The 1974 General Elections in Malaysia 9789814380072

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The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

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The 1974 General Elections in Malays1 a A Post-Mortem

by

Chandrasekar an Pillay

Occasional Paper No. 25 Institute of Southeast Asian Stud1es Price: S$3 . 00

FOREWORD It is seldom that one gets a chance to r e ad a contemporary account of a general election in Southeast Asia from the pen of a local, home-grown political scientist. From this standpoint, Mr. Chandrasekaran Pillay's The 19 ? 4 General Elect i on in Malaysia: A Po s t Mort em is all the more welcome, even though it makes no pretence to being a detailed analysis of voting patterns, party performances, and so on. In wishing Mr. Chandrasekaran Pillay and his paper all the best,it is clearly understood that responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in the work that follows rests exclusively with Mr. Chandrasekaran Pillay, and his int~rpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or pol1cy of the Institute itself or its supporters. 7 November 1974

Kernial Singh Sandhu Director

This post-mortem of the 1974 General Elections in Malaysia does not pretend to be a detailed study of voting patterns and party performances. Rather , the f ocus is on general electoral trends and their relationship to the political deve lopment of the country. Description of the Results The elections of 24th August 1974 turned out to be a massive victory for the Barisan Nasional (BN) (see Table 1) A coalition of nine political parties from both Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak, 1 it managed to capture 135 out of the 154 seats in the Malaysian Parliament. 2 This means that the BN . is much stronger today at Federal level than the Alliance was in 19 59, at the beginning of the First Malayan Parliament, or in 1964, at the beginning of the First Malaysian Parl1ament, or in 1969, at the beginning of the Second Malaysian Parliament. 3

1 'Ihe parties are the lhited Malays Naticnal Organizaticn (t..Mm), the Malaysian Otinese Association (M::A), the Malaysian Indian Ccr¥Jress (MIC) - all part of the Alliance, Peninsular Malaysia together with the Partai Islam (PAS), the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) , the People's Progressive Party (PPP), the Sabah Alliance , the Sarawak Alliance and the Sar.:Mak Ulited Peq>le's Party (SUPP). 2 The actual breakd::Mn of BN seats in Parliarent is as follONs: t..mo M::A MIC

PAS Gerakan PPP Sabah Alliance Sarawak Alliance-SUPP Total

61 20 4

14 4 1 16 15 135

~tails

en the 1959 elections see K.J . Ratnam, Corrununalism Proaess in Malaya , lhiversity of Malaya Press, Politiaal and the

3 For

Kuala IJ.mpur, 1965; for the 1964 electicns see K.J . Ratnam and R.S. Milne, The Malayan Parliamentary Eleation of 1964 , lhiversity of Malaya Press , Singapore, 1967; for the 1969 elections see R.K. Vasil, The Malaysian General Eleation of 1969 , OXford thiversity Press, Singapore, 1972.

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Table 1: The Party Situaticn in Parliarrent and State Assemblies after the 1974 General Elections Pekemas

BN

Parliarrent State Asseni>lies Jchore Kedah Kelantan Malacca N. Senbilan Pahang Penang Perak Perlis Selangor Tl::engganu Sabah* Sarawak Total

135

9

31 24 36 16 21 32 23 31 12

1 1

30

1

SNAP

154

9

1

.!2 26

36 20

4

24 32

3

2 11

l

1

1

2

27 32

l

23

1

18

27 4L

12 33 28 32

48

18

30

345

Independents Total

5

392

• Elections held previoosly. The stupendous triumph of the BN becomes even more significant if one looks at the election results ~n ~he various states. For the first time since 1959, the coal~t1 o n in control of the Federal Government is also ~n charge of each and every state in the Federation. In 1959 as a case in point, the Partai Islam (PAS), then known as ~he Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP), controlled Kelan~an and Trengganu; in 1964, Singapore was under the People's Action Party (PAP), while Kelantan continued to be ruled by PAS; in 1969 apart from PAS's continued dom~nance 1n Kelantan , Penang also fell to the Opposit 1on - the Gerakan Rakyat Malays1a raman1am who replaced Tun v. T. Sarrbanthan and h1s group. Smce takmg over 1 the new leadersh1p has o~aruzed an l.lrp)rtant ·•eo::nanics semmar' and reorganized the pany at certain levels.

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essential for safeguarding Chinese interests in the post1969 political env ironment . If anything, Tun Razak 's oftrepeated warning to the community that failure to e le ct the BN's Chinese candidates would result in an all -Malay government must have convinced a lot of Chinese voters about the danger of reje cting the coalition. In Tun Razak ' s words, "They Lthe Chinese and Indians] mus t vote n on-Malay candidates from the National Front, otherwise, they will have no representatives in the government which will be established .• . Even without non-Malay cand1dates from the Barisan Nasional we can establish a g overnment." ' ~ It 1s significant that Datuk Lee San Choon, the Acting MCA President responded to the warning by urging the Chinese to " vote Chinese who can play a role in government . " 1 f> And , to repeat an earl1er point, it was with this purpose in mind that the Chinese supported the MCA - the only Chinese-based party 1n the BN with a long history of relationsh i p with the Malay el1te . The PPP While the MCA won support to enable it to perform this role, the PPP was turned down - in spite of its newlyforged ties w1th UMNO. The PPP lost 3 out of 4 Parliamentary seats and retained just 2 state constituencies in t he Ipoh area, "the headquarters of the PPP and its birthplac e." !' There are two possible reasons for the party's defeat . Firstly, given its geographically restricted appeal and the small number of candidates it f1elded, the PPP was not regarded by the Chinese as a s1gn1ficant factor in ensuring commun1ty representation in a Malay - led government . In other words, the Chinese electorate could with some confidence reject PPP candidates without sacrificing the opportunity for influencing publ1 c policy from within . And apparently, the Chinese voters had an important reason for reJeCtlng the party . The PPP was seen as a party that had betrayed Chinese 1nterests by jo1ning UMNO and the BN . This sense of betrayal can only be understood agains t the back ground of PPP pol1cies and postures in the pre-coallLlOn era . Easily the most vocal advocate of non-Malay r1ghts, the PPP was vehemently opposed to the spec1al posit1o n o f the Malays and the status of Malay as the sole off1c1al language. Thus, while the Chinese were prepared to s u pport

15

See UtW>an

16 Ibid.

I

Ma L~s ia ,

8 August 1974.

16 August 1974.

17 See St r aits Times (Kuala Lumpur), 19 August 1974 .

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the MCA because of the political advantages inherent in its time-honoured relationship with the Malay powerholders, they were not prepared to tolerate the voZte face of the PPP. However, the switch to the BN alone does not explain the party • s defeat. It is :re1.iably learnt from various sources that in recent years top party leaders have been neglecting their constituencies. In fact,Datuk S.P. Seenivasagam, the President of the party, admitted, "that he had not visited his constituency in the last few years It is no use driving around to show my face when I can stay in the office and perform my responsibilities to the people." ' 8 The Gerakan Now, if 'betrayal' is the explanation in Ipoh , how does one account for the Gerakan's commendable performance in Penang, since the party, originally an opposition group, had also joined the BN? 19 The Gerakan won 4 out of 7 Parliamentary seats and 13 out of 18 state seats contested. Three out of the 4 Parliamentary and 11 out of the 13 state, victories were from Penang. 20 In contrast, its 2 Parliamentary candidates in the Federal Territory and 1 in Selangor lost their seats. 2 1 From my own investigations in Penang and elsewhere there was, undeniably, an undercurrent of resentment towards the Gerakan for joining the BN. For two reasons, this feeling did not manifest itself in the voting in Penang. Firstly, however strong the resentment, there was an even stronger sense of apprehension about voting out the Gerakan and voting in the DAP. The May 13th incident was largely responsible for this. For in a real sense it was the decline of the Alliance in Selangor and the possibility of a DAP-led government which sparked off the May 13th riots in the wake of

18 Ibid. , :>1 August 1974. 19

'!be Gerakan was the first Opposition party in Pen.insular Malaysia to join the Alliance in a coalitioo. '!his took place in early 1972.

20 The 4th Parlianent.aJ:y win was in Taiping, Perak ,while the J:emaining 2 state victories were in Changkat Jering, Perak and Tikan Batu, Iters in the Jelutong Parl~CJirentary Coostituency.

31 See Pekemas election manifesto 1 August 1974.

1n

Strai ts

T~m~o

tKuala Lumpur),

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these victories were due to the personal popularity of the candidates. 32 As a party, Pekemas was decisively rejected by the electorate on the 24th of August. What were the reasons for the party's annihilation? In a situation where certain BN candidates were demolished by the DAP because they had 'betrayed' Chinese interests, a party like Pekemas without any strong ethnic attraction could not be expected to do well. Besides, the party had neither the men nor the organization nor the energy to mount a powerful crusade . As an example of this, it was only in May 1974, that one of the party's leaders had asked whether, "Pekemas was going to be a serious political organization or would it maintain politics as a part-time hobby." 33 On the whole, Pekemas conveyed the impression of being a party of "has:..beens" 3 .. -an impression confirmed by the voters. PSRM Now the Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaya also failed to live up to its own high expectations. The vast majority of its candidates stood in rural constituencies- a ·good portion of them in Pahang, Kelantan and Trengganu . PSRM in fact made a special bid to capture the state government in Trengganu where it fielded its men in 27 out of the 28 constituencies . As we have seen the party did not win a single state or Parliamentary seat in Trengganu or anywhere else in Malaysia for that matter. From the point of view of the number of votes secured, however, the party fared better than, say, Pekemas. For instance, "66% of Pekemas State Assembly and 63% of its Parliament aspirants lost their deposits. For Partai Rakyat 1 the figures are 38 and 43% respectively." 35

32 Dr. Tan Chee I plus votes.

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Sarawak In Sarawak , election s were held for both the 40 State Assembl y seats and the 24 Parliam entary constitu encies. The BN consisti ng of the Parti Pesaka-B umiputra Bersatu (PPBB) and the Sarawak United Peo ple's Party (SUPP) conteste d all the seats. Its main rival was the Sarawak Nationa l Party (SNAP). The most remarka ble feature of the election s was of course SNAP's commend able perform ance. It won 18 state and 9 Parliam entary constitu encies. A number of factors explain the party's perform ance, the most salient of which are mention ed in this analysi s. The majority of SNAP victorie s were in Iban constitu encies . The !bans are the largest single communi ty in Sarawak and are numeric ally and cultura lly the most signific ant element within the indigeno us populat ion of the state . As the dominan t factor within the indigeno us populat1 on, the Ibans resented what they perceive d as the politic al pre-emin ence of the numeric ally smaller Muslim- indigeno us communi ty made up largely of Melanau s and Malays. For them, the ascendan cy of Datuk Abdul Rahman Ya'kub, the Chief Ministe r, himself a Melanau -Muslim , synboliz ed this dominan ce. It was felt that Iban interes ts were not adequat ely represen ted in the state governm ent. The merger between Pesaka, an Iban party, and Bumiput ra, an indigeno us-Musl im party, in early 1973, was interpre ted in certain quarter s as an attempt by Datuk Rahman, the Bumiput ra leader, to contro l and overwhe lm the !ban communi ty through the assistan5 ce of InciPesaka and its leader Tan Sri Temengg ong Jugah.~ which dentall y, it was the Pesaka compone nt in the PPBB suffered heavies t losses at the hands of SNAP. What reinforc ed !ban resent ~e nt was the close relation ship between the Sarawak State Governm ent and the indigeno us-Musl im dominat ed Central Governm ent in Kuala Lumpur. The tone and tenor of the 1974 election campaign revealed that a large number of !bans perceive d their own interes ts this relation ship as inimica l to 6 explain s S~Jll.:!?•s This ~ ng. and to Sarawak 's well-bei

45 Tan Sri Terrengg0l¥;J Jugah, the traditicn al learer of the !bans, did not take part in the elections . It is s~gested that his retiremen t fran polit1cs was one of the minor reascns for the downfall of Parti Pesaka. 46 Cbaervat im made by students studying the Sarawak electicns .

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effective election slogan, "Sarawak for Sarawakians." 47 If !bans responded to these slogans it was partly because SNAP had the services of a number of able , welleducated professionals who had joined state politics in the post-1969 era. People like Leo Moggie , Daniel Tajem and Dr. Jawie Masing would be among these new articulators of indigenous non-Muslim interests. 48 However Iban resentment does not explain all of SNAP's victories. It must be remembered that the party also secured a few Chinese dominant constituencies at the expense of the SUPP. Part of the explanation is, of course, SUPP ' s joining the Sarawak Alliance in a coalition government immediately after the 1969-70 elections. 49 The move was seen as a betrayal o f Chinese interests in much the same way as the PPP's alignment with UMNO had disillusioned the party's traditional supporters. It is very likely that SNAP which has always had a degree of Chinese support made same gains from this disillusionment. Of course, Chinese disillusionment was by no means confined to SUPP's action. A major Chinese grievance which the Datuk Rahman Government had failed to resolve was related to the question of land ownership. Chinese unemployment and under-employment were, in many ways , connected to this problem - and so was Chinese frustration with the government. All said and done, h01t1ever, it was still the BN that retained control of the state. The fear that the Central Government would not cooperate with a SNAP State Government and conse~uently "Sarawak would collapse and face a bleak future," 5 must have had a significant influen ce upon the

47 Datuk Rahman attad