Africa-US Relations: Strategic Encounters 9781626372030

Citation preview

R-FM1

3/17/06

10:44 AM

Page i

Africa- US Relations

R-FM1

3/17/06

10:44 AM

Page ii

R-FM1

3/17/06

10:44 AM

Page iii

Africa-US R elations STRATEGIC ENCOUNTERS

edited by

Donald Rothchild and Edmond J. Keller

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

R-FM1

8/2/06

3:56 PM

Page iv

Paperback edition published in the United States of America in 2006 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU Published in hardcover in 2006. © 2006 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved ISBN 1-58826-501-3 (pbk. : alk. paper) Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

R-FM1

3/17/06

10:44 AM

Page v

CONTENTS

Preface

1

vii

Africa and the United States: Meeting the Challenges of Globalization, Edmond J. Keller

Part 1

1

Confronting Security Challenges

2

African Peacekeeping, Severine Rugumamu

23

3

A Strategic Approach to Terrorism, Princeton N. Lyman

49

4

US Intervention in Africa’s Ethnic Conflicts: The Scope for Action, Donald Rothchild and Nikolas Emmanuel

65

The Special Case of the Horn of Africa, Ruth Iyob and Edmond J. Keller

99

5

Part 2

Confronting Societal Challenges

6

Human Security, Caroline Thomas

125

7

HIV/AIDS in Africa, Sandra F. Joireman

147

8

Foreign Interests and Environmental Degradation, Cyril I. Obi

167

Part 3

9 10

Confronting Economic Challenges

Debt and Debt Relief, Thomas M. Callaghy

191

Aid and Trade Policies: Shifting the Debate, Fantu Cheru

217

v

R-FM1

3/17/06

10:44 AM

Page vi

vi

CONTENTS

Part 4

11

Conclusion

Trends in US-Africa Relations: Implications for the Future, Donald Rothchild

List of Acronyms Selected Bibliography The Contributors Index About the Book

245

269 273 279 283 299

R-FM1

3/17/06

10:44 AM

Page vii

PREFACE

T

his volume had its genesis in intellectual exchanges between its editors over the past three years about the need to consider Africa-US relations, particularly as they relate to the concept of “security,” in the early stages of the twenty-first century. This is an era characterized by profound economic, social, political, cultural, and technological changes taking place on a global scale—an era in which much scholarly rethinking of the meaning of security is occurring. No longer can security be thought of simply in geostrategic terms. Instead, the concept must be broadened to include a human dimension, that is, “human security.” To be sure, the geostrategic aspect of security continues to be a legitimate concern for scholars and policymakers alike; yet, it is necessary that this conceptualization be complemented by a perspective that centers on personal well-being. In a very real way, state security is dependent on human security—on whether citizens feel personally secure and protected. The concept of human security incorporates the assumption that such issues as poverty, the spread of communicable diseases, environmental degradation, underdevelopment, and economic crisis are critically important to all of humankind. The chapters in this volume reflect this thinking. We greatly appreciate the efforts of the chapter authors, as well as the special contributions of John Harbeson, Rita Kiki Edozee, Kidane Mangisteab, Charisma Acey, and Lako Tongun. We are also especially appreciative of the assistance of graduate students who provided valuable feedback and research assistance on early versions of the chapters; they include Lahra Smith, Jennifer de Maio, and Kim George at UCLA, and Nikolas Emmanuel, Monti Datta, Marc Scarcelli, and Camille Sumner at UC-Davis. We are greatly indebted to the staff of the Globalization Research Center–Africa at UCLA, headed by Charisma Acey and supported by Dena Montegue and Tala Rezai, and to the James S. Coleman African Studies Center and the International Institute, also at UCLA. Our very spevii

R-FM1

3/17/06

viii

10:44 AM

Page viii

PREFACE

cial thanks go to Lynne Rienner for her careful handling of the review process and her sage advice on critically important editorial matters. Last but certainly not least, we are deeply grateful to our spouses, Genny Keller and Edith Rothchild, for their unwavering support of this project and our professional activities generally. This book could not have been completed without the generous help of all these individuals and more. —Donald Rothchild and Edmond J. Keller

R-1

3/17/06

10:45 AM

Page 1

1 Africa and the United States: Meeting the Challenges of Globalization EDMOND J. KELLER

T

he onset of the current period of globalization seems to have been coterminous with the ending of the Cold War. Since the early 1990s, the world has witnessed profound changes in economic relations; in the use of various forms of transportation; and in medical, electronic, and satellite technology, all of which have served to bring the various parts of the world closer together. At a very fundamental level, what we mean when we use the term globalization is an increase in worldwide interconnectedness.1 In many ways it is a good thing, in that it can serve to accelerate the pace at which countries of the developing world are able to address their problems relating to governance and human rights, economic development, poverty reduction, various health scourges such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, and human security in general. At the same time, these changes have served to expose the challenges facing countries like the ones we find in Africa, as well as their vulnerabilities. For example, at the same time that African countries have been drawn in as independent competitors in the world economic system, the rules of the game have changed. Regional trading blocs, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), European Union (EU), and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and virtual economies have emerged, with African countries finding themselves threatened with rapid marginalization. The challenge facing African leaders was to accept this fate passively or to gear up to protect their countries’ positions in the globalization process.2 In other words, the most serious challenge presented by the process of globalization for Africa was to find ways to engage it and make it work for their betterment. On the African continent today, debate continues over the merits of the globalization process. Some argue that the negative aspects of the process far outweigh the positives for Africa’s peoples. The concern over the nega1

R-1

3/17/06

2

10:45 AM

Page 2

AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

tives of globalization has created strange bedfellows from the left and the right, from advanced industrialized countries on the one hand to nonindustrialized countries of the third world on the other. A good example of such critical alliances could be seen in protest groups that have emerged to raise the consciousness of leaders in the World Trade Organization (WTO) about the unfair advantage rich countries have over poor ones when it comes to setting rules and regulations relating to international trade. The WTO, among other things, is dedicated to setting the terms by which countries participate in worldwide trade. Countries that belong to the organization must give up a certain amount of their sovereignty in setting economic policy so as to harmonize trade processes throughout the world. Some observers see that as a good thing, but others are very afraid of what they see as a drift toward one world government, a government that is out of reach and unaccountable to citizens of countries most affected by decisions taken by the WTO.3 This view is held especially in poor countries such as the ones we find in Africa. The general argument made by globalization opponents in poor countries is that it creates more losers than winners.4 The broad challenge that African countries face is to produce more winners than losers. Africa and the United States are both integral to the new international order. They have developed an interdependent relationship. They both need each other as markets, and the United States needs such critical African natural resources as petroleum and the continent’s partnership in the fight against international terrorism. Africa needs US development assistance in all areas, its technological know-how, and its technological assets. The question facing both Africa and the United States in this newest era of globalization is: How will they relate? What adjustments in their relationships will be made to accommodate the interests of both African countries and the United States? Will it be business as usual, with African countries in the position of dependent supplicants, or will a relationship emerge that is akin to a genuine partnership? Of course, Africa would prefer the latter, but can it ensure that result? That is certainly the hope of the newly formed African Union (AU), as well as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Will the United States be able to balance its traditional foreign policy based on its perceived vital national interests with the real need to broaden and deepen interstate cooperation to include, as equals, some of the poorest and least developed countries in the world? These are questions we will address in this volume. This chapter is intended to frame the analyses provided in the chapters that follow by providing a historical perspective on US foreign policy interests in Africa, particularly with respect to the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations; to outline African interests; and to do so within the context of five major challenges the continent now faces.

R-1

3/17/06

10:45 AM

Page 3

AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

3

Background to a Changing Relationship Africa has never been central to US foreign policy. Although some US involvement in the continent can be traced to 1789, official US attitudes and policies toward Africa have been marked by at worst indifference and at best neglect. Africa was historically treated as a backwater in official policymaking circles, as measured by the time and resources allocated to Africa in comparison with other regions of the world.5 The United States established an independent Liberia on the west coast of Africa in the 1840s as a possible resettlement option for freed slaves and others of African descent residing in the United States but exerted little effort to treat Liberia as an official US colony. However, the United States displayed an economic interest in opening up the Liberian interior and its natural resources to US businesses such as the Firestone Rubber Company. Some observers have noted that US policies toward Africa have historically followed a “hands off” approach, that is, until the onset of the Cold War.6 During the Cold War, US foreign policy makers defined its vital national interest as fighting and containing communism wherever it appeared. In pursuit of this vital interest, a consistent axiom of US foreign policy has been, “We have no permanent friends or enemies, but only permanent interests.” This attitude could clearly be seen in the policies of the United States toward modern Africa. When the United States believed it could benefit in a geostrategic or material manner by “engaging” or “disengaging” with one or another African country, it took the necessary steps to do so.7 As Ruth Iyob and I elaborate in Chapter 5, prior to the onset of the Cold War, the only significant presence the United States had in sub-Saharan Africa was in Ethiopia, but at the height of the Cold War, US interests shifted toward countering the Soviet Union’s attempt to secure a physical presence in the Africa region, and in the process its key alliances favored the countries surrounding pro-Soviet Ethiopia. In 1957, for example, then vice president Richard Nixon traveled for twenty-two days around the African continent to assess whether the United States needed to pay more attention to Africa in light of the growing divisions between East and West after the onset of the Cold War. On his return home, Nixon recommended that President Dwight D. Eisenhower create a separate Africa Bureau within the State Department. Within the US government, concerns about the possible vulnerability of Africa to the spread of communism intensified under the Kennedy administration.8 However, this new attention did not amount to more than monitoring situations; most countries in Africa received no great outpouring of material or military assistance. Partly in an effort to head off the penetration of communism into mineral-rich Congo-Kinshasa (later Zaire and now the Democratic Republic of

R-1

3/17/06

4

10:45 AM

Page 4

AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

Congo, or DRC) and southern Africa, the United States developed special relationships with Congo-Kinshasa and South Africa. Congo-Kinshasa came to be characterized by the brutal kleptocratic dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko. For geostrategic reasons, however, the United States tolerated Mobutu and his excesses and did what it felt it had to do to keep him in power, at least until the mid-1990s.9 A US Cold War anticommunist stratagem could also be found in southern Africa, where the apartheid regime in South Africa often publicly proclaimed race relations an internal affair, and the most important objective of US policy was to assist South Africa in containing communism in the region. President Jimmy Carter attempted to put pressure on South Africa to reform its regime in the late 1970s. Then, when President Ronald Reagan assumed office, he followed a policy of quiet diplomacy toward South Africa under the rubric of “constructive engagement.” While the United States often complained about the immorality of the apartheid system of separation of the races and separate development, it was not until the late 1980s, and then under the leadership of the US Congress (which debated and then passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986) that real pressure on the apartheid government and direct US support for South African civil society began to have a noticeable effect.10 In sum, beginning with the Cold War, the United States followed a policy of “selective engagement” toward Africa.11 It selectively engaged those countries where it felt US national interests were involved. Nowhere was this truer than in Ethiopia. Suffice it to say for the moment that in the 1970s the Soviet Union proclaimed the Brezhnev Doctrine, a policy designed to support fledgling socialist states throughout the third world. The most immediate targets of this policy were countries such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Yemen, Angola, and Mozambique. As a consequence, the focus of US containment strategy in Africa shifted once again. This was not a shift in purpose but in clients. Also, this change was mainly noticeable in the Horn of Africa. The Carter administration came to pursue an encirclement strategy in the Horn, designed to woo Ethiopia’s neighbors with military and economic development aid. Kenya, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Oman were asked to allow their territories to be used as staging grounds for a rapid deployment force (RDF) that could project US military power into the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Agreements were also signed that called for joint military exercises involving US military personnel and that of its new clients.12 By the late 1980s, the Soviet Union reconsidered the pursuit of the Brezhnev Doctrine, resulting in its strategic withdrawal from support of African clients. Initially, the US administration of President George H. W. Bush vacillated between a policy of disengagement and selective engagement with Africa. It allowed the State Department’s Africa Bureau to attempt to find political solutions in African conflict areas such as Liberia and the Horn of Africa. Officially, however, most US efforts were aimed at

R-1

3/17/06

10:45 AM

Page 5

AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

5

promoting and supporting democratic forces throughout the continent, although relatively modest amounts of material support were devoted to such purposes. Herman J. Cohen, Bush’s assistant secretary of state for African affairs, was instrumental in negotiating the demise of the Marxist regime in Ethiopia and establishing in its stead a successor regime headed by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).13 In addition, Cohen was able to get the EPRDF to agree not to oppose a referendum on Eritrean independence. However, he was less successful in Liberia, in part attributable to Libya’s support of rebel forces aiming to topple the USbacked regime of President Samuel K. Doe. These troops seriously challenged the peacekeeping forces of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Despite Cohen’s initiatives, the overall thrust of George H. W. Bush’s approach to Africa was one of selective disengagement.14 One dramatic exception was the human catastrophe in Somalia. In this case, growing concern over its drought and famine prompted Bush in December 1992 to send US troops to lead the humanitarian mission to Somalia authorized by the UN. From a humanitarian perspective, this policy was a good one, but as the UN-sponsored Operation Restore Hope proceeded, politics increasingly impinged on the humanitarian mission. The climax of this intervention for the United States came in October 1993, less than ten months into the Clinton administration, when eighteen US soldiers were killed in Mogadishu.15 The immediate response of the Clinton administration was to move back into a cautious mode of disengagement. Within less than six months, it became clear to the Clinton team that Cold War assumptions and rationales would not work for the administration in Africa. In April 1994 the genocide in Rwanda erupted. This event highlighted the fact that the lack of a proactive Africa policy would leave the United States unprepared to respond effectively to international crises within Africa. President Bill Clinton decided that, at least on his watch, the United States would not be taken by surprise and would not be guilty of neglecting potentially explosive situations such as that which occurred in Rwanda. Toward this end, he created three new institutions in his government: the Office of the Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues16; the Atrocities Prevention Interagency Working Group17; and the African Crisis Response Initiative, which was designed to build African capacity for peacekeeping with US assistance.18

Clinton’s Partnership with Africa From this point on, it became clear that the Clinton administration was committed to a new partnership with Africa. This approach caused some

R-1

3/17/06

6

10:45 AM

Page 6

AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

controversy within the administration, but the dominant voices favored this new approach. To show this new commitment, in June 1994 the administration held the first White House Conference on Africa. It was the beginning of efforts to look at Africa from a broad perspective rather than on a selective, case-by-case basis. At this conference, President Clinton proclaimed that it was the policy of his administration “to unleash the human potential of the people of the African continent in ways that [will] lead to a safer and more prosperous world. A better life for them and a better life for us.”19 In 1995 the administration demonstrated what this new policy might mean, applying serious pressure on the autocratic regimes in Sudan and Nigeria to submit to reform. Also in that year, late commerce secretary Ron Brown led a large US private and public sector delegation to the African–African American Summit in Senegal. Brown went on to announce that the United States was going to construct economic relationships with Africa through an invigorated emphasis on trade and investment. In the following year, the administration launched the first substantive engagement with Congress on the proposed African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). However, not until Clinton’s second term did this “new partnership” begin to take clear form.20 Madeleine Albright replaced Warren Christopher as secretary of state, and Susan Rice succeeded George Moose as assistant secretary of state for African affairs. Rice was a political appointee rather than a career foreign service officer, and she seemed more able to think creatively. Her approach fit well with what Clinton wanted to do in Africa. Following the untimely death of Commerce Secretary Brown, Clinton demonstrated that he would actively attempt to implement the economic and trade strategies that Brown had envisioned. The president went on to launch a sweeping economic policy initiative to accelerate Africa’s integration into the global economy—the President’s Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa. The approach came to involve all government agencies concerned with commerce and economic policy. Following an initial visit to Africa by First Lady Hillary Clinton in 1997, almost every cabinet officer also traveled to the region. Under the leadership of Assistant Secretary Rice, the administration pursued a two-pronged strategy to increase the importance of Africa as a trading and strategic partner. First, it sought to accelerate Africa’s integration into the global economy by promoting economic development, democracy, respect for human rights, and conflict prevention and resolution. Second, it sought to address security threats emanating from Africa, including terrorism, international crime, trafficking in drugs, and illicit arms. In 1998, President Clinton made his first visit to Africa, launching a number of new initiatives associated with his Partnership for Economic

R-1

3/17/06

10:45 AM

Page 7

AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

7

Growth and Opportunity. However, in that same year, the security threats faced by Africa and the United States in Africa were brought fully to the fore when the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya were bombed by terrorists in August, killing 253 people. In addition, a border dispute erupted between Eritrea and Ethiopia; the civil war in Angola resumed; and a civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo escalated, eventually involving seven African countries supporting either the government of the DRC or its opponents. What began as a ray of hope for Clinton’s new partnership turned into a dark shadow as many parts of Africa fell into chaos. Yet as his administration wound down, Clinton continued to push his African agenda. In 1999 he supported and participated in the National Summit on Africa. In 2000 the Clinton administration designed and executed the first-ever “Month of Africa” at the UN hosted by US ambassador Richard Holbrooke. Also in 2000, the administration shepherded the approval of the African Growth and Opportunity Act through Congress. As he left office, Clinton signed the Global AIDS and Tuberculosis Relief Act.

George W. Bush and Africa The rhetoric of the current Bush administration as far as Africa is concerned does not differ much from that of the Clinton administration, but it is clear that this administration has a much narrower view of US national security interests than that of its predecessor. A Bush administration policy document states: In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the U.S.—preserving human dignity—and our strategic priority—combating global terror. American interests and American principles, therefore, lead in the same direction: we will work with others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace and growing prosperity.21

In other words, realist principles are paramount, but some moral considerations might serve those interests and therefore should be pursued. For example, prior to his 2003 visit to Africa, Bush announced a $15 billion package to tackle the African AIDS pandemic, and in 2004 the administration inaugurated the $1 billion Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). The MCA is intended to increase US foreign aid to Africa by 50 percent by 2007. The countries selected to benefit from the account will be those that meet certain economic and political criteria.22 The Bush administration’s Africa policy is said to comprise three interlocking strategies for the region:

R-1

3/17/06

8

10:45 AM

Page 8

AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

• First, countries with a major impact in their neighborhood, such as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia, are seen as anchors for regional engagement and require focused attention. It is obvious that South Africa and Nigeria are seen as major players because of their size and economic significance. Ethiopia and Kenya are valued mainly for their strategic importance in the so-called war on terrorism. • Second, the Bush administration seeks coordination with allies, friends, and international institutions. It is seen as essential for constructive conflict mediation and successful peace operations. • Third, Africa’s capable and reforming states and subregional organizations are seen as being in need of strengthening as the primary means to address transnational threats on a sustained basis. The administration believes that if Africans are capable of fulfilling such a role, it is less likely that the United States will be drawn directly into solving African problems. In short, the Bush administration sees its Africa policy as being strategic in approach, with clear priorities of supporting subregional organizations; engaging the newly created African Union; combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which is an international security issue; and promoting good governance, economic reform, health, and education. What is most important about the current Africa policy is how it is driven by neorealist considerations of national interests. For example, Bush has threatened to withhold military assistance to some thirty-five countries that refused to sign an agreement with the United States exempting Americans from prosecution before the International Criminal Court. As of 2003 only four African countries, Gabon, Gambia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone, had consented to this agreement, but Nigeria and South Africa had not. The refusal of the last two is significant because Nigeria has oil and South Africa is the most industrialized country on the African continent, possessing a robust economy. In addition to Nigeria, at least twenty-two African countries have oil, which makes them of particular interest to the United States. African oil currently accounts for 15 percent of US imported oil, and that amount is expected to jump to 25 percent in the next decade.23 Another important fact to consider is that only three African countries are members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Those countries that are not members of the cartel may be more agreeable to striking deals with the United States, which could be particularly important given the ongoing crisis in the Middle East. In the process of deepening an economic relationship with Africa, the United States hopes to enhance its ability to fight international terrorism. At the same time, in a demonstration of its reluctance to rely solely on economic power, the United States exercises caution by committing its troops to Djibouti and other countries.

R-1

3/17/06

10:45 AM

Page 9

AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

9

The Bush administration’s handling of the Liberian crisis provides another indication that Bush has placed narrowly defined national security interests ahead of any other considerations in formulating US policy on Africa. Bush applied public political pressure on President Charles Taylor to step aside in Liberia, but despite the historical connections between the United States and Liberia, he committed a small number of US peacekeepers and then only very briefly. Instead, he provided monetary and other support for Nigeria to take a lead peacekeeping role, in keeping with the administration’s desire to assist African states in leading regional peacekeeping efforts.

Africa and Globalization: Where Does It Want to Be? In the broadest sense, the primary challenge that African countries face is to produce more winners than losers. The challenge is complex and formidable, and to meet it, African governments and African peoples must take note and act accordingly. More specifically, from a policy perspective, this book considers five major areas of challenge: (1) the HIV/AIDS pandemic; (2) the debt crisis, along with trade issues; (3) human security and development; (4) domestic and regional conflicts; and (5) democracy and human rights. At a fundamental level, poverty and poorly developed systems of education on the continent affect all these policy areas, and that is implied in whatever I say here. Let us look at each of these policy areas separately.

The HIV/AIDS Pandemic Nowhere is the HIV/AIDS crisis as devastating as in Africa. As Sandra F. Joireman notes in Chapter 7 and Donald Rothchild in Chapter 11, in 2003 the disease affected 25 to 26 million people on the continent. Infection rates for the disease in adults in Africa range from as high as 39 percent in Botswana to as low as 0.1 percent in Mauritius. The average for subSaharan Africa is 9 percent for all adults. Nearly 70 percent of all adults infected with HIV can be found in Africa, and 80 percent of the affected children worldwide are located in Africa. Since 1980, 5–10 million adults have been infected, and the disease has spread four times as fast in Africa as in other parts of the world. In 2001 alone, 2.2 million Africans succumbed to the disease.24 The HIV/AIDS pandemic and its almost uncontrollable nature run rampant in resource-poor African countries, which are unable to devote the kind of massive resources needed to prevent, treat, and bring the disease under control. A recent study estimates that in 1997, public health spending for AIDS alone exceeded 2 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in

R-1

3/17/06

10

10:45 AM

Page 10

AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

seven of sixteen African countries sampled, a staggering figure considering that total spending for health on the continent is between 3 and 5 percent of GDP.25 Whatever is spent is not enough. In addition, trade barriers make it difficult for African countries to purchase cheaper generic drugs for treating their HIV/AIDS-affected populations. The public health challenge facing Africa, then, is to bring this dreaded disease under control. Signs point to steps taken in this direction. For instance, Senegal and Uganda have been singled out for their exemplary AIDS education, prevention, and treatment projects. Tanzania is poised to follow suit. Moreover, countries have sounded a worldwide AIDS alert that views the AIDS pandemic as a threat to their own national security. Governments in Europe and the United States are committing resources that can be used to combat the problem in Africa. The UN and nongovernmental organization (NGO) groups such as the Global AIDS Alliance have taken a major lead. Although in his 2003 State of the Union address President Bush committed $15 billion to fight AIDS in Africa and the Caribbean, this pledge seems far from having any immediate benefit for the countries in Africa with the most need.26 AIDS is not only the major health challenge facing African leaders but also a major social and human security challenge.

The Debt Crisis and Trade Issues Africa is a continent mired in debt (see Chapter 9 by Thomas Callaghy in this volume). The fact that African countries must devote so much of their annual GDP to debt servicing and repayment reduces the amount available for tackling such social problems as communicable diseases, poverty, and underdevelopment. Rich countries, wanting to create conditions conducive to the expansion of trade, have recently realized that for them to penetrate the untapped economies of the third world, they must help poor countries reduce their debt burden. In 1996 the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) launched a project to help poor countries address their debt crises. This project, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, initially targeted forty-one countries (thirty-three in Africa) for debt relief. The first countries to receive assistance under the plan (for example, Uganda and Mozambique) realized almost immediate benefit. HIPC freed up resources that could be used to tackle some of their most pressing problems, such as in the areas of public health and social and economic development. Although eighteen of the thirty-three African countries have benefited from this assistance, critics claim that such aid is too little too late and advocate bolder measures.27 As Fantu Cheru discusses in Chapter 10, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, a centerpiece of both the Clinton and current Bush administrations, also addresses Africa’s position in the global economy. The act is

R-1

3/17/06

10:45 AM

Page 11

AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

11

intended to open the US market more fully to African exports. Thirty-eight African countries may participate in this program, but only twenty-two have ever exported anything under AGOA. Eighty-one percent of African exports in 2004 came from only seven countries (Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Angola, South Africa, and Nigeria). In 2004, oil accounted for 73 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s total exports to the United States, followed by nonpetroleum mineral resources, mainly platinum and diamonds at about 9 percent, and apparel at 4.9 percent.28 African countries want a dramatic increase in trade with the United States and are inhibited by protectionist US policies and the restrictive quotas it places on African imports. Now African countries must not only increase debt relief and gain more favorable terms of trade in the international marketplace but also manage their resources wisely so as to advance their developmental objectives.

Human Security and Development The IMF projected that the economies of sub-Saharan Africa would grow by 5.6 percent in 2006, and they did, up from a rate of 5.2 percent in 2005. Even though these figures seem robust and promising, these rates of growth are well below what would be needed for African countries to develop fully and alleviate poverty. Moreover, the forecasters stress that almost all African countries remain highly vulnerable to changes in primary commodity prices. As a result, growth will be largely concentrated in oil-producing countries expected to benefit from high prices for years to come. Export prices for most primary products, such as coffee and other agricultural products, are expected to remain low. At a fundamental level, the challenge facing the countries of Africa can be subsumed under the rubric of “human security” (see Chapter 6 by Caroline Thomas). Traditionally, the concept of “security” has been couched in neorealist terms relating to protecting the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of nations. That continues to be a legitimate concern for scholars and policymakers alike, but at the current state of human development it is clear that an alternative or even complementary conception of security needs to assume critical importance. In the strictest sense, the security of states depends on whether their citizens feel unthreatened. The world offers ample evidence today that political instability can easily cross borders, undermining national, regional, and even international security. A conceptualization of security centered primarily on the individual or community can be understood as human security. This notion grows from the assumption that human beings have common needs, problems, and issues no matter what part of the world they live in (that is, poverty, the spread of communicable diseases, environmental degradation, the loss of faith in

R-1

3/17/06

12

10:45 AM

Page 12

AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

institutions, population pressures, and economic crisis). It is imperative that we view these concerns in terms of global trends and forces that affect the individual. These trends include such processes as the depletion of nonrenewable resources; drug trafficking; human trafficking; the rapid spread of communications technology; the rampant growth of capitalist markets with no controls to avoid the excesses of the capitalists; poverty, inequality, and human misery; and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In Chapter 8, Cyril Obi highlights the close relationship between virtually unregulated oil exploitation, environmental degradation, and abject poverty. Chapter 5 addresses environmental forces, bad policies, and poverty within the context of food insecurity. Human security, then, primarily relates to the safety and well-being of people everywhere, including Africa. It has been found that a sense of insecurity among certain groups invariably leads to group conflict and political instability. The threats involved may relate to the physical well-being of individuals and groups, but they might also—and often do—involve a perception that values are being threatened. Although this list does not exhaust the range of issues that relate to the human security dilemma in Africa today, it gives a good indication of the scope and intensity of the problem. As in the past, African states are attempting to reverse the tide of human insecurity. Various mechanisms designed to do so are either now in place or on the drawing board (e.g., the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Resolution, the African Union, and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development). It remains to be seen, however, whether Africa can solve its human security problems alone. Some observers insist that given the global dimensions of the human security problem, global actors must become committed to its resolution. In other words, rich countries like the United States should step up their efforts to tackle poverty (defined as negative development or development in reverse) in Africa.29 Reversing this trend would increase the ability of African countries to help themselves and participate more fully in the global economy. Such a change would help African security as well as security in the world at large. The World Bank and other multilateral and bilateral aid agencies are now paying more attention than in the recent past to the need to attack poverty while still pursuing the objectives of spreading the market and encouraging free trade.30 They are providing new monies for nutrition and family health projects, for governmental efficiency promotion and capacity building, and for tackling various forms of corruption. These measures tend to have wide support in the donor community, which is good for African development. It must be acknowledged, however, that Africa’s recipient countries continue to be unhappy with the conditions that accompany developmental assistance, even when the aims of these conditionalities are well intentioned. Such development assistance is seen in many African circles as

R-1

3/17/06

10:45 AM

Page 13

AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

13

smacking of outside control and orchestration, rather than the result of autocentric development decisionmaking on the part of Africans themselves. In addition to being generally afraid of the possible negative effects of globalization, African leaders have viewed AGOA with mixed emotions. It does open up the US market for some African products, but there is a consensus among African leaders that not enough markets have been opened. It does create the possibility of increasing amounts of direct foreign investments in their economies by US firms. But unless the countries that stand to benefit can reform their education systems, increase their levels of technological capacity, and improve the investment climate for foreign firms, there will be no economic takeoff. The challenge, then, is for African governments and business communities to create a culture of entrepreneurship and commitment to local and regional development in their general populations. But a blot on the landscape is the threat of international terror, a strategic political challenge to human and national security of equal concern to Africa and the United States (see Chapter 3 by Princeton Lyman in this book).31 The vulnerability of African countries to international terrorism was made abundantly clear in 1998 with the bombing of US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. Those events were followed by similar incidents in Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. The September 11, 2001, plane hijacking and bombing of the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in the Washington, DC, area made it clear that an international network of terrorists violently opposed US culture and values and its dominant role in world affairs. Poor countries friendly to the United States but with relatively weak security systems are most vulnerable to international terror. The United States has a vital interest in strengthening the military and intelligence capacities of poor countries like the ones we find in Africa. For their part, African countries could measurably improve their ability to solve problems of peace and security with the aid of the United States.

Domestic and Regional Conflict The period since 1995 has witnessed ever-increasing incidents of intense conflict on the African continent. Sierra Leone endured a civil war involving rebel groups opposed to a democratically elected government. Coups and a civil war erupted in the historically peaceful Côte d’Ivoire. Rebel groups across the subregion organized their own militias and paid for them through the illicit trade in diamonds and other natural resources drawn from enclave economies.32 In the case of Sierra Leone, the world community attempted to impose sanctions on this practice, but with very little positive effect. Also, a UN peacekeeping force was dispatched to bring the situation

R-1

3/17/06

14

10:45 AM

Page 14

AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

under control, but a semblance of order was not restored until Britain decided to commit “boots on the ground” with orders to “root out the bad guys.”33 Similarly, France committed its military to Côte d’Ivoire to attempt to stabilize the situation there. However, in both countries, the peace is tenuous. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the bankrupt government of the now-deceased Laurent Kabila enlisted the aid of the neighboring states of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe in an effort to resist the attempts of numerous opposition groups, aided and abetted by forces from Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda, to overthrow his government. Rather than a decisive victory, a stalemate resulted. The UN eventually brokered a cease-fire and peace talks among the warring parties and dispatched a peacekeeping force of 10,800, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Mission de l’Organization des Nations Unies en République Démocratiqe du Congo, MONUC) to the eastern region of the country. However, those numbers are small, given the size of the country and its widespread population. A transitional constitution went into effect in April 2003.34 In Sudan, a civil war pitting the Arab-Muslim north against the largely non-Arab, largely Christian, and animist south is finally on the verge of ending. The UN has not directly intervened, but the subregional organization, the Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD), made an effort to broker a peace that eventually began to bear fruit toward the end of 2002. The problem there is exacerbated by the Khartoum government being propped up by corporate profits from the exploitation of oil fields. For its part, the opposition Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) was able to hold its own and forced a mutually hurtful stalemate to develop. Complicating the civil war between the north and the south was the eruption of another war front in the western region of Darfur between African Muslims and Arab Muslims.35 The government of Sudan, with the aid of 20,000 militiamen (Janjaweed) that it recruited, armed, and sponsored, is engaged in a scorched-earth policy and ethnic cleansing in the form of forced migration. The world community has attempted to apply various forms of pressure, even threatening to withdraw support for the peace agreement between the SPLAM and the central government, but these measures have had no effect. Consequently, Sudan may sink deeper and deeper into political instability. In the eastern part of the Horn of Africa, a devastating border conflict has festered between Ethiopia and Eritrea since the summer of 1998. What was unusual and ominous about this conflict is that it was as high-tech a war as Africa has ever seen. Some of the most modern military hardware available today was employed by both sides. The question is, does this situation have any implications for the future? In a very short time, Eritrea grew

R-1

3/17/06

10:45 AM

Page 15

AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

15

its small army to 250,000, and Ethiopia expanded its armed forces to 350,000. Both sides bought and bartered for sophisticated weapons from wherever they could get them—tanks, aircrafts, and anti-aircraft equipment.36 It is estimated that at the height of this conflict, which lasted for only about a year, Ethiopia was spending about a million dollars a day to maintain the war effort, amounting to between $2.9 and $3.1 billion.37 It is impossible to calculate how much in dollar terms the war cost Eritrea. However, there is little doubt that the cost was considerable, despite the fact that the per capita income of both countries is among the lowest in the world. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) brokered a peace in 2000, and the UN established the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), a peacekeeping mission that has been occupying a buffer zone between the two countries. It also set up the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC). In April 2002, the commission issued its report. Even though both sides had agreed to accept the findings of the EEBC as binding, Ethiopia refused to do so, and a stalemate has developed in the final demarcation of the border zone.38 A recent World Bank report shows clearly that domestic and regional conflicts in Africa have blunted and reversed growth prospects for all Africa’s war-torn countries.39 The challenge is for African leaders to move away from war and toward peace and thereby create an environment conducive to development. The UN and the OAU, along with bilateral aid agencies, spend a good deal of time trying to figure out how to keep the peace in Africa, but very little time has yet to be devoted to making and building peace. That is the challenge, to create social and economic conditions and institutions that steer countries away from both internal and regional wars.

Democracy and Human Rights For the foreseeable future, the prospects for further democratization of African countries are mixed. Since 1990, we have seen the mushrooming of multiparty systems and elections that have been at least nominally democratic. However, for just as many countries as have had successful “second democratic elections,” that is, elections that demonstrate progress toward democratic consolidation, we have also seen places where democratic reversals or incumbent elites have perverted the democratic process.40 For example, in Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe in 2000, flawed elections led directly to protracted civil strife. In Kenya, although the National Rainbow Coalition was able to loosen the grip of the Kenya African National Union on the reins of government in 2002, it has been unable to agree on a new constitution that would give more authority to parliament than the presidency.

R-1

3/17/06

10:45 AM

16

Page 16

AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

Elections in Senegal in March 2000, Mauritius in September, and Ghana in December each resulted in peaceful transfers of power, and that is a good sign. But it is hard to say for sure that Africa will not return to autocracy. At the same time, ironically, it is because of the forces of globalization that one can optimistically say that it is likely that Africa’s future will be continually in the direction of more democracy. The growth in the links between domestic civil society groups in Africa and similar groups throughout the world, as well as advances in information technology and the growing emphasis on the need for a free press in Africa, are creating environments in which democracy and human rights can take root. These words, democracy and human rights, are on the lips of everyone in Africa, whether they have good or bad things to say. For this challenge to be successfully met requires the emergence of a cohort of enlightened African leaders determined to create sustainable, consolidated democracies committed to good governance and basic human rights. This process can be helped along if the international community continues to contribute to the development of democratic institutions on the continent, such as independent judiciaries and a free but responsible press, and continues to provide support for civil society elements committed to people’s empowerment.

Conclusion It is clear that despite brief interludes during the struggle against apartheid in South Africa and then during phases of the Clinton administration, Africa has never been central to US policy. President Clinton sought to facilitate the access of US capital into African markets in the form of trade and private investments, but he realized that this effort could succeed only if a simultaneous effort was made to alleviate poverty on the continent, to promote good governance and democracy, and to make Africa more peaceful and secure. US national security interests were imbedded in Clinton’s policies, but he was flexible and seemed to be able to balance US needs and objectives with those of its African partners. The current Bush administration, however, seems to have reverted to the historical US position of selective engagement with some parts of Africa and not necessarily the continent as a whole. A good example of this attitude can be seen in the US courtship of countries in the Horn of Africa, Botswana, and West Africa to establish a US military presence that could be used to respond more effectively to crises relating to international terrorism in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. The Bush administration rhetorically supports new institutions such as the African Union and the NEPAD, but it remains to be seen whether these

R-1

3/17/06

10:45 AM

Page 17

AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

17

words will be backed up with real resource and political commitments. If there is going to be any real leadership in the US Africa policy under Bush, it will largely have to come from Congress and from international nongovernmental organizations.

Notes 1. See Jibrin Ibrahim, “Notes on Globalization and the Marginalization of Africa,” CODESRIA Bulletin: Special Issue, nos. 3–4 (2002): 3–7. 2. In testimony before the US House of Representatives, International Relations Committee, African Affairs Subcommittee, June 25, 2003, President Toumani Toure stated: “While rich countries and international financial institutions press for minimizing ‘market distorting’ government subsidies in African countries, often at enormous human cost, the most massive interference with international agricultural markets comes from European and US subsidies to rich farmers. This issue has gained new attention in recent years, as the World Bank has critiqued rich country governments and Europe and the US have pointed their fingers at each other’s offenses. But there has been little progress in changing this double standard.” Toure went on to say that enormous damage is being done to African agriculture around the continent by the $300 billion of US and European subsidies. See wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/afhear108.htm. 3. To be sure, globalization today has far-reaching benefits for some: (1) goods and services, capital, technology, and labor all move more freely across borders; (2) in those countries that actively participate in the global economy, standards of living in the general population tend to rise; (3) globalization has in general led to benefits in the areas of governance and culture (e.g., democracy, human rights, gender equity, popular empowerment); and (4) through advances in information technology in the context of increasing human freedoms, the state’s monopolistic hold over information from outside its borders has been severely weakened, if not broken, particularly in states with historically authoritarian regimes. See Jan Nederveeen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture: Global Melange (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004); and Netherlands Development Research Council, Coping with Globalization: The Need for Research Concerning the Local Response to Globalization in Developing Countries (The Hague: RAWOO, 2000). 4. Examples of such an argument include that, first, the gap between rich countries and poor ones continues to rise. For instance, the difference in average income levels between the world’s poorest and richest countries in 1960 was 30:1, by 1990 it was 60:1, and by 1997 this gap had grown to 74:1. Second, within loser countries the gap between the rich and the poor has also been on the rise, with certain pockets plugged into the world market emerging marginal winners, whereas other individuals and groups trapped in the cycle of subsistence production and poverty are relegated to the role of perpetual losers. Third, the rapid depletion of natural resources and environmental degradation are taking a greater toll in poor countries than in other parts of the world. Fourth, countries—particularly poor ones—are losing control over governance and culture. See John H. Dunning, Making Globalization Good: The Moral Challenges of Global Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); David Held and Anthony McGrew, eds., The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000); Anthony Giddens, The Global Third Way Debate (Oxford: Polity, 2001); Walden Bello, The Future in the Balance: Essays on Globalization

R-1

3/17/06

18

10:45 AM

Page 18

AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

and Resistance (San Francisco: Food First, 2001); Ibrahim, “Notes on Globalization,” 6; Joseph Stiglitz, “Unevenly Yoked: Has Globalization Dealt Africa a Bad Hand?” Yale Global, yaleglobal.yale.edu/index.js; and Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002). 5. Peter Schraeder, “Reviewing the Study of U.S. Policy Towards Africa: From Intellectual ‘Backwater’ to Theory Construction,” Third World Quarterly 14, no. 4 (November 1993): 776. 6. See Elliot P. Skinner, “Historical Framework Paper Written for the National Summit on Africa,” Washington, DC, National Summit on Africa, 1998, 1. 7. Donald Rothchild, “The Impact of U.S. Disengagement on African Intrastate Conflict Resolution,” in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in World Politics: The African State System in Flux (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000), 160–187; and Donald Rothchild, “The U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory on Africa,” SAIS Review 21, no. 1 (Winter–Spring 2001): 178–209. 8. See Henry F. Jackson, From Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960 (New York: William Morrow, 1982). 9. See Georges Nzongola-Ntgalaja, The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila—A People’s History (London: Zed Press, 2003), 160–163. 10. See Timothy D. Sisk, Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 101. 11. See Ruth Iyob and Edmond J. Keller, “U.S. Policy in the Horn of Africa: Continuity and Change,” in Dorina Bekoe, ed., East Africa and the Horn: Confronting Challenges to Good Governance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005). 12. See Edmond J. Keller, “United States Foreign Policy on the Horn of Africa: Policymaking with Blinders On,” in Richard Sklar, Gerald Bender, and James S. Coleman, eds., African Crisis Areas in United States Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 178–193. 13. Herman J. Cohen, Superpower Intervention in Africa (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). 14. See Donald Rothchild and Nikolas Emmanuel, “The Process of U.S. Decisionmaking on Africa,” in Ulf Engel and Gorm Rye, eds., Africa and the North (London: Routledge, 2005). 15. See Gilbert M. Khadiagala, “The United States and Africa: Beyond the Clinton Administration,” SAIS Review 21, no. 1 (Winter–Spring 2001): 259–273; and Edmond J. Keller, “Rethinking African Regional Security,” in David Lake and Patrick Morgan, eds., Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 310. 16. See David J. Scheffer, Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, US Department of State, “Human Rights and International Justice,” address at Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, October 23, 1998. 17. See David J. Scheffer, “War Crimes and the Clinton Administration: International Justice, War Crimes and Terrorism: The U.S. Record,” Social Research 69, no. 4 (Winter 2002). 18. See “Briefing on African Crisis Response Initiative,” News Briefing: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense (July 29, 1997). 19. See “Remarks by the President to the White House Conference on Africa,” White House: Office of the Press Secretary, June 27, 1994. 20. “Remarks by President Clinton to Conference on US-Africa Partnership for the 21st Century,” Department of State, Washington, DC, March 16, 1999. 21. “Africa Policy,” White House, www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/africa (accessed May 2003).

R-1

3/17/06

10:45 AM

Page 19

AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

19

22. In March 2002, at an international aid conference in Monterrey, Mexico, President Bush proposed the Millennium Challenge Account. According to Bush, the criteria for MCA grants would reward those countries that root out corruption; respect human rights; adhere to the rule of law; invest in better health care and better schools; and have more open markets and sustainable budget policies. See “Africa: Millennium Challenge Account,” Americans and the World: Public Opinion on International Affairs, www.americans-world.org/digest/regional_issues/africa/africa (accessed April 2, 2002). 23. See “Bottom of the Barrel: Africa’s Oil Boom and Prospects for Poverty Reduction: A Catholic Relief Services Report,” www.catholicrelief.org/getinvolved/advocacy/policy_and_strategic_issues/oil_report_full.pdf (accessed June 2003). 24. See “HIV and AIDS Statistics in Africa,” www.avert.org/subaadults.htm (accessed December 2002). 25. See UNAIDS, “AIDS Epidemic Update” (December 2000); and John Stover and Lori Bollinger, “The Economic Impact of AIDS,” The Policy Project: The Futures Group International (March 1999): 1–14. 26. Rather than keeping the focus on Africa and the Caribbean, Bush almost immediately announced that this initiative would be “global” in scope. See Salih Booker and Ann-Louise Colgan, “US Policy Toward Africa 2004,” www.progress.org/2004/fpif45.htm-22k (accessed January 2004). 27. See Shahla Shapouri and J. Michael Trueblood, “The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): Does It Really Present Opportunities?” Economic Research Service, US Department of Agriculture, paper presented at the International Conference on Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO (Capri, Italy), June 23–26, 2003. 28. US-Africa Trade Profile, Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce, 2005. 29. See Paul Collier, et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 30. See “World Bank President Highlights the New Debt Debate,” www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/headlines/vftt_wolfensohn.shtml (March 2004); and Jeremy Bransten, “World: IMF, World Bank Say UN Poverty Reduction Plan at Risk,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/ 4/939BB1F-1F11-42BE-8441-694BDF96F148.html (accessed April 26, 2004). 31. See also Princeton L. Lyman and J. Stephen Morrison, “The Terrorist Threat in Africa,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 1 (January–February 2004): 75–86. 32. See David K. Leonard and Scott Straus, Africa’s Stalled Development: International Causes and Cures (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003). 33. See “The Global Menace of Local Strife, The Economist, May 24–30, 2003, 23. 34. United Nations Press Release, “Security Council Extends Democratic Republic of Congo Mission until 30 July 2004, Raises Troop Level to 10,800,” Security Council, 4797th Meeting, July 28, 2003. 35. See Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Massive Atrocities in Darfur: Almost One Million Civilians Forcibly Displaced in Government’s Scorched-Earth Campaign,” www.hrw.org (accessed April 2, 2004). 36. See Takeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrea/Ethiopia War (Oxford: James Curry, 2000), p. 2. 37. See Befekadu Degefe, Berhanu Nega, and Getahun Tafesse, Second Annual Report on the Ethiopian Economy, vol. 2, 2001–2002 (Addis Ababa: Ethiopian

R-1

3/17/06

20

10:45 AM

Page 20

AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES

Economics Association/Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute, 2002), 42–48. 38. See Edmond J. Keller, “Understanding Conflicts in the Horn of Africa,” in Chandra Lekha Sriram and Zoe Nielsen, eds., Exploring Subregional Conflict: Opportunities for Conflict Prevention (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004). 39. See Collier, Breaking the Conflict Trap, 1. 40. See Edmond J. Keller, “Political Institutions, Agency, and Contingent Compromise: Understanding Democratic Consolidation and Reversal in Africa,” National Political Science Review 7 (1999): 96–115.

R-2

3/17/06

10:47 AM

Page 21

PART 1 Confronting Security Challenges

R-2

3/17/06

10:47 AM

Page 22

R-2

3/17/06

10:47 AM

Page 23

2 African Peacekeeping SEVERINE RUGUMAMU

T

he end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a new phase in the African security landscape. The global, political, and strategic relevance of the continent was becoming gradually yet markedly diminished.1 The superpower race to win political, ideological, and strategic friends and allies was virtually over, and the various forms of Cold War defense alliances and military and technical assistance programs ended. In today’s emerging configuration of interests, actors, and agendas, Africa’s intrinsic value as an ideological spoil or an economic or diplomatic asset to major powers seems to be increasingly inconsequential. Not least, the UN Security Council has gradually developed not only lackluster responses to Africa’s complex emergencies, but most importantly, individual major powers—particularly the United States—have become reluctant to get embroiled in large-scale overseas interventions perceived to be of low strategic import. The Security Council’s increased selectivity in intervening in internal conflicts has not favored Africa, demonstrating the international community’s declining interest in the continent. In fact, major powers, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, have shown a willingness to commit their own troops as well as massive funds to enforcement operations even without the Security Council’s authorization in Europe and the Middle East, but they have generally refused to send troops with an adequate mandate to end brutal conflicts in Africa. Such double standards by the Security Council have given rise to sometimes exaggerated perceptions of the marginalization and exclusion of Africa with respect to the management of international peace and security.2 What can Africa do for itself? Can the African Union, the United Nations, and the United States achieve a shared vision of mutual partnership, cooperation, and coordination in responding to the continent’s need for peace, security, emergency relief, reconstruction, and development? What complementary role can subregional organizations play in the mainte23

R-2

3/17/06

24

10:47 AM

Page 24

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

nance of peace and security in their respective regions, and how can they enhance their internal capacities to respond vigorously and preemptively to armed conflicts? How can the United States work cooperatively with African partners to respond to the continent’s basic challenges of security, sustainable development, and global justice? The purpose of this chapter is to place peacekeeping efforts in a broader conflict management process. I therefore analyze efforts taken by African regional and subregional organizations as well as international partners to prevent, manage, resolve, and contain violent conflicts on the continent. The peacekeeping initiatives discussed in this chapter are inevitably selective, with an emphasis on the role of key African actors, as well as extraregional governments and organizations. It is argued that the initial euphoria generated by the “new world order” at the dawn of the post–Cold War era was not only short-lived but also deceptively unrealistic. US contributions to African peacekeeping have been confined largely to limited financial and logistical support but not its own contingents.

Limited US Interests in Africa Most agree that Washington has minimal national interest in Africa, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.3 During the Cold War, the security fortunes of African countries were closely tied to the larger security interests of the former colonial powers (namely Britain, France, and Portugal) through various alliances, military assistance, security information sharing, trade, and investment arrangements. Additionally, Washington viewed Africa as part of its larger strategy of containing the further advances of Soviet communism. Consequently, US involvement in African security affairs assumed a relatively low profile. Underscoring this policy position, Herman J. Cohen, the former assistant secretary of state for African affairs during the first Bush administration (1989–1993), noted that although the United States had interests in Africa, specific vital national interests in the region could not be claimed “beyond the Israel-Egypt-Persian Gulf nexus.” 4 As would be expected, Washington has had no coherent, long-range policy strategy for sub-Saharan Africa. It would appear that the Clinton administration divided US national interests into three categories: vital interests, important national interests, and humanitarian and other interests. US vital interests in particular included the security objective of protecting its national survival and the physical defense of the homeland and that of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies against perceived enemies. Thus, national security strategy prioritized European stability as vital to US national security interests. Important national interests referred to the core economic objective of pro-

R-2

3/17/06

10:47 AM

Page 25

AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING

25

moting US prosperity through trade and commerce with key regions of the world, including Europe and Asia Pacific. The third and final national security interest involved the promotion of democracy, human rights, and respect for the rule of law. Sub-Saharan Africa fell within this last category. As Peter Schraeder has rightly concluded, “US policy makers have tended to ignore the African continent until some sort of politico-military crisis grabs their attention.” This lack of interest produces what he called “policy that often becomes driven by events as opposed to the more durable outcome of policy shaping events.”5 Even after the Cold War, US involvement in African security affairs, whether unilateral or through multilateral organizations, has remained largely hesitant and reactive. It was not until the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, that Africa was eventually perceived as a possible source of threat to international peace and security. Previously, most African nations tended to pose little or no direct military threat to the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, however, various transnational threats to US interests have been recognized as being as important as military threats. They include organized crime, Islamic fundamentalism, and narcotics and small arms trafficking, as well as terrorism. The Bush administration national security strategy fully acknowledges these sources of threat. The new strategy notes that “enemies in the past needed great armies. . . . Now, shadow networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank.”6 In addition, political and social instability in African countries can threaten the investment interests of US nationals and, in particular, strategic oil reserves. Above all, a desire to wean itself away from relying too heavily on Middle Eastern oil suppliers and to exploit Africa’s growing petroleum reserves seems to be one of the major factors in the changing US strategy.7 The August 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya gave credence to an expanded new security strategy. However, as I show later in this chapter, US interests at stake in Africa continue to be perceived as low, the costs of direct military intervention too high, and options for assistance too few.

False Hopes in the Post–Cold War Era As the UN Secretary-General emphatically noted in his comments on the implementation of the Brahimi Report on the UN peace operations, “peacekeeping is the responsibility of all member states, first and foremost, the members of the Security Council. . . . Those possessing the greatest capacity and means to do so.”8 The members of this international body are expected to maintain international peace and security. In order to avoid risks and cut costs, powerful Western states, particularly the United States, are increasingly supporting low-cost measures such as exhortations, diplomatic

R-2

3/17/06

26

10:47 AM

Page 26

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

and political pressure, and sanctions. At the maximum, they are participating in very limited peacekeeping interventions and in low-cost yet disjointed bilateral capacity-building initiatives to train national armies, ultimately to subcontract UN peace and security responsibilities to African regional and subregional organizations or even to friendly subregional powers. The emerging international burden sharing in peacekeeping interventions euphemistically referred to as “African solutions to African problems” seems to legitimize global disengagement from Africa. However, the Rwandan genocide in April 1994, which occurred under the noses of an illequipped UN force that never got proper support, provides a horrific example of the consequences of withdrawal. The conclusion of the Cold War created temporary false hopes: there were good reasons for entertaining the thought that ending ideological competition would usher in new progressive dynamics in the conduct of international politics and the management of the world economy. It was widely hoped that, under the new political dispensation, particularly in Africa, the post–Cold War geopolitics would give rise to a surge of worldwide enthusiasm for a safer, cleaner, friendlier, and more empathetic world order. In the security arena, it was envisaged that, with the apparently increased possibilities for consensus in the Security Council, the United Nations system would play an enhanced role in international life, be it in peacekeeping, promoting democratic governance, regulating the world economy, furthering development, or protecting the environment. Encouragingly, the United Nations began a series of world conferences dealing with some of the greatest development issues of our age, including poverty, population, children, gender, cities, and the environment. Major powers led by the United States began moving toward multilateralism, which flourished between the Gulf War in January 1991 and the October 1993 military disaster in Mogadishu, Somalia. In the latter case, the George H. W. Bush administration dispatched a US military force of 25,000 in November 1992 to support the UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). The purpose of the mission was to ensure a safe environment for the delivery of relief supplies, disarm the militias, restore order in Mogadishu, and undertake the necessary diplomatic initiatives for national reconciliation. During this short period, the five permanent members of the Security Council, led by the United States, provided a degree of commitment and leadership at the UN for what has been termed “assertive multilateralism.”9 Without threats of a veto, the major powers were eager to exercise their newly acquired capacity for collective decisionmaking. Coincidentally, for that brief period, the UN’s agenda for peace and security in the immediate post–Cold War period expanded rapidly. At the request of the Security Council in January 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali prepared the report An Agenda for Peace, which outlined five interconnected

R-2

3/17/06

10:47 AM

Page 27

AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING

27

roles that the UN would play in the fast-changing context of post–Cold War international politics. Briefly, the report highlighted the following roles for the UN: preventive diplomacy, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and postconflict peacebuilding.10 The period witnessed a significant shift in the international legal and political environment in which the UN operated. The end of the Cold War reopened the debate about the basis on which any form of intervention in the affairs of another state was permissible and legitimate. Intervention essentially violated both sovereignty and the prohibition against the use of force as laid down in the UN Charter. Member states subtly extended the acceptable scope of UN activity by altering the definition of what was considered to be sovereign, essential, national activity. Matters legally excluded from UN intervention, such as civil conflicts and humanitarian emergencies within sovereign states, now became legitimate issues for UN concern. Traditional ideas of domestic sovereignty lost priority in favor of new global appreciation for human rights and protecting people in danger. Human rights were increasingly claimed to be inherently global, a proposition endorsed by the Vienna Conference on Human Rights.11 Furthermore, the Security Council expanded the operational meaning of Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter to override domestic sovereignty. The Security Council was understood to have the power to determine what constitutes “a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, and acts of aggression.”12 The new interpretation of the UN jurisdiction soon appeared to include a wide range of matters once viewed as infringements of sovereignty. Indeed, “threat to peace” came to mean protracted civil wars that resisted international efforts at settlement, armed interference with humanitarian assistance in emergencies, and collapsed states. This new interpretation gave the members of the Security Council more latitude in responding to such problems. In the 1980s and 1990s, the international community supported ambitious peacekeeping and peacemaking initiatives in Africa and elsewhere. Of the thirty-two UN peacekeeping operations launched between 1989 and 1998, thirteen took place in Africa. The Security Council quadrupled the number of resolutions issued, tripled the peacekeeping operations it authorized, and increased the number of economic sanctions it imposed from one to seven per year. Military forces increased from fewer than 10,000 to more than 70,000. The peacekeeping budget skyrocketed from $230 million to $3.6 billion during the same period.13 Arguably, when deployed with a credible deterrent capacity, equipped with appropriate resources, and backed by sufficient political will, these efforts resulted in some significant successes. In particular, some comprehensive settlements ended prolonged and deadly conflicts in Namibia and Mozambique. The post–Cold War peacekeeping euphoria came to an abrupt end late

R-2

3/17/06

28

10:47 AM

Page 28

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

in 1993, when the ambitious UN operation in Mogadishu led by the United States was brutally attacked by a hostile crowd headed by a follower of warlord Mohammed Aideed during a failed attempt to apprehend him. The attack left eighteen US Marines and one Malaysian soldier dead; ninety US, Malaysian, and Pakistani soldiers wounded; and many hundreds of Somalis killed and injured. This incident angered many in the United States and led to a withdrawal of US soldiers from Somalia in March 1994. Clinton’s issuance of Presidential Decision Directive 25 in May 1994, another example of this disengagement, set out a limited and selective US role in future peacekeeping. The high hopes of the post–Cold War “peace dividend” were dashed. The second half of the 1990s saw a marked decline of troops, resources, and the political capital available for UN peace operations in the south in general and in Africa in particular. This period further witnessed a gradual erosion of the authority of the Security Council. The decisions by NATO and the Anglo-American coalition not to seek UN endorsement for their interventions in the former Yugoslavia and Iraq posed perhaps the greatest challenges to the Security Council’s authority. In both cases, divisions among the five permanent members of the Security Council on the use of force to resolve conflicts and veto threats from China and Russia were at the heart of the decision to circumvent the UN in both these interventions. More ominously, the UN’s inability to restore peace in Somalia, culminating in the Security Council’s unprecedented decision to withdraw before it had completed its mission, soured international support for conflict intervention, particularly in what the major powers considered low-priority areas like Africa. As a result, the anticipated possibilities for enhanced international peace, security, and cooperation gave way to despair and disillusionment. In addition, wide disparities in the international community’s commitment to containing conflicts in different regions of the world have brought into question the UN’s impartiality and credibility in promoting a stable and just international order. From that point onward, a rapid and distasteful mood of Afro-pessimism and conflict fatigue developed. The United States and other large peacekeeping contributors have required the UN Security Council to be more selective in its approach to conflicts. One tragic consequence was the failure of the international community to intervene to prevent genocide in Rwanda. In An Agenda for Peace 1995, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali admitted that the UN did not have the capacity to embark on peace enforcement everywhere that conflict breaks out.14 He further noted that UN peace efforts had become more expensive, more complex, and more dangerous. Such efforts required the UN to cooperate with various actors, including groups of states and regional organizations. He viewed regional arrangements, as outlined in Chapter VIII of the UN

R-2

3/17/06

10:47 AM

Page 29

AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING

29

Charter and in other UN policy statements, as likely to play a significant role in the maintenance of international peace and security. The US Institute for Peace had earlier proposed a strategy of so-called layered responses to resolve conflicts, beginning with “local or national organizations being expected to respond initially,” followed by “the responses at the sub-regional and regional levels,” and ultimately, “the level of the broader international community as the crisis escalates.”15 The underlying logic of this burdensharing strategy was not to relieve the broader international community of its collective obligations but rather to reinforce Africa’s own capacity. In short, the strategy sought to make the obvious point that the responsibility for mitigating conflicts in Africa should lie with Africans themselves and their collective organizations. Under the burden-sharing arrangement, peacekeeping would include mounting operations in two phases. First, an ad hoc mandate would be given by the UN to a regional organization or group of states to conduct an operation that would usually entail securing a safe environment for further activities. The second phase would involve handing over the given operation to the UN force, as was the case in Somalia and Haiti. These arrangements would also imply a clear division of labor between the UN and multinational actors. The first variation would entail giving multinational forces command over the military aspects of a given mission, with the UN overseeing its civil aspects, whereas the second would involve command of different types of forces by a multinational UN command. The coupling of troops from respective regional organizations with UN observers can be best seen in Georgia and Liberia. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia provides an example of the second variation, with NATO having responsibility for providing close air support for the UN and the UN providing ground forces during the 1998–1999 Kosovo crisis. The growing pattern of reluctance and partiality on the part of powerful Western states to intervene militarily in Africa after the 1993 US debacle in Somalia has led some observers to suggest that the development imperative of collective self-reliance in Africa is today a matter of necessity rather than choice. Africa’s increasing marginality is weakening its ability to exert leverage on decisionmaking over peacekeeping missions. By default, the burden of peacekeeping falls on the shoulders of Africa’s regional and subregional economic organizations. Slowly but inexorably, these organizations are filling the huge yet inevitable void left by the UN, the Security Council, and other major powers. As Paul Baran states, “It is better to deal imperfectly with what is important than to attain virtuoso skill in the treatment of what does not matter.”16 Therefore, it is urgent to strengthen Africa’s own capacity for conflict management and peace operations. Indeed, despite a host of initial logistical problems as well as resource dependency and political bickering, African regional and subregional organizations are gradually

R-2

3/17/06

30

10:47 AM

Page 30

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

clarifying their own peace and security agendas, building institutional capacity, and evolving common norms and standards as they seek to explore innovative collaborative arrangements with external actors under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.17 A huge gap remains, however, between expectations and the blunt realities on the ground.

Conflicts and Peacekeeping in Post–Cold War Africa As pointed out earlier, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides that regional organizations can carry out peace operations if they are consistent with the charter and authorized by the UN Security Council. Africa possesses a complex system of these organizations. However, as will become increasingly clear, their capacity building is frustrated by a lack of resources, institutional coherence, and political commitment, which in turn raises questions about the ability of regional and subregional organizations to provide more than a limited, reactive response to conflict.18 During the first thirty years of the existence of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor of the African Union (AU), Africa experienced numerous challenges to its peace and security, including struggles for independence, civil wars, and interstate conflicts. Some of the notable conflicts include those in Nigeria, Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Horn; the liberation struggles in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and the former Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau; and the fight to end apartheid in South Africa. The AU, the only pan-African institution, is the primary regional institution. Like the UN, the AU has the legitimacy and scope that derive from universal membership and a mandate that encompasses development, security, and human rights. The AU is composed of most of the African states, and it is the center of the African regional system, including member states, the general secretariat, and five subregional organizations. The latter’s role is recognized by the Abuja Treaty of 1991.19 Over the first thirty years of its existence (1962–1992), the OAU possessed limited ability to deal with continental conflicts. The key provisions of its charter set strict limits on intervention. Chapter 111 of the charter stipulated noninterference in the affairs of member states and sanctified the integrity of their territories. Failure to intervene in the Nigerian civil war in 1967 and the Ethiopian and Somali conflicts in the 1970s illustrated how these stipulations hampered the OAU’s ability to act.20 As a result of these institutional constraints, the OAU missed the opportunity to establish common norms and standards for peace and security, as well as to adapt new practices and capabilities for conflict management. Nevertheless, the OAU undertook a wide range of initiatives aimed at managing conflicts on the continent. These included direct mediation, as in the secessionist crisis in

R-2

3/17/06

10:47 AM

Page 31

AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING

31

the Comoros, and the application of political pressure, including regular issuance of statements and endorsement of sanctions against military putsches. The OAU also employed special envoys and peace negotiators, such as Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela in Burundi. Moreover, the secretaries-general of the OAU and the UN worked together to resolve the Ethiopia-Eritrea and DRC conflicts. Above all, on a few occasions, the OAU deployed fact-finding missions, as well as military observer missions in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Comoros. Given the limited resources, size, and mandates, these missions were always inadequate for complex emergencies such as civil wars and state collapse. The end of the Cold War and the reduction in superpower interests in Africa allowed new local and regional conflicts to emerge that carried the potential of fragmenting states. Since the early 1990s, Africa has hosted the largest number of armed conflicts and complex political emergencies of any geographic region. During this period, the number of intrastate conflicts increased dramatically, wreaking havoc across the continent, but during and since that time the continent’s institutional and organizational capacity to manage and resolve such conflicts has not developed at a commensurate pace. The various mechanisms and institutions that strengthen voice and transparency, such as the free press, elections, and participation in politics and in civil society organizations, have been extremely slow to include the disenfranchised, build mandates, and generate consensus. Without instituting effective mechanisms for preventing and resolving social conflicts, nurturing democratic practices, and supporting sustainable development, Africa cannot expect to realize any of the promises that globalization may offer. Civil war settings both affect and are affected by outside actors: political patrons, arms vendors, buyers of illicit export commodities, regional powers willing to intervene, and neighboring states hosting refugees. The risks and costs for operations that must function effectively in such circumstances are much greater than traditional peacekeeping. As the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations concludes, an ad hoc system of peacekeeping does not meet the demands posed by the post–Cold War world. It recommends integrated, multifunctional undertakings that include peacekeeping, civilian administration, peacemaking, election monitoring, disarmament, demobilization, restructuring of security forces, and human rights monitoring. It also calls for a comprehensive review of peacekeeping mandates, training, financing, equipment, and logistical support, as well as cooperation between the UN and regional organizations.21 Stung by the Somali escapade and prompted by the desire to reduce costly interventions in distant, nonstrategic locations of the world, individual Western states and organizations have sought to build the peacekeeping and peacebuilding capacities of African states. The most prominent ones

R-2

3/17/06

32

10:47 AM

Page 32

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

include those sponsored by the UK, France, the United States, and the European Union (EU). The British initiative has focused on ways to strengthen Africa’s ability to prepare and deploy troops for peacekeeping and to establish an early warning system, a skills development center, and an institutional framework for preventive diplomacy coordinated by the UN and AU. The French initiative centered on the creation of a rapid intervention force, known as Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP), which could be deployed during emergency crisis situations. The US initiative began with the adoption of the African Conflict Resolution Act in 1994, aimed at institutionalizing Africa’s conflict resolution capabilities. That led to the creation of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), partly as a response to what the United States perceived to be persistent political turmoil in Africa. The substance of the initiative was to train and equip between 5,000 and 10,000 African troops for rapid deployment in an African crisis. ACRI was only a temporary effort to create a rapid response force, to be followed up by a more long-term contingency force under UN and/or AU auspices. Its broad mission was to carry out humanitarian relief and peacekeeping operations. Its more specific aims were to establish and provide personnel to manage so-called safe areas in conflict zones and to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance, operating under the UN’s Chapter VI mandate. In addition to providing equipment and training, the United States committed itself to contributing airlift assistance to increase mobility, communications, logistics, and intelligence capabilities.22 European powers, particularly Britain and France, as well as some African countries, enthusiastically embraced the US proposal. The US European Command (EUCOM) managed military training programs in subSaharan Africa and sought to prepare selected African military forces for peacekeeping operations on the continent. The program cost an average of about $15 million a year, providing training and equipment for classical peacekeeping to eight sub-Saharan African countries at the battalion and brigade levels. Units with ACRI-trained soldiers participated in at least nine peacekeeping operations during the initiative’s five-year history.23 Some hoped that ACRI would eventually enable regional states and organizations to play a more active role in conflict management and that the West would no longer need or find the excuse to be embroiled in complex African conflicts. Some African countries, including South Africa, Nigeria, and Tanzania, were initially wary of these initiatives, suspecting that it was simply a means to persuade Africans to implement policies and decisions not of their own making. 24 ACRI tended to be concentrated more on military capacity building and much less on other equally important aspects of conflict management. Monde Muyangwa and Margaret A. Vogt aptly summarize these skeptical feelings about ACRI:

R-2

3/17/06

10:47 AM

Page 33

AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING

33

Many African analysts and policy makers have argued that these initiatives are not always consistent with the UN Charter, the OAU mandate, and the unity of the continent. Such critics are concerned that the OAU has not been consulted or invited to participate in the design or implementation of these externally led initiatives. This has led some to suggest that the initiatives are being developed mostly because Western countries want Africans to shoulder the full burden of conflict management activities in Africa, including peacekeeping and peace enforcement.25

Reacting to some important African countries’ initial rejection of ACRI, the US government created a number of capacity-building initiatives with a more multilateral flavor. Such initiatives tend to be more responsive to African needs, with the United States limited to providing the means for African peacekeepers to participate in UN, AU, or other subregional missions. The African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program, which succeeded ACRI in 2002, sought to be more flexible and responsive to African peacekeeping needs. ACOTA emphasized the participation of and consultation with subregional organizations. Unlike ACRI, ACOTA offered training for enforcing a peaceful environment as well as lethal equipment appropriate to the full range of supporting peace operations, such as a comprehensive communications package, portable electric power generators, mine detectors, and night vision devices. Moreover, the program sought to concentrate capacity development in Africa’s so-called anchor states of South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Kenya, which were perceived to have the means to project power in their respective subregions. By June 2003, ACOTA had trained and provided equipment to more than 1,200 peacekeepers from ten African countries. They included Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Mali, Ghana, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, South Africa, and Nigeria. Running concurrently with ACOTA, the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) was designed to counter terrorist threats in West Africa, but it has much in common with peacekeeping training programs. Mali and Mauritania received field training in their countries in early 2004. Chad and Niger followed later that year. The cost of the training was estimated to be around $8 million.26

Africa’s Response to Security Needs Responding to global concerns and anxieties, the OAU African heads of state meeting in July 1990 adopted a declaration on the “Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World.”27 They expressed the determination to transform Africa politically, socially, and economically in order to lay a solid foundation for self-reliant, human-centered, and sustainable development. On the issues of

R-2

3/17/06

34

10:47 AM

Page 34

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

peace and security, they resolved to establish an African mechanism for conflict prevention, as well as to create and strengthen security regimes at subregional levels. At the 1993 summit, African heads of state formally approved the establishment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution. The mechanism is charged with anticipating and preventing conflicts and engaging in peacemaking and peacebuilding activities. To monitor incipient conflicts and to act proactively, an early warning system on conflict situations in Africa was established in 1995. The Constitutive Act of the African Union has gone a long way toward defining why and when to intervene in the internal affairs of member states. Like the UN Security Council, the Constitutive Act calls into question the absolute nature of sovereignty, in Article 4(h) allowing for intervention without the consent of the target member state “in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” Moreover, Article 23(2) provides that “any member-state that fails to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union may be subjected to other sanctions, such as the denial of transport and communication links with other member states, and other measures of a political and economic nature to be determined by the Assembly.”28 Thus, unlike the OAU Charter, the AU Constitutive Act provides for unprecedented powers of intervention. Moreover, under the 2004 declaration adopted at the summit of the fifty-three-member African Union at Sirte, Libya, African leaders have also agreed to set up a multinational force empowered to intervene across the continent to end civil wars and genocide. The African Standby Force (ASF) would be deployed at five regional bases by 2005, expanding to a continental force by 2010. Initially, it would involve some 15,000 troops, drawn primarily from South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Egypt. As of early 2006, however, the ASF was still in the discussion stage. The new force will operate at the bidding of an AU Peace and Security Council, comprising fifteen members. Five countries will represent the five regions for three years, and ten other members will sit on the council for a two-year period. The votes of all members are equal, and no member has an independent veto. A question remains, however: Will the states that contribute the most to peacekeeping efforts eventually demand a larger say in the decisionmaking process? Despite this uncertainty, it would appear that this reconceptualization of security ignores the broader issue of human security in all its multifaceted dimensions. As Belefi Tsie has noted, although the human security paradigm is dominant in academic circles, it has had a marginal impact on the approach of the AU and subregional organizations to security management.29 The primary referents and agents for the human security paradigm are the people themselves—whether as individuals or groups represented by political parties and the organs of civil society. In fact, it has been argued that most post–Cold War conflicts in Africa are characterized by contested

R-2

3/17/06

10:47 AM

Page 35

AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING

35

identities, exclusion, and lack of justice. The discourse on peace and security needs to shift disciplinary attention from international politics to sociology and welfare economics. The Constitutive Act fails to address this important facet of security chiefly because the AU, like its various subregional organizations, lacks important, commonly agreed upon values that can bind a society or community together and, by extension, define collective security. Values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, justice, and nonviolent means of resolving disputes remain contentious. The OAU (now the AU) has undertaken various joint peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions alone, with the UN, major powers, and various subregional organizations. Two of these subregional organizations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), have accumulated extensive experience in peacekeeping, peacemaking, civil police observer groups, peace enforcement operations, humanitarian support, and postwar reconstruction.

ECOWAS Peacekeeping Record ECOWAS, comprised of sixteen West African states, was established under the 1975 Treaty of Lagos to promote trade, cooperation, and self-reliance. Regrettably, conflicts in the subregion distracted the effort from development to conflict management, particularly since 1990. ECOWAS has since created a collective security system and a cease-fire monitoring group (ECOMOG). Like the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security (OPDS), ECOMOG is defined as part of the international structure for peace and security coordinated at the international level by the United Nations Security Council and at the continental level by the AU Peace and Security Council. ECOWAS has participated in peacemaking and peacekeeping activities in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and GuineaBissau. In December 1989, a civil war broke out in Liberia when Charles Taylor, a former aide to President Samuel K. Doe and leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), invaded Liberia with some support from Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso. The conflict, which devastated Liberia’s natural, human, and material resources, caused widespread human rights abuses. It also produced a large number of refugees and internal displacement. Despite this crisis, the international community failed to intervene, particularly the UN and the United States. This lack of response is noteworthy for several reasons: Liberia had been the most important geostrategic location in West Africa for the United States for some time (especially Freeport for the US Marines and US Navy vessels); the United States had a large military and intelligence apparatus in Liberia as well as communica-

R-2

3/17/06

36

10:47 AM

Page 36

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

tions installations and a radio relay station; Liberia registers and flags many US commercial vessels; and Liberia was also the largest per capita recipient of US aid in sub-Saharan Africa, estimated at $500 million between 1980 and 1988.30 Nevertheless, Washington ignored widespread calls from Liberians and some of its own Western allies to intervene militarily. Instead, it responded by dispatching Operation Sharp Edge, a fleet of six ships, to the coastal waters of Liberia to evacuate US embassy personnel, US citizens, and other nationals who had sought refuge at the embassy and telecommunications site. As Donald Rothchild concludes, US involvement in African civil wars has largely avoided high-profile roles. He notes that it has confined itself mainly to nonstrategic supporting roles, such as mediating disputes behind the scenes, promoting international organizations’ initiatives, gathering early warning data, backing subregional actors, making exhortations, providing final and logistical support to ECOWAS, providing humanitarian assistance, and/or withdrawing political and economic support to belligerent parties.31 With only a very limited response from the international community, it became imperative for Liberia’s neighbors, through ECOWAS, to take action. In July 1990, ECOWAS attempted to mediate a peace proposal that included a ceasefire agreement, but Taylor refused to comply. After this initial failure, in August 1990 ECOWAS decided to intervene militarily. ECOMOG hurried a force to Liberia in August 1990 with a mandate to halt the civil war, facilitate humanitarian operations, and encourage a negotiated settlement. It was the first time that an African subregional organization had mounted and financed a peacekeeping force to intervene in an internal war situation to protect refugees and property. By this time, the various warring factions were out of control, openly violating international norms by attacking and killing unarmed civilians. The ECOWAS peacekeeping initiative quickly changed to peace enforcement when Taylor’s forces attacked it in September 1992.32 The situation in Liberia proved to be a frustrating experience for ECOMOG. Except for well-meaning envoys and observer missions from the OAU and the UN, ECOMOG was abandoned to confront the seemingly incessant cycle of cease-fires, renewed violence, and negotiations. A meeting held in July 1993 in Cotonou, Benin, under the chairmanship of OAU and ECOWAS resulted in a cease-fire agreement, to be followed by demobilization, disarmament, and eventually national elections. This agreement led to the establishment of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) and an expanded ECOMOG consisting of troops from two East African countries, Tanzania and Uganda. The postconflict process was frequently marred by repeated acts of violence and breakdowns in negotiations, as evidenced by the outbreak of violence in April 1996. Worse still, the widespread and

R-2

3/17/06

10:47 AM

Page 37

AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING

37

indiscriminate use of excessive force against civilians by the warring parties and ECOMOG forces undermined the legitimacy of all actors. Be that as it may, ECOMOG forces did effectively foreclose the seizure of Monrovia by rebel factions and facilitated agreement by the warring factions on a comprehensive cease-fire and disarmament process in 1996, which was followed by general and presidential elections in July 1997. Taylor won these elections by an overwhelming majority. Unfortunately, peace was only temporary in Liberia. Little effort was made to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate former combatants; institute national reconciliation; revamp the national economy; or build a viable democratic national polity. Taylor squandered his opportunities by pursuing an undemocratic course of governance characterized by political repression, severe economic mismanagement, and corruption. After Taylor had been in power for two years, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) emerged to challenge his legitimacy. LURD received support from Guinea because of Taylor’s support for Guinean dissidents against President Lansana Conté’s regime. In 2003, ECOWAS again facilitated a round of peace negotiations with the support of the International Contact Group on Liberia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, and Ghana. As rebel forces encircled Monrovia, these negotiators brokered a peace deal, calling for President Taylor to step down and for the establishment of an interim transitional government. On August 11, 2003, Taylor left power and went into exile in Nigeria. Next door, in neighboring Sierra Leone, the Liberian-backed Revolutionary United Front (RUF) violently overthrew the democratically elected government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah in May 1997. The coup ushered in a reign of terror in which the RUF killed thousands and forced hundreds of thousands of refugees to flee the country. For much of 1998 and 1999, Washington was preoccupied with Kosovo and therefore paid scant attention to the plight of Sierra Leone. The Sierra Leonean government had earlier signed a bilateral defense agreement with Nigeria, the mainstay of ECOMOG, which kept the government in power. ECOWAS imposed an embargo on the export of petroleum products and military equipment to Sierra Leone. It further imposed a travel ban on members of the Ruling Military Council. Both the OAU and the UN quickly endorsed these sanctions. Although ECOMOG received significant external funding from the United Kingdom, the military and human cost of the operation weighed heaviest on its participating states. Together with Guinean troops, Nigerian troops succeeded in overrunning Freetown and ousted the RUFbacked military junta from the city. For its part, the US special envoy provided behind-the-scenes pressure on President Kabbah, and the Reverend Jesse Jackson made three trips to the region to broker an agreement. A cease-fire was negotiated and signed in May 1999 and provided the break-

R-2

3/17/06

38

10:47 AM

Page 38

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

through for comprehensive peace talks that culminated in the July 1999 Lomé Accord reinstating President Kabbah. The 2002 national elections returned President Kabbah and his party to power with a majority. As Nigeria embarked on a staged withdrawal from Sierra Leone, the UN Secretary-General called for international support for the ECOMOG operation. The United States pledged an additional $11 million to the new UN force. Nigeria agreed to maintain 9,000 of its own troops in Sierra Leone as part of the UN operation. ECOMOG also remained responsible for ensuring the security of Freetown and protecting the government under the new United Nations mandate.33 These two cases point to ECOMOG’s potential as a successful regional intervention force. They prompted Adekeye Adebajo to claim in Building Peace in West Africa: “West Africa has gone further than any African subregion in efforts to establish a security mechanism to manage its own conflicts.”34 ECOMOG’s peacekeeping efforts have at times also been successful in dealing with other problems. In theory, peacekeepers intervene only after an existing cease-fire is in place. However, ECOMOG intervened in Liberia and Sierra Leone before a cease-fire agreement was signed. As earlier noted, Taylor refused to acknowledge the mandate of ECOMOG and claimed that ECOWAS violated the UN and OAU cardinal principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. In fact, he had vowed to attack ECOMOG troops if they ever intervened, a threat that he carried out the very first day troops landed in Monrovia. The peacekeeping mandate was, as a result, changed into peace enforcement. First, peacekeeping success rests mostly on the neutrality and impartiality of the troops and their contributing countries, which demonstrates the legitimacy and credibility of the intervening party. To be sure, peacekeeping is not part of the normal training and orientation of a soldier. Therefore, a need exists for thorough training in the appropriate doctrines of peace support operations and procedures, including military-civilian cooperation, use of minimal force, impartiality, credibility, and mutual respect.35 The UN Secretary-General had earlier expressed concern over reports of summary executions and mistreatment of civilians by ECOMOG soldiers. 36 Moreover, Nigeria, having shouldered the burden in Liberia with well over 70 percent of the troops, made no secret about which party it favored to hold power. To make matters worse, evidence also pointed to some neighboring states, namely Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, and Burkina Faso, providing training, money, and weapons to Taylor. Doubts always existed in West Africa about Nigeria’s political intentions and hegemonic ambitions in the ECOMOG peacekeeping missions. On the one hand, Nigeria and the ECOWAS community were legitimately concerned over the effects of the civil war on their own borders, the slaughter of innocent citizens, and the loss of property. On the other hand, it was

R-2

3/17/06

10:47 AM

Page 39

AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING

39

widely perceived that Nigeria was interested in enhancing its own role as the leading regional power.37 By contributing a disproportionately large share of the troops and finances, the Nigerian leadership tended to centralize decisionmaking in Abuja and vested the command and control in Nigeria rather than in ECOWAS headquarters.38 Understandably, other subregional states—particularly Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire—have objected to this perceived domination. In short, regional rivalries, a monopolistic command structure, and hegemonic ambitions tended to weaken the credibility and effectiveness of ECOMOG peacekeeping missions. Second, outside perceptions of the ECOMOG force were blind to the fact that almost all the leaders contributing troops, with the exception of Gambia’s Dauda Jawara (who was overthrown by the military in 1994), were military men who had seized power in a coup or in some equally controversial circumstances. Indeed, Africa’s national and subregional politics should begin to be rooted in a process of pluralism and popular participation, something that major donors can be expected to support. Without acceptable standards of governance on the continent, a regional or subregional security mechanism may degenerate into a protection racket for autocrats and dictators.39 Third, subregional peacekeeping troops often suffer from inadequate resources, including equipment and training. ECOWAS was unable to pacify Liberia and Sierra Leone militarily because of the ability of local warlords to control resource-rich areas. Diamonds, timber, and other raw materials often financed the various factions in these conflicts and gave them the means and motivation to sustain the conflict. To deal with this problem, international sanctions were put into place to curb illegal exports from rebel-held territories. Additionally, the United States and European Union provided logistical support and assistance in disarming warring factions, and the UN and nongovernmental organizations provided needed humanitarian relief. The partiality of ECOMOG troops in Sierra Leone was neutralized when the UN agreed to take over the subregional peacekeeping mission in 2000, broadening it by including extraregional peacekeepers and subsuming 3,500 Nigerian soldiers under its command.40

SADC Peacekeeping Record At its launch in Lusaka, Zambia, in April 1980, the Southern African Development Cooperation Conference (SADCC) was directed to increase cooperation within its geographic area and reduce economic dependence on South Africa and South West Africa/Namibia, while intensifying regional efforts in partnership with the OAU to dismantle apartheid. In August 1992 SADCC was renamed the Southern African Development Community, its current designation. Integration, rather than cooperation, was emphasized.

R-2

3/17/06

40

10:47 AM

Page 40

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

The new mandate was expanded to include political, military, and security matters. This shift was a response to new international and regional dynamics generated by the conclusion of the Cold War, a discernible pattern in which the UN and major powers shirked residual primary responsibilities on the continent, Namibia’s independence in 1990, and the demise of the apartheid regime in 1994. At its foundation, SADC comprised Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In 1994, SADC admitted South Africa after its democratic nonracial elections, followed by Mauritius in 1995, and then Seychelles and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1997. SADC adapted to new challenges by developing common political values and integrating defense institutions to promote peace and security in the subregion. In June 1996, SADC heads of state adopted the Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security. Because of political bickering, however, the organ remained dormant for about five years. This stagnation was caused by the lack of clarity regarding its institutional structure, which was compounded by personality clashes between the presidents of Zimbabwe and South Africa. In March 2001, the SADC summit in Blantyre, Malawi, adopted the Protocol on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation (PPDSC). Specifically, its functions and objectives included the following: • protecting the people and safeguarding the development of the region against instability arising from a breakdown of law and order and interstate conflict • promoting political cooperation among member states and developing common political values and institutions • creating a common foreign policy in areas of mutual concern and interest and lobbying as a region on issues of common interest in international forums • cooperating fully on regional security and defense through conflict prevention, management, and resolution • using preventive diplomacy to preempt conflict in the region, both within and between states, through an early warning system • promoting and enhancing the development of democratic institutions and practices within member states and encouraging them to observe universal human rights codes • developing a collective security capacity, concluding a mutual defense pact to respond to external threats, and building up a regional peacekeeping capacity within national armies that could be called upon to act within the region and elsewhere • supporting the United Nations, the AU, and international conventions and treaties on arms control and disarmament, human rights, and peaceful relations between states

R-2

3/17/06

10:47 AM

Page 41

AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING

41

• addressing conflicts outside the region that affect peace and security in southern Africa41 Even before the OPDS could become fully operational, SADC was confronted with conflicts in the DRC, Angola, and Lesotho, testing not only the resolve and the institutional capacity of SADC in peacekeeping efforts but also threatening the economic environment for regional cooperation and integration. In both the DRC and Lesotho, SADC responded with military interventions. The DRC crisis broke out in August 1998 when the Tutsi Banyamulenge and their anti-Kabila allies launched a rebellion against the government of President Laurent Kabila. He had come to power with the help of the Rwandan and Ugandan governments in May 1997 after ousting dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. Both governments felt threatened by guerrilla forces operating against them from DRC territories. The Mobutu regime had turned a blind eye to these guerrilla activities, if not tacitly encouraging them. The Rwandan and Ugandan governments had high expectations that Kabila would assist them in eradicating the ex-Rwandan armed forces, the Hutu Interahamwe militias, and the Lord’s Resistance Army, which operated from the eastern DRC. They were disappointed by Kabila’s refusal to cooperate on security matters, contributing to the two governments’ decision to provide military support for the Tutsi-led rebellion against the DRC government. The war in the DRC strained the relationship between the SADC member states and threatened to compromise regional cohesion. There were accusations and counter-accusations among member states, particularly between South Africa and Zimbabwe. Disregarding SADC, OAU, and UN limitations on intervention, Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe decided to send troops into the DRC in order to secure its sovereignty, restore law and order, and protect the so-called legitimate government of President Laurent Kabila. The decision to intervene was taken by the defense ministers under the auspices of the Interstate Defense and Security Committee. This initiative was ultimately backed by a US effort to mediate Mobutu’s exit from power. SADC allies placed no policy-based conditions on their military support for Kabila. They did not require a return to democracy or even a plan to promote national unity and reconciliation. Such conditions would have encouraged the requisite climate for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. At the maximum, they might have demanded a comprehensive program of action aimed at responding to the security concerns of the invading Ugandan and Rwandan forces. By failing to set such critical conditions, SADC neglected to address the underlying causes of the DRC conflict. In this context, the accusations that Angola and Zimbabwe had ulterior motives in the DRC appeared to have some basis.42 Although the SADC

R-2

3/17/06

42

10:47 AM

Page 42

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

military intervention reversed the rebel advance on Kinshasa, it prompted South Africa to take a strong public position against the intervention. In order to save face, SADC welcomed the OAU’s involvement, which ultimately led to the negotiation and signing of the Lusaka Cease-fire Accord in July 1999.43 Shortly after, the OAU started to canvass the UN Security Council for contributions for an international peacekeeping and peacebuilding operation in the DRC. In February 2000, the UN Security Council agreed to send 5,537 observers and troops to the DRC to monitor the Lusaka Accord.44 At the same time, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, involving 358 delegates of the DRC’s warring factions, political parties, and civil society organizations, took place in Sun City, South Africa, between February 25 and April 18, 2002, under Chairman Sir Ketumile Masire. They adopted thirty resolutions on political, legal, economic, security, and cultural issues and proposed a power-sharing agreement under which Joseph Kabila, the son of Laurent Kabila, would continue as president until elections two years later. This agreement did not bring an end to the DRC’s conflict or problems in SADC, largely because external actors and local spoilers had strong economic and political incentives to break the peace agreement. The ongoing violence in the northeastern Congo is a clear testimony of how fragile the security situation continues to be in the DRC. In Lesotho, a crisis broke out after weeks of political unrest sparked by the disputed outcome of the May 1998 elections. The conflict arose from opposition party complaints concerning the disproportionate distribution of seats in the Lesotho parliament as a result of the “first-past-the-post” electoral system.45 Antigovernment demonstrations orchestrated by opposition parties almost paralyzed the elected government of Prime Minister Pakalitha Bethuel Mosisili. At that time, opportunistic members of the Lesotho Defense Forces were about to stage a coup. These circumstances caused the Lesotho prime minister to ask for military assistance from SADC to restore law and order. In a similar crisis in September 1994, the SADC memorandum of understanding had appointed Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe as guarantors of democracy in Lesotho.46 With Zimbabwe now embroiled in the DRC conflict, it was only logical for Botswana and South Africa to take responsibility to preempt an emerging civil war, protect a constitutionally elected government, restore the rule of law, and pave the way for negotiations between the government and the opposition.47 Unlike in the peacekeeping intervention in the DRC, SADC troops did not take sides. Yet despite limited physical destruction and loss of life, excessive force was used that might have been avoided had the troops been properly trained in peacekeeping. Nevertheless, the intervention created a climate conducive for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, involving the adoption of a more proportional mixed-member electoral system borrowed from

R-2

3/17/06

10:47 AM

Page 43

AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING

43

South Africa. This change addressed one of the root causes of Lesotho’s political conflicts.48 After these two peacekeeping initiatives, SADC moved to address the institutional void that permitted states to deploy troops without the prior consent of all its members. An extraordinary meeting of SADC foreign, defense, and security ministers in October 1999 agreed on a new structure, incorporating the Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security into the main organization and developing a protocol governing SADC reaction to conflict situations.

Conclusion In recent years, the UN Security Council and some major powers have demonstrated clear double standards when it comes to African peace and security. Peace operations in intrastate conflicts are enormous and complex undertakings. Why are missions to Africa inclined toward vague mandates and inadequate troops, matériel, and transportation? The UN Security Council was accused of responding slowly and feebly to the protracted conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Indeed, where a distinction between keeping, enforcing, and building peace is blurred, as in Africa, the UN system is the only framework that can provide the expertise and experience necessary for comprehensive peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. As much as possible, it is important to discourage the temptation to subcontract peace enforcement to regional and subregional organizations in order to cut costs and save lives. Africa should demand equal and full treatment by the Security Council.49 Chapter VIII of the UN Charter spells out the role of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security, and the AU mechanism enjoins its members to “cooperate and work closely with the United Nations not only with regard to issues relating to peacemaking but also those relating to peacekeeping.”50 With superior access to resources, the UN is expected to shoulder heavier responsibilities in putting together a peacekeeping operation. In this rather ambiguous and unwritten division of labor between the AU and the UN, the former was traditionally expected to focus on the early detection and prevention of conflict, leaving the latter to assume a lead role in mounting peacekeeping and enforcement operations in Africa. The slogan of “African solutions to African problems” obviously flies in the face of this division of labor. In light of this, the newly established UN liaison office at the AU in Addis Ababa should be encouraged to explore possibilities for establishing and consolidating cooperation between the two organizations and other major international actors. By the same

R-2

3/17/06

44

10:47 AM

Page 44

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

token, it would facilitate cooperation if the US government and its agencies channeled their support through both organizations. Responsibility for coherent reactions to future crises might be devolved to regional organs closer to the field of given operations. In turn, the UN would remain responsible for developing broad policy and operational planning. Surely, properly strengthened and empowered AU and subregional organizations would go a long way toward widening the scope of and adding flexibility to the international community’s efforts in establishing and maintaining peace and security in Africa. The AU and its subregional organizations should focus their efforts on conflict prevention and peacemaking while leaving the peacekeeping and peace enforcement to the UN. The former should gradually define a framework for regional standards, norms, and practices of peace and security; a coherent division of labor in relation to subregional security structures; democratic governance; and human rights, including women’s rights. I strongly subscribe to Stanley Hoffmann’s observation that the great powers like the United States should have interests in the world order that go beyond strict national security concerns. They should feel, without exception, a moral obligation to respond swiftly and decisively to complex emergency situations anywhere and anytime they erupt.51 The superpower status that the United States enjoys has commensurate global responsibilities. I have argued that peacekeeping initiatives, when deployed with clear capacity, equipped with appropriate resources, and backed by sufficient political will, can make a huge difference between peace and war. In this chapter I have emphasized that the ultimate responsibility for maintaining global peace and security is the prerogative of the United Nations and, particularly, its Security Council. The growing reluctance among major powers to commit their troops and other critical resources for peacekeeping in areas perceived to be of low strategic value has been noted, with deserved unease. Although distinct threats from so-called failed states in strategically marginal regions are often overstated, the implications of such threats are likely to be colossal for global peace and security if the ensuing violence becomes further entrenched and widespread. In this sense, the international community should no longer address conflicts and peace in isolation, but rather the two must be approached from a more holistic and dynamic perspective. Such a perspective has to take into account not only the complex roots of conflict but also, most importantly, the need for democratic governance and sustainable development. The latter help provide the conditions for lasting peace after violent conflicts and should be addressed as part of the equation of conflict and sustainable peace. In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the United States, everyone seems to have been reminded that development, security, and peace are intertwined. As the current Bush administration’s National

R-2

3/17/06

10:47 AM

Page 45

AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING

45

Security Strategy has correctly observed, “Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet, poverty, weak states, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.”52 Underdevelopment, weak states, and extreme poverty tend to be breeding grounds for despair, extremism, and violence, which in turn undermine peace and security for the north and south alike. Therefore, the very conditions that give rise to stagnation, poverty, and marginalization should be tackled head on if economic growth and poverty reduction are to inform the US international development cooperation effort. Huge debts should be repaid only as a result of economic growth, not through reduced consumption and austerity, as is current practice. Washington should consider providing adequate support to Africa in the form of the transfer of financial and technological resources, the rectification of adverse terms of trade, no-strings-attached technical assistance, market access, and other means of assistance, if only for its security and long-term self-interest. Like most other developed nations, the United States has not taken its commitment in this regard seriously, nor has it honored its Millennium Development Goals.53

Notes 1. Donald Rothchild and John W. Harbeson outline the causes and manifestation of Africa’s decline in their introductory essay “The African State and State System in a Flux,” in Harbeson and Rothchild, eds., Africa in World Politics: The African State System in Flux, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000), 3–22. 2. Africa’s marginalization was a dominant theme at the thirty-fifth OAU summit meeting in July 1999 and encouraged participants to demonstrate a renewed sense of collective self-reliance. See “Une Afrique lucide,” Le Monde, July 15, 1999. 3. Writing about US interests in southern Africa, Chester Crocker noted that the “US was trying to conduct regional diplomacy with a distinctly weak hand. The region was distant from American experience, a place where we had relatively few tangible assets and no basis for deploying or projecting American power. Our allies had greater links of history, trade, investment and military acquaintance than we did.” See Chester Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), 38–39. 4. Herman J. Cohen, “U.S. Policy Toward Africa,” Foreign Service Journal 72, no. 6 (June 1995): 34–36. 5. Peter Schraeder, U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 2. 6. George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” www.whitehouse.gov./nsc/nssintro.html. 7. UNCTAD estimates Africa’s total oil reserves at 80 billion barrels, 8 percent of the world’s crude reserves. Much of that oil tends to be of high quality and low in sulfur, which gives it a growing market share for refining centers on the US East Coast. See UNCTAD, Energy Services in International Trade: Development Implications, June 2001, www.unctad.org.

R-2

3/17/06

46

10:47 AM

Page 46

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

8. UN, Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/502, October 20, 2000. 9. M. Doyle, “Discovering the Limits and Potential for Peacekeeping,” in O. Otunu and M. Doyle, eds., Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 4. 10. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (New York: UN, 1992), 11–12. 11. See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: IDRC, 2001). 12. Charter of the United Nations, www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1. htm. 13. P. Omach, “The Africa Response Initiative: Domestic Politics and Convergence of National Interests,” African Affairs 99, no. 394 (2000): 79. 14. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace. 15. US Institute for Peace, The U.S. Contribution to Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution in Africa. A Report of a USIP Symposium, Washington, DC, September 28, 1994. 16. Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957), 2. 17. Hakima Abbas argues that the ECOWAS Protocol for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security presses for an increasingly autonomous role in peacekeeping and collective security. For details see Abbas, “The New Collective Security Mechanism for ECOWAS: Innovation and Problems,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 5, no. 2 (2000): 211. 18. This point is succinctly made by R. Dwan, “Armed Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution,” in SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell, 2001), 107. 19. For the purposes of encouraging viable economic development and creating an equitable, geographical representation of member states on a regional basis, the AU is composed of five subregional organizations, namely, the Economic Community of West African States, Economic Community for Central African States, Southern African Development Community, Arab Maghreb Union, and East African Community. 20. For accounts of the Nigerian civil war, see A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971). 21. UN, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305.S/2000/809. 22. J. Frazier, “The African Crisis Response Initiative: Self-Interested Humanitarianism,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 4, no. 2 (1997): 109–110. 23. Nine countries concluded agreements to participate in ACRI, but the United States suspended Ethiopia from the program before training commenced because of that country’s war with Eritrea. Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, and Uganda were the recipients. See E. Berman, “Recent Developments in U.S. Peacekeeping Policy and Assistance to Africa,” Africa Security Review 13, no. 2 (2004): 4. 24. See M. Muyangwa and M. Vogt, An Assessment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, 1993–2000 (New York: International Peace Academy, 2000), 23. 25. Ibid. 26. See R. Handy, “Africa’s Contingency Operations Training Assistance: Developing Training Partnership for the Future of Africa,” Air and Space Power Journal (Fall 2003): 57–64.

R-2

3/17/06

10:47 AM

Page 47

AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING

47

27. OAU, “Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World.” OAU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, July 11, 1990. 28. African Union, “Constitutive Act of the African Union,” Lomé, Togo (July 11, 2000), www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm. 29. Belefi Tsie, “Regional Security in Southern Africa: Whither the SACD Organ on Politics, Defense and Security?” Global Dialogue 3, no. 3 (1998): 8. 30. F. Zimmerman, Dollar, Diplomacy, and Dependency: Dilemma of U.S. Economic Aid (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993). 31. D. Rothchild, “The Impact of U.S. Disengagement on African Interstate Conflict Resolution,” in John W. Harbeson and D. Rothchild, eds., Africa in World Politics: The African State System in Flux (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000), 164. 32. M. Vogt, “Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping: The Organization of African Unity and the United Nations,” in G. Sorbo and P. Vale, eds., Out of Conflict: From War to Peace in Africa (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1997), 57–58. 33. UN Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/1003, September 28, 1999. 34. A. Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002). 35. For details on appropriate standing operating procedures, see H. Anyidola, “Lessons from Peacekeeping,” in G. Sorbo and P. Vale, Out of Conflict: From War to Peace in Africa (Uppsala: Nordiska Africainstitutet, 1997), 114–131. 36. The ECOMOG High Command promised to investigate allegations of human rights abuses. See UN Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/645, June 4, 1999. 37. To underscore Nigerian preponderance in this mission Vogt notes that “Nigeria deployed a major part of its military arsenal to the Liberia operation, carrying out punitive air strikes on factions that were considered recalcitrant, enforcing, in collaboration with the other contingents, a land and sea-based embargo, and asserting a military surveillance of the areas under ECOMOG control to prevent infiltration” (in M. Vogt, “Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping,” p. 71). 38. Despite Nigeria’s claims of having spent about $8 billion on the intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone, some observers have reported that billions may have been diverted into private pockets of military officials, disguised as part of the costs of ECOMOG. See M. Baregu and C. Landsberg, eds., From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 190. 39. Eboe Hutchful, “The ECOMOG Experience with Peacekeeping in West Africa,” in M. Malan, ed., Whither Peacekeeping in Africa? Institute for Security Studies Monograph Series 36. Pretoria: ISS. April 1999, 61–85. 40. Adekeye Adebajo and Christopher Landsberg, “From the Organization of African Unity to the African Union,” in Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg, eds., From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 191. 41. Mwesiga Baregu, “Economic and Military Security,” in Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg, eds., From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 21. 42. UN Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2001/347, April 12, 2001.

R-2

3/17/06

48

10:47 AM

Page 48

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

43. See Mwesiga Baregu, “Economic and Military Security,” 19–30; and T. Nkinawe, “The Quest for Good Governance,” 53–72, in M. Baregu and C. Landsberg, eds., From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003). 44. Financing for the operation was extremely difficult and slow. The funds were pledged by the EU, the United States, and other Western states, as well as states of the subregion. See UN Report of the Secretary-General, “Enhancement of African Peacekeeping Capacity,” UN document S/1999/1116, New York (February 12, 1999). 45. The liberal model of democracy is considered to be one of the principal sources of conflict on the continent. The winner-take-all formula carries with it the control of national wealth and resources, as well as patronage, prestige, and the prerogatives of the top office. For details, see J. Elklit, “Lesotho 2002: Africa’s First MMP Elections,” Journal of African Elections 1, no. 2 (2002): 14–31. 46. This group was created when Lesotho experienced a constitutional crisis in August 1994. A threat of military intervention by SACD prevented a coup from taking place. 47. B. Tsie, “Regional Security in Southern Africa,” 10. 48. On the root causes of the Lesotho conflict, see K. Matlosa, “The Lesotho Conflict: Major Causes and Management,” in K. Lambrechts, ed., Crisis in Lesotho, FGD African Dialogue Series No. 2. Braamfontein, 1999, 26–41. 49. Dwan, “Armed Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution,” 194. 50. Charter of the United Nations, www.un.org/abouttheun/charter.htm. 51. S. Hoffmann, “In Defense of Mother Theresa: Morality in Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 75 (1994): 172. 52. George W. Bush, “Introduction,” in “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” September 17, 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall. html. 53. See S. Rugumamu, “Africa’s Debt Bondage: A Case for Total Cancellation,” Eastern African Social Science Research Review 17, no. 1 (2001): 31–52.

R-3

3/17/06

10:48 AM

Page 49

3 A Strategic Approach to Terrorism PRINCETON N. LYMAN

U

S policy toward Africa has a unique focus. That focus must change to take account of the ways in which Africa fits into the global issues of most concern to the United States. It must change if the United States is to be effectively engaged in addressing the greatest challenges in Africa, including peace, democracy, and development. It must change to meet important US objectives in the contemporary period. Terrorism, the subject of this chapter, is but one of the reasons for doing so. The traditional and largely continuing approach to US policy in Africa is that US interests are primarily humanitarian and moral. When George W. Bush declared during the 2000 election campaign that Africa was not of strategic importance to the United States, he may have offended some Africanists, but he was reflecting what had in fact been the approach of both Democratic and Republican administrations for decades. The United States does not approach any other part of the world with an initially humanitarian focus: not South Asia, whose numbers of poor rival those in sub-Saharan Africa; not Latin America, where persistent poverty remains a major fact of life; not China, which certainly until recently had the largest number of people in absolute poverty. The policy approach to these other parts of the world began with a strategic focus, either because of Cold War rivalries, such as in South Asia, replaced today with a focus on terrorism, or politicalhistorical as well as economic interests as in Latin America. US interests in Africa are usually framed in terms of humanitarian and moral concern over poverty, war, and natural disaster and as a reflection of the African American population in the United States, whose advocacy on behalf of Africa needs to be respected. There is nothing wrong with humanitarian concern. That should indeed be a part of US policy in all parts of the world, and certainly in Africa, where poverty, disease, and conflict are major problems. But making it the primary focus of US policy in Africa leads US policy down a path of short-term fixes; inconsistent and constantly 49

R-3

3/17/06

50

10:48 AM

Page 50

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

changing approaches to development assistance; and neglect of other traditional ingredients of diplomacy such as presence, intelligence, and security. The alternative is to frame US policy in Africa on the basis of how Africa relates to the United States, to US goals worldwide, and to US interests. That approach would allow for an examination of (1) Africa’s place in the process of globalization and of the extent to and the ways by which Africa’s relative marginalization in that process poses a problem for the international community; (2) the impact of failed and failing states on international peace and security, including the threat of terrorism; (3) the relative importance of growing African production of oil and gas and the political and security conditions surrounding those assets; (4) the impact of HIV/AIDS and other health problems, not only on Africa but also on the world as such infections spread; (5) Africa’s growing assertion of its voting power in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its implications for US trade policy; (6) the impact of poverty on migration and refugee flows to the industrialized countries; and, included in all these other concerns, (7) the humanitarian and moral demands for addressing the human needs of this most poverty-stricken continent. Such an approach would lead less to seeing Africa as primarily a charity case, consuming billions of dollars of emergency and relief assistance, and more as a continent in which substantial investments in diplomatic presence; attention to ongoing and potential conflicts; improvements in the security capacities of African states; and the employment of a variety of trade, investment, and assistance programs are all essential to achieving important US objectives.

The Limits of Humanitarianism No nation is more responsive to humanitarian crises than the United States. US humanitarian aid runs into the billions, often outstripping development aid. In the wake of the Rwanda genocide, the United States spent $1 billion on aid to survivors and refugees from that catastrophe. The United States has spent that much and more on humanitarian aid in relation to the brutal civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia. The United States is the leading contributor to the humanitarian needs of refugees and the internally displaced in connection with the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan. Americans expect such a response to humanitarian crises from their government. Congress rarely turns down requests for such assistance and indeed often initiates them. It would be churlish and wrong to criticize such humanitarian impulse. But that response masks something else: a reluctance to accept deeper and longer-lasting responsibility in Africa and to recognize other equally important interests. In 2003, on the eve of his trip to Africa, President George W. Bush was faced with a growing crisis in Liberia. Rebels were closing in on

R-3

3/17/06

10:48 AM

Page 51

A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO TERRORISM

51

the capital of Monrovia, and Africans were pressing the United States to send in peacekeepers to avoid a bloodbath. The rebels themselves said they would respect US intervention. President Bush tantalized his African hosts throughout his trip with that prospect. But in the end, the United States stationed its forces offshore, with only occasional forays on land. Once West African peacekeepers had stabilized the situation, US forces sailed away. Bush explained the decision by saying that US interest was in seeing that food and medicine could reach the capital. Once that was accomplished, US interests had been served. There was no mention that US interests in the stability of West Africa ran deeper than that: that instability could spread to neighboring states, affect a major oil supplier like Nigeria, and open the door to criminal and terrorist exploitation of the situation to smuggle diamonds and gems for financial gain. The administration had not even requested longer-term reconstruction aid for Liberia. Only a determined lobbying effort by a coalition of Africanists in the United States persuaded Congress to tuck such aid into legislation for financing the war in Iraq. This is not a criticism of the Bush administration in particular. Indeed, the Bush administration has done quite a bit to recognize broader US interests in Africa and to champion a number of initiatives that go well beyond humanitarianism. They include a significant investment in antiterrorism programs; the president’s $15 billion Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief; the Millennium Challenge Account; improvements and extension of the trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act; steady increases in bilateral aid to Africa; and negotiation of free trade agreements with Morocco, since concluded and ratified, and with the Southern Africa Customs Union. But it is significant that President Bush felt obliged to explain even a modest US troop presence in the Liberian situation and subsequent US actions in purely humanitarian terms. That was how Africa was perceived to count in policy terms and with the American public. A preoccupation with humanitarian issues leads down a certain path in both perception and action. It emphasizes Africa as an object of charity. The public is confronted every few years with another African disaster: drought and famine in Ethiopia, brutal amputations in Sierra Leone, landmines claiming the lives of children in Angola and Mozambique, and racial and ethnic cleansing in Darfur. The response is generous, but below it runs a certain wariness and weariness. In particular following the experience in Somalia in 1993, there is a reluctance to commit US troops on the continent as a means of intervening in even the most compelling emergency. It is better to ask others to do so, as in Liberia and Darfur. Besides, Africa’s woes seem endless, raising questions in the public’s mind: Why is Africa so prone to these disasters? What is the matter with Africans that this happens so often? Is there no hope or progress there? Little is said or exposed about other, more positive developments on the continent, such as the growth of

R-3

3/17/06

52

10:48 AM

Page 52

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

democracy; the economic turnaround in several African states; the settlement of civil wars in Mozambique and Angola; the African leadership in facilitating negotiations to end conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Sudan, and Liberia. Little is said about other US interests there (described later), interests that would lead the United States to invest more in addressing the root causes of such violence and taking other actions to limit the damage. The humanitarian approach limits US investment in security in Africa. Military and police assistance in Africa has always been small and subject to fits and starts. With a humanitarian focus, assistance to security institutions seems out of place, the wrong priority, and indeed encouraging of coups and human rights violations. In the 1980s, a small US Department of Defense coastal security assistance program to states with offshore oil facilities was hidden in a program for environmental assistance and that program eventually lost funding. Although Nigeria, often with US urging, has led peacekeeping efforts in West Africa and is now doing the same in Darfur, Congress for a long time put a hold on any assistance to Nigerian security forces over a single incident of serious human rights violations by the Nigerian army. Overall, until the more recent concern with antiterrorism, assistance to African intelligence, police, and other internal security institutions was looked upon negatively, even by many of Africa’s strongest advocates in the public and the Congress.1 It is not that security assistance is not a sensitive matter and that security forces in Africa are not prone to misuse of their power. As I discuss later in this chapter, political oversight is needed as antiterrorism programs are stepped up, especially security assistance. But whereas in any other continent one would accept that state security is one of the essential and worthy responsibilities of government and that making those institutions function better is one part of development, in Africa such concern was considered almost sacrilegious when poverty and human misery must constantly be given top priority. Another casualty of the humanitarian focus has been in the deployment of diplomatic and intelligence resources on the continent. At present the United States fills senior positions in key states such as Nigeria with junior or, at best, middle-level officers. No Hausa-speaking officers are placed in Nigeria, where 66 million Muslims speak that language, nor either Swahilior Arabic-speaking officers in consular posts such as Mombasa, Kenya, where terrorist infiltration has taken place among Arab-origin populations.2 During the past several years of the civil war in Congo, the United States had almost no on-the-spot access or knowledge of the situation in the eastern part of the country, where much of the fighting originated and still takes place. The United States has no diplomatic representation in the delta region of Nigeria, where the oil is produced, where the vast majority of US investment is located, and where a serious insurgency has developed. The United States

R-3

3/17/06

10:48 AM

Page 53

A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO TERRORISM

53

does not have a full embassy in Equatorial Guinea, though that tiny and most unfortunate of states will earn $10 billion in oil and gas revenues over the next decade, offering a prize for mercenaries and envious neighbors and possible danger for the oil and gas facilities themselves. Intelligence activity throughout Africa was cut back sharply following the Cold War. In sum, US officials have traditionally assumed—almost passively—that all other US interests—energy, security, stability, cooperation on peacekeeping and trade—can be taken care of without much diplomatic investment. They saw little real threat to these interests from the potential instability and conflicts that continue to wrack parts of the continent, to which the United States offers a generous but basically charitable response. There is beginning to be a change. In January 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced a program of “transformational diplomacy” that will shift US diplomatic assets toward the unsettled parts of the world, including Africa. It is a timely shift in the perception of where US interests lie.

The Other Interests The traditional, almost exclusively humanitarian focus must change for several reasons. One is energy. West Africa is on the way to supplying as much as 25 percent of US oil by 2010. It will account for 20 percent of all new supplies of oil on the world market in that same period. Oil is always a difficult challenge to policy. Oil wealth has done more harm than good to many developing countries, leading to corruption, instability, and often antiAmerican feelings.3 As Africa becomes more important because of oil, US concern with democracy, poverty, instability, and war in Africa’s oil-producing nations takes on a new dimension, a new strategic importance, just as those issues are beginning to do in the Middle East. Another reason for a new approach is trade. It is not that Africa is that important to US trade—although the United States trades more with South Africa than with Russia. It is because Africa, with forty of the 147 nations in the World Trade Organization, is flexing its voting muscles, together with other developing nations, challenging the United States in the current Doha trade round to take action on Africa’s priorities—primarily agricultural subsidies and tariffs—as the price for reaching agreement on a new round of worldwide reductions of tariff and other barriers to trade and investment. As a group of Malian cotton farmers told a US audience in early 2003, no longer would they allow their African leaders to be bought off from pursuing these interests by promises of aid. Sure enough, negotiations on the new trade round broke down at the Cancun meeting of the WTO in 2003, when developing countries stood firm. At the next WTO meeting in Geneva in July 2004, the European Union and the United States agreed to discuss concessions on agricultural subsidies, and the negotiations resumed.

R-3

3/17/06

54

10:48 AM

Page 54

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

A third issue concerns terrorism. The United States suffered two major terrorist attacks on its embassies in East Africa in 1998, and Israeli facilities were attacked there in 2002. Al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations have established themselves to one degree or another across the African continent. Africa is neither a seething sea of anti-American feeling nor a continent threatened with major terrorist emplacement in any one country. It is, however, a continent that offers terrorists opportunities to develop active terrorist cells, to recruit terrorists for actions elsewhere, to obtain financing, and to provide a safe haven for wanted terrorists. It also offers the United States a unique opportunity to engage with a strong center of moderate Islam in West Africa and to understand how religion, poverty, and politics can turn such a region into a more receptive arena for radical and potentially violent sympathy with terrorist organizations.

The Terrorist Threat

East Africa and the Horn The 1998 attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania revealed the presence of a network of Al-Qaida operatives that stretch down through the Horn of Africa, principally coming through Somalia to Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and farther south. For the most part, Al-Qaida has exploited a seam of discontent within the ethnic Arabic population of this region. The reasons for this discontent are complex, arising from the loss of land and privilege to the black majority since these countries gained independence, discrimination, corruption, and lack of opportunity for effective political participation. Al-Qaida does not need the support of the majority of this group, just enough to develop cells, safe houses, and guns and other arms trafficking to execute terrorist attacks. The actual perpetrators and their superiors can then escape into Somalia. What the situation in East Africa reveals—and what other parts of Africa may portend—is the opportunities that weak states, coupled in the case of Somalia with a collapsed state, offer to terrorists. Somalia collapsed in the late 1980s into a series of warring clans that have since defied US and UN military intervention: the United States withdrew after eighteen servicemen were killed, and the UN withdrew not long afterward. Somalia has resisted years of efforts by African and European mediators to bring about a restoration of a single, recognizable state. In the wake of the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the displacement of Al-Qaida headquarters, US officials feared that Somalia would become the next Afghanistan, a place of terrorist training camps, headquarters, and plotting. Only the last of these has come true. Somalia has been used as a transit point for bomb material,

R-3

3/17/06

10:48 AM

Page 55

A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO TERRORISM

55

surface-to-air missiles, and other weapons and as a means of entry and escape for all attacks in Kenya and others since foiled. UN investigators suspect that Al-Qaida is also exploiting the counterfeit currency trade in Somalia.4 As Ken Menkhaus, a former political adviser to the UN Mission to Somalia, has observed: On the basis of these incidents since 1996, the evolution of Somali involvement in terrorism is clear. There is modest but growing Somali complicity in terrorism, principally as a transshipment zone into Kenya, but also as a short-term safe haven for foreign terrorists, and most recently as a source of at least a handful of home-grown al Qaeda operatives willing to launch attacks against Western targets.5

Kenya is the major victim of this situation to date. Most of the casualties in the bombing of the US embassies were Kenyan. Kenya is now engaged in the difficult process of trying to control the terrorist threat while protecting its fragile new multiparty democracy. A counterterrorism law, favored by the US government, has produced outcries from both human rights advocates and Muslim leaders as being too draconian and too discriminatory against Muslims. Kenya’s problems are compounded by its own weakness as a state. Kenya has lost control over a good portion of the north-eastern hinterland; armed convoys are required for overland travel to border towns and refugee camps, and for most of the 1990s, the Kenyan side of the [Somali] border was generally more lawless and dangerous than the Somali side. The lawlessness has found its way into the heart of Nairobi. The teeming Somali slum of Eastleigh has become a virtual no-go zone for the Kenyan authorities, a world unto itself where black-market activity is rife, criminals can slip away undetected and guns can be rented for the day.6

Kenya is unlikely to be able to control the challenge of refugees and migrants and the associated problems of crime and smuggling any time soon. However, Kenya has sought to address the Somali problem by taking the lead in seeking a political solution to Somalia’s nearly anarchic state of warlordism and lack of central government. Under Kenyan urging and diplomacy, Somali factions in fall 2004 agreed on a president and a path to normalcy. Initially, however, the new president was unable to return to Somalia—his inauguration took place in Nairobi—and not all the factions recognized him. In October 2004, the interim government was able to relocate to Somalia, but not to the capital city. Presently, it is housed in Baidoa, in southern Somalia. The United States and European countries have tried to stem the flow of weapons along this corridor, but their efforts are largely symbolic. Most of the arms come by small boats, while the allied warships focus their efforts on large vessels that can be identified and contacted by radio. The sheer magnitude of this sea traffic makes close control impossible.

R-3

3/17/06

56

10:48 AM

Page 56

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

According to a UN investigator, as many as 3,400 six-person dhows can pass along the coast in the space of a few days. Among these, dhows carrying arms are estimated to arrive in Somalia from Yemen two to three times a week. The traffic continues along the entire east coast of Africa.7 The United States has also responded to the threat in this area with a $100 million antiterrorism program for East Africa and the Horn. Most of the funds will go for improvement in area governments’ intelligence and border control capabilities. In addition, the United States has stationed up to 1,800 troops in Djibouti in a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). This is a relatively strong response, but it looks greater than it is. The $100 million was cobbled together from existing funds for President Bush to announce during his visit to Africa. Follow-on funds are not assured, as Congress cut the administration’s request for fiscal year 2005.8 The CJTF may be a good deterrent to large-scale terrorist activities and perhaps a strong symbolic measure of support for East African governments, but it can do little to prevent the cross-border smuggling of arms and people that has marked terrorist activities in the region to date. A final trouble spot in the northeastern part of Africa is Sudan. This country became a major sponsor of militant political Islam in the 1990s under the guidance of Hassan Turabi, a founder of the Muslim Brotherhood there and a brilliant strategist in the cause of global Islamic politics. Sudan provided a home to Osama bin Laden from 1991 to 1996 and was the planning base for an attempt to assassinate Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. The UN Security Council placed sanctions on Sudan over the latter incident. After the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the United States bombed a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan suspected of producing precursors for chemical weapons. Following the attack on the World Trade Center on 9/11, the United States put more pressure on Sudan, and the Sudanese government, in the wake of a split in the government leading to Turabi’s fall from power, decided it was time to improve its relations with the United States. Much of the dialogue between the two countries revolved not only around terrorism, on which the Sudanese government was responsive, but also around ending the decades-long civil war between the Sudanese government and southern rebels, a war that had attracted strong interest from both evangelical Christians and the Congressional Black Caucus in the United States. Although the latter subject did not connect directly with the dialogue over terrorism, the understanding was that once the civil war was concluded, Sudan would come off the list of countries supporting terrorism, and normal relations would resume. As these negotiations neared completion in 2004, however, another crisis exploded in Sudan. A rebellion led by black tribes in the western Darfur region of Sudan prompted the Khartoum government to arm local Arab militias and use them to launch a vicious scorched-earth attack on the black

R-3

3/17/06

10:48 AM

Page 57

A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO TERRORISM

57

population. The result was what the UN has called the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. Relations between the United States and Sudan worsened as the United States took the lead in bringing pressure on Sudan to end the onslaught and in mobilizing international pressure, including a threat of sanctions against the regime. This is not the place to examine the Darfur crisis in detail.9 The relevant issue for this chapter lies in the way in which the Sudanese government has reacted to US pressure. Sudanese officials have appealed to Arab governments and to African Muslims alike that US actions on Darfur are part of the US war against Islam, linked to the US role in Iraq and Afghanistan. The appeal resonated. Arab governments have been notably silent about the outrages in Darfur and not at all helpful at the UN. African governments have been more responsive to the crisis, with deployment of military monitors and peacekeepers to the region. But in Nigeria, which has more than 60 million Muslims, the crisis in Darfur has hardly created a ripple of interest, whereas US actions in Iraq have angered Islamic leaders there. What this will mean in the end for US-Sudanese relations remains unclear. The end of the north-south civil war and the agreement in the settlement to create a more representative central government offer hope of better governance and better relations with the West. Problems continue, however, not only in Darfur but also in eastern Sudan, where unrest has been experienced. The prospect of Sudan becoming a strong ally in the war against terrorism thus seems unlikely. And the possibility of future terrorist infiltration cannot be ruled out.

Central and West Africa A Western diplomat recently told me that the threat of terrorist influence could spread across the entire continent of Africa. He was speaking from Nigeria, with 66 million Muslims, more than in Egypt, and where rising religious tensions have resulted in thousands of deaths over the past four years. It is easy, however, to oversimplify the threat and indeed the reality of terrorist operations outside East Africa. In central Africa and parts of West Africa, the evidence is that AlQaida, operating either independently or in collaboration with established criminal syndicates, has concentrated on exploiting instability and a plethora of weak states to reap financial gain through illicit trade in diamonds and other precious gems rather than to foment terrorist attacks. The most thoroughly documented reports of such trade, though contested in some quarters, focus on Liberia and Sierra Leone. Early reports suggested that AlQaida began such operations as early as 1996 but stepped them up toward the end of the decade to escape sanctions on its financial dealings. AlQaida’s principal accomplice in this trade was Liberia’s President Charles

R-3

3/17/06

58

10:48 AM

Page 58

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

Taylor, who was supporting a vicious rebel force in neighboring Sierra Leone, the source of the diamonds. 10 Despite reports on these dealings from the nongovernmental organization Global Witness and Washington Post investigative reporter Douglas Farah, the 9/11 Commission concluded that no conclusive evidence supported the allegations.11 However, shortly after that report was released, UN-backed war crimes investigators in Sierra Leone leaked a report detailing the names of six prominent Al-Qaida operatives who had operated in Liberia during this period. A Western official told the Associated Press that the evidence was now “close to overwhelming.”12 Similar reports, if less well documented, have surfaced about such trading in central Africa. A citizen of the Central African Republic told me that in the eastern part of his country, planes take off nearly every day with illegal shipments of precious gems. Exploitation of this kind supports the conclusion of Ken Menkhaus that weak states are even more attractive to terrorists than failed ones. In fact, transnational criminals and terrorists have found zones of complete state collapse like Somalia to be relatively inhospitable territory out of which to operate. There are certainly exceptions—the fiefdoms of druglords and radicals in parts of Colombia, for instance. But in general, terrorist networks have instead found safety in weak, corrupted or quasi-states— Pakistan, Kenya, the Philippines, Guinea, Indonesia. Terrorist networks, like mafias, appear to flourish where states are governed badly, rather than not at all.13

Menkhaus could have added to his list many of the war-torn states of central and West Africa. In addition, not all terrorism is related to Al-Qaida. In northwestern Africa, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, GSPC) in Algeria has moved through the Sahel region between North and sub-Saharan Africa. In 2003 the GSPC kidnapped a group of European tourists, releasing them (purportedly for a handsome ransom) in Mali. The president of Mali told a US audience in 2002 that it was nearly impossible for his government to know exactly what goes on in the vast semidesert region of the Sahel. The United States has responded rather forcefully to this threat. With the aid of US logistical help, and the presence in the region of Green Beret troops, the governments of Chad and Niger cornered and captured a significant number of GSPC members in 2004. US assistance to both North African and Sahelian states continues under the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative, a program to train and modestly equip antiterrorist forces, foster more cooperation among them, and improve border controls. In South Africa, a militant Islamic group, the People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), is suspected of bombing bars and night-

R-3

3/17/06

10:48 AM

Page 59

A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO TERRORISM

59

clubs in the late 1990s and threatening the life of the US consul general in Cape Town. The South African government has largely neutralized this group. But the small Islamic population in South Africa, which is of South Asian origin, has provided a convenient cover within which Pakistani and other Asian terrorists wanted elsewhere have hidden. Early in 2004, the South African government announced it had expelled two members of AlQaida who had entered the country illegally, adding to the complexities of the threat there.

The Nigerian Prize But no country in Africa offers a more tempting prize than Nigeria. That country has the largest population in Africa, as many as 130 million people virtually evenly divided between Muslims and Christians. In recent years, the Muslim population of the north has felt increasingly disenfranchised and has focused a good part of the blame on the United States. The Muslim north had historically dominated Nigerian politics since the civil war in 1966, including the military. But after nine years of particularly vicious and rapacious military rule under Sani Abacha, Nigeria installed a civilian government, and in 1999 elected as president a born-again Christian from the southwest, Olusegun Obasanjo. The new president was elected with support from the Muslim north because it was believed that he would be generally sympathetic to the leadership there and, as a former military leader, not likely to pursue former military rulers for their ill-gotten gains. However, one of Obasanjo’s first acts was to clear out the senior officers of the military who had been connected to politics and some rather blatantly self-serving oil deals. Almost all those retired or dismissed were northerners. Obasanjo, who was not particularly popular in the south at first, also spent much of his first term building a more powerful political machine in his home area of the southwest. He was reelected in 2003 in an election rife with irregularities and about which supporters of the opposition—almost all in the north—remain bitter. The context of this discontent is also important. Nigeria has experienced extraordinary impoverishment since 1990. In that period, per capita gross domestic product (GDP) declined by two-thirds, ushering in a degree of hardship not known in the country for some time. Under Abacha, dissent was quelled, and underlying tensions were muted. But with democracy, in just the first four years of Obasanjo’s presidency, the stresses of resource competition, fierce new political competition, and traditional religious tensions broke through in a series of ethnic and religious riots that took as many as 10,000 lives. The situation remains a tinderbox. In February 2006, religious riots in several cities took at least 150 lives. In the north, both to spite Obasanjo and in response to tremendous popular support, twelve of Nigeria’s thirty-six states have adopted the sharia penal code, which further

R-3

3/17/06

60

10:48 AM

Page 60

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

heightened the tensions between Muslims and Christians and between north and south. Why has this northern Muslim discontent also focused on the United States? The United States celebrated the return to civilian rule in Nigeria and hailed Obasanjo’s election as a beginning of badly needed economic and political reform. Obasanjo has many friends in the United States. He was a member of the Ford Foundation board of directors and a founder of Transparency International and had been a voice of opposition to Abacha, for which he was imprisoned for several years. Upon his election, Obasanjo in turn strongly endorsed the US war on terrorism, provided peacekeepers to Liberia and Sierra Leone at the strong urging of the United States, and pioneered an economic reform effort that wins further applause from US advisers and international institutions. None of this is sinister; much of it is sound policy on the part of both Obasanjo and the United States. But the perceived “coziness” of the USNigerian relationship has furthered the rumors in the north that the decapitation of northern influence in the military, Obasanjo’s heavy-handed reelection campaign, and the highly public Christian activity of Obasanjo—for awhile he conducted a prayer breakfast followed by a Sunday school session each Sunday on national television—are all done with US encouragement and support. Northern clerics and politicians alike told me that if Obasanjo changes the constitution (as his backers are seeking to do) and runs for a third term in 2007, which they believe the United States to be advocating, serious unrest will commence in the country. Stir into this mix the attitude toward US policy in the Middle East. Religious riots in Nigeria have been egged on by some clerics by linking Nigerian grievances to US policy in Iraq and Afghanistan. A Nigerian resident of Kaduna was shocked recently when he attended a wedding in a small northern village and the imam asked the wedding party to pray for the death of George Bush: the party all held out their hands and so prayed for five minutes! A leading Nigerian Islamic judge, a former grand kadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal in the capital, told an audience in Algeria that the United States is dedicated to denying Muslims their rightful place in the world and urged fellow Muslims to cease talking and take action. In a somewhat more friendly address to a US audience, he said that the United States was Islam’s most powerful enemy, but perhaps that was due to US ignorance of Islam.14 Nigeria has a long and proud history of Islamic leadership and does not easily bend to foreign influences. Indeed, West Africa offers the United States a window on moderate Muslim countries such as Senegal, Niger, and Mali, which have budding democracies and friendly relations not only with the United States but, in the case of Senegal and Mauritania, with Israel. Despite considerable input of Saudi and some Iranian funding throughout

R-3

3/17/06

10:48 AM

Page 61

A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO TERRORISM

61

the country and some deep and often divisive religious disputes within the Islamic community, little evidence exists that Al-Qaida has penetrated Nigeria or has won an appreciable audience there.15 But the discontent, the feeling of disenfranchisement, and the coupling of the north’s predicament with the policies of the United States opens the door. Even without Al-Qaida or other foreign leadership, the discontent within Nigeria aimed at the United States is ominous. Nigeria is the fifth-largest oil supplier to the United States, a cornerstone of African peacekeeping deployments that the United States avidly supports—rather than deploy US troops on the continent again after Somalia—and an economic center for much of West Africa. Major instability there would have reverberations throughout the region and be costly to the United States. Nigeria is also home, unfortunately, to some of the world’s most sophisticated criminal and drug syndicates. Nigerian traffickers are believed to be responsible for at least 40 percent of the heroin brought into the United States. Nigerian fraud—that is, the so-called 419 scam letters in which Americans are seduced into believing that millions can be theirs if they would just provide the details of their bank accounts—is now the leading computer crime in the United States. A Nigerian cleric, after stressing that Nigerian Muslims do not now harbor violent inclinations toward the United States, then looked carefully at me and said, “But if pushed too hard,” he paused, “you know what capabilities Nigerians have in crime and drugs.” The prize, of course, would be to take control of or to be in a position to disrupt the oil industry in Nigeria’s southeastern delta region. And there, in the region of oil production, the locale of the largest concentration of US investment on the continent, is yet another source of terrorism, or violence if one wishes, that is not at all linked to Islam, Al-Qaida, or the Middle East, but which is just as threatening to US interests. In the delta region of Nigeria, long-simmering grievances against the oil companies for despoiling the environment and against the Nigerian government for not returning the benefits of oil to the region in which it is produced have led to an armed insurgency. Government installations have been attacked, oil workers have been kidnapped and held hostage, and a growing trade has developed from stealing oil and trading it for arms. The insurgency has morphed into a quasi-criminal, quasi-political activity. Estimates are that as much as $1 billion of oil is stolen annually. Recently, President Obasanjo cashiered four admirals for their participation in moving the stolen oil offshore. The Nigerian government has also responded to the situation in the delta with a combination of relatively heavy-handed military actions and creation of mechanisms for greater sharing of the wealth. The former has often inflamed the situation, and the latter have yet to produce much change on the ground. In sum, Nigeria is a country of immense importance, one in which

R-3

3/17/06

62

10:48 AM

Page 62

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

Islamic attitudes toward the United States are tending toward increased antagonism, and which is struggling with a host of political, security, and economic problems. It is no wonder Osama bin Laden said that Nigeria would be a prime target.

A Strategic Response One part of the US government that has become especially concerned with the terrorist threat, and indeed the strategic importance of Africa, is the US European Command (EUCOM) that covers much of Africa for the Pentagon. High-ranking US officers have crisscrossed the continent, developed collaborative programs with African militaries, and offered to help develop regional programs to protect the oil installations in the West African gulf. As noted above, the US military has become directly engaged in the Sahel region to help track down and destroy terrorist groups. In the Horn, under the Pacific Command (PACOM), the United States has stationed up to 1,800 troops in Djibouti and patrols the coast to try to staunch the flow of arms and the transiting of terrorists. Welcome as this recognition is, it has operated in a political vacuum, and as such it can be counterproductive. One US partner in the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative is Chad, whose president has maneuvered himself to be president for life and whose involvement in the origins of the Darfur crisis in neighboring Sudan is murky at best. Another partner has been Mauritania, whose president equated almost all opposition with terrorism. A coup in 2005 replaced that government and left future cooperation with the antiterrorism program in limbo. In the cauldron of Nigerian suspicion, the visits of several high-ranking US officers to the new US ambassador over just a few weeks’ time in August 2004 produced a spate of media rumors and queries about US intentions. In other words, a military response is not only insufficient, but without other responses, may produce more antagonism than support. A political framework should guide US antiterrorism programs. A security policy should not be beyond US reach, but it must be one that responds to African stability needs as much as to immediate terrorist threats. The State Department has begun to redress this imbalance. The new Trans-Sahara Initiative, which replaces the earlier program in the Sahel, claims to place less emphasis on military activity and more on political intelligence and economic programs. US development policy has also to be clear-eyed and long term. The terrorism threat in Africa reflects the general problems that have been associated with human security: not only the need for physical security, though that is critically important in the regions suffering from conflict and banditry, but the problems of hunger, unemployment, the

R-3

3/17/06

10:48 AM

Page 63

A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO TERRORISM

63

breakdown of social controls, and the siren song of criminal and other violent activity that is heard within this environment. The task for the United States will not be easy. Africa’s large number of weak states and vulnerability to major conflict will last a long time. Demographics alone predict a burgeoning population of largely unemployed and possibly alienated youth, an almost sure sign of continued instability.16 Africa’s poverty is deeply rooted. No single prescription—structural adjustment, health, education, private sector encouragement, or trade—will overcome it in less than decades of sustained effort. US policy in the Middle East will almost always offend some Muslims in Africa, and no shortcourse program of speeches or visits will erase those feelings. Countries like Nigeria will require the most skillful dedication of diplomacy, resources, outreach, and careful balancing of US interests—none of which the embassy is today staffed adequately to provide—to avoid being drawn into a quagmire of both instability and more virulent anti-Americanism. The newly oil-rich nations of Africa, like their older cousins, Nigeria and Angola, will have to be carefully weaned from outrageous misuse of resources to avoid attracting both envious outside attacks, such as those recently mounted against Equatorial Guinea, or internal instability. All these efforts will demand commitment for decades to come. A humanitarian and moral approach to Africa does not encompass the strategic understanding and sophistication that will be needed for this kind of commitment. It will not mobilize the right kind of resources. It will not be able, alone, to defend the range of significant US interests in Africa. It will surely not be able, if it is the prime motivating factor for the United States, to meet the full scope of the threat of terrorism.

Notes 1. For example, see the mixed record of the Clinton administration on security assistance in J. Stephen Morrison and Jennifer G. Cooke, eds., Africa Policy in the Clinton Years: Critical Choices for the Bush Administration (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2001), 58–60. 2. Conversation with Department of State officials. See Jeffrey Herbst and Princeton N. Lyman, “Crisis Diplomacy and Peace Operations,” Rising Stakes in Africa: Seven Proposals to Strengthen U.S. Africa Policy, report to Secretary of State Colin Powell (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2004), 126. 3. Ian Gary and Terry Lynn Karl, Bottom of the Barrel: Africa’s Oil Boom and the Poor (Baltimore: Catholic Relief Services, 2003). 4. Stephen Fidler, “Al-Qaeda Outsmarts Sanctions, Says UN,” Financial Times, August 28, 2004, 1. 5. Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism, Adelphi Paper 364 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 71. 6. Ibid., 52. 7. Bjorn Willum, “Meagre Arms Seizure Off the Horn of Africa,” and

R-3

3/17/06

64

10:48 AM

Page 64

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

“Unguarded Ports Open to Any Business,” Danish Daily Information, January 27, 2004, www.willum.com. 8. Princeton N. Lyman, oral testimony, hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, “Fighting Terrorism in Africa,” April 1, 2004. 9. For a detailed account of the Darfur crisis, see Cheryl I. Igiri and Princeton N. Lyman, Giving Meaning to “Never Again”: Seeking an Effective Response to the Crisis in Darfur and Beyond, Council on Foreign Relations, CSR No. 5, New York: Council on Foreign Relations (September 2004). 10. Douglas Farah, “Fighting Terrorism in Africa,” statement before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, April 1, 2004. 11. The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 171. 12. “AP Enterprise: Al-Qaeda Bought Diamonds Ahead of 9/11 Attack, UN Investigators Told,” August 7, 2004, www.lexisnexis.com. 13. Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse, 71. 14. Justice Muhammed Bashir Sambo, Sharia and Justice: Lectures and Speeches (Zaria, Nigeria: Sankore Educational Publishers, 2003). 15. One Western diplomat claims that a small Al-Qaida cell does exist in the country, though still relatively insignificant. Private conversation, August 2004. 16. Researchers contend that the “youth bulge” (a high proportion of young adults, which is what Africa will have as its population doubles over the next twenty years) is most closely associated with the likelihood of a new outbreak of civil conflict. See Meaghan Parker, “The Security Demographics: Population and Civil Conflict After the Cold War,” PECS News, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Spring 2004), 5.

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

Page 65

4 US Intervention in Africa’s Ethnic Conflicts: The Scope for Action DONALD ROTHCHILD

AND

T

NIKOLAS EMMANUEL

he primacy of the United States in today’s world entails inescapable responsibilities. A great power cannot always stand aloof and ignore the widespread destruction of civil war, genocide, and the spread of disease and hopelessness without some loss of its own security and well-being in its region and beyond. Life in a dangerous global neighborhood has damaging effects on every country. Consequently, the United States must at times assume the mantle of a “protector.” In circumstances in which an African state fails to manage tensions within its domain responsibly and effectively, the international community has an obligation to act. As Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun state, “The responsibility to protect implies a duty to react to situations in which there is compelling need for human protection.”1 US leaders sometimes find themselves facing a difficult choice: whether to refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of African states and to respect their sovereign jurisdiction or to intercede forcefully, alone or in coalition with other states, in an effort to prevent starvation and repression—or even the mass murder of vulnerable peoples. In addition, policymakers must select from a variety of means. Public officials deemed diplomatic pressures and incentives to be appropriate to deal with intrastate conflicts and humanitarian crises in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia, Kenya, Sudan, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Moreover, an extensive military intervention was regarded as appropriate and necessary to deal with the challenges of delivering food and restoring political order in Somalia. Only when the costs of acting as a protector became apparent in Somalia did the United States and the United Nations reverse policies and decide upon a course of disengagement. And this decision to remain on the sidelines had terrible ramifications in terms of protecting other vulnerable peoples in Rwanda and Sudan.2 Although foreign policy makers have wide discretion to make decisions 65

R-4

3/17/06

66

12:14 PM

Page 66

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

on a variety of conflicts lacking mass media attention, they generally need congressional and public support, tacit if not explicit, for interventions of greater concern to domestic interests. Clearly, decisionmaking is a complex process, influenced in large part by public concerns and state capabilities. Commercial organizations, missionary groups, and ethnic lobbies all exert an influence on foreign policy far out of proportion to their numbers. 3 It would also be shortsighted to overlook the contribution that a society’s norms and values contribute to this process. Societal values become evident in the demands that elite and civil society interests make upon the state. They have an impact on the formulation of public goals across regimes and especially in democratic countries that require public support to achieve their purposes. As Joseph Nye comments, the national interest, which is broader than vital strategic interests, “can include values such as human rights and democracy, particularly if the American public feels that those values are so important to our identity or sense of who we are that people are willing to pay a price to promote them. . . . If the American people think that our long-term shared interests include certain values and their promotion abroad, then they become part of the national interest.”4 The American public can play an important role in foreign policy formulation by pressing its objectives or constraining the actions of the policy elite. In this chapter we seek to illustrate this role by examining the impact of congressional and public attitudes on executive decisionmaking in a single issue area: that is, the preparedness of the United States to act as a protector of vulnerable peoples in Africa at times of acute distress. To this end, we ask four questions: 1. Do members of the US Congress and the general public exhibit a general preference for the use of options that involve nonmilitary force rather than military force in Africa? 2. Do members of Congress and the American public prefer multilateral to unilateral interventions when dealing with Africa’s internal discord? 3. Do key demographic characteristics have a significant impact on the level of US public support for intervention in intrastate conflicts? 4. Is the public a constraint on US interventions to protect Africa’s vulnerable peoples? To address these questions, we have based our analysis on 161 public opinion polls concerning American preferences about intervention in eight ethnic conflicts: Burundi, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo/Yugoslavia, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, and Sudan. This material was gathered from the Lexis-Nexis Universe “Polls and Surveys” search engine, which is maintained by the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research and

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

Page 67

US INTERVENTION IN AFRICA’S ETHNIC CONFLICTS

67

includes opinion polls from sources such as Gallup, Harris, Roper, ABC, CBS, CNN, NBC, the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, USA Today, and the Wall Street Journal.5

The US Role as Protector With a few exceptions—Angola, South Africa, Somalia, and currently Sudan—the US government has been extremely cautious about becoming diplomatically or militarily caught up in Africa’s internal disputes. Despite a Wilsonian tradition that calls for self-determination, multilateralism, and an end to arbitrary power, the liberal internationalist commitment of the United States comes into conflict with other deeply held principles on unilateral action and economic expansionism. As William Schneider notes, the American public “believes in internationalist principles. . . . But when it comes to policy, the isolationist impulse begins to intrude.”6 Accordingly, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations data for 1990 indicated that 61 percent of the people surveyed sought cutbacks in economic assistance to other countries and 73 percent called for reductions in military aid.7 Robert D. Kaplan expresses the noninterventionist preferences held by many members of the general public this way: the United States should only intervene where “moral, economic, and strategic interests intersect.”8 Giving substance to these sentiments, the continuous reductions in taxes and the budgetary restrictions put into place during and after the Reagan period have had the effect of limiting federal government capacity to protect Africa’s vulnerable peoples. US officials have, despite these constraints on international action, engaged occasionally in far-reaching diplomatic and humanitarian operations in Africa, alone or in cooperation with the United Nations. In certain selected cases, the US role as protector of Africa’s vulnerable has been evident in various ways during the phases of the conflict process, in particular during the gestation, triggering/escalation, and postconflict phases. Preventive action can, at times, contribute importantly to the avoidance of highly destructive encounters. As Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis note, it is important for third-party protectors to intervene early “before the parties have done extensive killings.”9 Ideally, it is most useful for US policymakers to address deep-rooted socioeconomic, environmental, and structural causes of disagreements during the potential conflict phase, when popular discontent is latent, scattered, and at relatively low levels of intensity.10 The US role in preventing conflict has not received either the governmental or public attention it deserves in the early phases. Public opinion polls tend to take notice of Africa’s ethnic conflict issues during the escalation phase and less so during the periods when outside influence can prove

R-4

3/17/06

68

12:14 PM

Page 68

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

most effective, that is, the gestation or postconflict phases. Thus, 103 of the 161 poll questions regarding public support for US intervention in ethnic conflicts were posed after the conflict had flared up and had become intense, and only seventeen were asked during the gestation (or politicization) phase. The politicization phase clearly represents a critical juncture in the conflict process. Unless the United States and other third parties act decisively to influence local leaders to negotiate their differences, the fleeting opportunity to bridge intergroup differences may be lost. As a consequence of their economic and political power, the United States and other actors often have considerable leverage at their disposal. For example, they can freeze economic assistance, back counterelites, include or exclude target regimes from international organizations, close embassies, and place sanctions on trade or arms. In worst cases, such as Rwanda, they might have prevented the cascades of violence from occurring in 1994 had they used their influence to enlarge the peacekeeping force on the scene and been more determined in implementing the peace agreement.11 It is often difficult for external protectors to generate the kind of political will necessary to deal with the root causes of conflict in Africa. US policymakers can no doubt recognize that glaring economic disparities, population pressures, or the denial of human rights may exacerbate tensions in Zimbabwe or Liberia, but they are often reluctant to intercede and at times find themselves frustrated when it comes to convincing Congress to allocate the resources needed to address these problems meaningfully. As a consequence, what starts as elite manipulation of ethnic consciousness or a failure of communications has been allowed at times to lead to expanded enmities. In this politicization phase of conflict, elite ambition or communal sentiment can gather momentum and coalesce to the point where it cannot be ignored by potential third-party protectors.12 Although the possibility of group violence has increased, a determined third-party intervention can still hold out the possibility of preventing deadly conflict from occurring. In this regard, US and other intercessions in the early phases did help to keep the conflict in South Africa at manageable levels. With extensive public support, in the early 1980s through the early 1990s the US government somewhat reluctantly contributed to a relatively peaceful transition in South Africa from an apartheid regime to a nonracial democracy. The US Congress, which passed the 1986 Comprehensive AntiApartheid Act over the opposition of the Reagan administration, employed a variety of economic pressures to induce South African authorities to engage in political and economic reform and to negotiate with the Africanled opposition. Later in 1992, it combined soft diplomatic incentives to support both the internal negotiating process and the United Nations’ initiative in dispatching an observer team.13 Virtually all the questions in our sample

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

Page 69

US INTERVENTION IN AFRICA’S ETHNIC CONFLICTS

69

asked during the politicization phase were raised about South Africa, and they were generally supportive of a nonmilitary approach. However, when, as in Rwanda, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the DRC, conflict increased noticeably in intensity and the efforts of external facilitators proved unavailing, the conflict entered the triggering phase. The triggering of mass violence represents a dangerous expansion of tensions, for polarization becomes rigid and norms of intergroup reciprocity and political exchange weaken. As the level of tension rises, negotiation is complicated by a combination of elite manipulation of ethnic loyalties and by the zero-sum perceptions of group members, as well as by the lack of reliable information regarding the intentions of adversary leaders and the difficulty of making credible commitments that will survive the implementation process. Clearly, the United States and other third parties have limited scope for initiative once the fighting erupts; even so, an awareness of the constraints under which they operate is not an excuse for inaction. Thus the bitter conflicts that were triggered in such countries as Angola, Sudan, the DRC, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Macedonia, Cyprus, and elsewhere have responded over time to mediation efforts by diplomats from the United States, the United Nations, and others. It is necessary to engage in such diplomacy early on to prevent a cycle of violence and possible warfare from taking place. At times, as in Macedonia and the DRC, the United States has contributed to efforts to contain the spirals of violence and to promote peace negotiations under turbulent conditions. In other cases, such as Sudan, Western Sahara, and IsraelPalestine, the United States has attempted to facilitate an end to ongoing wars that appear to have escalated out of control, and the short-term triggering phase has evolved into a long-term escalation phase marked by recurring rounds of warfare. Facilitation is the form of intervention preferred by US government decisionmakers and seems relatively independent of public opinion. Nevertheless, it is interesting that during the escalation phase public opinion polls have been most likely to raise questions about the preferences of US residents on intervention in Africa’s conflicts. The results have tended to show cautious public support for operations other than war (OOTW) and somewhat less enthusiastic backing for direct military intervention. In time, when military victory appears to be beyond the reach of the adversaries and when peace appears to be less risky and costly than continued warfare, mediation and negotiation may succeed in shifting conflict relations back toward regularized encounters among groups. This postconflict phase is marked by decided risks of its own, for the hostility and distrust of civil wars does not dissipate easily and can, as in Sudan, Angola, and Rwanda, lead to a resumption of the fighting soon afterward.14 To avoid this destructive scenario, external third parties such as the United States can

R-4

3/17/06

70

12:14 PM

Page 70

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

play an important role in helping to monitor and validate the short-term military-related aspects of the implementation process (supporting the maintenance of the cease-fire, helping to separate the contending forces and quartering the troops at specified assembly points, overseeing the disarmament and demobilization of forces, reintegrating the rival armies, and encouraging and assisting in the reform of the police).15 Even though the American public is inclined to be cautiously supportive of these initiatives during the postconflict phase, the US government has been extremely reluctant to play an important role in helping postconflict societies achieve their confidenceand security-building guidelines. Something of an exception here is Angola. Following the signing of the peace agreement in 2002, US diplomats repeatedly assured Angolan officials that they would provide generous assistance for the peace implementation process. However, that represents a special transitional situation in which the United States is extricating itself from a Cold War involvement.

The Response of Congress and the American Public At every phase in the conflict cycle, the United States, as the world’s primary state actor, made or could have made a critical difference in intrastate conflicts in Africa. But did Congress and the public support US government intervention, and if so, what kind of intervention did they prefer? Certainly, various administrations require considerable room to maneuver on many issues that lie outside the public’s radar screen. On other, more visible issues, however, public sentiment may serve as a useful guide to what is moral and practicable.16 If the president acts contrary to public sentiment, as Bill Clinton did when he sent troops to Bosnia in 1995, it can involve considerable risks—in this case in his relations with a reluctant House of Representatives.17 Moreover, without public support, the president lacks “leverage.”18 As John E. Rielly warns, “policies which over time are contrary to public sentiment will almost certainly fail—along with the leaders responsible for them.”19 It is time to look more closely at public attitudes to see whether the members of the public in fact place constraints on US governmental action in intervening in ethnic-related conflicts in Africa. Does the American public have clear preferences concerning US intervention in such conflicts? And do members of the public differentiate in terms of the different tools to be used, and when they should be employed? In an attempt to answer these questions, we examine three basic methods for dealing with ethnic conflicts (that is, nonmilitary force interventions, operations other than war, and military force) and whether the public has consistent preferences about applying them.

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

Page 71

US INTERVENTION IN AFRICA’S ETHNIC CONFLICTS

71

Nonmilitary force interventions refer to actions taken by third parties to alter the perceptions and behavior of a target state or movement without recourse to the use of military action. The third party seeks to alter local behavior by means of diplomatic pressure and packages of incentives. 20 Examples of incentives include monetary assistance, diplomatic pressure, security guarantees, recognition, investment restrictions, trade embargoes, and economic sanctions. These actions are best typified by US policies toward South Africa in the 1980s. In addition, the cases in this chapter illustrate other types of incentives also employed. Operations other than war consist of a wide range of activities in which the armed forces of the third party or parties are deployed in noncombatant missions. The United States has a long tradition of deploying its forces in such actions. The classic example is the Berlin airlift (1948–1949). This operation used military aircraft to fly food and fuel to the beleaguered city to break the Soviet blockade. Although these kinds of operations have been going on for decades, their frequency picked up dramatically after the Cold War ended.21 The US Army defines operations other than war as “military activities during peacetime . . . that do not necessarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces.”22 These operations include humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, nation-building assistance, arms control, support to US civil authorities, and peacekeeping.23 In the eight cases examined in this chapter, the United States undertook OOTW in four of them: a noncombatant evacuation and brief humanitarian effort in Rwanda, more extensive humanitarian relief operations in Somalia, and peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The polls used in this chapter refer primarily to two types of OOTW: humanitarian-military interventions and peacekeeping. Humanitarian interventions include any action, possibly involving troops in noncombatant missions, that is destined to respond in combined nonmilitary and military ways to humanitarian problems. Under this category, the opinion polls we refer to include such examples as airlifting supplies like food and medicine to refugees, ensuring the distribution of humanitarian aid; providing medical assistance for refugees; protecting civilians in or fleeing from a conflict zone; and restoring survival support systems such as water lines, sewers, food storage facilities, power supply stations, and so forth. The UN agency specializing in humanitarian affairs describes such operations as “emergency relief and longer-term assistance . . . on behalf of people struck by emergencies.”24 For such activities, NATO has adopted the following definition: “A humanitarian intervention is an armed intervention in another state, without the agreement of that state, to address [the threat of] a humanitarian disaster, in particular caused by grave and large-scale violations of fundamental human rights.”25 This definition largely agrees with those put forward in the scholarly literature on this subject. In the words of Bhikhu

R-4

3/17/06

72

12:14 PM

Page 72

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

Parekh, humanitarian intervention is “an act of intervention in the internal affairs of another country with a view to ending the physical suffering caused by the disintegration or gross misuse of authority of the state, and helping create conditions in which a viable structure of civil authority can emerge.”26 Peacekeeping interventions include a wide range of activities. According to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, peacekeeping interventions use combined military, police, and civilian forces to “help implement peace agreements, monitor ceasefires, create buffer zones, or support complex military and civilian functions essential to maintain peace and begin reconstruction and institution-building in societies devastated by war.”27 When opinion surveys prompt questions on the subject of peacekeeping, they frequently use the term peacekeeping forces to clarify what is intended. However, such questions can also refer to peace enforcement, the maintenance of peace agreements, and so forth. Military force refers to a third party’s use of armed forces in explicit combat roles in an effort to overcome resistance on the part of the target state or movement. Direct military force or combat actions are implemented by third parties with the goal of decisively altering the balance of forces on the ground.28 For example, combat troops have been considered an option to stop aggressors in a civil war, such as in Bosnia, or in the case of genocide, as in Rwanda. Third parties usually resort to military interventions when other means are thought to be insufficient. In reference to military force, public opinion polls prompt respondents by referring to “the use of US troops . . . to end the civil war”; “sending troops . . . to fight and repel the aggressor”; “using armed forces . . . to try to stop the violence”; or “sending in ground troops to stop the killing.”

Analysis of the Data What tool does the American public prefer when dealing with ethnic conflicts? Can these preferences be generalized across cases, or are they regionspecific? To initiate a discussion of these issues, we examine 161 survey questions from ethnic conflict in eight countries, six in Africa and two in the Balkans. The questions have been broken down into three categories, based on descriptions of the types of interventions noted above. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the rank order relationship between the three intervention tools central to a discussion of public preferences. In both the African and Balkan cases, the public appears to prefer nonmilitary intervention, then OOTW, and lastly military force. Furthermore, in the chronological country-case figures (Figures 4.3 through 4.7), the hierarchy of public preferences is even more obvious: non-

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

Page 73

US INTERVENTION IN AFRICA’S ETHNIC CONFLICTS

73

Figure 4.1 US Public Opinion Support by Type of Intervention, African Cases

Note: African cases include Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, and Sudan.

military means receive the highest scores, closely followed by support for operations other than war, like humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping. These forms of action are both clearly preferred over military force. Descriptive statistics in Table 4.1 further demonstrate this rank order of preferences by giving the relative frequencies of support for each category of intervention. Clearly, the mean value of support for military measures is significantly lower than the others when it comes to confronting ethnic wars in both groups of counties. Furthermore, US public opinion also supported sending US troops to Liberia in summer 2003 for peacekeeping and combat operations. The mixed results for the African cases appear to be driven by the relatively large number of questions on nonmilitary intervention in South Africa (in twenty-one of twenty-five polls), which appears to be driving the overall frequency distribution for the African cases in this category. Bosnia and Kosovo are indicative of the rank order preferences generally. Hence, our overriding conclusion is that the public is largely opposed to sending US troops to fight to bring an end to ethnic civil war, as compared

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

Page 74

74 Figure 4.2 US Public Opinion Support by Type of Intervention, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo

Figure 4.3 US Public Opinion Support by Type of Intervention, South Africa, 1981–1994

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

Page 75

75 Figure 4.4 US Public Opinion Support by Type of Intervention, Somalia, 1992–1995

Figure 4.5 US Public Opinion Support by Type of Intervention, Rwanda, 1994–1995

R-4

3/17/06

76

12:14 PM

Page 76

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES Figure 4.6 US Public Opinion Support by Type of Intervention, Burundi, 1994–1996

to other less violent options; at the same time, the data seem to indicate that the level of public support for intervention is high relative to the level of actual government intervention. We also conducted a series of regression analyses to test the relative influence of the three types of interventions on the level of public support while controlling for four other factors prominent in the literature: multilateralism, presidential cues, congressional opposition, and risk (Table 4.2). An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to analyze the impact of our independent variables on the levels of support on the African cases (made up of eighty-four opinion polls), as well as on the comparative cases of Bosnia and Kosovo (seventy-seven polls). It is important to indicate that we examine three types of mutually exclusive interventions. However, because of the problem of perfect multicolinearity (that is, two of the three intervention types predict the third), one of these dummy variables had to be dropped from the regression analysis. The variable for nonmilitary intervention was therefore left out of the model, but its estimated value can be easily identified from the constant in Table 4.2. Doing so allows the level of support for nonmilitary interventions to be the benchmark by which the other tools and controls can be measured. That is to say, their coefficients indicate the estimated deviation from the level of support for nonmilitary force.

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

Page 77

US INTERVENTION IN AFRICA’S ETHNIC CONFLICTS

77

Figure 4.7 US Public Opinion Support by Type of Intervention, Liberia, 2003

Interestingly, the coefficients of the constant for the African and Balkan cases in Table 4.2 are very close. They both indicate a strong preference for such types of action. The expected score on an intervention using nonmilitary force is 70 percent of public support in the African cases and 63 percent for Bosnia and Kosovo. From that baseline, the coefficients for the other two types of intervention can be interpreted. Unfortunately, the estimations derived from the surveys concerning OOTW are not as statistically significant for the African cases. However, the negative direction in its coefficient makes some sense, suggesting a slightly lower expected value for public support of OOTW than nonmilitary force. The Balkan cases, however, are more revealing, perhaps because they were primarily thought of as OOTW. Their coefficient on the OOTW variable is highly significant and estimates that a set of responses in the sample on such a question would result in a score fifteen points lower than that of a nonmilitary force survey. Finally, the coefficients on military force in both groups of countries are highly statistically significant and negative. One would expect that a survey asking if the public supports sending US troops to fight the aggressors in the civil war in a given country would lead to a level of support twenty-one points (or about 51 percent) less than measures involving nonmilitary force in an African scenario, and thirty-one points lower (about 32

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

Page 78

78 Table 4.1

Mean Level of Support by Type of Intervention and Country Nonmilitary Force (n=) Yes

Bosnia (B) Burundi (A) Kosovo (B) Liberia (A) Rwanda (A) Somalia (A) South Africa (A) Sudan (A) Total (A) Total (B) Total (A and B)

8 0 5 0 1 3 21 0 25 13 38

62 — 68 — 76 88 62 — 65 64 65

OOTW

Military Force

No N/A (n=) Yes

No N/A (n=) Yes

No N/A

28 — 29 — 19 10 28 — 25 28 26

48 37 36 9 21 23 — 32 30 43 37

68 — 53 40 40 39 78 18 45 59 52

10 — 3 9 5 2 10 — 10 8 9

26 8 22 49 4 20 0 1 42 48 90

48 56 57 42 70 72 — 57 63 52 57

4 7 7 — 9 5 — 11 7 5 6

6 0 10 1 7 5 3 1 17 16 32

25 — 40 51 52 56 17 68 48 34 41

Notes: B = Balkans; A = Africa; N/A = no answer; — = no data available.

Table 4.2

Multivariate Analysis of Public Support for Intervention in Ethnic Conflict (ordinary least squares regressions)

Independent Variable OOTW Military force Multilateral Risk Presidential cue Congressional opposition Constant (nonmilitary force) R2 Adjusted R2 N

Africa

Balkans

All

–8.57* (4.004) –20.69*** (4.78) 7.01* (3.46) –13.14** (3.81) 6.83 (4.41) 5.74 (4.95) 69.64*** (4.43) 0.341 0.288 84

–15.16*** (3.41) –30.86*** (3.81) 5.01* (2.64) 4.32 (2.95) –0.46 (3.21) –5.82* (2.39) 63*** (3.48) 0.572 0.487 77

–9.89*** (2.82) –24.95*** (3.42) 5.06* (2.31) –3.48 (2.42) 1.31 (2.42) –6.85** (2.53) 66.4*** (2.72) 0.318 0.291 161

Notes: Estimated standard errors appear in parentheses. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.

7 — 7 9 8 5 5 14 7 7 7

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

Page 79

US INTERVENTION IN AFRICA’S ETHNIC CONFLICTS

79

percent) in Bosnia or Kosovo. Based on the data from our sample of polls, this reiterates the overall public preferences against military interventions and in favor of nonmilitary force measures and OOTW in dealing with ethnic conflict. An explanation of these results could be that Bosnia and Kosovo were fundamentally peacekeeping missions (within the OOTW set), whereas none of the African cases evolved into this type of operation. By far the most powerful variable in any of the models is the military force variable, which is always negative and statistically significant. This indicator plays a significant role in driving the results of this model.

Multilateralism Versus Unilateralism Does the American public have a preference for multilateral over unilateral intervention? Clearly, multilateral interventions in uncertain situations provide two clear advantages over unilateral action. First, such operations allow the United States to share the burden or risks involved with a potentially costly and/or dangerous operation. Second, they provide an added sense of legitimacy to any action when a large number of other countries feel that they have a shared interest in the initiative. This question on public preferences has been a recurrent theme in the public opinion literature. As Steven Kull and I. M. Destler argued in 1999, “Americans are highly sensitive about operations being either multilateral or unilateral.”29 Beyond a general sensitivity on this issue, a number of studies have demonstrated that the American public has exhibited a clear preference for multilateral interventions in a wide range of post–Cold War conflicts. 30 For Ronald Hinckley, “Most [of the American people] take a cooperative or multilateral stance, favoring modification of US interests to consider those of other countries.”31 The study of public attitudes regarding US intervention presented in this chapter comprises 161 public opinion polls when all the African and non-African cases are considered together and eighty-four polls when the African cases are analyzed separately. The data indicate that a preference for multilateral intervention does not exist for every type of intervention, but applies only to certain types of intervention (that is, mainly those dealing with highly coercive combat operations in which the risks and costs are high). We coded each question on the opinion polls we surveyed using a dichotomous variable to test for a public preference on this issue. We coded a “1” when a question contained direct references to a multilateral operation (e.g., UN, NATO, allies, international community, and so forth) and a “0” when the question referred to the United States acting alone. The following two tables summarize the breakdown of the percentages and numbers of polls associated with each country case (Table 4.3) and each intervention type in the African sample alone (Table 4.4).

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

Page 80

80

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

Table 4.3

Preference for Multilateral Intervention by Country Case Multilateralism

Bosnia (B) Burundi (A) Kosovo (B) Liberia (A) Rwanda (A) Somalia (A) South Africa (A) Sudan (A) Total (A) Total (B) Total (A and B)

Unilateralism

(n=)

Yes

No

N/A

(n=)

Yes

No

N/A

19 8 29 7 6 13 4 2 40 48 88

46 56 54 51 62 74 67 63 63 51 56

48 37 40 42 31 23 26 25 31 43 38

6 7 6 7 7 3 7 12 6 6 6

21 0 8 3 6 15 20 0 44 29 73

46 — 54 45 58 69 54 — 59 48 55

47 — 39 41 32 26 36 — 33 34 33

7 — 7 14 10 5 10 — 8 7 8

Notes: B = Balkans; A = Africa; N/A = no answer; — = no data available.

Table 4.4

Preference for Multilateral Intervention by Type, African cases Multilateralism

Nonmilitary force OOTW Military force Total

Unilateralism

(n=)

Yes

No

N/A

(n=)

Yes

No

N/A

7 22 11 40

76 62 59 63

19 32 34 31

5 6 7 6

18 20 6 44

61 66 27 59

28 27 65 33

11 7 8 8

Note: N/A = no answer.

Our data appear to run counter to those compiled by William Reilly (1999), who argued that, in general, Americans prefer multilateral approaches to unilateral ones in addressing international crises: “Seventytwo percent of the public . . . think the United States should not take action alone in responding to international crises if it does not have the support of allies.”32 No significant public preference calls for multilateralism (an overall average of 55 percent of respondents gave support to questions using unilateral language, and 56 percent supported questions mentioning multilateral action). In the African cases (Table 4.4), 63 percent favored multilateralism, and 59 percent preferred unilateralism.33 However, when the type of intervention is taken into account, interesting differences do emerge in our data.34 The public strongly prefers a multilateral approach in situations

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

Page 81

US INTERVENTION IN AFRICA’S ETHNIC CONFLICTS

81

where combat operations are envisioned (Table 4.4). These data seem to follow the logic suggested by Kull and Destler (1999), who indicated that “the majority is very hesitant about using military force unilaterally, but relatively comfortable with the idea of being part of a multilateral operation.”35 A similar preference for multilateralism (although less significant in magnitude) is seen concerning the use of nonmilitary force. Even though operations other than war (including humanitarian and peacekeeping missions) are considered to be primarily multilateral operations, our data set demonstrates no clear preference for them. The correlation between a preference for multilateralism and the level of public support is higher when the six African cases in our study are considered without Bosnia and Kosovo (all cases = 0.056, African cases = 0.1335). Both groups of cases show positive support for multilateral intervention. Questions indicating a preference for multilateral intervention have higher than average levels of support in the opinion polls, as compared with the polls referring to unilateral action. Although multilateralism has an effect on the support for intervention in ethnic-related conflicts, it is by no means the most important factor. In the eight-case model, the multilateralism variable was regressed with five other independent variables regarding the level of support from the public opinion polls. In both the eight-case and African-case analyses, the coefficient for multilateralism was positive and statistically significant (Table 4.2). That is to say, a relationship existed between higher than average levels of support and the possibility of a multilateral intervention, especially with the African sample. This analysis of our data runs counter to Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton’s conclusion that “multilateralism . . . is never statistically significant. Its coefficients are all small, sometimes positive, sometimes even negative.” That suggests that this variable is not a viable indicator of public preferences.36 Rather, our data tend to agree with Kull’s findings in 1995 that the public is more inclined to support intervention when the action involves a multilateral force. Furthermore, US public opinion does not seem to run parallel with congressional resistance to multilateralism over the past decade. Since the 103rd Congress (1993–1994), members of the House and Senate have been highly critical of any multilateral involvement, such as UN peacekeeping missions. This pressure from Congress even caused President Bill Clinton to back away from his earlier policy of “assertive multilateralism.” Reflecting this change of priorities, his speech before the UN General Assembly on September 27, 1993, not surprisingly emphasized the limits of US involvement in UN multilateral missions: “The United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world’s conflicts. . . . If the American people are to say yes to UN peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no.”37 Only a week later, after the deaths of nine-

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

82

Page 82

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

teen soldiers (eighteen US and one Malaysian) in Somalia, this feeling among US leaders became more pronounced. Senator Mitch McConnell (RKY) typified this growing sentiment, contending that “creeping multilateralism died on the streets of Mogadishu. . . . This is not just about Somalia. This is about how we should operate in the post–cold war world.”38 In sharp contrast to these opinions, the American public, in polls conducted by both the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) and the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), actually favored multilateralism over both unilateralism or isolationism at times when the United States confronted international crises.39 The 1999 CCFR report concluded that the American public preferred multilateral approaches by 72 percent to 21 percent when confronting international crises. 40 Leaders were more evenly split, with 48 percent favoring multilateral action and 44 percent supporting unilateralism.41 Our survey data point to a similar conclusion, but with some caveats. Thus the public has a clear preference for multilateralism when US troops are to be used to intervene and actively end a civil war. However, such a choice is not as apparent when the other foreign policy tools are discussed.

Risk Defined here in terms of potential or actual loss of American life, risk has been identified in the recent literature on public opinion as an important variable that requires serious attention. It must be analyzed in relation to other factors, particularly the type of intervention that is undertaken. As Eric V. Larson argues, “it is . . . the prevalence of a particular class of operation that explains the apparent recent low tolerance for casualties in US military interventions.”42 Jentleson and Britton reach a similar conclusion: “the public has limited tolerance for casualties, the limits vary somewhat with the PPO [principal policy objective] being pursued.”43 Our survey data also find risk to be related to the type of intervention. We coded a dichotomous variable linking the exposure of US troops to combat and the public attitudes on intervention. That is to say, we coded a “1” when the sending of US troops was strongly considered and fighting was going on in the theater of deployment; we coded a “0” once the situation had become relatively settled (that is, no regular combat) and a ceasefire was being respected. An example of the first would be Rwanda during the height of the genocide and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) advance (April to mid-July, 1994), while Bosnia after February 1996, regardless of a few minor incidents, would fit into the second category. Based on this coding, the data from our multivariate OLS model indicated that risk was negative and highly statistically significant for the six African cases, but not for Bosnia or Kosovo. The American public seems to

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

Page 83

83

US INTERVENTION IN AFRICA’S ETHNIC CONFLICTS

be hesitant about intervening in any African conflict where hostilities are ongoing. It is interesting to note, however, that the regression coefficient in regard to the African cases was negative, but American public responses were positive with respect to both Bosnia and Kosovo. That could mean that the American public was more risk-averse in the African cases than with regard to the Balkans. The explanation for such responses lies in two interpretations: the first is strategic, based on what is considered more important to US interests; the second is ethnic, based on Africans being accorded a lower priority than Eastern Europeans.

Influence of Elites What preferences do US leaders hold concerning intervention in African ethnic conflicts? Do significant gaps emerge between elites and the public on conflict management issues? When comparing the data in our previous tables with that in Table 4.5, two interesting points stand out. First, both the American public and opinion leaders share a preference for nonmilitary interventions and operations other than war while being extremely cautious about the use of military force. Second, the public and foreign policy leaders sometimes react differently to specific situations in different countries. The largest gap emerges in regard to the 1994 Rwanda genocide. Our survey data in Figure 4.9 show that one year after the genocide, some 70 percent of the American public thought that it would have been better to “have gone in with a large military force to occupy [Rwanda] and stop the Table 4.5

Assessments of US Opinion Leaders on Ethnic War in Africa Favor

Oppose

62

36

2

Do you agree with the use of US military forces if civil war broke out in South Africa? (1996)

3

84

13

Do you agree with the use of US military forces if renewed conflict in Rwanda threatened further acts of genocide? (1996)

18

60

22

Do you agree with sending US troops to deliver humanitarian aid to Somalia? (1996)

70

29

1

Do you agree with imposing economic sanctions on South Africa for its policy of apartheid? (1988)

Not Sure

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

Page 84

84

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

killings.” On the other hand, only 18 percent of foreign policy elites would have used US military forces if conflict reemerged in Rwanda and threatened further acts of genocide. This 50 percent disparity is somewhat of an anomaly in terms of the similarities of opinion that elites and the public held on dealing with other confrontations in Africa.44

Presidential Cues Because of the primacy of the executive in foreign affairs, it is understandable that the public could be influenced by arguments expressed by the president on a given foreign policy issue. A number of studies have examined the potential impact of presidential leadership on public opinion and reached similar conclusions regarding the president’s cue-making capacity.45 Illustrating this point with respect to Lebanon, Bruce Russett provides an interesting example of the direct influence of President Ronald Reagan on public opinion: The president’s speeches can be a powerful political tool. . . . A sharp and dramatic demonstration of this comes from a Washington Post/ABC threeday poll which happened to straddle the night of President Reagan’s speech on Lebanon of October 17, 1983. On the day before the speech 41 percent of the sample said they approved of his policy on Lebanon; on the following day the percentage was 52 (and within two months it had dropped back again).46

It seems logical that most of the time, as in the example above, a positive correlation would occur between a presidential cue and public opinion. However, such a cue can have negative as well as positive consequences. In the case of South Africa in the mid-1980s, we find an activist Congress seeking to impose sanctions on apartheid South Africa and being countered by strong resistance from the Reagan administration. While public opinion in favor of more restrictive sanctions averaged 74 percent during the two months prior to Reagan’s nationally televised speech on July 22, 1986, his address sent support on this issue plummeting to an average of 46 percent in the following months. Reagan’s negative impact on public support for sanctions lasted until well into 1987, when support began to return to the levels prior to the president’s speech. Here the president used his ability to cue the public to undermine a policy that he opposed. In order to control for any potential effect of presidential cueing, our study tested the relationship between cueing and public opinion by coding any presidential cue as a “1” when the president publicly took a position of support for action at the time of the survey in one of the country cases, and a “0” when the president did not publicly intervene around the time of the survey. The sources for this information, the Presidential Public Papers,

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

Page 85

US INTERVENTION IN AFRICA’S ETHNIC CONFLICTS

85

were available online from the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton presidential libraries.47 In this case, however, presidential cues did not appear to be statistically significant in either the African or non-African countries.

Congressional Opposition How does a disagreement between the executive and the legislative branches over the means of dealing with an ethnic conflict alter US public opinion? More specifically, can significant congressional opposition to the president’s position reduce the level of support for a given intervention, as is frequently argued in the case of Somalia? A number of researchers have looked into the question of how the emergence of deep divisions between the US Congress and the president can polarize public opinion.48 They frequently contend that when leaders agree that an operation is worthwhile, that increases public support for that action. When leaders are divided, however, the public tends to be similarly divided.49 This argument seems logical and was used in our analysis as an additional control for the impact of elites on public opinion. Using information available from the Congressional Record, we coded a “1” if there was significant opposition in Congress to the president’s position, and a “0” if there was not.50 Based on current research findings, we would expect congressional opposition to the president to lower public support for any type of intervention in an ethnic conflict. Our data indicate a negative correlation between congressional opposition and public support overall. This negative correlation is much stronger and statistically significant only concerning the African cases, which could be attributable to the influence of events in specific countries in our sample. First, South Africa, as was already briefly described, provides an example of when Congress advocated a foreign policy position, in this case antiapartheid sanctions opposed by the executive branch. Congressional opposition to President Reagan appears to have had a positive effect on the level of public support for sanctions against the apartheid regime. This case runs counter to the above-mentioned expectation regarding the impact of a disagreement between the two branches of government. Second, in the case of Somalia a strong dissensus between the US Congress and the president did not appear to have any real impact on public opinion. On October 15, 1993, about two weeks after the failed operation in Mogadishu left eighteen US soldiers dead, both houses of Congress passed a nonbinding resolution to push President Clinton to withdraw all US troops from Somalia and threatened a cutoff of funding for the operation if he failed to do so.51 The well-informed and highly respected Democratic senator Sam Nunn resisted calls for continued US military support to the UN mission, declaring: “Our role is too important in areas of the world that are

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

Page 86

86

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

significant to United States military interests to allow our military effectiveness to be dissipated in places where we have no economic and no security interests.”52 This shift in congressional support for the operation in Somalia was not reflected by a parallel downturn in public approval for the Somali intervention. Several polls taken shortly after the October 3 debacle indicate that just over 60 percent of the respondents still backed the humanitarian aspect of the US initiative in Somalia.53 These findings were in line with levels of support for the operation since its beginning. It seems that Congress’s position on withdrawal was not paralleled by an equally strong demand on the part of the American public.

The Impact of Demographics The impact of demographic characteristics on attitudes toward US foreign policy has been largely neglected in the public opinion literature. When analyzing the data from our sample, several interesting trends emerge with regard to the six categories of gender, party affiliation, education, income, age, and race. First, contrary to what one might anticipate, the data indicate that gender provides little analytic leverage in explaining public support for intervention into ethnic conflicts. Although a slight difference in preferences does exist between males and females, they are regular and relatively unchanging across cases, as well as across intervention types (see Tables 4.6 and 4.7).54 On average, women provide only five to six percentage points Table 4.6

Average Level of Support by Country: Impact of Gender and Race

Country

(n=)

Overall

Male

Female

White

Black

Rwanda Somalia Bosnia Kosovo

8 8 11 4

55 72 43 53

57 75 47 55

51 69 40 51

53 71 43 53

62 75 40 53

Table 4.7

Average Level of Support by Intervention Type: Impact of Gender and Race

Type Nonmilitary force OOTW Military force

(n=)

Overall

Male

Female

White

Black

4 20 8

59 59 38

64 61 41

54 56 35

59 59 37

58 59 45

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

Page 87

US INTERVENTION IN AFRICA’S ETHNIC CONFLICTS

87

less support than males for US involvement in ethnic wars. In light of these findings, gender cannot explain significant differences in levels of support on these issues. Second, party affiliation in the aggregate plays little role in forming public preferences on dealing with ethnic conflicts. This goes counter to Ole Holsti’s argument that as a general rule, party cleavages run deep on a wide range of foreign policy issues.55 The data gathered demonstrate that when our surveys are broken down by type of intervention, as well as along the multilateralism-unilateralism dimension, no clear relationship between party and support exists. However, an interesting pattern does become apparent when specific interventions are taken into consideration. For example, Republicans were somewhat more inclined to back the effort in Somalia because it had been initiated by the Bush administration. Seventy-four percent of Republicans favored the intervention, compared to only 67 percent of Democrats surveyed. Logically, it can be argued that Democrats favored action in Bosnia (48 to 40 percent) and Kosovo (58 to 48 percent) more than Republicans because the latter two were Clinton proposals. Partisanship may have had an impact during times of divided government. Thus, Republicans appear to have supported President Bush’s intervention in Somalia but opposed Clinton’s actions in support of opinions voiced by their party leadership in Congress. That could partially explain the Republican tendency to offer less support to the efforts in the Balkans. This partisan impact appears to run contrary to the conclusions drawn from our aggregate data concerning the significance of the impact of presidential cues and congressional opposition on public preferences. In this limited sample, elite influences on the public appear to be stronger when we control for both partisanship and targeted country. Third, both income and education have a significant positive relationship with the public’s support for intervention in the ethnic conflicts in our sample. As income and education (highly correlated) increase, so does the desire to get involved. On the other hand, age has a more complicated relation with support for intervention. Those aged eighteen to thirty show less support for intervention than those aged thirty to forty-nine. The widest gap is between those in the thirty to fifty-nine-year-old age range and respondents over seventy. When the use of military force is considered, those in the thirty to fifty-nine-year-old group support military action about 44 percent of the time, whereas the over-seventy age group is more cautious about intervention and prefers using military force only 28 percent of the time. This difference seems to contradict Holsti’s recent findings that “age based differences . . . were negligible.”56 Finally, race does appear to be a salient factor in specific cases, but not in others. Some writers detect a link between race and the level of

R-4

3/17/06

88

12:14 PM

Page 88

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

support for intervention in certain countries or regions. Thus, Miroslav and Donna Nincic note: “Black Americans may be somewhat more apt to approve of intervention in support of causes specifically involving countries with black populations, suggesting that social identity is a broad concept with a powerful impact.”57 On the surface, this idea makes sense. However, the information from our sample indicates that differences in support of using military force among blacks and whites cannot be generalized. Regarding the ethnic conflicts in Somalia and Rwanda, support for intervention among black Americans vis-à-vis whites reveals two interesting but clearly distinguishable patterns. With respect to the US intervention in Somalia (December 1992–March 1994), support among black Americans was inconsistent and at times lower than that of whites (see Figure 4.8). At the outset of the mission, blacks (compared to whites) preferred US military participation in the humanitarian relief effort by about 10 percent. This gap disappeared shortly after, and then reemerged in October 1993 when the eighteen US soldiers were killed in Mogadishu trying to arrest clan leader Mohammed Farah Aideed. Black Americans on average supported action in Somalia by only 4 percent more than whites over the

Figure 4.8 Support for Intervention in Somalia: Impact of Race

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

Page 89

US INTERVENTION IN AFRICA’S ETHNIC CONFLICTS

89

whole period of the military intervention, which is far from an overwhelming difference. Clearly, members of a US racial community may not always be more supportive of intervening in countries with populations of a similar demographic background than are the members of other racial communities. By contrast, the case of Rwanda shows a wide gap between black and white Americans. During the Rwanda genocide (roughly April 6, 1994, to July 16, 1994), African Americans overwhelmingly supported an armed intervention to stop the mass killings (see Figure 4.9). In this 100-day period, 52 percent of blacks supported using US combat troops to bring an end to the genocide, compared with only 36 percent of their white counterparts. This gap disappeared after the genocide, when white support for intervention rose dramatically and paralleled that of black Americans. However, polls in our sample from the other countries in Africa, as well as Bosnia and Kosovo, did not display such a striking divide. Unlike the support gaps that exist between men and women and between Democrats and Republicans, which are minimal on military force in ethnic conflicts, the gap between whites and blacks is at times highly salient.

Figure 4.9 Support for Intervention in Rwanda: Impact of Race

R-4 12:14 PM

Polls on African Cases (n=84)

Polls on Balkan Cases (n=77)

Dates

Source

Country

Burundi Burundi Burundi Burundi Burundi Burundi Burundi Burundi Liberia Liberia Liberia Liberia Liberia Liberia Liberia Liberia Liberia Liberia Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda

2/9–2/13/94 2/9–2/13/94 2/9–2/13/94 4/19–4/23/95 4/19–4/23/95 6/21–6/27/96 6/21–6/27/96 6/21–6/27/96 7/7–7/9/03 7/7–7/12/03 7/9–7/10/03 7/10–7/11/03 7/15–7/16/03 7/16–7/17/03 7/16–7/17/03 7/25–7/27/03 7/26–7/28/03 8/25–8/26/03 5/4–5/5/94 5/4–5/5/94 6/10–6/14/94 6/20–6/22/94 7/23–7/26/94 7/26/94

PIPA PIPA PIPA PIPA PIPA PIPA PIPA PIPA Gallup Technometrica Institute ABC, Washington Post Princeton Survey Research Opinion Dynamics Harris Harris Gallup Hart and Teeter Gallup Time, CNN, Yankelovich Yankelovich Hart and Teeter CBS News Los Angeles Times CBS News

Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia

Dates 7/17–7/19/92 7/17–7/19/92 8/12–8/14/92 8/29–8/30/92 2/25–2/28/93 2/25–2/28/93 5/27–5/29/93 6/5–6/6/93 6/21–6/24/93 9/23/93 10/8–10/10/93 3/4–3/8/94 4/21–4/23/94 4/21/94 4/21/94 4/21/94 4/21/94 11/27–11/28/94 12/7–12/8/94 6/4–6/5/95 6/4–6/5/95 6/8–6/11/95 7/27–7/28/95 9/9–9/22/95

Source Louis Harris and Assoc. Louis Harris and Assoc. Los Angeles Times Yankelovich Clancy Shulman ABC, Washington Post ABC, Washington Post CBS PIPA CBS, New York Times Yankelovich Gallup Hart and Teeter CBS, New York Times Yankelovich Clancy Shulman Yankelovich Yankelovich Yankelovich CBS Yankelovich CBS CBS Princeton Survey Research Princeton Survey Research Gallup (continues)

Page 90

Country

3/17/06

90

Appendix: US Public Opinion Polls, Dates, and Sources

R-4 3/17/06

Appendix, continued

Country

7/26/94 8/4/94 4/19–4/23/95 4/19–4/23/95 4/19–4/23/95 4/19–4/23/95 12/3–12/4/92 12/4–12/6/92 12/4–12/8/92 12/6/92 12/7–12/9/92 12/12–12/15/92 1/13–1/14/93 1/13–1/14/93 1/14–1/17/93 3/23–4/4/93 3/23–4/4/93 3/23–4/4/93 3/23–4/4/93 3/23–4/4/93 3/23–4/4/93 3/23–4/4/93 6/18–6/21/93 6/21–6/24/93

Source CBS News Time, CNN, Yankelovich PIPA PIPA PIPA PIPA Gallup Gallup Harris Polls CBS News CBS News, New York Times Hart and Breglio Yankelovich Yankelovich Los Angeles Times Market Strategies and Greenberg Market Strategies and Greenberg Market Strategies and Greenberg Market Strategies and Greenberg Market Strategies and Greenberg Market Strategies and Greenberg Market Strategies and Greenberg CBS News, New York Times CBS News, New York Times

Polls on Balkan Cases (n=77) Country Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Bosnia Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo

Dates 10/22–10/24/95 11/27/95 11/29–12/3/95 12/6–12/7/95 12/15–12/18/95 1/5–1/7/96 1/18–1/22/96 5/28–5/29/96 6/12–6/13/96 6/26–6/29/97 10/15–10/16/97 11/12–11/16/97 12/18–12/21/97 1/1/98 3/24–3/30/99 8/2–8/8/2001 2/8–2/9/99 2/19–2/21/99 3/11–3/14/99 3/19–3/21/99 3/24–3/25/99 3/25/99 3/25/99 3/26–3/29/99

Source

Page 91

Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia

Dates

12:14 PM

Polls on African Cases (n=84)

CBS, New York Times ABC News Associated Press Time, CNN, Yankelovich Gallup Gallup, CNN, USA Today ABC, Washington Post Gallup Time, Cable News Network Gallup, CNN, USA Today Harris Pew Research Center Gallup Gallup Princeton Survey Research Princeton Survey Research Gallup Gallup ABC, Washington Post Gallup Opinion Dynamics Yankelovich Los Angeles Times Princeton Survey Research

91

(continues)

R-4

Country

9/10–9/12/93 9/23/93 10/5/93 10/6–10/7/93 10/7/93 10/18–10/19/93 12/5–12/7/93 4/19–4/25/95 4/19–4/25/95 12/9–12/11/95 8/15–8/22/81 10/29–11/6/82 7/18–7/22/86 4/30–5/2/85 9/5–9/8/85 10/11–10/14/85 6/19–6/24/86 7/18–7/22/86 7/18–7/22/86 8/11–8/12/86 8/11–8/12/86 9/13–9/17/86 10/13–10/14/86 7/17–7/22/87

Source Gallup Yankelovich Gallup CBS News Yankelovich CBS News CBS News PIPA PIPA CBS News, NY Times Roper CCFR Louis Harris and Assoc. Yankelovich, Skelly and White Lousis Harris and Assoc. Gallup ABC News, Washington Post Louis Harris and Assoc. Louis Harris and Assoc. NBC News, Wall Street Journal NBC News, Wall Street Journal Gallup Gallup Louis Harris and Assoc.

Polls on Balkan Cases (n=77) Country

Dates

Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo

4/1/99 4/1/99 4/1/99 4/5–4/6/99 4/5–4/6/99 4/6–4/7/99 4/6–4/7/99 4/8–4/9/99 4/8–4/13/99 4/13–4/14/99 4/22/99 4/23–4/28/99 4/25–4/26/99 4/26–4/27/99 4/30–5/2/99 4/30–5/2/99 5/1–5/2/99 5/5–5/6/99 5/14–5/19/99 6/2–6/3/99 6/4–6/5/99 6/4–6/5/99 6/10/99 6/10/99

Source CBS Princeton Survey Research CBS CBS, New York Times ABC, Washington Post Poll Gallup Gallup Princeton Survey Research Louis Harris and Assoc. Gallup CBS ICR Survey Research Group ABC Gallup Gallup Gallup CBS Opinion Dynamics Louis Harris and Assoc. Opinion Dynamics Gallup CNN, USA Today Gallup ABC (continues)

Page 92

Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia Somalia South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa

Dates

12:14 PM

Polls on African Cases (n=84)

3/17/06

92

Appendix, continued

R-4 3/17/06 12:14 PM Page 93

Appendix, continued Polls on African Cases (n=84) Country South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa South Africa Sudan Sudan

Dates 3/22–3/27/88 9/8–9/10/88 11/8/88–1/20/90 2/15–2/18/90 6/21–6/26/90 6/21–6/26/90 7/6–7/10/90 6/20–6/24/91 6/27–6/30/91 10/7–10/25/94 7/9–7/15/2a004 7/9–7/15/2004

Source Marttila and Kiley Roper PIPA Gallup Harris Poll Harris Poll Hart and Teeter Louis Harris and Assoc. Gallup CCFR and Gallup PIPA PIPA

Polls on Balkan Cases (n=77) Country Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo Kosovo

Dates 6/11–6/13/99 6/16–6/19/99 6/25–6/27/99 3/15–3/19/2000 4/7–4/9/2000

Source Gallup Hart and Teeter Gallup Princeton Survey Research Gallup

93

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

94

Page 94

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

Conclusion When ethnic minorities are perceived as vulnerable in Africa, the US government and the general public has at times given limited and selective support to the idea of US responsibility to extend protection. Clearly, leaders and the public are more inclined to support US interventions to prevent ethnic victimization and build support for reconciliation when these actions involve nonmilitary force and multilateral cooperation than when they involve military action, coercion, and unilateralism. In approaching these decisions, the public has distinct preferences on when to use military force and is prepared to decide on its own about the desirability of intervening in the internal affairs of other countries to protect the vulnerable. And although multilateralism is strongly preferred when military intervention is involved, it is not equally strongly desired when nonmilitary intervention, humanitarian intervention, or peacekeeping options are under consideration (Table 4.4). Since the Cold War, the public’s preparedness to act as a protector of the vulnerable has remained at a moderate to low level. On the whole, the contemporary American public seems to be cautious and prudent, not given to irrational impulses on interceding in intrastate disputes abroad, as is so feared by the realist school of international relations. This opens the way to a contemporary consideration of the broad range of alternatives available to decisionmakers regarding intervention in ethnic-related conflicts within states. Clearly, as indicated by the mood both in Washington and at the United Nations, diplomatic manipulation is likely to be more in line with a wide spectrum of thinking on such intervention issues than either hegemonic control or large peacekeeping efforts. In these circumstances, soft power trumps hard power.58

Notes We wish to express our appreciation to Edmond Keller, Miroslav Nincic, Caroline Hartzell, Letitia Lawson, Philip G. Roeder, and Valerie Bunce for their helpful advice on this chapter. 1. Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 6 (November–December 2002): 102. See also Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild, and I. William Zartman, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996). 2. Donald Rothchild, “The Impact of U.S. Disengagement on African Intrastate Conflict Resolution,” in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in World Politics: The African State System in Flux (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000), 160–187. 3. Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001), 54.

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

Page 95

US INTERVENTION IN AFRICA’S ETHNIC CONFLICTS

95

4. Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 139. 5. Lexis-Nexis Universe, “Polls and Surveys.” See also Appendix in this chapter: US Public Opinion Polls, Dates, and Sources. 6. William Schneider, “The Old Politics and the New World Order,” in Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, eds., Eagle in a New World: American Grand Strategy in the Post–Cold War Era (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 63. 7. Ibid., 56. 8. Robert D. Kaplan, as quoted in Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 207. 9. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (December 2000): 795. 10. The phases of conflict are discussed in Donald Rothchild, “Third-Party Incentives and the Phases of Conflict Prevention,” in Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester, eds., From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003). See also Bruce W. Jentleson, ed., Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000). 11. Astri Suhrke and Bruce Jones, “Preventive Diplomacy in Rwanda: Failure to Act or Failure of Actions?” in Bruce W. Jentleson, ed., Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 261. 12. Donald Rothchild, “Third-Party Incentives,” 47–53. 13. Donald Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997), 203–204. 14. See the discussion of these breakdowns in Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa; also see Michael E. Brown, “The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict,” in Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 571–601; Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); and Bruce D. Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001). 15. See Joanna Spear, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” and Charles T. Call and William Stanley, “Civilian Security,” in Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousens, eds., Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 141–182, 303–325. 16. Walter Lippmann, The Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955); and Miroslav Nincic, Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Fallacy of Political Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992). 17. Bruce W. Jentleson, “Who, Why, What, and How: Debates over Post–Cold War Military Intervention,” in Robert J. Lieber, ed., Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the Century (New York: Longman, 1997), 47. 18. Michael Mandelbaum, “Foreign Policy as Social Work,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 1 (January–February 1996): 21. 19. John E. Rielly, ed., American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1999 (Chicago: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), 40. 20. Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa, 99, 103–104. 21. See Jennifer Morrison Taw and John E. Peters, Operations Other Than War: Implications for the U.S. Army (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995).

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

96

Page 96

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES 22. US Department of the Army, Force Manual 100-5: Operations, June 1993,

158. 23. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, June 16, 1995), viii. This joint doctrine identifies a wide variety of types of OOTW: arms control, combating terrorism, drug interdiction, enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations, enforcement of exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities, nation-building assistance/support to counterinsurgency, noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations, protection of shipping, show of force operations, recovery operations, support to insurgency. 24. UN Humanitarian Action, www.un.org/ha/moreha.htm. 25. Gareth Evans, “The Responsibility to Protect,” NATO Review (Winter 2002), www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue4/english/analysis.html. 26. Bhikhu Parekh, ”Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention,” in Jan Nederveen Pieterse, ed., World Orders in the Making (London: Macmillan, 1998), 147. 27. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, www.un.org/ Depts/dpko/dpko/ques.htm. 28. Donald Rothchild, “Third-Party Incentives,” 41–42. 29. Steven Kull and I. M. Destler, Misreading the Public: The Myth of New American Isolationism (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1999), 100. 30. Ole R. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Ronald H. Hinckley, People, Polls, and Policymakers: American Public Opinion and National Security (New York: Lexington Books, 1992); Kull and Destler, Misreading the Public; Bruce Jentleson and Rebecca Britton, “Still Pretty Prudent: Post–Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 4 (1998): 395–417; Steven Kull, “What the Public Knows That Washington Doesn’t,” Foreign Policy, no. 101 (1995): 102–115; William Chittick, Keith Billingsley, and Rick Travis, “A Three-Dimensional Model of American Foreign Policy Beliefs,” International Studies Quarterly 39 (1995): 313–331; William Reilly, American Public Opinion Report (Waukegan, IL: Lake County Press, 1995 and 1999). 31. Hinckley, “People, Polls, and Policymakers,” 18. 32. Reilly, American Public Opinion Report, 1999, 4. 33. The figures here are the average level of support in questions using language that refers to either a unilateral or multilateral action. For the most part, they are not, as in Reilly 1999, direct questions that present both unilateral and multilateral approaches in the same question. 34. Jentleson and Britton, “Still Pretty Prudent.” 35. Kull and Destler, Misreading the Public, 100. 36. Jentleson and Britton, “Still Pretty Prudent,” 412. 37. Congress and the Nation: A Review of Government and Politics, 1993–1996, vol. 9 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1997), 200. 38. Ibid. 39. CCFR and PIPA data, cited in Reilly, American Public Opinion Report, 1999, 4, 24–25, 35–40; Kull and Destler, Misreading the Public, 119, 124. 40. Reilly, American Public Opinion Report, 1999, 24–25. 41. Ibid. 42. Eric Larson, “Public Support for U.S. Military Operations,” RAND Research Brief, March 1996, www.rand.org/publications/RB/RB2502/RB2502.html. 43. Jentleson and Britton, “Still Pretty Prudent,” 406.

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

Page 97

US INTERVENTION IN AFRICA’S ETHNIC CONFLICTS

97

44. The four polls of US leaders were taken from the following source. Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, “Foreign Policy Leadership Project, 1976–1996” [computer file], ICPSR version, Durham, NC: Duke University/Washington, DC: George Washington University/Los Angeles: University of Southern California [producers], 1996; Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Science Research [distributor], 1999. 45. John Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley, 1973); Benjamin Page, Robert Shapiro, and Glenn Dempsey, “What Moves Public Opinion,” American Political Science Review 81, no. 1 (March 1987): 23–43; Richard Brody, Assessing the President (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991). 46. Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 36–37. 47. National Archives and Records Administration, Presidential Libraries, www.archives.gov/presidential_libraries. 48. John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for Military Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 75–97; and Eric V. Larson, “Putting Theory to Work,” in Miroslav Nincic and Joseph Lepgold, eds., Being Useful: Policy Relevance and International Relations Theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 174–233. 49. Larson, Casualties and Consensus, 91. 50. Congressional Record, online via GPO Access, www.access.gpo.gov/ su_docs/aces/aces150.html. 51. John Hirsch and Robert Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1995), 127. 52. Donald Rothchild, “The U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory on Africa,” SAIS Review 21, no. 1 (Winter–Spring 2001): 190. 53. Also see Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay, “The Myth of the Reactive Public: American Public Attitudes on Military Fatalities in the Post–Cold War Period,” in Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia, eds., Public Opinion and the International Use of Force (New York: Routledge, 2001), 205–228. 54. The gap between men and women on nonmilitary intervention is 10 percent, but our sample contains only four questions, all from Kosovo, thus creating a likely bias in our results. 55. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 183. 56. Ibid., 160. 57. Miroslav Nincic and Donna Nincic, “Race, Gender, and War,” Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 2 (September 2002): 547–568. Also see Ole Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 182. 58. Nye, The Paradox of American Power, 8–12.

R-4

3/17/06

12:14 PM

Page 98

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

Page 99

5 The Special Case of the Horn of Africa RUTH IYOB

AND

EDMOND J. KELLER

T

he purpose of this chapter is to critically assess the respective security challenges of the United States, the countries of the Horn of Africa, and the sometimes interconnected, contradictory policies that have emerged in the era of globalization.1 Although such challenges are present in all parts of the continent, the greater Horn region has been singled out for special attention in this book because of the high priority accorded it in the US global war on terror.2 Globalization in the Horn is a multidimensional process with different impacts on the region and the wider international state system. This region is both linked and fragmented by its history and geostrategic location as the bridge between Africa and the Middle East. Its contemporary hybrid nature—made more visible in the conflicts over identity, ideology, and resources—demonstrates that globalization has long-term, far-reaching, regional and international repercussions. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the United States has selectively engaged with and disengaged from the countries of the Horn, all of which are also involved in intrastate and intraregional conflicts. These relationships tend to be conducted mainly on the basis of considerations of realpolitik, rather than on an appreciation of the interface of their respective national interests with those of the United States.3 In the post–Cold War period, US policymakers have changed their former focus on combating communism to accommodating the new threat of international terrorism. The older focus in the US policymaking process failed to pay adequate attention to “the interplay of the regional, social forces at work at a given moment of history.”4 The collapse of the Somali state triggered the global dispersal of its people. The multiple crises in the Sudan, the unraveling of the Ethiopia-Eritrea alliance, and the insertion of Djibouti into the “war on terrorism” all indicate the need for a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the impact of globalization in the Horn. In this chapter we examine how the Cold War militarized both the states and societies of the 99

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

100

Page 100

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

Horn and seek to shed light on the complexity of the security challenges that characterize US-Africa relations, not only in the particular case of the Horn region but also with the other regions of the continent in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

The Horn of Africa and the United States Although the United States never had close relations with any African country (Liberia excepted), the onset of the Cold War and the strategic location of Eritrea and Ethiopia astride the Red Sea led to US development of a strategic alliance with Ethiopia that lasted for twenty-five years. In fact, after World War II, Ethiopia became the cornerstone of US involvement in the Horn of Africa.5 Following the Italian fascist occupation of Ethiopia, which lasted from 1936 to 1941, the British reinstated Emperor Haile Selassie and assisted him in administering part of modern-day Ethiopia until 1952. However, after 1943, British influence and involvement in Ethiopia declined rapidly. The emperor systematically cultivated a relationship with the United States, and when the last vestiges of a British presence in Ethiopia disappeared, the United States stepped in as Ethiopia’s main superpower patron. Beginning with the inclusion of Ethiopia in President Harry Truman’s Four Point Program, a reciprocal relationship developed between the two countries.6 The United States was interested in gaining a strategic presence in the Horn, and Ethiopia allowed it to establish a naval base and radio tracking station at Asmara, Eritrea. The presence of the Asmara tracking station enabled the United States to improve its ability to monitor the telegraphic traffic in the emerging communist bloc countries to the northeast. Ethiopia in turn received economic and military assistance from the United States. In May 1953, two diplomatic agreements were signed formalizing the relationship between the two countries: the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and the Agreement for the Utilization of Defense Installations within the Ethiopian Empire. A significant by-product of this new relationship was the political support Ethiopia received from the United States for its claims to Eritrea in the aftermath of the war.7 The US desire to maintain its access and presence in the region of the Horn led to its becoming more deeply involved in Ethiopia’s domestic affairs than strategic planners had ever imagined. Thus, US policy concentrated on keeping Haile Selassie in power and on keeping the Horn relatively stable and free from communism. In this way, the strategic interests of the United States came to intersect historically with Haile Selassie’s domestic and regional interests. A series of secret agreements between the two governments between 1960 and 1964 resulted in the modernization and dra-

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

Page 101

THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE HORN OF AFRICA

101

matic expansion of the Ethiopian military. The stated purpose of this venture was to prepare Ethiopia to respond successfully to whatever military challenge might come from independent Somalia, which claimed the Ogaden and Haud regions of southeastern Ethiopia.8 The US presence in the Horn has to be considered against the backdrop of the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s pronouncement in the mid-1970s of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which established the Kremlin’s commitment to support fledgling socialist states.9 Earlier, the United States and Ethiopia had held the balance of power in the Horn when the extent of armed conflict there involved armed militants in Eritrea and Somali irredentists, the latter aided by the government of Somalia. In the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union drew close to Somalia when the new regime of General Siad Barre proclaimed its commitment to governing on the basis of scientific socialism. Despite US displeasure with the military junta that overthrew emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 because of its gross violations of human rights, the United States felt compelled to “draw a line in the sand” against the expansion of communism in the Horn. The United States continued to maintain a relationship with Ethiopia despite its turn to the left under its new ruling military junta, the Derg. However, this changed with the election of Jimmy Carter to the US presidency in 1976. On assuming office, Carter did withhold military sales and grants to Ethiopia because of its human rights record, which led to a severing of the relationship between the two countries in April 1977. In the process the door was left open for the Soviet Union to step in as Ethiopia’s main superpower patron. The United States countered by increasing its efforts to woo Somalia away from the Soviets. From this point on, the United States saw its vital national interest as broadening its access and presence in the Horn. It actively considered direct military assistance to Somalia, though this assistance never became significant. What did become significant was the indirect military aid the United States provided via friendly third-party countries in the region (for example, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan).10 Also of significance was Carter’s decision to pursue an encirclement strategy with regard to Ethiopia. This strategy was designed to provide countries surrounding Ethiopia with economic and military assistance and thereby to hold communism at bay in the Horn. The United States asked Kenya, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Oman to allow their territories to be used as staging grounds for the US Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), which could be used to project US military might into the Middle East and Persian Gulf.11 In the process of pursuing what they perceived to be their own vital interests, the superpowers contributed to the escalation of a regional arms race in the Horn. While the United States and the Soviets competed for clients, the Ethiopians and Somalis stepped up their hostilities toward one

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

102

Page 102

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

another.12 Consequently, the military capacities of all the countries in the region, except for Djibouti, increased significantly between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s. 13 What was also significant by the mid-1980s was the growth in strength and activity of the armed nationalists in Eritrea, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), and armed opposition groups inside Ethiopia and Somalia.14 Their growth created a widespread sense of physical insecurity in the Horn, with devastating effects on human security in the region. Border tensions, civil wars, and the natural catastrophe of drought compounded the problems of Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia. The collapse of the Somali state demonstrated the multiple and deleterious effects of both the irredentist campaigns against Ethiopia and the civil war.

The End of the Cold War and Political Islam The end of the Cold War was accompanied by the escalation of intrastate conflicts and an upsurge of environmental and humanitarian crises in the Horn. The events of the mid-1980s and early 1990s amply demonstrated the political, economic, and social repercussions of the end of the Cold War on intrastate and intraregional relations. In Sudan, the post-Numeiri regime (1985–1989) signaled the death knell of the prospects for pluralist democracy and secularist government. Numeiri’s successors, Suwar al Dahab and Sadiq al-Mahdi, cemented the coalition of traditional and radical Islamists, and they embarked on a foreign policy path that relegated the United States to a secondary position vis-à-vis Sudan’s new patrons in North Africa and the Middle East, Libya and Iraq, respectively. This course marked a defiant articulation of anti-Americanism that gradually culminated in 1996 in a break in diplomatic relations. The regime of Sadiq al-Mahdi (1986–1989) was beset by the traditional rivalry between the two major sectarian parties and a civil-military coalition comprising militant Islamists who until this period had been kept on the periphery of the political arena.15 Political assassinations and acts of terror became almost commonplace in Khartoum. Also, unrest raged in Darfur, and the civil war in the south continued unabated in the absence of a real commitment to a just peace.16 It was during this period that the tribal militias of the Baggara17 of the west-central part of the country—precursors of the now infamous Janjaweed18 militia who operate in the Darfur region— were formed at the initiative of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi.19 The multiple crises that have engulfed contemporary Sudan—from the western borderlands of Darfur to the eastern Red Sea Hills and the war-ravaged southern regions—can be understood as the regionalization and internationalization of domestic problems long left unaddressed.20 A coup d’état

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

Page 103

THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE HORN OF AFRICA

103

that took place in 1989 led to the establishment of a theocratic Sudanese state. On the one hand, the theocracy was a culmination of the long struggle of Islamists against local communists and liberal capitalists, and on the other hand, it indicated the opening of a new chapter of open animosity against the West in general and the United States in particular.21 An escalation of violence in the late 1980s in Somalia between armed rebels and the government forces operating from inside as well as outside the country led to the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. As a result of treaties with the regime, the government forces as well as the various rebel groups all had access to arms from both the United States and the Soviet Union. More than any other country of the Horn, Somalia demonstrates the negative impact of the Cold War’s simultaneous militarization and globalization of local and regional conflicts. The post-1969 modernizing Somali state under Siad Barre “banned” ethnic and clan-based affiliations as ways of mobilizing political support. It introduced “scientific socialism”22 as the only official ideology, which led to resentment on the part of the majority of inhabitants who continued to practice traditional forms of eclectic, Sufi Islam. The dominance of the country’s strongman, Siad Barre, stultified the fluid socioeconomic and political modes of organization and resulted in the alienation of Somalis, except, of course, those enjoying the favors of the ruling elite. A result of this societal disengagement was the economic and political exodus of Somalis to the Middle East and Italy.23 The growth of the Somali diaspora and the community’s exposure to the outside world led to the creation of expanded links between Somalis in the homeland and in the rest of the world and in the process integrated all Somalis into the escalating process of globalization. It was done not only through remittances of foreign currency but also using modern communication technologies, new ideologies, and new concepts of political alignment. In fact, the large-scale migration of Somali workers to the Middle East and elsewhere from the 1970s until the early 1980s led to the growth of a remittance economy (much like that of Sudan during the same period) and the emergence of a diasporic community with political clout.24 However, the decline in the Middle East’s oil boom led to a shrinking of remittances that had enabled many communities to survive while avoiding confrontation with the state. It was at this juncture that new converts to Wahabbi Islam, which came into the country through the Somali diaspora, clashed with the indigenous Ahmadiyya and Quadriyya tariqas (religious brotherhoods), which were later expressed as interclan conflicts. The north, historically linked to the Wahabbists because of the preponderance of adherents of the Salihiyya (one of three Sufi orders that dominate Somali Islam, personified by the anticolonial hero Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan, who had studied in Saudi Arabia under Wahabbi tutelage), proved more amenable to the gradual Islamization of its society. Meanwhile, southerners viewed this

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

104

Page 104

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

revival of faith-centered conflict as a continuation of internal differences among Somalis.25 The growth of Islamic charities, established by adherents to local tariqas as well as new Somali converts to Wahabbism, loosened the hold of state institutions on both urban and rural communities.26 These Islamic charities proved adept at evading the reach of the state and competed with Western nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), whose links with corrupt governmental institutions rendered them useless to the majority of impoverished Somalis struggling to survive on the margins of the state.27 Such factors created a new political space that linked Somalis to the outside world and highlighted their subaltern relationship to the West. They also displayed the potential for political renewal and religious redemption in the revival of Islam. In an environment where the boundaries of the Somali body politic had been shattered by violence, chaos, famine, and the ineffective yet disturbing presence of foreign troops, Somalis divided along clan lines, ideologies, and religious tariqas throughout the 1990s. They were plunged into a Hobbesian world, where communities were turned against each other in the pursuit of power, resources, and legitimacy. Submerged historical conflicts, which had been subordinated to the larger goals of pan-Somalism and nationalism, reemerged with the collapse of state institutions and superpower patronage. Such forces had held the country together for three decades. The northsouth divide—between the former British Somaliland and Italian Somalia— exploded into full force, bringing with it the religious-cum-clan cleavages that had characterized the two regions’ relationship in the colonial and postcolonial period.28 Thus the “globalization” of Somali political and ethnoregional conflicts was accelerated by the UN-sponsored and US-led humanitarian intervention in 1992. This resulted in numerous new security challenges for the Somali state, the region, and the international state system.29 By the turn of the twenty-first century, thousands of Somalis had fled to neighboring countries, spilling over the country’s borders and presenting numerous security and economic challenges to the host countries.30 Inside the country Somalis did not fare better, as they were victimized by the arbitrary violence meted out by warlord-directed youth gangs known as Mooryan,31 which, like the Sudanese Janjaweed, vied for control of territory and resources. As the Somalis became ungovernable, their traditional modes of consensus no longer functioned; so too did the universalizing ethos of Islam prove unable to unify the nation. Islamists continued to succeed in communal reconstruction projects, but they did not attract international attention until the events of September 11, 2001. Following this event, it was common for US policymakers to consider all radical Islamists as security threats.

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

Page 105

THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE HORN OF AFRICA

105

On September 26, 2001, Al-Ittihad al-Islami (Islamic Union), which had been in existence since the 1980s, was put on the US list of terrorist organizations, as well as the Somali company al-Barakat, a financial clearinghouse for diaspora remittances to the homeland using the age-old network of disbursement known as hawala.32 It appears that policymakers lumped the Islamists together as a “terrorist threat” without regard to their objectives or actions. They proved unable to decipher the factors that would result in either the “fusion” or “fission” of Somali communities.33 Somalia, lacking a political center and beset by vying warlords supported by their regional and international supporters, demonstrates a key feature of a highly globalized society where “political space and political community are no longer coterminous with national territory, and national governments can no longer be regarded as the sole masters of their own or their citizens’ fate.”34 If Somalis cannot effectively lead their country out of this morass and if the United States and the international community remain unwilling to contemplate a new role other than a watered-down version of encirclement by neighboring allies, they risk alienating Somali citizens inside and outside the country. In doing this, they lend credence to the call from militant Islamists for an Islamic alternative to Somalis’ Hobbesian existence. It remains apparent that the key to reducing the multiple security challenges posed by an unstable Somalia lies within the Somali nation. US relations with other states in the Horn—notably Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Eritrea—also need to be conducted with an awareness of regional dynamics, particularly in light of the practice of incumbent regimes arming dissidents in neighboring countries.35 In Ethiopia, the reduction of Soviet aid to the Marxist regime in the late 1980s gradually weakened the regime’s capacity to win the war against the coalition of Ethiopian and Eritrean armed opposition groups. The regime took harsh reprisals against the Ethiopian officers who launched an abortive coup in 1989. The brutality against the coup makers had the unintended effect of turning the usually stalwart Ethiopian society against the regime’s heavy-handed approach and fueled the wars in Eritrea and the central part of the country that had dramatically escalated in 1988–1989. The rural majority, from whose ranks were drawn the soldiery of the Ethiopian Armed Forces, quietly withdrew its support from the regime’s unitary policies. Desertions became more frequent in the army, as well as defections to one of the guerrilla groups with bases in the northern, central, and southern parts of the country. The US involvement in negotiations between the warring parties provided much-coveted legitimacy for the Ethiopian and Eritrean guerrilla groups and altered the balance of power between the Menghistu government and its opponents. A number of factors contributed to the establishment of new regimes in both areas and, in the case of Eritrea, a new state:

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

106

Page 106

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

(1) the demise of the Soviet Union and its attendant consequences for client states, (2) the guerrilla groups’ abandonment of their anti-American ideologies, and (3) rebel success in holding on to territorial gains from which the Ethiopian army was evicted. Key agreements were reached between the Ethiopian government and its main adversaries, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)/Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), in numerous negotiations held in the United States, the Middle East, and Europe. In May 1991, the victorious armies of the EPLF and EPRDF marched into the capitals of Eritrea and Ethiopia, respectively, after having secured an agreement for US assistance for postwar reconstruction. The guerrillas’ long experience in dealing with international aid agencies as well as with the representatives of both the United States and the Soviet Union had provided them with knowledge of how to parlay their position as former socalled secessionists and terrorists to the laudable category of a “new breed of African leaders” now gaining influence on the continent.36 Past recipients of Soviet largesse, they were now showered with praise as the saviors of their respective countries from both the old threat of communism and the new threat of Islamist terrorism emanating from neighboring Sudan. By 1991, it appeared that the lessons of the past, especially those learned from the cycles of US engagement and disengagement, had been understood and applied to their respective “national” interests by the Islamists of the Sudan, the warlords of Somalia, and the guerrillas-turned-statesmen of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Radical Islam, Regional Alliances, and International Terrorism The end of Cold War competition between the superpowers in the Horn coincided with the emergence of a clash between secular and religious nationalism. This new global struggle was most pronounced with respect to how the secular state dealt with radical Islamists. Radical Muslims supported by the United States had succeeded in ousting the forces of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. The end result of this unlikely alliance between the multinational forces of the mujahidin—which included Africans—was the dissemination of jihad and the mujahidin’s acculturation into the shadowy world of international terrorism.37 The new leader of an international network espousing an anti-Western mentality and a radical transformation of Islam was a Saudi, Osama bin Laden, who upon his return home was regarded as a threat and stripped of his Saudi citizenship. He was granted asylum in Sudan in 1991, where he

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

Page 107

THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE HORN OF AFRICA

107

stayed until 1996, when he moved his headquarters to Afghanistan. Bin Laden established a number of commercial enterprises as well as his global radical network, known as Al-Qaida.38 Sudan’s clear endorsement of radical Islam in 1993 landed that country on the US list of states harboring terrorists.39 Bin Laden himself claimed to be committed to the purest form of Islam, and he asserted a preparedness to wage a holy war against its enemies, including the United States and Israel.40 Bin Laden developed close relationships with similar groups, such as the Egyptian Islamic Group,41 also present in Sudan and associated with Hassan Turabi’s Islamic Charter Front.42 The increased appearance in the early 1990s of radical movements seeking to create Islamic states in such countries as Egypt, Eritrea, and Ethiopia had become a concern for the secular governments of the region. The danger became patently evident in 1995 with the failed assassination attempt against the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, in Addis Ababa on the occasion of the annual summit of the Organization of African Unity. The responsibility for the failed assassination attempt was placed squarely on Sudan’s shoulders by Ethiopia, Egypt, and the United States. However, Sudan claimed it was not harboring these individuals, and therefore it could not honor a request to extradite them in order to stand trial. From that point on, relations between Sudan and its neighbors in the Horn became strained. Ethiopia and Eritrea, along with Uganda, began to support movements to bring down the Omar El-Bashir government. The United States was also concerned over the growing influence of Sudan-based terrorist organizations, particularly Al-Qaida. In February 1996, fearing for the safety of US citizens, Washington made a decision to shut down the US embassy in Khartoum. Increased human rights violations by government troops and their associated militias led to Sudan being castigated by its European allies, which created the conditions for a possible international consensus that could strengthen the effects of US sanctions on Sudan. The National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Sudan came under increasing pressure to provide its global partners with concrete evidence that it did not harbor terrorists and that it would negotiate in good faith with the southern rebels to bring about a lasting peace. Diplomatically, the Sudanese government agreed to “turn over” bin Laden to the United States, but in fact it allowed him to move his network to the staunchly anti-American Taliban-led regime in Afghanistan.43 From Sudan, bin Laden created a system of cells that dispersed throughout the Horn and East Africa. Cell members became active in local Islamic communities in the countries where they lived; they developed businesses, held jobs, got married, and had children. It was from cells on the coast of Kenya and Tanzania that Al-Qaida launched the deadly 1998

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

108

Page 108

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

attacks on US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. When it was discovered that Al-Qaida had been behind these attacks, the United States assumed the complicity of Sudan and launched a cruise missile attack on a pharmaceutical factory near Khartoum suspected of producing key chemical ingredients that could be used in terror attacks.44 Al-Qaida cells operated throughout the Horn and East Africa. That they were undetected by the various intelligence units of the countries in the region became evident when the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, was hit by a terrorist attack in November 2002. At the same time, terrorists attempted to bring down a plane filled with Israeli tourists with a shoulder-held surface-to-air missile.45 The second attack drove home the urgency of developing the capacity to effectively combat terror in the region to the governments of the Horn, East Africa, and the United States. While domestic and regional horror hung over the carnage that the attempted plane bombing might have entailed, grassroots resentment grew among impoverished local communities who felt victimized by the global wars and “counterwars” taking place on their own terrain between the United States and its adversaries. The bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam had clearly targeted symbols of US power in the world. The attempt on Israeli tourists in Mombasa further demonstrated how the Horn had become the site for the proxy battles between the United States, its allies, and its new enemies. Thus far, the emphasis by analysts has been on “international terrorism,” but they have tended to ignore the impact of such issues on local communities and how grassroots perceptions affect US-Africa relations. Failure to understand local perceptions and responses to the US use of power within those countries may well have led US decisionmakers to overlook the ways by which “international terrorists” have gained footholds among the local populations. Misuse of aid funds by ruling elites resulted in the inflation of local currencies, which curtailed the buying power of the average citizen already suffering from low wages and chronic impoverishment. The George W. Bush administration’s dramatic policy shift—from one of disinterest in African affairs to the unprecedented declaration that African oil constituted “a strategic national interest”46—left different African constituencies bewildered and feeling betrayed by the superpower that had promised to support economic development and democracy in the new millennium.47 Although different constituencies responded differently to the socioeconomic and political reverberations of superpower policy decisions, the US support given to authoritarian regimes that joined the US coalition against “terror” may well have fueled local resentment. In doing so, the United States created the conditions for the emergence of a countercoalition of those who take umbrage at being victimized by the strategic priorities of an angry and threatened superpower.48

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

Page 109

THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE HORN OF AFRICA

109

US-Africa Relations After 9/11 Even though the United States has considered the Horn of Africa to be a major source of international terrorism for more than a decade, it made halfhearted efforts to combat terrorist activities until after September 11, 2001. In 2002, demonstrating its resolve to develop partnerships with the countries of the Horn and to assist them in developing the capacity to fight terrorism in the region, the United States created the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), to be headquartered in Djibouti. This collaboration represented a major shift in US policy, since until this time, relations with Djibouti had been minimal.49 A military base was established for US personnel at Camp Lemonier near the Djibouti International Airport. Some 1,800 troops are now based there, but an additional 400 task force troops are aboard the USS Mount Whitney, a so-called fighting command ship anchored in the Gulf of Aden. The mission of CJTF is to gather intelligence on an ongoing basis and to deter, preempt, and disable terrorist threats from wherever they may emanate in the region. Presently, the most serious threats would seem to be found in Somalia, Kenya, and Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula. In June 2003, President Bush announced a $100 million package of counterterrorism measures to be disbursed over a fifteenmonth period. Half of these funds were for coastal security programs and other border security programs, including those in Africa.50 CJTF personnel have been involved throughout the Horn, operating as liaisons to governments and their security establishments. US military personnel work closely with counterparts in Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea, and Djibouti, providing counterterrorism training.51 In Kenya, for example, they provide support under the State Department’s antiterrorism assistance program, which has been in place since the 1980s, including detection and the disarmament of bombs, postblast investigation, VIP protection, crisis management exercises, and hostage negotiations.52 In addition to training, CJTF’s work involves information sharing. In the case of Ethiopia, the information shared relates to the “long porous border that exists between Ethiopia and Somalia to assist in locating potential places where terrorists may or may not attempt to cross.”53 Cooperation with Djibouti grows in part out of US concerns about a threat from the activities of Al-Ittihad, a terrorist group based in the former Somalia. As of early April 2004, the efforts of CJTF had begun to bear fruit. In testimony before the US House Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, terrorism expert and former US ambassador to South Africa Princeton Lyman noted that CJTF had recently reported the arrest of members of terrorist organizations in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya, and Djibouti.54 The United States now finds itself unable to ignore a new reality that emphasizes the garnering of local and regional support for what it calls the

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

110

Page 110

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

“war on terror” and the need to acquire more reliable energy sources that would lessen its dependence on its traditional Middle Eastern oil-producing allies. Six years after the turn of the millennium, the United States finds itself supporting ruling elites who are manipulating US strategic interests in order to consolidate their objectives of security and access to resources.55 The Horn’s geostrategic significance for US national interest during the Cold War has not receded. Rather, it has attained an important economic dimension with the development of Sudanese oil and the threat that global terrorists will close off access to new sources of energy. This convergence and divergence of domestic, regional, and international interests have led to the formulation of policies that may engender more conflict and therefore result in policies inimical to the US quest for secure access to energy sources and the elimination of the new threat of international terrorism. Contemporary “terrorists” in the Horn have taken the place of the previous “communist threat.”56 This changed situation has prompted countries in the region to pass antiterrorist legislation and to issue public pronouncements that they are willing partners in the global war on terror. Since 9/11, the United States has increased its delivery of technical and military assistance to its allies in the Horn, predicated on their “willingness” to sign on to the US strategic priority of “combating global terror.”57 Although some Africans might grant the urgency of the terrorist threat and the necessity that lay behind the alliances created during the 2001–2006 period, they nonetheless expressed doubts. For example, how is US assistance to the regimes of the Horn being utilized to “combat global terror”? What is the nexus between US aid to incumbent regimes and the security of both the states and societies of the region? Does the shift in US policy from emphasizing democratization and development (1992–2000) to securing strategic resources such as oil and enhancing the capacity of antiterrorist forces (2001–2006) signal a relapse to Cold War priorities of ensuring the stability and security of allied regimes? At present, the United States is developing significant relationships with the countries of the Horn regarding regional and global security matters. Given the eruption of new and old conflicts that threaten to engulf the region in humanitarian crises as well as political imbroglios, US engagement—diplomatic, humanitarian, or economic—appears to be unavoidable. But in order to meet its objectives, the United States may need to revisit the not-so-distant past and reexamine lessons learned as well as lessons yet to be learned. A gross omission in the calculus of contemporary US policymakers dealing with the Horn remains the inadequate attention to the widespread problems of poverty and general human insecurity. It almost goes without saying that no state and no regime can be secure, the well-endowed antiterrorist alliance notwithstanding, if its citizens are mired in poverty and

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

Page 111

THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE HORN OF AFRICA

111

perpetually insecure in their homes, lives, and livelihoods. The truth of that proposition is starkly evident everywhere in the Horn.

Poverty and Human Security The countries of sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn of Africa are among the poorest in the world, with an average annual per capita income estimated at $450. Among the countries under consideration, only Djibouti ($900) is ranked among the middle-income countries of the world (but at the low end).58 The other four range from Kenya ($560) to Sudan ($350) to Eritrea ($160) to Ethiopia ($100).59 Such grinding poverty is at the heart of the human security dilemma. Poverty is closely related to a myriad of other social problems, such as disease and the lack of educational opportunity, adequate shelter, and food. Food insecurity is intimately tied to environmental insecurity, and it is widely believed that these problems must be addressed simultaneously. An effective approach would involve a broad assault on interlinking issues of political and economic insecurity and a lack of social justice and equity throughout a given society. Food security requires that all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet their fundamental dietary needs for a healthy life. 60 Throughout the Horn, that is not the case. Many people who live in the Horn suffer from chronic hunger, malnutrition, and dislocation brought on by natural catastrophes such as drought and flooding and manmade problems associated with war.61 Food insecurity is particularly severe in places that are being ravaged or that have recently been ravaged by civil wars and border conflicts. For example, a twenty-oneyear civil war in southern Sudan created massive human dislocation and human misery in the south of the country. In 2003–2004, Sudan had a record cereal crop, up 63 percent over the previous year’s harvest. However, over the same period a new civil war front opened in western Darfur Province, where more than 3 million people are affected and more than 1 million have been driven from their land and into exile as refugees.62 A recent UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) report indicates that people in the region have lost the bulk of their last harvest, and the next planting season will no doubt be negatively affected if the conflict continues.63 During the thirty-year war for independence waged by Eritrean nationalists against Ethiopia, hundreds of thousands of Eritreans were driven into exile in Sudan. Since 1995, 100,000 have been repatriated by the United Nations. Most of these returnees are expected to be farmers, but they are immediately confronted with the fact that Eritrea is in the midst of a five-

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

112

Page 112

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

year drought, and presently 2.6 million people, 60 percent of the population, face food shortages. This compares to 1.9 million who faced a food crisis in 2004. The root cause of this problem is clearly related to war—the war for independence and the more recent border war with Ethiopia. The border war has been over since 2000, but the Eritrean government remains on a military footing, stretching its meager resources in order to be prepared for the possible renewal of fighting. This situation naturally affects the ability of the government to address problems of food insecurity and poverty.64 Civil unrest in the former Somalia is also at the heart of a current food security crisis. It is estimated that at least 123,000 people in the area face a food security crisis, with 95,000 people in a “critical emergency situation.” The main reason for this situation is a serious shortfall in the production of cereal crops.65 A deeper examination of the food security crises, though, points to the larger issues of the absence of sovereignty, little coordination of the institutions of governance, and the inability of the current regime to obtain regional and international recognition. With sovereignty and the right to rule being contested by different groups and with these groups vying for international aid as well as recognition, US policy on Somalia has tended to fail to take the wider dimensions of the food security crisis into account. It focuses solely on humanitarian aspects and disregards the role of Somali society and its particular forms of democratic institutions.66 As a consequence, it is unable to face up squarely to the failures of its 1992 intervention, which culminated in the withdrawal of US and UN forces in 1993–1994. In 2003, Ethiopia experienced its worst dry spell since the devastating 1984–1985 drought and famine, in which 1 million people died of starvation. In this most recent drought, 14 million people were at risk of famine and malnutrition; that compares to 1 to 3 million in the average year. The food crisis was the result of the interplay of many factors: • inadequate and erratic rains over short and long rainy seasons, which resulted in widespread crop failure in eastern and southwestern Ethiopia • slow recovery from the 1999–2000 food crisis that impoverished many communities • a rapid rise in grain prices • the lack of short-season produce • a shortage of seeds • significant livestock deaths and poor terms of trade for livestock • deterioration in the nutritional status of people living in the affected area67 Another factor that must be taken into account is the historical inappropriateness of Ethiopia’s agrarian system.68 Berhanu Abegaz argues that the

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

Page 113

THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE HORN OF AFRICA

113

agrarian systems set up by the imperial as well as the Marxist regimes in Ethiopia led to a failure of the national economy and thus to abject poverty in rural areas. He goes on to argue that two-thirds of children are malnourished, and nearly half of the population falls below the national poverty line.69 During the border conflict with Eritrea, the international donor community did not respond as readily to the food security needs of Ethiopia as the situation demanded. Although Ethiopia’s relations with donors had improved by 2003, other factors have placed a drag on development and consequently food security (for example, Ethiopia’s heavy debt burden, tensions over the final demarcation of the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the slow pace of trade liberalization, and charges of continued violations of human rights by the EPRDF government). Given the warming of relations between Ethiopia and the United States, how has the United States responded to the current crisis of food security in Ethiopia? In late October 2002, the United States declared a disaster in Ethiopia as a result of the continuing drought situation. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) famine early warning system has noted a seventeen-year trend of insufficient rainfall in Ethiopia that has had a negative impact on crop production.70 In 2003, the United States provided Ethiopia with almost a half billion dollars in food aid, accounting for half of the total donor contributions. However, this sum must be considered against the backdrop of Ethiopia’s non–food development assistance needs. Over the same period the United States provided Ethiopia with only $55 million in nonhumanitarian assistance, and only $6 million of that was for agricultural development.71 Donors and the Ethiopian government alike realize that Ethiopia’s problems with chronic famine are never going to be dealt with adequately unless its underlying causes (for example, poverty, poor health care, education, infrastructure, water, roads, soil erosion, and so forth) are addressed simultaneously. 72 One Ethiopian official, Tewolde Egziabher of the Ethiopian Environmental Protection Authority, recently asserted that the Western donor community was in part responsible for the slow progress the country was making toward food self-sufficiency. For example, he said, Western governments and international financial institutions insist that government get out of the business of controlling the food supply and leave this task to the private sector. 73 In the process, according to one report, the Ethiopian government is being prevented from building granaries and food depots that could store grain from one year to the next.74 The gap between US humanitarian assistance and developmental assistance to Ethiopia is obvious to even the casual observer. As noted earlier, what seems to drive US involvement in Ethiopia, as well as in the Horn in general, has more to do with perceived US national security interests related to international terrorist threats than with Ethiopia’s real needs. Ethiopia has

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

114

Page 114

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

developmental needs at least equal to its security needs. It receives about $1 billion a year in development assistance from all sources. It is estimated that to begin to see real progress, the country would need to receive at least $5 billion in international development assistance each year.75

Conclusion In the context of the changed global environment since the end of the Cold War, the Horn of Africa has assumed renewed importance in the foreign policy calculations of the United States. International terrorists may find fertile ground in countries such as those located in the Horn of Africa, plagued by chronic poverty, underdevelopment, and social inequalities. It is imperative that the United States denies international terrorists the opportunity to use poor countries as incubators for their destructive agenda. Given the current circumstances, both the United States and the countries of the Horn should enter into a wider partnership to overcome vulnerabilities these countries face in coping with insecurity and lack of development. More specifically, both the United States and the countries of the Horn must come to see the problems of political insecurity and human security in the region as being critically intertwined.76 Poverty and underdevelopment inhibit not only the development of political democracy but also economic progress and human security in general. Unless these two dimensions of the security threat emanating from the Horn are simultaneously acknowledged, neither problem will be adequately addressed. It is interesting and important to note that the United Kingdom and France have gone on record making African poverty and environmental degradation as top priorities during British prime minister Tony Blair’s tenure as the president of the Group of Eight (G8) in 2005.77 Blair has promised to take the lead among the leaders of the major industrial powers to work toward the complete cancellation of African debt, not only for the countries most heavily indebted, but for all African countries. Doing so would involve increased trade with African countries and increased development assistance. The Bush administration has indicated that it is willing to be a part of this movement.78 Although the United States has signed on to the Millennium Development Goals and set up the Millennium Challenge Account and Corporation, the requirement of strict conditionalities being applied to countries wishing to take part in its programs serves as an obstacle to the effective implementation of its ambitious goals.79 Clearly, the policies of rich countries toward poor ones must be dedicated to enhancing all aspects of poor countries’ security: physical, political, economic, and human. The United States and its partners in the G8 are key to the success of any efforts in this direction.

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

Page 115

THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE HORN OF AFRICA

115

Currently, the United States is working with several countries in the Horn to improve their ability to root out and fight international terror in their region. Military and police officials are acquiring new skills, equipment, and technological know-how for this effort, and the United States is coordinating its own antiterror activities in the region. Even so, while increased attention is being paid to halt the spread of international terror in the Horn, much less is being done to address the problems of poverty, underdevelopment, and social inequalities. To be sure, these problems are enormous and not as easy to address as the military and intelligence challenges. Yet, unless international donors such as the United States make a concerted effort to commit substantial material, technical, and human resources, the root causes of domestic conflict and international terrorism in the region will continue to be major drags on political and economic development and democracy and thus on human security. Even if the international community makes the necessary commitment, not much progress can be anticipated unless the political and economic elites in the region demonstrate the necessary political will to put the needs of their citizens first, backed up by good governance and effective policymaking.

Notes 1. Although the definition of “the Horn of Africa” is contested, for our purposes we define it to include Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Somalia(s), and Sudan. We are aware of the wider political definition of the Horn, which includes contiguous countries such as Kenya (which has played a major role as a mediator in the various conflicts that have spilled over to East Africa), but have limited our analysis to the core members of the region. 2. See Jim Fisher-Thompson, “Panel Makes Recommendations to Fight Terrorism in Horn of Africa,” US Department of State News, December 6, 2004, http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200412060187.html. This article refers to a conference held at Harvard University, November 4–6, 2004, titled “Examining the ‘Bastions’ of Terror: Governance and Policy in Yemen and the Horn of Africa.” At that event, three former US ambassadors to Ethiopia recommended that the United States and its European and African allies attempt to facilitate cooperation among the countries of the Horn and Yemen in the global war on terror. That was said to be extremely important because of the strategic proximity of these countries to the “bastions of terrorism.” 3. Policy analyst Michael Clough has pointed out the need for a real rather than rhetorical commitment from the United States to its African allies in order to extricate both from the impasse left behind by the Cold War. For details, see Michael Clough, “The United States and Africa: The Policy of Cynical Disengagement,” Current History (May 1992): 195–197. 4. For more details, see Edmond J. Keller’s analysis of how the preponderance given to ideological factors, combined with a lack of historical knowledge on interregional relations, led to outcomes that proved negative for US national interests. The same analysis holds true for contemporary relations between the United States and the countries of the Horn, which have led to similar “blinders” on policy-

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

116

Page 116

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

making in Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia. For details, see Edmond Keller, “United States Policy on the Horn of Africa: Policymaking with Blinders On,” in Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar, eds., African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 178. 5. See Harold Marcus, Ethiopia, Great Britain, and the United States, 1941–1974 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 6. See Jonathan B. Bingham, Shirt-Sleeve Diplomacy: Point 4 in Action (New York: John Day Company, 1953). 7. Eritrea was an Italian colony from 1890 to 1941, an occupied territory administered by the British from 1941 to 1952, and a unit federated with the Ethiopian Empire from 1952 to 1962. The federation was abrogated when Ethiopia annexed Eritrea in 1962. 8. See David Newsom, “Testimony,” in Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Ethiopia (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1970). The United States also supplied Ethiopia with counterinsurgency training and on-the-ground advisers in connection with helping suppress the Eritrean movement for national independence after 1962. See George W. Bader, “Testimony,” in Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Ethiopia (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1970). 9. See Jeffrey Lefebvre, “Moscow’s Cold War and Post–Cold War Policies in Africa,” in Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 208. 10. This policy of using third parties with interests in the region in turn provided opportunities for anti-American regimes like Libya to provide support for political and armed groups considered hostile to US interests. For details, see Robert Anton Mertz and Pamela MacDonald Mertz, Arab Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983), 86–88. 11. See Henry Jackson, From the Congo to SOWETO: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960 (New York: William Morrow, 1982). Separate agreements were signed with each country. Kenya at the time had a mutual defense agreement with Ethiopia, and the agreement with the United States was seen by Kenya as more of a hedge against the communist threat. 12. Peter Woodward, The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 151–159. 13. The size of the Ethiopian military grew from 54,000 in 1977 to more than 300,000 a decade later; by 1991, the Ethiopian army was estimated at more than 600,000 troops. Somalia’s army swelled from about 32,000 in 1977 to 65,000 in 1987. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976/77–1989/90). 14. For more details on the Sudan People’s Liberation Army Movement (SPLA/M), see Edgar O’Ballance, Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956–1999 (London: Macmillan, 2000), 133–134. 15. The evolution of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood into the National Islamic Front, a movement with connections to the army, security, and other governmental institutions as well as bases in the wider community due to the establishment of charity organizations and Islamic banks, forced the Umma Party and the Democratic Union Party to present themselves as orthodox Islamic parties rather than representatives of the diverse constituencies that make up present-day Sudan.

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

Page 117

THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE HORN OF AFRICA

117

16. Kamal Osman Salih, “The Sudan, 1985–1989: The Fading Democracy,” in Peter Woodward, ed., Sudan After Numeiri (London: Routledge, 1991), 50–71. 17. Baggara is a collective name applied to the separate cattle-herding tribes of Sudan and eastern Chad. The Baggara peoples identify with their tribal names more often than with the all-encompassing term baggara. There are at least seven principal tribes, which include the following: Humr/Messiria, Rizaygat, Shuwia, Hawazma, Ta’isha, and Habbaniya. 18. The word janjaweed in Arabic means “man on horseback with a gun.” Janjaweed militia are mainly members of nomadic Arab tribes who have long been at odds with Darfur’s settled African farmers. The term has been synonymous with “bandit.” Currently these militia are utilized by the central government of Sudan to fight Darfur rebels, and as such they are referred to as “patriots.” 19. Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, “Northern Sudanese Political Parties and the Civil War,” in M. W. Daly and Ahmad A. Sikainga, eds., Civil War in the Sudan (London: British Academic Press, 1993), 85. For an interesting interpretation of the Janjaweed as the transmogrification of the tradition of camel-raider banditry in Darfur (with counterparts in the Horn such as the Abyssinian Shifta), see Abdullahi Ali Ibrahim’s essay, “Janjaweed: What’s in a Name?” Sudan Studies Association Newsletter 24, no. 2 (September 2004): 15–16. 20. In addition to Southern Sudan, the term South Sudan is also being used to refer to the region beyond the sudd—the marshy swamp area–where conflict has raged since 1982. For details, see Jok Madut Jok, War and Slavery in Sudan (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), xiv. For a comprehensive understanding of the multiple conflicts in Sudan, see Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars (Oxford and Bloomington: James Currey and Indiana University Press, 2003). 21. Donald Petterson, Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict and Catastrophe (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999), 3. 22. Scientific socialism is a term that describes an ideological wish more than a reality. Proponents of this type of ideology use the term scientific in order to justify various political and economic measures designed to catapult societies from agrarian economies to state-based industrial economies by nationalization policies, the establishment of parastatal organizations, and so on. 23. In the mid-1980s, Rome provided a haven for some dissidents of the Barre regime and became a place where political networking was possible among the different diaspora communities. 24. For details, see Peter D. Little, Somalia: Economy Without a State (Oxford and Bloomington: James Currey and Indiana University Press, 2003), 147–150. 25. It is also worthwhile noting that the northern herders, who had long provided Mecca with sheep and goats for the sacrifice that marks the end of the annual pilgrimage (Hajj) often found religious renewal in their contact with Wahabbism. The political and economic impacts of this interaction require more scholarly scrutiny and would yield interesting insights into the layers of conflict characteristic of the modern Somali nation, which has not proven to be immune to internal and external friction despite its vaunted homogeneity. 26. Among those who could be characterized as converts to Wahabbi Islam are Jamaca Islaax and the Salafi, established in the late 1970s and 1980s. See Roland Marchal, “Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War,” in Alex de Waal, ed., Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 119–120. 27. For a detailed discussion on state-society relations, see Donald Rothchild

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

118

Page 118

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

and Naomi Chazan, eds., The Precarious Balance: State-Society Relations in Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987). See also John Markakis, Resource Conflict in the Horn of Africa (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996), on the victimization of pastoralists by economic and political globalization of the Horn. 28. The parallels between the legacy of the Mahdiyya and that of the Salihiyya led by Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan have long been ignored. As a result, policymakers have focused on clan-style sociopolitical configurations while leaving aside the differences among the tariqas, which have given rise to different types of Islamist mobilization in the twenty-first century. For details, see Said Samatar, ed., In the Shadow of Conquest: Islam in Colonial Northeast Africa (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1992), 40–45, 61–70. 29. For a detailed discussion on the policies that led to international intervention and the collapse of the Somali state, see Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, eds., Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995). 30. The Somali diaspora, which has now developed an advanced transnational network of remittances and communications, is found in the farthest corners of the globe. The resilience of the community and its capacity to cross national borders testify to the permeability engendered by globalization as well as the threats posed by unregulated immigration and xenophobic reactions to the plight of displaced persons. For an understanding of the impact of social modes of human organization of contemporary Somalis, see Nuruddin Farah, Yesterday, Tomorrow: Voices from the Somali Diaspora (London: Cassell, 2000). 31. The Somali Mooryan differ from the Sudanese Janjaweed in that the former are visible in urban youth areas, whereas the latter are unacknowledged by their patrons. Both, however, have arisen because of the lack of employment and will present an enormously difficult challenge after the termination of hostilities, when their services will no longer be required. 32. Marchal asserts that to date no “hard evidence of any link between al Barakaat and al Itihaad [is] available” (“Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War,” 142). In fact, a recent BBC article titled “Telecoms Thriving in Lawless Somalia” presents a scenario where both clan and hawala networks cooperate in establishing communications in a stateless country. For details, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4020259.stm. Nevertheless, hawala, the informal remittance network, has been uncritically portrayed as an integral part of “Islamic terrorist networks” by popular works of literature published in the aftermath of 9/11. For a discussion of the linkage between global terrorist networks and hawala, see Douglas Farah, Blood from Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror (New York: Broadway Books, 2004), 113–116. 33. The words fusion and fission capture the complexity of Somali society and the futility of the readiness of US policymakers to believe that “terrorists have a haven in Somalia.” On the one hand, Somali society is fragmented, with many fissures. On the other hand, Somali society is also unified in its sense of feeling besieged by its neighbors, the outside world, and the United States. It does not make sense to lump together all Islamists as terrorists because they seek to establish a sovereign state guided by Islam as a political and religious doctrine. 34. David Held and Anthony McGrew, “Globalization,” in Joel Krieger, ed., The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 326. 35. Salih Booker suggests an approach to “unbundling” Africa that in the case of the Horn has great relevance. For details, see “Thinking Regionally About

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

Page 119

THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE HORN OF AFRICA

119

Africa,” Current History (May 1998): 200. 36. For a detailed discussion of this transformation of guerrillas into US allies, see Marina Ottaway, Africa’s New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction? (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1999). 37. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 160. 38. See Princeton Lyman and J. Stephen Morrison, “The Terrorist Threat in Africa,” Foreign Affairs (January–February 2004): 77. 39. For years, Sudan had permitted groups perceived by Israel to be terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Islamic Group, to have offices in the country. 40. For details, see Roland Jacquard, In the Name of Osama bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the bin Laden Brotherhood (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 35. 41. For the ideological underpinnings of political assassinations by Egyptian extremists, see Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 197–204. 42. For a concise analysis of the role of Turabi in the Islamization of Sudanese society and politics, see Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 178–184. 43. The Sudanese “offer” to turn bin Laden over to the United States is said to be a concocted “fable.” See Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004), 140–142. 44. It was later revealed that the plant was actually producing aspirin. See David Shinn, “The Horn of Africa in International Terrorism,” Special Lectures, the Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, DC, January 29, 2002, 3. 45. See Gilbert Khadiagala, “Kenya: Haven or Helpless Victim of Terrorism,” in United States Institute of Peace Special Report: Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, Special Report 113 (January 2004). The author notes that the core of the leadership of the Kenyan cell is made up of citizens of the Gulf states, Somalia, Pakistan, and the Comoro Islands. As in other cells, these individuals have assimilated into the local cultures of coastal communities. 46. A quote attributed to Assistant Secretary of State Walter Kansteiner during his visit to Nigeria in July 2002. For details, see Michael T. Klare and Daniel Volman, “Africa’s Oil and American National Security,” Current History (May 2004): 226. 47. US promises of a balanced policy linking democracy and development were the basis of its policy in the post-1989 period. For details, see Herman Cohen, Superpower Intervention in Africa (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 16. 48. Olivier Roy makes a very important point about an “Islam of resentment” that is the basis for “acculturation.” We concur with Roy in his assertion that “Islamism is a discourse of protest and adaptation, thus of transition.” However, we go further to assert that if local discourse and perceptions are left unexamined, vast majorities of moderate Africans may join the “coalition of the resentful,” leaving US interests to be handled by discredited regimes. That is dangerous because the efforts to build up local intelligence to be used in the war on international terrorism depend greatly on the willingness of inhabitants to cooperate with state and intelligence authorities. The bombing of Mombasa provides an excellent reminder. For details, see Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 198–199.

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

120

Page 120

CONFRONTING SECURITY CHALLENGES

49. To establish this relationship, the United States invested $8.7 million. See Andrew England, “U.S. Officer Vows That the U.S.-Led Task Force Will Eradicate Terrorism in Horn of Africa,” Associated Press Worldstream, December 17, 2002. 50. The US campaign against international terrorism in Africa recently opened a new front in the Sahel, a region that military officials fear could become the next base for Al-Qaida. Special operations forces are training military units from Mauritania to the Horn and providing them with pickup trucks, radios, and globalpositioning equipment. See Craig S. Smith, “U.S. Training African Forces to Uproot Terrorists,” New York Times, March 11, 2004. 51. Significantly, such a close relationship has not developed in the collapsed state of Somalia. The reason given is that there is no viable government there. 52. See Jim Fisher-Thompson, “Africa Countering Terrorism with U.S. Help, Official Tells Congress,” US Department of State News, April 2, 2004. 53. See “Ethiopia: U.S. Force Commander in Horn of Africa Interviewed.” UN Integrated Regional Information Network, Nairobi, February 21, 2003. 54. Fisher-Thompson, “Africa Countering Terrorism with U.S. Help, Official Tells Congress.” 55. For a detailed analysis of resource-driven conflicts in this subregion, see John Markakis, Resource Conflicts in the Horn of Africa (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996). 56. Even NIF-ruled Sudan turned over “terrorists” associated more with the ideological rivalry of the two superpowers during the twentieth century, while enabling the new generation of “global terrorists” to slip through its security network and seek asylum outside the continent. 57. See “African Policy,” White House, www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/Africa. 58. Per capita income for lower-middle-income countries ranges from $736 to $2,935. 59. World Development Indicators database, World Bank, July 2003. Statistics for the collapsed state of Somalia are not available. 60. L. A. Thrupp, Critical Links: Food Security and the Environment in the Greater Horn of Africa (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 1999), 2–7. 61. It should be noted that poor and malnourished people are extremely susceptible to diseases such as HIV/AIDS, cholera, measles, malaria, and tuberculosis. 62. In an effort to explain Sudan’s food insecurity, one has to factor in corruption in the food distribution process, as well as the lack of easy access to credit for individual farmers and farm communities. 63. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Press Release: Better Harvests Improve Sub-Saharan Africa’s Food Supplies but Millions Still Need Food Assistance (Washington, DC: FAO, April 7, 2004). 64. See Raymond Thibodeaux, “Bittersweet Homecoming for Thousands of Eritean Refugees,” http://voanews.com, April 4, 2004. 65. See Food and Agriculture Organization, Press Release. 66. Peter Little, Somalia: Economy Without a State (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 167. 67. See Sue Lautze, Yacob Aklilu, Angela Raven-Roberts, Helen Young, Girma Kebede, and Jennifer Leaning, “Risk and Vulnerability in Ethiopia: Learning from the Past, Responding to the Present, Preparing for the Future” (Medford, MA: Feinstein International Famine Center, June 2003), 21; and USAID, “Food Security Crisis in Ethiopia and Eritrea,” http://usaid.gov/press/release/2002. 68. For a detailed discussion of Ethiopia’s agricultural potential and the lack of fit of the numerous regimes’ policies, see Dessalegn Rahmato, “Neither Feast nor

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

Page 121

THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE HORN OF AFRICA

121

Famine: Prospects for Food Security,” in Abebe Zegeye and Siegfried Pausewang, eds., Ethiopia in Change: Peasantry, Nationalism, and Democracy (London and New York: British Academic Press and St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 192–193. 69. See Berhanu Abegaz, “Escaping Ethiopia’s Poverty Trap,” Journal of Modern African Studies 42, no. 3 (September 2004): 314. 70. See US Agency for International Development, “USAID Ethiopia Drought Fact Sheet #15, FY 2003,” August 27, 2003. 71. See CARE, “Breaking the Cycle in Ethiopia: CARE Reaffirms Commitment to Overcome Poverty,” August 6, 2003. 72. Ibid. In August 2003, the president of CARE asserted, “With adequate resources, we can break the cycle of poverty in Ethiopia. We can help farmers and pastoral communities to recover from the current acute crisis by providing food assistance, seeds, tools, veterinary medicines, and livestock. And if donors provide funds for projects with five-to-ten-year timeframes, we can also address the roots of Ethiopia’s poverty and vulnerability.” 73. Barry Mason, “World Hunger Report: 842 Million Starve in the Midst of Plenty.” Axis of Logic, www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/article_5998.shtml. 74. Ibid. 75. Professor Jeffrey Sachs, head of the Columbia University Earth Institute and the UN Millennium Project, has argued that instead of donor assistance being doled out without any consideration of the real needs of the country, the equation should be turned around and based not on what donors are willing to give but on what the real needs of the country are. See “Ethiopia: Interview with Jeffrey Sachs, UN Special Adviser on Millennium Goals.” IRINnews.org, http://irinnews.org/ report.asp?ReportID=35634. 76. Policymakers dealing with the countries of the Horn are therefore urged to look at security from what Buzan has called the “integrative perspective.” For details, see Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post–Cold War Era, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991). 77. See “Prime Minister Addresses Business Leaders: Tony Blair’s Keynote Speech About Africa and Climate Change to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland,” www.britainusa.com/sections/articles_show.asp?SarticleType= 1&Article_OD=6260. Blair has noted that in order for the Millennium Development Goals to be met, the international community must mobilize at least $25 billion in development assistance for Africa alone by 2015. 78. See “Africa Policy,” White House, www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/africa (June 2003). 79. Ibid.

R-5

3/17/06

10:56 AM

Page 122

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

Page 123

PART 2 Confronting Societal Challenges

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

Page 124

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

Page 125

6 Human Security C AROLINE THOMAS

T

he engagement of the world’s most powerful political actor with the world’s poorest region has huge potential to affect the well-being of African citizens both positively and negatively. The close of Cold War competition has opened an opportunity for the United States to move beyond a strictly state-centric, national-security-driven approach and to engage with Africa from a human security perspective more supportive of the needs of ordinary African citizens. More recently, the tragic events of September 11, 2001, have offered the possibility of new patterns of strategic encounter between the United States and Africa. Therefore, the key question that I seek to answer in this chapter is, To what extent do current US-Africa relations reflect Africa’s human security needs rather than US national interest, narrowly defined? The method used embraces both conceptual and empirical analyses. First, I explore the concept of human security. Crucial to this endeavor is the close mapping of human security onto a holistic understanding of development. This particular approach to human security and to development requires us to move beyond the traditional state-centric analysis and to consider security and development not in narrow terms of national interest (such as impermeable borders and national measurements of gross domestic product and per capita income), but as broader, more people-focused concepts. Traditional state-centric analyses of security or development may hide important insights—not least the interconnections between security and development—and therefore present a limited picture of the impact of the US-Africa encounter. Second, I take an empirical view of the US-Africa relationship. The aim here is to assess the significance of recent US initiatives, including the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), and AIDS initiatives such as the five-year Emergency Plan for AIDS,1 by referring to their place within a deeper, structural context that 125

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

126

Page 126

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

requires consideration of factors such as the US role in global development agenda setting and US trade policy. The combination of the conceptual and empirical analyses allows for informed assessments of the extent to which the United States is engaging with Africa from a human security perspective. That is vital because the quality of knowledge and understanding that informs public debate affects policy.

What Do We Mean by Human Security? The concept of human security is the cause of some controversy among both scholars and diplomats, and it is undertheorized to date (consider the contributions by an array of authors of different persuasions in the special issue of Security Dialogue, September 2004). Some reject the concept altogether, albeit for different reasons, whereas others accept it but disagree over what it actually means.2 The literature reveals a mixed bag of politicians, diplomats, academics, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and activists exhibiting different views on human security. They range from the scholar Jorge Nef, who presents a clear, holistic, structural model of human security and insecurity, drawing on insights from world systems analysis, to politicians such as Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy, who focuses on the role that middle power governments can play in promoting human security, primarily as freedom from fear.3 Thus, scholars are still establishing the parameters of the human security discourse. Currently, most exponents, following UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, agree that the core concern of human security is to protect the vulnerable by ensuring freedom from want, freedom from fear, or both. 4 Broadly, human security as freedom from want describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met and in which a reasonable expectation exists that protection will be afforded during any crisis or downturn—natural or manmade—so that survival is not threatened. Human security as freedom from fear describes a condition of existence in which human dignity is realized, embracing not only physical safety but going beyond that to include meaningful participation in the life of the community and control over one’s life.

How Are the Two Strands of Human Security Related? Academics and practitioners have different views about the balance and relationship between freedom from want and freedom from fear.5 Some thinkers believe that freedom from fear can be pursued as a separate endeavor from freedom from want or that the realization of the latter

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

Page 127

HUMAN SECURITY

127

depends on the prior achievement of the former. At the diplomatic level, it is the pursuit of human security as freedom from fear that has won most support.6 Others believe that the idea that both freedoms are inextricably interrelated is fundamental to the human security approach.7 For the latter, neither aspect is sufficient for the enjoyment of human security: each depends on the existence of the other for its own full realization; vulnerability is constituted holistically. Annan also promotes this view, noting that the “pillars of what we now understand as the people-centered concept of ‘human security’ are interrelated and mutually reinforcing.”8 I share that perspective. The interpretation of the two aspects of human security as interdependent is particularly significant for the people of Africa, where the twin challenges of freedom from want and freedom from fear are most pervasive, where many people suffer both simultaneously (see below), and where human security is threatened by factors internal and external to the state, including governments and the impersonal workings of the global economy.

A Paradigm Shift Irrespective of whether the two strands of human security thinking are seen as separate or intimately interrelated, they share some crucial common ground. In particular, they share the simple belief that people everywhere matter, that they are thus a legitimate focus for our attention, and that our actions should be directed toward decreasing their vulnerability and protecting the most vulnerable. As Annan states, “No shift in the way we think or act is more crucial than that of putting people at the centre of everything we do. That is the essence of human security.”9 Other institutions—whether local or state governments, international institutions, private corporations, or NGOs—exist ultimately to serve people and to contribute to the wellbeing of society as a whole, not a selective and exclusive strand of it at the expense of the rest and future generations. Following in this vein, human security represents a paradigmatic shift from mechanical to complex analyses of the political world, or in its most far-reaching formulation, “the difference between seeing the world as a machine and seeing it as a living system or organism.”10 What happens in one part affects the condition of other parts. In a globalizing world, understanding these interconnections is essential for understanding mutual human vulnerability, involving not only weapons but also disease, financial instability, and global social crises. It is also vital for designing policies to ameliorate mutual vulnerability. The chain of causality may extend far beyond the physical state frontiers. For example, US domestic policy on agriculture may have a devastating impact on cotton farmers in West Africa. Similarly, domestic interest rate increases in the United States may have a huge impact

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

128

Page 128

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

on debt repayments in Africa and on the well-being of the population. The US desire for cheap oil may result in government policies in Sudan or Nigeria that promote fear in local populations and undermine the local physical environment, thus affecting livelihoods. US trade policy may undermine efforts of African governments to provide cheap generic drugs to combat the problem of HIV/AIDS. The human security approach represents a powerful analytical tool that stands apart from the national security orthodoxy that has held sway for so long. A human security analysis is far more than an add-on to an orthodox, state-centric analysis based on the separation of domestic and international spheres. In terms of level of analysis, people, not states, are the central unit under study, and in terms of scope, anything that threatens their freedom from want and freedom from fear—no matter what the source—is a legitimate focus for attention and remedial action. That could include factors as diverse as state-sponsored repression, environmental degradation, fluctuating commodity prices, or the unregulated activities of multinational corporations. In contrast to a state-based analysis, human security requires a disaggregated and therefore richer, more sophisticated, exploration of the very complex and sometimes contradictory impacts of globalization, global development policy, and global governance on actual human experience across the globe. Mechanistic state-level analyses of security are based on zero-sum games, assumptions of governmental legitimacy, and impermeable borders. A human security analysis, in disaggregating the idea of the nation (which in Africa is not strong in many places) and unpacking the associated notion of national interest, focuses on the perceptions and lived experience of real people and their communities rather than abstract states. In place of self-help by states within their own borders, human security concerns would trigger a multilateral response involving different actors at many different levels, ideally in an integrated activity that would change the condition of those people affected from insecure to secure. Automatic defense of the status quo would be replaced by deep inquiry, openness, and learning regarding cause and effect. This outcome might depend less on arms expenditures than on economic and social expenditures aimed at transforming structures that sustain human insecurity. Justice rather than order is the underlying motivation, accompanied by an expectation that the nearer the global community gets toward global social justice, the closer it will be to a sustainable peace and, therefore, sustainable global order (see Table 6.1). This new approach to security gained ground in the 1990s because of developments on the global political scene, and simultaneously it found academic proponents in the field of international relations. At the diplomatic level, the political space that opened up in the post–Cold War period allowed new ideas to flower. It was clear that the passing of East-West competition was leading neither to a peace dividend

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

Page 129

129

HUMAN SECURITY Table 6.1

Key Elements of Orthodox Security and Human Security Orthodox, State-Centric Security

Referent object Operating principle Agenda Means Input Output Outcome Future

Human Security

The state Humanity The state/national security Global holism; connectivity Justification and status quo; Explanation and military power/defense transformation; economic and social welfare Self-help by states Collective, integrated, multifaceted response at multiple levels Military expenditure/arms Redistribution; structural reform Secure borders Enjoyment of economic, social, civil, political, and cultural human rights Interstate stability; order Global social justice Intrastate conflict; Sustainable peace international instability; unsustainable resource use

for development nor to the absence of conflict.11 Significant humanitarian crises, such as the 1994 Rwanda genocide that resulted in 800,000 deaths, coupled with growing acknowledgment of the uneven distribution of the benefits of economic globalization (for example, the denial of benefits to Africa in the pursuit of free trade), drew attention to human insecurity in the post–Cold War world. At the same time, the academic field of international relations underwent changes. That discipline had long been characterized by the failure of its dominant theories to engage with the global human condition on the basis of anything other than its impact on the Group of Seven (G7)/Group of Eight (G8). For example, it remained silent on the questions of greatest concern to the majority of people on the planet, choosing instead to focus on a state-centric, realist approach that prioritized national security issues. The situation began changing in the 1990s with the growth of interest in such subfields as global political economy, critical security studies, global environmental politics, and feminism. Also in the 1990s, the discipline engaged in a healthy debate about appropriate theories and approaches. The floodgates began to open, and postcolonial and Marxist theories focused more attention on the south. It was in this academic environment that scholars began to explore the concept of human security, and issues of concern to the majority of humanity began to gain attention.12

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

130

Page 130

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

It is interesting to note that the new approach to security was made concrete within the 1996 South African constitution, which set out a humancentered concept of security interpreted as freedom from fear and want. In the same year, the South African Defense Department white paper identified intrastate rather than international threats to South African security, including such economic and social problems as ill health, environmental degradation, chronic underdevelopment, and small arms proliferation.13

The Normative Power of Human Security The human security approach has great normative power: a consideration of the values underpinning it suggests that policies devised in support of its achievements must be geared toward social transformation, not in the sense proposed by the neoliberal agenda, but rather the radical politics of equality, solidarity, sustainability, and so forth. These elements, integrated within a radical approach to international political theory, are exemplified by the work of Andrew Linklater in the late 1990s. In recent years, Linklater has focused more explicitly on the imperative to avoid suffering, from the perspective of a nonutilitarian normative theory that explicitly takes a human security focus. 14 The concept of human security concentrates political analysis firmly on the referent category of “lived lives” and thus undercuts the sociopolitical reductionism involved in (liberal) individualism, as well as the limitations of communitarian relativism. If we consider freedom from fear and want as interconnected parts of a single package, then that suggests a radical account of politics as freedom from domination and exploitation, not simply the freedom to choose as advocated by the liberal tradition. Thus, although material sufficiency lies at the core of human security, that concept also encompasses nonmaterial dimensions to form a qualitative whole. In other words, human security embraces the whole gamut of rights, civil and political, economic and social, and cultural. Moreover, it reflects the 1993 Vienna Convention and Programme of Action on Human Rights, which recognized the interdependence among democracy, development, and human rights and offered a holistic approach involving actors at all levels in promoting human rights, not just national governments.15 It sits comfortably with the Banjul Charter on Human and People’s Rights, the preamble of which states: “Convinced that it is henceforth essential to pay a particular attention to the right to development and that civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social, and cultural rights in their conception as well as universality and that the satisfaction of economic, social, and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights.”16 In particular, it fits closely with the notion of the right to development (RTD) (see Figure 6.1).17

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

Page 131

HUMAN SECURITY Figure 6.1

131

The Right to Development

Article 1: The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized. • •

The human person is the beneficiary, but the right can be invoked by individuals and peoples. The RTD imposes obligations on individual states to ensure equal and adequate access to essential resources and on the international community to promote fair development policies and effective international cooperation.

Source: www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm.

Human Security as Tool for Policy Evaluation The concept of human security offers clear indicators by which analysts can explore, measure, and evaluate the encounters between countries. Reflecting on the right-hand column of Table 6.1, a human security analysis would focus on: • people rather than states • their enjoyment of the full spectrum of human rights, economic and social as well as civil and political • connections and interdependence between states and their citizens, rather than separations • deep rather than surface understandings of insecurity • synergistic, multilateral responses at multiple levels (supranational, national, and subnational) • attention to structures, not just symptoms • global justice, not simply or mainly global order • long-term, sustainable peace through support for a new global social, political, and economic order that values people

The US Position on Human Security The United States has a number of key foreign policy traditions that reflect different interests and groups. Broadly, they can be divided into three currents: geopolitics, geoeconomics, and humanitarianism.18 The dominant liberal tradition of US foreign policy has strong geopolitical and geoeconomic currents, and the humanitarian theme is comparatively weaker. In general, it is fair to say that the notion of human security as mutually interdependent freedom from want and fear as represented above sits uncomfortably with

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

132

Page 132

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

all these traditions, even the humanitarian current that has a much more limited focus. Historically, the US government has had difficulty with a holistic understanding of human security, and equally difficult has been the notion of putting economic and social rights on an equal footing with civil and political rights.19 Similarly, the US government has never felt comfortable with the notion of the right to development20 and continues to argue that no consensus exists as to its meaning (see below). The official US position is that civil and political rights are a necessary precursor for economic and social development to be enjoyed. The US position as stated in 2003 by Richard Wall, US delegate to the Fifty-Ninth Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, is that economic and social rights “are aspirational; while civil and political rights are inalienable and immediately enforceable. . . . The progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights will not be achieved through justiciability and blame shifting. It will be accomplished when governments look inward and diagnose the effects of their own policies and practices.”21 Similarly, speaking a few weeks later, US delegate Joel Danies remarked, The key factor affecting whether or not nations develop is the extent to which they enjoy good governance, which permits individuals to develop their talents and their intellects to the maximum effect, which allows them to speak and associate freely with one another, and which allows them to regularly choose their representatives in government—in short—whether governments afford their people basic human rights.22

The US government believes that the protection of civil and political rights is indispensable to sustainable growth, although the experience of newly industrialized countries such as Taiwan, Malaysia, and China does not support that argument. Broadly, the official US government position is that African governments have caused Africa’s problems and must remedy them. The responsibility of African leaders is certainly part of the story, but it is not the whole story. The global economic structure presents Africa with some fundamental challenges that, no matter what actions governments take and no matter how many liberal freedoms its citizens enjoy, cannot be overcome by African actions alone. For example, the deteriorating terms of trade for commodities that Africa exports, such as tea or coffee, mean that African countries have had to run in order to stand still over the period of their independent statehood; this situation also makes it impossible for many of them to repay debts. It is clearly not the case that all US citizens share the same worldview. Civil society advocacy groups within the United States campaigning on debt, HIV/AIDS, and other issues represent other viewpoints and testify to the complexity of modern developed societies and the possibility of change. In

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

Page 133

133

HUMAN SECURITY

July 2004, for example, US NGOs spearheaded a successful campaign to get the US government to recognize genocide in Darfur. They worked through the Congressional Black Caucus to reach Secretary of State Colin Powell.

The Human Security Challenge in Sub-Saharan Africa In this section I explore the main challenges to human security in Africa before considering the extent to which the contemporary US-Africa encounter exacerbates or ameliorates them. The identification of human insecurity in Africa is straightforward: vulnerability is the norm rather than the exception. The condition of existence for the majority of people in subSaharan Africa (SSA) is characterized either by material want, fear, or both. Occurrences such as genocide in Rwanda or the dramatic spread of HIV/AIDS take place within a context of routine vulnerability. The extreme poverty faced by so many African people on a daily basis is mounting. There is nothing exceptional about it; rather it is routine: it defines people’s daily lives. The number of African people living on less than a dollar a day grew in the 1990s despite global improvements (see Tables 6.2 and 6.3). The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP’s) Human Development Report confirms that over twenty African countries are poorer than they were in 1995, that the ten countries at the bottom of the Human Development Index are all in sub-Saharan Africa and slipping further behind, and that HIV/AIDS has cut life expectancy to less than forty years in eight SSA countries.23 Looking forward, SSA is not on course to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) by 2015.24 The 2003 UNDP report contended that if sub-Saharan Africa continues on its current course, it will take another 150 years to reach the MDG target of halving poverty, and the hunger situation will continue to worsen.25

Table 6.2

Extreme Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa Global total Global total excluding China

Millions of People on < $1/Day

Percentage of People on < $1/Day

1990

1999

2015

1990

1999

2015

241 1,292 917

315 1,169 945

404 809 735

47.4 29.6 28.5

49.0 23.2 25.0

46.0 13.3 15.7

Source: Adapted from World Bank, World Development Indicators (2003) 1, no. 5, www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2003.worldview.pdf.

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

134 Table 6.3

Page 134

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES Basic Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa Global total Global total excluding China

Millions of People on < $2/Day

Percentage of People on < $2/Day

1990

1999

2015

1990

1999

2015

386 2,712 1,892

480 2,802 2,173

618 2,320 2,101

76.0 62.1 58.7

74.7 55.6 57.5

70.4 38.1 44.7

Source: Adapted from World Bank, World Development Indicators (2003) 1, no. 5, www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2003.worldview.pdf.

Reaching the point at which all people will know freedom from fear is an enduring and pervasive challenge. Although Darfur and Rwanda hit the headlines as examples of genocide, the general lack of civil rights is pervasive and routine rather than exceptional. Personal insecurity is a routine condition of existence for many citizens in SSA. In the developed world we think in terms of the necessity of free and fair competitive elections, but civil and political rights in SSA take on a different nuance. Civil conflict has plagued the continent for decades, very negatively affected the economic and social fabric of societies, and created millions of refugees and internally displaced persons. Even when civil conflicts cease, postconflict recovery is hampered by the economic condition of the continent and the rules of global economic engagement designed outside the continent and without its input. These pressures can then reignite civil conflict. Governmental legitimacy is often questionable, and in a number of cases, no national government exists. National leaders are sometimes complicit in creating conditions of fear among the populace in order to more effectively siphon off national resources into personal coffers. Millions of slum and shantytown dwellers live in an atmosphere of physical uncertainty and risk, lacking title to land and property as well as a voice in public affairs. Governments often do not have the capability to protect their citizens from problems such as the routine abduction of children in northern Uganda. Table 6.4 suggests multiple interconnections between freedom from fear and freedom from want. As is often the case in states with the lowest human development indicators, people also suffer routinely from physical fear.

Evaluating US-Africa Relations from a Human Security Perspective To what extent has the George W. Bush administration shown an interest in SSA based on concern for the security of Africa’s people in the broad sense,

R-6 3/17/06 10:57 AM

Table 6.4

Civil Conflict and Key Economic and Social Indicators in Selected African States

Angola Burundi Democratic Republic of Congo Liberia Rwanda Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Total Average

Displacement (percentage of population)

External Debt ($US billions)

Child Mortality, < 5 Years (per 1,000 births)

HDIa Rank, 2003

Adult HIV/AIDS Prevalence, 2002 (percentage of population)

36 10 5

12.7 6.1 56.6

11.8 4.9 8.8

18.1 18.0 6.4

9.6 1.1 11.4

260 190 205

164 171 167

5.5 8.3 4.9

14 1 11 13 35 289 18

3.3 9.3 5.6 8.0 38.1 247.2 —

7.6 8.6 3.6 6.3 5.2 — 6.6

18.8 0.7 6.9 11.3 14.4 — 10.9

2.0 1.3 1.2 2.5 20.0 84.1 5.6

235 183 316 225 107 — 165

— 158 175 — 138 — 141

8.2 8.9 7.0 1.0 2.6 — 4.3

Page 135

Conflict

Number of Years

Estimated Population, 2003 (millions)

Estimated Civilian Casualties (percentage of population)

Source: Adapted from UNAIDS, UNDP, UNICEF and World Bank data. Notes: a. HDI = Human Development Index. — = no data available.

135

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

136

Page 136

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

rather than narrow US national security concerns? President Bush has tried to present a positive image of his approach to Africa, which he mentioned in his 2003 whistle-stop tour as an example of his “compassionate conservative agenda.”26 However, in his 2004 State of the Union address, Africa did not warrant a mention. President Bush’s main preoccupation has been Iraq and the global war on terror, and the rise in US military spending accounted for 75 percent of the increase in global spending in 1998–2002.27 US military spending in 2001 was around the same as sub-Saharan Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP), just over US$300 billion. Compare that with total development assistance from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries, which stood at just over US$50 billion.28 Nevertheless, US policy vis-à-vis SSA has focused on a number of limited, relatively high-profile unilateral initiatives: AIDS (the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief), trade (the African Growth and Opportunity Act, 2000), finance (the Millennium Challenge Account, with three African countries out of a likely fifteen beneficiaries globally), and military capacity building (the African Crisis Response Initiative; the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program). On the surface, these initiatives would seem to be important contributions to human security in SSA. However, it is important to understand their significance within the wider US national and global policy context on related issues (such as trade and antiterrorism) and measured against the background of African human security needs. All these unilateral initiatives have come under critical scrutiny by NGO groups, some UN bodies, and academics, who regard them as giving with one hand while taking away with another, or working outside the spirit of a human security approach. (For examples, see numerous studies by Africa Action29 or work by the Association of Concerned African Scholars.30) AGOA, for example, has undoubtedly resulted in increased African exports to the United States. In addition to the limitations of the agreement itself, such as rules of origin, the bigger issue is how the achievements and potential of AGOA look when considered against the wider US stance on trade.31 In May 2002 a six-year, $51.7 billion farm bill, designed to boost crop and dairy subsidies for US farmers by 67 percent, was introduced in the US Congress. This law sounded a death knell for many farmers in the developing world, who will be unable to compete on the world market against heavily subsidized US exports. Anne Krueger of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has urged the developed countries to consider the impact of such agricultural subsidies on the poor in the south, three-quarters of whom live in rural areas and are dependent on agriculture.32 Concerning the AIDS initiative, although any new funding to address the problem is welcome, a question arises as to whether channeling the new funding through bilateral means is the most effective use of the money. For example, the Global Fund for AIDS, a multilateral group, is financially

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

Page 137

HUMAN SECURITY

137

starved but already well placed to carry out work. Working multilaterally can create synergies that result in better outcomes. The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), which was originally promoted as providing SSA countries with training for peacekeeping and humanitarian aid as well as nonlethal weapons, was transformed into African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) in 2002, and now funds training to combat terrorism.33 At the G8 summit in Sea Island, Georgia, in June 2004, the US government announced that it would be seeking $660 million in new money from Congress over the next five years to train and equip African peacekeepers.34 (That was the unilateral US contribution to the pledge made by the G8 to train 50,000 African peacekeepers over that period.) However, this amount needs to be seen against the background of continued US arrears to the UN peacekeeping funds of $480 million, and the possibility that this new investment will go to antiterrorist efforts. The United States is already involved in equipping and training North African states and others such as Mali, Chad, Niger, and Mauritania through the Pan-Sahel Initiative, aimed at supporting the efforts of national governments to combat jihadist groups and the uncontrolled movement of people and resources across borders.35 In addition to these much-heralded initiatives, other, less-high-profile developments are under way in the US-Africa encounter that suggest that Africa is of growing economic and strategic interest to the current administration.36 The growing interest of the US European Command (EUCOM) in the forty-three African countries within its remit can be attributed to the desire to combat terrorism and the perceived need to support access to raw materials.37 Notably, African oil reserves are becoming increasingly important to the United States, and companies like ChevronTexaco (whose record leaves much room for improvement) are making huge investments, often underwritten by the quasi-public Overseas Private Investment Corporation.38 African oil can offset Middle East oil: currently 18 percent of US oil imports come from SSA, and it is predicted that by 2015 West Africa will supply 25 percent of US oil imports.39 The history of the ChadCameroon pipeline has shown that the benefits of such investments do not always (or even often) advance poverty reduction through sustainable development. For example, consider the findings of the Extractive Industry Review (EIR) 2004,40 and comments by local civil society groups.41 The record shows that similar investments, such as those in the Niger Delta, have resulted in environmental degradation and unsustainable development for local people.42 The question must be whether this activity will support or run counter to African human security. The role of external funders such as the United States and the World Bank, in addition to African governments, is crucial to the outcome of such investments, and appropriate regulation is central.43 The EIR review suggested that three enabling conditions

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

138

Page 138

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

are necessary for these types of investments to help sustainable development: public and corporate governance that looks out for the needs of poor people, more effective social and environmental policies, and respect for human rights. The examples above provide evidence that the contemporary encounter between the United States and Africa is continuing and expanding. However, I suggest that they present a very limited and selective view of the relationship in terms of its effect on human security. If we scratch below the surface, dig deeper, adopt a wider perspective, we can see a different picture. It is important to ask whether the routine human insecurity endured by African people living in poverty is affected positively by global development policy and rule making, on which the US exercises an arguably preponderant influence. To answer this question, I consider two interrelated global challenges contributing to human insecurity outcomes on the ground in Africa: (1) the specific form that globalization is taking and the dominant development discourse legitimizing it, and (2) the global governance structures that further underpin it.

Contemporary Globalization and the Dominant Development Discourse A key challenge to human security in Africa is the particular nature of corporate-led global economic integration, which has resulted in highly uneven distribution of benefits within and between countries and regions. The disparities between the world’s richest and poorest countries are wider than ever. Nearly 3 billion people are trying to survive on less than two dollars a day, including 75 percent of the population of sub-Saharan Africa.44 The advocates of a broad human security approach feel that these people deserve the chance for a better future. The benefits of globalization have bypassed most Africans. Who is driving this agenda? Who is continuing to promote the assumption that corporate-led economic globalization through free trade is the best route to deliver economic growth and employment opportunities for all, even though human experience suggests otherwise and even though economic evidence to undermine this argument continues to grow? There is mounting evidence that in countries with a low per capita income, such as sub-Saharan Africa, it is the rich who benefit most from open trade.45 Since the 1980s, a liberal governance network (see below) under US hegemony has promoted a neoliberal blueprint for global economic integration that claims to offer the greatest hope to humanity. This network drives development discourse and thereby legitimates the current globalization agenda that is in fact a substitute for national development policies. The

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

Page 139

HUMAN SECURITY

139

network includes the key G7 states, the international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the IMF, and private actors such as corporations and banks. The IMF and World Bank have been portrayed globally as the exclusive holders of legitimate knowledge about development, and they have held a monopoly on policy advice.46 They in turn are dominated by the G7, especially the United States, which has the greatest voting power among them. Under their direction, globalization through neoliberal macroeconomic policies has become synonymous with development policy. The US and hence the IFI fundamental understanding of the African development challenge is significant: impediments to development are understood primarily in terms of domestic shortcomings rather than external/structural factors associated with Africa’s place in the global economy or, indeed, a balanced combination of both. The assumption is that when Africa removes domestic impediments to free trade, it will result in growth and development that will trickle down throughout society. However, recent evidence from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) suggests that trade liberalization is not delivering freedom from want in Africa; in fact, it is exacerbating structural vulnerability.47 Previous UNCTAD findings revealed that despite a massive increase in their openness to trade since the 1980s, the poorest countries were earning less.48 They have been unable to diversify into manufactured exports, which is a crucial ingredient of making trade work for growth and development. They remained dependent on the production of primary commodities that (with the exception of oil) have been characterized by stagnant markets and declining and highly volatile prices since the 1980s (see Table 6.5 for examples). This decline has cost SSA fifty cents for every US dollar received in aid since the late 1970s. UNCTAD suggests that had commodity prices remained at 1980 levels, then per capita incomes in Africa would have been 50 percent higher than they are today.49 Even with the commodity export sector, Africa has lost market share to Latin America and Asia. UNCTAD suggests that the commodity trap has become a poverty trap, undermining the human security of millions of people.50 The blanket policy of trade liberalization for development not only may be inappropriate to achieving human security, but also it is inconsistently applied by the developed countries. The human insecurity impact of deteriorating terms of trade is compounded by the subsidies that northern governments give to their farmers and industrial country policies such as tariff escalation.51 These run counter to the free trade philosophy espoused by the US government and clearly smack of double standards. These subsidies directly affect the livelihoods of farmers in the south unable to export their products. In West Africa, as is noted in the introduction to this volume, the livelihoods of 11 million cotton farmers and their families have been undermined because of US subsidies of up to $4 billion annually, and there is no

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

Page 140

140

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

Table 6.5

Commodity Price Decreases, Real Terms, 1980–2000

0–25% Decrease Bananasa Fertlizer Iron orea Phosphate rock Tea

–4.4 –23.1 –19.5 –21.6 –7.5

25–50% Decrease Aluminum Coconut oil Copper Cotton Fishmeal Groundnut oil Maize Soybean Wheat

–27.2 –44.3 –30.9 –47.6 –31.9 –30.9 –41.6 –39.0 –45.2

Over 50% Decrease Cocoa Coffee Lead Palm oil Rice Rubber Sugar Tin

–71.2 –64.5 –58.3 –55.8 –60.9 –59.6 –76.6 –73.0

Source: Adapted from Oxfam, “Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalization and the Fight Against Poverty,” 2002, www.maketradefair.com/assets/english/report_ english_pdf. Note: a. 1980–1999.

prospect of shifting into alternative export production quickly. Oxfam has summed up the situation neatly: “This system pits a typical Malian producer, farming two hectares of cotton, who is lucky to gross $400 a year, against US farms which receive a subsidy of $250 per hectare. The ten largest producers in the USA, whose government regularly preaches the virtue of free trade to developing countries, together pocket annual subsidy checks for up to $17 million.”52 When the West African cotton farmers presented their case at the World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Cancun in September 2003, the United States dismissively advised them to diversify their farm production. Promises of financial aid have been dangled before them, but that is no substitute for stopping the dumping of subsidized cotton on the world market at below cost. It has been calculated that a 1 percent increase in Africa’s share of world trade would generate US$70 billion, which Oxfam notes is five times the amount received through aid and debt relief.53 That change would bring more sustainable benefits to West African farmers and their families. Oxfam has commented that US trade policy is “shockingly indifferent to poverty in Africa.”54

Global Governance: A Story of Democratic Deficits Governance—both national and global—poses a related challenge. No doubt many Africans would point to their own governments and elites, or parts thereof, as obstacles to human security for the majority. They would highlight their elites’ failure to consult, listen, or truly represent the people, their corruption, and the unequal enjoyment of national wealth. Add the

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

Page 141

HUMAN SECURITY

141

lack of voice for Africa in the key global economic decisionmaking bodies for development policy as another challenge.55 In recent years the public antagonism between certain African governments and the IFIs—for example, Mozambique, over the cashew nut trade liberalization question—has been bitter and has lent weight to long-standing concerns that their neoliberal development model was being imposed on needy, vulnerable client states in violation of national sovereignty and expressed policy preferences, not only of governments but also of local people.56 The reform of global governance is imperative because it represents the interests of the few, not the majority. The United States dominates decisionmaking in the IMF, World Bank, World Health Organization, and WTO. But whose interests is the United States championing? And will the highprofile national poverty reduction strategies (PRS) really deliver more effective voice for people and greater autonomy for governments and citizens in economic policy? Some authors see them as a legitimatization of even more extensive external control of entire national development plans. The debate about reform of the governance of the IFIs is ongoing and has seen new international commitments to increase the voice of developing countries in the IFIs. The international community agreed at the WTO meeting at Monterrey, Mexico, that the IMF and World Bank should “continue to enhance the participation of all developing countries . . . in their decisionmaking.”57 Presently, the forty-four countries of sub-Saharan Africa are accorded only two executive director positions in the IMF, and they have very limited influence over the decisionmaking process of the directors because votes are weighted to reflect the financial standing of the countries or regions they represent.58 The democratic deficit in global governance is just as stark in relation to trade. Despite the formality of “one state, one vote,” the WTO operates in a highly undemocratic manner. Corporate actors have had a hand in setting the global trade agenda, in drafting WTO agreements (for example, the Agreement on Agriculture), and generally exercising a role not open to most developing countries due to their low level of financial and human resources. But whose interests do these companies serve? To what extent are they socially responsible? Africa’s issues, such as agriculture and development, have been neglected by the WTO in favor of a focus on issues such as services important to developed countries. When the needs of Africa are addressed within the WTO framework (such as the need for cheap generic rather than expensive patented drugs to combat HIV/AIDS), the United States pursues an aggressive bilateral trade policy. This approach makes it difficult for African governments to support human security access by increasing the availability of generic drugs, which is legitimate even under the WTO’s trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) policy. Although the price of patented drugs has fallen over the past few years

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

142

Page 142

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

because of discount deals and other adjustments, the US government is still dragging its feet on funding single-dose generic treatment, hiding behind the issue of quality and safety but risking giving the impression of protecting brand-name pharmaceutical companies.

Conclusion In this chapter I have sought to understand the extent to which the contemporary US-Africa encounter reflects an emphasis on Africa’s human security needs rather than US national interest, narrowly defined. To answer this question, I proposed a methodology that gave weight to a balance of conceptual and empirical factors. This methodology resulted in the statement of measurements or criteria that could be used to evaluate the extent to which a relationship is based on human rather than national security concerns. By applying those criteria to the material outlined above, I deduced the following: • Limited evidence suggests that the US government has prioritized the needs of African people to be free from want and fear over standard US national security objectives. • The enjoyment of the full spectrum of human rights, economic and social as well as civil and political, by African people does not figure high on the US government’s agenda—indeed, these two groups of rights are not given equal status. • The causal connections and interdependence between US domestic and global policy and lived experience in Africa are not prioritized by the US government, even though they are very clear to advocacy groups in the United States. • The US government adopts a surface rather than a deep understanding of insecurity and has not exploited the opportunity of the post–Cold War order to work multilaterally and at various levels for a sustainable peace, preferring unilateral policies. • The United States is tackling symptoms rather than causes of human insecurity. • Order remains the main motivation of policy, and a new binary division has been substituted for the East-West confrontation of the Cold War that pits the West against Islam. • The United States has failed to engage with the structural causes of global poverty. • The pursuit of a sustainable peace through support for a new global social, political, and economic order is not on the US agenda. It can reasonably be concluded that the United States has not grasped

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

Page 143

HUMAN SECURITY

143

the opportunities for redefining the US-Africa relationship after the Cold War or after September 11. It is pursuing a largely unilateral approach to the continent based on a narrow perception of national self-interest, rather than listening to Africa’s evaluation of its own needs or working multilaterally for maximum impact to address the enormous human insecurity in the region. The Bush administration’s beliefs about the causes of human insecurity in Africa provide insight into this policy response. According to the administration, the major challenge is internal (weak and failing states, conflicts over borders), not structural (Africa’s unenviable place within the global economy), not even a balanced combination of the internal and structural factors. US social justice advocacy groups are working hard alongside other groups such as UNCTAD and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) to challenge this analysis and to bring a more balanced appraisal of domestic and structural factors into the debate. They do so in the knowledge that success in this arena “would direct resources and action to the security of people’s lives, well-being and welfare. . . . It would give priority to action to improve security through economic, social and institutional development, much less than through arms and military action.”59 Until a shift occurs toward a more balanced appraisal of domestic and structural factors, raising the profile of human security within US-Africa relations— even in the absence of issues such as Iraq—will remain difficult.

Notes 1. See www.state.gov/documents/organization/29831.pdf. 2. For example, see Realists such as R. Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” International Security 26, no. 2 (2001); and Marxists such as D. Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention (London: Pluto, 2002). 3. See J. Nef, Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability, 2nd ed. (Ottawa: IDRC, 1999); L. Axworthy, “Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First,” Global Governance 7, no. 1 (January–March 2001): 19–23; and Rob McRae and Don Hubert, eds., Human Security and the New Diplomacy (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001). 4. See, for example, Kofi Annan, “We the Peoples: The Role of the UN in the Twenty-First Century,” Millennium Report of the Secretary-General at the Millennium Assembly, A/54/2000, www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/summ.htm. 5. For example, contrast the work of scholars such as Nef, Human Security, and P. Wilkin, “Global Poverty and Orthodox Security,” Third World Quarterly 23, no. 4 (2002): 633–645, with that of F. E. Hampson, Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder (Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2002), and McRae and Hubert, Human Security and the New Diplomacy. 6. Human security as freedom from fear has been pursued at the diplomatic level by several middle-ranking powers, both individually and collectively. It is clear in the agenda of Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy (2001) and in the

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

144

Page 144

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

collective agenda of Canada and Norway expressed in the Lysoen Declaration of 1998. The declaration pledged the two countries to work in partnership on the human security agenda, focusing mainly on freedom from fear. It was followed quickly by the Human Security Network, which took the partnership a stage further, embracing a collection of over a dozen northern and southern states committed to bringing international attention to new and emerging issues (www.humansecuritynetwork.org). Discussion of the concept of human security took place in the UN Security Council in the context of its first debate on AIDS in January 2000. Then in the autumn of 2001, the Human Security Commission was established as a Japanese-funded, UN-affiliated commission. 7. Exponents of this approach include Wilkin, “Global Poverty”; and C. Thomas, Global Governance, Development, and Human Security (London: Pluto, 2000). 8. See Kofi Annan’s Foreword in Rob McRae and Don Hubert, Human Security and the New Diplomacy (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001). 9. Ibid. 10. See M. Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (London: Zed, 2001): 9–10. 11. See A. Suhrke, “Human Security and the Interests of the State,” Security Dialogue 30, no. 3 (September 1999): 265–276. 12. See C. Thomas, S. Wilkin, and P. Wilkin, “Still Waiting After All These Years: The Third World on the Periphery of International Relations,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 6 (April 2004): 241–258. 13. See K. Cell, “Challenges to Human Security in the New South Africa,” ID21 Insights, 2004, www.id21.org/insights/insights50/insights-iss50-art02.html. 14. The development of Andrew Linklater’s ideas over this period can be traced through The Transformation of Political Community (Cambridge: Polity, 1998); “The Problem of Harm in World Politics: Implications for the Sociology of States-Systems,” International Affairs 78, no. 2 (2002): 319–338; and “Cosmopolitan Political Communities in International Relations,” International Relations 16, no. 1 (2002): 135–150. 15. See www.unhcr.ch/html/menu5/wchr.htm. 16. See www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z1afchar.htm. 17. The right to development was proposed in the early 1970s as a human right belonging to peoples and to individuals. At that time came calls throughout the UN system for a new international economic order more favorable to developing countries. In December 1986, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Right to Development in resolution 4/128 (www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm). The United States cast the only vote against the declaration, which focuses on the right of individuals to national development policies that would improve their wellbeing. Clause 3 highlights the importance of a fair distribution of the benefits of development and the free and meaningful participation of the entire population. States are charged with creating the national and international conditions to make possible individual fulfillment of this right. 18. See J. Hentz, “The Contending Currents in U.S. Involvement in Sub Saharan Africa,” in Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, eds., Africa in International Politics (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 23–40. 19. See T. Evans, The Politics of Human Rights (London: Pluto, 2001). 20. See Ambassador Mohamed-Salah Dembri, “Right to Development: A Test of International Solidarity,” 2002, www.southcentre.org/info/southbulletin/bulletin14/southbulletin14-02.htm.

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

Page 145

HUMAN SECURITY

145

21. See speech by Richard Wall, US Delegate to the Fifty-Ninth Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, April 7, 2003, www.humanrights-usa.net/statements/0407Item10.htm. 22. See speech by J. Danies, US delegate to the Fifty-Ninth Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, April 25, 2003, www.humanrights-usa.net/statements/0425RtoD.htm. 23. See United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report (New York: United Nations, 2004). 24. See D. Sahn and D. Stifel, “Progress Toward the Millennium Development Goals in Africa,” World Development 32, no. 1 (2003): 23–52. 25. See UNDP, Making Global Trade Work for People (London: Earthscan, 2003), www.undp.org/mainundp/propoor/docs.trade-jan2003.pdf. 26. S. Booker and A.-L. Colgan, “Africa Policy Outlook, 2004,” www.africaaction.org/resources/docs/2004PolicyOutlook2.pdf. 27. R. Jolly, “Military Spending and Development,” ID21 Insights 50 (June 2000), http://id21.org/insights/insights50/insights-iss50-art00.html. 28. Ibid. 29. See www.africaaction.org. 30. See www.prairienet.org/acas. 31. See A. Mattoo, D. Roy, and A. Subramaniam, “The African Growth and Opportunity Act and Its Rules of Origin: Generosity Undermined?” IMF Working Paper, Africa Department, WP/021158 (September 2000), www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp02158.pdf. 32. See A. Krueger, “Moving On from Cancun: Agricultural Trade and the Poor,” 2003, www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2003/110303a.htm. 33. See P. Abramovici, “United States: The New Scramble for Africa,” Le Monde Diplomatique (July 2004), http://mondediplo.com/2004/07/07/07usinafrica. 34. White House, “Africa Peace Efforts to Receive Expanded G8 Support,” press release, June 8, 2004, www.whitehouse.gov. 35. C. Cobb, “Africa Command, Not European Command,” May 4, 2004, http://allAfrica.com. 36. Abramovici, “United States: The New Scramble for Africa.” 37. C. Cobb, “General Sees Expanding Strategic Role for U.S. European Command in Africa,” April 15, 2004, http://allAfrica.com. 38. A. Adams, “At Last unto the Breach: The Logic of a U.S. Military Command in West Africa,” Orbis (Spring 2004): 309. 39. Abramovici, “United States: The New Scramble for Africa”; Adams, “At Last unto the Breach,” 309. 40. See www.eireview.org. 41. See www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/energyand_extractive_industries/ index.php. 42. J. Madeley, Big Business, Poor Peoples (London: Zed, 1999), 121–124. 43. See S. Picciotto and R. Mayne, eds., Regulating International Business: Beyond Liberalization (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999). 44. World Bank, World Development Indicators (2003) 1, no. 5, www. worldbank.org/data/wdi2003.worldview.pdf. 45. For example, see World Bank researcher B. Milanovic’s findings that in countries with a low per capita income, such as sub-Saharan Africa, it is the rich who benefit most from open trade: “The Two Faces of Globalization: Against Globalization as We Know It,” World Development 31, no. 4 (2003): 667–683. Also see the ILO’s Report of the World Commission on Fair Globalization, 2004, www.ilo.org/public/english/wcsdg.

R-6

3/17/06

10:57 AM

146

Page 146

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

46. Thomas, Global Governance. 47. For example, see UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa: Trade Performance and Commodity Dependence, 2004, www.unctad.org. 48. See UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 2002, Geneva. 49. UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa. 50. Ibid. 51. UNECA, Economic Report on Africa: Unlocking Africa’s Trade Potential in the Global Economy, 2004, www.uneca.org/cfm. 52. Oxfam International, “‘White Dust’ Turns to Gold: Which Way Forward for Cotton in West Africa?” Briefing Paper 58 (2004): 1, www.oxfam.org/policy/ papers. 53. See Oxfam, “Cultivating Poverty: The Impact of U.S. Cotton Subsidies on Africa,” Briefing Paper 30 (September 2003): 8, www.oxfam.org/policy/papers/ 30cotton/index.htm. 54. Oxfam, “‘White Dust,’” 2. 55. See Oxfam, “Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalization and the Fight Against Poverty,” 2002, www.maketradefair.com/assets/english/ report_english_pdf, 50. 56. See J. Hanlon, “Power Without Responsibility: The World Bank and Mozambican Cashew Nuts,” Review of African Political Economy 27, no. 83 (2000): 29–45. 57. See Monterrey Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, March 18–22, 2002, sec. 63, http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ GEN/N02/392/67/PDF/N0239267.pdf?OpenElement. 58. K. Watkins and N. Woods, “Africa Must Be Heard in the Councils of the Rich,” International Herald Tribune, October 1, 2004. 59. Jolly, “Military Spending and Development.”

R-7

3/17/06

11:30 AM

Page 147

7 HIV/AIDS in Africa SANDRA F. JOIREMAN

T

he response of the United States to the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa is an example of the redefined nature of security threats that characterizes the post–September 11 period. Even the most ardent realists now accept that serious threats exist to US security apart from those brewing in organized states. Scholars and governments have been forced to adopt a greater sensitivity to the issues that underlie international violence and terrorism, such as a lack of political freedom, state failure, poverty, and HIV/AIDS, the topic addressed in this chapter as an indirect threat to US security interests in Africa.1 The US response to HIV/AIDS in Africa reflects the way in which Africa fits into the US national security agenda. Although increased awareness of the causes of terrorism has made Africa more critical to the national security agenda of the United States than it has been in the past, the African security concerns of greatest interest to US policymakers are terrorism and state failure. But a state cannot stand when great numbers of its peoples are decimated by disease. HIV/AIDS shares three similarities with poverty as a contributing factor to state failure. Both are regionalized, are temporally less immediate, and address human security insofar as they affect international security. For the most part, African states do not pose a direct political threat to US security interests. The United States neither faces strong ideological enemies on the African continent nor engages in the kind of proxy wars that characterized the Cold War. With the recent opening of Libya to International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, the actual national security threats to the United States from African governments are relatively few. However, economic underdevelopment, coupled with HIV/AIDS, may produce an environment in which weak or even failed states are unable to stem the growth of terrorist groups within their borders—groups that may or may not be linked up to international terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaida or 147

R-7

3/17/06

11:30 AM

148

Page 148

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

Islamic Jihad. Moreover, other threats to US security occasionally materialize in states unable to adequately police their own borders and assert state control outside the capital. An excellent example of just such a threat was the recent attempt to illegally export uranium from the Democratic Republic of Congo.2 HIV/AIDS is a security threat, but it is indirect and played out at multiple levels of analysis: within individual bodies; clustered within families and communities, wreaking havoc on their ability to cope with the day to day challenges of living; and with destabilizing effects on the state.3 It is the pervasiveness of the disease and the lack of treatment that multiplies its effect to the point that it becomes a security issue for states. Through the challenges it creates within those states, it emerges as an international security issue. Thus, HIV/AIDS links human security and international security in unique ways. AIDS is a disease; it is neither a weapon nor a state.4 Yet it has been perceived by two US administrations as a threat to national security because of its potential for destabilizing states. This fact is worthy of note: it is the first time that a disease has been interpreted as a national security threat. After a brief description of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, I identify the development of HIV/AIDS as a perceived security threat and detail the specific security issues presented by HIV/AIDS in Africa. Then, I explore the linkages between national security and the recently passed “Global AIDS Bill.” Last, I discuss the divergence of perspectives between African states and the United States regarding the threat of HIV/AIDS. I then make some observations regarding the future of HIV/AIDS as a security threat in Africa and the development of the “next” wave of HIV/AIDS in South Asia.

The HIV/AIDS Pandemic in Africa Africa remains the continent most affected by HIV/AIDS. Eighty-one percent of the world’s AIDS-related deaths occur in sub-Saharan Africa.5 The prevalence of AIDS (7.5–8.5 percent of the total population) is higher in sub-Saharan Africa than anywhere else in the world. An estimated 2.4 million adults and children died from AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa in 2005.6 At least 2 million adults are infected in Ethiopia, South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria, and one in four adults have contracted the virus in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.7 Furthermore, most of the world’s women suffering from the AIDS virus—a shocking 83 percent— live in sub-Saharan Africa.8 On the African continent, HIV infection rates are not similar in all countries and all areas. The World Health Organization divides the conti-

R-7

3/17/06

11:30 AM

Page 149

HIV/AIDS IN AFRICA

149

nent up into regions; of these, southern Africa suffers the most, with its prevalence rates rising from 20.3 percent in 1997–1998 to 25.7 percent in 2001–2002. These percentages may result from the higher levels of urbanization found in southern Africa. East Africa’s prevalence rate has decreased slightly, from a high of 13.7 percent to 11.4 percent, which is partially attributable to the significant and consistent HIV/AIDS awareness campaign by the Ugandan government. This trend has been followed by other countries in the region, most notably Ethiopia, where in the capital of Addis Ababa HIV prevalence rates for fifteen- to twenty-four-year-old pregnant women dropped from 24 percent in 1995 to 11 percent in 2003. The AIDS prevalence in West Africa has fallen slightly from 4.4 percent in 1999–2000 to 3.1 percent in 2003–2004.9 It is important to unpack these statistics in order to understand the nature of the epidemic and how it affects different countries. We can do that by looking at three “snapshots” of African countries dealing with HIV/AIDS: Uganda, South Africa, and Ethiopia. I have chosen these three because they are all politically stable, not currently at war, and at very different points in terms of the response to the pandemic and its prevalence within their borders.

Uganda Uganda was one of the first African countries to experience the full impact of HIV/AIDS. At the height of the epidemic, infection rates were 14 percent throughout the country and much higher in some areas.10 Now HIV infection rates are down to 8 percent because most of the people infected earlier have died. Uganda has experienced the peculiar demographic challenge of HIV/AIDS; for example, the virus attacks people who are most sexually active and most economically productive (those between the ages of fifteen and forty-five). Uganda has suffered from a lack of teachers and medical professionals as a result of the epidemic. Thus the virus kills the population most necessary to development: the teachers, doctors, and entrepreneurs as well as the mothers and fathers raising children. In Uganda, high rates of the HIV/AIDS infection corresponded with conflict and instability in the country. As peace came in the mid-1980s, fewer people were displaced, soldiers and rebels returned to their barracks and hometowns, and infection rates began to decline. Uganda also embraced the challenge of reducing infection rates and launched a national educational campaign against HIV/AIDS beginning in 1986. The slogan of “Abstinence, Be Faithful, or Use a Condom”—often referred to as the ABC method—succeeded in getting across the message of safe sexual practices. The Ugandan model of HIV/AIDS prevention and awareness has been widely applauded and has shown significant results. President Yoweri Museveni supported the educa-

R-7

3/17/06

11:30 AM

150

Page 150

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

tional campaign and articulated it from the capital city to the classrooms in rural schools.

South Africa South Africa has the most HIV-positive people of any country in the world. It is at the peak rate for new infections, and little headway has yet been made to bring the infection rate down. Of South Africa’s 45 million people, 5.3 million are infected with HIV, 11 and 25 percent of its economically active individuals are infected.12 The staggering toll that AIDS is taking on South Africa’s social and economic fabric has only recently been acknowledged by the government. By 2000, the government began an AIDS prevention and treatment program, but it has been widely criticized for its ineffectiveness. In 2000, South Africa’s ministry of health refused to provide antiretroviral treatment for cost reasons, and President Thabo Mbeki publicly questioned whether HIV really caused AIDS.13 By 2002, the government began to work more closely with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and promoted limited antiretroviral use. South Africa’s government will face a growing crisis as AIDS patients clog its health infrastructure and the number of AIDS orphans grows.

Ethiopia Like the South African government, the Ethiopian government was slow to recognize the impact that HIV/AIDS could have on its country and was late to begin education and prevention programs. Throughout the 1990s, Ethiopia faced an increasing number of deaths from tuberculosis but failed to link these deaths to opportunistic infections resulting from HIV/AIDS. Under pressure from indigenous NGOs and international organizations, the situation began to change in 1999. Ethiopia now recognizes that it has a struggle ahead in terms of its efforts to cope with HIV/AIDS. Recently, it began a significant effort to educate the population on the basics of virus transmission. However, significant challenges remain, as surveys show that young people have a lot of misconceptions about the disease, particularly in the rural areas.14 A recently established government office, the National HIV/AIDS Council, has not yet been as effective as it could be in focusing attention and resources on the disease. One of the biggest challenges for Ethiopia will be how to deal with the AIDS orphans in the next decade. By some estimates, AIDS could orphan up to a quarter of all children in Ethiopia by 2011.15 These orphans will challenge the state’s ability to provide education and jobs and will also drain a healthcare system that currently spends only $2 per year per citizen.16 These snapshots give some indication of the varied nature of the

R-7

3/17/06

11:30 AM

Page 151

HIV/AIDS IN AFRICA

151

HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa. It is everywhere a challenge to the state and to fragile health care systems, but different countries are at different stages of their response to HIV/AIDS. Muslim areas and states have generally been less affected by HIV/AIDS, and West African average rates of infection have been lower than those in southern and East Africa (see Appendix at end of chapter).

The Evolution of HIV/AIDS as a Perceived Security Threat HIV/AIDS has existed as an epidemiological challenge on the African continent since the 1970s. From the 1980s onward, the HIV/AIDS pandemic was recognized as a humanitarian crisis and an issue of human security. International responses occurred primarily through NGO activity and international institutions tasked with health care, such as the World Health Organization, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and to some extent the United Nations High Commission on Refugees. Yet it was not discussed in policy circles as a security threat until 1994, when Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs Timothy Wirth noted the risks to state stability that develop in countries seriously affected by AIDS.17 It was not until 2000 that HIV/AIDS became more widely recognized as a security threat. At that time the full impact of the disease on state capacity became apparent to external observers. 18 In 2000, the Clinton administration requested $250 million in its 2001 budget to fight the global AIDS pandemic.19 The administration saw HIV/AIDS as a threat to the fledgling democracies on the African continent. It also commented on the possibility of AIDS contributing to failed states because of the state’s inability to provide security, health care, and education.20 What makes AIDS more than just an epidemiological crisis? Why has it made the leap from disease to a security issue? I answer these questions in the following section by examining the security concerns resulting from HIV/AIDS at the national and international levels. Certainly, HIV/AIDS is a threat to individual or human security: I show how the deaths of many individuals have turned HIV/AIDS into a national and international security threat.

African National Security Interests The greatest immediate security threat from HIV/AIDS infection at a national level is that which comes from the weakening of the military when a significant percentage of soldiers become infected with HIV/AIDS. If the HIV infection rate keeps pace with other sexually transmitted diseases, the threat to the military is considerable. Stefan Elbe has noted, “Prevalence

R-7

3/17/06

11:30 AM

152

Page 152

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

rates of sexually transmitted diseases among military personnel usually exceed those of the civilian population by a factor of two to five. In many African militaries, this is also true with regard to HIV.”21 In some countries, the rates of HIV infection among the military are estimated to be as high as 50 to 60 percent.22 The number of infected soldiers in any given army is difficult to determine, and governments are understandably reluctant to make this information public, even if they do know it with some certainty. According to Robert L. Ostergard, “the public admission of what may be high HIV infection rates among military personnel potentially compromises national and military security for some states by revealing what could be a substantial weakness in the military’s combat readiness.”23 Even though states thus have good reason to underestimate the rate of HIV infection in their military, some data do exist. The Appendix at the end of this chapter records the results of a concerted attempt to collect available infection rate data among military personnel in Africa. High rates of HIV infection in the military increase the amount of money that needs to be devoted to recruitment, training, and health care. Just as AIDS eliminates some of the most useful segments of the civilian population, so too does it have a significant impact on the officer corps and command structure of the armed forces. The training that goes into the preparation of a single soldier is lost when he or she is affected by HIV/AIDS and has to leave the armed forces. The average cost of training per soldier increases overall when more recruits have to be trained to compensate for those who have to leave the army due to HIV.24 Moreover, that particular soldier will not move up through the ranks and be available for leadership opportunities or lend his battlefield experience to the force. The end result of high rates of HIV infection will be a less experienced and therefore less prepared armed force than one in which the rates are substantially lower. Recognizing the high costs of training and frequent turnover, the Kenyan, Tanzanian, and Ugandan armed forces in Africa have made HIV testing mandatory for recruits. These countries then systematically exclude those who test positive.25 If we can call the issue of HIV infection among soldiers the primary threat to national security, the secondary and linked threat is the soldier as a vector of HIV transmission among the population. Zimbabwe’s army is an example. By some estimates, the army from the late 1980s to 1990 was more than 70 percent HIV-positive. 26 These Zimbabwean forces were deployed to the Democratic Republic of Congo in the 1990s, undoubtedly spreading the disease there. Such a high percentage of infected soldiers may be unusual, but the scenario is not. Indeed, it is thought that the war in Angola exacerbated the spread of HIV/AIDS globally in the 1970s and that soldiers were the original vectors of the disease.27 Soldiers are particularly vulnerable to HIV infection because of risky sexual behavior. They are

R-7

3/17/06

11:30 AM

Page 153

HIV/AIDS IN AFRICA

153

often deployed far from wives and family, resulting in a greater propensity to hire prostitutes and engage in the types of sexual activity associated with high rates of HIV transmission. Also, in many parts of Africa, soldiers are viewed as desirable mates because they have steady jobs and a reliable income. Thus, the opportunities for soldiers to spread HIV through consensual sex are significant. Soldiers are also vectors in the spread of HIV through nonconsensual sex, that is, rape. As has been documented in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, war, displacement, and genocide have led to the rape of women and girls and their subsequent infection with HIV. In Rwanda, the spread of HIV/AIDS among Tutsi women through rape was an intentional part of the genocide.28

International Security Threats These national security threats emanating from high rates of HIV infection are reflected in international security issues as well. Why would the high rates of HIV infection be a problem for other states, and why would the United States, in particular, be concerned about this issue? Three specific issues regarding the spread of HIV represent either a threat to US interests or a specific threat to US security: (1) the interest of the United States in having African peacekeeping forces available for regional interventions, (2) US investment in training African forces abroad in antiterrorism, and (3) the threat of failed states. Since the invasion of Somalia in 1992, the United States has had an explicit preference for regional peacekeeping efforts in Africa rather than the deployment of US forces. Accordingly, an attempt has been made to train members of African militaries for peacekeeping operations. The most prominent of these efforts has been the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance program (ACOTA), which built on and expanded the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) program developed by the Clinton administration. ACOTA focuses on training African militaries in the development of a common peacekeeping doctrine, interoperability, and standard communications technology. It seeks thereby to facilitate the effectiveness, coordination, and rapid deployment of African forces in response to African humanitarian and security crises. The goal of ACRI/ACOTA is to train eight to ten African battalions of 600 to 800 soldiers, each with additional specialized companies for combat support. 29 Countries receiving training and funds though the ACOTA program are expected to deploy their troops quickly in response to UN requests for peacekeeping forces, something in which the United States has an interest. Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Mali, Ghana, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire have thus far participated in training exercises.30 US Army Special Operations officers staff the initial ten-week training, which includes computer-simulated exercises. This initial training

R-7

3/17/06

11:30 AM

154

Page 154

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

is followed up by refresher courses. The significant difference between ACRI and ACOTA is that the latter includes training and equipment for light infantry and small unit operations, which are intended to enable peacekeeping and peace enforcement in hostile environments. In addition, a greater attempt is made to tailor the country programs to the specific needs of each country.31 Yet as HIV/AIDS begins to take its toll on the armed forces, the ability of those forces to deploy quickly in response to a threat is impeded. It is also less likely that countries in which the armed forces are stretched thin due to HIV/AIDS will be willing to participate in peacekeeping operations or regional interventions. That was one of the earliest points of concern with regard to HIV/AIDS and its effect on international security from the perspective of the United States.32 Robert Ostergard has noted that in addition to difficulties in carrying out peacekeeping operations and foreign interventions, armed forces may be limited by HIV infection in their ability to carry out operations in their own countries.33 However, the relationship between HIV infection and peacekeeping operations is not everywhere problematized. In spite of US concerns about HIV/AIDS negatively affecting the availability of soldiers for peacekeeping operations, the relationship between HIV and peacekeeping may be fundamentally different. In some African militaries, peacekeeping operations have also served as an incentive for HIV/AIDS prevention in Africa. The opportunity of a potentially lucrative and rewarding peacekeeping assignment is being used as an incentive to encourage HIV prevention in the Ghanaian military.34 The Ghanaian military high command encourages HIV prevention and condom use. HIV-positive soldiers are forbidden from serving on peacekeeping operations and miss the prestige and extra pay that these assignments bring. According to Brigadier General Daniel Twum, “[Soldiers] are aware of this policy and make an active personal effort to prevent themselves from catching the virus in order to take part in these operations.” The Ghanaian military has a lower rate of HIV infection than the population at large, which currently has an infection rate of 3.8 percent. 35 General Twum’s statement suggests that African peacekeeping assignments may be an incentive for HIV/AIDS prevention and should therefore be supported for reasons of both security and public health. As a consequence, evidence regarding peacekeeping is mixed. It is in the interest of US security to have available African peacekeepers, and if the Ghanaian case is any example, it also appears to be in the interest of African armed forces as well. To the extent that peacekeeping is viewed as a coveted assignment, setting high standards for peacekeepers, including HIV-negative status, will lead to higher standards across the board for the armed forces. It would help if policies mirroring those of the Ghanaian

R-7

3/17/06

11:30 AM

Page 155

HIV/AIDS IN AFRICA

155

armed forces were implemented in other militaries and received the support of countries to which these militaries are deployed. Such receiving countries may be reluctant to accept African peacekeepers who are HIVpositive.36 For example, Eritrea has asked that the UN not allow HIV-positive soldiers to be part of the UN peacekeeping force monitoring the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia.37 Such policies raise important human rights issues regarding discrimination against those who are HIV-positive and will serve to further the stigmatization of HIV-positive people in African countries. The focus on peacekeeping is just a subcategory of the largest type of US investment in security in Africa—military-to-military contacts and training. The second threat to US interests in Africa from HIV is the increased cost of training armed forces in Africa for more traditional operations. The United States regularly trains African military forces. Some of this training is funneled through ACOTA, but more traditional training occurs through the International Military Education and Training program (IMET), which has existed for decades to train African troops and officers at US sites. 38 In 2002, IMET trained approximately 1,600 members of African armed forces. The countries that have been the largest recipients of this training (in dollar amounts) include Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa.39 Defense dollars allocated to IMET and ACOTA are designed to serve US interests abroad. However, if HIV/AIDS is leading to the death, disability, or discharge of soldiers being trained via IMET dollars, then the net benefit to the United States in terms of security will decrease.40 IMET training is also linked to the global antiterrorism effort. Since the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration has pushed both to strengthen the ACOTA program to enable it to train soldiers for more “robust” assignments than peacekeeping41 and to shift the focus of US military training to those countries with terrorist threats in order to expand the reach of the United States in the struggle against terrorism.42 On March 11, 2002, President George W. Bush noted, “We will not send American troops to every battle, but America will actively prepare other nations for the battles ahead.”43 Thus the status of African armed forces is of critical importance to the United States in terms of their ability to participate in peacekeeping and to strengthen global antiterrorist efforts. It would be a great asset to African militaries and to US national security interests if the United States provided antiretroviral drugs to African armed forces as part of the US security strategy in Africa. That would address at least one aspect of the problem of HIV/AIDS in African armed forces. If we can assume that those targeted for IMET or ACOTA training have already been trained by their own militaries and are at least of middle rank and that those selected for IMET and

R-7

3/17/06

11:30 AM

156

Page 156

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

ACOTA training are some of the best and brightest, then the provision of antiretroviral drugs would safeguard the investment of US training dollars as well as the quality of the command structure of African militaries. The third area in which HIV/AIDS presents a threat to US national security is its impact on weak states. The armed forces serve as just one example of the ways in which a state can be adversely affected by HIV/AIDS. The same issues of investment in training and the development of a hierarchy are replicated among the ranks of teachers, doctors, nurses, politicians, and other educated people. There is a great fear that HIV/AIDS will weaken African states and that those weak states will fail. The United States and other countries now recognize that state failure in Afghanistan provided an environment conducive for terrorists to train and organize their attacks against Western targets. Failed states are a threat to global security.44 The United States therefore has a national security interest in making certain that state failure is contained so as to make the world a safer place and the United States a safer country. September 11 revealed the danger of allowing state failures and humanitarian emergencies to go unaddressed. In Africa, examples of failed states such as Liberia and Somalia provide ready illustrations that this fear has some foundation. Liberian state failure pushed the whole Mano River region into war, creating the movement of arms and people into nearby countries. Somalia is another African example, and in that case state failure has been linked directly to terrorism.45 Thus much of the rhetoric coming from US government officials regarding HIV/AIDS in Africa and national security uses state failure as the critical link between these two issues.46 In the section below, I examine the recent US response to that threat.

The Bush Administration and Global HIV/AIDS The Bush administration embraced the HIV/AIDS threat as both a human and a national security issue. In a 2002 speech, Colin Powell stated: AIDS is not just a compelling moral issue; it is not just a humanitarian issue; it is far more than just a health issue. It is a security issue. It is a destroyer of nations. It is a destroyer of societies. It has the potential to destabilize regions, perhaps even entire continents. It can tear the social fabric apart within any nation. It can rob young democracies of citizens they need to build freer, better futures for themselves and for their children. HIV/AIDS is an economic issue, leaving nations without human resources to grow and develop, ultimately sapping global well-being.47

The desire to take some sort of national action on an issue that was increasingly articulated as a humanitarian disaster as well as a national

R-7

3/17/06

11:30 AM

Page 157

HIV/AIDS IN AFRICA

157

security threat led to the announcement of a new bill to fight global HIV/AIDS. It was called the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The announcement was first made in the 2002 State of the Union address. President Bush promised $15 billion over a five-year period to fight AIDS, or $3 billion per year, a sum that would have been a huge increase over previous funding levels. After appropriations, that number was substantially reduced, yet the final contribution remained significant.48 In fiscal year 1995, the US government gave $127 million to international HIV/AIDS programs. In fiscal year 2005, that allocation reached $2.2 billion. The percentage of discretionary US government AIDS funding going to international programs has increased from 3 percent in 1996 to 22 percent in 2004.49 Figure 7.1 depicts the increase. In the PEPFAR legislation, international security issues are noted as one of the pressing concerns justifying the extraordinary commitment of US funds to fighting HIV/AIDS internationally: HIV/AIDS weakens the defenses of countries severely affected by the HIV/AIDS crisis through high infection rates among members of their military forces and voluntary peacekeeping personnel. According to

Figure 7.1 Federal Funding for International HIV/AIDS, FYs 1995–2004 (excluding international research; US$ millions)

Source: Todd Summers and Jennifer Kates, “Trends in U.S. Government Funding for HIV/AIDS—Fiscal Years 1981–2004,” Chart Pack, publication number 7032, www.kff.org.

R-7

3/17/06

11:30 AM

158

Page 158

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES UNAIDS, in sub-Saharan Africa, many military forces have infection rates as much as five times that of the civilian population. HIV/AIDS poses a serious security issue for the international community by increasing the potential for political instability and economic devastation, particularly in those countries and regions most severely affected by the disease; decreasing the capacity to resolve conflicts through the introduction of peacekeeping forces because the environments into which these forces are introduced pose a high risk for the spread of HIV/AIDS; and increasing the vulnerability of local populations to HIV/AIDS in conflict zones from peacekeeping troops with HIV infection rates significantly higher than civilian populations.50

Though it might be overstated, the US government takes the security threat noted in the PEPFAR legislation seriously, and it has put HIV/AIDS on the US agenda in terms of both security and the commitment of funds. Yet only twelve African countries are covered by the PEPFAR legislation: Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Others are left out for reasons that have not been made clear. Moreover, other countries at risk from the spread of HIV/AIDS, most notably India, are not currently targeted for funding. The substantial new funding represented by PEPFAR will affect human security, even though the effort is motivated by national security.51 PEPFAR legislation represents a different form of engagement than has previously been present between the United States and Africa. The United States has not previously dedicated so many resources to fighting a disease overseas, nor has a disease been portrayed as a national security threat. In fact, AIDS has been killing Africans in large numbers for fifteen years with little US regard for its effects beyond the NGO level. However, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, changed the way the US security establishment conceives of US interests. In the general reconceptualization of security, Africa became far more important than it had been in the immediate post–Cold War era, largely because of the threat of failed states.

US National Security and Public Health in Africa Whatever the motivation for US concern with AIDS in Africa, the flow of money to the continent to assist with the crisis being caused by AIDS deaths and HIV infections will be welcomed. The question must be asked, Will this money serve the goal of strengthening weak African states and bolstering US security interests? If past foreign aid targeted at public health and education is any example, the answer is no. If the United States pours money into African states to strengthen their public health systems over a five-year period, possibly African states will respond by withdrawing national fund-

R-7

3/17/06

11:30 AM

Page 159

HIV/AIDS IN AFRICA

159

ing in the areas where foreign funds are coming in. To some degree that makes sense: Why should states allocate scarce resources to areas that are already receiving funding? In the past, NGO involvement in Africa has resulted in states abdicating their responsibility to provide basic education and health care to their citizenry.52 The ironic effect is that when states stop providing these basic public goods, they grow weaker, despite the underlying intent of this funding initiative to strengthen African capabilities. In addition, the timing of the PEPFAR legislation and its long-term effects also give cause for concern. In the first year of funding, the US government requested less than $3 billion because of a stated desire to see the infrastructure in place through which the aid can be funneled. The bill states that 55 percent of the money allocated by the PEPFAR legislation would go toward the purchase of antiretroviral drugs. That is good news indeed: with treatment, HIV infection can change from a death sentence to a serious but chronic disease. But when the five years of funding runs out, will Africans just return to the business of dying?53 Additionally, it is unclear to what extent African governments see HIV/AIDS as a security threat. Certainly, good reason exists for them to do so. Yet for them, HIV/AIDS is also much more than a security threat. It is a public health disaster that drains from state coffers precious funds needed to combat even more pervasive diseases such as malaria. It is a drain on the educational system and burdens the state with large numbers of orphans to care for (or not to care for and then suffer the consequences). Moreover, HIV/AIDS affects the efficiency of a country’s workforce. One HIV-testing project in Tanzania indicated that HIV/AIDS is the dominant cause of lost labor productivity and thus has an impact on company revenue. 54 HIV/AIDS also affects the efficiency of labor, when even those who are not HIV-positive are obligated to care for the dying or to participate in frequent funerals and ritualized memorials for those that have died. The US focus on HIV/AIDS as a security issue could be a boon for African governments struggling with their response to overwhelming numbers of HIV-positive citizens. Yet US and African perspectives seem to diverge as African states struggle with more than just the security elements of the AIDS pandemic. The burdens that structural adjustment places on countries should also be noted. Although the US policy of support for combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic is laudable, it coexists with US support for structural adjustment programs that promote fee-based health care and primary education. Some evidence links structural adjustment with the spread of HIV/AIDS in Kenya, where the imposition of fees led to a decline in attendance at clinics.55 With growing numbers of AIDS orphans and families impoverished by multiple AIDS deaths, the US support of fee-based services puts these basic public goods out of the reach of those the United States is trying to assist through targeted HIV/AIDS funding.

R-7

3/17/06

11:30 AM

Page 160

160

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

Conclusion Security threats emanating from the HIV/AIDS pandemic are played out in an African context in which there are few ongoing international conflicts and the primary goal of most states is development. In those countries with high infection rates, HIV/AIDS has impeded overall development and lowered life expectancies significantly. It is important to recognize, however, that the HIV/AIDS pandemic does not affect every country in Africa in a similar fashion. Infection rates are substantially greater in southern Africa and East Africa than in West and North Africa. US interests regarding HIV/AIDS in Africa have evolved over time, from exclusively humanitarian interests to those of international security. PEPFAR is a short-term measure that will ameliorate but not eliminate, the threat of failed states in Africa. Although it is laudable that the United States is active in combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic, comprehensive programs, far beyond the reach of those suggested by the PEPFAR legislation, will be needed to establish long-term, sustainable HIV/AIDS prevention programs. Even with comprehensive long-term educational and health care programs, the task has only begun, for by many assessments Africa is not the only continent that will experience the ravages of the AIDS epidemic. The next wave of increasing HIV infections and AIDS deaths is expected to play out in Asia, particularly on the Indian subcontinent. There, the security implications of the HIV/AIDS epidemic will be magnified, as the issues of HIV infection within the armed forces and the weakening of the state develop in a context of the IndiaPakistan conflict, the arms race, and the delicate situation in Kashmir.

Appendix: HIV Prevalence Rates, 2003

Country Southern Africa Swaziland Botswana Lesotho Zimbabwe South Africa Namibia Zambia

HIV/AIDS Prevalence Among Individuals 15–49 Years Old, General Population (percentage) 38.8 37.3 28.9 24.6 21.5 21.3 16.5

HIV/AIDS Prevalence, Military Population (percentage)

50 60–70

(continues)

R-7

3/17/06

11:30 AM

Page 161

Appendix, continued

Country

HIV/AIDS Prevalence Among Individuals 15–49 Years Old, General Population (percentage)

Malawi Mozambique Angola East Africa United Republic of Tanzania Kenya Burundia Rwanda Ethiopia Uganda Djibouti Eritrea Sudan Somaliaa Central Africa Central African Republic Gabon Cameroon Congo Chad Democratic Republic of Congo Equatorial Guineaa West Africa Côte d’Ivoire Sierra Leonea Liberia Nigeria Burkina Faso Togo Guinea Ghana Guinea-Bissaua Benin Mali Gambia Niger Senegal Mauritania

14.2 12.2 3.9 8.8 6.7 6.0 5.1 4.4 4.1 2.9 2.7 2.3 1.0 13.5 8.1 6.9 4.9 4.8 4.2 3.4 7.0 7.0 5.9 5.4 4.2 4.1 3.2 3.1 2.8 1.9 1.9 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.4

HIV/AIDS Prevalence, Military Population (percentage)

40–60 15–30

10

10–25 40–60 10–20 61b 10–20

Sources: Radhika Sarin, “A New Security Threat: HIV/AIDS in the Military,” World Watch 16, no. 2 (March–April 2003): 16–22; Doctors for Life, “AIDS Statistics,” Doctors for Life Living Safely AIDS Projects, December 2000; Stefan Elbe, “HIV/AIDS and the Changing Landscape of War in Africa,” International Security 27, no. 2 (2002): 159–177; Kevin O’Brian, “AIDS and African Armies,” Atlantic Monthly 292, no. 1 (July 2003): 86–87; UNAIDS, “Table of Country-Specific HIV/AIDS Estimates and Data, End 2003,” 2004 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, July 2004, www.unaids.org/bangkok2004/report_pdf.html. These numbers of HIV-infected people were calculated as a percentage of the population given by UNDP for 2003. Notes: a. 2001 figures. b. 1998 figure.

R-7

3/17/06

11:30 AM

162

Page 162

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

Notes My thanks go to Jonathan Miner, Kim Gilsdorf, and Emily Monteith for their able research assistance. All faults remain my own. 1. Collier et al. have identified the linkages between civil war and the spread of AIDS. Civil wars are linked to the spread of HIV/AIDS because they make staying healthy more difficult and reduce the amount of money available to governments to spend on public health. Paul Collier, V. L. Elliott, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 2. Associated Press, “Congo Officials Seize Illegal Uranium,” March 22, 2004, www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/03/22/congo.uranium.ap/. 3. The peculiar nature of the transmission of the disease through sexual contact and mother-to-child transmission means that it does not affect each member of a community in a similar fashion, such as a natural disaster or a famine might. Rather, it clusters deaths within families and vulnerable populations such as sex workers, truck drivers, and migrant laborers. For a description of the local-level impact of AIDS, see Carolyn Baylies, “The Impact of AIDS on Rural Households in Africa: A Shock Like Any Other?” Development and Change 33, no. 4 (2002): 611–632. 4. Here I use AIDS rather than HIV/AIDS because I am referring to the disease of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome specifically rather than to the virus that causes it as well. 5. Economic Commission for Africa, Economic Report on Africa 2003: Accelerating the Pace of Development (Addis Ababa: Economic Commission for Africa, 2003). 6. WHO/UNAIDS, AIDS Epidemic Update (Geneva: Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, 2005), 3. 7. United Nations, “Countries Most Affected by HIV/AIDS Are Least Able to Pay for Prevention and Treatment: However, Governments Initiating Actions to Confront Challenge.” New York: Department of Public Information, Press Release, News and Media Services Division, November 6, 2001, www.un.org/News/ Press/docs/2001/aids18.doc.htm. 8. Economic Commission for Africa, Economic Report on Africa 2003, 48. 9. World Health Organization, HIV/AIDS Epidemiological Surveillance Update for the WHO Africa Region 2002 (Harare, Zimbabwe: WHO Regional Office for Africa, 2003), 19; World Health Organization, HIV/AIDS Epidemiological Surveillance Report for the WHO Africa Region 2005 Update (Harare, Zimbabwe: WHO Regional Office for Africa, December 2005), 25. 10. This percentage is the overall infection rate. A more reliable estimator is the infection rate for pregnant women. In 1992, 29.5 percent of all pregnant women in urban areas in Uganda were testing positive for HIV infection. By 2000 that rate had dropped to 11.3 percent, according to the Economic Commission for Africa, HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview (Yaounde, Cameroon: Economic Commission for Africa, 2002). 11. South African Department of Health, Report of the Joint Health and Treasury Task Team on Treatment Options to Enhance Comprehensive Care for HIV/AIDS in the Public Sector, South African Department of Health, Pretoria, 2003, www.gov.za/issues/hiv/ttr/index.html. 12. Kaiser Family Foundation, Kaiser Family Foundation Daily HIV/AIDS Report, October 6, 2003, www.kff.org (accessed April 20, 2004).

R-7

3/17/06

11:30 AM

Page 163

HIV/AIDS IN AFRICA

163

13. “Heir Inapparent,” Time, European Edition, November 17, 2000, www.time.com/time/europe/webonly/africa/2000/11/mbeki.html. 14. David H. Shinn, “HIV/AIDS in Ethiopia: The Silence Is Broken; the Stigma Is Not,” Africa Notes (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001). 15. UN Integrated Regional Information Network, Ethiopia: Warning over High Toll of AIDS Orphans (Africa English Reports), United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2003. 16. This amount contrasts with approximately $112 a year in South Africa, a number calculated by dividing the public health budget by the population. E-mail message to author, March 10, 2004, from UN Integrated Regional Information Network, Ethiopia: Focus on the Local Manufacture of Anti-retroviral Drugs. 17. Timothy Wirth, “Foreword,” Global HIV/AIDS: A Strategy for U.S. Leadership: A Consensus Report of the CSIS Working Group on Global HIV/AIDS (Panel Report), ed. K. A. Hamilton and C. A. Ducker (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994). 18. Lisa Richwine, “U.S. Calls Spread of AIDS Globally a Security Threat,” Boston Globe online, 2000, www.aegis.com/news/ads/2000/AD000772.html. 19. BBC, “U.S.: AIDS Is Security Threat,” BBC News, May 1, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/731706.stm. 20. White House, National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 1999). 21. Stefan Elbe, “HIV/AIDS and the Changing Landscape of War in Africa,” International Security 27, no. 2 (2002): 159–177. 22. Lindy Heinecken, “AIDS: The New Security Frontier,” Conflict Trends 3, no. 4 (2000): 12–15; UN Integrated Regional Information Network, HIV/AIDS Devastating Military, March 3, 2001, www.aegis.org/news/irin/2001/ir010301.html. 23. Robert L. Ostergard, “HIV/AIDS, the Military and the Future of Africa’s Security,” 12. Paper presented at the ISA annual convention, Montreal, Canada, March 17–20, 2004. 24. There is also a debate on when soldiers should be required to leave the armed forces if they are HIV-positive. Should they be made to leave when they test positive for HIV (sero-positive), or should it be when they become symptomatic? There are human rights and legal issues involved in forbidding a soldier from serving in the armed forces or in peacekeeping operations if he is HIV-positive but asymptomatic. See Roxanne Bazergan, “Testing Times,” World Today 57, no. 5 (2001): 6–8. 25. UNAIDS, Workshop on HIV/AIDS Activities with Armed Forces in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda. Entebbe, Uganda, 2003. 26. Gregory R. Copley, “AIDS and African Armies: A Crisis Worse Than War,” Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy 27, no. 11 (1999): 5. 27. Ibid., 4. 28. Amnesty International, “Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence Against Girls and Women,” AFR 51/035/2000; Jackie Martens, “Congo Rape Victims Seek Solace,” BBC News, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3426273.stm; Lisa Sharlach, “Rape as Genocide: Bangladesh, the Former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda,” New Political Science 22, no. 1 (2000): 89–102; Alistair Thomsom, “Refugee Rapes Fuel AIDS in Africa’s War Zones,” Reuters News Media, 2001, www.aegis.org/news/re/2001/RE010645.html (accessed March 29 2004); UNAIDS, “AIDS Becoming Africa’s Top Human Security Issue, UN Warns,” press release, 2000. 29. Jason C. Seal, “Peacekeeping Initiatives in Africa: A Preliminary Analysis,” Strategy Research Project (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2002), 15–16.

R-7

3/17/06

11:30 AM

164

Page 164

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

30. Assis Malaquias, “Peace Operations in Africa: Preserving the Brittle State?” Journal of International Affairs 55, no. 2 (2002): 415–440. 31. Russell J. Handy, “Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance: Developing Training Partnerships for the Future of Africa,” Air and Space Power Journal 17, no. 3 (2003): 57–65. 32. US Institute of Peace (USIP), “AIDS and Violent Conflict in Africa,” Special Report (Washington, DC: USIP, 2001). 33. One further issue rarely noted in the literature, perhaps because it has more of a national than an international impact, is battlefield casualties. AIDS changes the nature of the treatment of the wounded. When rates of infection among troops are high, medics will want to take as many precautions as possible in handling battlefield injuries. Moreover, a strong fear of HIV infection results in far less willingness to treat enemy casualties. Robert L. Ostergard, “HIV/AIDS, the Military, and the Future of Africa’s Security,” paper presented at the ISA annual convention, Montreal, Canada, March 17–20, 2004, 24. 34. These assignments are so lucrative because they are usually funded by the UN Security Council at a standard rate per soldier, which is substantially higher than base pay in most African countries. 35. UN Integrated Regional Information Network, Ghana: ECOWAS Governments Tackle HIV/AIDS in Their Armed Forces (United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2004). 36. In a study conducted by UNAIDS, 94 percent of the militaries responding to inquiries conducted some form of HIV testing, but only 55 percent had a declared policy regarding testing in 2004. AIDS Brief for Sectoral Planners and Managers: Military Sector, Health Economics and HIV/AIDS Research Division, University of KwaZulu-Natal, www.nu.ac.za/heard/aidsbriefs/sec/Military.pdf (accessed April 21, 2004). 37. Roxanne Bazergan, “Testing Times,” World Today 57, no. 5 (2001): 6–8. 38. See www.defenselink.mil/policy/isa/africa/sa-definitions.html for a further description of the program. The IMET program trains foreign military officers and troops from around the world, not just in Africa. It might be familiar to readers in its most infamous incarnation as the program that funded the School of the Americas. 39. The countries are noted here because they are not the same countries as those participating in ACRI, which specifically targets peacekeeping. IMET funds can be used for training over a wider range of issues. Daniel Volman, U.S. Military Involvement in Africa by Country, Association of Concerned Africa Scholars, February 11, 2003, www.prairienet.org/acas/military/militarysummary.html (accessed April 5, 2004). 40. I do not know at this point if the United States screens those it trains for HIV infection, which would seem an advisable course of action. The United States does screen its own recruits and tests those on active and reserve duty. Even if screening occurs for those receiving IMET training, it does not prevent infection after the training is given, so the net benefit to the United States still has the potential to decrease if infection rates are high. 41. Assis Malaquias, “Peace Operations in Africa: Preserving the Brittle State?” Journal of International Affairs 55, no. 2 (2002): 415–440. 42. Victoria Garcia. 2004. U.S. Foreign Military Training: A Shift in Focus, Center for Defense Information, 2002, www.cdi.org/terrorism/miltraining-pr.cfm (accessed April 6, 2004). 43. George W. Bush, President Thanks World Coalition for Anti-Terrorism Efforts, White House, 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/print/ 20020311-1.html (accessed April 12, 2004).

R-7

3/17/06

11:30 AM

Page 165

HIV/AIDS IN AFRICA

165

44. Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (2002): 127–142; Barnett Rubin, “A Blueprint for Afghanistan,” Current History 101, no. 654 (2002): 153–158. 45. This view is highly contested. Although he admits that Somalia is considered a threat by many people in the US national security bureaucracy, Ken Menkhaus argues that Somalia is linked to terrorism by those who are much more concerned with the global political scene than with facts on the ground in Somalia. Ken Menkhaus, “Somalia: In the Crosshairs of the War on Terrorism,” Current History 100 (May 2002): 210–218. 46. Colin L. Powell, “Powell Says Partnerships Needed to Stem AIDS Epidemic,” June 24, 2002, www.usembassy.it/file2002_06/alia/a2062407.htm (accessed December 26, 2005); US Institute of Peace, “AIDS and Violent Conflict in Africa,” Special Report (Washington, DC: USIP, 2001); White House, National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 1999); Wirth, “Foreword.” 47. Colin L. Powell, “Powell Says Parties Needed to Stem AIDS Epidemic,” June 24, 2002, www.usembassy.it/file2002_06/alia/a2062407.htm (accessed March 25, 2004. 48. Politically, the PEPFAR bill provided a counterpoint to Bush administration policies that have been termed neoimperialist. The bill appeared to be an example of the Bush administration’s compassionate conservatism, and the administration received kudos in the press and in politically unsympathetic circles for this example of constructive engagement. When it came to the appropriations process for the bill, the public hype played against the Bush administration. Their initial “ask” on the PEPFAR bill was only $2 billion, rather than the promised $3 billion. Intense lobbying efforts and sympathetic Republican congressional allies managed to increase the allocated amount to $2.4 billion for the FY 2004 budget, in spite of stress on the budget from US engagement abroad in Afghanistan and Iraq. 49. Jennifer Kates and Todd Summers, Trends in U.S. Government Funding for HIV/AIDS Through FY 2005 (Menlo Park, CA: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, June 2004), www.kff.org/hivaids/upload/U-S-Government-Funding-for-Global-HIVAIDS-Through-FY-2005.pdf. 50. United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, PL 108-25. 51. Assuming, of course, that the money is effectively distributed and goes beyond just the purchase of antiretroviral drugs. That is an important step, but strengthening the public health sector in many African states is also on the agenda and would have lasting benefits if it does occur. 52. Nicholas van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 53. I actually believe that even a five-year delay in death is a good thing, so this comment should not be interpreted in a completely negative light. Five extra years can allow parents to find homes for their children and be present with them for that much more time. This presence is not insignificant if it means leaving a fifteen year old as opposed to a ten year old, or an eight year old as opposed to a three year old, and so on. 54. Tamara Schuyler, “AIDS,” in C. Press, ed., World at Risk (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2002), 6. 55. Dennis Altman, “AIDS and Security,” International Relations 17, no. 4 (2003): 422.

R-7

3/17/06

11:30 AM

Page 166

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

Page 167

8 Foreign Interests and Environmental Degradation CYRIL I. OBI

A

frica now occupies a place of reckoning in US global geostrategic calculations. The contours of the emerging relationship have been defined largely by the challenges posed by the current phase of globalization. In this chapter I focus on US foreign policy toward Africa and how this policy relates to issues of oil exploitation and environmental degradation on the continent. I also explore the connections between state, civil society, corporate actors, and the human security of Africans, especially the challenges that these connections pose for Africa-US relations in a rapidly globalizing post–Cold War world. The post–Cold War broadening of the concept of security to include human and environmental concerns also suggests the need for the United States to be engaged in promoting the welfare, safety, and dignity of the individual in Africa as well as the need to contain threats arising from environmental conflicts there.1 In relation to the latter, US geostrategic considerations are focused on energy-rich African resources—all the more so because Africa contains about 8 percent of the world’s oil reserves, with great potential for expansion. US interests in Africa’s oil are concentrated largely in West and central Africa.2 Africa currently accounts for 15 percent of US oil imports, but that proportion is expected to rise to 25 percent by 2015.3 At the same time that access to African oil is central to US energy security interests in Africa, oil revenues are central to the economic development of African oil producers, and environmental degradation plays a role in the ensuing conflict. While the United States guards against conflicts in oil-producing areas and attacks on the operations of its oil companies, the African states are also interested in maintaining and promoting more oil investments. The result has been the involvement of African states and foreign oil multinationals in environmental conflicts. This situation in turn raises concerns in the United States about the threats that such conflicts pose to oil imports, the profits of US oil companies, and US jobs. 167

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

168

Page 168

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

African states see the United States as an economic partner and a strategic ally in the continent’s quest for economic growth and democratic consolidation. US oil corporations Exxon Mobil and ChevronTexaco are critical players in the production of oil in Africa. Thus a commonality of interests exists between the US and African oil states, even though the latter remain locked in a dependent relationship with the former. This relationship creates a complex situation because oil corporations enjoy great leverage in both Africa and the United States and because African states have been unable to call oil multinationals to account when their activities contribute to environmental degradation. Also of concern is the way some authoritarian regimes have used oil company resources to aid in the corruption of ruling elites and the repression of their people.4 Within the context of this unequal relationship, the critical challenge may not be the bifurcation of views but the possibilities that globalization offers for the transformation of the relations of power that tend to favor the United States and the oil multinationals. It is important to focus on the energy security and environmental dimensions of US interests in the oil-producing regions of West and central Africa, particularly Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta, and the challenges that they pose for US-Africa relations. As oil imports from Africa increase, more pressure will likely be placed on the oil-rich environment, leading to further degradation and confrontation between local oil communities and US oil companies. Environmental degradation is recognized as a major source of conflict and resulting insecurity in oil-rich contexts. The rest of this chapter is divided into four parts: (1) the framework for understanding African and US views on foreign corporations and environmental degradation, (2) an analysis of the new scramble for Africa’s oil as a critical factor in US-Africa relations, (3) an examination of the issues raised by complementary and contending perspectives on foreign corporations and environmental degradation in the Niger Delta, and (4) implications for Africa-US relations in the twenty-first century.

Framing US-Africa Relations in Security and Developmental Terms For analytical convenience, in this chapter I consider only the views of government and civil society groups in defining both “US” and “African” views on multinationals and environmental degradation. The US government strongly supports multinational oil corporations, but some civil society groups such as Human Rights Watch, Catholic Relief Services, and Global Witness criticize the role of multinational oil corporations in the developing world. The same scenario is repeated in Africa, where the petrostates have a

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

Page 169

FOREIGN INTERESTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

169

dependent relationship with oil multinationals. Certain constituencies within Africa criticize US hegemonic designs and its promotion of neoliberal (market-based) reforms that clearly have a negative impact on the poor majority within African countries. Such groups see oil multinationals as symbols of US hegemony and powerful global extractive actors that place profits before people. Oil multinationals are also perceived as unaccountable to the people whose resources they “plunder”; in tending not to operate in line with international safety standards, such companies contribute to the destruction of the environment and the livelihoods of Africans. As a result, groups such as the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), and Environmental Rights Action (ERA) have mobilized protests and resistance. They campaign against the complicity of oil multinationals, charging rights abuses and pollution in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta region. Similarly, US groups, journalists, and intellectuals openly criticize the involvement of oil multinationals in environmental degradation and human rights violations in the oil-rich Niger Delta. Such US-based groups as Catholic Relief Services, CorpWatch, Essential Action, Global Exchange, and Human Rights Watch have provided support for African human and environmental rights groups against the extractive and polluting activities of the oil multinationals.

Oil and the Environment: The Politics of Control Oil is a commodity of great economic, military, and strategic importance. Therefore, as the world’s sole surviving superpower, the United States has a critical stake in having ready access to global oil. US oil multinationals also generate employment for US citizens, profits for shareholders, and revenue for the government while providing fuel for the vast US domestic market. These companies are valuable partners to the US government. It is well known that oil corporations contribute to US political campaigns and that former industry officials exert influence at the highest levels of government. Oil production has far-reaching implications for the global environment. In many cases it involves overcoming difficult terrain or working in deep waters offshore. Thus, when oil spills and other such incidents occur in the course of the production and transportation of crude, the capacity to repair environmental damage becomes paramount. The production of oil also evokes a relationship of power in which the environment is subordinated to the control of oil technology and capital that lies in the hands of oil multinationals. In other words, it is true that oil production degrades the environment, but the critical issue is, Who bears the brunt of that and who repairs the damage? The degradation of the environment as a result of the activities of the oil industry directly threatens the livelihoods of the people who live in the oil-producing areas. Degradation of the land or water pollu-

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

170

Page 170

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

tion means that the local people’s human security is directly threatened by the activities of oil companies. From the companies’ vantage point, the environment contains a resource to be tapped for energy (oil) and profit. Degradation is merely collateral damage in the course of production and should not be allowed to disrupt the supply of oil to the market. Because of the high stakes involved in controlling oil, it is possible to discern a dialectical relationship between oil and the environment. It is this relationship that drives the oil industry to exploit and extract the oil from the environment for profit and the people to protest when extraction leads to impoverishment and pollution. Where the relations of power prevent effective regulatory, preventive, and cleanup measures or redress for environmental damage, conflict may occur. Oil multinationals as operators are to a large extent responsible for environmental degradation (although they find it expedient to blame the people for sabotaging oil installations). That explains why they are expected to operate within set safety parameters, show corporate responsibility, or pay some form of compensation for polluting the environment. But the reality is that their sheer wealth and technological sophistication enable them to exercise control over the environment and to exert leverage over the African states in which they operate. As a result, the people who live in those states bear the heavy environmental costs of oil production, which fuel crises and conflicts. Such problems emphasize the importance of the connections between oil corporations and environmental degradation in the context of Africa-US relations. The key to understanding this relationship lies in understanding the interests that shape these perspectives and their implications for the future.

Oil, Environmental Degradation, Conflict, and Insecurity Environmental degradation is often more pronounced in Africa than in the United States because the regulatory institutions are weak and the states depend heavily on the “oil super majors.” For instance, since the early 1970s, oil multinationals have produced over 95 percent of the Nigerian government’s foreign exchange earnings and over 85 percent of national revenues. The scenario in Angola is largely the same, with oil companies accounting for over 90 percent of export earnings and government revenues.5 African states dependent on oil revenues lack the political will, institutional capacity, and technology to regulate the foreign goose that lays the golden eggs. Such interaction between oil multinationals and the oil-rich environment exposes specific contradictions not effectively mediated by these states. They also find it difficult to take drastic actions that might scare away badly needed foreign (oil) investors. While environmental degradation leads to resource scarcity, most

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

Page 171

FOREIGN INTERESTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

171

African states that have adopted economic reform programs spend less on social welfare. The burden of harsh social conditions, borne mainly by the poor, feeds existing tensions. This situation has fueled a combustible mix that has exploded into conflict both in Nigeria’s Niger Delta and the prolonged, recently concluded conflict in Angola. The conflicts in the Niger Delta, sometimes involving attacks on oil company installations, have disrupted the flow of oil since the 1990s, causing the loss of billions of dollars in expected revenues. They remain a major cause of concern in Africa and the United States. These security concerns emanate not just from the ways in which oil production contributes to oil degradation but also from the perception of the role of oil multinationals as a cause of environmental degradation and the financing of state repression. This view is fundamental to determining whether these oil companies will be the objects of attack and protests that disrupt their operations or will be seen as sources of profit and contributors of petrodollars for Africa’s development process. The former scenario has far-reaching consequences for US energy security; the latter has serious implications for the legitimacy and profitability of US oil corporations operating in Africa. Insecure oil-producing contexts also raise other fears, such as the destabilization of entire subregions, human suffering, and the proliferation of networks of violence and criminality.6 In light of US global security calculations in partnership with African states, environmental conflicts involving acts of hostility against oil multinationals can be quite injurious. It would therefore serve US interests for African states to partner with it to contain threats emanating from the African environment so that they do not threaten wider interests.

The New Scramble for Africa’s Oil In a well-argued piece, Dena Montague describes Africa as the “new oil and military frontier,” an observation partly informed by the pronouncements of prominent US policymakers, debates, seminar and media reports, the National Energy Policy Report (the Cheney Report), and increased investment by US oil companies in Africa.7 According to Michael Klare, “The US Department of Energy projects that Africa’s share of global oil supply will increase from 10 percent in 2000 to 25 percent in 2020.”8 Klare reinforces the import of this for the United States by quoting the Cheney Report: “West Africa is expected to be one of the fastest growing sources of oil and natural gas for the American market.” The reasons for this lie in the proximity of West Africa to the US market, the high quality (low sulfur content) of its oil, and the expected increase in the amount of oil produced in West African waters (the Gulf of Guinea). The attraction of offshore oil partly

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

172

Page 172

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

lies in keeping the oil companies far from the oil communities who would make demands on them or protest against their activities. The United States must diversify and seek alternative, secure sources of oil because of increased volatility in the Middle East and because US oil production cannot keep pace with rising domestic demands. Underscoring the importance of West African oil to the United States, former US assistant secretary of state Walter H. Kansteiner III said, “African oil is of national strategic importance to us, and it will increase and become more important as we go forward.”9 Partnering with West African states would enhance US global security by promoting values of good governance and democracy, conditions critical to regional stability and peace and the advancement of African development and US interests. In line with this push by US oil companies, “ChevronTexaco announced in 2002 that it had invested $5 billion in the past five years in African oil and would spend $20 billion more in the next five years . . . [and] . . . Exxon Mobil signified its intention to spend $15 billion in Angola in the next four years, and $25 billion across Africa during the next decade.”10 US oil multinationals are working in tandem with the US government to secure increased access to African oil.11 No stone is being left unturned to secure US interests in the new African oil boom because US security is tied to Africa’s development. A key element of this nexus that became prominent after September 11, 2001, is the issue of global terrorism. The 9/11 attacks exposed the vulnerability of the US oil supply to the specter of global terrorism and particularly to the volatility of the Middle East. The United States also feared that those with access to oil wealth in the region and to links with extremist forms of Islam could be funding terrorist activities. African oil is valuable to the United States, not only because it provides an alternative source of US energy supplies but also because, if used effectively, the wealth that will accrue from African oil exports will help Africans develop their continent and give them an incentive to partner with the United States in the global war against terrorism. As the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG) report states, “there is a need to reshape US national security policy for Sub-Saharan Africa facilitating economic and political development. Such an initiative would be based on a West African regional economic engine driven by large petroleum revenues from oil producing states such as Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Congo (Brazzaville). . . . By providing the United States and other markets with a steady and secure flow of high quality and reasonably priced crude, dependency on hostile or unstable suppliers in other parts of the globe would diminish.”12 Taking into consideration the intimacy between the US government and US oil multinationals and the rising tide of protests from African oil-pro-

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

Page 173

FOREIGN INTERESTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

173

ducing communities against perceived oil company responsibility for environmental degradation, it is obvious that such opposing views have important implications for the relations between Africa and the United States and particularly for the US national security agenda after 9/11. In the next section I examine the conflict in Nigeria’s Niger Delta, Africa’s most prolific but troubled oil-producing region, where contending views of development, environmental degradation, and national security impinge upon Africa-US relations.

Insights from the Niger Delta The Niger Delta is located in the southernmost tip of Nigeria. It covers an area of about 70,000 square kilometers (27,027 square miles), interspersed by creeks, rivulets, and lagoons through which the River Niger empties itself into the Atlantic Ocean. It is characterized by saltwater and freshwater mangrove swamps and dense tropical forests that support a vast array of biodiversity. An estimated 10 million people inhabit the region, making it one of the most densely populated areas in Nigeria. The swampy terrain and dense population imply relatively scarce land and a fragile ecosystem. The inhabitants of the Niger Delta depend on the environment for their subsistence. They engage in farming; fishing; hunting; gathering of forest products; trade; and local manufacturing of crafts, nets, and canoes. In all the cultures of the many small ethnic groups that live in the delta, the environment is considered sacred—the very source of life itself. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the British conquered the Niger Delta and joined it to the colony of Nigeria. Under British colonialism, the region became an oil concession, with the first concession being granted to Shell D’Arcy (later Shell-BP, Shell), a British company (later Anglo-Dutch) that covered the whole area of mainland Nigeria. Shell started operations in 1938 but suspended them until after World War II. By 1960, the year of Nigeria’s independence, Shell had given up some of its concessions, which were taken over by other oil multinationals: Mobil (now Exxon Mobil), Gulf (now ChevronTexaco), Agip, and Elf. From the beginning, the oil industry in Nigeria rode on the back of British imperialism; it did not involve the people of the Niger Delta, nor did it lay a premium on much other than profit. Thus, the foundation was laid for oil multinationals’ exploitation and pollution of the fragile oil-rich ecosystem. Although Shell commenced oil exports in 1958, the resulting earnings initially made no significant contribution to national revenues. All that changed by the end of the Nigerian civil war in 1970, when rising prices and growing global demand spurred increased domestic oil production and exports. The price revolution instituted by the Organization of Petroleum

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

174

Page 174

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

Exporting Countries in 1973 further quadrupled oil prices, and Nigeria became an oil-boom country. From that period onward, oil contributed over 90 percent of export earnings and 80 percent of national revenues. The oil boom contributed to huge government spending on infrastructure, prestige projects, and imports, although some of it was also used to lubricate patrimonial networks. Hardly any resources were plowed back into the region that produced the oil or into the environment that had been degraded. The foreign oil multinationals, working largely through joint venture partnerships with the Nigerian state (the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, or NNPC), made significant profits, more so because the state lacked the capacity to effectively regulate their activities. Oil production peaked during the years 1978–1980 at almost 2 million barrels per day or went slightly over that figure, bringing billions of petrodollars into Nigerian state coffers. Nigeria became entirely dependent on oil receipts, while agriculture and other sectors of the economy were neglected. However, in the early 1980s the collapse of global oil prices and a ballooning external debt threw the Nigerian economy into crisis. The crisis was occasioned by the collapse of the external oil sector, but its roots lay deeper in the monocultural nature of the economy and its structural distortions. As a result, the government was forced to adopt austerity measures and in 1986 agreed to an International Monetary Fund/World Bank structural adjustment program (SAP) to reform the economy. This program required the deregulation of the economy, the removal of subsidies, and reduced state spending on social programs. The biting effects of economic austerity were further aggravated by the harsh social consequences of the SAP. The oil industry bowed to increased pressures to produce more oil (and earn less revenue following the fall of oil prices). It shored up profits and produced more revenue for the Nigerian state, which used them to repay its debts. As a result, pressures on the fragile Niger Delta environment increased and caused the collapse of living standards, impoverishment, and alienation. As resources became tight, social tensions increased, and the local people sought redress from the Nigerian state and oil multinationals for decades of exploitation, neglect, and destruction of the environment. When initially peaceful demands were ignored, in the late 1980s the people began organizing protests, most of which the military repressed brutally. The most well known case was that of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People, led by the well-known writer, environmentalist, and minority rights campaigner Ken Saro-Wiwa. Saro-Wiwa waged an international campaign against the Nigerian government and Shell.13 Framed in the language of genocide, MOSOP brought the Ogoni grievances against the exploitation and degradation of their land by oil multinational Shell to international attention. By 1993, Shell had been forced to withdraw its operations from Ogoniland.

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

Page 175

FOREIGN INTERESTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

175

The Ogoni paid a heavy price for resisting global oil. The military occupied their towns and villages and unleashed waves of repression intended to break Ogoni resistance. 14 Following the murder of four (allegedly pro-government) Ogoni chiefs by a mob in Giokoo on May 21, 1994, Saro-Wiwa and eight other MOSOP activists were arrested and detained. In November 1995 they were hanged on the orders of a specially constituted tribunal that had found them guilty after a trial that had been widely condemned as unfair.15 Tensions, as well as passions, continued to deepen with the militarization of the Niger Delta and the crushing of all protests against the state and oil multinationals. Efforts by oil multinationals to limit the damage to their image by promoting an agenda of corporate social responsibility based on community development projects in the Niger Delta merely fueled distrust, largely because they amounted to little more than public relations stunts.16 Other identity, communal, and protest movements prolonged the agitation for environmental protection and human rights. They insisted that the oil multinationals provide employment for the local people, clean up polluted sites, and pay compensation for damages inflicted on the region’s fragile ecosystem. Since the return of Nigeria to democratic rule in 1999, the situation has been further complicated by the rising tide of violence in the Niger Delta involving armed ethnic/communal youth militia. This violence has in several cases disrupted oil operations, leading to losses for the government and oil multinationals amounting to an estimated $2 billion in the last five months of 2003.17 Years of military repression have hardened views on both sides. Local people view oil multinationals as exploiters and polluters, whereas oil companies argue that conflict and disruptive violence have placed their huge investments in the region at grave risk. Recently, however, Shell conceded that it had some responsibility for “inadvertently” fueling “conflict, poverty and corruption,” and other oil multinationals have announced plans to boost spending on development partnership with oilproducing communities in the Niger Delta.18 However, the critical question of dealing with damage already inflicted on the fragile ecosystem remains unaddressed. Apart from the paucity of evidence to substantiate the huge amounts the companies claim to be spending on community partnership, except white elephant or abandoned projects, distrust of the companies remains widespread in the region.19 This distrust fuels perceptions of the role of oil multinationals in environmental degradation. The communities see the companies as big, rich actors who exploit their oil resource and pay lip service to the welfare of the communities. The villagers are concerned about their rights, their fair share of the proceeds from the oil boom, and their future. After the oil wells run dry and their environment is despoiled, what will happen to them when the oil com-

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

176

Page 176

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

panies move on? Their patience is wearing thin. The power relations in the Niger Delta favor the state and its partners—the oil multinationals—who recommend actions that seek to crush, rather than negotiate, with the forces of resistance.

The Nigerian Petrostate and Oil Multinationals: Anatomy of a Partnership? As previously mentioned, since the 1970s Nigeria has lived off oil receipts, and it depends on oil multinationals to produce the oil. Thus, a distorted, asymmetrical “partnership” has emerged between the Nigerian state and the oil multinationals, with the latter in a dominant position. The state, lacking the sophisticated technology and skills of the companies, plays a marginal role in the industry outside the collection of oil revenues. Within this “unequal partnership,” the Nigerian state has been both supportive and protective of the oil multinationals. Nigeria’s political economy places a very high premium on controlling oil revenues, which in turn compels the political elite to use the state and its institutions to seize or retain power by any means. Politics tends to be violent, and the winning faction centralizes power and nourishes its networks of power through the distribution of oil largesse. The coincidence of the oil boom with military rule reinforces this form of oil politics, which tends to negate the decentralization of power, transparency, accountability, or development.20 The “petro-elite,” with its brand of volatile politics and corruption, has thus been in (opaque) partnership with oil multinationals, united by the quest for profits and oil rents. The petrostate relies on oil as its fiscal foundation, rather than on the taxes paid by the citizens, and hardly considers itself accountable to the citizenry. The oil multinationals are, theoretically, only accountable to their shareholders abroad, not to the people in the Niger Delta. Any attempt to interrogate the basis of the partnership or challenge its hegemony, as in the case of the protests in the Niger Delta, is likely to be met by force. It is important to understand the ambivalence of the Nigerian state: it draws its legitimacy from protecting the interests of its citizens but also takes on the responsibility of protecting its partners from the anger of some of its citizens. In the calculus of power, the state, either under military or democratic rule, invariably sides with its oil partners. Yet it also must contend with the environmental threats emanating from the Niger Delta, which remains critical to its hold on power. The environmental security of the oil-rich delta region is in real terms mediated by relations of class, capital, and power. At this level, US and African views from above subordinate the environment to the imperatives of global oil production, profit, and control of access. Countering this perspective is the view from below that is critical of the role

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

Page 177

FOREIGN INTERESTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

177

of the state-oil partnership in the exploitation and degradation of the Niger Delta environment.

Oil Multinationals and the Niger Delta Environment: The View from Below Since the late 1990s, activist groups, identity and social movements in the Niger Delta, and human rights groups in the West have severely criticized the impact of oil operations on the fragile ecosystems of the region. The calculations of the ethnic minority groups of the Niger Delta that their support for the federal side during the Nigerian civil war (1967–1970) would provide them with access to oil revenues failed to come to fruition. Through several decrees, the federal military government vested the ownership and control of all oil in Nigeria in itself and proceeded to alter the “derivation principle” of the revenue allocation formula in ways that drastically reduced the amount of oil revenue accruable to the federal units (states) in the Niger Delta.21 The subsequent alienation and marginalization of these ethnic minorities from oil revenues and federal power fed into community frustration and anger. Impoverished villagers were confronted daily with the wealth of the oil multinationals, while they themselves suffered from the pollution that destroyed their farms and forests and poisoned the marine life upon which they depended for survival, without any meaningful compensation or redress. When the Niger Delta residents did not obtain employment in the oil companies and the government was far away in the capital, they perceived the oil companies in the communities as both partners of the government and tenants of the host communities, to be approached to address the people’s demands. Shell, however, ignored initial reports of oil spills in Ogoniland during the civil war, and as the oil companies ignored similar incidents across the delta, resentment over alleged company arrogance grew in the oil-producing communities. At the end of the Cold War, buoyed by discourses on human, environmental, and minority rights, these communities began to connect with global movements to voice local grievances.22 One of the earliest groups to question the subordination of the Niger Delta environment by oil multinationals was the Ogoni. 23 At the core of their protest was the view that oil from their land had yielded billions of dollars to the Nigerian federal state, leaving them severely short-changed and their lands polluted. 24 Through MOSOP, which was formed in 1990–1991, the Ogoni targeted the Nigerian state and Shell (the largest onshore oil operator in the Niger Delta).25 Shell had ninety-six oil production wells, five flow stations, numerous high-pressure oil pipelines, and numerous gas flares that had operated continuously for thirty-five years. Forty percent of Shell’s oil spills worldwide had taken place in the Niger

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

178

Page 178

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

Delta. 26 Apart from Shell, other oil multinationals were also seen as exploiters and polluters. MOSOP mobilized the Ogoni at all levels, organizing protests within their region and at global forums. It accused Shell of a double standard in relation to the environment and of violating the rights of an oppressed indigenous people.27 This turned out to be a public relations nightmare for the company in the West and also exposed the oil companies in the Niger Delta to the opprobrium of the oil-producing communities. MOSOP’s demands were framed in the Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR), which was sent to the government and the international community in 1990 and 1992. Central to its demands were the “right to the control and use of a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development.”28 It also sought compensation for pollution and reparations for unpaid royalties to the Ogoni people. At stake was control of the environment, which pitted the people against the oil multinationals. To the people, the main issue became (re)gaining control of their oil-rich environment. That way, they would be able to benefit from it and halt its degradation. In contrast, the state-oil partnership viewed any shift of control over the oil-rich environment as a denial of access to oil, profits, and power. A clash was therefore inevitable, the more so because the state-oil multinational partnership equated the people’s quest to control their environment with the partnership’s loss of control. The partnership would brook no such challenge to what it perceived as a winner-takes-all relationship. Buoyed by the justness of its cause and the international solidarity that it enjoyed from some groups in Europe and North America, MOSOP presented its case to forums such as the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) and the United Nations, and it also successfully lobbied nongovernmental organization (NGO) human rights groups, environmental activists, fair trade activists, consumer groups, and governments across the world to put pressure on the Nigerian state and Shell to respond to their demands. US groups such as Human Rights Watch, the Sierra Club, and Essential Action provided support for the MOSOP campaign. Shell offices and stations were picketed, letters were written to Shell, and some documentaries featuring the environmental degradation in Ogoniland were aired in the United States.29 The view from below clearly challenged the interests of the state-oil partnership, which resorted to repression in an effort to crush the challenge to its control of the delta. From 1993, and particularly after the hanging of the Ogoni Nine in November 1995, a military siege was laid on Ogoniland. Many Ogoni villages were invaded, burned, and looted; hundreds of Ogoni were killed or arrested; and thousands were displaced or exiled.30 But such repression did not solve the problem. Rather it opened up another front in the opposition to oil multinationals from below, based on allegations that the companies were providing material support to the

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

Page 179

FOREIGN INTERESTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

179

Nigerian military and police for the repression of the oil communities in the Niger Delta. 31 This support became more evident in the struggles against the oil partnership after the hanging of the Ogoni Nine. Some believe that had Shell intervened and used its leverage with the state to spare the lives of the Ogoni Nine, the condemned could have been saved. Allegedly, Shell did not intervene because it did not receive assurances from Saro-Wiwa that the campaign against the company would be called off as a reciprocal gesture.32 Shell’s “rejection of blame” was criticized by the late Claude Ake, a foremost political scientist who had resigned from the Niger Delta Environmental Survey, an initiative of oil multinationals intended to generate data on the state of the environment in the wake of the hanging of the Ogoni Nine. In Ake’s words, “Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria shows no sign of remorse for causing the strife in Ogoniland which has thrown Nigeria into one of the deepest crises in history. It insists defiantly that it will not change its ways and denies any part whatsoever in the environmental degradation of the Niger Delta which it blames on indigenes conniving at spills to collect compensation.”33 Ake’s position encapsulates the perspective from below: that the oil multinationals refuse to accept responsibility for the environmental crises in the Niger Delta and that they should be made to do so. The crushing of the Ogoni nonviolent “resistance” had unanticipated consequences, acting as a catalyst for a transition to a full-fledged environmental conflict in the Niger Delta. From the late 1990s onward, other oil companies (particularly US oil giant ChevronTexaco) were targeted by the Ijaw in the ongoing struggle for the control of the (oil) environment.

From Resistance to Conflict Following MOSOP’s example, other ethnic interests in the Niger Delta began to mobilize against the oil partnership.34 The formation of the Ijaw Youth Council in 1998 was particularly noteworthy. The IYC was made up of Ijaw youth from over forty clans across four states of the Nigerian federation. On December 11, 1998, at the end of a meeting in the town of Kaiama, Bayelsa state, the IYC formulated the Kaiama Declaration, which asserted: “All land and natural resources (including mineral resources) within the Ijaw territory belong to Ijaw communities and are the basis of our survival.” The IYC demanded that the Nigerian military withdraw from Ijawland. Perhaps most critical of all, it “advised all oil company staff and contractors to withdraw from Ijaw territories by December 30, 1998, pending the resolution of the issue of resource ownership and control of the Ijaw area of the Niger Delta.” 35 In response, the state government declared a state of emergency. Thousands of Nigerian Army, Navy, and Mobile Police were deployed across the Niger Delta to disperse the protesters and protect

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

180

Page 180

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

oil installations. The military invaded Kaiama; some youth were killed and others arrested. In 1999 a new set of crises broke out in the Niger Delta, involving Agip, Shell, and Chevron.36 In the case of Chevron, the company had provided Nigerian security forces with transportation, and on one occasion troops in a Chevron helicopter allegedly shot and killed two unarmed Ilaje youth among the protesters who had shut down production at Chevron’s Parabe oil platform in May 1999.37 This incident followed reports that Chevron had backed military attacks on the Opia and Ikenya oil communities in January 1999.38 The Parabe incident was widely reported internationally, and human rights groups, the parents of the youths that were killed, and those injured filed a suit against Chevron in the United States. Also, Amy Goodman, a US radio journalist (for Pacifica), visited Nigeria to investigate and report the incident. Goodman’s report did not go down well with Chevron, because she claimed that the company had collaborated with the Nigerian military to repress community protests. She further reported that in her documentary with Jeremy Scahill and Dred Scott Keyes, Drilling and Killing: Chevron and Nigeria’s Oil Dictatorship (www.pacifica.org). This documentary took the argument one step further by drawing a connection between the multinationals and a dictatorial Nigerian petrostate. 39 According to the documentary, the fight against the oil companies was not just a question of seeking environmental protection but a struggle for liberation. In spite of Nigeria’s transition from military to democratic rule in May 1999, the crises and conflicts continued to deepen. In November 1999, the Nigerian Army razed the oil-producing community of Odi in Bayelsa state following the murder of seven policemen by a criminal gang led by Ken Niweigha. When the state governor could not produce members of the gang traced to Odi, the military occupied the town from November 19 to November 30, 1999. It “demolished every single building, barring the bank, the Anglican Church and health clinic.”40 Over 2,000 people lost their lives, and many more were displaced.41 It could be argued that Odi was used to set an example to others that a democratically elected government would not brook any challenge to its authority and oil interests in the Niger Delta.42 Even the example of Odi failed to stem the slide to more complex forms of violence related to the escalation of community conflicts and violence in the region.43 In June 2002, hundreds of protesting women occupied Chevron’s Abiteye flow station. The following month, they also took over the company’s oil platform at Escravos for ten days. They demanded jobs for their husbands and sons and a halt to oil pollution. In the end, the company signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the women, but it remained unclear if this MOU, like earlier ones with other communities,

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

Page 181

FOREIGN INTERESTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

181

would ever be implemented. Distrust is evident, and the descent into further conflict seems inevitable. These conflicts over oil are therefore both consequences of the relations of power in the oil-rich environment and struggles over increasingly scarce resources. The result has been the escalation of tensions and the descent into environmental conflict.

Environmental Conflict and Insecurity in the Niger Delta Recent trends in environmental conflict in the Niger Delta reveal increased violence and insecurity. They have also led to increased distrust of and action against oil multinationals and their staff. In Warri, Delta state, conflict between three ethnic groups (the Urhobo, Itsekiri, and Ijaw) has raged intermittently since 1999, and after 2003, the level of violence escalated in the conflicts between the well-armed Ijaw and Itsekiri militias. At the heart of these conflicts lies the issue of the delineation of political boundaries and political representation, the basis upon which oil revenues are shared. As Human Rights Watch notes, “Both Ijaw and Urhobo see the current dispensation in the state, in which Itsekiri dominate government structures in the three Warri Local Government Areas (LGA’s), Warri North, Warri South, and Warri West, as unfair. They complain that this dominance means that the Itsekiri and their traditional ruler, the Olu of Warri (itself a contested title, having been changed in 1952 from the Olu of Itsekiri), benefit disproportionately from government resources.”44 It is estimated that hundreds of people have been killed in the fighting, with communities and properties destroyed. Most of those responsible for the fighting have not been apprehended. Worse still, oil multinationals have been forced to suspend operations because they fear for the safety of their staff; as a result, since 2003 Nigeria has lost hundreds of millions of dollars in revenues. The atmosphere of chaos and violence has also been compounded by oil theft (in the form of oil bunkering). Criminal networks with links to highly placed people drill holes in oil pipelines, load the product onto barges in the creeks, and export it to refineries in neighboring countries. According to the most recent estimates, citing the group managing director of the NNPC, Funsho Kukpolokun, “50,000 barrels of crude oil [were] lost per day to theft in 2003, . . . resulting in losses valued at between $392 million to $500 million worth of crude oil.”45 What is particularly dangerous about this trend is that profits from bunkering provide resources to the various youth militia and their local patrons, enabling them to secure ammunition. Arms are used to enforce control over areas of bunkering, combat security forces, intervene in local politics, or settle scores with rival militia. A region with a high level of youth unemployment suffers no shortage of foot soldiers ready to participate in these low-intensity conflicts. The repression of nonviolent groups in the 1990s has thus paved the way for

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

182

Page 182

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

extremist and criminal elements to confront the state-oil partnership in the struggle for the control of oil. As the middle ground continues to contract, violence has escalated on all sides, with the people of the oil-producing communities caught in the crossfire. Thus, 2004 witnessed another upsurge of violence in the region, largely from the Ijaw-Itsekiri imbroglio and crisis led by former IYC leader Asari Dokubo (see below). In the recent round of the Itsekiri-Ijaw conflict, a military force codenamed Operation Restore Hope, commanded by a Nigerian Army general, has been involved in enforcing the peace and arresting suspected fighters. The militia have resorted to guerrilla tactics. In one such incident on the Benin River close to Warri, two US employees of Chevron, three of their Nigerian colleagues, two navy personnel, and a contract worker with Halliburton were killed in an armed attack on their boat.46 According to reports, they were attacked while traveling under armed escort from Chevron’s oil facilities at Dibi and Olero Creek, where operations had been suspended since the outbreak of Ijaw-Itsekiri violence in March 2003. The news of the attack and deaths spread both alarm and concern across the world regarding the worsening security situation in the Niger Delta. Save for incidents of kidnapping or carjacking, the murder of expatriates in April 2004 was unprecedented. It marked a further deterioration of the situation in the region in which company staff could be targeted for attack in spite of military protection. Asari Dokubo’s rebellion is an example of the leader of a youth militia group challenging the control of oil by the state-oil partnership. Not only is he in conflict with a rival Ijaw militia—the Niger Delta Volunteer Service, led by Ateke Tom—but he is also struggling for “Ijaw autonomy” to “control our oil resources.”47 Apart from its bloody clashes with the rival militia, Dokubo’s Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force has fought pitched battles with government troops since 2003. According to an Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) report, Dokubo claims to have 2,000 men armed with “AK 47s, general purpose machine guns and rocket propelled grenades.”48 It is also reported that Dokubo admits stealing crude oil. He explains, “What we know is that the oil belongs to us; we’re not stealing it,” saying rather “it is the Nigerian state stealing our oil from us.” It is clear that the rebellion is funded by oil and is about oil. This situation has created pressure worldwide to stabilize the Niger Delta. The oil companies complain that they have been forced to reduce production by an estimated 800,000 barrels per day, that company staff and facilities are at risk, and that political instability in Nigeria is growing. In an article in CSIS Africa Notes, Esther Cesarz, Stephen Morrison, and Jennifer Cooke stretch the security angle to an absurd limit, linking Ijaw activism to global terrorism based on alleged similarity with “FARC and ELN armed insurgents in Colombia or the Aceh-based rebels in Indonesia.” 49 Clearly,

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

Page 183

FOREIGN INTERESTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

183

this position was informed by fears that President Olusegun Obasanjo’s government was not effective enough in reining in the Ijaw militants and that US interests (companies, investments, and employees) were facing potent security threats. In sum, it raised the alarm that the crises had gone beyond mere agitation against environmental degradation, human rights abuses, and the demand for fairness in the distribution of oil revenues. In response, Oronto Douglas and colleagues argue that what is required is corporate accountability, respect for human rights, and a democratic and just political settlement.50 The conflict in the Niger Delta is becoming quite serious. From all perspectives, it is an ill wind. For the sake of US-Africa relations, the crises in the Niger Delta must be resolved in the interest of all parties concerned. Yet the hegemonic global and state interests in the region appear to be fixated on certain zero-sum outcomes that deepen rather than fill the trenches, further worsening the crises and conflict. Clearly, a new foundation must be laid to sustain the area.

Conclusion: New Foundations It is clear that US and African views on foreign corporations and environmental degradation are critical to Africa-US relations in the era of globalization. The United States relies on African oil producers for its energy supplies, and expects the state to protect the massive investments by US oil multinationals in West and central Africa and to take into account US global security concerns. African states value the United States as an economic and strategic partner that provides a market for oil exports and consequent resources for development and also as an ally in promoting peace and security on the continent. Because the oil multinationals and African oil producers are players critical to US energy security, the need for partnership and cooperation is very clear. Yet the human security of Africans, particularly where economic interests tend to undermine people’s well-being, cannot be glossed over. As the case of Nigeria’s Niger Delta shows, the costs of the relationship tend to outweigh the benefits. Worse still, the alienation and repression of the people and the state’s penchant for military solutions and violence appear to be adding more fuel to the raging fire of conflict. Without a doubt, the current US government has high stakes in African oil production. Certain high-ranking officials in government have their background in the US oil industry, and US oil multinationals have full government support for their contribution to the US economy and support for the political process. Apart from economic interests, the control of global oil is intertwined with the maintenance of global power.51 Environmental conflict in the Niger Delta, driven by the view that oil multinationals exploit

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

184

Page 184

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

and degrade the environmental basis of human survival and back a corrupt and repressive government, is clearly a threat to US and Nigerian interests. In addition, the view that “securing” the Niger Delta and using top-down approaches based on a carrot-and-stick policy would resolve the deep contradictions and age-old grievances in the region is clearly misplaced. This much can be gleaned from two separate but interlinked events in Nigeria. First is the alarm raised by local media on the presence of the US Navy in the Gulf of Guinea, prompting the US embassy to note that it was “a transitory deployment through the Gulf of Guinea hundreds of miles off the West African coast,” and dismissing such reports as “unwarranted sensationalism.”52 Yet, if we consider the prediction by General James Jones, commander of the US European command, that “the carrier battle groups of the future may not spend six months in the Mediterranean sea, but I’ll bet they’ll spend half of the time going down the west coast of Africa,”53 then the link between West Africa and US global military-strategic calculations becomes clear. Second, two actions taken by Nigeria’s National Assembly are significant: the Senate’s directive to Shell to pay the Ijaws compensation of $1.5 billion for oil pollution,54 and the passing of a bill with a minimum social responsibility clause urging oil companies to provide employment and contracts to indigenes of oil-producing communities. 55 These two developments do suggest that the oil super majors are more likely to face a more difficult time if they insist on business as usual. Even if the bill is subject to a presidential veto, it will not weaken a significant body of opinion in Nigeria that the oil companies must change their dealings with the oil-rich Niger Delta and the people who live there. A logical step in confronting the complex crises ravaging the Niger Delta and their ramifications for US-Africa relations is to transform such relations from the current structure of dependency. A new foundation ought to be laid for US-Africa relations in ways that benefit all the sides involved in the oil nexus. How, then, can the issue of new foundations for US-Africa relations be managed? There are two dimensions to the challenge: the process within African states and the global context in which oil multinationals and the US government play a key role. African oil states need to diversify their economies away from dependence on oil revenues. It is not merely enough to go through the motions of democratic elections and rhetoric that turns politics into a game of musical chairs over who presides over resource-rich polities. The people of Africa need to be empowered to participate in the democratic project, insist on the accountability of the leaders to the citizens, and be included in decisionmaking. In the Niger Delta, for instance, the Nigerian state should engage with all relevant interest groups in the aim of reaching fair, mutually acceptable solutions, rather than alienating the people and criminalizing some of them. In addition, sustainable

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

Page 185

FOREIGN INTERESTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

185

conflict resolution mechanisms are needed that can address the complex conflicts in the region. Special programs should target mostly unemployed, alienated, and bitter youth. A comprehensive program for the repair of environmental damages and the development of the region should involve grassroots organizations rather than top-down or donor-driven programs, and the local people of the oil-producing communities should own the programs for their own development. The starting point would be for the people, rather than a rapacious local elite, to control the resources and to ensure processes of accountability, transparency, and development. An important aspect of democratization in petrostates lies in transparency. Oil multinationals should disclose what they pay the state, as well as the profits they make from oil concessions in Africa. Obviously, the public relations approach adopted by the community development/relations departments of oil multinationals is not working in the Niger Delta. Oil operations enrich a few people, contractors, and consultants while fueling increased community distrust of the oil companies. The local view of these corporate giants will change only when they change their behavior toward the communities, operate at the level of internationally recognized environmental safety standards, respect human rights, and contribute to sustainable livelihoods in the region. At the international level, what is required is a move away from the “securitization” of the Niger Delta and toward a show of more sensitivity to the political and environmental grievances and rights of the people who inhabit the oil-rich region. There is also a need for the oil companies to engage on a much more serious level with the “voluntary principles of security and human rights” adopted by the UK and US governments as far back as 2000. Both Nigeria and the United States should provide resources and a framework within which these principles can be implemented at the bilateral and multilateral levels. Then the companies will comply, setting the basis for the transformation of the existing power relations in the Niger Delta and a decompression of existing tensions.

Notes 1. Cyril Obi, “Globalised Images of Environmental Security in Africa,” Review of African Political Economy 27, no. 83 (2000): 50. 2. Jessica Krueger, “U.S. Oil States in West Africa,” CSIS Africa Notes, no. 11 (December 2002): 1–3; Dena Montague, “Africa: The New Oil and Military Frontier,” Peacework, 2002, www.afsc.org/pwork; Ian Gary and Terry Lynn Karl, Bottom of the Barrel: Africa’s Oil Boom and the Poor (Baltimore: Catholic Relief Press, 2003), 13–14; African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG), African Oil: A Priority for U.S. National Security and African Development (Washington, DC: AOPIG, 2002); Jim Lobe, “Pentagon’s ‘Footprint’ Growing in Africa,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 2003, www.fpif.org.

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

186

Page 186

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

3. AOPIG, African Oil. 4. Human Rights Watch, “The Warri Crisis: Fueling Violence,” 15, no. 18a (New York: Human Rights Watch, November 2003); Global Witness, All the Presidents’ Men, 2002, www.globalwitness.org. 5. Gary and Karl, Bottom of the Barrel, 12. 6. Cyril Obi, “Oil, Environmental Conflict, and National Security in Nigeria: Ramifications of the Ecology-Security Nexus for Sub-Regional Peace,” ACDIS Occasional Paper (January 1997): 16. 7. Montague, “Africa: The New Oil.” 8. Michael Klare, “Bush-Cheney Energy Strategy: Procuring the Rest of the World’s Oil,” Foreign Policy in Focus—PetroPolitics Special Report, 2004, www.fpif.org/papers. 9. AOPIG, African Oil, 3. 10. Gary and Karl, Bottom of the Barrel, 12. 11. Ibid., 14. 12. AOPIG, African Oil, 5 13. Ken Saro-Wiwa, A Month and a Day: A Detention Diary (London: Penguin Books, 1995); Cyril Obi, “The Changing Forms of Identity Politics in Nigeria Under Economic Adjustment: The Case of the Oil Minorities Movement of the Niger Delta,” Research Report no. 119, Uppsala, Nordic Africa Institute, 2001; Cyril Obi, “Global, State, and Local Intersections: Power, Authority, and Conflict in the Niger Delta Oil Communities,” in T. Callaghy, R. Kassimir, and R. Latham, eds., Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Cyril Obi, “From Homeland to Hopeland? Economic Globalisation and Ogoni Migration in the 1990s,” paper presented at the conference, “New Orders of Difference? Cultural Texts and Discourses of Economic Migration,” organized by the GIPSC Project in collaboration with the Ferguson Center for African and Asian Studies, Open University at the Froebel College, University of Surrey, Roehampton, England, July 14–16, 2004. 14. Deborah Robinson, Ogoni: The Struggle Continues (Geneva and Nairobi: World Council of Churches and All African Council of Churches, 1996); Human Rights Watch, “The Ogoni Crisis: A Case Study of Military Repression in South Eastern Nigeria,” 7, no. 5 (New York: Human Rights Watch, July 1995); Andy Rowell, Green Backlash: Global Subversion of the Environmental Movement (London: Routledge, 1996). 15. Michael Birnbaum, “Nigeria, Fundamental Rights Denied: Report of the Trial of Ken Saro Wiwa and Others” (London: Article 19, 1995). Article 19 is the name of an NGO registered in the UK as a charity. It seeks to combat censorship, promote freedom of expression, and access to official information. The report is also available at http://www.article19.org/docimages/654.htm. 16. Andrew Peddleton et al., Behind the Mask: The Real Face of Corporate Social Responsibility (London: Christian Aid, 2003); Friends of the Earth, Behind the Shine: The Other Shell Report (London: Friends of the Earth, 2003); Christopher Hobson, “Can of Worms in the Oil Backyard,” Upstream 9, no. 34 (August 20, 2004): 40–41. 17. Hector Igbikiowubo, “Govt. Loses N149 Billion Revenue in Warri War,” Vanguard Online, August 26, 2003, http://www.vanguardngr.com/articles. 18. BBC News, “Shell Admits Fuelling Corruption,” June 11, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk. 19. Peddleton et al., Behind the Mask, 22–33. 20. Cyril Obi, “Global, State, and Local Intersections”; Cyril Obi, “The Oil

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

Page 187

FOREIGN INTERESTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

187

Paradox: Reflections on the Violent Dynamics of Petro-Politics and (Mis)Governance in Nigeria’s Niger Delta,” University of Leipzig Papers on Africa no. 73 (2004): 18–19. 21. The derivation, or origin, principle of redistributing revenue from oil exploitation stipulated that a significant amount of the revenues generated in a particular jurisdiction of subnational government should be returned to that government. The formula for the derivation principle was reduced from 50 percent in the 1960s to 1.5 percent in the 1980s and then increased to 13 percent following agitation in 1999. Rotimi T. Suberu, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 63. 22. Cyril Obi, “Global, State, and Local Intersections.” 23. Susan Carr, Oronto Douglas, and Uche Onyeagucha, “The Ogoni People’s Campaign over the Oil Exploitation in the Niger Delta,” in Allan Thoms, Susan Carr, and David Humphreys, eds., Environmental Policies and NGO Influence (London: Routledge, 2000). 24. Saro-Wiwa, A Month and a Day. 25. Ibid. 26. “Crimes of Shell,” Rachel’s Environmental and Health News, 1997, www.rachel.org/bulletin. 27. Obi, “The Oil Paradox,” 16. 28. Ogoni Bill of Rights, 1990, www.waado.org/NigerDelta/ RightsDeclaration/Ogoni.html. Also see Appendices in Obi, “The Changing Forms of Identity Politics.” 29. Obi, “Global, State and Local Intersections.” 30. Human Rights Watch, “The Ogoni Crisis”; Robinson, Ogoni; Andy Rowell, Green Backlash: Global Subversion of the Environmental Movement (London: Routledge, 1996); Obi, “The Changing Forms of Identity Politics”; Obi, “The Oil Paradox,” 2004. 31. Human Rights Watch, The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria’s Oil Producing Communities (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999). Also see Robinson, Ogoni. 32. Owens Wiwa, “A Testimony.” Prepared by Greenpeace on behalf of MOSOP, 1995, www.archive.greenpeace.org/comms/ken/owens.text, 30. 33. Claude Ake, Letter of Resignation from the Niger Delta Environmental Survey, November 15, 1995; Claude Ake, “Shelling Nigeria Ablaze,” Tell, January 29, 1996. 34. Obi, “The Changing Forms of Identity Politics,” 74. 35. Kaiama Declaration, in ibid., 118–120. 36. Human Rights Watch, The Price of Oil. 37. Ibid., 12. 38. L. Esparza and M. Wilson, “Oil for Nothing: Multinational Corporations, Environmental Destruction, Death and Impunity in the Niger Delta, a U.S. NonGovernmental Delegation Trip Report,” September 6–20, 2000, Essential Action and Global Exchange. 39. Dimeari von Kemedi, “The Changing Predatory Styles of International Oil Companies in Nigeria,” Review of Africa’s Political Economy 30, no. 95 (2003). 40. Human Rights Watch, “The Niger Delta: No Democratic Dividend” 14, no. 7a (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002), 21. Also see Environmental Rights Action, A Blanket of Silence: Images of the Odi Genocide (Benin City: Environmental Rights Action/ Friends of the Earth Nigeria, 2002), 7. 41. Human Rights Watch, “The Niger Delta,” 21.

R-8

3/17/06

11:31 AM

188

Page 188

CONFRONTING SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

42. Obi, “From Homeland to Hopeland?” Also see Kemedi, “The Changing Predatory Styles.” 43. Human Rights Watch, “The Warri Crisis.” 44. Ibid., 4. 45. Onyebuchi Ezigbo, “Crude Theft: Nigeria Now Loses 50,000 Barrels Daily,” This Day Online, August 23, 2004, www.thisdayonline.com. 46. Glenn McKenzie, “Two American Oil Workers Killed by Gunmen in Nigeria,” Detroit News, April 25, 2004, www.detnews.com. 47. Quoted in IRIN News, “Nigeria: Niger Delta Moving from Agitation to Rebellion?” August 27, 2004, www.irinnews.org; IRIN News, “Africa: The Ijaw Rebellion,” 2004, reproduced in www.ocnus.net. 48. IRIN News, “Africa: The Ijaw Rebellion,” 2004. 49. Esther Cesarz, Stephen Morrison, and Jennifer Cooke, “Alienation and Militancy in Nigeria’s Niger Delta,” CSIS Africa Notes 16 (May 2003), www.csis.org. 50. Oronto Douglas, Von Kemedi, Ike Okonta, and Michael Watts, “Alienation and Militancy in the Niger Delta: A Response to the CSIS on Petroleum, Politics, and Democracy in Nigeria,” Special Report, Foreign Policy in Focus (Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, July 2003), www.fpif.org/papers/nigeria2003.html. 51. Klare, Resource Wars; Klare, “For Oil and Empire?”; Klare, “Bush-Cheney Energy Strategy.” 52. “No U.S. Troops for the Gulf of Guinea—US Embassy,” Vanguard, August 12, 2004, www.vanguardngr.com. 53. Julian Borger, “Oil and Terrorism Drive the Presidential Tour,” Guardian, July 7, 2003, www.guardian.co.uk. 54. Kola Ologbondiyan, “Senate Directs Shell to Pay Ijaws $1.5 Bn Compensation,” This Day Online, November 16, 2004, www.thisdayonline.com. 55. Alifa Daniel, “New Bill to Alleviate Plight of Oil Areas,” Guardian, December 8, 2004, www.guardiannewsngr.com.

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

Page 189

PART 3 Confronting Economic Challenges

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

Page 190

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

Page 191

9 Debt and Debt Relief THOMAS M. C ALLAGHY

I

n this chapter I examine the evolution of the international sovereign debt regime concerning the heavily indebted poor countries of Africa. I trace changes from the normal operation of the Paris Club of Western bilateral creditors from the 1980s, to the creation of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in 1996 and its revision in 1999, and finally to rising pressure to extend similar debt relief to other countries in Africa and elsewhere while significantly increasing it. Along the way, I analyze the lessons and implications of this evolution of the debt regime for Africa and the functioning of the international system.1 Although important, the Group of Seven (G7) governments, including the United States, have not been the main driving force of change in the debt regime.2 It is necessary to look at other actors to explain the nature and process of this evolution. Other US actors have been central, especially advocacy and development nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In this broader sense of “national” actors, the United States has played a major role in policy innovation in the debt regime, having an important impact on Africa as a result. At the core of the evolution of the debt regime is the broadening of the processes of international economic governance, especially the role of new actors and ideas and the institutional contexts that support them. The rise of HIPC brought striking and important but ultimately limited change to the sovereign debt regime for a specifically designated group of countries for which, for the first time, more uniform rules were developed. The striking innovations included treating multilateral debt systematically, developing the notion of debt sustainability, focusing debt relief on poverty reduction, and in the process, quietly shifting the center of gravity of the debt regime from the Paris Club of sovereign creditors to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, institutions more open and accountable than in the past.3 These changes were brought about by a confluence of fac191

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

192

Page 192

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

tors: (1) a slow and uneven learning process by bilateral and multilateral creditors about the existence of a group of states not benefiting much from structural adjustment while greatly increasing their debt loads in the process; (2) the growing pressure, influence, and effectiveness of a new set of actors in international economic governance—networks of NGOs that believed the existing situation was unjust and untenable and had new ideas and proposals of their own, plus a social movement to back them up; (3) the influence of a group of economists, both inside and outside creditor institutions, who provided knowledge, advice, and technical understanding on this issue; (4) the leadership of a group of small creditor states and eventually several members of the G7; (5) new leadership at the World Bank that was more open to new ideas; (6) evolving views of the major creditor countries; and (7) eventually tough negotiations between all major creditor countries and institutions. This outcome was not inevitable: a change in one or two of these factors, such as different G7 governments or leadership at the Bank, might have led to a quite different outcome. This confluence of factors was wrapped around a central structural dilemma of our time—the emergence in Africa of a group of weak states and economies that have not been able to benefit as easily or quickly from economic reform and democratization as has transpired in other parts of the world. This dilemma poses important difficulties for the functioning and evolution of the international political economy and for international peace and conflict. The causes of this structural dilemma are many, complex, and very deeply rooted, stemming from external trade patterns and other sources of shocks; heavy reliance on primary commodities; weak formal economies and economic reform efforts; corrupt and oppressive governments with weak state capacities; civil conflict and war; environmental degradation; and disintegrating physical, health, and social infrastructures. All that is reinforced by limited access to private international capital flows, despite the implicit bargain with the IMF and the Bank that such access would sustain economic reform efforts. The major path of the evolution of the treatment of sovereign debt was the move from debt collection to debt rescheduling, to aid and structural adjustment, to debt “sustainability,” to forgiveness and poverty reduction— what one official called the slippery slope of debt. The original aim of HIPC was to provide debt sustainability that would help to remove a major constraint on investment and growth and be a spur to further adjustment, in part by galvanizing increased private external investment. It is not at all clear that this has happened or would happen even if HIPC were broadened significantly. By the time enhanced HIPC emerged in 1999, the focus had shifted quite exclusively to poverty reduction, which may not necessarily be the most effective way to attack the structural dilemma of African countries. Southern states proposed many of the ideas inherent in HIPC during the

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

Page 193

DEBT AND DEBT RELIEF

193

New International Economic Order (NIEO) events of the late 1970s and early 1980s, but nothing came of this intense state-to-state bargaining. One of the striking things about the rise of HIPC is precisely that neither the creditor nor debtor states were a main driving force behind the innovation. Rather, it was NGOs shifting the battle into the domestic political arenas of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) industrial democracies and creditor learning that made it possible. The weak power position of the debtor states and the concomitant strong influence of the NGOs help to account for the fact that HIPC eventually became focused almost exclusively on poverty reduction and not on larger developmental concerns such as growth. The rising debt burden of poor countries, most of which were African, thus became an increasing concern of key actors in the international arena, consisting of some creditor countries, agencies of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in particular, a wideranging group of NGOs, and of course, debtor countries themselves. During the NIEO negotiations of the late 1970s and early 1980s, debtor countries insistently demanded more generous relief of sovereign debt, a simplified debt restructuring process (including generalized norms), and special treatment for the poorest debtor countries. In short, they wanted a reform of international governance processes on sovereign debt, especially the caseby-case norm. None of this, however, came to pass as a result of the struggle for the NIEO. Yet by the late 1980s, the Paris Club countries began slowly and incrementally to offer more generous terms for their poorest debtors and occasionally for some of their biggest and most strategically important debtors (Poland, Egypt, Russia, and Indonesia, for example). By the end of the 1990s, the debt regime for poor countries had changed dramatically, first with the advent of HIPC in 1996 and then with a major revision of it in 1999, creating the Enhanced HIPC (EHIPC) debt initiative.

A Change in the Debt Regime: The Triple Helix The sources of change in the debt regime lay elsewhere than in the northsouth state-to-state bargaining of the NIEO. They lay in three areas: (1) the complex and uneven relations among some of the actors in the international debt regime (for example, select creditor governments and the World Bank); (2) the activities of NGOs focused on debt, constituting what have been called principled-issue networks with their largely normative discourses and evolving capacities; and (3) fragments of an epistemic community of economists and other scholars who work on development issues, some of whom have played key roles as consultants and advisers to actors on both sides of the battles over debt. These three sets of actors have constituted a triple

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

194

Page 194

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

helix of relationships that have led to important but still curtailed innovation in the way the sovereign debt regime functions. The three strands of the triple helix—the official agencies and processes of the international debt regime, the NGO debt networks, and the epistemic community—interact with Africa’s structural dilemma. The driving force for change in the governance of official debt has been: (1) the synergy between various forms of power of and over key institutions such as the World Bank; (2) evolving knowledge and understanding about the nature and consequences of debt burdens; and (3) discourses about the inherent appropriateness of debt and existing debt relief mechanisms—all as they have interacted with the underlying structural dilemma. Each of the strands has used its power, knowledge, and discourses to alter or retain the overall pattern of governance of official debt. The actors of the international debt regime reacted haltingly and unevenly as they slowly came to the realization that something had to be done about Africa’s debt burden despite its apparent lack, until 9/11 at least, of major geostrategic importance. This realization was fostered and forced to the front by the networks of NGOs working on debt and development. These NGOs deployed an increasingly coherent moral discourse about social purpose, especially in regard to equity and poverty reduction, which was meant to gain representation and accountability for the people of heavily indebted poor countries, especially in Africa. A growing social movement and progressively more sophisticated knowledge about the technicalities and functioning of the international regime for official debt gave backing to this NGO discourse. The NGOs were assisted by sympathetic fragments of the epistemic community of economists, mostly but not exclusively by those outside the institutions of the international debt regime. Some of those inside the organizations of the international debt regime accepted or were influenced by the content of the moral discourse. These “outsider” economists used their technical knowledge of economic theory, debt, rescheduling, and the operations of the international financial institutions to propose alternative mechanisms, norms, and practices to tackle what they perceived to be the underlying problem of official debt, especially that owed to the IMF and the World Bank. In the process, both groups of economists contributed to and were influenced by the moral discourses on debt and development of the NGOs. Loose, mostly informal, networked connections were established between the three strands of the triple helix, which pushed the evolution of the governance structures. The triple helix of governance on official sovereign debt helped both to reproduce existing national and international structures for dealing with debt and to alter them in important ways. The result was a complicated new debt relief mechanism, HIPC, that built on existing structures and resulted from a series of political compromises.

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

Page 195

DEBT AND DEBT RELIEF

195

A key implication of this argument is that governance on debt was shifted haltingly and unevenly beyond the largely state-centric and international financial institution (IFI)–centric strand of the international debt regime. Over time, despite having little structural power, the NGOs and the sympathetic fragments of the epistemic community have grown in strength and influence. The result has been a much more complex web of international economic governance—one rooted in the democratic nature of the world’s highly industrialized democracies in which NGOs and their social movements can thrive and one strikingly different from the pattern of the early Bretton Woods era.4 Given a relatively healthy global economy and the absence of major war, such helixlike structures across a variety of issues may slowly weave more coherent latticelike structures of international economic governance. At the same time, given the power structures of the international state system and the growing power of global markets, distinct limits to elasticity and change continue to exist. A striking aspect of this story is the relatively small role played by the debtor states themselves; they did not constitute a fourth strand of the helix. They were weak during the NIEO debates about debt in the late 1970s and early 1980s, had only an indirect impact in the 1990s during the debates about HIPC, and remain weak now.

The Rise of the HIPC Debt Initiative The innovation of new Paris Club debt “menus” of more flexible and generous terms in the late 1980s and early 1990s was a sign that the major actors of the international debt regime were beginning to recognize the existence of the underlying structural dilemma, but only in relation to bilateral debt. The change resulted from: (1) the quiet lobbying of small European countries on their G7 colleagues; (2) the important leadership of Britain (strongly influenced by its NGOs), Canada, and to a lesser but eventually important degree, the Clinton administration in the United States; (3) the persistent work of the debt-oriented NGOs in encouraging both sets of countries; and (4) suggestions that emerged from the epistemic community on debt, both from outsiders and quietly from those inside some Paris Club governments, the World Bank, and, to a much lesser degree, the IMF. With each new menu, however, it became clear relatively quickly that it was not adequate, and pressure would build for additional measures, but again only within the context of the Paris Club. After the onslaught of Mexico’s debt crisis in 1982, a variety of groups and individuals made many far-reaching and innovative debt proposals, all to no avail because they did not resonate with the major actors of the sovereign debt regime at the time. Despite rising recognition of a poor country

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

196

Page 196

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

debt problem in the early 1990s, however, most of the Paris Club countries, the IMF, and the World Bank continued to defend the preferred creditor status of the Bretton Woods institutions. In large part, they were worried about the cost of tackling the problem for a group of countries that was not as a whole perceived to have major strategic importance. At the same time, the realization was growing inside the NGO networks and some parts of the epistemic community that the problem of multilateral debt needed to be tackled head on, irrespective of cost or the absence of strategic importance, largely for normative and what they considered to be developmental reasons. After 9/11, some governments and NGOs began to see a geostrategic link as well.

New Leadership at the World Bank and a Working Group At least a public rhetorical shift had taken place at the 1995 G7 summit in Halifax, Nova Scotia; now came the hard part of testing that rhetoric and turning it into something real. Prior to this time, concern did exist in various departments of the World Bank about poor country debt, especially in Africa. Debates were taking place, work was being done, and ideas were being discussed, but management blocked all this effort. It was not allowed to go anywhere. When Australian-born US banker James Wolfensohn became the ninth president of the World Bank on June 1, 1995, the discussions reached a crucial point. Wolfensohn was more open to the views of debtor governments and the NGOs, as he demonstrated in a trip to Great Britain before he took up his new position. While there, he met with a group of NGOs, including Oxfam, who urged him to take the debt issue very seriously. At the same time, the Bank had been extending its interactions with NGOs. After taking up his post at the Bank, Wolfensohn took a trip to Africa in which debt issues were particularly salient. In Uganda, for example, Oxfam helped to set up a meeting between Wolfensohn and local NGOs, including the Uganda Debt Network. Wolfensohn was not worried about the financial market consequences of altering the Bank’s preferred creditor status, and he needed a major policy initiative to demarcate his arrival at the head of this powerful international organization. He chose debt and empowered sympathetic elements of the Bank staff to accelerate its ongoing work on debt. Wolfensohn authorized the creation of a small, very low profile working group or task force on debt issues. It was headed by an economist, who after joining the Bank in 1994, started working quietly on these issues (based in part on a doctoral dissertation on debt sustainability) while establishing ties with a variety of groups interested in these issues, including NGOs. The working group’s low profile was designed to avoid upsetting critics

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

Page 197

DEBT AND DEBT RELIEF

197

of new efforts on debt inside the Bank and the IMF, among some major creditor governments, and in the Paris Club secretariat, particularly. The group focused on the notion of debt sustainability and the issue of multilateral debt, fighting strong resistance inside the Bank to any change in the status quo. The dominant line of thinking continued to argue that no major debt problem existed—certainly not one of insolvency—that current liquidity problems were being dealt with effectively via new lending and Paris Club rescheduling, and that increasing outside pressure to deal with this issue ought to be ignored and resisted. These were deeply entrenched views that the working group fought hard to change. By July 1995, the working group had produced a draft paper acknowledging the existence of a multilateral debt problem and proposing a set of mechanisms to deal comprehensively with the debt problems of a set of twenty to twenty-four poor countries. Central to the proposal was the creation of a debt reduction fund that would help to pay multilateral debt after all other private and public debt mechanisms had provided maximum debt relief.

A Leaked Working Paper In mid-September 1995, a copy of the draft report was leaked to the Financial Times, which published two stories and an editorial that spelled out and praised the proposal for a multilateral debt reduction facility. Wolfensohn was traveling overseas and had not seen the draft report. A revised version of it, which had undergone limited internal review but was not recommended by Bank management, was discussed a week later.5 At the same time, Bank officials consulted with the IMF and others on their reaction to the leaked proposal, which called for “the establishment of a Debt Reduction Fund that would coordinate action for reducing the entire debt burden of these countries to a sustainable level.”6 In the process, the issue of a write-off was neatly sidestepped. Some who had been involved in the working group referred to the facility as the “Washington Club” to distinguish it from the Paris and London Clubs. It was to “provide debtors with a much needed forum where debt relief is discussed in a concerted and comprehensive way, within the framework of an overall strategy to allow them to achieve debt sustainability.”7 Buried in one of the report’s annexes is a clear sketch of four successive phases envisioned by the proposal, with a progression through each until debt sustainability is reached. The four phases are: (1) private; (2) bilateral; (3) multilateral; and (4) bilateral again, if needed. An important strategic rationale for the proposed fund was “the eventual removal of a major constraint on investment and growth . . . that would be an essential spur to further adjustment.”8 This is an important argument, one that got lost with the enhanced HIPC in 1999, given its tight focus on poverty reduc-

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

198

Page 198

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

tion. The inflexibility of enhanced HIPC in this regard, thereby preventing investment in more growth-related projects, was the major complaint of African finance ministers. It also is a reflection of the failure of the “implicit bargain” in the structural adjustment regime for African and other poor countries referred to above: “do what we tell you to do, and you will have the funds to invest in growth-related activities to support ongoing economic reform because private external investment will flow in.” For most of these countries, this quid pro quo has simply not happened, and enhanced HIPC as it stands now may further aggravate this problem. Lastly, given the history of the sovereign debt regime, the paper makes the important point that the risks of the proposed fund are high because its multilateral nature “defines its major challenges, since consensus building and coordination at the multilateral level take time.”9 Given the uproar and resistance the leaked report generated, it is stunning that the HIPC debt initiative emerged only a year later, although it then stalled. In large part, this emergence was attributable to the fact that much of the groundwork outside the IMF and the Bank had already been laid by the NGOs and their allies and the hard bargaining that took place among all the key players; despite considerable disagreement on key issues, compromises and concessions were made. Some in the Bank and many in the NGO community believed that the report was leaked in order to sabotage the proposal. Wolfensohn and senior Bank staff were caught off guard and embarrassed. So were key creditor countries. An emergency board meeting was held the evening of the Financial Times leak. From Beijing, Wolfensohn called the leak “distressing,” noting: “It is a personal and tactical observation, but it is more difficult to negotiate something as serious as that when you read it in the newspaper and you have not yet had the benefit of serious discussions with the participants. When I have an answer on what I think we can do in co-ordination with our shareholders in the International Monetary Fund, I’ll make an announcement. But I don’t know when that will be. It could be that the Financial Times may have delayed it.”10 Describing the Bank proposal as “ideologically unsound,” an IMF official said, “The Fund would not get involved. This would undermine the Fund’s position and credibility. Writing off debt is not our business.”11 An executive session of the Bank board discussed the revised version of the leaked paper in September 1995. It was made clear that the paper was meant to be a staff-level working paper that would eventually be discussed with the IMF and that Wolfensohn had been very explicit about wanting intensive work that explored new options for dealing with a multilateral debt problem. The UK, the Netherlands, and Sweden voiced strong support for IMF-Bank efforts to help the HIPCs. The UK thought it was appropriate that the paper considered radical options and that limited efforts by creditor

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

Page 199

DEBT AND DEBT RELIEF

199

groups would not be able by themselves to solve the problem. The Netherlands supported a new multilateral approach aimed at developing an exit strategy for the HIPCs. France and Japan stated that they were not ready to support the proposal, however, with France expressing particularly vehement opposition to a significant role for the Bank.12 In the United States, the Clinton administration remained strikingly noncommittal. Wolfensohn decided to engage in serious negotiations with the IMF and other key players about the proposal, and the IMF announced its willingness to do so. In the period after the leak, IMF staff were told, despite some very negative views held by senior officials, to work with colleagues in the Bank, although it was clearly going to be a rough ride. In fact, considerable tension remained in the Bank over this issue as well. A senior IMF official said, “It is not a matter of a good idea or a bad idea. It is a matter of what is the preferable way to, what is the best way to use what are inevitably going to be limited resources.” 13 The IMF’s managing director, Michel Camdessus, said, “We support here in the IMF the ongoing efforts of the Bank in this area and we stand ready to assist in whatever measure we can.” Yet as two observers noted, “In private, however, senior IMF officials are much chillier. They heap scorn on the details of the World Bank’s calculations, argue that the scale of the problem is much less than claimed by the Bank and the NGOs, and question whether debt relief is the best use of scarce funds.” 14 At the IMF-Bank annual meetings in early October, although a number of G7 countries were opposed to the plan, the Bank’s Development Committee asked the two institutions to have proposals on multilateral debt ready for discussion by the time of its next meeting in April 1996. Wolfensohn asserted that IMF-Bank discussions were “proceeding in a totally amicable, professional and as good as you can have way,” although he added, “I’m not sure that there is unanimity even among the people we are trying to help.”15 Unanimity certainly did not exist among Bank staff. Nevertheless, the Bank eventually got the IMF on board by stressing the existence of a “debt overhang” that prevented increased development flows. The Bank proposal did generate positive, although sometimes cautious, reactions from key NGOs such as Oxfam, Christian Aid, and the Debt Crisis Network, as well as from the Commonwealth secretariat. Oxfam’s director, David Bryer, made his support clear very early on and observed, “The political initiative has at last caught up with the economic reality that current debt levels are unsustainable.”16 Wolfensohn clearly had the larger context in mind. Noting that the Bank was “not doing this in isolation” and that “there is a lot of emotion out there and a need to do something,” he said there was “no doubt that if we were to stop the debate tomorrow, the debate will continue around the world sponsored by many, many organizations who are giving this central focus and were indeed doing so even before my

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

200

Page 200

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

arrival.” The proposal generated a split among many of the NGOs working on debt, largely because of the continued link between debt relief and structural adjustment. Divisions among the NGOs remained as the HIPC saga unfolded, and an Oxfam official working in the United States had a “law” about them: “My law of Washington is that people who are making more compromises than you are sellouts who don’t know why they’re in this business. And people who are making less compromises than you are wildeyed idealists who have no idea how to accomplish something and would rather be right than make any change in the real world. Virtually everyone sees themselves as the midpoint in the spectrum.”17 Initially, the leak did galvanize opposition to the plan among more hard-line G7 governments. Although the initiative was likely to help only about twenty countries and not quickly, it was resisted strongly from the beginning by Japan, Germany, Italy, and even Belgium because of concerns (not always expressed explicitly) about cost, burden sharing, moral hazard, and issues related to the proposed sale of IMF gold reserves. It was likewise seen to undermine the credibility of the IMF and the World Bank as enforcers of major economic reform. The Clinton administration continued to have doubts along the way. The Paris Club secretariat was highly suspicious of the plan, as was much of the IMF staff. The Paris Club staff and the French government fought a vigorous battle right up to the day that HIPC was approved by all creditor countries and multilateral creditors. At the time of the leak, the French complained vigorously that the leaked document had significantly raised expectations that the Bank was making a dramatic change in regard to debt and had left the premature impression that the Bank’s shareholders approved of the plan and that the Bank and IMF positions were the same. Yet the British said that they were afraid of the opposite—the perception that the IMF and the Bank were squabbling.

The Politics of an Emerging Initiative By late January 1996, the Bank and the IMF had jointly produced two papers on the nature of the problem, the concept of debt sustainability, and its application to the forty-one HIPC countries. Both papers were discussed in an informal session of the Bank’s executive directors in late February. By early March, the Bank and IMF had put together a basic proposal for HIPC debt relief discussed at a meeting of the Bank’s executive directors in midMarch. The UK, Switzerland, Belgium, and Canada expressed strong support for the proposal, with a few suggestions to make it more realistic. They urged continued forward movement. The United States, Russia, China, and India provided support in principle in the spirit of supporting a consensus for more action. The Netherlands and Sweden on the one hand and France, Germany, Italy, and Japan on the other all expressed hesitation, but the two

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

Page 201

DEBT AND DEBT RELIEF

201

groups had different reasons—the former that the initiative was not strong enough, and the latter that it was too strong. France expressed considerable skepticism, indicating that the approach was unrealistic and unworkable. In particular, it criticized the assumption that the Paris Club would go to 90 percent debt reduction as part of the mechanism. Above all, though, the issue that started to rear its head in a clear way was widespread concern, by proponents and opponents alike, about how the initiative was to be funded. The Bank’s Development Committee welcomed the proposed framework in its April meeting. Bank and IMF staff had done what had been asked of them the previous October—a striking achievement given the strong initial opposition to the revised version of the Bank’s working group paper, as well as the earlier version of it that was leaked to the Financial Times. Between April and September 1996, more staff work was done, particularly on financing issues and on the two illustrative cases of Uganda and Nicaragua. Bank executive directors discussed this work in September 1996, almost exactly a year after the Bank’s working group document had been leaked. By this time, the battle had turned definitively from accepting the initiative to how to fund it. Even its strongest supporters now became vigorous examiners. In short, the battle now shifted to one that pitted all the bilateral creditors against the Bank and, to a lesser degree, the IMF. Burden sharing became the obsession. The UK, for example, indicated that all creditors should make a fair contribution and that it would be wrong to condition multilateral action on prior bilateral action. Yet it never obsessed about cost issues, assuming that they would be worked out over time as the pressure increased to fulfill raised expectations; it was more focused on getting the structure of the initiative in proper shape. The United States, Japan, and Canada also noted that it would be wrong to condition multilateral action on prior bilateral action. France, Italy, and Germany were skeptical about equal burden sharing because the Paris Club had not discussed, much less agreed to, 90 percent reduction. Only the Swedish government felt that it might be wise for the Paris Club to contribute more than the Bank. The more technically capable NGOs such as Oxfam International and Eurodad made important contributions to the design of the HIPC apparatus, not always getting what they wanted but certainly making a difference as advocates of the debtor countries. In fact, it was one of the NGO consultants from the epistemic community that came up with a key compromise formula: the IMF and World Bank were to be “preferred but not exempt”— in other words, they were to be paid first if possible, but they were not exempt from debt cancellation. Oxfam in particular had excellent access to key executive directors on the boards of both the IMF and the World Bank, to staff in each institution, and to finance ministry officials of key creditors. The same holds true for some of the academic fragments of the epistemic community interested in debt.

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

202

Page 202

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

What finally emerged was the complicated Rube Goldbergian mechanism that the HIPC Initiative came to be, with the Paris Club continuing to have a central role while allowing the IMF, the World Bank, and the other multilateral creditors to tackle their debt problems with the HIPC countries. The IMF was brought on board as Michel Camdessus eventually saw the wisdom of trying to steer the design of the mechanism rather than resist it. In addition to recognizing the warning signs, some evidence exists that he was influenced by the arguments of the Catholic Church and its debtfocused NGOs as well as by other religious figures. Over the years, Pope John Paul had sent senior aides to the IMF and World Bank to argue for debt relief. The HIPC initiative was formally approved and announced at the September 1996 IMF-Bank annual meeting. It was the result of the complicated interactions of the triple helix that combined the normative social pressure and influence of NGO networks, the ideas of epistemic economists and small creditor states, leadership by a major G7 creditor heavily influenced by its own NGOs (the UK), learning and leadership change at the World Bank, eventual acquiescence and serious negotiation on the part of the IMF and the Clinton administration, and a set of complicated political compromises between the major players of the international debt regime, but particularly major creditor states and the IMF and World Bank. This confluence of factors allowed striking but still limited innovation, a new strategic relationship. However, the absence of one or two of these elements could have led to no innovation, but instead to continued halting adaptation. Think, for example, what the outcome might have been with different governments in the United States and the United Kingdom, different leadership at the Bank, or the absence of NGO pressure and proposals. The intent of HIPC was to provide an exit from the rescheduling process by reducing debt to “sustainable” levels, so that it is not an impediment to growth and poverty reduction. It was billed as a “new paradigm” for international action, despite its having built on existing mechanisms in a very complicated way. It was meant only for those countries that demonstrated a strong commitment to major IMF and World Bank economic reform for at least six years and was conditioned on continued compliance with their dictates. In a complex, multistage process, the Paris Club countries would provide concessional relief on bilateral debt and reduction on a case-by-case basis to eligible countries, with the IMF and the World Bank providing important formal debt relief for the first time. In fact, the HIPC apparatus shifted the center of gravity from the Paris Club toward the IMF and the World Bank, because the latter two were tasked with doing the debt sustainability analyses central to the process. All non–Paris Club creditor countries and commercial creditors were supposed to provide comparable treatment, although how that would be achieved was

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

Page 203

DEBT AND DEBT RELIEF

203

not clear. With Russia now a member of the Paris Club, about $170 billion of Soviet-era debt was to be brought under the HIPC umbrella. Initial estimates put the cost to the creditor countries, the IMF, and the World Bank at about $5.5 billion, with the hope that it would catalyze private financial flows and help reintegrate these countries into the global economy in productive ways. The cost would prove to be much higher, however, and the catalytic affect much lower.

Off to a Slow Start Although the HIPC initiative was formally adopted, disputes over financing and case modalities slowed its implementation significantly. Battles were fought over contributions to the HIPC Trust Fund, with the United States, Canada, Germany, Japan, Belgium, and Australia insisting that the contributions be voluntary. Wolfensohn stuck to the Bank’s position that the Paris Club should go to 90 percent debt reduction, and to protect the preferred creditor status of the Bank, he did not want to do more than the bilateral creditors. He warned that if these procedures were not accepted and implemented, then the objectives of the initiative might have to be adjusted. All the while, the projected costs of the initiative continued to rise. The United States, the UK, Japan, Sweden, and the Netherlands strongly suggested that the multilaterals provide additional resources. France insisted that the bilateral creditors should not have to bail out the multilaterals. Germany and Italy expressed similar concerns, while Canada, the Netherlands, and Switzerland worried that cost considerations were unduly affecting the determination of debt sustainability ratios in cases under consideration. At the same time, battles were being waged on other fronts, such as the nature and length of the track record, the form of conditionality, the degree of flexibility that might be introduced in specific cases, the setting of sustainability ratios, and moral hazards, among others. Many of these battles were fought over Uganda, which became the first country to enter the complicated, multistage HIPC process, but not without considerable controversy. The Bank’s executive directors finally discussed the decision point documents for Uganda in late April 1997. The United States, the UK, Canada, and the Netherlands supported a low debt-to-export ratio to ensure a robust and well-deserved outcome, but Japan, Germany, and Italy supported a higher ratio because Uganda was not seen as vulnerable and because of fears about cost inflation and the use of International Development Association (IDA) resources to monitor poverty reduction and development objectives. France expressed concern about multilateral burden sharing, assuming that the IMF and the Bank would have to pick up the share held

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

204

Page 204

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

by the African Development Bank. Given Uganda’s exceptional track record, consensus existed on establishing a shorter period to the completion point, but even here Japan and Italy argued for the standard time to completion point to ensure strong policy performance. Thus, Uganda became the first country approved for HIPC treatment after important battles were fought on several fronts. Uganda did not get everything it wanted, but it got far more than it would have without the efforts of the NGOs and their epistemic community allies. Similar processes played out with Bolivia, Côte d’Ivoire, and more contentiously, Mozambique. Hence, the main NGOs and their epistemic community allies played a major role in affecting the design of HIPC, thereby altering the structure and process of the international debt regime, and they continued to be influential with each country case as it came up, helping to defend the debtor’s interests in the face of powerful larger forces. HIPC led to considerable institutional learning for World Bank and IMF staff. Coordination became far greater, although tough battles were fought, with hard bargaining and difficult political compromises on many fronts, over a variety of procedural and substantive issues. This process accounts for much of HIPC’s slow start. Some of the battles went all the way up to both boards. The rise of HIPC was a very political process.

The Rise of Enhanced HIPC and the Dominance of Poverty Reduction Serious doubts remained, however. Major NGOs led by Jubilee 2000, Oxfam, and Eurodad maintained that the Paris Club and in particular the IMF lacked the will to achieve serious debt relief. They claimed that IMF conditionality was much too stringent; challenged the way sustainability, vulnerability, and threshold indicators were assessed; pointed to weak comparability mechanisms; and above all, called attention to a seriously inadequate commitment to poverty reduction. Oxfam charged the IMF and some of the major countries with systematic attempts to delay and restrict implementation, partly through data manipulation, while asserting that industrialized countries could easily afford the cost. Not all the forty-one HIPC countries were eligible for HIPC relief; in fact, only about half of the original forty-one were likely to even be considered, and only seven countries had even entered the process after three years. 18 On both fronts of technical knowledge and moral discourse, the battle for greater representation, accountability, and hence, according to the NGOs, better international economic governance would continue. The shock of the Asian financial crisis slowed the momentum of the debt relief movement, a fact about which African leaders were particularly

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

Page 205

DEBT AND DEBT RELIEF

205

bitter. Kwesi Botchwey, the architect of Ghana’s mini–economic miracle, noted that the projected cost of HIPC was only “about a fifth of the resources that were mobilized in the space of a few months for bail-out operations for a handful of countries as a result of the Asia crisis.”19 But as a result of renewed pressure, the World Bank in late 1998 and 1999 undertook a quite wide-ranging and intensive two-stage process of consultation and review of HIPC. Informal consultation and exchange had now become formal and institutionalized. The Bank held regional meetings, including one in Africa, with NGOs and debtor governments and arranged consultations via a specially created website that it administered. At the same time, close consultations and negotiations took place among the creditor players in the debt regime. Out of this process came the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative (EHIPC) in September 1999. Almost everybody took credit for it, including the major creditor countries and especially the Clinton administration. A US Treasury report stated that “the United States led the effort to redesign the HIPC Initiative to provide deeper, broader, faster debt relief.”20 The US Treasury claimed that the United States got everything it wanted. That may be so, but it got things it had not wanted even two years earlier. Once again congressional influence was important, especially via Jubilee USA’s “Legislative Group,” which coordinated the work of a large number of US NGOs working on debt.21 In the emergence of EHIPC, the evolution of the views of key G7 players did make a real difference. This evolution included the intensifying interest of Gordon Brown in the UK (reinforced by NGO pressure); Clinton’s trip to Honduras in March 1999, which further raised congressional interest or at least knowledge about the problem; and above all, the change of government in Germany and the altered views of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s government, reinforced by Germany as host of the next G7 meeting in Cologne. The Development Committee and the then Interim Committee also helped to maintain pressure to secure progress on poor country debt, especially leading up to EHIPC. Bank staff used the Development Committee to maintain momentum, and the NGOs put pressure on both committees. This process also allowed the views of other countries to be manifested. EHIPC was meant to be “enhanced”—bigger, better, faster. One significant change incorporated in EHIPC is that all debt relief is now tied in a detailed way to poverty reduction. To ensure the link, debtor countries in consultation with civil society groups will put together poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs). In theory at least, IMF and World Bank adjustment lending programs will be finalized only after these efforts have been taken into account. The PRSP process is very demanding. The IMF noted, “These strategies must be genuinely country-owned and reflect the outcome of an open participatory process involving governments, civil society, and rele-

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

206

Page 206

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

vant international institutions and donors.” These plans “should contain systematic and participatory analyses of poverty, short- and long-term tradeoffs of alternative policy decisions, and the impact of proposed reforms for the most vulnerable social groups. These strategies will also address the critical, and often complex, issues related to building capacity, enhancing governance, and supporting transparency in policy making.” In addition to far better data, “the PRSPs will need to include clear, monitorable key actions that would allow, if endorsed by the two Boards, a country to reach its completion point under the HIPC Initiative. It is also essential in this context that all available resources are integrated in a transparent, accountable budgetary framework, which could include poverty/social funds, to ensure their effective use to combat poverty.”22 An elaborate process of consultation was developed for the PRSPs, and a much simpler one for the interim PRSPs was used to keep the process moving. If seriously implemented by all sides, this new process could be an important change in international governance on debt, aid, and development more generally and might have implications for the unfolding of democratization processes in African countries. In addition, it has the potential to be a process for enhancing state capacity and legitimacy. Major actors on the creditor side have praised the role of the NGOs while trying, often with gritted teeth, to co-opt them via consultation or to deflect them. It is not at all clear who was being co-opted, however. In 1999, US treasury secretary Larry Summers commented on how “grateful we are to the many committed NGOs and others in the development community who have kept debt relief high on the international agenda this year and helped to generate the political will for action. . . . Thanks in large part to the efforts of the Jubilee 2000 coalition, the advent of the millennium has given [the] US an historic opportunity to accelerate these efforts, and help these countries finally build an attractive environment for private investment and market-led growth” (emphasis added).23 Funding again became an issue, and this time the NGOs did battle on a different front—the US Congress. In October 2000, a complex bipartisan coalition that included major business support and was led by Jubilee 2000 convinced the US Congress to fully fund the US contribution to HIPC, grant approval to use IMF gold proceeds to fund it, and declare its opposition to the imposition of user fees for basic health care and education in structural adjustment programs for poor countries. The latter was to be enforced by the Treasury and US representatives to the IMF and World Bank. The coalition made effective normative appeals to conservative House Republicans, who then allied with liberal Democrats and the US Treasury, along with some clever policy proposals and intensive, hardheaded, and intelligent lobbying. This process is yet another example of how economic governance patterns are opening up in interesting ways.

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

Page 207

DEBT AND DEBT RELIEF

207

An Assessment of EHIPC On the donor side, the hope was that the EHIPC debt process would build legitimacy and “ownership” of structural adjustment programs without cutting the heart out of them. It soon became clear that this goal would be difficult to accomplish. Expectations had been raised very high by EHIPC, and there appeared to be plenty of room for failed expectations. This dangerous situation was created by the Bank and the IMF, the G7, and the NGOs (in this case because they thought it would get debtor countries more relief over the longer run). The PRSP process in its grandest form might be viewed as a somewhat meager attempt by creditor countries to extend their own “compromise of embedded liberalism”24 to the poorest countries of the world, based almost literally on a relatively small “pot of gold.”25 The long-term question remains how the partial extension of embedded liberalism might be financed. The major creditors were having enough trouble financing EHIPC as it is. However, the summit on development finance in Monterrey, Mexico, in 2002 and the G7 meeting in Canada in 1999 show that the battle continues. The political fact is, however, that the NGOs have won the battle over EHIPC debt savings; they are to go exclusively to “poverty reduction.” The primary focus of key NGOs and some debtor governments has been on health, especially AIDS and education, with a secondary emphasis on rural and other infrastructure. In addition to EHIPC, a number of creditor countries, including the United States, Britain, France, Canada, Germany, and Italy, have taken steps to write off significant amounts of bilateral concessional debt. EHIPC is not a magic bullet; it is important for a number of countries but very far from turning Africa and other poor countries around. It is also far from making a major dent in Africa’s structural dilemma. In this context, an exclusive focus on poverty may not be the correct approach. With EHIPC, there is a very clear sense that the process has acquired multiple objectives but still has only one instrument. The objectives include debt sustainability, regularization of relations with creditors, poverty reduction, and (because of these objectives) growth. The architects of EHIPC also increasingly perceive that debt relief is but one part in a much larger picture, one that needs to be dealt with for real debt sustainability to be achieved. Real and significant tensions remain. There are two main ways to respond to the charge that EHIPC is not dealing sufficiently with growth issues: (1) that the PRSPs really are about growth; and (2) that growth is being handled by the IMF, the Bank, and the “donors” in ongoing structural adjustment work, especially via poverty reduction and growth facilities (PRGFs). Neither response is satisfactory. But an even larger question remains: Is it possible to go beyond EHIPC? If so, how?

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

208

Page 208

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

Beyond HIPC? The Unexpected Role of the United States The George W. Bush administration came to power in the United States in 2001 with a policy of “drop the debt and stop the debt.” It was not enthralled by HIPC and spent much of its first three years pursuing two policy tracks simultaneously: (1) containing the cost of it as well as any new incremental policy innovation—its version of “drop the debt”; and (2) pushing a proposal to significantly increase the percentage of grants in IDA’s portfolio—“stop the debt.” As we shall see, the second track eventually encountered serious geostrategic issues and intense G7/G8 politics over a concept that the Bush administration had openly scorned as “odious debt.” Key battles in the first track focused on the sensitive and costly issue of topping off debt relief at the completion point if final HIPC debt relief would not bring a country within the initiative’s debt sustainability ratios. Key examples were Niger and Ethiopia, two of the world’s poorest countries. The United States, Germany, and Japan held up these two HIPCs from reaching their expected completion points in a dispute over topping up— both the amount for each country and how it was to be calculated in the future. On the other side, the UK, Canada, and France pushed for more generous relief. A meeting on Niger was postponed in January 2004 because of this dispute. Projected topping up for Niger was to be substantial—$142.5 million, or 28.5 percent of Niger’s promised $500 million in HIPC relief. A Treasury official in the Bush administration commented that the United States was worried that more debt relief would be an excuse for more borrowing: “We are concerned about the Bank being in a position where it is in a continual cycle of lending and forgiving.”26 The NGOs pushed very hard on these two cases. Jubilee Research charged that the United States and Germany were deliberately delaying and blocking debt relief at the same time the United States was trying to get Iraq relief from its “odious debt,” a term now being used by the Bush administration: “The double standards applied by Western creditors to these two debtor nations reveal that debt relief no longer conforms to a set of rules by the international community under HIPC but instead is subject to arbitrary geopolitical considerations.”27 Ann Pettifor, a main driving force behind Jubilee 2000 and now director of Jubilee Research in London, was very direct: In Cologne in June 1999, Germany’s Chancellor led the creation of the “Enhanced” HIPC Initiative. At that Summit, the US and other G8 leaders promised their electorates—led by Jubilee 2000 supporters—that countries like Ethiopia would benefit from debt relief. Today western creditors are playing fast and loose with that commitment, and with their own international rules and obligations. By bending over backwards to cancel Iraq’s debt, and at the same time willfully flouting their own commitments to Ethiopia, creditors are breaking promises to their own electorates, as well as undermining progress in heavily indebted countries. We call on the US

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

Page 209

DEBT AND DEBT RELIEF

209

and Germany to honour commitments made to Ethiopia—and immediately grant her the relief calculated as essential by officials in the World Bank and IMF.28 (emphasis added)

Intense pressure from a wide variety of fronts finally led the Bush administration and Germany to relent and allow both Niger and Ethiopia to reach their completion points with considerable topping up assistance. But the NGOs also operate simultaneously on a second, quite different track: working toward much more dramatic change in the strategic relationship between Africa and powerful external actors. With great consistency, the NGOs have maintained their demand for full debt cancellation and an end to structural adjustment, while arguing for substantial increases in aid to meet the Millennium Development Goals, especially a much larger reliance on grants. They link both of these issues to AIDS, the larger African health crisis, increased war and violent conflict, declining state services and infrastructure, unfair trade practices by the industrial democracies, and most recently, the cost of environmental damage caused by the industrial democracies. Concerning trade, an Oxfam report on “fair trade” asserts that the G7 is quite content to have debt remain the focus of debate in order to keep systematic attention away from major trade reform.29 The NGOs are likely, however, to find their task much more difficult than with debt, precisely because such efforts will impinge directly on very sensitive and powerful domestic political interests in the “donor” countries in ways that did not happen with debt relief. Yet they are correct that trade is central, and the World Bank and IMF agree. What is needed is not just debt triage but increased trade access. Widespread pressure for major debt reduction did exist by early 2004, because HIPC was scheduled to end in December 2004. This pressure came from the NGOs and African governments, as well as a number of smaller European governments, but also from some parts of the World Bank and some major states. Gordon Brown, the British chancellor of the exchequer, announced in April: “There is now a window of opportunity to make progress on this issue, and I’m hopeful that when we meet at the annual meetings we’ll have made the most of this opportunity.”30 Brown believed this opportunity existed because the Bush administration, in its efforts to get major debt relief for Iraq, appeared to be softening its position on HIPC reform; others were less optimistic.

The Geopolitics of Debt Relief: A Conversion on the Road to Baghdad Not long after the US invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration realized that, despite having the world’s second largest oil reserves, Iraq needed

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

210

Page 210

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

major relief on its roughly $120 billion external debt. The administration argued that Iraq deserved a 90 to 95 percent reduction of its $40 billion Paris Club debt, relief for which it was not qualified under existing Paris Club rules, despite earlier rule-breaking deals for Poland, Egypt, and Russia.31 Former secretary of the treasury and secretary of state James A. Baker became a special envoy whose task was to travel the world to persuade countries at least to join the financial “coalition of the willing.” Holding a relatively small proportion of Iraq’s debt, the United States all of a sudden did not hesitate to characterize Saddam Hussein’s borrowings as “odious debt.” Canada supported the US demand for 90 to 95 percent debt relief, as did Britain, but major G8 opposition emerged from France, Germany, Japan, and Russia. President Jacques Chirac of France asserted that Iraq should not get a better deal than the world’s heavily indebted poor countries, making it clear that little progress would be made on Iraq until more was done for these countries. He declared that Iraq should get no more than a 50 percent reduction, a position supported by the rest of the G8. At the G8 meeting in Sea Island, Georgia, in June 2004, the United States presented a stunning proposal to cancel all the multilateral debt that HIPC countries owed to the IMF, World Bank, and African Development Bank (ADB). The tacit quid pro quo would be support for the US position on Iraqi debt. The proposal was presented as an example of “compassionate conservatism” in the larger context of the Millennium Development Goals. Undersecretary of the Treasury for International Affairs John Taylor said, “We need to complete the ‘drop and stop the debt’ vision put forth by President Bush at the start of his administration” (emphasis added).32 Treasury Secretary John Snow put it in the context of the administration’s larger approach to development and international financial institutions: I believe the Bretton Woods Institutions have a responsibility to continue their own reform, for example by doing more to reinforce debt sustainability in poor countries. That requires private investment, but also a commitment to not making loans when it is highly probable that they will be forgiven. Grants and debt relief must be significantly increased—we are considering more options to do so, including those that would provide up to 100 percent debt relief and grants from international financial institutions. Employing both grants and debt relief together would give the poorest countries a chance to reach their international development goals of the Millennium Declaration without adding to debt burdens.33

The British had a similar proposal that Gordon Brown had formulated before the 2004 G8 meeting. They took the additionality issue—that committed resources are actually new and not recycled—very seriously by offering to cover 10 percent ($180 million) of the tab to the World Bank and the ADB, while insisting that the IMF portion be financed with its gold

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

Page 211

DEBT AND DEBT RELIEF

211

reserves. At this point, the United States was silent about how to finance the proposal. Any decision was put off until the annual IMF–World Bank meetings in Washington in early October. At the same time, HIPC was set to expire at the end of 2004. At the IMF-Bank meetings, HIPC was extended for the third time to the end of 2006 to allow eleven African HIPC countries, all with serious conflict and/or arrears problems, to enter the process. The Bush administration was desperate to get a deal on Iraqi debt, but it wanted a deal on the cheap and had to swallow its often-voiced moral hazard concerns. Facing an enormous budget deficit and the huge, growing, and not fully public cost of the Iraq war, it wanted the Bank and the IMF to finance this major debt relief out of their own resources. Unlike the British, the US government offered no contribution. Most observers saw the proposal for what it was—a geopolitical ploy. As one European diplomat put it, “When the United States asked us for so much debt relief for Iraq, we said the answer was to also relieve the debt of the poorest nations. Now the Americans are trying to come along with debt relief for the poor but we are afraid they will dry up the money . . . that these poor countries deserve.”34 Intense discussions at the IMF-Bank meetings failed to reach an agreement, bogging down in quarrels about how to finance any new multilateral debt relief. The G8 agreed to report on its discussion by the end of the year. Wolfensohn chided “world leaders” for their stinginess, and the IMF bemoaned the absence of “realistic proposals for financing.” The British were scheduled to take over the presidency of the G8 in 2005, and Gordon Brown was committed to having Britain lead the G8 into major new debt relief, the details of which were not yet public, by the next summit. Some NGOs supported the US position on the grounds of getting the Bush administration to formally commit to this major new step and worry about cost and additionality issues later. A senior Jubilee USA official provided clear support for the US position: “We laud Brown for his commitment to 100% debt cancellation, but his call to finance debt cancellation through G7 government appropriations threatens to scuttle a deal on debt. Brown’s commitment, though generous, is unnecessary considering the international financial institutions’ vast resources.”35 Others viewed the British proposal as more responsible and remained critical of the US position. Many of these NGOs supported major debt relief for Iraq because of the obvious “odious debt” precedent that it would set, at least in their eyes. The UN joined the chorus, with various agencies calling for full multilateral debt relief for poor countries: the Secretary-General, UNCTAD, and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) among others. After President Bush was reelected in November 2004, the United States redoubled its efforts to get major debt relief for Iraq while remaining

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

212

Page 212

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

silent on its surprising and unexpected Sea Island debt proposal of June. A compromise Paris Club deal was reached on November 21 that would cancel 80 percent of Iraq’s debt in three stages over four years if Iraq lived up to certain conditions. A number of NGOs noted the rapid movement on debt relief for Iraq and the slow progress toward more debt reduction for Africa and other poor countries. Germany and France wanted some reconciliation with the reelected Bush administration that would appear positive and not be military in nature. It is not yet clear what kind of deals were made concerning poor country debt relief. Russia, however, remained the last holdout, and it took all-night negotiations to reach a deal. The Russians subsequently made it clear that their support was linked to a “mutual understanding” about handling its own debt to the Paris Club and better treatment for its companies in Iraq. Speaking of the Paris Club agreement, President Vladimir Putin noted, “We did this out of solidarity with the Iraqi people. But at the same time we proceed on the basis that the interests of our companies will be taken into account.”36 NGOs, which had previously met with Paris Club officials to argue for an immediate moratorium on Iraqi debt service, did not believe the Paris Club agreement went far enough; some called it scandalous. In an early December report, Oxfam warned that the “war on terrorism” threatened to bring back an era when assistance was determined by security considerations rather than developmental need. Its chief policy adviser Max Lawson noted, “Debt relief for Iraq shows that rich countries can find the resources for foreign aid if they need to.”37 The Paris Club deal left the US position on debt relief for Africa undetermined, and the Bush administration remained silent on the issue as it approached the end of its G8 presidency, leaving it to the British. Britain was anxious for major movement on poor country debt and development more generally while it led the G8 in 2005. To further these aims, Gordon Brown made a six-day visit to the United States in mid-December 2004 to push his case with senior Bush administration officials. His efforts included a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. In the process, he made the details of his proposal public. Brown finally identified which countries would be eligible: the fifteen HIPC countries that have completed the full HIPC process, twelve of them African, and six other low-income countries: Albania, Armenia, Mongolia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. In addition, Brown’s debt proposal would cover “up to” 100 percent of multilateral debt service until 2015, not full debt cancellation as initially advertised. The devil really is in the details. The British proposal is billed as a core part of a new Marshall Plan meant to support the Millennium Development Goals. Most of the major NGOs support the British plan, albeit with some modification, and they spent considerable energy campaigning for it prior to the British-hosted G8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, in early July 2005.

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

Page 213

DEBT AND DEBT RELIEF

213

After much wrangling, a deal did come out of Gleneagles and was approved by the IMF in December 2005. It is known as the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. Major pressure will be aimed at the Bush administration to honor its 2004 Sea Island G8 pledge now that it has achieved its desperately sought Paris Club deal for Iraq, made all the harder by its stubborn unilateralism in foreign affairs. The question remains whether the conversion on the road to Baghdad is genuine after all. Will the United States follow the lead of its one true Iraq coalition partner? The British certainly view such support as their due, given their role in Iraq. Lastly, just as the NGOs helped to create the larger context that made the multilateral debt relief proposal possible, they will also play a key role in helping the Bush administration to make up its mind.

Conclusion Beyond geopolitics, the ultimate dilemma of debt relief for Africa is a larger political one. Debt is but one part of a much larger development context, and growth is central to the effort to achieve viable debt sustainability. For their part, the NGOs do not have any viable counterfactual about how total debt write-off and an end to externally imposed structural adjustment might actually bring about the poverty reduction and sustainable development they say they want. They have never been able to square this circle, despite a great deal of fancy rhetoric. For their part, many African governments simply want full debt cancellation, an end to structural adjustment, and the ability to borrow more. On the international side, the key growth issue is trade access to the OECD countries. The NGOs have now clearly realized the importance of this issue and have begun to work on it. They succeeded with debt by bringing it into the domestic political arenas of the OECD, a process quite different from the one that led to the failure of the NIEO endeavor. The absence of more progress on debt and trade raises the concerns of those who worry about the political underpinnings of globalization: Will the major industrial democracies be able to adjust their own domestic politics so that the larger and very important changes in the debt and trade regimes can be made? Given past track records and current events, serious doubt exists. If debt relief is to mean anything, the issues of growth and trade must be tackled. Necessities, however, do not often become realities. Getting HIPC was hard enough, and it was a very political process; getting additional substantial multilateral debt relief will be as well. Yet the politics of trade will be much more difficult. The globalization worriers have a right to be concerned—the political underpinnings of international economic governance are central to Africa’s future, and they may well not be up to that task.

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

214

Page 214

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

Will the institutions of international economic governance, such as those on sovereign debt, hold up under these challenges? The jury is still out, but it is certain that major battles will be fought, and tension will cross from one policy sector to another. Irritation will rise as creditor countries and institutions struggle over who will pay the cost, especially as the magic of the markets is not going to solve any new crisis by itself, just as it has not solved any previous crises. Cooperation between major powers to avoid beggar-thy-neighbor policies may be in short supply. The United States has a central role to play, but its impact comes not just from its government, but also from its internationally networked NGOs and epistemic communities central to the triple helix for debt and other issues of crucial importance to the future of Africa.

Notes 1. In addition to collected source material, this chapter is based heavily on confidential interviews with officials from the IMF, the World Bank, the US, British, French, and several African governments, and representatives of NGOs working on debt, conducted in Washington, New York, London, Dublin, Paris, Berkeley, and Brussels between September 1997 and November 2004. It draws in part on Thomas M. Callaghy, “Networks and Governance in Africa: Innovation in the Debt Regime,” in T. Callaghy, R. Kassimir, and R. Latham, eds., Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 115–148; and Callaghy, “Innovation in the Sovereign Debt Regime: From the Paris Club to Enhanced HIPC and Beyond,” Operations Evaluation Department Working Paper, World Bank, Washington, DC, 2004. 2. A group of the major industrial democracies (France, the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan, Italy, and Canada) meet annually to deal with the major economic and political issues facing their domestic societies and the international community as a whole. Particular attention has focused on the debt crisis in the developing world. Recently, representatives from Russia and the European Union have joined these meetings. 3. The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors whose role is to find coordinated and sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties experienced by debtor countries. It is particularly concerned with methodological issues regarding the debt of developing countries. Paris Club creditors agree to the rescheduling of debts due to them. The group has been meeting ten or eleven times a year in Paris since 1956. Nineteen permanent members include the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Russia, and Japan. Other creditors are invited on a case-by-case basis. 4. The Bretton Woods system is commonly understood to refer to the international monetary regime that prevailed from the end of World War II until the early 1970s. Taking its name from the site of the 1944 conference that created the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, the Bretton Woods system was history’s first example of a fully negotiated monetary order intended to govern currency relations among sovereign states. In principle, the regime was designed to combine binding legal obligations with multilateral decisionmaking conducted through an

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

Page 215

DEBT AND DEBT RELIEF

215

international organization, the IMF, endowed with limited supranational authority. In practice the initial scheme, as well as its subsequent development and ultimate demise, were directly dependent on the preferences and policies of its most powerful member, the United States. See www.polsci.ucsb.edu/faculty/cohen/recent/bretton. html. 5. “A Debt Reduction Fund for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries,” Staff Working Paper, September 16, 1995, marked “Confidential Draft.” 6. Ibid., 2. 7. Ibid., 9. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid., 13. 10. Quoted in Tony Walker, “World Bank Sees Debt Write-off Snag,” Financial Times, September 16, 1995, 3. 11. Quoted in Michael Holman, “IMF Cool to World Bank Debt Plan,” Financial Times, September 15, 1995, 6. 12. It must be remembered that since the 1950s, the French had fought tenaciously against any major role in debt relief by the IMF and the World Bank at the expense of “their” Paris Club. 13. Quoted in George Graham, “World Bank’s Debt Relief Idea Under Fire,” Financial Times, September 28, 1995, 4. 14. Both statements quoted in George Graham and Stephanie Flanders, “Enthusiasm Cools for Debt Relief Proposal,” Financial Times, October 4, 1995, 4. 15. Quoted in George Graham, “World Bank’s Debt Relief Idea Under Fire,” Financial Times, October 10, 1995, 5. 16. Quoted in Michael Holman, “IMF Cool,” 6. Oxfam issued a report in support of the proposal at the time of the annual meetings in early October: “Multilateral Debt: An End to the Crisis.” 17. Quoted in Andrew Bauck, “Oxfam and Debt Relief Advocacy,” Cascade Center for Public Service, Public Service Curriculum Exchange, 2001, 10. 18. The seven were Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guyana, Mali, Mozambique, and Uganda; packages for Ethiopia and Guinea-Bissau were discussed but put on hold due to armed conflict (a criterion never applied to Uganda, however). Benin and Senegal were evaluated and declared to have sustainable debt. 19. “Financing for Development: Current Trends and Issue for the Future,” paper for UNCTAD X, Bangkok, February 12, 2000, 12. 20. “US Debt Reduction Activities, FY 1990 Through FY 1999,” Public Report to Congress, February 2000, 9. 21. See Elizabeth Donnelly, “Proclaiming Jubilee: The Debt and Structural Adjustment Network,” in K. Sikkink, ed., Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 155–180, esp. 166–167. 22. IMF and IDA staff, “Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers—Status and Next Steps,” November 19, 1999, www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/prsp/status.htm. 23. Lawrence H. Summers, “Conference on Debt Relief and Poverty Reduction,” Washington, DC, Treasury News press release, July 26, 1999, www.ustreas.gov. 24. See John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982). The Paris Club countries have never applied embedded liberalism—what they practice, not what they preach—to the debtors. 25. See the report by the new Center for Global Development and the Institute

R-9

3/17/06

11:33 AM

216

Page 216

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

for International Economics that calls for the use of IMF gold to fully fund EHIPC as a first step to reinventing the “international aid architecture”; it is written by two leading “insider/outsider” economists. See Nancy Birsdall and John Williamson, Delivering on Debt Relief: From IMF Gold to a New Aid Architecture (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development and the Institute for International Economics, April 2002). 26. Quoted in Alan Beattie, “Debt Relief for Poor Countries Held Up by Rich World Discord,” Financial Times, February 14, 2004. 27. Jubilee Research Briefing Paper, “Doing Nothing for Ethiopia: A Briefing on Ethiopia’s Debt,” February 2004. 28. Jubilee Research Press Release, “US Brokers Debt Relief for Iraq—but Blocks Relief for Poorest Country in the World,” April 2, 2004. The emphasis indicates a key aspect of HIPC: the shift to rule-based decisionmaking rather than the more ad hoc procedures developed by the Paris Club. 29. Oxfam, “Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalization, and the Fight Against Poverty” (London: Oxfam, 2002), 1–17. 30. Christopher Swann and Ed Crooks, “World Bank: Low Levels of Aid for Poor ‘Unacceptable,’” Financial Times, April 26, 2004; also see Larry Elliott, “US Softens Line on Debt Relief,” Guardian, April 26, 2004. 31. Given these same geopolitical conditions, the United States is likely to support a Paris Club deal for Nigeria, one it does not deserve, despite all its posturing. 32. John Taylor, Speech at the Senate, “Poverty and Debt Relief Photo Exhibit,” October 14, 2005. 33. Speech to the Bretton Woods Committee Twentieth Anniversary Meeting, Washington, DC, September 30, 2004. 34. Quoted in Elizabeth Becker, “Guess Who’s Invited to Dinner,” New York Times, September 23, 2004. 35. Marie Clark, Jubilee USA Network Statement, September 30, 2004, www.jubileeusa.org/jubilee.cgi?path=/press_room&page=release093004.html. 36. Interfax New Agency, Moscow, December 8, 2004. 37. Quoted in Andrew Balls, “Foreign Aid Threatened by Anti-terrorism, Says Oxfam,” Financial Times, December 6, 2004.

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

Page 217

10 Aid and Trade Policies: Shifting the Debate FANTU CHERU

F

or many decades, Africa has occupied only a marginal place on the US scale of priorities, regardless of which political party holds the seat of power in Washington, DC. Witness the lack of official visits to African countries by top US government leaders and the low allocations of development assistance to African countries. Such indicators provide clues as to where US national interests lie. During the Cold War, strategic and security concerns clearly outweighed other concerns such as poverty reduction, and much of US assistance was focused on a handful of African countries considered strategically important. These countries were often governed by authoritarian figures who consistently ignored the plight of ordinary people in their countries. The end of the Cold War engendered much optimism that the United States would use the peace dividend to tackle poverty and deprivation in several African countries. Indeed, the Clinton administration’s hearty proAfrican rhetoric quickly reinforced such optimism, but the words were limited in scope and substance. Bilateral assistance during the Clinton administration started out fairly strong but faded considerably during the middle of the first term.1 US indifference to African affairs was also demonstrated by the failure of the Clinton administration to prevent the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. This indifference was in stark contrast to the decision of the same administration to intervene in the Balkans in the face of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s ineptitude. In the aftermath of the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC, the United States has expanded its security agenda to global proportions. Even as the global war on terror has substantially raised Africa’s strategic importance, the US desire to reduce its dependence on Middle Eastern oil has also put the spotlight on oil-producing African countries such as Nigeria, Gabon, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea, as evidenced 217

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

218

Page 218

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

by Vice President Dick Cheney’s energy policy, announced in May 2001.2 At the moment, sub-Saharan Africa supplies almost one-fifth of US oil imports; that amount is expected to increase to 25 percent by 2015. The new US “security” agenda has some important implications for African countries. Specifically, the overriding US preoccupation with security creates anxiety that US-Africa relations might relapse to a Cold War kind of foreign policy in which national security criteria are used to determine US trade and aid policies toward Africa. Moreover, many observers express concern that Africa’s march toward democracy might come to a grinding halt as countries deemed strategically important escape greater scrutiny from Washington about their human rights records.

US Foreign Policy Toward Africa US foreign policy in Africa consists of agreements with key anchor states in each subregion in areas of economic engagement and military assistance. The Bush administration’s foreign policy toward Africa has three main approaches. First, there is the strategic approach, which encapsulates working with key anchor states (South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Senegal) and regional and subregional organizations (the African Union, Southern African Development Community, Economic Community of West African States, Intergovernmental Authority on Development) as primary means to address transnational threats.3 A second approach involves clear policy priorities, which include combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic, advancing political and economic freedom, and promoting peace and regional stability. The promotion of good governance, economic reform, and health and education constitute the third approach. Since September 11, 2001, however, US-Africa military cooperation in the global war against terror has assumed considerable importance. The administration aims to eradicate vectors of war, disease, and poverty that threaten not only a core value of the United States—human dignity—but also a strategic priority of the administration, that of combating global terror.4 The fundamental challenge for the United States, however, is how to reconcile Africa’s needs for development and poverty reduction with the administration’s interest in securing an oil supply from Africa and preventing the spread of terrorist groups who might pose a grave danger to US security and its interests in the continent. Doing so will require a difficult balancing act. The measure of US commitment to build a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with Africa must be judged by the administration’s actions on four key issues of importance to Africa: (1) access to the US market for African products and increased US investment in the region; (2)

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

Page 219

AID AND TRADE POLICIES

219

US leadership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) trade negotiations and a successful conclusion of the Doha development round; (3) increased US development assistance, with special focus on the HIV/AIDS pandemic; and (4) full cancellation of Africa’s outstanding debt. In the remainder of this chapter, these critical issues are assessed.

US-Africa Trade and Investment Relations The United States is sub-Saharan Africa’s largest single-country export market, accounting for 20 percent of the region’s total exports in 2002. Hence, opening the US market to goods from Africa is a highly cost-effective way to spur economic growth in the continent and reduce poverty. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which was signed into law on May 18, 2000, is the centerpiece of US foreign policy in Africa. Its main objective is to promote trade and investment opportunities between Africa and the United States; to support African countries undertaking economic reforms; and to spur economic growth, create jobs, and reduce poverty. Thirty-seven of the forty-eight sub-Saharan African countries are now eligible for AGOA. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) is providing technical assistance through a number of programs, most notably the presidential Trade for African Development and Enterprise (TRADE) initiative, to implement AGOA.5 In fiscal year 2003, $133 million was devoted to trade-capacity-building activities in sub-Saharan Africa, up 26 percent from fiscal year 2002.6 The annual AGOA Forum provides an opportunity for high-level US consultations with officials from AGOA-eligible countries and helps to promote a tripartite alliance among US and African businesses, civil society organizations, and governments that is essential for realizing the full potential of US-Africa trade and economic relationships.

Eligibility Criteria AGOA requires the president to determine annually whether sub-Saharan African countries are or remain eligible for benefits based on their progress in meeting criteria set out in the act. These criteria include the following: • • • • • •

establishment of a market-based economy the rule of law elimination of barriers to US trade and investment implementation of economic policies to reduce poverty protection of internationally recognized worker rights establishment of a system to combat corruption

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

Page 220

220

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

In addition, countries cannot engage in violations of internationally recognized human rights or support acts of international terrorism or acts that undermine US national security.7 For example, following the last eligibility review in December 2003, and based on the recommendations of the US trade representative, Angola was designated as a new AGOA beneficiary, but the Central African Republic and Eritrea were removed from the list of eligible countries for failing to meet the eligibility criteria (see Tables 10.1 and 10.2).8

Table 10.1

AGOA-Eligible Countries, May 2004

Angola Benina Botswanaa Cameroona Cape Verdea Chad Congo-Brazzaville Côte d’Ivoirea Democratic Republic of Congo Djibouti Ethiopiaa Gabon Gambia Ghanaa Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenyaa Lesothoa Madagascara

Malawia Malia Mauritania Mauritiusa Mozambiquea Namibiaa Nigera Nigeria Rwandaa São Tomé and Principe Senegala Seychelles Sierra Leonea South Africaa Swazilanda Tanzaniaa Ugandaa Zambiaa

Source: Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2004 Comprehensive Report on AGOA, May 2004. Note: a. Qualified for textile and apparel benefits.

Table 10.2

US exports US imports

US Trade with Sub-Saharan Africa (US$ millions) 2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

5,933.9 23,487.5

6,941.8 21,286.8

6,026.1 17,891.4

6,870.9 25,633.3

8,565.7 35,874.9

Source: US Department of Commerce, Foreign Trade Division, US Trade with SubSaharan Africa, April 2004.

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

Page 221

AID AND TRADE POLICIES

221

Key Provisions of AGOA Although the United States has been granting preferential market access for qualified African countries since 1976 within the framework of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), all imports from sub-Saharan Africa are eligible under the AGOA initiative to enter the US market dutyfree. AGOA has added 1,800 tariff line items to the 4,600 more generally eligible for duty-free treatment under the US GSP. The AGOA regime of market access also exempts qualifying African countries from the competitive need limitations of the GSP, which phase out preferential entry after certain import thresholds are met. In 2003, over 95 percent of US imports from AGOA-eligible countries entered duty-free. In fact, under the AGOA Acceleration Act (AGOA III) signed by President George W. Bush on July 13, 2004, AGOA beneficiary countries will have their nonreciprocal access to the US market extended until 2015.9 The apparel provision of AGOA, which removed all existing quotas on textiles and apparel from sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), is probably one of the most significant aspects of the legislation. The apparel provisions grant unlimited duty-free access and quota-free access to SSA apparel made from US fabric, yarn, and thread. Apparel made with SSA fabric is also granted free access up to a cap set at 3 percent of overall US apparel imports, rising to 7 percent by 2008.10 Further, countries with a per capita gross national product (GNP) below $1,500 in 1998 have duty-free access for apparel made from fabric of non-US origin until September 30, 2007. Special exemptions were extended to South Africa, Gabon, Mauritius, Seychelles, Botswana, and Namibia. The fabric benefit essentially eliminates tariffs between the participating countries and allows companies such as the Gap the ability to import duty-free. Key clothing companies, such as the Gap, lobbied strongly for an extension of the fabric benefit, and President Bush granted this extension during the signing of AGOA III in July 2004. Use of the apparel provisions, however, is contingent on establishing effective visa systems to monitor trans-shipment and counterfeiting.

AGOA’s Impact on US-Africa Trade AGOA continues to bolster trade and investment relations between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa. Total trade between the United States and Africa was just under $44 billion in 2004, with US exports of almost $9 billion and US imports of $35.8 billion. US imports under AGOA were valued at just over $14 billion in 2003, a 55 percent increase from 2002. In 2003, the US direct investment position in sub-Saharan Africa was $10.6 billion, a 20 percent increase from $8.9 billion in 2002. A closer inspection of US export/import trade with Africa shows that

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

222

Page 222

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

most of the benefits of AGOA have gone to half a dozen countries. Four countries—Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, and Gabon—accounted for 81.4 percent of US imports in 2004. Three were major crude oil suppliers, while South Africa supplied platinum, diamonds, ferro alloys, and motor vehicles.11 Petroleum products accounted for 87 percent of AGOA imports, amounting to $27.9 billion for 2004. When fuel products are excluded, AGOA imports were slightly less than $3.5 billion. AGOA textile and apparel imports increased by 35 percent, to $1.6 billion (see Table 10.3). US exports to sub-Saharan Africa also remained highly concentrated among a small number of countries. The top three markets—South Africa, Nigeria, and Angola—accounted for a substantial percentage of US exports in 2004, with South Africa claiming 16.6 percent, Nigeria 45.3 percent, and Angola 12.6 percent. The top three US exports in 2004 were aircraft and parts, accounting for 12.2 percent of exports; oil and gas field machinery and equipment, 11.2 percent; and oil seeds and grains, 9.3 percent. The remainder of US goods exported to Africa comprised general machinery and computer and communications equipment.12 It is clear from these tables that market access to African agricultural exports has remained relatively unaffected since many such products are already covered under the existing GSP privileges. 13 Moreover, the European Union (EU), through its “everything but arms” initiative, already grants similar duty-free access to African products to the European market. The issue is no longer improving market access but stabilizing commodity prices, as well as removing the harmful US and European agricultural subsidies that put African countries in a disadvantageous position.

Table 10.3 Import

Leading US Imports from and Exports to Sub-Saharan Africa in 2004 (US$ millions) US$ Millions

Oil (crude/noncrude) 26,124.9 Woven or knit apparel 1,756.9 Platinum 1,746.8 Diamonds 934.6 Ferro alloys 536.5 Cocoa 491.5 Motor vehicles 423.5

Export

US$ Millions

Aircraft parts 1,040.8 Oil machinery/equipment 963.1 Oilseeds 799.4 Motor vehicles 489.2 Construction machinery 293.6 Milling products 287.4 Industrial chemicals 275.7 Communications equipment 243.6 Machinery, general 240.3 Electromedical instruments, etc. 208.0 Computer equipment, etc. 198.0

Sources: US Department of Commerce, US-African Trade Profile (Washington, DC: US International Trade Commission, 2005); and compiled from Census Bureau data.

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

Page 223

AID AND TRADE POLICIES

223

Reforming the Multilateral Trade System: The US Position In addition to redefining its bilateral trade relations with Africa, the United States can make an immense contribution to Africa’s development by playing a constructive role in the multilateral trade negotiations of the WTO. With a level playing field, trade can be a much greater force to reduce poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. But US leadership in the field of trade appears to be contradictory. The continued conflict between the United States and the European Union over agricultural export subsidies has profoundly affected developing countries and stalled any progress on the Doha development round. The December 2005 Hong Kong Sixth Ministerial Conference of the WTO failed to find a lasting solution on the problem of agricultural subsidies. Agricultural subsidies in high-income countries total more than $300 billion annually, or roughly six times the total amount of aid to developing countries.14 First of all, these subsidies distort agricultural trade by artificially lowering world prices for agricultural commodities to the extent that they depress incentives for production, particularly in developing countries. For example, between 1999 and 2001, African cotton exporters lost approximately $334 million in export revenue because of the decline in world cotton prices arising from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) export subsidies on the product.15 Second, tariff escalations continue to deprive African countries of access to export markets in which they would otherwise thrive. As long as African countries export unprocessed materials, the tariff remains low. But for every step in the processing chain that adds value, the duties rise sharply. These tariff escalations undermine manufacturing and employment in industries where African countries need to be competitive.16 For example, because of escalating tariffs, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana have no choice but to continue exporting unprocessed cocoa beans. The same is true for coffee-exporting countries such as Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia.17 Notwithstanding the US rhetorical or philosophical commitment to free trade, US agricultural subsidies and trade barriers present enormous obstacles to the future development of much of Africa, where about two-thirds of the population are employed in agriculture.18 The United States moves agricultural export subsidies through specific channels on their way to recipient countries. The 2002 US Farm Bill, for example, provided authorization for up to $5.5 billion annually for agricultural export credits through the end of 2007. It also included $1 billion in credits to countries likely to become new markets for US commercial agriculture and another $1 billion for the credit guarantee programs.19 During the start of the Doha development round of the WTO in 2001, developed countries agreed to a revision of the 1994 Agreement on

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

224

Page 224

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

Agriculture, which called for reduction in agricultural subsidies by the industrialized countries, including domestic and export subsidies. A decade later, little progress has been made to remove agricultural subsidies by the developed countries.20 This lack of progress was the main reason for the collapse of the WTO talks in Cancun in 2003. The United States has been pursuing two contradictory policies vigorously since the collapse of the Cancun WTO ministerial meeting. While affirming its commitment to resuming multilateral trade talks, the Bush administration and its point man on trade, former US trade representative Robert Zoellick, have spent considerable energy to conclude several deals with a large number of countries, including those in the Southern Africa Customs Union, Morocco, and possibly Senegal, in an attempt to wean them away from the Group of 20 (G-20), a coalition of developing countries that played a significant role in derailing the Cancun meeting.21 Such an approach can only weaken the multilateral trading system. In early 2004, however, the United States and the EU resumed talks on the elimination of all forms of export subsidies, as well as the subsidy element of export credits and food aid. This time, the United States pursued a strategy of divide and conquer by accommodating the demands of the key actors in the G-20, Brazil and India in particular. A framework document for relaunching the Doha round was finally agreed to in Geneva on July 31, 2004. Although initial reports heralded this framework as a victory for both rich and poor countries, the agreement by rich countries to reduce agricultural subsidies by 20 percent turned out to refer to the reduction of theoretical ceilings rather than of present subsidies.22 The United States managed to secure a “blue box” in which to cloak a considerable portion of the subsidies given to farmers under the US Farm Bill of 2002.23 Subsidies under the blue box do not have to be reduced, unlike those in the amber and green boxes—WTO jargon to categorize products that receive different levels of time-bound exemptions.24 The developing countries were generally against the expansion of the blue box, which they believed would be a loophole allowing subsidies to shift from box to box, thus enabling the developed countries to maintain their high domestic subsidies or even increase their overall level, thereby making a mockery of the oft-stated WTO aim of reducing domestic subsidies. African demands to put cotton on a separate fast-track negotiation were also set aside, despite a WTO ruling that stipulates that the United States must cut its illegal cotton subsidies.255

Current US Aid Initiatives to Africa (Development Assistance) Although access to the US market is more beneficial to Africa than increased levels of aid, the continent will require predictable flows of devel-

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

Page 225

AID AND TRADE POLICIES

225

opment assistance for the foreseeable future. The United States has traditionally been one of the countries of the Group of 8 (G8) with the lowest amount of development aid as a fraction of its economy. The Bush administration—more than any administration in recent history—has substantially raised the aid budget. The $15 billion AIDS initiative and the $5 billion Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which targeted aid to low-income countries, could substantially boost US assistance to Africa. Both initiatives have been met with deep skepticism, even from long-time aid proponents. While the Bush administration deserves credit for significantly increasing the budgets for global poverty and HIV/AIDS, the budget proposals for these initiatives nonetheless fell short of the administration’s promises. Year after year, Congress has failed to approve the full budget request coming from the administration for both initiatives.26 Moreover, the Bush aid budget—though dramatically higher in historical terms—is far below what other aid donors are giving. Using three different sets of criteria—aid in real dollars, aid as a share of the economy, and aid as a share of the budget—a recent report points out how marginal US assistance is relative to that of other OECD countries. Regarding aid in real dollars, for fiscal year 2004, US aid spending will be $14 billion, or 4 percent lower than development aid spending in the 1980s. When considering aid as a share of the economy, the United States devoted 0.12 percent of its resources to development aid in 2004. Development aid based on federal spending was a low priority, at a meager 0.57 percent of all federal expenditures in 2004. The supplemental aid (that is, MCA and the AIDS initiative) implies an increase to 0.62 percent in 2004, which marks the highest level of foreign aid since 1996, but it is still well below the historical average. This amount of foreign aid is also lower than that budgeted in the five-decade period from 1946 to 1996.27

Bush’s HIV/AIDS Initiative In his first State of the Union address, President Bush committed $15 billion over five years to fight the HIV/AIDS pandemic worldwide. Of this amount, $5 billion was intended to provide continuing support in the approximately 100 countries where the US government has bilateral, regional, and volunteer HIV/AIDS programs. Another $9 billion of the HIV/AIDS funding was intended for new or expanded programs to address HIV/AIDS in fourteen of those countries, which are among the world’s most devastated. 28 The African countries targeted by this funding are Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia; the non-African countries are Guyana and Haiti. The funds are intended to improve programs that provide antiretroviral treatment; teach prevention, including among youth; encourage safe medical practices; and provide care to orphans and vulnerable children. These fourteen countries account for

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

226

Page 226

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

approximately 50 percent of global HIV/AIDS infections. The last $1 billion is intended to support the principal multilateral US partner, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.29 Soon after the announcement of the president’s AIDS initiatives, two major policy shifts appeared on the horizon. First, instead of the $15 billion being directed to Africa and the Caribbean as originally intended, the initiative was transformed into a global program covering all regions of the world. Second, instead of channeling the $15 billion through the Global Fund to Fights AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, the Bush administration launched its own US Global AIDS Initiative in 2004. Consistent with the president’s religious right constituency, the initiative favors prevention through abstinence over treatment. Until recently, the administration was opposed to the use of US funds to purchase cheaper, generic versions of essential HIV/AIDS medications. Instead, it approved only the use of expensive brand names that generally cost three times as much as the generic version, thereby reaching only one-third of potential beneficiaries. It was only in January 2005, right after the president’s second inaugural ceremony, that the US Food and Drug Administration approved a set of generic antiretroviral drugs produced by the South African drug manufacturer Aspen, making it possible for countries to purchase these drugs using funds from the US bilateral AIDS program.30 Although that decision was a move in the right direction, the administration must demonstrate its commitment to fight HIV/AIDS in Africa by expanding access to essential antiretroviral drugs and supporting prevention programs instead of preaching abstinence.

The Millennium Challenge Account In March 2002, President Bush announced his intent to establish a special development assistance program, the Millennium Challenge Account, designed to help spur economic growth in developing countries taking steps to root out corruption, respect human rights, and adhere to the rule of law. In addition, qualifying countries must have open markets and sustainable budget policies, demonstrate a clear commitment to invest resources in better health care and better schools, and take initiatives to decrease the level of bureaucracy and bribery.31 The MCA promised a new approach to development assistance. First, it rewards pro-growth development policies by assisting those countries that have demonstrated a commitment to ruling justly, investing in their people, and promoting economic freedom. Second, the MCA establishes a partnership in which the developing country, with the participation of its citizens, proposes its own priorities and plans for MCA funding, much in the same way as the World Bank manages the poverty reduction strategy papers process. Finally, the MCA places a strong focus on results and

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

Page 227

227

AID AND TRADE POLICIES

transparency.32 Funds will go only to those countries with well-implemented programs that have clear objectives and measurable benchmarks. Once determined to be eligible, a country is invited to submit a proposal for assistance, which the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) will evaluate based on its potential to improve economic growth and reduce poverty, the quality of the consultation process that guided the development of the proposal, and the country’s commitment to continuing policy improvement. The candidates for 2004 included sixty-eight countries, each with a per capita income of $1,465 or less. Of these, sixteen countries became eligible: eight from Africa, two from Europe, three from Latin America, and three from Asia (see Table 10.4). The significance of the initiative lies partly in its scale. The administration promised to donate billions of dollars in incremental stages until the program got to a high of $5 billion a year, starting in 2006. That amount is just 0.04 percent of US gross domestic product. Although President Bush touted the program as proof that he cares about alleviating poverty in Africa, for the third straight year he has committed much less than he promised: the 2006 White House budget requests only $3 billion. Given past trends, Congress is likely to approve half that amount, which follows a sad pattern. The president asked Congress for $1.3 billion in FY 2004, and he Table 10.4

Millennium Challenge Account FY 2005, Eligible Countries

Country Armenia Benin Bolivia Cape Verde Georgia Ghana Honduras Lesotho Madagascar Mali Mongolia Mozambique Nicaragua Senegal Sri Lanka Vanuatu Median country

Per Capita Income (US$)

Population (millions)

790 380 900 1,250 650 270 930 550 230 240 430 200 710 470 850 1,070

3.1 6.6 8.8 0.5 5.2 20.3 6.8 1.8 16.4 11.4 2.4 18.4 5.3 10.0 19.0 0.2

600

Source: Millennium Challenge Corporation, FY 2005 Budget Justification, www.mca.gov.

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

228

Page 228

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

got only $1 billion. He asked for $2.5 billion in 2005, and Congress approved only $1.5 billion.33 Furthermore, in March 2005, three years after its inception, the MCC board has approved a $110 million funding package for Madagascar.34 Skeptics point out that, with the ever-increasing cost of the Iraqi reconstruction, funding for both the MCA and AIDS initiatives will likely fall far below what the administration has promised. In addition, does the planned $5 billion budget ceiling for MCA constitute an addition to current aid levels? Or does MCA take away resources from the regular US aid budget? Even if President Bush manages to get the full $5 billion funded, that amount is still a drop in the bucket for a continent where 300 million people lack safe drinking water, 3,000 children under the age of five die every day from malaria, and one in sixteen women die in pregnancy or childbirth.

The US Position on Debt Cancellation According to a recently released United Nations report, sub-Saharan Africa is the only region that will not meet Millennium Development Goals by 2015.35 At the center of Africa’s economic decline lies a crisis of almost unprecedented proportion: the huge debt owed by African countries to Western bilateral and multilateral creditors. At the end of 2002, African countries owed a total of $292.5 billion to creditor countries and institutions, of which $208.3 billion was owed by the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, and the balance of $84.2 billion by the countries of North Africa.36 The debt grew from $120 billion in 1980 to $340 billion in 1995, the socalled structural adjustment decades, when countries in crisis began to take more loans as part of the structural adjustment programs mandated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Almost 80 percent of Africa’s debt is owed to official institutions, and about one-third of it is multilateral debt.37 At the same time, total debt service paid by the continent increased from $3.5 billion in the 1970s to a peak of $26 billion in 1999. Of this, sub-Saharan Africa’s share was $14.6 billion in 1999.38 A substantial part of these debts are uncollectible because those countries are effectively bankrupt (see Table 10.5). Although measurable in dollar terms, the debt burden takes its toll on human beings with a brutality difficult to capture in words. African countries are required to spend some $15 billion in debt service payments, thus crowding out critical public investment in human development. Increasing malnutrition, falling school enrollments, and rising unemployment threaten the social fabric of African countries. As living standards erode, social unrest increases. Regrettably, the human cost of Africa’s debt burden has not yet galvanized the political will required by its creditors to undertake

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

Page 229

229

AID AND TRADE POLICIES Table 10.5

Africa’s External Debt Ratios, 1970–2002 (US$ millions and percentages) 1970– 1979

1980– 1989

1990– 1996

1997– 1999

2000– 2002

Africa Total debt stocks ($) 39,270 180,456 297,191 317,326 292,561 Principal arrears ($) 648 9,103 31,621 40,496 26,259 Total debt service paid ($) 3,347 18,591 25,683 26,075 23,706 Total debt stocks/XGS (%) 91.0 195.2 242.8 217.6 168.6 Total debt service paid/XGS (%) 7.8 20.1 21.0 17.9 13.7 Total debt stocks/GDP (%) 24.2 51.7 67.0 61.8 54.6 North Africa Total debt stocks ($) 17,411 Principal arrears ($) 46 Total debt service paid ($) 1,680 Total debt stocks/XGS (%) 173.9 Total debt service paid/XGS (%) 16.8 Total debt stocks/GDP (%) 44.3

75,780 3115 9,768 284.5 36.7 68.1

94,370 878 14,220 242.0 36.5 65.8

95,787 432 11,437 199.9 23.9 51.8

84,227 660 10,834 189.4 17.9 40.8

Sub-Saharan Africa Total debt stocks ($) 21,859 104,676 202,821 221,539 208,334 Principal arrears ($) 602 5,988 30,743 40,064 25,600 Total debt service paid ($) 1,667 8,823 11,463 14,637 12,872 Total debt stocks/XGS (%) 66.0 159.0 243.2 226.3 184.2 Total debt service paid/XGS (%) 5.0 13.4 13.7 15.0 11.4 Total debt stocks/GDP (%) 17.7 44.0 67.6 67.4 63.7 Source: UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa: Debt Sustainability: Oasis or Mirage? (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2004), p. 6, note 38, table 1. Note: XGS = exports of goods and services.

radical steps, as they recently did with the outstanding debt of post-Saddam Iraq (see Chapter 9 in this book). The current creditor-dominated debt relief framework—the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative—has failed to resolve this crisis. In a surprisingly candid admission, both the IMF and the World Bank concluded that as many as half of the countries receiving debt relief will find themselves in worse condition after the completion point than when they first entered the HIPC process.39 In several cases, exogenous shocks— extreme weather such as drought or unexpected declines in commodity prices—reduced export income or led to unexpected borrowing, thus lowering a country’s likelihood of achieving debt sustainability. For those African

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

230

Page 230

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

countries that had worsened net present value (NPV) of debt-to-export ratios, lower exports accounted for about 56 percent of the deterioration in the NPV of debt-to-export ratios.40 Based on the huge financing Africa needs to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015, debt relief under the Enhanced HIPC initiative has been neither sufficiently deep nor sufficiently broad to reduce debt to the levels described by the World Bank as “sustainable.” Some countries are not only spending more on debt servicing after they receive debt relief, but they are also overshooting the World Bank/IMF’s own definitions of debt sustainability. This situation limits the potential benefits of debt relief in that deserving countries are denied debt relief because of inappropriate indicators of debt sustainability. A 2003 World Bank report recommended more realistic economic forecasts when assessing debt sustainability, and the Bank has since been engaged in developing a new debt sustainability framework, but it has yet to be approved and put to the test.41 There is a growing consensus in the international community that significant debt reduction is needed for the recovery and resumption of growth in the poorest countries so that they can achieve the Millennium Development Goals. The UK, under the leadership of Prime Minister Tony Blair, has proposed a 100 percent debt cancellation for the poorest countries as a way out of this conundrum. His proposal has received widespread support by other governments and was considered seriously at the last G8 summit in the United States in July 2004 and at the IMF–World Bank Ministerial Level Development Committee meeting in fall 2004. UK finance minister Gordon Brown reiterated his government’s call for a 100 percent debt cancellation at the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 28, 2005, and former German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and French president Jacques Chirac threw their support behind the British proposal. Despite these positive developments, however, disagreement between the United States and the UK over the terms and conditions of debt relief threatened to undermine the growing momentum for full debt cancellation. While the United States took the position that the cost of debt cancellation should be borne by the World Bank and the IMF, the UK wanted to cover the cost through the revaluation of IMF gold. The UK proposed that G7 countries take over debt service payments on behalf of eligible countries for an initial ten years, but without canceling their debts.42 To demonstrate its commitment, the UK launched this new plan in January 2005, when Finance Minister Gordon Brown signed a deal with Tanzania to take over 10 percent of the debt payments it owes to the World Bank and the African Development Bank for ten years. A major breakthrough on full debt cancellation came during the July 2005 G8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, when Prime Minister Tony Blair assumed the G8 presidency. The G8 leaders agreed to fully cancel the debt

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

Page 231

AID AND TRADE POLICIES

231

owed to the IMF and the World Bank by eighteen eligible poor countries, fourteen of which were African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia). All eighteen countries were chosen because they have already completed the strict HIPC initiative, which includes the full range of economic conditionality in order to receive debt cancellation. Critics charge that the G8 initiative, which sets an important precedent for 100 percent debt cancellation, falls far short of what is needed. Too few deserving countries were included in this debt arrangement. Only fourteen of the fifty-four African countries are covered; the other forty will continue to owe over $200 billion.43 Considering the scale of the development challenge in Africa, greater effort is necessary to expand debt cancellation to all impoverished countries.

US-Africa Military and Security Cooperation The third pillar of US foreign policy toward Africa involves increased military and security cooperation. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and because of the lessons drawn from the Kenya and Tanzania bombings of 1998, Africa has regained strategic importance vis-à-vis US foreign policy. The scope of US military relations with Africa is broad: an FBI academy in Botswana that addresses antiterrorism issues in its training of regional police officers; a military base in Djibouti with at least 1,800 US troops, from which the US launches antiterrorism missions along the Kenya-Somali boarder; a separate $100 million program to help five East African countries battle terrorism; and a joint nine-country, $125 million military training and Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative in West Africa (involving Niger, Mali, Chad, Mauritania, and Senegal).44 Africa’s strategic importance for the United States in the post-9/11 era was clearly articulated by General James Jones Jr., head of US European Command. In May 2003, he told the Senate Military Construction Appropriations Subcommittee that “Africa is a continent that is going to be of very, very significant interest in the twenty-first century.” He elaborated that the United States will need to “engage more in that theater,” in part because large, ungoverned parts of Africa “could become terrorist breeding grounds.”45 Ironically, the United States does not have a separate regional command for Africa. Most African countries fall under the responsibility of the US European Command, which covers Europe and the former republics of the Soviet Union. This organizational arrangement is a vestige of both the continent’s colonial legacy and the Cold War, during which the concerns of

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

Page 232

232

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

Africa were subordinated to interests in Europe.46 It must be noted, however, that a number of northeastern African countries (Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan) fall under the responsibility of the US Central Command. The US Pacific Command covers the Comoros, Madagascar, and the Indian Ocean. These commands are responsible for conducting active military operations in Africa, distributing humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, evacuating civilians from unstable countries, and performing tasks on an as-needed basis.47 The United States also has a number of programs to support the transfer or purchase of arms by African militaries. The Foreign Military Sales Program (FMSP) facilitates arms sale to foreign governments under the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) provides grants and low-interest loans to foreign governments to finance arms purchases from the United States. In 2003, the total sales to African governments from the three programs amounted to $63 million. For fiscal year 2005, the administration’s request for foreign military financing was about $22 million (see Table 10.6).

Combined Join Task Force–Horn of Africa The major US presence in Africa is the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which oversees counterterrorism operations in the Table 10.6

Foreign Military Financing to Africa, FYs 2004–2006 (US$ thousands)

Botswana Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Ghana Kenya Liberia Nigeria Senegal Uganda Africa border security Military health affairs Total

FY 2004 Actual

FY 2005 Estimated

FY 2006 Requested

500 6,378 n/a 2,480 737 6,635 n/a n/a 737 1,990 n/a 1,490

980 5,990 496 1,984 496 6,944 2,976 496 496 1,984 3,968 1,984

500 4,000 500 2,000 500 7,000 2,000 500 500 n/a 4,000 2,000

20,947

26,288

24,000

Source: US Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, FY 2006, Foreign Military Financing, 203. Note: n/a = not available.

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

Page 233

AID AND TRADE POLICIES

233

volatile Horn of Africa region. It covers the total airspace and land areas of Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Yemen, and Ethiopia and the coastal waters of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Indian Ocean. With its base in Djibouti, the CJTF-HOA falls under the US Central Command but is also part of Operation Enduring Freedom. The main goal of the programs is to deny safe havens, external support, and material assistance for terrorist activity within the Horn of Africa by monitoring suspected activity and performing military exercises with governments in the region.48 Additionally, CJTF-HOA will be prepared to counter the reemergence of transnational terrorism in the region by providing security assistance in support of civilmilitary operations (CMO) and the backing of international organizations working to enhance long-term stability in the region. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), a branch of the Pentagon’s National Defense University, provides training in civil-society relations, national security strategy, and other topical security issues for high-level African military and civilian leaders.

African Contingency Operations Training Assistance A parallel initiative to improve security in Africa is the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA). The Bush administration created this program in the spring of 2002 to take the place of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). ACOTA provides training in peacekeeping operations and regular military tactics to military units from selected countries in Africa. In 2003, for example, ACOTA training was conducted in Ghana, Kenya, Ethiopia, Senegal, and Botswana. Troops from partner countries are currently active in every UN and regionally mandated peace mission in sub-Saharan Africa.49 US commitment to ACRI and (in spring 2002) to ACOTA is seen in the amount of funding provided to each initiative: in fiscal year 2001, ACRI received $15.6 million and another $15 million was requested for ACOTA, its successor, in 2002. In fiscal year 2003, $10 million was requested by the Pentagon to fund the new ACOTA program, but Congress approved only $8 million. 50 For FY 2005, an estimated $14.8 million was funded for ACOTA.

International Military Education and Training Program The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is a key funding component of US security assistance that provides training on a grant basis to military personnel from friendly developing countries. Created in 1976 and funded through the foreign aid appropriations process, IMET is overseen by the State Department and implemented by the Defense

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

234

Page 234

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

Department. The training program includes formal instruction involving over 2,000 courses taught at approximately 150 military schools and installations, on-the-job training, orientation tours for key senior military and civilian officials, and mobile education teams that take the curriculum to the host country.51 In fiscal year 2003, IMET provided training to more than 1,710 African officers at a cost of $10 million.52 The number of personnel predicted to undergo training for FY 2005 and FY 2006 is 1,268 and 1,289, respectively (see Table 10.7).

US Support for African Peacekeeping The United States also provides support to African regional organizations and individual governments to strengthen and expand peacekeeping by Africans themselves. Peacekeeping operation funds are used to help end destructive conflicts in Sudan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia, as well as other Mano River states of Sierra Leone and Guinea. In fiscal year 2004, the estimate for foreign peacekeeping operations was $133.2 million (see Table 10.8).53 In addition, US support continues to be used to sustain or implement important capacity-building efforts in regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States. The AU proves to be the source of much new optimism, as its security presence was substantially enhanced by the two new offices opened in Nairobi and Monrovia following the latest meeting of the Peace and Security Council on April 13, 2004. The two new offices not only will ensure an AU Table 10.7

International Military Education and Training Budget, FYs 2003–2006 (US$ thousands) FY 2003 Actual

FY 2004 Actual

FY 2005 Estimated

FY 2006 Requested

Botswana Ethiopia Ghana Kenya Nigeria Senegal South Africa

716 210 522 596 96 1,062 1,258

922 542 921 638 n/a 1,188 n/a

700 600 595 650 800 1,100 50

700 600 575 650 800 1,100 50

Total

9,868

11,173

10,807

11,035

Source: US Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, FY 2005, 181–182. Note: n/a = not available.

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

Page 235

235

AID AND TRADE POLICIES Table 10.8

Africa Peacekeeping Operations, FYs 2004–2006 (US$ thousands)

African regional ACOTA Sudan Sudan supplemental Total

FY 2004 Actual

FY 2005 Estimated

FY 2006 Requested

9,761 15,410 n/a 5,000 30,171

43,912 14,880 74,400a n/a 133,192

41,000 n/a n/a n/a 41,000

Source: US Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, FY 2005, Foreign Military Financing, 210. Notes: a. Figure indicates a one-time appropriation to bolster the African Union’s peacekeeping mission in Sudan. n/a = not available.

presence in terms of security but also will more effectively support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Liberia, which is more often known as the Accra Agreement.54 The AU has recently played a substantial role in the humanitarian cease-fire agreement signed between the government of Sudan, the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement, and the Justice and Equality Movement. Despite these successes, the unfolding humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan threatens to undermine AU efforts. It is clear from the preceding discussion that US military and security cooperation with a select group of African countries is growing in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. However, the Bush administration’s preoccupation with security and the war on terror must be balanced with a clear and consistent strategy to address Africa’s critical needs for economic development. Special attention must be paid to fragile African states with disgruntled and deprived populations that could become breeding grounds for terrorists. In its report, the Commission on Weak States and US National Security recommended that the United States adopt three strategic goals regarding weak states: the promotion of opportunities for broad-based growth and poverty reduction, the support of legitimate and democratic institutions, and the creation of effective US assistance to police and military forces to help governments develop the capacity to secure their territories and protect their populations.55 Whether those goals will be adopted remains to be seen. The eligibility criteria for AGOA and MCA leave little room for the initiatives’ architects to engage weak states constructively and to give the deprived populations an opportunity for upward mobility through economic development.

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

236

Page 236

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

Conclusion The global war on terrorism has increased Africa’s strategic importance, but it would be wrong for the United States to assume that African countries will willingly lend their support to its cause in the absence of a real US commitment to aggressively tackle massive human deprivation in subSaharan Africa. Such an effort would require an increase in development assistance and further opening of US markets to African exports, as well as greater US involvement in ensuring the rapid conclusion of the Doha development round, particularly the need for fast-track removal of agricultural subsidies by the industrialized countries. Among the measures that the United States should undertake are the following: 1. An end to agricultural subsidies. Continuing resistance by the developed countries to removing agricultural subsidies needs to give way. The United States should take a lead role in the WTO negotiations to ensure expanded market access for agricultural goods produced by African countries, as well as the reduction and elimination of export subsidies and other forms of domestic support provided by developed countries to their farmers. Achieving the MDGs in Africa requires, at the very least, the introduction of mechanisms to achieve fair and stable prices for commodities and improving market access for African exports. These needs were recognized by the UN Conference on Financing for Development, in Monterrey, Mexico. There, an unprecedented consensus emerged that fighting world poverty requires the following: (1) the recognition by developing countries that they themselves have the primary responsibility to tackle poverty—and that crucial to this is good governance; and (2) stronger, faster, and more comprehensive support by the international community. Even more important is the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)—an ambitious action program to redevelop the African continent, launched by a new generation of African leaders and embraced by the newly formed African Union. NEPAD’s long-term goal is an end to poverty in Africa, underpinned by peace, democracy, and the rule of law; development of the social and physical infrastructure; and the full participation of African countries in international trade. In addition to rewriting the current trade rules, the United States and its allies must renew their efforts to strengthen the supply capacity in the commodity sector of commodity-dependent African countries—especially in the area of production, marketing, and diversification—to enhance the value added to commodities through processing and manufacturing.56 Of course, that must be complemented by domestic measures to overcome structural impediments to production, such as access to credit and security of tenure. At present, even if market access for these countries is available through

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

Page 237

AID AND TRADE POLICIES

237

AGOA, this “supply constraint” prevents them from being able to take advantage of the access. 2. The establishment of a commodity fund. The decline and volatility of commodity prices represent a critical problem for African countries. The IMF Compensatory Financing Facility, which the IMF board came close to closing down in 2003, has not been used extensively by African countries since it provides nonconcessional financing, making it hard for low-income countries to access it. It is imperative that the United States and other developed countries support the establishment of a commodity fund to help African countries deal with the potential negative consequences of the erosion of benefits received under existing preferential market access arrangements. The commodity fund can be financed through a one-time sale of IMF gold, which one estimate expects to generate up to $5 billion.57 3. The creation of an “international export diversification fund.” In addition to the commodity stabilization fund, the United States should support efforts to establish an international export diversification fund. It would develop strong producer associations with a proper role for the majority of producers, build key infrastructure, and stimulate investment (for example, by providing risk capital or temporary compensation for certain infrastructural weaknesses). 4. Predictable long-term aid. For large numbers of African countries, official development assistance will continue to be a major source of development finance. Despite recent increases, US assistance remains low. The Bush administration should live up to the US commitment of providing at least 0.7 percent of its GNP for development assistance to Africa. 5. An expansion of the 2005 G8 debt cancellation. The debt of African countries has become sufficiently large that most new official aid flows do little more than offset the interest and principal payments on previous debt. In this situation, it is difficult for additional aid to have an economic or social impact, and debt payments by poor African countries crowd out private investment and public expenditures on education and health. While the July 2005 debt deal set an important precedent for 100 percent debt cancellation, the arrangement excludes the majority of African countries that must still continue to service huge amounts of outstanding debts to the IMF, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank. All African countries must receive 100 percent debt cancellation if they are ever to effectively fight HIV/AIDS, educate and feed their populations, and start the long march toward economic recovery. US leadership is critical in this regard. Measures to promote human security and economic development in Africa would be in the interest of both the United States and African countries. The extent to which the Bush administration moves in this direction in a consistent manner remains to be seen. With the ever-growing cost of the

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

238

Page 238

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

Iraqi reconstruction and the ballooning US trade and budget deficits, the Bush administration is unlikely to be able to devote more resources and time to address Africa’s development and security dilemma.

Notes I want to acknowledge the valuable assistance I received from my three graduate research assistants at American University, Mark Nielson, Janita Bhana, and Anna Neboisa. 1. Markus P. Goldstein and Todd J. Moss, “The Surprise Party: An Analysis of U.S. ODA Flows to Africa,” Working Paper No. 30, July 2003. 2. White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” September 17, 2002; Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, National Energy Policy, Chaired by Vice President Dick Cheney (May 2001), chapters 8, 11. 3. US National Security Strategy for Africa, 2004, www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/africa. 4. “Africa Policy,” www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/africa, 2001. 5. US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, AGOA 3: The United States–Africa Partnership Act of 2003, 108th Congress, March 25, 2004. 6. US Trade Representative, 2004 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, the Fourth of Eight Annual Reports, May 2004, 1. 7. Ibid., Annex B: AGOA Eligibility Criteria, 124–126. 8. Ibid., 7. 9. Ibid. 10. Under the limits adopted in the August 2002 revision of the law. The cap had originally been set at 1.5 percent of total US apparel imports, rising to 3.5 percent over eight years. 11. US Trade Representative, 2005 Comprehensive Report on US Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, the Fifth of Eight Annual Reports, Washington, DC, May 2005, 11. 12. US Department of Commerce, US-African Trade Profile, International Trade Administration, Market Access and Compliance/Office of Africa, March 2005, 13, 15. 13. Shahla Shapouri and Michael Trueblood, “The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): Does It Really Present Opportunities?” Economic Research Service, USDA, paper presented at the International Conference on Agricultural Policy Reform and the WTO, Capri, Italy, June 23–26, 2003. 14. Kevin Watkins, “Northern Agricultural Policies and World Poverty: Will the Doha ‘Development Round’ Make a Difference?” London: Oxfam unpublished document, 2003. 15. Blaise Compaore and Amadou Toumani Toure, “Your Farm Subsidies Are Strangling Us,” New York Times, July 11, 2003; UN Economic Commission for Africa, The Doha Round and African Development: Turning Words into Deeds, ECA position paper prepared for the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, Cancun, Mexico, September 10–14, 2003, 5. 16. Martin Khor, “The Commodities Crisis and the Global Trade in

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

Page 239

AID AND TRADE POLICIES

239

Agriculture: Present Problems and Some Proposals,” paper prepared for the Helsinki Process on Globalization and Democracy, 2003, Track 2: Global Economic Agenda. 17. UN Economic Commission for Africa, The Doha Round. 18. John Madley, Hungry for Trade: How the Poor Pay for Free Trade (London: Zed Books, 2000). 19. C. Hanrahan, Agricultural Export and Food Aid Programs, Congressional Research Service Brief for Congress, Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2003, 6. 20. Francis Perkins, “Africa’s Agricultural Trade Reform and Development Options,” Trade Policy Briefing, no. 1 (2003), South African Institute of International Affairs. 21. Paul Blustein, “Lowered Expectations: Zoellick Hoped for Bigger Trade Deals by Now,” Washington Post, April 23, 2004, E10. 22. Martin Khor, “Comments on the WTO’s Geneva ‘July 2004 Package,’” Third World Network Briefing Paper 22 (Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network, August 2004). 23. Ibid., 3–4. 24. In WTO terminology, subsidies in general are identified by “boxes” given the colors of traffic lights: blue (do not have to be reduced), green (permitted), amber (slow down—i.e., be reduced), red (forbidden). 25. Walden Bello and Aileen Kwa, “The G-20 Leaders Succumb to Divideand-Rule Tactics: The Story Behind Washington’s Triumph in Geneva,” Focus on the Global South (Bangkok, August 10, 2004), 5, www.focusweb.org. 26. Lael Brainard, “The Administration’s Budget for Global Poverty and HIV/AIDS: How Do the Numbers Stack Up?” Brookings Institution, February 24, 2003. 27. Nancy Birdsall, Isaac Shapiro, and Brian Deese, How Significant Are the Administration’s Proposed Increases in Foreign Development Aid? (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development/Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, May 20, 2003). 28. US Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, 108th Congress, HIV/AIDS Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Request, May 18, 2004. 29. Testimony of Ambassador Randall L. Tobias, US Global AIDS Coordinator, 108th Congress, US Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, May 18, 2004. 30. “Africa: AIDS Progress Real but Limited,” Africa Focus Bulletin, January 28, 2005. 31. White House, “Millennium Challenge Account: Fact Sheet,” June 3, 2003, www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/19429.htm; also see the speech by President Bush at the Inter-American Development Bank, March 14, 2002; Federal Register 69, no. 168, August 31, 2004, 53090–93. 32. Steve Radelet and Sheila Herrling, “The Millennium Challenge Account: Soft Power or Collateral Damage?” Center for Global Development Brief 2, no. 2 (April 2003). 33. “America’s Promises,” New York Times, January 28, 2005, A18. 34. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2005 Comprehensive Report on US Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, Fifth Report, March 2005, 4. 35. UN Millennium Project, Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

240

Page 240

CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

Achieve the Millennium Development Goals, Report to the UN Secretary-General (the Sachs Report), New York, 2005. 36. UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa: Debt Sustainability: Oasis or Mirage? (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2004), 10. 37. Christina Daseking and Robert Powell, “From Toronto Terms to the HIPC Initiative: A Brief History of Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries,” Working Paper WP/99/142 (Washington, DC: IMF, 1999), 4. 38. UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa, 6, table 1. 39. IMF/World Bank, The Enhanced HIPC Initiative and the Achievement of Long-term External Debt Sustainability (Washington, DC: IMF/World Bank, April 15, 2002. 40. IMF/World Bank, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative: Status of Implementation (Washington, DC: IMF/World Bank, September 21, 2002). 41. World Bank, The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Debt Initiative: An Operation Evaluation Department (OED) Review (Washington, DC: World Bank, February 20, 2003). 42. “The G7, Aid Debt,” Economist, February 12–18, 2005, 71–72; “Repaying Tony Blair,” New York Times, February 13, 2005, 14. This editorial decried US refusal to support a UK proposal to grant 100 percent debt cancellation to the poorest countries. 43. Africa Action, “Debt Is Not Done—The 2005 Debt Deal,” September 21, 2005, http://africaaction.org/campaign_new/page.php? 44. Abraham McLaughlin, “U.S. Engages Africa in Terror Fight,” Christian Science Monitor, September 7, 2004. 45. D. Morris, “Pentagon Weighs Increased Presence in Africa,” www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0503/050603cdam.htm. 46. Jame J. Carafano and Nile Gardiner, “U.S. Military Assistance for Africa: A Better Solution,” Heritage Foundation, Background Paper No. 1697, October 15, 2003. 47. D. Volman, “U.S. Military Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2001–2003,” in Information from the U.S. State Department Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2003 (Washington, DC: African Security Research Project in Washington, DC, 2003). 48. Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa, 2004, www.cjtfhoa.centcom. mil/mission.asp. 49. US Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations FY 2005, 298–299. 50. J. Fisher-Thompson, “Improved Security in Liberia Heralds More Support for Development Funding,” http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2004/Jan/14883460.html; Daniel Volman, “U.S. Military Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Africa Security Research Project, February 2003. 51. Information on IMET is found at www.dsca.osd.mil/home/international_ military_education_training.htm. 52. US Department of State, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington, DC: Department of State, February 2005), 210, www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/2004/. 53. Ibid., 203. 54. African Union, “Peace and Security Council, Fifth Session” (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union, 2004). 55. Commission on Weak States and US National Security, On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2004).

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

Page 241

AID AND TRADE POLICIES

241

56. Martin Khor, “The Commodities Crisis and the Global Trade in Agriculture: Present Problems and Some Proposals.” Paper prepared for the Helsinki Process on Globalization and Democracy, 2004, 12. 57. Nancy Birdsall and Brian Deese, “Beyond HIPC: Secure Sustainable Debt Relief for Poor Countries.” Paper prepared for the Helsinki Process on Globalization and Democracy, 2004.

R-10

3/17/06

11:34 AM

Page 242

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

Page 243

PART 4 Conclusion

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

Page 244

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

Page 245

11 Trends in US-Africa Relations: Implications for the Future DONALD ROTHCHILD

Africa has to bite the bullet, accept hard political choices and restructure. Our partners must adjust in order to encourage foreign private investments in Africa, allow us access to their markets, abolish subsidies and protectionism. In local parlance, “we must make head” with our partners—open their eyes and minds and influence their thinking. . . . Otherwise, we stand the chance of suffering an affliction worse than marginalization—being passed into oblivion. —Olusegun Obasanjo, “Africa’s Rendezvous with History”

Obasanjo’s observation from the early 1990s applies as much today as it did then. 1 Until the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the United States viewed itself as insulated from the crises besetting Africa and the developing world generally. That a highly disciplined rogue organization could penetrate US space and attack symbols of its financial and military power represented a wake-up call that could not be ignored, however. It became clear to many that the fate of the United States was tightly interlinked with that of the developing world, in terms of not only charitable support but also self-interest. In light of this change of perceptions, it seems relevant to raise two questions: First, how is the United States now ranking its African priorities with respect to security, relief, and development assistance; and second, to what extent has the African region increased its share of US aid vis-à-vis other developing regions of the globe? Such findings will give us an insight on the extent to which US strategies have shifted after the traumatic experiences of September 11.

The Two Aid Trajectories President George W. Bush points with pride at certain specific programs that he either created or enlarged upon—the African Growth and 245

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

246

Page 246

CONCLUSION

Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), and the HIV/AIDS initiatives—as indicative of his administration’s compassionate “realist” approach on African issues.2 Recognizing that poverty alone does not transform people into terrorists, Bush went on to observe in his 2002 National Security Strategy paper that when poverty is linked to weak institutions and corruption, it can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels.3 Hence, his administration now must meet the overriding need to take Africa seriously and to foster the conditions that encourage good governance and economic and social development. Accordingly, the Bush administration, building on the earlier AGOA signed by President Bill Clinton in 2000, facilitated the enactment of a new AGOA law that increased the opportunities of thirty-seven African countries that met certain specified conditions to export a list of goods and commodities to the United States tariff- and duty-free. To be sure, African producers did gain some increased access to US consumers for their agricultural and textile exports. For example, the value of African garment exports to the United States increased from some $600 million in 1999 to approximately $1.5 billion in 2003. Also notable was the 12 percent rise in US direct investments in sub-Saharan Africa in 2002, to $8.9 billion. 4 Nevertheless, it is also important to note that the main advantage of the new law went not to small African farmers or factory workers but to large exporters of petroleum products and South African automobile parts makers. 5 Thus, it is significant that under this program, crude oil imports accounted for three-fourths of total African imports into the United States in 2002.6 Similarly, the Bush administration designed MCA to provide resources to assist countries whose governments have demonstrated a determination to embrace the rule of law, fight corruption, respect human rights, invest in health care and education, and follow responsible economic policies. For Africa, it represents a major Bush administrative initiative because it aims to create successful models of development rather than to respond to crises of the moment. When he proposed MCA in 2002, Bush announced plans to increase core assistance to developing countries by fiscal year 2006 to $5 billion a year. Then, when the 2006 budget was announced, he asked for only $3 billion, perhaps reflecting the changed budgetary realities and realizing that MCA has been slower to get off the ground than previously foreseen. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) selected countries for participation in the program in terms of their ability to meet the requisite conditions; eligible African countries in 2004 included Benin, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, and Senegal, with Burkina Faso, Malawi, and Zambia added to the list as of 2005. In March 2005 the MCC announced its first agreement; this compact, signed with Madagascar, provides economic aid in an effort to achieve measurable results in stimulating

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

Page 247

TRENDS IN US-AFRICA RELATIONS

247

agricultural productivity. The MCC program represents a form of conditionality in which Africans choose to meet the conditions for access, but also it clearly holds out the prospect of a more focused US assistance program. However, policy analysts have been quick to note that the number of countries selected for participation is relatively small and the selection methodology imperfect. “Weaknesses and inconsistencies in the data,” writes Steve Radelet, a former deputy assistant secretary of the treasury for Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, “result in some countries appearing on the list that probably should not qualify, while there are a few nations that just barely miss and have a strong record of using aid effectively that should qualify. The existing methodology attempts to be strictly objective, but it is not perfect.”7 Furthermore, Bush’s compassionate realism found important expression through its promise of $15 billion over a five-year period for the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS in Africa. AIDS has reached pandemic proportions in much of Africa. Of the 42 million people the world over known to be infected by the AIDS virus at the end of 2002, roughly 31.5 million of them lived in sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean.8 Their numbers have continued to grow, with particularly devastating effects on the most mobilized and educated members of society, those involved in education, health care, governance, and the military. Because of the harmful effects of HIV/AIDS on the economy and political stability, it is not surprising that US policymakers find it to be in the US national interest to attempt to combat this growing health problem. What is involved is not only a humanitarian crisis with health and other social dimensions but also a strategic security crisis, one that could gravely weaken Africa’s capacity for effective governance and well-being. The AIDS relief package enacted by Congress in 2003 sought to respond to this growing problem by preventing 7 million new infections, treating 2 million HIV-infected people with antiretroviral therapy, and caring for 10 million people infected with the virus, as well as AIDS orphans.9 Although the intentions are sound, several predicaments deserve to be noted. For one thing, the challenge is a rapidly expanding one, creating some doubts as to whether current global responses will prove at all sufficient. For another, some uncertainty endures over whether Congress will continue to approve the annual funding requests for HIV/AIDS appropriations over the long term. And, finally, the US budgetary allocations through 2005 have not yet met Bush’s initial promise of some $3 billion per annum for a five-year time span (see Table 11.1), which may be explained by an inadequate administrative infrastructure or budgetary considerations. Although the Bush administration’s commitment to AGOA, the MCA, and the AIDS relief package indicated a preparedness to take Africa seriously and a willingness to make good (selectively) on his pledge to be a com-

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

Page 248

248

CONCLUSION

passionate conservative, it is important to gauge US commitment to overcoming Africa’s economic and political marginalization against a broader backdrop. As Table 11.2 indicates, total US aid to Africa declined somewhat between 2000 and 2005. The sharp rise in allocations in 2003 is attributable to emergency food aid (in particular, the drought that took place in the Horn). If calculated as a percentage of the gross national product (GNP), this aggregate amount has been less generous toward Africa than aid from other industrialized countries (0.12 percent of GNP).

State-Strategic Security The chapter authors in this book make an important distinction between state-strategic and human security approaches in determining the direction of US policy toward Africa. Each approach has its own inner logic, theory of causality, and preferred consequences. Those inclined toward a statestrategic belief system see a connection between US and African security, and they reason that a realistic plan requires an effective response to any perceived external terrorist threat to Africa. States have a primary obligation to protect themselves and their citizens, the realists contend, which requires that their leaders act in such a way as to maximize their countries’ power. In line with this time-honored view, President Bush declared, “Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government.”10 He warned that weak states could pose as great a danger to US national interests as strong ones, putting many of Africa’s states on notice that US decisionmakers might have reason to regard external threats (and particularly terrorist threats) to African security to be important matters of concern to the United States.11 He concluded the discussion by reassuring the world’s leaders that he planned to respect the values and interests of friendly governments wherever possible; at the same time, however, he noted that the United States has “long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security,” and he indicated a “prepared[ness] to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require.”12 For the Bush administration, then, it was deemed prudent, and even moral that the United States respond forcefully to any perceived threat to its vital national interests around the world, and if necessary, unilaterally. Not all realists push the logic of this doctrine to justify preemptive force; nevertheless, their emphasis on using US power to ensure the country’s survival in a perilous world, despite its evident costs and risks, remains something of a constant. In this book, most of the authors emphasized a human security perspective, concentrating on different aspects of Africa’s problems in terms of a humanitarian perspective. In doing so, they tended to overlook or leave

R-11 3/17/06

US Bilateral Spending on Fighting AIDS in Africa, FYs 2000–2006 (US$ millions) FY 2001 Actual

FY 2002 Actual

FY 2003 Actual

FY 2004 Estimated

FY 2005 Estimated

FY 2006 Requested

109 30 n/a 0 0 0 139

144 77 n/a 5 0 3 229

183 84 n/a 14 0 6 287

320 107 n/a 7 2 5 441

234.0 n/a 263.8 4.2 1.5 2.1 505.6

82.3 n/a 781.5 7.5 2.0 n/a 873.3

82.4 n/a 1,206.3 0 2.0 0 1,290.7

Page 249

USAID Centers for Disease Control Global AIDS Initiative Department of Defense Foreign military financing Department of Labor Total

FY 2000 Actual

11:36 AM

Table 11.1

Source: Raymond W. Copson, AIDS in Africa, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Order Code lB10050, June 29, 2005, 18. Note: n/a = not available.

Table 11.2

US$ millions

Total US Strategic Security, Human Security, and Development Aid to Africa, 2000–2005 2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005a

1,456

1,412

1,631

2,450

2,296

1,715

249

Sources: Food Aid/PL480, Child Survival and Health Programs Fund, Economic Stabilization Funds, Development Aid, Foreign Military Financing, IMET, ACOTA/ACRI, Peacekeeping Assistance and Logistics, NADR (demining), INCLE (border security, antiterrorism). See USAID, “Congressional Budget Justification for Africa Program,” 1997–2006, Washington, DC: USAID, www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/afr; USAID, “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants,” 1993–2002, Washington, DC; USAID, http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/home.html; US Department of State, “Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations,” 2000–2005, Washington, DC: US Department of State, www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj; US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “DSCA Facts Book 2003,” Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/bizops/2003_facts/Facts_Book_2003_Oct04_FINAL.pdf. Note: a. Figure for 2005 is provisional.

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

250

Page 250

CONCLUSION

unspoken state-strategic concerns in post–September 11 Africa, and those dealing at all with aspects of strategic security generally balanced statestrategic and human security concerns in a careful manner. It is nonetheless important to note that current evidence indicates Africa is experiencing an increasing level of terrorism. Al-Qaida militants sponsored and trained Somalis involved in attacks on US soldiers in Somalia in 1993 and were directly associated with the bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the attack on a synagogue in Tunisia, the surface-to-air missile attempt on an Israeli charter flight, the violent assault on a hotel in Mombasa, the reported purchase of illicit diamonds in West Africa before September 11, and so forth. Although Al-Qaida is responsible for many acts of extreme terror, it is by no means the only organization carrying on destructive attacks on governmental and nongovernmental bodies (for example, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi’s security organization in Libya in the 1970s and 1980s). With respect to state-strategic security, in Chapter 2 Severine Rugumamu focuses on the cautious and highly selective military (and especially peacekeeping) responses of the United States and other Western powers to Africa’s intrastate conflicts. “US contributions to African peacekeeping,” he notes, “have been confined largely to limited financial and logistical support but not its own contingents.” He explains this low-profile involvement in terms of Washington’s lack of vital interests in Africa. These priorities did change with the September 11 attacks and the promulgation of Bush’s National Security Strategy, but even then Rugumamu concludes that “US interests at stake in Africa continue to be perceived as low, the costs of direct military intervention too high, and options for assistance too few.” 13 Rugumamu tends to downplay the Western role in African peacekeeping and concentrates instead on the African Union and on subregional initiatives as the critically important ones. He views the United States and other Western countries as having an important part to play in helping to build Africa’s human security, but its role in the military security sphere is largely minimized when compared with other, contested regions of the world. This contrasts somewhat with the analysis in Chapter 5 by Ruth Iyob and Edmond J. Keller, who point to the US role in helping Africa’s states to develop greater capacity in the areas of peacekeeping and combating terror. Similarly, in Chapter 4 Donald Rothchild and Nikolas Emmanuel concentrate on public opinion as it relates to military and nonmilitary intervention in Africa (although not as a response to terrorism). They note the widespread destruction and insecurity caused by civil wars and analyze the extent to which public preferences give the governing elite some latitude to move from its cautious policy on intervening to help manage conflict. Their focus is useful in pointing out the gap between governmental caution and

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

Page 251

TRENDS IN US-AFRICA RELATIONS

251

public inclinations to take concerted action (at least prior to the evident risks of intervention after it has occurred). In terms of balancing the needs for state-strategic security and human security, Chapter 1 by Edmond J. Keller, Chapter 5 by Iyob and Keller, and Chapter 3 by Princeton N. Lyman offer insights on steps being taken by the US government and others to respond simultaneously to these different security challenges in contemporary Africa. It should be stressed that all these chapters place a strong emphasis on the need for increasing US support for economic and social development programs in Africa; at the same time, however, they recognize Africa’s current exposure to further terrorist attacks and comment on the progress being made to enhance Africa’s preparedness to defend itself from such assaults in the future. For example, Keller, commenting on the Bush administration’s narrower, realist-oriented view of US security interests in Africa, notes that current administration policies would act to build up the military capacity of weak African states to help them defend themselves against the illegal operations of rogue actors in their midst. “The United States,” Keller remarks, “has a vital interest in strengthening the military and intelligence capacities of poor countries like the ones we find in Africa. For their part, African countries could measurably improve their ability to solve problems of peace and security with the aid of the United States.”14 At the same time, Keller is not sanguine about the likelihood that current US policymakers will act generously to meet these challenges, overcoming the country’s longstanding tendency to treat Africa with some indifference. The most thoroughgoing attempt in the volume to balance state-strategic security against the needs of human security appears in Chapter 3 by Princeton Lyman. Contending that US national interests in Africa must go beyond a “preoccupation” with humanitarian and moral concerns over poverty, war, and natural disasters, Lyman argues instead for an alternative outlook, one that also focuses on “how Africa relates to the United States, to US goals worldwide, and to US interests.” Lyman thereupon documents the efforts under the Bush administration to promote security through peacekeeping or the backing of African peacekeeping forces; to build African military, police, and intelligence capacity; and to engage in antiterrorist programs. Clearly, this enlarged framework for US action in Africa, both in terms of state-strategic and human security goals, involved a broadened engagement in assisting in the Sahel and in East, West, and central Africa to protect African interests from the forces of destabilization and particularly from the deadly strikes made by Al-Qaida militants. It must be stressed that Lyman is not urging any move away from current efforts to bolster human security. Rather, he seeks to raise consciousness among US observers of African affairs to the reality of the terrorist challenge in Africa and the need for a

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

Page 252

252

CONCLUSION

more sufficient military response to Africa’s evident security needs in the contemporary period. In doing that, he moves partway toward the African worldview, which tends to see terrorism as primarily a problem for the West, thereby giving the Western-inspired terrorist issue a lower priority than do US policymakers.

Human Security The notion of human security goes beyond national interest considerations narrowly conceived to emphasize the political, economic, social, and cultural needs of Africa’s peoples. Its proponents boldly reject state-centric, national interest frameworks as counterproductive and urge instead a decisive shift in US diplomatic and aid allocations to favor the concerns of Africa’s unprotected and disadvantaged peoples. In Chapter 6 of this book, Caroline Thomas describes human security as a people-focused framework that seeks to make the vulnerable free from want and free from fear. She writes that these strands of human security “share the simple belief that people everywhere matter, that they are thus a legitimate focus for our attention, and that our actions should be directed toward decreasing their vulnerability and protecting the most vulnerable.” 15 Translated into policy programs, human security implies attention to the needs of society for security from unwarranted assaults, bad governance, injustice, lack of economic opportunity, the spread of disease, and an unsafe environment. This holistic and in some respects idealistic vision of US-Africa relations is in sharp contrast with the state-strategic framework of the realist school. Although US administrations and civil society organizations press for the global acceptance of political and civil rights, Thomas asserts that they tend not to view social and economic rights with the same urgency. In fact, the US approach to human security issues does seem very selective. Although some US programs that involve trade, such as AGOA, finance (MCA), and the HIV/AIDS laws, have attempted to deal (in part out of selfinterested considerations) with human security issues, other important challenges have suffered noticeably from lack of attention. High on the list of Bush administration efforts to promote Africa’s human security are those of increased trade openness and the Millennium Challenge Account. AGOA, originally sponsored by the Clinton administration and enacted into law in May 2000, sought to promote African trade with the United States by providing that certain African products could be exported into the US market without paying entry duties. From the outset, the act provided certain limitations on participation in the program: African countries could qualify for the program only if annual per capita incomes were below $1,500 and if they maintained market-based economies and

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

Page 253

TRENDS IN US-AFRICA RELATIONS

253

resisted corrupt practices. Even so, a lid was placed on textile and apparel exports of 1.5 percent of US textile imports (rising to 3.5 percent over an eight-year period).16 President Bush sponsored amendments to the act (now designated AGOA III) in 2002 and 2004 and indicated plans for a further expansion of Africa’s entry into US markets beyond 2008.17 Clearly, Africa has secured enhanced access to US markets under the act. In the initial three years after the act came into effect (two-thirds of the duty-free cap was made available on October 2, 2000, and the remaining one-third on January 1, 2001), US officials reported that thirty-eight countries had qualified for AGOA benefits and that sales of textiles to the US market had jumped from zero to $800 million. 18 In addition, the act has resulted in $4 billion of trade and investment in Africa.19 Yet it is important to keep these achievements in perspective. For one thing, critics complain that the subsidies given to US farmers exceed the Bush administration’s expenditures on foreign assistance.20 Second, they point out that much of the value of imports from Africa under the program consisted of petroleum and precious minerals. Third, the impact of opening up the US market to Chinese textile exports on January 1, 2005, remains unclear. Thus, if the act gave a temporary boost to African products, it does little to alter the structure of US trade relations with the continent. The Millennium Challenge Account is in some respects a natural extension of the economic assistance and debt relief programs under AGOA. The MCA program links economic development assistance with sound policies in developing countries. With funds increased to $5 billion annually by fiscal year 2006, the MCA is administered by a US government corporation that will select eligible countries on the basis of sixteen performance indicators. These indicators are applied rigorously to enable the corporation to “reward nations that root out corruption, respect human rights, adhere to the rule of law . . . invest in better health care, better schools and broader immunization, have more open markets and sustainable budget policies,” and so forth.21 In 2005, sixteen countries were selected as eligible under the program, including seven states in sub-Saharan Africa with incomes below the cutoff point of $1,435.22 Certainly, given the level of projected funding, broad possibilities loom to make a limited difference in the rate of economic and social development of the countries chosen as eligible. The funding represents a 50 percent increase over the levels of funding at the beginning of the twentyfirst century, and the guidelines and indicators seem reasonably clear. Nevertheless, the data on which the selection is made are not as precise as one might wish for, leaving open the possibility that some appropriate participants might be left out of the MCA selection process. Thus far, the program represents more in potential contribution than actual achievement. The corporation has spent a mere 2 percent of the $2.5 billion appropriated in its first two years and has signed agreements with only five states.23

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

254

Page 254

CONCLUSION

Finally, Bush gave an important lift to human security with his announced support for a new global emergency HIV/AIDS program. The HIV/AIDS pandemic is devastating large parts of Africa. With an estimated 42 million people currently affected across the globe, it is significant that the countries of sub-Saharan Africa (largely in the east and south) are home to nearly 25 million of them. The effect appears to be a deepening of Africa’s poverty and a diverting of scarce resources away from other urgent human security and developmental challenges. 24 Commenting on the macroeconomic costs of AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, the National Intelligence Council observes that “a growing number of studies suggest that AIDS and malaria alone will reduce GDP in several Sub-Saharan African countries by 20 percent or more by 2010. . . . A recent Namibian study concluded that AIDS cost the country nearly 8 percent of GDP in 1996, while a study of Kenya projected that GDP will be 14.5 percent smaller in 2005 than it otherwise would have been without the cumulative impact of AIDS.”25 AIDS threatens not only Africa’s political stability and well-being but also its global security. In Chapter 7, Sandra F. Joireman points out that HIV/AIDS contributes to state weakness, which results in fertile ground for international terrorist organizations. In the words of the National Intelligence Council, HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases “will endanger US citizens at home and abroad, threaten US armed forces deployed overseas, and exacerbate social and political instability in key countries and regions in which the United States has significant interests.”26 To deal with the global HIV/AIDS threat, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) committed the Bush administration to spend $15 billion over five years. PEPFAR will provide resources to treat HIV-infected people and to integrate treatment with prevention and care. The US global AIDS coordinator, Randall Tobias, who reports directly to the US secretary of state, is responsible for coordinating all US agencies involved in the global fight against HIV/AIDS at home and abroad.27 In her chapter, Joireman shows that US funding to combat the spread of AIDS and to treat the affected individuals has climbed significantly since President Bush announced in 2002 his intention to spend $15 billion in the fight against AIDS. Federal expenditures worldwide rose from $802 million in 2002 to an estimated $1.916 billion in 2004 (see Figure 7.1), with some $800 million earmarked for Africa in 2004.28 Even so, these funding levels remain substantially below the announced level of $3 billion a year. In addition, Joireman points out that the program is somewhat selective in the African countries covered by the PEPFAR initiative (Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia). Moreover, what will happen when the five years of funding comes to an end and the current impetus for the initiative disappears? Clearly, Africa requires generous long-term assistance

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

Page 255

TRENDS IN US-AFRICA RELATIONS

255

from the industrialized world if it is to deal effectively with this infectious disease burden in the years ahead. Despite such problems, it seems reasonable for the Bush administration to contend that its three initiatives on AGOA, MCA, and HIV/AIDS hold out the prospect for some improvement in human security in Africa. Elsewhere, however, the record on democracy and good governance, as well as foreign economic assistance, debts, and environmental degradation, is less inspiring. We turn now to a brief examination of these topics. In light of its longstanding advocacy of liberal democracy and civil rights, it is not surprising that US policymakers have committed themselves, in principle at least, to the cause of democracy and good governance. These goals focus on the values of regular elections, representative political institutions, transparency and accountability in the management of government affairs, and a vibrant civil society. President Bush, linking democracy (and economic openness) with his national security priorities, declared that the United States would promote them “because they are the best foundations for domestic stability and international order.”29 Nevertheless, democracy and governance funding by the Bush administration has been on the modest side, dropping from 5 percent of total US aid to Africa ($73,568,000) in 2002 to 2.94 percent ($36,330,000) in 2003.30 Not surprisingly, the results of this program have been somewhat disappointing, raising legitimate questions about the impact of aid programs on democracy promotion. The Freedom House evaluations for 2003 showed no movement in the not-free scores and only a small improvement in full political freedom scores between 2003 and the previous year, with eleven countries (25 percent) being classified as free in 2003 and eight countries (18 percent) in 2002.31 The upshot is a sense of skepticism about the level of progress made during the Bush years in promoting democracy objectives. Paralleling the skepticism over democracy promotion in the Bush era, some professional economists and policymakers have voiced growing doubts about the effectiveness of foreign aid as an engine of economic development. With the end of Cold War competition for African support, the urgency over foreign aid declined, and US policymakers increasingly viewed trade as a better way of accelerating Africa’s economic growth than economic assistance (a broad category that includes development assistance, economic support, food aid, foreign disaster assistance and rehabilitation, and child survival and health). US economic assistance to Africa in post–Cold War times, which reached a high point of $1.933 billion in 1992, fell significantly in the late Clinton years and then rose again to a limited extent in the Bush period. However, it is important to take the effects of inflation on the dollar into account when comparing recent statistics with those of 1992 (see Table 11.3). As Table 11.3 indicates, support for development assistance, foreign

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

256 Table 11.3

Page 256

CONCLUSION US Assistance in Real Dollars to Sub-Saharan Africa, 2001–2004 (US$ millions)

Development assistance Economic support funds Food aid funds (PL 480) Foreign disaster assistance and rehabilitation funds Child survival and health program funds Total

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005a

424 86 467

454 120 515

542 109 1,166

462 74 1,188

547 104 434

104 344 1,425

133 424 1,646

176 491 2,484

91 477 2,292

0 356 1,441

Sources: USAID, “Congressional Budget Justification for Africa Program” (Washington, DC: USAID, 2001–2006), www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/afr/; US Department of State, “Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations” (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2002, 2003, and 2004), www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/; USAID/Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance, “OFDA Annual Report,” 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004, www.usaid.gov/ our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/publications/annual_reports/index.html. Note: a. 2005 figures are provisional.

disaster assistance and rehabilitation, and child survival and health has increased somewhat, while allocations for food aid and economic support have declined. But the overall picture remains one of cautious commitment. In Chapter 10 Fantu Cheru points out the nature of US allocations, contending that “Africa has occupied only a marginal place on the US scale of priorities, regardless of which political party holds the seat of power in Washington, DC.”32 To some extent, US policymakers are making an effort to blunt this criticism through efforts to improve aid quality. This effort, if successful, implies increased efficiency in aid delivery, better alignment of aid programs with African country plans, and improved coordination among the donors themselves.33 Important as these and other efficiency steps may be, however, they are not likely to compensate for what remain very modest outlays on the part of the industrialized states toward African development. Rightly or wrongly, skepticism was also expressed in this book regarding the impact that US companies based in Africa and elsewhere have when extracting petroleum from the ground or ocean bed. The United States, intent on diversifying available energy resources, looks to West and central African oil producers (especially such key producing countries as Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, and Equatorial Guinea) to increase their combined output by 2 to 3 million barrels a day over the next decade.34 That could mean that Africa as a whole, which now supplies some 18 percent of US net oil imports, might account for as much as 25 percent of imported oil needs. Consequently, Africa has gained new importance in US eyes in terms of energy security, and it has therefore become a rising source of interest among the oil firms in terms of exploration and production.

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

Page 257

TRENDS IN US-AFRICA RELATIONS

257

As attractive as this new interest may be in African and US government and business circles, it is not without its possible costs. Referring to the Niger Delta case, in Chapter 8 Cyril Obi warns us of the potentially dangerous connection between oil exploitation and environmental degradation. To be sure, Obi sees a partnership of shared interests between the United States and Africa’s governments in extracting African oil and delivering it to Western markets at reasonable cost; even so, unless this process takes the local people fully into account and protects them from the destruction of their lands and waters, the effects are likely to be highly damaging and lead to great bitterness and conflict. Already such Nigerian civil society groups as the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People and the Ijaw Youth Council have formed for the express purpose of combating what they perceive as the excesses of US and other international oil companies in their African operations. In this high-stakes effort to exploit Africa’s oil reserves and ship the output to the world market, it clearly behooves the American public and private interests to plan for a coherent energy strategy that takes full account of local public concerns in Africa. A good sign of such sensitivity was the concern voiced by J. Stephen Morrison, the director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, urging that US policy “must be long-term, it must be built upon sustained partnership with African counterparts, and [it] must feature a two-pronged, regionally coordinated approach.”35 Clearly, with US energy needs rising and the possibility of a Middle East cutoff very real, planning a coordinated strategy that takes local public sensitivities into account is increasingly vital. Finally, widespread skepticism exists in Africa and elsewhere over whether the industrialized countries will take sufficient action to ease Africa’s crushing debt burden. African governments believe that the global economic structure is the primary cause of the deterioration in the terms of trade and therefore that decisive Western action is necessary to ensure Africa fair compensation for the commodities it produces to enable it to repay its debts.36 The present level of debt, estimated at $208.3 billion, is intolerable.37 It exceeds the region’s gross domestic product and is nearly three times the value of its exports.38 Such an amount represents an excessive burden on African producers unable to generate the savings necessary to achieve a satisfactory level of human security. The need for global reform is widely accepted, but developing a consensus on how to cope with the problem has proven extremely difficult. By 1996, it had become clear that the Paris Club process of rescheduling debts on an ad hoc basis to allow for extended repayment periods and lower rates of interest represented only short-term relief, not a solution in the form of debt reduction as such. This realization led to a more concerted effort, backed by the Clinton administration, to find a new, more comprehensive arrangement. What ultimately emerged were the Heavily Indebted Poor

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

258

Page 258

CONCLUSION

Countries debt initiative (HIPC) and its successor, the 1999 Enhanced HIPC debt initiative (EHIPC), which are described so effectively by Thomas Callaghy in Chapter 9. The HIPC debt regime targeted the forty-one poorest countries (thirty-three of them African), whose multilateral and bilateral debts were not likely ever to be repaid in full.39 These forty-one countries could become eligible for debt relief under the HIPC program, provided they displayed a strong commitment to World Bank–International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic reform principles. Uganda became the first country to meet the conditions for certification under the HIPC initiative, followed by six others (including Côte d’Ivoire and Mozambique) in the next three years. This slow pace led to sharp criticism in many quarters and spurred negotiations among the major creditor countries. The resulting 1999 EHIPC initiative represented something of a breakthrough, for it resulted in expanded support for the program and a speedier approval process for countries eligible for HIPC relief. Callaghy shows the change in Bush administration thinking about debt relief in general and the EHIPC initiative in particular. Its approach to this issue took a turn when it sought to gain international support for a rescheduling of Iraq’s debt, requiring the United States to be consistent toward the debt problems of other developing countries. Although US leaders have moved toward a more flexible and more generous position on debt relief issues, criticism of its cautious stance on such matters comes from various quarters. UN organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as Jubilee 2000 call for full debt cancellation. Some professional economists and others point to possible “perverse disincentive effects” if donors move too swiftly to cancel debts. It is feared that such effects may trigger a preparedness on the part of former debtors to borrow anew, returning to the old level of indebtedness.40 Other observers express unease over the lack of concern for economic growth and over the ineffective monitoring of the implementation of reforms.41 In December 2005, as Thomas Callaghy reports in Chapter 9 of this book, the G8 agreed to cancel the outstanding debt owed to the World Bank, IMF, and African Development Bank by the eighteen poorest countries (fourteen of them in Africa) that qualified under the HIPC program. This is a hopeful beginning in terms of debt relief, but much more remains to be done and will no doubt require tough—possibly bruising—negotiations.

The Overlap Between State-Strategic and Human Security It seems apparent that state-strategic security is unlikely on its own to prove sufficient in deterring future terrorist attacks in Africa. The continent is too poor, too large, and too diverse by itself for an effective military response.

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

Page 259

TRENDS IN US-AFRICA RELATIONS

259

Hence, state-strategic security must rely on an externally facilitated human security effort to help prevent terrorist organizations determined upon violent confrontations. This reality, with all its limitations in terms of capacity to deter terrorism in contemporary Africa, will be underscored in the following discussion. To gain an insight into a process that features a head-on and very violent attack by a small group of local and foreign terrorists on an established order, it is necessary to start by examining the nature of the insurrectionary group and the strategies it often uses to advance its cause, before turning our attention briefly to counterterrorist responses. Clearly, effective action by terrorist cells requires capable organization. These are not randomly chosen associations of like-minded people, but carefully selected bands of ideologically committed militants intent on forcing a radical change in the status quo. Their small numbers can actually prove an asset toward advancing their cause, because these carefully selected and highly motivated hard-liners, separated into loosely connected cells, are in a position to maintain a high degree of secrecy. As Vladimir Lenin recognized nearly a century ago, a revolutionary organization gains disproportionate strength through the recruitment of a small band of professional revolutionaries resolute in their determination to wrest power from what they regard as a repressive and morally corrupt state.42 In striking this blow against the established order, the terrorist organization sends a largely political-symbolic message to local authorities and the general public and their international supporters. Extreme violence is valued by the terrorist organizations because it is an indication of their strength and virility. It causes many uncommitted persons to remain on the sidelines in the hope of escaping retribution. “Terrorist violence,” Martha Crenshaw observes, “communicates a political message; its ends go beyond damaging an enemy’s material resources.”43 Terrorism is the logical strategic choice of a tiny but determined minority intent upon forcing a change of regimes toward one in line with their ideological preferences. To be sure, the terrorists’ success in Africa is heavily dependent on an enabling environment being in place—in particular, a weak state, state repression and the denial of human rights, and economic stagnation and comparative deprivation—but their actions are likely to have a significant effect only where mass anger over humiliation and deprivation combine with effective strategy.44 With an environment in place that buttresses resentment and opens up possibilities for a violent alternative to the status quo, terrorist cells are in a position to develop strategies that can harness the symbols of a shared religious and ethnic identity to advance their conspiratorial purposes. To be successful, the terrorist group must attract and train new members from the larger society without revealing its innermost secrets about its membership

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

260

Page 260

CONCLUSION

or immediate tactics. In part, this group can accomplish that goal by building on a base of communal solidarity, encouraging a sense of camaraderie within the intimate cell organization, and taking pains to secure broader societal support among those in the larger society who share its religious and ethnic identity. Common identity helps to build trust, as evidenced by the relationship between informal transfer agencies (hawalas) and Islamist politics in northern Somalia.45 Because cell members often start off with similar orientations to symbols of cultural distinctiveness, they are more able to trust other cell members and more able to communicate with them effectively. This common ethnic and/or religious orientation helps to overcome the challenges of maintaining secrecy and gaining vitally needed intelligence from societal members who also share basic cultural identities. Those engaged in terrorist activities can then use perceived injustices and hostile political memories of past abuses, whether real or mythical, to forge support for their cause. In addition to developing a social-cultural base to advance their cause, terrorists can learn a great deal about tactics and techniques from other conspiratorial networks and can also develop a network of external financial support indispensable for their operations. Thus, communal religious and ethnic ties offer links, not only within the community but also in the wider world of radical politics, upon which terrorist networks can draw. Clearly, a military response is not likely to prove sufficient by itself. As Arnold Wolfers has argued, strategic security is one among a range of interests, and its relevance depends on its “specific character and the particular circumstances of the case.”46 In Africa, the enabling environment offers terrorist organizations some advantages indispensable for their operations. For one thing, the presence of a weak state, with its low level of consensus on the validity of national state institutions and its lack of social cohesion, results in an inability on the part of central authorities to control its territory, leaving parts of the country exposed to possible terrorist initiatives. Like insurgents in general, say James Fearon and David Laitin, terrorist organizations are “better able to survive and prosper if the government and military they oppose are relatively weak—badly financed, organizationally inept, corrupt, politically divided, and poorly informed about goings-on at the local level.”47 They may, in certain circumstances, be able to move into this void of low central government influence and poor performance to build on the grievances of the local population, recruiting their members for critically important informational, logistical, and strategic support. In addition, terrorist groups can take advantage of repressive actions by state officials against the local population. Regime violence against a local community causes not only acute pain but also humiliation and a determination to get revenge.48 As Crenshaw remarks, “If there is a single common emotion that drives the individual to become a terrorist, it is vengeance on

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

Page 261

TRENDS IN US-AFRICA RELATIONS

261

behalf of comrades or even the constituency the terrorist aspires to represent.”49 Furthermore, terrorist organizations can build on the collective humiliation of economic stagnation and comparative deprivation to mobilize support for their cause. Clearly, where grinding poverty is compounded by feelings of comparative disadvantage between classes or ethnic groups, the anger that flows from this perceived humiliation can grow to threatening levels. In a statement before the US House Africa Subcommittee, Princeton Lyman warned that Nigeria was experiencing an “unprecedented level of poverty” and that resulting tensions made the country vulnerable to Islamic extremism.50 If a terrorist organization (as distinct from an insurgency) can gain critical support from the local population and combine it with technical abilities and external financing, a strictly military response will not likely succeed in containing terrorism. It is therefore imperative to combine traditional notions of state-strategic security with human security in Africa, and even this dual strategy may not prove a sufficient deterrent. It is necessary to complement a military effort in defense of the African states with the human security initiatives outlined in this book—in particular, democratization and responsive governance, economic development, trade and economic aid, assistance in dealing with the debt burden, environmental protection, and assistance in combating HIV/AIDS and other diseases. Only in this way can the United States weaken the links between the society and terrorist cells and thereby undermine their secrecy and ability to recruit local support in Africa. Consequently, this is no time for the United States to retreat from its leadership role in the world. It is only by adopting a positive, forwardlooking approach to Africa’s problems that it will be able to overcome possible suspicions as to its intentions. And as these suspicions recede, terrorist organizations will lose some of the access to Africa that the current enabling environment affords them. Ethnic communities will come to develop more diverse connections locally and externally, and local publics, hopeful as a result of new opportunities and lacking some salient grievances toward their own governmental authorities, will not act as a reservoir of information, recruitment, and possible financial backing for terrorist organizations. Hence, it is through the linking of state-strategic security and human security over the long term that “realism” finds its truest expression.

Conclusion: The Impact of Marginalization The two forms of security discussed in this chapter—state-strategic and human security—are not dichotomous but overlapping and linked. Neither strategy is likely to succeed in Africa’s current reality without being com-

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

262

Page 262

CONCLUSION

plemented by the other. However, given Africa’s extreme conditions of political, economic, and social disadvantage, neither is likely to prove effective unless generously assisted with external support. Here the prospects seem unpromising. Western governments, and most noticeably the United States, constrained by heavy budgetary shortfalls and debts of their own, often lack public support for the enlightened and generous programs of assistance required to make a decisive difference in Africa. Because they have maintained a relatively low human security profile in Africa, they appear not fully aware of the urgency of the current challenges confronting African states. The consequence, as Figure 11.1 makes apparent, is an insufficient external funding effort to lift Africa out of its continuing marginalization in relationship to other regions of the world. The data in Figure 11.1 indicate considerable continuity in expenditures on strategic security aid and developmental aid, with some spikes in human security aid (and especially, short-term food assistance for the Horn of Africa). Promises by the Bush administration to increase funding assistance for Africa have been undercut, in part at least, because of concerns over the budget deficits and the mounting cost of the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.51 To comment on each of these aid components separately, it is noteworthy that development aid has declined by 38 percent over the past decade, from just under $800 million in 1993 to a projected $500 million for 2005. Strategic security assistance (consisting of foreign military funds, international military education and training, nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, international narcotics control and law enforcement, and peacekeeping operations but not including direct contributions to the UN) experienced a slight increase. However, this increase is not entirely attributable to major antiterrorist efforts but to a rise in funding to provide assistance to peacekeeping operations and the strengthening of regional response capacity through such undertakings as the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance Program (ACOTA) and the Pan-Sahel Initiative. Military assistance to Africa is less than 5 percent of all US assistance to Africa over the past decade, although actual expenditures may in fact be enlarged by such ad hoc factors as logistical support and European command initiatives. An outstanding exception to this picture of declining aid to Africa is the one-time increase in human security assistance (including food aid/PL 480, child survival and health programs, and economic stabilization funds) for 2003. This increase is largely attributable to unexpectedly large emergency food aid shipments to Ethiopia ($352 million), Somalia ($136 million), Sudan ($111 million), and Angola ($105 million). To point out Africa’s marginalization in the area of state-strategic security even further, it is useful to compare US military assistance to the African countries with that to Asia and the Middle East (Figure 11.2).

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

Page 263

TRENDS IN US-AFRICA RELATIONS

263

Figure 11.1 US Assistance to Africa, 1993–2005

Sources: USAID, Congressional Budget Justification for Africa Programs (Washington, DC: USAID, 1997–2005), www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/afr/; USAID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Washington, DC: USAID, 1993–2002), http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/home.html; US Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2000–2005), www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/; US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, DSCA Facts Book 2003 (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2003), www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/bizops/2003_facts/Facts_Book_2003_Oct04_FINAL.pdf. Notes: Figures for 2004 and 2005 are provisional. All figures are totals for all country and regional programs for sub-Saharan Africa. Human security assistance includes food aid (PL 480), child survival and health programs, and economic stabilization funds. Strategic security assistance includes foreign military funds, international military education and training, nonproliferation, antiterrorism, demining, international narcotics control and law enforcement, and peacekeeping operations (not including direct contributions to the UN).

In Figure 11.2, Africa’s marginalization in terms of aid allocations becomes apparent again. The slight increase in US military aid to Africa from 2000 to 2004 lags far behind the additional funding provided to other regions for the war on terror. Two patterns emerge in US military aid to Africa. First, aid is concentrated, with high levels of assistance allocated to such key countries as Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. Thus, as Keller asserts in Chapter 1, the United States remains “selectively engaged” in Africa. Second, most of the recent aid increases are directed toward providing addi-

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

264

Page 264

CONCLUSION Figure 11.2 US Security Assistance to Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, 1993–2005

Sources: US Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 2000–2005), www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/; US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, DSCA Facts Book 2003 (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2003), www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/bizops/2003_facts/Facts_Book_2003_Oct04_FINAL.pdf.

tional support and training for the various peacekeeping operations in subSaharan Africa. These funds support multilateral peacekeeping and regional stability operations not funded through the direct contribution mechanisms of the United Nations. These monies are used under the ACOTA program to enhance Africa’s capacity to participate in peacekeeping operations through the provision of equipment and training and the airlifting of troops and supplies to and from peacekeeping operations. In sum, then, the data show that military and development assistance aid to Africa is a small part of total US aid allocations. By comparison with other conflict areas of the world, US aid allocations to Africa remain relatively low. The US low-profile approach to Africa must not be allowed to continue if the United States and Africa are to be in a position to resolve the continent’s human security and state-strategic security challenges.

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

Page 265

TRENDS IN US-AFRICA RELATIONS

265

Notes I wish to express my appreciation to Nikolas Emmanuel for research assistance and to Monti Datta, Edmond Keller, Letitia Lawson, Brooks Robinson, Edith Rothchild, and Camille Sumner for their helpful comments on the first draft of this chapter. 1. Olusegun Obasanjo, “Africa’s Rendezvous with History,” in Olusegun Obasanjo and Felix G. N. Mosha, eds., Africa: Rise to Challenge (New York: Africa Leadership Forum, 1992), 262. 2. Stephen Kaufman, “Bush Pledges Continued Attention to Africa During Second Term,” US Department of State, Washington File, December 2, 2004, http://usinfo.state.gov. 3. White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White House, September 17, 2002), ii. 4. “Ambassador Zoellick Hails Passage of AGOA III Legislation,” Washington File, June 25, 2004; and Charles W. Corey, “Passage of AGOA III Legislation Sends Good Signal to Africa,” Washington File, June 25, 2004. 5. Donald Rothchild and Nikolas Emmanuel, “United States: The Process of Decision-making on Africa,” in Ulf Engel and Gorm Rye Olsen, eds., Africa and the North: Between Globalization and Marginalization (London: Routledge, 2005), 74–91. 6. US International Trade Commission, Sub-Saharan Africa: U.S. Exports, Imports, GSP Imports, and AGOA Imports, by Major Commodity Sectors, Annual and Year to Date January-March, 2003, http://reportweb.usitc.gov/africa/ byvcountry_agoa.jsp. 7. Steve Radelet, “Will the Millennium Challenge Account Be Different?” Washington Quarterly 26, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 179–180. 8. US Congress, United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (HR 1298), Sec. 2. 9. Charlene Porter, “U.S. Senate Passes Emergency AIDS Relief Package,” US Department of State, Washington File, May 16, 2003, http://usembassy. state.gov/#AF. 10. White House, National Security Strategy, i. 11. Ibid., ii. 12. Ibid., 15, 31. 13. Severine Rugumamu, Chapter 2 in this book. 14. Edmond Keller, Chapter 1 in this book. 15. Caroline Thomas, Chapter 6 in this book. 16. US Congress, African Growth and Opportunity Act, HR 434 (2000). 17. Jim Fisher-Thompson, “White House Africa Official Helps Launch AGOA III Trade Effort,” Washington File (Washington, DC: US Department of State, June 11, 2003). 18. USAID, “AGOA Boosts African Trade and Jobs,” Frontlines (Washington, DC: USAID, April 2003), 5. 19. Lusungu Kayani, “U.S. Officials Say AGOA Is on Track Despite Tragedy,” Manchester Trade’s Africa Trade and Business Update, October 2, 2001, David [email protected]. 20. Elisabeth Bumiller, “Bush Says He Will Ask Congress to Extend Africa Trade Benefits,” New York Times, January 16, 2003, A4. 21. White House, The Millennium Challenge Account (Washington, DC: White House, December 1, 2004), www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/developing nations/millennium.html.

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

266

Page 266

CONCLUSION

22. Millennium Challenge Corporation, Press Release, Millennium Challenge Corporation Names Fiscal Year 2005 Eligible Countries (Washington, DC: Millennium Challenge Corporation, November 8, 2004). 23. Celia W. Dugger, “Foreign Aid Chief Pledges Reforms,” New York Times, November 13, 2005, 11. 24. UNAIDS, Regional HIV and AIDS Estimates, year-end 2003, www.unaids. org/en/geographical+area/by+region/sub-saharan+africa.asp. See also Office of the US Global AIDS Coordinator, The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief: U.S. Five-Year Global HIVAIDS Strategy (Washington, DC: Office of the United States Global AIDS Coordinator, 2004), 15. 25. National Intelligence Council, The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States, NIE 99-17D (January 2000), 28, file, www.cia.gov/cia/reports/nie/report/nie99-17d.html (accessed March 29, 2005). 26. Ibid., 2. 27. Office of the US AIDS Coordinator, The President’s Emergency Plan, 16–17. 28. US Department of State, “State Dept. Describes Increasing U.S. Assistance to Africa,” Washington File, January 14, 2005. 29. White House, National Security Strategy, ii. 30. USAID allocated 52 percent of total democracy and governance aid to sixteen sub-Saharan African countries, plus Nigeria, South Africa, and Mali in 2003. USAID, “Congressional Budget Justifications: Notification Levels” (Washington, DC: USAID, 2002, 2003, 2004), www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2002/afr/notlevs01.html; www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2003/afr/notlevels_2002.html; www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2004/sub-saharan_africa/levels_notified.pdf. 31. Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2002,” Table of Independent Countries, 2002, www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=212&year=2002; Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2003,” Table of Independent Countries, 2003, www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=237&year=2003. 32. Fantu Cheru, Chapter 10 in this volume. 33. Michael Fleshman, “Africa Pushes for Better Aid Quality,” Africa Recovery 17, no. 4 (January 2004): 18–21. 34. Correspondent, “Africa Will Become More Important U.S. Energy Supplier,” Washington File, July 16, 2004. Statement by John R. Brodman, deputy assistant secretary for international energy policy at the US Department of Energy. 35. J. Stephen Morrison, quoted in Charles W. Corey, “U.S. Energy Policy Must Look to West Africa,” Washington File, July 21, 2004. 36. See, for example, Chapter 6 by Caroline Thomas in this book. 37. UNCTAD, Computations Based on World Bank, Global Development Financial and World Development Indicators, www.unctad.org/en/docs/ gdsafrica20041_en.pdf. 38. Peter M. Lewis, “Pursuing U.S. Economic Interests in Africa,” in J. Stephen Morrison and Jennifer G. Cooke, eds., Africa Policy in the Clinton Years: Critical Choices for the Bush Administration (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2001), 102–106. 39. Thomas M. Callaghy, “Networks and Governance in Africa: Innovation in the Debt Regime,” in Thomas M. Callaghy, Ronald Kassimir, and Robert Latham, eds., Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 118. 40. William Easterly, “How Did Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Become Heavily Indebted? Reviewing Two Decades of Debt Relief,” World Development 30,

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

Page 267

TRENDS IN US-AFRICA RELATIONS

267

no. 10 (2002): 1683, http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/wdevel/v30y2002i1Op16771696.html (accessed March 29, 2005); see also G. K. Helleiner, “The IMF, the World Bank and Africa’s Adjustment and External Debt Problems: An Unofficial View,” World Development 20, no. 6 (1992): 781. 41. M. A. Thomas, “Getting Debt Relief Right,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 5 (September–October 2001): 45. 42. V. I. Lenin, What Is to Be Done? trans. S. V. and Patricia Utechin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 132. 43. Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (July 1981): 379. 44. Harold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York: Viking, 1948), 88–89. On the desire for revenge, see Lawrence Wright, “The Man Behind Bin Laden,” New Yorker, September 16, 2002, www.lawrencewright.com/artzawahiri.html. 45. Khalid Mustafa Medani, Globalization, Informal Markets, and Collective Action: The Development of Islamic and Ethnic Politics in Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia, PhD diss., Berkeley: University of California, 2003. 46. Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol,” in Harold Karan Jacobson, ed., America’s Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1960), 173. 47. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 80. 48. Wright, “The Man Behind Bin Laden,” 7. 49. Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 394. 50. Correspondent, “Former U.S. Envoy Calls for More Security Assistance to Nigeria,” Washington File, April 5, 2004. 51. Raymond W. Copson, “Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues,” CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Order Code 1B95052 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, July 22, 2003), http://fas.org/man/crs/#Africa.

R-11

3/17/06

11:36 AM

Page 268

R-Acronyms

3/17/06

11:50 AM

Page 269

ACRONYMS

ACOTA ACRI ACSS ADB AGOA AGOA III AOPIG ARV ASEAN AU CAFTA CCFR CFF CJTF CJTF-HOA CMO DRC ECOMOG ECOWAS EEBC EHIPC EIR EPLF EPRDF ERA ESF EU

African Contingency Operations Training Assistance program African Crisis Response Initiative Africa Center for Strategic Studies African Development Bank African Growth and Opportunity Act AGOA Acceleration Act African Oil Policy Initiative Group antiretroviral treatment Association of South East Asian Nations African Union Central American Free Trade Agreement Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Compensatory Financing Facility Combined Joint Task Force Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa civil-military operations Democratic Republic of Congo Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group Economic Community of West African States Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative Extractive Industry Review Eritrean People’s Liberation Front Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front Environmental Rights Action Economic Support Fund European Union 269

R-Acronyms

3/17/06

11:50 AM

270 EUCOM FAO FMFP FMSP G7 G8 G-20 GDP GSP GSPC HDI HIPC HIV/AIDS IDA IFIs IGAD IMET IMF IRIN IYC LURD MCA MCC MDG MONUC

MOSOP MOU NAFTA NDES NEPAD NGO NIEO NIF NPFL NPV OAU OBR OECD OLS

Page 270

ACRONYMS

US European Command Food and Agriculture Organization Foreign Military Financing Program Foreign Military Sales Program Group of Seven Group of Eight Group of 20 gross domestic product Generalized System of Preferences Salafist Group for Call/Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat) Human Development Index Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome International Development Association international financial institutions Intergovernmental Agency for Development International Military Education and Training program International Monetary Fund Integrated Regional Information Network Ijaw Youth Council Liberia United for Reconciliation and Democracy Millennium Challenge Account Millennium Challenge Corporation Millennium Development Goals United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Mission de l’Organization des Nations Unies en République Démocratiqe du Congo) Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People memorandum of understanding North American Free Trade Agreement Niger Delta Environmental Survey New Partnership for Africa’s Development nongovernmental organization New International Economic Order National Islamic Front National Patriotic Front of Liberia net present value Organization of African Unity Ogoni Bill of Rights Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ordinary least squares

R-Acronyms

3/17/06

11:50 AM

Page 271

ACRONYMS

OOTW OPDS OPEC PACOM PAGAD PEPFAR PIPA PPDSC PRGFs PRS PRSPs PSI RDF RECAMP RPF RTD RUF SADC SADCC SAP SPLA/M SSA TPLF TRADE TRIPS UNAIDS UNCTAD UNDP UNECA UNICEF UNMEE UNOMIL UNOSOM UNPO USAID VIP WTO

271

operations other than war Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Pacific Command People Against Gangsterism and Drugs President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief Program on International Policy Attitudes Protocol on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation poverty reduction and growth facilities poverty reduction strategies poverty reduction strategy papers Pan-Sahel Initiative Rapid Deployment Force Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix Rwandese Patriotic Front right to development Revolutionary United Front Southern African Development Community Southern African Development Cooperation Conference structural adjustment program Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement sub-Saharan Africa Tigrean People’s Liberation Front Trade for African Development and Enterprise Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Development Programme United Nations Economic Commission for Africa United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia United Nations Operations in Somalia Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization US Agency for International Development very important person World Trade Organization

R-Acronyms

3/17/06

11:50 AM

Page 272

R-Bib

3/17/06

11:51 AM

Page 273

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abramovici, P. “United States: The New Scramble for Africa.” Le Monde Diplomatique, July 2004, http://mondediplo.com/2004/07/07/07usinafrica. Adebayo, A. Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and GuineaBissau. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002. African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG). African Oil: A Priority for U.S. National Security and African Development. Washington, DC: AOPIG, 2002. Ake, C. “Shelling Nigeria Ablaze.” Tell, January 29, 1996. Altman, D. “AIDS and Security.” International Relations 17, no. 4 (2003): 417–427. Barber, Benjamin. Jihad vs. McWorld. New York: Times Books, 1995. Baylies, C. “The Impact of AIDS on Rural Households in Africa: A Shock Like Any Other?” Development and Change 33, no. 4 (2002): 611–632. Bello, Walden. The Future in the Balance: Essays on Globalization and Resistance. San Francisco: Food First, 2001. Bender, Gerald J., James S. Coleman, and Richard L. Sklar, eds. African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. Birsdall, Nancy, and John Williamson. Delivering on Debt Relief: From IMF Gold to a New Aid Architecture. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development and the Institute for International Economics, April 2002. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. An Agenda for Peace, 1995: With the New Supplement and Related UN Documents. New York: UN, 1995. Bratton, Michael. “Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa.” World Politics 41, no. 3 (1989): 407–430. Buzan, Barry. People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post–Cold War Era, 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991. Callaghy, Thomas M. “Innovation in the Sovereign Debt Regime: From the Paris Club to Enhanced HIPC and Beyond.” Washington, DC: World Bank, Operations Evaluation Department Working Paper, 2004. Callaghy, Thomas M., Ronald Kassimir, and Robert Latham, eds. Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Carafano, James J., and Nile Gardiner. “U.S. Military Assistance for Africa: A Better Solution.” Heritage Foundation, Background Paper No. 1697, October 15, 2003. Carothers, Thomas. “The End of the Transition Paradigm.” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 (2002): 5–22.

273

R-Bib

3/17/06

274

11:51 AM

Page 274

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Case, William. “Can the Halfway House Stand? Semidemocracy and Elite Theory in Three Southeast Asian Countries.” Comparative Politics 28, no. 2 (1996): 437–464. Cesarz, E., J. Morrison, and J. Cooke. “Alienation and Militancy in Nigeria’s Niger Delta.” CSIS Africa Notes, no. 16 (May 2003), Center for Strategic and International Studies, www.csis.org. Cohen, Herman. Superpower Intervention in Africa. New York: St. Martin’s, 2000. Collier, P., V. L. Elliott, H. Hegre, A. Hoeffler, M. Reynal-Querol, and N. Sambanis. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Comaroff, John L., and Jean Comaroff, eds. Civil Society and the Political Imagination in Africa: Critical Perspectives. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. Copley, G. R. “AIDS and African Armies: A Crisis Worse Than War.” Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy 27, no. 11 (1999): 4–6. Crenshaw, Martha. “The Causes of Terrorism.” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (July 1981): 379–399. Crocker, C. High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood. New York: W. W. Norton, 1992. Degefe, Befekadu, Berhanu Nega, and Getahun Tafesse. Second Annual Report on the Ethiopian Economy 2 (2001–2002). Addis Ababa: Ethiopian Economics Association/Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute, 2002. Deng, Francis M., Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild, and I. William Zartman. Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996. De Waal, Alex, ed. Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004. Donnelly, Elizabeth. “Proclaiming Jubilee: The Debt and Structural Adjustment Network.” In K. Sikkink, ed., Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002. Douglas, O., V. Kemedi, I. Okonta, and M. Watts. “Alienation and Militancy in the Niger Delta: A Response to the CSIS on Petroleum, Politics, and Democracy in Nigeria,” Foreign Policy in Focus Special Report, Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, July 2003, www.fpif.org/papers/nigeria2003.html. Dunning, John H. Making Globalization Good: The Moral Challenges of Global Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Elbe, Stefan. “HIV/AIDS and the Changing Landscape of War in Africa.” International Security 27, no. 2 (2002): 159–177. Esparza, L., and M. Wilson. “Oil for Nothing: Multinational Corporations, Environmental Destruction, Death and Impunity in the Niger Delta.” Essential Action and Global Exchange, US Non-governmental Delegation Trip Report, September 6–20, 2000. Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 75–90. Frazier, J. “The African Crisis Initiative: Self-Interested Humanitarianism.” Brown Journal of World Affairs 4, no. 2 (1997). Gary, Ian, and Terry Lynn Karl. Bottom of the Barrel: Africa’s Oil Boom and the Poor. New York: Catholic Relief Press, June 2003. Giddens, Anthony. The Global Third Way Debate. Oxford: Polity, 2001. Held, David, and Anthony McGrew, eds. The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000.

R-Bib

3/17/06

11:51 AM

Page 275

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

275

Hentz, J. “The Contending Currents in U.S. Involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa.” In Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, eds., Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent. New York: Routledge, 2004. Holsti, Ole R. Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996. Human Rights Watch. “The Niger Delta: No Democratic Dividend.” Human Rights Watch Report, October 2002, www.hrw.org/wr2k3/africa8.html. Huntington, Samuel. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. Igiri, Cheryl I., and Princeton N. Lyman. Giving Meaning to “Never Again”: Seeking an Effective Response to the Crisis in Darfur and Beyond. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, CSR No. 5, September 2004. Jackson, Henry F. From Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960. New York: William Morrow, 1982. Joseph, Richard. “Africa 1990–1997: From Abertura to Closure.” Journal of Democracy 9, no. 2 (1998): 3–17. Kansteiner, Walter, and J. Stephen Morrison, et al. Rising Stakes in Africa: Seven Proposals to Strengthen U.S. Africa Policy. Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2004. Kasfir, Nelson, ed. Civil Society and Democracy in Africa: Critical Perspectives. London: Frank Cass, 1998. Keller, Edmond J. “Political Institutions, Agency, and Contingent Compromise: Understanding Democratic Consolidation and Reversal in Africa.” National Political Science Review 7 (1999): 96–115. Keller, Edmond J., and Donald Rothchild, ed. Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996. Kepel, Gilles. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002. Klare, M. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2002. Kull, Steven, and Clay Ramsay. “The Myth of the Reactive Public: American Public Attitudes on Military Fatalities in the Post–Cold War Period.” In Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia, eds., Public Opinion and the International Use of Force. New York: Routledge, 2001. Larson, Eric V. Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for Military Operations. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996 ———. “Putting Theory to Work.” In Miroslav Nincic and Joseph Lepgold, eds., Being Useful: Policy Relevance and International Relations Theory. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000. Leonard, David K., and Scott Straus. Africa’s Stalled Development: International Causes and Cures. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003. Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 51–66. Lewis, Peter M. “Pursuing U.S. Economic Interests in Africa.” In J. Stephen Morrison and Jennifer G. Cooke, eds., Africa Policy in the Clinton Years: Critical Choices for the Bush Administration. Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2001. Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Little, Peter D. Somalia: Economy Without State. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003.

R-Bib

3/17/06

276

11:51 AM

Page 276

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Lyman, Princeton N., and J. Stephen Morrison. “The Terrorist Threat in Africa.” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 1 (January–February 2004). Madley, John. Hungry for Trade: How the Poor Pay for Free Trade. London: Zed Books, 2000. Marcus, Harold. Ethiopia, Great Britain and the United States, 1941–1974: The Politics of Empire. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Markakis, John. Resource Conflict in the Horn of Africa. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996. Mattoo, A., D. Roy, and A. Subramaniam. “The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act and Its Rules of Origin: Generosity Undermined?” IMF Working paper, Africa Department, WP/021158, September 2000, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/ 2002/wp02158.pdf. Menkhaus, Ken. Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism. New York: Oxford University Press, Adelphi Paper 364, 2004. Morrison, J. Stephen, and Jennifer G. Cooke. Africa Policy in the Clinton Years: Critical Choices for the Bush Administration. Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2001. Muyangwa, M., and M. Vogt. “An Assessment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution 1993–2000.” New York: International Peace Academy, 2000. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report. New York: W. W. Norton, 2004. National Intelligence Council. The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States. NIE 99-17D (January 2000). Nef, Jorge. Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability: The Global Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, 2nd ed. Ottawa: IDRC, 1999. Negash, Takeste, and Kjetil Tronvoll. Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrea/Ethiopia War. Oxford: John Curry, 2000. Nye, Joseph S. The Paradox of American Power. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Obi, C. “Global, State and Local Intersections: Power, Authority and Conflict in the Niger Delta Oil Communities.” In T. Callaghy, R. Kassimir, and R. Latham, eds., Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. ———. “The Oil Paradox: Reflections on the Violent Dynamics of Petro-Politics and (Mis)Governance in Nigeria’s Niger Delta.” University of Leipzig Papers on Africa, no. 73, 2004. Omach, P. “The African Response Initiative: Domestic Politics and Convergence of National Interest.” African Affairs 99, no. 394 (2000): 73–95. Ottaway, Marina. Africa’s New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction? Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999. Oxfam. “Cultivating Poverty: The Impact of U.S. Cotton Subsidies on Africa.” Oxfam briefing paper 30, September 2003, www.oxfam.org/policy/papers/ 30cotoon/index.htm. Radelet, Steve. “Will the Millennium Challenge Account Be Different?” Washington Quarterly 26, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 171–187. Radelet, Steve, and Sheila Herrling. “The Millennium Challenge Account: Soft Power or Collateral Damage?” Center for Global Development Brief 2, no. 2 (April 2003). Rotberg, R. I. “Failed States in a World of Terror.” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (2002): 127–142.

R-Bib

3/17/06

11:51 AM

Page 277

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

277

Rothchild, Donald. “The Impact of U.S. Disengagement on African Intrastate Conflict Resolution.” In John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in World Politics: The African State System in Flux. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000. ———. Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997. ———. “Third-Party Incentives and the Phases of Conflict Prevention.” In Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester, eds., From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003. Rothchild, Donald, and Nikolas Emmanuel. “The Process of Decision-making in Africa.” In Ulf Engel and Gorm Rye Olsen, eds., Africa and the North: Between Globalization and Marginalization (London: Routledge, 2005). Ruggie, John Gerard. “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order.” International Organization 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 379–415. Rugumamu, S. “Post–Cold War Peace and Security in Southern Africa.” SAPES Occasional Paper No. 5, 1993. Sambo, Muhammed Bashir. Sharia and Justice: Lectures and Speeches. Zaria, Nigeria: Sankone Educational Publishers, 2003. Schedler, Andreas. “The Menu of Manipulation.” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 21–36. Schneider, William. “The Old Politics and the New World Order.” In Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, eds., Eagle in a New World: American Grand Strategy in the Post–Cold War Era. New York: Harper Collins, 1992. Shraeder, P. U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Singer, P. “AIDS and International Security.” Survival 44, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 145–158. Sisk, Timothy D. Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995. Smith, A. “At Last unto the Breach: The Logic of a U.S. Military Command in West Africa.” Orbis (Spring 2004): 305–319. Snyder, Jack L. From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. New York: W. W. Norton, 2000. Stiglitz, Joseph. Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W. W. Norton, 2002. Stover, John, and Lori Bollinger. “The Economic Impact of AIDS.” The Policy Project: The Futures Group International, March 1999, www.policyproject. com/pubs/SEImpact/SEImpact_Africa.pdf. Suhrke, Astri, and Bruce Jones. “Preventive Diplomacy in Rwanda: Failure to Act or Failure of Actions?” In Bruce W. Jentleson, ed., Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000. Thomas, C. Global Governance, Development and Human Security. London: Pluto, 2000. Thomas, C., S. Wilkin, and P. Wilkin. “Still Waiting After All These Years: The Third World on the Periphery of International Relations.” British Journal of Politics and International Relations (April 2004): 241–258. UNCTAD. Economic Development in Africa: Trade Performance and Commodity Dependence. 2003, www.unctad.org. UN Economic Commission for Africa. “The Doha Round and African Development:

R-Bib

3/17/06

278

11:51 AM

Page 278

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Turning Words into Deeds.” ECA Position Paper prepared for the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico, September 10–14, 2003. UN Millennium Project. Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Report to the UN Secretary-General (the Sachs Report), New York, 2005. US Agency for International Development. Democracy and Governance. Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development, 1991. ———. Strategies for Sustainable Development. Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development, 1993. US Department of Commerce. US-Africa Trade Profile. International Trade Administration, Market Access and Compliance/Office of Africa, April 2004. US Trade Representative. 2004 Comprehensive Report on US Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act. The Fourth of Eight Annual Reports, May 2004. Van de Walle, N. African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Walter, Barbara F. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002. Wilkin, P. “Global Poverty and Orthodox Security.” Third World Quarterly 23, no. 4 (2002): 633–645. White House. The Millennium Challenge Account. Washington, DC: White House, December 1, 2004. ———. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. September 17, 2002.

R-Contri

3/17/06

12:02 PM

Page 279

THE CONTRIBUTORS

Thomas Callaghy is professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and serves on the executive committee of the university’s African Studies Center. He is the author of numerous articles and coeditor and contributor to several volumes, including Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power; and Rightsizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders. Fantu Cheru is professor of African and development studies at the American University in Washington, DC. He currently serves as a member of the UN Secretary-General’s Panel on International Support for NEPAD and convener of the Global Economic Track of the Helsinki Process on Globalization and Democracy. He has written extensively on development in the African context, including African Renaissance: Roadmaps to the Challenges of Globalization; The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, Development and Democracy; The Financial Implications of Divesting from South Africa: A Review of the Evidence; and The Not So Brave New World: Rethinking Regional Integration in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa. He has worked as a consultant for the United Nations and other nongovernmental organizations, with field research experience in seventeen African countries. Nikolas Emmanuel is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of California, Davis. His dissertation focuses on providing a comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of political conditionality to promote reform in Africa. He has recently coauthored (with Donald Rothchild) “The Process of U.S. Decision-making on Africa,” in Africa and the North: Between Globalization and Marginalization, edited by Ulf Engel and Grom Rye Olsen; and (also with Donald Rothchild) “The Impact of Economic Assistance in Africa’s Peace Processes,” in Africa Contemporary Record: 2001–2002. 279

R-Contri

3/17/06

280

12:02 PM

Page 280

THE CONTRIBUTORS

Ruth Iyob is associate professor at the University of Missouri in St. Louis and has served as the director of the Africa program at the International Peace Academy in New York. Her area of specialization is comparative politics and international relations, with a focus on Africa and the Middle East. Her research is multidisciplinary and includes foreign policy making in the Afro-Arab world, gendered citizenship, diaspora politics, peacemaking and peacekeeping, and postcolonial identity politics. She is the author of The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, Resistance, Nationalism, 1941–1993. Sandra Fullerton Joireman is associate professor of politics and international relations at Wheaton College in Wheaton, Illinois. She specializes in comparative political economy with an emphasis on Africa. She has written numerous books and articles on property rights, legal development, and ethnic conflict. She is also an activist on the issue of HIV/AIDS in Africa, cochairs the DuPage Global Aids Action Network, and serves on the board of directors for Upendo Village, a faith-based AIDS center for women and children in Naivasha, Kenya. Edmond J. Keller is professor of political science, director of the UCLA Globalization Research Center–Africa, and former director of the James S. Coleman African Studies Center at the University of California, Los Angeles. He specializes in comparative politics with an emphasis on Africa, and his research focuses on political transitions, cultural pluralism and nationalism, and conflict and conflict management in Africa. He is the author of two monographs: Education, Manpower and Development: The Impact of Educational Policy in Kenya; and Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People’s Republic; and has coedited Afro-Marxist Regimes: Ideology and Public Policy (with Donald Rothchild); South Africa in Southern Africa: Domestic Change and International Conflict (with Louis Picard); and Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security (with Donald Rothchild). Princeton N. Lyman served for over three decades in the US Department of State and US Agency for International Development, completing his government service as assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs. He was previously US ambassador to South Africa and to Nigeria, and director of the US Aid Mission to Ethiopia at USAID. He was a senior fellow at the US Institute of Peace from 1999 to 2000, and executive director of the Global Interdependence Initiative of the Aspen Institute until July 2003. He is currently the Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow and director of Africa policy studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Cyril Obi is the research program coordinator of “Post-Conflict Transition,

R-Contri

3/17/06

12:02 PM

Page 281

THE CONTRIBUTORS

281

the State and Civil Society in Africa” at the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, and was appointed Claude Ake Visiting Professor for 2004 in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at the University of Uppsala. He is presently on sabbatical leave from the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs in Lagos, Nigeria, where he is associate research professor. His most recent published work includes “The Oil Paradox: Reflections on the Violent Dynamics of Petro-Politics and (Mis)Governance in Nigeria’s Niger Delta,” Africa Institute Occasional Paper No. 73; and “Niger Delta: Trans-Atlantic Reflections on the Colonial Mirror,” in The Dark Webs: Perspectives on Colonialism in Africa (edited by Toyin Falola). Donald Rothchild is professor of political science at the University of California, Davis. He has authored Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya: A Study of Minorities and Decolonization; and Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation. He has coauthored Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa. He has coedited Africa in the New International Order (with Edmond Keller); The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation (with David Lake); Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (with Stephen John Stedman and Elizabeth Cousens); and Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars (with Philip G. Roeder). Severine Rugumamu has served as executive secretary for the African Association of Political Science, Pretoria, South Africa. He is professor of development studies at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. His research includes African politics, international political economy, and African security. His major publications include Globalization Demystified: Africa’s Possible Development Futures; Leading Issues in Development Studies: A Reader; Lethal Aid: Illusion of Socialism and Self-Reliance in Tanzania; and Globalization, Democracy and Development in Africa (coedited with Taya Assefa and Abdel M. Ahmed). Caroline Thomas is deputy vice chancellor of the University of Southampton, UK, where she is also professor of global politics. She spent a period as research fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, working in global environmental politics. Thereafter she enjoyed a two-year personal research fellowship funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council. Her research and publications have been in the broad area of south/north relations, global environmental politics, and human security. She has published extensively in these areas, authoring and editing several books and articles, including In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations; The International Politics of the Environment; and Globalization and Human Security. Her most recent publications have involved the global politics of health.

R-Contri

3/17/06

12:02 PM

Page 282

R-Index

3/17/06

12:03 PM

Page 283

INDEX

Abacha, Sani, 59, 60 Abegaz, Berehanu, 113 Abuja Treaty of 1991, 30 Accra Agreement, 235 Adebajo, Adekeye, 38 Afghanistan: conducive environment for terrorists in, 156; removal of Soviet Union from, 106; state failure in, 156; Taliban in, 54, 107 Africa: capacity for conflict management, 29; competition for oil in, 171–173; debt cancellation and, 228–231; debt crisis in, 10–11; deteriorating terms of trade in, 132; development assistance from United States, 224–228; development in, 11–13; economic growth in, 52; ethnic conflict in, 65–94; external debt ratios, 229tab; globalization and, 9–13; growth of democracy in, 52; HIV/AIDS in, 147–161; human security and, 11–13; integration into global economy, 6; intelligence activity in, 53; interdependent relationship with United States, 2; lack of proactive US policies in, 5; low allocations of developmental assistance to, 217; marginality of, 1, 29; military and security cooperation with United States, 231–235; need for developmental assistance from United States, 2; oil exports to United States, 8; oil reserves, 45n7, 50, 167, 171; as possible source of terrorism threat, 25; reconciliation of needs with United States interest in oil, 218–219; rising

debt burden in, 193; subregional organizations in, 8; terrorist threats in, 54–62; trade issues in, 10–11; trade relations with United States, 219–222; trends in relations with United States, 245–264; US foreign policy toward, 218–219; US investment in, 218, 219–222; US relations in human security perspective, 134–142; US relations in security/development terms, 168–171; US “selective engagement” policy in, 4; US support for peacekeeping in, 234–235; voting power in World Trade Organization, 53–54; vulnerability to terrorism, 13; “youth bulge” in, 64n16 Africa, Horn of: Cold War competition in, 101; Cold War militarization of, 99–115; contemporary hybrid nature of, 99; defining, 115n1; demise of Cold War in, 102–106; encirclement strategy in, 4, 101; geostrategic significance of, 99, 110; international terrorism in, 106–108; lack of development in, 114; poverty in, 110; radical Islam in, 106–108; regional alliances in, 106–108; regional arms race in, 101; security challenges in, 99–115; as sight for proxy battles between United States and new enemies, 108; US relations, 100–102 Africa, sub-Saharan: civil conflict in, 134; economic growth in, 11; extreme poverty in, 133, 133tab, 134; governmental legitimacy in, 134; HIV/AIDS

283

R-Index

3/17/06

284

12:03 PM

Page 284

INDEX

in, 9; human security challenge in, 133–134; lack of long-range policy for, 24; oil exports from, 11; US trade with, 220tab. See also Africa Africa Action, 136 African–African American Summit (1995, Senegal), 6 African Conflict Resolution Act (1994), 32 African Contingency Operation Training and Assistance (ACOTA), 33, 136, 137, 153, 154, 155, 233 African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), 5, 32, 46n23, 136, 137, 153, 154, 164n39 African Development Bank, 204, 210 African Growth and Opportunity Act (1996), 6, 51, 125, 136, 219, 245, 246, 253; Acceleration Act, 221; eligibility for, 219–220; exemptions for, 221; Generalized System of Preferences, 221; global economy position and, 10, 11; mixed reviews of, 13; provisions of, 221; and US-Africa trade, 221–222 African Standby Force (ASF), 34 African Union, 2, 12, 218; Constitutive Act, 34, 35; early detection and prevention of conflict by, 43; Peace and Security Council, 34; peacekeeping role, 235; as primary regional institution, 30; subregional organizations in, 46n19. See also Organization of African Unity Agenda for Peace, An (Boutros-Ghali), 26, 28 AGOA. See African Growth and Opportunity Act Ahmadiyya tariqas, 103 Aideed, Mohammed, 28 Ake, Claude, 179 Albright, Madeleine, 6 Algeria: terrorist activity in, 58 Alliances: Cold War, 23; defense, 23; regional, 106–108 Al-Qaida, 54, 107, 147; embassy bombings and, 108; in illicit trade, 57, 58; in Liberia, 58; presence in Africa, 54; in the Sahel, 120n50; in South Africa, 59; in Sudan, 107; in West Africa, 57 Angola: AGOA in, 222; civil war in, 7, 30, 52, 135tab; debt in, 135tab; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; ethnic con-

flicts in, 69; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 135tab, 152, 161app; human development index ranking in, 135tab; humanitarian assistance in, 51; humanitarian crises in, 65; motives for presence in DRC, 40; SADC, 39; Soviet Union support in, 4; US exports to, 222 Annan, Kofi, 126, 127 Apartheid, 4; OAU efforts to dismantle, 39. See also South Africa Arab Maghreb Union: in African Union, 46n19 Arms, 25, 31, 55–56, 71, 96n23, 101, 232 Assistance: airlift, 32; bilateral, 217; development, 12, 219, 224–228; military, 8, 23, 24, 218; nation-building, 71; technical, 23, 45 Association of Concerned African Scholars, 136 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 1 Atrocities Prevention Interagency Working Group, 5 Australia: debt-relief views, 203 Axworthy, Lloyd, 143n6 Baggara, 117n17 Baker, James, 210 Banjul Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 130 Baran, Paul, 29 Barre, Siad, 101, 103, 117n23 Bashir, Omar el-, 107 Belgium: debt-relief views, 200, 203 Benin: ACOTA in, 33; ACRI and, 46n23; debt cancellation for, 231; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 161app; MCC in, 227tab, 246 bin Laden, Osama, 56, 62, 106, 119n43 Blair, Tony, 21n77, 114, 230 Bosnia: ethnic conflicts in, 66; peacekeeping in, 71; public support for intervention in, 74fig, 78tab, 80tab, 90tab, 91tab Botswana: eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; HIV/AIDS funding for, 225; HIV/ AIDS prevalence in, 9, 148, 160app; IMET in, 155, 234tab; military financing for, 232tab; PEPFAR in, 158, 254; in SADC, 39, 42 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 26, 28

R-Index

3/17/06

12:03 PM

Page 285

INDEX Brahimi Report, 25 Bretton Woods system, 214n4 Brezhnev Doctrine, 4, 101 British Somaliland, 104 Britton, Bruce, 81 Brown, Gordon, 205, 209–212, 230 Brown, Ron, 6 Bryer, David, 198 Building Peace in West Africa (Adebajo), 38 Burkina Faso: debt cancellation for, 231; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 161app; intervention in Liberia, 35; MCC in, 246; objections to domination by Nigeria, 39 Burundi: African leadership in ending conflict in, 52; civil war in, 135tab; debt in, 135tab; ethnic conflicts in, 66; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 135tab, 161app; human development index ranking in, 135tab; humanitarian crises in, 65; intervention in DRC, 14; OAU intervention in, 31; peacekeeping in, 234; public support for intervention in, 76fig, 78tab, 80tab, 90tab; UN response in, 43 Bush administration (George H. W.), 4, 5, 26 Bush administration (George W.), 2; ACOTA program and, 155; Africa policy of, 7–9, 245–248; counterterrorism measures by, 109; debt-relief views, 208–209; declaration on African oil, 108; Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, 51; HIV/AIDS, 10, 156–158, 225–226, 247, 248, 249tab, 254; human security issues in Africa, 136; Liberia and, 9, 50, 51; MCA and, 19n22, 51; national security views, 7–9; neorealist considerations of, 8; PEPFAR, 157, 158; policy of selective engagement in Africa, 16; state-strategic security approach of, 248–252; strategic approach to foreign policy, 218; unilateral initiatives in Africa, 136; views on strategic importance of Africa, 49 Camdessus, Michel, 198, 201 Cameroon: eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 161app Canada: debt-relief input from, 195; debt-

285

relief views, 200, 201, 203; human security agenda, 143n6; support for debt relief for Iraq, 210 Cape Verde: eligibility for AGOA, 220tab Capitalism: liberal, 102 CAR. See Central African Republic Carter administration, 4; encirclement strategy in Horn of Africa of, 4, 101; withholding assistance to Ethiopia by, 101 Catholic Relief Services, 168, 169 Central African Republic (CAR): HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 161app; terrorist activity in, 58 Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), 1 Chad: civil war in, 30; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 161app; PSI in, 33; terrorist activity in, 58; Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative in, 62 Cheney, Dick, 218 ChevronTexaco, 168, 172, 173, 179–181 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 67, 82 China: debt-relief views, 200 Chirac, Jacques, 210 Christian Aid, 198 Christopher, Warren, 6 Clinton, Hillary, 6 Clinton administration, 2; debt-relief views, 195, 198; decisions on US role in peacekeeping, 28; division of national interests by, 24; facilitation of capital into African markets by, 16; intervention in Bosnia, 70; partnership with Africa, 5–7; request for funding for AIDS fight, 151; in Somalia, 5; trade with Africa and, 252 Cohen, Herman, 5, 24 Cold War: defense alliances, 23; demise of, 26, 102–106; globalization and, 1; political Islam and, 102–106 Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), 56 Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), 109, 232–233 Commission on Weak States and US National Security, 235 Communism: containment of, 24; fear of spread of, 3; Horn of Africa and, 101 Comoros: OAU intervention in, 31;

R-Index

3/17/06

286

12:03 PM

Page 286

INDEX

secessionist crisis in, 30, 31; in US Pacific Command, 232 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (1986), 4, 68 Comprehensive Peace Agreement on Liberia, 235 Conflict: addressing causes of, 67; African responsibilities for mitigating, 29; border, 111; civil, 64n16, 134; domestic, 13–15; escalation phase, 67, 69; ethnic, 65–94; ethnoregional, 104; faith-centered, 104; fatigue, 28; globalization of, 103; group, 12; historical, 104; influence of presidential cues on public support for, 84–85; interclan, 103; intervention, 65, 82–86; intrastate, 65, 70; liberal model of democracy as source of, 48n45; management, 24, 29, 35; mediation efforts in, 69; militarization of, 103; politicization phase, 68, 69; in post–Cold War Africa, 30–33; post-conflict phase, 69; prevention, 6, 67, 68; regional, 13–15; resolution, 6, 29, 32; triggering phase, 69; use of natural resources to sustain, 39; “youth bulge” and, 64n16 Congo-Kinshasa, 3, 4 Conté, Lansana, 37 CorpWatch, 169 Côte d’Ivoire: ACOTA in, 33; ACRI and, 46n23; British intervention in, 14; civil war in, 13; ECOWAS in, 35; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; flawed elections in, 15; French intervention in, 14; HIPC initiative in, 204; HIV/AIDS funding for, 225; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 161app; intervention in Liberia, 35; lack of market access to, 223; objections to domination by Nigeria, 39; peacekeeping in, 35, 234; PEPFAR in, 158, 254; rebel groups in, 13; UN peacekeeping force in, 14 Council on Foreign Relations, 212 Crime: against humanity, 34; international, 6; organized, 25; smuggling, 55, 56; syndicates, 57; transnational, 58 Crocker, Chester, 45n3 Currency: relations, 214n4; remittances, 103 Cyprus: ethnic conflicts in, 69

Dahab, Suwar al-, 102 Danies, Joel, 132 Debt, 191–214; bilateral concessional, 207; cancellation, 114, 219, 228–231; crises, 10–11, 195; increases in, 192; loads, 192; multilateral, 191; odious, 208, 210; Paris Club and, 193; primary commodity trade and, 192; repayment, 10, 45; service, 10; social problems and, 10; sovereign, 192; structural adjustment programs and, 192, 198; sustainability, 191, 192, 197, 202, 230 Debt Crisis Network, 198 Debt relief, 10; geopolitics of, 209–213; by poverty reduction, 191, 204–206 Decisionmaking: ability to exert leverage on, 29; collective, 26; domination by United States, 141; impact of congressional/public attitudes on, 65–94; on interventions, 66 Declaration on the Right to Development (1986), 143n17 Democracy: liberal, 48n45; mixed prospects for, 15–16; pluralist, 102; promotion of, 6 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 3, 4; African leadership in ending conflict in, 52; civil war in, 14, 40, 42, 135tab; debt in, 135tab; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; ethnic conflicts in, 69; HIV/AIDS prevalence, 135tab, 152, 161app; human development index ranking in, 135tab; humanitarian crises in, 65; illegal exports of uranium from, 148; OAU intervention in, 31; peacekeeping in, 14, 234; SADC response in, 40; UN response in, 43 Destler, I. M., 79, 81 Development: assistance, 2, 12, 219, 224–228; capacity, 33; collective selfreliance and, 29; distribution of benefits of, 143n17; dominant, 138–140; economic, 6, 10, 167; global, 126; globalization and, 138–140; human, 228; human security and, 11–13; national, 138–140; negative, 12; neoliberal model, 141; in reverse, 12; right to, 130, 131, 143n17; social, 10; trade liberalization and, 139 Diplomacy, US: “constructive engagement,” 4; in ethnic conflicts, 69; need

R-Index

3/17/06

12:03 PM

Page 287

INDEX for early engagement in, 69; preventive, 27, 32; regional, 45n3; US representation in Africa, 52, 53; US “selective engagement,” 4, 5 Djibouti: arrest of terrorists in, 109; Camp Lemonier in, 109; CJTF in, 56; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 161app; military base in, 109; military financing for, 232tab; in US Central Command, 232; US troops in, 8, 62 Doe, Samuel, 5, 35 Dokubo, Asari, 182 Douglas, Oronto, 183 Doyle, Michael, 67 DRC. See Democratic Republic of Congo Drug: interdiction, 96n23; trafficking, 6, 12, 25 East African Community: in African Union, 46n19 East Timor: ethnic conflicts in, 69 ECOMOG. See Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group Economic: development, 6, 10, 167; expansionism, 67; governance, 191; growth, 45; integration, 138; organizations, 29; policies, 2, 6; reform, 8, 60, 171 Economic Community for Central African States: in African Union, 46n19 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 218, 234; in African Union, 46n19; imposition of embargo on Sierra Leone by, 37; military interventions by, 36; peacekeeping record of, 35–39; Protocol for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security, 46n17 Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), 5, 35–37; international support for, 38; intervention in Liberia, 47n37; peacekeeping issues with, 39; reports of mistreatment of civilians by, 38 Economy: enclave, 13; food, 113; global, 6, 17n3; remittance, 103; virtual, 1 Education, 8; HIV/AIDS, 10 Egypt: in African Standby Force, 34;

287

rapid deployment forces in, 4; in US Central Command, 232; US Rapid Deployment Force in, 101 Egyptian Islamic Group, 107 Eisenhower, Dwight, 3 Elbe, Stefan, 151 Elections: flawed, 15; second democratic, 15 Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, 51, 136 Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (EHIPC) initiative, 193, 204–206, 258; assessment of, 207. See also Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative Environment: conflict in Niger Delta, 181–183; politics of control and, 169–170; protection of, 175 Environmental degradation, 12, 17n4, 167–185; damage repair, 169; multinational corporations and, 167; Niger Delta and, 173–183; oil production and, 173–183 Environmental Rights Action (ERA), 169 Equatorial Guinea: exports to US, 11; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 161app; lack of diplomatic representation in, 53; oil production in, 172 Eritrea: arrest of terrorists in, 109; border conflict with Ethiopia, 7, 14, 113; British occupation, 116n7; civil war in, 111; Eritrean People’s Liberation Front in, 106; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 161app; independence, 5; Italian occupation, 116n7; military financing for, 232tab; OAU intervention in, 31; per capita income in, 15; poverty in, 111; strategic location of, 100; UN peacekeeping mission in, 15; in US Central Command, 232; US relations with, 105 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC), 15 Eritrean Islamic Jihad, 119n39 Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), 106 Essential Action, 169, 178 Ethiopia: ACRI and, 46n23; agrarian system in, 113; Agreement for the Utilization of Defense Installations within the Ethiopian Empire in, 100; arrest of terrorists in, 109; border conflict with Eritrea, 7, 14, 102, 113;

R-Index

3/17/06

288

12:03 PM

Page 288

INDEX

British influence in, 100; capacity development in, 33; conflict with Somalia, 101; counterinsurgency training by United States in, 116n8; debt cancellation for, 231; debt relief in, 208; demise of Marxist regime in, 5; Derg in, 101; developmental needs, 113, 114; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; EPRDF in, 5; Ethiopian Environmental Protection Authority, 113; expansion of military in, 101; failure of national economy in, 113; food crisis in, 112; in Four Point Program, 100; HIV/AIDS funding for, 225; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 148–151, 161app; humanitarian assistance in, 51; IMET in, 155, 234tab; Italian occupation of, 100; lack of market access to, 223; military in, 100, 116n13, 232tab; mutual defense agreement with Kenya, 116n11; Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with, 100; opposition groups in, 102; OAU intervention in, 31; per capita income in, 15; poverty in, 21n72, 111; PEPFAR in, 158, 254; as regional anchor, 8; secret agreements with, 100–101; and Soviet Union, 3, 4, 105; strategic location of, 100; US alliance with, 100; in US Central Command, 232; US presence in, 3; US relations with, 105, 113; in war on terrorism, 8 Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), 5, 106 Ethnic: cleansing, 14; conflicts, 65–94; lobbies, 66 Eurodad, 201, 204 European Union, 1; assistance in building peacekeeping capacities in Africa, 32; subsidy conflict with United States, 223 Evans, Gareth, 65 ExxonMobil, 168, 172, 173 Farah, Douglas, 58 Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP), 232 Foreign Military Sales Program (FMSP), 232 France: assistance in building peacekeeping capacities in Africa, 32; colonial

interests in Africa, 24; debt-relief views, 198, 200, 201; intervention in Côte d’Ivoire, 14; opposition to debt relief for Iraq, 210; prioritization of African poverty by, 114; RECAMP, 32 Gabon: AGOA in, 222; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 161app; oil production in, 172 Gambia: eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 161app Genocide, 5 Germany: debt-relief views, 200, 201, 203, 205; opposition to debt relief for Iraq, 210 Ghana: ACOTA in, 33; ACRI and, 46n23; debt cancellation for, 231; elections in, 16; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 154, 161app; IMET in, 155, 234tab; lack of market access to, 223; MCC in, 227tab, 246; military financing for, 232tab; objections to domination by Nigeria, 39; support for peace negotiations in Liberia, 37 Global AIDS Alliance, 10 Global AIDS and Tuberculosis Relief Act (2000), 7 Global Exchange, 169 Global Fund for AIDS, 136 Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, 226 Globalization: benefits of, 17n3; challenges of, 1–17; defining, 1; dominant development discourse and, 138–140; economic, 128; effects of, 13; governance and, 17n3; impact in Horn of Africa region, 99; merits of, 1; neoliberal macroeconomic policies and, 139; standards of living and, 17n3 Global Witness, 58, 168 Goodman, Amy, 180 Governance: economic, 191; global, 140–142 Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), 58 Group of 7 (G7), 139, 191, 192, 198, 207 Group of 8 (G8), 114, 115, 128, 212, 213, 225, 230 Group of 20 (G-20), 224

R-Index

3/17/06

12:03 PM

Page 289

INDEX Guinea: eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 161app; peacekeeping in, 234; terrorist activity in, 58 Guinea-Bissau: civil war in, 30; ECOWAS in, 35; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 161app; peacekeeping in, 35 Haile Selassie, 100, 101 Hassan, Sayyid Muhammad Abdille, 103, 118n28 Hawala, 105 Health care, 8; fee-based, 159; spending for, 10; strengthening public health sector, 165n52. See also HIV/AIDS Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, 191, 192, 195–204, 229, 230, 257, 258; approval for, 202; consultation and review of, 205; costs of, 205; debt relief and, 10; freeing resources through, 10; projected costs of, 203; slow beginning for, 203–204; Trust Fund, 203. See also Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative Hezbollah, 119n39 Hinckley, Ronald, 79 HIPC. See Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative HIV/AIDS, 147–161; African national security interests and, 151–153; battlefield casualties and, 164n33; commitment of resources to combat, 10; difficulty in obtaining generic drugs for, 10; education and awareness campaigns, 10, 149–150; Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, 51, 125; evolution of perception of security threat, 151–156; federal funding for, 157fig; impact of, 50, 159; infection rates, 9; as international security issue, 8, 153–156; labor productivity and, 159; lack of treatment for, 148; links to civil war, 162n1; orphans and, 150; pandemic, 9, 10, 148–151; in peacekeeping forces, 154–156; prevalence in Africa, 148; prevention and treatment, 150; public health spending on, 9; regionalization of, 147; state failure and, 147; terrorism and, 147; threat of failed states and, 156; transmission,

289

162n3; US interests in availability of peacekeeping forces and, 153–156; US investment in training military forces and, 153–156; urbanization and, 149, 162n10; weakening of military forces and, 151–153; women, 148, 162n10 Hoffmann, Stanley, 44 Holbrooke, Richard, 7 Humanitarianism: aid for, 50; emphasis on Africa as object of charity, 51; in Liberia, 50; limits of, 50–53; in Rwanda, 50; in Sierra Leone, 50 Human Rights Watch, 168, 169, 178, 181 Human Security Commission, 143n6 Human Security Network, 143n6 Identity: common, 260; contested, 35 Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), 169, 179 IMF. See International Monetary Fund (IMF) Income: inequality, 17n4 Individualism, 130 Institutions: defense, 39; financial, 17n2, 113, 139; international, 8, 139; state, 104 Inter-Congolese Dialogue, 42 Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD), 14 Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 218 International Atomic Energy Agency, 147 International community: declining interest in Africa, 23; disparities in commitment to containing conflicts in, 28; failure to intervene in Liberia, 35; failure to intervene in Rwanda, 28; support for peacekeeping missions, 27 International Contact Group on Liberia, 37 International Criminal Court, 8 International Development Association (IDA), 203 International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), 155, 233–234 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 139, 141, 191; on agricultural subsidies, 136; Compensatory Financing Facility, 237; creation of, 214n4; debt relief and, 195, 197, 198, 200, 202, 204, 215n12; HIPC initiative and, 10; struc-

R-Index

3/17/06

12:03 PM

Page 290

290

INDEX

tural adjustment programs, 174, 228 Interstate Defense and Security Committee, 40 Intervention: congressional resistance to, 85–86; debates on, 27; facilitation, 69; impact of demographics on support for, 86–93; influence of elites on, 83–84; influence of presidential cues on public support for, 84–85; military force, 65, 72, 73, 73fig, 74fig, 75fig, 76fig, 77fig, 78tab, 80tab; multilateral, 79–82; need for public support for, 66, 70–72; noncombatant evacuation, 71; nonmilitary force, 70, 71, 73, 73fig, 74fig, 75fig, 76fig, 77fig, 78tab, 80tab; operations other than war, 71, 73, 73fig, 74fig, 75fig, 76fig, 77fig, 78tab, 80tab, 96n23; public support for, 72–93; risk factors in, 82–83; unilateral, 79–82; without consent of target state, 34 Investment: direct foreign, 13; private, 16, 192, 198 Iraq: debt relief and, 209–213; patronage of Sudan by, 102 Islam: charities of, 104, 116n15; fundamentalist, 25; jihad and, 106; militant, 56, 58, 59; Muslim Brotherhood and, 56; in Nigeria, 59–62; radical, 102, 104, 106–108; “of resentment,” 119n48; Sufi, 103; traditional, 102; Wahabbi, 103, 104, 117n25, 117n26 Islamic Charter Front, 107 Islamic Group, 119n39 Islamic Jihad, 148 Islamic Union, 105 Isolationism, 82 Italian Somalia, 104 Italy: debt-relief views, 200, 201 Jackson, Jesse, 37 Janjaweed groups, 14 Japan: debt-relief views, 198, 200, 201, 203; opposition to debt relief for Iraq, 210 Jawara, Dauda, 39 Jihad: dissemination of, 106 Jones, James, 184, 231 Jubilee 2000, 204, 206, 208 Jubilee Research, 208 Jubilee USA, 205, 211 Kabbah, Ahmed Tejan, 37, 38

Kabila, Joseph, 42 Kabila, Laurent, 14, 40, 42 Kansteiner, Walter III, 172 Kaplan, Robert, 67 Kennedy, John F., 3 Kenya: ACOTA in, 33; ACRI and, 46n23; AGOA and, 11; in African Standby Force, 34; Al-Qaida in, 54; arrest of terrorists in, 109; capacity development in, 33; counterterrorism laws in, 55; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; embassy bombing in, 7, 13, 25, 54–56, 107, 108; HIV/AIDS funding for, 225; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 148, 152, 161app; humanitarian crises in, 65; IMET in, 155, 234tab; Kenya African National Union in, 15; lack of market access to, 223; military financing for, 232tab; mutual defense agreement with Ethiopia, 116n11; National Rainbow Coalition in, 15; poverty in, 111; PEPFAR in, 158, 254; rapid deployment forces in, 4; as regional anchor, 8; terrorist activity in, 58, 108, 109; in US Central Command, 232; US Rapid Deployment Force in, 101; US relations with, 105; in war on terrorism, 8 Kenya African National Union, 15 Keyes, Dred Scott, 180 Klare, Michael, 171 Kosovo: ethnic conflicts in, 66; peacekeeping, 71; public support for intervention in, 78tab, 80tab, 91tab, 92tab, 93tab Krueger, Anne, 136 Kukpolokun, Funsho, 181 Kull, Steven, 79, 81 Larson, Eric, 82–83 Lawson, Max, 212 Lesotho: AGOA and, 11; constitutional crisis in, 48n46; elections in, 42; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; first-pastthe-post election system in, 42; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 148, 160app; Lesotho Defense Forces in, 42; MCC in, 227tab, 246; political unrest in, 42, 43; in SADC, 39 Lesotho Defense Forces, 42 Liberia: African leadership in ending conflict in, 52; Al-Qaida in, 58; civil war in, 30, 35, 135tab; debt in, 135tab;

R-Index

3/17/06

12:03 PM

Page 291

INDEX ECOWAS in, 35, 36; ECOMOG in, 36, 47n37; economic mismanagement in, 37; elections in, 37; establishment of, 3; ethnic conflicts in, 66, 69; Firestone Rubber Company in, 3; HIV/AIDS prevalence, 135tab, 161app; humanitarian assistance in, 50; Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, 37; military financing for, 232tab; NPFL in, 35; peacekeeping in, 35, 234; political repression in, 37; public support for intervention in, 77fig, 78tab, 80tab, 90tab; state failure in, 156; UNOMIL in, 36; UN response in, 43; US intervention in, 50, 51 Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), 37 Libya: International Atomic Energy Agency in, 147; patronage of Sudan by, 102 Linklater, Andrew, 130, 143n14 Lomé Accord (1999), 38 Lusaka Cease-Fire Accord (1999), 42 Lysoen Declaration of 1998, 143n6 Macedonia: ethnic conflicts in, 69 Madagascar: debt cancellation for, 231; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; MCC in, 227tab, 246; in US Pacific Command, 232 Mahdi, Sadiq al-, 102 Malawi: ACOTA in, 33; ACRI and, 46n23; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 161app; in SADC, 39 Mali: ACOTA in, 33; ACRI and, 46n23; debt cancellation for, 231; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 161app; MCC in, 227tab, 246; PSI in, 33; terrorist activity in, 58 Mandela, Nelson, 31 Market(s): access to, 223; for African products, 11, 13; agricultural, 17n2; capitalist, 12; distortion, 17n2; interference in, 17n2; opening, 13; stagnation in, 139 Masire, Sir Ketumile, 42 Mauritania: debt cancellation for, 231; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; HIV/ AIDS prevalence in, 161app; PSI in, 33; terrorist activity in, 62

291

Mauritius: elections in, 16; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; HIV/AIDS in, 9 Mbeki, Thabo, 150 McConnell, Mitch, 82 Menkhaus, Ken, 58, 165n45 Military: activities during peacetime, 71; assistance, 8, 24, 218; force, 72; interventions, 65; threats, 25; training programs, 32 Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), 7, 19n22, 51, 114, 125, 136, 225–228, 246, 252, 253 Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), 227, 246, 247 Millennium Development Goals (MDG), 21n77, 45, 114, 209, 210, 228, 230 Mobutu Sese Seko, 4, 40 Montague, Dena, 171 Mooryan gangs, 104, 118n31 Moose, George, 6 Morocco: MCC in, 246; support for peace negotiations in Liberia, 37; trade agreements with, 51 Mosisili, Pakalitha Bethuel, 42 Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), 169, 174, 177– 179 Mozambique: civil war in, 30, 52; debt cancellation for, 231; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; HIPC initiative in, 10, 204; HIV/AIDS funding for, 225; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 161app; humanitarian assistance in, 51; humanitarian crises in, 65; MCC in, 227tab, 246; peacekeeping in, 27; PEPFAR in, 158, 254; in SADC, 39; Soviet Union support in, 4 Mubarak, Hosni, 56, 107 Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, 213 Multilateralism, 67; assertive, 26, 81; “creeping,” 82; major powers and, 26 Multinational corporations: cooperation of US government in gaining access to African oil, 172; environmental degradation and, 167; international safety standards and, 169; in Niger Delta, 173–183; in oil production, 173–183; pollution of ecosystem by, 173; profits by, 174; as symbol of US hegemony, 169; viewed as exploiters/polluters, 175 Museveni, Yoweri, 149–150

R-Index

3/17/06

12:03 PM

Page 292

292

INDEX

Muslim Brotherhood, 56, 116n15 Muyangwa, Monde, 32 Namibia: eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; HIV/AIDS funding for, 225; HIV/ AIDS prevalence in, 160app; humanitarian crises in, 65; intervention in DRC, 14; liberation struggles in, 30; peacekeeping in, 27; PEPFAR in, 158, 254; in SADC, 39 National Energy Policy Report (Cheney Report), 171 National Islamic Front (NIF), 107 National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), 35 National Rainbow Coalition, 15 National Summit on Africa (1999), 7 Nef, Jorge, 126 NEPAD. See New Partnership for Africa’s Development Netherlands: debt-relief views, 200; support for HIPC assistance, 198, 199 New International Economic Order (NIEO), 192 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 2, 12, 236 “New world order,” 24 NGOs. See Nongovernmental organizations Nicaragua: debt relief in, 201 Niger: debt cancellation for, 231; debt relief in, 208; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 161app; PSI in, 33; terrorist activity in, 58 Niger Delta: biodiversity in, 173; British occupation of, 173; collapse of living standards in, 174; criminal networks in, 181; environmental conflict in, 181–183; fragile ecosystem in, 173; multinational corporations in, 173– 183; oil production in, 173–183; power relations in, 176; reduction of oil production in, 182, 183; violence over oil production in, 175, 177–179 Niger Delta Environmental Survey, 179 Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, 182 Niger Delta Volunteer Service, 182 Nigeria: ACOTA in, 33; AGOA in, 220tab, 222; in African Standby Force, 34; austerity measures in, 174;

autocratic regimes in, 6; capacity development in, 33; civil war in, 30; conflict with oil communities, 179– 181; criminal/drug syndicates in, 61; debt in, 174; debt relief in, 216n31; dependence on oil receipts, 174; economic reform in, 60; economic significance of, 8; fraud (scam letters) and, 61; hanging of Ogoni Nine in, 178, 179; HIV/AIDS funding for, 225; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 148, 161app; infrastructure spending in, 174; IMET in, 155, 234tab; intervention in Liberia, 9, 37, 47n37; Islam in, 59–62; lack of diplomatic representation in, 53; military financing for, 232tab; military occupation in, 175, 176; neglect of agriculture in, 174; oil exports to United States, 61; oil production in, 172, 174; opposition over oil production, 174; partnership with oil multinationals, 176–177; patrimonial networks in, 174; PEPFAR in, 158, 254; as petrostate, 176–177; political intentions in peacekeeping missions, 38, 39; political unrest in, 59, 60; poverty in, 59; pressure to reform, 6; as regional anchor, 8; religious tension in, 57, 59–62; repression of oil communities in Niger Delta, 178, 179; sharia law in, 59, 60; structural adjustment programs in, 174; terrorist activity in, 59–62; US exports to, 222 Niweigha, Ken, 180 Nixon administration, 3 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs): debt relief, 191–195, 200, 201, 207–209, 212; HIV/AIDS, 10, 150; human rights, 178; indigenous, 150; provision of leadership in Africa, 17; reports on terrorist activities, 58; in Somalia, 104; state abdication of responsibilities and, 159; Western, 104 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 24; humanitarian intervention by, 71; intervention in Yugoslavia, 28 Norway: human security agenda, 143n6

R-Index

3/17/06

12:03 PM

Page 293

INDEX Nunn, Sam, 85 Nye, Joseph S., Jr., 66 Nyerere, Julius, 31 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 59–61, 183, 245 Office of the Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, 5 Ogoni Bill of Rights, 178 Oil: alternative sources of, 172; competition for, 171–173; cooperation of US government in gaining access to African oil, 172; environmental degradation and, 167–185; export earnings from, 174; human security and, 170; Niger Delta and, 173–183; offshore, 171; politics of control and, 169–170, 176; prices/price collapse, 174; production/demand, 172; spills, 169; strategic importance of, 169–170; technology, 169; unregulated exploitation of, 12 Oman: US Rapid Deployment Force in, 4, 101 OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Operation Enduring Freedom, 233 Operation Restore Hope, 5 Operation Sharp Edge, 36 Organization for Economic Cooperation (OECD), 193, 223 Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), 14 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 107; African marginalization, 45n2; declaration on “Political and SocioEconomic Situation in Africa,” 33; direct mediation by, 30, 31; fact-finding missions by, 31; intervention in DRC, 42; joint actions with UN, 35; limited abilities to deal with conflicts, 30; Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, 12, 34; peacekeeping measures by, 30; peace work in Eritrea and Ethiopia, 15. See also African Union Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 8, 173, 174 Organizations: capacity building of, 30; civil society, 168; commercial, 66; economic, 29; international, 68; local, 29; national, 29; regional, 29, 43, 218; subregional, 14, 23, 44, 218; terrorist, 105

293

Ostergard, Robert, 152, 154 Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 137 Oxfam, 140, 196, 198, 200, 201, 204, 212 Pakistan: terrorist activity in, 58 Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 119n39 Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), 33, 137 Parekh, Bhikhu, 71 Paris Club, 191, 193, 195, 200, 202, 203, 212, 214n3 Peace and Security Council, 234 Peacekeeping: in Africa, 23–45; low-cost measures favored by Western states, 25–26; requirements for success of, 38; as Security Council responsibility, 25; subregional, 39; training for, 137. See also individual countries People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), 58, 59 Pettifor, Ann, 208 Philippines: terrorist activity in, 58 Policy: aid, 217–238; economic, 2, 6; energy, 218; foreign, 66, 131–133; initiatives, 6; national development, 138–140; scorched earth, 14, 56; trade, 50, 126, 140, 217–238 Policymaking: “blinders” in Horn of Africa, 116n4 Political: alignment, 103; capital, 28; competition, 59; instability, 11, 12, 14, 25; patronage, 31; repression, 37; security, 114; sovereignty, 11; values, 39 Politics: environmental, 128; as freedom from domination, 130; international, 27; oil, 176; post–Cold War, 27 Portugal: colonial interests in Africa, 24 Poverty: economic growth and, 11; extreme, 133, 133tab, 134; human security and, 111–114; impact on migration, 50; reduction, 192, 204–206; refugees and, 50; susceptibility to disease and, 120n61 Powell, Colin, 133, 156 Presidential Trade for African Development and Enterprise (TRADE), 219 President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), 157, 158, 159, 165n48, 254 President’s Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa, 6, 7 Prices: commodity, 140tab, 222; export,

R-Index

3/17/06

12:03 PM

Page 294

294

INDEX

11; oil, 174; primary commodity, 11 Production: agricultural, 112; subsistence, 17n4 Program on International Policy Attitudes, 82 Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (PPDSC), 39 Putin, Vladimir, 212 Quadriyya tariqas, 103 Raylor, Charles, 38 Reagan administration, 4, 67; opposition to intervention in South Africa, 68, 84 Reductionism: sociopolitical, 130 Reform: economic, 8, 60 Refugees, 31, 111; Liberian, 35; poverty and, 50; in Sierra Leone, 37; Somali, 104 Regimes: authoritarian, 108; autocratic, 6, 16 Reilly, William, 80 Relativism: communitarian, 130 Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de maintien de la Paix (RECAMP), 32 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 31 Resources: competition for, 59; depletion of, 12, 17n4; financial, 45; mineral, 11; natural, 2; nonrenewable, 12; technological, 45; used to sustain conflicts, 39 Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 37 Rice, Susan, 6 Rielly, John, 70 Rights: civil, 130, 132, 134; cultural, 130; to development, 130, 131, 143n17; economic, 130; human, 6, 15–16, 27, 55, 66, 178; intellectual property, 141; political, 130, 132 Russia: debt-relief views, 200; opposition to debt relief for Iraq, 210; in Paris Club, 203 Rwanda: civil war in, 135tab; debt cancellation for, 231; debt in, 135tab; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; ethnic conflicts in, 66, 68, 69; genocide in, 5, 26, 28, 50, 72, 128; HIV/AIDS funding for, 225; HIV/AIDS prevalence, 135tab, 161app; human development index ranking in, 135tab; humanitarian assistance in, 50, 71; humanitarian

crises in, 65; noncombatant evacuation in, 71; OAU intervention in, 31; PEPFAR in, 158, 254; public support for intervention in, 75fig, 78tab, 80tab, 90tab, 91tab; UN response in, 43 Sachs, Jeffrey, 21n75 Saddam Hussein, 210 Sahnoun, Mohamed, 65 Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat: terrorist activity by, 58 Sambanis, Nicholas, 67 Saro-Wiwa, Ken, 174, 175, 179 Scahill, Jeremy, 180 Schneider, William, 67 Schraeder, Peter, 25 Schroeder, Gerhard, 205, 230 Security: elements of, 129tab; food, 111, 112, 120n62; global, 110; HIV/AIDS as threat to, 147–161; impact of failed states on, 50; international, 8, 11; national, 7–9, 9, 11, 24, 25, 44, 128, 147; neorealist view of, 11; orthodox, 129tab; political, 114; poverty and, 111–114; public health in Africa and, 158–160; regional, 11, 110; statestrategic, 248–252, 258–261; strategy, 24; threats, 6, 7 Security, human, 11–13, 34, 125–143, 252–258, 258–261; defining, 126– 131; elements of, 129tab; freedom from fear, 126, 127, 128, 143n6; freedom from want, 126, 127, 128; normative power of, 130–131; obstacles to, 140; reflection in US-Africa relations, 125, 134–142; sub-Saharan challenge to, 133–134; as tool for policy evaluation, 131; US position on, 131–133 Senegal: ACOTA in, 33; ACRI and, 46n23; debt cancellation for, 231; elections in, 16; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; HIV/AIDS in, 10; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 161app; IMET in, 155, 243tab; military financing for, 232tab; MCC in, 227tab, 246; support for peace negotiations in Liberia, 37 Seychelles: eligibility for AGOA, 220tab Sierra Club, 178 Sierra Leone: civil war in, 13, 30, 135tab; debt in, 135tab; democratically elect-

R-Index

3/17/06

12:03 PM

Page 295

INDEX ed government in, 13; ECOWAS in, 35; elections in, 38; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; ethnic conflicts in, 69; HIV/AIDS prevalence, 135tab, 161app; human development index ranking in, 135tab; humanitarian assistance in, 50, 51; peace enforcement force in, 38; peacekeeping in, 35, 234; Revolutionary United Front in, 37; Ruling Military Council on, 37; UN response in, 43 Smuggling, 55, 56 Snow, John, 210 Social: development, 10; equity, 111; instability, 25; justice, 111, 128; programs, 174; tensions, 174; transformation, 130; welfare, 171 Socialism: scientific, 101, 103, 117n22 Somalia: Al-Qaida in, 54, 55; banning of ethnic affiliations in, 103; border conflicts in, 102; civil war in, 103, 112, 135tab; conflict with Ethiopia, 101; debt in, 135tab; disengagement in, 65; ethnic conflicts in, 66; food security crisis in, 112; HIV/AIDS prevalence, 135tab, 161app; human development index ranking in, 135tab; humanitarian assistance in, 5, 65, 71, 86, 104, 112; humanitarian crises in, 65; migration from, 103; military assistance in, 101; military in, 116n13; Mooryan in, 104, 118n31; nationalism in, 104; non-governmental organizations in, 104; Operation Restore Hope in, 5; opposition groups in, 102; public support for intervention in, 75fig, 78tab, 80tab, 91tab, 92tab; rapid deployment forces in, 4; refugees from, 104; remittance economy in, 118n30, 118n32; Soviet Union support in, 4, 101; state failure in, 156; terrorist activity in, 109, 165n45; UN inability to restore peace in, 28; US Rapid Deployment Force in, 101; warlordism in, 55; withdrawal of forces from, 28 South Africa: apartheid regime in, 4; ACOTA in, 33; AGOA and, 11, 220tab, 222; in African Standby Force, 34; apartheid in, 16; capacity development in, 33; Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act and, 68; “constructive engagement” in, 4; economic

295

significance of, 8; ethnic conflicts in, 66; HIV/AIDS funding for, 225; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 148, 149, 150, 160app; humanitarian crises in, 65; IMET in, 155, 234tab; militant Islam in, 58, 59; PEPFAR in, 158, 254; pressure to reform, 4; public support for intervention in, 74fig, 78tab, 80tab, 92tab, 93tab; as regional anchor, 8; struggle to end apartheid in, 30; terrorist activity in, 58, 59; United States and, 3, 4; US exports to, 222; US support for civil society in, 4 Southern Africa Customs Union, 224; trade agreements with, 51 Southern African Development Community (SADC), 39–43, 218; in African Union, 46n19; emphasis on integration by, 39; functions and objectives, 39, 40; intervention in Lesotho, 42, 43; Organ on Politics, Defense and Security, 39; Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation, 39 Sovereignty: absence of, 112; absolute nature of, 34; political, 11 Soviet Union: Brezhnev Doctrine and, 4, 101; presence in Ethiopia, 3; removal from Afghanistan, 106 State(s): anarchic, 55; collapse, 58; destabilization of, 148; failed, 44, 50, 153, 156; institutions, 104; monopolies, 17n3; socialist, 4, 101; theocratic, 102; weak, 54, 57 Structural adjustment programs, 159, 198, 207, 228 Subsidies: agricultural, 136, 223, 224, 236; “blue box,” 224; domestic, 224; ending, 236; export, 224; market distorting, 17n2; removal of, 224 Sudan: accusations against United States by, 57; African leadership in ending conflict in, 52; Al-Qaida in, 107; antiAmericanism in, 102, 103; arrest of terrorists in, 109; autocratic regimes in, 6; bin Laden in, 56, 106, 107; border conflicts in, 102; civil war in, 14, 56, 111, 135tab; Darfur region, 14, 50, 56, 102, 111; debt in, 135tab; Democratic Union Party in, 116n15; endorsement of radical Islam, 107; ethnic cleansing in, 14; ethnic con-

R-Index

3/17/06

296

12:03 PM

Page 296

INDEX

flicts in, 66, 69; HIV/AIDS prevalence, 135tab, 161app; human development index ranking in, 135tab; humanitarian assistance in, 51; humanitarian crises in, 57, 65; janjaweed groups in, 14, 102, 117n18, 117n19; Muslim Brotherhood in, 116n15; National Islamic Front in, 107; peacekeeping in, 234, 235; political instability in, 14; poverty in, 111; pressure to reform, 6; public support for intervention in, 78tab, 80tab, 93tab; rapid deployment forces in, 4; Sudan People’s Liberation Army/ Movement in, 102; terrorist activity in, 120n56; theocratic regime in, 102; Umma Party in, 116n15; UN sanctions on, 56; US bombing of, 56, 108; in US Central Command, 232; US Rapid Deployment Force in, 101 Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), 14, 102 Summers, Larry, 206 Swaziland: AGOA and, 11; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 148, 160app; in SADC, 39 Sweden: debt-relief views, 200; support for assistance to Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, 198 Switzerland: debt-relief views, 200 Tanzania: Al-Qaida in, 54; debt cancellation for, 231; in ECOMOG, 36; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; embassy bombing in, 7, 13, 25, 54, 56, 107, 108; HIV/AIDS funding for, 225; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 10, 152, 159, 161app; PEPFAR in, 158, 254; in SADC, 39 Tariffs, 223 Taylor, Charles, 5, 9, 35, 36, 37, 57 Taylor, John, 210 Technology: communications, 12, 103; electronic, 1; information, 16, 17n3; oil, 169; satellite, 1 Terrorism, 6; approaches to, 49–63; in Central Africa, 57–59; in East Africa, 54–57; embassy bombings, 13; failed/ weak states and, 54, 57, 58; HIV/ AIDS and, 147; in Horn of Africa, 54–57; human rights and, 55; international, 13, 106–108; in Kenya, 7;

opposition to US culture and, 13; organizations in Africa, 54; Somali involvement in, 55; in Tanzania, 7; vulnerability of African states to, 13; weapons flows and, 55, 56; in West Africa, 57–59; World Trade Center attack, 13 Third World: socialist states in, 4 Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), 106 Togo: HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 161app Toure, Toumani, 17n2 Trade: barriers, 10, 223; bilateral, 141; distribution of benefits of, 145n45; fair, 209; free, 12, 139; illicit diamond, 13; issues, 10–11; liberalization, 139; multilateral system, 223– 224; open, 139, 252; patterns, 192; policy, 50, 126, 140, 217–238; promotion, 35; protectionism, 11; terms of, 45, 132; worldwide, 2 Trade for African Development and Enterprise (TRADE), 219 Transparency International, 60 Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative, 58, 62, 231 Treaty of Lagos (1975), 35 Truman administration: Four Point Program, 100 Tsie, Belefi, 34 Turabi, Hassan, 56, 107 Twun, Daniel, 154 Uganda: ACOTA in, 33; ACRI and, 46n23; debt cancellation for, 231; debt relief in, 196, 201; in ECOMOG, 36; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; HIPC initiative in, 10, 204; HIV/AIDS funding for, 225; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 10, 149–150, 152, 161app; intervention in DRC, 14; lack of market access to, 223; military financing for, 232tab; PEPFAR in, 158, 254; US relations with, 105 Uganda Debt Network, 196 United Kingdom: assistance in building peacekeeping capacities in Africa, 32; colonial interests in Africa, 24; commitments of troops to Middle East and Europe, 23; debt cancellation position, 230; debt-relief views, 195, 200, 201; funding for ECOMOG, 37; interven-

R-Index

3/17/06

12:03 PM

Page 297

INDEX tion in Côte d’Ivoire, 14; prioritization of African poverty by, 114; support for debt relief for Iraq, 210; support for HIPC assistance, 198; support for peace negotiations in Liberia, 37 United Nations (UN): credibility issues, 28; Declaration on the Right to Development, 143n17; Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 72; inability to restore peace in Somalia, 28; jurisdiction of, 27; maintenance of peace and security, 44; peacekeeping missions, 14, 15; role in post–Cold War international politics, 27; world conferences by, 26 United Nations Charter: peace operations in, 30; prohibitions against use of force in, 27; role of regional organizations in, 43 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 132 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 139, 193 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 133 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 143 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, 111 United Nations General Assembly, 143n17 United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), 15 United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), 36 United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNISOM II), 26, 28 United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), 14 United Nations Security Council: authority erosion, 28; discussion of human security in, 143n6; divisions on use of force, 28; on domestic sovereignty, 27; double standards regarding Africa, 43; monitoring of Lusaka Accord by, 42; possible enhanced post–Cold War consensus in, 26; responses to African emergencies, 23; sanctions on Sudan by, 56 United States: access to markets for African products, 218–219; African

297 relations in human security perspective, 134–142; African relations in security/development terms, 168–171; African relations post-9/11, 109–111; agricultural subsidies, 223; aid to Africa, 225, 226, 227; antiterrorism assistance from, 56; commitments of troops to Middle East and Europe, 23; conflict prevention and, 67; CongoKinshasa and, 3, 4; debt cancellation position, 228–231; debt relief in Iraq, 209–213; debt-relief views, 200, 201, 203, 206, 208–209; development assistance to Africa, 224–228; domination of decisionmaking by, 141; energy policy, 218; Ethiopian relations, 110, 113; Farm Bill of 2002, 223; foreign policy effects on environmental degradation in Africa, 167– 185; foreign policy toward Africa, 2, 218–219; HIV/AIDS in Africa, 147–161, 156–158, 225–226; Horn of Africa relations, 100–102; humanitarian focus in Africa, 50–53, 131–133; import restrictions, 11; indifference to African affairs, 3, 217; intervention in ethnic conflicts, 65–94; intervention in Liberia, 35–37, 50, 51; intervention operations other than war, 71; intervention reluctance, 23; investment in Africa, 218–222; isolationist impulses of, 67; lack of long-range policy for sub-Saharan Africa, 24; liberal internationalist commitment of, 67; limited interest in Africa, 24–33; military and security cooperation with Africa, 231–235; military training programs, 32; moral obligations to respond to emergencies, 44; multilateral intervention, 79–82; multinational oil companies, 168–171; national interests of, 2; national security and African public health, 158–160; national security interests, 9; need for African resources, 2; Nigerian relations, 59–62; oil imports from Africa, 8, 61; peacekeeping in Africa, 32, 234–235; public response to African conflicts, 70–72; in role of protector, 67–70; Senate Military Construction Appropriations Subcom-mittee, 231; South Africa and, 3, 4; strategic interests in

R-Index

3/17/06

298

12:03 PM

Page 298

INDEX

Africa, 53–54; support for authoritarian regimes joining US coalition, 108; trade policy, 140; trade protectionism and, 11; trade with Africa, 53–54, 219–222, 220tab; trends in relations with Africa, 245–264; UN multilateral missions, 81 Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), 178 US Agency for International Development (USAID), 113, 219 US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 232 US European Command (EUCOM), 32, 62 US House Committee on Foreign Relations, 109 US Institute for Peace, 29 US Pacific Command (PACOM), 62 US Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), 101 US State Department: Africa Bureau, 4 Vienna Convention and Programme of Action on Human Rights (1993), 27, 130 Vogt, Margaret, 32 Wall, Richard, 132 War: crimes, 34; on terrorism, 212 White House Conference on Africa, 6 Wolfensohn, James, 196, 198, 203, 211 World Bank, 139, 191; attention to poverty, 12; creation of, 214n4; debt relief

and, 195–204, 215n12; Development Committee, 198, 201; HIPC initiative and, 10; structural adjustment programs, 174 World Health Organization, 148, 149 World Trade Organization (WTO), 2, 141, 219; African voting power in, 50, 53–54; collapse of Cancun talks, 224; Doha trade round, 53–54, 223; Hong Kong Sixth Ministerial Conference of, 223; protests against, 2; reform of multilateral trade system, 223–224; subsidies and, 140 Yemen: Soviet Union support in, 4; terrorist activity in, 109 Yugoslavia: ethnic conflicts in, 66; NATO intervention in, 28 Zaire, 3 Zambia: Al-Qaida in, 54; debt cancellation for, 231; eligibility for AGOA, 220tab; HIV/AIDS funding for, 225; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 148, 160app; PEPFAR in, 158, 254; in SADC, 39 Zimbabwe: flawed elections in, 15; HIV/AIDS prevalence in, 148, 152, 160app; intervention in DRC, 14; liberation struggles in, 30; motives for presence in DRC, 40; in SADC, 39 Zoellick, Robert, 224

R-ATB

3/17/06

11:52 AM

Page 299

ABOUT THE BOOK

R

eflecting the debate between state-centered and human-security approaches to security strategy, Africa-US Relations explores the interactions between the US and African countries in a wide spectrum of key arenas. The authors range from considering such traditional security issues as peacekeeping and terrorism to concerns with HIV/AIDS, environmental degradation, aid policies, and international trade. Their contributions place in sharp relief the differences in inner logic and preferred consequences among alternative strategic perspectives—as well as the implications of those differences for policy choices.

Donald Rothchild is professor of political science at the University of California, Davis, and Edmond J. Keller is professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles. Among the numerous books on which the two have collaborated are Africa in the New International Order and Afro-Marxist Regimes.

299