Thailand's Two General Elections in 1992: Democracy Sustained 9789814376242

Citation preview

THAILAND'S TWO GENERAL ELECTIONS IN 1992

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the multi-faceted problems of stability and security, economic development, and political and social change. The Institute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board ofTrustees comprising nominees from the Singapore Government, the National University of Singapore, the various Chambers of Commerce, and professional and civic organizations. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer.

THAILAND'S TWO GENERAL ELECTIONS IN 1992 Democracy Sustained

Surin Maisrikrod

Research Notes and Discussions Paper No. 75 INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES 1992

Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Road Singapore 0511 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. © 1992 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the author and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of' the Institute or its supporters.

Cataloguing in Publication Data Surin Maisrikrod. Thailand's two general elections in 1992 : democracy sustained. (Research notes and discussions paper I Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; no. 75) I. Elections--Thailand. 2. Democracy--Thailand. 3. Thailand--Politics and government. I. Title. II. Series. DSSO! 1596 no. 75 1992 sls92-l 00832 ISBN 981-3016-52-3 ISSN 0129-8828

T~peset. by International Typesetters Printed m Singapore by Vetak Services

CONTENTS

Preface

vi

I

Introduction

II

The Main Actors: Party Profiles

III

The Roles of the Generals in the 22 March General Election

21

IV

The May Incident: General Suchinda's Fall and New Democratic Inputs

26

V

The 13 September Election: Choosing the Right Prime Minister

40

VI

Cleaning Up the Election: The New Election Law, PollWatch, and the Media

50

4

VII The Chuan Leekpai Government and Its Policies

55

VIII Conclusion: Into the Future

60

Notes

62

Appendix

64

PREFACE

This paper documents significant events that occurred during the 22 March election, the May crisis, and the 13 September election. It also examines the political significance of those events in the context of Thailand's political development - or underdevelopment. The latest general election in September was part of the chain of political events since the military coup against the civilian government of Prime Minister Chatitchai Choonhavan in February 1991. The coup led by General Suchinda Kraprayoon, the then Chief of the Army, set the stage for the 22 March election, which led to the military "May crackdown" on the demonstrators, the dissolution of the House of Representatives, and eventually the September election, the country's nineteenth since 1932, when parliamentary democracy was first adopted. The September election did bring about a democratic government. But that was only a part of the whole political picture of Thailand. The democratic government of Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai is one side of the coin, in which the military remains in control of the other half. Indeed, the struggle for dominance between the military and a democratically established civilian rule is still the most important feature in contemporary Thai politics. The military was the most powerful political force during the 1950s and 1960s. With the adoption of Western-style economic development in 1961 by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, and with the large-scale introduction of Americanization to the Thai educational and bureaucratic systems- which saw a great number of students going to the United States - the country gradually produced other forces in the society, notably the intellectuals and, to a limited extent, the modem business class. These new forces which began to be more visible in the 1970s are democratically oriented. The weakening of the military institution and the strengthening of the intellectuals converged in the dramatic event of 14 October 1973 when a studentled uprising was launched against military rule. The 1973 incident which toppled

Preface

vii

the regime of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachom was the first dramatic challenge to the power of the military. A zero-sum struggle between the military and democratic forces continued through the 1970s. And by the 1980s the so-called "half-leafed" democracy was established; General Prem Tinsulanonda, the then Chief of the Army, held the military half of the political power as prime minister, while politicians got the other half, surrounding the General as parliamentarians and ministers. The endresult of the "half-leafed" democracy was the steady growth of the parliamentary system and the economy without interruption by a military take-over. Prem, who was a non-elected prime minister, stabilized the country under such a system between 1980 and 1988. Along with the unprecedented economic growth during the 1980s, more social forces such as the new business class emerged with a new sense of urgency to establish a firmer democracy in Thailand. Then came the period of "full-fledged" democracy in 1988 when the country had the first elected prime minister, Chatichai Choonhavan, in twelve years. Chatichai symbolized a new maturity of democracy in Thailand, although the military's power had by no means been marginalized. Having waited in the wings, the military saw it opportune to take back what it considered was its rightful hold of power when the public was dissatisfied with the Chatichai government because of widespread corruption within its ranks. The corruption did provide justification to the military to seize power from Chatichai by force. But the military, despite a promise to return democracy to the people in the form of an election in March, could not hide its real motive of wanting to once again be an all-powerful political force. That led the military to send its own man - General Suchinda - to assume premiership after the March election. The other forces spearheaded by the so-called "middle class" resisted such a move, and the May crackdown was the answer from the military. However, the military lost, and the September election was held, bringing in one of the country's most democratic governments. 1 thank Mike Yeong, a fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), for assisting me in my study trip to Thailand during the March election, and ISEAS for sponsoring my study trips to Bangkok, both in March and September 1992. I would also like to express my gratitude to those who granted me interviews and provided me with invaluable material for the writing of this monograph.

I

INTRODUCTION

By midnight of 13 September 1992, Sunday- the day when Thailand's nineteenth general election was held - euphoria reigned the country when it was clear that the pro-democracy parties had won a simple majority in the House of Representatives and would be able to form the next government. The four so-called "angelic" parties- Democrat, New Aspiration, Palang Dharma, and Solidarity- together commanded 185 seats out of 360 seats in the Lower House. The Democrat Party won the most number of seats, 79, while the New Aspiration Party, the Palang Dharma, and Solidarity won 51, 47, and 8, respectively. The rest of the seats went to the most "satanic" party, Chart Thai, with 77 seats, and to Chart Pattana, 60 seats, Social Action, 22, Seritham, 8, Muan Chon, 4, Prachakom Thai, 3, and Rassadom, 1 (see Appendix Table 1). The voter tum-out was the highest in the history of Thailand's elections - 62 per cent nation-wide. This snap election- within a period of six months- was held under very special political circumstances. It was held as a means to break a political impasse caused by a division between the pro-democracy and the pro-military forces following the election in March and the military crackdown on the demonstrators in May. The election was indeed a referendum to deny the military outright involvement in politics. The military, after having seized power from a civilian government in February 1991, indicated that it was not hungry for power by appointing a well-respected former technocrat, Anand Panyarachun, as prime minister. But that was contradicted by a military-constructed constitution that effectively put the military in firm control of politics; the military-appointed senate was given overwhelming power, and a non-elected person was eligible to assume the premiership. The public's fear of the military dominating politics was confirmed when General Suchinda, the then Supreme Commander and Commanderin-Chief of the Army and a key person in the military junta, took up the premiership in early April without having stood in the election, despite his promise late in 1991 that he would not accept the top job.

2

Thailand's Two General Elections in 1992

Suchinda's going back on his words immediately fuelled public outcry and his premiership was immediately met with public protests, beginning with a fast by a well-known former Member of Parliament, Chalard Vorachad, who demanded Suchinda's resignation, on grounds that the General had violated a democratic principle. The attacks on Suchinda came from virtually all sectors of society, and huge public protests were held between 7 and II May. The protests, which drew hundreds of thousands of people from all walks of life and clearly put pressure on Suchinda, were called off when the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Arthit Urairat, after consultation with the government parties, promised to amend the 1991 Constitution to disqualify a non-elected person from assuming the premiership. This was meant then to provide General Suchinda with an honourable way to step down. But soon leaders of key Suchinda coalition partners contended that the promise of the Speaker of the House was not binding on their parties. The protests were again held in response to what was seen as Suchinda's arrogance on 17 May which led to the bloody military crackdown on the demonstrators between 18 and 20 May. The King personally intervened in the conflict, and this averted further bloodshed. At least fifty-two protesters were killed, several hundred were injured, and some 200 were missing. By the time General Suchinda was seen on television (along with Chamlong) kneeling down in front of King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who asked him to end the violence, the General was already politically crippled. His coalition partners had begun withdrawing their support for him, and not long after that Suchinda resigned, accepting responsibility, although he pardoned himself and others involved in the bloody crackdown as well as in the protests by issuing a last-minute blanket decree. Anand Panyarachun was for the second time brought in, on 10 June, as prime minister, and he was entrusted with reprimanding the key military figures who were involved in the violence against the protesters and dissolving the House and holding a new general election. The 13 September election was probably one of the most memorable and exciting chapters in Thailand's political history. It was indeed a breathtaking event in the light of the aftermath of the political turmoil between April and May, which divided the country's political parties into the pro-democracy and the pro-military camps. The stake was particularly high because a victory on each side would have great implications over the future of the country's political system. Given the strong public mood for democracy, a victory of the so-called "satanic" parties could have triggered another public outcry- at least in Bangkok. The "May scar" that was left on the face of Thailand's political history will probably never fade away, but the victory of the pro-democracy parties have at least put Thailand in tune with the civilized world of democracy, respect for human rights, and a depoliticized military. The victory of the pro-democracy parties at least could

Introduction

3

serve as a consolation that the blood and tears that flowed down on Ratchadamnoen A venue in the heart of Bangkok were indeed worth something. A new government was formed in late September 1992, with the leader of the Democrat Party, Chuan Leekpai, as prime minister. The rise of the Democrat is in tune with the times, for the party is best known for fighting military dictatorship, and for being a strong promoter of democracy. Chuan, at fifty-four, having been in politics for more than twenty years, is known as a champion of democracy who has never wavered on the bumpy path to promote parliamentary democracy. Chuan, who often says "there is no short-cut to democracy", has been maintaining that democracy based on an honest election is Thailand's best political choice. He is now set to prove that. Chuan is now entrusted with the additional burden of proving that a democratically elected government can bring prosperity and well-being and social order to society. He has put together in his Cabinet a team of well-respected economic managers to look after the growth and distribution of wealth of the country. He has also moved to streamline the military and bureaucrats who have been enjoying far too many privileges and try to make them more accountable to the people. Chuan also aims to develop further the parliamentary system through strengthening the political party system by providing subsidies to political parties. On the foreign policy front, Chuan also wants to make Thailand more credible internationally and play a more active role in regional affairs. Needless to say, Prime Minister Chuan has more problems than solutions on his hands. Public expectations are very high, while the country is still faced with a great deal of bottle-necks. Nevertheless, the September election has produced better results than the March election did with regard to the development of democracy and political stability. Because what Thailand is witnessing after the September election is inseparable from the May incident and the March election, this paper provides more or less equal weight to the three events.

II

THE MAIN ACTORS: PARTY PROFILES

This chapter brings into view important political actors, particularly political parties, in the Thai political scene since the 22 March election. Between the March and September elections, there were some significant changes with regard to major political parties. First, a general picture of the political parties in Thailand is presented, followed by a discussion of a number of political parties that played major roles in the two elections. If the political development of a country can be judged by the maturity of political parties of that country, Thailand would rank relatively low. The Thai party system has not been able to serve as a strong base on which a democratic system can develop. Nevertheless, considerable development has already taken place in the party system since the 1970s. Weaknesses in the Thai political party system can be seen in at least two areas. First, in terms of their organization, political parties in Thailand are peer-based rather than people-based. That is, parties are not so much a mass party based on certain shared political beliefs as a forum where political friends gather for specific, short-term interests. Because of this characteristic, the party base is narrow and shallow. Also, this makes partyswitching a common thing. Causes of splits can be personal rather than ideological, or a change of party may take place when a switchover brings about better political opportunities. A politician who has switched party would generally not feel guilty about it, and some have switched to more than three parties over the course of two general elections; yet they continue to get elected and can hold up their heads. This situation is not alarming especially when party-switching is done on the basis of loyalty to friends. But it damages the political system when politicians can be literally "bought off' by a wealthier party, which shows that politicians are after money rather than political programmes. Secondly, in terms of political programmes. Thai parties are interest-based rather than policy-based. "Interest" here is rather narrowly defined, meaning the interests of their constituents, or interests of politicians themselves. It is more of

The Main Actors: Party Profiles

5

a personal or local interest rather than interest in a broader, national sense. For example, a mediocre candidate who builds a road into a village is more likely to get elected than one who is intelligent and has long-term policies which would benefit the country as a whole, including that particular village. Generally, this "getting the goodies back to one's own home" is not in itself damaging to the political system. Problems arise, however, when this "doing-good-for-constituents" tactic is abused and has practically led to what is known as "vote-buying" in politics. Although the handling out of "goodies" to voters is not always socially wrong, this practice has changed the nature of politics in general and voting behaviour in particular. It has led voters to become narrow-minded and assess candidates largely on how much tangible projects- often out of the candidates' own pockets- have come from them. And if this trend persists, in the end only the rich will get elected to the nation's highest policy-making body. This is damaging for the political system in the long run. However, various legal and administrative attempts to safeguard the political system, as well as the increasing political maturity of the people, have enabled the political party system to continue developing over the past decade. There have been two most important attempts to develop the system in Thailand. First, a law was enacted in 1981 that requires candidates to run under a party banner. This is to prevent independent candidates who act as "floating" Members of Parliament (MPs) who swing their support from one party to another, thus creating political instability. The same law also attempts to limit the number of political parties by stipulating that a party must field at least one-third of the total number of seats in the House of Representatives in order to qualify it for participation in the election. And a party is automatically dissolved if none of its candidates gets elected. The measure has resulted in a reduction of the number of political parties -which at one time in the 1970s numbered fifty-six- because it makes it more difficult for small groups of people to form a political party. The measure has also made it impossible for parties that would like to concentrate their activities in certain localities only. Secondly, recent Thai Constitutions since the late 1970s have also made it an automatic dismissal for a member of the House of Representatives if he resigns from his party. This measure has prevented the defection of MPs during a parliamentary session, which in the past had destabilized the government. Furthermore, political parties themselves have in recent years paid greater attention and devoted more resources to party organization and management, hoping to develop themselves into more professionally run and mass-based organizations. For example, parties have in recent years given more consideration to their office management, such as having permanent headquarters, hiring permanent professional staff to manage party finances, collect data, and do

6

Thailand's Two General Elections in 1992

political research, and so on. Many parties have also given emphasis to the setting up of party branches in provinces and institutionalizing a system to maintain old members and recruit new ones. Generally speaking, the momentum to enhance the development of political parties has begun, although Thailand still has a long way to go before broad-based, policy-oriented, and well-managed political parties are the norm. The birth and death of Thai political parties are still a part of Thailand's political phenomena. During the 22 March election, there emerged a military party - Samakkhi Tham Party- which played an important part in giving rise to the May crisis. The party no longer existed in the 13 September election, but it is important to discuss its brief existence because it is tied in to what happened in May and September. At the same time, two other parties - Chart Pattana and Seritham - were born just before the September election.

1. Samakkhi Tham Party (STP) Established in April 1991, Samakkhi Tham (Unity Justice) won the largest number of parliamentary seats - 79 altogether - in the 22 March election. Thiti Nakornthab, who left the Air Force to become a successful businessman, was the architect of the party. The party was set up to support General Suchinda Kraprayoon as prime minister, although the latter did not admit publicly that he was behind the formation of the party. Given its close links with the military and with access to immense financial resources, the STP quickly rose to the limelight. The emergence of the STP in the Thai political scene before the March election was likened to a bombshell in a wooden house. It intensified the political atmosphere and the STP became the focus of subsequent political debates. As expected, the STP became the core in the Suchinda coalition government. The fact that the STP had projected itself right from the outset as one closely linked with the military establishment and therefore having a good chance of forming a government attracted politicians from other parties. This was the primary tactic of the party because in the context of Thai politics, being in the government camp has always been the top priority of politicians. Often, ensuring that it stays on the side of the government overshadows long-term political objectives. Right from the beginning, the STP aimed to control northeastern Thailand, where the largest number of parliamentary seats - 128 out of 360 was allotted. Thiti was able to persuade prominent politicians from the northeast to join the party, including several former ministers, who in tum helped boost the STP's image. In fact, Thiti, who was the STP's secretary general, succeeded in bringing in not only conservative politicians, but progressive ones as well. Thiti 's success in recruiting them was also based on his appeal to their sense of

The Main Actors: Party Profiles

7

regionalism. Thiti believed that if politicians from the northeast could unite, they could contribute more to the development of that region, which is the poorest in the country. Although Narong Wongwan was brought in as leader of the STP, Thiti was the one who ran the STP. Ironically, Thiti himself did not stand in the election, and it is not clear why he declined to accept any ministerial post in the Suchinda government. Because the STP provided a major support in the Suchinda government, it lost political legitimacy after the May incident. The party was dissolved, along with the retrenchment of the military establishment and STP members were dispersed. The majority of them joined a new party, Chart Pattana, formed before the 13 September election by former Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan. Some joined the Chart Thai Party, while others grouped themselves into Seritham (Free Justice) Party, led by former House Speaker, Arthit Urairat.

2. Chart Pattana Party (CPP) As a newcomer in the political scene, the Chart Pattana Party (CPP)- National Development - won 60 seats in Parliament, making it the fourth largest party in the Lower House. It won most of the seats from the northeastern provinces of the country. Jts strength was not at all surprising, for its formation was based on bringing together former parliamentarians with high electability from other parties, particularly from the STP, which earlier dominated in the northeast. Two main political parties - the STP and Chart Thai which by then were known as "satanic" parties - in particular were blamed for the May incident. For the STP members, it was too hard to withstand the public outcry against them. Some of the more progressive members of Chart Thai shared the same sentiment with the STP members. Immediately after the May incident, there was a movement in the Chart Thai Party to replace Somboon Rahong, the party leader, who was directly linked with the military junta, and Banharn Silpa-archa, the secretary general. This faction, which was led by Korn Dabaransi, wanted former party leader and Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan to lead the party again, but failed to persuade him to do so. The rift was very deep and the hostility of Korn, Chatichai's nephew, against Banharn was irreconcilable. He eventually broke away from Chart Thai and formed the Chart Pattana Party with Chatichai as its party leader. The CPP wooed members of the STP who were known for being more moderate to the party. The CPP also stirred up considerable political waves in persuading the then secretary general of the Democrat Party, Prachuab Chaisarn, to be its secretary general. The Democrat Party was shocked by the move: the CPP seemed set to be a formidable political force after the election. It was clear from the beginning that the CPP wanted to break the dominance

8

Thailand's Two General Elections in 1992

of Chart Thai, and its prominence on the Thai political scene is tied to the possibility of a· political come-back by Chatichai Choonhavan. For Chatichai, nothing is more important than taking back his political honour by assuming the premiership again - even if for a short while - and clearing his name, which was tainted by allegations of corruption when he was first prime minister for two years in 1988. As a party, Chart Pattana would want to build enough political clout particularly in relation to Chart Thai. Chatichai claimed that the CPP is politically "neutral", referring to the political polarization between the "satanic" and "angelic" political parties. Apart from former members of Chart Thai and the STP, a number of former New Aspiration Party MPs also joined the CPP. Chart Pattana is one of the financially strong parties, which attracted former MPs. Chatichai's popularity, despite his being accused of being "unusually rich" by the military junta, also contributed to the strength of the party. Chatichai placed great emphasis on economic programmes, for which he was known during his premiership. Chatichai is also well-versed in foreign affairs. and he made good use of his international connections to boost his party. As part of his campaign strategy, Chatichai travelled to Cambodia to show that he was indispensable in the resolution of the Cambodian problem and that he was better accepted there. He also met with the Prime Minister of Japan, Mr Kiichi Miyazawa, in Tokyo, demonstrating his clout in international affairs.

3. New Aspiration Party (NAP) The New Aspiration Party (NAP) won 51 seats in the September election, compared with 72 seats in the March election. The party saw a considerable number of defections following the formation of Chart Pattana. The NAP was formed in October 1990, largely by former high-ranking military officers and bureaucrats. The party took a high profile from the beginning, appearing to be very sophisticated and projecting itself as the next government. Three well-known founders who used to be close associates with former Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda- Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, former Army Chief, Prasong Soonsiri, Prem's secretary general, and Phis an Moonlasartsathorn, former permanent secretary of the Interior Ministry, one of the most powerful positions in the country's civil service- attracted public attention and generated wide support. Within a year, with strong financial support, the NAP grew by leaps and bounds, expanding its presence throughout the country. The perception that the NAP could form the next government must have alarmed the military led by Suchinda who by then had regarded Chavalit, his former boss, as an "enemy". And the military-led STP was established to counter the growing popularity of the NAP.

The Main Actors: Party Profiles

9

Thiti argued that the reason for the STP challenging Chavalit's NAP was that "the current top military men in the armed forces have all questioned [Chavalit's] political thinking. They don't trust him." 1 It is not clear what "political thinking" Thiti was referring to. The most controversial of Chavalit's "political thinking" was his idea of direct election of a prime minister, which many viewed as a move to do away with monarchical parliamentary democracy. This idea was vigorously attacked by former Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj in his newspaper column. Kukrit, who still commands great influence in Thai society and who has close ties with the Royal Family, questioned Chavalit's motive and alleged that Chavalit was trying to undermine the role of the king. Kukrit argued that if a prime minister was directly elected by the people, the king's approval would not be needed, in which case the king's prestige would be reduced. Kukrit's comments generated public controversy which almost destroyed Chavalit's political career. Chavalit, however, succeeded in overcoming this controversy. In one of the pamphlets distributed during the March election, the NAP detailed Chavalit's close relationship with the Royal Family, citing for instance that his grandfather used to work for one of King Rama IV's children during the nineteenth century. Notwithstanding these explanations, Chavalit has never been perceived as someone who is comfortably close to the Palace, something which is necessary if he wants to be a prime minister of Thailand. Chavalit has been known as a "thinking soldier", and during his tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the Army he did a number of things which later contributed to the growth of the NAP. For example, he created a good impression of himself when he spoke up against military coups. Previously, only Prem was known to have tried to eradicate the idea of staging coups against the government while occupying the same position as Chavalit. Chavalit's democratic overture also won over to him a large group of intellectuals, which helped to boost his image as a representative of the new breed in the military establishment. Chavalit resigned in 1989 from active service, five years before the mandatory retirement age of sixty. He reasoned that he wanted to show that one should not be too attached to the most powerful post, that of Army Commander-in-Chief, and wanted to set a good example of a military man wanting to get involved in politics, although critics countered that Chavalit resigned because he was pressured by his subordinates, particularly members of Chulachomklao Military Academy's Class Five led by Suchinda Kraprayoon. Chavalit's record as Army Commander-in-Chief was also impressive. He was the architect of the famous order issued by Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda, Order 66/2523 (Prime Minister's Order No. 66 of 1980), which prescribed a new thinking about countering communist insurgency in Thailand, namely, replacing armed suppression with political programmes. The thrust of the political programme

10

Thailand's Two General Elections in 1992

was the adoption of peaceful means to fight communist insurgents. These included programmes to eradicate poverty and create jobs for the rural people, punish more severely corrupt and abusive government officials in the provinces, and grant amnesty to the communists. The programme worked very well, resulting in mass defections from communist insurgents to the government side under the amnesty programme. The order played a big role in reducing the influence of the nowdefunct Communist Party of Thailand, which was fighting the government in the jungles throughout the country. Chavalit got former members of the communist movement to advise him, an action which Suchinda later used against the NAP leader as favouring the communistic system. As Army Commander-in-Chief, Chavalit also initiated a number of development programmes in the poverty-stricken northeastern region of Thailand and in the south. Chavalit was the architect of the massive development project in the northeast which is known as ''Green Isarn". "lsarn" means northeast. The aim of the project was to eradicate poverty from that region by placing emphasis on irrigation systems and agricultural development. The project also involved government officials, academics, and businessmen. In the south, Chavalit initiated a project called "Harubbun Bahru" particularly in the five southernmost provinces where the Muslim population is concentrated. On the foreign policy front, Chavalit, whose rapid rise in the military took place during the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, played a key role in reconciling the different Cambodian factions and creating a Cambodian united front. This was made possible because he was the leading person responsible for Thailand's national security then. Chavalit also established a close relationship with China's People's Liberation Army, and was able to secure arm deals from China at a lower price. While the rise of the NAP depended largely on Chavalit's popularity, in the longer term this could be counterproductive to the party: without him, the party would be weakened. Indeed, this is a common feature in the Thai party system, because the progress of political parties is dependent on personalities, not policies. Secondly, because the NAP's core group consists of former "big shots" in the bureaucracy, they are perceived as being more interested in occupying political office after their retirement from active service than in building up a solid political party. The NAP has also put too much emphasis on expanding itself. taking in anybody who is "highly electable" without careful screening. One of its founders, Prasong Soonsiri, who broke with the party just before the March election, confirmed that in a number of instances the party took in "influential persons" with unscrupulous background, such as owners of illegal gambling dens." Thirdly, most of the senior positions in the party are held by former high-ranking officials who are in their late fifties or early sixties. Few younger members have been

The Main Actors: Party Profiles

11

groomed to advance the party's interests. Thus, if the NAP does not give sufficient attention to the building of the party, it could harm itself in the long run.

4. Chart Thai Party (CTP) The Chart Thai Party won 77 seats in the September election, an increase of 3 seats from the March election. Chart Thai (Thai Nation) was established in 1974 by three family members ofthe so-called "Rajakru clan"- former Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan, former Deputy Prime Minister Pramarn Adireksarn, and the late General Siri Siriyothin. The three are related by marriage. Rajakru is the name of a lane in Bangkok where the Choonhavan family lives. The Choonhavan family has long been prominent in Thai politics. Chatichai's father, Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan, led a coup against the civilian government of Prime Minister Luang Thamrongnawasawat in 1947, and a year later installed Field Marshal Luang Pibulsongkhram as head of government. However, the Choonhavan family became marginalized following Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat's coup to topple Pibulsongkhram in 1957. Chatichai, then a colonel in the army, was sent as ambassador to Argentina. The rest of the family then stayed out of politics and were successful in business, particularly in textiles. The formation of Chart Thai marked a return to the Thai political scene of the Choonhavan family. This old political group emerged in a new political environment created by the popularly led "democratic revolution" in Thailand in 1973. This enabled different interest groups to compete for political power. and Chart Thai had a great advantage because of its old power base as well as its newly acquired business power. To be sure, Chart Thai expanded its base to embrace prominent business tycoons in the provinces, particularly in the central parts of the country, although the party maintains its family-style of centralized management. The prominent tycoons in the provinces were mainly recruited through business contacts. High-ranking party officials, however, continued to come from the "Rajakru clan" and its close associates. The growth of Chart Thai has been very steady, and it is the most stable party in Thailand. Until before the 13 September election, Chart Thai had suffered no large-scale defections as had happened to parties such as the Democrat Party or the Social Action Party. Chart Thai, with strong financial back-up and the support of the establishment, emerged quite strong after the first election in the "democratic era" of the mid1970s. It came in third in the 1975 election, winning 28 seats. In subsequent elections, in 1976, 1979, 1983, and 1986, Chart Thai consistently maintained second place. In the 1988 general election, the party won the largest number of seats, 87 out of 257. In the more progressive atmosphere between 1973 and 1976, Chart Thai was perceived as representing the "right" wing in the Thai political

12

Thailand's Two General Elections in 1992

spectrum, and its image among the intellectuals was very negative. But as Thai politics became less ideological during the 1980s, Chart Thai's prestige started to improve. Chart Thai is known for being a "government party", which means that it will try all possible ways to get into the government camp. Since its establishment, Chart Thai had been on the opposition side only once before, after the 1983 general election. In the 22 March election, Chart Thai again positioned itself as a "government party". Following the 1991 coup, it chose to keep a low profile because of fear of confronting the military. As a member of the government, the party's power and influence is enhanced as it can provide goodies to the people. A member of the opposition, on the other hand, will not have the same kind of prestige, power, and privileges, and will have to work even harder to check and balance the government, which has all the resources at its disposal. That the CTP has always been on the executive side and maintained a steady growth has contributed to its political influence. One criterion in judging its influence is the number of ministerial portfolios under the control of Chart Thai members when it is in government. The party has run such ministries as industry, communications, agriculture, finance, and interior. These ministries are the most sought-after given their enormous power and influence. Chart Thai had been perceived as a party with no clear platform except for being conservative and for protecting the business interests of its party members until Chatichai Choonhavan took over the leadership. During his premiership, Chatichai launched one of the most innovative but controversial foreign policy programmes, which was to "tum the Indochinese battlefield into a market-place". Although the policy was not articulated by the party itself but by one of Chatichai 's advisers - specifically by M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, an academic from Chulalongkom University, who was recruited from outside the party structurethe party nevertheless got a great deal of credit for it. Chatichai, however, made a miscalculation- which was very un-Chart Thai- by getting into a confrontation with the military which led to the 23 February 1991 coup. Apparently, Chatichai's hostile stance towards the military did not come from his party, but from his advisers who were not enamoured of the military. Apart from his advisers occasionally criticizing the military, Chatichai reinstated former colonel Manoon Roopkachom, whom Suchinda's clique considered its arch-rival. Furthermore, Chatichai also promoted Monoon to the rank of a major general and appointed him as an aide to the prime minister who was concurrently minister of defense. The move to reinstate Manoon was already seen by Suchinda as attempt to undermine him. But Chatichai did not stop there. He appointed another of Suchinda' s arch-rival, General Arthit Kamlang-ek to the post of deputy defense minister. That was said to be the last straw between Chatichai and Suchinda.

The Main Act( Jrs: Party Profiles

13

Despite the fact that the party was seen as belongil)g to the ChoonhavanAdireksam family, another person, Banham Silpa-archa, the party secretary general, also played a crucial role in the rise of Chart Thai. Banhq_ln is a billionaire from Suphanburi in central Thailand. He is an ethnic Chinese, Who with little education (he later obtained a degree in law from Ramkhamhaen~ University, an open university) first made a fortune in the construction business. during the boom years in the 1960s when the country first embarked on a larg~-scale construction of infrastructure, including military facilities. Banham, whose business empire now covers all areas, has held ministerial appointments several times, including education, communications, finance, and interior. He was once sarcastically referred to by the local press as "Mr Mobile ATM (automated teller machine)" because he was alleged to have given his associates money in exchange for loyalty from them. Banham is believed to be a "money bag" for Chart Thai, and his political influence in the party is considerable. In each election, mare than 100,000 people voted for him, making him one of the highest vote-getters in the country. It has been said that Banharn owns the province of Suphanburi, because he has donated money for the construction of schools, bridges, and so fQrth, which in turn are named after him. The best asset of Banharn to the party is that he maintains a good relationship with both military officers and politicians from other parties, largely because of his wealth and his compromising stYle. That Chatichai was seen as bringing Chart Thai in confrontation with the military probably weakened his position in the party, as the majority of the senior party executives based their political survival on an alliance with the military. As a result, the party was presented with a no-choke situation of relieving Chatichai of the party leadership following the 1991 coup. After Chatichai' s resignation as party leader- he went into exile in England- Air Chief Marshal Somboon Rahong, a close friend of Air Chief Marshal Kaset Rojananil, a key figure in the military junta, was chosen as party chief. l'hat brought Chart Thai under almost complete control by the military, and the Party was a prime supporter of the Suchinda government after the 22 March election. And it was most widely blamed for the May bloodshed. Before the September election Somboon resigned as leader of the CTP and Pramarn - the first CTP leader - once again assumed the leadership.

5. Democrat Party (DEM) The Democrat Party won 79 seats in the September election, a dramatic increase from 44 seats in the March election. Established in 1946, the Democrat Party is the oldest political party in Thailand. The party, considered as progressive by most people, had in the mid-l970s adopted the platform Of "soft socialism". The

14

Thailand's Two General Elections in 1992

Democrat Party is probably closest to being a political party in the real sense, not having been based on any family or personality in particular. It has now gained a reputation for being the most democratic party in Thailand. To be sure, its leader and other senior officials are elected through the democratic process, based on their political experience and popularity rather than their relationship with any particular family. Up till the mid-1970s, the party's emphasis was on achieving political democracy. It has been known for spearheading political fights against military dictatorship. Since the mid-1970s the party has adopted economic policies which emphasize social and economic equity. Since the establishment of the party, three of its leaders have become prime ministers, including the present leader, Chuan Leekpai. The other two were Khuang Aphaiwong in 1948 and M.R. Seni Pramoj in 1976. Because of the party's stand against the military, both Khuang and Seni were, not surprisingly, toppled by the military. Also, the party was in its earlier period confined almost exclusively to intellectuals, and it was only after the 1970s that it began to popularize itself among the business people, the bureaucrats, the labour unions, and farmers, who provided the main block of votes for the party in any election. Compared with Chart Thai, the Democrat has suffered more internal turbulence which affected the party tremendously. Being better organized and having members who were politically capable in fighting the military, the party represented the country's hope for democracy, particulary during the 1960s when the military, under the Sarit and Than om regimes, was well-entrenched in politics. In 1969 the party embarrassed the government party, Saha Prachathai, led by Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn himself, by winning all the parliamentary seats in Bangkok. This was probably the public's reward to the Democrat Party for its role as the opponent of the Thanom regime. The party's criticisms of the military government reflected the sentiments of the people, who were fed up with the military rule they had to put up with for more than two decades. In November 1971, Than om declared martial law and dissolved Parliament, plunging the country further into dictatorship. The Thanom regime was toppled in October 1973 when the people, led by students, rose up against the regime. It is not an exaggeration to say that the Democrat Party provided the torch behind which the democracy movement stood up against the military regime in the 1970s. With the democratic mood reigning, the Democrats won most seats - 72 out of 269 - in the 1975 election, the first after the fall of the Thanom regime. The Democrat Party was thus given the chance to fonn a coalition government The party was in power for less than a month before it was forced to resign because of the lack of a working majority in the House of Representatives. In the subsequent election in April 1976, the Democrat Party again won the largest number of seats,

The Main AClnrs: Party Profiles

IS

this time 114 out of 279. It formed a coalition government, with the Chart Thai Party as a major partner. However, the rise of the Democrat Party in the 1970s came at a time when Thailand was deeply divided along ideological lines, with the Left pitted against the Right. The division was engineered by the military to destabilize the government in an attempt to stage a come-back. The rise of the progressive-leaning Democrat Party had fuelled fear in the more conservative ranks of the military and the bureaucracy. They were afraid that the Democrat Party would lead the country to the Left, which could undermine the establishment's (the military and the bureaucracy) status and interests, which could be better retained in a more conservative political environment. At that time, the three neighbouring Indochinese states- South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos- had fallen to communism, and the Rightists increasingly distrusted the Democrats. Some members of the Democrat Party, including Chuan himself, were accused of sympathizing with the communists. In October 1976 the military staged a coup against the Democrat-led government of Prime Minister Seni Pramoj, sending the Democrats into a political wilderness. The rise of conservative forces following the 1976 coup dealt a severe blow to the political aspirations of the Democrat Party. The party was badly split. As a result, the Democrat Party performed poorly in the 1979 election, winning only 32 seats nation-wide. For the first time the party lost all but one seat in Bangkok, where it had dominated in the previous election. But once the political atmosphere in Thailand stabilized after the appointment of General Prem Tinsulanonda as prime minister in 1980, the Democrat Party, being included in the Prem government, began to pick up the pieces and rebuild its popularity again. Prem, a "middle man", was a military strongman but was more sympathetic to democracy. Prem was accepted as prime minister by both the military and politicians, thus being viewed as a political stabilizer. Prem was known for his honesty, dedication, and incorruptibility and he viewed the Democrat Party as having a lot in common with him, which was that it was moderate and had a clean image. To some extent, Prime Minister Prem helped boost the popularity of the Democrat Party. In the 1986 election, the Democrat won the largest number of seats in the Lower House - 100 out of 347. One of the Democrat Party's dilemmas had been that it was unable to sustain its peak strength for a considerable period of time, if not because of external factors, it was because of conflict within the party. In I 986 the Democrat Party began to develop internal conflicts following disagreements among senior members over Cabinet appointments in the Prem government. A group of party members calling themselves "January I0" accused their leader, Bhichai Rattakul, of favouritism by appointing his own son, Pichit Rattakul, as deputy minister in the Ministry of Science and Technology. Pichit had the necessary qualifications-

16

Thailand's Two General Elections in 1992

he had a doctorate in science and was an MP from Bangkok -to be responsible for national science and technology policies. The dissidents led by Veera Musikapong, the party's secretary general, however, argued that there was in place an agreement that somebody from the party other than Pichit should be appointed minister. In retaliation against Bhichai's "dictatorial behaviour", the dissidents turned against their own party when a vote was taken in Parliament on an amendment to the copyright law in line with a demand from the United States. Publicly, the dissidents accused the party of yielding too much to U.S. pressure, but it was known then that the voting-down of the bill had to do more with internal conflicts in the Democrat Party than with Thai-U.S. relations. Describing the situation as a disunity in his government, Prem dissolved Parliament. That incident - a case of factionalism - adversely affected the Democrat Party. In the subsequent election of July 1988, it won only 48 out of the 360 parliamentary seats. Since 1975 the Democrat Party has always been a member ofthe government, particularly during Prem's premiership from 1980 to 1988. It was able to prove itself as an effective and reliable partner and was able to build up its image as a clean administrator. For example, during the tenure of Chuan Leekpai, then deputy leader of the party, as Minister of Commerce, there were no press reports of allegations of corruption against the ministry. Until his appointment, the Ministry of Commerce was known for being one of the most corrupt ministries because of its links with businessmen. The party's campaign theme in both, 22 March and 13 September, elections was typical of its current leader, Chuan Leekpai, whose political career was based on the promotion of democracy. As for its strategy, the Democrat presented Chuan as a likely prime minister. Chuan is considered to be one of the country's most honest politicians. Coming from a poor family in the southern province of Trang, he lives a simple life. Even now, he is not a man of great property, and has devoted most of his time to politics. He has been in politics since the age of thirty-one, and he is now fifty-four. Chuan was elected leader of the Democrat Party in 1990, its fifth leader since the formation of the party. He has won in every election since 1969 and has never switched party, which is atypical of politicians in Thailand. The party, especially in its traditional stronghold in the south, evokes the image of a common man rising up to the country's top job, an image that inspires ordinary people to do good deeds, and an image which also translates into votes for the Democrats.

6. Palang Dharma Party (PDP) The Palang Dharma Party (PDP) won 47 seats in the September election, a slight

The Main Actors: Party Profiles

17

increase from 41 seats in the March election. In the March election, it scored a landslide victory in the Bangkok Metropolitan area by winning 32 out of the 35 contested seats, and in the process inflicted a devastating defeat on the Prachakorn Thai Party, which had controlled Bangkok since 1979. However, the PDP's strength in Bangkok was undermined by the Democrat Party in the September election, which won nine seats, compared with only one seat in March. Palang Dharma, which means "Force of Virtue", derived its popularity from its leader, the former Army Major-General and former Governor of Bangkok, 3 Chamlong Srimuang, who as a devout Buddhist, is noted for his determination, integrity, and incorruptibility. It is impossible to separate the party from the charismatic Chamlong, who adheres to the eight Buddhist precepts including abstaining from sex. Eating only one meal a day, he is also a strict vegetarian. The party formally came into being in 1988, but its conception took place two years earlier. The people first heard of the "Palang Dharma Group" in 1986 when it was supporting Chamlong in his bid to become the Governor of Bangkok. Although Chamlong was already wellknown in Bangkok at the time - having served as secretary general to Prime Minister Prem- he was clearly an underdog in the race. However, his popularity surged quickly and he won the election with a landslide victory. This marked the political debut of the Palang Dharma Party in the capital, Bangkok. The force behind the initial success of Palang Dharma is a Buddhist sect called "SantiAsoke", which observes a strict vegetarian diet and a modest life-style, as distinct from mainstream Buddhism in Thailand. Before throwing its support behind Chamlong, Santi-Asoke already had a strong organization and dedicated members, both young and old, male and female. Its disciples had won the admiration of the public and the sect was gaining in popularity. Initially, when the supporters campaigned for Chamlong in 1986, the people had doubts as to whether the members of Palang Dharma would be able to do political work because they were newcomers. They also lacked financial support. The group surprised the public and succeeded in arousing political curiosity about Palang Dharma by resorting to a non-traditional style of campaigning. To do that, they invented various intriguing gimmicks which succeeded in getting votes for the party and at the same time conforming to the group's principle of modesty. Some of the gimmicks included getting youngsters to use bicycles to spread their message in the city, using cheap materials such as bamboo poles to hang pictures ofChamlong, and using straw edifices ofChamlong. While these gimmicks might have looked cheap and tasteless in form, they had a strong political content, which was to project Chamlong as one capable of running a clean government and that he was someone the people could trust. Because of its political uniqueness, Palang Dharma has achieved a distinct

18

Thailand's Two General Elections in 1992

image for itself. The public responded by treating the party differently. For example, compared with other political parties, the PDP was viewed as a poor party in need of financial support from the public. Thus, at PDP rallies people were seen donating money to the party. While the amount donated might not be substantial, such gestures further enhanced the image of Palang Dharma as an honest party and thus increased its popularity. As the party in charge of Bangkok, the PDP has performed relatively well. When Chamlong first became Governor of Bangkok, the public doubted his capability. But during his six years as Governor, Chamlong proved effective not only in running a relatively clean administration, but also in getting things done. His achievements included improving the cleanliness of the city and the construction of more expressways to help ease traffic congestion in the city. In his capacity as Governor of Bangkok, Chamlong won the 1992 Magsaysay A ward for community services. The PDP has been growing steadily since its inception in 1986. It has been able to dominate both the executive and the legislative branches of the city's government. And it is now trying to branch out into the provinces. The PDP tried to expand its party prior to the September election by bringing in a number of prominent politicians, including Prasong Soonsiri, former secretary general of the New Aspiration Party, Boonchu Rojanasatien, leader of the Solidarity Party, Chamni Sekdiset, and Sutham Saengprathum, also key members of the Solidarity. The attempt did help the PDP to win more seats in the provinces, an increase of 15 seats in September. It had only nine in the March election. Unfortunately, the provincial gains were subtracted by the loss in Bangkok, making a total gain of only six, despite various polls predicting the PDP's victory nation-wide. Although the PDP can still grow, observers are concerned that the party may decline very quickly without Chamlong. And if the PDP is to be considered a national party, it has to broaden its political support to encompass the more secular sections of society such as the intellectuals and businesses. Elements from these two influential groups are joining the PDP, but the religion-oriented Santi-Asoke wing, which is still in control of the highest decision-making body in the party, 4 can be an obstacle to the expansion of the party. Although Cham long was elected to Parliament for the first time in the March election, his political experience had been nurtured long before. He was head of the Chulachomklao Military Academy's Class Seven which masterminded the rise of Prem to the premiership in 1980. He then was appointed secretary general to Prime Minister Prem, but later resigned from the post because he was against the government-sponsored bill to allow abortion. He led a fight outside government along with other social activist groups and won. That won Chamlong a great deal of credibility for his adherence to both political and moral principles. During the

The Main Actors: Party Profiles

19

May incident, Chamlong played probably the most vital role in bringing down the Suchinda government. But being at the centre of a few hard-fought political battles has earned him the reputation of being a hard-headed man, which later became his political liability. 7. Social Action Party (SAP) The Social Action Party (SAP) won 22 seats in the September election, down from the 31 seats it got in the March election. Like most other parties, the SAP was formed after the "great democratic era" of the mid-1970s. The founder was M.R. Kukrit Pramoj. The most famous policy of the SAP when it became a core in the coalition government in 1975 was to "return funds to the rural areas". This was to create jobs for villagers, particularly during summer, in order to stop them from migrating to Bangkok. This policy was so popularized that it became part of a public discourse. As the "returning funds" were used for the construction of bridges and roads, there was a popular saying that there were a lot of "Kukrit roads. Kukrit bridges, Kukrit schools, Kukrit pavilions, etc." all over the country. A popular song was composed to reflect the Kukrit policy. Other popular polices included schemes to stabilize commodity prices, the provision of free medical care for the poor. and administrative decentralization by the setting up of village councils. In the field of foreign policy, Prime Minister Kukrit made a historic reconciliation with Beijing by establishing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China in 1975. Kukrit also played a crucial part in affecting the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Thailand in 1975. The establishment of diplomatic relations with China and the U.S. military withdrawal have long-term implications for the stability and prestige of Thailand. The SAP likes to view these achievements which have been accomplished within such a short time as the party's ''miracles".o In the 1975 election, the SAP won only 18 seats, but given Kukrit's prestige and political experience, he was able to act as a core to form a coalition government, with himself as prime minister. But it was an unstable government. As prime minister, Kukrit spent most of his time trying to please members of the parties in the coalition. A year later, he was forced to dissolve Parliament and call for a new election. During Kukrit's leadership. the party did have a large number of professionals and capable senior members, representing the intellectuals and the business community. Capitalizing on the popular policies that it had instituted in 1975, the SAP won the largest number of seats in Parliament in the 1979 election, 82 out of 301. In the 1983 election, it again was the largest party in Parliament, winning l 0 l seats out of 30 I. Its credibility was further boosted when the then

20

Thailand's Two General Elections in 1992

Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila, a close friend of Prem's, joined the party in the same year (Siddhi later became the party leader in 1986). However, the number of intellectuals and other quality supporters has declined over the years as the credibility and prestige of the party diminished following internal fighting and various scandals committed by its senior members when they were in government. The political fortunes of the party declined in the 1986 and 1988 elections because of in-fighting, which resulted in a substantial number of defections of prominent members to other parties, which further damaged its strength. Another internal conflict over the leadership of the party occurred after the 1988 election. The prestige of the SAP is at its lowest today since the party was founded in 1974. Montri Pongapanich, who is the party leader, is still under investigation for corruption when he was the Communications Minister in the Chatichai government. Although the SAP is a member of the Chuan coalition government, Montri was excluded from the Cabinet because of the allegation. The case is now in court.

III

THE ROLES OF THE GENERALS IN THE 22 MARCH GENERAL ELECTION

The 22 March 1992 election was held under the cover of military manipulation. In the first place, the election was promised by the military junta which seized power in a coup from Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan in 23 February 1991. Since the late 1970s the dominance of the military in politics has begun to decline and the influence of other social groups such as the business group has started to rise. The 1991 coup could be viewed as the military's attempt to seize back its power turf which was increasingly penetrated by the rise of business-oriented politicians, whom Chatichai represented. However, the military could no longer blatantly hold on to power without being democratic at least in form. Against this background, therefore, despite its pledge to have the March election, the military was- quite understandably - still concerned about its hold on political power. Subsequent events demonstrated this quite clearly.

The Pro-Military 1991 Constitution and Pro-Military Political Parties: The Military Reasserting in Politics Prior to the March election, the military had invented various means to remain influential in politics. First of all, it planned to perpetuate its power through the writing of a new constitution. Clauses in the 1991 Constitution which enhanced the domination of the military included the following: the power of the military junta to appoint 270 senators for the Upper House; the appointed senators have as much power as elected members of the House of Representatives. The senators are allowed to vote in critical sessions, as when government decrees are up for approval. (The significance of this is that if decrees that are issued when Parliament is not in session are not eventually passed, the government has to resign.) Furthermore,

22

Thailand's Two General Elections in 1992

senators are allowed to participate in a no-confidence motion; the president of the senate is automatically president of Parliament; a non-elected person can be appointed prime minister. Events prior to the adoption of the 1991 Constitution were worth noting, for they showed public resistance against the military's attempts. Originally, the military was far more blunt in its attempt to maintain its dominance in politics. In particular, the military's original proposal through the military-appointed constitution drafting committee contained the idea of an absolute separation of power between the legislative body and the executive branch. The idea was that no Cabinet minister should come from the House of Representatives as practised in the universal parliamentary system. The junta reasoned that this was an effective way to prevent politicians from getting into the Cabinet through vote-buying in an election. The military leaders argued that this was to prevent corrupt politicians - who view running in an election as a way of "investment" - to get their "returns" by trying to get a Cabinet appointment. This was met with strong resistance, for it was a clear attack on politicians in the parliamentary system which upholds the principle oflegislative superiority. Critics argued that if such a clause were passed, a military prime minister would have had all the leeway to appoint those who supported him, in which case the bureaucrats and military officers could have been in control in most of the ministries. Another heated debate concerned active military officers and bureaucrats assuming ministerial appointments. Again, there was a public outcry against this and the military was forced to back down. Eventually. a compromise was reached on this, and an amendment was made that requires military officers and/or bureaucrats who have become political appointees to resign their permanent posts. Despite strong public resistance, the military retained most of the clauses in the draft constitution that ensured its dominance over other political forces. To counter public resistance, particularly from the Bangkok area, the military used the strategy of citing support from the rural areas. Up to six million signatures were collected from the provinces in support of the draft constitution. The task of collecting them was carried out by the Interior Ministry which was headed by General lssarapong Noonphakdee, a key member of the junta. The signatures were collected in Jess than a month and in an "efficient" way, which at one point became a controversial issue itself. For example, the Nation. an influential English-language daily, discovered by sampling that some of the signatures were forged, presumably by officials of the Interior Ministry at districr level. 6 The ministry conceded that there were some forgeries but denied that it was responsible for it.

The Roles of the Generals in the 22 March General Election

23

The second most significant military strategy to ensure its dominance in politics was to have direct control over political parties. The military established a party of its own and interfered in at least another. The most prominent of the pro-military parties was the Samakkhi Tham Party (STP). Although the military denied that it had set up the STP, there was no doubt in the eyes of the public that the party had direct links with the military. The founder- and the then secretary general of the STP - former Squadron Leader Thiti Nakomthab is a friend of both General Suchinda and the then Supreme Commander, Air Chief Marshal Kaset Rojananil. By making known to prospective members that the party had military support and therefore stood a better chance to form a new government after the March election, the STP attracted a large number of veteran politicians whose prime aim was to be part of the government regardless of stripes and colours. Some of them were reportedly "bought" over by the STP because of their high electability. With these tactics, the STP grew by leaps and bounds overnight to become the largest party. Another significant move- though it was not clear whether it was initiated by the military - which enhanced the power and influence of the military was a senior military officer assuming the leadership of the Chart Thai Party. Air Chief Marshal Somboon Rahong, a close associate of Air Chief Marshal Kaset, resigned from active duty in the Air Force to lead the Chart Thai Party. According to some members of the Chart Thai Party, Somboon, who had never been a member of the party before, was "invited" to lead the party because of his close relationship with Chart Thai's senior members, including Pramam Adireksam. This to a large extent was true because Somboon used to serve as a close aide to Pramarn when the latter was Defense Minister in 1975. Somboon also moved up quickly within the air force during the Chart Thai-led government of Chatichai Choonhavan, indicating that he did have close connections with the party. Another version was that members of the Chart Thai Party had invited Somboon to lead it in order to prevent reprisals from the military after being a target of the military junta in the February coup. The fear was not groundless since most of the allegedly "unusually rich" politicians were from Chart Thai. But whatever the real reason for Somboon · s appointment as leader of Chart Thai, the end result enhanced the military's power, in that through Somboon the Chart Thai Party was brought to serve the military's political objective. It has to be noted that the military's attempt to control political parties in this manner was the first since the 1973 student-led revolution. It represented a resurgence of the military in a more sophisticated way. As it turned out then, Chart Thai and Samakkhi Tham were the two largest parties in Parliament after the March election. It was mainly the support of these two parties that added to Suchinda's arrogance that led to the May bloodshed.

24

Thailand's Two General Elections in 1992

The Results of the 22 March Election The Thai people went to the polls in high spirits, stirred by the media, particularly television, and the presence of PollWatch to monitor the voting. In general, the results of the election were as expected. As predicted by various polls, most of the parliamentary seats went to three major parties- Samakkhi Tham Party (79 seats), Chart Thai (74), and New Aspiration Party (72) (see Appendix Table 1). There were some surprises, particularly concerning the Palang Dharma, Prachakorn Thai, and Democrat Parties. The PDP won 32 out of 35 seats in Bangkok, upsetting Prachakorn Thai, which used to control Bangkok's constituencies over the past ten years. It won only seven seats in March. The Democrat lost all but one seat in Bangkok in the March election. The victory of the STP was indeed the military's triumph in the political front. It guaranteed that the military could wield enormous power in the political arena. Everyone including the pro-democracy groups got the signal, and right away launched a campaign against a "non-elected" person assuming the premiership, as there were indications that the military wanted to have its own person General Suchinda - as prime minister. The STP was for Suchinda as prime minister from the beginning. But the military probably sensed the public outcry - or it could be just a tactical withdrawal - backed down, and let the leader of the STP, Narong Wongwan, form the government. Unfortunately, Narong was alleged to have been involved in drug smuggling into the United States (and because of this Narong was denied a visa into the United States in July 1991 this was revealed after Narong's nomination in March 1992; in fact he had never been prosecuted for lack of sufficient evidence). And Narong never made it to the premiership. Two weeks after the "Narong crisis", moves were under way to replace him with Suchinda as the nominee for the premiership. As soon as Narong withdrew his nomination, the pro-military coalition nominated General Suchinda as prime minister. Suchinda's name was submitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Arthit Urairat, and on 7 April 1992 his nomination was forwarded to the King for approval, which would have made him the country's nineteenth prime minister since 1932. When Suchinda was confirmed as prime minister, he faced difficulties in forming his 48-member Cabinet. Theoretically, he had the power to make the final decision on Cabinet appointments, but since his appointment was supported by the five pro-military parties, Suchinda had to give in to their demands. Suchinda's weakness was demonstrated by the fact that some of the former ministers in the Chatichai government whom the military had accused of being "unusually rich" were offered Cabinet posts in his government. Suchinda's own credibility was

The Roles of the Generals in the 22 March General Election

25

tarnished as he himself had made the same accusations against these people, and furthermore he had said that he would not include any of them in his Cabinet. For example, Montri Pongpanich, leader of the Social Action Party whose assets were frozen by the court, was named Deputy Prime Minister. Two others, Wattana Assavahem and Sanoh Tianthong of Chart Thai, were named Minister Attached to the Prime Minister's Office and Deputy Minister for Communications, respectively. At the same time, Suchinda attempted to raise the calibre of his government by putting together a team of professionals to run some of the ministries and the Prime Minister's Advisory Board. They included the Ministry of Finance, which was headed by Suthee Singhsaneh, an economics veteran who also served in the same portfolio during the previous government headed by Anand. His economic advisory team was led by a well-respected economist, Virapongsa Ramangkura. who had previously served in the Prem administration. By including old hands in the economics field, Suchinda wanted to reassure the business community and foreign investors that there would be fair play and that political parties which had their own vested interests would not be able to amend government rules to favour themselves. In any case. the opposition had a field day. attacking Suchinda for including allegedly corrupt ministers in his Cabinet, and for going back on his words of not accepting the premiership. For the democratic forces, the March election was an election manipulated by the generals and for the generals. That Suchinda went back on his words and instead assumed the premiership was there for all to see how badly the military wanted to keep its political power. The political cloud was set over Thailand and a showdown between the military and the pro-democracy forces loomed incredibly larger and larger. It was just a matter of time.

IV

THE MAY INCIDENT: GENERAL SUCHINDA'S FALL AND NEW DEMOCRATIC INPUTS

The March election had, among other things, led to a political polarization in Thailand, which culminated in the May crisis and the resignation of General Suchinda. Attempts by various political leaders to form a new government to replace Suchinda failed. So the House was dissolved and a new election held to break the political deadlock. During the March election, political parties were divided into two distinctive groups: the pro-military, the ''satans"; and the prodemocracy, the "angels". Indeed, the political polarization could be traced back to the time when the 1991 Constitution was adopted. There were two opposing camps then: one belonged to the pro-democracy parties which had campaigned for an elected prime minister, and the other comprised pro-military parties which were prepared to accept a non-elected military officer as prime minister. It is also important to note here that even before the March election, the four pro-military parties - Samakkhi Tham, Chart Thai, Social Action, and Prachakorn Thai- had agreed to form a coalition if they together won a majority. They had also agreed to support a '"middle person" or a non-elected person to become prime minister, which meant General Suchinda. They had estimated that they could easily win at least 200 seats. based on the electability track records of their candidates. (However. the defeat of Prachakorn Thai - it won only 7 seats nation-wide as opposed to 31 in the previous election of 1988 -had upset their hopes of having a comfortable working majority. As a result, the total number of seats for the pro-military alliance came up to 19 I. A fifth party - Rassadorn [Citizens] - was brought in, increasing the total to 195 seats [see Appendix Table 3].) By the same token, as early as when the 1991 Constitution included a clause which allowed a non-elected person to assume the premiership, the four antimilitary parties- the Democrat, New Aspiration, Palang Dharma, and Solidarity - and other activist groups launched a campaign against the clause. A public

The May Incide11t: General Suchinda's Fall and New Democratic Inputs

27

rally was planned to take place at Sanam Luang Park on 19 November 1991 to air the opposing view. But Suchinda, realizing that such a move against him would have discredited him and the military establishment as a whole, tried to pre-empt it by declaring on 18 November 1991 that he and other key military figures in the junta would not accept the premiership after the election. He emphasized that the military top brass would go back to their barracks unconditionally. That move certainly dispelled doubts in the public's mind about Suchinda's ambition, although eventually the clause allowing a non-elected person to assume premiership was retained. Prior to the May crisis, General Suchinda commanded a great deal of respect from the Thai public. In fact, the public tacitly supported him when he staged a coup against the Chatichai government. The people believed that the General was a man of integrity and honour. By announcing that he would not accept the premiership and would not interfere in politics, he instilled in the people's minds a sense that he would be able to help demilitarize politics, something the public had long been calling for. So, when Suchinda eventually accepted the premiership on 7 April 1992, people were outraged. People felt that they were cheated by Suchinda and the military. Furthermore, Suchinda made things worse by including politicians he himself had accused of corruption in the Cabinet, and by promoting his close friends to key military positions. Suchinda was then seen as trying to build his own "dynasty". The public perception was that Suchinda was prepared for a long haul of military control in politics.

United Front Against Suchinda As a result, a united front of sorts against Suchinda emerged. The four main opposition parties were united in their goal to amend the "'dictatorial" clauses in the Constitution. The parts that they wanted to amend included: only an elected MP can be appointed prime minister; the Speaker of the House of Representatives should also be the president of Parliament; the power of the senate should be reduced to only screening bills from the Lower House and not participating in a critical motion like a vote of no-confidence. These pro-democracy parties had agreed before the March election that they would push for these amendments once they were in Parliament. In contemporary Thai political context, such a strong front among these opposition parties was unprecedented. Indeed, their common stand on having an elected MP as premier was what most united them. The unprecedented unity suggests a stronger resentment against the military's control in politics. Other pro-democracy groups which shared the same political goal with the opposition parties were a loosely formed coalition of intellectuals, students,

28

Thailand's Two General Elections in 1992

professionals, low- to middle-ranking government officials, and the business community. This coalition was initially brought about by the formation of Pol!Watch, a non-partisan election-monitoring body. The significance is that unlike in the past when the pro-democracy groups were mainly student activists who fought on for only a short period, this time the pro-democracy forces seemed to be able to stay united for a longer period. The agenda of the pro-democracy forces was also broad enough to appeal to every sector of Thai society. Their top priority was to put parliamentary democracy on a firmer foundation. The agenda appealed to the business community which had become increasingly involved in the business of politics. And its desire for a firmer democratic system was more pronounced than in the past.

Suchinda's Intimidation Suchinda, on his part, launched a counter move against the pro-democracy forces, a move which in fact precipitated the May crisis; the confrontations between the pro-democracy and pro-military forces were very much in place before May. Various important events after the March election indicated that the May bloodshed was almost unavoidable. The political temperature began to rise the day after the March election. As rumours of a non-elected "middle person" - Suchinda being offered the premiership spread, students and political activists were planning to stage a mass demonstration at a park adjacent to Thammasat University Sanam Luang Park - on that very same day. And the military was prepared to confront the pro-democracy movement. A secret military order was issued, calling on low-ranking military officers and their family members to gather at Sanam Luang Park to confront the prodemocracy demonstrators. But news of this military order leaked out, and the military top brass was forced to cancel the order, according to Khao Piscs, an influential Thai-language political magazine. 7 The students went ahead with their demonstration, with military units in full combat gear manning the park and keeping a close watch on the demonstrators. The sight was indeed intimidating, although nothing untoward happened. The anti-military forces increasingly gained strength. On 20 April 1992, some 50,000 people - a conservative estimate - rallied at the Royal Plaza near Parliament House despite warnings from key military figures. By Thai standards the rally was large and had great political significance. The rally was organized by the four main opposition parties and was focused on Suchinda's untrustworthiness. The leaders of the rally accused Suchinda of trying to perpetuate military power in politics and to plunge the country into another era of dictatorship. Candles were lit by demonstrators to symbolize the dispelling of"political darkness"

The May Incident: General Suchinda's Fall and New Democratic Inputs

29

brought about by Suchinda. The scene was dramatic and the weight against Suchinda was getting heavier. In another move to put pressure on Suchinda, a former MP, Chalard Vorachad, staged a hunger strike the day Suchinda became prime minister, and at one time he was joined by forty other persons. Chalard, who is a well-known political fighter and had staged several political hunger strikes in the past, demanded that Suchinda get himself elected first before becoming prime minister. Chalard's action impressed the Thai people, and quickly raised the political temperature in April, the hottest month of the year. Some expressed their fear of losing Charlard's life and wanted to stop him from carrying on with his hunger strike. Suchinda dismissed Chalard's action as being "politically irrelevant". Meanwhile, the government has instructed the government-controlled media not to report on the activities of the opposition. Chalard's hunger strike was not shown on television, although the press continued to give extensive coverage to his cause. There were also reports at the time that a student leader had been under surveillance by security personnel, indicating that there was intimidation of antigovernment personalities. Chuan Leekpai, leader of the Democrat Party, disclosed that he had received several death threats during the time. People in the media were also harassed. The windshield of the car belonging to Suthichai Yoon, publisher and editor of the Nation, which carried critical news and editorials on the military, was smashed, perhaps as a warning to him and others like him not to criticize the military.

The Showdown: The Bloody 17-20 May As already mentioned, tensions arose from the first day Suchinda became the nineteenth prime minister of Thailand on 7 April. Unlike other newly installed governments, which usually enjoy a brief "honeymoon" period without being bothered by the opposition, Suchinda 's government was met with strong attacks from the opposition from Day One in Parliament. But what was more important was that the real tension and opposition was happening outside of Parliament. Parliament no longer served as a sufficient forum where people's resentment against Suchinda could be voiced. Outside Parliament House, a sizeable number of people were gathering beside Chalard, the hunger striker, every day. The press carried daily news and commentaries against Suchinda for having gone back on his words. But Suchinda kept his cool, and brushed off all tirades and demands. MPs from the opposition parties wore black suits or black armbands to their first Parliament session on 16 April to "mourn the death of democracy in Thailand", and staged a walk-out the moment Suchinda took to the podium to deliver his policy statement on 6 May.

30

Thailand's Two General Elections inl992

Another dramatic turn of event emerged on 5 May when former MajorGeneral Cham long Srimuangjoined Chalard in his hunger strike outside Parliament House. Chamlong vowed to fast to death unless Suchinda resigned. Having himself been a former army general - two years behind Suchinda at the influential Chulachomklao Military Academy - and having had an impressive combat experience, Chamlong's decision lent a far greater weight to the movement against Suchinda. On the part of Suchinda, to have a former military colleague go against him effectively put him on the defensive. Furthermore, another person who was backing the anti-Suchinda coalition was Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, a former boss of Suchinda. As a result, Suchinda increasingly saw himself fighting with his former colleagues- or as Thais have come to know, "brothers". The General was unusually upset and hit harder at the leaders of the protesters, particularly Cham long and Chavalit, alleging that Chamlong was trying to propagate his own sect of Buddhism, and Chavalit for having communistic leanings. Suchinda made these accusations in the hope that this would paralyse the two main opposition leaders, but the public saw in it Suchinda's desperation. The situation turned from bad to worse. On 7 May, Supreme Commander Kaset Rojananil ordered the protesters to disperse, but some 70,000 continued to gather at Sanam Luang Park, about two kilometres from the Parliament ground. On 9 May, Chamlong called off his hunger strike, saying that he needed energy to fight on until Suchinda resigned. Suchinda was insistent that he would never yield to the pressure from the protesters, and would only step down in the event that the Constitution required him to do so. As political tensions heightened, the Speaker of the House, Arthit Urairat, moved to amend the Constitution to appease the demands of the protesters, and on 9 May, announced that the five-party coalition had agreed to amend the Constitution. He promised that an amendment would be made in a week. So the rally was called off the next day, and 17 May was set as the day to resume protests if the charter changes were not made as promised. Before the May bloodshed, there were two other big protests - one on 20 April, the other between 4 and II May. It is important to note that the protests on 20 April and those between 4 and 11 May were organized by four anti-military political parties and other democratic groups including the labour movement and student unions. But from 17 May on, the start of the May crackdown, the main actors in the rally were not political parties, but other pro-democratic forces and activist groups known as the "Federation for Democracy". The federation was led by Chamlong Srimuang, who by then had resigned as leader of the Palang Dharma Party. There were six other members of the federation who were not leaders of any political parties. They were Prateep Ungsongtham Hata, a Magsaysay award winner for her work on slum dwellers in Bangkok, Dr Sant Hatteerat, a professor at a medical school, and Dr Weng Tojirakarn, a private medical doctor,

The Ma\' Incident: General Suchinda's Fall and New Democratic Inputs

31

Parinya Tewanaruemitkul, a student leader, Chitri V orachad, daughter of Chalard Vorachad, and Somsak Kosaisook, an activist Sunday, 17 May: The First Blood Was Shed On Sunday, I 7 May, a rally was held at Sanam Luang Park, adjacent to Thammasat University, where another bloody military crackdown on demonstrators took place on 6 October 1976. As the evening drew near, the crowd quickly swelled. By various conservative estimates more than 100,000 people attended the rally, which was organized by the Federation for Democracy. A number of speakers, including politicians, were invited to take turns on stage to denounce Suchinda and his coalition partners for reneging their position on the amendment of the Constitution. They also demanded that Suchinda resign. There was no sign of a political way out, as Suchinda remained adamant on being prime minister, but the protesters were confident and upbeat. No one had any inkling of the imminent disaster awaiting them only hours later. At about 9 p.m., part of the crowd led by Chamlong Srimuang decided to move from Sanam Luang to the Government House, about one kilometre away, to demand Suchinda's resignation. But the first crowd of some 30,000 people was blocked by the police, who put out a barbed wire barricade on the Phan Fa Bridge, about half way to the destination. Some protesters tried to break the barricade, only to be hit back by water cannons from the police. Some protesters tried to seize a water truck, but were hit by police clubs. Stones and Molotovs were thrown at the policemen, who retaliated by clubbing more protesters. Some 100 protesters were injured. By midnight troops were sent in to reinforce the police force, and a state of emergency was declared, banning demonstrations after police vehicles and a nearby police station were set on fire. The state of emergency order effectively empowered the use of force- particularly military force - to suppress the demonstrators. From then on, Suchinda decided to deal with the demonstrators by military force. An account by a reporter who called it "the last interview with Suchinda" confirmed this. The reporter who covered Suchinda's drought inspection trip early in the day to Nan province in the north of Thailand reported that Suchinda left a hotel in the province shortly after midnight of 17 May. There, reporters managed to catch Suchinda, who forced his dry smile on journalists who were waiting for him at that hour upon hearing that a clash between protesters and the security forces had taken place earlier on in the night. Here are some questions and answers exchanged briefly between the journalists and the Prime Minister before the latter left the hotel for Bangkok: "Sir, have you issued any order to Bangkok?" "Nothing. I am about to declare a state of emergency."

32

Thailand's Two General Elections in 1992

·'Are you sure that you can keep the situation under contro!'J" ··sure. It will be under control." "Will you dissolve the House'?" ''There is nothing to do with that. There is only the issue of suppressing the riots." "How much time do you need to resolve the crisis'!" "It will be completed tonight."'

18 May: The Bloodiest Day and the Arrest of Chamlong

The initial clash between the demonstrators and the police on the night of 17 May might have been an accident derived from an increasingly angry mob, but from the early morning of 18 May on, it was a deliberate use of force, as Suchinda had said earlier on, to quell the demonstrators, which he expected to be "completed [by] tonight [18 May]". That explains why 18 May was the bloodiest day of the crackdown. Following the declaration of a state of emergency, troops replaced the police units, and the shooting began - fortunately most of the shots were fired into the air. The troops fired sporadic shots between 3 a.m. and 6 a.m. that day, and some deaths were reported. At daybreak, about 10,000 troops took control of the Ratchadamnoen Avenue - the main avenue connecting Sanam Luang Park to the Government House- and continued to fire shots into the air and in the afternoon arrested Chamlong Srimuang, who was up to that moment leading the crowd. Several other protesters were also rounded up, stripped of their shirts, and had their hands tied up. Still, thousands of angry protesters defied the military crackdown and the most intense shootings occurred between I 0.20 and I 0.40 p.m. 9 It was believed that that was the time when most deaths occurred. Well into the night, the demonstrators burnt down the Public Relations Department on the Ratchadamnoen in retaliation against the crackdown. The fire spread to the nearby Revenue Department. At the same time, up to 100 motorcyclists supporting the protesters roamed around the city and vandalized traffic lights and other government properties. The so-called government ''head-hunters'' comprising mainly military men chased them, and either arrested or killed them. The whole city was indeed in chaos. 19 May: The Crackdown Continued and the Protesters Held New Ground

Troops continued to round up the protesters who sought shelter at the Royal Hotel on Ratchadamnoen and nearby buildings, and they kept firing shots in an all-out attempt to eradicate what were known to them as "rioters''. Apart from Chamlong, the government also planned to arrest other prominent figures on charges of inciting the riots. They included General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, Prasong Soonsiri, then adviser to Chamlong, Veera Musikapong, deputy leader

The May lncidenr: General Suchinda's Fall and New Democratic Inputs

33

of Chavalit's New Aspiration Party. Life in the city came to a complete halt, as buses stopped running and schools, offices, and shops were closed. The international community poured in their condemnations and urged the military to cease its barbaric suppression. Protesters did not give up. Several tens of thousands of protesters assembled in a new place on the eastern side of Bangkok at Ramkhamhaeng University, setting up a barricade against possible assault by the military. Demonstrations also spread out to major provinces in the country, such as Chiang Mai in the north, Khon Kaen, and Nakhon Ratchasima in the northeast, and Nakhon Srithammarat, Songkhla, Krabi, Trang, and Pattani provinces in the south. 20 May: The Royal Intervention

The suppression in Thailand was constantly broadcast abroad. The most dramatic footage aired abroad was the scene at the Royal Hotel on Ratchadamnoen Avenue, in which the military stormed the hotel, fired shots, hit with their gun butts, kicked and stepped over the demonstrators. The protesters were ordered to face down and put their hands over their heads. Frantic and vulgar shoutings from the troops were heard loud and clear on television. Thais who were abroad were greatly shocked to see that. Overseas Thais attempted their best to get the people in Thailand know what was being done to help them. Particularly, they looked up to the king to intervene in the crisis. Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn, the King's daughter, who was then in France, also saw the footage and read the horrible stories in newspapers there. She was greatly shocked. She said she tried to contact the King since the morning of 19 May but could not get through, until the afternoon. According to her, the King by that time had already learnt of the shootings. 111 The Princess managed to record her pleas to her people on a videocassette, urging all parties to stop the violence, and sent it to air in Thailand. The Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn, who was in South Korea, also pleaded with both sides to come to a compromise. Back in Thailand, the King had decided to intervene to resolve the crisis himself. According to Sanya Dharmasakti, Chairman of the Privy CounciL which advises the King, the councillors met on 19 May at 4 p.m. at the residence of Prem Tinsulanonda. another key councillor, and resolved to request the King to appoint Prem to intervene in the conflict since the former general knows both Suchinda and Chamlong very well. "But, unexpectedly, the King decided to intervene and resolve the situation himself," Sanya said. 11 Suchinda and Cham long were summoned to the Chitralada Palace and were asked to cease their struggle against each other. After an audience with the King, Suchinda and Chamlong appeared side by side on television. Suchinda promised to speed up constitutional

34

Thailand's Two General Elections in 1992

amendments, while Chamlong urged the public to cease their protests.

Breaking the Political Impasse: Constitutional Changes and the Re-Appointment of Anand Panyarachun as Premier On 25 May, one day after the resignation of Suchinda, the government coalition parties, clearly conceding to public demands, amended the 1991 Constitution. The amendment included: (I) requiring a prime minister to be an elected member of the House; (2) curbing the power of the appointed senate to only screening legislations; (3) making the Speaker of the Lower House president of Parliament, and; (4) allowing a no-confidence motion to be moved in the second session of the parliamentary year. The first and second readings of the constitutional amendment were done on the same day, but the third and final readings required a two-week recess, after which it was passed. In the aftermath of Suchinda's downfall, the Speaker of the House, Arthit Urairat, who was empowered to propose a name for the post of prime minister to the monarch was extremely receptive to public sentiments against pro-Suchinda parties, although he himself was from a coalition party. Clearly, Arthit no longer sided with government parties. He first urged all political parties to abolish the divide between the government coalition and the opposition and to form a national reconciliatory government. When that failed, he deliberately gave ample time to opposition parties to form an alternative government. Arthit was under pressure by his own party members and others in government parties to propose a name from the coalition. The five-party coalition partners attempted to form a government, and hoped to use the opportunity as a power-that-be to clear their names. The coalition nominated Somboon Rahong, leader of the Chart Thai Party, the second largest party, to be the prime minister. But the public continued to resist the same coalition since it was behind Suchinda in the military crackdown on the demonstrators, and it had not taken any responsibility for it. An influential monthly political magazine splashed on its cover: "The country will plunge into turmoil, if the fiveparty coalition is back in the government again." 12 The pro-democracy forces, including academics, the business community, and others were calling for a change of parties in the government. The four-party opposition proposed an alternative by nominating Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, leader of NAP, the largest party in the opposition, as prime minister, and his name was submitted to the House Speaker, Arthit Urairat. Chavalit's task was to woo the Social Action Party, which had 31 seats, to join his side so that he could have a majority in the House. The opposition then had 165 seats. But the SAP decided to stick with its previous partners. So, Chavalit's attempt failed. The opposition attempted once more to

The Mav Incident: General Suchinda's Fall and New Democratic Inputs

35

provide the Speaker of the House with an alternative- this time, Chuan Leekpai of the Democrat Party. Chuan was pinning his hopes of forming a government on support from Chatichai' s faction in the Chart Thai Party. Chatichai had earlier expressed support for Chuan to be prime minister. But the attempt also failed. A tight political deadlock was in place, with Arthit facing pressure from both sides to decide on the choice for the premiership. Arthit Urairat then decided to postpone submitting a name for the prime minister to the King, saying that he would do that after 10 June - after the third and final reading of the amendment to the Constitution. Talks about having a "middle person" as prime minister soon surfaced, and calls for a dissolution of the House of Representatives got louder. Three powerful institutions from the private sector- the Board of Trade of Thailand, the Council of Thai Industries, and the Thai Banks Association- and other academics called for a dissolution of the House to break the political deadlock, so that the country could get on with patching up political wounds and repairing economic damages. Provincial trade associations also joined in the demand to dissolve the House. And in a highly surprising move, on 10 June, Anand Panyarachun, who had left the office as prime minister just less than two months earlier, was re-appointed to head a new government. The appointment of Anand was indeed dramatic. Apparently, Arthit had decided for some time to propose Anand's name to the King, but had kept silent. Arthit during the time continued to give the impression that Somboon Rahong, the choice of the coalition, would be appointed. According to Somboon, he even received a call from the Palace earlier on in the day that he would be appointed prime minister. On that day a big feast was prepared at Somboon's residence. Somboon was dressed in a royal white suit with decorations, a gesture which suggested his imminent appointment. A huge crowd of reporters were gathering at Somboon's place. A television station set up its equipment to do a live telecast from Somboon' s. Somboon was shocked when he learnt later that the appointment went to Anand, but the public was relieved at the appointment. In his first administration, Anand had set a lot of structural reforms in place, making, for example, bureaucratic affairs and governance more transparent. In his second time as prime minister, Anand was entrusted with three most important tasks: patching up the damages and winning back confidence from abroad; reshuffling military officers who were involved in the May crackdown. and holding a fresh general election. Anand, acting on the recommendations of General Pichit Kullavanich's committee investigating the May incident, and Minister of Defense, General Banchob Bunnag, in early August removed key military officers who were responsible for the May shootings. They included Air Chief Marshal Kaset

36

Thailand's Two General Elections in 1992

Rojananil, who was removed from the post of Supreme Commander to an inactive post of Inspector General of the Armed Forces; General Issarapong Noonphakdee, from Chief of the Army to a far less powerful post of Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Defense Ministry; General Viroj Saengsanit, from Deputy Chief of the Army to Deputy Permanent Secretary ofthe Defense Ministry; Lieutenant-General Chainarong Noonphakdee, from Commander of the First Army Region to a staff position as director of a defense college. Anand also succeeded in de-militarizing various public enterprises which had been sources of financial support from the military. Air Chief Marshal Kaset was removed from the chairmanship of Thai International, the national tlag carrier; General Issarapong was dismissed as chairman of the Telephone Organization of Thailand; Air Chief Marshal Anan Kalinta, an Interior Minister in the Suchinda government, was dismissed from chairmanship of the Communications Authority of Thailand. As a gesture to support Anand's move, General Vimol Wongwanich, current Chief of the Army, voluntarily resigned his chairmanship of the State Railways Authority of Thailand. At the same time, Anand had moved vigorously to ensure a clean election by first appointing his close associate, former national police chief, General Pow Sarasin, as Interior Minister to oversee the election. Secondly, Anand attempted to further strengthen PollWatch, which was first established before the March election, and make sure that Interior Ministry officials gave their fullest cooperation to his policy. Anand personally inspected a number ofkey constituencies best known for having "dark influences".

Lessons from the May Crisis The Military's Wrongdoings

It has now been established that the May incident. which is better known as "Black May", was the worst political violence in Thailand's recent history. Deputy Prime Minister, Meechai Ruchuphan, who acted as head of the government after the resignation of Suchinda, appointed a committee headed by a former Chief Justice Sophon Ratanakorn to investigate the bloody incident. Later, Interim Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun also appointed another committee headed by the then Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Defense Ministry, General Pi chit Kullavanich. Both committees had concluded their findings and submitted their reports to Anand before the September election. However, only the report by Sophon's committee was made available to the public, with some sensitive sections deleted. Pichit's report has been kept confidential, presumably because it contains more sensitive information.

The May Incident: General Suchinda's Fall and New Democratic Inputs

37

Sophon's committee spent about two months preparing the report, interviewing both leaders and participants of the protests and key persons from the military and the police. The committee's aim was first to establish what actually happened between 17 and 20 May, then offer observations and recommendations as to what measures a government should take in the event of similar situations. The committee, which was divided into six sub-committees, suggested that the Suchinda government was biased towards using military force to deal with the protesters as early as 7 May. The evidence was an order contained in a plan called "Pireepinart/33" (Operation Enemies Crushed/33) to have the military prepare to suppress "rioters". The report says, That plan in effect put the military and police forces in confrontation with the people, which in turn angered the public and invited more and more people to join the protest, to the extent that it was hard to disperse the protesters."

The committee strongly felt that although the officers were acting under a lawful order, "the shooting into the crowd, onto the street ... is a mistake in resolving the problem ... and is carelessness on the part of the officers who implemented the plan". 14 The gist of the committee ·s conclusion is that the Suchinda government was in fact not looking for other political alternative to deal with the protesters, but was set to deal with the people militarily from the very beginning. The committee also established that damages during 17-20 May were estimated at 32,890 million baht. These damages included the burning of seven government buildings, medical costs for those who suffered from the incident, and loss of income to the government and private sectors because of the disruption. 1' As of September 1992, the government established that fifty-two people were killed in the incident and 217 others were still missing. 16 Furthermore, the Anand II government established a committee under the supervision of the Interior Ministry to search for the missing persons. And Prime Minister Chuan further requested the committee to speed up the search. The Misinterpretation of an Earlier Conflict

Earlier, although the resentment against Suchinda was undoubtedly spontaneous, the impression was that it was a conflict between "brothers" of the Chulachomklao Military Academy. After 4 May. when Chamlong vowed to fast to death to demand Suchinda's resignation, the conflict looked even more personal: with Chamlong and Chavalit on one side and Suchinda on the other. all of whom were from the same military academy. Chavalit was from Class One of the Chulachomklao Military Academy, while Suchinda was from Class Five and Chamlong, Class Seven. They were once "brothers" and used to work more or less together, but

3~

Thailand's Two General Elections in /992

intra-military politics divided them. Both Chavalit and Chamlong saw Suchinda's becoming prime minister through non-elected means as an attempt by the Suchinda clique to entrench themselves in politics, thus blocking them in their path to the top job. As for Suchinda, he viewed the actions of Chamlong and Chavalit as their personal crusades against him, but strategically using some democratic principles to appeal for public support. In fact, Suchinda referred to "my conflict with Major-General Chamlong" 17 in his statement of I R May, accusing Chamlong of agitating the crowd to use violence against the government security forces. Suchinda's view was substantiated by the fact that Chamlong had earlier written a personal letter - through the press - to Suchinda, urging the latter to give up the premiership. In the letter, Chamlong addressed Suchinda as "Pee Su" ·'pee" means older brother and "Su" is a nickname of Suchinda. What was more serious was that Suchinda believed what he thought were the ulterior motives other than political objectives of Chamlong and Chavalit. But Cham long and Chavalit based their struggle on a more justifiable principle, while Suchinda lacked a strong basis for argument. He tried repeatedly to argue that the Constitution permits him to assume the premiership, and that the majority of the MPs, in the form of coalition partners, supported him. He asked, "How else can we measure public support except by the number of MPs in Parliament?" But his argument was seen as an excuse for being in power, something which was in line with what the military had done until then. The Constitution was seen after all as having been written by the military, and MPs were somehow subjugated to the military's influence. Whatever Suchinda might have wanted to believe, by then the political tension was already well beyond a conflict among ''brothers" of the Chulachomklao Military Academy.

The "Middle Class Moh'' One of the most phenomenal sights during the May incident was the extensive participation of the so-called "middle class", unlike the uprising on 14 October 1973. which was dominated by students. These were well-to-do people in their thirties and forties. They were business entrepreneurs. corporate executives. company functionaries. teachers. academics, doctors, and other professionals. In terms of their status. these people were well equipped with wealth and considerable management skills or were advancing in their respective professions. In terms of experience, they had good education and in their university years learnt firsthand about democracy during the 1970s. Of course, other groups such as students and workers were also active in the protests but the high visibility of these Thai "yuppies" led to the notion of ''middle-class mob" or "yuppies mob" when they first launched protests against the military junta over a draft of the Constitution

The May Incident: General Suchinda's Fall and New Democratic Inputs

39

in November 1991. A great many of these protesters came to the rally in their Mercedes Benz or other expensive cars, along with their handphones- a symbol of the yuppies of the 1990s. They were of course well-dressed, unlike jeanswearing university students. And their protests were well-timed- well after work hours. These people had a clearer idea of what they were demanding for. They could speak of democracy and freedom realistically. They knew from day-to-day experience that this was the basis that stabilized their well-being, their businesses, and their country. They believed that absolute power would corrupt and bring about a suppression, so they wanted a system with established credible checksand-balances on the business of governance; and they expected greater participation in the decision-making of running the country. The protests at Sanam Luang Park and Ratchadamnoen Avenue were only the tip of the iceberg. Wider support was extended by those people in the background who provided money and the basic equipment for bringing the protests to the attention of the international community, such as fax and copying machines. As Professor Prawes Wasi, a well-respected Thai scholar, put it: "Nobody can fight long if their stomach is empty." x Prawes was referring to the fact that these well-to-do people played a great role in providing not only ideas but also material support in a political fight. 1

V

THE 13 SEPTEMBER ELECTION: CHOOSING THE RIGHT PRIME MINISTER

The issue of who was to be the prime minister was very crucial in the September election. Even though the public expected the premiership to be filled by one of the leaders from the pro-democracy camp, the major contenders for the post particularly Chavalit, Chamlong, and Chuan - had different personality traits and policy agenda. In spite of their common stand against having a non-elected prime minister, competition among them was intense. Defying all polls - a newly introduced phenomenon in Thai elections the Democrat Party grabbed the most number of seats in Parliament, 79 in the September election. The Democrats themselves never expected their party to score such a victory, which made the party the core with which to form the new government. Earlier on in the campaign, polls showed that the Chart Pattana Party of Chatichai Choonhavan was leading, but later the Palang Dharma of Chamlong Srimuang was seen to be moving ahead. During the ten days of the campaign there were unexpected turn of events and factors which put the Democrats in front. First of all, as the campaign was drawing to an end, there were doubts about the credibility of the leaders of some parties. whether they were fit to head a government. When Chatichai was leading in the polls people doubted his suitability for the top job because of his pending case of corruption, which the militaryappointed committee lodged against him after the 1991 coup. A Chatichai political come-back would also bring about a political dilemma which could lead to political instability. As it turned out, the more Chatichai projected himself as the next prime minister the more it became his political liability. His statement that he was ready to become prime minister would immediately be taken up by political rivals contending that he lacked the credibility to lead the country. Chatichai was eventually forced to declare that he would not accept the premiership even if his party had won the most number of seats. 19 That announcement of Chatichai improved prospects for the Democrat Party leader, Chuan Leekpai. Better chances

The /3 Septemher Election: Choosing the Right Prime Minister

41

for Chuan were also raised by the weakening of another anti-military party, the New Aspiration, due to a defection prior to the September election. The NAP leader, Chavalit, was also seen as one who contrasted too sharply with the military, and a government led by him would see stark confrontation with the present military leadership. Chavalit's premiership was therefore seen as being very destabilizing for the country. On the part of Cham long Srimuang, the de facto leader of Palang Dharma Party was increasingly seen as an extremist~ which is uncharacteristic of Thais ~and thus would be a political liability. Thais saw that what the country needed most after the election was reconciliation so that there is stability in the country for economic well-being and social order. Especially now that the country is so dependent on foreign investment, sustainable political stability is crucial so that foreign investors have confidence to invest in the country. This view was of course propagated by the so-called "middle-class" Thais who fear political instability the most and whose influence in politics has taken on a new form. Consequently, Chuan Leekpai, known for his reasonable, pragmatic, compromising style, was increasingly seen as the right person to lead the next government. In fact several public opinion polls showed that Thais saw Chuan as the most suitable person for the premiership. As will be discussed later, Bangkokians are the best reflection of the political mood in Thailand, having no strong patron-client relationship with parliamentary candidates as compared with rural Thais. And this time Bangkokians voted in nine seats for the Democrats, compared with only. one the last time, showing an increased acceptance of the Democrat Party. The number of votes shows very clearly that the same people who voted for the PDP in the March election gave their votes to the Democrat Party in the September election. A number of PDP candidates, including Chamlong himself, received a reduced number of votes even though they got elected the second time. One interpretation of this is that Bangkokians had doubts about Chamlong's style of leadership. Understandably, in the September election, the PDP tried to capitalize on Chamlong's heroic role in bringing down the Suchinda government. Certainly, without Chamlong's stubbornness, determination, and combative style, Suchinda might have been able to continue on as prime minister. But such a strategy did not fare well for the PDP ~ at least in the Bangkok area ~ because the more his party members invoked the events of May, the more people, especially the moderates, were reminded of Chamlong's combative style, particularly in the wake of the growing notion that Chamong should also be held responsible for the deaths of the demonstrators whom he led to confront the military. At first, the Democrat Party, sharing the same political objective of opposing the military, did not take advantage of the assertion about Cham long's "leading people to die",

42

Thailand's Two General Elections in 1992

but when accused of being indecisive and of letting the people down in the May event, it came up with its own version of what it did during "Black May". On 2 September Chuan went on national television and spent most of his time relating some of the crucial things he did during the turbulent May, except letting people down. Chuan claimed he was presented with a no-choice situation to tell the public so as to prevent any damage to his party's and his own credibility. He said he had to clarify his role because he was accused of being a coward. 20 Chuan's version was that during the first most tense situation of 4-11 May when Chamlong vowed to fast to death, he initiated a move for constitutional amendment to disqualify any non-elected person for the premiership, which in effect would have provided Suchinda with a graceful way out. Chuan claimed that the move- which might have taken a bit more time- would save Suchinda' s face and Chamlong's life, as Chamlong was very determined to die at that point. But according to Chuan, Cham long stuck to his terms that Suchinda had to resign immediately. Chuan further claimed to the audience that on 18 May, when the military fired shots at the demonstrators, he played a part in bringing the idea to the attention of senior statesman and Privy Councillor General Prem Tinsulanonda that the monarch intervene in the showdown. Chuan hammered the point home: I may hesitate on some issues if I am not sure about placing people's lives at stake. But I will never hesitate if it comes to the question of choosing between right and wrong. 21

The gist of Chuan 's message was that he himself and the Democrat Party preferred a more moderate way of resolving the national crisis, an argument effectively aimed at contrasting himself with Chamlong. Chuan successfully cleared himself of the allegation that he was indecisive and cowardly by pointing out that he was a principled man: "I admit that I am polite (not indecisive). That's because I am the son of a teacher who taught me to be polite while being firm on urinciples". 22 Certainly, from that moment on Chamlong was on the defensive, as far as voters were concerned. In other debates broadcast on television nation-wide, among prominent party leaders - Chuan, Chavalit, Chamlong, and Chatichai, who were being projected as future prime ministers - Chuan always scored higher points. His answers showed that he was well-read and had kept himself abreast of both domestic and international issues. He could also impress the audience by his understanding of national economic problems and possible solutions. He was always focused, and was able to present himself as intelligent, calm, and polite -character traits which went well with the Thai psyche. He always emphasized the point that people tended to mistake his politeness for indecisiveness. What he was trying to emphasize during those debates was certainly in conformity with

The I 3 September Election: Choosing the Right Prime Minister ---~------

-

43

~-

what he had been known for during the two decades of his political career. But the emphasis made won him points in the political game. Among the four, Chuan, the youngest of all, was the longest-serving politician. There were other fundamental factors which contributed to the victory of the Democrat Party. First of all, the military establishment, which was still powerful but at that point was on the defensive, appeared to prefer the more moderate Democrat to Chamlong's PDP and Chavalit's NAP. To the military, Cham long and Chavalit were their greater enemies compared with Chuan. In other words, compared with Chatichai, Chavalit, and Chamlong, Chuan was seen as probably "the lesser of the four evils". This view might have also been a factor for the moderates casting more votes for the Democrat Party, for they believed it could be a more stabilizing force for the country. Secondly, Chamlong was known as belonging to a radical Buddhist sect, called "Santi-Asoke", that was banned by the mainstream Buddhist Supreme Council three years ago. The mainstream Buddhist monks in particular were not in favour of Cham long as the prime minister, and this had an impact at the village level where monks are social and spiritual leaders. Thirdly, and probably more importantly, was the support from the influential business community, particularly from the cash-rich Council of Thai Industries, the Board of Trade of Thailand, and the Thai Banks Association. These associations were in full support of Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun, and Chuan's announcement that he would continue with the economic liberalization policy of Anand could be viewed as an attempt to draw support from the business groups. It was said that Anand's political coalition actually shifted its support to Chuan. Chatcharin Chaiwat, editor-in-chief of an influential political magazine, Khao Piscs, pointed out that during the September election, the Democrat Party appeared to have the best financial backup, which contributed tremendously to the successful "management" of the campaign. 21 Chatcharin did not suggest that Democrat Party candidates had engaged in money-dumping or vote-buying in the election. In fact the party had been one of the two cleanest- other being the PDP- as far as vote-buying was concerned. Here again, Chuan's style - and the Democrat Party's for that matter - of moderation won him the confidence of the business community, which wanted to see the country stable so that it could grow faster economically. Despite the victory scored by the pro-democracy parties, the hold of promilitary Chart Thai remained very strong. Not only did the party not shtink in size following the defections, but it increased the number of its seats from 74 in the March election to 77 in the September election. Chart Thai had been known for lacking political prowess as an opposition, but with its longer years in politics -more of the same party members were re-elected to Parliament compared with other parties - it now gives the government one of the toughest opponents in

44

Thailand's Two General Elections in 1992

the Lower House. Chart Thai is not to be taken lightly, but to be treated as a political fact of life in Thailand. The party represents "dominant politics" whatever that is- in Thailand, and one should never, therefore, rule out a political come-back of Chart Thai as the core of another government. Three important prerequisites for prominence in Thai politics are money, grassroots support based on patron-client relationship, and strong bureaucratic (including military) connections. Chart Thai has them all- and holds on to them steadily. Recently, the Democrat Party has received increased support from the business community. For Chart Thai, such support has always been there. The contention in Thai politics is increasingly between the Chart Thai-led and the Democrat-led coalitions.

Political Implications of the Election Results What do these election results mean politically? What are some of the new political trends, if any, that have emerged in this election? The following are some preliminary findings: The Election

c~f

a Prime Minister

Among the more important things one can draw from this election is that the people saw a closer linkage between the electoral process and the choice of a prime minister. In other words, electors saw a greater meaning in their votes. In the 1980s, although party leaders also projected themselves as prime ministers in their election campaigns, in reality a prime minister was almost pre-picked by the military. And the public was content with that. For example, Prem Tinsulanonda, though a non-elected person, was a successful prime minister because he was most of all favoured by the military. Other civilians almost had no chance. In 1986 the Democrat Party won 100 seats, the largest number in Parliament, but still the premiership went to Prem. It was not then a reality for a civilian with the largest number of seats in the House to be automatically accepted as prime minister. On the contrary, having a leader of the largest party hold the premiership has now become a practice of sorts in Thai politics since 1988 when Chatichai became the first elected prime minister in twelve years. Thais in a way have internalized that political development as a new political "tradition". And that was the root cause of the May crisis when Suchinda accepted the premiership without having run in an election. The demand for a change in the Constitution in May to have an elected MP assume premiership clearly reflects the need of the people to stabilize this practice. In the September election, this linkage between the election and the choice of a prime minister was even stronger. And the leaders of major political parties,

The 13 September Election: Choosing the Right Prime Minister

45

particularly Chuan, Chavalit, Chamlong, and Chatichai, campaigned on this very issue, projecting themselves as the future prime ministers of the country. The mass media, particularly television, also made it a point to focus on the capability of party leaders as premiers. In other words, the public was now more serious than ever about choosing a leader who was capable of taking on the role of prime minister. Furthermore, this time the people knew for sure that only an elected MP could assume premiership, since that is already stipulated in the present Constitution. This trend will certainly prevail in the future, provided that there are no military coups interrupting the process. What this means politically is that when an election is more closely linked with the selection of a prime minister, it will eventually result in political parties choosing their leaders with the relevant prerequisites. Or if that person does not have the required qualities, he knows what is expected of him and so can be better prepared for it. In the long run this will help improve the party system, which should be expected to have a more rigorous selection process of leaders, policy platforms, and other innovative programmes. With a more systematic party system, the whole Thai political system could be expected to develop further. This is indeed a qualitative change. Regionalized Politics All the political parties have become more regionalized (s