Strategic Friends: Canada-Ukraine Relations from Independence to the Euromaidan 9780773556164

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s t r at e g i c f r i e n d s

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m c gi l l-qu een ’ s s tu di es i n eth nic history s e r i e s on e  don ald harm an a k enson, editor 1 Irish Migrants in the Canadas A New Approach Bruce S. Elliott (Second edition, 2004)

12 Such Hardworking People Italian Immigrants in Postwar Toronto Franca Iacovetta

2 Critical Years in Immigration Canada and Australia Compared Freda Hawkins (Second edition, 1991)

13 The Little Slaves of the Harp Italian Child Street Musicians in Nineteenth-Century Paris, London, and New York John E. Zucchi

3 Italians in Toronto Development of a National Identity, 1875–1935 John E. Zucchi

14 The Light of Nature and the Law of God Antislavery in Ontario, 1833–1877 Allen P. Stouffer

4 Linguistics and Poetics of Latvian Folk Songs Essays in Honour of the Sesquicentennial of the Birth of Kr. Barons Vaira Vikis-Freibergs

15 Drum Songs Glimpses of Dene History Kerry Abel

5 Johan Schroder’s Travels in Canada, 1863 Orm Overland 6 Class, Ethnicity, and Social Inequality Christopher McAll 7 The Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict The Maori, the British, and the New Zealand Wars James Belich 8 White Canada Forever Popular Attitudes and Public Policy toward Orientals in British Columbia W. Peter Ward (Third edition, 2002) 9 The People of Glengarry Highlanders in Transition, 1745–1820 Marianne McLean 10 Vancouver’s Chinatown Racial Discourse in Canada, 1875–1980 Kay J. Anderson 11 Best Left as Indians Native-White Relations in the Yukon Territory, 1840–1973 Ken Coates

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16 Canada’s Jews (Reprint of 1939 original) Louis Rosenberg Edited by Morton Weinfeld 17 A New Lease on Life Landlords, Tenants, and Immigrants in Ireland and Canada Catharine Anne Wilson 18 In Search of Paradise The Odyssey of an Italian Family Susan Gabori 19 Ethnicity in the Mainstream Three Studies of English Canadian Culture in Ontario Pauline Greenhill 20 Patriots and Proletarians The Politicization of Hungarian Immigrants in Canada, 1923–1939 Carmela Patrias 21 The Four Quarters of the Night The Life-Journey of an Emigrant Sikh Tara Singh Bains and Hugh Johnston 22 Cultural Power, Resistance, and Pluralism Colonial Guyana, 1838–1900 Brian L. Moore

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23 Search Out the Land The Jews and the Growth of Equality in British Colonial America, 1740–1867 Sheldon J. Godfrey and Judith C. Godfrey

24 The Development of Elites in Acadian New Brunswick, 1861–1881 Sheila M. Andrew 25 Journey to Vaja Reconstructing the World of a Hungarian-Jewish Family Elaine Kalman Naves

m c gi ll-qu een ’ s s tu di es i n ethnic history s e r i es two  john zu cchi , editor 1 Inside Ethnic Families Three Generations of PortugueseCanadians Edite Noivo

10 The West Indians of Costa Rica Race, Class, and the Integration of an Ethnic Minority Ronald N. Harpelle

2 A House of Words Jewish Writing, Identity, and Memory Norman Ravvin

11 Canada and the Ukrainian Question, 1939–1945 Bohdan S. Kordan

3 Oatmeal and the Catechism Scottish Gaelic Settlers in Quebec Margaret Bennett

12 Tortillas and Tomatoes Transmigrant Mexican Harvesters in Canada Tanya Basok

4 With Scarcely a Ripple Anglo-Canadian Migration into the United States and Western Canada, 1880–1920 Randy William Widdis 5 Creating Societies Immigrant Lives in Canada Dirk Hoerder 6 Social Discredit Anti-Semitism, Social Credit, and the Jewish Response Janine Stingel 7 Coalescence of Styles The Ethnic Heritage of St John River Valley Regional Furniture, 1763–1851 Jane L. Cook 8 Brigh an Orain / A Story in Every Song The Songs and Tales of Lauchie MacLellan Translated and edited by John Shaw 9 Demography, State and Society Irish Migration to Britain, 1921–1971 Enda Delaney

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13 Old and New World Highland Bagpiping John G. Gibson 14 Nationalism from the Margins The Negotiation of Nationalism and Ethnic Identities among Italian Immigrants in Alberta and British Columbia Patricia Wood 15 Colonization and Community The Vancouver Island Coalfield and the Making of the British Columbia Working Class John Douglas Belshaw 16 Enemy Aliens, Prisoners of War Internment in Canada during the Great War Bohdan S. Kordan 17 Like Our Mountains A History of Armenians in Canada Isabel Kaprielian-Churchill 18 Exiles and Islanders The Irish Settlers of Prince Edward Island Brendan O’Grady

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19 Ethnic Relations in Canada Institutional Dynamics Raymond Breton Edited by Jeffrey G. Reitz 20 A Kingdom of the Mind The Scots’ Impact on the Development of Canada Edited by Peter Rider and Heather McNabb 21 Vikings to U-Boats The German Experience in Newfoundland and Labrador Gerhard P. Bassler 22 Being Arab Ethnic and Religious Identity Building among Second Generation Youth in Montreal Paul Eid 23 From Peasants to Labourers Ukrainian and Belarusan Immigration from the Russian Empire to Canada Vadim Kukushkin 24 Emigrant Worlds and Transatlantic Communities Migration to Upper Canada in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century Elizabeth Jane Errington 25 Jerusalem on the Amur Birobidzhan and the Canadian Jewish Communist Movement, 1924–1951 Henry Felix Srebrnik 26 Irish Nationalism in Canada Edited by David A. Wilson 27 Managing the Canadian Mosaic in Wartime Shaping Citizenship Policy, 1939–1945 Ivana Caccia 28 Jewish Roots, Canadian Soil Yiddish Culture in Montreal, 1905–1945 Rebecca Margolis 29 Imposing Their Will An Organizational History of Jewish Toronto, 1933–1948 Jack Lipinsky

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30 Ireland, Sweden, and the Great European Migration, 1815–1914 Donald H. Akenson 31 The Punjabis in British Columbia Location, Labour, First Nations, and Multiculturalism Kamala Elizabeth Nayar 32 Growing Up Canadian Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists Edited by Peter Beyer and Rubina Ramji 33 Between Raid and Rebellion The Irish in Buffalo and Toronto, 1867–1916 William Jenkins 34 Unpacking the Kists The Scots in New Zealand Brad Patterson, Tom Brooking, and Jim McAloon 35 Building Nations from Diversity Canadian and American Experience Compared Garth Stevenson 36 Hurrah Revolutionaries The Polish Canadian Communist Movement, 1918–1948 Patryk Polec 37 Alice in Shandehland Scandal and Scorn in the Edelson / Horwitz Murder Case Monda Halpern 38 Creating Kashubia History, Memory, and Identity in Canada’s First Polish Community Joshua C. Blank 39 No Free Man Canada, the Great War, and the Enemy Alien Experience Bohdan S. Kordan 40 Between Dispersion and Belonging Global Approaches to Diaspora in Practice Edited by Amitava Chowdhury and Donald Harman Akenson 41 Running on Empty Canada and the Indochinese Refugees, 1975–1980 Michael J. Molloy, Peter Duschinsky, Kurt F. Jensen, and Robert J. Shalka

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42 Twenty-First-Century Immigration to North America Newcomers in Turbulent Times Edited by Victoria M. Esses and Donald E. Abelson 43 Gaelic Cape Breton Step-Dancing An Historical and Ethnographic Perspective John G. Gibson

44 Witness to Loss Race, Culpability, and Memory in the Dispossession of Japanese Canadians Edited by Jordan Stanger-Ross and Pamela Sugiman

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45 Mad Flight? The Quebec Emigration to the Coffee Plantations of Brazil John Zucchi 46 A Land of Dreams Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Irish in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Maine, 1880–1923 Patrick Mannion 47 Strategic Friends Canada-Ukraine Relations from Independence to the Euromaidan Bohdan S. Kordan

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S T R AT EG IC FRI ENDS Canada-Ukraine Relations from Independence to the Euromaidan bohdan s. kordan

McGill-­Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Chicago

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©  McGill-Queen’s University Press 2018 ISBN ISBN ISBN ISBN

978-0-7735-5520-4 (cloth) 978-0-7735-5521-1 (paper) 978-0-7735-5616-4 (eP DF ) 978-0-7735-5617-1 (eP UB)

Legal deposit fourth quarter 2018 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, through the Awards to Scholarly Publications Program, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Funding was also received from the St Thomas More College Publications Fund and the Ukrainian Canadian Foundation of Taras Shevchenko.

We acknowledge the support of the Canada Council for the Arts, which last year invested $153 million to bring the arts to Canadians throughout the country. Nous remercions le Conseil des arts du Canada de son soutien. L’an dernier, le Conseil a investi 153 millions de dollars pour mettre de l’art dans la vie des Canadiennes et des Canadiens de tout le pays.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Kordan, Bohdan S., author Strategic friends: Canada-Ukraine relations from independence to the Euromaidan / Bohdan S. Kordan. (McGill-Queen’s studies in ethnic history. Series two; 47) Includes bibliographical references and index. Issued in print and electronic formats. isb n 978-0-7735-5520-4 (hardcover). – is bn 978-0-7735-5521-1 (softcover). – isb n 978-0-7735-5616-4 (ep df ). – is bn 978-0-7735-5617-1 (ep u b ) 1. Canada – Foreign relations – Ukraine. 2. Ukraine – Foreign relations – Canada. 3. Canada – Politics and government – 1993–. 4. Ukraine – Politics and government – 1991–. I. Title. II. Series: McGill-Queen’s studies in ethnic history. Series two; 47 FC 251.U47K67 2018

327.710477

C 2018-905171-X C 2 018-905172-8

This book was typeset by Marquis Interscript in 11 / 13.5 Sabon.

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For Danya, Cherished Love

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Contents

Acknowledgments xiii Introduction 3 1 Negotiating Ukrainian Independence: Brian Mulroney and the Challenge of Systemic Change  14 2 A “Special Relationship”: Jean Chrétien and the Politics of Transition  35 3 “More Canada”: Ukraine, Paul Martin, and Canadian Values 59 4 Stephen Harper and the Euromaidan: Ideological and Geopolitical Perspectives  80 5 Canada-Ukraine Relations: Toward an Understanding  107 Notes 131 Index 153

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Acknowledgments

At a press conference in Moscow on 26 January 2016, the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, reflecting on the state of RussoCanadian relations, criticized Canada for its jaundiced attitude and approach toward Russia. In particular, he faulted the government of Stephen Harper for having sided with “rabid representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora” during the Ukraine crisis. Now that a recently elected Liberal government was in place, Lavrov was optimistic relations would improve. No doubt, then, he must have been surprised when Canada’s new Liberal foreign minister, Stéphane Dion, offered a sharp rebuke in parliament, expressing Canada’s earnest support for Ukraine by stating “how much we deeply disagree with the invasion and interference of the Russian government in Ukraine, and how much we will not tolerate from a Russian minister any insults against the community.” Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. At issue in this case is the nature of the Canada-Ukraine relationship, Canadian foreign policy interests, and Ottawa’s relations with a community that appeared to be conspicuously aligned. These subjects inform a long-standing interest of mine and, with Minister Lavrov’s remarks still ringing in my ears, serve as a foundation and motivation for this book. The process of writing is rarely a solitary affair. Anonymous hands frequently contribute to the making of the story told. This book is no exception. Benefitting from the assistance of others, I acknowledge their contribution with thanks. Leland MacLachlan, whose charming disposition made for easy company, helped me

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xiv Acknowledgments

organize the research materials. I relied on the exceptional ­talents of the indefatigable Mitchell Dowie for a host of jobs, including serving as a sounding board for some of the ideas in this book. Both students shared my interest in the subject and the inter­ action genuinely proved rewarding and satisfying. The graduate program in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Saskatchewan produced these two fine young ­scholars. They are a testament to the program’s strength. Lesia Demkowicz of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress aided my archival search, while Myron Momryk, retired national archvivist, brought to my attention several government documents that proved enormously useful. I am obliged to them both. Over the years, I benefited from the discerning professionalism that guides the editorial staff at McGill-Queen’s University Press. Their commitment has made for a fruitful collaboration. I am ever grateful to the ebullient Jacqueline Mason, M Q U P acquisitions editor, for her interest and encouragement, as well as for shepherding the manuscript through the final editorial stages. Kathleen Kearns was helpful with the external reviews. Ryan Van Huijstee offered a guiding hand throughout the process. Copy editors are unsung heroes, deserving of more praise than usually accorded them. The wordsmith on this manuscript is Correy Baldwin, whose incomparable talent and tremendous effort I acknowledge with admiration and thanks. I am deeply indebted to St Thomas More College at the University of Saskatchewan for granting me a half-year writing sabbatical and the Prairie Centre for the Study of Ukrainian Heritage for providing research support. Publication of this book was made possible through the generosity of the St Thomas More College Publications Fund and the Ukrainian Canadian Foundation of Taras Shevchenko. Families are privy to the toils of a writer and know full well the worries, anxieties, and pressures under which they labour. Perhaps because of this the writer’s journey is less lonely and the doubts easier to bear. For their love, patience, and understanding, there is only gratitude. Words fail to express the profound appreciation and affection that I have for my family: Danya whose gentle soul and caring heart comforts me to no end and Christian whose cheerful laughter and jubilant spirit brings such joy and happiness to my life. They are my treasure.

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s t r at e g i c f r i e n d s

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Introduction

In May 1971, on a state visit to the Soviet Union, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau responded to press questions about imprisoned Ukrainian dissidents and his silence regarding their fate, declaring, “Anyone who breaks the law to assert his nationalism doesn’t get much sympathy from me.” He further added, “I didn’t feel like bringing up any case which would have caused Mr. Kosygin or Mr. Brezhnev to say, ‘Why should you put your [FLQ] revolutionaries in jail, and we not put ours?’”1 Fast forward decades later and weighing in at the height of the crisis on Kyiv’s revolutionary square, or Euromaidan, Prime Minister Stephen Harper voiced his concern over the Ukrainian government’s use of force against protestors who were insisting that Ukraine’s sovereignty be protected. He denounced the government’s action as “undemocratic and excessive.” His comments, however, appeared to go beyond simple rhetoric. Canada, he asserted, expected Ukrainian authorities to respect and protect the rights of its citizens, and in solidarity with the Ukrainian people would “continue to forcefully oppose all efforts to repress their rights and freedoms.”2 To underscore the point, the prime minister added that Canada, in cooperation with like-minded allies, would consider all possible options. The contrast between these two episodes as they relate to Canada’s position on Ukraine is striking. It highlights for us how far the Canadian position has evolved. Indeed, historically, the issue of Ukrainian independence was of little interest to Ottawa. Only to the extent that it had bearing on Canada-Soviet relations

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did it merit attention. Not surprisingly, throughout the Cold War, Ottawa’s stance on the Ukrainian question was carefully tailored with an eye toward avoiding problems deemed sensitive, unwelcome, and even risky.3 It is through this lens that Trudeau’s statement, as an expression of strategic concern, can be understood. However, 2014, the year of the Euromaidan, was not 1971. The global system with its underlying power structure had changed. The Cold War, which had been so pervasive and entrenched, and which had shaped world politics for much of the post-1945 period, was no more. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and demise of the bipolar system, international relations and Ukraine’s place in the world were reworked. It is within this new liberal post-Cold War order that Stephen Harper, responding to the historical gravity of the moment, issued his statement in support of Ukrainian sovereignty. The changes that were brought about as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union greatly disrupted existing power arrangements. It was a momentous event that, although accompanied by much uncertainty, required a response. International recognition of Ukraine’s independence (along with that of the other Soviet republics) was one of a number of options. In the end it was granted. Yet, the decision taken could only occur in the context of a global power shift, highlighting for us the importance of systemwide change in shaping foreign policy. But how do systemic factors influence such decisions and how did Canada choose to work with the events as they unfolded? What were the geopolitical implications of systemic change and how did this affect Canada’s foreign policy towards Ukraine? And what of those other factors that intersect in the making of foreign policy during periods of disruption and change, including the role of leadership and all that this possibly entails? Pierre Trudeau resisted Ukrainian independence because he was ideologically averse to the phenomenon of nationalism. Trudeau’s worldview was born of both his experience as a cosmopolitan and his difficult personal fight with Quebec separatism. Despite aspiring to a rational form of politics, the impulse behind Trudeau’s position on nationalism was emotional and mercurial. Québécois and Ukrainian nationalisms are, of course, historically and culturally distinct. The political contexts in which both movements

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developed were also qualitatively different. That Trudeau ignored these distinctions and conflated all nationalisms as political anachronisms meant that there could be no truck with Ukrainian national aspirations, a point clearly made in 1991 when Trudeau chastised the West for facilitating the collapse of the Soviet Union “by playing footsy with the independentists … recognizing every Tom, Dick and Harry republic that decided to proclaim its independence.”4 Pierre Trudeau staunchly opposed nationalism to the point that it blinded him from critically assessing the nature of the Soviet Union and the historical forces at work. His successor, Brian Mulroney, could not afford to be so indulgent. Foreign policy is not conducted in a vacuum. Canada, like other countries, was confronted with the enormous task of navigating the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Given the inherent danger of the moment, responding to the crisis was of strategic importance. But it also merited caution. In this sense, that Canada took the step of unilaterally recognizing Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence in 1991 was unprecedented. It highlights for us the predilections of the prime minister and, more generally, the role of agency in foreign policy making. If Pierre Trudeau had his preferences, then so too did Brian Mulroney. But this also applies to every Canadian prime minister since then, including Stephen Harper. With Ukraine still in crisis, Canada’s relations with Kyiv have reached a high note. During a 2014 state visit to Canada, Ukraine’s Euromaidan president, Petro Poroshenko, was moved to declare: “Canada is one of Ukraine’s closest partners,” and still later yet that, in Canada, Ukraine had “no better friend” – a heartfelt acknowledgement of Canadian support.5 The comments spoke to Canada’s policy engagement but also denoted the remarkable personal investment of Prime Minister Harper in the relationship. Of this, there can be no doubt. It has led some observers to remark that this was due in part to Harper’s ideological and political convictions. He frequently spoke of “principle” guiding his foreign policy.6 What then are we to make of this? Was “principle” at work here? Oxford scholar Jennifer Welsh argues that no foreign policy is value free.7 In this sense, Harper followed the long Canadian tradition of a values-based approach. But more to the point, parliamentary consensus on support for Ukraine suggests that the values

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driving Canada’s Ukraine policy were nonpartisan. As has been said elsewhere, these were “Canadian” rather than Conservative or Liberal values. That they were also shaped by the prevailing ethos of post-Cold War liberalism meant there would be little fundamental disagreement between the actors no matter who governed. From this perspective the train of successive Canadian governments – Liberal and Conservative – supporting Ukraine can be explained. This, of course, is not to imply that the approach adopted by each government in their relationship with Ukraine was the same. But if their respective approaches were dissimilar, then what distinguishes and accounts for these differences? For example, if Harper’s policy on Ukraine was informed by ideology, then how distinctive was it given the claim that his foreign policy was based on “moral clarity” and “principle?”8 Indeed, when Mulroney acted unilaterally after Ukraine’s independence referendum and Paul Martin intervened at the height of the Orange Revolution to ensure that democracy would be respected, were they not guided by moral and political convictions as well? Systemic factors and agency are important determinants in the foreign policy-making process. But foreign policy also operates with national interests in mind. Security, economics, and politicalcultural considerations dominate the foreign policy discourse. To the degree that foreign policy makers value these objectives and prioritize them, how is this translated into policy prescriptions? Moreover, given the complexity of the nation’s interests and the various constraints and countervailing pressures that necessitate prioritization, how do foreign policy executives go about making these calculations? No foreign policy can be formulated without national interests in mind. In this, Canada is no exception. But how does Ukraine fit into Canada’s foreign policy calculus? What, for example, shaped the Chrétien government’s rationale in casting Canada-Ukraine relations as a national interest? This raises still another question. Is it in the Canadian national interest to maintain a robust relationship with Ukraine? It goes without saying that, for states, security is a principal national interest. The major concern and preoccupation of every state is its own preservation and the protection of its citizens. The current crisis involving Ukraine, Russia, and the West relates to this issue, albeit indirectly. Russia’s seizure and annexation of

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Crimea and its use of hybrid warfare in eastern Ukraine amount to a flagrant violation of that country’s sovereignty. Russia’s actions therefore pose a clear threat to European security and the political principles that frame it in the form of the 1990 Paris Charter. As a consequence, Russia’s actions endanger the stability of the global post-Cold War order. Ultimately, Canada’s support for Ukraine emanates from this concern as well as its interest in preserving international peace. The crisis, however, begs the question whether there is such a thing as “national” interest? Is the Canadian “national” interest inextricably linked to a supra-alliance system to which Canada’s foreign policy, by definition, is bound and acquiescent? Is acquiescence, in this case, a matter of degree or is there an element of independence that on occasion allows for Canada’s fervent support of Ukraine? Under what conditions does this occur? The existing crisis is a significant driver in Canada’s current foreign policy toward Ukraine. It is also true, however, that Canada’s strong support for Ukraine preceded the crisis. In this regard, the decision by the Mulroney government to recognize Ukraine’s independence was as significant as the willingness of the Chrétien government to engage Ukraine when, over time, there was little apparent incentive to do so. The Martin government, too, was supportive during the Orange Revolution. So, what then was the source of this support? Did the overarching commitment to the post-Cold War liberal order play a role? How did this support become manifest across and between governments? Under what circumstances did it increase and around what issues? Democratization and development, for instance, are traditional Canadian foreign policy objectives. These necessarily resonated in the case of Ukraine. But how did each government strategically pursue these objectives? We are constantly reminded that Ukraine’s post-Soviet transition has been difficult. Transition has presented some exceptional challenges in moving the Canada-Ukraine partnership forward – despite its inherent promise. This meant that, in managing the relationship, Canada has supported Ukraine in its reforms while keeping its own interests in mind. Trade relations provide one important example of the difficulty in managing such a dynamic. A CanadaUkraine free trade agreement was to be a hallmark of the relationship. Despite intensive negotiations, the talks stalled in the lead

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up to the Euromaidan as Ukraine failed to meet Canadian expectations.9 This episode mirrors other instances in which progress was equally stymied. The question, therefore, is how did the lack of progress affect the nature or course of the relationship as understood by successive Canadian governments? Was the effect uniform across governments? And how did each government respond to the impediments and challenges confronting reform in Ukraine? The problematic nature of post-Soviet transition in Ukraine is a result of economic change and the social-psychological dislocation that often accompanies massive and rapid adjustment. It is also a consequence of oligopolistic interests that have successfully maneuvered and manipulated Ukraine’s state institutions, adversely affecting the reform process. All of this should have served as a brake on the Canada-Ukraine relationship. Yet the relationship persists. Moreover, perseverance has defined the relationship in a very specific way. It is durable and resilient in nature. But why, given all the difficulties, does Canada stand by Ukraine with all of its complications? The argument usually advanced to explain this puzzle is the electoral heft of the Ukrainian-Canadian community; some 1.2 million Canadians self-identify as being Ukrainian in origin.10 This number creates the impression that Ukrainian Canadians exercise considerable political leverage, especially at the polls. Although this number is impressive, it presumes that Ukrainian Canadians act collectively. Moreover, as a group, Ukrainian Canadians matter electorally in only a handful of federal ridings (four or five at most). Consequently, if the influence does not necessarily lie in electoral clout, what then explains the government’s willingness to entertain support for Ukraine? How are we to understand the quixotic nature of the relationship between the government and the community given the complications in Ukraine? And precisely what role does the community play? The organized community has long pursued an activist agenda with respect to Ukrainian independence. Since 1991, the community has intensified its efforts. This support, however, has also been tempered by a realistic assessment of the political situation in Ukraine. During the long and difficult transition since independence, the Ukrainian-Canadian community has been vocal about widespread corruption, critical of the slow pace of reform, and

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disparaging of the leadership in Ukraine. Despite this criticism, the organized community has petitioned the Canadian government to support the reform process, and has encouraged Ukrainians to stay the course. In addition, the community has been involved in providing humanitarian relief and other forms of aid, including directing efforts from abroad. As expatriates in Ukraine, they have contributed expertise and advice, looking to make a difference in the country’s recent history. Cumulatively, this activity has lent the organized community the appearance of possessing political weight, influence, and authority. But is it simply a question of effective organization or does the community’s message about the importance of Canadian support actually resonate with the government? If it is the message, then what is it about the message that matters? The evidence suggests that the voice of the organized Ukrainian-Canadian community is not only being heard, but actively solicited as well. Under what conditions, then, has the community influenced Canada’s foreign policy toward Ukraine? The Harper government’s approach to foreign policy making has been described as a break with traditional Canadian foreign policy priorities and concerns. The break has been attributed to Harper’s effort to court the interests of “aspirational immigrants,” among others, in creating a conservative coalition.11 This populist orientation has become manifest in the trend to invite ethnic communities directly into the policy-making process, changing the complexion and orientation of Canadian foreign policy. The case of the Ukrainian-Canadian community is cited as one such example. But if there was, in fact, a departure from Canada’s traditional foreign policy approach, how did Stephen Harper differ from Paul Martin and his desire for community input and involvement in Ukraine, or for that matter Jean Chrétien and his efforts at soliciting the Ukrainian-Canadian business community? How did the various governments react to the community’s interest, efforts, and petitions to do more? And if there was a collaborative relationship, relatively speaking, then what accounts for it? For Canada, Ukraine’s difficult transition since independence has made for a less than satisfying relationship, especially since the lack of progress in that country is widely seen to be selfinflicted. Relations with Canada should have withered as a result.

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This has not been the case. Rather, the connection with Ukraine remains strong. Moreover, with the current crisis, it has taken on renewed importance. For this reason alone, Canada-Ukraine relations merit closer scrutiny and attention, thus providing the impetus for this book. This study is about Canadian foreign policy. It is also about Canadian foreign policy as it pertains to Ukraine. It seeks to examine the intersection between global developments and Canada’s evolving foreign policy in light of national interests and domestic factors, as well as human agency, explaining along the way the evolution, development, and resiliency in contemporary CanadaUkraine relations. The analysis eschews traditional meta- and mid-range theories about Canadian foreign policy in favour of a historical, comparative approach that places Canada-Ukraine relations within the context of post-Cold War geopolitical and geostrategic imperatives, national priorities, and political decision making. Focusing on the differences and similarities between governments and widely held assumptions about Ukrainian-Canadian influence, the analysis describes and explains the dynamics of this relationship. The argument advanced here is that Canada’s foreign policy responded to change and that forces at work provided the occasion for unprecedented policy preferences and innovation. Nevertheless, traditional parameters and constraints continued to shape Canada’s relations with Ukraine, accounting for continuity in Canada’s foreign policy. Characteristically, continuity and change have defined the nature of Canada-Ukraine relations since independence. The ensuing narrative follows chronologically the timeline of the post-Cold War era. It begins with the Mulroney government, and then follows the foreign policy aspirations and ambitions of the Chrétien and Martin governments. Developments under the Harper government are subsequently discussed. In each case, issues that are central to understanding the genesis, evolution, and nature of Canada-Ukraine relations are considered with an eye to assessing those responses that give shape and direction to Canada’s foreign policy toward Ukraine. Chapter 1 places Canada’s decision to recognize Ukraine’s independence in the context of both the collapse of the Soviet Union and the accompanying systemic change. Global as well as domestic

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determinants and constraints are detailed and assessed, focusing on the rationale and nature of the Mulroney decision. The chapter describes Canada’s immediate post-independence relations with Ukraine, which conformed to prescribed notions of a liberal peace and worked within parameters that addressed both regional stability and domestic concerns. How these considerations enabled the Mulroney government to exercise a degree of foreign policy independence while preventing it from veering too far away from Canada’s traditional foreign policy moorings is examined and assessed. Chapter 2 focuses principally on Ukraine’s post-Soviet transition and Canada’s association with Ukraine, which under Jean Chrétien followed neoliberal prescriptions on economic development and growth. This approach accentuated the importance of citizen participation and uniquely positioned the Ukrainian-Canadian community with respect to both Ukraine and the Canadian government. It would reinforce what has been termed Canada’s “special relationship” with Ukraine. This “special relationship” did much to fashion Canada’s foreign policy in an idiosyncratic and surprising way, giving rise to the perception that under the Chrétien government the Ukrainian-Canadian community had influence on the foreign policy process. Focusing on Canadian intentions and interest that resulted in a marked shift toward bilateralism with Ukraine, the chapter discusses the nature of the partnership and the role of the community. Opportunity, in the end, was ­limited, illustrating the corrosive effects of corruption, institutional weakness, and the shortage of political capacity required in Ukraine to help sustain the process of transition. Despite the heightened interest and effort, the analysis reveals the limits of Canada’s foreign policy toward Ukraine. Under the short-lived Martin government, Canada’s foreign policy toward Ukraine remained rudimentary as a result of the ongoing and deepening crisis associated with post-Soviet transition. Designed to encourage more than deliver, Canadian foreign policy was handicapped by the debilitating effects of corruption, graft, and intimidation on the Ukrainian body politic. Chapter 3 chronicles Canada’s foreign policy engagement with Ukraine at this time. But it also assesses Canada’s reaction to unexpected change, which took the form of the Orange Revolution. Specifically,

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“Canadian values” were said to have underpinned Canada’s external relations, bringing attention to this important aspect of Canada’s foreign policy tradition. In the context of Ukraine’s political upheaval, the meaning and practical implications of Canada’s values-driven foreign policy is explored and explained, as is the level and nature of government and community cooperation in support of liberal democratic changes in Ukraine. The emphasis on values and civic participation underscores both old and new developments in Canada’s foreign policy course, highlighting the issue of national interest as well as the personal and policy preferences of the prime minister. Despite the Orange Revolution, Ukraine’s ongoing internal difficulties continued. This ensured that Canada-Ukraine relations under the succeeding Harper government would languish, at least until the Euromaidan occurred – a civic movement that responded to political corruption and the concomitant need for transform­ ative change. Chapter 4 outlines, within the context of the Euromaidan and subsequent Russian aggression, how and on what basis Canada strengthened its relations with Ukraine. The response of the Harper government fell squarely within the Canadian tradition of a values-based foreign policy, although ideological and geostrategic considerations framed Prime Minister Harper’s view and approach toward Ukraine in very specific ways, lending the response a distinctive quality. In this regard, the role of ­ideology is examined and explained, as is the prime minister’s emphasis on and concern with international order and security. Of equal interest is how policy relevance conferred legitimacy on the organized Ukrainian-Canadian community and contributed at the time to the perception of the community’s influence on Canadian foreign policy. The concluding chapter offers an interpretation of the complex interplay between post-Cold War global dynamics and national interests, as well as leadership perceptions and preferences – all factors that helped shape Canada’s relations with Ukraine during a period of transition, uncertainty, and expectation. Drawing out the differences and similarities across governments, as well as detailing the role of the community, the analysis emphasizes the fundamental strength of the bilateral relationship. But it also demonstrates how multiple variables intersected to produce the

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undulations that have so come to characterize Canada’s relations with Ukraine from independence to the Euromaidan, factors that will continue to shape relations in new and unexpected ways. The Canada-Ukraine relationship is something of an enigma and, given its resilience, in need of study. This inquiry seeks to address this lacuna, investigating the nature and evolution of the Canada-Ukraine relationship and the dynamics at work. In the process, however, it also helps to reveal the undercurrent of contemporary Canadian foreign policy, and with it a better sense of the developments that have shaped Canada’s response in an age of change and uncertainty.

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1 Negotiating Ukrainian Independence Brian Mulroney and the Challenge of Systemic Change

It was an auspicious occasion when some 400 guests gathered at Ottawa’s majestic Château Laurier hotel on a May evening in 2007 to honour Canada’s eighteenth prime minister, the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney. The former prime minister was to be awarded two medals: the Order of Prince Yaroslav the Wise – the highest honour that Ukraine can confer on a foreign citizen – and the Shevchenko Medal – an award of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UC C ) – a body that represents the collective interests of Ukrainian Canadians before the people and government of Canada. The medals were presented to Mulroney for his contributions to Ukrainian development, especially with regard to the decision taken some sixteen years earlier recognizing Ukraine’s independence. In attendance that evening were Prime Minister Stephen Harper, fourteen members of the government’s cabinet, and numerous other dignitaries. For members of the community, the event served as a gesture of thanks to Mulroney for the singular decision taken so many years ago. That a large number of senior officials were in attendance also reaffirmed the close ties between the community and the Canadian government. For Harper and his government colleagues, their presence was simply a way to pay homage to the venerable statesman and to emphasize Canada’s continuing commitment to Ukraine. As for Mulroney, he took the opportunity to speak of his foreign policy legacy, detailing his decision as part of a wider struggle for freedom, opportunity, and rights.1

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The gala event accomplished a number of things. The highprofile delegation gave the community credibility, bolstering its legitimacy as a partner while positioning it further in its effort to assist Ukraine’s transition. But more importantly, the celebration vindicated the years of hard work on the part of generations of Ukrainian Canadians who supported Ukraine’s struggle for independence. Those in attendance could take some satisfaction in the belief that history had finally proven them right. The event, however, also helped deepen the Harper government’s connections with Ukrainian Canadians. The Harper government seized the occasion to reinvigorate its fortunes with the community – strained somewhat because of its forthright criticism of the reform efforts in Ukraine – by symbolically linking the early resolve of the Mulroney ­government with its continuing support for Ukrainian self-determination. The message that was conveyed – defending freedom, then as now – was meant to reinforce the political narrative favoured by the Prime Minister’s Office: namely, that there were moral imperatives behind Canada’s foreign policy and it was Conservatives, above all others, who tended the flame of liberty.2 To the extent that the community shared this perspective it was invited to become more involved in supporting Ukrainian sovereignty and independence. The gala, in effect, neatly and cleanly tied the past and present together, seamlessly connected the Ukrainian-Canadian community with the government, and helped solidify the interests of both. The celebration communicated a sense of inevitability and purposefulness about Ukrainian independence and Canada’s role in it. Mulroney’s remarks at the gala – describing Ukraine’s independence as a “march to freedom” – suggested Canadian recognition was deeply rational, taking into account history’s progress, which arced toward justice. It was the type of narrative that would have resonated with a great many in the audience. But the problem with this story is that it conveys neither the complexity of the moment nor the difficult nature of the original decision. At the time, Ukrainian independence was not inevitable, nor was it obvious how Canada would act. There were important issues at stake. These included the uncertainty and possible negative consequences associated with the unravelling of the Soviet Union,

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a Western alliance system that bound Canada to act with wider interests in mind, and the spectre of Quebec separatism that served, in general, as a brake on entertaining support for independence movements elsewhere. There were other issues, of course, but these were the matters that exercised the minds and fuelled the concerns of Canadian officials most. Still, Ukrainian independence was recognized by Canada – the first Western country to do so. What factors account for this (including leadership) and how did these combine to shape Canada-Ukraine relations during this crucial, formative period? Or more simply, how did Canada manage ­systemic change in light of its interests? The events leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union are now largely forgotten, having receded from our collective memory. This, undoubtedly, is the result of a happy outcome. No major wars erupted and the change that occurred did so in an orderly fashion. At the time, however, no one could have predicted the end result. In point of fact, there was much trepidation and anxiety.3 Indeed, the events that led to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to suggest a completely different outcome and one that was a lot worse. The events of early 1991 – rising popular discontent in the Baltic republics and their respective declarations of sovereignty – had precipitated a crisis of confidence in the Soviet leadership. The putsch that followed in Moscow, organized by reactionary elements attempting to restore Communist Party control, underscored the dangers associated with an imploding centre. In the aftermath of the failed coup, and fearing resurgent and competing nationalisms, Western leaders were forced to consider what decisions they should take to best ensure stability. There was a tangible sense that their decisions would be critical if the situation was to be managed successfully. From the perspective of the West, in that moment of flux, their options appeared limited. There was, of course, the possibility of intervening. But the more likely scenarios included offering advice and guidance or simply passively standing aside and letting events unfold naturally. At the height of the crisis, Canada’s foreign minister, Barbara McDougall, who was charged with charting Canada’s foreign policy response to the putsch (which saw the Soviet head of state, Mikhail Gorbachev, kidnapped and held against his will),

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stated that what mattered most for Canada was policy, not personalities. McDougall’s remarks implied that the coup was acceptable so long as those who seized power would respect the principle of democratization.4 On the face of it, the foreign minister’s remarks were extraordinary in that they seemed to harbour a naïve belief that those who committed crimes and sought to use force to further their ambitions could be expected to follow the rule of law. Underlying the minister’s remarks, however, was a sincere desire to help mitigate the potential for further violence and not add to the uncertainty. But as others observed, this was not the time for caution.5 In the face of coercion and repression, moral resolve and decisive leadership were needed. Anything else was a concession to reactionary forces and a retreat from political responsibility. To this end, the Liberal opposition leader in Canada’s parliament, Jean Chrétien, lambasted the minister, advocating for a unified Western response that would deter the coup leaders, including the possible use of economic sanctions. The Liberal foreign affairs critic, Lloyd Axworthy, echoed Chrétien’s proposal, stating: “I think while there’s still a flicker of hope that the democratic forces in the Soviet Union can reassert themselves, then we should continue to follow that.”6 And yet Minister McDougall’s cautiousness was not entirely misplaced. In the jockeying that served as a prelude to the putsch and eventual break-up of the Soviet Union, the prospect of largescale violence was real. Talk of violence was ubiquitous. The issue of Ukraine’s borders with Russia was hotly debated, as was the fate of Soviet nuclear weapons. There was also the question of ethnic Russians residing in the Baltics, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. What was Russia’s responsibility to its kith and how would it respond to any grievance or slight towards its kindred in these places? The dissolution of the Soviet Union threatened to bring national tensions to a boil. It was a worrisome development, prompting the US president, George H.W. Bush, to venture to Kyiv on 1 August. There, in a speech to the Ukrainian parliament, he maintained that the most propitious course of action for Ukraine was to remain in the Soviet Union, arguing that the US would not support “a suicidal nationalism” that would lead to “ethnic hatred.” The idea that chaos would follow a collapse was endemic, and it constituted part of the Canadian calculus as well. To this end,

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shortly after the failed coup, when Prime Minister Mulroney went to Kennebunkport, Maine, on 26 August for a working visit with the US president, Canadian officials accompanying Mulroney made it clear that certain conditions would have to be met before Canada, de jure, would recognize Ukraine’s independence. Specifically, Ukraine had to negotiate a settlement with Russia on a number of outstanding issues: borders, nuclear weapons, and minority rights. These and other comments reflected the deep concern within Canada’s external affairs department that decisions neither run ahead of events nor be taken without existing policy in mind.7 Nominally, this meant supporting the position of the Western alliance, and the US in particular, which still put considerable stock in the leadership and person of Mikhail Gorbachev. It also meant maintaining stability in the region. But there was more at stake than the alliance and international stability. For Canada, the issue of independence raised the apparition of separatism at home. Any decision entertaining independence for Ukraine raised the spectre of Quebec’s secession from the Canadian federation. For those following developments in the Soviet Union, they could not ignore the precedent that such recognition would invoke. In a speech before his caucus colleagues, Jacques Parizeau, leader of the separatist Parti Québécois, recalled past criticisms of Quebec’s independence quest and now chastised those same critics. For Quebec sovereigntists, international recognition of Baltic independence in late August 1991 and the further disintegration of the USSR signalled a promising beginning for Quebec. The idea, however, that the experience of Canada and the USSR could be equated and that the Quebec and Ukraine cases were somehow comparable was roundly rejected and strongly condemned by federalist politicians. When Ontario’s premier, Bob Rae, was asked at the annual provincial premiers’ summit in August 1991 about the comments made by Parizeau equating the struggle for independence among the republics in the Soviet Union with the push for Quebec sovereignty, he described the analogy simply as “grotesque.” The comparison, he said, was fantasy, since it ignored the countless victims of Soviet repression and the manner in which the Soviet Union was politically conceived. “If Mr. Parizeau seriously asks Canadians to compare that to the

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voluntary participation of Quebec in 1867,” Rae contended, “then I think that’s an insult to every Canadian, and to the historic sensibility of people around the world.”8 Prime Minister Mulroney was equally adamant. Denouncing the Soviet Union as “a totalitarian and illegal integration of states,” he argued there was no comparison to Canada. Rather to the contrary, the prime minister maintained, “Canadian experience and Canadian history is the antithesis of the Soviet Union. It was component states coming together freely asking for political and economic unity. Nothing was ever imposed on a Canadian, ever.”9 But Parizeau was not to be dissuaded. As he noted, the point of his remarks was not to suggest an analogous situation but to appreciate the precedent-setting nature of international recognition in which Canada was poised to participate. Recognition, he argued, could be swift and painless if there was sincerity and goodwill.10 Speculation about the implications of Soviet disunion for Quebec was rampant. And although every attempt was made to decouple the Ukraine and Quebec experiences, the argument that the two were unrelated was not entirely convincing when filtered through a democratic lens. As was often repeated, the right of a people to self-determination was universal. Not surprisingly, the anxiety in some quarters was palpable and the apprehension growing. Consequently, a number of other arguments appeared with reference to Ukraine and lessons for Quebec, which were floated to deflect the issue.11 Was Ukraine economically viable? Would it be able to satisfy the requirement of territorial sovereignty? Did Ukraine constitute a nation, given its ethnic differences, linguistic cleavages, and political divisions? Could it survive with such a torn identity? Would separatism foster other internal secessionist movements in Ukraine? Moreover, in view of Ukraine’s long, close relationship with Russia, was it right to destroy what history had brought together? And then there were the alternatives to consider. Disunion would prove economically disruptive and debilitating, while the natural tendency toward ethnic and territorial consolidation would engender conflict, resulting, as it had in the former Yugoslavia, in barbarity, brutality, and destruction. As everyone was reminded, the fate of Yugoslavia was not reserved for it alone. From the perspective of the Ukrainian-Canadian community, which had long waited this moment, the arguments seemed banal,

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clichéd, patronizing, and trite. Who, reasonably speaking, could object to freedom? Explanations and rebuttals were penned in the major dailies. But these had the appearance of lone statements raging against a torrent of hostile public opinion and resentment. The internal problems of a foreign country, the detractors argued, were of no concern to Canada, and Canadians of Ukrainian ancestry needed to be reminded that their allegiance was to Canada, not Ukraine. These and other arguments weighed heavily on activists and spokespersons, who were careful not to antagonize. They looked to work within the narrow confines of acceptable political discourse and behaviour.12 But community leaders also made clear that as Canadians they were simply helping Canada recognize its interests. Ukraine was not some isolated and distant land; there was a natural connection and the interests of the two peoples aligned. For the organized Ukrainian-Canadian community, it was unclear whether this alignment of interests was understood in official circles. Anecdotal evidence pointed to official ambivalence and even opposition. How else, for example, could the government’s failure to take seriously the issue of Canadian consular representation be explained? The Mulroney government had committed as early as 1989 to open a consulate in Kyiv. Two years on, there was little evidence to suggest that the government would make good on its promise. Indeed, in 1990, a Canadian diplomatic representative was assigned from Moscow to serve as consul general in Kyiv but would not be accredited until 1991. The consular service was also weakly supported with only two staff members – one of whom was dedicated full-time to simply processing visas. Neglected and forlorn, the Canadian consular presence in Ukraine was not much of a priority, highlighted by the pitiable image of Canada’s designated representative operating out of a hotel suite. From a Ukrainian-Canadian perspective, it was inconceivable that Canada would drag its feet on the opportunity that was Ukraine. Other countries, by comparison, were quick to respond to unfolding developments. Germany had organized a massive consular staff of forty. France had a fully functioning consulate in eight months and made significant inroads toward strengthening its relationship with Ukraine by providing substantial technicaladministrative assistance and creating a language-cultural institute

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as an auxiliary to France’s diplomatic presence in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Hungarians signalled their intention to elevate the status of their consul general to a fully ledged ambassador upon immediate recognition. For Canada, according to some, the question was of no less relevance. How was it, then, that Canada showed such indifference to positioning itself as a partner with all the advantages that a closer relationship would bring? Moreover, given the unabashed enthusiasm of the people of Ukraine for ­Canada, why would it not reciprocate by acknowledging the historical connection between both countries? And then there was simply the practical matter of serving Canadians. With so many Canadians travelling to Ukraine, doing business there, and working and engaging in humanitarian relief in the country, why was the diplomatic presence so woefully inadequate and weak? Some attributed the incongruity between promise and reality to petulance within the Department of External Affairs and the strong undercurrent of resentment directed at the UkrainianCanadian community. “Instead of viewing Ukrainian-Canadians as a useful bridge between our country and a vital emerging state in the new post-Cold War Europe,” wrote Chrystia Freeland, a stringer for the Financial Times, “Canadian government officials seem to feel that formal ties with Ukraine are a concession to a political pressure group.”13 As Freeland maintained, the bureaucracy did all it could to ensure the consulate would not function properly, even attempting to reverse the decision to have a representative in Kyiv. Other observers cited the lingering problem of Quebec and a “mania” for preserving the status quo as reasons behind the apathy.14 As for those who had historical knowledge of Canada’s foreign policy establishment and their views on Ukrainian self-determination, they wondered aloud whether this was simply part of the long record of official indifference about Ukraine.15 Of bureaucratic resistance there could be no doubt. Indeed, when in response to a press question at Kennebunkport in August 1991, Prime Minister Mulroney extemporaneously declared that Canada would respect the freely expressed wishes of the people of Ukraine, an external affairs spokesperson was quick to qualify the prime minister’s impromptu remarks, noting that Canada would not be encouraging the Soviet republics to leave.16 The spokesperson’s

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statement, revealing in nature, suggested, at a policy level at least, that Canada would not be rushed. The future course of Canadian policy needed to be calibrated to meet events as they unfolded. In preparation, a meeting with Ukraine’s provisional leaders was considered useful in order to  solicit their views and to convey Canadian concerns. Consequently, an invitation was sent to Leonid Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian parliament and senior Politburo member of the Communist Party of Ukraine, for a round of discussions in Canada. In addition, as a preliminary to those discussions, Minister McDougall was dispatched to Kyiv not only to open the long awaited consulate but also to assess the situation and ascertain the intentions of Ukraine’s leadership. McDougall’s visit to Kyiv in early September 1991 proved to be something of a muddle. The politically ambiguous nature of the Canadian position – favouring Ukrainian independence but leaning toward moderation and caution – surfaced awkwardly in the comments of the foreign minister. After being publicly pressured by Kravchuk for a statement on formal recognition (especially after the prime minister’s extemporary remarks at Kennebunkport), McDougall relayed that any talk of recognition at this point was “premature” since Canada wished to see beforehand what kind of “affiliation” Ukraine would have with the other Soviet republics and Moscow.17 Interpreted as a reversal in the government’s position, the comment led some to wonder whether the minister, newly appointed to the portfolio, was up to the job. More fundamentally, others began to question whether Canadian foreign policy was simply adrift.18 Canadian foreign policy had the appearance of being adrift because the stakes were high. Statements emanating from Kyiv about Ukrainian military formations being drawn from Soviet personnel based on its territory were especially troubling given Moscow’s stated opposition to the plan. Expectations for Ukraine needed to be discussed, and soon. The occasion for frank discussion was the meeting scheduled in late September between Leonid Kravchuk, Ukraine’s parliamentary chairman, and Brian Mulroney after Kravchuk quickly accepted the prime minister’s invitation to visit Canada for talks.

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For Kravchuk, recently resigned from the Politburo of the Ukrainian Communist Party and now a rehabilitated nationalist, the meeting was a chance opportunity. From the chairman’s perspective, the point of the 22 September meeting was to gain Canada’s confidence and possible recognition. Securing Ukraine’s status as an independent state was an important objective, since it was seen as a clean and effective way to address the country’s risky position in the Soviet unravelling. In this regard, the Canadian prime minister’s initial Kennebunkport remarks and Canada’s recent recognition of Baltic sovereignty were encouraging. The Mulroney government’s objective, on the other hand, was simply to gauge the intentions of the Ukrainian leadership and to prevail upon Leonid Kravchuk the importance of a plebiscite, while seeking assurances on human rights and nuclear weapons.19 To the degree that there was a meeting of minds, Kravchuk gained a greater appreciation of the political stock the Mulroney government attached to a referendum. It led him to consider the pos­ sibility of moving the date of the plebiscite up from 1 December to 15 October, an idea that was eventually scotched because of its impracticality. The Mulroney government, in the meantime, secured in principle the pledge it sought: Kravchuk declaring that an independent Ukraine would honour its international obligations and commitments.20 In the lead-up to the referendum, Canadian concerns became manifest as the gravity of the decision regarding recognition weighed on the prime minister and officials. Consequently, a series of additional conditions were laid out, including Ukraine’s formal agreement to arms control treaties. The Mulroney government’s cautionary approach gave the appearance of further backtracking. In light of reassuring statements emanating from both Kyiv and Moscow regarding successful bilateral negotiations and an agreement in principle, the Mulroney government’s conditions elicited a reaction from the opposition ranks. Lloyd Axworthy, the Liberal foreign affairs critic, queried about the delay: “What was the holdup?”21 It was a rhetorical question that unmasked the Mulroney government’s deep reservations about the future. A matter of such vital importance to international security as nuclear weapons could not be left to chance. For the Mulroney government, Ukraine had

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to sign on to international agreements, and these still needed to be negotiated to the satisfaction of all the relevant parties, including the Western alliance. From the government’s perspective, it was evident that the outcome of the referendum would not be the only factor determining Ukraine’s future.22 The people of Ukraine could vote, but de jure recognition would depend on what Ukraine would do to win the confidence of the international community. On 1 December, Ukrainians participating in the plebiscite overwhelmingly voted for independence (91 per cent), with majorities recorded across all regions of the country. The following day, in a surprising move, Canada recognized the vote as legitimate, and in the process Ukraine’s independence – the second country to do so, only after Poland. It was a remarkable development, underscoring the importance of Canada’s relationship with Ukraine. Yet, despite the move, Ottawa’s original concerns remained; certain conditions still had to be met. On the day that Canada recognized the results of the vote, the government simultaneously announced it reserved the right to extend full diplomatic status to Ukraine. Axworthy would again rise in the House of Commons, asking, in light of the delay, what Canada was looking for before approving diplomatic relations? The prime minister replied that it was not unusual for states to negotiate before full relations were established, especially given the circumstances. “Overnight a country has become a nuclear power with nuclear weapons on its territory,” Mulroney declared. “Obviously, in the interests of effective bilateral relationships and in the interests of security, we are going to want to assure ourselves of the security of those weapons.”23 For the Mulroney government, the future of the relationship would remain open ended until the matter was resolved to Canada’s satisfaction. The long-received narrative that Canada’s support for Ukraine was unassailable understates the difficulties and uncertainty associated with the original decision to recognize the results of the Ukrainian referendum. Nevertheless, a decision was taken to recognize Ukraine’s independence. And though full diplomatic relations were not entered into immediately, that Canada recognized the de facto independence of Ukraine was an extraordinary and singular development.24 On this score, Canada not only broke ranks with its allies but also with its own long-standing position

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not to endorse independence movements elsewhere for fear of the reverberations back home. How to account for this? Mulroney would explain years later to an audience honouring his decision that in August 1991 he resisted the entreaties of presidents Bush and Gorbachev to disavow any unilateral action on the issue of Ukrainian independence. He communicated his reasoning to the gathering: “We knew back in 1989 that freedom was on the march in Ukraine.”25 Couched in the language of triumphant liberalism, Mulroney conveyed to the audience that it was his belief that change, inexorable and inescapable, could not be ignored. His comments, however, also spoke to the broader political context in which the decision was being made. The demise of the Soviet Union was not just another international event. It was the culmination of a struggle that defined an age, animated by beliefs that over the years had shaped politics and the world. The conviction that democracy and freedom would prevail remained incontrovertible in the public mind, so that when the moment came it was interpreted as destined. But more importantly, it helped shape the prime minister’s decision. Ukrainian independence would be supported because it was seen as historically and politically inevitable. And yet, the reality was that a decision precipitating the end of the Soviet Union had to be balanced somehow to contain the potential for chaos. Such, then, was the paradox. Although the inclination was to welcome the outcome, there was abundant reason to be careful. This would account for the peculiar dynamic, in which a desire to embrace change worked alongside a desire to avoid catastrophe. For Mulroney, the issue, then, was to find the right balance – to respond without exacerbating the situation.26 For Canada, the way forward, therefore, entailed being strategically engaged while remaining cautious. Axworthy was inclined to believe that for successful relations to occur, Ukraine required economic assistance as well as security assurances, especially with regard to the dismantling of its nuclear weapons. The prime minister agreed, acknowledging that Canada would engage Ukraine constructively. But he also made clear Canada would do so with definite expectations and goals and that these would reflect the country’s broad political and foreign policy interests. With this in

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mind, Mulroney shared the news in Canada’s parliament that Minister McDougall would once again leave for Kyiv to discuss the future of the relationship.27 Canada’s strategic approach toward Ukraine would, in fact, follow the broad priorities and goals set by the Mulroney government in the form of its 1991 planning review of Canadian foreign policy.28 These included strengthening cooperative security and creating sustainable prosperity, as well as securing democracy and respect for human rights. Significantly, the knotty issue of Quebec sovereignty also factored into Canada’s cautious engagement with Ukraine. As Barbara McDougall elaborated: “Foreign policy is a reflection of domestic values and interests … [and] because national unity is a domestic issue, it is also part of our foreign policy consideration.”29 With a referendum looming in Quebec, it was imperative that separatism be defused by highlighting the benefits of cooperation. Unity, consequently, became a touchstone of Canadian foreign policy. Quebec, then, became the lens through which developments in the former Soviet Union would be filtered. This had practical implications. If cooperation were to be championed, separatism also needed to be censured, especially for its denial of the wider benefits that could accrue through cooperation. Not everyone was comfortable with this line of reasoning, claiming that interpreting Canadian external interests with Quebec solely in mind hobbled Canada’s ability to pursue wider foreign policy goals. National unity and Canada’s external interests were qualitatively distinct, and conflating the two categories was unhelpful, serving only to complicate and impede Canada’s foreign policy interests. Government officials, however, were not easily put off by the criticism. Pointing to the 9 December gathering of Slavic leaders in Minsk, where there was agreement on creating a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Canadian officials noted the continuing relevance of confederation as a political model. The possibility of a renewed political community committed to the common good was seen not only as a hopeful sign for the region but for Quebec as well.30 If there was uncertainty, it was whether Ukraine and the other republics would accept the idea of working together.31 With lingering concern over Quebec in the background, the aim of Canadian foreign policy was to promote, if at all possible,

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continuing collaboration and association between Ukraine and its former sister republics. The emphasis on cooperation, not surprisingly, served to conceptually frame the foreign policy priorities set out by the Mulroney government in its 1991 foreign policy review, especially as it related to Eastern Europe. Although bilateral emergency assistance to Ukraine was being attended to – 180,000 kilograms of medical supplies, for instance, was delivered by military transport within a month of the referendum – an approach that focused on the collective needs of the region offered greater dividends and helped reinforce the message that working with the interests of all in mind was preferable. It was for this reason that a new Canadian Program of Assistance to the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe was created – an initiative that followed the July 1991 London G 7 Summit, which sought to promote and assist postSoviet transition through regional cooperation. It became apparent that the importance of Ukraine to Canada at this critical juncture was tied directly to the manner in which Ukraine would respond to initiatives that promoted regional trust and stability – an expectation made clear by Brian Mulroney in his correspondence with Leonid Kravchuk from the very outset of the relationship.32 Security and economic recovery could only be achieved if Ukraine undertook reforms and looked to work within framework agreements alongside other regional players, enhancing the welfare and the sense of security for all. Although a number of political actors in Ukraine expressed scepticism about cooperating with Russia, it was an encouraging sign that during McDougall’s January 1992 visit to Kyiv the Ukrainian foreign minister, Anatoliy Zlenko, expressed that he shared this view and approach.33 Following the priorities set out in its foreign policy and planning review, Canada’s regional assistance program sought to promote stability. In particular, good governance, social security, and a strong economic environment were identified as the goals of assistance. This meant improving institutional frameworks (legal, accounting, and financial), creating mechanisms to facilitate foreign direct investment, as well as helping with balance of payments support, debt relief, and trading relations, especially within the region. In addition, social provisioning was seen as vital to recovery in so far as the costs of transition were being borne by populations

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already under considerable stress. To this end, maintaining adequate levels of public health, social services, and education were viewed as objectives. Where the former Soviet republics were unable to meet basic public needs, humanitarian assistance would be provided through the program. It was an ambitious scheme. But it was also one that underscored the rationale behind the Mulroney government’s wider strategic approach. By addressing the problem of transition from a regional perspective and using programming assistance as leverage in achieving stability and relative amity, it was felt that specific security challenges, especially with regard to Ukraine and Russia, might also be addressed. These challenges included the tensions between Russia and Ukraine over the disposition of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory, the unclear status of Crimea (especially the huge naval base at Sevastopol), and the division of the naval assets of the former Soviet Black Sea fleet. The problem of security was a daunting one that, if framed by other avenues of cooperation, might otherwise be sufficiently diffused. In the context of regional objectives, Canada encouraged Ukraine’s leadership to come to a quick decision on assuming joint responsibility for servicing the Soviet Union’s debt, estimated at US$60 to $70 billion. It would be a litmus test, indicating whether there was an appetite for cooperation while also demonstrating the degree to which Ukraine and other former Soviet republics were prepared to work together to assume their international responsibilities. After a set of complicated negotiations with Russia, Ukraine’s announcement that it would service 16.3 per cent of the total Soviet debt was the signal Canada needed to extend immediately a US$40 million loan to purchase food and technology, thereby breaking the barriers to Western credit.34 It was a significant development for Ukraine. It was also an important step for Canada. It reaffirmed the correctness of a strategy whereby Canada was prepared to assist those who, by working with others, helped themselves. Implicit in the strategy, however, was the view that the Canada-Ukraine relationship would be reciprocating. Need alone would not determine assistance; Ukraine would have to demonstrate a capacity for cooperation and reform. Never fully articulated and yet inferred was the notion that the failure to cooperate would have adverse effects.

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Assistance became the instrument by which Canada felt it could exercise influence – its strategic importance laying in its potential to accelerate change in Ukraine and further the prospects for regional security and stability. With this in mind, Canada undertook a number of initiatives between 1992 and 1993, including those that related to Ukraine’s nuclear file and the legacy of Chornobyl. To avoid a repeat of Chornobyl, Ukraine was made eligible for funding under the $30 million Canadian Nuclear Safety Initiative, set up to provide both regulatory assistance and facility management to those former Soviet republics that possessed R B M K -type reactors. In addition, Canada co-sponsored (along with Sweden and the US) the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, contributing $5 million for the purpose of redirecting scientists away from military research, as well as from the development of nuclear, biological, and chemical weaponry, fostering in its stead civilian careers linked to their fields of expertise. It was the economy, however, that Canada’s foreign minister, Barbara McDougall, described as Ukraine’s principal challenge. Expanding Ukraine’s economy was key if stability was to be achieved. To this end, Canada took a number of steps. In support of business and trade, the Renaissance Eastern European Program was enlarged to include Ukraine and other states from the former Soviet Union. Created in 1990 to address market development in East Central Europe, it would now be directed to help transfer Western business practices and increase familiarity with the Canadian private sector in order to jump-start commercial enterprises and trade opportunities within the former republics of the Soviet Union. Additionally, to facilitate business contacts and provide logistical support for trade, a Canadian Cooperation Office was opened in Kyiv. Meanwhile, funding for Canadian policy advisors in essential areas of support to the Ukrainian government was specially allocated, including for public administration, legal reform, and economic development. But perhaps the most distinctive initiative was the creation of a people-to-people program, Partners in Progress, which sought to capitalize on community interest and further make use of individual expertise with the hope of strengthening and deepening relations through personal contact and exchanges. It was a project that reflected a phenomenon that was already occurring since independence. Hundreds of Ukrainian

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Canadians, lured by the appeal of their ancestral homeland, were in Ukraine working and volunteering. From the perspective of Ukrainian Canadians, these and other interventions were important in growing the Canada-Ukraine relationship. But there was a sense, especially among Ukrainian Canadians working in Ukraine, that Canada could and needed to do more.35 Canada was the first Western country to acknowledge Ukraine’s independence. This, more than anything else, had singled Canada out as a respected and important partner of Ukraine. But it also elevated expectations. As such, that Canada, in the immediate years after independence, was not contributing more to assist Ukraine specifically came as a complete surprise and disappointment to some. As a number of community advocates noted, in comparison to Russia, Canada’s assistance to Ukraine was miniscule. The West’s attention and focus on Russia during 1992 to 1993, a volatile period in Russia’s post-Soviet transition, was accompanied by a corresponding rise in Western financial commitment to that country. In this regard, Canada followed suit. In early 1992, for instance, an initial $100 million credit was extended to Russia. As well, after the signing of a joint Declaration of Friendship and Cooperation, a $2 billion rotating line of credit was granted to Russia for the purchase of Canadian goods and services. Meanwhile, hoping to obtain and secure a position in Russia’s potentially lucrative oil and gas industry, Canada supported through guarantees the entrepreneurial efforts of Canadian companies to engage in the development and distribution of Russia’s vast oil and gas reserves. And then there was the April 1993 Vancouver summit between presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin at which US aid and assistance to Russia was discussed. Caught up in the euphoria of the moment and not wishing to be upstaged on Canadian soil, Prime Minister Mulroney announced the doubling of Canadian assistance to Russia. The enhanced interest in Russia left the Liberal Party critic for external affairs mystified, declaring that “It was an enormous mistake for [Canada] not to give more resources [to Ukraine].”36 It led others still to wonder where Ukraine stood in Canada’s foreign policy calculus. There were a number of reasons for the imbalance in Canada’s development assistance commitment. That Russia was big and Ukraine small was a factor. Moreover, Russia, even in its diminished

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state, exercised power and influence, and in as much as Canada’s focus was regional (with Quebec never far from mind), Russia’s role as a key player shaped Canada’s foreign policy response. In this regard, the C I S was seen as politically important in Ottawa. But it also meant that how Russia, as the most powerful of the successor states, negotiated its relations within the new commonwealth and dealt with challenges was what mattered most and necessarily commanded everyone’s attention. Not surprisingly, to the extent that Russia monopolized interest and to the degree that Russia was seen as testing the political boundaries of Ukrainian sovereignty, Ukraine, insecure and apprehensive, reacted negatively. This would have consequences for Canada’s nascent relations with the newly independent state. At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, international security and stability were important considerations in Canadian foreign policy making, greatly factoring, for instance, into Canada’s decision to recognize Ukraine’s independence.37 Ukrainian denuclearization was a key objective in Canadian and, more generally, Western diplomacy. It was with some satisfaction, therefore, that Canada welcomed Ukraine’s agreement (having signed the 1992 Lisbon Protocol) to dismantle or transfer to Russia’s control all nuclear weapons on its territory and adhere to the international Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (N P T ). It was, then, a stunning reversal and entirely unexpected when Ukraine’s parliament, the Rada, failed in 1993 to ratify the earlier US-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. In Ottawa, Washington, and elsewhere, the aspirations and anxieties of the political class in Kyiv had been underestimated. That international respect was equated with strength – and strength with nuclear weapons – had hardened attitudes against denuclearization in some political circles in Ukraine. Still others there believed that the nuclear card could be used advantageously in securing concessions or guarantees that would help protect Ukraine’s sovereignty and security.38 Either way, the decision not to ratify was disconcerting. A form of brinkmanship politics, the nuclear weapons issue became an important strategic gambit in Ukraine’s relations with the West, the latter seeming to favour Russia. Ukraine’s wrestling with Russia over basing operations in Crimea and Black Sea fleet assets, as well as resisting Russian overtures to integrate within

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CIS structures, added to the existing tensions and uncertainty.39 Ukraine, an enigma, was now also a problem. Moreover, from Canada’s perspective, trying to understand the vacillating political situation in Ukraine proved difficult in light of the scarcity of information from Ukraine’s embassy in Ottawa, which, without experience, functioned at a rudimentary level.40 The appointment of the former Soviet dissident Levko Lukianenko as the Ukrainian ambassador to Canada may have made for good optics and delighted the Ukrainian-Canadian community, but it made for bad diplomacy; though a well-meaning figure, Lukianenko was said to be unreliable insofar as he was seen to be prone to speculation and hyperbole.41 All of this raised the question: how might there be genuine political and diplomatic dialogue when Ukraine showed itself to be wilful, wayward, and dysfunctional? The situation cast serious doubt on Canada’s regional strategy, bringing into question its appropriateness. The regional focus gave the impression of neglect, which, combined with other incidents, hinted even at abandonment. Canada’s diplomatic presence in Ukraine, for example, announced with fanfare in 1990, continued to operate out of a hotel suite in 1993. Moreover, the embassy remained understaffed throughout the period, consisting of only a handful of career officers and local support. Not surprisingly, those who were hoping to do business in Ukraine described the Canadian diplomatic presence as “pathetic,” a view that resonated with some who attributed the shortcomings of Canadian diplomacy in Ukraine to “incompetence.”42 The criticism seemed unduly harsh. But two years after independence, the fact that Canada’s Department of External Affairs continued to send correspondence addressed to the “Canadian Consulate General, Kiev, U SSR ” was not a confident sign that relations were being taken seriously.43 Rather, it was a mark of either wilful ignorance or, further yet, that Canada’s foreign relations were being managed by those yet to be reconciled with the fact that history had moved on. For Lloyd Axworthy, Canada’s skewed regional approach and its use of a punitive strategy – denying assistance if concessions were not made – was misplaced and at fault. He felt that a balanced and more constructive diplomacy was needed. Specifically, he argued that Canada act as an honest broker and assume a leadership role

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by offering inducements to encourage nuclear weapons compliance while furthering the process of transition in Ukraine.44 His was a critical assessment that pointed to the limitations in the government’s regional strategy. It was also an important statement, inasmuch as the Liberal Party would form government, defeating the Conservatives in the October 1993 federal general election. For Ukrainian Canadians, the independence of Ukraine was nothing short of a miracle. Ukraine’s struggle for self-determination in the twentieth century was largely a rearguard action. Success had always seemed distant. Therefore, when independence did arrive, it was unexpected. But it also left many unprepared for the future. There was neither a strategy on what the community might do to assist Ukraine with its Soviet legacy nor a vision on how to help secure its place in the world. There was also no plan as to how the community might respond should Ukraine falter. The challenges ahead were great and the path unclear. At the Seventeenth Ukrainian Canadian Congress, held in Winnipeg, Ukraine’s ambassador, the ever-congenial Lukianenko, was invited to speak to the gathering. Reflecting on the state of community life in Canada, Lukianenko shared his thoughts on what needed to be done if Ukrainian Canadians were to help Ukraine (and presumably themselves). Principally, he called for greater dialogue within the community. His view was that an open and honest conversation would serve as an example back home of what genuine political life should look like, and from a Canadian perspective help frame the community’s strategy for what it could do to help. Above all, however, he insisted that if the community was to be effective and of genuine assistance, it had to adapt to the new reality that was Ukraine.45 On the whole, this was useful advice. Democratic voices were much needed after almost a century of focused political work that subordinated all other issues to the singular goal of Ukrainian independence. The ambassador’s exhortation to adapt, however, was more challenging. It implied that the situation in Ukraine was comprehensible and knowable. In the few short years since independence, it was unclear for many, both within and outside the community, what exactly was going on there. Ukraine was independent to be sure. But what kind of Ukraine was it, and how

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were Ukrainian Canadians, let alone Canada, supposed to relate? Did interests align, and what were the appropriate strategies of engagement? The answers to these and other questions, for the time being, were a complete mystery.

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2 A “Special Relationship” Jean Chrétien and the Politics of Transition

As Canada’s relationship with Ukraine deepened, Ukraine’s foreign minister, Anatoliy Zlenko, was invited to speak to members of Canada’s National Press Club at a breakfast meeting during a brief visit to Ottawa in March 2001. His talk generally dealt with Ukraine’s international relations but also included remarks on the state of Canada-Ukraine relations. Zlenko commended Canada for its steadfast support of Ukraine since independence and submitted that there was a continuing role for Canada to play. Among other things, he said that Ukraine would welcome Canadian consultative assistance in the areas of freedom of speech, developing the country’s mass media, and building a stronger civil society.1 Despite the scripted nature of his statement, those in attendance would have been left speechless, interpreting some of the points made as being either blatantly cynical or deliberately baiting in light of the distressing news from Ukraine. Information circulating for some time by then was that a decapitated body, discovered in a forest a short distance from Kyiv, was  that of the missing journalist Georgiy Gongadze, a defiant critic of the Ukrainian government. Furthermore, audio evidence had surfaced that connected the murder to the office of Ukraine’s president, Leonid Kuchma, implicating the president in a plot to eliminate the journalist. Investigations proved inconclusive, as political interference undermined and obstructed the course of justice. Nonetheless, the internationally recognized Committee to Protect Journalists, after conducting its own independent inquiry, determined Gongadze was murdered in reprisal for his political

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reporting and that the killing was the culmination of a range of activity in which the Kuchma government was allegedly engaged, the purpose of which was to harass, intimidate, and otherwise silence its critics.2 Among Canadian officials in the Chrétien government there was already abundant suspicion about Ukraine, but until that point never quite the depth of reservation as that it now expressed. When Minister Zlenko met with senior Canadian representatives in Ottawa, it was left to Canada’s foreign affairs minister, John Manley, to raise the Gongadze affair with the Ukrainian diplomat. It was no doubt an awkward meeting. Nevertheless, in the context of routine business, it had to be done. Zlenko, a seasoned diplomat, reassured Manley that the Ukrainian government would facilitate a transparent and objective investigation into the death of the slain journalist. He also wished to assure Canada’s foreign minister that Ukraine’s leadership would abide by the country’s constitution and laws. For Manley, the reassurance, no doubt, rang hollow. President Kuchma had been playing fast and loose with Ukraine’s constitution in a bid to wrestle more power from his parliamentary opponents. The situation in Ukraine had been deteriorating for some time and the prospects for the future were at best unclear, if not dim. From Canada’s perspective, all it could do was watch and hope for the best. Manley stated that Canada would continue to support Ukraine in its efforts to build a democratic society. It was a remark, however, that masked a deep sense of betrayal, given all that Canada was doing for Ukraine. For the Ukrainian-Canadian community the Gongadze affair was no less disturbing. Concern with the Ukrainian president’s Russocentrism had now been displaced by alarm. The slide toward authoritarianism was seen as a threat to Ukraine’s political existence. Aside from the distressing news that appeared to link the office of the president to the murder of Gongadze, state institutions were being undermined and the country faced growing isolation in view of its rogue international behaviour – purportedly selling advanced weapons systems to Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq. The dilemma facing the community was whether to retain its unqualified support for Ukraine or press politically for renewal. Democracy was a cherished objective and seen as a panacea for

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all that troubled Ukraine. But by insisting on democratic accountability and political change, would not the ties that bind be jeopardized and the Ukrainian people abandoned in their moment of need? The quandary made for difficult choices. The Ukrainian-Canadian community’s inclination was to assist. This constituted less of a political strategy than, more simply, a natural reaction to a difficult situation, underscoring the importance of attachment to place. For Canada, there was no such pull. There were questions, however, with which the Chrétien government had been grappling from the very start and which could only be answered in the unfolding of relations. Was it in Canada’s interest to have a tighter relationship with Ukraine? What approach would best reflect Canada’s interests? And what should be the Canadian government’s relationship with the Ukrainian-Canadian community in light of the role it played with respect to Ukraine? When the Liberal prime minister Jean Chrétien assumed office in November 1993, Canada’s policy toward Ukraine, at least initially, was both upbeat and bullish. From the outset, the Chrétien government was prepared to assist in the country’s development by encouraging reforms and looking to facilitate Ukraine’s role internationally. This followed from earlier policy prescriptions put forward by the Liberal foreign affairs critic Lloyd Axworthy, which held that relations with Ukraine could thrive and prosper if a constructive attitude and approach were adopted. He determined that the best method was to integrate the recently independent state into international frameworks, establishing benchmarks for the country to follow. This reasoning followed the traditional multilateralism that informed Canada’s international relations. The integrative function of multilateralism was viewed positively as an important modifier of international behaviour and therefore accepted as a guiding principle in the Chrétien government’s overall foreign policy stance, figuring prominently, for example, in its priorities and planning document, “Canada in the World.” Multilateralism, however, did not preclude strengthening direct bilateral relations with Ukraine. Rather it was seen as an important complementary strategy in advancing Canada’s foreign policy goals. Increased bilateral engagement with Ukraine – a departure from the regional approach of the Mulroney government – was

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supported by the Canada 21 Council, a blue-ribbon panel that recommended Canada use its comparative advantage to address pressing security and environmental issues. In particular, Canada’s dense network of personal contacts and the country’s broad expertise and interest in the peaceful use of nuclear technology for energy purposes positioned Canada perfectly to make a difference in Ukraine’s future.3 The proposal to boost the Chrétien government’s bilateral ­commitment to Ukraine would translate into a formal political arrangement. On 31 March 1994, André Ouellet, Canada’s newly appointed external affairs minister, and Anatoliy Zlenko, Ukraine’s chief diplomat, signed a Joint Declaration on Special Partnership.4 It was an unusual document in that the only other near equivalent was the Declaration of Enhanced Partnership with France. The declaratory statement carried with it no binding obligations but it did specify areas of mutual interest – security, trade, and commerce – in which both parties might find common cause and purpose. This, however, was a standard undertaking. What distinguished the document was the reference to enhancing the “special links that have historically existed” between Canada and Ukraine, underscoring the importance of facilitating and promoting people-topeople contact, guided by the conviction that “a true partnership could occur only when individuals had the freedom to develop such contacts.” The premise was that continuing relations would be predicated on the emotional desire of people to reconnect with their ancestral home – hence the exceptional or “special” nature of the partnership. The declaration, in effect, had combined the personal and the political, suggesting that this would be no ordinary relationship. Moreover, it would facilitate a different level of commitment, ensuring that the partnership would work and that the overall experience would be a positive one. The focus on personal linkages necessarily translated into an open invitation for the Ukrainian-Canadian community to participate in assisting Ukraine. It was a bidding that was extended to the community early on when Ouellet, in public remarks, indicated that the help of the community was needed if the partnership was to succeed. More importantly, he stated that it was his intention not only to consult with the community but also to incorporate their ideas and concerns into policy.5 In great measure it reflected

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the mutually reinforcing interests between the government and the community. The seriousness of the Ouellet proposal became evident when, in August 1994, responsibility for the newly created CanadaUkraine Partners Program – which grew out of the earlier regional Partners in Progress Initiative but now focused on transferring Canadian expertise and assistance directly to Ukraine – devolved to the U C C under a government contract. It was a remarkable development, signalling an important innovation and shift in policy development, planning, and delivery.6 The move to have greater community participation in policy development paralleled the endeavour to integrate Ukraine within international organizations and networks. The nuclear weapons issue had not yet been resolved and threatened to escalate with the ongoing tension between Russia and Ukraine. It was felt that Canada could leverage its close relationship with Ukrainian authorities to facilitate a solution that would ensure Ukraine’s security in exchange for denuclearization. At the November 1993 Rome conference of foreign ministers on security and cooperation in Europe, Ouellet offered to mediate between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States in the dispute over the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (STA R T 1) and NPT ratification. In the spirit of mediation, Ouellet also encouraged his Ukrainian counterparts to think of security in terms other than the nuclear option – to participate, for example, in NATO ’s Partnership for Peace program and enter into association agreements with other security-based intergovernmental organizations.7 To this end, Canada made the case before its N A T O allies in Brussels to strengthen Ukraine’s security, claiming that an enhanced relationship would assuage any fears that Kyiv might have, while also generating trust. Canada advocated for Ukraine, claiming that there were dividends in allowing Ukraine to participate in peacekeeping operations under the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (O S C E) and U N mandates. Developing a common understanding of operational concepts and meeting the functional requirements of peacekeeping missions, Ukrainians would be introduced to international standards and practices, creating in the process the necessary synergy for Ukraine to be engaged as a responsible member of the international community. To facilitate Ukraine’s initiation into the process, the Chrétien

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government offered to provide instruction under its Military Training Assistance Program (M T A P ) within the context of the NATO-sponsored Partnership for Peace.8 Communications training was eventually conducted at Canadian Forces Base (C F B ) Borden as well as Ottawa, and instruction in defence resource management and civil-military relations at the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, at C F B Cornwallis. M TAP became the primary mechanism through which CanadianUkrainian defence relations would take place under the Chrétien government. Canada also elected to act as an intermediary for N A T O in Ukraine by accommodating the N A T O mission at the Canadian embassy.9 This broader engagement was made possible because of the initial strength of the bilateral connection between Canada and Ukraine. Following the conventional wisdom regarding bilateralism, strong interstate relations, it was felt, would create an atmosphere of trust, while the obligations derived from binding bilateral agreements would generate certain expectations, with the potential of leading to wider goals and outcomes, albeit incrementally. For instance, when Ukraine requested assistance in its first-ever multiparty elections in 1994, a $2.5 million package consisting of technical and material support was granted to ensure a free and fair election. Comprising one quarter – and by far the largest share – of Canada’s 1994 international democratic development assistance allocation, the contribution was specifically targeted for Ukraine with the expectation that it could be leveraged politically. Designated a high priority, the purpose of the assistance, according to officials, was to promote electoral fairness, but in the process also build an appreciation for democratic procedures that might develop across the political spectrum and inform Ukraine’s political experience more generally.10 The elections assistance package was but the first of many such bilateral initiatives. In April 1994, funding in the amount of $11.5 million was allocated for three specific projects: the Dnipro River Rehabilitation Program (environmental management), the Osvita Medical Program (maternal and infant health care), and funding for the purchase of emergency medical supplies and vaccines. The significance of these projects was that they were unconditional, providing relief to the most vulnerable in Ukraine

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while improving the health outlook of its citizens – training, for example, environmental professionals to identify sources of pollutants in the Dnipro river basin. These were clearly designed to improve the health and wellbeing of Ukraine’s population. But they also served as confidence-building measures. The unconditional nature of the projects conveyed the message that Canada had the country’s best interests at heart. The gesture was widely appreciated and increased Canada’s political stock with Ukrainian officials. A good beginning, it portended even better things to come.11 It was the security/nuclear issue, however, that mattered most, determining international and Canadian perspectives on Ukraine and the nature of future relations. After intense negotiations, the nuclear weapons issue was finally resolved in January 1994 with the signing of the Trilateral Statement (Ukraine, Russia, and the United States) and the Ukrainian parliament’s ratification in February of both S TART 1 and the Lisbon Protocol, followed by security guarantees contained in the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances. The decision to denuclearize would energize relations with the West, including relations with Canada. Resolution of the nuclear weapons issue was a critical political development toward stabilizing the region and a positive sign that Ukraine was prepared to work within the prescribed security framework, accepting international responsibilities as a result of its participation. Ukraine’s decision to denuclearize was a calculated risk and widely recognized as such. Western governments would reciprocate. The US and other governments extended immediate aid, allocating US$200 million to assist Ukraine with the reform of its energy sector and the closure of the Chornobyl nuclear power station. The Chrétien government, meanwhile, supported the disarmament process by immediately allocating $15 million, ensuring that Ukraine moved quickly to implement ST A R T 1. The nuclear weapons issue was a taxing affair. Canadian officials were convinced that a constructive approach had proved key to unlocking the impasse. Moreover, they believed it was Canada’s bilateral relationship with Ukraine that helped the international effort in convincing Ukraine to accede finally to the N P T .12 This suggested that strategic engagement in other areas might have equally favourable results in moving the international agenda forward. In the immediate aftermath of the Ukrainian ratification

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of the nuclear deal and accession to the NPT, it was communicated that Ukraine could gain access to much needed US$4 billion in international financing should it demonstrate a commitment to market reforms. In this regard, at the July 1994 Naples G7 economic summit, Canada endorsed a proposal for a G 7-sponsored conference on Partnership for Economic Transformation in Ukraine. Support for Ukraine at the G 7 Summit was championed by Canada, which offered to host the G7 conference in Winnipeg, the historical centre of Ukrainian-Canadian life. The initiative and location were symbolically important. It conveyed Canada’s desire to assume a lead role in the multilateral venture. But by choosing Winnipeg, Canada also signalled that Ukrainian Canadians would be part of Canada’s strategy. The optics of a conference on Ukraine in Winnipeg was a powerful reminder of the close bilateral relationship and, more importantly, recognition of the partnership’s underpinnings, wherein the community would be called upon to assist. Ukraine’s newly elected president, Leonid Kuchma, acknowledged the Canadian gesture by choosing Canada as his first-ever state visit. The conference, held in October 1994, became part of a five-city tour, taking him to Ottawa and then Toronto, Edmonton, Saskatoon, and Winnipeg for meetings with the provincial premiers. The visit was important on a number of levels. For President Kuchma, it provided him with much-needed legitimacy, facilitating his introduction to the diaspora. Within the Ukrainian-Canadian community there was enormous scepticism around Kuchma ­personally. His Russocentric leanings marked him as someone inimical to Ukrainian interests and a man not to be trusted. The visit, therefore, was a singular opportunity for the new president to allay those fears and to communicate that he, in fact, represented Ukraine’s best hopes and aspirations for the future. On another level, it also gave Kuchma an opening to appeal for financial assistance and investment, including from Canada, the host nation. With its finances worsening appreciably, Ukraine was in an economic free fall. And because international financial aid to Ukraine was increasingly becoming conditional, every possible advantage had to be utilized. President Kuchma, in effect, would use the tour to generate interest by gathering support among the business community, and through the provinces (including a personal appeal

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to Saskatchewan’s premier, Roy Romanow) leverage influence at the federal level.13 The stakes were high at the G7 Winnipeg conference. An international package of aid and credits was on the table, including a $375 million line of credit from the International Monetary Fund (IM F) as well as loans and grants from individual donor nations. The package, however, was tied directly to a pledge on the part of Ukrainian authorities to liberalize their economy and introduce austerity measures. In the midst of a political crisis (a power struggle between the president and parliament), the Ukrainian economy was being battered. Hyperinflation and diminishing productivity exacerbated the steep economic decline, injecting a note of desperation in the appeal for financial aid. But as was repeated at the conference, including in a speech by Canada’s foreign minister, André Ouellet, Ukraine had to take decisive steps toward economic reform. Referring specifically to the Canada-Ukraine relationship, Ouellet declared, “Our partnership with Ukraine will be based on the principle of ‘help for self-help.’” He then added, “Our assistance to Ukraine can only be effective if the Ukrainian government takes the necessary steps to put in place the framework in which a market economy can develop.”14 From the perspective of the Chrétien government, economic reform was fundamental if Ukraine was to succeed during this transitional period. But there were other points to consider. Among the accords signed with the Kuchma government during the president’s visit (seven in total), the most important was the Agreement between Ukraine and Canada on Economic Cooperation. It followed an earlier declaration on economic cooperation (July 1992) and the Agreement on Trade and Commerce (March 1994), which granted Ukraine most favoured nation (MFN) status. Collectively, the agreements highlighted the important role that trade, commerce, and economic development would play not only in Ukraine proper as it transitioned away from its Soviet past, but also in the Canada-Ukraine relationship. Trade, in particular, was a touchstone of the Chrétien government’s foreign policy, reflecting neoliberal beliefs and perspectives. Although the Chrétien government famously touted Canadian values as being the driver behind Canada’s foreign policy, economic considerations deeply factored into the government’s thinking and

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strategy.15 (The image of an energetic Jean Chrétien leading multiple Team Canada trade missions around the world would become iconic.) In the case of Ukraine, the strategy would be predicated on three elements. First, the Chrétien government placed enormous credence in the idea that trade and commerce would not only grow Ukraine’s economy but also liberalize the political environment, benefitting Ukrainian society generally. Second, facilitating trade and growth would enable Canada to deliver on the promise of assistance without necessarily burdening Canada at a time when it, too, was facing fiscal pressures at home. Finally, although Ukraine came up short as a trading partner (trade turnover amounting to only $44 million in 1993), the future demand for Canadian goods and services looked promising if Canada positioned itself accordingly. Canada’s failure to capitalize on emerging markets in East-Central Europe after the collapse of the Berlin Wall was a lesson learned by the Chrétien government in its approach to trade. Trade would become an important consideration in Canada’s bilateral relations with Ukraine under the Chrétien government. On the face of it, this meant encouraging and supporting those efforts aimed at stabilizing the economic environment. President Kuchma acknowledged that there were serious obstacles but he was optimistic, believing that recent measures, including currency regulation, would have a net positive effect. He also noted that in crises lay opportunities, and he encouraged Canadian businesses and venture capital to take advantage of the moment – one that allowed their interests and Ukraine’s to be served, while also strengthening the Canada-Ukraine relationship.16 In order to facilitate trade and growth – to create an environment that enabled both – it was apparent that the Ukraine government required advice in the form of technical assistance on policy and legislation. As early as 1992, in one of Canada’s first technical assistance initiatives, Canadians were placed with the Ukrainian government as senior policy advisors, while training was provided through the newly created Institute of Public Administration and Local Self-Governance. Canadians were to be found in the Council of Advisors to the Ukrainian parliament, National Bank of Ukraine, and the ministries of justice, finance, and external economic relations, among other agencies. The relative success of the technical

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assistance project brought recommendations that it be renewed, especially in light of the pressing need for continued expertise.17 In late 1994, Canadian advisors and professionals, many of whom were drawn from the Ukrainian-Canadian community, were placed once again under contract and long-term assignment with Ukrainian ministries and agencies. The expectation was that they would assist in the formulation and implementation of policies and programs. These ranged from the definition of executive and legislative responsibilities, introduction to public management practices, public service training, policy development, planning around structural reforms, and Ukraine’s accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G A T T ). It was an ambitious undertaking, the limitations of which, however, despite the investment, were becoming increasingly apparent. No matter how much advice and guidance was given, there appeared little willingness to genuinely embrace a reform agenda. It pointed to deep-seated problems that were inseparably linked to the process of post-Soviet transition, the effect of which was to further curb international confidence and undermine Ukraine’s path forward. From the perspective of bilateral relations, the evidence that progress was stalled was incontrovertible. Where all-important trade was concerned, there was little improvement during 1994 to 1996. Despite the intergovernmental Agreement on Trade and Commerce (which established GA T T -compatible rules for the conduct of trade and commercial relations between the two countries), several provincial agreements, and M F N status for Ukraine, trade turnover during the period remained relatively unchanged. In 1994, a paltry $9 million in goods was exported to Ukraine and only $18 million in imports made their way onto the Canadian market. Although the amount of Canadian exports to Ukraine would increase in 1995, it still accounted for less than $43 million. As for joint ventures, financing was available through the Canadian International Development Agency’s (C I D A ) Renaissance Eastern Europe Program, but by year-end 1995 only forty firms applied and qualified for funding. Meanwhile, investment opportunities were confined to those companies whose planning and outlook for Ukraine were long-term and who were able to adapt and cope in the uncertain Ukrainian economic environment with its complex legislation on ownership and shifting tax policies.

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The real evidence, however, was the trade figures for the provinces, where the results in 1995 were truly disappointing in view of provincial agreements. Some of the results were even unexpected. Exports to Ukraine were highest from Quebec, rather than the prairie West, where historical-cultural connections ran deep. In New Brunswick, Ukrainian imports exceeded the levels for Manitoba and Saskatchewan combined.18 On being appointed Ukraine’s ambassador to Canada, Volodymyr Furkalo stated that technical advisory assistance “has its limits, [but] trade does not.”19 He admitted that Ukrainians, themselves, would have to find solutions to the current malaise, not least of which was mustering the will to support reforms. But where Canada could make a real difference was by remaining focused on the economic dimension of the relationship. Trade and investment especially benefitted Ukraine – introducing competition and putting pressure on Ukrainian industry to respond to market forces both inside and outside the country. It also had the potential of forcing the issue of openness and transparency. He encouraged Canada to continue to view Ukraine as a natural trading partner – it was a message, however, that needed to be more widely communicated and understood.20 The reality was that Canadian investors and commercial interests had less than full confidence in Ukraine.21 Anecdotal evidence about the difficulty of doing business in Ukraine was dissuasive. Nevertheless, the ambassador’s message was clear. In point of fact, as part of Canada’s wider trading strategy, the question of how to stimulate interest in trade and investment had been vetted for some time in Canadian government circles. For instance, it was thought that a high-level business mission to Ukraine would be the most appropriate and effective means by which to pique interest and advance prospects. A mission to Kyiv of senior business executives was proposed in early 1996, to be led by the new foreign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, in October of the same year. The trade mission’s objective – following a similar earlier Saskatchewan provincial venture – was to encourage commercial activity by providing a context in which contracts and agreements could be negotiated and signed. To build on the initiative, a ­political discussion centring on the role and responsibility of the partners was to take place in the form of an Intergovernmental

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Economic Commission (I E C ). The inaugural meeting was conducted during the Axworthy visit. In correspondence with Ukraine’s foreign minister, Hennadiy Udovenko, Axworthy wrote that the challenge ahead for both countries was to augment the relationship by building a strong commercial foundation. Outlining his expectations for the mission, he stated, “The ties that are built by trade and investment can serve as the basis for an even closer partnership, enhancing our ability to cooperate in a wide range of areas.”22 The Canadian foreign minister added that he hoped the visit would mark a new era in bilateral relations. His optimism stemmed from the fact that the IEC would serve as a mechanism whereby impediments to greater commercial trade could now be identified, discussed and resolved politically at the highest level. “We expect to emerge with a road map that will guide both sides as we clear these impediments,” Axworthy said at the time.23 But for this to happen, “From our side, it will be important to get across the message that business can only thrive in a transparent and reformed economy.” It was especially important, therefore, to finally address the bureaucratic and legislative obstacles that Canadian companies were encountering in trying to establish themselves in Ukraine. From a business perspective, there were high expectations around the trade mission to be led by the senior Canadian minister. The hope all along was that the venture would translate into economic opportunities. The mission to Kyiv was only partially successful. Prospects in energy, agri-food, construction, and technology sectors were identified. But these were mostly one-off megaprojects with limited contractual commitments: a $150 million agreement with Northland Power to renovate the Darnytsia power plant in Kyiv, a protocol of intent for SNC-Lavalin to build a $400 million World Trade Centre in Kyiv, and a Canadian-Ukrainian joint venture to develop the Leliaki oil field in east-central Ukraine. Nor did opportunities present themselves for mid-sized businesses. For this to occur, greater targeted government intervention would be required. With the help of Western Economic Diversification (W E D ) – a federal agency – and the governments of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba, a private-sector organization rooted in the UkrainianCanadian community was launched to promote business relations with Ukraine: the Canada-Ukraine Business Initiative (C U B I ).

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Chaired by prominent politicians of Ukrainian descent from Alberta – Laurence Decore and Ed Stelmach – C U B I looked to organize a major conference and trade show for June 1997 that would be held simultaneously in a number of cities across Western Canada. Ownership of the project and its ultimate success depended on the Ukrainian-Canadian business community, but the federal government was also closely involved, and not only through its lead agency, WED . Using diplomatic channels, Canada’s ambassador in Kyiv, Christopher Westdal, met with officials from various Ukrainian ministries. He related to them that, within the context of the trade exhibition, Canadian investors had identified projects with the potential to exceed half the total capital investment in the Ukrainian economy since independence. He described the CUBI-sponsored exposition as a “golden” opportunity to increase cooperation with Canada and encouraged the Ukrainians to seize the moment.24 The message was not lost on the Ukrainian government. Ukraine’s foreign minister, Hennadiy Udovenko, visiting Canada in March 1997 to discuss the issue of NATO enlargement, took the occasion to confer with his Canadian counterpart regarding the particulars of the proposed business conference and to convey his optimism about its possible outcomes. The June CUB I business conference was held in Calgary, with specific industry sector shows in various Western Canadian centres – Regina (agriculture), Winnipeg (construction and building products), and Calgary (energy, and oil and gas). It was a large affair, with Ukraine’s prime minister, Pavlo Lazarenko, in attendance, accompanied by a delegation of some 150 Ukrainian industrialists and economic development ministry officials. By all accounts the event was a success. Some $900 million in business agreements were announced, although some of these included the finalization of deals struck in 1996. As a preliminary to the conference, the I E C also met. The commission, chaired by Axworthy and Ukraine’s deputy prime minister, discussed its objectives and priorities. Frank and candid, the deliberations were meant to finally move the trading relationship along. It was agreed that Canada would identify the various impediments to conducting business in Ukraine, bring attention to those projects that required political intervention, and advocate for specific reforms in Ukraine so as to eliminate the need for preferential

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treatment. As for priorities, these included resolving the difficulties associated with the financing of Canadian sales to Ukraine through export credits, simplifying the procedures associated with company registration and taxation in Ukraine, and expediting Ukraine’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), including fasttracking bilateral access negotiations. The I E C was a singular development in as much as it signalled the deepening nature of the relationship, but also because as a dispute resolution mechanism it provided the means by which the impediments to business might finally and openly be addressed, including corrupt business practices and bureaucratic interference. In a number of his presentations at the CUBI conference, Pavlo Lazarenko spoke on the importance of reform, resolving administrative impediments, and the rule of law. He cited Ukraine’s successes, but conceded that there was still much to do. Lazarenko noted that income disparity and the absence of a middle class were challenges. He further admitted to the “excesses” of the Ukrainian bureaucracy, the precarious nature of the rule of law, and the pervasiveness of corruption – attributing these problems to “the legacy of seventy-three years of totalitarian socialism.” Only a commitment to growth, transparency, and lawful rule, he ventured, could address these difficulties. The prime minister’s comments were well received, having set the right tone with Canada’s foreign affairs minister. Axworthy, the host at the event’s gala celebration, was heartened by what he heard, declaring “Economics means stability for society.”25 It was a synergetic moment that allowed the many disparate problems besetting Ukraine to be easily glossed over. Only days back from Canada, Lazarenko reportedly took ill. It was then said that he was temporarily dismissed. Finally, it was announced he had resigned. Rumours, all along, were circulating about the prime minister; allegations of larceny, extortion, and influence peddling were rife. The claims, however, masked a more mundane transgression. Lazarenko planned to contest President Kuchma in the 1999 presidential election, an ambition that led directly to his dismissal – the accusations of malfeasance simply serving as a pretext for his removal. It was a sordid affair, ironic only from the standpoint of the I E C discussions and the prime minister’s earlier comments at the trade conference on corruption

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and rule of law. It pointed to the sad fact that the problems hampering Ukraine were not only deeply embedded, but located at the very apex of Ukraine’s political order. Lazarenko’s dismissal as prime minister was the fifth in five years, and he was the second to have fled Ukraine under a cloud of suspicion.26 (The ex-prime minister would eventually be extradited from his refuge in Switzerland to the US, where he was tried and convicted of money laundering, spending several years in a California prison.) Talk of reform was moot when the corrosive effects of corruption ate away at the country’s institutions and laws. What, then, was to be the course of action for Canada? And what of Ukraine? The evidence was discouraging if not depressing. On Transparency International’s 1998 Corruption Perceptions Index, Ukraine ranked 69 of the 85 countries listed.27 On several so-called “economic freedom” indexes – a composite of personal choice, voluntary exchange, competitive freedom, and personal and property pro­ tection – Ukraine placed 116 amongst 123 countries. Bohdan Krawchenko, a Canadian academic appointed vice-rector of the Ukrainian Academy of Public Administration and a key figure in the administrative reform campaign, expressed frustration and disillusionment with the political process. Votes were bought and sold in parliament, deputies frequently changed their positions, and legislation was bogged down during parliamentary review despite unanimous agreement. “It is a quagmire where everyone and no one is responsible,” he declared. “You have politics by intrigue. Commercial lobbies buy votes. It’s not even clear which factions in parliament support the government.”28 Despite the effort by Canada and other countries over the years, there appeared to be little return on the political investment. And yet despite the difficulties and setbacks, there were reasons to press on. Systemic considerations continued to dominate, with regional stability and security figuring prominently; a vulnerable population meant the situation had the potential to turn into a full-blown refugee crisis. But no less important was the issue of Canada’s interests, broadly defined. The difficult economic situation in Ukraine would not last forever; prospective trade and close community contacts suggested there was value in maintaining the relationship. It was for this reason that each and every Canadian

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minister who ventured to Kyiv on official business – Diane Marleau (international cooperation), Ralph Goodale (natural resources), and Art Eggleton (national defence) – uniformly reiterated the same message: Ukraine needed to engage in reform in order to foster stability and remain credible, both at home and abroad. It was also fundamental in terms of Ukraine’s relationship with Canada.29 In January 1999, Prime Minister Chrétien, accompanied by a group of some one hundred Canadian entrepreneurs, paid a brief visit to Kyiv as part of a four-nation tour. In an address on the economy at a luncheon gathering hosted by President Kuchma, Chrétien stated, “We have come to reaffirm that the Canadian business community has much to offer Ukraine … [Our business people] have come with a desire to invest.” But the plain-speaking prime minister also shared some quaint wisdom with his hosts: “I have always said that there is nothing more nervous in this world than a million dollars. Faced with an unhealthy business climate it will simply go elsewhere.” He exhorted his counterparts “to stay the course of reform. To see the job through.”30 His words, however, were also meant to admonish. Graft, cronyism, and bureaucratic red tape were significant obstacles to growth and, according to Chrétien, “a recipe for poverty, stagnation and alienation.” The social and political costs relating to the lack of reform in Ukraine had real consequences. The fear, as expressed by the prime minister, was that in the face of economic stagnation and growing poverty, anti-democratic forces in the Ukrainian parliament would stage a resurgence, threatening even some of the more basic reforms that had been undertaken. He made clear that Canada, along with other allies, was anxious that Ukraine not backslide. A senior official, accompanying the prime minister, offered an even more unvarnished assessment of the situation during a press briefing: “Ukraine is approaching a crossroads … [and] if we ignore it or don’t support it, there is a danger it will slip backwards,” ominously adding, “other scenarios could develop.” When asked about the prospects ahead, another Canadian official simply proffered the comment that the task of “propping up” Ukrainian reforms would be “a tough one.”31 The situation in Ukraine was indeed worrisome. So much so that it became a central point of discussion between Jean Chrétien

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and his Polish counterpart, Jerzy Buzek, during the Polish leg of the prime minister’s four-nation tour. Belarus, a neighbouring post-Soviet state, had regressed into a loathsome dictatorship. From the perspective of Western-leaning Poland, it was imperative that a similar situation be avoided in Ukraine. Acknowledging that there was mutual interest in championing Ukrainian reforms and that both states had influence in Kyiv – the two countries recognizing Ukraine’s independence early on in 1991 – Chrétien and Buzek agreed to consult and work jointly. Chrétien declared that as “middle powers” committed to liberal democracy, there was value and wisdom in working together, especially given that Poland, a bridge to the European Union, had considerable experience with developing democratic institutions during its own transition.32 That Canada looked to work with Poland in solving the Ukraine puzzle signalled a shift in policy. Although the trade dimension in Canada-Ukraine relations would not be completely abandoned, it was evident that a more effective approach would be to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Ukrainian state with the help of others. The legislative and judicial branches, for instance, were weak, and practical instruction in public administration could help mitigate some of the more corrosive influences of corruption on Ukraine’s political life. With this in mind, Canada announced that it would help fund a Canada-Poland multi-year Public Policy Capacity Building project ($4.1 million), which supported the Ukrainian Academy of Public Administration’s Centre for the Study of Administrative Reform and provided, among other things, policy instruction and internships in Canada and Poland for public policy students as a way to influence the next generation of civil servants. The government also earmarked additional funds in support of training Ukrainian judges as part of a Canada-Ukraine Judicial Reform Project, the purpose of which was to increase the efficiency and efficacy of Ukrainian courts while contributing to greater judicial independence. In addition, the Chrétien government reaffirmed its commitment to the $2.2 million Canadian-Ukrainian Legislative Education Program. Hand in hand with the effort to strengthen state institutions, however, was the strategic decision to bolster civil society. A strong civil society would not only act as a counterweight to the growing influence of money on politics, it held

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the promise of an alternative form of political community committed to change. In this respect, $1.2 million was allocated to the Non-Governmental Organization Development Project. Critically, the commitment to strengthening institutional and societal capacity was part of an earlier strategic review of the Canada-Ukraine Partners Program. Managed by the U C C , the Canada-Ukraine Partners Program initially sought to transfer skills and create links. It failed, however, to meet expectations, underscoring the view that the Ukrainian-Canadian community was better adapted and equipped to setting agendas than in formulating policy or administering projects.33 Management of the program, consequently, was ceded to C I D A , whose work would focus on project development and strategic institution building. Entrusting the partnership program to CIDA signalled a strategic realignment with the community on the part of the government. Program delivery required experience and administrative expertise, which under the circumstances was much needed. This did not mean, however, that the community would be sidelined. The Canada-Ukraine Advisory Council, created by the government in 1996, continued to operate as the chief mechanism for contact between the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the community. Consisting of officials from D F A I T and other departments, as well as members of the U C C , CanadaUkraine Chamber of Commerce, and the Canada-Ukraine Foundation (a community-based assistance and educational charity), its purpose was to serve as a policy forum whereby advice from the community, still useful given the mutable situation in Ukraine, might be received and discussed when needed. Significantly, despite the difficulties Ukraine faced, the problem at the start of the millennium year was not the economy. Ukraine’s economy, in fact, was showing signs of improvement. Pressure from the I MF and donor nations, including the EU and US, had finally convinced President Kuchma (re-elected in 1999) to undertake some important and necessary steps at economic reform. Under the leadership of his newly appointed and Western-leaning prime minister, Viktor Yushchenko, enormous progress was made in short order. The energy sector was reorganized and agriculture was transformed with the elimination of Soviet-style collective agro-enterprises. Wage and pension arrears were either eliminated

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or greatly reduced and Ukraine’s GDP grew for the first time since independence. Exports significantly picked up (by almost 18 per cent), including with Canada. Ukraine was showing itself to be a responsible actor in other ways as well. Ukrainian military personnel and civilian contractors could be found serving in U N and O S C E missions to Croatia, Bosnia, Tajikistan, Angola, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and Transnistria. Military peacekeeping contingents were also deployed in Lebanon, Congo, and Kosovo. In fact, Ukraine’s proposed peace plan for Kosovo served as the basis for the crucial U N Security Council Resolution 1244. All things considered, with the start of the new millennium, the situation with Ukraine was much improved, leading Canada’s ambassador, Derek Fraser, to declare that he was “prudently optimistic” about Ukraine’s future.34 If there were difficulties, these increasingly lay with domestic political shortcomings that threatened to undo the embryonic reforms. Legislative changes introduced during Prime Minister Yushchenko’s short time in office were only meekly embraced. Bureaucracy, business clans, and industrial interests continued to thwart change. Oligarchs, in particular, remained opposed to any effort that curtailed or impeded their business dealings. Equally, the authoritarian tendencies associated with the Kuchma presidency, already evident in the run-up to the 1998 parliamentary elections and especially during the 1999 presidential vote, con­ tinued to intensify. Print and televised media were increasingly censored or controlled by political and economic interests, while opponents were harassed and intimidated. The murder of the freelance journalist Georgiy Gongadze was seen as the inevitable result of a presidency gone rogue. Ukraine’s foreign minister, Anatoliy Zlenko, met with Canada’s foreign affairs minister, John Manley, in March 2001. The meeting primarily covered economic and security issues. The Gongadze affair, however, was also a point of discussion. The journalist’s death, with its wider implications for press freedoms and the rising tide of anti-Kuchma protests across Ukraine, demanded an explanation. Carl Schwenger, spokesperson for D F A I T , was forthright in his evaluation and expectations for the political situation: “We want to see change in Ukraine. We want to see transparency in how the [Ukrainian] government is dealing with the challenges it

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is facing from its citizens … The goal for Mr. Zlenko is to come here and tell us what’s going on in Ukraine. We are in a listening mode and welcome the opportunity to get a firsthand briefing.” Underscoring the urgency of the matter, Schwenger added: “[Zlenko] can expect to hear from Canadian ministers about our concerns, which relate to good government, transparency and a free and open media.”35 The murder of Gongadze was symptomatic of all that was wrong with Ukraine, and Canada’s inclination would have been to scale back on its bilateral commitments. That Canada might withhold support was cause for concern in the Ukrainian-Canadian community. The Ukrainian Canadian Professional and Business Federation (U C P B F ), in a tête-à-tête with Manley prior to his meeting with Ukraine’s foreign minister, iterated that the UkrainianCanadian business community rejected any thought of abandoning Ukraine. Rather, the UCPBF urged the government to redouble its assistance efforts, especially in the political sphere, by establishing an international think tank that could provide independent policy advice to Ukraine. The association also asked that a position of secretary of state for Eastern Europe be created to ensure continuing and focused government attention. Meanwhile, representatives of the national U C C , in a separate meeting with Manley, advised the minister to expand contacts with Ukrainian opposition leaders in order to reassure the people of Ukraine that the fight for human rights and fundamental freedoms would continue to earn Canada’s support.36 Despite the chaos, there were some continuing, albeit small, signs of progress in relations. The Canada-Ukraine IEC continued with its work on developing an investment plan for Ukraine, provincial missions to Ukraine were still being organized, and official delegations from Ukraine arrived regularly to learn, among other things, about Canadian governance, land registry, and banking protocols.37 Nevertheless, in view of the domestic political situation, there was real doubt about Ukraine’s future and, correspondingly, uncertainty about Canada’s relationship with Ukraine. It was in this context that Yushchenko, the former prime minister and now prominent opposition figure, wrote an op-ed in the Globe and Mail beseeching Canada to stand with Ukraine despite the disappointments and frustration.

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Commenting on the growing power of oligarchic interests in parliament, Yushchenko underscored the need for a broad democratic alliance in Ukraine to lessen the influence of the oligarchs and promote new ideas that would allow for the principles of rule of law and human rights to take root. For this to happen, he argued, Canada’s continuing support was needed. “There can be no thought of any reduction or cooling in Ukrainian-Canadian relations because of some perceived change in Ukraine’s orientation.” He added, “On the contrary, our cooperative programs should grow in order to adapt the Canadian experience to Ukrainian realties.” Yushchenko’s message, plain and simple, was that this was neither the time to retreat nor to surrender. Rather, underscoring the special bond between the two nations – “We are friends and we should remain friends” – it was his hope and desire that Canada would continue to assist Ukraine politically in overcoming the current difficulties.38 Yushchenko’s entreaty, however, was based more on wishful thinking than a critical assessment of the situation in Ukraine. After his dismissal, the office of prime minister reverted to Anatoliy Kinakh, head of the pro-presidential political faction, the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine, who in turn was soon replaced by the representative of the Donetsk business clan, Viktor Yanukovych. As proxies for the increasingly embattled Leonid Kuchma, both prime ministers sought to consolidate the power of the governing party and to turn Ukraine’s foreign policy toward Russia and away from the West. This was not an unexpected development. Western pressure – I MF insistence on greater transparency and accountability as a precondition for the release of assistance funds – and growing indebtedness to Russia – a result of Ukraine’s energy needs – forced Ukraine into a tighter dependency with the latter. Russian support for Ukraine was offered in exchange for acquiescence. Under this arrangement, oligarchic interests and the existing power structures flourished. Without a partner, at least one that took its responsibilities seriously, there was little the Chrétien government could do, except remain watchful and issue protests where flagrant violations of human rights and freedoms (especially press freedom) occurred. Within this limbo, it was left to others to make the case for a continuing relationship and to offer solutions. Ukrainian-Canadian

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activists, for instance, mobilized to intercede directly with Ukraine’s ambassador to Canada, the well-liked and respected Yuriy Shcherbak, recommending an advisory group be set up to work with him. Meanwhile, U C C representatives appeared before the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, outlining the independent contributions of community organizations to the development of Ukrainian civil society but arguing that significantly more could be done with greater support from the Canadian government and public. The UCC, in effect, called for a renewed commitment by the government. In particular, it would recommend that CIDA’s Partnership Branch develop a policy framework to assist N G O projects and programs in Ukraine. The UC C argued that the basis for a renewed commitment was the 2001 Joint Declaration on Continuing Development of the Special Partnership between Canada and Ukraine, which reaffirmed that the territorial integrity of an independent, prosperous, and sovereign Ukraine was of vital interest to both Canada and the international community. In the context of recent political developments, this necessarily meant providing backing for reformist attitudes and movements in Ukraine.39 The U C C made it plain that the solution was not less support during these critical times, but more support, the goal of which was to move Ukraine along the path of reform. In June 2002, the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs released its own report and recommendations after months of study and work. Reiterating the principle that support for Ukraine was of fundamental interest to Canada, the committee made it clear to the government that Canadian assistance should not be perceived “as a mere handout but rather a strategic investment in its own future.” Canada’s strategic approach toward Ukraine, according to the Senate committee, should align with Canada’s generally accepted foreign policy priorities. To this end the committee recommended that the Chrétien government employ a coherent, coordinated assistance strategy, incorporating long-term commitments focusing on economic reform, as well as assistance for Ukrainian nation- and state-building. The report also counselled that Canada expand its support for Ukraine’s undertaking of legal and judicial reform; strengthen its technical assistance role by directing more attention to long-term partnerships that took

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advantage of Ukraine’s scientific and technological potential; spearhead knowledge transfer through student exchanges, scholarships, and work programs; and create databases identifying expertise, aid projects, and volunteer organizations that could promote greater Canadian involvement in Ukraine.40 The Senate report, in effect, advocated that Canada build on the advantages inherent in the “special relationship.” The Senate committee noted the role that Canada might play in Ukraine’s democratic development and, by highlighting the policy objective of maximum engagement, reaffirmed Canada’s unique connection with Ukraine. But the measures proposed also acknowledged the severity of the crisis, following closely the organized community’s own assessment of the challenges ahead. In advocating maximum support for reform in Ukraine, the Senate committee implied that this was not just another set of obstacles to be overcome. Ukraine was at a tipping point and the course of action Canada undertook would matter. Despite the difficulties, with presidential elections scheduled in the fall of 2004 – a full year away – there was some reason for hope and optimism. Change was possible insofar as reformists appeared to be making some real headway in Ukraine. And yet, the path forward would not come without a fight. The forces around the increasingly embattled Ukrainian president were dug in. It remained to be seen how Canada would respond. This, however, was an open-ended question in light of the replacement of Chrétien as both leader of the Liberal Party and prime minister by his successor, Paul Martin. A person with considerable policy experience and high ideals, it remained to be seen what, if any, effect Martin’s vision for Canada in the world would have on Canada-Ukraine relations. It also remained to be seen what role there was for the community to play, if any.

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3 “More Canada” Ukraine, Paul Martin, and Canadian Values

In late August 2005, Prime Minister Paul Martin looked to meet with the Ukrainian-Canadian community while travelling to Western Canada on a four-city tour – Edmonton, Saskatoon, Regina, and Winnipeg. It was an opportunity for him to regain lost political ground, some eighteen months into his mandate, after a number of costly missteps. The signing of a redress agreement – after the government indicated it was finally prepared to put the long-standing grievance of First World War internment behind it – provided the occasion for the prime minister to meet with representatives in Regina. In Winnipeg, to attend a meeting of the Liberal Party caucus, he also opened the new national UCC office. The real purpose, however, was to receive the final observer reports on Ukraine’s 2004 presidential election from the head of Canada’s bilateral observer mission, former prime minister John Turner, and the UCC. The Winnipeg meeting was full of meaning. Foremost, it was a celebration of Canadian success. A large group of people – volunteers sent abroad under the aegis of the so-called Canada Corps – had participated as observers in the December runoff of the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election after irregularities led to the original results being nullified. The goal of the mission was to help ensure transparency and electoral fairness. As part of a larger international effort, it also helped diffuse the crisis and, as some claimed, even avert a possible civil war. The prime minister applauded the Canadian mission, praising the community’s involvement as well as the calibre of the work. He especially commended the mission

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participants for their professionalism, dedication, and verve, ­stating: “The comportment of those observers was impeccable, their commitment was unwavering, their contribution was inestimable, and they did it with an infectious enthusiasm, with expertise, and above all, with an acute sensitivity to local conditions and culture.”1 The prime minister’s receipt of the reports at the gathering was a symbolic gesture, reaffirming for the community that their work was important and much appreciated. But for Martin, the occasion also validated the policy relevance of the Canada Corps initiative. Touted as an assistance effort designed to help channel Canada’s contribution to governance and democracy abroad, the Canada Corps program concentrated on placing ordinary Canadians, volunteers, to help project “Canadian values” on the global stage. In doing so, they worked to make Canada’s long-standing commitment to peace and security just as relevant in a post-9/11 world. Given that the Canada Corps represented a signature piece in his government’s new foreign policy approach, it was politically important for the prime minister to receive the reports. Arguably, without the input of the community, Canada’s electoral observer mission to Ukraine would not have been as successful. It required organization, participation, and, above all, cooperation. As a general proposition, engaging with Canada’s communities was an important feature of the Chrétien government’s foreign policy repertoire. But this was somehow different. There was less of a transactional dimension to the relationship. There was also a willingness to connect with the Ukrainian-Canadian community personally. For instance, after Winnipeg and Regina, the prime minister continued to meet with community leaders – in fact, three times in a matter of eight months. He would also phone the U C C president, Orysia Sushko, to discuss events in Ukraine. By any measure, the willingness to engage the community was unusual, but it was especially striking in contrast to the previous government – with Jean Chrétien failing to meet with the UCC even once during the eleven years of his tenure as prime minister. As one representative stated, for a community thought to have been on the political margins for some time, its fortunes had changed markedly with the new prime minister.2

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The opportunity to exchange views reflected Prime Minister Martin’s personal predilection to work with the community. Although the motives may have been politically calculated – to finally resolve a number of contentious issues such as redress – it was also based on the recognition that interests might be mutually satisfied if common principles were observed. If the government and the community could agree that interests were best served by working together, cooperation was possible. Indeed, the Martin government’s desire to have Canada recognized as a model polity, worthy of international respect and emulation, brought it closer to a community that maintained in equal measure that representative democracy, rule of law, rights, and freedoms – values underpinning Canada’s national political experience – needed to be promoted and supported in Ukraine. The shared interests, grounded in “Canadian values,” thus coincided. But what was the dynamic process that led to this? How did the personal and policy preferences of the prime minister factor in? And what was the meaning and what were the implications of a values-driven foreign policy for Canada-Ukraine relations? The desire for Canada to serve as an example to be emulated would shape the Martin government’s approach to Ukraine. Yet initially under Prime Minister Martin’s watch, there was little evidence that Canada could or would make a difference in furthering Ukraine’s democratization. Ukraine under Leonid Kuchma had become progressively authoritarian in its behaviour. Through the use of fraudulent electoral tactics, the ruling presidential party outmanoeuvred the political opposition in the 2002 parliamentary elections, consolidating its grip on power. There was also circumstantial evidence suggesting Ukraine had sold advanced weapons systems to Saddam Hussein in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War, making it an international pariah. As for oligarchic influence, which had led to corruption being routine in Ukraine, the embezzlement of state assets had reached dizzying heights under Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. President Kuchma, his family members, and several of his close associates were allegedly implicated in a number of these schemes. Kuchma, scheduled to leave office in 2004 and seeking to avoid possible future prosecution, supported Yanukovych

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in his bid for the presidency, effectively ensuring that the status quo would prevail. Despite the pleas of the opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko, Canada was disinclined to do more. Indeed, when Martin succeeded Chrétien as prime minister in December 2003, the new administration contemplated changes in Canada’s foreign policy direction as a matter of course. But a shift in attitude toward Ukraine was unlikely to occur as long as the incumbent president, Kuchma, was in office and Prime Minister Yanukovych succeeded him. From the outset, the Martin government was measured, if not guarded, in its dealings with Ukraine. In January 2004, for example, a Ukrainian request for Canadian backing at a meeting of the G7-initiated Financial Action Task Force – an intergovernmental organization created to develop and promote policies and programs to help combat international money laundering networks – was rebuffed, ostensibly as a signal that the Martin government would not be party to the lie that Ukraine was committed to confronting financial irregularities on its territory. More telling was the Department of Foreign Affairs’ announcement that the position of Canada’s trade commissioner in Kyiv would be eliminated. The move was said to be part of a routine downsizing exercise, but Ukraine’s honorary consul in Edmonton, Ed Southern, read it as symptomatic of official fatigue with Ukraine. Southern opposed the decision. Noting that Canadian exports to Ukraine – mostly wheat and agricultural equipment – had increased by over one hundred per cent in 2003, he argued that the plan to dismantle the office conveyed the wrong message to Canadian entrepreneurs doing business in the country. It also undermined Canada’s longstanding efforts to help Ukraine rebuild its economy.3 His critique, however, ignored the question of whether continuing assistance simply legitimated the powers that be. Although the need in Ukraine dictated the providing of assistance, there was a sense that no amount could dislodge the pervasive influence of corruption that had so corroded the country’s politics. As Canadian officials were prone to ask, why prop up a regime that had no intention of engaging in serious reforms? The Martin government’s proposed idea to eliminate the Kyiv trade office exacerbated what was already a frosty relationship with the Ukrainian-Canadian community – a result of the government’s

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decision to appeal a court ruling on denaturalization and deportation that reignited the debate on the prosecution of war criminals from the Second World War. Registering its dismay, the Edmontonbased Ukrainian News commented that the Martin government’s actions were simply baffling.4 The decision on the Kyiv trade office, in particular, seemed inexplicable given the special relationship between Canada and Ukraine, and Canada’s own foreign policy declarations on assistance, economic growth, and international development. The criticism, however, masked a deeper concern. It was not just that the decision was seen as flawed and misguided. Rather, it reflected poorly on a community that appeared to no longer possess influence. The Ukrainian-Canadian community had come to the stark realization that it carried little political weight at a time when its intervention was needed most. If it was to remain relevant, the community, it was felt, had to elevate its game. Ukraine’s presidential elections, scheduled for October 2004, provided the catalyst for action. Political opposition in Ukraine was gathering, and reformists were on the move. The election would prove pivotal. In view of the irregularities in the 2002 parliamentary elections, it was imperative that every effort be taken to ensure transparency and fairness in the forthcoming presidential election. As a practical matter, this meant planning and organization. As early as December 2003, the UCC leadership met to discuss the organization’s possible role and what, if anything, could be done.5 The deliberations highlighted deep reservations about the future: the scale of the task ahead was enormous, the level of community interest unknown, funding problematic, and relations with the government and its lead development agency – CIDA – tenuous at best. On the other hand, it was felt that the community possessed capacity, skill, and the ability to make a difference. Trumping all of this was the belief that it was a decisive time for Ukraine. The community had to act, regardless. The UCC laid out general and specific strategic goals in its plan to intervene. The primary objective was to ensure the fair conduct of Ukraine’s presidential election. For this to occur, measures needed to be taken. These included involving the Western media to focus attention on events, thereby sidestepping oligarchic control of Ukraine’s domestic press. It also meant partnering with Ukrainian civil society groups to promote electoral transparency,

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complementing other international democracy-building initiatives in Ukraine, and working with groups in Canada either interested in helping or inclined to help. Most importantly, however, the UCC was determined to gain the Martin government’s confidence as a way to ignite official interest and possible participation in the effort.6 With this in mind, the UC C met with Aileen Carroll, minister for international cooperation, and the cabinet official responsible for C I D A . In its submission, the U C C highlighted the efforts of oligarchs to manipulate Ukraine’s government and their control of the media with its potential influence on the electoral process. The U C C was unequivocal: democracy in Ukraine was at risk. Citing the Martin government’s stated commitment to a free and fair election in Ukraine, they argued for the need to develop conditions in which Ukrainians could go to the polls with confidence. Monitoring the implementation of the electoral code before and during the elections could provide for this. In this regard, they felt that the presence of trained Canadian and Ukrainian electoral observers would lessen the likelihood of political intimidation and interference. The UCC proposed, therefore, to send sixty Canadian observers, train 200 local Ukrainian monitors, and help facilitate media coverage by sponsoring twenty representatives from major Western news outlets. The estimated cost of the project was $947,000. The UC C ’s contribution was pegged at $368,000. The remaining sum was to be covered by C I D A .7 The ministerial meeting was soon followed by correspondence from the minister’s designate, the director general of CIDA’s Russia, Ukraine and Nuclear Programs Division, Françoise Ducros. Though agreeing that the election would be pivotal, Ducros explained that the activities proposed by the UCC were already being undertaken through CI D A’s Democratic Institutions and Practices program, with funds allocated for this purpose. Consequently, the government would not provide separate funding for the proposed U C C venture. She suggested, rather, that those wishing to participate in the CIDA-sponsored effort register with CIDA’s elections observation partner, CANA D EM, an NGO contracted to oversee the mission. CANA D EM’s role was to ensure that the electoral observers being sent were experienced, qualified, properly trained, and nonpartisan.8 Tasked with the responsibility of ensuring international

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standards, C A NAD EM sought to avoid any suggestion of impropriety on the part of the Canadian mission. In prioritizing CANADEM, the inference from the minister’s designate was that Ukrainian Canadians were predisposed to bias and therefore seen as a liability.9 The community’s setback underscored the importance of establishing a closer working relationship with the Martin government and positioning itself so that it might be seen as a resource. For this to occur, the U C C looked to develop and adopt informed ­positions on a range of issues – citizenship revocation, immigration levels, human trafficking, multiculturalism, redress, and cuts to Radio Canada International (Canada’s international broadcaster) – and to bring its concerns to government for consultation, deliberation, and, if possible, resolution. It was a sign of growing sophistication on the part of the community. A meeting with Canada’s foreign minister, Bill Graham, to promote the observer mission proposal was another indication that the community leadership would not be deterred in pursuing its interest in Ukraine’s presidential election. As with Minister Carroll, Graham received the U C C ’s initiative warmly, but the meeting failed to produce results. The U C C was now convinced that it would have to act unilaterally, reaffirming a resolution adopted earlier by its Government Relations Com­ mittee.10 The organization thus developed a comprehensive action plan in the lead-up to the Ukrainian election. The strategy, based on the U CC’s original plan, was impressive both in terms of scope and scale. The UCC would launch its own electoral mission, working closely with both the Central Election Commission of Ukraine (CEC) and the OSCE regarding its role in the field. It further offered to organize polls on behalf of the CE C in major Canadian urban centres for Ukrainian citizens living in Canada. In addition, the UCC stated that it was prepared to work with the Ukrainian World Congress and the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America to maximize the use of resources. Finally, the organization made clear its willingness and desire to cooperate with CIDA so that the overall Canadian undertaking might be more robust. In the summer of 2004, the UCC issued an appeal for volunteers to serve as electoral observers in the U C C -sponsored mission. Heeding the call, hundreds registered. With sixty applicants

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eventually selected, the delegation served as a parallel body to the group of forty-five people chosen separately by C A N A D E M as members of Canada’s official mission. The total number of electoral monitors, however, was modest, leading the Canadian parliamentarian Borys Wrzesnewskyj to call on Canada to send more. According to Wrzesnewskyj, these were especially needed in Russia, where polls were being organized for the large Ukrainian expatriate community there. Some 500,000 signatures – an unexpectedly large figure – had reportedly been collected in a pre-election drive in Moscow and St Petersburg; many were said to be in favour of the government candidate, Viktor Yanukovych. It pointed to potential electoral interference from so-called Russian “power bodies,” highlighting the intense jockeying in the prelude to the election. With evidence mounting that the election could be in jeopardy, the Martin government was at a crossroads. Wary of becoming too deeply involved given the difficulties in Ukraine and still uncertain of its foreign policy priorities, it would have been imprudent to intervene more forcefully without a strategy in place. Ottawa’s reticence necessarily led some within the community to conclude that the government was biased. CI DA was specifically criticized for allegedly discriminating against persons of Ukrainian descent after fewer than a handful of people from a highly qualified pool were chosen as part of the official forty-five-member delegation. Suspicion gave rise to intense speculation about the community’s political fortunes, giving credence to the idea, once again, that it carried no weight with Ottawa. The community leadership was panned in particular for being unprepared and poorly equipped to deal with the challenges ahead.11 Taras Kuzio, a researcher and frequent public commentator on Ukrainian politics, argued that the purported political influence of Ukrainian Canadians was in fact a myth. Not only did Canada’s national media fail to publish articles and editorials on the crisis in Ukraine, they also had no effective presence in Kyiv. Relative to their US counterparts, senior Canadian ministers were also said to demonstrate little interest in the Ukraine file, and Canadian business and investment ties paled in comparison to British, Dutch, German, and American connections. This lack of influence, Kuzio claimed, went hand in hand with the community’s parochial thinking, which seriously hobbled its ability to make a difference. Why,

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for instance, was the UCC headquarters located in Winnipeg and not Ottawa, where the centre of power was located? According to Kuzio, it was time the UC C contemplated a geographic move “to accompany the Canadian diaspora’s psychological shift from the 19th into the 21st century.”12 He added laconically that if Ukraine was of importance to Canada, it was simply because of its strategic value and interest, and not because of any community influence. To be sure, the growing anti-democratic tendency within Ukraine (and Russia more generally) was of strategic concern to the Canadian government. However, since independence, Canada’s relationship with Ukraine was also invested with tremendous symbolism, suggesting that strategic interest was not the only factor at work. This raised the question: if the Martin government was at a crossroads with regard to the upcoming presidential election, then would the same considerations that suffused the relationship with such symbolic importance in the past not also unlock the stalemate now? In point of fact, other considerations were at play. How these became manifest in the context of the unfolding crisis would soon become apparent. The Ukrainian election was shaping up to be a trying affair given the enormity of the stakes. But Ukraine’s electoral law also made it likely that the situation would become difficult. It allowed for two electoral rounds if a majority vote was not secured in the first. It was already evident in the lead-up to the election that there was ample opportunity for even more irregularities to occur. Indeed, the rough and tumble of Ukrainian politics made a sham of any democratic propriety, prompting Canada’s ambassador to Ukraine, Andrew Robinson, to comment publicly that the election would fail to meet international standards given the abuses witnessed thus far in the voting preliminaries. The Canadian ambassador was reprimanded by the Ukrainian government for his remarks, which were said to be contrary to the spirit of the partnership. Not only did his “excessive attention to Ukraine’s internal affairs” undermine the relationship, it also “[gave] grounds to question the Embassy’s objectiveness in informing the Canadian Government about the real situation in Ukraine.”13 Contrary to this claim, however, Robinson had in fact understated the depth and extent of the problems, made apparent when an attempt was made on the life of the main opposition

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candidate, Viktor Yushchenko. The effect of the assassination attempt, which Yushchenko barely survived, was to galvanize the opposition, which rallied around him. The October ballot thus failed to produce a decisive result, leading to a 21 November run-off. The intense rivalry, along with other prevailing conditions, made it inevitable that the November run-off vote would be plagued by abuses. It was not surprising, therefore, that international observer groups, which included the sixty-member U C C -led mission and forty-five monitors from the C A N A D E M operation (which were still in place), cited numerous violations in the 21 November second round. Particularly disturbing was Russia’s purported meddling in the electoral process. Canadian observer David Kilgour, an MP, identified Russia’s overt support for Yanukovych as being especially egregious. “The governmental television stations in Russia that are broadcasting into this country are campaigning ultimately for Mr. Yanukovych … there are even billboards up in central Moscow that give the same message,” Kilgour observed. “Such interference is shockingly inappropriate for any fair-minded person anywhere.” Others reported equally serious violations. These included police arrests and detention, massive intimidation of voters and observers, negligence in the oversight and security of extra ballots, manipulation of mobile polling stations, ballot stuffing, confiscation of documents, and the false reporting of information.14 When exit polls pointed to sizable deviations from the announced results, the second round of the election was invariably called into question. The international reaction, including from Canada, was swift. On 24 November 2004, Deputy Prime Minister Anne McLellan informed Canada’s House of Commons that the government would not recognize the vote in view of allegations of significant electoral fraud. She called for a full and transparent review. If Ukraine failed to comply, McLellan said, Canada would have no choice but to re-examine its relationship with the country. Following an emergency debate in parliament on the deteriorating situation in Ukraine, the House unanimously passed a motion demanding that the democratic will of the Ukrainian people be respected, while noting that Canada would seek to cooperate with the international community in taking appropriate and effective measures if the government of Ukraine acted otherwise.15 The

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government’s invocation of an international response mirrored the wider geostrategic concerns of the alliance. More fundamentally, however, it reflected a deep and abiding concern about the prospects for rule of law and democratic processes in Ukraine, without which the post-Cold War liberal order would be in jeopardy. For Canada, as for its allies, nothing less than the survival of the liberal order was at stake, which accounted for the intense interest and urgency of the moment. The Canadian government’s defence of democracy in Ukraine, a decisive step on its part, echoed public concern with developments in the country. Editorials praised Canada’s firm stand, and insisted the Martin government do even more.16 Mass rallies were held across Canada in support of the political opposition in Ukraine. In the bitter November cold, many hundreds gathered in Edmonton, Calgary, Saskatoon, Regina, and Winnipeg. Five hundred gathered in Toronto and over a thousand assembled on Ottawa’s Parliament Hill. The Manitoba legislature passed a resolution calling on the provincial government to work with its federal counterpart in taking measures to uphold the democratic will of the Ukrainian people. The National Assembly of Quebec passed a motion affirming its solidarity. Meanwhile, the Alberta government committed $125,000 to the provincial branch of the UCC to help offset costs associated with the participation of Albertans in the UCC’s observer mission. In an appearance before an emergency meeting of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Ukraine’s ambassador, Mykola Maimeskul, expressed his gratitude for all that the Government of Canada and Canadians were doing on behalf of democracy in Ukraine. He especially thanked the Canadian observer teams in Ukraine. Maimeskul noted cautiously, however, that the situation was volatile and potentially dangerous. How Canada might continue to help became a point for discussion. On this, the ambassador was clear. Carefully balancing his comments as a diplomatic representative as well as a concerned citizen of Ukraine, he recommended that Canada, along with the international community, help create an atmosphere in which Ukrainians could express their preferences freely. But more importantly, if a new run-off was to be held, it was his view that the Martin government would do well to send even more observers.

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Citing the urgency of the moment – “And the time is near,” he said – the ambassador underscored the importance of Canadian bilateral assistance.17 During US president George W. Bush’s 30 November state visit to Ottawa, the president and prime minister discussed the possible use of violence by the Ukrainian government to enforce its will. At a news conference, both leaders iterated the importance of finding a peaceful and lawful solution to the crisis triggered by the rigged election. But it was Paul Martin who made plain in his public comments that interference from Russia was unacceptable and that further Russian meddling in Ukraine’s electoral process would not be tolerated.18 What this meant at the time was unclear. However, a well-defined and unambiguous response from Canada was required when Ukraine’s Supreme Court annulled the 21 November election results, ordering another run-off vote for 26 December. The government’s new foreign policy strategy would help guide its actions on this issue. Operating in the shadow of Jean Chrétien for years, Martin, the new prime minister, was anxious to establish his political bona fides. Although a foreign policy review had been undertaken in the waning months of the Chrétien government, the Martin administration was eager to exercise its own foreign policy voice.19 A number of ideas were apparent at the start of the government’s tenure. In the speech from the throne, which set out the goals and aspirations of the new government, it was emphasized that “Canadian values” – rule of law, liberty and democracy, equality of opportunity, and fairness – would help guide Canada in playing a constructive and positive international role. In this the Martin government was convinced, working on the premise that Canada embodied and would act as a force for international good. “The world needs more of Canada,” senior officials confidently declaimed.20 Wishing to make a difference, the Martin government set about undertaking its own foreign policy review in 2004. As the review dragged on for a full year, confidence in the Martin government’s abilities waned. Critics proffered that the dithering of the government, its proclivity to choose form over substance, and paralysis brought on by domestic scandal (a holdover from the previous government) made for uninspired leadership. “Where was the imagination?” some wondered publicly.21 The criticism,

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however, did not provoke panic in government ranks. Senior ministers insisted that Canada must “get it right,” emphasizing that its foreign policy had to possess necessary “character” if Canada was to make a difference in the world. In this regard, the gov­ ernment’s objectives had to be rooted in principles and values supported by Canadians, for only in this manner could the government be assured it was on the right track and its intentions be seen as sincere.22 In effect, moral authority – the soft power of diplomacy – would provide Canada with the needed influence and authority to conduct itself credibly on the international stage. Promoting those values that informed Canadian society had the added benefit of reinforcing the country’s sense of identity – “It is what makes us truly Canadian, being who we are, doing what we do best” – making it even more of a priority for the government. Canada’s new foreign affairs minister, Pierre Pettigrew, was unequivocal: “I intend to bring these values to the forefront of our foreign policy.”23 How this was to be achieved was articulated in the government’s International Policy Statement, the central elements of which were drawn from the completed review. Drafted at the end of 2004 and released at the start of the new year, the statement laid out many of the same priorities identified in the throne speech – aiding those in need, building a more secure world, promoting multilateralism, and strengthening overseas networks. But the statement also noted that the Martin government would implement its foreign policy agenda on the basis of renewed capacities.24 In this regard, the government would pursue a more aggressive public diplomacy. To this end, the Department of Foreign Affairs planned to work closely with partners, including NGOs and ordinary citizens. Partnerships would become an important way by which the Martin government would define its foreign policy identity, underscoring the importance of reinforcing the connection between values, societal interests, and the government’s new foreign policy direction. The release of the International Policy Statement coincided with the crisis in Ukraine. The government to this point had been loath to take steps without a clear plan in place, defaulting in the process to a bureaucracy that was both reserved and tentative in approach and outlook. The C A N A D E M mission, practical but limited, reflected the cautious predisposition of a hesitant bureaucracy.

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With the crisis in Ukraine, where basic democracy was at risk, the Martin government was presented with its first major foreign policy challenge. The government responded in keeping with its new strategy. Engagement would be grounded in values-based principles and supported by a community already invested in the idea and necessity of supporting democracy in Ukraine. At the height of the crisis, on 6 December, after Ukraine’s Supreme Court ruled in favour of a new run-off, Canada’s foreign minister Pierre Pettigrew and international cooperation minister Aileen Carroll, in an unexpected diplomatic move, jointly announced that the Martin government would send 500 electoral observers to Ukraine. The figure was unexpectedly large, catching everyone off guard. Although less than the 1,500 called for by the UCC, it was far more than the seventy-five observers initially recommended by C I D A . Funding in the amount of $3.5 million was also designated for the mission, to be managed by CANADEM, the observer contract agency. Pettigrew noted with pride that the bilateral mission was the largest group ever organized by Canada and that the number even exceeded the 120-observer contingent mobilized by Britain and the group of 100 US observers. “We feel in Canada,” Minister Carroll added, “that we’re challenging the international community and the O S C E to meet the Canadian contribution. We think it is imperative that we move at these numbers to ensure that this election is transparent and fair.”25 It was a demonstration of the government’s commitment to a principled foreign policy. For the Martin government, Ukraine was a test case for its foreign policy in action. The bilateral mission constituted the first full expression of Prime Minister Martin’s stated commitment to promoting Canadian values abroad and under the Canada Corps banner marked the government’s new strategy in making Canada’s voice and role in the world distinct and relevant. As a test case, it was also vital, however, that it be seen as legitimate. In this regard, the government would look to involve ordinary Canadians in the initiative. Yet, those engaged would have to be above reproach or suspicion, and participate for all the right reasons. At the time of the announcement, the U C C president, Orysia Sushko, was full of praise, giving voice to the feeling that with the participation of ordinary citizens, Canada was strengthening the

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course of democracy in Ukraine. It is likely, however, that her enthusiasm would have been tempered by the government’s notice that it would not fund a U C C proposal to send an independent group of some 1,500 observers. The UCC request, hastily organized in an attempt to cover as many of the 10,000 polling stations as possible across Ukraine, fell outside the government’s plan or strategy. Indeed, the government could not afford to be identified with a project that, operating outside known parameters, might fail or miscarry. The U C C ’s request amounted to $9.67 million, and once it was turned down, the organization was forced to undertake its own funding campaign in support of a scaleddown version of its proposal – a community-led mission of some 500 monitors that would complement the official 500-person contingent during the 26 December run-off vote.26 The Martin government’s refusal to fund the U C C initiative did not necessarily mean that it objected to the proposal. On the contrary, the government felt that a community-based observer team, if properly led, could still play an important role, appropriate in light of the government’s recently adopted international priorities and objectives. Aware of both the opportunity and the community’s desire to be involved, the prime minister met with a U C C delegation to discuss the Ukrainian-Canadian involvement in the overall Canadian mission. The complementary positions held by the government and the community allowed for natural cooperation to take place, something that was not lost on the community leadership. Indeed, after the meeting, Sushko stated with some satisfaction that the Ukrainian-Canadian proposal would help strengthen “Canada’s position as a leader in the global pursuit of freedom of choice.”27 As the first full measure of Prime Minister Martin’s commitment to a principled and public diplomacy, it was imperative that the mission, which now included government and communitysponsored contingents, succeed in terms of its organization and objectives. For former prime minister John Turner, who was chosen to head the mission, this meant keeping the potential biases of the observers in check. Those overseeing the mission did have misgivings in this regard, given that a large number of those applying to participate were from the Ukrainian-Canadian community. Concern about the mission’s credibility and legitimacy, however, were soon

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offset by the positive aspects of the bilateral mission, notably the enthusiasm generated by thousands of applicants. The National Post, for example, displayed little apprehension, noting simply the importance of the undertaking. “Helping [Ukraine] conduct a fair election will contribute not only to the country’s future, but to the stability of the entire region,” the newspaper asserted. “And if nothing else, it will help demonstrate that Canada is as committed to fostering democracy in volatile states as its more powerful allies.”28 The objectives of the bilateral mission were relatively straightforward: to observe the election, to give an impartial assessment of the conditions in which voting took place, and to report whether there was compliance with Ukraine’s electoral procedures. The 500 observers selected for the government team were trained by CANADEM in Ottawa, and left for Kyiv on 21 and 22 December. The 300-member U C C group, deployed at the same time, also received training and instructions in Ukraine, and were linked up with 200 expatriate Canadians who were living there. In the end, the 1,000-strong combined Canadian bilateral mission joined an additional 11,000 observers from other countries and NGOs. Any concerns about bias soon dissipated, as the task of monitoring proceeded without incident on 26 December.29 The election, declared to be free of intimidation, irregularities, or violations, produced a clear result, with Viktor Yushchenko receiving 52 per cent of the vote. His opponent, Viktor Yanukovych, received 44 per cent. Yushchenko, leader of the Orange movement, emerged as Ukraine’s new president. With the election of the Western-leaning Yushchenko, the ingredients for a reset in Canada-Ukraine relations appeared to be in place. Focused as it was on democratic renewal and European integration, the Orange Revolution gave the Martin government the assurance it needed for the continued backing of the country’s democratic endeavours. Substantively, what this meant was increased engagement with Ukraine and, more especially, increased assistance. The government’s new international policy statement provided for this, prioritizing Canadian development assistance on a case-by-case basis according to several criteria: “where we can be of most use,” where interests and values aligned, and where Canadians were personally engaged.

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During 2003 and 2004, Canadian aid flowed to 161 countries, including Ukraine. But Ukraine was far down the list in terms of allocation – a reflection of Canada’s intense dissatisfaction with the Kuchma regime. All of this, however, changed with the Martin government’s foreign policy review and the Orange Revolution, when the Canadian government announced that its bilateral aid program would be pared down to concentrate on twenty-five selected recipients. Ukraine was on the new list. This was a surprise to many, who argued against Ukraine’s inclusion on the basis that it did not qualify as a country with great economic need. Nevertheless, Ukraine was committed to taking steps toward good governance, and, as was pointed out, this was of no less importance to peace and security than economic development, which it was argued Canada would do well to support.30 As well, the minister for international cooperation noted that the extensive personal ties between Canadians and Ukraine, acting as a force multiplier, substantially increased the value of Canadian assistance, while the community as a committed stakeholder provided the needed assurance that there would be results.31 The success of Canada’s electoral mission to Ukraine helped reinforce this view, reaffirming for the government the importance of public diplomacy in furthering its international policy objectives. In enabling Canadians to show their commitment to democracy and rule of law by being directly involved in the process, the mission gave credence to the idea that the practice of Canadian foreign policy could and should draw more deeply on greater citizen participation. Moreover, by drawing on the strength and resources of the community, it was felt that Canadian assistance could be leveraged in a way that greatly promoted democracy in Ukraine while reinforcing Canada’s role and stature in the world as a positive force for good. From this perspective, the bilateral observer mission had farreaching political and policy consequences, explaining in part why Prime Minister Martin felt compelled to personally receive the mission reports in Winnipeg. It also accounted for the rare honour bestowed on the U C C by Governor General Adrienne Clarkson – a certificate of commendation for the community’s effort in Ukraine’s election. The governor general noted in her citation of

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the award that “the dedication, hard work and sacrifice demonstrated by all those who participated in the mission will serve as an inspiration to those who are struggling to achieve their democratic right to free and fair elections.”32 For Clarkson, as it was for Martin, the mission represented values as national interests, and those who embodied the best of these values promoted Canada’s interests abroad. The UCC, too, revelled in the success of the mission and viewed its participation as no less significant. As one of the representatives quipped at the time, when the UCC met with the prime minister: “They [the government] view us as a major player in Canadian politics and we have significant influence that needs to be respected.”33 The statement expressed the belief that as a political power broker the Ukrainian-Canadian community possessed influence with the government. But this view failed to recognize the source of their influence, which was not power but overlapping and shared interests. Insofar as the community’s goals resonated with the government, the government was willing to work with the community in pursuit of those interests. Although there may not have been full agreement between the two, there was considerable goodwill as long as the community mirrored the government’s inclinations and preferences. A context was now set in which the two could work together in the effort to assist Ukraine in its growth, development, and welfare. In congratulating the government on having identified Ukraine as one of the twenty-five countries soon to be the focus of Canada’s international development funding, the U C C added that for Canada to maximize its effort in Ukraine it was necessary for CIDA and other government agencies to work with the community.34 With this arrangement, however, the community was obliged to become more actively involved. The UCC was confident that the community would respond. With the instalment of Yushchenko’s Orange government, the prospect of doing business in Ukraine had never seemed better. Toronto’s Ukrainian-Canadian community immediately undertook to revive the Canada-Ukraine Chamber of Commerce (C U C C ). The first major project announced was a trade forum, scheduled to take place May 2005 during Toronto mayor David Miller’s visit to Kyiv – Toronto’s twin city. Discussions would centre on

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municipal issues, common challenges, and areas of possible collaboration. To help facilitate cooperation, the CUCC also announced that it would open an office in Ukraine’s capital and establish a presence in Kharkiv, Lviv, Odesa, and Kirovohrad. The CUCC also began organizing business seminars promoting Ukraine’s potential in the science and technology fields with the message that Ukraine could make significant breakthroughs with proper Canadian commercial investment in research and development. This optimism followed the general tenor and aim of the Yushchenko government to boost investor confidence in Ukraine’s economy. To this end, Ukrainian diplomats sought to relay and share information on what steps were being taken to improve Ukraine’s business climate. Meanwhile, at the NA TO summit in Brussels, where Yushchenko met with Paul Martin for the first time, the Ukrainian president reassured the Canadian prime minister that regaining the confidence of international investors was his government’s top priority.35 The Martin government was no less enthusiastic about the prospects for change and what this might mean for enhanced ties between the two countries.36 The challenges were real and Canada was prepared to help. Consequently, the Martin government, in keeping with its prioritization of development assistance, doubled down on its commitment to Ukraine. CIDA immediately announced, in May, a $5.5 million contribution over five years to help implement a comprehensive and integrated regional development plan that would promote accountable and effective regional governance. It would also contribute more funding to the Ukraine Credit Union Strengthening Project to assist the 711 Ukrainian credit unions with setting up a deposit insurance scheme, upgrading auditing standards, and enhancing financial regulations. In addition, three CIDA-funded projects were announced in October 2005 to help with economic performance reviews, administrative exchange, and support for civil society groups. But it was Canada’s pledge to fast-track Ukraine’s entry into the WTO that was seen as the most important development. Twelve years after its initial application, Ukraine’s admission into the WTO would provide for free trade, stimulate economic growth, and promote good governance. As a further goodwill sign that Canada was refocusing on Ukraine, international trade minister Jim Peterson announced that the Martin government would launch a large-scale trade

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promotion initiative – “Canada Days in Ukraine.” Acutely aware of the importance of the intervention, Peterson declared, “I think there is incredible potential in that market and I believe that the Orange Revolution has given us as an opportunity to see that reforms are made in that country and businesses can be more secure in their operations.”37 He was cognizant, however, that much also depended on the sincerity of the Ukrainian government to exercise leadership. The window of opportunity was narrow. The failure to introduce meaningful reforms as quickly as possible would have serious consequences. The objective for Canada at this critical juncture was to deepen its relations with Ukraine, and to the extent that it could, the Martin government did so. Yet, re-engagement with Ukraine occurred at a time when Canada was beset by domestic political uncertainty and flux. The residual effect of a sponsorship scandal associated with the former Chrétien government had implications for the current prime minister. Although the government tried shining light on Canada’s international role in promoting aid and assistance to Africa and elsewhere, Prime Minister Martin’s domestic troubles were a distraction. There was also the dynamic within the Liberal Party that saw leadership hopefuls busily positioning themselves with respect to the future. All of this led to considerable speculation and rumour about the political fate of Paul Martin and his government. Scholar and human rights advocate Michael Ignatieff of Harvard University was lured back to Canada with a view to possibly assuming the leadership mantle of the Liberal Party. For the UkrainianCanadian community the prospect was disturbing, given the perception that Ignatieff looked unfavourably on Ukrainian national aspirations and Ukrainians more generally based on remarks he had penned in a book on East European nationalism, which portrayed Ukrainians negatively. Community members organized to block his candidacy while protesting the decision of the Liberal Party to invite Ignatieff to the centre of political life in Canada.38 Their unease, however, was unwarranted. A parliamentary motion of non-confidence led to a Liberal defeat in a January 2006 general election at the hands of Stephen Harper’s Conservatives. The Liberals had been in power for a total of thirteen years. It was unclear what the change in Canada’s political landscape would

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bring. The Conservatives had little foreign policy experience, while their emphasis on austerity cuts and a smaller government footprint foretold a retreat in foreign affairs. There was a sense among the Ukrainian-Canadian community that this was neither the time for inexperienced hands nor a narrow policy view of Canada’s national interests. For those concerned about the situation in Ukraine, wariness over the change of government in Ottawa was especially germane. The coalition of President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, the political mainstays of the Orange Revolution, had collapsed in short order after both camps accused each other of corruption and incompetence. The rivalry led to Tymoshenko’s dismissal as prime minister in September 2005. Meanwhile, the mounting strength, influence, and appeal of the Party of Regions, led by the initially unsuccessful but now resurgent Viktor Yanukovych, pointed to that party’s possible victory in Ukraine’s upcoming 2006 parliamentary elections. The momentum of the Orange Revolution had quickly stalled, and with it the prospects of deepening Canada’s relationship with Ukraine.39 If the hope and promise of the Orange Revolution came to naught, was it in Canada’s national interest to pursue a failed and hopeless cause? There was much to suggest that the inability of Ukraine’s Orange leadership to deliver meaningful results and the growing influence of anti-democratic forces around a revived Yanukovych had finally exhausted the relationship between Canada and Ukraine. For the Ukrainian-Canadian community, the precariousness of the situation in Ukraine had altered the prospects for Canadian assistance. Indeed, the sentiment within certain quarters of the community was that Harper would end the masquerade of a “special relationship.” Presuming much and showing little in return, Ukraine had demonstrated that it was an unreliable partner. Given the cold pragmatism of the new prime minister, community leaders were inclined to believe that he would find little reason for Canada to continue with the relationship. For all intents and purposes, they were right to be worried. Change in Ukraine had proven elusive and there was nothing to suggest that the situation could be turned around. But as always with Ukraine, there were surprises.

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4 Stephen Harper and the Euromaidan Ideological and Geopolitical Perspectives

Within four years of being elected, Viktor Yanukovych would flee Ukraine after the massive protests that erupted on Kyiv’s main civic square, the eponymously renamed Euromaidan, irreversibly undercut both his power and authority as president. With Yanukovych having fled, executive function passed constitutionally to Ukraine’s parliament, which formed a new government. Nevertheless, the situation was tenuous, especially with Russia’s objection to the events on the Euromaidan. Symbolism mattered under the circumstances. Therefore, it was with some satisfaction that the new government in Kyiv welcomed Canada’s foreign minister, John Baird, to Ukraine, along with his expressions of support. In meeting with Ukraine’s interim president and prime minister, Baird stated: “We stand on the side of the Ukrainian people. We stand for peace, prosperity, security and freedom.” In light of unsettling news of Russian military activity on the Crimean peninsula, Baird added that “We expect the Russian Federation to honour the commitments it made in the Budapest Declaration [committing to Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty], and we certainly don’t apologize for standing with the Ukrainian people in their struggle for freedom.”1 Baird’s statements may have been seen as posturing had he not followed them up with several measures. Weeks earlier, Canada introduced a travel ban on persons associated with the Yanukovych government as a way to demonstrate its displeasure with the regime’s heavy-handedness towards the protestors on the Euromaidan. And shortly after Yanukovych fled the country, Canada

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expanded its targeted sanctions, strengthening the international prohibition on those attempting to financially assist the shunned president and members of his inner circle. The Harper government’s spirited actions gave the appearance of being premature, excessive, and even contrary to the Canadian tradition of moderation. A number of observers, for example, were convinced that the Canadian reaction was imprudent in light of still-unfolding developments. Christopher Westdal, Canada’s former ambassador to both Ukraine (1996 to 1998) and Russia (2003 to 2006), and a fierce critic of the Harper government, argued that because of its overt support for the anti-Yanukovych side, Canada had disqualified itself as a possible intermediary in the dispute. The former diplomat argued that the Harper government gained nothing by its intemperate behaviour. Russia would continue to affect the course of events in the region, while any standing Canada had with Moscow was now lost. “Our credibility is lopsided,” Westdal declared, insisting Ottawa take a more balanced approach.2 Westdal was not alone in his criticism. Other pundits would repeat the refrain that the Harper government’s relationship with the organized Ukrainian-Canadian community was unduly political, citing, for example, specific ridings where the UkrainianCanadian vote might prove pivotal in increasing the fortunes of the Conservative Party. They also argued that Paul Grod, the national president of the U C C , who they described as a major broker of Canadian foreign policy, was also exercising undue influence.3 Others, less charitably, maintained the position that “Ukrainian organizations in Canada are forcefully and loudly feeding [Canada’s] anti-Russian foreign policy.”4 Notwithstanding the speculative nature of these and other claims, ethnic pandering became a standard tag, as Stephen Harper’s resolute support for Ukraine appeared otherwise inexplicable and even oddly out of sync with Canada’s past foreign policy course. From Harper’s perspective, however, supporting change in Ukraine was both right and necessary. Moreover, Canada, he stated, would not retreat, even if there were consequences, and Canadians were prepared to defend democracy just as they had done in the past. The prime minister evoked martial images of Canadian participation in the twentieth century’s global struggle for democracy and rights, convinced that this was part of history’s progress.

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Canadians had sacrificed much on the altar of freedom; in the process, they learned the value of liberty and understood the need for continuing vigilance and commitment. It was a historicist view that was also underpinned by the prime minister’s specific political beliefs. Rights and freedoms, according to Prime Minister Harper, structured the very foundations upon which liberal democratic societies were constructed. And as values that gave substance to the meaning of human dignity, they needed to be defended. Democracy and rights were at stake in Ukraine and it was imperative that Canada – having invested heavily in the country’s transition for nearly a quarter century – assist those seen battling, as it were, for just and lawful rule. From Harper’s perspective, the fight in Ukraine was both historical and political, requiring Canada’s full and unconditional support. It was a perspective shared in part by a majority of Ukrainian Canadians. Invested in Ukraine’s age-long struggle for independence, the historical and political arguments were seen as germane. The appeal and relevance of democratic values and beliefs were hard to ignore in the context of their own experience, both as Canadian citizens and as descendants of a politically dispossessed people. For the majority, the national question was inextricably tied to the democratic question, shaping the community politically, socially, and culturally. Understandably, this made the issue of Ukraine’s independence deeply personal for many, explaining its emotional intensity. Now that there was a common language and understanding with a prime minister who appeared to share their aspirations for Ukraine, closer cooperation with the government was seen as a given. But did Harper’s policy response to the Ukraine crisis represent a break in Canada’s foreign policy direction as some maintained? If so, what distinguished it, and what was its impact on Canada-Ukraine relations? Or, alternatively, was the Harper response to the Euromaidan part of Canada’s foreign policy tradition? The Euromaidan was the catalyst for change. And although it served as a vindication of the inevitability of liberalism, the truth of the matter was that until the Euromaidan there was precious little to suggest that Ukraine was on the path toward reform and democracy. The drama on the Euromaidan, in fact, was unexpected,

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especially after the disappointment of President Yushchenko’s Orange government and the return of Yanukovych, who succeeded Yushchenko as president in 2010. Nothing could have foretold the Euromaidan except that among the citizens of Ukraine there was a pervasive dislike of governments of any stripe and a palpable distaste for politics and politicians generally. Since independence, Ukraine’s leadership had demonstrated an unwillingness to address the endemic problems of corruption, lawlessness, and an unscrupulous bureaucracy. Neither had it been prepared to remedy a dysfunctional parliament – considered largely responsible for the country’s woes. The situation in Ukraine, a country mired in its past, was predictably dire. Neither assistance nor intervention, it appeared, could alter Ukraine’s future for the better. From the outset, the depth of Ukraine’s crisis was apparent to the Harper government. In fact, it was at a complete loss in trying to understand the policy direction of Ukraine’s Orange leadership, which by the time Harper assumed office had been in power for two years. Despite being Western-leaning, Viktor Yushchenko appeared ineffectual, doing nothing to address the impediments to reform, save offering platitudes about democratic progress and renewal. With little progress, the Orange Revolution – which held such promise in 2004 – had by 2006 lost much of its lustre. And although there were several promising developments – the structural reform of the agricultural sector produced some dividends and the Ukrainian economy was growing – the ongoing effect of corruption, graft, and bribery took away from the gains made. The democratic impulse in Ukraine appeared to have withered and Canada’s interest in the country faded accordingly. That Ukraine was of little consequence became apparent in an eyebrow-raising moment at the 2006 G8 summit in Moscow, when Canada’s new Conservative finance minister, Jim Flaherty, referencing the growing gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia, stated publicly that he would not interfere in Russia’s “internal affairs.” Since Ukraine was a sovereign and independent state, Flaherty’s comment was seen as an unfortunate gaff. But it also served, according to some, as a metaphor of sorts, underscoring the new government’s apparent ambivalence about Ukraine, prompting an appeal from the U C C that the government stay the course and recommit “to a policy of supporting and protecting Ukraine’s

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independence at every possible opportunity and to make this support one of the pillars of Canada’s foreign policy.”5 Canada’s foreign minister at the time, Peter MacKay, hoping to assuage any hurt feelings as well as salvage the government’s reputation, reassured the community that its concerns were being heard. Yet, the assurance had a hollow ring to it. There were, after all, a number of other developments that suggested Canada had lost patience with Ukraine. Among the actions contemplated by the Harper government was a reduction in staff at the Canadian embassy in Kyiv. In June 2006, the government shared its intention to cut back its diplomatic presence in Kyiv during a meeting between the Ukrainian-Canadian community and Canada’s ambassador to Ukraine, Albina Dann. The Canadian ambassador was forthright in her defence of the government’s position, declaring that a backlog in immigrant applications from Asia warranted a prioritization of resources – an important consideration in the context of Harper’s public pronouncements and commitment to reduce government expenditures. In her remarks, however, she also offered a bleak assessment of the situation in Ukraine, emphasizing that corruption was pervasive and there was little prospect of success so long as Ukraine’s parliament remained hostage to venal, private interests. This was neither a passing observation nor a casual aside. It underscored Canada’s assessment of the difficulties in working with Ukraine – a situation that brought Canada’s support for Ukraine into question. Dann communicated that the Harper government would continue providing assistance to Ukraine, but that this assistance would be limited to specifically targeted projects that “encouraged the human spirit,” fostered democracy and good governance, promoted economic wellbeing, and enhanced business competitiveness in the country.6 Overall, however, the relationship with Ukraine would be downgraded until there were signs of improvement. The UCC responded by presenting a brief to Minister MacKay.7 Attempting to head off the proposed reduction in diplomatic staff and hoping to appeal to the government on the basis of Canada’s economic interests, the U C C pressed for a permanent Canadian trade officer at the embassy and the creation of a consulate in Lviv, a reform-minded city in a region where Ukrainian Canadians had

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extensive family connections and business contacts. The UCC further urged the government to continue to meet with the CanadaUkraine Advisory Council, the forum through which the community and the government had cooperated since 1996. Open lines of communication and regular contact between the community and the government were seen as vital given the perceived lack of interest and movement away from Ukraine. It was understood that if the community was to have any influence over the policy process, this channel needed to be preserved.8 In the end, despite the community’s entreaties, the Harper government’s doubts about the Yushchenko government could not be dispelled. The issue was for Ukraine to reform itself under the Orange leadership, and although there were worrisome developments – such as the surge in influence of parliamentary factions aligned with the highly suspect Yanukovych, who was staging a rapid political comeback – the Harper government was disinclined to do anything more than offer encouragement and tacit support for the Canada-Ukraine relationship, much as was done in the past when there was little movement. In keeping with the goals set out by the government, Peter MacKay announced some modest assistance during a visit to Kyiv in July 2007, directed at areas that could benefit from aid. These included the Juvenile Justice Reform Project, which supported NGO s and government agencies in the delivery of legal, judicial, and social services; the Policy Reform and Implementation Support Mechanism, which sought to improve Ukraine’s governance structure through policy development and implementation; and a funding allocation for a small contingent of electoral observers (sixty in total) to monitor the September 2007 parliamentary elections. The assistance, however, was unapologetically limited. Community representatives welcomed Peter MacKay’s visit to Ukraine, the first in four years by a senior minister. The U C C president at the time, Orysia Sushko, could take some pride in the foreign minister’s remarks, as he roundly praised the work of Ukrainian-Canadian N G Os – the Children of Chornobyl Canadian Fund and Canadian Friends of Ukraine, in particular – declaring them to be “a true bridge between our countries and an example of how we can build a more democratic and peaceful world through cooperation.”9 His comments suggested that

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greater responsibility should rest with the community in cultivating Canada-Ukraine relations. Minister MacKay elaborated on the government’s position after being asked by the press about the limited number of electoral observers (sixty was a far cry from the five hundred sent in 2004). Although not wishing to appear unduly pessimistic, he reiterated the government’s prognosis, priorities, and preferences. Given all the assistance over the years, he said, Canada would have expected more progress by this time. And although MacKay did express concern that Ukraine might suffer a setback as a result of the growing political divisions and distrust, he conveyed that if Ukraine were to move forward, it was up to the citizens of Ukraine to take the necessary steps. To the extent, however, that Ukrainian Canadians had an interest in promoting democracy in Ukraine, Canada would look to them to assist. Specifically, it was his hope that the community would encourage their ethnic kindred, conveying the importance of staying the course, combatting corruption, and exposing fraud. In a manner of speaking, it was an invitation for the community to become more involved, reflecting in some measure the predilection of the Harper government to engage the diaspora in foreign policy matters – a throwback to earlier government initiatives that sought to accentuate the bonds that linked the two countries and fuelled relations.10 It was an invitation that assumed symbolic significance in the context of a recent gala honouring the former prime minister Brian Mulroney and attended by Stephen Harper and his cabinet colleagues. Canada would continue to support Ukraine, but the community was now encouraged to play a greater part. Defaulting to the community did not mean that Canada was forsaking its interests or its role. On the contrary, since independence, a touchstone in Canadian foreign policy was its commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This was framed within the wider context of European security and a rules-based international order. Troubling developments in Russia’s foreign policy behaviour pointed to possible dangers. In 2008, these included Russia’s retreat from its treaty obligations on conventional weapons, its recognition and support for the separatist enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and the six-day RussoGeorgian war. Also worrying was Russia’s reaction to Ukraine’s

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expression of interest to join N A T O in the wake of the RussoGeorgian conflict. Russia declared that it would aim nuclear weapons at Ukraine should the latter attempt to become a member of the alliance. Canada condemned Russia’s statement as unacceptable, noting that such threats were inconsistent with the security guarantees developed in the post-Cold War period to which Russia was party. “Our response is firm,” a Harper government spokesperson declared, “the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine are not to be questioned. Ukraine is free and must remain free to choose the foreign policy course that suits its aspirations. In this respect it can count on Canada’s unquestionable support.”11 The escalation in regional tensions led Canada and its N A T O allies to support a Membership Action Plan for both Georgia and Ukraine. From Canada’s perspective, NATO was a stabilizing force by which regional problems and disagreements might be addressed and contained. It was also seen as able to help facilitate Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration, and thus facilitate the process of reform. For Ukraine, however, its interest in N A T O membership was far more fundamental and less nuanced. As President Yushchenko reminded everyone during a state visit to Ottawa, Ukraine had gained independence six times in the twentieth century and lost it on five different occasions. According to Yushchenko, who discussed with Harper what Canada might do to promote Ukraine’s eventual membership in the organization, “the topic was urgent.” And yet Yushchenko’s political opponents criticized his visit to Canada as undisguised opportunism, his international foray simply masking the president’s domestic political failures. Yulia Tymoshenko, a former Orange ally and an off-and-on political rival, capitalized on the wave of popular discontent with Yushchenko at home, insisting that he was a feckless partner, and in an attempt to discredit him cautioned the Canadian government in its dealings with the president. As the two contenders positioned themselves in the lead-up to the 2010 presidential elections, it became apparent that the path to reform was being made doubly difficult by a rivalry between personalities who were not above embroiling Canada in their political intrigues. It  also served as a cautionary reminder about the limits of Canadian support, given the murkiness and unpredictability of Ukrainian politics.

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Indeed, notwithstanding the start of free trade talks in October 2009 and the signing of a cooperation agreement, which identified security, defence, and economic and technology development as areas for bilateral cooperation, the power play between the major protagonists – Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, and a resurgent Yanukovych – troubled Canadian officials. The guile and callous use of power in the political contest was particularly disheartening, especially as it was at the expense of public trust. That the war of personalities was being played out in the face of the existential threat posed by Russia – which was increasingly mounting pressure on an energy-dependent Ukraine as a way to exert influence – was also baffling. In the end, there was a sense in Ottawa that with the upcoming 2010 presidential election, Ukrainians were at a crossroads. Whatever the outcome, the Ukrainian people would have to live with the result. And yet the election provided a compelling reason for Canada to become more engaged rather than less so. The Harper government, after all, insisted that promoting democracy was a foreign policy goal – particularly apropos in the case of Canada’s relations with Ukraine. As it had done in 2007, Canada was prepared to send a small contingent of electoral observers to help oversee the presidential elections. But after the dismal showing of President Yushchenko in the first-round of the election and a scheduled runoff vote between the two remaining candidates – Tymoshenko and Yanukovych – the pressure mounted on Canada to increase the size of its mission. Yanukovych had attempted to steal the election in 2004. There was every reason to believe the past could be repeated in 2010. The Harper government, with its parliamentary minority, initially proved reluctant to send more observers, fearing it would be criticized for having been stampeded into a decision. In the end, it did commit 270 observers but only because the political situation in Ukraine was quickly deteriorating, with evidence of vote tampering in the first round. Despite its initial reservations about Ukraine, the Harper government demonstrated a growing concern about the tenuous nature of democracy in that country and the critical role the incoming president would play in determining Ukraine’s future. The concern was underpinned by the ideological and geopolitical predisposition of the Harper government to intercede in

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strengthening the institutions of democracy internationally, wherever it was needed and whenever an opportunity presented itself. Believing the 2010 presidential election to be as vital to Ukraine’s democratic development as the 2004 election, Harper considered it important that the election be free and fair. As it was, the 2010 presidential election was conducted under a cloud of suspicion and acrimony. The result was eventually in Yanukovych’s favour, though Tymoshenko accused her opponent of vote rigging in his stronghold of Donbas. The international electoral observer missions, however, were satisfied with the outcome, reporting there was no evidence of systemic irregularities that would have called the process into question. Nevertheless, the presence of so many observers underscored the degree of unease about the possibility of wrongdoing. It seemed there was good reason for apprehension. Shortly after the election, the new president, Viktor Yanukovych, set about consolidating his grip on power by introducing constitutional amendments that greatly enhanced the office and power of the presidency. Yanukovych used money and influence to ensure that his desired constitutional changes would be legislated without opposition, and the scale, pace, and scope at which political consolidation occurred under his leadership was astonishing, even for Ukraine. The developments elicited criticism from the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, which saw the new president as a threat to Ukraine’s democratic development and national existence. In his remarks to an Edmonton audience, the director of the Ukrainian Resources and Development Centre (URDC) at MacEwan University, Roman Petryshyn, described the Ukrainian government’s manipulation of the constitution and silencing of parliamentary opposition as antidemocratic. He encouraged the community and the Canadian public to stand firm in its defence of democratic values and remain actively engaged with Ukraine. Moreover, the director stated that now was not the time to retreat but rather to offer ways in which Ukraine could become a member state among the world’s democracies: “It is in the economic and social interests of the Ukrainian and Canadian publics to have a vibrant democracy and practice in Ukraine, analogous to the values of modern western countries, rather than some form of autocracy.”12 Fearing the worst, he urged Canadian business interests, universities, and N G O s working in

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Ukraine to assist the effort by supporting democratic values, insisting on the rule of law and the constitutional division of powers, opposing censorship and intimidation, and promoting nonviolence while resisting provocations that would result in the use of force. Conditions in Ukraine worsened considerably as the Yanukovych government increasingly resorted to the use of both administrative coercion and the police to muzzle the media and control opposition groups. Criminal proceedings were engineered to silence opponents, including the president’s chief political rival, Yulia Tymoshenko. In a statement to the House of Commons, Borys Wrzesnewskyj, Liberal M P for Etobicoke Centre, spoke of the worsening conditions and the need for Canada to support those sectors of Ukrainian society that were resisting the regime’s effort at “methodically disassembling” Ukraine’s statehood and democracy.13 For Wrzesnewskyj, the issue was straightforward: how could Canada stand idly by while democracy was being extinguished? Whether it came from the URDC director or the parliamentarian Wrzesnewskyj, the argument was that Canada needed to support democracy and human rights in Ukraine – effectively making the case for a Canadian foreign policy based on principles and values. And yet the issue of a values-based approach was not that simple. There were no serious irregularities in Ukraine’s 2010 presidential elections and consequently no legitimate grounds for protest. On the contrary, there was an obligation to accept what was widely considered to be a fair election. And yet, as some asked, was the new Yanukovych government not obligated to observe Ukraine’s laws? And was the international community, including Canada, not responsible to ensure that the new government, still dependent on aid and assistance, meet international standards and norms? These concerns and objections were felt within the UkrainianCanadian community and led to the call for Canada to assume a principled foreign policy position with respect to Ukraine.14 The central tenet of a “principled” foreign policy approach is its insistence on moral right. This, however, carried considerable political baggage, being associated, as it was, with the crusading nature of American foreign policy in the post-9/11 period. It was precisely America’s relentless pursuit of moral right that led to such unintended yet disastrous consequences in Iraq. Canada’s continued, active stand on rights and freedoms in China and

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elsewhere had also shown the Harper government that there were costs related with pursuing such goals. Beijing had made Canada pay in terms of trade relations after Canada insisted China respect the human rights of its citizens, while an Arab coalition threatened to punish Canada for its untrammelled support of Israel in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, denying Canada a much sought after U N Security Council seat. The Harper government had felt the sting of these and other foreign policy setbacks, and irrespective of its full-throated support for principles, there was good reason not to be involved in a problem that was of Ukraine’s own making and in which Russia had taken such a keen political interest. This was not to say that the Harper government ceased expressing its views; nor did it cease looking to other avenues of approach. Ukraine, for instance, had voiced interest in an association agreement with the European Union, which would have required the country to meet certain standards were it to become an associate member. In addition, a proposed Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement could provide possible leverage in the relationship in as much as Ukraine’s political leadership avowed to pursue liberal trade and economic policies. And then there was the prospect of concluding a youth mobility exchange agreement between the two countries, which offered opportunity for young people to work and learn in the corresponding nation, strengthening the bonds between the countries through social and cultural interaction. Youth exchanges, it was felt, could help overcome the limits of government-to-government relations that so heavily constrained Canada’s ability to make strategic headway with Yanukovych at the helm. In practice, however, the Harper government was wary of wading haphazardly into the troubled waters that was Ukraine. The defence of freedom had ideological appeal for the Harper government, but the ramifications of such an approach were never far from the mind of the ever-cautious prime minister. Some eight years after Jean Chrétien’s sojourn to the country, the delicate balance of being critical yet supportive was on full display during Harper’s October 2010 state visit to Ukraine. The visit was notable for the Canadian prime minister’s tough talk and use of symbolism. Indeed, the meeting with President Yanukovych was said to have been chilly, while Prime Minister Harper’s appearances at

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the Holodomor Memorial, the Babi Yar Holocaust Memorial, and the Ukrainian Catholic University – a target of regime crackdown – were all symbolically meant to underscore Canada’s support for rights and register Canada’s dissatisfaction with political developments in Ukraine. Yet all the while during the visit, the Canadian delegation talked of free trade. The inconsistency between talk and action did not go unnoticed, and Harper was forced to respond to his critics. Commenting on  the apparent incongruity, the prime minister conceded that “sometimes there is tension. But in fact these go hand in hand.” He added, “Canadian companies … need rule of law and human rights. Where those things are problematic they create severe problems for Canadian business.”15 It did not appear to matter that, unlike with the previous visit of Jean Chrétien, Canadian commercial representatives were conspicuously absent from the delegation. Government officials who accompanied the prime minister privately relayed that Canadian companies had little interest in either participating or expanding their commercial ties with Ukraine. Having experienced significant losses either through corruption or outright theft, they were disenchanted with a country “whose business and political culture was no longer trusted.”16 It necessarily raised the question: what, then, was the purpose of the visit? In many ways, the question was often presaged by the riposte that the presumed rationale for the prime minister’s sojourn was to appease the Ukrainian-Canadian lobby, considered powerful and organized. Arguments regarding the community’s alleged influence served to explain the seemingly obsequious behaviour of not only Harper but also his predecessors. As a former Canadian ambassador openly declared: “I know that Chrétien, in dealing with trade and military expansion in Ukraine, he was appealing to the ethnic vote. And Harper is principally concerned with this too – our political relations with Ukraine are dominated by ethnic considerations.”17 Others, more simply, maintained that the visit was a way by which the prime minister could restore “his lost lustre as a global statesman” in the wake of a number of foreign policy stumbles.18 Either way, the motive was interpreted to be political and cynical. It was certainly true that the Ukrainian-Canadian leadership insisted that community concerns be brought to the attention of

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candidates in the upcoming 2011 federal election and for Ukrainian Canadians to vote accordingly. Moreover, the awarding of the Shevchenko Medal to the prime minister in 2011 – a community honour in recognition of his service to the Ukrainian community – was not without political calculation. (As one wag put it: “What’s the point of only honouring the dead?”) But all of this presumed that the community, touted to be 1.2 million strong, was united in ambition and purpose, and that the prime minister was one to be easily flattered into making decisions based on favours and favourites. No matter how speculative, it became currency to argue in the aftermath of Harper’s visit to Ukraine that partisan interests motivated the prime minister. The former Canadian ambassador Christopher Westdal, for example, savagely attacked the Harper government for its alleged biased support of Ukraine, “placing Canada in the unenviable position of being an immaterial force within the NATO alliance” as the alliance prepared to discuss better relations with Russia. In a piece written for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute think tank, he further argued: “Our prime minister’s credibility is undermined by widespread suspicion that his government’s policy in East-West security relations is tailored to suit Ukrainian, Baltic and other Russophobe diaspora voting blocs in Canada.”19 Elsewhere he added, “Rigid neo-con antipathy to Russia (reinforced by conservative national media) and a foreign policy designed for diasporas have led us to the margins of irrelevance and mischief.”20 Hardhitting words, they elicited a response. Jars Balan, chair of the UC C ’s Canada-Ukraine Committee, offered a rejoinder to the former diplomat’s criticism in the form of an opinion article published March 2011 in the Edmontonbased newspaper Ukrainian News.21 The critique, which was widely circulated within social media circles, focused on several points: Westdal’s characterization of the Ukrainian diaspora as Russophobes; the tone of his remarks concerning the Holodomor, the memory of which the prime minister honoured during his October state visit to Ukraine; and “the dismissive and patron­ izing” claim that the prime minister was “stoking a sense of aggrieved victimhood and narrow nationalism.” On all these issues Balan chastised Westdal for being patently misinformed, brazenly partisan, and openly sycophantic.

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The UC C representative took umbrage, in particular, with the allegation that Ukrainian Canadians were Russophobic. It was a charge, Balan claimed, that discredited those who legitimately criticized Russia for its hegemonic ambitions. Moreover, Ukrainian Canadians, he argued, were clear-eyed in their ability to distinguish between Russians and Vladimir Putin and had no need to apologize for their support of Russian democracy in the face of a regime that was ideologically bankrupt, thoroughly corrupt, and blatantly dangerous. As for Westdal’s characterization of Western foreign policy toward Russia as being unfair and hostile, Balan decried it as misleading insofar as it was the actions and threats of Russia’s ruling elite that brought the country into widespread disrepute. Focusing on the idea that Canadian foreign policy had to be grounded in principles, Balan defended the community’s position, stating unequivocally: “The UCC is firmly committed to promoting what it believes are fundamental Canadian values that should guide all of Canada’s dealings in the international community: rule of law; right to free speech, freedom of assembly and a free media; and respect for the territorial integrity of sovereign states.” He concluded his critique ridiculing the former Canadian ambassador, asking, “Exactly what values does Westdal represent in his repeated apologies for Putinist Russia?” The issue of a values-based foreign policy increasingly became part of a wider debate on Harper’s foreign policy course. What were the priorities and assumptions driving Canada’s foreign policy? It was one thing to declare that Canada was committed to promoting democracy, defending human rights, and upholding freedom. It was an entirely different matter to explain how these goals might be achieved. The scholar Jennifer Welsh, for one, argued it was precisely because of the government’s lack of clarity and planning that there was such criticism, suggesting the need for a review.22 Clarity was all the more pressing given the sense that the prime minister was bent on dismantling the multilateral, internationalist approach that had historically defined Canadian foreign policy. The critics argued that the government’s rhetoric and ideological bellicosity, largely seen as a crude attempt by Harper to displace the Liberals as Canada’s natural governing party with its lock on Canada’s foreign policy tradition, undermined the

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country’s international reputation and prestige.23 But was the criticism deserved, at least in the way it was cast? After making what were initially bold pronouncements on democracy and human rights, the Harper government’s foreign policy approach, as measured by its own yardstick, became tepid and restrained. Policy setbacks, notably at the UN and in relations with China, as well as constraints associated with the government’s minority status, forced the government to temper the imperious nature of its statements. It was a conspicuous retreat. And yet, despite the obstacles, the government was arguably no less committed. It simply became more strategic. As the Harper government gained greater foreign policy experience, it looked, for example, to carefully craft its responses so as not to hamper Canada’s trade prospects. It further sought to work with select, issue-oriented intergovernmental organizations to advance its interests and relied heavily on closer bilateral ties with like-minded allies. In addition, the government looked to the military – a blunt but robust foreign policy instrument – to enhance Canada’s international standing. Still, according to journalist John Ibbitson, this new direction in Canada’s foreign policy constituted a radical departure from Canada’s multilateral, internationalist past.24 It was a strategy, he argued, that went beyond simple rhetoric, tailored to align with Canada’s capabilities and considered interests. It was also a strategy that reflected the values of a new Conservative coalition of regional and suburban voters and recent immigrants that enabled the Harper government to invite the participation of groups into the foreign policy-making process. The change, which placed less emphasis on elite-driven policy inputs, infuriated some within the foreign policy establishment, reinforcing the divide between the government and traditionalists, especially former career diplomats.25 All of this mattered little for a government that drew political strength from its populist brand. And yet, the strategic character of the shift also tied a “principled” approach to calculated risk. The prescription was not simply to do what was perceived to be right and therefore necessary, but also to do what was realistic and practical. This mindset necessarily shaped Canada’s relations with Ukraine throughout 2011, 2012, and well into 2013. The Harper government remained critical of

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developments in Ukraine, being forthright in voicing its concerns and displeasure with Ukrainian officials. The government also continued to consult with the community, and engaged its leadership to participate in Canada’s dealings with Kyiv. But, wary and guarded, the government remained measured in its approach, careful not to upset the delicate balance in the East-West pull that Ukraine faced in its strategic choice for associate E U status. The Ukrainian-Canadian leadership was pleased with the prospect of being consulted and seized every opportunity to participate in government deliberations, especially since there appeared to be a growing synergy between the interests of the government and the aspirations of the community. The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, tasked in 2011 with preparing a report on Canada’s Ukraine strategy, offered just such an opportunity. The U C C attended hearings and presenting briefings, and was gratified when its idea of sending a large observer mission to Ukraine’s upcoming 2012 parliamentary elections was incorporated into the committee’s final report, along with its recommendation regarding the need to strengthen the rule of law and civil society in Ukraine. It could also take some measure of comfort in having convinced committee members that Canada needed a long-term strategy of engagement based on principles, incentives, and inducements. In this regard, it welcomed the other recommendations in the committee report: to review Canada’s priorities for development assistance to Ukraine; to increase participation in exchange programs, especially for youth; to assist the international effort to combat money laundering; and to proceed carefully with free trade negotiations, making ratification contingent on human rights progress.26 In April 2012, the minister for international trade, Beverly Oda, visited Kyiv with an offer of support, including Canadian participation in developing Ukraine’s shale gas industry to offset the country’s energy dependence on Russia. Separately, however, Minister Oda repeated that Canada was deeply concerned about human rights abuses in the country. Having invited community representatives to be part of the delegation, the minister then took the unusual step of inviting them to speak directly to Ukrainian officials. In raising their concerns about rights and rule of law with Ukrainian officials, the Ukrainian-Canadian representatives reiterated the Canadian government’s position on the importance of

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meeting standards and expectations consonant with the Ukrainian government obligations under international law. The intervention at the highest levels of diplomacy – unusual and somewhat unexpected – led one delegate to comment that the community was now respected and valued. But it also highlighted the deepening cooperation between the government and the community, made possible because of the alignment in interests. The crisis had strengthened the relationship while also validating the beliefs that informed the motivations of both. The community’s opinions and assistance were solicited in this instance as well as on other occasions. For example, working through the UCC’s Canada-Ukraine Advisory Council – the primary mechanism through which consultations had historically occurred – Canada’s foreign minister, John Baird, met with community representatives in May 2012 for an exchange of views on the increasing drift toward authoritarianism in Ukraine. In keeping with the government’s disposition to invite communities into the policy deliberation process, Baird shared with them his concerns about the mounting number of rights violations. He noted, in particular, that the Ukrainian government was unmoved by Canada’s diplomatic protests and objections – sadly illustrated by the image of an all-party Canadian parliamentary delegation, sent on a fact-finding mission, standing forlornly in an act of solidarity before the iron gates of a Kharkiv prison hospital where a hapless, ailing Yulia Tymoshenko, now a political prisoner, was being held. For their part, the community leadership believed it was still possible for Canada to engage Ukraine and encouraged the minister to act on the Standing Committee’s recommendation to sponsor an observer mission to the coming parliamentary elections.27 The importance the UC C attached to electoral observer missions was the result of its past successes in assisting with such exercises. But it was also one of the few ways that the community could make a real difference in Ukraine, ensuring transparency and fairness in an election that might otherwise prove pivotal in arresting Ukraine’s authoritarian slide. Taking the mission proposal to heart, the Canadian government announced it would send 500 election observers to monitor the October 2012 parliamentary elections under the leadership of Senator Raynell Andreychuk. As in 2004, it would be one of the

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largest government-sponsored contingents sent abroad by Canada and by far the largest of the international observer missions to Ukraine at the time.28 Jason Kenney, minister of immigration, citizenship, and multiculturalism, and the government’s point man on relations with Canada’s ethno-cultural communities, echoed the sentiment that the elections were important to Ukraine’s democratic development. But he also took note of the large number of Canadian volunteers “willing to stand with Ukraine.” It reaffirmed for him and others the correctness of the government’s strategy, which focused on principles that resonated with a supportive public. Given the erosion of rights under the Yanukovych regime, some were critical of the effort, questioning the effectiveness of an observer mission. The UCC’s Jars Balan was more philosophical: “Building a democracy from the wreckage of a totalitarian state is a long and difficult process,” he said. The presence of monitors, he argued, served as a deterrent to mass electoral fraud. But more importantly it provided “significant moral support to those Ukrainian citizens fighting to secure a democratic future for their country under very challenging conditions.”29 Casting the election as an epic struggle for democracy, Balan highlighted the ethical underpinnings of the response and the role individual Canadians were playing in it. Canadians, he implied, were both ready and willing partners in the defence of democratic values and principles. That the political contest in Ukraine was essentially shaping up to be a struggle over values was underscored during Minister Kenney’s later visit to Kyiv where he announced support for a project, in partnership with the Council of Europe, that would help strengthen press freedoms. The tenor of the political situation in Ukraine made for anxious moments, lending an air of urgency to the efforts of those hoping to make a difference. The Harper government was pressured to do even more. N D P M P Peggy Nash pushed the government to diplomatically press for the release of Tymoshenko, the symbol of Ukrainian opposition, who had been imprisoned on the improbable charge of having negotiated a gas deal with Russia on less than favourable terms while she was prime minister. Marc Garneau, a candidate in the contest for the Liberal leadership after Michael Ignatieff’s disastrous showing and subsequent resignation as party leader after the 2011 federal election, insisted that Canada take

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more decisive steps. But when pressed about possible sanctions he was reluctant to commit. There was little anyone could do for that matter. Former Liberal foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy, in a press editorial, was openly critical of the Harper government’s approach. He claimed that Canada was stymied in its ability to make a difference because it lacked a plan. Strategy was what was needed – not bluster or hollow support. In the uneasy drama being played out, in which Vladimir Putin looked to complicate Ukraine’s future, the only way forward, according to Axworthy, was for Ukraine to become fully integrated into European structures, which Canada could help facilitate by working with its European partners.30 European integration, however, depended on Ukraine making a geostrategic choice in Europe’s favour; only Ukraine could offer a verdict on an E U association agreement. The hope, of course, was that Ukraine would commit to a “European choice.” Among senior Canadian officials, there was even cautious optimism that an agreement would in fact be signed, if only because negotiations were at an advanced stage. There was also the corresponding belief that, if this were to transpire, the Canada-Ukraine relationship could be reset. The issue was not to push the matter but rather let the process naturally unfold. The Ukraine government appeared ready to ratify the agreement in December 2013, when in a surprising reversal, after Viktor Yanukovych visited Moscow for consultations, the Ukrainian president announced that Ukraine would suspend its efforts in seeking EU associate status and pursue instead a customs union agreement with the Russian Federation. Reaction was swift and categorical, as young people and others took to the streets in protest, gathering on Kyiv’s main square – the Euromaidan. The Yanukovych government responded with a security crackdown, which escalated into a vicious cycle of brutality and murder. The subsequent death of more than a hundred protestors not only galvanized the movement, which spread to other urban centres across the country, but also demoralized growing numbers within the security forces, who, having suffered losses, either defected or simply melted away. The Euromaidan movement’s rejection of a political settlement (arranged through international mediation but without the Euromaidan’s consent), public outrage over the deaths,

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and a feckless police force soon compelled the disgraced president to flee. The image of Yanukovych furtively boarding a government helicopter bound for Russia, with cash-laden suitcases in hand, contrasted conspicuously with the crowd of weary but relieved citizens gathered around the makeshift defences and smouldering rubble of the Euromaidan. With the flight of the president and in the absence of executive authority, constitutional power soon devolved to parliament, which passed a law returning the country to the 2004 constitution and restoring the primacy of the legislature. After having been approved by parliament, the provisional government and acting president (the speaker of the assembly at the time) were fully and legally empowered to act. The government, tasked with carrying out the legitimate functions of the state, including defence, promised quick presidential elections. It also declared that it would abide by the rule of law, and respect human and minority rights, as well as seek EU membership. For the Harper government, the Euromaidan was unexpected. Nevertheless, it responded in a way that was consistent with the prime minister’s foreign policy pronouncements and priorities. Unequivocal in its condemnation of the violence, Ottawa also insisted that the rights of the citizens of Ukraine be respected. After the new Ukrainian government announced this as its goal, the Harper government declared its full support for Ukraine’s European aspirations. In this the significance of the Euromaidan proved pivotal. Committed as the new government was to democratic rule and responsible government, the new direction in Kyiv meant that the Canadian government now had a partner. By standing up for democracy, Ukrainians had in effect made it possible for the Harper government to lend its support to the government of Ukraine. The Harper government was not alone in its unmitigated support for Ukraine. At the height of the Euromaidan, when Yanukovych was still in power, an emergency debate of the Canadian parliament resulted in all-party unanimity. But the opposition parties also urged the government to do more. In the early stages of the crisis, Paul Dewar, the N D P foreign affairs critic, insisted on targeted sanctions, adding that Canada should refrain from giving succour to the Yanukovych regime by continuing with free trade talks and providing assistance. Liberal deputy leader Ralph Goodale urged

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the government to go beyond general statements hinting at options being considered. Meanwhile, Chrystia Freeland, a newly minted Liberal MP with deep roots in the Ukrainian-Canadian community, maintained that even if there was disagreement among the allies on targeted sanctions, Canada needed to demonstrate leadership by taking unilateral action. Citing the enduring connection between Canada and Ukraine, Freeland observed, “Ukraine listens to us and the world listens to what we do and what we say about Ukraine. This is an opportunity … for us to do what Lester B. Pearson taught us, which is to punch above our weight in international affairs, by taking the lead on Ukraine.”31 The all-party parliamentary consensus on the issue of support for Ukraine highlighted the urgency of the moment, pointing to a common understanding of the issue and highlighting the importance of what was at stake. There was, however, some publicly voiced objection. A number of critics were vociferous in their condemnation of Stephen Harper’s credulous acceptance of the legitimacy of the Euromaidan and its alleged democratic credentials, disregarding the involvement of elements of the radical right in the movement. Others were unmoved by Canada’s support of the Euromaidan in view of the government’s perceived hypocrisy, ignoring the plight of Syrians who suffered no less under the brutal dictatorship of Bashar alAssad. But it was the barbed criticism emanating from within Canada’s foreign policy establishment that was particularly pointed. Canada’s former UN ambassador Paul Heinbecker, among others, argued that the government’s actions were empty gestures that either followed ideological prescription or simply played to the interests of certain ethnic communities. The result, they claimed, had been Canada’s marginalization in international affairs and a break from a tradition that historically had served Canada well.32 Still others, such as former ambassador Christopher Westdal, noted that by following narrow partisan advantage in the hope of achieving electoral gain, the government failed in its responsibility to uphold and adhere to the principle of national interest as the cornerstone of foreign policy making. By politically aligning itself with the community, the government had limited and weakened the country’s ability to act independently in foreign affairs and in its national interest. “We have a diaspora-driven foreign policy,”

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Westdal declared. “It might work at the polls, but it doesn’t do much good in the world.”33 Russia had a legitimate stake in Ukraine and it behoved Canadian policy makers to acknowledge Russia’s sphere of influence and assist Ukraine in working out a satisfactory political arrangement with its neighbour. Westdal’s critique suggested that between values and interests there was a fundamental divide, and a distinction needed to be made between the two. But for Harper, whose ideological take and interpretation of the wider meaning of the struggle seamlessly blended the two, there was no such tension. In this, he was convinced. For Harper, interests had to align with the principles Canadians held, for only in this way could public support for Canada’s foreign policy remain strong. Moreover, for Canada’s foreign policy to succeed, it would have to be imbedded in the values that Canadians themselves prized and held in common. It was with some satisfaction, therefore, that the government could point to poll results showing that a majority of the public backed Canada’s stand on Ukraine and its opposition to Russia.34 The real and only issue was what would be the nature of that support. This was an increasingly important question in light of other events that transpired shortly after the Euromaidan had taken place. Russian marines at the leased Sevastopol naval base in Crimea, reinforced by unmarked special forces (so-called “little green men”) arriving from Russia by helicopter and II-76 air transport, occupied the peninsula. Subsequently, in parts of the Donbas in eastern Ukraine, insurgents, supported by mercenaries and Russian regulars entering Ukraine through a porous border (“soldiers on vacation”), seized towns and territory with a view to overturning the government in Kyiv, which was characterized as putschist. Ukrainians from across the country responded to the insurgency and invasion in the east, joining volunteer battalions in a self-styled anti-terrorist operation under the command of Ukraine’s security service. The occupation of Crimea and invasion of the eastern territories were collectively seen as a threat to the rules-based international order. Understandably, it elicited a reaction. Canada cosponsored a U N resolution reaffirming “the impermissibility of redrawing borders through threats and force.” It also withdrew its ambassador to Russia, and during a dramatic visit to Kyiv on 24 March,

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Prime Minister Harper (the first dignitary to visit the country since the escalation) declared Canada’s solidarity with Ukraine, stating, “It is for Ukrainians and Ukrainians only to decide their future. In this principle we will not waver.” He added that there would be “no return to business as usual” until Russia’s occupation of Crimea and support for the insurgents ended.35 For Harper, democratic imperative and security needs were intertwined. Self-determination was contingent on free will, the full expression of which needed to be supported if democracy was to flourish. But the principle of territorial integrity also had to be defended because it created the stability and order under which European democracy thrived in the post-Cold War era. By attempting to impose its hegemony over the region, Russia undermined this principle and threatened the peace. The point for Harper was that rule of law needed to be respected and the values underpinning the liberal democratic order protected. Canadian foreign policy demanded their robust defence.36 Given the threat to Ukraine and European security, it was not for Canada to act alone but rather to do so in concert with its allies. Russia’s aggression necessitated close consultation and cooperation. The result was targeted sanctions, first introduced in March 2014 and progressively phased in. Canada participated unreservedly in this multilateral effort, exercising leadership at times by encouraging the expansion of the embargo. Seen as a useful and legitimate means by which to pressure Russia and its proxies, international sanctions were only partially successful. Although a ceasefire was signed 5 September 2014 in Minsk, the conflict remained unresolved, as Ukraine’s defences were regularly tested. Vicious fighting continued unabated, with a large number of civilian casualties. Not surprisingly, Ukrainian authorities requested military assistance after overwhelming evidence pointed to Russia supplying heavy armaments to the insurgents and Russian regular forces operating in the contested Donbas territories. Participating in a sanctions regime carried little direct cost for Canada, having limited economic ties with Russia. Ukraine’s request for weaponry in light of Russia’s involvement, on the other hand, was problematic. The introduction of more arms into the conflict zone was seen as a potential accelerant. A nuanced response was required. Despite Ukraine’s entreaties for so-called defensive

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weapons, Canada, in conjunction with its NATO allies, refused the request.37 What Canadian officials would do, however, was supply nonlethal military equipment in the amount of $11 million. Coldweather clothing, bomb disposal kits, communications apparatus, and thermal and night vision gear, as well as a field hospital, were delivered by transport in late 2014.38 The question of Canadian support loomed large in the context of both the conflict and the Canada-Ukraine relationship. The thorny issue of Russian involvement served as a constraint. It was also the case that, as a non-member, N A T O protection did not extend to Ukraine. And yet Ukraine’s long-standing partnership agreement with NA TO did provide for the possibility of a peacebuilding framework, which Canada was keen to embrace.39 Indeed, if strategic peace-building measures could be implemented, additional violations might be prevented and further aggression deterred. In this regard, in March 2014 the Harper government announced its contribution to an O SCE-led mission that would report on the security and human rights situation in eastern Ukraine and attempt to foster political dialogue.40 Meanwhile, as part of its N A T O obligations, Canada also announced in May 2014 its increased involvement in the alliances’ air and naval defence of Eastern Europe (Operation Reassurance) with the addition of six C F -188 Hornet aircraft in the Baltics and the rotational deployment of a Canadian frigate in the Black Sea. This was followed by Canadian Armed Forces (C A F ) participation in military training exercises with Ukrainian troops at the International Peacekeeping and Security Centre in Yavoriv, Ukraine, and then later by joint, multinational training in Latvia, Poland, and Lithuania. These measures were all aimed at signalling Canada’s objection to Russian actions in Ukraine, warning Vladimir Putin against any further regional encroachments, shoring up Ukraine’s defensive capabilities, enhancing CAF preparedness, and monitoring human rights. By working in tandem with the international community and within a peacebuilding framework, Canada hoped to stabilize the region and assist Ukraine.41 Peace-building ensured that Canada’s strategic response was measured and calculated. The political defence of principles and beliefs, on the other hand, offered an opportunity for a genuine and more forthright response. Harper personally attended the

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7 June 2014 installation of Ukraine’s Euromaidan president, Petro Poroshenko – the first international figure to meet with Ukraine’s new leader. He also invited Poroshenko to Canada for a state visit. The Ukrainian president seized the occasion to celebrate the special relationship by travelling to Ottawa. There, in an address to the House of Commons, he acknowledged the historical link and praised the shared interest of both Canada and Ukraine in preserving and protecting rights and freedoms generally. Poroshenko’s emotive appeal – “We count on your solidarity with us,” a statement infused with hope as much as uncertainty about the future – resonated with House members who understood the gravity of the moment and the bond that stemmed from a common cause. Also expressed in those few words was a profound sense of appreciation for all that Canada had done and was prepared to do.42 But it was Harper’s brusque personal statement to Putin on November 2014 at the G20 Brisbane summit – “You need to get out of Ukraine” – that was especially poignant, making plain Canada’s position on Russia’s aggression. It illuminated Harper’s intense antipathy with those who would seek to violate international law and looked to overturn the rules-based order. It also satisfied his deep desire to inject a sense of purpose – “moral clarity” – into what he believed was the ambiguous nature of modern diplomacy. Canada’s fundamental foreign policy interest was to ensure peace, prosperity, and international justice, and for these to prevail, the sovereignty of states as a political principle had to be preserved.43 Predictably, Canada supported the Minsk II agreement – brokered by France and Germany, and signed in February 2015 – which emphasized both the need for Kyiv to restore control over Ukraine’s borders and the withdrawal of all foreignarmed formations, military equipment, and mercenaries from Ukrainian territory. For the Ukrainian-Canadian community, the conflict would test its ability and capacity to assist. The community approached the task of helping Ukraine with conviction and resolve. The U C C believed that Ukrainian Canadians could play a role by providing assistance strategically. In the end, the community demonstrated it would make a difference, delivering on an impressive scale throughout 2014 to 2015.44 Their contributions included the private resourcing of nonlethal military surplus gear – footwear,

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body armour, Kevlar helmets, and night goggles – along with the purchase of commercial drones, laptop computers, iPhones, and GPS receivers for communication, reconnaissance, and tracking purposes. They organized the collection of hemostatic dressings and medicines, as well as the acquisition and delivery of ambulances for use in the conflict zones. Meanwhile, volunteers worked to raise funds and provide relief to internally displaced persons, while teams of medical personnel from major Canadian hospitals gave of their time and effort to tend to the seriously wounded and disfigured. Above all, however, the community organized so that the government of Canada might see beyond both the volunteering and donations, to recognize the community’s contribution as being steeped in the deeper meaning of the intervention; to view the crisis not just as another conflict in need of attention, but as a struggle for a country’s future and the ideas that would define it. For a government looking to validate Canada’s role in the world and ideologically primed to view the conflict as a test of values, it was an issue that lent itself to continuing support and assistance. The matter, however, was made moot with the October 2015 Canadian general federal election, when, after some ten years in power, the Harper government fell at the hands of a renewed Liberal Party under the leadership of yet another Trudeau – Justin.

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5 Canada-Ukraine Relations Toward an Understanding

The dissolution of the Soviet Union triggered a global power shift that required Western states to adjust. It also, however, demanded attention and careful consideration. After all, the Soviet collapse was not the result of a military victory in which conditions were imposed after defeat. Rather the unravelling had to be negotiated and the aftermath cautiously navigated in order to avoid possible pitfalls. Vigilance, in effect, would broadly shape and inform the Western attitude toward Soviet disunion and transition. In keeping with this preoccupation, Canada’s response would also become decidedly nuanced. As the record would show, the Mulroney government was mindful of the broader security concerns and demonstrated great sensitivity to the conditions accompanying the collapse. The guiding motivation, of course, was to avoid making the situation unnecessarily difficult by needlessly adding to the uncertainty. Indeed, when Canada recognized Ukraine’s independence, there was much trepidation about the path forward. In fact, the decision to recognize and formally accept Ukrainian independence was endlessly mulled over and qualified before a final determination was made. And although there were specific reasons for Canada’s uneasiness – Quebec separatism, in particular, weighed heavily on the minds of Canadian officials who sought to avoid bringing attention to an issue that would otherwise complicate Ottawa’s position on secession – in the end, it was international security and stability that mattered most. Yugoslavia was on

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everyone’s lips and it behoved leaders everywhere to act gingerly in light of a possible conflict brought on by systemic change.1 At the time, the American president, George H.W. Bush, reacted to the turmoil in the Soviet Union by stating that the United States as the lone superpower had “special responsibilities.” But Canada, too, had its obligations and responsibilities. These included a political commitment to an alliance system that had served its members well over the many years and the larger obligation to preserve international peace and security.2 Moreover, peace could only be maintained by working with allies on the basis of an international framework, the principles of which would guide Canada in promoting collaboration and cooperation. With respect to Ukraine, these imperatives helped shape Canada’s foreign policy approach. The overriding consideration was to encourage Ukraine to work in partnership with its neighbours, comply with international standards, and follow the strictures outlined in treaty law. To ensure Ukraine’s international compliance and cooperation, the Mulroney government set about using development assistance and the promise of aid as a way to achieve these objectives. A widely used foreign policy instrument, development assistance assumed additional significance and relevance in the context of Canada’s relations with Ukraine. Rooted in the original decision to recognize Ukraine’s independence – Canada being the second country to do so – the relationship presented Canada with a rare opportunity to leverage assistance and aid in a way that otherwise would not have been possible, marking the bond between the two as exceptional. Although Canadian assistance was part of a wider response to the Soviet unravelling, it reinforced the perception of the relationship as unique. Canada viewed its role through the lens of this partnership, placing itself in a position to give Ukraine advice and direction during the transition while pursuing its interests more widely. Yet, the primitive character of the interaction – largely a function of the embryonic nature of the Ukrainian state – made it difficult for Ottawa to articulate what it might do, save in a general sense. Since there was no specific strategy, the relationship would necessarily assume a passive character. Some took this as categorical evidence of bureaucratic bias or hostility. The overall attitude of the bureaucracy, however, had more to do with the uncertain

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environment that mirrored the government’s own apprehension about how to proceed strategically. The relative passivity that characterized Canada’s immediate post-independence policy engagement with Ukraine stands in contrast with the original, forceful decision to recognize Ukraine’s independence. At a critical moment in time, in a remarkable turn of events, the prime minister, Brian Mulroney, broke with his allies. This singular decision won over the admiration and respect of the Ukrainian people, and nothing can diminish its importance. But how are we to understand this decision, especially in light of the subsequent caution? Was it simply a matter of inclination or predilection on the part of the Mulroney government? Arguably, there is a larger context to consider, namely the ideological struggle that defined the Cold War and framed Canada’s foreign policy interests and approach in the post-Cold War environment. The Cold War was no ordinary conflict. It was a struggle over ideas in the defence of which enormous resources were committed over many years. It defined an era and infused history with a sense of meaning that transcended the geostrategic. Accordingly, from Prime Minister Mulroney’s perspective, the conflict’s end was said to be inevitable – part of freedom’s march. Bound by the logic of the struggle, the decision to recognize Ukrainian independence was characterized as part of that process and not simply a matter of preference.3 Mulroney envisaged the decision as an extension of the wider effort to which Canada was historically and politically committed. Critically, in the context of Canada’s relations with Ukraine, independence did not necessarily imply the triumph of liberalism. Rather, this was but one stage on the road ahead. Although postSoviet states were encouraged to accept liberal institutions and practices as the foundation of the new order, liberal democracy had yet to be consolidated. The next step on the path toward liberalism involved the encouragement and promotion of reforms. This became a political standard with respect to Ukraine, substituting for a comprehensive relationship based on reciprocating interests. Reflecting the ideological and political sensibilities of a Western alliance that looked to reshape the post-Soviet space around certain hegemonic ambitions, it became an important early determinant in Canada’s relations with Ukraine.4 But it also served

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as an overarching theme, in as much as each successive government – whether the government of Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin, or Stephen Harper – looked to consolidate the liberal order in postSoviet Ukraine. Like Brian Mulroney, the prime ministers that followed were no less wedded to the cause of advancing liberal democracy in Ukraine.5 The energy expended in furthering and indeed consolidating a liberal order coloured the policy approach of each successive government. But the Mulroney government was especially concerned about stability because of the fluidity and uncertainty that accompanied systemic change. For this reason, under Mulroney, any expression of satisfaction regarding the collapse of the Soviet Union was muted. There was neither celebration nor commemoration – the Cold War was simply over. The inherent danger in the unravelling gave credence to the belief that the process had to be managed carefully. Yet, the demonstrable caution stood in marked contrast with the earlier forceful decision that had led to the recognition of Ukraine’s independence, pointing to different dynamics at work. Maintaining stability (and thereby preserving the peace) was of no less importance than the need to embrace the freedom that accompanied the collapse of the USSR. In the context of postCold War sensibilities, the uneasy balance between these two competing priorities would inform the Mulroney government’s overall strategic take on the former Soviet Union generally, and Ukraine specifically, as the transition proceeded. In the pursuit of peace and stability, it was never simply about Ukraine, but rather Ukraine in relation to Russia. For the Mulroney government, therefore, considerable emphasis was placed on the need for Ukraine to accommodate the concerns not only of the international community but also the interests of Russia, which, even in its diminished form, continued to exercise significant influence over the region.6 This preoccupation would configure Canada’s foreign policy approach in a very specific way – nesting it within a strategy that maintained a regional focus. This became the preferred method for dealing with Ukraine, giving the Canada-Ukraine relationship under the Mulroney government a distinctive quality. But it also contrasted starkly with the prevailing idea that foreign policy independence and, more importantly, unconditional support

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animated Mulroney’s take on Ukraine, pointing to the ambiguity and the tensions underlying Canada’s position. Canada’s concern with stability resulted in an abundance of caution. And for good reason. The Soviet collapse brought to the fore difficulties that required vigilance and care. There was, of course, the issue of Quebec, which moderated Canada’s position on Ukraine and post-Soviet relations. But there was also the problem of the indeterminate status of the Soviet nuclear arsenal on Ukrainian territory. Which party – Ukraine or Russia – had rightful ownership and control over these weapons? From the Ukrainian point of view, their disposition had significant political consequences; the failure to recognize Ukraine’s interests was tantamount to ignoring its sovereignty, a particularly delicate question in light of threatening statements emanating from Moscow. Not surprisingly, the regional strategy that informed the West’s, and by extension Canada’s, engagement with Ukraine – which subordinated Ukrainian interests to Russia’s in negotiations on the nuclear file – elevated Kyiv’s anxiety and sense of insecurity. This pushed Ukrainian officials to insist on assurances and demand that Ukraine’s interests not be ignored. Nuclear arms negotiations, consequently, would test the West’s relations with Ukraine and revealed for Canada the limits of its regional approach. The impasse on nuclear weapons led the West to modify its thinking and strategy toward Ukraine. It also led directly to a policy shift under Jean Chrétien. Specifically, bilateralism was emphasized. The brokering of the nuclear weapons issue, attributed by some in Ottawa to Canada’s trusted relationship with Ukraine, required closer bilateral ties. And although traditional multilateralism continued to be part of Canada’s overall foreign policy orientation, an emphasis on direct bilateral relations with Ukraine was now preferred. Not only did this allow for the use of development assistance as a way to encourage compliance, it also worked to advance Canadian economic and commercial interests, an agenda item that increasingly became the nucleus of Chrétien’s foreign policy direction. Economic liberalism factored greatly in Prime Minister Chrétien’s foreign policy thinking and philosophy. His government’s neoliberal prescriptions regarding markets, free trade, and privatization created

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opportunities for Canadian businesses and capital abroad.7 They also helped to focus Canada’s foreign policy support for economic reforms in Ukraine.8 And although Ukraine was far from being a high-value trading partner, the country had potential given its significant natural and human resources. The issue, therefore, was to support the structural transformation of the economy and, while adhering to market fundamentalism, promote changes in the legislative, regulatory, and governance environment so that markets could flourish. As Chrétien and his cabinet colleagues pointedly remarked on several occasions in conversations with their Ukrainian counterparts, rule of law was essential for Ukraine to attract foreign direct investment and for businesses and trade to thrive.9 To augment these policy endeavours, the Chrétien government looked to the Ukrainian-Canadian community and more particularly Ukrainian-Canadian entrepreneurs and businesses for assistance.10 Personal contacts were pivotal in strengthening the bond that would facilitate business deals and the underlying political relationship. It stood to reason, therefore, that the community, acting as a force multiplier, be brought in to help the government deliver on its foreign policy objectives. This necessarily meant working with community representatives and engaging those elements that could advance Canada’s national interests. The contracting out of the Canada-Ukraine Partners Program to the U C C was emblematic of this approach. So, too, was Canada’s distinct diplomatic engagement with Ukraine. Recognizing the important role that the community could play in the relationship, Canada and Ukraine issued a declaration, the Canada-Ukraine Special Partnership. This unique diplomatic document outlined Canada’s development support for Ukraine and stressed the importance of bilateral cooperation. It also singled out the close historical-cultural connection between the two countries, fortified by the extensive web of family and personal ties. In effect, the personal links had made the political and economic ties stronger, providing the rationale for even greater interaction while strengthening the “special” nature of the partnership. In the end, despite the difficulties and frustration, the personal connections were what led Canada to maintain a resolute interest in and ­steadfast support for Ukraine while reaffirming the importance of deepening the relationship. It would not only inform the Chrétien

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government’s position but also later prompt the Martin government to identify Ukraine as a priority recipient of Canadian development assistance insofar as personal contacts could be leveraged to better and greater effect. Strengthening the relationship had ramifications in terms of policy. Although the commercial dimension was paramount for the Chrétien government, underscored by the business and trade shows that were organized at the highest political levels, Ukraine’s limited capacity to carry out much needed reforms were also a major factor in defining the relationship. Administrative experience and talent in Ukraine were in short supply, as was knowledge of Western legislative processes and legal practices. To bring Ukraine up to speed, Canada was prepared to commit technical resources to the effort, including funding Canadian professionals who would provide expertise, training, and oversight. This kind of effort was a recurring story in Canada-Ukraine relations. The countless number of private individuals – administrators, advisors, and public policy professionals alike – drawn largely from the community and who gave of their time, energy, and knowledge in the effort to assist Ukraine, was both significant and welcomed from the government’s perspective. The government’s invitation for the community to participate in Ukraine’s renewal may seem unusual, if not curious; after all, diplomacy, historically speaking, is the special preserve of politicians and foreign policy executives, not citizens. Contemporary diplomacy, however, is markedly different from past patterns and practice.11 Tools and methods have changed in response to the increasingly complex nature of international relations. There has also been a movement toward the democratization of diplomacy, adding to it a public dimension. Societal interests and values are increasingly integrated into foreign policy decisions, and political space has opened up to leverage citizen participation where interests overlap.12 To the degree to which there are complementary expectations, these are integrated into the policy planning process. Where there is divergence, expectations are set aside. Political calculations are based on strategic assessments of both the environment and needs, and are often modelled with risks and benefits in mind. The Chrétien government’s pursuit of national interests conformed to this pattern, which gave shape to its dealings with the Ukrainian-Canadian community.

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Indeed, the government’s drawing on community volunteers suggested that the two sides enjoyed a warm if not close relationship. But in point of fact the relationship was circumstantial – contingent on mutual interests that generally did not extend beyond specific projects. Despite the claim that the Ukrainian-Canadian community acted as a powerful lobby and exercised influence, Chrétien in all his years as prime minister did not meet with the community leadership even once. This, of course, speaks to personality. But it also points to the healthy scepticism generally displayed by the Chrétien government in dealing with the demands and expectations of ethno-cultural communities. The government’s inclination was to maintain its distance and entertain collaboration only under certain circumstances lest the relationship become problematic. In this regard, the mutual interest in Ukraine ensured limited cooperation, but no more. The debate around denaturalization and deportation, the impasse on redress, and cuts to multiculturalism under the Chrétien government all underlined the government’s position. Notwithstanding Canadian support, it was clear that Ukraine was ill equipped to undertake the necessary reforms because of its Soviet legacy. For Canada, which had invested heavily in helping Ukraine become a functioning and responsible polity, this was especially disappointing. The development assistance model with its focus on economic liberalization had proven inadequate, exposing as false the argument that markets would drive the transition, as well as the assumption that change would be universally welcomed. The overwhelming influence of the oligarchs and the creeping authoritarianism of the Kuchma regime had shown that the forces at work in Ukraine were nimble and capable. The Ukrainian leadership pledged to follow the necessary nostrums regarding democracy, accountability, and rule of law but worked to ensure that Ukraine remained hostage to the oligarchic interests to which the leadership was beholden. The problem for Chrétien – and one that invariably vexed every prime minister – was how to cope with a country that wanted to be taken seriously and yet failed to take its own responsibilities seriously. Languishing in its Soviet past, made apparent by the murder of the opposition journalist Georgiy Gongadze, Ukraine appeared to be beyond hope, save through fundamental political change. For this to occur, Ukrainian civil

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society required support, something that Ottawa intuited but which was made near impossible given the conditions in the country. Chrétien’s successor, Paul Martin, had a different approach to such matters. The most striking aspect of Prime Minister Martin’s leadership was that he would not be rushed into decisions on policy of which he was not the author. This was as much a result of the testy relationship between Chrétien and Martin as it was a function of the latter’s personal ambition to establish his own political credentials and legacy. Working in the shadow of Chrétien as his finance minister for years, Martin was eager to pursue foreign and domestic policy undertakings that would not only set him apart from his predecessor but also, more fundamentally, reflect his own preferences and priorities. During the course of his short-lived government, and in terms of foreign policy, this translated into a number of defining moments: spurning the US invitation to participate in a national missile defence program, committing to increase Canada’s international aid target to 0.7 per cent of G D P , and advancing the idea of a G20. On the domestic front, equality rights figured prominently. Martin pushed for a new social contract with Canada’s Indigenous peoples and implemented legislation on same-sex marriage. Elements of this progressive agenda were already apparent in the throne speech. But when it came to implementation, the prime minister was careful to ensure that these and other initiatives would be publicly embraced. This meant that citizens needed to feel a sense of ownership over these initiatives. The importance of soliciting public support for a renewal of Canada’s international undertakings led directly to a foreign policy review. That a review had been conducted only months prior under the Chrétien government was, for Martin, immaterial. Public consultation was needed to help validate both the findings of that review and the recommendations of an assessment conducted under Martin’s watch. Understandably, there was pressure to arrive at new foreign policy formulations. It was a long, drawn-out process, taking nearly a year to complete. On several accounts the review proved significant, with notable implications for Canada’s relations with Ukraine. First, the list of assistance recipient countries was pared down considerably. Ukraine, to the amazement of many, was on the final list of

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twenty-five, giving credence, once again, to the “special” nature of the partnership. Second, in line with the goal of boosting the public’s sense of ownership over foreign policy, the review recommended an increased role for citizen participation in Canada’s international endeavours. This meant there would be a role for the Ukrainian-Canadian community to play in Canada’s relations with Ukraine. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Martin government made explicit its intention to support a values-based foreign policy. Liberal democratic principles and ideals – rights, freedoms, equality, and justice – would be the cornerstone of a Martin government foreign policy, providing it with a moral authority and foundation upon which Canada would engage the world.13 In the context of the uncertainty gripping Ukraine, promoting Canadian values abroad would have significant import. The Martin review coincided with the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Ukraine’s reform opposition, with its European orientation, was poised to make a breakthrough in the scheduled presidential elections. Conditions in the country, however, posed a danger to democracy, as the governing party looked to use administrative coercion to shape the election outcome and hold onto power. Electoral fraud was widely expected. The UkrainianCanadian community, consequently, sought to intervene by supporting an electoral observation mission, looking to the Martin government as a partner. Fortuitously for the Ukrainian-Canadian community, the policy review indirectly provided for this. The Orange Revolution served as a litmus test for the Martin government. Electoral democracy was under threat. How would Canada respond? The decision at the height of the crisis to organize and send a 500-strong bilateral observer mission was a clear and unequivocal statement about Canadian commitment and support for Ukraine. It was also a practical expression of what Prime Minister Martin described as “Canadian values.” Casting the decision in the language of nationalist discourse spoke to the importance for the Martin government of portraying tolerance, pluralism, and democracy as an annex of Canada’s identity and spirit. It also helped cast Canada’s “principled” foreign policy, more generally, as an extension of the national experience and culture – a perspective that, years later, would resonate with Stephen Harper.14

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Needless to say, framing foreign policy in terms of national character had its advantages. Doing so not only reinforced the link between policy and community – a “national” interest – but also enabled the government to leverage citizen participation in the implementation and delivery of that policy. This framing by the government can offer insight into the strong connection at the time between the Ukrainian-Canadian community and the Martin government, and the symbolic significance the latter attached to the receipt of the electoral observer mission reports, as well as the awarding of the rare Governor General’s commendation for the community’s contribution overseas. And yet, as it was with the Chrétien and Harper governments, the link between the two must also be read against the backdrop of the requirements of traditional foreign policy making, which was still very much a calculation based on need, risk, and benefits. How else to explain, especially in light of its own significant commitment, the Martin government’s reluctance to support the UCC proposal to sponsor an additional 1,500 electoral observers to Ukraine as a joint operation? Notwithstanding official reticence with respect to the UCC proposal, the government’s partnership with the Ukrainian-Canadian community remained strong. That it selected Ukraine as one of the twenty-five recipients of Canadian aid and assistance (from an original list of 161) served as testimony to the priority given by the government to the Canada-Ukraine partnership. This reinforced the perception of a close if not binding relationship with the community, convincing the community leadership that it had influence. Indeed, the robust bilateralism conducted under the Martin government, later repeated under Harper, so framed the relationship that it could not have been interpreted as being otherwise. Strong bilateralism followed naturally as a result of the government’s programmatic effort at depicting Canada’s foreign policy as an annex of national character. It was not simply about promoting pluralism, democracy, rights, and freedoms; rather, these were portrayed as “Canadian” values. Moreover, these were identified with an activist agenda. Canada, depicted as a force for political good, would lead the world – or as the cultural icon Bono publicly declared in the company of an effusive Prime Minister Martin: “The world needs more Canada.” It was not surprising, then, that

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“national” interest featured prominently in Canada’s overall foreign policy and, by extension, its engagement with Ukraine. The result, however, was the shifting away from an emphasis on a self-effacing multilateralism, the approach that traditionally shaped the contours of Canada’s foreign policy orientation. Some attributed the change to a Liberal electoral strategy aimed at soliciting the support of Canada’s ethno-cultural communities. Others ascribed it to Martin’s gushing patriotism. Either way, the shift drew criticism, which extended to Canada’s electoral observer missions to Ukraine. Organized as bilateral undertakings, and operating independently of international bodies, Canada’s contribution was widely publicized by the Martin government as a “Canadian” initiative. However, by differentiating these missions from the other international undertakings, Canada was left open to the charge of partisanship.15 The government would weather the criticism. But, sensitive to the accusations, the government took steps to ensure that the personal biases of individual observers neither interfered with nor jeopardized Ukraine’s electoral process. It would account for why the government declined the U C C proposal to officially support 1,500 more volunteer observers, who would necessarily be drawn from the Ukrainian-Canadian community. Like the Chrétien government before it, the Martin administration was careful to maintain an element of distance from the community so as not to create unrealistic expectations. In the end, Canada’s bilateral electoral observer mission to Ukraine was seen as a resounding success and a crowning achievement of Canadian foreign policy, validating Martin’s Canada Corps initiative. Its significance for Canada-Ukraine relations under the Martin government, however, was in many ways more noteworthy. The government’s focus on values and civic participation as ways to support its foreign policy initiatives augmented Canada’s relationship with Ukraine, deepening it at a number of levels: it gave substance to the notion of the relationship being “special,” provided a unique opportunity for the community to contribute, and led to a calibration of Canada’s aid and assistance program to Ukraine in keeping with Ukraine’s enhanced status as a partner in need. The active bilateralism of the Martin government helped bolster Canada’s relationship with Ukraine to the point that it became natural to think of the relationship as being in the “national”

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interest. The process was helped by the fact that the prime minister was personally engaged and that the community reciprocated in kind, positioning itself to intervene at a critical moment of need and opportunity.16 And yet it was also the case that external developments allowed for this. Would Canada have been so moved to engage Ukraine vigorously if the Orange Revolution had not occurred? The Orange Revolution, with its democratic subtext, reinvigorated Canada’s commitment to strengthening democracy and in doing so strengthened the Martin government’s relations with Ukraine. These developments, in effect, lent themselves to an augmented relationship. What this demonstrated was that, in this case, context mattered, as did interests and agency. All would come together, giving particular shape to the events and to the moment – a phenomenon repeated, years on, during the course of the Euromaidan. The Orange Revolution energized the relationship and stimulated Ukrainian-Canadian involvement, rousing the community to ramp up its support for Ukraine under its new Orange leadership. There was a strong belief that the relationship, now on a firmer footing, was secure. However, Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, Ukraine’s new Orange leaders, failed to measure up to expectations. Ambition, rancour, and greed all contributed to stalling and then derailing the effort at much needed reform. Russian pressure on Ukraine also complicated the situation, giving pause to further Western engagement.17 When the Conservative leader Stephen Harper formed government after defeating the Liberals at the polls, the perception was that the relationship would diminish in importance. The situation in Ukraine was discouraging, and given the new leader’s views and political beliefs about the role of government, there was, at least initially, considerable doubt and scepticism within the community about what Canada might do further to help. Harper’s ideology was characteristically multidimensional. There was, of course, the traditional conservatism that moved him to celebrate individual rights and personal freedom. In addition, his adherence to laissez-faire economics endeared him to those who embraced market fundamentalism, and his populist bent made him an advocate for grassroots representation, austerity, and small government – important considerations from the point of view of

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mobilizing popular support for his domestic political agenda. In terms of foreign policy, he also viewed internationalism as suspect and snubbed it as a strategy.18 His preference was to tack towards a values-based approach that aligned with the historical and geopolitical objectives associated with the Anglo-American alliance; namely, advancing the cause of liberty and democracy – the socalled “freedom agenda” – while supporting and maintaining the international order that had shaped the peace and prosperity of the post-Cold War era. Harper’s ideological positions were significant on a number of levels, with implications for Canada-Ukraine relations in the context of the failed Orange Revolution. First, as was iterated on several occasions, there was little to show for Canada’s investment, despite decades of assistance. There seemed little reason to further privilege the Canada-Ukraine partnership. Why maintain the fiction of a “special” relationship if there was no real evidence of progress? This was especially germane insofar as austerity – among other priorities of the Harper government – dictated that a results-based metric be used in assessing Canada’s foreign relations. From here on, outcomes would determine the future of the Canada-Ukraine relationship, the prospect of which, given the record, was not encouraging. Second, the lack of progress was attributed to both the corrosive legacy of the Soviet Union and the failed nature of the Ukrainian leadership. Only by surrendering the Soviet past and embracing democracy could Ukraine’s course be altered. But there was nothing to indicate that this would occur. Finally, the shortcomings of Ukrainian governance had made Ukraine out to be a risk and liability. Its internal weaknesses and the fickle nature of its politics threatened regional stability. In this sense, Ukraine was only of “negative” strategic value. If Canada had any interest in retaining an influence in Ukraine, it was simply to prevent Ukraine from imploding and to deter Vladimir Putin’s aim of reintegrating Ukraine into Russia’s orbit – an impediment to the larger post-Cold War liberal, democracy-building project. From the perspective of strict national interest, there was nothing that commended supporting Ukraine. It was a position that at the outset appeared to distinguish Harper from his predecessors. In fact, by stepping away from Ukraine, it seemed that he took seriously the proposition that Canada would only help those who helped themselves.

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Ukraine, by almost every measure, was a disappointment for Harper. There was little that inspired optimism or confidence, and beyond the occasional symbolic protest and probing by the Harper government to see whether there would be any uptake on Canadian assistance and guidance, relations remained stalled until conditions improved. Predictably, at the time, the Ukrainian-Canadian community was divided about Canada’s strategy. Inclined to see the prime minister’s uncompromising moralism and pragmatism as potential impediments – the downsizing of the embassy in Kyiv, for example, was criticized – the diaspora insisted Canada do more to facilitate change in Ukraine. Discussions between the government and the community did take place to the extent that there was a common concern with what was transpiring in Ukraine. Consultations, in this regard, continued and the community was encouraged by Harper to persuade their kindred to embrace reforms, which ameliorated the relationship between the countries somewhat. Yet, practically speaking, there were real differences in opinion about what could and could not be done, particularly in the context of the deteriorating situation under Ukraine’s new president, Viktor Yanukovych. The Euromaidan, however, would change all that. Like the Orange Revolution before it, the Euromaidan was an expression of civic resistance against the malignancy of corruption, fraud, and authoritarianism – recurring themes in the narrative that was post-Soviet rule, but especially characteristic of the Yanukovych regime.19 And as during the Orange Revolution, Canada responded. The endeavour all along – part of the wider post-Cold War agenda and strategy – was to help facilitate transition and consolidate democracy. From this perspective, the unfolding developments on the Euromaidan complemented Harper’s ideological predisposition, accounting for both the fervency of his support and, once civic resistance in Ukraine took hold, the shift in his approach. Indeed, the Harper government’s ardent backing of the Euromaidan had less to do with community influence than the political change in Ukraine, which made such support possible and, as was the case under the Orange Revolution, even categorical.20 The ideological imperative associated with the Canadian response and the reaction of the Harper government to the developments on the Euromaidan did not preclude the community from playing

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a role. Far from it. For Ukrainian Canadians, the Euromaidan was the symbolic culmination of the long, historical struggle for an independent and democratic Ukraine. Years of toil had primed the diaspora to do what they could at this pivotal moment. And although the government had its own motives and priorities, it had an ardent and willing partner in the form of the community.21 The Ukrainian-Canadian community was ready to assist in any way it could and, for its part, as they had always done, they encouraged the government to do more. Harper’s critics interpreted this synergy to be the result of the government’s crude attempt to curry favour with the group. On this score, the prime minister was personally criticized for siding with Ukrainian Canadians and for ignoring Canada’s foreign policy interests and traditions. Generally, Harper was accused of bias, and seen as being personally motivated by a desire to dismantle the internationalist foundations upon which Canada’s foreign policy was built.22 More directly, however, the former ambassador Christopher Westdal charged the prime minister for being woefully ignorant of the regional power and political dynamics at work. Russia’s interests needed to be both acknowledged and respected lest Canada become marginalized, while the blind pursuit of principle, he said, was misguided if Canada’s national interests were to be preserved. The ambassador’s arguments, however, treated rather lightly the nature of civil unrest in Ukraine, minimized Russia’s aggression, and dismissed the prospect of genuine, overlapping interests between the community and the government, which, being based on shared values and goals, made the relationship not only possible but also mutually beneficial. On the question of Canada’s strategic engagement with Ukraine, especially in relation to Russia, differences did exist between the Harper government and Canada’s foreign policy establishment. But there is little to support the claim that the government’s position was motivated by the prospect of electoral gain. Rather, such criticisms were merely an attempt to explain the divide between past and present Canadian foreign policy making without assessing the assumptions underpinning past policy as well as its traditional role and relevance under the circumstances. Put off by Harper’s fervent ideological defence of freedom, the traditionalists, wedded to

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orthodoxies, demonstrated little inclination to either re-examine their own presuppositions or to innovate given the seriousness of the unfolding events. Overlapping interests created a synergy in the Canada-Ukraine relationship, assuring a robust response from the Canadian government. The ideological orientation of the Harper government also created the expectation that support for Ukrainian sovereignty during the crisis would be unwavering, which in terms of forcefulness seemed at first glance to set the prime minister apart from his predecessors, highlighting as it did the role of agency. Therefore, when Canada denied Ukraine’s request for assistance in the form of advanced weapons to help oppose Russian aggression on its territories in the east, the refusal was seen as incongruous and even unexpected in light of some of the earlier effusive statements made by Harper and his government at the height of the Euromaidan. How to account for this? For Harper, ideology had to be balanced with both a strategic assessment of the situation and the national interest. In this regard, the prime minister was consistent. He learned early on there were costs associated with unbridled and impulsive political action and was thus ever circumspect, weighing risk against success. He also relied heavily on rhetoric to convey Canada’s position.23 Faced with the crisis in Ukraine, the prime minister was encouraging yet restrained in the type of support given. It was a position that was unmistakably reminiscent of the past practices of Canadian governments, representing strategic continuity in the Canada-Ukraine relationship. The ideological stance of the Harper government, in effect, was tempered by geopolitical considerations. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine complicated the Harper government’s outlook and position. At one level, the Russian assault on Ukraine needed to be opposed, especially in the context of post-Cold War priorities and sensibilities. But it was also important that Canadian foreign policy abide by the strategic requisites historically associated with the Western alliance and with US global leadership, upon which the alliance rested. Until such time as the alliance collectively agreed on enhanced support for Ukraine – providing lethal military assistance, for instance – there could be no departure from the alliance’s original limited response of targeted sanctions.

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The Harper government heeded the traditional multilateral tenets underpinning Canada’s foreign policy behaviour, signalling its objection to Russia’s challenge of the post-Cold War order by participating in the phased-in, Western-imposed sanctions regime.24 This was followed by contributions to a N A T O -led deterrence mission in Eastern Europe that again signalled dissatisfaction with Russia’s menacing attitude towards its neighbours. As conflict resolution measures, these were designed to both curb and end the violence in Ukraine, but also to prevent it from spreading elsewhere.25 The measures, typical of the internationally sanctioned, multinational approach to peacekeeping, again signalled continuity with Canada’s past traditions and practices. Nevertheless, there could be no mistaking that Canada’s response under the Harper government had a different feel to it than previous undertakings. Ideology framed the effort in such a way that it was also portrayed as part of the struggle for democracy, freedom, and rights – echoing Mulroney’s remarks in 2007. Describing its policy as based on principles and values, the Harper government rejected appeasement, arguing that the wider rules-based international order needed to be defended. Filtered through an ideological lens, this policy would lend a strident quality to the language used by the prime minister in expressing his displeasure and opposition to Russia’s adventurism in Ukraine. “You need to get out of Ukraine,” Harper would personally admonish Putin at the Brisbane G20 conference. It was a comment that went well beyond Paul Martin’s earlier reproof of Russia’s involvement in the events leading up to the Orange Revolution, backstopped as it was with other symbolic gestures: the presence of Canada’s foreign minister in Kyiv days after the Euromaidan, Harper’s visit to Ukraine at the time as an act of solidarity, the withdrawal of Canada’s ambassador to Russia, and Harper’s subsequent appearance at the inauguration of Ukraine’s Euromaidan president, Petro Poroshenko. And yet it was also a noticeably declamatory comment, framed as it was by caution and restraint.26 Harper’s remarks and gestures could only be symbolic because of geopolitical constraints. The supply of arms, even of a defensive character, would have been considered an invitation to further trouble – a potential accelerant in the frozen conflict. And although traditional forms of support for Ukraine continued under Prime

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Minister Harper he would not implement any radical change in strategy until an alliance decision was made to act otherwise.27 Rather, the prime minister’s level of rhetoric regarding Russian aggression would increase, highlighting the dilemma of operating by principle in a geostrategic world. As for Ukrainians, they were left to muddle through the ongoing miasma of post-Soviet transition and the undeclared war with its Russian neighbour. Meanwhile, Ukrainian Canadians, ever anxious, would do what they could from afar. The conflict in Ukraine demonstrates that strategic concerns matter – now as before – and the issue for Canada – now as always – is how to respond when crises arise. The answer, of course, is straightforward: Canada’s response should be whatever advances its national interests. But the story of Canada-Ukraine relations indicates that various elements can combine in different ways to pull and stretch the meaning of national interest. In this regard, foreign policy, capacious in nature, is filled with contradictory objectives. It makes for difficult decision making, which explains why leadership perspectives matter under such circumstances, settling as they do the foreign policy direction, given the myriad choices to be made. It also explains why foreign policy objectives are often couched ambiguously in the language of values, avoiding specificity while maintaining the impression of focus. This imprecision does not minimize the importance of making sense of the dynamics at work. On the contrary, the complex narrative that is Canada’s relations with Ukraine, where multiple variables are at play, reaffirms the importance of identifying those factors that matter most and delineating how they shape the course of the relationship. Since Ukraine’s independence, the Canada-Ukraine partnership has figured prominently in Canada’s foreign relations matrix. Conventional perspectives on Canadian foreign policy making, such as liberal internationalism, offer only partial insight into this development, while mid-range theories, the ethnicization of foreign policy for example, fail to explain the varied and nuanced nature of Canada’s foreign policy direction. A comparative, historical analysis of Canada’s relations with Ukraine, on the other hand, can effectively decipher the layered, complex, and subtle nature of the relationship – one that is shaped by a global context

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and its dynamics, political interests and constraints, and leadership priorities and motivations. An informed foreign policy analysis needs to account for these while also assessing their impact on each government.28 What the narrative that is Canada’s relations with Ukraine shows, in the first instance, is that wider global factors and contexts factored greatly in determining Canada’s strategy and policy response to the challenges, needs, and opportunities associated with post-Soviet transition in Ukraine. Not only did global systemic change prompt a policy response, but so, too, did the extraordinary internal events that buffeted Ukraine during the entirety of its transition. These carried a significance beyond Ukraine’s borders, especially in light of the West’s ambitions for that part of the world, highlighting for us the importance of the broader political context in which Canadian interests, attitudes, and actions evolved. Indeed, the most salient feature of the post-Soviet transition was the unstinting commitment of the West in advancing the security, economic, and cultural frameworks that have informed and defined the post-Cold War liberal order. That drive, a legacy of the Cold War conflict, was the motivation behind the West’s engagement with the post-Soviet world. Predictably, Canada, as part of the Western alliance, sought to advance the principles and values of liberal democracy in the context of its close relationship with Ukraine. In this regard, Canada’s motives were formed externally. This speaks to the overarching ethos and effect of liberalism on the process of strategic engagement in the post-Cold War environment. But it also speaks to the influence, appeal, and importance of the Western alliance arrangement as well as the practical demands associated with international security and stability, which were no less important in Canada’s foreign policy decision making. The tension that can exist between these two competing dynamics – support for freedom and concern with stability – accounts for Canada’s ambiguous and occasionally contradictory position on Ukraine: strong yet cautious, robust yet careful, forceful yet hesitant. Shaped by these external, overarching considerations, the story of Canada’s relations with Ukraine underscores the impact that the wider geopolitical and geostrategic environment has on foreign policy, making clear that foreign policy is rarely of autonomous design.

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This raises important questions about foreign policy as a pursuit of national interest. Insofar as external determinants are bound up with a country’s political ambitions and needs, these are integrated into and form part of a national foreign policy agenda and repertoire. All foreign policy, in this sense, is derivative. But still, what constitutes a distinctive “national” interest, and to the extent that Canada is part of an alliance structure, what distinguishes the national from an international dimension? Is it even possible to disentangle the two? This is not entirely clear. Yet, political imperatives predicated on national ambitions, objectives, and priorities do exist.29 This becomes more apparent when considering the ancillary factors that, in this case, shaped Canada’s foreign policy interests with respect to Ukraine. Economics, domestic political issues, and historical-cultural links influence decision making and foreign policy choices. This is more than evident from the account of Canada’s relationship with Ukraine. Moreover, all of these have structured the Canada-Ukraine relationship in very specific ways, lending texture and colour to any one government’s approach. Anxieties about the implications of Ukrainian independence for Quebec separatism, for example, were apparent in the foreign policy calculus of the Mulroney government. The focus on market and investment opportunities for Canadian businesses dominated the Chrétien government’s agenda for Ukraine. Meanwhile, the projection of Canadian values onto the international arena was of vital importance to Paul Martin as a way to carve out a distinct political identity and legacy. In the case of Stephen Harper, the emphasis on an ideology informed by a grassroots populism was instrumental in framing the government’s position more broadly on international political, economic, and security issues. Independently, these domestic factors distinguished each government’s policy approach toward Ukraine. Collectively, however, they strengthened the bilateral character of the relationship, focusing attention on its significance for Canada as filtered through the specific concerns, needs, and priorities of each government. Without question the historical-cultural connection has been a singular feature of the Canada-Ukraine bilateral relationship. It relates to memory, origin, family, and community, explaining the resiliency in the relationship and the seemingly disproportionate

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attention accorded to Ukraine by Canada. It underpins, for example, the special nature of the relationship that was of importance not only to the Chrétien government, which authored the original diplomatic declaration on the unique partnership, but to every subsequent government as well. The historical-cultural link, in effect, serves as the bridge that connects Ukraine, the UkrainianCanadian community, and Canada. Frequently, however, the argument is made that this link allows the community to influence Canada-Ukraine relations through direct political influence on the government by way of electoral pull. It is a claim that plays well to stereotype, but for which there is scant evidence. Admittedly, Ottawa’s attention to Ukraine is real and the community does play a role. It is a role, however, that is decidedly different from the one that tends to be depicted. Over the years, the community has focused tirelessly on Ukraine and its future. Well-organized, it has sought to intervene on behalf of Ukraine before Canada. As an interlocutor, it has looked to facilitate cooperation between the two. Uniquely positioned to make a difference, the Ukrainian-Canadian community has on occasion done so. But its influence has largely been conditional, contingent on the desire or willingness of the government to avail itself of the resources or opportunities that the community presents. At issue is the potential synergy that arises as interests overlap. Where these coincide, the potential for cooperation naturally occurs and collaboration becomes more likely.30 Does the UkrainianCanadian community, therefore, wield influence? It depends. When interests mesh, then yes. But this, too, is a function of context, priorities, and constraints, as well as the ascendancy, power, and authority of leadership perspectives. Leadership approaches often reflects the personal predilections, preferences, and priorities set by the prime minister. Agency, as a result, also matters in foreign policy making. This becomes evident from a cursory examination of the relationship between Canada and Ukraine. Indeed, relations between the two states have benefited greatly from the policy choices and decisions taken by Canada’s prime ministers, starting with Brian Mulroney’s recognition of Ukraine’s independence, followed by Jean Chrétien’s formal acknowledgement of the “special” status of the relationship, and continuing under Paul Martin and Stephen Harper, each of whose

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support for Ukraine’s democratic renewal and national survival was significant. Leadership matters. But leadership is also constrained by externalities. No matter how great the desire to aid and assist Ukraine, such aspirations can narrow and wane as events, obstacles, and even history conspire against personal inclinations and the best of intentions. Moreover, when ideological perspectives favour greater support, as was the case with Harper, these, too, line up against the reality of both alliance obligations and security goals and needs. Leadership matters and leaders can be decisive – but within limits. Much of this points to the fact that Canada’s relationship with Ukraine is marked by both continuity and change. The external context serves as a backdrop to ongoing pressures and challenges that Canada faces as it looks to navigate the post-Cold War world. As part of an alliance system, Canada is constrained, and this tends to be reflected in strategic and geopolitical objectives and priorities, which are internalized by each and every government. But context also provides for moments that demand decision making and policy options that distinguish Canada in the world and in the relationship between the two countries. Some of this is mediated through intervening factors such as national interest and leadership perspectives. This lends a distinctive quality to the approach and strategy adopted by any one government in their engagement with Ukraine and accounts for the undulating nature of the relationship. But even so, there are enduring features that make for continuity. The connection between the government and the UkrainianCanadian community, for instance, which persists because of shared interests, ensures that Canada-Ukraine relations will remain a focus of Canada’s foreign policy. There are, of course, other features, not least of which is Canada’s underlying political culture that places a premium on value-informed foreign policy, which lends itself well to the challenge of supporting a Ukraine in postSoviet transition. All of this intimates that the Canada-Ukraine relationship will remain constant and yet mutable with changes in government and circumstances. Canada-Ukraine relations stand out as unique in the rich narrative that is Canada’s foreign affairs. This speaks to the resiliency of the relationship, which has already weathered several challenges

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associated with transition. Despite the difficulties, Canada has stood by Ukraine, giving credence to President Poroshenko’s comment that “In Canada, Ukraine has no better friend.” In this, the idea that nothing can come between Canada and Ukraine seems irrefutable. Yet, friendship is grounded in expectations, and to the extent that these are not always met, there will always be an element of doubt and uncertainty that will come between these friends. Given the post-Cold War liberal ethos, which structures and informs contemporary global processes more widely, the underlying trajectory in Canada’s relationship with Ukraine is in many ways set. Nevertheless, the outlook for Ukraine’s future will depend no less on context, interests, and the state of leadership both at home and abroad. How these combine in the future will be the basis for ongoing assessment and reflection. It will also provide a framework for further understanding of Canada’s relations with Ukraine.

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Notes

introduction

 1 “MP Slams PM on Ukraine Issue,” Ottawa Journal, 1 June 1971.   2 Stephen Harper, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on Developments in Ukraine,” 11 December 2013.   3 Managing the issue and the community also applied during the Second World War. See Bohdan S. Kordan, Canada and the Ukrainian Question, 1939–1945: A Study in Statecraft (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001).   4 As quoted in Bob Plamondon, “The Kremlin’s Interpreter,” National Post, 21 June 2013.   5 Mike Blanchfield, “Ukraine’s President Thanks Canada for Unwavering Support in Speech at Joint Session of Parliament,” National Post, 17 September 2014. See also statement of Jason Kenney and National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, “New Canadian Military Contribution in Ukraine,” 17 April 2015.   6 Stephen Harper, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the Death of Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher,” 8 April 2013; and Stephen Harper, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada in Toronto, Tribute to Liberty Dinner,” 30 May 2014.   7 Jennifer Welsh, “Are Interests Really Value Free?” Literary Review of Canada 14, no. 9 (November 2006).   8 L. Ian MacDonald, “Harper, Gaza and Ukraine: Foreign Policy without Apology,” iPolitics, 27 July 2014.   9 Tanya Talaga, “Ukraine Angry as Canada Suspends Free-Trade Talks,” Toronto Star, 27 September 2013.

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Notes to pages 8–19

10 Lee Berthiaume, “Ukrainians in Canada Could Be Game-Changers in Federal Election,” Huffington Post, 5 March 2014. 11 John Ibbitson, “The Big Break: The Conservative Transformation of Canada’s Foreign Policy,” Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI Papers, no. 29, 7 April 2014). chapter one

  1 “Mulroney Asserted Canada’s Independence on Ukraine’s Recognition,” Ukrainian News, 2–15 May, 2007.  2 “UCC Joins Ukraine to Honour Mulroney,” Ukrainian News, 2–15 May 2007.   3 On the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Western response, see Bohdan S. Kordan, Other Anxieties: Ukraine, Russia and the West (Kingston: Kashtan Press, 1994).   4 Ross Howard, “Ottawa Resists Demanding Gorbachev’s Return to Power,” Globe and Mail, 21 August 1991.   5 John Cruickshank, “Putting a Foot in a Minister’s Mouth,” Globe and Mail, 23 August 1991.   6 Julian Beltrame and Joan Bryden, “McDougall’s Statement Stirs Up Controversy,” Ottawa Citizen, 21 August 1991.   7 External Affairs monitored the views of all of its allies on the question of recognition and was especially conscious of the importance Ukrainian officials attached to securing the closest possible relations with Canada. See, for example, Access to Information (ATI) A201400513 2016-05-10 08-49-44 (Department of External Affairs, “Ukraine: Referendum and Recognition,” Oslo legation to Ottawa, 22 October 1991).   8 Patrick Doyle, “Quebec-Baltics Link Angers Mulroney, Rae,” Toronto Star, 27 August 1991.   9 Ibid. In answer to possible questions arising from Canada’s recognition of Ukraine’s independence and the implications for Quebec, the Department of External Affairs crafted a prepared statement that read in part: “We expect to succeed in our process of constitutional renewal. The circumstances in Canada – political, economic, historical – are quite different from those in the USSR. Our prospects, and reasons for, succeeding are much greater and more ­compelling.” ATI A201400513 2016-05-10 08-53-01 (Department

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Notes to pages 19–24 133

of External Affairs, “Recognition of Ukrainian Independence: Qs and As,” n.d.). 10 Robert McKenzie, “Quebec No Longer Fighting Tide of History,” Toronto Star, 27 August 1991. 11 For general examples, see Editorial, “Equating Quebec to Baltics Odious,” Toronto Star, 28 August 1991; Jean Claude Leclerc, “Baltics and Quebec Independence Isn’t Just a Question of Secession,” Montreal Gazette, 30 August 1991; and Jeffrey Simpson, “If Canada Followed the Communists, Things Might Not Stop at Quebec,” Globe and Mail, 10 September 1991. 12 See Estanislao Oziewicz, “Immigration Board Member Lobbied PM,” Globe and Mail, 30 October 1991. 13 Chrystia Freeland, “Shunning a Resurgent Ukraine Ottawa Is Missing a Unique Opportunity for Fear of Supporting a ‘Separatist’ State,” Toronto Star, 8 July 1991. See also Edward Greenspon, “Quebec Fears Felt in Quebec,” Globe and Mail, 5 September 1991. 14 Greenspon, “Quebec Fears Felt in Ukraine”; and “Ukrainian Blames Ottawa’s Lack of Ties on Quebec Factor,” Montreal Gazette, 10 September 1991. 15 Lubomyr Luciuk, “Ukrainians Should Not Expect Fairness from the West,” Ottawa Citizen, 22 September 1991. 16 Howard Ross and Graham Fraser, “Baltic Recognition Marks Turnaround in Foreign Policy,” Globe and Mail, 27 August 1991. 17 Jim Sheppard, “Canada Not Ready to Recognize Ukraine’s Independence,” Montreal Gazette, 9 September 1991. 18 “Canada to Recognize Ukraine Independence,” Windsor Star, 9 September 1991; Sheppard, “Canada Not Ready”; Iain Hunter, “Adrift in External Affairs?” Ottawa Citizen, 9 September 1991. 19 Tim Harper, “Canada Must Honour Rights,” Toronto Star, 20 November 1991. 20 Leonid Kravchuk, “An Independent Ukraine Counts on Canada’s Help,” Canadian Speeches: Issues of the Day 5, no. 7 (1991). 21 “Ukraine Recognition Recedes, Ottawa Sets New Conditions,” Globe and Mail, 28 November 1991; Parliament of Canada, House of Commons. Hansard, 34th Parliament, 3rd session, vol. 5, 28 November 1991: 5,506. 22 In formulating its response to a letter from Alberta premier, Don Getty, who urged the government to be the first country to extend

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recognition “as tangible evidence of the importance of the historical and current relationship between Ukraine and Canada,” the Department of External Affairs noted that Getty’s views would be taken into consideration but emphasized the need to communicate that other factors were as important as the referendum. ATI A201400513 2016-05-10 08-49-44 (Department of External Affairs, “Internal Memorandum re: draft reply to Premier Getty for PM’s signature,” 20 November 1991). 23 Parliament of Canada, House of Commons. Hansard, 34th Parliament, 3rd session, vol. 5, 2 December 1991: 5,635–36. 24 Canadian officials made clear the distinction between recognition and establishing diplomatic relations. “Recognition means that Canada accepts that a particular territory exists as a sovereign state, rather than as part of another state. The establishment of diplomatic relations refers to a particular formal channel of communications between two states. It’s possible to recognize a state without having diplomatic relations with it. Similarly, we can break diplomatic relations with a state, without withdrawing recognition that it exists.” ATI A201400513 2016-05-10 08-53-01 (Department of External Affairs, “Recognition of Ukrainian Independence: Qs and As,” n.d.). 25 “Mulroney Asserted Canada’s Independence on Ukraine’s Recognition,” Ukrainian News, 2–15 May 2007. 26 It was a position that was shared with European Community members, the main concern of which was “to avoid creating by precipitous decision, events which would bring more unknowns than there presently are.” See ATI A201400513 2016-05-10 0849-44 (Department of External Affairs, “Ukraine: Referendum and Recognition,” Lisbon legation to Ottawa, 17 October 1991). 27 Parliament of Canada, House of Commons. Hansard, 34th Parliament, 3rd session, vol. 5, 2 December 1991: 5,635–36. 28 Department of External Affairs and International Trade (DEAIT), Foreign Policy Themes and Priorities: 1991-92 Update, 1991. 29 Tim Harper, “McDougall Aims at Quebec Strategy, Links Foreign Policy With Unity,” Toronto Star, 11 December 1991. 30 Parliament of Canada, House of Commons. Hansard, 34th Parliament, 3rd session, vol. 5, 10 December 1991: 6,085. 31 The CIS was of keen interest to the Canadian government, which looked to understand if it resonated with Ukrainian officials. See,

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Notes to pages 27–32 135

for example, ATI A201400513 2016-05-10 08-53-01 (Department of External Affairs, “Meeting with Valentyn Lipatov, Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine,” 29 May 1992). See also ATI A201400513 2016-05-10 08-49-44 (Department of External Affairs, “Call on Ukrainian Ambassador-Designate Lukanyenko [sic],” 3 June 1992). 32 ATI A201400513 2016-05-10 08-53-01 (Department of External Affairs, letter from Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to President Leonid Kravchuk, 6 December 1991). 33 “Minister Boosts Ukraine, McDougall Predicts Expanded Relations,” Globe and Mail, 27 January 1992. 34 “Ukraine Gets Canadian Loan,” Globe and Mail, 20 February 1992. 35 See, for example, Edward Struzik, “Canada Losing Out,” Edmonton Journal, 30 May 1992. 36 “Ukraine: Canada Making Mistake Says Axworthy,” Ottawa Citizen, 20 April 1992. For an executive summary of 1992 aid and assistance projects for the former Soviet Union and for Central and Eastern Europe, see DEAIT, Task Force on Central and Eastern Europe, 1992. 37 See ATI A201400513 2016-05-10 08-53-01 (Department of External Affairs, “Ukraine: Input for Prime Ministerial letter,” 3 December 1991). 38 On the politics of Ukrainian denuclearization, see Nadia Schadlow, “The Denuclearization of Ukraine: Consolidating Ukraine’s Security,” in Ukraine in the World: Studies in the International Relations and Security Structure of a Newly Independent State, ed. L. Hajda (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 1998), 271–87. 39 Kordan, Other Anxieties, 45–9. 40 The unusual situation would force External Affairs officials to turn to the UCC’s Ottawa-based Information Bureau to obtain a read on the political situation in Ukraine and to offer basic training to Ukraine’s diplomatic staff on how to operate a mission. Ukrainian Canadian Congress, “National Information Bureau Weekly Report,” 1–7 March 1993. 41 ATI A201400513 2016-05-10 08-49-44 (Department of External Affairs, “Call on Ukrainian Ambassador-Designate Lukanyenko [sic],” 3 June 1992).

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Notes to pages 32–9

42 Struzik, “Canada Losing Out”; George Nikides, “Consulate in Ukraine a Hotel Suite,” Winnipeg Free Press, 2 July 1992; and John Gray, “Canadian Diplomacy in Ukraine on Cruise Control,” Globe and Mail, 1 July 1993. 43 Ukrainian Canadian Congress, “National Information Bureau Weekly Report,” 23 March–2 May 1993. 44 Lloyd Axworthy, “Liberal Party Unveils Ukraine Platform,” Ukraine-Canada Policy and Trade Monitor 1, no. 3 (July–October 1993): 11. 45 “Excerpts of a Speech by His Excellency, Levko Lukianenko, Ambassador of Ukraine to Canada on October 11, 1992 to the Seventeenth Congress of Ukrainian Canadians held in Winnipeg, Manitoba, October 6–11, 1992,” in Multiculturalism and Ukrainian Canadians: Identity, Homeland Ties and the Community’s Future, eds. Stella Hryniuk and Lubomyr Luciuk (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1993). chapter two

  1 “Speech of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine A.M. Zlenko During Breakfast at the National Press Club,” Embassy of Ukraine in Canada, 26 March 2001, accessed 7 August 2015, http://www.infoukes.com/ukremb/pr010326zle.shtml.   2 “Attacks on the Press 2000: Ukraine,” Committee to Protect Journalists, 9 March 2001, accessed 7 August 2015, https://cpj. org/2001/03/attacks-on-the-press-2000-ukraine.php.   3 Canada 21 Council, Canada 21: Common Security in the TwentyFirst Century (Toronto: Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, 1994), 44; and “Canada in the World: Government Statement,” Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1995.   4 The text of the declaration is reproduced in Canada-Ukraine Monitor 2, no. 2 (spring 1994).   5 “Canada’s Foreign Minister Discusses New Relations with Ukraine,” Ukraine-Canada Policy and Trade Monitor 2, no. 1 (Winter 1993–94): 2–7.   6 On expanding direct democratization under the Chrétien government, see James McCormick, “Democratizing Canadian Foreign Policy,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 13, no. 1 (2006): 120–24.

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Notes to pages 39–43 137

  7 On perceptions and the possible role of NATO in Eastern Europe during this period, including in Ukraine, see Yasemin Heinbecker, “Canadian Foreign Policy and NATO Expansion: A Study of the Implications of NATO Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe for Canadian Foreign and Security Policy” (master’s thesis, Queen’s University, 1998).   8 Ukraine received the largest single part of Canada’s MTAP budget. ATI A201400513 2016-05-10 08-47-03 (Department of Foreign Affairs, “Scenario: Meeting with F[oreign] M[inister] Hennadij Udovenko,” n.d.).   9 See Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (D F A I T ), “Declaration on Peacekeeping,” n.d.; Department of National Defence (D N D ), “Canadian-Ukrainian Defence Relations,” 1 October 1997; and D N D , “Briefing Note: Canadian Military Training Assistance Programme: Partnership for Peace,” 14 October 1997 (copy of documents in possession of the author). 10 Jane Jamieson, “New Directions in the Canadian Foreign Policy/ Foreign Assistance Nexus: The Case of the Canadian Assistance Programme to Ukraine” (master’s thesis, Carleton University, 1997), 80–1. See also DFAIT, “Canada and the International Promotion of Democracy,” n.d.; and DFAIT, “Canadian Electoral Assistance to Ukraine,” March 1994 (copy of documents in the possession of the author). 11 By June 1996, over $95 million was committed to some 100 bilateral technical cooperation projects in the energy and health sectors, environment, democratic development and good governance, and agriculture. For a list of the projects, see ATI A201400513 201605-10 08-47-03 (Department of Foreign Affairs, “Canadian Technical Co-operation with Ukraine,” n.d.). 12 DFAIT, Government Response to the Recommendations of the Special Joint Parliamentary Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy (1995), 19. 13 For the itinerary, speeches, and reports of the tour, see CanadaUkraine Monitor 3, no. 1 (1995). See also D F A I T , “Visit to Canada of the President of Ukraine Mr. Leonid Kuchma: October 23–27, 1994” (copy of document in the possession of the author). 14 Ibid.

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Notes to pages 44–50

15 On “Canadian values” under the Chrétien government, see Steve Lee, “Canadian Values in Foreign Policy,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 10, no. 1 (2002): 1–10. 16 Leonid Kuchma, “Help for Ukraine Offer Opportunity for Canada,” Canadian Speeches: Issues of the Day 8, no. 8, December 1994: 44–8. 17 The government considered its support for the Institute of Public Administration as its “flagship initiative,” underlining Canada’s commitment to supporting the development of a professional public administration in a democratic society. See ATI A201400513 2016-05-10 08-51-04 (Department of Foreign Affairs, “The Institute of Public Administration and Local Government,” n.d.). 18 Art Eggleton, “Growing Trade to Help Build a Strong and Prosperous Ukraine,” Canada-Ukraine Monitor 4, no. 2 (1996): 24–25. 19 “Looking to the Future: Ambassador Furkalo,” Canada-Ukraine Monitor 4, no. 1 (1996): 10–11. 20 Ambassador Furkalo relayed to the Chrétien government that although President Kuchma was satisfied with the state of bilateral relations between the two countries he was concerned “momentum was draining from the ‘special relationship’” and it was important to revitalize it. ATI A201400513 2016-05-10 08-47-03 (Department of Foreign Affairs, “Scenario: Call on President Leonid Kuchma,” n.d.). 21 While on a short official visit to Kyiv in early June 1996, Canada’s foreign minister would meet with Canadian business executives working in Ukraine who, as they had done in the past, shared with him their disappointments and concerns about the difficult economic climate in Ukraine. See ATI A201400513 2016-05-10 08-47-03 (Department of Foreign Affairs, “Scenario: Roundtable Meeting with Canadian Business People,” n.d.). 22 “Foreign Minister to Lead Trade Mission to Ukraine,” CanadaUkraine Monitor 4, no. 3 (1996): 10. 23 Ibid., 11. 24 “Bilateral Cooperation and Partnerships: CUBI ’97,” CanadaUkraine Monitor 5, no. 1 (1997): 9. 25 “State Visit,” Canada-Ukraine Monitor 5, no. 2 (1997): 5. 26 Including acting prime minsters, the total was seven. In addition to Lazarenko, acting Prime Minister Yukhym Zvyahilsky fled after being accused of embezzlement.

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Notes to pages 50–5 139

27 “Corruption Perceptions Index 1998,” Transparency International, 1998, https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_1998/0. 28 Geoffrey York, “Political Squabbles Hamper Ukraine,” Globe and Mail, 12 December 1997. 29 At an official reception during the 5 June 1996 visit of Lloyd Axworthy to Kyiv, the foreign minister toasted his hosts, declaring: “Canadians care about your country. We care because we are in your debt. You gave us the talent and energy of your ancestors. And we care for a less sentimental reason – because the success of your independence is in our interest. It is in the interest of the peace and stability of Europe. For which Canadians have fought twice in this century.” ATI A201400513 2016-05-10 08-47-03 (Department of Foreign Affairs, “Toast by Minister Axworthy,” n.d.). 30 Office of the Prime Minister, “Notes for an Address by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien to a Canada-Ukraine Business Luncheon,” Kyiv, Ukraine, 28 January 1999 (copy of document in the possession of the author). 31 Geoffrey York, “Canada, Poland Target Ukraine Reform Effort,” Globe and Mail, 26 January 1999; and Allan Thompson, “Clean Up Corruption, Chrétien Tells Ukraine,” Toronto Star, 28 January 1999. The problems and relevance for Canada-Ukraine relations were outlined in a confidential document, DFAIT, “Canada and Ukraine: A Discussion Paper,” October 1999 (document in the ­possession of the author). 32 Robert Fife, “Poles Implore Canada to Pump Financial Aid into Teetering Ukraine,” National Post, 26 January 1999. 33 See Jamieson, “New Directions,” 132–35. 34 See, for example, Marco Levytsky and D. Sereda “Canada’s Ambassador ‘Prudently Optimistic’ Over Ukraine’s Future,” Ukrainian News, 17–20 April 1999. 35 “Zlenko to Visit Canada for Talks on Unrest,” Ukrainian News, 23 March–3 April 2001. 36 “Meeting with Foreign Affairs Minister John Manley: Issues for Discussion,” Ukrainian Canadian Congress (U C C ) Archives, n.d. 37 For a statement on Canada’s strategic engagement, see “Ukraine Country Program Strategy: CIDA, Russia, Ukraine and Nuclear Programs Division,” UCC Archives, 8 May 2001.

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Notes to pages 56–65

38 Viktor Yushchenko, “Stand by Us, Canada,” Globe and Mail, 30 May 2001. 39 “UCC Stresses Canada’s Special Partnership with Ukraine Before Senate Committee,” Ukrainian News, 20 March–2 April 2002. 40 Senate of Canada, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Canada, Russia and Ukraine: Building a New Relationship,” June 2002 (copy of document in the possession of the author). chapter three

  1 “Transcript of Prime Minister Paul Martin’s Speech to the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, August 25, 2005, Winnipeg,” Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) Archives, 2005.   2 “Martin Meets UCC in ‘Watershed Moment,’” Ukrainian News, 22 December 2004–18 January 2005.  3 “DFAIT Proposes to Remove Canadian Trade Commissioner from Kyiv,” Ukrainian News, 21 January–3 February 2004.   4 “Martin Cabinet Sends Disturbing Signals on D&D,” Ukrainian News, 21 January–3 February 2004; and “Trade Office ­Downgrading Sends the Wrong Message,” Ukrainian News, 21 January–3 February 2004.   5 “Results of Discussion in Toronto, December 5, 2003,” UCC Archives, 2003.   6 “Electoral Project Development: Strategic Planning Mission,” UCC Canada-Ukraine Committee, UCC Archives, 5 December 2003; and “UCC Meeting Concerning the Presidential Elections in Ukraine,” UCC Archives, 5 December 2003.   7 “Concept Paper Submitted by the Ukrainian Canadian Congress: Participation of Election Observers, Presidential Elections in Ukraine, October 2004,” UCC Archives, n.d.   8 “Proposed Pre-Election Initiatives: Ukraine,” UCC Archives, 30 January 2004.   9 For a discussion of Canada’s electoral missions and the issue of politicization, see Leland MacLachlan, “Democracy Promotion or Self Promotion? Canadian Bilateral Missions to Ukraine, 2004–14” (master’s thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 2016). 10 “Resoliutsii dlia Komisii Zviazkiv Kanady z Ukrainoiu,” UCC Archives, n.d.

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11 See, for example, Oksana Bashuk Hepburn, “What Has Not Been Accomplished in Canada’s Ukraine Agenda,” Ukrainian News, 13–26 October 2004. 12 Taras Kuzio, “Myths about Canada’s Ukrainian Diaspora,” Ukrainian News, 14–27 April 2004. 13 Andrew Robinson, “Canada Seriously Concerned That Coming Ukrainian Elections Will Fail to Meet Democratic Standards,” Maple Leaf News [e-zine published by the Canadian Embassy in Ukraine], vol. 16 (21 September 2004); and “Foreign Ministry Appraises Canadian Ambassador’s Comments on Election Campaign in Ukraine as Dissonant from Spirit of Partnership Relations,” Ukrinform, 22 September 2004. 14 “Canadian Parliamentarians Blast Putin’s Involvement in Ukraine Elections,” Ukrainian News, 24 November–7 December 2004; and “Canadian MPs Denounce Election Fraud,” Ukrainian News, 24 November–7 December 2004. 15 Parliament of Canada, House of Commons. Hansard, 38th Parliament, 1st session, 140, no. 31, 24 November 2004: “Oral Question Period,” 1,420, and “Emergency Debate: Ukraine,” 1,830­–2,330. 16 See, among others, “Ukraine’s Best Hope,” Toronto Star, 3 December 2004; and “Putin Could Teach Lessons in Meddling,” Globe and Mail, 4 December 2004. 17 Parliament of Canada, Senate of Canada. Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs: Issue 2 – Evidence, 1 December 2004. 18 “George W. Bush: The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister Paul Martin of Canada in Ottawa, Canada,” 30 November 2004,” American Presidency Project, http://www. presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=72841. 19 The findings of the Chrétien review were presented in the form of a report: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), A Dialogue on Foreign Policy: A Report to Canadians, Catalogue no.: E2-481/2003, 2003. 20 Government of Canada, “Speech from the Throne to Open the Third Session of the 37th Parliament of Canada,” 2 February 2004. 21 Andrew Cohen, “Martin’s First Year on Foreign Policy: The Rhetoric of Good Intentions,” Policy Options, 1 February 2005.

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Notes to pages 71–6

22 “Playing to Our Strength: Diversity and Canadian Foreign Policy” (notes for an address by Pierre Pettigrew, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the 2004 Scotiabank–AUCC Awards for Excellence in Internationalization, in Gatineau, Quebec), 27 October 2004 (copy of document in the possession of the author). 23 Ibid. 24 DFAIT, Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. Catalogue no.: FR4-4/2005, 2005. 25 Brian Laghi and Carolynne Wheeler, “Canada to Send Ukraine 500 Election Monitors,” Globe and Mail, 7 December 2004. See also Mike Blanchfield and Aileen McCabe, “Up to 500 Canadians to Monitor Ukraine Vote,” National Post, 7 December 2004. 26 “Re: Ukraine’s Presidential Election,” UCC Archives, letter from UCC President Orysia Sushko to Prime Minister Paul Martin, 4 December 2004, and Martin to Sushko, 23 December 2004. 27 “Canada to Provide 500 Election Observers,” Ukrainian News, 8–21 December 2004. 28 Tonda MacCharles, “Martin’s Corps Reporting for Duty,” Toronto Star, 13 December 2004; Norma Greenaway, “‘Old School’ John Turner Brings ‘Full Weight’ of Canada’s Voice,” Ottawa Citizen, 13 December 2004; and “Bringing Democracy to Ukraine,” National Post, 8 December 2004. 29 See John Turner, “Interim Report of the Canadian Observers Mission to Ukraine,” Kyiv, Ukraine, 27 December 2004; and “Supporting Democratic Freedom in Ukraine: Final Report,” U C C Archives, Ukrainian Canadian Congress Observer Mission for the Ukrainian Presidential Elections 2004, 25 August 2005. 30 Danielle Goldfarb and Stephen Tapp, “How Canada Can Improve Its Development Aid,” C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, no. 232 (April 2006): 7–11. 31 Jeff Sallot, “Liberals Pare Aid Recipients List,” Globe and Mail, 20 April 2005. 32 Brock Harrison, “Canadian Group Cited for Monitoring Ukraine’s Elections,” Edmonton Journal, 1 September 2005. 33 “Martin Meets UCC in ‘Watershed Moment,’” Ukrainian News, 22 December 2004–18 January 2005. 34 “UCC Applauds Canada’s Commitment to Ukraine,” press release, UCC Archives, 25 April 2005.

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Notes to pages 77–81 143

35 “Martin, Yushchenko Meet,” Ukrainian News, 2–15 March 2005; and “Regaining Investor Confidence a Major Priority, Embassy Official Says,” Ukrainian News, 25 May–7 June 2005. 36 With the political change in Kyiv, the enthusiasm also extended to the provinces, which had elevated expectations about commercial and economic opportunities given the strong historical and cultural ties. See, for example, “Alberta, Lviv Oblast Sign Agreement,” Ukrainian News, 31 August–13 September 2005; and “Saskatchewan-Ukraine Skills Meeting Held,” Ukrainian News, 28 September–11 October 2005. 37 “Canada Helps Ukraine Fast-Track to NATO, WTO,” Ukrainian News, 26 October–8 November 2005; and “Peterson Wants to Boost Trade with Ukraine,” Ukrainian News, 26 October– 8 November 2005. 38 “Ignatieff Candidacy Strongly Protested,” Etobicoke Lakeshore Federal Liberal Riding Association, press release, 27 November 2005; “Ukrainians Disappointed with Liberal Push for Ignatieff as Candidate,” press release, UCC Archives, 27 November 2005; and Caroline Alphonso and Jeff Sallot, “Liberals Miffed by Ignatieff’s Candidacy,” Globe and Mail, 28 November 2005. 39 See, for example, Thomas Axworthy, “A Revolution Falls Apart,” National Post, 21 December 2005. chapter four

  1 Kathryn Blaze Carlson, “Canada Makes Strong Commitment to Ukraine,” Globe and Mail, 28 February 2014.  2 Ibid.   3 See A. Fujiwara, “Canada’s Response to Euromaidan,” in Ukraine’s Euromaidan: Analyses of a Civil Revolution, eds. David R. Marples and Frederick V. Mills (Stuttgart: Ibidem Press, 2015), 199–215.   4 For the criticism, see “Will a Visit by Ukraine’s PM Pay Off for Harper at the Ballot Boxes?” Global News, 14 July 2015; “The List: Top 100 People Influencing Canadian Foreign Policy, 2014,” Power and Influence: Hill Times (Spring 2014); and Mark MacKinnon, “Our Unofficial War: Canada’s Ukrainian Diaspora Is Fighting Russia Any Way They Can,” Globe and Mail, 26 February 2014.

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Notes to pages 84–93

  5 “MacKay Assures UCPBF of Canada’s Support for Ukraine,” Ukrainian News, 19 April–2 May 2006.   6 Marco Levytsky, “Canada May Cut Kyiv Embassy Staff,” Ukrainian News, 28 June–25 July 2006.   7 “Briefing Note, Ukrainian Canadian Congress Meeting with the Honorable Peter MacKay, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 10 November 2006,” UCC Archives, 2006.   8 “Harper Tories Give Us ‘figu z makom,’” Ukrainian News, 21 September–3 October 2007.   9 “MacKay Announces Over $16 Million for Ukraine during Visit,” Ukrainian News, 25 July–7 August 2007. 10 For a discussion of the Harper government’s predisposition to engage diasporic communities in foreign policy making, see Tapping Our Potential: Diaspora Communities and Canadian Foreign Policy, Mosaic Institute/Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, 2011. 11 Parliament of Canada, House of Commons. Hansard, 39th Parliament, 2nd session, 142, no. 52, 15 February 2008: 3,162. 12 “Community Must Defend Ukraine’s Democracy, URDC Director Says,” Ukrainian News, 13–26 May 2010. 13 Parliament of Canada, House of Commons. Hansard, 40th Parliament, 3rd session, 145, no. 51, 28 May 2010: 1,100; and “Statement of Borys Wrzesnewskyj, MP, on Intimidation of Rev. Borys Gudziak, Rector, Ukrainian Catholic University,” InfoUkes, 2010, accessed 27 April 2016, www.infoukes.com/newpathway/ 22-2010-Page-3-1.html. 14 See, for example, “Canada Must Take the Lead in Defending Ukraine’s Threatened Democracy,” Ukrainian News, 13–26 May 2010. 15 John Ibbitson, “PM Defends Trade Talks with Ukraine Despite Kiev’s Strong-arm Tactics,” Globe and Mail, 24 October 2010. 16 Doug Saunders, “Politicians Attend, but Business Gives Up on Ukraine,” Globe and Mail, 27 October 2010. 17 Ibid. 18 John Ibbitson, “Licking His Wounds from UN Vote, Harper Looks to Rebuild Image Abroad,” Globe and Mail, October 21, 2010. 19 Christopher Westdal, “NATO Summit: Making Peace with Russia, Canada Notwithstanding – A Policy Update Paper,” Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, November 2010.

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Notes to pages 93–101 145

20 Alan Woods, “Canadian Diplomat Blasts Ottawa’s Stance toward Russia,” Toronto Star, 22 November, 2010. 21 Jars Balan, “Former Canadian Ambassador on Wrong Side of ­East-West Divide,” Ukrainian News, 3–16 March, 2011. 22 Jennifer Welsh, “Do We Need a Foreign Policy Review? Afraid So …” Canadian International Council, 29 January, 2012. 23 Kim Richard Nossal, “The Liberal Past in the Conservative Present: Internationalism in the Harper Era,” in H. Smith and C. Sjolander, eds. Canada in the World: Internationalism in Contemporary Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2103), 23. Gerald Schmitz, “Canada and International Democracy Assistance: What Direction for the Harper Government’s Foreign Policy Direction,” Occasional Paper Series, No. 67, Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queens University, August 2013. 24 See John Ibbitson, “The Big Break: The Conservative Transformation of Canada’s Foreign Policy,” Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI Papers, no. 29, 7 April 2014). 25 See Gerald Schmitz, “The Harper Government and the De-Democratization of Canadian Foreign Policy,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 20, no. 2 (2014): 224–28. 26 “UCC Welcomes Foreign Affairs Committee Report on Ukraine,” Ukrainian News, 28 June–18 July 2012. 27 “CUAC: Minutes of Meeting with the Hon. John Baird,” UCC Archives, 12 May 2012. 28 The size of the mission would later be criticized as being excessive in an internal DFAIT report. See “Canada Sent Too Many Observers to 2012 Ukraine Elections, 2012: Report,” CBC News, 25 April 2014. 29 “UCC Welcomes Final Report of Canadian Observer Mission,” Ukrainian News, 11–24 April 2013. 30 Lloyd Axworthy, “Where Is Canada’s Strategy to Help Ukraine?” Winnipeg Free Press, 30 April 2013. 31 Parliament of Canada, House of Commons. Hansard, 41st Parliament, 2nd session, 147, no. 35, 27 January 2014: 1,900–20, and 1,945–50. 32 David Pugliese, “Harper Government Response on Ukraine Just Bluster Say Former Ambassadors: Canada Increasingly

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Notes to pages 102–5

Marginalized on World Stage,” Ottawa Citizen, 2 March 2014; and John Ibbitson, “Harper’s Foreign Policy: Ukraine and the Diaspora Vote,” Centre for International Governance Innovation, 23 March 2014. Heinbecker’s criticism of ethnic involvement in Canadian foreign policy making was long-standing. See for example his Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Playbook for Canada (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2010). Former prime minister Joe Clark also weighed in on the debate with his How We Lead: Canada in a Century of Change (Toronto: Random House, 2013). 33 Kathryn Blaze Carlson, “Canada Makes Strong Commitment to Ukraine,” Globe and Mail, 28 February 2014; and Chris Westdal, “Everybody Calm Down. Peace Is Still Possible in Ukraine,” iPolitics, 23 April 2014. 34 Ryan Maloney, “Ukraine Crisis: Most Canadians Satisfied with Harper’s Response, Poll Suggests,” Huffington Post, 5 June 2014. 35 Matthew Fisher, “Stephen Harper Has Harsh Words for Putin ­during Historic Visit to Ukraine,” Canada.com, 22 March 2014. 36 Stephen Harper, “Our Duty Is to Stand Firm in the Face of Russian Aggression,” Globe and Mail, 25 July 2014. 37 See, for example, “Time to Arm Ukraine,” Ukrainian News, 23 October–5 November 2014. 38 ATI A201302221 2017-05-19 11-52-38 (National Defence, “DND/CAF Support to the Ukrainian Armed Forces,” 20 November 2014). 39 On NATO’s strategic role in the Ukraine crisis and Canadian participation, see ATI A201400233 2016-05-11 10-25-48 (Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, “Strategic Overview: NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting,” 28 March 2014). 40 Canada’s participation in the OSCE-mandated risk reduction ­mission to Ukraine is detailed in ATI A201302221 2017-05-19 11-41-02 (National Defence, “Issue Synopsis: OSCE Risk Reduction Mission – Ukraine,” 6 March 2014). 41 See “Ongoing Situation in Ukraine” take note debate in Parliament of Canada, House of Commons. Hansard, 41st Parliament, 2nd session, 147, no. 203, 29 April 2015: 1,950–2,345. 42 The total amount of assistance at this time was $220 million, allocated to help support Ukraine stabilize its economy, implement needed reforms, and promote economic and social development. Of this total, $200 million constituted a loan and loan guarantee.

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ATI A201400089 2015-07-03 (Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, “The Crisis in Ukraine,” 8 April 2014). 43 ATI A201400089 2015-07-03 (Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, “The Crisis in Ukraine,” 8 April 2014). 44 See Mark MacKinnon, “Bypassing Official Channels, Canada’s Ukrainian Diaspora Finances and Fights a War Against Russia,” Globe and Mail, 26 February 2015. chapter five

 1 ATI A201400513 2016-05-10 08-53-01 (Department of External Affairs, “Meeting with Valentyn Lipatov, Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine,” 29 May 1992).   2 Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993).   3 Prime Minister Mulroney conveyed the inevitability of the decision in his letter to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. “I realize that you will be disappointed by Canada’s decision today [to recognize Ukrainian independence]. When the people of Ukraine speak so clearly and decisively, however, Canada consistent with its own democratic traditions cannot ignore these voices.” ATI A201400513 2016-05-10 08-53-01 (Department of External Affairs, letter from Prime Minister Brain Mulroney to the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 2 December 1991).   4 See Ronald Tammen, Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century (New York: Chatham House Publishers, 2000). That Ukraine’s leadership understood the requirements of participating in a new order was evident in their willingness to abide by the norms set out as a condition of Canada’s recognition. ATI A201400513 2016-05-10 08-53-01 (Department of External Affairs, letter by President Leonid Kravchuk to Prime Minster Brian Mulroney, 6 December 1991).   5 The argument more broadly is that states adhere to and seek to preserve the principles and values underpinning the international system organized by the leading hegemon because their share of the goods allocated under the system is increased. See Jason W. Davidson, The Origins of Revisionist and Status Quo Powers (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2006).

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Notes to pages 110–16

 6 See ATI A201400513 2016-05-10 08-53-01 (Department of External Affairs, “Meeting with Valentyn Lipatov, Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine,” 29 May 1992).   7 The economic dimension behind Canadian foreign policy under Prime Minister Chrétien is discussed in Jean François Rioux and Robin Hay, Canadian Foreign Policy: From Internationalism to Isolationism? (discussion paper no. 16, Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, 1997).   8 “The challenge ahead is to find new ways to maintain the special character of our partnership while converting it into real benefits for both countries. The preferred choice would be to see commercial ties to grow from the fertile ground prepared. The option is limited, however, by Ukraine’s slow progress on market reforms.” ATI A201400513 2016-05-10 08-47-03 (Department of Foreign Affairs, “Scenario: Meeting with F[oreign] M[inister] Hennadij Udovenko,” n.d.).  9 ATI A201400513 2016-05-10 08-51-04 (Department of Foreign Affairs, “Prime Minister’s Tête-à-Tête with President Kuchma,” and “Scenario: Prime Minister/President Kuchma Expanded Meeting,” n.d.). 10 “Ukrainian-Canadians have participated in many of the assistance projects, with their language skills, family ties, and knowledge of Ukraine contributing to the development of trade and political ties. The Ukrainian government tends to overstate the importance of government-to-government links, neglecting the potential of private sector contacts.” ATI A201400513 2016-05-10 08-47-03 (Department of Foreign Affairs, “Canada-Ukraine Relations” n.d.). 11 With reference to the participation and growing role of ethnic communities in Canada’s foreign policy making, see the discussion in the report Tapping Our Potential, Mosaic Institute/Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, 2011. 12 For a contrary perspective, see Jack L. Granatstein, “Multiculturalism and Canadian Foreign Policy,” in The World in Canada: Diaspora, Demography and Domestic Politics, eds. David Carment and David Bercuson (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008), 78–91. 13 Allan Gotlieb, former undersecretary of external affairs and subsequent ambassador to the US, was hypercritical of the “moralizing” tendency in Canada’s foreign policy and advocated that the Martin

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Notes to pages 116–21 149

government distinguish between values and interests to ensure foreign policy success. See Allan Gotlieb, “Romanticism and Realism in Canada’s Foreign Policy,” Policy Options 26 (February 2005). 14 “Transcript of Prime Minister’s Speech to the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, Winnipeg, August 25, 2005,” UCC Archives, 2005. 15 See the discussion in Leland MacLachlan, “Democracy Promotion or Self Promotion? Canadian Bilateral Missions to Ukraine, 2004– 2014” (master’s thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 2016). 16 Christian Leuprecht and Todd Hataley argue that the “symbiotic relationship” that exists between ethnocultural diversity and Canada’s foreign policy priorities under the Martin government would become an ongoing structural feature of Canada’s foreign policy agenda. The argument here, however, is that conditions determine whether the relationship will lead to collaboration. See Christian Leuprecht and Todd Hataley, “Just How Liberal and Democratic Is Canadian Foreign Policy?” in The World in Canada, eds. David Carment and David Bercuson (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008), 123–48. 17 See Derek Fraser, “Taking Ukraine Seriously: Western and Russian Responses to the Orange Revolution,” in Europe’s Last Frontier? Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, eds. Oliver Schmidtke and Serhy Yekelchyk (London-New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008), 157–73. 18 The link between Canadian foreign policy beliefs and support for Prime Minister Harper is explored in Timothy Gravelle, Thomas Scotto, Jason Reifler, and Harold Clarke, “Foreign Policy Beliefs and Support for Stephen Harper and the Conservative Party,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 20, no. 2 (2014): 111–30. 19 For a discussion of the Euromaidan, see Bohdan S. Kordan, “Maidan and the Politics of Change: Meaning, Significance and Other Questions,” East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies 3, no. 1 (2016), 137–53; Natalia Otrishchenko, “Beyond the Square: The Real and Symbolic Landscapes of the Euromaidan,” in Ukraine’s Euromaidan: Analyses of a Civil Revolution, eds. David R. Marples and Frederick V. Mills (Stuttgart: Ibidem Press, 2015), 147–61; and Anna Chebotariova, “‘Voices of Resistance and Hope’: On the Motivations and Expectations of Euromaidaners,” in Ukraine’s Euromaidan, eds. Marples and Mills, 163–76.

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Notes to pages 121–3

20 David Carment and Joseph Landry state that “The government’s hard line stance against Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine crisis appears to be driven by domestic politics and not by any larger geostrategic or moral imperatives.” The claim, however, is not substantiated, but follows the wider argument that this is part of a pattern of “diaspora pandering [that] converged with the government’s ideological orientation, creating and reinforcing a nested policy agenda that appealed to a narrow political base at home while serving no core Canadian interests abroad, or, worse, generating hostility with homeland governments.” David Carment and Joseph Landry, “Transformation, Ambiguity and Reversal: Harper’s Foreign Policy under a Microscope,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 20, no. 2 (2014), 107; and David Carment and Joseph Landry, “Diaspora and Canadian Foreign Policy: The World in Canada,” in The Harper Era in Canadian Foreign Policy: Parliament, Politics and Canada’s Global Posture, eds. Adam Chapnick and Christopher Kukucha (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2016), 212. 21 For a critical assessment of the community-government relationship, see Aya Fujiwara, “Canada’s Response to Euromaidan,” in Ukraine’s Euromaidan: Analyses of a Civil Revolution, eds. David R. Marples and Frederick V. Mills (Stuttgart: Ibidem Press, 2015), 199–215. 22 The case is made by Kim Richard Nossal, “The Liberal Past in the Conservative Present: Internationalism in the Harper Era,” in Canada in the World: Internationalism in Contemporary Canadian Foreign Policy, eds. Heather A. Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2013), 21–35. The Harper ­government’s opposition to the traditional emphasis on democracy development as a mainstay of Liberal foreign policy, in particular, is explored in Gerald J. Schmitz, Canada and International Democracy Assistance: What Direction for the Harper Government’s Foreign Policy? (occasional paper series, 67, Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen’s University, August 2013). 23 Gerd Schönwälder argues that without putting in place the necessary policy instruments or cultivating broader public “buy-in,” a values-based foreign policy is reduced to the level of rhetoric. See Gerd Schönwälder, “Principles and Prejudice: Foreign Policy under

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Notes to pages 124–8 151

the Harper Government” (Centre of International Policy Studies, policy brief, no. 24, June 2014). 24 The argument is made in Mitchell Dowie, “Agency and Moral Clarity: Stephen Harper’s Post-Euromaidan Ukraine Policy” ­(master’s thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 2017). 25 ATI A201302221 2017-05-19 11-41-02 (National Defence, briefing note for the minister, “Canada-Ukraine Defence Relations,” 3 February 2014). 26 The disconnect between rhetoric and action is described in Fujiwara, “Canada’s Response to Euromaidan,” 214–15. 27 The Harper government would commit $20 million in 2014 to democratic institution building and the economy. By March 2014, total Canadian technical assistance reached $410 million, while an additional $220 loan guarantee was announced by Ottawa in January to help Ukraine restore its economic, social, and political stability. ATI A201400233 2016-05-11 10-25-48 (Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, “Q&A: Canada, Ukraine, Russia,” n.d.). 28 The case for a multidimensional and flexible approach in foreign policy analysis where “explaining Canadian foreign policy, whether contemporary or historical, requires a persistent attachment to the possibility that more than one factor is at play” is made in Kim Richard Nossal, Stéphane Roussel, and Stéphane Paquin, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 4th ed. (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015). 29 See ATI A201400233 2016-05-11 10-25-48 (Privy Council Office, “The Year Ahead: Domestic Imperatives Limit Global Strategies,” February 2014). 30 The issue of the Ukrainian diaspora’s influence on Canada’s policy towards Ukraine during the crisis was addressed in the outlining of possible scenario questions Canada’s foreign minister might encounter in a press scrum. The response prepared for the minister was: “Canada has consistently taken a principled line on Ukraine, driven by Canadian values and Canadian interests. The UkrainianCanadian community is a very important part of Canada’s fabric. They are also experts on Ukraine. So it is natural – and beneficial for us – to consult with them and take account of their views.” ATI A201400233 2016-05-11 10-25-48 (Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, “Q&A: Canada, Ukraine, Russia,” n.d.).

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Index

aid and assistance: UkrainianCanadian community and, 8­–9, 11, 12, 15, 19–21, 33, 36–7, 38–9, 42, 45, 47–8, 51, 53, 55, 57, 59–60, 63, 65–6, 72, 73, 75, 76, 85–6, 97, 105–6, 112– 14, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 128, 148n10, 151n30; official, 20–1, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 35, 39, 40, 43, 44–5, 46, 55, 57, 58, 60, 62, 70, 74, 75, 77, 79, 84–86, 96, 100, 105–6, 108, 114, 115, 117–18, 120–1, 123, 135n36, 146n42, 151n27. See also Canadian International Development Agency Andreychuk, Raynell (Canadian senator), 97 Axworthy, Lloyd (Canadian minister of foreign affairs), 17, 23, 24, 25, 32, 37, 46, 47, 48, 49, 99, 139n29 Baird, John (Canadian minister of foreign affairs), 80, 97 Balan, Jars (U C C Canada-Ukraine Committee member), 93–4, 98

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bilateralism, 12, 127; and Chrétien government, 11, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 55, 111, 138n20; and Martin government, 117, 118; and Harper government, 84, 88, 95, 100, 117 Bush, George H.W. (41st US president), 17–18, 25, 108 Bush, George W. (43rd US president), 70 Buzek, Jerzy (prime minister of Poland), 52 Canada Corps, 60, 118 Canada 21 Council, 38 Canada-Ukraine Advisory Council, 53, 85 Canada-Ukraine Business Initiative (C UB I), 47, 48, 49 Canada-Ukraine Chamber of Commerce, 53, 77 Canada-Ukraine Foundation. See Canada-Ukraine Advisory Council Canada-Ukraine Partners Program, 29, 39, 53, 112 C A NA DEM (election observation mission), 64–5, 66, 68, 71, 72, 74

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154 Index

Canadian International Development Agency (CI DA), 45, 53, 57, 63, 64, 65, 66, 72, 76, 77 Carroll, Aileen (minister for international cooperation), 64, 72 Chrétien, Jean (prime minister of Canada), 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 37, 38, 56, 110; and Buzek, Jerzy, 52; foreign policy priorities and planning, 37, 41, 43–4, 111, 113, 127; as Liberal leader of the opposition, 17; and UkrainianCanadian community, 60, 92, 112, 113–14, 128; and Ukrainian Canadian Congress, 60; and Ukrainian reforms, 43, 51–2, 112, 114; visit to Ukraine, 51. See also bilateralism; Declaration on Special Partnership; independence of Ukraine Clarkson, Adrienne (governor ­general of Canada), 75–6 Commonwealth of Independent States (C I S ), 26, 31, 32, 134n31 Crimea, 7, 28, 31, 80, 102, 103 Dann, Albina (Canadian ambassador to Ukraine), 84 Declaration on Special Partnership, 38, 57, 112, 128, 138n20, 148n8 denuclearization, 29, 38, 111; Axworthy, Lloyd on, 25, 33; Mulroney government and, 17, 18, 23, 24, 28, 39, 41–2; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 31, 39, 42; Ouellet, Andre and, 39; Ukrainian attitude toward, 31, 41, 111

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Dewar, Paul (NDP foreign affairs critic), 100 Donbas, 7, 89, 102, 103–4 Ducros, Françoise (C IDA director), 64 Eggleton, Art (Canadian minister of national defence), 51 elections in Ukraine: 1994 parliamentary elections, 40; 1998 parliamentary elections, 54; 2002 parliamentary elections, 61, 63; 2006 parliamentary elections, 79; 2007 parliamentary elections, 85; 2012 parliamentary elections, 96–8; 1999 presidential election, 54; 2004 presidential election, 58, 63, 64, 116; 2010 presidential election, 87, 88, 90. See also Orange Revolution Euromaidan, 3, 4, 12, 80–1, 82–3, 99, 100, 101, 119, 121–2, 124 Flaherty, Jim (Canadian minister of finance), 83 Fraser, Derek (Canadian ambassador to Ukraine), 54 Freeland, Chrystia (journalist and Liberal member of parliament), 21, 101 Furkalo, Volodymyr (Ukrainian ambassador to Canada), 46, 138n20 Garneau, Marc (Liberal member of parliament), 98 Gongadze, Georgiy (Ukrainian journalist), 35, 36, 54, 55, 114

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Index 155

Goodale, Ralph (Liberal deputy prime minister and minister of natural resource), 51 Gorbachev, Mikhail (president of US S R ), 16, 18, 25, 147n3 Graham, Bill (Canadian minister of foreign affairs), 65 Grod, Paul (U CC president), 81 Harper, Stephen (prime minister of Canada), 9, 12, 110, 128; beliefs and priorities, 81–2, 84, 88–9, 91–2, 102, 103, 119–20, 123, 127; break with Canadian foreign policy, 9, 81, 82, 94, 116, 117, 122, 125; criticism of, 101, 122–3; and Euromaidan, 103, 104–5, 121, 124; and gala celebration, 14; and Orange leadership, 83, 119; and Putin, Vladimir, 105, 124; UkrainianCanadian community and, 79, 86, 92, 93, 95, 117, 121, 150n20. See also bilateralism; independence of Ukraine; Orange Revolution Heninbecker, Paul (Canadian ambassador to U N ), 101, 146n32 Ibbitson, John (journalist), 95 Ignatieff, Michael (leader of Liberal opposition), 78, 98 independence of Ukraine, 3, 5, 10, 15, 30, 87, 128, 134n24; Chrétien government and, 52, 139n29; Harper government and, 80, 86, 87, 125; Trudeau, Pierre and, 4–5; McDougall, Barbara and, 22; Mulroney

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government and, 6, 7, 14, 15, 18, 24, 25, 31, 107, 108, 109, 110, 147n3; plebiscite on, 24; Quebec and, 16, 18, 25, 107, 127, 132n9; Ukrainian-Canadian community and, 8, 15, 33, 82, 84 Intergovernmental Economic Commission (IEC), 47, 48, 49, 55 Joint Declaration on Continuing Development of the Special Partnership. See Declaration on Special Partnership Kenney, Jason (Canadian minister of immigration), 98 Kilgour, David (Liberal member of parliament), 68 Kravchuk, Leonid (Ukrainian politician), 22, 23, 27 Krawchenko, Bohdan (academic), 50 Kuchma, Leonid (Ukrainian politician): authoritarianism and ­corruption and, 61, 114; and Canada-Ukraine relationship, 44, 138n20; and Gongadze, Georgiy, 35; and Martin government, 62, 75; and opponents, 36, 49, 54, 56; reforms and, 53; and Ukrainian-Canadian community, 42. See also Gongadze, Georgiy Kuzio, Taras (academic), 66 Lazarenko, Pavlo (prime minister of Ukraine), 48, 49, 50, 138n26 Lukianenko, Levko (Ukrainian ambassador to Canada), 32, 33

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156 Index

McDougall, Barbara (Canadian minister of external affairs), 16, 17, 22, 26, 27, 29 MacKay, Peter (Canadian minister of foreign affairs), 84, 85–6 McLellan, Anne (deputy prime minister of Canada), 68 Maimeskul, Mykola (Ukrainian ambassador to Canada), 69–70 Manley, John (Canadian minister of foreign affairs), 36, 54, 55 Marleau, Diane (Canadian minister for international cooperation), 51 Martin, Paul (prime minister of Canada), 9, 58, 70, 78, 110, 115, 117, 118, 128; and Canada Corps, 60, 72; and Canadian electoral observer mission, 76, 116; and “Canadian values,” 117, 127, 148n13; on Kuchma, Leonid, 62; Orange Revolution, 6, 7, 116; and Russia, 70, 124; and the Ukrainian-Canadian community, 59, 61, 75, 149n16; Yushchenko, Victor and, 77. See also bilateralism; Kuchma, Leonid; Orange Revolution Military Training Assistance Program (M TAP), 40 Miller, David (mayor of Toronto), 76 Mulroney, Brian (prime minister of Canada), 5, 6, 11, 22, 110, 124; and development assistance, 30, 32, 108; and diplomatic negotiations, 26; and gala celebration, 14, 86, 124; on the nature of US S R , 19; and Quebec separatism, 16, 107, 127; and

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Ukrainian independence decision, 14, 15, 18, 21, 25–6, 109, 147n3. See also denuclearization; regionalism; independence of Ukraine Nash, Peggy (NDP member of parliament), 98 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NA TO), 39, 40, 48, 77, 87, 95, 104, 124 Oda, Beverly (Canadian minister for international trade), 96–7 Orange Revolution, 11, 12, 79, 83, 121; and Harper government, 85, 120; and Martin government, 6, 7, 74, 75, 116, 119; and Peterson, Jim, 78; Yushchenko, Victor and, 74, 76; and Ukrainian-Canadian community, 119 Ouellet, André (Canadian minister of foreign affairs), 38, 39, 43 Parizeau, Jacques (leader of the Parti Québécois), 18–19 Peterson, Jim (Canadian minister for international trade), 77–8 Petryshyn, Roman (academic), 89 Pettigrew, Pierre (Canadian minister of foreign affairs), 71, 65, 72 Poland, 24, 52 Putin, Vladimir (president of Russia), 94, 99, 104, 105, 120, 124 Quebec, 21, 31, 69, 132n9; separatism, 4, 16, 18–19, 26, 107, 111, 127

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Index 157

Rae, Bob (premier of Ontario), 18–19 regionalism: Axworthy, Lloyd on, 32–3; and Mulroney government, 11, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 37, 50, 110, 111 Robinson, Andrew (Canadian ambassador to Ukraine), 68 Romanow, Roy (premier of Saskatchewan), 43 Russia, 27, 81, 91, 93, 98, 102, 110, 122; aid to, 30; aggression and pressure, 6–7, 80, 86–7, 88, 94, 96, 102–3, 104, 105, 119, 120, 123, 125; and Euromaidan, 80, 99; Kuchma and, 56; and Soviet break-up, 17–18, 19, 28, 31, 39; sanctions against, 103, 124; security guarantees, 41, 80, 111; and 2005 Ukrainian elections, 66, 68, 70; Yanukovych and, 99–100. See also Putin, Vladimir Science and Technology Center, 29 Southern, Ed (honourary consul of Ukraine), 62 Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, 57, 69, 96, 97 Sushko, Orysia (U CC president), 60, 72, 73, 85 Trudeau, Pierre Elliott (prime minister of Canada), 3–5 Tymoshenko, Yulia (Ukrainian politician): as opposition leader, 87, 88, 89, 119; as prime minister, 79; as prisoner, 90, 97, 98

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Udovenko, Hennadiy (Ukrainian foreign minister), 47, 48 Ukraine: corruption in, 8, 11, 49, 50, 52, 61, 62, 79, 83, 84, 86, 92, 121; and reforms, 7, 27, 37, 42, 45, 46, 48, 51, 52, 54, 62, 78, 109, 112–14, 121, 148n8; trade with, 7, 29, 38, 43–8, 50, 52, 62–3, 76–7, 88, 91–2, 100, 111– 13. See also denuclearization; Euromaidan; independence of Ukraine; Kuchma, Leonid; Yanukovych, Victor; Yushchenko, Victor Ukrainian-Canadian community, 19, 20, 32, 37, 93, 129; and Chrétien government, 112, 113; and criticism of Ukraine, 8; and department of external affairs, 21; and electoral observer missions, 73, 116, 118; and Harper government, 15, 79, 81, 121; and Heinbecker, Paul, 101; and Ignatieff, Michael, 78; influence of, 8–9, 11, 12, 63, 76, 81, 114, 128, 151n30; and Kuchma, Leonid, 36–7, 42; and Martin government, 59, 60, 62–3, 116, 117; and Westdal, Christopher, 93, 101–2; and Yanukovych, Victor, 90. See also aid and assistance; independence of Ukraine; Chrétien, Jean; Harper, Stephen; Martin, Paul; Ukrainian Canadian Congress Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UC C ), 14, 53, 59, 60, 65, 67, 73, 76, 81, 83, 105, 135n40; on C IDA , 57; and Mackay, Peter, 84; and Manley, John, 55; before

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Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, 57, 96; and 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections, 63–4, 65, 117, 118. See also Balan, Jars; Canada-Ukraine Partners Program; Clarkson, Adrienne; Sushko, Orysia; Grod, Paul Ukrainian Canadian Professional and Business Federation (U CPB), 55 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (US S R ), 3–5, 10, 15–19, 25, 31, 107, 108, 110, 120, 132n9. See also Gorbachev, Mikhail United States, 21, 30, 31, 39, 41, 50, 53, 66, 70, 72, 90, 120, 123. See also Bush, George H.W.; Bush, George W.

Wrzesnewskyj, Borys (Liberal member of parliament), 66, 90

Westdal, Christopher (Canadian ambassador to Ukraine), 48, 81, 93–4, 101, 102, 122

Zlenko, Anatloiy (Ukrainian foreign minister), 27, 35, 36, 38, 54–5

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Yanukovych, Victor (Ukrainian politician): and Euromaidan, 80, 99–100; as opposition leader, 79, 85, 88; as president, 83, 89, 90, 91, 98, 121; and 2005 presidential election, 66, 68, 74; as prime minister, 56, 61–2 Yushchenko, Victor (Ukrainian ­politician): meeting with Martin, Paul, 77; as opposition leader, 55–6, 62; as president, 74, 83, 85, 87, 88; and 2005 presidential election, 68, 74; as prime minister, 53–4; and Tymoshenko, Yulia, 79, 87, 119

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