization was formed by the Young Turks. The first invitations from Diber were addressed only to Albanians, thus creating the impression that it was going to be a strictly Albanian assembly. Gradu­ ally, however, all other nationalities—except the Greeks—of the Macedonian and Albanian vilayets were invited to send their delegates. As the purpose of the congress was not made known, several suppositions arose: the question of Crete, the Albanian alphabet (a delegate from Monastir was the Mufti Redjeb Nureddin, an ardent defender of the Albanian alpha­ bet with Turkish letters), the question of military service, i l Lirija

j

42 Leka

XIX

14 March 1909. (1940), Document 11, pp. 19-20. 43PiSsfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 March 1909, No. 10, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. j

NATIONAL ALPHABET AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS

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and others.44 There were 315 delegates, 95 o£ whom were Christians, and most of the rest Moslem Albanians, from both the north and the south. Shkoder's Catholics declined the invitation, although they displeased the Turkish authorities. Among the Young Turks there were numerous officers, many of whom were dressed in civilian clothes.45 When the meeting opened, the Young Turks tried, through Vehbi Effendi, the Mufti of Diber, to force upon the delegates the acceptance of their program. There was a revolt among the nationally minded Albanians. Abdul Ypi protested, in a fiery speech, upholding the right of free discussion as guar­ anteed by the constitution. Divergencies came into the open and clashes occurred. It became necessary for the meeting to recess. The national Albanians went to the tekke of Baba Shahin for consultations, and the Young Turks to the munici­ pality (belediye). As a result, a large committee was consti­ tuted to decide on the program.46 It became clear that the primary aim of the Young Turks was to use the congress as a demonstration to the European and Ottoman public that the Albanians were for the constitution, were ready to defend it, and did not have separatist tendencies.47 Their secondary objective was to compel the Albanians to accept the Turkish alphabet. The discussions on this subject were lengthy. The Young Turks found a great many backers of their viewpoint.48 Finally, a compromise solution was reached as to the schools and the script: "In every part of Albania elementary, second44Pdisfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 19 July 1909, No. 53, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/7, and Beilage; Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 20 July 1909, No. 99, in ibid. 45See ibid. 4ePdsfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, a August 1909, No. 57, HHStA PA j xiv/15, Albanien xi/7. 47See the first five points of the resolution in Vendimet e Kongresit te Dibres me 10 te Korrikut 1909 (Resolutions of the Congress of Diber on 10-23 JuIy ϊ909)> Monastir, 1909, pp. 1-3. 48 Pdsfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 2 August 1909, No. 57, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/7.

380

ΠΙ. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

ary, commercial schools, and lyc^es should be opened and the native language, that is, Albanian, should be taught—as well as in the official schools—but the manner of teaching it [with the Latin or Turkish alphabet] is according to one's choice. The expenses of these schools will be incurred by the govern­ ment." 49 The Young Turks had succeeded at the Diber Congress not in obtaining a concession but in virtually ruling out the Latin alphabet. The gain which the vilayets of Monastir and Janina had made only a few days before July 3, 1909 by the permission granted by the Ministry of Education of Turkey that "the Albanian language be taught in the junior and senior high schools" suffered a set back.50 The Young Turks intensified their efforts. They organized demonstrations in various towns in Albania in favor of the Turkish alphabet. Their stand on the question of the alphabet was their last attempt to foster dissension between the Christian and Mos­ lem Albanians and thwart their union. But the Albanian patriots did not retreat. Next to ΚοΓςε, Elbasan had become a center of Albanian education. The organization and maintenance of schools there lay entirely in the hands of the Albanian club, which enjoyed general esteem. On the committee of the club were such influential patriots as Akif Pasha, Lef Nosi, Dervish Bey, Dhimitraq Buda, and others. The club supported four Albanian schools in the town.51 Elbasan had been selected by the patriots for a congress on Albanian education. 49Art. 3, Part 11, Vendimet e Kongresit te Dibres me 10 te Korrikut 1909, p. 4; "Spezielle Verwaltungsangelegenheiten," in Beschliisse der Versammlung von Dibra, as Beilage to Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 5 August 1909, No. 106, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/7 (the German translation is from Turkish.) 50See text of the telegram of the Ministry of Education of the Otto­ man Empire to the Government of the vilayet of Janina in Bilmski to Aehrenthal, Janina, 8 July 1909, No. 39, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. 51PcJsfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 February 1909, No. 4, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xiv.

NATIONAL ALPHABET AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS

381

The Congress of Elbasan was held on September 2, 1909, and lasted a little more than a week. Its purpose was to discuss the school question and the foundation of a school for teach­ ers (Normale). Thirty-five delegates attended it, all of them from southern and central Albania. It was said that the north did not participate because of a confusion resulting from the publication of the invitation in Lirija, which was not followed by separate invitations.52 It is probable that this was inten­ tionally done by the southerners, who, after the experience at the Diber Congress, thought that it would be wiser to keep the northerners far from a meeting in which educational mat­ ters were going to be discussed. Dervish Bey of Elbasan was elected president of the congress. The unfriendly attitude of the Young Turks toward the purely national meeting, in the cultural ends of which they could not believe, was manifested first when the gendarmerie commander of Elbasan, Major Nadji Bey, an Albanian known for his national inclinations, was suddenly recalled to Mon­ astic Later, when the congress was in session, members of the Young Turk committee of Elbasan harangued the peasants in the surroundings of the town to pay no attention to the work of the Congress.53 The Congress decided that it was the duty of the Monastir club to introduce the Albanian language in all the schools of Albania, and that meant in the Latin alphabet.54 It was fur­ ther decided to request of all the Albanian publicists and journalists that they use in the future only the dialect of Elbasan, as it was intelligible to both the Gegs and the Tosks.58 Evidently it was thought that it would form a link between the north and the south, and would later develop 52See PtSsfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 20 September 1909, No. 72, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/7; in Beilage 1 to it are the names of the delegates. s s I b i d . ; Bilinsk.! to Aehrenthal, Janina, 15 September 1909, No. 54, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/7. 54Art. 8 of "Beschliisse," P0sfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 20 September 1909, No. 72, vertraulich, Beilage iv, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/7. 55Art. n of "Beschliisse" in i b i d .

382

ΠΙ. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

the basis for a literary language. A very significant decision was the establishment of a teachers' school, composed of six classes, in Elbasan, and supervised by a council made up of 8 Elbasan-born Albanians, elected every two years by the clubs (2) and societies (2) of that town. In the program of the school, religion (Moslem, Orthodox, and Catholic) and his­ tory (World, Turkish, and Albanian) were included among the subjects.66 For the maintenance of the teachers' school and other schools, as well as for the building of new Albanian schools, a society was constituted called Perparimi (Prog­ ress),57 with its headquarters in Κοτςε. It was the task of this society to also publish books needed for the schools. The administrative council of Perparimi consisted of seven mem­ bers, residents of Κοτςε. The contributions from the various societies, clubs, and persons would be made to Perparimi.58 All clubs were asked to do their best to raise the educational level of the people and work toward the progress of the na­ tion, and to give maximum support to the club of Κοτςέ so it could carry out its task.59 By endeavoring to interfere in their goals, the Young Turks had alienated the Albanians. Many representatives expressed the conviction that the Committee of Union and Progress was playing a double game: it appeared to have a friendly attitude toward the Albanians, while it left its local committees to hamper and oppose their national efforts. The beys of Elba­ san, especially Dervish Bey, who chaired the Congress, let it be known that if the Turkish government did not recognize the legitimate aspirations for national autonomy and tried to suppress them, the Albanians would be compelled to resort to force. At the same time a small group of patriots considered the necessity of organizing better the secret committees of the country.60 5eSchul-Program

der Lehrerbildungsanstalt in Elbasan, Beilage π in

ibid. 57Its complete name was Shoqeria Mesonjetorevet Shqipe Perparimi nde ΚοΓςε (Society of the Albanian Schools "Progress" in Korge). 58Statuten des Schulvereines "Perparimi" in ΚθΓς8, Beilage in, in i b i d . 59Allgemeines Club-und Vereins Reglement, Beilage iv, in i b i d . eoSee i b i d .

NATIONAL ALPHABET AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS

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The Elbasan Congress gave a stimulus to the Albanian educational movement. New schools were founded. Even in the vilayet of Kosovo, in the towns of Gjilan and Mitrovice, national Albanian schools were opened. In the senior high school of Uskiib, through the Albanian Educational Club, the Albanian language in the Latin alphabet was intro­ duced.61 The Young Turks could not remain indifferent to this burgeoning of education and particularly to the propaga­ tion of the Latin alphabet. The Committee of Union and Progress sent from SaIonica in January 1910 Arif Hikmet, a young Albanian who came from a wealthy family of Kosovo, for the purpose of propagandizing among the Kosovars in favor of the Arabic alphabet. His activity was upheld by the local Moslem clergy.62 Then alphabet demonstrations and counter-demonstrations followed in the various towns of Albania. On February 6, 1910, the Young Turks organized in Monastir a meeting of the "partisans" of the Arabic alphabet, in which hodjas were the orators. A resolution was passed calling for the introduction of the Arabic alphabet in the Albanian language. Afraid of molestations, a detachment of Albanian soldiers went to guard the club Bashkimi and the offices of the Albanian newspaper Bashkimi i Kombit (Union of the Nation).63 In the beginning of the same month a demonstra­ tion by the partisans of the Arabic letters against the Albanian club took place in Oskiib. It was led by the mollahs. It con­ demned the use of the Latin script as being against the religious law and the interests of Islam.64 But on February 19, 1910 an imposing demonstration took place in Korge in which some 15,000 people protested against the intended introduction of the Arabic alphabet by force. Many speeches were delivered in support of the "Albanian letters," and a prayer was said by the hodja, Hafiz Ali, who elCf.

I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 151.

ei Ibid. ta Ibid..,

pp. 150-151. (?) to Minister of Foreign Affairs, tJskiib, 3 February 1910, No. 3, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Int&rieure, Albanie, 1910, Vol. vni. 04Calvifere

384

III. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

also blessed them. Telegrams were dispatched to the Alba­ nian deputies in Istanbul, whose answer was an encourage­ ment to stick to the demands.65 Gjirokaster followed suit. A meeting was held there from February 20 to March 5, 1910, headed by ulemas and notables. They declared that the Latin alphabet did not do any harm, religious or political, and were resolved not to abandon it.86 In Elbasan a demonstration occurred backing the Arabic alphabet. It was led by hodjas, who tried to arouse the fanati­ cism of the Moslem population, mostly of the environs, by telling them that they would be "infidels" if they used the Latin letters for their language. Two days later there was a powerful counter-demonstration favoring the Latin letters. At the head of it were the most prominent members of the Moslem society of Elbasan. Their telegraphic protests were addressed to the Grand Vizier. Elbasan, where the religiously tolerant element met with the fanatic, had become one of the targets of the Young Turks.67 In the sandjak of Durres the relationship between the enlightened and the fanatic Alba­ nians was different. The former, who had also founded the Albanian club of Durres, had declared themselves partisans of the Latin script. So had the beys of Tirana. Two of them, Fadil Pasha and Fuad Bey Toptani, had even got in touch with Vienna, asking for help to open Albanian elementary schools in Tirana and Malcija e Matit (Mountains of Mat) and to send Moslem Albanians to pursue their studies in higher institutions of Austria. The Austrian government promised them the necessary subsidies.68 But in comparison 65Bornemisza

to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 1 March 1910, No. 13, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xiv; E. b. V., op.cit., p. 20. eeSee text of telegram addressed to the deputy of Gjirokaster, Myfid Bey Libohova, in Leka, XII (1940), Document No. 41, pp. 48-49. 67Halla to Aehrenthal, Durazzo, 11 March 1910, No. 10, H H S t A , PA XIV/24, Albanien xiv. 68A conversation between Consul Kwiatkowski with Fadil Pasha and Fuad Bey Toptani on the island of Brioni, 20 August 1909, and answer from Vienna, 19 September 1909, pp. 1-13, HHStA, PA xiv/10, Albanien v/10.

NATIONAL ALPHABET AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS

385

with the fanatics, the enlightened elements in the sandjak of Durres were a minority. For this reason, they did not demon­ strate in favor of the Latin alphabet and so a demonstration by the fanatics was avoided.69 Despite official orders of the Committee of Union and Progress and the Turkish government to remain neutral in the question of the alphabet, the Young Turks agitated more and more. The mufti of Monastir, Redjeb Nureddin, for­ warded to the notables of Janina a pamphlet in which the Turkish letters for transcribing Albanian were recommended. The Albanian club of that city reacted quickly and wired the Grand Vizier and the Minister of Education a protest, stress­ ing that the Tosks were resolved to abide by the Latin alpha­ bet. Being the chief club of the vilayet of Janina, it advised the other Albanian clubs of the province to do the same.70 As the demonstrations in favor of the Turkish alphabet con­ tinued, the opposition on the part of the nationally minded Moslems of the south became stronger. Characteristic is the protest of the club of Filat to the Porte, when it learned that 12 hodjas had planned to demonstrate in support of the Turkish script; they ended their telegram: "We will shed the rest of our blood for the Latin alphabet." 71 The situation in Shkoder was different. The Catholics had their own confessional schools, under the protection of Aus­ tria-Hungary, which were private in character and, therefore, not under the jurisdiction of the Turkish educational author­ ities. They could not be drawn into the arena of the alphabet conflict. In the Catholic schools Albanian had been taught from the very outset with Latin characters; a change in them was impossible. The same may be said about the Italian schools. The action of the Young Turks in the alphabet ques­ tion concerned the government schools, and in Shkoder it 69HiIla

to Aehrenthal, Durazzo, n March 1910, No. 10, H H S t A , PA xiv/24, Albanien xiv. 70Bilmski to Aehrenthal, Janina, 3 March 1910, No. 17, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xiv. 71BilWski to Aehrenthal, Janina, 7 March 1910, in i b i d .

386

m. TOWABD INDEPENDENCE

could affect only the Moslem Albanians. There was no prob­ lem for the Young Turks there. The adherents to the Arabic alphabet—officers and some civil servants—did not think it necessary even to arrange any special demonstrations. Only a meeting was held in the beginning of February, 1910, called by some hodjas, where the Oskub resolution supporting the Arabic alphabet was adopted.72 Yet toward the end of the same month the Catholics demonstrated in favor of the Latin alphabet.73 In southern Albania, where the Bektashis played an impor­ tant role, the support of the Latin alphabet was strong. In central and northern Albania, if we exclude Elbasan, the propaganda of the hodjas had been successful.74 It was resolved in the Monastir Congress of November 1908 that after two years a second congress should be held. The Latin-Arabic alphabet struggle, which had pervaded Albanian life, brought about an earlier meeting. Between March 21 and 23, 1910,75 a second language congress organ­ ized by the partisans of the "national alphabet," as the Latin alphabet was called, took place in Monastir in order to clarify the whole question. It declared: "The pure linguistic ques­ tion of the Albanian alphabet, which had definitely been solved in the Congress of Diber, has come up again and has caused crises and contradictory currents of opinion. This question, which interests solely the Albanian element, has even acquired an internal political significance since it re­ gards education in the whole Ottoman empire and the inter­ est of the authorities. The government . . . has encouraged the adherents of the Turkish language [alphabet] to carry 72Cf.

Zambaur to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 20 March 1910, No. 33, vertraulich, in ibid. 73E. b. V., op.cit., p. go. 74Cf. Hilla to Aehrenthal, Durazzo, 11 March 1910, No. 10, HHStA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xiv. 76The dates, even when taken as O.S., do not correspond to those given in the reports of the French Consul in Monastir, who gives 30 March to 7 April. See his reports: 30 March 1910, No. 31, and 7 April 1910, No. 36, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Interieure, Albanie, 1910, Vol. vm.

NATIONAL ALPHABET AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS

387

out regrettable acts incompatible with the constitutional regime which we enjoy. . . . The congress unanimously states that the question of the Albanian language, however much it has deviated from its basis, belongs exclusively to the Alba­ nians; and it is desirable, in the true Ottoman interests, that it should not be taken out of its natural sphere." 78 At this congress it was decided also that in addition to the central club in Istanbul, a central advisory council be created, composed of members of the parliament and other Albanian personalities. It would be the task of this council to elaborate a general program for directing Albanian education in the whole of Albania. The central club of Istanbul would have charge of inspecting the clubs in Albania and the literary society of ΚοΓςε, which had undertaken the maintenance of the teachers' school of Elbasan.77 The French consul in Shkoder, Ferte, correctly summarized the situation when he wrote to his government: "On peut dire que I'Albanie toute entiere s'est soulevee contre la pretention du Gouvernement de Iui imposer un alphabet contre sa volontd, nettement formule dans la decision du Congris de Monastir." The columns of the Albanian papers were full of protests from the clubs of the principal towns. Among the signatures the consul could distinguish those of many mem­ bers of the Moslem clergy, who undoubtedly thought that the adoption of a Latin alphabet would not jeopardize the Islamic faith.78 The rift between the Young Turks and the Albanian na­ tionalists had deepened. It was useless any longer to make demands to the Istanbul government, for it had taken an inimical attitude. The Grand Vizier, Ibrahim Hakki Pasha, told a prominent Albanian deputy: "The government con7eC.

Libardi, I primi moti patriottici albanesi nel 1910-1911-1912, Trent, 1935,11, Document No. 18, pp. 262-263. "Resolutions of the Congress as communicated by Dervish Hima, Pdra to Aehrenthal, Salonica, 5 April 1910, No. 75, HHStA, PA xrv/10, Albanien v/8. 78Fertd to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 19 April 1910, No. 6, AMAEj Turquie, Politique Intirieure, Albanie, 1910, Vol. VIII.

388

ΙΠ. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

siders the desire to adopt the Latin characters [on the part of the Albanians] as the first step to be detached from Turkey. . . . The government must do everything, and will do every­ thing, to prevent the adoption of the Latin alphabet." 79 At the instigation of the Turkish government, the §eyh iil Islam, the supreme Moslem authority, sent to all the muftis of Al­ bania on April 5, 1910, a circular letter which read: "We hasten to inform you that on March 22, 1326 [1910], through an official letter to the Ministry of Education, we have drawn the attention of this [Ministry] not to accept the Latin alpha­ bet for the Albanian language and to pay attention that its use in he Albanian schools be strictly forbidden, and we ad­ dress therefore this circular letter to all the muftis of Alba­ nian cities and districts that they should act accordingly." 80 The Young Turks had also trampled on this promise with respect to the Albanian language and script and had offended Albanian national feelings by founding in April 1910 a club in Istanbul called the Educational Circle ( mahfil-i mearif), under government auspices, for the enforcement of the Turk­ ish alphabet.81 Furthermore, a newspaper in Albanian using the Turkish alphabet, the first and the last one, was published in Istanbul.82 This activity was counteracted by the society which the Albanian students in the University of Istanbul (some 150) had formed in the beginning of 1910—called the Society of Young Albanian Intellectuals—which stood openly for defense of the Latin script.83 As the Istanbul government was unable to attain its aims by propaganda, it resorted to force. It abolished the Albanian clubs and societies, suppressed the Albanian newspapers, and shut the schools, as well as the printing houses in Monastir, Salonica, and ΚοΓςε, eliminating at the same time the Alba79 Text in Pallavicini to Aehrenthal, Constantinople, 16 March 1910, No. 16, vertraulich, HHStAj PA xiv/24, Albanien xiv. 80 Text in E. b. V., op.cit., p. 21. 81 See letter of Albanian publicist Dervish Hima in Pdra to Aehrenthal, Salonica, 5 April 1910, No. 75, HHStA, PA xiv/10, Albanien v/8. 82 E. b. V., op.cit., p. 18. 83 See Leka, xn (1940), Documents Nos. 36, 37, pp. 39-42, 45*47·

NATIONAL ALPHABET AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS

389

nian language from the program of the government schools. The Albanian colonies abroad became active in protesting these rigorous measures. The colony in Boston even called upon the Albanian deputies in the Turkish parliament to resign in protest against Turkish inequities.84 The president of the court martial in Elbasan, Colonel Shevket, reported on August 31, 1910 to the commander of the army his view on the situation and the measures to be taken. Referring to the Latin alphabet, which had been prohibited by the govern­ ment, he regarded as the most dangerous centers the cities of ΚοΓςε and Elbasan. In those cities native policemen and gen­ darmes should not be in service and the teachers of the ele­ mentary and secondary schools should be competent but should not be Albanians. As it was believed that some of the officers were aiding the national Albanian movement, Colonel Shevket recommended that these should not be stationed in Albania but should be transferred to Anatolia. With regard to those who had joined the Albanian clubs, he was of the opinion that they should be dismissed from the army.85 In the meantime the revolts which had started in the north, not originally on the question of the alphabet but against the centralistic policy of the Young Turks, began to spread in the country. After eight months of oppression, a switch in policy oc­ curred. An important movement of opinion made itself felt rapidly in Istanbul in favor of the reopening of the Albanian schools.86 In March 1911 a circular from the Ministry of In­ terior in Istanbul was forwarded to the various Albanian districts. It ordered the reopening of the Albanian schools, 84See protest signed by Joseph Pani, chairman, Boston, Mass., 23 October 1910. A copy of it is attached to Jusserand to Pichon, Washing­ ton, 27 October 1910, No. 504, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Interieure1 Albanie, 1910, Vol. vm. 85S. Κϋΐςε, Osmanli Tarihinde Arnavutluk (Albania in the Ottoman History), Smyrna, 1944, pp. 395-397. se Boppe to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, P£ra, 27 March 1911, No. 172, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Int^rieure, Albanie, January-June 1911, Vol. DC.

390

ΠΙ. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

as well as the creation of new ones, and allowed the use of the Latin alphabet. But the schools had to comply with article 129 of the Education Act—Education Act of 24 Cimasi til eweli 1286 (September 2, 1869)—which pertained to the founding of private community schools. Only the teaching of the Koran was to be in Arabic characters.87 This change of policy was so unexpected that the Young Turk club in Vlore hesitated to believe it. It seemed that it was dictated by the imminent visit of Sultan Mehmed V to Albania: the govern­ ment wanted to prepare a friendly reception for him. The Albanians, therefore, believed that it was a temporary measure.88 The measure was to be applied in the fall of 1911. In August 1911 the Grand Vizier addressed a letter to that effect to the Minister of the Interior.89 The government entrusted inspectors, who were its functionaries, to open schools in Albania. As they would open schools only with the consent of the local populations, the Albanian patriots feared that a division would occur, for there would be localities which would ask for the use of the Arabic alphabet. There were also some patriots who had become so suspicious of the Young Turks that they believed that the new policy of the govern­ ment toward the Albanian schools would not continue after the parliamentary elections.90 Indeed, the true aims of the Young Turks, as will be seen in the next chapter, continued to be how to prevent the development of national conscious­ ness among the Albanians and their unification, and how to impose on them centralization and Ottomanization. i7 Ibid..; Kraus to Pallavicini in Vienna, Valona, 24 March 1911, No. 18, HHStA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xiv. 88Cf. ibid. 88Text of the letter in Leka, xn (1940), Document No. 54, pp. 56-57. 90See Dervish Hima's letter to Arthur Rabler, Pira, 23 January 1912, HHStA, PA xiv/10, Albanien v/8.

The Deepening of the Albanian-Young Turk Conflict ALTHOUGH the Young Turks found supporters of the Arabic

alphabet among the northern Moslems, when they tried to apply their centralistic policy they met with armed resistance. The Young Turks, wrote Ismail Kemal, regarded the Alba­ nians merely as a Moslem people with a slightly developed political ideal, and believed that by managing them and exerting pressure they could make them docile Ottomans who would serve as an example to the other nationalities.1 They asked them to pay taxes like the other subjects of the empire; to obey the government officials sent by the Porte; to deliver their weapons, and to accept the draft.2 Although such measures were justifiable from the Young Turk viewpoint of the authority of the state, the times and the area of applica­ tion were ill-chosen. The Gegs, especially the Moslems among them, were dis­ pleased with the new trends which emerged with the constitu­ tional regime, and which aimed at depriving them of their old privileges. If the Kosovars supported the constitution at Ferizovic, it was not because they desired freedom and wanted to enjoy a national life, but because they were lured by false promises of immunities on the part of the Young Turks.3 A Kosovar who visited his compatriots in the early period of the constitutional regime and was disappointed with the sit­ uation wrote critically: "But even those who call themselves Albanians in Kosovo have been blinded by fanaticism and do not know what is Albaniandom, or language, or nation." 4 Only in Gjakove, and particularly in t)skub, did one find a real national Albanian movement. 1 The

Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, ed. S. Story, London, 1920, p. 367. Jackh, Im tiirkischen Kriegslager durch Albanien, Heilbronn, 1911, pp. 27-29; E. b. V., Die Wahrheit uber das Vorgehen der Jungtiirken in Albanien, Vienna and Leipzig, 1911, p. 14. 8Lukes to Aehrenthal, tiskiib, 29 November 1908, No. 191, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. t Lirija, 13 December 1908. 2E.

392

III. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

The Kosovars had not been dissatisfied with the rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid, who had behaved toward them like an indulgent father, respecting their laws and customs and per­ mitting them to carry arms and pay low taxes. The Sultan even distributed honors, positions, and titles to their chiefs. When the Kosovars revolted, they did so against the centralistic policy of the Porte, which attempted to withdraw from them the very privileges the Sultan had recognized.5 When they became aware that the Young Turks had deceived them about the privileges, they wanted to resort to the old methods in order to extort them. The same could be said about the Moslems of Shkoder. They had no understanding of the constitution and the polit­ ical rights and responsibilities it implied. They were Hamidians, because they believed that they could hold their privileges only by the preservation of the authority of the Sultan. Among them, too, the national movement had made little progress. Abdul Ypi, a member of the commission for the founding of the Albanian secret committees, was shocked at the cold reception they had in Shkoder. The commission was deeply impressed by the religious fanaticism of the Mos­ lems of the city.® The stanchest opposition to the Young Turk regime came from the Kosovars, who even before the fall of Sultan Abdul Hamid had dispatched a delegation to Salonica (September i, 1908) to remind the Committee of Union and Progress that they wanted to preserve their privileges.7 In May 1909 the Young Turks, now firmly in the saddle, sent a military expe­ dition to Kosovo to stop the growth of hostile attitudes to the government and break the resistance of the peasants, who refused to be registered and pay the taxes which Istanbul 5 Cf.

C. Libardi, I

primi moti

patriottici albanesi nel

igio-igu-

1912, Trent, 1935, 1, 3. e Kral

to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 31 December 1908, No. 166, HHStA, PA

xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. 7 R.

Pinon, "La question albanaise," Revue des deux mondes, Liv

(1909), 812, 818.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK CONFLICT

393

had introduced. Djavid Pasha, the new commander of the division at Mitrovice, was ordered to make an army demon­ stration in the mountains. Isa Boletini, a prominent leader often honored by the Sultan—he had been decorated, was on the Sultan's payroll, had been granted a giftlik 8—, and other chiefs of Ipek and Gjakove attacked the Ottoman army. Ad­ vised by the vali, Djavid Pasha abstained from war actions against the populations of the towns, for the notables had already declared faithfulness to the new Sultan and the con­ stitution. In the mountainous regions, however, the Turkish general demanded that the population hand in the weapons and imposed on it a new tax for the army and the schools. The mountaineers refused. On June 7, 1909 Djavid Pasha started for the mountains of Gjakove, pitilessly destroying the houses of the peasants and forcefully recruiting the inhabi­ tants. When he reached the mountain pass, Qafa e Morines, the fight between the Turkish regiments and the armed Al­ banian highlanders began. After ten days of fighting, Djavid Pasha was compelled to return to Gjakove.9 In the meantime, in the middle of June, Bedri Pasha, the vali of Shkoder, announced that the government was about to embark on a census, the nofuz,10 as the Albanians called it. Among the Moslems two tendencies were manifested: some, intimidated by the campaign of Djavid Pasha, were inclined to submit; others, fanaticized by the hodjas, shouted that they would receive with bullets the agents entrusted with the census. They all saw in the measure a menace to their privi­ leges and a prelude to obligatory military service. Next the vali ordered the establishment of a record book of real estate to serve as a basis for taxation. The highlanders of the prov­ ince, who had always been poor, resented taxes, and when the Young Turks decided to take the arms away from them, t Lirija,

29 November igo8. I. G. Senkevich, Osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie albanskogo naroda ν 1905-1912 gg., Moscow, 1959, pp. 139-140. 10From Turkish tahir-i nufuz. 9Cf.

394

ΠΙ. TOWAKD INDEPENDENCE

which they had possessed from time immemorial, unrest vastly increased and resistance became more stubborn.11 At this juncture the Catholic tribes around Shkoder (Shala, Shoshi, etc.) addressed to the vali a petition, which shows the situation where Catholics and Moslems lived next to each other and the real dilemma which the Young Turks had to face. It was said that the petition was written by Mgr. Mjeda, coadjutor of the archbishop of Shkoder, who was then tour­ ing the mountains. The petition read as follows: "If the new regime is not a fiction, we are ready to enter in the common law; we accept the taxes, the military service, but on condition that the Moslems of Shkoder, too, should be subjected to them and that the system of boliikba§is (commanders of groups of soldiers) and Moslem serguirdehs (Turk, sergerde = chief bandit), consecration of the inequality of rights be­ tween the two faiths, be abolished and each tribe choose its magistrates. If the ancient regime should, in another form, remain in force, we claim, as it is fair, the maintenance of our immunities." 12 When at the Congress of Diber the question of recruit­ ment came up, the Shkodrans were reproached for enjoying the benefits of all other citizens without participating in their burdens. The delegates of Shkoder replied that from their point of view it was inacceptable that their province, which until then had been a privileged one, should suddenly be obliged to submit to recruitment. They were backed in their attitude by Captain Eyub Sabri Effendi, one of the prominent members of the Committee of Union and Progress, who praised the traditions, the proud history, the courage and patriotism of the Shkodrans. He pointed out that the difficult position of Shkoder required a reconsideration. Apparently, the Young Turks were not decided to extend the principle of equality to all the citizens of Shkoder, because in the fanati­ cism of the Moslems the Young Turks saw an obstacle to the 11Cf.

J. Larmeroux, La politique exterieure de I'Autriche-Hongrie, Paris, 1918, 11, 406; R. Pinon, op.cit., pp. 815-816. 12 Ibid., p. 816.

I^75'I9I4>

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK CONFLICT

395

nationally minded Moslems of that city, and an important support for their own pan-Ottoman and Moslem policy.13 In the fall of 1909 a new flare-up of popular agitations occurred, provoked by the collection of tithes. The popula­ tions of the towns of Vucitrn, Ipek, and Lume refused to pay 1/8 of the harvest as tithe, since they had previously paid only 1/10.14 Under the pretext that the Lumjans disobeyed the order to enter the market-place of Prizren without their weapons, Djavid Pasha penetrated in September into their mountainous region. Here he encountered resolute resistance. Following a fierce battle and the burning of several villages, he retreated to Prizren, giving as an excuse the cold weather.15 The disturbances were intensified in Diber, where many Al­ banians from Kosovo fled from the army of Djavid Pasha. Armed Albanians gathered in the mountains, on the left bank of the Drin river, threatening the rear of the Turkish armies in Kosovo. The Turkish command attempted to come to an agreement with them, but they turned down the Turkish proposal. The agitations in Diber went on for two months and even spread in the nearby district of Mat. The Turkish command did not deem it wise to pursue its struggle in these regions.18 In November 1909 in the parliament of Istanbul a drastic "law on the bands" was promulgated. He who carried and kept arms was condemned to six months of imprisonment; ten years in jail was to be the punishment for those who partici­ pated in bands; and death for organizers and leaders of guer­ rillas. The law further stated that if only one member of the family took part in bands, the whole family was subject to punishment and its property was to be confiscated. In spite of its general character, this law was believed to foreshadow ruthless legal measures to crush Albanian resistance. It gave 13Kral

to Aehrenthalj Scutari, 5 August 1909, No. 106, HHStA, PA

xiv/15, Albanien xi/7. 14I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 140. 15R. ieI.

Pinon, op.cit., 818; Leka, ix (28 November 1937), 3^4G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 140-141.

396

ΠΙ. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

the Turkish government the right to inflict reprisals on whole villages in Albania, for, owing to the tribal system which pre­ vailed there, it was possible for a whole village to belong to one family.17 The policy of centralization was also resented by the south­ ern Albanians, not because they wanted to preserve their privileges, for they had none, but because they desired the free development of their nationality. The clash had been foreseen. It was held that Albanians and Young Turks would work together until the former had sufficiently strengthened their national cause, but that they would part ways later because of the contradiction between the Albanian national efforts and the Ottoman idea of the state.18 While the prin­ ciple of religion bound Moselem Albanians and Young Turks together, that of nationality separated them. To the news­ paper Kombi of Boston, in whose opinions only the principle of nationality mattered, the opposition between the program of the Young Turks and the Albanian national cause ap­ peared deeper: "The Young Turks aim at reviving Turkey and the national Albanians endeavor to expel her from their country and govern themselves." 19 The Committee of Union and Progress did not fail to rec­ ognize the significance of the religious and theocratic prin­ ciple. Gradually—from outside and perhaps in a pan-Islamic form—it came again to be appreciated. Islam was used effec­ tively in the alphabet question in Albania. In the beginning, however, this principle was pushed to the background, be­ cause it was in too open an opposition to the interconfessional character of the July Revolution. Besides, an abrupt return to the direction of Islam would be provocative to the Chris­ tian population.20 17See for more details on the law V. Bdrard, La mort de Stamboul, Paris, 1913, pp. 395-396; The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, pp. 329, 367. 18P6sfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 7 December 1908, No. 77, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. 19 Kombi, 24 July 1908. 20Cf. Rappaport to Aehrenthal, Salonica, 17 March 1909, No. 27, vertraulich, p. 1, HHStA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/4.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK CONFLICT

397

All Albanian patriots who stood for unity, and there were none who did not support it, reacted to the pan-Islamic prin­ ciple, whether they were conscious of it or not. Some, like Faik Konitza, went even further. In an article addressed only to the Moslems, Faik pointed out that there was an imminent danger for them. It seemed certain to him that in a short time the Ottomans would be forced out of Europe and the Moslem Albanians would then run the risk of being expelled, as their country would be partitioned. There remained, therefore, two solutions for his co-religionists: either to return to the faith of their ancestors, that is, to become Christians, or remain Moslems, but be so closely and sincerely united with the Christians as to give to the nation a semi-Christian char­ acter. Since reconversion was not feasible, Failk counseled them to preserve Islam but at the same time to depart from the political evil it entailed: the identification by foreigners of the Moslem Albanian with the Turk. He then proposed the following steps: (i) to drop the use of "Turk" for "Mos­ lem" or "Mohammedan"; (2) to try to gradually reach the point when they would not recognize the §eyh-iil-Islam and would create for their religion a Moslem synod, called Coun­ cil of Ulemas of Albania (Arnautluk meclisi'ulemast), having at the head a director of ulemas (reis-ul 'ulema); (3) this synod should later make some laws in conformity with the Albanian customs; (4) as to the Bektashis, they should be reformed and better organized. He warned, in conclusion, that these changes would be of no avail, if the Albanian Moslems did not propagate among the people ideas of union and brother­ hood with the Christians.21 One who openly stepped into the fight was Dervish Hima. His fiery speeches against the pan-Islamic influences of the Young Turks and in defense of national unity were enthusi­ astically received by the audiences. For this reason the Young Turks tried to assassinate him. Although he encountered the undermining influence of the Young Turks everywhere, 2111Nje lajmerim i shkurter Muhamedaneve" (A Short Notice to the Mohammedans), Albania, xn (1909), 21-24.

398

ΙΠ. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

the most unsatisfactory impressions were made by Durres and Tirana, where religious fanaticism held the mass of the popu­ lation prisoner.22 It should not be overlooked also that panIslamism, apart from the danger it presented to the national idea, met with general aversion on religious grounds by the Moslem Tosks, as many of them were Bektashis. The centralistic policy of the Young Turks would inevita­ bly clash with the autonomistic demands of the Albanians, particularly if these contained radical reforms such as those proposed by Shahin Kolonja. In his program, the deputy of ΚοΓςε proposed that Albanians should serve as soldiers in their own vilayets, or at least in Albania, except in cases of general mobilization. For a better training of the soldiers, the subaltern officers should be Albanians. Even the gendarmerie officers in Albania should be Albanians and should either be graduates of military schools or of special gendarmerie schools. In the exploitation of mines and the construction and maintenance of railroads the interest of Albania should prevail and foreigners should be restricted in participation. Shahin further proposed that mayors should be elected by the system of open vote and their authority broadened. The revenues assigned to public works in Albania should be at the disposal of the local administration. In appointing civil servants to Albanian vilayets, Albanians should be preferred. The Albanian language and nationality should be officially recognized by the government and the birth certificates of the Albanians should carry the designation "Christian Alba­ nian" or "Moslem Albanian." 23 At the Congress of Diber (July 1909) autonomistic claims do not appear. Only a few nationalistic demands are con­ tained in the resolutions. Because of the frequent disputes about the Albanian-Montenegrin frontier, it was asked that the Ottoman government discuss the question soon with 22Cf.

P0sfai to Aehrentha], Monastir, 4 March 1909, No. 10, Geheim, HHStAj PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6; Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 16 April 1909, No. 58, HHStA, PA xiv/10, Albanien v/7-13. 23See text of the program as Beilage to P6sfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 30 November 1908, No. 75, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK CONFLICT

399

Montenegro (art. 6). As many Albanian soldiers had not re­ turned from expeditions to distant lands and hot climates, it was resolved that the soldiers who would be sent to Hedjas, Yemen, and other tropical lands should be chosen on a pro­ portionate basis, taking into account the Ottoman army as a whole (art. 7). It was further asked that the tithe be a fixed sum and not farmed out (art 8). Also the government em­ ployees should be acquainted with the particularities, cus­ toms, and character of the inhabitants in places where they would function (art. 5). More prominent, on the other hand, were the resolutions in favor of the Ottoman state. The dele­ gates declared that they were Ottomans and would live and die as such. No contradiction was found between the Consti­ tution and Islam and all attempts to alienate the Albanians were doomed. The Albanians were ready to die for the de­ fense of the Ottoman Constitution. In the event that the honor of the Ottoman empire would be at stake, because of questions of foreign policy, the Albanian regiments would be ready to go to war. If any revolutionary movements or dis­ turbances, instigated by foreigners, would be directed against the laws of the country and the constitutional government, the people would be called to arms to suppress them, under the orders of the government.24 The resolutions of the Diber Congress seem an artificial compromise between the demands of the Young Turks and those of the Albanians. Both parties revealed their weaknesses. The Young Turks failed in their objective because they accepted resolutions which brought forth the particular place of Albania; the failure of the Alba­ nians was that they could not eliminate or attenuate the articles which favored the Ottoman state and they did not succeed in making clearer and more nationalistic claims.25 24See

Vendimet e Kongresit te Dibres (The Resolutions of the Con­ gress of Diber), Monastir, 1909, or "Beschlusse der Versammlung von Dibra," as Beilage to Kral to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 5 August 1909, No. 106, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/7. There are differences between the Albanian and German versions of the resolutions, both of them translations from the original Turkish, but in essence they are the same. 25Cf. Rappaport to Aehrenthal, Salonica, 6 August 1909, No. 73, vertraulich, HHStA, PA Xrv/15, Albanien xi/7.

400

ΠΙ. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

Beginning with the second half of 1909 the policy of the Committee of Union and Progress tended to be more nation­ alistic. But the concept of an "Ottoman nation," which was created by Midhat Pasha and was adopted by the Young Turks, had nothing in common with nationality. It acquired a national meaning only for those who wanted to preserve the state—the officers and the more intelligent functionaries primarily—and from whom the members of the Young Turk Committee were chosen. This oligarchy, which was the rep­ resentative of the Ottoman national idea, aimed at a strong government for the maintenance of the unity of the empire.26 Although in the press and in the official statements the Young Turks continued to speak about constitutional freedoms and the unity of all the peoples of the empire, under the name of "Ottomanism," their actions bespoke the contrary. Gradually they abandoned allusions to national freedoms and rights of the non-Turkish peoples.27 It is true, on the other hand, that the constitutional freedoms had strengthened the centrifugal tendencies of the non-Turkish elements, particularly of those that identified themselves with the neighboring states. The rift between the Cemiet and the political organization of the non-Turkish people was unavoidable. In the Turkish parliament the opposition was intensified. Former members of the Ahrar party constituted a group of "modern liberals" under the leadership of Ismail Kemal,28 who at that time had returned from his exile in Athens, as the parliament had cleared him of the accusation that he had been an instigator of the counter-revolutionary movement.29 With the slogan of national autonomy, this group attracted the non-Turkish deputies, among whom were several Alba­ nians. Fadil Pasha of Tirana told the Austrian consul Kwiatkowski, during their conversation on the island of Brioni, 26Cf.

Rappaport to Aehrenthal, Salonica, 17 March 1909, No. 27, vertraulich, pp. 2, 7, HHStA, PA xiv/g, Albanien v/4. 27Cf. I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 136. 28H. Tunaya, Tiirkiyede siyasi partiler (The Political Parties in Turkey), Istanbul, 1952, p. 283, as cited in I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., 29Lirija, 4 July 1909. p. 156.

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK CONFLICT

401

that the Young Turks were jeopardizing the national develop­ ment of the Albanians; it was necessary for the latter to attach themselves to the liberal party, which did not want to put any difficulties in their national and perhaps autonomous devel­ opment.30 Toward the end of 1909 another group, the Otto­ man Democratic Party, became active as an opposition to the Young Turks. Its leader was the Albanian Ibrahim Starova (Temo).31 The program of this party, which was joined too by Albanians, was the democratization of the government and the defense of constitutional liberties, including the right of the subject peoples to receive education in their native lan­ guage. But it did not stand for national claims of any of the peoples of the Ottoman empire and did not make use of the antithesis between non-Turks and Turks. It had a pan-Ottomman character. Apparently the party believed that a constitu­ tional government should satisfy the national demands of the non-Turkish peoples. It did not ask, therefore, for national autonomy. Herein lay its weakness and the failure to expand its influence in European Turkey.32 These oppositions did not make the Young Turks relax their hold on the non-Turkish peoples of the empire; on the contrary, they made it tighter. In November 1909 the "law on associations" was enacted by parliament, despite the ob­ jections of the non-Turkish deputies.33 The law declared subject to closure all societies constituted on the basis of "national denomination and distinction." National societies could exist only as "Ottoman" and only if they were engaged in the fields of education, economics, industry, and agricul­ ture.34 Thus all national societies and clubs were deprived of the right to engage in political questions. 80Conversation of Consul Kwiatkowski with Fadil Pasha and Fuad Bey Toptani on Brioni, 20 August 1909, and answer of 19 September 1909, pp. 1-13, in HHStA, PA xiv/10, Albanien v/10. 31H. Tunaya, op.cit., p. 254, as cited in I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 157. 82See I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 157-159. The program of the "Otto­ man Democratic Party" in Albanian is in Bashkimi i Kombit (Union of the Nation), 17 December 1909. 88V. Birard, op.cit., p. 392. s i Ibid., p. 393.

402

m. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

The Albanian patriots felt the impending danger to their societies and clubs. Already rumors had been spread that the Albanian clubs were "insurrectional hearths," which, infil­ trating the sentiment of discord, served the interests of for­ eigners.38 In the Congress of Monastir of March 1910, the Albanians made clear the position as to their clubs. It was said in the resolution of that congress that, because of their fundamental aim and their general organization, the Alba­ nian clubs, which were literary, should not adhere to any political party. The committees of the clubs could discuss in their meetings only purely literary subjects. However, a mem­ ber of an Albanian club was free, as an individual, to belong to any political party of his choice. Supporters of all the par­ ties could be found in the clubs. Consequently, the congress rejected unanimously the suggestion—obviously made by the Young Turks—to declare itself for one political party alone. In order to dispel any error which might arise in public ac­ tion, the congress further stated that the Albanian clubs could not be engaged in anything but linguistic-literary questions. As long as there was no instance of force majeure, this line of conduct of the clubs could in no way be modified.3® Striving to weaken the Albanian national movement, the Young Turks offered to some of its leaders lucrative posts in the government.37 They did not end the old practice of ignor­ ing the Albanians as a separate nationality in their nofuz record.38 As the majority of the Albanian government em­ ployees were also active participants in the national move­ ment, they transferred them to Asia Minor and replaced them with Turks.39 In the beginning of March 1910, Ismail Kemal paid a visit 85C.

Libardi, op.cit., n, 364. Document 18, pp. 262-265. 37Rappaport to Aehrenthal, Salonica, 23 September 1909, No. 83, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/15, Albanien xi/6. 3SP0sfai to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 1 February 1910, No. 8, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xiv. 39Cf. I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 138. s Hbid.,

ALBANIAN-YOUNG TURK CONFLICT

403

to Pallavicini, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Istanbul. The statements he made showed the situation in the empire and the existing relations between the Albanians and the Young Turks. He attacked the Committee of Union and Progress for its inclination to make the Turkish nation alldominant, excluding the other nations, even the Moslem ones. He also condemned the way in which the government dealt with Macedonia, pointing to the use of the "law on the bands." Although he expressed confidence in the consolida­ tion of the Turkish state—perhaps for political reasons—he regretted that with respect to Albania the government did not pursue the right policy. The Grand Vizier, Hakki Pasha, was a partisan of dividing the Albanian people in two in order to play off one party against the other. He mentioned as a most striking example the alphabet question. Despite the interference of the government and the machinations of the Cemiet, there was no doubt in Ismail Kemal's mind that the national direction would have the upper hand.40 At about this time a solution of the Albanian question was proposed by the newspaper Flamuri (Flag). It was the changed name of the influential Dielli (Sun), organ of the autonomist party, published in Boston, because the Turkish government had prohibited its circulation in the empire. The program it espoused was as follows: The goal would be the administra­ tive autonomy of Albania. The method to be used would be the preparation of electing to the Ottoman parliament a group of nationalist Albanians, which would play a similar role there to that of the Irish in England and of the Catalan party in Spain. The justification would be that the geographic situation of Albania was such that that country could be iso­ lated from Turkey at any time and be forced to administer and defend itself all alone. Administrative autonomy would prepare her to play this role. It was believed that this project was advantageous even for the Turks, and efforts would be made to make them understand its advantage and 40See Pallavicini to Aehrenthal, Constantinople, s March 1910, No. 12B, streng vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/6.

404

m. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

obtain their support by a conciliatory attitude.41 Commenting on this program, the French consul in Shkoder found it the only solution which responded to the double eventuality of the dissolution or the preservation of the Ottoman empire. In the first instance, if this did materialize in the very near future, Albania, trained in self-administration, would be able, without crisis, to take her national place among the Balkan states. In the second case, Albania, grateful to Turkey for satisfying her national aspirations, would constitute for the latter power a precious force and not any longer a permanent trouble.42 But the Young Turks turned a deaf ear to such a sagacious solution of the Albanian question proposed from across the Atlantic. In retrospect it can be seen that the obstacles to Albanian national development were two-fold. On the one hand, there were the religious divisions among the people and the differ­ ence in culture between north and south. Regarding this dif­ ference Mr. Graves, financial adviser to the Turkish govern­ ment, who accompanied Hadji Adil Bey, the Turkish Minis­ ter of the Interior, in his reform trip to Albania in the spring of 1912, expressed a pertinent opinion. He held that in the culturally and economically more advanced southern part of the country five years would be sufficient to carry out the necessary reforms; in northern Albania, a whole generation would be necessary to obtain similar results.43 On the other hand, there were the efforts of the Young Turks to deepen the existing divisions and use them in their own interest. Although their various pressures prevented the free national development, the armed and the unarmed resistance of the Albanians, whether it was for privileges or for the national cause, was a unifying factor, which was later intensified. 41See

Fertd to the Minister o£ Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 10 April 1910, No. 8, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Interieure, Albanie, 1910, Vol. vm. i2Ibid.

isHalIa to Berchtold, Monastir, 13 May 1912, No. 37, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/39, Albanien xxxiv.

Revolts, Demands, and Interventions IN THE MIDDLE of March 1910 the situation in Kosovo began to deteriorate. The vali ordered that town dues be imposed on goods imported in Prishtine. As a protest, some 800 Kosovars barred the road from Prishtine to Podjova. Delegates from the city failed to persuade them to disperse. The insurgents demanded the abolition of the town dues and the fulfilment of the Ferizovic promises. A clash with the Turkish army ensued, and the revolt rapidly expanded.1 It was accompa­ nied by a meeting at Ferizovic, to which armed men from many parts of Kosovo rushed. Although there were different individual complaints, they all had one complaint in com­ mon: "We have been deceived! The Young Turks have broken their solemn agreement." 2 A besa was concluded to oppose the Young Turk regime, which had suppressed their age-old rights and traditions.3 In April the Turkish government dispatched General Shefket Turgut to quell the rebellion. He had under his command 16,000 infantry apart from cavalry and artillery.4 The Alba­ nian insurrectionists, who were fewer in number, had occu­ pied the passes. At Kacanik, the commander was Idris Seferi; at Crnoleva, the command was in the hands of Hasan Hyseni and Isa Boletini. In spite of the fact that they were without artillery, the Albanians inflicted heavy losses on the Turkish army in the battle of Kacanik.5 On May 2, 1910 the Ottoman Minister of War, Mahmud Shefket Pasha, arrived and the army was increased to more than 40,000 strong, for the Young Turks were firmly resolved to put an end to the Albanian 1E. b. V. [lora], Die Wahrheit iiber das Vorgehen der JungtUrken in Albanient Vienna and Leipzig, 1911, pp. 26-28. 2E. Jackh, Im tiirkischen Kriegslager durch Albanien Heilbronn, 19x1, i p. 26. 3 Ibid., p. 39. 4Cf. ibid., p. 32. •'Cf. Leka, ix (November 28, 1937), 366.

406

m. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

insurrection. In the battle of Crnoleva the Turks were again the victors and the road to Prizren was now open to them.® During his whole expedition in Kosovo, Turgut Pasha used harsh measures to disarm and subdue the population. In vain the Albanian deputies protested in the session o£ April 10, 1910 against his "barbarous advance." In vain the most influ­ ential Albanians in Istanbul presented a report to the Grand Vizier explaining the occurrences in Albania. The govern­ ment refused to give explanations even in the parliament and declared that there were no grounds to send an investigating commission.7 It further empowered the general in Albania to apply the nortorious "law on the bands." 8 Having disarmed Kosovo, Shefket Turgut Pasha proceeded to Shkoder. On his way he engaged in a serious battle with the forces of Mehmet Shpendi5 barjaktar of Shale, which made him reach Shkoder a few days later Quly 26,1910) than he had planned. Immediately he ordered the inhabitants to turn in their weapons, and asked for execution of the census and the drafting of young men 18 to 26 years of age 9—all steps deeply resented by the population. The whole of northern Albania, except the northern and northwestern mountains, was occu­ pied by Turgut Pasha's armies. Having accomplished his mission, the Turkish general left Shkoder on August 22, 1910, destined for Salonica. Passing through Mirdite, he or­ dered his troops to occupy Diber and disarm the population. His whole campaign in northern Albania lasted five months.10 The repression of the northern insurrection was followed by the war on the cultural movement. The Albanian clubs —on the basis of the "law on associations"—were closed, the eSee

E. Jackh, op.cit., pp. 37-39. L. v. Chlumecky, "Die Jungtiirken und Albanien," Osterreichische Rundschau, xxvi (January-March 1911), 270; I. G. Senkevich, Osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie albanskogo naroda υ 1905—1912 gg., Moscow, 1959, p. 169. 8V. Berard, La mort de Stamboul, Paris, 1913, p. 395. i Leka, ix (28 November 1937), 366-367. 10See E. Jackh, op.cit., pp. 27-29, 37-42; E. b. V., op.cit., pp. 26-27; Leka, ix (28 November 1937), 367. 7See

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION

407

authorities considering them as hotbeds of revolt.11 Next came the suppression of newspapers and the imprisonment of edi­ tors and leaders. Fehim Zavalani, the editor of Bashkimi i Kombit of Monastir, and his collaborators were arrested, be­ cause their paper had published an eye-witness account of the atrocities perpetrated by the Turkish army in northern Al­ bania. As the article had been reproduced in some European papers, it had disturbed the Turkish Minister of War.12 The arrests of the editors Mihal Grameno from Korge and Lef Nosi from Elbasan followed suit.13 During the perquisition of a house, Sami Frasheri's booklet on Albania's future, pub­ lished in Istanbul many years earlier, was found. The owner of the house was condemned to 15 years imprisonment be­ cause he kept writings which revived the historic past and were damaging to a common conception of the state.14 The court martial of Elbasan sentenced Demir Pasha to a 6-year deportation because his presence "could hinder the design of the government." 16 Hodja Hafiz Ali was exiled for 10 years for the simple reason that he had taught Moslem religion in Albanian in the Teachers' School of Elbasan. Albanian news­ papers published abroad were forbidden to enter the coun­ try.16 How much the attitude of the Albanians toward the Young Turks had changed by this time is shown in the harsh criti­ cism made by the agas of Janina of the unsatisfactory func­ tioning of the parliament, the struggle caused by the alphabet, 11C.

Libardi, I primi moti patriottici albanesi nel 1910-1911-1912, Trent, 1935, n, Document No. 18, p. 264. 12See Bornemisza to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 3 July 1910, No. 41, streng vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/24, Albanien xiv; Jousselin (?) to Pichon, Monastir, 20 July 1910, No. 71, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intirieure, Albanie, 1910, Vol. vm. 13See "Memorandum of the Central Committee of the Albanian Stu­ dents to the Public Opinion of the Civilized World," 10 October 1910, in C. Libardi, op.cit., n, Document No. 19, pp. 366-267. uL. v. Chlumecky, op.cit., p. 271. 15 Ibid., p. 27a. 16 Ibid., p. 267.

408

III. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

and the ruthless suppression of the revolt of the Kosovars by Shefket Turgut Pasha. In conversation with them, wrote the Austrian consul, one could discern disappointment, hopeless­ ness, and hatred for the regime of the Young Turks.17 After a demonstration in Boston, the Albanian colony in the United States wired to Aehrenthal: "Mass meeting Albanians re­ solved to humbly beseech his imperial royal majesty as one of most powerful neighbors intervene to moderate Turkish excesses against Albanian nationality." 18 The Austrians were concerned from the very outset about the outcome of the expeditions. They saw in the weakening of the Kosovars the strengthening of pan-slavism.19 Shefket Turgut Pasha's campaign, however, did not put a halt to the rebellion of the north. Ded Gjo Luli, the Catholic chieftain of Hot, gathered his highlanders and, joined by those of Shale, under Mehmet Shpendi, decided to defy the orders of the vali of Shkoder to pay taxes and deliver their arms. Pursued by the Turkish troops, the insurgents entered Montenegro.20 Other Albanian mountaineers, from Grude and Kastrat, followed in their steps; Podgorice (Titograd) be­ came the center of the refugee revolutionaries, among whom were Isa Boletini and other leaders of Kosovo. King Nicholas (he had now become a king) intervened with the representa­ tive of Turkey to Montenegro, Sadeddin Bey, and the Alba­ nian refugees to seek a solution. The Albanians stipulated these conditions: (i) return of their weapons; (2) dispensation from the newly ordered taxes; (3) construction of roads and opening of national schools. The Turkish envoy considered 17Kraus to Aehrenthal, Valona, 3 June 1910, No. 28, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/6. 18Text of telegram sent by Joseph Pani, chairman of the Albanian meeting, to Aehrenthal, Boston, 24 October 1910, HHStA1 PA xiv/33, Albanien xxxiv. 19Cf. "Memorandum iiber die Riickwirkung der Orientkrise auf die osterr.-ungar. Politik in Albanien" (by Consul General Rappaport), Herbst 1909, Geheim, p. 12, HHStA1 PA xiv/28, Albanien xx/10. 20Cf. Leka, ix (28 November 1937), 367-368; C. Libardi, op.cit., 1, 173 and 11, 119.

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION

409

these claims inacceptable and advised his government to leave the emigrants to their fate. The movement was assuming larger proportions—the number of Albanian refugees rose to 2,500—and this placed Montenegro under considerable ex­ pense and the menace of a conflict with Turkey. The Porte, on the other hand, must have understood that a sharp action in Albania, especially the forceful introduction of reforms, would vex the Catholics, who until then had been relatively quiet and on the side of Turkey, and would aid Montenegro. As the situation of the Albanian escapees in Montenegro was becoming worse, the King appealed to the great powers for a solution.21 King Nicholas informed the Austrian representative in Cetinje, Giesl, that he was willing to return the Albanian refugees to their country, but that he would not do anything contrary to the right of political asylum.22 The Montenegrin Prime Minister, on the other hand, had a talk with the Rus­ sian envoy, Arsenev, who advised him that Montenegro should abstain from any rash step, stressing that, if she did not, she would have no support at all from Russia. He pointed out that, in view of the disintegrating situation in Turkey, it would be folly to start a fight with that power in order to achieve what would shortly fall to Montenegro's share.23 Aware that he could not expect from any one of the great powers encouragement for war or even a benevolent neutral­ ity, King Nicholas assumed the role of a peacemaker.24 He 21See Giesl to Aehrenthal, Cetinje, g October 1910, No. 92, vertraulich; Mimoire by Tomanovich, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro, Cetinje, 4-17 October 1910, No. 2/98; Giesl to Aehrenthal, Cetinje, 23 October 1910, No. 94AB, vertraulich—all in HHStA, PA xiv/33, Albanien xxxiv; Quennec to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Scutari, 14 October 1910, No. 26, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Interieure, Albanie, 1910, Vol. viii. 22Giesl to Aehrenthal, Cetinje, 14 November 1910, No. 100-B, vertrau­ lich, in op.cit. 2 s Ibid.; Louis to Pichon, St. Petersbourg, 23 November 1910, No. 311, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intdrieure, Albanie, 1910, Vol. vm. 24See ibid..; Paul Cambon to Pichon, London, 17 November 1910, No. 424, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Interieure, Albanie, 1910, Vol. vm.

410

m. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

received fourteen chiefs of the Malissori (Albanian highlanders), who stated that they would not go back unless the fol­ lowing demands were fulfilled: (i) a general amnesty must be declared through an irade; (2) military service should be performed only in the vilayet; outside it only when sanc­ tioned by Istanbul; (3) the mudirs (municipal chiefs) of the tribes should be chosen from among the Albanians; (4) the kaymakams (sub-prefects) should be Christian and the Alba­ nian language valid; (5) the value of the confiscated arms should be reimbursed; if the Moslems were to be armed, the Christians should also be armed; (6) sequestrated or confis­ cated property should be indemnified; and (7) all the abovementioned points should apply to all the Malissori. Strange to say, the Turkish envoy this time found the demands on the whole acceptable and recommended them to the Porte. As it was here a question of Catholic Albanians, he asked for the support of Austria-Hungary at Istanbul.25 On November 18, 1910 the reply of the Turkish govern­ ment arrived, accepting in general the demands of the Alba­ nian emigrants. There were only a few changes in details: no money would be paid for weapons, but burned-down houses would receive indemnity. As for military service, only the 21-year-olds would go outside the vilayet, and then to Istan­ bul; the older ones, after 3-month service in the vilayet, would be in the reserve.26 Following the communication of the note to the Montene­ grin government, King Nicholas assembled the Albanian chieftains and made known to them its contents, at the same time stressing the hospitality in Montenegro and his govern­ ment's efforts to assure their fate and future. He then asked the Malissori chiefs to return together with their people to their homes. The vali of Shkoder, Bedri Pasha, was to wait for them in Tuzi and regulate their return.27 25Telegramm in Ziffern an Ritter von Zambaur in Scutari, Vienna, 19 November 1910, 7 Uhr 30 p.m., HHStA, PA xiv/33, Albanien xxxiv. 28See Giesl to Aehrenthal, Cetinje, 20 November 1910, No. 102, vertraulich, in ibid.

vi Ibid.

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION

411

The return of the Malissori to their homes was followed by another armed demonstration, this time in the mountains of Diber. Thousands of Albanians mustered there in December 1910 to set forth their claims. They did not appeal for privi­ leges, but for the opening of Albanian schools, free circula­ tion of Albanian publications, amnesty for all Albanians con­ demned for political activity, government employees to be of Albanian nationality, the construction of roads, and the spending of taxes within Albania.28 The signs were that disturbances would break out again. In February 1911 Ismail Kemal paid another visit to the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Istanbul and told him that in the spring he expected another Albanian uprising. This opinion was shared by his uncle, the former Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha, with whom the nephew was at odds.29 The revolt broke out in March 1911 in the mountains north of Shkoder (Mbishkoder). Ded Gjo Luli and his men attacked the Turkish watch-posts along the Albanian-Monte­ negrin frontier.30 It soon acquired a new vitality. The vali of Shkoder, Bedri Pasha, attempted to use religion in the appli­ cation of the principle divide et impera. As most of the insur­ gents—and there were more than 4,000—were Catholics, he appealed to the Moslems on March 27, 1911 to accept arms from the government and pursue those who wanted to destroy the din (Moslem faith). There were some Moslem Albanians who fought against their brothers. Ironically, they were called the followers of hixrriyet (liberty),31 the first part of the slogan of the Young Turks, the other two being "justice" and "friendship." Under the increasing attacks of the Turkish 28C.

Libardi, op.cit., n, Document No. 20, pp. 269-272; J. Larmeroux, La politique extirieure de I'Autriche-Hongrie, 1875-1914, Paris, 1918, u, 407-408. 29See Pallavicini to Aehrenthal, Constantinople, 25 February 1911, No. 8E, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/33, Albanien xxxiv. 30Zambaur to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 27 March 1911, No. 27 and Giesl to Aehrenthal, Cetinje, 28 March 1911, No. 19B, both in HHStA, PA xiv/33, Albanien xxxiv. 31See C. Libardi, op.cit., 11, 171; Para to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 27 March 1911, No. 27, HHStA, PA xiv/33, Albanien xxxiv.

412

ΠΙ. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

army, the whole mountainous region north of Shkoder 82 was united, joined by patriots like Luigj Gurakuqi, a Catholic intellectual from Shkoder, who had served as the director of the Teachers' School in Elbasan from the day of its opening until its closing.33 Podgorice became again the headquarters of the revolutionaries. On April 27, 1911, after a visit to the revolutionary leaders in Podgorice, Dr. Terenc Τοςϊ (Tocci), an Italo-Albanian nationalist lawyer, gathered the chieftains of Mirdite and Dukagjin, as well as the Moslems from Mat and Diber, and hoisted the Albanian flag at Kimez (Ghims), in Mirdite. Τοςΐ was in touch with General Ricciotti Garibaldi's Committee, which had promised him assistance. On the day of the meet­ ing at Kimez a short-lived "Provisional Government of Al­ bania" was proclaimed with Dr. Τοςϊ as president, and Alba­ nia was declared "free and independent with her frontiers in history and language and nationality." 34 Confronted with the growing proportions of the Albanian uprising, the Porte again entrusted Shefket Turgut Pasha with the command of the new expedition. As soon as the General arrived in Shkoder, he issued a proclamation of mar­ tial law (May 11, 1911). He promised pardon to Albanian insurgents if they returned home and handed in their weap­ ons within five days. Only the chiefs would not be pardoned, but would be tried by the court martial (Divani Harb).35 The Albanian chiefs gave their answer on May 18, 1911 from Pod­ gorice. They reminded Turgut Pasha that the previous year they laid down their arms because he had promised them the 32Hot,

Kelmend, Grude, Kastrat, Shkrel and Shale. ix (28 November 1937), 374. 84See P. Pal Dodaj, "Shqypnija e Shqyptarve e Qeverija e Perkoheshme" (Albania of the Albanians and the Provisional Government) Hylli i Drites (Star of Light), Shkoder, χ (1934), 245-255; Leka, op.cit., pp. 514-515 (text of the declaration is included); C. Libardi, op.cit., 11, 37-49, 52-53; Krajewski to Cruppi, Scutari, 4 June 1901, No. 99, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Int^rieure, Albanie, January-June 1911, Vol. ix. 85See Italian text of the proclamation in HHStA, PA xiv/35, Albanien xxxiv, and Albanian text in Leka, op.cit., 374-376. 3 s Leka

j

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION

413

constitutional rights. The Turkish government, however, had responded to those promises with the closing of national Albanian schools, levying of taxes exceeding their power, unjust imprisonments, and other oppressive measures of a despotic regime. They also added that only recently the Turkish authorities provoked an internecine fight by arming the Moslem Albanians and putting them on the front line against the Christian Albanians. They concluded that they would turn from revolutionaries into faithful subjects of the Empire only when the constitution was no longer a dead letter but a living pact.36 In a telegram previously dispatched to the Sultan they had appealed not only for grace and justice, but also for a delegate with whom they could talk on their terms; otherwise they would not return to their homes.37 Podgorice was once more full of Albanian refugees—insur­ gents ready for war and wounded ones, together with their families—and the battle was raging along the MontenegrinAlbanian frontier. It is strange that Montenegro, a country against which the northern Albanians had often fought, should offer asylum to Albanian revolutionaries. Her protec­ tion and support, for she supplied the Albanians with weap­ ons, was certainly motivated by political considerations. It was no secret that she had helped the Albanian revolt. Her king boasted that he could bring it to an end within twentyfour hours if he so desired. Montenegro wanted war in order to expand her territory, and the Albanian insurrection could be used for that purpose.38 The prolongation of the revolt had advantages for Montenegro: on the one hand, it diminished seThe reply from Podgorice, signed by approximately 60 Albanian chiefs, is an Italian translation found as Beilage to the Bericht ddo Scutari, 27 May 1911, No. 52, HHStA1 PA xiv/35, Albanien xxxiv; a French translation of it is an annexe to the ddp£che of the French Consul in Scutari, 22 May 1911, No. 89, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intirieure, Albanie, January-June 1911, Vol. ix. 37See Bericht ddo Scutari, 27 May 1911, No. 52, HHStA, PA xiv/35, Albanien xxxiv. 38M. E. Durham, Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle. London, 1920, pp. 217-218.

414

m. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

Albanian fighting power; on the other, it obligated the Al­ banian mountaineers to Montenegro. If Turkey yielded to the claims of the Albanians, the Turkish army would leave the country. In the event of an invasion on the part of Monte­ negro, resistance in northern Albania would be weaker. If Turkey continued to use force to quell the insurrection, the mountaineers would think that Montenegro was their friend and Turkey their real enemy. She could then use them for her aims, in case an intervention would be necessary for the peace of the Balkans. The Montenegrin Prime Minister had in fact assured his king the previous year, when the highlanders found asylum at Podgorice, that the Albanian highlanders would collaborate with Montenegro at the suitable moment.39 It should be remembered also that on several occasions Nicholas, both as a prince and as a king, had ex­ pressed directly or indirectly his intention of having as ruler of Albania his son Mirko or himself.40 Before long the situation became embarrassing for Monte­ negro. The number of Albanian refugees to be taken care of increased and Turkey concentrated troops on her border. Russia could not refrain from intervening. In a note of May 19 n she reminded the Porte that, when the Albanian upris­ ing began, it assured St. Petersburg that it did not intend to disturb the peace of the world. Montenegro's military meas­ ures near the borders, the Russian note maintained, were only for her protection and Russia would counsel her to be care­ ful. At the same time D. A. Nelidov, Chief of the Near East Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, gave an inter­ view to Novoe Vremya1 in which he stated that the Russian note was not a threat or an ultimatum, but that the situation was so grave that it was imperative to remind Turkey and 39See Giesl to Aehrenthal, Cetinje, 14 November 1910, No. 100 -B vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/33, Albanian xxxiv. 40Cf. D. Djorjevic, Izlazak Szbije na Jadransko more: Konferencija Ambasadora u Londonu 1912 (The Exit of Serbia to the Adriatic Sea and the Conference of Ambassadors in London 1912), Belgrade, 1956, P- 55; W. S. Vucinich, Serbia between East and West, Stanford, 1954, P- »35-

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION

415

Montenegro of their expressed assurance for peace.41 As a consequence, Turkey gave assurances of her pacific intentions toward Montenegro in the speeches delivered in the Turkish Chamber by both Rifat Pasha, the Foreign Minister, and the Grand Vizier. In this way Russia, by supporting Montenegro, which in turn was aiding the Albanian insurrectionists, at­ tempted to establish cooperation between Albanian and Slavic elements in order to upset Austrian designs. St. Petersburg also advised Montenegro to observe strict neutrality in the relations of the Albanian revolutionaries with Turkey.42 As the Albanians were disposed to make common cause with all those who favored their demands, Austria-Hungary was naturally somewhat disturbed. Moreover, the Turks had instituted a regime of terror in Albania, among whose victims were the Catholic highlanders. Because of its cult protectorate over the Albanian Catholics, the Dual Monarchy's prestige was at stake, particularly as clericalism had just at this time regained power in Vienna. It let the Porte know that a change in Turkish methods was necessary.43 This Austrian step had an immediate effect. The Turkish government, afraid of a new intervention in its affairs, announced on June 12, 1911, through the press that the Albanians were subdued, and that on the occasion of the trip of Sultan Mehmed V to the Kosovo plain, where Murad I fell during his victory over the Serbs in 1389, a general amnesty would be granted to the revolu­ tionaries.44 On June 18, 1911 Shefket Turgut Pasha communicated 41Szilassy to Aehrenthal, St. Petersburg, 27/14 May 1911, No. i6A-B, and the following Beilagen, HHStA, PA xiv/35, Albanien xxxiv. See also St. Petersburger Zeitung, 27/14 May 1911. 42Cf. Buchanan to Grey, St. Petersburgh, 26 May 1911, and Lowther to Grey, Constantinople, 30 May 1911, in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. ix, Part 1, Nos. 472 and 473 respectively. 43Cf. Bompard to Poincari, Therapia, 21 September 1912, DDF (1874-1914), 3ε sirie, Vol. hi, No. 450; Cartwright to Grey, Vienna, 8 June 1911, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. ix, Part 1, No. 476. 44Lowtlier to Grey, Therapia, 14 June 1911, in ibid., No. 479.

416

ΠΙ. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

the imperial decree of amnesty to the population. The insur­ gents should return within ten days and deliver their arms; the Sultan would grant a personal gift of 10,000 Turkish liras as reparation for damages; the government would indemnify the highlanders for property lost or destroyed.45 At this time Ismail Kemal was in Cetinje. He had gone there, he says in his Memoirs, "in order to join the chiefs of the Malissori, who had taken refuge with their families in Montenegro before the threats of Shevket Tourgoud Pasha." 46 Had he gone to Montenegro of his own accord? Fazil Pasha Toptani, one of his friends, told an Austrian diplomat (Rappaport) that Ismail Kemal took the trip to Montenegro at the expressed desire and advice of Count Charykov, the Russian Ambassador to Turkey, with whom he was in steady contact.47 At a meeting at the village of Gerche (Gertche) in Montenegro, on June 23, 1911, a memorandum was drawn up at the instigation of Ismail Kemal, signed by all the delegates of the Malissori. It was their reply to Turgut Pasha's proclamation of the am­ nesty. Having assailed the regime of the Young Turks as tyrannical and having referred to the destruction incurred by Djavid Pasha in Lume and the devastation in the north by Turgut Pasha, the memorandum set forth the Albanian claims. In addition to the usual demands for the opening of Albanian schools and the use of the Albanian language, the following were significant: a guaranty against anticonstitutional actions and abuses; the respect of customs and tradi­ tions; the recognition of the national existence of Albania; 45Text

in C. Libardi, op.cit., 11, pp. 94-95, or, Leka, op.cit., p. 390; see also Tewfik Pasha to Nicholson, London, 14 June 1911, British Docu­ ments on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. ix, Part 1, No. 480. 4 6 The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, p. 368. 47Ref. I, attached to Ballhaus (Aehrenthal) to Sziczen (Paris), Vienna, 5 December 1911, No. 3x21, HHStA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/6. Because of the activity Ismail Kemal was allowed to develop in Montenegro, it is plausible that he was in touch with Count Charykov. However, it is doubtful that his contact was "steady." Ismail Kemal's attitude was in general anti-Slav, and this author has not encountered other references to his relations with Charykov or any other Russian diplomat.

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION

417

full liberty to choose their own deputies; the organization of the vilayets inhabited by Albanians along lines o£ decentral­ ization; the choice of the valis and high officials from among the most capable of the empire, the rest of the government employees to be selected among the Albanians; the appoint­ ment for a given period of a representative of the Sultan as Inspector General; obligatory military service for all Alba­ nians, who would serve in time of peace only in Albania, and the constitution of a special military organization for the regions bordering on the Balkan states, with Albanians hav­ ing the right to serve there for the surveillance and defense of the frontiers; taxes to be spent first for the needs of Albania; the restitution of confiscated weapons with the obligation on the part of their possessors to comply with the regula­ tions.48 The Gerche memorandum, referred to often as the "Red Book," because of the color of its covers, was of great signifi­ cance for the Albanian national movement. It was not re­ stricted to any one region but applied to the whole of Albania, and aimed at national autonomy. It exercised a great influ­ ence on future demands, whether of the north or the south. Meanwhile the Albanian leaders were becoming more and more anxious as to Montenegrin intentions. Some members of the Albanian Committee asked Μ. E. Durham, the English writer and relief worker, who at that time was at Podgorice taking care of the Albanian refugees, if she would advise them to appeal, in the name of the Albanian people, to the British nation as a lover of justice and freedom. Although Miss Dur­ ham had less faith than they in British unselfishness, she replied that it could do no harm.49 A letter in French by a 48See complete text in C. Libardi, op.cit., π, 134-141, and a faithful extract from the reply itself in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. ix, Part 1, pp. 483-483; "Mimoire sur la decision prise par 1'Assemblie ginirale des chefs Albanais a Gertche 10-23 June 1911, en riponse a la proclammation de Chewket Tourgout Pacha" and the Albanian original, in AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intdrieure, Albanie, January-June, 1911, Vol. ix, pp. 233-243. 49 M. E. Durham, The Struggle for Scutari, London, 1914, p. 54.

418

m. TOWABD INDEPENDENCE

well-known foreign correspondent, well expressed and moder­ ate, was dispatched to England.50 The letter had been favor­ ably commented on by several papers, and it was then that the Montenegrin government learned of the step which had been taken. King Nicholas was annoyed for "as then became evident, he did not wish the Maltsors [Malissori] to be any­ thing but pawns in his own game." 51 When England's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, received the petition from the chieftains at Podgorice (the Gerche resolutions) and was asked to bring their case before the great powers, he seized the opportunity to step forth in the role of peacemaker and defender of a small people. He proposed to the great powers that they intervene and call on Turkey to promise to satisfy the claims of the Albanian insurgents in order to "bring rebellion to an end or to avert the serious consequences that may arise from its being prolonged." 52 Grey's proposal was opposed primarily by Germany on the ground that it constituted an interference in the internal affairs of Turkey.53 In the meantime, Monte­ negro and Turkey—under pressure from Russia and Austria, which were not ready for war in the Balkans—had begun talks for the regulation of their frontier differences and the question of the Albanian refugees.54 In the middle of June Sultan Mehmed V arrived in Kosovo together with his suite, at the head of which was the Grand Vizier. Although Kosovo had always been known for its faith­ fulness to the Sultan, the reception was cold. In the Kosovo plain, where a large and Islamic manifestation was expected, only people from the suburbs were assembled. The towns of 50 Ibid.,

The name of the well-known correspondent is not mentioned. p. 6i. 52Grey to de Salis (Berlin and other embassies), Foreign Office, 26 June, 1911, Tel. (No. 115), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. ix, Part 1, No. 498. 63De Salis to Grey, Berlin, 28 June 1911, ibid., No. 501. See, for Russia, Nos. 499; 502, Enclosures 1 and 2; 5007; for Austria-Hungary, Nos. 508, 511, 513, in ibid. 54See I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 190. 51 Ibid.,

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION

419

Ipek, Gjakove and Prizren did not send any representatives,55 revealing that a significant change had taken place in Kosovo. On July 3, 1911 the Sultan signed the decree of amnesty.5® But the revolutionaries refused to return. They were too bit­ ter against Turgut Pasha. They held him personally respon­ sible rather than the Istanbul government for all the mis­ fortunes of Albania. It was deemed wise by the Porte to recall him to Istanbul; he left Albania in July of that year. There was some satisfaction for the Albanian patriots to see the humiliation and departure of the General who, after his ex­ pedition against them, had been personally decorated by the Sultan and by the ambassadors of the powers in favor of the status quo for having quelled the Albanian insurrection.57 Abdullah Pasha, who replaced Turgut Pasha, brought new proposals with him from his government, concessions limited to the Catholic highlanders. Besides according an amnesty and permitting the opening of Albanian schools, these con­ cessions were: military service would be performed in the vilayet of Shkoder, and only the last year in Istanbul; govern­ ment employees should know Albanian; for a period of two years there would be no draft and no taxes would be paid; after two years the dues on livestock would be greatly re­ duced; the right to carry arms would be granted; a commis­ sion, composed of one representative of the government and one representative of the Catholic Archbishopric of Shkoder, would evaluate the damages to the property of the highland­ ers which the government would repair, the Sultan himself pledging 10,000 liras; all highlanders who returned from exile would be assisted with food and money.58 65See

Carlier to Cruppi, tlskiib, 18 June 1911, No. 37, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intirierej Albanie, January-June 1911, Vol. ix; I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 184. 56Text in C. Libardi, op.cit., 11, 162-163. 57 Ibid., pp. 142-144. For this period of the Albanian uprising (30 March-8i October 1911), see British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. ix, Part 1, Chapter LXXV, pp. 449-512. 58Text in C. Libardi, op.cit., 11, 175-176; Leka, ix (28 November

'937). 393·

420

III. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

The Malissori could no longer stay in Montenegro. King Nicholas, seeing that the powers were not willing to support him, had already yielded on July 15, 1911. He informed the foreign powers that he would not permit the Albanians to cross the border and attack the Turkish troops.59 His prohi­ bition was later changed into pressure. He asked the Malissori to accept the new proposals and return to their homes. After several interventions, including that of the Catholic clergy under Msgr. Seregji (Sereggi), on August 3, 1911 the agree­ ment between the Turks and the Malissori was signed at Podgorice.60 The uprising which broke out to the north of Shkoder in the spring of 1911 was followed by resistance in the south. Already in the beginning of the year the central secret com­ mittee in Monastir had asked many Albanian notables—Akif Pasha from Elbasan, Emullah Aga from Struge, Kiazim Bey Frasheri from Prespe, and several notables from Diber—to create guerrilla bands of 50 men each at their own expense.61 On May 15, 1911 an appeal was made from Vlore by the Central Revolutionary Committee 62 to the Albanians to be ready for the general revolution. The Committee demanded of the government of Istanbul: (1) administrative autonomy within the Ottoman empire; (2) union of the four vilayets (Shkoder, Kosovo, Monastir, Janina) in a single pashalik governed by Albanians, with a separate parliament and a separate army; and (3) all government employees to be of 59C.

Libardi, op.cit., n, 107; see also for other details, E. C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, Cambridge, Mass., 1938, p. 93. eoSee Krajewski to de Selves, Scutari, 7 July 1911, No. 143; 11 July 1911, No. 145; 10 July 1911, No. 156; 25 July 1911, No. 159; 28 July 1911, No. 163 in AMAE, Turquie, Politique Interieure, Albanie, JulyDecember 1911, Vol. x. elBornemisza to Aehrenthal, Monastir, 26 February 1911, No. 14, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/33, Albanien xxxiv. 62It is not clear whether this committee was for the district of Vlore or for southern Albania.

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION

421

Albanian nationality. The appeal concluded with the threat that if Turkey did not fulfill the demands, the Albanians would not lay down their arms.63 From Korge Mihal Grameno travelled to Istanbul, where he met with leaders of the Albanian national movement. Upon his return, the Commit­ tee of Korge was constituted, and on June 16, 1911 its first detachment took to the mountains, with Dr. Haki Mborja and Vangjel Gjika at its head. The organization of commit­ tees spread in other parts of the south and new bands were formed. One of the points of the program of the bands was the assassination of beys who opposed the insurrectional movement.64 The Turkish authorities began to arrest and imprison suspected organizers and collaborators. In the town of Korge about 30 persons were jailed, among them Mihal Grameno.65 The bands, which had been growing, were com­ posed of several hundred men: in Frasher, there were 500; in Delvine, 200; in Kurvelesh, 300.66 At the command of the most important ones were Themistokli Germenji from Korge, Spiro Bellkameni from the district of Fiorina, Qamil Panariti from Korge, and Musa Demi from Qameri.67 The guerrilla bands were composed of men from various social layers, and what is more significant, from different faiths. In the districts esC. Libardi, op.cit., 11, Document No. 23, pp. 274-275. A similar declaration by the "Central Albanian Committee," dated 1 May 1911, is included in Mercier [?] to Cruppi, confidential, Rome, 17 May 1911, No. 143, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intirieure, Albanie, January-June 1911, Vol. ix. e4Consul of France to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Monastir, 5 July 1911, No. 21, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Interieure, Albanie, JulyDecember 1911, Vol. x. 65M. Grameno, Kryengritja shqiptare (The Albanian Revolution), Tirana, 1959, p. 8. eeSee I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 194; Duchesne to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Janina, 24 July 1911, No. 17, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intirieure, Albanie, July-December 1911, Vol. x. 67Cf. A. Buda, "Rruga e popullit shqiptar drejt 28 nendorit 1912" (The Road of the Albanian People toward 28 November 1912), Rruga e Partise (The Road of the Party), hi (November 1957), 38.

422

ΠΙ. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

of ΚοΓςε and Gjirokaster the Bektashis were active in assist­ ing them.68 Their struggle was not for privileges or immu­ nities, as in the north, but for the rights of the Albanian nation: it was on the national level. Typical bands composed of young idealists, both Christians and Moslems, were those of Spiro Bellkameni and Qamil Panariti. Qamil Panariti's band, which was active in the dis­ trict of ΚοΓςε, had decided in the evening of July 27, 1911 to attack the prison of Κοτςε in order to liberate the patriots who were being kept there, but before attempting the assault, the band was surrounded by the Turkish army at Orman Qiflik, in the neighborhood of ΚοΓςε. The next day a fierce battle rag d in which several young Albanians fell69—the martyrs to the rising national πιονεπιεηΐ. It was not in the interest of the Turks to open a second front while they were engaged in the north. The Turkish government acted with caution in the south. The function­ aries were ordered to be restrai^d in their repressions and the army was in ge^ral on the defensive. It also tried to per­ suade the Albanians to give up demands for autonomy and ask for reforms.70 As a consequencc, some leaders of the na­ tional movement withdrew temporarily from the battle and intensified efforts to press the Albanian claims by a show of force in "armed meetings." The secret committe8 of Janina took such a step: it gave instructions that in the towns of the vilayet, on the occasion of the anniversary of the Young Turk Revolution (July 23, 1911), armed meetings should be held in favor of the autonomy of Albania. At this time in the north the Porte made its proposals to the Malissori insurgents. Some of the Albanian leaders of the south saw danger in the pro­ posals not so much because they did not recognize an auton­ omous Albania but because they applied only to the revolue8Consul of France to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Monastir, 5 July 1911, No. 21, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intdrieure, Albanie, JulyDecember 1911, Vol. x. e9See M. Grameno, op.cit., p. 8. 70Cf. I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 197.

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION

423

tionary zone of the north—and thus had as an objective the division of the country. In order to counteract this danger they organized on July 21—before the fixed date—an armed assembly in the Orthodox monastery of Cepo (Gardiki) near Gjirokaster. In the resolution of Cepo the harm to national unity by a special administration in the north was stressed and the demand was set forth that Albania should have one and the same system of administration for both the north and the south, in order to assure "the completeness of our na­ tion." Another claim was that the schools should be in Alba­ nian and that the national alphabet should be used. The memorandum of Cepo was on the whole of a peaceful nature.71 The committee of Κοτςε, however, and its guerrillas did not send any representatives to the Cepo meeting. Its example was followed by Vlore. Both districts stood for autonomy and could not accept the resolutions of Cepo for reforms. In fact, the patriots of Vlore and their guerrillas met on July 31, 1911, and proclaimed that they stood by the memorandum of Gerche and were ready to fight for the autonomy of Albania.72 Following the agreement of Podgorice, the Porte wanted to come to an understanding also with the south. A meeting was held at Tepelene on August 18, 1911, where the proposals made by the Turkish government were considered. The Turkish concessions, which provided for a general amnesty, the opening of the schools and the teaching of Albanian, the appointment of functionaries who knew the customs and lan­ guage of the country, military service in the Albanian vilayets and taxes according to the capacity of the people, as well as the carrying of arms with special permission, satisfied most of 71The memorandum was signed by Namik Selim Delvina and 43 other representatives; a copy of it is attached to Duchesne to Minister of For­ eign Affairs, Janina, 1 August 1911, No. 31, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Intirieure, Albanie, July 1911, Vol. x. See also Histori e Shqiperise, 1900-1919, p. 40. 72 Ibid. See especially Duchesne to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Janina, 3 August 1911, No. 32, AMAE1 Turquie, Politique Interieure, Albanie, July 1911 Vol. x.

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ΙΠ. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

those present. The efforts of the autonomist Albanian patriots to have the Gerche memorandum accepted failed. And the revolutionary movement in the south suffered a setback.73 Although contacts between the north and the south were established during the 1911 revolution, a common leadership which could direct and coordinate the various revolutionary actions could not be created. A secret organization, called the "Black Society," which was formed in the south for that pur­ pose, not only did not succeed in directing the whole Alba­ nian insurrectional movement,74 but it was not even in a posi­ tion to coordinate that of the south. There were powerful divergent forces within the Albanian society. Yet the revolu­ tionary movement of 1911 proved to be an important step toward mobilization and organization of forces and the growth of the political consciousness of the Albanians. It obliged Turkey to enter into political negotiations with the Albanians and made the Albanian question known to the outside world. The crisis through which the Young Turk regime was pass­ ing became more serious in the period subsequent to the August agreement between Istanbul and the Albcinian insur­ gents. On September 29, 1911, Italy declared war on Turkey. In order to avoid disturbances in Albania while engaged in war with a foreign power, the Porte tried to carry out some of the promises that had been made. It declared, for instance, that Albanian would be introduced in the elementary and secondary schools and that it would give financial support to the Albanian schools. It was suspected that this was to be arranged in such a way as to bring national education under its control and divide the Albanians.75 The Porte also released some of the patriots who had been imprisoned in Κοτςε, but it did not put into effect the general amnesty. Nor did the vali of Shkoder fulfill all the conditions of the Podgorice agreeHistori e Shqiperise, ιροο-ιριρ, p. 41. A. Buda, op.cit., p. 39. 75See Dervish Hima to Arthur Rabler, Pira, 23 January 1912, HHStA, PA xiv/10, Albanien v/8. 73

74

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION

425

ment.76 The discontent with the Young Turk regime began to spread among other elements of the empire as well. In November 1911 an opposition party was founded, known as Liberty and Entente (Hurriyet ve Itildf), which had as an important point in its program decentralization of the ad­ ministration and recognition of constitutional rights to the national provinces of Turkey. This party came in touch with the leaders of the Albanian national movement and in De­ cember 1911 began to exercise a decisive influence in the Turkish chamber. The Young Turks then resorted to the extreme measure of dissolving the parliament on January 18, 1912, with a view to assuring an absolute majority in the next elections.77 Some two weeks before the dissolution of the chamber, one of the most influential Albanian deputies, Hasan Prishtina from Kosovo, expressed his views about the Albanian situa­ tion to the Austro-Hungarian consul in Salonica. He saw everywhere a deep dissatisfaction with the Young Turk rule. The Union and Progress Committee's policy of pan-Turkism had been ruinous. He did not expect the Turkish government to meet the Albanian claims and he foresaw another revolt in Albania. The feeling of national identity in northern Kosovo, he said, had made considerable progress and the Kosovar leaders were working hard to reach an accord with the other parts of Albania for a great uprising. They had left out the Moslems of Shkoder because they could not be relied upon on account of their backwardness and fanaticism. He at­ tributed the development of the national idea in the north —Ipek, Gjakove, Diber, Prishtine, Prizren—to the repressive measures of the Turks and the breaking of their promises. Hasan Prishtina and his friends felt that it would be most advantageous for Albania to develop within a strong Turkish state, but the Albanians doubted the possibility of this. On the one hand, Turkey was not in a position to hold on but was disintegrating; on the other, she closed her eyes to the e Shqiperise i 1900-1919, pp. 42-43. I. G. Senkevich, opxit., pp. 202-203.

76 Histori 77See

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ΙΠ. TOWABD INDEPENDENCE

justified desiderata of the Albanians and would not allow them to be prepared for any eventuality.78 This was a clear picture of the situation and revealed the political thinking of most of the national leaders in the year of the general revolution. Meanwhile, the election campaign had started in Albania. It worsened the relations between the Young Turks and the Albanians. The Albanian press, especially Liri e Shqiperise (Freedom of Albania) of Sofia, assailed the Young Turks and appealed to the Albanian people not to believe their promises and to elect as deputies patriots like Ismail Kemal, Bajo Topulli, Hasan Prishtina, and others. The Young Turks took administrative measures, using money, fraud, even terror, in order to prevent their opponents from being elected. They gave a special weight to Albania because there the spirit of war was alive. The Young Turks succeeded in barring the re-election of such deputies as Ismail Kemal and Hasan Prishtina, despite their popularity. When the Turkish parlia­ ment convened on April 18, 1912, the majority of the deputies were favorites of the Young Turks, although in Albania the elections did not close until the end of May.79 So absolute was the majority of the Young Turks in the chamber that they occupied 215 out of 222 seats.80 During the period of the elections, March-April, a Reform Commission was sent to Albania to investigate matters. It was headed by Hadji Adil, Minister of Interior, accompanied by Albanians who were on the side of the Young Turks, in the hope that through collaboration they would obtain recog­ nition of the right to cultural national development of their people. In order to make a favorable impression, in Janina and Shkoder the Commission appointed new valis. Hadji Adil Bey admitted that the government had made grave mistakes. In principle, he said, the Porte should not have levied new taxes on the Albanians and should have endeavored to satisfy 78See Kral to Aehrenthal, Salonica, 5 January 1912, No. 6, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/33, Albanien xxxiv. 7 9 Histori e Shqiperise, igoo-igig, p. 44; I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 208. 80E. C. Helmreich, op.cit., p. 94.

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION

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their justified claims. The campaigns it had made had been too costly for Turkey. It was at the time the Commission was in Albania that the Albanian schools were reopened, even the Teachers' school at Elbasan. But the constant aim of the Commission was the strengthening of the administration and the gendarmerie in Albania.81 When upon his return to Istan­ bul the Minister of the Interior made his declaration to the chamber on June 6, 1912, he laid stress on the need for schools and roads in that country.82 Already before the dissolution of the parliament, toward the end of December 1911, on the initiative of Ismail Kemal, a meeting of a group of Albanian political personalities was held in Istanbul. It decided on the organization of a general insurrection in Albania, to begin in Kosovo and expand later to other parts of the country. Hasan Prishtina was entrusted with its preparation in Kosovo. It was further decided that 15,000 guns and funds needed for the revolt should be pro­ cured. It was the task of Ismail Kemal to obtain them from governments sympathetic to the Albanian movement. Imme­ diately after the dissolution of the Turkish chamber, Hasan Prishtina left for Kosovo and Ismail Kemal for Europe.83 In order to strengthen the revolution, Hasan Prishtina came in contact with the leaders of the Bulgaro-Macedonians, who were also discontented with the Young Turk regime. He proposed to them in Oskiib to revolt at the same time as the Albanians in order to create together an "autonomous Alba­ nian-Macedonian state." 84 But Sofia prevented the BulgaroMacedonians from coming to such an understanding because it had other plans with Belgrade—the Balkan alliance. 8lC£.

Halla to Berchtold, Monastir, 13 May 1912, No. 37, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/39, Albanien xxxiv. See also, primarily about its ac­ tivity in Shkoder, Μ. E. Durham, op.cit., pp. 137-147; I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 204-206. 82 His declarations are contained in the newspaper Stamboul, 7 June 1912, which is as Beilage to Bericht No. 47, ddo Constantinople, 7 June 1912, HHStA, PA xiv/39, Albanien xxxiv. s3 Histori e Shqiperise, 1900-1919, pp. 43-45. 84 Cf. ibid., pp. 45-46.

428

m.

TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

The policy of the Young Turks in the period of the elec­ toral campaign and the composition of the new chamber eliminated all hopes for an agreement between the Albanians and the Young Turks. However, the information from the members of the group—it is also referred to as the Central Committee—who had travelled in Albania and had estab­ lished contacts was that, in addition to Kosovo, Vlore, Berat, Tirana, Durres, and Kruje were ready for the uprising. In April 1912, following the opening session of the new parlia­ ment, members of the Central Committee held a meeting in Istanbul and resolved to begin the revolution, the center of which was to be Kosovo.85 Clashes between Albanian insurgents and Turks occurred during the election, but they were intensified, particularly in Kosovo, in the month of May. Now political leaders and members of the Central Committee began to cooperate with the revolutionaries. On May 20 in the village of Junik, near Gjakove, a gathering was held in which, participating along with the chiefs of the insurgents—Bajram Curri, Isa Boletini, Riza Bey, and others—were Hasan Prishtina and Nexhib Draga, one of the most influential leaders of Kosovo. A besa was concluded to wage war on the Committee of Union and Progress and its government.88 Within ten days about 3,000 insurgents reached Ipek and the rest Gjakove.87 The program of the revolutionaries amounted virtually to autonomy: (1) Albania to be constituted as a single vilayet; (2) instruction to be given in Albanian, using the national [Latin] alphabet, the schools to be built with the taxes levied in Albania for education; (3) Albanian functionaries for Al­ bania and the language of the courts to be Albanian; (4) military service in peacetime to be in Albania.88 85See

I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 212-213. PA, A. Reports of the Austrian consul in Prizren, 17 and 28 May 1912, and from Mitrovica, 21 May 1912, as cited in I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 217; see also Histori e Shqiperise, 1900-1919, pp. 47-48. s 7 Ibid., p. 48; I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., p. 217. 88Beilage to Heimroth to Berchtold, tiskiib, 11 June 1912, No. 68, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/39, Albanien xxxiv. s s HHStA,

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION

429

From the very first days the uprising of Ipek and Gjakove was backed by the Catholics of Mertur and Nikaj. Mirdite quickly joined them. The efforts of the Turks to make use of the difference of religion and place Mirdite between the Moslems of Shkoder and those of Kruje failed. Kruje and Tirana had been getting ready for the revolt since the end of 1911 and at the end of June they united with the insurgents of Catholic Mirdite and Zadrime. The insurrection found support in the city population of Shkoder, which formed a revolutionary committee. The anti-Turkish movement seized not only Catholic towns, known for a long time for their hos­ tility to the government, but Moslem towns as well. The revolt was now intensified in Diber and the Albanian districts to the southwest of it.89 The beys in the districts of the south were not kindly dis­ posed to the Turkish government, especially the Committee of Union and Progress. They were aware that grave disturb­ ances were expected to occur in the summer of 1912. The Albanian colonies abroad, composed mostly of southerners, had also been informed of the impending revolt. They watched with great interest the situation in the fatherland and were ready for material sacrifices. The Bucharest colony had sent as its representative to southern Albania Pandeli Cale from ΚοΓςε, who declared that he would exercise his influence on the Orthodox Christians to join if the Moslems, especially the beys, would rise. He was particular about the formation of the guerrilla bands: their chiefs should be chosen with great care among the patriots. The colonies of Egypt were collecting contributions and they put Jani Vruho in charge of the purchase of arms for the insurgents. How­ ever, he had to first meet with Ismail Kemal in Montenegro. Progress in the coordination of the movement had been made, although it was still far from satisfactory. Representatives from the south had been sent for talks with the headquarters of the revolt of the north near Ipek. The Turkish govern­ ment was impressed by the growing national currents in 88Cf.

I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 817-220.

430

ΙΠ. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

Albania. It attempted, by sending peace delegations and giv­ ing promises and gifts, to preserve division among the Alba­ nians, which had been the strongest card in its hand.90 The Kosovars had successfully revolted in Ipek and Gjakove. Denouncing the elections as improper, they called for the dissolution of the new parliament. The Turkish govern­ ment, although at war with Italy, was obliged to send troops so that the rebellion would not expand to Prishtine, Prizren, and Oskiib. But this time mutiny broke out in the army dis­ patched to restore peace. It spread to other parts of Kosovo.91 Under the influence of the Albanian national committee in Monastir, Albanian officers and soldiers began to desert. On June 22, a group of 150 Albanian soldiers with their officer, Tajar Tetova, carrying ammunitions, left Monastir and joined the insurgent forces in southern Albania. Within a few days the soldiers and officers of the garrisons of Diber, ΚοΓςε, and Ohrid followed suit. The deserters were not only Alba­ nians but also Turkish officers who were discontented with the Young Turk regime, one of the main reasons being its policy toward the Albanians. The Turkish officers belonged to a secret organization, widespread in the army of the Mon­ astir vilayet, which was called "The Saviors of the Nation." They declared that they supported the Albanian revolution­ aries, but only in questions of a general political character: improvement of the administration, resignation of the Young Turk government, and dissolution of the chamber. They declined categorically to recognize the autonomy of Albania. While the leaders of Kosovo agreed with the officers of the Saviors of the Nation, those of central and southern Albania refused to give up their demand for autonomy. Although no complete accord was attained between the Turkish officers and the Albanians, they helped each other in their war against the Young Turks. The Kosovars strengthened themselves in 90Kral to Berchtold Salonica, 25 June 1912, No. 102, vertraulich, j HHStA, PA xiv/39, Albanien xxxiv. 91C. Libardi, op.cit., p. 189.

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION

431

the districts of Gjakove and Prizren, and extended the terri­ tory of the revolt in the eastern part of Kosovo vilayet.92 The men at the top of the government in Istanbul did not seem to understand clearly the situation in Albania. The Grand Vizier and the Minister of War, Mahmud Shefket Pasha, assured Austria's ambassador, Pallavicini, that soon the Albanian insurrection would be suppressed. Mahmud Shefket Pasha maintained that among the insurgents—and he meant the Kosovars—there was no unifying idea and leadership and that the motives of the revolutionary move­ ment changed from place to place. Since the revolutionary action lacked a unified organization, the revolts, separated by space, could be repressed individually. The opinions of the Grand Vizier and his Minister of War failed to convince Pallavicini, who wrote to Vienna that they should be taken cum grano salis. 9 ' 6

There was truth in the arguments of the two Ottoman statesmen. What they failed to understand was that there was a unifying motive in the whole movement, different from those they took into account: the overthrow of the Young Turk regime. It was this motive which linked it with the movement of the army in the Monastir and Kosovo vilayets. The number of deserters was increasing every day and the officers of the 6 th Army Corps in Monastir asked the cabinet to resign.94 Despite the packed parliament resulting from the recent elections, Said Pasha's government was forced to re­ sign. The pressure of the forces outside the parliament was too heavy. On July 23, 1912 a new cabinet was formed with Gazi 92See

Halla to Berchtold, Monastir, 25 June 1912, No. 60, vertraulich; Kral to Berchtold, Salonica, 25 June 1912, No. 101, vertraulich—both in HHStA, PA xiv/39, Albanien xxxiv; also I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 220-226. 93Pallavicini to Berchtold, Jenikoi, 25 June 1912, No. 54, HHStA, PA xiv/39, Albanien xxxiv. 94Halla to Berchtold, Monastir, 27 June 1912, No. 65, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/39, Albanien xxxiv.

432

UI. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

Ahmed Muhtar Pasha at the head and with the majority of the Ministers opponents of the Committee. It had come to power with some definite tasks, the most urgent being to make peace with the Albanians.95 On the same day the chiefs of southern Albania met at Qafe Sinjes (Pass of Sinje) and prepared a memorandum. After stating that the Albanians had been the earliest sup­ porters of the Young Turk revolution and that they were compelled now to take to the mountains in order to defend their violated rights—for the deputies also were imposed on them—they presented their claims in twelve points similar not only in spirit but in substance to those of Gerche. At the end they expressed the resolution to remain in the mountains until their demands were satisfied.96 The memorandum was sent on July 29 from Vlore to the vilayet government and the Porte.97 It was important not only because of its national char­ acter but also because it indicated that the southern insur­ gents had definitely broken away from collaborating with the Turkish officers of the Saviors of the Nation and stood for autonomy. About this time a memorandum (July 28, 1912) was pre­ pared by the president of the Albanian Central Committee for Istanbul. It expressed the Albanian desiderata and at the same time explained them as being in the interest of both Albania and Turkey. It attempted to dissipate any misunder­ standing that the Albanians were unwilling to live within the framework of the empire. What they all desired, it empha­ sized, was an administrative autonomy, which would be for the salvation of Albania and the preservation of the Ottoman state. It proposed the same reforms as the other memoranda, but in a milder tone, and it made the concession of a "free choice of Arabic or Latin alphabet." It is significant that the 95Cf.

E. C. Helmreich, o p . c i t . , p. 95. Mimoire sur la decision prise par Γ Assemble Ginerale des Chefs de 1'Albanie Miridional (sic) au sommet du (sic) montagne Signa, 10-83 JuIy '912" copy in HHStA, PA xiv/41, Albanien xxxiv. 97Lejhavec to Berchtold, Valona/Berat, 5 August 1912, No. 35, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/39, Albanien xxxiv. 96See

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION

433

boundaries of the territory proposed to constitute the unified Albanian vilayet tended with the passage of time to acquire a stable form. This territory was to include the following administrative units: (i) the whole vilayet of Janina; (2) the whole vilayet of Shkoder; (3) the sandjaks of Prizren, Novi Pazar, Prishtine, Ipek, and the kaza of Kalkandelen from the vilayet of Kosovo; (4) the sandjaks of ΚοΓςε, Elbasan, and Diber from the vilayet of Monastir.98 As soon as the government of Muhtar Pasha assumed power, it entrusted a special commission to deal with the leaders of the Albanians in Prishtine. The Commission ar­ rived on July 27, 1912. The first Albanian demand, before the discussion began, was the immediate dissolution of the parliament. If this were not brought about, the Albanians would resume their attacks after 48 hours. It was an ulti­ matum. In his reply by telegram, the Grand Vizier called for patience and announced the arrival of Marshal Ibrahim Pasha, acting vali of Kosovo, on the 1st of August." When he came, the leaders of the insurgents and a delegate from each kaza assembled. Hasan Prishtina delivered a scathing attack on the Young Turk regime. After having enumerated all the violent actions of the Young Turks against his country and stressed the devastation they brought about, he pointed to the recent elections as the last straw. Albania, he said, was a unit and demanded immediate dissolution of the chamber, for it did not have a mandate from the people. Ibrahim Pasha answered that the Sultan had dispatched the Special Com­ mission in order to study the grievances of the Albanians and consider their justified wishes.100 The Turkish government, already in difficulties with the parliament, was compelled to yield to the Albanian pressure and on August 5, 1912, to the 98German

translation of the memorandum of the President of the Albanian Central Committee for Istanbul to one of the Ministers (name is not mentioned) of the Ottoman Cabinet, Constantinople, 28 July igia, HHStA, PA xiv/41, Albanien xxxiv. 98Tahy to Berchtold, Mitrovitza, 4 August 1912, No. 45, streng vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/39, Albanien xxxiv.

100 Ibid.

434

m. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

mortification of the Union and Progress Committee, the chamber was dissolved by imperial decree.101 The dissolution of the parliament satisfied only one part of the revolutionaries, the followers of Liberty and Entente, the so-called itilafists, who were relatively strong in Kosovo. Central and southern Albania, which were strongly for auton­ omy, continued to demand the fulfillment of the program of Gerche. A certain organization between the north and the south was evolving. Elbasan and Shpat, together with the greetings to the new cabinet, reiterated the desiderata which were common to the Gegs and the Tosks. The Albanian Committee of Fier asked the Grand Vizier that they be repre­ sented by two delegates in the discussions between the Alba­ nian leaders of Kosovo and the Special Committee, because there was a community of interests between north and south.102 The towns of Berat, Delvine, and Gjirokaster were agreed on solidarity with the northern Albanians.103 Dele­ gates from Monastir went to Prishtine to present the claims there, while Elbasan sent its representatives, among whom were the patriots Lef Nosi and Ahmed Dakli. In Preveza, Leskovik and Gjirokaster meetings were held, while notables from Janina wired to the Grand Vizier, making the same demands as those of the other Albanians.104 All these various movements were proof that the national consciousness among the Albanians had grown; they did not think in terms of their own region, but of the whole of Albania. On August 9, 1912, the Albanian leaders of the north, act­ ing on behalf of the four vilayets, were strong enough to 101 The

Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, p. 369. to Berchtold, Salonica, 5 August 1912, No. 119, H H S t A , PA xiv/41, Albanien xxiv. 103Lejhavec to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cod. teleg., Valona, 7 August 1912, HHStA, PA xiv/41, Albanien xxxiv; see also letter by Dervish Hima, environs of Gjirokaster, 24 July 1912 (o.s.), HHStA, PA xiv/10, Albanien v/8. 104Halla to Berchtold, Monastir, 8 August 1912, No. 89, and 15 Au­ gust 1912, No. 95; Bilihski to Berchtold, Janina, 15 August 1912, No. 61—all in HHStA, PA xiv/41, Albanien xxxiv. 102Kral

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION

435

present substantial demands to Marshal Ibrahim Pasha in Prishtine, who wired them to Istanbul and promised to lend his support. They were made up of fourteen points and they were presented by Hasan Prishtina; they are sometimes called "the fourteen points of Hasan Prishtina." These were: a special system of administration and justice in conformity with the requirements of the country; military service to be effected in Albania, except in time of war; appointment of capable and honest government employees knowing the lan­ guage and customs of the country; the creation of sultaniyes (lycdes), in the vilayets and sandjaks of more than 30,000, with Albanian in the program of instruction; the creation of medreses (schools of Moslem religious instruction); protec­ tion of habits and customs of Islam; the teaching of Albanian in schools of every grade; absolute liberty to establish private schools; the construction of roads; organization of nahiyes (communes); impeachment before the supreme court of Hakki Pasha and Said Pasha (fallen Grand Viziers); general amnesty; indemnity for damages suffered during the insur­ rection; restitution of arms which had been confiscated.105 The points appear to have been a compromise between the conservatives and Hamidists like Isa Boletini, on the one hand, and the enlightened intellectuals like Nexhib Draga and Hasan Prishtina, on the other. Such claims as the recog­ nition of local customs, the carrying of arms, and the founding of medreses were included primarily in order to please the conservative mass and its leaders. Those referring to schools must have been introduced by the enlightened Albanians. One is struck by the fact that the question of the alphabet was not mentioned. Obviously it was omitted because a part of the leaders of the fanatic mass of the north did not favor the Latin alphabet. The creation of nahiyes apparently had as its 105Tahy

to Berchtold, Mitrovitza, 11 August 1912, No. 48, streng vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/41, Albanien xxxiv, and for the points in French, as officially published by Agence Ottomane, see Beilage zu politischen Bericht No. 72G, Jenikoi, 25 August 1912, ibid,.; see also The Times (London), 13 August 1912 [3:2].

436

ΠΙ. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

goal the splitting of governmental authority so that local authorities—local committees or committees composed of elders and baryaktars—could exercise an influence toward an autonomous rule.106 Although on August 2 Istanbul answered the memorandum of Sinje with the promise that it would send a commission to investigate the situation, the Albanian insurgents of the south entered Fier and Berat. Under the influence of the agitation for autonomy, in many districts new guerrilla bands were formed. In ΚοΓςέ the Black Society appealed to the popula­ tion to intensify the war against the Turks. Albanian forces entered Permet on August 15, expelled the kaymakam, the director of the police, and the attorney of the government, and handed rule over to Albanian officers. Albanian guerrillas occupied Diber and Elbasan.107 The whole of southern and central Albania was in the hands of the Albanian revolution­ aries. In Prishtine, while the majority of the Albanian leaders wanted to wait for the acceptance of the fourteen points, Isa Boletini, Idris Seferi, Bajram Curri, and above all Riza Bey Gjakova, united among themselves and ordered their forces to advance toward Oskiib, under the pretext that their people could not wait any longer and that in that city one could extract a tangible guarantee—the distribution of arms. Be­ tween August 12 and 15 they entered tiskub, followed by the other leaders. On August 14 Ibrahim Pasha, who had re­ turned there in the meantime, called the chiefs of the Alba­ nian revolution to his headquarters in order to communicate to them the acceptance of their demands by the Sultan. Only the impeachment of the cabinets of Hakki and Said Pashas could not be fulfilled, such a procedure being the prerogative of the parliament then dissolved, and the demand for regional military service.108 106Cf. Tahy to Berchtold, Mitrovitza, u August 1 9 1 2 , No. 4 8 , streng vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/41, Albanien xxxiv. 107See I. G. Senkevich, op.cit., pp. 227-234. 108Cf. Heimroth to Berchtold, tiskiib, 2 1 August 1 9 1 2 , vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/41, Albanien xxxiv.

REVOLTS, DEMANDS, AND INTERVENTION

437

It was not an easy matter for the leaders to come to an understanding. The arrival of Abdul and Fazli Toptani from Tirana, who introduced the decentralizing and nationalistic program of the south, brought more confusion to the situa­ tion. During the negotiations three groups were distinguished among the leaders: (a) those who wanted the return to Abdul Hamid and preconstitutional conditions; (b) those who fol­ lowed the program of the itildfists and stood for the applica­ tion of the Constitution; and (c) those who pursued a pro­ gram of autonomy within the framework of the Ottoman state, outstanding among them being Hasan Prishtina, Nexhib Draga, and Ismail Kemal, although at that time he was not present in Oskiib.109 On the night of August 18, a new meeting of the leaders took place, in which the moderates, who were more numerous, succeeded in persuading three chief leaders of the first group (Isa Boletini, Bajram Curri, and Idris Seferi) to accept the agreement with Istanbul.110 On September 4, 1912 the Turkish government officially notified its acceptance of the Albanian conditions, with the two exceptions mentioned above.111 Ismail Kemal was correct in stating that the aggressive policy of the Young Turks was the "leaven that caused their [Albanians] national sentiment to revive and flourish afresh." 112 It brought about a feeling of unity which years of slow national development would not have been able to achieve. Common suffering and common danger constitute valuable links, particularly for a people whose regional dis­ crepancies are quite pronounced. The general Albanian up­ rising was not only a triumph over the Turks, but also a landmark in the struggle for unity of the Albanian people. 109For

a list of the principal leaders in each group, see ibid. ibid. 1 1 1 The Times (London) September 6, 1912 [5 :2]. 1 1 2 The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, p. 367. 110Cf.

The Attainment of Independence THE CONCESSIONS which the Porte made to the Albanians

were important and opened the way to autonomy. But when would autonomy be achieved and could they wait for it? The patriots saw that the Ottoman empire was in a state of disin­ tegration and that this jeopardized the very existence of their country. The most far-seeing and active patriot at this time was Ismail Kemal. He was aware that the preservation of Albania was dependent not only upon the efforts of the Albanians, but also—and perhaps even more—upon the support or rivalry of the great powers. As early as the spring of 1910, when he was a deputy in the Turkish parliament and the chief of the liberal party, he raised with Pallavicini the ques­ tion of a unified and integral Albania, in the event of a col­ lapse of Turkey.1 With this in mind, he asked a few months later, through his friend Fazil Pasha Toptani, to visit Vienna. At this time the Albanian patriots seem to have come to the conclusion that they could expect efficient help only from Austria-Hungary. But the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that, since Ismail Kemal was in Paris, he could see Nemes, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in that capital.2 He met Nemes and confessed to him that although originally mistrustful of the policy of the Dual Monarchy toward Albania, he had of late come to under­ stand that the only defender of Albania was Austria-Hungary. Nemes, according to the instructions he had received from Vienna, answered that the Albanians could rely on the sym­ pathy and the interest of the Monarchy as long as they worked for the development of their country within the framework of the Ottoman state and in conformity with its interests. 1See

Pallavicini to Aehrenthal, Constantinople, 2 March 1910, No. 12B, Streng vertraulich, HHStA1 PA xiv/9, Albanien v/6. 2Ballhaus to Nemes (Paris), Vienna, 11 August 1910, No. 2292, Gebeim Erlass, in ibid.

ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE

439

Ismail admitted that the interest of the Albanians was to strengthen Turkey but that the Young Turks in their folly to build a unified state did not understand the national feeling of the Albanians, and instead of looking for collaboration provoked the Albanians to insurrection by their unjust perse­ cutions. He appealed for a strong backing by Vienna in Istanbul.8 At the beginning of 1911 the situation began to disturb the Albanians more deeply. Prenk Bib Doda, a deputy then in the Turkish chamber, expressed to Pallavicini his fear of the downfall of Turkey and the partition of Albania among Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria. The Austrian ambassador's reply was that the situation of Turkey was not that bad. However, so far as the Albanian people were concerned, they had the sympathy of Austria-Hungary and her interest in seeing Albania remain undivided.4 A month later Ismail Kemal again paid a visit to Pallavicini to discuss Albania's gloomy situation and his fears of an attack by the Balkan Slavic states on Turkey. In such an event, he wanted to know, if the Albanians arose, could they rely on the sup­ port of the Dual Monarchy? The ambassador answered that his government was a friend of both the Albanians and the Turks and advised him that if such an attack occurred the Albanians would side with the Turks against the foreigners. In keeping with this policy he also counselled that the Alba­ nians should not again organize a revolt against Turkey such as that of the preceding year.5 At this time the Catholic clergy, or rather some influential members of it like Don Ndre Mjeda and Don Luigj Bum$i, attempted to extend the meaning of the Kultusprotektorat to political relations. In an appeal addressed to the Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand, they declared that the actions of the 3Nemes

to Aehrenthal, Paris, 1 October 1910, No. 22, A-E, in ibid. to Aehrenthal, Constantinople, 5 January 1911, No. iD, HHStA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/4,5,6. 5Pallavicini to Aehrenthal, Constantinople, 25 February 1911, No. 8E, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/33, Albanien xxxiv. 4Pallavicini

440

III. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

Ottomans infringed daily upon the Kultusprotektorat and that the abolition of age-old privileges with respect to military service and taxes—founded on accords between the free tribes and the Turkish government—was a breach of agreement. They called for Austrian intervention.® A year later, when the revolution had expanded to the whole of Albania, Zef Seregji, then archbishop of Shkoder, wrote to the AustroHungarian Consul General in Shkoder, requesting that his country occupy Albania, or at least her Catholic part.7 While many Albanian patriots looked to Austria for assist­ ance, others had turned to Italy, where an active movement was developing. When Τοςΐ proclaimed the provisional Al­ banian government at Kimez (Ghims), in April 1911, he ex­ pected to receive aid from Italy, not from the government but from Italo-Albanians and Italian volunteers. If for the Italians such help was, as a communication of the Italo-Albanian Central Committee read, an act of generosity and chiv­ alry, "for the Italo-Albanians it was a duty not to be ne­ glected." It was suggested that subcommittees be formed to raise funds and keep on the alert the youth that wanted to serve.8 In Italy men of all shades of political opinion found themselves making common cause with the Albanians; a parliamentary committee for Albania, consisting of some 60 deputies, was formed in Rome, and preparations were made for an expedition of volunteers to Albania.9 The correspond­ ent of an English newsparer in Rome referred to a Garibaldian Legion for service in Albania being fitted out under the command of Ricciotti Garibaldi. Its force was estimated at 10,000 enlisted men—an apparent exaggeration—ready to eSee

Zambaur to Aehrenthal, Scutari, 5 May 1911, No. 203/2 streng vertraulich, HHStA1 PA xiv/35, Albanien xxxiv. 7Sereggi to Zambaur, Scutari, 19 June 1912, No. 465, HHStA, PA xiv/39, Albanien xxxiv. 8Comunicazione dal Presidente del Comitato Centrale Italo-Albanese (Napoli), Aw. Francesco Mauro, Naples, 28 April 1911. 9G. Volpe, "Formazione storica dell'Albania," Nuova Antologia, ccvi (16 December 1939), 331.

ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE

441

strike when the moment was judged to be opportune. In his manifesto, Garibaldi said: "We must come to the aid of our unhappy brethren on the other side of the Adriatic, and pre­ vent the Turks from further venting upon them their fero­ cious vengeance. In the pro-Albanian movement it is clear that a wide gulf separates Italian policy from the aspirations of the Italian people. Counsels, entreaties, protestations have been of no avail. The Young Turk has been as deaf to these as was the old Turk. The time for action has arrived." 10 The Italian government was desirous of weakening Turkey at the time it contemplated its attack on Tripolitania, but feared that an expedition of volunteers to Albania might cause an intervention by Austria-Hungary. Merey, the am­ bassador of the Monarchy in Rome, having protested against the agitation of Ricciotti Garibaldi and his followers about Albania, the Italian government saw to it that it was dissi­ pated11 and seized the arms destined for the enterprise.12 When an Italian cruiser sailed to Durres in June 1911, Aehrenthal made serious demonstrations to Rome about violations of the accord on Albania.13 It was clear that Austria's policy toward Albania continued to be that of the status quo. Even in January 1912 its Consul General in Salonica, Krai, told Hasan Prishtina that the Al­ banians should give up efforts to break away from Turkey and should understand that their security was better preserved within the Ottoman Empire. He also found the tendencies toward autonomy rather premature, owing to the disunity of the Albanians.14 However, the Austro-Hungarian government did not approve of everything that the Young Turk regime had done and continued to advise Istanbul to be cautious and 10 Daily

Chronicle, London, 11 May 1911. in, No. 2456-57. 12 Daily Chronicle, London, 11 May 1911. 13L. Salvatorelli, La Triplice A lleanza, storia diplomatica, 1877-1912, Milan, 1939, p. 389. 14Kral to Aehrenthal, Salonica, 5 January 1912, No. 6, Geheim, HHStA, PA xiv/33, Albanien xxxiv. 11 O-UA.,

442

ΠΙ. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

not go to excesses. But it did this in a very confidential and discreet manner.18 Regarding official Austrian policy toward Albania, con­ nected with that toward Italy as well, the secret meeting held between Avarna, Italy's ambassador in Vienna, and Pallavicini, who was then substituting for Aehrenthal, is enlighten­ ing. Avarna formed the opinion that the Monarchy until then was not afraid of serious international complications with respect to the Albanian insurrection. Pallavicini told him that the Porte did not intend to make an issue out of the breach of neutrality by Montenegro. He was opposed to an eventual expedition of naval and military forces by Italy and Austria to Albania, motivated by the security of their settlements or for other reasons. He considered it as unworkable and morally very dangerous. The Monarchy, affirmed Pallavicini, did not think of intervening in Albania. It would not be able to find a plausible ground for action even if the Albanian insurrec­ tion expanded and became serious, and Montenegro provoked an armed conflict. Under such circumstances, Austria would only confine the conflict and enter into an understanding with Italy and other powers to prevent greater complications. Following this discussion, Avarna counselled his government to couch its statements in general terms so that Turkey would not believe that in reality there existed for Austria and Italy an Albanian question.18 Yet the suspicion and rivalry between the two powers con­ cerning Albania persisted. Avarna regarded Austria's attitude toward the Albanian revolt as proof that she desired the preservation of the status quo in the Ottoman empire in gen­ eral and in the Balkans in particular, and he tried to convince his government of that.17 But the next month, in a private let­ ter to San Giuliano, he made a proposal which, if it had 15See

vertrauliches Privatschreiben des Herzogs Avarna an Marquis di San Giuliano, de dato Vienna, 30 April 19x1, Uebersetzung, HHStA, PA xiv/34, Albanien xxxiv. ieSee ibid. 17Avarna to San Giuliano, Vienna, 28 July 1911, ACS , Carte Giolitti, Busta 22, Fasc. 59, Sottofasc. c / i .

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443

materialized, would have displayed Italy's interest in Albania to the advantage of the Albanian people and would have re­ stricted Austria's possibility of maneuvering. The proposal was that Italy should seize the opportunity of the renewal of the treaty of the Triple Alliance to ask that the accord perti­ nent to Albania be completed by including the declaration made by Goluchowski to Tittoni, in the meeting of Venice in 1905, namely, that "the Macedonian regions of the vilayet which were inhabited mostly by Albanian populations must be united in due time with Albania proper in order to give her the geographic and ethnographic delimitation of which there is no reference in the agreement itself." 18 This would have been tantamount to the recognition of a territorially unified Albania, for which the patriots had been striving for so long. However, Avarna's proposal does not ap­ pear to have been mentioned to the Austrians, for on August 31, 1911 Aehrenthal reported to his emperor a German com­ munication according to which Victor Emanuel and Giolitti were disposed to renew the Triple Alliance unchanged. Avarna himself also communicated officially to Vienna on September 26, 1911 that his government was ready for the renewal of the treaty in all secrecy and as it stood—unmodi­ fied. Three days later Italy declared war on Turkey.19 San Giuliano did not seem to favor the war against Turkey, and for good reasons relative to the situation in the Balkans. In a secret memorandum of July 28, 1911 he expressed the opinion that it would be preferable to avoid the expedition to Tripolitania. The main reason he gave was the probability (probability, though not certainty) that its success would be a blow to the prestige of the Ottoman empire. It would rouse to action against it the Balkan peoples, inside and outside Turkey, who were more irritated than ever by the foolish centralized regime of the Young Turks, and it would hasten 18Personal letter of Avarna to San Giuliano, Vienna, 12 August 1911, ibid., Sottofasc. c/z. 10L. Salvatorelli, op.cit., p. 391. The fifth treaty of the Triple Alliance was signed on 5 December 1912.

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a crisis which could influence and almost force Austria to act in the Balkans. Out of this would probably follow modifica­ tions of the territorial status quo in the Balkans and on the Adriatic, in part actually harmful to the interests of Italy, and in part judged to be, although wrongly, by Italian public opinion.20 The Italo-Turkish war rendered the position of Turkey in the Balkans more precarious. It indicated that the principle of territorial integrity—the status quo—of the Ottoman em­ pire was not to be respected any longer. It became doubtful that the Balkan states would remain quiescent. The Albanian patriots, faced with the possibility of the disintegration of the Ottoman empire, began to be more concerned about the fate of their country. Under pressure of these circumstances, Ismail Kemal visited Szecsen, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Paris, and told him that Albania was not prepared in the event of a collapse of the Ottoman state. She had not been recognized as a prov­ ince nor her people as a nation. He did not mention the exist­ ing division of the vilayets or Albanian aspiration for auton­ omy, but dealt only with what was more urgent, namely, the recognition of the Albanian people as an "ethnographic entity." He held that the Albanians and their friends, mean­ ing of course the Monarchy, should use the present movement to extract from the Turkish government "the recognition of the existence of the Albanian nation." He expressed the belief that the Albanians, in case of a dissolution of Turkey, would oppose a union with Italy and would aspire only for an Austro-Hungarian protectorate. But Vienna was not yet ready to speak about the future.21 At the same time Ismail Kemal had several discussions with a prominent Hungarian political figure, Bela de Rakovszky, who happened to be in Paris, and expressed to him too his opinion about an Austro-Hungarian 20Promemoria

San Giuliano, segreto, Fiuggi, 28 July 191 x, in ACS, Giovanni Giolitti Carte, B. 17, Fasc. 38. 21Szicsen to Aehrenthal, Paris, 28 October 1911, No. 38-D, HHStA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/6.

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protectorate of Albania, adding that she would thus form an integral and constituent part of an expanded Austria-Hungary, which could then confidently push toward Salonica in the event of a dissolution of Turkey. There was fear among the Albanian people, he further stated, of a conflagration in the Balkans, which would bring about Albania's partition among her neighbors. When Rakovszky commented on the friendly relations between the Albanians and Montenegro, Ismail replied that the Albanians were aware of the inten­ tions of the Montenegrins but that these would never mate­ rialize because the Montenegrins were hated in Albania. If at the moment King Nicholas was being treated with consid­ eration, he continued, it was because he had been friendly and had promised to introduce through his country the arms which the Albanians from abroad were supplying to their compatriots.22 Indeed, the declaration of war by Italy on Turkey gave rise to an active movement among the Balkan states. Serbia and Russia started to renew their efforts for a Serbian-Bul­ garian alliance.23 As the Balkan states aimed at a war on Turkey and Albanian territory was coveted by them, the recurrent demands of the Albanians for autonomy had deeply disturbed them. Peace between Turkey and Albania was dis­ advantageous to them, particularly if it were accompanied by the recognition of an ethnic Albania; consequently, they fomented revolts. In the spring of 1912 the Serbian government worked ac­ tively with guerrilla bands in Albania so as to be in a position to create difficulties at the proper moment. It was the impres­ sion of Toshev, the Bulgarian Minister in Belgrade, that Pasic and Hartwig, Minister of Russia in Belgrade, thought it advisable to produce as much unrest in Albania as possible, in order to feel the pulse of Austria and Italy. For this pur23Letter

of Bela de Rakovszky to Aehrenthal, Paris, 2 November 1911, in ibid. 23E. C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, Cambridge, Mass., 1938, p. 47.

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pose the "Black Hand," a Serbian terrorist organization, was used. It got in touch with leaders of the Albanian uprising, especially Isa Boletini.24 The Serbian government, moreover, was making use of the presence of some Albanian beys in Belgrade in order to stir up the insurrection by means of money and arms.25 As for Montenegro, as noted in the previ­ ous chapter, she rendered assistance to the Malissori. AustriaHungary again attributed to Montenegrin instigation the revolt in August 1912 of the Catholic mountaineers, who un­ til then had had a reserved attitude. Montenegrins, dressed as women, allegedly crossed the Turkish frontier into Albania.28 Greece, too, was not inactive, helping the Albanian insur­ gents with arms.27 The concern about Albanian autonomy on the part of the Balkan states began to manifest itself more openly. The Bul­ garian envoy to the Porte, Saratov, told Pallavicini that the rumors about an eventual unification of the four Albanian vilayets into an autonomous administrative unity were up­ setting. Such a measure, he said, would give an absolute domination to the Albanian element and would jeopardize the vital interests of the other elements—Bulgarians, Serbs, and Greeks—which inhabited those vilayets. If such an auton­ omous Albania were created, the Bulgarian diplomat ex­ pressed the hope that the great powers would approve of the unification of the vilayets of Adrianople and Salonica as a compensation for the Bulgarians.28 Pallavicini had heard from other sides that the representative of Serbia in Istanbul had voiced similar concerns.29 As to Greece, her guerrilla 2 i Ibid.,

pp. 44-45. telegram in cipher to Thurn in St. Petersburg, Vienna, 8 Au­ gust 191a, No. 80, HHStA, PA |ix/4i, Albanien xxxiv or O-U.A., iv, No. 3675. 2 a Ibid. 27Halla to Berchtold, Monastir, 5 September 1912, No. 108, vertraulich, HHStA, PA xiv/41, Albanien xxxiv. 28Pallavicini to Berchtold, Jenikoi, 5 August 1912, No. 66D, vertrau­ lich, HHStA, PA xiv/39, Albanien xxxiv. 2 Hbid. 25See

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bands made their appearance suddenly in Epirus, in response to fears that the Porte intended to grant to the Albanians a sort of autonomy.80 The situation which had evolved preoccupied AustriaHungary. She favored the government of Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, which had brought about a standstill in Turkey's internal crisis and was endeavoring by concessions to put an end to the Albanian revolt. On the other hand, she did not want to damage the interests of the other Balkan nations and antagonize them. She thought, therefore, that it would be advisable not to exert pressure on the Porte to grant autonomistic privileges to the Albanians or delimit their territory, but to restrict herself to supporting their claim for the preser­ vation of old privileges and equal rights for the Albanian language. Berchtold believed that the nationalities of RumeIia would welcome this first expression of decentralization if the great powers employed their friendly influence, thus pre­ venting the Balkan states from causing disturbance.31 The reception given to Berchtold's proposal by the powers was not completely in accord with his intentions.32 Italy replied that she agreed as far as the influence on the Balkan states was concerned, but she could not exert any influence on the Porte in favor of a policy of decentralization, because she was in a state of war with Turkey.33 Russia was dissatisfied with the Austrian proposal, and expressed the view to Italy that Berchtold's real objective was the constitution of an Albania dominated by the Dual Monarchy.34 Yet Austria-Hungary continued her efforts to prevent the outbreak of a war be­ tween the Balkan states and Turkey.35 The discussions about a Serbian-Bulgarian alliance, which 30Telegram to St. Petersburg and other capitals, Vienna, 13 August 1912, ϋ-U.A.j iv, No. 3687. sl Ibid. 82 Cf. T. v. Sosnosky, Die Balkanpolitik Osterreich-Ungarns seit 1866, Stuttgart and Berlin, 1914, 11, 276. 83 Telegrams from Rome, 15 August 1912, 0-U.A., iv, Nos. 3695-96. 34 Cf. L. Salvatorelli, op.cit., pp. 445-446. 35 See T. v. Sosnosky, op.cit., pp. 276-281.

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resumed after the declaration of the Italo-Turkish war, found Bulgaria more receptive. What dominated Serbian govern­ mental thinking, during the negotiations, was Serbia's exit to the Adriatic. Serbia proposed to Bulgaria an alliance which would secure her from a further expansion of Austria-Hun­ gary in the Balkans. She was ready to divide Macedonia with Bulgaria, giving to the latter power the greater part of Mace­ donia, provided she received for herself northern Albania, in order to acquire an exit to the Adriatic and frustrate the Dual Monarchy's plans.36 The treaty between the two powers was concluded on March 13, 1912, and the military conven­ tions followed. The participation of Montenegro was pro­ vided for. In the secret annex, clauses of territorial adjustment were included. While Bulgaria was to receive all territory east of the Rhodope mountains and the river Struma, Serbia would acquire all the lands north and west of the Sar moun­ tains, that is, Kosovo and Metohija (Kosmet) of today. The territory between the Sar mountains, the river Struma, and Lake Ohrid was considered as a contested zone. If Serbia and Bulgaria were unable to find a solution for a larger autono­ mous territory, the arbiter of the question would be the Rus­ sian emperor.37 Although Albania was not mentioned in the secret annex, Albanian land was partitioned, and it opened for Serbia the way to the Adriatic. Russia, which sponsored the Serbian-Bulgarian treaty, had as a principal goal to bar the supposed Drang nach Osten of Austria-Hungary. The Serbian-Bulgarian pact would also stop the quarrelling among the small Slavic states and bring them directly into the Russian orbit. Russia would establish her hegemony in the Balkans and her word would then carry weight when the impending dissolution of the Ottoman em­ pire came about.38 For Serbia, too, the Austro-Hungarian 86D.

Djordjevid, Izlazak Srbije na jadransko more i konferencija ambasadora u Londonu 1912 (The Exit of Serbia to the Adriatic Sea and the 1913 Conference of Ambassadors in London), Belgrade, 1956, p. 10. a7See E. C. Helmreich, op.cit., pp. 53-55. ssCf. ibid., p. 56.

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aspect of the treay was important. In June 1912 Premier PaSii told Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, in Peters­ burg that it would be dangerous for the Balkan League "if Austria's designs for a large Albania were not dissipated," and the latter agreed that Austria's plans could not be allowed to materialize.39 Side by side with the Bulgarian-Serbian negotiations were those between Bulgaria and Greece, which led to the signing of a treaty on May 29, 1912. The pact did not take up claims in Macedonia; it mainly stipulated that if one of the parties were attacked by Turkey the other would come to its aid.40 However, when mobilization was decreed on September 30, 1912, neither the Serbian-Montenegrin nor the BulgarianGreek military conventions were concluded yet.41 A formal treaty of alliance was signed between Serbia and Montenegro on October 6, 1912.42 On October 8, 1912 Montenegro opened hostilities. She had tried but failed to win the cooperation of the Catholic clergy of Shkoder in her action against Turkey.43 Early in September the King of Montenegro had offered Prenk Bib Doda support to attain his alleged aspirations to establish in northern Albania an autonomous state with Christian pashas and a Catholic as Governor General, provided that the Cap­ tain of Mirdite would help him occupy Shkoder and the northern part of Albania as far as the Drin river.44 At this time—in fact, since the visit of Hadji Adil Bey to Albania— 39Cf.

ibid., p. 151. p. 76. 41 Ibid., p. 125. t2 Ibid., p. 88. is Histori e Shqiperise (1900-/919), p. 55. 44The man used as intermediary in this offer was Sokol Ba9i (in Austrian documents, Nikola Bacci), Albanian chieftain of the clan of Grude, who at the time was in the service of Montenegro. See Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna, 14 September 1912, Z.Z1. 9177/M.I, and as Beilage the report of the Director of the Police in Trieste, 8 September 1912, No. 1405/GP.I., in HHStA, PA xiv/9, Albanien v/4,5-6. io Ibid.,

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Prenk Bib Doda had been alienated from the Young Turks, on whose Central Committee in Istanbul he was a member.45 Finally, Montenegro managed to foment the rebellion of the Catholic highlanders and assure their collaboration against the Turks.46 The Turks exploited the cooperation of the Catholic mountaineers with Montenegro in order to incite religious fanaticism in the vilayet of Shkoder and Kosovo. They began in September to massacre the Catholic population of Zadrime, a large number of whom were obliged to take to the mountains. In Shkoder itself a state of siege was proclaimed. With their policy of terror, the Turks pushed the Catholic Malissori still closer to Montenegro. Fierce battles took place in September between the Catholic mountaineers, assisted by the Montenegrin army, and the Turks.47 This situation and the preparations of the Balkan states for war put Vienna in a state of agitation. Before this, on March 17, 1911, Conrad, Chief of Staff of the Dual Monarchy, had viewed unfavorably the collaboration between Albanians and Montenegrins, as well as the continued opposition in Albania to the Young Turk regime.48 Now, at the end of September, Conrad's successor, Schemua, proposed the occu­ pation of Kosovo, in the event of the undoing of Turkey, in order to prevent the unification of Serbia and Montenegro and thus assure a connection with Albania, which he consid­ ered "unconditionally" within the Austrian sphere of influ­ ence.49 The hostilities which Montenegro started were followed on October 17 by the declaration of war on Turkey by Serbia and Bulgaria and a day later by Greece. Russia tried to pre­ vent the war, but as Poincar£ put it: "She perceives today that it is too late to stop the movement which she provoked, and as I was telling Sazonov and Isvolsky, she tries to apply Μ. E. Durham, The Struggle for Scutari, London, 1914, p. 143. Histori e Shqiperise (1900-1919), p . 5 5 . «Ibid.

45Cf. ie

Note des Chefs des Generalstafs, HI, No. 2487. L. Salvatorelli, op.cit., pp. 446-447.

4s O-U-A.,

49See

451

ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE

&0. In

the brake, but it was she who started the motor." a short time the Balkan allies dispersed the Turkish forces and en­ tered Albanian territory. Montenegro occupied Ipek and ap­ proached Shkoder. The Serbian armies seized Prishtine, Prizren, and, together with the Montenegrin troops, Gjakove. They then crossed the valley of the river Drin to advance toward Mat, for Serbia was eager to reach the sea. The Greek army, after the defeat of the Turkish forces in Epirus, marched in the direction of Janina. All the Balkan allied armies declared that they came as liberators.81 The first Balkan war created a very complicated situation in Albania. On the one hand, there still existed among the people a warlike spirit against Turkish domination; on the other hand, it became clearer every day that the intentions of the Balkan allies were to partition Albania. The problem which the patriots had to face was very grave: the fate of their country. What should their attitude be in the conflict, and what ways and means should they use for their country's salva­ tion? The situation was still more entangled by (a) the ab­ sence of an Albanian central authority recognized by all, able to override independent regional action, and direct an intri­ cate policy and (b) by the disruption of communications as a result of enemy invasion. It has been maintained that a "policy of neutrality" seemed from every point of view desirable to the Albanian patriots. By following a distinctive policy the Albanians hoped to give tangible proof of their racial individuality.52 This view, which appears so logical, was formerly shared by the present writer. Facts, however, show that the policy of neutrality was neither advocated by Albanian patriots nor pursued by the people. It is true that a "distinctive" policy was followed but not that of neutrality. The distinctiveness lay not in the policy itself 50Poincari to Paul Cambon, Paris, 15 October 1912, DDF, 3rd ser., iv, No. 170; see also Poincard's notes on the conversations at St. Peters­ burg, ibid.., hi, No. 264. 81Cf. Histori e Shqiperise (1900-1919), p. 58. 83J. Swire, Albania: the Rise of a Kingdom, London, 1929, p. 135.

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but in its motivation: the Albanians fought on the side of Turkey because they believed that by doing so they would best safeguard their own territory. Within Albania, the initiative for political action was taken by the patriotic society, Shoqeria e Zeze per Shpetim (Black Society for Salvation). On October 14, 1912 it organized a meeting in Uskiib which was attended by leaders of the Al­ banian movement, national patriots and ex-followers of itilaf, who now joined forces with the former because of the inevit­ able defeat of Turkey. Having concluded that the Ottoman empire was going to lose the war, the gathering of Uskiib resolved to make known to the great powers that the Alba­ nian people were seizing their arms not in order to strengthen the rule of Turkey in the Balkans but in order to defend the territorial integrity and liberty of Albania. They demanded for the four vilayets one and the same form of government. The declaration was delivered on October 16 to the represen­ tatives of the great powers inUskub. The meeting of Uskiib also appointed a delegation whose duty was to go to Malesi e Madhe in order to detach the Catholic mountaineers from Montenegro. The delegation was authorized at the same time to get in touch with other Albanian districts in order to or­ ganize the resistance to the partition that menaced Albania.53 Before the meeting of Uskiib, in the beginning of October, the newspaper Liri e Shqiperise (published in Sofia) appealed to the Albanians: ". . . We should take up the arms and de­ fend the borders of our fatherland demanding the autonomy of Albania. We should raise the Albanian flag and claim our rights." 54 At the same time the Austro-Hungarian representa­ tive in Rumania wired to Vienna that the Albanians in Turkey had decided to serve on the front: those of the vilayet of Janina against Greece, those of Shkoder against Monte­ negro, those of Kosovo and the Sandjak (Novi Pazar) against Serbia and those of Monastir against Bulgaria.55 i3 See

Historie Shqiperise (1900-1919), pp. 57-58. quoted in ibid., p. 57. 55Czernin to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Code Telegram No. 1263, Sinaia, 6 October 1912, HHStA, PA xiv/41, Albanien xxxiv. 54As

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As for the Albanians in the United States, in April 1912 they had succeeded in forming the Pan-Albanian Federation of America, called Vatra (Hearth), in order to help the na­ tional movement more efficiently. The leaders, Faik Konitza and Fan S. Noli, held that Turkey, although hard pressed, would not be beaten by the Balkan allies. They were also unwilling to believe that Austria's vague sympathy for Alba­ nia would turn into concrete political action. For the sake of Albanian autonomy they proposed to pledge their word and even their military assistance to Turkey.56 On October 7, 1912 Vatra called a mass meeting in Boston, where represen­ tatives from all New England listened with incredulity to their leaders' demand that they support Turkey. The Rever­ end Naum Cere, chairman of the meeting, said: "Turkey, by granting to the Albanian insurgents their demands, made the national existence of Albania a possibility. This development meant a deadly blow to the encroaching ambitions of the Balkan States. . . . Therefore our interest evidently lies in a hearty cooperation with the Turkish army against the en­ emies of the empire, who are chiefly the enemies of Alba­ nia. . . ." 57 When the war started, Turkey mobilized the Albanians in her armies. Albanian soldiers and reserves, as well as detach­ ments of volunteers, fought against the Balkan allies in order to defend their fatherland from the new conquerors. The Turks, however, after the first reverses, attempted to use the Albanian detachments in order to protect their retreating armies. This was one of the main causes of the desertion of the Albanians from the front.58 As the salvation of their country now depended more on the great powers, the activity of the Albanians on the foreign front was intensified. In mid-October 1912, Ekrem Vlora, a member of an influential family of Vlore and well regarded 56Federal

Writers' Project of the Works Progress Administration of Massachusetts, The Albanian Struggle in the Old World and New, Boston, 1939, pp. 48-49. 57As quoted in ibid., p. 50. 88See Histori e Shqiperise (ipoo-ipip), p. 58.

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at the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, arrived in Vienna, having been sent on a mission by the notables—rather the landowning beys—of south central and middle Albania. Be­ tween October 15 and 19, he had several talks with responsible foreign service officers. On the premise that Turkey would lose the war and that this would lead to an international conference, Ekrem Vlora put a number of questions to the Ballhaus: Could there be a guarantee for the coast of Qameri as far as Preveza and up the river Kalamas to be included in Albania? Could there be a guarantee for the continuation of Albania as she then existed? Was there a possibility for the demarcation of the part of the territory predominantly inhabited by Albanians to be under Turkish sovereignty and Austro-Hungarian supervision in organizing the administration, without any autonomy and without reforms after the Macedonian model? If AustriaHungary did not succeed at the expected international con­ ference in defending the integrity of Albania as previously mentioned, would she be ready, through secret delivery of arms and subsidies, to support the organization of a league of national resistance? Would the Monarchy be disinterested in the developments and leave the Balkan states a free hand with respect to Albania? Would it be advisable to oppose to the utmost the Balkan states with the assurance that at the given moment the rights of the Albanians with regard to Turkey and the Balkan states would be protected? Was there any prospect of an Austro-Hungarian occupation of Albania and under which eventualities? It is evident that the questions centered around the terri­ torial integrity of Albania and the help which the Monarchy could give for its preservation. The answers of the AustroHungarian Foreign Ministry were partly diplomatic and partly straightforward. They first stressed that the Monarchy and the other powers held fast to the status quo and that they had informed the Balkan states about it. Concerning the guarantees for the littoral up to the river Kalamas and the situation of Albania, the reply was that these questions did

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not represent actualities. If a broader crisis ensued, the inten­ tion of Vienna was to preserve the integrity of Albania at least up to the Kalamas river. With respect to the delimitation of the Albanian-inhabited territory under Turkish sover­ eignty, the answer was that it corresponded to Austro-Hungarian intentions, yet the Monarchy did not pretend a special right for itself. Although the question about Austria-Hun­ gary's failure to defend the integrity of Albania in an inter­ national conference referred to an unlikely situation, the answer was that Austria-Hungary would be inclined to further the national resistance secretly; in no instance would she be disinterested in Albania. With respect to the question of resistance to the Balkan states and Austrian defense of Alba­ nian rights, the reply was in the affirmative. It was also stated that never had the Monarchy considered the occupation of Albania.59 During the month of October, several ministerial confer­ ences were held in Vienna in which questions pertaining to Austrian interests were discussed. One of them (between Oc­ tober 25 and 30) dealt extensively with the territorial changes of Albania. As to the fate of Albania, the conference expressed the opinion that it was in the vital interests of the Monarchy to preserve that country even if it had to resort to war (ultima ratio). It was imperative that the Monarchy prevent a great power, or even a small one, from setting foot on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, particularly on the Ionian Sea. It was therefore thought desirable that an autonomous Albania or, in the event of the cessation of Turkish sovereignty, an inde­ pendent Albania should be established. As far as the territory of this entity was concerned, it would be in the interest of its durability and power of resistance to include as far as possible all the Turkish area inhabited by Albanians. But, because of the complicated ethnographic relations in the vilayets of Kosovo, Monastir, and Janina, Austria-Hungary thought the territorial desiderata would be difficult to realize, and still 59Ekrem Vlora's Questions and Answers of the Ballhaus, HHStA, PA xiv/10, Albanien v/13.

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ΙΠ. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

more so at the moment when the Balkan states were victo­ rious. The conference then drew, under the new circum­ stances, the frontiers—they were conditional—of an Albania capable of an independent existence.60 This point of the pro­ gram, which came out of the discussion, was communicated to Germany on October 30 and to Italy on November 3.61 Now that it had become evident that the status quo could no longer be maintained, Berchtold proposed to Rome on November 17 an exchange of views on the delimitation of the borders and the internal organization of Albania. Only the creation of an independent Albania and the security of its territory remained the expressed aim of Austria-Hungary's Balkan policy.61" Districts which were exclusively or pre­ ponderantly Albanian should be assigned to Albania, but the results of the war should also be taken into account: thus Gjakove, Ipek, and Prizren should be left to Serbia; to the Greeks Berchtold would cede the territory south of the Kalamas river; the Montenegrins would get Shkoder, if they conquered it, but with a rectification of the frontier near Bocche di Cattaro (Kotar). As to the inner organization of the country, it was suggested that Albania be a principality with a prince not belonging to any one of the Albanian con­ fessions. On November 21 Avarna communicated officially to Vienna that San Giuliano was in agreement with the Austrian program for Albania, but the detailed answer from Rome was dispatched on November 26. On November 30, however, Berchtold changed his mind about Shkoder and questioned whether it was possible to detach this city from Albania. There was fear that all the Albanian Catholics would defect. San Giuliano agreed with his Austrian colleague that Shkoder was of vital interest for Albania but affirmed that it was difficult to sustain the case against Russia's claim in favor of Montenegro.62 eoSee

0-U.A., iv, No. 4170. discussion of it in L. Salvatorelli, op.cit., pp. 450-452. 61,H. Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold,. Grandseigneur und Staatsτηαηη, Graz, Vienna, Cologne, 1963, p. 324. 62See L. Salvatorelli, op.cit., pp. 453-454. 61See

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The attitude of Russia toward Serbian and Montenegrin affairs oscillated. On November 8 Sazonov wired to Rome re­ questing it to intervene with Austria-Hungary to secure her agreement to a Serbian port on the Adriatic. On November 2 ο Sazonov appeared obdurate to the German ambassador, Pourtales, and spoke of war, but the same day he sent a tele­ gram to Belgrade that was pacific in tone. Indeed, three days later Pourtales found Sazonov's behavior conciliatory; the eventuality of a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia supported by Russia posed the question of a European war.63 In the meantime the Albanian patriots did not slow down their efforts. The situation was too critical for them. On November 12, 1912 the leaders of the region Tirana—Durres made an appeal to the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph II. They mentioned the difficult position of their country, as parts of the four vilayets were under the occupation of the Balkan allies. Regarding him as the emperor of a power that through the annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina had become Balkan, they appealed to him to insure the preservation of the territorial integrity of Albania and the granting of com­ plete autonomy to her within the Ottoman state. However, if Turkey, as a consequence of the war, were unable to rule in any way over Albanian lands, they asked that an Albanian kingdom be constituted similar to those of the Balkan peoples. If possible, this kingdom should be neutral like Belgium and Switzerland to maintain the equilibrium of the Balkans. They concluded that their hopes rested with Franz Joseph II.64 A week later the Albanian notables in Istanbul—and they were many, both Tosks and Gegs, Christians and Moslems— made an appeal to the great powers in the name of the Alba­ nian people. They stated that they were disturbed by the aims of the Balkan states and feared that "the rights and the fue 3 I b i d ., p. 454. "Appeal to Η. M. Emperor Franz Joseph, Shqypnie (Albania), 12 November 191a, the signatures of the leaders follow at the end, as

Beilage to Bericht des k.u.k. Konsulates in Durazzo, 13 November 1912, Zl. 74/streng vertraulich, HHStA, PA xn/417, Tiirkei xxxxv/6.

458

ΠΙ. TOWABD INDEPENDENCE

ture" of the Albanian people might be sacrificed. If the East­ ern question were to receive a just and durable solution, the Albanian people should be taken into account, and it was the duty of the great powers to intervene. Without denying cer­ tain prerogatives to the conquerors, they claimed that all peoples in the Balkan peninsula had the right to exist, and that fair conditions should be created for them. The Albanian people, known for their struggles for independence in the past and at present, had the conviction that they were worthy of the esteem of the great powers. They declared that the Alba­ nian people would not permit any alterations in the terri­ torial status quo of European Turkey prejudicial to their rights. They would not permit the interference of the Balkan states in the administration of the land which belonged to them. They would keep their own customs, develop accord­ ing to their social and political conceptions, and remain the master of their own destiny.66 The Albanian colony in the United States was not lax in its efforts to forestall partition of Albania. On November 17, 1912, Vatra called a mass meeting in Boston, at which Faik Konitza was the chief speaker. He acknowledged the defeat of Turkey: "Turkey is humbled and Albania is invaded and in danger of being partitioned. What are we going to do, we the nationalist Albanians, to save our country?" Resolutions were passed pledging Vatra's financial resources to save Albania. Cables were sent to the emperors of Austria and Germany, the king of Italy, the Pope, the Russian and French foreign offices, and President Taft, demanding that partition be prevented.66 During these critical days, the Albanian patriot who played the most important role—the man of destiny—was Ismail Kemal. He himself has written: "When the Balkan Allies declared war on Turkey, and the Bulgarian armies were in 85Appel du Peuple Albanais aux Grandes Puissances, addressed to Pallavicini, as Beilage to Pallavicini's Bericht, Constantinople, 19 No­ vember 1912, No. 88, HHStA, PA xn/417, Tiirkei xxxxv/6. t 6 The Albanian Struggle in the Old World and New, p. 50.

ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE

459

occupation of Kirk-Kilise, while the Serbs had seized t)skiib, I realized that the time had arrived for us Albanians to take vigorous measures for our own salvation." 67 Ismail left for Bucharest, together with Luigj Gurakuqi, at the end of Sep­ tember 1912, in order to consult with the patriots of the large Albanian colony in Rumania. Before his departure, he told an Italian journalist that he saw no solution to the Albanian problem except an Austrian intervention.68 There is ground to believe that he had been in touch with Pallavicini, for on November 12 the Austro-Hungarian ambassador informed his Ministry that Ismail Kemal had already left for Vienna.69 On November 5 a meeting was held in Bucharest, where it was decided that "a directing committee should be created which would undertake the government of the country"; a commission should be formed which would go to Europe in order to defend before the governments of the great powers "the national rights of the lands of the Albanian people"; a committee in Bucharest should be established which would coordinate the activities of the committees inside and outside Albania in order to aid the fatherland more efficiently.70 The gathering of Bucharest could not decide whether Albania was going to be autonomous or independent, as that depended on future developments and the attitude of the great powers. From Bucharest Ismail Kemal went to Vienna, while the members of the commission who would accompany him to Albania, like Luigj Gurakuqi, Pandeli Cale, Don Kacorri, left for Trieste. From the Austrian capital, on November 9, 1912, Ismail sent the momentous telegram to his son Edhem in Vlore: "Avenir Albanie assure/' and asked him to wire the good news everywhere in Albania. He recommended frater­ nal harmony and cooperation, maintenance of order, and er The

Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, p. 369. of Dervish Hima to Rappaport, Constantinople, 5 November 1912, HHStA1 PA xiv/9, Albanien v/6. e9Pallavicini [to Berchtold], Pera, 2 November 1912, No. 369, Ref. i, in ibid. 70See Histori e Shqiperise (1900-1919), p. 61. e8Letter

460

ΠΙ. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

regular functioning of public affairs. His son answered on November 13 from Vlore, informing him that the country­ men everywhere had been invited to send delegates to Vlore for the assembly. The delegates had already been chosen and were waiting for instructions. Ismail was asked to speed up his arrival at Durres, if that port had not yet been blockaded.71 On November 12 Ismail Kemal visited the Ministry of For­ eign Affairs in Vienna, and tried to sound out the Austrians as to their intentions. He mentioned the future organization of an autonomous Albania, his design to call an assembly of notables and address a memorandum to the powers contain­ ing the desiderata of the Albanians, and urge the Turkish government to order the military and civil authorities in Albania to cooperate with the leaders of the national move­ ment. The officials of the Foreign Ministry limited themselves to generalities. They told him what the semi-official press of the Monarchy had already published, namely, that the Aus­ trian sympathies for the Albanians and their development were profound and that it was their wish that Austria support the national integrity of his country in order to secure peace in the Balkan peninsula. They could not discuss the specific questions, which they said were still premature, owing to the war situation.72 But Ismail Kemal's conversation with Berchtold in Buda­ pest must have been more encouraging. Ismail himself says that Berchtold approved his views on the Albanian national question.73 He wired from there on November 17 to his 71See

copies of the telegrams by Ismail Kemal and his son Edhem as Beilage to the Bericht, Valona, 13 November 1912, No. 64, HHStA, PA xn/417, Turkei xxxxv/6. Intriguing is the signature in Edhem's tele­ gram: Edhem—Armiku—Hodhitopa. The last two words are Albanian. Armiku means the enemy; Hodhitopa should be divided into hodhi "fired" and topa "cannons"; the Albanian words would then read: "the enemy fired cannons." Apparently Edhem wanted to let his father know that the enemy armies, in this instance those of Greece, were near Vlore. 72 O-U-A., iv, No. 4398, Tagesbericht iiber einen Besuch des albanischen Notablen Ismail Kemal, 12 November 1912. 1 3 The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, p. 370.

ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE

461

friends in Vlore about his imminent arrival at Durres and the convocation o£ the delegates either in that town or Vlore. He assured them that Albania's position was secure. The next day his son Edhem, in accord with the notables of Vlore, telegraphed to all the towns of Albania to send the elected delegates to Vlore immediately. It was supposed that all of them would convene there in a short time. A large number had gathered in Tirana, among them the delegates of Kosovo; and those of Elbasan were already on the way to Vlore. But Vlore was threatened by the Greeks, who had landed in Himare, and there was fear that their armies might increase as the fight between them and the Albanians of the surround­ ing regions had begun. In order to protect the town, Alba­ nian forces from Vlore left for the passes of Logara.74 From Budapest Ismail Kemal left for Trieste, where he met "the little band of Albanians from Bucharest" that was waiting for him there. On November 19 they sailed together for Durres on the boat which Berchtold had put at his dis­ posal.75 On that day the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister had wired his vice consul in Durres, Ludwig von Rudnay, to welcome Ismail Kemal and his companions and be ready to assist them if any difficulties were to arise. As far as political subjects were concerned, he was instructed not to touch upon the form of government, but only restrict himself to saying that the Austrians would support the independence and in­ tegrity of Albania, a viewpoint shared by Italy as well. He was also warned to keep away from the differences which existed among the Albanian politicians and stress the need of unity among them. The content of the telegram was to be commu­ nicated to the representatives of the Monarchy in Vlore and Janina.76 The differences among the Albanian politicians to which 74Lejhanec

to Berchtold, Valona, 20 November 1912, HHStA, PA xn/417, Tiirkei xxxxv/6. 1 5 The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, pp. 370-371. 7 e O-U.A., iv, No. 4498, Tel. an den Vizekonsul Ludwig von Rudnay in Durazzo, 19 November 1912, No. 26, streng vertraulich.

462

ΠΙ. TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

Berchtold referred in his telegram seem to have been between Ismail Kemal and his followers, on the one hand, and the many landowning beys of central and northern Albania, most active of whom had been his cousin, Syreja Vlora, on the other. While Ismail was in Vienna and Budapest trying to win the support of the Austrian government for the national Albanian cause, these landowning beys were attempting to organize a meeting of Albanian representatives themselves. Toward the middle of November Syreja Vlora wired (perhaps from Durres) to his son, Ekrem, informing him that the rep­ resentatives of the northern Albanian towns had assembled in Tirana and asking him at the same time how the preparations in southern Albania were going. Ekrem answered that Vlore had not yet made up its mind, but that he along with some delegates from that town, Berat, and Elbasan would go to Tirana.77 Describing his trip, Ismail Kemal wrote: "As Valona was blockaded by the Greek fleet, I was glad to disembark at Durazzo." 78 However, he did not stay there, perhaps because of the opposition on the part of the landowning beys. Another obstacle must have been the declaration of the Orthodox Bishop of Durres, Jakovos, a Greek, that he recognized and honored only one flag, that of Turkey.79 Furthermore, the Serbian armies were not very far from Durres. Four days after his landing he left for Vlore, accompanied by 37 delegates from various Albanian towns, and arrived there on Novem­ ber 26.80 77Lejhanec

to Berchtold, Valona, 13 November 1912, No. 64, HHStA, PA xn/417, Tiirkei xxxxv/6. ' n The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, p. 370. 79See P. Donat Kurd, "Flamuri komtar ne krahine te Shkodres (The National Flag in the District of Shkoder), Hylli i Drites (Star of Light), Shkoder, xiu (November 1937), 515-537. t o H-UA., No. 4716. Bericht des Konsuls Wenzel Lejhanec aus Valona, 2g November 1912, No. 70. Either the date 15 is a printing error or his memory must have failed Ismail Kemal when he refers to the first sitting in Vlore as lasting from 15 to 28 November (The Memoirs of Ismail Ksmal Bey, p. 372), for he arrived there only on 26 Novem­ ber 1912.

ATTAINMENT OF INDEPENDENCE

463

When the group reached Vlore, "A holy fire of patriotism had taken possession of my native town, and public enthusi­ asm and delight greeted us everywhere. In a short space of time I found myself surrounded by eighty-three delegates, Mussulmans and Christians, who had come from all parts of Albania, whether or not they were occupied by the belligerent armies." 81 There was no time to allow for the arrival of other delegates. The situation was rapidly changing with the ad­ vance of the forces of the Balkan allies. On November 28 an extraordinary national assembly convened, presided over by Ismail Kemal. In a short speech depicting the situation cre­ ated in Albania as a result of the Balkan war, he said: "The Albanians had taken part in the war not so much as soldiers but as masters of the land in order to save themselves." He proposed that measures be taken to proclaim Albania's inde­ pendence, form a provisional government, elect a senate to control and aid the government, and constitute a commission to send abroad for the defense of Albania's rights. All his proposals were approved and he himself was entrusted with the formation of the provisional government. The Albanian flag was then raised and the great powers, as well as the Porte and the Balkan allies, were notified of the proclamation of Albanian independence.82 Thus the independence of Albania was achieved under precarious circumstances, after more than three decades of efforts in developing national consciousness. sl The

Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, pp. 371-372. Histori e Shqipertse (1900-1919), p. 6a, and 6-U.A., iv, No. 4716, Bericht des Konsuls Wenzel Lejhanec aus Valona, 29 November 1912, No. 70, and in the Beilage to it the names of the Albanian delegates, present and absent. 82See

Conclusion IN THEIR STRUGGLE for national affirmation, the Albanians, as

we have seen, faced obstacles that were greater than those of their Balkan neighbors—and at times were even unique. Religion was one of the most divisive forces. In the Otto­ man empire, religion, not nationality, was the criterion for dividing the rulers and the ruled. The majority of Albanians, being Moslems, enjoyed a privileged position in the empire, from which their Orthodox and Catholic countrymen were barred. This contrast in status between Christians and Mos­ lems constituted a serious hindrance to unification. Another significant obstacle was the product of geography and history. Although the neighboring Balkan countries also had their regional differences, these were not as deep and pronounced as in Albania. In this country, the mountainous north had remained in a backward and tribal state, while the lowlands of the south had evolved into a more progressive, though still patriarchal society. This situation was clearly reflected in the Albanian League. The Albanians of the south, having better means of communication and a more educated class, formulated the demand for administrative autonomy within the Ottoman empire and were better pre­ pared to understand it in its national aspect; the northern Albanians, living in isolation and leading a more or less autonomous life, laid more stress on exemption from taxa­ tion, military service, and payment of taxes—privileges they had enjoyed—and were less capable of thinking of autonomy in its broad and national sense. Largely because of these regional differences, the Albanian League was incapable of creating a single center of direction and concerted action. When the Ottomans conquered the Balkans, the Balkan peoples lost their leaders; some were eliminated, others fled into exile, and still others were converted to Islam. A leveling of their societies was brought about; peasants in Serbia and Bulgaria; a mixture of peasants, sea farers, and merchants in Greece. In Albania, however, with the conversion of the majority to Islam, a new class of leaders gradually emerged,

CONCLUSION

465

the landowning pashas and beys. This feudal nobility, which represented to a certain extent a cohesive political group among the Albanians, supported the claim to the autonomy of their country mainly because they were opposed to the centralistic policy of the Porte, which curtailed their own power. Although rivalries were not absent among them, vested interests in the empire kept them together as a class. However, not all of the feudal nobility conceived of auton­ omy in the same terms, and independence was far from their political thinking. Among the patriotic leaders—composed of elements from a cross-section of the country—there were some who from time to time raised their voice for independence, but their general political thinking revolved around administrative autonomy within the Ottoman empire, with the four vilayets (Janina, Shkoder, Kosovo, and Monastir) united into one large province. It was necessary that Albania should not re­ main a vague geographic expression, but should acquire definite frontiers as a territory in order to be protected in an eventual collapse of Turkey. Time was needed to attenuate the differences in the Albanian society and autonomy would serve this purpose best. A greater measure of Albanian unity became imperative. Unity, however, could not be achieved without enlighten­ ment. The other Balkan peoples had labored long for cultural emancipation before they achieved liberation. For the Alba­ nians, this was a difficult task. The Adriatic did not link them with the West but separated them from it. Western currents of thought scarcely reached them. The majority, as Moslems, were East-oriented. Moreover, enlightenment came slowly because the Albanian language and schools were banned by the Porte, and this ban was backed by the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Both of these powers tried to hinder the Albanians from becoming aware of their national individu­ ality. Enlightenment was carried on primarily outside the bound­ aries of the Ottoman empire. The Albanian colonies played

466

CONCLUSION

an important part. It was through them that the Orthodox Christians made their greatest contribution to the national cause. They were better suited for educational and propagandistic work than for revolutions, for in the mother country the use of arms had not been their privilege. In the movement for the development of Albanian national consciousness we witnessed the significant contribution of the Italo-Albanians. This was a unique phenomenon. Only the activity of the Serbs of southern Hungary (now Vojvodina) bears a certain resemblance to it. The memories of the distant past were kept alive among the Italo-Albanians, and they felt a nostalgia for the land of their forefathers, which they wanted to see free. But their position was delicate. Theirs was a kind of double allegiance: a sentimental tie with Albania on the one hand, and their duty as Italian citizens, on the other. The revolutionary party of the Italo-Albanians put official Italy in a difficult position toward Austria-Hungary, and the leader of the moderate party, A. Lorecchio, did not hesitate to make it clear that the Adriatic should be "an Albanian and Italian sea," which in general was not to the liking of the Italians. We cannot conceive of the liberation of the Balkan peoples without the help they received from the great powers. These countries supported the Christian nationalities of the penin­ sula but were indifferent to the fate of the Albanians. The position of the Albanians was disadvantageous. Since the majority of the Albanians were Moslems, they were often identified with the Turks by Europeans. Although IndoEuropean in language, the Albanians stood alone. They did not possess common ties with any one of the great powers, such as those existing between the Balkan Slavs and the Rus­ sians—ties based on common Slavic patrimony. Quite early they became aware of the indifference of European powers. As Ambassador Goschen observed in a communication to the British Foreign Office: "They [the Albanians] have seen the nationality of these neighboring races taken under the pro­ tection of various European Powers, and gratified in their aspirations for a more independent existence.. .. Meanwhile,

CONCLUSION

467

they see that they themselves do not receive similar treat­ ment." 1 True, Austria-Hungary and Italy showed deep concern for Albania, but strictly for reasons of political self-interest, each power striving to prevent the other from becoming en­ trenched on the Albanian coast. The policy of the status quo, which they formulated, protected Albania from occupation by a foreign power, but at the same time was a hindrance to the efforts of the patriots to bring about changes in her posi­ tion within Turkey. On the other hand, rivalry between the Monarchy and Italy, by stimulating Albanian reaction, con­ tributed to national awakening. The Albanian League laid the groundwork for future na­ tional activity. But the revolts, which continued for a long time after the suppression of the League, were intermittent and sporadic in the north and had as an objective local inter­ ests. They did not follow Albanian national political think­ ing. With the turn of the century, however, there were intoduced in the insurrections claims which were national in character. National consciousness had begun to evolve among the Albanians, not only in the south but also in the north. A letter of the French consul in Oskiib is indicative of this trend: "There are almost no longer those periodical gather­ ings where many chiefs of clans come together to treat of questions which divide them without speaking about an inde­ pendent Albania, without fixing the frontiers of the future state, without even being concerned about the form of gov­ ernment which will best fit it." 2 A further impetus was given by the Macedonian guerrilla war. The Albanians witnessed then the expansionist aims of their Balkan neighbors and created the first nationalist bands, composed of both Moslems and Christians. With the advent of the Young Turks to power in 1908, the 1Goschen

to Granville, Therapia, 26 July 1880, A and P, 1880, Vol.

LXXXVI, Turkey, 15 (1880), No. 81. 2Choublier to Delcassi, tJskiib, 15 September 1902, No. 6, AMAE, Turquie, Politique Int£rieure, Albanie1 1902-1903, Vol. rv.

468

CONCLUSION

Albanian national awakening entered a dynamic phase. Fol­ lowing the proclamation of constitutional guarantees, the Albanian patriots seized the opportunity to put their program into effect. They opened schools in Albanian, founded liter­ ary-cultural societies and clubs, and published newspapers and periodicals in their mother tongue. Most significant was the adoption of the Latin script for Albanian. It is easy to understand why the Young Turks mobilized all their efforts to thwart the propagation of the Latin alphabet for the Albanian language. They cherished the hope of keep­ ing the Albanians divided by religion and playing off one party against the other. The Latin script, though innocent in appearance, not only was a powerful factor in unification, but also signified a breaking away from Turkish-Islamic culture and an orientation toward the West. Moreover, the Young Turks feared that the Albanian example—the Moslem de­ tachment from Turkey—would serve as an incentive to other Moslem populations in their empire which were not Turkish. When they failed to substitute the Arabic alphabet for the Latin, they resorted to force. The series of alternating revolts and suppressions which ensued rendered the Albanians increasingly dissatisfied with the policy of centralization and "Ottomanization" pursued by the Young Turks. The uprisings expanded and were in­ tensified, and became more national in their objectives. Even the central lowlands, which until then had remained inactive, revolted. The inhabitants of this part of the country were generally peasants, dominated by feudal lords, and fanatic Sunnis. They had not experienced the foreign pressures of either the north (the Slavs) or the south (the Greeks). They felt protected in the central part of Albania, having created a kind of barrier which separated the north from the south. But now their feudal lords were discontented with the regime of the Young Turks. When the central lowlands also joined in the armed opposition, the revolt became general, and was transformed into a revolution. Although the revolution was not well organized—the vari-

CONCLUSION

469

ous parts of the country were loosely connected—a certain spontaneous union was reached because of the suppressions of the Young Turks. The most important role was played by the Kosovars. It is ironical that the Kosovars who helped the Young Turks to come to power contributed strongly to their loss of power. If the objectives of the various revolutionary groups differed, there were two which remained general and constant: the fall of the Young Turks and the autonomy of Albania within the Ottoman empire. By September 4, 1912, the two aims were virtually achieved. In the struggle for Albania's national awakening all three religious elements took part, each in its own way and each according to its strengths and weaknesses. For the Orthodox nationalists it was hard to work in Albania proper because their co-religionists pursued the policy of Greece. Although they found Turkish rule as tyrannical as their pro-Greek brothers, their field of activity could be only outside the borders of Greece and Turkey. The Catholics, who were least numerous but compact, were in a different position. They were confronted neither with the difficult alternatives of the Orthodox nor with the divided loyalty of the Moslems. They had lived in the north for centuries, surrounded by Moslems, Orthodox Slavs, and the deep sea. They looked for support from the nearest Catholic powers, which were Austria-Hun­ gary and Italy, but they also had been sufficiently well-armed to defend their rights. They had been brought up as Alba­ nians and they could be nothing but Albanians. Their na­ tional consciousness, however, was imbued with Catholicism. Some of their leaders would have been satisfied with a small Catholic Albania. As to the Moslem Albanians, it was natural that they would play the principal role. They constituted the majority, and without them there could be no Albania. Al­ though feeling as Albanians, it was not easy for them to detach themselves from Turkey, toward which they felt loyalty as Moslems. Their leaders began to be active when they became aware of the shaky structure of the Ottoman empire, which was supported by interested powers only for political reasons.

470

CONCLUSION

The best solution, they thought, would be an autonomous Albania as a steppingstone to independence. When the ques­ tion was raised about a foreign protectorate, most of them showed a preference for multi-national Austria-Hungary. However, as long as Turkey could still hold her own in the Balkans, they could not abandon her. Thus we see that even when they were opposing Turkey, they were ready to go to her assistance whenever she was in danger of being attacked from outside. Her survival was felt to be essential to their own conservation. When we consider the odds faced by the Albanians in their national awakening, their progress, which at first glance seems slow, can be regarded as an achievement. Along with the divisive internal and external forces discussed above, we must bear in mind certain positive factors which helped to make this achievement possible. The tribal society which existed in the past, and until recently, in the mountains of the north, must have given the Albanians, irrespective of religion, the feeling of common blood. Still more so in regions where the conversions had been of more recent date. In the beginning of our century there were instances in the south when one of the brothers was a Moslem and the other a Christian, and they celebrated together the big holidays of their respective religions (Easter or Bayram). Common folk culture served as another link. Language has always been important in the national move­ ments of nations, but its degree of importance has varied, depending upon the existence of other unifying factors. In Albania, where the divisive forces were so many, the role of common language was of paramount inportance. Language made the Albanians feel that they were distinct from the Turks and the Greeks, and for that matter from any other foreigner, and gave them a sense of belonging to one and the same nation. An incentive to the national awakening of the Albanians was the glorification of Skenderbeg and his times. The Alba-

CONCLUSION

471

nians had not inherited "the glory that was Greece" or the splendor of the medieval kingdoms of the Serbs and Bul­ garians. In Skenderbeg they saw their national hero. The Moslems forgot that he had fought against the Turks as a Christian. What mattered to them was that he was an Alba­ nian by blood and had defended his country. His name also helped to obliterate his religion, since he was known not by his Christian name Gjergj (George) but by that of Skenderbeg, a good Moslem name. Skenderbeg became a symbol of unification, irrespective of religion, and a Skenderbeg legend was created. Another important factor was foreign danger. Montenegro coveted northern Albanian lands and the Albanians were forced to take up arms against her. Serbia was eager to annex Kosovo and Metohija (Old Serbia) and acquire an exit to the Adriatic, passing through Albanian territory. She was a po­ tential enemy with whom clashes were inevitable. The Alba­ nians were also under the threat of Bulgaria's expansionist views in Macedonia including Albanian-inhabited lands. As a protector of all these Balkan Slavic neighbors was a power­ ful Russia. In the south, the peril came from Greece, which had given sufficient proof that her intention was to incorpo­ rate Epirus. For the Albanians then, outside pressure was tan­ tamount to the partition of their country. Islamic culture, with its identification of din (religion) and millet (nation), had served to blur to a certain extent the national distinctiveness of the Moslem Albanians. This dis­ tinctiveness began to emerge clearly at the time of the Alba­ nian League, when it became evident that what was in the interest of Turkey was not to the advantage of the Albanians. They proceeded to part company and, what was more, found themselves in opposite camps. The Albanians opposed the decisions of the Berlin Congress, but they also fought against the Porte. The insurrections and suppressions which fol­ lowed, particularly those of the Young Turk regime, rein­ forced the awareness of national identity. The last three years

472

CONCLUSION

of Young Turk rule did more for the development of Alba­ nian national consciousness than decades of slow cultural endeavors would have achieved. Yet one hesitates to say that the Albanians were ready for independence. The other Balkan nations had a long period of cultural preparation before attaining it. The Albanians who needed it most had the least preparation. National awak­ ening came to them partly in a gradual way and party in bolts and shocks. Even at the end, when the First Balkan War broke out, they had to put up resistance to prevent the dis­ memberment of their country. But the fate of their country now lay mostly in the hands of the great powers. Thanks to the efforts of Austria-Hungary in the international field and her collaboration with the proper Albanian elements, the independence of Albania was proclaimed. It was imposed on her by the nature of historical events. Although premature, it proved to be her salvation, promising further and freer development of national consciousness among her people in the decades to come.

Selected Bibliography Index

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as

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1890-1893); Serbien, i

(1879-1880), III (1882-1884); Türkei, iv (1879-1882), viii B (1881), xin B (1892-1895), XV (1890-1891), XVII (1891), XXX (1897-1898), xxxiii (1899), ''LV (1912-1913); Interna, vii (1881). FRANCE

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lowing files: several on F. Crispi; Carte G. Giolitti (1875-1928); Carte L. Luzzatti (1885-1920); Carte Pisani-Dossi Archivio ASMAE).

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Revue Internationale des Etudes Balkaniques, Belgrade. Rivista d'Albania, Rome. A publication of the Studies Center for Albania, Royal Academy of Italy, ι (1940), 11 (1941), πι (1942), and iv (1943). Rruga e Partise (The Road of the [Communist] Party), Tirana. Shejzat (Le Pleiadi), Rome. The Slavonic and East European Review, London. Sovetskoe vostokovedenie, Moscow, Only No. 1, 1958. Studi Albanesi (Rome). Published annually by the Istituto per l'Europa Orientale. There are six volumes, 1930-1936. Siidost-Forschungen, Munich. Voprosy istorii, Moscow. Only No. 6, 1956. The Times, London.

Index Abdullah Pasha, 419 Abeddin Pasha (Bey Dino), 69-71, 75, 77-79 Aehrenthal, 255, 441 Agimi alphabet, 141-42, 275-77, 37° Agimi society, 141-42, 278 Ahmed Niyazi, 340-41 Ahmed Riza, 336-38 AitSlos, Kosmas, 12; schools founded by, 17 Aladro Kastriota, Prince Gjin, 318-24, 331 Aladro y Perez de Valasco, Don Juan de, see Aladro Kastriota Albanian Central Committee (Istanbul), 1912 memorandum of, 4327-33 Albanian-Greek Committee, see Corfu committee Albanian language, suppression by Porte, 18; Janina memorandum concerning, 88; Turkish prohibition on, 89-90; first historical reference to, i n ; early religious writings in, 1 1 2 - 1 3 ; foreign references to, 1 1 3 - 1 8 ; and nationalist identity, 119-24; secret spread of, 143-44; and religion, 155-56; Italo-AIbanian promotion of, 2 1 8 - 1 9 ; promoted by AustriaHungary, 262-63; as nationalist issue, 366ff Albanian League, founding of, 35-38; southern committees of, 4 1 - 4 3 ; memoranda to Berlin Congress from, 43-47; initial reaction to Berlin Congress, 54-56; secret discussions with Greece, 55; and Montenegrin boundary issue, 60-62; split over Montenegrin (Dulcigno) issue, 65; and Greek boundary issue, 69-82; and Bulgarian guerrillas, 86-87; southern movement for Albanian autonomy, 88-91; split over autonomy movement, 9 1 - 9 2 ; votes on autonomy at Diber, 93-94; efforts to reunify, 94-95; changes in leader-

ship, 97; armed uprising, 97-98; reactions to uprising of, 99-103; petition to Austria-Hungary, 102; elimination by Dervish Pasha, 104—07; release of former leaders of, 192 Albanian National Congress (Bucharest), 328-29 Albanian nationalist leaders, 1877 discussions with Greece, 55 Albanian Orthodox church, in Boston, 161-63 Albanian Papal (Pontifical) Seminary, 130, 257 Albanian Political Committee (Naples), 219-20 Albanian publications, see publications Albanian schools, first boys', 134-35; Bucharest congress concerning, 135; first girls', 136-37; Luarasi's activity for, 137-38; Konitza's 1899 survey of, 143-44; as nationalist issue, 366ff. See also schools Albanian Society of Istanbul, 36-37, 318 Albanian Union (Athens), 309-10 alphabet question, 139-43, 217, 275-77, 337-38, 337", 36611 Apollinaire, GuiUaume, 321 Aranitis, 3, 6 Arbreshe, see Italo-Albanians Argondizza, Antonio, 216, 274 Asdren, 150, 187-88 Associazione Nazionale Italiana per Soccorrere i Missionari Italiani all'Estero, 264! Austria-Hungary, at Berlin Congress, 47-48; and transfer of Dulcigno to Montenegro, 63-68; and Albanian League uprising, 100; and Dogi plan, 170-73; and Macedonian movement, 20r-02, 204; attitude toward Italo-Albanians, 235-37; interest in Albania as anti-Slavic bastion, 238ff; peaceful activities within

490

INDEX

Austria-Hungary {cont.) Albania, asyff; Balkan agreements with Russia, a 88-90; and Uniate movement, 297-303; alleged secret treaty with Greece, 312-13, 3i3n; relations with Albanian pretenders, 323, 327; restates Albanian policy, 358-59; role in 1911 uprisings, 415; replies to appeals for support, 438-40; Albanian policy on eve of revolution, 441-43, 447, 450; on Albanian territorial integrity, 454-57. See also Kultusprotektorat Avrami, Thoma, 151, 154 bajrak, 14-15 Baldacci, Antonio, 245-46, 273-74, 280, 283 Balkan Committee (London), 326 Balshas, 3 Bardhi, Pater Pashko, 261 Barrere, 287 Bashkimi alphabet, 141-42, 275-77, 370 Bashkimi society, 141-42 Bektashis, 13, 41-42, 166, 386, 422; and Epirus issue, 78-79; in patriotic literature, 123; as promoters of Albzmian language, 143; and guerrilla activity, 212; relations with Young Turks, 338-39 Bellkameni, Spiro, 421 Bennici, Giuseppe, 225 Bennici, Manlio, 225-26, 228, 230, 232-33, 235, 322 Bismarck, 81, 86 Black Society for Salvation, 424, 436, 452 Boletini, Isa, 428, 435-36, 446 Bosnia, refused aid, 56 boundaries of Albania, as defined in 1877 by Austro-Hungarian consul, 31-32; as defined by San Stefano Treaty, 32-33; in memorandum to Berlin Congress, 44; with Montenegro in Berlin Treaty, 4 9 - 5 1 ; with Montenegro in dispute, 59-68; with Greece in dispute, 69-82; with Montenegro defended in 1883, 190; as

proposed by Abdul Frasheri, 3 1 6 - 1 7 ; as proposed in 1912 by revolutionaries, 433 British Bible Society, 373 Bulgaria, and the BerUn Congress, 49; guerrilla threats to Albania, 86-87; Albanian interest of, 295-96; activities on eve of revolution, 445-49 Bushatis, 21 Qajupi, Anton Zako, 125, 140-41, 152, 351-52 Cale, Pandeli, 429, 459 Calice, 242-43, 300-02 Camarda, Demetrio, 116-17 Carlotti, Marchese, 274 Catholics, 4 - 1 3 ; during period of Tanzimat, 19-ao; earliest Albanian writings of, 112; early schools for, 129-31; on alphabet question, 141-42, 275-76, 385-86; nationalist feelings of, 173-74; hierarchy attempt to suppress first Italian schools, 258-59; AustroHungarian policy toward, 282-86; and Uniate movement, 297-303; appeal to Austria-Hungary, 439-40. See also crypto-Christians Central Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Albanian NationaUty (Istanbul), 89 Cepo (Gardiki) resolutions, 423 Chiara, 45 Chinigo, Francesco, 274 Chlumecky, 284-85 giftliks, 19 Cilka, Grigor, 156, 210 Code of Leke Dukagjini, 15 Code of Skenderbeg, 15 College of St. Francis Saverius, 130 CoUegio S. Adriano, 116, 221, 259, 261, 269 Comitato Centrale dell'Alta Albania, see Corfu committee Commission for the Delimitation of the Turco-Montenegris Frontier, 56, 57, 60 Committee of Action (Italy), 225-26 Committee for the Liberation of Albania, see Monastir committee Conference of Ambassadors (Berlin), 63, 65, 76-78

INDEX Conference of Ambassadors (Istanbul), 81-82, 224 Congress of Berlin, 43; Albanian memoranda to, 43-47; work of, 47-53; and Mirdit question, 5 1 - 5 2 ; on autonomy within European Turkey, 89 Congress of Naples, 22off, 322 Congress of Ottoman Liberals, 336 Congress of the Subjugated People of Turkey, 150 Consiglio Albanese d'ltalia, 227-28, 235 Corfu committee, 305-07 Corigliano Calabro congress, 216-17 Corti compromise, 61-64 Crete, 355-56 Crispi, Francesco, 48, 83, 85, 165, 175, 258; and Italo-Albanians, 215-16; policy toward Albania, 240; receives letter from Abdul Frashëri, 316-17 crypto-Christians, 12-13, 296-97 Curri, Bajram, 209, 428, 436 Dakli, Ahmed, 434 Daku, Kristaq, 150 De Rada, Girolamo, 99, 116-17, 167, 216, 223, 307-08 Ded Gjo Luli, 411 Delcass6, 287 Demi, Musa, 421 Diber, resolutions of 1899 meeting in, 197-98; resistance to Young Turk regime, 395; 1909 congress of, 378-80, 398-99; revolt in, 411 Dibra, Djemal Bey, 94 Dibra, Ilijas Pasha, 37, 86, 94 Dibra, Sadik Pasha, 94 Dine, Spiro, 122, 152, 175 Dino, Sulejman Bey, 107 Dino, Vesel Bey, 70, 75 Djavid Pasha, 393, 395 Doçi (Dochi), Monsignor Prenk, 141, 170-73, 264, 267, 275-76 Dodani, Viskë, 152 Draga, Nexhib, 335, 348, 361, 428, 435 Dugi, Milo, 152-53 Dukagjinis, 6 Dulcigno, loss of, 63-68 Durham, M. E., 417

491

Eastern Rumelian Commission, 93 Elbasan education congress, 380-82 Elbasani, Dervish, 271, 38a Elbasani, Mahmud Pasha, 134 émigré, publications, see publications emigre settlements, after Ottoman invasions, 6 - 7 ; in Greece, 127; in Rumania, 145-52; in Egypt, 152-54; in Bulgaria, 154-56; in the United States, 159-63, 178, 453, 458; in Italy, 221-22; in IJalmatia, 261 emigre societies: Agimi, 278; Albanian Brotherhood of Egypt, 177; Albanian Committee of Istanbul, 177; Albanian Renaissance (proposed), 157-58; Bashkimi (Bucharest), 151, 213; Bashkimi (Constantsa), 336; BesaBesen, 160; Deshira, 154-55, >77; Dija, 277; Dituria, 146-47, J49, 177; Drita, 134, 146-49; Koha e Lirise, 160; Lidhja, 160; Lidhja Shqiptare, 163; Malli i Memedheut, 160; Perlindja, 163; Pro Patria, 228; Shpresa, 149-51, 161; Society of the Albanians "Drita," 148-49, 161, 177-78; Society of Istanbul, 145-47; Vellazeria Shqiptare, 152 England, offers London Protocol, 3 1 ; as Albanian spokesman at Berlin Congress, 44; and transfer of Dulcigno to Montenegro, 63-68; and Greek boundaries issue, 72, 75-77, 79; proposes Greco-Albanian union, 82-84; attitude toward Albanian autonomy, 92-93; limited Albanian interest of, 287-88; proposes Reval reforms, 340; responds to Gerche petition, 4 1 7 - 1 8 English-Albanian Committee, see Corfu committee Enver Bey, 340 Epirus, 52; Albanian defense of, 70-82; Greek activity in 1883-1884 regarding, 305-09 Evangj'eli, Pandeli, 146 fare J 16 Ferid Pasha, Grand Vizier, 411 fis, 14-15, 106

492

INDEX

Fishta, Gjergj, 124-25, 130, 14a, 331. 370-73 France, and transfer of Dulcigno to Montenegro, 63-68; role in Greco-Turkish boundaries negotiations, 69-82; limited Albanian interest of, 287 Franciscans, 8, 129-31, 141, 261 Frashëri, Abdul, 36; at Prizren meeting, 36-37; organizes southem committees, 41-43; secret discussions of 1877 with Greece, 55; and defense of Epirus, 70, 72-73, 79-80; on Greco-Albanian union, 85—86; and autonomy movement, 88-92; role in 1881 uprising, 98, 101-02; capture and death of, 105; nationalist ideals of, 165—66; letter to Crispi, 316-17 Frasheri alphabet, 147 Frashëri, Maliq Bey, 198-99 Frashëri, Midhat, 123, 128, 331, 346, 350, 360, 369n; nationalist ideals of, 185-86; at alphabet congress, 370-72 Frashëri, Nairn, 119, 128, 146, 268, 339; as poet, 123-24; nationalist ideals of, 166 Frashëri, Sami, 99, 129, 134; founds cultural society, 119-20; alphabet devised by, 140; nationalist ideals of, 166-69; republican proposal of, 318 Fuad Pasha, Prince of Egypt, 316-18 Galib Bey, 342-43 Galvagna, 242 Garibaldi, Ricciotti, 225-28, 323; Faik Konitza's opinion of, 231; expedition frustrated, 440-41 G a a Muhtar Pasha, 60, 69 Gazi Osman Pasha, 56 Gegs, 14—15; role in founding Albanian League, 35-38 Gerche memorandum, 416-17, 423-24 Germani, Peter, 211 Germanos, Archimandrite, 298, 301-02 Germany, Balkan role under Triple Alliance, 241; limited Albanian interest of, 288

Gërmënji, Themistokli, 421 Ghegs, see Gegs Ghika, Elena, 118 Ghika, Prince Albert, 324-31 Gjakova, Riza Bey, 194, 428, 436 Gjakove demonstrations, 57-58 Gjirokaster, committee, 78; conference of, 91-93 Goluchowski, 242-43, 246-47, 253-55> 289, 294 Grameno, Mihal, 207, 210, 2 1 1 - 1 2 , 407, 421 Greco-Albanians, publishing activity of, 126-28 Greece, military activity of prior to Berlin Congress, 39-40; and the Berlin Congress, 52-53; secret discussions of 1877 with Albanian nationalists, 55; boundaries settlement, 69-82; and Greco-Albanian union proposals, 82-86; and Macedonian movement, 201; Epirus political campaign of, 305-09; confederation proposals of, 309-10; rivalry with Italy over Epirus, 310-11, 313; relations with Austria-Hungary, 3 1 1 - 1 3 ; alleged secret treaty with Austria, 312-13, 3i3n; activities on eve of revolution, 446—47, 449 Greek Melkitic rite, 301 Greneville, Count, 239-40 Gucija, Ali Pasha, 35, 37, 61, 94, 100, 105 Guerini, Archbishop, 258-59 Guicciardini, Count Francesco, 131-32, 192, 249, 254, 260 GurEikuqi, Luigj, 412, 459 Hadji Ymer Eflendi, 106 Halil Bey, Colonel, 207 Hasan Pasha (Kalkandelen), 105 Hatt-l Humayun, 25, 89, 36in Hatt-i Sherif, 24, 25 Hima, Dervish, 268, 325, 363, 397 Hodja Vildan Effendi, 354, 373, 375 Hodo Pasha, 68 Hoi Vlamides Alvanoi, 308 Hoxhi, Koto, 133-34 Institute of Oriental Languages, 261 Institute Orientale di Napoli, 118, 220

INDEX Ipek resolutions, 195-97 Ippen, T., 173-74, 270-71, 284, 301 Ismail Hakki Bey, 153, 355 Istanbul alphabet, 275, 277, 370, 372f Istanbul committee (of notables), 46, 90 Istanbul nationalist club, 350-52, 387; secret committee of, 353-55; sends commission to Albania, 373-76 d'Istria, Dora, 118 Italo-Albanians, 6; early publishing activity of, 18; as originators of Albanian nationalist literature, 116—18; and nationalist movement, 215-37; number of, 2 i 7 n ; prepare to help revolution, 440—41 Italy, at Berlin Congress, 48-49; mediation of Turco-Montenegrin boundary issue, 61-62; and Greco-Albanian union proposals, 83, 85; schools founded by, 131; policy toward Italo-Albanians, 233-35; rivalry with AustriaHungary, 235-37; interest in Albania for Adriatic security, 24off; peaceful activities within Albania, 25811; and Austro-Russian agreements, 290; relations with Albanian pretenders, 324, 327; Albanian policy on eve of revolution, 440-44 Ivanaj, Nikolla, 230 Jakova, Don Gasper, see Gasper Jakova Merturi Jakova, Idris, 208 Jakova, Redjeb, 97 Janina, proposal for "armed meetings," 422-23 Jesuits, 130 Jubani, Zef, 121 Kadi Hasan Effendi, 75 Kadi Nazif Effendi, 97 Kalaja, Mehmed Effendi, 70 Kamber Effendi, 351 Kamil Effendi, 75 Kastriota Skenderbeg d'Auletta, D. Giovanni, 322, 324 Kemal (Vlora), Ismail, 139, 269, 336-37, 4 " , 429, 437; nationalist

493

ideals of, 182-85; relations with Italo-Albanians, 231-32; federation plan of, 3 1 3 - 1 4 ; and Prince Ghika, 330; considered as future governor-general, 331-32; on Bosnian annexation, 359; elected over Young Turk opposition, 360-61; on Turkey's future, 362; and Istanbul uprising, 363-64; endorses national autonomy policy, 400; political views in 1910, 402-03; and Gerche memorandum, 4 1 6 - 1 7 ; prepares for general revolution, 427; appeals to Austria-Hungary, 438-39, 444-45; proclaims independence of Albania, 458-63 Kiazim Bey, 79, 107 Kokojka, Mali, see Midhat Frasheri Kolasin massacre, 201-02, 293-94 Kolonja, Ali Pasha, 364 Kolonja, Nairn Bey, 193 Kolonja, Shahin, 155-56, 208, 230, 268, 320, 348, 361, 370; nationalist ideals of, 186-87; relations with Italo-Albanians, 232-33; schools program of, 368-69; autonomistic program of, 398 Konitza, Faik, 125-26, 128, 267-68, 370; 1899 educational survey of, 143-44; as publisher, 157-59, 347; nationalist ideals of, 180-82; and Ismail Kemal, 183-84; relations with Italo-Albanians, 230-31; and the pretender Aladro, 319-21; on Young Turk constitution, 344; urges brotherhood with Christians, 397; calls Vatra meetings, 453, 458 Kosovo, 1897 revolt in, 194; and Macedonian movement, 202-03; and Serbia, 292-94; and Young Turk uprising, 341-43, 345; ambivalence toward Young Turk regime, 348; anti-Austrian attitude in, 358; growing resistance to Young Turk regime, 391-93; 1910 revolt in, 405-06; Sultan Mehmed V's visit to, 418-19; revolutionary preparations in, 428-31 Kosturi, Idhomene, 147 Kosturi, Jovan, 210

494

INDEX

Kosturi, Spiro, 136, 210 Kosturi, Vani, 136 Koupitoris, Panayotis, 127 Kristoforidhi, Konstandin, 122-23 Kullurioti, Anastas, 126-27 Kultusprotektorat, 9, 257, 259, 263-64, 282-83, 285; early schools founded by, 129-31; jurisdiction over Uniates disputed, 300-02; political proposals for, 439-40 Kyrias, George, 207, 350, 353, 363, 367, 370 Lakshe, Anastas Avram, 146-47 languages, geographic boundaries as of 1877 defined, 31-32; in schools under Ottoman regime, 90 Latin alphabet, 372fr League of Prizren, see Albanian League Leybourne, G. W., 306 Liberty and Entente (HUrriyet ve Itilaf), 425, 434, 452 Libohova, Mufid, 361 Libohova, Neki Pasha, 107 Ligue pour la confederation balkanique, 314 Lippich, F., 31, 63; 1877 memorandvun on Albania, 238-39 London Protocol, 31 Lorecchio, Anselmo, 189, 216-17, 229, 234-35, 279-80, 321; proposes autonomous Albania, 223-25; and Faik Konitza, 230-31 Luarasi, Kristo P., 155, 230, 268 Luarasi, Petro Nini, 134-35, 137-38, 160, 213 Lumo Skendo, see Midhat Frasheri Lungro (Calabria) congress, 216-17 Macedonia, and the Berlin Congress, 49; revolutionary movement in, 200-04; reforms affect relations between Italy and AustriaHungary, 252; Albanian reactions to reforms in, 280-81; reforms lead to Serbian-Bulgarian treaty, 304-05 Mahmud Shefket Pasha, 405 Marchianò, Michele, 117 Marka Gjoni, 193 Marko, Thimi, 134, 136 Mzishkullore battle, 212

Mati, Djemal Pasha, 94 Mati, Hajredin Bey, 307 Mbrothesia printers, 155, 230, 366 Mehmed Ali, 317 Mehmed Reshad, Sultan of Egypt, 365 Melis, Ettore, 274 Merturi, Gasper Jakova, 229, 269, 327-28 Mesareja, Hasan Pasha, 193 Midhat Pasha, 183 Mirdite uprising of 1903, 199 Mitko, Thimi, 83-84, 121-22, 152, 153, 175 Mjeda, Dom Ndre, 141, 275-76, 370, 372, 439-40 Mjeda, Monsignor Ndre, 264, 394 Monastir, committee, 207-11; nationalist club, 350-55; alphabet congress of 1908, 370-73; congress of 1910, 386, 402; sounds call to revolution, 420-21 Montenegro, boundaries in Berlin Treaty, 49-51; boundaries settlement, 59-68; Russian interest in, 290-91; Italian policy toward, 291-92; and Serbia, 292-93; becomes refugee center, 408-10; role in 1911 uprisings, 4 1 3 - 1 5 ; role in revolution, 446, 448-51. See also King Nicholas Moslems, 4—13; early educational and cultural activities of, 1 6 - 1 7 ; Albanian, in Ottoman army and administration, 20-21; as a nationalist force, 96; Ottoman school policy for, 131-33; attitude toward Italo-Albanians, 234; Austro-Hungarian cultivation of, 270-71; Italian cultivation of, 282; on alphabet question, 375, 377, 383-84, 387 Muhtar Pasha, 70 Muraviev, 289-90 Miirzsteg agreements, 204, 207, 236, 252-53> 304 Mustafa Bey, 75, 107 Mustafa Nuri Pasha, 107 Muzakis, 6 Nagi, Nugi, 136, 208 Nago, Nikolla, 147-49, ' 5 ' . 321 Nafiz Effendi, 353 National Albanian League, 220

INDEX

495

National League for the Promotion Albanian League, 36; duality of of Albanian Schools, 352 Albanian policies, 95-97; reacNationalism, in reaction to San tions to Albanian League uprisStefano Treaty, 34; in Shkoder ing, 102-04; suppression of Almemorandum to Berlin Congress, banian uprising by, 104-07. See 45; as early desire for self-governalso Porte ment, 63-64; cultural history as inspiration for, 113-18; of Abdul Panariti, Qamil, 421-22 Frashëri, 165-66; of Naim Papazoglou, Dimitri, 325 Frasheri, 166; of Sami Frashëri, Pasetti, 243 166-69; 1901 Italian view of, 260 Peci, Sotir, 161, 268, 370 Negovani, Papa Kristo, 2o6f Pekmezi, G., 261, 277 newspapers: Aster-Yll, 310; CorPelasgian theory, 84, 114-15, 117, riere del Balcani, 230; Dielli, 347, 139, 154, 217 403; Drita, 146, 155-56, 187, 188, periodicals: Albania, 126, 157-59, 230, 369n; Kombi, 160-61, 178, 180-82, 187-88, 321, 347; Arbri 396; Lirija, 331, 347, 356, 360; i rii, 117; Diturija, 146, 347; Pellasgu, 154; Shkopi, 154, 356; Fjamuri Arberit, 117, 175; Shqiptari (Bucharest), 151 Kalendari Kombiar, 185-86; Nicholas, King (Prince), 291-93, Nazione Albanese, 216, 229, 321 328, 414, 418, 449; and Bosnian Perparimi society, 382 crisis, 357-58; negotiates refugees' Philhellenic Committee, 175 return, 408-10; asks Malissori to Phrearitis, K., 84 leave, 420 Poga, Petro, 146 Noli, Fan Stylian, 160, 162-63, Pojani, Orhan Bey, 136, 147, 210 Porte, April 1878 proclamation of, 179-80, 453 40-41; and Albanian League after Nosi, Lef, 380, 434 Berlin Congress, 56-58; and Montenegrin boundaries issue, Orthodox Christians, 5 - 1 3 ; early 59-68; and surrender of Dulcigno, educational and cultural activities 63-68; negotiations on Greek of, 17-18; during period of Tanziboundaries, 69, 71-72, 77, 81; mat, 19-20; earliest Albanian answers Janina memorandum on writings of, 112-13; Ottoman autonomy, 88; campaign against school policy for, 131-33; and Albanian League, 96-97; demands first Albanian schools, 137-38; Albanian hostages after uprising, emigration tendency of, 145; Al106; and question of Albanian banian church in Boston, 161—63; schools, 131-33; and growing Alnationalist feelings of, 174—75; banian resistance to centralizaand question of political protection, 19iff; attitudes toward tion, 179-80; and Bulgarian-SerItalian and Austro-Hungarian acbian rivalry, 296; mass convertivities in Albania, 281-82; grants sions to Uniatism, 296-303. See also crypto-Christians amnesty to 1911 revolutionaries, Osman Pasha, 199 4 1 5 - 1 7 ; concessions at Tepelene, Ottoman Committees of Union, 345 423-24; dissolves parliament, Ottoman Democratic Party, 401 433-34. See also Ottoman empire Ottoman empire, invasions of AlPrenk Bib Doda, 38, 68, 190, 199, bania by, 3-4; timars system of, 372, 449-50; deported, 99-100; 4 - 5 ; summary history of early rule appeals to Austria-Hungary, 439 over Albania, 2 1 - 2 7 ; changing Prishtina, Hasan, 361, 425-06, 428, administrative divisions as policy 433, 441; prepares for general of, 25-27, 89, 200-01; war with revolution, 427; fourteen points Russia, 31; early attitude toward of, 435-36

496

INDEX

Prizren League, see Albanian League Prizren, meeting of 1878, 36-38; 1884 tax revolt in, 191; 1897 clashes in, 193-94 Prizreni, Mejderiz Omer Effendi, 37 Prokopios, Archbishop, 298 publications, early, 18; emergence of patriotic literature, 123-28; pseudonymous, 128; first in new alphabets, 142; of Bucharest emigres, 147, 151-52; of Sofia emigres, 155-56; Austro-Hungarian interest in, 277—78; sup­ pression by Young Turk regime, 407. See also newspapers, peri­ odicals Puglia, 265-66 Qirias, Gjerasim D.,

136

railways, Italian proposals for, 251, 255; Austro-Hungarian proposals for, 255; Serbian proposal for, 303-04; Russian proposal for, 304 Rauf Effendi, 106 Redjeb Hodja, 353 Redjeb Nureddin, 385 religions, geographic distribution under Ottoman rule, 7-13; Turk­ ish policy of confusing national­ ities and, 176 Riza, Colonel, 373 Russia, war with Ottoman empire, 31; San Stefano Treaty goals of, 33; on Montenegrin boundaries issue, 67; on Greek boundaries issue, 81; attitude toward Al­ banian autonomy, 93; and Macedonian movement, 201, 204; effect on Albanians of 1905 revo­ lution in, 205-06; Balkan interests of, 288-91; protest to Porte re­ garding Uniate conversions, 302; proposes Reval reforms, 340; con­ cern over 1911 uprisings, 414—15; and Ismail Kemal, 416η; activi­ ties on eve of revolution, 445, 448-49, 457

Sabaheddin, Prince, 336 Salonica nationalist club, 364-65

350-52,

San Giuliano, Marquis A. di,

250,

254, 260, 275, 442-44

San Stefano Treaty, terms of, 31-33; Albanian reaction to, 33-35 Sanminiatelli, Count Donato, 248, 250-51, 283

Saviors of the Nation, 430, 432 Sayyad Jamaluddin, 96 Scanderbeg, see Skenderbeg Schir0, Giuseppe, 117-18; 216,

220,

222-23, 322

schools, Turkish, 16-17; Greek, 17-18; Albanian, 88; interde­ pendence with Albanian language, 129; founded by Kultusprotektorat, 129-31; founded by Italy, 131; in Porte policy, 131—33; as competitive interest of Italy and Austria-Hungary, 257—61; founded by Serbs, 293; founded during Uniate conver­ sions, 297-98. See also Albanian schools Seferi, Idris, 436 Sejfedin, Dr., 207 Selaheddin Bey, 351 Semseddin Sami Bey, see Sami Frasheri Senkevich, I. G., 186, 369η, 373-74 Serbia, and the Berlin Congress, 49; and Montenegro, 292-93; suspi­ cions of Austro-Hungarian mo­ tives, 294-95; railway proposal of, 303-04; activities on eve of revo­ lution, 445-51 Shejh Hutbi, 70 Shiroka, Filip, 152 Shkoder, armed assembly of 1901, 198; pro-Turkish bias of, 348-50; distrust of Young Turk regime, 392; armed outbreaks over census and taxes, 393-95; 191 ο revolt in, 406; 1911 outbreak in, 411—12 Shkoder Mountain Committee, 15; League Committee of, 38-39; Berlin Congress memorandum from, 43-46; growth after Berlin Congress, 56; efforts to defend Dulcigno, 65-68; collects funds in south, 76; and Epirus issue, 81-82

INDEX

Shoqëria e Zezë për Shpëtim, see Black Society for Salvation Sina, Thanas, 135 Sinjë memorandum, 432, 436 sipahis, 18-19 Skenderbeg, George Kastrioti, 3-4; Code of, 15; extolled in song, 116; in nationalist literature, 118; growth of legend about, 123; flag of, 126; lineage claims to, 319, 321-22, 324 Società Dante Alighieri, 248, 25051, 260-61 Società per le Missioni Italiane all'Estero, 264 Società Nazionale Albanese, 177, 216-19, 220, 274 Society of Istanbul (1879), 145-47 Society for the Printing of Albanian Writings, r i g - 2 i , 140, 142 Sokoli, Jusuf Aga, 65 Sotiri, Pandeli, 134-35, 146 Starova, Ibrahim (Temo), see Ibrahim (Edhem) Temo Tahsini, Hasan, 139 Tanzimat, 25; as continuing basis in 1889 for taxation, 192 Tashko, Thanas, 154 Temo, Ibrahim (Edhem), 335-38, 401 Tepelena, Ali Pasha, 21-23 Tetova (Kalkandelen), Esad Pasha, 94 Tetova, Sheh Mustafa, 37, 57 Tevfik Pasha, 193-94 Thessaly, 52, 70, 75, 78 Thopia, Karl, 3 timars system, 4 - 5 ; conversion to ^iftliks, 19 Tittoni, 253-54, 856 Toçi, Terenc, 412 Toptani, Abdul, 437 Toptani, Esad, 361 Toptani, Fazil, 437-38 Toptani, Murad Bey, 193, 209, 271 Topulli, Bajo, 207-10, 213, 348 Topulli, Qergis, 210-12 Tosks, 14 trade, as competitive interest of Italy and Austria-Hungary, 265-66 Trank Spiro Bey, see Faik Konitza

497

Treaty of Berlin, 190, 224, 3o6n Triple Alliance, 240-42, 247, 255 Trochsi (Troksi), Monsignor, 287 Turgut Pasha, 96-97, 99, 405-06, 412, 4 1 5 - 1 6 ; suppresses Albanian uprising of 1881, 103-07; recall of, 419 Turkhan Pasha, 178 Turtulli, Foqion, 153 Uniates, 6, 179, 296-303 Union and Progress, 335, 338-39; early attitude toward Albanian nationalist clubs, 347-49; reaction to Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, 355-56; becomes regular political party, 363; on alphabet question, 385; on role of Islam, 396; develops "national" policy, 400 University of Palermo, 221 University o£ Rome, 235 Vahan Effendi, 69 Vasa Pasha Effendi, 57, 58, 90-91, 139, 169-70 Venosta, Visconti, 244, 246-47 Veqilharxhi, Naum, 121, 139; in Rumania, 145 Vesel Pasha, 191-92 Villa-Frasheri, Nuri, 187 Vlakhs, 314-15, 325 Vlora, Ekrem, 453-54 VIora, Syreja, 279 Vokshi, Sulejman, 37, 97-98 Vreto, Jan, 139, 145, 152 Vrioni, Mehmed Ali Bey, 73, 107 Vrioni, Ymer Bey, 107 Vruho, Jani, 154, 429 Xhibali, see Shkoder Mountain Committee Ypi, Abdul Bey, 354, 375, 379, 392 Young Turks, constitution, 213, 343-44; uprising of, 340-44; early relations with Albanian nationalists, 344-52; abet anti-Austrian and anti-Greek sentiment, 355-58; in 1908 election, 359-62; emergence of Liberals {Ahrar) among, 362; growing hostility toward, 363-65; depose Abdul

498

INDEX

Young Turks {cont.) Hamid, 364-65; agitation against national alphabet and schools, 376-90; enact "law on bands," 395-96; enact "law on associations," 401; suppress Albanian newspapers, 407; make concessions to refugees in Montenegro,

408—10; dissolve parliament, 425; and 1912 elections, 426-27; forced out of cabinet, 431-32 Zaimis, Alexander, 195 Zavalani, Fehim Bey, 207, 209, 353, 407 Zeka, Hadji Molla, 194, 198, 271