State Violence and the Right to Peace: an International Survey of the Views of Ordinary People [4 Volumes] : An International Survey of the Views of Ordinary People 9780275996482, 9780275996475

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State Violence and the Right to Peace

State Violence and the Right to Peace An International Survey of the Views of Ordinary People Volume 1: Western Europe and North America

Kathleen Malley-Morrison, Editor Foreword by John M. Whiteley PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC

Copyright 2009 by Kathleen Malley-Morrison All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data State violence and the right to peace : an international survey of the views of ordinary people / edited by Kathleen Malley-Morrison ; foreword by John M. Whiteley. p. ; cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-275-99647-5 (hard copy : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-275-99648-2 (ebook) 1. Violence—Europe—History. 2. Violence—North America—History. I. Malley-Morrison, Kathleen. HN380.V5S73 2009 303.6094—dc22 2009015791 ISBN: 978-0-275-99647-5 978-0-275-99651-2 (Vol. 978-0-275-99653-6 (Vol. 978-0-275-99655-0 (Vol. 978-0-275-99657-4 (Vol. EISBN: 978-0-275-99648-2 13 12

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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. Praeger Security International An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

Contents

Foreword: Ordinary People, Country Portraits, and State Violence and Aggression John M. Whiteley

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Set Introduction Kathleen Malley-Morrison

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Introduction to Volume 1

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Part I. Western Europe

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1 Great Britain Kimberly Rapoza and Sarah E. Stuart

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2 Northern Ireland Michael J. Whitely and Carol Vincent Linsenmeier

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3 Portugal Carla Machado, Raquel Matos, and Mariana Barbosa

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4 Spain Helena Castanheira and Scott Borrelli

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5 France Christine Roland-Levy and Abel Dalleau

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6 Iceland  ottir and Michael Corgan Silja Bara Omarsd

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7 Sweden Mathilde Salmberg

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Contents

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Part II. North America

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8 The United States: European Americans Stephen Soldz and Stephen R. Shalom

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9 The United States: Ethnic Minorities Denise A. Hines and Tanvi Zaveri

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10 11

Canada John M. Davis and Carol J. Davis

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An Integrative Conclusion for Volume 1 Andrea E. Mercurio

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Notes

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Index

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About the Editor and Contributors

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Foreword

Ordinary People, Country Portraits, and State Violence and Aggression John M. Whiteley

Seeking the views of ‘‘ordinary people’’ is reminiscent of what President Dwight D. Eisenhower said about people’s views on the importance of peace in relation to the role of government: Indeed, I think that people want peace so much that one of these days governments had better get out of their way and let them have it. —From a TV talk with Harold McMillan, August 31, 1959

The broad area of inquiry in this multivolume and pioneering research provides portraits of 43 very diverse countries selected from every continent of the world. It co-joins these country-specific portraits with surveys of the opinions of ‘‘ordinary people’’ from those countries on a series of important issues using an instrument known as the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS). A great contribution of this novel and important line of research is that it opens up for further study the relationship between a country’s historical experience and current circumstances in the world around it, and the opinions of its citizens on a host of peace-related issues.

THE COUNTRY PORTRAITS Reflecting the bold vision behind the four-volume series, there is no standard format into which the 43 country portraits had to fit. This is a sound decision because the experiences of each of the countries are so different. For example, the case study of Great Britain has the following

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categories: (1) Historical and Political Context; (2) Current Demographics; (3) Religion; (4) Industrialization, Health Care, and Education; (5) Minorities; and (6) Post–World War II Involvement in Military Activities. By way of contrast, the case study of Greece has the following categories: (1) Historical Background; (2) Recent Involvement in Conflict and Peace Efforts; and (3) Social Contextual Factors. Similarly, the case study of Russia, one of the most developed in the volumes, has the following category: Historical and Political Context. The point is that whether there were 16þ double-spaced manuscript pages devoted to numerous topics under one heading (the Russian case study), or 8þ double-spaced pages devoted to three categories (the Greece case study), or 7þ double-spaced pages covering six categories, there is an authenticity to each of the portraits. Informed by the relationship found between the diverse country portraits and the opinions of ‘‘ordinary citizens’’ as expressed on the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey, the next generation of research in this promising paradigm may wish to ask the authors of country case studies to address a broader range of peacerelated content categories. For example, the authors of the case study on Great Britain obviously believed it was relevant to address the minority issue, the history of religious persecution, the current (more) openness to religious diversity, components of (and tensions over) a (more) welfare state model, and the (multiple) lessons derived from involvement in military activities since World War II. One area for the next generation of research is the relevance of these topics to countries other than Great Britain. In a similar vein, the case study of Greece asserts that although ‘‘the influence of ancient Greek civilization on the modern world is well known, few people know that among Greeks themselves, awareness of this great legacy was almost wiped out under nearly 400 years (1453– 1830) of Ottoman rule.’’ A consequence of this historical disruption, according to the authors of the case study of Greece, is that ‘‘Greece was largely isolated from great historical movements such as the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution.’’ Greater emphasis in this case study was assigned to experience in the 20th Century: The Balkan Wars, the World Wars, a civil war, and several military dictatorships. A richness of this four-volume portrait of 43 countries is that it is possible to develop categories of analysis within and across case studies using the current portraits. It is also possible to expand each existing portrait to include promising categories from other case studies. For example, post–World War II involvement in military activities (from the case study of Great Britain) and recent involvement in conflict and

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peace efforts and social contextual factors (from the Greece case study) appear to provide especially relevant insights for the (more) empirical investigation provided by the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey. Country Aggression and ‘‘Ordinary People’’ Peace Survey The main title of these four volumes, ‘‘State Violence and the Right to Peace’’ is very appropriately chosen. The empirical instrument, the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey, has six sections: Section I – probing ‘‘ordinary people’s opinions’’ about the right of governments to perform acts of aggression (invasions of another country, killing innocent civilians, engaging in torture); Section II – whether individuals have a right to a world of peace and to demonstrate in support of that conviction; Section III – patriotism and an assessment of the United States in Iraq; Section IV – acts of state violence as assessed through the prism of emotional responses to direct or indirect exposure; Section V – ‘‘ordinary citizen’’ definitions of such fundamental terms as war, peace, torture, terrorism, reconciliation, and rights; and Section VI – a dual consideration of the relationship of national security to individual and family security, and whether peace is achievable.

COMMENTARY AND ASSESSMENT A significant contribution of these four volumes is to open up an original line of inquiry with evidence from 43 countries. The various chapters address different aspects of these six sections as they pertain to the country being profiled. The next level of inquiry will, to advantage, broaden the within-country samples sufficiently that it will be possible to illuminate within-country differences. Building on the current country portraits and the current empirical samples, it is feasible to begin the process of hypothesis development relating country characteristics to attitudes of ‘‘ordinary citizens,’’ as well as the reverse, relating the attitudes of ‘‘ordinary citizens’’ to the characteristics of the country.

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Then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara wrote to President Lyndon Johnson in 1967 that there were limits to what the American people would allow their government to do: … there may be a limit beyond which many Americans and much of the world will not permit the United States to go. The picture of the world’s greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 noncombatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one. It could conceivably produce a costly distortion in the American national consciousness and in the world image of the United States.

The point Secretary McNamara was making to President Johnson is broadly applicable to the survey instrument questions about the United States in Iraq and citizen support for the torture and terrorism in relation to the world image of the United States. This general line of inquiry is broadly applicable to unsolved problems of global society in the 21st century. The approach to research by the organizers of these four volumes used the country case study method to pioneer an exploration of the views of ‘‘ordinary people’’ about the permissible levels of state violence on such significant questions as whether, and under what conditions, governments have the right to perform acts of aggression, and the relationship of national security to individual and family security. The inclusion of 43 countries from the continents of the world makes it possible to begin to understand how country characteristics and historical and current experience affect such significant perceptions in global context of whether peace is achievable, common understandings of the meaning of being patriotic, ordinary citizen support for torture and terrorism, and the prospects for reconciliation after the killing has stopped.

THE BROADER CONTEXT FOR A NEW RESEARCH PARADIGM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY The research in this four-volume series provides an imaginative new approach to the relationship between state violence and the opinions of citizens. This approach can be broadened as it further develops to incorporate another insight that Dwight Eisenhower shared with the American people and the world when he talked about the negative consequences of states putting such huge resources into preparing to conduct state violence. The essence of what he shared is as follows: Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed,

Foreword those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. This is not a way of life at all in any true sense. Under the clouds of war, it is humanity hanging on a cross of iron. —Dwight D. Eisenhower, ‘‘The Chance for Peace’’ Address, April 16, 1953

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Set Introduction Kathleen Malley-Morrison

When people in today’s world think about war and peace, they generally think about war and peace between or within nations. Yet the very idea of nations, or states, is quite a new one in human history. For most of human existence, people banded together in extended families, bands, tribes, or chiefdoms; later, in some parts of the world, leaders such as warlords, kings, and emperors forcibly created larger social and political structures. The notion of a human society organized into individual states or nations, with equal sovereignty, is, by contrast, quite modern, an outgrowth of the Peace of Westphalia that brought an end to the Thirty Years War in 1648. The Thirty Years War, which was actually a series of European wars, was essentially a set of conflicts between proponents of Catholicism and proponents of Protestantism, who allied themselves with the expansionist ambitions of many European power holders. Ultimately, these wars involved the leaders of Bohemia, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Poland, Russia, the Netherlands, Spain, and France, although it could also be seen as a conflict between the Holy Roman Empire, which was aggressively Roman Catholic, and various anti-imperialistic Protestant communities. It was fought primarily on German territory, often by mercenaries, with devastating results. The Peace of Westphalia formally ended the era in which princes and kings could demand feudal loyalties from sovereigns within other states and could also attempt to force their own religious observance on subjects of another sovereign. One of the immediate effects was to end the direct influence of the Pope, Innocent X, and his successors on the choosing of the Holy Roman emperor and on intervening in the internal

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affairs of European countries no longer Catholic. There arose, instead, the structure of independent sovereign states—a type of organization that gradually extended beyond Europe and has persisted into modern times. Even the Charter of the United Nations, though it champions peaceful resolution of disputes, acknowledges this idea of sovereignty in the very first section of Article 2 of the Charter: ‘‘The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.’’1 This statement so early in the UN Charter is simply recognition that the political order of today’s world remains characterized by the predominance of sovereign states acknowledging no higher authority than themselves in matters of vital interests. The Security Council notwithstanding, each state is the final decider of its own security interests and of the means appropriate to achieve those interests. The virtual anarchy enabled by this formalizing of the supremacy of sovereignty has particularly grave implications in an era when technology has made nearly instantaneous attack with unimaginably devastating weapons by other states or non-state actors possible anywhere on the globe. All states must, to some degree, live in a condition of perpetual concern about their readiness to provide for their security. This in turn induces what is called ‘‘the security dilemma’’ for other states. What one state does for its own protection is likely to be seen by at least some other states as threatening. Although states may find it useful to wage wars, it is the people who inhabit those states who suffer most in times of war, and governments often promise their people that a better peace, a more secure peace, will grow out of their sacrifices. In modern times, World War I turned out not to be ‘‘the war to end all wars’’; the death of approximately 20 million people did not lead to an enduring peace. The carnage of World War II was even greater, with the majority of deaths being civilians. Among the Allies, it is likely that 25 million people, at least two thirds of whom were civilians, died in the Soviet Union—15 million in China; 6 million in Poland; between 1.5 and 2 million in Yugoslavia; approximately 400,000 in the United Kingdom; and about 300,000 from the United States. Germany lost over 4 million, and Japan over 2 million lives in the war. ‘‘The total for the globe as a whole probably reached 60 million, a figure which includes 6 million murdered because they were Jewish.’’2 The loss of approximately 60 million lives in World War II, itself a direct consequence of mismanagement of the outcome of World War I, failed to bring peace to the world. According to one set of estimates, between the end of World War II and 2004, there have been a total of 228 armed conflicts; 118 of these have taken place since the end of the Cold War.3 However, the number of international wars has declined since the late 1970s, largely because of the end of colonialism and the Cold War.4

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The United Kingdom and France, former colonial powers, had fought most of the post-World War II wars, followed by the major Cold Warriors, the United States and the USSR. In addition, after World War II the number of civil wars first increased dramatically, but then, starting in the 1990s, decreased even more dramatically. In 2003, the majority of nonstate wars (not involving any government) took place in Africa. Many people are unsurprised at the level of violence permeating society, because they see aggression as an innate human characteristic, part of our evolutionary history. Not so, say many experts. For example, Robert Sapolsky argues effectively that although some of our related primate species are characterized by violence, others are communal, egalitarian, and cooperative.5 The Encyclopedia of Selected Peaceful Societies provides descriptions of 25 of the societies identified by sociologists and anthropologists as peaceful, the most well-known of these probably being the Amish, Tahitians, and Inuit of Utkuhikhalik.6 Ackerman and Duvall describe major changes in power and successful resistance movements achieved without major military conflict, and in which the ‘‘little guys’’ successfully combated powerful aggressors; for example, India’s transition to self-rule under the leadership of Mohandas Ghandi, Poland’s Solidarity Movement in the 1980s under the leadership of Lech Walesa, and the campaign against apartheid in South Africa under the leadership of many courageous men and women, including Nelson Mandela.7 Although violent conflict was widespread in the era from 1990 to 2002, 30 successful peace agreements were made and have been respected; for example, in Mexico, Northern Ireland, Mauritania, Slovenia, Albania, Uzbekistan, Bangladesh, and Kuwait. Thus, the claims of many leaders that their national or group aims (always portrayed as righteous) can be achieved only through violence are belied by numerous counterexamples, often not as widely remembered as the armed conflicts are. The Human Security Report attributes the decline in armed conflicts over the last 30 years to three key factors: the end of colonialism, the end of the Cold War, and the international conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peace-building activities of the United Nations. In 1948, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaims, among other things, that ‘‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person’’; ‘‘No one shall be held in slavery or servitude’’; ‘‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’’; ‘‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile’’; and ‘‘Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.’’ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a revolutionary document that provides the basis for international human rights law today. It has been followed by other human rights proclamations, such as the

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Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,8 the Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace,9 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which emphasizes the importance of preparing children to live in a world of peace.10 On the other hand, although banning torture and many other forms of violence and discrimination, the United Nations has not made all armed conflict illegal. For example, the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations states as one of its goals: ‘‘to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest’’ (emphasis added).11 Moreover, Article 51 of the Charter states, ‘‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.’’12 Finally, according to Article 42 of the Charter, if nonviolent efforts fail to resolve ‘‘any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,’’ then the Security Council ‘‘may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.’’13 The United Nations’ position concerning the justifiability of armed force for self-defense or in response to breaches of the peace and acts of aggression is generally viewed as consistent with Just War doctrine, which is designed to constrain and prevent warfare. In general, there are six criteria that Just War theorists agree must be met, in combination, for a nation to be justified in going to war: just cause (i.e., in response and only in response to actual or imminent attack); right authority (e.g., initiated by the United Nations or a national government, not a terrorist group); right intention (e.g., to achieve peace and security); reasonable prospect of success (to ensure there is not a needless loss of life); proportionate cause (the response should be proportionate to the level of the attack or threat); and war as a last resort (undertaken only if and when all nonviolent solutions have been tried and have failed, consistent with the United Nations Charter).14 Several social scientists and ethicists have evaluated the extent to which the United States’ invasion of Iraq fits the profile for a just war and have concluded that it does not.15 Moreover, Just War doctrine itself has been criticized on the ground that its principles, particularly the principle of just cause, can be too easily subverted.16 Others argue that Just War doctrine imposes at least some constraints on potential violent conflicts and needs to be updated to deal with modern realities (e.g., terrorist groups and weapons of mass destruction) rather than abandoned altogether.17

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It seems clear that some nations that are signatories to human rights proclamations, as well as non-state groups, break international laws and agreements, and even appear to reject the idea that everyone (regardless of ‘‘race’’ or religion) has a right to peace.18 How do ordinary people feel about the principles stated in such proclamations? Do they believe that strategies like invasion and torture are justifiable if being carried out by their own governments, regardless of whether such acts violate international law? Do they believe people have a right to peace? Do they think peace is achievable? In the months following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, members of our group became interested in the extent to which ordinary people, the men and women in the street, believed that various forms of governmental aggression were inevitable and perhaps justifiable, as well as the extent to which they believed people had a right to peace and that peace could be achieved. The four volumes in this series address the issue. GIPGAP: The Core Group The Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP) grew out of an earlier group of psychologists and students doing research on international perspectives on family violence and abuse.19 The events following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, particularly the expansion of the United States’ government’s aggressive response into Iraq, led student members of the local (Boston University) group to urge their faculty mentor (Kathleen Malley-Morrison) to broaden the group’s concern with interpersonal violence to include governmental aggression. In the next few years, international representation in the group grew, a pilot survey was developed, tested, and modified, a book contract was negotiated successfully with Praeger Security International (PSI), an imprint of ABC-CLIO, and the current project was launched. The Core Group, located at Boston University, initially consisted of a faculty advisor (Malley-Morrison), several postdocs who had worked on the family violence and abuse project, and international graduate and undergraduate students concerned with issues of violence. That group has expanded to include faculty and graduate students from the International Relations Department at Boston University. GIPGAP: International Contributors The International Group consists of faculty and graduate students from a range of academic departments, including psychology, sociology, and international relations, in more than 40 countries. These international contributors were recruited through a number of different approaches:

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networking by Core Group members, notices in Announcements from the APA Division of International Psychology, notices in International Psychology Bulletin, and invitations during presentations at international psychology conferences. With approval from the appropriate institutional authorities, these contributors administered the Personal and Individual Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) to ordinary people from multiple countries in every major area of the world: North America (the United States and Canada); Western Europe (Iceland, Great Britain, France, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden); Central and Eastern Europe (Germany, Greece, Slovenia, Serbia, and Turkey), Eurasia (Russia), the Middle East (Afghanistan, Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia); Africa (Egypt, Nigeria, Angola, Ghana, Botswana, Zambia, and South Africa), Central America (Nicaragua and Costa Rica); South America (Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Argentina); South and Southeast Asia (Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, and the Philippines); and the Far East (China, Laos, Japan, and Korea). The PAIRTAPS The Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) has six sections: (1) judgments concerning the extent to which governments have the right to perform such acts of aggression as invading another country, killing innocent civilians in times of war, and torturing prisoners during times of war; (2) judgments concerning the rights of individuals to grow up and live in a world of peace, and the right to demonstrate against war and in favor of peace; (3) views concerning patriotism and the United States’ involvement in the Iraq war; (4) projected emotional responses that might be experienced following direct or indirect exposure to acts of governmental violence; (5) definitions of war, torture, terrorism, peace, reconciliation, and rights; and (6) views on the achievability of peace and the relationship of national security to individual and family security. Several of the items in Sections A and B are direct expressions of human rights guarantees (e.g., freedom from torture, right to assembly) established in United Nations agreements. For Sections 1, 2, 3, and 6, respondents indicate on a scale from 1 (total disagreement) to 7 (total agreement) the extent to which they agree with each item (e.g., ‘‘Sometimes a country has the right to ignore international treaties or international human rights agreements.’’). Then, in their own words, they provide an explanation of the reasoning behind their rating on the item. Sections 4 and 5 call only for open-ended qualitative responses—for example, samples of emotions that would be felt in the face of governmental aggression and definitions of terms. For the purposes of this current set of Praeger books,

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chapter authors were asked to focus only on qualitative responses to the following selected items: • Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country. • The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war. • Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism. • All human beings have a basic right to peace. • Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace. • I believe that world peace can be achieved. • National Security is essential for individual and family security. • Definitions for war, peace, and terrorism Although most chapter authors analyzed responses to most if not all of these items, some chapter authors focused primarily on the definitions of war, peace, and terrorism. Moreover, some chapter authors included a discussion of the item ‘‘The United States’ involvement in the Iraq war is a moral activity’’ because they thought the responses were of particular importance in understanding public reaction in diverse countries to the United States’ war in Iraq. Despite such relatively minor differences in coverage of survey items, each volume in the series ends with an integrative chapter summarizing similarities and differences found across countries in the themes that emerged. In addition to responding to the PAIRTAPS items, participants completed a background information form asking for basic demographic data such as age, gender, ethnicity, nationality, and religion, as well as whether they or any family member had been in the military, and whether they had participated in any protest activities. Participants who responded to the survey in their home country generally did so in their native language, except in the case of South Africa, where all participants responded to an English version of the survey. The qualitative responses to the selected items were coded according to a grounded theory approach. That is, we did not start out with a particular theoretical framework and then strive to fit the responses into that framework. Instead, we followed the procedures recommended by Strauss and Korbin, proceeding from open coding to axial coding, using a process of constant comparison.20 During the open coding phase, we broke the qualitative responses to the government aggression and peace items into units of meaning that varied from one word (e.g., ‘‘Disgusting’’) to phrases (e.g., ‘‘Only in defense of one’s own citizens’’) and entire sentences (e.g., ‘‘The future of the world depends on peace’’). At the axial level of coding, the relationships among the more fragmented

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categories were identified, and these categories were organized into more inclusive categories. For example, in regard to qualitative responses to the item ‘‘Sometimes the heads of government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism,’’ thematic categories for ‘‘sanctity of life’’ (e.g., ‘‘No person has the right to kill anyone’’), ‘‘only God’’ (e.g., ‘‘Taking a life would be replacing the job of our Lord’’), and ‘‘emphasis on innocence’’ (e.g., ‘‘The word innocent should be enough to suggest that the above sentence is disgusting and the marks of a dictator not a legal government’’) were all incorporated into a more inclusive category labeled ‘‘No right to kill,’’ which in turn became one of the categories in the overarching category labeled ‘‘It’s not a right.’’ That overarching category also included other categories such as ‘‘The ends don’t justify the means,’’ ‘‘Killing innocent civilians is a terrorist tactic,’’ ‘‘Does not make sense,’’ and ‘‘Is avoidable.’’ In a grounded theory analysis, data collection, coding, conceptualizing, and theorizing take place simultaneously, and analyses of new responses are compared both with analyses of previous responses and with the concepts emerging from those analyses. Using an international coding manual sample, with blinded responses from nearly all of the countries represented in this PSI series, the Core Group developed coding manuals for each of the survey items being addressed. We found that, in general, the governmental aggression responses could be coded first into general categories: (1) unqualified rejection of the right of governments to perform the particular form of aggression (the intolerance category) and (2) identification of one or more circumstances under which the aggression would be justifiable (the tolerance category). Within those broad categories, there are numerous subcategories, depending on the particular form of governmental aggression being addressed. For example, in regard to the invasion item, major tolerance arguments include for self-defense, to respond to threat, to strike back at an aggressor, and for humanitarian intervention. In regard to the torture prisoners of war item, the major tolerance arguments include its presumed effectiveness in getting important information, its potential role in saving lives, and its appropriateness when carried out under the aegis of some authority. Responses to the peace-related items, similarly, can be coded into two general categories (unequivocal support for the rights to peace and to protest and rejection or qualification of any such rights) as well as subcategories. For example, in regard to the item ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace,’’ some responses could be categorized as qualifying the right with specified conditions—for example, that the protests be peaceful, or socially sanctioned, or not have negative consequences for the country’s military

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personnel. Similarly, in regard to the possibility of a right to peace, subcategories included conditional statements such as ‘‘unless they are terrorists,’’ ‘‘unless they have broken the peace,’’ and ‘‘as long as they have not hurt others.’’ In regard to definitions of key terms, we found that except for the definition of ‘‘peace,’’ the examples of definitions did not fall into two overarching categories quite as neatly as the responses to the rights items tended to do. In regard to definitions of peace, the responses frequently fell into the two major types identified by Galtung—that is, ‘‘positive peace’’ (i.e., the good things peace can mean, such as ‘‘harmony’’ and ‘‘reconciliation’’) and ‘‘negative peace’’ (i.e., peace as freedom from bad things such as conflict, peace as the opposite of war).21 Among the positive definitions of peace are subcategories emphasizing peace as goodness, peace as coexistence and cooperation, peace as a human right, peace as a force for growth, and peace as an ideal—along with some definitions including explicit doubt as to the achievability of peace. By contrast, we found that definitions of ‘‘war’’ generally did not fall into two major categories with subcategories, but rather fell into one of the following general categories: (1) conflict (e.g., ‘‘Time or state of conflict between two countries or groups’’); (2) morality or human rights (e.g., ‘‘selfishness,’’ ‘‘immorality,’’ ‘‘violation of rights’’); (3) likely emotional effects (e.g., ‘‘hate,’’ ‘‘terror,’’ ‘‘sadness,’’ ‘‘suffering,’’ and ‘‘desolation’’); (4) destruction and other physical outcomes (e.g., ‘‘death, destruction, out of control’’); (5) defense (e.g., ‘‘aggressive confrontation in defense of some position’’); (6) causes (e.g., ‘‘aggressiveness, unnecessary actions to gain more land or money’’); and (7) acknowledgment of alternatives (e.g., ‘‘the worst of solutions’’). Definitions equating war with conflict are most similar to typical dictionary types of definitions of the term. Similarly, there was no bifurcation of definitions of ‘‘terrorism,’’ which fell into five major categories: focus on intent, focus on motivation or trigger; value judgments concerning the morality or sanity of terrorist behaviors, focus on outcomes, and simple listing of behaviors that might be considered terroristic. As the Core Group developed these coding manuals on an everexpanding international coding manual sample, it made the coding manuals available to the International Group. The International Group was invited to conduct their own guided theory analysis or to use the Core Group’s manuals for coding the data. We did not want to be restrictive in regard to any group member’s coding, but rather to encourage them to use consistent category labels when discussing the same or similar types of arguments. The Core Group also offered to do the coding of the responses from any country, as long as they had been translated into English or could be translated by a member of the Core

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Group. Although a few contributors developed and applied their own coding systems, the great majority worked with the coding manuals developed by the Core Group or requested that the Core Group do the coding for them. In general, coding systems used were similar enough to allow comparisons across countries. Methodology All researchers contributing to this project adhered to human subjects ethical guidelines. The survey responses were collected between 2005 and 2008. In some cases, shortened versions of the survey were administered because the respondents were unfamiliar with taking surveys; moreover, in some cases, items that seemed particularly sensitive within the context of that country were deleted (e.g., ‘‘If your country is currently involved in armed conflict with another country, please respond to the following item: My country’s involvement in armed conflict is morally correct [morally defensible].’’). The survey could be completed either online over the Internet at a secure site or as a paper-and-pencil measure. Individual chapter authors made the decision as to which procedure best protected their participants’ rights and safety. In many of the Western countries, both procedures were used, although the bulk of the responses were submitted over the Internet.

PURPOSE OF THIS SET OF VOLUMES Although we know that globally almost all peoples have some exposure to armed conflict and other forms of sanctioned violence (including torture), rarely do books compare the views of laypeople around the world on issues such as the rights of governments to invade other countries, torture suspected terrorists, violate human rights treaties, and suppress dissent—all issues with great relevance to security at the level of individual, state, and system. We know even less about the views of laypeople around the world concerning such revolutionary ideas as a ‘‘right to peace.’’ To what extent do laypeople from countries with very different forms of government accept or reject their leaders’ arguments concerning the rights of the regime to perpetrate violence to achieve ends? Do laypeople from countries that have recently engaged in armed conflict with each other use similar or different arguments to justify their own nation’s involvement with the other in the conflict? To what extent do these laypeople believe that all individuals have an inherent right to peace and that children have a right to grow up in a world of peace? To what extent do judgments concerning peace vary in relation to the

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status of women and ethnic minorities? These are some of the questions that we address in the current book series, which includes chapters on issues of governmental violence and peace in more than 40 countries around the world. The four volumes in the current series are organized by major areas of the world (e.g., Western Europe, the Middle East, and Africa) and then by selected countries within each area. Many of the selected countries have a considerable history of military conflict with each other, as well as internal conflicts. Moreover, many of the countries were either colonizers or colonized in the 15th through 20th centuries, and the legacies of the colonial era’s depredations and disruptions of long existing social and political structures underlie much of the havoc being wrought in the world today. We begin Volume 1 in Western Europe, including the major former colonial powers—Portugal, Spain, Great Britain, and France—whose empire-building policies contributed greatly to their own economic and political power, while leaving much of the world economically and politically oppressed. We then move north to Sweden, which had a brief empire-building period but has been a model of nonaggression for centuries, and west to Iceland, also a model of nonaggression. We end the volume with the United States and Canada, both colonized by Western European countries, but with very different subsequent histories. Our national coverage heads eastward in Volume 2, starting with Germany, principal site of the Thirty Years War and the Peace of Westphalia, which moved the world toward the kind of nation-state organization it has today. Volume 2 continues with its sample of countries through war-torn Eastern Europe and Russia, seat of the former Soviet Union, and ends in the Middle East, where East meets West, and conflicts among Christians, Jews, and Muslims have flared for centuries. Volume 3 addresses perspectives on war and peace in the more southern parts of the globe, the areas most influenced (and probably most damaged) by colonialism—specifically, Africa and South America. Finally, Volume 4 includes countries in South Asia and Southeast Asia that were invaded and colonized by both Western and Eastern powers and ends with countries from the Far East, some of which did their own forms of colonizing, particularly Japan and China. Each chapter begins with a country profile describing the country’s recent history of involvement in armed conflict, the extent to which it has colonized, invaded, and occupied other countries historically and since World War II, the extent to which it has been involved in internal (e.g., ethnic) armed conflicts, its current economic status (developed or developing, level of income disparity) and political status (totalitarian, democratic)—all of these being contextual factors that have been

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Set Introduction

demonstrated to be relevant to perspectives on war, peace, and security. Following a description of the sample recruited in that country, each chapter focuses on the ‘‘voices’’ of those participants, expanding on the major themes and findings that emerged from our analyses of their responses. These themes are then linked to the country’s previous and current experience with war and peace.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My thanks to Professor Michael Corgan of the International Relations Department at Boston University for his helpful suggestions concerning this chapter. My thanks go to all the team members who have contributed to this book project by recruiting participants, translating responses, creating Excel and SPSS files, helping in the development of coding manuals, coding qualitative responses, handling correspondence with contributors, helping figure out the endlessly frustrating Chicago Manual reference style, and innumerable other tasks. In particular, I want to thank my current and recent lab managers and assistant managers: Helena Castanheira, Maria Daskalopoulos, Elizabeth Planje, Tanvi Zaveri, and Lauren Groves; without their help managing the lab, these volumes would never have been completed. I also greatly appreciate the assistance of Doe West, Nyryan Nolido, Matt Pita, Ting Wu, Samantha Kinney, Stephanie Nadler, Samantha Hoyt, Kristin Wagner, Jennie Davidow, Jonathan Fuss, Jeremy Peterman, Abram Trosky, Carolyn Certilman, Mariana Barbosa, Marisa Kirio, Mi Sung Kim, Mike Toohey, Rouba Youssef, Sarah Stuart, Shannon Turney, Tina Belanger, Maria Galmarini, Nisha Raj, Jacob-Joon Meyers, Tessa Schaaf, Natsuko Mori, Injin Park, Chanmi Lee, Kamala Smith, Kaitlyn Welsh, Abigail Rudnickas, Caroline Berrio, Cornelia Photopoulos, Stella Hirawan, Ken Mullane, Nadia El Tayar, Katie Maxted, Sophie Spiegel, and Sarah Jane Potter.

Introduction to Volume 1

Volume 1 of this set focuses on a diverse set of countries in Western Europe and the United States. On the one hand, all of them are considered ‘‘Western,’’ all have democracies of one form or another, all except Sweden are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and all except for Iceland, the United States, and Canada are members of the European Union. Most of these Western European countries (i.e., Great Britain, France, Sweden, Portugal, and Spain) were colonial powers for hundreds of years and well into the 20th century; only Iceland, which was once part of Denmark, was never an imperial power. Despite these commonalities, there are also important historical and cultural differences among these countries. For example, Great Britain and Sweden are largely Protestant, whereas France, Portugal, and Spain are largely Catholic. During World War II, Great Britain and France were active in the war against Germany, Sweden and Portugal remained neutral, and fascist Spain, while declaring neutrality, sent some soldiers to fight alongside the Germans. In regard to its invasion of Iraq, the United States had strong support from Great Britain but was largely criticized by the other European nations. Of those nations, only the United Kingdom (Great Britain plus Northern Ireland) were actively involved in 2008; Iceland, Portugal, and Spain contributed small numbers of troops early in the invasion/occupation but withdrew them before 2008. Volume 1 also includes the United States and Canada. Both countries were originally colonized by European nations (largely England and France), and in both countries the settlers destroyed a large part of the native populations; however, the two countries have subsequently had very different histories regarding war and peace, with Canada playing

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a much less imperialistic and more pacifistic role in relation to other nations. Finally, we have two chapters devoted to perspectives in the United States and two devoted to perspectives from the United Kingdom. In both cases, what we wanted to do was analyze not just the views of the dominant group (the European Americans in the United States and the English in the United Kingdom) but also the views of the minorities who had historically been oppressed by the dominant cultural group. Consequently, we have a chapter on European American views and a chapter on ethnic minority views in the United States, as well as a chapter on views from the United Kingdom and views from Northern Ireland. In this volume, we consider contemporary views on the extent to which governments have rights to commit aggression and individuals have a right to peace in relation both to historical similarities and differences among countries, and characteristics of the samples, such as gender, religion, and both historic and contemporary experiences with armed conflict and peacemaking.

Part I

Western Europe

1

Great Britain Kimberly Rapoza and Sarah E. Stuart

War is … ‘‘anger, hostility, hatred, violence’’; ‘‘death, pain, destruction.’’ Peace is … ‘‘respect for life’’; ‘‘not having to be afraid’’; ‘‘cooperation, understanding, no fighting!!!’’; ‘‘every human being greeted by every other human being with warmth and love.’’ Once the ruler of a great empire, Great Britain has struggled, since the end of World War II, to be a world leader but not a ruler.1 One of the more recent members of the European Union, the country is anxious to maintain its own identity. Coinciding with the push toward European solidarity, England is slowly yielding greater self-government to Scotland and Wales. Terrorism both at home and abroad is a concern throughout Great Britain for civilians and government alike, but there was much dissent concerning British troops in Iraq. Although Great Britain has embraced new globalization policies and open borders for Eastern European immigrants and seeks to lead the world in diversity and equality for all, a large percentage of British citizens resist such openness, clinging to an earlier culture of homogeneity and elitism. HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT In the first millennium BCE, Great Britain was inhabited by Celts. Over the centuries, these original inhabitants were overpowered by multiple invaders, including the Romans, Norse, Saxons, Angles, and Danes.2 The island experienced a long evolution from ‘‘governments’’ run by feudal lords to a government run by the people. The 16th through the 18th centuries were marked by a constant power struggle among leaders of the Church, the monarch, and high-ranking lords. Henry VIII was

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in dispute with Rome regarding his desire for a divorce from his wife Catherine of Aragon (she was his deceased brother’s widow and their marriage had produced no male heirs).3 When Rome did not acquiesce, Henry VIII altered the balance of power first with the Acts of Appeals (1533), which proclaimed the king of England had imperial status and abolished the pope’s right to jurisdiction over England’s ecclesiastic cases. Then, the 1534 Act of Supremacy declared the king to be the supreme head of the church in England. The imbalance of power between the monarchy and parliament, resulting from Henry VIII’s strengthening of royal authority and imperial ambitions, is considered to have catalyzed the ensuing English Civil War in which Oliver Cromwell led the Parliamentarians in the very bloody war against the Royalists. The public execution of Charles I in 1649 marked a turning point in British history, with the creation under Oliver Cromwell of a short-lived commonwealth republic characterized by attempts to govern England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland under one Parliament.4 After several more upheavals, the 1689 Bill of Rights gave Parliament the power of sovereignty, making England the first constitutional monarchy.5 In 1707, Parliamentary Acts of Union stipulated that the Kingdom of England and the Kingdom of Scotland would be joined into a single Kingdom of Great Britain, with one set of legislators. Ireland was not formally included until the controversial Act of Union in 1801 created the Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland—with ensuing events sparking enduring hostilities between Protestant and Catholic factions within Ireland. In its early days, Parliament represented only the nobility. Not until the rise of the bourgeoisie was the Great Reform Act of 1832 promulgated, giving middle-class, propertied males the right to vote along with lords and aristocratic landowners.6 By 1884, all men over the age of 21 could vote, but not until the end of World War I did women receive the franchise; even then, the right was limited to women over 30 because members of Parliament believed that, due to the large numbers of men lost during the War, if all women could vote they would have an unfair advantage at the polls. Universal suffrage for all British men and women over the age of 21 was achieved in 1928.7 During the last three centuries, Great Britain has built, maintained, and ultimately lost two world empires. The first empire, in America, was lost after the American Revolutionary War in 1778. During the height of the second imperial phase, from around 1880 to 1930, the British Empire was the world’s largest overseas empire, encompassing one-quarter of the world’s land area.8 This imperial system was a vast collection of more than 60 colonies (the most important of which was India, regarded as the centerpiece and heart of the empire) and

Great Britain

5

numerous Dominions (e.g., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand). However, the disintegration of the empire began rapidly after World War II, as Dominion countries began asserting their own political agendas. By the 1960s, the formal control once exercised by the British Empire was replaced by informal economic, political, and diplomatic relationships. In addition, it appears that even among the Scots and the English, feelings regarding the ‘‘British’’ national identity have declined.9 Today, most of Great Britain’s former colonies—including Australia, Canada, and India—belong to the Commonwealth of Nations, a voluntary association of 53 independent states.10

CURRENT DEMOGRAPHICS The eighth largest island in the world, Great Britain is situated off the northwest coast of continental Europe. In 2004, Great Britain had a multiethnic population of approximately 59,668,000 people and reported a life expectancy of 76 years for males and 81 years for females.11 Asian Indians—the largest single minority—had risen to 1.8 percent of the total population of Great Britain by 2001, followed by Pakistanis (1.3 percent), Irish (1.2 percent), people from mixed backgrounds (1.2 percent), black Caribbeans (1 percent), black Africans (0.8 percent), and Bangladeshis (0.3 percent).12 Although these numbers might not appear large compared to the rest of the British population, they have increased greatly over the past 10 years. Religion Like most other European countries, Britain has experienced a long history of religious persecution. Following the establishment of the Church of England under Henry VIII, and depending on the religion of the monarch in power, both Catholics and Protestants suffered persecution. Many wars were fought to keep possible monarchs off the throne because of their particular religious convictions. Now, Great Britain is more open to religious diversity. In a 2001 census, 92 percent of the population identified themselves as religious; 78 percent were Christian, followed by Muslims (1.6 million, about 3 percent), and then five other religions, each of which accounted for less than 1 percent of the population: Hinduism (559,000), Sikhism (336,000), Judaism (267,000), Buddhism (152,000), and ‘‘other’’ (179,000).13 Although only 3 percent list Islam as their religion, recent terrorist activities around the globe have led to increasing fear of Muslim fundamentalism in non-Muslim communities.

6

Western Europe and North America

Industrialization, Health Care, and Education The Civil War in America disrupted American exportation of cotton to England’s textile factories and put many English workers out of a job. This problem prompted English intellectuals to analyze economic cycles and to recognize that external forces, and not just personal motivation, can affect job opportunities. The recognition that it is not always the fault of individuals if they are poor or unemployed was a revolutionary outcome of the world’s first Industrial Revolution. Although this new mind-set was evolving from the early 1860s onward, it was not until World War II that the British government promised a welfare state to its people. Many of the components of the welfare state came from the 1942 report Social Influence and Allied Services (also known as the Beveridge Report) of William Beveridge, a British economist and social reformer, who outlined five problems to tackle after the war: disease, ignorance, idleness, squalor, and want.14 This report led to the National Health Service, a free education system, state-created jobs, better houses for urban dwellers, and money for the disabled. Minorities Because of its earlier status as an empire and ongoing association with members of the Commonwealth of Nations, Great Britain continues to increase in ethnic diversity. Within the past 10 years, the Black African population has more than doubled, the Bangledeshi population has grown by 74 percent, and the Pakistani and Chinese groups have each increased over 50 percent. In 2001, London schoolchildren spoke roughly 300 languages among them, including Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Punjabi, Yorubi, Somali, Urdu, Turkish, Arabic, and Cantonese.15 A cause of the growing diversity—but also of growing concern—is the expanding European Union. In May 2004, eight Central and Eastern European countries were admitted to the EU, sparking fears in Great Britain of massive immigration. By 2005, 80,000 citizens from these countries, 70 percent of whom were Polish citizens, had immigrated to the United Kingdom for one year or more.16 Many of these immigrants came to Great Britain in search of better salaries or jobs, and many want to return to their mother countries when salaries there become higher.17 Regardless, many working-class British citizens are angry over this influx of immigrants and lost jobs. Great Britain also expresses negative sentiments toward another group: asylum seekers (people seeking refuge from persecution in their mother country). As of 1955, any member of the United Nations must give people refugee status if they are in the country, ask for asylum, and can prove their persecution. However, because of issues related to both geography and documentation, it is very difficult for asylum

Great Britain

7

seekers to obtain full refugee status in Great Britain. First, the fact that Great Britain is an island makes entry possible only by air, by boat, or via the Chunnel. Security at these entry points has been increased to deter asylum seekers before they have the chance to reach British soil.18 Even with these obstacles, many are able to enter the country and seek safety and peace despite a laborious legislative process requiring documentation of persecution. Even if they are granted asylum, refugees must deal with many misconceptions about asylum seekers perpetuated by the media and making life difficult. Misconceptions run the gamut from holding that asylum seekers and refugees get the best welfare housing to accusing asylum seekers of eating the Queen’s swans.19 Despite the belief of most British citizens that their refugee population is the largest in the world, Great Britain contains only 2 percent of the world’s 19.8 million refugees, a percentage that is steadily decreasing. In 2006, there were 23,520 asylum applications—9 percent less than the year before.20 Of the 20,960 asylum decisions made in 2006, only 10 percent granted asylum, 11 percent granted Humanitarian Protection or Discretionary Leave, and 79 percent refused refugee status and sent the refugees back to their countries. The top five applicant nationalities for 2006 were Iranian, Afghan, Eritrean, Chinese, and Somalian. Post-WWII Involvement in Military Activities Great Britain’s military history and activities following World War II involved postcolonial conflict to protect economic and strategic strongholds, military action in the Middle East, and a long civil war in Northern Ireland. Immediately after World War II, the United Kingdom became involved in maintaining Cyprus as a strategic military base and Middle East headquarters.21 In the 1940s and 1950s when Cyprus was denied union with Greece, violence toward the British escalated until Cyprus was granted independence (1960). However, violent conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots ensued after the 1974 Turkish invasion, which led to the division of the island into northern Turkish Cypriot and southern Greek Cypriot territories, with the border maintained by UN peacekeeping forces (including British troops). Other postwar military engagements included the Suez Canal crisis in 1956, which involved a coordinated attack on Egypt by Great Britain, France, and Israel after President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which the British viewed as important militarily and economically.22 Although the military action against Egypt was a military success, it proved to be a political debacle, as the military action was rebuked by the United States, Canada, and Australia, forcing the resignation of then Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden. Later, the Falkland

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Western Europe and North America

War of 1982 involved a dispute with Argentina over the British claim to the Falkland, South Georgia, and South Sandwich Islands.23 Although the conflict lasted only about three months, the reestablishment of Britain’s claim to the islands was politically advantageous for Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the 1983 election. Great Britain has been involved in many conflicts in the Middle East since the early 1990s. The United Kingdom military was part of a coalition of 34 nations (sanctioned by the UN) involved in the first Gulf War from 1990 to 1991 following Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.24 After the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the United Kingdom joined the United States in the invasion of Afghanistan, beginning the ‘‘War on Terror.’’ Tony Blair entered the second Gulf War in Iraq in 2003, after a U.S.-led invasion (not UN-sanctioned) was undertaken to bring about change in the Middle East.25 However, the ineffectiveness of the Iraq initiatives and debacle over supposed ‘‘weapons of mass destruction’’ ultimately led to Blair’s stepping down from office. As of the writing of this chapter, the conflict is ongoing, and a secure, stable, and violence-free Iraq has not been accomplished. BRITISH PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION Sample In this context of ongoing changes in its status in the world, anxieties regarding terrorism, and growing concerns with immigration, we recruited a British sample of 82 participants—33 females and 46 males— who identified their country of birth primarily as England or Great Britain. At the time of survey completion, the majority lived within Great Britain (60 percent), but a few participants listed the United States or Australia as their current residence. The average age was 36 years old; most participants identified themselves as white or white British (65 percent), middle class (60 percent), or upper middle class (49 percent), and single (46 percent) or married (29 percent). Most participants were reared as Christians (58 percent) and listed their current religious affiliation as either none (30 percent) or Christian (32 percent), but adult religious affiliation varied widely, with responses such as Buddhist, Spiritual, Confucian, Agnostic, Hindu, Muslim, Pagan, and Sikh listed. Most participants were either employed full–time (41 percent) or were students (46 percent). Although 80 percent of the respondents indicated they had never served in the military, 50 percent reported having a relative who had served at some point in time. All participants completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS26); for the purpose of this study, six items from the

Great Britain

9

PAIRTAPS were analyzed. Respondents indicated their support for various forms of governmental aggression and the achievability of peace on seven-point scales (from 1 = total disagreement to 7 = total agreement) as well as explaining those ratings in their own words. Definitions of War British participants, when asked to define war, overwhelmingly provided dictionary types of definitions, emphasizing conflict (e.g., ‘‘Fighting on a national scale either within a country or between nations’’; ‘‘Official battle between countries’’). A 56-year-old man said war is ‘‘The resolution of conflict by all possible means, after talks have broken down.’’ When defining war by noting the presence of an ongoing process or particular outcome, many respondents made specific reference to the role of the state, country, or nation (22 percent) or to the individual (18 percent); thus, British participants view conflict, war, or military action as stemming from individuals as well as from nations. For example, pinpointing the role of the state, one 55-year-old woman said war was ‘‘One nation-state taking up arms against another (except civil war where it’s within a nation).’’ By contrast, one 28-yearold man, focusing more on the individual, said war was ‘‘Deliberate actions against another, often involving violence but could also be verbal or other actions.’’ Several respondents focused on the immorality or emotions of war (18 percent). For example, a 34-year-old man noted that war was ‘‘Anger, hostility, hatred, violence.’’ Views on Invasion of Another Country British respondents revealed a certain level of ambivalence regarding the item ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country.’’ Most respondents (60 percent) said that invasion of another country is indeed a governmental right, but 15 percent did so with some qualifications or provisos. For example, a 21-year-old man said, ‘‘In principle this is true, but in reality it can be abused if used too frequently’’ and a 55-year-old woman said, ‘‘Sometimes this is justified, e.g., Nazi Germany, but not nearly as often as it actually happens, e.g., Iraq.’’ A third of the respondents indicated that invasion was not a right and one person was indecisive. An example of lack of support for the right was given by a 20-year-old woman who stated, ‘‘Surely there is no legitimate reason to do this? Surely this is always an act of aggression?’’ Ambivalence regarding whether one country has the right to invade another may reflect influences from Great Britain’s imperial past and also from its newer role in global affairs. Although 60 percent of participants showed support for a right to invade, justifications focused less

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Western Europe and North America

on attainment of power and resources and more on invasion as a tool for peacekeeping or self-defense. The most common justifications for supporting an invasion were humanitarian reasons (20 percent) and to restore or bring about peace (10 percent). Humanitarian reasons included intervention to resolve a human rights crisis; for example, a 57-year-old man stated, ‘‘Although it may be necessary to prevent genocide, etc., by a country against its own citizens, that should never be a single country’s decision.’’ An exemplar of the subcategory regarding restoration of peace was given by a 19-year-old woman who said, ‘‘Last resort, if the country is in complete strife and the ONLY way is to invade, only if legal, solid evidence can be proved as justification.’’ Ten percent of respondents said invasion is permissible if done in selfdefense or to defend against a threat to one’s citizens (e.g., ‘‘I believe the only reason to invade a country is if we have definite evidence that the other country is threatening us with something lethal’’). The typical British responses concerning invasion may reflect a change in political outlook and belief regarding the use of British military forces, with the role of the military viewed as having changed by the 1980s and 1990s from empire building to peacekeeping—as, for example, in the involvement of British troops in NATO peacekeeping missions in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Sierra Leone.27 Given our sample’s responses, which included considerable lack of support for a right to invade or tied the right to humanitarian goals or self-defense, Great Britain’s low levels of public support for military involvement in Iraq may stem from viewing that invasion as falling outside the range of justifiable military involvement. One interesting trend was the reliance on historical events to provide rationales either for or against one country’s right to invade another. For those stating invasion was a right, about 13 percent used a historical example to support their argument. For example, a 56-year-old man stated, ‘‘Only to help that country get rid of aggressors, i.e., WW2 Invasion of France [D-Day].’’ For those stating invasion was not a right, 10 percent also relied on historical precedent (e.g., a 20-year-old man responded, ‘‘… for example, the recent invasion of Iraq I believe was wrong as it was to secure oil and not liberate the people as the politicians claimed’’). The use of historical examples was more frequent in response to the invasion question than in response to any of the other survey questions, indicating that past wars and the interpretation of the moral correctness of those conflicts may weigh heavily in the minds of some people when making this sort of judgment. In particular, all examples involving historical precedents either used World War II as support for the right to invade or cited Iraq as a reason contradicting such a right.

Great Britain

11

Views on the Governmental Killing of Civilians to Prevent Terrorism British respondents indicated strong disagreement with the item ‘‘Sometimes the heads of government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism.’’ This level of disagreement is notable, given that terrorist activity in Britain has been a concern and part of daily life since the 1970s ushered in the bombing campaigns of the Irish Republican Army in various areas around the United Kingdom. Some of the governmental measures aimed at reducing the potential for a terrorist attack have provoked controversy by also limiting civil liberties. One article in The Times noted that increases in armed police in London have become more common, as have concrete barriers and cast-iron bollards aimed at blocking traffic flow, all of which have changed the look and feel of certain areas of the city.28 The ‘‘Ring of Steel,’’ an antiterrorist strategy developed in the early 1990s in response to IRA bombings in London, protects the financial and historical institutions in London through the use of narrow roadways that allow only a few entry points into the district. This is complemented with cameras that monitor all traffic and can scan and record vehicle plates and photograph drivers. Closed-circuit cameras are also posted throughout the city on buildings and poles and are present in the Tube, which can be monitored by the police.29 In Great Britain, the precarious balance between civil liberties and public safety has led to recent changes in thinking regarding basic political and social freedoms. According to a 2007 British Social Attitudes Survey,30 people were willing to give up certain civil liberties in return for a counterterrorism measure. For instance, 81 percent of people surveyed thought that allowing the government to track people suspected of terrorism, tap their phones, and open their mail was ‘‘a price worth paying,’’ and 71 percent said the same about compulsory identification cards for all adults; however, a large majority viewed banning peaceful protest or denying the right of trial by jury to a suspected terrorist as ‘‘unacceptable’’ losses of liberties. In considering whether governments have the right to kill innocent civilians in the fight against terrorism, the majority of British respondents (55 percent) said they do not. For example, one 27-year-old male stated, ‘‘Not on your nelly. There is no right to kill innocent civilians …’’ In addition to general affirmation that there is no such right (e.g., ‘‘I do not think you ever have the right to do this’’), the most common reasons for considering the deaths of innocent civilians unacceptable were: (1) precisely because the citizens are innocent (22.5 percent) (e.g., ‘‘If they are innocent why do they need to be killed? I don’t think they have the right to kill innocent people’’); (2) killing innocent

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Western Europe and North America

civilians is itself a terrorist act (12.5 percent) (e.g., ‘‘If a government kills innocent civilians then surely they are terrorist themselves’’); and (3) killing is immoral (10 percent) (e.g., ‘‘Moral: No one has the right to kill under any circumstances.’’). Our finding that slightly over half of the British respondents believe governments do not have the right to kill innocent civilians does not depart substantially from the findings of other recent surveys of the British public. For example, in a 2007 survey, the International Committee of the Red Cross found that of 1,000 British citizens surveyed, 5 in 10 said it was permissible to target civilians in war.31 This figure represents an increase in tolerance for civilian deaths, as only 3 in 10 people surveyed before September 11 and the Iraq war believed targeting civilians was permissible.32 In addition, 72 percent of the people surveyed in 1999 believed military action should be limited to targeting combatants only and civilians should be protected, which dropped to only 50 percent by 2007. Half of those surveyed in the 1999 study also indicated civilian deaths were permissible because atrocities are inevitable during war. This view is in contrast to findings in our sample, where only 7.5 percent of respondents referred to the inevitability of loss of lives. A 23-year-old man said, ‘‘They don’t have the right to do this, so to speak, but I accept it’s difficult to avoid sometimes.’’ Other arguments indicated vague circumstances where civilian deaths might be acceptable (12.5 percent) (e.g., ‘‘I can see situations where this might occur’’) or affirmed but qualified the right in some way (5 percent) (e.g., ‘‘No-one has the ‘right’ to kill innocent civilians—but it must be accepted that in times of war and emergencies the killing of some innocent civilians may unfortunately be unavoidable’’). Although extended participation in an ongoing war in the Middle East and the July 7, 2005, terrorist bombings of London’s public transportation system have perhaps increased British tolerance for military aggression, particularly when framed as a counterterrorism move, our sample generally found civilian deaths unacceptable. Participants provided far more specific reasons for not granting a government that right than for granting it, indicating perhaps an enduring sentiment that civilians should be protected in times of war. Views on the Torture of Prisoners in Time of War British respondents also indicated considerable disagreement with the survey item ‘‘The Government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war.’’ This finding is consistent with those from other recent polls. For example, according to a 2007 survey,33 among the losses of freedom considered ‘‘unacceptable’’ were allowing the torture

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of terror suspects in jails to gain information (with 76 percent opposing such actions) and allowing the armed forces to torture people (with 78 percent in opposition). The Independent newspaper also reported that the International Committee of the Red Cross found that of 1,000 British citizens surveyed, 79 percent responded that prisoners of war should not be tortured.34 Although our quantitative rating scale results are in keeping with other British surveys showing a general conviction that torture is unacceptable, our qualitative results showed more of a split in response to this issue. Fifty-six percent of those surveyed indicated the government never has the right to torture (e.g., a 60-year-old man stated, ‘‘No government has the right to torture anyone’’), but 41 percent conceded that it did (e.g., ‘‘I would say no entirely, but many wars are won on the basis of information,’’ responded one 19-year-old woman). The most common arguments against a government’s use of torture were based on grounds of morality and fairness (18.5 percent) (e.g., a 34-year-old man noted, ‘‘Morally, no one has the right to torture’’) or of utilitarianism (18.5 percent) (e.g., a 57-year-old man stated, ‘‘As a means of getting information, torture is 100 percent ineffective’’). Other responses included: ‘‘Can never lead to lasting conflict resolution. Only inflames situations.’’ Although public polls indicated that most British respondents disapproved of the use of torture to gain information, our qualitative data indicated that ‘‘to gain information’’ was the most common response given in support of the government’s right to use torture. Moreover, among justifications for a governmental right to torture (41 percent of the qualitative responses), the most common arguments were utilitarian (22 percent). For example a 19-year-old woman stated, ‘‘Depends if there is information needed from a prisoner that will benefit all, say, the location of a bomb in a public area.’’ In fact, the most often cited utilitarian reasons in support of torture involved providing for the safety of others (e.g., one man stated, ‘‘If and only if it leads to information which can be used to save lives; even then, the prisoner should not be killed’’) and obtaining information (e.g., ‘‘Only if this person is known to have vital information,’’ responded a 35-year-old male). On the surface, it would seem that although respondents do not indicate a high level of approval for a government’s right to torture, they nevertheless could identify situations or instances where it might be acceptable— perhaps due to the terrorist bombings and to sentiments regarding the necessity of counterterrorism measures, and perhaps also due to coverage of those issues in the media. Such ambivalence is reflected well in some of the responses; one 21-year-old man stated, ‘‘Perhaps there should always be a provision for such a thing to occur. The principle in general I disagree with, though, because it would be abused.’’

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Peacekeeping Activities and Definitions of Peace Since World War II, the United Kingdom has been involved in many peacekeeping missions around the globe. Recently (2002), British troops and civilians have been deployed as part of United Nations (UN) peace and reconciliation responses to Sierra Leone in response to a brutal civil war (between the government and the rebel force the Revolutionary United Front). In addition, Britain was involved in peacekeeping missions from 1996 to 1999 as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the UN in Kosovo in response to genocide and human rights abuses of ethnic Albanians by Serbian forces under Slobodan Milosevic, and from 1995 to 1996 in Bosnia in response to ethnic cleaning, mass rape, genocide, and human rights abuses of Bosnian Muslims by Serbian forces.35 The government has also provided troops to the UN for electoral assistance in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and to UN and NATO peacekeeping missions in Macedonia and the Sudan. It has also made major contributions to the UN’s peacekeeping budget—8 percent (£374 m) in 2007/2008.36 On April 16, 2008, in a speech to the UN Security Council, Prime Minister Gordon Brown outlined the parameters of UK troop and civilian involvement, which he viewed as extending beyond peacekeeping and humanitarian aid to stabilization, reconstruction, and development ventures. In addition, he pledged to make available both military and civilian experts (e.g., police, judges, and governmental officials) to aid in training.37 Although the quality and reputation of British troops on peacekeeping missions has been well regarded, detractors have noted a more political than humanitarian slant to British involvement through its gaining increased opportunities for political influence with Europe and the United States.38 When asked for a definition of peace, 50 percent of the British sample gave negative definitions, indicating what peace is not (the absence or lack of something) rather than what it is. For example, one 26-year-old woman defined peace as ‘‘Absence of war, torture or terrorism’’ and a 21-year-old man as ‘‘When no military action is taking place between two sides and there is no terrorism involved.’’ More than 25 percent of participants defined peace specifically as the absence of war or armed conflict. On the other hand, 39 percent of participants defined peace positively as a particular process or state—for example, as ‘‘The right of citizens of the world to conduct their affairs …’’; ‘‘The enjoyment of human rights by all citizens’’; and ‘‘Not absence of war but the process of keeping a friendly relationship.’’ Thirteen percent of the responses equated peace with security or a feeling of being safe. When defining peace negatively as the absence of something, many respondents (43 percent) mentioned the role of the state, country, or nation

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as part of their definition; for example, a 21-year-old man indicated peace was ‘‘Where two states are in a state of non-violence.’’ In addition, when mentioning the state, they also viewed peace more as an end state (43 percent) than a process (2 percent). For instance, a 64-year-old man stated, ‘‘The state where war or terrorism is not practiced,’’ and a 49-year-old man responded, ‘‘The end state of no military conflict.’’ When providing positive definitions of peace that focused on the presence of something, British respondents gave answers that focused on both the individual (22 percent) (e.g., ‘‘Something that all humans should have and want to keep’’; ‘‘Mutual tolerance and or understanding’’), and on the state (17 percent) (e.g., ‘‘A state of open dialog and cooperation between two or more parties who … are willing to resolve all conflicts with dialog’’). Views on Protest British respondents indicated strong agreement with the survey item ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace.’’ The most typical response (34 percent) merely reaffirmed that being able to protest is a right. As one 28-year-old woman stated, ‘‘Protesting the actions of a government is a basic human right that should be respected.’’ Another common response (34 percent) involved agreeing that protest is a right, but qualifying that right in some way. For example, a 56-year-old male stated, ‘‘Yes, as long as those protests are also peaceful.’’ No one disagreed with or was unsure about a right to protest. This strong support for the right to protest may have roots in both a historical tradition and in a recent resurgence of protests since the 1990s. For example, from as far back as the 1820s, large protests were staged in Great Britain by trade unions and labor groups fighting for freedom of association among workers and against social and political conditions in an industrialized Britain. In the late 1960s, student groups led large demonstrations for nuclear disarmament, antiracism, antifascism, and women’s rights.39 Starting in the 1990s and continuing today, strong environmental groups staging protests against road building and land development turned small local issues into problems of national concern.40 In our sample, participants stating that protesting against war and for peace is an individual right typically affirmed that right in general terms (22 percent); for example, ‘‘I believe the right to protest is a very important one, and when this right is corroded then it is a very dangerous thing.’’ An analysis of data from the 1986 to 2003 British and Scottish Social Attitudes surveys, which each year ask around 3,300 randomly selected adults to give their views on a number of complex social, political, and moral issues, revealed that activity in protest campaigns has increased in recent years and may be one means by which people are

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choosing to engage in the political process, despite a steady decline in voter turnout.41 Moreover, in February 2003, 4 percent of all people in Britain participated in demonstrations against the government’s involvement in the Iraq war. Thus, some of our respondents may view the right to protest as an extension of the democratic political process, akin to other rights such as voting. When participants qualified their endorsement of the right to protest, the most common reasons given were that the protest needed to be nonviolent (20 percent) (e.g., ‘‘Everyone’s opinion must be heard; they must be peaceful protests though, no violence or aggression’’) or that the protest be socially sanctioned (12 percent) (e.g., ‘‘This is a basic democratic principle’’). This emphasis on the importance of nonviolence in protests may reflect a philosophy that discourages moral hypocrisy. That is, engaging in violence when protesting a government’s involvement in war and larger systemic violence might undermine the antiviolence message. The emphasis on nonviolence may also reflect public perceptions of direct action movements and protests. For example, the direct action movements of the 1990s were quite different from the tamer protests of earlier decades where the tactics often largely involved blockades and handing out leaflets.42 For example, expressions of resistance for things like road building took on more confrontational tactics that might involve sabotage, damaging property, or camping in the way of roadbuilding machinery for weeks or months on end.

CONCLUSIONS Great Britain has transitioned from the ruler of a great empire to a country with large global political influence and an increasing emphasis on humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping ventures. Although this study did not obtain a nationally representative sample of inhabitants of Great Britain, the qualitative data collected provide unique insight into the attitudes that the British people have formed regarding such important issues as war and peace. Overall, it would seem that war and peace were viewed as a process or end state involving both the state and the individual. The British sample seemed highly supportive of certain liberties and humanitarian issues, as in their responses indicating overwhelming support of the right to protest and a strong sense that torture or the killing of civilians is not something the government had a right to do. Thoughts on invasion were a bit more mixed, with considerable tolerance of such actions, especially when there was a perceived threat or the invasion was done for humanitarian reasons.

2

Northern Ireland Michael J. Whitely and Carol Vincent Linsenmeier

War is … ‘‘violence between (or within) two countries and an attack on human rights and beliefs.’’ Peace is … ‘‘when people of all nations live in harmony and mutual respect for human rights.’’ Many countries have suffered terrorism and civil strife in recent times. Because of its long history of civil strife, recent struggles over civil rights, differing political outlooks of two opposing groups, and recent progress toward peace, Northern Ireland is a country where citizens’ perspectives on governmental aggression and peace may have some unique characteristics compared with countries currently involved in armed conflict, or countries characterized by decades of peace. To investigate these perspectives, the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) was administered to a sample of 102 participants in Northern Ireland in December 2007. After expanding on the historical–political context of present world views in Northern Ireland, we report on the major themes emerging from the sample’s qualitative responses to items about governmental aggression and peace. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Archaeological evidence of Mesolithic human settlement in the valley of the Bann River, and a concentration of ancient gravesites and stone circles, show that the northern part of Ireland has had an indigenous population since prehistoric times. By the first century CE, there is evidence that the Celtic language was established in Ireland.1 In the fourth and fifth centuries CE, Christianity had arrived in northern Ireland with early churches established in the northern part of Ireland at Armagh,

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Downpatrick, and Saul by St. Patrick.2 In the eighth century, Vikings began to raid Ireland, creating settlements in the southeastern area of what is called Northern Ireland today.3 By the beginning of the Middle Ages, the northern area of Ireland was a country of Catholics who celebrated their Celtic traditions through their religion. Henry II’s arrival in Ireland in 1171 to keep his Norman baron under tighter control marks the beginning of English involvement in Ireland.4 For the next 500 years the English struggled against the Irish to expand their area of control from the southeastern area of Ireland.5 Henry VIII, by giving legitimacy to the Protestant church in England to ratify his divorce in 1532,6 brought a new dimension to English attempts to dominate the Irish—that of suppression of Catholicism and Irish culture. In 1537, Henry VIII increased English oppression by dissolving the Catholic monasteries and beginning a program of land repatronage.7 In 1608, James I increased English control of the northeastern area of Ireland by establishing a plantation and inducing Scottish and English Protestant tenants to settle and improve the land. Along with the suppression of Catholicism and Irish language and culture, and the removal of the Irish nobility, English domination took the form of exorbitant rents extracted by English landlords from their Irish tenants and failing to act to relieve the starvation of the Irish people when a blight obliterated the potato crop (their main source of sustenance) in 1845. As a result of this inaction, starvation and emigration reduced the population of Ireland by more than a million people.8 Although attempts to remove the English from Ireland in 1641, 1688, 1798, and 1803 failed, success was finally gained in the Easter Rising of 1916.9 After the negotiations that followed this war, the Anglo-Irish Treaty gave the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland separate parliaments in 1921.10 This agreement made the Republic of Ireland a dominion of the United Kingdom and gave Northern Ireland an ambiguous status in the United Kingdom.11 In the ferment and civil strife that preceded this treaty, two important groups of combatants active in the later Northern Irish ‘‘Troubles’’ came into being: The Irish Republican Volunteers, precursor of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) were both formed in 1913.12 After the Republic of Ireland became an independent country (in 1925)13 and Northern Ireland joined the United Kingdom, the Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland continued their strong opposition to each other, clashing over political agendas, cultural traditions, economic development, and religious ideology. Throughout the first 60 years of Northern Ireland’s status as part of the United Kingdom, the British government extinguished the Irish educational system in Northern Ireland and limited Catholic land ownership and voting

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rights.14 In addition, Catholic employment reached an all-time low due to the discriminating practices of Protestant business owners. For 50 years the British government turned a blind eye to legislation passed in Northern Ireland to limit the rights and welfare of Catholics. The ‘‘Troubles’’ in Northern Ireland started anew in 1967 with the formation of the Northern Irish Civil Rights Association, which began a struggle to gain civil rights for Catholics. By 1969, this struggle for civil rights had led to sectarian protests and violence15 and the deployment of the British Army in Northern Ireland.16 The ensuing deadly mix of Loyalist paramilitaries, the IRA, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, and the British Army caused the deaths of over 3,000 people between 1969 and 1990.17 The troubles worsened as Catholic resistors to British rule began to use more aggressive approaches to combat Protestant paramilitaries. Violence continued to escalate from 1969 to 1999 with heavy human and financial costs.18 The Joint Declaration of the Irish and British governments in December 1993 brought Northern Ireland to a new stage, with the British government agreeing on an official policy that would allow Northern Ireland to determine its own future within the limits of constitutional democracy. Negotiations beginning in the 1980s among various political figures active in Northern Ireland, Great Britain, and the Republic of Ireland led to an IRA cease-fire on August 31, 1994, and a Loyalist cease-fire on October 31, 1994. After four years of further negotiation between representatives of the Unionist and Nationalist parties of Northern Ireland and the British and Irish governments, the Belfast Agreement was drawn up.19 On Good Friday, 1998, 71 percent of those voting in Northern Ireland voted to support the Belfast Agreement and the process of forming a government based on joint representation began.20 The Belfast Agreement sets forth provisions in four areas. In regard to constitutional issues, the Agreement establishes a principle of consent requiring that the majority of people in Northern Ireland must agree to any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland and that both the British government and the Irish government remove their territorial claims for the whole of the island. The Agreement sets up a pluralistic government with strict allocation of ministerial posts and committees on a cross-community basis, and a North–South Ministerial Council composed of ministers from both the Northern Irish and Republic of Ireland’s governments. Key decisions of the Assembly must be passed by majorities of both Unionist and Nationalist members. The Agreement also set up the British–Irish Intergovernmental Council and the Council of the Isles for purposes of governmental communication.21 Implementation of the Belfast Agreement has traveled a rocky road. The decommissioning of IRA armaments was one major obstacle to

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progress. In 2005, the International Commission on Decommissioning affirmed that the IRA had destroyed all of its weaponry. Another obstacle, policing reform, was addressed with the establishment of a Policing Board and formation of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.22 Difficulty in forming a power-sharing government was also resolved, and in 2008 the Northern Irish Assembly became operative. Even before the 1998 Peace Agreement, the British government’s commitment to improving relations between the Catholic and Protestant communities was evident in the establishment of an explicit community relations policy with three primary aims: (1) to increase contact between Protestants and Catholics; (2) to encourage greater mutual understanding and respect for diverse cultural traditions; and (3) to ensure that everyone in Northern Ireland enjoyed equality of opportunity and equity of treatment.23 These objectives led to the development of the government’s Central Community Relations Unit (CCRU), charged with ‘‘formulating, reviewing, and challenging policy throughout the government system with the aim of improving community relations.’’24 The Northern Ireland Community Relations Council (CRC), created in 1990 to promote better community relations and recognize cultural diversity, has been a key initiative supported by the CCRU. Voluntary groups have worked to improve relationships between the two religious traditions in Northern Ireland since the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the efforts of community relations groups increased in popularity throughout the country. The earliest efforts were established to end the killing and help communities cope with the effects of violence. Other programs focused on the need to get children away from the troubled areas where death and violence were common. The trauma, hurt, and suffering inflicted by violence had deeply affected Northern Ireland; healing through understanding was seen as the way cross-community initiatives could help move the peace progress forward. With the establishment of paramilitary cease-fires just prior to the Good Friday Peace Agreement, grassroots initiatives could concentrate more fully on peaceful cooperation and programs for increasing tolerance and awareness between the two communities. Cross-community activities included peer mediation training of adolescents, peace and reconciliation initiatives, primary school social events, victim and family support groups, children’s camps and exchanges, youth work programs, mentoring programs in areas of conflict and violence, and economic development initiatives.25 Such community development activities have acted as a form of social cement, preventing Northern Ireland from sliding into a Bosnian-like situation.26 The persistence of divisions in Northern Ireland is reflected in the four different types of state-funded schools: controlled schools (largely Protestant), Catholic-maintained schools (funded by the state on premises

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owned by the Catholic Church), grant-maintained integrated schools (funded by parents and including both Catholics and Protestants), and voluntary grammar schools (usually either Catholic or Protestant).27 To reduce division within the educational system, the schools of Northern Ireland are required by law to engage in Education for Mutual Understanding (EMU).28 One of the educational design groups inspired by EMU was the Northern Ireland Community Cooperation Initiative (NICCI) of which the authors of this chapter were a part. By the summer of 2002, the NICCI committee had designed and modeled three large-scale cross-community programs in Northern Ireland: the NICCI School Project in 1999 and 2000—the NICCI Awards National Program in 2000 and 2001, and the NICCI I.M.P.R.O.V.E. international program in 2001 and 2002. The fourth and final program of the NICCI movement, aimed at bringing Catholic and Protestant communities together to emphasize their commonalities, was entitled Instructional Media Presentations and Collaborative Technology (NICCI-IMPACT), also referred to as the Phoenix Peace Conference. This one-day conference, involving more than 500 organizations from Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, gave Northern Irish primary students the opportunity to observe, participate, and evaluate three NICCI programs through instructional media presentation. The central tenet of the evaluation study was that by observing, participating in, and actively examining national cross-community programs, young people could develop a more favorable attitude regarding the future of the peace process in Northern Ireland. To measure the impact of instructional technology on attitude formation and change, attitudes were assessed in 522 10- and 11-year-old students before and after they attended the conference, using a researcherdesigned instrument, the Northern Ireland Student Inventory. Statistical analyses revealed that exposure to the conference raised the experimental group’s knowledge of nationwide cross-community programs, that the impact was virtually the same for Catholic and Protestant students, and that both groups showed an increase in positive future orientation; however, there was no change in the students’ behavioral intentions toward members of the other religious tradition.29 EXAMINATION OF NORTHERN IRISH ATTITUDES TOWARD VIOLENCE AND PEACE The Survey and the Sample The Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) consists of 45 questions addressing the respondent’s background, beliefs about governmental aggression and peace, political

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conservatism, emotional responses to governmental aggression, definitions of pertinent terms, and views on peace and security. In questions pertaining to beliefs and opinions concerning governmental aggression and peace, respondents were asked to rate their agreement with statements on a seven-point Likert scale (from strongly disagree to strongly agree) and write an explanation of their rating. To broaden the range of participants, participation in the PAIRTAS survey was solicited in public transportation locations throughout Northern Ireland. Participant Demographics The 102 respondents from Northern Ireland varied in age, education, and socioeconomic level, but most were lifelong residents of Northern Ireland. Of these 102 respondents, 51 percent were between the ages of 18 and 24 years, 40 percent were between the ages of 26 and 61 years, and 10 percent were between the ages of 69 and 85 years. Fifty-three percent of the respondents were female and 46 percent were male (one did not report gender). Seventy-six percent of the participants were born in Northern Ireland and 17 percent were born in the Republic of Ireland. Among the remaining participants, six were born in the United Kingdom (excluding Northern Ireland), and one was born in Spain. Eighty percent of the respondents were current residents of Northern Ireland, and 15 percent were current residents of the Republic of Ireland. The remaining participants either lived elsewhere in the United Kingdom or did not state their current residence. Most of the participants (80 percent) had lived in Northern Ireland all of their life, and the majority had parents who had also been lifelong residents of Northern Ireland. As is characteristic of Northern Irish society, most participants identified themselves as either Catholic (38 percent) or Protestant (50 percent), with 3 percent identifying themselves as ‘‘Christian,’’ 5 percent stating that they did not practice a religion, and 5 percent not stating a religious preference. Usually, Protestants in Northern Ireland ally themselves with Unionist parties, and Catholics are loyal to Nationalist parties. The 2003 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (NILTS) study of voting behavior found that the majority of Catholics supported the Socialist Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Fein. Among Protestants, NILTS found that most of them supported the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) or Ulster Unionist Party.30 Among our Catholic respondents, 23 percent aligned themselves with Nationalist parties: 16 percent to the SDLP, 6 percent to Sinn Fein, and 1 percent to Fianna Fail. Twenty percent of the Protestant respondents reported allegiance to Unionist Parties: 11 percent to the DUP and 9 percent to other Unionist parties. Recent studies have shown that there has been a shift away

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from the more moderate unionist (such as the UUP) and nationalist parties (such as the SDLP) to more radical parties such as Sinn Fein for the Nationalists and DUP for the Unionists.31 A higher percentage of respondents to the PAIRTAPS supported the more radical DUP, and the largest percentage of our Catholic respondents supported the SDLP. A wide range of educational levels was represented in the sample. Forty-nine percent of the respondents were students. Ten percent of the participants had some high school education, 51 percent were high school graduates, 4 percent had attended a trade or technical school, 10 had earned bachelor’s degrees, one had some graduate training, six held master’s degrees, and one had a doctorate. Seventeen percent of participants did not state their educational level. Most participants were employed part-time (27 percent) or full-time (40 percent), 18 percent were unemployed students, 4 percent were retired, and seven did not state their employment level. Forty percent of the respondents described their socioeconomic class as ‘‘working,’’ 45 percent described their class as ‘‘middle,’’ 11 percent as ‘‘upper middle,’’ and 1 percent as ‘‘upper.’’ Participants reported differing experiences in military service, peace and conflict resolution education, and participation in protests. Six percent of the participants had served in the military, and 26 percent of the participants had relatives who had served in the military. Twenty-five percent of the participants had been in a peace education program, either an Education for Mutual Understanding program in school or a government agency program. Nineteen percent of the respondents had participated in some type of protest; 10 percent had attended antiwar or peace protests, and 7 percent had attended civil rights marches. Participant Attitudes and Beliefs about War and War-related Issues When asked to define the term ‘‘war,’’ 34 percent of the participants identified it as a conflict between two countries, regions, or factions, whereas 17 percent emphasized violence and killing. When asked to describe how they would feel and what they would want to do in specific situations involving governmental aggression, 72 percent reported they would feel shame, disgust, anger, or sadness; 22 percent said they would protest to the government, 19 percent said they would try to find some way to stop it, and 9 percent said they would try to help the wounded. Regarding how they would react if their country was being bombed, 35 percent reported they would feel sadness, fear, or horror, and 31 percent said they would be angry; 20 percent said they would try to help those affected by the bombing, 17 percent said they would retaliate, 14 percent said they would try to find some way to stop the bombing, and 12 percent said they would seek to negotiate the conflict.

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Clearly war and warlike activities were viewed as shameful and saddening, and most of the Northern Ireland participants expressed a desire to take nonviolent action in response, although some saw revenge and retaliation as valid actions. The experience of more than 30 years of a warlike situation has not created a glorification of violence in Northern Ireland—most of our respondents abhor war and war-like acts. During the 30 years of the ‘‘Troubles’’, supporting the government was problematic for both sides of the dispute. Nationalists did not see the British government as the valid government of Northern Ireland32 and Unionists saw themselves as being forced to accept legislation that limited their dominance over Catholics in housing and rights, and their expression of that dominance in a ban on parades.33 This history probably helps explain why in response to the PAIRTAPS item ‘‘It is important to support the government in time of war,’’ the largest group of participants indicated some level of disagreement: total disagreement (25 percent), fairly strong disagreement (10 percent), or mild disagreement (3 percent). Smaller groups were either neutral or in agreement with this statement, with 25 percent of participants indicating that they neither agreed nor disagreed, and 27 percent indicating some level of agreement. In their responses, 10 percent of the participants expressed total opposition to war, making explanatory comments such as, ‘‘War shouldn’t be supported.’’ Other participants qualified their lack of support with statements such as, ‘‘It is important to support troops in time of war—even if fundamentally opposed to reasons of going to war’’ or ‘‘Only as long as the government is acting responsibly when going to war, and not doing so for purely political gain.’’ Catholic and Protestant respondents differed slightly in their levels of agreement: 56 percent of Catholic respondents disagreed with the statement whereas 30 percent of the Protestants disagreed. Eighteen percent of Protestant respondents and 30 percent of Catholic respondents neither agreed nor disagreed, and 23 percent of Protestant respondents and 28 percent of Catholic respondents agreed with the statement. When asked to report their level of agreement with a statement that their country’s involvement in an armed conflict was morally correct, 32 percent of participants indicated some level of disagreement, 9 percent neither agreed nor disagreed, and 9 percent reported some level of agreement. Among respondents who identified their religious preference, most (56 percent of Catholics and 62 percent of Protestants) did not answer this question. However, 36 percent of Catholics and 30 percent of Protestants expressed some level of disagreement with the statement. These results are interesting in light of the fact that historically both sides of the conflict in Northern Ireland made some claim to a

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moral right to engage in conflict. The IRA claimed that it was fighting to remove foreign domination.34 An important part of the Unionist agenda was to maintain the dominance of ‘‘true’’ religion in Northern Ireland.35 Participants were also asked to indicate their agreement with statements that dealt with the possible rights of countries to invade other countries and to ignore international treaties and agreements. Regarding a country’s right to invade another country, many participants (38 percent) indicated total disagreement or some level of disagreement (18 percent) whereas 10 percent neither agreed nor disagreed, and only 28 percent indicated some level of agreement. Participants who disagreed with a governmental right to invasion often expressed that disagreement in general terms—for example, ‘‘No country has the right to invade, only defend against invasion.’’ In explanations of their rating, 25 percent of participants said a country’s right to invade would depend on the circumstances that prompted the invasion—for example, ‘‘Depends on the situation, whether it would benefit the country or destroy a bad leadership.’’ Given the 900 years of British attempts to control and suppress Catholic resistance to English rule of Ireland, in modern Nationalist (Catholic) thinking, the presence of British troops in Northern Ireland was an invasion: 72 percent of Catholic respondents expressed some level of disagreement with a government’s right to invade, whereas 42 percent of Protestant respondents disagreed. Twenty-three percent of Catholic respondents agreed and 5 percent were neutral, whereas 32 percent of Protestant respondents agreed and 16 percent were neutral. One Catholic respondent commented, ‘‘I’ve lived under illegal occupation of a foreign government all my life.’’ In general, the ‘‘Troubles’’ have been viewed as 30 years of political terrorism, not a war. However, in 1939, the IRA declared war on the ‘‘British invaders’’ of Northern Ireland.36 A crucial part of the peace process in Northern Ireland was the IRA acceptance of British neutrality, which led to the cease-fire in 1994.37 On the Protestant side, the criminal nature of the activities of the paramilitary groups38 and the validity of the Catholic demand for civil rights were recognized. In addition, recognition by both sides that the political process was more powerful and less destructive than violence in settling the issues between them created a willingness to negotiate. Although some of our Northern Irish participants revealed some support of a governmental right to wage war, the majority of responses indicate an abhorrence of war. Participants responded to warlike situations with disgust and did not agree with the government’s rights to invade another country, violate treaties and agreements, and draft its citizens to fight a foreign war. The responses of the participants indicate

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a distrust of the possible moral correctness of war, lack of support for the Iraq war, and varying levels of discontent with current world politics—probably reflecting the history of violence experienced by both sides in Northern Ireland. For each side, violence was a crude attempt to achieve political goals by force. As the death toll mounted in Northern Ireland and destruction of infrastructure increased without achievement of political goals, the support of the people for violent solutions to conflict waned. Our findings are evidence of the realization by citizens of Northern Ireland that political goals are more efficiently achieved through the political process. Participant Attitudes and Beliefs about Torture When asked to indicate their level of agreement with the statement, ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war,’’ 62 percent participants indicated total disagreement, 14 percent indicated lesser levels of disagreement, 7 percent did not agree or disagree, and 10 percent expressed some level of agreement with the statement. In response to the statement, ‘‘No one has the right to physically or psychologically torture, injure, much less kill, any other human being,’’ 55 percent of respondents indicated total agreement, 13 percent reported lesser levels of agreement, 7 percent were neutral, and 17 percent expressed some level of disagreement. Participants who supported their rating with a comment often stated that torture was a violation of human rights, with such comments as, ‘‘Torture is a violation of human rights. No human being can take it upon themselves to torture another, not even to prevent terrorism.’’ A higher percentage of Catholic participants (77 percent) than Protestant participants (52 percent) stated an absolute opposition to torture: another 15 percent of Catholics and 12 percent of Protestants stated some level of opposition to torture. Only 3 percent of Catholic participants and 12 percent of Protestant participants had neutral opinions. None of the Catholic participants approved of torture, whereas 14 percent of Protestants did approve it. Although recognizing the common reasons given by the government for the necessity of torture, many participants rejected the idea that torture can be a morally correct way to gain information, even if lives are at stake. Although the IRA and Protestant paramilitary cease-fires have eliminated larger acts of terrorism, violent attacks against individuals continue to occur.39 ‘‘Punishment attacks,’’ which are a continuing threat, may take the form of torture and/or killing. Our Northern Irish participants, who have lived in a society where these types of attacks continue to happen, have an understanding of the reprehensible nature of torture.

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Participant Attitudes and Beliefs about Terrorism All of the participants in our study have lived all or a large part of their life in a society where terrorism was actively practiced. Before the cease-fires in 1994, public life was guided by constant vigilance for the possibility of a bombing. In each year from 1971 until 1999, from 250 to as many as 1,500 bombs were planted in Northern Ireland per year. When asked to define terrorism, 19 percent of our participants described it as violence against human beings, whereas 20 percent emphasized engaging in violence for political or religious gain. One participant defined terrorism as, ‘‘When groups of people bully different parties in a certain city or country in a bad manner, e.g. bombings’’ and another as, ‘‘An indiscriminate act of violence by a group against individuals or a nation.’’ These views are based on bitter experience; both sides of the dispute in Northern Ireland have engaged in terrorist acts. The IRA carried on a campaign of bombing against the British, and the Ulster Volunteer Force and Loyalist Volunteer Force engaged in bombing of Catholic homes.40 Both Protestants and Catholics have suffered significant losses in the more than 3,700 people who died as a result of terrorist acts.41 When asked to rate their level of agreement with a statement that governments have the right to kill innocent civilians to fight terrorism, 74 percent of participants expressed total disagreement and 8 percent fairly strong disagreement, 3 percent had a neutral opinion, and only 7 percent expressed some level of agreement with the statement. Twelve percent of participants commented that they saw terrorism as a violation of the human right to life, and 9 percent said that innocents should be protected. One participant wrote, ‘‘If governments must use force to fight terrorism, it must be carefully targeted to prevent death or injury of innocent people.’’ These participants recognized the violence and struggle for political power inherent in terrorism, but did not consider a government to have a right to kill innocent civilians in its efforts to lessen the risk of terrorism. Ninety percent of Catholic participants and 74 percent of Protestant participants expressed opposition to the killing of innocents in the fight against terrorism. However, 12 Protestant participants supported the statement, and only 3 Catholic participants did.

VIEWS ON THE RIGHT TO PROTEST In response to the statement, ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace,’’ most participants (57 percent) indicated total agreement and 25 percent indicated a lesser level of

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agreement. Only four participants indicated any level of disagreement with the statement; six took a neutral stance. Protest was often identified as a human right, equated with ‘‘freedom of speech and rights of peaceful assembly.’’ When asked to describe their emotional response to a situation in which police were beating peaceful antiwar demonstrators, 53 percent expressed anger, sorrow, or disgust, and 13 percent stated that the beating was unnecessary, illegal, or a violation of human rights. One participant’s reaction was, ‘‘angry at the injustice and brutality.’’ When asked what they would do about the beating, 36 percent said they would protest to the government, take legal action against the police, protest, or find a way to stop it. One participant would want to ‘‘Complain about the police violence to the relevant authority.’’ During the 30 years of the ‘‘Troubles’’, peaceful civil rights protests often turned violent as the opposing sides clashed. Among our participants, 28 percent of the Catholics had participated in a protest, and only 8 percent of the Protestants had done so. Without these protests, there would have been little motivation for the British government to change the situation in Northern Ireland. Most of the Catholic (90 percent) and Protestant (76 percent) respondents supported the right to protest. For the Catholics in particular, the long struggle for civil rights has elucidated the importance of protest in the political process. Most of our participants have lived through a time when the issue of police control of potentially violent situations was problematic. The horror of Bloody Sunday, January 30, 1972, when 13 unarmed protesters were shot dead by British soldiers, still looms in the Northern Irish memory.42 When asked to indicate their level of agreement with a statement that the police or military have the right to use violence against their own citizens, 7 percent of participants expressed total disagreement, and 35 percent of participants expressed lesser levels of disagreement. Sixteen percent indicated total agreement with this statement, and another 22 percent indicated some level of agreement with it. Twentyfive percent of the participants explained that whether the police or military had the right to use violence against citizens depended on the situation, citing threat to public safety or to the police, and incidents of extreme violence and law breaking. One participant stated, ‘‘From the point of view of living in NI, it is sometimes necessary to use force (reasonable force) to maintain order in a civil environment.’’ More Catholic (46 percent) than Protestant respondents (32 percent) disagreed with police or military force to control civil dissension. Forty-one percent of the Catholics reported some level of agreement with the use of force as did 12 percent of Protestants. Most of these Northern Irish participants believe in their right to express their opinions about government actions and support the right

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of citizens to protest peacefully. Their experience of the past 30 years has given them an understanding that protest is sometimes necessary and that violent protests need to be kept under control from a public safety standpoint. The memory of events such as Bloody Sunday has made them aware of the difficulty of finding the balance between crowd control and police or military brutality.

PARTICIPANT ATTITUDES AND BELIEFS ABOUT RECONCILIATION AND PEACE Since 1998, Northern Ireland has been traveling down a rocky road of reconciliation. Implementation of the Belfast Agreement has not always gone smoothly.43 Society-wide efforts have been undertaken to enhance cultural understanding through cross-community education. Reconciliation has not only included legislative action but also a gradual redefining of Northern Ireland identity, as is evident in crucial decisions about publicly used symbols, flags, and public events.44 In providing definitions of reconciliation, many respondents (24 percent) made reference to ending conflict and building peace, and 17 percent introduced the concept of coming to agreement as a necessary part of reconciliation. One participant defined reconciliation as, ‘‘Overcoming of past tensions, understanding causes of conflict, desire for peaceful relations in future.’’ As a part of the reconciliation process in Northern Ireland, participants experienced the results of delicate negotiations that resulted in engagement in the political process rather than renewed violence. The peace process has often teetered on the brink of failure as thorny issues such as disarmament, creating formulas for representative voting and seating in the Northern Ireland Assembly, and the redesign of the Police Service of Northern Ireland have been resolved.45 Underlying the peace process is a societal commitment to building a peaceful, civil society by the majority of the citizens of Northern Ireland, as evidenced by the 71 percent vote in favor of the Belfast Agreement in 1998.46 Behind the engagement in the political process has been a breaking down of the walls between Catholics and Protestants engendered by the many cross-community programs that have been developed and implemented and Education for Mutual Understanding. Participant Attitudes and Beliefs about Peace and National Security Participants were asked to define peace and to rate their level of agreement with statements about whether there is a right to live in peace. They also were asked if peace is achievable and the best way achieve it.

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Participant definitions included positive definitions such as people living in harmony (24 percent), and negative definitions focusing on the absence of war, fighting, and loss of life (17 percent). Some definitions introduced the ideas of countries working together such as, ‘‘when people/countries work together to provide for each other and support each other in a proper manner.’’ One rather poignant definition reflected Northern Ireland’s past: ‘‘No bombing and shooting and no army patrolling streets and check points.’’ When asked to state their level of agreement to a statement that children have a right to grow up in peace, 80 percent of participants indicated total agreement, 12 percent indicated lesser levels of agreement, and 3 percent expressed some level of disagreement. One participant stated, ‘‘All children should be given an equal opportunity in life regardless of where they are born.’’ In response to an item stating that all human beings have a right to peace, 76 percent of participants reported total agreement and 12 percent of participants reported some level of agreement with the statement, with 1 percent of participants stating neither agreement nor disagreement, and 6 percent expressing some level of disagreement. One participant stated, ‘‘Peace should be as important as clean water and food.’’ Sadly, only 30 percent of the participants indicated any level of agreement with the statement that world peace could be achieved, while 42 percent of participants indicated some level of disagreement. Reasons given for the impossibility of achieving world peace included human nature (13 percent), greed for money or power (9 percent), and cultural or religious differences (6 percent). When asked what they thought the best way to achieve world peace was, 14 percent of participants suggested negotiation, and 11 percent said stop fighting. National security is an issue associated with world peace. Most participants (55 percent) agreed at least somewhat that national security was essential for individual and family security. Twenty-one percent of participants commented that national security was essential to protect citizens against terrorists. Twelve percent neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement, and 6 percent expressed some level of disagreement. When asked the best way to achieve national security, participants made several suggestions but showed no consensus of opinion. Suggestions included international laws and agreements, policing, building equitable societies, living peacefully. Having lived with 30 years of ‘‘The Troubles,’’ the participants in this study value peace, but they recognize the difficulty of achieving it. After the great hope engendered by the referendum in support of the Belfast Agreement, they have watched its implementation drag on for the past 10 years in slow and unsteady process.47 Most of them believe that a human being has a right to live in peace, but they recognize that

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several human factors impede the development of a peaceful world. The factors that these participants cite as impediments to peace are the same as the ones they have experienced on Northern Ireland’s bumpy road towards peace—specifically, the difficulty of relinquishing weaponry and developing a representative government in the face of political agendas; nevertheless they embrace the need to move forward out of the pain of the past to a less rancorous future.

SUMMARY The Northern Irish participants in this study believe that they and their children have a right to live in peace, untroubled by terrorism, war, and civil strife. They believe that their government has only limited rights to wage war and violate treaties. They believe in their right to disagree with the government and to express this disagreement publicly. They do not support a governmental right to torture prisoners for information in time of war, or to kill innocent civilians in the fight against terrorism. At the foundation of these views is a strong belief in the value of human life and self-expression. They desire world peace, but most of them do not think that humans can achieve it. The application of the results of this study is limited by the demographics of its participants. Although a variety of educational and socioeconomic levels were represented in the sample, there was less representation of lower and upper socioeconomic classes, and lower levels of education. As is often the case with studies of this sort, young adults (i.e., student-aged) represent the largest group of participants, although a significant attempt was made to seek out older participants. Future research would benefit by collecting responses from more middle-aged adults and senior citizens—those with more life experience may have greater wisdom about these topics. It would also be of interest to examine the responses of those who participated in peace and conflict resolution education or have had military experience to see if their perspectives differ from those of others in the sample. Because the PAIRTAPS study is being conducted in several countries, cross-cultural and cross-national comparisons, related to the different histories and politics of the countries, are of value in contributing to an understanding of the bases of attitudes toward governmental aggression and peace.

3

Portugal Carla Machado, Raquel Matos, and Mariana Barbosa

War is … ‘‘Armed conflict between two opposing factions’’ (male, 50); ‘‘Conflict, opposition, fight, hostility’’ (female, 21). Peace is … ‘‘Friendly, prosperous, tolerant and civic coexistence among human beings’’ (male, 24); ‘‘Dialogue and solidarity among human beings and a utopia we all must fight for’’ (male, 27). Portugal was once, beginning in the 15th century, a vast colonial empire that included Asian and African domains. The decolonization of this empire was the last chapter in ‘‘the dissolution of the European colonial empires following World War Two.’’1 The fight for independence in the African colonies began in 1961; thus began the ‘‘colonial war’’ that lasted for 13 years. This war ended with the political revolution of 1974, a peaceful uprising led by elements of the army that put an end to the fascist regime and brought democracy to the country. Although there were strong communist influences in the government and in the political measures taken in the first postrevolutionary years, the country soon progressed into a democratic regime similar to most West European countries. Portugal joined the European Union (EU) in 1986 and lives today under considerable political stability. Under democracy, the government has been alternatively led by the socialist and social democratic parties. Given Portugal’s ‘‘ancient’’ history of imperialism, and current social and political stability, what do today’s Portuguese think about governmental aggression and peace? After expanding on the relevant historical and political context, we address this question, analyzing responses to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS).

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HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT From Colonial Empire to Democratic Revolution Portugal is a small country in the extreme west of Europe, with a population of about 10 million inhabitants. It has been independent since 1143 (making it one of the oldest countries in Europe) and was the center of a colonial empire that lasted from the 15th century to the third quarter of the 20th century. It was ruled by a monarchy until 1910, when the republican regime was created. The republic faced severe instability, political agitation, and economic crises. As a reaction to this turbulence, in 1926 a dictatorial regime was imposed, lasting for 48 years and constituting the most prolonged authoritarian regime in Western Europe during the 20th century. Until 1974, Portugal was an underdeveloped, rural, and highly Catholic country, with a patriarchal social organization, dominated by hegemonic values such as ‘‘God,’’ ‘‘the Nation,’’ ‘‘the Family,’’ and ‘‘Authority.’’2 Portuguese intransigence regarding the empire during the fascist regime led to a prolonged colonial war that involved nearly a million people, causing almost 9,000 deaths and more than 30,000 wounded.3 This intransigence led to Portugal’s increasing international isolation during the 1960s and early 1970s, with the exception of support from South Africa, and some benevolence from France and Germany as well as from the United States during the Nixon/Kissinger administration.4 Almost all African and Asian countries cut diplomatic relations with Portugal during that period, the Nordic countries openly criticized the regime, and even the dictatorial regimes in Brazil and Spain distanced themselves from Portugal’s colonial politics.5 In the early 1970s, international condemnation hardened, with the Catholic Church reproaching Portuguese colonialism and the international community recognizing Guinea-Bissau (a former colony) as an independent country in 1973. Inside the country, opposition to war was also rising, both from organized political movements and from students and the progressive Catholic movements. These internal and external pressures exploded in the military revolution of 1974, which had wide support from the public, led to decolonization, increased individual freedom, opened the country to the cultural changes Europe was experiencing during the 1960s and 1970s, and generated a period of intense social and political activism, conflict, and enthusiasm. The Portuguese Experience of Internal Terrorism This social and political climate, aggravated by external pressures from both pro-U.S. and pro-USSR forces, created the conditions for the appearance in the late 1970s of the FP-25, a left-wing terrorist group.

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This group was involved in direct violence against public authorities and leading capitalists and also engaged in ‘‘fund raising’’ actions, namely, high value bank theft. This small organization of about 152 members6 operated between 1980 and 1986 and caused 20 deaths and an identical number of injuries. Their actions were stopped after a police operation that arrested most of its members. Demographics, Lifestyle, and Values The 1980s in Portugal were, aside from the FP-25 action, characterized by a progressive stabilization of the democracy and the diminishing of political and social conflict. On the economic level, integration into the European Union and financial help contributed to a rapid improvement in the economic condition of most people. Political engagement was, in most cases, replaced by ‘‘hedonic consumerism’’ and an individualist and competitive lifestyle.7 However, despite the improvement, the economic situation in Portugal continues to give rise to concern: 20 percent of the population lives below the poverty line,8 including 15.6 percent of the children. More than 12 percent of the active population earns only the minimum wage and 7 percent is unemployed. Poverty is visibly feminized, as shown by the fact that women have higher rates of unemployment, lower salaries, and represent 69 percent of the beneficiaries of State support for extreme poverty cases. Portugal also has the highest rich-poor discrepancy rate of the EU, with 20 percent of the richest citizens retaining more than 46 percent of the national income.9 Life expectance in Portugal is steadily increasing (74 years for men and 81 for women), the fertility rate is rapidly decreasing (1.4 children born per woman), marriage rates are decreasing (4.7/1,000), and divorce rates are increasing (2.2/1,000). Some of these changes can be attributed to improved life conditions and better medical care, whereas others are more related to values and lifestyle changes. In fact, during the 1970s and 1980s, sexuality ceased to be a taboo, and contraception became easily available. During the 1990s, AIDS became a pertinent health concern. In 2007, abortion by women’s choice, until the 10th week of pregnancy, became legal. Despite these changes, Portugal is still, by and large, a Catholic country (84 percent of the population),10 and, although not as strong as before, the Church still occupies a relevant role in the social and political life of the country, especially in the North and in the inland regions. Regarding education, Portugal underwent rapid changes after the democratic revolution: analphabetism (illiteracy), which had had a rate of over 40 percent, was nearly eliminated; the number of students at all educational levels increased; nine years of education became mandatory; and special needs and preschool

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public education systems were created;11 nevertheless, 45 percent of the school-aged population still leaves school before the legal age,12 and Portugal has the lowest rate in the EU of young adults who have completed secondary education.13 Immigration and Ethnic Problems While traditionally a country of emigrants (mainly fleeing poverty during the fascist dictatorship), Portugal in recent decades has experienced an increasing number of immigrants. Data from the Organization of Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) show that, in 2005, foreigners represented almost 7 percent of the total population, which, although less than in most European countries, represents a significant social change. The immigrant population comes predominantly from Africa and Brazil, but also from China and former Soviet Union countries. Although there have been no major ethnic or religious conflicts, there has been some concern in the public discourse with the growing population of immigrants; concerns over crime and violence have been raised, especially by right-wing politicians. These problems have been focused on the urban regions of Lisboa and Porto, where most of the immigrant populations are concentrated, some of them in extreme poverty. The country has also a considerable population of gypsies, with significant problems of social exclusion. Women’s Status and Organization of Family Life Portugal has the third highest rate of female employment in the EU for the 25–49 years age-group (75 percent), and 63 percent of the collegeeducated population under 30 are women. In 2002, 57 percent of the university students were women and, even in traditionally ‘‘more masculine’’ areas, such as computer science and engineering, women in Portugal have higher representation than women in other European countries.14 They also spend more hours working. Recent sociological inquiries show that most women value their professional activities and reject the ideal of a domestic life devoted uniquely to their husband and children.15 Nevertheless, women’s average wages are considerably lower than men’s,16 and women are rarely active in public and, especially, in the political sphere (they represent only 12 percent of the Parliament members). This situation has been attributed to the accumulation of professional, childrearing, and housekeeping duties. In fact, the participation of men in housekeeping activities is still quite low, being estimated at 26 percent by men’s self-report and 3 percent by women’s reports.17 A recent inquiry shows that men’s participation exceeds 50 percent only in regard to financial or car problems, being less than 25 percent in

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cooking, doing the dishes, taking care of clothes, housecleaning, feeding the children, helping children do their homework, or taking care of elderly relatives.18 There are indicators, however, that this form of social organization is under a slow but progressive transformation process—as illustrated, for example, by increases in the divorce rate and in new forms of family organization (single-parenthood, cohabitation without marriage, reconstructed families). These changes have been accompanied by an increasing awareness of the problems of child and partner abuse and, especially since the 1990s, new legislation and institutions have been created to protect victims. Partner violence is nowadays a civil crime, educational campaigns on the subject have been active, and special police training on how to deal with victims has been provided. Reporting of child abuse is mandatory. Despite these positive signals, the Portuguese level of child protection and care is still considered by the UNICEF as one of the worst in the industrialized world.19 A recent study obtained a self-reported prevalence of 22 percent for emotional child abuse and of 12 percent for physical abuse of children.20 In the first and only representative study of victimization of women conducted in Portugal, 51 percent reported some form of psychological abuse, 28 percent unwanted sexual experiences, and 7 percent physical violence.21 Self-reported prevalence of partner abuse was 12 percent for physical abuse and 23 percent for emotional abuse.22 Thus, we see in Portugal a modernizing country, a democracy moving further and further away from the years of fascism, a country struggling to raise the living standards and level of education of its populace, a nation concerned with combating violence in the home. Of particular interest to us is the extent to which members of Portuguese society tolerate or reject governmentally sanctioned aggression and the extent to which they believe in peace.

PORTUGUESE PERSPECTIVES ON STATE VIOLENCE AND PEACE Our sample consisted of 600 Portuguese adults, 48 percent male and 52 percent female, aged from 18 to 67, with a mean age of 34 for both genders. Approximately 35 percent of the respondents lived in the North of the country, 23 percent in the Center, 26 percent in the Lisbon area, 7 percent in Alentejo, 4 percent in the Algarve, 2 percent in Madeira, and 2 percent in the Azores. The distribution by gender and region of the country corresponds quite well with the available census data.23 The sample was largely middle class (66 percent), and the remaining individuals were from lower (17 percent) and upper (17 percent) classes.

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Approximately 47 percent of the sample had a college or graduate degree, 37 percent had high school education, and 16 percent reported a lower educational level. Most of the participants (63 percent) were employed and represented a range of professions (e.g., teachers, musicians, engineers, farmers, and police officers), 12 percent were retired or unemployed, and 25 percent were full-time students. Seventy-eight percent of the participants were Christian Catholics, 19 percent were Atheist or Agnostic, and 3 percent were from other religions. All participants completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS).24 For the purposes of this study, responses to six items from the PAIRTAPS were analyzed. Participants were asked to rate each item on a scale of 1 to 7 (from totally disagree to totally agree) to indicate the extent to which they agreed with it and to then provide a brief written explanation for their ratings. The specific items analyzed were: ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country’’; ‘‘Sometimes the heads of government have the right to harm innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism’’; and ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war.’’ Portuguese views on peace were analyzed through the items: ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace’’; ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace’’; and ‘‘I believe world peace can be achieved.’’ Invasion ‘‘Independence and autonomy of each country are inalienable rights.’’ (female, 40) ‘‘[Invasion is acceptable] only when and if there is a violation of human rights.’’ (male, 40) On their rating scale responses to the item ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country,’’ most of the Portuguese participants (almost 70 percent) disagreed; 48 percent disagreed totally. On the other hand, 23 percent of the sample agreed with a national right to invasion, although only 3 percent expressed total agreement. Among the participants who provided arguments justifying their rejection of a right to invade, 43 percent referred to each country’s right to sovereignty and self-determination. According to the participants, countries have a right to independence, freedom, and respect for their borders, as well as a right to make their own decisions and to have their cultural and political values respected by other countries. This importance given to sovereignty is probably due to Portugal’s long history of fighting for independence from Spain and to the

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perception of national independence as an honorable motive. Pride in Portuguese nationality is quite visible, for instance, in the history curriculum taught in primary and secondary schools. Furthermore, guilt and regret feelings related with the country’s colonial past may also play a role, with Portuguese citizens being aware of the wrongs committed in the past and recognizing the importance of a country’s right to be independent and live according to its own values. Nearly a quarter of the sample provided other reasons for rejecting a right to invasion, including the inefficacy of invasion as a means to solve conflicts, the availability of better alternatives (e.g., the search for dialogue and diplomatic means), and the possibility of resorting to international organizations. One 29-year-old woman noted, ‘‘International organizations exist to help resolve conflicts through diplomacy.’’ About 5 percent of the participants focused on the negative consequences of an invasion, mainly the danger that it might lead to a long war. Once again, this probably reflects the heritage of the colonial war and consciousness of the devastating effects of a prolonged period of conflict. At the same time, present events, such as the war in Iraq, strongly rejected by most Portuguese people, may contribute to this reasoning. Most participants indicating agreement with a right to invasion referred to exceptional circumstances that made invasion ‘‘necessary.’’ Humanitarian reasons appeared as the major argument provided by 49 percent of these participants, most of whom emphasized the need to stop human rights violations in the invaded country. Seven percent of the participants who justified their agreement emphasized the importance of international approval, holding that invasion can be justified only in the framework of international missions by organizations such as the UN or NATO. One 30-year-old woman said, ‘‘A country alone can never decide to invade a territory over which it has no rights. Only world organizations can take that decision on a consensual basis.’’ This emphasis on humanitarian reasons for invasion can be related to Portugal’s involvement in peacekeeping operations during the last few decades. Today, more than 600 Portuguese personnel are integrated into internationally sanctioned military operations around the world, including Afghanistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina; in addition, there has been a Portuguese military contingent in East Timor since the year 2000. In fact, the East Timor process of independence constitutes a clear example of (and maybe a strong reason for) the Portuguese support for invasion when human rights violations are happening. As a former Portuguese colony, later occupied by Indonesia, East Timor fought a long fight for independence. Human rights violations committed by the Indonesian regime were known to a full extent in 1991, when pro-independence demonstrators were shot by Indonesian troops and police in the Santa

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Cruz cemetery, leading to the death of at least 250 Timorese. This massacre was testified to and filmed by foreign journalists and divulged all over the world, generating outrage and the organization of solidarity groups around the globe. Although Portugal had long been a supporter of the East Timorese people’s right to self-determination, this event brought a new urgency to their claim, and their cause was embraced with great enthusiasm by most Portuguese people. Support was demonstrated by numerous national demonstrations, recurrent media attention, and diplomatic efforts to promote East Timor’s right to self-determination. East Timor’s independence was, in fact, a major political cause unifying and mobilizing the entire country after the revolution, a cause that may have appeased Portuguese guilt over its colonial past. Portugal was in fact perceived by the Timorese as a friendly and helping country, the role of the oppressor being attributed to Indonesia. In addition to humanitarian reasons, both national security (25 percent) and international security (10 percent) were also invoked to justify invasion. These responses presumed that a country has the right to invade another country if it is attacked first (counterstrike) or if the other country is perceived as a threat (preventive attack). This suggests that some of the Portuguese have assimilated one of the core ideas of the war on terror discourse: the need for ‘‘preemptive’’ attack against countries perceived as a threat. Like much of the media to which they may have been exposed, these respondents seem unaware of or rejecting of the traditional distinction between preemptive war and preventive war. Preemptive war, which is permitted by international law, involves the situation where a military attack is imminent, appears inescapable, cannot be avoided by nonmilitary means, has high likelihood of being the only way of thwarting the imminent attack (likely to occur within days or weeks), and is likely to reduce or eliminate damage.25 By contrast, preventive war, which is not legitimized in international law, refers to a situation where future conflict seems inevitable but is not imminent, and mounting an attack seems to the aggressors to be in their best interests. Among the participants who referred to national security and even among those supporting humanitarian interventions, there was considerable stress on the need for a careful verification of allegations and clear awareness of the interests (money, oil, political influence) that tend to conduce to invasion. As a 20-year-old woman said, invasion was acceptable ‘‘Only if it really is to help the invaded country, which commonly is not the case.’’ This position expresses the suspicion voiced by several Portuguese opinion makers and by part of the general public toward the true objectives of some military operations, such as the NATO intervention in the Balkans’ conflict and, especially, the Iraqi war.

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Killing Innocent Civilians to Fight Terrorism ‘‘No one has the right to kill, either innocent civilians or guilty terrorists.’’ (female, 40) ‘‘Innocents should not pay for the errors of others.’’ (male, 51) Only a few individuals (7 percent) agreed that ‘‘Sometimes the heads of government have the right to harm innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism,’’ with 76 percent of the Portuguese participants totally disagreeing. Perhaps because Portugal’s experience of internal terrorism, which lasted only a few years, never signified a real threat to the security of the democratic regime, and was not nearly as ruthless as the experience of other European countries, the Portuguese can see no real reason why a fight against terrorism should be paid for by a loss of innocent lives. In 1996, the Portuguese Parliament approved a general amnesty for the members of the FP-25, as part of a process of conflict resolution and political reconciliation. Although this measure was far from consensual, it has become generally accepted by the public and understood as a symbolic marker of the general acceptance of the democratic regime. It appears that Portuguese people perceive Portugal as a peaceful country relatively shielded from external terrorist attacks. This perception does not seem to have changed after the events of 9/11 and subsequent attacks in London and Madrid. In fact, a recent study on public perceptions of risk from terrorism shows that Portuguese people consider that, although the risk of terrorist attacks has recently grown at the world level, it has remained almost the same in Portugal.26 They perceive this risk as relatively low and quite inferior to the risk posed to other European countries, such as England, Spain, or France. It is probable that this perception of low risk is related to a lower level of tolerance toward state violence, the relationship between security concerns and tolerance toward state control and violence being widely documented.27 In providing arguments to explain why they saw ‘‘collateral damage’’ as unacceptable in the fight against terrorism, 23 percent of the participants emphasized a universal right to life, whereas 22 percent focused on the innocence of the civilians—arguing, for example, that ‘‘only sinners shall be punished.’’ Although both positions evoke the Christian discourse that is a part of the country’s cultural tradition, the first one conveys a stronger reproach of state violence, because it establishes the right to life as universal. On the other hand, about a fifth of the respondents stressing the innocence of civilian victims expressed a tolerance for killing terrorists (e.g., ‘‘They should kill only the terrorists’’), whereas the others stressed that terrorists should be ‘‘punished, not killed.’’ We could, therefore, say that, although most participants perceive the killing

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of civilians as an unacceptable cost, even in the context of fighting terrorism, there is some dissent concerning whether the lives of terrorists should be respected in the same way other lives are. Although most participants emphasize the universal value of human life, others distinguish between the lives of the innocent and the lives of the guilty and perceive killing ‘‘the guilty’’ as sometimes acceptable. Alternative means of fighting terrorism were presented by 8 percent of participants judging civilian casualties as unacceptable, with some of these participants recommending prevention and elimination of terrorism through fair policies and social justice. For instance, a 49-year-old woman said, ‘‘Governments should fight international terrorism by endorsing fair policies that promote mutual understanding and the development of all the people in the world.’’ Finally, 7 percent of the disagreement justifications equated killing innocent civilians with State terrorism (‘‘That’s fighting terrorism with terrorism’’—male, 36), and 5 percent criticized the United States (‘‘That’s Mr. Bush policy and it is entirely wrong’’—male, 50). Among the 7 percent of participants who supported the state’s right to kill civilians to fight terrorism, loss of civilian lives was portrayed as acceptable only in exceptional scenarios, to save other people’s lives, or as an unintended but sometimes unavoidable ‘‘collateral damage’’ of war on terror. Torture ‘‘In spite of being prisoners they are human beings, therefore they have their rights.’’ (female, 61) ‘‘The time of fascism and dictatorships is supposed to be in the past and that should not happen in a democratic era.’’ (female, 21) Once again, almost all participants disagreed with the idea that governments have a right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war. Only 8 percent expressed their accord with this item; 28 percent of the participants who provided explanations for their disagreement based their reasoning on the humanity of prisoners of war, acknowledging them as human beings whose dignity and rights ought to be respected. The importance of respecting human rights was emphasized, with a special accent on the idea that torture denies the human right to dignity. The idea that war is no excuse for denying these rights was also pointed out by 6 percent of the participants rejecting a right to torture; as one 28-year-old woman said, ‘‘Even in war, human beings have the obligation to respect a set of values that should not be abolished in any circumstance.’’ Six percent stressed that torture is forbidden by international agreements, such as the Geneva Convention (‘‘a prisoner of

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war should be treated with dignity, as the Geneva Convention establishes’’—female, 56). Just as in response to the terrorism item, some participants focus on innocence, with 9 percent of the participants who rejected torture arguing that soldiers should not be blamed for being at war, only governments are to be blamed for wartime (e.g., ‘‘many of the war prisoners were at war because they were forced’’—male, 54). Finally, alternatives to torture were mentioned by 6 percent of the participants to justify their rejection of it, with an emphasis on fair trial and punishment of war prisoners. The torture item evoked, more than any other item, strong emotional responses in the participants, several of whom characterized torture as ‘‘cowardly,’’ ‘‘cruel,’’ ‘‘inhuman,’’ ‘‘degrading,’’ or ‘‘monstrous.’’ This strong, expressive, rejection of torture can be interpreted, at least for some participants, as rooted in the country’s history—namely, the use of torture by the political police during the fascist regime, especially with communist sympathizers and lower class suspects of political dissidence. On the other side, younger participants (less than 40 years old) were raised in freedom and tend to view liberty and respect for human rights as natural occurrences. Although there are reports of torture (especially physical aggression) still being used by Portuguese police against common criminals,28 the respondents’ answers do not acknowledge this reality. Perhaps the participants conceptualize prisoners of war as different from criminal offenders or perhaps they represent torture in its most extreme forms, not understanding the use of physical aggression as a form of torture. This seems to be exemplified by answers such as ‘‘it depends on the degree of torture we are talking about’’ (male, 24) or ‘‘discipline yes, torture, no’’ (male, 31). Consistent with responses to the terrorism item, the principal rationale provided by participants who saw possible acceptable uses for torture was as a means to obtain relevant information to save more lives. For example, a 33-year-old male said, ‘‘I am against torture but it can be justified in some situations, when it is the last resort to save the lives of others and there’s the need to obtain information in order to do so.’’ It is important, however, to stress that this ‘‘ticking bomb scenario’’ rarely corresponds to the reality. As some authors have pointed out, ‘‘in the majority of situations of torture there is no revealing of secrets. The real purpose of torture is silence—a silence induced by fear and terror.’’29 The use of torture by the fascist regime in Portugal confirms this idea. According to a researcher of that period, through detention and torture the regime ‘‘spread fear, with the threat of what could happen to those that become dissidents. It also spread, with some efficacy, the idea that it was omnipotent and omnipresent, seeing and hearing all, through an enormous net of informers and a culture of denunciation.’’30 The

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rejection of this culture of fear and the consolidation of the democratic regime made Portugal a country where liberty is nowadays represented as the ‘‘normal state of affairs.’’ This perception underlies, in our opinion, the Portuguese views on this item and on the right to protest. Protests in Favor of Peace ‘‘We live in a world of free speech.’’ (female, 23) Most participants (93.5 percent) considered that ‘‘individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace,’’ 74.5 percent of them totally agreeing with this statement. Freedom of speech was the most frequently invoked justification of the right to protest (56 percent). Although most of these participants conceive of freedom of speech as a ‘‘natural right,’’ others emphasize that this is a right allowed by democracy, valuing it as a political achievement of today’s Portugal: ‘‘we live in a democratic society, where protest must be accepted. Dictatorship belongs to history’’ (female, 22). On the other hand, some participants valued not the right to protest per se but rather the specified purpose of the protest—that is, in favor of peace (27 percent). Despite general agreement with this item, one group of participants (30 percent) qualified their agreement with the right to protest, especially in regards to how protests are enacted: ‘‘if they are peaceful and orderly’’ (male, 29). This statement expresses the concerns of most participants qualifying the right to protest, communicating their fear of political divergence and open conflict. The cultural valuation of peace, order, and the absence of major conflicts in the country (well expressed by the common saying that ‘‘Portugal is a country of bland habits’’) is probably the main explanation for this fear of public disturbance. This qualification of the right to protest in older participants may also relate to their experiences in a fascist regime and to the fact that the political agitation that followed the revolution was felt by many as threatening and risky. Right to Peace ‘‘Peace should be the number one word of all dictionaries.’’ (female, 44) ‘‘Peace is a necessary condition for development.’’ (male, 22) Almost all of the Portuguese respondents to the PAIRTAPS (97 percent) considered that ‘‘all human beings have a basic right to peace,’’ and 88 percent of the sample expressed total agreement with this statement. In fact, 54 percent of the participants who explained their belief in a right to peace seemed to view the right as self-evident, as expressed by answers such as ‘‘obviously’’ (female, 20) or ‘‘just

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because’’ (male, 18). This position reflects the climate of peace pervading Portugal for the last few decades, and the representation of Portugal as a quiet and nonviolent country, with no major enemies or external threats. At the same time, for the older participants in the sample, the desire for peace must be contextualized in the painful experience of the colonial war and the promise of long-lasting peace brought up by the democratic revolution. In an international study about attitudes toward war in five countries—Brazil, Portugal, Chile, Germany, and the United States—there was evidence of serious concerns among Portuguese adults about war involving countries other than Portugal.31 Particularly, Portuguese adults were more ‘‘worried’’ and ‘‘concerned’’ about ‘‘wars between other countries’’ than adults from the other nations studied. Portuguese adults also considered they were affected by war between two other countries ‘‘because there are deaths and people suffer.’’32 One possible implication of these findings is that participants supported peace primarily because of their fear of war and its effects; such a perspective is consistent with the complaint from some observers that peace education and education for development were not strongly implemented in Portugal before its entrance into the Economic European Community. Nowadays, there is evidence of growing concern about peace education, but also some indicators of lack of significant progress, and particularly a lack of funded actions.33 Based on the few Portuguese studies on conceptions of peace and war, one might assume that the country has a limited peace culture or sensibility. Lourenco,34 for instance, studied a sample of children and observed that their opinions about both peace and war were always expressed in terms of war or negative ideas, and not the positive effects or meaning of peace by itself. Our results, however, contradict this view. In fact, although some participants did explain their support for a right to peace by stressing the negative consequences of war, 29 percent of the participants agreeing with this item emphasized the positive consequences of peace, such as the possibility of self-development, happiness, harmony, and progress. Such answers may express an awareness that, although still facing difficulties, Portugal is clearly more developed now than some years ago and that peace was a necessary condition for that achievement. Possibility of World Peace ‘‘If we strive for peace daily.’’ (female, 22) ‘‘It depends on each one of us.’’ (male, 19) Despite the fact that most participants emphasize the desirability of peace, they seem quite divided over the viability of this ideal. Slightly

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more than half of the participants agreed that world peace can be achieved; nearly a third disagreed, and 14 percent took no position on this matter. Among the participants providing justifications for their doubts, the most common point of view emphasizes the difficulties of achieving peace, characterizing it as a utopia or a dream (66 percent). Although some of these participants believe that, despite these difficulties, peace can and will be achieved (25 percent), the majority (46 percent) view the achievement of peace as dependent on effort, mental change, and political modifications or as doubtful (29 percent), characterizing it as ‘‘something I would like to believe’’ (male, 40) but ‘‘unpredictable’’ (female, 20). Finally, 30 percent of the participants who rated achieving world peace as unlikely indicated that human nature (e.g., evilness, complexity, and ambition), economic interests, and differences among human beings make the achievement of world peace unlikely.

CONCLUSION Portuguese recent history is marked by a prolonged submission to a fascist regime and a peaceful transition to democracy. After a few years of intense political turmoil and a brief experience of internal terrorism, democracy stabilized and the country has lived in peace for the last three decades. The rejection by the Portuguese people of past oppression and the relatively calm nature of the country’s current political life appear to underlie the way participants in this study tended to reject state violence, especially its most extreme forms, such as the killing of innocents and the resort to torture. The participants, products of the democratic revolution, tended to defend individual values such as life, dignity, freedom, and right to protest as natural rights of all human beings. A history of war over borders and the country’s colonial past make Portuguese respondents quite sensitive to matters of sovereignty and selfdetermination, justifying their global rejection of invasion. Humanitarian reasons for invasion, are, however, perceived by a number of participants as exceptions to this rule. Once again, the right to self-determination can be perceived as a reason for invasion, if that right is being threatened by other countries. The traumatic nature of the colonial war and the promise of peace brought by the revolution and achieved during the last decades also translate into a clear rejection of war and the perception of peace as a necessary condition for development. A pervasive discomfort with conflict extends, in some participants, to worry over political protest, and the caveat that it must be conducted in a peaceful and orderly manner. Despite this valuation of the country’s peaceful situation, opinions are divided concerning the achievability of global peace. As one participant said, ‘‘It’s a utopia, but we all should believe in it’’ (male, 56).

4

Spain Helena Castanheira and Scott Borrelli

War is … ‘‘chaos, destruction, death’’; ‘‘violence, death of the less fortunate ones’’; ‘‘violence, death, hate, destruction’’; ‘‘families destroyed.’’ Peace is … ‘‘respect’’; ‘‘tolerance and respect from everybody. To live in harmony’’; ‘‘all the people respect each other’’; ‘‘love.’’ After being the center of a world empire in the 16th century, Spain fell into a prolonged political and economic decline and struggled with the loss of territory, a series of long and almost consecutive wars, and an extended search for a workable governmental structure. During the last century, in its attempts to establish democracy, Spain’s history has been marked by extreme internal violence as well as repeated collapses of the state. The 1936–1939 civil war was followed by a 36-year-long dictatorship that made the armed forces central to a political stability based on one of the world’s most violent and repressive regimes. Although total numbers of victims are still disputed, as many as 150,000 executions may have been carried out, including 50,000 after the war.1 Following the transition to democracy in 1975, Spain made considerable economic and social progress and became fully integrated into the family of developed Western countries. However, its democracy is still young and dealing with the repressive legacy of Franco’s dictatorship, as well as pressure from radical nationalist groups seeking territorial autonomy and sometimes resorting to terrorism to achieve it. This chapter explores perspectives of ordinary Spanish citizens concerning such issues as peace, war, terrorism, invasion, protest, and torture. We begin by giving a brief background on the historical and political context of Spanish society, followed by a review of more recent events that have marked Spanish society, including participation in the

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invasion of Iraq and the handling of the terrorist attacks of 2004. We then present and discuss Spanish views as derived from open-ended survey responses. HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT Spain was established in the 11th century, making it one of Europe’s oldest states; however, its complete political unification was not achieved until the 16th century, when it became the dominant world empire, establishing colonies in the Americas, Asia, and Africa. Around the mid17th century, Spain began to lose territory and the following 200 years, characterized by long and consecutive wars, left the country’s resources depleted. As the two pillar institutions of Spain—the church and the monarchy—lost much of their authority and credibility, the country’s stability began to decline. In addition, the Napoleonic invasion in the early 19th century, coupled with the collapse of the Spanish monarchy, led the country into a long search for a workable governmental structure.2 Spain’s Long Fight for Democracy The history of the Spanish army as a political institution and unifying force emerged in 1814 and reached its pinnacle in the civil war of 1936–1939 followed by the 40 year pax armata of the dictatorship.3 Political instability was intense throughout the 19th and 20th century, as Spain witnessed five civil wars, the fall of the monarchy, a short-lived military dictatorship, and a second republic, declared by popular acclaim in 1931. The Second Republic was expected to establish the first true democracy in a country previously ruled by an elite composed of the privileged, the clergy, and the military.4 Its constitution was intended to establish freedom of speech, freedom of association, universal suffrage, separation of Church and State, the right to divorce, and other freedoms. Major problems facing the Second Republic included the worldwide recession that followed World War I and political unrest. Most of Europe experienced a struggle among opposing ideologies, including revolutionary socialism, liberal democracy, and fascism. Spain was no exception,5 and the Republic’s politics were an aggressive struggle between right- and left-wing movements. Extreme political pressures and divisiveness, along with the Republic’s failure to implement military and land reforms, pushed Spain back into a military revolt in 1936, leading the country into the most violent reaction that it had ever experienced—a civil war and the subsequent Franco dictatorship.6

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The Civil War The 1936 rebellion in Spain occurred in a period when there was a general rise of the extreme right in Europe and growing fascism in Germany. The main goals of the Spanish Nationalists were the restoration of the role of the Catholic Church, the defense of territorial integrity against supposedly separatist ambitions, the return of the hegemony of the elites, and the destruction of democracy.7 From their perspective, the civil war was a crusade fought against the antichrists—the liberals and communists who were associated with other ‘‘outsiders’’: Marxists, Jews, and Freemasons.8 The Republican side, in contrast, was fighting for the defense of liberal democracy and, on an international level, the defense of democracy against fascism.9 Many proponents of Republican Spain were part of a large-scale anarchist movement,10 which had been planning a social revolution through collectivizing land and factories and giving control to workers. Although the rebellion had some civilian support, it was mostly a military campaign. The initial coup attempt failed, and the Nationalists sought international support, which was provided by the fascist dictators Mussolini and Hitler. France and Britain ignored the conflict. In addition to at least 300,000 killed during the war, about 440,00011 were externally displaced and an additional 400,000 went into prisons and forced labor camps.12 Although there are no exact numbers of civilian deaths as a result of human rights atrocities, some 10,000 exiles died in Nazi concentration camps.13 Because the nationalist army was far superior to the popular army, and France and England failed to support Spain, the Republicans were defeated and fascism triumphed. Franco became known for his organized terror, such as mass executions. The Dictatorship Spain’s new totalitarian government continued the terror and repression of the civil war. Thousands of ‘‘enemies of Spain’’ were sentenced to death, and thousands of Republican sympathizers faced constant discrimination. Psychological programming of the regime’s values through reeducation and media propaganda began while most families suffered from semistarvation, disease, and exploitation. A meeting between Franco and Hitler in 1940 resulted in a formal undertaking for Spain to join the war on the Axis side, but Spain managed to stay officially neutral, and in 1940 declared its non-belligerency. For a period following World War II, Spain was almost entirely shut out of the international community, and its economic condition worsened. Until the 1960s, Spain remained a poor country with nearly half of its population living from agriculture.14

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When Franco died in 1975, Prince Juan Carlos became king and head of state. The Spanish constitution was approved in 1978, and a democracy was established, advocating liberty, justice, equality, and political pluralism in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.15 Some regions were given financial as well as political autonomy in a system called the Federation of Autonomous Communities, creating what is one of the most decentralized countries in Western Europe. The Transition to Democracy and Recent Developments By 1982, Spain’s democracy was relatively consolidated. Despite economic crisis and dissatisfaction related to difficult social change, a substantial portion of citizens supported the notion that democracy was appropriate for Spain. Although political and governmental restructuring was not complete until 1993, Spain had already begun a period of industrial modernization, transitioning from poverty into prosperity so fast that it became known as the ‘‘Spanish miracle.’’16 The positive effect of these reforms was enhanced with Spain’s membership in the European Economic Community in 1986. As soon as Franco died, regional identities asserted themselves, seeking territorial autonomy, and, in the case of the Basque country, independence. Regionalism continues to strain the Spanish government and the gravest consequence has been the emergence of radical nationalists groups, namely, ETA (whose acronym means ‘‘Basque Homeland and Freedom’’ in Basque). Despite these internal conflicts, Spanish involvement in foreign affairs has grown stronger, with globalization a major factor in Spain’s modernization. From 1996 to 2000, Spain outperformed the world’s economy in amount of growth while political ties with the United States and United Kingdom grew closer. Social Cohesion and Liberalization Currently, Spain continues its journey toward a more liberal political stance, with goals like the promotion of civil rights. It is developing a reputation as one of the most liberal countries in the world on social issues, emphasizing aims such as pacifism, gender equality, women’s rights, and legalization of gay marriage. These policies, however, have driven a wedge between the powerful Roman Catholic Church and the state. Many progressive policies have created opponents who argue that the democracy is not ready for such rapid change, and who fear the shattering of an already divided nation and further destabilization of a still evolving democracy through the promotion of polarizing programs.17 Previous socialist party governments have preferred more

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moderate agendas to preserve the social cohesion that arose after the death of Franco in 1975. Spain’s various regions, with their differing economic and social structures, plus their varying historical and cultural traditions (including different languages), are so diverse that they threaten national unity as well as the unity of the social fabric of Spanish society. The immigrant population is growing while the native population is decreasing, which is problematic in relation to the high unemployment rate in Spain, which is greater than 30 percent in some provinces. In 2002, there were some 600,000 illegal immigrants and 1.3 million legal immigrants; the number of non-EU immigrants increased to 2 million in 2004, contributing to significant social problems and violence.18 Given the long history of violence and contemporary concerns over the preservation of democracy, the question we addressed in our study was what do Spaniards today think about governmental aggression and peace?

SPANISH OPINIONS ON WAR, PEACE, AND TERRORISM Our sample consisted of 85 Spanish adults aged 18–70 (42 women, 40 men, and 3 unspecified), with a mean age of 35 for women and 32 for men. The sample was 69 percent Christian; 21 percent Agnostic, Atheist, or none; 3 percent Buddhist; and 7 percent ‘‘other’’ or did not report. In regard to political affiliation, 38 percent identified as PSOE/Left,19 37 percent as None, 15 percent as PP/Center-right,20 4 percent as Center, and 5 percent as Other. All were Spanish and lived in Spain. Participants were largely middle class; occupations included students, office workers, managers, teachers, housewives, and one lawyer. All participants completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS)21 over the Internet. For the purposes of this study, seven items from the PAIRTAPS were analyzed. Participants were asked to rate each item on a scale from 1 to 7 (from totally disagree to totally agree) to indicate the extent to which they agreed with it and then to explain the reasoning behind their rating. Perspectives on Invasion In response to our survey, 65 percent of the Spanish respondents disagreed with the statement, ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country.’’ This percentage reflects the distaste Spanish people have for armed aggression. In no other country did the citizens manifest greater opposition to involvement in the Iraq invasion than in Spain.22 When the United States announced the failure of diplomacy

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to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and a need to proceed with the use of force to disarm Iraq, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain presented a resolution to the UN Security Council calling for immediate action. Despite massive domestic opposition, the Spanish government supported and contributed to the invasion of Iraq. A government-run poll in March 29, 2003, showed 91 percent of the Spanish population opposing the war and 80 percent rejecting the government’s stance.23,24 In our sample, within the responses opposing a right to invasion, several responses were undifferentiated, such as ‘‘no to invasion’’ or ‘‘in no circumstance,’’ whereas others were a whole-hearted ‘‘never!’’ The most common reasons given for opposing a right to invasion were (1) sovereignty, (2) existence of better alternatives, (3) opposition to violence, and (4) concern with ulterior motives for invasion. A need to respect national sovereignty was the most common category of justifications presented (11 percent), including arguments supporting a country’s right to independence, or to make its own decisions, or to have its own rights (e.g., ‘‘Each country has its own rights)’’. Others (6 percent) indicated that invasion does not solve problems and/or there are other better and more modern ways to solve problems: ‘‘No country should be invaded. If a country violates human rights, there are other ways to resolve conflicts. Alternative ways are sufficiently effective’’; ‘‘there should always be an attempt to solve conflicts through dialogue; violence leads to nowhere.’’ In addition, several responses referred to the self-interested and opportunistic aspect of invasion: ‘‘Countries invade other countries, usually, for economic reasons’’ and ‘‘Invasion is not ethical but, of course, the fastest way for a country to increase its wealth is to invade another.’’ Several responses asserted that no country is culturally superior to any other country and mentioned the need to respect other cultures. In fact, respect (for countries, cultures, borders, and sovereignty) and not allowing imposition of one country or culture on another, was one of the most frequent themes throughout the responses. This argument may reflect Spaniards’ distaste for American exceptionalism, the presumption that the United States is a ‘‘city upon a hill,’’ with its light illuminating the world.25,26 The widespread American assumption that their country and culture are a role model for all other cultures is not, for the most part, shared by the rest of the world—particularly since the Iraq war.27 A survey conducted in 15 countries reported that in most of those countries opinions on America’s global image fell from 2000 to 2006. Spain registered the highest decline among European countries in favorable opinion of the United States, dropping from 50 percent to 23 percent. In 2003, only one quarter of Spaniards held a favorable opinion of the United States.

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Although 35 percent of our sample’s responses to the invasion item revealed some support for a governmental right to invasion, all of these participants either qualified the extent to which they accepted such a right or held that invasion was an exceptional measure that should be avoided except in extreme and rare situations. The most frequent qualifiers in this category were (1) intervention intended for humanitarian help; (2) self-defense; (3) UN-led intervention; (4) a request and consent from the affected population for help; and (5) absence of political agendas and interests from the invading party. No one in our sample demonstrated full support for invasion. Notably, helping people from another country was a common rationale for supporting an invasion: ‘‘Countries are equal and invasion is a violation of another country’s freedom. Sometimes, however, people need help from outside,’’ and ‘‘Only to help protect the human rights of that country.’’ Several responses indicated that only with UN involvement would invasion be acceptable. In addition, the proviso that invasion be a response to a population’s request for help was often mentioned; for example: ‘‘In general my answer would be no, never. But suppose a country decides to kill all its children, or all its Muslims, or all the white people. In such case, the right to life of these citizens would justify an invasion. Such invasion would have to be carried out by the UN and not by any one country.’’ Several responses explicitly mentioned that intervention should not be motivated by political reasons: ‘‘necessary violence is justified if it is for the safety of others and not for a political reason.’’ Given that the Spanish government portrayed the unpopular Iraq invasion as a humanitarian intervention,28 it is somewhat surprising that so many participants said providing humanitarian help was an acceptable justification for a hypothetical invasion. A plausible explanation is that some Spanish respondents might not be associating the invasion survey question with Iraq, but with their past own experiences. During the Spanish civil war, the democratic countries in Europe silently witnessed the killing of thousands of Spaniards fighting for democracy against fascism. Furthermore, when Mussolini and Hitler came to the aid of the Spanish Nationalists, Britain and France again failed to interfere, keeping Republicans from receiving war supplies. Their failure to support a fellow democracy strengthened the confidence of their future enemies, enabling Germany and Italy to prepare for the new world war by testing their new technology in real battle and gaining a potential ally.29 Thus, it is not difficult to understand why Spaniards might see invasion as necessary to help people. In fact, the need to free or help people under a dictatorship was mentioned explicitly in 6 percent of the responses; for example: ‘‘In the case of a dictatorship in

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which the people of a country live precariously, it would be necessary for other countries to take action to help’’; ‘‘Sometimes governments are corrupt and people need protection.’’ Remarkably, some respondents referred to other historical or contemporary dictators and authoritarian regimes when justifying armed humanitarian intervention while not mentioning their own history: ‘‘Mainly, I disagree. However, in some cases, it might be necessary to put an end to a corrupt government. For example: to put an end to Nazism’’ and ‘‘Yes, if in that country people live in poverty because of one dictator (for example: Cuba).’’ Given that the majority of the Spanish population went through nearly 40 years of massacres, ideological repression, and starvation, one might expect that the memory of these traumatic events would lead them to refer to their own country’s past. However, several scholars have recently contended that even though the scale of repression in Spain exceeded that experienced by many other authoritarian regimes, such as in Argentina and Chile,30 in its transition to democracy, Spain chose a kind of ‘‘institutionalized amnesia’’ to which was given the label of ‘‘Pacto del Olvido’’ or the ‘‘Pact of Forgetting.’’ Until 2007, Spain did not seek accountability from its past dictator and repressors; rather, it chose amnesty and approved, in 1977, an Amnesty law that prevented Francoists from having to answer for 40 years of persecution. The discussion of this law in Parliament focused on forgetting, pardoning, and reconciliation31 as the necessary price to be paid for democratic change. Some scholars, however, explain the widespread acceptance of the Pacto del Olvido as a result of risk aversion associated with the traumatic memory of the civil war. Thus, fear of an upsurge of old resentments might be an inhibiting factor in seeking accountability for past abuses.32 As Carr put it, ‘‘the dictator has slid into oblivion in the space of one generation … In the new Spain, reconciliation remains unfinished business.’’33 In 2002, the UN included Spain on a list of countries that have yet to resolve the problem of forcible detention and subsequent disappearance of people.34 Spain’s choice of amnesty for the oppressor contrasts with a policy in other countries of stressing accountability for past abuses in autocratic regimes by instituting truth commissions and/or official policies. Several researchers have argued that memories of the war have been suppressed rather than resolved.35 Indeed, traces of dictatorship are still alive in Spanish society; one 24-year-old survey participant, when asked with what political party she identified the most, replied, ‘‘Franco’s.’’ Protest Integrating groups with views contrary to those of the state, cooperating with them, and tolerating their participation, is one of the basic rules of

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a truly democratic state.36 Resorting to violence and oppressing citizens to regulate the public order are symptomatic of states lacking a culture of peace and democratic values. There can be democracies without peace, and peace within nondemocracies, but generally, a state’s level of tolerance toward its citizens’ public demonstrations and the degree to which diverse views are integrated in a peaceful, collaborative, and discursive way is an indicator of a culture of peace. Despite Spain’s recent history of repression, the right to protest seems intact and, perhaps, growing. The vast majority of our Spanish respondents had participated in a protest, and 75 percent of the sample provided arguments indicating strong agreement with ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace.’’ Several respondents answered this item by emphatically stating ‘‘always,’’ ‘‘of course they do,’’ or ‘‘there is no other way.’’ An additional 23 percent supported a right to protest if expressed in a peaceful, nonviolent manner. Only a very small proportion of responses expressed some reservations. These responses suggested that there were better ways of asking for peace and indicated a concern that protests could undermine the government. The importance of freedom of expression was the most frequent justification (32 percent of the responses) given for a right to protest (e.g., ‘‘In every democratic country there should be freedom of assembly and expression to protest about a problem, such as armed conflict which causes the loss of innocent lives’’). This emphasis may reflect collective memory concerning the era when the power structure in Spain was totally hostile toward political dissent and public order was its highest priority. From 1939 to 1960, executions for political reasons were frequent. Public protests were forbidden, and anyone who protested was punished, most commonly with a death sentence.37 During the late 1950s, the fascist system grew weaker, and a greater social consciousness and courage to associate began to form in Spanish society, especially among the working class. During the last years of Franco’s regime, Spain witnessed a growing emergence of social dissent; even though protest was still banned, by 1975, strikes and other protests spread throughout Spain, media adopted a critical tone toward the government, and the population demanded sovereignty and democratic rights.38 The current importance of political freedoms and democratic rights in Spain is clearly reflected in participant responses arguing that even when people hold specific views (e.g., against the invasion of Iraq), the opposing opinion should also be heard: ‘‘Individuals have the right to protest about anything, including in favor of war and against peace’’ and ‘‘People can protest and manifest their ideas about whatever they want—against the war, for the war, or whatever they want—with total freedom.’’ Other arguments reflect the importance of citizenship and

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democracy, arguing that protest is more than a right, it’s a civic responsibility which all citizens have the obligation to fulfill: ‘‘Yes, people should exercise their freedom of expression and participate in decisions that are important for all’’ and ‘‘it is our right and our obligation to protest for the world.’’ Others focused on the value of protest as a means to promote change. A relatively frequent qualification (given by 23 percent of respondents agreeing with the right to protest) was that demonstrations should occur peacefully—probably another reflection of the longing to avoid public violence so reminiscent of the past: ‘‘As long as protest is done in a nonviolent way and respects the opposite point of view’’ and ‘‘as long as it’s done in a pacific, respectful, and organized manner.’’ Even though aggressive confrontation became rarer while protests became more frequent as Spain moved toward a democratic regime, the democratic process was not without bloodshed. Persistence of a militarized public order led security forces to kill 27 people while trying to disperse protests between 1975 and 1978, and there were 460 violent deaths for political reasons during the transition to democracy (1975–1978).39 In some instances, workers’ protests were met with violent repression similar to the period of the dictatorship.40 Furthermore, legislation on public order, enacted during Franco’s regime, was not changed until after 1992, almost 20 years after his death. The largest peace protest in Spain since the end of the dictatorship, involving 55 cities, occurred during the three days preceding the Iraq invasion February 15, 2003. In Madrid and Barcelona, an estimated one million people attended,41,42 and the total number may have been as high as 5 million.43 Strong public opposition to the war did not deter the government from supporting the war, which may explain respondents’ emphasis on the need for protesters’ messages to be heard (e.g., ‘‘I wish, that besides the right to protest, we would also have the possibility of deciding against war’’; ‘‘The voices of the pacifists have to be heard. With war we achieve absolutely nothing’’). Torture After the end of the dictatorship, Amnesty International estimated 30 cases of torture in Spain a year—one of the highest rates in Europe. Even during the 1980s, many people were still being arrested for political activities (more than 1,000 per year), and 85 percent of the detainees were subjected to torture. Although Spain gradually started to adhere to international treaties, torture was still common practice at least until the mid-1980s, when several cases of torture and death from torture were reported.44 Use of torture especially targeted prisoners captured

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by antiterrorist liberation groups. Between 1983 and 1987, the Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberation (GAL, which translates to ‘‘anti-terrorist liberation groups’’) were death squads illegally constituted and financed by the state to fight against ETA. Originally secret organizations, they were dismantled when the Spanish media revealed their actions to the country. Despite the fact that antiterrorist groups have been dismantled and torture is illegal, Spain continues to be accused of torturing prisoners arrested under the antiterrorist legislation, immigrants, and asylum seekers.45 Amnesty International reports reveal that police officers enjoy a high degree of impunity with regard to the torture and ill treatment of detainees and others in police custody. Thousands of immigrants and asylum seekers who cross the Spanish border for protection every year are targets of violence and human rights abuses (in 2007, there were an estimated 31,000 asylum seekers arriving in Spain). There have been frequent reports of torture and even murder of these migrants by police.46 Amnesty International has recently made an appeal to Spanish authorities to implement administrative, judicial, and legislative measures to prevent torture and ill treatment by law-enforcement authorities and to implement the recommendations of the United Nations Convention against Torture and the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture. Perhaps because of Spain’s internal problems with torture, survey responses suggest strong disapproval of such acts. In response to the item, ‘‘Sometimes the government has the right to torture prisoners of war,’’ 94 percent of the participants disagreed; some responded with a categorical ‘‘Never!’’ Only 6 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement, giving as the main reason the exceptional circumstances of war. Opposition by the people of Spain to the use of torture by the United States in its ‘‘war against terror,’’ especially in detention centers such as Guantanamo Bay, was made evident as one participant stated, ‘‘No to Bush policies!’’ This comment reflects the results of a 15-nation survey showing that Spain had the highest awareness of human rights abuses committed by the United States in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib.47,48 Despite the negative public view on U.S. policies, the position of the Spanish government on torture has not always been very clear. The Spanish Supreme Court ruled Guantanamo Bay to be ‘‘a legal limbo without guarantees or control, and therefore all evidence originating from it must be declared completely null and void.’’49 However, the Spanish media reported that the government has allowed the United States to use its airports for extraordinary rendition operations.50 Deceptive arguments offered by the government for the use of torture were pointed out by a 23-year-old woman, ‘‘The governments may claim that it is necessary and for the best, but I think there is always another

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way’’; another respondent said, ‘‘[torture is] unjustifiable in a society that preaches human rights.’’ The preservation of human rights and the inhumanity of torture were the most frequent explanations given against a governmental right to torture prisoners of war (17 percent). Eight percent mentioned that even prisoners should be treated with dignity, and three respondents stated that torture was against the Geneva Convention. Several people (10 percent) explained that torture was immoral or unethical, emphasizing its dehumanizing aspect (e.g., ‘‘I don’t think people have the right to hurt other people. Unfortunately it happens and it’s immoral’’). Three participants mentioned that torture had negative consequences not only for the victim but also for the government; one 70-year-old woman said, ‘‘Torture makes the government illegitimate.’’ Terrorism Since the end of Franco’s dictatorship, tensions between the ETA (in their pursuit of independence) and the central authorities have increased dramatically. ETA, listed in 2001 by the European Union as a terrorist group, has attempted to achieve independence for the Basque Country through violent means, including bombing and killing politicians, police, soldiers, civilians, and tourists. In fact, ETA is the oldest terrorist organization in the Western world, with a history going back more than 40 years; they have perpetrated more than 30 personal attacks and roughly a thousand homicides.51 When Spain joined the group of countries invading Iraq, then Prime Minister Aznar echoed the U.S. claim that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, posed a threat to world security, and necessitated a global war against terrorism.52 Drawing a link between the global war on terror and war on terrorism in Spain, Aznar, who had himself survived an ETA terrorist attempt in 1995, made the ETA his primary target. In 2001, after his election, he gained support from the European Union to classify ETA as a terrorist group, seized and arrested some of ETA’s activists and planners, and outlawed ETA’s political wing (Batsuna). The Madrid Bombings on the eve of the 2004 elections dramatically changed the political scenario both domestically and internationally, with implications for Spain’s strategy on terrorism. As it became clear that the March 2004 terrorist attack had been perpetrated not by the ETA, as claimed by the government, but by Islamic fundamentalists in retaliation for Spain’s participation in the Iraq invasion, popular anger was so great that millions demonstrated outside of the People’s Party offices throughout Spain.53 The government’s attempt to mislead the public by attributing responsibility to the ETA for the terrorist attack, and its continuing

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efforts to prove this link, caused a nationwide public protest of such intensity that the incumbent government lost the elections to Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero on March 14, just three days after the attack. Most Spaniards believed that the attack would not have happened but for Spain’s alliance with the United States in the invasion of Iraq.54 Zapatero is believed to have won primarily on the single-item platform of pulling the troops out of Iraq, which he did within a week of being elected. He was adamant that his decision did not represent surrender to terrorism but a rational response to what he called an illegal war. He also reopened talks with the ETA, but before the end of the year they had killed two people in a terrorist attack. Although a cease-fire was negotiated between the government and the ETA in 2006, ETA bombings were still occurring in 2008.55 Despite the fact that Spain has been a victim of national and international terrorism, the vast majority of our respondents showed an uncompromising attitude against violence, with 87 percent rejecting a governmental right to kill civilians to fight international terrorism. Of these respondents, 43 percent presented arguments based on the sanctity of human life, offering statements such as ‘‘the right to life is fundamental and cannot be violated under any circumstances.’’ Some respondents argued that ‘‘the ends do not justify the means,’’ and others (15 percent) equated killing innocent civilians with state-sponsored terrorism, arguing that it ‘‘makes governments [into] terrorists’’ and ‘‘terrorism shouldn’t be combated with more terrorism.’’ One respondent argued that ‘‘killing civilians would make the prerogative of defense invalid’’; another said ‘‘that would be a clear failure to fight terrorism. Trust in leaders would be lost.’’ It is interesting that 5 percent of our sample described killing civilians to fight terrorism as ‘‘a (government’s) excuse to pursue their own interests,’’ whereas a smaller number of responses referred to the links among 9/11, Al-Qaeda, and the global fight against terrorism as a government’s excuse to pursue economical and political interests. Some respondents argued that ‘‘other ways [of combating terrorism] that don’t cause so much collateral damage’’ should be sought and that ‘‘governments should look for other ways to avoid so many deaths as we are seeing everyday.’’ These responses suggest that Spaniards may have access to relatively uncensored information about the conflict from the media, which would also help explain why Spaniards strongly opposed the occupation of Iraq even after the Madrid bombings, rather than supporting Aznar’s arguments on the necessity of combating terrorism and seeking to retaliate. Some responses acknowledged the enduring quality of systemic violence: ‘‘No. Not only is it that one thing doesn’t solve the other, hate only generates more hate.’’

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Another survey question allowed us to analyze the extent to which Spaniards associated national security with the threat of terrorism. When asked if national security is essential for family and individual security, 24 percent of the participants agreed while 76 percent either qualified their agreement or disagreed. Analysis of the responses revealed that 30 percent of the responses indicated that invasion of other countries or poor external policies create national insecurity. For example: ‘‘If the European Union can invade Iraq, if Spain has invaded other countries, or if Spain has, in turn, been invaded, it seems that there is no other solution than to accept this reality. Switzerland is neutral, and it has an army.’’ Some responses (4 percent) implied criticism of the government’s position on national security: ‘‘This is only necessary for the interests of the powerful ones within a country’’ and ‘‘Listen, it is all about cash. And power. And geo-strategic positions to assure both.’’ Some responses pointed out negative consequences of national security: ‘‘People who were aggressed against will turn into aggressors.’’ These responses, like the terrorism responses, seem to attribute lack of security in Spain to the conflict over Iraq and to make a link between international conflict and systemic violence. Moreover, this group of responses seems to attribute responsibility for the conflict bilaterally rather than unilaterally, and make no references to the fight against international or national terrorism in the context of national security or international security. Rather, participants gave solutions centered on international communication; cooperation and dialogue; and respecting human rights and international treaties. Solutions addressing social inequalities were also mentioned, along with peace education, and the promotion of mutual understanding, respect, and tolerance. Finally, 10 percent of the sample pointed out the importance of living in a safe environment and without fear; 15 percent explained that the safety of a country, of the family, and of the individual are interdependent. Some respondents made a distinction between national security and international cooperation (e.g., ‘‘I prefer international cooperation and international understanding’’), whereas one respondent drew a distinction between the concept of national security and a state of peace: ‘‘If understanding national security as a state of peace.’’ Perspectives on Peace The beliefs of 78 percent of the respondents, that to achieve world peace was very difficult, an improbable dream, or a utopia appear to reflect the country’s long struggle to achieve peace and perhaps disenchantment with the country’s recent experience with international conflict. The most frequent reasons given for the difficulty of achieving peace

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(52 percent) were flaws in human nature; selfishness, ambition, lack of tolerance, and lack of respect for others were human traits identified as obstacles to world peace. This focus on human nature as the main obstacle to achieving peace reveals an internal as opposed to external (e.g., situational or political or social causes) attribution: ‘‘Because man is ambitious and wants power at any cost,’’ ‘‘Humans only love themselves,’’ and ‘‘Differences in races make it very hard to interact with each other.’’ There were, however, responses (17 percent) attributing the difficulty in achieving world peace to external causes such as nation states, the economy, or leaders: ‘‘It’s very hard [to achieve world peace]. There are many countries interested in possessing other countries, whether for military strategy or for resources belonging to these countries’’ and ‘‘Everything is based on the economy, not on the people.’’ In fact, political and economic interests were frequent themes; for example, ‘‘I would like to believe in it, but we live in a world where each country evolves differently. They have interests (economic) and no one or no country would agree to give their interests up in order to benefit others’’. Despite the fact that Spanish respondents revealed some pessimism with regard to the achievability of world peace, most respondents put their pessimism aside when asked to provide suggestions about the best way to achieve it. The majority focused on a social/interpersonal aspect of the pursuit of peace, with 37 percent of respondents mentioning positive interpersonal strategies such as respect, tolerance, and understanding other people’s cultures. Another important theme involved references to social justice and human rights, with 27 percent of the responses referring to social equality, justice, social inclusion, pacifism, and social reform: ‘‘to treat everyone with due respect, create equal opportunity to for everyone to develop, and to respect human rights.’’ Fifteen percent of the respondents defined social justice as the elimination of money, power, ambition, weapons, war, or religion: ‘‘Powerful rulers must stop being so ambitious and they must start to worry about the countries in need.’’ A few participants (8 percent) referred to political tools, such as democracy and diplomacy, as the best way to achieve world peace. Finally, 13 percent of the total respondents mentioned education. Nearly half of the Spanish sample (48 percent) agreed with the item, ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace,’’ stating that this right is one of the most fundamental human rights. Some respondents viewed peace as a necessary condition for working together and making advances on other issues, such as education and famine: ‘‘Taking into account all the lack of food, education, and other elemental rights that a high percentage of the world population suffers, we should at least make sure that we all live in peace, and then start to find solutions to other problems.’’

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Definitions of War and Peace The majority of our sample (60 percent) defined peace positively. The most frequent responses (17 percent) focused on effective interpersonal relations and communication, with an emphasis on tolerance, respect, and understanding with regard to differences of race, values, and nationalities (e.g., ‘‘needed state of understanding,’’ ‘‘a common brotherhood,’’ and ‘‘respect for others’ rights, including individual, social, national, international rights’’). An equal percentage of participants defined peace as a state of happiness, harmony, and tranquility, thus focusing on the psychological and environmental outcome of peace. Five percent of participants defined peace as an individual character trait; for example, peace is ‘‘a characteristic of mature, fair, and balanced people,’’ or peace is ‘‘physical, psychological, and spiritual balance.’’ Another 5 percent invoked the importance of justice (e.g., ‘‘peace without justice is clandestine violence’’)—perhaps remembering Franco’s most frequent justification for his oppressive tactics (i.e., that he ‘‘had brought peace to a society at war with itself’’).56 In contrast with positive conceptions of peace, 15 percent defined it as the absence of war or armed conflict; 5 percent revealed had pessimistic views, defining it as a utopia. In regard to definitions of war, 27 percent of our sample identified it with strong emotions such as pain, chaos, horror, hate, and cruelty, whereas 30 percent provided a dictionary-type definition; for example, armed conflict between two countries or groups, generalized violence, or extreme conflict. Political and economic interests were again often (18 percent) identified as a cause of war: ‘‘Violent conflict between two or more parties as a result of pursuing political or economic interest ends,’’ and ‘‘Organized armed conflict with the purpose of controlling natural or human resources. The submission or destruction of the enemy with multiple causes such as maintaining power relationships and solving economical and territorial disputes.’’ Finally, some respondents defined war as a failure of humanity or of leaders in finding viable solutions for conflicts.

CONCLUSION It is probably impossible to quantify the casualties throughout the last 200 years that resulted from Spain’s successive wars, internal violence, and successive collapses of the state, or deaths caused by war-related problems such as famine and disease. For the civil war alone, historians discuss numbers between 400,000 and 800,000. Whatever the numbers may be, Spain’s experience with war is one exclusively of loss. Its past

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inability to resolve its conflicts without resorting to war and its long and traumatic experience with violence may help explain Spain’s distaste for war. Our survey data made clear Spaniards’ strong opposition to war. Responses show an uncompromising disagreement with most items related to governmental violence, such as the right to invade other countries, the right to kill to fight terrorism, and the right to torture prisoners of war. Analysis of responses concerning war-related issues also suggests that our sample’s opinions about current international and national issues are well informed, because arguments included references to specific situations, international agreements, and governmental policies. Respondents often deliberately contrasted their own arguments with those presented by governments, stating why they disagreed with them and giving their own assessment on the issue. Very rarely did these assessments mirror official policies or doctrines used to justify invasion, torture, national security, or terrorism. Spaniards’ views on invasion revealed disagreement with the right to invade except in self-defense or when it is clear that the action is an intervention rather than an invasion and conducted by an intergovernmental organization, such as the UN. Common themes focused on sovereignty, existence of better alternatives, opposition to violence, and the opportunistic aspect of war. With regard to terrorism and torture, there was a general uncompromising disagreement with infringement on universal principles such as the right to life. As some of our respondents put it, ‘‘the ends do not justify the means.’’ The main emphasis was on human rights, ethics, and morality; responses predominantly reflected an ethical approach rather than a more pragmatic approach.

5

France Christine Roland-Levy and Abel Dalleau

War is … ‘‘Violent opposition, physical and symbolic opposition between two entities (groups, ethnicities, nations, blocks, civilizations) who are able to cause material destruction and death of human beings’’; ‘‘Poor people being sent by rich people to kill other poor people.’’ Peace is … ‘‘State of happiness and wisdom optimal for an individual or group’’; ‘‘utopia.’’ Unfortunately, one thing most of humanity shares is the experience of conflict and war, whether between tribes, regions, countries, religions, or cultures. While many authors have tried to understand why people are easily driven to fighting one another, others have focused more on the concept of peace. In this chapter, we consider values, attitudes, and representations related to conflict, especially from a psychological perspective; more specifically, we concentrate on the theory of social representations. After briefly describing several psychological theories of aggression, we consider the legacy of the French Revolution, and review particular conflicts that marked France’s recent history, focusing particularly on World War II, France’s war with its former colony Algeria during the early 1960s, and the 1995 terrorist attacks in the Parisian subway. All these events have shaped today’s perceptions of peace and war in France. CONFLICT THEORIES AND PROCESSES One major political philosophy approach to peace and war rests on the concept of building a social contract, which incorporates two perspectives. On the one hand, according to Thomas Hobbes,1 ‘‘man is men’s greatest threat.’’ Basically, for Hobbes, human beings are dangerous creatures and need society to temper a warlike nature. They can gain

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safety by choosing to live in society; it is the social contract that engenders peace. By contrast, Jean-Jacques Rousseau2 considered that ‘‘man is good by nature.’’ Humans live with others to survive, but being with others in times of scarcity creates conflicts and wars; thus, it is society that perverts man, and the related need for ownership that pushes men to war. Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, with its emphasis on the instinct of destruction and aggression, has assumptions similar to those of Hobbes. Freud connected aggression directly with the restriction of the instincts by religious and political institutions and argued that ‘‘it is clearly not easy for men to give up the satisfaction of this inclination to aggression.’’3 He also argued that humans are unconsciously willing to go to war both as ‘‘a direct manifestation of the death instinct’’ as well as the ‘‘destructive instinct directed outwards, thus acquiring the characteristic of aggressiveness.’’4 Greater emphasis on group processes can be found in Solomon Asch’s conformity theory and Muzafer and Carolyn Sherif’s conflict theory.5 According to Asch, when people have neither ability nor expertise to make decisions, especially in times of crisis, they leave decision making to the group and its hierarchy. According to social psychological conflict theory, limited resources lead to conflict between groups and contribute to the development of discrimination and stereotypes. Sherif and Sherif’s Robbers’ Cave experiment showed how easily oppositional in-group and out-group hostilities can form and how conflict resolution can be achieved by identifying superordinate needs transcending intergroup conflict. Social Representations: The Meaning of War Regardless of the relative importance of the contributions of biology and social group to aggression, the cognitions that fuel it are receiving increased attention. Social representations, as conceptualized by Emile Durkheim6 and Serge Moscovici,7 express the shared values, norms, and attitudes of a social group and can thereby shed light on how a social situation, such as war or peace, is perceived. Social representations can serve as a basis for perceiving and interpreting reality, as well as for channeling people’s behavior. They develop through two major processes: objectification and anchoring. Objectification translates characteristics of an unfamiliar situation, such as terrorism, into more familiar terms. Anchoring includes (1) a cognitive aspect, integrating the situation into available cognitions (e.g., terrorism may remind us of wars); and (2) a social aspect, associated with the meaning a social group gives to a representation (e.g., ‘‘If there is fighting, it must be Muslims attacking Christians’’). Through these processes, interpretations of particular situations can differ across groups.

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HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF PERCEPTIONS OF WAR AND PEACE IN FRANCE Much of the intellectual context for current political and social representations in France is rooted in the French Revolution of 1789 (see Albert Soboul8). Memories of the French Revolution constitute a living legacy that can be measured by the strong emotions it still arouses. For some, the French Revolution is a symbol of hope: it gave a world dominated by aristocratic privilege and monarchical tyranny a chance for freedom; however, it also gave birth to what soon came to be called ‘‘ideologies’’ (doctrines about the best form of social and political organization). French revolutionaries drew upon multiple traditions, the most important one being, perhaps, the French Declaration of Human and Citizens Rights (1789), which made human rights even more central to French policies and politics than to American ones. As the Revolution unfolded, the French grappled with the rights of women, slaves, and religious minorities. One of the main mottoes of the Revolution was  Liberte, Egalit e, Fraternite, ou la Mort! (‘‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, or Death!’’). This leitmotiv outlived the revolution and later became the rallying cry of all the activists, both militant and nonviolent, who promoted democracy. The first element of the motto of the French Republic, ‘‘Liberty’’ is derived from the field of political philosophy and identifies the condition whereby an individual has the ability to act according to her or his own will. The fourth article of the Declaration of 1789 states: ‘‘Liberty consists in being able to do anything that does not harm others: thus, the exercise of the natural rights of every man or woman has no bounds other than those that guarantee other members of society the enjoyment of these very rights.’’ The second term, ‘‘Equality,’’ means the law is the same for all, regardless of birth or wealth. According to the Declaration, the law ‘‘must be the same for all, whether it protects or punishes.’’ The third element, ‘‘Fraternity’’ is defined in the French Declaration of Human and Citizens’ Rights, which appeared in the preamble of the Constitution of Fructidor 5th, Year III (August 22, 1795): ‘‘Do not do unto others what you would not have done to you; always show to others the good that you would have shown to you.’’ The Secular Tradition Many of the French people who opposed the French Revolution did so because they were afraid of its potential effect on religion and preferred to have state power remain dependent on religious authorities;

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nevertheless, the Revolution firmly established a secular tradition that lingers on. France is the largest lay country in Europe, with 43 percent of the population saying they do not belong to any religion; among the remaining 57 percent, Catholics are still dominant. France: A Social Democracy France was the first real united republic and the first to establish a universal voting system.9 The first aim of the French Republic remains to educate its future citizens; Jules Ferry was awarded the Nobel Prize, in 1927, for his efforts at modernizing the French public school system to achieve national reconciliation through education. To raise pupils’ awareness of the importance of national defense in the 21st century, civic education also addresses matters of defense and security. The ideals of the Republic also mandate an equalitybased economy, and that legacy is reflected in France’s welfare state components: a national health insurance system, based on each individual’s revenue; a free school system; unemployment and young job seeker’s allowances; an alternative income program; and retirement pensions for those who have reached the age of 60, the legal age for retirement. The fiscal and social systems aim to maintain an average income, which should not be too distant from the national average, for all individuals. In part to support its social services and welfare systems, France’s taxation on capital is Europe’s largest (36.6 percent in 2002, over 8 percent more than the European average), and its unemployment rate is higher than the European and G7 nations averages, especially among the young and the over-50. Nevertheless, the gross national product (GNP) per capita is among the highest in the world ($21,000 per inhabitant in 2006), and France remains the world’s sixth richest country. As one of the founders of the European Union, a member of the G8 (the eight most industrialized countries), and a permanent member of the UN (thereby having veto powers), France is also a strong political power. France is, and has been, very open to immigration. In the 1950s, the major wave of immigrants came from Northern African countries, mainly from Algeria. Also, at the time of Franco, France welcomed many Spanish immigrants. Based on the Revolution legacy asserting that all men are born equal, the French model of assimilation is a political model. In contrast to America (where ethnic differences, including conflicts, are overt), French citizens are expected to behave according to the national social contract, which prohibits all forms of segregation.10

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FRANCE’S EXPERIENCE OF CONTEMPORARY WARS AND CONFLICTS France and the World Wars France was one of the major protagonists in the two world wars. Even before World War I, tension between France and Germany was serious. England and France were, at the time, the two most powerful colonial powers, with colonies all around the world providing exclusive economic advantages. Such a position caused animosity and jealousy from the rest of Europe, especially Germany. France also had specific ethnic issues, with people from some parts of France (e.g., Corsica) wanting recognition as autonomous nations. These conflicts created a complex context in which World War I was bound to break out, although it was the murder of the heir to the Austria-Hungary Empire, in June 1914, that led Europe to war through its alliance system. Although the public in every country supported the war and believed it would be short, it lasted four long and bloody years. During World War I, France managed to find enough military resources to sustain it until the end of the war; however, the situation was completely different in World War II, during which France was faced with defeat, occupation, collaboration, and resistance. The armistice of June 1940 marked Germany’s defeat of France and separated the country into two halves. Northern France was occupied and ruled by the Germans, whereas the newly formed French government settled in southern France, in Vichy, under the leadership of General Petain, the hero of World War I. The Vichy government openly collaborated with the Nazis—economically with the STO (Obligatory Work Services) and politically with the Gestapo, a French police force that arrested and deported Jews, homosexuals, communists, and others to Nazi extermination camps. This is not the France the French want to be reminded of. On the BBC, General Charles de Gaulle, on June 18, 1940, appealed to the French not to collaborate with the enemy and to resist the invaders. He formed the FFF (Free French Forces), based in Algeria, with members of the French and English colonies. At the end of the war, de Gaulle managed to bring France onto the ‘‘Winner’s Side,’’ its acts of collaboration deliberately forgotten.11 France and Its Colonies: War with Algeria Following World War II, the French Algerian colony and its members, who had fought against the Germans, received no expression of gratitude and were forgotten. Such disloyalty led to the Guerre d’Algerie, the Algerian War of Independence.12 Effectively started on November 1, 1954, the conflict shook the French Fourth Republic (1946–1958) to its

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foundations. Under orders from the government, the French Army initiated a campaign of ‘‘pacification’’ of what was still considered fully part of France. This ‘‘public order operation’’ quickly developed into fullscale war. Algerians, who at first were mostly in favor of peace and tranquility, turned increasingly toward wanting independence, supported by other Arab countries and worldwide public opinion. Following his return to power during the May 1958 crisis, Charles de Gaulle founded the Fifth Republic and established a new constitution. The Army assumed that his return to power would ensure Algeria’s continued integration in the French Community, which linked France’s colonies together. De Gaulle progressively shifted in favor of Algerian independence, seeing it as inevitable, and entered into negotiations with the FLN (National Liberation Force). These negotiations led to the March 1962 Evian Accords, which granted Algeria its independence, but not before the Algiers putsch (in April 1961), organized by generals hostile to the negotiations and headed by Michel Debre’s Gaullist government and the far-right Organization of the Secrete Army (OAS). The failure of the coup initiated a campaign of bombings in Algeria and France that aimed unsuccessfully at preventing implementation of the Evian Accords. The Algerian war has left long-standing scars in French society. For example, after the 1997 legislative elections, won by the Socialist Party (PS), the National Assembly officially acknowledged that a ‘‘war’’ had taken place in Algeria. Until then, the official terminology had been that the armed conflict was a ‘‘public order operation.’’ The Paris massacre of 1961, in which Algerian demonstrators were herded into the river Seine by the police, was not acknowleged by the French state until October 2001. On the other hand, the Oran massacre of 1962 by the FLN has not yet been recognized by the Algerian state, much to the dismay of the former colonists.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Two related studies were conducted for the purposes of this chapter. For Study 1, French citizens were recruited to respond to an online version of the complete Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS); their open-ended responses to 10 of the survey items are reported here. For Study 2, a face-to-face questionnaire approach was used with a modified version of the last, definitional section of the PAIRTAPS, to gain an in-depth understanding of French social representations of peace, war, and terrorism; free association tasks were used to distinguish the hypothetical central nuclei of these

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representations in three groups that differed in age, social class, and level of ‘‘contact’’ with war and/or terrorism.

STUDY 1 Sample 1 consisted of 54 respondents, 25 males and 29 females, between the ages of 18 and 63. The largest segment (43 percent) described themselves as Catholics, followed by atheists (31 percent). Three respondents identified as agnostic, three as Protestant, one as Muslim, and one as Unitarian. Nearly half the sample (48 percent) were students. Participants described a variety of occupations, with five of them involved in academia, four in the film and entertainment industry, and others in jobs such as artist, factory worker, and engineer. The majority described themselves as working class (44 percent) or middle class (28 percent), followed by upper middle class (16 percent). Five participants described themselves as upper class and one respondent as lower class. In the PAIRTAPS, respondents were asked to define war, peace, and terrorism. Half of the definitions of war referred to conflict, as in ‘‘armed conflict between two states.’’ Other responses (16 percent) identified a cause for war; for example, ‘‘when two opponents fight in order to defend their ideas or take something that the other possesses.’’ These two categories are representative of the 82 percent of responses referring to a larger force (e.g., the state), as opposed to the 15 percent focusing more on personal and emotional responses to war (‘‘horror, violence, injustice’’). When defining peace, 72 percent of the respondents defined peace positively (e.g., the presence of something such as a ‘‘state of equilibrium in relations between countries’’). Only 27 percent defined peace negatively, as the removal or absence of something aversive (e.g., ‘‘end of conflicts between two parties’’). A total of 60 percent of responses made reference to the state or other group while 38 percent focused more on the individual actor. The French have a long and intimate acquaintance with terrorism, earned in years of attacks by Algerian independence fighters. Even recently, France has been regularly hit by strong waves of terrorism, mainly during the 1980s and 1990s. In the early 1990s, Islamist radicals found a pool of willing recruits among the youth in impoverished suburban ghettoes housing many of France’s six million people of Arab origin. The point of connection among the suburbs of Paris and Marseilles and Osama Bin Laden’s Afghanistan-based networks came via Algeria. There, the military-backed government overturned elections won by the Islamists, banned their party, and drove its most extreme elements

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underground, where they’ve led a merciless war of terror against politicians and citizens alike. Men who fought as volunteers alongside Bin Laden in Afghanistan’s anti-Soviet ‘‘jihad’’ founded the most notorious Algerian terror faction, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). When the war in Afghanistan ended with the Soviet withdrawal, these men moved to France and began recruiting young people and building an infrastructure to attack France for its support of the Algerian government. The outcome was a very violent attack in the Paris subway in 1995. These events provide the context for views on war, peace, and terrorism. When providing definitions of terrorism on the PAIRTAPS, the majority of the French respondents referred to some sort of destruction and violence (36 percent of responses) or made a moral judgment (26 percent of responses). Included in the destruction and violence category were statements about terrorism having the purpose of creating fear: ‘‘voluntarily creating panic through violent acts.’’ An example of a moral judgment response is ‘‘actions led by a group of people who have no respect for human beings, their rights and their liberties.’’ There were also three categories of responses that linked terrorism with ideology: one (11 percent) with a positive view (terrorism as a tool for change), one (3 percent) with a negative view (the complete ideology of terrorism is wrong), and one (18 percent) with an ambivalent view (the actions are wrong, but the ideology behind it may not be). In addition, 5 percent of the responses pinpointed negative economic conditions as instigators to terrorism; for example, ‘‘It’s the weapon of the Third World that are tired of the West and their dictatorship on economics and politics.’’ Participants were also asked to respond on a seven-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree with statements about state or individual rights and explain their responses. Regarding the item ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country,’’ 25 percent of the responses indicated that invasion might be a right, whereas 70 percent said it was not a right. Among explanations supportive of a governmental right to invasion, 7 percent referred to historical examples (e.g., ‘‘the Allies had the right to invade Germany’’), 5 percent said invasion was acceptable as intervention to help the people in the invaded country, 4 percent identified defense and response to a threat, and one participant cited international laws; 5 percent did not elaborate (e.g., ‘‘It depends on the case’’). Responses rejecting invasion as a right fell into several categories, including there are better alternatives (14 percent), invasion is a violation of sovereignty (14 percent), countries have ulterior motives in invading (11 percent), and invading has negative consequences (11 percent). Strikes and protests are a recurrent French phenomenon; during the year 2005, there were 1.3 million strike days.13 In regard to the

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PAIRTAPS item ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace,’’ 52 percent of the qualitative responses agreed, 38 percent of the responses qualified the right, 7 percent were unsure, 2 percent didn’t answer the question, and none said that protesting is not a right. Among responses agreeing that protest is a right, 14 percent of the total responses called it a civic responsibility, holding, for example, ‘‘In a democratic system, it is the duty of the citizen to participate and give his opinion on a measure or idea’’; 19 percent of the responses qualified the right to protest by referring to its legal underpinnings: ‘‘we are in a democracy,’’ or ‘‘it’s the freedom of expression,’’ thereby identifying the right as socially sanctioned rather than inherent. Ten percent of responses qualified the right with a concern for consequences of the protest, and seven percent qualified the right by saying it must be nonviolent. The Algerian War of Independence, one of the most important French decolonization wars, was characterized by rural guerrilla warfare, terrorism against civilians, use of torture on both sides, and counterterrorism operations by the French Army. The use of torture by the French Army as well as the Algerians triggered a long-standing moral and political debate on the legitimacy and effectiveness of such methods. In regard to the item ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in times of war,’’ 60 percent of the responses gave reasons why the government does not have the right, whereas 25 percent indicated situations in which the government may have the right, and 11 percent were unsure. Justifications for a possible right to torture included appeals to the guilt of those being tortured (2 percent), the effectiveness of torture (6 percent), the use of torture in history (2 percent), and the possibility of torture protecting other people or rights (9 percent). The majority of responses stating that the government does not have the right to torture prisoners of war cited moral principles and human rights as their reasons for disagreeing (17 percent and 11 percent, respectively). Respondents also described the ineffectiveness of torture (9 percent), torture as violating international law (4 percent), and general disagreement (9 percent). The remaining responses called torture excessive, cited historical precedent, or identified negative consequences (‘‘Torture is degrading for the country that practices it. It lowers the country below the level of its lowest enemy’’), with one response in each of those categories. In response to the statement that ‘‘Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism,’’ only one participant agreed, arguing that ‘‘the lesser of two evils, when necessary.’’ Just over 70 percent of the responses explained that torture is not a right; the most common response in this

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category (26 percent of the total) emphasized the innocence of the victims; for example, ‘‘The ‘right’ to kill innocents or not is ridiculous and insensitive.’’ Participants also said that torture is avoidable (e.g., ‘‘At this point in time, technology should allow us to no longer kill innocent civilians’’) (9 percent), there is no right to kill (20 percent), the ends do not justify the means (6 percent), and the government itself acts like a terrorist if it kills innocents (6 percent). In regard to whether ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace,’’ 58 percent of the responses concurred, 25 percent described peace as an ideal (e.g., ‘‘Utopian. But one must dream of a world without war’’), 8 percent portrayed peace as a right with certain conditions (e.g., ‘‘from the moment that they respect others’’), one respondent said peace is a necessity, and another said that peace is not a right because it is not possible. France’s security agencies have been undergoing changes in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The Direction Centrale de la Securite des Systemes d’Information (DCSSI) has become the central organization for intelligence services associated with determining potential threats and vulnerabilities. Although the work and objectives of this organization are kept fairly secret, it has three main priorities: ensuring the security of the country’s information systems, increasing cyber security, and evaluating vulnerabilities and prevention of attacks on public information systems.14 There is currently a struggle between improving the communications between the different intelligence agencies and improving their secrecy. There is also a goal of improving the public opinion of itelligence services, as authorities within the organizations believe that even people in administrative positions in the government do not fully understand what their function is.15 In our sample, responses to the statement, ‘‘National Security is essential for individual and family security,’’ were split fairly evenly, with 40 percent providing reasons why national security is essential for the security of families and individuals, 27 percent saying it is not essential, and 35 percent agreeing with the statement under certain conditions. Arguments in support of the statement tended to be rather general; for example, ‘‘Yes, since the nation is constituted of families and individuals.’’ Arguments rebutting the assertion included national security restricts individual freedom (two respondents); national security is an illusion (one respondent); national security encourages obsession with fear (one respondent); and national security can instill distrust between nations (one respondent): ‘‘It should, except that the United States put even the Europeans on a terrorist list and their phone was wiretapped. The United States can’t trust anybody because it can’t trust even itself first. That’s where the problem is.’’

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STUDY 2 Building on Moscovici’s early work,16 the theoretical approach adopted in our second study incorporates Jean-Claude Abric’s structural approach,17 which states that social representations are composed of a central nucleus surrounded by peripheral elements, and ideas from Claude Flament,18 who argued that social practices are a major factor in the determination of representations. Given that no previous studies based on social representations have been conducted on perceptions of peace, war, and terrorism among French people, we hope, by relying on this theory, to contribute to a better understanding of these issues. For our in-depth examination of social representations in Study 2, we chose three specific samples of participants based on their different ‘‘practices’’ related to war or terrorism. The three samples were composed of men and women from three age-groups: (1) respondents between the ages of 18 and 25 with a mean age of 22 at the time of our study (40 percent of our participants); (2) respondents between ages 35 and 60, with a mean age of 51 years (37 percent of our participants); and (3) respondents between ages 65 and 92, with a mean age of 77 years (23 percent of our participants). Altogether, the sample included 286 French participants, 151 women (53 percent), and 135 men (47 percent). The oldest age-group was of interest because its members could have been active members or witnesses of World War II. The intermediate age-group could be the children of those who participated in or witnessed World War II and could potentially have been involved in the Algerian War or remember the various OAS bombings occurring in France in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Finally, the youngest age-group could remember quite well the strong waves of terrorism that have hit France during their childhood or early adult years, mainly from 1986 to 1995. We hypothesized that participants would differ in their associations to the terms war, peace, and terrorism depending on how close an event was to their experience. In other words, we expected to find different central elements in participant associations according to experience versus no experience, knowing that, of course, the oldest participants might have been directly involved in World War II and the Algerian War and also remember the waves of terrorism of the mid-1990s. They would thus have accumulated multiple experiences of peace, war, and terrorism, whereas the youngest age-group might have been exposed only to the Parisian subway terrorist attacks. In our questionnaire, we also had questions to determine whether the participant had been active, and if so in what ways, during one or more

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of these events, and/or had known someone who had been active (e.g., parents or grandparents). If they were themselves directly involved, we had a series of questions constructed to help us better understand their involvement. Altogether, out of our total sample of nearly 300 participants, fewer than 30 percent declared that they had, at some point, been directly involved in or witness to one or more of the following situations: World War II, the Algerian War, and/or the Paris terrorist attacks. Identifying the Central Concepts of a Representation By providing a first key target word ‘‘peace,’’ followed by the second key target word ‘‘war,’’ and finishing with the last key target word ‘‘terrorism,’’ we were looking for the most important aspects, called the central nucleus or central core, of a social object. The participants were asked to spontaneously associate to each key target word a minimum of six words or expressions and then provide a value—positive, neutral, or negative—in relation to each association with the target word. The associations were analyzed by taking into account their frequency of appearance, their rank of appearance (the first term or expression proposed is said to be of rank 1, and the last of rank 6), and the most dominant value attributed to the association (positive, neutral, or negative). Only relatively high-frequency terms shared by many participants were considered as part of the central elements and the shared representation; moreover, the high-frequency terms had to be proposed among the first associations given to be considered as belonging to the hypothetical central nucleus of the social representation.19 French Perceptions The 286 participants consulted in Study 2 appeared to share some main ideas for each of the target words. Overall, ‘‘peace’’20 was predominantly associated with nice feelings: being quiet and calm (271; 3),21 as well as, for half of our participants, with love (132; 3), as in ‘‘Peace and Love’’ or with friendship (132; 3), followed by the dove (83; 3) (the worldwide symbol of peace, both in Judaism and in Christianity). Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity (77; 3), the motto of the French Republic, was also associated with ‘‘peace,’’ as was freedom. War (98; 3) was also connected with ‘‘peace’’ for 34 percent of our participants; this association could be linked to Leo Tolstoy’s novel War and Peace, or the famous film made from Tolstoy’s book well-known to most French people, especially those in the 35–60 age-group. On the other hand, concerning our second key word, ‘‘war,’’ the first three dominating ideas were clearly negative: death (134; 3.1), fighting,

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and conflict (107; 2.5); the other shared associated ideas were connected to the means of waging ‘‘war’’; i.e., with weapons (97; 3.5), whereas the last main series of associations were connected to the horror (97; 3.5) of ‘‘wars,’’ including suffering and sadness (89; 3.4), as well as the consequences of ‘‘war’’: destruction (65; 3.5) and blood (64; 3.5). Although it was expected that the word ‘‘peace’’ would spontaneously be associated with the key word ‘‘war,’’ as war was to the key word ‘‘peace,’’ this association was not found. Finally, the French people we talked to mainly connected ‘‘terrorism’’ to September 11th (164; 3.3), along with (other) attacks with bombs (111; 3.2), including the Parisian subway explosion in 1995. Religions and extremism (103; 3.7) emerged as the two other main ideas associated with ‘‘terrorism’’; extremism connected with terror yielded insecurity (97; 3.6). Age-Related Perceptions of Peace, War, and Terrorism Out of 286 participants, only 80 (28 percent), 47 men (58 percent) and 33 women (42 percent), stated that they felt that they were, in one way or another, directly involved in at least one of the following situations: World War II, the Algerian War of independence, and/or the Paris terrorist attacks. In fact, 15 persons in each of the two youngest groups (13 percent for each age-group; 19 percent of the total population) said that they were either implicated in or witnesses to one of the situations. For the 18–25 age-group, this could only be the subway attacks; for the 35–60 age-group, the experiences could have been either with the OAS bombings of the late 1950s, early 1960s, or to the more recent explosions from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. Fifty of the participants from the oldest age-group, 65 years old and above (77 percent of this age-group), explained that they were directly involved in at least one of the three situations—which could have been any from World War II onward. The 18- to 25-Year-Old Group. For the youngest age-group, the 115 18- to 25-year-olds, war is often connected either to movies or to their grandparents. The war of Algeria is unknown to most of the participants of this age-group, except for those connected to Algeria in one way or another; however, all have lived through terrorism, not only with September 11, but also with the wave of terrorist attacks in France for the past 20 years—that is to say, for most of their life. For this agegroup, the notion of ‘‘peace’’ is, as for 90 percent of our participants of all ages, focused on being quiet and calm (86; 3.1). What distinguishes this age-group is what comes next in their rankings—that is, war (62; 2.7) as the opposite of ‘‘peace’’; the next most central associations are connected to love (potentially referring to the slogan used by their parents in the 1960s–1970s: ‘‘Peace and Love’’) and friendship (59; 3.2),

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followed by the biblical symbol of ‘‘peace’’: the dove (48; 2.5). Also specific to this age-group are the ideas of peace treaty, which appear in 31 percent of the cases (36; 3.5), along with the three pillars of the French Republic, ‘‘Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity’’ (32; 3.1), which appear among the peripheral elements for this age-group. The 18- to 25-year-olds describe ‘‘war’’ as a synonym of death (69; 2.8), connected to weapons (55; 3.5) as well as to fighting (50; 2.7). They associate ‘‘war’’ with peace (39; 1.9), in connection to the end of war, with the lowest mean rank of all terms (1.9); thus, for those who refer to this idea, it is most central and important. Reference to peace in connection with ‘‘war’’ is clearly specific to this age-group, which associates ‘‘terrorism’’ mainly with September 11th (108; 3.2). Also associated with ‘‘terrorism’’ are attacks (44; 2.6) with bombs (48; 3.4), linked to religious extremists in 34 percent of the cases (39; 3.5), being frightened, also in 34 percent of the cases (39; 3.7), but with a lower rank, because it causes death (37; 3.3). In conclusion, for this age-group, ‘‘peace’’ is directly associated with war, and in the same way, ‘‘war’’ is presented as the opposite of peace. The biblical symbol of ‘‘peace’’ is provided by more than 50 percent of the participants from this age-group; they also often refer to the important notion of peace treaty. ‘‘Terrorism’’ is strongly connected to September 11th, a very frightening attack produced by religious extremists with bombs to provoke death. 35- to 60-Year-Olds. The 126 35- to 60-year-olds are the children of war—‘‘baby boomers’’ born after World War II to parents who lived through the war. Concerning ‘‘peace,’’ the most central elements are quiet and calm (100 percent). What is more distinctive in this age-group, for nearly 50 percent of the sample, are the ideas—directly derived from the slogan used in the 1960s and 1970s of ‘‘Peace and Love’’—of love and friendship (50; 3.1), along with happiness (40; 3.2). War (20; 3.1) is not as central as in the youngest age-group, but belongs to the peripheral elements; it appears near dove (25; 2.3), which is a strong symbol for those who mention it (lowest rank of appearance, making it among the first spontaneous associations produced). Among the peripheral elements, peace treaty, which was quite central for the youngest age-group, is replaced for the 35- to 60-year-olds by the three pillars of the French Revolution: ‘‘Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity’’ (31 percent), followed by the association with negotiation and armistice (25; 4.2). Members of this middle-age-group perceive ‘‘war’’ as predominantly bringing death (42; 3), along with a lot of suffering and sadness (42; 3.2). They clearly connect it to conflict (40; 2) and struggling (40; 2.2); only 11 percent refer to peace when associating to the key word ‘‘war.’’ Similarly, fewer than 9 percent mention terrorism in connection to ‘‘war.’’ For these

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participants, as for the overall sample, ‘‘terrorism’’ covers acts intended to create fear or terror, and usually perpetrated for an ideological goal. It is mainly linked to deliberate attacks (33; 2.2)—among which September 11th (28; 2.8) is mentioned, but not as systematically as by the younger generation. For the majority of this age-group, the attacks are carried out with bombs and explosions (36; 2.7), which are usually perpetrated for an ideological goal, mainly by religious fanatics (46; 3.8), who share the intent of provoking death (37; 2.9); thus it creates fear and/or terror (30; 3.3), as well as horror and atrocity (26; 4). What is interesting is that ‘‘terrorism’’ does not seem to really constitute a shared common social representation as, especially for this group, no unifying concept or idea really covers it all. What is mostly shared, by 43 percent of this age-group, is that ‘‘terrorism’’ is connected to religious fanatics. In conclusion, perceptions of peace and war are likely to have been affected, in this generation, by parental memories and information from relatives. Their shared social representations of ‘‘war’’ are mainly connected with death, suffering, sadness, and struggle, and typical stereotyped notions such as the dove and the three pillars of the French Revolution— ‘‘Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity’’; ‘‘Peace’’ is mostly associated with the slogan ‘‘peace and love’’ from the 1970s; and ‘‘terrorism’’ is linked mainly to the idea of deliberate attacks, among which September 11th is often mentioned, but not as systematically as by the younger generation. ‘‘Terrorism’’ does not seem to be associated with clear shared ideas in this age-group. The 65 and Above Age-Group. As already mentioned, 50 of the 65 participants (77 percent) aged 65 and above reported involvement in at least one of the three main conflicts, including World War II. The most central elements for ‘‘peace’’ in this age-group, as in the other agegroups, are being quiet and calm (59; 3.6), which covers 91 percent of the answers of these participants. What distinguishes this group is the importance given to armistice and to reconciliation (39; 3.4), which bring happiness and joy (24; 3.5) as well as friendship and love (24; 3.6)—connections directly linked to surviving the war, and the arrival of the armistice as one of the most joyful events in their whole life, bringing solidarity22 (18; 3.7). Unlike the youngest age-group, the dove (15 percent) is not perceived as connected to peace, and war (20; 3.1) is not central at all, as only 24 percent of the participants associated war with peace. Only 18 percent connect ‘‘Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity’’ to ‘‘peace.’’ On the other hand, for the 65 and above, ‘‘war’’ is perceived as bringing horror and atrocities (27; 2.6), as well as death (24; 3.8). Forty percent of the associations from this age-group are directly connected to World War II (e.g., World War, Nazi, Hitler, German, extermination). Another

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40 percent of the associated terms, which are linked to military terms (e.g., army, guns and other weapons, troops, officers, general, soldiers), are also connected to these associations. What is then associated to ‘‘war’’ is a lot of suffering and sadness (28 percent), along with fright and terror (25 percent). Only among those who lived through the war is war connected with lack of food and misery (31 percent). As for the previous group, peace is very rarely spontaneously associated to the key term ‘‘war’’ (11 percent). ‘‘Terrorism’’ is also connected to horror and atrocity (46 percent; 4), produced by attacks (32 percent; 2.2), carried out with bombs and explosions (43 percent; 3), among which September 11th (27; 3.6) is mentioned and represents 42 percent of their associations. ‘‘Terrorism’’ clearly brings fear and/or terror (31 percent). It is, according to these participants, also produced by religious fanatics (31 percent; 3.8), who aim at generating suffering and pain (23 percent), as well as at provoking innocent victims and death (14 percent; 2.9). In conclusion, because most of the participants in the oldest agegroup said they had been involved in at least one of the three specified conflict situations, as their mean age is 73, we can expect that a few of the youngest participants were in fact children during World War II. The perception of peace and war in this group is clearly centered on a shared common collective memory. For them, ‘‘peace’’ is what they have experienced after the war; it is the result of the armistice and comes along with reconciliation; it provided happiness and love. War’s associations are rooted in their direct contact with it; 80 percent of their joint associations can be divided into two groups of ideas: 40 percent of the associations are connected to the two world wars (Hitler, Nazi, German, extermination), whereas the other 40 percent are linked to military terms (army, guns). ‘‘War’’ is also associated with many direct remembrances such as suffering, sadness, lack of food, fright and terror, atrocities and horror, along with death. ‘‘Terrorism’’ is produced to provoke fear and/or terror. Very few of these participants refer to September 11th; for them, terrorism seems more connected to their experience during World War II, when they personally had to survive varied unexpected terrorist attacks. Gender Differences To summarize the differences found concerning gender, women’s perception of ‘‘war’’ is connected to suffering and sadness, whereas ‘‘terrorism’’ provides them with fear and anxiety; they associate ‘‘peace’’ with war as well as with the dove symbol. On the other hand, men’s perception of ‘‘peace’’ is connected to love and friendship; ‘‘war’’ is associated with going to combat and to fighting; and ‘‘terrorism’’ is linked to bombs and explosions. Thus, although some of the most central definitional elements are

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common to men and women, the peripheral elements clearly vary according to gender. Ideological Differences Based on Political Affiliation Overall, the Study 2 sample could be divided into three groups based on political affiliation: right, center, and left. One of our surprising findings was that respondents who identified with the right wing and respondents who identified with the left wing share many more similarities than those who declare themselves as being in the center; for example, in relation to ‘‘war,’’ death, fighting, and conflict are common associations made by both right- and left-wing participants, whereas death disappears from the associations of the center. Similarly, for ‘‘peace,’’ left- and right-wing respondents share associations of war with the dove, plus liberty, fraternity, and equality in the peripheral zone; the only central common term for participants coming from the center is war. Concerning ‘‘terrorism,’’ respondents from the right wing have in their potential central nucleus only the idea of attacks, whereas for the center there is also horror, along with atrocities. The ideas of attacks along with horror and atrocities are shared by the left wing, who also include in the representational core the idea of bombs and explosions. CAN COLLECTIVE MEMORY SHAPE WHAT WE PERCEIVE? To understand better these French social representations of peace, war, and/or terrorism, it seems necessary to incorporate one of the main concepts in social psychology: collective memory. As Arthur Neal expressed: ‘‘In the telling and retelling of the stories of our past, the events in question become stereotyped and selectively distorted as they become embedded in our collective memory.’’23 Even important events will gradually be filtered and details forgotten. The significance of collective memory lies in the event’s meaning rather than in its accuracy. The event’s meaning is the part of collective memory that remains in the collective discourse, investigated in this study through the analysis of social representations from the association task. Collective memory is based on historical heritage, such as the traces of the French Revolution, but is also affected by events experienced by a whole generation. World War II, the Algerian War, and associated bombings, and/or the more recent terorrism attacks, both in France and in the United States, are examples of events that clearly affected and shaped collective memory. Collective memory selects and keeps only some aspects of the reality of events; some memories fade from collective memory because successive generations do not attach the same meaning and significance to specific events.

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If we take the example of September 11th, most people now between the ages of 10 and 30 will attach more meaning to this event than anyone who will come later or has lived before, which explains why this item appeared so central for the youngest age-group and somewhat less central, but still important, for the other two groups. Those over 30 have their own events, in particular World War II and the Algerian War of Independence, that hold the focus of their generational collective memories. This is not to say that they do not care about what happened on September 11, but it is not for them what it is for those who ‘‘witnessed’’ the attacks on television, on and on, or who knew people who might have been there at the time, and so on. For those who did not ‘‘experience’’ this event, it will be remembered, but the details and causes will blur. Henri Bergson stated that there are two types of memory: intentional and spontaneous.24 Intentional memory consists of encoding and retrieval; it is an intentional, deliberate, quantitative act, such as memorizing a poem or a history lesson. Intentional memory may involve memorizing the sequence of events on September 11 or how many people died; this ‘‘quantitative’’ information is, in a way, easy to recall. Spontaneous memory, which is part of collective memory, is impromptu; it is mainly qualitative. One may remember a sound or a feeling from the day, or something someone said; this recollection would be in the back of the mind behind a veil of intentional memory. Intentional memories fade with time as more relevant ones replace them, but spontaneous memories can persist in the background, waiting for a trigger, for the rest of one’s life. For example, the sound of an airplane flying overhead might trigger the video of the raw footage of the first plane hitting the World Trade Center. People who were alive at the time, in the United States or France, as in many other places, thanks to the role of mass media, will share both types of memories; people who were born after 9/11 can only create intentional memories of this event. The role of spontaneous memory could be clearly seen in our sample’s responses to war and peace. Our oldest age-group, who had directly lived through World War II, told us, in great emotional details, about events during the war; it clearly had personal meaning for them and for their generation. Members of the middle generation had similar responses, though not as emotional. This generation, born after World War II, who might have lived during the Algerian War of Independence, knew the history of the wars primarily through the emotionally charged discourse of their families. On the other hand, the youngest age-group, who were not alive during World War II nor during the Algerian War of Independence, could discuss the causes and effects of the war, but these factors did not have strong emotional connections for them.

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We have had history texts, classes, and even movies to explain the basics of many wars, but they do not contain the original emotion of the event. Movies often attempt to communicate the emotion but fill in the spaces with other irrelevant information, blurring history to fit their plot line and contributing to distortions in collective memory. Those who experienced the event firsthand will always hold it in greater significance. This could explain why our youngest age-group is the one that connects terrorism most directly to September 11, which they ‘‘saw’’ and ‘‘experienced’’ directly.

SUMMARY OF MAIN RESULTS AND CONCLUSION It is clear that collective memory shapes the meaning of social objects, but direct experience is even stronger than the discourse. In that sense, both collective memory and experiences mold the social representations of French people regarding the three key words ‘‘peace,’’ ‘‘war,’’ and ‘‘terrorism.’’ France appears still to be the country of human rights par excellence. The three key words ‘‘Liberty, Equality and Fraternity,’’ which lie at the root of the French democratic Republic, are proudly displayed on the front of every school and public building, thus contributing to promoting the collective memory of the French Revolution and to guiding the transmission of a collective discourse. It is interesting that French people today, especially the young people, still spontaneously mention these three words when they want to express the idea that the French democratic Republic represents ‘‘peace’’ for all, as we have seen in analyzing the associated terms constructing their social representation. By contrast, ‘‘terrorism’’ does not seem really to constitute a shared social representation, as the participants do not produce any strong common concepts or ideas in relation to the term. All our participants have in a way experienced terrorism, during World War II, during the Algerian War of Independence, with attacks in France and especially in Paris, and during the 1980s and 1990s. All have also witnessed, via television, the destruction of the World Trade towers. Nevertheless, these events do not contribute to form a similar view of terrorism, besides the fact that it is a strategy used to reach religious, political, or military goals, by terrorizing the population using bombs and attacks.

6

Iceland  ttir and Michael Corgan Silja Bara Omarsd o

War is … ‘‘Life—for example, Jihad/Western world.’’ Peace … ‘‘is to live in peace and fearlessness towards your neighbors, next village and the countries surrounding you.’’ To many, modern Iceland provides an example of a peaceful country, sufficient unto itself in many ways, with friendly relations with its neighbors. The population, which consists of a little more than 300,000 people, is fairly homogenous. The country has one of the highest birth rates in the industrialized world. Its economy expanded rapidly in the 20th century, but in the first nine months of 2008, it felt the full force of the looming global depression, indicating the possible demise of modern Western economies. Despite the current setbacks, Iceland has developed from one of the poorest countries in Europe at the outset of the 20th century to one of the richest countries in the world at century’s end. In 2007, Iceland ranked first in the UN’s Human Development Index and in the Global Peace Index for 2008. Iceland is ranked at the top as the most peaceful country out of 140 analyzed.1 Furthermore, in October 2008, the first John Lennon-Yoko Ono Peace Prize was awarded to the entire nation of Iceland for its ‘‘centuries of peace.’’2 Indeed, the population has known nothing but peace within its borders for centuries and has not had an organized military of its own at any point in history. The last time war was fought in Iceland was in the 13th century and, with the exception of the so-called Cod Wars with the United Kingdom, the country has had peaceful relations with its North Atlantic neighbors ever since. Upon receiving sovereign status under the Danish king in 1918, Iceland declared that it would ‘‘forever remain neutral,’’ although this promise was soon to be broken as the Cold War threat of the Soviet Union grew ever more present.3

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MODERN ICELANDIC SOCIETY IN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT Up until the beginning of World War II, Iceland’s security was obtained mostly through obscurity and remoteness. Distance from other countries and lack of natural resources made for a peaceful, if harsh, existence for the Icelanders. However, the advent of transpolar flights and supply routes between the United States, the British Isles, and the Soviet Union in the 20th-century wars brought Iceland into the range of militarily strategic air and sea routes. During World War II, Iceland was initially occupied by the British, who in 1941 requested that the Americans take over the base at Keflavik, at the time the country’s only international airport.4 Neutrality figured prominently in discussions in Althingi, the Icelandic parliament, on the establishment of the United Nations; it was decided in a closed session that Iceland would not declare war on Germany. Icelanders considered it inappropriate for a nonmilitarized country to declare war on another country.5 When Iceland took over management of its own foreign affairs in 1944, the government would not even admit a state of war with Germany existed, although that would have enabled it to become a founding member of the United Nations. After viewing an unsuccessful attempt to establish a Nordic security alliance in 1948, Iceland saw that it was no longer in its security interests to stay out of a Western security alliance that would include the United States.6 Thus, on April 4, 1949, Iceland became a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Nonetheless, the ideal of neutrality and pacifism has been held in public discourse to the present date and is often brought up in discussions of Iceland’s status in the ‘‘coalition of the willing,’’ as well as its participation in peacekeeping missions of a military nature. Although the United States withdrew all its NATO forces in 2006, Iceland remains in NATO, and its representatives participate fully in that body’s deliberations. Since the U.S. departure, Althingi has passed legislation establishing a national defense institute, responsible for handling the air policing conducted by NATO member countries at fairly regular intervals throughout the year.

NATION BUILDING: A PEACEFUL IDENTITY EMERGES Iceland was first settled in the late ninth century CE, by Vikings alleged to have been fleeing from unjust taxation by Norwegian kings. Because Iceland was uninhabited at the time—with the possible exception of a few Irish monks—no fighting was required to assert the rights of the arriving population to live in the country. In this faraway place, a

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societal structure developed in the absence of a centralized authority, and in some ways, the current society still reflects this. The first centuries of human habitation in Iceland were not terribly peaceful internally, with feudal infighting dominating the national arena. Nonetheless, major decisions were made at Althingi, which still operates, by the voting of local chieftains who gathered from all regions of the country. The Icelandic settlers were either heathen, worshiping the Norse gods, or were Christian. One of the first major decisions to be made collectively was whether to adopt Christianity as the national religion, which was done peacefully in the 999/1000 parliament. This outcome is often mentioned as an indicator that Icelanders are generally a peaceful people, as religion has often been a source of conflict throughout the world. In fact, the decision to convert the nation to Christianity was taken by a single person, Þorgeir Lj osvetningagoði, who was entrusted with the task by the attending parliamentarians. Goði, a term derived from the word god although there is no proof that their role in society was in any way related to religious practice, was the title of those belonging to Iceland’s most powerful class. Goðar in a sense held both legislative and judicial powers, sitting in the center row at Althingi and nominating members of juries. The fact that their authority survived the conversion to Christianity indicates that the source of their power was social and political, not religious. In early Iceland, the country was divided into 36 goðorð, ensuring the power of the country’s largest feudal families; each goði built his power by drawing more members to his goðorð, but this was done by free association within the segment of the country in which the farmers lived.7 Each goði was required to bring a certain number of parliamentarians to Althingi each summer, drawing these from those who pledged allegiance to him; thus, the Icelandic parliament was composed of 36 groups. Iceland differed significantly from neighboring countries in developing a power structure based on the separation of legislative and judicial powers and not the orders of a centralized ruler. Furthermore, the remote location of the country made its defenses a moot point; thus, no centralized authority was needed to organize such defenses.8 Having established a national parliament, Icelanders acted to place the law above all other factors in dispute resolution. The law was the central focus of the rules that parties used to settle joint problems and disputes. This system remained until a centralized authority emerged in the country. In a country organized in the absence of a centralized authority of any kind, as Iceland was before 1262, certain rules developed. Individuals placed a high value on social honor and status. Men were required to react immediately to any act of aggression, whether it was directed at their wives, daughters, servants, property, or rights. A good man was

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expected to run a harmonious and moral household, where nothing was supposed to be hidden. A man’s relationships with his neighbors were furthermore expected to be characterized by pacifism and good will, which seems to be a characteristic of societies with weak or no centralized government.9 Lındal noted that without the country’s relative isolation, Icelandic culture wouldn’t have developed the characteristics it possesses.10 Since the age of Sturlunga, Iceland’s nation-building era (a time of family feuds that eventually resulted first in Norwegian then later in Danish overlordship in Iceland), no battle has been fought in Iceland. Had there not been this distance from any neighbor, Icelandic culture is sure to have developed in a different manner, as happened elsewhere in Scandinavia.11 From the 11th century, Icelanders appear to have viewed themselves as a single nation and to have distinguished themselves from foreigners, although this distinction had a limited legal impact.12 In particular, a distinct Nordic language served as a distinguishing characteristic of this remote people. In the nationalistic discourse that developed in the 18th century, it was noted that the early Icelanders ‘‘were heroes, equally equipped to fight with the sword and the word.’’13 Discussions and elaborate argumentation were highly valued, but weapons were handy if disputes could not be resolved peacefully. One characteristic of the nation-building era is that a tradition of intervention developed when disputes turned serious, and mediation was attempted in the absence of law and order. The guilty party was given the opportunity of settling with the family of the deceased, paying a fine to restore his honor, and reinstating his right to residency in Iceland.14 Because of the country’s location, the existence of a cohesive identity did not result in warfare. The main potential for war was around the time of the country’s conversion from Catholicism to Lutheranism, in 1550. In the fall of that year, King Christian III of Denmark received word that J on Arason, the Catholic Bishop at H olar in northern Iceland, did not intend to accept conversion. The king sent two ships to the north of Iceland, where the officers were to enter the country with 300 men to arrest Arason and his sons and transfer them to Copenhagen.15 In the end, Arason and his sons were executed in Iceland and things seemed to settle down. As of 1556, the Danish king seemed to have relaxed and felt that the island’s peace was secure. Ships were subsequently sent out to monitor pirates and foreign merchants, not the potential military activities of Icelanders themselves.16 Icelanders were therefore not completely unaware of outside risks or violence, and although the distance was generally thought to provide them with protection from outside attacks, in 1579, 70 pirates sailed in to Patreksfjordur, in western Iceland, where they pillaged, raped the

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women, tortured the men, and even killed some, according to historical records.17 The Danish rulers realized after this that the defenses of Iceland were insufficient, but they had a hard time figuring out how to react and issued a series of contradictory decrees. The population’s ownership of weapons was deemed unsatisfactory, so the king resorted to sending eight spears and six pistols to every county.18 The existing lack of weaponry, however, is thought to have been the result of the king’s previous fears of fighting in Iceland around the conversion to Lutheranism, leading him to have all weapons confiscated and destroyed. Sources do not seem to agree on whether this was done around 1550 or closer to 1580, at which point this fear of violence would probably have been unsubstantiated.19 A ‘‘weapons’ verdict’’ introduced in 1581 indicates that the authorities had decreed as many as five years previously that all weapons should be confiscated and broken, and ownership of weapons prohibited. The decree was said to have been so successful that there was barely a sharp object found in the country for men to use to defend themselves, cut through ice, or chase away a yapping dog.20 The weapons’ verdict turned the king’s previous decree on its head, requiring tax-paying farmers to purchase and hold a gun and three quarters of a pound of gunpowder, and a spear and another sharp weapon as well. This decree does not seem to have been well received by the Icelanders, because a description of Iceland from the year 1589 states that the most practical weaponry had gone to waste and been melted to make tools, but others were to be found hanging on church walls, rusty and burnt to pieces.21 Furthermore, the so-called Turkish Robbery, an invasion of the Westman Islands off Iceland’s South Coast by Algerian pirates who enslaved a number of Icelanders in 1627, demonstrates that Icelanders were ill-equipped to defend themselves against external violence. The killings and eye-for-an-eye politics that had been a characteristic of the nation-building era started to recede after the conversion from Catholicism to Lutheranism. Regional chiefs stopped traveling the countryside with groups of armed men, because this could be construed as a challenge to the authority of the king, especially if he were expecting trouble to brew in Iceland. Icelanders, nonetheless, did not let up on their use of weapons against those with whom they had feuds to settle. A description of Iceland from 1589 indicates that a number of spears, double-edged axes, swords, ordinary knives, as well as some pistols, were still in use, and Icelanders were becoming ever more familiarized with guns every day.22 People, nonetheless, seemed to start to understand that they needed to behave differently in the 17th century than they had during the nation-building era, when the king was weak and distant.23 The open households24 of the nation-building era still present

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at the time of conversion started to disappear from 1550 on through around 1690. Social monitoring changed as well. Instead of neighbors watching neighbors and addressing disputes, the state took on the authority of doing so. For the first time, the distinction between public and private life became a factor in Icelandic society.25 The early history of Iceland therefore demonstrates a tolerance for violence to some extent, but always with an expectation that he who committed an act of violence must pay for it. Like most modern countries, Iceland underwent some seriously disruptive eras, but the disruptions have mostly been related to natural disasters, including volcanic eruptions, and to some extent to starvation resulting from plagues or harsh and abusive trade monopolies by colonial rulers. The Icelandic struggle for independence from the Danish Crown demonstrates Icelanders’ interest in winning battles peacefully, through argumentation and words rather than through violence. J on Sigurðsson, the most prominent leader of the fight for independence (his birthday was chosen as the day on which the Republic was established and is the national holiday celebrating independence), in a letter inciting his countrymen to form a national union and hold meetings, reflected the nation-building era’s reliance on laws; he urged them not to violate any laws, noting the message in Njal’s Saga that ‘‘with laws the land shall be built up and by lawlessness, destroyed.’’26 Guðmundur H alfdanarson discussed the possibility that Icelandic nationalism may present a nonviolent paradigm, noting that the Icelandic fight for independence ‘‘was non-violent almost to the extreme,’’27 as the leaders of the independence movement emphasized that the fight should be fought with words, not weapons.28 However, Halfdanarson also cautions the reader not to read too much into this achievement, arguing that it was peculiar circumstances that resulted in the success, for ‘‘Icelandic nationalism had the same propensity for violence as any other ethnic nationalism, because its ultimate goal was not negotiable.’’29 In his view, inflated rhetoric on the Icelandic character could lead to an unfortunate sense of racial superiority. From the Cod Wars of the mid- to late twentieth century, Iceland’s leaders realized that it might have some disputes with its neighbors and that these would need to be addressed in some way. Iceland’s membership in NATO resolved most of the country’s concerns in regard to defenses, especially as Iceland and the United States established a unique bilateral defense agreement within NATO, providing the United States access to Icelandic territory in return for physical defense of the country. This presence of a NATO base at the international airport at Keflavik was a major source of controversy and even a defining issue in Icelandic politics virtually throughout the Cold War

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era. The leftist Peoples’ Alliance opposed both the base and NATO membership itself and its successor party, the Left Green Movement established in 1999, actively opposed the base and continues to oppose NATO membership. More centrist parties accepted NATO membership but questioned the base. Only the rightist Independence Party, always a strong though never majority party, supported both NATO membership and the base. Attitudes about the possibility of the base drawing Iceland into quarrels in which it had no interest are best expressed in the novel Atom Station by Halldor Laxness, Iceland’s Nobel laureate. At one point, a leading figure notes an ‘‘atom station shall be built where Icelanders can be wiped out in a single day.’’30 During the Cold War era, Icelanders never joined any military operations and their series of three Cod Wars, principally with the United Kingdom, saw little more than deliberate though not catastrophic rammings of each nation’s ships by the other. In each case, Iceland ultimately took matters to various established international bodies to shop for an appropriate or congenial forum to try the issues—the UN General Assembly and Security Council, the NATO Council, the International Court of Justice among them. Though its fisheries were, as they are now, a vital national resource, Iceland’s tactics in these disputes ultimately resulted in changes in international Law of the Sea favorable to its position. All was accomplished without real violence and for a country having no military of its own. What may be the most powerful statement about Icelanders’ disavowal of force is to be found in the concluding words of Gunnar Karlsson’s recent English-language history of Iceland: If there is one main rule in Icelandic history, it is that victory is won by the inability to use force. The only attempt to rely on military force for its security—participation in the Western defense system—has not defended Iceland against any offensive, but has caused bitter conflict in the country and seriously damaged the people’s self-image. On the other hand, the struggle for political independence and autonomy in the fishing grounds has been won by the lack of means to exert force.31

In the changed security environment of the 21st century, the United States no longer considered a military base in the middle of the North Atlantic necessary for its own territorial security and withdrew. The Icelandic government had been aware of the possibility for awhile, although it seems to have been unwilling to face that reality. Nonetheless, an attempt to shape a new identity for its security emerged in the mid-1990s, when Iceland began participating actively in international peacekeeping missions, initially prioritizing missions organized by

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NATO.32 The nature of the Icelandic Peacekeeping Force (technically titled the Icelandic Crisis Response Unit) reflects, in a way, Icelanders’ perception of themselves as a peaceful people. When Icelandic peacekeepers were sent to Afghanistan, they were required to accept military titles, wear uniforms, and bear arms. This led some critics, in particular members of the Left Green Movement, a traditionally anti-NATO party, to claim that the peacekeepers were in fact soldiers and that this risked Iceland’s identity as a nonmilitarized country.33 Members of the governmental parties, the conservative Independence Party and the centrist Progressive Party, however, turned that logic on its head and said that since Iceland is a nonmilitarized country, the operations they participated in would have to be civilian.34 However, when images started to appear in Icelandic media, showing the peacekeepers armed to the hilt on the streets of Kabul, the images did not fit with Icelanders’ self-perception, and one member of parliament stated that the projects the peacekeeping force participated in did not fit with the nation’s unarmed status.35 Icelanders found it much easier to accept peacekeeping operations focusing on ‘‘soft’’ projects, such as gender equality training, than projects that were military in nature.36 It seems safe to say that this preference is a result of their perception of themselves as a peaceful and peace-loving people who lack knowledge of and expertise in military matters. As can be seen from the above, Icelanders have a long history of distrusting violence as a means to an end and a tendency to trust the rule of law to settle disputes. Historical examples point to the nation’s ability to find ways around difficult circumstances by resorting to international law and institutions, not always the same one but always the one that works best. The one example of Iceland allying itself with an international act of aggression remains its placement on the list of the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The decision to place Iceland on that list has been one of the most hotly debated matters in Icelandic politics over the last few years. The issue remained unsolved in the formation of the 2008 coalition government of the conservative Independence Party, whose then chairman was prime minister, and the Social Democratic Alliance, which was in opposition when the invasion began. In the coalition policy agreement, it is stated simply that the new government ‘‘deplores the ongoing war in Iraq,’’37 but no mention was made of taking steps to remove Iceland from the ‘‘coalition of the willing.’’ Within a few months, however, the Social Democratic Alliance’s minister for foreign affairs had Iceland’s sole peacekeeping officer in Iraq pulled out of the country. The fact that Iceland participates actively in peacekeeping missions seems intended to demonstrate that the country will accept its share of the burden of securing a peaceful world, thus maintaining what would seem a

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peaceful characteristic; however, the impact of the militarized peacekeeping forces and participation in the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ has led some to question that identity. How might this history of nonaggression in international affairs and rule of law in domestic affairs reflect itself in Icelandic responses to an open-ended survey on governmental aggression and peace? Let us turn now to the survey to observe the extent to which these national experiences and characteristics emerge in a sample of survey responses.

THE ICELANDIC SAMPLE The Icelandic sample consists of 107 respondents (out of a national population of 300,000) recruited through the snowball method, with an e-mail being sent out by the Icelandic author asking recipients to respond and to forward the link to an online questionnaire. Although the demographic profile of the sample could not be controlled through these procedures, they provided a fairly diverse group of respondents who can also be considered fairly interested in the questions posed, as they took the time to respond to them. The respondents were disproportionately female, 78 of the 107, but otherwise the sampling was a fair cross section of this relatively homogenous population. Ages ranged from 24 to 62, with a median age of 36. All except seven, who did not indicate their ethnicity (though all were born in Iceland), identified themselves either as Icelanders or as ‘‘white’’ or Caucasian. All respondents had lived in Iceland virtually their entire lives. Most respondents— 80 (75 percent)—were married or cohabiting, with the remaining describing themselves as divorced or single. Religious preference was, as might be expected in a country whose constitution recognizes the Lutheran Church, overwhelming Protestant, with only one respondent listing no affiliation and 8 (7 percent) listing themselves as atheists. None claimed the officially recognized status of ‘‘pagan.’’ As to class, 31 (29 percent) listed themselves as upper middle class, 72 (67 percent) as middle class, and 4 (4 percent) as working class, although one of these last had a PhD. As to education, four claimed no higher than elementary education; the rest had some college or bachelor or higher degrees, five being PhDs. Political affiliation showed an overrepresentation of the center-left and left parties. Only 10 (9 percent) claimed membership in the Independence Party, which has a consistent following of 30–40 percent in polls and elections. The largest group was 44 (41 percent) in Samfylkingin (Social Alliance) which is, as of October 2008, in the coalition government with the Independence Party, followed closely by the 32 (30 percent) claiming allegiance to the

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Left-Green party. For the remainder, eight (7 percent) claimed they had no party, three (3 percent) used nonspecific descriptors of ‘‘middle of the road’’ or moderate, and eight did not respond at all. Finally, as might be expected in a nation that has never had a military force in its 1,100-year history, only one respondent had had any military service and that was in the Norwegian Army. Overall, the sample showed a skewing toward female respondents and toward left-center or left political parties but otherwise reflected the current homogeneity of the Icelandic population, which is 94 percent native-born. Following are the characterizations of responses to the survey areas. Definitions of Peace, War, and Terrorism Of the 85 definitions of peace provided, approximately 56 percent were negative definitions, identifying peace with the absence of fear of external danger or more usually, fear of war: ‘‘A situation where people are not under threat of violence,’’ or ‘‘When people live without fear.’’ Positive definitions (45 percent) spoke of respect for others, harmony, and ‘‘each government giving a little’’ to get on in the world. Definitions of war encompassed both war between countries and domestic fighting; ‘‘For example, a fight between two gangs can be classified as a civil war.’’ Forty-one percent (41) indicated that war had to be between at least two groups. In the case of definitions taking more individualistic perspectives, the highest number of responses in one area, 18 percent (18), focused on a moral judgment such as, whether it is between or within countries, war ‘‘should in either case be non-existent.’’ As with a number of other response areas in this survey, Icelanders can only report in a rather conjectural way about terrorism. To date, there has been no terrorist action, nor even the threat of one, on Icelandic soil or against Icelanders anywhere. No clear pattern of attitudes about the definition of terrorism emerged. However, many whose answers converged on key ideas (12 percent) agreed that the purpose of terrorism was to instill fear. Even more (20 percent) agreed that terrorists’ actions were those directed against civilian targets or ‘‘the public.’’ Fourteen percent saw terrorism as a means to an end, although a few individuals saw it as ‘‘purposeless’’ or ‘‘pointless’’ and ‘‘can never be justified.’’ A number of respondents suggested that the term ‘‘terrorism’’ does not have now, if it ever did, a clear definition. There were no responses that incorporated all three elements usually given by Western governments in their definitions of terrorism: creation of widespread fear (e.g., ‘‘terrorists don’t want a lot of people dead, they want a lot of people watching’’); violence against civilians or innocents rather

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than government police, security or armed forces; and the achievement of specific aims. Acts of Aggression Iceland has never been invaded by enemy forces. As noted earlier, there was a slave raid in the early 17th century, but the only episode in the country’s history corresponding to a military invasion was the (necessarily) unopposed peaceful occupation by British forces in 1940, enhanced by American forces in 1941, to forestall a possible occupation by Germany. Though 58 percent of our respondents did not see invasion of another country as justifiable, there was no strong agreement on any one reason. Only 13 percent said it might be necessary to respond to a threat to one’s own country or to prevent use of weapons of mass destruction. An equal number, on the other hand, would hold an invasion justified if it were to prevent (presumably grave) human rights abuses. Among the 58 percent who did see one or another possible justification for an invasion, 14 percent said it would still require UN approval or ‘‘several countries in a union.’’ The largest number of responses that agreed on a single point was the 18 percent who voiced strong opposition to invasion under any circumstances. As may be recalled, the only experience of Icelanders with a large presence of foreign military forces was the British and American occupation in World War II. The occupying forces outnumbered Icelanders—about 140,000 to 90,000—but brought with them relatively few serious problems (nothing like the problems that routinely plague American forces in Okinawa). Indeed, some Icelanders, by no means a majority, called this the ‘‘blessed war’’ because of the influx of capital and modern amenities. As to a potential right of governments to kill innocent civilians in the fight against international terrorism, more respondents were adamantly opposed than was the case with invasion. Eight percent thought that killing innocents was inevitable in war or military action, but 35 percent saw no such right under any circumstances. Many expressed a fundamental opposition to the idea that anyone has the right to take life. According to one, ‘‘That would be replacing the job of our Lord.’’ The issue of torturing POWs, like the possibility of invading another state or killing innocent civilians while pursuing terrorists, was also a rather abstract question for Icelanders, because their country has never taken part in any military actions. This issue saw the highest agreement in the general category of Acts of Aggression: Of the 53 explanations given for rating scale responses, 81 percent were arguments against a right to torture. The majority of these arguments against torture characterized it as a violation of human rights. Some (8 percent) seemed to see it primarily

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as a violation of international law; an additional 21 percent seemed constitutionally opposed to torture. A typical comment of this last cohort was ‘‘It is incredible that someone thinks they have this power.’’ As with other issues addressed in this study, Iceland has a distinctive if not unique experience in this area. We are unaware of any instances of the use of torture by Icelandic civil authorities inflicted upon those in custody. Right to a World of Peace Though Denmark was asked to continue to conduct the country’s foreign affairs, Iceland proclaimed its ‘‘perpetual neutrality’’ when it gained independence in 1918. It is not surprising that responses to the item ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace’’ reflected the longcherished notion of Iceland’s unfailing support for peace. Though some few thought the question ‘‘too specific’’ and others converted the question into rights for women, 77 percent saw peace as a human right and no one thought it was not. There were some who felt that it was an ideal unlikely to be achieved, but the comments were generally along the lines of ‘‘All human beings have a duty to be peaceful,’’ or ‘‘Peace should be unquestioned for all.’’ Only a very few, 3 percent, thought peace should be conditional on the behavior of those who broke the peace. Protest against war and in favor of peace was seen as a right by most respondents (61 percent), and quite a few had themselves taken part in protests. Protests in Iceland in the past several hundred years, with just two exceptions, have themselves been peaceful. The last real mass protest was in 1949 when Iceland joined NATO. The violence consisted of demonstrators throwing rocks through the windows of the parliament building and the police using tear gas to disperse them.38 A good number of the respondents saw protest was not only a right but a responsibility, ‘‘It is a question of democracy and necessity of questioning government policies.’’ There was a significant number of these (36 percent), however, who insisted that protests be peaceful. Only two (4 percent) felt that protest was ‘‘not part of freedom of expression.’’ These results are very much in keeping with Iceland’s history which, as noted above, has seen only two mass protests where police felt they had to use force.39 It was in the area of protest, too, that the respondent comments were most voluble and explicit. By far, the greatest number reported protesting against the U.S. war in Iraq. Particularly annoying to those who protested this war was that Iceland was counted by President Bush among the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ in the war. By ‘‘involvement in protest,’’ too, the respondents, with one exception, meant that they were physically present at various venues including and especially outside the

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U.S. Embassy. This latter building has since 2001 had its street front in downtown Reykjavik cordoned off to regular vehicle traffic and has a deliberately visible Icelandic private security force outside. Other examples given of participant involvement in protest included favoring Palestinian statehood and opposition to China’s treatment of Tibet. Achievability of World Peace/National Security and Family Security By a small but nonetheless clear margin, Icelanders think that world peace can be achieved, even if not in the near future. A little more than one in seven surveyed, 15 percent, thought peace could and would be achieved and placed no time duration for this to happen. A smaller number (11 percent) said it would happen but not soon, ‘‘it will happen someday,’’ being a more characteristic response. Six participants (9 percent) placed a particular conditionality on achieving peace, namely, the inclusion of women into decision making; for example, ‘‘politics need to be changed and women need to be incorporated more into politics.’’ Other responses giving a generally favorable view of achieving peace included the need to respect human rights and the notion that peace, though it may not happen, is at least theoretically possible. Altogether, it is fair to judge that 35 percent of responses expressed a view that peace will happen at some point and is within the capability of the world and people; the idea that peace can only be an ideal or will take an effort beyond what is likely was expressed in 22 percent of the responses. Thirty-one percent of the respondents expressed the more pessimistic view that world peace is not achievable. Their reasons included greed (12 percent); ‘‘corrupt people in high places’’ and ‘‘maniacs’’ (9 percent); mankind generally (5 percent); and the nature of political states (5 percent). The remaining 13 percent of respondents indicated they were simply not sure. This range of views and the slight preponderance of those who think world peace is achievable reflect the particular history of Iceland having lived at peace for centuries in a world, which, as they have become increasingly able to observe, has generally not been at peace. Iceland presents to the observer, especially the outsider, an unusual degree of family closeness—splits, feuds, and divorce notwithstanding— compared to other industrialized or ‘‘modern’’ societies. This tradition of family closeness has a long history and can readily be seen in the sagas, many of whose early chapters are essentially chronicles of kin relationships. In Old Norse law, this chronicling of blood relationships was especially important, because the duty to avenge wrongs or discharge debts often passed down through successive generations. Though the sagas are often filled with exaggeration if not outright fancy, the skein of familial relationships is deemed quite reliable. Indeed, Dr. Kari

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Stefansson, who heads the deCODE genetics enterprise in Reykjavik, asserted in a conversation with one of the authors that the sagas were ‘‘98.5’’ accurate in noting who was related to whom.40 In today’s Iceland, the knowledge and importance of family relationships continue to be reinforced by the widespread use of patronymics for naming children and the small size of the society, with its increasing tendency to cluster in the Reykjavik capital area. National security was historically not an issue for Iceland until modern times—World War II and later—when national security as usually conceived by more powerful states became a matter over which Icelanders had relatively little control. It may not be surprising, then, that responses to the item ‘‘National security is necessary for individual and family security’’ provided little in the way of a discernible pattern to the answers. There simply has been no precedent in the historical experience of Iceland or the personal experience of Icelanders today for thinking of national security and family security as being related. Thus, the only category that included more than three answers of the total of 47 qualitative responses was the assertion that family (and individual) security does depend on national security (27 percent). Most of the other answers showed a reinterpretation of the question or answered some other question the respondents thought more apt. There was a high level of generalization in most answers illustrating the absence of actual experience. Only one answer suggested that the government itself could be a source of insecurity to the family (recall that Iceland does not have a military force).

CONCLUSION Though Iceland was occupied, somewhat benignly, during World War II and lost some of its merchant mariners to submarine attacks, though it was a charter member of NATO and remains in this essentially military alliance, and though it fought a series of three Cod Wars against the United Kingdom, Icelanders are aware that Iceland has been singularly favored by being out of the way of the world’s conflicts. It is not surprising that the responses of Icelanders tend to reflect a rather optimistic and even na€ive view of world affairs. This is not to say that violence is unknown in Iceland or that family life is untroubled by abuse and strife. The sagas of which Icelanders are so proud and that form the core of Iceland’s cultural heritage are often a rather unrelenting account of mayhem and murder, with women getting in their fair share of the action. What Icelanders have not had is a history of strife with peoples from other lands. There has never been a military force in the nation’s history,

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the general police force is unarmed, the Constitution does not allow for a militia, and even its Coast Guard ships are not armed. Occasional attempts by a few politicians on the right to create some type of national emergency response force a step above the so-called Viking Squad of the Reykjavik police inevitably fade quietly away. The responses in this survey bear out this history of peaceful living away from the world’s war zones and battlegrounds. Support for such things as invasion, even under provocation or threat to the country’s own security; torture of POWs who may be terrorists; killing of civilians as ‘‘collateral damage’’ to otherwise justified military action; and so on never rises to even 10 percent of those surveyed. Icelanders do follow events elsewhere in what must seem a less happy world. However, the answers to many of the questions in the survey must remain essentially hypothetical for these people. Of all the countries in the network of world alliances and treaty organizations, only Iceland and Costa Rica have no militaries, the latter country having had one but disestablishing it after the so-called ‘‘soccer war’’ of 1966. But unlike even Costa Rica, Iceland has never in its more than 1,100 years had an organized or a national military force, has never been forcefully invaded, and has never undertaken any such action itself. This small island state has had a charmed life in its relative isolation in the North Atlantic, and even Icelanders know theirs is not a path all or perhaps even any others can follow. Iceland was able to fight for its independence with words, not weapons—an exceptional and perhaps nonreplicable occurrence. Because of extraordinary circumstances, the country’s ability to live in peace may be a reflection of its geography as much as of its culture.

7

Sweden Mathilde Salmberg

War … ‘‘is the structural, cultural and direct use of violence. A downward spiraling state of conflict with destructive and longstanding consequences’’ (female, 36). Peace … ‘‘is the opposite of violence and oppression. Peace necessitates that psychological and physical needs are satisfied, everyone’s equal rights, justice, part of decision making, opportunity for development and freedom of opinion’’ (female, 76). Terrorism … ‘‘is demoralizing and destabilizing violence for the purpose of influencing an organization or a society of a certain opinion’’ (male, 45). Sweden has maintained peace for almost 200 years, which presents a unique opportunity to explore how a prolonged absence of war may influence peoples’ perceptions on issues related to governmental aggression and peace. This chapter begins with historical context focused primarily on the evolution of Sweden’s neutrality policy, political system, welfare system, military and defense, as well as considering other sociocultural issues such as religion, large-scale immigration, and progressive gender equality policies. The focus then shifts to a description of the participants, their definitions of peace and war, and their views on world peace, terrorism, torture, invasion of other countries, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq. HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND Sweden was considered the most influential country in Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea area from the mid-1600s to the early 1700s. The country reached its largest territorial area in the 1600s when it acquired parts

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of the Baltic region and neighboring Scandinavian areas. During this time, Sweden also briefly obtained lands overseas, including a post in Africa and a colony in America. These acquisitions came at a price, however, because almost 50 years of warfare depleted the economy and left the country in a weakened position. Sweden began to lose headway in the early 1700s when it was defeated by its nemesis Russia. When Sweden lost an attempt to reassert itself by invading Norway, Russia emerged as the leading nation of the Baltic Sea. Sweden’s last military engagement was in the Napoleonic Wars in 1814.1 By the end of this war, Sweden forced Norway to enter into a union under the Swedish Crown. This union was maintained until 1905.2 Despite the union with Norway, Sweden lost considerable areas of land during the Napoleonic Wars and was left economically destabilized. Upset by these losses, the Swedish people overthrew the reigning Swedish king in 1809. The new government set out to convert Sweden’s absolute monarchy into a constitutional monarchy, with power distributed between the monarch, Council, and Parliament.3 Foreign policy was also markedly reformed, and Swedish neutrality was mandated for all future armed conflicts.4 Although Sweden adhered to its official neutrality policy during World War I, the government initially held a pro-German bias, based on Sweden’s history of strong economic, cultural, and royal ties with Germany. As the war progressed, Sweden was increasingly burdened by economic hardship, social tension, and a limited supply of fuel and raw materials, which prompted the election of a less German-centered conservative cabinet in 1917.5 With the outbreak of World War II, Sweden again declared its neutrality, desiring to avoid becoming involved in the conflict and to maintain its sovereignty. Its foreign policy gradually shifted from strict neutrality at the outset of the war to a proGerman partiality toward the end of the war. For example, Sweden allowed German use of its railways for transportation of infantry divisions and soldiers on leave and exported large amounts of iron ore to Germany. The Swedish government was widely criticized for engaging in pro-German actions that breached its neutrality stance. For the Swedish government, however, it seemed essential to make these concessions to avoid occupation.6 As Sweden remained unoccupied, it was able to serve as a safe haven to many people whose countries were occupied during the war. It is estimated that by the end of 1944, 91,000 refugees were situated in Sweden, including the majority of Denmark’s Jewish population, thousands of Finnish children, and up to 30,000 refugees from the Baltic region.7 Following the war, a more active foreign policy was established because of the challenges the war had presented to Sweden’s neutrality. Sweden joined the United Nations (UN) and started to take part in peacekeeping and mediation efforts, demonstrated solidarity

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with developing countries, relinquished arms, and spoke out against major powers in the Cold War.8 Although Sweden officially stood by its neutrality policy during the Cold War, the government covertly engaged in a close relationship with the United States.9 Because of the impending threat of the Soviet Union, Sweden allowed U.S. submarines to be positioned close to its coast in the 1960s. If the Soviet Union were to launch an attack, having the submarines in this position would assist the United States in a possible nuclear retaliation against the Soviet Union. In exchange, the United States agreed to provide military assistance to Sweden should the Soviet Union invade Sweden and financially supported the Swedish defense and the Norwegian and Danish navies. Sweden was also granted access to advanced U.S. flight technology, which allowed Sweden to produce airplanes more quickly and less expensively than what would otherwise have been possible.10 This agreement was kept from the public until 1994 when the Swedish Commission for Neutral Politics released the information. One drawback of the agreement was that because very few Swedish officials were aware of it, it complicated Swedish defense planning and led to the defense becoming misbalanced.11 Swedish Foreign Policy and Defense System As the world witnessed new forms of security threats following the Cold War, European nations were impelled to cooperate to promote security. Sweden joined the European Union (EU) in 1995 and, as a member, was expected to provide military assistance if another EU nation was invaded. Because this naturally raised questions regarding Sweden’s long-standing public neutrality, Sweden’s security policy was revised in 2002 to allow increased flexibility regarding neutrality and a more active involvement in European security. Although Sweden refrained from entering any military alliances, several initiatives were taken to demonstrate its solidarity with the EU. For example, Sweden entered the NATO-initiated Partnership for Peace program with peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, became involved in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and became a full member of the Council of Europe (OSCE). Sweden also took on an active role in the UN; became a central supporter of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; assumed the presidency of the Council of Baltic Sea States in 2006; and set out to enhance NordicBaltic cooperation. Sweden is expected to continue its active role in developing the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. During the Cold War, the Swedish armed forces focused primarily on presenting a defense against potential invaders. Because of the changing security situation in the world, the defense system is being

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reformed to increase the flexibility, mobility, and rapid reaction capability of the armed forces.12 As part of this restructuring, Sweden spearheaded the establishment of the Nordic Battlegroup, which is a rapid reaction force composed of forces from Norway, Finland, Estonia, and Ireland, and expected to be ready for operation in 2008.13 Currently, the Swedish defense is based on full conscription; all Swedish men between 18 and 24 years of age go through testing, and approximately one third are subsequently enrolled to serve.14 Women are not drafted, but all military branches have been open to women since 1980.15 The armed forces, which included approximately 28,000 men and women in 2004, is prepared to mobilize up to 290,000 troops if needed. Acting in cooperation with the UN, NATO, and OSCE, Sweden had a military presence in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Bosnia in 2007.16 Political System, Welfare, and Human Rights Sweden is a monarchy in which the head of state is the supreme representative of the country; however, the monarch does not hold any political power and does not participate in political deliberations or decisions.17 The country is governed by a parliamentary democracy with national, regional, and local levels. The Riksdag is the federal legislative body that formulates proposals for new legislation and amendments that are later implemented by the government.18 Since 2006, Sweden has been governed by a four-party center-right coalition government. This is a noteworthy change from an almost uninterrupted domination by the Social Democratic Party (SAP) since the 1930s. The SAP developed and maintained an advanced welfare structure founded on aggressive taxation and designed to ensure economic security for its citizens by developing a mixed economy, with the public sector as a central influence.19 Cornerstones of the Swedish welfare system include universal health care, dental insurance, pension plans, unemployment protection, job retraining and relocation, five-week vacations, generous parental leaves, day care, and free education through university. The system also includes quality housing, affordable public transportation, and well-funded arts and cultural programs.20 The current government is restructuring the system to reduce the public’s dependency on welfare by reinforcing economic incentives to work.21 In addition to securing its own welfare system, Sweden has contributed significantly to development aid, meeting or exceeding the UN recommendations between 1989 and 1996. The majority of the aid has been distributed to African and Asian countries, and there has been notable assistance to the Baltic States.22

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Although Sweden has a strong record regarding human rights, the government has been criticized for several human rights violations since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. One case that was highly publicized occurred in 2001 when the Swedish government, assisted by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, returned two Egyptian men to their home country where they were at risk of being subjected to torture.23 From Emigration to Immigration By the end of 2007, Sweden’s total population reached 9,182,927 and 13.4 percent of the population were foreign born.24 This reflects a dramatic change in the ethnic balance in Sweden, which prior to World War II had a relatively homogenous population with large-scale emigration.25 Large numbers of refugees from neighboring Nordic countries entered Sweden following the war in the 1940s, and many Finnish citizens immigrated in the 1950s in response to the growing need for labor.26 The labor force shortage continued into the 1960s and 1970s and prompted a wave of immigration from the southern parts of Europe. Sweden later experienced an influx of refugees from the Middle East, South America, and Africa and then another surge following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the conflicts in former Yugoslavia.27 Close to 96,000 persons immigrated to Sweden in 2006, of whom 11 percent were from Iraq.28 This trend continued in 2007 when immigration reached record highs, with close to 100,000 immigrants. A large number of Iraqis sought asylum, and the percentage of immigrants in need of protection increased from 7 percent in 2006 to 15 percent in 2007.29 Gender Equality in Sweden Sweden is currently a world leader when it comes to gender equality. Following the post-World War II labor shortage in Sweden, increasing numbers of women joined the workforce, which led to a shift in the traditional division of labor. These changes led to the establishment of alternative methods for child care such as day care centers. Other postwar sociocultural trends include higher divorce rates, lower birth rates, higher rates of cohabitation without marriage, the introduction of the contraceptive pill, and equal rights to higher education. Activist groups influenced public opinion and political debate, and a Delegation for Equality between Men and Women was created in the early 1970s.30 By 2007, Swedish women outnumbered men in tertiary education, and the Swedish parliament was composed of 47 percent women, with 52 percent of ministerial positions being held by women. The same year, Sweden ranked number one in the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report,31 as well as in the Save the Children Women’s

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Index Rank and Mother’s Index Rank.32 Despite these significant strides forward regarding women’s rights, complete gender equality has not been achieved; women continue to face income disparities, employment discrimination, and Sweden has yet to be headed by a female prime minister.33 Religion in Sweden The primary religion in Sweden is Evangelical Lutheran, or Church of Sweden, in which 78 percent of the population are members. The church and the state were linked until 2000, and their separation led to a significant drop in membership.34 Although the majority of the population belongs to the church, only an estimated 2 percent of members regularly attend services.35 Most become members through baptism, which automatically enters them into the church. About half of couples who marry go through the church.36 Becaue of the increased immigration, Sweden houses a significant Muslim population; an estimated 300,000–350,000 Muslims were located in Sweden in 2004.37

THE SWEDISH SAMPLE AND RESPONSES TO THE PAIRTAPS How does Sweden’s long-standing history of peace and neutrality influence people’s perceptions and attitudes about war- and peace-related issues? To shed some light on these questions, 82 Swedish adults, 42 men and 40 women, participated in an anonymous international study of perspectives on war, rights to governmental aggression, and peace. The participants were invited to the study through informal networking channels; contact with universities; student organizations; peace organizations; interest groups for war, peace, military, and international affairs issues, and more. The ages of the participants ranged from 20 to 76, with a mean age of 36. Almost 55 percent of the participants identified as agnostic, atheist, or other; 41 percent identified as Christian, with the primary denomination being the Church of Sweden, and a few participants identified as Muslim or Buddhist. The participants were generally highly educated; over 90 percent had attained or were pursuing a university degree, and everyone had completed a high school education. Approximately 40 percent were students at the time they completed the survey. Nearly 30 percent of the participants had served in the military, and two participants had participated in combat; 34 percent of the sample reported having participated in a conflict resolution program, and 65 percent reported having participated in protests against war, most commonly by signing protest lists, but some by participating in various

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demonstrations. Several persons indicated that they found the survey lengthy or intrusive, particularly demographic questions about political affiliation and sexual orientation, which prevented some from participating or completing the full survey. All participants completed an anonymous Swedish online version of the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS), which assesses judgments and attitudes about war and peace both quantitatively and qualitatively. The participants were asked to rate items on a scale from 1 to 7 where ‘‘1’’ equaled total disagreement and ‘‘7’’ equaled total agreement. The following items or statements were analyzed: Definitions of peace; I believe world peace can be achieved; The best way to achieve world peace is …; Definitions of war; Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country; Definitions of terrorism; Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism; The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war; and The United States’ involvement in the Iraq war is a moral activity. Definitions of Peace When asked to give their personal definitions of the term ‘‘peace,’’ 54 percent of the participants provided negative definitions, describing not what peace is but what it is not—identifying it, for example, as the absence of violence—a condition that Sweden has enjoyed for much of its recent years. These negative conceptions of peace focused primarily on the absence of war, conflict, oppression, and violence. One participant described peace as: ‘‘The absence of mutually organized armed violence’’ and another said peace is: ‘‘A state without war or violent actions.’’ Several responses described peace as ‘‘the opposite of war.’’ In contrast to these negative definitions of peace, approximately 39 percent of the participants emphasized what peace is rather than what it is not. These positive definitions fell into the subcategories of: conditions necessary for peace (17 percent); attitudes of acceptance or harmony (15 percent); and positive relationships (8 percent). Approximately 6 percent of the responses fell into an ‘‘Other’’ category. Positive definitions focusing on acceptance and harmony included: ‘‘Living with mutual respect for one another’’ and ‘‘A state of acceptance, closeness, respect for the other’s integrity and needs.’’ Responses focusing on collaborative relationships between countries defined peace as ‘‘Friendship between countries’’ or ‘‘A positive relationship between one or more countries.’’ A few participants defined peace as ‘‘The dream’’; ‘‘Harmony’’; or ‘‘Utopia.’’ The responses delineating necessary prerequisites for peace focused on human rights, fair distribution of resources, and values and attitudes

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consistent with peace. Examples of such definitions include ‘‘Peace necessitates psychological and physical needs are satisfied, everyone’s equal rights, justice, part of decision making, opportunity for development and freedom of opinion’’ and ‘‘Peace leads to a positive development in society which is based on values such as human rights, democracy, equality and a goal to have equal power—equally divided resources, nationally and globally.’’ The issues of democracy, equality, and human rights predominated throughout the survey responses, a pattern that makes sense, given the extent to which these principles are prioritized in the Swedish political arena through the government’s progressive policies promoting equality and human rights at home as well as abroad. World Peace The results revealed that a slight majority of the participants (51 percent) believed that world peace can be achieved. Their somewhat optimistic responses were divided into the following subcategories: changes are necessary (17 percent); determination/hope is important (15 percent); progress has been made (6 percent); unspecified agreement (8 percent); and not sure (6 percent). In the ‘‘changes are necessary’’ category, some of the recommended changes were quite general; for example, ‘‘Conflicts will always exist and are natural, it is how they are handled that needs to change, I believe that pursuit can be realized but a common cultural change is necessary.’’ Some responses may reflect Sweden’s shift toward greater participation in international conflict resolution and peacekeeping efforts; for example, a response indicating that achieving world peace requires ‘‘Complete downsizing of arms, spreading ideas of nonviolence, providing education in alternative ways of solving conflicts, fighting for justice with nonviolent methods.’’ Another participant points out ‘‘We are slowly but surely going in that direction with EU, ASEAN, NATO, etc.’’ Determination and hope are seen as important to achieving world peace: ‘‘Of course it is possible if we want to’’ and ‘‘One has to keep hoping.’’ A few participants pointed to Sweden’s own history to support the notion that peace is possible on a larger scale: ‘‘If we in Sweden can maintain peace for several centuries, as well as peace with our closest neighboring countries, then why not on a global level?’’ Some participants argued that humans have evolved into more ethical beings over time: ‘‘One can see that humanity has overcome large problems in the past, for example, slavery is no longer acceptable today. We can see an evolution of ethics for humanity.’’ Forty-four percent of participants did not believe that world peace is possible; their more pessimistic responses were further divided into

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human, cultural, or religious barriers (24 percent); appeals to history (6 percent); concern with limited earthly resources (5 percent); and unspecified disagreement (9 percent). The remainder of the sample provided neutral responses. The largest subgroup of participants expressing doubts concerning the achievability of world peace referred to human, cultural, or religious barriers to world peace. One participant noted that ‘‘Human beings are destructive by nature … we desire others’ possessions and relentlessly seek to force our values on others’’; ‘‘If you look at history, conflicts and human cruelty have always existed.’’ Other respondents commented ‘‘Unfortunately, I don’t think it is possible with all the different people with different cultures and religions that exist in our world’’ and ‘‘It is completely impossible because there is a faction of a religion that is trying to eradicate non-believers of that religion.’’ Some participants also recognized the dangers inherent in the diminishing availability of natural resources: ‘‘There will be conflict regarding new problems in the world related to climate, for example, lack of water.’’ The Best Way to Achieve World Peace Suggestions about the best way to achieve world peace fell into the following categories: politics/diplomacy (33 percent); social justice/human rights (25 percent); positive interpersonal strategies (23 percent); ethical behavior (5 percent); and other (8 percent). Only 5 percent indicated that they did not know or peace is not possible. The largest group of participants focused on political and diplomatic solutions such as downsizing military arms, spreading democracy, education, and use of diplomatic or nonviolent conflict resolution strategies. Among these recommendations were ‘‘Stop production of weapons, dialogue between countries, diplomacy’’; ‘‘Democratization of the whole world’’; and ‘‘Get politicians to have the courage to make difficult decisions and stop caring about power and reelections.’’ Many of these responses seemed in tune with Sweden’s efforts at mediation and peacekeeping in various conflict-ridden parts of the world. Similarly, recommendations regarding social justice, human rights, and equity also seem consistent with Sweden’s peacekeeping commitment. These recommendations included ‘‘Justice, development, education and safety for humans’’; ‘‘International law that applies to all states. Fair distribution of the resources of the earth’’; ‘‘Diplomacy and to share the resources of the earth so that everyone gets food, etc.’’ Responses in the category of positive interpersonal strategies for achieving world peace emphasized increased understanding, communication, and acceptance of differences as summarized in this response: ‘‘Mutual dialogue and respect for each others’ differences.’’ One

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participant stated, ‘‘If everyone can see, understand and accept each others’ viewpoints and religions, I believe we can get along … but many people are unfortunately narrow-minded so it will never happen.’’ Responses underlining the importance of ethical behavior included ‘‘For each person to learn more about each other and to learn to live with our differences, to let go of the egotistical thinking that permeates so much of our society.’’ Another participant referred to her religious beliefs, noting ‘‘I start with myself. Love your enemies, do not engage in fights … the message of love in the Bible is the best answer I can give.’’ Only a very few participants did not think world peace is possible; for example, ‘‘I don’t believe in it, only as utopia.’’ Definitions of War Sweden’s long-standing history of peace means that experience with war has generally been indirect; for example, through political involvement, media, war refugees, military service, and voluntary peacekeeping efforts abroad. It may be this limited direct experience with war that is reflected in the majority of definitions of war (69 percent), which primarily provided synonyms or dictionary types of definitions such as ‘‘armed or violent conflict between parties, countries, or groups.’’ The second largest category of war definitions (12 percent) focused on the adverse consequences of war; for example, ‘‘Affects innocents in terms of physical injuries or decreased possibilities to live normally and eat and work and travel’’ and ‘‘A conflict in a downward spiral with destructive and long lasting consequences.’’ Approximately 5 percent of participants referred to the causes of war, most notably religion or a quest for power, as reflected in the following statements: ‘‘Conflict frequently caused by need for power or religion’’ and ‘‘Armed conflict between different groups with political or religious influences or motives.’’ A few participants provided vivid imagery or more emotional responses, such as ‘‘Blood, death, poverty’’ and ‘‘Unfair, abuse of power, violence, blood, terror, weapons, slaughter of humans.’’ One participant stated that war is ‘‘A state of anarchy, when the dialogue goes silent violence takes over,’’ and another participant simply said that war is ‘‘Incredibly unnecessary!’’ The Right to Invade Another Country Over 70 percent of the sample disagreed with the statement that one country sometimes has the right to invade another country. Their qualitative responses indicated support of the right only if an invasion is for humanitarian reasons (53 percent) or used as a defensive strategy (11 percent). Humanitarian justifications included occupation of a

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country by a third party, violation of human rights in a country, and specific requests for outside assistance, especially when sanctioned by international law or international nongovernmental organizations; for example, ‘‘If for example a dictatorship obviously violates its people, other countries cannot simply stand by and watch what happens’’; ‘‘According to international law or to observe humanitarian interventions (that exist in reality, not as an excuse)’’; and ‘‘If a country threatens the freedom of one’s own or another country’s people, as described by the UN conventions. It should always go through the UN.’’ One participant said invasion might be justified ‘‘If all diplomatic options have been exhausted and the provocations are so severe that the country’s own population is threatened. The invasion should in that case be executed with a time limit and with well-defined goals.’’ Responses indicating the potential justifiability of invasion depends on the circumstances generally referred to specific conflicts, including ‘‘If for example Syria stated they were planning a nuclear attack against Israel, I think Israel would have the right to invade Syria’’; ‘‘I think it was justified to invade Iraq when Iraq invaded Kuwait’’; ‘‘All countries should have their sovereignty, but for example what happened in Cambodia and now in Burma makes one think’’; and ‘‘In principle it can never be acceptable, but there are extreme cases where a country’s existence is on the line because of the threat of attack, for example Israel’s attack on its neighboring countries in 1967. USA’s war in Iraq does not fulfill that criterion.’’ Identification of specific circumstances under which invasion may be justifiable may reflect Sweden’s increasingly active foreign policy, involvement in international organizations, and interventions in other countries. Participants who said governments do not have a right to invade either did not provide a rationale (19 percent), made references to a state’s sovereignty (5 percent), or fell into an ‘‘Other’’ category (12 percent). The largest group of those who disagreed made simple statements such as ‘‘It is never right to invade another country without reason’’ and ‘‘Of course not.’’ A few participants argued that invasion is a violation of a country’s sovereignty; for example, ‘‘Every country has the right to be its own ruler and to be independent as well as solve its own conflicts’’ and ‘‘No country has the right to force its way into another country.’’ The sense that countries should ‘‘mind their own business,’’ particularly as it relates to invasion of other countries, seems consistent with Sweden’s traditional neutrality. Responses from the ‘‘Other’’ category mostly referred to better alternatives, posed rhetorical questions, or expressed ambivalence; for example, ‘‘Yes and no—sometimes an outside force is needed in order to get something done. Sometimes an outside force can do more damage than existed in the first place.’’

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Definitions of Terrorism When the participants defined terrorism, the largest group focused on the intent of terrorism (53 percent) followed by value judgments (11 percent), causes/conditions that give rise to terrorism (9 percent), motivation or emotions behind terrorism (4 percent), outcomes (4 percent), behaviors (4 percent), or indicated ‘‘don’t know/other’’ (15 percent). Those who focused on intent generally defined terrorism as a way of gaining power by instilling fear in people. One participant described terrorism as ‘‘A way to get people to feel insecure and scared, a way to ‘exercise war’ in an ugly and unethical manner.’’ Another response likened terrorism to torture ‘‘When you instill fear in a group of people with the purpose of holding them back, [it is] like torture but on a larger scale—one maybe does not want the information but power of some sort.’’ A smaller number of responses focused on the motivation or emotions behind terrorism; for example: ‘‘People who are dissatisfied with the state of the world and cross the line in order to get attention’’ and ‘‘Small, brainwashed idiots who feel bad and instead of getting help they make sure millions of people also feel badly.’’ Comments focusing on the outcome of terrorism included ‘‘A method where a group’s or a state’s actions lead to the killing of innocent civilians in order to achieve some goal’’ and ‘‘When someone or a group repeatedly acts in ways that bothers other parties.’’ Several responses indicated that terrorism is used by countries or groups that are in a weakened position either economically or militarily; for example, ‘‘The army of the poor man’’; ‘‘Warfare without the budget of the U.S. attempts to change the world with little resources’’; ‘‘To fight from an inferior position as the only possibility.’’ Responses that fell into the ‘‘other/do not know’’ category included ‘‘I think the expression is used very vaguely and mostly used to blacklist groups who are hostile towards their governments’’ and ‘‘Them bad, us good!?’’ Killing Innocent Civilians to Fight Terrorism The majority of participants disagreed (65 percent) that the heads of a government sometimes have the right to kill innocent civilians to fight international terrorism; 22 percent agreed at least partly, and 12 percent remained neutral in the quantitative ratings. The major categories emerging from the qualitative responses indicated that killing civilians is not a right (43 percent); is a right (22 percent); or must be qualified (18 percent); 16% of the responses fell into an unsure/other category. Approximately 10 percent of the participants made references to specific countries or conflicts in their responses.

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The majority of the qualitative responses fell into the category emphasizing that the threat of international terrorism does not justify killing innocent civilians. Some participants simply stated ‘‘It is never right to intentionally kill civilians’’ or noted that ‘‘Countries alone should not be able to do that, perhaps the UN or something like that.’’ Others elaborated more in their responses by highlighting alternative ways of fighting terrorism or addressing the roots of terrorism, as in this example, ‘‘You can solve the problem without the use of violence; it is about democratizing the world and about global equality without oppression. If all people have a good standard of living terrorism would not exist. If we Westerners stop oppressing poor countries, the foundation for terrorism will disappear.’’ Another participant stated ‘‘Because the threat of terrorism is almost non-existing, looking purely statistically, it is inevitable that the percentage of innocents would make up the larger part of ones who are killed. This is why such actions (such as the war against Afghanistan) are less desired than the actions of terrorists, which typically have a limited number of people killed.’’ Almost a fourth of the responses indicated that governments have the right to kill civilians to fight international terrorism, with most saying it should be avoided if possible and viewed as a last resort. Some noted that civilian causalities are inevitable: ‘‘Innocents can and will always be affected in conflicts. But the guiding principle can never be that unjustified violence that blindly affects innocents is allowed …’’ and ‘‘Sometimes you have to make a risk/benefit analysis and if it can prevent more people from being killed one should intervene even if you have to sacrifice a few innocents.’’ Similarly, several participants qualified the right by noting ‘‘In some extreme cases it may be justified if it leads to more people saved’’ and ‘‘It depends on whose civilians it is. Military or paramilitary goals are of course preferable, but if it can not be avoided that civilians get hurt, then ok. I have no problems being a victim if enough terrorists are killed.’’ Another participant commented on the problem related to who is deciding who the terrorists are, stating: ‘‘It [killing civilians] can possibly be justifiable if you in that way ‘save’ people from a terrorist attack. The problem is that the one who interprets what is terrorism frequently is driven by other interests.’’ The participants who made references to specific countries or conflicts most frequently referred to the U.S. invasion of Iraq and expressed strong sentiments on the topic. One participant noted ‘‘You can’t fight terrorism by killing people. That only leads to more terrorism. Countries like the U.S. are the biggest users of international terrorism … and have done enough damage already.’’ Another respondent noted that ‘‘Those who act against terrorism are the ones who started terrorism. The U.S cooperated with Saddam Hussein by installing the Taliban

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regime, tortured members of left-wing parties to death in the whole Middle East, etc. You work best against terrorism by NOT participating in terror acts such as occupying Iraq, Palestine, installing military bases around the world, placing nuclear weapons, patrolling with military ships around the world, patrolling with submarines with nuclear weapons such as Trident around the world and scaring the shit out of people—that is terrorism—not the peoples’ attempts to defend themselves that today are referred to as terrorism.’’ In general, Swedes have opposed the U.S. war in Iraq and the use of torture as a means of interrogation, practices that go against many values articulated by the Swedish sample, such as reliance on nonviolent conflict resolution strategies, respecting a country’s sovereignty, and adherence to international law. Torture The Swedish sample almost unanimously (95 percent) disagreed that the government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war. The qualitative responses asserting that torture is not a right fell into the following categories: unspecified/other (37 percent); human rights violation (17 percent); international law (12 percent); and ineffective method/better alternatives (15 percent). Among the responses rejecting a right to torture, most emphasized that it violates human rights or does not comply with international law. Examples include ‘‘Neither individuals nor states has the right to use psychological or physical violence’’; ‘‘It is never justifiable to use torture as a method. This deeply violates the person and the state can never have the right to do that’’; and ‘‘[Torture is a] violation of the Geneva Convention. On the other hand, each soldier has the responsibility to refuse such an order.’’ Some noted that torture is ineffective in achieving a desired goal or outcome; for example, ‘‘Torture has proved to be not only an inhumane but also a very imprecise and ineffective method of interrogation.’’ Arguments in favor of a right to torture (12 percent) fell into two categories: need to protect citizens/save lives (7 percent) and guilt of the torture recipient/unspecified (5 percent). Several participants believed governments have a right to torture if it serves to protect citizens or saves lives, achieves a desired goal or outcome, or if there is strong evidence of the torture recipient’s wrongdoing; for example, ‘‘If the military on very good grounds suspect a deed of a 9/11 character, and all other methods have failed, then the threat and implementation of limited violence can be allowed.’’ Another participant said that torture may be acceptable ‘‘With a goal of preventing future invasion, to gain access to the strategies of the opponent, but not for ‘enjoyment.’ However, the prisoner should have the right to be executed instead.’’ One

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participant spoke about the horrors of torture but still indicated that it may be acceptable: ‘‘Torture is awful. I don’t want to think about it. If you have that information and it can save them, that is a different situation. I hope there are few cases where it could be justified.’’ It was surprising to see even this small level of support for a governmental right to torture, given that Sweden is one of the few European countries in which torture was never legalized under any circumstances.38 The War in Iraq When participants were asked about their level of agreement with the statement: ‘‘The United States’ involvement in the Iraq war is a moral activity,’’ more than 80 percent at least partly disagreed and 70 percent strongly disagreed. The qualitative responses revealed strong feelings about the war and cast aspersions on the motives and the management of the war; for example, ‘‘[The U.S.] went to war based on a lie’’; ‘‘[The U.S.] went ahead without a UN mandate and without exhausting other options to overthrow the dictator first’’; and ‘‘I don’t consider oil to be a reason for moral justification.’’ Some participants suggested that the United States views itself as the ‘‘World police’’ or ‘‘Big brother of the world’’ and suggested that the invasion was ‘‘only about asserting power in that region and gaining control of natural resources.’’ Some said the war appeared to be a ‘‘personal vendetta.’’ One participant stated that ‘‘There are no legitimate reasons for starting the war … other than that Bush felt like starting a real war. It is about power, oil and money.’’ On the other hand, a minority of the participants condoned the U.S. invasion of Iraq, as in the following response: ‘‘I believe that the democratization of the Middle East is very important and I believe that the invasion of Iraq is an efficient way of infusing democracy into a dictatorship … it is too bad that the U.S. invasion of Iraq is tainted by torture scandals.’’ The general antipathy toward the U.S. invasion of Iraq may have a number of causes, including fundamental values about invasion, respect for international law, and rejection of torture. It is also possible that the negative attitudes are partly influenced by Sweden’s acceptance of large numbers of Iraqi refugees displaced by the war. Because Sweden is a relatively small nation, dealing with the economic, social, and political challenges of hosting large numbers of refugees has naturally heightened peoples’ awareness about the consequences of warfare and sparked debate that may have intensified people’s feelings about the war. Gender and Equality Issues in the Responses The prominence of gender and equality issues in Swedish politics and society was evident in the number of both male and female participants

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who discussed these matters in their qualitative responses. For example, some participants commented on the lack of women in positions of power and politics, suggesting that with more gender-balanced governments, decisions might be made differently with regards to conflict resolution and war. In response to whether world peace is possible, one woman noted ‘‘Not the way it looks today, perhaps if more women had power.’’ Another participant defined war as an ‘‘Illegal action perpetuated by aggressive states where the leadership is male-dominated.’’ Views on the best way to achieve security for individuals and families included ‘‘Try to improve the position of women in the world’’ and ‘‘Decrease the socioeconomic gaps in class, gender, and ethnicity in the world.’’ A female participant noted that the best way to achieve world peace is to ‘‘Alleviate poverty, improve health and education status, and provide sustainable livelihoods. Involve poor and vulnerable groups, the next generation, and women in the work toward peace.’’ Several male participants made more antagonistic remarks about men’s role in warfare and associated men with characteristics such as pride, arrogance, and immaturity. One man defined war as ‘‘A deadly game with immature men who can’t swallow their pride,’’ and another man noted ‘‘The people in power who conduct warfare are little, little boys in adult men’s bodies and it is too bad that so many innocent are affected even though they don’t have anything to do with it.’’ Yet another participant commented that the best way to achieve world peace is for ‘‘Immature men to swallow their pride and start expressing their feelings in words and not war.’’ Such views are very consistent with Sweden’s role as a world leader in regard to gender equality.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION The results of the survey revealed that the Swedish participants strongly disagreed with the propositions that any country has the right to invade another country, that governments have a right to torture prisoners in time of war or kill innocent civilians to fight terrorism, and that the U.S. involvement in the Iraq war is a moral activity. There was less consensus concerning the possibility that world peace can be achieved, and participants outlined a number of different strategies for achieving world peace. Regarding definitions of various terms, slightly more than half of the participants provided negative conceptions of ‘‘peace,’’ the majority responded with simple synonyms for ‘‘war,’’ and ‘‘terrorism’’ tended to elicit more emotional laden responses. Regarding the limitations of this study, it is important to be mindful of the limited sample size, nonrandom selection of participants, and

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lack of representativeness of the sample. The results should therefore be interpreted with caution and should not be generalized to the Swedish population as a whole. At the same time, the results offer important insights into the understanding of laypeople’s views on these issues, which is particularly valuable when the results can be compared and contrasted with those of other nationalities that have participated in the same study under the same circumstances. The results of the survey appear consistent with the experience of a people with an almost two-century-long history of neutrality and peace. The extended absence of war allowed Sweden to dedicate significant time and resources to ensure the welfare of its people and to provide humanitarian aid outside its borders. This orientation was mirrored in responses emphasizing the importance of fair distribution of resources and every person’s right to health care, education, and equality in a context of achieving and maintaining peace. The participants’ lack of direct experiences with war may have contributed to the large numbers of somewhat removed perspectives and definitions, which lacked the emotional charge that might be found in responses from countries directly affected by war. The participants were also highly educated and have had the chance to observe the world’s conflicts from the sidelines of a neutral nation. This may have influenced some of the more analytical responses or those referring to research or theoretical frameworks. Many participants also demonstrated their valuing of universal human rights and the importance of adhering to international law and UN protocol. The participants also tended to include gender and equality matters in their responses, reflecting the social and political prominence of these issues in Sweden.

Part II

North America

8

The United States: European Americans Stephen Soldz and Stephen R. Shalom

War is … ‘‘A conflict between nations (used to be) that can’t be resolved by peaceful means. Today it is generally a conflict started by someone who wishes to dominate for purposes of power, money, etc.’’ Peace is … ‘‘Utopia, where everyone agrees and loves one another.’’ The United States is the world’s strongest military power with the world’s largest economy. U.S. military expenditures are almost half of the world total, and more than that spent by the next fourteen highest spenders combined.1 Consequently, the views of its people on issues of war and peace are particularly important. Open-ended responses from European American residents of the United States allow us to explore those views and the reasoning behind them in somewhat more detail than is possible with typical public opinion surveys; responses from other ethnic and racial groups in the United States are treated in a separate chapter. Before presenting our analysis of the data, we first provide historical background on the wars of the United States, followed by what is known from other research about U.S. public opinion on questions relating to war and peace. Finally, we present our own data and offer some brief conclusions.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Continental Conflicts Throughout its more than 200-year history, the United States has had frequent involvement in wars, starting with its battles against Native

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Americans. Although battles with indigenous peoples took place within U.S. territory rather than against foreign countries, they differed little from other colonial wars. French, Spanish, and British cessions of territory on the North American continent to the United States may have conformed to then-prevailing international law, but pacifying the indigenous population required the use of continual and brutal military force. Even before the establishment of the United States, the Puritans exterminated Pequot Indians, hoping, in the Puritans’ words, to ‘‘cut off the remembrance of them from the earth.’’2 Repeatedly, in the Indian wars that raged across the continent, U.S. soldiers would proclaim as they massacred infants, ‘‘Kill the nits, and you’ll have no lice.’’3 General Sherman wrote in 1866 that ‘‘We must act with vindictive earnestness against the Sioux, even to their extermination, men, women and children.’’4 To Theodore Roosevelt, the ‘‘most ultimately righteous of all wars is a war with savages, though it is apt to be also the most terrible and inhuman,’’ but no matter, because it was ‘‘idle to apply to savages the rules of international morality which obtain between stable and cultured communities.’’5 Between 1800 and the 1890s, disease, massacres, wars, and forced relocation reduced the Indian population from 600,000 to 250,000. In other battles, U.S. armed forces were used abroad 320 times between 1798 and 2004—excluding covert actions, disaster relief, routine alliance stationing, and training exercises.6 Some armed conflicts were part of continental expansion. In the Mexican War, which then Congress member Abraham Lincoln described as ‘‘unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced,’’7 the United States took from Mexico some half a million square miles (including California and most of current-day southwestern United States). Washington paid Mexico $15 million for the forcibly seized territory, leading a U.S. newspaper to comment, ‘‘we take nothing by conquest.… Thank God.’’8 The War of 1812, partly a consequence of British interference with U.S. commerce and the impressment of U.S. sailors, was also directed at stopping British support for Indians who hindered U.S. expansion and at acquiring Canada and Florida. One other major conflict fought by the United States in North America was, of course, the Civil War, 1861–1865, the most costly war to Americans in U.S. history in terms of casualties to both sides. Although the Civil War ended slavery in the United States, that was not the initial cause for which the North fought. ‘‘My paramount object in this struggle,’’ Lincoln wrote, ‘‘is to save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy slavery.’’9 Emancipation, moreover, did not lead to freedom; by 1876, Northern and Southern elites reconciled, while African Americans were consigned by law to second-class status until the middle of the next century.

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United States Military Involvement in External Conflicts Many of the 320 U.S. uses of armed force abroad were minor operations by the marines or navy before World War II. In 1898, President William McKinley asked Congress for a declaration of war on Spain, claiming to be concerned with the well-being of the people of Cuba, as well as of U.S. commercial interests on that island.10 U.S. forces didn’t leave Cuba until they had pressured Cubans to include in their new constitution the terms of the Platt Amendment, giving the United States the permanent right to intervene in Cuba and a permanent lease to Guantanamo naval base. Moreover, the United States took Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines as colonies. The Spanish-American War lasted less than four months but resulted in the deaths of 3,289 U.S. troops (432 in combat). The Philippine-American War lasted at least three years, resulting in the deaths of 4,324 U.S. soldiers, 20,000 Filipino combatants, and several hundred thousand Filipino civilians who died from the privations of war, particularly the policy of ‘‘reconcentration’’ whereby civilians were forced into overcrowded and unsanitary stockades and everyone outside was fair game. Every person, declared U.S. General J. Franklin Bell, ‘‘should either be an active friend or be classed as an enemy.’’11 Washington justified its incursions in Latin America on the basis of two presidential declarations having no force in international law: (1) the Monroe Doctrine, issued in 1823, declaring that the ‘‘American continents … are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for further colonization by any European powers’’12 and (2) the 1904 ‘‘Roosevelt Corollary,’’ whereby President Theodore Roosevelt declared the U.S. right and intention to intervene in Western Hemisphere countries unable to keep order or pay their debts. The first three decades of the 20th century saw frequent U.S. military interventions in Latin America, with troops sometimes remaining in place for many years, among them Cuba, 1906–1909, 1917–1922; Dominican Republic, 1916–1924; Haiti, 1915–1934; Nicaragua, 1912–1925, 1926–1933; and Panama, 1903–1914. In 1917, the United States entered World War I, declaring war on Germany and Austria-Hungary. Though the United States was involved in the war for only a year and a half, nearly five million troops saw service, and the U.S. death toll exceeded that of all previous U.S. wars combined, apart from the Civil War. This war, declared President Woodrow Wilson, was a war to end all wars, a war for democracy and self-determination. However, the victors—including the United States— were allowed to keep their colonial possessions, and Wilson himself, only weakly committed to the principle of self-determination, ordered U.S. interventions in Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America, as

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well as in the Soviet Union from 1918 to 1920 as part of a coalition intent on defeating the Bolshevik revolution. U.S. interventions in Latin America provoked great hostility south of the Rio Grande, and many U.S. officials believed that U.S. economic strength could ensure control of Central America and the Caribbean without the use of troops. In 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced his Good Neighbor Policy, repealing the Roosevelt Corollary and most of the Platt Amendment with Cuba. Also that year, Secretary of State Cordell Hull signed a pledge in Montevideo affirming that no state had the right to intervene in the affairs of another, though privately he considered nonintervention ‘‘more or less wild and unreasonable.’’13 For the next three decades, U.S. interventions in Latin America were covert or economic. U.S. policies regarding other areas of the world also led to conflict. The Open Door Policy, issued in 1899, called on the major powers to refrain from establishing exclusive spheres of influence in China, allowing all to exploit it on an equal basis. By 1927, the United States had 5,670 troops ashore in China and 44 naval vessels in its waters.14 After invading Manchuria in 1931 and launching a full-scale war against China in 1937, Japan was subjected to increasingly severe economic sanctions by the United States. Japanese militarists decided that, rather than pull out of China, they would seize the resources they needed in Asia. Concluding this meant war with the United States and deciding to strike the first blow, they launched sneak attacks on U.S. bases at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines on December 7, 1941. The United States declared war on Japan the next day, and two days later Germany declared war on the United States. The United States entered the European war after it had been raging for more than two years. It was another two and a half years, though, before the United States launched, together with Britain and Canada, its D-day invasion of German-occupied France. In the interval, the Soviet Union and Germany fought the largest land battles in history; some 12 million Soviet soldiers died (and another 12 million civilians), compared to 180,000 U.S. deaths in the European theater. In May 1945, Germany surrendered. By late 1944, U.S. forces began bombing Japanese cities. In Europe, U.S. air forces had concentrated on military and economic targets; in Japan, urban areas received three quarters of the bombing tonnage, almost entirely in the form of incendiary attacks on densely populated areas.15 On March 9–10, 1945, fire-bombing raids on Tokyo killed some 100,000 people.16 On August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, and three days later another was dropped on Nagasaki. The two attacks had a combined death toll of 210,000 by the end of 1945 and 340,000 by five years later—nearly all of them civilians.17

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Many believe Japan would have surrendered soon without the atomic bombs (or perhaps after a demonstration explosion), given that a naval blockade had cut Japan off from its resources and that Soviet troops had begun cutting through the Japanese army in Manchuria. At the end of the war, the United States was the world’s dominant power. For four years, it had a monopoly on nuclear weapons. Although every other major combatant had suffered massive destruction, the United States actually emerged from the war economically stronger than when it entered. Before the war, the country had still been suffering from the Great Depression; the war provided full employment. ‘‘In terms of calories, people were generally fed better than they had been before the war, and they consumed more meat, shoes, clothing, and energy.’’18 Serious tensions among the Allies during the war were followed by a major souring of relations between Washington and Moscow after the war. The Soviet Union was determined to maintain a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, and the United States was determined to deny spheres of influence to others while maintaining its own—in Greece, the Middle East, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, as well as in Western Europe and Japan. This ‘‘Cold War’’ between the United States and the Soviet Union—in which the two principals did not directly go to war with one another—would last for 40 years. As the Soviet Union tightened its hold on Eastern Europe, in 1949 the United States organized its European allies into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for support in its fight against the ‘‘communist threat.’’ At the conclusion of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to divide Korea, a former Japanese colony, with U.S. troops occupying the country south of the 38th parallel and Soviet troops north of it. On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel in force, prompting President Harry S. Truman to order the U.S. military to come to South Korea’s defense. Truman called the intervention a ‘‘police action,’’ and hence not needing a congressional declaration of war. Some other countries contributed troops, but 90 percent of the non-Korean ‘‘UN’’ troops were American, and all essential decisions were made in Washington. By the end of September, North Korean troops had been expelled from the South and U.S.-led forces crossed the 38th parallel, claiming that the border was just ‘‘an imaginary line.’’ As U.S. forces approached the Chinese border, Chinese troops entered the conflict and pushed the UN back to the 38th parallel. Fighting continued for another two and a half years without much change in the front line; however, the U.S. Air Force leveled much of North Korea, even attacking two irrigation dams that provided water for 75 percent of the North’s food production. U.S. officials considered the use of nuclear weapons in Korea but did not use them, although

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U.S. planes ran simulated atomic bombing runs of North Korea to instill terror. When an armistice was signed in 1953, 54,000 Americans had died, along with more than 4 million Koreans and Chinese, among them 2 million North Korean civilians, 20 percent of the prewar population.19 Back in the Western Hemisphere, Fidel Castro took power in Cuba in 1959, and in 1961 the United States organized an invasion by Cuban exiles to overthrow him—the Bay of Pigs invasion. Washington directed and funded the entire operation, and U.S. pilots and frogmen were involved. The United States tried—unsuccessfully—to keep its role hidden. The invasion failed. The Kennedy administration then authorized Operation Mongoose, a covert plan of sabotage and assassination, to destabilize Cuba. In 1962, the Soviet Union placed nuclear missiles in Cuba, hoping to redress the considerable U.S. nuclear advantage. (In addition to having more than a 10:1 lead in intercontinental ballistic missiles, Washington had air bases surrounding the Soviet Union and intermediate range missiles in Turkey.) President John F. Kennedy declared a blockade of Cuba, and the world came close to all-out nuclear war before Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev backed down and agreed to remove his missiles from Cuba.20 In 1965, the Johnson administration dispatched U.S. troops to the Dominican Republic to block the return to power of the elected president, who had been deposed in a military coup. The U.S. pledge to refrain from interventions in Latin America was clearly irrelevant. In 1965, the United States also began sending combat troops to South Vietnam. The French colonial war in Indochina had ended in 1954, and the United States had moved into the South, supporting the establishment of a proAmerican dictatorship and blocking the 1956 elections, which all observers agreed would have been won by North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh, leader of Vietnam’s independence struggle. In August 1964, President Lyndon Johnson claimed the North Vietnamese had twice attacked U.S. naval vessels innocently traveling in international waters and persuaded Congress to pass a resolution authorizing him to ‘‘take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist’’ South Vietnam. In fact, one of the alleged attacks never took place, and the U.S. ships were involved in covert military operations.21 In 1965, the United States began the systematic bombing of North Vietnam and rural areas in South Vietnam where the National Liberation Front (NLF) had widespread support. U.S. troop strength went from 23,000 at the end of 1964 to 543,000 in 1969. The U.S. Air Force also dropped tremendous bomb tonnage on neighboring Laos and Cambodia, in part to cut infiltration routes into South Vietnam and to defeat leftist movements in these other countries. In January 1973, the United States and North Vietnam signed the Paris Peace Agreement, providing for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops.

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Nearly 60,000 Americans died in the war along with 2 to 4 million Vietnamese.22 Partly in response to public disillusionment, Congress passed, in 1973, the War Powers Act, which provided that the president could deploy U.S. troops for no more than 90 days without explicit congressional authorization. That same year, the draft—continuously in place since 1948—was ended and replaced with all-volunteer armed forces. Less than a decade after the Vietnam War ended, the Reagan administration sought to overthrow Nicaragua’s Sandinista government and organized, funded, armed, trained, and directed a paramilitary force, the Contras, to attack Nicaragua—activities ruled as violations of international law by the World Court in 1986.23 When Congress cut off funding for the Contras, the White House continued supporting them in secret, using money gained from selling arms to Iran and other sources. In 1983, Reagan sent U.S. troops to the small Caribbean island of Grenada, claiming U.S. medical students were in danger and that Cubans planned to turn Grenada into a Soviet base. Neither claim was true, but when the U.S. armed forces overcame the negligible opposition on an island with a population of 100,000, Reagan proudly proclaimed, ‘‘Our days of weakness are over! Our military forces are back on their feet, and standing tall.’’24 U.S. military operations around the world continued into the 1990s and beyond, including the bombing of Libya and an invasion of Panama. In August 1990, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. The U.S. rushed troops to neighboring Saudi Arabia, and the UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions demanding Iraqi withdrawal and imposing increasingly stringent sanctions on Baghdad. Resolution 678 warned Iraq that if it did not withdraw by January 15, member states were authorized to ‘‘use all necessary means’’—that is, force—to effect Iraqi withdrawal.25 On January 12, the U.S. Congress, by a narrow margin, voted to approve the use of force. Various proposals to settle the crisis peacefully—for example, a French plan that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait in return for a Security Council commitment to convene an international conference on the Palestine issue—were rejected by Washington.26 Shortly after the deadline expired, a U.S.-led coalition went to war to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Britain, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria were part of the coalition, but the more than half a million U.S. troops constituted about 75 percent of the total coalition forces. The war began with weeks of extensive bombing of military targets in Kuwait and Iraq, as well as of Iraqi infrastructure.27 Before the ground war began, Moscow announced that Iraq had agreed to a complete withdrawal, to begin 24 hours after a cease-fire and to be completed within three weeks. Washington rejected the offer and commenced the ground campaign. When fighting ended on February 28, Iraqi troops had been

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driven out of Kuwait. Saddam Hussein remained in power in Iraq, but he accepted surrender terms that included the elimination of his weapons of mass destruction programs. U.S. military personnel suffered fewer than 150 deaths from all causes. In April 1999, the United States and its NATO allies initiated 11 weeks of bombing of Serbia, because of its oppression of the ethnic Albanian minority in the Serbian province of Kosovo. Critics noted that the attack was not authorized by the UN, the human rights crisis in Kosovo followed rather than preceded NATO bombing, and that bombing from 15,000 feet may minimize NATO casualties (there were zero NATO combat deaths), but cannot prevent atrocities on the ground.28 On June 10, Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic agreed to withdraw his security forces from Kosovo and allow in UN/NATO peacekeepers. In the aftermath, ethnic Albanians in Kosovo drove out many of the province’s Serbian minority. In February 2008, Kosovo declared independence and was recognized by the United States and most European states. Military Activity in the New Century On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four planes and flew three of them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, killing some 3,000 civilians. Never before were so many U.S. civilians killed at one time apart from natural disasters. Not since the War of 1812, when British troops burned down the Capitol building, did a foreign enemy strike the U.S. homeland.29 President George W. Bush responded by declaring a global war on terror. He warned the nations of the world, ‘‘Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.’’30 He demanded that Afghanistan— ruled by the fundamentalist Taliban—turn over Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden to the U.S. The Taliban offered to turn bin Laden over to an Islamic court, but Bush dismissed these moves. On October 7, the United States began bombing Afghanistan. The Bush administration informed the UN that it was acting in self-defense, although many legal authorities argued that self-defense applies only when a country is responding to an ongoing attack. Washington did not seek explicit UN authorization or participation. Humanitarian aid groups warned that the bombing might disrupt the provision of food to millions of people dependent on outside aid, but the U.S. bombing continued.31 U.S. strategy was to avoid putting many troops on the ground, using airpower along with special forces, and paying the Northern Alliance, a group of Afghan warlords opposed to the Taliban, to do the fighting. U.S. officials warned that this war would take months, not weeks, but the Taliban fell rather quickly. Food aid was not delayed long, but between 4,000 and 20,000 Afghan civilians died from starvation and errant bombs.32 In addition,

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many Taliban prisoners of war were killed by the Northern Alliance.33 The Northern Alliance entered Kabul on November 13, 2001, and Kandahar fell on December 7. Bin Laden, however, escaped. The Bush administration then turned its sights on Iraq, claiming that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons program, and connections to Al-Qaeda . These charges were put forward as certainties by the Bush administration, though government experts viewed evidence on chemical weapons uncertain, and on nuclear weapons and the Al-Qaeda link doubtful.34 In October 2002, by a vote of 77–23 in the Senate and 296–133 in the House, Congress passed a resolution authorizing the president to use force. The UN Security Council, under pressure from the United States and its British ally, demanded that Saddam Hussein accept UN weapons inspectors. Saddam Hussein agreed; when the inspectors turned up no incriminating evidence, the Security Council refused to authorize war. Bush responded that he was giving Iraq one last chance to disarm. In the words of then National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice ‘‘we don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.’’35 U.S.-led forces (the ‘‘coalition of the willing’’) began an assault on Iraq on March 19 and quickly overwhelmed their enemy. On May 1, Bush— standing on the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln in front of a banner reading ‘‘Mission Accomplished’’—declared that major combat operations were over. It soon became apparent that there were no weapons of mass destruction or links to Al-Qaeda. Within a few months, an insurgency against U.S. occupation developed. Polls show a majority of Iraqis—Shia as well as Sunnis—oppose the presence of U.S. forces and think they provoke more conflict than they prevent.36 By late 2007, U.S. troop deaths in Iraq exceeded 3,800. The number of Iraqi civilian deaths is unknown, but estimates range from 78,000 to 85,000 (as of December 2007, based conservatively on a count of incidents reported in two or more media sources) to 655,000 (as of mid-2006, based on an epidemiological survey).37 This war is now longer than any war in U.S. history other than the Vietnam War. U.S. intelligence reports confirm that Al-Qaeda is as strong now as it was before 9/11 and that anti-American sentiment provoked by the Iraq war has enhanced terrorist recruiting.38 In Afghanistan, the Taliban has reemerged as a security threat.39 Reports on torture and mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison, Guantanamo Bay, and secret CIA prisons have only increased public distress with the war. Public Opinion Regarding U.S. Military Activity There has been some resistance to each of the major military operations undertaken by the U.S. government. During the Mexican War, prominent

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abolitionists opposed war, and there were several antiwar demonstrations by workers.40 In the Civil War, letters from soldiers suggest that—despite the views of Lincoln cited above—for those doing the fighting, slavery was the crucial issue.41 The Spanish-American War and the PhilippineAmerican War provoked a vigorous national debate between selfproclaimed ‘‘imperialists’’ who believed in acquiring an overseas empire and ‘‘anti-imperialists’’ who did not. The Imperialists carried the day, but the Anti-Imperialist League had over 30,000 members—including Mark Twain, William James, Jane Addams, and John Dewey—making it ‘‘the largest antiwar organization per capita in American history.’’42 Socialists and pacifists opposed U.S. participation in World War I. With both the major parties solidly behind the war, socialists got 20–50 percent of the vote in municipal elections in 1917.43 But opponents of the war faced severe repression, particularly with the passage of the Espionage Act, aimed more at internal dissent than at foreign spies. Although 50 members of the House of Representatives voted against entering World War I, there was only a single dissenting vote for World War II. A December 10, 1941, poll showed 96 percent of Americans approving the declaration of war, with only 2 percent opposed. The peace movement that had millions of adherents in the early 1930s ‘‘collapsed’’ after Pearl Harbor.44 Following the initial shock of Pearl Harbor, perhaps a fifth of the population had some sympathy for a negotiated settlement of the war, but there was never any substantial outspoken or organized dissent.45 By July 1944, more than 80 percent of households had purchased war bonds.46 Some criticized the conduct of the war, especially the saturation bombing of enemy cities, but these voices were a distinct minority. On the other hand, 13 percent of respondents to a December 1944 poll said they wanted to ‘‘kill all Japanese’’ at the end of the war; more than one out of five in December 1945 wished the United States had had the opportunity to use ‘‘many more’’ atomic bombs ‘‘before Japan had a chance to surrender.’’47 A few years later, the Korean War had strong support in its initial months, but this dropped off considerably by December 1950—after U.S. troops had crossed into North Korea and China entered the war.48 Unlike World War II and the Korean War, which had well-defined starting points, the Vietnam War evolved from covert and low-level involvement to full-scale war. Public support grew in 1965—the rallyround-the-flag effect as U.S. combat troops were deployed—but headed downward from 1966 on. By late 1967, more people agreed than disagreed that it was a mistake to have entered the war. By early 1971, a majority of respondents favored withdrawal from Vietnam (which didn’t happen for another two years).49 Opponents of the war were more likely to be female, nonwhite, and (contrary to impressions) older and less well-educated.50

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Historically, the American public has been willing to sacrifice more lives to stop aggression than to intervene in a civil war.51 But here information matters. The government and/or the media have often misled the public as to the facts behind a war, and often the truth only comes out over time, which is one reason why short interventions are likely to have higher approval ratings. More than a year after the beginning of the Iraq war—54 percent of the American population believed that Saddam Hussein either had weapons of mass destruction or major weapons programs and 50 percent believed that Saddam Hussein substantially supported Al-Qaeda (with 15 percent believing he was directly involved in 9/11).52 This fact suggests that misinformation is a real concern in assessing public opinion. The Gulf War of 1991 was a case where question wording showed an effect on judgments of public opinion. On the one hand, in midNovember 1990, a 2:1 majority seemed supportive of using force against Iraq; on the other hand, a more than 2:1 majority favored giving sanctions more time to work.53 Once the war began, it was backed by four-fifths of the public. By contrast, public opinion during the threemonth-long bombing of Kosovo in 1999 was quite volatile. Generally a small majority supported the bombing and, when air war alone appeared not to be leading to victory, there was a small majority as well for using ground troops, with various polls showing different sensitivity to casualties. In general, Republicans were more opposed to the war than Democrats. Conservative critics tended to argue that the United States had no interests in Kosovo; leftist critics were skeptical of the Clinton administration’s humanitarian claims.54 Contemporary Perspectives on Invasion Following the September 11 attacks, an overwhelming majority of the U.S. public favored military action to deal with the perpetrators—with approval levels unseen since World War II.55 There was also support for a broad war on terror rather than just on those responsible for 9/11, but this support diminished if it was not part of a multilateral effort.56 In the fall of 2002, the Bush administration began to push for war with Iraq, mounting an intensive public relations campaign, highlighted in February 2003 with a dramatic presentation at the UN Security Council by Secretary of State Colin Powell. The U.S. media by and large supported the administration’s position. Powell’s key claims were later shown to be false,57 and the prestigious New York Times later issued a mea culpa for its journalistic failures.58 During the fall and winter, a mass antiwar movement developed, culminating on February 15, 2003, in what may have been the largest antiwar demonstrations in the

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nation’s history. There were also protests of unprecedented scale across the globe, leading the New York Times to comment that there were two superpowers on the planet: the U.S. government and world public opinion.59 Despite the fact that administration misinformation was widely believed, some polls showed that there was not majority sentiment for the United States going to war without international sanction, a position the public held until the first bombs fell.60 When the war began, 54 percent of the population said they agreed with President Bush’s decision to initiate hostilities; another 21 percent said they disagreed but still supported the president. Two to one, the public believed care should be taken to avoid harming Iraqi civilians even if this would lengthen the war.61 For the next two months, support for the war remained strong, but as evidence of weapons of mass destruction failed to materialize and the apparently quick victory gave way to insurgency, negative opinions grew. Asked whether the decision to go to war was the right decision, the percentage answering yes fell from 63 percent in July 2003 to 46 percent in August 2004; those answering no rose from 32 to 49 percent over this same period.62 By March 2006, those who thought the government made the right decision was down to 44 percent, whereas those who thought it was the wrong decision had grown to 54 percent.63

RESPONSES TO OUR PERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO AGGRESSION SURVEY To examine the attitudes of U.S. citizens regarding war and peace, we analyzed the responses of 164 individuals (53 percent female, 47 percent male) to the PAIRTAPS questionnaire. These respondents ranged in age from 18 to 75 with some bias toward those in the age group from 19 to 30 (18–30: 39 percent; 31–50: 36 percent; >50: 25 percent). Nineteen percent had only a high school education, 19 percent some college, 29 percent a college degree, and 32 percent had at least some graduate education. Regarding self-identified social class, the sample was skewed toward the upper end, with 10.4 percent identifying themselves as working class, 82 percent as middle or upper middle, and 7.3 percent upper class. Thirty-four percent were Catholic, 23 percent Protestant, 5 percent Jewish, 28 percent atheist or agnostic, and 10 percent other. Perspectives on Governmental Aggression European American responses to the PAIRTAPS suggest that U.S. citizens of European origin have a rather conflicted and romanticized view

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of the role of warfare in the modern world. It is not surprising that our participants appeared to view issues of war and peace through the lens of the current Iraq war and the struggle against anti-American Islamic terrorism that the Bush administration called the ‘‘Global War on Terrorism.’’ Not only were there many references to terrorism, the Bush administration, and the Iraq war, but respondents’ answers to the PAIRTAPS items seemed to reflect current concerns. For example, respondents demonstrated a strong concern for national security in their answers to the question: ‘‘National security is essential for family and individual security.’’ The most common response, perhaps reflecting the recent emphasis of American governments on national security, strongly linked national security with personal security (29 percent), as in ‘‘If we cannot protect our country, we cannot protect ourselves.’’ Many seemed to be seeking a feeling of total safety (16 percent): ‘‘We need to be free of worry of attacks;’’ ‘‘When the USA and my state is safe, I feel safer and less concerned over terrorism.’’ A difficulty with this desire is that attention given to the existence of a danger and the concomitant need for security may decrease rather than increase the sense of safety. A few people (13 percent) expressed reservations about the focus on national security; for example, ‘‘It could help, but is not always essential.’’ Several (4 percent) were concerned that national security was being used to manipulate people. ‘‘I think the cause of national security is currently being used and is not giving us as individuals greater security.’’ Others (9 percent), while agreeing with a need for national security, expressed skepticism, as in ‘‘Security as in ‘aiding those in need’ is vital. Security as in ‘pre-emptive war’ and other acts of aggression is unacceptable.’’ In regard to the item ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country,’’ the vast majority of respondents (63 percent) expressed support. The most common explanations involved responding to a threat (17 percent) and protecting against human rights violations (26 percent), both of which were offered at various times by the U.S. government as justifications of the US/‘‘Coalition’’ invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. A few respondents even made the link to the Iraq war clear through references as in ‘‘If a nation is harming other nations with violence and 18þ resolutions have been ignored then it is necessary to remove that government.’’ Others (17 percent) made a link to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, seeing an invasion as a way to potentially avoid future terrorist attacks, as in ‘‘If it is to protect other countries/ world against events such as 9/11, then I believe one country has the right to invade another.’’ One respondent implied that this right had been misused by his government. ‘‘In cases where there is a clear and present danger to the welfare of a country’s citizens, invasion of another

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country may be necessary. If, after the fact, it is learned that the leaders who made the decision to invade another country did so under false pretenses, they should be held accountable by their citizenship (see the Iraq war).’’ Another common response (26 percent) characterized invasion as a right when undertaken to protect the rights of citizens of the invaded country; for example, ‘‘to stop genocide’’ or ‘‘only in the case of severe crimes against humanity and rescuing the victims of abuse.’’ By adding a qualification concerning the importance of international consensus, some advocates of human rights rationales took positions construable as critical of the Bush U.S. administration. ‘‘If proven that violent human rights abuses are taking place and immediate military action is the last option available and all countries’ citizens are in agreement.’’ A set of less common arguments (12 percent) supported the right to invade as a response to attack or as a last resort. Only a few (15 percent) ruled out a right to invade under any circumstances. Given that there has been some restricted and cautious reference in the media to the possibility that the Bush administration violated international law by invading Iraq, it is notable that a substantial majority of our respondents disagreed with the statement ‘‘Sometimes a government has the right to ignore international treaties or international human rights agreements.’’ The two most frequent response categories of these responses were an undifferentiated rejection such as ‘‘absolutely not’’ or ‘‘never,’’ or, more commonly, a reference to the importance of keeping agreements and ‘‘contracts,’’ or keeping one’s word, combined in some instances with an emphasis on the importance of rules in controlling the potential chaos of international relations, as in ‘‘the rules are a contract and without them we have terrorism.’’ A smaller number of respondents mentioned a need to regulate international relations, with lesser attention to the sanctity of agreements. ‘‘What is the point of joining and making a treaty if you are just not going to follow it? They are made to keep order in the world.’’ Other respondents emphasized the importance of international agreements for the protection of human rights ‘‘Without treaties and human rights agreements being followed there is oppression and injustice.’’ A sizeable minority, however, agreed that sometimes treaties and/or human rights agreements can be ignored. The largest categories of responses of this type emphasized that this practice should occur only in extreme situations. ‘‘I guess there could be a scenario in which an offending nation with whom our nation has a treaty gets so awful in its offenses that morally we need to break our treaty with them and kick their ass into shape.’’ Although many respondents viewed treaties and human rights agreements as important for the preservation of human

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rights, a few, in contrast, viewed the violation of treaties as a mechanism to protect human rights (‘‘can ignore treaties should they significantly harm their citizens’’). Other reasons for voiding treaties and agreements were violations by other countries (‘‘If the country is violating its treaties or human rights agreements’’) and in support of the national interest (‘‘We have to do whatever it takes to stay a safe and free USA’’). In response to the item ‘‘Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism,’’ most respondents disagreed with this proposition in very generalized terms (60 percent disagreed, 32 percent disagreed in general terms; for example, ‘‘This should not happen.’’ Several respondents (6 percent) equated such killing with terrorism. ‘‘Killing innocent civilians is completely unnecessary, and in fact seems like its own brand of terrorism.’’ These examples indicate the extent to which the language of ‘‘terrorism’’ and the struggle against it has come to permeate American thinking on war, peace, and human rights. A minority of respondents agreed that governments fighting terrorism sometimes have the right to kill innocents. Twenty-six percent of the arguments focused on the nonintentionality of civilian losses. ‘‘In war, ‘accidents’ happen. There’s a difference between an accidental killing and a purposeful intention to murder.’’ Others viewed such deaths as the expected ‘‘collateral damage’’ from antiterrorism actions. ‘‘Not the right to kill them, but if a civilian is in the area of known terrorists, they are taking chances by being there’’ or as an inevitable correlate of war. ‘‘I don’t think that innocent civilians should be killed to fight terrorism, but unfortunately it will happen; no combat plan can be flawless enough to attack only the ‘bad guys.’’’ A few people (9 percent) said killing a few innocents may be justified if it would save the lives of many. ‘‘There are situations when you’d have to kill 100 to save a million.’’ Opinions on Torture A poll conducted shortly after 9/11 found that 32 percent of Americans supported the use of government-sanctioned torture.64 Accounts of events at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, as well as reports of renditions of suspects to foreign countries known to engage in systematic torture, brought the treatment of detainees into the public spotlight. A July 2004 poll found that substantial majorities supported applying rights provided in international law to detainees (access to the Red Cross, 92 percent; right to a hearing, 81 percent; right to communicate one’s whereabouts to a member of one’s family, 77 percent). Sixty-six percent opposed the use of physical torture, 55 percent opposed mental torture (e.g., making detainees think they or a family member were going to be

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killed), and 52 percent opposed humiliating treatment.65 A poll late in 2004 found 51 percent saying torture was rarely or never justified, whereas 45 percent said it was often or sometimes justified.66 A 2006 poll found that 57 percent of respondents opposed renditions (37 percent supported them). According to those respondents, detainees were entitled to a hearing (84 percent), the right not to be tortured (79 percent), and the right not to be threatened with torture (63 percent). When the same question was asked regarding ‘‘terrorism suspects’’ instead of detainees in general, the corresponding figures were 73 percent, 75 percent, and 57 percent.67 Compared to Europe, U.S. opposition to the use of torture is less robust.68 In the responses of our European American sample to the PAIRTAPS item ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in a time of war,’’ a large majority of respondents rejected this right. The most frequent type of response provided no explanatory argument; for example, ‘‘Torture should never be used even if the prisoner is hiding information.’’ The most common reason for rejecting torture was an appeal to morality, as in ‘‘Torture confessions are evil.’’ Small numbers of respondents expressed each of the following reasons for opposing the right to torture: an appeal to the humanity of those tortured (e.g., ‘‘Absolutely not. These are people of another country who are fighting for their own beliefs’’); a claim that torture doesn’t work (‘‘Torture confessions … [elicit] poor information’’); an appeal to international law (‘‘During a time when a clear declaration of war has been made, I think the ideals of the Geneva Convention need to be adhered to’’); and the idea that rejecting torture protects our troops (‘‘If we complain about the abuse of our POWs, we have no right to abuse those of our [adversaries]’’). Of those supporting a governmental right to have recourse to torture, the two most common reasons were that torture is acceptable as a means to obtain information or as a last resort, often referring to a ‘‘ticking time bomb’’ scenario, as in popular movies and on television (e.g., ‘‘The government can torture prisoners during war time if those prisoners are suspected of knowing information that will aid the war effort. They should not be tortured just because they are prisoners of war.’’ An example of the last resort argument is ‘‘In extreme situations to get information that will prevent future deaths of innocent civilians.’’ Other reasons for endorsing this right included to protect the safety of others (e.g., ‘‘If they have information that could save other lives, torture the hell out of them.’’ or ‘‘If the safety of its own country is at stake, then the government must put its own people before the prisoners.’’) or its appropriateness as a response to the character of the tortured (‘‘A POW has rights and shouldn’t be tortured [WWII]. A prisoner who is a member of a terrorist cell does not.’’ Or ‘‘If they tortured, they should be tortured.’’).

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Perspectives on Peace When asked to define peace, the majority of respondents (53 percent) provided ‘‘negative definitions’’ saying, for example, that peace is ‘‘no more war,’’ ‘‘no hostility between countries,’’ or ‘‘lack of fear in the present or for the future.’’ A total of 6 percent of the responses defined peace as an ideal, or unattainable, or something to strive for. Excluding the responses that did not address the question, the remaining responses (a total of 41 percent) defined peace positively, pointing to the presence of some characteristic of a state of peace. Twelve percent defined peace as a positive state of well-being; for example, ‘‘when everyone is happy with the way things are going.’’ A little over 20 percent described peace as a social relationship, pointing to concepts like cooperation, equality, understanding, and respect (e.g., ‘‘mutual coexistence and respect’’). In the PAIRTAPS, three questions explored people’s attitudes toward peace. One asked about the right to peace, another whether peace can be achieved, and a third explored people’s attitudes toward peace protests. Over half of respondents (61 percent) expressed strong agreement that ‘‘all human beings have a basic right to peace,’’ seeing it as ‘‘a fundamental human right.’’ Some (17 percent) felt it was a worthy ideal, whereas others felt that people deserve or should have peace. ‘‘That’s just the way it should be.’’ In contrast, some 11 percent indicated that peace was not a right because it wasn’t realistic as in ‘‘I don’t really think that’s true at all, because what all human beings want is not the same and some groups will always be in conflict.’’ Nine percent said the right was conditional; for example, ‘‘If you show you are a reasonable human being.’’ Although a majority of respondents agreed that people have a right to peace, most were rather skeptical that peace could be attained. Thus, in response to the question ‘‘I believe world peace can be achieved,’’ most people disagreed. Of those who provided an explanation, the reasoning always focused on the omnipresence of conflict. The largest group among those disagreeing emphasized conflict arising from the diversity of beliefs, opinions, or interests, as in ‘‘With so many different characters, religions, personalities, etc. in this world, I’m not sure that we can ever just live in peace.’’ Another group focused on the inevitability of conflict and, in several instances, upon the unwillingness of people to compromise. ‘‘The reality is that disagreements will always flare up and … not all disagreements will be addressed productively and responsibly’’ or ‘‘There are those who will never be willing to sit down to have the conversations necessary to bring about peace.’’ Fewer people justified their skepticism by reference to human nature (‘‘Until human nature changes and man no longer wants what another has, I don’t think it can

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happen’’) or to the prevalence of hate and violence, as in ‘‘Too many people are far too violent and mean to other human beings.’’ A few respondents endorsed the belief that world peace could be achieved, mostly for nonspecific reasons and more as a wish than a justification of their belief: ‘‘It may take a long time but world peace can be achieved.’’ Or ‘‘I’m ever hopeful that one day we will use our intellect and collective compassion to resolve our differences.’’ A few others emphasized that, although peace will come, it will not be soon, as in ‘‘Not likely in my lifetime. However, the end to hostilities between such long-term enemies as France and Germany, Germany and Russia, etc., combined with the increasingly obvious economic drain resulting from warfare makes me think that in my children’s or grandchildren’s generation a general peace is very possible.’’ In response to the item ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace,’’ responses could be broadly divided into those that affirmed this right (41 percent) and those that placed qualifiers upon the right (59 percent). Responses affirming the right to protest fell into two main subtypes—generally affirming the right (32 percent), particularly as a form of freedom of expression and portraying protest as a civic responsibility (8 percent). Some supporters of protest as a civic responsibility (8 percent) viewed it as an important method of exerting influence on bad governments. ‘‘It’s the only way selfaggrandizing governments can be prevented from further bloodshed’’ or ‘‘It’s the only way to get idiots out of office and out of our hair.’’ Among those qualifying the right, the largest number (33 percent) viewed it as granted in certain, generally ‘‘democratic,’’ societies. ‘‘We all have the right to contribute to society and government through dissent (mostly, at least in the U.S.)’’ Several responses (17 percent) qualified this right, indicating that protest should be nonviolent—raising, implicitly, the question of how far societies should go in tolerating ‘‘violent’’ protest. ‘‘As long as the protests are controlled and nonviolent, they are acceptable.’’ Some responses (9 percent) qualified the right to protest with a concern for consequences, as in ‘‘As long as they do not hurt other people or their property.’’ For several of these respondents, the qualifier had to do with possible effects on fighting troops: ‘‘They should have the right but should understand that disunity and lowered troop morale are consequences.’’

CONCLUSION For many countries, a major deterrent to engaging in war, especially wars of choice, is the terrible harm and destruction that one’s own

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people and society are likely to suffer. The United States has been involved in many wars throughout its history, but most of these have been wars of choice against far weaker adversaries, where the expectation of serious loss has been minimal. Moreover, given the great wealth of the United States, minor military engagements can be pursued with little noticeable financial cost. Of course, U.S. wars have not always been cost-free. During the Vietnam War, Lyndon Johnson hoped to give the American people ‘‘guns and butter,’’ but was ultimately unable to do so; U.S. planners predicted that the 2003 Iraq war would pay for itself, but current estimates of the cost are in the trillions of dollars.69 Finally, from the Mexican War through World War II, the United States never lost a war, thereby creating a ‘‘victory culture’’ reducing the reluctance of Americans to go to war.70 From our current survey data, we see that white non-Hispanic Americans have mixed views on questions of war and peace. On both sides of the divide—hawks and doves—many respondents offered opinions with little explanation, but a significant minority gave reasons indicating efforts to define criteria for a war being just. As with the body of literature called ‘‘Just War theory,’’71 there is no consensus on the criteria, nor does agreement on the criteria guarantee agreement on their application. Nevertheless, common notions from Just War theory—such as selfdefense, humanitarian purpose, proportionality, last resort, and legitimate means—find expression in our respondents, though obviously, given the circumstances of a survey, in very schematic form. For example, respondents grappled with the question of whether intent matters in judging the killing of civilians, a debate that engages Just War theorists.72 On the issue of the justifiability of torture, some of the responses were simplified versions of arguments—pro and con—advanced by contemporary analysts: the ticking time bomb argument, the unreliability of information gained by torture, and the need to prevent similar treatment of our troops.73 However, the most common responses on both sides did not reflect these sorts of arguments. Among those who opposed the right to torture, there were few articulated arguments advanced. Some respondents indicated that torture was immoral, but they gave no further argument, which may make it difficult for these individuals to win over others to their view. The consequentialist claims frequently made by antitorture advocates in the public sphere—that torture doesn’t work, that use of torture by U.S. forces endangers captured U.S. troops, or that torture is bad for the American image and its influence—were decidedly minority views. Similarly, although much of the public discourse supportive of abusive techniques that are tantamount to torture reflect the so-called ‘‘ticking time bomb’’ scenario or other extreme situations, the majority

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of our respondents who supported a right to torture in some situations had a low threshold for use; torture was permissible whenever it might yield useful information or protect people. For these respondents, torture appeared to pose no real ethical issues, only pragmatic ones. Public debate in this area is likely to be difficult because the two sides seem to be coming from different moral universes and using what could be described as distinct languages. Our respondents overwhelmingly endorsed the importance of ‘‘national security,’’ with many viewing it as the basis for personal and family security. Yet responses seemed to reflect an idealized view that total security was, indeed, achievable. Such a view has potentially negative consequences if it leads people to support aggressive military efforts to control as much of the environment as possible. (The alternative view—that life inevitably contains an element of insecurity and danger—might also lead to problems when taken to an extreme, if it encourages risk-taking behavior as a consequence of the perceived precariousness of life.) Respondents overwhelmingly endorsed a belief in a basic right to peace. Yet, the most common responses did not really provide a justification for this right. At the same time, most respondents did not believe that world peace could be achieved, because of the prevalence of intergroup differences and conflicts. Most of those stating that world peace was possible gave no argument or reason for their belief. Thus, the attitudes expressed by these respondents suggest a longing for some state of peace that few believe is possible, and those believing in its possibility did not offer any explicit reasons for their belief.

9

The United States: Ethnic Minorities Denise A. Hines and Tanvi Zaveri

War … ‘‘helps the rich get richer’’ (Asian American male, 19). Peace is … ‘‘where all beings have an equal standing in society’’ (black American male, 22). The previous chapter presented perspectives on war and peace in European Americans, whose experiences differ substantially from those of ethnic minorities. European Americans immigrated to and colonized the United States. Native Americans were killed and colonized. Many majority group members came to the United States for freedom; African Americans were brought in chains for the system of slavery, which persisted for over 100 years. The majority community pushed through frontiers and claimed lands inhabited by Spanish-speaking peoples, displacing and killing many Spanish Americans. Many members of the majority culture have established deep cultural roots in the United States; in immigrant communities, many first- or second-generation Americans blend their ethnic and American cultures. Although the United States has long been considered a melting pot for diverse peoples, some immigrant groups have fared much better than others and than the native people who preceded them. In this chapter, we present views on war and peace from 258 participants from diverse ethnic minority groups in the United States who completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) and self-identified their ethnicity. Although all participants were born in the United States, many of their parents emigrated from different countries. Based on degree of acculturation

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and whether they are relatively new immigrants or descendents of ancestors who have lived in this country for generations, participants’ perspectives may vary considerably, both among and within ethnic groups. The sample consisted of 14 Native Americans; 40 African Americans, with parents primarily from the United States, but also from Haiti, Jamaica, Antigua, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Ghana; 42 Hispanic Americans, with parents from Mexico, Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and Colombia; 51 South Asian Americans, with parents mostly from India, but also from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Burma; 35 Southeast Asian Americans, with parents from the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Laos; 52 East Asian Americans, with parents from China, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan; and 24 Middle Eastern Americans, with parents from Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Israel, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. To understand such diverse American perspectives, we first provide a summary of the cultural and historical experiences of each ethnic minority group and then discuss trends in participants’ responses regarding war and peace.

CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXTS OF DIVERSE MINORITY GROUPS Native American Indians According to Census 2000, there are approximately 2.5 million Native American Indians and Alaska Natives in the United States.1 Although the hundreds of Native communities and tribes are culturally heterogeneous, they tend to share extreme poverty and its antecedents and consequences. The antecedents flow from oppression at the hands of Western Europeans when they invaded and settled America, forced Native Americans off their ancestral lands, restricted their means of obtaining food, shelter, and clothing, imposed their own forms of government, mandated the education of native children in white schools, and destroyed native languages and religions.2 An inability to escape abject poverty has led to Native Americans experiencing the highest rates of mental disorders, alcoholism, crime, and delinquency of all the ethnic communities in the United States.3,4,5,6 These antecedents and consequences of poverty continue to have repercussions today and are essential contributors to the worldviews of Native Americans. Despite their long history of domination and hardship, Native communities have displayed familial, cultural, and tribal strengths that have allowed them to survive centuries of European domination. Native communities are known especially for their sense of community, conscience, and

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commitment to the survival of the tribe, rather than to success of the individual.7 They share values of humility, cooperation, and noncompetition; a history of deep spirituality, rituals, and strict religious practices; and a belief in living in harmony with all of creation.8 Consistent with the historical emphasis on community and sharing, interdependence of the sexes was traditionally considered necessary for survival of the tribe. Prior to European domination, women sometimes assumed a stereotypically male role (e.g., positions as rulers, healers, and spiritual leaders) and often contributed to tribal decision making. European domination changed such practices. For example, when U.S. federal authorities negotiated treaties with Native American Indians, they would do so only with the men, weakening the status of Native American women within their tribes.9 Despite harsh treatment from the U.S. government, Native Americans have often served proudly in the U.S. military. Their participation dates back to the 17th century, although, like other minority groups in the military at that time, they served in segregated units. They were drafted during World War I, though not considered to be U.S. citizens, and made significant service contributions during World War II (e.g., in breaking enemy codes). Despite exemplary military service, Natives report experiencing discrimination and derogation in the armed forces, such as being passed over for promotions.10 They tend to join the military at rates comparable to their representation in the United States;11 however, they seem to have greater exposure to combat and war atrocities than other groups and suffer higher rates of posttraumatic stress due to combat exposure. Military service provides educational and occupational opportunities unobtainable within their own communities or reservations; moreover, military service is revered in their communities, and they have a sense of pride in their service.12 African Americans According to Census 2000, approximately 35.5 million Americans (13 percent of the country’s population) identified themselves as at least part African American. Although a substantial percentage of African Americans are descendents of slaves, a significant portion descended from black freedmen. In addition, the black population includes many 20th-century immigrants. Of the 6.7 million families in the United States living below the poverty level in 2000, 2 million were black (22 percent of the black population) and 3 million were whites (6 percent of the white population).13 Over 200 years of legalized slavery in the United States had profound and lasting negative effects on American society. Black men, women,

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and children brought to this country in chains under incredibly inhumane conditions were further dehumanized, brutalized, and terrorized by white masters, who controlled them with severe beatings, amputation of limbs, and violent deaths.14 This brutal treatment did not cease with the Emancipation Proclamation or the end of the Civil War. Lynching and violent intimidation were acceptable practices in the South into the early 1960s. African Americans were denied political rights, given subordinate social status, and denied economic control.15 Legalized discrimination in public accommodations (e.g., drinking fountains, restrooms, and hotels) was widespread until the 1964 Civil Rights Act.16 The civil rights movement succeeded in overthrowing the ‘‘Southern Jim Crow regime,’’ perhaps due to major grassroots involvement and nonviolent actions, including church organizations, student protests, boycott movements, and marches.17 Although there were many active organizers of the civil rights movement, minister Martin Luther King Jr. is considered the key charismatic leader.18 Cultural beliefs emphasizing the value of children and extended family, a strong role for women, loyalty to the community, and a strong religious faith sustained African Americans through slavery and the sustained racism of the postslavery era. Analogous to Native American women prior to European domination, African women had separate but cooperative and interdependent roles with men and controlled their own resources, property, and activities.19 In comparison to Caucasian, Hispanic, and Asian Americans, African Americans today exhibit more egalitarian gender roles and place less emphasis on patriarchal values.20 African Americans serve in the military and tend to reenlist at higher rates than members of other racial groups, perhaps in part because the military has been a place where they can achieve relative equality.21,22 During the Persian Gulf War, 25 percent of military personnel were black, though blacks made up only 12 percent of the population at that time.23 Although race relations within the military were strained and sometimes violent during the Civil Rights and Vietnam eras, a 1975 revision of the Army Affirmative Action Plan mandated that blacks be provided with a climate of racial impartiality and equal opportunity within the military and that military leaders were accountable for the quality of race relations within their units.24 Thus, in the military, blacks achieved a level of equality not possible in the civilian sector and gained access to educational and occupational opportunities otherwise unavailable.25 Latino and Hispanic Americans The United States has 35.3 million Latinos, the fifth largest such population in the world and the fastest growing minority group in the United

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States. Although the U.S. Hispanic population is mostly urbanized and poor, there is great variation across Hispanic communities. Overall, Puerto Ricans, who tend to be the darkest skinned Latino group, have the lowest standard of living, and Cubans, the whitest group, have the highest, with Mexicans and Central and South Americans falling between these two groups.26 Since the time of the European conquest of Latin America, there has been an implicit assumption that being white meant power, privilege, and conquest, whereas being dark implied being conquered, dominated, and intellectually inferior,27 perhaps one reason why Puerto Ricans are the poorest of the major Latino groups in the United States28 and Cubans are the most advantaged. The original group of Mexican Americans were residents of Texas when, in 1845, it was annexed by the United States in the MexicanAmerican War. Although Mexicans have lived in the United States for more than 150 years, they have relatively little economic or political power,29 have been victims of widespread political and economic discrimination, and are encouraged to come to this country when menial jobs are available, yet treated harshly when unemployment rates are high. Puerto Ricans experienced an even more tumultuous history. The United States acquired the territory of Puerto Rico by invading and annexing this Spanish colony in 1898 during the Spanish-American War. In 1917, the U.S. government granted Puerto Ricans full American citizenship; therefore, they are not immigrants.30 Although some Puerto Ricans approve of the U.S. involvement in their political affairs, others, angry about the federal government’s exploitation and colonialism, want full independence (or at least statehood) for the island.31 In comparison to Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, Cubans have had better experiences within the United States. Migration began between 1959 and 1965 to Miami, Florida, when the first wave of Cubans fleeing Castro’s regime arrived. They were received favorably and given resources because they had valued qualities including money, education, white skin, entrepreneurial skills, and an anticommunist, anti-Castro ideology. Even though Latinos are immigrating to the United States at increasing rates, they are underrepresented in the U.S. military.32 Although they comprise 18 percent of the civilian 18- to 24-year-old population, they comprised only 13 percent of military recruits in 2004.33 This underrepresentation has led the U.S. military to develop strategies to attract Latinos—strategies that many Latino grassroots efforts are trying to counter.34 Despite their consistent underrepresentation in the U.S. military, Latino youth traditionally have had a more positive view of the military than whites and Asian Americans,35 and Latinos, particularly Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans, have a history of exemplary service.36 Their military involvement has also led to greater acculturation

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into American life, better relationships between Latinos and whites,37 and greater participation in American political life.38 Asian Americans The 2000 Census showed that 11.9 million Americans (4.2 percent of the population) identified themselves as Asian. Within this category, respondents identified more than 24 specific group affiliations, including South Asian, Southeast Asian, and East Asians. On average, Asians and Pacific Islanders (API) were nearly as well-off as non-Hispanic whites in 2000; however, there are enormous economic disparities within the Asian American population, who have both a higher median income and a higher poverty rate than non-Hispanic whites.39 The first major wave of Chinese immigrants to the United States consisted of single men escaping the Opium Wars and helping build the railroads to take American pioneers West.40 Prejudice against these workers led to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which excluded family members and additional workers from entering the United States. In 1930, immigration laws allowed Chinese wives of Chinese American citizens to join their husbands in the United States, but Chinese immigrants did not start coming to this country in family units until 1965. Since then, there has been a tremendous influx of ethnic Chinese from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Vietnam, as well as substantial numbers from Laos and Cambodia. All of these groups are heavily influenced by Confucian values that emphasize interdependence, patriarchy, emotional control, obligations, and duties. Filipino immigrants were also typically single men recruited to work as laborers on farms in Hawaii and on the West Coast.41 They were not allowed to own property or marry interracially and were subjected to racial discrimination.42 Filipinos came to the United States in the greatest concentrations during the 20th century, and most American Filipinos today are recent immigrants who fled economic catastrophe and political oppression during the Marcos dictatorship. They are typically Catholic, belong to broad kinship networks, emphasize respect and harmony among family members, and have a tradition of granting economic and educational equality to women. Japanese immigration peaked in the United States between 1880 and 1920, when Japanese workers were brought over as alternatives to the Chinese builders of the railroads. As with the initial Chinese and Filipino immigrants, Japanese immigrants were subjected to poverty and harsh working conditions, prohibited from bringing wives with them or marrying white women, and faced with discrimination, which culminated in the internment of many Japanese Americans during

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World War II. Although the earlier generations of Japanese in this country were, like the Chinese, strongly influenced by Confucian values, there has been considerable acculturation since World War II to the Judeo-Christian values of the majority culture.43 During and following the Vietnam War, which increased the U.S. need for physicians, engineers, and other technical specialists, substantial numbers of young, well-educated, English-speaking Asian Indian professionals entered the country, generally gained considerable economic success, and became citizens. Despite vast cultural diversity in India, Hindu values that emphasize collectivism, social duty, karma, and sometimes nonviolence are pervasive among these immigrants; however, they do accept predetermined inequalities (e.g., caste differences).44 Other Asian Americans groups include (1) Laotians, who suffered terribly as a result of the Indochinese war and fled to the United States primarily after the fall of Saigon in 1975 and include many tribal people (e.g., the Hmong) who are often influenced by Hindu and Buddhist traditions; (2) Vietnamese, who also fled war-torn Indochina, typically embrace a Chinese Confucianism that includes ancestor worship, and have somewhat greater economic equality of women than the Chinese; (3) Cambodians, who were tortured, traumatized, imprisoned, and forced into work camps during the Pol Pot regime from 1975 to 1979, escaped to Thailand where they awaited repatriation for years, and generally follow a form of Buddhism that includes Brahmanistic beliefs in animistic, ancestral, and demonic spirits;45 and (4) Pakistanis, typically Muslim, many of whom are legal or illegal refugees from the IndianPakistan conflict over Kashmir. Asian Americans represent a very diverse set of religions—Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, and Muslim, among others—and religions may vary in beliefs about war and peace. However, a common cultural value that may be associated with beliefs about war and peace in many Asian Americans is suffering, which is seen as a path to maturity and a stronger character.46 Indeed, the assumption that life is inherently full of suffering is one of the Buddhist Four Noble Truths.47 A related cultural value is fatalism, conveyed, for example, by the Japnese term shikata ga nais (‘‘It cannot be helped’’)48 and the Filipino word bahalana (‘‘Leave it to God,’’ or ‘‘Come what may’’).49 Stoicism and the assumption that suffering will lead to better things in this life or the next may have helped Asian Americans survive considerable pain. Many Asian American communities have a history of patriarchal values, exemplified through women’s subordinate status compared to men’s. For example, according to South Asian culture and Chinese Confucian norms, girls must obey their fathers, wives must obey their husbands, and widows must obey their eldest son.50 In Korea, wives call

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husbands uri chip ju in (‘‘the master of our house’’) and husbands call their wife chip saram (‘‘house person’’). In Vietnam, there are popular sayings, such as ‘‘A hundred girls aren’t worth a single testicle.’’51 On the other hand, the first consonant of the ancient Philippine Tagalog word Bathala, meaning God, refers to woman,52 and the Filipino heritage is one of egalitarian values, reflected, for example, in the Tagalog term pakikipagkapwa, meaning ‘‘self and others’’ as equals.53 Despite the recent influx of Asian American immigrants to the United States, Asian Americans are consistently underrepresented in the U.S. military. Although they comprise over 4 percent of the national population, they comprised only 1.23 percent of recruits to the military and 1.14 percent of the total U.S. Army in 2003.54 Asian American youth typically have the least favorable views of military service and report the lowest likelihood of entering military service of all major ethnic groups.55 Middle Eastern and Arab Americans Following the Census in 2000, the Census Bureau released its first ever brief on the Arab population in the United States.56 The Census defined ‘‘Arab Americans’’ as those who declared their ancestry or ethnic origin as ‘‘Arab, Egyptian, Iraqi, Jordanian, Lebanese, Middle Eastern, Moroccan, North African, Palestinian, Syrian, and so on.’’57 Although not all people from these countries and regions consider themselves Arab, the Census Bureau labeled them as such to be consistent with previous censuses. This 2003 report indicated that for the first time, the Arab population in the United States passed the 1 million mark, growing by nearly 40 percent since 1990. The majority (>60 percent) has Lebanese, Egyptian, or Syrian ancestry.58 It is expected that the Arab population will double their 2000 numbers by the 2010 Census because Arabs still have a very strong interest in immigrating to the United States.59 Arab immigration to the United States began in the 1880s, with Christians fleeing Ottoman rule in Syria. These immigrants assimilated very quickly into American life, and many ‘‘Americanized’’ their names and shed their traditions. When the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act was passed, the U.S. preference for European immigration ended, and Arab immigration to the United States increased rapidly.60 Recent waves of Arab immigrants consist of Palestinians displaced by the creation of Israel and the ensuing Arab-Israeli conflict; Lebanese who fled civil war, foreign invasion, and poverty; and Arabs from other nations fleeing dictatorial regimes. Currently, Muslims comprise about 73 percent of Arab immigrants.61 Immigrants from Arab nations tend to assimilate quite well into American society. They have high levels of English proficiency, and

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their rate of attaining citizenship (55 percent) is higher than the rate for immigrants overall (38 percent).62 They are among the most highly educated groups in the United States, tend to work in professional or managerial positions, and often establish small entrepreneurships.63 They tend not to have the social coherence and political influence of other immigrant groups; however, this may be slowly changing as the rate of immigration increases and they become more likely to organize at community and national levels.64 The increase in numbers of Muslims and increased coherence of this group of immigrants has led to greater scrutiny of Arab Americans, particularly following the September 11, 2001, attacks. Although most Arab American groups pose no threat to national security or public safety,65 they have been targeted by the government and public as scapegoats for the terrorist attacks. For example, Arab Americans have been the victims of physical assaults, death threats, and hate crimes since the 9/11 attacks. Moreover, tens of thousands of Arab Americans and Muslims have been interrogated by the U.S. government, confined to mass detention centers, and held without charge or access to an attorney, practices reminiscent of the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.66 Although the majority of Arab Americans are faithful citizens or legal residents of the United States, there is a debate among Muslim immigrants about whether one can be a good Muslim and live in a land of unbelievers and pledge allegiance to a secular government composed of non-Muslims.67 Some people argue that the increased social cohesion of this immigrant group has provided a means for the small minority of radical Muslims with jihadist ideology to blend in and carry out their extremist goals.68 Nonetheless, the majority of immigrants from the Middle Eastern and Arab nations are loyal to the United States, and many even serve the U.S. military with distinction.69

ETHNIC MINORITY PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND PEACE Definitions of War Periods of armed conflict and intergroup aggression have plagued the United States for centuries, with diverse levels of involvement and different effects on the various ethnic groups. In addition to their experiences within the United States, some members of minority groups, specifically refugees and immigrants, have had their worldviews influenced by experiences of colonization, ethnic conflict, human rights violations, and political violence in their countries of origin. Perspectives

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on war may also reflect the U.S. military actions (e.g., numerous wars fought abroad following World War II), active involvement in the internal affairs of other nations, and media justifications for the ‘‘war on terror.’’ War Is . . . a Conflict. Over 67 percent of the participants provided definitions of war and nearly half (49 percent) of these, cutting across all ethnic minority groups, defined war as conflict or fighting. Many participants, including 8 of 14 Middle Eastern Americans, included ‘‘violence’’ and ‘‘physical conflict’’ in their definitions. Some participants, such as 23 percent of the 39 Hispanic Americans and 20 percent of the 31 South Asian Americans, defined war as aggressive military or armed conflict, or organized violence involving ‘‘bombs,’’ ‘‘guns,’’ and other weapons.’’ Although most participants identified war as a state of violent conflict, East Asian Americans (4 of 45) uniquely included psychological conflict in their definitions. For example, a Chinese participant stated war is ‘‘when two beings have either mental or physical tension with one another over an unsettled matter.’’ An East Asian respondent defined war as ‘‘more than one party in disagreement with each other and attacking each other with words or actions.’’ This attention to psychological over physical aggression among East Asians is consistent with findings in the fields of elder and sibling abuse70 and may reflect cultural values that not only emphasize collectivism but also emotional control to maintain social harmony. Just Purposes of War. Of the 174 participants providing a definition of war, 15 percent viewed it as purposeful and functional. An African American respondent declared war is ‘‘necessary to keep innocent people from dying in most cases.’’ A Bangladeshi man defined war as ‘‘justice being pursued,’’ and an Iranian man defined it as a ‘‘violent response to an aggressor nation.’’ Others viewed it as a path to conflict resolution. For example, a Hispanic woman said war is a ‘‘solution chosen over diplomatic resolutions to come to terms on a disagreement between countries.’’ Viewing war as having a just purpose may stem from rationales given by political leaders who say war is needed for ‘‘good’’ to overcome ‘‘evil.’’ Many American presidents have supported war in the name of a better world order (e.g., a world without communism or terrorism). Unjust Purposes of War. In contrast to the 15 percent of respondents defining war as functional, 30 percent (across all groups) classified war as unnecessary, occurring for unknown, ‘‘meaningless,’’ and ‘‘pointless’’ reasons. A South Asian woman defined war as ‘‘angry people fighting

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uselessly’’ and a Korean man as ‘‘stupid heads of states acting stupidly.’’ Many examples of this type of response included moral judgments, declaring war was ‘‘unjust’’ and ‘‘inhumane,’’ as well as ‘‘an out-dated tactic.’’ In labeling war as unjust, some participants identified negative consequences, such as ‘‘people dying,’’ ‘‘destruction,’’ ‘‘death,’’ and ‘‘bloodshed.’’ Participants from all ethnic minority groups defined war as a tool of domination rooted in selfish intentions. Nearly 30 percent of Southeast Asian Americans mentioned political causes and aims of war. A Filipino man stated war occurs ‘‘when two sides engage in political or physical combat based on self-interest.’’ An African American woman defined war as fighting ‘‘over issues like religion, land, etc.,’’ and a Japanese woman described it as ‘‘military or economic aggression.’’ Perhaps reflective of the genocide of Native Americans during colonial America, 27 percent of the Native American respondents viewed war as invasion, defining it, for example, as ‘‘aggression of one sovereign nation or culture of people against another for superficial reasons.’’ A substantial portion of Hispanic American responses (20 percent) put particular emphasis on economic, social, political, and power-related aspects of war; for example, defining war as ‘‘poverty’’ and as ‘‘declared by the privileged but never fought by them.’’ Similar to Native Americans, many Hispanic Americans may view war through the lens of invasion and colonization motivated by the political and social goals of the colonizers. The History of War. A unique trend among South Asian Americans (found in 10 percent of their responses) was a reference to history in supporting or opposing war. These responses overlapped with other categories, including just and unjust purposes of war. For example, an Indian Asian man said war was a ‘‘bad unshakeable habit from the dawning of human history,’’ and a Pakistani woman explained, ‘‘History has proven that war is often fought for unjust reasons.’’ This emphasis may stem from numerous invasions experienced by South Asia (from Europe, Central Asia, and neighboring countries) as well as cultural and religious norms focusing on the past, including the concept of reincarnation. The Right to Invade Intervention. Over 82 percent of the total of 258 participants explained their level of agreement with one country’s right to invade another country. Among the responses, 61 percent provided reasons supporting the right to invade, compared to only 29 percent providing reasons opposing the right. The most common justification for invasion, given by nearly 27 percent of the respondents across ethnic groups, was for

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protective and humanitarian intervention. Since its entrance into World War II, and especially after the end of the Cold War, the United States has been active in many foreign humanitarian interventions. Although withdrawing from Somalia and remaining uninvolved in the Rwandan genocide, the United States (through the United Nations’ peacekeeping missions and multinational military operations like NATO) has provided military and economic support to, for example, Kosovo, Bosnia, Cyprus, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Congo, Lebanon, South Korea, Laos, and Cambodia.71 Justifications given for such interventions included protecting others from governmental violence, ending ethnic conflict, responding to refugee crises, and ending colonialism. In our sample, similar justifications for invasion were given, with invasion seen as acceptable if ‘‘basic human rights are not being observed and the people of the foreign country are crying out for help’’ (Navajo) or ‘‘in defense and protection of other countries or citizens, it is acceptable, dutiful rather’’ (South Asian). Perhaps reflective of the U.S. role as a major world power, many participants viewed invasion as a responsibility in the face of human atrocities—even if historically their own peoples had been subjected to such practices. Some participants (15) saw intervening as a means of protecting innocent people from ‘‘evil,’’ ‘‘unjust,’’ and ‘‘oppressive’’ regimes. A Southeast Asian woman affirmed, ‘‘Yes, if that country is violating humanitarian law, such as genocide.’’ Respondents from all ethnic minorities (13) appealed to historical conflicts in support of invasion. A Hispanic woman stated, ‘‘Only in extreme cases such as WWII Germany, and someone should help Sudan and should have helped Rwanda.’’ A Filipino man argued, ‘‘I agree with World War II where the United States was able to stop Hitler, but I don’t feel that containing communism or spreading democracy are reason enough (i.e., Vietnam/Iraq).’’ Similar views were reflected in recent polls indicating that Americans were most likely to support intervention in Dafur if the violence was called ‘‘genocide.’’72 Defensive Invasion. Invading to defend one’s own nation from external threat was mentioned frequently (nearly 22 percent of responses) by members of all ethnic minority groups. An East Asian participant argued for invasion ‘‘if it is in the defense of its citizens,’’ and a Sri Lankan woman stated, ‘‘if and only if it is to protect a country or a world from terrorism.’’ Many participants qualified their support for invasion by stating that an ‘‘eminent,’’ ‘‘dire,’’ ‘‘real,’’ ‘‘dangerous,’’ and/or ‘‘actual physical threat’’ should be present. A Palestinian woman stated, ‘‘Unless the invaded country is directly threatening the other country, the other country should mind its own business.’’ Some participants

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supported preemptive invasions (e.g., a Chinese woman said, ‘‘Sometimes you have to do what you have to do. Invade before you get invaded’’); others described invasion as acceptable after an attack. A Lebanese woman supported invasion ‘‘if the invading country has a just cause (i.e., retaliation or response to a serious threat).’’ A Native American woman stated, ‘‘I don’t believe in war, but do believe in getting even.’’ Qualified support for invasion to defend oneself may reflect public controversy over the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Following Al-Qaeda’s attack on September 11th, 2001, the United States invaded Afghanistan to fight the terrorist-harboring Taliban regime. Although many Americans view the invasion of Afghanistan as justified, the legality and justness of the invasion of Iraq is highly debated. One poll found that although the majority of Americans view the war in Iraq negatively (e.g., that it has not helped reduce terrorism, and it has ruined the U.S. relations with the Middle East), most Americans support an active role for the United States in intervening to help others.73 In our sample, some participants explicitly stated ‘‘not Iraq’’ after describing support for defensive invasion. One Hispanic participant said, ‘‘I feel a country has a right only if genocide is occurring within the country or there is hard evidence that the country violated international law. Imperialism or spreading democracy by force is not a reason to invade another country.’’ Offensive Invasion. Members of all ethnic minority groups frequently justified invasion in the name of intervention and/or defense, but African Americans were unique in supporting invasion as a tool of power for self-benefit. This type of rationale for invasion was provided by 5 of 32 African American respondents and is consistent with a political realism perspective valuing national material interests and power status, and assuming that self-desires can dictate international politics74. One black man said, ‘‘It sucks, it’s morally wrong, but … if you have a strong enough army, you should expand your nationality and beliefs wherever you want.’’ Other African American responses include, ‘‘‘right’ is too strong but countries can do as they please’’ and ‘‘That’s what international politics is all about.’’ Such forms of apparent cynicism may reflect the experience of Africans as victims of the worst forms of racism worldwide;75 even today, African Americans suffer from greater racism than other minority groups.76 Such experiences may have contributed in unique ways to pessimistic and distrustful views on state aggression. Sovereignty. The most common reason given for opposing invasion was that it violates the principle of national sovereignty, a theme mentioned in 11 percent of the total responses. Sovereignty, established by international law, is a state’s right to govern and control itself. In the United

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States, many Native American communities maintain partial sovereignty (e.g., to practice tribal law).77 Individual rights (sovereignty at an individual level), as established in democracies, emphasize freedom to, for example, voice opinions, practice religion, and maintain cultural traditions. Such rights have, at some point, concerned all ethnic groups in the United States. When participants discussed sovereignty, they emphasized equality, freedom, and independence of all nations and peoples. For example, a Middle Eastern man stated, ‘‘No country has the right to tell any other how to function/run or to control it.’’ In addition to political sovereignty, a few participants mentioned physical sovereignty (e.g., a South Asian participant said, ‘‘You have to respect borders.’’). An Hispanic woman elaborated, ‘‘must not invade other countries, especially the U.S. We have no right or authority. This idea that we are superior to other nations must end now.’’ Unacceptable Motives. Although some participants endorsed popular motives for invasion (e.g., pursuing national interests, protecting human rights, and overcoming evil), 7 percent viewed them with skepticism. A Korean man stated, ‘‘For reasons of national security I believe that the country has a right but skeptically speaking very few countries invade because of their own security.’’ Similarly, a Cape Verdean participant stated, ‘‘If human rights violations are involved, there may be a need for outside intervention. I think this causes problems because the ‘invaders’ often proceed for their own selfish reasons and not for concern about the citizens.’’ These participants rejected economic gains and self-enhancing intentions as justifiable bases for invasion. An Iranian man participant declared, ‘‘There is no reason other than greed and ambition to invade a country, both of which are horrible.’’ Elaborating on the negative consequences of such ill-intentions, a black woman stated, ‘‘So many of the atrocities that humans have committed against each other have started because people have been greedy and invaded other lands.’’ Undermining common justifications for invasion, responses in this category contained moral judgments (e.g., ‘‘it is wrong’’) as well as pragmatic arguments (e.g., ‘‘it has negative consequences’’). Similar to conceptions linking war with unjust purposes, these views may stem from historical experiences with colonization and exploitation. In addition, these responses may reflect the controversy regarding the justness of the invasion of Iraq, as well as public dissatisfaction with the government’s justifications (e.g., changing arguments from preventive war to preemptive). A public opinion poll of Americans found that the majority of Americans not only reject the use of military force in spreading democracy but also think that overthrowing the authoritarian regime in Iraq was not a good enough reason to go to war.78

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Better Alternatives to Invasion. Nearly 5 percent of participants, from most ethnic minority groups, suggested better alternatives to invasion, including ‘‘peace and trade’’ and ‘‘foreign aid.’’ Unique among Hispanic Americans were references to international organizations and legal structures like the United Nations. One Hispanic man stated, ‘‘This line of thinking totally disregards the United Nations, which I believe to be necessary in world politics.’’ A Hispanic woman argued for ‘‘no invasion with military, only peacekeeping forces as a last resort.’’ Maybe because Hispanic Americans recognize better alternatives to invasion, they provided reasons opposing invasion more frequently than reasons supporting the right; all other ethnic minority groups provided more arguments supporting a right to invasion than opposing it. Definitions of Peace In the late 18th century, important charters, including the U.S. Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights, articulated the equal rights of men to life and liberty, as well as to free speech, assembly, religion, and bearing arms. However, the acknowledgment and protection of such ‘‘equal’’ rights for all Americans (including women and ethnic minorities) followed much later. Human society, America included, is ‘‘fractured’’ at multiple levels through inequalities between genders, ethnic groups, and socioeconomic groups, as well as through familial problems and human dominion over the environment; these ‘‘fractures’’ impede the achievement of peace and illustrate the interconnectedness of social problems.79 In the nonviolent civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King Jr., social organization and widespread collective action proved to be important conducive factors in achieving rights.80 In characterizing peace, Macquarrie discusses how different linguistic and prephilosophical conceptions of peace vary internationally. For example, in Western European linguistic roots like Greek (eirene) and Latin (pax), peace is viewed as the absence of war and/or an agreement between states. The Hebrew (shalom) and Biblical traditions expand this conception of peace to include completeness and unity; similarly, in Russian, peace (mir) means wholeness. Focused more internally, peace in Sanskrit (santi) refers to spiritual contentment. In Eastern traditions, like Chinese (ping), peace means balance and harmony between positive and negative forces.81 The diversity of religious, linguistic, and cultural traditions in ethnic minority groups in the United States may promote differences in their conceptions of peace; however, shared collectivistic values may contribute to commonalities in their views.

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Negative Conceptions of Peace. Nearly 70 percent of the participants provided open-ended definitions of peace. The most common definitions (in 56 percent of responses), across all ethnic minority groups, involved negative conceptions focusing on what peace is not (e.g., ‘‘no fighting’’ and ‘‘the absence of war or strife’’) instead of what it is. Perhaps reflective of the Bush administration’s ‘‘War on Terror,’’ an Iranian man described peace as ‘‘no war, no torture, and no terror going on in the world,’’ and an African American man stated, ‘‘Peace is being able to live without terrorism.’’ Positive and Social Conceptions of Peace. The second most common type of peace definition, occurring in over 30 percent of the ethnic minority responses, relates to social and community interconnectedness; another 10 percent defined peace as a positive social end state focused on cooperation and coming together. These responses, perhaps reflecting shared collectivistic values, provided a positive conception of peace, emphasizing affirmative characteristics of a peaceful end state. In addition, responses emphasizing tolerance and getting along with others may reflect conceptions of the United States as a ‘‘melting pot.’’ At the state level, a public opinion poll found that most Americans prefer a multipolar world system over a unipolar or bipolar one (thus desiring a balance of power) and want the United States to play an active role in international affairs through working with international organizations and/or other multilateral efforts.82 Thus, whether individual-to-individual, group-to-group, or state-to-state, peace is often viewed as stemming from coexistence and cooperation—as ‘‘mutual agreement and compromise’’ and ‘‘everyone working together for the good of everyone.’’ Respect for and tolerance of others was mentioned in over 6 percent of definitions. Hispanic American definitions of peace included ‘‘a state in which people can look past their differences and just live like human beings,’’ the ‘‘acceptance of others and their beliefs,’’ and ‘‘a utopian state. Live and let live. Understand. Communicate.’’ Another positive conception of peace, emphasized in 13 percent of the 174 definitions and in all ethnic minority groups, described peace as an end state of tranquility, calmness, stability, and/or security. For example, some South Asian Americans defined peace as ‘‘an environment of stability and security’’ and a ‘‘state of calmness where there is no threat to one’s safety.’’ A Hispanic participant said, ‘‘peace is the state of nonviolence and tranquility.’’ Peace Is . . . Internal. In addition to societal level definitions of peace, 18 percent of the 174 respondents (from all ethnic minority groups) provided individual level definitions. For example, a Filipino woman

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defined peace as the ‘‘absence of mental stress or anxiety,’’ and a Middle Eastern man said peace was ‘‘[t]ruly being content with oneself to the extent that external situations don’t affect your psyche in a negative way.’’ Twenty-seven responses defined peace as a feeling or emotion, with happiness mentioned most frequently. East Asian American examples include ‘‘only love,’’ as well as ‘‘prosperity and happiness.’’ It is interesting that over 45 percent of the 31 responses viewing peace as internal (e.g., ‘‘hopeful,’’ ‘‘no more argument and just love,’’ ‘‘people living with no hatred and no worries,’’ and ‘‘no sadness, pain, or anger’’) were from South Asian American participants. Such responses may reflect Eastern views of peace and spiritual enlightenment—peace as an end state stemming from one’s mental processes. Peace Is . . . Unattainable. Lastly, a minority of participants (nearly 6 percent of those providing a definition), from all ethnic minority groups, commented pessimistically on the difficulty of attaining peace. Examples from Middle Eastern Americans include peace as ‘‘an ideal but rarely reached or maintained’’ and a comment that ‘‘people are too egotistical and selfish to want this.’’ Likewise, a South Asian participant declared peace as ‘‘impossible—human nature is too erratic and chaotic,’’ and a Hispanic respondent stated that peace is an ‘‘ideal human goal that will never occur.’’ Some East Asian American participants also defined peace as an ‘‘impossible bliss,’’ ‘‘nonexistent,’’ ‘‘ideal that is strived toward and is yet to be achieved,’’ and as ‘‘something that will never truly happen because everyone is greedy.’’ Given the current involvement of the United States in war and the history of violence experienced by minorities in the United States as well as in other countries, pessimistic views of the attainability of peace are not surprising. The Right to Peace Equality. When asked to explain their level of agreement with the statement, ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace,’’ 33 percent of the 132 participants who provided comments gave general affirmations of the right and/or restated individuals’ equal right to peace. An Iranian woman wrote, ‘‘I don’t believe any one person is better than another so we should all have this right to live peaceful lives.’’ Similarly, a Taiwanese woman argued, ‘‘The right to peace should be given to everyone. Fighting is caused by people who do not respect this right.’’ Many other responses emphasized the lack of actual equality among peoples. Negative Conception of Peace. Similar to trends in participants’ definitions of peace, many participants (close to 11 percent of the respondents) explained their ‘‘right to peace’’ ratings in ways that revealed

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negative conceptions of peace. An African American participant said, ‘‘No one deserves to be living in turmoil.’’ An Indian Asian stated, ‘‘No person should have to fight for their existence; they should be free to live in a world void of all radical conflicts.’’ Positive Conception of Peace. In contrast to negative conceptions of peace, participants from all ethnic minority groups (nearly 17 percent of those providing comments) provided positive conceptions of peace in their responses to the ‘‘right to peace’’ item. Responses exemplifying this type of reasoning include ‘‘Everyone should have the right to grow up in peace and harmony. They should have the right to live life to the fullest.’’ The Declaration of Independence, by positing inalienable rights to ‘‘Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness’’ also portrays peace in this light. These responses convey the notion that the peace to which everyone is entitled is not just an absence of violence but the presence of a positive environment. One Southeast Asian woman stated, ‘‘I believe all human beings have the right to live in a world where they can prosper as individuals.’’ An East Asian man noted ‘‘peace brings prosperity’’ and a Lebanese man argued ‘‘people struggle daily and should have a stable and peaceful environmental existence.’’ Pessimism Regarding Attaining Peace for All. Although a substantial portion of the sample argued that individuals have a right to peace, over 24 percent of the respondents expressed pessimism about this possibility. Eight responses explicitly dismissed the right to peace, and 24 responses argued that peace is not easily attainable. Two Middle Eastern Americans specified, ‘‘It’s not ever going to happen, it is not realistic but ideal’’ and ‘‘they have the right to but probably won’t happen.’’ A Palestinian said, ‘‘At this point [peace] is not a right, it’s a privilege.’’ A Native American stated, ‘‘This is true but not everyone believes that right and sad enough, they sometimes violate another person’s right.’’ A Southeast Asian participant stated, ‘‘Unfortunately, it’s the powerful who decide.’’ These responses touch on the presumed inevitability of human conflicts ranging from power struggles and social inequalities to violent warfare. Although the United States has strong democratic roots emphasizing equality, in practice, racial discrimination and inferior statuses may contribute to a pessimistic outlook on attaining peace and equality. South Asians, East Asians, and Hispanic Americans most frequently used this pessimistic type of reasoning, with each ethnic group contributing 25 percent of the 32 responses in this category. South Asian participants said, ‘‘Human beings are violent creatures—we should strive for peace but we do not have a ‘right’ to peace,’’ and ‘‘Living in civilized society prevents that right. Nations will always be at war because they

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will always look out for their people so people give up the assumption of utopia.’’ Similarly, an East Asian response exemplifying pessimism is: ‘‘Yes, but humans are selfish and there will never be a time where there is total peace on earth.’’ A Japanese participant stated, ‘‘’Right?’ Reality check—the possibility is slim whatever the society.’’ Examples of pessimistic Hispanic responses include peace is ‘‘not a right if it hasn’t happened in the history of civilization but everyone should have the right to a government that has a military strong enough to keep war and suffering out of their backyard.’’ Qualified Support for the Right. Most participants unconditionally supported the right to peace; however, 10 percent, from all ethnic minority groups, qualified that basic right. Some East Asians responded, ‘‘What if that human deserves to die?’’ and ‘‘Peace is good. I think we should all have a chance at living peacefully, until we do something undeserving.’’ A Hispanic respondent qualified, ‘‘Some people due to their ideals and way of thinking do not know the meaning of peace so therefore they do not deserve it.’’ In addition to relating peace to the concept of justice and deservedness, some participants qualified the right to peace with choice; a Middle Eastern participant stated, ‘‘It’s a matter of the individual to determine how peaceful you make your life,’’ and a Filipino stated, ‘‘All humans should have the option whether to engage in war and combat.’’

CONCLUSION To summarize, participants most frequently viewed war as fighting and conflict, referring commonly to physical and violent conflict, but also to political, economic, and social conflict. East Asian Americans were unique in defining war as psychological conflict, perhaps reflective of cultural values related to emotional control and compliant respect. Participants tended to define war as the presence of conflict and peace as the absence of conflict (a trend common to Western conceptions of war and peace). Definitions of peace and support for a right to peace also affirmed positive end states, like social and community prosperity, gained through cooperation and tolerance. This view of peace may stem from the collectivistic values of many minority groups. Definitions focusing on tranquility and individual emotions were mentioned frequently by South Asian Americans. Respondents often supported one country’s right to invade another in extreme situations, most frequently when human rights violations are

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occurring within the other country. Many viewed invasion as a social obligation to counter oppressive governmental regimes, like Hitler’s Nazi Germany. Although humanitarian interventions are not required by international law (unless genocide is being perpetrated), the United Nations (founded in the ashes of World War II) and other multilateral coalitions have intervened to assist world citizens, through, for example, peacekeeping missions. Supporting this type of intervention is reflective of idealist political theory, valuing cooperation between states. In contrast to humanitarian interventions, mankind’s long history with war (including wars to conquer, colonize, spread an ideology, and increase resources) is used to support realists’ understanding of states (as hostile and based on competition). Many participants (especially South Asians when defining war) recognized this pattern by referring to, for example, the human history of violence. A minority of respondents, primarily African Americans, used the inevitability of a ‘‘dog-eat-dog’’ world system to support invasion for personal gain. Likewise, a minority of participants defined war as functional and useful. Perhaps because of the long history of aggressive wars and the assumption that humans are inherently violent, some participants perceived peace as difficult, if not impossible, to achieve—declaring that it is not a right, that individuals are not in reality equal, and/or that the goal of peace is difficult to actualize. On the other hand, references to a human tradition of violence were included more commonly as grounds to oppose than support a right to war, and more participants referred to war as unnecessary and unjust than saw war as functional. Many definitions of war identified political, economic, and social aims of invasion. Hispanic Americans used this reasoning frequently, as did Native Americans, who identified war with invasion, and Southeast Asians who focused on political motives. These trends may be rooted in each groups’ experiences with governmental violence, within the United States or externally. Many participants, similar to political realists, attributed invasions to greed and selfishness. Participants who offered better alternatives to invasion (like use of the United Nations, as emphasized by Hispanic Americans) implied war is not necessarily inevitable. International law is founded on each state’s right to political and territorial sovereignty. The Charter of the United Nations considers invasion an acceptable form of law enforcement against the crime of aggression (when a state violates or threatens the sovereignty of another state).83 Accordingly, self-defense, either unilaterally or collectively, is acknowledged as a justifiable reason to invade another country. Defending oneself from an external threat and invading after an attack (perhaps reflective of the war in Afghanistan) were commonly mentioned

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in participants’ reasons supporting invasion. In some responses, invasion was supported when the principle of sovereignty was violated; however, in other responses, invasion was opposed because it violates a nation’s right to sovereignty. Overall, participants provided more responses supporting the right to peace as well as the right to invade than opposing either right, which appears, on the surface, to be contradictory. (Hispanic Americans were an exception in that they showed more opposition than support for invasion.) Participants viewed peace as desirable, unless there are extreme circumstances that warrant invasion, like defense and protecting lives. Some participants interpret the history of human and state aggression as supporting the necessity of war, whereas others referred to history to oppose war in favor of peace. Similarly, invasion was both supported and opposed on the basis of the principle of sovereignty and violations of it. Thus, in these cases, interpreting the same events differently and applying the same principles to different situations yielded views that were polar opposites. Participants’ definitions also contained dichotomies, viewing war and peace as opposites (as the presence or absence of conflict), war as just or unjust, and peace by what it constitutes or lacks. Perspectives of Native, African, Hispanic, Middle Eastern, East Asian, South Asian, and Southeast Asian Americans ultimately illustrated strong support for peace but also for war, depending on particular presumed circumstances. Understanding such views of war and peace provides valuable insight into the types of reasoning used and issues focused on by different ethnic groups. These groups represent a diversity of historical experiences, social and economic statuses, religions, and cultures from around the world. Despite a few trends unique to one or two minority groups, participants overall defined and justified war and peace similarly. Similarities in responses may stem from shared experiences as Americans and similar views of state level behavior and forces like the media, mainstream culture, the political system, and the War on Terror following 9/11. Understanding justifications and how they form (from different interpretations and experiences at multiple levels of an individual’s social environment) is incredibly powerful. Social psychologist Albert Bandura84 argued that when individuals become aware of the ways in which they distort violence to rationalize it, they alter their moral reasoning to hold their behavior to their moral standards. Accordingly, to achieve the positive social state of peace among the diverse ethnic groups in the United States and around the world, we need to foster the conditions and values of cooperation and nonviolent problem solving as well as eliminate the need to resort to war.

10

Canada John M. Davis and Carol J. Davis

War is … ‘‘fighting amongst countries that usually goes on longer than originally planned.’’ Peace is … ‘‘Just love; compassion, grace; eventual freedom. A nonviolent state.’’ Canada is a developed country with a July 2008 estimated population of over 33 million. It has two official languages, English and French. It is an affluent, high-tech industrial society in the trillion-dollar class.1 Like the United States of America, it has a market-oriented economic system, a similar pattern of production, and affluent living standards. The media are independent and well developed and have a major influence in the country. The Canadian and U.S. media are linked to a considerable extent, and Canadians are very much aware of news developments in the United States, but the opposite is much less true. Canada is a constitutional monarchy that is also a parliamentary democracy and a federation. Formerly a British colony, Canada became a self-governing dominion on July 1, 1867. However, Canada still has strong emotional ties to Great Britain and the chief of state is Queen Elizabeth II. (The queen appoints and is represented in Canada by the governor general.) The head of government is the prime minister; the current prime minister is recently reelected Progressive Conservative Stephen Harper.2 The country’s ethnic makeup is as follows: 28 percent British; 23 percent French; 3.5 percent Aboriginal peoples; and 45.4 percent other.3 Thus, Canada is ethnically diverse and inherently multicultural.4 Through membership in the Commonwealth of Nations and La Francophonie, Canada maintains her historic ties with Britain and France, as well as with other former British and French colonies. Her powerful emotional attachment to the British Empire and to the Commonwealth

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resulted in major Canadian participation in the Second Boer War in South Africa and in World Wars I and II.5 Since World War II, there have been six major conflicts in the world, and Canada has had a military presence in all but one of them, as outlined below. Canada currently uses a professional, volunteer military force of approximately 64,000 regular personnel and about 26,000 reservists.6 Together, the Canadian Forces are made up of the army, the navy, and the air force. These Canadian Forces currently deploy 1,400 armored fighting vehicles, 34 combat vessels, and 861 aircraft.7 Because Canada and the United States share the world’s longest undefended border and are each other’s largest trading partners, it makes sense that they cooperate on military campaigns and exercises.8 Although often disagreeing with U.S. handling of war issues, Canada has never broken off relations with the United States and has usually supported U.S. military stances. There are exceptions, however: Canada has maintained full relations with Cuba and declined to participate in the Iraq war.9 In short, though often seen by the rest of the world as closely aligned with the United States, Canada has maintained an independent foreign policy.10

ETHNICITY AND GENDER IN CANADIAN LIFE In the early days of Canada’s settlement, the French and English were rivals in their exploration of the lands that became Canada. The English dominated in this struggle. The French, 85 percent of whom live in the Province of Quebec, felt mistreated by the English. From Canada’s earliest history until the present, many of the French Canadians have expressed a strong desire to separate from Canada and form their own state. In the view of the Separatistes, achieving sovereign status would allow the people of Quebec to pursue their own economic, social, and cultural development in a way that Canada’s current federal system does not allow. Two referenda have been held on this issue. In the first (1980), 60 percent of the Quebec voters rejected separation; in the second (1995), Quebecois decided to remain part of Canada by a very narrow margin (50.7 percent to 49.3 percent).11 Like the French, the Aboriginals in Canada see themselves as subordinate and seek to gain rights and privileges. Their dissatisfaction dates from the beginning of European settlement in Canada when conflict occurred and misunderstanding began. The First Nations practiced war according to different rules than those employed in Europe.12 Aboriginal ‘‘wars’’ were mainly raids by a few warriors for whom success in battle was an important test of manhood. Aboriginal tribes often captured

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women and children to replace those lost by their band in other conflicts, a practice that was anathema to the Europeans. They did not wage ongoing war but simply staged brief skirmishes and (except for the Iroquois) were not able to compete with the newcomers militarily. Thus, their numbers were greatly decreased, and they have had little influence since that time. Now they wish to reverse this. Ethnic heterogeneity in Canada has developed further as a result of the immigration of various non-British, non-French Europeans, plus Asians and Afro-Caribbeans. To describe this mix, the term ‘‘multiculturalism’’ was introduced by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (RCBB). The term is now recognized in official government policies and used by federal and provincial government institutions, some social scientists, and the average Canadian citizen. There is an advisory board on multiculturalism, and many refer to ‘‘multicultural’’ Canada. Surveys and laboratory experiments are currently being conducted on the ‘‘Multiculturalism and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada.’’13 The movement for women’s suffrage began to surface in Canada as early as the 1870s but did not gain force until the turn of the century. The Prairies were an area of maximum suffragette activity, and in 1916, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta were the first provinces to grant the provincial vote to women. Other provinces lagged behind. Quebec, for example, did not allow women to vote in provincial elections until 1940, although the federal franchise was granted to women by the Dominion Elections Act of 1920; thus, within some provinces women could vote in national elections before they could vote for candidates for more local offices. Even before obtaining the right to vote, Canadian women participated in organizations dedicated to improving social conditions and quality of life, such as developing educational opportunities and promoting stricter liquor laws. Once they could participate in the electoral process, women began to have an impact politically. In 1929, they were legally declared ‘‘persons’’ and granted the right to become members of the senate. Since then, hundreds of women have participated in affairs of state. The first woman to be governor-general (de facto head of state and commander-in chief of the Canadian Forces) was Jeanne Sauve in 1984. Women have served in the military since 1885 when nurses first served during the Northwest Rebellion. They participated in a wider variety of roles in World War I and World War II. By 1974, 66 percent of Canadian Forces (CF) occupational positions were open to women, but they were still excluded from combat and near-combat positions. In 1989, the decision of a Canadian Human Rights Tribunal directed that all restrictions on employment of women in the CF be removed. Today, women in the CF comprise 11.4 percent of the Regular Force

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and 18.6 percent of the Reserve Force, and the Canadian military’s commitment to gender integration is clear.14

CANADIAN INVOLVEMENT IN ARMED CONFLICT, INVASION, AND/OR OCCUPATION SINCE WORLD WAR II Since World War II, Canada has advocated multilateralism and made efforts to work collaboratively with other nations to resolve global issues.15 Canada joined the United Nations in 1945 and became a founding member of NATO in 1949. During the Cold War, Canada was a strong contributor to UN forces that served in the Korean War. In joint action with the United States, it founded the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) on May 12, 1958, to defend against aerial attacks from the Soviet Union. The ‘‘Cold War’’ lasted from the end of World War II in 1945 until the 1990s. According to Desmond Morton, it actually began in Canada: ‘‘Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk at the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, announced that he had evidence of widespread Soviet spy rings that ‘reached as far as the prime minister’s office.’ ’’16 The prime minister gave little credence to this information and threatened to send Gouzenko back to the Soviet Union. However, when Gouzenko went into hiding, his revelations were taken seriously and the Cold War began gearing up from that point.17 The Korean and Vietnam Wars The Korean War began on June 25, 1950, when the forces of North Korea crossed the 38th Parallel into the Republic of Korea. It was an enormous assault involving many different points of attack and landings of seaborne detachments. When the United Nations called for cessation of hostilities to no effect, President Truman ordered the U.S. Navy and Air Force into action and later committed American troops to the support of the South Koreans. The Canadian government voiced its agreement with these moves to halt aggression but did not place troops in Korea for several months. However, in July, three Canadian destroyers were sent to Korean waters to support the United Nations efforts. These ships helped in the evacuation of Inchon and were soon joined by a Royal Canadian Air Force squadron and later by the Canadian Army Special Force. The 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade joined the effort in April 1951 as the crisis deepened and fighting intensified. This brigade later became part of the newly formed British Commonwealth Division, the first of its kind in history. Fighting continued in Korea until July 1953, when the Korea Armistice Agreement was finally

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signed. Although not able to provide fighter squadrons to the UN, Canada contributed 22 Royal Canadian Air Force pilots who served with the American units. Altogether, 26,791 Canadians served in the Korean War, and the names of 516 Canadian war dead are inscribed in the Korea Book of Remembrance. It was the ‘‘first time in history an international organization had intervened effectively with a multipower force to stem aggression and the UN emerged from the crisis with enhanced prestige.’’18 Canada declined to participate in the Vietnam War, and demonstrations against it were common throughout Canada. Even today, many people—including many Canadians—believe that their country completely dissociated itself from the Vietnam War; however, although Canada was not engaged militarily, it profited hugely from the Vietnam War.19 Despite the official diplomatic position as nonbelligerent, which prohibits the export of war-related materials to combat areas, Canadian industry was a major supplier of equipment and supplies to American forces. These goods included munitions, napalm, and commercial defoliants, all of which were ardently opposed by Canadian antiwar protesters. Canada also profited culturally and academically. Draft dodgers and deserters from the U.S. forces were welcomed in Canada, and Canadian immigration policy made it easy for them to obtain legal status. Estimates of the total number of Americans who moved to Canada because of their opposition to the war range from 50,000 to 125,000, making this ‘‘the largest politically motivated migration from the United States since the United Empire Loyalists moved north to oppose the American Revolution.’’20 Those who moved to Canada were frequently well educated and politically left of center, and many remained when the war ended in 1977. They affected Canada’s institutions and her society at large by balancing the ‘‘brain drain’’ toward the United States that had previously taken place when welleducated Canadians moved to the United States to seek the good jobs they could not find in Canada. Another little mentioned aspect of Canada’s role in the Vietnam War is the fact that not all young Canadians agreed with the official position or with the antiwar protesters. About 30,000 Canadians became volunteers and fought with the Americans in Southeast Asia; 110 Canadians died in Vietnam and seven are still listed as Missing in Action. This influx of Canadians into the U.S. forces mimics the cross-border enlistment in reverse that took place in World Wars I and II when tens of thousands of Americans joined the Canadian forces while the United States was still neutral. Still another aspect of Canada’s involvement with the Vietnam War has to do with the ‘‘boat people,’’ the name given to the thousands of Vietnamese refugees that took flight from

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their homeland after the fall of Saigon. Canada agreed to accept many of these, and today has substantial Vietnamese communities in Vancouver and Toronto.21 The War in Afghanistan Canada has taken and continues to take a major role in the hostilities in Afghanistan and in the efforts to defeat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and rebuild Afghanistan. The Canadian government cited three reasons for Canada’s participation: to defend Canada’s national interests; to ensure Canadian leadership in world affairs; and to help Afghanistan rebuild.22 Immediately after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the Canadian Minister of National Defence (Art Eggleton) gave orders authorizing 100þ Canadian Forces members, who were serving on military exchange programs in the United States and other countries, to participate in the U.S. operations in Afghanistan designed to neutralize Al-Qaeda there and to defeat the Taliban regime. A month later, Prime Minister Jean Chretien announced that Canada would contribute forces to the international force being formed to conduct a campaign against terrorism. In December 2001, 40 operators of the Joint Task Force Two were sent to Afghanistan.23 During Operation Anaconda in 2002, a Canadian sniper team broke, and rebroke, the long distance sniper kill record set by the United States in Vietnam. In 2002, Canadian Forces also undertook a second initiative called Operation Harpoon. In 2003, the Canadian Forces moved to the northern city of Kabul and took command of the newly formed International Security Assistance Force. In 2004, Canada pledged $250 million in aid to Afghanistan as well as $5 million to support the 2004 Afghan election. In 2005, the number of Canadian troops in Afghanistan was doubled from 600 to 1,200, and Canadian Forces were moved back to the unstable Kandahar Province, where they took over from the U.S. forces. By 2006, Canada had a major role in Afghanistan and troops had been increased to 2,300. Canadian participation has focused on working closely with the Afghan army, police, and civil administration. In January 2008, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced that Canada would extend its military mission in Afghanistan to 2011 only if another NATO country other than the United States puts more than 1,000 soldiers in the dangerous southern province of Kandahar. So far, none of Canada’s European allies has agreed to do so. The Liberals and the Conservatives, Canada’s two major political parties, both agree on the need for the Afghanistan mission. However, it is controversial with the Canadian public on the grounds that it lacks clear objectives and measures of success.24

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The War in Iraq Prime Minister Jean Chretien decided not to join the U.S. ‘‘Coalition of the Willing’’ in the invasion of Iraq, a decision supported by most Canadians. This public position was based on interpretations of international law and on a desire to allow time for due process to take place.25 On the other hand, although sending no troops to Iraq, Canada has aided the U.S. effort there in many ways: (1) Canada helps train police and army officers in postwar Iraq; (2) a Canadian (Jean-Pierre Kingsley) served as head of the international team observing the 2005 Iraqi election; (3) Canadian experts have helped write the new Iraqi constitution; and (4) NORAD-stationed Canadian Air Force troops have flown combat missions in Iraq. To date, five Canadians have died in Iraq.26 CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND PEACE The Canada Sample The PAIRTAPS was completed by 118 Canadians sampled over two time periods. The first time period was during 2007 when 69 surveys were completed. The second time period was in early fall of 2008 when an additional 49 surveys were completed. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 86 and consisted of 64 percent females and 36 percent males. Both the gender makeup and the average ages of the 2007 and 2008 respondents differed substantially. The recruitment method was different as well. The 2007 respondents were recruited through announcements to networks of peace and veterans’ associations. Their average age was 29 years; 75 percent were female and 25 percent were male. The 2008 respondents were recruited during a college class reunion at a university in Manitoba. These Canadians had a mean age of 46; 32 percent were female and 68 percent were male. Some participants in each group completed a paper and pencil version of the survey, whereas others completed it online. The age range and multigenerational characteristics of the sample provide a particular strength of the data set. The respondents’ comments in regard to the following three definitions and seven questions from the larger PAIRTAPS are the main focus of the present chapter. DEFINITIONS OF WAR, PEACE, AND TERRORISM Definition of War In defining ‘‘war,’’ the largest percentage of Canadian respondents (62 percent) referred to military or violent conflict between countries or

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nations. Examples in this category included ‘‘attack of one national army on another country’’; ‘‘armed conflict that is organized and deliberate’’; and ‘‘when a country (group) resorts to military action to satisfy their goals or to resolve an argument.’’ Almost one fifth of the definitions (17 percent) included specific recognition that war is a means to achieving a goal; for example, ‘‘a course of action or state of being in which domination/control are the prime goals of at least one entity’’ and ‘‘violence committed by one country against another in order to fulfill certain principles.’’ Other definitions had similar emphases. Examples included ‘‘Normally war means disciplined hostilities between nation states or hostilities of any kind that may lead to loss of life in a civil conflict within a nation state’’ and ‘‘fighting, physically hurting people in an opposing country.’’ Definition of Peace Somewhat more than half the Canadian respondents defined ‘‘peace’’ negatively in terms of what it was not, defining it as lack of conflict, violence, and/or war. Examples of these definitions included ‘‘Countries/ groups not being at war’’; ‘‘A period of time without war or conflict’’; ‘‘no conflicts between any groups, happy people resolving conflicts without violence’’; and ‘‘the absence of war, torture, and terrorism.’’ Some of these ‘‘negative’’ definitions identified additional ills that were expected to be missing in a state of peace; for example, ‘‘no hate, no discrimination, no racism, no sexism, no hate crimes’’ and ‘‘living in a world with no fear.’’ Some respondents defined peace in ways that revealed their pessimism concerning the achievability of peace (e.g., ‘‘an idealistic, almost impossible situation in which war, torture, terrorism are not needed’’ and ‘‘the best we can hope for in general is a state of non-war’’). One respondent noted that ‘‘In the political arena, peace is absence of war. In personal terms, it is a state of mind.’’ Somewhat less that half (43 percent) of the Canadian respondents defined peace in a more positive way that referred to the presence of something (e.g., a positive process or outcome). Examples included ‘‘Genuine kindness towards all humans, regardless of color, race, economic, or social background’’; ‘‘complete agreement; getting along or at the very least indifference towards other countries’’; ‘‘the state of being where individuals can live in harmony and have established means of settling differences and resolving conflict’’; ‘‘compassion, grace’’; ‘‘respecting one another’’; ‘‘harmony’’; ‘‘utmost cooperation and good faith’’; ‘‘understanding and respect of each other’’; ‘‘an idealistic theory in its pure form’’; ‘‘a situation in which the freedom and dignity of all persons is upheld’’; ‘‘a means to achieve tranquility or harmony with

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yourself or between oneself and others’’; ‘‘a state where citizens can live positive lives and realize their own and their country’s best potentials’’; ‘‘where people of different origins or in different countries live in harmony and respect each other’s beliefs and differences and do not interfere with each other’’; ‘‘a state of lawful cooperation that can only truly exist when individuals, communities, and nations have learned to consider others’ needs and to care for them as for themselves’’; and ‘‘where every one respects one another and where conflicts, inevitable as they are, are resolved through communication, understanding and compromise.’’ One respondent noted, ‘‘I cannot believe that any human being would choose violence above all else. If so, I have no remorse for those individuals because they are not what I would define as human beings.’’ These definitions reflect not only the diverse views toward peace in Canada today, but the repeated themes of multiculturalism, equality, and communication among groups. The ‘‘War on Terror’’ and Canadian Definitions of Terrorism Terrorism is a concern in Canada as elsewhere. The Liberal government of Canada passed the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act in 2001 in response to the September 11 attacks on the United States. This bill extends the powers of government and of the security establishment to respond to the threat of terrorism. The bill was controversial because it was perceived as incompatible with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The bill’s provisions relating to preventive arrest and investigative hearings expired on March 1, 2007, and the House of Commons voted against renewing these provisions. The relative quiet since 2001, however, does not mean that Canada is exempt from terrorist threat. An audiotape in November 2002, thought to be the work of Osama bin Ladin, threatens Canada and five other Western nations because of their involvement in Afghanistan. A group of Jihadists formed an operational cell in Montreal in the 1990s, and the Canadian Security and Intelligence Services (CSIS) warned at that time that Canada was being used as a financial and logistical base for international terrorists seeking to attack the United States. This cell was disbanded in 1999, but another major network has been discovered in Canada, a branch of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad led by Ayman alZawahiri. Today several Islamic Jihad networks are operating throughout Canada. These are composed of three types of substructures: (1) a financial and logistics cell supporting operations overseas by forging documents, raising funds, and sheltering/transporting militants; (2) radical Imams/ideologues taking over mosques, using them to spread jihadist ideology and recruit future terrorists; and (3) operatives

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undertaking attacks, including suicide missions. All three structures share the same ideology. They are being actively countered by American and Canadian security services ‘‘cooperating on an unprecedented scale with their European counterparts to battle an adaptable and determined enemy which shows no signs of retreating.’’27 In response to the item on the PAIRTAPS requesting definitions of ‘‘terrorism,’’ nearly two thirds of the respondents (64 percent) provided definitions that emphasized the motivation or focus of terrorism; for example: to cause fear or harm, or as a movement to destroy democracy or peace. Examples of these definitions included statements such as ‘‘Creation of fear by violent events’’; ‘‘Covert war, meant to kill’’; ‘‘Deliberate actions that are meant to harm people.’’ Approximately one fourth of the responses (24 percent) included the recognition that terrorism is associated with an ideological motivation; for example: ‘‘the intentional killing of innocent persons and spreading of fear to accomplish a particular agenda’’; ‘‘killing civilians to make political or religious statements’’; and ‘‘violence with the express purpose of achieving political objectives that reach beyond the effects of the violence itself.’’

RESPONSES TO SURVEY QUESTIONS All Human Beings Have a Basic Right to Peace There is a strong peace movement in Canada, with leaders like Douglas Roche, member of the Canadian Senate, speaking on human rights and lobbying for the creation of a Department of Peace in Canada. More than half of our survey respondents (54 percent) concurred that it is the right of everyone to live in peace. There were many statements (29 percent) in general agreement with this idea, such as ‘‘All human beings have a right to peace’’ and ‘‘Self-evident truth.’’ Some of the responses (19 percent) focused on the idea that all people deserve the right to live in peace: ‘‘Everybody deserves a world of peace.’’ A few (2 percent) mentioned that there are consequences of not living in peace: ‘‘Peace is our basic nature. As long as our cultures support violence we will have difficulty seeing how dysfunctional it is as an option to anything.’’ Almost a third of the respondents (29 percent) liked the idea of living in peace but felt that it is an ideal and not likely to be achieved: ‘‘Again, in an ideal world! We can only pray!’’ ‘‘Perhaps a Utopian ideal, but one worth striving toward.’’ ‘‘It is a nice thought—marred by reality.’’ Some responses were hopeful of a good outcome in the pursuit of a peaceful world: ‘‘I am not an advocate of violence. I strongly believe in good versus evil. True human beings can achieve compromise in any situation.’’

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Others were pessimistic: ‘‘Agree, but to call it an absolute right is hopelessly idealistic. Justice sometimes is not compatible with peace.’’ Another 7 percent focused on conditions. These respondents made such statements as ‘‘That would require all citizens to be law-abiding and respectful of one another’’ and ‘‘You have a basic right to peace unless you are causing harm to others.’’ Only 7 percent felt that peace is not a right. Is World Peace Achievable? When asked directly whether they believed that achieving world peace would be possible, a small majority of the respondents (53 percent) indicated that they did not hold this belief. Their explanations included ‘‘I think that conflicts will always arise, and the best we can do is try to predict where and when it will happen, and how best to resolve it.’’ ‘‘There will always be something in dispute—unless we’re united in the fight against aliens in outer space.’’ ‘‘Let’s be realistic … at least not until we go to heaven.’’ Many of these responses focused on the intransigence of differences among groups: ‘‘There are too many powers who will not let it happen.’’ ‘‘Currently the world has too many value systems which negate against consistent rights to allow everyone to live with one set of morals.’’ ‘‘Differences are too vast.’’ Some suggested that economic or religious factors would prohibit the achievement of peace: ‘‘Peace is not profitable.’’ ‘‘Until such time as ethnic and religious differences can be subdued and the good of the people raised to the number one priority, world peace will not be achieved.’’ Several respondents attributed the presumed elusiveness of peace directly to human nature or individual characteristics; for example, ‘‘I’m skeptical because it seems to be part of human nature to hate people who are too different from ourselves. ‘‘Human nature is such that this is impossible.’’ ‘‘The will to power of individuals is sufficiently strong as to result in their pursuing conflict and manipulating others to achieve their own ends.’’ ‘‘Not in the near future. Too many people want their own way.’’ Some respondents focused on the characteristics of nations rather than those of individuals; for example, ‘‘There are some countries where war is such a part of the culture, and peace is not an objective. You cannot have peace without wanting peace.’’ ‘‘Not with the U.S. the way it is, not with Israel the way it is, and not with how the Middle East is. Not with how world greed is. The human race takes two steps forward, and then four steps back.’’ ‘‘Sadly I don’t think it will be achieved in my lifetime. There are too many control freaks in power at the moment.’’ Slightly more that one fifth of the respondents (22 percent) believed that world peace is achievable, though many of these respondents viewed it as an ideal or a possibility for the distant future. This more

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optimistic set of responses included the following beliefs: ‘‘We saw miracles happen in the last 20 years. Why not again?’’ ‘‘I have no idea how it will come about, but I do believe it is possible.’’ ‘‘Man is a rational animal. Sooner or later it will become clear to all that either we all live together in peace or perish together.’’ ‘‘I believe we should be guided by this as a goal.’’ There were also several respondents who believed peace is achievable under certain conditions. Examples of these conditions can be seen in the following responses: ‘‘Eventually it may be, but in order for that to happen everyone has to either be accepting of intolerances (each country is its own entity—very little interaction between others) or globally everyone must agree on the same fundamental laws.’’ ‘‘If women were leading all the nations in the world [peace would be attainable].’’ ‘‘If countries began thinking of world good rather than of their individual agendas, other than when their own security is clearly at stake.’’ ‘‘It will take a long time and a lot of effort from everybody but it is doable.’’ ‘‘Humans are learning, more and more, to look for the beauty and the good in another and to accept that there are always multiple ways to do anything. Many of us are finding that travel is a great equalizer and that it is through living in another’s shoes for a time that we can come to a true understanding of the owner of the shoes. Being surrounded by many cultural differences is now seen as the norm and living side by side with people from all around the globe allows the differences to fade out of sight.’’ In contrast to respondents who saw religion as one of the forces working against world peace, there were also a few respondents who believed that religion could provide a path to peace. Such responses included ‘‘I believe if the world powers truly wanted peace and that if all world religious leaders all preached for the requirement of peace it would be achievable.’’ ‘‘The only time the world will achieve peace is when the Lord comes back at the rapture to claim His children.’’ ‘‘Peaceful negotiation and prayer.’’ National Security Exactly half of the respondents (50 percent) agreed that ‘‘National security is necessary for individual and family security.’’ Statements such as ‘‘I think it [national security] is very important to our existence’’ demonstrated this belief. Many of the responses (19 percent) basically reiterated the wording of the item, asserting that family and individual security is dependent on the security of the nation: ‘‘Everyone deserves security; national security helps families be safe.’’ Some respondents argued that it is the obligation of any country to protect its citizens: ‘‘As a species we have structured ourselves into nations, which are basic units for ensuring rights are protected.’’ Others indicated that national security is necessary

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for protection, to ward off threats: ‘‘In our current society, national security is essential for family and individual security. A strong nation can ward off attack.’’ ‘‘People need to feel their borders are safe, before they will see themselves as safe within them.’’ ‘‘I think we need national security to protect us from other countries who may try and take away our freedom.’’ ‘‘No one could possibly be safe unless their nation is, nor can they be happy without peace of mind.’’ Some participants, while agreeing with the importance of national security, also warned about the pitfalls of a preoccupation with or overreliance on it: ‘‘This function should be kept secure and defended if need be, but ‘national security’ is a political term which often has much darker connotations. Not to mention that resisting threats to national security do not necessarily need to involve military operations! Yes, it is essential currently in the sense that it helps to provide a kind of armed peace in the environment. It is not the answer to world peace by any stretch of the imagination.’’ Another 25 percent of the respondents agreed conditionally that national security is necessary: ‘‘Depends on the country. I would think it’s pretty important though.’’ ‘‘I suppose … but really, if you change the situation in the rest of the world, the chance that anyone would want to harm your country is far less.’’ Some of the respondents in this group thought there might be better ways to be safe than reliance on one’s own government (e.g., ‘‘perhaps a security based on international agreements might be superior’’). Others thought that a focus on national security might restrict individual freedoms (e.g., ‘‘only if not at the expense of individual rights and freedoms’’). Still others thought that national security is not equally attainable for everyone: ‘‘The privileged can often find security even if the nation doesn’t have security.’’ ‘‘It is impossible for any government to guarantee 100 percent national security.’’ Finally, 20 percent of the respondents revealed a conviction that national security is not essential because it is an illusion: ‘‘You have to cover yourself … can’t rely on anyone else.’’ Some believed it is not achievable: ‘‘There is no such thing! Efforts to increase awareness and do more for national security only make people more insecure!’’ Others were concerned that it would be too expensive (e.g., ‘‘But it does not come above health and education in terms of expenditure’’) or that it would have other negative consequences (e.g., ‘‘What is entailed in national security and how do my national security measures affect another nation’s security … and their families, etc?’’). Sometimes One Country Has the Right to Invade Another Country Almost two thirds (62 percent) of the respondents believed that sometimes one country has the right to invade another country. A number of

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respondents mentioned historical precedents; for example, noting that the World Wars were justified; others made the argument that the Vietnam and Iraq wars were not justified. People gave various justifications for approving the invasion by one country of another. One of the primary arguments given to support such a right was the need for defense in response to threat; for example, ‘‘if a real, proven imminent threat to the invading country’s citizens exists’’ and ‘‘if the other country is truly a danger to the rest of the world.’’ Other reasons given to justify a governmental right to invasion were to stop genocide, to protect human rights, and for self-defense. Statements such as the following were common: ‘‘Intervention rarely helps, but sometimes there is no alternative if genocide or rampant abuse of life and liberty is occurring.’’ Many respondents mentioned genocide or other serious abuse as a justification: ‘‘Invasion is wrong. However, I do support the bringing in of a UN force where a country’s own government is committing serious crimes against its people.’’ Also mentioned was peacekeeping and the need to respond to countries such as Afghanistan if they ask for help in preserving human rights. Less than one third (27 percent) of the participants took the position that invasion is not a right, making statements such as ‘‘Invasion is not allowed, not right; War is not the answer.’’ Some of these respondents were explicit concerning their belief in the immorality of an invasion: ‘‘Invasion is wrong.’’ ‘‘Invasion is unacceptable.’’ However, even some of the respondents who said there was no governmental right to aggression included provisos such as ‘‘I do support the bringing in of a UN force where a country’s own government is committing serious crimes against its people.’’ A few participants said that there were better ways of handling conflict: ‘‘Other measures could be used such as boycotting that country or helping its citizens by lifting them out.’’ Civilian Casualties in the War on Terror Over two thirds of the respondents (69 percent) expressed strong disagreement with the item ‘‘Sometimes the heads of government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism,’’ and only 10 percent thought governments had such a right. A few respondents (4 percent) qualified the right or (6 percent) thought there could be acceptable reasons for such killing. Those opposed were often unequivocal: ‘‘No, there is never this right.’’ ‘‘No person or authority has the right to harm or to authorize that others harm another person.’’ ‘‘It should be avoided at all costs.’’ Quite a few respondents argued that killing innocent civilians would be, in effect, state terrorism: ‘‘This would make them no better than the terrorists themselves.’’ Some

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stressed that killing innocent civilians is a moral issue: ‘‘Moral issue. ‘Do unto others as you would have others do unto you.’’’ ‘‘Again, ‘Thou shalt not kill.’’’ Others emphasized the wrong in killing innocent people: ‘‘Cannot kill innocent people on purpose.’’ ‘‘No innocent civilians should be intentionally harmed in the fight against terrorism. Accidental civilian casualties should also be kept to a minimum.’’ ‘‘I agree that terrorism is a global problem, but to say that the government has the right to kill innocent civilians to further that cause is not right at all.’’ Some pointed out that such killing has negative consequences: ‘‘The injuring of even one civilian turns the population against the attacking government; this is not only inhumane, but also counterproductive.’’ ‘‘Ineffective method of ‘solving’ terrorism.’’ The few who viewed such killing as a governmental right in the war on terror often used the term ‘‘collateral damage’’: ‘‘Unfortunately in warlike conditions what is now called ‘collateral damage’ is sometimes unavoidable.’’ ‘‘Collateral damage happens. It’s regrettable, but often necessary for the greater good … as in bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which was necessary, I think. Sometimes citizens have to accept retribution caused by their own governments.’’ ‘‘Ideally no; realistically, hell yes.’’ ‘‘Most people would think very long and hard about specific circumstances if they ever encountered dilemmas like the ones mentioned. It is very easy to believe in an ideology but very difficult to live one.’’ The few respondents who qualified this right said that such killing could take place only if it cannot be avoided: ‘‘Only when unavoidable and after taking all precautions possible to avoid it. It is often unavoidable in Israel, for instance.’’ ‘‘War always has innocent casualties. Only when the government or group has the direct premeditated intention to kill innocents, is it then murder and not war.’’ Torturing Prisoners of War Three fourths (75 percent) of the respondents disagreed with the statement ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war.’’ Slightly fewer than one fifth (17 percent) agreed with the statement, and the remainder indicated that they were not sure or did not answer the question. Those who disagreed with the statement gave a variety of reasons. Many were based on principle (25 percent) or not specified (20 percent). For example, reasons based on principles included ‘‘Again, no person has the right to harm another.’’ ‘‘Moral issue, do unto others as you would have others do unto you.’’ ‘‘Should never stoop to this level of human nature.’’ ‘‘The prisoners are not fighting for themselves, they are fighting for their country, they themselves do not deserve to be tortured for a broader reason.’’ ‘‘In many cases—at

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least in our current war—our soldiers may not be in complete support for the reasons of the war they’re fighting in, yet they have no other choice. This is completely possible in other countries as well.’’ ‘‘Barbaric and inhumane treatment should not be allowed!’’ ‘‘Risk of torturing the innocent.’’ A related set of responses focused on torture as a violation of human rights or international law: ‘‘Basic human rights should be upheld at all times by all people.’’ ‘‘It’s a violation of human rights.’’ ‘‘Counter to international agreements.’’ ‘‘It may be tempting but should never happen, against international law.’’ In contrast to arguments based on principle, some participants took a more pragmatic approach, emphasizing that torture is an ineffective or misguided procedure: ‘‘It’s not only a violation of human rights, but it tends to produce bad information.’’ ‘‘Never, no matter what. Torture does not lead to accurate confessions and is intolerable.’’ Another one fifth of the respondents (20 percent) disagreed but did not provide reasons. Comments from this group included ‘‘There should be no torture—under any circumstances.’’ ‘‘The government has no such right.’’ ‘‘There is never an excuse for torture.’’ ‘‘Never, never.’’ Of the 17 percent who agreed with the statement ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war,’’ the reasons were varied and included the protection of human rights and the usefulness of torture. For example, ‘‘I can easily imagine situations where the prisoner would hold the key to saving the lives of many. This is very difficult.’’ ‘‘In extreme cases where highly knowledgeable people were captured and the information they could provide may save thousands of innocent lives, I may be okay with that.’’ A Right to Protest? Almost two thirds of the respondents (63 percent) agreed that ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace,’’ but commented that this right has qualifications or exists because of legal codes. The other one third (32 percent) believed that freedom of speech is a basic civil right and therefore a right without qualification. None of our respondents (0 percent) said that being able to protest is NOT a right. The qualification mentioned most often is that protests must be nonviolent. Sample statements expressing this idea were ‘‘Everyone’s opinion must be heard; they must be peaceful protests, though—no violence or aggression.’’ ‘‘Providing the protests are peaceful … and don’t escalate into mobs and rioting. Also, the opinions of those who are in favour of war must be respected. Debate is healthy and a good thing, mobs are not.’’ ‘‘Yes, everyone has the right to demonstrate, but there is a fine

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line between stating opinions and hatemongering in political activism.’’ ‘‘Yes, of course, as a broad right, but within reasonable limits to protect the liberties of others and public order.’’ Another common argument made in support of the right to protest is that it is socially sanctioned: ‘‘It’s in the constitution’’; ‘‘Yes. In democratic countries people have the right to express their thoughts.’’ Those who considered protest against war to be an inherent right made such statements as: ‘‘Individuals have the right to protest for peace’’; ‘‘Everyone should have the basic right to voice his or her opinions’’; ‘‘Individuals have the right of free speech’’; ‘‘It is part of our civil duties to be able to protest.’’

SUMMARY OF MAJOR THEMES AND CONCLUSIONS Although more than half of the Canadian respondents believe that all humans have a basic right to peace, a substantial number expressed the tension between peace as an ideal and peace as a reality. However, when asked if they believe that world peace can be achieved, an equal number report that it cannot be achieved. They gave reasons that included the intractability of human nature, human differences, and aggressive individuals and governments. To what extent do Canadians believe that the achievement and maintenance of peace is a responsibility of their government? Exactly half of the respondents felt that national security is essential for the safety of individuals and families. One in five of the respondents commented emphatically with phrases such as ‘‘No one could possibly be safe unless their nation is’’ or ‘‘I think it is very important to our existence.’’ Another 25 percent agreed with some qualification that national security is necessary to individual and family security. Only 20 percent felt it is not necessary. Thus, a majority of Canadians believe that peace is a human right, yet perhaps not achievable, and a large majority believe that individual and family security depends on, and is a duty of, the government. What, then, are their views regarding governmental use of force to pursue these ends? Almost two thirds of Canadians believe that there are times when one country has the right to invade another country. Conditions under which this is permissible include self-defense, to stop genocide, and to protect human rights. Many respondents cited World Wars I and II as being examples of justified invasion. Slightly less than a third believe that invasion is not a right, and their comments suggest that they consider it to never be acceptable. When asked if the heads of government have the right to kill innocent citizens in order to fight international terrorism, more than two thirds were emphatically opposed. Only 10 percent

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thought this a right of government, and an additional 10 percent commented that there might be acceptable reasons such as killing a few to protect the many. Finally, when asked if the government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war, a full three fourths said, ‘‘No.’’ The reasons were based primarily on principle or were unspecified. A few believe that in any case torture is not effective or would likely produce bad information. Slightly less than a fifth believe that the government does have the right to order torture in time of war and their reasons were varied. Some respondents believe that torture can sometimes provide useful information and potentially save many lives. The responses to the above six survey items make clear how diverse and nuanced are the attitudes of Canadians regarding the difficult issues of war, peace, terrorism, and security. Clearly, there is a strong idealism among many Canadians, while at the same time, a pragmatic understanding of the difficult choices that are often involved. Canadians struggle with this tension and are articulate in expressing their views. It is within this context that we comment on the seventh survey question regarding whether individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace. Nearly two thirds of the respondents believe that individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace but that this right has qualifications. The qualification most often mentioned is that the protests must be nonviolent. A further one third believe that it is a right without qualification. Not a single respondent believes that being able to protest is not a right. Thus, it is clear that, while Canadians struggle with the hard choices and, on many of these choices do not agree, they are united in their support for open discussion and the right to disagree. The Canadian voices captured with the PAIRTAPS provide a rich cross section of the views that describe Canada’s role in the international arena. Canada is the world’s second largest country in terms of geographic area, surpassed only by Russia, and followed by the United States. However, as one of the most sparsely populated countries in the world, with a population of only 33 million, Canada has had only modest influence in world affairs. Thus, typically Canada has participated in military conflicts as a partner with other countries. In the past, these partnerships were often driven by emotional ties to England and France. Since World War II, they have more often been based on proximity to and shared values with the United States as well as economic integration with the United States. Despite this reliance on other countries, Canada has charted her own course in a number of distinctive ways. As a member of the United Nations, Canada has played a leading role in UN peacekeeping efforts. This role began in 1956 during the Suez Crisis, when Prime Minister

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Lester B. Pearson proposed setting up the United Nations Peacekeeping Force to ease tensions.28 Subsequently, Canada served in 50 peacekeeping missions, including every UN peacekeeping effort up to 1989. Canada supports and participates in peacekeeping operations led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the African Union (AU). In so doing, Canada helps bring security, stability, and support to volatile situations. Canada also helps provide the means for reconstruction and development that involves interconnected military, diplomatic, and humanitarian tasks. In addition to the above tasks, Canada maintains forces in several beleaguered countries, such as Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Clearly, peacekeeping is an ongoing primary concern for Canada. In the five years ending in 1996, the UN set up 24 new peacekeeping missions. More conflicts are now internal and therefore harder to define and ameliorate, requiring people with a greater mix of skills to deal with them. Experts needed may include regional and municipal administrators; judges and prosecutors; media, health, tax and social policy advisors; child protection experts; facilitators and mediators; and even personnel to manage railways, sewage treatment, and other basic services.29 Peace education is also important in Canada and is a chief concern of Peace Research: The Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies.30 Finally, for those interested in knowing more about Canada, here are some useful references: If you have a particular interest in Canadian history, see A History of the Canadian Peoples, Third Edition, by J. M. Bumstead.31 If you have a particular interest in Canada’s military history, see A Military History of Canada by Desmond Morton.32 If you have a particular interest in Canada’s role in World War II, see ‘‘Canada at War,’’ from the Archives of Maclean’s magazine.33

11

An Integrative Conclusion for Volume 1 Andrea E. Mercurio

How do ordinary citizens from around the world conceptualize global issues such as peace, war, terrorism, and torture? What are their views on governmental involvement in national and international conflicts? Do they think a peaceful world is truly possible? Or is peace viewed as an unattainable, illusive ideal? The authors of Volume 1 in this series give voice to the perspectives of laypeople from eight nations of the Western world, two from North America and six from Western Europe, thereby providing a range of very personal perspectives on these and other eminent questions. Moreover, the volume includes two chapters representing the United States (one focusing on the European American majority and one on the major ethnic groups within the United States) and two chapters representing the United Kingdom (one on Great Britain and one on Northern Ireland) based on the assumption that historical differences based on relative power and experiences with aggression may have led to different views within these different national groups. As indicated in chapter 1, there are important differences as well as similarities among the countries addressed in this volume in regard to their experiences with governmental and other forms of aggression. For example, some of these countries have invaded other countries. Many but not all (e.g., Sweden) were involved in World Wars I and II. Most but not all have some level of involvement in the ‘‘war on terrorism.’’ Some of these countries, like the United States, have not experienced much political violence inside their borders in the recent past but have been involved in a considerable number of international conflicts. Some countries, like the United Kingdom, particularly Northern Ireland, have experienced more recent episodes of violence in their homelands. In addition, these

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countries vary in the extent to which they have been actively involved in conflict resolution and peacekeeping missions. For instance, in 2007, the contribution of personnel to peacekeeping missions from the countries considered in this volume ranged from 21 from the small new nation of Serbia to 316 from the United States and 362 from the United Kingdom (including Northern Ireland).1 In the chapters in this volume, the authors endeavored not just to provide a historical and political context for contemporary perspectives on governmental peace and aggression in their countries but also to share the views of citizens from those countries who responded to our survey, the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS). The authors make no claim of having recruited nationally representative samples, but they do believe that the voices of their participants should be heard. The chapters provide a rare look into the minds of the average citizen, exploring how contemporary views on important global issues may be shaped by current and historical differences in social, political, cultural, and economic circumstances. The challenges involved in making cross-national comparisons of perspectives on peace and war presented in this concluding chapter are not inconsequential. Wide-ranging sample sizes, convenience sampling, and mixed data-analytic strategies, to name a few, hamper the ability to make straightforward and clear-cut comparisons as well as to draw precise conclusions. Nonetheless, and despite these barriers, an integration of the preceding chapters is a unique opportunity to compare the views of everyday people from a number of Western nations, with an emphasis on the underlying themes that emerged from a grounded theory approach. In this final chapter, I first highlight some of the major themes that surfaced in response to selected PAIRTAPS items addressing issues of governmental aggression, pointing out both themes that are prominent in all countries studied and themes that are particularly characteristic of one or more of the countries compared to the others. Then I provide a similar analysis for themes related to peace. Finally, I consider the extent to which the themes seem to reflect particular patterns of experience within the selected countries. ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR, TORTURE, AND TERRORISM Across countries, participant definitions of war often identified it as a state of conflict or fighting between or among nations, groups, or militaries. Although these responses are quite consistent with basic and common definitions of the term ‘‘war’’ such as might be found in a dictionary, in each country there were also participants who gave more emotional or evaluative definitions of war. For example, some

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participants provided definitions that identified war with the negative outcomes that often accompany war and war-related activities, such as destruction, violence, and death. Swedish respondents included the death of innocent people and the emotional and physical injuries that may occur as a result of violent conflict in their characterization of the concept of war. In some countries, participants included references to the causes of war in their definitions. For instance, 18 percent of the Spanish sample highlighted economic and political interests as a catalyst for armed conflict between nations. Within the United States ethnic minority sample, a larger percentage (i.e., 30 percent) characterized war as unjust and unnecessary than as having a functional and just purpose (i.e., 15 percent). It is interesting that Spanish participants, compared to participants from other countries, tended to use more vivid and emotionally charged descriptors when elaborating on their concept of war. Participants in other countries, like Sweden and Great Britain, also used expressive language to describe war but appeared to do so to a lesser extent. Analysis of PAIRTAPS items related to the government’s involvement in invasion, torture, and terrorism revealed some interesting differences in views among respondents across various countries. In regard to rating scale responses to the item ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country,’’ approximately 50 percent or more of respondents from the U.S. majority and ethnic minority samples, Great Britain, Canada, and Iceland, expressed some level of agreement with such a right. Moreover, supportive arguments were given by at least 60 percent of the participants from the U.S. European American and ethnic minority samples, Great Britain, and Canada. Across countries, justifications for invasion often centered on delivering humanitarian aid, protecting basic rights, and acting in response to threat or in self-defense. In European Americans, the most frequent justifications concerned providing humanitarian aid (26 percent) and responding to threats (17 percent). Similarly, in support of invasion, U.S. ethnic minorities commonly emphasized protective and humanitarian efforts (27 percent), with defending against an external threat as the second most common justification (close to 22 percent). Support for invasion as a means of protecting oneself from preemptive threats or in selfdefense is consistent with research linking threatening events with increased prejudice and aggressive attitudes.2,3 The prominence of this theme in the U.S. samples may be related to relatively recent and novel experiences with terrorism on U.S. soil (i.e., the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks), although the authors of the European American chapter point out the long history of U.S. involvement in armed conflict around the world.

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Less support for a governmental right to invade was seen in Spain, France, Portugal, Northern Ireland, and Sweden. Of those who provided specific rationales, common responses included the right of each country to remain sovereign and independent; the availability of superior, more effective alternatives to invasion; and the objectionable ulterior motives underlying the decision to invade. However, even in countries where the right to invade was strongly opposed by the majority of respondents, there were still some participants who supported the right in extreme or extenuating circumstances. Cases meeting the criteria of an exception to the general view of ‘‘no right to invade’’ concerned acting in self-defense or when a country may be engaging in genocide or other forms of human rights violations. Appeals to past historical events were used in justifications for both pro and con beliefs in the acceptability of one country’s invasion of another. The need for military interventions in World War II and against the Nazi regime were invoked by participants from a number of countries (e.g., U.S. ethnic minorities, Great Britain, and France) as reasons why governments need a right to invade other countries. In contrast, the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was invoked as a counterexample to the acceptability of a right to invasion by U.S. European Americans and ethnic minorities, as well as participants from Great Britain, Canada, and Sweden. It is not surprising that past events like World War II and the Iraq war were called to mind by participants as they were formulating their explanations. Researchers have noted that people will often use past events as an interpretive framework for making sense of the present.4 In most countries, there appeared to be stronger and more consistent rejection of a governmental right to torture than to a governmental right to invasion. In response to the item ‘‘sometimes the government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in times of war,’’ a sizable majority of participants in most countries disagreed with this statement. It is notable that over 80 percent of participants from Spain, Sweden, Portugal, and Iceland expressed some level of disagreement, either through quantitative ratings or through written explanations, against the right to use torture in times of war. The Canadian sample was not far behind, with 75 percent opposed to torture tactics. A majority of European Americans also expressed views against the use of torture, but respondents from Great Britain, France, and Northern Ireland appeared to be more polarized on the issue. When participants provided rationales against a governmental right to torture, many referred to the issue of human rights, suggesting that torture tactics are immoral and a violation of basic, individual rights. The focus on the infringement of human rights of those being tortured was a consistent theme across countries. Participants who showed some tolerance for torture suggested that it

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may be acceptable if used to protect citizens. It is interesting that judgments concerning the utility (or inutility) of torture as a tactic were provided both by supporters and rejectors of torture. Specifically, some participants argued that torture was a practical and beneficial strategy for gathering valuable information for the government. In contrast, others alleged that torture was an ineffective strategy. Other views on government-related aggression were assessed through analysis of responses to the item ‘‘Sometimes the heads of government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism.’’ Similar to patterns observed for other items, a substantial majority in most countries disagreed either completely or to some extent with the notion that innocent lives are expendable in order to combat terrorism. Spanish respondents were particularly opposed, as 87 percent of the sample disagreed, while Northern Ireland, Canada, and Portugal had around 70 percent of their respondents showing disapproval. Responses from Great Britain were not as consistent in their rejection, as only 55 percent of the arguments from their participants were classified into a category rejecting a governmental right to kill innocent civilians in the fight against terrorism. Arguments challenging a government’s right to fight terrorism in ways that killed innocent people were varied and sometimes very general. However, participants from a number of countries emphasized the idea that the government does not have the right to kill people who are by definition innocent and that killing innocent people violates the sanctity of life. Another argument suggested that when governments kill innocent people in the name of fighting terrorism, they are engaging in terrorist acts themselves. Respondents equating ‘‘collateral damage’’ with terrorism came from most nations, including the United States (European Americans), Canada, Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden. Furthermore, there were respondents from the United States (ethnic minorities), Sweden, Portugal, Spain, France, and Canada who asserted that better alternatives are available to governments, and thus civilian deaths are avoidable and preventable. Participants demonstrating some tolerance for a government’s right to kill innocent civilians or qualifying the right indicated that civilian casualties may be inevitable in extreme circumstances, especially when such losses are an unavoidable side effect of actions allegedly designed to save more lives or for the protection of the people. Thus, there appears to be willingness by some to sacrifice lives for the ‘‘greater good’’ or as a last resort if no other alternatives can be identified. The qualifying statements may again be a reflection of how feelings of insecurity or threat may prompt some individuals to express more tolerance for aggressive actions5,6 than they would otherwise endorse.

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VIEWS ON PEACE AND NATIONAL SECURITY Some scholars have conceptualized peace as consisting of both positive and negative dimensions.7 Negative peace generally refers to the absence of physical violence, war, and conflict. Positive peace, in contrast, incorporates such concepts as harmony and integration8 and concerns ‘‘the promotion of social arrangements that reduce social, racial, gender, economic, and ecological injustices as barriers to peace.’’9 Creating positive peace is designed to reduce or eliminate what is known as structural violence. Structural violence, as opposed to overt physical violence, entails the organization and arrangement of institutions in ways that promote social, economic, and even political advantages for some individuals over others. Such hierarchical social structures result in inequalities in society.10 Accordingly, a state of positive peace is one where social injustices are reduced or eliminated and cooperative group relations are pursued. Consequently, a complete understanding of peace appears to involve consideration of both the absence of violence (negative peace) as well as the positive features of peace, including societal structures that promote social justice and equality among all.11 An examination of definitions of peace across chapters indicated that participants most often provided negative conceptions of peace, which included references to lack of fighting, conflict, and war-related activities. All chapter authors who considered the themes of positive and negative peace when analyzing the definitions reported that about half or a little over half conceptualized the concept in negative terms. This included participants from the United States (ethnic minorities and European Americans), Canada, Great Britain, Iceland, Sweden, and Ireland. In addition to referring to peace as a lack of conflict, 7 percent of European American participants also defined peace as the absence of a negative feeling. It is possible that participants may describe peace more frequently in negative terms because it is easier to conjure up images of death, destruction, and violence than of harmony and cooperation—perhaps in part because of the kinds of stories that predominate in the media. However, while negative descriptions of peace appeared to dominate slightly, it is noteworthy that respondents understood peace in positive terms as well. Indeed, there was mention of fair distribution of resources, equality, human rights, a state of happiness and well-being, living in harmony, and cooperation. In fact, 72 percent of participants from France described peace positively compared to 27 percent who described it negatively; perhaps it is because of their strong commitment to positive peace that France so strongly opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Across nations, there was marked similarity in viewpoints acknowledging an individual’s right to peace as well as an individual’s right to

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stage protests against war and in favor of peace. Approximately half or more than half of participants from most nations frequently stated in general and emphatic terms that human beings have the right to peace and that this is a fundamental and basic right—as indeed is indicated in the United Nations Charter. In fact, in some countries, like Portugal, participants often explained their support in ways that made it seem as though the right was self-evident and not in need of further clarification. Similarly, most participants across countries agreed that people have a right to participate in war protests. However, in all of the countries considered in this volume, there were participants who qualified this right by suggesting that demonstrations required peaceful and nonviolent activity. Given that the vast majority of respondents supported the right to peace and the right to peacefully protest war, it is interesting how much uncertainty was expressed about the possibilities of realizing a state of peace in modern society. A tone of doubt and ambivalence was particularly evident in responses alluding to the notion of peace as a ‘‘dream’’ or ‘‘utopia.’’ A common theme emerging from respondents from a variety of nations referenced the shortcomings of human nature and mankind, the desire for power and economic resources, and cultural or religious differences as obstacles to realizing peace around the world. Disagreement with the likelihood of attaining world peace was particularly apparent in the Spanish sample, where approximately 78 percent of respondents expressed their reservations. In a few countries, a slight majority of the participants at least partly or conditionally agreed with the achievability of world peace. In Sweden, for example, slightly more than half of the participants agreed or at least partly agreed that peace could be achieved. As discussed in chapter 8, Sweden has been able to sustain peaceful relations for almost 200 years and has established progressive policies geared toward promoting social justice and gender equality among its people. Thus, it perhaps is not surprising that the Swedish sample shows one of the highest levels of optimism concerning the potential for peace. Respondents from several of the participating countries were asked to provide suggestions on the best way to achieve world peace. Respondents from Northern Ireland mentioned negotiation and ending violence. The Spanish and Swedish samples emphasized positive dimensions of peace such as respect and tolerance for individuals from different cultures, education, the use of nonviolent conflict resolution strategies, and the promotion of social justice and human rights. It is important that in these responses there is recognition by participants that a state of peace involves more than just the absence of violence and conflict among people.

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Around half of the participants from most of the countries surveyed on perspectives toward national security agreed with the notion that national security is essential for individual and family security. Spanish participants were somewhat less likely to agree with this idea than participants from other countries. Participants who elaborated on their views about national security often made general statements in support of their position. For example, in some countries, like Spain and Iceland, participants tended simply to agree that security at the individual and family level was dependent upon establishing security at the national level. The need to feel safe and secure, especially from terrorism and future terrorist attacks, was also mentioned by U.S. European Americans and participants from Northern Ireland. The connection made between security and the threat of terrorist acts is part of the national political discourse on security in some nations (e.g., the United States and Great Britain) and is often reinforced in the media. The ongoing emphasis on this ‘‘threat’’ is argued to create a culture of fear among the people, and attention is then diverted away from other, serious problems such as poverty and disease.12 A frequent theme in Spanish responses involved recognition that national and international security were mutually dependent and that this relation may be threatened when a country implements bad foreign policies. Some respondents who expressed doubts about the necessity of national security for individual and family security alluded to the possible ulterior motives of government military operations executed to increase or maintain national security. Suspicion of government motives may not be unfounded, as scholars have noted that leaders may attempt to persuade citizens that force is primarily for protection from direct and immediate threats when in reality they may support its use for broader purposes.13

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS Although issues of peace, war, and other forms of aggression are not new, the current social and political climate and recent worldwide concern over terrorism has increased attention in these areas. The preceding chapters in the current volume were designed to capture the authentic voices of ordinary people from a sample of Western countries on critical topics related to peace and war. Our hope was to uncover themes that were both common across nations as well as unique to particular nations. It is noteworthy that notions of a right to peace and a right to protest against war were strongly supported by most participants across countries, and yet skepticism outweighed beliefs in the

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possibility of peace. These less than hopeful attitudes seen across nations may be a reflection of ongoing conflicts and violence around the world that are often highlighted in the media. Media attention and prowar propaganda may help fuel the assumption that human nature inevitably leads to conflict, aggression, and war, while a state of peace is always more likely to be fleeting. According to some researchers, this assumption is flawed, dangerous, and inconsistent with empirical evidence.14 Individuals clearly have the capacity to make war, but a predisposition to such activity is not necessarily inherent and immutable. Correcting the misperception that war and aggression will always prevail over peace is something that deserves increased attention in future peace-building efforts. Even when suggesting that at times certain aggressive strategies may be justified, respondents in many countries seemed to question the motives behind government decisions to use aggressive tactics. Indeed, respondents specifically mentioned abuse of power by countries like the United States. Reference to U.S. military activity was often included in arguments about why it is not justifiable for governments to invade, use torture, or kill innocent civilians. In fact, there was at least some spontaneous reference to U.S. military operations or U.S. foreign policies in all countries surveyed. Some supportive statements were made regarding U.S. involvement in armed conflict, particularly with respect to the first U.S. invasion of Iraq. However, responses appeared to reflect opposition to, more than support for, U.S. policies and military interventions. For example, references in countries such as Great Britain, Sweden, and Canada to the more recent 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq were included in arguments against invasion. Even in responses from U.S. European Americans and ethnic minorities, there was suspicion and uncertainty regarding the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003. A number of Swedish respondents were especially critical of the U.S. invasion of Iraq when elaborating on their explanations of whether the government has the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism. Although it is difficult to draw strong conclusions about differences in views toward peace and government aggression across countries, it does seem that less tolerance of violence and war-related activities was seen more consistently in countries like Portugal, Iceland, Sweden, and Spain than in the other countries. This is perhaps not surprising because in the recent past the governments of these countries have taken a less aggressive and direct approach to involvement in international conflicts than countries like the United States and Great Britain. The greater reluctance to advance justifications for the use of aggression characteristic of respondents in countries such as Sweden and Iceland may also

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derive, in part, from the relatively peaceful historical climates of these nations. In contrast, countries like the United States and its ally Great Britain have taken stronger political stances on issues such as economic globalization and the aggressive promotion of ‘‘national security’’ that may foster greater acceptance of governmental aggression and warrelated activity. Overall, it appears that participants from a diverse set of nations reported remarkably similar views on a number of important issues related to peace and war. The relevance of this point should not be understated. Perhaps a small but significant step toward creating a more peaceful world involves recognition that people from varied backgrounds, with distinctive social, cultural, and political histories, hold perspectives that are more the same than they are different. Such recognition of similarities in fears and hopes across nations provides a basis for empathy, understanding, and negotiation. Moreover, recognition of the ways in which people in power, and often their supportive media, demonize the ‘‘enemy’’ of the moment, disseminate rationales justifying their own aggression, provoke fear and hostility toward ‘‘outsiders,’’ and strive to intensify anger over presumed injustices—endeavors that find expression in the cognitions and emotions of ordinary people—can also move people in the direction of embracing the positive features of their shared humanity and move them away from assuming that all humans are inevitably and inescapably selfish, dangerous, and destructive.

Notes

Set Introduction 1. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, 1945. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1. 2. Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 894. 3. Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, ‘‘Armed Conflict and Its International Dimensions, 1946–2004,’’ Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 5 (2005): 623–35. 4. Human Security Centre (2005), Human Security Report 2005 Fact Sheet. (Vancouver, BC: University of British Colombia), http://www.humansecurityreport.org/press/Armed_Conflict-Factsheet. 5. Robert M. Sapolsky, ‘‘A Natural History of Peace,’’ Foreign Affairs 85, no. 1 (2006): 104–20. 6. Peaceful Societies: Alternatives to Violence and War, ‘‘Encyclopedia of Selected Peaceful Societies,’’ http://www.peacefulsocieties.org:80/Society/ intro. 7. Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Palgrave, 2000). 8. Office of the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights, ‘‘Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,’’ http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cat.htm. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984, entry into force 26 June 1987, in accordance with article 27 (1). 9. Office of the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights, ‘‘Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace,’’ http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ peace.htm. Approved by General Assembly resolution 39/11 of 12 November 1984.

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10. Office of the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights, ‘‘Convention on the Rights of the Child,’’ http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, entry into force 2 September 1990, in accordance with article 49. 11. United Nations, ‘‘Charter of the United Nations,’’ http://www.un.org/ aboutun/charter/. 12. United Nations, ‘‘Charter of the United Nations.’’ 13. United Nations, ‘‘Charter of the United Nations.’’ 14. C. Enemark and C. Michaelsen, ‘‘Just War Doctrine and the Invasion of Iraq,’’ Australian Journal of Politics and History 51, no. 4 (2005): 545–63. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2000). 15. Enemark and Michaelsen, ‘‘Just War Doctrine and the Invasion of Iraq.’’ 16. Laurie Calhoun, ‘‘Legitimate Authority and ‘Just War’ in the Modern World,’’ Peace and Change 27, no. 1 (2002), 37–62. 17. Nicholas Rengger, ‘‘On the Just War Tradition in the Twenty-First Century,’’ International Affairs 78, 2 (2002): 353–63. 18. In our view, ‘‘race’’ is a social construct lacking a biological basis. 19. Kathleen Malley-Morrison, International Perspectives on Family Violence and Abuse (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004). 20. A. Strauss and J. Corbin, ‘‘Grounded Theory Methodology: An Overview,’’ in Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry, ed. N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1998), 273–85. 21. Johan Galtung, ‘‘Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses,’’ Journal of Peace Research 22, no. 2 (1985): 141–58.

Chapter 1 1. Politically, the term ‘‘Great Britain’’ refers to the countries inhabiting the largest island in Europe—England, Scotland, and Wales—whereas the ‘‘United Kingdom’’ includes Great Britain and Northern Ireland. (Northern Ireland is considered in chapter 2.) 2. Marvin Perry, ‘‘The Rise of Europe: Fusion of Classical, Christian and German Traditions,’’ in Western Civilization: A Brief History, 2nd ed (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1993), 138–75. 3. John Guy, ‘‘The Tudor Age (1485–1603),’’ in The Oxford History of Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 257–326. 4. John Morrill, ‘‘The Stuarts (1603–1688),’’ in The Oxford History of Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 327–98. 5. Paul Langford, ‘‘The Eighteenth Century (1688–1789),’’ in The Oxford History of Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 399–469. 6. Christopher Harvie, ‘‘Revolution and the Rule of Law,’’ in The Oxford History of Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 470–517.

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7. Kenneth Morgan, ‘‘The Twentieth Century,’’ in The Oxford History of Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 582–680. 8. Lawrence Butler, Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-imperial World (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2002). 9. Anthony Heath, Jean Martin, and Gabriella Elgenius, ‘‘Who Do We Think We Are? The Decline of Traditional Social Identities,’’ in British Social Attitudes: the 23rd Report. Perspectives on a Changing Society, eds. Alison Park, John Curtice, Katarina Thomson, Miranda Phillips, and Mark Johnson (London: Sage Publications, 2007), 1–34. 10. Commonwealth Secretariat, ‘‘Member States,’’ http://www.thecommonwealth.org/ Internal/142227/members/ (accessed September 25, 2001). 11. United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ‘‘World Population Prospects. The 2004 Revision,’’ http://www.un. org/esa/population/publications/WPP2004/wpp2004.htm (accessed September 25, 2001). 12. Commission for Racial Equality, ‘‘Ethnic Minorities in Great Britain: Factfile 2,’’ http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/Documents/Race/General%20 advice%20and%20information/CRE%20factfile2%20ethnic%20minorities%20in%20 Britain.pdf (accessed September 26, 2008). 13. Office for National Statistics, ‘‘Census, April 2001,’’ http://www.ons.gov. uk/census/ index.html (accessed September 26, 2006). 14. Kenneth Morgan, ‘‘The Twentieth Century,’’ in The Oxford History of Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 582–680. 15. Commission for Racial Equality, ‘‘Ethnic Minorities in Great Britain: Factfile 2,’’ http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/Documents/Race/General%20 advice%20and%20information/CRE%20factfile2%20ethnic%20minorities%20in% 20Britain.pdf (accessed September 26, 2008). 16. Office for National Statistics, ‘‘Census, April 2001,’’ http://www.ons.gov. uk/census/ index.html (accessed September 26, 2006). 17. UK Immigration News, ‘‘Eastern European Immigration Statistics Released by UK,’’ http://www.workpermit.com/news/2008-05-20/uk/unitedkingdom-accession-monitoring-figures-released.htm (accessed September 26, 2008). 18. National Statistic, ‘‘International Migration: Migrants Entering or Leaving the United Kingdom and Wales, 2005. Series MN, no 32,’’ http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/ theme_population/MN_no32.pdf (accessed September 26, 2008). 19. Dominic Ponsford, ‘‘Sun Accused of Swan Bake ‘myth-making’,’’ Press Gazette, December 19, 2003, http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=24624§ioncode=1 (accessed September 26, 2008). 20. Home Office Statistical Bulletin, ‘‘Control of Migration: Statistics United Kingdom 2007,’’ http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs08/hosb1008.pdf (accessed September 26, 2008). 21. Ronald Hyam, ‘‘Cyprus and Enosis,’’ in Britain’s Declining Empire. The Road to Decolonization, 1919–1968 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 150–3.

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22. Ronald Hyam, ‘‘Egypt: Decline and Fall,’’ in Britain’s Declining Empire. The Road to Decolonization, 1919–1968 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 221–40. 23. Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign (London: Routledge, 2005). 24. BBC, ‘‘Mother of all Battles begins,’’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/ hi/dates/stories/january/17/newsid_2530000/2530375.stm (accessed September 1, 2008). 25. Staff Journalist, ‘‘Leaders: How Will History Judge Him; Tony Blair,’’ The Economist, May 12, 2007. 26. Kathleen Malley-Morrison et al., ‘‘International perspectives on war and peace.’’ Peace Psychology 1, no. 1 (spring 2006): 6–7. 27. Owen Bowcott and Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘‘Braving Hostilities in the Name of Peace: Doubts Grow Over Britain’s Growing Role as a Peace Enforcer Around the Globe,’’ The Guardian, August 28, 2001, 4. 28. Daniel McGrory and Stewart Tendler, ‘‘The Concrete Sign of London’s Changing Face Upsets Tourists,’’ The Times, May 24, 2003. 29. Jonathan Calvert and David Lepard, ‘‘CCTV and Phone Records May Yield Vital Clues,’’ The Sunday Times, July 1, 2007. 30. Mark Johnson and Conor Gearty, ‘‘Civil Liberties and the Challenges of Terrorism,’’ in British Social Attitudes: the 23rd Report. Perspectives on a Changing Society, eds. Alison Park, John Curtice, Katarina Thomson, Miranda Phillips, and Mark Johnson (London: Sage Publications, 2007), 143–74. 31. Staff Journalist, ‘‘Survey: Opinions on Conflict,’’ The Independent, December 12, 2007, News & Advice. 32. Staff Journalist, The Independent, December 12, 2007. 33. Mark Johnson and Conor Gearty, ‘‘Civil Liberties and the Challenges of Terrorism,’’ in British Social Attitudes: the 23rd Report. Perspectives on a Changing Society, eds. Alison Park, John Curtice, Katarina Thomson, Miranda Phillips, and Mark Johnson (London: Sage Publications, 2007), 143–74. 34. Staff Journalist, The Independent, December 12, 2007. 35. Owen Bowcott and Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘‘Braving Hostilities in the Name of Peace: Doubts Grow Over Britain’s Growing Role as a Peace Enforcer Around the Globe,’’ The Guardian, August 28, 2001, 4. 36. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘‘Peacekeeping and Stabilizing Conflict,’’ http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/fco-in-action/conflict/peacekeeping (accessed September 2, 2008). 37. United Nations. ‘‘Security Council SC/9301 5868th Meeting, April 16, 2008,’’ http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9301.doc.htm (accessed September 2, 2008). 38. Andrew Parker, ‘‘Rise in Military Budget is Price of Keeping the Peace: Tony Blair Has Raised Expectations that Britain Could be the World’s Policeman,’’ Financial Times, October 4, 2001, 6. 39. Christopher Rootes, ‘‘The Resurgence of Protest and the Revitalization of Democracy in Britain,’’ in Social Movements and Democracy, ed. Pedro Ibarra (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 137–68.

Notes

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40. Kay Milton. ‘‘A Changing Sense of Place: Direct Action and Environmental Protest in the UK,’’ in Confronting Environments: Local Understanding in a Globalizing World, ed. James G. Carrier (Lanham, MD: Rowman Altamira, 2004), 165–82. 41. Catherine Bromley, John Curtice, and Ben Seyd, ‘‘Is Britain Facing a Crisis of Democracy,’’ Center for Research into Elections and Social Trends, Working Paper 106 (June 2004), http://www.crest.ox.ac.uk/papers/p106.pdf. 42. George McKay, ‘‘DIY Culture: Notes Towards and Into,’’ in DIY Culture: Part & Protest in 1990’s Britain, ed. George McKay (London: Verso, 1998), 1–53.

Chapter 2 1. Liam DePaor, The Peoples of Ireland from Prehistory to Modern Times (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 18. 2. Sea˚n Duffy, The MacMillan Atlas of Irish History (New York: MacMillan, USA, 1997), 17. 3. DePaor, The Peoples of Ireland from Prehistory to Modern Times, 77. Duffy, The MacMillan Atlas of Irish History, 25. 4. DePaor, The Peoples of Ireland from Prehistory to Modern Times, 96. Robert Kee, Ireland: A History (London: Abacus, 1998), 29. 5. Duffy, The MacMillan Atlas of Irish History, 36–39. 6. DePaor, The Peoples of Ireland from Prehistory to Modern Times, 120. 7. DePaor, The Peoples of Ireland from Prehistory to Modern Times, 121. Kee, Ireland: A History, 30. Tim Pat Coogan, The Troubles: Ireland’s Ordeal 1966–1996 and the Search for Peace (Boulder, CO: Roberts Rhinehart Publishers, 1997), 4. 8. DePaor, The Peoples of Ireland from Prehistory to Modern Times, 246. 9. Kee, Ireland: a History, 10–11. 10. DePaor, The Peoples of Ireland from Prehistory to Modern Times, 290–291. Kee, Ireland: A History, 13. 11. Duffy, The MacMillan Atlas of Irish History, 114. Kee, Ireland: A History, 191–193. 12. Kee, Ireland: A History, 12. 13. Kee, Ireland: A History, 202. 14. C. Knox, ‘‘Conflict Resolution at the Microlevel: Community Relations in Northern Ireland,’’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38 (1994): 595–619. 15. K. Dowling, ‘‘Civil Rights, Human Rights, and Terrorism in Northern Ireland,’’ Journal of Intergroup Relations, 7 (1979/80): 3–23. 16. Duffy, The MacMillan Atlas of Irish History, 129. 17. The ‘Troubles,’ http://fortunecity.com/bally/sligo/93/past/troubles.htm. 18. Central Community Relations Unit, Community Relations in Northern Ireland (Belfast, Northern Ireland; Author, 1991). 19. Paul Bew and Gordon Gillespie, Northern Ireland: A Chronology of the Troubles 1968–1999 (Dublin, Ireland: Gill and MacMillan, Ltd., 1999), 359–360. Coogan, The Troubles: Ireland’s Ordeal, 414. Graham Spencer, ‘‘Containing Dialogue:

198

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The British Government and Early Talks in the Northern Ireland Peace Process,’’ The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 10 (2008): 452–471. 20. Bew and Gillespie, Northern Ireland: A Chronology of the Troubles 1968– 1999, 365. 21. Clodagh Harris, ‘‘The Northern Ireland Peace Process: Obstacles Remain,’’ Political Issues in Ireland Today, ed. Neil Collins and Terry Cradden (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2007), 67. 22. Harris, ‘‘The Northern Ireland Peace Process: Obstacles Remain,’’ 49. John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, ‘‘Stabilising the Northern Ireland Agreement,’’ Devolution and Constitutional Change, ed. Paul Carmichael, Colin Knox, and Robert Osborne (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2007), 67. 23. Department of Finance and Personnel and H. M. Treasury, Northern Ireland Expenditure Plans and Priorities 1992–3 to 1994–5 (Belfast, Northern Ireland: Author, 1992). 24. Central Community Relations Unit, Community Relations in Northern Ireland (Belfast, Northern Ireland: Author, 1991), 2. 25. Michael J. Whitely, ‘‘The Impact of a Multimedia Learning Conference on Student’s Perceptions Regarding Cross-community Initiatives, Future Orientation Regarding Peace, and Social Distance Between Groups’’ (Ph.D. Diss., Kent State University, 2005), 16, 53–56. 26. T. Lovett, D. Gunn, and T. Robson, ‘‘Education, Conflict, and Community Development in Northern Ireland,’’ Community Development Journal, 29 (1994): 177–196. 27. Gra˚inne Byrne and Caitlin Donnelly, ‘‘The Educational System in Northern Ireland,’’ Devolution and Pluralism in Education in Northern Ireland, ed. Caitlin Donnelly, Penny McKeown, and Bob Osborne (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2006), 20–21. 28. Laura Lundy, ‘‘Human Rights and Pluralism in Education: Prospects Under Devolution,’’ Devolution and Pluralism in Education (see note 31), 25. 29. Whitely, ‘‘The Impact of a Multimedia Learning Conference on Student’s Perceptions Regarding Cross-community Initiatives, Future Orientation Regarding Peace, and Social Distance Between Groups,’’ 149. Carol V. Linsenmeier and Michael J. Whitely, ‘‘Designing Cross-community Initiatives in Northern Ireland,’’ (paper presented at the Coleraine Borough Council NICCI Conference, Coleraine, Northern Ireland, July 2002). 30. Paul Mitchell, ‘‘Party Competition and Voting Behavior Since the Agreement,’’ Devolution and Constitutional Change (see note 28), 116. 31. Mitchell, ‘‘Party Competition and Voting Behavior Since the Agreement,’’ 118. 32. Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2002), 375. 33. Eric P. Kaufmann, The Orange Order: A Contemporary Northern Irish History, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007). 34. Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, 48. 35. Kaufmann, The Orange Order: A Contemporary Northern Irish History, 2–4. 36. Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, 48.

Notes

199

37. Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, xv. Spencer, ‘‘Containing Dialogue: The British Government and Early Talks in the Northern Ireland Peace Process,’’ 462. 38. Spencer, ‘‘Containing Dialogue: The British Government and Early Talks in the Northern Ireland Peace Process,’’ 464. 39. Brice Dickson and Robert Osborne, ‘‘Equality and Human Rights Since the Agreement,’’ Devolution and Constitutional Change (see note 27), 163. N. Jarman, No Longer a Problem? Sectarian Violence in Northern Ireland. http://www. community-relations.org.uk/services/research-documents. 40. Bew and Gillespie, Northern Ireland: A Chronology of the Troubles 1968– 1999, 43–352. 41. Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, xiii. 42. Bew and Gillespie, Northern Ireland: A Chronology of the Troubles 1968– 1999, 44–46. Coogan, The Troubles: Ireland’s Ordeal, 132–135. 43. McGarry and O’Leary, ‘‘Stabilising the Northern Ireland Agreement,’’ 62–82. 44. Dominic Bryan and Gillian McIntosh, ‘‘Symbols and Identity in the ‘New’ Northern Ireland,’’ in Devolution and Constitutional Change (see note 27), 125–137. 45. Harris, ‘‘The Northern Ireland Peace Process: Obstacles Remain,’’ 48–51. 46. Bew and Gillespie, Northern Ireland: A Chronology of the Troubles 1968– 1999, 364. 47. Harris, ‘‘The Northern Ireland Peace Process: Obstacles Remain,’’ 48–51.

Chapter 3 1. Pedro P. Correia, ‘‘A Descolonizac~ao,’’ in Portugal. 20 anos de democracia, ed. Ant onio Reis (Lisboa: Cırculo de Leitores, 1994), 40–73. 2. Cecılia Barreira, ‘‘Os Estilos de Vida e o Convıvio Quotidiano,’’ in Portugal. 20 anos de democracia, ed. Ant onio Reis (Lisboa: Cırculo de Leitores, 1994), 492–5. 3. Marcus Power, ‘‘Geo-politics and the Representation of Portugal’s African Colonial Wars: Examining the Limits of ‘Vietnam Syndrome’,’’ Political Geography 20 (2001): 461–91. 4. Correia, ‘‘A Descolonizac~ao.’’ 5. Fernando Rosas, O Estado Novo (Lisboa: Cırculo de Leitores, 1994). ~es Colibri, 6. Jose Costa, O Terrorismo e as FP 25 anos depois (Lisboa: Edico 2004). 7. Barreira, ‘‘Os Estilos de Vida e o Convıvio Quotidiano,’’ 493. 8. Melanie Santos and Andrea Mercurio, ‘‘Portugal,’’ in International Perspectives on Family Violence and Abuse, ed. Kathleen Malley-Morrison (Mahwah: LEA, 2004), 51–67. 9. OIKUS, Social Watch Report (Montevideo: Instituto del Tercer Mundo, 2005). 10. Instituto Nacional de Estatıstica, Recenseamento Geral da Populac~ ao (Portugal), Censos, 2001. 11. Eduardo Marcal Grilo, ‘‘O sistema educativo,’’ in Portugal. 20 anos de democracia, ed. Ant onio Reis (Lisboa: Cırculo de Leitores, 1994), 406–35.

200

Notes

12. OIKUS, Social Watch Report (Montevideo: Instituto del Tercer Mundo, 2005). 13. Ministerio da Educac~ao, ‘‘Necessidade de resposta ao desafio da qualificac~ao,’’ http://www.min-edu.pt. 14. Analia Torres, Vida Conjugal e Trabalho (Oeiras: Celta, 2004). 15. Torres, Vida Conjugal e Trabalho. 16. Ibid. 17. Virgınia Ferreira, ‘‘As Mulheres em Portugal: Situac~ ao e Paradoxos,’’ in Pavilh~ao do Territorio, ed. Leonel Moura and Maria Nobre Franco (Lisboa, Expo 98: Ministerio do Planeamento e da Administrac~ ao do Territ orio, 1988), 86–147. 18. Torres, Vida Conjugal e Trabalho. 19. UNICEF, A league table of child maltreatment deaths in rich nations. Innocenti Report Card (Florence: UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2003), 5. 20. Carla Machado et al., ‘‘Child and partner maltreatment: Self-reported prevalence and attitudes in the North of Portugal,’’ Child Abuse and Neglect 31 (2007): 657–70. 21. Nelson Lourenco, Manuel Lisboa, and Elsa Pais, Viol^encia contra as mulheres (Lisboa: Comiss~ao para a Igualdade e Direitos das Mulheres, 1997). 22. Machado et al., ‘‘Child and partner maltreatment.’’ 23. Instituto Nacional de Estatıstica, Recenseamento Geral da Populac~ ao (Portugal), Censos, 2001. 24. Kathleen Malley-Morrison et al., Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression Scale, PAIRTAPS (Boston: Boston University, 2006). 25. Neta C. Crawford, ‘‘The Slippery Slope to Preventive War,’’ Ethics & International Affairs 17, no. 1 (2003): 30–6. 26. Marco Teixeira, ‘‘Terrorismo (do passado ao presente): Contributos para o ~es sociais e do medo do terrorismo em Portugal’’ (Masestudo das representaco ter diss., Universidade do Porto, 2006). 27. Jock Young, The Vertigo of Late Modernity (London: Sage, 2007). 28. Amnesty International, ‘‘Amnesty International Report 2008: The State of the World’s Human Rights,’’ http://thereport.amnesty.org. 29. Penny Green and Tony Ward, State Crime. Government, Violence and Corruption (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 131. 30. Irene Pimentel, ‘‘Caminhos da Memoria,’’ http://caminhosdamemoria. wordpress.com. 31. Angela Biaggio, Luciana De Souza, and Rosa Martini, ‘‘Attitudes Toward Peace, War and Violence in Five Countries,’’ Journal of Peace Education 1, no. 2 (2004): 179–89. 32. Biaggio et al., ‘‘Attitudes,’’ 183–4. 33. Centro de Intervenc~ao para o Desenvolvimento Amılcar Cabral, A educac~ao para o desenvolvimento, Ficha formativa 4 (2004): 1–25. 34. Orlando Lourenco, ‘‘Toward A Positive Conception of Peace,’’ in How Children Understand War and Peace: A Call to International Peace Education, ed. A. Raviv, L. Oppenheimer, and D. Bar-Tal (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1999), 91–108, quoted in Biaggio, De Souza, and Martini, ‘‘Attitudes Toward Peace, War and Violence in Five Countries,’’ Journal of Peace Education 1, no. 2 (2004): 180.

Notes

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Chapter 4 1. Julius Ruiz, ‘‘Defending the Republic: The Garcıa Atadell Brigade in Madrid, 1936,’’ Journal of Contemporary History 42, no. 1 (2007): 97–8. 2. Stanley G. Payne, The Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933–1936: Origins of the Civil War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 3–4. 3. Payne, The Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 3–4. 4. Raymond Carr, Spain: A History (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001), 245. 5. Carr, Spain: A History, 246. 6. Carr, Spain: A History, 245–53. 7. Carr, Spain: A History, 253–54. 8. Carr, Spain: A History, 254. 9. Carr, Spain: A History, 254. 10. Noam Chomsky, Radical Priorities. ed. Carlos Peregrin Otero (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2003), 212. 11. Paul Preston, The Politics of Revenge: Fascism and the Military in TwentiethCentury Spain (New York: Routledge, 1990), 41–2. 12. Preston, The Politics of Revenge, 41–2. 13. Preston, The Politics of Revenge, 41–2. 14. Ramon E. Arango, Spain: Democracy Regained (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 233. 15. ‘‘La Constituicion Espanola 1978, Titulo I, art.10,’’ http://noticias.juridicas.com/base_datos/Admin/constitucion.html. 16. Arango, Spain: Democracy Regained, 233. 17. Renwick McLean, ‘‘Leader Pushes Spain to Left, Rejecting Calls to Slow Down,’’ New York Times, December 13, 2006, online edition. 18. Joaquim Arango and Philip Martin, ‘‘Best Practices to Manage Migration,’’ International Migration Review 39, no. 1 (2005): 258–69. 19. The Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) was founded in 1879 and is a center-left, social democratic, and Democratic socialist party. 20. People’s Party (PP) is the main Spanish conservative political party. It was founded in 1976 by Manuel Fraga Iribarne, a former minister of tourism during Franco’s regime. Its ideology is Liberal conservative and Christian-democratic. 21. Kathleen Malley-Morrison, Maria Daskalopoulos, Julia Gefter, Julia Wenger, and Kyleen Hashim, ‘‘International Perspectives on War and Peace,’’ Peace Psychology 15, no. 1 (2006): 6–7. 22. Paul M. Heywood, ‘‘Desperately Seeking Influence: Spain and the War in Iraq.’’ European Consortium for Political Research, no. 3.1 (Autumn 2003), http:// www.essex.ac.uk/ECpR/publications/eps/onlineissues/autumn2003/feature/ heywood.htm. 23. Heywood, ‘‘Desperately Seeking Influence.’’ 24. Al Goodman, ‘‘Polls: 90 percent of Spaniards against war,’’ CNN, March 29, 2003, http://64.233.169.104/search?q¼cache:YWJ-hq0gDloJ:www.cnn.com/ 2003/WORLD/europe/03/29/sprj.irq.spain/þpercentþofþSpanishþiraq&hl¼ en&ct¼clnk&cd¼5&gl¼us.

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25. Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (New York: Oxford University, 2005), 122. 26. Humphrey Taylor, ‘‘The Not-So-Black Art of Public Diplomacy.’’ World Policy Journal, December 22, 2007, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_01997750346/The-not-so-black-art.html. 27. PEW Global Attitudes Project, ‘‘Spring 2006 Survey: America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran,’’ http://pewglobal.org/reports/ display.php?PageID=825. 28. Pew Global Attitudes Project, ‘‘Spring 2006 Survey.’’ 29. Carr, Spain: A History, 264. 30. Madeleine Davis, ‘‘Is Spain Recovering Its Memory? Breaking the Pacto del Olvido,’’ Human Rights Quarterly 27, no. 3 (August 2005): 862–63. 31. Davis, ‘‘Is Spain Recovering Its Memory?,’’ 862–63. 32. Paloma Aguilar. Memoria y Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to Democracy (New York: Berghahn Books 2002), xx–xxi. 33. Carr, Spain: A History, 282. 34. Davis, ‘‘Is Spain Recovering Its Memory?,’’ 858. 35. Davis, ‘‘Is Spain Recovering Its Memory?,’’ 864. 36. Fernando Reinares and Oscar Jaime-Jimenez, ‘‘Countering Terrorism in a New Democracy: the Case of Spain,’’ in European Democracies Against Terrorism. Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation, ed. Fernando Reinares (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 119–46. 37. Reinares, ‘‘Countering Terrorism,’’ 119–46. 38. Cristina Palomares, The Quest for Survival After Franco: Moderate Francoism and the Slow Journey to the Polls 1964–1977 (Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2004), 147. 39. Paloma Aguilar Fernandez, Carmen Gonz alez-Enrıquez, and Alexandra Barahona de Brito, eds., The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies, (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 147. 40. Ibid. 41. Norm Dixon, ‘‘WORLD: Largest coordinated anti-war protest in history.’’ Green Left Online, February 19, 2003, http://www.greenleft.org.au/2003/526/30915. 42. Angelique Chrisafis, David Fickling, Jon Henley, John Hooper, Giles Tremlett, Sophie Arie, and Chris McGreal, ‘‘Millions Worldwide Rally for Peace: Huge Turnout at 600 Marches from Berlin to Baghdad,’’ Guardian, February 17, 2003, online edition. 43. Norm Dixon, Green Left Online, February 19, 2003. 44. Palomares, The Quest for Survival After Franco, 117. 45. Amnesty International, ‘‘Spain Shamed by Police,’’ November 13 2007, Index Number: EUR 41/007/2007, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-andupdates/reports/spain-shamed-police-20071114. 46. Amnesty International, ‘‘Spain: Reform Investigatory System to End Torture and Other Ill-Treatment by Police,’’ November 14 2007, Index Number: EUR 41/008/2007, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR41/008/2007. 47. PEW Global Attitudes Project, ‘‘Spring 2006 Survey: America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran,’’ http://64.233.169.104/search?

Notes

203

q=cache:6xFAlw0eCO0J:pewglobal.org/reports/display.phppercent3FReportI Dpercent3D252þSPAINþOPINIONþUS&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us. 48. Ninety percent of Spanish reported being aware of human rights abuses committed in Abu Gharaib and Guantanamo Bay, second only to Germany (98 percent) in contrast with 69 percent of Americans; PEW Global Attitudes Project, ‘‘Spring 2006 Survey: America’s Image Slips, But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran,’’ http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=825. 49. Amnesty International, ‘‘Spain’’ in Amnesty International Report 2007: the State of the World’s Human Rights, http://64.233.169.104/search?q=cache:iEFV pOyO3V0J:report2007.amnesty.org/eng/Regions/Europe-and-Central-Asia/Spainþ spanishþsupremeþcourtþrulesþguantanamoþbayþlimbo&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=9& gl=us. 50. Andrew Manreas, ‘‘La investigacion halla en los vuelos de la CIA decenas de ocupantes con estatus diplomatico,’’ El Pais, November 15 2005, http://64. 233.169.104/search?q=cache:Du4tB2Ttm2AJ:www.elpais.com/articulo/elpepiesp/ 20051115elpepinac_4/Tes/þLaþinvestigacionþhallaþenþlosþvuelosþdeþlaþCIAþ decenasþdeþocupantesþconþestatusþdiplomatico&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us. 51. Luis Moreno, ‘‘The Madrid Bombings in the Domestic and Regional Politics of Spain.’’ (Paper presented at the conference The War on Terror—Three Years On, Royal Irish Academy, Dublin, Ireland, November 26, 2004.) 52. Paul M. Heywood, ‘‘Desperately Seeking Influence.’’ 53. Enric Ordeix i Rigo, ‘‘Aznar’s Political Failure or Punishment for Supporting the Iraq War? Hypotheses About the Causes of the 2004 Spanish Election,’’ American Behavioral Scientist 49, no. 4 (2005): 610. 54. Luis Moreno, ‘‘The Madrid Bombings.’’ 55. Renwick McLean, ‘‘Leader Pushes Spain to Left, Rejecting Calls to Slow Down,’’ New York Times, December 13, 2006, online edition. 56. Carr, Spain: A History, 273.

Chapter 5 1. See, for example, Thomas Hobbes, Le Leviathan: ou matiere, forme et puissance de l’etat chretien et civile (Paris: Gallimard, first edition 1651, edition of 2000). 2. For more on this, see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du contrat social ou principes du droit politique (Paris: Flammarion, first edition in 1762, edition of 2001). 3. See Sigmund Freud, ‘‘La Guerre, la pulsion de mort,’’ in Les bloc-notes de la psychanalyse, no. 18, Lettre de Freud a Einstein (Paris: Georg Edition, first edition in 1932, edition of 2003), 9–20. 4. See Sigmund Freud, Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (Civilization and Its Discontents), first edition in 1930. 5. For more on conflict theory, see Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn W. Sherif, Groups in Harmony and Tension (New York: Harper and Row, 1953).

204

Notes

6. Emile Durkheim, ‘‘Representations individuelles et representations collectives’’ Sociologie et Philosophie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, first edition in 1898, edition of 1967). 7. For more on the origin of social representation, see Serge Moscovici, La psychanalyse, son image et son public (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, first edition in 1961, edition of 1976) and Serge Moscovici, ‘‘Des representations collectives aux representations sociales,’’ in Les representations sociales, ed. Denise Jodelet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1989), 62–66. 8. For more on the French Revolution, see for example, Albert Soboul, Comprendre la revolution, problemes politiques de la revolution francaise (1789–1797) (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1981). 9. For more on the voting system, see Annie Jourdan, La revolution, une exception francaise? (Lonrai: Flammarion, 2004). 10. For more on this social contract, see for example, Emmanuel Peignard, ‘‘L’immigration en France, in France Analyse et reflexions (2001), http://www. premier-ministre.gouv.fr. 11. For more on de Gaulle, see for example, Yves Durand, La France dans la deuxieme guerre mondiale: 1939–1945 (Paris: Armand Colin, first edition in 1998, edition of 2002). 12. For more on the Algerian War of Independence, see Patrick Rotman and Bertrand Tavernier, La guerre sans nom: les appeles d’Algerie 54–62 (Saint-Amand: Seuil, 1992). 13. Gombault and Quarre, 2007. 14. Frederic Ocqueteau, ‘‘Securite nationale et securite globale: l’adaptation des services de renseignments francais.’’ Revue canadienne de criminologie et de justice penale (June 2006): 435–51, 438. 15. Frederic Ocqueteau, 437. 16. See Serge Moscovici. La psychanalyse, son image et son public (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961). 17. For more on Jean-Claude Abric’s structural approach, see Jean-Claude Abric, ‘‘Les representations sociales: aspects theoriques,’’ in Pratiques sociales et representations, ed. Jean-Claude Abric (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994), 10–36. 18. Claude Flament, ‘‘L’analyse de similitude: une technique pour les recherches sur les representations sociales,’’ Cahiers de psychologie cognitive I(4) (1981), 375–95, and Claude Flament, ‘‘Structure, dynamique et transformation des representations socials,’’ in Pratiques sociales et representations, ed. JeanClaude Abric (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994), 37–58. 19. For more on the methodology used in Study 2, see Pierre Verges,  ‘‘Representations sociales en psychologie economique,’’ in Psychologie Economique. Theories et Applications, eds. Christine Roland-Levy, and Philippe Adair (Paris: Economica, 1998), 19–33, and Pierre Verges and Marina Bastounis, ‘‘Towards the Investigation of Social Representations of the Economy: Research Methods and Techniques,’’ in Everyday Representations of the Economy, eds. Christine RolandLevy, Erich Kirchler, Elfried Penz, and Colin Gray. (Vienna, Austria: WUV, 2001), 19–48.

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20. The target words are between ‘‘/’’, whereas the terms produced by the participants are in italics. 21. In parentheses, the frequency of appearance of a term is the first figure, whereas the second is the mean rank of appearance, showing the importance of the idea: the smaller the mean rank is, the most important the notion is to the participants. 22. Note that the term ‘‘solidarity’’ finds its roots the French term ‘‘solidarite.’’ 23. This quote is from Arthur Neal, a British politician (1862–1933). 24. This fundamental difference in memory structures was addressed in the philosophy of Henri Bergson (1859–1941).

Chapter 6 1. Global Peace Index, http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi/results/rankings/2008/. 2. Alex Elliott, ‘‘Lennon-Ono Peace Prize goes to 300,000 people,’’ Ice NewsDaily News (October 9, 2008), http://www.icenews.is/index.php/200810/09/ lennon-ono-peace-prize-goes-to-300000-people. 3. Whitehead, Þ or, ‘‘Hlutleysið kvatt,’’ Goodbye to Neutrality, http://www. mbl.is/serefni/nato/whitehead.html (accessed March 21, 2008). 4. Michael Corgan, Iceland and Its Alliances: Security for a Small State (Lewiston, NY: Mellen Press, 2002), 54. 5. Valur Ingimundarson, I eldlınu kalda strıðsins: Samskipti Islands og Bandarıkjanna 1945–1960 (Reykjavik: Vaka-Helgafell, 1996). 6. Corgan, Iceland and Its Alliances, 58–9. 7. Jakob Benediktsson, ‘‘Landnam og upphaf allsherjarrıkis [Settlement and the Emergence of the Complete State],’’ in Saga Islands I, ed. Sigurður Lındal (Reykjavik: Islenska B okmenntafelag, 1974), 173–4. 8. Benediktsson, ‘‘Settlement,’’ 176. 9. Helgi Þorlaksson, ‘‘Fra kirkjuvaldi til rıkisvalds, [From Church Rule to State Rule],’’ in Saga Islands I, ed. Sigurður Lındal (Reykjavik: Islenska B okmenntafelag, 2003), 358–9. 10. Sigurður Lındal, ‘‘Island og umheimurinn [Iceland and the Outer World],’’ in Saga Islands I, ed. Sigurður Lındal, (Reykjavik: Islenska B okmenntafelag, 1974), 218. 11. Lındal, ‘‘Iceland and the Outer World,’’ 218. 12. Lındal, ‘‘Iceland and the Outer World,’’ 216. 13. Guðmundur Halfdanarson, ‘‘Icelandic Nationalism: A Non-Violent Paradigm?’’ in Nations and Nationalities in Historical Perspective, ed. Guðmundur Halfdanarson and Ann Katherine Isaacs (Pisa: Universit a di Pisa, 2001, Edizioni plus). 14. Þorlaksson, ‘‘From Church Rule to State Rule,’’ 355. 15. Þorlaksson, ‘‘From Church Rule to State Rule,’’ 89. 16. Þorlaksson, ‘‘From Church Rule to State Rule,’’ 92. 17. Þorlaksson, ‘‘From Church Rule to State Rule,’’ 159.

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18. Þorlaksson, ‘‘From Church Rule to State Rule,’’ 159–60. 19. Þorlaksson, ‘‘From Church Rule to State Rule,’’ 160. 20. Þorlaksson, ‘‘From Church Rule to State Rule,’’ 160. 21. Þorlaksson, ‘‘From Church Rule to State Rule,’’ 161. 22. Þorlaksson, ‘‘From Church Rule to State Rule,’’ 161. 23. Þorlaksson, ‘‘From Church Rule to State Rule,’’ 358–9. 24. Þorlaksson, ‘‘From Church Rule to State Rule,’’ 358–9. 25. Þorlaksson, ‘‘From Church Rule to State Rule,’’ 360. 26. Halfdanarson, ‘‘Icelandic Nationalism,’’ 6. 27. Halfdanarson, ‘‘Icelandic Nationalism,’’ 2. 28. Halfdanarson, ‘‘Icelandic Nationalism,’’ 7. 29. Halfdanarson, ‘‘Icelandic Nationalism,’’ 10. 30. Halldor Laxness, The Atom Station (London: Methuen, 1961), 151–2. 31. Gunnar Karlsson, Iceland’s 1100 Years: History of a Marginal Society (London: Hurst, 2000), 365. 32. Gunnar Pall Baldvinsson, ‘‘Friðargsla herlausrar þj oðar: Stefnum otun, sjalfsmynd og orðrða [A Non-Militarized Country’s Peacekeeping: Policymaking, Identity, and Discourse],’’ in Uppbrot hugmyndakerfis: Endurmotun ıslenskrar utanrıkisstefnu 1991–2007, ed. Valur Ingimundarson (Reykjavık: Hið ıslenska b okmenntafelag, 2008), 143. 33. Baldvinsson, ‘‘A Non-Militarized Country’s Peacekeeping,’’ 155. 34. Baldvinsson, ‘‘A Non-Militarized Country’s Peacekeeping,’’ 155. 35. Baldvinsson, ‘‘A Non-Militarized Country’s Peacekeeping,’’ 162. 36. Baldvinsson, ‘‘A Non-Militarized Country’s Peacekeeping,’’ 164. 37. ‘‘Stefnuyfirl ysing rıkisstj ornar Sjalfstðisflokks og Samfylkingar 2007 [Policy Agreement for the Government of the Independence Party and Social Democratic Alliance 2007],’’ http://www.stjornarrad.is/Stefnuyfirlysing//nr/275. 38. One author had the experience of driving a car in 1982 through a group of several hundred protesters of the SHA, the antibase, anti-NATO organization, who were making their annual march along the highway from Reykjavik to the Keflavik NATO base. Though the protesters filled the road and surrounded the car clearly marked with Defense Force license plates as they crossed the road, there were only waves and friendly greetings. 39. Corgan, Iceland and Its Alliances, 61–2. 40. Conversation between Dr. Kari Stefansson and Michael Corgan, Reykjavik, October 2004.

Chapter 7 1. Byron J. Nordstrom, The History of Sweden (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 48–51. 2. J€ orgen Weibull, Swedish History in Outline, 2nd rev. ed. (Stockholm: Svenska Institutet, 1997), 104–9. 3. Weibull, Swedish History in Outline, 76. 4. Weibull, Swedish History in Outline, 78–81.

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5. Nordstrom, The History of Sweden, 93–7. 6. Christine Agius, The Social Construction of Swedish Neutrality, Challenges to Swedish Identity and Sovereignty (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 77–79. 7. Nordstrom, The History of Sweden, 121–2. 8. Agius, The Social Construction of Swedish Neutrality, Challenges to Swedish Identity and Sovereignty, 90. 9. Jan-Ivar Askelin, ‘‘Livl€ os livlina till v€ast,’’ Framsyn (Issue I, 2004), Swedish Defence Research Agency, http://www.foi.se/FOI/templates/Page____537. aspx. 10. Nils Bruzelius, ‘‘Hemliga atomuba˚tar gav Sverige s€ akerhetsgaranti’’ Framsyn (Issue I, 2005), Swedish Defence Research Agency, http://www.foi.se/FOI/ templates/Page____3941.aspx. 11. Askelin,’’Livl€ os livlina till v€ast.’’ 12. The Economist, Country Profile Sweden 2007 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, DOP), 15–7, http://0www.eiu.com.library.lausys.georgetown.edu/ index.asp?layout=displayIssueArticle&issue_id=343335619&opt=full. 13. Swedish Armed Forces, ‘‘The World has Changed’’ (2006), http://www. mil.se/article.php?lang=E&id=15694 14. The Economist, Country Profile Sweden 2007, 17. 15. Nordstrom, The History of Sweden, 138. 16. The Economist, Country Profile Sweden 2007, 18. 17. Government Offices Sweden, ‘‘The Head of State’’ (2008), http://sweden. gov.se/sb/d/2853/a/21785. 18. Government Offices Sweden, ‘‘Sweden’s Democratic System’’ (2004), http://sweden.gov.se/sb/d/2853. 19. The Economist, Country Profile Sweden 2007, 4. 20. Nordstrom, The History of Sweden, 127–8. 21. The Economist, Country Profile Sweden 2007, 4. 22. The Economist, Country Profile Sweden 2007, 47. 23. International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights—Annual report 2007, ‘‘Human Rights in the OSCE Region: Europe, Central Asia and North America, Report 2007,’’ http://www.ihf-hr.org/documents/doc_summary.php?sec_id=3& d_id=4387. 24. Statistics Sweden, ‘‘Sveriges befolkning December 31, 2007,’’ http:// www.scb.se/statistik/BE/BE0101/2008M02/Be0101KomJmfBef_2007.xls. 25. Arthur Gould, Developments in Swedish Social Policy: Resisting Dionysus, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 55. 26. Nordstrom, The History of Sweden, 142. 27. Gould, Developments in Swedish Social Policy: Resisting Dionysus. 28. Statistics Sweden,’’Press release from Statistics Sweden, 2007,’’ http:// www.scb.se/templates/pressinfo____192728.asp. 29. Statistics Sweden, ‘‘Press release from Statistics Sweden, 2008,’’ http:// www.scb.se/templates/pressinfo____231050.asp. 30. Christina Florin and Bengt Nilsson, ‘‘Women’s questions on the agenda: the politicisation of gender equality in Sweden,’’ Different Paths to Modernity: A

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Nordic and Spanish Perspective, ed. Magnus Jerneck et al. (Sweden: Nordic Academic Press, 2005), 302–16. 31. Ricardo Hausmann, Laura D Tyson, and Saadia Zahidi, The Global Gender Gap Report 2007, 140, http://www.weforum.org/pdf/gendergap/report2007.pdf. 32. Save the Children, ‘‘State of the World’s Mothers 2007,’’ 52, http://www. savethechildren.org/publications/mothers/2007/SOWM-2007-final.pdf. 33. Nordstrom, The History of Sweden, 146–7. 34. Europa World, ‘‘Christianity, Sweden,’’ http://www.europaworld.com/ entry/se.dir.194. 35. Church of Sweden, ‘‘Liturgy and Worship,’’ http://www.svenskakyrkan. se/SVK/eng/liturgy.htm. 36. Church of Sweden–Statistics, ‘‘D€ opta, konfirmerade, vigda och begravda enligt Svenska kyrkans ordning a˚r 1970–2006,’’ http://www.svenskakyrkan.se/ statistik/xls/kyrklighandling_tabell.xls. 37. Europa World. ‘‘Islam, Sweden,’’ http://www.europaworld.com/entry/ se.dir.212. 38. Heikki Pihlajam€aki, ‘‘The Painful Question: The Fate of Judicial Torture in Early Modern Sweden,’’ Law and History Review 25, no. 3 (DOP), 25–33, http:// www.historycooperative.org/journals/lhr/25.3/pihlajamaki.html.

Chapter 8 1. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, ‘‘The 15 major spender countries in 2006,’’ http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_ major_spenders.pdf/download, accessed 12/17/07. These figures are based on market exchange rates, and the Russian and Chinese totals are estimates. Using Purchasing Power Parity figures instead (which tend to equalize the purchasing power of different currencies), U.S. spending is greater than that of the next six countries combined. 2. Richard Drinnon, Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire Building (New York: Schocken Books, 1990), 55. 3. Drinnon, Facing West, 199, 502. 4. Drinnon, Facing West, 329. 5. Roosevelt quoted in Oscar M. Alfonso, Theodore Roosevelt and the Philippines, 1897–1909 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1970), 20. 6. Richard F. Grimmett, ‘‘Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2004,’’ Washington D.C: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, report RL30172, October 5, 2004, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/ awcgate/crs/rl30172.htm, accessed 7/17/07. This list also excludes the American Revolution and the Civil War on the grounds that these were not fought ‘‘abroad.’’ 7. Congressional Globe, House of Representatives, 30th Cong. 1st Sess (12 January 1848), Appendix, p. 93, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage, accessed 7/17/07.

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8. Quoted in Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States: 1492-Present (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 169. 9. Quoted in Zinn, People’s History, 191. 10. McKinley war message, April 11, 1898, United States Department of State, Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, with the annual message of the president transmitted to Congress December 5, 1898 (1898) (Washington), 1898, pp. 750–760, http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type= header&id=FRUS.FRUS1898, accessed 12/12/07. 11. Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate in Relation to Affairs in the Philippine Islands, 1902, pp. 1607ff. 12. The Monroe Doctrine, December 2, 1823, available on the website of The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/ monroe.htm. 13. William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Delta, 2nd revised and enlarged edition, 1972), 175. 14. Grimmett, ‘‘Instances.’’ 15. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 5, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944–August 1945 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 750–1. 16. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Touchstone, 1986), 599. 17. Rhodes, Making of the Atomic Bomb, 734, 740–2. 18. Alan Gropman, Mobilizing U.S. Industry in World War II: Myth and Reality, McNair Paper 50 (Washington, DC: Institute For National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, August 1996), 107. 19. Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. II, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947–1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 770. 20. Kennedy privately told Khrushchev that the U.S. would remove its missiles from Turkey, which were obsolete, but the U.S. president refused to make this commitment publicly, denying Khrushchev a face-saving way out. 21. Edwin E. Mo€ise, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). 22. See the sources listed by Michael White, ‘‘Death Tolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century,’’ http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/ warstat2.htm#Vietnam, accessed 12/17/07. 23. International Court of Justice. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America). Merits, Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, 14ff, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf, accessed 12/12/07. 24. Stephen R. Shalom, Imperial Alibis: Rationalizing U.S. Intervention After the Cold War, (Boston: South End Press, 1993), 99–108, quoted in Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2006), 238. 25. UN Security Council Resolution 678, Nov. 29, 1990, available at the UN website, http://www.un.org, accessed 12/12/07.

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26. Paul Lewis, ‘‘France and 3 Arab States Issue an Appeal to Hussein,’’ New York Times, January 15, 1991, A12. Iraq did not indicate its support for this proposal. 27. Barton Gellman, ‘‘Allied Air War Struck Broadly in Iraq; Officials Acknowledge Strategy Went Beyond Purely Military Targets,’’ Washington Post, June 23, 1991, A1; Thomas J. Nagy, ‘‘The Secret Behind the Sanctions,’’ Progressive, September 2001, 22–5. 28. See, for example, Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1999); Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000). 29. In World War II, U.S. territorial possessions (Hawaii, Alaska, the Philippines, and various smaller Pacific islands) came under attack, but not the homeland. 30. George W. Bush, ‘‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,’’ September 20, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2001/09/20010920-8.html, accessed 12/12/07. 31. Rahul Mahajan, The New Crusade: America’s War on Terrorism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2002), 33–43; Noam Chomsky and Gilbert Achcar, Perilous Power: The Middle East and U.S. Foreign Policy. Dialogues on Terror, Democracy, War, and Justice (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 71–2. 32. Carl Conetta, ‘‘Strange Victory: A Critical Appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan War’’ (Cambridge, MA: Project on Defense Alternatives), appendix, http://www.comw.org/pda/0201strangevic.html, accessed 10/1/07. 33. Jennifer Lane, ‘‘The Mass Graves at Dasht-e Leili: Assessing U.S. Liability for Human Rights Violations During the War in Afghanistan.’’ California Western International Law Journal, vol. 34 (Fall 2003), 145–70. 34. See Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, Report on Postwar Findings About Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare With Prewar Assessments, Together With Additional Views, 109th Congress, 2d Session, September 8, 2006, http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf, accessed 12/12/07. 35. CNN Late Edition With Wolf Blitzer, Interview With Condoleezza Rice, Aired September 8, 2002, 12:00 ET, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/ 0209/08/le.00.html, accessed 12/12/07. 36. Survey conducted by D3 Systems for the BBC, ABC News, ARD German TV, and USA Today, March 19, 2007, cited in Brookings Institution, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, October 1, 2007, 50, http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex, accessed 12/13/07; World PublicOpinion.org, ‘‘The Iraqi Public on the U.S. Presence and the Future of Iraq,’’ September 2006, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/sep06/ Iraq_Sep06_quaire.pdf, accessed 12/13/07. 37. Iraq Body Count, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/, accessed 12/13/07; Gilbert Burnham, Riyadh Lafta, Shannon Doocy, and Les Roberts, ‘‘Mortality after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: A cross-sectional cluster sample survey,’’ Lancet, www.thelancet.com, published online October 11, 2006.

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38. Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, ‘‘The Iraq Effect: The War in Iraq and Its Impact on the War on Terrorism.’’ Mother Jones, March 1, 2007; NIE, 2007. 39. See, e.g., Alan Freeman, 2007. ‘‘’Dramatic’ Taliban resurgence detailed.’’ The Globe and Mail (Canada), June 14, 2007, A1. 40. Zinn, People’s History, 160–1. 41. Chandra Manning, What This Cruel War Was Over: Soldiers, Slavery, and the Civil War, (New York: Knopf, 2007). 42. Charles DeBenedetti, The Peace Reform in American History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 73. 43. DeBenedetti, Peace Reform, 101. 44. Lawrence S. Wittner, Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941–1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 34–5. 45. Richard W. Steele, ‘‘American Popular Opinion and the War Against Germany: The Issue of Negotiated Peace, 1942.’’ The Journal of American History, vol. 65, no. 3 (1978), 704–23. 46. ‘‘Public Opinion Polls,’’ Public Opinion Quarterly (Autumn 1944), 451–2. 47. Dower, War Without Mercy, 53–4. 48. John E. Mueller, ‘‘Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam.’’ The American Political Science Review, vol. 65, no. 2 (1971), 358–75. 49. William L. Lunch and Peter W. Sperlich, ‘‘American Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam.’’ The Western Political Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 1 (1979): 21–44. 50. Lunch & Sperlich, ‘‘American Public Opinion.’’ 51. Bruce W. Jentleson, ‘‘The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force.’’ International Studies Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 1 (1992): 49–73; Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton, ‘‘Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force,’’ The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 42, no. 4 (1998): 395–417; Richard C. Eichenberg, ‘‘Victory Has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force, 1981–2005,’’ International Security, vol. 30, no. 1 (2005): 140–77. 52. Program on International Policy Attitudes, The PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll, ‘‘U.S. Public Beliefs and Attitudes About Iraq’’ (August 20, 2004), 6, http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/IraqAttitudes_Aug04/IraqAttitudes percent20Aug04 percent20rpt.pdf, accessed 12/12/07. 53. John Mueller, ‘‘A Review: American Public Opinion and the Gulf War: Some Polling Issues.’’ The Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 57, no. 1 (1993): 80–91. 54. Charles Babington, ‘‘Kosovo Forces Clinton’s Popularity Rating to 2-Year Low,’’ Washington Post, April 23, 1999, A6; Richard Benedetto, ‘‘Support Not As High As for Other Strikes,’’ USA Today, April 2, 1999, 4A; Richard Morin and Claudia Deane, ‘‘Attitudes Harden Against Milosevic; Public Support Grows for Ground Troops,’’ Washington Post, April 08, 1999, A26; Richard Morin, ‘‘Poll Shows Most Americans Want Negotiated Settlement,’’ Washington Post, May 18, 1999, A18; Program on International Policy Attitudes, ‘‘Americans on Kosovo: A Study of U.S. Public Attitudes,’’ May 27, 1999, http://www.pipa.org/Online Reports/Kosovo/Kosovo_May99/Kosovo_May99_rpt.pdf, accessed 12/12/07;

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Richard Benedetto, ‘‘U.S. in the Balkans, GOP All Over the Map,’’ USA Today, May 10, 1999, 7A. 55. Eric V. Larsen and Bogdan Savych, American Public Support for U.S. Military Operations from Mogadishu to Baghdad (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), 91– 101. 56. Program on International Policy Attitudes, ‘‘Americans on the War on Terrorism: A Study of U.S. Public Attitudes,’’ November 13, 2001, 4, http:// www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Terrorism/WarOnTerror_Nov01/WarOnTerror_ Nov01_rpt.pdf, accessed 12/12/07. 57. Charles Hanley, ‘‘Powell’s Case for Iraq War Falls Apart 6 Months Later.’’ Associated Press, August 11, 2003. 58. From the Editors, ‘‘The Times and Iraq,’’ New York Times, May 26, 2004, A10. 59. Patrick E. Tyler, ‘‘A New Power in the Streets,’’ New York Times, February 17, 2003, A1. 60. CBS News, News Poll, ‘‘End of the Line for Diplomacy?’’ March 15–6, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/CBSNews_polls/war_back.pdf, accessed 12/ 12/07. Larsen & Savych (American Public Support, 151) dispute this claim but then present a chart of data from this poll showing less than majority support for war without UN approval. See also Program on International Policy Attitudes, The PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll, ‘‘Americans on Iraq & the UN Inspections II,’’ February 21, 2003, http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/IraqUNInsp2_ Feb03/IraqUNInsp2 percent20Feb03 percent20rpt.pdf, accessed 12/12/07; Eichenberg, ‘‘Victory Has Many Friends.’’ 61. Program on International Policy Attitudes, The PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll, ‘‘Americans on the Iraq War and the Future of the United Nations,’’ March 31, 2003, http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/IraqUNfut_Mar03/ IraqUNfut percent20Mar03 percent20rpt.pdf, accessed 12/12/07. 62. Program on International Policy Attitudes, ‘‘U.S. Public Beliefs and Attitudes About Iraq,’’ August 20, 2004, 12. 63. Program on International Policy Attitudes, WorldPublicOpinion.org, ‘‘Americans on Iraq: Three Years On,’’ March 15, 2006, 4, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/mar06/USIraq_Mar06_rpt.pdf, accessed 12/12/07. 64. Abraham McLaughlin and Seth Stern, ‘‘How Far Americans Would Go To Fight Terror,’’ Christian Science Monitor, November 14, 2001, 1. 65. Program on International Policy Attitudes, The PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll, ‘‘Americans on Detention, Torture, and the War on Terrorism,’’ July 22, 2004, 3, 6, http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Terrorism/Torture_Jul04/ Torture_Jul04_rpt.pdf, accessed 12/12/07. 66. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, ‘‘Beyond Red vs. Blue: Republicans Divided About Role of Government—Democrats by Social and Personal Values,’’ May 10, 2005, p. 49, http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/242. pdf, accessed 12/12/07. 67. WorldPublicOpinion.org, ‘‘Americans Support Full Due-Process Rights for Terrorism Suspects,’’ July 17, 2006, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/

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pipa/articles/btjusticehuman_rightsra/228.php?lb=bthr&pnt=228&nid=&id=, accessed 12/12/07. 68. WorldPublicOpinion.org, ‘‘World Citizens Reject Torture, BBC Global Poll Reveals,’’ October 18, 2006, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/ home_page/261.php?nid=&id=&pnt=261&lb=hmpg1, accessed 12/12/07. 69. See Linda Bilmes and Joseph Stiglitz, The Economic Costs of the Iraq War: An Appraisal Three Years After The Beginning of the Conflict, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 12054, Cambridge, MA: February 2006, http://www.nber.org/papers/w12054, accessed 12/17/07. 70. See Tom Engelhardt, The End of Victory Culture (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, rev. ed. 2007). 71. See, for example Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977; 4th edition 2004); and Alex Bellamy, Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq (Malden, MA: Polity, 2006). 72. See, for example, Michael Mandell, How America Gets Away with Murder: Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage and Crimes Against Humanity (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2004), esp. 46–56; Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 151–9. 73. See, for example, The Torture Debate in America, ed. Karen J. Greenberg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Chapter 9 1. U.S. Bureau of the Census, ‘‘The American Indian and Alaska Native Population: 2000,’’ (2001), http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/ briefs.html. 2. I. M. Norton and S. M. Manson, ‘‘Research in American Indian and Alaska Native communities: Navigating the cultural universe of values and process,’’ Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 64 (1996): 856–60. 3. Centers for Disease Control, ‘‘Self-reported frequent mental distress among adults–U.S., 1993–1996,’’ Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 47 (1998): 326–31. 4. U.S. Department of Heath and Human Services, ‘‘Mental Health: Culture, Race, and Ethnicity—A Supplement to Mental Health: A Report to the Surgeon General,’’ (2001), http://www.mentalhealth.org/cre/toc.asp. 5. L. A. Greenfeld and S. K. Smith, ‘‘American Indians and Crime,’’ U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, NCJ 173386 (1999), http://www. ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/aic.htm. 6. Indian Health Service, 1997 Trends in Indian Health (Rockville, MD: Author, 1997). 7. D. K. Carson, ‘‘American Indian Elder Abuse: Risk and Protective Factors Among the Oldest American,’’ Journal of Elder Abuse and Neglect 7 (1995): 17–39. 8. Carson, ‘‘American Indian Elder Abuse.’’ 9. M. Braveheart-Jordan and L. DeBruyn, ‘‘So She May Walk in Balance: Integrating the Impact of Historical Trauma in the Treatment of Native American Women,’’ in Racism in the Lives of Women: Testimony, Theory and Guides to

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Antiracist Practice, ed. J. Adleman and G. M. Enuidanos (New York: Harrington Park, 1995), 345–68. 10. N. D. Harada et al. ‘‘Exploring Veteran Identity and Health Services Use among Native American Veterans,’’ Military Medicine 170 (2005): 782–6. 11. Harada et al. ‘‘Exploring Veteran Identity.’’ 12. Harada et al. ‘‘Exploring Veteran Identity.’’ 13. U.S. Bureau of the Census, ‘‘The Black Population: 2000,’’ (2001), http:// www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs.html. 14. R. F. Lassiter, ‘‘Child Rearing in Black Families: Child-abusing Discipline?’’ in Violence in the Black Family: Correlates and Consequences, ed. R. L. Hampton (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 39–53. 15. Lassiter, ‘‘Child Rearing in Black Families.’’ 16. Aldon Morris, ‘‘A Retrospective on the Civil Rights Movement: Political and Intellectual Landmarks,’’ Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 517–39. 17. Morris, ‘‘A Retrospective.’’ 18. Morris, ‘‘A Retrospective.’’ 19. Lewis, 1982; cited in Peter Ucko, ‘‘Museums and Sites: Cultures of the Past within Education Zimbabwe, Some Ten Years On,’’ in The Presented Past: heritage, museums and education, ed. Peter Stone & Brian Molyneux (London: Routledge, 1994), 237–282. 20. Talmadge Anderson, ‘‘Comparative Experience Factors Among Black, Asian, and Hispanic Americans: Coalitions or Conflicts?’’ Journal of Black Studies 23 (September 1992): 27–38. 21. N. Kimbrough, Equality or Discrimination? African Americans in the U.S. Military During the Vietnam War (Lanham, MD: University Press of American, 2007). 22. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘Population Representation in the Military Services,’’ (2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/prhome/poprep2004/summary/ summary.html. 23. C. A. Bartling and R. Eisenman, ‘‘Attitudes of American Youth Concerning Military and Civilian Jobs,’’ Adolescence 27 (1992): 407–13. 24. G. H. Lawrence and T. D. Kane, ‘‘Military Service and Racial Attitudes of White Veterans,’’ Armed Forces & Society 22 (1995): 235–55. 25. Bartling and Eisenman, ‘‘Attitudes of American Youth Concerning Military and Civilian Jobs.’’ 26. U.S. Department of Heath and Human Services, ‘‘Mental Health: Culture, Race, and Ethnicity—A Supplement to Mental Health: A Report to the Surgeon General,’’ http://www.mentalhealth.org/cre/toc.asp. 27. U.S. Department of Heath and Human Services, ‘‘Mental Health,’’ http:// www.mentalhealth.org/cre/toc.asp. 28. Lois Weis et al., ‘‘Puerto Rican Men and the Struggle for Place in the United States: An Exploration of Cultural Citizenship, Gender and Violence,’’ Men and Masculinities, vol. 4, no. 3, (2002): 286–301. 29. Lois Weis et al., ‘‘Puerto Rican Men and the Struggle for Place in the United States.’’

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30. Lois Weis et al., ‘‘Puerto Rican Men and the Struggle for Place in the United States.’’ 31. C. J. Falicov, Latino Families in Therapy: A Guide to Multicultural Practice (New York: Guilford, 1998). 32. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘Population Representation in the Military Services.’’ 33. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘‘Population Representation in the Military Services.’’ 34. R. Lovato, ‘‘The War for Latinos,’’ The Nation (October 3, 2005): 14–8. 35. Bartling and Eisenman, ‘‘Attitudes of American Youth Concerning Military and Civilian Jobs.’’ 36. C. D. Conde, ‘‘Latino Soldiering: the Red, White, and Brown,’’ The Education Digest (November 2006): 19–21. 37. D. L. Leal, ‘‘The Multicultural Military: Military Service and the Acculturation of Latinos and Anglos,’’ Armed Forces & Society 29 (2003): 205–26. 38. D. L. Leal, ‘‘It’s Not Just a Job: Military Service and Latino Political Participation,’’ Political Behavior 21 (1999): 153–74. 39. Council of Economic Advisors, Changing America: Indicators of Social and Economic Well-being by Race and Hispanic Origin (1998), http://www.access.gpo. gov/eop/ca/index.html. 40. E. Lee, ‘‘Chinese American families,’’ in Working with Asian American, ed. E. Lee (New York: Guilford, 1997), 46–78. 41. J. Sustento-Seneriches, ‘‘Filipino American families,’’ in Working with Asian Americans, ed. E. Lee (New York: Guilford, 1997), 101–13. 42. M. P. P. Root, ‘‘The psychology of Asian American women,’’ in Bringing Cultural Diversity to Feminist Psychology: Theory, Research, and Practice, ed. H. Landrine (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1996), 265–301. 43. R. Homma-True, ‘‘Japanese American families,’’ in Working with Asian Americans, ed. E. Lee (New York: Guilford, 1997), 114–24. 44. S. Prathikanti, ‘‘East Indian American families,’’ Working with Asian Americans, ed. E. Lee (New York: Guilford, 1997), 79–100. 45. J. K. Boehnlein, P. K. Leung, and J. D. Kinzie, ‘‘Cambodian American families,’’ in Working with Asian Americans, ed. E. Lee (New York: Guilford, 1997), 37–45. 46. B. Masaki and L. Wong, ‘‘Domestic Violence in the Asian community,’’ in Working with Asian Americans, ed. E. Lee (New York: Guilford, 1997), 439–51. 47. S. K. Tomita, ‘‘The Consideration of Cultural Factors in the Research on Elder Mistreatment with an In-depth Look at the Japanese,’’ Journal of Cross-Cultural Gerontology 9 (1994): 39–52. 48. Tomita, ‘‘The Consideration of Cultural Factors.’’ 49. Sustento-Seneriches, ‘‘Filipino American Families,’’ in Working with Asian Americans: A Guide for Clinicians, ed. Evelyn Lee (New York: Guildford Press, 1997), 101–113. 50. Hsu, 1967, cited in K. L. Chin, ‘‘Out-of-Town Brides: International Marriage and Wife Abuse among Chinese Immigrants,’’ Journal of Comparative Family Studies 25 (1994): 53–70.

216

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51. C. G. Tran and K. Des Jardins, ‘‘Domestic Violence in Vietnamese Refugee and Korean Immigrant Communities,’’ in Relationships among Asian American Women: Psychology of Women, ed. J. L. Chin (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2000), 71–96. 52. Mananzan, 1985, cited in P. Agbayani-Siewert, and A. Flanagan, ‘‘Filipino American Dating Violence: Definitions, Contextual Justifications, and Experiences of Dating Violence,’’ Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment 3 (2001): 115–33. 53. Siewert, and Flanagan, ‘‘Filipino American Dating Violence,’’ 115–33. 54. Tim Kane, ‘‘Who Bears the Burden? Demographic Characteristics of U.S. Military Recruits Before and After 9/11,’’ Heritage Foundation Center for Data Analysis Report No. 05–08 (November 7, 2005); www.heritage.org/Research/ NationalSecurity/upload/95512_1.pdf. 55. Bartling and Eisenman, ‘‘Attitudes of American Youth Concerning Military and Civilian Jobs.’’ 56. U.S. Bureau of the Census, ‘‘The Arab Population: 2000,’’ (2003), http:// www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs.html. 57. U.S. Bureau of the Census, ‘‘The Arab Population: 2000.’’ 58. U.S. Bureau of the Census, ‘‘The Arab Population: 2000.’’ 59. S. A. Camarota, ‘‘The Muslim Wave: Dealing with Immigration from the Middle East,’’ National Review (September 16, 2002): 24–6. 60. A. Kulczycki and A. P. Lobo, ‘‘Deepening the Melting Pot: Arab-Americans at the Turn of the Century,’’ The Middle East Journal 55 (Summer 2001): 459. 61. Kulczycki and Lobo, ‘‘Deepening the Melting Pot: Arab-Americans at the Turn of the Century,’’ 459; R. Z. Abdelkarim, ‘‘Arab and Muslim Americans: Collateral Damage in the Wars on Terrorism, Iraq,’’ Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 22 (2003): 55–6. 62. J. A. D’Agostino, ‘‘Immigration from Middle East to U.S. Increasing,’’ Human Events 5 (2002): 723. 63. Kulczycki and Lobo, ‘‘Deepening the Melting Pot: Arab-Americans at the Turn of the Century.’’ 64. Kulczycki and Lobo, ‘‘Deepening the Melting Pot: Arab-Americans at the Turn of the Century.’’ 65. T. Tancredo, ‘‘Immigration, Citizenship, and National Security: The Silent Invasion,’’ Mediterranean Quarterly (Fall 2004): 4–15. 66. Abdelkarim, ‘‘Arab and Muslim Americans: Collateral Damage in the Wars on Terrorism, Iraq.’’ 67. Camorota, ‘‘The Muslim Wave: Dealing with Immigration from the Middle East.’’ 68. Tancredo, ‘‘Immigration, Citizenship, and National Security: The Silent Invasion.’’ 69. Camarota, ‘‘The Muslim Wave: Dealing with Immigration from the Middle East.’’ 70. Kathleen Malley-Morrison, Hyo Soon You, and Robert Mills, ‘‘Young Adult Attachment Styles and Perceptions of Elder Abuse: A Cross-Cultural Study,’’ Journal of Cross-Cultural Gerontology 15 (September 2000): 163–84.

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71. William Keylor, The Twentieth Century World: An International History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 558–60. 72. Angela Stephens, ‘‘Americans Favor More U.S. Action in Darfur,’’ Program on International Policy Attitudes at University of Maryland, March 23, 2006. http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brunitedstatescanadara/181.php?lb=brusc&pnt=181&nid=&id=. 73. ‘‘Americans Continue to Support International Engagement Despite Frustration over the War in Iraq,’’ Program on International Policy Attitudes at University of Maryland, October 11, 2006, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/ pipa/articles/brunitedstatescanadara/256.php?nid=&id=&pnt=256&lb=btis. 74. Patrick James, ‘‘Structural Realism and the Causes of War,’’ Mershon International Studies Review 39 (October 1995): 181–208. 75. Paul M. Anderson ‘‘Racism in Sports: A Question of Ethics,’’ Marquette Sports Law Journal 6 (1996), 357. 76. Paul M. Anderson ‘‘Racism in Sports: A Question of Ethics.’’ 77. Dian Million, ‘‘Policing the Rez: Keeping No Peace in Indian Country,’’ Social Justice 27 (2000): 101–19. 78. ‘‘U.S. Public Rejects Using Military Force to Promote Democracy: Rejects Democratization as Rationale for Iraq War,’’ Program on International Policy Attitudes at University of Maryland, September 29, 2005, http://www.world publicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brunitedstatescanadara/77.php?lb=btgov& pnt=77&nid=&id=. 79. John Macquarrie, The Concept of Peace (London: SCM Press, 1973). 80. Aldon Morris, ‘‘A Retrospective on the Civil Rights Movement: Political and Intellectual Landmarks,’’ Annual Review of Sociology 25 (1999): 517–39. 81. Macquarrie, The Concept of Peace. 82. ‘‘Poll of 9 Major Nations Finds All, including the U.S., Reject World System Dominated by Single Power in Favor of Multipolarity: Uncertainty about whether U.S., China will be World Powers in Future,’’ Program on International Policy Attitudes at University of Maryland, June 12, 2006, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/views_on_countriesregions_bt/208.php?nid=& id=&pnt=208&lb=btvoc. 83. United Nations, ‘‘Charter of the United Nations,’’ http://www.un.org/ aboutun/charter/. 84. Albert Bandura, ‘‘Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities,’’ Personality and Social Psychology Review [Special Issue on Evil and Violence] 3 (1999): 193–209.

Chapter 10 1. CIA: The World Factbook—Canada, www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/ca.html. 2. CIA: The World Factbook—Canada. 3. CIA: The World Factbook—Canada.

218

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4. James Bickerton, Alain Gagnon, and Alain Gagnon, eds. Canadian Politics (Orchard, NY: Broadview Press, 2004). 5. Andrew Fenton Cooper, et al. Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 1993). 6. Canada, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada. 7. Canada, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada. 8. Canada, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada. 9. Canada, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada. 10. Canada, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada. 11. Jack M. Bumsted, A History of the Canadian Peoples (Ontario, ON: Oxford University Press, 2007), 464–5. 12. Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada (Toronto, ON: McClelland and Stewart, 2007). 13. Multiculturalism—Canadian Diversity: Respecting our Differences, http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/multi/respect_e.cfm. 14. Canadian Women in Government–Celebrating Women’s Achievements, http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/women/002026-800-e.html. 15. See Cooper, et al. 16. Desmond Morton, Understanding Canadian Defense (Canada: Penguin, 2003), 65. 17. Morton, Understanding Canadian Defense. 18. Canadians in Korea, 1950–1953, http://www.korean-war.com/canada.html. 19. Victor Levant, Quiet Complicity: Canadian Involvement in the Vietnam War (Toronto, ON: Between the Lines, 1986). 20. Canada, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada. 21. Canada and the Vietnam War, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada_ and_the_Vietnam_War. 22. Canada’s role in the invasion of Afghanistan, http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Canada’s_role_in_the_invasion_of_Afghanistan. 23. Joint Task Force in Afghanistan, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_ Task_Force_2#Afghanistan:_2001.E2.80.93present. 24. Canada’s role in the invasion of Afghanistan, http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Canada’s_role_in_the_invasion_of_Afghanistan. 25. Canada and the Iraq War, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada_and_ the_Iraq_War. 26. Canada and the Iraq War, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada_and_ the_Iraq_War. 27. See Cooper, et al.; Also see Terrorism Monitor, vol. 3, issues 14 and 15 (1997). 28. Canada, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada. 29. Canada and Peace Operations, http://international.gc.ca/peace-paix/ index.aspx?lang=en. 30. Peace Research: The Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies, www. peaceresearch.ca; published by Menno Simons College, 210–520 Portage Avenue, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, R3G 0G2. 31. Jack M. Bumsted, A History of the Canadian Peoples, 3rd ed (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2007).

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32. Desmond Morton, A Military History of Canada (Toronto, ON: McClelland and Stewart, 2007). 33. Michael Benedict, ed., Maclean’s Magazine Archives: Canada at War (Toronto, ON: Penguin Books, 1998), personal accounts of Canadian experiences in World War II.

Chapter 11 1. Peace and Security Section of the United Nations Department of Public Information, ‘‘United Nations Peace Operations: Year in Review’’ (2008). 2. Daniel Bar-Tal and Daniela Labin, ‘‘The Effect of a Major Event on StereoTyping: Terrorist Attacks in Israeal and Isreali Adolescents, Perceptions of Palestines, Jordanaians, and Arabs,’’ European Journal of Social Psychology 31 (2001): 265–80. 3. Carol Gordon and Asher Arian, ‘‘Threat and decision making,’’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (2001): 196–215. 4. Diederik A. Stapel and David M. Marx, ‘‘Making Sense of War: Using the Interpretation Comparison Model to Understand the Iraq Conflict,’’ European Journal of Social Psychology 37 (2007): 401–20. 5. See Daniel Bar-tal and Daniela Labin. 6. See Carol Gordan and Asher Arian. 7. Daniel J. Christie, Barbara S. Tint, Richard V. Wagner, and Deborah D. Winter, ‘‘Peace Psychology for a Peaceful World,’’ American Psychologist 63 (2008): 540–52. 8. Johan Galtung, ‘‘Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses,’’ Journal of Peace Research 22 (1985): 141–58. 9. Daniel J. Christie, Barbara S. Tint, Richard V. Wagner, and Deborah D. Winter, ‘‘Peace Psychology for a Peaceful World, American Psychologist 63 (2008): 540–52. 10. Ilse Hakvoort and Louis Oppenheimer, ‘‘Understanding Peace and War: A Review of Developmental Psychology Research,’’ Developmental Review 18 (1998): 353–89. 11. Leo R. Sandy and Ray Perkins, ‘‘The Nature of Peace and Its Implications for Peace Education,’’ The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution (2002): 1–8. 12. Frank Furedi, ‘‘Terrorism and the Politics of Fear,’’ in Criminology, ed. Chris Hale, Keith Hayward, Ali Wahidin, and Emma Wincup (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005): 307–22. 13. Terrance Chapman and Dan Reiter, ‘‘The United Nations Security Council and the Rally around the Flag Effect,’’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (2004): 886–909. 14. Daniel J. Christie, Barbara S. Tint, Richard V. Wagner, and Deborah D. Winter, ‘‘Peace Psychology for a Peaceful World, American Psychologist 63 (2008): 540–52.

Index

Abric, Jean-Claude, 75 Abu Ghraib prison, 57, 129, 135 Act of Supremacy (1534), 4 Act of Union, 4 Acts of Appeals (1533), 4 Afghanistan, 71–72; Canada’s relation with, 168, 171; United States’ relation with, 128, 129, 133, 153 African Americans, 143–4 African Union (AU), 181 Algerian War of Independence, 69, 70, 73, 75, 76, 77, 81, 82, 83 Al-Qaeda, 59, 128, 129, 131, 153, 168 Althingi, 86, 87 al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 171 American Revolutionary War (1778), 4 Amnesty International, 56, 57 Amnesty law, 54 Anglo-Irish Treaty, 18 Anti-Imperialist League, 130 API. See Asians and Pacific Islanders (API) Arab Americans, 148–149 Armed Islamic Group (GIA), 72 Army Affirmative Action Plan, 144 Asch, Solomon, 66 Asian Americans, 146–8 Asians and Pacific Islanders (API), 146

Atom Station (Laxness), 91 AU. See African Union (AU) Aznar, Jose Marıa, 58, 59 Bandura, Albert, 161 Bay of Pigs invasion, 126 Belfast Agreement, 19, 29, 30 Bell, Franklin J., 123 Bergson, Henri, 82 Beveridge, William, 6 Beveridge Report, 6 Bill of Rights (1689), 4, 155 Bin Laden, Osama, 71–72, 128, 129, 171 Blair, Tony, 8 Bloody Sunday, 28 Boer War, 164 British–Irish Intergovernmental Council, 19 British Social Attitudes Survey (2007), 11 Brown, Gordon, 14 Bumstead, J. M., 181 Bush, George W., 96, 115, 128, 131, 132, 133, 134, 156 Canada, 163, 179; Afghanistan’s relation with, 168; ethnicity and gender in, 164–6;

222 Canada (Continued) invasion, public opinion on, 175–6; Iraq’s relation with, 169; killing civilians to fight terrorism, public opinion on, 176–7; Korean War and, 166–7; national security, public opinion on, 174–5; peace, public opinion on, 170–71; right to peace, public opinion on, 172–3; right to protest, public opinion on, 178–9; terrorism, public opinion on, 171–2; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 177–8; United Nations and, 180–81; United States’ relation with, 164; Vietnam War and, 167–8; war, public opinion on, 169–70; world peace, public opinion on, 173–4 Canada at War, 181 Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act (2001), 171 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 171 Canadian Forces (CF), 164, 165, 167, 168 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, 165 Canadian Infantry Brigade, 166 Canadian Security and Intelligence Services (CSIS), 171 Carlos, Juan, 50 Castro, Fidel, 126 Central Community Relations Unit (CCRU), 20 CF. See Canadian Forces (CF) Charles I, 4 Charter of the United Nations, 160 Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), 146 Chretien, Jean, 168, 169 Civil Rights Act (1964), 144 Civil Rights Movement, 144, 155 Civil War, 4, 6, 47, 48, 49, 53, 54, 62, 122, 123, 130, 131, 144 ‘‘Coalition of the Willing,’’ 86, 92, 93, 96, 129, 169 Cod Wars, 85, 90, 91, 98 Cold War, 85, 90–91, 103, 125, 152, 166 ‘‘collateral damage,’’ 41, 42, 59, 99, 135, 177

Index collective memory, 81–82 colonial war, 33, 34, 39, 45, 46, 122, 126 Commonwealth of Nations, 5, 6, 163 conflict theory, 66 conformity theory, 66 Contras, 127 Costa Rica, 99 Council of Europe, 103 Council of the Isles, 19 CRC. See Northern Ireland Community Relations Council (CRC) Cromwell, Oliver, 4 CSIS. See Canadian Security and Intelligence Services (CSIS) Cuba, 123, 124, 126, 127, 145, 164 Cyprus, 7 DCSSI. See Direction Centrale de la Securite des Systemes d’Information (DCSSI) De Gaulle, Charles, 70 Debre, Michael, 70 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), 22, 23 Direction Centrale de la Securite des Systemes d’Information (DCSSI), 74 Dominion Elections Act (1920), 165 Douglas, Roche, 172 DUP. See Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) Durkheim, Emile, 66 East Timor, 39, 40 Easter Rising (1916), 18 Eden, Anthony, 7 Education for Mutual Understanding (EMU), 21, 23, 29 Emancipation Proclamation, 144 EMU. See Education for Mutual Understanding (EMU) England. See Great Britain Espionage Act, 130 ETA (Basque Homeland and Freedom), 50, 57, 58, 59

Index Ethnic minorities in United States, 141; African Americans, 143–4; Arab Americans, 148–9; Asian Americans, 146–8; invasion, public opinion on, 151–5, 159–60, 161; Latino and Hispanic Americans, 144–6; Native American Indians, 142–3; peace, public opinion on, 155–7, 161; right to peace, public opinion on, 157–9, 161; war, public opinion on, 149–51, 161 EU. See European Union (EU) European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, 57 European Economic Community, 45, 50 European Union (EU), 3, 6, 33, 35, 36, 58, 103, 181 Evian Accords, 70 Falkland War (1982), 7–8 Federation of Autonomous Communities, 50 Flament, Claude, 75 FP-25, 34–35, 41 France: age-related perceptions of peace, war and terrorism in, 77–80; Algerian War and, 69–70; collective memory for perception of peace, war and terrorism, 81– 83; conflict theories and processes, 65–66; French Revolution (1789), 67; gender-related perceptions of peace, war and terrorism in, 80–81; invasion, public opinion on, 72; killing civilians to fight terrorism, public opinion on, 73–74; national security, public opinion on, 74; peace, public opinion on, 71, 76; right to peace, public opinion on, 74; right to protest, public opinion on, 73; secular tradition, 67–68; social democracy, 68; social representations, 66; terrorism, public opinion on, 71–72, 77; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 73; war, public opinion on, 71, 76–77; World Wars and, 69

223 Franco, Francisco, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 62, 68 French Declaration of Human and Citizens Rights (1789), 67 French Revolution (1789), 65, 67, 79, 81, 83 Freud, Sigmund, 66 GAL. See Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberaci on (GAL, Antiterrorist Liberation Groups) Geneva Convention, 42–43, 58, 114, 136 GIA. See Armed Islamic Group (GIA) Great Britain: demographics, 5; history, 3–4; industrialization, 6; invasion, public opinion on, 9–10; killing civilians to fight terrorism, public opinion on, 11–12; military activities of, 7–8; minorities in, 6–7; peace, public opinion on, 14–15; politics, 4–5; religion, 5; right to protest, public opinion on, 15–16; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 12–13; war, public opinion on, 9 Great Reform Act (1832), 4 Global Peace Index, 85 Good Friday Peace Agreement, 20 Good Neighbor Policy, 124 Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberaci on (GAL, Antiterrorist Liberation Groups), 57 Guantanamo Bay detention camp, 57, 129, 135 Guerre d’Algerie. See Algerian War of Independence Gulf War, 8, 131, 144 Halfdanarson, Guðmundur, 90 Harper, Stephen, 163, 168 Henry II, 18 Henry VIII, 3–4, 5, 18 A History of the Canadian Peoples (3rd edn, Bumstead), 181 Hobbes, Thomas, 65

224

Index

Hiroshima attack, 124 Hitler, Adolf, 49, 53, 160 Ho Chi Minh, 126 Hull, Cordell, 124 Hussein, Saddam, 8, 113, 127, 128, 129, 131

James I, 18 John Lennon-Yoko Ono Peace Prize, 85 Johnson, Lyndon B., 126, 139 Joint Declaration of the Irish and British governments (1993), 19

Iceland, 85, 98–99; family relationships in, 97–98; international relations of, 86, 90–92; invasion, public opinion on, 95; killing civilians to fight terrorism, public opinion on, 95; national security, public opinion on, 98; nation-building era, 86–93; peace, war and terrorism, public opinion on, 94–95; right to peace, public opinion on, 96; right to protest, public opinion on, 96–97; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 95–96; world peace, public opinion on, 97 Icelandic Peacekeeping Force, 92 Immigration and Nationality Act (1965), 148 Imperialism, 4, 153 Imperialists, 130 Independence Party (Iceland), 91, 92, 93 The Independent, 13 Instructional Media Presentations and Collaborative Technology (NICCI-IMPACT). See Phoenix Peace Conference intentional memory, 82 International Commission on Decommissioning, 20 International Committee of the Red Cross, 12, 13 International Security Assistance Force, 168 IRA. See Irish Republican Army (IRA) Irish Republican Army (IRA), 11, 18, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27 Irish Republican Volunteers, 18 Islamic Jihad, 171

Karlsson, Gunnar, 91 Kennedy, John F., 126 Khrushchev, Nikita, 126 King, Martin Luther Jr., 144, 155 Korea Armistice Agreement, 166–7 Korean War, 130, 166–7 Kosovo, 14, 103, 128, 131 La Francophonie, 163 Latino and Hispanic Americans, 144–6 Laxness, Halldor, 91 Left Green Movement, 91, 92 ‘‘Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity,’’ 67, 78, 79, 83 Lincoln, Abraham, 122, 130 London public transportation system, bombing of, 12 Loyalist Volunteer Force, 27 Maclean (magazine), 181 Madrid bombings, 58–59 McKinley, William, 123 Mexican–American War, 122, 129, 139, 145 A Military History of Canada (Morton), 181 Milosevic, Slobodan, 128 Monroe Doctrine, 123 Morton, Desmond, 166, 181 Moscovici, Serge, 66, 75 Mother’s Index Rank, 106 multiculturalism, 165 Mussolini, Benito, 49, 53 Nagasaki attack, 124 Napoleonic Wars, 102 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 7 Native American Indians, 142–3 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Index Neal, Arthur, 81 New York Times, 131, 132 NICCI. See Northern Ireland Community Cooperation Initiative (NICCI) NILTS. See Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (NILTS) 9/11 terrorist attacks. See September 11 terrorist attacks NORAD. See North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Nordic Battlegroup, 104 North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), 166 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 10, 14, 39, 40, 86, 90–91, 92, 96, 98, 103, 104, 108, 125, 128, 152, 166, 168, 181 Northern Alliance, 128, 129 Northern Ireland, 17; historical background of, 17–21; peace and national security, public opinion on, 29–31; reconciliation and peace, public opinion on, 29–31; right to protest, public opinion on, 27–29; schools in, 20–21; terrorism, public opinion on, 27; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 26; war-related issues, public opinion on, 23–26 Northern Ireland Community Cooperation Initiative (NICCI), 21 Northern Ireland Community Relations Council (CRC), 20 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (NILTS), 22 Northern Ireland Student Inventory, 21 Northern Irish Civil Rights Association, 19 North–South Ministerial Council, 19 OAS. See Organization of the Secrete Army (OAS) OECD. See Organization of Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)

225 Open Door Policy, 124 Operation Anaconda, 168 Operation Harpoon, 168 Operation Mongoose, 126 Opium Wars, 146 Oran massacre (1962), 70 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 103 Organization of Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), 36 Organization of the Secrete Army (OAS), 70, 75, 77 OSCE. See Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) ‘‘Pact of Forgetting,’’ 54 ‘‘Pacto del Olvido.’’ See ‘‘Pact of Forgetting’’ PAIRTAPS. See Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) Paris massacre (1961), 70 Paris Peace Agreement, 126 Peace Agreement (1998), 20 Peace Research: The Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies, 181 Pearson, Lester B., 181 Pentagon, 128 Peoples’ Alliance, 91 Persian Gulf War, 144 Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS), 8–9, 17, 21, 23, 24, 33, 38, 44, 51, 70, 71, 72, 73, 106, 107, 132, 136, 137, 141, 169, 172, 180, 184 Philippine-American War, 123, 130 Phoenix Peace Conference, 21 Platt Amendment, 123 Portugal: colonial empire in, 34; economic situation in, 35; education in, 35–36; family life in, 36–37; immigration and ethnic problems in, 36; internal terrorism in, 34–35;

226 Portugal (Continued) invasion, public opinion on, 38–40; killing civilians to fight terrorism, public opinion on, 41–42; life conditions in, 35; right to peace, public opinion on, 44–45; right to protest, public opinion on, 44; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 42–44; women status in, 36; world peace, public opinion on, 45–46 Powell, Colin, 131 preemptive war, 40 preventive war, 40 Progressive party (Iceland), 92 Puerto Rico, 145 Quebec, 164, 165 Queen Elizabeth II, 163 RCBB. See Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (RCBB) Reagan, Ronald, 127 Resolution 678, 127 Rice, Condoleezza, 129 Riksdag, 104 ‘‘Ring of Steel’’ strategy, 11 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 124 Roosevelt, Theodore, 122, 123 ‘‘Roosevelt Corollary,’’ 123, 124 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 66 Royal Canadian Air Force, 166, 167 Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (RCBB), 165 Sandinista, Nicaragua, 127 SAP. See Social Democratic Party (SAP) Sauve, Jeanne, 165 Save the Children Women’s Index Rank, 105–6 SDLP. See Socialist Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) September 11 terrorist attacks, 8, 12, 41, 59, 74, 77, 82, 83, 105, 114, 128, 129, 131, 133, 149, 161, 168, 171

Index Serbia, 14, 128 Sherif, Carolyn, 66 Sigurðsson, J on, 90 Sinn Fein, 22, 23 social contract, 65–66 Social Democratic Alliance, 92 Social Democratic Party (SAP), 104 Social Influence and Allied Services. See Beveridge Report Socialist Democratic Labour Party (SDLP), 22, 23 Spain, 47, 63; civil war, 49; definitions of war and peace, public opinion on, 62; dictatorship, 49–50; fight for democracy, 48; historical and political context, 48; invasion, public opinion on, 51–54; right to protest, public opinion on, 54–56; social cohesion and liberalization in, 50–51; terrorism, public opinion on, 58–60; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 56–58; transition to democracy, 50; world peace, public opinion on, 60–61 ‘‘Spanish miracle,’’ 50 Spanish-American War, 123, 130, 145 spontaneous memory, 82 Stefansson, Kari Dr., 97–98 Suez Canal crisis, 7, 180 Sweden, 101, 117; foreign policy and defense system, 103–4; gender equality in, 105–6, 115–16; human rights in, 105; immigration in, 105; invasion, public opinion on, 110–11; killing civilians to fight terrorism, public opinion on, 112–14; peace, public opinion on, 107–8; political system, 104; relation with United States, 103; religion in, 106; terrorism, public opinion on, 112; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 114–15; U.S. invasion of Iraq, public opinion on, 115; war, public opinion on, 110; ways to achieve world peace, public opinion on,

Index 109–10; welfare system, 104; world peace, public opinion on, 108–9; World Wars and, 102–3 Swedish Commission for Neutral Politics, 103 Taliban, 113–14, 128–9, 153, 168 Thatcher, Margaret, 8 The Times, 11 Tolstoy, Leo, 76 ‘‘Troubles,’’ 18, 19, 24, 25, 28, 30 Truman, Harry S., 125, 166 Turkish Robbery, 89 Ulster Unionist Party, 22 Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), 18, 27 UN. See United Nations (UN) UN Human Development Index, 85 UN Security Council, 14, 52, 127, 129, 131 United Nations (UN), 6, 14, 53, 57, 86, 95, 102, 103, 104, 125, 128, 129, 155, 166, 167, 176, 181 United Nations Convention against Torture, 57 United Nations Peacekeeping Force, 181 United States, 121; Afghanistan and, 128, 129, 133, 153; attack on Japan, 124–5; Canada’s relation with, 164; continental conflicts, 121–2; human rights, public opinion on, 134–5; intervention in Latin America, 123, 124; invasion, public opinion on, 133–4; killing civilians to fight terrorism, public opinion on, 135; military activity in new century, 128–9; military involvement in external conflicts,

227 123–8; national security, public opinion on, 133; North Vietnam and, 126–7; peace, public opinion on, 137–8; perspectives on invasion, 131–2; public opinion on military activity of, 129–31; Soviet Union’s relation with, 125; Sweden’s relation with, 103; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 135–6 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 50 U.S. Declaration of Independence, 155 UVF. See Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)

Vietnam War, 127, 130, 139, 147, 167–8

War and Peace (Tolstoy), 76 War of 1812, 122, 128 War Powers Act, 127 Wilson, Woodrow, 123 World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report, 105 World Trade Center, 82, 128, 168 World War I, 4, 48, 69, 102, 123, 130, 143, 165 World War II, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14, 49, 69, 75, 77, 80, 82, 86, 98, 102, 125, 131, 139, 143, 147, 164, 165, 166, 180, 181

Zapatero, Jose Luis Rodriguez, 59 al-Zawahiri, Ayman, 171

About the Editor and Contributors

EDITOR Kathleen Malley-Morrison, Ed.D., Director of the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP), is a Professor of Psychology at Boston University. She has conducted extensive research on family violence since a 1980 postdoctoral fellowship on the family violence team at Children’s Hospital in Boston. She regularly teaches undergraduate and graduate courses on family violence and the psychology of war and peace. She is the first author or coauthor of several books, including Treating Child Abuse and Family Violence in Hospitals, Family Violence in a Cultural Perspective, and Family Violence in the United States as well as editor of the book International Perspectives on Family Violence and Abuse: A Cognitive Ecological Approach. She has published and presented numerous articles on cross-cultural and international perspectives on governmental aggression and peace and won a mentoring award from the American Psychological Association International Psychology Division.

CONTRIBUTORS Mariana Barbosa is a teaching assistant at the Catholic University of Portugal. She is working on her Ph.D at Minho University, studying the Portuguese perspectives on state violence, by exploring the citizens’ judgments, but also the mass media and political discourse on this issue. In 2007, she was in Boston University as a visiting scholar, under the supervision of Professor Kathleen Malley-Morrison and was collaborating with the GIPGAP team.

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About the Editor and Contributors

Scott Borrelli, Ed.D., received his Ed.D. in Counseling Psychology from Boston University in 1979. He is a licensed psychologist (MA, CA, FL), Diplomate/Board Certified in clinical psychology, counseling psychology, and medical psychology, and is the Chief Editor of the online European journal, The EMDR Practitioner. For nearly two decades, he has been living in Europe teaching and working with multi-cultural populations as a faculty member of Boston University and now the University of Maryland. He was lead author of the chapter on Italy for the book International Perspectives on Family Violence and Abuse (2004). Helena Castanheira, PgD., laboratory manager for the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP), has a post graduate degree in business management from ISCTE University in her native Portugal and is currently a graduate student in psychology at Boston University. Her research focuses on moral disengagement theory, transitional justice systems, and reconciliation processes in post-conflict situations. She has published several papers, in the International Psychology Bulletin and in Peace Psychology and has presented her work at several international conferences. Michael Corgan, Ph.D. (B.S., U.S. Naval Academy; M.P.A., University of Washington; Ph.D., Boston University) was a Professor of National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval War College, 1991–1993, and is currently an Associate Professor of International Relations at Boston University. He is a specialist in international security, Icelandic government and politics, and American governmental institutions. He has extensive government service in political and military planning (especially NATO) and is a media analyst on security and political affairs. He is also adjunct faculty in Political Science at the University of Iceland. Abel Dalleau is a Master’s degree student in social psychology at the Paris Descartes University, France. Carol J. Davis has B.A. and B.Ed. degrees from the University of Manitoba, and an M.A. degree in English literature with an emphasis on literature of the Commonwealth. She has taught high school English and French in Manitoba, high-school English in Oregon, and Freshman English courses at Texas State University-San Marcos. She has also worked in the Center for Continuing Education at the University of British Columbia and holds credentials from UBC to teach English as a second language. She has taught English in China at Nankai University in Tianjin and worked in Hong Kong as a supervisor of English teachers in a United Nations camp for Vietnamese boat refugees. She is a Canadian

About the Editor and Contributors

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citizen who has lived in Texas for 30 years. She maintains close ties with Canada and returns there frequently. John M. Davis is Graduate Professor of Psychology at Texas State University-San Marcos. Educated at Oklahoma City University (B.A., Psychology) and the University of Oklahoma (M.S.; Ph.D., Experimental Psychology), he also studied at the Universities of Heidelberg and Erlangen in Germany. He has taught psychology at Schiller International University in Germany, directed psychological research with Vietnamese Refugees in UNHCR camps in Hong Kong, established a study abroad program in psychology in the UK, and has taught and maintained an active research program at Texas State University for more than 30 years. His research focuses on interpersonal and intergroup relations, international psychology, and the application of psychology to international relations. His recent publications include the book chapters ‘‘International Perspectives on Social Justice: Essentials for the Effort toward Global Security’’; and ‘‘Countering International Terrorism: Perspectives from International Psychology.’’ He regularly teaches courses on social psychology, statistics, and a new course he has pioneered, international psychology. He has served as president of Psi Chi, the National Honor Society in Psychology, president of the Southwestern Psychological Association, and secretary-general of the International Council of Psychologists. Denise A. Hines, Ph.D., earned that degree from the programs in human development in the psychology department at Boston University. She is currently Research Assistant Professor in the Department of Psychology at Clark University, Worcester, MA, and a research associate at the University of New Hampshire, Family Research Laboratory and Crimes against Children Research Center, Durham, NH. She is principal investigator on a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health on the ‘‘Mental Health Status of Male Help-Seekers for Partner Violence Victimization.’’ She has published widely on issues related to aggression as well as to culture. Carol Vincent Linsenmeier, Ph.D., earned her degree in special education from Kent State University, Kent, Ohio. She has worked as a research associate for Inspirational Media International as a part of the Northern Ireland Community Cooperation Initiative (NICCI). In 1999, she took part in the Six Schools Project in Coleraine, Portstewart, and Portrush, Northern Ireland as a qualitative researcher and has continued, at the request of the Northern Irish Assembly, to be involved as a researcher in the NICCI Awards and the Phoenix Peace Conference.

232

About the Editor and Contributors

Carla Machado, Ph.D., completed postgraduate studies in criminology at the University of Porto in 1993 and received her Ph.D. in psychology of justice at the University of Minho (2000). She is currently Assistant Professor in the Department of Psychology of Minho University and was Director of the University of Minho’s graduate program in psychology between 2002 and 2005. She teaches undergraduate and master courses on victimology and psicossociology of crime and is author of several books and articles on the topics of crime, victimology, and forensic psychology, published in Portugal, Spain, and Brazil. Raquel Matos, Ph.D., is a lecturer at the Faculty of Education and Psychology of the Catholic University of Portugal, where she teaches research methods and justice psychology. She worked as a researcher on projects about victims of violence, but her research interests are now focused on gender and crime and on state violence. She has finished her doctoral dissertation about life trajectories of young women in Portuguese prisons and is now researching Portuguese attitudes toward state violence. Andrea E. Mercurio, Ph.D., is a postdoctoral fellow at Boston Medical Center in the Department of Psychiatry. She received her Ph.D. from George Washington University in May 2007. Although her background and training are in social psychology, she has a broad interest in health and human development, with a particular focus on family violence as well as on international perspectives on peace and governmental aggression. She is coauthor of the chapter on Portugal in the book International Perspectives on Family Violence and Abuse (2004). Her current work examines issues of apology and forgiveness in the context of international conflict.  Silja B ara Omarsd ottir, Ph.D., is the director of the Institute of International Affairs and Centre for Small State Studies at the University of Iceland, as well as adjunct lecturer in the university’s Department of Political Science. She completed her BA (departmental honors) in international affairs from Lewis & Clark College and an MA in international  relations from the University of Southern California. Dr. Omarsd ottir has written and produced a radio program on international affairs and is an activist for women’s rights, having served on the National Committee of UNIFEM in Iceland, the Feminist Association, and the Icelandic Women’s Rights Association. Kimberly Rapoza, Ph.D., received her Ph.D. in psychology from Boston University and is currently an assistant professor at Mercy College’s

About the Editor and Contributors

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Division of Social and Behavioral Sciences. Her research interests encompass the impact of interpersonal violence on physical and psychological wellness, substance use, and attachment styles. She was awarded an EARDA pilot grant from the National Institutes of Health to investigate the relationships among chronic stress, social support, attachment, and physical/psychological illness. She has also received a RIMI subproject grant from the National Institutes of Health to further explore a multicomponent model assessing psychosocial and physiological mechanisms that may underlie compromised psychological and/or physical health, particularly for women and ethnic minority populations. She authored the chapter on the United States for the book International Perspectives on Family Violence and Abuse (Erlbaum, 2004). Christine Roland-L evy, Ph.D., is Senior Lecturer, HDR, in psychology, University Paris Descartes. She received her Ph.D. in psychology in 1980, HDR in social psychology in 2000, and qualified as professor in 2002, 16th division of the National Committee, CNU. She is a member of the Research Laboratory of Applied Psychology, CRP, LPA, ‘‘Stress, Health, Society,’’ EA 3793, University of Rheims Champagne-Ardenne (URCA). She is responsible for the research program Stress, Representations and Socialisation, Head Manager at the European level of the online Masters Citizenship Education in Europe, and President-Elect (2006–2008), and now President (2008–2010) of Children’s Identity and Citizenship European Association. Mathilde Salmberg, Psy.D., originally from Sweden, completed a doctoral degree in clinical psychology at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C. She completed her predoctoral internship at the University of Virginia and her postdoctoral fellowship at Georgetown University. She currently serves as a staff psychologist at Georgetown University, specializing in clinical work and outreach with international students. Her professional interests include cross-cultural research, cross-cultural adjustment, eating disorders, and issues related to self-care. She serves as the cochair for the Early Career Committee of the American Psychological Associations’s Division for International Psychology (Div. 52) and as a mentor coordinator for the Division 52 Mentoring Committee. Stephen R. Shalom, Ph.D., earned his degree in political science from Boston University, and is a professor of political science at William Paterson University, Wayne, NJ. He has published extensively on issues related to state aggression. Among his authored books are Imperial Alibis: Rationalizing U.S. Intervention after the Cold War (Boston: South End Press, 1993) and The United States and the Philippines: A Study of

234

About the Editor and Contributors

Neocolonialism (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1981). His edited or coedited books include Perilous Power: The Middle East and U.S. Foreign Policy. Dialogues on Terror, Democracy, War, and Justice (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007); East Timor, Indonesia, and the World Community (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); and The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance (Boston: South End Press, 1987). He has also authored many other chapters and articles, including ‘‘Getting Out of Iraq,’’ [with Gilbert Achcar] in Introducing Issues with Opposing Viewpoints: the Middle East, ed. Laurie Friedman (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2007); ‘‘Iraq White Paper: The Invasion and Occupation of Iraq: A Pattern of Lies and Deception,’’ in Enduring Freedom or Enduring War, ed. Carl Mirra (Washington, DC: Maisonneuve Press, 2005); ‘‘The United States and the Gulf War,’’ in The Saddam Hussein Reader, ed. Turi Munthe (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press/Avalon Publishing, 2002); and ‘‘The United States and the Middle East: Why Do ‘They’ Hate Us ’’ in Shattered Illusions: Analyzing the War on Terrorism, ed. Aftab A. Malik (Bristol, England: Amal Press, 2002). Stephen Soldz, Ph.D., is a psychologist, psychoanalyst, and public health researcher. He is Director of the Center for Research, Evaluation and Program Development at the Boston Graduate School of Psychoanalysis and a faculty member in BGSP’s psychoanalysis programs and its doctoral program in culture and psychoanalysis. Dr. Soldz has consulted to several states on the evaluation of public health programs. He is the author of over 80 professional publications, coeditor of Reconciling Empirical Knowledge and Clinical Experience: The Art and Science of Psychotherapy (APA Books, 2000), and member of several editorial boards including Journal of Research Practice, Psychotherapy Research, and Psychotherapy and Politics International. He is a prolific writer on social issues for such Web sites as CounterPunch, ZNet, OpEdNews, Dissident Voice, Scoop, and his own blog Psyche, Science, and Society among others. He is co-chair of the Psychologists for Social Responsibility End Torture Action Committee and a founder of the Coalition for an Ethical Psychology. Sarah E. Stuart, B.A., is currently a research associate at the San Francisco Veterans Affairs Medical Center and the Northern California Institute for Research and Education. She has presented her work on elder abuse and governmental aggression at professional conferences. John M. Whiteley is Professor of Social Ecology at the University of California, Irvine. His most recent scholarship involves the peace-building implications of the transboundary ethnic/national disputes in the

About the Editor and Contributors

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Caucasus region of the former Soviet Union. His teaching focuses on the problem of peace in the nuclear age, the nuclear environment, and the issues of global sustainability associated with the interrelationship of health and environment. He is the coauthor (with Russell J. Dalton, Paula Garb, Nicholas P. Lovrich, and John C. Pierce) of Critical Masses: Citizen, Nuclear Weapon Production, and Environmental Destruction in the United States and Russia (MIT Press). He is an editor and contributor to Water, Place, and Equity (MIT Press). He is the creator of the ‘‘Quest for Peace Project,’’ a comprehensive set of interviews on the problems of achieving peace in the nuclear age. This project is available electronically at http:// www.lib.uci.edu/quest/. Michael J. Whitely, Ph.D., received his doctor of philosophy in educational psychology from Kent State University, Kent, Ohio. He is currently adjunct faculty at Kent State, and director and program designer of Inspirational Media International (IMI), which was named ‘‘2007 National Community-Based Organization of the Year’’ by the National Association of Experiential Education (NSEE). He has received many professional honors and leadership awards for humanitarian work in the field of social action programming and experiential education. He is author of The Northern Ireland Student Inventory as well as several reports on the Northern Ireland peace process. Tanvi Zaveri, M.A., received her degree in international relations and B.A. in psychology and sociology from Boston University. Her thesis focused on moral disengagement and perspectives on invasion, torture, killing civilians to fight terrorism, and breaking international law in samples from Peru, the United States, and Lebanon. She has also presented her research on cross-cultural attitudes toward family violence, governmental aggression, and peace at numerous professional meetings. She is currently pursuing a law degree at American University.

State Violence and the Right to Peace

State Violence and the Right to Peace An International Survey of the Views of Ordinary People Volume 2: Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Middle East

Kathleen Malley-Morrison, Editor Foreword by John M. Whiteley PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC

Copyright 2009 by Kathleen Malley-Morrison All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data State violence and the right to peace : an international survey of the views of ordinary people / edited by Kathleen Malley-Morrison ; foreword by John M. Whiteley. p. ; cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-275-99647-5 (hard copy : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-275-99648-2 (ebook) 1. Violence—Europe—History. 2. Violence—North America—History. I. Malley-Morrison, Kathleen. HN380.V5S73 2009 303.6094—dc22 2009015791 ISBN: 978-0-275-99647-5 978-0-275-99651-2 (Vol. 978-0-275-99653-6 (Vol. 978-0-275-99655-0 (Vol. 978-0-275-99657-4 (Vol. EISBN: 978-0-275-99648-2 13 12

11 10 9

1) 2) 3) 4)

1 2 3

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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. Praeger Security International An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

Contents

Foreword: Ordinary People, Country Portraits, and State Violence and Aggression John M. Whiteley

vii

Set Introduction Kathleen Malley-Morrison

xiii

Introduction to Volume 2

xxv

Part I. Central and Eastern Europe and Russia

1

1 Germany Elisabeth A. Leembruggen-Kallberg, Mariana Barbosa, and Julia K€onig

3

2 Slovenia Vlado Miheljak and Marko Polic

25

3 Serbia Nebojsa Petrovic, Kristina Pota, and Helena Castanheira

41

4 Russia Sherri McCarthy, Elina Tochilnikova, and Anna Medvedeva

59

5 Greece Maria D. Daskalopoulos and Charikleia A. Tsatsaroni

79

6 Turkey Feryal Turan and Alev Yalcınkaya-Hanly

99

Contents

vi

Part II. The Middle East

113

7 Israel Helena Syna Desivilya and Dalit Yassour-Borochowitz

115

8 Lebanon William J. Tastle, Rouba Youssef, and Adam Hammoud

129

9 Iraq Abdul Kareem AlObaidi and Linda Jeffrey

147

10 11 12

Kuwait Heyam Mohammed and Raja Tayeh

159

Saudi Arabia Majed A. Ashy and Elizabeth Planje

177

An Integrative Conclusion for Volume 2 Mathilde Salmberg

193

Notes

209

Index

233

About the Editor and Contributors

243

Foreword

Ordinary People, Country Portraits, and State Violence and Aggression John M. Whiteley

Seeking the views of ‘‘ordinary people’’ is reminiscent of what President Dwight D. Eisenhower said about people’s views on the importance of peace in relation to the role of government: Indeed, I think that people want peace so much that one of these days governments had better get out of their way and let them have it. —From a TV talk with Harold McMillan, August 31, 1959

The broad area of inquiry in this multivolume and pioneering research provides portraits of 43 very diverse countries selected from every continent of the world. It co-joins these country-specific portraits with surveys of the opinions of ‘‘ordinary people’’ from those countries on a series of important issues using an instrument known as the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS). A great contribution of this novel and important line of research is that it opens up for further study the relationship between a country’s historical experience and current circumstances in the world around it, and the opinions of its citizens on a host of peace-related issues.

THE COUNTRY PORTRAITS Reflecting the bold vision behind the four-volume series, there is no standard format into which the 43 country portraits had to fit. This is a sound decision because the experiences of each of the countries are so different. For example, the case study of Great Britain has the following

viii

Foreword

categories: (1) Historical and Political Context; (2) Current Demographics; (3) Religion; (4) Industrialization, Health Care, and Education (5) Minorities; and (6) Post–World War II Involvement in Military Activities. By way of contrast, the case study of Greece has the following categories: (1) Historical Background; (2) Recent Involvement in Conflict and Peace Efforts; and (3) Social Contextual Factors. Similarly, the case study of Russia, one of the most developed in the volumes, has the following category: Historical and Political Context. The point is that whether there were 16þ double-spaced manuscript pages devoted to numerous topics under one heading (the Russian case study), or 8þ double-spaced pages devoted to three categories (the Greece case study), or 7þ double-spaced pages covering six categories, there is an authenticity to each of the portraits. Informed by the relationship found between the diverse country portraits and the opinions of ‘‘ordinary citizens’’ as expressed on the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey, the next generation of research in this promising paradigm may wish to ask the authors of country case studies to address a broader range of peacerelated content categories. For example, the authors of the case study on Great Britain obviously believed it was relevant to address the minority issue, the history of religious persecution, the current (more) openness to religious diversity, components of (and tensions over) a (more) welfare state model, and the (multiple) lessons derived from involvement in military activities since World War II. One area for the next generation of research is the relevance of these topics to countries other than Great Britain. In a similar vein, the case study of Greece asserts that, although ‘‘the influence of ancient Greek civilization on the modern world is well known, few people know that among Greeks themselves, awareness of this great legacy was almost wiped out under nearly 400 years (1453– 1830) of Ottoman rule.’’ A consequence of this historical disruption, according to the authors of the case study of Greece, is that ‘‘Greece was largely isolated from great historical movements such as the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution.’’ Greater emphasis in this case study was assigned to experience in the 20th Century: The Balkan Wars, the World Wars, a civil war, and several military dictatorships. A richness of this four-volume portrait of 43 countries is that it is possible to develop categories of analysis within and across case studies using the current portraits. It is also possible to expand each existing portrait to include promising categories from other case studies. For example, post–World War II involvement in military activities (from the case study of Great Britain) and recent involvement in conflict and

Foreword

ix

peace efforts and social contextual factors (from the Greece case study) appear to provide especially relevant insights for the (more) empirical investigation provided by the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey. Country Aggression and ‘‘Ordinary People’’ Peace Survey The main title of these four volumes, ‘‘State Violence and the Right to Peace’’ is very appropriately chosen. The empirical instrument, the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey, has six sections: Section I – probing ‘‘ordinary people’s opinions’’ about the right of governments to perform acts of aggression (invasions of another country, killing innocent civilians, engaging in torture); Section II – whether individuals have a right to a world of peace and to demonstrate in support of that conviction; Section III – patriotism and an assessment of the United States in Iraq; Section IV – acts of state violence as assessed through the prism of emotional responses to direct or indirect exposure; Section V – ‘‘ordinary citizen’’ definitions of such fundamental terms as war, peace, torture, terrorism, reconciliation, and rights; and Section VI – a dual consideration of the relationship of national security to individual and family security, and whether peace is achievable.

COMMENTARY AND ASSESSMENT A significant contribution of these four volumes is to open up an original line of inquiry with evidence from 43 countries. The various chapters address different aspects of these six sections as they pertain to the country being profiled. The next level of inquiry will, to advantage, broaden the within-country samples sufficiently that it will be possible to illuminate within-country differences. Building on the current country portraits and the current empirical samples, it is feasible to begin the process of hypothesis development relating country characteristics to attitudes of ‘‘ordinary citizens,’’ as well as the reverse, relating the attitudes of ‘‘ordinary citizens’’ to the characteristics of the country.

Foreword

x

Then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara wrote to President Lyndon Johnson in 1967 that there were limits to what the American people would allow their government to do: . . . there may be a limit beyond which many Americans and much of the world will not permit the United States to go. The picture of the world’s greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 noncombatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one. It could conceivably produce a costly distortion in the American national consciousness and in the world image of the United States.

The point Secretary McNamara was making to President Johnson is broadly applicable to the survey instrument questions about the United States in Iraq and citizen support for the torture and terrorism in relation to the world image of the United States. This general line of inquiry is broadly applicable to unsolved problems of global society in the 21st century. The approach to research by the organizers of these four volumes used the country case study method to pioneer an exploration of the views of ‘‘ordinary people’’ about the permissible levels of state violence on such significant questions as whether, and under what conditions, governments have the right to perform acts of aggression, and the relationship of national security to individual and family security. The inclusion of 43 countries from the continents of the world makes it possible to begin to understand how country characteristics and historical and current experience affect such significant perceptions in global context of whether peace is achievable, common understandings of the meaning of being patriotic, ordinary citizen support for torture and terrorism, and the prospects for reconciliation after the killing has stopped.

THE BROADER CONTEXT FOR A NEW RESEARCH PARADIGM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY The research in this four-volume series provides an imaginative new approach to the relationship between state violence and the opinions of citizens. This approach can be broadened as it further develops to incorporate another insight that Dwight Eisenhower shared with the American people and the world when he talked about the negative consequences of states putting such huge resources into preparing to conduct state violence. The essence of what he shared is as follows: Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed,

Foreword those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. This is not a way of life at all in any true sense. Under the clouds of war, it is humanity hanging on a cross of iron. —Dwight D. Eisenhower, ‘‘The Chance for Peace’’ Address, April 16, 1953

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Set Introduction Kathleen Malley-Morrison

When people in today’s world think about war and peace, they generally think about war and peace between or within nations. Yet the very idea of nations, or states, is quite a new one in human history. For most of human existence, people banded together in extended families, bands, tribes, or chiefdoms; later, in some parts of the world, leaders such as warlords, kings, and emperors forcibly created larger social and political structures. The notion of a human society organized into individual states or nations, with equal sovereignty, is, by contrast, quite modern, an outgrowth of the Peace of Westphalia that brought an end to the Thirty Years War in 1648. The Thirty Years War, which was actually a series of European wars, was essentially a set of conflicts between proponents of Catholicism and proponents of Protestantism, who allied themselves with the expansionist ambitions of many European power holders. Ultimately, these wars involved the leaders of Bohemia, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Poland, Russia, the Netherlands, Spain, and France, although it could also be seen as a conflict between the Holy Roman Empire, which was aggressively Roman Catholic, and various anti-imperialistic Protestant communities. It was fought primarily on German territory, often by mercenaries, with devastating results. The Peace of Westphalia formally ended the era in which princes and kings could demand feudal loyalties from sovereigns within other states and could also attempt to force their own religious observance on subjects of another sovereign. One of the immediate effects was to end the direct influence of the Pope, Innocent X, and his successors on the choosing of the Holy Roman emperor and on intervening in the internal

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affairs of European countries no longer Catholic. There arose, instead, the structure of independent sovereign states—a type of organization that gradually extended beyond Europe and has persisted into modern times. Even the Charter of the United Nations, though it champions peaceful resolution of disputes, acknowledges this idea of sovereignty in the very first section of Article 2 of the Charter: ‘‘The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.’’1 This statement so early in the UN Charter is simply recognition that the political order of today’s world remains characterized by the predominance of sovereign states acknowledging no higher authority than themselves in matters of vital interests. The Security Council notwithstanding, each state is the final decider of its own security interests and of the means appropriate to achieve those interests. The virtual anarchy enabled by this formalizing of the supremacy of sovereignty has particularly grave implications in an era when technology has made nearly instantaneous attack with unimaginably devastating weapons by other states or non-state actors possible anywhere on the globe. All states must, to some degree, live in a condition of perpetual concern about their readiness to provide for their security. This in turn induces what is called ‘‘the security dilemma’’ for other states. What one state does for its own protection is likely to be seen by at least some other states as threatening. Although states may find it useful to wage wars, it is the people who inhabit those states who suffer most in times of war, and governments often promise their people that a better peace, a more secure peace, will grow out of their sacrifices. In modern times, World War I turned out not to be ‘‘the war to end all wars’’; the death of approximately 20 million people did not lead to an enduring peace. The carnage of World War II was even greater, with the majority of deaths being civilians. Among the Allies, it is likely that 25 million people, at least two thirds of whom were civilians, died in the Soviet Union—15 million in China; 6 million in Poland; between 1.5 and 2 million in Yugoslavia; approximately 400,000 in the United Kingdom; and about 300,000 from the United States. Germany lost over 4 million, and Japan over 2 million lives in the war. ‘‘The total for the globe as a whole probably reached 60 million, a figure which includes 6 million murdered because they were Jewish.’’2 The loss of approximately 60 million lives in World War II, itself a direct consequence of mismanagement of the outcome of World War I, failed to bring peace to the world. According to one set of estimates, between the end of World War II and 2004, there have been a total of 228 armed conflicts; 118 of these have taken place since the end of the Cold War.3 However, the number of international wars has declined since the late 1970s, largely because of the end of colonialism and the Cold War.4

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The United Kingdom and France, former colonial powers, had fought most of the post-World War II wars, followed by the major Cold Warriors, the United States and the USSR. In addition, after World War II the number of civil wars first increased dramatically, but then, starting in the 1990s, decreased even more dramatically. In 2003, the majority of nonstate wars (not involving any government) took place in Africa. Many people are unsurprised at the level of violence permeating society, because they see aggression as an innate human characteristic, part of our evolutionary history. Not so, say many experts. For example, Robert Sapolsky argues effectively that although some of our related primate species are characterized by violence, others are communal, egalitarian, and cooperative.5 The Encyclopedia of Selected Peaceful Societies provides descriptions of 25 of the societies identified by sociologists and anthropologists as peaceful, the most well-known of these probably being the Amish, Tahitians, and Inuit of Utkuhikhalik.6 Ackerman and Duvall describe major changes in power and successful resistance movements achieved without major military conflict, and in which the ‘‘little guys’’ successfully combated powerful aggressors; for example, India’s transition to self-rule under the leadership of Mohandas Ghandi, Poland’s Solidarity Movement in the 1980s under the leadership of Lech Walesa, and the campaign against apartheid in South Africa under the leadership of many courageous men and women, including Nelson Mandela.7 Although violent conflict was widespread in the era from 1990 to 2002, 30 successful peace agreements were made and have been respected; for example, in Mexico, Northern Ireland, Mauritania, Slovenia, Albania, Uzbekistan, Bangladesh, and Kuwait. Thus, the claims of many leaders that their national or group aims (always portrayed as righteous) can be achieved only through violence are belied by numerous counterexamples, often not as widely remembered as the armed conflicts are. The Human Security Report attributes the decline in armed conflicts over the last 30 years to three key factors: the end of colonialism, the end of the Cold War, and the international conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peace-building activities of the United Nations. In 1948, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaims, among other things, that ‘‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person’’; ‘‘No one shall be held in slavery or servitude’’; ‘‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’’; ‘‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile’’; and ‘‘Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.’’ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a revolutionary document that provides the basis for international human rights law today. It has been followed by other human rights proclamations, such as the

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Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,8 the Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace,9 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which emphasizes the importance of preparing children to live in a world of peace.10 On the other hand, although banning torture and many other forms of violence and discrimination, the United Nations has not made all armed conflict illegal. For example, the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations states as one of its goals: ‘‘to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest’’ (emphasis added).11 Moreover, Article 51 of the Charter states, ‘‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.’’12 Finally, according to Article 42 of the Charter, if nonviolent efforts fail to resolve ‘‘any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,’’ then the Security Council ‘‘may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.’’13 The United Nations’ position concerning the justifiability of armed force for self-defense or in response to breaches of the peace and acts of aggression is generally viewed as consistent with Just War doctrine, which is designed to constrain and prevent warfare. In general, there are six criteria that Just War theorists agree must be met, in combination, for a nation to be justified in going to war: just cause (i.e., in response and only in response to actual or imminent attack); right authority (e.g., initiated by the United Nations or a national government, not a terrorist group); right intention (e.g., to achieve peace and security); reasonable prospect of success (to ensure there is not a needless loss of life); proportionate cause (the response should be proportionate to the level of the attack or threat); and war as a last resort (undertaken only if and when all nonviolent solutions have been tried and have failed, consistent with the United Nations Charter).14 Several social scientists and ethicists have evaluated the extent to which the United States’ invasion of Iraq fits the profile for a just war and have concluded that it does not.15 Moreover, Just War doctrine itself has been criticized on the ground that its principles, particularly the principle of just cause, can be too easily subverted.16 Others argue that Just War doctrine imposes at least some constraints on potential violent conflicts and needs to be updated to deal with modern realities (e.g., terrorist groups and weapons of mass destruction) rather than abandoned altogether.17

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It seems clear that some nations that are signatories to human rights proclamations, as well as non-state groups, break international laws and agreements, and even appear to reject the idea that everyone (regardless of ‘‘race’’ or religion) has a right to peace.18 How do ordinary people feel about the principles stated in such proclamations? Do they believe that strategies like invasion and torture are justifiable if being carried out by their own governments, regardless of whether such acts violate international law? Do they believe people have a right to peace? Do they think peace is achievable? In the months following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, members of our group became interested in the extent to which ordinary people, the men and women in the street, believed that various forms of governmental aggression were inevitable and perhaps justifiable, as well as the extent to which they believed people had a right to peace and that peace could be achieved. The four volumes in this series address the issue. GIPGAP: The Core Group The Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP) grew out of an earlier group of psychologists and students doing research on international perspectives on family violence and abuse.19 The events following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, particularly the expansion of the United States’ government’s aggressive response into Iraq, led student members of the local (Boston University) group to urge their faculty mentor (Kathleen Malley-Morrison) to broaden the group’s concern with interpersonal violence to include governmental aggression. In the next few years, international representation in the group grew, a pilot survey was developed, tested, and modified, a book contract was negotiated successfully with Praeger Security International (PSI), an imprint of ABCCLIO, and the current project was launched. The Core Group, located at Boston University, initially consisted of a faculty advisor (MalleyMorrison), several postdocs who had worked on the family violence and abuse project, and international graduate and undergraduate students concerned with issues of violence. That group has expanded to include faculty and graduate students from the International Relations Department at Boston University. GIPGAP: International Contributors The International Group consists of faculty and graduate students from a range of academic departments, including psychology, sociology, and international relations, in more than 40 countries. These international contributors were recruited through a number of different

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approaches: networking by Core Group members, notices in Announcements from the APA Division of International Psychology, notices in International Psychology Bulletin, and invitations during presentations at international psychology conferences. With approval from the appropriate institutional authorities, these contributors administered the Personal and Individual Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) to ordinary people from multiple countries in every major area of the world: North America (the United States and Canada); Western Europe (Iceland, Great Britain, France, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden); Central and Eastern Europe (Germany, Greece, Slovenia, Serbia, and Turkey), Eurasia (Russia), the Middle East (Afghanistan, Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia); Africa (Egypt, Nigeria, Angola, Ghana, Botswana, Zambia, and South Africa), Central America (Nicaragua and Costa Rica); South America (Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Argentina); South and Southeast Asia (Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, and the Philippines); and the Far East (China, Laos, Japan, and Korea). The PAIRTAPS The Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) has six sections: (1) judgments concerning the extent to which governments have the right to perform such acts of aggression as invading another country, killing innocent civilians in times of war, and torturing prisoners during times of war; (2) judgments concerning the rights of individuals to grow up and live in a world of peace, and the right to demonstrate against war and in favor of peace; (3) views concerning patriotism and the United States’ involvement in the Iraq war; (4) projected emotional responses that might be experienced following direct or indirect exposure to acts of governmental violence; (5) definitions of war, torture, terrorism, peace, reconciliation, and rights; and (6) views on the achievability of peace and the relationship of national security to individual and family security. Several of the items in Sections A and B are direct expressions of human rights guarantees (e.g., freedom from torture, right to assembly) established in United Nations agreements. For Sections 1, 2, 3, and 6, respondents indicate on a scale from 1 (total disagreement) to 7 (total agreement) the extent to which they agree with each item (e.g., ‘‘Sometimes a country has the right to ignore international treaties or international human rights agreements.’’). Then, in their own words, they provide an explanation of the reasoning behind their rating on the item. Sections 4 and 5 call only for open-ended qualitative responses—for example, samples of emotions that would be felt in the face of governmental aggression and definitions of terms. For the purposes of this current set of Praeger books,

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chapter authors were asked to focus only on qualitative responses to the following selected items: • Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country. • The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war. • Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism. • All human beings have a basic right to peace. • Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace. • I believe that world peace can be achieved. • National Security is essential for individual and family security. • Definitions for war, peace, and terrorism. Although most chapter authors analyzed responses to most if not all of these items, some chapter authors focused primarily on the definitions of war, peace, and terrorism. Moreover, some chapter authors included a discussion of the item ‘‘The United States’ involvement in the Iraq war is a moral activity’’ because they thought the responses were of particular importance in understanding public reaction in diverse countries to the United States’ war in Iraq. Despite such relatively minor differences in coverage of survey items, each volume in the series ends with an integrative chapter summarizing similarities and differences found across countries in the themes that emerged. In addition to responding to the PAIRTAPS items, participants completed a background information form asking for basic demographic data such as age, gender, ethnicity, nationality, and religion, as well as whether they or any family member had been in the military, and whether they had participated in any protest activities. Participants who responded to the survey in their home country generally did so in their native language, except in the case of South Africa, where all participants responded to an English version of the survey. The qualitative responses to the selected items were coded according to a grounded theory approach. That is, we did not start out with a particular theoretical framework and then strive to fit the responses into that framework. Instead, we followed the procedures recommended by Strauss and Korbin, proceeding from open coding to axial coding, using a process of constant comparison.20 During the open coding phase, we broke the qualitative responses to the government aggression and peace items into units of meaning that varied from one word (e.g., ‘‘Disgusting’’) to phrases (e.g., ‘‘Only in defense of one’s own citizens’’) and entire sentences (e.g., ‘‘The future of the world depends on peace’’). At the axial level of coding, the relationships among the more fragmented

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categories were identified, and these categories were organized into more inclusive categories. For example, in regard to qualitative responses to the item ‘‘Sometimes the heads of government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism,’’ thematic categories for ‘‘sanctity of life’’ (e.g., ‘‘No person has the right to kill anyone’’), ‘‘only God’’ (e.g., ‘‘Taking a life would be replacing the job of our Lord’’), and ‘‘emphasis on innocence’’ (e.g., ‘‘The word innocent should be enough to suggest that the above sentence is disgusting and the marks of a dictator not a legal government’’) were all incorporated into a more inclusive category labeled ‘‘No right to kill,’’ which in turn became one of the categories in the overarching category labeled ‘‘It’s not a right.’’ That overarching category also included other categories such as ‘‘The ends don’t justify the means,’’ ‘‘Killing innocent civilians is a terrorist tactic,’’ ‘‘Does not make sense,’’ and ‘‘Is avoidable.’’ In a grounded theory analysis, data collection, coding, conceptualizing, and theorizing take place simultaneously, and analyses of new responses are compared both with analyses of previous responses and with the concepts emerging from those analyses. Using an international coding manual sample, with blinded responses from nearly all of the countries represented in this PSI series, the Core Group developed coding manuals for each of the survey items being addressed. We found that, in general, the governmental aggression responses could be coded first into general categories: (1) unqualified rejection of the right of governments to perform the particular form of aggression (the intolerance category) and (2) identification of one or more circumstances under which the aggression would be justifiable (the tolerance category). Within those broad categories, there are numerous subcategories, depending on the particular form of governmental aggression being addressed. For example, in regard to the invasion item, major tolerance arguments include for self-defense, to respond to threat, to strike back at an aggressor, and for humanitarian intervention. In regard to the torture prisoners of war item, the major tolerance arguments include its presumed effectiveness in getting important information, its potential role in saving lives, and its appropriateness when carried out under the aegis of some authority. Responses to the peace-related items, similarly, can be coded into two general categories (unequivocal support for the rights to peace and to protest and rejection or qualification of any such rights) as well as subcategories. For example, in regard to the item ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace,’’ some responses could be categorized as qualifying the right with specified conditions—for example, that the protests be peaceful, or socially sanctioned, or not have negative consequences for the country’s military

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personnel. Similarly, in regard to the possibility of a right to peace, subcategories included conditional statements such as ‘‘unless they are terrorists,’’ ‘‘unless they have broken the peace,’’ and ‘‘as long as they have not hurt others.’’ In regard to definitions of key terms, we found that except for the definition of ‘‘peace,’’ the examples of definitions did not fall into two overarching categories quite as neatly as the responses to the rights items tended to do. In regard to definitions of peace, the responses frequently fell into the two major types identified by Galtung—that is, ‘‘positive peace’’ (i.e., the good things peace can mean, such as ‘‘harmony’’ and ‘‘reconciliation’’) and ‘‘negative peace’’ (i.e., peace as freedom from bad things such as conflict, peace as the opposite of war).21 Among the positive definitions of peace are subcategories emphasizing peace as goodness, peace as coexistence and cooperation, peace as a human right, peace as a force for growth, and peace as an ideal—along with some definitions including explicit doubt as to the achievability of peace. By contrast, we found that definitions of ‘‘war’’ generally did not fall into two major categories with subcategories, but rather fell into one of the following general categories: (1) conflict (e.g., ‘‘Time or state of conflict between two countries or groups’’); (2) morality or human rights (e.g., ‘‘selfishness,’’ ‘‘immorality,’’ ‘‘violation of rights’’); (3) likely emotional effects (e.g., ‘‘hate,’’ ‘‘terror,’’ ‘‘sadness,’’ ‘‘suffering,’’ and ‘‘desolation’’); (4) destruction and other physical outcomes (e.g., ‘‘death, destruction, out of control’’); (5) defense (e.g., ‘‘aggressive confrontation in defense of some position’’); (6) causes (e.g., ‘‘aggressiveness, unnecessary actions to gain more land or money’’); and (7) acknowledgment of alternatives (e.g., ‘‘the worst of solutions’’). Definitions equating war with conflict are most similar to typical dictionary types of definitions of the term. Similarly, there was no bifurcation of definitions of ‘‘terrorism,’’ which fell into five major categories: focus on intent, focus on motivation or trigger; value judgments concerning the morality or sanity of terrorist behaviors, focus on outcomes, and simple listing of behaviors that might be considered terroristic. As the Core Group developed these coding manuals on an everexpanding international coding manual sample, it made the coding manuals available to the International Group. The International Group was invited to conduct their own guided theory analysis or to use the Core Group’s manuals for coding the data. We did not want to be restrictive in regard to any group member’s coding, but rather to encourage them to use consistent category labels when discussing the same or similar types of arguments. The Core Group also offered to do the coding of the responses from any country, as long as they had been translated into English or could be translated by a member of the Core

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Group. Although a few contributors developed and applied their own coding systems, the great majority worked with the coding manuals developed by the Core Group or requested that the Core Group do the coding for them. In general, coding systems used were similar enough to allow comparisons across countries. Methodology All researchers contributing to this project adhered to human subjects ethical guidelines. The survey responses were collected between 2005 and 2008. In some cases, shortened versions of the survey were administered because the respondents were unfamiliar with taking surveys; moreover, in some cases, items that seemed particularly sensitive within the context of that country were deleted (e.g., ‘‘If your country is currently involved in armed conflict with another country, please respond to the following item: My country’s involvement in armed conflict is morally correct [morally defensible].’’). The survey could be completed either online over the Internet at a secure site or as a paper-and-pencil measure. Individual chapter authors made the decision as to which procedure best protected their participants’ rights and safety. In many of the Western countries, both procedures were used, although the bulk of the responses were submitted over the Internet.

PURPOSE OF THIS SET OF VOLUMES Although we know that globally almost all peoples have some exposure to armed conflict and other forms of sanctioned violence (including torture), rarely do books compare the views of laypeople around the world on issues such as the rights of governments to invade other countries, torture suspected terrorists, violate human rights treaties, and suppress dissent—all issues with great relevance to security at the level of individual, state, and system. We know even less about the views of laypeople around the world concerning such revolutionary ideas as a ‘‘right to peace.’’ To what extent do laypeople from countries with very different forms of government accept or reject their leaders’ arguments concerning the rights of the regime to perpetrate violence to achieve ends? Do laypeople from countries that have recently engaged in armed conflict with each other use similar or different arguments to justify their own nation’s involvement with the other in the conflict? To what extent do these laypeople believe that all individuals have an inherent right to peace and that children have a right to grow up in a world of peace? To what extent do judgments concerning peace vary in relation to the

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status of women and ethnic minorities? These are some of the questions that we address in the current book series, which includes chapters on issues of governmental violence and peace in more than 40 countries around the world. The four volumes in the current series are organized by major areas of the world (e.g., Western Europe, the Middle East, and Africa) and then by selected countries within each area. Many of the selected countries have a considerable history of military conflict with each other, as well as internal conflicts. Moreover, many of the countries were either colonizers or colonized in the 15th through 20th centuries, and the legacies of the colonial era’s depredations and disruptions of long existing social and political structures underlie much of the havoc being wrought in the world today. We begin Volume 1 in Western Europe including the major former colonial powers—Portugal, Spain, Great Britain, and France—whose empire-building policies contributed greatly to their own economic and political power, while leaving much of the world economically and politically oppressed. We then move north to Sweden, which had a brief empire-building period but has been a model of nonaggression for centuries, and west to Iceland, also a model of nonaggression. We end the volume with the United States and Canada, both colonized by Western European countries, but with very different subsequent histories. Our national coverage heads eastward in Volume 2, starting with Germany, principal site of the Thirty Years War and the Peace of Westphalia, which moved the world toward the kind of nation-state organization it has today. Volume 2 continues with its sample of countries through war-torn Eastern Europe and Russia, seat of the former Soviet Union, and ends in the Middle East, where East meets West, and conflicts among Christians, Jews, and Muslims have flared for centuries. Volume 3 addresses perspectives on war and peace in the more southern parts of the globe, the areas most influenced (and probably most damaged) by colonialism—specifically, Africa and South America. Finally, Volume 4 includes countries in South Asia and Southeast Asia that were invaded and colonized by both Western and Eastern powers and ends with countries from the Far East, some of which did their own forms of colonizing, particularly Japan and China. Each chapter begins with a country profile describing the country’s recent history of involvement in armed conflict, the extent to which it has colonized, invaded, and occupied other countries historically and since World War II, the extent to which it has been involved in internal (e.g., ethnic) armed conflicts, its current economic status (developed or developing, level of income disparity) and political status (totalitarian, democratic)—all of these being contextual factors that have been

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demonstrated to be relevant to perspectives on war, peace, and security. Following a description of the sample recruited in that country, each chapter focuses on the ‘‘voices’’ of those participants, expanding on the major themes and findings that emerged from our analyses of their responses. These themes are then linked to the country’s previous and current experience with war and peace.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My thanks to Professor Michael Corgan of the International Relations Department at Boston University for his helpful suggestions concerning this chapter. My thanks go to all the team members who have contributed to this book project by recruiting participants, translating responses, creating Excel and SPSS files, helping in the development of coding manuals, coding qualitative responses, handling correspondence with contributors, helping figure out the endlessly frustrating Chicago Manual reference style, and innumerable other tasks. In particular, I want to thank my current and recent lab managers and assistant managers: Helena Castanheira, Maria Daskalopoulos, Elizabeth Planje, Tanvi Zaveri, and Lauren Groves; without their help managing the lab, these volumes would never have been completed. I also greatly appreciate the assistance of Doe West, Nyryan Nolido, Matt Pita, Ting Wu, Samantha Kinney, Stephanie Nadler, Samantha Hoyt, Kristin Wagner, Jennie Davidow, Jonathan Fuss, Jeremy Peterman, Abram Trosky, Carolyn Certilman, Mariana Barbosa, Marisa Kirio, Mi Sung Kim, Mike Toohey, Rouba Youssef, Sarah Stuart, Shannon Turney, Tina Belanger, Maria Galmarini, Nisha Raj, Jacob-Joon Meyers, Tessa Schaaf, Natsuko Mori, Injin Park, Chanmi Lee, Kamala Smith, Kaitlyn Welsh, Abigail Rudnickas, Caroline Berrio, Cornelia Photopoulos, Stella Hirawan, Ken Mullane, Nadia El Tayar, Katie Maxted, Sophie Spiegel, and Sarah Jane Potter.

Introduction to Volume 2

Volume 2 of this set of volumes focuses on a diverse set of countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle East. Included are Germany, Russia, two former parts of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Slovenia), two traditional Mediterranean rivals (Greece and Turkey), and several rival countries from the Middle East (Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait). There are vast differences among these countries in regard to economic development, religion, political system, and military involvement. For example, while Greece has been a member of the European Union since 1981, other European countries such as Slovenia and Serbia are at different phases of economic growth and political stability. In regard to religion, among the European and Eurasian countries, we can find countries that are predominantly Orthodox Christian (Serbia, Greece), Catholic and Evangelical (Slovenia), Russian Orthodox (Russia), and Muslim (Turkey), although there are also members of religious minorities in all these countries. In the Middle East, we have a predominantly Jewish state (Israel), two predominantly Muslim states (Iraq and Kuwait), and a truly multireligious state (Lebanon, with many different Christian groups plus a substantial Muslim population). Political systems are also diverse. Although all of the countries in this volume have at least some democratic institutions in place (most notably some form of election), they are not all full democracies, at least according to the 2007 Democracy Index of the Economist Intelligence Unit, which ranks countries for level of democracy achieved based on five categories: ‘‘electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture.’’

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According to the Unit’s World Report of 2007, only two of the countries considered in this volume, Greece and Slovenia, both of which are members of the European Union, meet all of their specified criteria for full democracies. Israel and Serbia are considered ‘‘flawed democracies’’; that is, they have formal electoral procedures and elected officials have real power, but the system has shortcomings in one or more of the criteria for full democracies. Lebanon, Russia, Turkey, and Iraq are placed in the category of hybrid regimes—in transition from authoritarian regimes to democracy. Kuwait, long considered the most democratized of the Muslim Middle Eastern countries, is identified as an authoritarian regime, despite having some electoral elements in operation. Finally, in regards to military involvement, Greece and Turkey, after years of sporadic violence over the island of Cyprus and the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea, appear to have reached a stage of relative rapprochement. Slovenia has experienced relative peace in recent years. Serbia has continued to experience military conflict, particularly in relation to its desire to hold onto to the breakaway region of Kosovo. Russia has been embroiled in ongoing military conflicts with many other former Soviet Union republics and breakaway areas still fighting over issues of sovereignty. Within the Middle Eastern countries, only Kuwait can be considered peaceful; indeed its 2007 ranking in the world peace index was 45—higher, for example, than the United Kingdom, which was involved in the Iraq war. The peoples in all these countries have suffered massively as a result of invasion and internal conflict, as well as, in many cases, vast disruptions in the availability of food, clean water, health care, and education. Issues of security are immediate and pervasive. Issues of war and peace are extremely delicate in a region of the world where there is so much uncertainty and strife. Recruiting participants from many of these countries could have proven dangerous both for recruiters and volunteers, so for some of our selected countries the samples consist entirely of expatriates. Their views, like those of participants living within the countries they represent, provide important insights into the experiences of people for whom aggression is not just an abstract idea.

Part I

Central and Eastern Europe and Russia

1

Germany Elisabeth A. Leembruggen-Kallberg, €nig Mariana Barbosa, and Julia Ko

War is . . . ‘‘The most terrible invention of humankind’’ (male, 38); ‘‘The absolute failure of communication and the absolute victory of fear’’ (female, 40); ‘‘A destructive pack mentality where all moral inhibitions fail’’ (female, 32). Peace is . . . ‘‘Being able to drink a cappuccino in a street cafe without fear’’ (male, 37); ‘‘Harmony, a dignified coexistence between partners in the community of the world’’ (male, 26); ‘‘[Peace] may be defined a number of ways: from ‘lack of war’ to ‘a just world order’’’ (female, 45). In the past century, Germany has experienced major shifts in attitudes and practices toward war, from the Nazi militarism of World War II to a strong antimilitarist mood in the postwar period. The ghost of the Holocaust has had a strong influence on German politics and society; as a result, postwar Germany was very reluctant to engage in military interventions. The involvement of Germany in both 20th-century world wars and its efforts since World War II to play more of a peacekeeper’s role have undoubtedly affected the views of contemporary Germans concerning governmental aggression, peace, and terrorism. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND From the Middle Ages through 1806, the region that today is Germany was part of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. The end of the empire in 1806 was followed by a period of instability. In 1848–1849,

4

Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Middle East

revolutionaries tried to form a democratic national state but were eventually defeated, mostly by Austrian and Prussian troops. After different alliances had been formed between the remaining territories, on January 18, 1871, the Prussian King Wilhelm I proclaimed the German Reich, of which he became emperor.1 In the following period, the Reich experienced a great economic upturn and by the beginning of World War I was the second largest national economy in the world, after the United States.2 In 1914, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne was assassinated in Sarajevo, and Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. Because of the treaties that each country had with other nations, this conflict quickly evolved into World War I. The flight of Kaiser Wilhelm II to Holland, his abdication on November 9, 1918, the abdication of the German princes, and the absolute misery and suffering of the German people at the end of World War I led to the German Revolution.3 The revolution started in 1918 with a mutiny of sailors in the last months of World War I, quickly spread over the whole nation, and led to the establishment of the first democratic state on German territory, the Weimar Republic.4 After a difficult start, the Republic experienced a brief period of democracy and relative stability. However, with the Great Depression, faith in the democracy faded, enabling Adolf Hitler to gain influence. With the Enabling Act of 1933, the constitution of the Weimar Republic was basically abolished, and the 12 years of Hitler’s Nazi regime began. The so-called Final Solution of the Jewish Question cost the lives of 5.1–6 million Jews, who were killed in death camps, massacred, or starved to death in ghettos.5 Many died during the deportation to the camps or from the inhuman conditions of forced labor. In addition, in the process of ‘‘cleansing’’ the German population, at least 200,000 members of the gypsy peoples of the Sinti and Roma were killed, and at least 10,000 homosexuals died in concentration camps.6 The euthanasia of incurably sick and (especially mentally) disabled people, another dark and not well-investigated chapter of German history, cost 275,000 lives.7 The Nazis also continuously increased the number of crimes punishable with death and restricted the rights of those indicted of a crime, leading to 16,000 death sentences issued by regular courts and at least 40,000 issued by court-martials. About two-thirds of these sentences were put in effect.8 World War II, started by Germany with the purported goal of acquiring living space for the Aryan race in Eastern Europe and for gaining international influence, lasted from 1939 to 1945. After Germany’s capitulation on May 8, 1945, Germany lost its Eastern territories. (Silesia, Pomerania, and East Prussia were put under Polish and Soviet administration, and the Sudetenland went back to Czechoslovakia.) The advance of the Soviet Army had already caused many people living in

Germany

5

these provinces to flee during the war; the remaining Germans were systematically expelled, resulting in about 12 million displaced persons distributed over the remaining German territory.9 About 2,800,000 Germans died during flight or expulsion.10 This territory was divided into four zones of occupation, with the United States, France, Britain, and the Soviet Union each responsible for a zone. The capital, Berlin, was also divided into four sectors. In postwar Germany, there was a shortage of practically everything, from food and coal to shelter. Because so many men had died in the war or were still in captivity, women, the so-called Tr€ ummerfrauen (rubble women), cleaned up the destruction caused by bombs and struggled to keep themselves and their families alive during these times of cold and hunger. In the immediate postwar period, the most widely used currency became U.S.-American cigarettes.11 The Cold War Period Very soon after the end of World War II, tensions began rising among the former allies. In 1948, the Soviet Union imposed a blockade on West Berlin, which led to the famous airlift: over a period of 10 months, U.S. and British planes flew in food and heating material for the West Berlin population. The beginning of the Cold War also led to the founding of two different German states instead of one: the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) that comprised the French, British, and American zones in 1949, and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) that comprised the Russian zone. The makers of what was to be the constitution of the new West German state decided not to have a ‘‘constitution,’’ but a Grundgesetz (Basic Law) until the time a constitution could be written for all of Germany. Even before the founding of the new German states, the allied government introduced a new currency: the Deutsche Mark (DM). The new currency dried out the black market and was, among other factors, the foundation of the Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle), the fast recuperation of the West German economy that took place in the mid-1950s. With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the Allies became less reluctant toward West German rearmament, which they had previously feared might lead to reemergence of an aggressive Germany, and started viewing it as essential in the fight against communism. In 1952, the Soviet Union proposed reunification under the condition that Germany would remain neutral. The West German side proposed the countercondition of free elections for all Germany under UN supervision. There was no agreement. West Germany’s reluctance to agree with reunification at this time has been explained by its government’s belief

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that integration with the Western countries would be the best way to secure West Germany’s interests.12 Consistent with this aim, in 1955 West Germany joined NATO, and in 1958 American nuclear weapons were deployed on German soil. Furthermore, West Germany was allowed to establish its own armed forces. Rearmament and NATO membership contributed to regaining almost full sovereignty and reestablishing the country’s role in the international arena.13 Concerning the FRG emphasis on Western integration, some authors argue that West Germany has been prevented from pursuing any other kind of foreign policy because of the Allies’ efforts to control its postwar policies, whereas others emphasize the nation’s interest in joint action. Both international and domestic interests may have had a strong influence, but perhaps the strongest motive was an ‘‘elementary need for peace, security, prosperity and democracy’’ deeply rooted in the lessons of the National Socialist experience.14 Given the country’s division between the West and the East, Germany was a central stage for the tension and hostilities between the two factions. This was especially true for the city of Berlin, where the ideological and political tensions between the East and the West came to have their most iconic expression: the Berlin Wall. The economic gap between the two sides of Germany plus the increasing political repression in East Germany was leading to a migration flood from East to West Germany. To prevent the exodus, in 1952 the East Germany government decided to build up a frontier area between the two sides, leaving only the borders between East and West Berlin open.15 On August 13, 1961, the East German government decided to close the border to West Berlin, and the Berlin Wall was erected. Until the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is estimated that 171 people died while trying to escape.16 Political Repression and Torture During the Cold War, East Germany was the context for one of the most repressive security agencies of the world: the Ministry for State Security, known as the Stasi. Almost every aspect of East Germany’s life was monitored by the Stasi. Intimidation campaigns were conducted against citizens who opposed the regime, and torture was one of the methods for getting information. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, many former Stasi agents were prosecuted, and nowadays former Stasi officers are prohibited from engaging in police work.17 Terrorism in the 1970s Even though there were other terrorist groups, and even though the principal members of the Red Army Faction (RAF) were active before

Germany

7

using that name, the letters RAF are widely used as a synonym for leftist terrorism in Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. The RAF was a militant leftist group whose beginnings can be traced back to 1970, when Andreas Baader, who was in jail for setting fires in two department stores, was freed by a group of comrades, among them his girlfriend Gudrun Ensslin and journalist Ulrike Meinhof. Baader, Ensslin, and Meinhof were the heads of the so-called ‘‘first generation’’ of the RAF, who went underground after freeing Baader. Over the next 20 years, the RAF killed 34 people. Some were policemen who were shot by terrorists resisting arrest; some were explicitly targeted as key figures of capitalism (e.g., J€ urgen Ponto, CEO of the Dresdner Bank, who was shot and killed in what had been planned as a hostage taking). Other deaths were accepted as ‘‘collateral damage,’’ such as the drivers or security guards of targeted victims. Twenty-eight terrorists died a violent death during this time, in the course of arrests, during assaults, or in hunger strikes. (For example, in 1974 Holger Meins starved himself to death in prison during an organized hunger strike aimed at improving conditions.) Others committed suicide; for example, Ulrike Meinhof hanged herself in 1976 in the Stammheim prison. The other members of the group knew it had been a suicide, but publicly stated that Meinhof had been murdered, which added to the zeal of the group members outside the prison. Hysteria increased among the terrorists but also among those fighting them. Two completely unconnected people were killed when they were mistaken for RAF members by the police. In 1972, the leaders of the ‘‘first generation’’ RAF (Ensslin, Baader, Meinhof, and Jan-Carl Raspe) were caught and put in Stammheim prison. The conditions of their confinement violated legal standards, and during the trial, the rights of both defendants and lawyers were restricted. All three defendants (Meinhof was already dead) were sentenced to life in prison for multiple crimes. The most notable time in more than 20 years of RAF activity is the fall of 1977, the so-called Deutscher Herbst (German Autumn). On September 5, an RAF group of the ‘‘second generation’’ captured the president of the Employers’ Organization, Dr. Hanns Martin Schleyer, killing his driver and three security agents in the process. The terrorists demanded ransom and the release of RAF prisoners. The German public was in shock. The government tried to delay the negotiations to give the police time to find and free Schleyer; however, management of the affair involved grave mistakes by the police and the government. When the government’s delay tactic became apparent to the terrorists, a commando of four people from the Middle East, supporters of the RAF, hijacked the German passenger plane Landshut with 91 people on board.

Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Middle East

8

After four days and stops in different places, agents of the GSG9 freed the hostages in Mogadishu, Somalia, by entering the plane, shooting three of the terrorists, and capturing the fourth.18 Hours after this event was made public, the RAF members imprisoned in Stammheim took their own lives. The next day, Schleyer’s body was found in the trunk of a car in France. He had been shot in the head after 44 days of captivity. Thirty years after these events, issues about the RAF are still being discussed.19 The image of Schleyer from the video messages recorded by his captors, tired and weary after weeks of captivity and constant danger, with the RAF logo (five-pointed star, an assault rifle, and the three letters, RAF) in the background, has become part of the collective memory. There has also been violence from the other extreme of the political spectrum, especially during the early 1990s. In 1992, there were riots in Rostock against asylum seekers that lasted four days. In November of the same year, two neo-Nazis in M€ olln threw Molotov cocktails into two houses, killing two Turkish girls and their grandmother. In the spring of the following year, four young people burned a house where many Turkish families lived, and three girls and two women died. Unfortunately, these are just a few examples of violent crimes committed out of hatred of foreigners—violence that is severe but not as organized as RAF terrorism. Civilian Power The world was saved from nuclear Armageddon—not by Reagan and his cronies ‘outspending’ the Soviet Union, but by the passionate, persistent, often brilliant work of millions of people worldwide. (Helen Caldicott)20

Peace movements in Germany accompanied the different phases of the Cold War period and undoubtedly contributed to the end of the Cold War and Germany’s reunification. During the 1950s, rearmament, NATO membership, and American nuclear weapons on West German soil invoked fresh memories of World War II.21 Peace movements were organized to protest against these measures and to alert the public to the consequences of endangering peace and reducing the chances for Germany reunification.22 The issue of rearmament and, particularly, the use of nuclear weapons, were also the subject of great attention by the mass media and by the scientific community, with 18 of West Germany’s most famous nuclear scientists (The Gottingen 18) making a public statement against nuclear weapons in 1957.23

Germany

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The 1960s witnessed the Easter March movement, which evolved from a vague peace movement to a vehicle for opposing the Vietnam War. In the early 1960s, this movement was opposing NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force, demanding a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, and calling for disarmament and a new policy toward Eastern Europe. In the late 1960s, the student movement and dissident unionists joined forces with the peace movement, forming the Extraparliamentary Opposition movement (APO).24 At this time, the movement was increasing (from 50,000 in the 1963 Easter March to 300,000 in the 1968 march), and the focus shifted to imperialism and the Vietnam War.25 A growing number of people, mostly university students, who were frustrated with the situation in which they lived, believed that the crimes of the Nazi era had never been sufficiently investigated and punished26 and criticized the German government for being too uncritical of the capitalist and ‘‘imperialist’’ United States, especially in relation to the war in Vietnam. When the Shah of Iran and his wife visited Berlin, there were protests at the opera, where they were scheduled to see a performance of Mozart’s The Magic Flute on the evening of June 2, 1967. While inside the opera house the music was playing, the police cut off the protesters’ exit ways and went after the mostly peaceful protesters (some had been throwing tomatoes, flour bags, or paint bombs; however, some stones were thrown as well) with utmost violence and without the warning demanded by law.27 In the aftermath of this bloody evening, a policeman shot an unarmed protester (who was participating in a demonstration for the first time) in the head. The young man, Benno Ohnesorg, died in the hospital that same night. The policeman was tried and cleared of guilt. Many of the people who were at the scene describe these events as a turning point that made them more militant in their views.28 In no other period did peace movements have such intensity and impact as during the 1980s, with millions of ordinary citizens protesting against NATO and U.S. defense politics. According to Breyman, ‘‘it embroiled much of western society in a historic debate over the meaning of security in the nuclear age and over the meaning of national identity for decades after the end of the Second World War.’’29 Peace movements were rising all over Europe, but the West German social movement was by far the largest one, leading hundreds of thousands to the streets protesting against deployment of new nuclear missiles in their country. West Germany also witnessed a revival of the national unification issue, with protesters stating that ‘‘responsibility for division rested at least as much with the United States as with the Soviet Union.’’30 NATO’s double-track decision of 1979, modernizing defense while negotiating arms reductions, was the last straw, paving the way to the largest peace movement West Germany had ever seen.31

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Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Middle East

During the same period, peace movements were also rising in East Germany; in response, surveillance and political repression increased as well. Protesters and dissidents were targeted and interrogated, arrested, prosecuted, and in some cases expelled from the country. East Germans protested against the presence of Soviet missiles in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), demanded unification, and argued for better living conditions and their basic freedoms. These protests became increasingly inspiring, energizing the population to take to the streets in large numbers, and ‘‘on November 4, 1989, the largest demonstration in GDR history took place, with over 1 million people in East Berlin demanding democracy and free elections.’’32 On November 7, 1989, the East Germany government resigned, and on November 9 the Berlin Wall was finally opened by the border police. If the Berlin Wall was a major symbol of the Cold War, its fall symbolized the end of it, and both West and East German citizens had a crucial role in this achievement. On this historical day for Germany and for the world, Germans from both sides climbed up on the wall, embracing each other and singing and dancing in the streets. On October 3, 1990, Germany’s reunification was formally concluded.33 The Postunification Period With reunification, Germany regained a powerful geopolitical position in the center of Europe. Many European political leaders became concerned with the implications of reunification: Would Germany carry on the foreign policy of the Cold War period, thus maintaining its commitment to multilateralism and Western orientation, or would it fail to resist the temptations of hegemonic power? There is some consensus that in general the transition from division to unity was successful: ‘‘The adherence to multilateralism remained and unification seemed to reinforce the European project and the strength of transatlantic relations.’’34 One major element of foreign policy did change over the next decade: Germany gradually abandoned the policy of military restraint in favor of a policy of engagement in a variety of different military interventions. The end of the Cold War gave origin to new forms of conflict, and there was increasing international pressure for German military contribution. Dalgaard-Nielsen has described the battle between the ‘‘never again alone’’ precept, embedded in notions of international solidarity and requirements of partnership and calling for an extended German engagement in international security, and the ‘‘no more war’’ precept, the historical responsibility to oppose and abstain from the use of military force under all circumstances.35

Germany

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Even before the ‘‘two-plus-four’’ treaty leading to German reunification was ratified, Germany faced a big challenge to its culture of military restraint, with the U.S. government asking for German military participation in the Gulf War. A great majority of Germans, both among the elite and the public in general, were against Germany’s involvement and demonstrated in the streets against the Gulf War. Germany did not participate militarily in the war (although it gave financial help), and the government declared that the German constitution would not allow military involvement in the Gulf War. Nevertheless, there were indications that a willingness to review Germany’s role in international military operations was emerging. In fact, in the following years, the government stretched the legal limitations, and Germany gradually increased its engagement in international crisis management: In 1991–1992, Germany deployed medical troops to the UN peacekeeping operation UNAMIC in Cambodia36; from 1992 to 1996 German naval forces took part in the European Union embargo against Serbia-Montenegro (Operation Sharp Guard).37 In 1993, German ground troops were dispatched beyond the NATO area for the first time, in a UN mission in Somalia (UNOSOM II).38 In the same year, German aircraft helped to monitor the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of a NATO operation.39 Germany’s participation in these out-of-area deployments caused controversy domestically because they were not covered by the Basic Law; however, in 1994 the constitutional court ruled that out-of-area deployments were constitutional. The practice of accustoming the German public to out-of-area interventions, by gradually raising the scope of Germany military deployments along with a reframed political discourse on this issue, led to a gradual change in public opinion.40 A new meaning for ‘‘responsibility’’ was introduced in the political discourse: the responsibility rhetoric, previously used to mean responsibility to ‘‘stay out of the fight,’’ was now used to mean a responsibility toward Germany’s partners.41 The 1995 massacre at Srebrenica may have had a crucial role in shifting the out-of-area debate to the side of the proponents of an expanded German military role. Germany’s responsibility came to be seen not only as a responsibility to oppose war but also as a responsibility to prevent another Auschwitz.42 There is considerable agreement that German participation in NATO’s Kosovo war was ‘‘the final step on the road that led from military abstinence to full participation in out-of-area crisis management.’’43 With the Kosovo war, for the first time in the history of the Federal Republic, Germany endorsed the deployment of soldiers in a combat mission. Furthermore, it was the first time NATO did a military intervention in a geographic space beyond the ones described in the Treaty

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Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Middle East

of Washington, which was limited to the territory of its member states. Despite the international controversy that surrounded this mission, which was not authorized by the UN Security Council, ‘‘the stunning result—unimaginable for most Germans only five years ago—was that this has been widely accepted both among foreign policy elites as well as the public more broadly.’’44 The gradual changes over the course of a decade that led up to the Kosovo deployment left its imprint in the German political discourse such that ‘‘taking over responsibility started meaning playing the same role militarily as the big Western partners.’’45 A public opinion survey taken at the time the government decided to go to war showed that 60 percent of respondents were in favor of the decision.46 In another poll taken during the Kosovo war, 58 percent of the interviewees agreed that Germany’s participation in the air strikes was consistent with unified Germany’s role in world politics, and 52 percent concurred that this participation should be continued even if German soldiers died in combat.47 Safety versus Civil Rights—Discussions following the 9/11 Attacks In Germany as elsewhere, the threat of international terrorism was felt more intensely after 9/11. The assaults in the Madrid and London public transport systems in 2004 and 2005 and the attempted suitcase bombings in two regional trains in Germany in the summer of 2006 made the danger come even closer. On January 15, 2005, the Aviation Security Act came into effect, legalizing the shooting down of any passenger plane hijacked by terrorists. About a year later, in February of 2006, the German Constitutional Court ruled that the law was void because it was not possible to weigh life against life and because the law breached two articles of the Basic Law (pertaining to the right to life and to human dignity). The supporters of this law obviously disliked this ruling, and the whole public debate was ignited again in the fall of 2007. The Basic Law also does not permit the military to operate inside the country. Exceptions are natural disasters and especially grave accidents, but the Basic Law does not permit the Federation to order ‘‘missions of the armed forces with specifically military weapons.’’48 Even though the Constitutional Court has been very clear on this point, proponents of such a law are still trying to find a way to make the shooting down of hijacked planes lawful. Those who take the other side in this controversy believe that basic rights in Germany are being narrowed more and more. Former Minister of the Interior Gerhart Baum speaks of a process of erosion of basic rights, starting with the RAF trials, when ‘‘the rights of the accused and their lawyers were being restricted—in a way that was inadequately excessive.’’49 Currently, the

Germany

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discussion is less about the Aviation Security Act and more about a new draft law that is supposed to give more competencies to the federal police and allow secret computer surveillance in the fight against terrorism. Germany Today Today’s Germany is Europe’s largest economy and the most populated nation in the European Union, with about 82 million inhabitants, which corresponds to a population density of 230 persons per square kilometer.50 Approximately 90 percent of the population is German, and 2.4 percent is Turkish, with the other 6.1 percent including mainly Greeks, Italians, Poles, Russians, Serbo-Croatians, and Spaniards. Life expectancy has been rising and in 2007 was estimated at 79.1 years for the total population (76.11 years for males and 82.26 years for females); the fertility rate is low (1.41 children born per woman). The predominant religions are Protestant (38 percent) and Roman Catholic (34 percent). Illiteracy is almost nonexistent in Germany, with 99 percent literacy for both genders.51 On October 3, 1990, West Germany’s Basic Law became the constitution of the united Germany. The Basic Law recognizes fundamental human rights, such as freedoms of speech and press, the right to equality before the law, and the right to asylum. According to the Basic Law, gender discrimination is illegal, and the country ranks ninth worldwide in the United Nation’s Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) Index, which measures women’s participation in business and politics.52 Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel, is the first woman chancellor in the history of Germany. Germany’s foreign population is estimated at 7.3 million people, including many refugees from developing countries. The new immigration law of 2005 gave rise to a more open immigration policy and extended the right to asylum to victims of genital mutilation, sexual abuse, and political persecution by non-European Union groups.53 Furthermore, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities protects the four national minorities who have lived in Germany for centuries: the Danes, the Friesans, the Sinti and Roma, and the Sorbs. In recent years, Germany has deployed troops to several international peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Lebanon, Liberia, Serbia, Sudan, and Uzbekistan.54 The country’s adherence to international cooperation has been expressed in the country’s strong support for international agreements on human rights, in the country’s categorical ‘‘No’’ to the Iraq invasion, and in its support of the International Criminal Court.

Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Middle East

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GERMAN PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND PEACE The German Sample The German sample consisted of 47 women and 29 men between the ages of 18 and 59, with a mean of 30 years; one respondent did not identify gender. All but three participants were born in Germany, and most (84 percent) were living in Germany at the time of survey completion; three were living in another European country, and nine were living in the United States. The vast majority (87 percent) had been raised in the Christian faith, with 56 percent Protestant (Lutheran), 29 percent Roman Catholic, and 2 percent in other Christian faiths; eight participants had not been raised religious, and two did not answer the question. Most of the participants identified themselves as ‘‘middle class’’ (44 percent) or ‘‘upper middle class’’ (32 percent). Four said they were ‘‘lower/working class’’ and four said they were ‘‘upper class.’’ Half of the sample had completed at least a secondary education; 40 percent of the participants had a university degree, and 4 percent had a doctoral degree. Approximately 40 percent of the participants were students, including some who were employed at least part-time. Only 9 percent of the sample indicated that they were unemployed or homemakers. All participants completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS). In response to items concerning such issues as whether governments have a right to commit aggression (e.g., invasion and torture) and whether individuals have a right to live in peace, respondents first indicated their level of agreement on seven-point rating scales (from 1, totally disagree, to 7, totally agree), and then wrote an explanation of the reasoning behind their rating scale response. They also provided their own definitions of key terms such as ‘‘war’’ and ‘‘peace.’’ Perspectives on Invasion ‘‘Grown-up men don’t fight but speak.’’ (female, 40) ‘‘Seneca Peace that is unjust is better than a just war.’’ (male, 23) Analysis of participant rating scale scores on the item ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country’’ revealed that 66 percent indicated disagreement, with 33 percent disagreeing completely. These participants represent the voices that sustain the ‘‘no more war’’ precept, conveying the idea that Germany has a historical responsibility to oppose and abstain from the use of military force under any circumstances. Nevertheless, analysis of the qualitative explanations given by

Germany

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the participants for their scores revealed that 66 percent of these responses provided reasons why invasion may sometimes be a right. This ambivalence between desiring to stand against war and yet seeing situations that may justify it seems to reflect the recent political and public debate regarding military intervention—a debate between the ‘‘no more war’’ and the ‘‘no more Auschwitz’’ precepts that gradually moved the country from a culture of military restraint to one of greater engagement. Among the arguments rejecting a governmental right to invasion, 17 percent of the responses emphasized the human rights violations inherent in war; other arguments against invasion focused on the negative consequences of war. Germany’s historical past, filled with war and violence, helps to explain German participants’ awareness of these negative consequences. As already mentioned, the ghost of the Holocaust has had a strong influence on German politics and society and has led to emphasis on nonviolent alternatives to conflict resolution and a culture of peace. Our results reflect this culture and its commitment to diplomacy and dialog. In fact, 28 percent of the disagreeing responses were based on the idea that invasion should be avoided because it does not solve problems or because there are better ways to solve problems, such as diplomatic means, negotiation, and communication. Furthermore, 5 percent of the participants explicitly advocated a nonviolent philosophy, echoing the voices of the pacifist movements that have been developing in Germany since World War II. Although arguments against invasion can be seen as reflecting the role of ‘‘the lessons of the past’’ and the ‘‘ghost of the Holocaust,’’ explicit references to Germany’s history of war were made mostly by participants who agreed that governments have a right to undertake invasions. Once again, we can see reflected in our sample the debate between the ‘‘no more war’’ precept and the ‘‘no more Auschwitz’’ precept. In this debate, advocates of the country’s involvement in military operations have insisted on the importance of avoiding other ‘‘holocausts’’ by any means, including military ones. ‘‘Humanitarian mission,’’ ‘‘saving lives,’’ and ‘‘protect human rights’’ were the major arguments made by 33 percent of the participants to support a country’s right to invade another country. Ten percent of the supportive responses mentioned the importance of international approval before going to war, thus maintaining the country’s commitment to multilateral and international cooperation; the ‘‘never again alone’’ precept can be seen here, embedded in notions of international solidarity, requirements of partnership, and calls for an extended German engagement in international security. Although some participants advocated Germany’s involvement in international humanitarian missions, the majority of the participants

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Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Middle East

(52 percent) agreeing with a governmental right to invasion stated that only national security motives could justify an invasion. Participants referring to international humanitarian missions focused on helping the other country; they viewed invasion as acceptable if it is meant to help the country being invaded, to bring or restore peace in that country, and/or to bring world peace. In the case of national security reasons, the focus was on the invading country, which was seen as having the right to invade another country to protect itself. The fact that most of the participants who agreed with invasion justified their positions by stating that invasion could only be accepted for self-defense purposes highlights the strong civilian character of Germany’s foreign policy. Killing Innocent Civilians in Order to Fight International Terrorism ‘‘Human life must not be weighed against each other.’’ (male, 22) ‘‘History has shown that out of violence comes always more violence, never peace.’’ (female, 47) Regarding the item ‘‘sometimes the government has the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism,’’ the participants were asked to position themselves on an issue that has been causing some controversy in their country. The 2005 Aviation Security Act made shooting down of any passenger plane hijacked by terrorists legal. One year later the same law was voided by the German Constitutional Court. This was the beginning of a general political and public debate on how to balance national security and civil rights. Where do our participants stand on this debate? Our results reveal that the majority of our participants agree with the German Constitutional Court decision, because 57 percent of them provided explanations to justify their disagreement with a state right to sacrifice the lives of innocent civilians. Furthermore, the major argument given by these participants (17 percent of the disagreeing responses) was based on the same principles that guided that decision: the principles of the Basic Law, pertaining to the right to life and to human dignity and, consequently, the impossibility of weighing life against life. Nevertheless, the explanations of other participants (12 percent) opposed to a governmental right to disregard civilian lives were framed within a dichotomy of ‘‘innocent’’ versus ‘‘guilty.’’ Thus, although the majority of the participants rejecting the acceptability of civilian losses framed their rejection by advocating the right to life as inherent in every human being (innocent or guilty), a minority focused on the fact that because innocent people are not responsible for the terrorist act, they should not have to pay for a situation they did not ask to be in.

Germany

17

Some participants addressed the inefficacy of using violent methods to fight a violent action arguing that violence generates violence; 5 percent of the participants said that by killing innocent civilians in order to fight terrorism, the state would be using the same methods as the terrorists, which would be a form of ‘‘state terrorism.’’ According to these participants, by killing innocent civilians in order to fight terrorism, the state is not only acting as a terrorist but also contributing to the legitimization of terrorist methods by accepting the idea that a cause can justify the loss of innocent lives. Similarly, some participants specifically articulated the principle that the ends cannot justify the means. In contrast, among respondents who indicated civilian deaths were acceptable in the fight against terrorism, 11 percent of the participants said the ends did justify the means, and 12 percent commented on the difficulties of avoiding civilian losses in some situations. The arguments given by these participants (who made frequent references to the 9/11 attack) reflected the classic ‘‘ticking bomb scenario.’’ In fact, public controversy over the Aviation Security Law may have sensitized some of our participants focused on ‘‘ticking-bomb scenarios.’’ On the other hand, German public opinion was more highly consensual on rejecting Germany’s involvement in other actions perpetrated in the name of war on terrorism, particularly in the Iraq invasion. Torture Prisoners of War ‘‘No more Guantanamo! Torture denounces a state as an unjust state.’’ (female, 45) ‘‘Human rights also apply in wartime.’’ (female, 26) From Nazi Gestapo to East-German Stasi, Germany was the context for the most repressive security agencies of the world, and torture was used against the enemies of the regime. Today Germany is viewed as a country with a strong commitment to the defense of human rights, which is reflected by the human rights emphasis of the German Basic Law and by the country’s adherence to international treaties on human rights such as the case of the Geneva Convention for the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The PAIRTAPS item ‘‘the government has the right to order the torture of prisoners of war’’ was the one that elicited the highest level of disapproval among the German participants: 84 percent of them disagreed that the government had such a right, with 70 percent totally disagreeing. Invocations of human rights were the most common arguments used to justify disagreement, appearing in 55 percent of the disagreeing responses (representing 44 percent of the whole sample). Human rights arguments took two major forms: (1) humanizing the

Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Middle East

18

prisoners of war, viewing them as human beings whose dignity and rights should be respected (38 percent) and (2) references to international treaties, particularly the Geneva Convention, for the treatment of prisoners of war (6 percent); for example, ‘‘No. Prisoners should be treated as it is specified in the Geneva Convention’’ (female, 26). The core idea given by these participants is that being at war cannot be an excuse for the infringement on human rights. Eleven percent of the participants adopted a more utilitarian perspective, justifying their opposition to torture by stating it is ineffective in achieving a desired outcome. Outcomes were the main focus of arguments presented by the few participants (16 percent) who agreed with a government’s right to use torture during times of war. Most of these arguments were based on a cost/benefit analysis of hypothetical situations in which the ends (‘‘the greater good’’) may justify the means (the use of torture). The most commonly mentioned outcome was the protection of people and rights; for example, ‘‘Only when it contributes to saving people’s lives’’ (female, 28). On the other hand, 2 percent of the participants focused more on the use of torture as an end (punishment method) rather than as a means to an end: If the prisoner’s guilt has been proved, punishment involving torture is acceptable. In the fall of 2002, law student Magnus G€ afgen kidnapped the child of a banker for ransom. Two days later, he was given one million Euros. The police followed him to find his hiding place, but there was no sign of the child. When the police arrested G€ afgen the next day, believing that the boy was still alive, G€ afgen admitted having kidnapped the boy, but did not confess the hiding place. On October 1, vice president of the Frankfurt police, Wolfgang Daschner, had G€ afgen threatened with pain to make him tell the whereabouts of the child, and G€ afgen revealed where he had hidden the body of the murdered child. Daschner made an official note of his actions and informed the public prosecutor’s office, thereby enabling an investigation of the incident. He and the other policeman involved were tried in 2004 and found guilty of coercion. The punishment was a fine that was subject to probation, which was the least possible punishment given the guilty sentence. The court maintained again that it is not possible to weigh the dignity of one human being against the life of another. The incident itself and the court ruling inspired controversy and debate in the general public. Protest ‘‘It must be shown to the government that the citizens wish to live in peace and will demonstrate for it. The uncle and the grandfather want peace in Europe.’’ (male, 57)

Germany

19

‘‘The right of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom to form unions or clubs, all these rights are in the German basic laws and also a large part of the human rights. Here we can argue about the form of protest. So has Germany in the course of time.’’ (female, 25) The lessons of war taught the Germans the value of peace and the need to protect it. Peace movements contributed to social and political change in postwar Germany, helping to establish a critical and politically mature democracy embedded in civilian power. In their rating scale responses to the item ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace,’’ 99 percent of the German participants agreed, with 86 percent of them expressing total agreement; the only other response was ‘‘neither agree nor disagree.’’ The major argument provided by the participants (62 percent) emphasized the individual’s right to freedom of opinion, with 30 percent of these participants specifically addressing freedom of speech as a fundamental right of democratic countries such as Germany. Although agreeing with a right to protest, 29 percent of the participants revealed concern with the nature of the protests, emphasizing the necessity of protesting peacefully. Escalating violence between protesters and government authorities culminated in the terrorism of the 1970s, which may help to explain our participants’ concerns with the nature of the protests. On the other hand, in 2000–2001 Germany witnessed a boom of violent xenophobic and anti-Semitic attacks. Concerns with the reemergence of xenophobia and neo-Nazism have been troubling Germany since World War II—statements promoting racial hatred or Nazism or denying the Holocaust are prohibited—but the boom of 2000 was subject to great attention among both citizens and politicians. Indeed, some of the participants revealed concern not only with its nature (violent or nonviolent) but also with the content of the protests. Civilian power had its most recent expression in Germany’s categorical ‘‘No!’’ to Iraq invasion, with antiwar and anti-U.S. policies demonstrations in the streets all over Germany. A public opinion survey taken at that time showed that over 50 percent of Germans were against any kind of contribution (even a logistical or financial one) to the Iraq invasion, and only 9 percent supported a military contribution.55 Views on Peace ‘‘Peace is a universal right, no matter of what race, colour, or creed.’’ (female, 18) ‘‘Already there has been too much war.’’ (female, 46)

20

Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Middle East

In the German sample we found great consensus regarding the belief that all human beings have a basic right to peace. On the rating scale, 95 percent of the participants agreed, with 89 percent agreeing totally. The small group of participants who scored in the disagreement range asserted that it is irrelevant to consider a right to peace because of the impossibility of ensuring that right to everyone. The difficulties of achieving peace were also addressed by some of the participants who agreed with the item; specifically, some of these participants (6 percent) said peace is very hard to achieve; others (13 percent) said peace is not a reality in today’s world, or is prevented. Thirteen percent of our sample said everyone has a right to peace because we all are equal. This belief in the implications of equality, enshrined in the German constitution, has been reflected in responses to other items as well; for example, to justify disagreement with a government’s right to kill civilians in order to fight terrorism: ‘‘The value of human life does not change from person to person,’’ (male, 19). According to the findings of the European survey, Eurobarometer of 2003, the proportion of Germans who oppose discrimination was lower than in any other EU member state, with almost one-third of Germans not rejecting discriminatory behaviors.56 Germany has been described by many nongovernmental organizations and antidiscrimination experts as having a ‘‘weak culture of anti-discrimination.’’57 In fact, the process of implementing the EU Equality Directives into Germany’s national legislation was a very difficult, slow, and controversial one. It was in August 2006 that Germany implemented the EU Equality directives with the introduction of the General Equal Treatment. Civil society organizations have been playing a vital role in the promotion of equality, diversity, social cohesion, and antidiscrimination in Germany, particularly since the years 2000–2001, when several violent xenophobic and anti-Semitic attacks took place.58 Given the obvious connection between xenophobic racist attitudes and policies and the Holocaust, we can speculate that these participants emphasized the principle of equality not only because of the principle itself but also because of their awareness of the most dramatic consequences of discriminatory beliefs—genocide. Despite this negative heritage, most responses focused on the positive consequence of peace rather than on peace as absence of war. This emphasis may reflect the fundamental role of peace movements and peace education, which have contributed to a culture of peace that focuses not just on negative peace (preventing violence and war) but also on positive peace (promoting social justice and human rights). Responses focusing on the positive consequences of peace (12 percent) are evidence of a well-established peace culture in which peace means

Germany

21

more than absence of violence and is viewed as fundamental for human development and happiness. Despite the German participants’ general consensus about the idea that we all have a basic right to peace, most of them showed a pessimistic view on the possibility of achieving a world of peace. In the qualitative responses to this item, 57 percent of the participants stated that achieving world peace was impossible. In their explanations, 21 percent referred to individual causes, such as the selfishness or intolerance of individuals; for example, ‘‘One can’t unify all peoples, there are too many differences’’ (female, 29); another 15 percent mentioned human nature as an obstacle to peace achievement. Three percent of the participants blamed the nations for their disbelief in the possibility of achieving peace, referring to self-interest and selfish principles that guide most nations’ international relations. As one participant put it, ‘‘I believe that the superpowers of this world are only interested in their own egotistical goals’’ (female, 46). Only 8 percent of the participants indicated a belief in world peace being achievable, and 13 percent noted that world peace was desirable but not necessarily achievable. ‘‘I don’t think so but I still hope’’ (female, 18). Fourteen percent of the participants expressed conditional agreement by stating that to achieve world peace, it is necessary to work for it. Most of these participants emphasized the importance of a global effort toward world peace; for example, ‘‘By the creation of a common awareness for the communal future’’ (male, 22). Participants were also asked to provide their own definitions of peace. John Galtung, a Norwegian sociologist, posited the differentiation between positive and negative peace. According to Galtung, while negative peace is absence of direct violence, positive peace is more than absence of violence, involving the presence of social justice through equal opportunity and a fair distribution of power and resources, etc. In the definitions provided by the German participants, we found both positive and negative conceptions of peace, with approximately half of the sample (53 percent) focusing on negative peace; for example, ‘‘the absence of war’’ (male, 21) and approximately half of the sample (47 percent) focusing on positive peace; for example, ‘‘A condition where the interests and needs of all are satisfied and none are overcome by misery’’ (female, 47). National Security ‘‘Yes [I believe in the importance of national security], but the nation should be integrated into an international union.’’ (female, 28) ‘‘If ‘national security’ should be pursued by lowering oil prices by going to war with another country, then it is not important for the protection of individuals. . . .’’ (male, 33)

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Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Middle East

In the rating scale scores for the item ‘‘National Security is essential for individual and family security,’’ 69 percent of the participants scored in agreement with the item, 21 percent scored ‘‘neither agree nor disagree,’’ and the remaining 10 percent scored in disagreement. Nearly 50 percent of the participants provided reasons why they view national security as essential: 33 percent reiterated their belief that both individual and family security depends on national security, and some of the participants mentioned positive consequences of living in a secure environment: ‘‘For humans it is important for a free and healthy development’’ (female, 19). Eight percent of the participants endorsing the necessity of national security emphasized that it is the country’s duty to protect its citizens: ‘‘The first priority of the state is the protection of its people from aggressors from within and without. When the state can no longer promise this, it is condemned to failure. It is important though that national security is not necessarily established through military force’’ (male, 28). Eight percent of the participants focused on the need to protect the nation against attacks or threats; 6 percent focused on an individual need to feel safe and secure. Nevertheless, 26 percent of the responses conveyed only conditional agreement with the item. These participants noted their concern with the costs of too much emphasis on national security, such as restrictions on human and civil rights. According to these participants, national security is beneficial to individual and family security under the condition that it is achieved without compromising fundamental civil rights and liberties. It is interesting that some participants made specific references to the U.S. security policies; for example, ‘‘National Security? What an American-ism!’’ (male, 29) and criticized the way ‘‘national security’’ is used many times to justify violent measures against specific groups or countries. Along with the emphasis on human rights, an international orientation was expressed in the results for the majority of the PAIRTAPS items; consistent with this orientation, some of these participants stated that only with a focus on international security can individual and family security be achieved.

CONCLUSION In this chapter, we emphasized Germany’s history of war and peace, in particular, how the hard lessons learned from war influenced national security and foreign policy issues during the Cold War and after German reunification. Reunified Germany has progressively moved toward military ‘‘normalization,’’ and a peace culture that developed in the antinuclear and antimilitarism movements of the 1950s, the Easter

Germany

23

March Movement of the 1960s, and the astonishing peace movement of the 1980s. These movements continue echoing in contemporary Germany, seen most recently in antiwar protests related to the Iraq invasion. This peace culture is also voiced by the German respondents to the PAIRTAPS; although pessimistic toward the possibility of peace achievement, a great majority believes that peace is a basic right. Most importantly, most of them believe that individuals have a crucial role in promoting positive peace and that protesting in favor of peace and those rights is worthwhile. The item concerning a country’s right to order torture of prisoners of war was the one that elicited the most consensus and strongest disapproval, with individuals stating that wartime cannot be an excuse for human rights infringement. This adamant position may be related to awareness of the negative consequences of war, such as higher tolerance toward human rights violations; if it is true that the majority of our participants did not have any direct experience with wartime, it is also true that reflection upon the lessons of the past was demanded by postwar generations. From monuments, museums, and documentaries to history books and academic debates, German citizens are being constantly reminded of the negative consequences of war and the importance of peace. Nevertheless, the participants’ responses also reflected the debate on whether the lessons from the past mean ‘‘no more war’’ or the need for military intervention under the ‘‘no more Auschwitz’’ icon. Arguments relating to the defense of human rights were used on either side of the argument concerning the acceptability of invasion. Despite increasing efforts to promote equality and social justice and the country’s adherence to international agreements on human rights, tensions remain between Germans and immigrant groups in some areas. Thus, it was interesting to verify that half of the participants view peace as meaning more than mere absence of war or violence, implying having basic rights such as equality, dignity, and justice respected. In fact, a major argument used by our sample to support their belief in a basic right to peace was ‘‘equality’’; in the words of one of our participants, ‘‘peace is a universal right, no matter of what race, color or creed.’’

2

Slovenia Vlado Miheljak and Marko Polic

War is . . . ‘‘The most cruel and stupid invention of humankind’’; ‘‘Violation of the most basic human rights (for peaceful life, education), violation of all freedoms because of interests of narrow political elites and war profiteers.’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘The most beautiful word in the world beside love’’; ‘‘A time without wars and aggressions, when life is nice’’; ‘‘Basic value of (almost) every individual and nation, which is alas too often violated.’’ Live, oh live all nations, Who long and work for that bright day, When o’er earth’s habitations No war, no strife shall hold its sway; Who long to see That all men free, No more shall foes, but neighbors be. France Preseren: A Toast (Slovenian National Anthem)

This chapter considers the attitudes of ordinary people toward war, peace, torture, security, and reconciliation. All respondents are from a country that has undergone a number of cruel wars, with the wounds of the last major conflict (World War II) still active in the collective memory of the nation. Attitudes never occur in a vacuum; they are shaped by people’s experiences, the values of the given society, and by current circumstances. Slovenia’s history is a long and paradoxical tale of good and bad, benevolence and cruelty, victory and defeat. In this context, we must ask: Are the friendly words from the national anthem reflected in people’s everyday attitudes?

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Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Middle East

HISTORICAL CONTEXT Slovenia has had a long past, but a short history. As an independent state, Slovenia has existed only since 1991, emerging from the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Slovenia is a small country (20.273 km2), of 2 million inhabitants, bordered by Austria, Italy, Hungary, and the northwestern margin of Croatia. Because of its position between the Adriatic Sea and the Alps, it has long been at the crossroads of important Euopean trade routes. The so-called ‘‘Amber Road’’ from the Baltic toward the Adriatic and Mediterranean seas passed through Slovenia.1 Although the territory of the country now called Slovenia was settled by many different tribes (e.g., Celts, Illiryans, and even Romans), the ancestors of modern-day Slovenes first settled the territory during the sixth century CE. Soon after, the early settlers traded sovereignty for security.2 Between 623 and 658, in order to defend themselves from other hostile groups, the western and southern Slavic tribes united under Samo’s Tribal Union, which extended from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea. This first independent state3 is deeply ingrained in the collective memory of Slovenes (akin to Kosovo for Serbs, but to a lesser emotional degree).4 Slovenes were Christianized in the ninth century, by way of both peaceful and violent means. Religious splits demonstrated real conflict potential when the Protestant Reformation, through North Germanic influence, spread into Slovenia. The Reformation promoted religious renovation as well as cultural modernization, but also divided Slovenes along the lines of urban (Protestant) versus rural (Catholic). A major step toward the social and cultural emancipation of the Slovenes also occurred during the Reformation, with the publication of the first printed books in the Slovenian language (Catechismus and Abecedarium, 1550 in T€ ubingen, Germany). During the Habsburg Monarchy when the principle ‘‘Cuius regio, eius religio’’5 was put into force, a strong antiReformation movement emerged. Its consequences were drastic. Protestants, who produced the first printed books in Slovenian, were banished, leading to a long-lasting decline of Slovenian citizenry. In the 19th century, a tendency toward greater unity and more precise grammatical and orthographic codification of the Slovene language appeared. Concurrently, Slovenian nationalist movements emerged, initially demanding only Slovenian autonomy within the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy. For much of the 19th century and into the 20th century, Slovenia was dominated by the Holy Roman Empire, which lasted until 1918.6 Although the Slovenian elites mostly became Germanized, the lower classes strongly resisted German influences and retained their unique

Slovenia

27

Slavic language and culture. World War I brought about an end to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Slovenia became a part of the ‘‘Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes’’ in 1918.7 In 1929, King Alexander dissolved the parliament, changed the name of the kingdom to Yugoslavia, and ruled as a dictator. He attempted to create a homogeneous Yugoslavia by abolishing historic regions and drawing new internal boundaries for provinces (known as ‘‘banovinas’’). During Alexander’s reign, many politicians were jailed or kept under tight police surveillance. The Communist party had been proclaimed illegal even earlier (1920), although until then it had been a legal and relatively strong parliamentary party. The result of Alexander’s dictatorship was the dissuasion of the non-Serbs from the idea of unity. The royal dictatorship officially ended in 1931.8 Yugoslavia was occupied by the Axis Powers in 1941 and subsequently divided among Germany, Italy, and Hungary. Resistance to occupation was organized primarily, though not exclusively, by communist groups. In Slovenia, resistance was from the very beginning organized on a wider basis, including also Christian Democrats, cultural workers (intellectuals and artists), and left-wing members of the state sports organization Sokol (Falcon), with roots in the pan Slavic movement of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. Initially, this organization, known as Osvobodilna fronta (the Liberation Front), functioned as a coalition. Eventually, the Communists prevailed, controlling all political power in the region. Because of their illegal status in prewar Yugoslavia, Communists were experienced in underground activity, with adequate organization and technical bases. This experience and structure strongly contributed to the efficiency of the resistance, but at the cost of sacrificing equal status for all involved parties. The Communists’ social program, attractive to the masses for its promise of a more equal and just society, also contributed to their surfacing as leaders of the resistance. During World War II, Yugoslavia also suffered a civil war; ethnic violence was especially pervasive in Croatia and Bosnia, with violent atrocities committed by the ustase, a fascist militia of the so-called Independent State of Croatia.9 The Yugoslav partisan guerrilla campaign, which developed into the largest resistance army in occupied Western and Central Europe, became involved in the civil war. Anticommunist groups joined occupier forces and supported their antiguerrilla actions, in part because of the radicalism of the communists. The cruelty of the anticommunists toward citizens and supporters of the resistance movement shaped the hard-lined and bitter attitudes of postwar communist leaders. Events closely followed what Staub described as progression along a continuum of destruction.10 Ethnic violence ended only when

28

Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Middle East

the multiethnic Yugoslav Partisans took over the country at the end of the war. In 1945, following the successful end of occupation and the victory of the Liberation Movement, Democratic Federal Yugoslavia was established. In the immediate postwar period, members of anticommunist armed formations, allies of the Nazis, were imprisoned, executed, and buried in mass unmarked graves.11 The political opposition was banned and several of its members imprisoned. Following the 1948 Yugoslavia– Soviet Union split, Yugoslavia ceased to be part of the so-called Soviet bloc; its regime became less repressive and produced leaders of the Nonaligned Movement. Political parties were still outlawed, and democratic standards were limited to lower level matters of everyday life and work. Slovenia became one of the most prosperous and advanced republics of the (Socialist) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, at the forefront of its unique version of socialism.12 Overall, peace and relatively swift economic development lasted until the 1970s. A few exceptions occurred in the form of nationalist protests, but they were usually repressed and their leaders were arrested.13 In 1974, the new constitution gave greater autonomy to the republics and to the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, constitutive parts of Serbia. Serbs saw the new constitution as conceding too much to Croat and ethnic Albanian nationalists. Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo were dissatisfied with the solution and demanded that Kosovo become a constituent republic. This demand was strongly opposed by the country’s leadership, especially by Serbian leaders who resented the 1974 constitution, which had established an unstable and open-ended situation in which the nation could become more or less centralized and thus more or less democratized. The leadership viewed this constitution as weakening Serbia’s influence and jeopardizing the unity of the country by allowing the republics the right to separate.

DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA The independence of Slovenia resulted from the dissolution of Yugoslavia due to economic and political crisis and growing nationalism, stemming from the weakening of communism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. The economic crisis that started in the 1970s and erupted in the 1980s was the product of the disastrous economic policy of Yugoslav governments. The crux of the problem involved borrowing vast amounts of Western capital to secure economic development. Western economies then entered recession, blocked Yugoslav exports, and created a huge debt problem. Increasing inflation, lack of goods, and

Slovenia

29

decreasing quality of life provided a background for the political crisis based on nationalistic movements in the Yugoslav republics.14 The more developed areas desired to separate, whereas the less developed areas (particularly Serbia, with the exception of Kosovo) desired greater cohesion among republics, even a return to strong centralization. Although long latent, Slovenian nationalism arose considerably in response to Serbian nationalism and its rhetoric favoring centralization of the country. The federal Communist party was losing its apparent homogeneity and ideological dominance to this growing nationalism.15 At the 14th Called Congress of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia, on January 20, 1990, the republic delegations could not agree on the main issues in the Yugoslav federation, causing the Slovenian and Croatian delegates to leave the congress. The Slovenian delegation demanded democratic changes and a looser federation, whereas the Serbian delegation utterly opposed it. This congress is considered the formal beginning of the end of Yugoslavia.

INDEPENDENCE AND REINTEGRATION In 1990, the first multiparty elections took place in a number of Yugoslav republics, including Slovenia and Croatia. Opposition parties to the Union of Communists won in both areas. Following these elections, in the autumn of 1990, the republics of Slovenia and Croatia proposed to transform Yugoslavia into a loose confederation of six republics with the right to self-determination. Serbian leaders rejected all such proposals, arguing that like Slovenes and Croats, Serbs (including the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs) should also have a right to self-determination. Based on relatively great minorities of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, Serbian nationalists wanted to create a Great Serbia, annexing parts of Croatia and Bosnia.16 In a December 23, 1990, plebiscite, 88 percent of Slovenia’s voters voted for independence, and on June 25 1991, the Republic of Slovenia declared its independence.17 As a result, great changes in politics and civil society emerged. Unfortunately, a 10-day war with Yugoslavia (June 27–July 6, 1991) followed Slovenia’s proclamation of independence, when the Federal Executive Council (Yugoslav government) ordered the army to take control of the ‘‘internationally recognized Yugoslavian borders.’’18 The Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) forces withdrew because of the combination of Slovenian resistance and lack of Serbian interest in the territory. The conflict resulted in relatively few casualties: 67 people were killed, according to statistics compiled by the International Red Cross, of which most (39) were JNA soldiers. Later

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Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Middle East

wars in Croatia and Bosnia were much longer and much more cruel. Names of the towns Vukovar, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and many others in Croatia and Bosnia became widely known. The events connected to them put the final end to the existence of Yugoslavia. Slovenia became a member of the United Nations on May 22, 1992, and a member of NATO in March 2004.19 Because of historical ties to Western Europe, Slovenia became a strong candidate for accession to the European Union, which occurred on May 1, 2004. The other Yugoslav Republics still remain outside the EU. The Slovenian tolar became part of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 2004. Slovenia joined the European Monetary Union and adopted the euro as its currency on January 1, 2007, as the first of the new member countries.

THE SLOVENIAN NATIONAL CHARACTER Slovenia’s geographical position in relation to the Balkans and Central Europe, as well as issues of identity, have exposed Slovenes to many conflicts and wars. However, Slovenes have not developed a strong fighting spirit,20 in part because the amount of territory and the size of the population were both too small to enable Slovenes to fight successfully against dominant neighbors. Slovenian folk narrative and mythology have few stories about heroic warrior rebels, but one important literary work dealing with mythical dimensions of wars and battles in Slovenia is a poem by the greatest Slovenian poet, France Preseren. Entitled ‘‘Christening at Savica,’’ this epic poem shifts the story of war from a focus on external to inner conflict. Specifically, the narrative is about Slovenes during the Christianization of Carantanian’s Slavs in the ninth century. The poem describes the war between the Christian army led by Christian Carinthian Duke Valjhun and the army of those Slavs/  Slovenes who, with the hero Crtomir, resist violent Christianization. The poet describes the eternal longing for freedom and choice (‘‘Most of this world belongs to Slavdom’s races; We’ll find a path to where each blood relation His trust in faith and justice freely places’’21) but also illuminates the dangers of blindly following the appeals of homeland and faith to go to war and the senselessness of bloody fratricidal war (‘‘From fratricidal Slovene malefaction—How frightful is mankind, and how dim-sighted!’’). The poem shows the eternal theme of Slovenian social, cultural, and religious splits, a kind of ‘‘arch-cleavage,’’ a theme that perpetuates itself through the actual polarizations and separations that have characterized Slovenian society, culture, and politics.22 The small size of the country, accompanied by constant threatening and encirclement by larger nations (Romans, Germans, and Hungarians),

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31

gradually created the Slovenian national character. The national disposition is distinguished by its high degree of defensivity, caution, and distrust toward others who are foreign or different—a kind of passive rejection.23 In international empirical studies of trust in others, the Slovenian tendency to be distrusting has been constantly confirmed even in comparison with other posttransition countries in which distrust as well as rejection are above the average.24 This distrust is a problem because the level of support for the political community is determined by a sense of community; there are other means for maintaining a political community, but the long-term absence of a sense of community impairs stability.25 Levels of trust in others and tolerance toward others are especially important factors in the formation of social cohesiveness. Trust is at the same time a necessary but not a sufficient condition for establishing and maintaining the democratic order. Of course, confidence in institutions is as necessary for the normal functioning of an open society as trust is in the participants. Many researchers see the problem in postcommunist consolidation of democracy as one of insufficient trust in participants and institutions.26 The postcommunist countries show a strong lag behind the established democracies in confidence in institutions of the polity as well as trust in others. Trust in others has been found to be low in all the Central European countries examined, and it is lowest in Slovenia.27 Together with the high level of distrust and relatively high rejection of minorities and borderline groups, neither a fighting spirit nor combativeness are key Slovenian values. After independence and the change in the political system, many old traumas, originating in wartime and postwar events, appeared. Although the National Liberation War, which changed the traditional passive response of Slovenes into an active role as creators of their own destiny, was strongly present in the collective memory of the nation, the defeated side was mainly silent and postwar events became silent events, the ones ‘‘where people actively avoid talking about a major shared upheaval.’’28 This failure to talk was in part imposed by repressive governmental institutions but also stemmed from the shamefulness of the victim’s position (being an ally of the occupier). The perpetrators were not willing to talk about postwar events because of self-awareness of their denigrated moral value, independent of any guilt in the victims. But silent events are very potent in the development of collective memories. When people attempt to suppress unwanted thoughts, they typically fail, because ‘‘when people are blocked from talking about an important psychological event for whatever reason, they continue to process it.’’29 That is why the discussion of war and postwar events in Slovenia has not yet ended.

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Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Middle East

SLOVENIA’S UNIQUE POSITION AMONG (POST)TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES In communist times, Slovenia was different from the other Yugoslav republics in that it was the most developed, the most pro-Western, and the most liberal.30 It was also quite different from the other Eastern and Central European countries. Sociological surveys of the value orientations of the general population and generational studies of youth in the 1980s showed that notwithstanding the wide economic and cultural differences among the former Yugoslav republics individually, the differences between Slovenia and all the other republics were greatest.31 These differences were manifested as a split between traditional and secular-rational orientations regarding authority, political authorities, religion, gender roles, and national identification. Actually, the first explicit conflicts between Slovenia and the federal establishment, which was taking more and more regressive and authoritarian stances after Slobodan Milosevic took power in Serbia, concerned not so much issues of politics as issues of values: positions on the death penalty, homosexuality, and conscientious objection, including the right to civil instead of military service. What made Slovenia so distinctive is the atypical homogeneous ethnic composition and religious denomination of its population. Practically all ethnic Slovenes declaring a religious affiliation describe themselves as Catholics.32 Its ethnic composition was also atypical for the former Yugoslavia. It alone fitted Brunner’s definition of a homogeneous nation state, in which the titular nation makes up 90 percent or more of the population.33 Most of the former Yugoslav republics were ‘‘multi-ethnic’’ in the sense that besides being titular nations with an unquestionable majority, they had one or more culturally, economically, or numerically strong ethnic groups. Bosnia and Herzegovina were in the category of ‘‘multi-nation state’’ because they had no single titular nation and consequently had a split ethnic awareness. In principle, the transition to democracy has been far more complicated, and often bloody, in ethnically heterogeneous countries (particularly in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union) because of an ‘‘ethnification of politics,’’34 and the related processes of ethnic conflict and ethnocentrism. Another important feature of Slovenia was its relatively high economic development, amenable industrial composition, and close ties to the Western European market. This advantage stoked the differences between Slovenia and the other parts of the country not only economically but also in regard to political atmosphere. As a typical Central European country, Slovenia withstood systematic and sometimes

Slovenia

33

forcible ‘‘socialist modernization’’ much more easily than the other more rural and traditionalist parts of former Yugoslavia.35 It was a typical Central European country of small towns, and it developed smallscale, market-oriented industries producing general goods. The state invested in the country’s rural sectors though heavy industry was always unprofitable and forcibly changed the social structure (rapid and mass transformation of farm into industrial workers) and damaged the environment. Slovenia was far better prepared to transition to democracy than its neighbors, either in former Yugoslavia or among Soviet Union allies. Although the actual act of independence was accompanied by a military intervention, loss of the greatest part of Slovenian markets, and a subsequent recession in 1992 and 1993, by 1997 (about the end of political and economical transition), Slovenia’s GDP had surpassed its 1990 level. With regard to crime rate (total registered crimes), on which Romania was the infamous leader with a staggering index of 684 in 1996 (relative to 1989), the Czech Republic recorded an index of 328 and Hungary 213. Slovenia was one of the few countries with an index below 100 (92).36 Income inequality has grown far less rapidly and scandalously than in countries in which equality was imperative prior to transition. The situation is similar in regards to registered poverty.37 In 1995, 13.5 percent of the population was below the poverty line, which was far below the average for Eastern Europe, where the proportion ranged from 20 to 25 percent of the population.38 Finally, Slovenia’s comparative advantage is reconfirmed each year by its quality of life scale ranking on the Human Development Index (HDI). In 1997, it ranked 28th on an absolute world ranking, surpassing even some of the EU countries.39 The third exceptionally important advantage of Slovenia over the other former Yugoslav republics and other Central and East European countries is that Slovenia borders two Western countries (Italy in the west and Austria to the north) with completely open borders.40 This enabled relatively high mobility and information transfer between the countries.41 As a result, the collapse of the communist system did not bring the cultural shock that most of the other transitional countries experienced when the borders were opened to consumer goods and new social styles, and when media restrictions were removed.42 Up until the death of President Tito, Yugoslavia had, to some extent, ‘‘breathed with common lungs.’’43 Throughout Yugoslavia, periods of liberalism and authoritarianism had alternated in all the major political, cultural, and university centers (particularly Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana). Following Tito’s death and the initial outbreak of the Kosovo crisis at the beginning of the 1980s, great schisms developed along national lines regarding public issues. In the 1970s, independent Serbian

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and Slovenian intellectuals took similar stances; the Slovenian party oligarchy’s positions were similar, although somewhat less hard-line, to the Serbian party’s. There was a fateful twist in the 1980s and, despite differences between the party apparatus and the independent intellectuals, republican or national positions took shape.44 The political stances of the Slovenian intellectuals and the party began to allign, as did those of the Serbians; the new cleavage had a national basis. Ultimately, the intellectuals radically breached topics that became the substance of subsequent clashes between the parties. As absurd as it may seem, by the mid-1980s the Slovenian party was just carefully raising issues in Belgrade that had already been debated in Slovenian intellectual circles, such as the right to conscientious objection, the end of sanctions on public speech, abolition of the death penalty, equal rights for people with different orientations, and Albanian rights in Kosovo. As a rule, Serbian dissident circles tended to favor an even more authoritarian position than did the authoritarian Serbian party, which itself was averse to reforms and democratization.45 The national homogenization in the two republics so divided public opinion in these two key players of the 1980s that Slovenia began to opt en bloc for the abolition of the death penalty, freedom of public speech, political pluralization, and the right to conscientious objection (civilian service as a substitute for military training).46 Thus, the attitudes toward the public issues that typify authoritarian/nonauthoritarian personality structure influenced characteristics of political stance in the final years before the breakup. Given its historical experience and national identity, we expected that Slovenes would not show a great deal of support for governmental aggression in their responses to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS); moreover, we expected strong support for the rights of individuals to peace and to freedom of speech regarding peace.

SLOVENIAN PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND PEACE The Slovenian Sample The simple quota sample (56 women and 45 men) consists of 101 participants, with an average age of 43.50 years (SD = 18, from 17 to 85 years). The majority (92) were born in Slovenia; others are of different nationalities, predominantly originating from former Yugoslav republics. Their parents are mainly of Slovenian origin (81 mothers and 82 fathers). Their religion during childhood was mainly Catholic (80), and currently

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67 describe themselves as Catholic; others are atheist, Orthodox, and Muslim. They mostly belong to the middle class (64), working class (20), and upper middle class (12), with a few indicating that they belong to the lower or upper class. Sixteen participants completed primary school or less, 30 completed secondary school, 17 completed high school, 10 completed professional school, 25 completed university, and 2 graduated with a PhD. Fifty-eight people are employed, 16 are students, 13 are retired, 6 are unemployed, and the rest of the participants did not answer the question. The majority (60) are married, 27 are single, seven are widows or widowers, and three are divorced. Only 30 have been in military service, but 90 have a relative who served in the military, and 25 of them saw combat. Ten people had participated in a peace education program, and 15 had been involved in a protest against war and in favor of peace. All participants completed an adapted and expanded version of the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS). Slovenian Perspectives on Invasion People’s decisions and actions are always rooted in their values and motivations. Nevertheless, conflicts between important values and actions that seem necessary at certain moments may arise. In his book The Logic of Failure, D€ orner explains how people find excuses for doing bad things to achieve goals of high value.47 In this process, their values may completely change; for example, ‘‘Bombs for Peace’’ and ‘‘The road to hell is paved with good intentions.’’48 The question of whether one country has the right to invade another country is not new. However, in the past few years, serious concerns have surfaced in the international community because of the American-led invasion into Iraq of the ‘‘coalition of the willing.’’ The majority of western European countries were critical of the invasion and its intentions, whereas the newer Eastern democracies strongly supported it. Slovenia was one of the countries formally supporting the invasion, though the general public did not approve it. A generally negative attitude about invasion was evident in the sample. The majority of Slovenian respondents totally disagreed (60) or disagreed to a strong extent (12) with the right of one country to invade another. Only eight respondents totally or partially agreed with such a right, while others expressed mild rejection (4), neutrality (7), or mild agreement (8). Those who agreed identified potential excuses for such action; for example, ‘‘Yes if this other state threatens peace in its homeland and perhaps also the neighboring countries.’’ One of those who disagreed commented, ‘‘In a war politics is involved that is not aware

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of innocent people suffering.’’ Those who disagreed with invasion mainly disagreed absolutely, but some would support a defensive war if a country is attacked. How are we to explain these findings? Although they well represent general attitudes in Slovenia, we are aware that our sample is not representative. Slovenia, as a small nation, has had a number of relatively recent experiences of being invaded, including in World War II and the 10-day war in 1991. By not supporting a governmental right to invasion, they are defending their own freedom and expressing their values. And, of course, Slovenia is not a country that would attack another country, except as a member of an alliance. The fact that the question was relevant for Slovenia not so much as an attacker, but mainly as a potential victim, could explain the relatively low level of support for invasion. The few indications of some support for invasion may perhaps reflect general attitudes toward terrorism and genocide as well as acceptance of U.S. and NATO policy. Perhaps this support is smaller than it would be in other former socialist countries because of the fact that Slovenia (Yugoslavia) was never under the Soviet Union, and therefore the United States and NATO are perceived as a greater guarantee of their sovereignty, and thereby worthy of support. Peace and Its Value The idea that all human beings have a right to peace received almost total support. Peace is of high value for the respondents and 92 totally agreed with the statement that human beings have a basic right to peace. Only one totally disagreed, and one mildly disagreed; the few remaining participants were in between. The high value of peace is understandable given Slovenian history and much more recent events in its neighborhood. As one respondent wrote, ‘‘I have no comment because I believe that this is the fact.’’ Others said, ‘‘This is the basic human right’’ and ‘‘Yes, because we are all equal.’’ A 33-year-old woman qualified her approval by saying, ‘‘Yes, if they are not threatening others,’’ while a 47-year-old woman explained her disagreement with the statement by saying, ‘‘Unfortunately, too much emphasis is given to the right for peace and not to the duty for peace (duty to overcome aggressiveness and greed),’’ expressing in this way that she is not against this right, but believes that people must work to achieve it. By contrast, a 19-year-old girl, in a statement representative of many responses, recognized the right for peace unconditionally, saying, ‘‘Nobody deserves to live in unrest irrespective of his deeds.’’ These results are in accordance with the findings of many studies on values in

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which ‘‘peace’’ appeared for Slovenian respondents as one of the most important values in their value hierarchy.49 Who Will Protest for Peace? There is a great difference between passively valuing peace versus actively working to achieve it. Slovenian respondents were somewhat conflicted about doing something for peace, as only 63 totally, 22 strongly, and 8 mildly agreed that individuals have the right to stage protests against war, while one was neutral, five totally disagreed, and one mildly disagreed with the right. Thus, altogether 93 respondents supported to a greater or smaller degree the right to stage peace protests. Six respondents were more or less against it. The right to protest is a rather controversial indicator of social consciousness and perceptions of individuals and groups. On the one side, protest potential (readiness for protest or demonstration of civil disobedience) is the most reliable guarantee that in a certain state authoritarian leadership principles are not prevailing. Meanwhile, on the other side, mass protest activity could potentially cause instability, leading either to violence or to authoritarian leadership. Therefore, the kinds of activities citizens are defending as legitimate and the forms of protests they participate in or are willing to participate in are important. To throw additional light onto our respondents’ views concerning the right to protest, a number of control questions were added to the original PAIRTAPS questionnaire. Specifically, in regard to particular forms of protest (e.g., petition signing, joining a boycott, participation in legal or permitted protest, participation in unpermitted protest, and occupying of buildings), the respondents were asked if they had already participated in such activities and whether they, in principle, would or would not participate. Nearly two-thirds of our sample had already participated in the mildest form of protest actions such as signing a protest petition. Only two respondents would not do this under any circumstances. A small number of respondents (only 7) had already participated in different forms of boycott, but potentially more than twothirds would participate. Only a small portion of respondents had actively participated in protest; 14 percent had participated in permissible forms of protest, but 60 percent indicated that they potentially might participate in that type of protest. Only 12 percent answered that they would not join a protest of any kind. The response pattern was quite different for unpermitted protests. No one, according to their own statement, had participated in them; potentially 45 percent would participate and one-third would not. Analysis of our respondents’ explanations of their answers showed that without regard to their willingness to

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participate or not participate in protest, they believe that protest is a legitimate right. Between Safety and Humanity Slovenia has not yet experienced any direct attacks by terrorists. Furthermore, Slovenian soldiers are engaged in peace missions in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere. The majority of Slovenian respondents totally disagreed (76) or strongly disagreed (6) with the statement that the government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war. Six totally agreed and one strongly agreed with a governmental right to use torture. An even greater majority totally (84) or strongly (8) disagreed with the statement that the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism, whereas five totally and one strongly agreed with it. The correlation between responses to these two answers was relatively high (r = 0.68; p = 0.001), which means that respondents perceive these two issues similarly. Prevailing views on torture and killing of innocent civilians were unconditionally rejecting, expressed in opinions such as ‘‘torture is uncivilized’’ (47-year-old employee), ‘‘torture must be forbidden’’ (24-year-old unemployed man), and ‘‘torture stimulates violence’’ (61year-old worker). While rejection of torture and killing of innocents was deontological in nature, utilitarian aspects were considered by respondents who rejected both actions to a lesser degree or even approved one or the other: ‘‘There must be good reasons for this (torture)’’ (53-yearold man); ‘‘Depending on damage caused by prisoners’’ (30-year-old woman); ‘‘If this (torture) is necessary to get information’’ (22-yearold man); and ‘‘Only if, in this way, a greater number of other innocent people would be saved’’ (33-year-old woman). One 47-year-old woman even mentioned the continuum of destruction in connection with killing of innocent civilians: ‘‘If we make one exception (sometimes), then it may be again, and again.’’ Slovenian opposition to any act of torture and encroachment upon prisoner rights or even life in general could be attributed to the fact that real direct experience with war is rare among Slovenes, and their experience with terrorist acts is nonexistent. During the fight for independence (1991), the limited military activity in Slovenia lasted only 10 days and resulted in very few casualties. Given the nearby disintegration of Yugoslavia and violent intervention by the Yugoslav Army, Slovenia remains a safe country in the mind of its citizens; violent acts in any form are extremely rare. While valuing their security, Slovenes are not willing to trade freedom to keep it, as confirmed by responses to

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supplementary items on the PAIRTAPS. For example, 80 percent of the respondents believe that the government’s use of force for achievement of political goals is not justified. They are not willing to give the government the right to limit freedom in the name of order and security. When asked if it was more important for governments to preserve order or respect individual freedom, the majority (54 percent) gave priority to personal freedom, whereas 37.8 percent gave priority to preserving order. More than 75 percent believe the death penalty is never justified. The majority of respondents believe that the democratic system, despite its weaknesses, is better than other forms of government; 10 percent believe that in some circumstances terrorism as a form of resistance can be justified. Optimism for Peace Despite participants’ strong belief in the human right to peace, they were not optimistic regarding the possibility of achieving world peace; 15 totally and 12 strongly agreed that achieving world peace is possible, whereas 16 totally and 15 strongly disagreed. Women were more pessimistic than men. The young respondents without experiences of war or hard social crisis were no more optimistic than the older people who had experienced war, hard times, and crises. Many of the explanations were generally pessimistic about human nature; for example, one 46-year-old woman said, ‘‘I would like to believe, but not with such reflection of humanity as it is today,’’ and a 61-year-old worker commented, ‘‘There will always be individuals who will violate it.’’ In one word: peace is illusion. Other reasons for doubting the attainability of world peace included the operation of political interests, including the interests of great powers that deliberately generated ethnic and interstate conflicts. When asked about the best way to achieve world peace, the answers fell largely into two groups: formal processes such as ending the armaments race and forcing dialogue or changing the minds of people or leaders. National Security and Safety The majority totally (36) or strongly (30) agreed with the statement that national security is essential for family and individual security, while only two totally disagreed and one strongly disagreed. As one 47year-old woman said, ‘‘Really, if you are not occupied with the problems of war, enemies, you may consider your own problems and direct your energy into their solution,’’ or, according to a 46-year-old man, ‘‘If there is no national security, then you hardly build family and

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individual safety, because you are afraid what will be.’’ As we have seen, the majority saw no excuse for subordinating freedom to security; however, at the same time, security was perceived as the key condition to achieve family and individual safety. It is interesting that respondents put the condition into the formal frame of a secure state and not into the quality of personal relationships. Perspectives on War and Peace Slovenia is not, as it might look to casual observers, an island of peace in the middle of a turbulent ‘‘Balkan Sea.’’ The memories of slaughter in the Balkans during the 1990s, and perhaps even of the whole 20th century, have all left their mark on public consciousness and national identity. In the Slovenian national character, caution, defensiveness, and distrust toward strangers is prevalent, but ‘‘the culture of war,’’ as conceptualized by John Keegan, does not prevail and strictly speaking never did; it was not inscribed into some national archetype, as it appears to have been in some neighboring militant nations. On the other hand, Slovenia does not have a ‘‘full-blooded’’ peace culture (where peace means more than mere absence of war and violence) either. Nevertheless, Slovenes value peace very highly; it is one of their fundamental values. What then are the perspectives on peace through the eyes of our respondents? Though they are not overly optimistic regarding peace, it is not because they would support war, but because of the perceived obstacles concerning the achievement of peace. The great majority think in a similar way, as clearly summarized in the short but clear definitions given by a 50-year-old female respondent. She defines war as ‘‘Evil of Civilization. Clash of arms.’’ Torture she defined as ‘‘Method for achieving a goal. A brutal method, indecorous for humans.’’ She perceived terrorism as the mirror image of war, defining it as ‘‘Evil with which you excuse your goal.’’ ‘‘Reconciliation’’ is ‘‘wise solution,’’ ‘‘peace’’ is ‘‘the greatest wealth,’’ and ‘‘right’’ is ‘‘the good we should not doubt.’’ The majority of Slovenes do not have doubt about the merit of these things.

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Serbia Nebojsa Petrovic, Kristina Pota, and Helena Castanheira

War is . . . ‘‘Horror, apocalypse, projection of the worst human characteristics.’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘Not imperiling someone’s personality, rights and/or property.’’ At the end of the 1980s, the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the transition of Eastern European countries from an authoritarian communist system to a multiparty democracy. It was the start of great positive changes in lives of millions of people from Central and Eastern Europe. Serbia, at this time, was the largest republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The SFRY was a country of South Slavic nations (including what are now the states of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia, as well as the area of Kosovo) that was generally more liberal than the other countries in that part of the world. Unfortunately, instead of the fast democratization and admission to the European Union that might have been expected, the SFRY was beset with resurgent nationalism. In alliance with the most dogmatic communist elements, that nationalism led to the disintegration of the SFRY, fratricidal war, and horrendous crimes. From 1989 until the end of the 1990s, Serbia was led by the infamous Slobodan Milosevic, the insolent pragmatic who used both nationalistic goals and communist sentiments to advance politically and then to maintain his power. One of the main instruments he used to solidify and extend his power in this very turbulent and uncertain time was strong propaganda. The topics of the propaganda included all the elements that Bar-Tal identified as part of a conflictive ethos; for

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example, self-presentation as a victim, justification of one’s own goals, and delegitimization of the goals and traits of the adversary.1 The 1990s were also a time of economic embargo, when ordinary citizens of Serbia struggled to meet basic needs. The majority of these citizens were politically apathetic and easily manipulated, and a minority of them accepted war goals with enthusiasm, invoking ‘‘patriotism’’ as an excuse for selfish pursuit of war spoils. Other groups, led by some opposition parties, students’ organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, attempted to resist engagement in armed conflict and organized prolonged demonstrations almost every year from March 1991. The Dayton Agreement, signed in Paris in December 1995, ended the wars in Bosnia. The war in Croatia had finished a little bit earlier. The UN embargo against Serbia had been loosening and its citizens could take a breath; however, this lull lasted only for a short period, after which a new crisis arose in Kosovo. Reports on continued disregard for human rights by the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and war crimes committed in the Kosovo region in 1998 and 1999 caused a crisis to escalate.2 Repression was widely used not only against ethnic minorities but against any citizens who expressed disagreement with the government.3 NATO’s several threats on the use of force did not produce compliance from the Serbian government,4 and the unstable and fragile situation was broken with confrontations between the Serbian security forces and the forces of the Kosovo Albanians.5 Reports on human rights violations within the region and failed negotiations between Milosevic, Kosovars, and the international community led to the NATO military intervention against Serbia in 1999, which involved almost three months of heavy bombing. NATO bombing led Milsovic to capitulate.6 Shortly after, Milosevic withdrew military forces and agreed to a foreign military presence in Kosovo. In 2000, the people of Serbia organized a large demonstration, widely recognized as a democratic revolution, and Milosevic and his party were eventually removed from power. All those circumstances created a very strong background for the issues we investigate in the Personal and Individual Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) project. Our Serbian respondents were participants, victims, and bystanders in several wars during the last decade. Serbia itself has been blamed for inspiring and maintaining war in neighboring countries, and it also experienced war on (or perhaps it is better to say ‘‘over,’’ because the NATO attacks consisted of air strikes only) its territory. It is likely that all of these circumstances strongly influenced the views of our participants concerning war, terrorism, torture, antiwar demonstrations, and peace.

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SERBIAN PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND PEACE Sample The Serbian sample consisted of 100 respondents (54 percent female and 46 percent male), from 19 to 58 years old, with an average age of 36. Ninety-two percent of them were Serbs and 88 percent were Orthodox Christians. Sixty percent of them have had at least a high school education and 57 percent were employed. The sample is relatively varied by marriage status (37 married, 33 single, 8 divorced, and 4 widows), and political party preference (the whole political specter has been covered). Approximately one-quarter of the sample had been in the armed forces, and approximately one-quarter had participated in peace protests. The relative variety of the sample adds to the representativeness of the views assessed. All participants responded to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS). In response to this measure, they rated their level of agreement on a seven-point scale (from totally disagree to totally agree) with items concerning the potential rights of governments to use aggression (e.g., invasion and torture) and the potential rights of individuals to live in a world of peace and demonstrate against war. In addition, they provide explanations, in their own words, for their rating scale responses. Finally, the participants provided their own definitions of terms such as war, peace, and terrorism. Definitions of War ‘‘Armed conflict of two sides which do not agree in some important interests.’’ (male, 27) ‘‘Conflict between two or more countries, mainly unjustified.’’ (female, 44) The Serbian participants’ definitions of war had strong negative connotations. All but one of the participants defined war in these negative terms and provided no excuses for making war. The only participant who diverged from this pattern defined war as an ‘‘Armed clash between parties that do not agree regarding some important interests’’ and then proceeded to comment that ‘‘It is always negative, but sometimes necessary (when the problem cannot be solved through peaceful resolution).’’ The most frequent words used in the definitions of war were ‘‘clash’’ (19 times) and ‘‘armed clash’’ (27 times). Thirty-five participants defined war as ‘‘a clash between two sides’’ and did not elaborate on their definitions. Among participants who provided more elaborate definitions, the major thematic categories included

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(1) responses focusing on the immorality or senselessness of war (e.g., ‘‘evil,’’ ‘‘Anarchy that leads nowhere,’’ ‘‘unnecessary evil,’’ ‘‘kind of terrorism,’’ ‘‘projection of worst human features,’’ ‘‘the biggest nonsense,’’ ‘‘something which can not be justified in any way,’’ ‘‘the biggest evil of the world’’); (2) emotional and sensory responses to war (‘‘suffering,’’ ‘‘pain,’’ ‘‘sorrow,’’ ‘‘tears,’’ ‘‘the biggest sorrow and disaster for every society and individual’’); (3) characteristics and outcomes of war (‘‘horrors,’’ ‘‘killings,’’ ‘‘jeopardizing the right to life,’’ ‘‘destruction of the human kind,’’ ‘‘death,’’ ‘‘disaster,’’ ‘‘chaos,’’ ‘‘apocalypse,’’ ‘‘homicide,’’ ‘‘state with no security and/or possibility for progress’’); and (4) the motives and other forces underlying war (e.g., ‘‘hate among people’’). The 14 participants who defined war in terms of its motives focused on a ‘‘fight for power’’ and ‘‘self-interest.’’ One participant commented, ‘‘On the bottom line, (war) is always based on material benefits of the group leaders and states which make war.’’ These explanations may reflect the controversial view of Milosevic as creating conflict out of personal ambition and self-interest rather than genuine nationalism.7 Definitions of Terrorism ‘‘Killing civilians.’’ (male, 40) ‘‘Kind of fight used by people who are not able to use other ways to fight.’’ (female, 44) Participants were mostly very critical of terrorism in their definitions of the term, except for one participant who said that terrorism is ‘‘an imaginative word; terrorists exist in all countries.’’ The majority of participants characterized terrorism as violence by a group of people whose targets are innocent civilians. Examples of the most typical definitions are as follows: ‘‘The most radical way (by killing innocent people) for fulfilling one’s goals’’; ‘‘Mass killings of innocent civilians with aim of threatening and fulfilling own political aims’’; ‘‘Organized jeopardizing of peace or life of other people for political or religious interests.’’ Some participants equated or compared terrorism with war: ‘‘New form of war. World collision in which the collided parts cannot be defined according to the existing way. As with every war, it is made because of material interests’’; ‘‘More than war, genocide and torture’’; ‘‘The worst way of fighting against something.’’ Two participants viewed terrorism as an escalation of discontent or as a consequence of certain propaganda: ‘‘Discontent which escalated and caused aggression. Most often it is the aggression of the powerless or oppressed because of selfish aims. I differentiate between terrorism that happens naturally and the

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one that happens artificially, as a consequence of propaganda.’’ In the context of this response, it is worth mentioning that Milosevic’s rapid rise in popularity as a proponent of Serb national sentiments gained much of its strength through support from the media. National television replayed nationalistic clips so many times that their words became catch phrases.8 Although most participants focused on the motives of terrorism (e.g., fulfilling political aims in the most radical way [by killing innocent people]), some participants also showed a kind of resistance toward full acceptance of the view on the nature of terrorism promulgated by the George W. Bush administration in the United States. Thus, some respondents differentiated between real terrorism and an ‘‘imagined terrorism,’’ which was actually an excuse for political (and military) actions. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was one of the founders and leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, initiated by Tito, for countries that did not want to align themselves with either the United States or the USSR during the Cold War. The Non-Aligned Movement countries generally supported uprisings of different nations as part of decolonization. Evidence of nonalignment thinking may be emerging in the responses of some of our Serbian respondents, who view ‘‘terrorism’’ only as a normal response to oppression. One respondent said, ‘‘Sometimes it is a normal reaction of the long oppressed ones. And sometimes it is a consequence of a demoralized state of mind.’’ One participant defined terrorism with one name: Osama bin Laden. Definitions of Peace ‘‘[Peace is] the absence of armed and political conflicts.’’ (male, 40) ‘‘[Peace is] the most important thing in the world, primary in the life of each person. Goal which everyone should pleading for.’’ (female, 32) The Serbian definitions of peace fell into the two broad categories: positive peace (the good things that peace is; for example, an ‘‘Ideal state for development of personality’’) and negative peace (peace as an absence of clashes and an opposite of war). The most frequent word in the category of positive definitions of peace is ‘‘well-being’’ (six times). Peace is also defined as freedom, blessedness, ideal, love, harmony, growth, progress, happiness, agreement, tolerance, unselfishness, peaceful sleep, heaven on earth. Examples of negative definitions of peace include ‘‘An opposite of war. Normal, needed condition for people to live’’; ‘‘A condition with no clashes, violence, war’’; ‘‘A condition without clashes.’’ The most frequent phrase among the negative definitions of peace is ‘‘Condition without clashes’’ (11 times).

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Other major categories that emerged in the analysis of the definitions of peace included (1) peace as a right of every man (e.g., ‘‘The right of every man, obligation of every man not to disturb it and to do everything in his power to preserve it’’); (2) peace as an important goal (‘‘Primary goal. Something that is always uncertain, a still wanted and needed condition for the development of civilization’’); and (3) peace as an ideal (‘‘Ideal condition of the state towards which the entire world should aim’’). In addition to responses identifying peace as a desirable goal, there were definitions portraying peace as a utopia, fiction, unattainable ideal: ‘‘Utopia’’; ‘‘Another ideal fiction. Gratification with the given here and now. Very hard to do’’; ‘‘Unattainable ideal, should aim towards, still impossible in practice’’; ‘‘I cannot define peace since it does not exist.’’ These rather pessimistic definitions of peace may be related to the large amount of conflict Serbians have personally experienced over the last few decades. Many of the definitions also made reference to the state: ‘‘Peace is the primary condition for developments both of the individual and of the state’’; ‘‘Peaceful coexistence between peoples and states.’’ Three participants did not provide definitions of peace. Views on Peace ‘‘As long as there are countries which want to be dominant over others, peace is a dream.’’ (female, 44) ‘‘People are imperfect and therefore they cannot achieve perfect conditions.’’ (female, 32) The majority of the participants agreed with the item stating that world peace can be accomplished, and provided one of two basic rationales for their belief: (1) consciousness raising can lead to world peace, and (2) the state can do things in order to achieve world peace. The first group of responses portrayed peace as something that can be built through processes such as upbringing in a healthy family and adopting the right system of values, based on respecting oneself as well as others. The second group included suggestions such as seeking unity among small countries in the quest to stop the powerful countries from nuclear testing and acting as world policemen. These responses mention discussions and good will as a useful approach and way of communicating. The most frequent recommendations for accomplishing world peace were ‘‘respect for basic human rights,’’ ‘‘tolerance of differences,’’ and ‘‘equality of power among the most powerful countries.’’ ‘‘Destroying of the weapon factories’’ was also mentioned. Other responses were more pessimistic, suggesting, for example, that people are not capable of preserving peace because it is not in their

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nature, or explicitly expressing doubts about the feasibility of world peace—another reflection, perhaps, of the high level of conflict Serbians have experienced in the past few decades. Explanations expressing doubts were especially prevalent among participants showing the mildest degree of agreement with the statement ‘‘I believe that world peace can be accomplished.’’ Thus, although most rating scale responses indicated agreement that peace could be achieved, the majority of the qualitative explanations were actually reasons why world peace is unattainable. This contradiction suggests that although many Serbians may wish to believe in the achievability of peace, and therefore indicate at least some level of agreement with the statement, their reasoning about the issue leads them in a different direction. Some of those pessimistic responses include ‘‘It would be ideal, but I think that it is impossible since it does not correspond with what many rich countries do’’; ‘‘Absolute peace can never be accomplished, since there will always be leaders of countries who will like to possess something that does not belong to them.’’ Reasons provided for rating scale responses rejecting the achievability of world peace were coherent and based primarily on views concerning the ‘‘unequal distribution of power in the world.’’ Perhaps this reasoning reflects the unequal distribution of money and resources in the Serbian economy and government up until the 1990s; during that period, when power was consolidated among the nationalists, economic inequalities in Serbia were more pronounced than in other socialist European countries. During the 1980s and 1990s, there was a shift from socialism to nationalism that contributed to a nearly stagnant social structure. The number of unemployed grew as did the number of impoverished.9 Arguments that unequal distribution of material and political power are barriers to the achievability of world peace included ‘‘There are always those who are stronger and those who are weak’’; ‘‘As long as there is financial interest for making war, it will be made’’; ‘‘As long as there are people who have an interest in making war—and such always exist—there will be wars’’; ‘‘People will always fight for material things, resources which are restricted, economical power. All other reasons for war are excuses.’’ Some responses also viewed aggression as inherent in human nature: ‘‘People, like other living beings, must have some hierarchy, and therefore there always will be fight for predominance’’; ‘‘evil nature of people.’’ Emotional and motivational factors were also mentioned as barriers to achieving peace; for example, ‘‘intolerance’’; ‘‘desire for possessing.’’ Others just stated rather simply that there are no ways to achieve world peace: ‘‘It does not exist’’; ‘‘There is no way.’’ Although disagreeing with the achievability of world peace, one participant nevertheless suggested: ‘‘Offer economic,

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cultural and all other independencies to all countries, so that on equal bases they all participate in making decisions on the world level!’’ This recommendation appears to reflect a desire for equality as well as independence, both of which seemed out of reach for many people in Serbia until recently. In addition to being asked for their level of agreement concerning the achievability of world peace, respondents were also asked to make suggestions as to what needs to be done to achieve world peace. Some participants replied with ‘‘I do not know,’’ and again, some indicated that there are no ways to accomplish world peace. Others suggested that peace could be accomplished if everybody advocated for it: ‘‘Everybody must want peace and everybody must work towards peace.’’ Other proposals included: ‘‘Through education and informing the people’’; ‘‘By realizing the goals of antiglobalists’’; ‘‘By the individual turning towards him/herself and his/her family as ultimate values’’; ‘‘Tolerance, co-operation, acceptance of one’s own place in society, without greed, megalomania’’; ‘‘Veto and elimination of all weapons.’’ The following two quotations encompass the answers of the remaining participants: ‘‘Establishing international law, and justice and absolute respect on behalf of everybody, regardless of the degree of power they have,’’ and ‘‘Educate people on rights, freedom, overcoming of disagreements and personal interests (or the interests of one’s own country), making concessions because of higher goals.’’ The respondents’ focus on tolerance, respect, and justice might reflect Serbia’s recent attempts to move toward reconciliation with Bosnia and Croacia for war crimes committed between 1992 and 1995. In 2003, Serbian president Svetozar Marovic officially apologized to the people of Bosnia-Herzegorina and Croatia.10, 11 Despite this undertaking, Serbia’s public opinion was divided over whether Serbia should take collective responsibility for the war. Part of the population opposed Serbia taking responsibility for the war crimes, whereas others considered it a necessary step to promote peaceful coexistence. Although the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has taken on the responsibility of prosecuting the ones responsible for violations of international human rights in the former Yugoslavia territory, some experts have reservations on the extent to which its activities will be sufficient to help the Balkan communities overcome their differences and progress toward a postconflict reconciliation.12 Participants who reported that they were hesitant to make suggestions about how to achieve world peace generally indicated that although they favored world peace, they believed that implementing it in real life demands characteristics that humans traditionally do not

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demonstrate (e.g., ‘‘patience, will, and unselfishness’’). They argued, for example, ‘‘There is always somebody who wants more of everything’’; ‘‘I would love to believe in world peace, but I think that it is not the wish of all countries, since they wish to enlarge their territory and to have power over many countries. America does not allow world peace.’’ Such explanations are in accordance with well-known opinions of groups around the world that are antiglobalism and anti-American (or at least anti-Bush) and included ‘‘unequal distribution of power’’ and the wish of the United States for ‘‘domination over other countries’’ as barriers to peace. What is interesting is that within the Serb sample, people with left- and right-wing ideology seemed to offer these explanations equally. Antiglobalism and anti-American sentiments were expected from people subscribing to the left-wing political parties, but Serbian right-wingers are especially resentful of American policy toward Serbia and therefore express the same criticisms and distrust. The involvement of the United States and NATO in Kosovo and in air strikes may have enhanced the bitterness experienced by a wide range of Serbian citizens. Views on Security ‘‘Personal existence and the existence of family depend on the situation in the country they live in.’’ (male, 27) ‘‘Security is necessary for a person in order to give his/her best.’’ (female, 32) National security is not as prominent an issue in everyday Serbian political discourse as it is in America. The majority of our Serbian respondents indicated agreement with the item ‘‘National security is essential for individual and family security.’’ They explained that only a strong, stable, and democratic country can guarantee family and personal safety and that the safety of the country is a precondition for the economic and social safety that influence the family and personal safety. As one respondent said, ‘‘In a safe country, a person can dedicate her/ himself to her/his personal development and the development of her/ his family. Without a safe country, a person has no conditions for family and personal safety.’’ Some participants mentioned model countries, free of armed aggression: ‘‘the countries that had no armed clashes (Switzerland, Finland) reached the highest degree of family and personal safety.’’ Some of the Serbian respondents pointed out a connection between state security and the conditions of ‘‘brain drain,’’ which has been a problem for security: ‘‘The more the state is safe, the more it is stronger,

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and the more the young would not go abroad but would stay in the state’’; ‘‘We felt a lack of security in our skin. Huge numbers of young people left.’’ Some mentioned the years spent in political and economic isolation because of the United Nations embargo: ‘‘Although we are used to being isolated, there is no family harmony without harmony on a general level.’’ Some of the participants agreed with the necessity of national security for individual and family security but gave contradictory explanations: ‘‘It is one of the important conditions, but not the essential and the most important one’’; ‘‘It would be desirable, but not vital for fulfilling happiness.‘‘ When asked to describe the best ways of achieving family and personal security, the Serbian participants who agreed that national security was essential to individual and family security suggested ‘‘democracy’’; ‘‘absence of corruption’’; ‘‘strong and independent media’’; ‘‘respect for human rights’’; ‘‘strengthening of economy’’; ‘‘election of wise statesmen’’; ‘‘economic and political stability’’; ‘‘functioning of the legal system’’; and ‘‘social programs.’’ Some of the participants who disagreed with the statement about the importance of national security argued that in reality family and personal security lead to state security and not the other way around. Other participants did not consider family security as dependent on circumstances in the state, or they thought that if there was a connection between national security and family, it was not a vital one. Their recommendations for the best ways to accomplish family and personal security for the people around the world included life satisfaction; organizing one’s own life; realizing ambitions; personal development; tolerance; patience; suppression of nationalistic activities; and respecting the articles of even the worst written constitution. In our view, all of the explanations given contradict the view that family and personal security are not dependent on state security; rather, they assume that state security is indeed a vital precondition for family and personal security. The strongest argument for this conclusion is that none of the explanations given for building family security could operate in an unstable state, a state at war, a poor state, or a state with very high unemployment. Is There a Governmental Right to Invasion? ‘‘Generally speaking it has no right. But, for example, if one country is endangered by the other I think that international community has a right to intervene. It is a similar situation when majority of citizens of one country are seriously endangered by some political system in their own country, but it is more delicate matter!’’ (male, 27)

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‘‘Never, because invasion goals are always exploitations and no one can be permitted to become rich on others’ account, or not to think about innocent who suffer.’’ (female, 32) Questions about one country’s right to invade another and answers to those questions have been particularly interesting in Serbia, which was blamed by part of the international community for the war in Bosnia, and several years later was bombed by NATO air forces. However, it seems that participant responses to the issue of whether countries have the right to wage war were directed primarily at the American invasion of Iraq. It was clear that most Serbian participants do not approve of such actions. More specifically, the majority of the Serbian participants did not agree with the item stating that ‘‘Sometimes one state has a right to invade another state.’’ They explained their rejection of such a right by saying they are pacifists, that they see nothing that would give one state the right to invade another, that every state should take care of its internal problems, that all disagreements could be solved through negotiations and in a peaceful way. One participant commented, ‘‘I do not justify invasions of other country; there are always many innocent victims.’’ Some participants argued that invasions are undertaken because of the interests of individuals affiliated with the government of the invading country who benefit from an invasion and that the motives for an invasion are, above all, material interests, with no regard for the human victims. It is possible that such responses reflect either criticism of the United States-led invasion of Iraq or more direct experience with invasion (aerial bombing) during the conflict in Kosovo. Some of the participants suggested that all disagreements between countries can be solved through negotiations and in a peaceful way. Some equate invasion of a state with occupation of the state and with declaring war on that state: ‘‘Where does that right come from? It is an occupation’’; ‘‘It would mean starting a war with the invaded state.’’ Some participants consider invasion through the prism of unequal distribution of power: ‘‘It is not right for one country to invade another, still, the one who is stronger invades and the weaker one is silent and suffers’’; ‘‘Strong countries attack small and poor ones.’’ One participant qualified his disagreement by referring to United Nations missions: ‘‘Invasion—No! Maybe participation in mission of the United Nations (UN) which intervenes to protect human rights in certain country (Darfur).’’ Some participants who did not agree with a governmental right to invasion nevertheless argued that invasion is justified if it is undertaken

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with the aim of self-defense or for the salvation of the people in the invaded country, saying, for example, ‘‘Unless it is undertaken with the aim of self-defense’’; ‘‘Depends on the circumstances. If the attack is not provoked at all, of course not. However, if the invaded country in some way jeopardizes the survival of the other country, then I agree’’; ‘‘If somewhere some ‘slavery’ exists, and the people are not aware enough of the problem, maybe they should be helped to become aware.’’ These explanations reveal that participants who are in principle against invasion approve it in practice in cases where they consider that there is a solid reason for it. A small number of the Serbian respondents indicated that they agreed with a governmental right to invasion and explained their ratings by saying that invasion is justified if it is in support of self-defense or improvement of life conditions in the invaded country; for example, ‘‘If it is the only way to protect its people and territory, to prevent genocide, if the UN agrees with that’’; ‘‘Yes, if the final goal is improvement of the life conditions in that country. For instance when a dictator is in power and invasion has the aim to bring him down.’’ For these participants, there was no contradiction between their rating scale responses and their justifications for their responses. Their justifications confirm that they really stand behind their views on invasion, both in principle and in practice. Perhaps their consistency derives from personal experience. As one of these participants said, ‘‘Others were also mean towards us. Both bombing and everything.’’ A Right to Live in Peace? ‘‘Everybody has equal rights for freedom and to live in peace, the same as he/ she has a right for sun, air . . . Nobody has a right to usurp it!’’ (male, 27) All participants except for one agreed that all human beings have a basic right to live in peace. In their view, peace is the only normal and acceptable state, something that belongs to people from the moment they are born, an optimal condition for development and progress of man. They see no basis upon which some person or people should be denied that right, no matter what their political, national, religious, or other background is. Participants showed a very positive view of what peace enables, saying that it allows every person who wishes to do so to spend his/her life becoming educated, acquiring new concepts, traveling, creating a family, enjoying children, and establishing good relations with family and others. They stressed that life in peace is a basic human need, that tolerance and understanding are the basis of everything, and that all people are equal and therefore have equal rights to a

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peaceful life. Some participants directly associated peace with respect for other basic human rights: ‘‘If the basic human rights of the individual are respected, breaking the peace is unlikely to happen.’’ A few respondents conceptualized peace in regard to the negative things that it can eliminate from life. For example, they noted that peace enables people to live without fear for their existence. Some said that war cannot be good for any human being, and therefore individuals should demand and obtain the right to live in peace. One respondent commented, ‘‘Only peace provides harmony. It has to be basic human right, jeopardized by nothing. People are not born with destructive tendencies. Their basic rights are abolished by the government.’’ Some participants had directly experienced war and its consequences and expressed their views in highly emotional statements: ‘‘We are fed up with everything, both war and poverty.’’ Strong emotions were also expressed in regard to people or nations who break the peace: ‘‘There are persons who break the peace, and I think that they should not live in that world’’; ‘‘Those who made wars and sufferings cannot live in peace.’’ The only participant who did not agree that there is a right to peace made a similar argument: ‘‘Those who jeopardize the lives of a large number of people due to their interests do not have the right to live in peace.’’ For these participants, peace is not an unconditional right for every human being, but completely the opposite, a benefit that should be earned through certain behavior and actions. This position raises the question of what should happen to those who, according to their criteria, do not deserve that right. What would these respondents want to do with people who do not earn a right to peace through their behaviors? What do the respondents think should happen to such groups? Do Individuals Have the Right to Protest against War? ‘‘Everybody has a duty to fight for his/her own rights and has freedom to support others who fight for the same goal.’’ (male, 21) ‘‘It is a normal and basic right of each person to express his/her own opinion and belief.’’ (male, 40) ‘‘Of course, if the protesters are peaceful.’’ (female, 44) All of the Serbian participants agreed with the statement that individuals have the right to demonstrate against war and in favor of peace. They said that everyone has the right to speak out publicly about his/ her dissatisfactions, attitudes, and opinions, and that protesting against war is a way of forming a critical attitude regarding the concepts of war and peace. Moreover, they argue that not only does everyone have the

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right to protest, but it is also their duty to protest against war, bombs, and dying for no reason. Protest is a demonstration of freedom of thought and speech that should be guaranteed, and all actions that resist any form of violence should be welcomed. This belief is consistent with the actions of Serbians who, in 2000, participated in or were supportive of the large public demonstration that was widely recognized as a democratic revolution and was ultimately responsible for removing Milosevic and his party from power. Some participants stressed that they supported only peaceful protests, without violence; in their view, protestors should not themselves break the peace. Some mentioned that protestors should bear no consequences because of protesting and that they should not be prohibited by the government. One participant acknowledged that protests might be dangerous: ‘‘In those situations those people get hurt, so the majority backs off.’’ Some participants suggested that protests should be organized regarding the number of people, time, and place of the events, because if they were organized, their influence would be stronger. Some participants mentioned hunger strikes as one of the ways to protest against war. Others said that people should protest if the possibilities for a political solution are not exhausted, but they did not indicate whether they believed that protests were effective only when all the possible political solutions had not been exhausted. Some participants expressed doubt regarding the effects of protests: ‘‘I do not see any use of it.’’ Another participant took a stance in favor of war when he commented: ‘‘I consider that war should be made in the case where signing a peace treaty would mean the presence of another force on the territory of the country.’’ Do Governments Have a Right to Torture Prisoners of War? ‘‘It [torture of a prisoner of war] will be a war crime against prisoners and it is punishable by all international regulations.’’ (female, 35) ‘‘[Government has a right to torture prisoners of war] only in cases where some information which the prisoner possesses can save innocents.’’ (male, 40) The majority of Serb participants disagreed with the statement that the government has the right to torture prisoners during times of war; they said they were against any form of violence, especially such a brutal one. Many of them said that nothing can justify torture; it is always against basic human rights and international law: ‘‘According to Geneva Convention, they have no such right and, officially, no one will do that or admit it.’’ Respondents see torture as done in order to benefit

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the aggressors, but they feel that the humanity of the prisoners must be respected. They believe that human rights and the rules regarding how to treat prisoners of war must be respected and think that the government should serve as a good example to its citizens. In regard to any government that might authorize torture, they noted: ‘‘Such a government should not exist’’; ‘‘In such case there is no government but a wild horde that claims to be a ‘Government.’ ’’ Other themes stressed that the people who were prisoners did not go to fight of their own free will, but ‘‘were sent to war and therefore are not the main criminals.’’ [Whether these participants would have a different view concerning voluntaries or professional soldiers is not known.] Still other themes focused on the immorality of torture (‘‘Life has no price, any reason for maltreating is unjustified’’) and the view that prisoners are already punished enough just by being prisoners (‘‘The sole fact of being prisoner is enough’’). Such responses showed a high level of awareness and sensitivity regarding the difficult position of prisoners of war. Finally, some of those who rejected the right to torture argued that the reciprocity of the situation should be kept in mind—that governments that allow the use of torture may find their own citizens tortured in times of war. Some of the participants who did not endorse a governmental right to use torture nevertheless identified circumstances under which a government might have a right to order torture of prisoners of war. Some of these respondents identified the situation wherein the prisoner does not want to reveal important information that is crucial for saving other people: ‘‘The government has that right only if the prisoner does not want to reveal important information that might save the lives of other people who are in danger’’; ‘‘Only in the case where certain information the prisoner possesses can save the innocent.’’ For other respondents, the sole reason of obtaining desired information is enough (‘‘If the aim is gaining information’’). One participant commented that if the prisoners are professional soldiers, they should be killed, and that women, children, and civilians should not be hurt. Such responses lead us to wonder: What is the difference between those who both explicitly and in practice approve torture and those who explicitly do not agree with torture but justify it under certain conditions? Several participants neither agreed nor disagreed with a governmental right to torture, explaining that it is a matter of war doctrines and that they cannot judge it, that in war everything is possible, and that people are doing what they have to do. One participant said, ‘‘We face that, I never asked myself if they have the right to do it.’’ Another said, ‘‘Maybe, if the government considers it useful; however, there have to be boundaries, they must not go too far.’’ The only participant who

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explicitly agreed with this statement explained his answer by saying that the government has the right to order torture of prisoners during the war only if the prisoner possesses important information regarding the war. Is the Loss of Civilian Lives Acceptable? ‘‘[If we accept civilian losses] what is the difference, then, between government and terrorists?’’ (female, 32) ‘‘[Loss of civilian lives is acceptable] if it is a way to kill terrorists and protect bigger number of innocent people’’ The majority of Serbian participants did not agree that sometimes it is acceptable if innocent civilians are killed in the fight against terrorism. They said that there is no excuse for killing innocent people and that killing an innocent person because of ‘‘higher goals’’ is insanity and absurdity. Some of them also raised the idea that when governments killed innocent civilians, there is little or no difference left between the government and the terrorists: ‘‘It will not help in any way. That would be terrorism on behalf of the government. Who is a terrorist then?’’; ‘‘Terrorists kill innocent people too, so the sovereignty would become one of them.’’ Many of the respondents indicated their disbelief in the idea that allowing innocent people to die in the fight against terrorism would actually stop terrorism. Moreover, many believe that innocent people must not be killed even if their deaths could somehow bring something ‘‘good’’ to those who commit the act. Participants also mentioned that there are other ways to fight terrorism that do not include killing people. Regarding the government that would kill innocent people in the battle against international terrorism, participants said the following: ‘‘No sovereignty has a right to speculate with collateral damage’’; ‘‘They have no right, but in our country everything is possible, sacrificing civilians because of something’’; ‘‘I do not agree; however, there were such cases in the world’’; ‘‘It is mostly done, but such cases are hidden.’’ Some explanations are simple, warm human messages: ‘‘To kill is something most horrifying. A whole world disappears.’’ Some participants made specific reference to the United States in their answers: ‘‘American theories are absolutely neither close nor understandable to me’’; ‘‘This is what the American example speaks about’’; ‘‘I do not like these American ‘tales’ about justified killings of innocent civilians.’’ As was true in regard to the torture item, some participants indicated that there were some circumstances under which the killing of innocent civilians was justified, essentially providing a cost/benefit analysis.

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Such responses included the following: ‘‘I do not agree because they are innocent civilians, but on the other hand, it is better for few of them to suffer than a whole country or much larger number of other innocent people,’’ and ‘‘If such choice would decrease the number of victims.’’ Participants who agreed that some civilian casualties might be acceptable to fight terrorism generally qualified their approval; for example, ‘‘the government should make efforts to decrease the number of victims’’; ‘‘Only in case it is inevitable and when there are no other ways’’; ‘‘Only if it is the only way directly to save from inevitable death a big group of people’’; ‘‘Some extreme situations are coming into my mind when it would be justified (though not correct)’’; ‘‘Hard word ‘to kill,’ maybe should say ‘to sacrifice,’ if there is no other option’’; ‘‘In exceptional cases, the brain stops from the horrors that humans, like monsters, could imagine and do, so that exceptional circumstances need exceptional law.’’

CONCLUSION The majority of our respondents—independent of their ages, education, and social strata—provided explanations of their views on governmental aggression and peace that were indicative of a strongly humanistic orientation. However, people often accept some positive ideas generally when there are no counterforces challenging those views. We have no hard proof that in a potential situation of forced choice between different rights and values, our participants would be able to maintain and defend their basic humanistic values. Nevertheless, given the aggression to which they have been exposed in recent decades, their optimism is encouraging to all who value peace. Serbia’s experience of conflict and war is probably still too recent for the memories and scars of the fratricide to have diluted. Thirteen years (since the end of the war) is a relatively short period of time to expect cross-community understanding to develop, and it is normal that animosities might still be present at some level. In this context, it is important to try to assess to what extent measures toward peace and reconciliation have been taken. There is, in fact, a great amount of work being conducted within Serbia by hundreds of national and international organizations to promote reconciliation processes. The NGO landscape has made considerable progress since 1997 and continues to do so; hundreds of NGOs have been formed to address and help the transition in several areas such as policy making, human rights, media restructuring.13 These organizations operate at several institutional as well as grass roots levels to help reform the political social and judicial infrastructures.

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The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is an important program established to promote peaceful cooperation between partner countries (including Serbia, as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro) and NATO, with the objective of observing principles of international law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights under the UN charter. Serbia’s partnership for peace program is considered to be a crucial step within the European security structure and a necessary factor in building peace and democracy consistent with the principles of international and regional organizations.14 In close connection with the PfP, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was also established. The ICTY consists of a UN body created to prosecute people who committed crimes in the former Yugoslavia. In collaboration with the ICTY, a number of national and international organizations have extended their programs to help the divided communities. In addition, recent efforts have been made toward developing public discussion about promoting tolerance toward differences. These discussions include several regions, social groups, and ethnicities. Specifically, steps have been taken toward establishing a Truth and Reconciliation project.15 The TRC has an inclusive approach to reconciliation and has been recommended by The Hague with the objective of taking into account all victims and perpetrators of war regardless of their origins. This project was modeled after several truth and reconciliation commissions taking place around the world. Its main goal is to investigate war crimes committed in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo over the war period. There have been a number of criticisms of the TRC, including failure to produce results, lack of ethnic diversity and political impartiality, and failure to consult with NGOs and victims.16 Nevertheless, national and international groups have continued to work on finding a suitable model for dealing with truth and reconciliation in the region as well as on formulating strategies to implement them.17 Other initiatives include the work of several groups to address systemic problems such as reducing poverty and reform of democratic structures.18 As a result of national and international efforts, Serbia has recently been classified on the Global Peace Index as a relatively peaceful country. Meanwhile the reported level of distrust (as reflected by how cautious one is when dealing with other citizens) was somewhat cautious.19 In addition, Serbia has also been classified as one of the top attractive markets for investment in terms of potential attractiveness for foreign investment. This increase in trust by investors probably indicates optimism regarding expected political development and social and economic progress.20

4

Russia Sherri McCarthy, Elina Tochilnikova, and Anna Medvedeva

War is . . . ‘‘Inner and outer turmoil’’; ‘‘barbaric ways’’; ‘‘greed and lack of wisdom.’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘found within each person’’; ‘‘normal existence without fear’’; ‘‘The calm before the storm’’; ‘‘an impossible fantasy.’’ Russia is a large and diverse country rich in natural resources. Despite the harsh climate and living conditions combined with centuries of political struggle and war, many cultural and scientific achievements have originated in this vast land. In 988 CE, Prince Vladimir, seeking to unify the Russian people, rejected paganism and adopted Christianity, forbidding idol worship in his realm. Russia assumed a political system with monarchic, aristocratic, and a limited number of democratic characteristics,1 a system characterized by violent solutions to both internal and external conflict over the last 1,000 years. Although the recent collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) resulted in an attempt to create a Western-style capitalistic democracy, deep economic and cultural crises ensued, and the attempt has been met with considerable opposition from the Russian people in reaction to the heightened morbidity, mortality, and social instability that followed the sudden decision for drastic political change. ‘‘The great mass of ordinary Russians has a deep yearning for stability and order,’’ notes Anatol Lieven. ‘‘This at present outweighs even the desire for social justice, let alone wounded nationalism and hopes for the restoration of the Soviet Union. This is a tired, depressed, and apathetic people, not one yearning for great deeds of revolutionary conquest.’’2 Results from the nearly 300 Russians who participated in completing the Personal and Individual

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Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS), described later, seem to reflect this general discouragement.

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT In the 13th century, because of internal conflicts, Russia assumed a Byzantine model of government,3 consisting of an omnipotent ruler with ultimate authority and power over his lands and people. Under this model, the rulers of Russia, the tsars, commanded with passionate judgment rather than popular participation, while Christianity—the official religion of the state—remained subservient to secular leadership. The church was used to validate decisions of the government—whether in favor of war or of peace. The effects of this legacy continue today. The period between 1237 and 1480 was characterized by Mongol conquest. Although the princes were warned of the upcoming invasion, dynastic dispute and ignorance prevented them from mobilizing an effective alliance against the Mongols.4 Thus, apparently because of their leaders’ negligence, Russians were subjected to mass burnings and killings.5 Whole cities were annihilated, much of the population was enslaved, and Russia became part of the Mongol Empire. Although the Russians were allowed to continue living as they previously had,6 provided they paid regular tribute and accepted conscription,7 violent uprisings resulted. The common people, who suffered financially under Mongol control, found it humiliating to be subjected to foreign rule. Many historians, economists, and political scientists cite Mongol domination as the root cause of Russia’s present-day difficulty assimilating into the modern Western world. Even though Russians were afforded religious tolerance, access to novel trade routes in China, and an opportunity to transform and strengthen their military during the centuries of occupation, their development as a free and independent society was stunted.8 Mongols repressed the only democratic political institution in Russia, called the Veche, which allowed the populace to openly complain against their authorities.9 In addition, they introduced judicially enforced capital10 and corporal punishment, and normative practices of torture. Centuries of foreign conquest left the Russian people longing for a powerful ruler, one able to protect them at almost any expense. Thus, Mongol domination increased the separation between Russia and Western Europe. While the Protestant Reformation, the scientific revolution, and the Enlightenment affected Western Europe, Russia remained separated from these movements, which spread ideas of individualism and rationalism. Finally, in 1480, after the Mongols were unable to defeat the now more experienced Russian army, their

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domination finally ended,12 although struggle with the Mongols would continue for many more years. To financially strengthen his kingdom, the grand prince of Russia, Ivan III, chose a policy of centralization and expansion. From 1492 to 1595, Russia was at war as often as it was at peace, and Ivan ruled a ruthless patrimonial state whose main goal was to supply men for his army.13 During his reign, Ivan confiscated approximately three million acres of populated agricultural land,14 which he distributed as payment to his expanding army; however, he also issued Russia’s first uniform code of law. Consequently, his rule was one of infrastructural improvement as well as aggression. Ivan IV, the infamous ‘‘Ivan the Terrible,’’ inherited the kingdom of Ivan III at the age of 16 and ruled Russia from 1547 until 1584.15 His reign was characterized by massacre, torture, economic struggle, and natural disaster, as well as by political unification, suppression of the corrupt aristocracy, and communication in state affairs between royalty and the common people—achievements that have led to Ivan’s rule being described as the ‘‘madness of a genius.’’16 When Ivan feared that the city of Novgorod was going to revolt, he had 60,000 of its citizens murdered and then had their names sent to monasteries so that prayers could be conducted as tribute. As Ivan feared potential revolt and anarchy throughout his vast territory, his reign was one of absolutism, extremes, and contradictions. He instituted the oprichniki, Russia’s first internal secret police group. Unlike other rulers, he sought connections with Western Europe, but he ruled with a very different idea of autocracy than was characteristic of Western European countries. In 1570, in a bitter letter, Tsar Ivan wrote to Queen Elizabeth of England: ‘‘We had thought that you were sovereign in your state and ruled yourself, and that you saw to your sovereign honor . . . But it turns out that in your land people rule besides you, and not only people, but trading peasants.’’17 Soon after Ivan died, Russia was engulfed in anarchy. During the ‘‘Time of Troubles’’ between 1605 and 1613, struggle for the throne was followed by violent class struggle resulting in the death of almost half of Russia’s population. This social instability ended with the instatement of the new Romanov dynasty. The rule of the Romanov family, which lasted for three centuries, was marked by fundamental changes in military, religious, societal, and cultural institutions. With the import of Western ideas, Russia modernized at a rapid pace, but it did so at a high cost. Approximately 100,000–300,000 died from slave labor and disease during the building of St. Petersburg as Peter I brought Russia the grandeur of a major world power.18 By the late 19th century, Russia had achieved improvement in the quality of government, rapid population

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growth, the creation of public schools and universities, and the largest standing military in Europe; however, it did not follow Western Europe’s course of modernization. The tax burden increased and freedom of movement for peasants decreased, slavery remained legal until 1861,19 and the nobility was the only social group exempt from corporal punishment and compulsory state service. Furthermore, torture remained legal, sporadic prohibitions on freedom of the press and travel abroad were created, and the institution of the secret police remained strong; in addition, sexual segregation increased (with women secluded in separate domestic quarters).20 Peter I, known as ‘‘Peter the Great’’ ruled Russia from 1682 until 1725. Although Peter introduced the idea of action for the greater good and criteria for a meritocracy in Russia and allowed for religious tolerance, he was also responsible for increasing the burden held by peasants, who consisted of at least 80 percent of the population, harshly punishing those who rejected his modern reforms and increasing his own power as autocrat. To unify diverse populations and protect exposed regions, Russia remained at war during the majority of his reign and gained control of many Eastern European countries. Catherine II, also known as ‘‘Catherine the Great,’’ ruled from 1762 to 1796 and was further responsible for propelling Russia into modernity. Influenced by Voltaire and other philosophers of the French Enlightenment, she supported peace, love, free will, and action for the greater good. She created orphanages, schools, and universities, encouraged women and serfs to be educated, created the first school for aristocratic girls and even published a prohibited French encyclopedia in Russia. However, she was also responsible for projecting Russia into several wars for land and glory, retaining the system of serfdom, and exiling political dissidents while maintaining the privileges of the nobility and the Russian Orthodox Church.21 Because of pressure from the Russian Orthodox Church, toward the end of her reign, it became lawfully impossible for women to achieve divorce without their husband’s permission. Territorial gains from war resulted in vast population gains. During Catherine’s rein, the population living within Russia’s borders increased from 19 to 36 million. Many of the people who were supposed to be incorporated into the Russian empire refused to assimilate. Five million Jews and two million Poles were subjected to social and political sanctions, which led to hostility, bloody revolts, purges, pogroms, and policies of pacification that resulted in the deaths of Poles, Jews, and peasants.22 Catherine began her reign sponsoring education and wholeheartedly embracing freedom. Toward the end of her life, following her observations of the French Revolution, she wanted to put an end to ‘‘French madness,’’ proclaiming, ‘‘Equality is a monster.’’

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Political communism, which would control Russia for much of the 20th century, had strong cultural roots. Serfs, who comprised at least 80 percent of the Russian population, had little notion of personal property and tended to live in communes. They believed those who worked the land should control the land and that their dear tsar agreed with them, even though their egotistic landlords prevented their emancipation. Concurrently, concepts of equality and belonging, freedom to speak and be educated, and the ability to propel social movement compelled women, Jews, and other marginalized minorities to support communism, although the communist revolution was in no way economically necessitated. By the end of the 19th century, Russia, comprising onesixth of the earth’s surface, enjoyed a thriving economy and retained the largest standing army in Europe. The government also founded multiple new educational facilities, including 2,551 state schools, 57 new high schools, and 6 new universities, resulting in a growing class of educated intelligentsia from all levels of the social strata. The majority of the people residing within Russian borders, the serfs in combination with diverse minority groups, believed they deserved greater freedom, including control over government affairs. Many soldiers and members of the elite, having resided in Western Europe, became conscious of the benefits of representational government. Numerous societies were created, followed by uprisings, to confront matters of civic concern—abolition of serfdom and corporal punishment, education, and social justice. In 1825, the Decembrist Revolt was suppressed by Tsar Nicholas I, ending in the death of 70 patriots, followed by 5 official executions, 85 imprisonments, and the exile of 31 presumed participants. Nihilist philosophy enveloped portions of the intelligentsia, who defined morality as anything promoting revolution and believed that throughout history progress had emerged only out of periods of oppression.23 Popular behavior shifted from one of acceptance and resignation to one of passionate obligation toward activism for the greater good. Between 1826 and 1854, 712 incidents of public unrest occurred, including the murder and attempted murder of landlords. The government reacted by using military measures to pacify the public 132 times. Instead of concentrating on reform, the tsarist regime proceeded with a tenacious policy of censorship and Russification. Literature and publications were controlled, foreign travel was suppressed, education was used to encourage subservience to the state, and the secret police were used to gather information and intimidate. Nevertheless, because of ineffective censorship and unchecked corruption, many liberal works were published—most notably Marx’s Das Kapital. Furthermore, on the international front, in reaction to a dispute with France over Christian

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holy places in Palestine, Russia plunged itself into the Crimean War, which resulted in the deaths of 600,000 Russian soldiers and a fiscal deficit of 75 million rubles. Beginning in 1861, the government ‘‘emancipated’’ approximately 75 percent of its population, enacted important judicial and military reforms, created a system of local government with democratic qualities, and built roads, hospitals, and churches. Nevertheless, because of poor economic conditions, 1,176 incidents of peasant rebellion occurred that year. High rates of public unrest continued for several more years, including assassination attempts on the tsar. The government reacted with violence, shooting, torturing, and exiling the participants as well as instigating pogroms, systematic incitement against Jews involving massacre engineered to diffuse rage away from itself and resulting in 150,000 deaths. Because of social chaos, the populace lost trust in ‘‘their father the tsar’’—and in his capability to control his state and rule justly. People from all socioeconomic levels began to protest the autocratic regime and to demand transformation of the entire governmental structure; however, the majority of peasants did not strive for revolution. They wanted to improve their lot, but for the most part they were illiterate and superstitious and felt intrinsic loyalty to their tsar. On Sunday, January 9, 1905, a Russian Orthodox priest named Father Gapon peacefully led up to 100,000 peasants, workers, and minorities, carrying icons and portraits of the royalty, to a place outside the Winter Palace to ask Tsar Nicholas II for acknowledgment. The government made attempts on this Bloody Sunday to disperse the crowd with verbal requests followed by indiscriminate firing, resulting in 200 dead and 300 injured; the government’s uncompassionate reaction fueled the revolution of 1905.24 The government was no longer able to convey authority, either domestically or abroad because of its losses in the Russo-Japanese War. Seeing compromise as the only way of holding on to power, Nicholas II signed an agreement allowing for universal suffrage, the creation of political parties, and the establishment of a central legislative body. Meanwhile, the government initiated pogroms as an antirevolutionary tactic to encourage a nationalistic attack on groups deemed outsiders, killing hundreds of Jews and injuring thousands. Although these specious techniques fostered hate among the masses, they were not powerful enough to generate veneration for the monarchy. In 1914, Russia chose to involve itself in World War I. An irresponsible military leadership and underdeveloped and deteriorated infrastructure led to the loss of vast territories of Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bessarabia (15 percent of the population, 10 percent of railways, and one-third of industrial enterprises), as well as the loss of

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650,000 lives. Furthermore, 3.5 million people were either missing in action or prisoners of war while 2.5 million were wounded. Citizens became utterly demoralized. For the general populace, the West became associated with the German troops who fought against them during the war, leading to a desire to develop separately from Western influence and follow their own path of development.25 In February, the first revolution of 1917 took place; it was characterized by the peaceful resignation of Tsar Nicholas II and the subsequent creation of a democratic provisional government. This short-lived governing body, which included the participation of all existent political parties, had the goal of creating a democratic republic. However, after several months, the minority Bolshevik party, led by Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky, overthrew the provisional government and seized power. Thus, the October Revolution of 1917 occurred. The masses supported ‘‘revolutionary terror’’ to seize power and punish the privileged.26 Because Western forms of government were viewed as tools of bourgeois exploitation, opposition was as strong to the Western political system as to the tsarist system. That same year, the Russian Civil War occurred, completely altering the societal fabric and resulting in the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922. Twenty million people lost their lives to the revolution and subsequent civil war; this type of disregard for human life would characterize national policy until the USSR’s fall in 1991—and perhaps after, as well. Although many intellectuals in the West praised the USSR for universal health care and free education, the USSR was in fact developing into a dystopia, which became characterized by seven decades of statesponsored terror, the absence of legal order, forced secularism and collectivism, large-scale exploitation and denial of human rights, statecontrolled economy and media, debilitated industrial production, prosperous underground economy, the buildup of a massive military complex, an uncompromising policy of expansion, a double burden for women, a chronic deficit of consumer items, and a shortage of food. Expecting war at any moment, the Communist leadership militarized the whole society. Trains were camouflaged, dual-purpose tractors could serve as military vehicles, and military preparation classes were mandatory in school. Russia was transformed from an agrarian society to a highly industrialized global military power. The USSR’s pugnacious character, in combination with groupthink, resulted in volatile domestic and international policies, eventually leading to its fall. Two years before his death, Lenin appointed Josef Stalin to rule, later regretting his decision and believing Stalin to be too inhumane to lead a nation. Nevertheless, in 1922, Josef Stalin became the secretary general, father, owner, and master of the USSR for 31 years. Stalin was

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responsible for continuing the politics of violence through terror and fear induction, resulting in the death of millions of people.27 The Soviet government system became rigid and centralized, providing the potential for absolute rule. Soon after gaining authority, Stalin strengthened and expanded the power of the secret police and intelligence agencies, also known throughout history as Cheka, GPU, NKVD, KGB, and now FSB. Following the Russian Civil War, to reestablish an economy after its total collapse, Stalin created a policy of farm collectivization. However, a combination of the peasants’ lack of interest in production coupled with Stalin exporting the majority of the grain for economic gain resulted in a decreased standard of living and the famines of 1931–1933, during which several million people died from hunger. When making decisions concerning industrial development, Stalin calculated the financial bottom line. The sustenance of the populace was not considered. From 1937 to 1938 Stalin launched mass purges, also known as the Great Purge and the ‘‘Soviet Holocaust,’’ against those considered a potential threat to the construction of a socialist state. These purges resulted in approximately two million deaths. Stalin’s purpose was to consolidate his power, regardless of cost. He was responsible for the murder and the deportation of intelligentsia, peasants, religious followers, professionals, and national minorities to Gulag penal labor camps. Torture was used to guarantee confessions to government-manufactured crimes. In 1941, Germany betrayed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and in a short time captured a large percentage of the European Soviet territory; thus, the USSR entered World War II. Shortly before Germany’s surprise attack, Stalin murdered the majority of the Red Army leadership, leaving few who could effectively command the military. In addition, a deficit in military supplies, machinery, communication lines, fuel, and sustenance left the USSR unprepared to withstand Germany’s occupation. Still, after four years of bloody battle, the USSR was able to proclaim victory against Germany. On May 8, 1945, World War II ended, and the USSR was left in a state of devastation. Most of the city infrastructure was in a state of wreckage from the retreating German armies, the economy was in a state of depression, food was rationed, people went hungry, and bandits flourished. In addition, an unprecedented number of casualties had occurred—25 million or more, many of which were civilian deaths. To this day, nearly every adolescent in Russia is familiar with stories of the deaths endured by his or her family during the ‘‘Great Patriotic War,’’ and this intimacy with the destruction in the last century certainly is evident in the views of Russian citizens who completed the PAIRTAPS reported here.

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Because of Russia’s victory against Germany, Stalin became a national hero. Because of successful propaganda efforts, by the end of the 1940s, Russian patriotism thrived. Media portrayed Stalin as the father of the nation—a great wartime leader who had guaranteed the Soviets victory against the Nazis. Despite the turmoil they had undergone, the populace felt high morale, a feeling of strong community, and a nationalistic bond. Historian Geoffrey Hosking writes, ‘‘The legitimacy of the Soviet state had been established more satisfactorily than ever before. It had not created the perfect society, but it had saved Europe from a powerful and destructive enemy . . . The apocalypse had been averted.’’28 Some historians believe that Stalin’s policies strengthened the state structure and helped the USSR emerge as a superpower, though at an enormous cost of human life. However, other historians believe that Russia had been rapidly progressing through industrialization since Bolshevik rule and that because of Stalin’s repressions of military officers, the army as well as civilians suffered big losses. What is certain is that Stalin’s rule contributed to ordinary Russians’ perceptions of violence. He facilitated the formation of the now-common perception that state violence is inevitable and even fundamentally required to sustain a safe society. He also contributed to the xenophobia that still predominates today, characterizing foreigners as enemies and culturally inferior. Violent measures toward native citizens were accepted as a norm. Although the next general secretary, Nikita Khrushchev, denounced Stalinism at the 20th Congress in 1956 and disbanded many Stalinist-era agencies, Stalin remained popular in Russian society. With much effort, the cult of personality was discredited after his death; however, Stalin’s style of administration was preserved by successors and repression continued, although on a lesser scale. There was no national repentance for the years of terror and the millions of victims and no equivalent to the Nuremberg trials. In the mid-1940s, the Cold War had begun between the United States and the USSR, the two world superpowers. Although no official war was declared, this rivalry expressed itself in military buildup, a nuclear arms and space race, military coalitions, espionage, and propaganda. For the next half century, the USSR attempted to promote and safeguard the development of Communist movements, spread their political ideology, and gain superiority in the world—actions that the United States considered hostile. A shared belief in the mutually assured destruction that would occur prevented direct warfare, but the Cold War was characterized by several international conflicts: the Berlin Blockade, Korean War, Berlin Crisis of 1961, Vietnam War, SovietAfghan War, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

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Khrushchev’s administration was characterized by sociopolitical instability as well as a more effective economy and political liberalization. Domestically, the Russian people experienced an improved standard of living and increased availability of consumer goods. To the detriment of his relations with the nascent Communist China and in opposition to communist ideology, Khrushchev began his rule by heralding a desire for peaceful coexistence with the West. He clearly demonstrated the liberalization of the Communist Party when he cut relations with China in response to Mao Tse-tung’s pro-nuclear war stance, which was characterized by the view that, ‘‘It might kill 300 million Chinese, but the rest would be more than enough to build socialism.’’ However, his reputation in the West soon worsened. In 1962, in an attempt to intimidate the United States and prevent it from intervening in the politics of other countries, Khrushchev began sending nuclear weapons to the newly founded Communist Cuba, bringing the world close to the brink of World War III. Although Khrushchev had infamously poor diplomatic skills, after several days the United States and the USSR reached a compromise: the United States would not invade Cuba, while the USSR would withdraw its missiles.29 Leonid Brezhnev became the general secretary in 1964; his rule lasted for almost two decades and was characterized by economic stagnation and struggle, a lack of successful reforms, a decline of the political establishment, and the nine-year-long invasion of Afghanistan.30 After seizing power in Afghanistan in 1978, the Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan repeatedly asked the Soviet government for military assistance in resisting anticommunist, U.S.-supported rebels. Despite the discontent of many in the Communist Party and the opposition of many Soviet citizens and soldiers (who would later mutiny), Brezhnev decided to enter Afghanistan in 1979 to counter U.S. influence in the nascent communist regime. This was the USSR’s first territorial expansion by direct use of military power since World War II. Brezhnev was a skillful negotiator; however, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (known as the ‘‘Soviet Vietnam’’) weakened the position of the country in the international arena as well as internally and revived the Cold War conflict. As a result of the war, one million Afghans and nearly 14,000 Soviet soldiers lost their lives. Many more were maimed, psychologically wounded, and uprooted; agricultural sustenance, economics, and health suffered. In reaction, the United States placed a trade embargo against the USSR, and many prominent countries boycotted the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. Nevertheless, many citizens considered the Brezhnev era to be one of the most stable and safe periods in the history of the Soviet Union, a time characterized by relative domestic peace, stability, and decreased secret police functioning.31

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Mikhail Gorbachev, the last general secretary of the USSR, presided from 1985 until 1991. His reign was characterized by continual reforms, effective international diplomacy, a reduction in the country’s nuclear weapons and Cold War tensions, a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and experimental social programs, as well as inefficient economic policies, low levels of labor productivity, extreme food shortages, and nationalistic movements.32 Gorbachev was a skillful negotiator and strove for the peaceful coexistence of the world’s superpowers. Major European and American leaders liked him and in 1990 he received the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. He understood that the old Soviet system was not working and undertook social reforms such as Perestroika (Restructuring) and Glasnost (Openness). Such policies allowed for freedoms never before experienced by the populace: freedom of information, speech, press, organization, and dissent, and decreased restrictions on travel.33 However, Gorbachev failed to foresee that growing political openness would give rise to nationalist independence movements throughout the Soviet Republics, which would lead to the empire’s collapse. With the Communist Party losing authority and legitimacy, the economy deteriorating, and violent nationalistic uprisings occurring throughout its territory, on December 26, 1991, the USSR ceased to exist. Post-Soviet Russia can be seen as continuing the tsarist legacy, with power assumed not through a particular bloodline, but through systems of nepotism and bribery, and maintained through an established system of intimidation, torture, and imprisonment otherwise known as statesponsored terrorism, in combination with media control and strict limitations on freedom of speech.34 This system is politely referred to as ‘‘controlled democracy’’—a specious title used to mislead Russians and others alike. The casualties of military force are excused as necessary to stability, democracy, and human rights.35 Some social scientists have speculated whether Russia is simply a society transitioning into democracy with inevitable heightened conflict; others have concluded that because of corruption and interethnic and intergovernmental conflict, the process of democratization has come to a standstill for an indefinite time to come. ‘‘Do you know what a totalitarian government is? The majority of the Russian population is against this, but no one can say anything, they will be shot.’’ Although the government enacted a policy of freedom of speech and of the press in 1990, Putin officially ended this policy on grounds of

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national stability. The great majority of free media sources were closed, and journalists were injured or murdered; minimal public protest followed. When Russian generals and soldiers committed numerous human rights abuses (torture, indiscriminate bombings, and disappearances of males) in their wars with Chechnya,36 resulting in the death of approximately 10 percent of the Chechen population,37 once again no public protest was heard. Both the media and the people ignored the atrocities. One group of mothers of deceased soldiers organized to battle the chronic brutal practices of dedovchina—hazing of young conscripts by superior conscripts—but with little success. Russia today is characterized by nationalistic sentiment in combination with an ardent belief in ‘‘no change.’’ Opposition becomes instantly labeled as U.S. involvement. Each year, a significant number of Russian soldiers die at the hands of their own people.38 Theorist Paulo Freire suggested that lack of personal educational initiative is at the root cause of Russia’s failure to democratize,39 whereas Professor Hizkias Assefa believes that establishing justice and fairness will lead to the resolution of conflict and subsequent peace.40 It is likely that neither understands Russia very well—the puzzle inside a riddle wrapped in an enigma, as Churchill noted in a BBC broadcast in 1939. There were many significant political events in 20th-century Russian history: World War I, the Russian Revolution, World War II, the Cold War, Soviet-Afghan War, Chechen War, Perestroika,41 and the disintegration of the USSR due to bankruptcy and other pressures. Inside the country, violence functioned as a protective shield against social change and perceived external threat. Totalitarianism and military development were the tactics used to create a superpower. The undertakings of the powerful could not help but influence the mentality of the people at large. The government’s disregard for human life helped form the sociopolitical attitudes of the populace.42 Thus, following the fall of the USSR, Russia soon returned to an autocratic system of functioning.43 All of these events have affected views on war, peace, security, torture,44 and terrorism45 in modern Russians, a people who remain connected to and respectful of history.

RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND PEACE: SAMPLE AND PROCEDURE The PAIRTAPS, described elsewhere in this volume, was completed by 285 Russian citizens (183 females and 102 males), representing a cross section of the ordinary people of the country in regard to both geographic location and social status. The research team visited

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workplaces, public areas, and universities in the areas of St. Petersburg, Vologda, and Vladivostok. Participants completed a paper version of the survey in Russian; responses were then translated back to English and coded on the basis of coding manuals derived by an international team from an international sample. Participant ages ranged from 18 to 70 years, with an average age of 26. Slightly fewer than half (45 percent) of the respondents were university students from programs including biology, medicine, engineering, social sciences, linguistics, geology, and business. Those who were not students worked in a variety of occupations, from scientists to janitors. Some were unemployed. The majority of those who completed the survey identified themselves as middle class, although 25 percent of respondents indicated they were lower or working class and two respondents indicated they were upper class. About 45 percent were married. All were born in Russia or the former Soviet Union and had lived there for their entire lives. Their parents had also been born in Russia, except for one respondent who said her mother was born in China and her father in the United States. About half of the participants indicated they were religious; Russian Orthodox was the religion indicated by all but two, who listed ‘‘Pagan’’ and ‘‘Taoist.’’

RUSSIAN CITIZENS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR AND PEACE As Tolstoy’s novel, and the history recounted above, indicate, war— both internal and external—has been more common than peace in Russia throughout the country’s existence. This perhaps explains why questions on the survey addressing war and peace often elicited answers portraying peace as an impossible dream and war as a reality, albeit unpleasant. When asked to define war, one respondent wrote, ‘‘the condition in which states are most of the time.’’ Defining peace, one wrote, ‘‘impossible,’’ while another wrote, ‘‘no war, torture or terrorism—that is, everyone must be in white clothes with a halo, playing the harp.’’ Definitions of peace such as ‘‘A time when people die a natural death’’ and ‘‘It is good, but it is a utopian ideal’’ are also representative of this perspective. Still, most definitions of peace were positive, indicating that peace was a state of harmony and accord necessary for the happiness—even the long-term survival—of mankind. Peace, in the view of ordinary Russians, is ‘‘a friendship between all nations,’’ ‘‘calm relations everywhere,’’ ‘‘well-being, development, no war,’’ although some respondents saw it as ‘‘fragile.’’ Over 25 percent of the sample gave negative definitions of peace, referring to it simply as an absence of war. ‘‘Good relations between countries’’ and ‘‘total agreement’’ were

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common definitions; indeed, many respondents considered total agreement to be a necessary component of peace. Definitions of war included moral judgments such as ‘‘evil, a horror’’; ‘‘inhumane’’; ‘‘terrible, bloody actions’’; and ‘‘senseless slaughter.’’ Traditional definitions focusing on conflict—for example, ‘‘Struggle between states for power’’—were also common. A personal familiarity with the pain of war characterized over half of the responses, and negative effects on both the individual and the state were referred to in over 90 percent of the definitions; for example, ‘‘suffering, devastation and death’’ and ‘‘death, tears, cries.’’ The Great Patriotic War (World War II) is still a tangible reality for most Russian families today, who lost many relatives and hear the suffering and grief frequently recounted in family lore. Despite media-hyped patriotism in the country, only 2 percent of the sample defined war as ‘‘defense of the Motherland.’’ About 10 percent described it as a means to an end for achieving state control, giving definitions such as ‘‘killing people, with the aim of seizing property’’ or ‘‘conflict between countries for resources, status or power.’’ In short, Russians are idealistic, prefer peace to war, understand the devastation caused by war but, in many cases, see war as an inevitable state of affairs—such as, war is ‘‘the condition states are in most of the time’’ while peace is ‘‘an impossibility.’’ Ironically, nearly all Russian respondents agreed completely with the statement that ‘‘All human beings have the right to peace,’’ and over 75 percent explained this agreement by indicating that peace is a basic need of all people. ‘‘Life is impossible without peace’’; ‘‘only in peace can there be the normal existence of humanity’’; ‘‘to be happy and noble, the human being must live in peace’’; and ‘‘peace is necessary in order to live’’ were common responses. Despite this conviction, responses still echoed the sense that peace is impossible and war is inevitable. ‘‘Yes, peace is needed but humans cannot live in peace with others,’’ wrote one respondent. ‘‘Unfortunately, this right that all have has never been respected throughout history,’’ wrote another. In response to the item ‘‘I believe world peace can be achieved,’’ only 8 percent agreed that it is possible at present, and another 11 percent viewed it as a possibility at some indeterminate time in the future, but not now. Twenty percent were certain it could not be achieved. The remaining responses included some suggestions as to what was needed for achieving peace—for example, ‘‘with more diplomacy and less violent action’’ and ‘‘it would be necessary to neutralize all terrorists and extremists.’’ ‘‘If governments of countries would be more loyal to each other, peace may be possible’’ and ‘‘Wars will be always. There are people and countries who want to become rich at the expense of other countries’’ were cited as reasons for pessimism. ‘‘There is so much selfish

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action from government [that it is impossible]’’ and ‘‘each country has interests which contradicts each other’s country.’’ ‘‘Peace never was and never will be. At least one state always will be at war.’’ Responsibility for the impossibility of peace is generally attributed to the government or state, however, and not seen as the fault of individuals or under their control. Given the historical experiences of Russia, this is not surprising. A totalitarian government absolves everyone of personal responsibility. The assumption that individuals are not responsible for the ills in their country is also reflected in many of the comments given regarding the statement ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war in favor of peace.’’ Nearly 60 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement to some degree, but some of those who agreed added qualifications; for example, ‘‘It should be allowed, but I really doubt if it will work,’’ or ‘‘Yes, but they should ask the permission of the government first.’’ Most wrote ‘‘No comment’’ as the explanation for their answer—interesting in and of itself. Nearly 40 percent of the Russian respondents agreed that ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country,’’ despite their strong support for a right to peace. Self-defense, threats to country, citizens or the world, or to protect people and achieve eventual peace were the most common explanations given for agreement. Not surprisingly, given this perspective, the majority agreed with the statement ‘‘It is important to support the government in times of war.’’ Invasion was deemed necessary for a multitude of reasons. Some conceptualized invasion as a country’s preemptive response to threat, stating that invasion was necessary ‘‘in case of preventive actions.’’ Others supported invasion for the purposes of protecting one’s own citizens; for example, ‘‘The state has no right to attack [an]other state, but to protect itself and the citizens it has this right.’’ Certain respondents support invasion for the purposes of protecting another nation, especially an allied nation: ‘‘If one country poses a threat to another country’’; ‘‘when there is a declaration of war from another state . . . [to our] allies.’’ Intervention was also judged as a viable reason for invasion. One respondent explained, ‘‘Some conflicts cannot be resolved without the third party, and innocent civilians can suffer,’’ whereas another felt ‘‘Yes, if there are a lot of terrorists in this country.’’ Others emphasized that invasion should only be an option as a last resort: ‘‘When compromises and talks don’t help.’’ Overall, respondents who supported invasion conceptualized it as a necessary preventative measure or necessary due to agreed-upon alliances. Subsequently, this sample thought of invasion as a problemsolving tactic. However, some made references to a need for adequate intelligence (‘‘if there is reliable information about acts of aggression being prepared against the country’’), whereas one respondent simply

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stated, ‘‘Survival of the strongest,’’ implying the lack of ethical consideration. Considering the historical trend of Russia gaining vast territory and resources through invasion, it is understandable why 40 percent of the sample did agree with invasion. However, we must keep in mind that some respondents may have manufactured their support in an attempt to agree with their government’s invasions. We must also keep in mind that Russian culture is collectivistic and Russians have been raised to conform to proclaimed familial and societal values. Thus, Russia’s promotion of action in defense of the ‘‘motherland’’ may have prompted respondents to provide socially desirable answers. Russia has also fallen victim to an ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them’’ mentality, exemplified in daily xenophobic crimes committed within its borders, as previously noted. Thus, the dehumanization of the opposition may facilitate agreement with invasion. Sixty percent of respondents failed to support invasion. Some respondents argued that better alternatives existed suggesting for example, ‘‘Countries should be able to find a compromise.’’ Others cited its negative consequences, noting ‘‘War is death of people who should live.’’ Some respondents disagreed with invasion on the basis of principles; for example,‘‘This violates the sovereignty of the State’’; ‘‘Each state has own territory which other states have no right to break.’’ Others demanded discretion due to a belief in pacifism: ‘‘All can be solved in a peaceful way.’’ Respondents also looked to history to justify their disagreement with invasion, citing government’s selfish ulterior motives and the innocence of soldiers who participate; ‘‘The State sends people on war to satisfy the political and economic interests. Frequently, soldiers do not know these purposes.’’ Thus, a multitude of reasons were cited in disagreement with a state right to invasion. This is very interesting, considering Russia’s tradition of expansion. This view may be caused by the influx of Western ideas, following the fall of the USSR. Another explanation may be that the Russian government, especially after the 2003 Iraq war, has portrayed the United States as an expansionist, even colonialist, superpower that seeks to invade other countries for mercantile reasons far removed from any justifiable selfdefense reasons. The result is that the majority of Russians may identify the term invasion in the 21st century with the American invasion of Iraq, which they see as unjustifiable.

RUSSIAN CITIZENS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD TERRORISM, TORTURE, AND NATIONAL SECURITY When asked to indicate their level of agreement with the statement, ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time

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of war,’’ over 40 percent agreed to some extent and indicated torture is justified because the prisoners ‘‘are enemies.’’ Three percent indicated that prisoners deserved to be tortured if guilt was proven. An additional 36 percent noted that the end justified the means; torture was a right if ‘‘they need to get some information,’’ ‘‘if it is strategically important,’’ or if it could ‘‘save some other lives.’’ One respondent noted that ‘‘Always in times of war, normal laws can be inactive.’’ Torture is a right of government if ‘‘it is important for a society,’’ noted another. ‘‘In time of war, torture can be reasonable.’’ Of those who opposed torture, 13 percent considered it immoral. About 10 percent saw it as inefficient. ‘‘There are other ways to get the information’’ and ‘‘there is less chance the correct information will be given with torture’’ were noted. Russia’s long acquaintance with torture by the secret police and frequent involvement in war may explain why, compared to other countries, so many Russians are not opposed to torture, but see it as acceptable for ‘‘the good of society’’ or to ‘‘protect others.’’ This line of thinking extends to responses to the statement ‘‘Sometimes the heads of government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism.’’ Nearly 40 percent agreed to some extent with the statement. Twenty-four percent saw it as a right, and many even indicated it was inevitable. ‘‘What else could they do?’’ asked one. ‘‘Terrorists should be killed,’’ said another. ‘‘We have this everywhere,’’ noted a third. ‘‘Maybe it is cruel, but some lives can be sacrificed to allow thousands of people to live,’’ summarized the responses of many. An additional 14 percent qualified the right, but agreed, writing justifications such as ‘‘Only if there is an ample proof.’’ or ‘‘It depends on the level of threat that the state has from terrorism.’’ National security is viewed as extremely important by most Russians; 90 percent agreed with the statement ‘‘National security is essential for individual and family security.’’ Fifty percent reported sentiments similar to ‘‘if the nation is protected, the family will be protected, too.’’ ‘‘State and family security are synonymous’’ or similar responses were common. An additional 20 percent indicated that the nation had an obligation to protect its citizens against threats. The patriarchal experience of most Russians—first through the tsars and the church, and then through charismatic government leaders seen as father figures such as Lenin—is reflected in these responses. It is seen as a governmental duty to protect the family through national security because ‘‘everything depends on this.’’ It is the government that should protect against outside forces, other countries, internal strife, and, of course, terrorism. How do Russians define terrorism? Fifty percent see it as actions of individuals leading to destruction and violence. Another 40 percent see it as a tool to effect change, albeit a totally misguided one; for example,

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as ‘‘armed blackmail.’’ ‘‘It is a way to dictate terms of power,’’ said one. ‘‘It is an unconstructive way to prove the rightness of one’s cause,’’ said another. ‘‘It is the worst way to decide political problems,’’ said another, ‘‘a way to come to terms with those in power.’’ About 4 percent viewed it as the result of negative individual and environmental conditions. ‘‘It is the result of fear, pain, hate and rage,’’ wrote one. A few respondents were even more cynical. Terrorism is ‘‘50 percent fabrication of globalists, 30 percent incapacity of our government, and 20 percent ploys for power.’’ Some respondents defined terrorism as a ‘‘mental disorder,’’ ‘‘mass psychosis,’’ or ‘‘an antisocial phenomenon common now.’’ Terrorism was also attributed to governments: ‘‘a strange thing created by governments to promote their own goals.’’ ‘‘The politics of imposition of certain ideas by intimidation’’ was a definition given by one respondent. Definitions such as ‘‘intentional disorder to change the rule in a country,’’ ‘‘establishment of new rules by violence, terror and death,’’ and ‘‘a particularly unclear phenomenon, never as certain as it seems to be at first’’ abound. Given experiences with state terrorism throughout their history, Russians appear to be more familiar with and sophisticated about just what it is than those from many other countries represented in this book. CONCLUSION Despite a love of peace, harmony, and family, most Russians seem resigned to a reality of pain and war at present. Peace is seen as a universal human right, but national security is considered to be a national obligation, and nations have the right to invade, torture, and kill. A riddle, wrapped in a puzzle, caught in an enigma, and lost in a maze. The hope of humankind, the protector of the world, and the ‘‘evil empire’’ are Russia as reflected in the voices of her citizens, who are among the best educated, most creative, and most competent (at everything from poetry to space technology to computer hacking to organized crime) in the world. As the end of the first decade of the 21st century draws to a close, however, Russia remains a work in progress—rapid progress. Economic improvement and increased safety and stability may well be perceived as worth the price of less freedom, especially from a collectivist point of view. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Sasha Lysova of Far Eastern State University in Vladivostock and her students Dimitry Naroda, Marina Oshkina, and Anastasia Zhadon are

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acknowledged for their data collection in Eastern Russia. Kathleen Malley-Morrison and the student research team at Boston University, including Helena Castenheira, Matthew Pita, Michael Toohey, Tanvi Zaveri, Lauren Groves, Abram Trosky, and Elizabeth Planje are thanked for their assistance with data analysis.

5

Greece Maria D. Daskalopoulos and Charikleia A. Tsatsaroni

War is . . . ‘‘a terrifying means of imposing opinions of a few against the world’’ (female, 52); ‘‘violence and withdrawal of deeds carried out for the good of citizens’’ (male, 50). Peace is . . . ‘‘a beautiful word that makes you dream and plan for the future’’ (male, 62); ‘‘a right to life, creation, freedom of speech and circulation of ideas and people’’ (female, 55). Because of its history, religion, and geography, Greece developed quite differently from its Western European neighbors. Simultaneously Balkan and Mediterranean, it is the point where Eastern and Western societies meet. Although the influence of ancient Greek civilization on the modern world is well known, few people know that among Greeks themselves, awareness of this great legacy was almost wiped out under nearly 400 years (1453–1830) of Ottoman rule. As part of the Ottoman Empire, Greece was largely isolated from great historical movements such as the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution. Democracy, said to have been born in Greece, was essentially imported into the new Greek state from the West. Its 20th-century experience was marked by the Balkan wars, the World Wars, a civil war, and several military dictatorships, the last one ending in 1974. Given this history of internal and external strife, what do today’s Greeks think about peace, war, terrorism, and torture? This chapter examines contemporary views on governmental violence and peace in relation to relevant characteristics of Greek history and contemporary life in Greece.

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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Greece’s war of independence from the Ottoman Empire began in 1821 and lasted, intermittently, until 1832. Mediation from the Great Powers (Britain, France, and Russia) gave Greece a conditional sovereignty, setting a precedent for the country’s long-lasting dependence on foreign influence. Revolutions in territory still controlled by the Ottomans resulted in humiliating defeats, interventions by the Powers, and accumulation of a large foreign debt. Financial and political stabilization in the early 20th century allowed Greece to incorporate large amounts of territory during the Balkan wars of 1912–1913. Although national spirit rose as Greece came closer to achieving the ‘‘Great Idea’’ (uniting all Greeks of the Near East in one state), the country became bitterly divided over participation in World War I. With the king advocating neutrality and the prime minister favoring cooperation with the Entente, the ‘‘National Schism’’ divided the country into two opposing camps with rival governments. Pressure from Britain and France forced the king to leave the country, and the Liberals brought Greece into the war. Two years of postwar negotiations awarded Greece with new territory and a protectorate over the largely Greek populated region of Smyrna on the coast of Asia Minor. Greek forces landed in Smyrna in 1920 and began extending their zone of occupation until a Turkish counteroffensive in 1922 sent them into retreat. In the chaos that ensued, the city of Smyrna was set ablaze, and an estimated 30,000 Greeks and Armenians were massacred.1 Subsequent agreements between Turkey and Greece included the compulsory exchange of populations on the basis of religion. Approximately 400,000 Muslims living in Greece were sent to Turkey and nearly 1,300,000 Orthodox Greeks arrived in Greece.2 The struggle for power between Liberals and Royalists caused much hostility and political turmoil during the interwar period. Coups occurred regularly between 1923 and 1936, culminating in the dictatorship of General Ioannis Metaxas. Invasion by Italy drew Greece into World War II. Although the British and Greek forces successfully drove out the Italians, the Axis powers returned with Hitler. By June 1941, Greece was under triple occupation (by Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria) and largely controlled by the Nazis, who set up a series of collaborationist governments in Athens. Several resistance groups formed, each with its own political agenda for postwar Greece, with the National Liberation Front (Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo [EAM]), under the leadership of the Communist Party, quickly dominating the resistance movement. Coordination among the different resistance groups, Britain, the king, and the government in exile in Egypt became increasingly difficult and fighting broke out in fall 1943. The ensuing civil war was

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essentially the first armed conflict of the Cold War.3 Fearful of a communist upsurge, the British stopped funding EAM, which still managed to gain control over much of northern Greece where it established its own government. Tensions flared with the withdrawal of the occupation forces, as EAM confronted the demands of the returning government. A mass demonstration held by EAM in Athens in December 1944 turned into bloody fighting between the communist insurgency on one side and the national army and British forces on the other. It lasted a few days and claimed around 11,000 lives.4 Thousands of individuals remotely connected with EAM were arrested, and the vengeful persecution of the Left continued when the right wing won the elections of March 1946. The Communists struck back with the formation of the Democratic Army in August 1946, which—skillful in guerilla tactics—scored some notable successes over the national army. Around this time, the United States replaced Britain as patron of Greece and under the Truman Doctrine helped suppress communism. American financial and military aid, as well as a break in relations with Communist Yugoslavia, contributed to the defeat of the Democratic Army in 1949. The civil war cost Greece more lives than did World War II, and its economy lay in ruins. The right-wing government that came into power in 1952 afforded few political liberties and kept a close eye on anyone suspected of having left-wing ties. With American financial aid, Greece experienced extraordinary social and economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s, thus becoming an industrializing country. The United States also continued providing military aid, largely in the form of training. Shortly after Greece joined NATO in 1952, four American military bases were established in Greece. This period marks the beginning of hostilities with Turkey over Cyprus (under British administration since 1878 and formally annexed in 1914). Much of Cyprus’s population wanted integration with Greece, but the Turkish minority (around 20 percent of its population) and British colonists were unwilling to allow union. In 1955, a campaign of terror broke out against the British and anyone rejecting union with Greece. Turkey responded with a series of riots against the Greek minority still living in Turkey. Finally, in 1959, Britain, Greece, and Turkey decided Cyprus would become an independent nation. When the president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, demanded changes in the unfeasible constitution in 1963, fighting erupted between Greek and Turkish communities. An invasion by Turkey was prevented by stationing a UN peacekeeping force on the island. Around that time, mainland Greece was experiencing its own constitutional crisis with the ascendance of a centrally aligned government after a decade of dominance by the Right. A number of factors, including conflict between the prime minister and the king over control of the

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armed forces, and the imminent threat of war with Turkey, convinced the military that they had to seize control of the country. In April 1967, to the surprise of everyone, a group of junior military officers staged a coup and took over the government. Their oppressive dictatorship used terror to remain in power for seven years, and many politicians of all affiliations were imprisoned, exiled, or placed under house arrest. In 1973, students started protesting against the authoritarian educational system, a movement that grew into a general political uprising against the dictatorship and culminated in the student occupation of the Athens Polytechnic University. On November 17, a day that is annually commemorated and that became the name of Greece’s most active terrorist group, armed police and army units attacked the occupied university, wounding and killing dozens of students. The leader of the junta was briefly replaced by an even more repressive general, whose insistence that Cyprus become part of Greece almost brought the country to war with Turkey. In July 1974, he organized a coup to overthrow Cyprus’s government and on the grounds of protecting the Turkish Cypriot minority, Turkey invaded the island. When negotiations reached a deadlock, Turkish forces invaded again, displacing some 250,000 Cypriots5 and occupying a zone in Northern Cyprus covering almost 40 percent of the island; they have remained there ever since. Soon thereafter, the junta collapsed, with the army itself demanding a return to civilian government. The process of democratization included abolishing the monarchy, eliminating armed forces from politics, and ending institutionalized foreign influence.6 Following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Greece temporarily withdrew from the military wing of NATO and came close to ending operation of the U.S. military bases in protest of NATO’s failure to prevent the invasion and press for the removal of Turkish forces from the island. Greece’s anti-Western sentiment was also exacerbated by the perception that the United States had assisted the accession of the junta and supported the dictatorship. Greece gained full membership in the European Union (EU) in 1981, but its foreign policy in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g., support of the Serbs during the Yugoslavian wars and hostilities with Turkey, Albania, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM]) alienated many of its Western allies.

RECENT INVOLVEMENT IN CONFLICT AND PEACE EFFORTS Hostilities between Greece and Turkey were prevalent during the 1990s, with frequent disputes over Cyprus, the demarcation of the continental shelf, and violations of each others’ airspace. Perceived threat led both countries to increase their military expenditure, with Greece’s defense

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budget reaching the highest (in proportion to its GDP) among European members of NATO.7 The long-time enemies came close to war in 1996 over ownership of the Imia islets. Relations improved when Greece and Turkey offered each other humanitarian aid after both experienced big earthquakes in 1999. Greece also changed its policy toward Turkey’s entrance into the EU and is currently an active supporter of its neighbor’s application for membership. Greece has been in close proximity to the Balkan and Middle Eastern conflicts. In addition to housing many refugees from these war-torn regions, Greece has consistently given NATO forces access to its strategically important naval and air bases. Greece had the largest and loudest opposition among NATO allies to the air bombardments of Yugoslavia in 1999 and refused to participate in military operations.8 Although offering logistic support to troops heading to Kosovo, the Greek government urged negotiations and is still actively involved in promoting peace and stability in the Balkans. In addition to Kosovo, Greek peacekeeping forces are present in Bosnia and FYROM. Moreover, because of its geographical location and historical ties to the Middle East, Greece has a special interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although efforts have been made recently to achieve a more balanced relationship with Israel, traditionally, Greeks have been ardent supporters of the Palestinian cause. This is largely due to Greece’s identification with the experience of national tragedy involving the loss of land and refugees, as well as its experience as a pawn in the plans of the Great Powers.9 The crisis in Iraq put EU-U.S. relations to the test and challenged the unity of the European Union. Holding the presidency of the EU when the March 2003 attack on Iraq was imminent, Greece faced the challenge of achieving a common European position on the issue. Although a diplomatic and peaceful resolution to the Iraq problem was not achieved, many praised the Greek presidency for skillfully modulating differences occurring among the EU countries.10 Greece did not contribute troops to Operation Iraqi Freedom but offered maritime and airspace access to foreign troops as well as use of its naval base in Crete. When war broke out between Israel and Lebanon in 2006, Greece was the first country to respond to the Lebanese government’s call for humanitarian aid.11 In addition to transporting medical supplies, food, water, and other goods, Greek ships evacuated refugees from the war-torn region.

SOCIAL CONTEXTUAL FACTORS Contemporary Greek views on governmental violence and peace are also influenced by ambivalent sentiments toward the Western world,

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the Greek Orthodox Church, and the mass media. In writing about the clash of civilizations, Samuel P. Huntington argues that a line separates ‘‘the poles of Western Christianity on the one hand from Muslim and Orthodox peoples on the other.’’12 Membership in NATO and the EU did not supersede Greece’s historical position in this eastern pole. Moreover, the frequent 20th-century foreign intervention in the country’s affairs left Greeks with a heightened suspicion of superpowers and a tendency to displace internal faults onto outside intervention. Those with strong anti-American sentiments point to the U.S. financing of the fairly repressive right-wing government that ruled after the civil war and its support of the military dictatorship, moves that were motivated by the desire to prevent Greece from falling under Soviet control. Such experiences undoubtedly contribute to the Greek public’s frequent opposition to American foreign policy. The Greek Orthodox Church, with its long-standing interdependent relationship with the state, has played a significant role in the country’s historical development and is closely tied to national identity.13 It is an active promoter of nationalist ideology as demonstrated by the massive rallies it organized in June 2000, when the government decided to remove religious affiliation from identity cards to protect religious minorities and converge with other EU members.14 In 2007, clerics (and extreme right nationalists) successfully pressed for the withdrawal of a revised sixth grade history book that aimed to move away from the promulgation of national myths and stereotypes by minimizing the Greeks’ suffering under the Ottoman Empire.15 The Greek Church also actively promoted support for (mainly Orthodox) Serbia during the wars in former Yugoslavia, seemingly turning a deaf ear to the atrocities committed against Bosnians and Albanian Kosovars.16 Archbishop Christodoulos, former head of the Greek Church, proposed a military solution to the Imia crisis in 1996.17 The state’s monopoly (and strict regulation) of the broadcasting sector ended in the late 1980s, when the first private television and radio stations appeared. The printed press, which has a long history of division along political party lines, has been described as ‘‘partisan, colorful, excessive, at times cross-patronizing and in some cases laced with adjectives that in most western media would be considered incompatible with fairness.’’18 Neutrality and objectivity are often overlooked to represent the interests of the party with which a station or newspaper is affiliated. Television broadcasting is quite sensationalist, and facts and comments are freely blended together—as when, during the war in Bosnia, the media demonized the Bosniaks and focused almost exclusively on the plight of the Serbs.19 Moreover, Greek media coverage of the Iraq war, saturated with shocking images of Iraqi casualties, was far

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from objective and instead sent a loud message of opposition to the war and American policies.20 Greek citizens have inherited a history marked by foreign occupation, world and civil wars, and military dictatorships. They have also seen the map of Europe change (often forcefully) as the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union gave birth to new states. Greece’s own position and role in Europe has been uncertain due to the aforementioned geographical, historical, and social reasons. Nevertheless, Greece has come a long way in its approach to issues of war, peace, and terrorism. Adopting a more conciliatory and constructive policy toward the Balkans, establishing rapprochement with Turkey, supporting the Anan Plan (a UN proposal for settling the Cyprus problem), guiding Europe through the times preceding the start of the Iraq war and successfully staging the first post9/11 Olympic Games, have enhanced the country’s image and credibility in the international system.21 It is the views of these modern, 21st-century Greeks, with their ghosts from the past, that we analyze in this chapter.

GREEK VIEWS ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND PEACE The Greek Respondents The 75 Greek participants (35 men, 39 women, and one unidentified) who responded to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) came primarily from Athens. Ages ranged from 18 to 76, with students composing 25 percent of the sample. Most respondents were Greek Orthodox, with 12 percent identifying themselves as agnostic or atheist. Nearly 11 percent had only a high school education, 17 percent had a bachelor’s degree, and 32 percent had completed graduate training (MA, PhD, or professional school). A quarter of the sample was unemployed and 12 percent was retired. Occupations included public servant, accountant, civil engineer, teacher/ professor, homemaker, and physician. Close to half of the sample selfidentified as middle class and 39 percent as upper-middle or upper class. Regarding political affiliation, 21 percent of the sample positioned itself in the center-right of the spectrum (Nea Dimokratia), 23 percent in the center or center-left with the socialist democratic PASOK, 8 percent with the left-wing Synaspismos Party, and 3 percent with the communist party (KKE); 19 percent claimed to have no political affiliation. Greek Views on War Survivors of a 20th century beset with violence, Greek men and women today are painfully familiar with matters of armed conflict and national

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defense. Men must fulfill a compulsory 12-month military service, and many of our participants reported having served time in the military or having a relative who has done so (29 percent and 68 percent, respectively). Perhaps in part because of awareness of their own country’s occupation a little over 60 years ago, the majority of our sample disagreed with the statement ‘‘Sometimes, one country has the right to invade another country.’’ Thirty percent of the respondents who gave explanations for their ratings drew upon moral principles to justify their disagreement. Appeals to moral principles included emphasizing the need to respect citizens’ rights (6 percent; e.g., ‘‘Invasion is a blatant infringement of the rights of citizens’’), as well as countries’ rights and sovereignty (6 percent). Some respondents denounced violence in general (e.g., ‘‘Social clashes do not get solved with violence’’). References to borders (11 percent) also emerged (e.g., ‘‘every country has its own borders and others should respect these’’; ‘‘under no circumstance should a country’s borders be violated’’). Reflecting the suspicion of a people whose fate was largely shaped by other nations’ interests, some respondents (17 percent) criticized invaders for pursuing selfish goals (e.g., ‘‘No one believes this happens for a good reason, only for self-interests’’), expansionist policies (e.g., ‘‘I don’t agree with imperialistic politics’’), exploitation, and other covert motives. A couple of participants emphasized alternative ways of resolving differences (e.g., ‘‘There are thousands of ways to resolve problems’’). Some specifically cited treaties, courts, and international organizations as alternatives to invasion, implying that war is an outdated means of conflict resolution. One 76-year-old woman who experienced World War II as a young girl wrote, ‘‘Today everything can be settled with dialogue and good faith.’’ Self-defense was a popular reason among Greek participants for supporting invasion (16 percent). Some respondents referred to preventive warfare (e.g., ‘‘only if they are sure that the other country is going to invade and they want to prevent them’’), whereas others justified invasion as a response to an actual attack. Echoing bitterness that still exists regarding Greek populated territories that never got incorporated into the state, the lost homelands,22 a 32-year-old woman said invasion was justified ‘‘only when a country does it to claim its own land.’’ Another common justification for a right to invade was for humanitarian purposes (16 percent; e.g., ‘‘to help free the country from dictatorial regimes’’; ‘‘only when the human rights of citizens are being threatened.’’). A 58-year-old male said a nation has a right to invade ‘‘either when the territorial integrity and security of the country or the fundamental goods of the western civilization and of open societies in general (e.g., freedom, democracy, law, human rights, individual and political

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liberties, tolerance) are threatened or abolished.’’ Intervention related to international security was another justification for invasion (e.g., ‘‘Only when security or international peace is in question’’). Perhaps reflecting Greece’s recent role in peacekeeping activities, some responses included provisos regarding a right to invade, such as approval from other countries or international bodies (e.g., ‘‘under the direction of the UN’’). Personal definitions of ‘‘war’’ hinted at the close contact Greek citizens have had with armed conflict; for example, approximately one-fourth of the definitions referred to death, destruction, and other outcomes of war (e.g., ‘‘lots of blood and pain, orphanhood, widowhood, deserted countries’’). Also relatively common were references to war-related emotions or sensations (22 percent) such as horror, sorrow, pain, anguish, rage, fear, and paranoia, and value judgments (15 percent) regarding the unacceptability, immorality, or insanity of war (e.g., ‘‘Condemnable, unacceptable in any circumstance’’; ‘‘The greatest evil for all people’’; ‘‘A decision from perverse minds’’). Similar to explanations for opposing invasion, the theme of ulterior motives was also present in definitions of war. Some participants (14 percent) defined war as resulting from or being motivated by economic or political interests (e.g., ‘‘a means to satisfy interests’’), often implying exploitation (e.g., ‘‘opportunity for economic exploitation’’) or other selfish motivations (e.g., ‘‘Killings and violence for the satisfaction of the vanity of the few and powerful insecure’’; ‘‘Egotism, self-centeredness, gluttony’’). Reflecting Greece’s traditional cynicism toward the actions of big powers, a 25-year old male defined war as ‘‘Test-drive of systems of weaponry, covert profit business, death.’’ A more clearly post-World War II conception of war was reflected in definitions from participants (8 percent) making references to human rights (e.g., ‘‘Violation of human rights in the name of interests’’). Others (8 percent) defined war as representing a loss of rationality (‘‘A situation where logic disappears’’; ‘‘Return of man to the jungle and annulment of speech and dialogue’’). Only 10 percent gave dictionarytype definitions of war such as a conflict between countries or within a country (e.g., ‘‘Armed settlement of differences between countries’’). Some participants (8 percent) defined war as something pervasive, inevitable; or necessary (‘‘An inevitable dimension of human civilization and its societies’’; ‘‘Necessary evil?’’); others (6 percent) expressed their wish for war to disappear (‘‘If only it could be eliminated from the world and problems were solved without it’’; ‘‘Make love, not war!’’). Greek Views on Peace The majority of the Greek sample agreed with the statement ‘‘All human beings have a right to peace,’’ with two participants taking a

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neutral position. A large proportion of the sample (31 percent) affirmed the right to peace in general terms (e.g., ‘‘Undoubtable human right’’; ‘‘For me, this is self-explanatory’’), and 26 percent emphasized that everyone deserves this right (e.g., ‘‘The whole world has a right to live in a peaceful environment’’; ‘‘All people, regardless of descent, preference in religion, sexuality, etc. have this right’’). Some pessimism regarding the universality of a right to peace was expressed by a 50year-old male who wrote, ‘‘If we don’t take into consideration weapons merchants and those who profit from them then this is IDEAL!!!’’ Some participants (13 percent) focused on the positive consequences of peace or the detriments of growing up without it (e.g., ‘‘Definitely for their psychological normalcy’’; ‘‘Only in serenity and an atmosphere of freedom can man develop’’). A 76-year-old woman wrote, ‘‘In a peaceful situation, people with mutual empathy and a disposition of understanding resolve their differences in a friendly manner and tread on paths of progress and prosperity.’’ Participants referring to the negative consequences of war implied that peace is the absence of war (e.g., ‘‘War is a horrific human event and it only has negative outcomes’’; ‘‘War is one of the most atrocious things that anyone can experience, especially a child’’). A few participants (7 percent) confirmed their belief in the ideal of peace but questioned its feasibility (e.g., ‘‘We have a basic right and a basic instinct to peace, but they don’t give us basic training so that we can build the right foundations for peace’’; ‘‘It sounds romantic, too bad there are wrong individuals managing the fate of the simple people and deprive them of this right’’). Unexpectedly, four respondents noted that people have a choice about whether to live in peace or not; for example, ‘‘All people have the right to choose how they wish to live’’; ‘‘All humans have an inalienable right of choice (for or against peace).’’ Three participants emphasized that in addition to peace, human beings have, or should have, the right to other things. For example, a 58-year-old male physician said, ‘‘They also have the right to other historical and social goods, like freedom, justice, the possibility of seeking prosperity, and very distinct specific individual liberties: freedom of speech and expression, freedom from fear, freedom from intolerance, freedom of distinctiveness (religious or other), freedom from current plagues (in larger parts of the world) of hunger, poverty, and diseases.’’ Greek definitions of ‘‘peace’’ were largely positive, emphasizing the good things it means. Many respondents (21 percent) gave general, nonspecific definitions affirming the value or necessity of peace (e.g., ‘‘The greatest good for man and society’’; ‘‘Important for everyone’’). Fourteen percent focused on life and growth (e.g., ‘‘Force of life’’; ‘‘Everyone is free to develop’’; ‘‘The ideal condition for progress’’), and 17 percent

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focused on cooperation, coexistence, and harmony (e.g., ‘‘Coexistence with mutual understanding of our rights and our commitments’’; ‘‘The right of coexistence of peoples with whatever cultural differences’’). A 70-year-old woman defined peace as being ‘‘able to make plans and feel the world as a big village.’’ Positive definitions of peace also referred to a situation where rights, liberties, equality, or democracy exist (17 percent; e.g., ‘‘Everyone equal and free’’; ‘‘Everyone respects the rights of everyone to life, health, dignity’’; ‘‘A right to live democratically’’). Several respondents (11 percent) expressed pessimism regarding the achievability of peace (e.g., ‘‘Very hard for it to exist for everyone’’; ‘‘Something not in our hands to have’’; ‘‘Globally unfeasible’’). One 35-year-old man said peace is ‘‘Utopian designation of a situation that humanity dreams of as an end point, but never experiences as a reality.’’ More optimism was found in some definitions: ‘‘Incessant effort and perseverance that we can create a better tomorrow’’ and ‘‘We have to fight every day in order to preserve it.’’ Consistent with these definitions were positive definitions of peace as an ideal (7 percent), or as synonymous with happiness (10 percent), love (3 percent), and tranquility or serenity (6 percent). A small portion of the sample (11 percent) defined peace in negative terms, by what it is not (e.g., a situation of conflict) rather than what it is (e.g., ‘‘When in a country there is no war with other country(ies) or civil war, or armed conflicts’’; ‘‘The situation in humanity not marked by armed conflict between groups of people, races, ethnicities, or countries in a local or geographically broader context’’). Recognizing that war need not include weapons, a 33-year-old said peace is ‘‘The nonexistence of armed conflicts or economic measures against states.’’ Culture of Protest23 Whether it is union workers and civil servants holding strikes to demand better pay and benefits, students and professors organizing marches and sit-ins to protest educational reforms, or clerics gathering outside the Athens Metropolis cathedral to protest the Pope’s visit, demonstrations of the public’s dissent are customary in Greek society. Roadblocks, traffic jams, and closed offices and businesses are frequent by-products of demonstrations to which the public has become accustomed. Unfortunately, violence often breaks out at such protests; riot police routinely use tear gas to control rowdy protesters hurling rocks and homemade gasoline bombs. Time and again, cars and trash cans are set ablaze and storefront windows are smashed. The junta left Greeks with a cynical view of authority and an enduring eagerness to exercise their constitutional right to protest. The

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student uprising of 1973 is commemorated annually with a march, which due to the alleged U.S. support of the junta, ends in front of the heavily guarded American embassy. Every year, on November 17, thousands of left-wingers, antiglobalization activists, immigrants, and students take to the streets to celebrate the anniversary of modern democracy and to express grievances against the Greek government, condemn capitalism and imperialism, and voice their opposition to American foreign policy. Antiwar demonstrations, often bolstered by work stoppages, are widespread and rich in anti-American sentiment. Protests against the bombing of Yugoslavia occurred almost daily in Athens and Thessaloniki. Demonstrations included rallies but also blockages of the railway line and port of Thessaloniki, which prevented on several occasions the passage of NATO convoys and equipment heading to Kosovo.24 Violent protests took place during President Clinton’s visit in 1999, which was delayed and shortened because of a series of bomb explosions targeted at American sites.25 Similar demonstrations against the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan forced former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to cancel two planned visits. Violent protests also marked the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2006, as protesters tried to break police barriers to reach the building where Rice was meeting with the foreign minister. On the other hand, the Greek public has been quite selective in protesting visits of foreign leaders associated with contentious policies. For instance, no demonstrations were held when Greece hosted leaders with dubious human rights records such as indicted war criminals Karadzic and Milosevic.26 Greek Views on Protesting Thirty-five percent of the Greek participants stated that they have participated in a protest in favor of peace and against war, including rallies against the wars in Yugoslavia and Iraq and the use of torture in Guantanamo, signing petitions, and protesting against the junta in the 1970s. Cognizant of our research group’s ties to the United States, a 26-yearold male affiliated with the left-wing Synaspismos Party wrote the following regarding his antiwar activism: ‘‘Signatures against the Americans and marches for every war you have had all over the world.’’ Another participant wrote, ‘‘At a given moment (during nighttime) we left the lights on in our house, as did the rest of the neighborhood, so as to make visible the opposition to the war in Iraq.’’ Given Greek citizens’ tradition of protesting, it is not surprising that 97 percent of the sample agreed with the statement ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace.’’ Of the

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54 participants who provided explanations, 24 percent gave general, nonspecific affirmations of this right (e.g., ‘‘All people, regardless of descent, preference in religion, sexuality, etc. have this right’’). Others (18 percent) explained their support by reference to other basic rights (e.g., ‘‘This means freedom of thought and expression’’). Nearly 25 percent of the participants framed antiwar protests as civic responsibility (‘‘Not only a right, but the duty of people is to fight against war and to fight for peace’’; ‘‘The preservation of peace is every democratic citizen’s obligation and every measure for this purpose is legitimate’’; ‘‘They have to in some way demonstrate their opposition to all this absurdness’’). Such responses often included negative judgments toward those who do not join in antiwar demonstrations. A 56-year-old woman wrote, ‘‘Certainly, if they perceive themselves to be active citizens and not weak-minded and indifferent beings’’ and a 23-year-old male said, ‘‘Protest is a healthy reaction of thinking people. If you don’t react, you’re a participator in the bad.’’ A few participants (7 percent) connected the right to protest to the right to live in peace and to the benefits of peace (e.g., ‘‘Because peace is a necessary precondition for the development and progress of nations’’). Given the frequent violence and physical damage that erupts in protests in Greece, it is not surprising that 20 percent of the sample emphasized the need for protests to be nonviolent, (e.g., ‘‘As long as there is no use of violence or intensity’’; ‘‘With the precondition that these protests do not result in that which they condemn’’). Others (5 percent) gave the proviso that protests not have a negative impact on the general public (e.g., ‘‘To the extent that they don’t interfere with the freedom of the others’’). Finally, a few participants (9 percent) associated protests with presumably democratic governments (e.g., ‘‘It’s a fundamental right but also a cultural characteristic of Western civilization and open societies in general’’). Torture, Mistreatment, and Violations of Human Rights Contemporary Greek history reveals that diverse groups have conducted and experienced torture. During the military dictatorship, torture of political prisoners was a common practice of the Greek Military Police (Elliniki Stratiotiki Astinomia [ESA]) and its Special Interrogation Unit (Eidikon Anakritikon Tmima [EAT]).27 The ESA was composed of soldiers from the regular military who were selected for having the ‘‘appropriate’’ physical and emotional abilities and political beliefs (anticommunist) that ensured in advance hostility toward prisoners and obedience to authority, the military revolution, and its symbols. Essential parts of their training included personal harassment and physical

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punishment by their officers, development of elitist attitudes, attendance at daily lectures against communism and enemies of the state, and learning how to torture by watching other officers at first and gradually torture using themselves.28 Although democracy has existed in Greece since 1974, there are recent reports pointing to ‘‘a pattern of ill-treatment by Greek police officers which is sometimes so severe that it amounts to torture.’’29 According to those reports, members of ethnic minorities, immigrants, and asylum seekers from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa are particularly at risk of human rights violations, physical, verbal, and psychological abuse, and sexual threats, as well as unlawful shootings by the police and border guards.30 Although judicial and internal police inquiries have been conducted in many cases, it usually takes a long time for a case to reach a court decision, and punishment, if any, comes several years after the crime of abuse. International organizations for human rights have urged the Greek authorities to stay consistent with their international legal obligations for the protection of human rights and to respond effectively to such reported violations by thorough investigations that will bring perpetrators to justice.31 Greek Views on Torture An overwhelming majority of Greek participants (88 percent) disagreed with the statement ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war.’’ Many (23 percent) gave blanket statements that affirmed, but did not specify reasons for, their disagreement with torture (e.g., ‘‘No one has the right to torture anyone else’’; ‘‘I disagree fully with torturing’’). Several participants (18 percent) referred to prisoners’ rights to explain their disagreement (e.g., ‘‘Prisoners of war have rights, just like every other person, and these must be protected’’; ‘‘Prisoners of war have the rights of life-psychological and physical health’’). References to international treaties or other legal frameworks were found in 12 percent of the responses denouncing torture (e.g., ‘‘The captives are protected by international treaties’’; ‘‘There are treaties (Geneva treaty) that the government ought to respect’’). One 50-yearold man commented, ‘‘Torturing prisoners is a criminal offense.’’ Several respondents (11 percent) drew upon moral principles to denounce torture (e.g., ‘‘It’s an ethically wrong action’’). Others (7 percent) cited the existence of alternatives to torture (e.g., ‘‘If they are cunning enough, they should find the information they want differently’’; ‘‘There are other methods besides torture’’). Several others (7 percent) described torture as excessive because it goes beyond imprisonment, which is tormenting in and of itself (e.g., ‘‘Restriction yes, torture, no’’;

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‘‘Prisoners are already psychologically degraded. There is no need for torture as well’’). A 40-year-old woman argued: ‘‘Prison is a type of torture in itself because it takes away the right to freedom.’’ Two participants questioned the usefulness or effectiveness of torture (‘‘It is violent and useless’’; ‘‘They are prisoners, they can’t do harm. Nor can they repent with torture’’). Only a small number of Greek participants (11 percent) provided instances where the torturing of prisoners of war may be permissible. Some of these participants (7 percent) identified torture as acceptable if it is useful in achieving a desired goal, such as the attainment of advantageous information (e.g., ‘‘If the life of one is at stake for the lives of many, then torture him in order to attain information’’; ‘‘Only for the extraction of information and not as a penalty’’). Two participants cited evidence of wrongdoings as a possible reason to endorse torture: ‘‘If, for example, the prisoners are spies, they must reveal everything they know; therefore, it is imperative that they be tortured’’ and ‘‘Honestly, if bin Laden or a mass murderer were to be tortured, I don’t think I would be that upset.’’ One participant emphasized that torture should be the last resort ‘‘given that mild scientific methods have been exhausted.’’ A few participants (5 percent) said they were unsure of their views on torture or implied that specific information was needed to give an appropriate response (e.g., ‘‘I have not thought of this subject’’; ‘‘I am against but the conversation is open’’; ‘‘How did war start? What is the prisoner? A spy? A saboteur?’’). Finally, 16 percent of the sample said torture is unacceptable regardless of whether there is war or peace. These responses often suggested that the context of war should not be used to justify torture (e.g., ‘‘Nobody has the right to degrade anyone during a period of war or peace’’; ‘‘Not even in peace, or in war, which is considered a good excuse for such atrocities to occur’’). A 35-year-old man wrote, ‘‘If we want to respect the term human rights, we must fight the right to torture, even in a period of war.’’ Close Encounters with Terrorism Greek terrorism can be examined within the framework of three periods during which changes occurred in the way the public and authorities perceived and dealt with the phenomenon.32 The first period (1974– 1999) was marked by the birth of ‘‘17 November’’ (17N), when members of the leftist organization killed Richard Welch, the chief of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency station in Athens. A proclamation sent to the press blaming the United States for ‘‘decades of innumerable humiliations, calamities, and crimes’’ was not published.33 The group continued sporadically to attack high-profile foreign targets, via assassinations, car

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bombings, and rocket attacks. Although an antiterrorist bill was introduced in 1978, Greek authorities considered terrorism an ephemeral phenomenon, failing to recognize its significance and to address it effectively. Reactions to terrorist attacks were usually slow and unplanned, and certain segments of Greek society believed that the group’s victims (many associated with the junta) were legitimate targets. Nevertheless, the assassination in 1989 of Pavlos Bakoyannis, son-in-law of then Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis, marked the end of tolerance for 17N by the public and the political establishment. During this period (1989–1999), which included the first innocent bystander victims, terrorism entered the political agenda.34 Despite the introduction of a new antiterrorist bill, little progress was made in capturing 17N because the public resisted the perceived curtailing of civil liberties and politicians failed to reach consensus. Around 1999, terrorism finally came to be recognized as an important national security issue.35 The assassination of Brigadier Stephen Saunders, a British defense attache in Greece, in 2000 had great impact on Greece’s international image, changed public opinion in favor of potential counterterrorist measures, and created pressure on the Greek government to respond effectively to the attack. New legislation adopted in 2001 gave police greater powers in arresting suspects, allowing the use of DNA testing in investigations, and included provisions such as the ‘‘witness protection program.’’ Closer cooperation with British and American intelligence services was also established, and a computerized management system was introduced in order to facilitate the investigations.36 Only in this third period of securitization has Greek society been willing to allow restrictions on liberties to support governmental efforts to uproot terrorism. Images of the relatives of victims of 17N, as well as images of the September 11 attack, increased Greek society’s sensitivity to the significance of the terrorist threat.37 In addition, planning for the Athens Olympics 2004 sensitized Greek society to international concerns about terrorism. Finally, after a failed 17N attack in June 2002, Greek authorities arrested 19 suspects and convicted 15, the group’s leader receiving the heaviest sentence in Greek legal history.38 The government has remained alert to attacks from new terrorist groups like the ‘‘Revolutionary Struggle,’’ who attacked the U.S. embassy in January 2007, without any victims.39 Greek Views on Terrorism40 Our sample’s personal definitions of ‘‘terrorism’’ were coded into four broad categories: focus on intent, focus on motivation or emotional

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trigger, value judgments, and focus on outcomes. A large number of participants (47 percent) included value judgments concerning the morality, sanity, or appropriateness of acts or perpetrators of terrorism (e.g., ‘‘Inhumane and repulsive act’’; ‘‘Condemnable actions’’; ‘‘Absurd’’; ‘‘Unmanly way of dealing with things’’; ‘‘The ugliest and most unfair thing’’; ‘‘Absolutely blameworthy’’). A 55-year-old woman defined terrorism as a ‘‘big and unjust evil from a group of brainless people against innocent fellow people.’’ Many referred to the outcomes of terrorism or the mechanisms used to achieve an intent, including physical outcomes (13 percent; e.g., ‘‘death’’; ‘‘torture’’; ‘‘innocent population lost’’) and emotional outcomes (16 percent; e.g., ‘‘lost mental peace’’; ‘‘absolute fear’’; ‘‘psychological pain’’; ‘‘terror, insecurity’’). A few respondents (6 percent) defined terrorism on the basis of underlying motivations or emotions (e.g., ‘‘Desperate outburst’’; ‘‘Despondent act of unfairly dealt with and oppressed people’’). Nine percent of the sample spoke about terrorists’ destructive intentions such as creating damage and fear, disturbing peace, or harming civilians (e.g., ‘‘Conscious and methodical instigation of, or threat of instigation of death, injury, or physical/mental/psychological pain’’; ‘‘a modern method of destruction of the efforts for peace in the world’’). A larger number of respondents (22 percent) recognized wider goals of terrorism (beyond the destructive intent) such as the intention to express or spread beliefs, to revolt, and to create change (e.g., ‘‘Undemocratic way of expressing and imposing ideas’’; ‘‘Act of revolution expressed in the wrong way’’; ‘‘The blind attack against citizens with the aim of averting unfavorable governmental decisions’’). Such responses are not surprising given the ‘‘Robin Hood image’’ that the 17N terrorist group had managed to cultivate in the Greek public.41 The view that terrorism can have constructive intentions is reflected in one 50-year-old man’s definition: ‘‘If the terrorist is a liberator and a revolutionary for the good of the interests of his copatriots, then I see him as a hero and a patriot.’’ In a similar vein, three respondents emphasized the subjectivity of the term terrorism: ‘‘Let’s not forget that everything is a matter of definition’’; ‘‘We have to be careful when we refer to terrorism. It is a complex term. Each one of us conceives it differently’’ and ‘‘Weird term these days—rather dangerous. Usually, we call ‘terrorism’ the opinions with which we don’t agree.’’ Some participants (9 percent) defined terrorism as something contemporary, or unique to our times (e.g., ‘‘New trend’’; ‘‘Contemporary crime’’). Finally, a couple of respondents stressed the need to fight terrorism (e.g., ‘‘We have to fight against terrorism in every form, when it is produced by the government or when it has no face’’; ‘‘Any means against it is by default legitimate’’). The vengeance that breeds and is

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bred by terrorism is evident in one 35-year-old respondent’s definition: ‘‘Violent means of reacting against the direct or indirect violence and the enforcement of central and dominant powers, which also summons commensurate use of violence in order to react.’’

CONCLUSION The aim of this chapter was to provide a window into the worldviews of 75 Greek citizens regarding the rights and responsibilities of governments and individuals vis- a-vis the issues of war, peace, torture, and terrorism. Our sample was largely in support of the right to peace, which to many was a self-evident, fundamental, and inalienable right of all human beings. Peace was characterized as valuable and necessary, equated to life, growth, and progress, and associated with coexistence, cooperation, and respect for human rights. Human rights were also emphasized in relation to the torturing of prisoners of war, as were legal frameworks that ensure the proper treatment of captives. With regard to war, the principles of territorial integrity and state sovereignty were commonly cited, with an emphasis on the inviolability of national borders. Historically, Greece’s frontiers have been provisional as successive wars and agreements resulted in the annexation of territory (as late as 1947 for the Dodecanese islands). Several Greekpopulated territories remained outside the final borders. Concerns that territorial claims will be made on northern Greece’s province of Macedonia are part of a dispute that began in 1991 and has yet to be settled between Greece and FYROM. Furthermore, while Greece’s northern frontier is clear-cut, most of the country lies in water. With approximately 2,465 islands,42 the country’s eastern frontier is less precise, resulting in many altercations over sovereignty rights in the Aegean Sea. Although the principles of territorial integrity and state sovereignty have occupied an important position in international law, their rigidity has been called into question as the notion of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security was expanded to include humanitarian concerns.43 At the 2005 World Summit, all the countries of the world came together and agreed that each state has ‘‘a responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,’’ and if it fails to do so then the international community, through the United Nations, must take collective action.44 In our sample, alongside those who emphasized the inviolability of borders and the right of countries to govern themselves, we found an equal number of participants who were willing to override these principles (and endorse the right to invade) if the need for humanitarian

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intervention arises. The ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ (R2P) principle emphasizes diplomatic and economic sanctions that several participants mentioned in explaining their opposition to invasion. While R2P also provides specific criteria that must be met to justify military intervention for humanitarian purposes, some remain wary of its possible misuse or question the impact it can have in the realpolitik that often governs actual decision making.45 This skepticism was apparent in the Greek responses, which were packed with references to material interests and covert motives. Such responses are reminiscent of the findings of a study of Greek narratives regarding NATO’s bombing of Kosovo in 1999.46 The intervention was highly debated in the international community because it was carried out without the authorization of the United Nations Security Council. The presumed motives for the Kosovo intervention that were uncovered in the Greek popular discourse included the following: to divert attention from the Monica Lewinsky scandal, to use missiles that were nearing their expiration date, and to undermine Europe and Orthodoxy. Brown and Theodosopoulos note that while such explanations may be deemed paranoid or conspiracist, they can be viewed as attempts to make sense of the world’s contingencies and they reflect a distinct cultural logic. Similarly, it can be argued that our participants’ preoccupation with an invading country’s ulterior motives reflects a search for deeper interpretations and more complex explanations for governmental aggression. Sutton,47 who conducted a similar analysis regarding attitudes to the Bosnian war in 1991–1992, argues that beliefs that resemble conspiracy theories (e.g., material interests motivate historical actions, history is a collection of patterns, and thus examples taken from the past are equally relevant to the present) are in fact consistent with Greek cultural hermeneutics. Such beliefs (and the political actions that accompany them, e.g., protests and strikes) are not only a logical consequence of Greece’s long history of foreign intervention but are also ‘‘a sensible attempt to open global politico-economic processes to popular scrutiny’’48 and make the political personal. This attempt is consistent with our sample’s overwhelming support for the right of individuals to stage protests against war. Although freedom of speech and expression were commonly cited, many respondents described protesting as a citizen’s responsibility, emphasizing the need for the public to challenge political decisions and actions. Our sample also demonstrated a complex understanding of terrorism. Although participants largely condemned terrorist acts and cited many of their devastating outcomes, several respondents recognized the perpetrators’ deeper motivations and objectives, some of them quite

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worthy. Although this recognition is by no means a justification for these crimes, it reflects an awareness of the complexity of the issue and an attempt to search beneath the destructiveness to understand the cause and purpose of terrorism. Greece’s most active terrorist organization, 17N, was born during the junta, and its initial aim, to overthrow the dictatorship, was consistent with the sentiment of the general public. Some argue that even well beyond the fall of the dictatorship, there was significant overlap between the worldview of 17N and that of large sections of the Greek population.49

6

Turkey Feryal Turan and Alev Yalc¸ınkaya-Hanly

War is . . . ‘‘Not necessary’’; ‘‘would be acceptable if there is a goal of keeping peace’’; ‘‘Planned attack with an intention of destroying the opposite side’s thinking or existence.’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘A universal order in which no greedy people exist.’’ ‘‘Like €rk said, ‘peace at home, peace in the world’; I also would like peace Atatu to rule everywhere.’’ The aim of this chapter is to analyze ordinary Turkish people’s attitudes about war, peace, and reconciliation. The chapter begins with some background information on democracy and conflict in the Turkish society. It then focuses on Turkish perspectives on war, peace, and reconciliation, as derived from responses to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS).

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: DEMOCRACY AND CONFLICT IN TURKEY Geopolitically, Turkey extends over two continents. It includes Anatolia, a large Asian territory that is considered the ‘‘heartland’’ of the country, and Thrace, a small European territory to the west of Anatolia. Turkey borders Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Greece, and Bulgaria and has coasts on the Black Sea to the north, the Mediterranean Sea to the south, and the Aegean Sea to the west. Cut by the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus waterways—the only water routes between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean—Turkey is a strategically important crossroad for the Middle Eastern and European regions that has long served as a bridge between the East and West.

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Historically, the first usage of the word ‘‘Turk,’’ meaning ‘‘strength,’’ was found in Chinese chronicles in the sixth century CE referring to pastoralists skilled as ironworkers and perhaps signifying the high military skills of the early Turkic people. When Turks moved westward from Asia, they mixed with local populations of Persians, Kurds, Arabs, and others, building the ethnic diversity that continues to characterize Turkey today. Before the first recorded presence of Turks in the Middle East in 674 CE, their religion was shamanism, which was a natureworshiping religion revering natural elements such as fire, water, and air. Around 800 CE, the Turks took over the Islamic world and the Ottoman Turks became the caliphate (leaders of the Muslim community) in the 16th century.1 Turkey experienced several significant wars in its prerepublic history. In 1071, the Seljuks defeated the forces of the Byzantine Empire in the War of Malazgirt and settled in Anatolia, which is the home of today’s Turkish Republic. According to Kongar, the War of Malazgirt was the first step of Turks toward westernization. Ten years later, the Turks established the first Anatolian Turkish Empire, which continued until 1308. Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire, located between Seljuks and Byzantine, emerged as a power in 1290 and lasted from 1290 until 1923, when modern Turkey and the Turkish Republic were established.2 After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, who later became known as Atat€ urk. Atat€ urk implemented social, legal, and political reform, secularized Turkey, replaced Islamic legal codes with Western codes, and gave women more rights. Turkey’s Republican People’s Party (RPP, or Turkish acronym for Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atat€ urk, was Turkey’s only political party until 1946. The multiparty period in Turkey started with the establishment of the Liberal Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası) in 1930, although that party was banned by the RPP government. In 1945, the National Development Party (Milli Kalkınma Partisi) was founded, followed the next year by the Democratic Party. During this period, the Turkish society moved peacefully toward a multiparty system.3 Since the foundation of the Republic in 1923, the Army has played an important role in Turkey’s political history. As Feroz Ahmad pointed out, ‘‘Anyone reading about the political situation of Turkey in the early 1990s, or indeed during the past quarter century, is likely to be struck by the role played by the armed forces.’’4 He references military interventions in governmental politics in May 1960, March 1971, and September 1980, as examples of this military role. Specific events in Turkey led to each of these military interventions. Under the 1961 constitution, Turkey had achieved a greater degree of

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freedom than ever before in its history. People were given more civil rights, the universities had greater autonomy, and students possessed the freedom to organize their own associations. Workers were given the right to strike and, under these conditions, trade unionists and intellectuals tried to organize a party to represent the interests of workers and peasants. New freedoms permitted conflicting ideologies to compete in Turkey for the first time.5 However, by January 1971, Turkey seemed to be in a state of chaos. Because of student protests and fights between left- and right-wing groups, the universities were not functioning. Students emulating Latin American urban guerrillas robbed banks, kidnapped U.S. servicemen, and attacked American targets. Factories were on strike. In response to these conditions, the military took control of the country, explaining that their aim was ‘‘the restoration of law and order.’’ The restoration of law and order became identical to repression of any group viewed as leftist.6 During the 1970s, Turkey faced a severe economic and political crisis, characterized by political violence, paralysis of the political system and other institutions, foreign exchange problems, growing foreign debt, high inflation, a series of shortages, unemployment, and payment deficits. Confronted with these political and economic problems, the government, in January 1980, announced a major stabilization and economic liberalization program aimed at restructuring the economy.7 The main aim of this program was the implementation of a new economic program, EIO, and it was not possible to apply the new policy under the existing political and economic system. Because the implementation of this policy was inconsistent with high wages, strong labor unions, and even a parliamentary democracy, political and economic reforms were necessary to implement successfully the requirements of EIO. Therefore, the restoration of ‘‘political’’ order was achieved by military intervention. Lombardi claims that the Turkish army intervened for two reasons: threats to the legitimacy of the state ideology and ‘‘a rejection of the government’s use of the armed forces to support explicitly partisan political objectives rather than the national interest.’’8 The main aim of the 1980 military intervention was to destroy the power of the working class and the unions to drive down the costs of labor. At the same time, it was necessary to create political conditions that allowed industrialists and exporters to organize their resources. As the former economic orientation eroded during the 1970s, labor militancy increased, and it was not possible to achieve a smooth transition to the new policies under these conditions. As Berch Berbero glu states, ‘‘between 1970 and 1980 there were 903 industrial strikes, involving 234,288 workers. The number of strikes increased from 72 in 1970 to 220 in 1980, and the number of workers involved in these strikes increased

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from 21,150 in 1970 to 84,832 in 1980. The year 1980 saw a loss of 7,708,750 worker days due to strikes.’’9 The decade of the 1980s constituted a critical turning point in Turkey’s economic and political life. The changes in the political and economic aspects of the country affected democratic rights and freedoms. The new economic policy was impossible to implement within the competitive party system and democratic institutions. ‘‘Vast and deep changes were promised in virtually all areas of Turkish life; only two fields of activity were left untouched: foreign policy and the economic stabilization programme.’’10 The Parliament was dissolved, strikes were banned, and three trade unions were outlawed. Thus, Turkey has had a democracy, at least a multiparty system, since the 1950s, but policies of the 1970s and 1980s prevented the implementation of democracy. There continue to be some problems related to abuses, violations of human rights, limits on freedom of expression and organization, torture, and imprisonment of people for their political ideas.11

BALANCING EAST AND WEST Turkey’s attempts to balance the pulls to East and West are reflected in the many diverse political and economic organizations to which the country belongs. On the one hand, Turkey became a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. Turkey is also a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a group that includes many European countries plus the United States, Canada, and several other countries. It is an associate member of the European Community, has a Customs Union with Europe (effective as of January 1, 1996), and is a formal candidate for membership in the European Union. On the other hand, Turkey occupies an important position among Islamic countries and shares common ethnic and linguistic ties with Central Asia’s Turkic societies. In 1955, it initiated the Baghdad Pact, which later became the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and was also known as the Middle Eastern Treaty Organization. Begun with a Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Turkey and Pakistan in 1954, the pact soon expanded to include other nations concerned with Soviet expansionism. The pact was intended to provide member nations with security and defense in regard to any Soviet interests in the area. Although the Soviet Union saw the pact as aggressive, it never became involved in armed combat with the member nations. Turkey is also a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), an intergovernmental

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organization with a permanent seat in the United Nations. With a membership of 57 states on four different continents, it is second only to the UN in size. Launched in September 1969, the organization aims at protecting the interests of the Muslim world through promoting international peace. Pulled between East and West and home to many different ethnic groups with their own language, customs, and organizations, Turkey continues to deal with ethnic and religious conflicts.12 Turkey’s geographic location and historical background contribute to its unique position in the world today. As the bridge between East and West, Turkey has both allowed the passage of goods and ideas from Asia to Europe and adapted those goods and ideas to its own culture. For example, Turkey is a secular Islamic country—the only one in Europe. Moreover, Turkey is considered to be the only democracy in the Middle East other than Israel.13 Turkey’s role as the only democratic system among Islamic countries has important implications for the relation between Islam and democracy.14 The political system in Turkey allows a wide array of political groups to represent the population. The Great National Assembly of Turkey has 550 members, elected for a five-year term. The Turkish election system allows only the parties that receive more than 10 percent of the national vote to be represented in the Parliament. The last elections took place on July 22, 2007, with the participation of 14 political parties; the AKP (Justice and Development Party) won the elections with 46.58 percent of the total votes. ‘‘Peace at home, peace in the world’’ is one of the most essential principles of the Republic of Turkey. World War I changed the country in many aspects. Ahmad15 explained this situation as follows: ‘‘The Empire (Ottoman Empire) had not only collapsed during the World War, but territories in Asia Minor were included in the armistice lines of 30 October 1918 which were threatened with partition. Foreign occupation of some of the most valuable provinces of Anatolia, including _ Istanbul, brought the question of a Turkish state and nation to the forefront.’’ After the foundation of the Republic, the most important thing was to guarantee ‘‘survival of the new country.’’ Although Germany had drawn Turkey into World War I, partly by raising fears concerning Russia, Turkey maintained neutrality throughout most of World War II, despite pressure from the Allies and Nazi Germany to join the conflict on one side or the other. Throughout the war, the Turkish government steadfastly refused to allow Axis transport across its lands or waters. Although the president, Ismet Inonu, tried to keep Turkey out of the conflict, toward the end of the war Turkey joined the Allied side to participate in the creation of the United Nations and to be one of its 51 founding members.16 During the War, Turkey helped the Jewish

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community by providing refuge for some of the escapees from Germany, and some of them stayed in Turkey at the end of the war.

TERRORISM IN TURKEY It is clear that terrorism has become a major problem in many parts of the world. Turkey is no exception. Terrorism is officially defined by Turkish law as ‘‘any kind of action conducted by one or several persons belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the State within its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedom, or damaging the internal and external security of the State, public order or general health by any method of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat’’ (Act 1).17 Like other countries, Turkey has experienced a number of terrorist attacks, arising mostly in the southeastern area of the country. Among the terrorist groups active in Turkey since 1978 are the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), and an Islamic terrorist organization known as the Turkish Hezbullah.18 The most important group is the PKK. The warfare/ struggle between the Turkish state and PKK began in 1984 and still continues. ‘‘The PKK has waged a guerilla campaign since 1984 to carve out an independent Kurdish state from Turkey, [and] took advantage of the absence of authority in northern Iraq to establish bases close to the Turkish border.’’19 Since 1984, Turkey has lost 30,000– 35,000 people and spent more than $120–130 billion to fight the terrorist attracts of PKK.20 During the peak of the struggle, many families in these areas had to move to big cities, and many villages were evacuated for safety reason. The Kurdish conflict is also influenced by and contributes to Turkey’s relations with neighbors such as Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Based on an agreement between the Turkish and Iraqi states, during the 1980s, Turkey had to initiate incursions into northern Iraq to destroy the PKK camps and stop the passage of Kurds from these places into Turkey. The basic aim of these military actions was to demolish PKK bases and € logistical infrastructures.21 In 1999, Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, was captured and sentenced to life in prison; however, problems continue: ‘‘In summary, given the number and intensity of conflicting goals and interests as well as the unavailability of acceptable solutions

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within the existing political system, Turkey’s current social and economic crisis will remain unresolved.’’22 Extremist religious groups are another important source of terror in Turkey. On November 15, 2003, two pickup trucks driven by Islamist suicide bombers exploded near two synagogues in Istanbul. The Turkish Islamic Raiders of the Greater East-Front (IBDA-C) sent a fax to Turkish newspapers claming responsibility. On November 20, 2003, two more suicide truck bombs exploded outside the British Consulate General and the Turkish Headquarters of the HSBC bank in Istanbul, killing 62 people. It is reasonable to say that the ordinary Turkish people suffer significantly from terrorism and conflict. Their lives and future have been affected by these attacks, and many families have lost members. Many innocent people, including children, have died from suicide bombs. Under these conditions it is important to investigate what ordinary people living in Turkey think about terrorism, as well as about war and peace.

TURKISH PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND PEACE The political and economic aspects of conflict and terror in Turkish society have been analyzed by many social scientists.23 However, a detailed study of ordinary people’s attitudes about peace, war, and reconciliation in Turkey has not been undertaken. This paper attempts to highlight Turkish responses to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS).24 The survey was administered to 134 people, selected randomly, in Ankara between May and September 2007; it included both open- and close-ended questions. Each interview lasted approximately 40–50 minutes. Participants were asked to rate each item on a scale from 1 to 7 (from totally disagree to totally agree), indicating the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the item. Participants were also asked to explain their rating in their own words. The verbal explanations of rating scale responses to each item were analyzed, along with the responses to two open-ended questions addressing the following issues: the best ways to achieve peace and national security for individual and family security. The Turkish Participants The Turkish sample consisted of 134 adults; 49 percent of the respondents were between the ages of 18 and 21 years, 41 percent were between the ages of 22 and 34 years, and 10 percent were between the ages of 35

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and 67 years. Seventy-one percent were women and 29 percent were men. Most of the respondents (91 percent) were Muslim; 1 percent was Christian, and 9 percent were none, agnostic, or atheist. Almost all of the respondents were born in Turkey, and 75 percent indicated that they belonged to the middle class. A majority (79 percent) had completed high school, and 18 percent had a bachelor’s degree; 80 percent of the respondents were students at the time of the data collection. Compulsory military service for all male citizens in Turkey is expected to start at the age of 20 and lasts either 12 or 15 months. Citizens who are students at the university or in vocational training programs are allowed to delay service until they have completed the programs or reach a certain age. Twenty-seven percent of our male respondents reported that they had completed their military service, and 73 percent reported that they had not yet done so. Approximately 10 percent of the respondents had participated in some conflict resolution programs, and 27 percent reported taking part in protests against war. Turkish Definitions of War War is . . . ‘‘Shame of humanity’’; ‘‘Any type of violence’’; ‘‘A game of human destruction which I would participate in if it is necessary to protect the unity of my country and my sacred values’’; ‘‘Sometimes it starts because of a necessary cause, but most of the time because of a meaningless cause. Nations start wars brutally—only thinking of their own interests.’’ ‘‘The extreme end of the wish of possessing. Believing in all sorts of meaningless ideas which restrict human beings and ignoring the nature of the earth’’; ‘‘an unliveable situation, an unlivable world.’’ A large number of the respondents (128 of a total of 134) responded to the item asking them to define ‘‘war.’’ Many participants provided more than one definition, for a total of 247 codeable responses. In the majority of the responses (66 percent), war was defined from the perspective of the state (e.g., social causes and effects) rather than from the perspective of the individual (e.g., personal moral judgments). Responses focusing on what war means on a community (state) level fell into several major categories. The most common type of definition (33 percent of the responses) focused on destruction and other outcomes of war; for example, ‘‘People killing each other, bloodshed, violence.’’ Another fairly popular type of definition (15 percent of the responses) focused on causes of or motives for war (e.g., ‘‘Planned attack with an intention of destroying the opposite side’s thinking or existence’’; ‘‘wish to gain power for their social, economical, geological interest or interest for land’’). Only 8 percent of the responses provided traditional

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definitions identifying war as conflict. Four percent associated war with a lack or loss of something (e.g., ‘‘the situation before peace’’). Four percent of responses suggested that war is acceptable if the goal is keeping the peace. Turkish media, both television and newspapers, are explicit in sharing visual images of the ongoing wars with the public, and the Turkish participants seem to have a vivid knowledge of the destructiveness of war. This may help explain the frequency of responses defining war in terms of destruction and other horrific outcomes. It is interesting that so few responses defined war as ‘‘defense.’’ Turkish people, not very long ago, had the largest war in their history—one in which they had to defend the country against invasion. Atat€ urk, who has been greatly admired not just as a political leader but also for his military skills, led the ‘‘War of Independence’’ after World War I (from 1919 until 1922), after which the Turkish Republic was established. One of Atat€ urk’s most famous phrases, ‘‘peace at home, peace in the world,’’ was quoted by some of our participants and reflects the internalization of the great need for peace in a nation that suffered many years in war. Another group of responses (30 percent of the total sample) defined war as an individual level process or concern. These individual level responses consisted of moral judgments of the nature of war or emotional responses to war. Examples of emotion-based definitions (10 percent of the responses) include ‘‘something that darkens a person’s life’’ and ‘‘anxiety over losing freedom.’’ An 18-year-old female associated war with feelings of ‘‘unhappiness, sorrow, pain, tears.’’ Morality-based definitions (20 percent of the responses) defined war as a moral violation; for example, ‘‘bad’’; ‘‘a concept that needs to be erased.’’ An implicit moral judgment can be seen in the words of one 21-year-old female, who asserted, ‘‘There is no end to it in the world. It has to finish.’’ Turkey shares a border with Iraq, and the recent conflict between Iraq and the United States has once again brought war very close to the Turkish people. Although not affected directly, Turks have witnessed conflict and been part of it as a NATO member, and our participants might in part be reacting to their close contact with the ongoing violence near their borders. This proximity may also be reflected in the findings that more than half of the Turkish participants agreed with the statement that ‘‘it is important to support the government in time of war,’’ with just under 40 percent disagreeing. However, approximately 91 percent of the respondents stated that they did not agree with the statement that ‘‘United States’ involvement in Iraq was a moral activity.’’ Some expressed their opposition to the invasion of Iraq as follows: ‘‘Killing of the innocent children and women is not acceptable. All these are happening in the name of democracy.’’

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The participants’ emphasis on the destructiveness of war appears consistent with the finding that nearly 70 percent of the Turkish respondents expressed at least some degree of opposition to the statement ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country,’’ and only 6 percent of the respondents totally agreed with it. An examination of respondents’ explanations of rating scale responses showing some acceptance of a governmental right to invade reveals that justifications focus on protection of their country or their citizens (i.e., self-defense or deterrence of the potential aggressor). Turkish Definitions of Peace Peace is . . . ‘‘People loving each other, respecting each other; the existence of serenity, sharing, and trust within a society’’; ‘‘It is the necessary concept to live in the world; the key to happiness’’; ‘‘People feeling themselves in confidence and in tranquility—in unity and togetherness’’; ‘‘People and societies living together without weapons, attacks, and insults and without violating each others’ rights’’; ‘‘People, especially children, living together in happiness’’; ‘‘Beautiful life for all people.’’ Nearly all of the respondents (98 percent) agreed with the statement that ‘‘Children have a basic right to grow up in a peaceful world.’’ Similarly, 98 percent indicated that peace constitutes a fundamental human right. However, when asked about the possibility of attaining worldwide peace, respondents expressed considerable pessimism: 68 percent of the respondents stated that world peace is not possible, and only 24 percent were optimistic about the possibility of achieving world peace. In regard to the item asking for definitions of ‘‘peace,’’ 128 of 134 participants provided a total of 168 codeable responses. Eighty-one percent of the responses were a ‘‘positive’’ definition of peace; that is, the good things that peace means or brings to society and individuals. About 10 percent of these positive definitions were quite general; for example, ‘‘It is the basic need for humanity, a requirement, and it should be provided’’; ‘‘The meaning of life’’; and ‘‘The most needed thing in the world.’’ As was true in regard to the definitions of war, participants were more likely to define peace as a social level construct than to focus on peace at the individual level. Among the answers focusing on peace at a social/ interactional level (48 percent of the total sample of responses; these responses), the two largest categories defined peace either as some sort of achieved state (27 percent of the responses) or as a relational construct (21 percent of the responses). Typical examples of peace as an achieved

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state included ‘‘Peace makes the world happy and liveable’’ and ‘‘Living of nations with tolerance and tranquility.’’ Definitions of peace as a relational construct included ‘‘Two countries, peoples, groups live together without fighting and war’’ and ‘‘People living together observing their legal rights, without any fight, and without any discrimination related to race, religion or language.’’ Social/interactional definitions of war also included responses focusing on peace as social justice (12 % of the total sample of responses; these responses typically focused on the beneficial social outcomes of peace but also imply a solution to how peace is reachable—e.g., ‘‘A free world in which classes and wars do not exist’’; ‘‘Under any condition, people do not oppress others and everybody has respect towards each other’’). The popularity of the positive forms of social/ interactional conceptions of peace suggests that although the Turkish respondents may want and see peace as a source of stability, they also believe it is obtainable through good relations between larger groups of people. Some respondents (9 percent of the total sample of responses) provided negative definitions of peace, viewing it as an absence of conflict (e.g., ‘‘End of fight and war’’; ‘‘a state of living together without violating each others’ rights and living without aggression and without conflicts of interest’’). These negative definitions also have implications for obtaining peace, namely, through stopping violence. A small number of responses (5 percent of the total) demonstrated a pessimistic view of peace, suggesting it is difficult to obtain if even possible (e.g., ‘‘Because of limited life resources I don’t believe there will be permanent peace in the world’’). Eight percent of the responses portrayed peace as an ‘‘ideal,’’ as a ‘‘perfect’’ situation (e.g., ‘‘It should exist everywhere and always between people of the world’’). Only a small number of people (1 percent of the responses) defined ‘‘peace’’ at an individual level (e.g., ‘‘Peace is very important for me—it is one of the most important attitudes in the name of humanity’’). Turkish Definitions of Terrorism Terrorism is . . . ‘‘Acts of violence from a group towards another group or country’’; ‘‘Certain groups intimidating the opposite side by harming them physically and trying to obtain what they wish, and these groups attacking innocent people and shedding blood’’; ‘‘What I hate most. It makes me angry and is supported by foreign countries.’’ ‘‘Murder’’; ‘‘A group of traitors’’; ‘‘Violence not caused by the state, but by other forces. I think that there is no justification to any violence.’’ ‘‘Anarchy groups, which are built based on concepts, such as religion, ethnic nationalism or sects, kill innocent people or go to war against the country in which they are part of.’’ ‘‘Something that has to be condemned.’’

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A large number of the respondents (124 of a total of 134) provided a total of 197 definitions of ‘‘terrorism.’’ Thirty-two percent of the responses echoed the definitions of war in their emphasis on the destructiveness of terrorism, its likelihood of causing fear, harm, or a movement against peace (e.g., ‘‘Chaos which leads to disorder and destroys the order in the society’’). A larger proportion (43 percent of the responses) consisted of moral judgments concerning the nature of terrorism—defining it, for example, as ‘‘immoral,’’ ‘‘not goal-oriented,’’ and ‘‘A big shame of humanity. An unconditional murder.’’ Terrorism was seen as an ‘‘ideological tool’’ in 11 percent of the responses, some of which were positive about this role and some of which were negative. Specifically, 2 percent of the responses indicated a positive role for terrorism, whereas 6 percent focused on ‘‘terrorism’’ as an ‘‘ideology gone wrong’’ (e.g., ‘‘An attempt to win their believed cause at the expense of destroying civilians’’), and 5 percent reflected total opposition to the use of terrorism as an ideological tool (e.g., ‘‘Ignorant actions of a bunch of brainwashed people’’; ‘‘The reason for unending human massacres’’). There were some responses (9 percent) that associated ‘‘terrorism’’ with ‘‘negative environmental conditions’’ (e.g., ‘‘Until they have a land, they are condemned; after they get what they want, they become heroes’’; ‘‘A tool of imperialism’’). Overall, Turkish participant definitions of terrorism reflect the fact that they most importantly approach the concept of ‘‘terrorism’’ with a moral judgment, as many witnessed the killing of innocent people throughout their lives. A large group also highlighted the destruction and violence of terrorist acts—‘‘it is like witnessing and being part of a continuous trauma.’’ Some participants focused on the political or ideological aspects of terrorism—blaming the terrorists, not supporting their ideologies or blaming the external forces.

Turkish Attitudes and Beliefs on Torture ‘‘War is not an ordinary situation but nobody has a right to torture.’’ ‘‘Even though it may be necessary for the interest of the society, it is not defendable to torture any person.’’ ‘‘It is not possible to justify torture.’’ ‘‘Ordinary people never support this, but some people who have power can do.’’ ‘‘Two countries may be in war but they have to follow international rules.’’ ‘‘In our age, this is against human rights.’’ In response to the statement, ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war,’’ 80 percent of the participants reported total or strong disagreement, 8 percent reported mild

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disagreement, whereas 10 percent reported some level of agreement with the statement; 2 percent neither agreed nor disagreed. While 15 percent of the responses supported ‘‘governmental torture’’ as a ‘‘right’’ (e.g., ‘‘In some conditions, it is acceptable’’), 53 percent did not. Seventeen percent of the responses were those answers that either were not sure or did not address the question. The supporting responses focused on the following categories: ‘‘deserve/guilt/proof,’’such as ‘‘If they are hostile, it can be [a right]’’ (7 percent); ‘‘effectiveness/usefulness’’ as in ‘‘They can do it—to get some secret information’’ (2 percent); ‘‘protect people or people’s rights’’; as in ‘‘In order to defend your country’’ (2 percent); or ‘‘acceptable under supervised/controlled conditions,’’ such as ‘‘Why not? They try to destroy our society. If it is necessary, responsible person can use this method’’ (2 percent). Respondents who believed that ‘‘governmental torture in times of war’’ is not right were grouped in the following categories: 31 percent of the responses were simply stating that ‘‘torture is not right’’ (e.g., ‘‘There is no reason to justify this’’); 13 percent of the responses focused on ‘‘torture’’ as a ‘‘human rights’’ issue (e.g., ‘‘No. It should not be forgotten they are human. They have some rights’’); 9 percent of the responses rejected ‘‘torture’’ just as a principle (e.g., ‘‘It is not acceptable behavior’’); 7 percent of the responses referenced ‘‘legality’’ and ‘‘international law’’ (e.g., ‘‘No, they have power but they have to follow international law and rule’’); and 4 percent of the responses were about ‘‘negative consequences’’ of ‘‘torture’’ (e.g., ‘‘This causes harm to people, not powerful people’’).

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND LOOKING AHEAD In summary, Turkish respondents find war a destructive state, have strong personal feelings about it, and consider it morally wrong. They tend not to conceptualize war as a form of defense. Turkish people are very proud of the War of Independence fought before the Turkish Republic was established, under the strong military and political leadership of Atat€ urk. Yet they are also big defenders of peace. A large number of our respondents believe in peace as a state and think that it can be obtained through good relations. Only a small percentage of the respondents defined peace negatively as a lack of conflict. Terrorism has been a destroyer of peace in Turkey for many years. Almost all of the respondents voiced strong negative reactions to it. Respondents wrote about terrorism being influenced by ‘‘other forces,’’ such as external forces. According to Philip Robins,25 toward the end stages of the Ottoman Empire, external forces indeed used communities and people against the

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state. During the First World War the Russians used the Armenians against the Ottoman state. Robins further stated that external powers continued to stimulate internal conflict after the end of the Ottoman Empire. To aid in their conflict against the Turkish state, Greece used the Greek communities in Asia Minor in the early 1920s, the British used a Kurdish uprising in 1925, and Russia used the Communist groups during the Cold War. Around the 1990s, the challenge from political Islam was also perceived to be a product of external encouragement. In parallel with this history, our respondents talked about ‘‘brainwashed’’ people, ‘‘traitors,’’ and ‘‘anarchy groups’’ organizing the terrorist attacks. They also openly wrote that these groups are supported by foreign forces. The government is trying to resolve the problem of terrorism by retaliating against the attacking groups, but yet also trying to act constructively by not confusing the terrorist groups with ethnic groups; for example, the Kurdish people speak their language freely, and there are Kurdish members in the parliament. In general, our participants did not accept a governmental right to use torture during war, although 15 percent of the responses suggested there may be such a right. Seventeen percent of the participants either did not address the question in their answers or were not sure. Although participants’ views when defining war, peace, and terror in general are strongly oppositional to destruction, tolerance for torture in 15 percent of the responses is a significantly high percentage. We think future research should try to address concepts of torture in relation to other forms of aggression in greater depth. Turkey Today As an Islamic country sharing common ethnic and linguistic ties with Central Asia’s Turkic societies and the Balkans, Turkey wants to play a more active role in the regions close to its borders. To do so, the government has tried to implement a new policy or paradigm, moving away from its earlier role in the region. ‘‘Turkey had made a mistake for decades by denying its ties with the neighboring countries. Perhaps that was understandable during the Cold War, but the brave new world was presenting Ankara the chance to be an effective power that could promote peace and stability throughout the region.’’26 As part of its new role, Turkey has been a supporter of the Middle East process. For example, Israel and Syria have begun indirect peace talks mediated by Turkey. In addition, the leaders of the Justice and Development Party are carrying out a new foreign policy. For example, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo gan made some effort to solve the conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, and President Abdullah G€ ul recently visited Armenia. Turkey’s efforts in these directions are a valuable new approach to connecting East and West.

Part II

The Middle East

7

Israel Helena Syna Desivilya and Dalit Yassour-Borochowitz1

War is . . . ‘‘Chaos, destruction, violence, killing, blood, death, fear, horror, terror.’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘the opposite of War.’’ Apology is ‘‘important, but restitution is more important.’’ This chapter presents the attitudes of ordinary people, all of them Israeli citizens, concerning war, peace, and reconciliation. We attempt to illuminate and unravel the ways whereby the protracted Middle Eastern conflict shades the respondents’ perceptions. The chapter begins with some background information on Israeli society, underscoring the internal divisions and conflicts. Subsequently, the sociopolitical context, namely, the Jewish-Arab/Palestinian conflict, is briefly presented, highlighting the dynamics of protracted national conflicts. Finally, we display and discuss Israeli perspectives on war, peace, and reconciliation, as derived from the study participants’ responses. CONFLICTS IN THE ISRAELI SOCIETY Israeli society is composed of various social groups. It is a fairly young society, largely made up of Jewish immigrants who form a national majority, with the Arabs/Palestinians who remained in Israel after 1948 constituting a national minority. The Jewish majority is hardly monolithic; it is characterized by internal divisions classified into five main categories: Jews-Arabs/Palestinians, religious-secular, Ashkenazi (European)-Sephardic (Asian, African), old-timers-newcomers, doves (political left)-hawks (political right). Encounters along these splits have bred numerous disputes and clashes in the course of Israeli history,

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with the relative prominence of the competing forces shifting over time. Nevertheless, the Jewish-Arab/Palestinian division has maintained its high intensity for generations, because of the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the neighboring Arab states.2 The Jewish-Arab/Palestinian Conflict An explicit Jewish-Palestinian conflict dates to the Balfour declaration of 1917, which granted the foundation of a ‘‘national home’’ for Jewish people in the land of Israel. This declaration stirred a struggle over a territory, termed at that time ‘‘Palestine,’’ culminating in the war of independence in 1948 and subsequent establishment of the state of Israel.3 With the foundation of this new state, the status of Arabs/Palestinians shifted from a well-to-do majority to a defeated minority, oppressed by Jewish rule.4 Owing to protracted armed conflict between Israel and its neighbors, the Arab citizens of Israel have been viewed as a subversive element and security threat. It is not surprising that a national security doctrine, which has evolved in the process of a national liberation struggle and nation building, has become the primary social ethos in the state of Israel. The Holocaust trauma enhanced the fear of annihilation, which in turn nourished the security doctrine and the striving for national cohesion and unity. As expressed by Muhlbauer,5 ‘‘Any digression from this dominant national security doctrine has been criticized for promoting internal factionalism and risking the nation’s well-being . . .’’ Protracted National Conflicts and Intergroup Relations Conflicts reflecting intergroup tensions that emanate from clashes among ethnic or national identities tend to intensify, often erupting into violence, leading to perceptions of intractability. They manifest several typical features, such as persistence and pervasiveness of the disputes, perception of irreconcilable goals, and threatened existential needs.6 These kinds of conflicts are prone to escalate within a complex system of adverse transformations on the individual, the group, and the community level.7 This process is typically marked by a mounting deterioration in the following modalities of human experience: motivation, affect, cognition, behavior, and social environment.8 In the motivational sphere, each side embraces a highly competitive, intransigent stance, viewing the conflict as a ‘‘zero-sum game,’’ while the motives gradually change from outdoing to demolishing the opponent. The parties’ feelings toward one another are progressively transformed from anger to overall antagonism, often turning to hatred inflamed by vengeance. Flawed processes develop also in the cognitive

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modality, namely, biased processing of information about the self and the other. The adversaries rely excessively on stereotypes, selectively perceiving the other and attaching disproportionate weight to negative information while discounting positive data about the opponent. By contrast, self-serving bias is evident while processing information about one’s own side: negative data are either discounted or attributed to external factors, whereas favorable evidence is inflated and ascribed to internal causes. The increasingly negative perception of the other side breeds growing distrust between the parties9 and can be accompanied by hostile acts within the behavioral modality. In the course of the escalation process, the protagonists often tend to advance from verbal aggression, such as derogatory remarks and taunting statements, into physical violence. They encounter mounting difficulties in communication, failing to listen to one another, a phenomenon labeled as a ‘‘dialogue between the deaf.’’ Such individual level changes unfold in social contexts, where group phenomena evolve simultaneously. Group level symptoms include deepening ethnocentrism and groupthink.10 Each side tends to believe that their own group’s goals are just, whereas the opponent group’s goals are illegitimate.11 Their ethnocentric proclivities are displayed in biased group attributions.12 Groupthink symptoms include an extreme tendency toward within-group conformity with suppression of any attempts at dissent. Some scholars (e.g., Desivilya-Syna; Rouhana and Bar-Tal; and Turner and Pratkanis)13 contend that these group patterns are maintained because of cognitive and motivational processes, such as biased information processing and the tendency to maintain positive group identity. These individual and group level transformations are accompanied by modifications within the entire community, notably polarization, with community members tending to join one or the other of the rival camps.14 Adverse changes at the group and community level support the mutual animosity experienced by the individuals on both sides of the conflict.15 This model can be seen clearly in the evolution of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, which demonstrates many of the characteristics of the escalation process,16 including the development of an intergroup psychological repertoire (social identity, collective memory, and orientation concerning conflict) characterized by a positive collective image of the ingroup coupled with self-construal as a victim, juxtaposed with adverse emotions, views, and delegitimization of the adversary out-group.17 Repercussions of Escalation on Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel The Jewish-Palestinian conflict has lasted for over 100 years. Notwithstanding the overall atmosphere of antagonism between Jews and

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Arabs, these years were not uniformly marked by wars, occupation, and uprising; indeed, attempts toward coexistence were also made during this time. Since the inception of the state of Israel, wars have been the dominant feature of Jewish-Arab relationships in the Middle East region, but the early 1980s marked a turning point in this ordeal of mutual hostilities—a slow progression toward resolution of the protracted conflict was initiated. The Peace Accords between Israel and Egypt (1980) constituted the first step in this direction, but unfortunately were followed by an outburst of hostilities—the civil uprisings (the Intifada) in the occupied territories (1987), which were considered by Israelis as the seventh war18 and perhaps more devitalizing than all its predecessors. For the Palestinians, however, the first Intifada was probably the most meaningful event in regards to crystallizing their national identity. The process of reconciliation, resumed during talks in Madrid following the cessation, for all practical purposes, of the first Intifada, culminated in the attainment of actual formal agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, namely, the OSLO 1 and OSLO 2 Accords. The rapprochement process in the Middle East has evolved at three levels: (1) the formal political negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors (Egypt, Jordan, attempts with Syria, etc.); (2) the struggle and wobbly discourse between Israel and Palestinians, residents of the West Bank or Gaza Strip, and even individuals residing in Lebanon, Tunis, Libya, and other Arab states; (3) the continuous attempts, since 1948, when Arabs became a national minority (nowadays about 20 percent of the Israeli population), to find effective ways of coexistence between Jewish and Arab citizens in Israel. These rapprochement efforts were halted again with the renewed eruption of violence in the fall of 2000, the second uprising (Al Aqsa Intifada), which demonstrates the difficulty of resolving protracted, identity-based intergroup conflict. Moreover, the recurrent escalation episodes leave hardly removable traces in the life experiences of those who dwell in the region,19 including, of course, both the Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel. Indeed, numerous surveys have indicated20 that both Arab and Jewish public opinion in Israel fluctuates in accordance with the level of violent confrontation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Peaking escalation chills both sides’ motivation for contact, exacerbates fear and anxiety, and adversely affects their mutual images.

ISRAELI ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR, PEACE, AND RECONCILIATION The Israeli sample consisted of 155 adult Israeli citizens, with a mean age of 31 ranging in age from 19 to 81). Sixty-four percent of the

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respondents were women and 36 percent were men. Most (84 percent) were Jewish, 11 percent were Muslim, 4 percent were Christian, and the remaining 1 percent did not indicate their religion. A majority (62 percent) had completed high school education, 11 percent had a bachelor’s degree, 9 percent had a master’s degree, and 2 percent had a doctoral degree). Eighty-three percent were students at the time of data collection. Over 70 percent rated their socioeconomic status as middle class. Seventy-nine of the respondents served in the military (nearly all of them served in the Israel Defense Forces). Thirty-four percent of the respondents have participated in some conflict resolution programs, and 28 percent reported taking part in protests against war. All participants completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS21). For the purposes of this study, responses to seven items from the PAIRTAPS were analyzed. Participants were asked to rate each item on a scale from 1 to 7 (from totally disagree to totally agree), indicating the extent to which they endorsed or objected to its content. The content of the verbal explanations following each of the seven items were analyzed. The respondents’ definitions of the terms ‘‘War,’’ ‘‘Peace,’’ and ‘‘Reconciliation’’ were also analyzed. Finally, we also conducted a thematic analysis of two open-ended questions addressing the following issues: the best way to achieve peace and the necessary steps or conditions for attaining reconciliation. Definitions of the Term ‘‘War’’ The most striking features in the respondents’ construal of ‘‘war’’ are the intensity and vividness of the images associated with this concept. Words such as ‘‘blood,’’ ‘‘killing,’’ and ‘‘destruction’’ and deep negative emotions—‘‘fright,’’ ‘‘hatred,’’ ‘‘fear,’’ ‘‘antagonism’’—appear prominent in the Israeli definitions of ‘‘war,’’ which fell into three main categories: sources, relationships, and outcomes. Responses in the sources of war (antecedents) category refer by and large to competition over scarce resources, notably land, power struggles, and divergence or conflict of interests, which in turn lead to violent fights between nations: ‘‘A situation involving struggle over territory, interests and resources’’; ‘‘Divergence of interests which are solved through war and killing of the enemy’’; ‘‘A situation where a number of countries do not agree with one another on one or several issues and do not see discussions as a solution but only by means of violence.’’ The category for relationships pertains to the adverse ways whereby the parties deal with conflict on both behavioral and emotional levels. Behavioral responses include coercive and dominating modes of handling conflicts, mainly reflected in severe physical violence. Sample responses in this category

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are ‘‘Armed and violent struggle’’; ‘‘Invasion of land in a foreign country’’; ‘‘Aggression directed to exaggerated violence, demonstration of destructive technologies, competition of deadly weapons.’’ Responses in the emotions subcategory were generally intense negative emotions accompanying the violent ways of coping with conflicts between nations; for example, ‘‘Chaos, fear, insecurity, lack of tranquility’’; ‘‘Fear, anxiety, worry, insecurity’’; ‘‘Hatred and fear.’’ Finally, the outcomes category included responses focused on the adverse consequences of war, such as human suffering, chaos, destruction, and futility, or the uselessness of the violent struggles; for example, ‘‘A lot of blood and dead in vain’’; ‘‘Chaos, there is no right or wrong, innocent get hurt and suffer, killing and unnecessary suffering, no problems are solved.’’ War-Related Attitudes In response to the item ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country,’’ nearly half of the respondents (48 percent) agreed to at least some extent; 45 percent expressed some disagreement, and the remaining 7 percent were undecided on the issue of a country’s right to invade another country. The content analysis of explanations of rating scale responses revealed that approval of the right to invade another country involved justification or rationalization of the aggression. The prevailing excuse was grounded in a perceived or real threat hovering over the invading country; hence, the offensive constituted self-defense, particularly as a response to provocation or an actual attack, a preventive measure, or deterrence of the potential aggressor. Examples of these rationales for invasion included ‘‘A fear or a threat to one’s country’s fate’’; ‘‘A country living in a state of a lingering threat is entitled to invade the adversary’s land’’; ‘‘If the other country acts aggressively there is a right to invade as a preventive measure.’’ Another category of justification revolves around supposedly humanitarian acts, namely, one nation’s invasion of another country on behalf of a third nation or people whose human rights have been violated; for instance, ‘‘Sometimes invasion can be effective in failing countries or in countries where the government hurts citizens.’’ Some respondents based their approval of invasion on local, historical circumstances—a legitimate struggle for independence and national liberation: ‘‘Eventually the state of Israel was founded by means of invasion.’’ Some of the endorsements of invasion were qualified, that is, limiting the right to invasion to precursors to cease-fire and peace negotiations and last resort measures in situations of a grave danger. The thematic analysis of the responses rejecting the right to invade reflected two major categories: pragmatic arguments and universalistic

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arguments. Pragmatic arguments stressed the adverse consequences of invasion; for example, ‘‘There is no need to invade another country, there will be dead in vain, much suffering from the foreign country’’; ‘‘It always produces more violence than necessary’’; ‘‘Invasion of another country even though for self-defense creates problems for the invaded country and for the invading one.’’ Universalistic arguments, grounded in deontological moral principles, such as an opposition to coercion, violence, and violation of a fundamental right of a state for sovereignty, included the following explanations: ‘‘No country can invade another, because each one is entitled to sovereignty’’; ‘‘Every human being is born free, nobody can deny this basic right to freedom’’; ‘‘Each country has rights only on its own territory.’’ Two additional war-related questions received a fair amount of endorsement from the Israeli respondents. Specifically, 60 percent of the respondents endorsed the importance of supporting the government at the time of war, whereas 22 percent expressed disagreement and 18 percent did not report any clear idea concerning that matter. In addition, over half (54 percent) of the Israeli participants thought that the involvement of the state of Israel in military action is morally right; close to a third (26 percent) expressed an opposite view and 20 percent were undecided. Integrative analysis of the responses concerning war and war-related attitudes suggests that ordinary people in Israel hold fairly clear opinions about issues directly relevant to the local reality—abundant with warfare, combat, violence, and aggression—such as a right to invade another country, the importance of supporting the government in times of war, and the morality of one’s country’s involvement in war. In general, the respondents perceive war as a horrific experience, behaviorally and emotionally, with numerous adverse consequences, such as human casualties, misery, suffering, and destruction; nevertheless, their attitudes seem to be somewhat tilted toward supporting war-related acts rather than rejecting them. Presumably, Israelis resort to the rationalization of coercive and violent ways of managing international conflicts because of beliefs that these are acts of self-defense and deterrence, at least as manifested in their construction of the local bitter reality. Definitions of Peace Because peace has not been part of the Israeli reality since its inception, it is interesting that the respondents’ definitions of peace, and views on attaining it, are not quite as clear and decisive as their attitudes regarding war and war-related issues. Five major categories emerged from their definitions of the word ‘‘peace.’’ The two most salient and

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recurring categories are (1) definitions referring to the nature of relationships between nations. Commonly occurring words in this category are ‘‘mutual understanding,’’ ‘‘cooperation,’’ ‘‘friendly relations,’’ ‘‘respect and empathy’’; (2) definitions emphasizing the positive feelings accompanying peace (e.g., ‘‘tranquility,’’ ‘‘brotherhood,’’ ‘‘serenity,’’ ‘‘equality,’’ and ‘‘respect for rights and for human lives’’). The other categories included (3) utilitarian definitions based on the benefits peace may afford, often referring to the economic aspect of a peaceful situation (e.g., ‘‘mutual interests’’ or ‘‘fair relationships between nations who gain equally from the situation’’); (4) definitions based on universal values (e.g., ‘‘tolerance,’’ ‘‘social justice,’’ ‘‘morality,’’ ‘‘solidarity,’’ etc.); and (5) definitions that are ‘‘local’’ in their nature, specifically related to the Israeli-Arab conflict (e.g., ‘‘When the rest of the nations will accept our country’’; ‘‘no discrimination between Arab and Jews or between the nations all over the world.’’ Only a few participants described peace as a utopian situation unlikely ever to materialize. Peace-Related Attitudes A vast majority of the Israeli respondents (almost 99 percent) endorsed the basic right of children to grow up in a peaceful world. Similarly, nearly all of the participants (almost 99 percent) believe that peace constitutes a fundamental human right. However, when participants were asked about the possibility of attaining worldwide peace, their opinions were polarized: 45 percent expressed optimistic views, 41 percent thought such a possibility is unlikely, and 14 percent were undecided on this matter. Apparently, the local hurdles and unfulfilled attempts to attain peace in the Middle Eastern region remain vivid in the Israeli citizens’ experiences, hence chilling their beliefs in the possibility of materializing the basic human right for peace. Most of the respondents who endorsed the statement that a world peace is possible explained their opinion in one of two ways: (1) rational explanations, constructed in operational terms, namely, suggesting actions or conditions that are necessary to materialize peace such as compromise, the right leadership, education, etc. For example, ‘‘I simply think that it can be achieved by means of educating about the principle of ‘love thy neighbor as thyself’ ’’ and ‘‘If everyone will compromise a little’’ and (2) emotional explanations such as hope, longing, wish, and belief. For example, ‘‘I want to believe it’s possible because without this belief it will be very difficult for me to bear the violence in Israel and in the world. Hope gives strength to continue.’’ Participants endorsing the possibility of world peace generally appeared somewhat reserved and doubtful or ambivalent (‘‘On one hand I have a wish and

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longing for it. On the other hand, rationally thinking it’s hard not to doubt this belief’’) and at times even acknowledged a sense of naivety (‘‘I believe it’s possible even though it’s na€ıve’’). Our analysis of the respondents’ explanations of their ratings revealed that the arguments of those who do not believe in the possibility of world peace appeared more decisive and rational, or rational-like, in their nature than the explanations of those who believed a world peace could be attained. The arguments provided by respondents who disbelieve the prospects of world peace can be classified into four major categories, each representing a distinct type of barrier to peace: (1) Diversity barrier. Arguments in this category portray world peace as impossible due to diversity of religions, nationalities, and polarization in opinions and interests. The assumption is that extremists will never allow compromises to take hold. As put by the respondents, ‘‘It will never be agreed by all parties. There will always be exceptions, people with different opinions’’; ‘‘There have always been fanatics and there will always be, so it will never be possible to reach world peace’’; ‘‘As long as there are different religious beliefs and races there will never be a world peace.’’ These voices represent a pessimistic position discrediting the capability of humanity to attain acquiescence. (2) Human nature barrier. Arguments in this category were that world peace is contrary to human nature; human beings are fundamentally egoistic, oriented toward survival and accomplishment of their own interests: ‘‘The nature of humans will not allow it’’. (3) Historical evidence barrier. This category comprises explanations that rely on history, on lessons of the past, such as ‘‘It’s a fact—it (world peace) has never happened in the past.’’ This kind of reasoning entails a ‘‘scientific’’ tone because it relies on evidence, such as history, and on statistical probabilities. It is interesting that the same logic is also applied by those who stated that world peace is possible, such as ‘‘It depends on many unpredictable factors, but there is always a possibility.’’ (4) Prejudice barrier. These arguments express beliefs that anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism, and the proliferation of Islam worldwide constitute a barrier to peace. This line of reasoning is less universal in orientation and more related to the local conflict-ridden reality. An example is, ‘‘World peace doesn’t exist. There will always be people who hate the Jews and hate Israel, and Israel will always have to fight for its existence,’’ or ‘‘World peace is impossible as long as Islam is getting stronger.’’ Overall, the Israeli arguments for and against the chances of world peace can be conceptualized as deterministic psychological explanations that draw on human nature in contrast with social-cultural explanations that refer to cultural-religious and national conflicts and emphasize group social identities. The participants’ explanations can also be

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analyzed according to their underling rationale—universal reasons (e.g., human nature and diversity among social groups) versus local reasons (e.g., anti-Semitism and the rise of Islam). Definitions of the Term ‘‘Reconciliation’’ A vast majority of the respondents defined ‘‘reconciliation’’ as a positive process worthwhile pursuing; for example, as ‘‘A (very much wanted) process trying to bring peace between two parties who were in conflict/ war.’’ Others describe it as a preliminary step on the path to achieving peace (‘‘A return to the track towards peace’’). Those who see reconciliation as a phase preceding peace describe it as a means to an end, as ‘‘the only road to peace’’ and as a process, rather than a static concept. All the respondents described reconciliation in positive terms, using both rational terms (e.g., ‘‘understanding,’’ ‘‘mutual agreements,’’ and ‘‘compromise’’) and emotional terms (e.g., ‘‘relief,’’ ‘‘love,’’ ‘‘happiness,’’ and ‘‘harmony’’). Most of them agree that this process requires a few measures; for example (1) ‘‘Stopping the war, agreeing on some issues and starting the peace processes’’; (2) ‘‘The ability to reach understanding between parties who are in a state of conflict/war’’; (3) ‘‘compromise on both sides and agreement on common principals’’; and (4) ‘‘Moving from a state of war, distance, alienation, etc., to getting closer and to mutual respect.’’ A few of the respondents stated clearly that ‘‘It’s the only way for peace.’’ Two interesting and important distinctions emerged from the data. First, quite a few of the respondents described the term ‘‘reconciliation’’ either as a state or as something passive (‘‘Quiet, passivity’’) or as an act of halting violence and avoiding aggression—or, in other words, as a negative process (‘‘Stopping terror activities of all kinds’’). On the other hand, even more respondents described it as a very active, vigorous process that requires initiative, acts of compromise, negotiation, and other peace-promoting activities (‘‘Negotiating in order to reach an end to war’’ or ‘‘Making peace’’). Second, it can be clearly seen that while some of the respondents describe the term by emphasizing pragmatic and useful measures that construct the process of reconciliation (e.g., ‘‘negotiating,’’ ‘‘starting a dialogue with the other side,’’ and ‘‘compromising’’), many others describe it in emotional and spiritual terms (‘‘It’s the emotional process that accompanies the transformation from a state of war to a state of peace’’ or ‘‘Giving up everything, especially the ego. It’s a deep spiritual state that is very distant’’). Construal of the Notion ‘‘Reconciliation’’ The repercussions of the protracted Jewish-Palestinian discord are clearly visible in Israeli people’s attitudes toward reconciliation. Half of

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the Israeli respondents endorsed the statement that apology following an invasion of one country by another can increase the odds for reconciliation between these nations, whereas 30 percent disagreed and 20 percent did not express a clear opinion concerning this issue. Genuine reconciliation, according to the respondents, must be based primarily on deeds rather than on words. Most of the respondents who endorsed apology viewed it as a first, albeit insufficient, step for reconciliation. It seems that the Israeli participants’ attitude toward apology is ‘‘in a middle eastern spirit,’’ meaning that people prefer actions rather than talking. Both those who agree that apology is part of a reconciliation process and those who disagree refer to it merely in a local context (and ignore, for example, the process that took place in South Africa). Conceivably, this explains why apology does not strike a strong chord in Israeli’s opinions. Since the Israeli-Palestinian conflict persists, still characterized by violence and aggression, nice and polite measures such as apologies appear inadequate to ensure reconciliation and peace. The language used by the participants to respond to the items on reconciliation has highly emotional negative overtones, such as ‘‘hurt,’’ ‘‘insult,’’ ‘‘humiliation,’’ ‘‘disgust,’’ and ‘‘vanity.’’ Although there are also responses indicating a quest for fulfillment of basic human needs— ‘‘recognition and understanding’’—the prevailing tone appears to be that ‘‘Peace is something that will never be achieved in Israel’’ or somewhat less pessimistically, ‘‘Peace is a utopian concept.’’

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS This chapter attempted to shed light on the impact of protracted national conflict in the Middle Eastern region on the attitudes of ordinary people, all of them Israeli citizens, concerning war, peace, and reconciliation. Extant research has examined the opinions of Israeli citizens concerning the specific international conflict in the region22; however, it has not explored their views on war, peace, and reconciliation in general. The current study contributes new knowledge in this domain. Specifically, we addressed the issue of how the lingering adverse experiences of warfare, terror, and political violence inform Israelis’ construal of these three conflict-related notions—war, peace, and reconciliation. Several aspects were examined: clarity, salience, and vividness of the concepts in the respondents’ minds, and the nature of the emphases given in the definitions of these terms: rational versus emotional, pragmatic in comparison with abstract or theoretical notions, local in contrast with universal, and the extent of support for each type of the three processes associated with the management of intergroup conflicts. We

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also examined the overall sense of optimism as expressed in the participants’ beliefs in the likelihood of constructive ways of resolving conflicts—peace and reconciliation. The respondents’ confidence in the high odds of constructive processes was juxtaposed with their pessimistic views (namely, fatalistic beliefs in the persistence of destructive and coercive ways of dealing with conflict by means of war). Overall, the attitudes of the Israeli participants toward war, peace, and reconciliation appear to reflect traces of the protracted and seemingly intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The respondents represent predominantly fairly young (in their late twenties or early thirties), Jewish students; not only have they vicariously experienced war-related activities but the majority of them have been directly involved in such destructive events, either as soldiers, civilians, or in both capacities. Thus, the psychological repertoire of these young people includes vivid images of war, manifested in extremely violent behaviors, intensely negative emotions, and fatal consequences. These adverse experiences presumably form prototypical memories, constantly rehearsed due to the recurring war-related events. Drawing on theories of social cognition,23 such strong negative experiences are deeply processed, hence loom larger in a person’s mind than occasional positive events in the course of a lingering conflict. Specifically, regardless of the fact that the state of Israel reached peace accords with two neighboring Arab states, Egypt and Jordan, these remarkable achievements recede to the background of Israelis’ minds while war-related experiences remain imminent in their collective memories.24 Violent conflict then becomes, in their minds, an inevitable reality, necessitating active coping—that is, self-defense by means of coercion and offensive so as to deter the enemy.25 Moreover, the content of the psychological inventory of Israelis entails a positive collective image of the in-group coupled with self-construal as a victim juxtaposed with adverse emotions, views, and delegitimization of the adversary out-group.26 One might add another aspect to the conflict-related social-psychological repertoire of the Israeli participants, namely, the centrality of a national security doctrine that has shaped the primary social ethos in the state of Israel.27 Conceivably, such social-psychological processes illuminate the findings that about half of the respondents justify and rationalize an invasion of one country by another, and even some of those who opposed such an aggressive act tended to use pragmatic arguments rather than explanations associated with violation of fundamental human rights. Furthermore, for the majority of Israeli study participants, support of the government in the time of war was deemed vital. In contrast with the fairly clear, intense, and vivid views concerning war-related experiences, the respondents appear more equivocal,

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ambivalent, reserved, and emotional while presenting their attitudes concerning peace and reconciliation. Obviously, nearly all of the participants support the view that children deserve to live in a peaceful world and that peace constitutes a basic human right. However, they reveal skepticism concerning the likelihood of worldwide peace, suggesting different kinds of barriers preventing these benevolent prospects, such as human nature, diversity, prevalence of prejudice, and lack of historical precedence of peace (regardless of historical evidence of peace accords in the world following bitter and protracted conflicts!!!). Apparently, peace and reconciliation remain a distant vision, a hardly attainable quest or a fantasy. ‘‘Peace is the opposite of war’’—with the latter being the unfortunate reality, to be counteracted by reconciliation, an active and vigorous process composed of deeds—‘‘actions rather than words.’’ In conclusion, the Israeli participants have suffered from a psychological escalation, losing their faith in reconciliation and peace owing to their prolonged exposure to violent national conflict.28 It appears that the difficulty in transition from seemingly intractable conflict to peace can be attributed to the intricate challenge of coping with uncertainty, which requires the capacity to reliably process a complex reality, while not denying the past, and the capability of conceiving creative solutions. Persistent war-related experiences create difficulties in shedding off existential anxieties and self-concepts as victims, internalized because of the Holocaust trauma and nourished by the leadership and social institutions. Local perceptions concerning the regional national conflict appear to generalize into broadly pervasive attitudes toward war, peace, and reconciliation.

8

Lebanon William J. Tastle, Rouba Youssef, and Adam Hammoud

War is . . . ‘‘Killing, crimes and destruction; the way of injustice; Hell, death’’; ‘‘The enemy of a human being and it’s a killer and a criminal, and there is no remedy for it except peace.’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘Prosperity and peace of mind; the way of justice and democracy; a right that does not exist in the Middle East’’; ‘‘a dream that would be nice if realized.’’ Lebanon lies at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea, north of Israel and west of Syria. For more than two millennia, the area now known as Lebanon has been home to diverse and multicultural groups of traders. Since early times, Lebanon’s central location within the Mediterranean, coupled with its mercantile social structure, allowed merchants to flourish throughout the region, and Lebanon quickly became a religious, cultural, and social hub. Despite being home to diverse cultures and religions, while operating on less land than the state of Connecticut, Lebanon remained a peaceful and tolerant state for much of its history. At the same time, the diverse population of the northern Levant (the Middle East, along the Mediterranean) has always been the greatest challenge for those who wished to establish a nation in the area.1

THE EMERGENCE OF LEBANON AS A NATION Historical Roots: Phoenicians, Romans, and Turks The Phoenicians, a group of conquerors from an area south of the current state, established Lebanon’s reputation as outstanding traders and navigators in 3000 BCE. The Phoenician influence declined around

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800 BCE, and Lebanon came under the control of several different groups: the Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, and eventually the Romans, who occupied Lebanon around 63 BCE and united it with the Roman province of Syria. For 600 years, Lebanon was the most peaceful and prosperous country in the Middle East. Heliopolis (Baalbek), the city of the sun, was built during this period. Roman control ended in 630 CE, with Arabs conquering Palestine and Lebanon. During Roman rule, most of the Lebanese population converted to Christianity; however, the Arabs, another group of conquerors from the south, were followers of the new religion of Islam. The Arabs entered many Middle Eastern countries in the early 600s and they, along with their new religion, were allowed peacefully into Lebanon. One group of Lebanese Christians, the Maronites, did not accept these new conquerors and isolated themselves in the northern part of Lebanon, called Mount Lebanon. The Arabs settled in the rest of Lebanon, which became largely Muslim. Around 1100, the Crusaders from Europe entered Lebanon with the expectation of converting these Arab Muslims to Christianity; they were unsuccessful at conversion but claimed riches and developed castles, towers, and churches. The Mamluk leaders of Egypt ruled Lebanon for the next 200 years, an era prone to oppression and economic failure. This period of stagnation continued with the arrival of the Ottoman Turks from the north in 1516. Initially, Mount Lebanon was not affected by these conquerors; Christians and Muslims of minority sects lived under the rule of a prince and local feudal lords and the Ottomans permitted self-rule. Under the rule of Basheer Shihab, ameer (prince) of Mount Lebanon for most of the years from 1783 to 1840, the people experienced more freedom, justice, and well-being than in any other location in the Middle East at the time.2 An alliance with Egypt eventually became oppressive. The people of Lebanon rose up, and with the help of forces from England, France, and Ottoman Turkey, ended the alliance with Egypt in 1840. The Maronite Christians began moving south into the territory that had been previously held by the Druze, a group that followed a faith related to Islam. Tension among these groups grew and was worsened by outside powers. Open fighting and massacres broke out on the Mount in 1860, but the Ottomans continued to permit some self-rule until World War I. Following the establishment of the Reglement Organique (a statute that constituted Lebanon as an autonomous Ottoman province),3 On June 9, 1861, Mount Lebanon was divided into seven districts led by a mutesarrif. The mutesarrif was an Ottoman subject, assisted by 12 elected members of four religious communities, appointed by a village

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headsman or sheikh. The 12 elected members were composed of Maronites (4), Druzes (3), Greek Orthodox (2), Greek Catholics (1), Sunni Muslims (1), and Shiite Muslims (1). The system of feudalism was abolished, every Lebanese individual was declared equal before the law, and public works boomed. As public services became efficient and the economy flourished, a general sense of security pervaded the country; however, by 1916, World War I was underway and the Ottoman Empire was headed toward collapse. In 1918, the French occupied Lebanon and on September 1, 1920, proclaimed it the state of Greater Lebanon. Through a secret treaty known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the French aimed to maintain political control of Syria and the ‘‘Greater Lebanon’’ area, help mitigate the effects of the massive power vacuum left by the dissolution of Ottoman rule, protect their allies, and improve accessibility to traders in the region. Twentieth-Century Lebanon: Wars and Civil Wars France governed Greater Lebanon, which was predominantly Maronite Christian, from 1920 to 1943.4 Lebanon’s territory included the mountain, the coast, and the Beka’a Valley, as well as part of the mountains inhabited by anti-Lebanon factions. With this division in 1920, the term ‘‘Lebanese’’ became accepted, because the Lebanese were regarded as different from other Arabs.5 Lebanon’s independence was granted on November 26, 1943. A full-scale evacuation by the French concluded in 1946. The Maronite Christians were the most powerful group at the time, and the country grew rapidly. However, religious tension was mounting; civil war broke out between the government and Muslim rebels in 1958. Violence spread among several groups: the Maronite Christians who headed the government, the Sunni Muslims who shared political power and prospered in business, the Druze who were mountainous people and followers of Islam and Gnosticism, and the Shiite Muslims who were the poorest and least educated of the Muslim factions. Added to this multisided conflict were Palestinian refugees who had fled Israel after it became a state in 1948, leaving about half a million Palestinians homeless. During this time, approximately 360,000 Palestinians were forced to leave the West Bank and Gaza strip for Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. The power base of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) relocated to Lebanon after the Jordanian government attacked refugee camps in response to Palestinian military activities in Jordan. In the 1970s, the Israeli military crushed the PLO in Lebanon; however, it could not eliminate the Palestinian presence.

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Political and economic differences between Lebanon and Syria added to tension in the Middle East in the period after the end of World War II. Syria followed a policy of protective tariff, whereas Lebanon was committed to free enterprise and free trade. Under a succession of military regimes, political refugees from Syria found refuge in Lebanon, where they carried on anti-Syrian propaganda and agitation. Syrians suddenly found themselves directly involved with the fight for control of Lebanon. Civil war broke out in 1975 and a Syrian-dominated Arab Deterrent Force intervened after 40,000 civilians were killed and 100,000 were wounded. During the ‘‘brief interlude between the relatively benign civil war of 1958 and the protracted cruelties of 1975,’’ Lebanon experienced ‘‘sustained political stability, economic prosperity, and swift societal transformations.’’6 This period became known as Lebanon’s ‘‘golden age,’’ with all the outward manifestations of stupendous vitality, exuberance, and rising expectations. ‘‘But these were also times of growing disparities, cleavages, neglect, portends perhaps of a more ‘gilded age’ of misdirected and uneven growth, boisterous political culture, conspicuous consumption, and the trappings of frivolous life-styles masking creeping social tensions and other ominous symptoms of political unrest.’’7 It was from these disparities and inequities that tensions grew. Although an estimated 4 percent of Lebanon’s population disposed of 32 percent of the country’s gross national product, only 18 percent of the country’s wealth filtered down to the bottom half of the population.8 Christians, and even some Sunni Muslims, were able to benefit from the increase in capital in Lebanon, but the majority of lower income jobs were held by Shiite Muslims and Palestinians. Lebanon was the banking hub of the Middle East, and the region’s wealthy were increasingly placing their money in its banks to the extent that the total volume of bank deposits grew by 38 percent from 1950 to 1974.9 Lebanon also became a safe haven for dozens of political exiles from all over the world. Furthermore, it was during this golden age that tourists, both Europeans and Arabs alike, were attracted to Lebanon, thereby helping to establish the country as the Switzerland of the Middle East; moreover, their presence helped Lebanon remain essentially neutral in regional and international affairs.10 The attraction of wealth to Lebanon during its golden age facilitated the rise of the literacy rate, increased the desire for a more representative and balanced democracy, and widened the gap between the rich and the poor, resulting in appeals for better redistribution of the nation’s wealth. Rival factions began arming and training for war because as Lebanon ‘‘started to grapple with some of the unsettling

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manifestations of uneven development and socioeconomic transformations, a generation . . . broke away from such romanticized visions and started to expose . . . symptoms of injustice, confessionalism, corruption, and poverty.’’11 To compound the problem, political refugees and exiles from Palestine and the PLO had made Lebanon their operating center and orchestrated attacks on Israel. The 1980s saw an expansion of the conflicts in the Middle East in which Lebanon was embroiled. For example, Palestinian raids led to two large-scale Israeli invasions of South Lebanon in the early 1980s, and the United Nations peacekeeping force, UNIFEL, was called in to help with the withdrawal of the Israeli forces. Initially, the peacekeeping forces were seen by many groups in the Middle East—including the Syrians and the Israelis—as neutral liberators. However, it proved to be impossible for the peacekeepers not to take sides, and even the American and French troops were seen as supporting one side over another. Israeli troops cooperated with the Christian militias led by Samir Geagea against the PLO and the Palestinian refugees. After fighting broke out between the Shiite and Druze militias in West Beirut, Syrian troops entered Lebanon in February 1987. The Syrian government increased its presence to prepare for a long occupation, setting the stage for events that came decades later. Hezbollah, a militarized Shiite resistance movement, was also born out of this war, and it too would later become a formidable force altering the course of Lebanese history. The multinational peacekeeping force of U.S. marines and British, French, and Italian soldiers proved unable to stop the conflict among the different Lebanese factions and evacuated in 1984. Life was trying for the Lebanese during the civil war, and the prosperity and promise of the 20 years prior to 1975 vanished. Trade within the country was limited to illegal ports set up along the coastline; the infrastructure was completely decimated, and many who could afford to pack up and leave did so; the souks, or markets, set up shop only when circumstances were stable enough. The government had little, if any, control over the country, and rule shifted to municipalities in the cities and village warlords in the mountains. There was no public sector debt because the public sector had virtually no income. It was surprising that the banks remained untouched throughout most of the civil war, but investment slowed as investors lost confidence. During the civil war, elections continued in a manner that was hardly free or fair. There were repeated assassinations of presidents and ministers. Those who claimed to have power could not exercise it effectively. Most of the authority was held by community leaders and elders

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looking only to advance the cause of their own people (i.e., members of their religious sect, tribe, or asabiya).12 All groups became highly opportunistic and formed alliances only for short periods to further their agenda. Essentially, there was no political structure during the war. Lebanon was in serious need of repair and the first step was to negotiate a cease-fire. The Taif Agreement By 1989, there were two governments claiming control of Lebanon: one Muslim and one Christian. In September 1989, parliamentarians from both sides agreed to meet in Taif, Saudi Arabia, to negotiate terms for a peace treaty and postwar reconstruction. The deliberations took nearly a month, but the result was critical for Lebanon’s future. The participants agreed to a ‘‘confessional system’’ (with power distributed among the different ethnic groups) similar to the one that existed before the war, with a few substantial changes. Many of the powers that had been held by the Christian president were given to the Sunni prime minister, although the president retained the majority of power. The Agreements also changed the structure of the National Assembly by increasing the number of seats from 108 to 128 and splitting the representation evenly between Christians and Muslims. The objectives of the Taif Agreement were to forge a national reconciliation that would return Lebanon to prewar economic status while improving its democratic system of government and preventing sectarian conflict. The agreement preserved the earlier custom of distributing power among its different sects: the Maronite presidency, the Sunni premiership, and the Shi’a speakership. The ratification of political reforms recommended in the Taif Agreement by the Lebanese National Assembly in November 1989 marked a significant moment in Lebanese history for several reasons. First, the agreements formed a pact among all the religious sects of Lebanon. This was crucial because it helped bring about an end to the bloody and destructive 15-year civil war that claimed the lives of more than 7 percent of the population and displaced more than a half million.13 Second, the Taif Agreement proposed a new form of government that would be equally divided between Christians and Muslims. Third, the treaty proposed several economic reforms needed to alleviate the economic fallout of the war. These economic reforms would also help Lebanon rebuild and modernize so that it could become a competitor in the global market and reclaim its reputation as the Switzerland of the Middle East.

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Post-Civil War Lebanon In 2004, Syria’s departure from Lebanon united Christians and Muslims; both religious groups were interested in the departure of the 35,000 Syrian troops and the establishment of Lebanon as a sovereign state. Although there was widespread rejoicing over the Syrian departure, tensions still remained high. Many Druze expressed their approval. However, Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader, ‘‘wanted the Syrian troops redeployed and sought more balanced relations between Beirut and Damascus with no Syrian interference in Lebanese domestic issues.’’14 In April 2004, three Druze women, including the sister of the Druze deputy, Akram Chehayeb, a close associate of Jumblatt, were injured when they opened a parcel bomb left on their doorstep— evidence of continuing conflict and continuing resistance of some factions to the agreement. The United States continues to play an important role in Lebanon; although governments have indicated a policy of distancing the country from the Middle East peace process, there have been notable lapses in the policy. The 2004 meeting of Israel’s Prime Minister Arial Sharon with President George W. Bush in Washington, D.C., made the Lebanese, as well as the rest of the world, question America’s alleged disinterest in Middle Eastern affairs. These concerns were linked in part to the results of an Israeli inquiry that held Sharon directly responsible for the 1982 massacre of hundreds of Palestinians by Lebanese Christian militias allied to Israel. The Bush administration continuously blamed the Palestinians for violence in Israel while accepting the Israel position on the issues wholeheartedly.15 Given their nearly chronic experience with aggression within and beyond their borders, Lebanese people are likely to have strong views on governmental (and nongovernmental) aggression and peace. It was those views that we sought for this chapter.

LEBANESE PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND PEACE The Lebanese Sample The survey for this study on international perspectives on governmental aggression and peace was administered through three separate initiatives: initially, the survey was distributed in Arabic in paper form, but later it was available as an English language Internet survey and then as an Arabic Internet survey. The aggregate sample consists of

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186 participants (100 female and 86 male) with a mean age of 26. Most of the participants were students in an undergraduate institution. Fifty percent described themselves as middle-class and 16.5 percent as upper-class. Fourteen different sects were identified; around 64 percent were Christian and 32 percent were Muslim, with the highest percentages classified as Maronite Catholic (30 percent) and Shiite Muslim (14 percent). For the purposes of this chapter, seven items from the survey were coded and analyzed. Participants were asked to rate each item on a Likert scale of 1 to 7, from ‘‘totally disagree’’ to ‘‘totally agree,’’ to indicate their level of endorsement. They were also asked to provide an explanation, in their own words, for their rating scale responses. Eighty-three percent of the participants were born in Lebanon, and 80 percent currently live there. Recruiting efforts were handled cautiously, and anonymity of respondents was ensured, as Lebanon continues to struggle politically, and its recent war of July 2006 keeps its citizens wary. With the recent conflicts in Lebanon, many Lebanese citizens have taken part in protests and political gatherings; however, very few of our respondents reported any political activism. Whether the actual rate of activism in our sample is low or respondents were concerned about confidentiality is unknown. Many respondents were also hesitant to answer the ‘‘were you in the military service’’ question. The draft in Lebanon has been eliminated since February 10, 2007,16 and many male students had not enlisted in the military service when it was in existence. These questions were not answered on 26 percent of the surveys. As far as we know, our survey is the first such open-ended survey allowing Lebanese participants to share their views on governmental aggression and peace in their own words. Despite any apprehensions they may have felt regarding particular demographic items, the participants who responded directly to the survey in Lebanon (rather than over the Internet) indicated great eagerness to voice their opinions on these important and personally relevant issues. They wanted to be known and understood as a people who are not interested in war but rather in peace.

PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND TERRORISM Definitions of War War is . . . ‘‘destruction, death of the innocent, fear, and obstruction to all intellectual development.’’

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‘‘When countries have feuds they can’t resolve, they lash out and cause war.’’ ‘‘[War] is the worst solution for any problem.’’ When asked to provide a definition of war, 52 percent of participants focused on traditional synonyms for war such as ‘‘armed conflict’’ or ‘‘violence between people or groups.’’ Thirty-two percent of the Lebanese respondents described the destructive and negative outcomes of war such as ‘‘fear,’’ ‘‘killing of innocents,’’ and ‘‘terrorism.’’ Twenty percent identified war as a conflict between groups or nations. The third most frequent type of response (16 percent) referred to individuals’ emotions during or because of war, reflecting the psychological effects of war on individuals. Examples included ‘‘misery,’’ ‘‘regret,’’ and ‘‘catharsis.’’ A Governmental Right to Invasion ‘‘[Invasion] is not acceptable. Peace and Sovereignty should be respected between all nations.’’ ‘‘Every country has its own independence.’’ ‘‘[Invasion is acceptable] if the invading country has a just cause (i.e., retaliation or response to a serious threat).’’ ‘‘Why not [invade] if the other country is home for terrorists?’’ ‘‘If you have to do it, then you go for it.’’ In response to the item, ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country,’’ almost 73 percent of the Lebanese expressed some level of disagreement. Among the arguments against a right to invasion, 26 percent of the responses referred to each country’s right to be independent, make its own decisions, and have its own customs. Seven percent of the responses emphasized the importance of respecting physical boundaries or the territory of another country, and another 7 percent argued that there are better alternatives to invasions because they do not solve problems. Lebanon’s location has made for many trespasses on its boundaries and perhaps inadequate efforts to resolve internal conflicts; our Lebanese participants were well aware of these problems. Right to Kill Innocent Civilians In Order to Fight Terrorism ‘‘Killing citizens means killing the tree of freedom.’’ ‘‘No innocents should be killed by anyone. It’s unfair.’’ ‘‘That’s exactly what is happening in Lebanon and Iraq: the US and its allies are killing civilians to fight terrorism.’’

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‘‘We shouldn’t hurt the innocent people; we should only kill the terrorists if we are sure they are terrorists.’’ ‘‘The terrorist is the cancer or killer of this century but we have to fight this cancer.’’ Lebanon’s long experience with invasion and civil war is reflected in participant responses to the item ‘‘Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism.’’17 Nearly two thirds of the Lebanese respondents expressed strong disagreement with this item though 9 percent chose to strongly agree. Eighteen percent of the qualitative responses fell into the category ‘‘state terrorism,’’ indicating that the killing of innocent civilians makes governments into terrorists, and 16 percent emphasized the civilians’ innocence as the reason why governments do not have a right to kill them. A few respondents (7 percent) emphasized that there were better ways to fight terrorism; for example, an 18-year-old Christian responded, ‘‘There are other ways to fight terrorism like dialogue, discussions, and compromise.’’ Eight percent of the respondents qualified their disagreement with a governmental right to torture. A 29-year-old female participant wrote, ‘‘You have first to be sure that this citizen is guilty or innocent; if he’s a terrorist then we have to punish him.’’ No differences were found between Christians and Muslims nor between English- and Arabic-speaking participants in level of rejection of a governmental right to kill civilians while fighting terrorism—a finding that may be contradictory to some stereotypical images of the Lebanese individual or the Middle Easterner. Terrorism is endemic to this region and has often been identified with Islam, Palestinians, Iran, and Shiism; this negative stereotype did not hold true in this religiously diverse sample. For example, one Palestinian American activist has contested the assumption that the terrorists of contemporary times are Muslim, Palestinian, and Middle Eastern, whereas the West is incapable of such behavior.18 In our sample, whether the participant was Muslim or Christian, the responses were still in strong disagreement.

Definitions of Terrorism Terrorism is . . . ‘‘Aggressive acts of violence from an organized group toward others having different beliefs’’; ‘‘Against humanity, leads to the killing of innocent people’’; ‘‘craziness’’; ‘‘primitive way of thinking’’; ‘‘people who accept death and refuse peace’’; ‘‘revenge.’’

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Although ‘‘terrorism’’ has become a source of international concern in the 21st century, there is controversy over how it should be defined. In our sample, many Lebanese participants (30 percent) defined terrorism with words expressing moral judgments; for example, ‘‘crazy,’’ ‘‘stupid,’’ ‘‘selfish,’’ ‘‘awful,’’ ‘‘criminal act,’’ and ‘‘ugliness.’’ One respondent commented, ‘‘the explosion of evil drives aggressive acts of violence from an organized group toward others having different beliefs, a network of killers that has no mercy, no morals and no religion.’’ Twenty-nine percent of the respondents focused on the destructive intents of terrorism; for example, ‘‘violence’’ and ‘‘death.’’ One respondent viewed terrorism as constructive, referring to it as ‘‘revolution.’’ There were also a few responses that alluded to conditions that give rise to terrorism; for example, a 43-year-old female participant explained that that terrorists lack education about life. These definitions of terrorism may reflect what it means to be living in a country that had witnessed 11 assassinations. President Suleiman was elected on May 25, 2008, after a six-month-long political deadlock.19 Parliamentary elections were postponed eight times because of disagreements among the different political parties. The prime minister had assumed all power, and the military was demoralized as Army General Francois Haj, chief of operations, was killed by a car bomb— the first security forces assassination. The two main Palestinian refugee camps, Nahr al Bared in Tripoli and Ain el Hilwe in Sidon, have been strengthened by the political instability. These camps, which are supposed to provide shelter and schools for refugees, have become homes for militants interested in the Islamic cause, fighting the larger, predominantly Western powers, and waging a war in the name of Islam. This tension has made sectarian strife alive again. In its prosecution of the ‘‘war on terror,’’ the American government has made the argument that aggressive interrogation of suspected terrorists is necessary—a position that has been widely challenged as a violation of international law. Our Lebanese respondents expressed considerable disagreement with the Personal and Individual Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) item ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war.’’ Overall, 64 percent percent of the sample showed some disagreement with this item, with 27 percent of the respondents denouncing torture because it violates human rights and 8 percent denouncing it as illogical or immoral. Fourteen percent of respondents specified that torture is acceptable if there is strong evidence of wrongdoings on the part of the torture recipient. A 19-year-old female wrote, ‘‘Yes, if the prisoner is an enemy, if he is a killer of our people, destroys our houses . . .’’

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Perspectives on Peace and Protest Peace is . . . ‘‘love, beauty, health.’’ ‘‘Peace reigns when the war is over.’’ ‘‘Life means Peace.’’ ‘‘We should build a world of peace for the benefit of the human being.’’ ‘‘In this world of hate, the achievement of peace is getting complicated.’’ When defining peace, 50 percent of the Lebanese participants provided positive definitions of peace, referring to it as a desirable end state. Examples of these positive responses included ‘‘love,’’ ‘‘everybody’s hope and dream,’’ ‘‘security,’’ and ‘‘tranquility.’’ Twenty-seven percent of participants defined peace negatively, emphasizing what it is not rather than what it is. Such definitions included ‘‘A state of nonviolence and nonthreatening’’; ‘‘a period void of hatred and fighting’’; and ‘‘when there aren’t any countries fighting.’’ Several respondents (7 percent) defined it as ‘‘utopia’’ or ‘‘unobtainable.’’ Peace is ‘‘a dream that should come true,’’ according to an 18-year-old female. More than 90 percent of the participants agreed that all human beings have a right to peace. Although violence has been in their history, the Lebanese people are calling for a change that involves peace. About 35 percent of the participants agreed that world peace is possible. This is a third of the percentage of respondents who thought that all human beings have the right to peace. In regard to responses describing peace as unachievable, one can understand the pessimism of Lebanese individuals who have repeatedly felt victimized by circumstances beyond their control. The Lebanese Diaspora has accelerated this growing pessimism regarding world peace; many families have become fragmented and their homeland rarely feels secure. An 18-year-old woman commented, ‘‘I would like to see the statistics of how many human beings actually live in peace on this earth! Probably the population of North America only. We live in a violent world, no one cares about peace, and their main concern is oil, money, power. Our god has become the ‘God of Dollars.’’’ Is There a Right to Protest? ‘‘Yes [there is a right to protest] but who listens to the voice of the weak people and the poor?’’ ‘‘It is the essence of freedom and speech.’’ ‘‘Yes, but with respecting the society’s culture.’’ ‘‘That’s democracy.’’ ‘‘It’s necessary.’’

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Images of and articles concerning Lebanese protests have been published globally since the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005. People of all different religions, genders, ages, and socioeconomic backgrounds paraded to Beirut to protest his death. Protests have continued to occur in Lebanon, especially in protest of more killings and injustices. Most of these protests have been nonviolent and attractive to all ages, individuals and families alike. Protests have been particularly abundant since January 2007. Hezbollah, opposing the government, led a mass protest and sit-in against the ‘‘illegitimate’’ government. In our sample, 87 percent of the respondents strongly agreed that individuals have a right to protest against war and in favor of peace. An 18-year-old female wrote, ‘‘Yes, because the individuals are the most important thing in the society.’’ The Lebanese participants who endorsed the item, ‘‘individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace,’’ reported personal involvement in war protests. Is National Security Necessary for Individual and Family Security? ‘‘National Security provides prosperity and security for citizens. Government is responsible.’’ ‘‘If there is no security, there is no way to education, no way to work [or] to live.’’ ‘‘If there is no security the human being is lost and . . . all citizens try to immigrate.’’ ‘‘Security and strength are necessities for people.’’ How can a nation that is as diverse as Lebanon achieve national security, especially when it is situated in such a conflict-ridden area? When asked the extent to which they believed that national security was essential to individual and family security, 40 percent of the participants left the item unanswered. Unfortunately, Lebanese citizens have scarcely witnessed national security. They have basic needs such as shelter, employment, and stability, and many of these needs have been difficult to satisfy. The Lebanese people have yet to see a country that is nationally secure, and family security continues to come first in its collectivistic culture. Twenty-four percent of respondents agreed that national security is essential to individual and family security as a protection of values. One 19-year-old participant expressed the view that ‘‘Family is a small image of the country. If the country is secure, the people are secure.’’ Thirteen percent described national security as protection against forces and threats. A 21-year-old male explained that

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‘‘national security is the basic or ground security for other securities including cultural, economic, political, geographic, and family security. It is considered the physiological need in Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.’’ None of the participants indicated that it was the government’s duty to secure this right for its citizens. How Can Peace Be Achieved? ‘‘[Peace can be achieved through] dialogue and compromise.’’ ‘‘Spread love by starting with yourself.’’ ‘‘Reconcile and be fair to each other as you want them to be fair with you.’’ ‘‘Love and unselfishness’’; ‘‘justice, equality and [it is] impossible.’’ Despite the internal turmoil that Lebanon has experienced, the responses of the 186 participants suggest they see reconciliation as within reach both on an individual and public level. ‘‘Justice,’’ ‘‘equality,’’ ‘‘communication,’’ and ‘‘understanding’’ were responses to how peace can best be achieved, and these are the processes through which unity through diversity can lead to a stable Lebanese identity. A 21-year-old male participant explained, ‘‘The best way to achieve peace is to believe in it. If someone believes in a cause, then he/she would sacrifice pretty much anything to achieve that cause. Peace is quite similar. It is the most beneficial, least destructive, cost-minimizing, human respected method of resolving conflicts.’’ Forty-seven percent of the responses indicated that the best way to achieve peace is through positive interpersonal strategies such as communication, compromise, sacrifice, and respect. Thirty-seven percent of the responses called for the elimination of war, of bearing arms, and of invasion. Countries were called on to unite, to stop making weapons, and to eliminate terrorism. The third largest category focused on the individual (14 percent) having faith and working on ‘‘inner peace’’; 9 percent of the responses focused on political and diplomatic solutions to peace. Of all the topics that we have discussed, this is the one where an emphasis on the role of the individual stood out over an emphasis on action by the collective group.

LEBANON: INTO THE FUTURE Lebanese individuals are in search of an identity while in a struggle for political and national sovereignty. The struggle has been described by

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the American government20 as a fight for democracy; however, there are similarities and fundamental differences between Lebanon (the East) and America (the West) concerning the nature and the goals of the struggle. Both countries have engaged in wars and negotiations in the Middle East. They are both diverse and house many migrant and refugee populations with their differing ethnicities. Wimmer defines ethnicity as ‘‘a subjectively felt sense of belonging based on the belief in shared culture and common ancestry’’ and notes that this belief ‘‘refers to cultural practices perceived as ‘typical’ for the community, to myths of a common historical origin, or to phonotypical similarities.’’21 As a mixed ethnic country, Lebanon has developed a political structure based on compromise, but in some ways the division of power has worked against the promotion of peace. Different self-identified ethnic groups within Lebanon appear to differ in their ideals for Lebanese sovereignty, with Muslim Arabs often favoring Arab unity and Maronites favoring Lebanese sovereignty.22 It appears that to a considerable extent, Maronites have used their religious identity in determining the boundaries of their ethnic identity and their desires regarding nationality, whereas Muslims have used their ethnicity as Arabs or the use of spoken language to define themselves and their goals in regard to the future of Lebanon.23 These two identities, a premodern national church group, the Maronites, and a modern language-based identity, the Arabs,24 appear in many ways to be incompatible and contribute to Lebanon’s internal conflicts. Despite similarities, there are important differences between Eastern and Western perspectives. For example, communities in the East tend to be structured differently from those in the West. In the West, the community has an armed force that serves a nation-state. The East to a considerable extent lacks nation-states that are comparable to those in the West. Lebanon’s Islamic Resistance groups have traditionally served at a local or transnational level, although these groups have recently been declared a national level movement. In the West, patriotism is defined as national loyalty, love of national symbols, specific beliefs in the country’s superiority, and the development of civic ties for a mature nation.25 Lebanon, with its uneasy conjoining of many political groups motivated by religion, lacks a sense of national patriotism and a true nationalistic movement. There are constraints to peace and reconciliation in Lebanon. On several points, peace in Lebanon remains elusive. Debts are rising, and the emigration of many highly qualified professionals and university graduates leaves a severe gap in economic stability. Poverty is also on the increase, and although charities and social organizations are making

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progress, there are still many refugees and migrant workers in need of assistance. The reconstruction of downtown Beirut has been halted because of strikes that have been ongoing since Raffia Hariri’s assassination in 2005. The Israeli-Lebanese war in the summer of 2006 halted hopes of renewed economic and political stability. Although the United States is making an effort to bring democracy and peace to this region, the Lebanese individual (regardless of religion or ethnicity) may not be willing or ready to join this effort. Political parties have become abundant in Lebanon; political leaders of the past are reinventing agendas. Religious and sectarian differences become minor as patriotic and nationalistic ideas become mainstream. How one relates to the current political climate relates to one’s overall group identity. In a country that has over 18 different religions and sects, this process becomes complicated. Of the 186 survey participants, 41 percent did not report a political affiliation, which may be the easiest way to demonstrate identification with a group in a volatile and constantly changing political atmosphere. The sense of belonging to a specific group can help alleviate fears and build hopes for a better future. In the struggle for identity, Lebanon has proven that it achieved both a personal and collective identity for its diverse population. Culture has made a home for both militants and volunteers in the context of a postwar society. However, based on the responses of the 186 participants, reconciliation is within reach both on an individual and public level. Justice, equality, communication, and understanding were responses to how peace can best be achieved and are the processes through which unity through diversity can lead to a stable Lebanese identity. There is an element of connection that underlies Lebanon’s history and survey responses. Groups are based on social solidarity (asabiyya) where personal ties are based on kinship, friendship, religion, and religious affiliation.26,27 Communities are formed informally through family connections and relationships, which are united although internally divided and fragmented. The Lebanese Zu’ama system, or family system, underlies the Lebanese system of affairs wherein an individual decision is based on the beliefs and ideas of many. Lebanon is a principal example of the struggle for individual human rights in concert with the quest for peace and reconciliation. As long as the West is viewed as imperialistic and the East as conquerable, it appears that East-West differences can continue to lead to animosity. The Iraq war has been perceived as a sign the West is attempting to impose its doctrines and ideals on a region regarded as violent, unstable, and unsuccessful. A 26-year-old male participant laments, ‘‘It is highly immoral. The U.S. is

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thirsty for blood and oil, and big brother wants to have its troops everywhere.’’ F. Pratto, in her research, wrote, ‘‘Lebanon is literally and culturally at the cross-roads of East and West, and as such has a diverse population in which numerous group identities, including religious, ethnic, national and cultural (Arab/Western) are up for grabs.’’28

9

Iraq Abdul Kareem AlObaidi and Linda Jeffrey1

War is . . . ‘‘destruction.’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘life.’’ The modern, independent nation of Iraq has existed for only threequarters of a century. In recent decades, Iraqis have experienced the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, transitional governments, and most recently a government elected democratically during occupation by U.S.-led coalition forces. It has also experienced severe deprivation related to embargo and years of war and civil unrest. In 2006, it was estimated that about 3,000 Iraqi civilians were being killed every month.2 In 2007, nearly 20,000 civilian fatalities occurred in Iraq.3 Of an estimated 4 million displaced Iraqis, about l.9 million are refugees inside Iraq, and about 2.2 million have become refugees in neighboring countries.4 Since 2003, nearly l5 percent of Iraq’s total population have left Iraq—an estimated 50 percent of them children.5 Since invasion by the United States and coalition forces in 2003, Iraq has had to confront an enormity of social problems, including internal refugees and overburdened social services. Those seeking more secure living circumstances create an overwhelming demand on basic services. Internal refugees often settle in poor communities that have been detrimentally affected by previous violence and insecurity. About 45 percent of internal refugees cannot afford their own homes and move in with extended families or occupy public buildings. Basic educational and heath care services have been eroded; communities hosting displaced families are being overwhelmed. Baghdad has the highest numbers of displaced people in Iraq.

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IRAQI HISTORICAL CONTEXT The ancient cultural history of Iraq as the cradle of civilization extends several millennia into the past. Central and southern Iraq was Mesopotamia, the site of the world’s first cities and city-states. Iraqis take pride in their long historical tradition of urban vitality and diversity, agricultural innovation, and distinguished intellectual and artistic creativity.6 The Babylonian ruler, Hammurabi, for example, was a noteworthy lawgiver who codified the principles of equivalence in punishment and retribution; for example, taking just one eye for one eye.7 Saddam Hussein, the former Iraqi dictator, recognized the Iraqi regard for their historical heritage and devoted resources to rebuild Babylon near the current capital, Baghdad.8 In addition to its rich cultural history, the natural resources of Iraq include oil reserves and arable lands irrigated by the Tigris and Euphrates river networks.9 Laurie King-Irani10 described the historical features of Iraq influencing current prospects for peace and rehabilitation following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. For centuries, Iraq was a region of many autonomous centers of diverse political and economic activities. In the British colonial period (1918–1932), the state of Iraq was created from the three Ottoman provinces of the cities of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. These regions displayed distinctly different socioeconomic and ethnic characteristics. Each used different currency, weights, and measures until the late 19th century. The institutional infrastructure of the nation-state structure was established in the second half of the 19th century through the Ottoman Empire’s Tanzimat legal reforms of land ownership to resemble a system of private property. Tribal social structures were transformed into landed feudal structures. As tribal groups became more agriculturally established and integrated into a market economy, the tribal moral values of egalitarian solidarity, honor, dignity, and mutual assistance became less prominent. With the advent of prohibition of collective rights to land, a class system of wealthy landowners and impoverished farmers emerged. Class disparities were formalized with the recognition of land title when the state of Iraq was established in l932.11 In l958, a military coup established a Pan-Arab nationalist republic emphasizing modern secular values and socialist models of government. Private property ownership was undercut by a military led government. The height of the national power and influence of the Iraqi Communist Party took place from l958 to l963. A bloodless coup brought the Ba’ath Party to power in l968. The postmonarchical regimes of l958 and l968 controlled increasing levels of wealth based on rapidly rising oil revenues and nationalization of production sectors of the economy. The worldwide rise of oil prices and the Ba’ath regime’s

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nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company positioned the Ba’ath regime to exercise totalitarian rule. Instead of channeling the impressive resources of Iraq into raising the standard of living for all Iraqis, the regime focused spending on projects serving the regime’s interests.12 Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in l990 in an attempt to reannex it to Iraq. Iraq is made up of multiethnic communities. Hussein’s regime, which ‘‘encouraged dependency while also fragmenting Iraqi society into competing identity groups based on sect, region, and tribal affiliation’’ was deposed in 2003 in the United States-led invasion of Iraq.13 Kurdish Iraqis are a non-Arab ethnic group with historical ties beyond the borders of Iraq that experienced a forced migration from the cities of Mosul and Kirkuk in northern Iraq in the l970s and l980s. In l988, the Hussein regime executed thousands of Kurds in the AlAnfal campaign. Arabs from tribal and rural communities in central and southern Iraq were relocated into the residences of Kurds under Hussein’s ‘‘Arabization campaign.’’ With the fall of Hussein, hundreds of Arab families were internally displaced. Hussein’s regime also drained the extensive wetlands that were home to Marsh Arabs (Madan). They were forced to relocate in Missan, Basra, and Thi-Qar governorates.14 Failure to take into consideration the complex sociopolitical terrain of Iraq, including its political dynamics and interrelationships among groups and regions, has characterized the U.S. involvement in Iraq since 2003. Security and safety are not the only fundamental challenges to wellbeing in Iraq. Sanitation and landmines are also key concerns. In addition, the amount of solid waste being produced in the country every day (around 31,000 tons) far overruns the capacity of local authorities to deal with it adequately—contributing to a range of health problems. ‘‘Lack of hygiene and unsafe drinking water are priority concerns for Iraqi families, second only to security,’’ said Robert Wright, UNICEF Special Representative for Iraq (March 2008).15 An outbreak of cholera in late 2007 sickened nearly 5,000 Iraqis. Dr. Naeema Al-Ghasser, WHO Representative for Iraq, said, ‘‘Poor sanitation in Iraq is a dangerous conduit for disease.’’ According to UNICEF and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Iraq is also plagued with one of the world’s greatest concentrations of ‘‘unexploded ordnance’’ (UXO) and other ‘‘explosive remnants of war’’ (ERW), including landmines and cluster bombs. It has been estimated that Iraq was subjected to a minimum of 55 million cluster bombs during the last two invasions, leaving a deadly remnant that continues to plague Iraqi civilians. UXO are of particular risk to Iraqi children; a quarter of Iraq’s 565 UXO victims assessed in 2006 were under l8. Children often mistake UXO for toys or harmless play objects.

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Within Iraq, displacement of citizens has unbalanced social services and left many communities struggling to cope with the influx of new people. Even Iraqis who escape the immediate conditions of war in their country by seeking refuge elsewhere may continue to experience the repercussions of social unrest and conflict. Premigration, flight, and resettlement experiences involve significant stress that impacts the well-being of refugees, particularly children. THE IRAQI SAMPLE Given the ongoing political turmoil and armed conflict occurring in Iraq, factors of personal safety and risk affect the collection of survey data. This convenience sample included l6 Iraqis, 11 females, and 5 males, living in Egypt, Norway, and Australia. Fourteen of the respondents were refugees living in Egypt; their responses to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) were brief, often only one-word answers. The remaining two respondents from Norway and Australia submitted their responses online and answered in greater detail. Although not a large or highly representative sample of Iraqis, this expatriate sample is of interest because all the respondents have personally been directly affected by war. Issues of war and peace may have a particular salience for them that may not be as immediate or telling in individuals more buffered from the realities of armed conflict. The survey respondents ranged in age from l8 to 77 years with an average age of 40 years old. All respondents were born in Iraq, as were their parents. Fifteen respondents were Moslems, and two were Christian. About 60 percent of the respondents were married. Half of the participants had engaged in university or postgraduate study. Most respondents had a family member who had served in the military. Two participants reported serving in the military, one for 30 years and one for 22 years. None of the participants had participated in any conflict resolution or peace education programs in a school or community setting. PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND PEACE The classic definition of war (i.e., armed conflict between nations or between factions within a state) may carry different connotations depending on the immediacy of one’s experiences with its actual realities and experientially derived perspectives on the efficacy of war. Five of our Iraqi respondents (36 percent of the sample) focused on the effects of war, calling it ‘‘destruction,’’ and 9 (64 percent) identified war

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as the lack of a positive state, defining it as ‘‘instability.’’ One respondent also defined war as ‘‘evil.’’ One of the online respondents quoted Abraham Lincoln’s observation, ‘‘There is nothing good in war except its ending.’’ The war between Iraq and Iran from 1980 to 1988 certainly brought much destruction. In particular, the oil sector in both countries was greatly damaged; within days of the beginning of the war, oil exporting was out of operation.16 This outcome was especially damaging given that the oil sector had been the most important economic sector for Iraq since the 1970s. It is estimated that the Iraq-Iran war made up 96 percent of Iraq’s GNP in the years of the war (the Vietnam war was between 2 and 3 percent of the U.S. GNP from 1965 to 1974).17 This economic burden—along with infrastructure disruptions, looting, and sabotage characterizing 21st-century Iraq—may have contributed to the tendency of Iraqi respondents to identify war with ‘‘destruction’’ and ‘‘instability,’’ as well as ‘‘evil.’’ The UN estimated in June of 2003 that Baghdad had lost up to 50 percent of its water supply because of additional breaks in the water mains attributed to vibrations from bombing and tanks passing over the water lines.18 When asked to define terrorism, 64 percent of the respondents from the Egypt sample called terrorism ‘‘crime,’’ 21 percent described a feeling of ‘‘fear’’ or ‘‘dread,’’ and 14 percent (two respondents) defined terrorism by making a moral judgment, calling it ‘‘bad’’ and ‘‘unacceptable.’’ The respondents from Norway and Australia also defined terrorism in moral terms, as a ‘‘cowardly act’’ and ‘‘idiots with bug’s brains.’’ In regard to moral judgments, none of the respondents agreed with the item stating that the United States involvement in the Iraq war is a moral activity. Only two respondents did not give a response of ‘‘total disagreement’’: one gave ‘‘fairly strong disagreement,’’ and the other gave ‘‘neither agree nor disagree.’’ Respondents were skeptical about whether it is possible to identify in all the military actions taking place around the globe today which party (nation, ethnic group, or religion) is in the right and which is wrong; on the rating scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree), the average score was 2.31, and only one respondent neither agreed nor disagreed. One respondent wrote, ‘‘Iraq is under occupation, there is no proof of WMD, so the old so-called ‘regime’ should come back to power as it will be the only way to install stability and security throughout Iraq. I am not in full support of any form of dictatorship, but it is necessary to protect the lives of the citizens in general.’’ When asked to define ‘‘rights,’’ 43 percent of the Iraqis defined the term positively (i.e., as the presence of something, specifically ‘‘equality’’), and slightly more than half of the other respondents

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seemed oriented more toward the removal of something aversive, defining rights as ‘‘freedom.’’ One of the online respondents focused on the reality of his or her situation: ‘‘missing things and we’re still looking forward to find them.’’ In response to the item ‘‘What is your definition of torture?’’ all respondents incorporated a moral judgment into their definition. In the Egypt sample, responses were fairly evenly distributed among three different words that appear to differ in intensity: ‘‘bad’’ (36 percent), ‘‘unfair’’ (21 percent), and ‘‘inhumanity’’ (36 percent). One of the online respondents also identified torture with inhumanity, whereas the other online respondent focused on the inefficacy of the practice: ‘‘a method to push people to lie.’’ According to a January 2008 survey through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 20 percent of registered Iraqi refugees experienced torture or violence in Iraq, which amounts to over 19,000 people. Among the forms of torture that refugees reported experiencing were beatings, electric shocks, burns, rape, and objects being placed under fingernails.19 Given the statistics from the UN report, it is possible that the respondents for the PAIRTAPS have a concept of torture based on a less than abstract experience. The majority of the Iraqi respondents in Egypt (79 percent) defined reconciliation as ‘‘solution,’’ whereas the remaining 21 percent defined it as ‘‘hope.’’ One of the online respondents defined reconciliation as ‘‘God’s Work.’’ These responses indicate that they see reconciliation as effective and positive and something to which nations should aspire. The remaining respondent, perhaps less optimistic, defined reconciliation as a ‘‘new way of colonization but undercover’’—a view with interesting implications for those parties currently involved in reconstructing Iraq. As was true of the definitions of reconciliation, most of the definitions of peace expressed a positive and optimistic view. Specifically, 57 percent of the refugee sample in Egypt defined peace as a goal or ideal, and all but one of the respondents in this category indicated that peace is something to be striven for (‘‘hope’’ and ‘‘dream’’); the other respondent focused on the idea that peace is hard to achieve (‘‘difficult’’). The remaining 42 percent of the Egyptian refugee respondents identified peace with a state of security, defining it as ‘‘safe.’’ The online respondents defined peace as ‘‘God’’ and ‘‘life.’’ When asked the best way to achieve security, 53 percent of the sample wrote ‘‘negotiations,’’ and 40 percent wrote ‘‘equal opportunities.’’ Their responses point to reasons why they feel a country is not secure: conflict and inequality. Both responses speak of governmental responsibilities for security. ‘‘Equal opportunities’’ seems to indicate more internal conflict in response to inequality as a threat to security.

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INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO PEACE AND PROTEST The respondents felt that children have the right to grow up in a world of peace and that all human beings have a basic right to peace. All of the respondents totally agreed with both of these statements. The majority felt that no one has the right to physically or psychologically torture, injure, much less kill, any other human being; one respondent chose ‘‘neither agree nor disagree,’’ and all the others either fairly strongly agreed or totally agreed. All but one of the respondents fairly strongly disagreed or totally disagreed with the statement ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country.’’ One respondent (one of the online respondents) totally agreed with the statement, adding, ‘‘When the other country crossed the red lines.’’ The respondents displayed uncertainty or skeptism about the achievability of world peace. The highest score the respondents gave for the item ‘‘I believe that world peace can be achieved’’ was a 4, which means that they ‘‘neither agree nor disagree.’’ One respondent questioned the achievability of peace as long as there are ‘‘idiots in this world who are ruling.’’ The respondents were more consistent in their agreement with the item ‘‘National security is essential for individual and family security.’’ One participant mildly agreed, whereas all the others either fairly strongly agreed or totally agreed. One respondent defined security as ‘‘Well-being and peace to all nations.’’ Despite some pessimism about the achievability of world peace, the respondents expressed strong support for a right of individuals to stage protests against war and in favor of peace; all but two respondents fairly strongly or totally agreed that individuals have this right, and the remaining two mildly agreed.

THE RIGHTS OF GOVERNMENT Regarding responses to PAIRTAPS items assessing views on the extent to which individuals are tolerant of governmental aggression, it is important to remember that the Iraq government has undergone major changes in the last few years. As a result of attempts in 2003 by former Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) head Paul Bremer to clear away the overthrown Ba’ath regime with which Saddam Hussein was associated, the majority of the top three grades of ministry officials were removed from power, and the army was disbanded.20 In a meeting with a U.S. congressional subcommittee on July 18, 2003, international humanitarian worker Pat Carey likened the system in Iraq to a body whose head was cut off.21 However, the U.S. government has not always been

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opposed to the Ba’ath regime; as one source points out, ‘‘It is well known that the CIA was responsible for staging the coup that brought the Ba’ath party to power in 1968, later aiding the regime in its struggle against the revolutionary government of Ayatolla Khomeini in neighboring Iran.’’22 This behavior must have added to the confusion in Iraq concerning what kind of authority was in charge in Washington, with the U.S.-directed CPA overthrowing the regime the United States had once encouraged. The United Nations Security Council identified three institutions as part of the transitional government in 2003: the CPA (of which Bremer had been the head), the Governing Council of Iraq, and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).23 In June 2004, the CPA dissolved the IGC to establish the Iraqi Interim Government, led by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi.24 In July 2004, provincial committees of local tribal, religious, and business leaders gathered to choose a provisional national assembly.25 In December 2005, elections were held for a constitutionally elected government, and a new parliament, the Council of Representatives, was established in 2005.26 Currently, 33 countries are involved in Iraq either through the coalition or UNAMI; these countries (excluding the U.S.) contribute 10,000 personnel to the coalition and 450 personnel to UNAMI.27 A large majority of our Iraqi respondents did not concur with the PAIRTAPS item stating that the police or military sometimes have the right to use violence against their own citizens; specifically, 75 percent at least mildly disagreed. Similarly, a large majority disagreed with the statement that ‘‘Governments have the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war’’: 81 percent totally disagreed, 13 percent fairly strongly disagreed, and one respondent mildly disagreed. Over 80 percent of the respondents also disagreed strongly that heads of government sometimes have the right to kill innocent civilians to fight international terrorism, with only one participant neither agreeing nor disagreeing. None of the respondents agreed that a country has the right to ignore international treaties or international human rights agreements: one respondent fairly strongly disagreed, whereas the remaining respondents totally disagreed. As one respondent said, treaties ‘‘are there for the protection of everyone (if possible). Why sign a treaty or agree to something you are going to overturn sometime in the future?’’ One of the most significant treaties in Iraq’s most recent history has been the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This treaty, from 1970, is one of the most widely adhered to arms control treaties in history, with Iraq being one of the more than 140 parties signed on to the treaty.28 It was on the basis of this treaty that the Bush administration launched investigations into the question of whether Iraq, under Hussein’s rule, was pursuing a program to develop nuclear

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weapons of mass destruction. One of the principal arguments the U.S. government initially gave for its invasion of Iraq was that Iraq was violating that treaty. Subsequently, the whole world was to learn that no evidence of arms for mass destruction had been found in Iraq by the occupying forces.

EMOTIONAL RESPONSES TO WITNESSING VIOLENCE The PAIRTAPS contains several items asking participants how they would feel and what they would want to do in each of several situations, including the following: (1) ‘‘Another country is indiscriminately bombing a major city in your country, and women, children, the elderly, and civilian men are running around bloody and screaming’’; (2) ‘‘Your country is indiscriminately bombing a major city in another country, and women, children, the elderly, and civilian men are running around bloody and screaming’’; and (3) ‘‘Military officials are torturing somebody suspected of having information about terrorists.’’ The Iraqi respondents expressed shock and resentment about the bombing of cities affecting the civilian population. They also expressed a desire to help the victims and to move away. In response to the possibility of learning about their country bombing another country, they reported feelings of helplessness, hatred, and a desire for revenge. Most of the participants indicated that if they witnessed police beating peaceful antiwar demonstrators, they would feel resentment, and two respondents reported they would feel hate. They indicated they would feel helpless in such a circumstance, would want to protest, and would want to help if possible.

LESSONS FROM THE IRAQIS Six of the 16 Iraqi refugees surveyed in this study, aged l8–30 years old, grew up during a period in which their country experienced a dictatorship, two wars, sanctions, and deprivation. Exposed to multiple warrelated traumas and life as refugees, they are ordinary citizens offering opinions about war, peace, and human rights informed by direct experience. While exposure to war and violence might be thought to have a degrading or corrupting influence, leading its victims to embrace violence and the desire for revenge, these respondents reflected a belief in human rights and the rule of law. The younger members of this sample, like the older respondents, indicated they do not believe that one country has the right to invade another country. They do not believe that a

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government has the right to conscript citizens and send them to fight in a foreign war. They do not believe a country has the right to ignore international treaties or international human rights agreements. They strongly believe that children have the right to grow up in a world of peace and that all human beings have a basic right to peace. They believe individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace. They believe that no one has the right to physically or psychologically torture, injure, much less kill, any other human being. They do not believe that governments have the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war. They do not believe that the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism. They do not believe that, in military actions taking place around the globe today, it is possible to identify which party is in the right and which is wrong. Their desire is to help when they see an injustice. Some feel helpless, and some feel world peace cannot be achieved. They defined terrorism as ‘‘a cowardly act’’ and ‘‘a crime.’’ They defined torture as ‘‘inhumanity,’’ ‘‘unfair,’’ and ‘‘bad.’’ Their answers reflect a basic assertion of universal human rights by these ordinary citizens and a preference for nonviolent solutions.

CONCLUSIONS Though the ravages of war affect all citizens in its wake, the often devastating consequences are frequently felt particularly acutely by children. In times of war, the central responsibility of adulthood (i.e., child protection) takes a backseat to the motives of armed conflict (e.g., control of territory or regime change). According to UN statistics, an estimated two million children in the world were killed in the decade from l997 to 2007. In addition, three times as many have been seriously injured or permanently disabled, often in armed conflict and landmine accidents.29 In some cases children may spend their entire childhoods in wartime. Others may episodically experience renewed outbreaks of military crisis following periods of relative stability. Still others may be affected by the necessity to flee their native countries and live in the limbo of refugee status. Exposure to war and its aftermath may have a multitude of negative effects for everyone, but perhaps particularly for children. Children living in contexts of armed conflict display increased mental health problems. Qouta et al.30 report extensive research studies documenting the mental health consequences for children, including posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), particularly the symptoms of intrusion,

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avoidance and hyperarousal, depression, anxiety and sleeping difficulties, extended grief, and problems in identity formation, moral development, and social relationships.31 The Refugee Trauma Task Force of the National Child Traumatic Stress Network (2005) reported that children who are refugees of war are exposed to traumatic stressors in premigration, flight, and resettlement that affect their psychological well-being and development, including ‘‘direct exposure to war time violence and combat experience, displacement and loss of home, malnutrition, separation from caregivers, detention and torture and a multitude of other traumatic circumstances affecting the children’s health, mental health and general well being.’’32 The Task Force noted that symptoms displayed by refugee children, including anxiety, recurring nightmares, insomnia, secondary enuresis, introversion, depression, relationship problems, behavior problems, academic difficulties, anorexia, and somatic problems, have been widely documented. Factors that may influence the effects of war trauma on children include the nature of the specific trauma experienced, the child’s responses, characteristics of the child, relationships with the family, and community values and support.33 Multiple and cumulative traumatic stress and chronic trauma exposure may increase the risk of childhood PTSD.34 Children in Iraq have been subjected to armed conflict, sanctions, and deprivation for nearly three decades. Roger Rosenblatt noted that Iraqi children in l992 were not only experiencing the effects of U.S. bombing but also were exposed to ‘‘polluted water and lack of food, medicines and competent care.’’35 Rosenblatt’s interviews with Northern Irish, Israeli, Palestinian, Lebanese, Cambodian, and Vietnamese children of war, although documenting egregious examples of inhumanity, led him to conclude the following: ‘‘While conceding the power of history to overwhelm and belittle the best intentions and instincts, I felt . . . that the desire of the children to better the future, informed as it was by terror and loss, could prevail over a continuous cycle of murderousness and irrationality.’’36 A little more than a decade later, Iraqi children again found themselves living in a war zone. At an address at the University of Tehran on Human Rights Day (December 10, 1997), Kofi Annan said that human rights ‘‘are the foundation of human existence and coexistence . . . Human rights are what make us human.’’37 War violates the rights accorded to human beings by the historic tradition of human rights documents produced by the United Nations, including ‘‘freedom from fear and want [that] has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people . . .’’38 The ordinary citizens surveyed in this study demonstrate a continuing belief in the importance of peace, the inhumanity of violence, and the

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essential need for the rule of law while they face the dire circumstances of being refugees from war. Efforts to wage what William James referred to as ‘‘the moral equivalent of war’’39 may be informed by attention to the demonstrated ability of these Iraqi refugees in the face of war, displacement, and deprivation to continue to affirm the human capacity for constructive behavior.

10

Kuwait Heyam Mohammed and Raja Tayeh

War is . . . ‘‘ruin in every area and collapse of humanity’’; ‘‘something that has become easy as drinking water.’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘no to wars and no to terrorism’’; ‘‘a gift from the Creator to his creatures and security.’’ Kuwait, located on the Arabian Peninsula at the head of the Persian Gulf, is bordered on the north and west by Iraq and on the south and west by Saudi Arabia.1 Even before the discovery of oil in the 20th century, Kuwait’s position at the center of a major maritime trade route attracted Europeans, Turks, and Arabs to the area; through the centuries, control of the region has shifted frequently among competing groups.2 Most recently, on the Global Peace Index of 2008, Kuwait ranked 45th of 140 countries, with a score of 1.786 (the lower the score, the more peaceful the country). The lowest score for the year was Iceland’s at 1.176, and the highest was Iraq’s at 3.14. The United States, involved in both Afghanistan and Iraq, received a score of 2.227 and a rank of 97.3 Thus, after centuries of on and off conflict of local people with Turks, Arabs, and Europeans, Kuwait seems to have achieved a relatively strong level of peace and stability.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT Compared to other countries, the history of Kuwait is still relatively new. On the other hand, it has experienced its fair share of violence, mostly as result of invasions and tribal disagreements over artifacts and land. Relations between the Turkish Ottoman Empire and the Gulf Arabs in the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula began in the mid-16th century CE following the Ottoman success in conquering Baghdad in

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1534 and controlling Basra in 1546—conquests that were intended to counter Portuguese influence and power bases in Muscat, Hormuz, and Bahrain.4 The Ottomans were helped by the Iraqi tribe of Al-Muntafiq, which had settled in neighborhood of Basra. Muslim leaders in the Gulf area originally welcomed the Ottomans because they needed help resisting the efficient Portuguese naval force and were also involved in other conflicts. Over time, control of the area by Ottoman Turks declined and Arab forces replaced Portuguese power in the Gulf and eastern regions near the Arabian Peninsula.5 In the 17th century, the Bani Khalid (a confederation of Arab tribes) was able to overthrow the remaining Ottomans in the Gulf region; by 1670, the Bani Khaled extended from south of Qatar to the outskirts of Kuwait and north of Basra, where they acted as a police force among the unruly Bedouins of the desert.6 A small fortress, ‘‘Kout,’’ was built in the region of present-day Kuwait to be used as a repository of supplies, ammunition, and shelter for the convenience of the Prince of Bani Khalid and his tribe. Kout was also used as a staging base for invasion and attack against Iraqi tribes in the north. Many small groups of Bedouin followers of Bani Khalid and fishermen formed a small village near the fortress due to an abundance of underground waters and wells in the surrounding area. With the approval of the Bani Khalid, the AlUtab, another set of confederated clans, was allowed to settle in the region under the condition that they support the fight against the Ottomans. It is the Al-Utab, whose name derived from ‘‘Atabe,’’ meaning ‘‘travel from place to place’’ (nomads), who are the primary ancestors of today’s Kuwaitis. The first settlers in this group consisted of three principal tribes: the Al-Sabah family, the Al-Khalifah family, and the Al-Jalahmah family, descended from the Anza of northern central Arabia.7 The role of the Bani Khalid was critical in providing an umbrella of protection, enabling the Al-Utub to achieve progress and prosperity without fear of any outside threats.8 It is reported that one reason for the Al-Utub migration from Najd to the Kuwait region was a disagreement between them and their cousins from the Al-Anza tribe; according to this account, having been forced out by the Al-Anza tribe, the Al-Utub tribe ended up in Kuwait. The Al-Utub tribe also might have migrated to Kuwait to avoid tribal conflicts and revenge-related conflicts within the Arabian Peninsula between the Allsubah and Al-Khalifa familes, and their cousins, the Al-Saud family. There also was a drought that swept the Arabian Peninsula during the 17th century, and migrating to Kuwait enabled the Al-Utub family to escape it.9 In 1716, after the Al-Utub arrived and settled in Kuwait, there was a good bit of collaboration among the three tribes. It was agreed by the

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Al-Utub tribe that ‘‘Suleiman ibn Ahmed,’’ a senior of the Al-Sabah Family was to be the chief and ruler of Kuwait, whereas ‘‘Khalifa bin Mohammad,’’ a senior of the Al-Khalifa family, was to be responsible for commerce, and ‘‘Jaber Al-Utaibi,’’ a senior of the Algelahmah family, was to be responsible for seafaring10 and that all profits would be shared equally.11 Kuwait (Utub town) became qualified to handle the bulk of trade brought by the merchants and others who used the port as a station for caravans and goods from southern and eastern Arabian Syria.12 Searching for peace and justice for all people, the sheikh was expected to abide by the Qur’an and Shari’a law, or even to use traditional Urf or Salifa (custom). It was the custom to ask someone for the required wisdom to settle any conflict, and it was assumed that a judge (Qadi) in Kuwait was necessary at the start.13 Kuwaiti natives’ success in trade and commerce caused some tension between the Alsubah ruling family and the Bani Khalid tribe, who wanted to reestablish their control over Kuwait.14 These efforts were thwarted because whenever the Bani Khalid sent forces to subjugate Kuwait, the Kuwait natives would temporarily sail to the Kuwaiti island of Failaka, taking their assets and wealth with them and awaiting the opportunity to return with their possessions as soon as the Bani Khalid abandoned Kuwait.15 The Kuwaiti people knew that Kuwait was of little value to the Bani Khalid without the assets and wealth; in addition, the nomadic nature of the Bani Khalid made their departure certain. As further protection from marauders, in 1760, the people of Kuwait built a mud fence (wall) around the city to defend themselves from attackers.16 Kuwait was able, for the most part, to preserve its sovereignty, typically without any help from the Ottoman authorities in Basra or Baghdad to fight off attackers. As a result, the Kuwaitis were self-dependent in defending their country, property, and lives from greedy tribes.17 Despite earlier problems with the Portuguese, the rulers of Kuwait tried to establish relations with European powers such as the Dutch and the British in the 18th century. Their interactions with the Dutch began with the Dutch colonies on ‘‘Kharaj’’ island in 1752 between Sheikh Sabah bin Jabber I of Kuwait and the governor of Kharaj, who in 1756, ordered his superiors in the East India Dutch Company to establish direct relations with the Kuwaiti sheikh.18 The relationship between Al-Utub and Bani Khalid tribes was defined by a convention on good neighborly cooperation and friendship held by Sheikh Abdullah Alsubah I, on behalf of his father, with the rulers of the Bani Khalid.19 In accordance with this document, the Al-Utub continued their loyalty to the Bani Khalid for the first six decades of the 18th century; however, in the beginning of the second half of

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the 18th century, the Bani Khalid began to lose their strength because of the emergence of internal conflicts over the presidency and governance and growing external threats from Saudi Arabia. Kuwaiti Al-Utub wanted to maintain their loyalty to the Bani Khalid at the same time as they maintained their independency; consequently, the Kuwaiti sheikh preferred to remain neutral even though he was very sympathetic with the Bani Khalid and gave shelter to leaders of the Bani Khalid who fled from conflict and asked for protection. The lack of strong centralized rule in eastern Arabia made it possible for the Alsubah tribe to become entirely independent of the Bani Khalid.20 From the middle of the 18th century, the Al-Sabah family was the only family ruling Kuwait. Between 1762 and 1766, in the era of Abdulla bin Sabah I, the Al-Khalifa family had migrated from Kuwait to the newly established emirates of ‘‘Al-zubara’’ in Qatar, which they later left for Bahrain. The departure of the Al-Khalifa family enabled the Alsubah family to better take power in Kuwait. The Al-Sabah family strove to create more wealth and prosperity, which was helped by the port of Kuwait and the excellent geographic location that allowed them to supersede all rivals among Gulf traders. This growth was not hindered by the presence of the Persians, the Ottomans, or the English East India Company. The Persians had neither the sea power nor internal peace to control even their own coast of the Gulf. The Ottoman Pasha in Bagdad and Mutasallim of Basra were in the same position, and neither was ready to challenge the Bani Khalid on the eastern shores of the Gulf. The only force that could directly affect the Utub was the Wahhabi Power, which was not consolidated.21 Arabs who were in the northern and eastern shores of the Gulf became particularly interested in Kuwait after the 1760s, when the growing trends toward piracy in the Gulf hindered the increasing Utub trade and threatened the commodities of the East India Company destined for the factory at Basra. By the late 18th century, the Saudis realized the importance of Kuwait as a port of supply to Najd and also as a flourishing trading center, especially between 1793 and 1795, when the British East Indian Company was present in Kuwait. At this time, the Saudis attempted several armed raids on Kuwait to pursue and punish tribal enemies who had fled to Kuwait. In 1797, Kuwait prepared a campaign to revenge against the Saudi attacks and built a second wall for protection. Conflicts between Kuwait and the Saudis continued off and on throughout the 19th century. In 1863, good relations were established between the sheik of Kuwait and the ruler of Najd, but relations deteriorated again in 1872 when Saud bin Faisal attacked Kuwait City. The Kuwaiti Sheikh was able to force the Saudis to flee, and from 1871 to 1897 assisted the Amir of Hael and Najd in attacks on the Saudis.

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However, hostile relations between Kuwait and Najd increased, and Kuwait supported Al-Saud against the Al-Rashid, who were allied with the Ottomans from 1897 to 1906.22 By the 19th century, the Kuwaiti people, free from Ottoman influence, were known among other Gulf countries to be freedom loving. According to a traveler known as Stocqueler, who had been in the region in February 1831, Kuwait didn’t need to maintain a regular army on a full-time basis due to the sheikh’s fairness in the treatment of his people and the peacefulness of life in the country. In 1865, a traveler named William G. Palgrave described the Emirate of Kuwait as having a great reputation at home and abroad, because of its intelligent political management by its rulers, low taxes on imports, and good ports attracting hundreds of ships.

RELATIONS BETWEEN KUWAIT AND OTHER POWERS Kuwait maintained its successful existence as a distinguished civilized entity owing to the commercial maritime activity of its people, while the neighboring political entities were dominated by different social and economic types that varied between the feudal system and the Bedouin one that did not move into the stage of a stable society. However, because of its developing activities, prosperities, and emergence as an influential power and because of its strategic position on the Arabian Gulf, Kuwait faced, from 1750 onward, the ambitions and conflicts of bigger powers, including the Ottoman Empire, the Portuguese, the Dutch, and then the British.23 The Germans and the Russians also had their own interests. Conflicts occurred among the forces attempting to control the international communication routes in which Kuwait represented the key link.24 Because of these competing pressures, Kuwait developed a certain orientation to which both its rulers and its people were committed: adopting a balanced policy to preserving its independence and avoiding attempts to enter into subordination and hegemony spheres with any big power. The Ottoman Empire’s Power in Kuwait Over a period from 1756 to 1899, Kuwait resisted all attempts at containment and control by the Ottoman state, although it was keen on supporting and continuing its general Islamic relation with the Ottomans, a religious relation that did not impinge on Kuwait’s interests or independence and did not grant any political rights to the valis (governors) of the Ottoman State in Iraq over Kuwait. Kuwait did not promise

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any commitment or even loyalty to the Ottoman valis in Basra or elsewhere and depended on itself in repulsing the tribal attacks. It also did not agree to extradite the anti-Ottoman rebels who sought refuge in Kuwait and did not permit the Berlin Railway Line to pass through its territory despite German pressure and Ottoman approval and participation in its construction in January 1900.25 The relations between the Principality of Kuwait, since its inception in the 17th century, and the Ottoman Empire, went through two basic stages, each of which had its own particular characteristics.26 Stage one: The State of Kuwait’s formal subordination to the Ottoman Empire. In Kuwait, the earliest settlers—the amalgamated Al-Utub clan—sought to secure their status in their emerging Emirates by recognizing some loyalty to the Ottoman state. They dispatched their leader, Sabah bin Jabber, to the Ottoman viceroy in Baghdad, to seek support and to demonstrate their willingness to live in peace, stability, and security. The leader of the Al-Sabah family succeeded in his quest. Thus, Kuwait recognized a kind of religious subservience to the Ottoman state, without allowing for Istanbul’s interference in their internal affairs.27 Stage two: Attempts to extend Kuwait’s subordination to the authority of the Ottoman Empire. The reform movement in the Ottoman Empire during the 19th century was considered to be an important factor affecting the relationship between Kuwait and the Ottoman Empire before 1869. Its essence was the attempt of the Ottoman Empire to establish a strong central government similar to those in Europe to expand control over various mandates. Beginning in 1866, Namik Pasha, the governor of Baghdad (1866–1869), sought to expand the Ottoman Empire beginning with central Iraq. Within this framework, the magistrate undertook a two-stage process designed to change the relationship between Istanbul and Kuwait: first, acceptance of the title of Kuwait Sheikh, district officer (Qaem Maqam), and second, establishment of an Ottoman center for customs collection in Kuwait. The Kuwait shiekh refused the plan and insisted on maintaining an open trade port. Concerned with the possibility of increased British influence in Kuwait, Namik Pasha called for two equipped ships from Al-Astetana to attack and occupy Kuwait. In response, in 1861, the Kuwaiti sheikh asked Britain to make an agreement forbidding Kuwait from involving itself in sea or land warfare, even in the case of attack by foreign armies; his goal was to give the responsibility of defense to the British force present in the Gulf region. Lewis Bailey, a diplomat from the British political Gulf accepted the order for British ships to temporarily stop anchoring in Kuwait to

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protect the Kuwaiti economy from the Ottoman Empire, thus spoiling the attack planned by Namik Pasha.28 The power of the Ottoman Empire decreased along the Gulf region and the Arabian Peninsula after the Medhat Pasha period (1869–1872), because it was preoccupied with its war with Russia and ensuing problems in the Balkans. The Ottoman military presence in Al-Hasa also began to deteriorate and collapse, as many tribal rebellions and the spread of diseases and epidemics prompted authorities to withdraw the Ottoman troops, stationed in Al-Hasa, to Basra.29 During Sheikh Mubarak Bin Sabah II’s rule (1896–1915), the Ottoman authorities sought to have a physical presence in Kuwait. Pasha of Basra established a quarantine center and the Ottomans sent staff for it. In response, Mubarak, not willing to accept the presence of Ottoman staff in Kuwait, began looking for external support to aid in his resistance. Kuwait was also threatened by Saudi leader Abdul-Aziz Al-Rashid, an ally of the Ottomans, and Iranian leader Yusuf bin Abdullah, who was looking forward to ruling over Kuwait. The same month as the arrivals of the Ottoman staff in Kuwait, Mubarak revealed to the British his desire to place Kuwait under their protection. Britain, however, did not respond immediately, because Kuwait needed to declare its independence from the Ottoman Empire before the British could agree to a treaty of protection. Britain retreated from its 1878 recognition of Ottoman sovereignty in the north coast of the Gulf. Mubarak reiterated his demand for protection from Britain, and in November 1897, the British government accepted his request. The two sides signed a confidentiality agreement on January 23, 1899.30 British Power Even before 1775, it can be said that the most important factors that governed British-Kuwaiti relations were as follows: the strategic importance to Britain of the Gulf in general and Kuwait in particular for extending the British Empire in India and increasing European competition in the Gulf, the principle of mutual benefit, and Kuwait’s rulers’ attempts to maintain the independence of their Imaret.31 In the early 19th century, with the increase of British influence from Muscat to the south coast of the Gulf, Britain began considering the extension of their influence in Kuwait.32 The British exerted pressure on Sheikh Jaber bin Abdullah I, the third Amir (1812–1859) to join the Marine Peace Treaty or the Indian Navy Treaty, but he did not respond to them. In 1829, they asked him to raise the British flag on his palace and allow them to build their military and civilian base in Kuwait. He refused these

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requests as well. To avoid potentially falling under British control, Sheikh Jabber I raised the Ottoman flag on top of his palace and on ships, with the word ‘‘Kuwait’’ on the flag side.33 Though Britain had neglected Kuwait for a long time, they again showed their interest in extending their influence on Kuwait beginning in 1839. An envoy was sent to Sheikh Jabber I regarding the establishment of a mail postage system through the Sahara Desert, extending from Kuwait to the Mediterranean. The discussion, however, did not lead to any results. In May 1841, Sheikh Jabber I signed a contract on behalf of his father, to participate in the Marine Peace Treaty, imposed by Britain on the Arab Emirates rulers along the coast of the Arabian Gulf.34 After 1863, the Kuwait Gulf began to attract the attention of the Ministry of British Foreign Affairs. In 1896, Sheikh Mubarak sought to hold a convention for the protection of Kuwait by Britain, which was considered seriously interested in establishing new friendly relations. In fact, the international political circumstances pushed Britain toward signing this Convention in January 23, 1899, with Sheikh Mubarak.35 Britain’s main reason was to retain their control along the Arabian Gulf, especially in light of the great interest France and Russia were showing in the area and Russia’s contacts with Sultan Abdul Hamid. In addition, Germany sought to win the establishment of a railway linking Berlin and Baghdad. Thus, the British realized the necessity to close the ports to fleets of these three Western countries (Russia, France, and Germany).36 The British had several treaties with both Muscat and Bahrain in the early 19th century. The purpose, as alleged by Britain, was the establishment of maritime peace in the Gulf, which was occupied by pirates who attacked British and Dutch ships carrying the British flag. In fact, their true purpose was to establish bases for their fleets to preserve the open road to India.37 Because Kuwait was not in near danger from piracy, it did not sign the Treaty of 1820. Britain had to find a new justification for Kuwait to sign the treaty, which they did at the end of the 19th century, when they found that the Ottoman State intended to build a new railway line that would connect Istanbul with the Arabian Gulf. The Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913 was a short-lived treaty, signed in July of 1913, between the Ottoman and British representatives. The only lasting point was recognition of the status of Kuwait, which helped lead to its later independence.38 According to the Convention of 1913, Sheikh Mubarak Al-Sabah was recognized as provincial subgovernor under the Ottomans and ruler of Kuwait City, an autonomous region made up of a radius of 40 miles (103 km) of uninhabited desert within the Ottoman Empire.39 Kuwait obtained its official independence on June 19, 1961, with the removal of British protection.40

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TWENTIETH-CENTURY CONFLICTS Jahra Battle of 1920 One of the most important events in the modern history of the sheikhdom of Kuwait is the Battle of Al-Jahra in 1920. It took place in Al-Jahra in the west of Kuwait City on October 10, 1920, between Sheikh Salem Al-Sabah, ruler of Kuwait, and Al-Ekhwan forces, supporters of Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Saud, the Najd ruler. It began in 1920 when Sheikh Salem Allsubah was informed of the migration of Al-Ikhwan and their attempt to build a town in the Al-Jahra village. In response, the Sheikh ordered a secret army led by Duaij Al-sabah to be sent to the northern village of the ‘‘alulia town’’ to intimidate and discourage the Al-Ikhwan migration. This was a significant move because not only did it reflect Salem’s tenacity but also proved that Salem intended to defend the entire territory of his sheikhdom from aggression, not only Kuwait, its capital. Sheikh Salem al-Sabah sought support from neighboring tribes as well as from Britain, and the battle ended with the retreat of Al-Ikhwan to the south.41 The Iraq and Iran War and the Invasion of Iraq In 1980, Iraq went to war with Iran to prevent the Islamic Revolution of Iran from extending across the Islamic world. Saddam believed that he had to defend his country and neighboring countries like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia from the spread of fundamentalism, and he expected financial support from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, based on his assumptions that this war would build good relations between the three countries.42 In fact, the war led the Iraqi economy into a continuous decline. When the war ended, Saddam expected the Gulf countries to forgive their loans to Iraq, while anticipating using the oil revenues to repay Iraq’s debts. Kuwait began to increase its oil production, which led to the lowering of world oil prices and stimulated further decline of Iraq’s economy, exacerbating tension between the two countries initially caused by dispute over borders in 1921. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1991, Saddam Hussein’s forces committed many human rights violations, including grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol.43 Iraqi troops harassed, tortured, and executed thousands of Kuwaitis, released millions of liters of crude oil into the Persian Gulf, and set fire to as many as 950 oil wells, causing the release of tons of toxic gases into the atmosphere. The last act alone caused widespread and severe long-term damage to the environment,44 and resulted in significant economic toll on the country’s petroleum industry as well as posing serious health

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threats to natives in the Persian Gulf region. The fires burned for more than eight months, releasing hazardous mixtures of gaseous emissions and particulate matter into the environment, which caused some of the respiratory problems observed in Kuwaiti residents and Gulf War soldiers. Furthermore, uneven heating of the land and sea surfaces created local atmospheric inversions during the summer months that trapped toxic smoke in the lower atmosphere. Another problem that Kuwaitis faced was depleted uranium contamination and its consequent health problems. Depleted uranium (DU), a pyrophoric, genotoxic, and teratogenic heavy metal with a half-life of 4.4 billion years, was used in the Gulf War tanks. Most exposure began with the inhalation of the fine DU oxide particles, which lodged deep within the lungs. DU irradiates the surrounding lung tissues and results in a slow process of immune suppression and pneumonitis. If the DU enters the body, it becomes concentrated in the bones, affecting the bone marrow and red blood cell production.45 Despite all these worrying facts, however, a health survey of the population of Kuwait relating to these matters has not yet been undertaken. Kuwaiti physicians have reported that after the Gulf War, many Kuwaiti civilians slowly became sick with Gulf War illnesses. Fifteen percent of the civilian population has been confirmed to have Gulf War illnesses by an independent survey conducted by Dr. Charles T. Hindshaw, past president of the American Academy of Environmental Medicine.46 Symptoms include chronic fatigue, headaches, memory loss, muscle pain, nausea, gastrointestinal problems, joint pain, lymph node pain, and increased sensitivity to various environmental agents and enhanced allergic responses, all of which have very few effective treatments. The war also affected Kuwaitis psychologically. Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), as exemplified by symptoms of depression and anxiety, has been observed in certain groups of civilians; for example, the wives of Gulf War Kuwaiti soldiers, as well as among Kuwaiti children, especially children of POWs.47 Despite all these events, at present, the Kuwaiti people have made a very good recovery from the war. Human health side effects from the fires were much less significant than expected.48 According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the rate of respiratory infections for Kuwait is 0.5, compared to the lowest score of 0.1 and the highest score of 56; and the rate of asthma is 1.6 where 0.3 is the lowest and 2.4 is the highest.49 Nevertheless, more research would be needed in specific areas such as rates of cancer, birth defects, and mental illness among the Kuwaiti people post-Gulf War; and that research should be compared to national statistics to establish any differences.

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Overall, through the centuries, Kuwait has shown a remarkable ability to maintain independence in the face of many pressures from outsiders wishing to control the area and to maintain good relations with the West while preserving its strong Islamic heritage and beliefs. They have also shown an ability to forge alliances that help safeguard their independence and well-being. Within recent decades, they experienced a serious assault from the outside, but appear to be recovering effectively and moving ahead as a nation. Within this context, what kinds of views do present-day Kuwaitis have concerning such issues as war and peace?

KUWAITI PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND PEACE The Kuwait Sample The Kuwait sample consisted of 38 females and 35 males, all currently living in Kuwait, except for four participants who left Kuwait one or two years ago to be students in the United States. Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 60, with an average age of 33. All respondents who listed religion identified as Muslim. One participant who responded that Islam was his childhood religion currently identifies himself as agnostic/atheist/none. Of those respondents giving their social class, 71 percent described themselves as middle class, 18 percent as upper middle class, 7 percent as working class, and 4 percent as upper class. Thirteen of the participants identified as students. Aside from students, among the professions listed were teachers, dentists, a doctor, and a shopkeeper. One woman in her forties from the working class described herself as never educated and never employed. Twenty-three of the participants listed their marital status as married, but there may be more participants who are married, because six people listed their marital status as ‘‘good,’’ and two people responded ‘‘average situation.’’ Four of the participants said they had been in the military; two of these reported having seen combat in Desert Storm. Sixty-seven percent of the participants who responded to the item asking whether they had a family member who had been in the military said that they did. Three respondents described themselves as having participated in a peace education program. Two of those respondents had also participated in a protest demonstration, along with one other person. The two who described their protest experience said they had demonstrated against Iraq invading Kuwait; as one explained, ‘‘To protest the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 and this was in the city of Seattle in the United States of America.’’

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These participants responded to an Arabic version of the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS). For the purposes of this chapter, quantitative and qualitative responses to several key items in that survey were analyzed. On most of these items, the participants first indicated on seven-point scales (from 1, totally disagree to 7, totally agree) the extent to which they agreed with the statement. Each item referred either to a potential right of a government to use aggression (e.g., invasion, torture) or the potential right of an individual to peace or a right to protest in favor of peace. Participants were asked not just to provide a rating scale response indicating their level of agreement with the item but also to provide an explanation of their rating in their own words. Participants were also asked to define a number of key terms, including ‘‘war,’’ ‘‘peace,’’ and ‘‘terrorism.’’

KUWAIT PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION Definitions of War War is . . . ‘‘destruction, killing, ruin for homes, and backwardness for civilization’’; ‘‘Destruction, spread of oppression, and disrespect to human rights’’; ‘‘disagreement between sides and it reaches violence and the use of weapons.’’ Most respondents (58 percent) described destruction and other outcomes of war when giving their definitions of war; for example, ‘‘destruction of the hopes of society and ruin to their homes and stealing of their dreams.’’ The next largest group of respondents (13 percent) provided standard synonyms such as ‘‘conflict’’ when defining war. A typical example of responses in this category is ‘‘One (or more groups) battling with one (or more groups) to the best of their abilities, no lives spared, no questions asked.’’ Nine percent of the sample defined war with a moral judgment; for example, ‘‘it is fighting and blood and loss of souls without a benefit.’’ Seven percent identified war with negative emotions, defining war, for example, as ‘‘a nightmare’’ and ‘‘complete destruction for people and the planting of resentment in the minds of the innocents.’’ Is There a Right to Invade? ‘‘No country has the right to invade another country, but there must be dialogue between the two countries to discuss the misunderstanding.’’ ‘‘Every country has its independence, identity, unity, and not allowed to violate for any reason.’’

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‘‘[Invasion is a state right] if the invaded country is the aggressor against the rights of this country (the invader) or if it is holding innocent citizens as hostages.’’ In response to the statement ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another,’’ only 9 percent of the sample (four respondents) agreed; in their qualitative explanations, these participants suggested situations that might justify an invasion. Their reasons focused on the potential need to respond to a threat or take action to protect peoples’ rights; for example, ‘‘If innocent peoples’ lives are at stake, and the consequences of not invading are worse than invading, the country might have the right to step in.’’ Ninety percent of the sample gave reasons why one country does not have the right to invade another. The most common response (making up 24 percent of the total responses) was general opposition to the statement. A large group (20 percent of the sample) cited sovereignty as a reason why invasion is not a right. As one participant stated, ‘‘Each country has the right to its independence and the right to feel sovereign and safe against foreign invasion. No country has the right to impose its values and principles upon another country.’’ Seventeen percent of the sample pointed to negative consequences that happen as a result of invasion; for example, ‘‘it causes problems, kills relations, and causes separations and problems between countries.’’ What Is Terrorism? ‘‘[Terrorism is] ‘‘a group of people fighting the government while hidden behind the name of Islam but it does nothing but destruction and killing and spreading terror among people.’’ ‘‘[Terrorism is] the enemy of humanity.’’ ‘‘[Terrorism] is brain washing the youth and pushing them to do evil to others.’’ The majority of respondents (52 percent) used terms such as ‘‘destruction’’ or ‘‘violence’’ when defining terrorism. Examples of this kind of response are as follows: ‘‘It’s aggression against societies and individuals by killing and psychological or physical torture’’; ‘‘It is destruction work against the country’’; and ‘‘it’s shaking world stability.’’ Thirteen percent of the respondents described the ideology of terrorism, either positively, negatively, or ambivalently. One respondent defined terrorism as ‘‘a fanatic group or a fanatic person who understands the issues in the wrong way that cause harm to his nation and he thinks he is right.’’ A large group (28 percent) defined terrorism with

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a moral judgment; for example, ‘‘Satan (the devil)’’ and ‘‘The disease of the society.’’ Some of the participants emphasized the point that terrorism is not a religious action, particularly that it is not part of Islam: ‘‘Terrorism has no religion,’’ and ‘‘it has no relation to Islam and is one of the most important enemies of Islam.’’ The Kuwaiti participants most likely have had personal experiences with war and terror. Almost every Kuwaiti lost family members to the Iraqi forces, and the society has been traumatized by this piece of history and worries about the uncertain future. The invasion by Iraq led to much devastation. It has created new long-term health concerns, related to the environmental damages and psychological impacts of war. As the writer of one article stated,50 ‘‘The truth is that we are all broken up inside . . . We try to live as before, worry free, but we cannot really go back to normal until there is a recognition that we are deeply wounded and we must deal with those wounds.’’ Is Killing Innocent Civilians Acceptable in the Fight against Terrorism? ‘‘Wrong to kill people without a reason.’’ ‘‘The citizens will feel insecure.’’ ‘‘[Killing innocent civilians] is not allowed by Shariah (Islamic Law).’’ None of the respondents agreed that sometimes the heads of government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism. Excluding the eight percent of the sample that didn’t address the question, all of the respondents disagreed that governments have such a right (92 percent). The majority of the sample that disagreed with such a right (59 percent) focused on the innocence of the civilians being killed, saying, for example, ‘‘It is not fair to make the innocents responsible for the guilty and the terrorists.’’ Nine percent of the sample explained that in tolerating the loss of civilian lives, the government is acting like the terrorists: ‘‘That’s just the excuse they use. They themselves are the terrorists if they’re going around killing innocent civilians.’’ Another respondent asked, ‘‘What is the reason for killing the innocents and how can we fight terrorism by killing the innocents; instead, we become the ones increasing terrorism and become the ones defending terrorism.’’ Is Torture Ever Justifiable? ‘‘No one has the right to torture any human, no matter what the human did. Torture is far more inhumane than murder, in my opinion.’’ ‘‘Our Islamic religion orders that we be generous to prisoners and not to torture them.’’

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‘‘[Governments have a right to torture prisoners] if the prisoners were among those who did corruption and destruction and killed and destroyed without a right to do so.’’ In response to the item ‘‘the government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in times of war,’’ 74 percent disagreed, 6 percent agreed, and 10 percent each were not sure or did not address the question. An equal number of participants (7 percent each) pointed to international laws, negative consequences, and principles as reasons why they object to allowing governments to have such a right. An example of an argument based on general ethical principles was, ‘‘In my opinion, prisoners can be pressured (against their countries) for the interest of the country but cannot be tortured regardless of the cause.’’ The majority of respondents (27 percent) disagreed with a governmental right to torture because torture is a violation of human rights. Kuwaiti Perspectives on Individual Rights and Peace ‘‘[People have a right to protest against war] so peace be generalized in the world.’’ ‘‘[People have a right to protest against war] so they serve their homeland with all that is valuable.’’ ‘‘[People have a right to protest against war] so they force the government to establish peace.’’ ‘‘They should not do these protests unless it is peaceful.’’ The majority of respondents (75 percent) agreed with the statement ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace.’’ One participant simply stated, ‘‘do not agree.’’ The remaining 24 percent qualified the right somehow and were concerned with consequence, condoning protests only if they are nonviolent, or meet other specific conditions. For example, one participant explained, ‘‘I am with it (the protest) if it was on the side of the truth.’’ Among those who agreed, some of the participants (9 percent of the sample) described protesting for peace as a civic responsibility, saying, for example, ‘‘everyone should aid world peace!’’ Is World Peace Achievable? ‘‘I do not believe that international peace is easy to obtain because humans rarely agree.’’ ‘‘[Peace is] possible to achieve if the efforts of the world governments were joined.’’

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‘‘[Peace can be achieved] if all humans give up selfishness.’’ ‘‘[Peace can be achieved] by limiting the use of weapons of mass destruction.’’ Responses were varied in regard to the statement, ‘‘I believe that world peace can be achieved.’’ The largest group of respondents (46 percent) expressed the view that world peace can be achieved if certain conditions are met. Respondents pointed, for example, to the need for a global effort toward peace, the Will of God, and respect. One participant explained that the achievement of world peace required ‘‘dialogue and respecting the rights of others and not to violate the forbidden things. (In Islam, there are five things that are called the forbidden things that belong to each human that should not be taken from him: his soul, his mind, his honor, his money, and his religion).’’ Twenty-six percent of the respondents said that world peace is an ideal and that they hope for world peace. Eighteen percent of the sample felt that world peace is not achievable; participants elaborating on this view blamed nations and/or individuals for having characteristics that interfere with the achievement of world peace; for example, ‘‘There are some people out there that are relentless fighters. We can’t get rid of them all.’’ Finally, 8 percent of the sample agreed without any conditions that world peace is achievable. Definitions of Peace ‘‘[Peace is] that the person feels secure for himself and his family for a long time, for the length of his life.’’ ‘‘[Peace is] the presence of security and comfort in the country.’’ ‘‘[Peace is] no fear of wars and displacement and conflicts between countries.’’ ‘‘[Peace is] a gift from the Creator to his creatures and security. (In Islam, peace is a gift from Allah and a test to see how people do, and war is seen as a punishment or a test for patience.)’’ When defining peace, 80 percent of the sample gave positive definitions of peace, describing the presence of something good, and 17 percent provided negative definitions, characterizing peace as the lack of something negative, such as violence. Among those giving positive definitions, some respondents (13 percent) described peace as a desirable process; examples of such responses are ‘‘Establishing security and stability and the protection of human rights’’ and ‘‘justice between countries and cooperation.’’ Those who gave negative definitions characterized peace as ‘‘living without war’’ and ‘‘when there are no conflicts.’’

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CONCLUSION Kuwait Today Kuwait today is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system of government. Despite occasional clashes between the royal family and the democratically elected parliament, Kuwait is considered by many to be an icon for democracy in the Middle East. It was the first Arab state in the Gulf to have an elected parliament. Among its achievements is progress in securing rights for women. According to the U.S. Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report from 2005, in family matters, women may have less legal authority than men, but in higher courts their rights are more equal. The State Department report describes women’s legal rights this way: ‘‘In the family courts, one man’s testimony is sometimes given the same weight as that of two women; however, in the civil, criminal, and administrative courts, the testimony of women and men is considered equally. Unmarried women 21 years of age or older are free to obtain a passport and travel abroad without permission of a male relative; however, a married woman must obtain her husband’s permission to apply for or renew a passport. According to the BBC, ‘‘moves to change the male-dominated political structure culminated in the granting of full political rights to women in 2005.’’51 The current emir, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jaber al-Sabah, is expected to continue the country’s favorable relationships with the West and progress in political reforms—movement supported by the relatively free press in the country.52 The Kuwaiti participants in our study, consistent with the positive and forward-looking perspective of their country, have a positive attitude toward peace and believe they have a right to stage protests against war in favor of peace. They also hold that no government has a right to torture anyone, even a prisoner of war, because torture is a violation of human rights. Perhaps based in part on their own experience and observations, they view war as a nightmare, as a completely destructive process for people, and as a source for planting resentment in the minds of innocents. Terrorist attacks are against the moral principles of the Islamic religion, and our participants are aware of this. The majority of respondents pointed to the negative effects of invasion on society, but they still believe that world peace is achievable. Although our sample is relatively small, it has many positive attributes. It includes the voices of approximately equal numbers of men and women and best represents the views of educated people from the middle classes and higher, many of whom will be the leaders of tomorrow or the parents of the leaders of tomorrow.

11

Saudi Arabia Majed A. Ashy and Elizabeth Planje

War is . . . ‘‘Two countries fighting (leaving permanent damage on both sides) in order to achieve power (political, economical, oil, money, etc.).’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘Understanding between all parties and respect of the human being and his rights.’’ Several factors shaped the history of the Arabian Peninsula and modern Saudi Arabia. These factors include climate change, tribalism before Islam, the birth of Islam in Arabia, the formation of the various Islamic empires, the schism between Sunnis and Shi’a, the strategic location, the discovery of oil in Arabia, the Arab-Israeli conflict, modernization, and terrorism. Each of these factors created conditions that had the potential to ignite wars and put the Arabian Peninsula and modern Saudi Arabia, at various points in history, in the center of global changes and conflicts. These factors also made Saudi Arabia carry major responsibilities. Modern Saudi Arabia is going through major developments to meet the needs of its population. It is also going through rapid political, social, and cultural reforms to cope with the cultural and demographic changes inside Saudi Arabia and the realities of the world today. It is also going through serious self-examination and internal dialogue to counter extremism and terrorism. Saudi Arabia also plays an essential role in stabilizing oil prices within ranges that can be considered fair to both consumers and producers. In addition, Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s major contributors to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which are in turn contributing to developing countries via various loans and donations. Finally, Saudi Arabia has been a major supporter of the Palestinian right to a state but also worked on various peace initiatives to make sure that the conflict does not get out of

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control in ways that make peace harder in the future. In the following sections we discuss each of these factors and how they are related to the formation of the Saudis’ attitudes toward war and peace.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND WAR Environmental and climate changes played an important role in the history of the Arabian Peninsula. More than 15,000 years ago, the Arabian Peninsula was covered with green trees, rivers, and various animals. During the last Ice Age, the European ice cap melted, and the peninsula’s climate became very dry, resulting in desertification. These changes forced the area’s human inhabitants to adopt a nomadic lifestyle, searching constantly for seasonal oases.1 To survive in such harsh and fickle environs, people had to cooperate both within and between tribes to provide for the basic needs of their members, forging close physical and psychological bonds. Conversely, scarcity also provoked in-fighting and tribal strife. Before Islam, each tribe had its own god that was represented by an idol in Makkah, and the conflicts between tribes included conflicts over water, herds, territory, and religions. Thus, the environmental challenges associated with climate change in Arabia initiated both the close social cooperation and frequent conflict that came to characterize the region. Ironically, the former wealth of plant and animal species translated to literal wealth with the discovery of the world’s largest oil reserves, which has been a blessing and curse in terms of national development.

THE BIRTH OF ISLAM AND THE ISLAMIC EMPIRES Around the year 610, Muhammad, a native of Makkah, a trade center in the crossroads of the caravans traveling between the north and south of Arabia, received a message from God (‘‘Allah’’ in Arabic) through the Angel Gabriel. Over the next few years, the Prophet Muhammad’s following grew. In 622, the Prophet led his followers to the town of Yathrib, which was later named Madina. Attracted by his message about the oneness of God, the Christians and Jews of Madina invited him to come after they heard of the suffering he and his followers were enduring in Makkah at the hands of leaders who saw in his message a threat to their economical and political powers.2 The Christians and Jews also invited him to come and help them by becoming a mediator between them in their conflicts. The Prophet’s acceptance of the invitation led to the Hijrah, or migration, which marks the beginning of the

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Islamic calendar. Within the next few years, several battles took place between the followers of the Prophet Muhammad and the pagans of Makkah. By 628, the Prophet had unified the tribes so successfully that he and his followers reentered Makkah without bloodshed.3 With Muhammad’s death in 632, disagreement broke out over who would succeed him as leader of the Muslim community. Disputes over religious and political leadership gave rise to a schism in the Muslim community; one group became known as Sunnis and the other as the Shi’a. In the decades that followed this schism, some devout Muslims, Zahid, began to question the piety of indulgence in a worldly life and violence, emphasizing poverty, humility, love, and avoidance of sin based on renunciation of bodily desires. Muslim ascetics such as Hasan al-Basri inspired the movement that evolved into Sufism. Less than 100 years after the birth of Islam, the Islamic Empire extended from Spain to parts of India and China. The expansion of the empire was sometimes done by wars or Jihad, sometimes by populations overthrowing their rulers and joining the empire, and sometimes by voluntary mass conversions to Islam by people who were either on the borders of the empire or who dealt with Muslim merchants or scholars (as in the case of Indonesia, which became the most populated Muslim country). The concept of Jihad is a fundamental principle in Islam. The word Jihad means ‘‘struggle.’’ It is struggle against the self and its desires, against oppressors, and against aggressors. Mostly, it is seen by Muslims as a defense principle, not an aggression principle. Prophet Mohammad outlined the basic principles of the conduct of Jihad or war. He told his followers not to cut a tree, not to kill a woman or a child or an old person, not to kill an animal, not to kill a worshipper or a farmer, and not to kill those who were not fighting. Killing one’s self is strictly forbidden in Islam and was not a method of war until it was used by some groups in the late 20th century. The annual pilgrims to Makkah and Madina facilitated the exchange of ideas and culture between the people of the peninsula and the rest of the Arab and Muslim worlds. The fact that the Quran was in Arabic put the Arabic language at the center of education in the Muslim world. Muslim scholars made major contributions in many fields including medicine, biology, philosophy, astronomy, arts, and literature. Many of the ideas and methods pioneered by Muslim scholars became fundaments of modern sciences. The Islamic Empire continued into the 17th century, when it broke up into smaller Muslim kingdoms. The Arabian Peninsula gradually entered a period of relative isolation, though Makkah and Madinah remained the spiritual heart of the Islamic world and continued to attract pilgrims from many countries.4

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THE FIRST SAUDI STATE Until the 17th century, the caliph or Muslim ruler of the Islamic Empire was the head of both the political and religious institutions. In the early 18th century, a Muslim scholar and reformer named Shaikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab began advocating a return to the original form of Islam and did not require that the ruler of the Muslim land be a religious scholar. He formed an alliance with Muhammad bin Saud, the ruler of the town of Diriya, who joined with Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab in the attempt to restore the teachings of Islam to the Muslim community. That cooperation led bin Saud to establish the First Saudi State, which prospered under the spiritual guidance of bin Abdul Wahhab, known simply as the Shaikh.5 By the early 19th century, the Ottoman Empire, the dominant power in the Middle East, started an effort to resist the newly formed Saudi state. In 1818, the Ottoman sent a large force to the western region of Arabia and surrounded Diriyah, one of the largest cities in the peninsula, destroying it completely and making it permanently uninhabitable. However, by 1824, the Al-Saud family had regained political control of central Arabia and transferred the capital to Riyadh and established the Second Saudi State. During the following 11 years, the state succeeded in retaking most of the lands lost to the Ottomans and enjoyed a period of peace and prosperity, during which both trade and agriculture expanded considerably. In 1865, a renewed Ottoman campaign to end the Second Saudi State started. In the face of the Ottoman attack, Abdulrahman bin Faisal Al-Saud, the ruler of the state, had to leave with his family and seek refuge in Kuwait, where they stayed until 1902.6

THE MODERN KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA In 1902, Abdulaziz, son of Abdulrahman bin Faisal Al-Saud, accompanied by only 40 followers, marched into Riyadh to retake the city. This event marks the beginning of the formation of the modern Saudi state. After establishing Riyadh as his headquarters, Abdulaziz captured all of the Hijaz, including Makkah and Madinah, in 1924 and 1925. In the process, he united warring tribes into one nation. On September 23, 1932, the country was named the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, an Islamic state with Arabic as its national language and the Quran as its constitution. The founder of modern Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz (1932–1953), was followed by his sons: King Saud (1953–1964), King Faisal (1964– 1975), King Khalid (1975–1982), King Fahd (1982–2005), and King Abdullah who reigns currently.7

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Saudi Arabia: Facts and Figures Saudi Arabia’s population, as of the 2004 census, consists of 16.7 million Saudis and about 6 million expatriates. These expatriates play an important role in the economical and social development of the country. They are part of almost every sector in the country, and almost every home in Saudi Arabia includes a maid and chauffer from abroad. Many of the expatriates are non-Muslims, especially the maids and nurses who come from the Philippines. They influence the culture in ways that have not been studied yet. The official religion of Saudi Arabia is Islam, which is the source of the laws in the country. The country follows the Islamic (Hijrah) calendar, which dates from the emigration of the Prophet from Makkah to Madinah about 1428 BCE. The Hijrah year consists of 12 lunar months with weekends marked at Thursday and Friday. Saudi Arabia is a founding member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), United Nations, League of Arab States, Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); it is also a member of such international organizations as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization (WTO), and a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.8 Economy and Global Trade Saudi Arabia has a free-market economy in which the private sector accounts for 48 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). Saudi membership in the WTO has increased access to global markets, created jobs, and encouraged foreign investment. Saudi Arabia went through rapid development after the discovery of oil in 1938. The government invested in building a basic infrastructure of roads, airports, seaports, schools, and hospitals. The Kingdom possesses a quarter of the world’s proven oil reserves—more than 260 billion barrels—and is the world’s largest producer and exporter of oil. Saudi Arabia’s oil policies aim at stabilizing oil prices in ways that are fair to both consuming and producing countries. For example, during the Persian Gulf War of 1990– 1991, global markets lost four million barrels per day of crude oil supplies from Iraq and Kuwait; Saudi Arabia immediately responded by increasing production.9 Education and Public Works Saudi Arabia offers a number of social welfare programs to its citizens, including occupational hazard insurance; social security pensions; benefits and relief assistance to the disabled, elderly, orphans, and widows

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without income; and facilities to treat and rehabilitate the mentally and physically disabled. In recent years, Saudi Arabia established both governmental and nongovernmental agencies for the protection of women and children against abuse. It is also passing laws against sexual harassment in the workplace and other settings. Today, female students make up more than half of the nearly five million students enrolled in Saudi schools and universities. The education system in Saudi Arabia has Islam at its core, but it also provides instructions in diverse fields of arts and sciences.10 Government Saudi Arabia is a monarchy that has the Holy Quran and Sunnah as its constitution. The king and the government bear the responsibility of ensuring the application of Shari’ah, in addition to other regular governmental responsibilities such as defense and social and economical welfare. The king is also the prime minister and governs with the help of the Cabinet of Ministers. The resolutions of the cabinet are nonbinding unless agreed upon by a majority vote. In the case of a tie, the prime minister casts the tie-breaking vote. The Consultative Council (Majlis Al-Shura), which currently consists of 150 members appointed by the king for a four-year renewable term, provides counsel to the king and the cabinet. The mandate of Majlis Al-Shura was broadened in 2004 to include proposing new legislation and changing existing laws without prior submission to the king. New bylaws introduced in 1992 explain the purpose of the state as ensuring the security and rights of all citizens and residents and emphasize the importance of family as the nucleus of Saudi society.11 Political Reform and Human Rights In a speech to a United Nations Summit in 2000, Saudi Prince Abdullah stated, ‘‘Human rights, as we Muslims understand the concept, is an inalienable gift of the Creator, and no one has the right to deny it to anyone.’’12 In addition, the Saudi Arabian Constitution states that ‘‘the State will protect human rights according to the norms of the Islamic Shari’a.’’13 Understanding the Islamic basis of the constitution is important because a person with a non-Muslim Western perspective might view human rights in a different way than someone whose concept of human rights is derived from Islam. Islam views men and women as sharing humanity and therefore being equal in that respect; however, from an Islamic perspective viewing men and women as completely the same ignores their inherent differences.14 The Shari’a

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describes a complementary relationship in which the man is required to provide for the woman and take care of her investments to compensate for her role as a conceiver, childbearer, and mother: ‘‘The Islamic Shariah respects these natural differences and accords woman a privileged position in order to achieve justice for her.’’15 Women and men largely operate in separate spheres; for example, boys and girls are educated in different schools. The Saudi government is interested in women being more active in taking advantage of opportunities afforded to them, as evidenced in the booklet ‘‘Information on Current Issues’’ available on the Web site of the Saudi Arabian embassy in the United States. The booklet notes, for example, that ‘‘Over the past two decades, the percentage of Saudi women in the workforce has grown from just 1% to 7%.’’16

PERSPECTIVES ON RIGHTS, WAR, PEACE, AND TERRORISM It is useful to begin our analysis of Saudi Arabian perspectives on topics such as rights, war, peace, and terrorism by referring to Prince Saud AlFaisal’s comments on the outcomes of the Resolution of the Millennium Assembly of the United Nations at a UN General Assembly in September 2003. The prince noted that three years had lapsed since the adopting of the Millennium Declaration and expressed sorrow that the assembly appeared to lack the ‘‘collective political will’’ and commitment needed to translate the earlier agreements into a reality. He noted, ‘‘International peace and security are still a hope and expectation to many nations and peoples . . . Wherever we look, we see widespread and increasing evidence of violence and unrest, fueled by feelings of injustice, inequality, discrimination and obvious violations of human rights and legitimate aspirations.’’ He reminded the audience that substantial evidence indicating that many people suffer from a lack of sufficient food, clean water, proper sewage disposal, medical care, and other necessities of decent living ‘‘presents a dim and depressing picture of our state of affairs.’’17 Prince Al-Faisal called attention to the situation in which laws, even international laws, do not necessarily describe the reality of the situation, but rather reflect the hopes and expectations of those who participated in its creation. As Prince Al-Faisal explained, ‘‘Humanity is now certain about the importance of peace, the benefits of good neighborliness and the advantage of international cooperation. These expectations and hopes were reflected in the Resolution of the Millennium Assembly of the United Nations, which also included the values and principles that will guide and lead us to achieve these goals.’’18

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SAUDI PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND PEACE Our sample consisted of 16 Saudi Arabians who responded to questions that appeared on either the pilot version or the final version of the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS). A few of the participants responded to the pilot version of the survey over the Internet from Saudi Arabia; the remainder of the participants were Saudis living in the United States who responded to a paper and pencil version of the final survey. Respondents’ ages ranged from 20 to 48, with an average age of 25. There were 6 males and 10 females. All participants reported their current religion as Islam, with four identifying as Sunni and one as Shiite. Those who identified social class identified as either middle class (56 percent) or upper-middle class (31 percent). In addition, 44 percent of the sample were students. Respondents were asked to respond to items on a seven-point scale, with a score of 1 meaning they totally disagree and a score of 7 that they totally agree; they were then asked to explain their rating scale response in their own words. Their qualitative responses were coded on the basis of coding manuals developed from responses to the PAIRTAPS from an international coding manual sample. Perspectives on Governmental Aggression ‘‘Invading another country is essentially like taking someone else’s property.’’ ‘‘Defense I agree with, invasion I do not.’’ In response to the item ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another,’’ respondents gave an average score of 1.20, showing an extremely high level of disagreement with the idea that governments have such a right. Seven people gave qualitative responses to the item. Three respondents cited the principle of sovereignty as the reason why invasion is not a right, saying, for example, ‘‘Let every one live in their own country and let others live in their own,’’ and ‘‘Because invasion is a violation of rights.’’ Another respondent referred to current events in making a moral judgment against invasion: ‘‘Israel and Palestine, Iraq and Kuwait, Iraq and USA are all wrong!’’ Another respondent said that rather than invasion, ‘‘We need peace.’’ Finally, two respondents condoned self-defense only. Respondents in other samples studied for this book set sometimes argue that invasion is acceptable in response to threat or aggression, which seems consistent with the view of the two Saudi participants

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who said that invasion can be undertaken only as a form of self-defense. In the Pact of the League of Arab States, of which Saudi Arabia is a member, Article 6 describes what member states should do in response to threat. Specifically, Article 6 explains that the member state should call for a meeting of the Council, and then the Council must come to a unanimous decision about what to do in response to the aggression or threat.19 In our sample, participants’ general opposition to the idea that one country has the right to invade another is consistent with the view in the Pact of the League of Arab States, then, which seems to indicate that the choice to invade is one that should be made by the Council and not by any individual state. Thirteen of the participants responded to the item asking if police or military officials have the right to use violence against their citizens, six of them giving qualitative responses. Respondents largely disagreed with the statement, giving an average score of 2.54, which falls between fairly strongly disagree and mildly disagree. One respondent, who totally disagreed, explained, ‘‘Police and military are supposed to protect their citizens. Even when dealing with criminals, they do not have the right to use violence against them.’’ One respondent, who agreed fairly strongly with the statement, explained, ‘‘sometimes violence is the appropriate solution.’’ The remaining respondents were more ambivalent, some of them giving scores that indicated disagreement but also offering situations in which violence might be acceptable: ‘‘because there are people that don’t understand their interest and the interest of others’’; ‘‘only in those cases where the citizens get involved with terrorist groups or other activities that put the other citizens’ well-being and the soundness of the nation in danger’’; and ‘‘I don’t agree mostly because not everything can be solved with violence and violence is something barbaric. I have chosen the number 2 because there are cases that necessitate the use of force by the army or the police if it’s in the interest of the country or the people.’’ Finally, one respondent, who scored ‘‘neither agree nor disagree,’’ responded that ‘‘It depends on the situation, if people are being unruly and not listening, then yeah maybe.’’ There were mixed responses among those given to whether the government has the right to execute a citizen who has been convicted of murder. The average score among the 14 responses was a 3.93, which corresponds with ‘‘neither agree nor disagree,’’ which was the most frequently chosen response. Those agreeing with the statement specified that if the person was in fact guilty of murder, then execution is acceptable; for example, ‘‘if the citizen committed a horrible crime like killing someone (why should the murderer deserve to live?)’’ and ‘‘it definitely has the right if he deserved that punishment and my country is

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applying its legal Islamic policy, which is the policy of forgiveness and justice.’’ One participant in this category felt that execution was also best for the person being executed: ‘‘Because his death is better for him and others like the killer or murderer.’’ Two respondents expressed complete opposition to capital punishment: ‘‘executing people is not a solution,’’ and ‘‘Government should never commit act of murder. Life sentence is more than enough.’’ Saudi Arabia, like the United States, uses the death penalty as a punishment. In a UN General Assembly Meeting in 1999, the representative from Saudi Arabia stated that ‘‘God himself in the Koran had said that punishment served to preserve life . . . and that anyone who killed a human without reason committed an act that was tantamount to killing all people. In the crimes warranting the death penalty, the human rights of society were at stake.’’20 This view is consistent with the comments of the participants who agreed with the state’s right to administer capital punishment. Saudi Arabia has signed the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The 2001 addendum to the report from Saudi Arabia to the UN Committee related to this convention illustrates the relationship between the Sharia and confessions made as a result of torture: ‘‘With regard to article 15 of the Convention (‘‘Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings’’), under the provisions of the Islamic Sharia such statements are inadmissible as evidence since anyone who confesses to an offence must do so of his own free will and no confession made under torture can be held against him.’’21 The strength of this concept, and likely the reason why the Convention added it, is that torture is not an effective legal tool for gathering information, because any evidence that could be proven to have been obtained through torture cannot be used in a court of law. In addition, a Saudi law passed in May 2002, prohibits the use of physical or moral harm to get confessions from detainees, who must be questioned within 24 hours of their arrest.22 Those in our sample who responded to the item ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in a time of war’’ tended to reject such a right. The average score for this item was a 3.6, which falls between mild disagreement and ‘‘neither agree nor disagree.’’ The two respondents, who gave qualitative responses, provided arguments stressing human rights to justify their disagreement with such a right: ‘‘That is inhumane,’’ and ‘‘it doesn’t have the right, they must be treated respectfully and humanly.’’ In response to the item asking if the government has the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight terrorism, seven people gave numerical responses with an average of 3 (mildly disagree). Of the four

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respondents who gave qualitative responses, two likened this kind of behavior by the government to terrorist behavior: ‘‘‘Any means necessary’ is simply another form of terrorism,’’ and ‘‘killing civilians is not much different than terrorism.’’ One respondent wrote that the ‘‘statement is outrageous,’’ showing complete disagreement. Finally, the last respondent spoke about what he or she felt was occurring: ‘‘They don’t have any right but unfortunately this is exactly what we are seeing in front of our own eyes and that leads to the killing of innocents and destruction and everything that has anything to do with monstrosity.’’ Perspectives on Treaties and Protests ‘‘No country has the right to ignore human rights.’’ Respondents were very consistent with each other in their responses to the item ‘‘sometimes one country has the right to ignore international treaties and human rights agreements.’’ Among the 12 responses, the average was a 1.25, indicating almost total disagreement with the idea that it could be acceptable for a government to ignore international agreements. One respondent explained, ‘‘international treaties and agreements come from universal agreements on certain things that are beneficial to all and therefore should not be ignored.’’ Two respondents stressed the importance of respecting human rights; one of these respondents argued that ‘‘the country doesn’t have the right to because humans are the most numerous creatures on earth and have rights that must not be violated.’’ In Saudi Arabia’s report to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, it is explained that the kingdom ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women because it is consistent with the country’s beliefs concerning women’s’ rights.23 The report calls attention to the Law of Treaties, which allows for reservations; it explains shortly thereafter that Saudi Arabian Law is inherently tied with Islamic law (and in fact the Constitution is subject to Islamic law).24 In other words, one might say that Saudi Arabia ratifies Conventions on the basis of the extent to which they are consistent with the Islamic codes that govern the kingdom; agreement on a treaty is recognition that the treaty shares values with Islamic law. With this in mind, it makes sense that the participants would attribute such importance to treaties, because treaties are representative of more than simply a legal agreement. Five respondents answered the item ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace.’’ All respondents

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agreed to some degree, yielding an average score of 6.4. Two respondents gave written responses. One respondent generally agreed by saying, ‘‘Freedom of expression is necessary.’’ The other respondent qualified the right to protest by saying, ‘‘They have the right to do that and if those demonstrations were getting them somewhere, that’s great, but if it didn’t have any useful purpose, I don’t think they’re needed in my opinion.’’ In the Saudi Arabian Constitution, Article 10 describes the state’s role in family security: ‘‘The State shall strive to strengthen family ties and safekeeping of Arab and Islamic values; protect and take care of all its individuals and provide suitable circumstances for developing their talents and capabilities.’’25 Conversely, Article 34 explains the responsibility of the citizen: ‘‘Defense of the Islamic faith (belief), society and homeland is a duty imposed on every national (citizen); the (specific) law shall set down the provisions concerning the military service.’’26 The Constitution therefore indicates that security is a relationship between the state’s role in protecting families and individuals and the citizen’s role in defending society and the homeland. Consistent with that commitment, the two participants who responded to the item ‘‘National security is essential for individual and family security’’ either fairly strongly or totally agreed. One respondent explained that ‘‘Security is essential for living.’’ Definitions of War, Terrorism, and Peace ‘‘[War is] destruction, misery.’’ ‘‘[Terrorism is] ‘‘cancer that kills every peaceful soul.’’ ‘‘[Peace is] love, harmony.’’ Four respondents provided one or more definitions of war, peace, and terrorism. The greatest emphasis in the definitions of war was on the outcomes of war, particularly the destruction it caused: ‘‘destruction and sabotage and killing innocent people’’ and ‘‘two countries fighting (leaving permanent damage on both).’’ Two of the definitions also pointed to the concept of war as a tool used to gain something; for example, ‘‘in order to achieve power (political, economical, oil, money, etc.).’’ One of these definitions also included a moral judgment concerning the use of war as a tool, defining war as a ‘‘bad and non-humanitarian way used to achieve some purpose.’’ All of the definitions of terrorism included a moral judgment. Two responses focused exclusively on the morality of terrorist acts, defining terrorism, for example, as ‘‘acts committed by people who need to be locked away from civilization.’’ Two participants focused more on the

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purposes of terrorism, but they judged the strategies terrorists use as immoral, defining terrorism as a ‘‘wrong way of expression’’ and ‘‘a group of people using violence, unethical fighting techniques on innocent civilians to get what they want from a government.’’ In his statement at the UN General Assembly in September 2003, Prince Saud Al-Faisal explained that for Saudi Arabia, countering terrorism is a serious priority. He described the efforts the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has taken in its war against terrorism, including more serious regulations to punish terrorist sympathizers and perpetrators, making counterterrorism a main subject in schools, and monitoring charity funds to ensure they do not fund terrorism.27 The prince also pointed to environmental conditions such as social, economic, and political situations, as well as various forms of injustice that could potentially foster a radicalism that might lead to the reemergence of terrorism.28 Our participants’ negative views of terrorism are consistent with the government’s efforts to counter it, especially considering the inclusion of counterterrorism into the school curriculum. When defining peace, respondents focused on different aspects. Some of the responses included positive definitions of peace, emphasizing the presence of something desirable (e.g., ‘‘Understanding between all parties and respect of the human being and his rights’’), and some were negative definitions of peace, focusing on the negative things that peace frees us from (e.g., ‘‘people living without anything to worry about’’). The other respondents pointed directly or indirectly to the potential role of individuals as obstacles to peace. One person said that peace is ‘‘minding your own business,’’ and the other commented ‘‘it is difficult to be achieved when people who don’t understand its meaning still exist.’’ For the item ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace,’’ five respondents gave numerical responses, averaging a score of 5.6, showing a fairly high level of agreement. Three respondents provided qualitative responses. Two respondents explained that this statement was so true that it didn’t need explanation; for example, ‘‘Of course, without any doubt, and this question doesn’t need any explanation.’’ The other person had a pessimistic view, giving a 6 as a response but saying, ‘‘unlikely to happen.’’ The Saudi government has supported the United Nations’ position that everyone has a right to peace and has made efforts to promote the peace process in the Middle East. In the 2002 meeting of the Council of Arab States, Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, put forward the Arab Peace Initiative. This peace plan calls for Israel to withdraw back to the borders before June 4, 1967, the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, and

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finding a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem.29 According to the Peace Initiative document, if Israel agrees to these terms, then the Arab countries would consider conflict with Israel over and could then reestablish a good relationship with Israel.30 In addition, in 2008, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia led an international effort under the umbrella of the United Nations to start an international dialogue among all of the world religions. This was an important step for Saudi Arabia toward more religious tolerance and for the world toward forming common grounds for cooperation among the world’s religions. In our sample, responses were fairly negative toward the statement ‘‘I believe that world peace can be achieved.’’ Four people responded, giving an average score of 2.25. Two participants pointed to the world’s current situation to show reasons why peace is unlikely to be achieved, asking, ‘‘Has it ever been achieved?’’ and saying, ‘‘No, because that’s the way the world works.’’ One respondent noted, however, that ‘‘one could only hope that one day it will happen.’’ Respondents’ pessimistic responses to the PAIRTAPS item asking for their views on the achieveability of world peace may have been influenced by the fact that the history of the region specifically, and the world in general, has been full of wars and that the Arab-Israeli conflict has not been resolved and is still producing more conflicts internationally. One respondent saw the possibility of world peace if certain conditions are met: ‘‘It can be achieved if all humans in this world started to believe in the true peace.’’

CONCLUSION Saudi Arabia is a country that has been going through major economic, social, cultural, and political changes and reforms. Saudi Arabia’s place in the world has been changing, too. More responsibilities and expectations are being placed on the country and its people. These expectations stem out of Saudi Arabia’s position as a leader in the Muslim world, as a major producer of oil, as an economic power, and as an important player in the region’s history and conflicts. Saudi Arabia has undertaken a lot of reforms to uproot extremism in its society and to counter the way of thinking that produces it. King Abdullah Al Saud has been leading an international effort to encourage and facilitate dialogue among all of the world religions under the umbrella of the United Nations. The leaders of Saudi Arabia have also been aware of the urgent need to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of justice in order to reduce extremism and contribute to world peace. In addition, leaders of Saudi Arabia are aware that the country’s development requires stability and prosperity in the region. They have also been working internally on reforming

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political, educational, and legal systems to meet the demands of a rapidly changing society and world. The invitation to Saudi Arabia to join the G20 meeting in Washington in 2008 underlined the increasingly important role Saudi Arabia is acquiring internationally. The leaders of Saudi Arabia also are aware that work must be done if the country is to meet its potential and achieve its goals. Bureaucracy not only slows such development but also creates social conditions and frustrations that can be in some ways more damaging than extremism. The ideology behind such bureaucracy has to be faced and addressed for Saudi Arabia to develop further. The country’s rapid economic development has to be balanced by educational and civil rights development. Saudi Arabia has been making efforts to reduce bureaucracy by privatization, spreading citizenship values in schools, passing new laws, and forming supervisory bodies to follow the performance of different sectors in the government. Bureaucracy is one of the important obstacles in the face of the healthy and rapid development of Saudi Arabia. In addition, Saudi Arabia is making efforts to grant its citizens, especially women and children, more civil rights. Saudi Arabia is rich in diverse cultures, and the development of the Saudi cultures can enrich the experience of Saudi Arabia and its contribution to the world. It can also help in breaking the stereotypes held about Saudi Arabia. Such stereotypes have the potential to fuel hate and violence against Saudi Arabia specifically and Arabs and Muslims in general. The address of King Abdullah Al Saud at the United Nations Peace through Dialogue meeting in 2008 expresses well both the views of Saudis on peace and justice and the model that Saudi Arabia would like to share with the world; he said: Peace and the mercy and blessings of God be with you. In the presence of this gathering of international leaders and representatives and members of the General Assembly—the conscience of the United Nations—and in front of the whole world, we state with a unified voice that religions through which Almighty God sought to bring happiness to mankind should not be turned into instruments to cause misery. Human beings were created as equals and partners on this planet; either they live together in peace and harmony, or they will inevitably be consumed by the flames of misunderstanding, malice and hatred. Dear Friends, throughout history, preoccupation with differences between the followers of religions and cultures has engendered intolerance, causing devastating wars and considerable bloodshed without any sound logical or ideological justification. It is high time for us to learn from the harsh lessons of the past and concur on the ethics and ideals in which we all believe. Matters on which we differ will be decided by our Omniscient Creator on the Day of Judgment. Every tragedy suffered in today’s world is

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ultimately a result of the abandonment of the paramount principle enunciated by all religions and cultures: The roots of all global crises can be found in human denial of the eternal principle of justice. Terrorism and criminality are the enemies of every religion and every civilization. They would not have appeared except for the absence of the principle of tolerance. The alienation and the sense of loss, which affects the lives of many of our young, leading them to drugs and crime, became widespread due to the dissolution of family bonds that Almighty God intended to be firm and strong. Our dialogue, conducted in a constructive manner, should, by the grace of God, revive and reinstate these lofty ideals among peoples and nations. No doubt, God willing, this will constitute a glorious triumph of what is most noble over what is most evil in human beings and will grant mankind hope of a future in which justice, security and a decent life will prevail over injustice, fear and poverty.31

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An Integrative Conclusion for Volume 2 Mathilde Salmberg

The preceding chapters in this volume have focused on perceptions regarding governmental rights to aggression and individual rights to peace in ordinary citizens from a number of European and Middle Eastern countries—specifically, Germany, Slovenia, Serbia, Russia, Greece, Turkey, Israel, Lebanon, Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. The authors of these chapters described the views of participants from their countries on such issues as the extent to which governments have rights to invade other countries and/or kill innocent civilians to fight terrorism, the extent to which people have rights to peace and to protest against war, whether world peace can be achieved, how important national security is for individual and family security, whether people should support their government in times of war, and, in some chapters, views on the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Personal definitions of the terms ‘‘war,’’ ‘‘peace,’’ and ‘‘terrorism’’ were also discussed, as were the ways in which the histories and contemporary concerns of each country may have contributed to the views of its citizens. Each chapter started with an account of the country’s historical, political, economic, and cultural background, providing a context for interpreting and understanding the research results. As is evident, the countries included in this volume have both significant parallels and significant divergences regarding their experiences of war, other forms of governmental forms of aggression, and peace. The organization of the volumes and the chapters provides an excellent opportunity to compare patterns of responses and themes while considering each country’s unique circumstances.

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Some of the countries considered in this volume have invaded other countries and/or been invaded themselves. Many have been subjected to internal conflict. The next section provides a brief account of some of the influential historical events of the 20th century that were discussed in greater depth in each country’s respective chapter. This overview begins with the central European country of Germany and then moves eastward toward countries in central, eastern, and southeastern Europe and Eurasia before moving on to the countries in the Middle East. Germany, a major combatant and perpetrator of the Holocaust in World War II, has undergone sweeping transformations in attitudes and actions related to government-sponsored aggression, moving from the aggressive Nazi regime of World War II to strong antimilitarist attitudes following the war. In recent decades, Germany has gradually increased its engagement in international crisis management and peacekeeping efforts, demonstrating a sense of responsibility not only to oppose war but also to prevent war by actively intervening when needed. The Russian people have endured more than a thousand years of governmental uses of tyranny, corruption, oppression, periods of anarchy, and violence as means to address internal and external conflicts. Post-Soviet Russia, following the end of the USSR in 1991, has also experienced various forms of governmental aggression, media control, and limitations on freedom of speech in the name of promoting stability. Serbia, the largest republic of former Yugoslavia, came under the rule of the communist regime of Slobodan Milosevic following the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Subsequently, it experienced a difficult period of economic blockages sponsored by the United Nations, internal conflicts such as those related to the Kosovo crisis, and a NATO intervention that beleaguered Serbia before its democratic revolution in 2000. Slovenia also became an independent state following the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991 but had previously lived with external threats and subordination in addition to many inner conflicts over the years. Greece, a nation located between Eastern and Western cultures, has experienced many events relating to war over the last century, including the Balkan wars, the World Wars, a civil war, and several brief dictatorships. Adjacent to Greece is Turkey, which serves as a bridge between East and West because it is located on two continents: Europe and Asia. Turkey was established in 1923 following the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish military, an authoritative government, and police violence have played prominent roles in Turkey over the last five decades as the country struggled with periods of chaos and economic crisis. Israel was proclaimed as an independent state in 1948 and continues to be embroiled in the long-standing Jewish-Palestinian conflict. Although historically Jewish-Arab relationships in the region have been

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characterized by war and conflict, recent decades have seen increased efforts toward reconciliation and peaceful coexistence. Nonetheless, this process remains challenging. Lebanon became independent in 1943 after a long history of occupation, division, and internal multisided conflicts between the government and different religious groups. Iraq has been an independent nation since 1932. In recent decades, Iraq has experienced a totalitarian government and a number of wars, including the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, and invasion by the U.S.-led ‘‘Coalition of the Willing.’’ These events significantly destabilized the country and led to the displacement of millions of Iraqi refugees. Kuwait became an independent state in 1961, following the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and after having been under British protection and influence for a number of years. Kuwait was invaded by Iraqi forces in 1991. The occupation came to an end with the assistance of a U.S.-led military intervention. When the Iraqis withdrew from Kuwait, Iraqi troops caused tremendous economic and environmental damage by setting a large number of oil wells on fire; however, Kuwait has since made a successful recovery. Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state with Arabic as its national language and the Quran as its constitution. The state was established in 1932, preceded by numerous struggles against the Ottoman Empire and other Arabian families for control of the area.

PARTICIPANTS AND RESEARCH RESULTS Participants from all countries completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS), generally either in hard copy or electronic online form. The samples varied in size, and although the samples from a couple of the Middle Eastern countries were rather small (Iraq, 16; Saudi Arabia, 16), the samples from most of the countries were either nearly 100 participants (Germany, 76; Greece, 75; Kuwait, 73) or over 100 participants (Serbia, Slovenia, Turkey, Israel, Lebanon, and Russia), with the largest sample coming from Russia (285 participants). This chapter reviews the response patterns of participants from each country, considering both quantitative results as well as qualitative themes. For the purposes of this chapter, responses to items addressing the following issues were considered: definitions of war, peace, and terrorism; assumptions concerning potential governmental rights to invasion, torture, and killing innocent civilians in the fight against terrorism; assumptions concerning the extent to which everyone has rights to experience peace and engage in protest; views on the achievability of world peace; and beliefs about the extent to which national security is important to individual and family security.

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Conducting cross-national analyses of views on war, peace, and governmental aggression is a challenging undertaking. Systematic analysis of qualitative responses is a demanding process, even at the level of a single sample from a single country. The complexity of the process only increased with the effort to provide cross-national comparisons, because each country’s sample varied significantly with regards to size, level of representativeness, and selection procedure, and the authors varied in their approach to data analysis and style of reporting the results. Despite these challenges, the findings from the participating countries provide a unique opportunity to explore the views of people from different national backgrounds, religions, and experience in relation to war- and peace-related issues.

DEFINITIONS OF WAR A cross-national comparison of participants’ personal definitions of the term ‘‘war’’ revealed that there were many commonalities across countries; however, there were also some differences that appeared consonant with particular historical circumstances and current issues. A large portion of Lebanese participants (52 percent) as well as a smaller numbers of participants from Greece (10 percent), Kuwait, Turkey, Israel, and Serbia provided synonyms or dictionary type definitions of war, describing it as conflict between one or more groups or countries. Another major definitional category that emerged in approximately a quarter or more of participants from Greece, Turkey, Lebanon, and in unknown percentages in the Saudi Arabian, Israeli, Kuwaiti, Iraqi, and Serbian samples included negative consequences or outcomes of war, such as death, destruction, and suffering. Definitions focusing on emotions or individual painful experiences related to war were also found with some consistency across countries (Greece, 22 percent; Turkey, 20 percent; and unknown percentages of the Israeli, Lebanese, Serbian, Kuwaiti, and Iraqi samples), which is not surprising considering that many of the participants from these countries have been personally affected by war. The war-related experiences of some participants appeared to be reflected directly in their definitions of war, particularly in responses from Israel, Russia, Turkey, and Lebanon. The Russian definitions of war clearly represented the participants’ personal experience with the pain of war, as over 90 percent of the responses conceptualized war in relation to its negative effects on both the individual and the state. Many Russian participants referred to the Great Patriotic War (World War II), a war that continues to be very much alive in the minds of

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many families that lost relatives in the war. Ten percent of Russian participants defined war as a means to achieve state control, echoing the philosophies of many of Russia’s leaders. One Russian participant captured the extensive history of armed conflict in Russia by defining war as ‘‘the condition in which states are most of the time.’’ The Iraqi authors discussed the dire economic consequences of war on Iraq, such as the greatly damaged oil export business; and the subsequent severely compromised economy and impoverished living conditions for Iraqis. The widespread economic hardship imposed by ongoing armed conflict within the country, both against the occupying forces and among the competing Iraqi groups, may have been reflected in some of the Iraqi responses that spoke to the destruction and instability associated with war. The Israeli authors commented on the intensity and vivid images associated with war in the definitions of many of the Israeli respondents, who defined war with powerful and affect laden words such as ‘‘blood,’’ ‘‘killing,’’ and ‘‘destruction.’’ In addition, definitions focusing on causes and motives behind war (e.g., conflicts over scarce resources such as territory) emerged more strongly in Israel than in other countries, which likely reflects the reality of their prolonged struggle over land. Some Israeli participants considered the nature of the parties’ relationships; these definitions focused on how competing parties deal with conflict both behaviorally and emotionally—an issue the Israeli citizens have had ample opportunity to contemplate over the many years of conflict and efforts to promote cooperation and peaceful coexistence in their region. Definitions focusing on political or economic motivations for war appeared to be more common in Turkey and Greece than in other countries, perhaps reflecting the economic struggles they have endured. A small percentage of the Turkish participants defined war negatively as a situation that is lacking in or antecedent to peace (e.g., ‘‘the situation before peace’’) or as ‘‘defense.’’ The definitions of some Serbian and Greek participants included references to ulterior motives such as a quest for power and pursuing self-interests. In their definitions of war, some respondents from Greece, Serbia, and Turkey simply condemned war or made moral judgments against war, and some Greek participants spoke about the violation of human rights and the loss of rationality in war.

RIGHTS TO INVASION Every country with participants who responded to the item ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country’’ has had some

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form of direct experience with invasion, either being occupied themselves, invading another country, or both. The results revealed that all Iraqi and the majority of German, Kuwaiti, Russian, Lebanese, Slovenian, Greek, Turkish, Serbian, and Saudi Arabian participants disagreed with the premise that a country has the right to invade another country. The Israeli sample was divided with 45 percent opposing and 48 percent supporting the right to invasion. Common themes present in the qualitative responses across most countries included general denouncements of invasion, violence, and coercion; assertions concerning each country’s right to sovereignty; stated preferences for peaceful or diplomatic alternatives to invasion; and identification of adverse consequences of invasion. Some participants from Serbia and Greece questioned the invaders’ motives. Many of the German responses reflected the national debate surrounding their sense of responsibility to oppose war and abstain from the use of military force and the responsibility to partake in international peacekeeping efforts in order to ‘‘prevent another Auschwitz.’’ Other common themes in the German sample were the focus on the inherent violation of human rights violations that accompanies invasion and a preference for nonviolent alternatives. Approximately 11 percent of the Greek participants and 7 percent of Lebanese participants emphasized that a country’s borders or physical boundaries should be respected. The authors of the chapter on Lebanon noted that the emphasis on boundaries may reflect the ways in which Lebanon’s geographical location has caused it to be subject to numerous trespasses. With regards to Greece, it is possible that the participants’ perspectives on invasion may have been influenced by the historical struggle over Cyprus. Although the majority of participants from most countries disagreed with a governmental right to invasion, some participants from almost every country identified some circumstances that might justify an invasion. Some such justifications included self-defense, deterring an actual or potential attack on one’s own country, responding to humanitarian demands, and engaging in a third-party intervention. The countries with a larger portion of supporters of the right to invasion included Israel (48 percent) and Russia (nearly 40 percent). Respondents from these countries tended to provide similar justifications for invasion, such as in defense of one’s citizens, country, or the world; humanitarian reasons/third party interventions; or in efforts to work toward peace. The relatively high number of Russian participants agreeing with invasion appears consistent with recurring themes in the Russian sample portraying war and violence as an inevitable or necessary part of protecting and maintaining a nation. Some Israeli participants noted that

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they support a governmental right to invasion based on their local historical conditions, such as their fight for independence and national liberation. One Israeli participant noted that ‘‘eventually the state of Israel was founded by means of invasion.’’

TERRORISM The countries considered in this volume had divergent experiences in relation to terrorism, with some but not all of the countries having been directly affected by terrorism. This section provides brief summaries of some of the countries’ experiences with terrorism as described by their respective authors. For example, Turkey has dealt with challenges presented by several active domestic terrorist groups. One particularly active group, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), has fought to establish an independent Kurdish state out of Turkey; this effort has resulted in the deaths of 30,000–35,000 people since 1984. Turkey also has extremist religious groups that have killed numerous citizens through suicide bombs. Greece also had an active terrorist organization, named November 17, created on the same date in 1975. This group attacked highprofile foreign targets such as the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency station chief in Athens. The government was slow to respond to the attacks, and segments of the population initially believed that the victims were legitimate targets, resulting in a considerable delay before terrorism came to be viewed as a national security issue in Greece. Germany has had several experiences with terrorism, with the most active group being a militant leftist group, the Red Army Faction (RAF); the RAF has been responsible for the deaths of 34 individuals, although its activity has waned since the 1970s and 1980s. Several major categories emerged across countries in definitions of terrorism, including making negative value judgments about terrorism; identifying terrorism as an ideological tool; describing underlying motivations or emotions of terrorism; identifying conditions that give rise to terrorism; and describing outcomes of terrorism. Participants from some countries also discussed the challenge of defining terrorism, and some reflected on terrorism as a phenomenon of modern times. Very few participants identified terrorism as something that could be constructive or positive. The relative frequency with which the different themes emerged did vary somewhat across countries. For example, significant numbers of the Saudi Arabian (100 percent), Greek (47 percent), Turkish (43 percent), Kuwaiti (28 percent), and Lebanese (30 percent) participants, as well as some Iraqi participants, incorporated negative moral judgments

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about terrorism into their definitions, commenting on the immorality, or insanity, or inappropriateness of acts or perpetrators of terrorism. Given some of these countries’ extensive exposure to terrorism, it is understandable why many of the definitions of ‘‘terrorism’’ were predominantly either moral judgments or references to the destructiveness and violence of terrorism. The Saudi Arabian responses were also consistent with their government’s stance against terrorism and efforts at counterterrorism, such as including it in the educational curriculum. References to underlying motivations, intentions, or goals of terrorism generally focused on the destructive intent of terrorism; 52 percent of the Kuwaiti participants, 50 percent of the Russian participants, 32 percent of the Turkish participants, 29 percent of the Lebanese participants, and 9 percent of the Greek participants defined terrorism in terms of its destructive objectives, such as the creation of fear in citizens, violence, death, or destruction. The majority of Serbian participants defined terrorism as violence by groups directed at innocent civilians. Another common definition of terrorism that varied in frequency across countries was terrorism as an ideological tool, a way to spread beliefs, to revolt, or to create change in the world. Larger portions of the Russian (40 percent), Greek (22 percent), and Turkish responses (11 percent) fell into this category than was true of the other samples. A number of Russian participants who described terrorism as an instrument for change also remarked that it is an ill-advised way to go about it. Most Turkish participants in this category noted that terrorism is an ‘‘ideology gone wrong,’’ and some articulated total opposition to terrorism as an ideological tool. Two percent of the Turkish participants in this category conveyed a positive view of terrorism as a means to effect change. The Greek participants tended to discuss broader aims of terrorism beyond the destructive intent, noting, for example, that terrorism is an ‘‘act of revolution expressed in the wrong way’’ or a ‘‘blind attack against citizens with the aim of averting unfavorable governmental decisions.’’ Some of the Greek participants provided definitions of terrorism that were less negative than the typical definitions provided by the different samples, which may relate to the support some Greek citizens initially felt for the agenda of the terrorist group November 17, and the Greek government’s delay in recognizing terrorism as a national security issue. One Greek participant noted, for example, ‘‘If the terrorist is a liberator and a revolutionary for the good of the interests of his copatriots, then I see him as a hero and a patriot.’’ A small percentage of the participants from Turkey (9 percent), Russia (4 percent), and a number of Lebanese participants spoke about negative individual and environmental conditions that give rise to terrorism, such

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as intense feelings of fear, hatred, rage, dissatisfaction, or lack of education. Some participants from Greece and Serbia discussed the challenge of defining terrorism and the subjectivity of the term. Some questioned whose definition of terrorism should be considered; for example, a Serbian participant noted that terrorism is ‘‘an imaginative word; terrorists exist in all countries.’’ Another trend across countries was defining terrorism as a contemporary or modern phenomenon, unique to our times. One Greek participant described terrorism as ‘‘the biggest curse of our century’’ and one Serbian participant simply defined it as ‘‘Osama bin Laden.’’ The Iraqi respondents generally used highly emotional words such as ‘‘crime,’’ ‘‘fear,’’ and ‘‘dread’’ in their definitions of terrorism. Some Kuwaiti participants emphasized that terrorism is not a religious action, and in particular that it is not related to Islam. In response to the statement ‘‘Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism,’’ the majority of participants addressing this question from all countries disagreed to some degree (Kuwait, 92 percent; Slovenia, 91 percent; Lebanon, approximately 70 percent; Germany, 57 percent; and the majority of Serbian, Russian, Iraqi, and Saudi Arabian participants). Common themes across countries included arguments that killing innocents constitutes ‘‘state terrorism,’’ emphasis on the innocence of the civilians as the reason why governments do not have a right to kill them, and a preference for nonviolent methods of countering terrorism. Some participants noted that there are cases where killing innocent civilians may be justified; for example, when a greater number of individuals can be saved as a result. As the chapter on Germany discussed, the national debate regarding a law legalizing shootings of airplane hijackers, which was passed in 2005 and voided one year later, was reflected in some German responses emphasizing the inherent difficulty of weighing life against life when deciding if the government has such a right. Participants from Lebanon and Russia noted that killing civilians can be justified if someone is guilty of being a terrorist. Russia had the highest number of participants who agreed that the government has the right to kill innocents (40 percent). The Russian respondents either simply affirmed a governmental right to kill civilians in the fight against terrorism, indicated that civilian losses are inevitable, noting ‘‘What else could they do?’’ and ‘‘Terrorists should be killed,’’ or imposed qualifications on a government’s right to accept civilian losses as part of fighting terrorism. Some Serbian participants stated that such a right would not be constructive in any way; other Serbian participants focused on their disagreement with U.S. foreign policy and actions in regard to the fight against terrorism.

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PEACE The vast majority of participants across countries agreed with the statement ‘‘Everyone has a right to peace.’’ Common themes included general affirmations of the right to peace and of beliefs that peace is a fundamental human right and a basic human need. The strong desire and need for peace was particularly evident among the Russian participants, almost 75 percent of whom stated that peace is a basic human need. The emphasis on peace as an inherent human need seems consistent with what the authors of the Russian chapter articulated as a strong yearning for stability among the Russian people. Thirteen percent of the German responses referred to a fundamental equality that entitles everyone to peace, as well as providing more general articulations concerning a universal right to peace. As discussed in the chapter on Germany, the presence of this category may speak to the prominence of equality issues in Germany, particularly after several violent xenophobic and anti-Semitic attacks. The focus on equality may be indicative of the Germans’ heightened sensitivity to the connection of discriminatory attitudes with events like the Holocaust. Some participants from Slovenia and Serbia noted that peace is not just a right but also a duty that people must work for and that peace is something people must earn. Some participants from Greece and Serbia made references to the negative consequences of war in their responses, illustrating the powerful association between the concepts of peace and war; even when prompted to think about a right to peace, these respondents seemed to automatically generate images of war. Some Greek participants noted that people have a choice about whether to live in peace or not. The Iraqi participants mainly defined peace as something difficult to achieve, and some also defined peace with affective themes of hopefulness and safety, of peace as a ‘‘dream.’’ Across nationalities, responses varied considerably when participants were asked whether they believe that world peace can be achieved. The majority of the Turkish (68 percent), German (57 percent), Iraqi, Saudi Arabian, Lebanese, and Russian participants indicated that they did not believe in the possibility of world peace. The Slovenian and Israeli participants were almost equally divided between participants who were optimistic and those who were pessimistic about the possibility of achieving world peace. Israeli participants who expressed pessimism about the achievability of world peace tended to include religious or cultural barriers, human nature, and historical evidence in their explanations. Some Israeli responses reflected issues of great immediate importance to many Israelis, referring to anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism, and expansion of Islam as reasons why world peace cannot be achieved.

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The authors of the chapter on Saudi Arabia speculated that their participants may be pessimistic about the achievability of world peace in part because Israel did not respond positively to the Arab Peace Initiative. As noted in the chapter on Russia, the Russian participants demonstrated a tendency to place the responsibility for achieving peace on the state or government, thus absolving individuals of responsibility to work toward peace. A small number of Russian participants conveyed some hopefulness regarding the achievability of peace, indicating that they believe world peace might be possible in the future. The Greek participants were the most optimistic about the possibility of world peace; the majority agreed with the statement, and only 11 percent expressed pessimism. Forty-six percent of Kuwaiti participants believe in world peace if certain conditions are met, and 26 percent expressed hope for world peace. In their quantitative rating scale responses, the majority of the Serbian participants also expressed some level of agreement with the statement that world peace is possible; however, their qualitative responses primarily consisted of explanations of why world peace is not possible. Many of the chapter contributors discussed positive and negative conceptions of peace when describing their participants’ definitions of peace. A negative concept of peace describes what peace is not as opposed to what it is. For example, negative definitions focus on the absence of war, conflict, or violence. Positive conceptions of peace focus on specific characteristics that contribute to peace.1 The majority of participants from Greece, Turkey, Israel, Russia, Lebanon, Kuwait, and a large part of the Serbian sample provided positive conceptions of peace. The typical positive definitions centered on the importance of good interpersonal and diplomatic relationships and cooperation, general or specific affirmations of the benefits of peace, positive feelings associated with peace, and peace as a state. The participants from Germany (50 percent), Russia (25 percent), and Lebanon (27 percent) had the largest portion of negative conceptions of peace. A small number of participants from various countries described peace as an ideal, perfect situation, and some noted that it is an unachievable utopian ideal. Some of the Saudi Arabian participants focused on barriers to peace in their definitions. Themes in the Israeli sample also included tolerance, social justice, morality, and solidarity. It is also noteworthy, as pointed out by the Israeli authors, that the Israeli participants’ definitions of peace were less clear and decisive than their attitudes regarding war and war-related issues. As discussed in the chapter on Turkey, the Turkish people recently experienced the largest war in their history, where they had to defend themselves against invasion. This event seems very much in the collective consciousness of the people, as several participants directly quoted the famous phrase

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‘‘peace at home, peace in the world’’ spoken by Mustafa Kemal Atat€ urk, a nationally admired political leader who played an integral part in establishing the Turkish Republic. This emphasis may reflect the great desire for peace in a nation that has suffered many years of war. .

RIGHTS TO PROTEST Regarding individual rights to participate in protests against war and in favor of peace, most participants across countries at least partly agreed, and many completely agreed that protest is a legitimate right (Iraq, Serbia, and Saudi Arabia, 100 percent; Germany, 99 percent; Greece, 97 percent; Slovenia, 93 percent; Lebanon, 87 percent; and Kuwait, 75 percent). Common themes among these countries were that protest is part of freedom of opinion and expression and that protesting against war is not just a right but a duty. The Greek authors discussed the Greek citizens’ strong tradition of protesting, highlighting the belief of many Greek participants that protesting against war is a duty or civic responsibility. Such responses often included negative judgments toward individuals who do not join in antiwar demonstrations. A number of Greek (20 percent), German (29 percent), and some Serbian and Kuwaiti participants emphasized the need for protests to be nonviolent. Several Serbian participants also noted that protests should be organized to strengthen their influence. Twenty-four percent of Kuwaiti participants noted the importance of qualifying the right to protest (e.g., ensuring that protests are peaceful) and expressed concerns about the potential negative consequences of protesting. The Russian participants demonstrated a significantly lower rate of agreement with a right to protest, with less than 60 percent being supportive and many mentioning qualifications to such a right. The majority of Russians simply stated ‘‘No comment’’ in regard to their rating scale responses, and some questioned the efficacy of protest or noted that protesters should seek permission from the government first. These themes may be indicative of how an authoritarian regime and limited freedom of expression can shape the attitudes and perceptions on individual’s right to protest.

GOVERNMENTAL RIGHTS TO TORTURE The majority of participants from all of the countries in this volume disagreed with the statement ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war,’’ although their level of disagreement

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varied to some extent. Most countries had a fairly high percentage of disagreeing participants; for example, all Iraqi participants, 88 percent of the Greek participants, 88 percent of the Turkish participants, 84 percent of the German participants, 81 percent of the Slovenian participants, 74 percent of Kuwaiti participants, 64 percent of the Lebanese participants, and the majority of the Serbians disagreed completely or fairly strongly with a governmental right to torture prisoners of war. The average quantitative rating for the Saudi Arabian participants fell between mild disagreement and neither agree or disagree, and Saudis who provided qualitative answers generally referred to torture as inhumane. In addition to general denouncements of torture, common reasons given for disagreeing with a right to torture included identifying it as contrary to international laws or treaties, a violation of human rights, disregarding the value of human life, having negative effects, violating ethical or moral principles, and lacking efficacy as an interrogation technique. Some participants stressed a preference for alternative methods of interrogation. All Iraqi participants defined the term torture with some form of moral judgment such as ‘‘bad,’’ ‘‘unfair,’’ or ‘‘inhumane.’’ The Iraqi authors noted that according to recent statistics, many Iraqi refugees have been subject to torture, which makes it likely that some of the participants may have been victims of torture themselves or know victims. A number of Serbian participants demonstrated sensitivity regarding the difficult position prisoners of war find themselves in, noting that the prisoners are not involved in a wartime situation out of their own free will and that imprisonment is punishment enough. Across countries, the general minority of participants who supported the right to torture prisoners of war expressed the view that torture can be justified in cases where it is useful in obtaining needed information; in addition, some participants noted that proof of guilt or wrongdoing on behalf of the prisoner can justify the use of torture. Although the majority of Russian participants also disagreed with a right to torture, this sample had a higher proportion of participants, over 40 percent, who agreed with a governmental right to torture than was found in the other countries. Common justifications among the Russian participants for a governmental right to torture included the government’s need for information from prisoners for strategic purposes, to save lives, or for other social benefits. Some Russian participants stated that torture is justified because prisoners of war are ‘‘enemies,’’ and others noted that torture can be justified in times of war. This type of argument may be explained by Russian familiarity with torture by the secret police,

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frequent involvement in war, and messages from leaders saying that some violence is inevitable or necessary to benefit society or protect citizens.

NATIONAL SECURITY The majority of German, Saudi Arabian, Russian, Serbian, and Slovenian participants agreed with the statement ‘‘National security is essential for individual and family security.’’ The Russian sample had the highest percentage of participants agreeing with the statement: 90 percent. Both Russian and German participants simply asserted that both individual and family security depend on national security, equated state security with family security, or discussed the positive consequences of living in a secure environment. Portions of both the Russian (20 percent) and German samples (8 percent) expressed beliefs that the government has the duty to protect its people against any threat to security. The authors of the chapter on Russia related this belief to the country’s tradition of patriarchal governments, starting with the tsars and the church and followed by government leaders seen as father figures such as Lenin. The German sample stood out as somewhat different from other samples in expressing the view that national security is not established through military force and that national security should not be achieved through compromising fundamental civil rights and liberties—statements consistent with the strong antiwar sentiment in Germany that followed the end of World War II. Although very few participants from Saudi Arabia responded to this item, the ones who did tended to agree strongly with the importance of national security; this belief appears consistent with their constitution, which states that in the defense of the nation, security is a mutual responsibility for both the state and the citizens. A strong theme in the Slovenian sample that was also evident in their responses to other items was unwillingness to subordinate freedom to security, while at the same time perceiving security as the key condition underlying the achievement of family and individual safety. Most Serbian participants outlined conditions necessary for national security, such as democracy, political and economic stability, freedom of opinion and expression, and valuing of human rights. Some Serbian participants who disagreed with the statement viewed it from a different perspective, noting that family and personal security lead to state security. In contrast to the majority of participants from other countries who generally agreed with this statement,

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only 24 percent of the Lebanese participants agreed. The authors noted that this may be related to the fact that national security has not been a reality for the Lebanese people and that a focus on family rather than national security is consistent with its collectivistic culture. None of the Lebanese participants considered national security as the responsibility of their government.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION Humankind has been familiar with the realities and ideas of ‘‘war’’ and ‘‘peace’’ throughout history and has engaged in endless debates about governmental uses of aggression. Our national backgrounds, the current social and political climate in which we live, and how we interpret our realities influence how we feel and think about these issues. In our rapidly changing world, with significant advances in globalization, access to media, and new forms of security threats, most people, even those living in peaceful parts of the world, get ample exposure to these issues. The authors of this volume have given us a glimpse into the history and current state of affairs in their respective countries, in addition to giving a voice to ordinary citizens on these issues. The intent of this concluding chapter was to summarize and highlight the similarities and differences in patterns of responses and themes across all countries. Commonalities that emerged across countries were a general denouncement of war and terrorism and rejection of the possibility of governmental rights to invasion, torture, and killing innocent civilians. Some variability was evident as participants from some countries expressed higher levels of tolerance for government aggression than others did. Another finding was that the participants generally agreed that the right to peace is universal. At the same time, the majority of participants were pessimistic about the possibility of achieving world peace, although participants from a few countries conveyed some hopefulness about world peace. Most participants agreed that people have the right to protest, with participants from some countries emphasizing the importance of protests being carried out in a peaceful manner. There was also consensus that national security is essential for individual and family security, while there were differing opinions concerning whose responsibility it is to ensure national security. The definitions of the terms ‘‘war,’’ ‘‘peace,’’ and ‘‘terrorism’’ varied somewhat from country to country. Regarding the definitions of war, themes that emerged in many countries included negative consequences of war, emotional responses, and personal experiences of the pain associated with war. Participants from some countries made references that

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were specific to their areas or countries, such as a particular conflict or consequences that they may have experienced themselves. A number of the chapter contributors conceptualized definitions of peace from the perspective of Galtung, who pointed out that peace can be defined either positively or negatively. In this approach, positive peace definitions describe what constitutes peace, with implicit or explicit recognition of the importance of fairness and equality, and negative definitions of peace refer to descriptions of what peace is not. The majority of participants defined peace in positive terms, focusing on good interpersonal and diplomatic relationships, affirmations of the benefits of peace, positive feelings, and peace as a state. Some countries had higher numbers of participants discussing barriers to peace, concepts related to tolerance and social justice, and references to local experiences than some other countries had. When defining terrorism, the majority of participants from all countries defined terrorism in a critical and disapproving manner. Many participants made negative moral judgments, discussed the destructiveness and violence of terrorism, or spoke to conditions that give rise to terrorism. On the basis of personal experiences with terrorism, some participants appeared to be more tolerant and understanding of terrorism and its aims than others. Although it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the patterns of responses, one important finding was that not everyone responds in the same way to aggression. Even though a number of participants had encountered the same or similar forms of aggression, the individual experiences, interpretations, and responses to aggression varied both within and between countries. Some responded by granting their governments more latitude in their rights to exercise aggression, whereas others were more concerned with restricting such rights. Another interesting discovery is that when the participants provided support for governmental aggression, they demonstrated a tendency to use similar arguments across countries, the kind of arguments that many leaders have used to justify their actions. Finally, despite the fact that many participants had lived through or been directly or indirectly affected by different forms of aggression, they generally placed a very high value on peace, cooperation, solidarity, and human rights. They also had a propensity to endorse nonviolent or diplomatic solutions to conflict over forceful or violent ones. These findings may indicate a universal reverence for life, inspiring hope for peaceful conflict solutions for a more peaceful world in the future.

Notes

Set Introduction 1. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, 1945. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1. 2. Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 894. 3. Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, ‘‘Armed Conflict and Its International Dimensions, 1946–2004,’’ Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 5 (2005): 623–35. 4. Human Security Centre (2005), Human Security Report 2005 Fact Sheet. (Vancouver, BC: University of British Colombia), http://www.humansecurityreport.org/press/Armed_Conflict-Factsheet. 5. Robert M. Sapolsky, ‘‘A Natural History of Peace,’’ Foreign Affairs 85, no. 1 (2006): 104–20. 6. Peaceful Societies: Alternatives to Violence and War, ‘‘Encyclopedia of Selected Peaceful Societies,’’ http://www.peacefulsocieties.org:80/Society/ intro. 7. Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Palgrave, 2000). 8. Office of the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights, ‘‘Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,’’ http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cat.htm. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984, entry into force 26 June 1987, in accordance with article 27 (1). 9. Office of the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights, ‘‘Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace,’’ http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ peace.htm. Approved by General Assembly resolution 39/11 of 12 November 1984.

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10. Office of the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights, ‘‘Convention on the Rights of the Child,’’ http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, entry into force 2 September 1990, in accordance with article 49. 11. United Nations, ‘‘Charter of the United Nations,’’ http://www.un.org/ aboutun/charter/. 12. United Nations, ‘‘Charter of the United Nations.’’ 13. United Nations, ‘‘Charter of the United Nations.’’ 14. C. Enemark and C. Michaelsen, ‘‘Just War Doctrine and the Invasion of Iraq,’’ Australian Journal of Politics and History 51, no. 4 (2005): 545–63. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2000). 15. Enemark and Michaelsen, ‘‘Just War Doctrine and the Invasion of Iraq.’’ 16. Laurie Calhoun, ‘‘Legitimate Authority and ‘Just War’ in the Modern World,’’ Peace and Change 27, no. 1 (2002), 37–62. 17. Nicholas Rengger, ‘‘On the Just War Tradition in the Twenty-First Century,’’ International Affairs 78, 2 (2002): 353–63. 18. In our view, ‘‘race’’ is a social construct lacking a biological basis. 19. Kathleen Malley-Morrison, International Perspectives on Family Violence and Abuse (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004). 20. A. Strauss and J. Corbin, ‘‘Grounded Theory Methodology: An Overview,’’ in Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry, ed. N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1998), 273–85. 21. Johan Galtung, ‘‘Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses,’’ Journal of Peace Research 22, no. 2 (1985): 141–58.

Chapter 1 1. Winfried Halder, Innenpolitik im Kaiserreich 1871–1914 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003). 2. Volker Ulrich, Deutsches Kaiserreich (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 2006). 3. Deutscher Bundestag, Fragen an die deutsche Geschichte (Bonn: Presse-und Informationszentrum, 1983). 4. Hans-Wilhelm Kelling, Deutsche Kulturgeschichte (London: Holt, Rinehardt & Winston, 1974). 5. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, How Many Jews Were Killed during the Holocaust? USHMM, http://www.ushmm.org/research/library/faq/ details.php?lang=en&topic=03#02. 6. Friedemann Bed€ urftig, Drittes Reich und Zweiter Weltkrieg: Ein Lexikon (M€ unchen: Piper, 2004). Other sources state up to 800,000 deaths in this group; the actual number might be hard to estimate because of a lack of records due to their nomad lifestyle. The Sinti and Roma had a difficult time being recognized as victims even after the war.

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7. Here, Bed€ urftig (2004) references the Nuremberg trials. 8. Bed€ urftig (2004), 256f. 9. Verlag Ploetz, Der große Ploetz (Freiburg: Verlag Ploetz, 1991), 944. 10. Buchners Kolleg Geschichte, Von der franz€osischen Revolution bis zum Nationalsozialismus (Bamberg: Buchner, 1992), 457. 11. Bernt Engelmann, We Still Have Our Heads on Our Necks. The Germans between Zero Hour and Economic Miracle (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1987). 12. Alice Holmes Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace: German Peace Movements since 1945 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996). 13. Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace, 1996. 14. Gregor Schollgen, Facts about Germany: Germany, A Partner Worldwide, http://www.tatsachen-ueber-deutschland.de/en/foreign-policy/main-content-05/ germany-a-partner-worldwide.html. 15. EconomicExpert.com, Berlin Wall, http://www.economicexpert.com/s/ Berlin:Wall.htm. 16. Berlin Wall online, Why the Berlin Wall Was Built Up, http://www.daily soft.com/berlinwall/history/why-the-berlinwall-was-built.htm. 17. CNN.com International, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/ experience/spies/spy.files/intelligence/stasi.html. 18. The GSG9 is the elite counter-terrorism and special operations unit of the German federal police. It was founded after the 1972 massacre at the Munich Olympics, which ended as tragically as it did in part due to mismanagement by the German police, who were neither equipped nor trained for counterterrorist operations. 19. A quick online search of the Bavarian State Library for ‘‘Rote Armee Fraktion’’ gives 110 sources in the German language that have been published since 1985. About one third of these (38) have been published since 2005. 20. Quoted in Brigitte L. Nacos, review of ‘‘Why Movements Matter: The West German Peace Movement and U.S. Arms Control Policy’’ by Steve Breyman, Political Science Quarterly 118, No. 2 (2003), 333. 21. Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace, 1996. 22. David Gress, Peace and Survival: West Germany, the Peace Movement, and European Security (Stanford: Hoover Press, 1985). 23. Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace, 1996. 24. Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace, 1996. 25. Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace, 1996. 26. It does indeed seem strange that in the postwar period there appeared to have been many crimes, but very few perpetrators. See for an example, J€ org Friedrich, Die kalte Amnestie. NS-T€ater in der Bundesrepublik (Munich: Piper, 1994). 27. Information in this and the following section is from Stefan Aust, Der Baader-Meinhof-Komplex (Hamburg: Hoffman & Campe, 1997), 57. 28. Aust, Der Baader-Meinhof-Komplex, 1997, 59. 29. Steve Breyman, Why Movements Matter: The West German Peace Movement and U.S. Arms Control Policy (Albany, State University of New York Press, 2001). 30. Gress, Peace and Survival, 1985.

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31. Gress, Peace and Survival, 1985. 32. Country listing: Nations Encyclopedia, Germany, http://www.countrydata.com/frd/cs/gxtoc.html. 33. Berlin-life.com, The Berlin Wall, http://www.berlin-life.com/berlin/wall. 34. Regina Karp, ‘‘The New German Foreign Policy Consensus,’’ The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2005), 61–82. 35. Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, ‘‘The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-emptive Strikes.’’ Security Dialogue 36, no.3 (2005) 339–59. 36. Rainer Baumann and Gunter Hellman, ‘‘Germany and the Use of Military Force: ‘Total War,’ the ‘culture of restraint’ and the quest for normality’’ German Politics 10, no.1, (2001) 61–82. 37. Baumann and Hellman, ‘‘Germany and the Use of Military Force’’ (2001). 38. Dalgaard-Nielsen, ‘‘The Test of Strategic Culture’’ (2005). 39. Baumann and Hellman, ‘‘Germany and the Use of Military Force’’ (2001). 40. Baumann and Hellman, ‘‘Germany and the Use of Military Force’’ (2001). 41. Baumann and Hellman, ‘‘Germany and the Use of Military Force’’ (2001). 42. Dalgaard-Nielsen, ‘‘The Test of Strategic Culture’’ (2005). 43. Dalgaard-Nielsen, ‘‘The Test of Strategic Culture’’ (2005). 44. Baumann and Hellman, ‘‘Germany and the Use of Military Force’’ (2001). 45. Ruth Wittlinger and Martin Larose, ‘‘No Future for Germany’s Past? Collective Memory and German Foreign Policy, German Politics 16, no. 4 (2007) 481–95. 46. Wittlinger and Larose, ‘‘No Future for Germany’s Past? (2007). 47. Baumann and Hellman, ‘‘Germany and the Use of Military Force’’ (2001). 48. Bundesverfassungsgericht, ‘‘Press release no. 11/2006 of 15 February 2006.’’ http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg06011en.html. 49. Hengst, Bj€ orn. Luftsicherheitsgesetz: ‘‘Sch€ auble ist in dieser Frage blind’’ Spiegel Online 01-03-2007, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518, 457609,00.html. 50. Facts about Germany, Population, http://www.tatsachen-ueber-deutschland. de/en/inhaltsseiten-home/zahlen-fakten/bevoelkerung.html. 51. Federal Research Division, A Country-Study: Germany, http://lcweb2.loc. gov/frd/cs/detoc.html. 52. Facts about Germany. 53. Central Intelligence Agency, ‘‘The World FactBook,’’ Germany, http:// www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html#Intro. 54. Federal Research Division. 55. Wittlinger and Larose, ‘‘No Future for Germany’s Past?’’ (2007). 56. Mario Peucker, European Forum for Migration Studies, Equality and Antidiscrimination Approaches in Germany, http://www.efms.uni-bamberg.de/pdf/ Anti-discrimination_in_Germany.pdf. 57. Mario Peucker, Equality and Anti-discrimination Approaches in Germany. 58. Mario Peucker, Equality and Anti-discrimination Approaches in Germany.

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Chapter 2 1. Peter Stih, ‘‘Slovenska zgodovina: Od prazgodovinskih kultur do konca srednjega veka’’ (‘‘A Slovene History: From the Prehistoric Cultures to the End of the Middle Ages’’), (2008), http://www.sistory.si/publikacije/pdf/zgodovina/ Stih-Slovenska_zgodovina_od_prazgodovinskih_kultur_do_konca_srednjega_ veka.pdf. 2. Stih, A Slovene History, 21–38. 3. The state is perhaps too strong a term for this entity, but in a collective memory of the nation it is ‘‘remembered’’ as such. Actually, the name of its special part Carinthia in folk history often denotes the area of whole union of tribes under Samo’s reign, although in that time later Carinthia was named ‘‘marca Vinedorum’’ after the then name for Alps Slavs ‘‘Vineds.’’ 4. While myths of Kosovo were used by Serbian official policy to gain national support for their expansionistic ideas culminating in Yugoslav wars, myths of Carinthia never served this purpose. The reason could be that Slovenia was never a local power. 5. ‘‘Whose region, his religion.’’ The quote expresses the idea that the religion of the king or other ruler would be the religion of the people. 6. From 1804 until 1867 Austrian Empire and from 1867 until 1918 AustroHungarian Empire. 7. Wikipedia, ‘‘Yugoslavia,’’ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yugoslavia.  8. Miroslav Stiplovsek, ‘‘Sestojanuarska diktatura’’ (‘‘Dictatorship of Sixth January’’), in Enciklopedija Slovenije, vol. 13, zvezek (Encyclopedia of Slovenia, Vol. 13, 1999). Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 33–4. 9. Horrible atrocities were committed by ustase especially in the infamous concentration camp Jasenovac, where many thousands of antifascists, communisst, Jews, Serbs, Roms, and others were killed in a very cruel way. Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, with their domestic and other allies, were responsible for the death and torture of more than a million citizens of Yugoslavia. Many were sent to Italian and German concentration camps; many were killed as hostages. 10. Ervin Staub, The Roots of Evil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 17–8. 11. Tone Ferenc, ‘‘Povojne mnozicne usmrtitve 1945–46’’ (‘‘Afterwar Mass Executions 1945–46’’), In: Enciklopedija Slovenije, vol. 16, zvezek (Encyclopedia of Slovenia, vol. 16) (2002.) Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 166–7. 12. Vid Pecjak, ‘‘Kognitivna struktura pojmov komunizem, socializem in kapitalizem’’ Teorija in praksa (1970), 6–7, 1022–34. While in Western countries the term ‘‘communism’’ or ‘‘communistic’’ was used to describe the Soviet Union, its satellites, as well as Yugoslavia, the term ‘‘socialist’’ or ‘‘socialistic’’ was officially used by them in the same sense, though of course with a quite different connotation. 13. Yugoslavia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yugoslavia. 14. Ethnic tensions and the economic crisis, ibid. 15. Breakup, ibid. 16. Yugoslav wars, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yugoslav_Wars.

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17. History of Slovenia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Slovenia. 18. Ten-Day War, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ten-Day_War. 19. History of Slovenia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Slovenia. 20. Janek Musek, Psiholoski portret Slovencev (Psychological Portrait of Slovenians). (Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicisticno sredi, 1994). 21. Preseren, France (1836), Krst pri Savici (The Baptism on the Savica), translated by Henry R. Cooper (1996), Bilje: Studio Ro, Zalo zba Humar. 22. Vlado Miheljak, ‘‘Slovenia in Central Europe: Merely Meteorological or a Value Kinship?’’ In Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe, Hans-Dieter Klingemann (ur.), Dieter Fuchs (ur.), and Jan Zielonka (ur.) (Routledge research in comparative politics, 15) (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 119–47. 23. Janek Musek, Psiholoski portret Slovencev (Psychological Portrait of Slovenians) (Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicisticno sredi, 1994); Anton Trstenjak, Slovenska postenost (Slovenian Honesty) (Ljubljana: Institut Antona rstenjaka za psihologijo, logoterapijo in antropohigieno, 1995); Slavoj Zizek, Jezik, ideologija, Slovenci (Language, Ideology, Slovenians) (Ljubljana:Delavska enotnost, 1987). 24. WVS, World Value Survey; EVS, European Value Survey; European Social Survey (http://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/). 25. David Easton, A System Analysis of Political Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979). 26. Piotr Sztomka, ‘‘Vertrauen. Die fehlende Ressource der postkommunistischen Gesellschaft,’’ in K€olner Zeitschrift f€ ur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, (Politische Institutionen in Wandel), ed. B. Nedelmann (Sonderheft 35, Opladen, 1995). 27. J. Delhey and K. Newton, Who Trusts? The Origins of Social Trust in Seven Nations (Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin f€ ur Sozialforschung [WZB], 2002). 28. James W. Pennebaker and Becky L. Banasik. ‘‘On the Creation and Maintenance of Collective Memories: History as Social Psychology.’’ Collective Memory of Political Events, ed. James W. Pennebaker, Dario Paez, and Bernard Rime (Mahwah, NJ: LEA, 1997), 10. 29. Pennebaker and Banasik, ‘‘On the Creation and Maintenance of Collective Memories,’’ 11. 30. For a detailed analysis of Slovenia’s distinctive position in former Yugoslavia and in the ex-communist camp and the features of the transition to democracy, see Tos and Miheljak 2002. 31. Niko Tos and Vlado Miheljak, eds. Slovenia between Continuity and Change, 1990–1997: Analyses, Documents and Data (Founding Elections in Eastern Europe) (Berlin: Edition Sigma, 2002). 32. In the census for 2002, 69.1 percent of the respondents declared themselves Catholic, 1.2 percent Protestant, 0.6 percent Orthodox, and 0.6 percent Muslim; 20.4 percent of respondents who did not declare a religion came from a Catholic background, http://www.stat.si/popis2002/en/rezultati/rezultati_ red.asp?ter=SLO&st=8). 33. Georg Brunner, Nationalit€atenprobleme und Minderheitenkonflikte in Osteuropa. Strategien und Optionen f€ ur die Zukunft Europas (G€ utersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 1992).

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34. Claus Offe, Der Tunnel am Ende des Lichts. Erkundungen der politischen Transformation im Neuen Osten. (Franfurt a.M./New York: Campus Verlag, 1994), 140f. 35. Niko Tos and Vlado Miheljak, eds., Slovenia between Continuity and Change, 1990–1997, 21. 36. United Nations Development Program, ‘‘Human Development Report for Central and Eastern Europe and CIS 1999,’’ http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/ regionalreports/europethecis/name,2799,en.html. 37. United Nations Development Program, 20–21. Applying $4 per day as the poverty line (1990) the UNDP estimates that the percentage falling below it in Eastern Europe and the CIS climbed from 4 percent in 1988 to 32 percent in 1994, or from 13.6 million to 119.2 million. 38. The country data are not directly comparable because poverty is defined as a percentage of the minimum wage (less than 50 percent), yet the differences in base wages are wide. 39. United Nations Development Program, ‘‘Human Development Report 2007/2008,’’ http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/chapters/. In 2005, Slovenia ranked 27th on an absolute world ranking in the global Human Development Report for 2007/2008, whereas the Czech Republic was 32th, Hungary 36th, Poland 37th, and Slovakia 42nd. 40. Yugoslavia was exceptional in the whole of the socialist Central and Eastern European area in that it completely opened its borders to the West in the early 1960s, allowing its citizens to travel abroad as tourists, privately and as economic emigrants to the West. 41. From the late 1960s on, Slovenes, like other Yugoslav citizens, went to work in Western Europe in large numbers. Economic emigration thus became a powerful modernizing impulse. This was particularly so for the less-developed parts of Yugoslavia. 42. Owing to its particular location and its smallness, Slovenia was covered by Western television signals even before the era of satellite and cable television. 43. Wikipedia ‘‘Josip Broz Tito,’’ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tito. Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) was the leader of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1945 until his death in 1980. During World War II, Tito organized the antifascist resistance movement known as the Yugoslav Partisans. Later he was a founding member of Cominform, but he resisted Soviet influence (see Titoism) and became one of the founders and promoters of the Non-Aligned Movement. 44. Niko Tos and Vlado Miheljak, eds., Slovenia between Continuity and Change, 1990–1997, 22. 45. Niko Tos and Vlado Miheljak, eds., Slovenia between Continuity and Change, 1990–1997, 22. 46. Niko Tos and Vlado Miheljak, eds., Slovenia between Continuity and Change, 1990–1997, 23. 47. Dietrich D€ orner, The Logic of Failure (Cambridge: Perseus Books, 1996). 48. Dietrich D€ orner, The Logic of Failure (Cambridge: Perseus Books, 1996).

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49. Janek Musek, ‘‘Raziskovanje vrednot v Sloveniji in vrednotni univerzum Slovencev’’ (‘‘Research of Values in Slovenia and Value Universe of Slovenians’’), http://www.prihodnost-slovenije.si/up-rs/ps.nsf/krf/6E9DC6507D449 582C1256E940046C554?OpenDocument.

Chapter 3 1. Daniel Bar-Tal, ‘‘Socio-psychological Foundations of Intractable Conflicts,’’ American Behavioral Scientist 50 (2007): 1430–53. 2. Gabriel Partos, ‘‘Belgrade’s Cautious Apology,’’ BBC News, November 13, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3268405.stm. 3. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘1999 Report,’’ http://www.hrw.org/worldreport99/ europe/yugoslavia.html. 4. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘1999 Report.’’ 5. United Nations Security Council, ‘‘Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Briefs Security Council on Kosovo,’’ 4249th Meeting (AM), December 19, 2000, http://74.125.45.104/search?q=cache:KUJWlq0MR0YJ:www. un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/sc6977.doc.htm+with+confrontations+between+ the+Serbian+security+forces+and+the+Albanian+Liberation+Army.&hl=en&ct= clnk&cd=4&gl=us. 6. Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, ‘‘Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate,’’ International Security 24, no. 4 (2000): 5–8. 7. Michael T. Kaufman, ‘‘Conflict in the Balkans: The Yuguslav Leader; For Serbs, Apparatchik Appeals to Nationalist Pride to Become a Hero,’’ New York Times, March 28, 1999. 8. ‘‘Calling for Forgiveness, Serbia Leader Apologizes to Bosnia for War,’’ New York Times, November 13, 2003, http://64.233.169.104/search?q=cache: t096VcZ9a4J:query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html percent3Fres percent3D9500 E5D61438F937A25752C1A9659C8B63+serbia+opinion+apology&hl=en&ct=clnk& cd=28&gl=us. 9. Mladen Lazic, Slobodan Cvejic, Kristen Ringdal, and Albert Simkus, ‘‘Structural Changes in Serbian Society: A Case of Blocked Post-Socialist Transformation,’’ Swiss Academy of Humanities and Social Sciences, http://www.sidos. ch/method/RC28/abstracts/Kristen percent20Ringdal.pdf. 10. ‘‘Calling for Forgiveness, Serbia Leader Apologizes to Bosnia for War,’’ New York Times. 11. Gabriel Partos, ‘‘Belgrade’s Cautious Apology,’’ BBC News, November 13, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3268405.stm. 12. Institute for War and Peace Reporting, ‘‘Global Policy Forum on The Hague Tribunal and Balkan Reconciliation,’’ http://74.125.45.104/search?q=cache: 1HSTmNf9t8J:www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/yugo/2006/0721 reconciliation.htm+reconciliation+serbs+neighbouring+countries&hl=en&ct= clnk&cd=10&gl=us. 13. U.S. Aid, ‘‘Serbia,’’ in NGO Sustainability Index 2001, http://www.usaid. gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2001/serbia.pdf.

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14. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘‘The Partnership for Peace,’’ http:// www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html. 15. Victimology society of Serbia, ‘‘TRC,’’ http://www.vds.org.yu/indexE.html; http://www.vds.org.yu/ProjekatOIstiniIPomirenjuE.htm. 16. The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, ‘‘Justice into Perspective: Truth and Reconciliation Commission,’’ http://www.justiceinperspective. org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=91&Itemid=98. 17. Vesna Nikolic-Ristanovic, ‘‘Truth and Reconciliation in Former Yugoslavia: Where Are We Now and Where to Go?’’ (International conference report, Belgrade, October 2004). 18. U.S. Aid, ‘‘Serbia,’’ in NGO Sustainability Index 2001, http://www.usaid. gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2001/serbia.pdf. 19. The global peace index of 2008, ‘‘Serbia,’’ http://www.visionofhumanity. org/gpi/results/rankings/2008. 20. Price Waterhousecoopers, ‘‘Balancing Risk and Reward,’’ in The Price Waterhousecoopers EM20 Index June2008, http://www.pwc.co.uk/pdf/EM20_ 2008_report.pdf.

Chapter 4 1. Abraham Ascher, Russia: A Short History (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2002). 2. Anatol Lieven, ‘‘Freedom and Anarchy: Russia Stumbles Toward the Twenty-First Century,’’ Chechen Republic Online, 1996–2006 (1997), http://www. amina.com/article/rus_anarchy.html (accessed April 20, 2008). 3. Francis Dvornik, The Slavs: Their Early History and Civilization (Boston: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1956). 4. David R. Stone, A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006). 5. Geoffrey A. Hosking, Russia and the Russians: A History (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001). 6. Gregory L. Freeze, Russia: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 7. Charles J. Halperin, Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985). 8. Peder Walberg et al., ‘‘Economic Change, Crime, and Mortality Crisis in Russia: A Regional Analysis, British Medical Journal 317 (1998): 312–8. 9. Encyclopdia Britannica Online, ‘‘Veche’’ http://www.britannica.com/ EBchecked/topic/624300/veche (accessed April 28, 2008). 10. H. W. Dewey, ‘‘Russia’s Debt to the Mongols in Suretyship and Collective Responsibility,’’ Comparative Studies in Society and History 30 (1988): 249–70. 11. George Vernadasky, The Mongols and Russia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1953). 12. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

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13. Ascher, Russia. 14. Ascher, Russia. 15. Stone, Military History. 16. Stone, Military History. 17. Stone, Military History. 18. Nadezhda Sergeyeva, ‘‘Establishing the City of Saint-Petersburg: From 1703 to 1720,’’ Neva News, August 1, 2001, http://www.nevanews.com/index. php?id_article=674§ion=14 (accessed September 1, 2007). 19. L. Volin, ‘‘The Russian Food Situation,’’ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 225 (1943): 89–91. 20. Barbara A. Engel, Women in Russia, 1700–2000 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 21. Liah Geenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). 22. Benjamin Pinkus, The Jews of the Soviet Union: The History of a National Minority (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 23. Orlando Figes, A History of the Russian Revolution (New York: Penguin, 1997). 24. Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891–1924. (New York: Viking, 1998). 25. Anatoly I. Utkin, The First World War (Moscow: Algorithm Publishers, 2001). 26. Leonard B. Shapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1960). 27. Mark B. Tauger, ‘‘Natural Disaster and Human Actions in the Soviet Famine of 1930–1933 (paper presented at the Conference of Historical Standards of Living: Eurasian and American Countries, in Keio University, Japan, 2006). 28. Hosking, Russia and the Russians. 29. Robert Service, A History of Modern Russia: From Nicholas II to Vladimir Putin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). 30. Alam Payind, ‘‘Soviet-Afghan Relations From Cooperation to Occupation, International Journal of Middle East Studies 21, no. 1 (1989): 107–28. 31. Mary Buckley, Post-Soviet Women: From the Baltic to Central Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 32. Stone, A Military History, 228. 33. Anatoly M. Khazanov, ‘‘Soviet Social Thought in the Period of Stagnation,’’ Philosophy of the Social Sciences 22, no. 2 (1992): 231–7. 34. Mark Galeotti, The Age of Anxiety: Security and Politics in Soviet and Post Soviet Russia (London; New York: Longman, 1995). 35. Galeotti, The Age of Anxiety, 107. 36. Jonathan Steele, Eternal Russia: Yeltsin, Gorbachev and the Mirage of Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). 37. Bobo Lo, ‘‘Soviet Labour Ideology & the Collapse of the State,’’ EuropeAsia Studies 53 (7): 1124–5.

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38. Anna Politkovskaya, Arch Tiat, and Simon Scott, A Russian Diary: A Journalist’s Final Account of Life, Corruption, and Death in Putin’s Russia (New York: Random House, 2007). 39. Myles Horton et al., We Make the Road by Walking: Conversations on Education and Social Change (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990). 40. Natalia Mirimanova, ‘‘Democratization and Conflicts in Russia and the Newly Independent States,’’ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 552 (1997): 86–97. 41. Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: Harper & Row, 1988). 42. Heyward Isham, Natan M. Shkyler, and Jack F. Matlock, Russia’s Fate Through Russian Eyes (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001). 43. Richard Morin and Nilanthi Samaranayake, ‘‘The Putin Popularity Score: Increasingly Reviled in the West, Russia’s Leader Enjoys Broad Support at Home,’’ Pew Research Center Publications, December 6, 2006, http://pewresearch. org/pubs/103/the-putin-popularity-score (accessed January 9, 2007). 44. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘War Crimes in Chechnya and the Response of the West, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,’’ Human Rights News, 2004, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2000/03/01/ (accessed January 5, 2007). 45. Tony Wood, Chechnya: The Case for Independence (London; New York: Verso, 2007).

Chapter 5 1 Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 97. 2. Glenn E. Curtis, ed., Greece: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1995), 51. 3. See, for example, Konstantinos Kotzias, ‘‘September 11 and the War against Terrorism: The Greek Reaction,’’ Contemporary Review 281, no. 1642 (2002): 264. 4. Curtis, 61. 5. Vassilis K. Fouskas, ‘‘Reflections on the Cyprus Issue,’’ Mediterranean Quarterly 12, no. 3 (2001): 99. 6. Nikiforos P. Diamandouros, ‘‘Greek Politics and Society in the 1990s,’’ in The Greek Paradox, ed. Graham T. Allison and Kalypso Nicola€idis (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), 24. 7. Monteagle Stearns, ‘‘Greek Security Issues,’’ in The Greek Paradox, ed. Graham T. Allison and Kalypso Nicola€idis (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), 24. 8. Clogg, 230–1. 9. Apostolos Agnantopoulos, ‘‘The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict’’ (paper presented at the annual conference of the British International Studies Association, Cork, December 18–20, 2006), 14.

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10. See Athens News Agency, ‘‘Chirac Congratulates Greek EU Presidency over Iraq Issue Management within EU,’’ March 22, 2003, http://greekembassy. org/embassy/Content/en/Article.aspx?office=3&folder=345&article=11317 (accessed April 20, 2007); US Department of State, Bureau of International Information Programs, ‘‘Powell Lauds Greek EU Presidency for Modulating Differences over Iraq,’’ April 25, 2003, http://www.america.gov/ (accessed April 20, 2007). 11. Press Office of the Embassy of Greece, ‘‘Greece’s Humanitarian Aid and Contribution to the Peace Keeping Forces in Lebanon,’’ August 25, 2006, http:// www.greekembassy.org/ (accessed November, 7, 2006). 12. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 26. 13. Approximately 98 percent of the Greek population adheres to the Greek Orthodox faith according to the CIA, ‘‘The World Factbook,’’ https://www.cia. gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed August 28, 2008). 14. Clogg, 237. 15. Anthee Carassava, ‘‘Greek Officials Criticized for Revoking Textbook,’’ International Herald Tribune, September 26, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ 2007/09/26/asia/greece.php (accessed September 9, 2008). 16. Michas, 80. 17. Michas, 112. 18. Stylianos Papathanassopoulos, ‘‘Media Commercialization and Journalism in Greece,’’ European Journal of Communication 16, no. 4, (2001): 511. 19. Michas, 29–35. 20. For an analysis of the Greek media’s representation of death and suffering in the Iraq war, see Christina Constantinidou, ‘‘The Spectacle of Suffering and Death: The Photographic Representation of War in Greek Newspapers,’’ Visual Communication 7, no. 2 (2008): 143–69. 21. Louis Klaveras, ‘‘Greeks Bearing Consensus: Suggestions for Increasing Greece’s Soft Power in the West,’’ Mediterranean Quarterly 16, no. 3 (2005): 142; Kevin Featherstone, ‘‘Modernisation and the Structural Constraints of Greek Politics,’’ West European Politics 28, no. 2 (2005): 225. 22. See Theodoros Karzis, I Patrides ton Ellinon [The Homelands of the Greeks] (Athens: Ekdotikos Organismos Livani, 2002). 23. Title borrowed from Nicole Itano, ‘‘In Greece, the Culture of Protest,’’ The Christian Science Monitor, January 29, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/ 0129/p20s01-woeu.html. 24. Athens News Agency, ‘‘NATO Supplies for French Contingent in FYROM Blocked by Protesters,’’ April 16, 1999, http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ apeen/1999/99-04-16.apeen.html; ‘‘Demonstrators in Thessaloniki prevent passage of NATO tanks,’’ April 29, 1999, http://www.hri.org/news/greek/apeen/ 1999/99-04-29.apeen.html; ‘‘Protestors Block NATO Convoy,’’ May 5, 1999, http://www.hri.org/news/greek/apeen/1999/99-05-05_1.apeen.html; (accessed May 28, 2007). 25. ‘‘Clinton Postpones Greece Visit,’’ BBC News, November 10, 1999, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/514368.stm; ‘‘Violence Greets Clinton Visit,’’

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BBC News, November 20, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/528012.stm (accessed November 25, 2006). 26. Michas, 142. 27. Janice T. Gibson and Mika Haritos-Fatouros, ‘‘The Education of a Torturer,’’ Psychology Today 20, no. 11 (1986): 50–8. 28. Gibson and Haritos-Fatouros, 52. 29. ‘‘Greece: Ill-treatment, Shootings, and Impunity,’’ Report by Amnesty International and The International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, September 2002, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR25/020/2002/ en/dom-EUR250202002en.html (accessed August 25, 2008). 30. Ibid. Also see ‘‘A Gamble with the Right to Asylum in Europe: Greek Asylum Policy and the Dublin II Regulation.’’ Report by Norwegian Organization for Asylum Seekers, Norwegian Helsinki Committee, and Greek Helsinki Monitor, April 9, 2008, http://noas.no/odp_admin/files/files/Greek%20asylum%20 policy%20and%20the%20Dublin%20II%20Regulation.pdf (accessed August 25, 2008). 31. ‘‘Greece: Impunity for Ill-treatment by Police Must Stop Now,’’ Public Statement by Amnesty International, June 18, 2007, http://www.amnesty.org/ (accessed August 25, 2008). 32. John Nomikos, ‘‘Terrorism, Media, and Intelligence in Greece,’’ International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 20 (2007): 65–78. 33. Georgios Karyotis, ‘‘Securitization of Greek Terrorism and Arrest of the ‘Revolutionary Organization November 17’,’’ Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association 42, no. 3 (2007): 271–93. 34. Nomikos, 69–70. 35. Nomikos, 70–1. 36. Karyotis, 283–5. 37. Karyotis. 38. Karyotis, 286. 39. Ian Fisher and Anthee Carassava, ‘‘Attack on U.S. Embassy Revives Greek Fear of Terrorism,’’ New York Times, January 14, 2007, http://www. nytimes.com/2007/01/14/world/europe/14greece.html (accessed September 26, 2008). 40. The majority of the sample responded to a version of the PAIRTAPS survey that did not include the item ‘‘Sometimes the heads of the government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism.’’ As an alternative, personal definitions of terrorism were analyzed. 41. Helena Smith, ‘‘Terrorists Hold Greece Hostage,’’ The Guardian (England), May 27, 1999, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/may/27/helenasmith (accessed September 26, 2008). 42. Haralambos Athanasopulos, Greece, Turkey, and the Aegean Sea: A Case Study in International Law (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2001), 65. 43. Rebecca J. Hamilton, ‘‘The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine—But What of Implementation?’’ Harvard Human Rights Journal 19 (2006), http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss19/hamilton.shtml# fn24 (accessed September 14, 2008).

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44. ‘‘2005 World Summit Outcome.’’ Report by United Nations General Assembly, October 24, 2005, p. 30, http://www.un.org/summit2005/documents. html (accessed September 12, 2008). 45. Hamilton. 46. Keith Brown and Dimitrios Theodossopoulos, ‘‘The Performance of Anxiety: Greek Narratives of War in Kosovo,’’ Anthropology Today 16, no. 1 (2000): 3–8. 47. David Sutton, ‘‘Poked by the ‘Foreign Finger’ in Greece: Conspiracy Theory or the Hermeneutics of Suspicion?’’ in The Usable Past: Greek Metahistories, ed. Keith S. Brown and Yannis Hamilakis (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003), 191–210. 48. Sutton, 204. 49. Michas, 92.

Chapter 6 1. Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey (New York: The Overlook Press, 1997). 2. Emre Kongar, Y€ uzyılda T€ urkiye: 2000’li Yıllarda T€ urkiye’nin Toplumsal Yapısı (Istanbul: Remzi, 1999), 21. 3. Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London: Routledge, 1993). 4. Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, 1. 5. Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, 1. 6. Feroz Ahmad, ‘‘Military Intervention and the Crisis in Turkey,’’ MERIT Reports, no. 11 (1981): 149. 7. Atilla Eralp, Muharrem Tunay, and Birol Ye+ilada, ‘‘Introduction’’ in The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey, ed.; and Anne O. Krueger and Okan Aktan, Turkey, Country Studies, no. 6, 1992 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993). 8. Ben Lombardi, ‘‘Turkey—The Return of the Reluctant Generals?’’ Political Science Quarterly 112 (2008): 191–215. 9. Berch Berbero glu, Turkey in Crisis (London: Zed Press, 1982), 180. 10. Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London: Routledge, 1993). 11. Demet Yalcın Mouseau, ‘‘Democracy, Human Rights and Market Development in Turkey: Are They Related?’’ Government and Opposition 41 (2006): 298–326. 12. Mustafa Saatci, ‘‘Nation-states and Ethnic Boundaries: Modern Turkish Identity and Turkish-Kurdish Conflict,’’ Nations and Nationalism 8 (2002): 549–64. 13. Freedom in the World Country Ratings, through 2003, compiled by Freedom House, 1972, http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm. 14. Manus I. Midlarsky, ‘‘Democracy and Islam: Implications for Civilizational Conflict and Democratic Peace,’’ International Studies Quarterly 42 (1998): 485–511. 15. Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London: Routledge, 1993), 72. 16. United Nations, ‘‘The UN in Turkey,’’ http://www.un.org.tr/index.php? ID=12&LNG=2.

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17. Law No. 3713, April 12, 1991, ‘‘The Law to Fight Terrorism,’’ http:// www.informaworld.com/smpp/titlecontent=t714592856. € 18. O. Ozsoy, and H. *ahin, ‘‘Direct and Indirect Effects of Terrorism on the Turkish Economy,’’ International Journal of Business Management and Economics 2 (2006): 59–74. 19. Sabri Sayarı, ‘‘Turkey and the Middle East,’’ Journal of Palestine Studies 26 (1997): 44–55. 20. Kasım Varol, ‘‘Terorizmin T€ urkiye Kalkınmasına Etkisi,’’ http://www. egm.gov.tr/temuh/terorizm10_makale4.htm. 21. Sabri Sayarı, ‘‘Turkey and the Middle East,’’ Journal of Palestine Studies 26 (1997): 44–55. 22. Mustafa Saatci, ‘‘Nation-states and Ethnic Boundaries: Modern Turkish Identity and Turkish-Kurdish Conflict,’’ Nations and Nationalism 8 (2002): 549–64. 23. Sabri Sayarı, ‘‘Turkey and the Middle East,’’ Journal of Palestine Studies 26 (1997): 44–55. Amichai Kilchevsky, Jeffrey Cason, and Kirsten Wandschneider, ‘‘Peace and Economic Interdependence in the Middle East,’’ The World Economy, (2007): 647–64. 24. Kathleen Malley-Morrison et al., ‘‘International Perspectives on War and Peace,’’ Peace Psychology 15, 1 (2006): 6–7. 25. Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003). 26. Mustafa Akyol, ‘‘From Isolationism to Peacemaking: ‘New Turkey’ Meets Middle East,’’ Turkish Daily News, May 24, 2008.

Chapter 7 1. The authors’ names are presented in alphabetic order, but their contributions are equal. 2. E. Ya’ar and Z. Shavit, Trends in Israeli Society, vol. 1 (Tel Aviv: The Open University Press, 2001). (Hebrew). 3. Ruth Gabison and A. Abu-Raya, The Jewish-Arab Rift in Israel: Characteristics and Challenges (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 1999). (Hebrew). 4. Ruth Gabison and A. Abu-Raya, The Jewish-Arab Rift in Israel. 5. Varda Muhlbauer, ‘‘Israeli Women and the Peace Movements,’’ Peace Review, no. 13 (2001): 287–93. 6. Nadim Rouhana and Daniel Bar-Tal, ‘‘Psychological dynamics of intractable ethnonational conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian case,’’ American Psychologist, no. 53 (1998): 761–70. 7. Jeff Rubin, Dean Pruitt, and Su Hee Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1994). 8. Dean Pruitt and Paul V. Olczak, ‘‘Beyond Hope: Approaches to Resolving Seemingly Intractable Conflict,’’ in Conflict, Cooperation and Justice: Essays Inspired by the Work of Morton Deutsch, ed. Barbara Benedict Bunker, Jeff Rubin, and Associates (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1995), 59–93.

224

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Helena Desivilya, ‘‘Promoting Coexistence by Means of Conflict Education: The MACBE Model,’’ Journal of Social Issues, no. 60 (2004): 339–57. 9. Daniel Bar-Tal, Living with the Conflict: Socio-Psychological Analysis of the Jewish Society in Israel (Jerusalem: Carmel, Ltd, 2007). Desivilya, ‘‘Promoting Coexistence by Means of Conflict Education: The MACBE Model,’’ 339–57. 10. Helena Desivilya, ‘‘The Role of Joint Professional Teams in Promoting Jewish-Arab Coexistence in Israel,’’ Journal of Peace Research, no. 35 (1998): 429–52. Desivilya, ‘‘Promoting Coexistence by Means of Conflict Education: The MACBE Model,’’ 339–57. Marlene Turner and Anthone Pratkanis, ‘‘Mitigating Groupthink by Stimulating Constructive Conflict,’’ in Using Conflict in Organizations, ed. Carsten De Dreu and Evert Van De Vliert (London: Sage Publications, 1997), 53–72. 11. Myron Rothbart, ‘‘Intergroup Perception and Social Conflict,’’ in Conflict between People and Group, ed. Stephen Worchel and Jeffrey A. Simpson (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1993), 93–110. 12. Peter Coleman, ‘‘Intractable Conflict,’’ in The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice, ed. Morton Deutsch and Peter Coleman (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 2000), 428–50. Rothbart, ‘‘Intergroup Perception and Social Conflict,’’ 93–110. 13. Desivilya-Syna, ‘‘The Role of Joint Professional Teams in Promoting JewishArab Coexistence in Israel,’’ Journal, 429–52. Rouhana, Nadim and Daniel Bar-Tal, ‘‘Psychological Dynamics of Intractable Ethnonational Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case,’’ 761–70. Turner and Pratkanis, ‘‘Mitigating Groupthink by Stimulating Constructive Conflict,’’ 53–73. Coleman, ‘‘Intractable Conflict,’’ 428–50. 14. Pruitt and Olczak, ‘‘Beyond Hope: Approaches to Resolving Seemingly Intractable Conflict,’’ 59–93. Jeffrey Rubin, Dean Pruitt, and Su Hee Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1994). Peter Coleman, ‘‘Paradigmatic Framing of Protracted, Intractable Conflict: Toward the Development of a Meta-framework–II,’’ Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, no. 10 (2004): 197–235. 15. Coleman, ‘‘Intractable Conflict,’’ 428–50. Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2nd ed. 16. Daniel Bar-Tal and Yona Teichman, Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict: Representation of Arabs in the Israeli Jewish Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 17. Robert Sternberg, ‘‘A Duplex Theory of Hate: Development and Application to Terrorism, Massacres, and Genocide,’’ Review of General Psychology, no. 7 (2004): 299–328. 18. Reuven Gal, The Seventh War—The Effect of the Intifada on the Israeli Society (Tel Aviv: Kibbutz Meuchad, 1990; in Hebrew). 19. Bar-Tal and Teichman, Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict: Representation of Arabs in the Israeli Jewish Society.

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20. Asher Arian, Israeli Public Opinion on National Security (memorandum No. 61, July 2002, Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv University, Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, 2002). Gadi Wolfsfeld and Moshe Dajani, Media Images of the Other in Israel and the Palestinian Territories: Covering One Another during the Second Intifada (Jerusalem: Research Report Submitted to Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, 2003). 21. Kathleen Malley-Morrison et al., ‘‘International Perspectives on War and Peace,’’ Peace Psychology, no. 15 (2003): 6–7. 22. Arian, Israeli Public Opinion on National Security (memorandum No. 61, July 2002). Bar-Tal and Teichman, Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict: Representation of Arabs in the Israeli Jewish Society. Bar-Tal, Living with the Conflict: SocioPsychological Analysis of the Jewish Society in Israel. Wolfsfeld and Dajani, Media Images of the Other in Israel and the Palestinian Territories: Covering One Another during the Second Intifada. 23. John Bargh and Melissa J. Ferguson, ‘‘Beyond Behaviorism: On the Automacity of Higher Mental Processes,’’ Psychological Bulletin, no. 126 (2001): 925–45. Diederik Stapel and Jerry Suls, ‘‘Method Matters: Effects of Explicit Versus Implicit Social Comparisons on Activation Behavior and Self-Views,’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, no. 87 (2004): 860–75. 24. Bar-Tal, Living with the Conflict: Socio-Psychological Analysis of the Jewish Society in Israel. 25. Desivilya, ‘‘Promoting Coexistence by Means of Conflict Education: The MACBE Model,’’ 339–57. Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement, 2nd ed. Bar-Tal and Teichman. Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict: Representation of Arabs in the Israeli Jewish Society. 26. Robert J. Sternberg, ‘‘A Duplex Theory of Hate: Development and Application to Terrorism, Massacres, and Genocide,’’ Review of General Psychology, no. 7 (2004): 299–328. 27. Muhlbauer, ‘‘Israeli Women and the Peace Movements,’’ 287–93. 28. Bar-Tal, Living with the Conflict: Socio-Psychological Analysis of the Jewish Society in Israel.

Chapter 8 1. Tom Hill, ‘‘Lessons of the Levant: Israel, Lebanon, the Palestinians and Peace. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2006,’’ http://www.rusi.org/go.php?structureID=articles_newsbrief&ref=A451170948AD94. 2. Elsa Harik, The Lebanese in America (Minneapolis: Lerner Publication Company, 1987), 12. 3. Kamal S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon (New York: Caravan Books, 1965), 110. 4. Philip K. Hitti, Lebanon in History: From the Earliest Times to the Present (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1957), 224. 5. Harik, The Lebanese in America, 46. 6. Samir Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 151.

226

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7. Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon. 8. Sandra Mackey, Lebanon: A House Divided (New York: W. W. Norton Press, 2006). 9. Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence, 196. 10. Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil Violence, 205–6. 11. Michael Dawahare, Civil Society and Lebanon (Boca Raton, FL: Universal Publishers, 2000). 12. Abbas Ali, Islam: The Sunni-Shia Split, 2007, http://wincoast.com/forum/ showthread.php?t=55415. 13. Clyde R. Mark, ‘‘CRS Brief for Congress: Received through the CRS Web,’’ updated April 26, 2005, Lebanon, http://www.globalsecurity.org. 14. Arabia On Line, 2000, ‘‘Beirut Blast Sparks Civil War Memories Online,’’ Emmanuel College Internet, http://www.arabia.com. 15. Ramzy Baroud, ‘‘Bush’s Policy Clearly Biased,’’ Arabia On Line, Emmanuel College Internet, http://www.arabia.com. 16. Omar Raad, ‘‘No More Mandatory Military Service in Lebanon, http:// yalibnan.com/site/archives/2007/02/no_more_mandato.php. 17. In all the graphs, the x-axis represents: SD = Strongly Disagree, FSD = Fairly Strongly Disagree, D = Disagree, N = Neither Disagree nor Agree, A = Agree, FSA= Fairly Strong Agreement, SA= Strong Agreement. 18. Edward Said, The Politics of Dispossession (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994), 350. 19. BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/819200.stm. 20. Nicholas Blandford, Killing Mr. Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and its Impact on the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2006), 157. 21. Andreas Wimmer, ‘‘The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory,’’ American Journal of Sociology 113, no. 4 (January 2008): 970–1022. 22. Blandford, Killing Mr. Lebanon, 157. 23. Leonie Huddy and Nadia Khatib, ‘‘American Patriotism, National Identity, and Political Involvement,’’ American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 1 (2007): 65. 24. Lara Deeb, An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi’i Lebanon (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). 25. Leonie Huddy and Nadia Khatib, ‘‘American Patriotism, National Identity, and Political Involvement,’’ American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 1 (2007): 65. 26. Lara Deeb, An Enchanted Modern: Gender and Public Piety in Shi’i Lebanon. 27. James A. Bill and Robert Sprigboard, Politics in the Middle East, 5th ed., 67. 28. F. Pratto et al., ‘‘American and Lebanese College Students’ Responses to the Events of September 11, 2001: The Relation of Hopes and Fears to the Psychology of Group Positions,’’ Psicolo gia Politica 21 (2003).

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Chapter 9 1. Our thanks go to Elizabeth Planje for her assistance in coding and summarizing survey responses. 2. James Baker III and Lee Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 3. 3. UNICEF, ‘‘Iraq’s Children 2007: A Year in Their Life,’’ (2008), 2. 4. Abdul Karem AlObaidi and Jack Piachaud, ‘‘While Adults Battle, Children Suffer: Future Problems for Iraq,’’ Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 100 (2007): 394. 5. AlObaidi and Piachaud, ‘‘While Adults Battle, Children Suffer.’’ 6. Laurie King-Irani, ‘‘Iraq: A Look Back,’’ Foreign Policy Research Institute Winter (2007): 91–106. 7. Christopher Catherwood, A Brief History of the Middle East (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2006), 5. 8. Catherwood, A Brief History of the Middle East. 9. King-Irani, ‘‘Iraq: A Look Back,’’ 93. 10. King-Irani, ‘‘Iraq: A Look Back,’’ 93. 11. King-Irani, ‘‘Iraq: A Look Back,’’ 93. 12. King-Irani, ‘‘Iraq: A Look Back,’’ 93. 13. King-Irani, ‘‘Iraq: A Look Back,’’ 104. 14. King-Irani, ‘‘Iraq: A Look Back,’’ 103. 15. UNICEF Iraq: Update for Partners on the Situation of Children in Iraq, First Quarter 2008. http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/files/Iraq_Update_ for_Partners_First_Quarter_08.pdf. 16. Abbas Alnasrawi, ‘‘Economic Consequences of the Iraq-Iran War,’’ Third World Quarterly 8, no. 3 (July 1986): 873. 17. Alnasrawi, ‘‘Economic Consequences of the Iraq-Iran War,’’ 886. 18. Sarah Graham-Brown, ‘‘Multiplier Effect: War, Occupation and Humanitarian Needs in Iraq,’’ Middle East Report, no. 228 (Autumn 2003): 14. 19. United Nations News Centre, ‘‘1 in 5 Iraqi Refugees in Syria Suffered Torture or Violence Back Home’’ UN report, January 22, 2008, http://www.un. org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25366&Cr=iraq&Cr1=syria. 20. Sarah Graham-Brown, ‘‘Multiplier Effect,’’ 14. 21. Graham-Brown, ‘‘Multiplier Effect, 19. 22. Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad, ‘‘Problems of Belligerent Occupation: The Scope of Powers Exercised by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, April/May 2003–June 2004.’’ The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 54, no. 1 (January 2005): 253. 23. Thomas D. Grant, ‘‘The Security Council and Iraq: An Incremental Practice,’’ The American Journal of International Law 97, no. 4 (October 2003): 824. 24. Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad, 252. 25. ‘‘Turmoil in Iraq, Transitional Arrangements, and the Capture of Saddam Hussein,’’ The American Journal of International Law 98, no. 1 (January 2004): 192. 26. United Nations Security Council, ‘‘Security Council 5463rd Meeting (AM),’’ June 15, 2006, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8751.doc.htm.

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27. United Nations Security Council, The Situation Concerning Iraq, 5878th meeting, April 28, 2008, New York, S/PV/5878. 28. Joseph F. Pilat, ‘‘Iraq and the Future of Nuclear Nonproliferation: The Roles of Inspections and Treaties.’’ Science, New Series 255, no. 5049 (March 6, 1992): 1224. 29. Samir Qouta et al., ‘‘Predictors of Psychological Distress and Positive Resources among Palestinian Adolescents: Trauma, Child, and Mothering Characteristics,’’ Child Abuse & Neglect 31, no. 7 (July 2007): 700. 30. Qouta et al., ‘‘Predictors of Psychological Distress and Positive Resources.’’ 31. Qouta et al., ‘‘Predictors of Psychological Distress and Positive Resources.’’ 32. National Child Traumatic Stress Network Refugee Trauma Task Force, ‘‘Mental Health Interventions for Refugee Children in Resettlement White Paper II.’’ (2005), 3. 33. Qouta et al., ‘‘Predictors of Psychological Distress and Positive Resources.’’ 34. James Garbarino and Kathleen Kostelny, ‘‘The Effects of Political Violence on Palestinian Children’s Behavior Problems: A Risk Accumulation Model,’’ Child Development, 67, no. 1 (February l996); Oouta et al. ‘‘Predictors of Psychological Distress.’’ 35. Roger Rosenblatt, Children of War (Anchor, 1992), vii. 36. Rosenblatt, Children of War, ix. 37. United Nations Department of Public Information, The Quotable Kofi Annan (New York: United Nations, 1998), 32. 38. United Nations Department of Public Information, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: United Nations, 1948), Preamble. 39. Daniel J. Christie et al., ‘‘Peace Psychology for a Peaceful World,’’ (2008), 63, 6, 541.

Chapter 10 1. BBC. BBC NEWS | Middle East | Country profiles | Country profile: Kuwait,’’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/791053 (accessed March 21, 2008). 2. Kuwait: Location, Population, Religion, Membership, Currency, http:// www.arab.de/arabinfo/kuwait (accessed February 23, 2008). 3. Global Peace Index Rankings, Vision of Humanity, http://www.visionof humanity.org/gpi/results/rankings/2008 (accessed March 28, 2008). 4. Khalid Bin Sultan Abdul-Aziz, and Patrick Seale. Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander. (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 21. 5. Abdul Allah Al-Hajri and Nasser AlAniai, A Guide to the History of Modern Kuwait. Second edition. Kuwait, 2007, 7. 6. Bin Sultan and Seale, 24. 7. Abu-Hakima, The Modern History of Kuwait (Westerham Press: Kuwait, 1983), 11–2.

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8. E. Lauterpacht, C. J. Greenwood, and Marc Weller, The Kuwait Crises: Basic Documents. (Cambridge International Documents Series, V. 1: Cambridge Grouts Publication Limited, 1991), 127–9. 9. Bin Sultan and Peale, 55. 10. Maimuna Khalifa Al Sabah, ‘‘The emergence and development of Kuwait in the 18th century.’’ Journal of Gulf Studies and the Arabian Peninsula, No. 46, 1986, 42. 11. Bin Sultan and Peale, 71. 12. Abu-Hakima, The Modern History of Kuwait, 24. 13. Abu-Hakima, The Modern History of Kuwait, 28–9. 14. Maimuna Khalifa Al Sabah, History and Civilization of Kuwait in 1713–1800. 4th ed. Part I. (Kuwait Press: Kuwait, 2003), 54. 15. Bin Sultan and Peale, 33. 16. Sayif Marzuq Al Shamlan, History of Kuwait, 2nd ed. (Kuwait: Kuwait Press, 1986), 65–7. 17. Abu-Hakima, The Modern history of Kuwait, 42. 18. Bin Sultan and Peale, 41. 19. Bin Sultan and Peale, 45. 20. Abu-Hakima, The Modern History of Kuwait, 46–7. 21. Abu-Hakima, The Modern History of Kuwait, 51. 22. Abu-Hakima, The Modern History of Kuwait, 54–7. 23. Bin Sultan and Peale, 62. 24. Bin Sultan and Peale, 67–9. 25. Abdul Allah Al-Hajri and Nasser AlAniai, A Guide to the History of Modern Kuwait. 2nd ed. (Kuwait: Kuwait Press, 2007), 17. 26. Abu-Hakima, The Modern History of Kuwait, 61. 27. Abdul Allah Al-Hajri and Nasser AlAniai, A Guide to the History of Modern Kuwait. 2nd ed., 61. 28. Abdul Allah Al-Hajri and Nasser AlAniai, A Guide to the History of Modern Kuwait. 2nd ed., 83–4. 29. Khalid Ben Sultan Abdul-Aziz, Desert fighters: facts and memories, a vision of the future commander of joint forces, the theater of operations, 81. 30. Maimuna Khalifa Al Sabah, Kuwait under British protection: The Twentieth Century, Part III, 4th ed., 72. 31. Maimuna Khalifa Al Sabah, Kuwait under British protection: The Twentieth Century, Part III., 4th ed., 77. 32. Khalid Ben Sultan Abdul-Aziz, Desert fighters: facts and memories, a vision of the future commander of joint forces, the theater of operations, 89. 33. Abdul Allah Al-Hajri and Nasser AlAniai, A Guide to the History of Modern Kuwait. 2nd ed., 98. 34. Bin Sultan and Peale, 121. 35. Bin Sultan and Peale, 139. 36. Abu-Hakima, The Modern History of Kuwait, 67. 37. Sayif Marzuq Al Shamlan, History of Kuwait, 65–7. 38. Gulourky Boland Orvaiski, Kuwait and its international relations during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Translated and edited by Maher Salama, (Kuwait: The Kuwaitis Center for Research, 1994), 157. 39. Khalid Soud Al-Zaid, Guide to Kuwait in the Gulf Travel History, Part 1, 1st ed., (Kuwait: Al-Rubaiaan Publication, 1981).

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40. Anglo-Ottoman, Convention of 1913. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Anglo-Ottoman_Convention_of_1913 (accessed February 19, 2008). 41. Abdul-Allaha Saad Al Sharan, (2007). From Kuwait History: Kuwaiti Battles: Remedial Reading and the Names of Historical Facts. 1st ed., (Kuwait: Kuwait Press, 2007), 59. 42. Kuwait Oil Fires, Persian Gulf War, http://www.answers.com/topic/ kuwait-oil-fires-persian-gulf-war. Revised 11/20/2008, (accessed March 18, 2008). 43. Frank Smyth, Crimes of War A-Z Guide, http://www.crimesofwar.org/the book/gulf-war.html, 11/20/2008, (accessed March 21, 2008). 44. Bader Al Zizi, Economic development in Arab Gulf States. A thesis presented to academic faculty, 2008. 45. Gluon Leman Nicolson, Report from Kuwait: Gulf War Illnesses Strike Civilians and Veterans of the 1991 Gulf War, (2008), 26–35. 46. Gluon Leman Nicolson, Report from Kuwait: Gulf War Illnesses Strike Civilians and Veterans of the 1991 Gulf War, 26–35. 47. Fawziyah A. Al-Turkait and Jude U. Ohaeri, ‘‘Post-traumatic stress disorder among wives of Kuwaiti veterans of the first Gulf War.’’ Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 2nd V., no. 1, 2008, 34–45. 48. Kuwait Oil Fires, Persian Gulf War. http://www.answers.com/topic/ kuwait-oil-fires-persian-gulf-war. Revised 11/20/2008 (accessed March 12, 2008). 49. Fawziyah A. Al-Turkait and Jude U. Ohaeri, ‘‘Psychopathological Status, Behavior Problems, and Family Adjustment of Kuwaiti Children whose Fathers were Involved in the First Gulf War’’, Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and Mental Health, 29, no. 2, December, 2008. 50. Fawziyah A. Al-Turkait and Jude U. Ohaeri, ‘‘Post-traumatic stress disorder among wives of Kuwaiti veterans of the first Gulf War’’. 51. Fawziyah A. Al-Turkait and Jude U. Ohaeri, ‘‘Psychopathological Status, Behavior Problems, and Family Adjustment of Kuwaiti Children whose Fathers were Involved in the First Gulf War’’. 52. BBC. ‘‘BBC NEWS | Middle East | Country profiles | Country profile: Kuwait.’’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/791053.stm (accessed March 21, 2008).

Chapter 11 1. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia-History, http://www.saudiembassy.net/Country/History.asp (accessed November 20, 2008). 2. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia-History. 3. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia-History. 4. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia-History. 5. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia-History. 6. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia-History. 7. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia-History. 8. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia-History. 9. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia-History.

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10. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia-History. 11. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia-History. 12. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—Information on Current Issues. (Washington, D.C.: Information Office, 2003), 17. 13. ‘‘Saudi Arabia: The New Constitution: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,’’ Arab Law Quarterly 8, no. 3 (1993): 262. 14. UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Combined Initial and Second Periodic Reports of States Parties Saudi Arabia, March 29, 2007, Rep. CEDAW/C/SAU/2, 11. 15. UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Combined Initial and Second Periodic Reports of States Parties Saudi Arabia. 16. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—Information on Current Issues, 15. 17. United Nations General Assembly, Statement by His Royal Highness Prince Al-Faisal Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the General Debate at the 58th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (New York: 58th United Nations General Assembly, September 29, 2003). 18. United Nations General Assembly, Statement by His Royal Highness Prince Al-Faisal. 19. ‘‘Pact of the League of Arab States,’’ Arab Law Quarterly 7, no. 2 (1992): 150. 20. ‘‘Efforts to Strengthen Protection of Rights of Women Migrant Workers are Urged by Social Committee,’’ UN Press Release GA/SHC/3545, November 3, 1999. 21. UN Committee against Torture, Consideration of Reports submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, Initial Reports of States Parties due in 1998, Addendum-Saudi Arabia, September 20, 2001, Rep. CAT/C/42/Add.2, 13. 22. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—Information on Current Issues, 16. 23. UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 10. 24. UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 10. 25. ‘‘Saudi Arabia: The New Constitution: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,’’ 260. 26. ‘‘Saudi Arabia: The New Constitution: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,’’ 263. 27. United Nations General Assembly, Statement. . . 28. United Nations General Assembly, Statement. . . 29. The Council of Arab States, The Arab Peace Initiative, 2002, Summit Level, 14th Ordinary Session, 2002. 30. The Council of Arab States, The Arab Peace Initiative, 2002. 31. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—Information on Current Issues.

Chapter 12 1. Johan Galtung, ‘‘Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses,’’ Journal of Peace Research 22, no. 2 (1985): 141–58.

Index

Abdul-Aziz Al-Rashid, 165 Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Saud, 167 Abdulaziz, King, 180 Abdul Hamid, 166 bin Abdullah I, Jaber, 165 Abdullah Al Saud, King, 190, 191 Abdullah Alsubah I, 161 Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, 189, 190 Abdulla bin Sabah I, 162 Abdullah, King, 180, 190 Abdulrahman bin Faisal Al-Saud, 180 Additional Protocol (1977), 167 Afghanistan, 68, 69, 90, 159 Al-Anza (tribe), 160 Al Aqsa Intifada, 118 Alexander, King, 27 Allawi, Iyad, 154 Allsubah, 160 Al-Utab (tribe), 160 American Academy of Environmental Medicine, 168 Anan Plan, 85 Anatolia, 99, 100, 103 Anglo-Ottoman Convention (1913), 166 Annan, Kofi, 157–8 antiterrorist bill (1978), 94

APO. See Extraparliamentary Opposition movement (APO) Arab Deterrent Force, 132 Arabian Peninsula, 159, 160, 165, 177, 178 Arab-Israeli conflict, 83, 177, 190 ‘‘Arabization campaign,’’ 149 Arab Peace Initiative, 189–190 Article 10 (Saudi Arabian Constitution), 188 Article 34 (Saudi Arabian Constitution), 188 Assefa, Hizkias, 70 Athens Polytechnic University, 82 Aviation Security Act, 12, 13, 16, 17 Axis powers, 27, 80, 103 Baader, Andreas, 7 Baath regime, 148–9, 154 Baghdad Pact, 102 Bakoyannis, Pavlos, 94 Balfour declaration (1917), 116 Balkan wars, 79, 80, 194 Bani Khalid (tribe), 160, 161–2 al-Basri, Hassan, 179 Battle of Al-Jahra (1920), 167 Baum, Gerhart, 12 Berlin Blockade, 67

234 Berlin Crisis (1961), 67 Berlin Wall, 6, 10, 41 bin Laden, Osama, 45, 197, 201 Bolshevik party, 65, 67 Bosnia, 11, 13, 27, 29, 30, 32, 42, 48, 58, 83, 84 Bosnian War, 97 Bremer, Paul, 154 Brezhnev, Leonid, 68 British-Kuwaiti relations, 165–6 Bush, George W., 45, 135 Byzantine Empire, 60, 100 Carey, Pat, 154 Catherine II (Catherine the Great), 62 CENTO. See Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 102 Chechen War, 70 Chehayeb, Akram, 135 ‘‘Christening at Savica,’’ 30 Christodoulos, Archbishop, 84 Clinton, Bill, 90 ‘‘Coalition of the Willing,’’ 195 Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), 154 Cold War, 5, 6, 8, 10, 22, 45, 67, 68, 69, 70, 81, 112 Consultative Council (Majlis Al-Shura), 182 ‘‘controlled democracy,’’ 69 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 186 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 187 Council of Arab States, 189 CPA. See Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Crimean War, 64 Croatia, 27, 29, 30, 42, 58 Cuban Missile Crisis, 67 ‘‘Cuius regio, eius religio,’’ 26

Index Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. See Republican People’s Party (RPP) Cyprus, 81, 82, 95, 112, 198 Das Kapital (Marx), 63 Dayton agreement, 42 Decembrist Revolt (1825), 63 Democratic Army, 81 Democratic Federal Yugoslavia, 28 depleted uranium (DU), 168 Deutsche Mark (DM), 5 Deutscher Herbst (German Autumn), 7 DHKP/C. See Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) Diriyah, 180 DM. See Deutsche Mark (DM) Druze, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135 DU. See depleted uranium (DU) East Germany, 5, 6, 10 Easter March Movement (1960), 9, 23 Eidikon Anakritikon Tmima (EAT), 91 EIO (economic program), 101 Elliniki Stratiotiki Astinomia (ESA), 91 Enabling Act (1933), 4 Ensslin, Gudrun, 7 Erdo gan, Recep Tayyip, 112 ERW. See ‘‘explosive remnants of war’’ (ERW) Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo (EAM), 80, 81 EU. See European Union (EU) EU Equality Directives, 20 European Community, 102 European Exchange Rate Mechanism, 30 European Monetary Union, 30 European survey Eurobarometer (2003), 20 European Union (EU), 11, 13, 20, 30, 41, 82, 83, 84, 102 ‘‘explosive remnants of war’’ (ERW), 149 Extraparliamentary Opposition movement (APO), 9

Index Fahd, King, 180 Faisal, King, 180 farm collectivization policy, 66 Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). See West Germany first revolution (1917), 65 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), 82, 83, 96, 96 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 13 Freire, Paulo, 70 FYROM. See Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) Galtung, John, 21, 208 Gapon, Father, 64 GCC. See Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Geneva Convention, 17, 18, 54, 167 German Democratic Republic. See East Germany German Revolution, 4 Germany, 194; Aviation Security Act, 12–13; Cold War period, 5–6; foreign population in, 13; historical background, 3–5; international crisis management and, 11; invasion, public opinion on, 14–16, 198, 199; killing civilians to fight terrorism, public opinion on, 16–17, 201; national security, public opinion on, 21–22, 206; peace, public opinion on, 19–21, 23, 202, 203; peace movements in, 8–10, 13, 202; political repression and torture, 6; postunification period, 10–12; present situation, 13; relation with Russia, 66–67; right to protest, public opinion on, 18–19, 204; Shah of Iran’s visit to, 9; terrorism in 1970s, 6–8, 199; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 17–18, 23, 205 Glasnost (Openness), 69 Global Peace Index, 58, 159

235 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 69 Governing Council of Iraq, 154 Great National Assembly of Turkey, 103 Great Patriotic War. See World War II Great Purge, 66 Great Serbia, 29 Greater Lebanon, 131 Greece, 79, 194; constitutional crisis, 81–82; culture of protest, 89–90; encounter with terrorism, 93–94; historical background, 80–82; invasion, public opinion on, 86–87, 198; involvement in conflict and peace efforts, 82–83; media in, 84–85; peace, public opinion on, 87–89, 202, 203; relation with Turkey, 81–82; right to protest, public opinion on, 90–91, 204; social contextual factors, 83–84; terrorism, public opinion on, 94–96, 199, 200, 201; torture, mistreatment and violation of human rights, 91–92; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 92–93, 205; war, public opinion on, 85–86, 87, 196, 197 Greek Military Police. See Elliniki Stratiotiki Astinomia (ESA) Greek Orthodox Church, 84 Grundgesetz (Basic Law), 5, 12, 13, 16 G€ ul, Abdullah, 112 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 181 Gulf War, 11, 168 Hammurabi, 148 Al-Hasa, 165 Hariri, Rafik, 141, 145 Herzegovina, 11, 13, 32, 41, 58 Hezbollah, 133, 142 Hijrah, 178, 181 Hindshaw, Charles T., 168 Hitler, Adolf, 4 Hosking, Geoffrey, 67 Hussein, Saddam, 147, 148, 149, 154, 155, 167

236 ICTY. See International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Al-Ikhwan (tribe), 167 Indian Navy Treaty, 165 ‘‘Information on Current Issues,’’ 183 Inonu, Ismet, 103 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 48, 58 International Monetary Fund, 177, 181 Intifada (civil uprisings), 118 Iraq, 147, 195; children in, 157; historical background, 148–50; ignoring international treaties, public opinion on, 154–5, 156; invasion, public opinion on, 198; killing innocent civilians to fight terrorism, public opinion on, 154, 156, 201; national security, public opinion on, 153; peace, public opinion on, 152–3, 156, 202; reconciliation, public opinion on, 152; right to peace, public opinion on, 153; rights, public opinion on, 152; rights of government, 153–5; terrorism, public opinion on, 151, 155, 156; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 152, 154, 155, 156, 205; war, public opinion on, 151, 196, 197 Iraq war, 74, 84, 85, 146, 151, 195 Iraqi Petroleum Company, 149 Israel, 125–7, 194; conflicts in, 115–16; invasion, public opinion on, 120–21; Jewish-Arab/Palestinian conflict, 116; Jewish-Arab relations in, 117–118; Middle East, rapprochement process in, 118; national conflicts and intergroup relations in, 116–17; peace, public opinion on, 121–2, 203; reconciliation, public opinion on, 124–5; right to peace, public opinion on, 122; war, public opinion on, 119–20, 196, 197;

Index world peace, public opinion on, 122–4, 202–3 Israeli-Lebanese war, 145 Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 116, 117, 118, 125, 126, 190 Ivan III, 61 Ivan IV, 61 ‘‘Jaber Al-Utaibi,’’ 161 Al-Jalahmah family, 160 Jaber bin Abdullah I, 165 Jewish-Arab relationships, 117–18, 194 Jewish-Palestinian conflict, 116, 117, 124, 194 Jihad, 179 JNA. See Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) Jumblatt, Walid, 134–5 junta, 82, 89, 90, 94, 98 Justice and Development Party (AKP), 103, 112 Keegan, John, 40 Khalid, King, 180 ‘‘Khalifa bin Mohammad,’’ 161 Al-Khalifa families, 160, 161, 162, Kharaj, 161 Khomeini, Ayatolla, 154 Khrushchev, Nikita, 67, 68 King-Irani, 148 Korean War, 5, 67 Kosovo, 11, 12, 28, 33, 34, 42, 49, 51, 83, 97, 194 Kout, 160 Kurdish Iraqis, 149 Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), 104, 199 Kuwait, 195; Battle of Al-Jahra (1920), 167; British power in, 165–166; historical context, 159–63; invasion, public opinion on, 170–71, 198; Iran and Iraq war, 167–9; killing civilians to fight terrorism, public opinion on, 172, 201; Ottoman Empire in, 163–5; peace, public opinion on, 174;

Index Kuwait (Continued) present situation in, 175; right to protest, public opinion on, 173, 204; terrorism, public opinion on, 171–2, 199, 200, 201; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 172–3, 205; war, public opinion on, 170, 196; world peace, public opinion on, 173–4, 203 Landshut plane hijack, 7–8 Law of Treaties, 187 League of Arab States, 181 Lebanese National Assembly, 134 Lebanese Zu’ama system, 145–6 Lebanon, 129, 195; civil war and, 133; emergence of, 129–31; in future, 144–46; golden age of, 132; invasion, public opinion on, 137–8, 198; killing civilians to fight terrorism, public opinion on, 138–9, 201; national security, public opinion on, 142–3, 207; peace, public opinion on, 140–41, 143–4, 203; post–civil war, 134–5; right to protest, public opinion on, 141–2, 204; Taif Agreement, 134; terrorism, public opinion on, 139–140, 199, 200; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 140, 205; twentieth-century, 131–2; United States relation with, 135; war, public opinion on, 136–7, 196, 202 Lenin, Vladimir, 65, 75, 206 Liberal Republican Party. See Serbest Cumhuriyet Firkasi Liberation Movement, 28 The Logic of Failure (D€ orner), 35 Madina, 178, 179, 180, 181 Makarois, Archbishop, 81 Makkah, 178, 179, 180, 181 Marine Peace Treaty, 165, 166 Maronites, 130, 131, 134, 135, 144 Marovic, Svetozar, 48 Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, 68

237 Meinho, Ulrike, 7 Meins, Holger, 7 Merkel, Angela, 13 Metaxas, Ioannis, 80 Middle Eastern Treaty Organization, 102 Millennium Declaration, 183 Milli Kalkınma Partisi, 100 Milosevic, Slobodan, 32, 41, 42, 44, 45, 54, 194 Mitsotakis, Constantine, 94 Mount Lebanon, 130 Mubarak Bin Sabah II, 165, 166 Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, 180 Muhammad bin Saud, 180 Muhammad, Prophet, 178, 179, 180 Mustafa Kemal Atat€ urk, 100, 107, 111, 204 Al-Muntafiz (tribe), 160 Najd, 160, 162–3, 167 Namik Pasha, 164, 165 National Development Party. See Milli Kalkınma Partisi National Liberation Front. See Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo (EAM) National Liberation War, 31 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force, 9 Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, 66 new immigration law (2005), 13 9/11 terrorist attacks, 12, 17, 85, 94 Nicholas I, Tsar, 63 Nicholas II, Tsar, 66, 65 Nihilist philosophy, 63 Non-Aligned Movement, 28, 45 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 6, 8, 9, 11, 30, 36, 42, 49, 58, 81, 82, 83, 84, 90, 97, 102, 107, 194 € Ocalan, Abdullah, 104 October Revolution (1917), 65 OECD. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

Index

238 OIC. See Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Olympics, 68, 85, 94 OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Operation Iraqi Freedom, 83 oprichniki, 61 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 102 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 181 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 102–3, 181 OSLO Accords, 118 Osvobodilna fronta (the Liberation Front), 27 Ottoman Empire, 79, 80, 84, 100, 103, 111–12, 130, 131, 148, 159, 160, 162, 163–5, 166, 180, 194, 195 Pact of the League of Arab States, 185 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 131, 133 Palgrave, William G., 163 Pan-Arab nationalist republic, 148 partnership for peace (PfP), 58 Peace Accords, 118, 126 Perestroika (Restructuring), 69, 70 Persian Gulf War, 181 Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS), 14, 17, 23, 34, 35, 37, 39, 42, 43, 59–60, 66, 70, 85, 99, 105, 119, 140, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 170, 190, 195 Peter I (Peter the Great), 61, 62 PfP. See partnership for peace (PfP) Phoenicians, 129–30 PKK. See Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 168 Powell, Colin, 90 Preseren, France, 30

Protestant Reformation, 26, 60 PTSD. See posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) Putin, Vladimir, 69–70 Quran, 161, 179, 180, 182, 195 RAF. See Red Army Faction (RAF) Red Army Faction (RAF), 6–8, 199 Refugee Trauma Task Force of the National Child Traumatic Stress Network (2005), 157 Reglement Organique, 130 Reich, 4 Republican People’s Party (RPP), 100 Resolution of the Millennium Assembly of the United Nations, 183 ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ (R2P) principle, 96, 97 Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), 104 Rice, Condoleezza, 90 Riyadh, 180 RPP. See Republican People’s Party (RPP) Russia, 59, 194; historical and political context, 60–70; invasion, public opinion on, 73–74, 198; national security, public opinion on, 75, 206; peace, public opinion on, 71–72, 202; relation with China, 68; right to peace, public opinion on, 72, 203; right to protest, public opinion on, 73, 204; terrorism, public opinion on, 75–76, 200; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 74–75, 205–6; victory against Germany, 66–67; war, public opinion on, 72, 196, 197; world peace, public opinion on, 72–73, 202, 203 Russian Civil War, 65, 66 Russian Revolution, 70 Al-Sabah, Salem, 167 Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jaber al-Sabah, 175

Index Sabah bin Jabber I, 161, 164, 166 Al-Saud family, 160, 163, 180 Saud, King, 180 Saud Al-Faisal, 183, 189 Saud bin Faisal, 162 Saudi Arabia, 177, 195; birth of Islam, 178–179; bureaucracy, 191; climate change and war, 178; economy and global trade, 181; education and public works, 181–2; execution, public opinion on, 186; facts and figures of, 181; First Saudi State, 180; government, 182; invasion, public opinion on, 184–5, 198; killing civilians to fight terrorism, public opinion on, 186–7, 201; modern kingdom of, 177, 180; national security, public opinion on, 188, 206; peace, public opinion on, 189–90, 203; political reform and human rights, 182–3; right to protest, public opinion on, 187–188, 204; terrorism, public opinion on, 188–9, 199, 200; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 186, 205; treaties, public opinion on, 187; war, public opinion on, 188, 196; world peace, public opinion on, 190, 202, 203 Saunders, Stephen, 94 Schleyer, Hanns Martin, 7, 8 Seljuks, 100 Serbest Cumhuriyet Firkasi, 100 Serbia, 41–42, 194; invasion, public opinion on, 50–52, 198; killing civilians to fight terrorism, public opinion on, 56–57, 201, 202; national security, public opinion on, 49–50, 206; NATO military intervention against, 42; NGOs in, 57; peace, public opinion on, 45–46, 203; peace programs in, 58; right to peace, public opinion on, 52–53; right to protest, public opinion on, 53–54, 204; terrorism, public opinion on, 44–45, 200, 201; torturing prisoners, public opinion

239 on, 54–56, 205; UN embargo against, 42; war, public opinion on, 43–44, 196, 197; world peace, public opinion on, 46–49 serfs, 62, 63 ‘‘17 November’’ (17N), 93–94, 95, 98 SFRY. See Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) shamanism, 100 Shari’a law, 161, 182–3 Sharon, Arial 135 Shi’a, 134, 177, 179 Shihab, Basheer, 130 Slovenia, 25, 194; economic development, 32–33; history of, 26–28; as homogenous nation state, 32; independence and reintegration, 29–30; invasion, public opinion on, 35–36, 198; killing civilians to fight terrorism, public opinion on, 38–39, 201; national character, 30–31; national security, public opinion on, 39–40, 206; peace, public opinion on, 36–37, 202; right to protest public opinion on, 37–38, 204; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 38–39, 205; unique position among post transitional countries, 32–34; war and peace, public opinion on, 40; world peace, public opinion on, 39, 202; Yugoslavia, disintegration of, 28–29 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), 41, 45 ‘‘Soviet Holocaust,’’ 66 Soviet Union, 5, 28, 33, 36, 59, 68, 71, 85, 102 Soviet-Afghan War, 67, 70 Special Interrogation Unit. See Eidikon Anakritikon Tmima (EAT) Srebrenica, 1995 massacre, 11 Stalin, Josef, 65–66, 67 Stasi, 6 ‘‘Suleiman ibn Ahmed,’’ 161 Sunnah, 182 Sunni, 131, 132, 134, 177, 179, 184

240 Sykes-Picot Agreement, 131 Synaspismos Party, 85, 90 Syria, 131–2, 133, 134–5 Taif Agreement, 134 Tanzimat, 148 Tito, President, 33, 45 tolar, 30 Treaty of 1820, 166 Treaty of Washington, 11–12 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 155 Trotsky, Leon, 65 Truman Doctrine, 81 Tr€ ummerfrauen (rubble women), 5 Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) project, 58 Turkey, 194; balancing East and West, 102–4; definitions of terrorism, public opinion on, 109–10; democracy and conflict in, 99–102; economic liberalization program, 101; invasion, public opinion on, 107–8, 198; peace, public opinion on, 108–9, 202, 203; present situation in, 112; terrorism in, 104–5, 199, 200; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 110–11, 205; war, public opinion on, 106–7, 196, 197 Turkish Hezbullah, 104 Turkish Islamic Raiders of the Greater East-Front, 105 Turkish Republic, 100, 107, 204 ‘‘two-plus-four’’ treaty, 11 UN General Assembly, 183, 186, 189 UN mission in Somalia (UNOSOM II), 11 ‘‘unexploded ordnance’’ (UXO), 149 UNAMI. See United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) UNAMIC, 11 UNDP. See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) UNICEF, 149

Index UNIFEL, 133 Union of Communists of Yugoslavia, 14th called Congress, 29 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 45, 59, 65, 66, 67, 68–69, 70, 74, 194 United Nations, 30, 50, 51, 96, 103, 156, 158, 181, 183, 189, 190, 194 United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), 154 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 187 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 149 United Nation’s Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) Index, 13 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 152 United Nations Peace through Dialogue meeting (2008), 191–2 United Nations peacekeeping force, 133 United Nations Security Council, 97, 154 United Nations Summit (2000), 182 United States, 9, 36, 45, 49, 51, 56, 67, 68, 74, 81, 82, 93, 107, 135, 147, 149, 151, 159, 186 University of Tehran on Human Rights Day, 157 UNOSOM II. See UN mission in Somalia (UNOSOM II) Urf or Salifa (custom), 161 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 93, 199 U.S. Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report, 175 USSR. See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) Ustase, 27 Al-Utab (tribe), 160 Al-Utub (tribe), 160, 161, 162, 164 UXO. See ‘‘unexploded ordnance’’ (UXO)

Index Veche, 60 Vietnam War, 9, 67, 151 Vladimir, Prince, 59 War of Malazgirt, 100 Weimar Republic, 4 Welch, Richard, 93 West Berlin, 5 West Germany, 5, 6, 8, 9, 13 WHO. 168 See World Health Organization (WHO), Wilhelm I, King, 4 Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 4 Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle), 5 World Bank, 177, 181 World Health Organization (WHO), 168 World Summit (2005), 96

241 World Trade Organization (WTO), 181 World War I, 4, 27, 64, 70, 80, 100, 103, 107, 131 World War II, 3, 4, 5, 8, 19, 27, 36, 66, 68, 70, 72, 80, 87, 103, 131, 194, 206 Wright, Robert, 149 WTO. See World Trade Organization (WTO) Yugoslav partisan guerrilla campaign, 27 Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA), 29 Yugoslavia, 26, 32, 33, 38, 41, 45, 58, 81, 83, 84, 85, 90, 194; civil war in, 27–28; disintegration of, 28–29 Yusuf bin Abdullah, 165 ‘‘Al-zubara,’’ 162

About the Editor and Contributors EDITOR Kathleen Malley-Morrison, Ed.D., Director of the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP), is a professor of psychology at Boston University. She has conducted extensive research on family violence since a 1980 postdoctoral fellowship on the family violence team at Children’s Hospital in Boston. She regularly teaches undergraduate and graduate courses on family violence and the psychology of war and peace. She is the first author or coauthor of several books, including Treating Child Abuse and Family Violence in Hospitals, Family Violence in a Cultural Perspective, and Family Violence in the United States as well as editor of the book International Perspectives on Family Violence and Abuse: A Cognitive Ecological Approach. She has published and presented numerous articles on cross-cultural and international perspectives on governmental aggression and peace. CONTRIBUTORS Abdul Kareem AlObaidi, Ph.D., a consulting psychiatrist and child psychiatrist, is the founder and chairman of the Iraqi Association for Child Mental Health (IACMH). He has been awarded International Membership at both the Royal College of Psychiatrists (UK) and the American Academy for Child & Adolescent Psychiatry (AACCAP), and he is the Iraqi representative at the International Society for Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect (ISPCAN). His main area of interest is promotion of child mental health and child protection in Iraq. In June 2007 he addressed a direct appeal to the UN secretary general over the plight of children in Iraq, warning that the violence was causing widespread emotional and behavioral damage and could lead to spiraling violence in the future.

244

About the Editor and Contributors

Majed A. Ashy, Ph.D., received his B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. in Psychology from Boston University and did his postdoctoral work in psychiatric research at Harvard Medical School. He is currently an associate researcher in psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and has been teaching psychology, cultural psychology, and medical anthropology at several universities and colleges. He was born in Lebanon and is a Saudi Arabian citizen. His research focuses on the association between childhood experiences, brain development, and later associations to various issues such as physical health, political views, apology, forgiveness, and attitudes towards peace and violence. His approach is interdisciplinary and integrative of the findings in different fields. Mariana Barbosa, a Ph.D. candidate at Minho University, and a teaching assistant at the Catholic University of Portugal, is completing her dissertation on Portuguese perspectives on state violence, including the role of the mass media and political discourse. In 2007 she was a visiting scholar at Boston University, under the supervision of Professor Kathleen Malley-Morrison. She has presented several papers on perspectives on governmental aggression at professional conferences. Helena Castanheira, Ph.D., laboratory manager for the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP), has a postgraduate degree in business management from ISCTE University in her native Portugal and is currently a graduate student in psychology at Boston University. Her research focuses on moral disengagement theory, transitional justice systems, and reconciliation processes in postconflict situations. She has published several papers, in the International Psychology Bulletin and in Peace Psychology and has presented her work at several international conferences. Maria D. Daskalopoulos received her B.A. in psychology from Boston University in 2005. She has coauthored journal articles on Greek, Italian, and English perspectives on elder abuse, as well as articles on governmental aggression and peace in International Psychology Bulletin and Peace Psychology. She is currently a graduate student in human development and family studies in the area of marriage and family Therapy at the University of Connecticut, Storrs. Helena Syna Desivilya, Ph.D., is associate professor and head of the sociology and anthropology department at the Max Stern Academic College of Emek Yezreel. A social organizational psychologist by training, she conducts research on interpersonal and intergroup relations in organizations (including conflict management) and the community,

About the Editor and Contributors

245

focusing especially on the effects of personal factors such as gender and ethnic or national origin on intra- and intergroup dynamics. She is an active member of the International Association for Conflict Management and a member of the editorial boards of Conflict Resolution Quarterly, International Journal for Conflict Management, and Negotiation and Conflict Management Research. She has published her research on conflict in various journals, such as Journal of Social Issues, Journal of Peace Research, and International Journal for Conflict Management and Organization Studies. Adam Hammoud holds Lebanese citizenship and has been researching and studying various topics about Lebanon for more than five years. Among these topics are democratic development, economic development, political activism, and terrorism. He travels to the region every year to continue his research. He has also recently been involved with orchestrating Humanitarian Aid missions to Lebanon, working closely with the Hariri Foundation, as well as the International Red Cross. Mr. Hammoud graduated from Drexel University with a Bachelor of Science in Political Science and History, with a concentration on Middle Eastern Affairs, and is currently a law student. Linda Jeffrey, Ph.D., is professor in the psychology department of Rowan University. She has contributed extensively to research concerning alcohol and substance use and prevention among college students, school bullying, and domestic violence. She also has authored chapters in books, among which are the 1999 Encyclopedia of Psychology published by the APA, Encyclopedia of Creativity, and Creative People at Work: Thirteen Cognitive Case Studies. She is also the recipient of numerous awards, including but not limited to, the Anthony D. Cammarato Award of Excellence, from the U.S. Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration and the Pioneer Award, from the Addictions Professional Counselors Board of New Jersey. Julia K€ onig is currently working at the department of clinical psychology and psychotherapy of the Ludwig-Maximilians-University in Munich, Germany, as a university lecturer and research assistant. For her doctoral thesis, she is involved in a psychotherapy study with patients suffering from PTSD. Elisabeth A. Leembruggen-Kallberg, Ed.D., graduated from Boston University, with postgraduate studies in counseling psychology at the University of Maryland. She has written on cross-cultural adjustment, the role of religious coping and spirituality in cross-cultural adaptation,

246

About the Editor and Contributors

and identity development. She teaches life span development, counseling, ethics, and family systems at Azusa College, Free University, Amsterdam. Born in Colombo, Sri Lanka, Beth has lived in five cultures (Sri Lanka, the United States, Belgium, Germany, and The Netherlands), traveled throughout Africa, Austral-Asia, North America, and Europe and studied at the universities of Tuebingen and Mainz. She coauthored a chapter on Germany for the book International Perspectives on Family Violence and Abuse (2004) and coauthored a text on German life and culture. Sherri McCarthy, Ph.D., is a professor of educational psychology, counseling and human relations at Northern Arizona University. Her research spans a variety of areas, including forensic, developmental, and peace psychology. She is the author of several books, including Coping with Special Needs Classmates; A Death in the Family; Teaching Psychology Around the World; Preventing Teen Violence, and Building Asian Families and Communities in the 21st Century. She has also written several book chapters, including the chapter on adolescence in Psychology of Terrorism (Greenwood, 2002), chapters on drug courts and crack kids in Treating Abusers in Correctional Settings (Haworth, 2003), and chapters on grief and bereavement counseling and program evaluation in Handbook of Practicebased Research (2004). Her articles have appeared in several journals, including Peace Psychology, Teaching of Psychology, Korean Journal of Thinking and Problem Solving, Psychologie Practiques, and others. She spent a year in Russia as a Senior Fulbright Scholar and three years in Brazil as a CNPq scholar. She has also been a visiting professor at the University of Malaya and is currently on the board of directors for the Asian Psychological Association and the International Council of Psychologists. Anna Medvedeva earned her master’s degree in studies in European societies at St. Petersburg State University (Russia); her concentration was in political studies, with a particular focus on human rights, especially the right to education. She has also participated in educational programs related to the work of nongovernmental organizations and the development of civil society; for example, at the winter school in Germany and the international summer school in Serbia, where participants shared their experiences and perspectives on the work of nongovernmental organizations in their countries. She also completed an internship in European Human Rights Advocacy Center ‘‘Memorial,’’ Moscow. Vlado Miheljak studied psychology at the Faculty of Arts in Ljubljana and at the Freie Universit€ at in West Berlin and is currently associate professor of social and political psychology and a researcher at the

About the Editor and Contributors

247

Centre for Public Opinion Research and at the Centre for Social Psychology of the Faulty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. His research focuses on public opinion, voting behavior, youth population, and values. His publications include Slovenia between Continuity and Change, 1990–1997: Analyses, Documents and Data (Founding Elections in Eastern Europe) (2002); The Slovenian Way to Democracy and Sovereignty in Political Faces of Slovenia: Political Orientations and Values at the End of the Century vol. 2; and ‘‘Slovenia in central Europe: Merely meteorological or a value kinship’’ in Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe. Heyam Mohammed, Ph.D., has conducted extensive research and published numerous papers examining child rights as related to social and health abuse as well as the effect of physical education classes on student behavior in Kuwait public schools. As a member of the National Committee for Physical Education Curriculum within the Ministry of Kuwait Education, he has presented at various health and sport science conferences. He is also affiliated with many professional organizations, including but not limited to, the American Public Health Association, American College of Sports Medicine, and the International Council for Health, Physical Education, Recreation, Sport, and Dance (ICHPER-SD). Nebojsa Petrovic, Ph.D., is an assistant professor of social psychology at the department of psychology, faculty of philosophy, University of Belgrade. He has been a visiting fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science twice. His doctoral dissertation dealt with psychological aspects of reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. He is an active member of several professional organizations (ISPP, SPSSI, and APA DIV48) and has engaged in several international research projects mainly in the field of political and peace psychology. Elizabeth Planje, B.A., majored in Psychology and French at Boston University. She is currently Assistant Lab manager for the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace and is pursuing a master’s degree in clinical counseling at Lesley University with the goal of becoming a licensed mental health counselor. Marko Polic, Ph.D., is professor of general and environmental psychology at the department of psychology, faculty of arts, University of Ljubljana. He is active in the fields of environmental psychology, psychological aspects of disasters, economic and traffic psychology, and was engaged in a number of international and Slovenian research projects.

248

About the Editor and Contributors

Kristina Pota, MSc., received her master’s degree in clinical psychology from the University of Zagreb, Croatia (2006). Her master’s thesis focused on the knowledge and the attitude of the doctors regarding delivering the news of terminal diagnosis. She is interested in psychotherapy and involved in education in transactional analysis and Gestalt therapy. Presently (2008), she volunteers at the Institute for Mental Health in Belgrade, Serbia. Mathilde Salmberg, Psy.D., originally from Sweden, completed a doctoral degree in clinical psychology at the George Washington University in Washington DC. She completed her pre-doctoral internship at the University of Virginia and her postdoctoral fellowship at Georgetown University. She currently serves as a staff psychologist at Georgetown University, specializing in clinical work and outreach with international students. Her professional interests include cross-cultural research, cross- cultural adjustment, eating disorders and issues related to self care. She serves as the co-chair for the Early Career Committee of the American Psychological Association’s Division for International Psychology (Div. 52) and as a Mentor Coordinator for the Division 52 Mentoring Committee. William J. Tastle, Ph.D., received his PhD in advanced technology with specialization in systems science from the Thomas J. Watson School of Engineering and Applied Science of the State University of New York, University Center at Binghamton (1994) and an MBA in MIS (1983) from the School of Management at Binghamton. He is a professor of information systems in the business school at Ithaca College and is active in the IS community, having served as the president of the Association for Information Technology Professionals, Education Special Interest Group (EDSIG), treasurer of the North American Fuzzy Information Processing Society, and on many other committees. He is the managing editor of the International Journal of General Systems and a member of the editorial board of the International Journal of Information Systems and Social Change. He organized the 2008 conference of the North American Fuzzy Information Processing Society. He is a visiting scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory and a visiting research professor at the University of Iceland. Dr. Tastle’s current areas of interest involve measures of consensus, dissension, agreement and disagreement, requirements analysis elicitation, and IT/IS outsourcing. Raja Tayeh, M.Ed., is the director of institutional research at Doane College, a liberal arts institution, in Crete, Nebraska. She is also an adjunct faculty member at BryanLGH College of Health Science, and a

About the Editor and Contributors

249

PhD candidate at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Her primary research area is physical and mental wellness among Kuwaitis, including tobacco use among refugees. Elina Tochilnikova holds a B.A. from Boston University in psychology with a minor in sociology. Her thesis focused on the relationship between changes in social status, family violence, and apostasy from Islam. Her research interests are in the areas of spirituality, resiliency, forgiveness, cross-cultural justice, and the relationship between intrapersonal and interpersonal peace. She is coauthor of several papers on perspectives on governmental aggression presented at professional meetings at the American Psychological Association and the Eastern Psychological Association. She is currently a graduate student in clinical social work at Boston College. Charikleia A. Tsatsaroni, MSc., EdM., received a BA with a major in psychology (1994) and a master’s degree in school psychology (1999) from the University of Athens as well as a master’s degree in counseling from Boston University (2001) and a certificate of the special postgraduate training program in management and social planning in the field of drug dependence/addiction treatment (2006), from the Greek National School of Public Health (Medical School of Athens) and The Therapy Centre for Dependent Individuals (KETHEA) in collaboration with the department of psychiatry of the University of California, San Diego, and the section of social work of Boston College. She is currently studying for her Ph.D. in psychology (department of psychology) at Boston University. Feryal Turan, Ph.D., is an assistant professor of sociology at Ankara University. Her research interests are in the areas of environmental sociology, social change, and technology, and she has published on such issues as the impact of disasters and elder mistreatment. She has worked as a researcher in several projects about conservation planning, village development, and solid waste management. Alev Yalc¸inkaya-Hanly, Ph.D., received her master’s degreee in clinical psychology at Bosphorus University, Istanbul, and her Ph.D. in human development at Boston University in 1997. Her dissertation focused on Turkish daughters’ attachment styles, romantic relationships, and recollections of parental acceptance and control. She has also done work on attitudes toward abuse, particularly elder abuse, with a Turkish sample. She has presented her works at several professional meetings. She is author of the chapter on Turkey in the book International Perspectives on Family Violence and Abuse: A Cognitive Ecological Approach.

250

About the Editor and Contributors

John M. Whiteley is Professor of Social Ecology at the University of California, Irvine. His most recent scholarship involves the peace-building implications of the transboundary ethnic/national disputes in the Caucasus region of the former Soviet Union. His teaching focuses on the problem of peace in the nuclear age, the nuclear environment, and the issues of global sustainability associated with the interrelationship of health and environment. He is the coauthor (with Russell J. Dalton, Paula Garb, Nicholas P. Lovrich, and John C. Pierce) of Critical Masses: Citizen, Nuclear Weapon Production, and Environmental Destruction in the United States and Russia (MIT Press). He is an editor and contributor to Water, Place, and Equity (MIT Press). He is the creator of the ‘‘Quest for Peace Project,’’ a comprehensive set of interviews on the problems of achieving peace in the nuclear age. This project is available electronically at http://www.lib.uci.edu/quest/. Dalit Yassour-Borochowitz, Ph.D., is the head of the human services department in Emek Yezreel College, Israel. A social worker by profession and a feminist by intuition, she teaches and researches issues of gender, especially different aspects of intimate violence against women, and issues of human services ethics. She has published several articles in different Israeli and international journals and a book titled Intimate Violence—The Emotional World of Batterers (in Hebrew). Rouba Youssef, M.A., is a research assistant at Brown University’s Center for Alcohol and Addictions. She holds a B.A. and M.A. in psychology. She is primarily interested in the cognitive, neurobiological, and behavioral outcomes of trauma. She has most recently presented on international views of governmental aggression. She was born in Lebanon, and immigrated to the United States in 1989.

State Violence and the Right to Peace

State Violence and the Right to Peace An International Survey of the Views of Ordinary People Volume 3: Africa and Central and South America

Kathleen Malley-Morrison, Editor Foreword by John M. Whiteley PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC

Copyright 2009 by Kathleen Malley-Morrison All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data State violence and the right to peace : an international survey of the views of ordinary people / edited by Kathleen Malley-Morrison ; foreword by John M. Whiteley. p. ; cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-275-99647-5 (hard copy : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-275-99648-2 (ebook) 1. Violence—Europe—History. 2. Violence—North America—History. I. Malley-Morrison, Kathleen. HN380.V5S73 2009 303.6094—dc22 2009015791 ISBN: 978-0-275-99647-5 978-0-275-99651-2 (Vol. 978-0-275-99653-6 (Vol. 978-0-275-99655-0 (Vol. 978-0-275-99657-4 (Vol. EISBN: 978-0-275-99648-2 13 12

11 10 9

1) 2) 3) 4)

1 2 3

4 5

This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. Praeger Security International An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

Contents

Foreword: Ordinary People, Country Portraits, and State Violence and Aggression John M. Whiteley

vii

Set Introduction Kathleen Malley-Morrison

xiii

Introduction to Volume 3

xxv

Part I. Africa

1

1 Egypt Natoschia Scruggs

3

2 3 4 5 6 7

Nigeria Adeniyi Famose and Samantha Hoyt

25

Ghana Bradley Hartfield, David Young Oh, and Elizabeth Planje

43

Angola Helena Castanheira and Eduardo Baptista Correia

61

Botswana Mahlon B. Dalley

75

Zambia Jacqui Akhurst, Davies Banda, and Nina Carstens

95

South Africa Jacqui Akhurst, Mark M. Leach, and Priscilla Dass-Brailsford

111

Contents

vi

Part II. Central and South America 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

135

Nicaragua Amanda Clinton

137

Costa Rica Rodrigo Barahona Chacon and Eddy Carrillo Retana

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Brazil Sherri McCarthy, Robert S. Rose, and Helena Castanheira

167

Colombia Amanda Clinton and Luz Amparo Escobar

185

Peru Eros R. DeSouza and Michael J. Stevens

201

Argentina Ricardo Angelino, Flavia Angelino, and Maria Galmarini

227

An Integrative Conclusion for Volume 3 Denise A. Hines

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Notes

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Index

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About the Editor and Contributors

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Foreword

Ordinary People, Country Portraits, and State Violence and Aggression John M. Whiteley

Seeking the views of ‘‘ordinary people’’ is reminiscent of what President Dwight D. Eisenhower said about people’s views on the importance of peace in relation to the role of government: Indeed, I think that people want peace so much that one of these days, governments had better get out of their way and let them have it. —From a TV talk with Harold McMillan, August 31, 1959

The broad area of inquiry in this multivolume and pioneering research provides portraits of 43 very diverse countries selected from every continent of the world. It co-joins these country-specific portraits with surveys of the opinions of ‘‘ordinary people’’ from those countries on a series of important issues using an instrument known as the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS). A great contribution of this novel and important line of research is that it opens up for further study the relationship between a country’s historical experience and current circumstances in the world around it, and the opinions of its citizens on a host of peace-related issues.

THE COUNTRY PORTRAITS Reflecting the bold vision behind the four-volume series, there is no standard format into which 43 country portraits had to fit. This is a sound decision because the experiences of each of the countries are so different. For example, the case study of Great Britain has the following

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categories: (1) Historical and Political Context; (2) Current Demographics; (3) Religion; (4) Industrialization, Health Care, and Education; (5) Minorities; and (6) Post–World War II Involvement in Military Activities. By way of contrast, the case study of Greece has the following categories: (1) Historical Background; (2) Recent Involvement in Conflict and Peace Efforts; and (3) Social Contextual Factors. Similarly, the case study of Russia, one of the most developed in the volumes, has the following category: Historical and Political Context. The point is that whether there were 16þ double-spaced manuscript pages devoted to numerous topics under one heading (the Russian case study), or 8þ double-spaced pages devoted to three categories (the Greece case study), or 7þ double-spaced pages covering six categories, there is an authenticity to each of the portraits. Informed by the relationship found between the diverse country portraits and the opinions of ‘‘ordinary citizens’’ as expressed on the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey, the next generation of research in this promising paradigm may wish to ask the authors of country case studies to address a broader range of peacerelated content categories. For example, the authors of the case study on Great Britain obviously believed it was relevant to address the minority issue, the history of religious persecution, the current (more) openness to religious diversity, components of (and tensions over) a (more) welfare state model, and the (multiple) lessons derived from involvement in military activities since World War II. One area for the next generation of research is the relevance of these topics to countries other than Great Britain. In a similar vein, the case study of Greece asserts that, although ‘‘the influence of ancient Greek civilization on the modern world is well known, few people know that among Greeks themselves, awareness of this great legacy was almost wiped out under nearly 400 years (1453– 1830) of Ottoman rule.’’ A consequence of this historical disruption, according to the authors of the case study of Greece, is that ‘‘Greece was largely isolated from great historical movements such as the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution.’’ Greater emphasis in this case study was assigned to experience in the 20th Century: The Balkan Wars, the World Wars, a civil war, and several military dictatorships. A richness of this four-volume portrait of 43 countries is that it is possible to develop categories of analysis within and across case studies using the current portraits. It is also possible to expand each existing portrait to include promising categories from other case studies. For example, post–World War II involvement in military activities (from the case study of Great Britain) and recent involvement in conflict and

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peace efforts and social contextual factors (from the Greece case study) appear to provide especially relevant insights for the (more) empirical investigation provided by the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey. Country Aggression and ‘‘Ordinary People’’ Peace Survey The main title of these four volumes, ‘‘State Violence and the Right to Peace’’ is very appropriately chosen. The empirical instrument, the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey, has six sections: Section I – probing ‘‘ordinary people’s opinions’’ about the right of governments to perform acts of aggression (invasions of another country, killing innocent civilians, engaging in torture); Section II – whether individuals have a right to a world of peace and to demonstrate in support of that conviction; Section III – patriotism and an assessment of the United States in Iraq; Section IV – acts of state violence as assessed through the prism of emotional responses to direct or indirect exposure; Section V – ‘‘ordinary citizen’’ definitions of such fundamental terms as war, peace, torture, terrorism, reconciliation, and rights; and Section VI – a dual consideration of the relationship of national security to individual and family security, and whether peace is achievable. COMMENTARY AND ASSESSMENT A significant contribution of these four volumes is to open up an original line of inquiry with evidence from 43 countries. The various chapters address different aspects of these six sections as they pertain to the country being profiled. The next level of inquiry will, to advantage, broaden the within-country samples sufficiently that it will be possible to illuminate within-country differences. Building on the current country portraits and the current empirical samples, it is feasible to begin the process of hypothesis development relating country characteristics to attitudes of ‘‘ordinary citizens,’’ as well as the reverse, relating the attitudes of ‘‘ordinary citizens’’ to the characteristics of the country.

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Then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara wrote to President Lyndon Johnson in 1967 that there were limits to what the American people would allow their government to do: . . . there may be a limit beyond which many Americans and much of the world will not permit the United States to go. The picture of the world’s greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 noncombatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one. It could conceivably produce a costly distortion in the American national consciousness and in the world image of the United States.

The point Secretary McNamara was making to President Johnson is broadly applicable to the survey instrument questions about the United States in Iraq and citizen support for the torture and terrorism in relation to the world image of the United States. This general line of inquiry is broadly applicable to unsolved problems of global society in the twenty-first century. The approach to research by the organizers of these four volumes uses the country case study method to pioneer an exploration of the views of ‘‘ordinary people’’ about the permissible levels of state violence on such significant questions as whether, and under what conditions, governments have the right to perform acts of aggression, and the relationship of national security to individual and family security. The inclusion of 43 countries from the continents of the world makes it possible to begin to understand how country characteristics and historical and current experience affect such significant perceptions in global context of whether peace is achievable, common understandings of the meaning of being patriotic, ordinary citizen support for torture and terrorism, and the prospects for reconciliation after the killing has stopped.

THE BROADER CONTEXT FOR A NEW RESEARCH PARADIGM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY The research in this four-volume series provides an imaginative new approach to the relationship between state violence and the opinions of citizens. This approach can be broadened as it further develops to incorporate another insight that Dwight Eisenhower shared with the American people and the world when he talked about the negative consequences of states putting such huge resources into preparing to conduct state violence. The essence of what he shared is as follows: Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed,

Foreword those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. This is not a way of life at all in any true sense. Under the clouds of war, it is humanity hanging on a cross of iron. —Dwight D. Eisenhower, ‘‘The Chance for Peace’’ Address, April 16, 1953

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Set Introduction Kathleen Malley-Morrison

When people in today’s world think about war and peace, they generally think about war and peace between or within nations. Yet the very idea of nations, or states, is quite a new one in human history. For most of human existence, people banded together in extended families, bands, tribes, or chiefdoms; later, in some parts of the world, leaders such as warlords, kings, and emperors forcibly created larger social and political structures. The notion of a human society organized into individual states or nations, with equal sovereignty, is, by contrast, quite modern, an outgrowth of the Peace of Westphalia that brought an end to the Thirty Years War in 1648. The Thirty Years War, which was actually a series of European wars, was essentially a set of conflicts between proponents of Catholicism and proponents of Protestantism, who allied themselves with the expansionist ambitions of many European power holders. Ultimately, these wars involved the leaders of Bohemia, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Poland, Russia, the Netherlands, Spain, and France, although it could also be seen as a conflict between the Holy Roman Empire, which was aggressively Roman Catholic, and various anti-imperialistic Protestant communities. It was fought primarily on German territory, often by mercenaries, with devastating results. The Peace of Westphalia formally ended the era in which princes and kings could demand feudal loyalties from sovereigns within other states and could also attempt to force their own religious observance on subjects of another sovereign. One of the immediate effects was to end the direct influence of the Pope, Innocent X, and his successors on the choosing of the Holy Roman emperor and on intervening in the internal

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affairs of European countries no longer Catholic. There arose, instead, the structure of independent sovereign states—a type of organization that gradually extended beyond Europe and has persisted into modern times. Even the Charter of the United Nations, though it champions peaceful resolution of disputes, acknowledges this idea of sovereignty in the very first section of Article 2 of the Charter: ‘‘The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.’’1 This statement so early in the UN Charter is simply recognition that the political order of today’s world remains characterized by the predominance of sovereign states acknowledging no higher authority than themselves in matters of vital interests. The Security Council notwithstanding, each state is the final decider of its own security interests and of the means appropriate to achieve those interests. The virtual anarchy enabled by this formalizing of the supremacy of sovereignty has particularly grave implications in an era when technology has made nearly instantaneous attack with unimaginably devastating weapons by other states or non-state actors possible anywhere on the globe. All states must, to some degree, live in a condition of perpetual concern about their readiness to provide for their security. This in turn induces what is called ‘‘the security dilemma’’ for other states. What one state does for its own protection is likely to be seen by at least some other states as threatening. Although states may find it useful to wage wars, it is the people who inhabit those states who suffer most in times of war, and governments often promise their people that a better peace, a more secure peace, will grow out of their sacrifices. In modern times, World War I turned out not to be ‘‘the war to end all wars’’; the death of approximately 20 million people did not lead to an enduring peace. The carnage of World War II was even greater, with the majority of deaths being civilians. Among the Allies, it is likely that 25 million people, at least two thirds of whom were civilians, died in the Soviet Union—15 million in China; 6 million in Poland; between 1.5 and 2 million in Yugoslavia; approximately 400,000 in the United Kingdom; and about 300,000 from the United States. Germany lost over 4 million, and Japan over 2 million lives in the war. ‘‘The total for the globe as a whole probably reached 60 million, a figure which includes 6 million murdered because they were Jewish.’’2 The loss of approximately 60 million lives in World War II, itself a direct consequence of mismanagement of the outcome of World War I, failed to bring peace to the world. According to one set of estimates, between the end of World War II and 2004, there have been a total of 228 armed conflicts; 118 of these have taken place since the end of the Cold War.3 However, the number of international wars has declined since the late 1970s, largely because of the end of colonialism and the Cold War.4

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The United Kingdom and France, former colonial powers, had fought most of the post-World War II wars, followed by the major Cold Warriors, the United States and the USSR. In addition, after World War II the number of civil wars first increased dramatically, but then, starting in the 1990s, decreased even more dramatically. In 2003, the majority of non-state wars (not involving any government) took place in Africa. Many people are unsurprised at the level of violence permeating society, because they see aggression as an innate human characteristic, part of our evolutionary history. Not so, say many experts. For example, Robert Sapolsky argues effectively that although some of our related primate species are characterized by violence, others are communal, egalitarian, and cooperative.5 The Encyclopedia of Selected Peaceful Societies provides descriptions of 25 of the societies identified by sociologists and anthropologists as peaceful, the most well-known of these probably being the Amish, Tahitians, and Inuit of Utkuhikhalik.6 Ackerman and Duvall describe major changes in power and successful resistance movements achieved without major military conflict, and in which the ‘‘little guys’’ successfully combated powerful aggressors; for example, India’s transition to self-rule under the leadership of Mohandas Ghandi, Poland’s Solidarity Movement in the 1980s under the leadership of Lech Walesa, and the campaign against apartheid in South Africa under the leadership of many courageous men and women, including Nelson Mandela.7 Although violent conflict was widespread in the era from 1990 to 2002, 30 successful peace agreements were made and have been respected; for example, in Mexico, Northern Ireland, Mauritania, Slovenia, Albania, Uzbekistan, Bangladesh, and Kuwait. Thus, the claims of many leaders that their national or group aims (always portrayed as righteous) can be achieved only through violence are belied by numerous counterexamples, often not as widely remembered as the armed conflicts are. The Human Security Report attributes the decline in armed conflicts over the last 30 years to three key factors: the end of colonialism, the end of the Cold War, and the international conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peace-building activities of the United Nations. In 1948, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaims, among other things, that ‘‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person’’; ‘‘No one shall be held in slavery or servitude’’; ‘‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’’; ‘‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile’’; and ‘‘Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.’’ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a revolutionary document that provides the basis for international human rights law today. It

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has been followed by other human rights proclamations, such as the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,8 the Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace,9 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which emphasizes the importance of preparing children to live in a world of peace.10 On the other hand, although banning torture and many other forms of violence and discrimination, the United Nations has not made all armed conflict illegal. For example, the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations states as one of its goals: ‘‘to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest’’ (emphasis added).11 Moreover, Article 51 of the Charter states, ‘‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.’’12 Finally, according to Article 42 of the Charter, if nonviolent efforts fail to resolve ‘‘any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,’’ then the Security Council ‘‘may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.’’13 The United Nations’ position concerning the justifiability of armed force for self-defense or in response to breaches of the peace and acts of aggression is generally viewed as consistent with Just War doctrine, which is designed to constrain and prevent warfare. In general, there are six criteria that Just War theorists agree must be met, in combination, for a nation to be justified in going to war: just cause (i.e., in response and only in response to actual or imminent attack); right authority (e.g., initiated by the United Nations or a national government, not a terrorist group); right intention (e.g., to achieve peace and security); reasonable prospect of success (to ensure there is not a needless loss of life); proportionate cause (the response should be proportionate to the level of the attack or threat); and war as a last resort (undertaken only if and when all nonviolent solutions have been tried and have failed, consistent with the United Nations Charter).14 Several social scientists and ethicists have evaluated the extent to which the United States’ invasion of Iraq fits the profile for a just war and have concluded that it does not.15 Moreover, Just War doctrine itself has been criticized on the ground that its principles, particularly the principle of just cause, can be too easily subverted.16 Others argue that Just War doctrine imposes at least some constraints on potential violent conflicts and needs to be updated to deal with modern realities (e.g., terrorist groups and weapons of mass destruction) rather than abandoned altogether.17

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It seems clear that some nations that are signatories to human rights proclamations, as well as non-state groups, break international laws and agreements, and even appear to reject the idea that everyone (regardless of ‘‘race’’ or religion) has a right to peace.18 How do ordinary people feel about the principles stated in such proclamations? Do they believe that strategies like invasion and torture are justifiable if being carried out by their own governments, regardless of whether such acts violate international law? Do they believe people have a right to peace? Do they think peace is achievable? In the months following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, members of our group became interested in the extent to which ordinary people, the men and women in the street, believed that various forms of governmental aggression were inevitable and perhaps justifiable, as well as the extent to which they believed people had a right to peace and that peace could be achieved. The four volumes in this series address the issue. GIPGAP: The Core Group The Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP) grew out of an earlier group of psychologists and students doing research on international perspectives on family violence and abuse.19 The events following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, particularly the expansion of the United States’ government’s aggressive response into Iraq, led student members of the local (Boston University) group to urge their faculty mentor (Kathleen Malley-Morrison) to broaden the group’s concern with interpersonal violence to include governmental aggression. In the next few years, international representation in the group grew, a pilot survey was developed, tested, and modified, a book contract was negotiated successfully with Praeger Security International (PSI), an imprint of ABC-CLIO, and the current project was launched. The Core Group, located at Boston University, initially consisted of a faculty advisor (Malley-Morrison), several postdocs who had worked on the family violence and abuse project, and international graduate and undergraduate students concerned with issues of violence. That group has expanded to include faculty and graduate students from the International Relations Department at Boston University. GIPGAP: International Contributors The International Group consists of faculty and graduate students from a range of academic departments, including psychology, sociology, and international relations, in more than 40 countries. These international contributors were recruited through a number of different approaches:

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networking by Core Group members, notices in Announcements from the APA Division of International Psychology, notices in International Psychology Bulletin, and invitations during presentations at international psychology conferences. With approval from the appropriate institutional authorities, these contributors administered the Personal and Individual Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) to ordinary people from multiple countries in every major area of the world: North America (the United States and Canada); Western Europe (Iceland, Great Britain, France, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden); Central and Eastern Europe (Germany, Greece, Slovenia, Serbia, and Turkey), Eurasia (Russia), the Middle East (Afghanistan, Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia); Africa (Egypt, Nigeria, Angola, Ghana, Botswana, Zambia, and South Africa), Central America (Nicaragua and Costa Rica); South America (Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Argentina); South and Southeast Asia (Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, and the Philippines); and the Far East (China, Laos, Japan, and Korea). The PAIRTAPS The Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) has six sections: (1) judgments concerning the extent to which governments have the right to perform such acts of aggression as invading another country, killing innocent civilians in times of war, and torturing prisoners during times of war; (2) judgments concerning the rights of individuals to grow up and live in a world of peace, and the right to demonstrate against war and in favor of peace; (3) views concerning patriotism and the United States’ involvement in the Iraq war; (4) projected emotional responses that might be experienced following direct or indirect exposure to acts of governmental violence; (5) definitions of war, torture, terrorism, peace, reconciliation, and rights; and (6) views on the achievability of peace and the relationship of national security to individual and family security. Several of the items in Sections A and B are direct expressions of human rights guarantees (e.g., freedom from torture, right to assembly) established in United Nations agreements. For Sections 1, 2, 3, and 6, respondents indicate on a scale from 1 (total disagreement) to 7 (total agreement) the extent to which they agree with each item (e.g., ‘‘Sometimes a country has the right to ignore international treaties or international human rights agreements.’’). Then, in their own words, they provide an explanation of the reasoning behind their rating on the item. Sections 4 and 5 call only for open-ended qualitative responses—for example, samples of emotions that would be felt in the face of governmental aggression and definitions of terms. For the purposes of this current set of Praeger books,

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chapter authors were asked to focus only on qualitative responses to the following selected items: • Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country. • The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war. • Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism. • All human beings have a basic right to peace. • Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace. • I believe that world peace can be achieved. • National Security is essential for individual and family security. • Definitions for war, peace, and terrorism Although most chapter authors analyzed responses to most if not all of these items, some chapter authors focused primarily on the definitions of war, peace, and terrorism. Moreover, some chapter authors included a discussion of the item ‘‘The United States’ involvement in the Iraq war is a moral activity’’ because they thought the responses were of particular importance in understanding public reaction in diverse countries to the United States’ war in Iraq. Despite such relatively minor differences in coverage of survey items, each volume in the series ends with an integrative chapter summarizing similarities and differences found across countries in the themes that emerged. In addition to responding to the PAIRTAPS items, participants completed a background information form asking for basic demographic data such as age, gender, ethnicity, nationality, and religion, as well as whether they or any family member had been in the military, and whether they had participated in any protest activities. Participants who responded to the survey in their home country generally did so in their native language, except in the case of South Africa, where all participants responded to an English version of the survey. The qualitative responses to the selected items were coded according to a grounded theory approach. That is, we did not start out with a particular theoretical framework and then strive to fit the responses into that framework. Instead, we followed the procedures recommended by Strauss and Korbin, proceeding from open coding to axial coding, using a process of constant comparison.20 During the open coding phase, we broke the qualitative responses to the government aggression and peace items into units of meaning that varied from one word (e.g., ‘‘Disgusting’’) to phrases (e.g., ‘‘Only in defense of one’s own citizens’’) and entire sentences (e.g., ‘‘The future of the world depends on peace’’). At the axial level of coding, the relationships among the more fragmented

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categories were identified, and these categories were organized into more inclusive categories. For example, in regard to qualitative responses to the item ‘‘Sometimes the heads of government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism,’’ thematic categories for ‘‘sanctity of life’’ (e.g., ‘‘No person has the right to kill anyone’’), ‘‘only God’’ (e.g., ‘‘Taking a life would be replacing the job of our Lord’’), and ‘‘emphasis on innocence’’ (e.g., ‘‘The word innocent should be enough to suggest that the above sentence is disgusting and the marks of a dictator not a legal government’’) were all incorporated into a more inclusive category labeled ‘‘No right to kill,’’ which in turn became one of the categories in the overarching category labeled ‘‘It’s not a right.’’ That overarching category also included other categories such as ‘‘The ends don’t justify the means,’’ ‘‘Killing innocent civilians is a terrorist tactic,’’ ‘‘Does not make sense,’’ and ‘‘Is avoidable.’’ In a grounded theory analysis, data collection, coding, conceptualizing, and theorizing take place simultaneously, and analyses of new responses are compared both with analyses of previous responses and with the concepts emerging from those analyses. Using an international coding manual sample, with blinded responses from nearly all of the countries represented in this PSI series, the Core Group developed coding manuals for each of the survey items being addressed. We found that, in general, the governmental aggression responses could be coded first into general categories: (1) unqualified rejection of the right of governments to perform the particular form of aggression (the intolerance category) and (2) identification of one or more circumstances under which the aggression would be justifiable (the tolerance category). Within those broad categories, there are numerous subcategories, depending on the particular form of governmental aggression being addressed. For example, in regard to the invasion item, major tolerance arguments include for self-defense, to respond to threat, to strike back at an aggressor, and for humanitarian intervention. In regard to the torture prisoners of war item, the major tolerance arguments include its presumed effectiveness in getting important information, its potential role in saving lives, and its appropriateness when carried out under the aegis of some authority. Responses to the peace-related items, similarly, can be coded into two general categories (unequivocal support for the rights to peace and to protest and rejection or qualification of any such rights) as well as subcategories. For example, in regard to the item ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace,’’ some responses could be categorized as qualifying the right with specified conditions—for example, that the protests be peaceful, or socially sanctioned, or not have negative consequences for the country’s military

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personnel. Similarly, in regard to the possibility of a right to peace, subcategories included conditional statements such as ‘‘unless they are terrorists,’’ ‘‘unless they have broken the peace,’’ and ‘‘as long as they have not hurt others.’’ In regard to definitions of key terms, we found that except for the definition of ‘‘peace,’’ the examples of definitions did not fall into two overarching categories quite as neatly as the responses to the rights items tended to do. In regard to definitions of peace, the responses frequently fell into the two major types identified by Galtung—that is, ‘‘positive peace’’ (i.e., the good things peace can mean, such as ‘‘harmony’’ and ‘‘reconciliation’’) and ‘‘negative peace’’ (i.e., peace as freedom from bad things such as conflict, peace as the opposite of war).21 Among the positive definitions of peace are subcategories emphasizing peace as goodness, peace as coexistence and cooperation, peace as a human right, peace as a force for growth, and peace as an ideal—along with some definitions including explicit doubt as to the achievability of peace. By contrast, we found that definitions of ‘‘war’’ generally did not fall into two major categories with subcategories, but rather fell into one of the following general categories: (1) conflict (e.g., ‘‘Time or state of conflict between two countries or groups’’); (2) morality or human rights (e.g., ‘‘selfishness,’’ ‘‘immorality,’’ ‘‘violation of rights’’); (3) likely emotional effects (e.g., ‘‘hate,’’ ‘‘terror,’’ ‘‘sadness,’’ ‘‘suffering,’’ and ‘‘desolation’’); (4) destruction and other physical outcomes (e.g., ‘‘death, destruction, out of control’’); (5) defense (e.g., ‘‘aggressive confrontation in defense of some position’’); (6) causes (e.g., ‘‘aggressiveness, unnecessary actions to gain more land or money’’); and (7) acknowledgment of alternatives (e.g., ‘‘the worst of solutions’’). Definitions equating war with conflict are most similar to typical dictionary types of definitions of the term. Similarly, there was no bifurcation of definitions of ‘‘terrorism,’’ which fell into five major categories: focus on intent, focus on motivation or trigger; value judgments concerning the morality or sanity of terrorist behaviors, focus on outcomes, and simple listing of behaviors that might be considered terroristic. As the Core Group developed these coding manuals on an everexpanding international coding manual sample, it made the coding manuals available to the International Group. The International Group was invited to conduct their own guided theory analysis or to use the Core Group’s manuals for coding the data. We did not want to be restrictive in regard to any group member’s coding, but rather to encourage them to use consistent category labels when discussing the same or similar types of arguments. The Core Group also offered to do the coding of the responses from any country, as long as they had been translated into English or could be translated by a member of the Core

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Group. Although a few contributors developed and applied their own coding systems, the great majority worked with the coding manuals developed by the Core Group or requested that the Core Group do the coding for them. In general, coding systems used were similar enough to allow comparisons across countries. Methodology All researchers contributing to this project adhered to human subjects ethical guidelines. The survey responses were collected between 2005 and 2008. In some cases, shortened versions of the survey were administered because the respondents were unfamiliar with taking surveys; moreover, in some cases, items that seemed particularly sensitive within the context of that country were deleted (e.g., ‘‘If your country is currently involved in armed conflict with another country, please respond to the following item: My country’s involvement in armed conflict is morally correct [morally defensible].’’). The survey could be completed either online over the Internet at a secure site or as a paper-and-pencil measure. Individual chapter authors made the decision as to which procedure best protected their participants’ rights and safety. In many of the Western countries, both procedures were used, although the bulk of the responses were submitted over the Internet.

PURPOSE OF THIS SET OF VOLUMES Although we know that globally almost all peoples have some exposure to armed conflict and other forms of sanctioned violence (including torture), rarely do books compare the views of laypeople around the world on issues such as the rights of governments to invade other countries, torture suspected terrorists, violate human rights treaties, and suppress dissent—all issues with great relevance to security at the level of individual, state, and system. We know even less about the views of laypeople around the world concerning such revolutionary ideas as a ‘‘right to peace.’’ To what extent do laypeople from countries with very different forms of government accept or reject their leaders’ arguments concerning the rights of the regime to perpetrate violence to achieve ends? Do laypeople from countries that have recently engaged in armed conflict with each other use similar or different arguments to justify their own nation’s involvement with the other in the conflict? To what extent do these laypeople believe that all individuals have an inherent right to peace and that children have a right to grow up in a world of peace? To what extent do judgments concerning peace vary in relation to the

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status of women and ethnic minorities? These are some of the questions that we address in the current book series, which includes chapters on issues of governmental violence and peace in more than 40 countries around the world. The four volumes in the current series are organized by major areas of the world (e.g., Western Europe, the Middle East, and Africa) and then by selected countries within each area. Many of the selected countries have a considerable history of military conflict with each other, as well as internal conflicts. Moreover, many of the countries were either colonizers or colonized in the 15th through 20th centuries, and the legacies of the colonial era’s depredations and disruptions of long existing social and political structures underlie much of the havoc being wrought in the world today. We begin Volume 1 in Western Europe including the major former colonial powers—Portugal, Spain, Great Britain, and France—whose empire-building policies contributed greatly to their own economic and political power, while leaving much of the world economically and politically oppressed. We then move north to Sweden, which had a brief empire-building period but has been a model of nonaggression for centuries, and west to Iceland, also a model of nonaggression. We end the volume with the United States and Canada, both colonized by Western European countries, but with very different subsequent histories. Our national coverage heads eastward in Volume 2, starting with Germany, principal site of the Thirty Years War and the Peace of Westphalia, which moved the world toward the kind of nation state organization it has today. Volume 2 continues with its sample of countries through war-torn Eastern Europe and Russia, seat of the former Soviet Union, and ends in the Middle East, where East meets West, and conflicts among Christians, Jews, and Muslims have flared for centuries. Volume 3 addresses perspectives on war and peace in the more southern parts of the globe, the areas most influenced (and probably most damaged) by colonialism—specifically, Africa and South America. Finally, Volume 4 includes countries in South Asia and Southeast Asia that were invaded and colonized by both Western and Eastern powers and ends with countries from the Far East, some of which did their own forms of colonizing, particularly Japan and China. Each chapter begins with a country profile describing the country’s recent history of involvement in armed conflict, the extent to which it has colonized, invaded, and occupied other countries historically and since World War II, the extent to which it has been involved in internal (e.g., ethnic) armed conflicts, its current economic status (developed or developing, level of income disparity) and political status (totalitarian, democratic)—all of these being contextual factors that have been

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demonstrated to be relevant to perspectives on war, peace, and security. Following a description of the sample recruited in that country, each chapter focuses on the ‘‘voices’’ of those participants, expanding on the major themes and findings that emerged from our analyses of their responses. These themes are then linked to the country’s previous and current experience with war and peace.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My thanks to Professor Michael Corgan of the International Relations Department at Boston University for his helpful suggestions concerning this chapter. My thanks go to all the team members who have contributed to this book project by recruiting participants, translating responses, creating Excel and SPSS files, helping in the development of coding manuals, coding qualitative responses, handling correspondence with contributors, helping figure out the endlessly frustrating Chicago Manual reference style, and innumerable other tasks. In particular, I want to thank my current and recent lab managers and assistant managers: Helena Castanheira, Maria Daskalopoulos, Elizabeth Planje, Tanvi Zaveri, and Lauren Groves; without their help managing the lab, these volumes would never have been completed. I also greatly appreciate the assistance of Doe West, Nyryan Nolido, Matt Pita, Ting Wu, Samantha Kinney, Stephanie Nadler, Samantha Hoyt, Kristin Wagner, Jennie Davidow, Jonathan Fuss, Jeremy Peterman, Abram Trosky, Carolyn Certilman, Mariana Barbosa, Marisa Kirio, Mi Sung Kim, Mike Toohey, Rouba Youssef, Sarah Stuart, Shannon Turney, Tina Belanger, Maria Galmarini, Nisha Raj, Jacob-Joon Meyers, Tessa Schaaf, Natsuko Mori, Injin Park, Chanmi Lee, Kamala Smith, Kaitlyn Welsh, Abigail Rudnickas, Caroline Berrio, Cornelia Photopoulos, Stella Hirawan, Ken Mullane, Nadia El Tayar, Katie Maxted, Sophie Spiegel, and Sarah Jane Potter.

Introduction to Volume 3

Volume 3 of this set focuses on countries from the southern parts of the world (Africa and Central and South America) that have, arguably, been most scarred by the effects of imperialism—particularly, but not limited to, Western imperialism. There is, however, a significant difference between South American and African colonization experiences. In South America, the colonizing imperialist powers left behind their European colonizers, whose descendants pretty much run things today. By contrast, in sub-Saharan Africa, the European settlers mainly departed or ceded power (although this took quite a long time in the case of Zimbabwe and South Africa), and control of the governments was taken over by native Africans. However, the African countries that were established by European force were often mixes of peoples or tribes that had never gotten on together particularly well before. For example, Nigeria has the Ibo, Hausa, and Yoruba tribes, and Rwanda has the Hutus and Tutsis—groups that never chose to live and work together in a nation. Civil and tribal wars abound even today. Moreover, imperialists and slavers also introduced Christian versus Muslim conflict systems into the mix. Central and South America experienced much less breaking up of indigenous groupings and arbitrary creations of boundaries by western colonists, particularly in the 20th century, and since the end of colonization have been less troubled by inter-state and civil wars. For the purposes of this volume, we share the voices of peoples from southern countries that vary in colonial history, geography, religion, language, involvement in armed conflict and peace-making activities, and current political system.

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THE AFRICAN NATIONS The African countries considered in this volume include, starting in the north and moving south: Egypt in the northeastern Mediterranean area; Nigeria and Ghana bordering on the South Atlantic Ocean (Gulf of Guinea) in West Africa; Angola, in Central Africa; land-locked Zambia in Southern Africa, to the east of Angola; land-locked Botswana in southern Africa, south of Zambia; and South Africa at the southern tip of the continent, at the juncture of the South Atlantic and Indian oceans. As was true of the continent as a whole, and quite different from the experience of Central and South American colonies, none of these African countries achieved full control over their internal affairs until after World War II. Although all of these African countries were parts of colonial empires right into the 20th century, the length, nature, and outcomes of their experience varied considerably. For example, in the long span of time between the fourth century BCE and the end of the 20th century, Egypt, with its valuable location on the Mediterranean Sea to the north and the Red Sea to the east, was occupied and controlled first by Persians (341 BCE to 323 BCE), then (starting in 323 BCE with Alexander the Great) by Greeks, then by Romans (31 BCE to 642 CE), then by a series of competing Islamic leaders (including from 1517–1796, the Turkish Ottomans), briefly by the French under Napoleon (1798–1801), again by the Turks until 1882, then by the British until 1922, although the British retained considerable political influence over the country right through World War II. The country did not achieve full independence and sovereignty until the military overthrow of the British-backed monarchy in 1952. Although this may be the longest and most diverse experience of external control of any of the African countries, not all of these occupations were as devastating to Egyptians as the colonial experiences of some of the other African countries. For example, during these centuries of occupation, Egypt experienced great periods of literary and artistic productivity, as well as economic growth. In contrast to Egypt’s long history of foreign domination, presentday Nigeria consisted largely of independent kingdoms governed by local rulers until colonization by the British in the 19th century. By 1905, the British had gained control over the entire area of modern Nigeria and maintained this control until after World War II. In a shift of power very different from what was experienced in many African countries, the British government launched, in 1945, a series of constitutional changes in Nigeria that led to self-rule in the country 15 years later. Nevertheless, Nigeria experienced considerable political unrest, coups, and countercoups until what appears to have been a successful transition to democratically elected presidents in 1999.

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The modern-day Republic of Ghana, called the Gold Coast until 1957, is the site of the former Empire of the Ashanti. European traders—first the Portuguese, and later the Dutch, English, Danes, and Swedes—began coming to the area and building forts in the fifteenth century. During the 19th century, there were four Anglo-Ashanti wars culminating in the Gold Coast becoming a British Crown colony in 1874. Like Nigeria, the Gold Coast remained under British rule through World War II, following which decolonization began in much of Africa. Under the sponsorship of a UN plebiscite, Ghana gained its independence in 1957. Under the leadership of democratically elected Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana became increasingly involved in pan-Africanism and has successfully maintained a working democracy. Unlike Nigeria and Ghana, which became British colonies in the nineteenth century, Angola was a Portuguese colony from the 17th century until 1951, when Portugal made it an ‘‘overseas province.’’ Angolans fought a long and bloody war for independence from 1961 to 1974, but independence in 1975 was followed by years of civil war, which lasted until 2002. They are now in the process of rebuilding their country. The majority of Angola’s population is Christian, and the majority of the Christians are Roman Catholic. Botswana, like Nigeria and Ghana, was ruled primarily by local chiefs and kings until the late 19th century, when it became a British protectorate (the Bechuanaland Protectorate). In the 20th century, the British set up a dual-power governing system whereby affairs were administered locally by chiefs but England retained the right to collect taxes. Bechucanaland became selfgoverning in 1965 and declared itself the Republic of Botswana in 1966. It is the oldest and probably most stable African democracy. Originally part of Northern Rhodesia, Zambia was administered by Great Britain’s South Africa Company from 1891 until 1923, when it was taken over by the government of the United Kingdom. The British Colonial Office (BCO) administered the Central African Federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland (now Malawi) from 1953 to 1963, when Zambia became independent. Although Zambia was a single-party authoritarian state for much of its first few decades, it made a peaceful shift in 1991 to a multi-party democracy and has maintained peace and stability despite economic problems. South Africa, the final African state considered in this volume, is probably the one best known to most readers because of its apartheid era, and the heroism of Nelson Mandela. The first Europeans to settle in South Africa were from the Dutch East India Company. This Afrikaner community gradually expanded and came into conflict in the late 19th century with the British who wanted to control the area. The British prevailed, and in 1910 established the Union of South Africa as a

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dominion within the British Empire. Following World War II, when colonialism was coming to a close in many parts of Africa and elsewhere, apartheid became more and more entrenched. Apartheid lasted until 1990, when in response to both internal and external pressure the government released Nelson Mandela from prison, and prepared for the national elections that finally brought democracy to South Africa in 1994. Perspectives on states’ rights to aggression and individuals rights to peace are likely to be influenced not only by political history but also by religious beliefs. In all of the African countries, indigenous beliefs were largely displaced by religions brought in from the north by invading nations or groups—particularly Christians and Muslims—although many indigenous beliefs are ‘‘silent partners’’ of the forms of Christianity and Islam that have been adopted. Over 90 percent of Egyptians are Muslim (particularly Sunni), with the remainder of the population being predominantly Coptic Christian. Nigerians are more equally divided, with about half of the Nigerians being Muslim, 40 percent being Christian, and 10 percent other. In Ghana, religious affiliation as of 2000 was reported to be 69 percent Christian, 16 percent Muslim, and 15 percent traditional indigenous religious beliefs or other religion. Botswani today is 72 percent Christian. The predominant religion in South Africa today is Christianity. The 2000 census indicated that nearly 90 percent of Zambians are Christian, the rest of the population being Muslim or Hindu or subscribers to indigenous beliefs. Within all of these major religions, perspectives on war and peace vary considerably, with the more conservative advocates of each religion being more likely to tolerate aggression in the service of spreading their religion.

THE CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICAN NATIONS Among the Central and South American countries featured in this volume are: Nicaragua and Costa Rica in Central America, north of the Panama Canal; Colombia, the northernmost South American country, which connects with Central America, and borders on the Pacific Ocean; Brazil, by far the largest South American country, which borders on the Atlantic; Peru, south of Colombia and west of Brazil; and Argentina, a large county in southeastern South America, bordering on the Atlantic Ocean and Strait of Magellan. The colonial history of Central and South America is quite different from that of Africa. Most of the colonization was carried out by Spain, with the exception of Brazil, which was colonized by the Portuguese, and many of the colonies achieved their freedom in the nineteenth century. For example, both Nicaragua and Costa Rica were settled in the

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sixteenth century, but then, because they lacked the riches of many South American colonies like Peru, were largely ignored until they rebelled against Spain and established their sovereignty in the mid1800s. Following independence, both countries experienced nearly constant internal conflict, and frequent incursions into their affairs from the United States, well into the 20th century. Because of their wealth, Peru and Argentina had very different experiences under Spanish control than Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Starting in the 16th century, the Spanish took iron control over both areas and to a considerable extent enslaved the local indigenous population. There was considerable resistance to Spanish rule over the next two centuries, with both countries winning their independence in the 1820s; nevertheless, the Spanish elite in each country maintained primary political and economic control well into the 20th century, with the support of the United States and other Western countries. Brazil was also claimed as a European colony at the beginning of the sixteenth century, but by Portugal rather than Spain. Although the Spanish enslaved indigenous people to work for them, the Portuguese made Brazil the largest center of slavery in the world. A military coup in 1889 ended Portuguese rule, but the country was wracked by internal conflict for a hundred years; not until 1989 did the country have a democratic election that was followed by some stability. The majority religion in all these Central and South American countries is Christianity, and in most cases Roman Catholicism predominates.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STATUS OF COUNTRIES IN THIS VOLUME Many of these southern countries, particularly the African countries, are among the poorest in the world. Based on the United Nations Poverty Index, the poverty rankings within the Central and Southern American countries covered in this volume, from lowest to highest, range from an international rank of 38 for Argentina to 75 for Colombia. For the African nations in this volume, the poverty rankings range from 112 for Egypt to 165 for Zambia. Based on the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index of 2006, Costa Rica is the only country covered in the volume that is considered a full democracy; its democracy ranking of 25 puts it just below the UK (rank of 23) and France (rank of 24) and not all that far from the United States (rank of 17). South Africa (rank of 29), Botswana (36), Brazil (42), Argentina (54), Colombia (67), and Peru (75) are identified as ‘‘flawed democracies,’’ and Nicaragua (89), Ghana (95), and Zambia (97) as ‘‘hybrid regimes’’ mixing democratic elements with

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other political characteristics. One might well ask the extent to which the formerly imperialistic Western nations, with their relatively high ratings on economic development and democracy, are responsible for the higher levels of poverty and lower levels of democracy in the countries they once ruled. Another useful index is the Global Peace Index. According to the 2007 Index, which ranks countries from most peaceful (Sweden, with a rank of 1) to least peaceful (Iraq, with a rank of 140), the most peaceful of the countries covered in this volume is Costa Rica (rank 34), followed by Ghana (40), Botswana (45), Zambia (53), Argentina (56), Nicaragua (59), Peru (80), and Brazil (90)—all of which score as more peaceful than the United States (97), embroiled in its war on Iraq. The other countries in the volume were ranked as even less peaceful than the United States. It is remarkable that a number of African countries, despite being beset by poverty, and despite a long struggle against imperialism, are now ranked as more peaceful than the United States and a lot of other more developed countries. Of particular interest in the current volume are the perspectives on state aggression and peace of individuals from these developing countries, all of which experienced colonization, and many of which also experienced considerable internal conflict following independence.

Part I

Africa

1

Egypt Natoschia Scruggs

War is . . . ‘‘like what we had in 1973’’; ‘‘when we destroy our lives, kill our future, and make men extinct (many men die in wars).’’ Peace is . . . ’’when you have work and an organized government’’; ‘‘a quiet life, a good life with access to education.’’ Egypt. The name evokes images of hieroglyphics, the Pyramids at Giza, feluccas gliding up the Nile River, the Sphinx, Cleopatra, the bust of Queen Nefertiti and the tomb of the boy-king Tutankhamen. Indeed, Egyptian civilization is one of the most venerated and ancient in the world. We know much about the daily lives and thoughts of ancient Egyptians because they left behind writings describing everything from circumcision to land ownership.1 We know how and why they engaged in warfare because they meticulously depicted scenes from these events on temple walls and objects.2 But what can be said of how contemporary Egyptians perceive war? What do they think about peace? Do they think reconciliation after conflict is possible? This chapter briefly discusses Egypt’s military past from ancient times, through the colonial period, to the present. This historical backdrop provides a useful context for understanding the responses provided by 70 Egyptians who completed our Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS). However, the primary focus of this chapter is contemporary Egypt—1952 to the present—and how this recent history has shaped the views of Egyptian people on the subjects of war, conflict, peace, and reconciliation. What is most clear is that Islam, as interpreted by many, and the socioeconomic and political conditions that are confronted daily, heavily inform the ideas Egyptians espouse about the most beneficial society in which to live.

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WAR AND CONFLICT IN ANCIENT EGYPT Ancient Egyptians believed that war was part of the natural order of things; it was necessary. They even had goddesses of war. Neith was from Lower Egypt and worshipped as the mother of the sun.3 Menhet meaning ‘‘the one who sacrifices’’ and ‘‘the slaughterer,’’ was from Upper Egypt, and it was she who led the pharaoh’s troops into battle.4 Ancient Egypt was a place of much internal conflict. Conscripted artisans and peasants formed armies that were led by opposing members of the nobility over territory within Egypt, producing lots of small civil wars. There were also border disputes with regional neighbors in present-day Libya and Sudan, as Egyptians pushed farther west and south. However, it was not until around 1630 BCE,5 when the Hyksos, an Asiatic people, invaded and took over Lower Egypt, that Egyptians found themselves fighting an ongoing full-scale war against foreigners. During the Old Kingdom (2575–2150 BCE),6 the Egyptians began incorporating foreigners into their army to help fight against the Hyksos. The New Kingdom (1539–1075 BCE) saw even more changes to the military. It was at this time that Theban pharaohs began adopting new strategies and weapons, and Egypt’s first professional army was formed. Instead of relying on conscripts, the pharaoh or a close member of his family fought among professional soldiers while the nobility served as charioteers and officers.7 The military provided men from all backgrounds the possibility to elevate their social status, making the career of professional soldier very appealing to many. The Egyptians were finally able to expel the Hyksos around 1567 BCE, but their encounter with these foreign invaders challenged their military defenses and left them in a much stronger position in the end. Intermittent periods of expansion and invasion characterized much of ancient Egyptian history. During the reign of Ramses II, mounted cavalry was introduced and Egypt sought to continue expanding its empire. Prisoners of war were inducted into the military to provide more troops. Egyptians disliked fighting in foreign lands because, if killed, they had to be buried there. The prospect of being laid to rest in foreign soil ran counter to the very territorial nature of the Egyptian people. They identified strongly with the land they inhabited and considered themselves to be of the land. Being buried away from home also ran counter to their strong belief in the necessity to prepare for the afterlife. Ancient Egyptians were often quite brutal with their enemies, mutilating their bodies and leaving them to be eaten by scavengers. They commonly took war prisoners back to Egypt where they were settled in villages. Meanwhile, the conquered lands were annexed and administered by Egyptian officials. When victorious in war, ancient

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Egyptians thanked their gods, honored the efforts of the men who made victory possible, and distributed plunder among them. In addition to having an army, ancient Egyptians patrolled the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Boats and ships were simple vessels that varied in size and could be sailed or rowed. The ancient Egyptians did not develop special naval techniques but instead focused on using kebentiu from Byblos8 and other vessels to surprise enemies with seaborne land troops and to transport goods up and down the Nile River. Ancient Egypt’s military might, both on land and at sea, waned at different times throughout the New Kingdom (1552–664 BCE). By the end of this period, Egypt was militarily defeated by foreign armies and occupied. Pharonic Egypt came to an end when Queen Cleopatra VII of the Greek Ptolemics was defeated by the Romans at Actium in 30 BCE, causing her to take her life and bring to a close a long era in Egyptian history.9

MODERN EGYPT UNDER FOREIGN RULE From 332 BCE until 1952, Egypt experienced continuous foreign rule and domination. Egyptians lived under the successive control of the Greeks, Romans, Persians, Arabs, Turks, French, and British. Arguably, it was the Arabs who made the most indelible mark upon the land. They invaded in 640 CE,10 bringing Islam with them and leaving behind the Arabic language and culture that define Egypt to this day. Egypt was a province of the Ottoman Empire from 1517 to 1798. Under Napoleon Bonaparte, the French invaded the country in 1798. Although they stayed for only three years, they are credited with producing a multivolume book on Egyptian monuments and discovering the Rosetta Stone, all of which gave birth to the field of Egyptology.11 A combined force of Ottoman and British troops successfully kicked out the French in 1799, and Muhammad Ali Pasha, an Albanian in the Ottoman army, ruled Egypt until his death in 1849.12 Ali made westernizing Egypt one of his top priorities. He reformed the nation’s educational and agricultural systems. He also reinvigorated the Egyptian military by modernizing the army and aggressively pursued campaigns in the Sudan, the Arabian Peninsula, and Greece. After the deaths of Ali and his son, Egypt fell increasingly under the control of European nations. Tension had been building across the country since November 1869, when the Suez Canal was opened. Egyptians disliked how the French and British controlled the canal, a precious link between the Mediterranean and Red Seas. They also disliked how Egyptians were prevented from building a strong military and playing a pivotal role within it. A nationalist revolt erupted in 1879 and

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was crushed by the British in 1882.13 In response to the revolt, the British disbanded the Egyptian army and restructured it entirely, putting British officers in command. They instituted a conscription system that allowed the wealthy to pay their way out of military service or else into high-ranking positions while the poorest Egyptians comprised most units. In effect, Britain used Egypt and the Suez Canal to the advantage of the British Empire under the guise of protecting Egypt. Mounting Egyptian nationalism in the post-World War I era resulted in the British granting Egypt independence in 1922. It was not until the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 that Egypt regained full command over its armed forces and was able to expand the army despite maintaining very strong ties with Britain.14 Egypt was the Allied forces’ most important base in the Middle East during World War II. It remained neutral for much of the conflict, but King Farouk declared war against the Axis powers in February 1945, after the Germans entered western Egypt and threatened the country’s safety. The next major military excursion involving Egypt was the First Arab-Israeli War (1948–1949), when Egyptian forces invaded Palestinian territory and put the Israelis on the defensive. The war ended with the intervention of the United Nations and an eventual cease-fire that reestablished boundaries between the Sinai and Palestine.15 Although they had been forced back by the Israelis, Egyptian troops were proud of their performance and believed they could have succeeded if the military had been better developed. Egyptians blamed King Farouk for the disorganization of the military and loathed his overall apathy toward the well-being of the people he was supposed to serve. For many, he was an ineffectual leader who spent all of his time surrounded by opulence and extreme wealth, plundering the nation’s resources for selfgain. It came as no surprise in 1952 when a coup d’etat led by members of the Free Officers’ Movement overthrew King Farouk’s regime.

THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT: POST INDEPENDENCE LEADERS, WARS, AND CONFLICTS Formed by Gamel Abdel Nasser in 1949, the Committee of the Free Officers’ Movement (COFOM) played a decisive role in the formation of the modern Egyptian political system. Nasser was a lieutenant colonel in the military who, along with other frustrated young officers, had been plotting to depose King Farouk. In July 1952, members of the COFOM launched what is now alternately called the Egyptian Revolution and the July 23rd Revolution. They seized control of the

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government, pressuring King Farouk to abdicate. The Americans, Europeans, and Brits feared widespread violence and anarchy, but the July 23rd Revolution proved to be a bloodless coup d’etat. King Farouk and his family were allowed to exit the country safely and the COFOM began implementing the political and social changes they believed the country desperately needed. The COFOM formed the Revolution Command Council (RCC), whose task was to execute the six principal goals behind the revolution: (1) to end British occupation of Egypt and the presence of British troops at the Suez Canal; (2) to abolish feudalism and redistribute land; (3) to eliminate the monopolization of resources by the wealthy few; (4) to establish a system of social justice; (5) to build a strong national army capable of defending against domestic antirevolutionaries and foreign enemies; and (6) to create a solid democratic system that would foster and nurture a strong national identity. In regard to foreign policy, the RCC believed that Egypt’s focus should be within three spheres—what Nasser termed the Arab Arena, the African Arena, and the Islamic Arena. The RCC believed that Egypt’s Arab cultural, African geographical, and Islamic religious backgrounds meant that the country had a responsibility to forge the strongest ties with those nations with which it shared these heritages and a similar fate of having been dominated by Europe for much of modern history. The monarchy officially came to an end and Egypt was declared a republic on June 18, 1953. RCC member Mohamed Naguib was named Egypt’s first president. After a brief time in office, Naguib stepped down and was succeeded by Nasser, under whom much national reform was undertaken. Gamel Abdel Nasser and the Road to Pan-Arabism (1954 1970) Gamel Abdel Nasser became prime minister in 1954, then president in 1956, and led the country until his death in 1970. He is arguably one of the most charismatic and beloved leaders of the modern Arab world. His working-class roots informed Nasser’s worldview. He declared throughout his career that he could never and would never forget about Egypt’s poor. Nasser was guided by three main principles, which served as the impetus behind all of his political decisions: Arab socialism, Arab nationalism, and nonalignment. These three elements formed what began to be called ‘‘Nasserism.’’ At its core, Nasserism was a political ideology that stressed the need for Arabs, regardless of their religious background, to rule over the Arab region. Nasser thought that Western influence in Arab affairs was unacceptable and that industrializing and modernizing Arab countries were the only ways to become self-sufficient and to avoid dependence on Europe and North America.

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Africa and Central and South America

It is not a surprise, then, that Nasserites16 did not view modern Israel, which was created by Western powers via negotiations, as a legitimate state. Much of Nasser’s time in office was marked by conflict and war between Egypt and Israel. Internally, Nasser’s administration made many changes that set Egypt on a radical new path socially, politically, and economically. Nasser pursued an extensive nationalization program (mostly via land redistribution), subsidized basic goods, reduced educational fees and rents, and redistributed income. Perhaps the biggest internal change was that the Free Officers’ Movement had finally opened up the political process to all Egyptians by removing power from the hands of the select few. Now ordinary poor Egyptians, like Nasser, could play a role in the military or political arena if they were qualified to do so. In January 1956, Nasser spearheaded the promulgation of a new constitution, which proclaimed Egypt as a one-party socialist sovereign Arab state, with Arabic as its official language and Islam as its religion. An election law that made voting compulsory for all Egyptian men and optional for Egyptian women quickly followed the constitution. Collectively, the internal changes Nasser implemented gave rise to a new social class and political system. In Nasser’s view, the main way Egypt could meet its external obligations was by aiding nationalist groups in their struggle to gain independence. Since the country’s first allegiance was to the Arab region, Nasser spoke fervently and frequently about the need to overthrow Middle Eastern monarchies and get rid of the vestiges of European colonial power. Nasser’s increasing radicalism, anti-imperialist actions, strengthening ties with the Soviet Union, and Arab unity rhetoric did not go unnoticed by the West, and he was quickly perceived as a threat to Western and Israeli regional interests. Unable to collect the funds promised by the United States and Britain, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956 to finance the construction of the Aswan Dam. Armed conflict soon followed. In what became known as the Second Arab-Israeli War, Egypt was defeated in autumn 1956 by France, Britain, and Israel’s successfully coordinated attacks. The war ended in a cease-fire. Although Egypt had been militarily defeated, Nasser emerged as an Arab hero who was willing to defy the West and whose courage was to be emulated. Nasserites continued to increase in numbers across the Middle East, prompting the United Kingdom and the United States to send troops into Lebanon in 1958. Their fear was that Nasserites would successfully overthrow the conservative government in place, thereby officially taking over the country. Meanwhile, upon Syria’s request, Egypt and Syria merged to form the United Arab Republic in 1958.

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Nasser served as its president and, although the merger lasted only until 1961, it was seen as a first tangible attempt at Arab unity. Throughout his presidency, Nasser continued to lead Egypt and support other Arab leaders and revolutionaries but not without further military losses. In 1962–1967, Egyptian troops were sent to assist Yemeni revolutionaries in their failed attempts to overthrow Saudi Arabian-backed royalists. On the heels of foolishly involving Egypt in Yemen’s civil war, Nasser instigated the Six Days’ War with Israel. He requested that the United Nations Emergency Force evacuate the Sinai Peninsula in May 1967. After the UN’s departure, Nasser began to remilitarize the Sinai and closed the Straits of Tiran, which blocked Israel’s only access to the Indian Ocean. Israelis interpreted the blockade as a provocation and the manifestation of Nasser’s repeated threat that Egypt would soon attack Israel. In response, the Israeli air force launched preemptive attacks against the Egyptian air force. Despite having the support of numerous Arab nations in the form of troops and weaponry, the Arab forces suffered heavy casualties, and Egypt was completely humiliated yet again. A cease-fire was called. UN Resolution 242, which requested that Arab states recognize Israel’s sovereignty and that Israel withdraw from the Occupied Territories, was ignored by both sides. It soon became clear that this would be a protracted conflict. Embarrassed by Egypt’s crushing defeat, Nasser made a public national announcement of resignation. However, the Egyptian people refused to accept his decision and begged Nasser to reconsider, which he did. In April 1969, Nasser initiated the War of Attrition (1969–1970). This time, the ‘‘Arabs’’ fighting against Israel were Egyptian and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) forces. This armed conflict also ended in a cease-fire, but tensions in the Sinai region and canal zone remained high. Nasser died of heart failure in September 1970. His passing sent shock waves around the world and especially throughout the Arab region, where he remained a hero until the end. Who would be heir to his legacy? What would be the future relationship between Egypt and Israel? These were the questions on the minds of so many. Nasser’s administration had steadfastly refused to accept Israel’s right to exist as a nation-state in the Middle East. It had been a warlike administration dedicated to socialist principles and, above all, Arab unity. The man who eventually filled Nasser’s shoes was someone with whom he shared much in common and a lifelong friendship. However, this man had a different vision for Egypt’s future. A Most Costly Peace: Anwar Sadat, Israel, and Murder (1970 1981) Upon his death, Nasser’s confidant and friend, Anwar Sadat, became Egypt’s president. Like Nasser, Sadat came from humble beginnings.

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As a member of the Free Officers’ Group, he was instrumental in the revolution that ousted the monarchy and was committed to leading Egypt down a path of independence and modernization. However, he did not necessarily think that socialism would move the country in the most positive, prosperous direction and began dismantling some aspects of the system that Nasser had put into place. The Sadat administration severed economic and military ties with the Soviet Union, restructured Egypt’s economy—helping to develop the private sector and attract much foreign investment—lifted press censorship, offered amnesty to political prisoners, and restrained the power of the police.17 It was under Sadat that the Egyptian middle-class and private ownership grew substantially. He is credited with boosting Egypt’s social image and helping to generate an immense amount of wealth in the country via his ‘‘open door’’ economic reform policies. Tourism expanded, luxury hotels were built, real estate developed, and foreigners with business interests in the country were ever-present. Although Nasser and his administration had been seen as simple, Soviet-leaning, and favoring the collective good of Arabs, the Sadat administration was perceived as extravagant, Western-influenced, and concerned with the welfare of Egypt and Egyptians before all else. This last point is reflected in the fact that one of the first actions taken by Sadat when he came to office was the official renaming of the country from the United Arab Republic to the Arab Republic of Egypt in 1971.18 His decision to move Egypt away from its Arab neighbors and closer to the United States ideologically, which was in direct opposition to the actions of Nasser, put Sadat in conflict with some Arab leaders. Tensions between Sadat and President Muammar Gaddafi of Libya resulted in fighting on the border between those two nations in 1977.19 Although domestically his primary focus was economic liberalization and socioeconomic change, Sadat’s foreign policy was at least partially preoccupied with restoring Egypt’s national pride, which had been lost in the wars with Israel under Nasser. Sadat had not forgotten the blows dealt to his country and plotted with Syria on ways to even the score. No one suspected the surprise attack Syria and Egypt launched on Israel on October 6, 1973. In what became alternately known as the Ramadan or Yom Kippur War, Egyptian and Syrian forces crossed the cease-fire line that had been in place in the Sinai since the Six Days’ War of 1967.20 Although the Ramadan War ended in a UN cease-fire, the Arab forces experienced success early on and were able to feel a certain level of psychological vindication. Sadat was heralded as a hero who had restored a level of respect for the Arabs and resituated Egypt in a position from which it could either reject altogether or normalize relations with Israel; either way, it could now be done with dignity,

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which was of utmost importance to Sadat and the Egyptian people. In the end, with the encouragement of the United States and President Jimmy Carter, Sadat chose to normalize relations with Israel, setting a precedent for his country and angering scores of people throughout the Arab world. Within a two-year period, relations between Egypt and Israel had completely changed in a manner that took many by surprise. After addressing the Israeli parliament in November 1977, Sadat attended a series of meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the most famous being held at Camp David and resulting in the two signing an Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in March 1979.21 This treaty called for each country to acknowledge the other with an official diplomatic presence, trade agreements, and flights between the two countries. Most importantly to Egypt, Israel agreed to withdraw from the Sinai and did so in April 1982. To say that Sadat fell out of favor among many Arabs and Arab leaders is an understatement. He was heavily criticized for ‘‘selling out’’ the Arab cause by acquiescing to Western desires for Arab nations to negotiate with Israel and for Westernizing Egypt to a degree that was unacceptable. Sadat was also criticized for not demanding a strong commitment to Palestinian self-determination. Sadat’s decision to realign Egypt with the West and to accept Israel evoked much external and internal disapproval. Egypt was suspended from the Arab League and the organization’s headquarters was moved to Cairo to Tunis.22 There were riots and demonstrations throughout the country, to which Sadat responded by instituting regulations that cracked down on opposition and political associations. On October 6, 1981, while attending a celebration commemorating the Ramadan War, Muslim extremists from the Muslim Brotherhood23 assassinated Sadat. Many concluded that his decision when he entered office to allow this group a voice within the political process—something Nasser vehemently opposed and suppressed—led to his very undoing. A Third Way: Hosni Mubarak and Egypt’s Future (1981 Present) Hosni Mubarak served as vice president under Sadat and assumed the office of president upon his murder. For the past 27 years, the aging former pilot and commander of the Egyptian air force has ruled Egypt with a style that lies somewhere between the two men he succeeded in office. Like Nasser, Mubarak believes that Egypt has a pivotal role to play within Arab/regional affairs. He saw to it that the country’s membership in the Arab League was reinstated in 1989 and that the organization’s headquarters was relocated to Cairo. Mubarak is also firm on the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic fundamentalists, and other opposition,

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indefinitely extending the Emergency Law that went into effect the day Sadat was assassinated in 1981. This law gives the police the right to arrest and detain anyone at anytime for any reason, which human rights advocates decry as an infringement of civil rights. However, Mubarak counters this criticism with the reasoning that such a law helps Egypt prevent terrorists from gaining a foothold. Like Nasser’s, the Mubarak administration is accused of censoring the press. Opponents assert that the purpose of the censorship is to keep accusations of corruption, vote rigging, police brutality, and cronyism from being published and broadcasted.24 Despite having high unemployment, poverty, overpopulation, and other social issues with which to grapple, Egypt has made some positive strides under Mubarak, and he is recognized for having set the political and economic stage for these improvements. Mubarak continued the Sadat ‘‘open door’’ economic policies that encouraged private and foreign investment. According to a report issued by the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, the country realized its highest gross domestic product (GDP) growth in 40 years for the fiscal year ending June 2006.25 Egypt has also maintained cordial relations with Israel and continues to openly criticize Israeli policies on the Palestinian issue while avoiding military confrontations and conflicts with the nation. Although Nasser and Sadat spent much of their time in office embroiled in clashes with Israel, Mubarak has had to use military force against an Arab regional neighbor: Iraq. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, Egypt condemned these actions and led an Arab-allied coalition against Iraq. In the end, Kuwait was liberated by a 34-country coalition in what became known as the Persian Gulf War.26 Not only did Egypt benefit from having taken a leadership role against an unjust war, the country had billions of dollars worth of its debt either canceled or rescheduled, ultimately benefiting the national economy.27 Building on policies undertaken by Sadat, Mubarak has continued to cultivate Egypt’s relationships with Western countries. In this respect, it can be said that he has proceeded with the Westernizing of Egypt, putting his administration at odds with Islamic fundamentalists and others who feel the country should take a more religious/Arab-focused path. Egypt is cited as America’s strongest Arab ally, and there are many military, economic, and trade agreements between the two nations. The September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City pushed to the fore the issue of terrorism on the American political agenda. These events also created an even closer cooperative alliance between the United States and Egypt. What lies ahead for Egypt is difficult to predict. The country’s future is uncertain for three key reasons. First, there is much internal

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restlessness among the young—those most affected by the 9.1 percent unemployment rate.28 It is estimated that, of Egypt’s more than 81 million people, ‘‘58 percent of the total population is under the age of 25, while 41 percent of the population is between the ages of 15 to 39.’’29 Unable to find work, these young people also cannot marry because they lack the financial means to support their own household. In Arab societies, marriage is the first step to independence, sexual activity, and societal respect.30 Those who do not get married experience isolation to varying degrees because so much of daily life revolves around the family. Many experts ascribe the rise in religiosity in Egyptian society partly to the disillusionment of the young. After being faced with much disappointment, the line of thinking goes, these young people seek solace in Islam, alienating themselves from all Western influences and becoming radicalized in their religious thinking. These conditions leave many young people vulnerable to being recruited to carry out acts of terrorism. The young are also quick to accuse the government, not religion, of holding them back from reaching their full potential.31 Disgruntled youth and the rise in religiosity bring us to the second reason Egypt’s future is uncertain: growing opposition to the Westernoriented regime. Arguably, growth in opposition is the by-product of a collision between dissatisfaction and sheer numbers, which can be provided by one or many segments across a society. A recent Pew Research Center Public Global Attitudes poll revealed that, although 69 percent of the Egyptians surveyed believe that President Mubarak has a positive effect on the country, only 13 percent feel that the national government is having a good influence on the way things are going.32 A full 75 percent of the respondents reported that they are dissatisfied with the quality of life in general in their country. These findings illustrate the degree to which Egyptians are unhappy with the status quo. Just what shape their unhappiness will take on over time is unclear. It may manifest itself in riots, as it did in April 2008 when thousands flooded the streets in protest over rising food prices and stagnant wages.33 It could become more sinister and translate into an increase in crimes, such as domestic terrorism and kidnappings for ransom, as was the case in September 2008, when 11 foreign tourists and eight Egyptians were abducted from the Western desert in southern Egypt.34 Still possible and not unthinkable, it could produce revolutionary leaders like Nasser and Sadat who would attempt to overthrow the current system by staging a coup d’etat. To date, there have been six reported unsuccessful attempts against President Mubarak’s life. Each time, Islamists have been accused as culprits.35 Lastly, although he enjoys a high approval rating, Mubarak has not named a successor. Rumors of his ailing health, coupled with the fact

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that he is advancing in age, makes his refusal to name who will follow him an uncomfortable reality for most Egyptians. So much in national and global politics is influenced by the personalities of political leaders. This has been true throughout Egypt’s political past and will probably hold true into the future. The course the country takes after Mubarak will, therefore, likely be shaped much by the leader at the helm. Despite the uncertainties they face and discomfort they voice about the current state of affairs, a great many Egyptians believe that their children will have better lives than they did and that Egypt has a hopeful future.36

EGYPTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND PEACE The Egyptian Sample Seventy Egyptians shared their views on peace, war, and other forms of governmental aggression by voluntarily completing paper versions of the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS).37 Participants were presented with 18 statements and asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with each statement on a scale from 1 to 7—1 being total disagreement and 7 being total agreement. They were also asked to define a number of key terms, including war, peace, and reconciliation. The individual responses were a testament to the fact that, while each is a unique individual, Egyptians collectively hold views that can be attributed to their country’s political, social, and economic history as well as to its geopolitical location in the world. Moreover, religion deeply informs ideas about how life should be lived and conflicts settled. The Egyptian sample ranged in age from 18 to 42 years old, with most participants falling in the range of 21 to 32 years old. Fifty-nine percent of the participants were men and 41 percent were women. Although 10 percent of the Egyptian population is Christian, only 1 percent of our survey participants were, and the rest (99 percent) were Muslim. There was an even split between married (50 percent) and single (50 percent) participants. Seventy percent reported being unemployed while 29 percent said they were employed in occupations as varied as farmer, lawyer, electrician, and importer. The vast majority (61 percent) self-identified as being middle class, 31 percent as lower class, 6 percent as upper class, and 1 percent as working class. In regard to levels of education attained, 53 percent reported having finished high school, 19 percent were currently students studying such subjects as law, art, and business, 13 percent had completed secondary school,

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10 percent had earned a bachelor’s degree, and 2 percent had either only completed primary school or never received a formal education. When asked to self-describe in terms of ethnicity or race, 51 percent said they were Egyptian, 26 percent said Arab, 19 percent said EgyptianArab, 3 percent said Egyptian-Sudanese, and 1 percent said ArabEgyptian. It is interesting that those who self-described as exclusively Egyptian claimed it was a nationality and a unique ethnicity at once, different from the other groups found throughout the Arab world such as Nubians, Bedouins, Berbers, Tuaregs, and the various different Arab groups. Those who self-described as Egyptian-Sudanese had Sudanese mothers and Egyptians fathers, but viewed themselves as Egyptian over Sudanese. Nonetheless, they wanted to acknowledge their connection to their maternal heritage. Egyptian Definitions of War For 52 percent of our survey participants, defining war involved either making moral judgments or identifying war with destruction and other outcomes. An example of a definition that incorporates a moral judgment is ‘‘War is a horrible environment that no one can stand. After awhile you cannot find real humans in war situations because their hearts become like rocks. They have no sense of right or wrong. People only know how to kill.’’ Another participant defined war as ‘‘the lowest level humans can fall to.’’ Egypt’s many wars over the past few decades and feelings about these wars seemed to factor rather directly into the definition of one respondent, who stated: ‘‘[War] is a really bad thing. It is good that we do not have one now. . . .’’ Twenty-six percent of participants focused their definitions on war’s gravity and destructive outcomes, particularly the loss of life. War is ‘‘when civilizations are killed,’’ according to one participant, and ‘‘it’s the ending of our lives . . . our fathers and brothers are killed,’’ stated another. One participant linked war with forced migration—the involuntary movement of large numbers of people from their homeland due to war, natural disasters, and environmental catastrophes. For this participant, war means ‘‘destroying everything, people dying and people immigrating to other countries, losing family . . . everything.’’ Thus, not only is death part of war; the collapse of social life and our attachment to our physical surroundings are also ruined in the process. This participant’s definition is, perhaps, influenced by the contemporary social reality found in Egypt. No one knows for sure just how many refugees are in the country, but estimates put the Iraqi population at somewhere between 60,000 and 80,000, Palestinians at 70,000 plus, and Sudanese at more than 12,000.38 Egypt’s role as host to these and many more

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refugees has influenced the way in which the Egyptian people perceive war and its ramifications. Just over one-fifth of our participants (22 percent) supplied responses that were unique and not shared with other respondents. ‘‘War is the devil’s work and prevents you from living out your purpose in life’’ and ‘‘you cannot describe war’’ are two such definitions. The former statement seems to connote that the respondent is relying on a religious belief system to articulate the meaning of war, though this is not explicit. Fifteen percent of the survey participants defined war as an alternative to something (e.g., war is ‘‘the opposite of peace) or as the lack of something (e.g., war is ‘‘the absence of peace’’ or ‘‘the absence of humanity’’). Definitions that referred to war as a conflict between groups or that referred to individuals’ emotions during or because of war were nearly equal, collectively representing the thoughts of 12 percent of the participants. Referring to war as ‘‘when another country fights your country or government’’ clearly focuses on conflict while statements like war is ‘‘the worst thing you can see in your life’’ and war is ‘‘when humans hate each other’’ emphasize the role of emotions. Only one participant defined war as being a form of defense or protection. That participant also highlighted the destruction of war in his definition: ‘‘War is when I go to the army and I have to fight against another country and lots of people die.’’ Nearly 6 in 10 Egyptians depend on their set of personal values and point to the effects of war when asked to define what war means to them. No participants referred to causes of war in their definitions. That is, none of the Egyptian participants referred to a government’s motivation for going to war; rather, it was the behaviors and the aftermath of war that appear to influence Egyptian perceptions the most. Egyptian Definitions of Peace When asked to define peace, some participants described it as a process; for example, ‘‘the result of communication and being good neighbors.’’ However, 58 percent of the Egyptian participants defined peace with statements referring to peace as a positive end state rather than a process. These respondents cited the acts, thoughts, feelings, and states of being of individuals when describing peace. In the words of two participants, peace ‘‘is the original state in life,’’ and it ‘‘is what human beings are supposed to live for, the purpose of life.’’ The implicit logic behind these definitions is that individuals are meant to be peaceful, and war and conflict are not necessarily inherent in life. This belief is in direct opposition with the one that ancient Egyptians held: war is a natural

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part of life. Other participants who expressed the view that peace is a positive end state said peace is ‘‘the population’s right to live a quiet life in their country’’; ‘‘when we have humanity’’; ‘‘the quiet present and the future’’; and ‘‘work, education, good economy and a quiet life.’’ A statement made by one participant summed up the rationale behind all the comments made by Egyptians who see peace as a positive end state: ‘‘Peace has many definitions but the definition I believe is most accurate is this: peace exists when I can live a quiet life and have fun without worrying about my or my family’s safety.’’ Overall, 72 percent of participants provided positive definitions of peace—the desirable process, or end state or context that it involves. By contrast, 26 percent of the participants defined peace negatively, and as a negative end state rather than a process; for example, they said that peace is ‘‘against war’’ and involves ‘‘living a quiet life without any fighting or wars.’’ One young respondent referred to his father, an older man who lived through some of Egypt’s most tumultuous times, saying: ‘‘As my father says, ‘You don’t know peace until you know war.’’’ There were also respondents whose comments betrayed a sense of pessimism. One participant explained peace as ‘‘difficult currently in this life and hard to come by.’’ The illusive quality of peace hinted at in this definition was matched by the definition provided by another participant who stated, ‘‘All the countries of the world are looking for peace.’’ Definitions of Reconciliation Comparing the perceptions of reconciliation and peace as provided in statements from the Egyptian participants reveals an interesting divergence. As already noted, the majority of the Egyptian participants portrayed peace as a positive end state rather than a process; however, when defining reconciliation, the majority of participants described it as a process rather than an end state. In fact, 73 percent of the participants defined reconciliation as a dynamic process rather than an end state or goal. One theme that emerged was reconciliation as a healing process that is often more internal and passive than external and active. Definitions in this category identified reconciliation with making up, restoring good feelings and eliminating bad ones, and redefining relationships by reuniting. Some respondents expressed themselves by giving personal or familial examples. Reconciliation is ‘‘what you do to fix a bad old relationship,’’ and it is ‘‘to be brothers and begin again,’’ in the opinion of two young male respondents. The family is supremely important within Egyptian culture, and one is expected to strive to resolve issues

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amicably with relatives as opposed to cutting relations, as one may choose to do with a nonrelative. The cultural importance placed on familial bonds is most evident in the latter statement. Other respondents conceptualized reconciliation as involving state relations rather than interpersonal ones. For example, one woman said reconciliation is ‘‘something that can happen between countries when they become friends again after a bad experience.’’ Yet another participant specifically referenced Israeli-Palestinian relations: ‘‘It is a good thing that happens after a war ends. It should happen between Israel and Palestine one day.’’ Nearly one in every five participants (20 percent) referenced the act of granting forgiveness and apologizing or referred to two parties engaging in active and external means to achieve reconciliation. Many of these participants put forth examples of interstate relations. ‘‘The best way for one country to say sorry to another country is to have a reconciliation,’’ replied one participant. Reconciliation, according to a female respondent, is ‘‘something good between countries; it is the way that countries say sorry to each other.’’ A participant who may have been thinking about historical examples of reconciliation, perhaps even the Camp David agreements, said, ‘‘Reconciliation is the second step taken by two countries that had a problem and a third country mediated.’’ Referring specifically to a contemporary incident, one male participant stressed the need for Denmark—a state—to issue an apology to a group—Muslims—to achieve reconciliation. According to this respondent, ‘‘Reconciliation is needed when one party does something wrong against another. In my opinion, Denmark needs to apologize to Muslims for allowing these degrading cartoons to be published. If Denmark apologizes to Muslims around the world, there can be reconciliation and everyone can move past the bad incident that occurred.’’ The incident mentioned by this respondent occurred in fall 2005 and set off a series of negative events that turned deadly in some places. Specifically, in September 2005, the Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, published 12 editorial cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad and what looked to be caricatures of different aspects of Islamic life. The cartoons were subsequently reprinted in dozens of newspapers around the globe. The response from Muslims worldwide was fast and furious. There were protests in the streets of countries throughout the Muslim world. Danish embassies were torched and vandalized in Iran, Syria, and Lebanon, and there were believed to be ‘‘over one hundred deaths worldwide’’ in connection.39 When Kurt Westergaard, the cartoonist who penned the illustrations that sparked the conflict, was nearly killed by three radical Islamic assassins in February 2008, a host of Danish daily newspapers reprinted the cartoons. They claimed their actions

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were done in a show of solidarity for Westergaard’s freedom of speech and to send a message to Islamists that they would not be intimidated or forced into silence. Oslo-based journalist Bruce Bower cautioned that ‘‘it is important to understand just what’s going on here because it’s not just about yellowing cartoons—it’s about Western freedoms.’’40 Many agree with Bower, believing that Denmark and other European societies have reached a point where they must either agree to appease their Muslim populations by never criticizing Islam and any of their practices or they must continue to write whatever they like—for and against any subject—as long as they maintain journalistic integrity. The question then becomes who defines journalistic integrity, and whose cultural norms are the barometer of what is acceptable and what is not. Al-Qaeda took credit for a bomb that killed eight people outside the Danish embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, in June 2008. The bomb was in response to the February cartoon reprints. This issue has not been resolved, and it is highly doubtful that Denmark will issue an apology to Muslims worldwide anytime soon, as the respondent recommended. Close to 10 percent of all the Egyptian survey participants defined reconciliation as an end state. ‘‘Reconciliation is exactly what the name says: it is to say sorry,’’ proclaimed one participant. Reconciliation ‘‘always comes after a misunderstanding,’’ said another man. For others, reconciliation always signals an ultimate end to conflict and a return to peace; as one Egyptian woman said, ‘‘After you break the law you do this [reconcile] because you want to have peace and a relationship again.’’ One young man deemed reconciliation to be vital to all life and articulated his feelings in passionate words: ‘‘Reconciliation links our past, present, and future. It is one of many ways that makes the world very small and lovely. It keeps us connected as a world community. Reconciliation is good for politics, the economy, and development.’’ Torture Is Unacceptable! The Egyptian participants were close to unanimous in describing torture as an unacceptable practice, although one man commented, ‘‘Torture is very bad and I feel bad when they do it but some governments say it is necessary to do it in some cases; torture is universal . . . it happens around the world.’’ By contrast, 51 percent of the definitions indicated strong emotional or philosophical responses to torture and judgments concerning the incompatibility of torture with morality, justice, and humanity. Some of the responses in this group linked torture with political institutions, exposing the participants’ lack of trust in such entities. These participants noted, for example, that: ‘‘Torture happens in prisons, police stations, and after wars; it is something bad that

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must not happen’’; ‘‘it [torture] is a form of intimidation that governments and powerful people use against weak people’’; and ‘‘Police and governments that do this do not respect human rights.’’ Other participants within this group were critical of the public for not doing more to resist the use of torture. One woman noted that torture is ‘‘a crime that happens under our eyes and we do not say anything about it,’’ and a man commented, ‘‘No one has the right to torture someone, even countries do not have the right to torture because it is against the law and against religion; we must think of other ways to deal with people.’’ Two other participants asserted that people must find ways to prevent ‘‘acts against humanity and peace’’ and ‘‘stop torture everywhere.’’ Another 27 percent of the survey responses concentrated on the intended result of torture. These responses fell into three different intent categories: destructive, constructive, and neutral. Intent was labeled destructive if the identified purpose of the torture is to cause pain, suffering, or harm. One respondent’s definition encapsulates the notion of destructive intent: ‘‘Torture is when people feel pain in their body because the police believe they have done something wrong; some people lose their body parts, like their eyes, because powerful people abuse them.’’ This respondent linked power and authority with the ability to inflict hurt on less powerful human beings to punish them. Intent is characterized as ‘‘constructive’’ if the purpose of the torture is to gain something that, from the perspective of the torturer, would be seen as desirable. It is interesting that most definitions that fell into this category implicated governments as having ‘‘constructive’’ intent when they sanction torture; for example, ‘‘Sometimes governments do this to get information or to protect someone or something like that.’’ Other participants defined torture as ‘‘when governments force people to say or do something’’ and ‘‘what governments do against people to get what they want.’’ Few respondents (less than 4 percent) focused on the conditions that give rise to torture, and even fewer (2 percent) focused on the outcome of torture. One poignant reply spoke volumes about how some Egyptians may be affected by their country’s geopolitical position and current political events. When asked to define torture, the participant replied, ‘‘Actually, you don’t need to ask me this. Just look at Israel and Palestine and you will know what war, torture and terrorism mean.’’ It is not clear whether this respondent is accusing both sides of instigating or carrying out war, torture, and terrorism, or just one. However, the fact that the Israeli/Palestinian issue factored into an Egyptian’s definition of these three terms is indicative of the enormity and enduring quality of a still unresolved issue that invokes strong feelings about religion, nationality, and legitimate claims to territory.

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THE GLOBAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF TERRORISM Terrorism is controlled by the devil and the devil is very clever. If we do not find a way to stop it, it will destroy everything we have built in life. (male) We consider terrorism to be a political system that exists in every country on earth; just like we have democracy, we have terrorism existing and functioning like its own system. (male) Of all the responses elicited from the Egyptian survey participants, probably the most unique and emotion-laden ones were in reply to a simple statement: Define terrorism. Just as with torture, most Egyptians provided definitions expressing judgments concerning morality, justice, and humanity, and revealed strong emotional or philosophical responses to terrorism. Twenty-two of the responses (31 percent) identified terrorism as acts against governments, or acts that represent a global threat. For one male respondent, terrorism is universal and timeless: ‘‘Terrorism is in every place on earth during every period in time; it is always because people are angry with the government.’’ This definition highlights the belief that anger toward a government, or governments, serves as the motivation behind an individual or group’s decision to commit a terrorist act. Many other respondents echoed this belief. In one woman’s words, ‘‘Organizations do acts [of terror] to push their government or the governments of other countries to do something for them, or to prove something.’’ One man emphasized that ‘‘Terrorism is always against the system and the government, not the people of a country, though the people are always the victims.’’ Given that 99 percent of the Egyptian respondents were Muslim and that Islam is perceived to be closely identified with global terrorism in the media and by many people around the world, it is probably not surprising that 21 percent of the survey responses expressed views on the link between terrorism and religion. Three respondents commented succinctly that ‘‘Terrorism is always related to religion’’; ‘‘It is always done in the name of religion’’; and ‘‘People do it because they want people to follow their religion.’’ Nevertheless, the majority of responses making reference to religion explicitly reject the view that any one religion can be blamed for terrorism and suggest that people who carry out terrorist acts in the name of a religion are misguided. A sampling of these statements follows: ‘‘Terrorism comes from people who misinterpret religion; it comes from Christians, not just Muslims’’; ‘‘This is what some people do when they hate the government; sometimes they do it in the name of religion but not all terrorism is done this way. The people who use religion for terrorist purposes do not understand the religion

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correctly’’; ‘‘[Terrorists are] stupid people who sometimes wear Islam like a cover. But, actually, terrorists are in every country and within every religion, not just Islam.’’ Some respondents seemed to lament the fact that the image of their religion has been tarnished by the acts of a few. One 30-year-old woman had a suggestion for those who want to understand the true meaning of Islam: ‘‘[Terrorism happens] when stupid Muslims hide behind religion to do bad things and make this beautiful religion look bad. Islam is good. You can ask the people who have converted to Islam.’’ Presumably, if Islam were a bad religion, then people who were not born into it and had free will would not choose to become a Muslim. It has been projected that by the end of 2008 13 million tourists would have visited Egypt, generating US $11.6 billion in revenue for the year.41 Tourism is the backbone of the Egyptian economy and every Egyptian knows this fact. Beginning in 1996, terrorist attacks in the country led to the loss of Egyptian and foreign lives as well as temporary decreases in the number of tourists visiting the country, thereby contributing directly to the livelihood of millions of Egyptian people. These attacks occurred throughout the country in places where terrorists knew tourists were likely to gather and casualties would be high. For example, in April 1996, 19 Greek tourists and their Egyptian tour guide were gunned down in front of a Cairo hotel when terrorists opened fire on them.42 The following year, the Egyptian tourism industry suffered two more devastating blows. In September 1997, 10 people—9 German tourists and their Egyptian driver—lost their lives when terrorists opened fire and threw gasoline bombs at a tourist bus just outside the Egyptian Museum.43 This was a daring deed since the museum is located in Tahrir Square, the Egyptian equivalent of Times Square in New York City or London’s Trafalgar Square. Less than two months later, terrorists committed an act that Egyptians thought unfathomable and that scared away tourists more than any other attack thus far. On November 17, 1997, terrorists who were dressed up as fellow tourists and police, massacred 70 tourists standing outside the Temple of Hatshepsut, located in the city of Luxor in southern Egypt.44 Reportedly, most of those people killed were Japanese and Swiss tourists. Egyptian police killed six gunmen in a two-hour gun battle that followed, but the damage had already been done; Egypt’s tourism industry collapsed and did not begin to fully recover until 2000. October 2004 bombings in Ras Shitan and Taba, two towns located in the Sinai Peninsula, claimed the lives of 30 tourists. Four people were killed when bombs blasted through a busy Cairo market in April 2005, and more than 80 tourists and local residents were killed by bombs that went off in the Sinai town of Sharm

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el-Sheikh just three months later.45 The Sinai Peninsula was the site of yet another deadly terrorist attack on April 24, 2006, when three bombings occurred in the town of Dahab, killing 30 people.46 Local and international media coverage of all of these terrorist attacks was extensive, making the average Egyptian well aware of what was happening. However, most Egyptians experienced the aftermath of diminished tourism directly in their wallets and pocketbooks. No doubt, owing to this, 10 percent of our Egyptian survey participants linked terrorism with the economy in their definitions. ‘‘Terrorism is against the economy,’’ ‘‘Terrorism is against the economy and civilians,’’ and ‘‘Terrorism is the worst thing that can happen to a country’s economy; it makes a country get poor quickly’’ were a few of the statements provided. One participant thought in global terms: ‘‘Terrorism is a disease that threatens the global economic system and we need an antibiotic for it.’’ For most respondents, though, the local implications of the damage that terrorism can havoc were too consuming to move beyond. Their definitions spoke about their own country, specifically, ‘‘Terrorism is dangerous for the Egyptian economy,’’ according to one woman and it has the capability to ‘‘destroy the country and the economy,’’ as stated by another. One man focused his definition on both the goals of terrorism and its effect on ordinary people: ‘‘Terrorism is a way of intimidating a society and keeping if from reaching its goals. Here in Egypt, we rely on tourists to bring money to the economy. Terrorism keeps tourists away and keeps the government from making money; then we all suffer.’’ Finally, 10 percent of the responses cited a specific example of terrorism outside of Egypt. One woman proclaimed, ‘‘Look at Israel and what it does to Palestinians,’’ and a man said, ‘‘Terrorism is what happened in the U.S. on September 11, 2001, and what happened in Sharm el-Sheikh in 2005.’’ In reference to the U.S. response to the September 11 attacks, one woman commented, ‘‘Terrorism is a disease in countries. Every country must do what they can to stop it. We have to have an international convention to address terrorism. I like what the U.S. did when they fought against bin Laden in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq.’’ If any one statement could serve to warn against stereotyping any region, group of people, or individual as blind supporters of terrorism simply based on religious affiliation, it could be this one made by an Egyptian Muslim woman: ‘‘Terrorism is the most difficult war [to fight] inside any country.’’ This woman, and the overwhelming majority of the Egyptian survey participants, put faith aside and vehemently criticized indiscriminate killing for any cause. Their outrage at the very thought of terrorism emanates throughout their strong, very powerful antiterrorism declarations.

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Nigeria Adeniyi Famose and Samantha Hoyt

War is . . . ‘‘to fight with arms and ammunition’’; ‘‘an act of violence against an enemy.’’ Terrorism is . . . ‘‘an act of violence to provoke a state for religious and political reasons.’’ Torture is . . . ‘‘to inflict punishment or pain to get information.’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘the absence of tension and conflict.’’ Reconciliation is . . . ‘‘reestablishing a cordial relationship.’’ As the most populous country in Africa, with over 146 million citizens, Nigeria occupies an area about twice the size of California in West Africa. It has an 853-km coastline on the Gulf of Guinea, but otherwise this former British colony is surrounded by former French colonies: Niger to the north, Cameroon to the south, Benin to the west, and Chad to the east. Although English is the official language, over 400 different languages are spoken within this relatively small country. Furthermore, the country is home to over 250 different ethnic groups, including the Hausa and Fulani, the Yoruba, the Igbo, and less populous ethnicities such as the Ijaw, Kanuri, Ibibio, and Tiv. Within these many groups, approximately 50 percent of the people practice Islam, 40 percent practice Christianity, and only 10 percent practice indigenous religions. However, as in many African countries, the major world religions have also been adapted to many indigenous beliefs. Nigeria underwent its first peaceful democratic transfer of power in 2007, but the country’s history is long and complicated. PRECOLONIAL HISTORY Archaeologists have found artifacts indicating that societies existed in parts of Nigeria as far back as the Early Stone Age (12,000 BCE).1 A

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greater array of archaeological evidence suggests more widespread societies by the Iron Age (500 BCE) and indigenous societies in all corners of the country by the Metal Age (200 CE). Prior to European settlement, the land of present-day Nigeria was divided into many states, each having its own government. Among the most prominent were the Kano, Katsina, Borno, and Zaria kingdoms in the north, Oyo, Ife, and Ijebu kingdoms in the west, and Benin, Ibibio, and Nri (Igbo) kingdoms in the east. There were two kinds of states in precolonial Nigeria: centralized and noncentralized.2 The centralized states relied on a strong military to control their territories. These states were ruled by kings who lived in the major city of the state. The king exercised direct control over the capital city and indirect control over the provinces outside the city, which were ruled by chiefs who were loyal to the king. The common people generally worked in small-scale agriculture. To create a public treasury, the kings and chiefs collected taxes, which typically made them rich. By contrast, noncentralized states were generally small in size, and power was shared by elders, youth groups, and interest groups from within the state. The noncentralized states were generally more democratic than the centralized ones. Despite differing politics, the two forms of states shared many economic similarities. People relied on agriculture, trade, mining, and manufacturing for their livelihoods. Large families were desirable as they provided labor for each sector. Workers were not paid, but their survival needs were met by the head of the family, who provided food and shelter on his compound. Peoples’ lives were interdependent both within and beyond their community through trade. Most interstate relations developed through trade networks, and because of the great interdependence between states, most relations were peaceful. In fact, intermarriage was encouraged to strengthen bonds between groups. In the 1400s, the northern states of Nigeria developed trade relationships with North Africa. With the exchange of goods came the exchange of ideas, notably the religion of Islam.3 The southern Nigerian states, by contrast, developed relationships with European voyagers. The Portuguese came first, exchanging cheap European goods for Nigerian pepper, cloths, beads, and ivory. By the 16th century, the Portuguese were replaced as major traders by the English, French, and Dutch. The slave trade, though initiated by the Portuguese, flourished under the English, who were sending slaves to the New World. The indigenous groups living on the coast became middlemen in the slave trade, going deeper into the country to capture Africans to exchange for European goods.

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COLONIALISM During the 19th century, Europeans moved inland from Nigeria’s coastal regions. Their goals included exploring, trading, spreading Christianity, and gaining territory for their own nations, all of which led to colonization. In 1849, John Beecroft was appointed as British consul for the West African Coast, with the responsibility of regulating ‘‘legal trade.’’ Slowly, the British took control, and by 1905 ‘‘virtually the entire country was under British rule.’’4 Many of the Nigerian states fought British control without success. Between 1900 and 1914, the British were primarily occupied with suppressing resistance. They did this by using the army and police to ‘‘destroy opposition forces.’’5 By World War I, the British had erected a dual government system in Nigeria, not entirely dissimilar to the centralized states in Nigerian pre-colonial history. This system involved a central authority with the responsibility of managing the country through indirect (noncentralized) rule at the local level and requiring chiefs to pay patronage to the British through taxing the people. One of the most significant flaws in the system of indirect rule was the increase in power of tribal chiefs. This increase in local power bases ‘‘promot[ed] the abuse of power and tyranny.’’6 It had lasting effects in Nigeria and is still a problem today. Colonization brought many changes.7 Farmers were required to produce more cash crops for trade abroad than food for the local market. Infrastructure was built, especially railroads to move raw materials from inland to the ports. Nigeria also was exposed to Western medicine and education. There was a massive move toward urbanization, because the cities were where services were provided and jobs were to be had.

INDEPENDENCE The movement for independence started with a succession from Christianity, ‘‘an expression of protest against domination.’’8 Nationalism became the unifying force behind the move for independence. Nigerians were angry about racism and modifications to their traditional values during colonial rule. A large part of the struggle for independence was economic: Nigerians believed the prices of raw materials would increase if they were in control of trading instead of the British. In addition, the urbanization that accompanied British rule allowed Nigerians to organize for independence. Trade unions played a large role in this movement. For example, in the early 1940s these trade unions worked

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with student groups to publish a memorandum to the government insisting on the transfer of power to Nigerians. In 1941, the student union called for the ‘‘creation of ‘a united Nigeria with a Federal Constitution.’’’9 In 1945, the unions staged a 52-day strike to protest the government. Later, the student union called for 10 years of a representative government followed by five years of government run by Nigerians. Independence in Nigeria came gradually and peacefully. In 1945, the British government launched a series of constitutional changes leading to self-rule 15 years later. A series of constitutions were drafted in the 1940s and 1950s. Then, on October 1, 1960, Nigeria declared independence. It became a republic in 1963.

POSTINDEPENDENCE The constitution of 1963 followed the British Parliamentary model with an executive, legislature, and judiciary.10 It called for one popular election to elect members of the legislature, which had the responsibility of electing an executive branch, consisting of the president, the prime minister, and a cabinet of ministers. The president was head of all three branches of government. He had the power to call Parliament and to dissolve it. He was also the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The president was to be elected to a five-year term unless he died, resigned, or was removed on the basis of some constitutional provision. The president also had the power to appoint judges to the Supreme Court and remove them at his will. The first election was held in 1959 under British rule; the Nigerian People’s Congress (NPC), which was largely conservative, Muslim, and concentrated in the North, won a plurality of the seats. The British Governor-General, Sir James Robertson, asked Tafawa Balewa to form a government.11 The NPC joined with the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), whose constituents were largely Igbo and Christian and concentrated in the eastern regions, to form the ruling party. This collaboration left the Action Group (AG), a left-leaning party concentrated largely in western Nigeria, as the opposition party. Before long, the NPC had accumulated great power. In 1963, the NCNC and AG called for a census to determine what kind of power dynamic was needed to reflect the characteristics and goals of the population; the results of the census were consistent with NPC rule. In 1964, the second national election was held in Nigeria. The results were disputed by two alliances: the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA).12 The elections brought political violence and a system of bribes and threats on election

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officials. There was corruption to the point that the NNDP candidates were the only candidates on the ballot in areas where the NNDP was extremely unpopular. Unfortunately the Federal Electoral Commission ‘‘ignored most of the irregularities.’’13 Violence followed in 1965 as a protest against both the election results and the ruling party’s actions to reduce the price of cocoa. The government ignored the fighting, focusing instead on the Commonwealth Conference it was hosting in January 1966. Immediately following the end of the conference, the military struck.14 The coup brought Major General J. T. U. Aguiyi Ironsi to leadership, but his failure to announce immediate reform policies led to a loss of public support. Ironsi made many poor decisions, but the final straw was the Unification Decree in May 1966.15 This decree called for four major changes: regions would be replaced with groups of provinces, military governors of the groups of provinces would replace the military governors of the regions, military prefects would supervise the individual provinces, and the administration of all federal and regional services would be unified. The reality of the political environment at the time did not support this decree. Protests started among student groups and spread quickly into riots across the country. In July a countercoup took place. It ended the First Republic and brought greater instability to the country.16 Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon came to power and called for a review of Nigeria’s national standing. Sadly, the review ended in civil war. On May 27, 1967, the Eastern Regional consultative assembly declared an independent state called the Republic of Biafra.17 Gowon’s response was to call a state of emergency, break the four regions into 12 separate states, and levy economic sanctions on the Eastern Region. By calling for police action, Gowon believed he could quickly end the clash. He was wrong. The civil war lasted for 30 months, largely due to international support for the Biafran cause. The issues of competing ethnicities, minority complaints, violence, and corruption that plagued postcolonial Nigeria were largely ignored until an ad hoc conference was recommended by a group of regional representatives.18 This conference was the first recognition of the deep ethnic and regional divides within the country. Compromise was attempted, and it was successful at ending the civil war, but not at preventing future conflict. During Lieutenant Colonel Gowon’s rule, the OPEC increase in the price of oil allowed Nigeria to trade its oil at a reduced cost to the buyers, but for a higher price than Nigerians had ever experienced.19 The currency strengthened and the government was stable for the first extended period since Independence. However, Gowon suspended his

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reform policy, calling for more time to transfer authority to a civilian government. The public was shocked and angered by this delay. On July 29, 1975, Lieutenant-General Murtala Mohammed came to power in a bloodless coup. His rule was short and memorable for its many reforms. He was killed in an unsuccessful coup on February 13, 1976. His second-in-command, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, took over the presidency and continued the programs of Mohammed. His was the first government to ‘‘articulate and implement a philosophy of administration based on nationalism, probity, responsibility, and discipline.’’20 It was the first government transfer of power to the people. A four-year five-stage transition to civilian rule was announced in 1975 and completed in 1979 with the start of the Second Republic. In an effort to correct the British parliamentary system used during the First Republic, Nigeria’s new civilian government adopted a presidential constitution similar to that of the United States. The Second Republic oversaw large investments in education, agriculture, health infrastructure, and shelter. However, these efforts were stymied by widespread economic and religious problems. For example, medical school graduates were not able to find jobs in Nigeria and many medical personnel left the country and were not available to staff the new hospitals.21 A large-scale riot broke out in Kano in 1980 and spread throughout the country by 1985. The tribunal established to investigate these riots found that people were responding to the worsening political and economic problems with violence. Ultimately, thousands were killed during the violence. The constitution of the Second Republic identified Nigerian foreign policy goals as ‘‘to promote African unity; to achieve the total political, economic, social, and cultural liberation of Africa; to promote all other forms of international cooperation conducive to the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect and friendship among all peoples and states; and to combat racial discrimination in all its manifestations.’’22 President Shehu Shagari agreed with the 1980 call for a new world economic order and called for African nations to stop selling their raw materials so cheaply to Western countries in exchange for their overpriced manufactured goods. Ironically, in an effort to increase investment within the country, Nigeria retained close relations with Western countries until 1983, when the government expelled all foreign citizens. By 1983, Nigerians had realized that under President Shagari’s leadership, there was no system of checks and balances, politicians were abusing power, and the police were violating human rights. Unemployment increased, and the populace was overwhelmingly disenchanted with the government.23 On New Year’s Eve 1983, the military launched

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a coup, bringing Major General Mohammed Buhari to power and ending the Second Republic. Major General Buhari’s authoritarian regime is remembered as Nigeria’s worst regime in modern history, characterized by great corruption and a failure to deal with the worsening economic situation. Buhari was ousted by a nonviolent coup in 1985 that brought General Ibrahim Babangida to power. General Babangida’s regime was characterized by structural adjustment programs (SAPs) to deal with the economic crisis, increased freedom of the press, release of political prisoners, and the promise of a transition back to civilian government. The efforts to implement SAPs, which included mandatory pay cuts for many segments of the population, were widely unpopular. Protests and violence ensued as the national debt mounted. Religious tension also continued as General Babangida registered Nigeria as a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), which unites Islamic countries on political and economic issues. This move caused great conflict with the Christian population in the country. Military disengagement proved fraudulent and unpredictable under General Babangida, and over time it became clear that he had no intentions of relinquishing power.24 For example, the government created two political parties and then banned them. Babangida did everything in his power to ensure no politician would win the elections held on June 12, 1993. Despite his efforts, Chief Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola won 58 percent of the votes in the most free and fair election in Nigerian history. General Babangida annulled the election before Chief Abiola was inaugurated. This move launched the country into crisis, and pro-democratic movements protested the annulment. Babangida used divide and rule tactics to try to stay in power but the population had had enough. On August 26, 1993, Babangida, facing a coup, vacated office after installing an Interim National Government. The Interim National Government, led by Chief Ernest Shonekan, was marked by chaos and public distrust. General Sanni Abacha overthrew the unpopular government and ‘‘abolished all the elected national and state assemblies, dismissed all the state executives, dissolved all the local government councils, and banned all political parties.’’25 His rule marked an era of despotism that did not end until his death in 1998. Then, senior military officials installed General Abdusalam Abubakar in power. His goal was to ‘‘prepare the country for a credible civilian government.’’26 Public distrust of the military led to questioning of his political intentions, but the first in the series of elections occurred on December 5, 1999. Approximately 2,000 observers were allowed into the country to observe the presidential election. The elections were relatively peaceful and brought Chief Olusegun Obasanjo back to power.

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Chief Obasanjo’s rule was characterized largely by a focus on external relations. He helped develop the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) with the presidents of South Africa and Algeria in 2001. This partnership aimed to open government and end wars in exchange for foreign aid. In July 2005, the Paris Club of rich lenders wrote off twothirds of Nigeria’s debt. This debt relief, and record oil prices, allowed the country to become the first African nation to pay off its debt to the Paris Club in April 2006.27 However, great ethnic strife continued during Chief Obasanjo’s two-term presidency. Hundreds were killed and thousands injured during eight years of ethnic conflict throughout the country, including religious conflicts like the Yelwa and Kano attacks that killed 200 people and led to a presidential declaration of a state of emergency in the central Plateau State. Other conflicts were fought over oil. The main question regarding Obasnjo’s presidency was whether it would become a dictatorship as had occurred in the previous two republics. However, in May 2006, the senate successfully denied the President’s request to run for a third term, and in April 2007, the PDP candidate Umaru Yar’Adua won the presidential election.28 This event marked the first successful democratic change in leadership during a Nigerian republic. However, religious tensions, oil conflicts, and international struggles have continued throughout the Yar’Adua regime.

SNAPSHOT OF NIGERIA TODAY Today, Nigeria is Africa’s largest oil producer. However, half of the country lives in poverty, and corruption and mismanagement in the oil industry have led to violence over stolen oil. In addition, efforts to attract international capital have failed because of Nigeria’s worsening security situation. Ethnic and religious conflicts plague the country, killing thousands in the last few years, and ‘‘separatist aspirations have been growing.’’29 The ongoing conflict in the Niger Delta is one of the most prominent issues facing the country today. In August and September 2004, Amnesty International cited 500 deaths from gang violence in Port Harcourt, the major oil city in the region.30 From January 2006 to today, these gangs have attacked pipelines, stolen oil, and kidnapped foreign oil workers. The gang leaders believe the oil belongs to the people of the delta. They claim that they refine some of the oil they steal and sell it to local villagers at reduced prices.31 The oil companies have moved their offices from Port Harcourt to Lagos to protect their employees. The government has insisted that they return to the delta because it is safe, yet there are still kidnappings and pipeline bombings.32 Observers

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indicate that the military is involved in the violence. Activists claim that soldiers have burned entire villages and killed innocent civilians.33 Amnesty International acknowledges human rights violations such as ‘‘extrajudicial executions, torture and destruction of homes.’’34 In addition, Amnesty claims that militants have ‘‘kidnapped dozens of oil workers and their relatives, including children.’’35 NIGERIAN PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND PEACE Given Nigeria’s struggle to free itself from colonial rule and military dictatorships, its progress towards democracy, its ongoing ethnic conflicts, and its continued economic problems, what kinds of views might Nigerians have about various forms of governmental aggression, including invasion and torture, and what are their views on peace? The administration of the Perspectives on Individual and Institutional Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) to a sample of Nigerians allowed us to explore some of the answers to these questions. Sample and Procedures Fifty Nigerians completed the PAIRTAPS. The respondents were students, employees, and visitors from different institutions of higher learning who completed the survey in an academic environment where the first author of this chapter taught and studied; 32 percent indicated they were students. Although a few participants answered the survey items individually, most of them completed the survey within the context of focus groups. The typical format within these groups was discussion of the items, following which each respondent recorded his/her response. Because of this format, there was considerable consistency across groups of responses. The PAIRTAPS includes items asking for judgments concerning a government’s right to use aggression (e.g., invasion, torture), and individuals’ rights to live in a world of peace. On these items, participants are asked to indicate their level of agreement with each item (e.g., ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another’’) on seven-point scales ranging from 1 (total disagreement) to 7 (total agreement). They are also asked to provide rationales for their rating scale scores in their own words and to provide their own definitions of the terms war, peace, and terrorism. In general, the Nigerian participants responded to the rating scale items indicating level of support for governmental rights to use aggression but did not provide rationales for their rating scale responses. They did, however, provide definitions of the key terms.

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The ages of respondents ranged from 20 to 56, with an average age of 31 years. The sample represented many of Nigeria’s ethnic groups, including Ibo, Yoruba, Hausa, Ijaw, Tiv, and Fulani. Though the sample may not have fully reflected the ethnic makeup of Nigeria, voices from many ethnic backgrounds were tapped. A slight majority (54 percent) of respondents were female, but males were also very much represented in the sample. All 50 respondents indicated that they were born in Nigeria and that both of their parents were born and lived in Nigeria. Thirty percent of the participants identified themselves as lower class, 30 percent as working class, and 40 percent as middle class. Respondents identified themselves as 40 percent Catholic, 24 percent Protestant, and 18 percent Muslim. Fifty-six percent of the respondents were employed, and 42 percent were unemployed. Most of the employed respondents were also married. Twenty-eight respondents were married and 22 remained single. None of the participants has ever been in the military and only three have family members who have been or are in the military in Nigeria. Sixty-two percent of the respondents supported the PDP, 20 percent supported the AC, and 20 percent supported the AMPP.

JUDGMENTS CONCERNING GOVERNMENTAL RIGHTS TO AGGRESSION ‘‘[War is] total anarchy, using arms.’’ ‘‘[War is] a conflict settled by race using arms.’’ ‘‘[Torture is] an act of inflicting pain for confession.’’ ‘‘[Terrorism is] an act intended to provoke a state for political purposes.’’ Eleven of the 17 statements regarding potential rights of governments to take aggressive actions elicited strong unified opinions from the Nigerians. Disagreement was particularly high in regard to statements concerning forms of governmental aggression that Nigerians may see other countries, including the former colonial powers, as having committed against Nigeria. For example, there was overwhelming disagreement with the statement, ‘‘Sometimes a government has the right to conscript (draft) citizens and send them to fight in a foreign war (that is, a war outside its own borders),’’ with 90 percent of respondents indicating total disagreement, 4 percent indicating fairly strong disagreement and only 6 percent indicating mild agreement. Similarly, 84 percent of the respondents totally disagreed with the statement, ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country,’’ whereas 10 percent fairly strongly disagreed; one respondent mildly disagreed, and one mildly agreed.

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Nigerians may also be distrustful of the extent to which some nations are justifying aggression against other countries by arguing that such aggression is necessary in the fight against terrorism. For example, 84 percent of the respondents totally disagreed with the statement, ‘‘Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism.’’ The remaining 16 percent of respondents totally agreed with the statement. On the other hand, quite unexpectedly, 56 percent of the respondents totally agreed and 30 percent mildly agreed that ‘‘the United States’ involvement in the Iraq war is a moral activity,’’ whereas only 6 percent totally disagreed. This seems surprising in a country with a relatively substantial Muslim minority; however, Muslim representation in this sample was quite small. Of the nine respondents who indicated they were Muslim and the one who indicated he was Catholic/Muslim, 70 percent totally agreed, 10 percent mildly agreed, and 20 percent totally disagreed that U.S. involvement in Iraq is a moral activity. The Nigerian respondents also demonstrated considerable objection to violence by governments against their own people, although there was somewhat less consistency in this domain. For example, in regard to the statement ‘‘Sometimes the police or military have the right to use violence against their own citizens,’’ 94 percent of the respondents totally disagreed. On the other hand, only 62 percent of the respondents indicated total disagreement with the statement, ‘‘Sometimes a government has the right to execute one of its citizens,’’ whereas 32 percent only mildly disagreed. Conversely, in what seems like a bit of a contradiction, 84 percent of the respondents indicated total agreement with the statement, ‘‘No one has the right to physically or psychologically torture, injure, much less kill, any other human being.’’ One respondent fairly strongly agreed and one respondent neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement. It is interesting that 12 percent of respondents chose not to rate this question. The death penalty is legal in Nigeria and many Nigerians have been on death row since military rule, but at least within our fairly well-educated sample, there seems to be some ambivalence about the acceptability of capital punishment. It may be that when the Nigerians respond to issues framed in the language of human rights (e.g., the right to freedom from torture or murder), they reflect on their own individual desire to be free of such threats and perhaps on the general desirability of such individual rights. Conversely, when they address an issue framed in the language of states rights (e.g., the right to commit capital punishment), they reflect that there may be circumstances where their government may need to hold such rights. There was also lesser unanimity in regard to five other PAIRTAPS items. For example, in response to the item ‘‘Sometimes a country has

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the right to ignore international treaties or international human rights agreements,’’ 72 percent totally disagreed, whereas 22 percent totally agreed. In regard to the item ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war,’’ 44 percent of the respondents totally disagreed, 28 percent mildly disagreed, and 20 percent indicated total agreement. Fifty-six percent of the respondents totally agreed that ‘‘It is unpatriotic to disagree with your government on the decisions it makes,’’ whereas 30 percent totally disagreed with this statement. Furthermore, 48 percent totally agreed and 32 percent mildly agreed that ‘‘It is important to support the government in time of war,’’ whereas 14 percent totally disagreed with this statement. JUDGMENTS CONCERNING PEACE AND PROTEST ‘‘[Peace is] freedom from civil disturbance.’’ ‘‘[Reconciliation is] meditation and reconstruction.’’ In general, responses from these Nigerian participants, most of whom had witnessed directly the country’s struggle to achieve peace among its competing factions, showed nearly total endorsement of statements involving a right to peace. To the statements ‘‘Children have the right to grow up in a world of peace’’ and ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace,’’ 92 percent and 94 percent, respectively, of respondents indicated total agreement. Furthermore, expressing an unusual degree of optimism compared to respondents in other countries, 96 percent of respondents totally agreed with the statement ‘‘I believe that world peace can be achieved.’’ Perhaps this optimism reflects the progress Nigerians believe they have made toward peace in their own country. Historically, Nigeria has experienced many protests against various governments, often by labor and student movements. Within the current sample, 92 percent totally agreed that ‘‘individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace.’’ Until recently, protests within the country have often been met with violence, and the country has certainly experienced considerable unrest and violence in recent decades. These experiences may have contributed to the high level of support expressed by participants to the statement ‘‘National security is essential for individual and family security’’; 98 percent of the respondents totally agreed. In addition, perhaps stemming from their own history of victimization by colonial powers and perhaps because of a continuing distrust of the West, 90 percent of the respondents totally agreed that ‘‘In all the military actions taking place around the globe today, it is possible to identify which party (nation, ethnic group, religion) is in the right and which is wrong.’’

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Definitions of War The definitions of war were first broken down into two categories: definitions taking the perspective of the state or other group-level entity (e.g., war as international conflict) and those oriented toward the perspective of the individual (including personal moral judgments on war and emotional responses to war). Of the codable responses, 92 percent were from the perspective of the state. The majority, 53 percent, identified war with conflict, particularly armed conflict; other state-oriented definitions focused on the causes or outcomes of war. The most common response equating war with armed conflict was ‘‘fighting using arms.’’ Another typical definition was ‘‘to carry out violence.’’ Definitions including some references to the causes of war included ‘‘total disagreement resulting in using arms,’’ ‘‘use of arms to settle dispute,’’ and ‘‘using arms to settle conflict.’’ Definitions focusing on the outcomes of war included ‘‘chaos.’’ Definitions reflecting the point of view of the individual generally identified emotions associated with war; the most common examples were ‘‘a state of hostility’’ and ‘‘active hostility.’’ Only one response was coded as constituting a moral judgment on war: ‘‘an act of putting an end unto undesirable things.’’ None of the definitions portrayed war as a defensive response to aggression, although one participant defined war as ‘‘to invade with force.’’ Only one response defined war negatively as ‘‘an absence of peace.’’

Definitions of Terrorism The vast majority (69 percent) of the 83 codable units for the definitions of terrorism fell into the category of destruction and violence. These responses included ‘‘violent action intended to influence government plan,’’ ‘‘use of terror as policy,’’ ‘‘an act intended to cause death or harm,’’ ‘‘use of terror as a means of coercion,’’ and ‘‘act of subversion by group of people.’’ Many of the responses with a destruction and violence component also included a moral judgment component (13 percent). The two most common responses including both components were ‘‘criminal act against the state’’ and ‘‘criminal behavior designed to generate fear in a community.’’ Indeed, all of the definitions of terrorism that contained a codable moral judgment unit also made reference to destruction and violence. Some examples of responses identifying the goals of terrorism included ‘‘an act of violence to provoke a state for religious and political reasons,’’ ‘‘use of force on innocent people for religious or political reasons,’’ and simply ‘‘to use violence to achieve goals.’’ Fifteen percent of the definitions were from an ideological perspective. No respondents attributed any worthy goals to terrorism,

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although one definition connected terrorism with ‘‘an action due to injustice done to a group of people,’’ and several responses (14 percent of the codable responses) identified terrorism as ‘‘misguided.’’ Definitions of Peace The definitions of peace were overwhelmingly ‘‘negative,’’ defining peace in terms of what it was not rather than what it is. Specifically, 82 percent of the codable responses were negative definitions of peace. Common responses included ‘‘absence of war,’’ ‘‘absence of hostility and conflict,’’ ‘‘freedom from civil disturbance,’’ and ‘‘absence of tension.’’ Of 54 codable responses, only 9 were positive definitions. These included ‘‘harmony,’’ ‘‘harmony in personal relations,’’ and ‘‘state of tranquility.’’ Especially important among the positive definitions, because of its emphasis on the necessary foundations of peace, was ‘‘presence of justice.’’ Another participant, focusing on positive peace as a process, emphasized that peace is ‘‘a struggle for harmony.’’

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS Given Nigeria’s past history of coups and countercoups and corruption, it seems logical that a significant percentage of Nigerians would disagree with the idea that the police and the military have a right to commit violence against civilians and that many of them do not support a governmental right to use capital punishment. Change in government may still be associated with potential for violence in Nigeria and with general uncertainty concerning what such changes may mean. In addition to a generalized rejection of the appropriateness of internal aggression, there were large percentages of respondents disagreeing with the involvement of countries in external conflicts. The high percentage of total disagreement responses in relation to potential governmental policies concerning terrorism, the draft, and invasion can be understood in relation to Nigeria’s present role on the continent. As one of the strongest states in Africa, Nigeria is a large contributor to the work of the African Union (AU) in solving international conflicts in Africa. Our participants’ high level of disagreement with the idea of governmental rights to engage in international aggression could indicate that the respondents are more concerned with issues at home than in distant countries and/or that they associate invasion with what other countries have done to their country, particularly in the not-so-distant colonial past. Moreover, because all of the respondents identified themselves as part of the middle class or lower, it is likely that each would

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stand to benefit from more focus on internal rather than external problems. It is also likely that Nigeria’s history of violence and conflict has led to a significant percent of respondents totally agreeing with statements concerning a right to peace and the importance of security. It is possible that the respondents believe that because violence brings insecurity, peace must bring security. Respondents overwhelmingly agreed that children and indeed all people have a right to peace. They also believe that world peace is achievable. This apparent optimism concerning the achievability of peace may be linked to the belief of 90 percent of the respondents that in every conflict situation there is a right and wrong side. Looking at conflict through this black and white lens, they might assume that if all of the wrongdoers were eliminated, there would be peace. In addition to affirming their belief in the achievability of world peace, most respondents also endorsed the view that national security will ensure security in their own lives. Possibly the respondents believe that wrongdoers cannot be eliminated from the world, but if the government can keep all of the wrongdoers away from the people, the people will in turn be secure. In recent decades, outside of a mild border dispute with Cameroon, Nigerian conflicts have generally been internal rather than external. It is perhaps because the Nigerian government has not led its people into foreign wars that 56 percent of the respondents indicated that it was unpatriotic to disagree with the government and 48 percent said people should support their government in times of war. Many of these respondents are from political parties outside the ruling party. Clearly, they do not totally agree with the government, and for the most part they endorse the individual right to protest against governmental involvement in war; nevertheless, many of them also argue that it is unpatriotic to disagree. It seems likely that these somewhat inconsistent sets of beliefs could lead to some cognitive dissonance. Perhaps it is some of these mixed feelings and cognitive dissonance that can help explain some of the separatist movements in the country today. Perhaps separatists feel that because they disagree with the current Nigerian government, they should start a new government to which they can be loyal. Nearly 50 percent of the Nigerian respondents defined peace as an absence of conflict. Perhaps this strong tendency of the Nigerians to define peace negatively rather than positively reflects the fact that Nigeria has never had extended internal peace. Historically, there has regularly been some form of conflict or tension (political, ethnic, religious, or economic) within the country. To the extent that they have experienced such threats and stressors, respondents may tend to define peace

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in terms of the anticipated escape or release from tensions and conflicts they believe peace can provide. Perhaps people from countries without endemic conflict are more likely to define peace as a state of well-being or in terms of social relationships. The definition of peace by two respondents (one 30-year-old man and one 35-year-old woman) as the presence of justice is so unique that it deserves special mention. This response falls into the category of positive definitions of peace, but it probably also tells us something about how the current situation in Nigeria is seen by some people; for example, as a place where justice has not yet been firmly established. The definitions of war overwhelmingly reflected the perspective of the state and offered few judgments as to the morality or personal emotional concomitants of war. Specifically, only one participant included any moral terms in his definition, and only three made any reference to emotions. Moreover, none of the respondents refer to violent actions against another state or outside force or to war as a form of defense. The respondents seem thereby to be distancing themselves from war, perhaps because within their lifetimes, Nigeria has been largely free from invasion and terrorism. On the other hand, their emphasis on the use of arms in warfare may reflect more directly participant observations or awareness of internal conflict within their country. The overriding emphasis on destruction and violence in the Nigerian definitions of terrorism suggest that they are more oriented toward the products of terrorism rather than the motivations behind terrorist actions. For those who do see the ideology behind terrorism, they view it as wrong and misguided rather than understandable or even defensible. Many respondents also included a moral judgment in their definition, calling terrorism, for example, a ‘‘criminal action.’’ It is interesting that the respondents attach a negative moral judgment to their definitions of terrorism but not their definitions of war. One respondent, a 20-year-old female, who provided a relatively unique definition of terrorism, called it ‘‘an action due to injustice done to a group of people.’’ This respondent identifies a reasonable explanation for the occurrence of terrorism but does not judge the action as right or wrong and does not specify that the action is violent or destructive in nature. She simply provides a reason for the act of terrorism. Nigeria’s turbulent history probably contributed also to the ways in which the participants conceptualized the basic terms addressed in the study. The definitions almost always related to violence of some form. Even the definitions of peace overwhelmingly referred to the absence of war; the majority of the definitions of war involved conflict and the use of arms; and most of the definitions of terrorism cited destruction and violence. The Nigerian sample clearly dislikes war and conflict and

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wants peace. However, they seem unable or not disposed to define peace positively, perhaps because they have not experienced sufficiently long periods of time without internal conflict in the country. Although the sample cannot represent the country as a whole, the thoughts of everyday Nigerians on governmental aggression and peace, as provided by our sample, seem to reflect well the experiences of Nigerians.

3

Ghana Bradley Hartfield, David Young Oh, and Elizabeth Planje

War is . . . ‘‘indiscriminate fighting between two or more countries, tribes or parties that involves the use of ammunitions’’; ‘‘a situation in which two or more factions/countries use offensive weapons to injure, harm or kill one another.’’ Peace is . . . ’’the key to any door’’; ‘‘living together in harmony despite one’s social economic or religious class.’’ Even to Africans, the United States’ first African-American president is a miracle. Shortly after the United States elected Barack Obama to be president, Ghanaians went to the polls to elect their president. In a country too familiar with coups, on a continent too accustomed to election violence, President Kufour had resigned after the two four-year terms permitted by the Ghanaian constitution to make way for an entirely new set of candidates. In the election, his party’s candidate was ahead by about 100,000 votes, approximately 1 percent, but none of the eight candidates reached the 50 percent required to win.1 Electoral season was extended for three weeks to prepare for a run-off election between the two leading candidates. This too was inconclusive; the opposition candidate moved ahead by 23,000 votes, but the election commission determined that a lack of ballots in a remote part of western Ghana prevented people from voting and gave that small district the chance to vote again—to determine the president of the country. On January 2, 2009, the election commission announced that the opposition candidate had made up the difference and won the election 50.23 percent to 49.77 percent, 40,000 of the 9 million votes cast. When the defeated candidate announced that he was considering legal action, the president asked him to accept the results peacefully. He has done so.

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Despite the razor-thin margins, Ghana will have successfully held its fifth multiparty democratic election in a row.2 In America, the citizens have learned much about the chaos and emotional upheaval of close elections. They have seen anger, court intervention, demonstrations, and governments not immediately accepted as legitimate. In 2000, it took six weeks of shocking, contradictory news before Americans learned who would be their next president.3 In 2008, it was months before the outcomes of all the senatorial races were known.4 What are Americans to make of a developing African country, which observers agree honors free speech and holds free, fair—and peaceful—elections?

COUNTRY PROFILE Ghana is located in West Africa on the Gulf of Guinea. It is about the size of Oregon or the United Kingdom.5 Its name comes from the title used by kings in a powerful empire whose territory lay 500 miles north of the present-day Ghana and means ‘‘warrior king.’’6 Ghana is the 48th most populous country in the world with an estimated population of 23.5 million.7 Political, Economic, and Social History of Ghana The earliest written records suggest that the territory now known as Ghana served as a crossroads on major trading routes for at least 1,000 years. East-west routes brought ideas, goods, and people from the interior of Africa. North-south routes brought ideas, medicine, and writing from the Islamic Berber and Arab cultures of northern Africa. Peoples highly involved in trade, like the ancient Ghanians, may tend to judge others less and be more open to difference; the Netherlands is a European example of a nation that has valued trade more than empire.8 One can speculate that this trading tradition may also have influenced the perspectives of the people of Ghana. For centuries, gold from sub-Saharan Africa found its way to Europe. In the 1400s, European powers embarked on their ‘‘Age of Exploration,’’ with Prince Henry the Navigator of Portugal at its forefront. In part, the goal of the explorers was to find legendary stores of gold in Africa, but even more so, their goal was to break the hold of Asian, Muslim, and Venetian traders who controlled the exchange of goods with the ‘‘Orient.’’ In the mid-15th century, Portuguese explorers in search of the sea route to Asia sailed down the west coast of Africa. Along the Gulf of Guinea, they encountered peoples rich with gold;

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they returned to Portugal with gold and natives to present to Prince Henry. In 1481, to protect the gold trade they had quickly established, the Portuguese built the first European structure in sub-Saharan Africa: a castle, which came to be known as Elmina, The Mine. Finally, in 1497, the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama sailed around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa and on to India, establishing a sea route to the east. The Portuguese achieved both of the goals that Europe had been so set on.9 Although the gold trade was tremendously profitable, by the 16th century, trade in slaves became more profitable. Initially, the market for slaves was largely confined to Africa, but as the size and number of English and Portuguese plantations in the ‘‘New World’’ colonies grew, so did the demand for African slaves. The Portuguese traders sought out allies along the Gulf of Guinea and provided wares to secure the rights to trade both goods and slaves. For a century, they enjoyed a monopoly, but by 1600, the Dutch joined them in building fortifications along the Gulf of Guinea. By 1650, the Dutch had captured the remaining Portuguese castles and forts and dominated the trade in gold, slaves, and ivory from West Africa.10 In the ensuing centuries, those forts and others were important in the trading of gold and slaves from what became known to English speakers as the Gold Coast. Over time, forts were built, won, and abandoned by the English, Dutch, and Swedes, as well as the Portuguese. In fact, although on African soil, their main role was to defend against European rivals seeking to encroach on profitable trade routes. Despite these efforts, by the mid-18th century, the Danes, English, and Swedes were claiming portions of this lucrative trade; many of their forts, dotting the coast, can still be seen today.11 It is estimated that about 50,000 African slaves were imported into Europe, with the overwhelming majority destined for the New World. Despite the relatively small number of Africans imported to Europe, the scale of the trade with the New World had a substantial economic impact on the powers that participated in it, and its effects on the development of the New World cannot be underestimated. The effects of the slave trade on West Africa are more difficult to assess. Available data suggest that the number of slaves sold per year was approximately equal to the population gain that would otherwise have existed, so the enslavement and removal of individuals did not depopulate the region.12 In 1696, American Quakers (Religious Society of Friends) in Philadelphia became the first religious group to condemn slavery, ‘‘urging Quaker merchants and traders to cease and desist from trading in human beings.’’ By 1727, English Quakers joined their cause, and the

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Society subsequently led the way to outlaw the practice. In succession, the Danes, Swedes, and Dutch stopped trading in slaves in the 18th century. By 1807, the United States outlawed the importation of slaves (as opposed to slavery, outright), so the number of slaves taken from Africa increased steadily until 1810, following which it began to decline. Throughout the course of the 19th century, England developed a steadily larger influence on European trade and relations with the Gold Coast. A series of battles with the Asante Federation led to the British proclaiming a colony in 1901. British colonial administration in the Gold Coast in the 20th century led to broad-based development of sectors such as transport, communications, education, and agriculture. The British-style education system, instituted through revenue gained from mineral exports, was the most advanced in West Africa. In the 1920s, the British-appointed governor required that half of the colony’s technical positions be filled by Africans. These positions laid the basis for a new Ghanaian elite who ultimately led the independence movement.13 After World War II, Britain turned its attention back to its empire, slowly realizing that it had neither the power nor the will to maintain its imperial role in the world. In the years immediately after the war, returning Gold Coast veterans were less willing to accept their lack of autonomy after fighting alongside the soldiers of their colonial masters. They soon joined with much of the educated elite and urban workers to press for independence. A series of reforms resulted in Africans gaining more and more power; by 1954, the new Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah and his cabinet handled all portfolios except for defense and foreign policy. In 1956, by unanimous vote, the assembly authorized the government to formally request independence from British rule. On March 6, 1957, the Gold Coast became the independent nation of Ghana under the independence leader Kwame Nkrumah.14 At independence, Ghana was seen as well situated to succeed. It was one of the most prosperous and developed of African countries. It had mineral wealth, a well-developed power and transport infrastructure, and ‘‘one of the best educated workforces on the continent.’’15 It produced more cocoa than any other country in the world and was one of the world’s leading exporters of gold. It also had Kwame Nkrumah, the charismatic leader who became a central figure in the pan-African movement. Its prospects seemed good as Britain handed over the reins of leadership.16 At midnight, as Ghana became the first independent state in Africa, its new Prime Minister, Kwame Nkrumah said, ‘‘We are going to see that we create our own African personality and identity. We again rededicate ourselves in the struggle to emancipate other countries in Africa; for our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with

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the total liberation of the African continent.’’17 His message of PanAfricanism attracted followers throughout Africa and encouraged their efforts towards independence.18 Divided we are weak; united, Africa could become one of the greatest forces for good in the world. I believe strongly and sincerely that with the deep-rooted wisdom and dignity, the innate respect for human lives, the intense humanity that is our heritage, the African race, united under one federal government, will emerge not as just another world bloc to flaunt its wealth and strength, but as a Great Power whose greatness is indestructible because it is built not on fear, envy and suspicion, nor won at the expense of others, but founded on hope, trust, friendship and directed to the good of all mankind.19

Domestically, Nkrumah’s economic development strategy was a loose form of socialism, which included nationalizing industries, and initiating a vast number of major construction and social engineering projects from dams to hydroelectric plants, roads, railroads, schools, and hospitals, all at once. The country was soon in great debt to the World Bank.20 Many Ghanians became frustrated by the slow pace of economic progress and the rise of privileged elites. In response, Nkrumah’s idealism lapsed into demagoguery. Within a handful of years, Nkrumah’s rule became dictatorial. He outlawed all political parties but his own, hired only members of his own party into the government, and arrested rivals. He even changed the constitution to designate himself president-for-life, of both his political party and the country. Demoralized by corruption and oppression, many in Ghana turned against Nkrumah. While on a trip to China in 1966, he was overthrown in a coup and never set foot in Ghana again. Despite this litany of problems, Nkrumah is still very much respected today as the man who shepherded the Gold Coast into the first independent nation of sub-Saharan Africa. In some ways, the leaders who came after him can all be characterized by their relation to the early ideas and bold actions of Mr. Nkrumah. For 15 years, a series of coups and countercoups resulted in a succession of ineffective governments. The resulting political and economic chaos kept Ghana poor and unstable. Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings effectively ended that period by leading a coup in 1979. Although he quickly relinquished power to a civilian government, in 1981 he staged another coup. This time, with popular support, he took the seat of power himself. Rawlings was and is controversial for his outspoken ideas and his strong grip on power combined with populism.21 As quoted by the BBC, Rawlings once explained to a group of journalists:

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‘‘Don’t ask me what my ideology or economic programme is. . . . I don’t know any law and I don’t understand economics, but I know it when my stomach is empty.’’22 Facing growing pressure in the 1990s to restore democracy, Rawlings created a process to write a new constitution calling for a president and assembly, each elected by popular vote for a maximum of two terms. Significantly, the constitution also outlawed any political parties associated with a single ethnic group. In 1992, Rawlings traded his uniform for a tailored suit and ran for the office of the first president of the 4th republic.23 Despite some complaints about the election, international observers judged it fair, and Rawlings was elected president. Despite widespread political corruption and violent silencing, Rawlings honored the constitution and left office after serving two terms.24 His vice president and appointed successor ran for president in 2000 but lost to John Kofi Agyekum Kufuor, who served for his full two-terms. After a long-disupted 2008 election, John Atta Mills became president on January 7, 2009.25 The Ghana Sample The sample from Ghana consisted of 46 respondents, 84 percent of whom were male, which is disproportionate in relation to the broader population in that age range, which is roughly balanced as to gender (in 2008, the population sex ratio was 1:1 males to females).26 The sample ranged in age from 18 to 63, which represents the age distribution in Ghana reasonably well; 50 percent of Ghanaians are 20 or under, and in our sample 47 percent were under 30. The formative years of the oldest of our sample took place under colonialism. Others came of age in the heady rush toward independence and the optimism of the PanAfrica days. Others matured during successive coups, repression, economic stagnation, the hope of new governments, and now, a sufficiently democratic government for people to feel, generally, that it is representative. Recently, life expectancy and literacy have been increasing substantially.27 Those most influenced by events in any one of those major periods of change will likely have a different perspective than those who experienced the events of another era. For a country like Ghana, with its ethnic diversity and complex history, it is useful to consider the ethnic identity or ‘‘tribe’’ of respondents and how their particular history may help to understand the perspectives revealed in the survey. The ethnic makeup of our population clearly does not represent Ghana’s population well. Although the Ewe people make up less than 12 percent of the population of Ghana, they

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comprise 93 percent of our respondents. According to a census in 2000, Ewe are in fact the third most prevalent group, making up 11.7 percent of all ethnic groups. The two more prevalent ethnic groups are Akan (45.3 percent) and Mole-Dagbon (15.2 percent).28 In regard to religion, all participants who identified a childhood religion reported that they grew up as Christians, although almost a quarter of the sample had changed their particular religious affiliation since childhood. One-sixth of the sample, all male, identified as either pentecostal or evangelical. Despite this self-identification, it is quite possible that some or, even, many of the participants have incorporated traditional forms of Ewe or Fon religious beliefs or practices into their form of Christianity. Consistent with the demographics of our sample, the same aforementioned census found Christianity to be the most common religion, with 68.8 percent of the population identifying as Christian, with 24 percent Pentecostal/Charistmatic, 18.6 percent Protestant, 15.1 percent Catholic, and 11 percent other. In addition, 15.9 percent of the population identifies as Muslim, 8.5 percent are traditional, and 6 percent identify with no religion.29 All participants completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS). Specifically, they rated several items asking for level of agreement (from 1, totally disagree, to 7, totally agree) concerning state rights to aggression (e.g., ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another’’) as well as individual rights to peace and protest (e.g., ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace.’’) They then provided explanations, in their own words, for their rating scale responses. Finally, they defined some key terms; for example, ‘‘war’’ and ‘‘peace.’’ GHANAIAN PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION ‘‘Invasion is a premeditated preparation to kill persons and destroy property, such a right is inhuman!’’ ‘‘Since a prisoner of war is also human, it is inhuman to order their torture.’’ Does One State Ever Have a Right to Invade Another? Almost 10 percent of our Ghanaian sample believed that an invasion of one country by another could be warranted to protect the rights of people perceived to be oppressed in their own land. Of particular relevance to Americans’ understanding of Africa’s history,30 one respondent noted, ‘‘A country has a right to invade another country if

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they have captured their people as slaves.’’ Another justification for invasion that may reflect the historical frequency of dictatorial regimes in Ghana and surrounding countries focused on liberation; for example, ‘‘Where the citizens are being oppressed under a dictatorial rule, they need to be liberated. Where the liberation cannot be obtained internally, an external source could be a relief.’’ Other responses revealed a utilitarian means/ends form of reasoning; for example, one respondent noted that invasion was acceptable ‘‘to prevent a worse outcome.’’ By contrast, 85 percent of the responses indicated that invading another country is never the right thing to do. Slightly more than half of those responses provided arguments based on matters of principle. The most common such argument, constituting more than 50 percent of the responses, related to respect for the sovereignty of nations; these arguments implied that as a matter of principle, the invasion of a nation, regardless of its domestic policies, is illegal and/or immoral. Each nation is assumed to have the right to make its own decisions and to arrange things its own way; outside countries do not have the right to invade based on their judgment of those arrangements. Representative responses included ‘‘The jurisdiction of a country does not go beyond its borders to enable one to invade another’’; ‘‘Every country in this world has its authority from its citizens and not another country’’; ‘‘No matter how crude and wicked a leader is, it is not the duty of a more powerful country to invade another weaker country whatever problems that may occur. [Invasion] should be the duty of the UN’’; ‘‘Countries have their own constitutions and their own way of ruling . . . Therefore no country should place their nose into another’s administration.’’ Almost 10 percent of the arguments against a right to invasion emphasized that proffered rationales were often—or, perhaps, always— duplicitous. These respondents contend that invasion is better understood as a pretext for states to gain greater power (e.g., political hegemony), wealth (e.g., access to oil or other minerals), or resources (e.g., access to water or good farmland). About 20 percent of the arguments offered concerning a state right to invasion emphasized that we must find better ways to handle difficulties. Respondents argued, for example, that ‘‘invading another country means war, but we are looking for peace . . . it would be like taking the world into its darkest age again’’; and ‘‘there should be dialogue and peaceful resolution to whatever their difference may be.’’ Of the arguments made rejecting a state right to invade another country, one in eight indicated that the consequences of a military invasion could be so prohibitive as to view force itself as unacceptable. Ghanaians have been slower to fight, more inclined to negotiate, and more able to tolerate tensions than have the citizens of many countries of the region.

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Do Countries Have the Right to Torture Prisoners during Times of War? The people of Ghana have experienced political repression, regional war, the influx of refugees from foreign wars, and the use of military force and coups d’etat repeatedly since independence. During times of warfare, people may feel that different rules apply, both in what they would personally do, and in the kinds of actions they would sanction when done by their government. Fully 75 percent of our sample responded that even in times of war, governments do not have the right to torture prisoners. About 30 percent of the arguments rejecting the right indicated that based on moral and/or legal principles, government-sanctioned torture is unacceptable. An example of this kind of response includes ‘‘No government has a constitutional mandate to order the torture of prisoners. Prisoners are put there for their lives to be reformed.’’ A related set of arguments (21 percent of the responses) stated that torture is a violation of human rights; for example, ‘‘This is a human rights abuse.’’ Some of these arguments against a state right to torture acknowledged, at least implicitly, the possible innocence of prisoners of war: ‘‘The prisoners . . . might not be cause of the war.’’ The other major type of argument against a state right to torture (making up 7 percent of the sample) was utilitarian; generally, these answers reflected the view that torture was not effective and therefore should not be done. As one respondent commented, ‘‘Torturing prisoners doesn’t bring the war to an end.’’ Two memorable aphorisms were ‘‘Will the government itself want to undergo such torture?’’ and ‘‘No war, no prisoners, no torture!’’ The Ghanaian Constitution is consistent with these views rejecting torture. According to Chapter Five of the Constitution, which outlines ‘‘fundamental human rights and freedoms,’’ ‘‘The dignity of all persons shall be inviolable. No person shall, whether or not he is arrested, restricted or retained, be subjected to (a) torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (b) any other condition that detracts or is likely to detract from his dignity and worth as a human being.’’31 As noted previously, under stress or in a state of emergency, people may well accommodate or even invite methods that in more normal times would be anathema. Ghana is currently experiencing peace and the people are more optimistic about continued prosperity than has been the case for most of their history as a nation. Even in such times and with such legislation, 25 percent of the responses provided examples of circumstances under which a governmental right to torture was seen as defensible. It is particularly important to consider these people and their perspective on torture: something that one could so reflexively dismiss as evil. In Europe and the United States, with few exceptions,

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Adolf Hitler has become the personification of evil. We no longer view him as a thinking, feeling human, but instead as a twisted extreme of wrath or madness—through which many Germans inflicted great harm on the world. One problem with this perspective is that it lets us all off the hook. It’s easy to swear that we would never act in a harmful way and thereby feel we don’t have any need or responsibility to consider it, assuring ourselves that the evil of Mr. Hitler was a rare aberration about which we need not worry. In fact, it’s important to at least consider the possibility that perhaps we don’t know how we would act, what we would do, what risks we would personally take to publicly or privately oppose ‘‘evil’’ practices, if we haven’t been in that situation. We like to think we wouldn’t collaborate with such activities, but until we are really under those pressures, with the partial, manipulated information that is always associated with them, it is difficult to know what we would really do. In that light, it’s illuminating to examine the responses of respondents who said that torture would be acceptable under certain circumstances. One respondent said that governments have a right to torture prisoners of war ‘‘if it will bring peace.’’ Utilitarian reasoning, aimed at pragmatic consideration of actions in light of the possible results, was used by some respondents to argue against a right to torture, but by others to justify it. Respondents indicated governments might have the right to torture ‘‘when a prisoner is considered to be a major suspect but failed to talk when being interrogated’’; ‘‘for them to reveal secrets of their enemies.’’ Some of these responses qualified the right to torture (e.g., ‘‘if sufficient evidence to warrant’’ ‘‘if it’s the real offenders’’). Underlying these responses there seems to be an assumption that if torture were directed at the people who really caused the warfare, it may well be warranted, but that the risk of torturing the wrong person is very serious. The Ghanian arguments supportive of torture are reminiscent of the most powerful rationale circulated in the United States to justify ‘‘enhanced interrogation techniques’’ at Guantanomo Bay and elsewhere. The premise of that argument is this: a prisoner is in custody. He knows where the bomb is. There’s one hour before it goes off, killing hundreds of innocent people. In order to find that bomb and save those lives, it is claimed, we must resort to torture. This kind of story is often used to justify state use of torture in the United States, but the scenario itself is deeply flawed. In the real world, we can’t ever know with certainty that an incarcerated person actually knows what we’re looking for. The scenario assumes something that might well be impossible— certainty that this guy is the right one. What government database doesn’t contain errors? 32 What government agency has not once tried

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to exceed its authority? Even in the ‘‘best’’ of circumstances, one would be torturing someone who might—or might not—be the ‘‘right’’ one. Torture may indeed get results, because humans have limitations and generally seek ways to end torment. But will those ‘‘results’’ save any lives? If the ‘‘right’’ person is being interrogated at the right time, it is still easy for him or her to lie. If the wrong person is being tortured, anything he or she says would be misleading and waste time. A U.S. Army captain in charge of several torture teams in Iraq commented that in circumstances like this, torture is useless.33 Anyone with the desired information has certainly learned how to protect it. If the suspect has played such a major role in the opposition as to have important information, approaches that include conversation and developing some sense of shared humanity and friendship, artificial as it may be, can lead to far better and more accurate results. One respondent from our sample, taking a similar point of view, considered the potential benefits prisoners could offer if not tortured: ‘‘The prisoners were or might not be cause of the war. Moreover, torturing prisoners doesn’t bring the war to an end. It doesn’t make a difference who is joining. They also have the right to live even when they are criminals. They can change to help the nation one day.’’ Killing Innocent Civilians in the Fight against International Terrorism In regard to the item ‘‘Sometimes governments have the right to kill innocent civilians in the fight against international terrorism,’’ over 85 percent of the responses were arguments against such a right. Of these 85 percent, the large majority underscored the innocence of those who might be killed, individuals who, in the jargon of the United States Pentagon, might be called ‘‘collateral damage.’’ Examples include ‘‘Innocent civilians know nothing about terrorism’’; ‘‘Nobody has the right to shed the blood of an innocent person’’; ‘‘It does not make sense under any condition’’; and ‘‘It is the terrorists who must be killed and not innocent civilians’’ Some of the arguments were based on moral and/or legal principles; for example, ‘‘This is a crime against humanity’’; ‘‘in any civilized country governments are rather supposed to put offenders of the law before the court.’’ Other arguments were more utilitarian; for example, ‘‘Killing innocent people will only promote more terrorist groups to carry on with their wicked act since they [the terrorists] know that the innocents will pay for their [the terrorists] sins.’’ Other arguments emphasized the availability of more considered and legitimate ways to respond to situations where a government might be tempted to kill, although sometimes noting that even in apprehending criminals to bring them into custody, innocent people may be hurt or

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killed. About 15 percent of the responses acknowledged that it might be necessary to accept civilian losses at times, but indicated that, even then, tolerance for losses should be strictly limited; for example, ‘‘Every effort should be made to get the culprits and leave the innocent civilians alone.’’ Another look at Ghana’s Constitution provides insight on the government’s perspective regarding the life of its citizens. Article 13 of the chapter on human rights holds that ‘‘1) No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally except in the exercise of the execution of a sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence under the laws of Ghana of which he has been convicted.’’34 This alone would indicate that the government itself clearly says it does not have the right to kill innocent (or at a minimum unconvicted) civilians to accomplish a state goal like fighting terrorism. However, the second section of this article complicates the picture because it appears to grant the government (or any person) the right to use violence ‘‘to such an extent as is reasonably justifiable,’’ in specifically described situations, two of which are relevant to this question: ‘‘for the defense of any person from violence’’ and ‘‘for the purposes of suppressing . . . insurrection or mutiny.’’35 The way the law is written, the person who experiences the use of force is not necessarily the person who is committing those acts. Using these laws, one might be able to argue that killing an innocent civilian could aid in the defense of another person from violence or in suppressing insurrection or mutiny, both of which could fit the definition of terrorism. What Is Your Definition of War? The totality of war exists on so many levels as to be almost incomprehensible to any single person. Its breadth includes great national movements of liberation, creation of community (even if its goal is to attack), human suffering of a degree and scale almost impossible outside of it, heroism, struggle, moral judgments, personal fear, disintegration of home, values, stability, normalcy. In our sample, a large majority of the definitions of war (65 percent) incorporated the traditional language of conflict between two or more parties; some of these definitions focused on war as ‘‘conflict between two or more people,’’ and others identified it with ‘‘the use of armed force between countries or rival groups in the nation.’’ A sizeable minority (24 percent) of the responses equated it with the destruction that such conflict generates. Most of the definitions focused on war as a state-level phenomenon, although a few definitions (4 percent of the responses) reflected more personal judgments and feelings; for example, one participant identified war with immorality, defining it as ‘‘the greatest crime against humanity.’’

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Overall, the definitions ranged from almost philosophical to more emotional, with the latter group suggesting a deep and perhaps personal awareness of the power of modern weapons and the destruction they cause.36 One group of responses identified war with its causes; for example, ‘‘misunderstanding over issues’’; ‘‘pursuing a misunderstanding between two nations until there is violence’’; ‘‘a situation where one party feels the other party is not living by the dictates of the widely accepted norms and would want to reverse it by force/might.’’ More than expressing disagreement on the causes that lead to the rush to violence, 24 percent of the responses identify war with the outcomes of war, often describing the tools of war that lead to the horrors associated with war. Such responses include ‘‘It occurs when the factions fight with guns or clubs’’; ‘‘aggressive, bloody encounter using weapons that destroy life’’; ‘‘a conflict situation where two or three countries engage in open fighting using dangerous tools/technological materials to destroy the other country’’; and the ‘‘massive destruction of life and property by gun.’’ Finally, one respondent summarizes his understanding of war by describing its futility, describing it as ‘‘a violent confrontation between two societies which nobody wins.’’ Another respondent pointed to the concept of war as self defense, writing that war ‘‘is the use of weapons by a country on the other for self defense issues.’’ What Is Terrorism? In the West, terrorism is such a charged word that it can be difficult to study both the term and its origins. Invoking the word ‘‘terrorism’’ or labeling the actor ‘‘terrorist’’ involves making judgments about the actions or people doing them. Some possible connotations associated with the word ‘‘terrorism’’ are that the perpetrators’ goal is to kill, destroy, and cause fear, and that the people who organized and execute such actions are evil, thoughtless, and ‘‘not like us.’’ The permissible actions to prevent terrorist successes or to punish them are broader than most socially sanctioned actions, and the sense of righteousness driving those actions can be strong. Simply stated, the actions characterized as ‘‘terrorism’’ can be viewed as a fairly loose set of methods sometimes used by people seeking great change. Historically, terrorist methods are brought to bear when conventional means to power, both political and military, are very unbalanced. In other words, terrorism is used when no other power is readily available. Although surprise attacks and ambushes have been used from the beginning of time (e.g., Gauls attacking the periphery of the Roman empire, even at its height), modern communication techniques have enabled perpetrators to view terrorism as a useful tool (despite the

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murder of innocent people that is so often involved in these actions). Why is this? Imagine an oppressed group seeking to overthrow a government and establish democracy. If they destroy one building and kill its inhabitants, but news of this act doesn’t spread and become well-known, then the effect on the government is not very strong and nothing has changed. It is only when fear seeps through the government, and especially the people, when no one knows how they will next strike, and when fear comes to permeate the lives of citizens, that terrorism might begin to achieve its goals (which of course, vary, just as its methods do). There are ways to demand social change that do not involve violence; Mohandas Gandhi, and Martin Luther King, Jr., are among the best known and most successful of individuals who insisted that violence not be a part of their movement. In fact, the discipline and wisdom that allowed these two to succeed is rarely evident in social movements, and many may come to resort to violent actions. Often, the individuals resorting to violence are labeled terrorists by those in power. This formulation suggests that there are two dominant perspectives on terrorism: one focuses on the violent actions and the fear that ensues, and the other focuses on the potentially constructive objectives involved in at least some terrorist movements. The first perspective focuses on how sending your children to school, shopping in the market, and traveling to one’s village can be transformed into actions that might risk the lives of each person involved. The fear is often exacerbated because of uncertainty and the knowledge that there may be little one can do to protect one’s loved ones, one’s home, and one’s country. The other focus, while acknowledging the dangers and uncertainty, notes that the actions are not random and the people behind them are not always evil, and that even through the terror, political change of some sort is sought. In our sample, 63 percent of the responses emphasized violence and fear, and the bridge between the two, as well as the ongoing threat of violence. Some examples of how people in this group defined terrorism are ‘‘causing fear in people by events that can result to death,’’ ‘‘threats of violent action,’’ and ‘‘covert or overt activities to either put fear into people or even subject them to trauma.’’ Additional responses in this frequently used category include ‘‘violence action/activities by group of people that cause fear,’’ ‘‘all acts that cause fear, pain, anxiety, chaos, injury or death by enemies of society and government,’’ and the ‘‘act of frightening, injuring, killing, causing unrest among a people.’’ Notice that this last response mentions unrest; one might infer that in response to unrest, people will be inclined to seek some change. Slightly more than half of the sample emphasized the political aspect that the terrorist methods might seek to achieve. Responses of this kind included ‘‘the use of fear and intimidation politically to achieve aims,’’ ‘‘the act using

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unpleasant ways or violent means to achieve one’s goal in a government or politically,’’ and ‘‘expressing grievances using mass destruction or killings by an organized group.’’ This last example is a bridge to another, smaller category of responses—those focusing on injustice, which, the respondents implied, terrorism may try to redress. Six percent of the responses focused on an ideology of fighting injustice that might underlie terrorism; for example, ‘‘an act of being violent due to suppression of a [people] situation.’’ Is National Security Essential for Individual and Family Security? Over 90 percent of respondents believed that national security is essential for individual and family security; 41 percent of the responses elaborated on their agreement by describing how individual and family security depend on the security of a nation: ‘‘Individual and family security cannot do without national security,’’ ‘‘because individual and family form the national body,’’ and ‘‘it is only when the nation is safe that individuals will be safe.’’ Responses pointed to the organizational hierarchy that forms a nation: individuals come together to form families, families come together to form towns and villages, and villages and towns come together to form a nation or country. Consistent with this perspective, 12 percent of the sample said that individuals feel more safe if a nation is secure; for example, ‘‘because security helps us to have a peace of mind to do our work’’; ‘‘it will protect life and property necessary to social and economic development’’; and ‘‘it will ensure protection of life and property, the basic existence of man.’’ A handful of the responses, less than 5 percent, considered what could be the ultimate source of security and found it in god. The Ewe have a reputation for being devoted Christians, so it is almost a surprise to find relatively few who cite God as the ‘‘true’’ source of security, as exemplified in this response: ‘‘The question is why security, who is giving you that security, a mere man giving security to a country or family? I think God is the best security, giving security to that man who is giving security to the nation and family.’’ Another response highlighted the vulnerability of individuals and families: ‘‘In conflict moments, it is only individuals and families that are victims, hence the need for national security to combat any internal and external aggression.’’

PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE AND PROTEST ‘‘[Peace is necessary] to enjoy the right to life, to enjoy socialization, to learn from each other and improve upon the past.’’

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Do All Human Beings Have a Basic Right to Peace? Seventy-two percent of responses agreed that all human beings have a basic right to peace. Responses in this category include the following examples: ‘‘Every human being has the right to maintain, fight for, and enjoy peaceful existence and co-existence’’; ‘‘With peace all will live in harmony, happiness, and above all we shall all have a fulfilling life’’; ‘‘in fact, all human beings have a basic right to peace,’’ and ‘‘The rights are the foundation so without the right, life is useless to live.’’ Thirtythree percent of the responses elaborated on their agreement by describing the developmental consequences associated with peace; for example, ‘‘Man brings about development. For man to plan for development, peace is needed. Without peace then development is illusive and a mirage.’’ In a country where development has been a priority, it is not surprising to see that many phrase their answer in terms of requirements for successful development. Without a modifier (e.g., personal development), development might refer to creating the infrastructure and human capital through which a people can become more prosperous. An example of a response that points to this kind of development is ‘‘Your nation can only be developed if there is no conflict.’’ Given the preponderance of media reports talking about seemingly chronic development crises in Africa, it is perhaps surprising to note that 26 percent of the total responses cited peace as a sine qua non (i.e., a necessary precondition for personal development). Examples of such responses are ‘‘Humans need peace to feel safe and comfortable’’ and ‘‘Individuals have the right to peace because no one in the world can feel happy when there is always misunderstanding.’’ Finally, almost 10 percent of people viewed the right to peace as given by the Christian God: ‘‘God never sent anyone into the world for war, but for peace; therefore, everyone has the right to a peaceful environment in order to think of good things to do. Everybody was born in peace, and therefore it is a natural right where one can be successful and healthy where love prevails everywhere. No one must take it from us.’’

Can World Peace Be Achieved? Only 8 percent of the responses to the item ‘‘I believe that world peace can be achieved’’ were affirmative without any conditions, but almost 50 percent of the total sample of responses specify that world peace can be achieved if certain conditions are met. Some responses that fall into this category include ‘‘only when we turn away from evil and do good and follow Christ Jesus because He is the true way, life and peace’’; ‘‘when all put aside self-interest and conform to law and order’’; and

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‘‘it can be achieved only when the evil presidents and head of states are no more.’’ These responses represent the 16 percent of responses that described various conditions that did not fall into a larger pattern. Sixteen percent of the sample also explained the need for respect as the condition under which world peace could be achieved; for example, ‘‘if everybody respects each person’s right,’’ and ‘‘if we learn to understand each other and in our own small way contribute to peaceful co-existence of every nation.’’ Finally, 9 percent of the responses pointed to the need for a global effort to achieve peace; for example, ‘‘if only we become one people with a common goal. There is the belief that when more campaigns for peace are carried out, it could be achieved. But the scriptures of the Bible must be fulfilled. Where religious fights are going on all over, it will be very difficult to be done’’ and ‘‘There is a saying that united we stand, divided we fall, and countries that once had misunderstandings are now coming together as one people, and there is even the evidence that some countries have international treaties that bring good relationships with them. I think every country should come together for a treaty.’’ More than 40 percent of the responses rejected the possibility of achieving world peace. Responses were equally divided among four reasons (11 percent each) why world peace is not achievable: problems created by individuals, problems related to the very nature of human beings, problems related to the organization of people into nations, and general disagreement without elaboration. Responses blaming individuals for getting in the way of achieving world peace included ‘‘It is impossible to have world peace due to diverse ideological differences and the class society we have across the globe: the fundamentalists, the Zionists, etc . . .’’ Responses blaming mankind or human nature for why world peace cannot be achieved included ‘‘Humans always may have their differences’’; and ‘‘Man has gone too far left to be able, genuinely, to work for peace and have it. This is truer for world leaders—they are mainly selfish cowards.’’ A response disagreeing with the achievability for world peace because of the nature of states noted that peace cannot be achieved ‘‘because every country has its own law and acts in according with the rules and regulations governing them.’’

CONCLUSION How important are our beliefs to our actions? How important are our beliefs to our potential as individuals and in communities? What is the basis of our beliefs and what can change them for the worse or, more importantly and more mysteriously, for the better? The emphasis of our

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respondents on the importance of sovereignty in their responses to the invasion item, for example, is particularly interesting in that one of the great challenges facing Africa as a continent and Ghana more specifically has been taking the somewhat random borders instituted by colonial powers, which divided tribes and splintered traditional identities, and forming a nation from them. Respect for sovereignty may also have contributed to views on the importance of national security for individual security and to definitions of war. Much of postcolonial African history has centered on these issues. Our survey indicates that the idea of national sovereignty has clearly taken hold. To the extent that our results are representative, they might represent a crucial development for postcolonial Africa; after three generations of intranational ethnic tensions, our results suggest that national identities are, perhaps, beginning to predominate. Passport may begin to trump heritage. Counter to this idea of the supremacy of sovereignty is the great debate engendered by the tragedy of the genocide of Rwanda. Much of the global north,37 as well as the United Nations Secretariat,38 had great misgivings about their lack of action to prevent the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Former U. S. President Bill Clinton has said that his failure to intervene there was the greatest regret of his presidency. Yet, our Ghana survey results indicate that many Africans, despite direct or indirect exposure to genocide, hold that even genocide is not grounds for invasion. In the introduction to each volume in this series, it was intimated that much of the violence in the world today might be traced to the evolution of nation-states. The majority of our Ghanaian respondents view nation-states as a basic unit with important attendant rights but do not, apparently, see the organization of society into such units as a contributor to conflict. Despite the historical outcomes of Kwame Nkrumah’s policies, one might do well to reconsider the words in which he expressed his belief in the sovereignty of Africa as an instrument of nonviolent ideals. His hope was that Africa ‘‘will emerge not as just another world bloc to flaunt its wealth and strength, but as a Great Power whose greatness is indestructible because it is built not on fear, envy and suspicion, nor won at the expense of others, but founded on hope, trust, friendship and directed to the good of all mankind.’’39

4

Angola Helena Castanheira and Eduardo Baptista Correia

War is . . . ’’To resolve conflict with military force. Hunger for power, authority, greed’’; ‘‘unnecessary evil’’; ‘‘an armed conflict between two nations or two parties within the same nation with different ideals.’’ Peace is . . . ’’A state of mind, utopia that several generations have been trying to reach’’; ‘‘state of harmony and understanding between people, groups and nations’’; ‘‘acceptance of differences and resolving conflict with understanding’’; ‘‘plenitude and harmony.’’ HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT A Long History of Repression Although there is evidence that the African country of Angola was inhabited in prehistoric times, its first known settlers were Bushmen in the beginning of the sixth century CE.1 These hunters and gatherers were followed by the Khoisan and Bantu speakers who settled in Angola between 300 and 1600.2 As the later group established itself, several ethnicities and groups formed, some of which are still in existence. The region that is considered Angola today was part of the Kingdom of Congo in the thirteenth century. From the 1300s until the arrival of the Portuguese on the coast of Africa in 1419, the region was controlled by native aristocrats with a centralized government and a population of approximately fifty thousand.3 However, as the slave trade developed, tensions between Portugal and the Congo increased. Portugal founded the colony of Angola in 1575 and the city of Luanda in 1605.4 Angola was officially incorporated into Portugal in 1886.5 Angola had nearly 500 years of colonial history, as one of the earliest and longest lasting colonial outposts. The Portuguese slave trade shipped its people to Brazil to serve as slaves on the coffee plantations, and

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Angola’s rich agricultural resources served Portugal for centuries. Angola’s status as a Portuguese colony came to an end with the war in 1975. However, independence plunged the country into an even bloodier period that lasted for the next 30 years. War and conflict stemmed from an internal fight for power between nationalistic groups and, later, separatist groups who fought for the independence of Cabinda, the richest oilproducing region in the country. From the slave trade to the exploitation of natural resources, Angola’s long history of repression has always been associated with its wealthy resources.6 The Angolan War of Independence In the post–World War II era, deep socioeconomic inequalities between the Portuguese and Angola’s native people led to the formation of nationalist and cultural movements that sought a UN protectorate for the people of Angola and later called for independence from Portugal. In 1953, these movements led to the creation of Angolan separatist groups such as the MPLA (Movimento Popular para Libertacao de Angola, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and the UPA (Uniao das Populacoes de Angola, Union of the Angolan People). Inflamed by a wave of nationalism that was sweeping through southern Africa in 1960, both the UPA and the MPLA established offices in the newly independent Congo. There, they started preparing for the launching of the armed struggle that would lead to the Angolan war of independence. In the same year, the Portuguese reacted against growing separatist tension by violently repressing activists in Angola.7 The Angolan war of independence began in 1961 as a guerrilla war between 11 separatist movements and the Portuguese armed forces, sparked by an uprising of Angolan peasants against Portuguese traders over forced cotton harvesting.8 The Portuguese military responded by killing 7,000 indigenous Africans. Following the uprising, both sides engaged in brutal massacres. Within weeks, militants had organized themselves, taking farms and trading centers and then proclaiming an independent Angola.9 The major factions involved in the guerrilla war were the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, a Marxist group backed by the Soviet Union, and two other independent guerrillas groups: the National Liberation Front (FNLA) and the National Front for Independence (UNITA). These groups fought each other as much as they fought the Portuguese. With the 1975 Portuguese revolution back in their native Portugal distracting the Portuguese armed forces, the Angolan nationalist groups turned against each other for control of Angola. The war for independence turned into a civil war, and Angola fell into a state of internal chaos

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without a central government that could control the territory. Beyond Angola’s borders, as the Cold War gained momentum, national and international interests became intermixed for Portugal, which ceded independence to the people of Angola in the Alvor agreement, signed on January 15, 1975, by the MPLA, FNLA, UNITA, and the Portuguese government.10 On November 11, 1975, the MPLA announced control of the government and called the territory the People’s Republic of Angola.11 The new Republic was led first by Agostinho Neto and then, after 1979, by Jose Eduardo dos Santos. However, a lack of integration among the three groups resulted in continued hostilities, with the groups refusing to integrate their armies. Furthermore, support for the feuding groups by different external powers reinforced the internal divisiveness. Specifically, the support of South Africa and other African states for FNLA and UNITA versus the support of the USSR and Cuba for the MPLA continued to inflame the civil war until South Africa and the United States withdrew their support for FNLA-UNITA, leaving the superiority of the MPLA unquestionable.12 Eventually, the OAU,13 the United Nations, Portugal, and 80 other nations recognized the MPLA as Angola’s official government.14 The Angolan civil war is known as the longest civil war in African history. It is estimated that more than 500,000 people15 were killed, and about 4 million Angolans became internally displaced persons (IDPs).16 The widespread use of landmines during those 27 years of civil war has also put Angola on the list of countries with the highest number of amputees in the world: One in every 334 Angolans has lost a limb to a landmine.17 In 1991, the first peace agreement—the Bicesse accords—was signed between the MPLA and the UNITA, and elections were held in 1992. However, UNITA rejected the results of the election, which were favorable to the MPLA, claiming a lack of transparency. The fighting resumed, and the war continued until 1994, when another peace agreement was attempted. The Lusaka protocol was signed in 1994, with the government of Angola and UNITA agreeing to a cease-fire. Again, the agreement failed and the war continued throughout 1999. With the death of UNITA’s leader in 2002, the rebels and the government signed another cease-fire, which led, finally, to the end of the civil war. Since then, elections have been repeatedly delayed until the recent elections of September 2008, which were again favorable to the governing party. According to international observers and the Human Rights Watch, the elections were neither transparent nor fair.18,19 Scholars have argued that the oil and diamond industries financed the military strategies of both of the main parties involved in the civil war and that the interests of these parties in oil and diamonds motivated the civil war to continue beyond the end of the Cold War.20

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In countries such as Angola, devastated by war, diamonds remain one of the few products that rebel groups can use to fund themselves.21 It also appears that international profiteers, such as international corporations and foreign powers, played a role in supporting the parties involved in delaying the transition to peace and attempts to reform, keeping the conflict out of the eyes of the international community.22 According to the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Global Witness, it is estimated that between 1992 and 1998, UNITA produced ‘‘conflict diamonds’’ worth a minimum of U.S. $3.7 billion, marketed through major diamond companies in the world’s diamond trading centers.23 The separatists’ argument for independence is based on ethnic and cultural differences not supported by Angola’s government. In 1975, with the establishment of Angola’s government, the MPLA invaded Cabinda and overthrew the Liberation Front of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a Libertac~ ao do Enclave de Cabinda, FLEC), a former Portuguese colony north of Angola, and incorporated Cabinda into the Angolan territory. Consequently, since Angola’s independence from Portugal in 1975, FLEC (the separatist group) has conducted a violent resistance against the MPLA in a low-scale civil war. About 60% of Angola’s oil production comes from Cabinda’s territory. In 2006, the separatists negotiated a memorandum of understanding with the Angolans in return for the granting of a special status to Cabinda, but the separatist movement is fragmented and some of the factions question the validity of the proposal.24 Nevertheless, since the accord, about 80 percent of FLEC fighters joined the army or demobilized, and the region has entered a more peaceful stage.25 However, it would be premature to say that Cabinda’s 30 years of guerrilla war has came to an end; arrests of members of FLEC and cases of human rights violations by both the government and FLEC in Cabinda were documented in 2007. Recent Events Although the civil war ended in 2002 and a constitutional republic was formed, it has not been easy to rebuild the country after 27 years of war. Despite its rich national resources, including oil, diamonds, and gold, Angola has not been able to use its resources to improve its socioeconomic conditions. Its weak democratization process, lack of government transparency, general corruption, and insufficient political and economic reforms26 are the country’s biggest problems. Angola was rated in 2008 as number 131 out of the 167 countries on the Economist’s Democracy Index and classified as an authoritarian regime.27 Angola is the second largest oil producer in Africa, which is probably the driving factor behind its GDP ranking (10th among African countries)28

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and its 5.21 percent growth from 2006 to 2007.29 However, the disparity between rich and poor is significant. In 2008, Angola ranked number 160 in the Human Development Index out of the 168 countries included in the index.30, 31 Corruption explains part of this gap, and there have been reports of national oil income disappearing from Angola’s treasury.32 Angola is currently undergoing the reconstruction of its infrastructure.33 The resettlement of displaced persons has led to a growth in construction. Although agriculture has also grown, it is still not enough to feed the population, and about half of country’s food is imported.34 Unemployment affects more than half of the population.35 In the context of years of internal conflict, and continuing problems of poverty and social unrest, what do ordinary Angolans think about the extent to which governments have the right to commit acts of aggression? To what extent do they believe that individuals have a right to live in a world of peace and protest against war? These were the kinds of questions we addressed through administering the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) to a small sample of Angolans. The Angolan Sample Our sample consisted of Angolan adults (5 women, 11 men), from 23 to 55 years of age, with a mean age of 36. The sample was 80 percent black and 20 percent mixed. Sixty percent identified themselves as Roman Catholic and 33 percent no religion or ‘‘Other.’’ Participants were largely middle class; occupations included students, office workers, military officers, teachers, and housewives. In regard to political affiliation, 60 percent identified as MPLA, 26 percent as None; 13 percent either listed themselves as Other or did not report. All participants completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS).36 For the purposes of this study, seven items from the PAIRTAPS were analyzed. Participants were asked to rate each item on a scale from 1 to 7 (from totally disagree to totally agree) to indicate the extent to which they agreed with it and then to explain the reasoning behind their rating. They were also asked to provide definitions of war, peace, and terrorism.

ANGOLAN PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION ‘‘Invading means war and it’s a demonstrated fact that war only brings destruction.’’ ‘‘There is no situation that justifies the use and abuse of force.’’

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Invasion In response to our survey, 73 percent of the Angolan respondents disagreed with the statement ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country.’’ A significant percentage of these responses (20 percent) argued for the existence of better alternatives to invasion or asserted that invasion was outdated: ‘‘Violence is rarely the best solution,’’ or ‘‘I totally disagree because in case of not reaching an understanding between countries, above all dialogue should prevail as a form of resolving differences.’’ The need to respect sovereignty and for one country to resolve its conflicts without the interference of other countries was an equally common argument (20 percent of the total responses opposing the right to invasion). Specifically, these responses included statements supporting a country’s right to independence, or to make its own decisions, or to have its own rights (e.g., ‘‘Each country has their own problems which should be solved internally and without the intervention of other countries’’; ‘‘Nothing justifies this kind of attitude, each country should solve its own problems as it thinks best and without other countries’ interference’’). Other arguments indicated that in cases where invasion becomes necessary, the job belongs to an international organization rather than to one country alone: ‘‘No country has the right to invade another because that job, if necessary, belongs to the UN.’’ Angolans’ strong rejection of a country’s right to invasion may be related to their own experience of invasion by Cuban and South African forces in 1975– 1976 during the Angolan war of independence. Another frequent theme was concern with ulterior motives for invasion; these responses referred to the self-interested and opportunistic aspects and negative consequences of invasion. As one participant expressed it, ‘‘No one has the right to kill, cause physical or emotional harm, or disturb the lives of millions of people for the sake of their own benefits.’’ These respondents may be well aware of the personal interests underlying the prolongation of the civil war. Thirteen percent of the responses qualified the extent to which a country might have the right to start an invasion, depending on the reasons behind the invasion: ‘‘It depends on the reason for the invasion,’’ and ‘‘It depends on the motive.’’ An equal percentage supported invasion as an exceptional measure that should be avoided except in extreme and rare situations, such as when one’s citizens are threatened: ‘‘Sometimes in these cases there are a lot of things at stake, which almost all of us don’t know, but I would agree if it was to fight something that was detrimental to people’’ or ‘‘when civilians are oppressed.’’ No one in our sample demonstrated full support for invasion.

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Torture In response to the item ‘‘Sometimes the government has the right to torture prisoners of war,’’ 64 percent of the participants disagreed. The importance of preserving human rights and the inhumanity of torture were the most frequent explanations given against a governmental right to torture prisoners of war (21 percent): ‘‘It is a violation of human rights’’; ‘‘In my opinion, when we torture someone, we are committing a savage act because it’s a human being. I don’t believe that it is the most appropriate way to achieve peace.’’ Fourteen percent mentioned the excessive aspect of torture: ‘‘There is no need to torture more because being in prison is horrible enough,’’ and an equal percentage focused on the negative consequences of torture: ‘‘If the government does that to others, it will do it to you also.’’ International observer groups say detainees of Angola’s government show visible signs of torture.37 The UN’s office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that Angola’s reform of the legal framework is insufficient in regard to guarantees of basic freedoms. Furthermore, there is evidence that unlawful ways of extracting confessions from prisoners are still used regularly while the right to a lawyer and a proper legal system, as provided for in the constitution, is not applied in practice.38 International observers have been denied access to Cabinda’s military prison, which has been accused of ‘‘secret detentions.’’39 Awareness of and tolerance for governmental practices in regards to maltreatment of detainees might help explain why a relatively large percentage of our sample (36 percent) argued that torturing prisoners of war might be a right. The presumed usefulness or effectiveness of torture was the most frequently advanced argument; for example, ‘‘In case the information is necessary, so be it.’’ One respondent appealed to the historical precedent of war as a justification for torture: ‘‘There are reasons in war that justify these attitudes,’’ whereas one other supported torture under a supervised or controlled environment: ‘‘It should be carried out by an independent organization.’’ Terrorism The majority of our respondents (63 percent) disagreed with any governmental prerogative to sacrifice the lives of civilians to fight international terrorism. Thirteen percent of the responses presented arguments based on the sanctity of human life, offering statements such as ‘‘You can’t put a value on life (life cannot be subject to deciding whether or not you kill people)’’ and ‘‘No one has the right to kill another human being.’’ Some respondents argued that the ends do not justify the means, ‘‘We shouldn’t kill innocents in order to achieve our ends,’’ and

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others (13 percent) focused on the civilians’ innocence as the main reason against this right: ‘‘Because civilians are innocent’’ and ‘‘Nothing justifies the death of innocents.’’ Another frequent argument (19 percent of the responses) focused on trying to find better solutions: ‘‘It’s one thing when there is unintentional collateral damage, and another thing when you know you are going to deliberately kill people, and that’s a criminal attitude’’; ‘‘We should research alternative ways of reaching terrorists without sacrificing innocent people like when trying to get hostages out of a situation while only targeting the abductors’’; ‘‘Find another way, the innocents should not pay for this’’; and ‘‘There are other solutions.’’ During Angola’s war for independence, there were several civilian massacres, and during the civil war that followed, there were several terrorist attacks that directly targeted civilians. In several cities, guerrilla groups were responsible for promoting ethnic cleansing, including the ‘‘Bloody Friday’’ in 1993, in which the national police, the military, and civilians massacred Bakongo civilians, resulting in some 4,000 to 6,000 deaths.40 Also, toward the end of the war, UNITA emphasized guerillastyle attacks on civilian targets, terrorizing populations throughout the country. The 55-day war for Huambo, Angola’s second largest city, resulted in about 10,000 deaths and hundreds of thousands of refugees, mostly civilians. Twenty-five percent of our sample revealed some support for the right to kill civilians to fight international terrorism. Although these respondents argued that there should be an attempt to avoid killing civilians in the fight against terrorism, they nevertheless contemplated the acceptability of civilian losses in some circumstances: ‘‘If there is no other way to control the situation, and you really have to sacrifice innocents in order to save the world, we should research alternative ways of reaching terrorists without sacrificing innocent people.’’ One respondent argued that to some extent, the ends justify the means: ‘‘This is very difficult for me. Sometimes it makes sense to kill civilians to save more civilians.’’

ANGOLAN PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE AND PROTEST ‘‘[Achieving world peace] is probably not possible because there are several interests in the world that are not consistent with world peace.’’ ‘‘Only peace can provide the right environment for healthy development.’’ ‘‘Anti-war protests are an act of giving voice to the minority to the majority which holds the power.’’

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World Peace and the Right to Peace In response to the item ‘‘I believe that world peace can be achieved,’’ 60 percent of the sample stated that world peace is either not achievable or is a very difficult goal. The most frequent reasons given for the difficulty (52 percent) were flaws in human nature leading to conflict: ‘‘Man has been pursuing this ideal for a long time, however his own nature (very complex) leads him to conflicts with others’’; ‘‘It seems to me that dissatisfaction and conflict are part of the human condition; there will always be something wrong with someone who will affect society’’; ‘‘Human beings are excessively ambitious and use any means to achieve their ends.’’ The almost fatalistic view expressed by 52 percent of the respondents is probably due to the length of conflicts in Angola and the fact that Angolans have known no peace for five centuries. Other explanations for the difficulty in achieving world peace focused on nation-states and on the inherency of conflicts over scarce resources: ‘‘It is normal that there will always be nations in conflict because resources are limited.’’ These views are hardly surprising, given Angola’s wealth and the fact that over the last 500 years, violence in Angola has been mostly associated with its abundance of resources,41 which have been coveted by nations such as Portugal, the United States, and Russia, among others. Thirteen percent of the responses revealed less pessimism with regard to the achievability of world peace, indicating that world peace was an ideal that society should strive for: ‘‘Despite everything, the world is still oriented towards a goal based on the best intentions among people.’’ Similarly, twenty percent of our respondents stated that world peace might not be achievable now but could be in the future: ‘‘Although it might take many years, I believe that one day when poverty is no longer a human problem, it will be possible to reach world peace,’’ and ‘‘The way things are going, I honestly don’t know in which future decade it will happen, but I don’t think it’s impossible.’’ Lastly, one respondent mentioned that world peace would be achievable ‘‘if mankind shows goodwill, less ambition, and more love.’’ In regard to the item ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace,’’ the majority of our sample (70 percent) agreed with the item, stating that this right is one of the most fundamental human rights: ‘‘This is the basic law of nature. Not only humans, but all beings that inhabit the earth have the right to peace.’’ Some of the responses emphasized a positive conception of peace, equating it with having basic needs met: ‘‘I completely agree, all without exception have the right to food, shelter, security, and above any concrete material thing, all human beings have the right to peace of mind.’’ Some responses identified peace as a

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necessary condition to having a better world, and some focused on the difficulty of ensuring this right: ‘‘Unfortunately, as with so many other rights, this one is also disregarded.’’ Protest Seventy-nine percent of the sample provided arguments indicating strong agreement with an individual right to protest against war and in favor of peace; for example, ‘‘Yes, because war only creates destruction and therefore hunger, poverty, and underdevelopment.’’ This emphasis on the destructiveness of war was a recurrent theme across many of the survey items, which is not surprising, given that peace has been achieved only recently in Angola and that some parts of the territory are still experiencing some degree of armed conflict. Several of the responses (29 percent) supported the right to protest by stressing civic responsibility, which all citizens have the obligation to fulfill: ‘‘To seek the interests of the collective’’; ‘‘I believe this is a right and a form of fighting which is often neglected, but which should be used more often and more sagely’’; and ‘‘Of course. The world is the product of our actions and our responsibility and we have the right to demand what we want.’’ Although the civil war has ended, civil society in Angola is not without conflict, given that some form of political repression is still present. Some scholars have argued that since the transition from the Cold War, several postconflict elections have been part of negotiated peace processes in societies marked by civil war. Elections are the fundamental mechanisms allowing citizens to participate in the choices being made. Because the structure of electoral democracy allows managing conflicts through nonviolence,42 elections are a fundamental step in transitioning from war to peace. However, the democratization process can also lead to the polarization of parties, if the demobilization of armed forces is not done properly. Furthermore, voters are often traumatized and fearful of engaging in and trusting the electoral process.43 Perhaps because the international realigning of countries’ positions occurred at the same time as the transition to democracy in Angola, the international community did not take sufficient action to support a sustainable democracy. The inadequacy of the response from the UN and major international players44 in 1992, when Angola held the first elections, might have contributed to a series of frustrated peace negotiations and the resurgence of armed conflict leading ultimately to a weak democracy.45 Freedom of expression was the most frequent justification given for a right to protest (36 percent of the responses); for example, ‘‘We have to have freedom of expression’’; ‘‘Freedom of expression and opinion

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should be preserved because it is the only way you can have all points of view represented’’; and ‘‘Everyone is free to express themselves.’’ Despite Angola’ weak democracy, participants strongly endorsed democratic rights such as freedom of expression and association. Possible explanations for reservations concerning such a right might be the perceived lack of political freedom and/or fear of repression. However, another reason might be that for Angolans, the experience of democracy has been too limited for them to be fully aware of democratic norms. In fact, recent literature has focused on the need for learning democratic values in emerging democracies and the extent to which the democratization process requires increased awareness of democratic norms, as well as a strengthening of citizens’ efficacy in becoming active in public matters.46 In Angola,47 reports on the 2008 election indicated threats to a free and fair election of the national assembly, scheduled to take place in September 2008.48 Observers in the field reported lack of both an independent media and an impartial Angolan electoral body.49 The stifling of an independent media and interference with the formation of an impartial electoral body are two ways that governments can interfere with citizen rights to a free election, freedom of expression, and assembly. There are also reports of incidents of political violence, including assaults on MPLA supporters by UNITA party members and property.50 Media coverage in Angola is poor. There is only one newspaper distributed throughout Angola, and it is owned by the state, whereas private newspapers are weekly and are distributed mainly within the capital. Television and radio are also state-owned. Overall, media sources are biased toward the ruling party.51 Human Rights Watch also claims that there is evidence of intimidation of journalists and civilian groups questioning the peace agreement between the Angolan government and the separatist guerilla group, FLEC, especially as a separatist conflict and heightened military presence continues in this region.52 Furthermore, human rights reports from 2007 list Angolan human rights abuses, including killings by the police, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, forced evictions, and impediments to freedom of speech and assembly, among other human rights violations.53 A relatively low percentage of our participants’ responses agreed conditionally with the right to protest, focusing on the necessary of maintaining nonviolence: ‘‘[Protest is a right] if done peacefully and able to make a point so that the government officials will seriously consider why you are protesting.’’ Only a very small proportion of responses expressed some reservations. These responses suggested that protests do not solve the real causes of conflict (e.g., ‘‘Protests aren’t always planned in order to solve the real problems behind the conflict’’)

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and that sometimes war is inevitable to achieve peace (e.g., ‘‘I totally agree, although in some cases war might be needed in order to achieve peace.’’) Definitions of War and Peace ‘‘[War is] extreme antagonism and another way to conduct a political struggle.’’ In regard to definitions of war, 19 percent of our sample identified it with strong emotions such as evil or a horrible conflict. Thirty-three percent of our sample defined war as an ‘‘armed conflict between two countries or groups,’’ ‘‘act of collective violence involving guns between two parties,’’ or ‘‘when two countries are in disagreement.’’ Power, greed, and political interests were again often (43 percent) identified as a cause of war: ‘‘to resolve conflict with military force. Hunger for power, authority, greed,’’ and ‘‘the extreme antagonism and another phase of a political fight.’’ Five percent of our sample focused on the destructive outcomes of war: ‘‘the greatest cause of disgrace in the world.’’ Despite Angola’s rich history of war, the majority of our sample (55 percent) defined peace positively rather than as an absence of war. The most frequent responses (17 percent) focused on peace as something valuable that ‘‘should be conquered and preserved,’’ ‘‘a good that we are very much in need for,’’ or ‘‘there are no words to describe something as beautiful as peace.’’ Nine percent of the responses emphasized ‘‘well-being’’ and ‘‘tranquility,’’ whereas 23 percent focused on the social relationship aspect of peace, such as expressed by this participant: ‘‘[Peace is] the condition in which all societal activities proceed normally and in a stable environment.’’ Responses in this category also mentioned the importance of tolerance and understanding with regard to differences between people and races (e.g., ‘‘Acceptance of differences resolves conflict with understanding’’ and ‘‘State of harmony and understanding experienced between people or races.’’ Peace was frequently referred to as a state of harmony with 14 percent of the responses falling in this category. In contrast with positive conceptions of peace, 23 percent defined it as the absence of war or armed conflict, and another 5 percent defined peace as a utopia. National Security When asked if national security is essential for family and individual security, 85 percent of the participants agreed and 15 percent qualified their agreement. Analysis of the responses revealed that in 46 percent of

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the responses Angolans associated security with individual and family security. For example, ‘‘if we are safe in our country, we feel safe in our families’’ and ‘‘yes, because we have to first feel safe within our country because that’s where our home is.’’ Some responses (8 percent) implied that national security should start within the individual: ‘‘We feel safe with national security, but to have individual and family and safety it starts with us.’’ In addition, respondents who conditionally agreed with the importance of national security (15 percent) either pointed out that national security depended on social status (e.g., ‘‘It depends on your social status if you have security or not. Even in an unstable society if you are in an upper class you are safe, if you are in a lower class you are unsafe’’) or stated that national security does not guarantee individual and national security (e.g., ‘‘the world is a global society. National security no longer assures security for family and individual. The world needs to come together and desire world peace.’’)

CONCLUSION Angola’s five centuries of violence are marked by colonial repression and war. Just in the last 30 years, it would be impossible to quantify the impact of war-related problems, such as famine and disease, on its impoverished population. Angolan’s long and traumatic experience with violence is reflected in the responses showing Angolan’s opposition to war. Our survey data made clear Angolans’ strong opposition to war. Responses show an uncompromising disagreement with most items related to governmental violence, such as the right to invade other countries, the right to kill to fight terrorism, and the right to torture prisoners of war. Responses also reflect awareness of how political and economic agendas have been part of the driving force behind the conflict. Angolans’ views on invasion revealed disagreement with the right to invade and the importance of sovereignty as well as a country’s right to be independent, make its own decisions, and have its own rights. Common themes focused on the self-interested and opportunistic aspect of invasion. With regard to protest, respondents showed a strong support for civic responsibility, freedom of expression, and the consequent right to protest. As for terrorism and torture, there was a general uncompromising disagreement with infringement on universal principles such as the right to life and the preservation of human rights.

5

Botswana Mahlon B. Dalley

War is . . . ’’continuous damage or killings done as a way to get an angry message across; just hatred and attacks towards another nation.’’ Peace is . . . ’’to believe that we are all equal in the eyes of God and unite; destroy all weapons and technology being used in ways which would benefit people not to make weapons.’’ We were taught, sometimes in a very positive way, to despise ourselves and our ways of life. We were made to believe that we had no past to speak of, no history to boast of. The past, so far as we were concerned, was just a blank and nothing more. Only the present mattered and we had very little control over it. It seemed we were in for a definite period of foreign tutelage, without any hope of our ever again becoming our own masters. The end result of all this was that our self-pride and our self-confidence were badly undermined. It should now be our intention to try to retrieve what we can of our past. We should write our own history books to prove that we did have a past, and that it was a past that was just as worth writing and learning about as any other. We must do this for the simple reason that a nation without a past is a lost nation, and a people without a past is a people without a soul.1

Located in the southern end of Africa divided by the Tropic of Capricorn, Botswana is a land-locked, mostly arid country; the exception is the Okavango Delta, one of the world’s largest inland watersheds, in the north. Botswana is surrounded by Zambia, formerly Northern Rhodesia, on the north; Zimbabwe, formerly Southern Rhodesia, on the north and east; South Africa to the east and south; and Namibia, formerly South-West Africa to the west. If known to the Western world at all, Botswana might be recognized as the African country that harbors the stereotypical ‘‘Bushman,’’ as in the film The Gods Must Be Crazy, Parts I and II,2 or the country that straddles the Kalahari, or the country

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in which Mma Ramotswe in Alexander McCall Smith’s The Number One Ladies Detective Agency solves colloquial crimes in her country.3 Little known is that because of large deposits of diamonds discovered one year after independence in 1967, this country of only a million and a half Botswana people is perhaps the richest country in Africa on a per capita basis. This new wealth is in stark contrast to the situation in 1966, when Botswana was ranked as one of the world’s poorest nations.4 Clark Leith in Why Botswana Prospered states that since its independence Botswana has consistently dominated the list of the world’s fastgrowing countries in relationship to gross domestic product (GDP). A success story financially for an African country, Botswana also leads in other indicators such as primary school enrollment and accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. Leith concludes that the reason for this growth was sound policies and not luck.5 After more than 40 years of independence, the average individual annual income in Botswana rose from less than $500 (in today’s prices) to more than $5,000 in 2006. Between 1966 and 1980, Botswana had the fastest growing economy in the world. Botswana has held nine open and free national elections and has escaped war, misrule, strife, and government corruption for these 40plus years. It has at the same time expanded electricity, municipal water, paved roads, education, and health services to most of its citizens.6 What has differentiated Botswana from other African countries has been its long tradition of democratic rule, its freedom of the press, and its respect for ethnic and racial differences.7 Unlike most of its African neighbors (e.g., South Africa), the doctrine of nonracialism was incorporated into Botswana’s constitution at independence, this at a time when apartheid and white rule were dominant in most of the countries adjacent to its borders.8 One need only inquire about the meaning of the relatively simple Botswana flag to understand Botswana’s message to the world regarding nonracialism. The flag’s horizontal, bold black bar dominates the middle, two white stripes flank the black, and the skyblue color frames the rest of the flag. The black and white stripes represents a country of racial harmony, and the sky-blue color represents rain, more affectionately referred to as Pula, or ‘‘let there be rain.’’ Rain is in short supply, a vital commodity, and revered in this arid land.9 Even though Botswana’s dominant population is over 90 percent black (Tswana 79 percent, Kalanga 11 percent, Basarwa 4 percent, and other, including Kgalagadi and white 7 percent),10 racial harmony has as its symbol the first president of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama. In 1948, Ruth Williams, a British citizen, married Sir Seretse Khama, the chiefdom heir of the territory of the Bamangwato, Seretse’s people. This land bordered the country where the policy of apartheid was being formulated in South Africa. The British exerted every effort to stop the

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marriage between Seretse and Ruth, in part because South Africa was the world’s biggest supplier of uranium, which was critical for Britain to break the U.S. monopoly of atomic weapons. For Seretse’s people, the prospect of a white wife for their chief-to-be in Bechuanaland (now Botswana) was also unacceptable and reprehensible. With growing pressures, Sir Seretse Khama and his wife Ruth Williams were exiled to England from 1952 to 1956.11 The commonwealth relations minister coordinated their return to Bangwato in 1956 to separate Botswana from the institutional racism in South Africa; however, he was stripped of his title. Seretse Khama would have no part of being a common citizen and later, as head of the liberal-democratic Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP), became prime minister (1965). Then, in September of the same year, he became the first president of the Republic of Botswana.12,13 Despite its many achievements, Botswana also has had its share of difficulties. As in so many developing countries, challenges have been many. Recently, the three highest priorities for Botswana have been refugees, HIV/AIDS, and Western intrusions. Refugees, especially from Zimbabwe, have been one of the three major challenges, with tens of thousands of economic refugees putting pressure on Botswana’s border patrol and social services. Citizens’ long-standing acceptance of immigrants and a policy of neutrality has been strained.14 The second biggest challenge and perhaps the paramount challenge in Botswana has been the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In 2007, approximately 300,000 people were infected with the HIV virus. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Botswana has reached disturbing proportions considering its total population is less than 2 million. Nearly 24 percent of adults are infected with HIV, the second highest in the world following Swaziland.15 In a June 2001 speech to the UN General Assembly, President Festus Mogae summed up the problem concisely: ‘‘We are threatened with extinction. People are dying in chillingly high numbers. It is a crisis of the first magnitude.’’16 A third major concern has been with the European and North American pressure groups and their mantra to stop the sale of ‘‘conflict’’ or ‘‘blood’’ diamonds, diamonds originating from areas controlled by forces outside of and opposed to legitimate governments. Botswana diamond exports, which underwrite most of its country’s development, represent more than a third of the world’s total output by value. Even though Botswana’s diamond deposits are found in ‘‘kimberlite’’ pipes, accessible only through capital-intensive, machinery-driven extraction processes, the blood diamond campaign has lumped Botswana among those countries with ‘‘alluvial’’ or surface deposits, which can be mined by individuals with simple tools for illicit purposes. Alluvial mining is

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the type of mining that finances civil wars in troubled nations such as Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire—thus, the name ‘‘blood’’ diamonds. In response to international concerns about blood diamonds, Botswana was cofounder of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, an initiative among diamond-producing nations designed to keep conflict diamonds out of the pipeline. Although ‘‘alluvial’’ diamonds amount to only 1 percent of the global diamond trade, there are innuendos regarding Botswana and blood diamonds. The loss of revenues as a result of the conflict diamond publicity campaign remains a significant problem for Botswana. Most of this publicity is exerted from outside of Botswana and is perpetuated from pressure groups from Europe and North America. There is no substantive evidence that Botswana exports blood diamonds. In a CNN World Report from Orapa, the largest open pit diamond mine in the world, long-term production manager, Mike Moremong, states that he is proud that none of Botswana’s diamonds can be classified as conflict or blood diamonds, ‘‘Every diamond that comes out of the ground in Botswana can be traced from the mines until it gets to De Beers [international diamond company] in London.’’17 The possible link between blood diamonds and the Botswana diamond industry is adamantly renounced by Botswana. Despite the fact that blood diamonds are not a part of the diamond-mining operations in Botswana, some sources have subsequently claimed that the government’s forced removal of the Bushman/San people from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve is a blood diamond type of issue. The government states that the removal is an attempt to integrate the Bushman/ San into society and to use the vast Kalahari Desert for game protection and tourism. Others see the removal as a way for the government to acquire vast tracts of diamond-mining land. Removal of the Bushman/ San has resulted in litigation and accusations not directly tied to the diamond issues but has contributed to an inflammatory climate, as seen in the paper ‘‘Last Exit from the Kalahari: The Slow Genocide of the Bushmen/San’’.18 This paper makes a case for a long slow genocide going on for centuries and now reaching the point of total extinction of the Bushman/San by forced evacuation. Both the government members favoring relocation and those opposed to forced evacuation have a point; however, one wonders what harm there is in allowing people who have occupied this land for 40,000 years the choice of remaining on their land and still providing basic services. Those forecasting that the removal of the Bushman/San will force the extinction of the Bushman/San may be correct. In addition to the above three major problems facing Botswana, other challenges include poverty, unemployment, violence against women, and declining involvement in national and local elections. Even though

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Botswana’s economic picture has improved overall, multiple and varied efforts by the government to increase employment through subsidies, loans, education, training, and tax incentives in the manufacturing, investment, commercial, tourism, and agricultural sectors have failed so far to raise employment or lower poverty below 30 percent. Symptomatic of violence against women, ‘‘passion killings’’ have also plagued the country and expose the lack of protection for women in a still patriarchal legal and social system. Political apathy has also risen despite increased mobility and an expanded free press, new radio stations, a proliferation of cell phones, expansion of Internet communication, and a national television service.19

SHORT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Pre-British Protectorate Hunters, herders, and gatherers speaking Khoe and San (Khoesan) languages have lived in Botswana for many thousand years, from approximately 17,000 BCE to 1650 CE. For most of this period, Khoesanspeaking people subsisted as hunters and gatherers who adapted to seasonal mobility in family groups in and around rivers and wetlands. Some Khoesans converted to a more pastoral lifestyle of herding cattle and sheep in the last centuries BCE.20 Over the course of millennia, as the Khoesan hunters and gatherers established themselves, farming people migrated southward from north of the equator, bringing with them the speaking of western and eastern Bantu languages. From the 13th to the 15th centuries, Great Zimbabwe emerged as a powerful state based on its control of the gold trade. The rise of Tswana domination from the east and south began in the 1500–1600 period; some explain these migration patterns as a response to drought with junior brothers splitting off to become independent chiefs. After about 1700, people began settling in stonewalled villages, and some large towns began developing on hills, a shift in settlement patterns for the region. The towns were hostile toward each other, usually competing for cattle wealth and subject populations to control hunting, mining, and trade.21,22,23 From 1750 until the 1840s, Southern Africa experienced a period of disruptions, various migrations, and numerous wars. The pillaging of ivory, cattle, and slaves spread inland from the coast of Mozambique, the Cape Colony, and Angola. By 1826, an army of refugees—the Kololo—moved through Shoshong to the Boteti River attacking the Tawana and taking cattle as far west as Namibia. In about 1835, the Kololo settled on the Chobe River.24

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In the 1840s, following the wars, Tswana states of Ngwaketse, Kwena, and Ngwata were reconstituted. Commoners and subject peoples were controlled firmly by the state and were organized in units under individual chiefs, while paying homage to the king. The states were in competition for the increasing trade in ivory and ostrich feathers, arriving by wagons from Cape Colony in the south. The roads from the south also brought Christian ministries to Botswana and the Boer trekkers who inhabited in the Transvaal, east of Botswana. Beginning in the early 1870s, a series of armed clashes involving the major Batswana seriously disturbed the region. These wars continued into the early 1880s, disrupting trade, lowering agricultural production, resulting in the loss of thousands of cattle, and leading to the deaths of thousands of people.25,26,27 British Protectorate On the Botswana’s Paula 100 paper currency, worth about $20, one Batswana kiKgosi (meaning ‘‘king’’), Bathoen I, is standing between two other sitting Batswana Kings, Sebele I and Khama II. The situation depicted took place in 1895 in London. According to a widespread Botswana myth, these three kings persuaded the British to rule Bechuanaland to prevent South Africans (Boers) from taking over the country and imposing white rule. As great a myth as this is, what really happened in 1895 was that the three kiKgosi visited London to protest the imminent transfer of the Bechuanaland Protectorate (Botswana) to the British South Africa Company (BSACO) and to the Cape Colony. At that time, the Cape parliament wanted to annex British Bechuanaland (Botswana) and have BSACO’s President Cecil Rhodes take over control of Bechuanaland. In July of 1895, the three kings, Bathoen, Khama, and Sebele, journeyed to England for the purpose of making a personal appeal to the queen for imperial, rather than BSACO, rule. The visit was a popular success with the queen and Joseph Chamberlain, colonial secretary, even though it didn’t change Chamberlain’s decision to hand over the entire Protectorate to the BSACO. The kiKgosi agreed to submit to taxation as well. In return, they gained only the reassurance that within their respective territories they could continue to rule their people much as they already did.28 Fortunately, for the kiKgosi, Cecil Rhodes, then prime minister of the British Cape Colony, was plotting to support a rebellion of Englishspeaking residents against the Afrikaans-speaking Boer Republic of the Transvaal under Paul Krieger. A band of British adventurers, led by Starr Jameson, planned a secret raid from Rhodesia through Botswana that was to coincide with an uprising of the English-speaking Uitlanders in Johannesburg (now South Africa). Jameson’s uprising, involving

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600 men, was quickly defeated. The BASC was forced to pay the Boer government almost one million pounds in compensation. The failure of the rebellion embarrassed the British government, and demands to transfer Bechuanaland to the control of Rhodes’s company were put on indefinite hold.29,30 Thus, the Jameson Raid on New Year’s Day in 1896 was an event that averted Rhodesian white settler rule in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, perhaps averted the kind of civil unrest and war that hit Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) a century later in the 1990s, averted Rhodesian white settler rule in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and maintained the status quo of Bechuanaland as a British Protectorate for almost a century (from 1885 to 1966).31 To help pay for the administration of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, the British administration instituted a ‘‘hut tax’’ in 1899 and a ‘‘native tax’’ in 1919. These taxes had the effect of forcing the Tswana into wage labor in the European-dominated sector of the economy. A system of parallel government developed that let the African kings rule their own people, but their powers to tax, conduct trials and wars, and other matters were eliminated or regulated by the magistrate of the British Protectorate. In 1919 and 1920, this system of governance was formalized, and separate African and European Advisory Councils were created. Each Advisory Council was supposed to deal with the affairs of its own people under the eye of the resident magistrate.32 An attempt to incorporate Bechuanaland into the Union of South Africa failed in 1910; however, Botswana, along with the other ‘‘High Commission Territories’’ of Lesotho and Swaziland, was integrated economically with South Africa as part of the South African Customs Union. Up to and beyond their independence in 1966, Botswana received only a fixed 2 percent share of Customs Union revenues and was left to fend for itself as a poor, sandy wasteland with no resources of note other than serving as a labor pool, especially for mining by its wealthier South African neighbor. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, there were periodic protests from local kings who objected to the interference of British administrators in their internal affairs, but generally little notice was paid to these complaints.33 In 1960, Motsami Mpho and Philip Matante, both members of the African National Congress in South Africa and active in antiapartheid protests, formed the Bechuanaland Peoples Party (BPP). In 1965, Mpho broke from the BPP to form the Behuanaland Independence Party (BIP). What was viewed as the radical stance of this party among more conservative Tswana led to the formation of the Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP) in 1962 under the leadership of the Ngwato Kgosi, Sir Seretse Khama. In the country’s first election, the BDP won a dominating 28 seats in the general assembly, followed by three seats for the BPP

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and none for the BIP. Nevertheless, resistance to British rule steadily increased, and in 1964, the British government bowed to pressure to accept democratic self-government in Botswana. A constitution was formulated in 1965, and Botswana held its first general elections as an independent country in 1966.34

CURRENT INTRUSIONS, CONFLICTS, AND SHORT WARS Countries that have been plagued by civil unrest and war since its independence in 1966 surround Botswana. First, the long Rhodesian war (Zimbabwean Liberation War) at times spilled over into Botswana. The worst single attack inside Botswana occurred on February 15, 1978, near the village of Lesoma in northeast Botswana. A Botswana Defence Force (BDF) patrol responded to information that the Rhodesian forces were pursuing Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) guerrillas in the area. At that time, Botswana policy was to prohibit any liberation group from using Botswana as a base for operations. According to Batswanians, when the BDF found three ZAPU guerrillas, they drove them off in their Land Rovers to interrogate them at the BDF base. On their way, Rhodesians ambushed the BDF and killed 15 soldiers and two Batswana civilians. In addition, eight civilians were wounded in the attack. International observers believed that the ambush was designed either to intimidate the newly formed BDF or to retaliate for presumed BDF assistance to the ZAPU.35 In the 1970s and 1980s, Botswana, outside Francistown, provided a primitive haven from political persecution and warfare for refugees from all the neighboring countries. The war for the liberation of Zimbabwe, which reached its peak in the late 1970s, created the largest influx of refugees into Botswana. By 1979, more than 30,000 were settled in three refugee camps. After the end of the Zimbabwean war in 1980, most of these refugees returned to Zimbabwe. In recent years, however, thousands of Zimbabweans have entered Botswana as economic refugees, many of them illegally. Between 1999 and 2004, an estimated 800,000 destitute Zimbabweans crossed into Botswana, and in 2003 Botswana for the first time in its history began systematic repatriation by force, to cope with the deluge.36 Over the last 40 years, another difficult situation for the newly democratic country of Botswana has been the apartheid situation in South Africa. Although Botswana tried to maintain a stance of political freedom and neutrality, the South African Defense Force in the 1980s launched a number of military raids into Gaborone, the capital of Botswana, setting off car bombs and murdering innocent Tswana as well

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as the refugees whom they were targeting.37 Botswana was repeatedly pressured by South Africa to sign a mutual security agreement, but to no avail. The relationship between Botswana and South Africa further deteriorated when South Africa accused Botswana of harboring anti-South Africa insurgents, and thus, permitting the terroristic acts and sabotage perpetrated against South Africa—a claim Botswana fiercely denied. South African commandos raided alleged ANC homes during the night of June 14, 1985, killing at least 15 people—many innocent of ANC connections. More South African border violations and attacks on Botswana continued during 1986 with incursion halting in 1988. Formal diplomatic relations were established in 1992 between the two countries.38 Many thought that this first democratically formed African country had no other option but to ally itself with its white neighbors—South Africa, South-West Africa (currently Namibia), and Southern Rhodesia (currently Zimbabwe). Yet, despite some external and internal strife, Botswana did not sell out and instead became a beacon of peace and hope for the more oppressed and war-ravaged countries of Africa, some of them on Botswana’s borders (e.g., Zimbabwe). ATTITUDES ON PERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO AGGRESSION AND PEACE In the context of a Euro-American perspective on this rather obscure, marginalized, out-of-the- way protectorate, one might well wonder how it became a well-respected, highly prized, and informative African country that has seen little in its history that compares with the genocide of other African countries such as Rwanda, Sudan, or Uganda or the horrific civil unrest of countries such as South Africa or Zimbabwe. It has been on the borders of such countries and yet it still maintains a fragile but sustainable democracy of 40 years, the best in Africa, without the instability that other African nations have endured. Because of its unique situation, a look at some of its people’s attitudes and beliefs regarding personal and institutional rights to aggression and peace could provide valuable insight into this country’s soul. Sample and Procedures As part of a larger international project, the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS)39 was administered to 68 Batswana students (40 females and 28 males) enrolled at the University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana, with approval from the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs. Participants ranged in age from 19 to 46, with a mean of 22.5; most were between 20

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and 25 years of age. The most prevalent ethnic group (10 students) was Motswana,40 which included 15 percent of the respondents. The second most prevalent ethnic group (9 students; 13 percent of the respondents) was Kalanga.41 Four of the participants simply responded Black African, with one other responding African (7 percent). The remaining participants came from a diverse set of ethnic groups, including Mokgatla, Mokwena, Herero, Morolong, Mokalaka, Sekgatla, Mokgalagadi, Molete, Mongwato, Mokgatia, Motalaote, Mbukushu, Caucasian, Sotho, Mohurutshe, Mongwato, and Bangwato. Three students identified their countries of South Africa, Nigeria, and Zambia as their ethnic group. As noted previously, Botswana is a land of many ancestral groupings and after 40 years of independence, it is clear that the citizens still identify with various ethnicities/language groups around their country. What is unusual is that even with the large diversity, there does not appear to be open animosity among ethnic groups; because the democracy has lasted over 40 years, there must be a sense of Botswana for all. The one exception to this may be the San/Koei (Bushmen) peoples, who were not represented in this sample. As is usual in a traditional undergraduate university setting, 55 of the students (88 percent) were single; seven were married, and six did not report marital status. All but six participants (from the United States, Zambia, South Africa, Nigeria, and Lesoto) said they were born in Botswana, indicating that the large refugee populations in the country were not represented in this college sample. All but one of their fathers and mothers were born in Botswana. Twelve students did not report their religion; of the remainder of the sample, two respondents identified themselves as Muslims, and all the others said they were Christian or some variant such as Roman Catholic, Protestant, Pentecost, Apostolic, etc. Most of the students considered themselves to be middle class (56 percent) followed by the working (16 percent) and upper middle (13 percent) classes; 10 percent said they were from the lower class, and five percent said they were upper class. All students were undergraduates except for two graduate students. Majors included economics (24 percent), social work (29 percent), environmental science (15 percent), and accounting (5 percent). Despite the fact that for the past 40 years, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has dominated all elections with all the presidents elected from this party, Botswana is a multiparty government. When asked which political party do you identify with most, the majority of students (55 percent) said BDP. However, 13 percent indicated they align with the fastest growing political party, Botswana Congress Party (BCP), which split from the Botswana National Front in 1998 and is the third largest party in Botswana. Six percent said their party was the main oppositional party, the Botswana National Front (BNF), which is

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the second largest party in Botswana.42 It would appear that although students at UB mostly align with their elders’ established party, many are now aligning with the opposition party. In regards to having participated in any conflict resolution or peace education programs in a school or community setting, 34 (50 percent) answered no, 7 (10 percent) answered yes, 1 (2 percent) not sure, and 26 (38 percent) left the item blank. Some of the types of involvement mentioned included peace poster competition; counseling and working in a clinic as part of a class; counseling courses; solving conflicts as headboy at school; and serving as a UNICEF member at Kumamoto, Japan. Thus, it appears that UB students have not been given systematic or formal types of conflict resolution or peace education. When asked if they had ever been involved in any sort of protest against war and in favor of peace, 40 (50 percent) responded ‘‘No,’’ only 7 (10 percent) said ‘‘Yes,’’ and 21 (30 percent) left the question blank. Those answering ‘‘Yes’’ indicated involvement in the following types of protest activities: strike at school; demonstration at the U.S. embassy in Gaborone against the U.S. invasion of Iraq; the protest march complaining about poor conditions at UB; a vigil at church; and a protest against the Botswana government’s silence on the Zimbabwean crisis. It appears that UB students’ interpretation of ‘‘protest against war and in favor of peace’’ was broadly interpreted to mean any form of ‘‘protest,’’ including a protest at UB regarding the meal allowance. Only two participants indicated that their protest involved the larger issue of ‘‘war and peace.’’ In summary, it appears that Batswana citizens, as represented by these students, have not been very involved with protests against war. For the purposes of this chapter, the students’ qualitative responses to items on the PAIRTAPS dealing with judgments concerning the extent to which governments have the right to commit aggressive acts (e.g., invasion and torture) and individuals have a right to peace and protest were analyzed, as were their definitions of war, peace, and terrorism, and their ideas about national security. In regard to the items on rights, participants first responded on seven-point rating scales ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree) with items such as ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war’’ and then provided explanations of their rating scale responses. On the basis of coding manuals developed by the international research team, these explanations were then coded into categories. Rating Scale Analyses Quite telling were the averages for the ratings on each of the survey questions. With the midpoint of 4 corresponding to neither agree nor

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disagree, all scores between 1 and 3 indicated some level of disagreement with the item and all scores between 5 and 7 indicated some level of agreement. Batswana students scored close to total agreement on the following items: Children have the right to grow up in a world of peace (average score, 6.58), all humans beings have a basic right to peace (average score, 6.77), individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favour of peace (average score, 6.44), I believe world peace can be achieved (average score, 5.08), and national security is essential for individual and family security (average score, 6.22). In regard to the items addressing a potential state right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war and kill innocent civilians in the fight against international terrorism, participants soundly disagreed, with average scores of 2.68 and 1.90, respectively. Students also disagreed rather strongly (average score, 2.17) with the statement that sometimes one country has the right to invade another country. ANALYSES OF QUALITATIVE RESPONSES REGARDING GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION What Is War? The most common definitions of war (47 percent) provided by the Botswana sample equated it with conflicts, and the second most frequent type of definition (32 percent) identified it with destruction and other negative outcomes of war. These two types of definition portray war as a state-level phenomenon rather than viewing it from an individualistic perspective. Within the conflict category, definitions included ‘‘physical confrontation between disagreeing parties,’’ ‘‘hostilities between or among nations,’’ ‘‘when mass people kill each other over a conflict,’’ ‘‘groups (denominations) fighting against each other,’’ ‘‘battle between nations,’’ and ‘‘fight between countries, ethnic groups, etc.’’ Responses in the category for destruction and other outcomes of war included the following rather vivid definitions: ‘‘may result in death, loss of house, disability,’’ ‘‘killings and destruction of each other,’’ ‘‘fights, killings and beatings,’’ ‘‘where there are bombings and killings between the parties,’’ ‘‘extreme fighting and killing of people between or within countries,’’ and simply ‘‘death.’’ Five percent of the responses stated or implied a concern with defense; for example, ‘‘because of a political or civil situation’’ and simply ‘‘Defense.’’ Another five percent indicated that war is just one alternative to dealing with conflict—a ‘‘last resort to an understanding,’’ ‘‘occurs when two different entities have a misunderstanding and cannot agree so they fight,’’ and ‘‘due to a misunderstanding.’’ One response suggested that war is ‘‘fighting caused by some instability in the system.’’

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Only a few of the responses provided an individual level orientation to war, either a morality-based definition (6 percent) or an emotionbased definition (4 percent). Definitions incorporating a personal moral judgment concerning war included ‘‘anti-peace and stability.’’ Emotionbased definitions of war included ‘‘Hate,’’ ‘‘pain inflicted on innocent people and those said to be guilty,’’ and ‘‘forceful and physical infliction of pain in another individual.’’ A Right to Invasion? There were 54 codable qualitative responses to the item ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country.’’ None of these responses made reference to self-defense. A relatively large percentage of the responses (63 percent) were reasons why an invasion is not a right; only 34 percent were arguments why invasion is or may be a right. Among the arguments rejecting a state right to invasion, 31 percent cited some sort of general principle or sovereignty. The students argued, for example, ‘‘We have to respect the sovereignty of other countries and international organizations that deal with conflicts’’; ‘‘each country is independent, so it has a right to solve its internal problems without influence from any country’’; ‘‘what happens out of our borders is not our business no matter how badly it affects us’’; and ‘‘countries experiencing internal affairs have to be given a chance to solve their problems alone as they understand the situation better than anyone else.’’ Two students made different kinds of judgments concerning a right to invasion, calling it ‘‘stupid’’ and saying it (invasion) should be punished. One student mentioned ulterior motives, ‘‘no country needs to show or display its superiority over another one.’’ This student also indicated alternatives to invasions, saying, ‘‘A country should help mediate rather than invade a country because that [invasion] won’t solve any problem.’’ One of the conditions imposed on a right to invade was proof of wrong-doing. One student said a country has a right to invade ‘‘only when there’s proof that the other country is causing trouble.’’ The second major reason given for not invading another country (11 percent of the responses) had to do with negative consequences; for example, ‘‘brings fear and disturbances to innocent people.’’ One respondent commented, ‘‘So far, the only thing I have seen is a spring of more violence when invasion is exercised.’’ Four of the responses (7 percent) focused on the availability of better alternatives or suggested that invasion was outdated. These participants made such comments as ‘‘each country is ruled by its own rules and one country has no right whatsoever to invade the other country, it can only give the country advice on how to rule, not invade.’’ A few of the responses (6 percent) didn’t give a

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rationale for opposing a state right to invasion, but generally reiterated the content of the item ‘‘no one country has the right to [invade].’’ Perhaps because Botswana’s sovereignty has been in jeopardy in the past from South Africa and Zimbabwe, Batswana citizens are particularly sensitive to any country invading another country and are overwhelming opposed to the proposition that states have any right to do so. Several responses provided thoughtful reasons as to why a country may have a right to invade. Most of the responses supporting such a right (13 percent of all the responses) indicated that it is defensible if the purpose of the invasion is to protect people’s rights: ‘‘if there are wars where rulers are abusing its citizens and there is no democracy’’ and ‘‘if basic rights are violated by the country being invaded.’’ Another justification was for invasion as a response to threats. Seven percent of the responses had statements to the effect that invasion is a right ‘‘when the stated country is under huge threat.’’ A couple of explanations supported intervention on behalf of others (e.g., ‘‘for the best interest of invaded country’’) and invasion as justified by historical or contemporary evils (e.g., ‘‘No country should just sit while genocides like those in Rwanda and Burundi happen. While it can do something, invasion is the only remedy to save lives’’). A few responses were largely reassertions of the right expressed by ‘‘yes we are living in a global world.’’ Are Civilian Casualties Acceptable? Of the 47 codeable responses to the item ‘‘Sometimes the heads of government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism,’’ only 13 percent were supportive of the statement, a resounding 84 percent of the responses argued against such a right, and 2 percent did not address the question. From the coded responses indicating that the government has the right, three responses indicated that the ends justified the means; for example, ‘‘If such an action will prevent a lot of damage [then it is justified].’’ Three other responses were mixed as to the possibility of such a governmental right. Two responses suggested that killing innocent civilians was ‘‘inevitable’’ but should be avoided to the extent possible: ‘‘only if they are fighting local terrorism and the killing should be absolutely accidental, you got to break a few eggs to make an omelette.’’ The idea of retribution was seen in the responses of one student: ‘‘The govt [sic] doesn’t have the right to end a life except for murderers.’’ As previously mentioned, UB students overwhelming (84 percent) rejected the premise that the heads of governments sometimes have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism. Several of the arguments against a right to sacrifice the lives of civilians

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simply denied the right; for example, ‘‘No one has the right to kill, even governments.’’ A substantial portion of the arguments (15 responses) appealed to human rights. Examples of such arguments are that a right to tolerate civilian losses (often euphemistically labelled ‘‘collateral damage’’) ‘‘infringes their right to life,’’ ‘‘is inhuman and denies people their right to life,’’ and ‘‘violates the individual’s rights.’’ Several respondents emphasized the innocence of the civilians in arguing that their deaths should not be considered acceptable: ‘‘They are innocent and have the right to life . . . why get killed for something they have nothing to do with’’ and ‘‘no one has the right to kill any innocent civillian as a way of fighting terrorism.’’ Two responses focused on the immorality of such a potential right (‘‘It is unethical’’), and one response indicated that only God has the right to kill: ‘‘The line has been crossed in today’s so-called ‘war on terror.’ The real terror is the government . . . Innocent people just want to live their lives peacefully without fear . . . Heads of government do not have to right to take a life . . . That would be replacing the job of our Lord.’’ Another student also invoked the concept of ‘‘state terrorism’’ in disapproving a governmental right to sacrifice civilian lives. Three responses emphasized the availability of better strategies for fighting terrorism; for example, ‘‘Government could try and reconcile with the terrorists’’; ‘‘not if the civilians are innocent, why not just capture the culprit.’’ The last group of responses focused on the negative consequences of sacrificing civilians to fight terrorism. Examples included ‘‘Are there no other peaceful means to fight terrorism, such action worsens and jeopardises efforts to peaceful resolution’’; ‘‘Killing innocent civilians would not stop terrorism but make the innocent live in fear.’’ Batswanians’ strong opposition to the idea that heads of government can sacrifice innocent lives when fighting terrorism may reflect Botswana’s history of neutrality and efforts to avoid involvement in conflicts outside its borders. Also relevant may be Botswana’s history as a British Protectorate in which Batswanians had few rights and may sometimes have felt like pawns in the hands of outsiders who believed they had the right to exercise power over the local people. Finally, perhaps because of historical attacks by South Africans and Zimbabweans against Batswana civilians, Batswana students are adamantly against hurting civilians for any reason. What Is Terrorism? In defining terrorism, 64 percent of the responses focused on its destructiveness and violence (e.g., ‘‘killing innocent citizens’’). Many of these definitions included elements reflecting the presumed motivation or

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purpose of terrorism, identifying it with causing fear, harm, or a movement against democracy or peace. Sample definitions in this category included ‘‘act of killing civilians in order to get back at a country/ leader,’’ ‘‘violence aimed at achieving political power,’’ ‘‘acts of violence in order to put fear into people’s hearts and dominate them,’’ and ‘‘physically threatening group of people because of race, religion, or just differences.’’ Thirteen percent of the definitions focused on the negative environmental conditions that could give rise to terrorism, citing social, economic, or political conditions as contributing factors. A smaller number of the responses (8 percent) associated terrorism with either a positive or negative ideology directed at achieving change or protesting against oppression. These definitions identified terrorism with ‘‘rebellion,’’ or, interestingly enough, ‘‘when two enemies make peace.’’ Another type of definition in the ideology category identified terrorism as an ideology gone wrong or are ambiguous regarding the extent to which the ideology is seen as defensible. Sample responses labelled the terrorist ideology as a ‘‘misconception’’ or ‘‘use of terror/ fear to prove a point.’’ About 9 percent of the definitions incorporated a moral judgment concerning terrorism without mention of ideology or goal or purpose. Definitions such as ‘‘violating peace’’ and ‘‘evil’’ fall into this category. Identifying terrorism with negative emotions (‘‘just hatred and attacks towards another nation’’) and miscellaneous/uncodable responses made up the remaining 4 percent of definitions. Thus, overall, the people of Botswana equate terrorism with destruction and violence, with some recognition of power-oriented motivation, and some consideration of the possibility that terrorism grows out of negative environmental conditions. Can States Torture Prisoners of War? Since its independence, Botswana has not been involved in a war even though it has had some skirmishes with neighboring countries such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa. As far as is known, it has never held prisoners of war nor has it had any of its military held as prisoners of war. It does have a military, the Botswana Defence Force; therefore, it is possible that the country could have prisoners of war but highly unlikely. Historically, Botswana (then Bechuanaland) had soldiers serving in both World Wars I and II. Roughly ten thousand men from Botswana served in the British Army during World War II and others served in the Union (of South Africa) Defense Force in World Wars I and II.43 Botswana is a country that has not seen direct aggression toward its people from a foreign government, yet it is not immune from the dangers of aggression and war.

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Participants provided 35 codeable responses to the item ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war.’’ Among those who provided rationales for their rating scale responses, a substantial majority of the explanations (61 percent) were reasons why the government does not have such a right; only 23 percent of the arguments supported a state right to use torture. Among the arguments opposing a governmental right to torture prisoners of war (POWs), 48 percent focused on human rights or related principles; for example, ‘‘Prisoners are human beings and have the right to peace and fair treatment regardless of the crime they committed,’’ and ‘‘[torture is] inhumane and punishable.’’ Thirty-three percent of the respondents disagreeing with a right to torture provided no explanation but simply made comments like, ‘‘No.’’ One of the students pinpointed better alternatives to torture, arguing that, ‘‘People should be asked to bring about information with their dignity instilled.’’ Another argument was that ‘‘By being in prison they are already serving their appropriate punishment.’’ The 23 percent of responses endorsing torture of prisoners as a governmental right included straightforward assertions like, ‘‘Punishment is good when needed.’’ Fifty percent of the responses had to do with deservedness, guilt, or proof. For example, one student said, ‘‘Prisoners equal to innocent citizens should not be tortured . . . However, prisoners that acted as spies or betrayed their country should be treated in a manner to find the truth.’’ Others used the rationale of effectiveness or usefulness in torture such as ‘‘That would help them get vital info.’’ Analyses of Qualitative Responses Related to Peace and Protest In regard to the item ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace,’’ 41 of the 53 coded responses (78 percent) indicated agreement with such a right, with 17 percent of the responses simply affirming the right (e.g., ‘‘Yes why not?’’). Another 29 percent of the responses expanded on belief in the right; for example, ‘‘Every person in the world irregardless of their race, color, age, or religion is entitled to live peacefully . . . It is a basic right that they are born with.’’ One of the major arguments in support of a right to peace (24 percent of the responses) emphasized the consequences for human development of such a right; for example, ‘‘so they can live in harmony,’’ ‘‘happiness, prosperity, innovativeness, only possible in peace,’’ ‘‘for personal development, which is unlikely in an unstable environment,’’ and ‘‘will allow good life styles.’’ One person made reference to the idea that peace is a right but also a responsibility, stating, ‘‘be responsible.’’ Eight percent of the responses portrayed a right to peace as an ideal, as in ‘‘We all like harmony.’’ Four percent of the responses indicated some pessimism regarding a right to peace but focused on its

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achievability. One of these students indicated, ‘‘it is a good right but at times it is hard to achieve, becomes beyond control too.’’ Another student mentioned that peace is conditional by stating, ‘‘yes everyone does indeed [have a right to peace] and that should be guaranteed unless that particular individual now attempts to override his/her rights.’’ A related item in the PAIRTAPS regarding peace was ‘‘I believe world peace can be achieved.’’ Perhaps because of Botswana’s history of having been under British rule and having viewed African conflict across its border, many responses (57 percent) indicated ‘‘conditional’’ support for a belief in the achievability of peace. Twenty-three percent of the conditional responses indicated that the achievability of peace depended on such things as ‘‘a more powerful UN’’ and ‘‘If human beings can stop being selfish.’’ Another 23 percent of the conditional responses indicated that peace was conditional on respect; for example, ‘‘World peace can be achieved if we come together as one and love each other as we love ourselves.’’ Fifty-five percent of the 22 conditional responses indicated that peace is achievable if there is a global effort. Examples of these responses include ‘‘If we all put our hearts into it, put our differences aside and work together towards it surely world peace can be achieved.’’ Some optimism was expressed in the 13 percent of the responses that simply affirmed the achievability of world peace with such statements as ‘‘Nations can settle matters peacefully without involving war which makes it worse.’’ Two of these five participants indicated that world peace is ideal: ‘‘It is as if we are saying all human beings can think the same way! World peace is desired for but it is far fetched.’’ Of the total participants whose responses were coded on the question of whether world peace is achievable, 28 percent were pessimistic, indicating that world peace is not achievable. Six of these 11 students (54 percent) simply indicated that peace could not be attained, making such statements as ‘‘The battle of dominance is eternal’’; however, 36 percent indicated that the reason for the elusiveness of peace was because of individuals, ‘‘We all have different values and everyone wants to have their values appreciated and put into practice, which is almost impossible.’’ One of the participants blamed mankind, ‘‘We will need a new human species.’’ It appears that mostly Batswana students believed that world peace is achievable but were cautious, indicating that world peace necessitates the achievement of particular conditions. A minority of these students indicated that world peace is achievable without conditions. Because the last two questions focused on peace, definitions of peace were elicited from the students and the content of their answers was analyzed. Positive definitions of peace generally equated it with a state of well-being that involved psychological wellbeing, physical wellbeing, security, and tranquillity. Another category that emphasizes positive

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aspects of peace focused on social relationships including coexistence and acceptance, acceptance with understanding, and acceptance with reconciliation. Fifty-eight percent of the total coded responses were in the category of positive definitions of peace. Less than 5 percent of the total responses occurred in the positive subcategories of state of wellbeing (1 percent) with a comment of ‘‘everything being ok.’’ Other low frequency definitions (less than 5 percent of the total) made references to psychological aspects of peace (4 percent) such as, ‘‘when people are in good spirits and don’t have problems’’; physical aspects (1 percent) such as ‘‘state of no disturbances;’’; coexistence (5 percent) such as ‘‘no war and cooperation exists’’; acceptance (2 percent) as in ‘‘where there is stability, understanding and love’’; and reconciliations (4 percent), ‘‘co-existing without resorting to violence in order to solve differences rather [than] diplomacy,’’ and ‘‘entails living in an environment where there are no conflicts in society after instability.’’ The category of love occurred in only one response, which said peace is ‘‘where there is stability, understanding, and love.’’ Three percent of the responses referred to legislation/diplomacy in their definitions of peace (for example, ‘‘laws and regulation set to govern people to live free and happy’’) and a few definitions made reference to natural human rights (1 percent), as in ‘‘when everyone can enjoy their human rights,’’ and freedom (5 percent), with such comments as ‘‘living with dignity and freedom.’’ Definitions of peace that constituted more than 5 percent of the total responses were in the areas of harmony (7 percent), including definitions such as ‘‘living in harmony without wars and disagreements,’’ and tranquillity (8 percent) (for example, ‘‘a period of tranquillity and calm and order’’). The largest percentage of responses (15 percent) equated peace with security: ‘‘when there is peace and stability, and stable, safe condition’’ and ‘‘stable, safe condition.’’ Among the definitions of peace, 37 percent of the responses were negative focusing on freedom from negative feelings (5 percent) such as ‘‘out of fear’’ or a conflict (32 percent). Examples of conflict definitions include, ‘‘absence of conflict,’’ ‘‘absence of war, anarchy and violence,’’ and ‘‘freedom from war.’’ Only 1 percent of the responses asserted that peace is an ideal that is unattainable. An example of this view of peace as an unattainable ideal was the brief and to-the-point response, ‘‘never.’’

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS The Batswana people have a tradition handed down since the 1800s whereby Tswana communities were governed through an institution

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known as the kgotla, which are still evident in the villages across Botswana. The venue by which kiKgosi (chiefs) communicated with their subjects was (and to a limited extent still is) the kgotla. Here men discussed matters of economic or political importance to the community. A somewhat democratic institution permitted a type of free speech while at the same time the kiKgosi could learn about degree of public acceptance of matters that had been discussed in private. The people expected the kiKgosi to be diligent, compassionate, and modest, and to show respect for tribal customs and practices. Perhaps Botswana’s tenacity for democracy and the Batswana peoples’ tendency to endorse peace while at the same time opposing governmental torture, invasion of other countries, and overall aggressiveness (as seen in the PAIRTAPS) springs forth from the often-recited proverb in the kgotla, ‘‘Kgosi ke kgosi ka batho,’’ which literally means, ‘‘kgosi is a kgosi by the grace of the people.’’44 Perhaps the people in this survey, as in a kgotla, have spoken out against any government’s assertion of a right to torture, invade, or otherwise aggress against others. Overall, the sample of UB students seems to have a very optimistic outlook regarding peace, but a cautious attitude toward war and terrorism. In respect to both of the statements regarding peace, there was an overwhelming majority of participants who felt that peace was achievable and that human beings have a basic right to peace. Whether this is because the sample were mostly young Batswana college students or because Botswana is a relatively young democracy that has succeeded in a continent in which so many other nations have failed, it is apparent that this sample of citizens endorses peace as a basic human right and views peace as something achievable (even if conditional) while at the same time overwhelmingly opposing invasions of other countries, hurting innocent people in the name of fighting terrorism, and torturing prisoners in time of war.

6

Zambia Jacqui Akhurst, Davies Banda, and Nina Carstens

War is. . .’’fighting one another usually between or among countries or within a country, which is called civil war as it was in Liberia, Ivory Coast and the Sudan.’’ ‘‘War is everywhere and in the homes. It is fighting back at someone who belittles you and you want to show them that you are somebody as well.’’ Peace is. . .’’unity of individuals which eventually leads to the unity of countries and their communities.’’ ‘‘We have 72 tribes but you cannot know, people are just like one tribe, they relate and love each other as Zambians, that’s how we have managed to live in peace in this country for this long.’’ Zambia occupies a central position in tropical southern Africa, landlocked and surrounded by eight countries, of which five have seen noteworthy conflict and war in the past half-century: Namibia, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. A country rich in mineral reserves, particularly copper, its borders were established in the 1800s during the colonial ‘‘scramble for Africa,’’ and at that time it was named Northern Rhodesia. The establishment of its borders carved up tribal land, leading to some tribes being divided by arbitrary lines drawn on a map. Seven languages are spoken by the main tribal groups (along with more than 70 others) in the area, leading to English being used as lingua franca. On October 24, 1964, after 74 years of British colonial rule, Zambia gained her political independence. The country adopted its name from the substantial Zambezi River that flows through western areas, forming a natural boundary with Zimbabwe in the south. At independence, Zambia had a stable economy supported by copper production and

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exportation. After gaining independence, the tribal groups, each with their own leader, needed to unite to form a nation state. Subsequently, the country was ruled for 27 years under socialist one-party rule by Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, who coined the phrase ‘‘One Zambia, One Nation’’ to bring the people together. The regional political unrest during the 1970s and 1980s was not replicated in Zambia, which provided a base for resistance movements supporting the struggles for freedom in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique. However, support for these movements and connections with communist countries came at great economic cost, cutting Zambia off from ports to the East and South. Then a series of droughts, along with worldwide economic events that impacted adversely on the copper price, led to the landlocked country facing increasing trading difficulties. In response to international pressures, a new constitution was crafted in 1991, followed by the first peaceful democratic election. Although a period of political turmoil followed in the mid-1990s, the country has been hailed for its largely peaceful transition to capitalism. Over the years, Zambia has been a haven for thousands of refugees of war, including Angolans, Congolese, Rwandans, and Zimbabweans. In the past two decades, robust dialogue across the political spectrum has increased. The country has become a firm presence in the 15-nation Southern African Development Community (SADC), with her leaders expressing increasing concern at the human rights abuses perpetrated recently in Zimbabwe. Today, Zambia is 165th of the 177 countries on the UN Human Development Index (HDI).1 According to the UN HDI, the life expectancy in Zambia is 40.5 years, with 17 percent of the adult population infected with HIV/AIDS—an issue for later elaboration. With her economy having been heavily dependent on revenue from copper exports, efforts to diversify Zambia’s economy have been fraught with difficulty. The untimely death of the third president in August 2008 led to a period of national grieving before the country prepared for its next democratic election. The chapter outlines relevant historical factors that have influenced contemporary Zambian attitudes toward conflict, war, and peace. It highlights the impact of nation-building on stability and the desires of the people for autonomy. RELEVANT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Precolonization Bantu-speaking people arrived in Zambia during the 15th, 17th, and 19th centuries. The seven main languages are associated with the dominant tribal groups, namely, Nyanja, Bemba, Lozi, Luvale, Lunda, Tonga,

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and Kaonde. The Ngoni people are believed to have come from the south, whereas the other groups migrated from the Luba-Lunda empires of the southern region of the Congo and from the northern region of Angola. As these groups of people became established in the area, they organized themselves into chieftainships and monarchies. It was after the settlement of the Bantu-speaking immigrants that Western explorers and traders became interested in the land. Era of Colonization In its search for more gold and diamond deposits, the British South African (BSA) Company moved northward from South Africa into Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Northern Rhodesia.2 When the BSA entered Northern Rhodesia, they gained control over the land through wars and treaties with local chiefs.3 Northern Rhodesia was subjected to colonial rule by a minority of racist white settlers, based mainly in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The BSA ruled Northern Rhodesia from the 1890s until 1924 when they handed over the administrative role to the British Colonial Office (BCO) for economic reasons, having found neither gold nor diamonds. Though this territory was handed over, the BSA maintained full rights over the mineral deposits in the country. When deposits of copper were discovered in 1902 near Ndola, in what is now referred to as the Copperbelt, the BSA did not mine it, because it was not considered good enough to compete with copper mined in the Katanga province (now DRC). From 1953 to 1963, the BCO formed the Central African Federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland (now Malawi), with Salisbury in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) as the capital. The Africans of Northern Rhodesia, such as those led by Harry Nkumbula of the African National Congress (ANC), and those led by Kenneth Kaunda of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), strongly objected to rule by the Federation.4 During the colonial era, there was an influx into Zambia of European and Asian people from the British Empire. The influential Anglo-American Corporation monopolized mining on the Copperbelt. Once the mining began to expand, Europeans took over managerial jobs and Asians occupied the retail sector.5 The time of colonial rule was described as at best a period of paternalism and at worst one of oppression.6 The African majority suffered from wage discrimination and taxation, segregation, and exclusion from public amenities and social facilities, with little rural development for the indigenous people, many of whom remained subsistence farmers. The exploitation of copper in Northern Rhodesia supported the industrial development of Southern Rhodesia and benefited the white rulers there, causing a loss of revenue for Zambia.

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Before independence, Zambian society was stratified along race/ color and social class lines, which contributed to substantial social inequalities. ‘‘The whites (Europeans) formed the upper class, the browns (Asians) the upper middle class, the blacks (Africans) the lower middle class, the working class and the peasantry.’’7 Struggle for Independence For the indigenous people, undoubtedly the most momentous event was the passing of resolutions calling for Northern Rhodesia’s secession from the Federation, which was dissolved on December 31, 1963, opening the path to independence. This development was due to pressure from a coalition effort by ANC and UNIP and through a campaign of civil disobedience against the Federation. UNIP, led by Kaunda, won the 1964 election and was in power in a multiparty state (with an interminable extension of a temporary state of emergency) until December 1972, when an act of parliament changed Zambia to a one-party state. Most land was subsequently nationalized and control was centralized. Postindependence When colonial rule was coming to an end, the middle-class Africans who had secondary school education experienced some upward social mobility due to their education. This group played a crucial role by mobilizing themselves and becoming African politicians who took over leadership roles. At independence, Zambia’s most serious problem was the lack of trained people to take over from Europeans and Asians working in central and local governments and in sectors such as the mines. This lack of trained personnel was directly linked to practices that entrenched a restricted educational policy to support the colonial administration.8 The other issue facing the new government was the inherited income inequalities between white and black groups and between urban and rural dwellers.9 The newly independent Zambia entered an unfavorable economic environment due to the previous drain of resources southward to Southern Rhodesia, where industries had been concentrated and facilities for education built for white settlers. Transport networks were more developed in the south and existing transport services were mainly for the transport of raw materials to the industries. Zambia was thus tied to the southern African economic system through her dependency on those transport networks for its exports and imports. At independence, Zambia had only approximately 100 university graduates and 1,000 secondary school graduates.10 When Southern Rhodesia’s white-ruled government unilaterally declared independence in November 1965, President Kaunda felt

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compelled to promote the causes of liberation of southern African nations toward black majority rule. The nations under minority rule were Namibia (administered by South Africa), Angola, Rhodesia, Mozambique, and South Africa. Zambia thus hosted exiles from political parties such as the African National Congress (South Africa), the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU); and the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO). Because these countries were located on the routes for Zambia’s foreign trade, Kaunda needed to find alternatives, and, with the help of the Chinese, construction began on the Tazara railway, to form a link with the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. Zambia’s postindependence economy Soon after independence, the University of Zambia was established, and efforts were made to provide at least basic education in the country. There was unprecedented growth of the nation’s economy during the first 10 years of independence, but because of poor governance, poor policies, and mismanagement of the country’s resources, Zambia started to experience intensive economic hardships.11 Governmental development documents (e.g., the First National Development Plan, 1966–1970) deny accusations of mismanagement, attributing Zambia’s hardships to negative aspects of colonial administration such as underdevelopment of other sectors, the poor education system for indigenous people, and exploitation of resources rather than Zambian development. Zambia gradually slumped from being one of Africa’s wealthy economies to being ranked as one of the continent’s poorest nations today. In addition to the reasons above, Zambia’s economic hardships were exacerbated by the fall in the world price of copper. In an effort to sustain the economy through difficult times, President Kaunda allowed continued borrowing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Meyns states that ‘‘from 1970 to 1990 Zambia’s external debt rose from $800m to $7,000m, making the country one of Africa’s most highly indebted economies.’’12 After independence, most white settlers left the country, enabling the government to abolish private ownership of land. Although this exodus led to large tracts of land being available for farming, lack of expertise and failure to implement modern agrarian practices limited agriculture development. As copper prices continued to fall, the economic situation deteriorated because of an increase in imports of foreign goods and continued failure by the government to diversify the economy. The IMF imposed economic conditions in 1980, with resulting negative effects on the labor force. In 1987, Kaunda yielded to pressure from trade unions and other civil society organizations, deciding to discontinue the IMF Structural Adjustment Programme reforms.

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Reintroduction of a Multiparty System Zambia was a one-party state from 1972 to December 1990, when multiparty politics were reintroduced. In 1991, the peaceful shift of power from the UNIP to the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) was a significant democratization step in southern Africa.13 The landslide victory of the MMD and presidential elections ushered in Frederick Titus Chiluba as president. His term in office, in a now poverty-stricken nation, did not bring any significant material change to the people of Zambia, and his reign as president has been associated with further plundering of the nation’s resources. The MMD’s ideological stance, aimed at liberalizing the market and promoting a free market economy (with foreign investors not paying tax), was too radical a response to the nation’s failing economy and led to some officials becoming corrupt. After Chiluba’s two terms as president, economic recovery was still elusive. Chiluba’s attempts to gain a third term by attempting to change the constitution were futile and the MMD turned to Levy Mwanawasa as its candidate during the December 2001 elections. From 2002, Mwanawasa, a trained lawyer, began a process of fighting corruption in government. In all the 2006 presidential, parliamentary, and local government elections, Zambia experienced peaceful campaigns, free of violence, and Mwanawasa was reelected.

ZAMBIA TODAY ‘‘Peace can be a state of harmony or the absence of hostility. Peace can also be a non-violent way of life.’’ Zambia today is a country of almost 11 million inhabitants and is home to many thousands of refugees from surrounding countries. Since her return to multiparty politics, Zambia has been viewed internationally as an ‘‘Oasis of Peace’’ in Africa. Women and men have equal status under Zambian law, and there has been a program promoting opportunities for individuals to buy farmland from the government, leading to improved agricultural prospects. There are programs to provide land tenure to people in informal periurban settlements and to improve women’s access to land. All these transitions have been relatively peaceful and free of the repression evident in some other African nations. Although the opposition and some local groups characterized the presidential elections in 2001 as not being free and fair, the citizens resorted not to social anarchy but to dialogue. Indeed, even after the death and burial of President Mwanawasa in August 2008, the nation mourned

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peacefully, and the campaigning period leading to presidential byelections proceeded well. Today Zambia faces high inflation, and the impact of the scourge of HIV/AIDS has not spared any sector of society. The nation has lost a considerable number of the workforce to the disease, leaving families without a breadwinner. Almost two-thirds of the population survive on less than $1 per day, and with 40 percent of the people living in urban areas, unemployment is very high.14 Although the government has, to some extent, tackled issues of water supply and sanitation to the extensive informal settlements, poverty exacerbates the spread of HIV. The government and nongovernmental organizations, with the support of international agencies, have joined hands to curb the further spread of the pandemic. Without substantial debt relief, effective diversification of the economy, a reduction of the nation’s dependency on copper, and control over the HIV/AIDS epidemic, Zambia will remain vulnerable to external elements. ZAMBIAN PERSPECTIVES ON WAR AND PEACE All Zambian participants completed an online abridged version of the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS15), consisting of seven items from the original survey. Participants responded to each item on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 5 (totally agree) and wrote an explanation of their rating scale response. Responses to the survey were gathered from 30 respondents, 13 men (43 percent) and 17 women (57 percent). Ages ranged from 21 to 54, with a mean age of 35 years. The majority were Black African, thus reflecting the ethnic composition of the country. It was difficult to recruit online respondents from within the country; thus, just over half of the sample currently live outside of Zambia. Only 10 percent of the respondents did not have a postschool qualification, one-third had achieved some form of diploma, and the majority were engaged in studying for or had achieved a university degree. The quantitative and qualitative responses to the survey are combined into the five themes that follow. ZAMBIAN PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED AGGRESSION ‘‘[War is] when man fails to reason and decides to behave worse than animals by not showing restraint and respect for human life especially that of civilians.’’

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Does One Country Have the Right to Invade Another? In response to the PAIRTAPS item about whether one country has the right to invade another, 78 percent of respondents disagreed. A number of these participants justified their rating scale response by asserting that countries have the right to self-determination; for example, ‘‘Each country is supposed to be sovereign’’ (39-year-old male) and ‘‘Sovereignty of every country must be respected otherwise international anarchy may be imminent’’ (35-year-old male). Strong feelings against interference were expressed: ‘‘To invade another country infringes that state’s autonomy and creates an imbalance pertaining to the rules of engagement and the extent to which each country has a right to interfere with the functioning of any other’’ (21-year-old female). There was also support for the idea that not just states but individuals are ‘‘entitled to a land of origin’’ (43-year-old male). A related theme focused on the rights of individuals to equality, which presumably could be endangered by an invasion. Several participants expressed firm views on the importance of peaceful resolution of conflicts as well as cynicism regarding perpetrators of invasion. For example, one 51-year-old woman commented, ‘‘Whatever reasons, issues, or problems [there are] should be resolved at a round table. In the event of an attack, it is the innocent souls like babies, small children, women, and other vulnerable that get killed. The people responsible for the attacks do so by remote control. They don’t get involved directly and their families are always secure.’’ A 40-yearold man asserted: ‘‘Much depends on the reason for the invasion. Is it justifiable? Many of the reasons we have seen, current and historic, would push one into total disagreement with the above statement.’’ On the other hand, one of the previously quoted participants noted the right of countries to defend themselves: ‘‘If a country is unfairly (by virtue of international law/regulation/treaty) attacked by another country and diplomacy fails to resolve the conflict, then it’s expedient for the attacked country to defend itself even to a point of invading the assailant.’’ Fifteen percent of the respondents took the middle option (neither agree nor disagree) regarding a governmental right to invade, whereas only 7 percent agreed that an invasion could be legitimate. Some of these respondents viewed invasion as acceptable only when other alternatives had been exhausted; for example, one 26-year-old woman commented, ‘‘Depending on circumstances, any country which poses a security threat to international peace should be put under scrutiny and, as a LAST RESORT (own caps), be subjected to military intervention, for the good of everyone.’’ Another conditional response, possibly

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prompted by the recent situation in Zimbabwe, was ‘‘In normal circumstances a country should not invade another. But if the nationals of the foreign county are being abused by their leaders and helpless, countries should be able to save the situation lawfully’’ (37-year-old male). These views were in contrast to those of participants who took a firm moral stance against war, as illustrated well in one 35-year-old man’s definition of war: ‘‘Waging of armed conflict against a PERCEIVED (own caps) enemy. To my mind darkness or absence of light is symbolic of war. It is the highest form of barbarism.’’ Do Governments Have the Right to Torture Prisoners of War? ‘‘Torture infringes human rights and is not a peaceful option for handling prisoners of war.’’ Seventy-one percent of the respondents disagreed with the item ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war.’’ In their qualitative explanations, several of these respondents referred to the humanity of prisoners of war: ‘‘Even prisoners are human beings who feel pain just like any other person at liberty.’’ Concerns about disregard of human rights were also expressed: ‘‘To avoid what is happening in Guantanamo, it’s only prudent to have basic human rights, otherwise everyone with a divergent view will be arrested’’ (39-year-old male) and ‘‘bodily integrity is an inherent right’’ (21-year-old female). Another theme involved a recognition that justice systems can be flawed, as in ‘‘It is not always the case that prisoners are guilty’’ (21-year-old female). Some responses focused on the immorality and inexcusability of torture: ‘‘Any type of war is barbaric and the notion of rights does not really apply’’ (35-year-old male). The longterm consequences of acts such as torture were of concern to some participants. For example a 39-year-old woman commented that ‘‘torture creates animosity.’’ Compared to the other PAIRTAPS items on potential governmental rights to use force, the question of torture elicited the greatest number of conditional responses (25 percent). One participant, a 39-year-old man, noted that the acceptability of governmental use of torture ‘‘depends on what information the prisoner of war has to offer, e.g., if the prisoner of war has information of weapons that may be used to wipe out innocent lives, then torture is necessary.’’ Another man (43 years old) wrote, ‘‘I agree in the sense that if those being tortured had invaded other peoples land, [use torture] so that they stop. I disagree in that if the locals are defending their land then captured, they are not supposed to be tortured.’’ Conditional responses therefore related to the

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intentions of the captors. Only 4 percent of the respondents indicated any unconditional support for using torture during times of war. Can Killing Innocent Civilians Be Justified in the Fight against Terrorism? In their rating scale responses to the item ‘‘Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism,’’ 80 percent of the Zambian respondents indicated some level of disagreement. Some of their justifications emphasized the innocence of the civilians: ‘‘What about the rights of the innocent civilians? The sacrifice of one innocent life is one too many’’ (37-year-old male). Others emphasized the responsibility of citizens to resist such aggression: ‘‘In a peace loving country this can not be condoned by any peace loving citizen’’ (39-year-old female). Some participants argued that it was the role of governments to protect citizens and/or promote peace: ‘‘The heads of government are not appointed to destabilise peace but to foster peace especially for innocent civilians’’ (40-year-old female); ‘‘In certain cases, certain citizens may be casualties of war but this does not mean the state has the right . . . The state has a duty to protect its citizens from harm’’ (21-year-old female). The importance of governments in building and sustaining civil society was implicit in many responses to the item about the lives of innocent civilians (as well as an item on how to achieve national security). Eighty percent of the qualitative responses argued against the harming of innocent civilians through any actions; for example, a 26-year-old woman asserted, ‘‘No one has any right to punish innocent people,’’ and a 51year-old woman commented, ‘‘There is no need to harm innocent civilians even if it is to fight international terrorism.’’ A 35-year-old man stated, ‘‘No one must be accorded the right to harm an innocent person’’; however, he then added ‘‘but during war anarchy is expected and the innocent die.’’ In perhaps a direct acknowledgment of the influence of living in a society at peace, a 39-year-old woman said, ‘‘Being in a peace loving country, this can not be condoned by any peace loving citizen.’’ The response of one 35-year-old man emphasizes the importance of a broad definition of ‘‘terrorism’’ and reflects strongly his experiences within a Zambian context: ‘‘[The term ‘terrorism’ provokes] thoughts of first world pharmaceutical companies carrying out dangerous drug tests on unsuspecting third world subjects who mostly happen to be poor mothers and children. The thought of a genocide going on unabated next door to your country making you wonder when next it will be your country.’’ Approximately 20 percent of the respondents indicated some tolerance of civilian casualties in the fight against terrorism. The major

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argument in support of such a right focused on governmental rights to defend their people: ‘‘As those who stage terrorism harm innocent people, the heads of government have to fight international terrorism and protect their people by all means.’’ A few respondents qualified such a right: ‘‘Depends on which government. Some countries will have this right legislated’’ (40-year-old male). Showing concern with the rule of law, a 43-year-old man said civilians should not be killed in the fight on terrorism, ‘‘unless proven and found guilt by a court that they were assisting terrorist activities or preventing the course of justice.’’ A 40year-old man expressed some cynicism regarding the arguments made by some governments in support of the justifiability of civilian casualties in the fight against terrorism; he stated that such deaths were acceptable ‘‘only if that fight is real and the target ‘terrorist zones’ have no rich oil reserves.’’ One 44-year-old man, whose rating scale response indicated some agreement with a governmental right to torture, nevertheless commented, ‘‘[This is a right] in very limited circumstances, as the very nature of international terrorism is such that it is difficult to identify who the terrorist is.’’ A 34-year-old woman showed similar concerns: ‘‘The only way to fight terrorism is to screen everyone who enters your territory.’’ Ten percent of the respondents agreed that killing innocent civilians in the fight against terrorism was acceptable in the cause of achieving some ‘‘greater good.’’ One 39-year-old man argued that ‘‘Civilians have been used as tools for terror in other parts of the world; thus, it would be necessary to institute measures that would reduce terror threats to a sovereign state.’’ Another 39-year-old man emphasized that ‘‘those who stage terrorism harm innocent people.’’

ZAMBIAN PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE ‘‘[Peace is] the situation of living above circumstances, i.e., looking beyond the current situation and expecting things to be better one day.’’ Does Everyone Have a Right to Live in a World of Peace? The most resounding consistency in response to any of the PAIRTAPS items was a 97 percent agreement with the item stating that human beings have a right to peace. The impact of peaceful coexistence was noted in the following: ‘‘It’s something that makes you free; it’s the freedom which each one has to have; whether poor or rich, you have to have peace, freedom from worrying’’ (46-year-old female). The positive effects of peace were also highlighted in many responses, as in ‘‘Peace

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of every kind is essential for the development of an individual and a nation. Therefore, all human beings have a basic right to peace—peace of mind and the absence of violence/war’’ (51-year-old female). Several participants defined peace negatively, as an absence of war, rather than defining it in positive terms regarding the good things it means or brings to people. Negative definitions included ‘‘Absence of avarice, prejudice, and lack of respect for another human being. Unfortunately, the animal kingdom seems to outmatch the human race in as far as riches of peace are concerned’’ (40-year-old male). The role of civil society in ensuring peace was emphasized by some: ‘‘The Human Rights Commission and the UN emphasize the fundamental importance of such basic rights. States have a duty to protect their citizens from war (from other states) and from each other (the functions of the police and law enforcement aids or services)’’ (21-yearold female). However, several participants also qualified their support for a right to peace, indicating various conditions that must be met: ‘‘Yes [people have a right to peace], but those who wage unfair war against others risk waiving the right’’ (35-year-old male). Furthermore, such a right ‘‘depends on the definition of ‘peace.’ Criminals should not be at peace. All law-abiding human beings should have a right to peace’’ (37-year-old male). ‘‘Peace will prevail only when there is no aggression against anyone . . . meaning there will be no retaliation towards anyone’’ (39-year-old male).

Can World Peace Be Achieved? The influence of living in a country that has been able to maintain peace, when the surrounding region has been ravaged by war and violence, is evidenced in the finding that two-thirds of our Zambian respondents agreed that world peace could be achieved, and many provided suggestions as to how this could be done. Some of these suggestions emphasized group processes, the role of groups and states in achieving the kinds of international understanding and cooperation seen as essential to world peace. For example, one respondent commented, ‘‘World peace can be achieved if all people can work together towards achieving peace and understand(ing) each other . . . that is why globalisation is very important.’’ Similarly, a 34-year-old woman said, ‘‘Yes, world peace can be achieved if all nations can join hands and work together.’’ Other responses emphasized the role of individuals in helping the peace process. For example, a 26-year-old woman noted, ‘‘It always starts with individuals. If we try to contribute to world peace as individuals, then this can be achieved within our generation.’’

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By contrast, 17 percent of the respondents were equivocal about the achievability of world peace. Many of these respondents saw ideological differences between and within countries as barriers to peace. For example, one 39-year-old man commented, ‘‘Due to differences in beliefs and religion, it will be wishful thinking to dream of a total world peace. It is sometimes intra-country conflicts that would not allow for international intervention as is the case in the Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan and a few other countries including Zimbabwe.’’ It is interesting that this respondent seems to believe that interventions may help bring about peace between warring nations but will not be effective in intrastate conflicts. Another 17 percent disagreed with the achievability of world peace, arguing that power and resource imbalances between nations were the primary foes of world peace. For example, a 37-year-old woman argued, ‘‘If other counties were not selfish then it [world peace] would be achieved,’’ and a 39-year-old man commented ruefully, ‘‘If only wealth, power, and control were to be second to the prize of peace.’’ Similarly, a 21-year-old woman said, ‘‘With the on-going struggle for superpower status, someone wants to be at the top.’’ An even more strongly pessimistic response in this category came from a 40-year-old man who asserted, ‘‘Never! It’s not possible to have the same ideological belief systems across the world and neither is the world ever going to have the same balance of natural resource endowments: copper in Zambia, Chile, etc., and just sand elsewhere, oil in Iraq and nothing in Washington, rich agricultural lands in Zimbabwe, and flood-prone English nature.’’ Such statements show the awareness of these Zambians of global power relations and the need for governments to play an active role in peace promotion rather than merely defending against potential aggression or working solely for what they see as their own interests. Do People Have a Right to Protest against War and in Favor of Peace? The right to stage protests against war was supported by 76 percent of the respondents, whereas only 10 percent disagreed. The majority view was often supported by general statements reiterating the right, such as ‘‘in order for the general public to express their dissatisfaction regarding certain policies they should be allowed to stage peaceful protests that aim to attain a defined goal’’ (21-year-old female). Some participants spoke rather generally of the benefits of such a right; for example, ‘‘Staging protests against war is good for people who want to stay in a peaceful world.’’ Others were a bit more specific about the potential positive effects of protest; for example, ‘‘It helps to influence policy makers.’’ As one 43-year-old man commented, ‘‘Some people don’t

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have a chance to speak out where they can be heard, so demonstrations catch the attention of those in authority.’’ A substantial portion of the sample imposed limitations on the right to protest. Many of these respondents emphasized the need for protests themselves to be peaceful: ‘‘As long as the protests are peaceful’’ (44year-old male) and ‘‘Depends on the manner in which the protest is held/conducted, e.g., is it violent or peaceful?’’ (39-year-old male). Another respondent commented, ‘‘This purely depends on circumstances in which a war was entered into or otherwise.’’ On the whole, respondents believed that the public had rights to voice their opinions, and there appeared to be little fear expressed about such actions. Is National Security Essential for Individual and Family Security? National security was seen as essential for peace by 89 percent of participants, with one 39-year-old woman asserting that ‘‘National security is what defines peace.’’ National security was also seen as a precondition for future prosperity: ‘‘One can only feel secure if the nation is at peace. One will be happy and count on the future, but in a nation at war you have no idea if you live to see the next day’’ (43-year-old-male), and ‘‘[With national security], people don’t have to live in fear. As a result they are able to do a lot of things to improve their lives.’’ However, 10 percent disagreed with a strong need for national security. In particular, several of these respondents were concerned with the possibility that preoccupation with national security could lead to infringements on individual rights. As one 44-year-old man said, ‘‘National security is essential as long as its implementation does not infringe on the basic rights of the nation’s citizens.’’ Another man, perhaps also concerned with individual rights to equality, commented, ‘‘We are all entitled to the same land we live in, so we should share the cake equally.’’

CONCLUDING COMMENTS This collection of rich responses from a cross section of Zambian people illustrates the effects of having lived in a country where there has been explicit promotion of unity across potential divisions and active strivings for peace against many odds. Although in material terms the country has struggled and most people subsist on very little from day to day, the ‘‘social capital’’16 that has accrued, to some extent related to strong influences from religious belief systems, has had a clear influence on people’s views on governmental aggression and peace. The country

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faces multiple challenges in common with many of her regional neighbors; these challenges include dealing with: the impact of poverty and poor living conditions; the ongoing spread of HIV/AIDS; widespread unemployment; increasing difficulties in promoting economic development in the face of competition in a global economy; and the continued mining of mineral resources for export without compensatory investment in industrial development or infrastructure. The responses to this survey illustrate the interaction between subsystems at various levels, including governmental policy and philosophy, discourses on civil society, and cooperation between individuals. There are positive fundamentals in place in Zambia, leading to a sense of greater hope than in other developing countries: ongoing land reform processes are beginning to impact on agricultural production; the government is willing to work alongside other organizations, both regional and international, to pursue democratic processes; and considerable goodwill exists among Zambian people. As a country, Zambia is a rich cultural and intellectual source giving rise to peaceful Africans desiring to resist conflict and war both on the continent and further afield.

7

South Africa Jacqui Akhurst, Mark M. Leach, and Priscilla Dass-Brailsford1

War is . . . ’’conflict motivated by ambitions for policy, power, or territorial advantage.’’ Peace is . . . ’’where war, terrorism and other forms of violence are absent . . . In South Africa I would say we are not at peace because of the high rates of crime. As a young South African woman I would not walk the streets at night because I fear rape and murder.’’ Terrorism is. . .’’when civilians are targeted or used as a fulcrum. Not to be confused with guerrilla tactics [which are] used in formal combat very effectively but can also be used by terrorists.’’ South Africa (SA) is probably best known for its oppressive nationalist regime and racist apartheid2 policies from 1948 until the peaceful transition to a democratically elected government representative of the majority of its citizens in 1994. Apartheid and its systematic exclusion of 90 percent of South Africa’s people from political, economic, and social rights during most of the 20th century has played a crucial role in the history of violence in the country. Apartheid has been described as ‘‘one of the great evils of the modern era’’3 and ‘‘a crime against humanity.’’4 The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to four South Africans, including African National Congress (ANC) president Albert Luthuli (1960), Archbishop Desmond Tutu (1984), and jointly to Nelson Mandela and former Prime Minister Frederik de Klerk (1993), is testament to the work of people of great stature to bring about peace. In their acceptance speech, Mandela said, ‘‘We stand here today as nothing more than a representative of the millions of our people who dared to rise up against a social system whose very essence is war, violence, racism, oppression, repression and the impoverishment of an entire people.’’5

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As an independent country, SA today has a population of about 48 million. A rich cultural milieu has resulted from the histories of the different groups of people who call SA ‘‘home’’ and the 11 official languages (as well as a number of other languages spoken regionally) attest to its multicultural diversity. To understand some of the complexity of the social landscape and a cross section of South Africans’ attitudes to war, terrorism, and peace at the beginning of the 21st century, it is important to consider the following factors: the historical events and circumstances that led to the apartheid regime coming into power; the enforcement of the divisive and oppressive policies through violence and force from 1948 to 1994; and the transition to democracy. A brief account of each of these factors forms a backdrop to the diverse views expressed by South Africans in response to a survey about war, terrorism, and peace. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND6 This brief account traces conflicts over the acquisition of land, resources, and political and economic power over four centuries in South Africa. The indigenous people of SA originate from two main groups: the Khoi-San (comprising the Khoikhoi and the San) and the Bantu. The Khoi-San were the earliest inhabitants of the area and roamed the wide open spaces as hunter-gatherers and pastoralists. The Khoikhoi owned herds of animals and tended to be found around the southwestern edges of SA; the San hunted in the extensive north and western inland areas, where the rainfall was less than 400 mm.7 The Bantu8 moved southward in small groups from central Africa over the course of about 1,000 years (with the earliest artifacts dating from 1,400 years ago). Through a process of tribal warfare and division, they settled in the wetter areas, being cattle farmers who also needed arable land for maize. The largest population group in SA today derives from these people and is Zulu-speaking, closely followed by Xhosa- and Sothospeaking people. People of European origin first set foot in SA in 1488 when Portuguese navigators rounded the Cape of Good Hope. In 1652, the Dutch established a settlement at the Cape, a ‘‘half-way’’ stop for ships traveling between Europe and the East to access fresh meat, water, and timber, via trade with the local Khoikhoi. There were armed struggles with the Khoikhoi from the 1670s as the Dutch settlers took over more land. A combination of superior fire power and smallpox in the early 1700s decimated the Khoikhoi population. Settlement in the Cape grew

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steadily, with additional people coming from East Africa and Malaysia (brought as slaves to the Dutch until the early 1800s), and French Huguenots arriving as escapees from religious persecution. Sporadic tension and conflict over land and resources occurred between the Trekboers9 and the Khoi-San. In 1795, the Cape was annexed by the British, with the purchase of the colony being finalized after the Napoleonic Wars, leading to a movement of people of Dutch origin inland, away from the influence of the British. When British and other settlers landed on the east coast of SA during the early 1800s, they mistakenly believed they were moving into a largely uninhabited land. The land had this appearance because of the rise of the Zulu people (isiZulu) under the strong leadership of Shaka, whose military forays led to other tribes fleeing threat of enslavement or death. After Shaka’s death in 1828, an agreement with his successor (Dingane) led to the British establishing a trading post in Natal. In the meantime, the Dutch settlers had moved into the interior of the area, and this led to conflicts first with the British and then with the isiZulu. The Dutch made a separate agreement with Dingane in 1837 for tracts of land; however, the isiZulu king’s fear that his rule was threatened led to incidents in which isiZulu warriors massacred groups of Dutch settlers. The Dutch, who retaliated at the Battle of Blood River (1838), believed that divine intervention enabled them to gain victory. They subsequently killed Dingane, and a short-lived Boer republic was established. These events led to a long-standing Boer distrust of the isiZulu. ‘‘[War is] fighting with the intent to take over the power, resources, and people of another country.’’ By the 1870s the isiZulu nation had regained strength under Cetswayo’s leadership. The British colonial leaders saw the isiZulu kingdom as an obstacle to their ambitions to expand and demanded the disbanding of the isiZulu army. Though Cetswayo sought a peaceful solution, escalating aggression and unreasonable demands from the colonial governor culminated in the Zulu War of 1879. The British colonials erroneously believed that they would be victorious in a short time, but the conflict lasted six months and cost about 10,000 lives in the battles that ensued. The political power of the isiZulu was limited for decades after this war by the devolution of power to a number of chieftains, and the defeat and subsequent treatment of the isiZulu formed the basis for lasting resentment. In the rest of South Africa, settlers of Dutch origin (known as Afrikaners10) established republics in the areas known as the Orange Free

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State (named after the Orange River) and Transvaal (across the Vaal River). These republics might have remained independent if diamonds (from 1867) and gold (1884) had not been discovered in the areas of the Northern Cape and Gauteng (around Johannesburg). The subsequent rush of European prospectors, and the desire of the British to control these mineral resources, led to wars in the 1880s and 1899–1901 between the British and the farmers from the Afrikaner republics. It was in these arenas that the British learned about trench warfare and the role of guerrilla fighters. The ongoing resistance of the Afrikaners led to the British burning thousands of farms and forming concentration camps that held Afrikaner men, women, and children (with some of the men sent as far afield as Sri Lanka). The treatment of these prisoners led to an enduring hatred of the British by subsequent generations of Afrikaners. In 1910, the Union of South Africa was established, with SA as a selfgoverning dominion within the British Empire; compromises related to land ownership and the resultant status of black people were made (without the representation of these people in the settlement negotiations). Due in part to legal limitations on access to land, African people were drawn to the developing industrial cities and market towns, working as laborers, with limited rights to purchase land and qualified franchise. In 1912, to protest such treatment, a group of African people formed a political group, which evolved into the ANC, established in 1923. The worldwide economic depression of the 1930s had a significant impact on many Afrikaners, who had moved into the growing industrial areas after losing their farmland. Despite internal conflicts, South Africans from across the racial spectrum fought alongside the Allies in both World Wars. The Rise of Apartheid Over the course of the Second World War, Afrikaner nationalism gathered momentum, fueled by previously mentioned events and sympathies toward Germany. Although racial divisions between people were prevalent in SA from the colonial era, the election of the Nationalist Party (NP) to government in 1948 and the introduction of the Population Registration Act of 1950 codified apartheid. This governmentally sanctioned system of classifying people by race and language had a profound impact on social interactions. The majority of the population (over 80 percent black African) were politically, legally, and economically dominated by the Afrikaner minority. Numerous governmental policies maintained white privilege and power through geographic, political, and economic access, leading to increased oppression and often violent countering of opposition from black people, for a number of decades.

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A separate education system for blacks resulted from the Bantu Education Act (promulgated in 1953), with significantly less funding and poorer facilities provided for black schools. This system was supposedly designed to preserve the ‘‘racially genuine Bantu culture’’11 but was really a way of safeguarding the future of a white-dominated nation. The system prepared blacks for subordinate positions in society, giving students skills for subordinate jobs in the workplace rather than focusing on intellectual development. The broad encouragement of racial stereotyping through classification of people into black, ‘‘Colored,’’12 Indian, and white groups had catastrophic effects on the social and psychological fabric of the country. Conservative Christian religion played a role in the establishment and continuation of apartheid policies (based on racially biased reading of biblical texts), promoting ideas about ‘‘separate development.’’ A system of forced removals of people into separate settlements escalated through the 1960s, with increasing levels of protest and vicious responses from the police and armed forces. Social and educational divides were also engineered between white English and Afrikaansspeaking South Africans. Government-sponsored propaganda promoted fear and hatred, resulting in prejudice, which is one of the major tragedies of SA,13 and has left a lasting imprint on the nation. As an organization, the ANC grew dramatically from the 1950s, including people from across the racial spectrum. The people drew inspiration from the civil rights and Black Consciousness movements in the United States. The more militant Pan African Congress (PAC) was established for people of black African origin. Both organizations responded to the increasingly oppressive laws by mass protests and were banned in 1961. This banning led to a militarization of the black opposition, including the formation of Umkhonto we Sizwe (‘‘Spear of the Nation,’’ often termed MK), which engaged in covert attacks, at first targeting strategic installations like power stations and police buildings. Terrorism is . . . ‘‘a very value-laden word that describes violent or destructive acts by a group with the aim of making a political point by generating fear among people . . . the term ‘freedom fighter’ has the same meaning, but is used when the acts of violence or destruction are endorsed.’’ The struggle escalated, with many young people covertly leaving the country to train as ‘‘freedom fighters.’’ The NP termed them ‘‘terrorists’’ and drummed up a fear campaign within SA. Young white men were conscripted into the army for increasing periods of time, and

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the army was at times used to suppress resistance to the oppressive laws. The army also engaged in covert operations in the surrounding countries; for example, in Angola and Mozambique, they supported illicit guerrilla fighting by right-wing groups against the ruling parties. Many South Africans aged over 30 today have experienced the effects of living in a police state with its deeply entrenched divisions, hurt, and hatred. Some of the militarization is still evident in situations where small groups of South Africans have supported guerilla conflicts and are employed in the ‘‘security industry’’ in parts of the world where there is unrest. As a result of the police brutality of June 16, 1976, to suppress what has become known as the Soweto riots (when thousands of schoolchildren demonstrated against the imposition of learning in Afrikaans), many schools became sites of the struggle. Learners rebelled against discriminatory policies and inferior teaching and materials. Political parties, such as the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and United Democratic Front (UDF), were active in parts of the country, and conflict between them was promoted by subversive elements of the police (sometimes called the ‘‘third force’’). Young people were exposed to violence and intimidation throughout the 1980s, often learning to use weapons. They have become what has been termed the ‘‘lost generation’’ of people whose education was cut short and who have not been compensated for the effects of their losses in that tumultuous time. It is against the above backdrop of separation of people, division, and often violent oppression of the majority, that various negotiations to end apartheid began in the late 1980s. The increasing civic unrest within the country and the economic and political sanctions against SA by much of the developed world, and its increasing marginalization as a ‘‘pariah state,’’ along with political leadership with less entrenched ideas, played important roles in forcing the government toward change. Acknowledgment must be made of the role of the Christian church, which in its very conservative form supported apartheid, which also, through the South African Council of Churches (SACC), and the tireless work over decades, of people such as Desmond Tutu in the dominant denominations (including the Anglican and Roman Catholic churches), helped move the country toward democracy. Increasing communication was brokered between the NP and ANC (led both by people who had been imprisoned and by others in exile), and multiparty negotiations took place. Although more extreme factions on both sides of the political spectrum promoted ongoing hatred and tried to fuel an armed struggle, the majority of South Africans supported the shift toward a more just and equal society; the freeing of Nelson Mandela from prison in 1990 was a significant symbol of the unfolding changes. Mandela is

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quoted as saying on that day, ‘‘Our struggle has reached a decisive moment. Our march to freedom is irreversible.’’14 The Transition to Democracy In 1993, South Africa’s two major political forces, the ANC and the NP, developed an interim constitution that resulted in the first democratic general election in 1994. Despite the debilitating backdrop of apartheid, a bloody civil war was averted and South Africa was applauded for peaceful conflict resolution. By choosing reconciliation rather than retribution, South Africa became a fine example of political inclusiveness, power sharing, and mutual accommodation. Nelson Mandela was elected the first black president, and the long journey of transition toward a more just society began. Mandela focused on nation-building and reconciliation in the five years of his presidency. During this period, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) took center stage and assured whites and other minority groups that they had a place in the new order. Thus, our discussion of the transition from apartheid to democracy focuses first on the TRC and then describes social and economic development, contrasted with the escalating incidents of crime and violence that still permeate SA society. Although these are not the only factors that have influenced the period of transition, they illustrate the unique interactions of morality, justice, and faith in the country’s democratic journey. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission ‘‘Positive peace requires freedom and justice for all people. It also builds on experience of making peace and becoming reconciled with former enemies.’’ ‘‘Peace means loving others for who they are. This is not achieved lightly and is very costly—Archbishop Tutu with his peace and reconciliation is one of the few who understands how important it is and has gone to extraordinary lengths to achieve it for South Africans.’’ The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act established the TRC. Its mission was primarily to ‘‘ensure that we put our country on a sound moral basis.’’15 More explicitly, the TRC aimed to bring healing and ‘‘return to victims their civil and human rights; to restore the moral order of the society.’’16 To fulfill its mandate, the TRC broke the silence of apartheid by exposing stories of suffering and dehumanization endured primarily by black South Africans. It took two years to listen to more than 2,000 verbal testimonies, read 18,000 written submissions, and review 8,000 amnesty applications. Uncensored and consistent

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media coverage of the proceedings of the TRC ensured that all South Africans became aware of the atrocities committed under apartheid. Despite good intentions, the TRC was heavily criticized for not distinguishing between those who fought against apartheid and those who defended it; people on both sides of the struggle were allowed to apply for amnesty. A more pervasive criticism was that the TRC had sacrificed justice for truth by believing that reconciliation could result in greater good than punitive justice. The TRC was also criticized for downplaying the role of economic (redistributive) justice, leading to fears that individuals who hoped for radical transformation after apartheid would transform their disappointment into revenge because they felt they had not been treated in a just manner.17 The current high rates of crime and violence may to some extent result from this disappointment; however, crime and violence affect people from across the racial spectrum and appear to have more complex causes linked to the breakdown in the social fabric and structures during the apartheid era.

Social Development After 1994, the ANC government began a policy of redistributive justice through programs of employment equity, black economic empowerment, land redistribution, increased social benefits, capital gains tax, and a national payroll skills levy. When Thabo Mbeki became president in 1999, 22,000 victims of gross human rights violations were financially compensated. To redress the wrongs of the past, 869,506 claims of forced removal were registered, and their processing was due to be completed by March 2008. Other major developments included abolishing the death penalty, constitutional guarantees against racial and gender discrimination, and recognition of gay and lesbian rights. However, a major tragedy during the period of transition has been the effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The social and economic implications of HIV/AIDS are alarming, with young adults and especially women the most affected groups. The prevalence rate for women is 12.8 percent compared to 9.5 percent among men. It is estimated that South Africa will lose over half of its workforce to AIDS in the next 10 years and the orphan population will increase tremendously as a result. Deeply divided responses and controversial statements by both President Mbeki and the ministry of health regarding use of antiretroviral drugs have not helped the process.18 The emergence of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), which mobilized large campaigns to draw national and international attention to the government’s failure to respond to this pressing issue, has been an important

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social development. As a result, in 2004, the government began to establish structured mechanisms to address the epidemic. Economic Development The ANC government introduced economic development policies to revitalize the economy and ensure that growth would benefit all South Africans, especially the impoverished majority. The Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) outlined these policies and discussed how these disparities were to be addressed by providing basic needs (housing, land reform, electricity, water, transport, telecommunications, health care, and nutrition), prioritizing education, increasing governmental transparency, and the participation of its citizenry. Unfortunately, the RDP was unable to fulfill its ambitious goals. The government miscalculated the time it would take to complete such a large project, the arduous task of making up for the wrongs of the past, and the economic and fiscal challenges it inherited.19 However, the RDP has had some success in improving school nutritional programs and developing thousands of new homes, water supply projects, and clinics to support health care. When Mbeki took office, he introduced a macrodevelopmental policy called the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Program (GEAR); the primary goal was rapid economic growth through international integration and globalization. An additional task undertaken during the period of transition was to transform the welfare system, which under apartheid provided generous social services and benefits to needy whites but not blacks.20 The White Paper for Social Welfare, published in 1995, outlined a humanitarian, people-centered social welfare policy for the nation. However, resistance from provincial departments, incompetent administrative personnel, and fraudulent spending and corruption has hampered its implementation. Nevertheless, the new government was able to overhaul human resources and broaden welfare to include child and youth care work, community development, and probation work.21 In contrast to the aging populations of the United States and Europe, South Africa has a rapidly growing young population (under age 20). This means that South Africa is moving toward higher taxes, lower growth, and higher unemployment. Seven million taxpayers out of a population of 48 million currently support nearly 10 million recipients of social grants. There are concerns about the sustainability of this level of redistribution without a consequent negative impact on wealth creation. Direct investment from foreign sources, crucial to economic growth, has been severely hampered by concerns about the high unemployment rate, violent crime, and the alarming HIV and AIDS infection

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rate. Although SA is viewed as a leading economic force in Africa, development is inhibited by the aforementioned concerns along with the regional instability that has resulted from the political situation in Zimbabwe (with associated economic hardships and illegal immigration into SA). Crime and Violence Violence in South Africa has turned into criminality since 1994, and the crime statistics reflect this change. Recorded crime has increased by 30 percent over the past decade, with violent crime showing the most increase (with apartheid era weapons fueling much of this). In 1997, Jo Beall used Interpol data to highlight the country’s ranking with the highest murder rate in the world and the rate of homicide among the top five in the world. Beall found that women were more vulnerable to sexual crimes and domestic violence in the home, whereas young men (black) were more likely to experience interpersonal violence and violent crime in public places.22 One of the challenges faced by the ANCled government has been the task of aligning the country’s law enforcement with the principles and values outlined in the new constitution. The past decade has thus been characterized by new policies, plans, strategies, and laws aimed at transformation and nation-building. The tensions between a crime prevention approach, which views crime as being caused by social, economic, and environmental conditions, and a law enforcement approach, which suggests that the best way to reduce crime is by arresting and convicting criminals, remain strong. Since 1999, the business community and the criminal justice system have collaborated to curb rampant crime and violence. These efforts have been described as positive interventions between the public and private sectors, but public perception of security in the country continues to be negative. Feelings of safety have decreased substantially in more than half of the South African population, and there is a widespread belief that criminals have more rights than victims.23 Confidence in police protection is low and corruption is a key complaint. The promotion of human rights and provision of safety have become conflicting goals for many South Africans. South Africa Today ‘‘[War is] a state where one country violently enters and attacks another. Mostly this is made possible only by the supply of arms by the larger nations to smaller nations. A complete embargo on all arms to Africa would end, in my opinion, 90% of the wars and genocide. The supply of . . . all

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weapons to Africa in exchange for money, diamonds, and tin I find utterly repugnant. Likewise the supply of sophisticated aircraft to SA by Sweden and the UK.’’ A primary focus of political transition has been moving the country from an oppressive oligarchy to a human rights-based constitutional democracy. Mandela’s reconciliation agenda emphasized the ‘‘Rainbow Nation,’’ with a ‘‘one nation, many cultures’’ approach. His reconciliation government had popular support, but not much changed for many people, since the structural inequalities still remained, and with hindsight his rhetoric has been criticized as an attempt to smooth over the many differences rather than fundamentally tackle these. In contrast, the Africanism discourse of the Mbeki government had the primary goal of improving the quality of life of SA’s black majority by growing the economy and gaining a place globally. Despite a growing black middle class and constitutional promises of freedom from poverty, more than half of South Africans (mostly black) remain impoverished, whereas for most whites political life has changed, but they are relatively secure economically. South Africa has experienced widespread migration to and from the country; for example, for decades migrant laborers have come to work in the mines from Southern and Central Africa, and many stayed on. SA has been a haven for thousands of displaced refugees, such as Rwandans, Burundians, and Congolese, and lately there are reports that between one and three million Zimbabweans are living in SA. This influx of refugees has placed additional strain on the delivery of services and particularly on employment patterns and housing. It is in this complex context that an exploratory online survey was conducted, to probe a sample of South Africans’ opinions of war, terrorism, and peace. RESPONSES TO THE SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICANS’ ATTITUDES All participants completed an online abridged version of the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression Survey (PAIRTAPS) consisting of seven items from the survey.24 Participants rated each item on a scale from 1 to 5 (from strongly disagree to strongly agree), and most also took the opportunity to qualify their answers with an explanation of the rating chosen. Demographics A total of 102 adult individuals completed the survey, with women accounting for 62 percent of the sample (38 percent male). Over 71 percent had achieved a university degree, with half fitting into

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‘‘professional’’ occupations. Occupations varied from engineers, artists, administrators and managers, technology consultants, educators, homemakers, and researchers, to clergy, machinists, social workers, and psychologists. The ages of respondents were well distributed across the life span (mean age = 42 with a standard deviation of 14), with 68 percent falling between 31 and 60 years of age. Twenty-four percent of respondents were below 31 years of age, and 8 percent were above 60 years of age. Unfortunately, ethnic designations were less well distributed, with 80 percent of respondents being white, 16 percent black, and 4 percent colored or Indian descent. Over 81 percent were resident in SA, and the rest currently live outside of the country. Quantitative Analyses Simple correlations were examined across the answers to the PAIRTAPS questions. As expected, answers to the basic right to peace question were positively correlated with the right to stage protests and negatively correlated with acquiescence to government rights to torture prisoners and harm civilians. In other words, peace as a basic right was positively related to support for staging of peace protests, but inversely related to viewing torture and harming innocent civilians as governmental rights. There was no significant relationship between support for the idea that peace is a basic right and degree of confidence that world peace can be achieved. In general, there were no significant relationships between demographic characteristics and rating scale responses indicating endorsement of governmental rights to aggression or individual rights to peace; however, the older the respondent the more likely he or she was to endorse the idea that sometimes the heads of government have the right to harm innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism. Rating scale responses did not vary in relation to racial and residential characteristics, gender, education, or current occupation. We now consider the participants’ qualitative justifications for their rating scale responses, noting the gender and age of the respondents quoted.

QUALITATIVE ANALYSES OF ATTITUDES TO WAR AND TERRORISM ‘‘[War is] where one country formally declares its intention to go ‘to war’ against another country, for example, United States and Britain against Iraq or Britain against Germany in the Second World War.’’ ‘‘Military conscripts get caught up in it, told they’re fighting for their country, [go] through a lot of unnecessary heartache, then come home

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and try and put their lives together, then find that the ‘enemy’ they were fighting are now best friends.’’ ‘‘[Terrorism is] actions against a perceived authoritarian control that does not respond to negotiation and does not hear one’s point of view. It can be against regimes that are racist and violate human rights. The act of terrorism can however itself be a violation of human rights.’’ Over 72 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that sometimes one country has the right to invade another, and over 82 percent disagreed that a state has the right to torture prisoners in times of war. These attitudes would appear to reflect many South Africans’ distaste for war, their desire for negotiations in times of conflict, and their support for human rights as enshrined in the new SA constitution. An example of the desire to seek other means of conflict resolution is this comment: ‘‘While it is ok to send aid to another country in turmoil and to try and convince leaders to talk, hostile invasion should not be tolerated’’ (female, 32). Distrust in the motives of some politicians may be seen in the statement: ‘‘As we have seen from the past, invasions are about more than what we are told; it just shows how many powerhungry people are out there and what lengths they would go to, to obtain that power . . . In most cases, the invasions end up in a lot of innocent people dying for a cause they know nothing about. I feel that if there are problems in a country, the world at large should assist, but not for their own gain or benefit’’ (female, 20). Although the majority of respondents rated their answer to the question about invading another country in the ‘‘disagree’’ categories, many provided qualifications in their statements, with more than 15 percent of respondents referring either to wars in the past or to concerns about recent conflicts and war in Africa. There were several references to the legitimacy of invading Nazi Germany; for example, ‘‘The world had every right, nay the duty, to invade Nazi Germany. But only with the consent of a large number of nations’’ (male, 59). The importance of support from other countries and/or the United Nations (UN) was reiterated by many. Some respondents expressed their opposition to the Iraq invasion based on its not being legitimated by the UN, but several others noted the prevailing situation in Zimbabwe as an example where invasion may well be supported. For example, the respondent quoted earlier in this paragraph continued, ‘‘I hesitate to agree that the USA and UK had the right to invade Iraq, ugly as Saddam Hussein was. I think the UN may have the right to invade Zimbabwe, with Security Council consent.’’ However, one respondent had some doubts about the UN as follows: ‘‘While there are international organizations like the UN and protocols and agreements that bind countries to peace and which

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can be used as a basis for invasion, these organizations are dominated by powerful global forces and countries with vested interests that are concealed from the masses. No invasion in recent times has been proved to be justified’’ (female, 43). Further examples of qualified support for invasion are: ‘‘This statement needs context. Under certain circumstances, perhaps invasion is the only way to protect yourself—or the world. One has the right to defend oneself, one’s people, one’s way of life, values, etc.—this may include some kind of pre-emptive invasion’’ (female, 43); and ‘‘there might be certain circumstances under which it was justified. For example, the activities in Nazi Germany were such as to justify an international force to invade and halt them. However, as we have seen in Iraq, this ‘right’ can be easily manipulated’’ (female, 54). Some respondents who supported a governmental right to invasion reasoned that it may be appropriate in cases where countries were under threat or there was great human suffering. ‘‘Agree but only if the country invaded has acted clearly and demonstrably to severely threaten the sovereignty and safety of the invading country, and all reasonable methods undertaken to stop the situation have been tried and failed’’ (female, 46). Other participants agreed with invasion when such actions would save innocent people and ensure a good living ‘‘in times when a country needs to be invaded to restore law and order or to bring peace to that country, e.g., attempted military take over in Lesotho a few years ago. SANDF (SA National Defence Force) went in and sorted out the problem’’ (male, 35). Some respondents believed that countries did not have the ‘‘right’’ to invade, but acknowledged that ‘‘in times of war, all rules change and when human rights are being ignored or when civil war breaks out, the people of the country must be considered and it might be for their sake that another country might invade’’ (female, 38). Moreover, some respondents saw warfare as inherent in nations, and not necessarily a bad thing: ‘‘It is in the natural order of things that a stronger nation will invade and take over a weaker one. They would then impart their more advanced knowledge and skills on the invaded country, but hopefully also absorb some of the existing culture’’ (female, 50). This respondent went on to be critical of the United States role in Iraq, ‘‘I do not agree with America ‘invading’ Iraq and causing havoc and then withdrawing.’’ A number of arguments were offered in opposition to a right to invade. For example, many respondents expressed concern over the effects of invasion on the innocent. Such arguments included: ‘‘No-one ever wins a war. Civilians, especially women and children, suffer most’’ (female, 67). Several respondents questioned the motives of the invading forces; for example, ‘‘Invasion of another country is usually for own

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gain or out of arrogance (the latter being particularly true for western nations)’’ (female, 26). There was a strong sense of respect for the autonomy and sovereignty of countries, and ‘‘even under the most extreme circumstances, change can only come from within’’ (female, 30). Because torture was used by the police during the apartheid regime, it is a particularly emotive subject for most South Africans. Although acts of torture were not widely reported in the state-muzzled media of the time, TRC disclosures of the human rights abuses that had occurred horrified many citizens of SA. Eighty-two percent of our respondents marked one of the ‘‘disagree’’ categories in response to the item ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war.’’ Many of them rejected torture on moral grounds, describing it as ‘‘abusive,’’ ‘‘unethical,’’ a ‘‘denial of human rights and dignity,’’ ‘‘barbaric,’’ and ‘‘inhumane.’’ One man wrote, ‘‘Torture may yield results but the practice is archaic and abhorrent’’ (male, 36). A woman commented, ‘‘It is ironic that the West is always so critical of Islamic Law (Shariah) and the means of punishment meted out against criminals, yet something like torture—a deliberate act of senseless violence against soldiers acting on the orders of so-called ‘world-leaders’—can be justified’’ (female, 43). Another group of participants focused on the effects of torture, noting that it can ‘‘promote hatred’’ and ‘‘dehumanize both victim and perpetrator,’’ without being a useful way to obtain information. One respondent noted, ‘‘It means unprincipled leaders can give the right to the military to break down opposition members with no conscience and no accountability, to create a climate of subterfuge and fear’’ (male, 66). The way in which such practices ‘‘pathologize’’ victims and promote sadism was mentioned by some. One participant said, ‘‘I cannot see how it could not be fuelled by hatred for a certain group of people’’ (male, 27). Of the 11 percent who marked an ‘‘agree’’ category when responding to the torture item, many qualified their choice. A fairly common justification among these respondents was the possibility of saving lives; however, even some of these respondents were distrustful of underlying motives for torture. One woman (age 38) said, ‘‘If torturing one prisoner meant saving the lives of innocent people I would support torture. However, I don’t trust the motives . . . I fear that personal and political reasons lead to torture as well as torture being a means of terrorizing the powerless.’’ Another saw torture as acceptable only if the person had first been convicted of crime. Some remarked on the importance of knowing the context; for example, a 58-year-old woman said, ‘‘The situation might determine one’s response. Gratuitous torture should not be allowed. However, a situation might well exist where torture to obtain information might lead to a greater good. Very stringent checks and balances would need to be in place.’’

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The term ‘‘terrorism’’ is also a particularly loaded term in SA. It was the term used by the apartheid government to describe the actions of antiapartheid activists, who preferred to term themselves ‘‘freedom fighters’’; this illustrates the power of emotive labelling. The term therefore provokes reactions from across the spectrum in SA. One 43-yearold man said, ‘‘Nelson Mandela was a terrorist, so is one man’s terrorist another man’s freedom fighter?’’ Strong statements were made in response to the item ‘‘Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism,’’ with 76 percent marking one of the disagree options. In opposing the harming of innocent people when fighting international terrorism, participants frequently referred to historical events, or disputed the morality of civilian casualties, rejecting the principle that the ends justify the means. One 38-year-old woman wrote, ‘‘We’ve seen this happen in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and more recently Africa—and this is a complete travesty of justice; the means (harming innocent civilians) do not justify the ends.’’ There is evidence of the ways in which people have openly debated such issues in SA in statements recognizing alternatives to violence in the fight against terrorism: ‘‘International terrorism is a product of prior aggression and the root causes should be identified and removed. All dissension should be fought through diplomatic and negotiated channels’’ (female, 67). Many of the respondents recognized the difficulties inherent in fighting against what is perceived as terrorism and were pessimistic about the possibility of avoiding civilian casualties; for example, a 25-year-old woman said, ‘‘Innocent civilians should never have to die. But unfortunately, this is sometimes unavoidable in an attempt restore/maintain peace for the majority’’ and a 26-year-old man commented, ‘‘sometimes it is unavoidable but is never acceptable.’’ Many respondents wrote about the responsibility of governments to protect citizens and to promote citizens’ well-being and were concerned about the effects of warlike actions; for example, ‘‘Collateral damage is a fact of life when war is concerned but that does not make it right. No government has the ‘right’ to do so, they are thus no better than the terrorists themselves’’ (male, 36). On the other hand, some respondents indicated that sacrificing civilian lives would be tolerable if, for example, ‘‘it is to save the innocent people from terrorists that are taking over the country’’ (male, 32), or ‘‘if civilians support the terrorists, then yes’’ (male, 47). A number of respondents recognized the way in which those labelled as ‘‘terrorists’’ seek the support or cover of those who are innocent: ‘‘Sometimes it is impossible to separate the innocent from the terrorists, and innocent

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people should try to distance themselves from the troublemakers’’ (male, 66). The challenge of individual versus group rights was noted, with one respondent suggesting there is a ‘‘fine line between abuse of power and making decisions for the greater good’’ (female, 36); however, the same participant noted, ‘‘I do not know what I would recommend if I had been personally affected by such acts of terrorism. I do feel that sometimes we need to take action against an individual in light of the greater good.’’ Some respondents cited the case of an innocent man killed in the wake of the 7/7 bombings in London, noting that there had initially been an argument for the so-called ‘‘greater good’’ but then distress at the unnecessary use of violence. The promotion of dialogue and communication has built levels of respect across the religious spectrum, enabling the views of, for example, people of Muslim faith to be heard. ‘‘War is generally unjust—it seems that invariably it is innocent civilians who suffer the most (female, 37). ‘‘International terrorism probably creates more innocent victims than the fight against it’’ (female, 50). Many noted that the innocent need protection and that government should focus on this responsibility.

QUALITATIVE ANALYSES OF ATTITUDES TO PEACE ‘‘[Peace is] a state without conflict, where all people can live as free citizens, exercising their basic human rights without fear.’’ ‘‘[Peace is] cooperative negotiation to equitably distribute resources.’’ In recent years, South Africa has assumed a central role in Africa. It has been involved in peacekeeping missions (e.g., in the Democratic Republic of Congo), and representatives of the government have played a role in peace negotiations (e.g., with Iraq in 2003, prior to war being declared). SA is a member of the nonaligned movement, and there are strong discourses in SA about peaceful resolution of conflicts. However, the country engaged in a multimillion dollar arms deal during the latter part of the 1990s, with debates about its necessity and allegations of corrupt dealing between politicians and certain Western nations that still reverberate today. Eighty-five percent of South African respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace.’’ However, only 33 percent agreed or strongly agreed that ‘‘world peace can be achieved,’’ and 53 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed that peace is achievable. Respondents offered a variety of responses to the ‘‘basic rights’’ question, which generally fell into two categories,

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arguments that were uniformly resolved and direct and arguments that included qualifications to the right. The SA context must be remembered when considering the responses; regardless of the category into which the responses fell, they were influenced by SA’s oppressive past. South Africa’s unique history of a minority group dominating the majority of the population caused decades of upheaval that tore at society’s fabric. The majority of people in SA were not afforded moral and social equality, creating social, economic, political, and international disturbances that eventually led to the downfall of apartheid and continue to affect judgments about war and peace. Many respondents commented on society’s need for peace, particularly the favorable outcomes associated with peace. As one 47-year-old woman said, ‘‘Without this basic right, society cannot function.’’ Some respondents argued that greater peace within the nation could eventually increase the strength of the nation as a whole, as evidenced by the comment: ‘‘[Peace means] a greater chance of development, both personally and for the country’’ (female, 50). A number of comments about the need for peace were expressed by individuals old enough to recall and be embedded in the apartheid system, and many participants emphasized the connection between equality and peace. For example, a 19-year-old man said, ‘‘Everyone is morally and socially equal, and deserves peace.’’ Though the majority of individuals agreed that peace should be a basic right, other comments were more qualified. For example, comments such as the following were made ‘‘That is surely what we all pray for and expect our leaders and governments to aim for. However, we also have a responsibility to live as if we wanted to enjoy peace. Very few rights come without responsibilities’’ (female, 58). This comment highlights the expectation that governments should strive toward peace but also recognize that individuals and groups can disrupt peace regardless of governmental intent. On the other hand, large oppressive governmental systems can actually be portrayed as peaceful, as evidenced in the comment, ‘‘Peace could also be defined by others as silent oppression’’ (female, 53). In essence, dominant governments can oppress people to the point where uprisings are minimal, as evidenced during apartheid-era SA and other states such as the now defunct USSR. It is important to recognize that oppressive systems are comprised of individuals, not all of whom adhere to the party line. While there was relative ‘‘peace’’ in SA during much of apartheid (at least as perceived by many outside of SA), because of the exceedingly oppressive nature of the system, some individuals and small groups disrupted the ‘‘peace’’ by engaging in protests and other activities. Others opposed the system and strove for peace through education, business, and politics.

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Although one-third of respondents agreed that world peace can be achieved, the majority maintained that it is not achievable. Many individuals agreed with the statement in principle but were not overly hopeful. For example, responses included, ‘‘One must live with this goal, however unattainable’’ (female, 44), and ‘‘[There are] too many powerful countries trying to outdo each other, so it’s very doubtful there will ever be world peace’’ (female, 46). Others indicated that political, social, economic, and religious justice is needed, also perhaps a reflection of the apartheid era in SA and consistent with a positive definition of peace. More directly, the majority of respondents did not believe world peace was achievable. Among the common themes denoting barriers to peace were world peace can only be achieved in a utopian state; resources are unjustly distributed; there are individual or national needs for power that obstruct peace; the world is too diverse; biblical text establishes peace as an impossibility prior to the return of Jesus; and human beings are selfish creatures, thus peace cannot be achieved. Others offered practical solutions to achieving peace. A 67-year-old woman suggested peace could be achieved ‘‘If every weapon was destroyed and societies concentrate on their own resources fully instead of coveting and exploiting the wealth of others.’’ A 74-year-old woman said achieving peace was possible if everyone ‘‘obeys the Ten Commandments and also if everyone agrees to live and let live.’’ Others emphasized the need to eradicate poverty and move spiritually toward one another. Even among participants believing peace can be achieved, the influence of governments in southern Africa and other regions was highlighted by comments concerning tyrants and other oppressive regimes. For example, one respondent wrote, ‘‘Yes, it can be achieved if people like Hitler, Idi Amin, and Mugabe are dethroned, then peace can be achieved’’ (female, 55). By contrast, a 38-year-old woman commented, ‘‘There are too many tyrants out there who are allowed to remain in power, for there ever to be world peace.’’ Beliefs concerning a citizen’s right to protest against governmental aggression were probed by the item ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace.’’ Within the SA context, prior to the early 1990s protests were often common but considered illegal. The war being fought was not across national borders but within the country, as geographic regions segregated individuals, services were unevenly distributed, schools were seriously inequitable, democratic elections were nonexistent, national police could be exonerated from beatings and murder, and people of color lived in fear. Although banned, political groups such as the ANC and the PAC were developed

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and prospered, often engaging in public protests that spurred increased membership. As a result of many protests, persons of color were often arrested, beaten, tortured, and sometimes killed. Protests under the apartheid regime were not, however, reserved only for persons of color, as some of the minority whites were also involved with and fostered protests. Protests also helped to bring international recognition of some of the atrocities occurring during apartheid, resulting in trade embargoes and other international pressures. These pressures, combined with growing unrest due to protests, eventually moved the country toward a less stringent system and the first democratic elections in 1994. Over 91 percent of respondents indicated that they agreed or strongly agreed with the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace. People across all ages, whether they recall the apartheid era or not, asserted the importance of protests. Common responses included, ‘‘As an individual I would like my voice to be heard and considered, even if it goes against the current/proposed status. As long as the protest itself is peaceful and does not impinge on the rights of others, all individuals should be confident of their freedom to protest against war (or anything else)’’ (female, 58). This theme could be found throughout the responses, with comments focusing on the idea that protests are a basic right, they are a tenet of democracy, they are important in any country, they should be peaceful actions that do not harm others, and there should be a voice against the inhumanity of war. Conversely, one individual strongly disagreed with a right to protest against war, stating that ‘‘they voted for their government’’ (male, 47), with the supposed implication that voting for a government implied abiding by its decisions, including going to war. Numerous individuals commented that protests must be peaceful, perhaps a reaction to decades of protests in SA that became violent, resulting in losses of life. Others mentioned that ‘‘Without this right, tyranny is likely to expand and increase throughout the world’’ (female, 46). Over 73 percent of individuals agreed that ‘‘National security is essential for individual and family security.’’ Many responses were directly related to the previous governmental regime. For example, one reported, ‘‘In order to feel safe in your home you need to feel safe in your country’’ (female, 38); another noted, ‘‘Especially when the nation has removed the right to see to your own security’’ (female, 50). Finally, numerous comments indicated a belief that without national security a country is in disarray and cannot possess a law-based social system, resulting, through a domino effect, in less security all the way down to the individual family. Others made comments such as the following: ‘‘It depends on how national security impacts on the individual and family situation. During the apartheid era in South Africa, many individuals

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and families lived in relative security oblivious to the township war zones that ripped apart communities and families’’ (male, 33). In sum, national security is necessary for personal security, and many comments reflected specific experiences within SA. Others were less positive about the necessity of national security for individual and family security. Responses incorporated the idea that national security can sometimes result in extreme costs, with one individual specifically mentioning the U.S. government’s recent decrease in individual privacy rights in the name of maintaining national security against terrorism. Of course, extreme costs also include loss of life as a result of war. Other comments included a theme of ‘‘national security is a blanket term that has been abused in the past. Transparency is the key for the future’’ (female, 30). The apartheid government in SA had used ‘‘national security’’ as the reason for detaining people against their will, using deadly force, and imposing social and economic restrictions on those not abiding by the party line. Finally, a minority of individuals expressed concerns for national security in the context of the struggle with the criminal element in SA, essentially stating that individuals will engage in behaviors regardless of the security of a nation. For example, ‘‘Neither individual nor family safety can be guaranteed in the presence of national security. Individuals commit crimes no matter what national security looks like’’ (female, 50).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION It is clear from the results of the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey that South African respondents have many firm views on war, terrorism, and peace. It is acknowledged that the sample is skewed by the snowball sampling technique used and the still limited number of South Africans who regularly use the Internet. As a result, most of the sample was white and about half the sample was university educated, both of which would be dramatic overrepresentations in the SA context. Moreover, for the majority of South Africans, English is a second language, if understood at all. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that experiences of the history of the country and its present political dispensation have had a marked impact on citizen’s views regarding governmental aggression and peace. The shift politically has been from a conservative right-wing government up to 1994, for which there was tacit support from the United States and the United Kingdom, to a more inclusive nonaligned government with a strong African identity. Diverse views are expressed in the national media, and there is the promotion of dialogue with countries and leaders

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across the political and religious spectrum providing rich sources of material. Respondents often gave nuanced opinions about the implicit motives behind war and terrorism; for example, ‘‘often there is a particular reason for the conflict (e.g., a disagreement on values or beliefs or a dispute over territory or resources) but there need not be.’’ Because there has been national debate about such ideas as the need to purchase arms or to defend the country, a questioning of the economic motives related to war arose in a number of different responses, such as ‘‘War . . . is also the opportunity to make profit from violence’’ (female, 30); ‘‘War is about money . . . greed, death, destruction, power’’ (female, 50); and ‘‘[War] is primarily military in nature, but also uses diplomatic and psychological weaponry. It is usually not started by democratic decision, but is the product of the desire by a few to gain power or wealth of another nation or group. It is particularly destructive to civilians, especially women and children’’ (female, 67). Definitions of terrorism varied from those describing the (often localized) impact of militarized wings of extremist groups to more allencompassing views that portrayed whole countries as being involved, such as ‘‘Communities are terrorized from within and from outside. Any war is terrifying and therefore I would regard it as ‘terrorism.’ By its very nature it is designed to instill fear and terror in opponents. People are terrorized in their homes by family members; when communities engage in protest they are terrorized by police. Terrorism for me is not used just by ‘undercover’ forces or people using civilians as targets. Legitimate governments, as in the case of the United States, engage in acts of terrorism as with their invasion of other countries. Governments such as that of Zimbabwe are engaged in terrorism when they force suffering on their citizens. The apartheid government was a terrorist organization as it terrorized civilians.’’ Respondents recognized the nuanced nature of the term, with one stating that ‘‘Terrorism is a clandestine war where normally a minority group uses hit and run tactics. (The) intention is to bring about the downfall of the authority they are opposing. The French Resistance and the Yugoslav Partisans in WWII were terrorists, striving to reverse the process imposed by the Germans.’’ The majority of respondents value the hard-won political peace in SA, where the structures of democracy are now established, and there has been a period of stabilizing of the country and developing a stronger sense of national identity. However, the challenges in the country in the form of unequal division of land and resources, widespread poverty, the scourge of HIV/AIDS, and the high rate of crime, with the interconnections among these factors, all impact on conflict and experiences of violence. Thus, when asked to define peace, there were a

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number of interesting comments, including ‘‘Peace is more than the absence of war or terrorism. It is the positive sense of security that comes from having no fear. It exists when people can live with each others’ differences and tolerate other beliefs and practices and know that their own beliefs and practices are not threatened’’ (female, 58). ‘‘Peace is where everyday people are free to walk the streets without fear of attack’’ (female, 26)’’; [Peace is] not just the absence of violent warfare carried out by militia. Peace is a state of being in which each person is safe from violence of any sort’’ (female, 54); and ‘‘SA is not currently in a state of peace (with 50 murders per day). Peace includes the rule of law, access to the courts, basic human rights, including the right to work and access to work’’ (male, 59). Although the majority of the responses reflect the participants’ recognition of the problems attached to war, torture, and terrorism on a macroscale, the questions did not probe the possibly more divergent views related to the SA context, such as the ‘‘war’’ on crime. Moreover, although participants were asked to provide their own definitions of the terms ‘‘war’’ and ‘‘peace,’’ there were no standard probes for determining the nuances of meaning that could be embedded in those terms (reflecting, for example, differing views between people of different faiths); although respondents might have expressed views that are idealized given the relative peace in SA today, their definitions and judgments may have been different if issues related to personal security had been probed. This account of the situation in SA and people’s judgments concerning war, peace, and terrorism is merely a snapshot of a very complex country. Recruiting online respondents and their need to read English were limiting factors, because English is only one of the many languages spoken in the country. Furthermore, the cultural diversity of the country has not been well represented here, and a more comprehensive study is needed to capture the broader extent of South Africans’ experiences and perspectives. To conclude, at this point it is apt to turn to the words of Nelson Mandela: ‘‘We have not taken the final step of our journey, but the first step on a longer and even more difficult road. For to be free is not merely to cast off one’s chains, but to live in a way that respects and enhances the freedom of others.’’25

Part II

Central and South America

8

Nicaragua Amanda Clinton

War is . . . ‘‘Unjustified killing’’; ‘‘Pain, hunger, death and destruction.’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘A renewed union, an effort at reconstructing harmony where it did not previously exist’’; ‘‘Tranquility’’; ‘‘Friendship and agreement.’’ This chapter presents views on peace and governmental aggression in a sample of citizens from Nicaragua, Central America, a country with a lengthy history of internal conflict. The perceptions of Nicaraguans are discussed within the context of the country’s experience in times of peace and times of war. The discussion begins with a review of the political history of Nicaragua—one that is intertwined with conflicts and complicities that began over 100 years ago. Next, a brief explanation of the demographics and geography of the country is provided. Finally, Nicaraguan responses to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey1 obtained in the current research project are reported and analyzed.

THE NICARAGUAN CONTEXT ‘‘Let peace shine brightly in your skies’’ intones the Nicaraguan national anthem, a poem put to music whose words seek an end to war and bloodshed in favor of garnering work and honoring the country’s people. ‘‘Hail to Thee,’’ the prize-winning entry in a 1918 contest, specifically emphasized themes of peace and work in an effort to assuage the damages of a recently ended civil war. These very themes—selected as markers of a better, more tranquil time in the country—have, sadly, endured in their relevance to the realities of life in Nicaragua. Indeed,

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the desire for peace and the experience of war dominate the last century and a half of Nicaragua’s history. Spanish Colonization As with much of Latin America, the Spanish colonized the area that is present-day Nicaragua in the 16th century. Subsequent to colonization, however, Spain generally ignored Nicaragua, due largely to Spain’s interest in protecting the extraordinary riches discovered in her other colonies, such as Mexico and Peru. As a result, Nicaragua experienced relative peace during the Spanish colonial period. This era spanned approximately 300 years, ending in 1821 when Nicaragua gained independence from the Spanish crown. Independence The call for peace in Nicaragua’s national anthem is a response to the country’s history of the past 150 years, a history marked by war and political turmoil since independence from Spain. In fact, according to historians, ‘‘Revolution, banditry, civil war, and anarchy became the facts of life in Nicaragua’’2 at the end of Spanish rule. Ultimately, these conflicts often became further complicated by foreign intervention. Initially, the events of the last century and a half revolved around disputes between conservative and liberal groups based in the rival pueblos of Granada (organized with centralized government and aristocracy) and Le on (strongly opposed to Spanish colonialism), respectively. From the time of independence in 1821 to the end of the 19th century, civil war raged frequently in the country as opposing parties jostled for leadership. Within the Central American region, the situation was particularly violent in Nicaragua, which ‘‘suffered more than any of the other [Central American] states from nineteenth-century civil wars between liberals and conservatives’’ that resulted in a very ‘‘bloody and costly conflict.’’3 In 1909, perceiving its interests to be at risk, the United States became involved in Nicaragua’s internal conflicts. The United States actively supported forces against the country’s liberal president, Jose Santos Zelaya, when he engaged in conversations with Japan about the construction of an interoceanic canal through Nicaragua,4 a waterway of particular interest to the Americans. As political unrest increased, due in large part to the U.S. presence, two Marines were shot and killed by Nicaragua’s Nationalist government. The United States responded by increasing her presence in Nicaragua. The Knox Note, America’s congressional answer to the violence, unilaterally legitimized U.S. intervention in Nicaraguan affairs and ultimately led to the landing of U.S. forces on

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Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast. Thus ensued more than a decade of protests and guerrilla warfare related to the U. S. presence in the country.5 After supervising the democratic election of a conservative president and liberal vice president in 1924, and subsequent to negotiating the exclusive right to the development of an interoceanic canal through Nicaragua, the Marines withdrew from Nicaragua in 1925. Shortly thereafter, revolt ensued and political chaos reigned until 1927, when Liberal Party candidate, General Jose Moncada, won the presidency. The Somoza Regime and the Rise of the Sandinistas General Moncada had previously fought against U.S. involvement in Nicaragua; however, upon becoming head of state, he developed diplomatic relationships with his former enemy, engaging in talks with an envoy sent by U.S. President Calvin Coolidge. Significant public resistance surfaced regarding the relationship between Moncada and the Coolidge presidency, ultimately provoking a guerrilla war under the leadership of Augusto Sandino against U.S. forces. Approximately seven years, 500 battles, and numerous casualties later,6 Sandino and his army expelled U.S. forces from Nicaragua. Retaliation on behalf of the United States arrived quickly and violently, when, in 1934, the U.S.-backed National Guard Commander, Anastasio Somoza Garcia, masterminded the assassination of General Sandino. The general, along with two of his colleagues, was arrested, transported to an airfield, executed, and buried in an unmarked grave. The killing occurred at the direct order of Somoza Garcia and without the knowledge of President Sacasa, who had been involved in peace talks with General Sandino.7 Within two years of Sandino’s assassination, Somoza Garcia assumed the Nicaraguan presidency. Somoza’s rise to power led to over 40 years of a ‘‘harsh form of despotism’’8 that received financial backing from the United States. Somoza, or ‘‘Tacho,’’ ruled until 1956, when he was assassinated by Nicaraguan poet Rigoberto L opez Perez, who shot him with poison-tipped bullets.9 Somoza’s son, Luis, occupied the presidential residence next, and later Luis’ younger brother Anastasio II, or Tachito, ascended to the presidency. In sum, the Somoza family or its close allies ruled Nicaragua until 1979. When the Somoza dictatorship finally ended, it left Nicaragua ravaged and bankrupt.10 After an unsuccessful insurrection at the end of 1978, the Frente Sandinista de Liberaci on Nacional (FSLN; the Sandinista National Liberation Front) launched their ‘‘final offensive against the Somoza dynasty,’’11 engaging in a concentrated attack against the Somoza regime. The cost of ending the Somoza dictatorship included the loss of approximately

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50,000 Nicaraguan lives, the majority of whom were killed when ‘‘Tachito’’ Somoza indiscriminately bombarded several major cities in an effort to combat the Sandinista guerrilla insurgence.12 Another 100,000 Nicaraguans suffered wounds, nearly 40,000 children were orphaned, and about 150,000 Nicaraguans sought refuge in neighboring countries. When it took power at the end of the 1970s, the FSLN (the party of Daniel Ortega) offered a devastated land a renewed opportunity for hope. Ortega assumed the primary leadership role in Nicaragua, along with a nine-person FSLN member directorate. After decades of Somoza policies based largely on self-interest and worsened by an economic slowdown, the Sandinista government dedicated its efforts to health care, education, childcare, land reform, literacy, and the formation of unions. During its initial years, the Sandinista government’s social programs yielded positive results13 and achieved widespread popularity. Despite its positive progress, peace once again evaded Nicaragua. Already recognized as possessing one of Central America’s most violent and tumultuous histories,14 Nicaragua found the decade of the 1980s to be as devastating as the prior ones. Throughout this decade, the United States, under the direction of President Ronald Reagan, funded the Contra movement. In Reagan’s opinion, Central America demonstrated an impending security threat and Nicaragua was ‘‘an armed camp supplied by Cuba and threatening communist takeover [of the region].’’15 Thus, the U.S. president formulated a justification for the Central Intelligence Agency-backed intervention that lasted nearly a decade and incorporated selling weapons to Iran to support arms for Contra guerrillas in their fight against the Sandinistas.16 Change came in 1990 with the democratic election of Violeta de Chamorro, who ran as the candidate of the Nicaraguan Opposition Union (UNO). In her autobiography, de Chamorro indicates she ran in the spirit of her late husband, Pedro, who dreamed of a democratic Nicaragua.17 If the Sandinistas continued in leadership, argued de Chamorro, ‘‘the roots of communism would spread throughout the land, strangling freedom forever.’’18 Opponents argued, however, that Chamorro and her UNO coalition severely cut spending on Sandinista social programs that demonstrated promise19 and that she won only because financially, emotionally, and psychologically exhausted Nicaraguans perceived a continued Sandinista government as equivalent to further U.S. intervention in the country. Election statistics indicate that the FSLN, which Daniel Ortega continued to direct, retained 41 percent of the popular vote, giving weight to the second hypothesis. Despite initial disputes surrounding her election, de Chamorro remained in office until 1997 and was credited with a successful amnesty program for Contra fighters20 and establishing economic stability in a country devastated by war.21

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The elections for de Chamorro’s successor renewed tensions between former Somoza official, Arnoldo Alem an, and FSLN leader, Daniel Ortega. Alem an, who had been arrested by the Sandinistas when the Somoza regime fell, campaigned on a strong anti-Sandinista platform. Election results indicated 48 percent of the vote for Aleman and 40 percent for Ortega, who contested the findings. Aleman was later found guilty of money laundering, embezzlement, and corruption and sentenced to a 20-year prison term (later reduced to 5 years and permitting his release from house arrest in December 2007).22 Aleman’s vice president, Enrique Bola~ nos, won the presidency for the next term.

NICARAGUAN POLITICS: 2006 PRESENT In 2006, Daniel Ortega ran as the FSLN candidate for the presidency for the fifth time. His campaign emphasized pacifism, solidarity, God, love, reconciliation, and peace.23 Ortega won the presidency with approximately 38 percent of the vote—just surpassing the Nicaraguan minimum of 35 percent, with two liberal candidates splitting the remainder.24 Since his election, he has engaged in talks with Russia’s dictator, Vladimir Putin, and demonstrated close ties with Venezuela’s strong-man president, Hugo Ch avez, as well as with communist Cuba’s Fidel Castro.25 He described Colombia’s leftist guerrillas as hermanos (brothers),26 thus leading to concerns that his government represented a return of the Marxist Sandinista policies of nearly 17 years ago. Upon taking office in 2007, Ortega presented a plan for the development of a ‘‘direct democracy’’ that puts Nicaraguan citizens in charge of decisionmaking at all levels of government. However, the ‘‘Councils of Citizen Power’’ have been described as similar to programs in Castro’s Cuba and Ch avez’ Venezuela in their emphasis on party fidelity.27 Demographics One of seven countries forming Central America, Nicaragua is located to the south of Honduras and north of Costa Rica. Nicaragua boasts both Atlantic and Pacific coastline. Within the Central American region, Nicaragua is the largest country in regard to land area, occupying territory approximately the size of New York State. On the other hand, it is the least densely populated of all the Central America countries. The official language of Nicaragua is Spanish, which is spoken by 90 percent of the population. Along the Caribbean coast, however, indigenous languages such as Miskito are still spoken, as well as a form of English adapted since British rule of the coastline in the 1800s.

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Nicaragua is recognized as one of the poorest countries in Central America, a region itself defined as the poorest in the hemisphere. Nearly half of the general population in Nicaragua lives below the poverty line.28 Forty-five percent of Nicaraguan children live in such dire poverty that they lack access to resources determined necessary to meet minimum nutritional needs.29 In this context of prolonged armed conflict, disputes between Leftists and Rightists, U.S. interventions, and persistent poverty, what are Nicaraguan views on governmental aggression and peace?

The Nicaraguan Sample The Nicaraguan sample consisted of 137 adults, all Nicaraguan citizens currently residing within the metropolitan region of the Nicaraguan capital, Managua. The mean age of respondents was 27 years, with a standard deviation of 9 years and a range from 18 to 70 years. The sample was 60 percent female and 40 percent male. The majority of the respondents (61 percent) identified their religious affiliation as Christian, with 27 percent of the sample reporting ‘‘Other,’’ 8 percent reporting ‘‘None, Atheist, Agnostic,’’ and 4 percent not responding to the item on religious preference. Regarding educational level, 5 percent of the participants reported completing ‘‘some high school,’’ 10 percent indicated they had completed high school, and 15 percent said they were currently enrolled at university or had obtained some college education. Another 48 percent of the respondents had completed their college education, and 8 percent reported some graduate education or completion of a graduate degree. The remainder reported an elementary school-level education or did not respond to the item. Socioeconomic status ranged from 16 percent lower class and 28 percent working class to 46 percent middle class, 6 percent upper-middle class, and 5 percent upper class. One percent left the item blank. The participants from Nicaragua completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey30 in its entirety, although this chapter focuses on responses to items concerning the extent to which respondents endorsed governmental rights to aggression and individual rights to peace, as well as definitions for war, peace, and terrorism. On the rights items, the respondents indicated first the extent to which they agreed with each item (from 1, completely disagree to 7, completely agree) and then wrote justifications of their rating scale responses. It is the justifications that are of primary interest in the current chapter.

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NICARAGUAN PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL RIGHTS TO AGGRESSION ‘‘[War is] the fight of a country that wants to conquer others in search of economic well-being.’’ ‘‘[War is] a sad decision that is all wrong.’’ Definition of the Term ‘‘War’’ Eighty-four percent of the Nicaraguan definitions portrayed war abstractly as a state or national-level phenomenon. Within this group, responses were nearly evenly split between the 41 percent defining war traditionally as a ‘‘state of conflict’’ between groups and the 37 percent defining war in terms of its outcomes, particularly, ‘‘destruction.’’ Typical examples of conflict themes in the Nicaraguans’ definitions of war are ‘‘A fight that occurs between two or more parties’’ or discord between groups that are ‘‘opposites in opinion.’’ Examples of Nicaraguan responses focusing on the effects of war are ‘‘Death of innocent civilians’’ and ‘‘Death, disgrace, and poverty’’ or ‘‘Destruction of humanity.’’ Only a small percentage of the responses identified war with its causes (e.g., ‘‘Armed conflict for the benefit of a government’’), or with a lack of something (e.g., ‘‘The absence of peace’’), or with selfdefense. The only response making a connection between war and selfdefense revealed some scepticism regarding the reality underlying such a connection; according to that respondent, war is ‘‘an act of terror and death committed to supposedly defend an ideal or possibly a nation.’’ War was also defined in relation to potential alternatives: ‘‘Why war if we can solve problems using talks and dialogue?’’ Thirteen percent of the Nicaraguan responses defined war from a more individualistic perspective, providing personal moral judgments on armed engagements or focusing on personal emotional responses to war in their definitions. Of the 6 percent of responses that included some value judgment concerning war, a typical response indicated that war was, ‘‘completely incorrect acts used to resolve differences.’’ Examples of definitions equating war with negative or destructive emotions included ‘‘Where there is no peace—envy and hate.’’ Perspectives on Invasion In response to the item ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country,’’ 87 percent of Nicaraguans indicated disagreement; 39 percent of the explanations of the rating scale scores focused on the concept of national sovereignty. Responses denying a state right to invasion based on sovereignty ranged from simple descriptive statements

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such as ‘‘Each country has its own territory’’ to more complex acknowledgments of the accepted nature of sovereignty such as ‘‘It is not necessary that one country invades another, each one has its own laws.’’ One participant noted that ‘‘In each country what is necessary to survival for the population exists, so there is no need to invade a sovereign land.’’ Another 30 percent of the arguments against a right to invasion appealed to ethical or human rights principles, rather than sovereignty. For example, one respondent stated, ‘‘[invasion] denies the right of selfdetermination,’’ and another said that ‘‘respect for rights is peace.’’ The overwhelming distaste that Nicaraguans demonstrate for invasion seems a logical outcropping of the country’s history. The country’s most recent armed conflicts in the decade from the 1980s to the 1990s— as well as those preceding—involved foreign influence and, as is well documented in the Iran-Contra Affair, were frequently orchestrated by foreign governments. Although a full-scale invasion by a foreign country has not occurred on Nicaraguan soil, the occupation of the country by U.S. Marines and the military influence of the U.S. armed forces are consistent themes of the last century of Nicaraguan history. Despite Nicaragua’s history of foreign involvement in internal conflicts, 11 percent of the qualitative responses expressed some level of agreement with the principle that sometimes countries have a right to invade another country. Explanations offered in support of tolerance for such a right were sometimes vague, such as ‘‘I believe it depends on the circumstances.’’ However, more frequently the right to invade was justified in the name of self-defense. For example, two Nicaraguan respondents stated that invasion of one country by another is legitimate should it be necessary ‘‘to defend themselves when attacked’’ or ‘‘if it is a threat against our sovereignty.’’ Invasion was also acceptable for some respondents when it was perceived as an intervention to help others, such as ‘‘to combat injustices’’ or ‘‘if the invaded government damages the rights of its citizens.’’ Perspectives on Torture In their response to the item ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war,’’ 83 percent of the Nicaraguan sample disagreed. Thirty-seven percent of the qualitative responses justified opposition to a state right to torture prisoners of war (POW) based on human rights. Respondents stated, for example, that, ‘‘Human beings are sacred’’ and that ‘‘Even though they are prisoners, their human rights must be respected.’’ Seventeen percent of the qualitative responses rejecting a state right to torture were a simple and categorical ‘‘No!’’ while others within this group elaborated on their disagreement

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with terms such as ‘‘No government should torture their prisoners in time of war.’’ Eleven percent of the qualitative responses suggested that torture cannot be justified because more adequate means of addressing issues related to POWs exist. Examples of these responses include ‘‘There are other methods that do not require resorting to violence’’ or ‘‘It is never necessary; torture is not precise as a means of garnering information and a prisoner’s actions can be punished in a court of law.’’ Opposition based on fundamental principles, such as ‘‘doing unto others as they do unto you’’ characterized 8 percent of the arguments against a right to torture, and another 5 percent of the responses pointed to international laws that prohibit torture. Only a small minority (11 percent) of the Nicaraguan responses expressed tolerance for a right to torture POWs. Justification for such a right was based on the potential effectiveness of torture. As one respondent stated, ‘‘[Torture] is always a right when beneficial information can be extracted.’’ Perspectives on Terrorism In reference to terrorism, Nicaraguans generally defined the term in a way that recognized terrorism as destructive and violent (62 percent). Their explanations emphasized the loss of life and property that terrorism produces. For example, ‘‘terrorism’’ was defined as, ‘‘Large-scale assassination, and attempt against the life of another, against peace, or against a nation or one’s own country.’’ Another respondent described terrorism concisely as ‘‘the killing of innocent people.’’ Several of the responses focused on the intent or goal of terrorism, with varying levels of implied tolerance for terrorism’s agenda; for example, ‘‘attempt against the stability of a country’’ and ‘‘camouflaged action aimed toward a goal.’’ Twenty-three percent of the responses included some sort of moral judgment concerning terrorism in their definition of the term. One respondent simply stated, ‘‘Terrorism is unjustified,’’ whereas another explained, ‘‘Terrorism is a sickness that is a love of war.’’ Ideology held a key position in the definitions of 8 percent of the coded responses. The individuals who incorporated ideology into their explanation suggested varying degrees of error in the thinking of terrorists; some of these responses were less judgmental than others. Examples of definitions of terrorism identifying it with an ideology included ‘‘Mass murder of innocent people with a political ideology in mind.’’ Other ideologically oriented responses were unequivocably against terrorism, seeing it as an ‘‘excuse to control other countries’’ or a clearly ‘‘violent act for people who want to draw attention to themselves.’’ Other responses, approximately 4 percent,

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associated terrorism with strong negative emotions—defining it, for example, as a mechanism for the expression of hate.

PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL SECURITY ‘‘If there is national security, our land and its people are secure.’’ ‘‘One cannot live securely with their country at war.’’ ‘‘National security is not a determining factor for security itself.’’ ‘‘[National security is essential] as long as in its name atrocities are not committed.’’ Seventy-nine percent of the Nicaraguan sample agreed with the assertion that ‘‘National security is essential for individual and family security.’’ The majority of the qualitative responses were again simply strong assertions of support, such as ‘‘Complete agreement’’ and ‘‘Because it is vital in society.’’ The majority of the 34 percent of responses affirming a relation between national security and personal and familial security indicated that a secure nation was the ‘‘only’’ way for families and individuals to thrive: ‘‘The nation must be secure for its citizens to be secure’’ and ‘‘This [national security] is the basis of well-being.’’ Among the responses endorsing the idea that national security is fundamental for individual and familial security, 10 percent focused on a sense of safety and security. In effect, these responses indicated that a nation that was free from threats permitted individuals to concentrate on developing a positive home environment. Examples of this view included ‘‘Feeling secure in your own country influences your feeling of security in your own home’’ and ‘‘This is essential because it helps us be better people since being protected gives us security,’’ and finally, ‘‘When a country is secure, its people interact without difficulty, fear, and sadness.’’ Eight percent of the responses from the Nicaraguan sample explained that security is critical because of its protective role; for example, ‘‘This is how to keep watch over the citizens of a country.’’ Six percent of the responses indicated that a country is obliged to protect its citizens, informing and assisting them in their need to live safely and securely. Another 12 percent of the responses provided some qualifications to the idea that national security is essential to individual and family security. A number of these, 4 percent, expressed the idea that national security is ‘‘essential but incomplete.’’ Examples of these responses include ‘‘National security protects in a general way, but does not protect the individual’’ or ‘‘[It] is a beginning’’ but not sufficient for ensuring a safe home and person. Other respondents, also 4 percent, indicated specifically required conditions, such as ‘‘Rights should not

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be violated in the name of security’’ and commented that seeking national security would not justify the loss of human life. As described by Wayne,31 government is designed to be a mechanism that allows people to control their own destiny by virtue of improving overall social welfare. Since freeing itself from Spanish rule, Nicaragua’s present and future have largely rested directly in the hands of foreign powers, often the United States. Frequently, Nicaragua has had little control over her destiny, instead finding herself in a reactionary mode. For these reasons, national security may be of particular importance to Nicaraguans, balanced with the need for democracy.

NICARAGUAN PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHTS TO PEACE AND PROTEST ‘‘[Peace] constitutes the best for an individual.’’ ‘‘[Peace is] something utopian in unconditional terms.’’ ‘‘[Peace is] reconciliation.’’ The Right to Protest November of 2008 showcased the Nicaraguan passion for and commitment toward political expression and protest. The election of a Sandinista mayor was disputed by the opposition party, the Liberal Alliance, whose members believed that President Ortega, a Sandinista, rigged the vote. The debate led to two weeks of large-scale, organized protests throughout Managua and other nearby cities, such as Le on. This fervor for expression may best be seen in the words of a former Sandinista, Mejia Godoy. Godoy wrote the Sandinista party’s campaign song in the 1980s but has since defected and now supports the Liberal Alliance. His latest lyrics state, ‘‘I want a Nicaragua that is free, where nobody . . . puts a straitjacket on my way of thinking.’’ Indeed, after decades of foreign intervention in Nicaraguan politics, largely by the United States, the desire of the people to actively influence the political process seems more than justified. Within the past and present political context, the fact that 75 percent of Nicaraguan respondents agreed with the statement ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace’’ appears unsurprising. Generally, participant responses indicated fervent support for this liberty, as reflected in simple, straightforward assertions such as ‘‘Always!’’ ‘‘Of course it is a right!’’ ‘‘We all have the right to protest!’’ Other responses within this 75 percent in agreement described protest as an obligation or responsibility, because ‘‘War often

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occurs due to government decisions’’ or because ‘‘Government decisions are often wrong.’’ Twenty percent of the qualitative responses indicated support for the right to protest, although they qualified this right. Frequently, respondents indicated that protest was acceptable but warned of the importance of the protest remaining nonviolent. For example, one respondent agreed with the right ‘‘as long as protest does not become a riot.’’ Other respondents within the 20 percent who qualified the right to protest emphasized the importance of freedom of expression, particularly when the situation is immediately relevant to one’s personal needs. A minimal number, only 2 percent, of the Nicaraguan responses expressed the opinion that protesting against war and in favor of peace is not a right. A couple of these responses deferred to the government as the best entity for making decisions; for example, ‘‘Because citizens are not capable of thinking as well as their government.’’ A few participants explained that the right to protest is not exclusively related to the question of peace and war and therefore they could not agree completely with the item. Perspectives on Peace Peace is an idea that carries positive connotations for Nicaraguans, as demonstrated by 81 percent of the present sample. In 23 percent of the definitions, peace was associated with the positive elements of ‘‘calm’’ and ‘‘tranquillity.’’ Another 11 percent of the positive definitions of peace linked it with a broadly harmonious existence such as ‘‘harmony and love’’ or ‘‘harmony throughout one’s surroundings.’’ Two percent of the responses specifically mentioned that peace means a harmony that goes beyond the individual, involving ‘‘harmony between all people in the world.’’ Emotional well-being associated with peace was also expressed in responses identifying it with ‘‘love.’’ Other positive definitions of peace referred to overall well-being (4 percent), psychological welfare (5 percent), and a secure and stable existence (5 percent). Additional positive responses were more relationship-oriented, defining peace as a means of getting along with others through reconciliation (3 percent), respect (4 percent), and justice (1 percent). Finally, the right of humans to live free from conflicts (3 percent) and the notion that living in peace represents development or progress (3 percent), were mentioned. Thirteen percent of the Nicaraguan responses to the request for a definition of peace were negative definitions (i.e., conceptualizing peace as the absence of something negative). According to 9 percent of the responses, peace means the absence of war or conflict, ‘‘not having problems with others,’’ or ‘‘a society without conflicts.’’ Four percent of

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these responses offered descriptions of how living in peace would feel; for example, ‘‘Live without any worries’’ and ‘‘Rid oneself of resentment and revenge.’’ For a number of Nicaraguans, peace is an ideal. Three percent of the responses defined peace in terms such as ‘‘the magical quality we all want in order to live a great life’’ or ‘‘an idealist state.’’ Other replies demonstrated a perception of peace not only as an extraordinary occurrence but as so idealistic as to be effectively unattainable. A representative response for this category would be the answer provided by a 20-year-old female: ‘‘Most beautiful word, but sadly we continue fighting to achieve it.’’ Not only do an overwhelming majority of Nicaraguans describe peace in positive terms, but 80 percent of them replied in the affirmative to the item. ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace.’’ More notable, perhaps, is the fact that not a single Nicaraguan stated that peace is not a right. However, although all of the Nicaraguan respondents agreed to a certain degree that human beings have a right to peace, some responses were qualified in a pessimistic way (4 percent). For example, one respondent wrote, ‘‘Yes, but the right must exist before it could be taken away.’’ Other explanations (2 percent) included conditional statements such as ‘‘Every human that does not cause harm should have the right to live in peace.’’ The right to peace was further noted as a necessity by another 4 percent of respondents: ‘‘Peace is necessary because human beings can focus their abilities on constructing a more just world.’’ In 5 percent of the responses, peace as a human right for all humans was represented as an ideal: ‘‘When there is peace, everything is possible.’’

CONCLUSION Results of the PAIRTAPS collected from a sample of 137 Nicaraguan men and women indicate that the country’s citizens generally recognize war as a state of violent conflict. Perhaps in response to their perceptions of war (which many Nicaraguans experienced directly and not so very far in the past), the present sample expressed views demonstrating they are overwhelmingly in favor of peace, which they perceive in positive terms. Although the sample predominantly recognized national security as key to the overall well-being of the country’s population, they did not endorse violent acts by their government in the name of their country or its security. That is, invasion into another sovereign country was broadly opposed in the responses provided by the Nicaraguan sample. Furthermore, tolerance for torture of prisoners of war was extremely limited, even if specific information could be obtained through such procedures.

9

Costa Rica Rodrigo Barahona Chacon and Eddy Carrillo Retana

War is . . . ‘‘a conflict between the weak . . . for the benefit of the strong’’ (female, 30); ‘‘an armed conflict between two countries’’ (female, 29). Peace is . . . ‘‘an understanding with which human beings can live . . . respecting each others rights’’ (female, 24); ‘‘‘real’ democracy . . . equal distribution of wealth, and basic necessities guaranteed by the State’’ (female, 40). This chapter presents the views of ordinary citizens of Costa Rica regarding issues of war, peace, and torture. Costa Rica is in the unique position of having a national identity consolidated around the presumption of anti-war, pro-peace, and pro-diplomacy ideals. Having abolished its army in 1949 and declared perpetual neutrality in 1983, Costa Rica has come to be considered, rightly or wrongly, the ‘‘Switzerland of Central America.’’ Nevertheless, post-World War II Costa Rica has experienced armed conflict within its territory at least four times, not to mention bursts of less publicized political violence throughout the decades. In fact, politically motivated violence has been a part of Costa Rican identity since before the birth of the Republic in 1848, though the history of these events has somehow eluded the fabric of the ‘‘peaceful’’ Costa Rican national identity.1 More recently, this peaceful, pro-democracy exterior has been energized by the role the country played during the Cold War, when in 1987 Costa Rican president Oscar Arias Sanchez negotiated, against Washington’s wishes and major military investment, the Esquipulas I Peace Plan, later known as the Arias Peace Plan.2 This plan marked the beginning of the end of more than 30 years of civil war in Central America, an era that

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saw the violent deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. During this time, Costa Rica, Panama, and Belize were the only Central American countries to avoid war, and the peace plan, in part, was an effort to stop Costa Rica from becoming absorbed into a vortex of increasing regional militarization and chaos. ‘‘We had to choose,’’ said Arias about the peace plan, ‘‘between rationality and madness.’’3

WAR AND PEACE IN COSTA RICA: THE OFFICIAL STORY Costa Rica’s experience with war began centuries before the establishment of the republic. The (erroneous) belief that there was never a significant population of native people at the time the Spanish arrived and that therefore there was no genocide served to prop up the equally fantastic claim, referred to as la leyenda blanca or ‘‘the white legend,’’ that has long portrayed Costa Rica as a democracy without poverty or violence, and Costa Ricans as direct, democratic, white, and pure descendents of Europeans.4 The official history of Costa Rica’s relationship with armed conflict begins with its establishment as a separate republic in 1848. Its second president, Juan Rafael Mora (1849–1859), led the fight against the U.S. mercenary and filibuster William Walker and his army. A conflict that has largely disappeared from U.S. history books, the so-called Filibuster War, began when William Walker, a native of Tennessee, attempted to enact the doctrine of Manifest Destiny throughout Mexico and Central America, with the goal of establishing separate states owned by the United States and spreading slavery. Walker, after conquering Nicaragua, promptly instituted slavery and declared English as the country’s official language. His mercenary soldiers were given land grants in exchange for their service.5 In a crucial battle on April 11, 1856, the Costa Rican national hero Juan Santamaria6 is said to have been the third of three men sent on a suicide mission to burn down the hostel where Walker and his men were hiding. The second man and Santamaria were shot and killed in the attempt, but not until the latter had succeeded in setting the house afire and precipitating the retreat of Walker and his men, who never again set foot in Costa Rica.7 This war against ‘‘the imperialists,’’ however, was not enough to save President Mora. Blamed for the economic crisis of 1859 and a cholera epidemic that wiped out 10 percent of the population, he was soon overthrown and executed in Puntarenas, Costa Rica, after unsuccessfully attempting a coup d’etat upon his return from exile. Violent political upheavals plagued Costa Rica well into the 20th century. For example, fighting erupted between Costa Rica and Panama in a border dispute in 1921,

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with Costa Rica briefly invading and occupying the town of Coto in Panama.8 In 1940, in response to World War II, Costa Rica formed part of the Pan American Union and in 1941 formally declared war on the Axis powers, contributing only at a diplomatic level until a Nazi submarine emerged off the shores of the Atlantic at Puerto Limon, sinking the San Pablo and taking the lives of 23 Costa Rican deckhands.9 In 1948, war erupted after Costa Rican President Rafael Calderon Guardia (1940–1944) annulled election results that gave the election to his rival, in what amounted to an effort to maintain his party’s grip on power. Future three-term president Jose ‘‘Pepe’’ Figueres (1948–1949/ 1953–1958/1970–1974) led a small army against the government forces in a campaign that in merely five weeks cost the lives of 2,000 Costa Ricans.10 Two counterrevolutionary attempts were made by the defeated forces of Calderon Guardia with the aid of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somosa, first in December of 1948 and then in 1955. The 1955 counterrevolution (which amounted to an invasion of Costa Rica by Costa Rican exiles and the Nicaraguan army, aided by other Central American mercenaries) saw the United States playing both sides: Fearing on one hand that ‘‘Don Pepe,’’ as Figueres was called, was a ‘‘prored, pro-Russian’’ communist,11 the CIA actively supported and helped train an army of 300–500 rebels and mercenaries in Nicaragua.12 On the other hand, under pressure from the Organization of American States (OAS), the U.S. State Department sold the new Costa Rican government the four P-51 fighters (at a symbolic $1 apiece) needed to put down the invasion. The OAS, the nonaggression pact of the 1947 Rio Treaty, and the fact that Figueres abolished the army that could have been mobilized against him, saved Don Pepe’s Second Republic from sliding back into a bloody third civil war.13 Despite the ‘‘non-confrontational and conciliatory political culture’’ often attributed to Costa Rica, the 1950s continued to see political violence, which took the form of exiles, seizures of property, and summary executions, as well as revenge killings of political prisoners and rivals on all sides.14 Nevertheless, the abolishment of the army in 1949 and the declaration of perpetual neutrality in 1983 by the Monge administration helped consolidate the evolving Costa Rican national identity founded on an ethical/political stance of diplomacy, international law, and intolerance for violent conflict and war. The Cold War and Beyond Almost 12 years after the War of 1948, the U.S. Alliance for Progress, first under President Kennedy and later under President Nixon, helped flood Central America with weapons in an arms race against the Soviet

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Union for control over a region already destabilized by decades of dictatorships, violence, and poverty. In an effort to stem the rise of leftist sentiment and movements among the masses, the Central American Defense Council was established in 1965, underwritten by the United States, and in support of the standing dictatorships of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The only country to protest the council was Costa Rica; the increase of militarization in the region and the obstacle to this that Costa Rica represented soon made Washington strongly pressure the country to reestablish its army, which it refused to do.15 Despite declaring perpetual neutrality on November 17, 1983, the president of Costa Rica, Luis Alberto Monge, caved into U.S. pressure to allow the CIA to build bases in Costa Rican territory from which to launch its attacks on Nicaragua’s newly formed Sandinista government, which had overthrown Somoza’s dictatorship in July 1979. Although Costa Rican support for the Nicaraguan Revolution was mixed, the Sandinistas were helped greatly throughout the 1970s by the Costa Rican government, which aided in the trafficking of arms to the rebels.16 Also unofficially, support for the revolution was great among Costa Rican politicians, intellectuals, and students, many of whom hid Nicaraguan rebels and arms in their homes and even joined the ranks of the revolutionary armies in Nicaragua as well as in El Salvador.17 Official support for the United States, started by Monge, ended when Oscar Arias Sanchez assumed the presidency in 1987 and adopted a foreign policy stance that included a peace plan and the demilitarization of Central America. This step returned to Costa Rica some of its anti-imperialist and pro-diplomacy identity, but it also cost the country some $85–160 million of U.S. aid.18 Arias’s efforts culminated in the Arias Peace Plan, eventually leading to peace in the region and triggering the beginning of the end of almost 30 years of continuous war, which by some estimates cost the lives of more than 300,000 Central Americans.19 More recently, Costa Ricans saw their pro-diplomacy, pro-rule of international law, and pro-peace identity shaken once again, this time in regards to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. In an unpopular decision, then-president Abel Pacheco supported U.S. President George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq. Acting against the Costa Rican constitution, Pacheco placed the country on the list of the Coalition of the Willing, once again tampering with Costa Rican neutrality.20 This took a little over a year to correct in the courts after much litigation,21 although Costa Rica was not formally removed from the White House’s Web page until 2006, some three years later. Currently, the perceptions of Costa Ricans in regards to national identity, cultural values, and globalization appear to be changing, as seen most recently in the debates over the Free Trade Agreement with the United States (CAFTA). The country, for several years, has

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remained divided on this issue,22 which has ignited passions in what have been sometimes peaceful, and at other times violent manifestations. Costa Rican attitudes toward CAFTA have been used by the popular press to gauge the society’s openness toward the West, which in turn has been seen as an indicator of its stance toward issues inevitably associated in Costa Rican popular culture: imperialism, war, and loss of identity through aggressive cultural takeover. Although once taken for granted as the ideological fabric for social institutions serving as the pillars of post-World War II Costa Rican society, socialist leanings are now seriously in doubt.23 It also is becoming increasingly common to hear editorialists in the popular press bemoan the ‘‘hypocrisy’’ of a Central American Switzerland plagued by internal issues such as corruption, domestic violence, alcoholism, and alcohol-related violent deaths.24 More shockingly, a 2008 poll by UNIMER25 revealed results painting a bleak picture regarding Costa Rican attitudes toward violence. For example, of the 1,220 adults polled, 54 percent were in favor of reinstituting the death penalty, and another 47 percent agreed that it was acceptable for the police to torture suspected criminals to obtain information. Articles in the main Costa Rican newspaper, La Nacion, attributed these attitudes to national frustration, both over the rise in violence and insecurity, and reports of governmental corruption in relation to drug trafficking and possible dealings between FARC26 forces and high-level Costa Rican politicians. Many contrasted these new results with Costa Rica’s historical decision to abolish the death penalty in 1882, making it one of only eight countries in the world to have done so by 1948. Many also felt compelled to remind readers that Costa Rica is a member of the American Convention for Human Rights as well as the United Nations Convention Against Torture,27 and aside from winning in 1987, has been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize 12 times.28 Do Costa Ricans still maintain a national identity oriented toward peace and diplomacy and an absolute intolerance for violence, armies, and war, or has that identity faded into a calcified relic of a more glorious, historical age? Is a peaceful national identity something most Costa Ricans take for granted, while individually harboring less conscious and less supportive attitudes toward peace and nonviolence? For this chapter, we attempted to address these issues by asking Costa Ricans about their views on war, peace, and torture. COSTA RICAN VIEWS ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND PEACE The sample for this study consisted of 66 Costa Rican citizens, with a mean age of 35 (age range from 18 to 76); 55 percent were women and 45 percent were men. The majority of respondents (64 percent)

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identified their religion as Catholic; 21 percent stated they did not have a religion, 6 percent identified as Protestant, 3 percent Agnostic, 3 percent Evangelic, 2 percent Baptist, and 1 percent Jewish. The majority selfidentified as middle class (53 percent), followed by upper-middle class (30 percent) and lower-middle class (17 percent). All participants completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS).29 This chapter focuses specifically on rating scale and qualitative responses to seven of the items; respondents indicated on a seven-point rating scale the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each item and then provided an explanation of their rating. They also provided their own definitions of war, peace, and torture. Definitions ‘‘[War is] death drive, absurd, horror, destruction and death.’’ (female, 48) ‘‘In Costa Rica there is no army, therefore, I don’t have an objective opinion on the subject.’’ (male, 30) ‘‘Those of us who are outside of conflicts have a difficult time understanding who is in the right during military interventions . . . ’’ (female, 30) The Costa Rican definitions of war, peace, and torture were organized into two basic categories: emotionally involved versus indifferent to the concept, each of which had subcategories. Responses classified as emotionally involved conveyed a sense of engagement with the issue. For example, when defining ‘‘peace,’’ some respondents gave answers such as ‘‘Necessary for survival.’’ Responses classified as indifferent conveyed a basic lack of concern with the issue being raised. For example, when defining ‘‘torture,’’ some respondents gave textbook, almost thoughtless answers such as ‘‘an act of aggression against two or more people.’’ It is surprising that 60 percent of the respondents gave personal definitions of ‘‘war’’ that fell into the general indifference category. Of this 60 percent, most definitions referred to ‘‘conflict’’ or ‘‘fight’’ ‘‘between two countries’’ or ‘‘between two nations.’’ These textbook-type answers contained no further elaboration and conveyed a lack of depth and complexity. However, the remaining 40 percent of the responses displayed emotional involvement in regard to the meaning of war and often conveyed moral judgments (7 percent); for example, ‘‘War is stupidity,’’ ‘‘War is against humanity,’’ ‘‘War is cruelty,’’ or ‘‘War is indiscriminate stupidity.’’ Other definitions referred to destruction and other possible outcomes of war: ‘‘War is death’’ or ‘‘(War is) horror, destruction.’’ When responses were analyzed in relation to social class,

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it was the less privileged respondents, those of the lower-middle class, who gave the most emotionally invested answers (73 percent); 45 percent of the upper-middle class also responded in an invested manner. Despite the apparent indifference depicted in many of the definitions of war, 77 percent of the sample totally or strongly disagreed that one country has a right to invade another country. The justifications for this stance appealed to a sense of principle, most notably a country’s right to sovereignty, independence, and values: ‘‘Every country should solve its own problems without foreign intervention’’; ‘‘the only justifiable invasion is an invasion of values so that countries can achieve internal peace’’; ‘‘Another country can act as a mediator . . . but never spill blood’’; ‘‘(Invasion) flies in the face of sovereignty, turning it into nothing more than a fairy tale.’’ However, 15 percent of the responses indicated strong agreement with a state right to invasion. The explanations that most of these respondents gave indicated that invasion could be acceptable as a response to threats to others (e.g., ‘‘Yes, if it is in order to help another country’’) or to one’s own country (e.g., ‘‘If it is in self-defense’’), as a ‘‘last resort,’’ or when socially sanctioned by an international body (e.g., ‘‘If it is approved by the United Nations’’). The remaining 8 percent neither disagreed or agreed, or weakly agreed, with a right to invasion and tended to give vague answers, such as ‘‘it depends on the reason.’’ In regards to the rights of a government to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism, the general opposition was higher: on the rating scale; 88 percent of the respondents totally or strongly disagreed, compared to 8 percent who totally or strongly agreed. The remaining respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. Eight percent of the qualitative responses were assertions that the government had the right to kill innocents, either because such losses were inevitable (e.g., ‘‘it happens’’) or because the ends justified the means (e.g., ‘‘I believe there are a few sacrifices that are for the well-being of many’’ and ‘‘to preserve human life’’). Six percent of all responses qualified the right to kill innocents with statements such as ‘‘if the innocents did not feel it’’ and ‘‘during times of war it is ok.’’ Eighty percent of the qualitative responses were arguments opposing a governmental right to kill innocent people in the fight against terrorism. A majority of the arguments opposing such a right (63 percent of the qualitative responses) were strong general assertions, such as ‘‘nothing justifies violence,’’ ‘‘the right to life is inviolable under any circumstances,’’ and ‘‘no, never should blood run.’’ Other responses were more specific in their opposition, citing God (8 percent), human rights (8 percent), and the view that the ends do not justify the means (3 percent) as reasons for their opposition. Another 5 percent of the responses were assertions that the government did not have the right to kill,

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whereas 5 percent indicated a belief that such acts would place the government in the role of terrorist. Eight percent of the arguments expressed the view that killing innocent civilians was avoidable and that there are more appropriate and effective methods available to combat terrorism. Six percent of the responses did not directly address the question; for example, ‘‘it is an idea in the head’’ and ‘‘it is a form of showing animal instincts.’’ Peace and Peace-Related Attitudes When asked to define ‘‘peace,’’ a majority of respondents (65 percent) gave answers that could be classified as emotionally invested. These usually referred to peace as a positive state (70 percent) characterized by particular social/community sentiments: ‘‘(Peace is) a state of morality’’ and ‘‘(Peace is) a fight for life, energy, libido.’’ However, 35 percent of these positive peace responses (defining peace in terms of what it is, rather than what it is not) defined ‘‘peace’’ in more ‘‘indifferent’’ terms, giving one-word positive synonyms; for example, ‘‘tranquility’’ or ‘‘harmony.’’ Other responses classified as ‘‘indifferent’’ were ‘‘negative’’ definitions (30 percent) (i.e., defining peace in terms of what it is not rather than what it is): ‘‘The absence of war’’ and ‘‘the absence of conflict.’’ Similar to definitions of ‘‘war,’’ it was the lower-middle class that gave the most visceral answers (81 percent of the lower-middle class), followed again by 70 percent of the upper-middle class. Among the middle-class respondents, 51 percent gave emotionally invested responses, whereas the remaining 49 percent gave more indifferent positive and negative dictionary-style definitions. In regards to peace-related attitudes, an overwhelming majority of the respondents (97 percent) totally or strongly agreed that all human beings have a basic right to peace and tended to say simply that ‘‘Peace is a basic right of all nations.’’ Others clearly viewed peace as essential: ‘‘(Peace is) a basic necessity of every country,’’ and ‘‘Peace is essential, and it is related to liberty.’’ More than 90 percent of the sample totally or strongly agreed that individuals had a right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace; 5 percent weakly agreed. The 92 percent who strongly or totally agreed usually appealed to: (1) a sense of civic responsibility (‘‘This is the only real way a people can be heard’’) or (2) personal choice (‘‘Of course every individual has a right to make his own decisions and express his own opinions’’). Those who weakly agreed seemed to have pessimistic views on protests, based at least in part on their own personal observations: ‘‘Usually when we have protests they hardly have anything to do with peace,’’ or ‘‘I’d be more in favor if protests were good for something.’’

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When asked to rate the extent to which they believed that world peace could be achieved, 64 percent indicated some level of agreement and 36 percent indicated some level of disagreement. Those who totally agreed (31 percent) that peace could be achieved on a worldwide scale usually made statements suggesting they viewed peace as an ideal: ‘‘Yes, we all want the same thing,’’ although some of their arguments qualified the nature of their agreement: ‘‘Of course, as long as there aren’t personal interests involved,’’ or ‘‘If everyone practices love as a universal rule.’’ Those who strongly agreed (10 percent) gave responses that were optimistic but again often attached qualifications or conditions to their explanations: ‘‘Anything is possible, with the right political leadership,’’ or ‘‘Yes, but we must find convincing ways of exercising peaceful methods.’’ Overall, regardless of level of agreement, 8 percent of the qualitative responses included some sort of condition. The explanations of the participants who weakly agreed (23 percent) with the achievability of peace were quite pessimistic: ‘‘The way things are going nowadays, I don’t think so’’; ‘‘There is too much lust for power’’; ‘‘There will always be conflicts between countries.’’ Pessimistic views were also found in respondents who totally disagreed (17 percent) with the achievability of peace; for example, ‘‘No, because too many human beings are only interested in their own well being’’; ‘‘It is impossible for there to be peace between men. Personal interest or the interests of the government will never permit it.’’ The responses of those who strongly or weakly disagreed were almost indistinguishable from those who totally disagreed: ‘‘It is not possible’’; ‘‘There are too many personal interests.’’ One person who weakly disagreed commented, ‘‘I can’t think of peace within my own family, much less world peace.’’ The Issue of Torture A slight majority of the respondents defined ‘‘torture’’ in an emotionally invested way (52 percent), as in ‘‘the abuse of power and authority,’’ ‘‘atrocious crime, bestiality, sadism.’’ The remaining 48 percent gave responses that suggested a lack of emotional investment in the issue of torture, despite the attention it has received. These apparently indifferent responses included ‘‘to hurt somebody,’’ ‘‘something that makes a person suffer,’’ or ‘‘a method of questioning others.’’ Again, as in the cases of ‘‘war’’ and ‘‘peace,’’ those who seemed to show the highest amount of emotional investment in the issue were from the lowermiddle class (82 percent of the lower-middle class), followed by the upper-middle class (60 percent). The middle class showed the lowest amount of emotional investment when defining ‘‘torture,’’ with the majority (62 percent) giving indifferent responses.

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In regard to rating scale responses to the item concerning whether a government has the right to torture prisoners during times of war, a majority (88 percent) totally or strongly disagreed that governments have such a right, 8 percent strongly or totally agreed, and the remaining neither agreed nor disagreed. Most of the respondents who rejected such a right tended to give answers appealing to the sanctity and integrity of human life and human rights: ‘‘Torturing is a justification for violence’’; ‘‘Torture is a vile form of aggression.’’ However, the small minority who were tolerant of torture considered it justifiable as a response to threats to the citizens of the country: ‘‘If it is to protect the country and save the people, then yes,’’ or ‘‘It isn’t the correct thing to do, but in cases of national security it should be done.’’ This minority view is surprising in light of Costa Rica’s identity as peace-loving, but consistent with the findings of the 2008 UNIMER poll. The Question of National Security On the rating scale responses to the statement ‘‘National security is essential for individual and family security,’’ 77 percent of the participants totally, strongly, or weakly agreed, only 8 percent totally or strongly disagreed, and 15 percent neither agreed nor disagreed. The qualitative justifications of the rating scale responses revealed that national security, for Costa Ricans, is a highly local issue. It has little to do with other countries or threats from the outside and more to do with local, ‘‘national’’ issues like crime, domestic violence, education, health, and prosperity: ‘‘Families nowadays are fighting too much, they need to get along better so as to improve society.’’ When asked about the best ways to achieve national security, participants gave responses such as ‘‘work, education,’’ ‘‘less delinquency . . . more communication between family members,’’ and ‘‘Equal distribution of riches and resources between classes.’’ Those who disagreed that national security was essential to individual and family security tended to give cynical answers: ‘‘National security usually means protecting the private property of the elite’’; ‘‘It is possible, though unlikely, as it would entail the equal distribution of properties’’; ‘‘Usually it translates into repression’’; and ‘‘The government would have to have a commitment to the people, not the oligarchy.’’ The 15 percent who neither disagreed nor agreed gave no explanations. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS The PAIRTAPS responses are illuminating within the context of Costa Rica’s historical relationship with violent conflict, particularly in regards to the many superficial and indifferent responses Costa Ricans gave when asked for personal definitions of war.

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Six main points can be drawn from the findings: (1) the majority of the Costa Rican respondents maintain a pro-peace, anti-war, and anti- torture self identity; (2) the majority of these respondents provided only superficial definitions of the concept of ‘‘war’’; (3) almost half of the respondents had a similar problem when defining ‘‘torture’’; (4) most respondents provided more complex and emotionally invested definitions of ‘‘peace’’; (5) national security, for Costa Ricans, refers primarily to local issues, which may say something about Costa Rican’s view of world issues in general; (6) the lower-middle and upper-middle classes gave more developed and emotionally toned definitions of war, peace, and torture than the middle class. It is significant that the middle class gave the fewest number of emotionally invested definitions. This may indicate that concern with the realities of issues such as war may be related to social and economic divisions along class lines. Perhaps it is those who believe they have the most to lose, people from the upper- and lower-middle classes, who can more easily imagine what war means in terms of loss of ‘‘humanity’’ or ‘‘cruelty’’ and ‘‘destruction.’’ This distinction between classes may also apply to the definitions of peace and torture. The majority (65 percent) of the respondents provided emotionally charged definitions of peace, but 35 percent appeared to be indifferent to the potential richness or significance of peace. It could be reasoned that the state of relative peace that has characterized the country since 1955 (the end of the last counterrevolution) and the regular indoctrination of peace-related values in the cultural identity of Costa Rican citizens may contribute to a rich appreciation of peace for some people, whereas for others peace is taken for granted and conceptualized rather simplistically. Again, the largest percent of indifferent responses came from middle-class respondents, almost half of whom defined it negatively (e.g., as ‘‘the absence of war’’). An overwhelming majority of the respondents (97 percent) agreed that everyone has a right to peace and to protest in favor of it; only 64 percent, however, believed peace could actually be achieved on a worldwide scale. The issue of torture produced a similar, response pattern: Although 88 percent of the respondents repudiated its use, only a little over half of them defined it in terms indicating any sense of emotional investment. Here again it was the middle-class respondents who appeared most indifferent to the horrors of torture. Conversely, with torture, as with war and peace, it was the respondents who came from the lower-middle class who gave the most passionate and invested responses. War and Peace in Costa Rica: The Unofficial Story It is difficult to ascertain how the citizens of a country with a collective identity that is both locally and internationally recognized as peaceful,

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anti-war, and neutral can show so much difficulty elaborating on the concepts that sustain their very identity. Moreover, how can the majority of the sample appear to be so dispassionate about something that is supposed to be so central to Costa Rican identity? The reasons for these apparent contradictions are in all likelihood overdetermined and multicausal. The fact that the mean age of the respondents was 35 may reflect an emotional as well as temporal distance (from concepts such as war and torture). The last counterrevolution was in 1955, almost 20 years before most of the respondents were born. It may also be that the very hot wars to the north and south (Panama was invaded by the United States in December 1989) have accentuated the absence of war in Costa Rica, itself a safe haven for refugees and political prisoners searching for peace. However, one must not overlook the selective national recollection of the dramatic era of violent colonization in Costa Rica, centuries earlier, as a prerequisite process, so to speak, for the perceived aloofness in the Costa Rican attitude toward war-related concepts in this study. This is particularly striking if one notes that, by far, the three events most emphasized as the historic foundations of Costa Rican identity are directly related to experiences of war (the Battle of Rivas, the National Campaign itself, and the Civil War of 1948).30 How could the largest, bloodiest act of Costa Rican violence go unacknowledged not only by the population at large but also by academics (with the exception of a small handful of anthropologists, teachers, historians, etc.), for the greater part of the 19th and 20th centuries? The official version of Costa Rica’s history of war and peace, for the greater part of the last century and a half, has been that the indigenous population of Costa Rica was so small when the Spanish arrived that it has hardly been worth mentioning. The assumption that the size of the population was trivial (the exact figure was estimated at 27,200 inhabitants) has indeed been a building block in the construction of the myth of a peaceful nation, the myth that the Spanish conquest of Costa Rica was an easy and peaceful process of domination, bringing with it the voluntary submission of a handful of natives,31 assumed to be, right from the beginning, different from their Central American counterparts—more peaceful, hardworking, and whiter. As difficult as it is to believe that the entire territory of Costa Rica was populated by less than 30,000 natives, particularly considering the wealth of natural resources that typify the area, somehow Costa Ricans managed to accept this interpretation of history without question for close to 150 years. However, in the last decade of research by anthropologists, linguists, and historians, more accurate calculations have been advanced, and it now seems that the population at the time of the

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arrival of the conquistadors was no less than 400,000 indigenous peoples of various ethnicities, eight of which still survive within Costa Rican territory. What is truly shocking is what happened to this population over the next 60 years, from circa 1524 to circa 1580. By 1550, the original population of 400,000 native inhabitants had decreased to 123,300, and by 1580 to 55,800.32 The population as of 2000 is of 63,876 self-identified indigenous people, only 52,378 of whom were born in Costa Rica.33 Illnesses from epidemics cannot account for such a staggering loss of population. Indeed, a combination of factors are to blame, and these, as we are now discovering, have directly to do with slavery, exploitation, the Spanish institution of encomienda (the form of paid but compulsory labor, which frequently forced large numbers of people to leave their families and ancestral homes and move to other latitudes, sometimes even other countries), battles, and bloodshed, as well as forced acculturation.34 These events may represent the kinds of institutionalized violence that, although part of the country’s history, are so readily disavowed by the majority of Costa Ricans today. When many citizens are psychologically invested in rejecting a part of their country’s history of aggression, notions such as torture and war become necessarily divested of emotion and experienced and expressed as psychologically distant. This new understanding of prerepublican history carries important implications for the national identity of Costa Ricans, not just because coming to terms with this dreadfully violent decimation of multiple ethnic groups that lies in the deep recesses of their past is no easy task but also due to the fact that great effort, both sociopolitical and psychological, has been set in motion to ignore/deny this part of Costa Rican history. The rather widespread denial, both of the violent disappearance of a vast number of the original precolonial population as well as the importance of these ethnic groups in Costa Rican culture and history, may have already had a severe impact on Costa Rican identity and may have contributed to a weaker sense of historical continuity than is held by their neighbors, where the indigenous populations survived in greater numbers, despite centuries of violence and oppression. Not only did many of the other Central American populations survive physically but so also did many of their customs, to a much greater degree than in Costa Rica. Five of the eight pillars of Costa Rican national identity (the peaceful colonization myth/the white legend,35 pre- and post-1948 social democratic reforms and welfare programs, the abolition of the army in 1949, the perpetual neutrality declaration of 1983, and the Nobel Peace Prize of 1987) can be said to represent a curbing of the war/violence-like

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attitude, and an attempt to extinguish it from the national consciousness.36 Bowman comments, ‘‘Myths, propaganda, selective memory, and a chauvinistic view of Tico (Costa Rican) exceptionalism have led to an inaccurate portrayal of the democratization process.’’37 Avenda~ no Solis’s work in the politically taboo territory of the very violent period between 1948 and 1949 and a moderately violent one during Pepe Figueres’ first government (1953–1958) flies in the face of what has been a post-Civil War repression of scholarly work on politically motivated violence and state-sponsored terrorism and torture. Both Solis and Bowman interpret this repression as deliberate and protective of the ideal pro-peace/democratic Costa Rican identity, which Bowman calls ‘‘the National Myth.’’38 Referring to the aftermath of the 1948 Civil War as ‘‘dangerous academic territory,’’ Bowman explains, ‘‘when a commission announced plans to hold a symposium on the 1948 Civil War and the results of the event, former and future presidents (Echandi and Rodriguez) wrote that such an academic event may be risky for the ‘unity and tranquillity of the Costa Rican family’ and that as it would merely awaken hatred; it is better to look to the future and forget the past.’’39 In regard to the responses to the PAIRTAPS questionnaire, there appear to be two main conclusions. First, the vast majority of Costa Ricans in the study identify themselves as being anti-war, anti-torture, and pro-peace. By the same token, a majority seemed not to connect emotionally with their definitions of war, torture, and peace. A short and to a certain degree fallacious version of history may partly explain this phenomenon. Umberto Eco has proposed that a present without historical depth produces a fake culture, and one could extrapolate that this leads to fake identities.40 For many Costa Ricans—perhaps those from the middle class in particular—disavowal of past institutionalized violence may have led not so much to fake identities as to superficial ones. As the results show, the lower-class respondents presented the most elaborate and emotionally significant responses, followed by the upper-middle-class respondents, with the middle-class respondents often seeming more distant, abstract, and ‘‘textbooky’’ in their responses. To the extent that any Costa Ricans remain unaware of their own history, in particular of the realities of war and state-sponsored violence, it behooves us, in the words of Martin-Bar o, to ‘‘realize systematic research in all those mechanisms that maintain our people alienated from their own reality.’’41 In regard to Costa Rica’s stance in relation to the war in Iraq, for example, the implications of an anti-war self-identity without profound psychological and cognitive roots can be seen in the fact that it took three years and a change in presidency to finally get Costa Rica off the White House’s Web page of the Coalition of the Willing. There were no

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marches on Congress, no political or legal processes against then President Pacheco for his clearly anticonstitutional act, and initially the war in Iraq was unpopular with only 60 percent of the population.42 This percentage is somewhat at odds with the 77 percent of the respondents in this study who stated that they totally or strongly disagreed that a country had a right to invade another country. This finding suggests that despite an officially pacifistic national identity, portions of the Costa Rican population may be swayed with ease in regard to issues of violence. This aspect of Costa Rican self-identity poses difficult dilemmas, insofar as it touches on a multitude of identities, as pertaining to issues of ethnic, socioeconomic class, gender, and so on. Milan Kundera writes that forgetting is the only memory of those who cannot face their own identity.43 If this is true, then the extent to which Costa Ricans are in some sense alienated from their own past makes it particularly challenging to envision a change in self-identity founded in deeper roots, ethnic and otherwise. If the country is to continue, or rather to redefine its path toward a truly peaceful, anti-war and anti-torture future, it would seem imperative that its forgotten past catch up with its convoluted present. Otherwise, the internalization of the official historically blind national identity may leave Costa Rican citizens, like Oedipus, blind and wandering, oblivious to the danger of the decimation of their culture and what little they have managed to retain of their ancestral past.

10

Brazil Sherri McCarthy, Robert S. Rose, and Helena Castanheira1

War is . . . ‘‘a military undertaking with a predisposition to violence in defense of an ideal.’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘an environment free from threats’’; ‘‘when the integrity, freedom and right to life are completely respected.’’ Brazil is considered by most people to be the land of the glorious Amazon River, lush jungles and tropical forests, Carnivale, and soccer. It encompasses a substantially larger area than the continental United States and includes more biodiversity—more types and species of plants and animals—than any other country on earth. The diversity in the landscape seems to translate into an acceptance by the populace of the value of diversity and a respect for the sovereignty of separate nations, as is indicated later in this chapter by Brazilian responses to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS). The world’s largest hydroelectric plant is situated in Brazil, generating electricity for four countries in South America. Nature and technology both abound. From equatorial regions to mountainous areas with four seasons, from beaches to desert, Brazil is a beautiful and exotic country, rich in natural resources. It is home to indigenous tribes that have never had contact with the modern world, as well as to many European and Asian immigrants, descendants of Africans brought to the country as slaves, and descendants of original Portuguese settlers. Agriculture, ranching, tourism, oil production, and modern industry characterize the country, and the economy has been steadily improving, in regard to exchange rates and production, for the last two decades. Attention has been paid to educational improvements, and the university system in

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some subject areas, including psychology, rivals that of any country in the world in quality. Brazilian food, music, and culture are currently very popular in Europe. War is not unknown in Brazil. The country experienced a brief civil war nearly two centuries ago when Rio Grande do Sul attempted to secede. Over the past few hundred years, it has also participated in a few border skirmishes with Uruguay and Argentina. More recently, it had a very limited involvement in World War II, supporting the United States. Nevertheless, in marked contrast with many former colonies, the country was granted independence from Portugal without a revolution and is generally perceived as a peaceful land. It has been at peace with other countries for most of its existence and has never suffered major losses on its own soil at the hand of outside forces. Nevertheless, the military dictatorship of the last century and internal class wars keep it from qualifying as the paradise that many tourists and other outsiders may perceive it to be. Both its avoidance of external wars and its experiences under a military dictatorship undoubtedly influence the perspectives modern Brazilians have toward war, peace, state security, and torture.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Although Brazil has been populated by indigenous tribes for thousands of years, and artifacts attest to advanced cultures inhabiting the area long before Western European countries existed, Brazil’s history as part of the modern Western world dates back just a little over 500 years. On April 22, 1500, Pedro Alves Cabral discovered the fertile land across the Atlantic that would become Brazil and claimed it for the Portuguese crown. The first people stepping ashore were not just interested in finding gold, like the settlers in the regions under Spanish control, although gold was certainly a consideration. The Portuguese also wanted to establish themselves in this newly discovered land. Because wood was the primary export, many men were needed to cut and process it. One school of thought holds that the scarcity of women among the settlers led to the Brazilian willingness to miscegenate. Miscegenation may also have been connected to the system of slavery as it took form in Brazil. For 388 years, enslavement thrived in Brazil in higher numbers than anywhere else in the New World. Although slavery had existed in Portugal for centuries, it had essentially been used as punishment for a crime, not as the basis for large labor undertakings; however, when Brazil needed more labor to clear trees, the Portuguese solution was to import previously captured slaves from northwestern

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Africa. These slaves were originally Moors,2 and most were Muslim and had been enslaved for their beliefs. Ever since the Moorish invasions of the eighth century, the Catholic Church and the Holy See had been nervous about another Muslim campaign of conquest through Portugal and Spain. To mollify these fears, the Church issued Romanus Pontifex on January 6, 1454. This Papal Bull granted Portuguese King Alfonso V the authority to enslave all Africans hostile to being brought into the Christian fold.3 The leader of Christendom thereby permitted the Portuguese to warn all shades of nonbelievers from Morocco to India that they could find salvation only in Jesus Christ. Whenever such persons resisted, they could immediately be enslaved by virtue of a proviso in Romanus Pontifex, the ‘‘justified war.’’4 It is debatable whether members of the cloth were ever really interested in converting Muslims; they certainly were not very successful.5 What they increasingly became involved in was obtaining more African slaves via the justified war clause of the Romanus Pontifex. As vessels with huge painted crosses on their sails ventured south along the west coast of Africa, the Portuguese touched shore for purposes of trade and proselytizing. When faced with resistance, and even when there was none, the Portuguese claimed the right to enslave the resistors.6 By 1650, however, the need for bond servants had grown to such a degree that the idea of declaring a just war in order to enslave them was thrown aside and forgotten. Portugal was now the master of Brazil and brought slaves there with little concern over principles. Although the British transported about 500,000 slaves to their Caribbean and American colonies, the Portuguese made off with some 4,000,000 individuals of African decent. Before they left Africa for Brazil, many of the slaves were branded like livestock.7 Control of slaves and slave labor was of overriding concern for the ruling class. Slave rebellions were fairly common, and a large settlement of escaped slaves arose in the unsettled interior regions of northeastern Brazil. Because bondsmen had come to be used in every aspect of dirty, dangerous, and degrading work by all classes, a host of enforcers and laws were put into place to keep slaves in servitude. Cabra, capanga, and jagunco on the fazendas, or large landed estates, and the bund~oes down in the mines, were given these roles. A cabra was originally a strapping farmhand or vigorous worker who, if asked to, committed murder for his master. The jagunco also killed for those over him, but in more ordinary times his job was to keep the slaves in line on the fazendas. The capanga was different. He was always a privately contracted armed enforcer. Besides murder, a capanga was put to use for purposes of intimidation so that his presence alone might be enough to sway decisions in his superior’s favor.8

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At first, Brazil was a largely rural society made up of vast estates. Each was headed by a patriarch, his descendants, and those who worked for them. Many of the patriarchs used their positions to carve out an additional niche for themselves in administrative and political arenas.9 Once a family or clan attained the power emanating from such positions, much of what each desired could be obtained. Wishes that could not be fulfilled in legally approved ways could be pursued through cabra, capanga, and jagunco working behind the scenes. This system promoted corruption at the highest levels and acted as an example for those at the bottom—probably influencing the later corruption within elected government for which Brazil was noted throughout the 20th century, as well as current attitudes toward torture, security, terrorism, and capital punishment. Although corruption continued, slavery was doomed. The first nudge toward the end of slavery can be traced to a largely ignored statute designed to release all slaves entering the country after 1831—the socalled Africanos Livres (‘‘Free Africans’’). The Free Africans were declared wards of the state, apprenticed out, but then reabsorbed back into the general slave population. In 1864, Rio de Janeiro granted liberty a second time to these same slaves under renewed English pressure. In 1865, the whipping of bondsmen serving sentences in labor gangs was prohibited. The following year, using slaves in work sponsored by the national administration was outlawed. Freedom was also granted to slaves who joined the military in the War of the Triple Alliance (1864–1870). In 1868, the province of Cear a began granting freedom to 100 newly baptized slave children each year. These children were normally girls because the anticipated labor from male children was still too alluring to exempt them. In 1871, newborn children of those in servitude were freed under the Lei do Ventre Livre (‘‘Law of the Free Womb’’); however, these children continued to be the property of their masters until their eighth birthday, when they could be granted their freedom in exchange for a reimbursement from the government. This provision was followed in the 1880s by Ceara’s slow expansion of emancipation options. The Amazon territory likewise struggled to end legal bondage in the late 19th century. Next, Rio Grande do Sul gave slaves within its borders their freedom if they agreed to serve a supplemental number of years in servitude. The exact number of years was an arbitrary decision for each owner. In 1885, all slaves 60 or older were given their liberty via the Lei dos Sexagenarios (‘‘Law of the Sixty Year Olds’’). A ban on all public whippings of slaves was enacted in 1886. The abolitionists then got a boost when S~ ao Paulo began using the limited-service plan developed in Rio Grande do Sul. As the year 1888 approached, slaves were starting to desert their masters in ever increasing numbers.

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On May 13, 1888, acknowledging the inescapable and representing her ailing and absent father Dom Pedro II, Princess Isabel put her signature  to the Lei Aurea or ‘‘Golden Law,’’ formally outlawing slavery in Brazil.10 Although debt peonage lingers on until the present day, with the promulgation of the Golden Law, Brazil became the final nation in the New World to abolish slavery and, notably, did so without the war and bloodshed extolled by a revolution, or by a civil war, as happened in the United States. Former bonds people found it difficult to obtain jobs as free laborers, however, and their plight was magnified by waves of European immigrants that flooded the country. Many of the foreigners looking for a better life in Brazil were poor Italians who ended up on the coffee plantations,11 recruited by the agricultural barons in S~ao Paulo seeking to widen their labor forces.12 From 1879 to 1884, over 10,000 Italians landed in Brazil; by 1899, nearly 600,000 more had arrived. Recruiters sent to Europe, and particularly to Italy, offered able-bodied peasants free transportation and a guaranteed job in Brazil.13 Thus, following emancipation, former slaves lost their positions in the system of production. Essentially, they were moved aside and replaced with immigrants. What had formally been a caste issue became primarily a class issue. With or without work, the classe conservadora, or dominant class, looked down on immigrants for carrying out the menial work previously assigned to those in servitude. As the number of immigrants increased in S~ ao Paulo, so also did the provincial police, whose job it was to keep these newcomers submissive, with force if necessary. There was no tolerance for working-class movements. Following a visit to S~ ao Paulo in 1899, an Italian legislator objected vociferously to the brutality of Brazil’s law enforcement apparatus.14 The Italian Parliament condemned the brutality of the Brazilian laws and even introduced a bill to prevent any further Italian emigration to Brazil.15 From roughly the early 1890s through the first years of the new century, arrest rates in Sao Paulo were about double those of London, and fewer than 10 percent were ever charged with a formal offense.16 Awareness of this history may contribute to the views of modern Brazilians regarding state security. By 1889, less than one year after the signing of the Golden Law, the monarchy stepped down and ceased to govern Brazil. There followed a period of military rule, led first by army marshal Deodoro da Fonseca, who resigned in 1891 when Brazil’s second army marshal, Vice President Floriano Peixoto, seized office. Thirteen fellow officers and Jornal do Brasil editor Rui Barbosa complained vociferously that Peixoto had violated the new constitution, which stated that direct elections should be used to replace the leader, not an in-house coup d’etat. Floriano had the rest of the military on his side, ignored the law, and enacted a state of siege. He jailed the opposing

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13 military officers and placed them aboard the steamer Pernambuco, which left for the Amazon on April 12, 1892. No trial was conducted. Floriano’s actions were really nothing new. For decades before he took office, opponents and troublemakers had been sent to remote areas of the Amazon to rot. Floriano was merely improving on what had gone on before when he permitted large numbers of indesejaveis, or undesirables (e.g., criminals, persons of mixed race, blacks, the poor, and the unemployed) to be included on the exile lists. Foreigners were likewise subjected to this treatment or to being deported back to their original country or port of embarkation. In two years of Floriano’s government, 1893 and 1894, a total of 76 foreigners were removed by presidential decree at the behest of the chief of police. Of these, 31 were expelled for theft (2 were females), 2 for pimping, 7 for counterfeiting (3 females), 16 for political crimes, and 20 for anarchism.17 In this tense atmosphere, the military government opened attack on the city of Canudos, originally one of the settlements created by escaped slaves. Located in the Bahia badlands, the place was a collection of mud shacks occupied by the impoverished poor seeking guidance from a religious zealot named Ant^ onio Vicente Mendes Maciel, or ‘‘Ant^ onio Conselheiro’’ (‘‘Ant^ onio the Counselor’’). Afraid that he was a royalist, but just as much in fear of what the poor could do if they rebelled en masse, the government sent four armies north in 1896 and 1897. Canudos was leveled and obliterated by a revenge-bent military. The army lost a national hero, Moreira Cesar, in the fighting and became the butt of jokes. Male prisoners from Canudos were rapidly interrogated before being drawn and quartered, burned alive, or having their heads chopped off. Women, both young and old, were beaten and raped. Others were turned into prostitutes, compelled to be concubines, or even enslaved in outlying areas where slavery was still practiced. On a forced march for some of the female survivors to a makeshift holding area, anyone who could not keep up was shot. A number of children were killed when soldiers smashed their torsos against trees; others were taken to the coast and given to the families of the more prosperous citizenry. In the ensuing months, some of the surviving females who had taken up liaisons with the troops made their way to Rio de Janeiro and began living just west of the downtown area. Because ordinary soldiers could not marry during these years nor bring women into the barracks, housing was built on a rise behind the city’s main army installation. This creation on Morro da Provid^encia (Providence Hill) still exists. A teeming legacy from Canudos, it became the first favela, or shantytown slum, in Rio—then the national capital.18 As the new century unfolded in Brazil, two important events took place in rapid succession. The first was the presidential election of 1909–1910, the renowned Civilista (i.e., ‘‘put a civilian in charge’’)

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election. Among the main candidates was another army marshal, the somewhat short and very naive Hermes da Fonseca. His opponent was Rui Barbosa, the editor of Jornal do Brasil. Rui captured the ear of the country by saying that the military should get out of politics but not out of the armed forces. Many officers felt Hermes was a worthy man and understood their own function as ‘‘the guardians of the republic they helped establish in 1889.’’19 The election was held, the votes were counted, and Hermes, as nearly everyone anticipated, was declared the victor. He took office on November 16, 1910. Six days later, the Naval Mutiny of 1910 exploded in Rio’s Guanabara Bay. The revolt was led by a charismatic enlisted man named Jo~ ao C^ andido Felisberto. C^andido was black, and the government was not about to let him hold the country at ransom with two new battleships parked down in the harbor. All the sailors sought was an end to corporal punishment, principally whippings on deck, for minor transgressions. Slavery was over, but in the navy, the forms of chastisement used during slavery continued. Public support for Rui Barbosa and the moral high ground of his position did not matter. The Naval Revolt of 1910 was brutally put down amidst promises of amnesty from the government—all of which were broken. Corporal punishment continued. With the advent of Artur Bernardes as the country’s president in 1922, all hell broke loose. In Minas Gerais, a state noted for its mines and dairy products, Bernardes was perhaps the most hated national leader of what came to be called the Old Republic (1889–1930). To try to impede Bernardes from taking office, one section of young officers revolted on July 5, 1922. A reporter took a picture showing 18 rebels walking down Avenida Atlantica to meet their doom. Although there were, in fact, 23 men,20 the event has ever since been referred to as the ‘‘Eighteen of the Fort.’’ The rebels lost in 1922 and again in a 1924 revolt that brought Luis Carlos Prestes to national attention. An army captain, Prestes became the de facto leader of the revolutionary forces, which earlier had taken control of the city of S~ ao Paulo and then been forced to flee to the West. Ultimately, to be called the Coluna Prestes (Prestes Column), they went on a 15,500-kilometer trek all over the interior of the country in a failing effort to entice peasants to take up arms against Bernardes.21 Going into exile in 1927, Prestes was converted to communism and journeyed to the Soviet Union. In the meantime, Brazil’s most important president in the 20th century, Get ulio Dornelles Vargas, took power in October 1930, following a new rebellion that removed his predecessor from office. A charismatic individual, Vargas ruled Brazil as provisional leader, dictator, and elected president from 1930 to 1945 and again from 1950 to 1954. He put down a Communist rebellion led by Luis Carlos Prestes in 1935 and

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an attempted Fascist Putsch in 1938. He was popular for what he eventually did for the middle class. To a lesser degree, he helped proletarian interests. Yet Vargas apparently never intended to leave office and ran a repressive police state from 1938 to 1945, at which point the military removed him from office. He was later elected and reinstated, but the military planned to remove him again in 1954. Instead of allowing this to happen, he dramatically shot himself in the heart on August 24, 1954, while still in his pajamas in the presidential mansion. A number of the plans to help Vargas’ working-class countryman probably came from the pen of his minister of labor, the future President Jo~ ao Goulart, who was ousted from office in a 1964 military uprising. The men in uniform who took over following the fall of Goulart were supported by President Lyndon Baines Johnson in Washington, DC. Johnson even dispatched a fleet of U.S. naval warships, headed by the aircraft carrier Forrestal, to provide logistical support in case it was needed. Brazilian generals supported by the United States ran the country from 1964 to 1985, one of the darkest periods in the country’s history. Of the five generals who succeeded one another, Castelo Branco, Costa e Silva, Medici, Geisel, and Figueiredo, the first three were from the tenente movement of the 1920s. During their 21-year reign, the military promoted the torturing and killing of opponents, ruined the economy, and banished critical thinkers, artists, and social activists who questioned the regime. This legacy now seems to be reflected in the staunch opposition of all the Brazilians in our sample to torture and killing. When Figueiredo was about to step aside, the first civilian chosen to lead a redemocratized Brazil, Tancredo Neves, suddenly took sick with stomach problems. Neves had been in the government of Jo~ao Goulart and may well have still been coupled with him in the minds of the men in gold braid. Despite a team of international medical specialists, Neves passed away before he could take office. His vice president-elect, Jose Sarney, accepted the presidential sash on March 15, 1985. Figueiredo boycotted the ceremony. The Sarney years are remembered as a time of triple-digit inflation. Following Sarney came Fernando Collor de Melo. A former governor of the state of tiny Alagoas, Collor was incredibly corrupt. The financial head of his election campaign was a fellow Alagoano, P. C. Farias, who was ousted for his questionable money dealings. When a Congressional investigation of Farias and Collor revealed offshore and other bogus bank accounts, all with funds deposited from large firms wanting favors from the government, Fernando Collor de Mello was impeached and a few years later, Farias was murdered together with his girlfriend, Susana Marcolino da Silva. The crime has never been solved.22 After Collor resigned, his vice president, Itamar Franco, became president on December 29, 1992. His term of office is best remembered for

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the work of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, his minister of the economy, who was the father of the Plano Real (Real Plan), which brought in a new and stable currency, the Real, replacing a system that had worked fine for those with money in the bank but was disastrous for the many Brazilians who lived month to month. Cardoso, an academic with a background in economics, changed the game by promoting a constitutional amendment that cut massive amounts of funding from the public sector. He also set out to privatize numerous state-owned enterprises, including the telephone system, some banks, and steel businesses, and opened the economy up to foreign investment. The country was so grateful for what Cardoso did, which included improvements to education and social programs as well as stabilizing the economy, that they elected him to the presidency for two consecutive terms. Brazil’s most recent president, Luiz In acio Lula da Silva, came from a poor family in northeastern Brazil. He migrated to Sao Paolo as a young man to make a living working in factories. He was a machinist who soon became active in union activities. In February 1980, he was also one of the founders of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) or Workers’ Party, one of Brazil’s nine major political parties. Lula tried for election three times before winning in 2002. His victory brought joy and new hope to Brazil’s poor. He made several positive changes, including family grants. Since 2004, Brazil’s economy has yielded increases in both real wages and employment. The strength and stability of the economy result from sound macroeconomic policies and commodity-driven account surpluses by strengthening reserves to new levels, reducing public debt, and dropping interest rates significantly.23 From 2003 to 2007, Brazil ran record trade surpluses. Although Lula’s administration, like the previous ones, was eventually accused of corruption, he succeeded in making a comeback from the accusations. Because the country’s commodity surplus was maintained throughout the election, Lula was voted into office for a second term in 2006 by highlighting his administration’s commitment to fiscal responsibility.24 After his inauguration, he announced a package of further economic reforms to reduce taxes and increase infrastructural investment.25 History will determine how his years at the helm will be remembered, though a positive trend seems to characterize his moderate policies. A preliminary evaluation would certainly have to acknowledge that his years in office, although they improved living and economic conditions for many Brazilians, did not do much to mitigate the vast social distance between the rich and the poor in this country, which the United Nations has called the most unequal on earth.26 Inflation also began to creep up again, complicating the lives of the vast multitude on the bottom of the economic scale.

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In short, Brazil is the largest and most populous country in South America and the fifth largest in the world. It is the leading economic power in South America, rich in natural resources, industry, and agriculture, with a large and well-educated labor pool.27 It has been an independent nation for less than 200 years and a republic since 1889. Independence, government change, and freedom for slaves all occurred without any type of armed conflict, through negotiation. In 1985, over half a century of military rule ended the same way—peacefully, with the military ceding power to civilian rulers. Despite the financial challenges, the years of totalitarian military rule, and ever-present political corruption, Brazil still appears to be a peaceful and prosperous country characterized by realistically optimistic, peace-loving, and humane people, as attested by the survey responses. Brazil is currently predominantly Catholic in religious orientation, which may also have influenced some of the responses. BRAZILIAN RESPONSES TO THE PAIRTAPS Sample and Procedure Our sample consisted of 105 Brazilian adults (26 males and 79 females) from 19 to 69 years of age, with an average age of 26 years. Slightly over half of the sample lived in Minas Gerais. About 10 percent were from Rio Grande do Sul. The remainder came from throughout Brazil, including Sao Paulo, Rio de Janiero, Pernambuco, Bahia, Parana, and Brasilia. The childhood religion reported by the sample was 73 percent Catholic; 7 percent Jewish; 3 percent Protestant; and 7 percent Spiritist (a religion based on psychic phenomena, African tribal beliefs, and Kardek’s metaphysical teachings). This distribution mirrors the overall religious makeup of the country. The 2000 Census indicated 73 percent of the population was Catholic.28 Reported political affiliation also mirrored the country as a whole: About half of the respondents indicated no political party affiliation. Among the rest, PT (the Worker’s Party, of which President Lula is a member) was the most commonly cited, followed by PDT (Democratic Labor Party) and PMDB (Democratic Movement Party). About 3 percent listed the PSDB (Social Democracy Party) and about 1 percent each identified with the Green Party and the PSOL (Freedom & Socialism Party). All respondents were Brazilian and had lived most or all of their lives in Brazil. Only 10 respondents reported ever living outside Brazil, and for 9 of these, this was in the United States during graduate school. One had lived briefly in Korea. Although participants were asked to report ethnicity, most listed Brazilian or mixed. Some wrote ‘‘very diverse,’’ South American, Latin

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American, Buddhist, Muslim, or Jewish. ‘‘Pardon?’’ or ‘‘N/A’’ were also common answers. It is worth noting that asking ethnicity on surveys and forms was not even legal in Brazil for some time, is still not common, and is often perceived as rude if it is even understood. Although the UN report cited earlier stresses the vast difference between rich and poor in Brazil, there seems to be a growing middle class, as well. Most of the participants identified themselves as working class (26 percent), middle class (53 percent), or upper-middle class (16 percent). Only one respondent indicated lower class, and eight indicated upper class. About 10 percent were married; an additional 5 percent had been married in the past and 10 percent reported gay sexual orientation. Many of the respondents were university students, however, so this may account for the relatively high percentage of middle- and upper-middle-class respondents. It may also explain why more than 25 percent reported participating in some type of conflict resolution or peace education training, because these are fairly common in modern Brazilian schools. The majority of participants (68 percent) were psychology students, because both paper and pencil and online versions of the survey were distributed by psychology students from federal universities in Brazil. All participants completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey. For the purposes of this chapter, nine items from the PAIRTAPS were analyzed. Participants were asked to define war and peace and to rate seven statements regarding war, peace, invasion, protest, torture, terrorism, and security on a scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree) to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the statement and then to explain the reasoning underlying their ratings. Although Brazil has not been at war during the last two centuries and has never been attacked by outside forces, the country does maintain an army, navy, and air force and requires 9–12 months of compulsory service. Only one respondent reported having served in the military, but approximately 25 percent of the sample reported a family member—usually a father or grandfather—who had served in the military. The majority of the Brazilian military is composed of volunteers. The Brazilian Army was the first military organization in South America to accept women in career ranks, and currently over half of the citizens available and fit for military service in Brazil are women. Only 2 percent of Brazil’s GDP is devoted to military spending. This low level of investment in the military, combined with a recent history free of invasion, may account for why the participants’ definitions of war tended to be theoretical and abstract, overall, rather than graphic. Unlike many in Europe, Brazilians have never experienced war at home. Unlike many in the United States, Brazilians are not accustomed

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to having family members engaged in wars abroad. War is not a focus of Brazilian media or Brazilian society at present.

PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION [Countries have a right to invade] ‘‘only if the objective is to preserve peace and justice.’’ ‘‘Torture is wrong but in times of war there are other rules; still, the problem is the war itself.’’ Definitions of War Definitions of war generally conceptualized it as a state-level phenomenon. Typical definitions from this perspective tended to be classic definitions focusing on conflict; for example, ‘‘conflict with the use of guns between two rival groups’’ and ‘‘violent armed conflict.’’ Also fairly common were definitions reflecting a more individualistic perspective characterized by moral and emotional judgments. Examples of definitions that involved a moral judgment regarding war included ‘‘fighting involving the use of weapons with the loss of ethical attitudes and with non-sustainable goals,’’ ‘‘the utmost human ignorance,’’ ‘‘absurd barbarity,’’ ‘‘evil of mankind,’’ ‘‘unthinkable and inefficient way of resolving conflicts,’’ ‘‘stupid and senseless,’’ and ‘‘dumbness.’’ Perspectives on Invasion Nearly all respondents disagreed with the statement ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country.’’ Respect for diversity (for countries, cultures, borders, and sovereignty) and not allowing imposition of one country or culture on another were the most frequent themes in the qualitative responses. None of these responses revealed unqualified support for a governmental right to invasion, although 25 percent of the responses indicated circumstances under which there might be such a right, describing invasion as an exceptional measure that should be avoided except in rare situations. The most frequent qualifiers in this category were self-defense or UN-led interventions. ‘‘A country only has the right to invade another if all of humanity is under threat,’’ wrote one participant. ‘‘When there is a situation of abuse in another country, it may be acceptable to put an end to the regime,’’ wrote another. ‘‘Only if there is a serious violation of human rights’’ and ‘‘only if approved by the UN’’ were common qualifiers. A few gave specifics from recent events, citing Iraq as an unjustified invasion, or noting it may be appropriate to invade Sudan or Myanmar due to human

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rights violations. Most, however, saw invasion as unjustified in all situations, noting ‘‘there are better ways to resolve conflict.’’ ‘‘[Invasion] disrespects cultural and social values of the country and imposes an external model which is almost always a cause of violence’’ was a frequently echoed response. Respecting national borders and respecting the sovereignty of each country were frequently cited as reasons to support disagreement with the right to invade under any circumstances: ‘‘It is necessary to respect each country’s sovereignty’’; ‘‘each country’s borders must be respected but the establishment of these must be in common agreement.’’ The argument that ‘‘no country can prevail over another’’ seemed reminiscent of the history lessons learned from the border skirmishes of the gauchos in the south of Brazil. Perspectives on Torture Brazilians adamantly disagreed with the statement that ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in times of war.’’ Nearly 90 percent made simple, strong declarative statements such as ‘‘torture should never be used,’’ ‘‘even in times of war human life must be respected,’’ and ‘‘there is no right under any circumstances to torture another human being.’’ One participant argued, ‘‘Prisoners are just as human as all other citizens and they have the same rights.’’ Even for the few who suggested that torture may be a right under certain extreme and limited circumstances, justification was tentative. ‘‘Depends on the law, the culture and the historical moment,’’ wrote one. Even those who did agree even slightly that torture may be warranted in some situations asserted that ‘‘This would be the very last choice.’’ Many respondents differentiated between government power and state rights, suggesting, for example, that ‘‘even though the government is the authority, they do not have that right.’’ Others noted that ‘‘The fact that they are prisoners is torture enough.’’ Human rights are considered paramount. Predetermined rules and ethics governing both military and law enforcement officers’ treatment of prisoners are continually stressed as of major importance in the answers. This emphasis may be a reaction to recent experiences with military regimes in South America combined with a strong value on and respect for human life rooted in religious training. It may also be influenced by the Roman legal codes that still govern Brazil to this day. Perspectives on Terrorism The strong opposition to state aggression extends to the item ‘‘Sometimes the heads of government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism.’’ Over 95 percent of

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respondents strongly disagreed with this statement. Even the four respondents who expressed conditional agreement did so guardedly, with comments such as ‘‘I don’t have an informed opinion on this’’ and ‘‘only when clearly under attack.’’ ‘‘It is worse than an atomic bomb or an epidemic,’’ wrote one. ‘‘Cowardly violence is the weapon of terrorists and should never be the weapon of those who fight terrorists.’’ ‘‘The right to life must be granted independently of color, race, or political orientation’’ was a common response. ‘‘No government has the right to take the life of its citizens,’’ and ‘‘no one has the right to kill under any circumstances’’ were common responses. ‘‘Never!’’ The distaste for terrorism in the Brazilian sample was also reflected in their definitions of terrorism. About half of the sample identified terrorism with destruction and violence that cause widespread fear. Eleven respondents defined it more as mistaken or misguided actions, such as ‘‘extremism sustained by an ideal’’ or ‘‘a desperate attempt to obtain rights.’’ Others (about 20 percent of the sample) defined it as a tool to achieve societal change, such as ‘‘a protest instrument always with an objective’’ or ‘‘a reaction to oppression.’’ Terrorist is ‘‘what some people accuse their political enemies of being at the present time,’’ noted one. The remainder viewed it negatively as ‘‘an abuse of ideology,’’ ‘‘ignorance,’’ and ‘‘malice.’’ It is ‘‘unjustified attack,’’ ‘‘unjustifiable action,’’ ‘‘illogical,’’ and ‘‘inhumane.’’ Despite the fact that terrorism is generally not condoned and is mostly seen as violent and unacceptable, using state power to torture or take lives to prevent terrorism is not seen as acceptable. Rather, aggression in the name of fighting terrorism is seen as just as immoral as terrorist acts. ‘‘An efficient anti-terrorist system would avoid the death of innocent civilians,’’ wrote one respondent. ‘‘If governments kill or torture, they are making a mistake,’’ was the sentiment of many. ‘‘They shouldn’t compromise the life of any innocent person in the fight against terrorism.’’

PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE AND PROTEST ‘‘All have the right to peace if they wish to have it.’’ ‘‘Everyone should express their thoughts and opinions in a free manner and also in a way that does not harm others.’’ Definitions of Peace Definitions of peace were typically abstract and highly positive, sometimes to the point of being idealistic. ‘‘Harmony and happiness,’’ ‘‘tranquility and honest work,’’ ‘‘when everything is in perfect harmony,’’

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‘‘justice,’’ and ‘‘health and well-being’’ were typical. ‘‘When conflicts are discussed instead of being transformed into war’’ and ‘‘when integrity, freedom and right to life are completely respected’’ were also common responses. About 4 percent of the definitions described peace as unattainable or utopian, but the vast majority saw it as a necessity, a right, even a duty—and currently existing in Brazil. Overall, over 50 percent of the responses were social definitions, defining peace as a basic requirement of society. Interpersonal relations and communication were stressed in over 15 percent of the definitions, with explanations offered such as ‘‘dialogue, empathy’’ and ‘‘respecting differences and being able to co-exist.’’ Respect for diversity and social justice, important components of positive definitions of peace, were paramount. Nearly 20 percent also defined peace as a state of happiness, love, and harmony. About 30 percent of the definitions were negative definitions, identifying peace with an absence of negative conditions; however, crime, political violence, threats, suffering, fear, worry, harm, illness, and injustice were the negative conditions that are seen as gone in times of peace rather than battles or bloodshed. Only about 5 percent of the definitions referred to individual acts, thoughts, feelings, or states, such as ‘‘becoming wiser’’ or ‘‘becoming closer to God.’’ It appears that the people of Brazil, much as the people of other countries reviewed in these volumes, base their understanding on what they have known firsthand. Crime, injustice, and political violence have been experienced in recent history. Invasions and battles have not been. Thus, fairness and equality are important to defining peace; lack of killing on battlefields is not. A Right to Peace? Everyone agreed with the statement that all human beings have a basic right to peace. Over 70 percent said it was an absolute and basic right for all regardless of conditions. The remainder added qualifiers to their endorsement of the right, making comments such as ‘‘besides rights, we also have duties to maintain it’’; ‘‘everyone has the right, though achievement may be hard’’; ‘‘we have this right, but we must understand that we give up this right when we make war or violate the rights of other human beings.’’ Perspectives on peace seemed directly tied to experiences within Brazil. A right to safety, health care, and quality of life free from crime and poverty was peace as perceived by the sample, and all were deemed to have a right to this. However, when asked whether they believed that world peace could be achieved, the respondents showed considerable skepticism. Only 13 percent thought world peace could be achieved. An additional 9 percent said it may be achievable in the future. ‘‘Maybe in a very distant future, if

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humans still exist, but in our times, human nature will not allow this to happen,’’ seemed to be a common view. ‘‘It depends on the whole world’s willingness to reach it,’’ wrote one. ‘‘It can be achieved if each human being does his own part,’’ wrote another. ‘‘It is a matter of individual attitude and, if practiced, becomes collective attitude.’’ Over half of the sample did not consider world peace possible, or even worthwhile. ‘‘Peace might not be the best situation for the world,’’ wrote one respondent. ‘‘Conflicts are always going to exist and this is not all bad because conflict many times makes you grow and evolve,’’ wrote another. ‘‘There will always be conflicts of interest,’’ and ‘‘I would like to believe peace is possible, but cultural differences and thirst for power makes it impossible’’ were other typical answers. An additional 19 percent thought peace was conditionally possible but ‘‘not the way everyone currently sees and acts toward each other. We need to be more flexible.’’ The remaining 10 percent were not sure if world peace could ever be achieved. In short, it appears that peace within Brazil, as it pertains to equality, freedom from crime, lack of poverty, and quality of life, is seen as a right and as a condition that is possible, though difficult, to achieve. Peace outside of Brazil, because of the vast cultural differences Brazilians perceive and respect, is seen as unlikely. Brazilians respect the right of others to wage war but choose not to participate. Views of Right to Protest Integrating groups with views contrary to those of the state, cooperating with these groups, and encouraging their participation in the democratic process are among the basic functions of a truly democratic state. Regulating the public order by resorting to violence and oppressing citizens are symptomatic of states lacking a culture of peace and democratic values. There can be democracies without peace, and peace within nondemocracies, but generally, a state’s level of tolerance toward its citizens’ public demonstrations and the degree to which diverse views are integrated in a peaceful, collaborative, and discursive way is an indicator of a culture of peace. Despite Brazil’s recent history of military dictatorship, the right to protest seems intact. About one-third of the respondents reported participating in various types of protests, and all agreed that ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace’’ ‘‘as well as protesting anything else that people feel strongly about’’ because ‘‘expressing opinions is everyone’s right’’ and ‘‘freedom of expression must be maintained.’’ Protests of any nature were seen as legitimate and important and the right to free expression was valued.

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Ever respectful of sovereignty, however, a few qualified their agreement by noting, for example, that the extent to which protest is acceptable ‘‘depends on the country in which a person is born and its laws,’’ and the value of the protest depends on how the government ‘‘decides to respond to it. If the people allow a corrupt and autocratic government to take power, then the effects might be very unpleasant.’’ Still, protest is expressed as both a right and, within democratic forms of government, a necessity. The right to peaceful protest, as well as widespread support for this right, is intact in Brazil. Attitudes toward State Security The majority of the Brazilian participants agreed more than they disagreed with the statement ‘‘National security is essential for family and individual security.’’ About 68 percent of the responses showed some level of endorsement of the importance of national security, citing reasons such as ‘‘it is the country’s obligation to protect its citizens’’ and ‘‘we should all be responsible for national security.’’ As might be expected from the history recounted earlier, the focus seemed to be more on internal than external threats. ‘‘The country should be responsible for its own citizens’’ and ‘‘national security should control internal violence; violence from citizens against other citizens in the same country’’ because ‘‘there are those who want to find others to exploit and abuse’’ were common sentiments. Still, nearly one-third of the sample did not agree that national security was essential. ‘‘Sometimes what threatens individual and family security is the nation itself,’’ wrote one respondent. ‘‘This is not always the truth,’’ wrote another. It ‘‘depends on what is understood by national security and the values that underlie it,’’ noted a third. ‘‘We should not justify certain measures with the excuse of national security’’ was a common statement. Several also noted that although the state had the responsibility for ensuring basic public safety from criminals, it was the family, not the state, that had the responsibility for providing security for the family. Relatively recent experience with a military state, as well as ongoing experience with government corruption, seems to have made Brazilians wary of falling once more into the grips of an authoritarian state with control over the family through rallying for national security. CONCLUSION Brazil’s history over the past two centuries is a dichotomy of peace abroad and military coups, dictatorships, and political instability at home. Our survey data made it clear that Brazilians feel strong

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opposition to war. Responses show uncompromising disagreement with items related to the potential rights of states to invade other countries, kill to fight terrorism, and torture prisoners. As in Spain, Russia, and other countries summarized in these volumes, views on current international and national issues are well informed. Explanations and justifications for agreement or disagreement included references to specific situations, international agreements, and governmental policies. Views on invasion revealed disagreement with the right to invade except in self-defense or cases where it is clear that the action is an intervention rather than an invasion and conducted by an intergovernmental organization, such as the UN. Common themes focused on sovereignty, existence of better alternatives, opposition to violence, and the right to life, peace, freedom, and harmony for all of humankind. Many respondents noted that the end does not justify the means. They maintained that actions should emphasize human rights, ethics, and morality. Running throughout all answers, though, was the predominant theme of acceptance of and respect for diversity. The right to life, and to quality of life, for all of humankind was presented as an absolute. All else was qualified as ‘‘shades of gray,’’ though, and all shades were acceptable, depending on the cultural context of a given society or country and the wishes of the diverse individuals comprising each.

11

Colombia Amanda Clinton and Luz Amparo Escobar

War is . . . ‘‘a fight without meaning’’; ‘‘a total violation of human rights.’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘society living within parameters of security, tranquility and stability.’’ This chapter presents views on peace and governmental aggression in a sample of citizens from Colombia, South America, a country embroiled in a 50-year-long internal conflict. The relationship between Colombia’s lengthy and violent civil war and the perceptions of its people is explored. The chapter begins with a brief explanation of the demographics and geography of the country, both of which have significantly influenced the political situation. To facilitate a better understanding of Colombian perspectives, a discussion of the Colombian Civil War follows, focusing on the initiation and development of the conflict from its distal origins to present-day issues. Finally, Colombian responses to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS)1 that were obtained in the current research project are discussed, with a focus on Colombians’ perspectives on war, peace, and reconciliation.

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT Geography and Demographics Colombia is situated at the northern tip of South America in a position that grants it both Pacific and Atlantic Ocean coastline. Within its borders, Colombia boasts Amazon rain forest, lush jungles, snow-covered peaks in the Andes Mountains, and rich plains and lowlands near its

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eastern border with Venezuela. The physical structure of Colombia’s mountain region and the direction of its main ranges and valleys are a dominant factor in the distribution of the population and natural resources, and, as is discussed in this chapter, in strategic planning for guerrilla warfare. Because armed groups tend to establish themselves in areas with solid economic potential,2 Colombia’s guerrilla fighters frequently selected the crop-rich Andean areas and the oil-rich lowlands to establish operations.3 Colombia is the third most populous Latin American country, following Brazil and Mexico, with nearly 45 million residents, the largest percentage of which are between 15 and 65 years of age.4 The majority of Colombia’s residents live in major urban areas, including the capital city, Bogot a, as well as in Medellin and Cali,5 each with populations numbering in the millions. Although Colombia boasts significant commercial development, including exclusive shopping centers, elegant restaurants, and private country clubs, these luxuries are largely reserved for the wealthy elite, a small minority of the citizenry. Sixty-five percent of the country’s population lives at the poverty level, with 42 percent of rural dwellers existing in extreme poverty; restricted educational opportunities result in an illiteracy rate of 15 percent.6 Foundations of the Conflict As with much of Latin America, Colombia was settled by the Spanish in the early 1500s. Slightly over 300 years later, Colombia’s struggle for independence from Spain established the broad framework for decades of civil war when Sim on Bolivar’s Conservative Party fought with Francisco Santander’s Liberal Party for control of the region. When the Republic of Colombia was named in 1886, Bolivar’s Conservative Party, which preferred a centralized government and close alliance with the Catholic Church, and the Liberals, who were associated with Santander, who sought decentralized government and state control of civil matters, continued their fierce rivalry. This internal divide in Colombia, first initiated in 1816, is considered by some historians,7 to be the source of a pattern of conflicts that later ignited the civil war that still rages today. Although it is difficult to pinpoint the exact commencement of the Colombian Civil War, the 1948 assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, then a populist presidential candidate, is considered a key contributing factor,8 if not the point at which civil war began. Although the emergence of the guerrilla insurgence in the 1960s may be considered the more precise initiation of the Colombian Civil War, scholars tend to agree that, at a minimum, the political unrest resulting from Gaitan’s death contributed to internal conflict in the country that ultimately resulted in civil war.

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As a politician, Gait an emphasized distinctions between the Colombian oligarchy, which he defined as corrupt, and the Colombian pueblo and people, whom he characterized as worthy and deserving.9 Thus, he attracted the support of numerous union members, low-income Colombians, and communist leaders, while also gaining the attention of the Conservative Colombian government and American investigative bodies such as the Central Intelligence Agency,10 which saw him as a threat to stability in the region. On April 9, 1948, the day of his assassination, Gaitan left his office to eat lunch at a nearby restaurant, supposedly with the young Fidel Castro, who was in Bogot a at the time. As he walked down the street toward his meeting place, he was shot and killed. Although his alleged murderer, Juan Roa Sierra, was killed by a mob at the scene of the crime, no clear motive for Roa Sierra’s involvement has been obtained, and reasons for Gait an’s murder remain obscure. What is clear, however, is that the assassination of the man striving for the Colombian presidency led to riots in Bogot a and nearly 3,000 deaths. It also led to the beginning of a decade-long period called ‘‘La Violencia’’ (The Violence), frequently characterized as the initial stage of Colombia’s Civil War11 due to the divides it created. Battles between liberals and conservatives marked the years between 1948 and 1958, during which approximately 200,000 individuals died as a result of guerrilla warfare and massacres utilized as political tools.12 Only in 1958, when a power-sharing agreement between the elites of each political party was achieved, did La Violencia end. However, politically oriented unrest—first observed as a severe divide between political parties nearly 140 years prior and exacerbated subsequent to Gaitan’s death—continued to foment, and the ground for Colombia’s seemingly endless civil war had been sown. Guerrilla Warfare If not the commencement of the first phase of Colombia’s ongoing civil war, Gaitan’s murder at least reflected acceptance of violent conflict as a means of political protest and generated a backlash that evolved into the Colombian Civil War. As La Violencia reached its end, most of the self-defense and guerrilla groups active during the decade demobilized, although some continued to operate in enclaves. The targeting of public infrastructure and civilians by distinct armed factions subsequent to Gait an’s assassination had contributed to the creation of left-wing guerrilla groups during La Violencia. Later, as part of the ongoing civil conflict, paramilitary fighters, the Colombian military, and support from the United States were added to this mix. All of these elements

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have been influential during the decades-long war that followed Gait an’s assassination. Regional unrest and Colombia’s apparent political instability drew the attention of the U.S. government as early as the 1950s. At the end of 1959, in light of Cuba’s Communist Revolution and just months after La Violencia, U.S. President Eisenhower recommended an evaluation of anticommunist efforts within Latin America.13 His concern stemmed in part from the difficulties the Colombian government experienced reasserting state power and control subsequent to the decade of violence. Findings of the report commissioned by the president effectively encouraged the establishment of a counterinsurgency and facilitated the thinking that civilians were the enemy. This analysis of Colombia’s political problems, in fact, was described in a manual initially published by the U.S. Army in 1962, subsequent to a visit to Colombia by Commander of the U.S. Army Special Warfare School, General William Pelham Yarborough. The manual teaches, for example, that civilians are the enemy and indicates that dealing with ‘‘the civil population . . . is one of the fundamental objectives of Army units.’’14 Editions of this training material were adapted and published until 1987. In 1964 and 1966, respectively, two guerrilla groups that began their evolution during La Violencia were formally established: the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), or FARC, and the Ejercito de Liberaci on Nacional (National Liberation Army), or ELN. At their initiation, the FARC and the ELN campaigned in favor of greater representation for the poor, weak, and less educated against the rich and powerful of the country. The FARC’s ideology incorporated nationalist and anticapitalist rhetoric, with particular attention given to land reform and assisting farmers in obtaining plots of land large enough to facilitate crop production and establish cooperatives.15 The ELN, in contrast to the FARC, was directly inspired by the Communist Revolution in Cuba and Communism in the Soviet Union. In the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, the FARC developed its own school, judicial, and health care systems, in addition to an agrarian economy within a de facto autonomous state in southern Colombia. This period witnessed expansion of the guerrilla group’s battalions, although overall the FARC was recognized for the quality of life improvements facilitated in remote areas of Colombia. In the mid-1980s, La Uribe Peace Accords were signed between the FARC and the government, permitting the guerrilla group to form a legitimate political party, the Uni on Patri otica [Patriotic Union], or UP. The UP included disarmed guerrillas, former communists, and Gaitanist Liberals. Their platform stood for economic and land reform, anticorruption, and strict penalties for drug trafficking. The UP consistently won municipal and national elections,

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thereby becoming a target of paramilitary and right-wing death squads desiring to limit the influence of leftist ideology in Colombian politics. Organized assaults—some coordinated by the drug czar Pablo Escobar’s terror group ‘‘MAS’’ [‘‘MORE’’] and others by Fidel and Carlos Casta~ no’s Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia [United Self-defense Forces of Colombia], or AUC—resulted in the deaths of nearly 3,000 UP members in 20 year’s time. As it became apparent that the FARC’s opposition would prevent the group from legitimate participation in Colombian politics, the organization increasingly resorted to violent military tactics. To fund their guerrilla operations, the organization started charging obligatory ‘‘taxes’’ on farmers, residents, and workers of the coca- and poppy-producing terrain that they controlled. In addition, the FARC garnered money from extortion and kidnapping. In response to the increasing power and violent tactics of the FARC, other moneyed interests in Colombia developed a counterstrategy. Notably, oil producers, as well as wealthy cattle ranchers, offered economic support to the AUC paramilitary organization. Thus, violence increased across the country, impacting virtually all people, from rural farmers to city businessmen. Drugs and War Colombia’s Civil War is inextricably linked to cocaine production and drug trafficking, a multimillion dollar endeavor spearheaded by infamous criminals and organizations, such as Pablo Escobar and the Medellin and Cali cartels, but also involving the FARC and the ELN. Political shifts have further influenced the relationship between drugs and war in Colombia. For example, the end of Communism in the former Soviet Union contributed to an increase in Colombia’s civil conflict as a by-product of the spread of the illegal drug trade, drug cartels, and the U.S.-backed War on Drugs.16 The United States responded to the increasing violence with Plan Colombia in 2000. As described by the Clinton White House, Plan Colombia authorized $4 billion in military aid over five years to stem drug production and sales. Presented by the United States as an antinarcotics effort that included a large-scale fumigation policy, its impact on the drug trade has been limited, and Plan Colombia is perceived largely as a U.S. counterinsurgency effort.17 Civil War, People, and Politics: 1990 to the Present In 1991, the National Constitution of Colombia was revised. The former constitution emphasized a highly centralized governmental organization. The new version increased focus on regional and municipal governance. Formerly, governors and mayors were appointed to their positions. Currently,

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these politicians obtain their positions through election processes. As much as political and fiscal management shifted, however, public order and justice remained in the hands of the federal government. The result of this differentiation of responsibilities between local/state and federal levels has facilitated the continued growth of illegal organizations in the country, both guerrilla and paramilitary. In January 1999, President Andres Pastrana authorized an autonomous zone for the FARC in southern Colombia. He hoped that this effort would further peace talks. Instead, sovereignty over a region the size of Switzerland allowed the FARC to consolidate power and resources. In fact, President Pastrana ultimately accused Manuel Marulanda, the group’s commander, of using the zone as ‘‘a protector of kidnappers, a laboratory of illicit drug production, and depository for stolen arms, dynamite and autos.’’18 With an empowered and emboldened FARC, the peace process in Colombia effectively fell to shambles.19 In 2002, reacting to the growing sense of insecurity that pervaded the country, Alvaro Uribe campaigned on a platform of mano dura [hard hand] toward the guerrillas. Uribe’s election coincided closely with Plan Colombia, a multibillion dollar assistance package purported to ‘‘enable Colombia to grapple more effectively with its ongoing security problems’’ under the auspices of fighting drug production.20,21 In the six years that followed, Uribe redoubled military efforts with the funding provided by the United States, while the FARC faced challenges as its leadership aged and the group’s effectiveness and aims came into question. The combination of increased military efforts on behalf of the government and confusion within the ranks of the guerrillas likely seemed serendipitous to many Colombians. At the very least, this joining of events allowed the country to experience renewed hope that peace would be achieved in their embattled but beloved country. The culminating example of the reduced strength of Colombia’s guerrilla groups occurred on July 4, 2008. On this day, the front page of the New York Times carried the headline, ‘‘Bold Colombia Rescue Built on Rebels’ Disarray.’’ The article described a successfully executed military operation in which the FARC was tricked into releasing 15 civilian hostages to military custody. Some of those who had been held, including a former presidential candidate who wrote extensively about peace negotiations in the country, had been in custody as long as six years. This risky operation has been characterized as the event that could signal the end of Colombia’s lengthy civil war among leftist guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries, and state-funded armed forces,22 as the group’s primary leaders are now deceased and its numbers waning.23 It was following this exciting event that we surveyed a sample of Colombians about their views on governmental aggression and peace.

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The Colombian Sample The present sample consisted of 70 Colombian adults (36 women, 32 men, and 2 unspecified) ranging from 18 to 78 years of age, with an average age of 30. All respondents were natural-born citizens of Colombia, the majority of whom presently live within the country. They reside largely in the State of Antioquia, an area that has been significantly impacted during Colombia’s protracted civil war. In regard to religious affiliation, 67 percent of the sample classified themselves as Christian, 18 percent as ‘‘None, Agnostic, Atheist,’’ and 2 percent as ‘‘Other’’; 11 percent of the sample did not specify religious preference. Educational levels were relatively high. Fifteen percent of the respondents had studied ‘‘some’’ high school without completing their diploma, whereas 18 percent had finished high school. Fifty percent had completed college, and 3 percent had completed a graduate degree or were pursuing one. In regard to employment and income, only 1 percent of the sample reported permanent full-time employment, whereas 4 percent indicated permanent part-time employment. Although respondents indicated professional and technical specializations in areas such as teaching, industrial engineering, architecture, and machine operations, 48 percent selected ‘‘other’’ employment as the best descriptor of their job status, possibly reflecting Colombia’s vast informal economy, where numerous individuals of limited to advanced educational levels work independently selling goods, offering training, or working as consultants for established companies, such as those selling uniforms, clothing, or cosmetics. Twenty-two percent were not employed because they were studying or retired from their careers. Approximately 25 percent of the participants left the item blank. Socioeconomic standing of the participants was largely identified as lower-middle (34 percent) to middle (47 percent) class, with 10 percent indicating their earnings placed them in the lower-class range and 7 percent reporting earnings in the uppermiddle class range, respectively. The remaining 3 percent provided no indication of social class. All of the individuals included in the present analyses completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) in its entirety, although the current project focuses on a subset of specific items from the larger survey. Respondents rated their agreement with items on Likert scales ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree), where 4 represented neutrality. Each of the Likert scale items included space for a qualitative explanation of the quantitative responses. These verbal replies were coded for content, as were definitions of the words war, peace, and terrorism.

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COLOMBIAN PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION Perspectives on Invasion A large majority of Colombian participants (68 percent) indicated disagreement with the item ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country.’’ This strong level of disagreement may reflect Colombian perceptions of the often uncertain diplomatic relationships with its nearest neighbors, Ecuador and Venezuela. In May 2008, for example, serious diplomatic disagreements resulted between the three countries when the Colombian Army (unilaterally and without permission) carried out a military operation in Ecuadorean territory. As a result, the presidents of Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela expelled diplomats and cut ties, citing the importance of national sovereignty.24 It is also possible that Colombia’s own protracted civil conflict has versed its citizens well in the meaning of war, fueling their opposition to invasion because they recognize the loss and suffering that war brings. Within the past year alone, scores of bodies of victims of Colombia’s right-wing paramilitary group have been unearthed, while innocent civilians and politicians have spent years in captivity, held as negotiating tools.25 Young soldiers are often injured or die as they serve their country, as well. Thus, Colombians may extrapolate from the horrors of their internal conflicts to the cruelties of foreign invasion. In addition, Colombian awareness of the role of foreign governments in their internal conflicts may also contribute to their distaste for invasion. Plan Colombia, funded by the United States in 2001, has been controversial, given its purported intention of reducing drug trafficking, which largely failed, while providing justification for increasing arms sales and military aid to the country.26 In another example, Venezuela, its neighbor to the east, has provided aid to guerrilla groups in an effort to weaken Colombia’s democratic government.27 Explanations given for opposition to invasion varied from broad indications of rules and responsibilities, such as ‘‘A country does not have the right’’ to interpretations based on principled concepts, such as ‘‘We are civilized and we should act as such.’’ Frequently, respondents indicated that invasion ultimately leads to war and that no justification exists for provoking war. On occasion, respondents offered an emphatic ‘‘This needs no further explanation!’’ The most common reasons for opposition included—in order from greatest level of opposition to least—sovereignty (38 percent of the responses), a matter of principles (13 percent), and the option to select better alternatives to war (5 percent). Repeatedly, the arguments related to sovereignty indicated the

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belief that autonomy within a country’s borders is a ‘‘fundamental right’’ and that this right must be respected for individual countries. Arguments based on logical or moral principles included ‘‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression,’’ and ‘‘Laws should be followed.’’ Recommendations for positive alternatives to invasion included trade negotiations and interaction between nations. Twenty-eight percent of the qualitative responses affirmed the right of one country to invade another. The majority who supported a right to invasion indicated it is appropriate in cases of self-defense or in response to a threat. For example, respondents stated that ‘‘when a country is threatened by another and there is no other way. . . ‘‘ or ‘‘if and only if it is to defend their autonomy.’’ In a similar vein, a large percentage who approved of a right to invade said it is acceptable when people’s rights have been violated. Perspectives on Torture Colombia’s various warring factions—the military, leftist guerrillas, such as the ELN and the FARC, and right-wing paramilitaries—have all been accused of engaging in torture of civilians. Data gathered during a five-year period from 1996 to 2001 indicated over a thousand persons were tortured, of whom 88 percent were later killed.28 These numbers do not include civilians who were killed for political motives, disappeared persons, or kidnappings. Although the majority of torturous acts have been attributed to right-wing paramilitaries, as recently as 2008 Colombia’s armed forces were accused of torturing and killing civilians thought to be supportive of leftist guerillas.29 The growth of governmental support for torture in Colombia can, at least in part, trace its roots to the United States and its U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA). The SOA, located in Fort Benning, Georgia, has trained numerous Colombian military commanders, including General Montoya, the official in charge of Plan Colombia.30 The Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual, a text used by SOA, was evaluated for use in military expansion programs in Colombia in 1991. This manual specifically stated that an interrogator may ‘‘manipulate the subject’s environment to create unpleasant or intolerable situations, to disrupt patterns of time, space, and sensory perception,’’ thereby condoning torture. Possibly due to the country’s past and current experience of torture, 92 percent of the Colombian PAIRTAPS respondents disagreed with the statement ‘‘Sometimes the government has the right to torture prisoners of war.’’ Many of the responses (46 percent) were emphatic and categorical statements such as ‘‘In absolute disagreement,’’ ‘‘Nobody has this

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right,’’ ‘‘No torture is acceptable,’’ and ‘‘Under no circumstances; torture is an abuse of power.’’ One set of arguments (21 percent) against the use of torture referred to human rights; for example, ‘‘The government must defend human rights’’; ‘‘The obligation of the State is to fight for human rights’’; and ‘‘No one has the right to hurt another person.’’ Trends in response patterns further indicated disagreement for torture related to principles and the existence of options other than torture for treatment of prisoners. The indication that torture ‘‘has no justification’’ and that ‘‘rights are based on morals’’ are examples of antitorture sentiments rooted in principles. The ideas that ‘‘jails exist to pay for bad actions’’ and that truth should be obtained ‘‘without requiring physical harm to another person’’ represent Colombian attitudes against torture. Finally, a number of responses emphasize the nonvoluntary status of many people who may become prisoners during times of war, saying that they ‘‘are conscripts due to obligation’’ and ‘‘are not to blame because they are sent to a bad situation.’’ In contrast, 6 percent of the Colombian sample supported torture of prisoners in time of war. On the basis of means/ends analyses of the potential usefulness of torture, such as for a ‘‘just cause,’’ or protection of human rights, or ‘‘information can save lives,’’ torture garnered some approval. Definitions of Terrorism Decades of guerrilla warfare, often exacerbated by conflicts related to drug trafficking, familiarized Colombians with terrorism. In May 2000, for example, the ELN kidnapped 170 persons as they were attending Catholic mass at a church near Cali.31 In 2002, the FARC hijacked an airplane and forced it to land on a highway, kidnapping Eduardo Turbay, senator and president of the Peace Commission, along with his son.32 In a particularly chilling example, in May 2000, the wife of a cattle rancher died when a collar bomb the FARC placed around her neck detonated.33 The financial as well as personal cost of terrorism in Colombia has been high. In strictly numerical terms, entire pueblos left in ruins by bombings and, later, open warfare between guerrillas and military or between guerrillas and paramilitaries, has been estimated at U.S. $10 billion per year.34 Psychologically, Colombians have had to adjust to traveling within limited ranges to avoid guerrilla- or paramilitaryoccupied areas. The impact on families is also acute, as relatives emigrate because of the dire situation in the country. Almost all families know someone who has died, been kidnapped, or been blackmailed by one of the warring factions. Insecurity is high, as insurgent forces engage in pescas milagrosas (fishing for miracles) in which they ambush

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vehicles to kidnap individuals who might bring high ransom or to control movement within a region. A history marked by terrorist acts between paisanos—that is, amongst Colombians themselves—has probably contributed to the extent to which the majority of our participants related the term predominantly to destruction and violence. Fifty-one percent of the responses defined terrorism as an act designed to cause fear and negatively impact peaceful and democratic movements. For example, terrorism was defined as ‘‘acts of intimidation,’’ ‘‘an extreme version of war that generates terror and fear,’’ and ‘‘total acts of cruelty.’’ A large percentage of the responses (31 percent) defined terrorism in moral or legal terms, indicating that terrorist acts violate human integrity and human rights. A smaller number, 7 percent, defined terrorism in relation to social, economic, or political conditions; for example, ‘‘a violent act that leads to others obtaining something.’’ Four percent interpret terrorism as an ideologically based action that is misguided, such as ‘‘Armed acts and warlike action to destroy or attack a group with different ideals.’’ Perspectives on Civilian Casualties An overwhelming majority (92 percent) of respondents disagreed with the statement ‘‘Sometimes the heads of government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism.’’ Nineteen percent of the respondents directly stated, ‘‘Under no circumstance’’ or ‘‘This practice should never be employed.’’ Another 19 percent based their disagreement on their understanding of human rights, saying, for example, ‘‘No one can violate fundamental human rights,’’ or ‘‘[Terrorism] is a criminal act against human beings.’’ Twelve percent made moral judgments, specifically noting the need to protect innocent persons. These responses included explanations such as ‘‘An innocent should not pay for the errors of others,’’ and ‘‘Innocent people do not deserve to die for the ignorance and cruelty of [terrorist] governments.’’ Another 6 percent indicated even more directly that they considered terrorism highly immoral: ‘‘To kill is murder’’ and ‘‘These things have a name and they are called massacres.’’ Eight percent of the respondents who disagreed with a governmental right to kill civilians in the fight against terrorism did so on the basis of the idea that the ‘‘ends do not justify the means.’’ For example, one participant commented that ‘‘Innocent lives should not be the cost for more power.’’ Eight percent of the responses rejecting the acceptability of civilian casualties argued that steps can be taken to avoid terrorist acts; for example, ‘‘Governments should find ways to combat terrorism

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without involving the population,’’ or ‘‘Alternatives to prevent terrorism should be sought.’’ Others explained that the use of terror is nonsensical, unjustifiable, and that its target is largely unspecified. Definitions of War Colombia’s Civil War is a protracted and complicated conflict that, while evolving through periods of relative quiet to those of significant aggression, has never succeeded in moving to a permanent resolution and a state of complete peace for the country’s citizens. Generations of Colombians have grown up in the shadow of war. Consequently, the significance of the term ‘‘war’’ has likely been contemplated by its citizens. The great majority (86 percent) of our Colombian participants defined war as some sort of state-level phenomenon. Within this classification, the largest group (40 percent of all responses) defined war in classic terms as a state of conflict. For example, war was defined as ‘‘an armed fight between two sides’’ or ‘‘an action to carry out unnecessary conflicts or disputes.’’ Another 20 percent of the responses focused on the outcomes of war, equating it with ‘‘death’’ or ‘‘destruction.’’ Sixteen percent of the responses identified war with its causes, including such disparate motives as ‘‘a fight for ideals’’ and a ‘‘way to impose ideologies.’’ By contrast, 14 percent of the responses reflected more individualistic orientations, generally invoking personal moral judgments (11 percent of the responses) concerning war. For example, war was defined as ‘‘ignorance’’ or ‘‘a conflict in which human life is not a sacred value.’’ Another 3 percent offered emotionally based replies, such as ‘‘horror’’ and ‘‘the worst.’’

COLOMBIAN PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE AND PROTEST Definitions of Peace Within this schema, 23 percent of the responses identified peace with a ‘‘state of tranquility.’’ For example, peace was described as a ‘‘state of serenity and calm,’’ ‘‘tranquility and relaxation,’’ or ‘‘living in tranquility.’’ Other positive definitions of peace as a state of being equated it with the psychological experience of happiness and joy (5 percent) and the experience of living securely (4 percent). Positive social relationships related to peaceful coexistence (4 percent), cooperation (2 percent), and equality (2 percent) between countries, as well as acceptance and reconciliation (4 percent), love (4 percent), and harmony (8 percent) were mentioned. Seventeen percent of Colombian respondents provided negative definitions of peace, explaining it as ‘‘an absence of conflict’’ (13 percent) or the physical experience of ‘‘living without pain’’ (4 percent); in addition,

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several respondents viewed peace as utopian (11 percent) or unattainable (4 percent). Despite strong positive feelings about peace, only 15 percent of the Colombian sample responded affirmatively to the item ‘‘I believe world peace can be achieved.’’ Their sense of peace, then, appears to be of an unattainable ideal, a condition that the country strives toward and people long for but cannot yet obtain. Similar to the Greek God, Orpheus, who was two steps from achieving his ultimate goal when he looked back—the one unallowable condition—and, as a result, was condemned to never find happiness, Colombians often perceive peace within their very reach, only to see it vaporize. That is, talks between warring parties in Colombia occur frequently, deals are often reached, and yet an end to armed conflict eludes Colombians.35 Most recently, President Uribe and the FARC discussed an end to the civil war, albeit with mixed results.36,37 Indeed, each time a new plan, presidency, or shift occurs, Colombians express hope that life is improving and the war will soon end. In 82 percent of their qualitative responses, the Colombian participants indicated doubts about the possibility that world peace could be achieved. Within this group, 34 percent indicated achieving peace depended on the presence of a specific set of conditions, 13 percent stated they were uncertain about peace prospects, and 33 percent soundly denied the possibility. The most frequent reason cited for the impossibility of world peace was that of human nature (13 percent), reflecting the ineptitude of political and diplomatic efforts to negotiate a permanent cease-fire with guerrilla groups, the latter frequently perceived as powerful individuals manipulating a mass of conscripts for personal gain within their own country.38 Typical responses indicated ‘‘Man’s ambition will never end’’ or explained that ‘‘Since the existence of power relationships, there has been interest in the continuation of capitalism.’’ A smaller number, 7 percent, attributed lack of peace to individual differences, and only 3 percent attributed it to state-level forces, indicating ‘‘all countries are corrupt and think unilaterally.’’ Respondents who reported believing in the possibility of peace under specific conditions reflected on the realities of Colombia’s own situation, a fight for wealth and power that provided privilege for a limited number at the cost of many. One person explained, for example, ‘‘If peace can be achieved, the important aspect is to work on a definition of human rights and make evident the power of money and acquisition of those who make decisions; the majority of wars are related to financial gain—the FARC sells drugs, the United States sells arms, Africa sells diamonds and so on. . .’’ Another simply stated that peace is possible ‘‘for a few.’’

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While peace generally appears elusive to Colombians, 63 percent agreed that ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace.’’ The most frequent (22 percent) of these explanations expressed general agreement with the premise, commenting, ‘‘There is no reason to the contrary.’’ Others (14 percent) explained this right in regard to its importance to human growth, commenting, ‘‘We are here to live and enjoy, not to suffer,’’ or ‘‘We all have the right to a tranquil life without pain.’’ Ten percent referred to the right to peace in the context of human rights or divine law, as well. An ideal, rather than a right, describes the perception of 17 percent of Colombian respondents. These individuals recognize the positive aspect of peace, being ‘‘the best’’ or ‘‘the dream we all have’’ yet highlighted related challenges, noting ‘‘it would be ideal; difficult but ideal’’ and ‘‘logical but utopian.’’ Of the 5 percent who disagreed with the idea that peace is a right, forces external to one’s desires were frequently mentioned. Some of these comments related to broader political panoramas, such as ‘‘Worldly interests do not allow life to prosper as it should.’’ Others referred directly to the Colombian situation. For example, one respondent indicated, ‘‘There are rights, but peace will never exist because there are ignorant stationed in the hills who are ruining the country.’’ Protest Perhaps incredibly, Colombia represents one of the oldest democracies in the region. Regarding its elections, all but one have been considered free and fair. Colombians frequently engage in peace marches that are, implicitly, protests against war. Thus, the 77 percent agreement to the item ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace’’ reflects the political action common in Colombia. A very small percentage (4 percent) qualified the right, highlighting the importance that protest is conducted ‘‘in a peaceful manner, otherwise we are being contradictory.’’ CONCLUSION Colombians understand war in a personal way. To some degree, war pervades the daily lives of all Colombians, through loss of loved ones, distance between family members as relatives moved abroad, the inability to travel within their own country for fear of kidnapping, concern about young adult children participating as soldiers in the conflict, or attacks and open fighting announced on the evening news. If civil war can be characterized as a ‘‘contest for political power of long duration and low intensity,’’39 then Colombia’s conflict qualifies. The Colombian

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military, the leftist FARC and ELN, and the right-wing Autodefensas have engaged in various degrees of conflict for the past 40 years. The estimated death toll during the first 10 years of the engagement—La Violencia—accounted for 200,000 deaths, whereas Amnesty International40 estimates another 60,000 Colombians have perished in warrelated conflicts between the years 1985 and 2002. The mortality rate, however, cannot capture the multifaceted aspects—political, personal, social, and economic, to name a few—of living in a country that is actively fighting a civil war. Our current PAIRTAPS responses indicate that Colombians understand the concept of peace in a positive manner. However, they are highly guarded in their hopefulness that it can be obtained. It is likely that the doubtfulness relates to decades of failed attempts at reconciliation in their own civil war. Even strong political actions, such as ceding autonomous territory to leftist guerrillas, have been unable to fulfill the people’s desires for peace in their country. Results also demonstrate that Colombians are overwhelmingly opposed to torture and to the right to kill in the war against terrorism. Colombians are exposed to the death and destruction related to war, including acts of terror and torture, on a daily basis. Their proximity to these harsh realities likely fortifies their solid disagreement with these forms of state aggression. Colombians reported strong, but less vehement, opposition to the right of a government to invade another country. Since Colombia’s government has crossed into the sovereign territory of neighboring nations in the name of fighting against leftist guerrillas (often successfully capturing them), this issue presents a less well-defined scenario in regard to present policies and needs. During the past five or six years, Colombia and Colombians have had reason to hope that, maybe, an agreement between parties could be achieved. Human rights abuses by all parties involved in the conflict have been acknowledged and interest in a cessation of fighting is high, as noted by exchanges between government, right-wing, and left-wing groups. Certainly, the spirit of the pueblo continues to be one that opposes violence and hopes above all hope for a future of an enduring peace.

12

Peru Eros R. DeSouza and Michael J. Stevens

War is . . . ‘‘violence among countries and where many people die’’ (mestiza female, 20). Peace is . . . ‘‘the end of suffering’’ (white female, 30). Terrorism is . . . ‘‘an act that causes terror in the population’’ (mestiza, 18). Although war and peace are the central themes of this book set, this chapter focuses on terrorism because of its greater relevance to Peru’s unique history and current challenges as a nation. In addition, although Peru has engaged its neighbors in wars, we believe that its recent experience with domestic terrorism is more likely to have influenced Peruvians’ views toward war and peace. In many ways, domestic terrorism in Peru may be viewed as both a cause and an effect that influences and is influenced by various contexts in complex ways. Consequently, our purpose is to articulate dynamic processes within systems through an ecological framework. We have structured this chapter into five sections: terrorism, the historical context, the national context, the local context, and lay definitions of war, peace, and terrorism. Thus, we move from broad to narrow descriptions of conditions and forces that set the stage for understanding the contemporary and personal views of Peruvian students toward war, peace, and terrorism. We examine each ecological level separately and together to achieve a holistic understanding of the struggles that the Peruvian people have endured. TERRORISM Before describing the violent struggle between the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the government of Peru during the 1980s and 1990s,

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we must first define terrorism. Next, we identify forms of terrorism perpetrated on Peruvian citizens. Finally, we offer two causal models for understanding terrorism. Definitions of Terrorism Definitions of terrorism can be controversial (e.g., one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter). Attempts to define terrorism often become mired in disagreements about the motives of terrorists, targets of terrorist acts, organization of terrorist groups, and methods that terrorists use and how these can, or cannot, be distinguished from guerilla warfare, revolutionary movements, and crime.1 As a result, no universally accepted definition of terrorism exists. However, two definitions that have gained prominence lay out the broad parameters of terrorism. The U.S. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism supports the definition of terrorism found in the U.S. Code (Title 22, Section 2656f[d]). The following definition has been adopted by the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, and Department of State: The term terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence, perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience or group.

In addition, in 2002 the Counterterrorism Committee of the United Nations General Assembly drafted a definition of terrorism that remains under consideration: The act of destroying or injuring civilian lives or the act of destroying or damaging civilian or government property without the expressly chartered permission of a specific government, thus, by individuals or groups independently or governments on their own accord and belief, in the attempt to effect some political change.

Based on these definitions, terrorism can be construed as premeditated violence, whose nature is political and/or symbolic. It may be enacted directly or by proxy, with the intent of producing harm or damage to instill fear among the general population and, in some instances, to modify a government’s policies.2 In the following section, we identify forms of terrorism that were central to Peru’s 15-year insurgency and counterinsurgency. Forms of Terrorism Experienced in Peru Although different forms of terrorism overlap, two forms are especially relevant to Peru: ideological/political terrorism and state terrorism.

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Both are used to impose change or enforce the status quo. Ideological/ political terrorism involves violence, based on political principles, against allegedly oppressive economic and social systems.3 It presumes the existence of an unjust authority, dissatisfaction with the prevailing order, and influence of external role models.4 State terrorism involves terror perpetrated by a government against its citizens. State terrorism is often more extreme when there is an authoritarian executive, coupled with a weak legislature and judiciary.5 State terrorism brings the full force of law and law enforcement to bear, including the military. The nightmare of ideological/political and state terrorism that Peru endured reflects the country’s long history of systemic oppression based on race and class. Such oppression provides fertile ground for intergroup conflict: the brown races and the poor who seek equality and justice versus the white minority who strive to maintain power and privilege.6 Causal Models of Terrorism Isolated individuals do not commit terrorist acts; individuals are socialized into a culture of terrorism.7 Terrorism is a complex phenomenon embedded in culture, economics, history, politics, and religion. Until recently, accounts of terrorism have been incomplete, emphasizing the personality and psychopathology of the terrorist or the processes that lead to identification with the doctrine and members of a terrorist group.8 These individual factors fail to address the interaction of broad ecological factors that give rise to terrorism. Two exceptions are worth noting: the staircase model and the integrative model.9 Each model serves as a template through which the ideological/political and state terrorism of Peru can be understood. Although the staircase and integrative models are well suited to explain the actions of terrorists who oppose governments, they are less readily applied toward understanding governmental use of terror against its citizens. Moghaddam10 uses the metaphor of a narrowing staircase to articulate how an individual acquires the worldview and action tendencies of a terrorist. The staircase rises from the ground floor of real or perceived oppression and injustice, to the first floor of systematic exclusion from having a voice in society, to the second floor of displacing anger onto an out-group, to the third floor of disengaging from social norms and family, to the fourth floor of joining a terrorist organization and embracing its goals, to the top floor of preparing to commit terrorist acts. Moghaddam argues that effective counterterrorism requires a multilevel approach that remedies unjust conditions at their source (e.g., nurturing democratic movements). Post et al.11 offer a model to explain how an ideological/political group can evolve from radicalism to terrorism. The model stresses the

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interaction of individual differences and environmental conditions. Post et al. cluster 32 variables predictive of terrorism into four interacting fields: (1) external factors (e.g., historical and cultural); (2) key actors (e.g., government leaders, constituents, and supporters); (3) the characteristics, structure, and processes of the group (e.g., leadership style, decision making, experience with violence, ideology, and goals); and (4) the immediate situation (e.g., triggering events). Post et al. propose that the interaction among the four fields provides a basis for predicting terrorist acts. In the following sections of Peru’s historical, national, and local contexts, we apply the staircase and integrative models of terrorism to the Shining Path and the violent government counterinsurgency. In doing so, we offer a meaningful framework with which to understand the diverse sources for the domestic terrorism of the 1980s and 1990s: chronic racial, economic, and gender-based oppression and injustice. This legacy of oppression and injustice is key to understanding Peruvian students’ definitions of war, peace, and terrorism, and reinforces the importance of adopting an ecological framework to gain an appreciation of events that have left their mark on contemporary Peru.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT This section begins with current facts about Peru, followed by its history, including international conflicts. Finally, it examines gender roles. Peru (a western South American country about the size of Alaska) has a population of 28 million, with Indians making up approximately 45 percent of the population and about 20 percent of the entire indigenous population of North and South America; the rest of Peru’s population consists of mestizos (i.e., people of mixed Indian and white ancestry; 37 percent), whites (15 percent), and individuals of African and Asian ancestry (3 percent).12 Spanish and indigenous Quechua are the official languages. Catholicism is the predominant religion (81 percent of the population), blended with Indian religious customs in rural areas.13 The per capita income is approximately U.S. $6,000, with nearly 5 percent of families earning more than 25 percent of the total per capita income; 54 percent live in poverty, most of whom are Indian or mestizo.14 Peru continues to have an ‘‘Indian problem’’ manifested by regional tensions between the coast (white and affluent) and interior (indigenous and poor).15 Though a numerical majority, Indians and mestizos remain marginalized economically, politically, and socially by a powerful white minority.16

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Colonial Legacy One of the earliest clashes between Western and indigenous civilizations was the Spanish conquest and colonization of Peru, which left a legacy of racism and classism, oppression and injustice, as well as violence.17 By the 15th century, the Incas controlled territory from northern Ecuador through the middle of Chile.18 Francisco Pizarro explored Peru’s coast in the early 1500s, defeated Inca emperor Atahualpa in 1533, and founded the city of Lima in 1535. Although the last major Inca rebellion was crushed in 1572, uprisings continued episodically. In the 18th century, there were 14 uprisings; one of the fiercest was that of T upac Amaru in 1780.19 Pizarro and the Viceroyalty of Peru administered the encomienda, or land ‘‘grant’’ given by the Spanish king to the conquistadores, or conquerors.20 It gave near-absolute authority to Spanish landlords while the king held title to the land. Indians were forced to raise crops, cattle, and poultry for their landlords. Landlords further profited because they were allowed to pay less tribute to Spain if they converted Indians to Christianity.21 Cities became the focus of white domination and the power of the Catholic Church.22 In addition to being stripped of their land, religion, and freedom, Indians fell victim to alcohol and Western diseases.23 A census taken by the last Quipucamayoc, or Inca accountants, showed 12 million Incas living in Peru; less than 50 years later, the Inca population fell to 1,100,000.24 Such sharp decline shows the devastation that Spanish rule visited upon the indigenous population.25 Foreign Influences and International Conflicts Foreigners have played a significant role in Peru’s history. Peru’s independence from Spain in 1821 was achieved by Venezuelan Simon Bolivar and Argentine Jose de San Martin, who led landowners and their militias against the Spanish Viceroyalty.26 With Peru’s emancipation and the establishment of a republic, the criollos, or Spanish children born in Peru, became the new economic, political, and social elite, maintaining power for most of Peru’s history with the support of Western countries, including the United States, which coveted Peruvian agriculture, fisheries, mines, and industry.27 The self-serving ruling class, coupled with exploitive foreign interests, reinforced an export-dependent economy and attendant inequalities. Peru has also been embroiled in territorial disputes with its neighbors. The War of the Pacific (1879–1883) pitted Chile against Bolivia and Peru. Chile won and annexed the cities of Arica and Tacna, which were prized for their nitrate.28 The United States arbitrated the dispute, awarding Arica to Chile and Tacna to Peru, in violation of the original referendum guaranteeing self-determination.29 Peru went to war with

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Ecuador over border disputes in the 1940s and 1990s, with the United States playing a key role in the 1998 peace accord signed in Brasilia, Brazil.30 Although our focus constrains us from tracing the relationship between Peru and the United States, the relationship is summarized by an adage attributed to John F. Kennedy: ‘‘An embrace for the democrat, a handshake for the dictator.’’31 This adage acknowledges willingness by the U.S. government to cooperate with authoritarian regimes on economic and national security matters, despite disagreements about human rights. Sexism: Marianismo and Machismo Racism and classism have a long and violent history in Peru. Sexism can be added to these systemic forms of oppression and injustice and are included in our ecological approach to understanding Peruvian perspectives on war, peace, and terrorism. Although gender roles are becoming more relaxed with the diversification of family structure and changing status of women,32 Peru remains a patriarchal society in which women and men subscribe to the gender scripts of marianismo and machismo. Based on the Virgin Mary, marianismo is defined by the self-sacrificing woman, who is submissive and a ‘‘good’’ mother and wife;33 she is the mujer sufrida (suffering woman). In Peru, the status of women tends to increase with age, with older women having access to more resources, power to make decisions, and freedom to move about. Young women are viewed as having little importance.34 Machismo is characterized by exaggerated masculine attributes and behaviors, including great physical strength and courage, capacity for drinking alcohol, and virility; such hypermasculine men shun all aspects of female roles and activities.35 There is a near monopoly by Peruvian men over the public domain (i.e., economic and political life), as well as within the family;36 thus, a married man should be obeyed by his wife and children, because he is the family patriarch (we elaborate on this theme in the section on local context—patriarchal violence in the family). However, gender roles vary in Peru, depending on such factors as region and social class. In urban areas, where men usually have salaried jobs, there is a distinction between the public and domestic arenas; having wives to rear their children and maintain their home signifies socioeconomic success.37 In rural areas, where work centers on agriculture, the division of labor is less rigid, because women must contribute economically.38 Summary The colonial legacy of violence, racism, sexism, and economic exploitation, coupled with the hegemony of the Catholic Church, established inequality and exclusion in virtually all spheres of Peruvian society.39 The

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institutionalization of regional (i.e., coast versus highlands), racial, and cultural disparities drove an economic, political, and social wedge between criollos and Indians, whose labor generated enormous wealth for the ruling class. Peru’s colonial legacy conforms to the ground and first floors of the staircase model, which set prerequisites for the emergence of terrorism; the Inca rebellion against the ruling elite reflects a key element of the second floor: displacement of anger onto an outgroup.40 Peru’s colonial heritage also fits with the external field of the interactive model, which identifies historical and normative contexts that combine with other factors to predict terrorism.41 Notwithstanding some progressive laws and policies aimed at restoring the rights and territory of Indians, racial and gender discrimination persists, and precipitated demands for a nondiscrimination provision in the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement.42 Peru’s colonial legacy and ensuing oppression and injustice have contributed to its recent history of sociopolitical instability, including domestic terrorism.

THE NATIONAL CONTEXT Violence, ineffective government, and economic crises fill Peru’s national landscape. The late 19th century through the mid-20th century saw elected governments and military regimes frequently replacing each other.43 Since gaining independence, Peru has had 13 constitutions, 26 successful coups, and 108 governments; of these, only 19 were elected and only 9 of which completed their terms.44 Through the 1960s, much of the population—mostly rural, poor, and Indian—was denied the rights of citizenship; universal suffrage was introduced only in 1980.45 The political pattern involved short-term, self-interested, concentrated executive power, political intrigue and corruption among the elite, and socioeconomic tensions within the population erupting in periodic crises for both democratic and dictatorial governments. Peru’s weak democratic and civil institutions, organized drug trafficking, and erratic export-oriented economy produced one of the most unequal distributions of wealth and levels of sociopolitical exclusion in Latin America, giving rise to domestic terrorism.46 Political Parties Peru’s political parties have been weak and fragmented, with only one party providing consistent leadership: Alianza Popular Revolutionaria Americana (APRA, American Popular Revolutionary Alliance). Since the mid-20th century, APRA, a left-wing party, has espoused anti-imperialism,

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pan-Americanism, and economic nationalism.47 APRA and the Peruvian Communist Party were the first to address Peru’s festering socioeconomic problems. The democratic governments of this time identified themselves with the middle-class and mestizo population.48 Military regimes also adopted a more progressive agenda than their predecessors.49 The latest period of military rule (1968–1980) aimed at redistributing unequal land ownership in the Andes and nationalizing industries; the first military regime of the era promoted peasants’ rights, including recognition of Quechua as a national language. However, successive military governments tempered economic and social reforms, gradually restoring the oligarchy to political preeminence. The mid-20th century also featured antagonism between civilian and military governments, revealing a political norm characterized by unwillingness to resolve conflict through negotiation or compromise in the face of growing social problems.50 This combative governing style eroded public trust and support, essential elements of an open and stable society. For example, President Bustamante y Rivero, elected with APRA support, tried unsuccessfully to curtail the power of the military and elite class. Conversely, after a military coup, General Manuel Odria limited the activities of APRA, along with civil liberties generally. By 1985, Peru faced a critical mass of crises, or, according to the integrative model, an immediate situation that triggered the violent insurgency of the Shining Path: massive foreign debt, endemic racism and poverty, organized drug trafficking, and a military ill-prepared for domestic terrorism.51 Domestic Terrorism Ironically, 1980—when Peru returned to democracy after 12 years of military rule—marked the birth of the Shining Path, a terrorist group based in the Andes whose leaders were university elites and whose followers were largely students.52 Rondon estimated that 40 percent of all Shining Path members were women; they lived ‘‘for the party and the war only’’ and participated fully in terrorist violence.53 These women chose roles very different from the culturally sanctioned role of sacrificial wife and mother. Rondon suggested that endemic sexism and limited opportunity to determine the course of their lives made the ideology of the Shining Path appealing to women, even though they were better educated than their male counterparts. The Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrine of the Shining Path had one goal: the annihilation of the capitalist state. Like Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge, the Shining Path envisioned depopulating cities, indoctrinating the citizenry, and creating a socialist society reminiscent of Peru’s

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glorious past.54 It initially co-opted Indian peasants with its appeal to their Inca past, but its demand for total obedience and brutality toward anyone who resisted failed to garner broad support among Peru’s poor majority.55 For 15 years until the capture and life imprisonment of its charismatic leader, Abimael Guzm an, the Shining Path disrupted the political process and left widespread physical and psychological carnage. The indiscriminant killing of poor peasants by the Shining Path and the violent counterinsurgency by the military precipitated a mass migration to cities, especially Lima.56 However, refugee settlements were not safe because of the hostility toward and marginalization of indigenous people, who even today are often pejoratively called cholos, or simple-minded Indian peasants. The Shining Path also mounted deadly attacks in Lima, setting fire to factories and detonating bombs near government buildings and malls in upscale neighborhoods; particularly gruesome was the murder and subsequent use of dynamite to obliterate the body of Maria Elena Moyano, a black activist who opposed the Shining Path.57 Resistance to the Shining Path also took place within communities in the rural interior. It is important to mention that Catholics and Evangelicals often defended human rights and provided rural peasants, as well as the urban poor, with a network of support in their struggle to organize themselves and maintain their communities.58 Many communities formed peasant-defense patrols, called rondas campesinas, to resist the Shining Path. Serving in these patrols was a civic duty, inspired by biblical solidarity: ‘‘in times of war, violence in the defense of the faith is not a sin.’’59 Another insurgency that terrorized Peru was the Movimiento Revolutionario T upac Amaru (MRTA, T upac Amaru Revolutionary Movement), which was launched in 1983 and named after anticolonial leader, T upac Amaru.60 Like the Shining Path, MRTA was founded by intellectuals but was centered in cities and inspired by Castro’s Cuba. MRTA specialized in attacks on U.S. representatives and corporations and the extortion of money from businesses. Several conditions aided these violent insurgencies.61 In the early 1980s, an El Ni~ no weather pattern triggered flooding in some areas, droughts in others, and crippled the fishing industry. Peru’s economy was further weakened by hyperinflation, precipitating the country’s isolation from the world banking community; by 1990, the per capita annual income fell to $720, below that of 1960. During this time, emergency zones covered nearly 33 percent of the country’s provinces and over 50 percent of the population, and included the suspension of civil liberties by the government and increasing violence by the military.

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Concerned about the economy, terrorism, and corruption, voters elected a relatively unknown mathematician, Alberto Fujimori, as president in 1990. Facing opposition to his effort to reform the economy, Fujimori dissolved congress in 1992 and redrew the constitution in 1993, which consolidated power in the executive, established a smaller legislature, and reduced the size and autonomy of the judiciary.62 A terrified society acquiesced, allowing Fujimori to seek an unprecedented third term. The 2000 elections were so corrupt that Fujimori was forced to resign, faxing his resignation from Japan. Fujimori remained in exile until detained while visiting Chile in 2005. He was extradited to Peru in 2007 and convicted of ordering illegal search and seizure operations, for which he received a six-year prison sentence. Fujimori is currently being tried for human rights violations. Fujimori’s legacy was the erosion of democratic institutions. He engaged in dictablanda or democradura, soft dictatorship or hard democracy. His government exemplified Peru’s political tradition: concentration of power, authoritarian exercise of power, and confrontation to resolve conflict.63 According to Mor on and Sanborn, ‘‘Peru’s profound social and economic inequalities have long served to sustain this dynamic and to debilitate the kind of mass-based parties and civil society organization that could effectively challenge it.’’64 The capture in 1992 of Shining Path leader Guzman and the deaths in 1996 of MRTA terrorists who overran the Japanese embassy in Lima largely put an end to domestic terrorism in Peru, although there has been a modest reemergence of a less ideologically virulent Shining Path, now trafficking in narcotics in the impoverished highlands, against which current president Alan Garcia has introduced a counterterrorism strategy that combines military and police action with education, health, and infrastructure development. Years of terrorism and the violent counterinsurgency wounded the psyche of the Peruvian, especially indigenous, people. Overall, 75 percent of the dead and disappeared spoke Quechua or another indigenous language and lived in rural areas,65 revealing the underlying racism and classism of Peru’s ideological/political and state terrorism. In the counterinsurgency, Indian peasants became identified as terrorists, even though many resisted the Shining Path.66 Thus, ‘‘the war [against the Indians by the Shining Path and the military] was experienced as a ‘cultural revolution’—as an attack against cultural practices and the very meaning of what it is to live as a human being in these villages.’’67 In 2003, Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission reported to then President Alejandro Toledo on the causes and consequences of terrorism and the counterinsurgency. The Commission reflected the country’s desire to confront its violent past and promote peace through

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transparency and dialogue.68 The Commission concluded that nearly 70,000 people died or ‘‘disappeared’’ in the terrorist violence and estimated that the Shining Path murdered about half of all victims and that the military was responsible for the deaths of another third. In a bid to promote national healing, the Toledo government agreed to consider the Commission’s recommendation that human rights violators be tried and that the government indemnify segments of the population who suffered the most, chiefly Indians and mestizos in Andean villages. In Ayacucho, a region that suffered 40 percent of all who died and disappeared, the ‘‘terrorist’’ was often a relative, friend, acquaintance, or neighbor, as villagers formed armed patrols to cleanse their communities of Shining Path sympathizers. The reconciliation of violence by civilians against one another will require more than laws safeguarding human rights and strengthening democratic institutions, to which Peru’s post-Fujimori governments appear committed; it will require years of dialogue and the restoration of trust within local communities.69 Summary It is easy to see the higher floors of the staircase model of terrorism reflected in the formation and activities of the Shining Path: rage directed at the criollo elite and its government for injustices based on entrenched racism, classism, and sexism (second floor); rejection of social norms, such as marianismo, by educated women who joined the Shining Path as well as conventional methods for pursuing economic, political, and social change (third floor); indoctrination in an ideology of violence to achieve a utopian state (fourth floor); and desensitization and ultimate willingness to commit atrocities for the sake of the Shining Path or government and their distinct visions of the future (fifth floor).70 The integrative model of terrorism illuminates the role of key players (e.g., the messianic Guzm an and the bland father figure of Fujimori, the acquiescent general population) and critical elements of the Shining Path and Peru’s government (e.g., hierarchical authority revealed in Guzm an’s absolute power based on Maoist ideology coupled with the violent destruction of civil society and Fujimori’s concentration of executive power and authoritarian decision-making style that emphasized confrontation over dialogue) in setting the stage for the emergence of political/ideological terrorism and state terrorism. Although the economy is doing well now (e.g., growing more than 4 percent per year with a stable exchange rate and low inflation), unemployment, poverty, and crime remain high; thus, unremitting social inequalities maintain the conditions for a terrorist resurgence and/or a return to authoritarian regimes, from either the political left or right.71

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Recognizing this, Peru has sought to preempt violent social unrest through economic integration and political representation.72 For example, Peru is a member of the Andean Community, a free-trade alliance with Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador. Peru is also an associate member of Mercosur, a South American customs union whose aim is to expand the transnational movement of capital, goods, services, and peoples. Finally, Peru has bilateral relationships with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum and European Union designed to establish global ties in trade, training, and security. The movement toward economic integration reflects the government’s belief that economic stability and growth, specifically the reduction of poverty through the expansion of jobs, are prerequisites to a lasting peace in Peru.73 Politically, Peru has sought greater political stability in two unprecedented ways.74 The Toledo government advocated the Acuerdo Nacional, or National Agreement, a consensus among all political parties on an overarching national agenda that would survive presidential terms and made cabinet-level appointments from across the political spectrum. As we have suggested, racial and gender discrimination, political exclusion and economic exploitation, a norm of resolving disagreement through the abuse of power, and the violent destruction of civil society contribute to an understanding of contemporary attitudes toward war, peace, and terrorism in Peru. Before we articulate Peruvian attitudes toward war, peace, and terrorism, we examine links between the factors just mentioned and selected features of the local context of Peru: individual empowerment and interactions within the family.

THE LOCAL CONTEXT Past and present oppression in Peru contributes to violence at the local and individual level. For example, although Peru’s constitution recognizes equality under the law, including protection from family violence, and Peru passed legislation in 2003 protecting workers against sexual harassment, Peruvian women still face hurdles.75 Many women are not empowered to resist unwanted sex or avoid unwanted pregnancies and unsafe illegal abortions because of limited access to sex education, contraception, and abortion.76 The Center for Reproductive Rights has documented violations of women’s reproductive rights in Peru. Women have been abused by health care workers (e.g., denying an abortion to a woman carrying an encephalic fetus in defiance of the law and forcing her to feed the infant for two days until its death), involuntarily sterilized on the basis of race, and denied access to prenatal and postnatal health care. Such evidence has been critical in finding the government

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responsible for reproductive rights violations and in developing safeguards to protect women. In 2003, the government admitted culpability in the death of Mamerita Mestanza, whose sterilization was coerced, agreeing to punish those responsible, pay damages to the family, and mandate informed consent to sterilization.77 Although Peru’s recently enacted law against sexual harassment has been welcomed, legislation and policies designed to prevent sexual harassment are hollow if they are not enforced. In countries like Peru, where women are viewed as unequal to men, antiharassment laws and policies may conflict with entrenched values and customs; thus, the motivation to enforce such laws and policies is often weak.78 The extent of sexual harassment in Peru is unknown, for there are no readily available data. We speculate that it is high, especially among poor indigenous women, many of whom work as cooks, maids, or nannies for urban white or mestizo middle- and upper-class families. Due to low pay, hence economic dependency on the host family (e.g., ‘‘free’’ housing), and close proximity to family members, these women are at risk of being harassed sexually behind closed doors. Patriarchal Violence in the Family The family is perhaps Peru’s most violent system at the local level. This is not surprising, given Peru’s legacy of sociopolitical violence. Such violence is closely linked to domestic violence.79 For instance, Gonzales de Olarte and Gaviano Llosa (1999) conducted a study with a sample of women in metropolitan Lima and found that 88 percent reported having experienced some type of domestic violence, especially among poor women. Thus, poverty is an important risk factor for domestic violence. In a national study of Peruvian women aged 15 to 49, 39 percent reported having experienced physical abuse (e.g., being pushed, shaken, or attacked) by a male partner.80 Flake suggests that such abuse may be even higher, because some women may deny, minimize, or underreport it. Flake found that violence in their upbringing (e.g., witnessing father hitting mother or being abused by a parent) predicted future abuse by a male partner. Thus, interpersonal violence is modeled from one generation to the next. In a cross-cultural study with representative national samples from Colombia, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Peru, Flake and Forste found that Peru had the highest rate of partner violence (39 percent).81 Partner alcohol use significantly increased a woman’s likelihood of being assaulted. In Peru, women whose partners sometimes got drunk and those whose partners were frequently drunk were twice and nine times, respectively, more likely to be abused by intoxicated

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partners than women whose partners never got drunk.82 This finding is related to the earlier discussion of machismo, which characterized ‘‘real’’ men as heavy drinkers. In addition, Peruvian women who engaged in decision-making responsibilities (e.g., women having sole authority to make decisions in all or in gender-related domains) were at a greater risk to experience domestic violence than women who did not engage in decision making.83 Again, marianismo and machismo may explain these findings: Peruvian men are expected to head the household and make decisions for the entire family. Similarly, Peruvian women with more education than their male partners had a higher probability of being abused than women with comparable or less education than their partners. Because traditional gender roles dictate that Peruvian men be superior to women, some men may feel threatened by their partners’ greater education. Overall, these findings suggest that women who challenge the patriarchal power structure by having more responsibilities or status than their male partners are at greater risk for being abused than more traditional women. Recall that many women who joined the Shining Path were well educated, perhaps seeking empowerment because they were denied such opportunities within the conservative communities of the interior highlands.84 In another cross-cultural study conducted in 15 sites within 10 countries (Bangladesh, Brazil, Ethiopia, Japan, Namibia, Peru, Samoa, SerbiaMontenegro, Tanzania, and Thailand), Garcia-Moreno, Jansen, Ellsberg, Heise, and Watts reported that women in Cusco (a city in the Peruvian Andes) had the highest lifetime prevalence of physical partner violence (61 percent), followed by women in Lima (49 percent); in fact, women in Cusco had the highest rate of severe physical violence (49 percent) of all the sites surveyed.85 Women in Peru also had one of the highest lifetime prevalence rates for sexual partner violence (47 percent in Cusco and 23 percent in Lima). Moreover, Peru had one of the highest proportions of women reporting both physical and sexual partner abuse (69 percent in Cusco and 51 percent in Lima). Regardless of locality, most acts of partner violence reflected a pattern of ongoing abuse. In keeping with the discussion of marianismo and machismo, male control over female behavior is normative in Peru, with women who experience partner abuse being significantly more likely to have severe constraints placed on their physical and social mobility than women who have not experienced partner abuse.86 Often, women are further victimized when they seek help from authorities because the laws are biased against women (e.g., they favor conciliation over prosecution), the police are often unresponsive and ineffective, and medical examinations are typically cursory and inadequate.87

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Summary Continued sexual harassment, partner abuse, violation of women’s reproductive rights, and weak protective laws with indifferent enforcement mirror women’s continued unequal footing in Peruvian society and cultural valuing of gender scripts framed by marianismo and machismo. Notwithstanding the growing flexibility of gender roles and the changing status of women, women in Peru, especially poor women and women of color, remain under the control of men and disempowered.88 As mentioned earlier, pervasive sexism and limited opportunity to take control of their lives led some well-educated women to join the Shining Path and willingly engage in terrorist acts.89 Real and perceived injustice based on sexism and the exclusion of women from having a voice in society represent the ground and first floors of the staircase model of terrorism, respectively, laying the groundwork for social unrest, as well as the external field of the integrative model, in which historical and cultural realities combine with other factors to radicalize the disempowered.90

LAY DEFINITIONS OF WAR, PEACE, AND TERRORISM We anticipated that the terror inflicted by the Shining Path and the violence of the governmental counterinsurgency would still influence Peruvians’ lay definitions of war, peace, and terrorism. Thus, in 2006, we conducted a study with 288 college students recruited from five universities in metropolitan Lima, Peru. Of these, 62 percent were women. The age for the total sample averaged 21.62 years and ranged from 17 to 54. Most students reported themselves to be mestizo/a (72 percent) or white (20 percent), raised Roman Catholic (93 percent), and from a middle-class (55 percent) or upper-middle class (25 percent) background. During class time, students completed several measures, in Spanish, that reflected quantitative and qualitative approaches to the investigation of beliefs about war, peace, and terrorism. Our chapter focuses exclusively on the analysis of students’ personal definitions of war, peace, and terrorism. First, students’ definitions were unitized. A unit is an independent and complete idea that may consist of a word, phrase, or sentence. Next, we developed core themes and categories. We then coded each unit under one and only one thematic category. Table 12.1 shows the 22 categories that thematically summarize students’ definitions of war, along with a description and verbatim example of each category, the number of units or ideas as well as the percentage of all ideas about war that fit within each category. We

216

State of dispute, disharmony, instability, or disagreement Hostility, fighting, combat, or violence To kill, murder, or slaughter Destruction and destroying

Conflict

Violation of human rights or human dignity, injustice, or inequality Chaos and disorder Absence of a characteristic, such as lack of peace, of union, or of altruism Bad, wrong, or immoral

Injustice

Evil

Chaos Lack of positive qualities

Hatred

Misfortune

Pain

Panic, anxiety, being tense, fear, and sadness Inflicting suffering, pain, torment, or bodily injury Misfortune, poverty, hunger, or tragedy/disaster Hate, resentment, or holding a grudge

Negative affect

Death Destruction

Aggression

Description

Category

Table 12.1 Peruvian Students’ Definitions of War

Evil that should end

10

12 11

2.30%

2.76% 2.53%

3.00%

13

Disorganization Lack of altruism

3.23%

14

Moments of indiscriminate hatred that countries and people go through Violation of rights

3.46%

4.15%

5.76%

13.36% 6.91%

16.59%

19.59%

Percentage

15

18

25

58 30

72

85

Units

Economic and human poverty

Injury, pain

Where many innocents die Destruction at every level between two or more countries or inside one country Fear in a city or town

Time or state of conflict between states, groups, or societies Violence between countries

Verbatim Example

217

Self-interest, selfishness, ambition, or egoism Describing war as an alternative solution or method of resolution War as irrational or illogical

War as unnecessary or that it should be stopped or eliminated Misunderstanding or poor communication Regression, disintegration, or loss Insecurity and uncertainty War as a means that a country or individual uses for self-defense or to defend an ideology Control, domination, and imposition Does not fit into any of the above categories or meaning could not be determined

Selfishness

Unnecessary

Miscellaneous/ Uncodeable

Power

Insecurity Defense

Regression

Misunderstanding

Irrational

Solution

Description

Category

Table 12.1 (Continued)

3 17

There are no words to describe it

4 3

5

5

Imposition of an ideology

Backward movement, underdevelopment Everyone is insecure Defending public and political interests

Lack of communication

7

8

9

The worst of solutions

The most irrational form of being human Something that should be ended in this world

10

Units

Selfishness

Verbatim Example

3.92%

0.69%

0.92% 0.69%

1.15%

1.15%

1.61%

1.84%

2.07%

2.30%

Percentage

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labeled the last category ‘‘miscellaneous/uncodeable’’ to denote responses that did not fit within any of the other 21 categories or that were unclear. Nineteen students did not respond. For the remaining students who provided a definition of war (n = 269), there were 434 units or ideas about war (note that a student could express more than one independent and complete idea). Table 12.1 shows that the most frequent thematic category is ‘‘Conflict,’’ comprising almost 20 percent of all ideas on war. These students perceived conflict as a precipitating factor of war. Thus, when nations or groups within society find that their collective goals are frustrated or interfered with, conflict may emerge, with war as a possible consequence. The following statement exemplifies the theme of conflict: ‘‘conflicts that exist that turn into armed actions.’’ The second most frequent thematic category is ‘‘Aggression,’’ comprising nearly 17 percent of all ideas on war. Many students equated war with physical aggression or violence perpetrated by nations or by groups within a nation, as illustrated by the quote: ‘‘violence in which people are attacked.’’ The third most frequent thematic category is ‘‘Death,’’ comprising slightly more than 13 percent of all ideas on war. Thus, loss of life is an outcome of war, as indicated by the reference to ‘‘innocent deaths.’’ Each of the remaining 19 categories contains less than 10 percent of all ideas on war. For example, approximately 3 percent or fewer of all ideas linked war to intergroup ‘‘Hatred’’ or described war as ‘‘Evil,’’ ‘‘Irrational,’’ or ‘‘Unnecessary.’’ A miniscule percentage of ideas portrayed war in somewhat positive terms, as evidenced by the categories ‘‘Solution,’’ ‘‘Defense,’’ and ‘‘Power.’’ Overall, the findings show that the most frequent thematic categories on war reflect a state of discord between peoples or nations, followed by aggression and loss of life. Table 12.2 shows the 19 categories that thematically summarize students’ definitions of peace, along with a description and verbatim example of each category, the number of units or ideas about peace that fit within each category as well as the percentage of all ideas about peace that fit within each category. Again, we labeled the last category ‘‘miscellaneous/uncodeable’’ to denote responses that did not fit into any of the other 18 categories or that were unclear. Fifteen students did not respond at all. For the remaining students (n = 273), there were 416 units or ideas about peace. Table 12.2 shows that the most frequent thematic category is ‘‘Tranquility,’’ constituting slightly more than 28 percent of all ideas on peace. An illustrative statement is: ‘‘tranquility for all.’’ The next most frequent category is ‘‘Harmony,’’ constituting slightly more than 19 percent of all ideas on peace. A sample quote is ‘‘to live in harmony.’’

State of equilibrium or stability

Absence of a negative characteristic, such as a lack of war, of pain, or of conflict Ideal values, utopia, or dreams Positive feelings and enjoyment Overall physical and/or mental well-being or health Love or devotion to others Related to family, friendships, fraternity, or other positive relationships Tolerance, acceptance, or co-existence with others Respect between countries or individuals Related to unity or a bond between people Equal rights, fairness, or justice

Harmony

Lack of negative qualities

Life

Equality

Union

Respect

Tolerance

Love Positive relationships

Related to life and being able to live

State of calmness

Tranquility

Ideal Happiness Well-being

Description

Category

Table 12.2 Peruvian Students’ Definitions of Peace

Union of all individuals and peoples Equality for all, without discrimination Life, to be able to live

Tolerance between two people, countries, or entities Respect between people

An ideal state, a utopia, a dream Happy people State of mental, physical, and social well-being Love among all Friendship

To live in tranquility with yourself and others Harmony between members of a community (family, city, country) Absence of tensions of any type

Verbatim Example

(Continued)

1.44%

2.16%

9 6

2.64%

2.64%

11 11

3.37%

4.09% 3.37%

7.45% 5.53% 5.05%

7.69%

19.23%

28.37%

Percentage

14

17 14

31 23 21

32

80

118

Units

Being safe Autonomy, freedom, or liberty Development, progress, improvement, or production

Related to positive communication, discussion, or conversation Related to God, spirituality, or religion Does not fit into any of the above categories or meaning could not be determined

Security Freedom Progress

Communication

Miscellaneous/ Uncodeable

God

Description

Category

Table 12.2 (Continued)

The better weapon to utilize

God

Security Freedom State in which the interpersonal relations allow the optimum development of people Resolution of conflicts through dialogue

Verbatim Example

7

1.68%

0.72%

0.72%

3

3

1.44% 1.20% 1.20%

Percentage

6 5 5

Units

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Each of the remaining 17 categories represents less than 10 percent of all ideas on peace. For example, less than 8 percent of all ideas portray peace as an ‘‘Ideal,’’ and even fewer ideas reflect ‘‘Tolerance,’’ ‘‘Respect,’’ ‘‘Equality,’’ or ‘‘Communication.’’ Overall, the findings show that the most frequent thematic categories on peace reflect a state of calm and accord between people(s), nations, or groups, and that students’ definitions of peace are largely opposite of their definitions of war. Table 12.3 shows the seven categories that thematically summarize students’ definitions of terrorism, along with a description and verbatim example of each category, the number of units or ideas as well as the percentage of all ideas about terrorism that fit within each category. Here, too, we labeled the last category ‘‘miscellaneous/uncodeable’’ to denote responses that did not fit into any of the other six categories or whose meaning was unclear. Twenty-five students did not respond at all. For the remaining students (n = 263), there were 316 units or ideas about terrorism. Table 12.3 shows that the most frequent thematic category is ‘‘Destruction/violence,’’ comprising almost 39 percent of all ideas on terrorism. For these students, terrorists are politically motivated to inflict harm and instill fear in a population through destructive and/or violent acts, as exemplified by the quote ‘‘an act of destruction and death that is meant to put fear into the people of that nation, government, or group.’’ This category is very similar to three of the categories for war, namely, ‘‘Aggression,’’ ‘‘Death,’’ and ‘‘Destruction’’ (see Table 12.1). With respect to war, students tended to describe its outcomes in concrete terms (e.g., death); however, in the case of terrorism they focused on the goals and intentions of terrorists’ violent acts to undermine democracy and peace. Again, these categories diametrically oppose the peace categories of ‘‘Tranquility’’ and ‘‘Harmony’’ (see Table 12.2). The second most frequent category is ‘‘Ideology is completely wrong (negative view),’’ representing slightly more than 30 percent of all ideas on terrorism. It highlights the relevance of ideological/political terrorism for Peruvian students. These students strongly disapproved of terrorists’ ideologies and terrorist acts based on such ideologies, as reflected in the statement: ‘‘threats and actions against others fueled by an insane belief that your god wants you to do these heinous atrocities.’’ This category shares elements of several categories for war, including ‘‘Injustice,’’ ‘‘Lack of positive qualities,’’ ‘‘Evil,’’ and ‘‘Irrational’’ (see Table 12.1). Like war, many students viewed terrorism as an immoral violation of fundamental human rights and having no justification or redeeming features. In addition, the terrorism category of ‘‘Ideology is completely wrong’’ sharply contrasts the peace categories

Motivation or focus of terrorism on causing fear, harm, including death, or a movement against democracy/peace Completely opposed to use of terrorism as an ideological tool Somewhat mistaken, misguided, inadequate actions Terrorism is an ideological tool to achieve positive change or to protest against oppression Terrorism as a result of negative emotions Social, economic, or political conditions as contributing factors Does not fit into any of the above categories or meaning could not be determined

Destruction/violence

Miscellaneous/ Uncodeable

Negative environmental conditions

Negative affect

Ideology is completely wrong (negative view) Ideology gone ‘‘wrong’’ (ambivalent) Ideological (positive view)

Description

Category

Table 12.3 Peruvian Students’ Definitions of Terrorism

8

7

Social problems that cause destruction Sounds like Peru

25

People who fight for idealism

12

45

A good cause with mistaken ways

Frustration

96

123

Units

Bad belief or ideology to acquire something

Violent armed acts toward a group of people or enemies

Verbatim Example

2.22%

2.53%

3.80%

7.91%

14.24%

30.38%

38.92%

Percentage

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of ‘‘Ideal’’ and ‘‘Tolerance,’’ which point to utopian values and coexistence with others, respectively (see Table 12.2). The third most frequent category was ‘‘Ideology gone ‘wrong’ (ambivalent),’’ constituting slightly more than 14 percent of all ideas on terrorism and underscoring again the meaningfulness of ideological/ political forms of terrorism. These students displayed a more reserved, even accommodating stance toward terrorism. Their criticisms of terrorism were substantially milder than those expressed by the category on terrorism just described. Although students opposed the methods used by terrorists as misguided, mistaken, or improper, they deemed the ideology underlying terrorism to have some merit, as conveyed by the assertion: ‘‘inadequate mechanism of manifesting a political position.’’ Each of the remaining four categories contains less than 10 percent of all ideas on terrorism. It is interesting that a minority of students viewed terrorism as a tool of protest against oppressive regimes to promote social change, that is, ‘‘Ideological (positive view)’’ and even fewer linked terrorism to oppressive structural conditions, that is, ‘‘Negative environmental conditions.’’ Overall, these findings show that the most frequent thematic categories on terrorism bear some similarity to the definitions of war, suggesting that, to a degree, Peruvian students view terrorism as a form of war. It is not surprising that the thematic categories on terrorism are contrary to students’ definitions of peace. The findings also indicate that Peruvian students see terrorism as an expression of political ideology, toward which their attitudes range from mostly abhorrence and disapproval to slightly accepting and approving. Such a broad spectrum of viewpoints is consistent with the diversity of perspectives toward terrorism held by U.S. samples.91 Peruvian students’ definitions of terrorism overlap substantially with standard definitions of terrorism found in the U.S. code and adopted by the United Nations in that they incorporate intentional violence and ideological/political goals. However, the former tend to overlook the external field of the interactive model of terrorism, which addresses the historical and normative contexts of this phenomenon, as well as the ground and first floors of the staircase model of terrorism, which put down the groundwork for terrorism as structural forms of injustice.92 Although our findings are informative, the sample is one of convenience, consisting of relatively affluent college students from Lima. Hence, the findings should not be generalized to Peruvians in the rural interior highlands, most of whom are of Indian descent, and to older or younger Peruvians with less education and income. It is also reasonable to assume that there are other regional differences that we were unable to identify in this study.

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Summary Economic, geographic, political, racial, and social inequality and oppression permeate Peru’s colonial past and recent history, contributing to national and local forms of interpersonal violence, such as domestic terrorism and the abuse and harassment of women by men, respectively. Such widespread violence appears to have desensitized Peruvians to aggression to the degree that violence has become normative and ordinary.93 We have reported several types of violence in everyday life in Peru. Efforts to prevent violence of all types, in Peru and elsewhere, should be framed by an ecological perspective, which is likely to capture the multiple factors (e.g., exclusion, exploitation, sexism, attitudes toward conflict and its resolution) that contribute to the sanction and perpetuation of injustice. The current study adds significantly to the scant cross-cultural literature on war and peace. The qualitative analysis of Peruvian college students’ definitions of war, peace, and terrorism sheds light on how some are able to justify governmental aggression (e.g., a defense against ideological perversion and domestic terrorism). Consistent with Peru’s overall political history and social norms, many students situated war in a general framework of conflict rather than focusing on Peru’s experiences with domestic terrorism. These findings suggest that the current generation of Peruvian college students might not have been touched as much by the Shining Path and government counterinsurgency as their peasant compatriots in the interior. This sample viewed disagreement and war as closely related. It is alarming that most students did not construe war as unreasonable, needless, or contingent upon the quality of dialogue taking place between adversaries. The data analysis also suggests that most students equated peace with a state of tranquility and harmony. They tended to view peace as transitory and subject to disruption by episodes or periods of conflict and did not construe peace as an outcome of enduring democratic traditions that would be accepting and respectful of differences between groups or nations and that would ensure justice for all. Although many students viewed terrorism as an unacceptable, or at best a misapplied, political ideology, only a very small minority identified economic, political, and social inequalities as potential contributors to terrorism. Overall, most students did not mention injustices. Their perceptions of war, peace, and terrorism suggest an elitist insulation from and unawareness of their class and/or race privileges (e.g., unearned advantage or conferred dominance). If these gross inequalities remain unchanged, they may ferment a renewal of sociopolitical unrest, including domestic terrorism. Our research on Peruvian perspectives on war, peace, and terrorism informs policy makers, social scientists, activists, and the general public

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of the diverse stances held on issues of fundamental importance and of guiding ongoing and effective dialogue in an era of clashing civilizations. Future cross-cultural investigations need to explore the relationship between moral disengagement and support for aggressive governmental responses to domestic and/or foreign terrorism. For example, McAlister, Bandura, and Owens found that the September 11 terrorist attack increased the level of moral disengagement within the United States for use of military force compared to preattack levels.94 They also found that moral disengagement was positively related to public support for immediate retaliatory strikes against suspected terrorists. Future studies also should examine cross-nationally the motives for initiating war or maintaining peace.

13

Argentina Ricardo Angelino, Flavia Angelino, and Maria Galmarini

War is . . . ‘‘an irrational act, taken to completion by animals (beasts).’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘an emotional sensation of tranquility and stability shared by a civil population.’’ To understand current Argentinean perspectives on governmental aggression and peace, one should keep in mind three fundamental realities: (1) the emergence of the state out of a history of colonialism and slavery; (2) the use of Secret Detention Centers (Centros Clandestinos de Detenci on; CCD) during the 1976–1983 military dictatorship, which constituted Argentina’s most extreme source of institutional violence (labeled the ‘‘National Re-organization Process’’ by the junta); and (3) economic projects and social taxes, which, since the 1970s, have led to the progressive impoverishment of the population, causing as many social and physical deaths as the Secret Detention Centers, even during democratic governments. The ‘‘disappearance’’ of people in Secret Detention Centers—a form of genocide ‘‘legalized’’ systematically by the state from 1976 to 1983—can be considered the worst violence possible among human beings in organized society. Those who caused the genocide were never penalized adequately, which has generated public feelings of insecurity, reinforced daily by unresolved crime and corruption. Poverty today has marked the lives of ever growing numbers of people, adding new poor to the historic or structural poor. Argentina today is characterized by a ‘‘correlation of systems’’ in which biological, psychological, anthropological, sociological, historical factors and impoverished ethical values contribute to the prevailing anomie.1

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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The Origins of Argentina: Conquest and Enslavement The Republic of Argentina established its territory through the combined use of slavery and death. The history of Buenos Aires serves as an example of Argentina’s violent beginnings. Around 1536, Pedro de Mendoza, a Spanish gold-seeker, ordered the building of a fort in the area of present-day Buenos Aires. In the beginning, the natives, known as querandies, were friendly with the new arrivals and offered them their food and wealth. In return, the Spaniards offered trinkets. The peace was broken when the Spanish conquerors tried to make the natives work for them. The foreigners were conquered and their forts were destroyed, thus forcing the Spaniards to return to Asunci on (today, the capital of Paraguay). Forty years passed until Juan de Garay, a Spanish conquistador, arrived in 1580. The querandies had organized themselves in those years, fearing a new invasion. According to the account of the columnist Ulderic o Schmidel (1510–1563), when the battle began, the Spaniards quickly killed the overlord, Teloman Condie, which led the natives to disperse and abandon the field of battle. Juan de Garay ordered that they be followed until all of the warriors were killed. Successive campaigns of the ‘‘whites’’ against the natives continued the latter’s decimation; however, resistance of the natives in Argentina’s frontiers to the ruling white oligarchy in Buenos Aires continued through the 19th century, and General and President Julio Argentino Roca (1878–1879) responded by granting extensive territories to the oligarchic minorities, making only 50 families the owners of four million hectares in Argentina. The unofficial history of the south of Argentina relates that individuals paid for the ears of dead family members. Subsequently, so that there was no doubt about the men’s deaths, testicles were returned to families. The foremen of Patagonia poisoned tribes in banquets created for these ends, or they demonstrated their hospitality by shooting them. Natives never had rights equal to those who descended from the European ships. In fact, the lowest class in Argentina consisted of descendents of settlers who had cross-bred with descendents of natives.2 Moreover, according to the Constitution of 1853, in its Article 67, clause 15: ‘‘It corresponds to the Congress to provide security to the frontiers, to conserve the pacific deal with the Indians and to promote their conversion to Catholicism . . . ’’ With a reform of the Constitution in 1994, native ancestral rights were finally recognized. However, in a country governed primarily by those with European ancestry, being native generates discrimination. Today, through the denial of basic needs and lack of appreciation for native culture, the genocide that started with the Spanish conquest continues.

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Genocide and the Cold War Doctrine of National Security On December 11, 1948, the Assembly of the United Nations (UN), by Resolution 9, declared genocide an international crime, defining it as ‘‘acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.’’3 This resolution also calls for the punishment of any individual or group involved in genocide, including rulers, officials, or individuals. Providing a similar definition, Feierstein said that genocide is the ‘‘execution of a systematic and massive plan with the total or partial intention of destruction of a human group of any sort.’’4 Although there is some controversy over whether the UN definition fits the extermination of thousands and the pervasive inhumanity of Argentina’s ‘‘dirty war,’’ it is clear that in Argentina during the 1970s, all human rights, including a right to exist, were denied to anyone considered an ‘‘opponent’’ or ‘‘internal enemy’’ of the state. Because of the prevailing Cold War doctrine, with its emphasis on ‘‘national security,’’ the United States and other Western nations did nothing to help end these abuses and indeed contributed to them at least indirectly. The doctrine of national security, devised in the United States after World War II, acquired a great deal of influence in Latin America, especially in the military institutions, which received support and training from the School of the Americas, created by the United States. As an ideology, ‘‘national security’’ was linked to an economic, political, and social model enforced in every Latin American country through military dictatorships that took power in the 1970s. In the ‘‘Argentine Process,’’ the armed forces of Argentina aligned themselves with the flow of hemispherical politics of the United States. The dictatorship’s concept of ‘‘subversive elements’’ expanded to include everyone whose ideas or actions appeared to challenge the concept of ‘‘Christian and Western society,’’ considered to be the foundation of national security. On the basis of new concepts of ‘‘internal enemies’’ and ‘‘ideological frontiers,’’ any person could become a suspect and be found guilty according to the needs and circumstances of those in power. A fundamental assumption of national security ideology is that war is a permanent reality and enemies are internal. The emphasis on enemies within one’s own borders leads to the repression of any citizens thought to be subversive and to the removal of all their civil and

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individual rights. Political parties, unions, and popular organizations are watched and marginalized. The media are controlled; education is injected with an obsolete and narrow nationalism. The doctrine of national security does not consider civil society as superior to the state (government). It supports powerful military, political, and economic elites, and establishes a permanent climate of insecurity, of state terrorism, with methodical violation of human rights. During the military regime from 1976 to 1983, the Argentine armed forces adopted and applied national security doctrines and techniques of ‘‘counterrevolutionary war,’’ as used by the French army in Indochina and Algeria and by the American army in Vietnam. Those practices reflected modern war doctrine, which holds that the enemy is not easily identified. There is no physical border separating warring groups. The line that marks the difference between friend and enemy can be found in the heart of a nation, in the same city where one resides, in one’s circle of friends, perhaps even within one’s own family. It is an ideological line that identifies who are our adversaries and whom we have to defeat.5 This concept of the ‘‘modern war’’ opened the door to new tactics and forms of discourse by the Argentine armed forces, providing justification for torture and destruction of the invisible ‘‘enemy.’’ There are several advantages to the methods used in a ‘‘modern war’’ without clear borders among the ‘‘combatants.’’ Identifying aggressive practices as a war against subversives subverts any international claims regarding massive executions. Similarly, the lack of a clear line between friend and enemy allows perpetrators to torture the person under arrest, cuts communications among the detainees and their companions, and facilitates the use of psychological methods designed to change people’s identity.6 In Argentina, such practices could be used with impunity because the society was not prepared for the public application, massive or selective, of the death penalty, or for the rationales used to facilitate capital punishment, regardless of the age or popularity of the prisoner. The systematic plan of extermination executed by the terroristic Argentine state, in alliance with others in the southern hemisphere, was transformed into the ‘‘Condor Plan.’’ This plan can be considered a criminal covenant among the military regimes of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay—with support and financing from major western countries—allowing the abductions and murders of opponents and the pursuit of refugees into neighboring countries. There is evidence that as recently as 2007, the United States and a few other countries still resist supporting the rights of native peoples. Specifically, on September 12, 2007, after 22 years of refusal from the developed countries, the UN approved the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, including 46 Articles comparable to those in the Declaration of the Universal

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Statement of Human Rights (1948) and applying to 370 million people around the world. This declaration was supported by 143 countries and rejected by four (United States, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand), while 11 abstained.7 Similar to the Nazi fascists and in connivance with the governments of bordering countries (‘‘Condor Plan’’) and Western countries following a policy of national security, Argentina’s last military dictatorship (1976–1983) sanctioned the extermination of social fighters, both ‘‘active and potential.’’ The torturing, forced disappearance of individuals, looting, imposition of silence, external and internal exile, appropriation of newborns, etc., was endured by the citizens of the country and the adjacent regions. All in all, it was a ‘‘forced peace,’’ which came to an end following the ill-fated attempt of general dictator and de facto President Leopoldo Galtieri to recover the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic, off the Argentine coast, from Great Britain, whose invasion of the archipelago in 1833 had been a long-term source of aggravation for Argentina’s leaders. The disembarkation of the Argentine troops occurred at 2 a.m. on Friday, April 2, 1982. On June 11, 1982, the Security Council of the United Nations (Resolution 502), President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Ambassador Vernon Walters, representatives of the Organization of American States, the TIAR, the Movement of No Alliance, and Pope Juan Pablo II all arrived in Buenos Aires, along with military missions and secret civilians from around the world, trying unsuccessfully to end the war. Although Reagan supported the British government of Margaret Thatcher, Galtieri proclaimed, ‘‘We will give them battle, it does not matter if 400 or 4,000 die!’’ The Argentine forces occupied the islands for 74 days and had 45 days in combat with the British. On May 2, 1982, Britain torpedoed Argentina’s General Belgrano’s cruiser outside the zone of maritime exclusion. More than a thousand soldiers were on board; 320 lives were lost. Soldiers and officers were discredited for cowardice. In this whole Falklands military blunder, 649 Argentine soldiers died and 1,068 were injured; 208 British lives were lost and 777 were injured.8 After this war, the fall of the dictatorship was accelerated. The military leaders surrendered power to the politicians, and democracy was reestablished in a country heavily mortgaged with external debt.9 The psychological consequences of the Falklands conflict have continued through the decades, leaving many more victims than those who fell in the war. According to the first national census carried out by the Argentine government, there are 25,528 veterans of the Falkland War, and, according to those veterans, the dictatorship wove a plot of lies and concealments around the war, leading Argentines initially to believe

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they had won the war and hiding the fact of the surrender.10 Furthermore, survivors of the war were prohibited from sharing what had happened in the Southern islands. Those who rebelled against this treatment were detained in the ‘‘Campo de Mayo,’’ given psychiatric diagnoses, and medicated over months while not receiving any physical or psychiatric assistance programs. It was not until 2005, 23 years after the War of the Falklands, that the National Program for Attention to Veterans of War was created by Resolution 191 of the democratic government. Despite the fall of the dictatorship, Argentine’s modern society is saturated by an authoritarian discourse that is intolerant of differences. The political repression implemented during the military dictatorship was based fundamentally on the disappearance of people. These disappearances involved abduction, torture, and murder, all under the framework of a secrecy that effectively counteracted any opposition. In addition to the 30,000 people who disappeared, more than 10,000 people were arrested, and hundreds of thousands were exiled or forced into internal exile.11 The trauma created by the state’s terrorism was exacerbated by both concealed and open intimidation, requisitions, unexpected vehicle checks, the constant presence of soldiers and police officers with threatening attitudes, a climate of suspicion, the induction of social accusations and culpability, and especially the silence produced by psychological media campaigns in a system of monopolistic control of communication—all of which served to enforce social control of the population. As a result, the experiences of danger and defenselessness, the development of pertinent reference groups, and growth in social alienation were inevitable consequences promoted by the terrorist policies of the government. The responsibility of the killers for the crimes committed was established in the dictators’ Final Document (April of 1983), where the Armed Forces ‘‘assume the quota of historical responsibility that is of their concern in their approach and execution of actions.’’ However, the leaders continuously hid behind the defense of ‘‘the war against subversives’’ in which ‘‘excesses on behalf of the safeguard of the welfare’’ were committed and sanctioned.12 In September 1983, the General and de facto President Reynaldo Bignone promulgated the law of National Pacification, providing amnesty for everyone in the military, thereby immunizing them from penal actions for their crimes from May 24, 1973, to June 17, 1982. Moreover, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, in September 1984, resolved not to judge its comrades. Protests were almost unanimous, and on December 9, 1985, a civil court convicted some the worst of the military Juntas leaders. However, these men served terms of only four years, and Jose Martinez de Sickle,

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minister of economy during the military dictatorship, continued his work after being endorsed by the new chosen president, Carlos Menem, who pardoned other leaders of the ‘‘dirty war’’ and silenced conflict regarding the crimes committed during the dictatorship. The cultural, economic, political, and social crises created by the military dictatorship and its dirty war continued to deepen and have impact on Argentina, even today.13 The creation of the National Program for Attention to Veterans of War and the interest it generated led, in 2007, to a study of 200 cases from 1,800 veterans of the Falkland War in the Lan us area of Buenos Aires.14 Based on surveys and structured and semistructured interviews, the researchers found that: 39 percent of the veterans had attempted suicide at least once; 48 percent presented with problems of alcoholism; 65 percent believed it would be better to be dead; 69 percent recalled, with intensity, the experiences in the Falklands; 65 percent had consulted with a psychologist or psychiatrist; 87 percent had experienced more irritability than those around them; and 78 percent presented with sleeping difficulties.15 Their family members (wives and companions, in particular) also were experiencing difficulties: 53 percent were fearful of the violent reactions of their companions; 60 percent felt emotionally abused by the veteran; 52 percent had presented with symptoms of anxiety in the last year; and 66 percent had presented with symptoms of depression in the last year. Health problems, alcohol and other addictions, as well as family violence, were problematic characteristics of this population. In addition, 350 veterans had committed suicide. In total, veterans of the short-lived Falklands War suffered depression, diverse traumas, labor and social discrimination, and the indifference of successive governments and their own armed forces.16 Authoritarianism and Its Preferred Weapon: Censorship Jorge Guizburg (1948–2008), journalist and Argentine comedian, indicated that ‘‘If one thinks about the years of the military dictatorship, the most serious thing that could be read was a magazine called ‘Humor.’ ’’17 Maria Elena Walsh, an Argentine author, was excluded from state-controlled media following publication of her article, ‘‘Misfortunes in the Country-Garden-of-Infants’’ in the Clarin newspaper of Buenos Aires on August 16, 1979. The article was a declaration of rights and expectations of the intellectual, and a manifesto against the silence imposed by the de facto government in Argentina. It was through censorship and intimidation during the period in which the genocide was carried out that the communication media were transformed into simple conveyors of official opinions. Just as Argentine

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society was divided between those who openly and brazenly supported the mass murdering of thousands of people and those who preferred to ignore such atrocities, so too were the newspapers, magazines, and newscasts. Some media (newspapers like La Nacion, El Cronista Comercial, Cronica, and La Prensa, and magazines like Gente, Somos, and Extra, among others) supported the murder of people, the abductions, the torture, and the disappearances seen as necessary in reorganizing the country.18 Because of either inconvenience or fear (of censorship or forced closing), there were other media that did not denounce, transmit, or report what was occurring.19 Two mentalities characterized the majority of the society. The first was exemplified by: ‘‘Do not get involved because if you do then you will see what happens to you,’’ reflecting the fear and terror that existed (and still exists). ‘‘Do not denounce that disappearance, that death, that boy stolen from its family, because you may end up like those who you intend to defend.’’20 The second mentality reflected the childlike innocence of the individuals who said, ‘‘I do not know’’ but also the presumed infallibility of the repressive apparatus of the state and its accomplices: ‘‘Whatever they’ve done must be in the right; they (the soldiers) are never mistaken.’’ In actuality, the majority of the mass media were left impregnated by all that silence and even since the return of democracy they failed to report social problems.21 Central themes for the growth of the country (e.g., education, health, and work) were not headlines, even though the need for a more just and supportive country remained urgent.

ARGENTINE PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND PEACE It is within this context of ongoing memories of a brutal totalitarian military dictatorship, the failed Falklands War, the relative freedom of the perpetrators of horrendous human rights crimes, ‘‘disappearances,’’ and current economic hardship, that we conducted our study of Argentine perspectives on governmental aggression and peace. Our sample consisted of 50 Argentine citizens ranging in age from 18 to 54 years, carried out largely during the months from December 2007 to March 2008. Most of these respondents were from the geographical zones in the Province of Buenos Aires (the areas surrounding the city) and the city of Buenos Aires itself. They all are Argentine, generally of Argentine parents, and disproportionately female. All but one were Roman Catholic. The majority of the sample belongs to the middle class, with 5 percent self-reporting as members of the lower class, 10 percent

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middle/low, and 10 percent high/middle class. The majority had completed high school, and 80 percent had a college degree. Five percent were unemployed while the majority worked either independently or for someone else. Most participants reported no political association. Although many reported having male relatives who had served in the military, no participant had had direct military experience. In Argentina, mandatory military service ended in 1997. The only way to join the army is to volunteer. No individual had participated in any educational programs on conflict resolution or world peace. The majority had not been involved in protests against war or in favor of peace. Ten percent had signed a public petition, 5 percent had participated in a march, and another 5 percent had participated in a plebiscite on the Conflict of the Beagle Channel with the neighboring country of Chile.22 Do Governments Have a Right to Commit Aggression? ‘‘[Countries have a right to invade] only in the case that the country is correct about another country violating them and the other country is armed.’’ ‘‘Torture systematically causes terror and dehumanization.’’ In response to the item ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another,’’ 12 respondents (23 percent of the sample) provided no justification for their rating scale score. The remaining 38 participants produced 41 codable responses, of which only 20 percent indicated some support for a governmental right to invade. Although three of the explanations were essentially just restatements of the right or references to vague justifiable circumstances (e.g., ‘‘It should be for a major reason’’), specific rationales included self-defense (three responses), a threat to one’s citizens (one response), and approval of an international group (one response). The great majority of the explanations (78 percent) opposed a state right to invasion. The most common arguments against such a right (53 percent of the responses) invoked principles, particularly the principle of sovereignty (e.g., ‘‘Sovereignty should be respected’’). Another argument against the right (10 percent of the responses) included the availability of better alternatives (e.g., ‘‘Violence is rarely the best solution’’). Two of the responses focused on the negative consequences of war (e.g., ‘‘Wars of invasion provide unjustifiable pain and death’’). The Argentine sample also strongly rejected a governmental right to torture prisoners in times of war; on the rating scale, 80 percent of the respondents indicated total disagreement, 5 percent strong disagreement, 5 percent neither agreed nor disagreed, and only 10 percent

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expressed complete agreement. Of the 39 codable rationales provided, 92 percent were arguments against a governmental right to torture. One-third of the explanations were simply a general rejection of torture (e.g., ‘‘I am totally against aggression and violence. To torture is aggression’’), and another 8 percent specified that torture was a violation of ethical or legal principles. Other arguments against a right to torture included that it violated human rights (21 percent of the responses) as well as the ineffectiveness of torture in accomplishing any useful purpose (18 percent). The only outright argument in support of torture (one response) showed a means/ends orientation and implied that torture could be effective in reducing threat (‘‘It all depends if the person is a threat’’). Two responses indicated that governments might have a right to use torture under controlled, supervised conditions. In response to the item ‘‘Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism,’’ 15 percent of the qualitative responses supported such a right, and 85 percent opposed it. Some respondents affirmed the right in very general terms without an explicit rationale; for example, ‘‘The government says, ‘Damage the other side.’ I interpret that as ‘‘if they are enemies, the age, the sex, the religion are not important.’’ The major rationales behind tolerance for civilian deaths were that such deaths were inevitable (4 percent), and the ends justified the means (6 percent). These startling results go beyond a response to the terrorist attacks on the Embassy of Israel and the Jewish community center AMIA (Association Mutual Israelite Argentina) that took place in the country’s capital during the 1990s. Beyond the immediate feeling of terror associated with particular actions, a government can instill a more pernicious idea of terror with a bigger impact on the collective memory.23 Therefore, the idea of ‘‘state terrorism’’ is more tangible and recognizable to Argentines than the more general idea of ‘‘terrorism.’’ Simple ‘‘terrorism’’ is perceived as a foreign concept, at least in the way that the world’s dominant countries experience it (e.g., attempted murders in the United States or Spain, perpetrated by terrorist groups not necessarily inside the official government). State terrorism is what Argentines experienced during the dictatorships, experiences still embedded within the collective memory. Definitions of War Many of the participants’ definitions of war identified it simply as a conflict between groups (47 percent of the responses). These individuals did not specify a cause for war; they merely said, for example, that war is ‘‘conflict between countries that elevates to weapons and combat,’’ or

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‘‘confrontation between opposing sides.’’ However, 21 percent of the responses added some reference to a cause or motive for war, such as ‘‘a form of violence in the attempt to resolve conflicts’’ or a ‘‘situation of conflict about certain interests (political, economic).’’ Most of the responders provided no indication whether or not the cause for war can ever be just. Those who did give their opinion portrayed the cause as spurious or unjustifiable; for example, ‘‘a fight between countries with motives that only they create.’’ Disapproval and disregard for war motives can be understood in the context of the Falkland War, an unnecessary, government-sponsored embarrassment for the Argentinean people. Four respondents cited the destruction that results from war. Only one respondent identified war as self-defense. One typical definition of war in the Argentine sample identified it with ‘‘the situation of a standoff between countries, cities, or towns, as a form of trying to impose one’s will onto others and defend political ideas, economies, etc., for the government.’’ These participants see war as an irrational act, a clash, but also as something done for the government, which may itself be characterized by intolerance and lack of dialogue. The construction of the ‘‘politic’’ as alien to the majority of the interviewees is key to our analysis. There is a disassociation between the decisions from the top (the government, ‘‘the political power’’) and the actions of the civil society. Hannah Arendt’s work on politics and power is particularly helpful for understanding these perspectives on war.24 Arendt indicated that violence is the opposite of politics. Politics is what makes us human, as it embodies the possibility of action and consensus. At the same time, political action can take place only when it is free of constrictions, with access to open communication. Today, that freedom is scarcely to be found in Argentina and many other parts of the world. Definitions of Terrorism The majority of the Argentine definitions of terrorism (53 percent of the responses), identified terrorism with the use of violence to spread fear. Sample responses include ‘‘violent form of a political fight to create terror’’ and ‘‘to utilize methods parallel to the state to provoke terror in a society or group.’’ Some participants also linked terrorism to the denial of fundamental human rights (e.g., ‘‘lack of guarantee of the protection of basic rights like life, justice, peace, etc.’’). The ‘‘terrorist state’’ is seen as infusing the social body with terror, when in fact it is the state that should protect the guarantees and rights of the citizenry. If the governmental sector produces terror, terrorist action is generalized. Only a few respondents indicated that individuals or a group of individuals were responsible for terrorist acts.

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Many of the respondents likened torture to terrorism. They defined both torture and terrorism as ‘‘sinister,’’ ‘‘nefarious,’’ and ‘‘anti-humanitarian.’’ These respondents understand both torture and terrorism to have a common purpose—specifically, the creation of fear and terror on a generalized scale. Their free associations about torture and terrorism in their survey responses strongly suggest that sociohistoric factors contribute to their constructs. The second most common type of terrorism definition (25 percent of the responses) identified environmental conditions functioning as motivating factors for terrorism. Typical examples include ‘‘differences in capitalism’’ and ‘‘action of territorial removal.’’ Though respondents did not elaborate on these reasons, they introduced a motive to terrorism outside the realm of pure destruction and chaos. The remaining respondents attributed terrorism to an ideology gone wrong (four responses), made a moral judgment (two responses), or viewed terrorism as a violation of religion (one response). Do Individuals Have a Right to Peace and a Right to Demonstrate against War? In response to the item asserting that all humans have a right to peace, the majority of responses (69 percent) expressed agreement with the statement, often emphasizing its basic, inherent nature. For example, participants argued that a right to peace ‘‘is the basic law of nature; not only humans, but all beings that inhabit the earth have the right to peace,’’ and, rather idealistically, ‘‘To be human is to live in peace on earth.’’ Some of the explanations focused on the benefits of peace: ‘‘To be humane, it is the only action to do’’; ‘‘When there is no peace, no one is able to live with dignity.’’ Some participants agreed that peace is a basic human right but also argued that it has not been achieved or cannot be achieved; for example, ‘‘It is fundamental; however, it is a forgotten principle’’; ‘‘It is possible to have the desire to avoid war; however, death and suffering invariably happen.’’ Another 9 percent of the responses specified that peace is an ideal rather than a right. The remaining 22 percent of the responses expressed the belief that peace is not a right or qualified the right to peace. One respondent said somewhat poetically: ‘‘If peace is justified, yes. If it is armed peace, or cemeteries of peace, or the earth is destroyed, then one, two, more Iraqs!’’ In response to the item ‘‘People have the right to protest against war and in favor of peace,’’ 71 percent of the responses indicated that protest is a right. Some of these responses described the right to protest as a socially sanctioned or legally provided right (e.g., ‘‘Protest is a permitted right for the citizens’’; ‘‘It is one of our rights with being a citizen.

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To protest and fight to live without inequality’’; ‘‘In a free country, everyone in the world has the right and should express their ideas’’). A few responses identified the right as an inherent human right: ‘‘Protests are a right to all humans and should be respected’’; ‘‘A basic right is free expression of the people and the right to live in peace and it does not have to be the mission or the decision of the government.’’ An additional 26 percent of the responses qualified the right, usually by insisting that protests be peaceful; for example, ‘‘All have freedom of expression that should not be used with violence’’; ‘‘If they do it without violence, yes’’; ‘‘Provided that their protest does not overlook the rights of the people.’’ The overwhelming level of agreement with a right to protest is another example of the historical disparity between the government’s agenda and public opinion. In addition, given the fact that during recent periods of Argentine history dissenters faced harsh punishment, it is not surprising that the freedom to protest is not taken for granted. When presented with the item ‘‘I believe that world peace can be achieved,’’ participants gave a fairly wide range of responses. Only 11 percent of the responses expressed outright agreement that world peace can be achieved, 42 percent expressed disagreement, and 15 percent neither agreed nor disagreed. One participant, who totally agreed with the statement, said, ‘‘It [peace] should be protected (fundamentally from the government).’’ Although only 11 percent of the sample indicated unconditional agreement with the statement, the number of respondents expressing some optimism—or at least hope—for the achievement of peace was quite a bit higher. Typical examples of guarded optimism included ‘‘It is very difficult to change the priority of peace over money. It is difficult, but I have hope,’’ and ‘‘Wars, armed fights, are as old as humanity. I wish for world peace but I believe it is uncertain.’’ Nine percent of the responses indicated that world peace is achievable under certain conditions; for example, ‘‘with education, lectures, and love’’ and ‘‘if governments make decisions in that direction and not promoting their own interests to the rest of the world.’’ One respondent had this recommendation: ‘‘Each person has to be tranquil within him or herself and with this power there can be world peace.’’ Seventeen percent of the responses portrayed world peace as more of an ideal than a reality, but some of them nevertheless expressed some optimism about achieving it: ‘‘It is a utopia toward which we should act.’’ Despite these signs of optimism, the great majority of the responses expressed doubts as to the achievability of peace. One major group of explanations for pessimism concerning the achievability of world peace blamed human nature (e.g., ‘‘the ambition of man for dominance over others makes it difficult’’; ‘‘To be human is very complicated and the

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fight for power dominates most of the time’’). The other major group of explanations placed the blame on the nature of states; for example, ‘‘It is impossible sometimes for the inhabitants of a country to have or to develop world peace, obtain power, and not tyrannize other countries’’; ‘‘It is difficult to see peace as global with imperialism and capitalism still existing.’’ When participants were asked whether they thought national security was necessary for individual and family security, 42 percent of their responses were affirmative and 39 percent were negative. The even split of opinion may be indicative of the ambiguity within the Argentine population regarding the role of the government. Responses provided in support of the statement often simply reiterated the substance of the item; for example, ‘‘If the nation does not have security, the inhabitants do not have it’’; ‘‘Clearly national security on a basic level affects individuals and families.’’ Arguments offered in disagreement with the assertion sometimes showed distrust of governmental uses of the term ‘‘national security’’; for example, one respondent commented, ‘‘If significant security equals police, an authoritative government, war, terrorism, torture, discrimination, violence, etc., I totally disagree.’’ Another respondent said, ‘‘I cannot think to comprehend the concept of national security and the relation with individual security.’’ The remaining 18 percent of the responses added conditions to the expressed agreement with the statement. For example, one respondent declared that ‘‘National security can be effective only when it accomplishes individual and family security.’’ Definitions of Peace The most common definition for peace (33 percent of the responses) identified it with a positive state of well-being, pertaining specifically to a sense of security, tranquility, or physical health. Another group of responses (17 percent) conceptualized peace within the context of a social relationship. Such responses included ‘‘state where people live in equality,’’ ‘‘well-being between countries,’’ and ‘‘the capacity to resolve differences.’’ Sixteen percent of the responses were ‘‘negative’’ definitions; that is, they defined peace as the absence of conflict or war. Sample positive definitions of peace include ‘‘circumstance and state of well-being social and individual.’’ However, some uncertainty characterized by desperation or hope is evident in many of the definitions provided, especially those that characterize the possibilities of lasting peace, world peace, and social peace as ‘‘utopian.’’ Utopia is an idea that allows for advancement, action, doing, and being, without a final solution. This lack of an engine for progress brings with it an

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uncertainty and is presented as something foreign to the direct action of the populace. There is no certainty that either individual or collective action can move the state along the paths to peace. In considering the notion of a utopia, perhaps it is better to consider the tracing of a path (pro-peace) as a final destination. The frustration and lack of satisfaction humans experience are of two types: those inherent in the human condition and those originating in the structure of modern society. The modern division of labor is not only functional, as proposed by Durkheim, but also hierarchical. Today’s social hierarchies are sustained only by formal rules, criteria of efficacy, or some great ideology that only in part sustains the authority, as the issue is now based on some impossible historical or possible transcendental ideal.25 Peace, like similar abstractions such as liberty, or reconciliation, or war, is not seen as an individual possibility but rather a social one. We can see, in the majority of the respondents’ answers, clashes against the nation itself and against the desires of the state. This clash is evidenced as well by the participants who did not complete the definitions or simply wrote ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’ after the concept.

DISCUSSION Our respondents’ perspectives on violence show how a level of violence is constructed that goes beyond the mere action of the parties to the violence. Structural violence can be understood as consisting of human actions and interactions that constitute active deposits of insecurity, marginalization, and exclusion. Racism, hunger, and marginalization are examples of structural violence. Furthermore, the schools, health care institutions, shelters, institutes of security, and the police are contexts within which the line between a show of authority and an abuse of power translates into institutional violence. The child, a minor by law, the patient, and the detained are at the mercy of justice time and again, experiencing institutional violence violating their human rights and dignity as persons. Factors contributing to stress have produced a considerable increase in inconveniences in recent years. It is known that stress physically sickens people as biological organisms; however, people are also social beings functioning within and integrated into particular circumstances and times. Thus, getting sick is a bio-psycho-social process and relationship.26 Thirty-two years since the military dictatorship that still haunts the Argentines with economic, political, and social crises, the causes of individual and communitarian vulnerability have manifested themselves with much strength on an emotional level. Argentina is among

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the top 10 countries in the world for deaths (30 percent) as a result of cardiovascular problems (2007).27 There are 288 cardiac-related deaths daily in Argentina, which is more than from cancer, respiratory illness, and accidents. There is also evidence that cardiac disease can be a result of social stress. For example, in an Argentine study of the relation between heart conditions and social crises, a sample of 3,220 patients hospitalized for preheart attacks, myocardial heart attacks, and sudden death were studied during a period of socioeconomic crisis in the country compared with a postcrisis period.28 The period of crisis (from April 1999 to December 2002) encompassed the fall of the economy, the devaluation of the peso by 70 percent, and the depreciation of savings in dollars by 60 percent. The postcrisis period was from January 2003 to September 2004. The investigators found significantly higher levels of both in-hospital myocardial infarction and congestive heart failure during the financial crisis period compared with the postcrisis period and noted that the spike in mortality rates was striking and above normally expected levels. If financial crisis can have such a dramatic affect on cardiac health, it seems logical that torture and disappearances took their toll as well. It is no coincidence that two Argentine musicians, known worldwide as Daniel Barenboim and Miguel Angel Estrella, the latter being the Argentina ambassador to the UN (December 2007), look for peace in zones of conflict like Israel and Palestine. Through their action via international cultural channels, they achieved, separately, the forming of a committee for dialogue between powerful Jews and Arabs.29 In October 1795, Immanuel Kant published an essay regarding the attainment of perpetual peace.30 His recommendations continue to be relevant to today’s problems. Among the principles he postulated for the attainment of peace were ‘‘No Independent States, Large or Small, Shall Come under the Dominion of Another State by Inheritance, Exchange, Purchase, or Donation’’; and ‘‘No State Shall by Force Interfere with the Constitution or Government of Another State.’’ One of the ‘‘articles’’ he proposed as essential to permanent peace was ‘‘The Law of Nations Shall be Founded on a Federation of Free States.’’ Based on this postulate, and his assumption of an international right to vouch for perpetual peace, the responsibility for achieving peace must be voluntarily assumed by the United Nations, without its assuming supremacy and with the exercise of a competence that is more than that of each associated state. Unlike his contemporaries, Kant took a position that should guide the world today—the idea that ‘‘war is an illegitimate method of attaining rights.’’31 Contrasting with theories developed in different times by Machiavelli, Hobbes, Grocia, and Pufendorf, as well as contemporary advocates of the ‘‘Realpolitik’’ that induces the jus ad bellum (right to war) or the equilibrium of terror, Kant argued that

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between the states ‘‘there should not be war.’’ Lasting peace is achieved with the construction of an international right to peace, based on the universal rights of man. In Kant’s view, achieving peace through an international body is not a simple task because the states do not always represent their towns, which many times are governed by ‘‘despotic monarchies’’ that consider their subjects as mere property. These kinds of governors have bellicose tendencies and do not act morally. The states that do not grant their subjects political rights are the ones that frequently suffer aggression and war. Kant claimed that democratic republics, where the state adequately represents the will of the people based on human rights, are generally not bellicose but are instead peaceful. Extrapolating this theory to practice, a recent application of the principle occurred in the first months of 2008 in a conflict among various Latin American countries: Without any prior communication with Ecuador, Colombia ordered its army to invade Ecuador to exterminate a guerrilla group named FARC (Revolutionary Colombian Armed Forces). This transgression against Ecuador’s sovereignty caused a rupture in relations between the countries, the mobilization of Venezuelan troops, and the ending of relations with Nicaragua, which was worried about the presence of a Colombian ship in its waters. On March 7, 2008, a few days after these events, in a meeting of Latin American countries in Santo Domingo, the countries represented voted unanimously to reject the Colombian invasion. Argentina stood firm, asking for dialogue and compromise from the Latin American countries to prevent ‘‘the Doctrine of Unilateralism,’’ arguing that the conflicts must be resolved legally and multilaterally through dialogue among the states involved. In our Argentine sample, there was strong rejection of unilateral methods by bellicose nations. In the words of one participant, the best way to establish world peace is ‘‘A relationship and collaboration of the world to sustain and help the state of rights grow.’’ The best way to reach individual security and that of families in the world is ‘‘The same path that must be taken to establish world peace.’’ Similar views were expressed by another respondent regarding the right of a nation to invade another: ‘‘Wars of invasion provoke pain and unjustifiable death for the sake of an economic plan.’’ Furthermore, according to another participant, another step or factor that will lead to apology and eventual reconciliation between countries is the ‘‘concrete politics of compensation, civil and cultural interchange, shared reconstruction of the past, and the consequences in the present.’’ Consistent with the recommendations of Kant, a majority of the Argentine participants indicated that dialogue and laws ensuring the sovereignty of each country are key components to reconciliation and

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the conservation of peace, and achieving these are the duty of the representatives of the nations involved. In South America, respect between parties is particularly important and should be made possible by the OEA (Organizacin de Estados Americanos, that is, the Organization of American States) for the region or for the group of nations created by consensus to achieve those ends. Kant’s ideas do not appear utopic. Our participants, like Kant, believe that peace involves harmony, well-being, and respect for differences. As put forth by Kuhn,32 it is time for a new paradigm to grow out of the crises and ruptures of today. Change is always present in the definition of crisis, as is resistance to change.33 On December 2001, the Argentines took to the street and the clamor was unanimous. Tired of lies and faced with a political situation that brought to mind the darkest periods of the dictatorial rule, the protestors engaged in numerous social manifestations spanning all social classes. Perhaps it was a crisis of the feeling of legitimacy? In any case, the authority was no longer recognized. Security has become inconsistent, or in the best of cases, utopian. In Latin America, Argentina is a risk society—‘‘a society increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety), which generates the notion of risk’’34—with particular Argentine cultural forms, in the periphery of the ‘‘globalized world.’’ Work has been converted into a merry-go-round where not everyone can ride. Education presents another means by which to make the ride a valuable and often elusive prize. This is the ‘‘normal’’ state of things in many societies. As always, the line between the normal and the pathetic is thin. The ‘‘normal’’ of these conditions of existence often generates overadaptation, tension, stress, and distress. The collective identities, the interaction, and the contention that is forged in social circles become stymied, replaced by infinite individualities, in a large world of loneliness and superficiality, leaving the companionship that comes with standing together ‘‘in an immense solitude.’’35 Today, one must be free to act rapidly. At the same time, identities are constructed by interaction and in a given social frame, in a structure sealed and shared. The society of the present has become unhinged in contemporary individualism. The fragmentation is seen in such phenomena as the crisis of representation and legitimacy. Society’s ‘‘representatives’’ pragmatically offer discourses. They offer products for infinite spectators with multiple identities. Any ideology must have enough electoral credit to maintain itself, and the government is costumed by a small consensus. Individuals with more capacity to elect have the duty to do so. The processes of globalization and individualization have become radicalized; the constant changes in the normative frame of action and the plurality of voices. Silence regarding the power of the government is coupled with the indicators of the market; the

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deep criticism of the process of dis-institutionalization; the social circles and the identities in a critical context. In essence, ‘‘the Crisis is when the old dies and the new is not yet born.’’36 It then becomes conceivable to view violence, war, and peace as open signifiers and constant constructions, from the past and into the future, in a critical, contemporary moment of change. The Argentine reality permits and demands multiple levels of analysis regarding such constructions. Durkheim37 defined the term ‘‘anomie’’ as the absence of adequate norms for necessities. He analyzed the consequences of this situation by looking at the phenomenon of suicide. What happens when a society is born, grows, and lives in crisis, in anomie? If it were a living, breathing thing, would it commit suicide? Is society committing suicide? The question in itself encloses the possibility of questioning, of criticism, of construction. The doubt that battles the incertitude surrounding such questions gives one of the few fair battles to the notion of peace: can it grow out of crisis?

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An Integrative Conclusion for Volume 3 Denise A. Hines

The goal of this volume was to present the voices of ordinary people from a variety of nations on issues that are very salient in the world today: war, terrorism, and peace. We heard from a wide range of people from countries representing Africa, Central America, and South America. Participants from these nations presented their definitions of ‘‘war’’ and ‘‘terrorism,’’ in addition to answering questions and providing justifications for their answers about whether one country had the right to invade another, the government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war, and the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism. The participants also provided definitions of ‘‘peace’’ and justifications for the extent to which they believed all human beings have a basic right to peace, world peace can be achieved, people have the right to protest against a government’s involvement in war, and national security is essential for individual and family security. Their answers to these questions provided a perspective on these issues that the world rarely ever hears—that of ordinary citizens. The countries that were represented in this volume have much in common. Both Africa and Latin America were colonized by Europeans, and all of the countries on these continents have been granted their independence. There are also important differences in the nature, duration, and outcomes of their colonial experiences. African countries were colonized later than Latin American countries and were also granted their independence later. Most Latin American countries were colonized in the 1600s, and their indigenous inhabitants were subsequently conquered and subjected to harsh treatment; these countries were later

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granted their independence in the 1800s. Most African countries were colonized during the 1800s. Prior to that time, the indigenous peoples were captured and sold as slaves—with the largest numbers of them going to Brazil when it was under Portuguese colonial rule. After their colonization, most of the indigenous peoples were subjected to discrimination, violence, and poverty, and in the mid-1900s, the European nations began granting independence to African countries. The histories of these countries tend to diverge around the time of independence. In the South American countries, as in the United States, the descendants of the colonists stayed in the liberated countries and retained considerable power. In the African countries, particularly the sub-Saharan countries, the descendants of the colonists more typically left the country and/or turned over power to native peoples. In some of the countries, the native people had to fight a war to achieve independence (e.g., Angola). In other countries, a peaceful transfer of power was followed by considerable social stability and progress ever since (e.g., Egypt, Botswana, Zambia). However, most of the former colonies have suffered from considerable civil unrest, violence, coups, and countercoups as the countries try to establish how they will be governed (e.g., Nigeria, Ghana, Angola, South Africa, Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru, Colombia, and Argentina); this civil unrest varies from successive coups and protests, to bloody civil wars, to violent despots squashing any dissent in the country, to apartheid. Some countries have engaged in wars against neighboring countries (e.g., Egypt and Nicaragua), whereas others have not (e.g., Nigeria, Botswana, Zambia, Brazil, and Costa Rica); indeed, Costa Rica abolished its standing army in 1948 after its civil war, and Article 12 of the Constitution in 1949 codified this decision into law. Some of the countries considered in this chapter have experienced terrorist attacks, typically from internal sources (e.g., Colombia and Peru). Costa Rica has experienced civil unrest but has tried to maintain a peaceful status. It is in the light of these varying contexts that the authors of the individual chapters in this volume have interpreted their respondents’ answers. The authors of the chapters indicated clearly that the samples of participants they recruited were nonrandom ‘‘convenience’’ samples, whose participants heard of the study at a university or through wordof-mouth. Some participants could complete the survey only over the Internet, which meant that in their countries, they were most likely quite privileged. In fact, the participants in all of the countries were for the most part among the well-educated members of their society. The method through which they completed the survey differed across countries: some completed the survey in paper-and-pencil format; some completed the form on the Internet; and in at least one country, the

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survey was administered via focus group format. It is important to keep these characteristics of the samples in mind as one interprets and critically evaluates the results presented. Given the fact that the samples are not necessarily representative of their countries and that the mode of survey administration differed, it can be a daunting task to attempt to compare the respondents from the different countries represented in this volume. Inferences based on comparisons of the findings across countries should be considered tentative—food-for-thought rather than strong conclusions. In the following two sections, I make such comparisons, paying particular attention to differences among the countries and why those differences might be occurring. It is very important to note from the outset, however, that the most striking observation is the level of similarity in responses across countries, which is discussed in the concluding section.

VIEWS ON WAR AND TERRORISM Across the various nations, the most common definitions of war were primarily standard ‘‘dictionary’’ definitions. That is, across countries people tended to view war as a state of conflict, particularly armed conflict, between two nations, although the countries that had the largest percentages of participants defining war in this manner were Brazil and Nicaragua. The similarity between these two countries in their citizens’ definitions of war is striking considering how different their experiences have been. Nicaragua is considered to be one of the most violent and war-torn countries in its region, whereas Brazil, although having experienced many coups, is relatively peaceful within its region. Another common theme in the definitions of war was a focus on the destruction that war caused; the percentage of people who defined war this way did not vary much across countries. Very few participants in any country discussed emotional reactions to war; the country with participants most likely to do so was Costa Rica. Costa Rica is the only country in this sample that considers itself neutral with regard to war; perhaps this self-designation leads to strong emotional reactions and judgments concerning warfare. Some of the more striking differences across countries involved the extent to which participants talked about moral issues and causes of war. For example, the majority of Egyptian participants discussed moral issues surrounding war, such as the gravity of war and its destructive outcomes, particularly death. Of all of the nations represented in this volume, Egypt has probably engaged in the most external armed conflicts, so the destruction and gravity of war may be much more salient

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to its people. Finally, a large minority of participants in both Nigeria and Angola stressed causes of war, such as disagreements, power, greed, and political interests. Both of these countries have had much experience with internal conflicts, including Angola’s long, bloody war for independence, Angola’s 27-year-long civil war, Nigeria’s 30-month civil war, and both countries’ experiences with corrupt and violent governments, and political and economic civil unrest. Thus, it is not surprising that the members of these two countries stressed power, greed, and political interest when defining war. Participants were also asked to define terrorism. Most of the respondents from all of the nations identified terrorism with the violence, destruction, and fear it causes. Given that Colombia and Peru are the two nations in this volume that have had firsthand experience with internal terrorism, it is instructive to look at what is unique about their responses. The majority of Colombians stressed how terrorism negatively impacts peaceful and democratic movements, and a large minority asserted that terrorism is morally wrong and violates human rights. Similarly, Peruvians defined terrorism as behavior designed to undermine democracy and peace, and about a third of the Peruvians emphasized their disapproval of terrorist ideologies and actions based on those ideologies; these respondents echoed the Colombian arguments that terrorism has no justification and violates human rights. It is interesting that the respondents from these two countries, which have similar experiences with domestic terrorism, had such similar views on terrorism. In addition to defining war and terrorism, respondents in most of the participating nations indicated their level of agreement with several statements having to do with war and terrorism and provided a justification for their ratings. The majority of citizens of all countries disagreed with the statement, ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another,’’ mostly as a general matter of principle, but also because of respect for the sovereignty of other countries. The highest level of disagreement with a state right to invasion came from the citizens of Brazil, all of whom disagreed on the basis of respect for diversity and unwillingness to impose one country or culture on another. The countries with the lowest levels of disagreement with such a state right included Colombia (68 percent), Angola (73 percent), and South Africa (72 percent). Given that these three countries are quite violent in comparison to Brazil, it is instructive to consider the reasons they gave for agreeing with a state right to invasion. Angolans and South Africans said that invasion is acceptable only with approval from the United Nations or other countries; South Africans expressed some tolerance for invasion

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when done in response to threat or when there was great human suffering in the nation being invaded; and Colombians discussed the need for invasion in cases of self-defense or in response to a threat. Given that these countries have had much more experience with civil unrest and war than Brazil, it is not surprising that they could think of circumstances in which invasion might be considered necessary when Brazilians could not and that their reasons included self-defense, responses to a threat, and the need to alleviate human suffering. Similarly, in response to the question, ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war,’’ the majority of respondents from all countries surveyed disagreed, usually on the principle itself, but also primarily because of respect for human rights. Other responses typically mentioned the fact that torture is not effective, that there are alternative and more effective means available, and that torture leads to hatred, dehumanization, and animosity. The countries with the lowest levels of disagreement included Botswana (61 percent), Angola (64 percent), and Zambia (71 percent). Their reasons for sometimes condoning the torture of prisoners focused mostly on the usefulness of torture in gaining information that could protect innocent people. The fact that these three countries are similar in their lower levels of disagreement to this statement is puzzling, given their very different histories. Botswana is one of the most peaceful nations in Africa; it has had a peaceful and prosperous democracy ever since its independence, even with its neighbors being engaged in wars and civil conflicts. Angola, on the other hand, is a neighbor of Botswana that has been embroiled in lengthy, bloody wars, including a war for independence and a civil war. Zambia is more like Botswana; although it has had some domestic issues, including poverty, it has been relatively peaceful and has provided safe haven to refugees from neighboring countries. Finally, in response to the statement ‘‘Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism,’’ again, the majority of respondents from all nations disagreed, principally based on the innocence of those involved and the fact that alternative methods are available to fight terrorism. Respondents to this question also stressed that the ends do not justify the means in this case. Angola stands out again as the country with the lowest level of disagreement (63 percent) to this item. Given their long history of lengthy, bloody wars, it may not be surprising that a large minority of respondents could find reason to agree with a state’s right to sacrifice the lives of innocent civilians when trying to combat terrorism. Most of the participants who indicated some tolerance for civilian losses said that efforts should be made to avoid them, but did stress, in stark comparison to the responses of those who disagreed, that the ends do justify the means.

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VIEWS ON PEACE Definitions of peace were typically placed in one of two categories by the authors of each chapter: either the respondent defined peace positively, in that they framed peace in terms of things that needed to be achieved, such as harmony and tranquility, or the respondent defined peace negatively, in that they framed peace in terms of what is absent, such as the absence of conflict or war. Nigeria and Brazil stand out as the only two nations where the majority of the respondents defined peace negatively. Nigeria and Brazil do have similar histories: They both gained their independence quite peacefully, and both have experienced coups, military dictatorships, and political unrest, as they try to achieve democracy, although Brazil is certainly a more peaceful and prosperous nation. Given that many of the other nations in this sample also have similar histories, it is unclear why these two nations alone would have the majority of their participants define peace negatively. All other nations tended to define peace positively. Across these nations, the majority of respondents who defined peace positively identified it with harmony, tranquility, and equality; however, there were some interesting variations in terminology in some nations. The majority of Costa Ricans provided emotionally invested answers in their positive definitions of peace, which reflects their tendency, in comparison to other nations, to define war in emotionally invested terms. Egyptians, in their positive definitions, stressed the ‘‘quietness’’ of peace—peace allowed one to live a ‘‘quiet’’ life. The most common definition for the Angolans focused on social aspects, such as stable environments and societal activities proceeding normally, probably reflecting that fact that a first step to achieving world peace for Angolans would be achieving a stable environment within their own country. Participants in several of the nations also answered specific questions about peace. For example, in most nations, the majority of people agreed with the item stating, ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace.’’ Most respondents agreed with this right on principle alone, but others argued that peace was necessary for development and prosperity of nations and individuals. Over 95 percent of the respondents in Nigeria, Zambia, Costa Rica, and Brazil agreed with this statement. These are all countries that achieved independence peacefully, but, with the exception of Zambia, all have experienced political unrest and coups in the ensuing years as they pursue democracy. It is interesting that the countries with the lowest level of agreement, Argentina at 69 percent and Colombia at 63 percent, are both South American countries that share many historical features with the countries showing the highest levels of agreement; specifically, after achieving independence, they

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experienced violent coups, political repression, economic stagnation, poverty, and regional war. However, the participants in both Colombia and Argentina may feel that with political violence so recent, and rights so often infringed upon, they have no basis for assuming that peace can be a right. In response to the statement ‘‘I believe that world peace can be achieved,’’ the highest level of agreement by far came from Nigerians, 96 percent of whom totally agreed. This near unanimity of agreement could reflect Nigerians’ recent experience with achieving democracy and its first peaceful transfer of power in 2007; however, countries with similar histories had more moderate levels of agreement with this statement—typically between one-third and two-thirds of respondents from all nations agreed with this statement. It is also possible that the high level of agreement among the Nigerians is due, in part, to the fact that many of them completed the survey within a focus group format. Overall, most of the respondents who indicated a belief in the achievability of peace discussed the conditions that would be necessary for such an achievement, including the making of a global effort, having a more powerful United Nations, having the right leadership, having people working together, and helping human beings to be less selfish and more respectful. Some also stressed that world peace is something that should be strived for and could be achievable in a few generations. The participants who disagreed with the achievability of world peace tended to focus on the flaws in human nature and social relations (e.g., too much diversity; inherent selfishness; ambition for power and dominance) and in our nations (e.g., efforts to outdo each other; too much need for power; too much political, economic, and religious injustice; too many tyrants allowed to remain in power). Others also stressed that there are too many differences between individuals and too many imbalances in power and resources. By far the lowest levels of agreement with the idea that world peace can be achieved came from the Angolans (13 percent), Brazilians (13 percent), and Colombians (15 percent), each of whom had their own specific reasons for disagreeing. Angolans, who have been subjected to lengthy, bloody internal wars, stressed the flaws in human nature. Brazilians, who have experienced political unrest and coups, but live relatively peacefully in comparison to Angolans and Colombians, stressed the vast cultural differences in the world as barriers to peace. Colombians discussed issues specific to the warring parties in Colombia, where peace deals are never followed by an end to armed conflict; they also discussed how Colombia is embedded in a fight for wealth and power to provide privilege for a few. In contrast to the response pattern for the items concerning the achievability of peace, respondents from the various countries were

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highly consistent in their agreement with the statement ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace.’’ In general, across countries, respondents tended simply to re-iterate the right, emphasizing the need for people to be able to express themselves freely, and arguing that this is the only way they can be heard. Many respondents also imposed qualifications on this right, saying that the protests themselves need to be nonviolent and peaceful. Some participants even stressed their belief that protests are a civic responsibility, not just a right, because citizens need to speak out against war and when they think their governments are acting immorally. The highest level of agreement came from Brazilians, 100 percent of whom agreed in the right to protest and said that people should express their thoughts and opinions freely and in a way that does not harm others. The lowest level of agreement (71 percent) came from Argentines, many of whom said that participating in protests was a legally provided or socially sanctioned right, not an inherent right. This response may reflect their recent experience with a military dictatorship in which all dissent was squashed and dissenters were subjected to intimidation, torture, forced disappearance, looting, imposition of silence, and exile. Although Argentineans have the right to protest under the current democracy, it is not surprising that, given their history, almost 30 percent of Argentines do not view protesting as an inherent right. The final statement that respondents addressed was ‘‘National Security is essential for individual and family security.’’ As was true in regard to a right to protest, the majority of the respondents from most countries agreed with the item, although their justifications varied. In Angola, which had an 85 percent agreement rate, some of the respondents argued that security needs to start with the individual, rather than the state. In South Africa, where 73 percent of the participants agreed, the respondents argued that without national security, a country is in disarray and cannot provide a law-based system to protect individuals and families. In Nicaragua, which had a 79 percent agreement rate, respondents noted that the nation needs to be secure for its citizens to be secure and thrive; people can then act freely without fear. In both Costa Rica and Brazil, respondents tended to define national security and threats in relation to internal issues, such as crime, education, health, and family violence. The highest level of agreement with this statement was in the Nigerian sample, where 98 percent agreed, whereas the lowest level was in Argentina, where only 42 percent agreed; those who disagreed cited their distrust of the government’s use of the term ‘‘national security’’ and a failure to see the link between national and individual security. The vast difference between levels of agreement in Nigeria versus Argentina could be due to their different

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historical experiences: Argentineans lived under a military dictatorship that left effects that are still felt today, perhaps resulting in an inherent mistrust of governmental motives, whereas Nigerians have had several attempts at democracies, the most recent of which has succeeded, thereby possibly reinforcing a growing trust in government.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS What is most telling about the responses to the various issues related to war, terrorism, and peace in this survey is that despite the differences in each nation’s histories, overall, there is much consistency in their response patterns. Particularly with regard to issues of war and terrorism, people were in agreement: Governments do not have the right to invade another country, torture prisoners of war, or kill innocent civilians to fight international terrorism. The reasons people gave for their responses were also quite similar, including an emphasis on national sovereignty, respect for human rights, and the availability of alternative ways of handling situations. Moreover, definitions of war and terrorism were remarkably similar across nations. Participants tended to define war as an armed conflict between two nations, and terrorism as a force of violence, fear, and destruction. Although there were some variations in percentages of people in each nation who expressed disagreement with a given statement (e.g., the nation that consistently had the lowest level of disagreement with these statements was Angola, a country that has had decades of bloody wars) or who gave a particular response, the similarities are what stand out. Where there seemed to be the most divergence was around the issue of peace. Respondents from the different nations actually seemed to define peace very similarly, usually in terms of harmony and tranquility; however, despite consistency in their conceptions of peace, they revealed considerable disagreement concerning whether peace is a human right and whether world peace is achievable. Moreover, historical and contemporary differences among nations did not seem to account for the extent to which their participants tended to agree or disagree with a right to peace and the achievability of peace. People from nations with a history of civil unrest and violence both agreed and disagreed with these statements. Of course, it is telling that two nations that have experienced some of the highest levels of internal violence, Angola and Colombia, expressed the most doubt that world peace could be achieved. What can we conclude and learn from these findings? The voices of ordinary people throughout the world, with diverse backgrounds,

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cultures, and histories, reveal remarkable similarities in views on war and terrorism, showing that humans want something different from the aggression of the past and recognize that there are alternatives to resolving conflicts other than violence. These voices support the proposition that humans abhor war and terror. Even though views on peace were more varied, the qualitative responses did point toward the fact that people want peace. Peace may be a utopia, and it may be achievable only in the distant future if it is achievable at all, but people seemed to agree that it is something that is desirable and should always be pursued. The fact that many participants recognized the human and national weaknesses that interfere with world peace—needs for power and domination, selfishness, and wide differences between individuals and cultures—indicates that these are the points we can start to address in our efforts towards peace. By shunning war and terror and using alternative means to resolve conflict, by learning to appreciate differences among individuals and cultures, and by addressing the vices of power, domination, and selfishness, we can take several steps closer to a peaceful world.

Notes

Set Introduction 1. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, 1945. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1. 2. Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 894. 3. Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, ‘‘Armed Conflict and Its International Dimensions, 1946–2004,’’ Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 5 (2005): 623–35. 4. Human Security Centre (2005), Human Security Report 2005 Fact Sheet. (Vancouver, BC: University of British Colombia), http://www.humansecuri tyreport.org/press/Armed_Conflict-Factsheet.pdf 5. Robert M. Sapolsky, ‘‘A Natural History of Peace,’’ Foreign Affairs 85, no.1 (2006): 104–20. 6. Peaceful Societies: Alternatives to Violence and War, ‘‘Encyclopedia of Selected Peaceful Societies,’’ http://www.peacefulsocieties.org:80/Society/ intro.html. 7. Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Palgrave, 2000). 8. Office of the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights, ‘‘Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,’’ http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cat.htm. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984, entry into force 26 June 1987, in accordance with article 27 (1). 9. Office of the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights, ‘‘Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace,’’ http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ peace.htm. Approved by General Assembly resolution 39/11 of 12 November 1984.

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10. Office of the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights, ‘‘Convention on the Rights of the Child,’’ http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc. htm. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, entry into force 2 September 1990, in accordance with article 49. 11. United Nations, ‘‘Charter of the United Nations,’’ http://www.un.org/ aboutun/charter/. 12. United Nations, ‘‘Charter of the United Nations.’’ 13. United Nations, ‘‘Charter of the United Nations.’’ 14. C. Enemark and C. Michaelsen, ‘‘Just War Doctrine and the Invasion of Iraq,’’ Australian Journal of Politics and History 51, no. 4 (2005): 545–63. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2000). 15. Enemark and Michaelsen, ‘‘Just War Doctrine and the Invasion of Iraq.’’ 16. Laurie Calhoun, ‘‘Legitimate Authority and ‘Just War’ in the Modern World,’’ Peace and Change 27, no. 1 (2002), 37–62. 17. Nicholas Rengger, ‘‘On the Just War Tradition in the Twenty-First Century,’’ International Affairs 78, 2 (2002). 353–63. 18. In our view, ‘‘race’’ is a social construct lacking a biological basis. 19. Kathleen Malley-Morrison, International Perspectives on Family Violence and Abuse (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004). 20. A. Strauss and J. Corbin, ‘‘Grounded Theory Methodology: An Overview,’’ in Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry, ed. N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1998), 273–85. 21. Johan Galtung, ‘‘Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses,’’ Journal of Peace Research 22, no. 2 (1985): 141–58.

Chapter 1 1. Michael Oren, ‘‘Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East’’ (Oxford, 2002). 2. Richard Warner, www.touregypt.net/featurestories/ahmose1.htm (accessed April 1, 2008). 3. Because the sun is so essential to sustaining life, the fact that this war goddess was considered its mother shows how natural a part of life ancient Egyptians viewed conflict as being. 4. ‘‘Menhet,’’ Ancient Egypt Online, www.ancientegyptonline.co.uk/menhet. html (accessed October 11, 2008). 5. Scholars are not in agreement on when the Hyksos invasion occurred. The name Hyksos is a shortened Greek interpretation of the Egyptian name Hega-Khases, ‘‘Rulers of Foreign Lands.’’ Richard Warner, ‘‘Ahmose I, Founder of the 18th Dynasty and the New Kingdom of Ancient Egypt,’’ www.touregypt. net/featurestories/ahmose1.htm (accessed April 18, 2008). 6. See John Baines for information on the Hyksos and a general timeline on Ancient Egypt, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ancient/egyptians/timeline. shtml (accessed April 18, 2008).

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7. Richard Warner, ‘‘Ahmose I, Founder of the 18th Dynasty and the New Kingdom of Ancient Egypt,’’ www.touregypt.net/featurestories/ahmose1.htm (accessed April 18, 2008). 8. Byblos is present-day Lebanon. See Troy Fox for an explanation of kebitu. ‘‘The Ancient Egyptian Navy,’’ www.touregypt.net/featurestories/navy.htm (accessed April 18, 2008). 9. Helen Chapin Metz, Egypt: A Country Study, (Washington, DC: Federal Division of the Library of Congress, 1990). 10. Today, Muslims comprise 90 percent of the population while Christians— mostly Copts—are believed to be 10 percent (CIA World Factbook: Egypt), www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html#People (accessed 1/1/2009). See Metz on the Arab invasion, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ frd/cs/egtoc.html (accessed October 11, 2008). 11. Max Sewell, ‘‘The Discovery of the Rosetta Stone,’’ www.napoleon-series. org/research/miscellaneous/c_rosetta.html (accessed October 11, 2008). 12. Ali died in 1949 but the family ruling dynasty he began stayed in power until 1952. 13. Helen Chapin Metz, ‘‘Egypt and the Eastern Question,’’ www.shsu.edu/ ~his_ncp/593Egy.html (accessed April 15, 2008). 14. The Egyptians and British signed the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, which allowed Egypt to maintain close ties with the British while strengthening their army. See ‘‘The Anglo-Egyptian Alliance Treaty 1936,’’ www.britainssmallwars.com/Canal/Treaty.html (accessed April 15, 2008). 15. ‘‘The Middle East 1916-2001: A Documentary Record,’’ The Avalon Project at the Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/mideast.asp (accessed April 15, 2008). 16. Nasserites are revolutionaries with Nasser’s political ideology and many can be found throughout the world today. 17. Raymond William Baker, Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt’s Political Soul (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). 18. Mark N. Cooper, The Transformation of Egypt (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). 19. ‘‘Egyptian-Libyan War 1977,’’ Dictionary of Wars, 273; Revenge in the Desert, www.onwar.com/aced/data/lima/libyaegypt1977.htm (accessed April 15, 2008). 20. While Jews refer to it as the Yom Kippur War, Muslims call it the Ramadan War based on its occurrence around important holidays for both religions. For more on the strategies and outcome of this war, see Simon Dunstan, The Yom Kippur War: The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 (Westminster, MD: Osprey Publishing, 2007). 21. For more on the Camp David Peace Accords and Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of March 1979, see Metz, ‘‘Egypt: A Country Study,’’ http://lcweb2.loc. gov/frd/cs/egtoc.html (accessed October 11, 2008). 22. John Baines and Jaromir Malek, Cultural Atlas of Ancient Egypt, 2nd ed. (New York: Checkmark Publishers, 2000).

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23. The Muslim Brotherhood is a religious based opposition group, the largest opposition group in Egypt (Heba Saleh, ‘‘Islamists Suffer as Freedom Slips Down the Mideast Agenda,’’ Financial Times, July 10, 2007). 24. According to Reporters Without Borders, Egypt ranked 146 out of 173 countries in the 2008 Worldwide Press Freedom Index Ranking. See http:// www.rsf.org/. Accusations of vote rigging were most pronounced when Mubarak was reelected for his fifth consecutive term during the September 2005 elections, Egypt’s first multicandidate competition for the office of president. Up until then, Mubarak had been nominated by parliament and confirmed uncontested in referendums at the end of each of his terms. 25. Economic Trends Report: Egypt, May 2007, Embassy of the United States of America, Cairo. See also ‘‘Egypt realizes best GDP growth for 40 years, inflation hits 12.4%,’’ Business Intelligence, www.bi-me.com/main.php?id=10870&t=1& c=34&cg= (accessed August 16, 2008). 26. ‘‘The Unfinished War: A Decade since Desert Storm,’’ CNN, www.cnn. com/SPECIALS/2001/gulf.war/facts/gulfwar/ (accessed August 16, 2008). 27. ‘‘The IMF’s Model Student,’’ The Economist, March 18, 1999, www.econo mist.com/surveys/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=319594 (accessed August 17, 2008). 28. This is a 2007 estimate. See ‘‘The World Factbook: Egypt,’’ Central Intelligence Agency, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg. html (accessed November 21, 2008). 29. ‘‘Egypt’s Profile,’’ Egyptian Investment Portal, Ministry of Investment, www.investment.gov.eg/MOI_Portal/en-GB/EgyptsþBusiness/Profile/ (accessed September 3, 2008). 30. Michael Slackman, ‘‘Stifled, Egypt’s Young Turn to Islamic Fervor,’’ New York Times, February 17, 2008. In Arab societies, it is customary that a man cannot gain the permission to marry from his parents or the parents of the brideto-be unless he has a furnished apartment, or has the means to purchase an apartment with furniture where he and his new family can live. These material goods serve as proof to the woman and her family (especially her male relatives) that the man asking for her hand in marriage can, indeed, support her. 31. Nadim Audi, ‘‘What the Generation in Question Thinks,’’ New York Times, February 16, 2008. 32. Killian Clarke, ‘‘Public Opinion Poll Reveals Egyptians Displeased with Government,’’ Egypt Daily News, July 26, 2007. 33. See ‘‘Egyptians Riot over Bread Crisis,’’ Telegraph, www.telegraph.co.uk/ finance/economics/2787714/Egyptians-riot-over-bread-crisis.html (accessed September 12, 2008). 34. See ‘‘Eleven Tourists, Eight Egyptians Kidnapped,’’ Cnn.com/world, September 22, 2008, www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/09/22/egypt.italians. kidnapped/index.html (accessed September 24, 2008). 35. ‘‘Egypt Country Profile,’’ BBC http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/ country_profiles/737642.stm#leaders (accessed October 2, 2008). 36. Killian Clarke, ‘‘Public Opinion Poll Reveals Egyptians Displeased with Government,’’ Egypt Daily News, July 26, 2007.

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37. The Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) was developed by Boston University psychology professor, Dr. Kathleen Malley-Morrison, and a group of international researchers whose chief interest was investigating and assessing international and cross-cultural perspectives on various forms of aggression. See http://people.bu.edu/jdgmnts/ for further information. 38. These are 2007 estimates. See ‘‘CIA World Factbook: Egypt,’’ Central Intelligence Agency, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg. html (accessed November 21, 2008). 39. Bruce Bower, ‘‘Courage and Cowardice in Scandinavia,’’ Standpoint Online, July 2008, www.standpointmag.co.uk/node/158/full (accessed November 25, 2008). 40. Bower, ‘‘Courage and Cowardice.’’ 41. ‘‘Tourism Minister: Tourism Revenues by 2008 End Hit $11.6b,’’ Arab Finance, November 25, 2008, www.arabfinance.com/news/newsdetails.aspx? id=124754 (accessed November 30, 2008). 42. BBC, ‘‘On This Day 4/18,’’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/ stories/april/18/newsid_2525000/2525335.stm (accessed January 2, 2009). 43. Douglas Jehl, ‘‘Attack on Cairo Tourist Bus Kills 9 Germans and Driver,’’ New York Times, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C06EFD81138F93AA 2575AC0A961958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all (accessed January 2, 2009). 44. BBC, ‘‘On This Day 11/17,’’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/ stories/november/17/newsid_2519000/2519581.stm (accessed January 2, 2009). 45. ‘‘Egypt Terror to Hurt Tourism Industry Temporarily,’’ afrol News, www. afrol.com/printable_article/18932 (accessed January 1, 2009). 46. ‘‘30 Arrested in Egypt Resort Attack,’’ USA Today, http://www.usatoday. com/news/world/2006-04-24-egypt-blasts_x.htm (accessed January 1, 2009).

Chapter 2 1. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria (London and Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 17, 19. 2. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, 21, 23–4. 3. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, 28–9, 30–1. 4. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, 39, 53. 5. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, 67, 72. 6. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, 72. 7. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, 74–5. 8. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, 82, 89. 9. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, 89. 10. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, 95–97. 11. Eghosa E. Osaghae, Nigeria Since Independence: Crippled Giant (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998), 33. 12. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, 93, 119–21. 13. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, 137, 147, 151, 161.

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14. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, 151. 15. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, 165–9. 16. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, 172–3. 17. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, 175, 177, 183-8. 18. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, 188–93. 19. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, 195, 205, 215-22. 20. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, 205. 21. British Broadcasting Company, ‘‘Timeline: Nigeria,’’ http://news.bbc.co. uk/2/hi/africa/1067695.stm. 22. Eghosa E. Osaghae, Nigeria Since Independence, 43. 23. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, 105. 24. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, 106–7. 25. Eghosa E. Osaghae, Nigeria Since Independence, 56–61. 26. Toyin Falola, The History of Nigeria, 116–8. 27. Eghosa E. Osaghae, Nigeria Since Independence, 65. 28. British Broadcasting Company, ‘‘Timeline: Nigeria.’’ 29. British Broadcasting Company, ‘‘Country Profile: Nigeria,’’ http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1064557.stm. 30. Nigeria-Amnesty International Report 2008, http://www.amnesty.org/ en/region/nigeria/report-2008. 31. BBC News, ‘‘In Pictures: Fighting for Nigeria’s Oil,’’ January 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/picture_gallery/04/africa_fighting_ for_nigeria0s_oil/html/4.stm. 32. BBC News, ‘‘Oil firms ordered to Niger Delta,’’ February 8, 2008, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7234901.stm. 33. Andrew Walker, ‘‘‘Blood Oil’ Dripping from Nigeria,’’ BBC News, 7/27/ 08, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7519302.stm. 34. Nigeria-Amnesty International Report 2008, http://www.amnesty.org/ en/region/nigeria/report-2008. 35. Nigeria-Amnesty International Report 2008, http://www.amnesty.org/ en/region/nigeria/report-2008.

Chapter 3 1. BBC News, ‘‘Ghana Election to Go to a Run-Off,’’ BBC News, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7775789.stm. 2. Associated Press, ‘‘Ghana Presidential Vote to Be Rerun in Single Area by Francis Kokutse,’’ Associated Press, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/ article/ALeqM5h-sSFDir6ZY-P1r-O9Qq3A7zgEoQD95D6R700. 3. Joseph Uscinski, ‘‘Too Close to Call? Uncertainty and Bias in ElectionNight Reporting,’’ Social Science Quarterly 88, no. 1 (2007): 54. 4. Kirk Johnson, ‘‘Democrat Is Winner in Recount of Minnesota Senate Race,’’ New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/06/us/politics/ 06minnesota.html.

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5. The CIA World Fact Book, ‘‘Ghana,’’ CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gh.html. 6. John G. Jackson, Introduction to African Civilizations (New York: Citadel Press, 2001), 201. 7. United Nations, Economics and Social Affairs Division, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision, http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/ wpp2006/WPP2006_Highlights_rev.pdf, 40. 8. Rachel Naylor, Ghana: a Country Profile (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxfam GB, 2000), 13–6. 9. Ivor G. Wilks, Asante in the Nineteenth Century: The Structure and Evolution of a Political Order (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975, 19. 10. Naylor, Ghana, 15. 11. Larry W. Yarak, ‘‘Elmina and Greater Asante in the Nineteenth Century,’’ Africa 56, no. 1 (1986): 33–52. 12. Naylor, Ghana, 14. 13. Economist Intelligence Unit, Ghana: Country Profile 2002 (London, UK: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002), 13–4. 14. Kwame Arhin, ‘‘The Pressure of Cash and Its Political Consequences in Asante in the Colonial Period, 1900–1940,’’ Journal of African Studies 3, no. 4 (1976): 453–68. 15. Michael Porter, ‘‘Ghana: National Economic Strategy,’’ Harvard Business School, case study, August 14, 2007, 1. 16. Porter, ‘‘Ghana,’’ 3–4. 17. Kwame Nkrumah (speech, Accra, Ghana, March 1957). 18. Naylor, Ghana, 19. 19. Kwame Nkrumah. I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology, (London: William Heinemann Ltd. 1961). 20. Porter, ‘‘Ghana,’’ 5. 21. Naylor, Ghana, 27. 22. BBC News, ‘‘Rawlings: The Legacy,’’ BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/africa/1050310.stm. 23. BBC News, ‘‘Rawlings.’’ 24. Naylor, Ghana, 31. 25. BBC News, Opposition leader. 26. The CIA World Factbook: Ghana. 27. The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) were promulgated by the United Nations under the previous Secretary General, Kofi Annan, to establish a minimum standard of decency and prosperity for all countries (i.e., member states) to strive for. Of all places in the world, sub-Saharan Africa is lagging in meeting those goals more than any other region. Although it is unlikely that Ghana will meet the MDG, it has been making progress. Now, as the economic crisis unfolds in the richer countries, as aid decreases and trade is protected, the prospects for Ghana, as well as the rest of Africa, drop considerably. 28. The CIA World Factbook: Ghana. 29. The CIA World Factbook: Ghana.

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30. Ultimately, very few places exported slaves from Africa, and the numbers didn’t tend to depopulate even those places. Slavery is more a dominant historical aspect of American history than Africa, overall. 31. Ghana Constitution, Chapter 5, art. 15, sec. 1-2, http://www.ghana.gov. gh/ghana/fundamental_human_rights_and_freedoms.jsp. 32. Senator Edward Kennedy was on the FBI’s list of terrorist suspects for several years and had great difficulty convincing the authorities to stop the harassment that he encountered at American airports. 33. Private interview with Bradley Hartfield (author). 34. Ghana Constitution, Chapter 5, art. 13, sec. 1, http://www.ghana.gov.gh/ ghana/fundamental_human_rights_and_freedoms.jsp. 35. Ghana Constitution Chapter 5, art. 13, sec. 1. 36. Although none of the people in our Ghana survey has served in the military, we did not explore whether they had other related experience either as a member of a private militia, or victim, or as has so often been the case in Africa, both. 37. Economists and development workers use the phrase ‘‘global north’’ to refer, broadly speaking, to the developed countries of the world. It includes the developed west, as well as Japan, Korea, Chile, Argentina, Singapore, and other countries not geographically in the ‘‘west,’’ nor, necessarily, in the northern hemisphere. 38. Kofi Annan was the head of UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) at the time of the Rwandan genocide and was a key player in the ensuing debate about the right of the international community to intervene to prevent or minimize a humanitarian crisis. 39. Kwame Nkruma. I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology.

Chapter 4 1. Embassy of the Republic of Angola, About Angola: History (Washington DC), http://www.angola.org/history.html. 2. U.S. Library of Congress, ‘‘Precolonial Angola and the arrival of the Portuguese,’’ http://74.125.45.132/search?q=cache:7_uuhjCvVFoJ:countrystudies. us/angola/4.htmþpreþcolonialþhistoryþangola&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us. http://74.125.45.132/search?q=cache:7_uuhjCvVFoJ:countrystudies.us/angola/ 4.htmþpreþcolonialþhistoryþangola&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us. 3. Embassy of the Republic of Angola, About Angola: History (Washington DC), http://www.angola.org/history.html. 4. Embassy of the Republic of Angola, About Angola: History. 5. Edmund Jan Osm^aanczyk and Anthony Mango, Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements (London: Taylor & Francis, 2003), 95. 6. Philippe Le Billion. ‘‘Angola’s Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds 1975-2000,’’ African Affairs 100 (2001): 55-59. 7. Edward George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale (Cass Military Studies) (New York: Routledge, 2006), http://books.google.fr/books?id=u_0yE0vcBQoC&pg=PA9&lpg=PA9&dq=

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angola’sþuprisingþagainstþtheþportuguese&source=web&ots=7FLCttuBJU&sig= 4EV8niI49LYTfMxVwh3WnoYDFo&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct= result#PPA10,M1. 8. Donald S. Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and Incentives for Cooperation (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 115–6. 9. George Wright, The Destruction of a Nation: United States Policy Towards Angola Since 1945 (London: Pluto Press, 1997), 2, 8–11, 57. 10. U.S. Department of State, Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, The Angola Crisis 1974-75, http://74.125.45.132/search?q=cache:HBQZtwUooskJ: www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-539.htmlþinternationalþpressureþindepend enceþangola&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=us. 11. U.S. Department of State, Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, The Angola Crisis 1974–75. 12. U.S. Department of State, Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, The Angola Crisis 1974–75. 13. U.S. Department of State, Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, The Angola Crisis 1974–75. 14. U.S. Department of State, Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, The Angola Crisis 1974–75. 15. Global Policy Forum, Angola’s 25 Years of Civil War, http://www.global policy.org/security/sanction/angola/001109.htm. 16. UNHCR, 2005. Country Operations Plan. Overview. Country: Angola. Planning Year 2006. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/ 43218fad2.pdf (accessed on January 11, 2008). 17. Alison C. Smith, ‘‘The Angolan Civil War. A Civilian Disaster,’’ Australian Family Physician 32, no. 9 (September 2003). 18. BBC News, ‘‘Observers Unsure on Angola Poll,’’ http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/africa/7603735.stm. 19. Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Angola: Irregularities Marred Historic Elections,’’ September 15, 2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/09/15/angola-irreg ularities-marred-historic-elections. 20. Philippe Le Billion. ‘‘Angola’s Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds 1975–2000.’’ p. 58. 21. Michael L. Ross, ‘‘What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?’’ Journal of Peace Research 41. no. 337 (2004). 22. Philippe Le Billion. ‘‘Angola’s Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds 1975–2000, ‘‘ 55–8. 23. Global Witness, ‘‘United Nations Lifts Diamond Sanctions on Angola but Keeps Sanctions on Sierra Leone Diamonds, Meanwhile Congo Still Has No Diamond Sanctions. Does The UN Have A Coordinated Conflict Diamond Policy?’’ October 12 2002, http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail. php/278/en/united_nations_lifts_diamond_sanctions_on_angola_b. 24. Relief web, Angola: cabinda separatist movement say ready to sign ceasefire, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/KKEE-6RKMY3?Open Document.

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25. BBC News, Angola ‘‘clampdown’’ on separatists, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/africa/6941185.stm. 26. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, ‘‘Angola,’’ https:// www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html. 27. The Democracy index is an annual study published by The Economist, quantifying the electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of the government, political participation, and political culture. 28. International Monetary Fund: World Economical and Financial Database, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/02/weodata/index. aspx. 29. United Nations Statistics Division–National Accounts, http://unstats.un. org/unsd/snaama/selectionbasicFast.asp. 30. Human Development Index: Angola, http://74.125.45.132/search?q= cache:AIi4kiUZbZwJ:www.sarpn.org.za/RegionalViews/angola.phpþangolaþginiþ index&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us. 31. The Human Development index is a measure published by the United Nations Development Programme combining measures of life expectancy, literacy, educational attainment, and GDP per capita. 32. BBC News, ‘‘IMF: Angola’s Missing Millions,’’ October 18, 2002, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2338669.stm. 33. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, ‘‘Angola,’’ https:// www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html. 34. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, ‘‘Angola,’’ https:// www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html. 35. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, ‘‘Angola,’’ https:// www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html. 36. Kathleen Malley-Morrison, Maria Daskalopoulos, Julia Gefter, Julia Wenger, and Kyleen Hashim, ‘‘International Perspectives on War and Peace,’’ Peace Psychology 15, no. 1 (2006): 6–7. 37. BBC News Channel. UN reports Angola ‘‘torture abuse,’’ http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7018226.stm. 38. BBC News Channel. UN reports Angola ‘‘torture abuse,’’ http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7018226.stm. 39. BBC News Channel. UN reports Angola ‘‘torture abuse,’’ http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7018226.stm. 40. Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Bakongo in Angola, 2004. UNHCR, Refworld, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469f3863c.html. 41. Philippe Le Billion. ‘‘Angola’s Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds 1975–2000,’’ p. 55–6. 42. Edward R. McMahon and Thomas Sinclair. Performance: Research and Policy Perspectives, (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002) 127–8. 43. Edward R. McMahon and Thomas Sinclair. Performance: Research and Policy Perspectives, 127–8. 44. Cristopher Paycroft, ‘‘Angola–The Forgotten Tragedy,’’ Journal of Southern African Studies 20, no. 2 (1994): 21. 45. Cristopher Paycroft, ‘‘Angola–The Forgotten Tragedy, 23.

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46. Finkel, Steven E., http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals/journal_of_ democracy/v014/14.4finkel.html. 47. Edward R. McMahon and Thomas Sinclair, Performance: Research and Policy Perspectives. 48. Human Rights Watch, Angola: Doubts over Free and Fair Elections. http:// 74.125.45.132/search?q=cache:zFHFXew5lxUJ:www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/08/ 12/angola-doubts over-free-and-fair-electionsþreportsþhumanþrightsþangola& hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=5&gl=us. 49. Human Rights Watch, Angola: Doubts over Free and Fair Elections. 50. Human Rights Watch, Angola: Doubts over Free and Fair Elections. 51. Human Rights Watch World Report 2007: Angola, http://74.125.45.132/ search?q=cache:7-jf5TrxwWUJ:www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,HRW,AGO, 456d621e2,45aca29816,0.htmlþreportsþhumanþrightsþangola&hl=en&ct=clnk& cd=14&gl=us. 52. Human Rights Watch, Angola: Doubts over Free and Fair Elections. 53. Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 2007, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 11, 2008, http://angola.use mbassy.gov/angola_country_report_on_human_rights_practices_2007.html.

Chapter 5 1. Sir Seretse Khama, speech of Chancellor at University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland graduation ceremony, May 15, 1970. Botswana Daily News, May 19, 1970, supplement. 2. Jamie Uys, writer and director, The Gods Must Be Crazy: I and II (Norway: August 1981; United States: April 1990). 3. Alexander McCall Smith, The Number One Ladies Detective Agency (New York: First Anchor Books Edition, 2002). 4. James Denbow and Phenyo C. Phebe, Culture and Customs of Botswana (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006), 1–4. 5. J. Clark Leith, Why Botswana Prospered (Montreal & Kingston: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2005), ix. 6. Fred Morton, Jeff Ramsay, and Part Themba Mgadla, Historical Dictionary of Botswana, 4th ed. (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2008), 1. 7. Denbow and Phebe, Culture and Customs of Botswana, x. 8. Morton, Ramsay, and Mgadla, Historical Dictionary of Botswana, 2. 9. ‘‘Explanation of the Flag,’’ FOTW Flags of the World website, http:// www.flags.de/fotw/flags/bw.html#exp. 10. ‘‘The World Fact Book,’’ Central Intelligence Agency, Field Listings–Ethnic Groups, https://cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2075.html. 11. Michael Dutfield, A Marriage of Inconvenience: The Persecution of Seretse and Ruth Khama (Gaborne, Botswana: Pula Press [reprint], 1990). 12. Neil Parsons, ‘‘Seretse Khama 1921–80: A Brief Biography of Sir Seretse Khama, Botswana’s first president,’’ University of Botswana History Department, http://www.thuto.org/ubh/bw/skhama.htm.

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13. Morton, Ramsay, and Mgadla, Historical Dictionary of Botswana, 11. 14. Morton, Ramsay, and Mgadla, Historical Dictionary of Botswana, 2–4. 15. Maggie Farley, ‘‘At AIDS Disaster’s Epicenter, Botswana Is a Model of Action; During U.N. conference, leader speaks of national ‘extinction,’ but country plans continent’s most ambitious programs,’’ Los Angeles Times, June 27, 2001. 16. Farley, ‘‘At AIDS Disaster’s Epicenter.’’ 17. CNN, World, ‘‘Gem-of-a-Deal Spares Botswana from Blood Diamonds,’’ http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/12/11/koinange.botswana/index. html. 18. Rupert Isaacson, ‘‘Last Exit from the Kalahari: The Slow Genocide of the Bushmen/San,’’ Open Democracy, http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization africa_democracy/article_267.jsp, 2002. 19. Morton, Ramsay, and Mgadla, Historical Dictionary of Botswana, 3–4. 20. Neil Parsons, ‘‘A Brief History of Botswana,’’ Bostwana History Pages, http://ubh.tripod.com/bw/bhp1.htm#doc_top. 21. Morton, Ramsay, and Mgadla. Historical Dictionary of Botswana, 7–8. 22. Denbow and Phebe, Culture and Customs of Botswana, 27–8. 23. Parsons, http://ubh.tripod.com/bw/bhp1.htm#doc_top. 24. Ibid. 25. Parsons, http://ubh.tripod.com/bw/bhp1.htm#doc_top. 26. Denbow and Phebe, Culture and Customs of Botswana, 29–30. 27. Morton, Ramsay, and Mgadla, Historical Dictionary of Botswana, 8–9. 28. Morton, Ramsay, and Mgadla, Historical Dictionary of Botswana, 329–30. 29. Morton, Ramsay, and Mgadla, Historical Dictionary of Botswana, 329–30. 30. Denbow and Phebe, Culture and Customs of Botswana, 30–1. 31. Morton, Ramsay, and Mgadla, Historical Dictionary of Botswana, 154-5. 32. Denbow and Phebe, Culture and Customs of Botswana, 31. 33. Denbow and Phebe, Culture and Customs of Botswana, 31–2. 34. Denbow and Phebe, Culture and Customs of Botswana, 32. 35. Morton, Ramsay, and Mgadla. Historical Dictionary of Botswana, 191. 36. Morton, Ramsay, and Mgadla. Historical Dictionary of Botswana, 285–86. 37. Denbow and Phebe, Culture and Customs of Botswana, 4. 38. Encyclopedia of Nations, Africa, Botswana History, http://www.nation sencyclopedia.com/Africa/Botswana-HISTORY.html. 39. Kathleen Malley-Morrison, et al. International perspectives on war and peace. Peace Psychology 15, no. 1 (spring 2006): 6–7. 40. Tswana (Motswana, plural Batswana) is the name of a Southern African people. The Tswana language, also called Setswana, belongs to the Bantu group of the Niger-Congo languages. Ethnic Batswana make up a majority of the population of Botswana. However, the term ‘‘Batswana’’ is sometimes used simply to mean citizens of Botswana and can include Khoisan people, white people, and others. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tswana. 41. Ikalanga or Kalanga is a Bantu language spoken in Botswana by 150,000 people and in Zimbabwe by 700,000 people who are called the BaKalanga. It is a Bantu language known for its extensive phoneme inventory, which includes

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palatalized, velarized, aspirated, and breathy voiced consonants. A people who originated from the Limpopo/Drakensburg areas of S/Africa and settled in the Northern part of Botswana and the modern day Zimbabwe, http://en.wikipe dia.org/wiki/Ikalanga_languageWikipedia. 42. The Free Encyclopedia, ‘‘List of Political Parties in Botswana December 24, 2008, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/. 43. University of Botswana History Department, World War I and II Pages, Botswana (Bechuanaland Protectorate and Two World Wars), http://www. thuto.org/ubh/bw/ww/wwp1.htm. 44. Denbow and Phebe, Culture and Customs of Botswana, 22.

Chapter 6 1. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2007/ 2008, http://hdr.undp.org/en/. 2. William Tordoff and Robert Molteno, Introduction, ed William Tordoff, Politics in Zambia (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1974). 3. M. R. Bhagavan, Zambia: Impact of Industrial Strategy on Regional Imbalance and Social Inequality. (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies Research Report, 44, 1978). 4. Philip Daniel, Africanization, Nationalisation and Inequality: Mining Labour and the Copperbelt in Zambian Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 5. William Tordoff and Robert Molteno. 6. E. D. Bewayo, ‘‘Local Government in Different Images: Kenya and Zambia’’ (paper presented at the 22nd Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Los Angeles, California, 31 October–3 November, 1979). 7. M. R. Bhagavan. 8. Government of the Republic of Zambia, First National Development Plan, 1966–1970 (Lusaka: Office of National Development Planning, Government Printer, July 1966). 9. Philip Daniel. 10. Trevor Coombe, ‘‘The Origins of Secondary Education in Zambia,’’ Africa Social Research 3 (1967): 173–205. 11. Michael Bratton, ‘‘Economic Crisis and Political Realignment in Zambia,’’ in Economic and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa, ed. Jennifer A. Widner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1994), 101–28. 12. Peter Meyns, ‘‘The Creation of an Enabling Environment for Poverty Reduction—Can Zambia’s Political System Deliver the Goods?’’ (paper presented at Political Dimensions of Poverty Reduction Conference, Lusaka, Zambia, March 9–11, 2005). 13. D.M.C. Bartlett, ‘‘Civil Society and Democracy: A Zambian Case Study,’’ Journal of Southern African Studies 26, 3 (2000).

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14. United Nations-Habitat, ‘‘Land Tenure, Housing Rights and Gender– National and Urban Framework: Zambia,’’ Law, Land Tenure and Gender Review Series: Southern Africa, http://staging.unchs.org/programmes/landtenure/ documents/ZambiaFinal.doc. 15. Kathleen Malley-Morrison, Personal and Institional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) (2003). 16. Elizabeth Thomas, ‘‘Social Capital and Mental Health of Women Living in Informal Settlements in Durban, South Africa and Lusaka, Zambia,’’ in Social Capital and Mental Health, eds. Kwame McKenzie and Trudy Harpham (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2006), 124–37.

Chapter 7 1. The authors thank Laura Howson for her assistance in the first stages of the data analysis. 2. Apartheid is translated as ‘‘separateness’’ and defines the policies of the white government of South Africa from 1948 to 1991, by which people were segregated by race. 3. Clifton Crais, The Politics of Evil: Magic, State Power, and the Political Imagination in South Africa (African Studies Series, no. 103.) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 4. 4. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Volume 1 (Cape Town: Juta, 1999), 94–102. 5. http://almaz.com/nobel/peace/1993a.html (accessed January 22, 2008). 6. For more comprehensive coverage, see http://countrystudies.us/southafrica/. 7. Rainfall of 400 mm is a significant figure, because arable crop farming is not possible below this annual figure, a necessary minimum impacting also on grass suitable for the grazing of cattle. 8. Literally, ‘‘human beings’’: during the apartheid era, the term Bantu was often used in government statements and regulations to designate people of black African descent. Because of the labelling and treatment of this group by the apartheid regime, the term Bantu has assumed some pejorative connotations. 9. Semimigrant farmers of primarily Dutch ancestry played a key role in the expansion of the settlement in the 18th century, leading to increasing frontier conflicts. These people were often poorer whites, seeking to make a living in the hinterland. Traveling by wagon inland and along the southwestern coast, individuals (some with their immediate families), a few slaves, several Khoikhoi herdsmen, and small numbers of livestock set out to find grazing on large tracts of land. 10. South African of mainly Dutch ancestry, but possibly also having German, French, or other European forebears. 11. Michael Cross, Imagery and Identity in South African Education: 1880–1990 (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1999), 75.

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12. ‘‘Colored’’ was a classification term used for people of mixed racial origin. 13. Thobeka Mda and Steward Mothata, eds., Critical Issues in South African Education after 1994 (Kenwyn, South Africa: Juta, 2000). 14. Quoted in BBC news, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/ february/11/newsid_2539000/2539947.stm. 15. Antjie Krog, Country of My Skull: Guilt Sorrow and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1999), 8. 16. Krog, Country of My Skull, ix. 17. Puleng LenkaBula, ‘‘Justice and Reconciliation in Post-apartheid South Africa: A South African Woman’s Perspective,’’ International Review of Mission 94 (2005): 103–15. 18. Solomon Benatar, ‘‘Global Issues in HIV Research,’’ Journal of HIV Therapy 5, no. 4 (2000): 89–92. 19. James Midgley, ‘‘South Africa: The Challenge of Social Development,’’ International Journal of Social Welfare 10, no. 4 (2001): 267–75. 20. Richard Johnson, South Africa: The First Man, the Last Nation (London: Orion Books, 2004). 21. Mel Gray, ‘‘Social Work and the Social Service Professions,’’ Social Work/ Maatskaplike Werk 36, no.1 (2000): 99–109. 22. Jo Beall, ‘‘Fragile Stability: State and Society in Democratic South Africa,’’ Journal of Southern African Studies 31, no. 4 (2005): 686. 23. Patrick Burton, Anton Du Plessis, Ted Leggett, Antoinette Louw, Duxita Mistry, Hennie Van Vuuren, National Victims of Crime Survey: South Africa 2003 (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2004). 24. Kathleen Malley-Morrison, et al., ‘‘International Perspectives on War and Peace,’’ Peace Psychology 15, no. 1 (spring 2006): 6–7. 25. Nelson Mandela, A Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela, (Randburg, South Africa: Macdonald Purnell, 1994), 617.

Chapter 8 1. Kathleen Malley-Morrison, Maria Daskalopoulos, Julia Gefter, Julia Wenger, and Kyleen Hashim, ‘‘International Perspectives on War and Peace,’’ Peace Psychology 15, no. 1 (2006): 6–7. 2. Neill MacAulay, The Sandino Affair (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1998), 19. 3. Leslie Bethell, Central America since Independence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 23. 4. MacAulay, The Sandino Affair. 5. Stanford Center for Latin American Studies, ‘‘Expressions of Nicaragua,’’ Stanford University, http://www.stanford.edu/group/arts/nicaragua/discov ery_eng/timeline/. 6. MacAulay, The Sandino Affair. 7. MacAulay, The Sandino Affair. 8. Knut Walter, The Regime of Anastasio Somoza: 1936–1956 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993).

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9. Claribel Alegrıa and Darwin Flakoll, Death of Somoza (Willimantic, CT: Bookcrafters, 1996). 10. Alegrıa and Flakoll, Death of Somoza. 11. Bernard Didierich, Somoza and the Legacy of U.S. Involvement in Central America. (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2007), 1. 12. Alegrıa and Flakoll, Death of Somoza. 13. New England Central American Network, ‘‘Historical Background of Nicaragua,’’ Stanford University, http://www.stanford.edu/group/arts/nicara gua/discovery_eng/history/background.html. 14. Anja Nygren, ‘‘Violent Conflicts and Threatened Lives: Nicaraguan Experiences of Wartime Displacement and Postwar Distress,’’ Journal of Latin American Studies 35, no. 2 (2003): 367–93. 15. Ronald Reagan and Douglas Brinkley, The Reagan Diaries (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 44. 16. Lawrence Walsh, Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1997). 17. Violeta Chamorro, Dreams of the Heart: The Autobiography of President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro of Nicaragua (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing, 1996). 18. Charmorro, Dreams of the Heart: The Autobiography of President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro of Nicaragua, 9. 19. David Close, Nicaragua: The Chamorro Years (Boulder, CO: Lynee Rienner Publishers, 1999), 37–61. 20. Shelley McConnell, ‘‘Institutional Development,’’ in Nicaragua Without Illusions, ed. Thomas Walker (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1997), 49 21. Thomas Skidmore and Peter H. Smith. Modern Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 344–5. 22. Joel Brinkley, ‘‘U.S. Envoy Goes to Nicaragua to Back Embattled Leader,’’ New York Times, October 5, 2005, International section. 23. Max Blumenthal, ‘‘The Kinder, Gentler Daniel Ortega,’’ The Nation, January 19, 2007, Foreign Affairs section. 24. ‘‘Ortega Wins Nicaraguan Election,’’ BBC News, November 8, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6117704.stm. 25. Associated Press, ‘‘Daniel Ortega Visitar a Rusia el 18 y 19 de Diciembre,’’ La Prensa, 2005, http://www.laprensa.com.ni/archivo/2008/diciembre/12/ noticias/ultimahora/300227_print.shtml. 26. James McKinley, ‘‘Nicaraguan Councils Stir Fear of Dictatorship,’’ New York Times, May 4, 2008. 27. Frank Kendrick, ‘‘Nicaragua: The Second Coming of Daniel Ortega,’’ Council on Hemispheric Affairs, February 4, 2008, http://www.coha.org/2008/ 02/nicaragua-the-second-coming-of-daniel-ortega/. 28. Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Econ omicas y Sociales, ‘‘Highlights of Current Labor Market Conditions in Nicaragua’’ Global Policy Network, 2001, http://www.gpn.org/data/nicaragua/nicaragua-analysis. pdf.

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29. Diego Cevallos, ‘‘Central America: Anti-Poverty Programmes Abound, but Poverty Deepens,’’ Interpress Service of Mexico City, September 17, 2008, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=30318. 30. Malley-Morrison et al., ‘‘International Perspectives on War and Peace.’’ 31. Steven Wayne, Is this Any Way to Run a Democratic Government? (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press), 2004.

Chapter 9 1. For a detailed study of the fallacies inherent in the construction of Costa Rica’s post-1948 identity of peacefulness and neutrality, see Manuel Solıs Avenda~ no, La Institucionalidad Ajena (San Jose: Editorial UCR, 2006). 2. For this effort Arias won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987. U.S. Congressman Newt Gingrich (Rep-Ga) at the time called the award ‘‘premature and saddening.’’ Quoted in Walter La Feber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1993). 3. Walter La Feber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America, 342 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1993). 4. Kirk S. Bowman, Militarization, Democracy, and Development: The Perils of Praetorianism in Latin America (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 232. 5. All of this was done with official U.S. recognition for his new government, granted in 1856. See Lynn V. Foster, A Brief History of Central America (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007). 6. Juan Santamaria has been another victim of a different type of political/ cultural violence, that of characteristic Costa Rican doubt and fashionable historical revisionism. For interesting articles on this topic, see Fernando Dur an Ayanegui, ‘‘Nacion, verdad y mito (Nation, truth, and myth),’’ La Nacion, May 20, 2007, Op Ed, 15; Fernando Duran Ayanegui, ‘‘1856: ¡Pura Vida!,’’ La Nacion, May 13, 2007, Op Ed, 15; Guillermo A. Brenes Tenicio, ‘‘La quema del Meson (The Burning of the Hostel),’’ La Nacion, April 12, 2007, Op Ed, 15; Clotilde Obreg on Quesada, ‘‘Rivas y Juan Santamarıa,’’ La Nacion, April 11, 2006, Op Ed, 15. 7. Eventually, Walker was executed by the Honduran Army after he ended his self-imposed U.S. exile and attempted to reenter the region in 1860. See Lynn V. Foster, A Brief History of Central America (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007); Thomas L. Pearcy, The History of Central America (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 8. New York Times, February 25, 1921. 9. Manuel Solıs Avenda~ no, La Institucionalidad Ajena (San Jose: Editorial UCR, 2006) and Guillermo Villegas Hoffmeister, La Guerra de Figueres (San Jose: Editorial EUNED, 1998). 10. Figueres enlisted the aid of Guatemalan president Arbenz, who together with Figueres built the so-called Caribbean Legion, a group of Latin American reformer politicians, including Fidel Castro, whose goal was to topple the Latin American dictators of the time: Trujillo in Dominican Republic, Batista in Cuba,

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Somoza in Nicaragua, and Calderon in Costa Rica. See Charles Ameringer, The Caribbean Legion Patriots, Politicians, Soldiers of Fortune, 1946–1950 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). 11. Kurt S. Bowman, ‘‘Democracy on the Brink,’’ in The Costa Rica Reader: History, Culture, Politics, ed. I. Molina and S. Palmer (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004), 178. The same year he first became president (1948), Figueres renegotiated Costa Rica’s contract with the United Fruit Company, which he called ‘‘ . . . a vestige of colonialism employed by other countries in past epochs.’’ Quoted in Bowman, ‘‘Democracy on the Brink’’ (2004), 178. 12. Kirk S. Bowman, ‘‘Democracy on the Brink.’’ 13. Kirk S. Bowman, ‘‘Democracy on the Brink.’’ 14. Kurt S. Bowman, ‘‘Democracy on the Brink.’’ 15. Lynn V. Foster, A Brief History of Central America (New York: Checkmark Books, 2007); Walter La Feber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1993). 16. A fact now confirmed in a 1987 interview with Daniel Ortega on CNN (www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/18/interviews/ortega/; see also Walter La Feber, Inevitable Revolutions. 17. An interesting firsthand account of this can be found in the rebel/poet/ catholic priest Ernesto Cardenal’s memoir La Revolucion Perdida (Managua: Anama Ediciones, 2004). 18. Walter La Feber, Inevitable Revolutions. 19. Estimates of the number of dead vary, but at a minimum it has been suggested that it is around 200,000 after 1979 (La Feber, Inevitable Revolutions). However, Guatemala’s civil war, which lasted from 1966 to 1996 is said in itself to have claimed the lives of 200,000 people. In all, many estimates agree that 300,000 is closer to the real numbers of dead in those 30 years of conflict. For this last estimate, see Lynn V. Foster, A Brief History of Central America. 20. A 2003 Demoscopia poll, however, showed that only 60.7 percent of Costa Ricans were against the war in Iraq. It is interesting that the poll showed that Nicaragua and Guatemala, countries that experienced the harsh realities of war more directly, scored a higher opposition to the war, 82.2 percent and 81.2 percent, respectively. Source: Demoscopia/Siglo XXI. Methodology: Telephone interviews with 400 adults in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, conducted on April 3 and April 4, 2003. Margin of error is 5 percent. See Angus Reid Global Monitor, Polls and Research, ‘‘Central Americans Reject War on Iraq,’’ http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/central_americans_reject_war_on_iraq/ (accessed September 9, 2007. 21. The actual words of the Constitutional Assembly retiring the country from the coalition were the following: ‘‘Because it is in contradiction of the Public Constitution, of the international system of the United Nations, and of international law accepted by Costa Rica, we annul the agreement made by the Executive Power on March 19, 2003, related to the military conflict against Iraq, as well as any act related to this.’’ The entire text of the ruling can be read in PDF format at: http://www.uc3m.es/uc3m/inst/MGP/FCISCR1.pdf (accessed September 9, 2007).

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22. As Bowman notes, Costa Rican attitudes toward economic opening and privatization are mixed, with polls regularly showing the majority of the population opposing privatization, yet welcoming export-led growth. See Kirk S. Bowman, Militarization, Democracy, and Development, 232. 23. In the October 7, 2007, national referendum to decide definitively on CAFTA, 51 percent of Costa Ricans voted in favor, indicating a serious ideological split in society. 24. See for example, Javier Sauma Rossie, ‘‘¿Suiza Centroamericana?,’’ La Nacion, December 21, 2007, Op Ed, 15. 25. Source: UNIMER. Methodology: phone interviews to 1,220 adults in Costa Rica, conducted between March 5 and March 15, 2008. 26. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. 27. See Mauricio Herrera, ‘‘Crece respaldo a soluciones violentas contra el hampa (support growing for violent solutions against crime),’’ La Nacion, April 6, 2008. El Paıs, and Hugo Mora Poltronieri, ‘‘Pena de muerte? despues que? (Death Penalty, and then what?),’’ La Nacion, April 9, 2008, Op Ed, 15. 28. Kirk S. Bowman, Militarization, Democracy, and Development, 241. 29. Kathleen Malley-Morrison et al., ‘‘International perspectives on war and peace,’’ Peace Psychology 15, no. 1 (spring 2006): 6–7. 30. We compiled a list of our own of what are commonly known to be the eight ‘‘facts’’ on which the Costa Rican Democratic/Peaceful Identity is based: 1. the peaceful colonization myth and ‘‘the white legend’’, 2. the Battle of Rivas, 3. the National Campaign of 1856, 4. the Civil War of 1948, 5. the abolition of the army in 1949, 6. the social democratic reforms and welfare programs preand post-1948, 7. the Declaration of Perpetual Neutrality in 1983, and 8. the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987. 31. Eugenia Ibarra Rojas, Las manchas del Jaguar: Huellas indıgenas en la historia de Costa Rica (San Jose, Costa Rica: Editorial de la Universidad de Costa Rica, 1999). 32. Hector Perez Brignoli, ‘‘Estimaciones de la poblaci on indıgena de America Central (del siglo XVI al siglo XX),’’ in De los Mayas a la planificacion familiar: demografıa del istmo, ed. L. Rosero Bixby, A. Pebley, and A. Bermudez Mendez (San Jose, Costa Rica: Editorial de la Universidad de Costa Rica, 1997). 33. This also means that the current indigenous population went in roughly 480 years from 100 percent of the total population to 1.3 percent of the population. See Hector Perez Brignoli, ‘‘Estimaciones de la poblaci on indıgena de America Central (del siglo XVI al siglo XX),’’ in De los Mayas a la planificacion familiar: demografıa del istmo, ed. L. Rosero Bixby, A. Pebley, and A. Bermudez Mendez (San Jose, Costa Rica: Editorial de la Universidad de Costa Rica). For data on current population distributions in Costa Rica see Elizabeth Solano Salazar, La poblacion indıgena en Costa Rica seg un el censo del a~ no 2000, www.eclac.cl/ publicaciones/xml/3/13143/9.pdf. 34. Eugenia Ibarra Rojas, Las manchas del Jaguar. 35. When Bowman writes of the importance of the white legend for the construction of the ideal Costa Rican national identity, he couples it with another founding myth, a second intertwining part. This is an economic and structural explanation that emphasized the ‘‘egalitarian nature of pre-coffee Costa Rica

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and the economic stratification that resulted from coffee and capitalism,’’ a vision where the ‘‘yeoman farmer as the centerpiece of the development of a rural democracy endures and is strongly associated with democracy in Costa Rica in the post-1948 period.’’ See Kirk S. Bowman, Militarization, Democracy, and Development, 77–8. 36. At times, this expulsion from the national consciousness seems to take the form of a transformation into its opposite. The most charming examples, by now world famous, are the popular tourist-aimed T-shirts with drawings of exotic birds and turtles with the slogans ‘‘Costa Rican Air Force’’ and ‘‘Costa Rican Navy’’ above. For an explanation of the impact of these T-shirts on tourism and in propagating the antimilitary Costa Rican identity, see Kirk S. Bowman Militarization, Democracy, and Development, 241–2. 37. Kirk S. Bowman Militarization, Democracy, and Development, 72. 38. See Kirk S. Bowman, Militarization, Democracy, and Development, 74–83. It is important to note that discussions here on the ‘‘National Myth’’ are by no means intended to question whether or not Costa Rica has a well-established democratic government, but rather, the myths that have been used to prop up the idea of the natural pro-democracy (which includes nonviolence) self-identity of the Costa Rican citizen. 39. Kirk S. Bowman, Militarization, Democracy, and Development, 69–70. For Rodriguez’s text, see Miguel Angel Rodriguez, ‘‘Echandi y la Unidad Nacional,’’ La Nacion, October 5, 1987, Op Ed, 15. 40. Umberto Eco, Travels in Hyperreality (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1986). 41. Ignacio Martın-Bar o, Psicologıa de la Liberacion (Madrid: Trottia, 1998), 185. 42. Angus Reid Global Monitor, Polls and Research, ‘‘Central Americans reject war on Iraq,’’ http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/central_ameri cans_reject_war_on_iraq/. 43. Milan Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting (New York: Perennial Classics, 1996).

Chapter 10 1. Luciana Karine de Souza and Claudio Hutz are acknowledged for their assistance with data collection in Southeastern Brazil. Kathleen Malley-Morrison and the student research team at Boston University are thanked for their assistance with data analysis. 2. Many people believe, perhaps erroneously, that all Moors were black. This might have been a product of Shakespeare’s Othello: The Moor of Venice. Actually, the Moors were composed of blacks and whites, the exact proportion of which is in dispute. Wayne Chandler, ‘‘The Moor: Light of Europe’s Dark Age,’’ in African Presence in Early Europe, ed. Ivan van Sertima (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1985), 144. 3. An earlier version of Romanus Pontifex can be consulted in Antonio Caetano de Sousa, Provas da historia genealogica da casa real portugueza, triadas dos instrumentos dos archivos da Torre do Tombo, da serenissima casa de Braganca, de

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diversas cathedraes, mosteiros, e outros particulares deste reyno (Lisbon: Sylviana, 1739), book I, 448–54. 4. Jose Joaquim da Cunha de Azeredo Coutinho, Concordancia das leis de Portugal, e das bullas Pontificias, das quaes humas permittem a escravid~ao dos pretos d’Africa, e outras prohibem a escravid~ao dos indios do Brazil (Lisbon: Jo~ ao Rodrigues Neves, 1808), 8-9; and Emilia Viotti da Costa, ‘‘The Portuguese-African Slave Trade: a Lesson in Colonialism,’’ Latin American Perspectives XII, no. 1, Issue 44 (Winter 1985): 45. 5. Charles Boxer, Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire, 1415–1825, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963), 6. 6. Antonio Brasio ed., Monumenta missionaria africana, 2nd ser. (Lisbon: Agencia Geral de Ultramar, 1958–1964), vol. II, 552; and Costa, 54, 56. 7. Newsweek, December 8, 1997, 62; Costa, 59; and Antonio Brasio ed., Monumenta missionaria africana: Africa Ocidental (1469–1599), suplemento ao seculo xv e xvi (Lisbon: Agencia Geral de Ultramar, 1954), vol. IV, 123–33. 8. Gilberto Freyre, The Masters and the Slaves: A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization, trans. Samuel Putnam, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1966), 48n, 66n–7n; The Mansions and the Shanties: the Making of Modern Brazil, ed. and trans. Harriet de Onis (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1963), 41; Chiavenato, 10–1; Affonso Henriques, Ascens~ao e queda de Get ulio Vargas: o maquiavelico (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1966), vol. I, 53; Francisco Juli~ao, ‘‘The Practice and Preaching of Revolution,’’ Revolution in Brazil: Politics and Society in a Developing Nation, ed. Irving Horowitz (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1964), 35n; Peter Singelmann, ‘‘Political Structure and Social Banditry in Northeastern Brazil,’’ Journal of Latin American Studies VII, no. 1 (May 1975): 61; and Jorge Amado, The Violent Land, trans. Samuel Putnam, 4th ed. (New York: Avon, 1979), 189, 220, 275–6. 9. Eul-Soo Pang, Bahia in the First Brazilian Republic: Coronelismo and Oligarchies, 1899–1934 (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1979), 4. 10. R. S. Rose, ‘‘Slavery in Brazil: Does It Still Exist?’’ Review of Latin American Studies [hereafter RLAS], vol. IV, no. 1, 1991: 97–8, 101–7; Folha de S~ao Paulo, May 7, 2000, Mais!: 16–7; and Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro), May 13, 2000, Ideias especial, 4. 11. Marcos Arruda et al., The Multinational Corporations and Brazil: The Impact of Multinational Corporations in the Contemporary Brazilian Economy (Toronto: Latin American Research Unit, 1975), 1. 12. June Hahner, Poverty and Politics: The Urban Poor in Brazil, 1870–1920, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986), 45–6; and Thomas Skidmore, Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 125. 13. Brazil, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatıstica, Repertorio estatıstico do Brasil: quadros retrospectivos no. 1, (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1941), 17. The state of S~ ao Paulo provided this free transportation to 283,982 Italians between 1894 and 1897. Eventually, there may well have been two Italians for every native-born Brazilian in the city of S~ao Paulo by 1897. Out of a state population of 2,282,279 in 1900, one-half were probably first- or second-generation Italian immigrants. Richard Morse, Formac~ao historica de S~ao Paulo: de comunidade a metropole (S~ ao

278

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Paulo: Difus~ao Europeia do Livro, 1970), 240; Brazil, Ministerio da Agricultura, Industria e Commercio, Annuario estatistico do Brazil, 1908–1912 (Rio de Janeiro: Directoria Geral de Estatistica, 1916), vol. I, 289; and Pierre Denis, Le Bresil au xxe siecle (Paris: Armand Colin, 1909), 131, 145. 14. Michael Hall and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, ‘‘The Control and Policing of the Working Class in Brazil’’ (paper presented to the Conference on the History of Law, Labor and Crime, University of Warwick, September 15–18, 1983), 4. 15. Dalmo de Abreu Dallari, ‘‘The Forca P ublica of S~ ao Paulo in State and National Politics,’’ in Perspectives on Armed Politics in Brazil, eds. Henry Keith and Robert Hayes (Tempe: Arizona State University Press, 1976), 86. 16. Hall and Pinheiro, 5. The exact years the authors cite in reference to the London data were 1892–1904. 17. Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco, Rodrigues Alves: Apogeu e declınio do presidencialismo (Rio de Janeiro: Jose Olympio, 1973), vol. I, 424; Jornal do Brasil, April 18, 1993, sec. Cidade, 21; Glauco Carneiro, Historia das revoluc~oes brasileiras, (Rio de Janeiro: Cruzeiro, l965), vol. I, 63–5; Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, Estrategias da ilus~ao: a revoluc~ao mundial e o Brasil, 1922–1935 (S~ ao Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1991), 88–9; Gilberto Freyre, Order and Progress: Brazil from Monarchy to Republic, ed. and trans. Rod Horton (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1970), 9–10; Edgard Carone, A Rep ublica Velha: Evoluc~ao polıtica (S~ ao Paulo: Difus~ ao Europeia do Livro, 1971), 74–8; Brazil: Arquivo Nacional, document, Cx. 6C5/GIFI; Senado Federal: Constituic~oes do Brasil de 1824, 1891, 1934, 1937, 1946 e 1967 e ~es Tecnicas, 1986): vol. I, 102, title suas alterac~oes Brasılia: Subsecretaria de Edico V, art. 80, sec. 2, no. 2; Constituic~oes do Brasil de 1824, 1891, 1934, 1937, 1946 e 1967, 180, title VIII, art. 175, sec. a; 221, art. 168, sec. a, 296, art. 209, sec. 3; and United States, National Archives, letter, ‘‘Sackville to G-2,’’ April 17, 1936, no. 1634, 2, MID 2657-K-70/34. Only with the Constitution of 1967 would internal exile be outlawed in Brazil. 18. Jornal do Brasil, November 29, 1992, sec. Cidade, 31. 19. June Hahner, Civilian-Military Relations in Brazil, 1889–1898 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1969), 4. 20. Cristıana de Ara ujo Corr^ea, interview, Rio de Janeiro, June 23, 1994. 21. Jorge Amado, A vida de Luıs Carlos Prestes: O Cavaleiro da Esperanca, 4th ed. (S~ao Paulo: Martins, 1945), 98; Boris Fausto, A Revoluc~ao de 1930, historiografia e historia, 9th ed. (S~ao Paulo: Brasiliense, 1983), 61; and D^enis de Moraes and Francisco Viana, Prestes: Lutas e autocrıticas, 2nd ed. (Petr opolis: Vozes, 1982), 37. Because there are several estimates of how far the group actually traveled, it was decided to use the figure provided by Prestes (Moraes and Viana, loc. cit.) himself, 25,000 kilometers. This converts to 15,534.3 miles and should have earned the Coluna, the name given to the feat begun in the next decade by Mao Tse-tung. That journey, by comparison, was a mere 6,000 miles in length. 22. Alzira Alves de Abreu, Israel Beloch et al., Dicionario historicobiografico brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro: Fundac~ao Get ulio Vargas/CPDOC, 2001), 2105–6. 23. CIA World Factbook: Brazil, https://www.cia.gov/library/publica tions/the-world-factbook/geos.br.html. p. 8.

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24. Alzira Alves de Abreu, Israel Beloch, et al., Dicionario historico-biografico brasileiro., 2332–5, 3330–6. 25. CIA World Factbook: Brazil. 26. Jornal do Brasil, May 2, 2004, A1, A3. 27. CIA World Factbook: Brazil. 28. CIA World Factbook: Brazil.

Chapter 11 1. Kathleen Malley-Morrison et al., ‘‘International Perspectives on War and Peace,’’ Peace Psychology 15, no. 1 (2006): 6–7. 2. Paul Collier, ‘‘Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy,’’ in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, ed. Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2000), 1–23. 3. Alfredo Rangel, Colombia: Guerra en el Fin de Siglo (Bogot a: Tercer Mundo Editores, 1998). 4. United Nations, ‘‘Colombia Statistics,’’ http://www.unicef.org/infoby country/colombia_statistics.html (accessed December 31, 2008). 5. Population Reference Bureau, ‘‘Gender, Health, and Development in the Americas 2003,’’ http://www.prb.org/pdf/GenderHealthDevAmers_Eng.pdf (accessed December 31, 2008). 6. World Bank, ‘‘Reducing Poverty in Colombia,’’ http://web.worldbank. org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,contentMDK:20044584~menuPK:34460~ pagePK:64003015~piPK:64003012~theSitePK:4607,00.html (accessed December 31, 2008). 7. Michael P. Costeloe, Response to Revolution: Imperial Spain and the Spanish American Revolutions, 1810–1840 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 8. Olga Scarpetta, ‘‘Political Traditions and the Limits of Democracy in Colombia.’’ International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 5, no. 2 (1991): 143–66. 9. Grace Livingstone, Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy, and War (Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004). 10. Malcolm Deas, ‘‘Poverty, Civil War, and Politics: Ricardo Gait an Obeso and His Magdalena River Campaign in Colombia, 1885.’’ Nova Americana 2 (1979): 262–303. 11. Paul Wolf, ‘‘The Assassination of Gaitan,’’ http://www.prb.org/pdf/ GenderHealthDevAmers.Eng.pdf (accessed December 28, 2008). 12. John Fishel, ‘‘Colombia: Civil–Military Relations in the Midst of War,’’ Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 2000): 51–6. 13. Harry Bernstein, The Making of an Inter-American Mind (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1961). 14. Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of AntiCommunism (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1988).

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15. The Center for International Policy, ‘‘Center for Research and Population Education [CINEP]: Colombia’s Conflict is Far From Over,’’ http://www.cipcol. org/ (accessed January 2, 2009). 16. Keith Stanski, ‘‘Terrorism, Ideology, and Gender: A Case Study of Women in the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)’’ in The Making of a Terrorist, ed. James Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 135–50. 17. ‘‘The FARC Files,’’ The Economist, May 22, 2008, Colombia and Venezuela Section, http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_ id=11412645 (accessed November 10, 2008). 18. Daniel Garcia-Pe~ na Jaramillo, ‘‘Colombia: In Search of a New Model for Conflict Resolution’’ in Peace, Democracy, and Human Rights in Colombia, ed. Christopher Welna and Gustavo Gallon (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2007), 90–131. 19. ‘‘Colombia/Guerra: 60 Civiles Muertos,’’ BBC Mundo.com, May 4, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_1967000/1967245.stm (accessed September 15, 2008). 20. Max Manwaring, ‘‘U.S. Security policy in the western hemisphere: Why Colombia, why now, and what is to be done?’’ Strategic Studies Institute, June 2001, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub22.pdf (accessed January 1, 2009). 21. Peter DeShazo, ‘‘Hemisphere Highlights,’’ Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2008, http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_ experts/task,view/id,157/#pubs (accessed September 15, 2008). 22. Simon Romero and Damien Cave, ‘‘Bold Colombia Rescue Built on Rebel Group’s Disarray,’’ New York Times, March 4, 2008. 23. Romero and Cave. 24. Romero and Cave. 25. Benavides Vengas, Farid Samir, ‘‘Forgive and Forget? The Transitional Justice Colombian Experiende 1948–2006,’’ 2006, http://www.allacademic.com/ meta/p181792_index.html (accessed November 1, 2008). 26. Juan Forero, ‘‘Colombian Coca Survives U.S. Plan to Uproot It,’’ New York Times, August 19, 2006. 27. John Carlin, ‘‘El Narcosantuario de las FARC,’’ El Paıs, December 4, 2007. 28. Amnesty International, ‘‘Position on Plan Colombia,’’ http://www. amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR23/049/2000 (accessed November 1, 2008). 29. Simon Romero, ‘‘Colombia Lists Civilian Killings in Guerrilla Toll,’’ The New York Times, October 29, 2008. 30. Sister Marge Eilerman, ‘‘The Blood Still Flows,’’ The Free Press, May 16, 2001. 31. Timothy Pratt, ‘‘Colombian City Reeling from Guerrilla Kidnappings,’’ The Associated Press, November 17, 2000. 32. Salud Hernandez-Mora, ‘‘Las FARC Secuestran un Avi on para Raptar a un Senador,’’ El Mundo, February 21, 2002. 33. Ines Miranda, ‘‘Mueren Dos Personas al Explotar un Collar-Bomba en Colombia,’’ El Mundo, May 17, 2000.

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34. Paula Andrea Rossiasco, ‘‘How Much Does the Conflict Cost Colombia?’’ 2001, http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia54.htm (accessed December 15, 2008). 35. ‘‘FARC wants Colombia Peace Talks,’’ BBC Mundo.com, June 24, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5112418.stm (accessed November 15, 2008). 36. Associated Press, ‘‘Colombian President to Release Rebels in Exchange Effort,’’ The New York Times, June 2, 2007. 37. Leon Valencia, ‘‘Commentary: FARC Fighting Two Wars,’’ 2008, http:// www.reuters.com/article/reutersComService4/idUSDIS95174420080909 (accessed December 20, 2008). 38. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, ‘‘Colombia: The Recruitment Methods of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) and Government Measures to Help FARC Members Reintegrate into Civilian Society (2005-February 2008),’’ 2008, http:// www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,QUERYRESPONSE,COL,4829b55c23,0.html (accessed 20 November 2008). 39. Jorge Restrepo, Michael Spagat, and Jim Vargas, ‘‘The Dynamics of the Colombian Conflict: A New Data Set,’’ CEPR Discussion Pages, 4108, 2008. 40. Amnesty International, www.amnesty.org (accessed December 15, 2008).

Chapter 12 1. Michael J. Stevens, ‘‘What Is Terrorism and Can Psychology Do Anything to Prevent It?’’ Behavioral Sciences and the Law 23 (2005): 507–26. 2. Michael J. Stevens. 3. Michael J. Stevens. 4. Martha Crenshaw ed., Encyclopedia of World Terrorism (Armonk, NY: Sharpe Reference, 1997); Carl J. Jenson, ‘‘Beyond The Tea Leaves: Future Research and Terrorism,’’ American Behavioral Scientist 44 (2001): 914–36. 5. Martha Crenshaw and Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 6. Lillian Comas-Diaz, M. B. Lykes, and R. D. Alarcon, ‘‘Ethnic Conflict and the Psychology of Liberation in Guatemala, Peru, and Puerto Rico,’’ American Psychologist 53 (1998): 778–92. 7. Michael J. Stevens. 8. Michael J. Stevens. 9. Fathali M. Moghaddam, ‘‘The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,’’ American Psychologist 60 (2005): 161–9.; J. M. Post, K. G. Ruby, and E. D. Shaw, ‘‘The Radical Group in Context: 1. An Integrated Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk For Terrorism,’’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 25 (2002): 73–100. 10. Fathali M. Moghaddam. 11. J. M. Post, K. G. Ruby, and E. D. Shaw.

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12. Central Intelligence Agency, ‘‘Peru,’’ in The World Factbook (2006); United Nations Statistics Division, ‘‘Peru,’’ in Millennium Development Goals Indicators (2006). 13. CIA, World Factbook: Peru. 14. CIA; UN Statistics Division. 15. Jeffrey Klaiber, ‘‘Peru’s Truth Commission and the Churches,’’ International Bulletin of Missionary Research 28 (2004): 178–9. 16. Lillian Comas-Diaz, M. B. Lykes, and R. D. Alarcon, ‘‘Ethnic Conflict and the Psychology of Liberation in Guatemala, Peru, and Puerto Rico,’’ American Psychologist 53 (1998): 778–92.; Orin Starn, Carlos Ivan Degregori, and Robin Kirk, ed., The Peru Reader: History, Culture, Politics, 2nd ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005); Kimberly Theidon, ‘‘Justice in Transition: The Micropolitics of Reconciliation In Post War Peru,’’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (2006): 433–57. 17. Lillian Comas-Diaz et al.; Orin Starn et al. 18. Orin Starn et al. 19. Lillian Comas-Diaz et al.; Orin Starn et al. 20. Orin Starn et al. 21. Orin Starn et al. 22. Jefrey Gamarra, ‘‘Conflict, Post-conflict, and Religion: Andean Responses to New Religious Movements,’’ Journal of Southern African Studies 26 (2000): 271–87. 23. Lillian Comas-Diaz et al. 24. Lillian Comas-Diaz et al. 25. Orin Starn et al. 26. Orin Starn et al. 27. Lillian Comas-Diaz et al., Cynthia McClintock and Fabien Vallas, The United States and Peru: Cooperation at a Cost (New York: Routledge, 2003). 28. Orin Starn et al.; Cynthia McClintock and Fabien Vallas. 29. Cynthia McClintock and Fabien Vallas. 30. Cynthia McClintock and Fabien Vallas, 1. 31. Norma Fuller, ‘‘The Social Constitution of Gender Identity Among Peruvian Men,’’ Men and Masculinities 3 (2001): 316–31. 32. Norma Fuller. 33. M. B. Rondon, ‘‘From Marianism to Terrorism: The Many Faces of Violence against Women in Latin America,’’ Archives of Women’s Mental Health 6 (2003): 157–63. 34. C. F. Caceres, B. V. Marin, and E. S. Hudes, ‘‘Sexual Coercion among Youth and Young Adults in Lima, Peru,’’ Journal of Adolescent Health 27 (2000): 361–7. 35. Norma Fuller and Eros R. DeSouza et al., ‘‘A Latin American Perspective on the Study of Gender,’’ ed. M. A. Paludi, Praeger Guide to the Psychology of Gender (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004): 41–67; A. Gonzalez, ‘‘Sex-Roles of the Traditional Family: A Comparison of Chicano and Anglo Students’ Attitudes,’’ Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 13 (1982): 330–9. 36. Norma Fuller. 37. A. Invernizzi, ‘‘Street Working Children and Adolescents in Lima: Work as an Agent of Socializatio,’’ Childhood 10 (2003): 319–41.

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38. A. Invernizzi. 39. Lillian Comas-Diaz et al.; Jefrey Gamarra; E. Moron, and C. Sanborn, The Pitfalls of Policymaking in Peru: Actors, Institutions and Rules of the Game (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2006). 40. Fathali M. Moghaddam. 41. J. M. Post, K. G. Ruby, and E. D. Shaw. 42. Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘‘U.S. Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Policy Brief,’’ http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilat eral/Peru_TPA/Fact_Sheets/Section_Index.html (accessed September 8, 2005). 43. CIA, World Factbook: Peru. 44. E. Moron and C. Sanborn, The Pitfalls of Policymaking in Peru: Actors, Institutions and Rules of the Game (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2006). 45. CIA, World Factbook: Peru. 46. CIA; UN Statistics Division; Cynthia McClintock and Fabien Vallas; G. G. Ellenbogen, The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarium War in Peru (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999). 47. E. Moron and C. Sanborn. 48. Lillian Comas-Diaz et al.; E. Moron and C. Sanborn. 49. Lillian Comas-Diaz et al.; E. Moron and C. Sanborn. 50. Cynthia McClintock and Fabien Vallas; E. Moron and C. Sanborn. 51. G. G. Ellenbogen, The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarium War in Peru (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999). 52. Lillian Comas-Diaz et al.; Kimberly Theidon, ‘‘Justice In Transition: The Micropolitics of Reconciliation in Post War Peru,’’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (2006): 433–57.; G. G. Ellenbogen. 53. M. B. Rondon, ‘‘From Marianism to Terrorism: The Many Faces of Violence against Women in Latin America,’’ Archives of Women’s Mental Health 6 (2003): 157–63. 54. Lillian Comas-Diaz et al.; Cynthia McClintock and Fabien Vallas; G. G. Ellenbogen 55. Orin Starn et al. 56. G. G. Ellenbogen. 57. ‘‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission,’’ Final Report (2003). 58. Jeffrey Klaiber, ‘‘Peru’s Truth Commission and the Churches,’’ International Bulletin of Missionary Research 28 (2004): 178–9; Jeffrey Klaiber, ‘‘Peru: The Church and the Shining Path,’’ America 166 (1992): 136–41. 59. Orin Starn. 60. Cynthia McClintock and Fabien Vallas. 61. G. G. Ellenbogen. 62. M. Taft-Morales, Peru: Recovery from Crisis (Washington DC: Congress, 2001). 63. Cynthia McClintock and Fabien Vallas; E. Moron and C. Sanborn. 64. E. Moron and C. Sanborn, 29. 65. Kimberly Theidon; ‘‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission.’’ 66. Jeffrey Klaiber, ‘‘Peru’s Truth Commission and the Churches’’; Kimberly Theidon; G. G. Ellenbogen; ‘‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission.’’

284

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67. Kimberly Theidon. 68. Jeffrey Klaiber, ‘‘Peru’s Truth Commission and the Churches.’’ 69. Lillian Comas-Diaz et al.; Kimberly Theidon; P. Elsass, ‘‘Individual and Collective Trauma Memories: A Qualitative Study of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Symptoms in Two Latin American Localities,’’ Transcultural Psychiatry 38 (2001): 306–16; D. Paez et al., ‘‘Political Trauma and Emotional Climate: A Transcultural Investigation,’’ Psicologia Politica 12 (1996): 47–69. 70. Fathali M. Moghaddam. 71. CIA, World Factbook: Peru. 72. C.O.F. Relations, ed., A Conversation with the President of Peru (2003). 73. C.O.F. Relations, ed., A Conversation with the President of Peru (2003). 74. C.O.F. Relations, ed., A Conversation with the President of Peru (2003). 75. Congreso de la Republica del Peru, ‘‘Constitucion Politica Del Peru,’’ http:// pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Peru/per93.html (accessed October 21, 2006). 76. M. B. Rondon; Center for Reproductive Rights, Women of the World: Laws and Policies Affecting Their Reproductive Lives, Latin America and the Caribbean: Progress Report 2000 (New York: Center for Reproductive Rights, 2000); World Health Organization, ‘‘Summary Report,’’ in WHO Multi-Country Study on Women’s Health And Domestic Violence against Women: Initial Results on Prevalence, Health Outcomes and Women’s Responses (Geneva, Switzerland: 2005). 77. WHO. 78. Eros DeSouza and J. Solberg, ‘‘Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual Harassment across Cultures’’ in Academic and Workplace Sexual Harassment: A Handbook of Cultural, Social Science, Management, and Legal Perspectives, ed. M. Paludi and C. A. Paludi Jr. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003): 3–30. 79. U. Messing. 80. D. F. Flake, ‘‘Individual, Family, and Community Risk Markers for Domestic Violence in Peru,‘‘Violence against Women 11 (2005): 353–73. 81. D. F. Flake and R. Forste, ‘‘Fighting Families: Family Characteristics Associated with Domestic Violence in Five Latin American Countries,’’ Journal of Family Violence 21 (2006): 19–29. 82. D. F. Flake. 83. D. F. Flake; D. F. Flake and R. Forste. 84. M. B. Rondon. 85. C. Garcia-Moreno et al., ‘‘Prevalence of Intimate Partner Violence: Findings from the WHO Multi-Country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence,’’ Lancet 368 (2006): 1260–9. 86. C. Garcia-Moreno et al. 87. Human Rights Watch, HRW Memorandum Peru: Law of Protection from Family Violence (2000). 88. Norma Fuller. 89. M. B. Rondon, ‘‘From Marianism to Terrorism: The Many Faces of Violence against Women in Latin America,’’ Archives of Women’s Mental Health 6 (2003): 157–63. 90. Fathali M. Moghaddam; U. Messing, Introduction, in Too Close to Home: Domestic Violence in the Americas, ed. A. R. Morrison and M. L. Biehl

Notes

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(Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 1999): xi–xiii.; J. M. Post, K. G. Ruby, and E. D. Shaw. 91. M. J. Stevens, ‘‘The Impact of Terrorism on Public Opinion and Psychosocial Adjustment,’’ Journal of Social Distress and the Homeless 12 (2003): 307–20. 92. J. M. Post, K. G. Ruby, and E. D. Shaw; Fathali M. Moghaddam. 93. D. F. Flake, ‘‘Individual, Family, and Community Risk Markers for Domestic Violence in Peru,’’ Violence against Women 11 (2005): 353–73. 94. A. L. McAlister, A. Bandura, and S. V. Owen, ‘‘Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in Support of Military Force: The Impact of Sept. 11,’’ Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 25 (2006): 141–65.

Chapter 13 1. Emil Durkheim held that anomie is the absence of adequate norms to meet needs. Emil Durkheim, ‘‘The Suicide’’ (1897) Editions (Spain: Akal, 1995). 2. See M. Margulis, ‘‘La Rationalization of the Relations of Class,’’ in Margulis, Urresti et al. The Denied Segregation (Buenos Aires: Bibles, 1999). 3. United Nations, ‘‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, New York (1948),’’ http://www.un.org/millennium/law/ iv-1.htm. 4. Daniel Feierstein, Cinco estudios sobre genocidio (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Acervo Cultural, 1997). 5. Daniel Feierstein, Cinco estudios sobre genocidio. 6. Roger T. Trinquier, ‘‘The Modern War,’’ ed. Rioplatense, Buenos. Aires. (1963), 32.; Eduardo Luis Duhalde, ‘‘El Estado Terrorista Argentino,’’ (Buenos Aires: El Caballito, 1983), 146–7). 7. United Nations, ‘‘Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,’’ September 13, 2007, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc. htm. 8. Martin Middlebrook, Fight for the Malvinas (New York: Penguin Books, 1990). 9. This external debt was the entry door for the major internal debt that guaranteed the neoliberal era, with its increasing failure to provide security for the population at all levels—health, education, and work. Today’s indices of unemployment, child malnutrition, and illiteracy stem directly from the institional violence of this historic period. 10. The mass media—newspapers, magazines, television, etc.—all proclaimed the certainty of triumph. Collections were organized for the combatants; Argentine families and children sent letters and chocolates, as well as money, warm clothing, food, etc. The swindle was major and ‘‘televised.’’ The newspaper Cronica, on April 2, 1982, indicated in large headlines: ‘‘ARGENTINAZO: THE FALKLANDS RECOVERED!’’ Likewise, the newspaper La Razon, in its 6th edition the same day, published: ‘‘Today is a glorious day for the Country. After a captivity of a century and a half, a sister is incorporated to the National

286

Notes

Terriroty. IN THE FALKLANDS THERE IS AN ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. In a combined operation by the ocean, air, and land forces the Islands of the Archipelago were recovered.’’ See ‘‘Falklands: The Withdrawal’’ in We Said Yesterday. The Argentine Press Under the Process, ed. E. Blaustein and M. Zubieta (Buenos Aires: Colihue, 2006), 443–562. 11. Presentation Material of the Institute of Psychosocial Investigations— EATIP, ‘‘Clinical Consequences of the Violations of Human Rights,’’ 2002. 12. Thomas C. Wright, State Terrorism in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and Human Rights (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 126. 13. Ricardo Angelino, ‘‘Work and Mental Health,’’ International symposium, Iztapa 1999: Employment and Social Politics before the Third Millennium, Iztapa, Mexico, March 1999. 14. Araceli Iglesias, Guillermo Cuneo, Margartia Moroni, Study of the Sufferings of the Veterans of the Falklands (PAMI-Lan us: National Program of Attention to the Veteran of War, 2007). 15. Araceli Iglesias and others, Study of the Sufferings of the Veterans of the Falklands. 16. Note: While this analysis was being written (March of 2008), veterans were camping in ‘‘Plaza de Mayo,’’ in front of the house of the government, demanding recognition from the state, appropriate pensions, and the development of a social vision that does not rely on military rout and victory. 17. Note published in the newspaper Pagina/12 on Thursday March 13, 2008, entertainment section (30). The article was an homage to J. Guinzburg who passed away March 12, 2008. The article makes allusion to a satirical (humorous) magazine that parodied the authorities and persons of power. The political satire, the irony, besides configuring a form of defense of the subjectivities an escape by means of humor, compromised a social space where one could express their discontent. 18. By way of example, the magazine Extra of January of 1977 indicated in a segment of photos with portraits of distinguished ‘‘heroes’’: ‘‘The ‘Heroes’ of 1976’’: ‘‘Businessmen that gave it all, judges that had to give face, priests that were beacons of contention and equilibrium, military that was distinguished in the functions of the government, soldiers-military.’’ Names and last names of these new ‘‘important persons’’ of the country. Magazine Extra No. 139, January 1977. Blaustein and Zubieta, We Said Yesterday. The Argentine Press under the Process (Buenos Aires: Editorial Colihue, 2006), 172. 19. The example of the newspaper La Opinion of 1977 is key: on the one hand, in June of that year, it indicated that ‘‘The disappearance of Hector Hidalgo Sol a worries all spheres,’’ relates the disappearance of the Venezuelan ambassador in Argentina, kidnapped in a ‘‘Ford Falcon,’’ which was a repressive vehicle of the forces in power, and was attributed to the ‘‘terrorist forces’’ according to police testimony. On the other hand, in October 1977, a full page map of Argentina on a plate was published that said ‘‘Let’s unite and we will not be bit by the subversion.’’ Jacobo Timerman, directior of La Opinion, disappeared during this period. Testimonies of ex-detainees relate their captivity in Secret Centers of the Country. See Blaustein and Zubieta, 200–1.

Notes

287

20. See Piera Aulagnier, ‘‘The Destinies of the Pleasure‘‘, ‘‘The State of Alienation’’ op.cit. 1979. 21. The newspapers Cların, La Nacion, and La Razon acquired the INC newsprint business in which the state contributed economically for its financing. Blaustein and Zubieta, 194. 22. Note: Opposite case would have been to interrogate about the participation in marches and public protests over human rights, social rights, labor, and political rights. The surveyed affirmed said position in the same way. It would be convenient to simply put these issues in the usual ‘‘war-peace’’ dichotomy. 23. Michel Foucault, Vigilar y Castigar. Nacimiento de la Prision (1975). 24. Hannah Arendt, ‘‘On Violence’’ in Crisis of the Republic, ed. Taurus and Madrid, 1973. 25. See Franz Hinkelammert, Ideologia del desarrollo y dialectica de la Historia (Buenos Aires: Editorial Nuva Universidad, 1970). 26. Ricardo Angelino, in Introduction to Psychiatry, 3rd ed., Richards M. Suarez (comp.) expanded and corrected (Buenos Aires: Polemons, 2006). See especially chapter 27, ‘‘Violence.’’ 27. Jorge Belardi, President of the Cardiovascular Institute of Buenos Aires (2007). 28. Enrique P Gurfinkel, Gerardo E Bozovich, Omar Dabbous, Branco Mautner, and Frederick Anderson, ‘‘Socio-Economic Crisis and Mortality: Epidemiological Testimony of the Financial Collapse of Argentina,’’ Thrombosis Journal 3 (2005): 22. 29. Cesar Chelala, ‘‘Music as a Messenger for Peace.’’ The Epoch Times, January 17-23, 2008, Arts & Culture, 10. 30. Immanuel Kant, ‘‘Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,’’ http://www. mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm. 31. Immanuel Kant, Hacia la Paz Perpetua . . . (Buenos Aires: UNQUI Prometeo, 2007). 32. See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of the Scientific Revolution (Buenos Aires: FCE, 1998). 33. See E. Pichon-Riviere and A. Quiroga, Psychology of the Daily Life (Buenos Aires: Nueva Vision, 1985). 34. Anthony Giddens, ‘‘Risk and Responsibility’’ Modern Law Review 62, no. 1 (1999): 3. 35. C. S. Lewis, The Joyful Christian: 127 Readings (New York: Scribner; Touchstone Edition, 1996), 191. 36. See works by Antonio Gramsci. 37. See Emile. Durkheim, Suicide (Madrid: Ediciones Akal, 1995).

Index

Abacha, General Sanni, 31 Abiola, Chief Moshood Kashimawo Olawale, 31 Abubakar, General Abdusalam, 31 Action Group (AG), 28 Acuerdo Nacional. See National Agreement Africanos Livres (‘‘Free Africans’’), 170 African National Congress (ANC), 97, 98, 111, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120 AG. See Action Group (AG) American Popular Revolutionary Alliance/Alianza Popular Revolutionaria Americana (APRA), 207–8 Aleman, Arnoldo, 141 Alfonso V, 169 Al-Qaeda, 19 Alvor agreement, 63 Amaru, T upac, 205, 209 American Convention for Human Rights, 155 AMIA. See Association Mutual Israelite Argentina (AMIA) Amnesty International, 32, 33 ANC. See African National Congress (ANC) Andean Community, 212

Anglo-American Corporation, 97 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty (1936), 6 Angola, 255; elections in, 70, 71; history of repression, 61–62; invasion, public opinion on, 65–66, 250; killing innocent civilians, public opinion on, 251; media coverage in, 71; national security, public opinion on, 72–73, 254; peace, public opinion on, 72, 252; present situation in, 64–65; right to peace, public opinion on, 69–70; right to protest, public opinion on, 70–72; terrorism, public opinion on, 67–68; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 67, 251; war, public opinion on, 72, 250; war of independence, 62–64; world peace, public opinion on, 68–69, 253 Angolan civil war, 63 Angolan war of independence, 62–64 apartheid, 111, 114–18, 126, 128, 130, 131, 132 APRA. See American Popular Revolutionary Alliance/Alianza Popular Revolutionaria Americana (APRA) Arab League, 11

290 Argentina, 241–5; British relation with, 231; censorship, 233–4; conquest and enslavement in, 228– 9; doctrine of national security, 229–30; genocide in, 229; health issues in, 241–2; invasion, public opinion on, 235; killing innocent civilians, public opinion on, 236; military regime in, 230–31, 232; national security, public opinion on, 240, 254–5; peace, public opinion on, 240–41; right to peace, public opinion on, 238, 252, 253; right to protest, public opinion on, 238–9, 254; terrorism, public opinion on, 237–8; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 235– 6; veterans of Falkland War, 233; war, public opinion on, 236–7; world peace, public opinion on, 239–40 Arias Peace Plan, 151–2, 154 Article 13 of Ghana Constitution, 54 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, 212 Association Mutual Israelite Argentina (AMIA), 236 AUC. See Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia/United Self-defense Forces of Colombia) Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia/ United Self-defense Forces of Colombia), 189 Babangida, General Ibrahim, 31 Balewa, Tafawa, 28 Bantu, 61, 96, 112, 115 Bantu Education Act (1953), 115 Barbosa, Rui, 171, 173 Bathoen I, 80 Battle of Blood River (1838), 113 BCO. See British Colonial Office (BCO) BCP. See Botswana Congress Party (BCP) BDF. See Botswana Defence Force (BDF)

Index BDP. See Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP) Beall, Jo, 120 Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP), 77 Bechuanaland Independence Party (BIP), 81, 82 Bechuanaland Peoples Party (BPP), 81 Bechuanaland Protectorate, 80, 81 Beecroft, John, 27 Begin, Menachem, 11 Bernardes, Artur, 173 Bicesse accords, 63 Bignone, Reynaldo, 232 BIP. See Bechuanaland Independence Party (BIP) blood diamonds, 77–78 ‘‘Bloody Friday’’ (1993), 68 BNF. See Botswana National Front (BNF) Bola~ nos, Enrique, 141 Bolivar, Sımon, 205 Botswana, 75, 94; blood diamonds and, 77–78; British protectorate, 80–82; challenges faced by, 78–79; flag, 76; growth of, 76; historical background, 79–82; HIV/AIDS epidemic in, 77; invasion, public opinion on, 87–88; killing innocent civilians, public opinion on, 88–89; peace, public opinion on, 92–93; pre-British protectorate, 79–80; refugees in, 77; relationship with South Africa, 82–83; right to peace, public opinion on, 91–92; terrorism, public opinion on, 89–90; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 90–91, 251; war, public opinion on, 86–87; world peace, public opinion on, 92 Botswana Congress Party (BCP), 84 Botswana Defence Force (BDF), 82, 90 Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), 84 Botswana National Front (BNF), 84–85

Index Bower, Bruce, 19 BPP. See Bechuanaland Peoples Party (BPP) Brazil, 184; Bernardes as president of, 173; description of, 167–8; Fonseca as president of, 173; Franco as president of, 174–5; Goulart as president of, 174; invasion, public opinion on, 178–9, 250, 251; Italians emigration to, 171; Lula as president of, 175; military rule in, 171; national security, public opinion on, 183, 254; peace, public opinion on, 180–181, 252; right to peace, public opinion on, 181–2, 252; right to protest, public opinion on, 182–3, 254; Sarney as president of, 174; slavery in, 168– 71; terrorism, public opinion on, 179–80; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 179; United States support for, 174; Vargas as president of, 173–4; war, public opinion on, 178, 249; world peace, public opinion on, 253 British Colonial Office (BCO), 97 British South Africa Company (BSACO), 80, 97 BSACO. See British South Africa Company (BSACO) Buenos Aires, 228, 231, 233, 234 Buhari, Major General Mohammed, 31 Bush, George W., 154 Bushman/San people, 78 Cabinda, 62, 64, 67 Cabral, Pedro Alves, 168 CAFTA. See Free Trade Agreement with the United States (CAFTA), 154, 155 Canudos, 172 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 174 Carter, Jimmy, 11 Castro, Fidel, 141 Center for Reproductive Rights, 212 Central American Defense Council, 154

291 Chamberlain, Joseph, 80 Chavez, Hugo, 141 Chiluba, Frederick Titus, 100 Civil Rights and Black Consciousness movements, 115 Civil War (1948), 153, 162, 164 Clinton, Bill, 60 CNN World Report from Orapa, 78 Coalition of the Willing, 154, 164 COFOM. See Committee of the Free Officers’ Movement (COFOM) Cold War, 63, 70, 151, 153 Colombia, 199, 255; Civil War, 186, 187, 189, 196; conflicts in, 186–7; demographics, 186; drugs and war in, 189; Gait an as president of, 186–7; geography, 185–6; guerilla warfare, 187–9; invasion, public opinion on, 192–3, 251; killing innocent civilians, public opinion on, 195–6; peace, public opinion on, 196–7; present situation in, 190; right to peace, public opinion on, 198, 252, 253; right to protest, public opinion on, 198; terrorism, public opinion on, 194–5, 250; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 193–4; war, public opinion on, 196; world peace, public opinion on, 197, 253 Committee of the Free Officers’ Movement (COFOM), 6–7 ‘‘Condor Plan,’’ 230, 231 Congo, 61, 62, 97 Constitution of 1963 (Nigeria), 28 Contra movement, 140 Coolidge, Calvin, 139 Costa Rica, 151; civil unrest in, 248; Cold War and, 153–5; killing innocent civilians, public opinion on, 157–8; institutionalized violence in, 162–3; invasion, public opinion on, 157; national identity, 163–4; national security, public opinion on, 160, 161, 254; peace, public opinion on, 156, 161, 252;

292 Costa Rica (Continued) right to peace, public opinion on, 158, 161, 252; right to protest, public opinion on, 158, 161; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 159–60, 161; war, public opinion on, 156–7, 161, 249; war and peace in, 152–3, 161–5; world peace, public opinion on, 159 ‘‘Councils of Citizen Power,’’ 141 Counterterrorism Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, 202 ‘‘creation of ‘a united Nigeria with a Federal Constitution’ ’’, 28 de Chamorro, Violeta, 140–41 de Klerk, Frederik, 111 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 230 Declaration of the Universal Statement of Human Rights (1948), 230–31 Democratic Labor Party (PDT), 176 Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), 176 Denmark, 18, 19 Dingane, 113 ‘‘the Doctrine of Unilateralism,’’ 243 Egypt, 3; ancient, 4–5; Arab republic of, 6–14; British influence in, 5–6; foreign rule in, 5–6; Mubarak as president of, 11–13; Nasser as president of, 7–9; peace, public opinion on, 16–17, 252; reasons for uncertain future of, 12–14; reconciliation, public opinion on, 17–19; relation with Israel, 9, 10, 11; Sadat as president of, 9–11; terrorism, public opinion on, 21–23; terrorist attacks in, 22–23; torture, public opinion on, 19–20; tourist industry and terrorism in, 22–23; war, public opinion on, 15–16, 249–50

Index Egyptian Revolution, 6–7 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty (1979), 11 ‘‘Eighteen of the Fort,’’ 173 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 188 Ejercito de Liberaci on Nacional/ National Liberation Army (ELN), 188, 189, 193, 194, 198 Elmina, The Mine, 45 ELN. See Ejercito de Liberaci on Nacional/National Liberation Army (ELN) Emergence of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), 118 Emergency Law, 12 Escobar, Pablo, 189 Esquipulas I Peace Plan. See Arias Peace Plan European Union, 212

Falkland War, 231, 232, 233, 234, 237 FARC. See Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia/ Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Farouk, King, 6, 7 Felisberto, Jo~ ao C^ andido, 172 FLEC. See Frente para a Libertac¸~ ao do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) FNLA. See National Liberation Front (FNLA) Francisco Santander’s Liberal Party, 186 Franco, Itamar, 174–175 Free Trade Agreement with the United States (CAFTA), 154, 155 Freedom & Socialism Party (PSOL), 176 Frente para a Libertac¸~ ao do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC), 64 Frente Sandinista de Liberaci on Nacional (FSLN), 139, 140, 141 Figueres, Jose ‘‘Pepe,’’ 153, 164 Filibuster War, 152 First Arab-Israeli War (1948–1949), 6

Index Fonseca, Deodoro da, 171 Fonseca, Hermes da, 173 FSLN. See Frente Sandinista de Liberaci on Nacional (FSLN) Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia/Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), 155, 188–9, 190, 193, 194, 197, 198, 243 Fujimori, Alberto, 210 Gaddafi, Muammar, 10 Gaitan, Jorge Eliecer, 186–7 Galtieri, Leopoldo, 231 Garay, Juan de, 228 Garcia, Alan, 210 GEAR. See Growth, Employment and Redistribution Program (GEAR) Ghana, 43, 60; gold trade in, 44–45; independence of, 46; invasion, public opinion on, 49–50; killing innocent civilians, public opinion on, 53–54; national security, public opinion on, 57; Nkrumah’s as prime minister of, 46–47; Rawlings as president of, 47–48; right to peace, public opinion on, 58; slavery and, 45–46; terrorism, public opinion on, 55–57; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 51– 53; war, public opinion on, 54–55; world peace, public opinion on, 58–59 Ghanaian Constitution Chapter Five, 51 Godoy, Mejıa, 147 Gold Coast, 45, 46, 47 Golden Law, 171 Goulart, Jo~ao, 174 Gowon, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu, 29–30 Growth, Employment and Redistribution Program (GEAR), 119 Guardia, Rafael Calderon, 153 Guizburg, Jorge, 233 Guzman, Abimael, 209, 210, 211

293 Haig, Alexander, 231 Hitler, Adolf, 52 Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual, 193 Hussein, Saddam, 12, 23 Hyksos, 4 IFP. See Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) IMF. See International Monetary Fund (IMF) Inca, 205, 207, 209 Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), 116 Interim National Government, 31 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 99 Iran-Contra Affair, 144 Ironsi, Major General J. T. U. Aguiyi, 29 isiZulu, 113 Israel, 9, 10, 11, 236 Jameson, Starr, 80–81 Janeiro, Rio de, 170, 172 Johnson, Baines, 174 July 23rd Revolution, 6, 7 Jyllands-Posten, 18 Kant, Immanuel, 242–244 Kaunda, Kenneth, 96, 97, 98, 99 Kennedy, John F., 153, 206 Khama II, 80 Khama, Seretse, 76, 77 Khoikhoi, 112 Khoi-San, 112, 113 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, 78 Kufuor, John Kofi Agyekum, 48 Kundera, Milan, 165 La Nacion, 155 La Uribe Peace Accords, 188 ‘‘La Violencia,’’ 187, 188, 199  Lei Aurea. See Golden Law Lei do Ventre Livre (‘‘Law of the Free Womb’’), 170

Index

294 Leith, Clark, 76, 171 Liberal Alliance, 147 Llosa, Gaviano, 213 Lusaka protocol, 63 Luthuli, Albert, 111 machismo, 206, 214, 215 Mandela, Nelson, 111, 116–17, 121, 126, 133 marianismo, 206, 211, 214, 215 Martın, Jose de San, 205 ‘‘MAS’’ [‘‘MORE’’], 189 Matante, Philip, 81 Mbeki, Thabo, 118, 119, 121 Melo, Fernando Collor de, 174 Mills, John Atta, 48 ‘‘Misfortunes in the CountryGarden-of-Infants,’’ 233 MMD. See Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) Mogae, Festus, 77 Mohammed, Lieutenant-General Murtala, 30 Moncada, General Jose, 139 Monge, Luis Alberto, 153, 154 Mora, Juan Rafael, 152 Moremong, Mike, 78 Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), 100 Movement of No Alliance, 231 Movimento Popular para Libertacao de Angola/ Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), 62, 63, 64, 65, 71 Movimento Revolutionario T upac Amarux/T upac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), 209, 210 Mpho, Motsami, 81 MPLA. See Movimento Popular para Libertacao de Angola/ Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) MRTA. See Movimento Revolutionario T upac Amaru/T upac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)

Mubarak, Hosni, 11–14 Muhammad, Prophet, 18 Muslim Brotherhood, 11 Mwanawasa, Levy, 100 Naguib, Mohamed, 7 Napoleonic Wars, 113 Nasser, Gamel Abdel, 6, 7–9 Nasserism, 7 National Agreement, 212 National Constitution of Colombia, 189 National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), 28 National Front for Independence (UNITA), 62, 63, 64, 68, 71 National Liberation Front (FNLA), 62, 63 National Pacification, 232 National Program for Attention to Veterans of War, 232, 233 Nationalist Party (NP), 114, 115, 116, 117 Naval Mutiny of 1910, 173 NCNC. See National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) NEPAD. See New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) Neto, Agostinho, 63 Neves, Tancredo, 174 New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), 32 Nicaragua, 137; demographics, 141–2; independence, 138–9; invasion, public opinion on, 143–4; national security, public opinion on, 146–7, 254; peace, public opinion on, 148– 9; present politics in, 141–2; right to protest, public opinion on, 147– 8; Sandinista government in, 140– 41; Somoza’s regime in, 139–40; Spanish colonization in, 138; terrorism, public opinion on, 145– 6; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 144–5; United States intervention in affairs of, 138–9; war, public opinion on, 143, 249

Index Nicaraguan Opposition Union (UNO), 140 Niger Delta, 32 Nigeria, 25; colonialism in, 27; dispute with Cameroon, 39; governmental rights to aggression, public opinion on, 34–36, 38–39, 41; ignoring international treaties, public opinion on, 35–36; independence, 27–28; killing innocent civilians, public opinion on, 35; national security, public opinion on, 36, 254; peace, public opinion on, 38, 39–40, 252; postindependence, 28–32; precolonial history of, 25–26; present situation in, 32–33; right to peace, public opinion on, 36, 39, 252; right to protest, public opinion on, 36; terrorism, public opinion on, 37–38, 40; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 36; war, public opinion on, 37, 40, 250; world peace, public opinion on, 253 Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), 28 Nigerian People’s Congress (NPC), 28 Nixon, Richard, 153 Nkrumah, Kwame, 46, 47 Nkumbula, Harry, 97 Northern Rhodesia. See Zambia NP. See Nationalist Party (NP) OAS. See Organization of American States (OAS) Obama, Barack, 43 Obasanjo, Chief Olusegun, 30, 31–32 Odria, Manuel General, 208 OIC. See Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Olarte, Gonzales de, 213 Organization of American States (OAS), 153, 231 Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), 31 Ortega, Daniel, 140, 141, 147

295 PAC. See Pan African Congress (PAC) Pacheco, Abel, 154, 165 PAIRTAPS. See Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 9 Pan African Congress (PAC), 115, 129 Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), 175 Pasha, Muhammad Ali, 5 Pastrana, Andres, 190 PDT. See Democratic Labor Party (PDT) Peixoto, Floriano, 171–2 Perez, Rigoberto L opez, 139 Persian Gulf War, 12 Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS), 14, 33, 49, 65, 83, 101, 103, 105, 121, 122, 156, 160, 167, 176, 185, 191, 199 Peru, 224–5; colonial legacy, 205, 207; demographics, 204; domestic terrorism in, 208–11; foreign influences in, 205; forms of terrorism in, 202–3; Fujimori as president of, 210; international conflicts in, 205–6; models of, 203– 4; patriarchal violence in family, 213–15; peace, public opinion on, 219–21; political parties, 207–8; sexism in, 206; sexual harassment in, 212–13; terrorism, definitions, 202, 250; terrorism, public opinion on, 221–3; war, public opinion on, 216–18; women in, 212, 213, 214 Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 210–11 Peruvian Communist Party, 208 Pew Research Center Public Global Attitudes, 13 Pizarro, Francisco, 205 Plan Colombia, 189, 192, 193 PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) PMDB. See Democratic Movement Party (PMDB)

296 Population Registration Act (1950), 114 Prestes, Luıs Carlos, 173 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 117 PSDB. See Social Democracy Party (PSDB) PSOL. See Freedom & Socialism Party (PSOL), 176 PT. See Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) Putin, Vladimir, 141 Quakers, American, 45; English, 45–46 Ramadan War, 10 Rawlings, Jerry John, 47–48 RCC. See Revolution Command Council (RCC) RDP. See Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) Reagan, Ronald, 140, 231 Real (currency), 175 Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), 119 Republic of Biafra, 29 Revolution Command Council (RCC), 7 Rhodes, Cecil, 80 Rhodesian war, 82 Rio Grande do Sul, 168, 170, 176 Rio Treaty (1947), 153 Rivero, Bustamante y, 208 Roa Sierra, Juan, 187 Robertson, James, 28 Roca, Julio Argentino, 228 Romanus Pontifex, 169 rondas campesians, 209 Rosetta stone, 5 SACC. See South African Council of Churches (SACC) Sadat, Anwar, 9–11 Sanchez, Oscar Arias, 151, 154 Sandino, Augusto, 139 Santamaria, Juan, 152

Index Santos, Jose Eduardo dos, 63 SAP. See structural adjustment program (SAP) Sarney, Jose, 174 Schmidel, Ulderic o, 228 Sebelle I, 80 Second Arab-Israeli War, 8 Secret Detention Centers, 227 Security Council of the United Nations (Resolution 502), 231 September 11 attack, 12, 23, 225 Sickle, Jose Martınez de, 232–3 Silva, Luiz In acio Lula da, 175, 176 Shagari, Shehu, 30 Shaka, 113 Shining Path, 201, 204, 208, 209, 210, 211, 215, 224 Shonekan, Chief Ernest, 31 Sim on Bolıvar’s Conservative Party, 186 Six Days’ War of 1967, 9, 10 SOA. See U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA) Social Democracy Party (PSDB), 176 Somoza Garcıa, Anastasio, 139 South Africa, 82–83, 111; apartheid, rise of, 114–17; crime and violence, 120; economic development, 119– 20; historical background of, 112– 14; HIV/AIDS in, 118; invasion, public opinion on, 123–5, 250, 251; killing innocent civilians, public opinion on, 126–7; national security, public opinion on, 130– 31, 254; peace, public opinion on, 132–3; present situation in, 120–21; right to peace, public opinion on, 127–8; right to protest, public opinion on, 129–30; social development, 118–19; terrorism, public opinion on, 126, 132; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 123, 125; transition to democracy, 117; Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 117–18; war, public opinion on, 132; world peace, public opinion on, 129

Index South African Council of Churches (SACC), 116 South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), 99 Soweto riots, 116 structural adjustment program (SAP), 31 Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, 232 SWAPO. See South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) Syria, 8, 10, 18 TAC. See Emergence of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) Tenente movement (1920), 174 Theban pharaohs, 4 TIAR, 231 Toledo, Alejandro, 210, 211, 212 TRC. See Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 117–18, 125 Turbay, Eduardo, 194 Tutu, Desmond, 111, 116 UDF. See United Democratic Front (UDF) UN General Assembly, 77 UN Resolution 242, 9 Uniao das Populacoes de Angola/Union of the Angolan People (UPA), 62 UNIMER poll (2008), 155, 160 Union of South Africa, 114 Uni on Patri otica/Patriotic Union (UP), 188–9 UNIP. See United National Independence Party (UNIP) UNITA. See National Front for Independence (UNITA) United Arab Republic, 8–9 United Democratic Front (UDF), 116 United National Independence Party (UNIP), 97, 98, 100 United Nations Convention Against Torture, 155 United Nations (UN) Resolution 9, 229

297 United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), 28 United States, 230; Colombia and, 189; involvement in Nicaragua’s affairs, 138–139; relation with Brazil, 174 UNO. See Nicaraguan Opposition Union (UNO) UN’s office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 67 UP. See Uni on Patri otica/Patriotic Union (UP) UPA. See Uniao das Populacoes de Angola/Union of the Angolan People (UPA) UPGA. See United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) Uribe, Alvaro, 190 U.S. Alliance for Progress, 153 U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA), 193 U.S. Army Special Warfare School, 188 U.S. office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 202 U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, 207 Vargas, Get ulio Dornelles, 173–4 Walker, William, 152 Walsh, Maria Elena, 233 Walters, Vernon, 231 War of Attrition (1969–1970), 9 War of the Pacific (1879–1883), 205 War of the Triple Alliance, 170 Westergaard, Kurt, 18, 19 White Paper for Social Welfare (1995), 119 Why Botswana Prospered, 76 Williams, Ruth, 76, 77 Yar’Adua, Umaru, 32 Yarborough, General William Pelham, 188 Yom Kippur War. See Ramadan War

298 Zambia, 95, 109; colonial rule in, 97– 98; economy, 99; invasion, public opinion on, 102–3; killing innocent civilians, public opinion on, 104–5; life expectancy, 96; multiparty politics in, 100; national security, public opinion on, 108; political unrest in, 96; postindependence, 98–99; precolonization in, 96–97; present situation in, 100–101; right to peace, public opinion on, 105–6,

Index 252; right to protest, public opinion on, 107–8; struggle for independence, 98; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 103– 4, 251; world peace, public opinion on, 106–7 ZAPU. See Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), 82, 99 Zulu War (1879), 113

About the Editor and Contributors

EDITOR Kathleen Malley-Morrison, Ed.D., Director of the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP), is a professor of psychology at Boston University. With the support of grants from the NIMH she conducted several studies of family relationships with a particular focus on the transition from late adolescence into adulthood. She has also conducted extensive research on family violence since 1980 when she was a postdoctoral fellow on the family violence team at Children’s Hospital in Boston. She regularly teaches undergraduate and graduate courses that focus on the family and family violence, as well as a course on the psychology of war and peace. She is the first author of several books, including Treating Child Abuse and Family Violence in Hospitals with Eli Newberger, Richard Bourne, and Jane Snyder, and Family Violence in a Cultural Perspective with Denise Hines. She is the editor of the book International Perspectives on Family Violence and Abuse: A Cognitive Ecological Approach. She is coauthor, with Denise Hines, of Family Violence in the United States and, with Anne Copeland, of the Sage book Studying Families. Her current focus is primarily on cross-cultural and international perspectives on governmental aggression and peace. CONTRIBUTORS Jacqui Akhurst has a Ph.D. from South Africa. She is a senior lecturer at York St. John University, York, England. She was formerly a senior lecturer in psychology in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, and worked extensively with trainee and in-service teachers, school counselors, and

300

About the Editor and Contributors

school psychologists. She has published articles about the impact of apartheid on education and counseling. Her research interests are in the fields of community psychology, student development in higher education, career psychology, and adolescent mental health and well-being. Luz Amparo Escobar, M.A., possesses a double bachelor’s degree in Spanish and Spanish literature. She earned a master’s degree in social sciences with an emphasis in psychoanalysis. She teaches classes in psychology and sociology at the University of Antioquia in Medeillin, Colombia. Flavia Angelino, M.A., currently resides in Argentina. She is a licensed sociologist, receiving her title from the Faculty of Social Sciences from the University of Buenos Aires. She has participated in research across many topics. She attends and participates in many conferences, including some based on the genocide that occurred in Argentina’s history. She is co-author of two books, one discussing the bio-psycho-social view of adolescence and another on Internet use by youths. Ricardo Angelino, M.D., is a medical doctor specializing in medical psychiatry and psychology and an active member of the Argentine Psychiatry Association (APSA). He is the founder of the Psychiatry Lecture of the School of Medical Sciences at the University La Plata as well as being the head of psychopathology I and II of the specialist in medical psychiatry and psychology degree at University La Plata. He served as a member of the academic committee in the specialty of clinical psychology at Universidad Argentina J. F. Kennedy, as a founding member of the Latin American Federation of Sexology and Sexual Education Societies, and a founding member and honorary president of the chapter: Mental Health, Human Rights, and Torture of the Argentine Psychiatry Association (APSA) as well as a founding member of the chapter: Group and Community Approaches (APSA). Davies Banda, MSc., is a senior lecturer in sports policy and development at York St. John University in North Yorkshire, England. He has worked with marginalized groups in the UK through a Home Office Social Inclusion program called Positive Futures. He is a Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of Sport and Leisure Policy at Loughborough University focusing on the role of sport in National Governing Bodies and NGOs in Zambia’s multisectoral approach to fighting HIV/AIDS. His research interests are centered on the use of sport as a tool for social change. He has previously worked for Sheffield Hallam University on a national research team commissioned by the UK Home

About the Editor and Contributors

301

Office to monitor and evaluate the impact of sports initiatives as tools for social inclusion and community cohesion. He also worked for Loughborough University on a project commissioned by the International Olympic Committee focusing on the role of women on national Olympic committees. Rodrigo Barahona Chacon, Psya. D., LADC-1, from Costa Rica, is a certified psychoanalyst in private practice in Brookline, Massachusetts, and director and supervisor at the Latino Partial Hospital at the Arbour Hospital. He is a faculty member at the Boston Graduate School of Psychoanalysis and adjunct faculty at the Center for Psychoanalytic Studies in San Jose, Costa Rica. Eddy Carrillo Retana, from San Jose, Costa Rica, received his M.A. from Teachers College, Columbia University, in developmental psychology, his M.Sc. in mental health counseling from Nova University, Florida, and his B.A. in psychology from the Universidad Autonoma Monterrey, Costa Rica. He is professor of clinical psychology at the Universidad Independiente and Director of the Center for Psychoanalytic Studies of the Association for Socio-Critical Psychoanalysis in Costa Rica. He is also clinical trainer and supervisor at the Manuel Fajardo Psychiatric Ward in Havana, Cuba. His main research interests lie in the interplay between sociocultural/ideological factors and psychoanalytic clinical practice. Nina Carstens, B.S., earned her bachelor’s degree in economic sciences from Stellenbosch University and is working on a degree in clinical psychology at the University of South Africa. Her work experience has involved her interest in human dynamics, which she is now expanding upon in her studies. Helena Castanheira, P.G., has a postgraduate degree in business management from ISCTE University in her native Portugal and a B.A. in psychology and management. Her research interests are in the areas of moral disengagement theory and transitional justice systems and reconciliation processes in post conflict situations. She has published in the International Psychology Bulletin and in the Peace Psychology newsletter. She joined the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace in 2006 and is currently working as lab manager for the group while pursuing a master’s degree in psychology. Amanda Clinton, M.ED., Ph.D., is an assistant professor of psychology at the University of Puerto Rico who specializes in violence prevention,

302

About the Editor and Contributors

culture and bilingualism, learning disabilities, and early childhood. She is a credentialed school psychologist and a licensed psychologist with experience in educational, hospital, and clinic settings in addition to research and teaching. Dr. Clinton was previously awarded a Fellowship by the Organization of American States and recognized as a Fulbright Scholar. She has published articles in English and Spanish regarding learning, behavior, and violence prevention issues and is currently spearheading research projects based in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, as well as Puerto Rico. Eduardo Baptista Correia, Ph.D., is currently the chair of the MBA program and a Professor at ISCTE Business School in Lisbon, Portugal. He is the author of Volume 1 and 2 of Gest~ ao.com: Customer Management on 21st century and New Technologies – Present and Future, of Digital Economy, and Merit and Society Manifesto. He frequently writes articles for Premio, Diario Economico, Jornal de Negocios, Semanario Economico, and Marketeer. Mahlon B. Dalley, Ph.D., is an associate professor of psychology at Eastern Washington University. He has served as school psychologist in the public school system as well as serving as the director of school psychology at the university level. He now serves as the director of school psychology at Eastern Washington University. He was honored as a Fulbright Scholar from 2003 to 2006 and received the Edmund J. Yarwood Dean’s Honor Faculty award in 2004 from the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences. Priscilla Dass-Brailsford, Ph.D, graduated from Harvard University with a doctorate in human development and psychology and is currently an associate professor at Lesley University in the Division of Counseling & Psychology. She has clinical experience at Roxbury Community Mental Health Center, MacLean Hospital, among many other clinics and has many publications including articles, books, and chapters in books. Eros R. DeSouza, Ph.D., received his doctorate from the University of Missouri in community counseling with a minor in counseling and did his post doctorate at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University. He is a member of the American Psychological Association, the Association for Psychological Science, the Society for the Psychological Study of Men and Masculinity, as well as the Division of International Psychology. He is currently an associate professor in the department of psychology at Illinois State University.

About the Editor and Contributors

303

Adeniyi Famose, M.A., has received a master’s of business and management as well as a master’s of art in peace & conflict studies and a certificate in practical approaches to peace building and development. He is currently a Ph.D./research student and assistant lecturer at the University of Ibadan, in Nigeria. He is also a current member of the Nigeria Institute of Town Planners and the Nigeria Institute of Management. Maria Galmarini, B.A., was born in Argentina and currently lives in the United States. She has a bachelor of arts degree in psychology from Boston University. She is currently working towards a master’s in mental health counseling at Nova University in Florida. Bradley Hartfield, M.P.A., holds a master’s of public administration from Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government as well as a master’s in linguistics and a bachelor’s in computer science from Brown University. He has used his experience in international development and humanitarian assistance to focus on creating innovative opportunities for peace and economic development in post-conflict areas. Prior to this, his career included work spanning multiple disciplines in the education, government, non-profit, and corporate sectors. He has consistently created opportunities by ‘‘facilitating relationships across boundaries’’ whether it be in crisis management and relief work in Sumatra or in providing strategic planning, or marketing or design expertise to Fortune 100 companies. Hartfield founded and directed the Project on Partnership in a Technological Future; The Evolution of Industry and Government at Stanford University’s Center for Work, Technology and Organization. In addition, he has also been a visiting fellow at the University of Hamburg, Germany, and at Aarhus University in Denmark. Denise A. Hines, Ph.D., has a Ph.D. from the programs in human development in the psychology department at Boston University. She is currently research assistant professor in the department of psychology at Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts, and a research associate at the University of New Hampshire, Family Research Laboratory and Crimes Against Children Research Center, Durham, New Hampshire. She is principal investigator on a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health on the ‘‘Mental Health Status of Male Help-Seekers for Partner Violence Victimization.’’ She has published widely on issues related to aggression as well as to culture. Samantha Hoyt, M.A., earned her master’s of arts in international training and education from the American University in Washington, DC.

304

About the Editor and Contributors

Her primary research interest is equity and quality of basic education in Africa. She has traveled widely throughout Africa, her regional specialty, and lived on the continent for a year. Samantha has spent the last year teaching adult basic education classes in Washington, DC, and in Boston. She is currently working with Partners In Health writing training manuals for community health workers in Africa. Mark M. Leach, Ph.D., is a licensed psychologist and the director of training for the counseling psychology program at the University of Southern Mississippi. He has held various positions at the University of Natal-Pietermaritzburg, South Africa, including adjunct instructor and honorary research fellow. His research has included topics such as counseling, forgiveness, suicide, international issues, and ethnicity and racial identity. Sherri McCarthy, Ph.D., received her Ph.D., from Arizona State University with a focus on adolescent development and developing critical thinking skills. She is currently a professor at Northern Arizona University-Yuma in educational psychology, counseling, and human relations. She now serves on the board of directors of the Asian Psychological Association, and on the board of directors on the International Council of Psychologists. She is also a current fellow of the American Psychological Association, the Fulbright Alumni Association, the International Council of Psychologists, and the American Psychological Society. David Young Oh, M.A., of Korean ancestry, was born and raised in New Orleans, Louisiana. An avid traveler, he has spent extended periods of time in Argentina, Korea, and Spain. He received his undergraduate and graduate degrees in psychology from Boston University, where he examined interpersonal violence with Dr. Kathleen MalleyMorrison. In addition to governmental violence and peace strategies, his interests include cross-cultural attitudes concerning the self and identity development. Elizabeth Planje, B.A., majored in psychology and French at Boston University. She is currently assistant lab manager for the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace and is pursuing a master’s degree in clinical counseling at Lesley University with the goal of becoming a licensed mental health counselor. Robert S. Rose, Ph.D., was educated at California State University, Long Beach, and received both a M.S. and Ph.D. from the University of Stockholm in Sweden. Bob has published several articles and a number

About the Editor and Contributors

305

of books, including: Unpast: viol^encia das elites e controle social no Brasil, 1954-2000; The Unpast: Elite Violence and Social Control in Brazil, 19542000; Uma das coisas esquecidas: Get ulio Vargas e controle social no Brasil, 1930-1954; and One of the Forgotten Things: Get ulio Vargas and Brazilian Social Control, 1930-1954 (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000). Natoschia Scruggs, M.A., received her B.A. in international studies from York College of Pennsylvania, and an M.A. in political science with a focus on African studies from Boston University. She recently completed her Ph.D. in the African diaspora studies program at the University of California, Berkeley. She has published on various aspects of African and African-American culture and specializes in Horn of Africa studies. In addition, she is the recipient of Fulbright (Senegal, 2003; Egypt, 2006) and Ford Foundation (2006-2009) fellowships. Michael J. Stevens, Ph.D, DHC, is a professor of psychology at Illinois State University, where he was named Outstanding University Researcher, and a licensed clinical psychologist. He has served as president and treasurer of the APA’s Division of International Psychology and director-at-large of the International Council of Psychologists. He is a fellow of the American Psychological Association and received the Division of International Psychology’s Outstanding Mentor Award and Recognition Award. Dr. Stevens is an honorary professor at the Lucian Blaga University in Romania, where he completed Fulbright and IREX grants and received a doctor honoris causa degree. Dr. Stevens has published over 100 peer-reviewed book chapters and journal articles and presented over 100 papers at conferences and other venues. He has been invited to speak in Argentina, China, Cyprus, Finland, Guatemala, Pakistan, Romania, Russia, Tajikistan, Uruguay, and Vietnam. Recent scholarship on international psychology includes the Handbook of International Psychology (2004), Toward a Global Psychology: Theory, Research, Intervention, and Pedagogy (2007), and Psychology: IUPsyS Global Resource (2005-2009). He also has written extensively on terrorism, most notably contributing to the four-volume The Psychology of Terrorism and to the journal Behavioral Sciences and the Law. John M. Whiteley is Professor of Social Ecology at the University of California, Irvine. His most recent scholarship involves the peace-building implications of the transboundary ethnic/national disputes in the Caucasus region of the former Soviet Union. His teaching focuses on the problem of peace in the nuclear age, the nuclear environment, and the issues of global sustainability associated with the interrelationship of health and environment. He is the coauthor (with Russell J. Dalton, Paula Garb,

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About the Editor and Contributors

Nicholas P. Lovrich, and John C. Pierce) of Critical Masses: Citizen, Nuclear Weapon Production, and Environmental Destruction in the United States and Russia (MIT Press). He is an editor and contributor to Water, Place, and Equity (MIT Press). He is the creator of the ‘‘Quest for Peace Project,’’ a comprehensive set of interviews on the problems of achieving peace in the nuclear age. This project is available electronically at http://www.lib. uci.edu/quest/.

State Violence and the Right to Peace

State Violence and the Right to Peace An International Survey of the Views of Ordinary People Volume 4: Asia and Australia

Kathleen Malley-Morrison, Editor Foreword by John M. Whiteley

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC

Copyright 2009 by Kathleen Malley-Morrison All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data State violence and the right to peace : an international survey of the views of ordinary people / edited by Kathleen Malley-Morrison ; foreword by John M. Whiteley. p. ; cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-275-99647-5 (hard copy : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-275-99648-2 (ebook) 1. Violence—Europe—History. 2. Violence—North America—History. I. Malley-Morrison, Kathleen. HN380.V5S73 2009 303.6094—dc22 2009015791 ISBN: 978-0-275-99647-5 978-0-275-99651-2 (Vol. 978-0-275-99653-6 (Vol. 978-0-275-99655-0 (Vol. 978-0-275-99657-4 (Vol. EISBN: 978-0-275-99648-2 13 12

11 10 9

1) 2) 3) 4)

1 2 3

4 5

This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. Praeger Security International An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

Contents

Foreword: Ordinary People, Country Portraits, and State Violence and Aggression John M. Whiteley

vii

Set Introduction Kathleen Malley-Morrison

xiii

Introduction to Volume 4

xxv

Part I. Central, South, and Southeast Asia 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Afghanistan Lane L. Smith, Kamala F. Smith, and Elizabeth Planje

1 3

Pakistan Megan Reif and Asifa Hasan

21

India Ellora Puri, Tanvi Zaveri, and Nisha Raj

51

The Philippines Ma. Regina E. Estuar and David Young Oh

77

Indonesia James Page, Syafuan Rozi Soebhan, and Jeremy Peterman

101

Malaysia Jas Jaafar, Sherri McCarthy, and Haslina Muhamad

121

Australia James Page

137

Contents

vi

Part II. The Far East 8

157

Laos Janice E. Jones, Paul E. Priester, and Cher Vang

159

China Andrea Jones-Rooy and Ting Wu

169

South Korea Mi-Sung Kim, Ting Wu, In-Jin Park, and Mikyung Jang

185

Japan Alice Murata, Michelle Murata, and Shiho Takagi

207

An Integrative Conclusion for Volume 4 Sherri McCarthy

235

An Integrative Conclusion for the Set Michael Corgan, David Young Oh, and Kathleen Malley-Morrison

257

Notes

265

Index

291

About the Editor and Contributors

301

9 10 11 12

Foreword

Ordinary People, Country Portraits, and State Violence and Aggression John M. Whiteley

Seeking the views of ‘‘ordinary people’’ is reminiscent of what President Dwight D. Eisenhower said about people’s views on the importance of peace in relation to the role of government: Indeed, I think that people want peace so much that one of these days, governments had better get out of their way and let them have it. —From a TV talk with Harold McMillan, August 31, 1959

The broad area of inquiry in this multivolume and pioneering research provides portraits of 43 very diverse countries selected from every continent of the world. It co-joins these country-specific portraits with surveys of the opinions of ‘‘ordinary people’’ from those countries on a series of important issues using an instrument known as the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS). A great contribution of this novel and important line of research is that it opens up for further study the relationship between a country’s historical experience and current circumstances in the world around it, and the opinions of its citizens on a host of peace-related issues.

THE COUNTRY PORTRAITS Reflecting the bold vision behind the four-volume series, there is no standard format into which 43 country portraits had to fit. This is a sound decision because the experiences of each of the countries are so different. For example, the case study of Great Britain has the following

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categories: (1) Historical and Political Context; (2) Current Demographics; (3) Religion; (4) Industrialization, Health Care, and Education; (5) Minorities; and (6) Post–World War II Involvement in Military Activities. By way of contrast, the case study of Greece has the following categories: (1) Historical Background; (2) Recent Involvement in Conflict and Peace Efforts; and (3) Social Contextual Factors. Similarly, the case study of Russia, one of the most developed in the volumes, has the following category: Historical and Political Context. The point is that whether there were 16þ double-spaced manuscript pages devoted to numerous topics under one heading (the Russian case study), or 8þ double-spaced pages devoted to three categories (the Greece case study), or 7þ double-spaced pages covering six categories, there is an authenticity to each of the portraits. Informed by the relationship found between the diverse country portraits and the opinions of ‘‘ordinary citizens’’ as expressed on the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey, the next generation of research in this promising paradigm may wish to ask the authors of country case studies to address a broader range of peacerelated content categories. For example, the authors of the case study on Great Britain obviously believed it was relevant to address the minority issue, the history of religious persecution, the current (more) openness to religious diversity, components of (and tensions over) a (more) welfare state model, and the (multiple) lessons derived from involvement in military activities since World War II. One area for the next generation of research is the relevance of these topics to countries other than Great Britain. In a similar vein, the case study of Greece asserts that, although ‘‘the influence of ancient Greek civilization on the modern world is well known, few people know that among Greeks themselves, awareness of this great legacy was almost wiped out under nearly 400 years (1453– 1830) of Ottoman rule.’’ A consequence of this historical disruption, according to the authors of the case study of Greece, is that ‘‘Greece was largely isolated from great historical movements such as the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution.’’ Greater emphasis in this case study was assigned to experience in the 20th Century: The Balkan Wars, the World Wars, a civil war, and several military dictatorships. A richness of this four-volume portrait of 43 countries is that it is possible to develop categories of analysis within and across case studies using the current portraits. It is also possible to expand each existing portrait to include promising categories from other case studies. For example, post–World War II involvement in military activities (from the case study of Great Britain) and recent involvement in conflict and

Foreword

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peace efforts and social contextual factors (from the Greece case study) appear to provide especially relevant insights for the (more) empirical investigation provided by the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey. Country Aggression and ‘‘Ordinary People’’ Peace Survey The main title of these four volumes, ‘‘State Violence and the Right to Peace’’ is very appropriately chosen. The empirical instrument, the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey, has six sections: Section I – probing ‘‘ordinary people’s opinions’’ about the right of governments to perform acts of aggression (invasions of another country, killing innocent civilians, engaging in torture); Section II – whether individuals have a right to a world of peace and to demonstrate in support of that conviction; Section III – patriotism and an assessment of the United States in Iraq; Section IV – acts of state violence as assessed through the prism of emotional responses to direct or indirect exposure; Section V – ‘‘ordinary citizen’’ definitions of such fundamental terms as war, peace, torture, terrorism, reconciliation, and rights; and Section VI – a dual consideration of the relationship of national security to individual and family security, and whether peace is achievable.

COMMENTARY AND ASSESSMENT A significant contribution of these four volumes is to open up an original line of inquiry with evidence from 43 countries. The various chapters address different aspects of these six sections as they pertain to the country being profiled. The next level of inquiry will, to advantage, broaden the within-country samples sufficiently that it will be possible to illuminate within-country differences. Building on the current country portraits and the current empirical samples, it is feasible to begin the process of hypothesis development relating country characteristics to attitudes of ‘‘ordinary citizens,’’ as well as the reverse, relating the attitudes of ‘‘ordinary citizens’’ to the characteristics of the country.

Foreword

x

Then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara wrote to President Lyndon Johnson in 1967 that there were limits to what the American people would allow their government to do: . . . there may be a limit beyond which many Americans and much of the world will not permit the United States to go. The picture of the world’s greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 noncombatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one. It could conceivably produce a costly distortion in the American national consciousness and in the world image of the United States.

The point Secretary McNamara was making to President Johnson is broadly applicable to the survey instrument questions about the United States in Iraq and citizen support for the torture and terrorism in relation to the world image of the United States. This general line of inquiry is broadly applicable to unsolved problems of global society in the twenty-first century. The approach to research by the organizers of these four volumes use the country case study method to pioneer an exploration of the views of ‘‘ordinary people’’ about the permissible levels of state violence on such significant questions as whether, and under what conditions, governments have the right to perform acts of aggression, and the relationship of national security to individual and family security. The inclusion of 43 countries from the continents of the world makes it possible to begin to understand how country characteristics and historical and current experience affect such significant perceptions in global context of whether peace is achievable, common understandings of the meaning of being patriotic, ordinary citizen support for torture and terrorism, and the prospects for reconciliation after the killing has stopped. THE BROADER CONTEXT FOR A NEW RESEARCH PARADIGM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY The research in this four-volume series provides an imaginative new approach to the relationship between state violence and the opinions of citizens. This approach can be broadened as it further develops to incorporate another insight that Dwight Eisenhower shared with the American people and the world when he talked about the negative consequences of states putting such huge resources into preparing to conduct state violence. The essence of what he shared is as follows: Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed,

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those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. This is not a way of life at all in any true sense. Under the clouds of war, it is humanity hanging on a cross of iron. —Dwight D. Eisenhower, ‘‘The Chance for Peace’’ Address, April 16, 1953

Set Introduction Kathleen Malley-Morrison

When people in today’s world think about war and peace, they generally think about war and peace between or within nations. Yet the very idea of nations, or states, is quite a new one in human history. For most of human existence, people banded together in extended families, bands, tribes, or chiefdoms; later, in some parts of the world, leaders such as warlords, kings, and emperors forcibly created larger social and political structures. The notion of a human society organized into individual states or nations, with equal sovereignty, is, by contrast, quite modern, an outgrowth of the Peace of Westphalia that brought an end to the Thirty Years War in 1648. The Thirty Years War, which was actually a series of European wars, was essentially a set of conflicts between proponents of Catholicism and proponents of Protestantism, who allied themselves with the expansionist ambitions of many European power holders. Ultimately, these wars involved the leaders of Bohemia, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Poland, Russia, the Netherlands, Spain, and France, although it could also be seen as a conflict between the Holy Roman Empire, which was aggressively Roman Catholic, and various anti-imperialistic Protestant communities. It was fought primarily on German territory, often by mercenaries, with devastating results. The Peace of Westphalia formally ended the era in which princes and kings could demand feudal loyalties from sovereigns within other states and could also attempt to force their own religious observance on subjects of another sovereign. One of the immediate effects was to end the direct influence of the Pope, Innocent X, and his successors on the choosing of the Holy Roman emperor and on intervening in the internal

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affairs of European countries no longer Catholic. There arose, instead, the structure of independent sovereign states—a type of organization that gradually extended beyond Europe and has persisted into modern times. Even the Charter of the United Nations, though it champions peaceful resolution of disputes, acknowledges this idea of sovereignty in the very first section of Article 2 of the Charter: ‘‘The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.’’1 This statement so early in the UN Charter is simply recognition that the political order of today’s world remains characterized by the predominance of sovereign states acknowledging no higher authority than themselves in matters of vital interests. The Security Council notwithstanding, each state is the final decider of its own security interests and of the means appropriate to achieve those interests. The virtual anarchy enabled by this formalizing of the supremacy of sovereignty has particularly grave implications in an era when technology has made nearly instantaneous attack with unimaginably devastating weapons by other states or non-state actors possible anywhere on the globe. All states must, to some degree, live in a condition of perpetual concern about their readiness to provide for their security. This in turn induces what is called ‘‘the security dilemma’’ for other states. What one state does for its own protection is likely to be seen by at least some other states as threatening. Although states may find it useful to wage wars, it is the people who inhabit those states who suffer most in times of war, and governments often promise their people that a better peace, a more secure peace, will grow out of their sacrifices. In modern times, World War I turned out not to be ‘‘the war to end all wars’’; the death of approximately 20 million people did not lead to an enduring peace. The carnage of World War II was even greater, with the majority of deaths being civilians. Among the Allies, it is likely that 25 million people, at least two thirds of whom were civilians, died in the Soviet Union—15 million in China; 6 million in Poland; between 1.5 and 2 million in Yugoslavia; approximately 400,000 in the United Kingdom; and about 300,000 from the United States. Germany lost over 4 million, and Japan over 2 million lives in the war. ‘‘The total for the globe as a whole probably reached 60 million, a figure which includes 6 million murdered because they were Jewish.’’2 The loss of approximately 60 million lives in World War II, itself a direct consequence of mismanagement of the outcome of World War I, failed to bring peace to the world. According to one set of estimates, between the end of World War II and 2004, there have been a total of 228 armed conflicts; 118 of these have taken place since the end of the Cold War.3 However, the number of international wars has declined since the late 1970s, largely because of the end of colonialism and the Cold War.4

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The United Kingdom and France, former colonial powers, had fought most of the post-World War II wars, followed by the major Cold Warriors, the United States and the USSR. In addition, after World War II the number of civil wars first increased dramatically, but then, starting in the 1990s, decreased even more dramatically. In 2003, the majority of non-state wars (not involving any government) took place in Africa. Many people are unsurprised at the level of violence permeating society, because they see aggression as an innate human characteristic, part of our evolutionary history. Not so, say many experts. For example, Robert Sapolsky argues effectively that although some of our related primate species are characterized by violence, others are communal, egalitarian, and cooperative.5 The Encyclopedia of Selected Peaceful Societies provides descriptions of 25 of the societies identified by sociologists and anthropologists as peaceful, the most well-known of these probably being the Amish, Tahitians, and Inuit of Utkuhikhalik.6 Ackerman and Duvall describe major changes in power and successful resistance movements achieved without major military conflict, and in which the ‘‘little guys’’ successfully combated powerful aggressors; for example, India’s transition to self-rule under the leadership of Mohandas Ghandi, Poland’s Solidarity Movement in the 1980s under the leadership of Lech Walesa, and the campaign against apartheid in South Africa under the leadership of many courageous men and women, including Nelson Mandela.7 Although violent conflict was widespread in the era from 1990 to 2002, 30 successful peace agreements were made and have been respected; for example, in Mexico, Northern Ireland, Mauritania, Slovenia, Albania, Uzbekistan, Bangladesh, and Kuwait. Thus, the claims of many leaders that their national or group aims (always portrayed as righteous) can be achieved only through violence are belied by numerous counterexamples, often not as widely remembered as the armed conflicts are. The Human Security Report attributes the decline in armed conflicts over the last 30 years to three key factors: the end of colonialism, the end of the Cold War, and the international conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peace-building activities of the United Nations. In 1948, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaims, among other things, that ‘‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person’’; ‘‘No one shall be held in slavery or servitude’’; ‘‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’’; ‘‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile’’; and ‘‘Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.’’ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a revolutionary document that provides the basis for international human rights law today. It has been followed by other human rights proclamations, such as the

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Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,8 the Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace,9 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which emphasizes the importance of preparing children to live in a world of peace.10 On the other hand, although banning torture and many other forms of violence and discrimination, the United Nations has not made all armed conflict illegal. For example, the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations states as one of its goals: ‘‘to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest’’ (emphasis added).11 Moreover, Article 51 of the Charter states, ‘‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.’’12 Finally, according to Article 42 of the Charter, if nonviolent efforts fail to resolve ‘‘any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,’’ then the Security Council ‘‘may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.’’13 The United Nations’ position concerning the justifiability of armed force for self-defense or in response to breaches of the peace and acts of aggression is generally viewed as consistent with Just War doctrine, which is designed to constrain and prevent warfare. In general, there are six criteria that Just War theorists agree must be met, in combination, for a nation to be justified in going to war: just cause (i.e., in response and only in response to actual or imminent attack); right authority (e.g., initiated by the United Nations or a national government, not a terrorist group); right intention (e.g., to achieve peace and security); reasonable prospect of success (to ensure there is not a needless loss of life); proportionate cause (the response should be proportionate to the level of the attack or threat); and war as a last resort (undertaken only if and when all nonviolent solutions have been tried and have failed, consistent with the United Nations Charter).14 Several social scientists and ethicists have evaluated the extent to which the United States’ invasion of Iraq fits the profile for a just war and have concluded that it does not.15 Moreover, Just War doctrine itself has been criticized on the ground that its principles, particularly the principle of just cause, can be too easily subverted.16 Others argue that Just War doctrine imposes at least some constraints on potential violent conflicts and needs to be updated to deal with modern realities (e.g., terrorist groups and weapons of mass destruction) rather than abandoned altogether.17

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It seems clear that some nations that are signatories to human rights proclamations, as well as non-state groups, break international laws and agreements, and even appear to reject the idea that everyone (regardless of ‘‘race’’ or religion) has a right to peace.18 How do ordinary people feel about the principles stated in such proclamations? Do they believe that strategies like invasion and torture are justifiable if being carried out by their own governments, regardless of whether such acts violate international law? Do they believe people have a right to peace? Do they think peace is achievable? In the months following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, members of our group became interested in the extent to which ordinary people, the men and women in the street, believed that various forms of governmental aggression were inevitable and perhaps justifiable, as well as the extent to which they believed people had a right to peace and that peace could be achieved. The four volumes in this series address the issue. GIPGAP: The Core Group The Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP) grew out of an earlier group of psychologists and students doing research on international perspectives on family violence and abuse.19 The events following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, particularly the expansion of the United States’ government’s aggressive response into Iraq, led student members of the local (Boston University) group to urge their faculty mentor (Kathleen Malley-Morrison) to broaden the group’s concern with interpersonal violence to include governmental aggression. In the next few years, international representation in the group grew, a pilot survey was developed, tested, and modified, a book contract was negotiated successfully with the Praeger Security International (PSI), an imprint of ABC-CLIO, and the current project was launched. The Core Group, located at Boston University, initially consisted of a faculty advisor (Malley-Morrison), several postdocs who had worked on the family violence and abuse project, and international graduate and undergraduate students concerned with issues of violence. That group has expanded to include faculty and graduate students from the International Relations Department at Boston University. GIPGAP: International Contributors The International Group consists of faculty and graduate students from a range of academic departments, including psychology, sociology, and international relations, in more than 40 countries. These international contributors were recruited through a number of different

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approaches: networking by Core Group members, notices in Announcements from the APA Division of International Psychology, notices in International Psychology Bulletin, and invitations during presentations at international psychology conferences. With approval from the appropriate institutional authorities, these contributors administered the Personal and Individual Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) to ordinary people from multiple countries in every major area of the world: North America (the United States and Canada); Western Europe (Iceland, Great Britain, France, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden); Central and Eastern Europe (Germany, Greece, Slovenia, Serbia, and Turkey), Eurasia (Russia), the Middle East (Afghanistan, Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia); Africa (Egypt, Nigeria, Angola, Ghana, Botswana, Zambia, and South Africa), Central America (Nicaragua and Costa Rica); South America (Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Argentina); South and Southeast Asia (Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, and the Philippines); and the Far East (China, Laos, Japan, and Korea). The PAIRTAPS The Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) has six sections: (1) judgments concerning the extent to which governments have the right to perform such acts of aggression as invading another country, killing innocent civilians in times of war, and torturing prisoners during times of war; (2) judgments concerning the rights of individuals to grow up and live in a world of peace, and the right to demonstrate against war and in favor of peace; (3) views concerning patriotism and the United States’ involvement in the Iraq war; (4) projected emotional responses that might be experienced following direct or indirect exposure to acts of governmental violence; (5) definitions of war, torture, terrorism, peace, reconciliation, and rights; and (6) views on the achievability of peace and the relationship of national security to individual and family security. Several of the items in Sections A and B are direct expressions of human rights guarantees (e.g., freedom from torture, right to assembly) established in United Nations agreements. For Sections 1, 2, 3, and 6, respondents indicate on a scale from 1 (total disagreement) to 7 (total agreement) the extent to which they agree with each item (e.g., ‘‘Sometimes a country has the right to ignore international treaties or international human rights agreements.’’). Then, in their own words, they provide an explanation of the reasoning behind their rating on the item. Sections 4 and 5 call only for open-ended qualitative responses—for example, samples of emotions that would be felt in the face of governmental aggression and definitions of terms. For the purposes of this current set of Praeger books,

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chapter authors were asked to focus only on qualitative responses to the following selected items: • Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country. • The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war. • Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism. • All human beings have a basic right to peace. • Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace. • I believe that world peace can be achieved. • National Security is essential for individual and family security. • Definitions for war, peace, and terrorism Although most chapter authors analyzed responses to most if not all of these items, some chapter authors focused primarily on the definitions of war, peace, and terrorism. Moreover, some chapter authors included a discussion of the item ‘‘The United States’ involvement in the Iraq war is a moral activity’’ because they thought the responses were of particular importance in understanding public reaction in diverse countries to the United States’ war in Iraq. Despite such relatively minor differences in coverage of survey items, each volume in the series ends with an integrative chapter summarizing similarities and differences found across countries in the themes that emerged. In addition to responding to the PAIRTAPS items, participants completed a background information form asking for basic demographic data such as age, gender, ethnicity, nationality, and religion, as well as whether they or any family member had been in the military, and whether they had participated in any protest activities. Participants who responded to the survey in their home country generally did so in their native language, except in the case of South Africa, where all participants responded to an English version of the survey. The qualitative responses to the selected items were coded according to a grounded theory approach. That is, we did not start out with a particular theoretical framework and then strive to fit the responses into that framework. Instead, we followed the procedures recommended by Strauss and Korbin, proceeding from open coding to axial coding, using a process of constant comparison.20 During the open coding phase, we broke the qualitative responses to the government aggression and peace items into units of meaning that varied from one word (e.g., ‘‘Disgusting’’) to phrases (e.g., ‘‘Only in defense of one’s own citizens’’) and entire sentences (e.g., ‘‘The future of the world depends on peace’’). At the axial level of coding, the relationships among the more fragmented

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categories were identified, and these categories were organized into more inclusive categories. For example, in regard to qualitative responses to the item ‘‘Sometimes the heads of government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism,’’ thematic categories for ‘‘sanctity of life’’ (e.g., ‘‘No person has the right to kill anyone’’), ‘‘only God’’ (e.g., ‘‘Taking a life would be replacing the job of our Lord’’), and ‘‘emphasis on innocence’’ (e.g., ‘‘The word innocent should be enough to suggest that the above sentence is disgusting and the marks of a dictator not a legal government’’) were all incorporated into a more inclusive category labeled ‘‘No right to kill,’’ which in turn became one of the categories in the overarching category labeled ‘‘It’s not a right.’’ That overarching category also included other categories such as ‘‘The ends don’t justify the means,’’ ‘‘Killing innocent civilians is a terrorist tactic,’’ ‘‘Does not make sense,’’ and ‘‘Is avoidable.’’ In a grounded theory analysis, data collection, coding, conceptualizing, and theorizing take place simultaneously, and analyses of new responses are compared both with analyses of previous responses and with the concepts emerging from those analyses. Using an international coding manual sample, with blinded responses from nearly all of the countries represented in this PSI series, the Core Group developed coding manuals for each of the survey items being addressed. We found that, in general, the governmental aggression responses could be coded first into general categories: (1) unqualified rejection of the right of governments to perform the particular form of aggression (the intolerance category) and (2) identification of one or more circumstances under which the aggression would be justifiable (the tolerance category). Within those broad categories, there are numerous subcategories, depending on the particular form of governmental aggression being addressed. For example, in regard to the invasion item, major tolerance arguments include for self-defense, to respond to threat, to strike back at an aggressor, and for humanitarian intervention. In regard to the torture prisoners of war item, the major tolerance arguments include its presumed effectiveness in getting important information, its potential role in saving lives, and its appropriateness when carried out under the aegis of some authority. Responses to the peace-related items, similarly, can be coded into two general categories (unequivocal support for the rights to peace and to protest and rejection or qualification of any such rights) as well as subcategories. For example, in regard to the item ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace,’’ some responses could be categorized as qualifying the right with specified conditions—for example, that the protests be peaceful, or socially sanctioned, or not have negative consequences for the country’s military

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personnel. Similarly, in regard to the possibility of a right to peace, subcategories included conditional statements such as ‘‘unless they are terrorists,’’ ‘‘unless they have broken the peace,’’ and ‘‘as long as they have not hurt others.’’ In regard to definitions of key terms, we found that except for the definition of ‘‘peace,’’ the examples of definitions did not fall into two overarching categories quite as neatly as the responses to the rights items tended to do. In regard to definitions of peace, the responses frequently fell into the two major types identified by Galtung—that is, ‘‘positive peace’’ (i.e., the good things peace can mean, such as ‘‘harmony’’ and ‘‘reconciliation’’) and ‘‘negative peace’’ (i.e., peace as freedom from bad things such as conflict, peace as the opposite of war).21 Among the positive definitions of peace are subcategories emphasizing peace as goodness, peace as coexistence and cooperation, peace as a human right, peace as a force for growth, and peace as an ideal—along with some definitions including explicit doubt as to the achievability of peace. By contrast, we found that definitions of ‘‘war’’ generally did not fall into two major categories with subcategories, but rather fell into one of the following general categories: (1) conflict (e.g., ‘‘Time or state of conflict between two countries or groups’’); (2) morality or human rights (e.g., ‘‘selfishness,’’ ‘‘immorality,’’ ‘‘violation of rights’’); (3) likely emotional effects (e.g., ‘‘hate,’’ ‘‘terror,’’ ‘‘sadness,’’ ‘‘suffering,’’ and ‘‘desolation’’); (4) destruction and other physical outcomes (e.g., ‘‘death, destruction, out of control’’); (5) defense (e.g., ‘‘aggressive confrontation in defense of some position’’); (6) causes (e.g., ‘‘aggressiveness, unnecessary actions to gain more land or money’’); and (7) acknowledgment of alternatives (e.g., ‘‘the worst of solutions’’). Definitions equating war with conflict are most similar to typical dictionary types of definitions of the term. Similarly, there was no bifurcation of definitions of ‘‘terrorism,’’ which fell into five major categories: focus on intent, focus on motivation or trigger; value judgments concerning the morality or sanity of terrorist behaviors, focus on outcomes, and simple listing of behaviors that might be considered terroristic. As the Core Group developed these coding manuals on an everexpanding international coding manual sample, it made the coding manuals available to the International Group. The International Group was invited to conduct their own guided theory analysis or to use the Core Group’s manuals for coding the data. We did not want to be restrictive in regard to any group member’s coding, but rather to encourage them to use consistent category labels when discussing the same or similar types of arguments. The Core Group also offered to do the coding of the responses from any country, as long as they had been translated into English or could be translated by a member of the Core

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Group. Although a few contributors developed and applied their own coding systems, the great majority worked with the coding manuals developed by the Core Group or requested that the Core Group do the coding for them. In general, coding systems used were similar enough to allow comparisons across countries. Methodology All researchers contributing to this project adhered to human subjects ethical guidelines. The survey responses were collected between 2005 and 2008. In some cases, shortened versions of the survey were administered because the respondents were unfamiliar with taking surveys; moreover, in some cases, items that seemed particularly sensitive within the context of that country were deleted (e.g., ‘‘If your country is currently involved in armed conflict with another country, please respond to the following item: My country’s involvement in armed conflict is morally correct [morally defensible].’’). The survey could be completed either online over the Internet at a secure site or as a paper-and-pencil measure. Individual chapter authors made the decision as to which procedure best protected their participants’ rights and safety. In many of the Western countries, both procedures were used, although the bulk of the responses were submitted over the Internet.

PURPOSE OF THIS SET OF VOLUMES Although we know that globally almost all peoples have some exposure to armed conflict and other forms of sanctioned violence (including torture), rarely do books compare the views of laypeople around the world on issues such as the rights of governments to invade other countries, torture suspected terrorists, violate human rights treaties, and suppress dissent—all issues with great relevance to security at the level of individual, state, and system. We know even less about the views of laypeople around the world concerning such revolutionary ideas as a ‘‘right to peace.’’ To what extent do laypeople from countries with very different forms of government accept or reject their leaders’ arguments concerning the rights of the regime to perpetrate violence to achieve ends? Do laypeople from countries that have recently engaged in armed conflict with each other use similar or different arguments to justify their own nation’s involvement with the other in the conflict? To what extent do these laypeople believe that all individuals have an inherent right to peace and that children have a right to grow up in a world of peace? To what extent do judgments concerning peace vary in relation to the

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status of women and ethnic minorities? These are some of the questions that we address in the current book series, which includes chapters on issues of governmental violence and peace in more than 40 countries around the world. The four volumes in the current series are organized by major areas of the world (e.g., Western Europe, the Middle East, and Africa) and then by selected countries within each area. Many of the selected countries have a considerable history of military conflict with each other, as well as internal conflicts. Moreover, many of the countries were either colonizers or colonized in the 15th through 20th centuries, and the legacies of the colonial era’s depredations and disruptions of long existing social and political structures underlie much of the havoc being wrought in the world today. We begin Volume 1 in Western Europe including the major former colonial powers—Portugal, Spain, Great Britain, and France—whose empire-building policies contributed greatly to their own economic and political power, while leaving much of the world economically and politically oppressed. We then move north to Sweden, which had a brief empire-building period but has been a model of nonaggression for centuries, and west to Iceland, also a model of nonaggression. We end the volume with the United States and Canada, both colonized by Western European countries, but with very different subsequent histories. Our national coverage heads eastward in Volume 2, starting with Germany, principal site of the Thirty Years War and the Peace of Westphalia, which moved the world toward the kind of nation state organization it has today. Volume 2 continues with its sample of countries through war-torn Eastern Europe and Russia, seat of the former Soviet Union, and ends in the Middle East, where East meets West, and conflicts among Christians, Jews, and Muslims have flared for centuries. Volume 3 addresses perspectives on war and peace in the more southern parts of the globe, the areas most influenced (and probably most damaged) by colonialism—specifically, Africa and South America. Finally, Volume 4 includes countries in South Asia and Southeast Asia that were invaded and colonized by both Western and Eastern powers and ends with countries from the Far East, some of which did their own forms of colonizing, particularly Japan and China. Each chapter begins with a country profile describing the country’s recent history of involvement in armed conflict, the extent to which it has colonized, invaded, and occupied other countries historically and since World War II, the extent to which it has been involved in internal (e.g., ethnic) armed conflicts, its current economic status (developed or developing, level of income disparity) and political status (totalitarian, democratic)—all of these being contextual factors that have been

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demonstrated to be relevant to perspectives on war, peace, and security. Following a description of the sample recruited in that country, each chapter focuses on the ‘‘voices’’ of those participants, expanding on the major themes and findings that emerged from our analyses of their responses. These themes are then linked to the country’s previous and current experience with war and peace.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My thanks to Professor Michael Corgan of the International Relations Department at Boston University for his helpful suggestions concerning this chapter. My thanks go to all the team members who have contributed to this book project by recruiting participants, translating responses, creating Excel and SPSS files, helping in the development of coding manuals, coding qualitative responses, handling correspondence with contributors, helping figure out the endlessly frustrating Chicago Manual reference style, and innumerable other tasks. In particular, I want to thank my current and recent lab managers and assistant managers: Helena Castanheira, Maria Daskalopoulos, Elizabeth Planje, Tanvi Zaveri, and Lauren Groves; without their help managing the lab, these volumes would never have been completed. I also greatly appreciate the assistance of Doe West, Nyryan Nolido, Matt Pita, Ting Wu, Samantha Kinney, Stephanie Nadler, Samantha Hoyt, Kristin Wagner, Jennie Davidow, Jonathan Fuss, Jeremy Peterman, Abram Trosky, Carolyn Certilman, Mariana Barbosa, Marisa Kirio, Mi Sung Kim, Mike Toohey, Rouba Youssef, Sarah Stuart, Shannon Turney, Tina Belanger, Maria Galmarini, Nisha Raj, Jacob-Joon Meyers, Tessa Schaaf, Natsuko Mori, Injin Park, Chanmi Lee, Kamala Smith, Kaitlyn Welsh, Abigail Rudnickas, Caroline Berrio, Cornelia Photopoulos, Stella Hirawan, Ken Mullane, Nadia El Tayar, Katie Maxted, Sophie Spiegel, and Sarah Jane Potter.

Introduction to Volume 4

Volume 4 of this series focuses on a highly diverse set of countries in Asia and the Asian Pacific—including Australia, which, despite its location in the Pacific, near the Asian continent, is considered part of the developed ‘‘West.’’ Countries from South Asia (one of the most populous areas of the world, accounting for about one-fifth of the world’s population) include Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (the latter two being two of the world’s nuclear-armed states). Countries from the Asian Pacific are the People’s Republic of China, Japan, South Korea, and Laos, as well as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Australia. These countries vary widely in type of government, predominant religious affiliation, poverty rate, the extent to which they are considered ‘‘developed’’ or ‘‘developing,’’ and many indices. On the 2005 United Nation’s Human Development Index (HDI), Australia ranked third of the 177 countries with available data. On several of the specific HDI criteria, it ranked fifth for life expectancy (80.9 years), first for gross educational enrollment level, and 16th for GDP per capita ($31,794 per year). Japan also received high ratings on the various UN HDI indices, ranking eighth for its overall HDI status, first for life expectancy (82.3 years), 42nd for level of educational enrollment, and 17th for GDP per capita ($31,267). By contrast, Pakistan ranked 136th of the 177 countries in overall HDI, 123rd in life expectancy (64.6 years), and 127th in GDP per capita ($2,370), and had a literacy rate of only 49.9 percent). Income was even lower in Laos (the Lao People’s Democratic Republic), where the annual GDP at the time of the 2005 report was $2,039. No data were available for Afghanistan so it is not included in the ranking.

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The Economist Development Unit1 reveals that across nations there is a positive correlation between level of development (roughly defined as income per head) and degree of democratization; despite the apparent economic advantage found in democracies, the international movement towards democratization may have been stymied somewhat by the association of the movement with recent American imperialism and a distrusted American president. Also, the direction of the relationship between development and democratization is debatable. Although originally it was widely assumed that economic development is a facilitator of democracy, there are now strong arguments that democracy may lead to economic growth; in oil-rich nations, which tend to be autocratic, the relationship between level of development and level of democracy weakens. Because of infringements on civil liberties associated with the ‘‘fight on terror,’’ the standing of the United States and the United Kingdom on the Economist Democracy Index has shown some slippage, while several other countries have maintained or improved their ranking over the last few years. In regard to the countries considered in this volume, Australia (rank 10) and Japan (rank 17) both scored higher on the 2008 Democracy Index than the United States (rank 18). In addition, South Korea (rank 28) moved into the category of full democracies on the 2008 index. The other Asian countries fell into the categories of flawed democracies (India, Malaysia, Philippines, and Indonesia), hybrid regimes (Pakistan), or authoritarian regimes (China, Afghanistan, and Laos). Within the countries considered in this volume, there are very divergent histories in regard to colonization and invasion. Originally, a European colony—including for a time a penal colony—Australia did not follow in the path of the United States and become itself an imperialist. However, as was true in North America, the European colonists expanded aggressively, taking an enormous toll on the native population. Descendents of the Europeans have shaped Australia’s culture, and it has become more of a Western than an Asian nation. India, under the control of the Islam Mughal Empire for several hundred years, was colonized by Great Britain in the 19th century and did not win its independence until 1947. Pakistan was also part of the Islamic Mughal Empire for centuries, before becoming, along with India, part of the British colonial empire. Once part of the Mongol Empire, the territory of present-day Afghanistan has been fought over and divided up by many powers through the centuries. Caught between expanding British and Russian empires in the 19th century, it fought several wars against the British to maintain its independence, but has continued to deal with incursions and occupations by competing powers right into the 21st century.

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Laos was colonized by the French in the nineteenth century, became incorporated into French Indochina, was occupied by the Japanese during World War II, repossessed by France following that war, and gained independence in 1954. As has been true of so many former colonies, independence was followed by civil war between groups fighting for control of the country. Then, during the Vietnam War, Laos experienced bombing from the United States. Over the centuries, many other areas of Asia also underwent colonization. A variety of outside powers exercised some control over Malaysia, including Hindus and Muslims, and later first the Portuguese and then the Dutch and the British. Indonesia was colonized by the Portuguese and the Dutch (through the Dutch East India Company) and then occupied by Japan during World War II. The Philippines were colonized first by the Spanish and then by the United States and occupied by Japan during World War II. China as a whole never became a colony, but Hong Kong was colonized by the British in the 19th century and remained a British protectorate until 1997. Moreover, China was certainly subjected to much unwanted influence from the West, divided into zones of influence by Western powers, and lost territory to an expansionist Japan. On the other hand, China itself has been accused of imperialism under the Qing Dynasty for its expansion into Tibet and Taiwan, and the legitimacy of its occupation of Tibet today is widely debated. Starting in the late 19th century, Japan, apparently concerned about its own security in the face of Western imperialism, and spurred on by developing nationalism, followed the Western imperial model in a few brief skirmishes designed to expand its territory; the height of its expansionism came during World War II, following which it has played a largely pacifistic role in the world. Korea, including what is now South Korea, was occupied by Japan during most of the 19th century and then divided into North and South Korea following World War II. The countries considered in this volume, like those in the other volumes (particularly Volumes 2 and 3), differ enormously among themselves in regard to predominant religion. India is predominantly Hindu (80 percent), with Muslims as an important minority (about 13 percent), and fewer percentages of Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, and others. Laos is largely Buddhist. The major religions practiced in Japan are Shinto (51 percent) and Buddhism (44 percent). Islam predominates in Pakistan (97 percent Muslim), Afghanistan (about 99 percent Muslim), and Indonesia (about 86 percent Muslim). Some of the countries are characterized by greater religious diversity. In Malaysia, about 60 percent of the population is Muslim, 19 percent Buddhist, 9 percent Christian, and 6 percent Hindu. Although the Chinese government does not encourage religious affiliations, about 20 percent of Chinese report practicing

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traditional Chinese religions, about 8 percent indicate that they are Buddhists, and about 2 percent practice Islam. In South Korea, nearly half the population claims no religious affiliation, with the remainder of the population split relatively evenly between Buddhists and Christians, with a small percentage of Muslims.

Part I

Central, South, and Southeast Asia

1

Afghanistan Lane L. Smith, Kamala F. Smith, and Elizabeth Planje

War is . . . ‘‘an invasion of a nation for political empowerment. It is marked by bloodshed, violence and death. Most importantly, it rapes a nation of its women; destroys its land and natural resources; leaves its citizens in a state of despondent mourning.’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘not just stability and prosperity, but justice also.’’ Since December 2004, Afghanistan has been led by an elected president and vice president, reflecting an improvement in the country’s extremely complex political situation. This type of government, however, has not been common in Afghanistan’s turbulent political history, which includes thousands of years of intrusions and conquests by other countries and regimes. Afghanistan’s unique location, at the juncture of central, south, and west Asia, landlocked on all sides, has contributed to the country’s complicated and violent past. Dating from 328 BCE, Afghanistan was known as the ‘‘cross roads of Central Asia,’’1 and was used by people such as Alexander the Great for trade and invasion routes leading from Central Asia into South and South West Asia. In 642 CE, the Arabs overran the area of present-day Afghanistan, introducing the religion of Islam and continuing the pattern of violence and invasion besetting the country. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the country’s current official name, was founded in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani.2 Today, Afghanistan contains about 32 million people; there are also more than 3.5 million Afghans who live outside the country, primarily in Iran and Pakistan. Ninety-nine percent of the population is Muslim. The official languages of the country include Dari (Afghan Persian) and Pashto, with a minority of people also speaking Turkic languages. An Islamic republic, the country contains both Sunni Muslims (84 percent) and Shi’a Muslims (15 percent) and consists of many different ethnic groups

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including the Pashtun (42 percent), Tajik (27 percent), Hazara (9 percent), Uzbek (9 percent), Turkmen, Aimaq, Baluch, Nuristani, and Kizilbash (13 percent, collectively).3 After the Arabs lost control of the area to the Persians, Afghanistan was conquered by the Turkic Ghaznavids in 998 CE. The country experienced a period of relative stability for 200 years, ended by the Mongol invasion in 1219. After many years of power struggles, regime overthrows, and invasions, the Pashtun tribes united and Afghanistan was founded. In 1747, Ahmad Shah Durrani, Afghanistan’s founder, was elected king by a tribal counsel. During his reign, Durrani was able to consolidate many fragmented provinces into one country. It wasn’t until the 19th century that the country faced a new challenge. While serving as a buffer between czarist Russia and the expanding British Empire, Afghanistan initiated the first of three Anglo-Afghan wars. The first war took place from 1839 to 1842 and resulted in the demolition of the British army. This war is cited today as a prime example of Afghanistan’s strong resistance to foreign rule.4 A few decades later, Afghanistan engaged in a second war (1878–1880) against the British, starting at the Khyber Pass. Although there was no clear victor in this war, the British won most of the battles, and a new Amir who was more accommodating to British interests in Asia was installed. Britain had considerable control over Afghan foreign policy and set the boundaries of present-day Afghanistan, through the demarcation of the Durand Line Agreement, in 1893.5 The Durand Line became recognized as the demarcation line between Afghanistan and British India; everything to the west fell under Afghan control, and everything to the east fell under the British Raj in India. However, this line was never formally established as an international border, and it is still a point of dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the successor state to the British Raj in western India. The Pakistanis would like to see it as a firm, fixed international border, whereas the Afghans would like to see it remain flexible, to make a greater Pashtoon state possible.6 During World War I, Afghanistan remained neutral by decision of the king, despite the contrary views held by many of the country’s citizens. Many Afghan rebellions followed, taking place on the borders of British India and encouraged by Germany’s anti-British feelings. In 1919, the third Afghan-Anglo war was launched after Abdur Rahman’s son and successor was assassinated and his third son, Amanullah, sought to gain control over the country’s foreign policy. The war facilitated the creation of the Treaty of Rawalpindi, which entailed Britain’s release of control over Afghanistan’s foreign affairs and the liberation of Afghanistan from foreign control.7 Today, Afghans celebrate August 19 as their Independence Day, commemorating their escape from British control in 1919.8

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Afghanistan’s independence set the stage for King Amanullah to end the country’s traditional strategy of isolation and establish diplomatic relationships with many countries. However, King Amanullah’s rule did not last long; in January 1929, he was forced to resign by Bachai-Saqao and his armed forces. Soon after, Prince Nadir Kahn, Amanullah’s cousin, was able to regain the throne by defeating Bacha-i-Saqao. King Nadir Kahn was assassinated four years later in a revenge killing,9 a common occurrence in Afghanistan, even today. Kahn’s son, only 19 years old at the time, succeeded him. Mohammad Zahir Shah ruled from 1933 to 1973. Shah experimented with democracy by disseminating a liberal constitution and permitting the growth of The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The PDPA held ideologies very similar to those of the Soviet Union.10 Zahir’s cousin, Sardar Mohammad Daoud, was appointed prime minister in 1953 but was dismissed a decade later because of rising tensions with Pakistan caused by Doaud’s alleged support for the creation of a Pashtun state on the border of Pakistan.11 On July 17, 1973, King Zahir Shah fled the country after former prime minister Daoud seized power in a military coup. Daoud appointed himself president and prime minister of Afghanistan, which he declared a republic. Daoud promised a ‘‘New Constitution’’ but was unable to establish the necessary social and economic reforms and soon faced a country full of political instability and rising dissatisfaction among its citizens. The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) sought to exploit the country’s dissatisfaction with Daoud. In April 1978, with the help of Moscow, the party reunited and overthrew Daoud in a bloody coup. The coup facilitated the rise of Nur Muhammad Taraki, who became the prime minister of the newly established Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Opposition to the communist government began immediately, and by the summer of 1978, a revolt took place in the Nuristan region of eastern Afghanistan. The revolt ended with Hafizullah Amin taking power from Taraki in a palace shoot-out; unfortunately, the inveterate instability persisted under Amin’s regime.12 After the Soviet Union took advantage of the turmoil associated with the 1978 coup by signing a bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation with Afghanistan, Amin’s regime grew increasingly dependent on Soviet support. However, in October 1979, Amin refused to take Soviet advice on how to consolidate his government, creating tension between his regime and the Soviets. In December 1979, thousands of Soviet airborne forces and troops landed in Kabul, claiming they were engaging in a field exercise. Several days later, the invasion forces killed Amin and brought back the previously exiled PDPA member Babrak Karmal as the new prime minister. However, with nearly 80 percent of the

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countryside able to avoid government control, Karmal’s regime was unable to gain widespread national support.13 With the takeover of Afghanistan by the Soviet armed forces, millions of Afghans fled as refugees, either internally or to Pakistan, India, or Iran. With strong, yet clandestine support from the United States and other allies, a vigorous and robust guerilla war was launched. Operating from strongholds in the rugged mountainous regions of west and northwest Pakistan, the Mujahadin—Muslim warriors engaged in a jihad—began infiltrating major parts of Afghanistan and attacking Soviet forces wherever they could be found. Their use of newer weapons, such as the Stinger ground-to-air missiles, enabled the Mujahadin to counteract Soviet strength in helicopters and fighters. The Mujahadin slowly squeezed the Soviets toward the major cities and ultimately made the fight so costly that the Soviets withdrew.14 In May 1986, Karmal’s regime was terminated, and the former chief of the Afghan secret police, Muhammad Najibullah, was appointed prime minister. The Afghan resistance movement was aided by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. The governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan signed a document, known as the Geneva Accords, and agreed on settling their differences. The document also included a U.S. and Soviet noninterference component, and on February 15, 1989, total withdrawal by the Soviets was completed. It is estimated that about 14,500 Soviets and 1 million Afghans lost their lives between 1979 and the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.15 The Mujahidin continued to fight against Najibullah’s regime. In May 1989, they elected Sibhatullah Mojadidi as head of their government-in-exile. In April 1992, the Mujahidin penetrated Kabul, assumed control, and liberated Afghanistan. They formed an Islamic Jihad Council and elected Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani as president. Rabbani did not enter without opposition; both Abdul Rashid Dostam and Gulbuddin Hekmatryar, veteran leaders in the fight against the Soviets, resisted his rule. Dostom and Hekmatyar continuously clashed against Rabbani’s government and in January 1994 large-scale fighting ensued in Kabul. As a result, Kabul was reduced to rubble and thousands of civilians were killed and displaced. In 1994, the Taliban militia was born and advanced rapidly against Rabbani and the government. They were able to expand quickly, capturing the city of Kandahar in 1994 and ultimately occupying Kabul by 1996. In June 1996, Hekmatyar signed a peace pact with Rabbani and returned to Kabul to rule as prime minister. In September 1996, Taliban militia forced President Rabbani and his government out of Kabul. After capturing Kabul, the Taliban executed Najibullah. By the end of 1998, the Taliban occupied about 90 percent of Afghanistan, consolidating

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their control and leaving only the Panjshir Valley, a few provinces in the northwest, and some isolated districts in the Wakhan Corridor free from their control. During their rule, the Taliban committed massive human rights violations, especially against women and girls. They also committed serious atrocities against minorities and in several instances killed noncombatants.16 They soon allowed Al-Qaeda to establish a safe haven in Afghanistan and provided sanctuary for Osama bin Laden. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Taliban repeatedly refused to surrender bin Laden. The United States and its partners in the antiterrorism coalition began a military campaign in October of 2001, targeting terrorist organizations in Afghanistan. Because of pressure from the U.S. military and other anti-Taliban forces, the Taliban disintegrated and Kabul fell on November 13, 2001.17 Shortly after, the European powers and the United Nations convened the Bonn Conference, producing the Bonn Agreement. These accords laid out a step-by-step process for reestablishing Afghanistan as a nation, setting forth the benchmarks, beginning with the Interim Administration, led by Hamid Karzai, to be followed to create a politically sustainable Afghanistan republic. The first step was the Emergency Loya Jirga of June 2002 that cemented agreement of the major Afghan factions to the Bonn Agreement, establishing the Transitional Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and Karzai as its president. This step was followed by the Constitutional Jirga, which established the new constitution, as well as successful presidential elections in October 2004 and parliamentary and provincial elections in September 2005. Since those days, the Taliban, with extensive support from factions in Pakistan and elsewhere, have been regaining their strengths. Poppy production, outlawed during the Taliban reign, returned with a flourish, and Afghanistan now produces 90 percent of the world’s opium supply. The Taliban and their allies have used resources drawn from the poppy trade to purchase arms and fighters. Their rising success in gaining control of Afghan territory has begun to threaten the substantial developmental achievements in almost every sector (e.g., education, health, transportation, rule-of-law, banking and finance, and agriculture).

A SHORT NOTE ON TRIBAL TERMINOLOGY AND STRUCTURE No paper would be complete without a reference to the tribal dynamics that have defined Afghanistan for centuries and continue to do so today. Qawm in Pashtu and in most other languages in Afghanistan is the term for people, ethnic groups, and tribes. Ethnic groups and tribes are structured in a similar way—that is, through genealogical links.

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Subtribe or clan is khel in Pashtu, but they may also be called qawm, as any tribal unit may be seen as a tribe or subtribe at the same time, depending on the level of ramification from which it is viewed. Thus, a subtribe or subclan of a khel is also a khel down to the village level.18 Ethnic and tribal identities are singularly important and can lead to strong emotions and particular aggressiveness when conflicts arise. Organizers and leaders of conflicts use ethnic and tribal emotions and leverage the feelings of tribal honor and shame as an effective tool or weapon. The Pukhtoon (also known as Pashtun) social fabric is governed by a code of honor known as Pukhtoonwali. It drives many actions that may seem extreme from the outside but have been followed generation after generation. The Pukhtoonwali imposes four chief obligations: l

l

l l

Nanawatey: repentance over past hostility or inimical attitude and grant of asylum Teega: a truce declared by a Jirga to avoid bloodshed between two rival factions Badal: the obligation to seek revenge by retaliation Melmastiya: an open hearted hospitality.

Nonobservance of any of these customary laws is considered disgraceful and may lead to expulsion from the community of an individual or even a whole family. The fear of community disgrace or dishonor drives much of the behavior of Pashtoon tribes. Even families with liberal views keep them behind closed doors, fearful of the power of public opinion.19 Pashtoon beliefs and customs often lead to practices that are very difficult for Westerners to understand. For example, in Pashtoon eyes, women are an honored part of the family, to be protected. However, young Pashtoon women are frequently transferred for marriage to another family as a way of gaining forgiveness for a transgression against that family, a practice seen by the public as a way of remedying a dishonor. From a Western perspective, the women are being treated as commodities to satisfy a debt. However, from a Pashtoon perspective, transferring those young women to another family is seen to be repaying a dishonorable deed with a significant ‘‘piece’’ of the family’s honor. Pashtoons describe themselves as ‘‘Pashtoon first, Muslim second.’’20 AFGHAN PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND PEACE The Afghan Sample and Procedures A total of 15 Afghan participants (six females and nine males), ranging in age from 22 to 49, with an average age of 31, completed an abridged

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version of the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS). All of the participants gave Afghanistan as their country of origin and also as the country in which their parents were born. Two of the respondents reported currently living in Afghanistan, and the remaining respondents claimed the United States as their current country of residence. All respondents described themselves as Muslim, except for one participant who was raised Muslim but is currently agnostic. Eight of the participants were single, four were married, and one was divorced. None of the respondents reported having served in the military, but six of them had relatives who had, with two of those family members serving in a U.S. branch of the military. Six of the respondents had participated in some kind of protest against war or in favor of peace; two of them reported protesting against the Soviet invasion. Definitions of War, Torture, and Terrorism ‘‘War is a violent contact of distinct but similar entities.’’ ‘‘[Torture is] the act of inflicting excruciating pain, as punishment or revenge, as a means of getting a confession or information, or for sheer cruelty,’’ ‘‘basically any punishment that causes pain, it can include anything that hurts people.’’ Terrorism is: ‘‘the act of instilling fear in another or in society through tactics outside the norm of what most societies define as militaristic rules of engagement. To perpetrate fear through acts of terror and destruction,’’ ‘‘a term created by the neo colonialists in order to create a sense of impending doom and fear in its citizens such that they would be willing to accept any violent means to ‘protect’ their social welfare and ‘peace.’’’ Participants gave varied definitions of war. Forty-five percent of the definitions made reference to the effects of war; for example, ‘‘a major fight that any living thing suffers.’’ Fourteen percent of the responses were classic definitions identifying war with conflict; for example, ‘‘war is a type of conflict between two countries or different ethnic groups or tribes inside the country.’’ One participant described war as an action that could protect the population, commenting that ‘‘war could be to defend your country against invasion.’’ Another participant took a more pessimistic view, portraying war as a governmental hoax or distraction to control the public (‘‘a political manipulation to get the public thinking about something else’’). In the definitions of torture, 31 percent of the responses focused on the outcome only; for example, ‘‘excruciating pain,’’ ‘‘anguish of body or mind,’’ and ‘‘acute mental or physical pain.’’ The remaining responses

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analyzed the intent or purpose behind torture; for example, as ‘‘punishment or revenge,’’ with 26 percent focusing on an instrumental means/ ends relationship (e.g., ‘‘physical/emotional distress caused to someone in order to gain information,’’ ‘‘a way to hurt someone enough to hear what you want to hear,’’ and ‘‘brutal pain and anguish imposed on another individual in order to seek out important information’’). Thirtysix percent of the responses constituted a moral judgment about torture (e.g., ‘‘punishing without solid reason,’’ ‘‘should be illegal,’’ ‘‘suffering from pain, injustice, and unfairness’’). A few responses simply described the behavior; for example, ‘‘beating a human being.’’ One participant highlighted the potential futility of torture, noting that ‘‘Some people might say what they are expected to say to get out of torture.’’ Four of the definitions of terrorism spoke of political incentives, two of them describing politics as a motivational factor for terrorists (‘‘using indiscriminate violence against civilians for political purposes’’ and ‘‘the use of violence and threats to intimidate or coerce, especially for political purposes’’) and the other describing manipulation (‘‘another political manipulation—everyday people are the only ones hurt by it, never the leaders’’). Twenty-four percent of the definitions referred to outcomes of terrorism; for example, an act that ‘‘creates unnecessary terror among civilians and innocent people.’’ Forty-three percent of the responses equated terrorism with attacks on human rights: ‘‘All those who are against the peace and human rights in the world can be called terrorist. For example, Alqayeda, Taliban,’’ and ‘‘attacks against human rights and international communities.’’

DO GOVERNMENTS HAVE RIGHTS TO PERPETRATE AGGRESSION? In their rating scale scores, the Afghan participants had an average score of 2.93 (which falls between fairly strong disagreement and mild disagreement) on the items pertaining to support for governmental rights to aggression. These items addressed killing innocent civilians to fight terrorism, invading another country, and torturing prisoners of war. A Right to Invasion? Participants were on average in fairly strong opposition (with an average score of 1.9) to the item ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country,’’ responding, for example, by writing, ‘‘No nation has the right to oppress another nation.’’ Twenty-six percent of the responses rejected such a right as a matter of principle, with one respondent identifying unacceptable motives behind invasion: ‘‘There is

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no explanation for colonialism or imperialism.’’ Another response explained that it is not in a country’s power to make this decision: ‘‘No one has this right to invade other countries, because for these kinds of decisions we have the United Nations security office that should get the decision.’’ Thirty-three percent of the responses identified situations in which an invasion would be acceptable. One justification given for a right to invasion was a need to help people in another country: ‘‘If the country is going to invade another country, it should be for bringing peace and stability to that country to help their people but not invading to get benefit of natural resources or some other political reasons. Even if a country invades another one to bring peace, that country should respect the people, religion, culture, and values of the invaded country.’’ Two responses explained that invasion is acceptable in selfdefense situations; for example, ‘‘I would say in defense. Pre-emptive strikes are highly questionable.’’ A Right to Kill Innocent Civilians? Sixty-nine percent of the qualitative responses to the item ‘‘Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism’’ provided arguments against such a right. Two of these responses invoked legal principles, stating that ‘‘No one is above the law’’ and ‘‘No one has this right, if it is heads of government or simple people, everything should be according to law.’’ Three of the responses invoked moral principles; for example, ‘‘Killing of civilians is a big sin, and should be taken seriously.’’ Two responses provided explanations for why the government does have this right; however, one response indicated that killing civilians should be avoided, and the other took a means/end stance: ‘‘Ending terrorism is for the benefit of all people in the world. Therefore, some innocent people should be sacrificed to allow finishing off such type of people who are involved in the crime around the world.’’ One participant commented, ‘‘Violence encourages violence. Education and people awareness of the darkness of terrorism is the best solution.’’ A Right to Torture? In response to the item ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in times of war,’’ 71 percent of the responses listed reasons why governments do not have such a right. The major rationales used to reject such a right included describing torture as a violation of human rights or ethical principles (e.g., ‘‘torture is wrong and inhumane’’ and ‘‘according to human rights, the government shouldn’t behave cruelly with prisoners’’); specifying negative consequences of

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the use of torture (e.g., ‘‘The government needs to regulate the human rights in all situations or people will lose trust in them and be pessimists about their government’’); and identifying better alternatives to torture (e.g., ‘‘It is not the right of a government to torture its prisoners. Instead they should behave with them as a human and make them educated to not commit crimes a second time’’). Twenty-nine percent of the responses described situations in which a right to torture could be justified; for example, if the individual deserved it because of guilt (‘‘need to investigate first, if found guilty yes but to a certain limit,’’ or ‘‘It is very important during the war to torture those who are involved in the war against the government. Specifically, those who are the leaders and motivate others to get involved in the war against the government’’). U.S. Involvement in Iraq Examination of responses to other items about specific war situations provides a deeper understanding of this sample’s views on war. When asked if ‘‘the United States’ involvement in the Iraq war is a moral activity,’’ all participants totally disagreed, except for one who neither agreed nor disagreed. One participant commented, ‘‘A lot of innocent people died and many are still suffering. This could have been prevented through human rights interventions in Iraq and by educating the public and empowering them to stand against Saddam and his party.’’ Another participant criticized what he saw as the true motivation behind the U.S. invasion, saying sarcastically, ‘‘if moral activity means search for oil, perhaps.’’ Another participant responded simply, ‘‘I don’t see killing civilians as moral or ethical.’’ Other responses included ‘‘If the U.S. believes its involvement in things to be moral, then why did they not go in before 9/11 came to pass in order to stop the human atrocities against women and citizens of Afghanistan under the reign of the Taliban? Would that not have been a moral decision? War has nothing to do with moral activity. War is about politics, power, money, and survival.’’ Is There Always a Right Side in War? Participants were also asked to respond to a more general statement concerning the extent to which there is a right side and a wrong side in wars: ‘‘In all military actions taking place around the globe today, it is possible to identify which party (nation, ethnic group, religion) is in the right and which is wrong.’’ They showed considerably more ambivalence to this item than the one about the U.S. involvement in Iraq, with the average rating scale score being a 3.4 (which falls between mildly disagree and neither agree nor disagree). As one person explained,

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‘‘Well, it’s really difficult to find a party or nation that we can say they are the right party or they aren’t. It needs lots of analysis and survey, it’s quite difficult.’’ One respondent who totally disagreed with the proposition expressed complete opposition to war: ‘‘It’s usually both parties that are wrong and the innocent ‘normal’ people who are abused.’’ Another participant described his or her own experience of war: ‘‘I am sorry I am not certain about this question. But I really hate the war because I have been growing up in a country with experience of more than two decades of war. According to my religion, which is a complete religion, war is not a good thing. I cannot say about the military actions taking place around the world.’’

DEFINITIONS OF PEACE AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO PEACE AND PROTEST ‘‘[Peace is] a situation in which one feels secure and feels that they have freedom.’’ ‘‘Peace is a fundamental right of every human being regardless of race, conscience, language, gender, religion, etc.’’ ‘‘Individuals have the right to protest against the war, because war brings destruction, sorrow, misfortune. However, the protest should be peacefully. Individuals don’t have the right to destroy the public properties, burn the peoples’ houses, bring violence, kill the innocent people.’’ Definitions of Peace Eighty percent of the definitions of peace were ‘‘positive’’ definitions, describing what peace is and/or the conditions that lead to and help maintain peace. Forty-six percent of the total responses described peace as a positive state characteristic of individuals (e.g., peace ‘‘is something that brings us joy and success, it is something that makes us relaxed and happy.’’) Two respondents described peace as justice, commenting, for example, that peace is ‘‘Not just stability and prosperity, but justice also.’’ Several responses identified peace as a feature of positive social relationships and/or justice; for example, ‘‘a pacifist state that encourages the inclusion of differing peoples, cultures and generational evolutions’’; ‘‘Not necessarily an idealistic state, but one of acceptance.’’ Finally, some responses were negative definitions of peace, identifying peace with the absence of conflict or strife; for example, ‘‘a situation where there is no war’’; ‘‘does not resort to war during times of disagreement.’’

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A Right to Peace? On the rating scale, participants gave an average rating of 6.9, which corresponds to total agreement to the item ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace.’’ Several of the qualitative responses were primarily just restatements of the item or expansions on it: ‘‘It is a human right to grow up or to live in a world of peace.’’ Some of the responses described the benefits of peace; for example, ‘‘Peace is the only thing which makes the people optimistic to their future life’’; ‘‘[Peace] makes people do their best’’; ‘‘When we have peace, we have developments, discoveries, and national unity. Peace is like a thread that holds the nation together. If we don’t have peace, the nation segregates from each other.’’ Other responses emphasized a human need for peace: ‘‘Peace is something that every individual needs.’’ One respondent commented, ‘‘Though an idealistic view, and though conflict teaches us much, I do believe they should have that right.’’ All but one of the respondents totally agreed with the item ‘‘Children have the right to grow up in a world of peace.’’ Responses described the necessity of peace, saying, for example, ‘‘Absolutely, so they can enjoy every moment of their life.’’ Another respondent explained, ‘‘Everyone needs peace, everyone wants to be in a peaceful and calm world, children are our future and everything will be on their shoulders so they have to grow up in a world of Peace.’’ Another respondent described the duty of nations in securing peace for children: ‘‘Children are very innocent human beings. It is the responsibility of each country to advocate for the protection of their rights and welfare.’’ Can World Peace Be Achieved? Answers were more varied for the item ‘‘I believe world peace can be achieved,’’ with answers averaging a 5, which corresponds with agree. Forty-three percent of the explanations for the rating scale responses indicated that world peace is achievable under certain conditions. Some of the more optimistic responses were ‘‘if there is unity and kindness then it must be’’ and ‘‘through unity and collaborations.’’ Other responses seemed a bit more pessimistic, indicating that peace might be achievable ‘‘if our politicians get along with one another and stop being selfish.’’ Several of the respondents rejected the idea that world peace could be achieved. One explanation pointed to flaws in human nature: ‘‘too much human error/flaws involved.’’ Another type of explanation pinpointed scarcity of resources; for example, ‘‘There will always be a state of conflict, especially as the natural resources of the world become more scarce with the progression of time’’; ‘‘World peace is a tough thing. The world grows ever wider and more people need more

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resources from one another to survive and many cultures seem to be losing their origins. This tends to make them fearful and so they close themselves off, become more nationalistic, etc.’’ One participant provided a personal reason why he needed to believe in world peace: ‘‘Perhaps it’s idealistic or silly, but it’s the only way I can keep working here in Afghanistan.’’ In suggesting ways that world peace could be achieved, many respondents described the need for some social effort. Two of these responses specifically referred to the need for honesty: ‘‘People need to be honest with themselves and each other. Everyone’s tribe/political party/organization has done some wrong in the past’’; and ‘‘Think about our people honestly, achieve our duty honestly.’’ Other suggestions included ‘‘Clear out faith from evil actions, feel the pain of our people, end the war and conflict whether national or international, compromise, be unified, feel responsible toward our people and homeland.’’ Two responses explained that getting rid of terrorism is the essential step in achieving world peace. One person described the need to recognize and accept differences, saying the best way to achieve world peace is ‘‘having patience and tolerance between one another and stop discriminating against one another based on our color of skin, religion, status.’’ Three responses embodied positive peace concepts of respect for human rights and more equal distribution of resources as leading to peace; for example, ‘‘more teachers, more open borders, more cultural access to one another, more exchange programs, more spreading of the wealth.’’ The average score in response to the item stating that ‘‘No one has the right to physically or psychologically torture, injure, much less kill, any other human being’’ was a 6, which corresponds to strongly agree. Forty-two percent of the responses nevertheless applied qualifiers to the right to freedom from being hurt, indicating that such a right applies only to certain people, and not, for example, to a person who has ‘‘committed a harsh crime.’’ According to one of these responses, ‘‘Killing of a person is the highest of crimes and if a person kills someone, he/she should be killed.’’ Another qualification of this individual right gave precedence to state laws; for example, ‘‘other than cases of capital punishment, if it is part of the country’s penal system, I would agree.’’ Another participant indicated that nobody has the right to harm anyone in the specified ways, but comments, ‘‘We see around the world there are lots of killers that just do things which no one wants to see or hear about.’’ Two of the responses invoked religion as an explanation as to why people don’t have such rights to hurt others: ‘‘Human beings are made by God and he is the only one who has the right, not human beings’’; ‘‘It is written in the holy book Quran, that no human being has

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the right to injure, harm, or even kill another human being. Even if someone harms us, we don’t have the right to get revenge because the law should give him or her punishment.’’ Participants gave an average score of 6.27, which falls between strongly agree and totally agree in response to the item ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace.’’ Some of the qualitative responses were simply assertions of the content of the item; for example, ‘‘Yes, everyone has this right to be against war and always call for Peace.’’ A second theme focused on the importance of opposing immoral governmental decisions: ‘‘Yes, politicians are corrupt, we as commoners should protest against what is not right.’’ One participant first echoed the sentiment that it is important to protest for positive ends but then suggested that if the protest will have no outcome, it is not a right: ‘‘If the protest helps people in stopping the war and bringing peace in the country, I agree. Otherwise, in conditions like Afghanistan, where protest doesn’t have any impact, I disagree.’’

APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION When defining reconciliation, all but one of the participants described it as a process. Seventy-two percent of responses identified reconciliation with problem resolution, with 44 percent mentioning the process of coming together to a compromise (e.g., ‘‘a process through which parties in disagreement come to find common ground’’ and ‘‘acceptable compromise in order to live in a peaceful and acceptable manner with one another’’) and 11 percent describing the process of making amends (e.g., ‘‘to bring peace between two parties’’). In addition, two responses mentioned forgiveness (e.g., ‘‘forgiveness between parties and people’’) and one mentioned forgetting (e.g., ‘‘forget about war’’). In response to the statement ‘‘If one country has in the past invaded, colonized, or exercised control over the governmental affairs of another country, an apology by the invading/colonizing/controlling country can improve the chances for reconciliation between the countries,’’ the average response was a 5. Those who agreed with the statement indicated that apology was a good initial step: ‘‘Yes, admitting they are wrong is the first step’’ and ‘‘Yes it is very good diplomacy and it’s start of new friendship.’’ Other participants also described an apology as a first step but indicated that it is not enough on its own: ‘‘It’s a start, but much more should be done’’ and ‘‘Only apology doesn’t help the country.’’ Several of the responses indicated additional state-level steps that were needed to achieve reconciliation: ‘‘They need to fix their infrastructure, give the civilians jobs, and try to have open trade relations

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with that nation, instead of forming a puppet government’’; ‘‘there should be steps for remediation, such as scholarships/funds for the abused parties.’’ Another response described the psychological or internal steps needed for reconciliation: ‘‘Ignore the mistakes which were made by both sides and control the patience, and show their interest for being in peace.’’ One response highlighted the respondent’s personal ambivalence toward the usefulness of an apology: ‘‘I think reconciliation between countries can be a good idea in order to stop the violence and war. Although I think by an apology we cannot compensate what we lost. For example, in a country where millions of people were killed, injured, handicapped, and lost the members of their family, home, everything they had, I don’t think that an apology can make up all these losses.’’

CONCLUSION With such a small sample and a country filled with such ethnic, religious, and political diversity, it is hard to generalize from the perspectives presented in this chapter. This sample is predominately young, well-educated, and economically and socially privileged, compared to the typical uneducated villager or provincial Afghan. The values expressed could be fairly characterized as somewhat more idealistic than those held by the typical Afghan struggling to feed and educate his family during a time of enormous turmoil. However, the responses still shed light on some of the ideas and attitudes held by Afghans over the past several hundred years. Perhaps most interesting is the nexus between the traditional values as expressed in the Pashtunwali code of behavior and some of the responses noted above. For example, when speaking of the steps required to reconcile two warring governments, an apology by the aggressor is a necessary first step, followed by remediation and confidence building measures such as ‘‘scholarships’’ or other indications of good faith by both sides. These measures find an almost perfect parallel in the steps imposed by jirga in settling conflicts between individuals, families, or tribes. Given the small sample size and quasi-homogenous nature of the participants, this chapter offers only a glimpse of the dynamic and varied attitudes of the Afghans toward violence, peace, war, and reconciliation. But it is an intriguing glimpse, offering several fundamental avenues for additional research. For example, given the dominant role played by tribal allegiances over national allegiances, are there differing views of the legitimacy of tribally sanctioned violence? On its face, the

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Pachtunwali code of honor, which emphasizes generosity and good works but also demands revenge when tribal honor has been breached, would suggest that Afghans would hold a more accepting view of such violence. Taken to the household level, violent retribution that can ensue when female members are dishonored, even if through a simple inadvertent glance by a nonfamily male, is cause for study. The extension of this sanctioned violence to the female—an honor killing—who may have dishonored her family by engaging in inappropriate behavior with a nonfamily male is even more compelling.21 Another area ripe for examination relates to the jirga, the traditional nonhierarchical representational system for solving problems, disputes, and other challenges facing Afghans at community, tribe, district, and national levels. A jirga is effective when it negotiates a just settlement among the grieving parties, one that provides both meaningful compensation and the appearance to all observers that the aggressor has admitted to his errors. Additional areas deserving of further study relate to the diversity of Afghanistan. For example, do Afghans who have been forced to flee— either internally or across borders—hold different views from those electing to remain in place during violent periods? A large proportion of the Afghan population is functionally illiterate; do attitudes have any relationship to education or rudimentary literacy? Are there substantial differences among the various ethnic groups—the Tajiks, Hazaras, and Turkmen versus the views of Pachtuns? In closing, Lane Smith, first author of this chapter, offers the following anecdote: On Sunday past (April 2008), during the celebration of the Mujahadin victory over the Soviet forces, there was an attack on the life of the president. Three attackers were killed, and another one was captured. The entire country was stunned and upset that the insurgents could get so close to the president and launch an attack. Two days later, using information obtained from the insurgent who had been captured, the security forces surrounded three safe houses maintained in Kabul by these insurgents, where they attacked and killed most of the enemy occupants. All Kabul citizens applauded this move. Assuming that the Afghan security forces obtained the information from the captured insurgent through torture, I asked three professional Afghans if they thought it was appropriate to have used torture. All three of them gave the same very nuanced and thoughtful response. They said that it depended upon the magnitude of the crime that was committed, and the degree of certainty that the prisoner was complicit in the act. In this case, it was a terrorist attack—an act of war—that claimed the life of one person and injured 11 others. And, the security

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forces were 100 percent confident that the prisoner was 100 percent complicit. Hence all three thought it was appropriate to use torture. They said if it were only a robbery or if the authorities were only 70 percent sure of the complicity, then it might not be appropriate for the state to use torture.22 In a diverse and challenging culture such as is Afghanistan these days, any view of violence is worthy of additional study and deserves our continued attention and commitment.

2

Pakistan Megan Reif and Asifa Hasan

War is . . . ‘‘ a state of anarchy when anything becomes essential for survival’’; ‘‘an act of attacking a country or political or religious group involving military action and bloodshed.’’ Terrorism is . . . ‘‘ an inhuman and unfair way of making political gains, but a freedom fighter should not be confused with a terrorist.’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘tolerance for diversity, acceptance of the other’’; ‘‘law and order, no violence, basic utilities of life being provided to all citizens.’’ Reconciliation is . . . ‘‘friendship with humility’’; ‘‘forgetting past differences to work together in the future’’; ‘‘the understanding that we have a basic commonality.’’ Bordered by Afghanistan and Iran to the west and China to the north, Pakistan is part of the Indian subcontinent (the area covered by the modern nation-states of Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, parts of Afghanistan, Ladakh, Assam, and Kashmir). Populated by 165 million people, Pakistan is the world’s sixth most populous country. The population doubled between 1975 and 2005, but the percentage under the age of 29 has remained steady at about 67 percent. In 1975, over two-thirds of the population had been born after Partition. By 2005, more than two-thirds had been born after Pakistan’s 1971 civil war, which resulted in secession of East Pakistan from the nation of Bangladesh. As of 2005, less than eight percent of the population had been four years of age or older in 1947. Pakistan’s history—shaped by both inter-state and civil violence—still influences Pakistani attitudes, particularly through the ways in which the pre-Partition generation has socialized the post-Partition generation. However, events since 2007 are undoubtedly more salient in molding the contemporary outlook of this young polity with respect to war, peace, and aggression.1 Moreover, despite—or, perhaps, because

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of—heightened media coverage since September 11, 2001, and its roles as both the United States, ally in the global ‘‘War on Terrorism’’ and rugged sanctuary for indigenous and foreign militants, Pakistan may also be one of the world’s least understood countries among the lay publics of Europe and North America. Just over 60 years after the country’s simultaneous independence from British rule and separation from India in 1947, media and policy makers routinely characterize Pakistan as ‘‘the most dangerous country in the world’’ and India, in contrast, as ‘‘the world’s largest democracy.’’2 Focused on security, outside observers have constructed Pakistan’s image from recent events and the relatively small percentages of population and territory affected by Islamist militants. Some call the regions where Islamist political parties and militants are seeking greater influence ‘‘Talibanistan,’’ warning that the extremists there could impose their vision across the country and take possession of its nuclear arms.3 High-profile events such as the assassination of former Prime Minister (and 2008 National Assembly candidate) Benazir Bhutto just before the 2008 National Assembly elections, the bombing of the Islamabad Marriott hours after Pakistani president and Benazir’s widower Asif Ali Zardari delivered his first address to Parliament in September 2008, and attacks carried out in Mumbai, India, by the Pakistan-based terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, in November 2008, perpetuate Pakistan’s negative image.4 Some fear that Pakistan’s diverse extremist groups could not only continue to fight in Kashmir or in Afghanistan alongside the Afghan Taliban, reinforce international terrorist organizations, and launch attacks abroad, but also succeed in uniting to enforce an archaic vision of Islamic law, destabilize Pakistan, and take possession of its nuclear arms.5 These fears appeared somewhat justified when the government of Pakistan, unable to defeat Islamist militants known as Pakistani Taliban in Swat valley, made a deal in April 2009 allowing enforcement of an extreme version of Islamic law in the area. When Taliban captured additional territory in Buner—a four-hour drive (60 miles as the crow flies) from the capital, Islamabad, domestic and international outcry about Pakistan’s accommodation of extremists and pressure from the United States and other foreign governments prompted the military to reverse this policy. More than two months of fighting between the military and militants had by July 2009 displaced almost three million people—the largest refugee migration since the 1947 division of India and Pakistan.6 Although concerns about armed extremist groups, who also operate across the borders of Afghanistan and Indian-controlled Kashmir, are valid, Pakistan is much more dynamic and complex than its prevalent image abroad. The incidents of violence that give Pakistan its reputation

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as ‘‘most dangerous’’ remain, for the most part, confined to specific regions, neighborhoods, and targets and do not have much to do with the daily lives of most Pakistanis. Indeed, Pakistan has a burgeoning youth population, many of whom readily consume American pop music and films, shop at Western clothing boutiques, eat at McDonald’s and Pizza Hut, chat with friends on Facebook and Orkut,7 and watch the ubiquitous Pakistani and Indian soap operas on the country’s many cable television channels. If they are among the lucky few who can afford higher education, Pakistani young people doggedly pursue careers in banking, high-tech business, medicine, computer science, engineering, and other fields they perceive as modern and lucrative. ‘‘Talibanistan,’’ on the one hand, is represented by some of the hundreds of thousands of now-grown children of war—among the more than 1.5 million refugees who left Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of their country. Like the Pakistani children with shared ethnolinguistic and, typically, poor socioeconomic backgrounds in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Balochistan, if these refugee children were lucky enough to get an education at all, they were often educated in religious seminaries. Economic hardship precludes access to Pakistan’s secular, modern, and, largely private, schools, whereas madrasas (Islamic religious schools) provide students not only some education but also, in many cases, modest room and board until the age of 18.8 On the other hand, another group in the same age cohort with ‘‘Talibanistan’’ shares more in common with America’s Generation X and the Millennials; this group has been described as ‘‘Cosmopolistan,’’9 also the name of one of many popular cultural and political Pakistani blogs, where members comment regularly on ‘‘what’s hip, what’s happening, and what’s not—in the twin cities Islamabad and Rawalpindi.’’10 These are the children of Pakistan’s Western-educated, sophisticated, and often wealthy elite, who remain highly influential and readily consume Pakistan’s diverse, literary, and dynamic Urduand English-language media in a country with only about 55 percent literacy in any language.11 The educated first generation forms the backbone of Pakistan’s civil, military, business, intellectual, and bureaucratic elite, participating in a lively and often very public discourse about national identity, the role of the military in politics, democracy, economic policy, and other important policy issues. The second generation of the Pakistani elite is educated in the illustrious institutions of secondary and higher education, such as the Lahore University of Management Sciences and Aga Khan University, which offer training

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on a par with many American and European universities. Younger members of this generational subgroup shop at the many fashionable urban boutiques and bazaars, which combine local couture designers with shops full of familiar brands—Nike, Reebok, Adidas, Benetton, North Face, IZOD, Gap, Dockers, Ralph Lauren, Tommy Hilfiger, American Eagle, and so on, which are produced in the textile factories of Karachi, Sialkot, Multan, Lahore, and Faisalabad. Members of this generation also have started to take their place among Pakistan’s emerging social and political leaders. Most notably, thousands of young lawyers, students, and journalists protested in the streets to call for reinstatement of judges fired by General Pervez Musharraf when he imposed emergency rule on November 3, 2007.12 This was Pakistan’s first widespread ‘‘secular’’ mobilization, filling streets not with men in turbans but men in black suits and ties and jean-clad students, and it received considerable international news coverage. Web multimedia and blogs such as The Emergency Times both coordinated and reported on spontaneous protests around the country,13 a movement that promises to continue until the current government restores all of the judges whom Musharraf fired.14 In addition to strong support for democratic principles, ‘‘Cosmopolistan’’ has its share of ‘high art,’ with a thriving independent publishing industry and a vibrant contemporary art scene that draws on a number of renowned art schools.15 After years of decline, the Pakistani film industry is also resurfacing, thanks in part to the independent news and film conglomerate, Geo TV, which released the film, Khuda Ke Liye (In The Name of God). This film, directed by Shoaib Mansoor, comments on America’s War on Terrorism and portrays the tensions between ‘‘Talibanistan’’ and ‘‘Cosmopolistan’’ within one family; it also reveals the high degree of national self-criticism in the country. It became the first-ever Pakistani film released simultaneously in India and Pakistan since 1956, to large audiences and critical acclaim.16 A majority of Pakistanis live somewhere between these extremes and rarely receive attention from outsiders. A considerable amount of survey data, however, offers clues about the socioeconomic characteristics and attitudes of ordinary Pakistanis. Gallup Pakistan has been conducting public opinion research since 1980, and A. C. Nielsen, private research institutes, nongovernmental and governmental researchers, and international agencies, such as the World Health Organization, regularly collect survey data throughout the country, including two waves of the World Values Survey (1995, 2000). Because of the large sample sizes needed to measure variation in attitudes across Pakistan’s diverse regional, ethnic, and linguistic groups, however, most sample surveys limit their format to closed-ended responses.

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Analysts have learned much about Pakistani attitudes toward terrorism and war through the available survey data, which challenge a view of Pakistan as a country on the verge of an Iranian-style revolution. In a 2006 Pew poll, for example, 74 percent of the respondents said they were very or somewhat concerned about the rise of Islamic extremism in their country, and in the 2007 poll, more than three-in-four (76 percent) called terrorism a ‘‘very big problem’’ for the country. Only 9 percent of the respondents in a recent survey said that suicide attacks are ever justified, and 72 percent said they are never justified.17 Paradoxically, although most public opinion research shows that Pakistanis overwhelmingly endorse democracy and its institutions, they also consistently express greater trust in the Pakistan army than in any other institution in Pakistan, including elected assemblies; in a 2007 voter survey, 51 percent of respondents said they held a great deal of trust in the army, even though other surveys during the same period indicated that few supported General Pervez Musharraf.18 Underpaid and ill-trained, Pakistan’s police rely on both petty bribes and profit from collusion with drug smugglers, kidnappers, and weapons dealers.19 Police rarely investigate interpersonal crime without bribes or involvement of business or political elite, and public distrust of the police lingers after episodes of their use of force during ethnic riots in the 1970s.20 Kidnapping for profit in both Karachi and rural Sindh—often through carjacking—grew to epidemic proportions in the 1990s. Landlords, politicians, and police cooperate with the dacoits and take a cut.21 Whether they identify more with Talibanistan, Cosmopolistan, or simply lead an ordinary life working on the land, in factories, or small shops to support their families, Pakistanis from all classes and levels of education feel vulnerable, not just to economic hardship but also to severe insecurity. Many have had extended family members kidnapped, injured, killed, or otherwise victimized without intervention by police or courts. Powerlessness against local strongmen and an inefficient justice system leads people to seek their own revenge. Some frustrated youth join neo-Taliban groups, which promise to establish minimum security, law, and order, while others become addicted to drugs22 or join urban gangs,23 which are growing as a result of the spillover of weapons and heroin from the ongoing Afghan conflict.24 Eighty percent of gang members are between the ages of 16 and 25.25 To date, few, if any, studies have attempted to collect systematic indepth information about how Pakistani citizens interpret the concepts and terms included in public opinion surveys. Similarly, little is known about the pattern of reasoning that underlies Pakistani views on issues related to international aggression and peace. That many Pakistanis both support greater freedom while also putting great faith in the

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military is a puzzle, as is the fact that many express support and admiration for Osama bin Laden’s self-declared campaign of anti-imperialism and defense of Islamic lands, yet reject a Taliban-style interpretation and enforcement of Islamic law and an austere public and private life. Such apparent inconsistencies in attitudes about peace and aggression can be better understood through qualitative research, placed in the context of Pakistan’s long and complex experience of violence. This chapter is part of a broader, ongoing research project to assemble voices of people in Pakistan and across the world to discern the ways in which different ideas, problems, causes, and solutions regarding war and peace are interrelated in the minds of ordinary people. Although there are many limitations on the generalizability of findings from responses to open-ended questions in a small and disproportionately literate and economically well-off sample, we hope that the views on peace, aggression, and reconciliation expressed by Pakistani participants in the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) can contribute to a more nuanced understanding of a country typically typecast as an epicenter of violence, both local and global.

PAKISTANI HISTORY AND IDENTITY Although the majority of Pakistan’s population is too young to remember some of Pakistan’s most salient political events involving violence, Pakistan Studies is one of three centrally regulated, compulsory subjects taught and tested in all schools and universities, in addition to Urdu and English. Since 1947, and particularly after the 1971 division of East and West Pakistan, the state has helped to create an often artificial and simplified national identity through Islamization, minimization of the rights and identities of religious and ethnolinguistic minorities, and emphasis on military strength, often through curricula boards that supervise the choice of textbooks.26 There is a parallel, though less centralized, mythologizing process in India. Hindu Nationalist movements, such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and conservative political parties, have introduced textbooks to construct a Hindu-dominated past and idealize Hindu heroes,27 similarly diminishing the overwhelming diversity of a country that is home to more Muslims (154 million, or 12 percent of its population) than is Pakistan.28 It is not surprising, then, that the history of the subcontinent is disputed,29 not only by its own historians but also by those outsiders depending on their regional or topical specialties and therefore the oral histories and archives to which they have access.30 Although most Pakistanis under the age of

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45 have not witnessed firsthand many of the events that led to the creation of Pakistan, most can weave a narrative version of that history that they have received through the state’s dynamic attempt to establish a national identity as the first nation-state created for Muslims, if not an Islamic state. Before 1857: Precolonial History of Pakistan A number of textbooks have tried to make the argument that during Pakistan’s precolonial pre-Partition history, the geographic area around the Indus River and its territories, which make up modern Pakistan, has always had a separate Islamic identity and culture shaped by its geography, which determined agricultural and human fertility, trade, urbanization, literature, poetry, and even a separate ‘‘Indus personality.’’31 Similarly, India’s Hindu Nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has claimed that the earliest large civilization in the Indus Valley was the font of Hindu civilization.32 The evidence indicates that prior to the emergence of the Indus Valley Civilization, highly organized hunter-gatherer societies crafted tools and divided labor in the northeast subcontinent by around 50,000 BCE and settled villages by around 7000 BCE.33 Although there is no question that the cities of Harappa and Mohenjo Daro were urban centers and thrived in what is now Pakistan from 2600 to their still-unexplained decline around 1900 BCE, the larger Indus Valley Civilization, of which they were a part, spanned a diverse and much larger territory of urban settlement and agricultural production, which included parts of modern-day India and extended its trade networks as far as northern Afghanistan, modern-day Iraq, and Oman.34 The Indus civilization fragmented into different cultural groups by the time Aryan invaders arrived from what is now Iran around 1400 BCE, settling primarily in the Punjab and spreading influence through both conquest and assimilation of local people.35 Vedic (or Aryan) principalities began to serve as a unifying political force after the sixth century BCE. The armies of Alexander the Great passed through the northern subcontinent in 327 BCE, leaving remnants of Greek influence, including Corinthian columns discovered at Taxila in 2004.36 Buddhist artifacts also appear in the area dated to the first or second century BCE in a region ruled primarily by the Kushan-Zoroastrian rulers who allowed Buddhism to flourish until the 11th century CE, when Muslims began to establish power in several waves of conquest. Around 375–415 CE, the Hindu Gupta era ruled by Brahmins reached its height in western India, extending its influence to Sindh and northern India, a reign eclipsed in the fifth century CE under threat of invasion by barbarians

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from Central Asia, the Huns, who destroyed much of the art and architecture of Gandhara and forced Buddhism into retreat.37 Turko-Iranian-Afghan forces from the Ghaznavid Empire began invading from the northwest during the 11th and 12th centuries and established the Sultanate of Delhi, ruled by five dynasties of Persianand Arabic-speaking religious minorities until 1555. Vaughan remarks ‘‘that a small elite could establish and retain control over such a vast and populous area while remaining a religious minority reflected a flexible attitude toward religion on all sides,’’ such as a respect for saints of all religious denominations and cross-fertilization between Sufi mystical orders and non-Muslim religions through blending of social customs and sharing of poetry and music.38 Shia Islam, a branch of the faith that emerged only a few years after the prophet Muhammad’s death (over political differences about whether companions of the prophet and other nonrelatives or only descendants of the prophet should lead the growing community of Muslims), probably took hold in the subcontinent during the Delhi sultanate with Sufi orders of this branch of Islam. Under the leadership of Genghis Khan, the Mongols had both paved the way for and inspired the brutal methods of Timur, a nomadic warlord whose tribe’s conquests reached from Syria to Central Asia. Timur crowned himself king of an empire at Balkh in what is now Afghanistan in 1370, and led the sacking of Delhi by 1399, during which his armies slaughtered both Hindus and Muslims.39 Timur died in 1403, but his Timurid governor of Multan (in what is now Pakistan) took control of Delhi in the name of Timurid Shah Rukh in 1414.40 Although brutal, the Timurids further cultivated ‘‘an indigenous form of Islam’’ in which Sufis and other religious groups mingled ‘‘folk traditions and magical beliefs with Islamic teaching.’’41 Some Muslim scholars and historians have documented such un-Islamic practices as gambling, drinking, and fornication, even in mosques and shrines, among Timur and members of his court, even while he presented himself to the larger Muslim world as a champion of Islam.42 Babur, a descendent of Timur, won a battle northwest of Delhi in one of its former Sultanates (Lodi) in his effort to reestablish his ancestors’ empire, marking the beginning of the Mughal rule in the subcontinent.43 The first six Mughal emperors (1526–1707) created a system of extractive agricultural revenue collection, as well as administrative, fiscal, and commercial policies, for ruling the empire’s 12–15 provinces, districts, and subdistricts. The empire depended in large part on extracting the revenue from surplus labor through zamindars that relied on armed strongmen to enforce payment of taxes, creating a system of perpetual indebtedness (a ‘‘predatory bureaucracy’’44) not unlike Europe’s feudal serfdom or sharecropping in the American South.

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Without codified rules of succession for leadership at the center of the empire, fratricidal conflict followed the death of nearly every Mughal emperor. Although the Mughal empire survived until 1857, it began to deteriorate with the death of Aurangzeb (1658–1707) and was made up of largely separate, autonomous, and feudal successor states by the time British, French, Portuguese, and Dutch were competing for control of trade with the region.45 Before 1947: Pre-Partition History of Pakistan Upon the arrival of the Europeans, about a third of the subcontinent’s population was Muslim, practicing various forms of Sunni and Shia Islam as a result of migration from other regions as well as many local conversions (occasionally forced but more often based on marriage, interest in Islamic emphasis on egalitarianism, or the sociopolitical advantages of being Muslim under Mughal rule).46 The population was segmented and ruled by as many as 500 separate, wealthy Muslim princes, ruling over their large, poor population of peasants. At the same time, Muslims were divided by language, speaking Tamil in the south or Bengali in the northeast, for example, within provinces that had their own distinct administrative structures, rule of law, and economic regulation.47 These Muslims practiced the local, popular, eclectic, ‘‘folk’’ Islam of the Sufis and saints, or Pirs, that the Mughal and Timurid aristocracy before it had cultivated, rather than the more literate and therefore more conservative and scripturally based Sunni Islam of orthodox religious scholars. By negotiating exclusive or advantageous privileges with the separate Sultans as early as the 17th century,48 the British East India Company was able to extend its influence to the point where the Muslim rulers became nothing more than puppets of the company by the 1760s.49 Despite the British approach of adapting Persian and Mughal practices of governance, after the formal assumption of direct British control over India in 1857, the British favored Hindus in education, administration, and employment.50 By 1900, 75 percent of Hindus and 70 percent of Sikhs lived in urban areas, whereas 60 percent of Muslims lived in rural areas.51 These disproportionately rural Muslim areas served two purposes: (1) providing vast tracts of arable land for growing cotton, jute, wheat, and sugar and (2) providing men for induction into the British army to defend the empire. Moreover, the predominant political and economic system in these areas was still largely feudal; money, power, and control over labor were concentrated in the hands of major landowners. These landowners, who expropriated surplus produce from the peasants and had previously surrendered it to the

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Mughal, now simply shifted the flow of resources to British revenue officials. The feudal lords were also useful to the British administrative power structure because they maintained their own private armies and suppressed rebellion in the far-flung areas of the empire that could disrupt their advantageous personal arrangements with the company and later, the Raj. In return, the British administration excluded land-ownership disputes from the purview of civil courts. The Alienation of Land Act of 1900, for example, prevented nonagriculturalist classes from gaining access to markets for land.52 The gradual introduction of democratic elections in broader India ensured that Muslims would remain an institutionalized minority, skeptical of parliamentary democracy, while the feudal Muslim elite could promote their own interests within the political system that the British introduced. This history helps to put in context the attitudes of Indian Muslims, first toward the East India Company and, later, toward the British Raj, shaping differences between the subcontinent’s Hindus and Muslims for years to come. Targeted for education and employment, the Hindu population absorbed Western education, the English language, and Western thought more quickly than did Muslims. Political and democratic grooming of an Indian elite started almost simultaneously with the passage of power from the East India Company to Her Majesty’s Government by an Act of Parliament in 1858. In the following 50 years, the educated elite of India, mostly Hindu, took a leading part in the development of public political life through formation of numerous organizations for the purposes of reform of religion and society in India.53 Much of the later leadership of the Indian National Congress Party and indeed modern Indian nationalism grew out of these democratic and political traditions, from which Muslims were largely excluded. Toward the end of the 19th century, some Muslim leaders, such as Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817–1898), made Muslims aware of their slow cultural and intellectual deterioration and encouraged them to pursue Western education to regain their lost status. Khan founded a college that would later become Aligarh Muslim University, where the urban-based Muslim intellectuals and politicians would emerge to argue that a separate religious-cultural identity characterized Muslims in India. Khan advocated political advancement for Muslims,54 though he did not propose a separate Muslim state.55 The formation of the All-India Muslim League to represent the Muslims of India came at about 1906 under the leadership of a handful of these educated Muslim leaders. However, in comparison with the Congress Party, the Muslim League was a relatively newer and weaker political association with a leadership dominated by the Muslim aristocracy; it was strongest in areas of pre-Partition India where Muslims did not have a majority, such as Bombay and Delhi.

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The idea of a separate land for Muslims did not emerge until later. Allama Muhammad Iqbal, a Muslim poet and philosopher, articulated in 1930 the most notable but not entirely unique political philosophy of a separate land for India’s Muslim minority comprised of Punjab, the North Western Frontier Province, Sindh, and Balochistan.56 The idea subsequently grew in popularity due to the charisma and integrity of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, popularly known as Quaid-i-Azam (great leader), who embraced the ‘‘two-nation theory’’ only after he came to believe that a unified, self-governing India and the interests of the Muslim minority were no longer reconcilable.57 Jinnah, like Gandhi, was a Gujarati lawyer from a middle-class background, not the landlord class. Energized by the ardor of his speeches calling for the formation of a separate homeland for Muslims in the late 1930s, the Muslims of India almost blindly followed the Quaid, joining a Muslim League that was, in spirit, more of a mass nationalist movement than a political party.58 It was not until 1940, under Jinnah’s leadership, that the Muslim League was, in fact, able to gain a foothold in the Muslim-majority provinces. The most notable exception to the support the Muslim League enjoyed from urban intellectuals, women, students, pirs, urban religious scholars, and even leftists—who gave legitimacy to the two-nation theory by demanding Muslim self-determination—was fervent opposition from the conservative Muslim scripturalists, led by the Jamat-e-Islami, Jamiatul-Ulema al-Hind, and smaller groups. They condemned the Muslim League’s leadership as un-Islamic.59 Later, this group began to rewrite history, portraying Jinnah as a devout orthodox Muslim and recasting the Pakistan Movement as an effort driven by a desire to establish an Islamic state and championed by the very scripturalists who had opposed the creation of Pakistan bitterly!60 After August 1947: Post-Partition Ethnic, religious, linguistic, regional, and ideological diversity began to plague Pakistan almost immediately after its birth in 1947, as pre-Partition ethnic and regional autonomy movements continued and new ones emerged in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), Sindh, NWFP, and Balochistan. Nearly all have elements—often violent—that continue to this day; because colonial era provincial borders remain intact, they do not overlap neatly with ethno-linguistic loyalties. Of Balochistan’s population of about 8 million (not including an additional 730,000 Afghan refugees), for example, only 62 percent are native Balochi speakers, concentrated in the south, while Pushtuns are a majority in the north, including the provincial capital of Quetta. Balochistan holds more than 20 percent of Pakistan’s mineral and energy resources, but has the

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country’s highest unemployment, illiteracy, and poverty rates—even higher among Balochis. Conflict erupted between Balochi tribes and central government forces in 1948, 1958, 1962, from 1973 to 1977, and 2005. Although led by the Balochistan Liberation Army, which has a Marxist heritage, government disinformation has created a perception that the Balochi nationalist movement is linked to Islamic terrorism. The impact of the latest episode of violence is severe, with the death of hundreds, the disappearance of 1,200, and displacement of over 200,000 people. The crisis erupted out of mounting Balochi fears that they will be the last to benefit from massive pipeline, transit, and port projects expected to generate enormous revenues and an influx of more than two million people from outside the province.61 The struggle of the people of the subcontinent for independence and the struggle of the Muslims of India for a separate homeland culminated in the exodus of the British from the subcontinent and partition of the area into India and Pakistan. Partition was followed by mass migration, the largest in history, of people moving in both directions across the newly drawn border. Political violence of massive proportions took place on both sides of the border, and trains and lorries carried the butchered bodies of Hindus and Muslims back to their communities. Painful memories of Partition persist in both India and Pakistan in the generation that witnessed this mutual violence, but the events are less salient to the younger generation. The areas constituting Pakistan were the Muslim majority areas, with the exception of Kashmir, which remained under India’s control after 1947 under a semiautonomous Hindu maharaja. The British had bestowed upon him the right to decide whether to opt for India or Pakistan and left him to face intense pressure from both India and Pakistan. He decided in favor of India in October 1947, an act that Pakistan and Kashmir’s Muslim majority disputed as unfair, given the advance of Indian troops toward Srinagar. The first war between India and Pakistan erupted in 1947–1948 and divided the state. Pakistan still controls ‘‘Azad’’ (Free) Kashmir and the neighboring Northern Areas, while India controls the other two-thirds of Kashmir. In 1948, the United Nations Security Council took up the issue, eventually recommending a solution already agreed upon by Indian and Pakistani leaders in July 1949 that established a cease-fire line and called for a plebiscite to determine the preferred allegiance of the Kashmiri people.62 The issue remains unresolved to this day. Pakistan inherited some of its institutional problems at the time of the Partition of India, and these problems remain at the heart of today’s institutional malaise. The sociopolitical system bequeathed to Pakistan at the time of Partition was different from the Indian legacy. India had

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a relatively strong and vibrant middle class led by established business houses, whereas Pakistan had neither a vibrant, intellectually sound, and educated middle class nor much industrial development. The political institutions in India were firmly rooted in democratic tradition and therefore civilian supremacy was established. In comparison, Pakistan, with one-fifth of the population of India, ended up with one-third of the military that had supported the Raj, giving it a larger and denser soldier-to-population proportion than elsewhere on the subcontinent. Exposure, training, and economic stability helped these men grow into charismatic soldiers, serving in a military that became the most modern, professional, and developed institution within the country. The Indiacentric defense policy at the time diverted all attention and funds of the fledgling state into further strengthening and equipping the military. After Partition, Jinnah became the first governor general of Pakistan, and Liaquat Ali Khan became the first prime minister. With swift ingenuity, the bureaucracy managed to entrench itself in the administrative framework of the fledgling state and cleverly hijacked the supremacy of the prime minister’s authority to formulate decisions and policy in serious matters of the state. The Pakistan Army also attempted to assert its political authority despite Jinnah’s dislike for military adventurism. The first two commanders in chief were both British. They reported to the government of Pakistan as well as turning to their own superior field marshall, Sir Claude Auchinleck, creating a dual system of control and command, and sometimes disregarding even Jinnah’s instructions. Jinnah was perhaps the only leader who could have ensured development of democratic institutions in Pakistan by correcting the inherited imbalances of military and civil bureaucratic might over political representation; however, he died in September 1948, merely a year after the Partition. No other politician emerged with vision, political acumen, and resilience equaling that of Jinnah’s. Barely two years later, in October 1951, Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated in Rawalpindi, and the pattern of political violence in Pakistan took hold. A bureaucrat, Ghulam Mohammad, became the governor general. A quasi-militarized society, Pakistan had a large army with praetorian tendencies, supported by the bureaucratic system left in place by the Raj. To establish a political system, the country had one political party with considerably weak structures. Therefore, the tradition of subordination of the political systems to the military and civil bureaucracy in Pakistan became entrenched in the governance systems of the new state from its inception and persists even today. At the time of partition, because of the weak political base of the Muslim League at the provincial level, the feudal lords had a stronger influence base than the politicians.

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In January 1951, violence broke out in Lahore against the Ahmadiya sect, followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian. As the violence spiraled out of control, the military was called in to control the situation. The first Pakistani commander in chief, General Ayub Khan, imposed martial law on the city, the first martial law in Pakistan. But the commander in chief did much more than impose martial law; he also clamped down on markets, smugglers, and hoarders, thereby enhancing the position of army in the polity.63 This incident is important for two reasons: (1) because it was the first interference of military in civil administration and (2) because it brought the religious fundamentalists to the fore. The idea of Pakistan had been opposed by the religious leaders, but these riots fanned the flames of religious bigotry and many fundamentalist organizations joined hands against the Ahmadis. Civil administration failed to regain its authority from the army or bring the religious zealotry under control. The spirit and implementation of federalism was quite weak from the beginning. In 1954 provincial elections in East Pakistan, the United Front, a coalition of three political parties opposed to the Muslim League, won the election. The reaction of the central government based in West Pakistan was deeply inimical to democratic power sharing. The United Front provincial government in East Pakistan was dismissed and troops were moved in. An attempt by the central assembly to curtail powers of the governor general and enhance the authority of the federal legislature was thwarted by Ghulam Mohammad, who called a state of emergency and appointed Commander in Chief Ayub Khan as the defense minister. In March 1969, after resigning, instead of handing over the power to civilian political administration, Ghulam Mohammad handed control to Yahya Khan. Martial law was imposed and the constitution of 1962 was abrogated. Centrifugal Forces and Partition of Pakistan: September 1971 Ethnic and linguistic diversity began to plague Pakistan almost immediately after its birth, with full-fledged movements emerging, for example, among Pushtuns in the NWFP who shared ties with their coethnic tribes in Afghanistan, and among the Urdu-speaking Mohajers, or Muslim migrants, who crossed over to Pakistani territory from India during Partition. The physical and linguistic separation of the West (comprising Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and the North Western Frontier Province, where Urdu became the language of government) and East Pakistan (created with the division of India’s Bengal province into West and East, where the population spoke Bengali) was an insurmountable challenge for administration and unity. One thousand miles of Indian territory

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separated Pakistan’s two wings. Problems began with the emergence of the Bengali Language Movement in 1948, which sought to make Bengali the second official language of the state, alongside Urdu.64 These problems came to a head when General Yahya held the first free and fair Constituent Assembly elections in December 1970. When the Bengali-dominated Awami League won overwhelmingly, the central government in West Pakistan refused to accept the results, triggering a popular uprising in East Pakistan. The army moved in to quell the uprising with force, but the civil war spiraled out of control. On March 25, 1971, Mujibur Rehman declared over the radio that East Pakistan would become the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. The Indian army moved in to help the rebels in East Pakistan and contributed to the defeat of the Pakistan army.65 After this bitter defeat, General Yahya released control of West Pakistan to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, deputy prime minister and majority leader of the Pakistan People’s Party in the National Assembly. To his credit, Bhutto gave Pakistan its first complete constitution in 1973, a document, though suspended and amended over time, that still forms the foundation of Pakistan’s parliamentary, democratic structure. The first leader to introduce land reforms, Bhutto was in many ways quite dictatorial in his approach. To maintain control, he organized the Federal Security Force (FSF), which became an instrument to suppress political dissent.66 Pakistan and ‘‘Islamization’’ under General Zia-ul-Haq (1977 1988) On July 5, 1977, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq imposed martial law and dismissed the democratically elected government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Zia’s regime, the longest period of military rule in Pakistan’s history, left a crushing legacy of unprecedented intensification of religious violence, narcotics trade, arms and ammunitions flooding the streets of Pakistan, and the distortion of school curricula to reflect Zia’s image of Islam and Pakistan. He banned political association and freedom of speech, repressing what had become a relatively lively free press and incarcerating a number of political workers, journalists, and activists. Although Zia held an election in 1985 on a nonparty basis, he also introduced the eighth amendment to the constitution, which gave him and future presidents the right to dissolve the national assembly and dismiss elected governments at will. Talibanistan For almost two centuries, writers, journalists, and aspiring operatives have made names for themselves, braving the mountainous region of what is now Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and the

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semiautonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to describe their encounters with the ethnic Pathans, or Pushtuns. The Pathans straddle the Durand line, an artificial boundary negotiated between the British and the Amir of Afghanistan in 1893 after repeated British failures to defeat these tribes and extend the empire beyond north India. Now forming the modern-day border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Durand line is neither demarcated fully nor recognized by many leaders of the Durrani, Ghilzai, Shinwari, Afridi, Yusufzai, Waziri, Khattak, Mohmand, and many smaller clans that make up the Pushtun people.67 The Western perception of Pakistan as a violent land threatened constantly by turbaned men bearing Kalashnikovs or suicide vests, now frequently described as Pakistani Taliban, is rooted primarily in the recent history of NWFP and FATA, which, according to the most recent (1998) census, comprise only 16.7 percent, or 27.6 million of Pakistan’s approximately 165 million people, including 1.5 million Afghan refugees who flooded the country after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,68 and 6.5 million Pakistanis (4 percent) in Balochistan.69 The Durrani, Ghilzai, Shinwari, Afridi, Yusufzai, Waziri, Khattak, and Mohmand and other Pushtun70 tribes straddle the Durand line, an artificial boundary negotiated between the British and the Amir of Afghanistan in 1893 after repeated British failures to extend its empire northward.71 After three decades serving as a rear base for war in Afghanistan, however, first against the Soviets and later against the US and NATO presence, these areas host impenetrable enclaves for Islamist militants, known collectively by some as ‘‘Talibanistan.’’72 Three decades of war have strengthened and militarized cross-border intratribal networks that, though not always involved in militancy, take advantage of instability to profit from smuggling of vehicles, commodities, weapons, and heroin to and from Afghanistan and international markets. Many of these refugee and poor Pakistani children were educated in conservative Islamic schools (deeni madaris, or madrasas), which grew exponentially and fell under Saudi and other foreign influence under the policies of General Zia ul Haq. General Zia centralized zakat, or charity contributions, and funneled them to these religious seminaries while also recognizing degrees earned there for civil and military service.73 With support from the United States and the Gulf in the form of money and arms, General Zia and a military with strong Pushtun influence recruited two generations of young men—mujahideen—from this region to fight the struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. A substantial number of militants fighting the Indian Army in Jammu and Kashmir, however, as well as rank and file officers in the Pakistan military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), trained alongside

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these men and received similar religious indoctrination. When the disintegration of the Soviet Union brought an end to U.S. involvement on behalf of Pakistan, the seven main Afghan factions, which had their bases in Pakistan, began to fight one another for control of Kabul. Those following the most rigid interpretation of Islam on both sides of the border, working with current and retired Pakistani officials and Interior Minister Nasrullah Babar under the second government of Benazir Bhutto, eventually emerged under the loosely configured Taliban movement, which rapidly gained support inside Afghanistan. It was the effort to end the infighting of the mujahideen that devastated much of Afghanistan between 1989 and 1994. Pakistan’s support for the Taliban government was linked to its desire to establish trade with Central Asia, ensure a friendly government that could help counter Indian influence in the region, and ensure security for pipelines that could bring oil from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and beyond.74 With the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in 1996 and consolidation of power through 2001, Pakistani Islamist militants shifted their attention to the imposition of their version of Islamic law inside Pakistan. After September 11, 2001, the arrival of American forces began a new cycle of jihad, this time directed against the United States as well as the military regime governing Pakistan under another U.S. ally, General Pervez Mushareff, who had taken over control of Pakistan from the elected prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, in a bloodless military coup in 1999. Jihad has increasingly become a symbol of Pakistan’s long history of sectarian conflict, beginning with sectarian bigotry in the Ahmadiyya community in the 1970s. The state became involved in institutionalized discrimination against them on charges of blasphemy, and a law was promulgated denouncing the Ahmadiyyas as non-Muslims. In the 1980s, the Sunni and Shi’ite communities, the two largest Muslim sects in Pakistan, targeted each other with religious extremism, which in Pakistan has always been politically motivated and gains strength only with the complicity of the state. After the 1989 Soviet withdrawal and the Afghan Taliban ascendance and consolidation of power in Afghanistan from 1994-2001, the young Pakistani madrasa graduates, or neo-Taliban, turned their attention southward, seeking to impose their rigid, extreme version of Islamic law at home. After 9/11, American forces overthrew the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, beginning a new cycle of cross-border war, this time directed against the United States as well as General Pervez Musharraf, the United States’ military ally in Pakistan. Pakistan’s factionalized, traditional Islamist political parties united to capitalize on the massive shift in sentiment among ordinary Pakistanis against the United States

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as a result of American military operations, including drone attacks inside Pakistani territory and the extradition of several high-profile terrorism suspects, such as 9/11 architect Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, to U.S. custody. These rival groups, which had rarely managed to cooperate and failed to win more than five percent of the popular vote in any of Pakistan’s competitive elections, formed a coalition before the 2002 provincial and national assembly elections and managed to win a majority in the NWFP assembly. The percentage of overall national support for the Islamist parties remained unchanged from previous years, but Islamists’ unprecedented unity and Musharraf’s decision to severely restrict the participation of Pakistan’s mainstream, secular parties artificially inflated their level of electoral support by depressing turnout. The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) governed the NWFP from 2002 until 2008, when secular parties again secured a majority of votes. During this period, support for their ideology declined as they made attempts to ban dancing, Western music, photography of women, and otherwise regulate daily life without producing real improvements in socio-economic and physical welfare.75 According to a May 2009 poll, four out of five Pakistanis viewed the Taliban as a threat to the country, although more than two-thirds still hold an unfavorable view of the U.S. government.76 Religious diversity is an equally disruptive source of division in Pakistan. The population is about 96 percent Muslim by heritage—20 percent Shia, 77 percent Sunni, and 10 million Ahmadiyya (six percent of the total population).77 The Ahmadkyya follow the teachings of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, whose claim to be a messenger of God is perceived as heretical by many orthodox Muslims.78 Christians, Hindus, and others make up the remaining four percent. Countless varieties of Sunni Islam alone make for a patchwork of religious belief. PAKISTANI PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND PEACE The Pakistani Sample In late 2008, 56 Pakistanis living in Pakistan and overseas voluntarily completed online or paper versions of the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS),79 expressing views on peace, war, and other forms of governmental aggression. The survey first asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they agreed with each of 18 statements on a scale from 1 (total disagreement) to 7 (total agreement), then to explain their rating scale responses, and finally, to provide their own definitions of concepts such as war, peace, and reconciliation.

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The Pakistani respondents ranged in age from 18 to 74 years old, with a median age of 27. Twenty-six women and 30 men participated. Of those who volunteered a response indicating their primary identity, 21 (38 percent) offered their ethnolinguistic identity, whereas only 6 (11 percent) identified primarily as Pakistani, 6 as South Asian or another supernational identity, and even fewer (4) primarily as Muslim. Twelve (22 percent) of respondents identified as Punjabi, 8 (15 percent) as Pathan/Pushtun, 2 as Kasmiri, and 1 each as Balochi, Sindhi, and Mohajer. Pakistani Perspectives on War ‘‘I believe war is a period of time when human beings regress to an earlier stage of evolution and seek to retain or gain control of others purely by force/power. It leads to the loss of life, suffering and societal and economic hardships.’’ (female, 22) Of the 45 definitions of war, 25 percent associated it exclusively with destructive, almost apocalyptic outcomes with no purpose. Participants defined it, for example, as ‘‘nothing but death and destruction’’ (38year-old female), ‘‘ghastly catastrophe’’ (26-year-old male), ‘‘annihilation where everyone loses’’ (49-year-old male), and ‘‘the worst thing that could happen in the world’’ (21-year-old female). Another theme emerging from the Pakistani responses describes war as a state of conflict defined by particular methods and actions. Thirteen percent of the responses identify war with the use of arms, using phrases such as ‘‘categorical use of arms, weapons by two parties against each other’’ (24year-old female). Thirty-eight percent of the responses identify war with conflict between clearly defined parties; for example, as ‘‘military conflict between two parties where the aim is to outkill the other party’’ (34-year-old female). Some of these responses specifically identify war as a bilateral form of conflict occurring between two nation-states; for example, ‘‘a prolonged armed conflict between two nations’’ (64year-old male) and ‘‘a situation in which two or more countries are trying to damage each other in order to win the situation’’ (26-year-old male). There was also some recognition that wars could take place between nonstate actors: war is an ‘‘act of attacking a country or political or religious group involving military action and bloodshed’’ (32year-old male). Reflecting assumptions about the causes or goals of armed aggression, 18 percent of the responses associate war with the pursuit or defense of national interest; examples include: ‘‘two or more countries engaged in a conflict to defend their own interests at the expense of the

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other’’ (19-year-old female), ‘‘when two countries or entities fight over material resources’’ (22-year-old male), and ‘‘violent means to achieve national interest’’ (31-year-old female). Four respondents see war as a form of conflict resolution or a breakdown in nonviolent means of resolving conflict. A 25-year-old woman defines war, for example, as ‘‘a confrontation between two nation-states, based on a conflict that could not be resolved diplomatically, and now requires military action by parties.’’ Another respondent views war as ‘‘an extreme last resort taken only in self-defense’’ (25-year-old male). Reflecting an understanding of war in a context of international law, a 23-year-old male called it ‘‘justified invasion of one country into another and targeting only the military establishments.’’ Twenty-nine percent of the definitions of war consisted of a moral judgment about its utility and motivations: ‘‘War is not a solution’’ (58-year-old man); ‘‘an outrageous waste of resources as well as lives’’ (24-year-old woman); ‘‘rarely justifiable, when old bury the young’’ (53year-old male); ‘‘as proved by history, war is often fought for unjust reasons’’ (18-year-old female). Two respondents state that war involves ‘‘indiscriminant’’ killing. The most poignant responses in this moralizing group are those that portray war as inhuman and dehumanizing or, conversely, an inevitable part of human nature. For example, one 33year-old woman views war as ‘‘destruction, a curse, but inevitable—it’s deep in human nature to cause pain for political, material gains.’’ Pakistani Perspectives on Terrorism The survey participants supplied 44 definitions of terrorism, 46 percent of which argued that it is destructive, produces fear or harm, and/or undermines peace and democracy. Ten (23 percent) of the qualitative definitions equate terrorism with killing innocent people. ‘‘Killing of innocent civilians by people trying to impose their own agendas’’ (23-year-old male) and ‘‘attack that targets people not fighting in a war’’ (30-year-old female) are responses typical of this theme. Eighteen percent of the responses were explicit moral judgments, referring to terrorism as ‘‘wrong,’’ ‘‘inhuman,’’ ‘‘illegal,’’ ‘‘immoral,’’ ‘‘unjust,’’ and ‘‘unfair.’’ According to a 33-year-old woman, terrorists engage in ‘‘inhuman actions that are not justifiable under any circumstances.’’ Seventeen (39 percent) of the definitions emphasized rational, goaloriented motivations as causes for terrorism, usually describing it as a tactic used to achieve a political goal or communicate a message to an audience other than the direct target of an attack. Of these, five (29 percent) provide an unambiguously negative judgment on the use of this tactic (e.g., ‘‘the unethical use of fear and force by individuals looking

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to coerce the government and often targeted toward innocent civilians’’), eight (47 percent) offer a relatively neutral definition that could be described as technical (e.g., ‘‘the use of violence to intimidate and undermine the authority of governing through fear and disorder’’), and four (24 percent) suggest circumstances under which the goals of terrorism may be justified or at least explicable (e.g., ‘‘The use of violent measures by recruited individuals that target civilians, governmental and corporate entities in order to achieve a political goal, such as the independence of a nation, the end of occupation or targeting a foreign presence in a given country’’). A 74-year-old man noted that to use terrorism is to ‘‘force your ideology on others,’’ but he goes on to say, ‘‘However, I feel fighting against oppression, aggression (immoral and unjustified) by a foreign power and fight for freedom of one’s country is justified.’’ In contrast to responses describing terrorism as a goal-oriented activity, 18 of the definitions convey a feeling of the futility and meaninglessness of terrorism, describing it as ‘‘senseless,’’ ‘‘irrational,’’ ‘‘violence inflicted without any justifiable reason or cause on innocents,’’ and ‘‘very vague, abstract, undue and uncalled for.’’ These responses, often written in the passive voice, focus on personal emotions and mental states, such as ‘‘continuous fear’’ (26-year-old male) and ‘‘fear, loss of life, . . . interminable’’ (49-year-old male), or a perception that the perpetrators of terrorism are disembodied actors whose purpose is unclear, leaving those affected helpless to make sense of the acts or to seek justice. In the words of one 33-year-old woman, terrorism is an ‘‘act of cowardice in which an unknown force is calling the shots.’’ Government Entitlement to the Use of Force In rating their level of agreement with the statement ‘‘Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism,’’ a very large majority (80 percent) of the Pakistani sample indicated ‘‘total disagreement.’’ An additional five respondents (9 percent) expressed ‘‘fairly strong disagreement,’’ one neither agreed nor disagreed, and five (9 percent) agreed on some level. Twenty-seven respondents (48 percent of the sample) provided explanations of their rating scale responses, and all but one of those responses rejected a right of any government to kill civilians in fighting terrorism. The only exception was a response by a 24-year-old woman who articulated the way in which terrorists sometimes create dilemmas for governments by placing civilians in harm’s way: ‘‘‘innocent civilians die not only because governments attack terrorists nestled in a

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residential area but also because terrorists choose those areas so that they have human shields and a place to hide.’’ The remaining 96 percent of respondents who indicated that governments should never kill civilians offered several different explanations. Nineteen percent of the explanations argued simply that no one has any such right. Several of the qualitative responses (27 percent) emphasize that governments, in particular, should at best, protect civilians, and at worst, avoid killing them. In the words of a 25-year-old man, ‘‘An innocent civilian is an innocent civilian. If you kill him to get to the terrorist you are no better than the terrorist.’’ Similar responses included those by a 32-year-old man who wrote, ‘‘The very killing of innocent civilians is terrorism,’’ and a 25-year-old woman who asserted, ‘‘It is completely unethical to sacrifice innocent civilians in order to combat terrorism. It is even worse when governments exercise this option.’’ In the view of three respondents, government policies that threaten civilians to fight terrorism fail to solve the problem or make it worse. ‘‘Killing isn’t gonna solve the problem’’ (23-year-old male), writes one, whereas another elaborates further, ‘‘Such actions would only alienate people’’ (21-year-old female). Four respondents emphasize principles of protecting justice and human rights while fighting terrorism. ‘‘Heads of the government have no such right,’’ stresses a 74-year-old man, ‘‘Only the courts have such rights to award sentence to the people who have been proved guilty.’’ A 25-year-old man agrees that ‘‘all measures should be taken to ensure that only those who should be punished are punished.’’ Finally, two respondents see the use of force against civilians as irrational: ‘‘[The] government would be insane then—Bush certainly is’’ (26-year-old female) and ‘‘It’s a violation of basic human rights, against common sense, morality, rationality, and intuition’’ (23-year-old male). ‘‘No one should be subjected to torture for any reason. Only punish a person for the crimes he has committed and not for what he may know.’’ (male, 23) In contrast to their near-unanimous rejection of a governmental right to disregard the lives of civilians, the Pakistani PAIRTAPS participants were somewhat more comfortable with governmental use of torture in a time of war. In this context, it is likely that younger Pakistani participants may think of a prisoner of war as a Pakistani held in overseas detention centers, such as Guantanamo Bay, or that older Pakistanis may imagine their conationals detained by the Indian army during previous wars between the two countries. On the other hand, some respondents may think of people arrested by Pakistan’s security forces

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under suspicion of involvement in terrorism or even ordinary crime, many of whom are never charged and constitute a growing population of ‘‘disappeared.’’ Such disappearances are a well-known strategy of military governments in places like Argentina and Algeria but relatively new to Pakistan, where people are just beginning to talk openly about the problem.80 Interpretation of responses to this question therefore may depend on what first comes to mind when a respondent reads ‘‘prisoners in time of war.’’ On their rating scale responses, 20 percent of the participants agreed that ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war,’’ and three neither agreed nor disagreed. Twenty-six (48 percent) disagreed totally, another nine (17 percent) disagreed fairly strongly, and five did so mildly (9 percent). Of a total of 23 qualitative explanations provided for the rating scale responses, over half (52 percent) offered qualified support of the government’s right to torture. Included in this category were utilitarian responses (13 percent of the total) that weighed the brutality of torture against the number of lives that might be saved as a result. A 32-year-old female commented, for example, that ‘‘[torture] is a violation of basic humanity. However, if the individual has information that may save several lives, it could be justified.’’ A 21-year-old man indicated that torture can be used ‘‘only if information to save more lives is to be obtained,’’ and a 26-year-old man held that torture is a state’s right ‘‘only in exceptional cases such as where security of a country is at stake.’’ Some of the responses indicated that wars create special circumstances that justify behaviors that would otherwise be unacceptable: ‘‘Sometimes, such as in the times of war,’’ writes one, ‘‘it becomes necessary for the government [to torture]’’ (20-year-old female). A 33-year-old woman showed qualified support for torture, but at the same time questioned its effectiveness: ‘‘Torture must be prohibited, unless torturing an individual can prevent escalation of war and can save many other lives,’’ she writes. ‘‘However, since definitions of national security tend to vary, torture perhaps is not a reliable tool.’’ Of the nine qualitative responses rejecting the use of torture under any circumstances, four cited the importance of protecting human rights (10 percent) and four (10 percent) mentioned violations of international law. A 23-year-old male wrote, for example, that torture is ‘‘a violation of the Geneva Convention,’’ whereas two respondents emphasized the particularly vulnerable position of prisoners. One 22-year-old respondent referenced Islamic principles in expressing his feelings: ‘‘Being a Muslim and a human being the basic values and morals do not allow me to think that torture is justifiable by any means.’’

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Pakistanis are somewhat more comfortable with the government use of aggression against another country than toward civilians when described more generally. When asked if one country may sometimes have the right to invade another, 27 participants (50 percent) disagreed totally, another 10 (19 percent) disagreed fairly strongly, and 1 mildly disagreed. Four respondents neither agreed nor disagreed, 10 agreed mildly, and 2 agreed fairly strongly. Almost two-thirds of the participants (59 percent) further explained their level of agreement or disagreement with the statement. Fourteen of their responses (26 percent) supported a government’s right to violate another nation’s territory, mentioning two main conditions: self defense (16 percent) or humanitarian intervention on behalf of trapped conationals or suffering and genocide inside the invaded country’s territory (9 percent). To a 42year-old man, for example, invasion is permissible ‘‘in retaliation to invasion or if the other country seeks such support,’’ and a 25-year-old male agrees that one country invading another is acceptable ‘‘to protect itself, its interests and its people.’’ In support of the second justification, a young woman writes, ‘‘If oppression in a state exceeds all limits, or law and order completely fails and life becomes impossible, then, with the willingness of the native people, one country may intervene, but invasion is never legitimate’’ (27-year-old female). Similarly, another 26year-old man argues, ‘‘Because every state is sovereign . . . a country must [have] strong reason and belief in order to invade another country. I mean invasion is allowed in extreme circumstances; for example, in case of genocide.’’ Thirty percent of the qualitative responses maintained that invasion is never justifiable. Among the reasons provided, three stand out. Four responses are assertions that diplomacy and conflict resolution can and should be allowed to work, five portray invasion as an archaic method of conflict resolution that is inappropriate in a modern context, and another five indicate that invasion is illegal or unjustifiable for any reason. One 33-year-old woman comments, ‘‘In today’s globalized world with modern methods of conflict resolution, no country has the right to invade another.’’ A 22-year-old woman states, ‘‘All matters can and should be solved in a peaceful, diplomatic manner.’’ Another woman of the same age believes in the effectiveness of diplomacy, saying, ‘‘I do not believe any country has the right to undermine the sovereignty of another nation and all conflicts can be resolved through diplomacy without the need of bloodshed and chaos.’’ In contrast, however, one respondent doubts the efficacy of international conflict resolution, despite his belief that it should supersede invasion: ‘‘In the 21st century all issues between the governments should be resolved through negotiations or organizations like the UN or International Court; however,

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these international organizations are not working independently’’ (74year-old male). Other responses reflect a belief that any ‘‘legitimate’’ justification hides ulterior motives (three responses) and that the blowback and other negative consequences of invasion outweigh any advantages (three responses). A 23-year-old man asserted, ‘‘Even the slightest allowance of such an activity will be exploited by countries to achieve their own agendas. There should be a global agreement to prevent such actions and measures should be taken against any country that violates this agreement. These measures could even include military action against the perpetrators.’’ A 23-year-old female said, ‘‘It’s hard to find solutions to problems or bring peace by invading another country because of the anger and resentment that will be harbored by the citizens of the invaded country. Also there will be unnecessary bloodshed.’’ Pakistani Perspectives on Peace Peace: ‘‘when there are no acts of war and individuals of different backgrounds, political ideas and religions are able to harmoniously co-exist.’’ (male, 32) Forty respondents provided one or more codable definitions of peace. Seventy-eight percent of the responses were positive definitions of peace, describing it in terms of the presence of something positive or the conditions necessary for establishing it, whereas 28 percent of the responses were negative definitions, equating peace with the absence of war and, in one case, ‘‘a state of relative calm with low levels of violence’’ (27-year-old male). For example, within the first group, 13 responses defined peace as a state of well-being. Some associated peace with psychological well-being, such as ‘‘a condition of calm, serenity and equity between all living things’’ (22-year-old male), and a state in which ‘‘everybody is content with the status quo’’ (22-year-old female). Three responses focused on physical well-being, whereas a 53-year-old male envisions peace as a state in which ‘‘there is no economic and social discrimination of human beings.’’ The quality of interpersonal relationships is important to the meaning of peace in about 25 percent of the responses: ‘‘Understanding and mutual respect’’ (22-year-old male) and ‘‘where humankind lives in harmony’’ (43-year-old male) exemplify this theme. Twenty percent of the responses mentioned justice, equality, and/or rights, equating peace with, for example, ‘‘guarantees of fundamental rights’’ (25-year-old male) and ‘‘equity between all living things’’ (22-year-old female).

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Twenty-three percent of the responses described peace as an ideal that human beings are and should be seeking. Peace is the ‘‘ultimate aim of humanity’’ (31-year-old female), the ‘‘greatest aim to be achieved’’ (25-year-old male), ‘‘desired, wanted but difficult to achieve’’ (24-year-old female), and ‘‘the only hope of our next generation’’ (58year-old male). All of these responses provide a sharp contrast to the 11 negative definitions of peace that identify it with the absence of conflict or negative feelings. Examples of negative definitions of peace included ‘‘having no fear’’ (25-year-old male), ‘‘a state of non-aggression’’ (30year-old female), ‘‘the absence of violence, bloodshed’’ (23-year old male), and ‘‘no war/absence of war’’ (three respondents). Responding to a related statement in the survey, ‘‘All human beings have a right to peace,’’ most participants (83 percent) indicated total agreement, seven (13 percent) agreed fairly strongly, and 1 agreed mildly. Only one respondent strongly disagreed with this statement. This question elicited only 13 qualitative responses, an overwhelming majority of which (87 percent) supported a right to peace, many of them generally just restating the words of the item. One respondent noted that ‘‘All religions and philosophic discourses endorse this [right to peace]’’ (25-year-old male). Three of the qualitative responses (23 percent of all the responses) provided qualifications or conditions relating to those who have violated this right, even suggesting that violence may be required to achieve peace under some circumstances. In the words of a 23-year-old man, ‘‘All individuals who live peacefully have the right to peace, [but] any individual who seeks to disturb that peaceful lifestyle should be punished.’’ A 21-year-old woman agrees, ‘‘as long as they are upholding this right for others and participating in peace processes,’’ but argues that ‘‘people engaged in violence and transgressions (even within their households or against friends, colleagues, employees, etc.) forgo their right to peace.’’ Finally, a 26-year-old man declares that ‘‘for some humans [the] definition of peace may require an intervention or use of force to procure peace.’’ In response to a related statement, ‘‘World peace is achievable,’’ a majority (67 percent) agreed; five participants neither agreed nor disagreed, and the remainder indicated some level of disagreement. Ninety percent of the 29 qualitative responses identified major obstacles to, or the inherent impossibility of achieving world peace. Five responses attributed challenges to peace to specific forces and power arrangements outside of Pakistan. A 74-year-old male stipulated that world peace may be possible, ‘‘Provided that some powerful states stop their expansionist policies and hegemony over the resources of other nations.’’ Similarly, two young men cited the distribution of power in the world, stating, ‘‘It is only possible if we have a proper balance of

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power in the world’’ (26-year-old), and ‘‘In the presence of some super power it is impossible’’ (29-year-old). One 22-year-old man commented that ‘‘world peace can only be achieved if America and India give up their hegemonic designs and end aggression against weaker communities.’’ In contrast, a 24-year-old woman sees the global economic system and ethnic conflict as primary obstacles to peace. In her view, ‘‘the level of thinking required for world peace does not exist yet. The developed world wants to keep moving forward, while the developing world is still getting up on its feet. This disparity means that capitalist imperialism ensures that the developed continue to exploit the developing, not to mention the ethnic conflicts that prevail in all corners of the world.’’ Fifty percent of the responses indicated that peace is unachievable because of individual motivations and the nature and history of human interaction. According to a 33-year-old female, world peace is ‘‘impossible. There are too many people out there with an enormous thirst for power.’’ World peace, writes another 33-year old woman, ‘‘would go against intrinsic human nature.’’ ‘‘There will always be some people who will seek to cause rancor and distress’’ (23-year-old male) and ‘‘people are too greedy and selfish for this to happen’’ (21-year-old female) reveal the skepticism of some Pakistanis regarding the achievability of world peace. Another respondent wrote, ‘‘With the armament and weapons available in the world today coupled with the aggressive nature of humans, [world peace] may not be possible’’ (43-year-old male). A 24-year-old woman thinks that peace ‘‘cannot be achieved; too many religions, sects, identities, interests, scarce resources and many self interests.’’ Eleven percent of the responses described peace as a far-off ideal. Only six participants expressed their convictions that world peace is achievable, due to either changing circumstances that might alter human interdependence and needs or a belief in the inherent goodness of human nature. For example, a 34-year-old woman predicts, ‘‘globalization will help. We can see that economically we are all related and the effects in one country have repercussions in others—even acts of war and peace.’’ Another woman states, ‘‘I believe that despite our racial, ethnic, and religious differences we can seek a common ground for all and learn to coexist peacefully.’’ Two 23-year-old men believe in the prospect of peace, stating, respectively, ‘‘humans can achieve anything they put their mind to’’ and ‘‘human goodness or fear of annihilation shall one day lead to [peace].’’ Protest All but one respondent, who declined to answer the question, agreed with the statement ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against

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war and in favor of peace,’’ with 44 (80 percent) expressing total agreement. Only 16 of the participants (29 percent) elaborated on their response, with 6 of their responses framing this right in terms of the phrase ‘‘freedom of speech’’ or its definition. A 22-year-old man explained, ‘‘Every individual has the right to voice their personal opinion without fear of being persecuted whether it be in favor of or against war or any other matter of society in which they reside.’’ Another five responses qualified the right, noting that the protest itself must be peaceful. According to a 21-year-old woman, the right to protest for peace is part of a ‘‘basic freedom of speech,’’ but it ‘‘shouldn’t be abused and must be done peacefully in respect of the underlying principle being supported.’’ Two respondents who indicated only mild agreement with the statement suggested that the right to protest ‘‘depends on the nature and causes of war’’ (43-year-old male) and that in a case of self-defense, ‘‘if the war has been imposed on a country, then every citizen should fight for his country’’ (22-year-old, gender not reported). A 74-year-old, on the other hand, cited the utility of protest, noting that ‘‘protests may bring a change in the mindsets of the leaders who force war on other countries.’’ Pakistani Perspectives on Reconciliation Seventy-seven percent of the Pakistani participants offered a definition of reconciliation. Over half of the definitions refer to reconciliation as a process, method, or behavior involved in resolving conflict, emphasizing, for example, that reconciliation is a ‘‘dialogue’’ (two respondents), ‘‘trying to make peace’’ (two respondents), ‘‘compromise’’ (four respondents), setting aside or overcoming ‘‘differences’’ (five respondents), and ‘‘mature behavior’’ (31-year-old female). A 33-year-old woman defines reconciliation as ‘‘facing the truth of the situation and meeting your opponent half way,’’ and a 74-year-old male believes reconciliation is ‘‘Not to adopt hard-line about any issue.’’ Nine percent of the responses mention forgetting the past in their definition, and 3 percent mention forgiveness. Many responses (58 percent) either deleted or added an outcome or end state to a definition that involved a process or only mentioned an end state in their definition of reconciliation. Whether describing reconciliation as a process, an end state, or both, 42 percent of the definitions frame reconciliation as either seeking or reaching an end to conflict— ‘‘reaching a state of compromise by avoiding reprisals based upon past experiences’’ (25-year-old male), for example. Thirty-five percent of the responses, on the other hand, view reconciliation as something more than just the absence of conflict. Nine percent mention achieving

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friendship, harmony, and/or mutual understanding, whereas 19 percent discuss hope for the future and the possibility of making the world a better place. Others write that reconciliation is ‘‘the ability to forgive and forget and settle past differences in order to seek more cooperative and fruitful relations that benefit all parties involved’’ (22-year-old female), a state ‘‘without regret for the past, confident in the present and full of hope for the future’’ (53-year-old male), ‘‘rejuvenation’’ (24-year-old female), and ‘‘a positive step toward a better world’’ (40year-old male).

CONCLUSION Although not a randomly selected sample from the Pakistani population, our sample portrays a picture that is probably quite representative of ordinary people in Pakistan. Consistent with other, more quantitative survey data from Pakistan, the respondents reveal a strong sentiment against use of aggression by the state—showing the least tolerance for killing of innocent civilians. There are also strong arguments against a state’s right to invade another nation or to torture prisoners of war, although some people in this beleaguered country can see instances where such forms of governmental aggression may serve to protect them and their communities. Many of the arguments against aggression by states consist of strong moral judgments concerning the wrongness of such acts. Complementing this strong level of rejection of any rights to aggression is a strong endorsement of an individual’s rights to peace and to peaceful protest, as well as considerable optimism that positive forms of peace can be achieved and reconciliation accomplished through dialogue and effort.

3

India Ellora Puri, Tanvi Zaveri, and Nisha Raj

War is . . . ‘‘To demolish our limited resources’’; ‘‘holy practice for the stabilization of peace in world’’; ‘‘damage of physical & capital and torture of woman, children & common masses’’; ‘‘State-declared and supported by its machinery.’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘the time b/w war and war. To generate more energy, developments and maturity’’; ‘‘The state of living in which everyone is enjoying the life and contributing to the growth of the society’’; ‘‘Definitely not what Bush thinks it is’’; ‘‘a normal state of human life including conflicts, challenges and opportunities for initiatives, growth, development and mutual cooperation.’’ Reconciliation is . . . ‘‘realizing the need for sitting together for rethinking any mutual areas of conflicts and disagreements. It also is a psychological state of mind where individuals and states alike start thinking in terms of accepting a situation—whether good or bad—as part of existing life processes with which they will have to live.’’ To further the dialogue of how to create a peaceful world, it is crucial to understand commonalities and differences in the views of war and peace from individuals internationally. In South Asia, diverse religious, cultural, linguistic, and economic groups have coexisted for millennia; however, the area also has a history filled with invasions, colonialism, and communal conflict. Within this context, the modern state of India was founded only 60 years ago, following one of the world’s few examples of a successful nonviolent independence movement. India is now the second most populated nation (making it the world’s largest democracy) and growing as an economic power on the world platform. However, the maintenance of peace, social progress, and tolerance of

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diversity is still difficult in the face of external conflict, group violence, and social inequalities. This chapter explores the unique perceptions of war and peace from Indian respondents. In our study, 144 participants provided explanations to items in the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS), providing a glimpse into Indian views on issues such as whether one country has the right to invade another country as well as whether individuals have a right to protest against war. Participants rated their level of agreement with statements concerning state rights to aggression and individual rights to peace on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree) and then provided explanations for their rating scale responses. To facilitate understanding of our participants’ views, the chapter provides an overview of Indian history—pre-Partition and post-Partition—depicting India’s external and internal struggles with intergroup conflict. The chapter also elaborates on political, economic, and social influences on Indian perspectives on the rights to war and peace.

PRECOLONIAL HISTORY Much of India’s precolonial history, which dates back to thousands of years BCE,1 is shared with other modern states making up the region of South Asia, including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, as well as parts of China. One of the earliest recorded civilizations in the region is the Harappan civilization (from about 2500 BCE to 1500 BCE), which covered the Indus Valley and Central Asia.2 This indigenous society focused heavily on agrarian life and was composed of urban trade centers and numerous, decentralized chiefdoms. Specialized metal and stone weapons as well as moats are evidence of defense practices and warfare during the Harappan era.3 Although trade with the West and Central Asia (e.g., Mesopotamia) long existed, the northern part of the Indian subcontinent experienced Aryan invasions from about 1300 BCE.4 Although it has been speculated that Hinduism dates back to 3000 BCE, historians have more collective confidence in evidence dating it to 1000 BCE during the Vedic period.5 During this time, Hinduism spread across the land through oral traditions. The Rig Veda, the oldest Sanskrit text of Hindu hymns, explored philosophical concepts of creation as well as sacrifice; later Vedic scriptures of Brahmanas (manuals of rituals) like Upanishads also developed cosmic beliefs of Hinduism. By the sixth century BCE, independent monarchies (called mahajanapadas) were established from former chiefdoms.6 Hinduism continued to spread,

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especially after composition of the epics Mahabharata and Ramayana (around 400 BCE) as well as the Bhagavad Gita (in 100 CE).7 However, Jainism and Buddhism also developed as major religious movements in Southeast Asia, largely through dissatisfaction with Vedic Hindu practices during the Gupta classical period.8 Vardhamana, later known as Mahavira, spread his spiritual philosophy of Jainism in the fifth and sixth centuries BCE.9 Shortly after, Siddharta (Gautama) Buddha inspired many Hindus toward the path of enlightenment via ethical teachings of birth, death, attachment, and suffering.10 Early Indo-Aryan Vedic society was divided into groups based on occupational and caste distinctions, established by lineage and clans.11 The four major castes, or varnas, include Brahmins (priests with sacred knowledge) at the top, followed by the Kshatriyas (warriors), then Vaishyas (traders and merchants), and lastly the Sudras (manual laborers who were systematically discriminated against).12 By 300 BCE, many of the smaller kingdoms (the mahajanapadas) declined, gradually being replaced by larger monarchies (e.g., the Nanda, Magadha, and Mauryan kingdoms) that stretched from the north to south of the region.13 However, these kingdoms experienced military invasions from Western rulers like Alexander the Great, who momentarily expanded the ancient Greek empire to the Indian subcontinent around 325 BCE (before dying).14 Despite invasions and rule in certain areas by the Greeks and Central Asian tribes, political entities like the Mauryan kingdom remained strong, stretching until the second century BCE.15 Although the Arthashastra (an early Mauryan text) describes the aggressive power-conflict of political units as natural, later Mauryan rulers (like Ashoka) were documented to be more tolerant and sensitive to the autonomous governance of subcommunities.16 By the first century CE, numerous kingdoms had emerged throughout the subcontinent as larger kingdoms disintegrated. In the south, Tamil culture flourished in ruling groups like the Pandyas, Cheras, and Cholas.17 By the sixth century, the Pallava kingdom was established in the southern Tamil region. These kingdoms differed from those of the north culturally and linguistically; although the south held onto its Dravidian roots, the northern culture was a blend of Indo-Aryan influences and based on Sankrit.18 In the North, the Gupta dynasty expanded across the subcontinent over centuries.19 During the Gupta Empire, also known as the Golden Era, trade and interactions with the East and West increased, influencing the development of literature and sciences.20 In the eighth century, northern India experienced further invasions from the West. By 1000, Mahmud of Ghazni was raiding Indian cities. By 1200, Turkic Muslims, under Mahmud of Ghur, destroyed Ghazni and took over control of Delhi. By 1300, following the establishment of

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the Delhi sultanate, many sultans ruled the northern regions of South Asia, succeeding Hindu kings.21 In the 14th century, Mongol invasions of the subcontinent began and by the early 1500s, much of the land was under the rule of the Mughal Empire.22 During this time, politics were not based on religious distinctions; although Hindus were initially discriminated against with a jizya tax, Akbar (Babur’s grandson) eliminated the tax and achieved the unification of most of north and central India.23 Overall, during medieval times and Mughal rule, communities coexisted with tolerance while maintaining their unique identities;24 the fusion of different cultures also yielded developments in music, literature, and architecture.25 In the early 1600s, violent rebellions occurred in the Mughal Empire as warriors arriving from Central Asia brought new military equipment to the locals in the northern part of the subcontinent.26 Trade with European powers (including the British, French, Portuguese, and Dutch) became increasingly common, especially following the establishment of the East India Company by Queen Elizabeth I in 1600.27 The European powers took advantage of the regional social fractures created by separate and numerous kingdoms not unified under a central Mughal government.28 The East India Company made treaties with certain kingdoms for military protection in exchange for material and symbolic rewards (like status) and used these Indian soldiers to implement policies upon locals (which exacerbated intergroup tensions).29 By the 1700s, the Mughal Empire began to decline, with the last Mughal emperor in the mid-1800s.30 Simultaneously, the British increased control through the East India Company, which monopolized the trade of vital resources and even created an army of locals; 1857 was an important transitional year, as the Mughal Empire disintegrated, the East India Company dissolved after a coalition of different kingdoms rebelled, and British colonization of South Asia subsequently began.31

COLONIAL HISTORY The English considered India to be the ‘‘Jewel of the Crown,’’ an important economic asset to Great Britain during the British Raj (i.e., the British rule over the Indian subcontinent from 1858 to 1947). During this time, South Asia was divided into two different types of political systems: the vast colonial structure ruled by the British crown (and other European powers) as well as over 500 independent princely states. In contrast to precolonial society (which was composed of decentralized political units), colonial rule brought Western conceptions of a modern

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centralized nation-state (built on self-governance through democratic institutions) to the Indian subcontinent.32 In many of the older Hindu and Muslim Indian kingdoms, diverse religious, cultural, and linguistic groups had coexisted for centuries; during colonization, however, Indian society was transformed not only into a single political state but also into one struggling to establish a unified national identity for polarized groups.33 The British Raj fed Indian nationalism, as Indians shared both their anticolonial sentiments in the face of discrimination and the desire for independence.34 While the British exploited resources and labor, they also helped develop the infrastructure of South Asia, through increasing communications (by spreading the use of English, building railroads, and introducing telegraphs) and establishing an educational system. To solidify the colony, Queen Victoria declared herself the empress of India in 1877. During this time, most indigenous individuals were denied traditional rights, and only an elite few were allowed to vote.35 In 1885, the Indian National Congress (the first Indian political party) was created for both Hindu and Muslim political elites, in a step toward self-determination.36 Over time, however, nationalism became linked to religious identity for many leaders. The Muslim League (established in 1906) first established separate electorates for the different religious communities (through the Morley-Minto council reforms in 1909) and later advocated for the creation of two separate states.37 Separate electorates were also established for Sikhs and Christians under the Government of India Act of 1919.38 These policies, while designed to ensure proportionate representation in politics, reinforced religious differences among South Asians. During World War I, the INC supported the Turks and Germans against the British in the Khalifat movement; the British responded by threatening Indian’s civil liberties (e.g., through the Rowlatt Act of 1917) to protect the British Raj from terrorism. Despite oppressive polices, during the early 20th century, steps were taken to increase Indian political power (e.g., through the Montague-Chelmsford Report of 1918).39 Many indigenous political and religious leaders emerged during this time to lead to independence. For example, Mohammad Jinnah was an active member of the INC and later the Muslim League. Jinnah feared the consequences of majority Hindu rule for minority Muslims after the British withdrawal.40 Through his Twelve Points given in 1928 and later in the Lahore Resolution of 1940, Jinnah advocated for a separate Muslim state. The notion of two separate states was strongly opposed by INC leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohandas Gandhi, who shared the goal of independence from the British with Jinnah.

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Mohandas Gandhi was born in Gujarat and studied in South Africa, returning to India in 1915.41 He was an active leader of the nationalist movement (and INC), who particularly emphasized unity and the political empowerment of all individuals, especially the untouchable masses or Harijans.42 He also worked to improve the rights of mistreated individuals, like women and poor laborers.43 Gandhi adhered strongly to the principle of ahimsa or nonviolence, believing that satyagraha (holding firmly to the truth) would oblige colonizers to change.44 This was illustrated in his fight for independence through civil disobedience movements such as protests, speeches, marches, and fasting strikes.45 He (along with other participants) was subsequently jailed multiple times for his efforts to destabilize the British Raj. Gandhi recognized that, ‘‘even the most powerful cannot rule without the cooperation of the ruled’’46 and thus helped reduce dependency on colonial power through self-sufficiency and noncooperation (e.g., wearing only handspun clothing).47 For example, in 1930, Gandhi led a march to the beach town of Dandi in Gujarat to make salt and to directly defy and protest against the British monopoly of and tax on salt.48 He also inspired movements like the Vaikom Satyagraha in Kerala in the mid-1920s, which protested for the rights of untouchables. Gandhi also negotiated with the Muslim League and British at, for example, the Round Table Conferences in the 1930s.49 He ultimately opposed the Partition and instead advocated for the unity of the South Asian masses (across castes and religions) against the British.50 Like the 1919 Government of India Act, the 1935 Government of India Act provided a foundation for the Indian Constitution, reiterating religious differences and autonomous provinces with overhead British control.51 Consequent elections held in 1936 showed that most of the voting Hindus and Muslims supported the INC. In 1942, during World War II, the Indian political parties launched the ‘‘Quit India’’ movement, which demanded Indian independence from the British through civil disobedience. During this rebellion, almost 100,000 people were arrested and over 1,000 were killed.52 The rebellion succeeded: in 1946 the British announced they would leave the subcontinent by 1948 and transfer power to the new state of India through the Cabinet Mission Plan.53 The elections of 1946 revealed overwhelming Muslim support for the Muslim League (which was used to justify the desire for a separate Muslim state). In August 1947, South Asia was partitioned into the newly independent states of Pakistan (East and West) and India, a division based on the evolution of two different national and religious visions.54 While Jinnah is considered the father of the Islamic state of Pakistan, Nehru is revered as the political father, and Gandhi as the moral leader, of secular democratic India.

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POSTCOLONIAL HISTORY While the first half of the 20th century witnessed India’s struggle for independence, the second half was characterized by the need to address internal social strife and external political crises. Ultimately, the philosophy of British colonizers to ‘‘divide-and-conquer’’ left deep emotional and cultural fractures in India and other parts of the world (including Ireland, the Middle East, and Nigeria). Although the majority of Indians are Hindu, the national identity of India (articulated through the Indian Constitution) emphasized tolerance for all social groups and coexistence through liberal democracy. This orientation contrasts with that of Pakistan, which is focused on Islamic unity.55 Immediate and long-term external consequences of the partition of South Asia include India’s conflict with Pakistan (mostly over control in the region Kashmir), border disputes with China, and violence in divided regions of Punjab and Bengal. Domestic consequences of the partition include instabilities caused by separatist movements (e.g., the Sikhs in the Northwest Frontier and Tamils in the South) as well as continued communal violence. Following the independence of Pakistan and India, mass migrations forced Muslims and Hindus to leave regions in which they were minorities. Violence ensued between the two groups during this period of population exchange in, for example, Delhi and Punjab. In 1947, Gandhi fasted to end the religious violence;56 however, despite his popularity and role as a moral figure, some Indians (including Hindus) disliked Gandhi because of his emphasis on negotiation and unity between different religious groups.57 In fact, in 1948 a Hindu nationalist assassinated Mohandas (the holy, Mahatma) Gandhi. During India’s first 30 years as a nation (from 1947 to 1977), the INC dominated the political scene. Until his death in 1964, Nehru was the prime minister of India, serving for four terms. His belief in Fabian socialism supported his plans (and those of the Planning Commission) for nation building, which focused on political democracy as well as state-controlled economic development. During this time, the government was responsible for redistributing wealth and industrializing. Also during the 1950s and 1960s, many social reforms were enacted to encourage slow population growth and increase women’s rights (e.g., the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 and the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961). In the face of severe famine, the Indian government also launched agricultural reforms in the 1960s (known as the Green Revolution), which successfully eliminated the threat of famine.58 Reflecting internal political instabilities, some cultural groups fought for separation from the larger Indian state. In the early 1960s, due to insurgent activity, Naga tribes in the northeast region of Assam were

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granted autonomous statehood within the union of India.59 Other separatist movements tried to establish independent statehoods for Sikhs in the northwest through Khalistan, for Kashmiris in the north, and Tamils in the south. During the Cold War, Indian political unity was also threatened by the Naxal communist insurgency. In 1966, INC leader Indira Gandhi (daughter of Nehru) came to power at a time when militant separatist movements were gaining momentum in India. From 1975 to 1977, Prime Minister Gandhi declared authoritarian emergency rule in an attempt to ban extremist organizations; in doing so, she not only interfered in state-level affairs but also suspended civil liberties of Indian citizens. She was strongly opposed by the Sikh political party Akali Dal (led by Jarnail Singh Bhindarwale, who desired a homeland for Sikhs called Khalistan in the 1980s). Following the undemocratic emergency era, the BJP came to power shortly from 1977 to 1980.60 The 1980s saw a return to INC rule first with Indira Gandhi and, following her assassination (due to her attack on the Sikh’s Golden temple in 1984), with her son Rajiv Gandhi (who was also later assassinated).61 The Cold War led to many nations building their military power through increasing weapons of mass destruction. In 1974, India conducted its first nuclear tests, under the Smiling Buddha operation.62 By the late 1980s, more nuclear detonations took place and today India is one of the many global nuclear powers. It is interesting that to assert its sovereignty, the Indian government has refused to sign the CTBT and Non-Proliferation Treaty, but undertook a process of creating a bilateral agreement with the United States.63 The end of the Cold War also yielded many other internal changes for India. Politically, one-party rule ended and the trend of coalition politics emerged (in which no single party is able to get the majority of votes for parliament, so multiple parties join to form a majority coalition). In the 1990s and in the 21st century, the BJP was quite influential politically, although currently, the INC has regained political power. Post-Cold War years also saw increased economic liberalization as a different approach to development during the era of globalization. Despite changes following the 1990s, religious clashes still persist in India. First Indo-Pakistani War The partition of the Indian subcontinent resulted in violent internal and external conflicts that remain unresolved even today. In fact, India and Pakistan have fought four wars in their 60-year-old histories as nationstates. When South Asia was divided in 1947, the princely states remaining at the time had to accede either to India or Pakistan,

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depending on their religious composition and geographical proximity; independence was not an option.64 Although most Muslim kingdoms joined Pakistan or dissolved into India, the kingdom of Kashmir was unique because it was ruled by Hindus but was composed of a Muslim majority and located on the border between the two new nations.65 At the time of partition, the king of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, desired independence.66 For the opposing national identities, Kashmir symbolizes more than mere territory for India and Pakistan. Nehru declared Kashmir an integral part of India because it represents the view of the Indian state as tolerant and secular; Jinnah viewed Kashmir as an integral piece of Pakistan because of its Muslim majority.67 In October 1947, a tribal rebellion erupted in Kashmir, in which Hindus were attacked.68 Maharaja Hari Singh requested help from a neighboring kingdom as well as from the Indian military and received it after signing the Instrument of Accession and agreeing to join the state of India in return.69 During this conflict, the Pakistani army supported the Azad Kashmiri rebels and managed to push the Indian troops away from the border.70 The Indian and Pakistani armies continued to fight until January 1, 1948, when India reached out to the United Nations for mediation in hopes of ending the hostilities. According to the resolution (which took a year to go into effect), about one-third of Kashmir went to Pakistan based on the Line of Control.71 Ultimately, the cease-fire agreed upon ended the first and longest Indo-Pakistani war. Sino-Indian War In 1962, China used its military force to effectively gain control over land in the remote Indian and Himalayan region of Arunachal Pradesh (including modern Tibet, Xinjiang, and Aksai Chin). The defeat of the Indians in this Sino-Indian war raised major concerns for India’s defense policies at the national level; however, surveys of Indians prior to and after the war suggest that only a minority (less than 10 percent of the population) was concerned about the military implications of the war and viewed China’s action as a threat to Indian sovereignty.72 Second Indo-Pakistani War In January 1965, Pakistan acted aggressively in the Kutch, Gujarat; however, due to the rough terrain of the region and to avoid escalating the conflict, the Indian military response was quite timid. The following May, the British intervened and returned each nation’s territory to the status quo prior to the fighting. Later the same year, though, the Pakistani military covertly invaded Jammu and Kashmir by disguising Pakistani troops as local Kashmiris to cross the Line of Control into India.

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Because local Kashmiris notified the Indian government, steps were taken by the Indian military in August 1965 to push the infiltrators back to the border. Ultimately, gains by one side led to retaliatory attacks by the other. In the next month, Pakistani Air Marshal Asghar Khan contacted the Indian Air Marshal P. C. Lal to discuss an agreement to avoid bombing civilian areas and irrigation facilities like dams.73 A United Nations Security Council resolution in September 1965 further established a cease-fire agreement between both sides.74 This second Indo-Pakistani war officially ended in January 1966 when the two sides met in Tashkent (Central Asia) under the guidance of Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, who brokered the agreement to withdraw troops. Third Indo-Pakistani War In 1971, internal conflict erupted in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) after the failure of East Pakistani leader Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and West Pakistani leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to come to a power-sharing agreement following elections. The Pakistani army responded to this internal crisis by killing thousands of individuals in Dacca, East Pakistan, during the spring and summer of 1971.75 This triggered a massive refugee influx into West Bengal (India). In response to the refugee crisis, Indira Gandhi intervened in East Pakistan to liberate Bangladesh.76 India’s 20year treaty of peace and friendship with the Soviet Union established in August of 1971 enabled this invasion to occur (as the Soviet Union, a member of the United Nations Security Council, would help protect India’s national security). India’s military strategy consisted of training East Pakistanis to fight against the Pakistani army (claimed by West Pakistan to be an invasion in internal affairs).77 Simultaneously, the Pakistani army attacked parts of Kashmir, Punjab, and Rajasthan in the West; the Indian army maintained control through bold air strikes. By December 1971, the Indian army entered Dacca in the East and came to cease-fire terms with Pakistan, consequently giving birth to the independent state of Bangladesh.78 Fourth Indo-Pakistani War The fourth war between India and Pakistan began in 1999, also over the disputed border between the two nations.79 Despite four wars, conflict between India and Pakistan continues, especially in regard to Kashmir. As the Pakistani military aims to fuel Kashmiri insurgency, the Indian military is trying to suppress it. Ultimately, the conflict over Kashmir illustrates the complexity of an indigenous struggle fueled by nationallevel forces.

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CONTEMPORARY CONTEXTS Social psychologists argue that individual perceptions of state and human behaviors develop through interactions with multiple layers in our social environments. To understand the perspectives of our 144 Indian participants, it is important to explore aspects of the Indian social environment. In addition to history, more recent political, economic, and social conditions also shape and are shaped by individual perspectives. India’s complex experiences with interdependence, coexistence, and occasional conflicts between different social classifications of people are reflected in participants’ unique views of state rights to aggression, individual rights to peace, and reconciliation between conflicting groups. Political/Social/Economic Contexts The Indian Constitution defines the nation-state as a sovereign, democratic entity, focused on secularism, the freedom of expression, and equal individual and group rights.80 The constitution and subsequent laws importantly condemn discrimination based on education, gender, social class, caste, and/or religion. The Indian Constitution, drafted in 1948 and put into effect in 1950, divides political power between central, state, and local levels of government.81 Whereas the central government is responsible for defense, foreign policy, and national development, state and local levels focus more on social policies like education. The constitution also stipulates that the government consist of three branches (legislative, executive, and judiciary); at the national level, the legislative branch consists of a bicameral parliament, composed of the Rajya Sabha (the upper house and Council of States) and the Lok Sabha (the lower house and House of People); the president and prime minister make up the executive branch; and the courts compose the judiciary branch. During most of India’s history as a free state, politics at the nation level was dominated by one-party rule (mostly by the INC with brief periods of BJP rule). Since the 1990s, however, there is an increasing trend toward multiparty governance as parties form coalitions to combine for majority votes.82 In addition to the INC, the BJP, and communist political parties at the national level, a multitude of political parties have emerged at regional levels. New forms of political action also are increasingly common at the grassroots level; nongovernmental organizations (focused on human rights and development) are working to empower politically those who are disenfranchised.83 Socially as well as politically, pluralist India challenges the notion of a state as homogenous and consisting of integrated institutions.

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Political transitions in Indian history often accompanied changes in economic policy. During the INC rule, economic development was centralized, with the socialist state controlling industrialization and businesses.84 Following reforms in 1991, which encouraged an open market economy, privatization, and foreign investment, national as well as regional economies were transformed with the technology boom. India began to emerge as a global economic power. Today, the Indian population provides both a large consumer market and a cheap, Englishspeaking labor base for many multinational corporations.85 Scholar D. L. Sheth argues that as these corporations partner with individuals at the local level, they reduce the governance of the state.86 Despite overall economic growth and success, Indian society is still economically stratified, with drastic differences in rural and urban life as well as severe inequality between economic classes, leaving the poor masses to suffer from malnutrition, illiteracy, and discrimination. Participants in our studies were asked to self-report their economic classes; of those who reported, 3 were from the lower class, 12 were from the working class, 76 were from the middle class, 37 were from the uppermiddle class, and 7 were from the upper class. Closely linked to economic status, level of education also varies significantly among Indians. For example, literacy is highest in the state of Kerala (due to policies of the popular communist party) and lowest in the poorer state of Bihar. Indian society is composed of many social differentiations based on, for example, cultural, linguistic, and religious grounds. The nation of India is divided both socially and physically into 28 states and 7 union territories by language and ethnicity, based on the Reorganization Act of 1956.87 Each state in India represents unique economic activities, customs, art forms, cuisine, and even religious emphases.88 Many of our participants were from the state of Delhi, with some few from Jammu and Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, and Haryana. There are 18 official languages in India and over 1,500 dialects (which have either Indo-Aryan or Dravidian roots).89 Most Indians are unified in their acceptance of differing faiths, the central government, and national languages like English (the language in which our participants responded). Although the Constitution of India states the official national language is Hindi, not all Indians know Hindi (e.g., the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu opposes teaching and using Hindi because Hindi is a northern language that represents cultural imperialism and threatens secessionist beliefs).90 The caste system, like other social classifications, is ultimately a conceptual grouping of individuals. Generated in ancient Vedic Hindu times, the hierarchical caste structure consists of four castes and hundreds of subcastes.91 Justified through a spiritual source, the system

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consequently provided grounds to discriminate against and segregate the poorer and lower caste. Sudras, members of the lowest caste, were and are still by some considered to be untouchable and unclean; they call themselves Dalits, which means the ‘‘crushed and broken.’’ Although the enforcement of the caste system has declined with the democratization and modernization of India, discrimination still occurs in poorer, rural regions.92 Through the Mandal Commission in 1980, the Indian government reserved seats (up to 49.5 percent) in governmental jobs, legislature, and education for ‘‘backwards classes,’’ which include scheduled castes and tribes (traditionally economically disadvantaged groups).93 Although over 80 percent of Indians are of Hindu faith, India is quite diverse religiously, with 12 percent Muslims, 8 percent tribal individuals (practicing their own indigenous religions), over 2 percent Christians, 2 percent Sikhs, and less than 1 percent each of Buddhists, Jains, Jews, Parsis, and Baha’is.94 Some religions—Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism—originated in South Asia, but others—Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism—came from abroad. While these religious groups have maintained their unique identities and practices, the various religious philosophies have assimilated and coexisted for millennia under different forms of social governance. Aside from a minority of separatists, most Indians share their belief in and respect for cultural expression;95 nevertheless, individual-level discrimination and group-level violence based on religious differences still persists in India. Our sample consisted of 24 Hindus, 82 Muslims, 3 Buddhists, 14 Christians, 2 Sikhs, 2 atheists, and 6 participants who did not identity their religious orientation. The multitude of religious groups in India ultimately represents a diversity of histories, values, and understandings of the meaning of human life. Hinduism is based on rituals dating back thousands of years and has persisted through numerous invasions. However, it has been expressed heterogeneously and differently by cultures over time and in different regions.96 While Hinduism has been interpreted to justify caste inequalities, it also advocates for values of nonviolence as well as individual and societal perfection.97 Hindus believe in a monotheistic supreme being that is incomprehensible by the human mind and omnipresent throughout all beings in the universe. In totality, Hindus also worship hundreds of polytheistic idols and divine reincarnations.98 While India was founded on secularism, political parties like the BJP illustrate Indian nationalism as equivalent to a unified religious Hindu nation (called Hindutva).99 Hinduism branched off into new religions like Buddhism and Jainism in ancient India, and Sikhism more recently. Although Gautama

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Buddha was born in India, Buddhism has few followers remaining where it originated.100 Buddhism emphasizes the middle path and moderation as well as the eightfold path to enlightenment.101 Compared to Buddhism, Jainism advocates for more extreme moral adherence for salvation102 and is practiced almost solely among Indians. Sikhism, which originated in the 15th century and was long linked to the military caste, also focuses on prayer and salvation. Sikhism is dominant in the Indian state of Punjab.103 Most of these religions share some conceptions of a supreme being, spiritual enlightenment, reincarnation, and nonviolence, although expressed and practiced differently. The faith of Islam came to South Asia externally when Muslim rulers conquered the region and established kingdoms.104 Islam, which is free of a caste hierarchy, usually spread through conversion that was encouraged through political, economic, and social incentives (instead of by force). During this time, the monotheistic religion intertwined with the development of Indian music, literature, and architecture.105 Today, Islam is the largest minority religion in India, composed of the descendants of Muslim rulers and the ‘‘northern Indian political elite.’’106 Like Islam (and other religions in India), Christianity is a religion of a past Indian ruler and has deep roots in Indian history. Historians suggest this monotheistic religion arrived in South Asia in the second century CE with St. Thomas and other missionaries;107 it was further spread through conversion with Portuguese explorations in the 1600s and later European colonies.108 Many missionaries helped establish schools, education for females, and drives for charity.109 Other Environmental Factors In addition to politics, economics, and social distinctions, other macrolevel social forces (like the media) may also influence individual perspectives of war and peace. In addition, individual-level factors, like life experiences, may also prove important. Our sample (which has an age range of 18 to 62 and average age of 28 years) consisted of 81 females and 59 males. While the status of women varies tremendously, Indian society is traditionally patriarchal, emphasizing strict gender roles and viewing women as the property of their husbands. Perhaps because the oldest male is responsible for taking care of the parents, there is a strong preference for males (leading to sex-selective abortions and female infanticide). Over time, however, many policies and grassroots movements have improved the rights of women (through denouncing dowries and the seclusion of widows). Although enacted laws cannot erase or prevent conflicts based in deep-rooted social differences, they are an important step toward creating an environment conducive to

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peace and respect. Although our sample is not representative of national group proportions, nevertheless, the Indian views of war and peace presented in this chapter provide a meaningful glimpse into a subset of overall Indian perspectives.

INDIAN PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND PEACE ‘‘The notions of security and power are beyond me. Being an international relations student, I wonder how, why, and for whom we invade another country or for that matter fight wars at all. When half your population is dead, what will you do? For whose security are you talking about? For the likes of Bush and Blair. Seeing the current world scenario, I think that is what is happening. Wars are being fought for their security because even their countrymen are dying. What will you do when half your population is dead? Dance!!!!!’’ (Hindu female, 21) ‘‘I believe any act of invasion on a country, religion, etc., goes against humanity. In humanity there is minimum space for the concept of ‘us against the other.’ ’’(Hindu female, 44)

Does One Country Have the Right to Invade Another? India has historically been on both the perpetrating end and, more frequently, the receiving end of invasion and foreign rule. In one of its few aggressive invasions, the Indian military entered into and annexed the Portuguese colony of Goa in 1961; the colony was established in the 1600s before the British arrival in India and failed to remain an independent state. During its history as the victim of invasions, India was viewed as attractive due to its economic and resourceful wealth.110 Even after independence, India has struggled with invasions and border conflicts with Pakistan as well as with China. Accordingly, it is interesting to explore participants’ explanations of their level of agreement with the statement ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country.’’ Out of the entire sample, 99 participants provided comments for this item, opposing invasion more than supporting it; 60 percent of the responses gave some reason why a right to invasion is inadvisable. Sometimes participants provided more than one type of reason, yielding a total of 129 codable responses. Only 33 percent of the 129 responses provided a reason supporting a governmental right to invasion. The most frequent justification (in 7 percent of the 129 responses)

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viewed invasion as a defensive maneuver to counter a threat. A male participant wrote, ‘‘For an expansionist, hegemonistic state, all other countries happen to be enemies. Therefore, they have to be invaded and colonized.’’ Another example is, ‘‘If any country is giving threat to the country’s security, it will be better to invade that country.’’ India has experienced invasions from and has lost territory to Pakistan and China but has not responded by invading the aggressor nations; it has, however, gone to war to defend its border and governance. One of the second most common reasons for a right to invasion, provided in 6 percent of the 129 responses, was to protect individuals in another country. A 20-year-old Indian female reasoned, ‘‘I believe no country ever has any right to invade another country under any circumstances . . . theoretically. I wish I could muster absolute conviction to say that. But a little voice inside me asks, how else could Hitler be stopped?’’ Another example of intervening to protect others is ‘‘Yes [governments have a right to invasion] when the people of the other country are denied basic human rights & cannot wage a war against their own govt. & want foreign assistance & want freedom from apartheid, colonial, authoritarian, undemocratic conditions.’’ In fact, India intervened in and went to war with Pakistan to liberate Bangladesh in 1972 and sent the Indian Peace Keeping Force into Sri Lanka in the 1980s. India has also contributed a significant number of troops to the United Nations’ peacekeeping missions. Overall, our participants opposed the right to invasion but identified certain extreme circumstances in which they thought invasion could be justified, specifically, when one’s security is directly threatened (in self-defense) and when harm to innocents threatens international peace. Both of these justifications are also permissible reasons to invade another state in international law, according to the United Nations.111 Only 33 percent of the arguments given by respondents to justify rating scale responses showed some support for a right to invasion; by contrast, 60 percent of the 129 responses opposed the right and on multiple grounds. One common argument against a right to invasion— articulated in 22 percent of the responses—invoked moral or legal principles. One participant stated, ‘‘This [a right to invasion] is absolutely unethical or may we say inhuman.’’ The most common type of argument appealing to principles (13 percent of the responses) asserted that a right to invade would violate the principles of physical and political sovereignty. Examples of such arguments include ‘‘No country has the right to intervene in one’s privacy & dominion of other country’’ and ‘‘Boundaries/jurisdiction/freedom of other country must be respected under all conditions.’’ This type of response emphasized independence and noninterference in other countries’ affairs (the stance taken by the

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Indian government during the nonaligned movement during the Cold War). Perhaps because of the memories of repeated invasions and colonization, many Indians unconditionally uphold sovereignty. Unlike the Muslim rulers of South Asia, the British did not consider India their home, did not integrate, and instead exploited the people and land for self-benefit.112 Following its independence, India was thus a strong supporter of the United Nations’ efforts to decolonize regions of Africa and Latin America (because colonization inhibited the right to self-determination). Another argument against a country’s right to invade (5 percent of the responses) referenced better alternatives to invasion, like helping the people of another country in nonviolent ways or using structures like the United Nations. An Indian female stated, ‘‘Invasion is completely ruled out, humanitarian assistance is acceptable’’ and a male wrote, ‘‘On cases of disagreement, dialogue is the best way out.’’ Some of these responses referred to invasion as outdated in today’s world (alluding to better problem-solving alternatives than invasion). For example, a male participant stated, ‘‘I do not think any country has the right to invade another country especially in the era of globalization,’’ and a woman said that invasion ‘‘should never happen in civilized world.’’ Are Civilian Deaths Acceptable in the Fight against Terrorism? ‘‘If fighting terrorism requires killing innocent civilians, then do not fight terrorism. In no case should a government kill innocent civilians. It is because of these activities that citizen become rebels.’’ (Muslim male, 22) Terrorism is a long-standing problem in India. During the colonial era, some Indians murdered British officials to encourage the British withdrawal.113 Since independence, insurgent groups in many parts of India (the northeast and northwest in particular) have used terror to spread their separatist causes.114 The Indian military has been criticized for violating human rights (e.g., conducting torture) to combat Kashmiris supported by the Pakistani military; the conflict between the Indian state and insurgency in Kashmir ultimately has resulted in civilian casualties (as well as human rights violations like rape).115 Over 40,000 people have died and tens of thousands have been injured and/or displaced.116 To combat terrorism and threats of separation, Indira Gandhi declared a national emergency in 1975 (violating civil rights) and approved the Blue Star Operation in 1984 in which the Sikh’s Golden Temple in Amritsar was attacked.117 R. K. Raghavan suggests that police training

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in combating terrorism has improved, because the focus is now on intelligence collecting with human rights awareness.118 After 9/11, terrorism became ‘‘more important than dealing with conventional crime’’ in India; like many other nations, India faces terrorist threats from Al-Qaeda (located across the border in Pakistan).119 Experiences with terror in India include the attack on the Red Fort of New Delhi in 2000, on the Indian Parliament in 2001, on trains in Mumbai in 2006, and on Hindu temples (e.g., the Akshardam and Raghunath temples).120 In response to such militancy, the government enacted policies like the highly controversial Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA) and Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA).121 The government has stopped the practice of opening fire on unarmed protestors, but some soldiers still kill suspected militants and terrorists without upholding the law. In 2006, Human Rights Watch condemned ‘‘patterns of impunity’’ in reference to disappearances, killings, and monetary rewards given for killing suspected militants in Kashmir.122 In May 2008, India suffered from terrorist attacks in the northwest region of Jaipur when bombs were detonated in the streets near a Hindu temple and market; 63 civilians were killed and hundreds injured in the attacks, which were claimed by a group called the Indian Mujahideen.123 To understand views on terrorism, we asked participants to provide rating scale responses and comments on the statement, ‘‘Sometimes the heads of government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism.’’ Of the total sample, 68 participants responded to this item, providing 96 codeable responses. The majority of these comments (78 percent) provided a reason against the right to kill civilians, with only 8 percent arguing in support of such a right. Although India has gone to war with Pakistan numerous times, events leading to the cease-fire in 1965 (and an agreement to avoid bombing civilian areas) illustrated both sides’ opposition to killing civilians.124 Of the minority of responses tolerating a potential right to kill innocent civilians, three accepted this method of warfare as inevitable, although adding that governments should try to avoid it. Examples include ‘‘Collective damage cannot be strictly avoided’’ and ‘‘misguided information or mistaken identity may lead to deaths of innocent civilians, which is not entirely wrong.’’ A 47-year-old man declared, ‘‘The term ‘innocent civilians’ seems to imply that all militaries are guilty. War and terrorism are fought by states, not militaries. Under the current philosophies of State Sovereignty, the state has a right to take all such actions as necessary for its survival.’’ Of the 78 percent of responses rejecting a government’s right to kill civilians in the name of combating terrorism, moral principles related to

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innocence were most common (25 percent of the responses). Examples include ‘‘If innocent civilians are involved then it [killing] is completely immoral,’’ and ‘‘The govt. has no right to kill innocent civilians because they are not responsible for terrorism, the govt. itself is responsible.’’ Less common arguments (7 percent of the responses) referred to human rights, declaring the equal right of each individual (guilty or innocent) to live; for example, ‘‘Even [the] suspected are not entitled to be killed . . . killing civilians is something that is extremely uncalled for.’’ Another relatively common argument focused on governmental responsibility to avoid harming civilians. For example, one woman proclaimed, ‘‘Never! A government cannot sacrifice the same people whom it has sworn to protect. Terrorism can not be fought by terrorism, state-sponsored or not.’’ Similar to the emphasis on the need for ethical governmental decisions, 10 percent of the responses focused on better alternatives to sacrificing civilian lives. As one man said, ‘‘Terrorism can be wiped out not by killing innocent rather investing in social sector.’’ Less common themes included disputing the effectiveness or rationality of killing civilians to fight terrorism (6 percent of the responses) (e.g., ‘‘Killing the innocent does not remove the root cause does it? It’s the overgrown leech (terrorist) that needs to be put to sleep’’), arguing that killing innocent civilians is itself an act of terrorism conducted by the state (4 percent) and citing consequences counterproductive to the goal of combating terrorism (2 percent) (e.g., ‘‘No leader can ever justify killing innocent civilians to fight terrorism. In fact, such a thoughtless action would only breed and intensify terrorism. Instead of fighting terrorism, there would be escalation in tension and the leader ordering such an action himself may be killed. Terrorism would become a popular movement enjoying widespread support among people of the world’’). What Is Your Definition of War? ‘‘War is a crop of an aggressive mind. Because everybody loses in war. Nobody benefits. It is the ego of people who start war. Nothing gets solved after war.’’ One hundred twenty participants gave definitions of war, yielding 206 codable responses. The most common kind of response (25 percent) defined war as a conflict; for example, ‘‘A period/condition of fighting b/w two or more communities/nations using arms.’’ The second most popular type of response (23 percent) focused on the outcomes of war, particularly destruction; for example, ‘‘Devastation of human life/ resources’’; ‘‘It gives nothing to anyone except poverty, miserableness, death and lack of love,’’ and ‘‘Chaos and violence.’’ In addition,

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11 percent of the sample described the causes of war; for example, ‘‘War is the fight between two countries to show their power and superiority to the world.’’

PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE AND PROTEST ‘‘Not only humans but also animals have a basic right to peace.’’ (Muslim female, 22) ‘‘As Aristotle articulated it so well, human beings are rational, social, and political animals. So, they are inherently peaceful and peace loving creatures. There is no excuse for imposing and subjecting human beings to violence. One can, under no circumstances, be justified in perpetrating violence against peace loving, unarmed innocent people.’’ (Hindu female, 20) A Right to Peace? Overall, South Asian history consists of numerous periods in which a diversity of religious groups peacefully coexisted. The vision of India promulgated by Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru at independence painted India as a collectivistic society built on values of secularism and equal rights. However, religious, economic, and ethnic divides threaten some individuals’ security and peace. Seventy participants provided 71 codeable responses to the item ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace.’’ Participants overwhelmingly provided reasons supporting individuals’ right to peace (79 percent). The other responses were more pessimistic; for example, one 35-year-old male emphasized that peace, although desirable, is an ideal that is difficult to achieve: ‘‘It is easier said than done. It is a utopian idea.’’ Four percent of the responses cited reasons why peace is not a basic right for all human beings; for example, one participant said, ‘‘Peace is not a natural right of Man. It’s a comfort.’’ In 14 percent of the responses, participants emphasized positive developmental consequences of peace, at both societal and individual levels; for example, ‘‘Peace or at best peaceful co-existence creates a better & wholesome society’’; ‘‘Ultimately consensus will build up among nations’’; ‘‘Peace is an important aspect of the civilized world. So war is against civilization’’; ‘‘In a peaceful atmosphere every human being can achieve their own goal’’; and ‘‘For any human being, peace is necessary for their physical & mental development.’’ In addition to focusing on positive consequences of peace, 21 percent of the responses emphasized equality and the idea that everyone

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deserves peace; for example, ‘‘Certainly if they are given to every individual fairly.’’ Participants also affirmed each individual’s right to peace with general statements (like ‘‘yes, absolutely,’’ ‘‘total agreement!’’ and, ‘‘that’s true’’) about 44 percent of the time. Some of these responses implied that the right to peace is an inherent human right (that ‘‘it is every human being’s birth right’’); others portrayed peace as a socially sanctioned right, referring to legal texts and democratic rights (e.g., ‘‘As everybody likes to live happily & peacefully, it is prescribed in the Constitution in art. 51’’). The Indian Constitution also prescribes fundamental rights to justice and freedom as well as equal social rights (regarding education, culture, language, and religion); individuals have the right to be free from discrimination and exploitation based on religion, caste, gender, or ethnicity.125 However, equality under the law has not been fully achieved, nor has the government been able to protect the right to peace for all individuals. Do Individuals Have a Right to Protest against War? ‘‘In spite of a state’s pro-war campaign, citizens, at least some of them, can and do have different opinions. Since nobody is absolutely right or wrong, peace marches are legal and do not pose a threat to authority of the state in any manner. Even after war, peace is going to be the ultimate goal. So, if peace activists protest against the decision to go to war/ embark upon a war or seek an early end to war, it should be appreciated. It is wrong to ban peace marches.’’ (Hindu male, 37) ‘‘War brings with it unnecessary loss of lives and properties. It should be condemned in the strongest possible way. But the protest should be peaceful because advocating the cause of peace should not be violent.’’ (Muslim male, 25) One of the many rights granted to Indian citizens by the constitution is freedom of expression, including the right to protest. In our study, 77 Indian participants provided 93 codable comments to the item ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protest against war and in favor of peace.’’ Forty-one percent of the responses provided unspecified support for an individual’s right to protest; for example, ‘‘In my view every individual or collective individuals have right to protest against war.’’ Among the more specific arguments in support of a right to protest was the belief that protesting is useful and functional, often a means to the end of peace. One Indian male argued, ‘‘War is a big threat for peace so protest against war is right of individual.’’ Another participant stated, ‘‘To a larger extent, everyone has the right to protest against war because at the end of it, the money spent

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on war could be used for the betterment of human kind.’’ Gandhi’s civil disobedience movement and other Indians’ nonviolent forms of protest have proven successful political strategies in overcoming exploitation and improving individual rights. Perhaps for that reason, some responses indicated that it is the individual’s duty and responsibility to protest for peace. For example, a 22-year-old female stated, ‘‘Peace in any form helps a great deal in human involvement & individuals should promote it, whenever possible.’’ Another example is ‘‘Yes, it is the moral right and duty of every individual to stage protest against war & in favor of peace. This can help us to achieve & retain peace.’’ Viewing protest as a responsibility is linked to viewing protest as functional and necessary for peace. Some participants focused on the duty of the government to respond to the protestors’ demands; one respondent stated, ‘‘Yes because freedom of expression should be there, & govt must take into consideration the views of its citizens.’’ Fifty-one percent of the responses qualified the right to protest in some way. The most common type of qualification, mentioned in 16 percent of the responses, insisted that the protest be peaceful and nonviolent: ‘‘Individuals have right to protest or favor anything they find right until or unless it harms others,’’ and ‘‘Surely, but in a peaceful manner, violent protest against war refutes the very purpose.’’ Conditional support for the right is perhaps reflective of India’s struggle with violent protests, not against war but rather stemming from religious tensions. Religious conflicts have erupted in India over time (e.g., 1959 riots in Gujarat; 1979 riots in Bihar; 1991 riots in Mumbai; and 2002 riots in Gujarat), illustrating the persistence of communal conflict. In the recent Gujarati riots, the Indian police were accused of inadequately protecting the minority Muslim community.126 Twenty-five percent of the 92 responses qualified the right to protest based on its socially sanctioned status or belief in freedom of speech (e.g., ‘‘to express public opinion.’’) A couple of participants viewed peace as a natural human right, stating, for example, that, ‘‘Human rights are not a buffet table, to pick and choose. An individual is free to protest against whatever he finds objectionable as long as it does not endanger someone else’s well-being. It is a right accorded to him by his very humanity.’’ Viewing protest as an inherent natural right contrasts with the responses focusing on protest as a democratic or socially condoned human right. For example, one participant said, ‘‘Governments are ideally supposed to be for the people, of the people and by the people. Hence in such a situation, individuals possess the right to voice their discontent.’’

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What Does Reconciliation Mean? ‘‘[Reconciliation is] the recognition by both sides of the conflict at hand—the acceptance by the perpetrators of the crimes committed by them—the act of taking responsibility of the same—the process of unearthing all emotions and laying them out in the open to resolve and come to terms with—so that the victims in particular can attain closure and move on in their respective lives—a process of accepting the past.’’ (Hindu male, 20) India has had many experiences with aggression, and many attempts have been made to reconcile conflicts in a nonviolent manner. Externally, India has made cease-fire agreements with Pakistan (although they have been violated on the ground-level) and has worked with the United Nations to end conflict in Kashmir. India, as an active member of the United Nations, has also helped many United Nations’ peacekeeping missions. Internally, many steps (including making amends) have been taken to reconcile social inequalities and conflicts; women’s rights are, for example, increasingly protected. To compensate for the disadvantages imposed by systematic discrimination, the government of India created the Mandal Commission. Subsequent affirmative action policies employed reverse or positive discrimination to reserve a certain proportion of seats in the governmental and educational sectors for historically unrepresented and oppressed classes and tribes (traditionally of lower socioeconomic status).127 Despite these attempts, social, economic, and religious inequalities persist, manifesting in interpersonal discrimination and occasionally violent eruptions. In total, 67 participants provided 92 codable definitions of reconciliation. Nearly half of the definitions (43 percent) referred to reconciliation as problem solving. A 25-year-old male conceptualized reconciliation as dialogue, ‘‘To sit and talk . . . talk . . . talk.’’ Within the category of problem solving, 26 definitions (28 percent) focused on parties coming to terms through, for example, compromise or negotiation. Examples include to ‘‘make treaty for peace’’ and to ‘‘come at an agreement by the parties involved in conflict.’’ Other instances of the problem-solving theme included definitions (3 percent) identifying reconciliation with fixing or resolving conflicting perspectives or desires (e.g., ‘‘Rebuilding some bonds etc. Patch up b/w the two or more people or things’’) and definitions (8 percent) emphasizing understanding the other party’s perspective (e.g., ‘‘To understand and accept the other’s world view’’). Scholars suggest that viewing members of an opposing group as ‘‘others’’ and ‘‘evil’’ feeds division and discrimination,128 whereas a unified approach to humanity is more conducive to peace, understanding, and cooperation.

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The second most frequent type of definition focused on interpersonal aspects of reconciliation, conceptualizing it as the healing of the relationship between two parties. This view was found in 30 percent of the definitions of reconciliation. Examples include ‘‘Try to make good relationship,’’ and ‘‘It is good if both parties realize it from the core of their heart.’’ Four percent of the responses defined reconciliation as apology and/or forgiveness. Two examples of this kind of definition are a ‘‘sincere apology & working for the betterment of the other’’ and to ‘‘forgive and treat all of them as brothers and sisters.’’ Less frequent definitions of reconciliation viewed it as a state of peace (2 percent) and the end of conflict (5 percent). For example, one participant viewed reconciliation as a process and ‘‘a step towards achieving peace’’ while another viewed it as an end-state consisting of the ‘‘Peaceful settlement of disputes.’’ Understanding definitions of reconciliation as a process and end-state sheds light on potential solutions (e.g., reparations, treaty making, and nuclear deterrence) to unresolved disputes, like the border and nationality of Kashmir.

CONCLUSIONS The region of South Asia that is now the modern state of India has a long history of social inequalities, reflecting the conflict between majority group hegemony and minority group marginalization.129 Colonization in particular, with a ‘‘divide-and-conquer’’ approach, left deep religious fractures in Indian society, as religious communities were in ‘‘sociological juxtaposition to one another.’’130 Today, this conflict is illustrated in the struggle between secular democracy and religious freedom. India, with the world’s second largest population and the world’s third largest military, continues to increase its economic power—for its military capabilities, for its political scope, and for its constituents in the world’s largest democracy. Despite its advances, India continues to face external and internal threats to security and peace. In fact, some regions previously under Indian control remain disputed territory. Accordingly, insight into the unique perspectives of war and peace from Indians is an important beginning step toward resolving intergroup conflicts. Scholars argue that language and rhetoric are vital to understanding the nature and formulation of differing arguments and serve as reflections of values and assumptions concerning human behavior.131 In this light, perceptions on rights may be intertwined with national identity building and the overall social environment of the individual. In exploring the open-ended comments regarding war and peace from Indians, we found that our respondents showed substantially

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more opposition than support for governmental rights to aggression (through invasion and killing civilians to fight terrorism). Their adamant opposition to governmental rights to violence was based most frequently on inviolable principles as well as the ineffectiveness of aggressive tactics and the availability of better alternatives. Thus, generally, participants did not believe in justifying the use of a lesser evil (e.g., invasion and killing civilians) to fight a greater evil (e.g., threat to national insecurity and terrorism). Perhaps these trends reflect the secular principles on which India was founded. They may also reflect the legacy of Mohandas Gandhi and other social activists, who adhered to nonviolent principles in the struggle for independence. Only a relatively small portion of participants supported the right to invade under extreme circumstances of defense and the violation of human rights. Regarding individuals’ rights to peace and protest, almost all of the comments supported those rights for all, finding them useful for individuals and groups. Perhaps this pattern of response for individuals’ rights may also stem from strong beliefs in nonviolent principles, as illustrated more explicitly in the responses opposing governmental rights to violence; Amartya Sen argues that Gandhian nonviolence not only rejects violence but also proactively cultivates society-building toward peace and tolerance (through institutions like education).132 An emphasis on achieving positive relationships was also found in definitions of reconciliation, which generally focused on two conflicting parties coming to a common understanding and finding a peaceful means to repair their relationship. These conceptualizations and views of individual and state rights are of critical importance, as India combats intergroup conflict to pursue the peaceful coexistence of diverse economic, religious, cultural, and ethnic groups in the era of globalization.

4

The Philippines Ma. Regina E. Estuar and David Young Oh1

War is . . . ‘‘destruction of people, relationships, trust, property and many others’’ (male, 20); ‘‘when there is a loud sound of bombs and guns from country 1 and country 2 and people are told to save their lives and resort to a safe place’’ (female, 21). Peace is . . . ‘‘the basic recipe for growth and bountifulness’’ (male, 31); ‘‘no war, no political difference, a country with socio-economic stability, fully sustained agricultural and food security, well-developed educational system’’ (female, 60). The Philippines today is an archipelago consisting of 7,107 islands in southeastern Asia. The three major islands are Luzon, the largest, which includes Manila, the nation’s capital; Visayas; and Mindanao, in the South, which includes the Autonomous Region of the Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).2 The Philippines was first settled by the Austronesian (Malayo Polynesian) people about 30,000 years ago.3 Spanish colonization began in the mid-16th century, and the islands remained under Spanish control until the late 19th century. Spanish occupation was characterized by significant uprisings and counterinsurgencies, culminating in the Philippine Revolution of 1896 and the Spanish-American War of 1899–1902, which formally ended Spanish occupation. Following that war, however, the United States occupied the Philippines for nearly half of the 20th century, until Japan took control during World War II. With the end of World War II, the Philippines became an independent democracy, though ceding special privileges to the United States. In a context of ongoing government corruption and public dissension, the government declared martial law, turning the Philippines into a military dictatorship. This resulted in more political killings, torture, and dissatisfaction in civil society, fueling the development of many

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Communist and Muslim organizations. The exponential growth of political and civilian unrest led to the peaceful People Power Revolution of 1986. The revolution overthrew the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos, and the Philippines became a democracy again. Despite the successful conversion of the Philippines to a democracy, the country continues to experience violent internal conflicts, as it did during the colonial centuries and foreign occupations. The imperialist history of the Philippines has created a people with a blend of several cultures and races. Religion was inherited from Spanish rule (90 percent of Filipinos self-identify as Roman Catholic), whereas education and democratic values are largely American.4 The Philippines’ violent history of imperialism and the current insurgencies and terroristic attacks underscore the importance of understanding how the Filipino people have coped intellectually with their struggles. This chapter examines lay Filipino perceptions of the rights of states to perform acts of aggression in the form of invasion, killing of civilians, torture, and terrorism. It also considers perceptions on the rights of individuals to live in a world of peace and to protest against war. The chapter begins by briefly reviewing the history of conflicts in the Philippines, related social issues that perpetuate conflict and unrest, and current efforts toward peaceful reconciliation. It then discusses Filipino responses to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression Survey (PAIRTAPS) and interprets those responses in the context of the country’s history and current challenges.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF PEACE, WAR, AND RELATED ISSUES Occupation by Spain When the Spanish arrived in the Philippines in 1565, they were surprised to find a largely literate population with egalitarian views toward women; for example, many women were religious leaders, practiced sexual freedom, and were able to initiate separation from their husbands. The more progressive ways of the Filipino people did not work within the religious, Western structure the Spanish intended to enforce on the people. To convert the Filipinos to Western ways, the colonizers learned the local customs and introduced ways to make their Spanish cultural customs and beliefs align with those of the native peoples; for example, the colonizers fabricated folk tales that fit within the Filipino religion of animism. The stories degraded women into a cursed species in need of healing and aid.5 Enforced changes in social structure coupled with the economic struggles of the Filipino people resulted in resistance and

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uprisings. As a result of their dissatisfaction with social, political, economic, and cultural changes, the Filipinos engaged in approximately 85 significant revolts between 1569 and 1898. The Spanish retaliation against these social uprisings and resistances was extremely punitive, often subjecting insurgents and suspected insurgents to immediate execution.6 Despite violent counterinsurgencies, the Filipino people continued their struggle for independence, igniting the Philippine Revolution in 1896. Occupation by the United States To extend its own international strength, the United States assisted the Philippines in their fight for independence, leading to the SpanishAmerican War in 1898. Despite the Philippine efforts to regain control of their country, the Spanish ceded the country to the United States, and it remained a U.S. protectorate until 1946. The United States launched strategies designed to advance their position with the Filipinos, such as improving education and roads; however, Filipino resistance against foreign occupation and struggles for independence persisted.7 As part of their campaign for independence, Filipino fighters resorted to guerilla style warfare, mixing in with local civilian populations to attack unsuspecting American forces. The U.S. forces retaliated by using indiscriminate and punitive burning and pillaging of villages, extrajudicially executing suspected war criminals, and using torture tactics against prisoners suspected of war crimes.8 One example of U.S. punitiveness, which occurred in 1901, was the tragic event now known as the Balingiga Massacre. At the time, U.S. troops had been deployed to Samar to restore order at the end of the SpanishAmerican War. During one of the reconnaissance missions, several U.S. troops separated from the pack. During this mission, American soldiers overran villages looking for the poorly armed guerilla fighters. When it was difficult to find and capture the resistance fighters, the soldiers grew frustrated and began employing the most severe punishments on whomever they were able to capture. The villagers of Samar were abused, dehumanized, and humiliated by being forced into wooden pens and made to sleep standing in the rain.9 The ultimate tragedy came after several guerilla fighters entered Samar, and on September 28, 1901, during breakfast, murdered 54 American soldiers and seriously injured another 18. U.S. Brig. General Jacob H. Smith was chosen to lead the revenge mission and told his soldiers to ‘‘kill and burn . . . the more you kill and the more you burn the more you please me.’’ Smith also told his soldiers that no prisoners should be taken alive; instead, they should kill all civilians over the age of ten. All inhabitants of the island were eventually forced into detention camps (266,000 people); being found outside of the detention camp was automatic grounds for death without any questions asked.10 Although the

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troops had made the decision to spread their forces out in their search for guerilla fighters, the ten Filipino guides were blamed for the lost troops. All ten guides and a Filipino associate were executed without a trial.11 Moreover, despite egregious abuse of human rights, General Smith was never punished. He was not convicted of any crime, as the courts argued that the civilians should have removed themselves from the stage of war.12

The Filipino people were subjected to many other shameful war violations during U.S. occupation, including the extensive use of torture. For example, U.S. Major Edwin F. Glenn frequently used the ‘‘water-cure’’ to obtain information or confessions from detainees.13 The ‘‘water-cure’’ is a form of water torture where the victim’s mouth is forced open while large quantities of water and other liquids are forced down the throat, resulting in gastric distension, water intoxication, and possibly death. Major Glenn was subsequently found guilty of torture. Despite the judge’s statement that U.S. forces should never use torture, Major Glenn’s sentence was not nearly commensurate with the crime: He received a month suspension from duty and a $50 fine, about $1,000 U.S. dollars today.14 Occupation by Japan Under the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 established between the United States and Philippine forces, the Philippines was scheduled to become an independent country in 1946. However, in December 1941, the Japanese attacked the Philippines along with Pearl Harbor. Less than a year later, the last U.S. forces in the islands surrendered to Japanese soldiers. The Japanese established a puppet Philippine Republic with the cooperation of the political elite, but like the U.S. soldiers who preceded them, had to deal with massive resistance from the Filipino people. The extreme brutality of the Japanese left many Filipinos believing they had no choice but to join with the United States to resist the Japanese occupation. U.S. officers helped Filipino insurgents by leading many of the guerilla resistances.15 With the end of World War II, the Philippines was ceded back to the United States, and in 1946, as promised, the United States granted independence to the Philippines. The Philippine government, however, granted many special benefits to the United States, such as preferential tariffs and a no parity clause for U.S. citizens in the Philippines. The United States in return provided the Philippines with military and rehabilitation aid.16 The Philippines, Post-World War II Following independence, the Philippine governance was shaped by significant insurgencies and protests throughout each presidency. Social,

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economic, and political dissatisfaction was exacerbated by rampant corruption. The first president elected postindependence was Manuel Roxas, whose government faced harsh criticism from the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). The CPP was particularly concerned with the economic ties and other cessions to the United States, such as land for U.S. army bases. Roxas, a former collaborator with the United States during U.S. occupation, was sharply criticized for his alignment with the United States.17 Roxas’s government violently repressed the CPP and its army, making it easier for the CPP to recruit new members. The CPP retaliated by unleashing violence to thwart counterinsurgency efforts. They murdered several leaders, including Aurora Quezon, the widow of the Philippine’s president during U.S. occupation.18 Ferdinand Marcos was another controversial president whose presidency was characterized by rampant corruption and violence. When Marcos assumed the presidency, the country was plagued with economic problems. Despite economic woes, Marcos unveiled massive development plans to build bridges, expand roads, and increase the supply of electricity. Although previous governments had also been corrupt, the Marcos regime was much more egregious in its abuse of power, including manipulation and control of the media regarding implementation of the proposed development projects. Marcos also used public funds to bribe district heads to ensure they would bring in votes from their respective districts.19 Marcos’s election to a second term led to the loss of all legitimacy. Formerly peaceful citizens, believing Marcos was fraudently reelected, began to stage protests, which were met by extreme violence, including the killing of four protestors.20 Protestors were also infuriated by the lack of affordable housing, high prices on commodities, lack of jobs, the poor educational system, and the current constitution, which they believed gave the president too much power.21 They felt economically, politically, and socially neglected at a time when U.S. interests were favored with trade agreements, a parity clause (allowing Americans equal access to land and natural resources), and the presence of U.S. military bases.22 Protests started to spread throughout the country, with citizens calling for better governance and an end to corruption. In efforts to quell uprisings, Marcos unleashed violent attacks, the most notorious one being when his associates threw a bomb into an opposition party rally. Eight people were killed and another 120 injured.23 The event angered the Filipinos and the opposition party multiplied. Fearing the rise of the Communist Party and infuriated by the student protests, Marcos declared martial law. During his military dictatorship, all media were shut down, curfews were set, Congress was suspended, and thousands were arrested. No demonstrations, meetings, or strikes were tolerated.

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In response to widespread international criticism, Marcos announced he would stage an election to show his popular support. Exiled opposition leader Benigno Aquino, Jr., returned to the Philippines for the election but was shot as he exited the airplane.24 Marcos’ military dictatorship slowly started to collapse following Aquino’s assassination, as the country was nearly bankrupted by foreign debt and people grew outraged by the murder of Aquino. As his power declined, Marcos staged an election against Aquino’s widow, Corazon Aquino, hoping to neutralize the opposition and demonstrate to his people and the world that he maintained popularity. With more flagrant election fraud, Marcos declared victory for a third term. Corazon Aquino and her supporters, however, also claimed victory and citizens around the country began to protest in the streets in support of her presidency. With growing protests, military leaders joined against Marcos and worked to overthrow him. Marcos and his family fled in the middle of the night.25 Marcos would not be the last Filipino president forced out of office. In 2000, Joseph Estrada was impeached on corruption charges. During the impeachment trial, many of Estrada’s political allies voted not to open an envelope that contained incriminating evidence against him. In the ensuing days, hundreds of thousands of protesters took to the streets calling for his resignation. Witnessing the social upheaval throughout the country, the Armed Services of the Philippines withdrew their support of Estrada, eventually appointing the vice president, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, as the next president.26 Similar to her predecessors, as of this writing, there have been several unsuccessful attempts to impeach current President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on bribery and corruption charges. Her government has also been ridiculed for being too closely aligned with U.S. interests, especially regarding the Philippine’s support on the U.S. war on terrorism.27

CURRENT CONTEXT OF PEACE, WAR, AND RELATED ISSUES In 2004, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected to a second term. Today, the Philippines is a democracy where elected representatives vote on legislation, as is done in the United States. The country is a member of the United Nations and is considered a developing country, alongside other newly industrialized countries such as Turkey, Thailand, China, and Mexico.28 It is the world’s 12th most populous country with 90 million inhabitants and has the 46th largest national economy in the world. However, despite considerable economic development, the wealth disparity is staggering, with nearly 15 percent of the population living below the poverty line. Of the 192 countries surveyed for the U.N.

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Human Development Index, the Philippines ranked 84. Despite a high literacy rate (93.3 percent), the highest level of education achieved by most Filipinos is elementary school.29 Although the Philippines has experienced economic, political, and social improvements since colonial and foreign occupation eras, the government still faces three major security challenges: terrorism, revolts, and land disputes.30 Terrorism Following the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, terrorism has been a preoccupation in the Philippines as well as in the United States. For decades, the Philippines has experienced insurgencies from disaffected communist and Muslim factions. In 1968, Muslim leaders created the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) to work toward full autonomy in the southern region of Mindanao, a largely Muslim region. Ferdinand Marcos fought against the MNLF, requiring Muslims and other Filipinos in the south to give up their firearms. However, by 1974, through the aid of many oil-rich nations in the Middle East, the MNLF had amassed an army estimated at 50,000–60,000 soldiers. In 1977, with mounting opposition, Marcos complied with the MNLF and granted autonomy to specific regions in Mindanao, forming the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). By 1981, autonomy was expanded to include more regions in the area.31 Throughout Philippine history, Mindanao has been an area of conflict. The region was cited as the most resistant to colonialism, explained by the historically strong presence of Muslims. Even today, due to continued land disputes, tribal warfare, high rates of poverty, poor governance at the local government level, national government neglect, and large religious, cultural, and ethnic differences, it is a center for much unrest.32 Although Marcos granted autonomy to the MNLF in several regions in Mindanao, the MNLF did not represent the views of all factions in the South. More radical groups began to challenge both the Filipino government and Christian communities in the South. In 1991, one group—Abu Sayyaf, which means ‘‘bearer of the sword’’—began a campaign targeting Christian congregations with grenades and bombs, and kidnapping priests, nuns, and Christian educators.33 Abu Sayyaf is known for its strong ties to the Al-Qaeda network, with many members receiving training in Afghanistan. Following the death of the Abu Sayyaf leader in 1998, the group separated into smaller factions, which now focus their energies on murder and abduction for ransom in efforts to increase their finances for recruitment, training, and supplies.34 After an August 2008 Supreme Court ruling that prevented Arroyo’s government from signing a previously agreed upon peace agreement,

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which would have further expanded the ARMM, violence flared again. In the following months, Amnesty International reported the killing of over 100 civilians, with 140 men, women, and children taken hostage, and over 400,000 living in displacement camps, leaving behind their homes and oftentimes their farms. Many homes have been looted and burned by insurgents and the Armed Services of the Philippines.35 Another identified terrorist organization in the Philippines is the New People’s Army (NPA). Despite being designated as a terrorist organization by the United States in 2002 and the European Union in 2005, the NPA has received relatively little attention as part of the world’s focus on terrorist organizations. The NPA, formed in 1969, has taken credit for murders, political assassinations, rapes, abductions, and other violent and nonviolent illicit activities and continues its acts of terror, most recently, ambushing soldiers serving as a security convoy for a senator.36 Thus, the historical pattern of violent resistance as a means for gaining autonomy and concessions continues. Insurgency Continued protests, revolts, and the government’s response to these activists further threaten government security. Arroyo’s government has been the center of human rights violations, including several extrajudicial killings of left-leaning activists. A Philippine human rights group, Karapatan, claims that during Arroyo’s presidency in 2001–2006, over 830 people were extrajudicially killed.37 Amnesty International recognized 51 political killings in the first half of 2006 and 66 in 2005.38 The Asian Human Rights Commission lists 57 extrajudicial killings in 2008, with the last one committed on November 22, 2008.39 With regard to journalists, 46 have been killed under Arroyo’s government, and the number continues to increase every month, with three cited in November and December of 2008.40 The number of journalist killings falls second only to Iraq.41 A special police task unit, Task Force Usig, denies any government responsibility for violence, recognizes only 115 murders, and attributes the deaths to the violent uprisings of the communist rebel groups. A report submitted by the Melo Commission, which was created after Arroyo faced sharp international criticism for failing to stop the extrajudicial killings of the opposition, linked her government forces to the murders and called for the trial of several military officials.42 The Arroyo administration failed to hold her agencies responsible for the murders. In regard to the 115 murders acknowledged by the government, only three arrests have been made, with no reported convictions. Of the 46 journalists killed, only three people have been convicted; this

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conviction was for the murder of one journalist, who was killed while dining with her children.43 Following the Melo Commission report, Arroyo invited international agencies to conduct their own independent investigations; however, despite requests from the international investigators for the Melo report, Arroyo’s government refused to disseminate it, describing it as incomplete.44 Arroyo’s resistance to transparency and ongoing corruption continue to plague the Philippines, with increasing numbers of people growing upset and angry and turning to support the rebel forces. Other Challenges Because of the continued conflict in the southern region of Mindanao, approximately 900,000 people were displaced in 2000–200145 and, according to an August 2008 report, 600,000 civilians were displaced. Through the course of the four-decade conflict, over 120,000 people have been killed, with over two million people displaced from their homes.46 One particular group that has suffered from both terrorist violence and the Philippine government’s neglect is the Agta tribe. This peaceful, hunter-gatherer tribe has lived for centuries in eastern Luzon. Due to violence and kidnapping, the population of the tribe has declined precipitously in the past 30 years, from 10 percent to only .05 percent of the population in the Luzon region. Many of the women and children have been kidnapped for sexual purposes at the disposal of NPA soldiers, and the people’s human rights have been violated in numerous ways, such as shooting a boy for stealing rice. Young girls have been forced to work as housemaids in non-Agta families and forced into common-law marriages, breaking up families and the Agta community. Many Agta community members have chosen to flee rather than engage in violent resistance, causing further damage to the unity of Agta tribes. Furthermore, nearby non-Agta residents have usurped land settled by the Agta tribes and forced the Agta people to work as laborers on land they settled centuries ago. Some non-Agta farmers claim that priority for the land should be given to civilized Christian Filipinos over the ‘‘savage’’ Agta, a sentiment reminiscent of imperialists.47 Current Peace and Education Activities There are many signs of hope in the Philippines today. Research and programs to aid suffering groups are being implemented by various NGOs. In regards to the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) in Mindanao, a Philippine-based NGO—Community and Family Services International (CFSI)—is working to help displaced people transition from conflict to peace and to work on creating sustainable development at

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the community level. CFSI, a World Bank-funded project, was undertaken to create a postconflict model to promote lasting peace through respect and understanding.48 The program began with CFSI personnel working to develop rapport and understanding with the traumatized IDPs by identifying the needs of the IDPs and incorporating them into positions of program leadership. The program also served to raise selfesteem in community members by allowing them to be active in identifying and implementing ways to solve important issues related to their community. CFSI built respect for the community into their program by honoring cultural traditions, such as the kandulis, a ritualistic tradition that signifies thanksgiving.49 Other peace efforts by NGOs include the book Motions for Peace, written and published through the collaboration of various peace organizations. The book offers a summary of peace processes and negotiations between the Philippine government and the Communist insurgency that took place between 1986 and 1992. Strategies included formation of coalitions, declaration of peace zones, seminars on conflict resolution, conferences on peace, holding of cease-fires, exploratory dialogues, and third-party facilitation.50 The Philippine government, led by Arroyo, has also shown attempts to improve peace initiatives through several measures of reconciliation with opposition, rebel groups. During a 2006 state of the nation address, Arroyo stated, ‘‘We must take on the challenge of creating a new, peaceful, humane and competitive nation.’’51 In 2007, Arroyo signed Amnesty Proclamation 1377, providing amnesty for opposition members of the Communist Party and their armed services, the NPA, and other communist rebel groups, provided they did not commit any violent or drug-related crimes.52 Consistent with her state of the nation address, Arroyo has also harshly condemned political killings of militants and has appointed new members to her security council to ensure proper security implementation. In 2007, incidences of extrajudicial killings allegedly dropped by 87 percent, because of the establishment of the new security council. During her July 2007 state of the nation address, to address international criticism on the lack of arrests and punishment for the extrajudicial killings, Arroyo called for legislation to deal with the political killings.53 Such statements help create a more just and conciliatory atmosphere for the victims and activists. However, in the same address, Arroyo unveiled new antiterrorism measures that include the government’s authority to detain suspects for up to three days without charges, use wiretaps, and seize suspects’ assets—all part of a plan to help pacify the displaced citizens in the southern region.54

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Other state decisions designed to help restore peace involve returning land to farmers who gave up their land to a large farm in return for a promise of specific developments to benefit the original titleholders. The land, owned by members of the Higaonon tribe, was given to a large development company that was going to convert the land to a hog farm on the condition that they provide specific developments to benefit the tribe. Arroyo returned the land to the farmers after they marched for two months from Mindanao to Manila, more than a 1,000mile journey.55 In another land settlement issue, united with the farmers, some Filipino bishops went on a peaceful protest, staging a hunger strike a few weeks before Christmas 2008. On December 18, 2008, the Community Agrarian Reform Program of 1990 was extended despite criticism concerning its sustainability over the next five years.56

FILIPINO PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND PEACE Despite efforts in the direction of peace and reconciliation, hundreds of thousands of people in the Philippines have been directly affected by violence. To understand how the struggles may have shaped the views of lay Filipinos, surveys were administered through university contacts in three areas—the north (Baguio), Manila, and the south (Davao). Filipino-born residents in the United States were also included in the sample. All participants completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) available in pencil-paper version or an electronic version posted on the Web. For the purposes of this study, six items from the PAIRTAPS were analyzed. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the survey items on seven-point scales ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree) and to explain their ratings in their own words. Participants were then asked to define war, terrorism, and peace. The Filipino participants were given the option to answer the survey in either English or Filipino. Offering both Filipino and English versions of an open-ended survey is not unusual. Many Filipinos are able to speak English, because English is the second official language of the Philippines. Although the sample size is quite large for a survey of this type (n = 228), it is important to note that Filipino perspectives may vary greatly depending on factors such as region, socioeconomic status, political affiliation, or religious affiliation, just to name a few. Our convenience sample predominantly reflects Filipinos who are female (n = 140 [61 percent]), from Metro Manila, have achieved college education,

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self-describe as Christian (n = 206 [90 percent]), and are between middle- to working-class status. The ages of our sample ranged from 18 to 69 with an average age of 29. Despite efforts to recruit a broadly representative Philippines sample, there are several factors that limit its representativeness. For example, Filipino respondents in the United States responded over the Internet, which may not be equally accessible to all Filipinos in the United States; pencil-paper versions were available only to those at the Philippine recruitment sites. In addition, although great efforts were made to translate the survey into an easily intelligible version, there were certain words that perhaps only Filipinos who have reached a certain level of education may understand. For example, on most of the surveys, many Filipinos left the demographic items on ethnicity and political affiliation unanswered, perhaps because these constructs are not part of the ordinary conversations of an average Filipino. Differing demographics, tribes, migrations, locations, languages, and other institutions of culture, such as customs, rituals, ceremonies, and beliefs have influenced the experiences and worldviews of many Filipinos, and those views may not be well reflected in our nonrandom ‘‘convenience’’ sample. Although we do capture the perspectives of the majority of the Filipinos, our findings probably fail to reflect many minority views that may prove important for peaceful reconciliation. For example, there are several other identified languages in the Philippines besides English and Filipino, like Bikol, Cebuano, Ilocano, Hiligaynon, Kapampangan, Pangasinan, and Waray Waray. People who speak only those languages were not reached, so these people, possibly holding more minority and rural views, are not represented in the data. In addition, while Christianity, particularly Roman Catholicism, is the major religion of the Philippines, 5 percent of Filipinos identify as Muslim. Only two of our respondents identified as Muslim, representing less than 1 percent of our sample. Filipino Perspectives on Governmental Aggression ‘‘[War is] two or more conflicting sides destroying each other, and at the same time, us too.’’ ‘‘[War is] use of military or politics in order to suppress the enemy force.’’ ‘‘[Terrorism is] very political, just an excuse of the first world countries to continue to subjugate the ‘less-advantaged’ and those countries questioning their dominance.’’ Although the Philippines has not officially engaged in international war since World War II, it has experienced a history filled with violence

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resulting from repression and corruption. Most recently, as one of the first global leaders to join U.S. President George W. Bush’s war on terrorism, President Arroyo sent thousands of Philippine troops in pursuit of Al-Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf.57 Among others, however, internal conflict between the government and the communist and Muslim factions continues to trouble the nation and surely influences the lay public’s views on governmental aggression and peace. Is There a Governmental Right to Use Torture? In regard to the item ‘‘the government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war,’’ a majority of the responses (41 percent) expressed no support for such a right. Many responses indicated that torture is ‘‘barbaric and uncivilized’’ and governments do ‘‘not have the right to torture anyone.’’ Some (28 percent) discussed torture as a violation of basic human rights or of war rules outlined in the Geneva Convention, whereas others (18 percent) cited the ineffectiveness of torture as a way of gaining peace; for example, ‘‘torture will not help achieve peace’’ and ‘‘for me it’s wrong because for me government should build for peace.’’ As was true of responses to a number of other items, several participants also cited the incompatibility of violence with religion (12 percent). By contrast, 9 percent of the responses expressed support for a governmental right to torture prisoners of war, generally justifying the right on the basis of its being necessary to achieve a goal or for retribution. Sample responses include ‘‘If the prisoner holds the key towards victory, then I believe that it is necessary to take all possible actions, may it be torture, to achieve that goal’’ and ‘‘only if that human is charged with a heinous crime and proven guilty.’’ A 61-year-old Filipina wrote, ‘‘The constitution so highly regards the preciousness of life, liberty, and security of the individual that even when accused of a crime, he is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved. But in time of war the government has the right to order the torture of prisoners.’’ Responses that did not address the item directly and were difficult to code included ‘‘Throw the first stone if you’re blameless—Jesus Christ.’’ Is It Okay to Kill Civilians in the Fight against Terrorism? For the item ‘‘Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism,’’ 85 percent of the responses asserted that governments do not have this right. Many of the responses went beyond disputing a governmental right to discount civilian losses and argued strongly that no one has the right to

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kill anyone. Responses included ‘‘I don’t believe in killing’’; ‘‘definitely not, that’s why they’re called ‘innocent’’’; ‘‘no one has the right to kill.’’ The item prompted one 23-year-old Filipina to ask, ‘‘When did killing become a right?’’ Many participants (32 percent) cited human rights as the primary reason for their disapproval. Perhaps reflecting the participants’ strong Catholic faith, references to religion and faith appeared in many responses (12 percent); for example, ‘‘killing is a mortal sin’’; ‘‘only God has the right to kill, they are not God!’’ Indirect expressions of underlying faith may be represented in responses such as ‘‘Human life is such a great value and we must all protect and preserve it.’’ Some responses (8 percent) suggested alternative ways to combat international terrorism, whereas others (8 percent) pointed out that violence only begets more terrorism. Many of these strong responses may have been influenced by awareness of human rights violations (for example, extrajudicial killings) that have recently received international criticism. Some responses alluded specifically to violations by the Philippine government, with one 18-year-old female stating, ‘‘no, because [killing civilians] is a bad shadow of our government and they have no right to kill people, especially the innocent,’’ while another 31-year-old male said, ‘‘No right anymore.’’ A 61-year-old man indicated neither agreement nor disagreement with such a right, but argued, ‘‘An individual has a constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to be heard.’’ It is two of the younger respondents who indicate belief in progress and possibly faith in the government in suggesting that killing innocent victims is an act of the past, as shown through words like ‘‘shadow’’ and ‘‘[not] anymore.’’ Even though Amnesty International and other human rights groups have recognized several extrajudicial murders in 2008, President Arroyo has publicly criticized these actions and has appointed new members to her security council to address what she refers to as purported allegations. In the last year, her council has announced a sharp decline in reported extrajudicial killings. A small minority of the responses (3 percent) expressed some approval, or at least tolerance of a governmental right to kill civilians in the fight against terrorism, in responses that primarily reflected endsjustifying-means thinking; for example, ‘‘in order to protect the people against terrorists’’; ‘‘the death of a few is justifiable if it serves multitudes.’’ Another 3 percent did not agree fully, but qualified the right with statements such as ‘‘maybe if it’s martial law’’; ‘‘innocent civilians should not be used as sacrificial lambs to combat terrorism . . . but it is inevitable and cannot be totally avoided.’’ One percent of the responses reflected uncertainty on the issue.

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What Is War? When asked to give their personal definition of war, a large segment of the Filipino responses (49 percent) referred explicitly to the negative outcomes or causes of war. A majority of the consequences used to define war were graphic, such as ‘‘murder and mayhem’’; ‘‘bloodshed’’; ‘‘bloody fight between two countries, nations, tribes, which results in death’’; ‘‘death or dying.’’ The prolonged violence, particularly in the South, seems to be strongly reflected in the responses, including the many definitions identifying war with the ‘‘absence of peace’’ and ‘‘never ending killing.’’ Other definitions suggested an emotional investment in the experiences of victims of war, saying, for example, that war is the ‘‘loss of many lives, properties, right of a person to peace’’; ‘‘an act of violence where everybody is affected whether they are innocent or not.’’ Some respondents included moral judgments concerning war in their definitions; for example, ‘‘pointless killing of families and friends; losing loved ones,’’ ‘‘human’s greediness’’; and ‘‘evil, senseless, cruel.’’ Definitions focusing on the causes or motivations of war (14 percent) were also very explicit, with many participants using strong phrases such as the ‘‘rage to kill’’; ‘‘quest for power through violence’’; ‘‘human’s greediness’’; ‘‘to attack or kill people of a country.’’ Some of these definitions of war also acknowledged an ideological basis to war: ‘‘countries trying to impose what they think, but in a violent way’’; ‘‘to prove their own ideology.’’ Out of all the causes of war, only three responses (2 percent) identified war with defense. Thirty-seven percent of the responses defined war with a more textbook or dictionary type of definition, describing it as a conflict between two nations. What Is Terrorism? When asked to define terrorism, many respondents equated it with various forms of immorality (40 percent). Some of these definitions were quite general, such as ‘‘act of cowardice’’ and ‘‘inhuman act’’; however, many incorporated the idea that terrorism violated religious principles; for example, ‘‘mad fanaticism magnified by non-Christian, western behavior.’’ Thirty-seven percent of the responses focused on the actions and behaviors that constitute terrorism. Many of these definitions referred to disruption, violence, and bullying: ‘‘act of bombing and destroying the economy’’; ‘‘actions of attrition to create chaos and panic’’; ‘‘killing innocent people.’’ A few responses (5 percent) referred to the disruption of peace as terroristic, whereas others (8 percent) made explicit references to religion, such as ‘‘devil acts’’ and ‘‘satanic acts.’’ Terrorism was also defined generally as the act of invading another

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country and more specifically as the actions of the United States and other countries in Iraq. Such definitions of terrorism included ‘‘invading of one country through violence’’; ‘‘any invasions to a country’’; ‘‘being abused by other countries in violent ways.’’ One 21year-old male made reference to the U.S. invasion as the definition of terrorism by defining it as ‘‘the U.S. myth of terrorism was created to invade Iraq.’’ One 60-year-old woman, perhaps disappointed by the violent protests, said terrorism is an ‘‘act of protest against the government.’’ Another 16 percent of the responses defined terrorism in terms of its consequences, such as ‘‘damage of property, death of civilians, or economic problems.’’ Moral judgments, behaviors, and outcomes dominate the characterization of terrorism, with 84 percent of the responses falling into those categories. It seems likely that responses making moral judgments or identifying terrorism with specific forms of behavior and outcomes directly reflect Filipinos’ experiences—as perhaps do the associations of terrorism with ‘‘western’’ and the ‘‘United States.’’ However, a small, but significant minority (15 percent) of the responses defined terrorism by describing the motivations and desires of the terrorist. Some respondents appeared to be trying to understand acts of terrorism, linking terrorism with positive, negative, or general intentions and motivations. Some general intent responses included ‘‘an act to scare people to give them what they want and to prove their ideology’’; ‘‘an act of killing civilians so the government will know what they are fighting for.’’ Some provided negative reasons for the perpetration of terroristic acts, such as ‘‘instilling fear against individuals or groups for their own selfish and ulterior motives’’; ‘‘acts of violence to a country or a group of people to make others do whatever they want.’’ Other respondents attributed more benevolent purposes to terrorism, such as ‘‘expressing their own beliefs, which are not accepted by law’’; ‘‘person who is fighting for their right’’; ‘‘cry for survival.’’ One participant defined terrorism as ‘‘no God in their mind but brainwashed to the devil side.’’ Overall, acts of terrorism were attributed to various sources ranging from religion to individual motives of spreading dominance and ideology. Do Countries Have the Right to Invade Other Countries? Filipinos’ strong resistance to foreign invasion is further underscored by survey responses to the statement ‘‘Sometimes one country has a right to invade another country.’’ Most of the responses (69 percent) expressed opposition to a state right to undertake invasions. Although the average participant has not personally experienced foreign

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occupation, most of their parents have lived through an era of strong anti-imperialist attitudes. Throughout history, many sources cite outrage by the Filipino people for their government’s alignment with the United States, believing that foreign interests were often put before their own. These sentiments were reflected in responses expressing disapproval of invasion. Twenty-three percent of the responses referred to a government’s sovereignty as a reason why invasion was not acceptable. Responses included ‘‘each country should respect the autonomy of another and should only promote peace and good will with them’’; ‘‘every country needs to be free and independent’’; ‘‘invading another territory is not healthy and friendly—you are stealing one’s land’’; ‘‘each country must be given the opportunity to establish itself and its people’’; ‘‘the reason why wars started was invasion/imperialism—each country should learn to respect one’s sovereignty.’’ Twenty percent of the responses were opposed to invasion and cited negative effects, such as ‘‘civilians will suffer too’’; ‘‘there are a lot of innocent victims and this will just result in a series of invasions and eventually to war’’; ‘‘we will lose our peace’’; ‘‘countries would be better off if they minded their own problems instead of creating new ones for other countries.’’ Other themes included: better alternatives to invasion (9 percent), historical references (3 percent), self-serving ulterior motives (3 percent), and respondents’ preferences for peace (3 percent). The Filipino experience with foreign invasion and revolts appears to be directly reflected in statements such as ‘‘it is difficult on the part of the people invaded to adhere to individuals ‘alien’ to them’’; ‘‘no, we have our own private lands and invasion is not the way to gain political power’’; ‘‘it will become the conflict in the culture, beliefs and norms of an individual or country.’’ A few responses explicitly mentioned the United States in their responses. One 18-year-old female stated, ‘‘I hate the United States, they are their own society and should leave everyone alone.’’ Another 21-year-old male remarked, ‘‘I do not agree with invading a country for one’s personal gain, as [George W.] Bush is doing with Iraq—he told the whole world that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction when in fact all he wanted was Iraq’s oil.’’ Notwithstanding the strong anti-invasion attitudes, some responses (24 percent) supported a country’s right to invade another country. Most of these responses (64 percent of them), however, indicated that invasion was a right only under specific circumstances, such as defense or a direct response to threat (36 percent) or in protection of people or their rights (14 percent). Responses included ‘‘if the reason for invasion is to uphold the declaration and principles of the UN Charter’’; ‘‘only if the country is causing unreasonable harms or destruction to their country or another’s.’’ An additional 14 percent of these responses insisted

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invasion be used only as a last resort. Thirty-two percent of those in support of a country’s right to invade another country did so without any qualifying conditions: ‘‘if one country invades another country the invaded country will become more powerful and their economy will grow.’’ On the other hand, despite widespread anti-U.S. sentiments, one response was in support of the U.S. invasion if it was for the betterment of the country or the greater world. A 20-year-old female observed, ‘‘in the case of the U.S. and Iraq invasion, it is acceptable because it is serving to help the country.’’ Seven percent of the responses indicated uncertainty about whether any country had the right to invade another.

PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE AND PROTEST ‘‘Everybody should have the right to freedom of speech, expression and of the press.’’ ‘‘[Peace is] making a situation calm and heavenly.’’ ‘‘[Peace is] a state of no conflicts, which are a threat to human rights.’’ ‘‘We are created to do God’s will—he gave us peace so we must take this peace and share it.’’ Do Individuals Have a Right to Protest? The Philippines has a long history filled with rebellious or revolutionary acts, such as protests. However, recent history has shown evidence of successful peaceful revolutions such as People Power I and People Power II. When asked whether individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace, 88 percent of our participants strongly endorsed the individual right to stage protests, asserting, for example, that ‘‘this is a basic right and should really be pursued and fought for,’’ and ‘‘it’s a human right.’’ Some of these responses (16 percent) indicated that protest is a right only under certain circumstances; for example, when it is peaceful, nonviolent. A small group of responses (2 percent) specified that protest is a right, but not a basic human right. Rather, it is a socially sanctioned right: ‘‘of course, because our nation has the stages of a democratic country, which means all individuals have the right to protest against war.’’ One percent of the responses rejected a right to protest. These responses included ‘‘staging a protest rally could only perpetuate the ill-effects of war’’ and ‘‘there are certain solutions to stopping war, staging protests is not a solution.’’ Despite the overwhelming support for a right to protest, only 14 percent of the sample reported having participated in a protest. Seventyfive percent reported never having participated in a protest, and

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12 percent did not answer the question. Such discrepancies between beliefs and behaviors may be related to the violent history of protests, although this possibility was not addressed specifically in the responses. As recently as 2001, hundreds of thousands of Filipinos protested during Estrada’s presidency, leading to his resignation and the appointment of the current president, Arroyo. Definition of Peace Participants’ definitions of peace were first organized into definitions of either positive peace or negative peace. Negative peace is understood as the absence or elimination of violence and/or its correlates, such as corruption, whereas positive peace refers both to positive feelings (e.g., contentment) and to efforts to remove barriers to peace by improving social standards and well-being, such as eliminating injustices, increasing stability, and building respect.58 Sixty percent of the responses fell into the positive peace category, with most of the responses focusing on desirable outcomes for the state or larger community, such as ‘‘dreams for everyone’’; ‘‘world peace’’; ‘‘something that will happen in our country, orderly living, peaceful communities’’; ‘‘where people feel secure’’; ‘‘a state in which everybody is getting along well and living harmoniously with each other.’’ Other positive peace responses focused on desirable outcomes or processes for the individual, such as ‘‘silence’’; ‘‘happiness and calmness’’; ‘‘a safety happiness more like heaven’’; ‘‘good for the civilian’’; and ‘‘love.’’ In the positive peace responses, there is an emphasis on religion, respect, universality, understanding, compromise, and ideals. Forty percent of the definitions of peace fell into the negative peace category, with responses related to the lack of overt violence in the greater community. These definitions linked peace with ‘‘a state of no war.’’ A smaller number of the negative peace responses focused on more personal and individual freedom from negative states, such as ‘‘to sleep soundly without any thought of losing safety the next morning’’; ‘‘free from unnecessary or bad thoughts’’; ‘‘living in the absence of fear on one’s limb, security, and property.’’ The responses demonstrate the Filipino’s understanding of peace as a collective experience and are consistent with other responses that take the perspective of the collective. Do Individuals Have a Right to Peace? In regard to the item ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace,’’ a large majority of the responses (89 percent) indicated strong agreement. Most of the responses emphasized the belief that peace is a human right. Common responses included ‘‘absolutely because this is an inborn right

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of every individual’’; ‘‘humans have a basic right to peace’’; ‘‘everyone deserves to live happily and freely with the feeling of security that no harm will befall them.’’ Many (35 percent) used religion to justify the right to peace, asserting, for example, that ‘‘everyone should enjoy God’s gift’’; ‘‘God-given rights’’; ‘‘yes, because I think that it is the basic reason for creation’’; ‘‘a gift from God, the peace maker’’; ‘‘we are all creations of God; thus, we shouldn’t fight with one another’’; ‘‘because God taught us to.’’ Many (37 percent) of the explanations for supporting a right to peace specified the benefits of peace, such as ‘‘for the progress of our country’’; ‘‘so we can have prosperity in the world’’; ‘‘to have a better life.’’ One respondent discussed the consequences of not having peace, such as ‘‘everything that surrounds an individual affects his/her behavior. Depriving people of the right to peace, then, may have an adverse effect on his/her behavior.’’ Two percent of the responses specified that only some types of peace are a basic right, such as ‘‘inner peace at least’’; ‘‘not necessarily world peace.’’ Eight percent of the responses did not address the question directly, while making statements such as ‘‘human beings are the creation of God—our sins have been washed away with the death of Christ’’; ‘‘peace not war should be the battle cry of all citizens of the world.’’ Thus, despite a history during which many citizens had little opportunity to experience peace, the vast majority of the Filipino respondents maintain that everyone has a basic right to peace. Achieving Peace When respondents were asked to respond to the item, ‘‘I believe world peace can be achieved,’’ 78 percent affirmed the statement. Forty-seven percent of the responses indicated a belief that world peace could be achieved in the future, while 31 percent of the responses specified necessary circumstances for the achievement of peace, such as ‘‘if people will only follow the teachings and principles of religion’’; ‘‘in sharing and understanding’’; ‘‘by having a great leader’’; ‘‘no corruption’’; ‘‘distribution of wealth.’’ A minority, but significant 22 percent of the responses were arguments that world peace is not achievable because of ‘‘different beliefs and interests’’; ‘‘men are greedy’’; ‘‘people will always have wants and needs’’; ‘‘there will always be conflict with someone else’’; ‘‘everyone is too different—in order to have peace, there must be agreement on everything.’’ Overall, the results demonstrate the Filipinos’ strong belief that world peace is achievable; however, many believe it is possible only under certain circumstances, such as there being only one religion or one belief system—circumstances that do not seem possible in the foreseeable future. Many of the conditional

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responses reflect concerns about the current conflicts regarding religion; for example, conflicts related to the Islamic terrorists and rebel groups in the south. Very few of the responses mention peaceful ways to reconcile differences and compromise, which may indicate the need for peace education. Despite the Philippines’ current and past conflicts, and perhaps in part because of their strong religious faith, the Filipino people remain largely an optimistic people, endorsing a right to peace and believing in its achievability.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Violence and war have many deleterious effects on a nation and have become ubiquitous as a vehicle for social mobility. Spanish imperialists used violence to quell revolutionaries and maintain authority. Filipino insurgents with the aid of the U.S. military fought off Japanese occupation, ultimately leading to the Philippine’s independence. More recently, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao continues to gain autonomy and authority through the use of violence. Theories and research related to the intergenerational transmission of family violence and cycle of domestic violence may help in the understanding of international and intergroup violence and in turn provide some insights on how to work toward a more peaceful world.59 The importance of leading by example may be better understood in light of the Filipino responses. Centuries of violence have left impressions on the Filipino consciousness that were revealed in the responses to all of the PAIRTAPS items. Definitions and discussions related to state aggression and peace indicated historical connection with experiences of violence in the country and efforts to pursue positive peace, as well as with religious and other cultural values. The Philippine responses indicate low tolerance for any form of governmental violence and conciliatory attitudes in their desire to promote peace rather than wage war. One particular problem that continues to haunt the country is the conflict in the South, which has taken the lives of thousands of innocent civilians and has displaced hundreds of thousands more. A consistent theme in responses to all items was concern with innocent victims, especially the displaced women and children. To create a more peaceful nation, the Philippine government must work to end the use of internal violence, such as the extrajudicial killings, along with strengthening existing provisions for national stability, ensuring protection of basic human rights, and seeking peaceful reconciliation of conflicts. Progressive and conciliatory methods to deal with the conflict in the South should be explored. Violations of human rights

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serve only to aggravate tensions and intensify divisions. Although the Philippine government faces a difficult task in trying to satisfy the Muslim South while ensuring safety and progress to the displaced citizens, the government must work hard to refrain from the use of violence and work toward a more transparent government. To help engender a more peaceful reconciliation, it is important to help restore trust and provide respect to their citizens. Governments adhering to and publicizing international rules, such as the International Humanitarian Law, and governing bodies, courts, and agreements such as the Geneva Conventions, help establish a standard of peace and respect at the root of all actions and decisions.60 In addition to ethical responsibility, peace building requires public awareness and education programs followed by action to advocate nonviolently for peace.61 Though generally positive, the responses to peace building do not reflect proximity to the issues due to their generic tone. The importance of education was highlighted in the response that defined terrorism as a ‘‘protest against the government.’’ The response implies that protests and violence are inextricably tied—in a way viewed as synonymous. As the association between terroristic acts and protests continue to grow, it is important for the Filipinos to have access to alternative and rewarding ways to address their discontents and many struggles. Establishing and maintaining mutual respect through understanding is also important, which participants seemed to recognize. One respondent suggests that there would be ‘‘no terrorists if there were respect among people.’’ Some respondents humanized terrorists—people they did not necessarily agree with—by striving to understand the perspectives and desires of the terrorist, and some participants defined terrorism in empathic ways by discussing motivations for perpetrating violence. We need to continue to connect with people regardless of our differences. Programs such as the CDFI and many other local peace organizations should continue to tailor programs to address the special and specific needs and protections of the displaced. Teaching people the importance of respecting the ideas of others and providing nonviolent ways to deal with conflicts by example will help create a new social standard within the Philippine society of more peaceful advancement. After all, many of our participants’ responses already advocate for nonviolence, pointing out that violence only engenders more violence. As internal conflict continues to grow, government and nongovernment organizations should establish programs that will help victims of war understand the root causes of their divisions. A more targeted addressing of the concerns of Muslims and Christians, with a focus on women and children, may help enhance their perspectives on war and peace.62

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Although the Philippines have gained freedom from external control and do not have to deal with external invasions, millions of Filipino migrants and overseas workers are stationed close to war zones, and the Filipinos at home worry about conditions abroad. As demonstrated in our sample, the Filipino people have continued to be optimistic about world peace. With peace education and activities, programs to help stabilize communities and provide every person with the basic human rights, and trustworthy leaders demonstrating the benefits of peaceful reconciliation, state violence and rights to peace will not remain abstract constructs with varying meanings. Instead, these perspectives may well be the key in understanding how we can come closer to achieving world peace.

5

Indonesia James Page, Syafuan Rozi Soebhan, and Jeremy Peterman

War is . . . ‘‘a USA hobby’’; ‘‘There are no words to describe it.’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘No USA!’’; ‘‘when countries help other countries that are in need, etc.’’ INDONESIA AND GOVERNMENTAL VIOLENCE Indonesia is one of the most populous countries within what some geographers call the Indo-Pacific region; on this basis alone, it merits attention in an international project that addresses perspectives on peace and war. However, it is the Indonesian experience of governmental violence, both under colonial rule and under a military dictatorship, that makes the study of Indonesian views so important. Moreover, the emergence of Indonesia from such violence offers real hope to others. There are aspects of Indonesian history that are controversial, especially when looking at attitudes on peace and war. These include the confrontation with Malaysia, the annexation of West Papua, and the invasion and incorporation of East Timor. This chapter has not tried to avoid these episodes, but rather has attempted to give a balanced yet truthful view of each of them. Finally, it should be pointed out that this chapter ought not be taken as an expert rendering of Indonesian history or politics, but rather an attempt to consider the findings of the survey within an historical and political context. INDONESIAN SOCIETY The Republic of Indonesia is a multiethnic and multireligious country of some 222 million people within the Indo-Pacific region. Indonesia

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consists of some 17,508 islands, and as such, is the largest archipelago nation in the world. The most populous island is Java, where some 130 million live. More than half of Indonesia consists of forests, although there has been rapid deforestation in recent decades, and there are environmental concerns as to the impact of this deforestation. The country is generally a peaceful one—most Indonesians live harmoniously and peacefully with each other and peacefully with neighboring countries— although the Indonesian people have experienced long periods of direct and structural violence. Indonesia as an independent country is relatively young, not having become a nation-state until 1945. Indeed, the idea of a nation of Indonesia gained popularity only in the 20th century, amongst emerging nationalist groups.1 The entity of Indonesia owes much to its colonial background, both in regards to the borders of the country, which included the archipelago but excluded the Malay Peninsula, East Timor, and the South Philippines, and in regards to a history of centralist and repressive administrations. Max Lane refers to the ‘‘blind spot’’ in typical descriptions of Indonesia, in that such descriptions ignore the extent to which the shape of the country was determined by the pattern of colonial control for some 300 years prior to independence.2 The majority religion in Indonesia is Islam, and consequently Indonesia constitutes the most populous Islamic majority country in the world. Yet there is widespread religious tolerance within Indonesia. For instance, there is no reference to Islam within the constitution, and the constitution officially recognizes freedom of religion. The population is of various ethnic origins, and most speak a local language as a first language. Indonesian is the official language of the country, although English is sometimes used within educational institutions and within international business. The armed forces of Indonesia, previously the Angkatan Bersenjata Republic Indonesia (ABRI), now known as the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), have long played a central role in Indonesian society and politics, both in combating separatist movements within the republic and also in suppressing dissent. Within the Suharto era, the military had a dual function or dwifungsi—responsibility for defense and responsibility for implementing government policy. In effect, this system involved the military in political life, reflected in the reservation of special seats for the armed forces in parliament. The armed forces today number 410,000 and thus form a significant part of the public sector in Indonesia. However, since the process of political liberalization over the past decade, the reserved seats for the military within the parliament have been abolished, and the military has been required, in theory at least, to divest itself of commercial interests and involvement.

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Although Indonesia is a resource-rich country and a newly industrializing country, the majority of Indonesians rely on subsistence agriculture. Rice is a common crop. The nation, however, is becoming increasingly urbanized and the manufacturing sector is growing rapidly. Oil exports have been a significant revenue earner for the country in recent decades, although in 2008 Indonesia ceased to be a net exporter of oil, and thus the country announced that it was withdrawing from OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries). Indonesia has a presidential system of government, although there is also some devolution of power to the provinces. There was a long period of limited democracy from 1949 to 1965 and a long period of dictatorship from 1965 to 1998, although the system of government is now formally that of an elected president and an elected legislature, with both the president and legislature elected for a five-year period. One of the developments of the current reform era has been the strengthening of the legislative arm of government, with increased regional representation and an increased willingness of the legislature to be involved in government. There has also been an increase in the number of provinces and the number of districts, with more devolution of power away from the central government. Indonesia continues to be a source of considerable international investment and currently enjoys an economic growth rate that is in excess of that of most developed countries.

THE INDONESIAN EXPERIENCE OF GOVERNMENTAL VIOLENCE European Colonialism The people of Indonesia have experienced extensive governmental and external violence within recent history; much of this centered upon the desire to exploit the rich resources of the region. The Indonesian archipelago has been occupied for many thousands of years, as part of the general southeasterly Austronesian migrations. However, from 1700 to 1800 the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie—the (Dutch) United East Indies Company—established trading hegemony within the region, forming arguably the world’s first multinational company.3 From 1800 this operation became nationalized by the Netherlands, with the formation of the Netherlands Indies. The colonization of the Indonesian archipelago was thus, originally at least, quite clearly commercial in operation. Put simply, Europeans wanted access to local resources, and local rulers were subjugated through a process of indirect rule. The result of Western incursions was that Indonesian cultural development was held back by colonial

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intervention, suppression, and manipulation.4 A second result was that there was a process of dislocation, as local authorities and rules were alienated from the local people.5 The commercial exploitation of the region was perhaps best illustrated by the period of tanam paksa, or planting obligation, from 1830 to 1870, wherein the local population was obliged to plant export crops to assist with the finances of the colonial power. Subjugation and alienation represent indirect forms of colonial violence. Direct forms of colonial violence are perhaps best illustrated through the colonial wars, such as the Padri War in Sumatra (1821– 1837), the Java War (1825–1830), the Banjarmasin War in Bornea (1859– 1862), and the Aceh War (1873–1903). The Aceh War took place during the time of the so-called new imperialism, when almost all European nations were scrambling to obtain colonial possessions. This Western expansionism explains in part why the Dutch were willing to pay such a high price in loss of life for the conquest of this region on the island of Sumatra, and indeed were so eager to hold onto the Netherland Indies. The Netherlands Indies became important for the self-image of the Netherlands and not merely an enterprise of commercial importance. Japanese Occupation The violence of colonialism continued through the Japanese occupation during World War II, which in effect substituted one colonial power for another. The Japanese were initially welcomed as liberators of the Indonesian people from Dutch domination; they came with propaganda promises of ‘‘Asia for the Asians’’ and the establishment of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, led by Imperial Japan. However, the euphoria over the arrival of the Japanese soon dissipated. The reality of Japanese occupation involved summary executions, the kidnapping of women for use as military sex-slaves, romusha (forced labor), and widespread starvation, as all the resources of the archipelago, especially food, were directed toward supporting the Japanese war effort. One UN report estimates that four million people from the archipelago died during the war, either from killings or privation.6 The experience of Japanese occupation did, however, provide the inspiration and opportunity for Indonesian nationalists. Nationalism had been slowly growing throughout the 20th century, although the Japanese accelerated the process by demonstrating the fragility of European domination. They also deliberately fostered nationalist sentiment as a force to support the Japanese war effort; in particular, they cultivated Indonesian nationalists such as Sukarno and Hatte and nationalist organizations such as the Pusat Tenaga Rakjat (Centre of People’s

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Power). It soon became clear that Japan would lose the war, and the aim of nationalists became securing independence after the inevitable defeat of Japan. War of Independence On August 17, 1945, only days after the surrender of Japan, the Indonesian nationalists declared the independent Republic of Indonesia, with Sukarno as president and Hatte as vice president. What followed was a strange yet violent four years whereby the Dutch attempted to reassert their control over what they saw as the Netherlands Indies. The struggle was a complex one, involving British troops, who intervened initially on behalf of the Dutch, and also involving Indonesia Republican struggles against Islamic and Communist forces. The Dutch forces soon achieved control over the major cities, although control of the rural areas proved much more difficult. Neither of two abortive agreements, the Linggadjati Agreement of 1946–1947 and the Renville Agreement of January 1948, was able to hold, and the Netherlands continued what they called ‘‘police actions.’’ Ultimately, the key factors in ending the war included the anticolonial sentiment of the era, and in particular the threat of the United States to withhold Marshall Plan assistance from the Netherlands if the Netherlands government did not negotiate with the Indonesian Republicans. Eventually, with the Roem-van Royen Agreement of May 1949, the Netherlands agreed to transfer sovereignty of Indonesia to the United States, effective December 1949. The war of independence cost many Indonesian, Netherlands, and British lives and resulted in the dislocation of many Indonesians.7 The war of independence remains substantially a forgotten colonial war, overshadowed by the more publicized Vietnamese wars of independence. After it became obvious that independence was inevitable, the Netherlands attempted to maintain an association with the new republic, although this formal association did not last. Above all, the war of independence strengthened the role of the military within Indonesian society and the perceived importance of armed struggle as a means of achieving political ends. The Confrontation War with Malaysia, 1962 1966 For a decade and a half after independence, Indonesia was ruled by the charismatic President Sukarno, who advanced a centralist and politically nonaligned administration. The new Republic of Indonesia was fiercely anticolonial in stance, and an uprising in Brunei provided the opportunity for President Sukarno to commence a campaign of what he

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termed ‘‘confrontation’’ against the northern states of Malaysia on the island of Borneo, namely, Sarawak and North Borneo (Sabah). This confrontation involved guerrilla attacks by Indonesian armed forces into Malaysian territory. It is not certain that the military campaign by Sukarno was motivated by a desire for territorial gain. Sukarno claimed that the incorporation of the northern Borneo states into Malaysia was a sign of the return of British imperialism, and asserted that this was what he was fighting against. The war ended with the accession of General Suharto to power in Indonesia. The Killings of 1965 1966 The mass killings of 1965–1966 marked the dramatic end of the Sukarno era. The cause of the killings has been open to debate. The PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) had been traditionally very powerful in Indonesia, and Sukarno had been open to cooperation with the PKI, something that did not endear him to many leaders of the powerful Indonesia military nor to Western powers. Using a failed coup by a group of dissident generals as pretext, the influential General Suharto encouraged a widespread purge of left-wing elements from Indonesian society, including those perceived to be supportive of left-wing or even progressive ideas. Estimates of the death toll vary, although it is generally accepted that between 500,000 and 2 million people were massacred during the purges of 1965–1966.8 The fact that the new republic did not have efficient records is one factor explaining why estimates of the genocide vary so widely; the lack of record keeping by Indonesia stands in contrast to other genocides, such as by the Nazis.9 Indeed, it is difficult to comprehend how killings on this scale operated. Adrian Vickers gives an insight into how this happened, indicating that during the purges the best way for individuals under suspicion to survive was to participate in the killings, even taking an active role in killing others.10 Thus, fear and the desire for self-preservation actually spread the killings. What is notable about the killings is the acquiescence of major western nations, especially the United States, in the genocide. One of the major factors in the hands-off position of the West was the portrayal of the killings as an act of self-defense against the PKI;11 in this context, Suharto was able to consolidate power and avoid being confronted with potential human rights concerns. We now know that the experience of violence results in trauma, and this is well recognized in the posttraumatic stress syndrome suffered by combat troops. However, the effects of trauma may be even more enduring for civilians who experience violence or witness widespread violence against neighbors. Adrian Vickers comments on the lasting

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effects of the purges: ‘‘The grimness of the killings affected more than family and friends of the victims. Other witnesses still live with lifelong trauma. In many villages locals can still point out who were the killers. While some of these killers were well rewarded with public office by the regime, many went mad from the burden of what they did. This was a terror that blighted millions of lives.’’12 The Suharto Dictatorship The purge provided the opportunity for General Suharto to establish a dictatorship in Indonesia, which lasted from 1965 to 1998. Like most dictatorships, his was a brutal rule, reinforced through violence and intimidation. However, the administration was also characterized by powerful propaganda, which characterized Suharto’s Orde Baru or New Order as an organic state, and dissent as being un-Indonesian. Golkar was the official party, although it was not really seen as a party but as the embodiment of Indonesia. It is significant that many writers found their work banned, even if it was not directly criticizing the Suharto regime. For instance, Pramoedya Ananta Toer’s Buru trilogy dealt with the struggle against Dutch colonialism.13 However, this work was banned because of concerns that it could encourage dissidence against the current ruling Suharto regime. The violence of the era was both internal and external. The internal violence involved intimidation of political dissent, and the external violence of the era was arguably demonstrated in the incorporation of West Papua and East Timor, and the suppression of separation movements such as in Aceh Province. Before each of these conflicts is considered, it is important to note the role of the West in supporting the Suharto regime. Noam Chomsky, for instance, describes the Suharto regime as constituting a typical form of Third World fascism and pointedly suggests that this regime existed only with continuing support from the United States.14 The Incorporation of West Papua The incorporation into Indonesia of what was known as Irian Barat or West Papua is one of the many controversial aspects of the postindependence history of Indonesia. This area constitutes the western half of the island of New Guinea and is populated by Melanesian peoples who are ethnically distinct from the Malays in the Indonesian archipelago. The Republic of Indonesia bases its claim for incorporating West Papua on the fact that the area was included in the predecessor colonial entity of the Netherlands Indies, and that therefore, as part of gaining its independence, the Republic of Indonesia ought also to include West Papua.

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After the Netherlands recognized the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia in 1949, West Papua remained under the control of the Netherlands. According to an agreement in December 1962, the region was transferred to Indonesian control, on the understanding that in 1969 there would be a plebiscite to determine the future of the region. Based on the controversial plebiscite in 1969, West Papua became the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya. However, in violation of the previous agreement, the plebiscite did not involve universal franchise or thorough UN oversight, but instead was based on the vote of 1,025 carefully selected representatives, under circumstances in which it was very difficult for those representatives to have voted against integration, even if they had wanted to.15 Iran Jaya therefore became a province of the Republic of Indonesia. Throughout the Suharto regime, there was ruthless suppression of the Free Papua Movement within what had become Irian Jaya, and, as often happens with suppression of movements for self-determination, a protracted guerrilla war for independence ensued.16 It has been suggested that the region is now the most militarized area in the world, with one security person for every 100 citizens, compared to the situation in Iraq, with one security person for every 140 citizens.17 Colin Brown suggests that the desire for independence comes from deprivation and moral outrage at the conduct of the military and indeed comments that ‘‘Rather than being the instrument for unity that many of Indonesia’s founders saw as its greatest strength, the military has become one of the most important forces encouraging the break-up of Indonesia.’’18 What has complicated the situation in West Papua is that the region is not merely home to a traditional indigenous people, but it is also resource rich, with, for instance, oil resources and the world’s largest concentration of copper, located at Tembagapura. Moreover, in recent decades, the colonial policy of transmigration, which involves moving people from highly populated regions such as Java to West Papua, has resulted in an ethnically mixed population in the region. Thus, it is now unclear whether a referendum on separation from Indonesia would be successful. A seeming breakthrough occurred in 2001 with the granting of special autonomy status allowing regional assembly control of transmigration, sharing of resource wealth with the central government, and some cultural autonomy. As a mark of the cultural independence, the new autonomous region was designated the traditional name of Papua. However, a subsequent presidential decree has substantially diminished the impact of special autonomy, limiting it to a section of the territory traditionally occupied by Papuans, and removing the sharing of resource revenue and control of migration from the control of the regional assembly.

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The Annexation of East Timor On another front, on December 7, 1975, the Suharto regime commenced an invasion on newly independent East Timor. The claim of Indonesia to East Timor is basically a geographical one; East Timor is part of the Indonesian archipelago and indeed is separated from (Indonesian) West Timor only through the historical accident of European colonization. Critics of this claim asserted that the area’s former colonial status did not change the right of the East Timorese to self-determination, a position that was eventually recognized by the Indonesian government. As with other acts by the Suharto regime, the key to the continuation of such a foreign policy was the collusion of Western governments, in particular the United States and Australia. The United States continued to be transfixed by the anticommunist credentials of the Suharto regime, which blinded the U.S. government to obvious questions concerning the morality and legality of the invasion of another country. The Suharto regime played on this, justifying the invasions on the grounds of concern that East Timor was about to be ruled by the supposedly communist Fretilin Party. Australian opinion seemed to be less concerned about the anticommunist argument, but rather dominated by apathy and a desire to share in the rich oil resources of the Timor Sea. Indeed, Australia was eventually the only nation-state in the world to recognize the incorporation of East Timor as a province of Indonesia and eventually signed a controversial agreement with the Republic of Indonesia to share the oil wealth of the East Timor Sea. As with most invasions, this invasion and incorporation did not proceed as simply and smoothly as the invaders had planned.19 What ensued was a bloody guerrilla war lasting some 25 years and including a number of well-documented massacres; the most notable was in the capital Dilli in November 1991, when Indonesian troops opened fire on a protest march. What was significant was not the number of East Timorese murdered when they retreated to the Santa Cruz Cemetery, but the fact that the massacre was graphically recorded on video and subsequently replayed on television around the world. This event was just one of the factors in the gradual mobilization of world opinion against the Indonesian annexation of Timor. If the invasion of East Timor is a dark period in the history of Indonesia, then the resolution of the situation is indicative of hope. After the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, and as part of the political liberalization that followed, President Habibie offered the people of East Timor a plebiscite on their future. The UN-administered ballot resulted in 78 percent of the people of East Timor voting for independence. Tragically, in the ensuing weeks, pro-Indonesian militias and elements of the

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Indonesia military engaged in a pattern of revenge killing and destruction of buildings and infrastructure. However, the people of East Timor had achieved independence. The death toll from the original invasion and subsequent annexation is difficult to ascertain for certain, given the conditions under which the invasion and annexation took place. However, the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor gives the upper estimate of 183,000 deaths and the minimum of 102,800 deaths from killings and privation.20 The degree of the devastation that the East Timorese have suffered is perhaps illustrated by the fact that the population of East Timor is generally estimated to be around 700,000. The fall of the Suharto regime was complex. Even though the DPR or People’s Representative Council consisted of pro-Suharto representatives, in 1980 the Petition of 50 (Petisi 50) protested the personality cult that surrounded the president and the way President Suharto manipulated allegiance to Indonesia to mean allegiance to himself. Moroever, there was a gradual growth in the middle class, whose members had higher aspirations and were not content to live in a country where corruption was dominant. Another factor was the growth in travel and communication, so that Indonesians were exposed to global liberal ideas and were thus encouraged to apply these to Indonesia. Ultimately, however, the key factor was the courage of ordinary people, especially students, who in the face of a brutal regime, were willing to risk their lives in public protests against the Suharto regime in 1997 and 1998. The Free Aceh Movement As has been described earlier, Aceh has a history of independence, and had fought a long but unsuccessful war of independence against Dutch control. It is thus unsurprising that from 1976 to 2005 the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) continued to fight to obtain independence for the region. The most violent of the struggles came after the end of the Suharto regime, and it is estimated that some 2,000 people were killed by the military in what the military described as ‘‘security operations’’ against armed separatist guerrillas.21 The ending of the conflict in Aceh, or at least what seems to be the ending of the struggle in Aceh, came in December 2005 through the internationally brokered Helsinki Agreement, which gave a greater share of resource revenue to the local people and removed most of the military presence from the region. Aceh is not the only internal security challenge confronting the Republic of Indonesia (others were Maluku and Selatan), although it is one where democratic reform and the sharing of resources can provide a fundamental solution. The commitment

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of a democratically elected government in Indonesia to the peaceful resolution of conflict is also a key factor.22 The Indonesian Perspective In any overview, it is important to strive for balance, however difficult that may be. In dealing with Western criticism of political and social practices in Indonesia, scholars within the country point to a number of factors. One is that individuals within the developed world (Global North) often have little direct experience of the problems facing an emerging world (Global South) country such as Indonesia. These problems include poverty and population challenges. It is arguably inconsistent for developed countries to criticize the morality of Indonesian human rights and foreign policy, when most people within developed countries enjoy a standard of living that most Indonesians can only dream of. In other words, it is all too easy for those within the Global North to make statements of moral outrage about conditions in the Global South. For ethical concern to be credible, this concern should extend to action in a just sharing of global resources, something that the Global North is reluctant to do. The other Indonesian response to Western concerns about human rights issues in the archipelago is that the developed Western nations themselves have a very questionable record in dealing with their own indigenous peoples. Australia and the United States in particular have flourished on the basis of the genocide of indigenous peoples and expropriation of their lands. It is now therefore arguably hypocritical for people within Australia and the United States to criticize Indonesia for exactly the same difficult process of nation building that these countries previously engaged in. At the very least, an honest examination of their own dealings with indigenous peoples should lead people within Australia and the United States to recognize the moral complexity of the situation. The Promise of the Reform Era If much of this overview appears dark, then it must equally be said that the current situation for the Republic of Indonesia says much of the courage of ordinary Indonesians and provides a cautiously positive outlook for a peaceful Indonesia in the future. Multiculturalism is a crucial issue for Indonesia.23 Indonesia is one of the largest functioning democracies in the world. What is particularly impressive is that the fall of the Suharto regime took place in 1997 and 1998 through what were essentially peaceful demonstrations, under circumstances where the protestors displayed extraordinary courage. Moreover, in the recent decade

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Indonesia has been particularly successful in resolving local conflict, substantially through the process of devolution of power and democratization at all levels. Terrorism has been a significant challenge within the past decade for Indonesia, with the 2000 Christmas Eve church bombings, the 2000 bombing of the Jakarta Stock Exchange, the Kuta bombing of 2002, the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing, the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing, the 2005 Palu bombing, and the 2005 Jimbaran and Kuta bombings. What has complicated the situation has been widespread anti-American sentiment within Indonesia over the invasion of Iraq. However, the antiterrorism efforts of the Indonesian government have been highly effective, and increased public support for militant Islamic groups has not occurred. On the other hand, tourism, which is all-important for the Indonesian economy, is not returning to previous levels. Much of the history of Indonesia can be explained through the notion of learned patterns of violence, but also through social transformation. Violence becomes part of political culture. In assessing Indonesian history, it is possible to argue that violence became entrenched in the colonial era and was reinforced through the events that followed.24 This history makes the peaceful ending of the Suharto regime and the current era of liberal reform all the more remarkable. Doubtless, there are many challenges for the Republic of Indonesia, including ongoing issues of self-determination for indigenous peoples, dealing with corruption, terrorism, and militant Islam, and negotiating a new role for the military. However, remarkably, and against all odds, the Republic of Indonesia now represents at times one of the largest peaceful and democratic countries in the world.

THE SURVEY AND INDONESIAN SAMPLE The study used a sociometric device, the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS), which asked a range of questions regarding social perspectives on peace, war, and other forms of governmental violence. The sample of participants taking the survey consisted of 24 Indonesians, 13 of whom were living in Indonesia. The remaining respondents were living in a number of international destinations such as the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, Singapore, and the United States. The sample consisted of an equal number of men and women with ages ranging from 18 to 37, with a mean age of 24. With regard to religious affiliation, 12 people identified themselves as Muslim, 6 as non-Catholic Christians, 3 as Catholics, 2 as no affiliation, and 1 as Buddhist. All but 2 respondents categorized

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themselves as middle or upper-middle class. In regard to employment, only five participants were unemployed, with the remaining representing a variety of professions such as security guard, bartender, PR assistant, flight attendant, entrepreneur, and full-time student. All participants listed some degree of formal education with 11 graduating from college, 8 from high school, and the rest unspecified. Most of the sample classified themselves as ethnically Chinese or Indonesian, followed by one of the country’s islands or regions. DO GOVERNMENTS HAVE A RIGHT TO COMMIT AGGRESSION? ‘‘If everyone thinks one country has a right to invade another, there will be world war 3.’’ ‘‘ ‘Invade’ has a negative meaning and the country being invaded is going to suffer.’’ ‘‘[A terrorist] is disappointed about the world’s autocrats.’’ Invasion The vast majority, namely 72 percent, of Indonesian participants rejected the assertion that ‘‘sometimes one country has the right to invade another.’’ Many of the respondents who indicated total disagreement with a governmental right to invasion did not provide an explanation of their rating scale responses. This may have been because they considered the proposition so wrong that they believed it was unnecessary to elaborate. However, among the explanations given, 17 percent attributed their disapproval to the negative outcomes of invasion. For example, one respondent stated, ‘‘countries should not be invaded as it will only lead to more undesired bloodshed.’’ Another participant noted, ‘‘throughout history, innocent people became the victims when one country was invading another country.’’ Others who opposed invasion discussed preferable alternatives (11 percent) or cited an historical example (6 percent). The emphatic denunciation of invasion may reflect the historical experience and memory of centuries of foreign occupation of the islands now known as Indonesia, such as the economic invasion of the 17th and 18th centuries, the occupation by the Dutch colonialists, and Japanese military occupation during World War II. In other words, the Indonesians have many centuries of collective experience of the destruction linked with invasion, and this has created a national sentiment against invasion. The active involvement of the Suharto regime in invasion may be an additional source of strong feeling against the articulation of a right of invasion, even a qualified right. However, 17 percent of the

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respondents expressed some tolerance of a government’s right to invade another country, but it is interesting that these respondents did not provide an explanation for their agreement. One respondent declared, ‘‘Yes, like USA’’—implying that that is the way the world works under the hegemony of the United States as the world’s superpower. The remaining 11 percent of respondents provided answers that did not directly address the question. Torture The participants were also asked to provide their viewpoints concerning the proposition that ‘‘the government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war.’’ Approximately 58 percent of the responses indicated disagreement with this proposition, some 33 percent indicated agreement, and 8 percent neither agreed nor disagreed. Some of the responses simply asserted that there is no such right (‘‘No one has the right to torture anyone else’’), which is absolutely true according to international human rights law. The most common explanation for disagreement (33 percent of the responses) referred to torture as a violation of human rights. Respondents emphasized that prisoners are still human beings regardless of their actions—something often neglected in the dehumanized environment of a prison or war zone. One respondent passionately summarized this view by declaring, ‘‘You can’t torture a human being! No matter how bad he is as a person, you can’t torture him!’’ Of the 33 percent who indicated tolerance of governmental use of torture in times of war, half did not provide explanations while the other half provided means/ends arguments, citing benefits for the greater population. One respondent suggested governments might have a right to torture if it would benefit the state (‘‘maybe if they can help the country’’) while another justified such a right on a more universal level (‘‘if it can save the peace of the world.’’) Killing Innocent Civilians In response to the proposition ‘‘Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism,’’ there was an overwhelming 85 percent disagreement. A large number of the responses, 31 percent of the total sample, were outright denunciations of any legitimacy to civilian casualties, asserting, for example, ‘‘No, it’s totally wrong,’’ or ‘‘total disagreement.’’ Some 46 percent of the responses explicitly focused on the innocence of the potential victims, with one respondent commenting, ‘‘no reason to kill someone who never did a criminal [act].’’ Others in disagreement went beyond moral condemnation and elaborated on the negative

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consequences of tolerating the killing of innocent civilians. For example, one participant stated ‘‘wrong people being executed will make a resistance movement.’’ This pragmatic interpretation may allude to Indonesian occupation of West Papua and East Timor. Another participant condemned killing by noting the hypocrisy: ‘‘If the government wants to fight international terrorism, they should not be targeting innocent civilians. Their war on terrorism must be flawed if innocent civilians are killed together with international terrorists.’’ The antipathy generated toward the idea of the government having a right to kill civilians may stem from memories of atrocities committed during the Sukarno dictatorship, including the purges of 1965–1966 and also ongoing political imprisonment and killings. Though these events occurred well before the young respondents’ time, tales from parents may have instilled the view that a government should never be allowed to have such a power. Of course, history cannot explain all responses. It is reasonable to assume that a strong cross-cultural value that killing is wrong, regardless of purpose or perpetrator, is a causal factor in the responses. The remaining 16 percent of responses defended a governmental right to tolerate civilian losses by invoking a utilitarian perspective; for example, ‘‘Death of one saves thousands . . . but it would be better if the innocent survived.’’ Definitions of War When participants were asked to define war, 27 percent of the responses centered on the destructive effects of combat. The devastation equated with war was described in specific examples (e.g., ‘‘innocent people will die, children can’t go to school’’) and as more general statements of chaos (e.g., ‘‘destruction and mayhem.’’) Some 23 percent of the responses were essentially dictionary-type definitions equating war with conflict between groups and not listing a specific cause (e.g., ‘‘fight among countries’’). The 9 percent of the responses that did mention a possible motivation for conflict rejected the acceptability of those motivations, likening them to coercive and petty processes, such as ‘‘an attempt to force other countries to think that the invader is righteous by all means’’ and ‘‘bitterness and jealousy among them [two countries].’’ Fourteen percent of the definitions identified war with a lack of something such as ‘‘communication,’’ ‘‘peace,’’ or ‘‘respect for human rights.’’ One respondent made a moral judgment about war by labeling war as ‘‘duty in Hell.’’ Definitions of Terrorism The participants were also asked to define terrorism, a topic all too familiar to Indonesians. The majority of the responses, some 53 percent,

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identified terrorism with destruction, both physical and mental. One respondent summed up many other individual responses by stating, ‘‘any kind of activity, if it is disturbing, frightening, and destroying our life, I call terrorism.’’ This perspective on the destructive realities of terrorism perhaps reflects the reality that Indonesia has experienced terrorist attacks. Thus, although the respondents might not be speaking from personal experience, they are reflecting national experience. The destruction also goes past the immediate wreckage of an attack and extends to long-term welfare issues, such as the severe decline of the tourism industry, which has left many Indonesians (specifically Balinese) without income. The ‘‘fear’’ and ‘‘insecurity’’ directly referenced by the sample are consequences of terrorism, thus keeping visitors and investors alike away from Indonesia, devastating the economy. Overall, some 26 percent of the responses reflected what might be called an ideological perspective on terrorism. For example, among the more tolerant ideologically oriented definitions was that terrorism means ‘‘to fight for one’s beliefs.’’ The opposite ideological perspective was expressed in the definition of another respondent, who said terrorism is ‘‘when stupid Muslims think that they’re the conqueror of the world.’’ Another 11 percent of the definitions incorporated a moral judgment into the definition of terrorism, saying, for example, ‘‘violence is wrong’’ and ‘‘terrorism is cowardice.’’

DO INDIVIDUALS HAVE A RIGHT TO PEACE AND A RIGHT TO DEMONSTRATE AGAINST WAR? ‘‘Without peace, there is no real prosperity.’’ ‘‘There’s no better environment to grown up in than a peace environment.’’ A unanimous 100 percent of the respondents agreed that ‘‘all humans have the right to peace.’’ Fifty-four percent of their qualitative responses were a simple ‘‘yes,’’ ‘‘total agreement,’’ or ‘‘that’s absolute.’’ An additional 15 percent of the responses elaborated on the intrinsic nature of this right; for example, ‘‘all humans have the basic right to live their lives.’’ Some 16 percent of the responses referred to the negative consequences of failing to respect a human right to peace. One participant viewed the absence of peace as detrimental to social progress: ‘‘Human beings should not have to deal with war when their energies, intellect, etc., can be channeled into making the world a better place to live in.’’ Another respondent commented, ‘‘If there is no peace, innocent people will become the victims. This will be [an] unfair situation.’’

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In response to the item ‘‘People have the right to protest against war and in favor of peace,’’ 75 percent of the respondents expressed agreement (although 42 percent of them provided no supportive explanation), and 25 percent of the participants did not respond to the item. Some 17 percent of the responses focused on the desirability of the freedom to make personal choices. Some respondents saw the right to protest as inherent in being human; for example, ‘‘Individuals are all different so they have the right to have their opinions voiced out.’’ Others favored a right to protest not because of natural rights but because of the benefits of peace, ‘‘yes, in one country, the government might rule/control certain aspects, such as the economy, politics, etc. However, the people also have the freedom of speech to improve their country.’’ Others responded similarly by stating that ‘‘[protest] is a kind of political efficacy’’ and humans should protest ‘‘because they are a part of a peace.’’ When considering Indonesia’s postcolonial history of a ruthless dictatorship with little or no tolerance for dissent, it is no surprise that modern Indonesians do not take their right to protest for granted. Protestors faced imprisonment or death during portions of the Sukarno and Suharto eras. In addition, the policies of these dictators were carried out regardless of popular opinion. Therefore, the modern-day right to protest represents a connectedness to government that has existed only in recent years. Support for protest is also justifiable by its capacity for positive change. Protesting helped to remove Suharto from office in 1998, marking the beginning of an influx of democracy that resulted in free elections in 2004. The responses that noted protest could be used as a tool of ‘‘political efficacy’’ and to ‘‘improve their country’’ illustrates how Indonesians respect the power of protest and value their new role in state affairs. When asked to respond to the proposition ‘‘I believe world peace can be achieved,’’ there was a dramatic variation in responses: 31 percent indicated that it could be achieved, 23 percent said it could not, and 38 percent stipulated the presence of conditions for the attainment of peace. One respondent who said yes added rhetorically ‘‘who wants to suffer?’’ Another person provided his own brand of optimistic philosophy by replying, ‘‘Everything is real if you believe it.’’ Those respondents who said peace could not be achieved put the burden on the shortcomings of humankind; for example, ‘‘not if the population is still selfish,’’ and ‘‘[every] human has his/her own ego.’’ One skeptic not only rejected the possibility of achieving peace but made a pessimistic prediction, ‘‘In a world like this, I don’t think so . . . will it get worse? Definitely!’’ Some of the responses indicating necessary preconditions for the achievement of peace focused on the negative things that needed

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to be eliminated (‘‘no guns, no bombs’’). Other responses focused more on the positive things that were needed: ‘‘Each of us can give our best efforts to achieve it.’’ The combined 69 percent of respondents who were at some level optimistic regarding the achievability of world peace may seem surprisingly high in light of Indonesia’s turbulent and violent past. However, when one takes into account the dramatic democratic progress made over the past decade, the hopeful outlook is not as unfounded as it appears. Free elections, a decreased military presence in politics, a cease-fire with Aceh rebels, and the end of the East Timor conflict serve as reasons to be optimistic. If the seemingly inescapable foreign entanglements and invincible dictators of the 20th century could be vanquished in the new millennium, then perhaps the overall dream of peace is not so unachievable. When asked to respond to respond to the proposition ‘‘National security is essential for family and individual security,’’ 90 percent of the sample agreed, at least on some level. The 10 percent minority opinion rejected national security on behalf of better, more localized alternatives, such as ‘‘I think law enforcement is enough; national security doesn’t help when a bank is robbed, or if someone is murdered.’’ Justifications for the importance of national security portrayed its role as both a physical and emotional protector of the people. Sample responses included ‘‘[Security is necessary] to guard a country from invasion and slavery,’’ and ‘‘Everyone wants to feel secure.’’ One respondent said that states are created with the primary purpose of providing security, ‘‘absolutely . . . if there’s no such thing as national security, what’s the point of living in that country?’’ Finally, one example of the 30 percent of the responses adding conditions to the statement indicated that national security is essential as long as it remains within national borders, ‘‘It is not a good reason to invade other country.’’ Definitions of Peace Among the definitions of peace provided by the respondents, the largest group, 25 percent, were ‘‘negative definitions,’’ that is, defining peace by what it is not rather than what it is. Thus, one respondent suggested that peace is ‘‘when there’s no war. . . no bombing. . .’’ and another suggested that peace is a ‘‘condition without terror.’’ Considering the relative peace in today’s Indonesia compared to centuries of violence, it is no surprise that citizens interpret peace in regard to a contrast with the past and that this orientation carries over into their conceptualizations of peace. Most of the other definitions were positive, specifying the good things associated with or necessary for peace.

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Among these, the second most popular response (20 percent of the total) classified peace as a natural human right; for example, as a ‘‘basis of good human life’’ and ‘‘what everyone deserves.’’ Some 10 percent identified peace with harmony; for example, peace is ‘‘a state where everyone lives in harmony.’’ Another 10 percent viewed peace as a personal sense of well being, describing peace as, for example, ‘‘happy, joy forever.’’ A further 10 percent found peace to be an ideal, ‘‘an ideal state which realistically might be unattainable.’’ Finally, a few respondents focused on the essential nature of positive peace, that is, peace as ‘‘made by tolerance’’ and ‘‘a way for development and prosperity.’’

CONCLUSIONS In brief, the Indonesian sample suggests that contemporary Indonesian society is a strongly peace-oriented society. There are a number of indicators for this, although perhaps the strongest indicator is the 100 percent of the sample who agreed that peace ought to be regarded as a right. It is interesting to note that in 1984, the United Nations General Assembly formally recognized peace as a universal right,25 and it is further interesting to note that support for this resolution was strongest among developing (Global South) countries. One possibility as to why those within Global South countries are more vehement in supporting statements about peace is that it is often the people within the Global South who have experienced violence at a personal and national level, and who are therefore able to see through the institutional support for governmental violence. In other words, one can argue that it is precisely because Indonesians have experienced governmental violence that there is such a strong support for peace. The responses for Indonesia also provide some indirect evidence for cautious optimism about the future of Indonesia. Some might argue that the sample is too limited to draw any wide conclusions, and yet the content of the responses was very strong. Indonesia remains, in the words of Colin Brown, an ‘‘unlikely nation,’’26 although in reality all nation-states are unlikely because they are, as Benedict Anderson argues, ‘‘imagined communities.’’27 The key to the future is what people imagine these communities to be and to become. The survey results suggest there is a powerful groundswell of opinion within Indonesia today that envisages the future of the Indonesian nation-state as a peaceful, democratic, and multicultural nation. The very fact that this sentiment exists is some cause for cautious optimism.

6

Malaysia Jas Jaafar, Sherri McCarthy, and Haslina Muhamad1

War is . . . ‘‘A conflict between two or more countries causing death’’; ‘‘An act of one country that can destroy others’’; ‘‘A power struggle.’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘An orderly, organized situation’’; ‘‘Living in harmony, happiness and tolerance’’; ‘‘Beautiful; no disruptions; a comfort to the heart’’; ‘‘A good two-way relationship.’’ Malaysia is both one of the oldest and one of the youngest countries on the planet. Declared independent of British rule in 1957 and founded in its current form in 1965, Malaysia is barely half-a-century old. Yet some of the most ancient ruins of civilization, dating back more than 35,000 years, have been discovered there. The Malay and Orang Asli in the area have maintained a continuous, civilized country and culture since prehistoric times. Perak Man, discovered in 1991 in northern Penninsular Malaysia, dates back more than 13,000 years, and his civilization seems not too different from that of many of the indigenous Malay inhabitants of modern times.

MALAYSIA: A LAND OF DIVERSITY Malaysia comprises the long, peninsular land mass that separates the Indian Ocean from the South China Sea and the northern quarter of the island of Borneo. Penninsular Malaysia is composed of 11 states and covers approximately 132,000 square kilometers. Sabah and Sarawak, on the island of Borneo, include an additional 198,000 square kilometers. Until 1965, the island of Singapore was also part of Malaysia. The country includes coastal plains, rugged mountains, rain forests,

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lowlands, swamps, highlands, and desert. Nearly 70 percent of the country is still covered by forestation, including primary jungle regions and the oldest rain forest on earth. Malaysia lies between one and seven degrees north of the equator. The climate is generally warm and humid, except in the higher altitudes, where nights are cool. Seasons are marked by variation in rainfall, rather than temperature. Malaysia can be characterized as a diverse and tolerant land, in both ecology and civilization. The earliest inhabitants of the Southeast Asian peninsula and island comprising the country were huntergatherers who adapted to life in different ecological niches.2 One of the oldest finds of modern man, dating from 35,000 years ago, was discovered in Sarawak’s Niah Caves, making Malaysia arguably one of the first civilized areas on the planet.3 It appears that rice agriculture has been practiced in the area since at least 3000 BCE and organized governments, or Sultanates, were scattered throughout the region even then. The original inhabitants of Malaysia were skilled at utilizing the resources of the many forests in the region. They played an important role in trade due to their location, bordering the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea, midway between the two cultural centers of the time, China and India. Evidence of a sophisticated trade network involving India, China, and Malaysia dates back to at least 500 BCE. Recorded history regarding Malaysia from occidental scholars began in the first century BCE, when it was referred to by Greek authors as ‘‘Aurea Choroneas’’—the Golden Peninsula. Long inhabited by the Malay, it was known to travelers in the third century as ‘‘Malayadivpa.’’4 Located strategically at the crossroads between the East and West, Malaysia has always attracted travelers from many different parts of the world, including India, China, Europe, the Mideast, the South Pacific, and Africa. From the beginning, in addition to the ecological diversity of the region, linguistic and religious diversity ensued from Malaysia’s status as a trade center and crossroads of many civilizations. The naturebased, sun-worshipping animistic religion of the original inhabitants, which is still practiced in some regions, was dominant until displaced by Buddhism. Evidence from ancient civilizations in the state of Kedah illustrates how Hindu, Buddhist, and Taoist influences from India and China were slowly incorporated into the indigenous religious and social structure. By the seventh century, Hinduism and Buddhism were predominant, and Taoism also was well established. This trend continued until the end of the 10th century CE, when both Christianity and Islam had moved into the region, as well. Islam rapidly began to predominate.

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Much of the wealth of early Malaysia, famous throughout the ancient world, was built on trade, and on the well-crafted hardwood ships that facilitated this. Living in a trade center, the people of the region became accustomed to a diversity of beliefs, languages, and cultures. Their tolerance appears to continue into modern times. Malaysia remains an important international trade center, populated by a multilingual and multiethnic population, and scattered with mosques and churches from many different religions. Malay inhabitants comprise over half of the population of the country today. Another 11 percent are Aboriginal or indigenous people, including the Orang Asli. About 25 percent of the population are Chinese, and another 7 percent or so are of Indian origin. The remainder of the population includes those whose heritage is Arabic, Armenian, Eurasian, Thai, Philipino, Indonesian, European (especially those of British, Dutch, and Portuguese descent), and African. Malay is the national language, although English is also widely spoken and is one of the official languages for instruction in public schools, where all math and science is taught in that language. Chinese (including many dialects, most notably Hakka, Teochew, Hokkien, Cantonese, Hailam, and Mandarin), Tamil, Punjabi, and Thai are also widely spoken. Fifteen additional languages can be found among the indigenous peoples, most notably Iban and Kadazan. This linguistic diversity is matched by a wide range of religious and cultural traditions. Virtually all Malay are Muslims, as are some of the Chinese and Indian inhabitants, and most of the Arabs. Christianity (both Catholic and Protestant), Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism also flourish, but Islam is the official religion of Malaysia. All holidays are celebrated, though—from Christmas to Eid Mubarak (the end of Ramadhan) to Hindu Festivals and Chinese New Year. Malaysia is a cultural quilt.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MALAYSIAN CULTURE Islamic influence came to predominance in Malaysia during the Melaka Sultanate in the 14th and 15th centuries, brought by traders from the Middle East and India. It engulfed the nation when the Sultan of Melaka embraced the religion and personally helped spread it across the region. The reign of the sultanate also solidified ties with the Kingdom of China, with which all the separate, small sultanates and kingdoms in the area had been trading in ivory, tortoiseshell, pottery, silk, wood, wax, resin, rattan, tin, and spice for centuries. At this time, Melaka, a state on the southeast of the peninsula along the famed Straits of

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Melaka and near Sumatra, became the center of power among the many independently ruled kingdoms, each with its own sultanates and governing structures, scattered throughout the peninsula. The sultanate in Melaka was originally founded by Paramesvara, a prince from Palembang, who fled Sumatra. After initially establishing a kingdom in Singapore, then in Betram, both with the assistance of the Orang Asli, he finally moved north to Melaka. In Betram, his daughter married into the local tribe and he rewarded those of the tribe who had helped him by bringing them into positions of governance and granting them titles. Later, his son, Iskandar Syah, supposedly a descendant of Alexander the Great, was hunting. When he approached Melaka Hill, a mousedeer behaved very oddly, turning upon his dogs during a pursuit. Taking this as an omen, Iskandar Syah asked his father’s permission to build his own house on that hill, where the kings of Melaka have remained ever since.5 The Melaka Malay language became the language of trade throughout the region. Because of its location, Melaka, from about 1400 onward, rapidly became the most powerful region in the Malay Peninsula; according to Tome Peres, a prominent Portuguese trader/priest/historian of the times, Melaka was then ‘‘of such importance and profit that it seems to me it has no equal in the world.’’6 The success of Melaka was due not only to its prosperity as a trading center but also to the patterns of government and lifestyle that were established there and later emulated by all of the other kingdoms in Malaysia. It became the basis for what is now termed ‘‘traditional Malay culture and statecraft.’’ It remained an inspiration for all of the subsequent kingdoms and states in Malaysia that consider themselves its heirs. The code, as commonly quoted in speeches and reports by many scholars, officials, and politicians when speaking to or about Malays, is summarized thus: ‘‘If any ruler puts even one of his subjects to shame, that shall be a sign that his kingdom will be destroyed by Almighty God. Similarly, it has been granted by Almighty God to Malay subjects that they shall never be disloyal to their rulers.’’ Much of the organization, laws, and lifestyle of Melaka were tied to Islam, as embraced by the rulers and later popularized throughout the peninsula. The prestige and commercial success of Melaka made Islam look increasingly attractive as a religion to others in the region. Strong ties to China and an infusion of Chinese culture were also established via Melaka, as many brides of the royal house were sent from the house of the Chinese emperor. The Chinese traditions, beliefs, and culture were respected and continued to flourish. Melaka’s rise to power and profitable trade did not escape the attention of the rest of the world. By the beginning of the 16th century, more than 100,000 people had settled there, and the value of commerce was

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approaching that of Seville, one of the wealthiest ports in Europe. This economic success led to an attack by the Portuguese in 1511, resulting in the fall of the Sultanate. With their conquest, the Portuguese brought their language and the Catholic faith to the locals. They ruled and occupied Melaka for nearly a century and a half.7 Many ancient Catholic churches still exist in Malaysia, one of which claims to house the tomb of St. Francis of Assisi. A large Portuguese-speaking community still lives in the modern city of Melaka. Following their defeat of the Portuguese in 1641, the Dutch took over control of Malaysia. During the period of Dutch control, many Bugis traders and warriors emigrated to Johor in southeastern Malaysia from Sulawesi, now part of Indonesia. They remained loyal to their own rulers and segmented Malay society, already fragmented by the assassination in 1699 of Sultan Mahmud, supposedly the last of the descendants of Alexander the Great. Despite political volatility, trade continued to thrive for the next hundred years, particularly with China. Many Indians and Arabs also settled in the peninsula. During Dutch rule, intermarriage was common among the various ethnic groups in the region, so ethnic conflicts were minimal, though political, economic, and regional conflicts were common. The Dutch were finally displaced by the British, who had already been heavily involved in trade in the region for over a century, particularly in cloth and opium,8 and had been acting as advisers to the ruling families for many years. Originally based primarily in the north and centered on the island of Penang, the British, by the end of the 18th century, had gained supremacy throughout Malaysia. The British formed crown colony states on the peninsula, called the Straits Settlements, and subtly intervened in the administration of the previously independent Malay states, as well. Penang and Singapore, rather than Melaka, became the centers of trade. The 19th century, under British administration, saw the establishment of political boundaries that became the basis of modern Malaysia. It also witnessed Malaysia becoming a major supplier of raw materials, particularly tin, hardwood, and rubber, to the rest of the world. Tea, rice, tapioca, and sugar also became major exports. Newspapers and journals began production in both Malay and English, and many of the legends and stories formerly passed on orally among the Malay were printed. Malay literature, always a rich, colorful part of the culture, was published. Several important Islamic works were translated into Malay, leading to a religious resurgence. During the 19th century, the major groups of immigrants to Malaysia were Thai, Chinese, and Indian. The Chinese became primarily a ‘‘merchant class,’’ as agriculture, mining, and logging expanded. Kuala Lumpur, today’s shining, modern capital city, grew rapidly because of the

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tin mines there. The various sultanates, or royal families, throughout the various states of Malaysia continued to govern their regions, while many Malay were educated and trained as British civil servants. There was some concern among the Malay that the encroachment of Western ways might lead to a decline in traditional customs, especially among youth. Purity of language and maintaining ‘‘Malayness’’ was stressed, and Islam took on renewed importance in governance. Malay society sought to incorporate the technologies and advantages of Western civilization without jeopardizing their centuries-old Melayu heritage. Under British colonial rule, religion and custom were excluded from British control, but the general administration of the country was governed by the British Resident (the official representative of the British government). This arrangement became muddy, however, since religion, custom, governance, and law were so intertwined in Malay culture. For example, governmental decisions were traditionally made collectively, after long discussion. Assemblies were called and a general consensus was necessary before any action could be taken, and consensus was reached only after days of debate. Enforcement of obedience was considered beyond royal powers. Sharia law rooted in the Islamic code forbade many common Western practices such as charging interest on loans. The division between secular and religious, so clear cut to many Westerners, was an alien concept to the Malay, for whom language, culture, etiquette, religion, and life were—and remain—joined. Despite major differences between Eastern and Western worldviews, Malay culture remained intact under British rule. Trade continued to prosper, tolerance continued to flourish, and the faith of the people and their strong adherence to Islamic law remained intact. Under British colonial rule, life continued profitably and pleasantly for most of the Malay people during the late 19th century. The 20th century was more tumultuous. Events in China, including the Manchu government’s proclamation that all individuals of Chinese descent through the male line throughout the world were Chinese citizens, intensified ethnic division between the Chinese and Malay. Royalist reformers exiled from China actively solicited support, and revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen visited Malaysia several times between 1900 and 1910 for the same reason. Branches of T’ung Meng Hui, the Chinese Revolutionary League, began to spring up. By the 1920s, the influence of the Chinese Communist Party was strong. Branches of Tarikat Islam developed, especially on the east coast. Followers of Tarikat Islam argued for Malay nationalism and spurred rebellions such as the To’ Janggut uprising in 1915 and the Terengganu rebellion in 1928. The Terengganu rebellion leaders claimed the land belonged to the people, for whom infidel government was improper and unnecessary.

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More pervasive and influential, however, were the reasoned views of the urban Islamic elite, who were well versed in teachings emanating from the universities in the Moslem heartlands; for example, the mission of Al-Azhar University was to urge Islamic societies to work to improve their situations, since ‘‘Verily, Allah does not change the condition of the people until they change their own condition.’’9 Throughout Malaysia, wherever educated Muslims gathered, study clubs were formed to discuss the issues facing the country and to urge the reform of Islamic education to provide a new generation with the knowledge needed to compete successfully in the modern technological world. Thus, both the Malay and the Chinese were becoming more politicized. Malay fears of Chinese domination increased when the 1931 census revealed that, for the first time in history, there were more Chinese than Malay in British Malaya.10 Life in Malaysia was further disrupted when, in 1941, the Japanese invaded the country and ruled for about three years before surrendering to the Allied Forces. During the Occupation, anti-Chinese feelings among the Malay were encouraged by the Japanese, who used paramilitary units composed of the Malay to fight Chinese resistance groups. The end of World War II was the beginning of nationalism in the country, and the first task of the nationalist movement was to heal the ethnic division that had been created, and, according to Cheah Boon Kheng, to ‘‘create a real and valid sense of loyalty to Malaya among all races by inspiring in the Malay a national loyalty over and above the natural loyalty to the Sultans as symbols of history and tradition, and educating them to an understanding of their place as Malay; and by weaning the non-Malay races from their nostalgia for the homelands of their ancestors, by putting into their hands the basis of an enduring loyalty.’’11 This nationalist movement, which consisted primarily of English-educated, Malaya-born individuals, later coalesced into the Malayan Democratic Union Party. In early 1946, after reoccupying Malaysia, the British revealed the Malayan Union Plan in a White Paper. This plan transferred sovereignty from the Malayan sultans to the British crown. Needless to say, the plan was not popular. The normally peaceful and content Malay population rose up in protest. They had been satisfied to accept the British as advisers and administrators as long as the true power still rested with the ruling Malay families, and their culture and religion predominated in the land, but they were not willing to give up their country to foreign rule. The Chinese and Indian communities also protested. Over 200 delegates representing over 40 different Malay organizations gathered in Kuala Lumpur in March 1946 to form Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu, or the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). This group gained critical importance in the move to independence and

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in Malaysian politics from independence to the present time. Through negotiations among the British, Malay rulers, and UMNO, the unpopular Malayan Union scheme was overturned, and a new proposal for a Federation of Malaya was accepted. The new federation maintained the sovereignty of the sultans, the individuality of the states, and special Malay privileges. In Kuala Lumpur, a central government was established that had legislative powers administered through an elected prime minister and a parliament. Citizenship became more restrictive, requiring residence of at least 15 years, mastery of Malay and English, and a declaration of permanent settlement. In response to the formation of the UMNO, the Chinese in the peninsula formed the Malay Chinese Association (MCA), and the Indians began establishing their own political group. These organizations, divided along ethnic lines, set the stage for future politics in Malaysia. Still, despite the ethnic divisions, the groups worked together well in an alliance, and formed a political party. This Alliance Party obtained 51 of the 52 contested legislative seats in the 1955 election, soundly defeating the Chinese Communist Party (MCP), which was also active in the region during this time. The British officially withdrew from Malaya on August 31, 1957. By 1958, the government considered all communist threats to Malaysia, armed and otherwise, to have ceased. The Alliance government, which had won another impressive victory in 1959, could now devote its attention to creating a united Malayan nation. Although the economy was healthy, 85 percent of the profit came from exporting rubber and tin, so programs were developed to diversify and to educate the population for future commercial needs. ‘‘There are no watertight compartments in our policies,’’ explained a director of the Alliance Party. ‘‘We are right and center and left according to what we think is best.’’12 In 1963, Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak joined hands to form Malaysia. Singapore seceded from this union in 1965. Initially, threats and land claims from the Philippines and piracy from Indonesia deterred smooth progress, but the pragmatism of the Malaysian government and its people—and their adherence to the work ethic epitomized by the prophet of ‘‘Verily, Allah does not change the condition of the people until they change their own condition’’—has ensured the survival and even prosperity of the nation through the challenges of the last half-century of growth.13

MALAYSIA TODAY Oil reserves, electronics, and banking have supplanted hardwood, tin, and rubber in establishing a strong economy. Education remains

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valued. The infrastructure—roads, telephones, and electronics—is superb. According to The World Factbook, during the 22-year term of Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad (1981–2003), Malaysia diversified its economy successfully to become self-sufficient. It eliminated dependence on exports, expanded manufacturing, services, and tourism, and became an emerging multisector economy.14 Prime Minister Abdullah bin Ahmad Badawi (2003–2008) continued to move the economy up the value-added production chain by attracting investments in medical technology, pharmaceuticals, and high-tech industries. Healthy foreign exchange reserves and a very small external debt protect Malaysia from major financial crises. The country, which is slightly larger than New Mexico in area, is rich in petroleum, tin, copper, natural gas, bauxite, and iron. Palm oil, rubber, cocoa, rice, coconuts, pepper, and timber are also produced in volume. Light manufacturing, electronics, and petroleum refineries are the major industries. Substantially more electricity, oil, and natural gas are produced than are consumed within the country. Air and water pollution, as well as deforestation, are current concerns, but Malaysia is party to many international agreements on environmental protection and is actively working to keep the natural environment clean and safe. The current population of about 25,275,000, roughly half male and half female, is young, with a median age of 25. Less than 5 percent of the population is over 65; about 30 percent is under 14 years of age. Average life expectancy is 73 years of age. Infant mortality rate and prevalence of HIV infection are both lower than in the United States and overall literacy is comparable (approximately 90 percent as of the 2000 census and even higher now). The majority of the population will spend at least 13 years in public school, and females generally remain in school longer than males. Malaysia remains a constitutional monarchy, headed by a paramount ruler from a Malay royal family. It has a bicameral parliament. The Senate, or Dewan Negara, consists of 70 seats. Forty-four senators are appointed by the paramount ruler, and 26 are elected by the 13 state legislatures (2 from each) to serve three-year terms with a limit of two terms. The House of Representatives, or Dewan Rakyat, is composed of 222 members elected by popular vote to serve five-year terms. A prime minister, designated from among the members of the House of Representatives following legislative elections for a renewable five-year term, appoints a cabinet from among the members of parliament, with the consent of the paramount ruler. The prime minister is the head of the party that wins a plurality of seats in the election of the House of Representatives. There are more than 20 political parties active in Malaysia, but UMNO, described previously, has been the strongest party until

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quite recently. The paramount ruler is elected by and from the hereditary rulers of the nine states still governed by ruling families and also serves a renewable five-year term. In practice, selection is based on a principle of even rotation among the rulers of each state. There are 13 states and one federal district. All states have hereditary rulers descended from the sultanates except Sabah, Sarawak, Melaka, and Penang. These states are ruled by appointed governors. Powers of state governments are limited by the federal constitution, much as in the United States. In fact, the design of the Malaysian flag was based on the U.S. flag, with a blue rectangle in the upper left corner and 14 equal horizontal stripes of red and white. A yellow crescent and 14-pointed star, traditional symbols of Islam, appear in the blue rectangle. Malaysia has two parallel legal systems: one civil and one Islamic. The civil legal system is based on English common law. Judicial review of legislative acts may occur in the Supreme Court at the request of the paramount ruler and prime minister. Civil courts include Federal Court, a Court of Appeal, a High Court of Malaya for Penninsular Malaysia, and a High Court of Sabah and Sarawak in Borneo. Islamic law applies to Muslim citizens in matters of family law, custody, divorce, inheritance, and religion. The Sharia courts, which oversee the application of Islamic law, include the Sharia Appeal Court, Sharia High Court, and Sharia Subordinate Courts. The two types of courts function independently, and decisions of Sharia courts cannot be appealed in civil courts.

MILITARY, MORALITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES Most germane to the survey findings described in this chapter are the history and current views of Malaysians regarding war, peace, and national security. As previously described, Malaysia has frequently been a conquered nation—by the Portuguese, Dutch, British, and Japanese—but never a conqueror. Modern armed forces, consisting of the Malaysian Army, Royal Malaysian Navy, and Royal Malaysian Air Force exist in Malaysia, but stopping piracy in the Straits and preventing civil unrest have always been their major focus. Military service is voluntary for anyone over the age of 18. Only about 2 percent of the GDP is spent on the military. Malaysia is a Tier 2 Watch List country for human trafficking. It enacted comprehensive antitrafficking legislation in 2007 and has primarily been a destination country for men, women, and children who willingly, although illegally, migrate from South and Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia and Myanmar, to work; some of them are subjected to conditions of involuntary servitude by Malaysia-based employers.

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Both drug and human trafficking are prosecuted vigorously and carry severe penalties. Religious diversity continues to characterize Malaysia. About 60 percent of the residents are Muslim, 20 percent Buddhist, 10 percent Christian, 5 percent Hindu, and the remainder practitioners of Confucianism, Taoism, or other traditional Chinese religions. A Malay, however, is defined culturally as someone who speaks Bahasa Melayu, is Muslim, and practices the Malay customs known as adat, the Malay notion of a morally virtuous individual. This is someone who is, above all, tolerant (tolak ansur), moderate (sederhana), humble (rendah diri), filial and respectful toward parents and the elderly, loyal (taat), considerate, careful not to hurt or offend others (jaga hati), protective of the group and society, and able to demonstrate good manners and good intellect (sopat santun). Malays also treasure budi—maintaining social relationships by always offering hospitality and repaying good deeds through a tacit system of reciprocal obligation that emphasizes collectivism and the sacrifice of personal rights and values for the welfare of the majority. Being ungrateful toward one’s parents and disrespectful of elders— derhaka—results in ostracism from one’s group and from God and is seen as horrendous, deserving of the worst penalty imaginable. Failure to practice adat is also viewed as horrendous. Adat seems to be the dominant perspective in Malay moral reasoning, values, and attitudes, significantly affecting judgments.15 Thus, tolerance, moderation, and consideration for others should characterize responses of Malay participants on the PAIRTAPS instrument. As described below, this does, for the most part, seem to be the case. The Chinese and Indian respondents are not bound by adat; however, Confucianism and Hindu beliefs are also collectivistic and peaceful, overall. Sample and Procedures The Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS), described elsewhere in this volume, was translated into Malay from English. A paper-and-pencil version of the survey was distributed to a representative sample of 150 Malay citizens by faculty and students at the University of Malaya. Ages of respondents ranged from 18 to 32, with an average age of 23. Approximately half were male and half were female. Sixty percent listed their ethnicity as Malay; Chinese, Indian, and indigenous citizens were also proportionally represented. Responses were back-translated from Malay into English. Data were analyzed by members of the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP) at Boston University.

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PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION ‘‘[War is] a chaotic environment within a country due to political, economical, cultural, and religious issues.’’ ‘‘Invasion is a crime.’’ ‘‘Torture and killing are against the law, uncultured, and rude.’’ War and Invasion The Malaysian participants’ definitions of war often included or consisted of strong moral judgments. War was defined as ‘‘inhumane,’’ ‘‘immoral actions,’’ ‘‘a terrible event that occurs through battles’’ and ‘‘the result of satisfying materialistic status without regard for humanity.’’ Emphasis was also put on the consequences of war: ‘‘chaos,’’ ‘‘bloodshed,’’ and ‘‘inflicting calamity, despair, destruction of properties toward a particular country.’’ Fifteen percent of the definitions also included explanations and justifications for war, such as ‘‘a violent action to uphold justice,’’ ‘‘an act to protect a country from its enemies,’’ ‘‘something which involves a group which is greedy to be in power’’ or ‘‘conquering another country to gain economic benefits.’’ Overall, the responses were not surprising in light of Malay history and culture. They reflected a peaceful but pragmatic group of citizens with a collective orientation who have always striven for tolerance and cooperation, yet been conquered in the past by other groups without similar values for group decision making, tolerance, and cooperation. Perspectives on invasion showed a similar orientation. Over 80 percent of the respondents disagreed strongly with the statement ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country.’’ Many of the qualitative responses were largely restatements of the item; for example, ‘‘No, countries definitely have no right to invade.’’ Another substantial group of responses focused on the outcomes of invasion: ‘‘Invasion causes suffering and negative impact in the long term’’; ‘‘It destroys a country’s own people’’; ‘‘makes matters worse’’; and ‘‘is considered humiliating to other people.’’ Another major theme was a focus on the state right to sovereignty: ‘‘Invasion is trespassing and is an international crime.’’ ‘‘Every country has its own identity and should not be invaded.’’ ‘‘Tainting the sovereignty of a country is a despicable act.’’ Some of the responses included references to relevant historical events, such as ‘‘A country has no right to invade or trespass on another country regardless of circumstances. An example is the America vs. Iraq War’’ and ‘‘Imperialism does not exist any more, so power expansion should not occur.’’ The minority of respondents who were not strongly opposed to invasion generally qualified their answers by saying, ‘‘it depends on the

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situation’’ or ‘‘only okay if help is needed, for example in a country that oppresses its citizens.’’ ‘‘It can be done for peace and security,’’ and ‘‘okay if fighting is to preserve peace, e.g., the Palestine issue.’’ Attitudes toward Terrorism and Torture When asked ‘‘What is your definition of terrorism?’’ only one respondent defined it in a way that showed some tolerance for terrorism, writing ‘‘Terrorists are a group that fight for their unfulfilled rights.’’ The rest of the definitions revealed very negative conceptions of terrorism. More than half of the definitions included moral terms such as ‘‘evil,’’ ‘‘savagery,’’ ‘‘a wrong method,’’ and ‘‘bad behavior.’’ Thirty-seven percent of the answers simply defined it as destruction and violence. An additional 2 percent focused on motives for terrorism, indicating, for example, that it is motivated by an attempt to disrupt the current government by causing harm and fear. In response to the item ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in times of war,’’ fewer than 10 percent of the responses revealed any support for such a right. Even respondents who indicated some agreement attached qualifiers to their explanations, asserting, for example, that governments might have such a right ‘‘but the punishment must be accepted by the United Nations’’ and ‘‘only to get important information for the sake of the country.’’ The vast majority held that there were no circumstances in which death or torture could ever be justified. ‘‘The government has no right to do that.’’ Some of the arguments against torture were based on ethical or religious principles: ‘‘Even in the times of the Prophet, they were treated decently and their welfare taken care of.’’ People are ‘‘not supposed to act cruelly’’ and ‘‘tyranny is a sin.’’ ‘‘Prisoners are also human beings and have feelings.’’ Other responses focused more on torture as a violation of basic human rights. In addition, several responses proposed better alternatives to torture: ‘‘The government must not give orders for terrorists or prisoners to be tortured. Instead, it should educate them and advise them not to repeat their mistakes.’’ Despite the relatively strong desire for national security expressed (73 percent agreed that national security is essential to individual and family security), the great majority of Malaysian respondents did not consider national security to be a justification for torture or killing. ‘‘Who is the government to kill civilians?’’ ‘‘They have no right to kill. It is a severe sin.’’ ‘‘It is against human rights to kill.’’ ‘‘Life cannot be bought, sold, destroyed or exchanged.’’ ‘‘Use the brain, not the pistol.’’ Contrary to the stereotypic image of Muslim countries that currently seems to be prevalent in America, the Malay sample indicates a country

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opposed to torture and killing under any circumstances. The Malaysian respondents favor rehabilitation of terrorists and are strongly against war. They are tolerant and moderate, favoring cooperation, collectivism, and peaceful resolution of problems. In fact, less than 1 percent of the over 1,500 comments provided in the sample could in any way be construed as anti-Semitic or anti-American. Religion is important and Islam characterizes the country, yet within Malaysia it is a unifying rather than a divisive force.

PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE AND PROTEST ‘‘All humans deserve peace and must protect each other.’’ ‘‘[Peace is] an aspiration for the development of a country and its citizens.’’ ‘‘[Protest is] very important in a democratic country which allows citizens to voice their opinions.’’ ‘‘Currently all of the countries want globalization without giving priority to world peace.’’ Several questions on the survey related to perspectives on peace and the right to stage protests in support of peace. In response to the statement ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace,’’ 99 percent of the respondents agreed. Qualitative responses fell into six general categories: (1) It is a right for all; (2) It is a necessity and an obligation; (3) It is an ideal state that humans should try to achieve, although it may not be possible; (4) It is a conditional right, depending on circumstances; (5) It is a choice, and up to individuals whether they live in peace or with violence and war; and (6) It is not a basic right. Eighty-eight percent of the responses fell into the first general category, ‘‘It is a right.’’ Within this category, 33 of the responses restated or asserted the right to peace without further comments. Some examples of these were as follows: ‘‘Peace is for every one of us’’; ‘‘Peace should be enjoyed by every human being’’; and ‘‘Peace belongs to us all.’’ Thirty-nine percent of the responses cited developmental and psychological consequences of not living in peace for individuals or for society. It is not surprising, based on the collectivity and communal aspects of adat recounted above, the majority of these responses referred to social (e.g., ‘‘Peace is necessary for the country to continue living’’) rather than individual outcomes (e.g., ‘‘If one does not live in peace, the heart will be restless and one will face a chaotic life’’). One percent of the responses fell into the second general category, characterizing peace as a duty and obligation. ‘‘Yes, as a lawful citizen, one must protect and

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not destroy peace,’’ wrote one respondent. Again, the majority of the answers reflected collective, social orientations rather than individual orientations; typical responses were ‘‘Peace is important to the country,’’ and ‘‘Peace must continue to exist for the sake of the prosperity of all human beings.’’ About 9 percent of the responses fell into the third general category, portraying peace as an ideal; for example, ‘‘Every human wants peace’’; ‘‘Peace must eventually be achieved for all’’; and ‘‘Peace can be achieved if we unite.’’ The definitions of peace were about equally divided between those that referred to a positive state and those that referred to the absence of a negative state. As with other answers, group well-being was stressed more than individual well-being. Positive states of peace were described as ‘‘A country in a comfort zone without political and economic problems’’; ‘‘Safe surroundings’’; ‘‘Tranquility for all’’; ‘‘A good two-way relationship’’; and ‘‘Society living together.’’ Peace was also described as ‘‘An agreement made by two or more countries,’’ ‘‘Harmony, happiness and tolerance,’’ and ‘‘Reconciliation and well-being for all.’’ Definitions of peace that identified it with the absence of negative states included ‘‘No war, no violation of human rights and no invasion’’; ‘‘A condition free from violence’’; ‘‘Freedom from internal and external war’’; and ‘‘No physical or mental conflict.’’ Despite the strong conviction that peace is a basic right for all, 25 percent of the sample do not believe it is likely world peace can be achieved. Only two responses expressed full agreement with the achievability of world peace, and two more indicated that peace could be achieved some time in the future. Forty-four percent of the responses suggested that peace could be achieved under certain conditions; for example, if we ‘‘follow Islamic teachings’’; ‘‘are responsible’’; ‘‘each uphold human rights’’; ‘‘live in tolerance’’; ‘‘work together’’; and ‘‘cooperate.’’ Those who were not sure it was possible to achieve peace said, ‘‘it is not easy because there is no understanding.’’ Those who believed it is impossible to achieve world peace gave responses such as ‘‘judging from the current situations in the world, it is impossible’’; ‘‘countries are easy to bribe’’; ‘‘as long as there are differences in philosophy, peace will never be achieved’’; and ‘‘as long as there are humans there will be no peace’’; ‘‘because the needs and feelings of every individual are distinct’’; and ‘‘humans are always dissatisfied with what they have.’’ Protest Over 85 percent of the respondents agreed that ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace.’’ Many made

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strong statements such as ‘‘This is obligatory,’’ and ‘‘We need to do anything for the sake of peace.’’ Protest is ‘‘important to prevent war.’’ Even those participants who were not sure that individuals have such a right or who disagreed with the statement qualified their answers by saying protest is inappropriate if it violates the laws of the country in which one lives or ‘‘if there are more appropriate ways.’’ Peaceful protest was stressed. ‘‘The protest to the government must be done peacefully.’’ ‘‘There should be no hassle, with the aim to be for the government to listen to the people’s voice.’’ Protests should ‘‘follow the appropriate procedure’’ and ‘‘the demonstration must be peaceful and controlled.’’ ‘‘Just be sure the protests do not disturb the peacefulness of the community.’’

CONCLUSIONS The struggle among Malays over the proper relationship between the Malaysian state and Islam in everyday life has long roots. Recent Malaysian social and developmental policies termed Islam Hadhari (Civilization of Islam) stress piety and faith in Allah combined with public morality, integrity, mastery of science, and attainment of a high standard of living. Malaysians seek to maintain a fully developed, prosperous, and ethical society that embraces science and protects the rights of all Malaysians, regardless of religion or ethnic background. Moderation, tolerance, and national unity have long been stressed in Malaysia. Overall, as Ben Thirkell White notes, ‘‘Malaysia provides a marked contrast to much of the Middle East where Islamic radicalism has built on the failures of authoritarian regimes. Relatively good governance in Malaysia, rapid poverty reduction, expanding employment opportunities for Malays and so on has undermined popular support for a radical agenda or for the kinds of social movements that might support violent opposition to westernization.’’16 The history of Malaysia, a tolerant, multilingual, multicultural trade center for millennia that values collectivity, cooperation, hospitality, and adat is probably what is most responsible for the tolerant, peace-loving views expressed by Malaysian citizens in response to the PAIRTAPS.

7

Australia James Page

War is . . . ‘‘Invasion of a powerless country by a country that is powerful’’; ‘‘Blood, terror, unnecessary killing’’; ‘‘Two or more bodies engaging in conflict, over land, ideology, religion or power.’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘harmonious co-operation between groups and individuals’’; ‘‘No war, hatred, terrorism, all people living equally’’; ‘‘freedom to live as you want as long as you are respecting the rights of those around you.’’ Understanding any society is an enduring challenge. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the social attitudes of Australians toward governmental violence and peace. Australia is a relatively sparsely populated yet economically prosperous nation of some 21 million people, inhabiting a resource-rich continent of some 7.6 million square kilometers. The nation is a parliamentary democracy, with a federal division of power between national and state governments. At the current time, Australia also remains a constitutional monarchy, with Queen Elizabeth II as head of state, although there have been increasingly popular calls for Australia to become a republic. The two major political parties in Australia both favor, to varying degrees, the maintenance of a strong military alliance with the United States. Australia’s economic prosperity is reflected in its current world rank of third on the Human Development Index,1 as developed by the United Nations Human Development Programme. Australia is substantially a neo-European settler society within what is known as the IndoPacific region. The population is mainly of European descent and mainly adherents of Christianity, although increased Asian migration within the past three decades has resulted in an increasingly multicultural and multiracial society. Australian English is the national

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language. The settler basis of the country has also tended to shape the international outlook of Australia, in that Australia has tended to see itself as an outpost, surrounded by enemies, and in need of cultivating superpower friendships. It is an adage of contemporary cultural anthropology that any ethnography of a culture needs to be undertaken by an outsider, or, in the words of Michael Agar, the professional stranger.2 The reason for this is that just as it is often difficult to know oneself, so too it can be difficult to know one’s own culture. This study is not quite an ethnography. The study uses a sociometric device, the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS). However, a substantial part of the study involves contextualizing and interpreting the open-ended responses to the survey. And in this case the writer is an Australian citizen. Thus, the complexities of writing about one’s own culture do come into play. Examining some of the cultural stereotypes of Australian society is important, because understanding and interpreting the culture of a country is not something that occurs in a vacuum. Our attitudes are mediated through a cultural mileux. Therefore, if we want to understand social attitudes on a specific issue, we need to look at the cultural stereotypes that will frame those understandings. This is especially so when we examine perspectives on peace and war, because peace and war are very closely linked with national identity. As the nation-state is often defined by war and conquest, so too does the national image often center on war. I suggest that in Australia, there are two major competing images; these are addressed in the next section.

PEACE, WAR, AND AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY Within popular culture, there is an enduring and powerful image of Australians as peaceful. The peaceful Australian image is very much relaxed and hedonistic, centered upon sporting achievement and enjoying life. If one is committed to enjoying life, then commitment to war does not have much appeal. The relaxed and hedonistic image is mediated and reinforced through popular culture, film, and music. The peace researcher Kenneth Boulding once queried why the social violence that had bedevilled South America had not occurred in Australia. His assessment was that there was a relaxed aspect to the Australian society, which in effect promoted a society that was more tolerant and less prone to militarism.3 The peaceful image of Australians is complemented by the tradition of egalitarianism. The writer D. H. Lawrence once famously said that Australians would regard a fellow national citizen as being better off,

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but never better.4 The egalitarianism of Australians is perhaps best expressed through the concept of mateship, which involves helping and standing by a fellow citizen in some kind of trouble.5 The egalitarian mind-set of Australians is also very antiauthoritarian and arguably also antimilitary. Even in time of war, Australian troops have not enjoyed a good reputation for conformity to military discipline and protocol. Australians are not good militarists. There is, however, a dark side to Australian attitudes to peace and war, one that suggests a deep level of denial. At a fundamental level, Australia constitutes a settler society, where a territory already occupied by an indigenous people was expropriated and occupied by incoming settlers. Often this occupation of the Australian subcontinent was associated with protracted frontier wars between the occupying forces and the indigenous Aboriginal population, with an inevitable victory to the technologically superior settler forces. Worse was to follow, with massacres, and depopulation through disease and enforced assimilation. Aboriginal Australians were forced to live on reserves and mission stations, and for many decades children were taken away from their natural families. It has been only in recent years that the injustices perpetrated on Aboriginal peoples have begun to be recognized by Australian society. The Human Relations Commission Report Bringing Them Home acknowledged that genocide had been perpetrated upon the Aboriginal peoples.6 In 1992, the High Court of Australia recognized, through the Mabo decision, that Australia had not been a terra nullius (empty territory) and that there was a prior Aboriginal occupation of the continent.7 In 2008, the Australian Parliament finally issued a formal apology to the Aboriginal peoples for the past wrongs committed upon them.8 An element of denial arguably applies also to Australian participation in war. Australia has a record of regular participation in imperialistic wars, such as the Sudan War (1885), the Boer War (1899–1902), and World War I (1914–1918). Even Australia’s entry into World War II (1939–1945) was announced in imperialist terms by then Prime Minister Menzies, who indicated that because Britain was at war then Australia too was at war.9 Since that time, Australia has been a participant in the Korean War (1950–1953), the Vietnam War (1962–1972), the Gulf War (1991), and the invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). A governmental eagerness to commit to war does not necessarily reflect social attitudes. However, Australians continue to elect governments that are either pro-war or at the least tolerate war as a technique of global politics. It is true that in recent decades Australia has been active in peacekeeping actions, both those sanctioned by the United Nations and those with regional sanction. The prominent peacekeeping commitments in

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recent time have included operations in Cambodia (UNTAC and UNAMIC) 1991–1993, Somalia (UNOSOMI, II, and UNITAF) 1992–1995, Bougainville (PMG) from 1998 to 2003, Timor Leste (INTERFET, UNTAET, UNMISET, and UNOTIL) from 1999 to the present, the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) from 2000 to the present, Sudan (UNMIS) 2005 to the present, and Dafur (UNAMID) 2007 to the present. Of the above, the peacekeeping missions within the local region (i.e., in Bougainville, Timor Leste, and the Solomon Islands) have been the most substantial. Nevertheless, it is still true to say that most of Australia’s military involvement has not been of a peacekeeping nature and has been in arenas with at best a tenuous relationship to the defense of Australia.10 What is arguably the central role of war in the Australian national psyche is symbolized in the Australian commemoration of war, and in particular the commemoration of the unsuccessful invasion of the Gallipoli peninsula in Turkey in 1915. The first day of the invasion, April 25, is celebrated nationally as Anzac Day, after an acronym for the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, and functions as an effective national day for Australia. The invasion at Gallipoli is often cited as the moment that the Australian national consciousness commenced;11 the centrality of war in Australian history and its national psyche is reflected in the central place of war memorials in the Australian landscape.12 However, not all Australians are comfortable with the way the Anzac legend and the memorialization of war have tended to dominate Australian nationalism. The sociologist Ken Inglis suggests that the memorialization of war has tended to become a form of worship in Australia, such that the Anzac culture now constitutes a secular cult.13 Former priest Michael McGirr is even more scathing. Describing the Australian obsession with memorializing war, he writes: The remembrance of war [in Australia] is moving from the personal to the public sphere, and that, from a description of something unspeakable to something about which you can never say enough . . . As ideology comes to replace history, there are fewer and fewer faces to go with the stories. They have been replaced by a lather of cliches, most of which are as much about filling a void in the narcissistic present as lending dignity to the past. People seem now to believe that in looking at the Anzacs they are looking at themselves. They aren’t. The dead deserve more respect than to be used to make ourselves feel larger.14

The comments from McGirr are not entirely unique to the Australian context. Nationalism can function as a means of generating meaning. However, there are aspects of Australia’s diffuse origins, with an indigenous Aboriginal heritage, followed by waves of Anglo-Irish, Southern European, and now increasingly Asian migration, that make it difficult

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to define what it means to be Australian. The nationalistic temptation is to look back to an era of heroism in time of war and then to say that this is what it means to be Australian. Reasons for Australian Involvement in War McGirr’s views on the commemoration of the Gallipoli invasion also suggest an obvious reason why Australia has so regularly committed troops to conflict, in that there is a degree of mythmaking about how noble the military adventures in Australia’s past have been. If one believes that military involvement in the past was worthwhile, then it is likely that as a nation people will be likely to engage in further military conflict. The sacrificial involvement in the military commitment can, paradoxically, serve to strengthen the idea of the nobility of the venture. Sacrifice is generally regarded as something noble, an idea that is sometimes extended to imply an inherent nobility to military commitment. Another explanation for Australia’s willingness to engage in war may be located in the sense of unease that Australians often feel due to geographical location. Australia has long been a predominantly European country in the midst of the Indo-Pacific region and moreover a country with sparse population inhabiting a country of extensive resources. Thus, Australia has sought to ally itself with superpowers, namely, Britain and more recently the United States, and through such alliances Australia has often been committed, or believed it was committed, to go to war. The current formal alliance with the United States is the ANZUS (Australian New Zealand and United States) Treaty, which, among other things, commits members to regard an armed attack on any one of them as an attack on the others. Most recently, Australia justified its participation in the so-called War on Terrorism by citing the obligations of the ANZUS Treaty. Yet perhaps a more basic explanation of the willingness of Australians to commit to armed conflict may be found in the so-called war weariness hypothesis. This is essentially a psychological theory of war causation, suggesting that a nation commits to war either because it has not suffered extensive casualties in a recent war or because the generation that has truly experienced the horror of war starts to die out. It is a hypothesis with many supporters. Arnold Toynbee suggested that survivors of military conflict tend to be reticent about repeating the tragedy upon their own generation or their children.15 Lewis Richardson wrote that extensive experience of war tends to convey immunity on those who have experienced such war.16 There may be something to this hypothesis with regard to the attitude of Australians to war and peace. Indeed, this is suggested by the previous comments by Michael McGirr.

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If we examine Australian history through the lens of the war-weariness theory, the suffering of the indigenous Aboriginal people due to frontier wars and occupation has been largely marginalized and is now only beginning to be recognized. Australian troops did suffer extensive casualties during World War I. However, at no time was there any large-scale invasion of Australia, and at no time have there been large-scale civilian casualties in time of war. There are now no survivors who can relate firsthand the terrors of warfare from World War I. By contrast, World War II is often regarded as a good war, and by extension, an example of how governmental violence can be redemptive. The recent military involvement of Australia in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq has resulted in comparatively few Australian casualties—tragic of course to the individuals and families involved, although nothing like on the scale of Gallipoli and the Western Front during 1914–1918. All this begs the question of what do ordinary Australians think about war and peace. How pacific or bellicose are Australians? The most obvious action is to ask ordinary people, and this is exactly what this sociometric survey set out to do.

AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION AND PEACE The opening questions of the PAIRTAPS invited respondents to identify gender, social class, education, military service, peace activist experience, and protest experience. These questions were important, because they make it possible to explore connections between self-identifications and perspectives on social-political issues. For instance, one might assume that individuals with military experience might be more sympathetic to the need for governmental violence and less sympathetic to seeing peace as a right. However, equally, one might argue that direct experience might make respondents more pacific, as indeed suggested last century by the war weariness hypothesis advanced by Toynbee and Richardson. The sections of the PAIRTAPS addressed in this chapter include questions concerning the extent to which governments have the right to use violence and individuals have a right to live in peace; items asking for definitions of war, peace, terrorism, and several other terms; and items asking in what ways global peace and security might be achieved. On the items concerning governmental and individual rights, respondents first indicated their level of agreement with statements on sevenpoint scales ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree) and then explained their rating scale responses in their own

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words. It is their explanations concerning potential rights to aggression and peace and their definitions of the key terms that are of most interest in this chapter. Sample Demographics In general terms, the respondents constituted a wide sample of Australian society, involving a total of 272 people, with relatively equal representation by gender. Ages ranged from 18 to 66, with a mean age of 35, and education level ranged from no postsecondary education to completion of higher degrees. Most participants were employed; for example, self-employed, in management, in professions, in contract employment, or in casual and part-time employment. Some participants were students, and a few were unemployed or in unskilled work. The sample revealed a wide range of political and religious affiliations. Australia is very much a migrant country, which is reflected in the fact that 13 percent of the sample indicated that they were born outside of Australia, and 38 percent of the sample had at least one parent born outside of Australia. The ethnic identification of respondents included Aboriginal, Anglo-Celtic, Asian, and European, although approximately 26 percent of the respondents simply listed ‘‘Australian’’ as an ethnic identification. One can only speculate as to what individual respondents meant by this, but a reasonable assumption is that ‘‘Australian,’’ in this sense, denotes Anglo-Celtic, which is a dated conception of national identity. There is clearly no reason to believe that an Australian citizen of Asian or indeed Aboriginal descent is any less an Australian than those of the majority Anglo-Celtic descent. The social class identification of respondents was interesting, especially given that egalitarianism is an important theme for Australians. As indicated previously, the notion that a person might be materially better off than others but not substantially better than others is important for Australians. Traditionally, there has not been a strong class consciousness in Australia, yet the current sample sorted itself into social classes, with 17 percent identifying themselves as working class, 4 percent as lower class, 56 percent as middle class, and 23 percent as upper class. One of the key background factors in a survey such as this is military service. This is not to say that one ought to privilege the view of individuals in the armed forces. However, a potential problem with a survey dealing with peace issues is that respondents may disproportionately have a predisposition to the peace movement. To achieve balance within the sample recruitment process, efforts were made to circulate the survey to Listservs of military personnel. The result was that the survey does

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include a good coverage of those within the community with a background of military service. Some 28 percent of respondents indicated that they had been in military service and many of those indicated they were still serving. Some 10 percent of the sample indicated that they had seen combat. Given the fact that Australia has been readily involved in wars over the past two centuries, it is not surprising that 64 percent of the sample indicated that they had a member of their family who was in or had been in military service. These respondents often identified that family member as someone who would generally be regarded as a member of the extended family (i.e., an uncle or grandparent). Sometimes the military service was with another country. Overall, the frequency of respondents with a relative who had served in the military is a reminder of the influence of veterans within Australia, especially through powerful veterans’ organizations, such as the Returned Services League (RSL). If one asks about the military experience of respondents, it is only reasonable by way of balance to ask also about any conflict resolution or peace education training. Some 26 percent of the sample had been involved in such training. The understanding of what constituted peace-oriented training was very broad, ranging from workshops in nonviolence to conflict resolution within a workplace setting. Some 39 percent of respondents indicated that they had participated at some stage in some form of peace protest. This participation ranged from the conventional mechanisms of protest, such as petitions and marches, to the more unusual, such as an ‘‘all female nude protest’’ held in Byron Bay, on the north coast of New South Wales, against the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Australian Perceptions on Aggression ‘‘I don’t agree with war but in circumstances like ww2 countries have had to invade to save human life.’’ ‘‘As much as governments deny it, invasion is only acted out for personal gain.’’ ‘‘Torture is too deliberate and too horrific to be allowed, especially for it to be a right.’’ ‘‘The government killing innocent civilians is a form of terrorism and is possibly even worse than guerrilla terrorism, which is by no means justifiable but is used in order to make a statement.’’ The item ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country’’ elicited a wide range of responses. The most common rating scale response, found in approximately 25 percent of the sample, indicated

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total disagreement. Yet there was wide variation of opinion; although just over 50 percent indicated some level of disagreement with the proposition, 40 percent indicated some level of agreement with it. This variation in opinion is to be expected, as current international law generally supports the principle of nonintervention in state matters, although there are important exceptions, such as provided in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide17 and by conditions specified in the Charter of the United Nations.18 Respondents generally followed this line of argument that invasion of another country ought only to be countenanced in extreme circumstances. In many cases, the argumentation from respondents on this issue was similar to the debate over just war theory—the idea that nationstates are allowed or do have a right to invade others, although only in extreme and defined circumstances. Yet one 38-year-old male respondent insightfully commented that invasion is allowable ‘‘only when the justification is real and not contrived as an excuse to invade.’’ It was interesting that many respondents focused on the recent invasion of Iraq as an instance of how invasion of another country was not justified; by contrast, many respondents identified the invasion of Nazi Germany as an instance of a justified invasion. A few respondents took the logical step of questioning the notion of state sovereignty; for instance, one 26-year-old male respondent suggested that ‘‘There probably shouldn’t even be ‘countries.’ As long as we have them, though, and as long as we believe in the concept of national sovereignty, then there cannot be a case made for invasion.’’ There was strong sentiment against the proposition that ‘‘Governments have the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war,’’ with 59 percent of the sample indicating total disagreement. One strong set of themes that emerged in the qualitative responses focused on human rights and argued that torture is prohibited by international law, especially the Geneva Convention. Another theme was the argument that torture was not practical, summed up by a 28-year-old male respondent with the comment that ‘‘torture is an ineffective interrogation technique—people will confess to anything under torture.’’ Three respondents argued what might be called an existential theme, namely, that if one uses torture one becomes no better than one’s enemies. In regard to a right to torture, it was again the dissenting opinions that were the most interesting. One 21-year-old female respondent argued that torture might be justifiable when ‘‘prisoners have information that could save a city and thousands of people,’’ and a 46-year-old male respondent wrote, ‘‘There may be a time when the safety of a large number of people overrides the rights of any individual.’’ This is indeed the classic utilitarian argument in favor of the use of torture, and the fact that

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torture may be justifiable from a utilitarian perspective is one of the standard critiques of utilitarian ethics. Use of this argument does demonstrate that there is some moral complexity to this issue. Similar issues emerged in responses to the item on a potential governmental right to torture. The proposition was that ‘‘Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism,’’ and, as with the invasion item, there was a strong sentiment against the proposition, with some 70 percent of the sample indicating total disagreement. In regard to this issue of civilian casualties, 13 respondents (5 percent) emphasized what might be called the existential issue, suggesting that in killing innocent civilians, one becomes just like terrorists, and therefore this action is self-defeating. Others (3 percent) took a more utilitarian position, arguing that some killing of civilians might be justifiable on proportional or last-resort grounds. Others (13 percent) argued that ‘‘collateral damage’’ was inevitable in the struggle against terrorism. One 31-year-old female respondent made a specific suggestion for dealing with terrorism. The respondent argued that treating terrorism as an act of war, paradoxically, legitimates terrorism, because in any war there are always two sides. Thus, the solution is that ‘‘Terrorism should be dealt with through domestic or international criminal courts.’’ There are indeed legal capacities at both an Australian and international level to allow this judicial approach to be undertaken. In other words, there is the potential for an accused terrorist to be brought to court, both in Australian and international jurisdictions. Such an approach, of course, does not have the popular appeal of waging a supposed ‘‘war’’ against terrorism. Individual Rights to Peace and Protest ‘‘[Peace is] a basic human right not requiring justification.’’ ‘‘What is happy life without peace of some kind?’’ ‘‘Peaceful protests are democratic and vox populi.’’ ‘‘Silence is being permissive of war.’’ In addition to items asking for judgments concerning the potential rights of governments to act aggressively, there were several items addressing the potential rights of individuals to live in peace and protest in favor of peace. For example, one item invited responses to the proposition ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace.’’ This proposition has precedence in international law. The right to peace was recognized in 1984 by the United Nations General Assembly, with the resolution Declaration on the Right of the Peoples of the World to Peace.19

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The notion of a right to peace has also been espoused by writers such as Douglas Roche,20 the rationale being that if peace is a right, then it ought to be something that we demand, rather than merely aspire to. The response of the Australian sample to the proposition on the right to peace was a massive 87 percent total agreement with the proposition. Respondents indicating total agreement often suggested that the proposition was so self-evident that it did not need explaining. One 54-year-old male respondent wrote indignantly, ‘‘I can’t believe that you even left space for an explanation to this question.’’ Another 26-year-old male commented that ‘‘If we don’t start from this premise, then hope for peace is lost.’’ It was interesting that the minority reaction (25 percent) against considering peace a universal right was also voiced vehemently. A 24-year-old male respondent described the idea of the right to peace as ‘‘a pointless feely good statement that means absolutely nothing’’; another 28year-old male suggested that ‘‘Peace is nice, but to say everyone has a right to peace is just [a] meaningless motherhood statement that has no real bearing on the real world’’; and a 45-year-old female suggested that ‘‘Peace is generally highly desirable, but if you find yourself being attacked, you have to respond. Citing a basic right to peace is meaningless.’’ Some reactions (10 percent of the responses) against the rightto-peace proposition also used the language of realism, arguing that the world is simply not like this. Other responses were more considered, such as the 37-year-old male who argued: ‘‘I am not sure there is a right to peace—we can work towards it but it requires individual choice by all to make it happen.’’ One 25-year-old male suggested that ‘‘This right would place unreasonable demands upon the population of the world.’’ One wonders what was the nature of these supposed unreasonable demands the respondent was thinking of—perhaps we might need to actually question our reliance on the military as means of policy? Perhaps we might need to rethink global governance? There was a theme of pessimism toward human nature in isolated comments. One 21-year-old female respondent wrote, ‘‘We should do what we can to make [world peace] happen, but it isn’t a right. Our sin caused this world to be the way it is—we lost the right to live in a perfect world.’’ Another 21-year-old female wrote, ‘‘People should be treated how they treat others,’’ implying that those who perpetrate violence ought to expect violence in return. Yet another 21-year-old female wrote, ‘‘Many people don’t deserve that right [the right to peace] considering their actions.’’ Responses to the right-to-peace item also included some specific suggestions as to how peace might be implemented as a universal human

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right. One 57-year-old female wrote that ‘‘we need education to understand this and develop this by learning how to be peaceful in every moment, through mindfulness and meditation.’’ A 59-year-old female suggested that ‘‘If diplomats were trained with as much vigour as soldiers, surely peace would be more likely to break out.’’ The final insight on the notion of peace as a universal right was a very simple one, and this came from a 57-year-female who wrote, ‘‘Some [people] actually appear to enjoy fighting and war.’’ This simple insight is often not recognized in writing on peace and war. If peace is a right, then it follows that the citizen ought to have the right to assert that right; consequently, participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement to the proposition that ‘‘Citizens have a right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace.’’ As was the case with the right-to-peace item, the right-to-protest item received strong support, with 72 percent of the sample indicating that they totally agreed with the proposition. In the comments there were, however, two important qualifications. One qualification (22 percent of the responses) was that protests should always remain nonviolent. The other was a note of caution that protests might not achieve anything. One interesting individual comment (from a 34-year-old male) was that ‘‘it says a lot about society that the only way one can voice opposition to war is through a protest’’; the implication of the comment was that there ought to be more formal democratic channels. Responses to the right-to-protest item included repeated references to the basic human right to voice dissent (23 percent of the responses). However, one 47-year-old female went beyond a simple assertion of the right and specifically made the connection between the right to peace and the right to protest about the peace. This particular respondent wrote, ‘‘Government cannot be allowed to wage war unimpeded—it is a democratic right to voice dissent.’’ The responses to the protest item by individuals serving in the military were of particular interest. In general, individuals in the armed forces agreed that there was a right to peace or antiwar protest, although the agreement was not total and was qualified. The common theme among these respondents, understandably, was that protest ought not to be directed at the members of the military. One 22-yearold female wrote, ‘‘People should have the right to be heard by their government; however, if the government decides to go ahead and send soldiers to war, they [the soldiers] should not be persecuted for doing their job,’’ and a 24-year-old male wrote, ‘‘Those who serve a country must never be subjected to hatred for merely executing a legal order given by their command.’’ The last comment, of course, begs the question of what is a legal order within a military context.

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Another survey item asked participants to indicate their level of agreement with the item ‘‘I believe that world peace can be achieved.’’ This is a simple item that seeks the respondents’ views on the prospects for world peace. The significance of the item is that one’s view of the world is the view that one will tend to work to confirm. In other words, if we believe that world peace can be achieved, then we are more likely to work to actualize that goal. If we don’t believe that world peace can be achieved, then we obviously will not work to achieve it, as the effort can be expended elsewhere. Respondents seemed generally unsure as to how to respond to this item. Approximately 46 percent of the sample indicated some disagreement with the proposition, and 32 percent indicated some agreement. No single type of argument dominated the explanations of the rating scale responses. However, it is fair to say that a certain deterministic pessimism pervaded the arguments. Typical comments were ‘‘people by nature are selfish and power hungry, and people . . . have been causing wars since humans evolved’’ (20-year-old female); ‘‘human nature is to hurt and destroy’’ (20-year-old female); ‘‘people are fundamentally selfish and stupid’’ (28year-old male); and ‘‘whilst there are angry men in the world, and greed and power, I seriously doubt that there will be peace’’ (35-year-old female). One 40-year-old male and a member of the Australian military forces wrote, with some determination, ‘‘I have been to combat in the Middle East and Asia—and there is no way that world peace can be achieved.’’ There was even a sense of despair within some of the comments (17 percent) expressing a desire for world peace. One 32-year-old female respondent wrote, ‘‘I hope world peace can be achieved, but I feel completely useless in working out how to do it. I just try to make the bit of the world I touch a better place for me having been in it.’’ Despite the general pessimism, there was a range of suggestions as to how world peace might be achieved. These included education for understanding and tolerance; strengthening and/or renewing the United Nations system and international courts; changing the financial incentive for war; creating a cultural change toward nonviolence; unwinding nationalism as a world force; introducing some form of world government; diverting energies toward space exploration; and exploring one’s own self-awareness. The remarkable aspect of the responses was that despite pessimism and despair, almost everybody had some suggestion to make about the attainment of world peace; world peace was a near universal aspiration. The final item that respondents were invited to consider was the proposition ‘‘National Security is essential for family and individual security.’’ Perspectives on security are important because national security tends to function as a dominating concept in our understanding of global conflict

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and peace. Responses tended to support this proposition, with only 17 percent of the sample indicating some degree of disagreement and 66 percent of the sample indicating some degree of agreement with the proposition. Yet it was interesting that no one theme dominated the qualitative responses. The majority views tended to be relatively straightforward. Typical responses were ‘‘National security is in place to protect our country’’ (21-year-old female); ‘‘if people live in a nation that is not safe and secure, they cannot feel safe and secure’’ (21-year-old female); and ‘‘I think you need to have national security or a perception of it to ensure you feel safe within your own environment. If your neighbourhood/country is constantly under threat then your actions will reflect this, i.e., you will live prepared to fight or flight’’ (40-year-old male). A number of people did indicate some concern as to what ‘‘national security’’ actually meant, suggesting that it was a ‘‘loaded term’’ in the current political lexicon. The minority views took a number of forms. Some (3 percent of the responses) suggested that the notion of national security was central to the problem of world peace, because concern for national security can prompt aggression against other countries. One 39-year-old female respondent wrote at length on the ‘‘security dilemma’’ engendered by a concentration upon national security, whereby a nation invested vast amounts of resources into making itself militarily secure, although that investment tended to make its neighbors less secure themselves, and thus was self-defeating. Another minority view (5 percent) emphasized the importance of inner security or inner peace, as opposed to national security. One 21-year-old female respondent wrote that ‘‘people can feel secure in themselves’’ and a 34-year-old male wrote ‘‘the responsibility is on the individual to find the truth within themselves.’’ When respondents were invited to indicate the best way to achieve security for individuals and families through the world, they suggested a range of measures, including redistribution of world resources; educating for tolerance and nonviolence; reducing spending on armaments and increasing spending on education and health; strengthening the United Nations and international courts; reduction of poverty and the improvement of food security; and ‘‘adoption of a global peaceful worldview’’ (30-year-old female). It is noteworthy that not one respondent, even those respondents employed within the military, suggested that increased military spending or increased military preparedness would help improve national security. Defining War, Peace, and Terrorism When providing definitions of war, many participants focused on the conventional understanding of war as constituting armed conflict

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between countries or nation-states. However, equally many definitions acknowledged that war does not necessarily involve nation-states and can consist of armed conflict between other types of groups. Thus, a 26-year-old male respondent wrote that war is ‘‘when two or more groups of people (people who identify together strongly) wage an aggressive campaign against each other’s wellbeing.’’ Others were direct about the motivations or purposes of war, emphasizing the intention to kill and injure to gain objectives. One 20-year-old female respondent wrote that war is ‘‘a means by which governments are allowed to murder innocent people for their own political reasons.’’ Defining terrorism is a difficult enterprise, and many attempts at a definition by the United Nations have proven unsuccessful. One 32-year-old male respondent defined terrorism as ‘‘the use of violence to incite terror amongst a population and disrupt their way of life,’’ and a 34-year-old male suggested that terrorism is ‘‘the act of achieving a social or political objective against a society by applying small concentrated pockets of violence against individuals in that society, such that the other members of the society change their behavior through fear that it may happen to them.’’ A 20-year-old female defined terrorism as ‘‘the act of killing civilians in a sensationalised way to ensure media coverage and draw attention to a certain group or situation.’’ There were also many respondents who identified the subjective element in the use of the language of terrorism. One 22-year-old female participant simply wrote that defining terrorism ‘‘is dependent upon your side,’’ and a 21-year-old female commented that a terrorist could be understood as ‘‘someone fighting for their freedom.’’ The line between the freedom fighter and the terrorist is not a clear one, and a number of respondents pointed to the abuse of the term. For instance, a 34-year-old female respondent suggested that terrorism is ‘‘the best excuse for a government to do whatever it wants. . . . Many countries are currently using anti-terrorism as an excuse to crack down on minorities they already persecuted, using systematic violence against a society for selfish political ends.’’ One 59-year-old female respondent hinted at a solution to the problem of terrorism, suggesting that ‘‘When one side feels that they are not being heard—then they go to desperate measures to be heard.’’ Defining peace is also extremely difficult. Basically, the responses were evenly divided between those who defined peace as the absence of war or violence (negative peace) and those who defined peace as the presence of justice and cooperation (positive peace). Typical of the positive peace understanding was the definition from a 21-year-old male respondent, who suggested that peace was ‘‘a state in which every man, woman and child can live without fear for their physical, psychological or spiritual

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well-being and where they have the capacity to fulfil their human potential.’’ Another 29-year-old male defined peace succinctly as, ‘‘no war, torture or terrorism. Love, laughter and happiness.’’ Perhaps the most poetic definition came from a 32-year-old female, who wrote that peace is ‘‘a place/time when each person gets to choose their own dreams,’’ and ‘‘Peace is about making life better, not just possible.’’ Critics of positive peace definitions contend that these are impossibly inclusive. Yet it was interesting how many respondents did venture into the emotional domain in the definition of peace. Even those who saw peace as the absence of armed conflict or war tended to see peace as also being a state of freedom from fear of violence and other negative emotions. Thus, one 49-year-old male wrote that peace is ‘‘the absence of violence, hate and hostility between groups,’’ and a 22-year-old female defined peace as ‘‘no feelings of hate, anger or any other negative emotions.’’ It is interesting that some participants also identified practical aspects of peace, such as tolerance and having nonviolent means of conflict resolution readily available.

CONCLUSIONS What conclusions might be drawn then from the Australian participants’ responses? Empirical data never exist in isolation but always exist within a context that pushes for interpretation. In this final section, I summarize the conclusions that I have drawn from the Australian sample’s responses to the global survey of attitudes on peace and war. I believe these are consistent with the evidence. The most general conclusion is that there is widespread positive sentiment toward peace at all levels of Australian society. One could say that the evidence suggests Australian society is pacific in its expressed attitudes. Taken from a wide socioeconomic sample, there was no group that did not display positive sentiment for peace. It is important that this positive sentiment toward peace was evident also in those respondents who were serving in the military forces, although understandably the sentiment and opinions were often qualified. This result confounds the view sometimes expressed that pro-peace sentiments reflect the view of a radical elite or some subversive minority within Australian society. The pro-peace sentiment is indeed reflective of a wide crosssection of Australian society. The positive sentiment for peace was perhaps best illustrated by the response to the proposition ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace,’’ which received resounding support. Cynics might suggest that the right to peace is yet another instance of rights inflation, whereby

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citizens in developed nations are demanding more and more forms of personal rights. Yet the fact that there is such broad support for the notion of peace as a right suggests that political leadership, which may be less enthusiastic about endorsing everyone’s right to peace, is not connected to popular opinion. This is an area where the so-called democratic deficit (i.e., where government policy does not reflect popular opinion) is very apparent, and those in political leadership ought to take cognizance of this opinion. A second conclusion is that there are aspects of the survey that suggest a need for peace education on a number of levels. There is a need for social education on: the sentiment for peace; Australia’s own background; the way the appeal of war works; the nature of war and human society; the nature of the nation-state; the way nonviolence can work; and on encouraging a culture of peace. The importance of education on the sentiment for peace is evidenced in the fact that so many of the respondents indicated some pessimism that the peace they desired could become a reality or an assumption that they were isolated in their views. This pessimism is reflected in the fact that 87 percent of the sample indicated strong agreement with peace being regarded as a right, yet only 32 percent of the sample indicated any agreement with the prospect of attaining world peace. If people regard themselves as isolated in their beliefs, then they will be less likely to work for the attainment of that belief or to demand that right. It is important in itself that people do understand how widespread peace sentiment is. One of the notable aspects of the survey responses was the relative paucity of reference to Australia’s own background of conquest and occupation, namely, the fact that Australia itself is a country that has arisen out of colonization and settlement. The lack of references to relevant Australian history is testimony to the ethnographic reality that it is often very difficult to know one’s own culture and society. For those outside Australia, it is quite obvious Australia represents a colonized country. It is true that curricula in Australian schools now stress the prior occupation of Australia and the dispossession suffered by the indigenous peoples of Australia, as well as other forms of oppression and discrimination. However, more needs to be done. The importance of education on how the appeal of war works is important when one looks at recent Australian history. There is a seeming contradiction between the pacific attitudes of the sample and the willingness of Australian governments since 1945 to engage in war. Most of the military inventions participated in by Australia were justified on humanitarian grounds (i.e., the desire to protect innocent life or the rights of civilians). Indeed, on the question dealing with the right of one country to invade another, many respondents argued that invasion can

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be justified as a way of preventing the killing of innocent people. This position is justified in international law. However, citizens need to be educated in critical literacy as to how such concern with protecting innocent life can be manipulated to support military aggression. Education on the nature of war and human society is revealed through the repeated pessimistic and deterministic comments to the effect that wars have always existed in history and thus always will. Expert opinion runs counter to this assumption. For instance, the UNESCO Seville Statement on Violence indicated in strong terms that war is an invention.21 Contrary to much popular sentiment, war is not natural and it is not inevitable. This is another area where education is important. If we believe something is inevitable, then we will not work or hope to change this situation. Education on the nature of the nation-state and the importance of the working of nonviolence are also important. As indicated above, most respondents indicated positive views on the importance of peace. However, few revealed any knowledge of the workings of the nonviolence movement as a way to achieve peace. Moreover, on the question of the importance of national security for individual and family security, very few respondents questioned the validity of the nation-state as the central organizing concept for society. One of the central challenges for peace education is to enable individuals to see themselves as more than members of a particular nation-state, but rather as international or global citizens. Some respondents did acknowledge the importance of cultural change. The challenge of encouraging a culture of peace is a very complex issue. The dimensions of a culture of peace were indicated in detail in the 1999 United Nations Programme and Declaration on a Culture of Peace.22 In supporting this United Nations resolution, member states, including Australia, undertook to support the encouragement of a culture of peace at all levels. The fact that so many respondents saw peace as important, and yet were pessimistic about the prospects of peace, illustrates that within Australia, at a public policy level, there needs to be specific action to support and encourage the development of a culture of peace. One of the important aspects of a culture of peace is democracy at all levels. This leads to the final conclusion from the results of the Australian survey, namely, that genuine democracy is important at all levels. This principle needs to operate at a level of public policy, where those in positions of representative political leadership undertake to act in accordance with the stated desires of the civil population for peace. According to the results of this survey, peace is a strong desire of many mainstream Australians (25 percent). Thus, government ought to be

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actively committed to pursuing peace, including being committed to a culture of peace.23 Anything less than full commitment to peace means true democracy is not functioning. The importance of democracy and democratic voice also operates on a psychological level. One of the most telling responses to the whole survey was when a respondent wrote that ‘‘when one side is not being heard, then they go to desperate measures to be heard.’’ Hearing differing opinions is an important metaphor for a genuinely democratic society and a genuinely democratic world. Democracy also implies there will be structures in place for variant voices to be heard. As indicated in the above comment, when there is frustration regarding freedom to express an opinion, then individuals and groups will resort to desperate measures. Australia is in some ways in a similar situation to the United States in the 19th century, in that it is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a young country with much hope. In many ways, Australia is seen as the new new world.24 However, the challenge is to translate this hope into practice and to produce a genuinely pacific country, one acknowledging its own at times dark past and working for peaceful interaction within the world community. Hopefully, this study and this chapter provide one step toward this goal.

Part II

The Far East

8

Laos Janice E. Jones, Paul E. Priester, and Cher Vang

War is . . . ‘‘death.’’ Terrorism is . . . ‘‘fear in action, to make a point.’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘balance on Earth.’’ The Hmong people are noted for their peaceful nature and agrarian lifestyle. It is interesting that the word Hmong means ‘‘free people.’’ There are conflicting stories about early Hmong history. Perhaps the Hmong are one of the minority races in Asia whose origin no one knows. Some evidence shows that the Hmong originated in China, but there are scholars who believe that the Hmong people originated elsewhere in Asia and traveled south to eastern China nearly 2,000 years ago. The Hmong people currently live in all parts of the world; however, they are concentrated in Southeast Asia and the United States. The Hmong arrived in Laos in the early 1800s and settled in the tropical and northern mountainous regions of Laos. Most Hmong believe that their forefathers immigrated to Laos from China. Because the history of the Hmong people is traditionally an oral history with stories passed down through the generations, historians and researchers rely on an oral tradition that consists of true stories intermingled with folktales and myths. The Hmong people have divided themselves into clans, and each clan has a distinctive clothing style with specialized embroidery that helps to identify who belongs in each group.1 In 2000, the United States Census counted 186,310 Hmong people across the United States, which is a figure that is almost double that of the census previously done in 1990. Some Hmong scholars view this number with some skepticism, believing that it should really be much higher; they suspect that many Hmong people did not participate in the

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2000 census due to language barriers and a pervasive fear among Hmong people of the government.2

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT The largest influx of Hmong people into Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Burma occurred in the late 1800s when more than 10,000 Hmong people fled south after an unsuccessful revolt. The Hmong rebellion and flight was a response to their treatment in China, where they were treated like slaves, taxed, and forced to work without pay. Following their flight from China into Southeast Asia, the Hmong came under the control of the French, who dominated French Indochina from 1859 to 1954. In the early 1900s the Hmong of Laos revolted against French rule and for several years fought a war called the Madman’s War over northern Indochina. War would continue to plague this peaceful group of people. From the 1940s (during World War II) and continuing through the early 1950s, the French continued to dominate Laos and the Hmong people, who fought in the First Indochina War (resulting in the split of Vietnam into communist North Vietnam and noncommunist South Vietnam) from 1946 to 1954. The Second Indochina War raged from 1957 to 1975; when the United States officially entered this war in 1965, it became known as the Vietnam War. In the early 1960s, Hmong men agreed to join the United States in a group known as the Special Forces. Promises made to the Hmong fighters by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) included finding new homes for Hmong fighters if they lost the war. During this time, America recruited nearly 15,000 Hmong men to work as soldiers to guard the Ho Chi Minh Trail (designed to allow the North Vietnamese to attack the south) and to rescue downed pilots, to save them from imprisonment by the North Vietnamese. In addition, the Hmong soldiers guarded supply trails and ambushed the supply trails of the enemy. The Hmong soldiers were excellent at gathering intelligence for the army and guarding the radar sites. As the war intensified, more Hmong were recruited to serve. The government of Laos at this time was divided into two separate governments: the Royal government headed by Prince Souvannaphouma and the Pathet Lao Communist government run by Prince Souphanouvong. Twice as many Hmong and around half a million people at that time sided with Prince Souvannaphouma, and around 250,000 followed the other leader, Prince Souphanouvong. Although the princes were half-brothers, they had very different ideas on what was best for the Hmong people and how best to govern them.3

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The Vietnam War was fought between North Vietnam, along with its communist allies, and South Vietnam, along with the United States and other countries that had joined together to form the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The United States entered the war to prevent the communist takeover of South Vietnam. This war had a large impact on the culture, politics, and foreign relations of both Southeast Asia and the United States. The loss of human life was enormous; the United States lost over 58,000 soldiers, the North and South Vietnamese lost over 3 million people, and Laos and Cambodia lost over 1.5 million people.4 Although the numbers lost are huge, the people who survived also suffered enormously; their lives were changed immeasurably due to their involvement in the war. Posttraumatic stress disorder, loss of limbs, and drug addiction plagued the soldiers on all sides of that war. In 1983, the government in Laos ordered that all of the interment camps be abolished and destroyed. However, groups such as Amnesty International have reported that these types of camps still exist, with prisoners being forced to do heavy labor.5 The belief that camps such as these continue to exist helps to foster persistent fears of the government among the Hmong people, fears of the dangers of imprisonment and the possibility of continued torture. Following years during which immigration to the United States had been halted for Hmong refugees, immigration was once again allowed, and paperwork expedited. This helped many Hmong people who had been living in Thailand to move to the United States.

THE HMONG SAMPLE The Hmong population in the United States immigrated primarily after enduring atrocities during the Vietnam War that shattered their way of life. In addition to escaping the scene of the atrocities, the Hmong people have immigrated to the United States in an effort to live peaceful lives, to obtain better education for their children, and to live lives outside the sphere of poverty. In addition, many immigrated to avoid living their lives in refugee camps. The sample for this study included both men and women, ranging in age from 18 to 82. Twenty-one people (11 women and 10 men) responded to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression Survey (PAIRTAPS). Within this sample, 10 people were randomly chosen for interviews. The participants attend a community center where they are able to take part in English as a Second Language classes, job-seeking classes, and assorted other community service programming. None of the participants have a high school diploma, and all are categorized as

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lower socioeconomic status. None of the participants were currently employed, and they relied heavily on the help of relatives, Title 19 health insurance, W-2 (welfare) aid, and if appropriate, subsidized child care that would allow them to seek employment if they were both in need of child care and eligible for employment. The sample included people who identified with both of the major political parties in the United States, Republican and Democratic. No one identified as having served in formal military service. Only one person reported having participated in a conflict resolution or peace education program, and no one reported any involvement in a war protest. Although this sample is not large, it is of interest because rarely has this population had the opportunity to have its voices heard. All of the participants are recent immigrants, making their experiences fresh. Issues surrounding war and peace may be far more important to this group than to many others, as their recent immigration status has not removed the memories of what happened to them in Laos. Moreover, continued victimization through poverty, racism, and discrimination can make these issues far more salient for this group compared to those who have lived in the United States longer. Procedure Because of the recent immigrant status of the participants, many were unable to read written English, so the PAIRTAPS (2003) was read to them. The reader of the survey was an advanced doctoral student who is Hmong and considers English to be his second language. He has been in the United States for 20 years. The surveys were read at the community center where the participants for this study were participating in educational and community-based services. The actual words of the participants were written down so none of the subtle nuances would be lost. In all cases, the participant’s exact statements were analyzed. For this study, seven of the items from the PAIRTAPS (2003) survey were analyzed and the results reported. Perspectives on Acts of Aggression Nine participants provided qualitative responses to the item ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country.’’ Forty-five percent of the responses rejected this right, citing the negative consequences of invasion and the availability of better alternatives. For example, one participant explained, ‘‘No country has that right. It will only bring war. Countries need to work together and establish trade and jobs.’’ On the other hand, 27 percent of the responses justified the right as necessary for the protection of human lives and rights, and as a

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defense against threats; one participant qualified the acceptability of a governmental right to invasion, insisting, ‘‘Only to save its people from harm.’’ When asked if the government has the right to torture prisoners in time of war, 27 percent of the responses supported this right, citing as reasons, the protection of potential victims and the necessity of acquiring information; one participant indicated that governments had a right to use torture ‘‘if info needed is critical to war.’’ In contrast, 43 percent of the responses argued against such a right, suggesting it would be a violation of human rights (e.g., ‘‘prisoners of war should not be tortured but be treated humanely’’) and could have negative consequences (e.g., ‘‘That is setting a bad example.’’) In response to the item asking if governments have a right to kill innocent civilians in the fight against international terrorism, all six of the qualitative responses denied this right, with the majority emphasizing the innocence of the victims. One participant argued, ‘‘innocents are innocents by all means,’’ and another clarified, ‘‘Heads [of government] should protect all innocent civilians if possible.’’ One response reflected a religious conceptualization of the issue: ‘‘No one has the right to judge. All are guilty under God’s law.’’ Perspectives on Peace and Protest Of the six qualitative explanations for rating scale responses to the item ‘‘All human beings have a right to peace,’’ all demonstrated agreement with that right. Half of these responses focused on the positive consequences of peace; as one participant suggested, ‘‘Peace can bring a sense of clarity and understanding and purpose on earth.’’ A different participant also agreed with an individual right to peace but showed some pessimism about the achievability of peace, ‘‘Yes, they do, but people are still selfish regardless of what we say and do.’’ Similar views are reflected in the nine qualitative responses to the item ‘‘I believe world peace can be achieved.’’ Forty-four percent of the responses indicated that peace can be achieved only under certain conditions, with half of these responses focusing on the necessity of global efforts (‘‘I believe world peace can be achieved by working together to improve the quality of life of all people instead of trying to fight against each other’’) and half focusing on the need for divine intervention (‘‘We live in a fallen, sinful world, we have no peace until Jesus returns and a new heaven and earth is created by God.’’) Among the responses expressing doubts over the achievability of peace, the major barriers were identified as the nature of individuals, mankind, and nations. For example, one participant explained, ‘‘too many corruptions,’’ and another

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detailed, ‘‘I don’t agree because leaders of people have their own ideas to run a country and someone will be in opposition towards that.’’ Participants were asked to give their definitions of peace. Eightythree percent of their responses were positive peace definitions, reflecting the idea that peace can be achieved when society ensures the rights of its citizens and provides them access to their basic needs. Typical responses were ‘‘endurance in the midst of suffering,’’ ‘‘happiness,’’ and ‘‘living in harmony together.’’ Negative peace, however, is when overt forms of violence are absent or taken away; within our sample, the negative definitions of peace were ‘‘no conflict’’ and ‘‘no war.’’ In response to the item, ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace,’’ 50 percent of the qualitative responses supported this right and 50 percent qualified this right. One individual explained, ‘‘Yes, wars are bad for people, people should and do have the right to protest and call for peace when war occurred.’’ This response reveals the participant’s belief that protest is not merely a right but a duty as well. Other responses limited the right to nonviolent demonstrations, ‘‘freedom to speak and demonstrate their beliefs as long as it doesn’t have physical harm on someone else.’’ When asked to define rights, 11 of the 21 participants provided answers. Answers ranged from ‘‘individuality’’ to ‘‘everyone treated equally and have their own rights’’ to ‘‘a person’s own ability to live and feel the way they want.’’ Although the Hmong people are traditionally a clan people6 and work together as a collectivist culture, they clearly recognize individuality and a person’s own basic rights. Reconciliation was a term that seemed to be more difficult for these participants to define. One participant responded that for him reconciliation was equated with ‘‘balance.’’ Another participant responded that for him reconciliation meant ‘‘coming together.’’ A third male participant responded that reconciliation meant ‘‘agreement.’’ Female participants responded equally as positively as the male participants did, defining reconciliation as, for example, ‘‘peace’’ and ‘‘forgiving.’’ All of these terms seem positive and upbeat, allowing the participants to experience a glimmer of hope in their thoughts for the future. National Security For the item stating that national security is essential for individual and family security, four of the five qualitative responses (80 percent) provided arguments related to protection and safety; for example, ‘‘Individuals and family need to be protected’’; ‘‘Security is always important to have because these might be people who like to break laws/rules’’; and ‘‘The world should work together so that people are free from fear

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of being attacked.’’ One response disagreed with the importance of national security: ‘‘I don’t think it would impact everyone personally.’’ Torture Qualitative responses reveal that torture is viewed as a ‘‘frightening’’ experience that is most often associated with war and fighting. For several of the participants, torture was not even a topic they wanted to respond to during an interview. Basically, the interviews ended when this question was asked. One female participant revealed that torture was something associated with drug trafficking and was perpetrated by opium traders in her country. It is interesting that the older participants were the ones who were least forthcoming in their responses about torture. Overall, findings indicate that although torture is a horrible thing, the Hmong participants viewed it as a necessary component of war and survival. The relatively high degree of tolerance for the practice of torture in our Hmong sample seems paradoxical in that there is a high probability that many of them, especially the older participants, personally experienced torture. This torture would have occurred either during the Viet Nam conflict 7 or after the United States’ withdrawal from the conflict. Alternatively, as one participant noted, the terrorist acts could have been performed related to the drug trade in Laos. If the participants did not personally experience torture, they most likely personally knew someone who was tortured. The whole experience of being forced to live in a refugee camp under conditions of squalor could be conceptualized as a form of torture. This is an experience that all of the refugees or the younger participants’ older family members had experienced. The paradox is that one might suppose that individuals who either have been direct victims of torture or have family members who have been tortured would reject the use of such a practice. It is surprising to see such a large response endorse the use of state-sponsored terrorism. Contextual Variables Impacting Torture-Related Research with Hmong Participants The research interview quickly came to a close when the researchers brought up the topic of torture. Why were the Hmong participants so reticent to discuss this topic, after having freely shared answers to other open-ended questions? In fact, this level of reticence was so high that virtually all of the elder participants unilaterally discontinued the interview when the final questions related to torture were asked. There are two possible contextual explanations for this response. The first potential explanation relates to cultural issues within the Hmong community. The second potential explanation relates to the research process itself.8

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The first possible set of explanations for the reticence of the Hmong participants to discuss the issue of torture could be traced to traditional Hmong cultural values. Hmong participants may view having been tortured as a source of shame. The Hmong culture is one that is very collectivistic in nature. A highly prized cultural value is to not bring shame to your clan. It could very well be that disclosing that you or a family member had been tortured would induce such a sense of public shame.9 The second related cultural value that may have been a barrier to exploring terrorism-related questions is that traditionally, in the Hmong community, matters of a highly personal nature are not shared outside of one’s family.10 Consequently, an issue of such highly intimate content as experience with torture may be seen as an inappropriate topic to discuss with somebody outside of the family. Even though a Hmong researcher from within the community carried out the interview, this individual was still not a member of the participants’ family. One final cultural value that could have contributed to the difficulty in obtaining answers to the terrorism items relates to the hierarchical nature of the clan structure within the traditional Hmong community. Each clan has a specific leader.11,12 It could be that the researchers failed to obtain sufficient ‘‘buy in’’ from these leaders to explore such a sensitive topic. Reflecting back, the research process might have been facilitated if we could have had a more visible endorsement from the clan leaders. Such an explicit endorsement may have given the participants permission to discuss such intimate and potentially shame-inducing matters. The second set of potential explanations for the reticence of the Hmong participants regarding torture relates to the very research process itself. There has been some fascinating work published related to engaging in social sciences research with survivors of torture.13 Kagee and Naidoo suggested that it is the research process itself that is problematic for survivors of torture. One way in which the research process is problematic is that it can replicate the dynamics of the torture process itself. In torture, you have authority figures who are coercively attempting to gain information from individuals. The social science research paradigm can be seen as a parallel process to this. In this case, the authority figures are the researchers and the information being sought is the participants’ views on terrorism. The greater the power differential between the researcher and the participants, the more likely it is that the interview can become a process parallel to the act of torture. In this study, the Hmong participants have low levels of education and a lower socioeconomic status in relation to the researchers. The researchers are doctoral-level trained psychologists with a markedly higher level of material affluence. Sensitive to these issues and in accordance with

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human subject protections, the researchers refrained from pressuring any participant to respond to any item that caused discomfort; thus, many of the participants did not complete the survey. If the Hmong participants were survivors of torture, they may have posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). One of the hallmark features of PTSD is the avoidance of any stimuli associated with the initial lifethreatening event.14 Therefore, if the participants see any similarity between the research process and the original act of torture, an avoidance response and anxiety would be triggered. As was stated, the interview was abruptly ended by the elder research participants when the qualitative questions related to torture were introduced. This abrupt unilateral discontinuation of the research process could be seen as just such an avoidance response and as necessary to the wellbeing of the participant. Emotional Responses to Witnessing Violence The PAIRTAPS (2003) has a section that asks participants how they would respond to ‘‘very direct and dramatic exposure’’ to the following situations: (1) Another country is indiscriminately bombing a major city in your country, and women, children, the elderly, and civilian men are running around bloody and screaming. What would you feel? What would you want to do? (2) Your country is indiscriminately bombing a major city in your country, and women, children, the elderly, and civilian men are running around bloody and screaming. What would you feel? What would you want to do? The participants in this study responded with feelings of sadness and a desire to stop the bombing. In addition, a desire to defend the innocent was conveyed through their responses. Several participants responded that they would like to ‘‘find out why’’ the bombing was happening. It is interesting that one participant responded that he would feel ‘‘nothing’’; this type of protective response could indicate that he was numb from his past experiences or was using self-protective responses to keep himself from feeling too much. Several participants said that they would want to help the people who were harmed.

CONCLUSION The Hmong people have had their agrarian lifestyle dramatically altered by war and relocation. The vestiges of their past lifestyle can be seen as they struggle to create a new lifestyle in a new country. Immigration issues such as poverty, lack of employment, literacy, illegal

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status, acceptance, and integration into society to avoid discrimination and racism continue to plague this population. Recent immigrants have experienced the ravages of war, the continued effects of poverty, fear, and feelings of displacement that come from living in refugee camps, and the pervasive sense of uncertainty that can simply wear down the human spirit as they struggle to make sense out of their new surroundings. The participants in this study echo a desire for safety, a belief in peace, and the important role that peace plays in life along with the need for governance.

9

China Andrea Jones-Rooy and Ting Wu

War is . . . ‘‘a terrible state of bloodshed and pain.’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘calm, love, no fear.’’ Chinese citizens are not strangers to violence. China has a long, proud history, though many of its turning points are marked by violence. China’s state-sponsored or otherwise leader-led aggression is more famous around the world, but important civilian movements, such as rebellions and calls for revolution in 1911 and 1989, also deserve prominence in Chinese history. The first section summarizes the historical background of violence in China and major turning points in Chinese history, with particular emphasis on the 20th century through the present. The second section outlines major issues in China as they relate to governance, aggression, and the use of violence domestically and abroad. The final section presents major findings from the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS).

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The Dynastic Periods Records of civilization in China date back about 3,500 years, making China the world’s oldest continuous major world civilization.1 For most of its long history, China was ruled under successive dynasties with systems of bureaucratic control that organized and centralized China’s expansive territory and large population long before state organizations comparable in formality and scope emerged in other cultures. Chinese civilization featured a common written language, which contributed

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considerably to the unity of China’s many local cultures, each with its own local spoken language or dialect. The Qing dynasty, established in 1644 when the Manchus overthrew the Ming dynasty, was the last dynasty in China. Among its many accomplishments, the Qing dynasty gained control over many of China’s present borders, plus disputed areas, including Xinjiang, Yunnan, Tibet, Mongolia, and Taiwan. The authority of the Qing dynasty waned in the 19th century as China’s status began to deteriorate under a rapidly growing population and economic stagnation, both of which contributed to increasing social unrest.2 Moreover, several events, including the Taiping rebellion (1850–1864), the Nian rebellion (1852– 1868), and a Russian-supported Muslim separatist movement in the Xinjiang province (Chinese Turkestan), weakened the Qing dynasty’s control over the country. All of these difficulties were exacerbated during the Opium Wars (1839–1860). Frustrated by China’s closed-door policy to the West (designed to prevent the spread of Christianity into China) and highly restrictive trade policies, merchants from several Western nations began offering opium to the Chinese market. The attempts of the Qing dynasty to stop the importing of opium involved them in two wars, primarily against the British government and the British West India Company, and later also against France. The victory of the Western forces led to treaties granting Britain, the United States, and other Western powers privileged commercial relations with China (at China’s expense); in addition, Britain gained control over Hong Kong and the New Territories under a 99-year lease. End of the Dynastic Period The end of the Qing dynasty came on October 10, 1911, when the revolutionary reformist Sun Yat-sen, supported by many reform-minded military officers, officials, and students, led a rebellion against the dynasty and called for the creation of a republic. Various forces contributed to the revolutionary fervor, but the isolationist policies of the Qing dynasty, and their efforts to resist the importation of Western ideas and technologies had the greatest influence. In particular, the overthrow stemmed from the refusal of the dynasty to heed reformist calls for adoption of new technologies to better compete with the West. The years between 1911 and 1949 were tumultuous. In an effort to avoid a violent civil war, revolutionaries allowed Qing leaders to maintain important positions in the new government. One of these leaders was the new republic’s first president, Yuan Shikai, who maintained his authority until his death in 1916.3 During his tenure he tried, and failed, to reinstate an empire, with himself as emperor. His death led to chaos,

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the collapse of any sort of central authority, and decades of turmoil and competition between various provincial military leaders—including Sun Yat-sen. In the 1920s, Sun, with the support of the Soviet Union, established the Kuomintang (KMT, or ‘‘Chinese Nationalist People’s Party,’’ or Guomingdang in pinyin), based in southern China. Originally, the KMT was aligned with the new Chinese Communist Party (CCP), but in 1927 Chiang Kai-shek, who took over the party after Sun’s death, turned the KMT away from the CCP, even executing many CCP leaders. The Long March and the Establishment of the People’s Republic of China In 1934, members of the CCP who had escaped the KMT’s aggression by retreating to eastern China made their way in a ‘‘Long March’’ toward Shaanxi province in northwestern China. It was during the Long March that Mao Zedong emerged as leader of the party, and the CCP was reorganized and strengthened considerably. Clashes between the KMT and CCP would continue for decades, including during the 14-year Japanese invasion of China in the period leading up to and during World War II (1931–1945). Some unification among the rival Chinese parties was established in an effort to combat Japan, but it dissolved after Japan’s defeat in 1945. By 1949, the CCP had gained control of most of China, ultimately forcing Chiang Kai-shek and what was left of the KMT to flee to Taiwan. Once there, Chiang Kai-shek declared Taiwan the ‘‘Republic of China,’’ with Taipei its provisional capital. On the mainland, Mao Zedong officially founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949. The political and economic system of the newly established PRC was modeled after the example of the USSR. The first several decades of life under the PRC saw massive social upheavals and huge cultural and economic reorganization programs. The most well known of these are the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), though nearly a dozen major national campaigns were undertaken during the Mao era.4 The Great Leap Forward The Great Leap Forward was launched by Mao with the goal of catalyzing positive social and economic change through the release of the ‘‘full force of the human will.’’5 Mao saw traditional social distinctions, such as those based on age, gender, and skill, as limitations on human ability. He also believed that tearing down those distinctions (e.g., by forming communes and cooperatives) would spur on economic growth. Unfortunately, this great social experiment failed: Millions of Chinese citizens suffered from widespread famine during this campaign.

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Experts attributed the disaster of the Great Leap Forward to a tragic combination of social and natural forces: The disruption of market mechanisms and failures in agricultural production meant underproduction of food products, even in China’s most fertile areas.6 The famine would cause a 123 percent increase in China’s mortality rate during the years of the Leap, hitting rural areas the hardest.7 The Sino-Soviet Split and the Cultural Revolution Still reeling from the Great Leap Forward, China suffered another major setback in the 1959 Sino-Soviet Split. The Sino-Soviet Split was the result of a long and gradual deterioration of relations between the USSR and the PRC. Much of the disagreement was over communist ideology and China’s desire that Asia follow its model of communism. Mao’s own specific policies also became gradually estranged from the Soviet: Where Stalin promoted advancement through heavy industry, Mao believed capitalizing on China’s vast labor force would drive growth. Relations between the two countries grew even more strained after Stalin’s death in 1953. Mao and Khrushchev, who replaced Stalin in 1954, disagreed over many issues, with Mao accusing Khrushchev of being too accommodating to the wishes of Western powers.8 In addition, the failure of the Great Leap Forward itself also put increased pressure on Mao to prove himself as a leader, thus giving him further incentives to stand up to the USSR. The USSR pushed back by restricting the flow of scientific and technological information to China and ultimately broke ties with China completely in 1960, withdrawing all aid.9 All of the Soviet advisers and technical experts who had been working in China were called back to the USSR, leaving China to reorganize what was left of its post-Great Leap industry and production on its own, contributing significantly to much of the damage ensuing from the Great Leap Forward. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was conceived by Mao as another attempt to ‘‘free’’ the Chinese people from limitations of central control and rigid social roles. Unlike the Great Leap Forward, however, the emphasis in the Cultural Revolution was more on sociopolitical change than on increased production.10 The primary thrust of the Revolution was to challenge what Mao saw as the dangerously entrenched Chinese bureaucracy. Mao emboldened China’s youth in particular by creating the Red Guards, radical youth organizations whose mission was to challenge party bureaucracy on all levels. The Red Guards and other activists accused top party leaders of dragging China back to capitalism.11 This 10-year political and ideological campaign proved to be ‘‘an immense and contorted movement’’ that ‘‘wrought terror and

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disorder’’ in China.12 The conflict ultimately led to divisions at the very top level of Chinese leadership, with Party Vice Chairman and Defense Minister Lin Biao allegedly attempting to assassinate Mao, and with Biao dying supposedly in a plane crash. There continues to be much uncertainty concerning these events. China’s political situation stabilized toward the end of the Cultural Revolution and after the Lin Biao incident. Many leaders who had been dismissed during the peak of the Revolution’s upheaval were reinstated in the years between 1966 and 1969. A prominent leader who reemerged in 1973 and was confirmed in 1975 as Vice Premier, the PLA Chief of Staff, and member of the Politburo Standing Committee, was Deng Xiaoping. In January 1976, Premier Zhou Enlai passed away and in April a memorial demonstration was staged by citizens in Beijing. The demonstration was rife with political messages suggestive of support for Deng Xiaoping. Authorities suppressed the demonstration with force and blamed Deng for the disturbance, stripping him of his official positions.13 Post-Mao China The year 1976 would prove to be a traumatic year in Chinese history. Mao’s death left a power vacuum, and scrambles for that power went on until August 1977, when the CCP leadership ultimately reinstated Deng Xiaoping to all of his previous posts. In 1978, Deng enacted sweeping reforms to spur economic development. He was decidedly against massive Mao-style social movements and renounced Stalinist-style central economic planning in favor of experiments with a market economy.14 Deng’s famous 1978 Open Door Policy was designed to increase foreign trade and attract foreign direct investment into China. Overall, Deng’s series of economic reform policies are seen as sources of tremendous improvements in China. After approximately 140 years of civil wars, foreign invasions, revolutions, and famines that marked the Chinese experience between the Opium Wars of 1840 and the economic reforms of 1978, China became one of the most powerful and dynamic economies in the world. Between 1978 and 2005, China’s per capita income rose by 400 percent.15 By contrast, the period from 1840 to 1978 saw an average rise of only 60 percent, and most of the time during that period, per capita income was lower than before 1840.16 Along with China’s rapid economic growth came new social problems. Inflation, corruption, and unprecedented levels of urban migration became the burdens of the new era. In 1988–1989, intellectual elites in Beijing began to openly advocate political reforms. Small- and

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medium-sized protests broke out sporadically during these two years and ultimately came to a head in late spring 1989.17 To say that the days from May 20 through June 4, 1989, were difficult for the Chinese government would be an understatement. What began as a mourning activity for the death of Secretary General Hu Yaobeng transformed into a protest for free speech, education reform, and democratic reform, and against political corruption. Estimates vary, but one estimate indicates that upwards of 100,000 students from surrounding universities, including Beida and Qinghua universities, gathered at Tiananmen Square to participate in demonstrations, including speeches, sit-ins, and hunger strikes. As the protest spread out from the capital to include urban workers in many other cities, including Shanghai, Chongqing, and Urumqi, normal activities were severely disrupted. Negotiations between protesters and government officials came to a standstill, and when the army was ordered to disperse the crowd, thousands of civilians lost their lives. As a result, the tragedy put immense pressure on the Chinese government and soured relations between China and its major international partners. Jiang Zemin replaced Deng Xiaoping in the wake of the Tiananmen incident, forming the core of the ‘‘third generation’’ of Chinese leaders. In November 2002, the first truly peaceful transition of power in the PRC took place when the Communist Party Congress elected Hu Jintao as the core of the ‘‘fourth generation’’ of leadership in China. In October 2007, key members of the ‘‘fifth generation’’ were elevated to prominent positions in the Politburo and Standing Committee.18

MAJOR ISSUES Human Rights The international community has long been critical of China for its poor human rights record. The U.S. State Department’s Human Rights Practices and International Religious Freedom Reports (2007) described China’s human rights violations as ‘‘well documented,’’ ‘‘continuing,’’ and stemming from two main sources: the Chinese authorities’ intolerance of dissent and the inadequacy of the legal system to safeguard human rights.19 The Chinese government has been accused of mistreating prisoners; for example, torturing them, forcing confessions, and detaining them for lengthy periods without communication privileges. Strict restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, religion, privacy, and worker rights are also considered unacceptable by many outside powers.20 Limitations on the activities of nongovernmental

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organizations (NGOs) in China, monitoring and censoring of news sources and the Internet, and harassment and intimidation of lawyers, religious figures, journalists, and political activists are all charges that have been made against China. China’s One Child Policy, introduced in 1979, which stipulates that (with some exceptions), each nuclear family can have no more than one child, has been a controversial addition to its battery of infringements on what many international actors deem to be rights to which every individual ought to be entitled. Foreign Relations Relations between China and other countries vary from very tense to relatively friendly and peaceful. Disagreements over the ownership of Taiwan have caused friction not just between China and Taiwan but also between China and many other countries when those countries choose to recognize or support Taiwan’s independence. In the 1970s, most countries recognized the PRC as the legitimate China, and in 1971 Beijing replaced Taipei in the China seat in the United Nations. As of March 2008, 171 countries had established formal diplomatic relations with China, leaving only 23 with diplomatic ties to Taiwan.21 Disagreements between countries that support Taiwanese independence and those that support PRC’s claim of ownership over the island continue, and the unresolved conflict is a thorn in relations between China and other countries. Major players in China’s most salient foreign policy challenges include Russia (and formerly the USSR), North Korea, Vietnam, Japan, and the United States. Levels of strife and agreement between China and these countries have fluctuated widely since the establishment of the PRC in 1949. In the 1950s, China’s foreign policy was aimed almost exclusively toward solidarity with the USSR.22 One of the PRC’s first major initiatives abroad was to send the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to North Korea to help the North Koreans defend themselves against UN forces as they approached the Yalu River.23 During the Cold War, China competed with the Soviet Union for political influence in the developing world and particularly for influence over other communist parties. China also fought a two-month border war with Vietnam in early 1979 in response to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. The 1970s and 1980s saw China demonstrate growing interest in improving its international relationships, including turning to Western powers to help with its modernization. Economic reforms encouraged economic interaction between China and the United States, but after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, China had to exert extra efforts to forge solid relationships with other powers. By the late 1990s, these

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relationships had been restored, and the last 15 years or so have seen China becoming an active player in many international organizations and agreements. The government is now initiating many, especially regional, agreements and organizations, and recently, proved a vital player in the Six Party Talks with North Korea over nuclear weapons. At the same time, China has recently experienced some increased tension with the United States and the European Union related to trade disputes. Tensions with the West have also arisen from China’s pursuit of increasingly close ties with many African states, especially those with rich natural resources, since becoming a major oil importer in 1993. In its quest for energy resources, China’s involvement with Sudan and Zimbabwe in particular, as well as with Iran and Venezuela, is becoming increasingly controversial, because its actions are seen as capable of undermining U.S. and EU foreign policy efforts in those regions. For example, U.S. sanctions on Zimbabwe in 2008 were largely ineffective because China continued to trade with that troubled country. By contrast, China has proven to be a constructive player in the ongoing crisis in Sudan. At present, it is uncertain whether China’s growing influence and involvement in the affairs of other countries around the world are likely to be a source of peace or of conflict.

RESPONSES TO THE SURVEY OF CHINESE ATTITUDES Demographics The 78 participants (47 females and 31 males) who constituted the sample for this chapter represented a broad range of individuals of Chinese ancestry; 82 percent of the sample had at least one parent from China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan. The remainder had at least one parent from Indonesia, but identified as Chinese. A substantial portion of the sample (38 percent) was born in the United States. The average age was 21, with a range between 18 and 58. In regard to religion, 44 percent were self-reported Christians and 6 percent considered themselves Buddhists. In addition, most participants were either middle (44 percent), or upper-middle (36 percent) class, and students (85 percent) with at least a high school diploma (60 percent). Only a few of the respondents had participated, respectively, in peace education programs (10 percent) or protests (8 percent) of any kind. All participants completed, via a secure Web site, the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS).24 The PAIRTAPS includes five separate components: (1) the Institutional Rights Survey; (2) the Government Beliefs Survey; (3) the Emotional

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Responses Survey; (4) Definitions; and (5) Views on Peace and Security. Three of the five sections, the Rights scale, Government Beliefs Survey and Views on Peace and Security include a seven-point rating system (1 = total disagreement, 7 = total agreement); all five sections include qualitative items, asking participants to explain their rating scale responses or define key terms. For this chapter, qualitative responses to the Rights Survey, definitions of peace, war, and terrorism, as well as views on peace and security, were analyzed. Accurate sampling is never easy, and in a context like China, where research by foreigners is a relatively new phenomenon, sampling continues to be subject to important limitations; sampling that even remotely approximates a fully representative sample is very difficult. Ideally, the survey would include Chinese citizens currently in China, Chinese citizens who do not speak English, and Chinese citizens who do not have access to the Internet. It would also be useful to have proportionate representation of Chinese participants from the Hong Kong section of China and from Taiwan. Future work is planned to include as many individuals from these backgrounds as possible; the results from this chapter are intended to present a first cut at what is planned as an ongoing, increasingly rich, exploration into the views of Chinese men and women regarding rights and responsibilities related to state use of violence and expectations for peace. In summary, the results presented below should be interpreted carefully. Please keep in mind that the perspectives presented here come from a very specific demographic of individuals of Chinese ancestry. Although we cannot truly know the direction of bias in these responses, it would not be far-fetched to assume that the ideas presented by our Chinese sample are likely to be more moderate than those of nonEnglish-speaking, non-internationally traveled, or non-Internet-using residents of China. The results are presented in three parts. The first section below discusses Chinese respondents’ opinions on governmental rights to carry out different forms of aggression. The second section presents respondents’ definitions of the words war, terrorism, and peace. The final section summarizes respondents’ views on a right to protest against war and possibilities for world peace.

PERSPECTIVES ON STATE RIGHTS TO AGGRESSION ‘‘At no time should a country invade another but sometimes it’s hard to tell whether it is invading. Only the government knows.’’

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‘‘This practice [torturing prisoners in times of war] should not be done. However, other countries use these tactics and to withhold from torturing prisoners could prove to be a disadvantage.’’ ‘‘Innocent people shouldn’t be killed but sometimes it’s hard to avoid.’’ Sometimes One Country Has the Right to Invade Another Country Throughout its history, China has been both the victim of invasions (e.g., from Mongols, the French-British Alliance of 1856, the Eight-Nation Alliance of 1900, and Japan) as well as the invaders (e.g., into Vietnam, Mongolia, Tibet, and Nepal). When asked if one country has the right to invade another, 68 percent of the 52 respondents agreed, and only 27 percent disagreed. Among those who agreed with the right, several reasons were given, including defense in response to threat (14 percent of the qualitative responses), threat to others or the world (5 percent), in retaliation for a previous offense (10 percent), intervention either on behalf of the people of the invaded country or for peace (9 percent), and invasion as a last resort (5 percent). Several responses (8 percent) emphasized the importance of proof and absolute certainty that invasion was justified. For example, a 58-year-old male explained, ‘‘Only if one of the parties poses a direct and obvious threat to the peace of the other,’’ and a 27-year-old male qualified, ‘‘If the country’s government is causing violence against its own citizens then other countries, with the support of the UN, should have the right to invade.’’ On the other hand, a wide assortment of reasons were also given against invasion, including the availability of better alternatives (3 percent), the likelihood of negative consequences (8 percent), principles (8 percent), and stances against violence (2 percent). Sample responses include ‘‘Countries should not be invaded as it will only lead to more undesired bloodshed’’ (24-year-old female respondent) and ‘‘No country has the right to take away another country’s freedom’’ (18-year-old female respondent). The Government Has the Right to Order the Torture of Prisoners in Time of War When asked if governments have the right to torture prisoners in time of war, 26 percent of the 30 qualitative responses expressed agreement, but the majority (63 percent) disagreed. Sixty percent of the arguments in favor of a governmental right to torture (17 percent of all the qualitative responses) cited the effectiveness of torture as their reason. According to a 32-year-old male, ‘‘You do not get correct and truthful answers from asking prisoners nicely. Torture is an option to be considered,’’ and to a 19-year-old female, ‘‘If there is important information that the government needs to get from the prisoners, depending on what type of information it

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is, it may be reasonable.’’ Among the arguments rejecting a right to torture, two reasons were commonly given. Twenty-six percent cited torture as a violation of human rights (e.g., ‘‘No one has the right to torture another person, not even in event of war’’ from a 33-year-old male), and 17 percent cited principles (e.g., ‘‘The government should not do so if they expect their own POWs to be treated fairly,’’ from a 19-year-old male). Sometimes the Heads of a Government Have the Right to Kill Innocent Civilians in Order to Fight International Terrorism Thirty-three responses were given for the statement that governments sometimes have the right to kill civilians in order to combat terrorism. Fifteen percent of the responses expressed support for the right, the most common reasons being that ‘‘the ends justify the means.’’ As one respondent explained, ‘‘If sacrificing one innocent citizen could save the lives of even only two other innocent citizens, then this citizen has the duty to be willingly sacrificed; otherwise, he’s just selfish.’’ On the other hand, 69 percent of the responses disagreed with the right, with most (41 percent) emphasizing the innocence of the victims. Other reasoning against such a right include the sanctity of life (5 percent), state terrorism, the assumption that the act of killing civilians turns the government into terrorists (2 percent), the ends do not justify the means (2 percent), and the avoidability of killings (2 percent). Definitions of War Of the 52 respondents who gave definitions of war, 91 percent defined war from the perspective of the state, with 60 percent of the definitions identifying war as a conflict between states, nations, or other groups, and 10 percent specifically pointing to the destruction and death associated with war. Nineteen percent of the responses defined war in terms of its causes, and 6 percent described it as unnecessary. For example, a 58-year-old male defined war as ‘‘the useless violence between two states with no regard for the costs incurred by both’’ and for a 21-year-old female war was ‘‘countries fighting with people dying.’’ Seven percent of the definitions of war included concepts related to the individual, and 7 percent invoked moral judgments (e.g., ‘‘bad’’ from an 18-year-old female and ‘‘hate’’ from a 20-year-old male). Terrorism In recent years, China and Taiwan have experienced comparatively few terrorist activities. According to the Xinhua news agency, officials in China successfully thwarted a plan by Muslim separatists of the

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Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region to attack the Summer Olympics hosted in Beijing. Because the reasons behind the attacks are not religious in nature, it is not surprising that of the 48 definitions of terrorism, only 14 percent specified a motivation, among which rebellion (four responses) was more often cited than religion (two responses). For example, an 18-year-old female defined terrorism as ‘‘Rebellious acts against a country.’’ Sixty-three percent of the responses described terrorism as an undertaking with fear and destruction as its goal (14 percent), as its means (35 percent), or as its outcome (14 percent). According to a 19-year-old male, terrorism is ‘‘Creating fear and destroying another country’’ and to a 20-year-old female, terrorism is ‘‘Undermining a country’s government by inducing fear in its citizens.’’ Seventeen percent of the responses consisted of moral judgments, including ‘‘evil’’ by a 19-year-old female and ‘‘violence is wrong’’ from a 21-year-old male.

Definitions of Peace Of the 50 definitions of peace provided by participants, approximately 51 percent were positive, identifying peace as the presence of something (e.g., emotional and physical well-being, good relationship with others, harmony, and love). For example, a 19-year-old female defined peace as when ‘‘People and groups can respectfully disagree but there is no violence or bloodshed over matters. Problems can be solved peacefully and diplomatically,’’ and a 24-year-old female defined it as ‘‘respect and love, and being generous.’’ Forty-one percent of the responses were negative definitions, describing peace as the absence of conflict (33 percent) or absence of negative emotions such as anxiety, fear, or hate (8 percent). Thirteen percent portrayed peace as ideal, and something to strive for, although 8 percent believed peace to be unattainable. For example, an 18-year-old female described peace as ‘‘something that will never truly happen because everyone is greedy.’’

VIEWS ON PEACE AND PROTEST ‘‘Long time ago, people had peace. Why can’t we have it now?’’ ‘‘Individuals are all different so they have the right to have their opinions voiced out.’’ ‘‘Since global warming is happening, if everyone died on earth, then world peace can happen.’’

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A Basic Right to Peace Although the Chinese Civil War, which ended in 1949 with the establishment of the PRC, was the last war to be fought on Chinese soil, its people did not experience peace and stability until well after the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. Against this relatively violent backdrop, 68 percent of the 32 respondents to the statement ‘‘All people have the right to peace’’ believed in this right, with 24 percent of their qualitative responses citing the positive consequences of peace as a reason. For example, a 19-year-old male explained, ‘‘Peace brings prosperity’’ and a 24-year-old female commented, ‘‘Human beings should not have to deal with war when their energies, intellect, etc., can be channeled into making the world a better place to live in.’’ Twenty-one percent of the responses indicated that peace was an ideal, with 8 percent optimistic regarding its eventual achievability and 13 percent questioning the likelihood of world peace. For example, according to a 21-year-old female, ‘‘All humans deserve to have peace . . . live freely but the world isn’t like that though.’’ Six percent of the responses did not agree that there is a right to peace. One 21-year-old female said, ‘‘I don’t think you’re born with the right of peace because ‘peace’ can be elusive.’’ Individuals Have the Right to Stage Protests against War and in Favor of Peace Protests have an interesting role in Chinese history. To outsiders, the words ‘‘China’’ and ‘‘protesting’’ most likely conjure up thoughts of Tiananmen Square; however, protests in China have been many and have had different causes and outcomes. Recent years have seen an increase in smaller scale protests, both violent and nonviolent, around the country, as technological advances such as cell phones and the Internet have facilitated organization between citizens. The Chinese government almost always attempts to stifle these demonstrations and has shown willingness to resort to as much violence as necessary in order to do so.25 Alternatively, some protests in recent history have allegedly been organized—or at least, many argue, encouraged—by the government itself. In 2005, anti-Japan protests erupted across China in response to outrage over Japan’s downplaying its atrocities against China in the 1930s and 1940s in Japanese history textbooks. It is widely suspected that the Chinese government helped organize and publicize the protests. Strong consensus does not yet exist for why the government may have done this, but many have speculated that perhaps it was in an effort to promote nationalism in China.26

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When asked if individuals have the right to protest against war in favor of peace, 34 percent of the 33 responses agreed with the right in general, whereas 61 percent believed that the right exists only under certain conditions. Specifically, 14 percent of the responses indicated that protest must be nonviolent (e.g., ‘‘There’s a right to protest, but there’s also a limit on how they protest. If the protest is done peacefully, on the protestors’ parts, then it is okay. If it becomes violent, that is when they are being hypocritical,’’ 19-year-old female); 19 percent of the responses indicated that the right can be exercised only when socially sanctioned, and 25 percent showed concern with the consequences of protest. For example, a 20-year-old female responded, ‘‘Freedom of speech—as long as they are protesting without disrupting others.’’ No respondents disagreed with the right to protest.

I Believe that World Peace Can Be Achieved Of the 34 responses to the statement ‘‘I believe world peace can be achieved,’’ only 5 percent unconditionally agreed. Ten percent indicated that world peace is ideal, and 10 percent revealed hope that peace will be achieved sometime in the future. Twenty-four percent indicated that world peace is dependent on certain conditions, including global effort (5 percent), and divine intervention (5 percent). For example, an 18year-old female responded, ‘‘This is wishful thinking, but only if countries learn to shelve their greediness and arrogance’’; a 24-year-old female explained, ‘‘We are all educated and one day we will all come to realize that war is fruitless’’; and a 19-year-old female replied, ‘‘Peace will not be achieved until the second coming of Christ.’’ Seventeen percent of the responses emphasized the difficulty of achieving world peace; according to a 19-year-old male, ‘‘There will always be war and peace is not easily achieved.’’ Thirty percent of the responses disagreed with the possibility of world peace, with 5 percent blaming the nature of individuals, 2 percent blaming the nature of nations, and 21 percent blaming the nature of mankind as reasons why achieving worle peace will not be possible. For example, according to a 19-year-old female, ‘‘This is a hopeful statement that probably will never be achieved. There will always be extremists who believe that their cause can only be recognized if they use violence’’; a 33-year-old male said, ‘‘Human beings are evil by nature, so it would not be easy,’’ and a 24-year-old female said, ‘‘it’s really difficult. Every country wants to get the maximum of benefits.’’

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CONCLUSION The general attitude toward peace and war that was shared by the majority of Chinese respondents to this survey might safely be summarized as one of guarded optimism. Indeed, most respondents indicated pragmatism about the use of aggression: It was acceptable under certain conditions, such as when acting as a means to an end, the benefits of which outweigh the costs of the aggression. Recall that over two-thirds of respondents stated that they agreed one country has the right to invade another, but most within that group said the right existed only when in response to a threat from or act of aggression by that other country. In addition, two-thirds were also against a state right to use torture; those who were not against it described torture as being a necessary evil for obtaining information when state security is at risk. This is not to say that respondents see aggression as a fitting response to all challenges. In particular, respondents were not as tolerant of violence within their own country: Over two-thirds said that the government does not have the right to kill citizens. Although this is an easy majority, it is interesting that the number is not much closer to 100 percent. A tolerance level of just under 30 percent of respondents for government violence against its own citizens is not a particularly low level, after all. With respect to optimism, over two-thirds of respondents indicated that people have a right to peace, but within that group, many thought the actual realization of that right was improbable. The one-third who did not think all people have a right to peace almost exclusively said they thought that peace was simply too hard to achieve. Only about one-third of the respondents agreed that citizens have a right to protest, and even within that group, only about two-thirds thought the right was universal and unconditional. Many argued that the right to protest existed only when the protests wouldn’t harm others, when the protests were purely peaceful, or when the protests were ‘‘socially sanctioned.’’ Thus, again, this trend echoes arguments regarding other forms of governmental aggression, where the respondents expressed outward dislike of violence, but argued that it is not always avoidable: The right to peace is nice to think about or desire, but it is just not likely. Respondents were not against world peace by any means, but they certainly did not, on average, think it reasonable to expect we would actually ever achieve such a state. On the whole, the respondents did not indicate any aversion to government intervention or government responsibility for citizens’ wellbeing. Most respondents who were against the use of violence, of

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torture, or of war as a strategic tool were so because they hoped there could be peaceful solutions to problems. They were not against these forms of aggression on the basis of any assumption that it is not the role or responsibility of the government to interfere in matters of security. Many of the items were implicitly about national-level security issues, which is traditionally the domain of the national government, so that connection may help explain the lack of comment about the extent to which the government has the ability to involve itself in the affairs of its citizens. Further research and broader sampling are necessary before we can make stronger claims about the issues raised in this chapter, but the results presented here do provide an important glimpse into the attitudes of Chinese men and women toward the use of violence by governments and citizens’ rights to peace.

10

South Korea Mi-Sung Kim, Ting Wu, In-Jin Park, and Mikyung Jang

War is . . . ‘‘something that could destroy the other country or even one’s own country without a gain’’; ‘‘works to remove the factors threatening the country’s safety.’’ Peace is . . . ‘‘no war, feel happy, and no trouble and worry’’; ‘‘the state that there is no external threat and that the country’s safety is secured.’’ War is dreadful. During the Korean War we had to flee to a place where nobody knew us so that nobody was involved in any matters with us. Neighbors would harm other families next door collaborating with the occupying party just because, for example, they had directly or indirectly unresolved or engaged conflicts, interests, or emotions with them. During the war, the occupying party would switch almost everyday and we were hardly able to predict who would turn their back on us. Rather, a complete stranger had no reason to bring us into their issues.1

The Korean peninsula’s pivotal position in bridging countries in northeast Asia2 has led to frequent invasions and domination by its larger neighbors. South Korea has experienced injustice, abuse, oppression, agony, and internal discord stemming from Japanese colonialism and its aftermath, national division following World War II, the Korean War, and 39 years of dictatorship. For South Korea, the division of the peninsula legitimated the expansion of military power, which resulted in dictatorial military regimes for more than 30 years. These regimes, which ended in 1992, set aside agendas such as social and democratic reforms on the pretext of economic development as well as anticommunism.3 Within these sociohistorical contexts, South Koreans are confronting the reconciliation process both as perpetrators and as victims.4 Presently, North Korea’s nuclear program poses important security

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concerns for those living in the surrounding area. This chapter addresses how these contextual factors shed light on the perspectives of contemporary South Korean respondents on topics related to human rights: war, invasion, torture, terrorism, and peace. Following the end of the military regimes, South Korea began to move forward with the new government’s policy of reconciliation with North Korea. In addition, many human rights movements emerged across all levels of society, propelled in part by the relatively high educational levels of the general public. As interest and participation have expanded to include an awareness of history beyond that of everyday life and politics, South Koreans have also endeavored to seek justice in relation to the legacies of both Japanese colonization and the previous authoritarian regimes. Much of the reconciliatory process is grounded in an understanding of an aggressive past, during which the Korean people both acted as perpetrators and suffered as victims. Without understanding the social contexts in which people engaged in aggression, Koreans may be unable to have a deeper understanding of human rights, which may in turn hinder them from embracing and reconciling with fellow citizens criticized as perpetrators of past violence.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Korea became a unified and independent country in 936 CE (the Koryo dynasty) and maintained its independence into the 20th century. Although Korea proclaimed its neutrality before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904–1905 (during the Chosun dynasty), the U.S. president, Theodore Roosevelt, encouraged the Japanese to take control of Korea while also accepting the U.S. Open Door Policy in China.5 In 1910, Korea was formally annexed by Japan. As a result of the Koreans’ strong sense of national and cultural identity, Japan’s initial method of military domination in Korea proved ineffective.6 Consequently, the Japanese changed their policy and used appeasement to divide and weaken the Korean national liberation movement. By providing selected Koreans with benefits or top positions in organizations, the Japanese attained a measure of success in cultivating professional pro-Japanese Koreans who would lay down their life for Japan. In return for the favors they received, the pro-Japanese Koreans worked to arouse public opinion in favor of Japan, form proJapanese organizations, expose independence movement activists, provide intelligence information, perform propaganda campaigns designed to present a positive image of colonial rule, and persuade independence activists to abandon their cause.

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After invading China in 1937 and entering World War II (1941–1945), Japan forcibly mobilized more than one million Koreans to assist with military actions.7 Specifically, influential Japanese collaborators publicly encouraged young men to volunteer in the Japanese army, privately making sure that their own sons were not enlisted. In total, about 200,000 young Korean men were drafted near the end of the war. Furthermore, several thousand females between the ages of 12 and 40 were forced to work in munitions factories or sent to the battlefields in China and the South Pacific as military sexual slaves—the so-called ‘‘comfort women.’’8 Meanwhile, throughout the period of Japanese occupation, political and social movements that had formed to promote Korean independence were brutally suppressed by the occupiers. Divided Korea Four days before Japan surrendered to the Allies in 1945, U.S. officials were given the task of dividing the Korean peninsula between the United States and Russia. This division was remarkable in light of the fact that Korea was not a defeated power like Germany or Austria, and that Japan, the aggressor in Asia, remained an integrated state. Furthermore, the division exacerbated the problems created by Japanese colonialism and severely disrupted the Korean economy. Although the North had plenty of natural resources, South Korea had more areas for farming, and the economies had been interdependent.9 Moreover, the division contributed to the sense of Han (feelings of unresolved anger, frustration, and resentment at past injustices) that Feffer10 believes characterizes modern Korean history. Before the official outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, significant battles involving thousands of troops and hundreds of deaths took place, with South Korea initiating most of these incidents.11 With Kim Il Sung eager to unify the peninsula through force, activists in South Korea provoked an assault in order to get U.S. help against North Korea. Finally, on July 27, 1953, representatives of the UN forces and the communist powers signed an armistice agreement. In the 1950s, the military grew into the most modernized and powerful body in South Korea, receiving highest priority in the distribution of human and material resources. In effect, South Korea had generalsturned-presidents from 1961 to 1992. Lacking popular support, the military resorted to physical strength in place of procedural justice to accomplish their goals. The Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) became deeply involved in domestic politics, arrested without warrant, and even tortured political opponents, antigovernment people, and military personnel, as well as civilians, on the pretext of investigating

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spy organizations. This apparatus of suppression, expanded from the colonial period through the Korean War, grew tremendously during the military regime, until no sector of society was free from its control. The KCIA was synonymous with omnipotent power; being branded as a spy meant death or life more painful than death.12 At the beginning of the 21st century, after 50 years of separation, North and South Korea by 2003 had little in common.13 In fact, according to Grinker14 and Kwon and Han,15 many in South Korea had come to fear that absorbing their 25 million impoverished cousins in North Korea would produce negative economic consequences. Nevertheless, unification is the long-term goal of most Koreans,16 and the South Korean government’s policy regarding the North began to shift in response to signs of an end to the Cold War in the late 1980s.17 Summit meetings between the two countries in 2000 provided a crucial turning point, which ended decades of hostilities. For example, more than 100,000 civilians visited each state in 2006,18 although free travel was not yet allowed. A much grander scheme is the industrial park and tourism complex in Kaesung that South Korea’s Hyundai corporation expects will boast 3,000 factories, 100,000 housing units, a shopping center, and two golf courses by 2010. Although losing hundreds of millions on a Kumgang mountain tourism project, Hyundai, whose founder was born in North Korea, continues to link its fortunes to an improvement in North-South relations.19 Several studies have provided evidence of the repercussions of South Koreans’ experiences with military regimes. For example, in one study of Korean responses to the question, ‘‘What is meant by the word democracy in Korea,’’ the only common denominator seemed to be that ‘‘democracy is anything but military dictatorship.’’20 In another study, three years after democracy was introduced as something more than a disguise for military rule, only 30 percent agreed that ‘‘Korea is at present a democratic society.’’21 Helgesen contended that the division of the country was to blame for the expansion of military power, the role of ex-generals as presidents, and corrupt links among the political elites, the generals, and business tycoons, as well as a strong bond with the U.S. government.22 Human Rights Today, many in South Korea agree with the importance of ‘‘bringing justice to the past.’’ The objective is to free the nation from the legacies of both Japanese colonization and the previous authoritarian regimes and to bring about national reconciliation and democratic development. Prior to the emergence of civil government, families and friends of

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victims of the military dictatorship fought for years to discover the real facts behind the loss of their loved ones. Even in the new civilian administration of Kim Young Sam, the bureaucracy and the security forces still held an authoritarian attitude toward the people, which led to the violent suppression of labor strikes, and brought about suspicious deaths.23 As a result of steadfast sit-in protests (e.g., a 422-day tent sit-in protest in 1998–1999), campaigns (e.g., obtaining 100,000 signatures in 1993), and written petitions, the Act on Rehabilitation and Restitution for Persons Victimized in Connection with Democratization Movements and the Special Act to Reveal the Truth regarding Suspicious Death were decreed in 1999 and in 2000, respectively.24 However, by defining ‘‘suspicious deaths’’ as ‘‘deaths caused by state power and connected with the democratization movement,’’ the Special Law neglected various types of death by state violence and infringements of human rights outside the category of the democratization movement.25 In general, the Commission for the Restoration of Honor and Compensation to Activists of the Democratization Movement has reviewed 11,041 of 12,657 reported cases since 2000 and determined that compensation was due in 3,112 of them as of November 2007.26 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the Republic of Korea, established as a temporary governmental advocacy in 2005, has investigated incidents to take necessary measures to bring about reconciliation in cases relating to, among others, the anti-Japanese independence movement, mass victimization of civilians before and during the Korean War, human rights violations, and politically fabricated trials after independence.27 Finally, with respect to women’s rights, in 2005 the National Assembly eliminated the household registration system that made women legally subordinate to the male family head. This reform makes it legal for women to head a household and for remarried women to change their children’s family name to their new husband’s name; it also ended the six-month waiting period for remarriage that was directed only at women.28 Involvement in Armed Conflict The Vietnam War was South Korea’s first involvement in armed conflict overseas. Combat divisions were dispatched by request of the U.S. government. A total of 312,853 soldiers were sent over a period of about nine years. After the United States, South Korea had the largest contingent of soldiers fighting Hanoi.29 Consequently, for South Korea, the Vietnam War claimed 5,077 lives and left 10,962 wounded.30 Similar to their American counterparts, many of the South Korean Vietnam veterans did not come home to a warm reception.31 Moreover, many of them

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are still suffering health problems caused by their exposure to Agent Orange, the chemical used by the U.S. military to kill dense jungle foliage during the war.32 Koreans have voiced many different opinions concerning South Korea’s involvement in the Vietnam War. Many South Koreans felt that they needed to repay the United States for saving South Korea from Communist domination during the Korean War. Others believed that although the general public in Korea did not want to get involved, propaganda from the military-dominated government at that time convinced them of the necessity of involvement.33 It has also been argued that the South Korean government wanted both military and financial assistance from the United States as well as acquiescence to the unelected, militarydominated government’s legitimacy.34 Presidents Park and Johnson signed the Brown Memorandum in 1966, which was initiated by the United States and promised South Korea a $150 million loan and yearlong military provisions during its military tension with Communist North Korea, to pave the way for South Korea’s additional troop dispatch to Vietnam. The following quote of a soldier’s soliloquy from a 1992 South Korean film, ‘‘White Badge,’’35 describes the circumstances in which South Korean troops were sent to the Vietnam War: ‘‘The blood money we had to earn at the price of our lives fueled the modernization and development of the country. Owing to our contribution, the Republic of Korea, or at least higher echelon of it, made a gigantic stride into the world market. Lives for sale. National mercenaries.’’ In 1991, South Korea aided the United States in the Gulf War with a medical unit, an air force transport unit, and a cash support of $5 billion. No combat troops were dispatched. From 1993 until September 11, 2001, South Korean forces overseas were involved solely in UN Peace Keeping Operations in several areas, such as Somalia (1993–1994), South Sahara (1994–2006), and East Timor (1999–2004). Since September 11, the number of South Korean military forces dispatched overseas has increased. According to the Ministry of National Defense of South Korea,36 423 and 5,266 noncombat military forces served in the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and the Operation Iraqi Freedom, respectively. Sending of military forces overseas, especially combat troops, regardless of the characteristics of their service, has been controversial within South Korea. Those in support contended that the dispatch of troops as a response to the U.S.’s call for assistance would help solidify the alliance for collective defense stated in the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea (ROK: the official name of South Korea) and the United States, which was signed in 1953 and is still in effect at present.

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They also asserted that the dispatch of troops would help take advantage of Iraq’s reconstruction projects as well as provide more leverage to South Korea in trade negotiation with the United States in the future. Some argued that the dispatch of troops would be an opportunity to test and strengthen South Korea’s military operation capabilities through the actual practice of warfare. Opponents asserted that the dispatch of troops would bring more loss than gain, because the dispatch of troops would harm the secure oil supply or the business of private companies in Middle Eastern countries by spreading a negative image of South Korea.37 A telephone survey of 1,000 participants by Hankook Daily Newspaper in 200438 reported that 57.5 percent of the population disagreed with sending additional troops to Iraq. Level of disagreement varied in relation to age, with 70 percent of respondents in their twenties opposed to sending additional troops, and 53.7 percent of those in their sixties agreeing with it. The most frequent reason (48 percent) for disagreeing with any additional troop dispatches was that ‘‘aggravated civil war and terrors may result in sacrificing Korean soldiers.’’ The second major argument given by those opposed to sending more troops (35.3 percent) was that ‘‘The Iraq War has no moral justification.’’ On the other hand, the most frequent reason (43.4 percent) given by respondents who supported additional dispatch was to ‘‘respect the ROK-U.S. alliance.’’ Current Issues in Preventing Armed Conflicts Concerned with possible armed conflicts within the Korean peninsula, many have argued for a reduction of arms. Related issues include the establishment of an inter-Korea peace agreement, denuclearization of North Korea, armament reduction in South Korea, and the keeping of Japanese Constitution Article 9, limiting Japan’s military to defending only the state’s own territory.39 Although South Korea is still technically at war with North Korea, both parties seem to recognize the need to set up a peace agreement that could replace the armistice that ended the Korean War. Responding to pressure from five nations (i.e., South Korea, the United States, Russia, China, and Japan), North Korea recently agreed to disable all of its nuclear facilities in exchange for benefits provided by the other members of the six-party talk. Following the agreement reached on February 13, 2007, the second six-party conference was held in Beijing, China, on July 19, 2007, and more meetings are planned. Although the 2007 discussion failed to set a disarmament timetable, it yielded agreement over the goals for the next phase of the agenda.40

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Peace Education In the past, South Korean people were taught that peace could be realized through reunification, but now it is recognized that reunification could be realized through peace.41 In fact, 80 percent of 300 teachers thought that current reunification education failed to draw students’ interest. Instead, they suggested more focus on educating students about the principles of democracy by emphasizing universal values, respect for human rights, and peace as a way of finding coexistence without strife.42 However, peace is not yet systemically taught in schools. Bae43 pointed out that the word ‘‘peace,’’ in elementary school textbooks was mentioned only in the units related to reunification, which may lead students to a narrow understanding of the concept of peace. Bae also criticized South Korea’s current educational system for focusing on higher education entrance examinations, which hinders students and teachers from appreciating peace education as an important part of schooling.44 A few alternative schools (e.g., Gok-Sung Peace School) and experimental schools (e.g., Namwon Middle School) began peace education as an independent curriculum in the mid-2000s. Namwon Middle School, for example, provided a peace-human rights program, educating their students on the concept of community identity and peace, human rights, and understanding of international society.45 In addition, some studies of peace education in preschool settings started being published since the early 2000s.46 South Korean people’s recognition of peace has grown through reflection on their own contemporary history47 as well as their growing recognition of human rights.48 Some discourses about peace education that view it as an issue independent of religious ideas started in the early 1990s.49 Civic groups have provided peace education programs and peace coordinators. For example, Peacemaking operates ‘‘Alternative to Violence Project’’ workshops. The Women’s House of Peace as well, is running a Conflict Resolution Peace Education Program for adolescents or adults. Specifically, they send program leaders to schools requesting the implementation of peace programs in their classes or after-school classes. The typical contents dealt with in the classroom include respect for others and self, acknowledgment of differences and respect for diversity, communication skill training, and respect for all living beings.

THE KOREAN SAMPLE The Korean sample consisted of 110 participants (46 females and 64 males), ranging in age from 20 to 57 years (average age 30) and

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representing a variety of professions, including student, researcher, teacher, housewife, company employee, selling agent, accountant, Web marketer, pharmacist, dentist, skin care specialist, realtor, designer, and freelancer. Sixteen participants had completed high school, 40 had finished college, and 11 had more than a college education; 1 participant had dropped out of college; 38 were undergraduate students, among whom 9 males were temporarily leaving college for military service obligation; and 5 participants did not report their levels of education. No female participant had served in the military. Forty-two male respondents had completed their military obligation, and 11 were at present in service. All participants were recruited in South Korea through both a convenience and a snowball sampling technique (with the opportunity to fill out the survey being passed around by word of mouth) in 2006. Participants completed the Personal and Institutional Right to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) by rating each item on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = total disagreement; 7 = total agreement) and explaining their chosen rating in their own words. They also provided definitions of war, torture, terrorism, reconciliation, and peace. The quantitative results are briefly reviewed first, and then qualitative analysis is addressed.

KOREAN PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION ‘‘There is no excuse to justify invading another country. In addition, there is no country that has this kind of right.’’ ‘‘The approach toward wars between countries must be exercised by way of logic of gains and losses of nations, which is different from the logic of gains and losses of individuals and small groups. One solution among various solutions is viewed as a ‘war.’ ’’ ‘‘[Torture] is a matter that can be practiced for a national interest.’’ ‘‘[Regarding a right to torture], any situation where the use of unsound means is exercised for achieving its own purpose is undesirable.’’ ‘‘Terrorism occurs after the last attempt at conversation.’’ Definitions of War Seventy of 110 participants provided their own understanding of war. Twenty-six percent of the definitions indicated that war takes place out of self-interest or conflicting interests and is undertaken to achieve a state’s or a group’s aim or intention. One percent of the responses attributed war to lack of understanding or irrational judgment, and

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4 percent attributed it to conflicting ideologies/opinions. For example, a 24-year-old male undergraduate said war is ‘‘Armed conflicts because of a state’s greed.’’ Regarding lack of understanding or irrational judgment, a 25-year-old male undergraduate described war as ‘‘The worst decision.’’ A 23-year-old female receptionist said war is ‘‘A lack of compromise and concession.’’ Regarding conflicting ideologies/opinions, a 24-year-old female nurse’s aide, for example, stated that war is ‘‘Armed fight between people, states, or nations who have different opinions.’’ The above themes seem to reveal that participants considered that wars tend to break out because of the perpetrator’s intention to carry his or her point. In addition, many participants (26 percent) viewed war as a type of conflict-solving method: ‘‘action to resolve conflicting interests between states using armed force’’ (44-year-old male research professor) and ‘‘effort to solve, by means of armed force, things not settled by communication’’ (34-year-old male Web marketer). Although many Korean participants referred to war as a troubleshooting tactic in service of self-interest, 4 percent defined war as violence itself. For example, one 28-year-old woman described war as ‘‘something that involves only violence and order without freedom,’’ whereas a 30-year-old woman said war is when ‘‘violence or armed force is inflicted between states or groups.’’ Three percent of the responses referred to war as a last resort. In addition, 9 percent explicitly described war as ‘‘inhumane’’ or ‘‘to be eliminated’’ (a 41-year-old female theology student), and a 23-year-old female receptionist associated war with ‘‘the loss of human dignity.’’ Finally, 10 percent of the responses referred to tragic characteristics and outcomes of war such as cruelty, loss of life, and destruction/chaos. A 23-year-old female undergraduate defined war as ‘‘an incident in which lots of people die at a stretch.’’ Some of these responses reflected a very personal orientation to war, including a focus on the emotional effects of war. For example, a 41-year-old housewife stated, ‘‘Pain, cruelty, sadness, and separated family, which break my heart.’’ A 26-year-old female professional stated, ‘‘An incident in which people suffer pain and lose their own and their beloved’s lives because of the wrong choice and judgment; action to destroy each other’s or one’s own state for nothing.’’ Invasion When asked to rate the statement ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country,’’ 47 percent (n = 52) of participants totally disagreed, 16 percent (n = 17) strongly disagreed, 9 percent (n =10)

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mildly disagreed, 9 percent (n =10) neither agreed nor disagreed, 13 percent (n = 14) mildly agreed, and 3 percent (n = 3) strongly agreed with it. Among the respondents, 71 explained their ratings. Most of the reasons for denouncing invasion provided by participants who either totally or strongly disagreed with the statement were as follows: because of its ulterior motives of self-interest (1 percent of all the qualitative responses), because of its use of violence and interference with peace (11 percent), because of the existence of better alternatives (7 percent), and because of its negative consequences (7 percent). For example, a 26-year-old female working for a dermatology clinic said, ‘‘Invading another country is to torment its people for one’s interests no matter how the invading country justifies it. Unjust aggression should not be excused.’’ A 44-year-old male professor also indicated its negative consequence, in addition to the motives of selfinterest, saying that ‘‘When invading another country, an intrinsic attribute by the power who intends to take advantage by invasion is to inflict damage on the people of another country.’’ In regard to better alternatives, a 21-year-old female said, ‘‘Without insisting on military attacks, it is possible enough to interfere in another state using economic and cultural means.’’ Participants who mildly agreed that a country has the right to invade another country indicated either that exercise of such a right depends on the situation (6 percent of the total responses) or that states have such a right if there are threats to one’s citizens’ rights and interests (4 percent) and use it only as a last resort (6 percent). For example, a 25-year-old male student said, ‘‘[A right to invasion is acceptable] for protecting their own citizens and countering against another country’s impinging upon their interests and rights.’’ A 27-year-old male in military service said, ‘‘The initiation of war is a final method. That is, war itself cannot be avoided; however, we should try to avoid it.’’ Finally, two of three participants who totally agreed with the right to invade another country provided their explanations as follows: ‘‘To protect the citizens’ rights and interests’’ (a 35-year-old male dentist) and ‘‘The world is operated by power logic’’ (a 28-year-old male English instructor). As can be seen, the same language, self-interest, was applied by many respondents to either denounce or to approve a state right to invade another country. In addition, the importance of peacekeeping and self-defense were also mentioned in arguments on both sides of the issue. On the other hand, statements concerning the existence of better alternatives and emphases on the negative consequences of such a right were used exclusively in arguments to explain total or strong disagreement with a state right to invasion.

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Torture of Prisoners in Time of War When asked to rate the statement ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war,’’ participants provided a broad range of responses: 22 percent totally disagreed, 14 percent, strongly disagreed, 13 percent mildly disagreed, 20 percent neither agreed nor disagreed, 22 percent mildly agreed, 4 percent strongly agreed, and 6 percent totally agreed. Fifty-seven of the respondents provided qualitative explanations of their ratings. Explanations provided by participants who mildly disagreed with, or agreed with, a state right to torture (16 percent of the qualitative responses) referred to the unusual circumstance of war time. For example, a 21-year-old male student mildly agreed with using torture, explaining that ‘‘First of all, in time of war our country’s nation is important. Thus, I think it is possible to torture prisoners from the opponent country.’’ A 24-year-old female said, ‘‘Torture could be implemented in time of war although it is not a good method.’’ A 26-year-old female working for a dermatological clinic also mentioned that ‘‘I think ordering the torture of prisoners could be conducted in time of war because people are furious and cannot trust each other.’’ Along with the consideration of circumstances that may be peculiar to war, participants who neither agreed nor disagreed and those who showed agreement with a governmental right to torture prisoners of war provided the following explanations for indicating some tolerance of the right: effectiveness of torture in gathering information (12 percent), protection of human lives and rights (5 percent), it’s a necessary vice (2 percent), and it can help in keeping the peace (2 percent). A 23-year-old male student mentioned that ‘‘[Torture] could be conducted depending on necessities. Imagine if the information able to reduce the danger of the state could not be gathered because of not ordering the torture, and if it would result in more death.’’ In addition, two participants viewed torture as punishment that was deserved; for example, a 21-year-old female student said, ‘‘If the convict committed a crime that is acknowledged by all people, he or she deserves punishment.’’ A few participants who mildly disagreed with a governmental right to order torture of prisoners approved using torture in times of war and argued for the importance of considering circumstances. Other participants did not accept the view that the unusual circumstances of war can justify a right to torture. Twenty percent of the responses emphasized the dignity of prisoners as human beings, or human rights, as principles that override wartime circumstances that may seem to justify extreme measures. For example, a 25-year-old male student totally disagreed with the torture of prisoners and said, ‘‘Even in time of war the

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right of human dignity should be kept.’’ A 22-year-old male who is serving in the military strongly disagreed with torture and said, ‘‘Even the system of government is composed of members of individuals. We have no right to ignore human rights of others, although we are in the time of war.’’ All participants who referred to human dignity disagreed with inflicting torture on prisoners and tended not to differentiate general prisoners from prisoners of war when referring to human rights and dignity of human beings. For example, a 46-year-old male teacher mildly disagreed with a right to torture prisoners and said, ‘‘Basic human dignity should be respected, although committing crime cannot be tolerated when it’s taking advantage of the confusion under war time.’’ A different perspective on human rights came from a 20-year-old male student who said that ‘‘Under the emergent condition of the state, it is inevitable not to consider human rights of the fewer in order to protect the rights of more.’’ Two participants who emphasized the importance of behaving in a lawful way differed in their level of tolerance for a state right to torture. A 23-year-old female receptionist mildly agreed with a state right to torture prisoners and argued that ‘‘I think that torturing prisoners is possible when they do not admit themselves in the wrong. Nevertheless, a government has no right to do so. A government should make sure if the criminal investigation has been done correctly and if there is not an inch of error in the investigation before torturing them.’’ A 44-year-old male research professor, who totally disagreed with a right to torture prisoners, said, ‘‘Although going through a war, it cannot be allowed to infringe the basic human right of prisoners without a lawful measure.’’ Definitions of Terrorism Seventy-three of 110 participants provided their own understandings of terrorism. Fifty-three percent of the responses defined terrorism as characterized by violent action, with 8 percent focusing on terrorists’ intention to cause terror as its goal, 36 percent on the acts of terrorism, and 3 percent on the negative consequences of terrorism. For example, one participant described terrorism as a means ‘‘To raise fear using assassination, violence, etc. in order to achieve one’s goal,’’ and another defined terrorism as ‘‘killing many people.’’ On the other hand, 11 percent of the responses focused on the attitudes and doctrines imbedded in terrorism, referring to the belief/ideology/doctrine justifying a use of violent and fearful means. For example, a 44-year-old male research professor said that terrorism is ‘‘an ideology that justifies the use of physical and ideological violence as a means of pursuing an individual’s, a group’s, or a state’s interests.’’ In contrast, 8 percent of the

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responses identified terrorism with its political, economical, or social causes. One participant conveyed his understanding of terrorism this way: ‘‘When there is a large difference in ordinary armed force, the inferior party delivers physical pressure and attacks against the superior party in order to propagate and achieve its economical and political intention.’’ Six percent of the responses focused on the negative emotional consequences of acts of terrorism. For example, one participant described terrorism as simply ‘‘grief,’’ and another identified terrorism with ‘‘sadness, pain.’’ Twenty-one percent of the responses included moral judgments of terrorism based on the acts themselves but not the people who commit the terrorist acts. For example, terrorism was defined as selfish, unfair, dastardly, cruel, unjustifiable, useless, evil, and the most imprudent behaviors, a necessary vice, the worst choice, and something that should never occur. One 21-year-old male currently serving in the military said terrorism is ‘‘An evil in the society. Hard to forgive it.’’ Similarly, a 41-year-old female student said, ‘‘It is an evil behavior. It is extortion, coercion, and infringement on freedom.’’ By contrast, one participant (a 25-year-old male student) took a broader perspective: ‘‘Terrorism is defined relatively depending on perspectives. Literally, it could cause terror, but it could be martyrdom or patriotic sacrifice from a perspective of perpetrators.’’ Finally, some participants focused on the perpetrators of terrorism, attributing the potential for terrorism to either a nongovernmental group (12 percent) or an individual (6 percent), or a country (5 percent). By mentioning a violent regime, a few (3 percent) also implied that a government could be a perpetrator. In addition, several responses (5 percent) indicated that terrorism is perpetrated by the party that has inferior power, whereas others (14 percent) argued that terrorism could be perpetrated by any group, regardless of level of power, when they are dealing with differences regarding ideas, idealities, religions, and interests. One 23-year-old female student defined terrorism as ‘‘Doing harm to the opponent in an unexpected situation by means of physical violence by a group or country or individual with inferior power.’’ A 21-year-old female student identified terrorism with ‘‘Using armed force against a group that has ideas or beliefs different from one’s own group.’’ A 22-year-old male serving in the military equated terrorism with ‘‘Exercising violence toward an unidentified majority, for strongly expressing opinions of one’s own or one’s group, or inflicting harms on the group that is contradictory to one’s own.’’ With respect to its various perpetrators, destructive intentions, and contexts involving different interests, terrorism was associated with the concept of war. In fact, a few participants defined terrorism as a war.

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For example, one 21-year-old female student defined terrorism as ‘‘an abridged or simplified edition of war.’’ Killing Innocent Civilians in the Fight against Terrorism When asked to rate the statement ‘‘Sometimes heads of government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism,’’ most of the participants rejected this right: 55 percent totally disagreed, 13 percent strongly disagreed, and 12 percent mildly disagreed. Six percent of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed, and only a few participants agreed with this right: 4 percent mildly agreed, 2 percent strongly agreed, and 8 percent totally agreed. Among these respondents, 56 provided rationales for their ratings. The most common argument against tolerating civilian loss of life (33 percent) emphasized the innocence of the civilians, whereas 11 percent referred to the role of the head of a government as protecting civilians. A 24-year-old female nurse said, ‘‘The reason to fight terrorism is to prevent citizens from being killed without reason. I think it is nonsense to kill innocents to fight terrorism.’’ The next most common argument against sacrificing civilians (6 percent) focused on human rights or human dignities; this was the most typical rationale of participants who indicated strong or total disagreement with a governmental right to kill innocent civilians. One 23-year-old female student asserted that ‘‘Human dignity should not be ignored for any just cause such as fighting against terrorism.’’ A few participants (3 percent) expressed the idea that ends do not justify the means (e.g., ‘‘If the motives are good, the process should also be good’’). Similarly, 3 percent of the participants asserted that sacrificing human lives to fight terrorism was contrary to common sense, and 2 percent equated such killing with terrorism. For example, a 22-year-old male serving in the military said, ‘‘Terror is the thing conducted by a terrorist. Killing innocent civilians to fight terrorists is another action of terror.’’ Although many of the respondents emphasized that civilian causalities are wrong, some respondents (10 percent) agreed that the ends justify the means. It is interesting that this argument accompanied a range of ratings from mild disagreement to strong agreement with the proposition. For example, a 40-year-old female teacher mildly disagreed with a governmental right to kill innocent civilians, but then argued that ‘‘If the condition requires preventing more loss of lives.’’ A 21-year-old male student mildly agreed with the proposition and commented, ‘‘Under a state’s emergency situation, it is inevitable that the rights of a smaller number of people are not considered for the sake of larger number. By the same reasoning, it is inevitable to sacrifice a smaller number,

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even though they are innocent, under a situation threatening the security of a larger number.’’ A 21-year-old female student strongly agreed with the proposition but commented, ‘‘Rather than a right, it [civilian losses] is thought inevitable if it is the case to sacrifice a smaller number of people for the sake of a larger number of people. However, it should not be done intentionally.’’ These examples indicate that although many respondents rejected the right to kill innocents in any situation and a few of them equated killing innocents for whatever ends with terrorism, some respondents showed tolerance for the loss of innocent lives in the fight against terrorism for utilitarian reasons and because they believed civilian casualties are inevitable.

KOREAN PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE AND PROTEST ‘‘Humans have the right to be in peace, to try to maintain peace, and to create peace.’’ ‘‘Peace is a kind of thing that we should protect and keep, not a thing to be given to enjoy.’’ ‘‘Although we could exercise the rights to stage protest on behalf of those who fall a victim to war, substantively we should exercise it in order to keep one’s own life and peaceful life.’’ ‘‘Each individual can have a respect and dignity, and play a representative role to support individual rights [such as the right to protest against war.]’’ Definitions of Peace Eighty-one of 110 participants provided their own interpretations of peace. Galtung categorized definitions of peace as either positive or negative.50 Positive peace implies the existence of certain social conditions; such as harmony, integration, and cooperation that may only be achieved in the absence of structural violence (social fragmentation and marginalization stemming from particular social institutions). Negative definitions of peace, on the other hand, conceptualize peace as the absence of violence. Sixty-seven percent of the Korean respondents provided positive definitions of peace (e.g., ‘‘physically and psychologically secure state), whereas 29 percent gave negative definitions of peace (e.g., ‘‘the state of no conflict in relation to one’s own mind or in the relationship with others’’). Thirty-two percent of the responses related peace to individual states of well-being. Within this general category,15 percent of the responses identified peace as a psychological state of well-being (e.g., ‘‘everyone

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living in happiness’’), whereas 5 percent described peace as a physical state of well-being (e.g., ‘‘All people in the world living comfortably’’), or as security or tranquility (e.g., ‘‘All men keep their mind and body quiet’’). On the other hand, 23 percent of the responses defined peace in relation to social relationships, with 7 percent emphasizing understanding and 5 percent respect. Nine percent of the responses associated peace with freedom: ‘‘a condition in which all people can freely pursue their happiness.’’ Among the negative definitions of peace, 22 percent of the responses defined peace as the absence of conflict. According to one participant, peace is ‘‘the state that there is no external threats and that the country’s safety is secured.’’ Seven percent of the responses characterized peace as the lack of negative emotions (e.g., ‘‘a state in which there is no hatred’’). Basic Right to Peace When asked to rate the statement ‘‘all human beings have a basic right to peace,’’ most of the participants expressed strong and total agreement: 75 percent totally agreed, 14 percent strongly agreed, and 4 percent mildly agreed. Five percent of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed, and only three participants indicated any level of disagreement with the statement. Fifty-six percent of the respondents provided explanations of their ratings. Forty-one percent of the explanations were general endorsements of the right, and an additional 26 percent emphasized that this right belongs to all human beings. A 24-year-old woman explained, ‘‘No one is born by the decision of another, from the moment of birth, and so the peace should not be damaged or destroyed by anyone. Thus, humans always have the right to live in peace.’’ In addition, several responses (7 percent) connected a right to peace to the idea of equality; for example, ‘‘All humans are equal’’ (33-year-old male) or ‘‘Because every person is respectable and valuable’’ (21-year-old female student). Five percent of the responses imposed specific conditions on a right to peace: ‘‘As long as they do not infringe upon others’ freedom’’ (25-year-old male student). In addition, some responses (11 percent) based a right to peace on its importance as a foundation for happiness and fairness. A 41-year-old housewife said, ‘‘Peace is the only basic framework that can chase happiness,’’ and a 26-year-old woman working for a dermatological clinic said that ‘‘Peace is the basis for all human rights. For that reason, the basic responsibility of the government is to sustain the right for peace and all human have the basic right for peace.’’

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Seven percent of the responses described a right to world peace as an ideal, with 5 percent indicating some optimism concerning the eventual achievability of this ideal, and 2 percent suggesting it was not realistic to assume there would ever be a human right to peace. For example, a 23-year-old male student neither agreed nor disagreed with the proposition, but said, ‘‘It is more of a hope than a right.’’ A 35-year-old male dentist mildly disagreed with the proposition, asserting that ‘‘It is an unrealistic idea in this competitive society. Consider the reality of life!’’ Achieving World Peace When asked to rate the statement ‘‘I believe that world peace can be achieved,’’ 19 percent totally agreed, 9 percent strongly agreed, and 24 percent mildly agreed. Twenty percent of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed, 11 percent mildly disagreed, 5 percent strongly disagreed, and 13 percent totally disagreed. Only 29 respondents explained their ratings. Although 16 percent of the responses expressed optimism concerning the achievability of world peace, 33 percent rejected this possibility. More specifically, 13 percent of the responses cited human nature, and 10 percent cited the temperament of nations as preventing world peace. One participant explained, ‘‘[Achieving peace] is impossible because of people’s greed,’’ and another predicted, ‘‘Never as long as there is a powerful country and a weak country.’’ Forty-three percent of the responses indicated that world peace can be achieved under certain conditions. For example, one respondent urged, ‘‘Although one’s own benefit is important, trying to find a way to live together will do,’’ and another suggested ‘‘It would be best for each country to keep watch on other countries through a coalition system.’’ Furthermore, 7 percent of the responses indicated that peace can only occur through global efforts, and 10 percent said it requires divine intervention. One participant commented, ‘‘Government diplomatic problems are very complex in each country so resistance is predictable, but it would be possible if the countries continue to follow the pattern of globalization,’’ while another declared, ‘‘yes! God will achieve it.’’ Protests against War and in Favor of Peace When asked to rate the statement ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace,’’ 56 percent totally agreed, 17 percent strongly agreed, and 17 percent mildly agreed. Nine percent of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed, one participant strongly disagreed, and one participant totally disagreed with this right, but neither of these respondents provided any explanation of their rating.

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Among the respondents, 60 provided qualitative responses explaining their rating. Fifty-seven percent of the responses affirming an individual right to stage protests generally focused on freedom of expression; for example, ‘‘Either to agree or to disagree with war, it is a basic right to express one’s own thoughts’’ (21-year-old female student). Seven percent of the responses portrayed the right to protest as socially sanctioned, and another 7 percent qualified the respondents’ approval by imposing some conditions on the protest. For example, one 25-year-old male student explained that ‘‘Freedom of assembly and demonstration is a very important basic right in democracy.’’ Two other male students qualified their approval by stating that ‘‘The right to stage protests against whatever is undoubted, provided that they are staged peacefully,’’ and ‘‘[Protest is a right] within the scope of not infringing upon others’ freedom.’’ It is interesting that several participants (5 percent) viewed the right to protest as civic responsibility. By contrast, several other responses (5 percent) suggested that a right to protest was a matter of personal choice. In addition, one participant (a 34-year-old male Web marketer) viewed protests pessimistically: ‘‘If protests could solely solve problems, peace could be kept but it is not so in reality.’’

CONCLUSION This study considers how the views of ordinary Koreans concerning war, governmental aggression, and peace could have been influenced by an historical context that included Japanese colonization, the Korean War, a divided country, dictatorship, and a democratization movement. South Korea is currently involved in uncovering truth, looking for reconciliation, and resisting armed conflict within the Korean peninsula, as well as facing international issues of economic competition. Although our nonprobability sample, recruited through a snowball sampling technique, is not nationally representative, it is diverse in age, education, and occupation, includes both genders, includes individuals who are serving in the military, and varies in regard to participants’ level of interest in human rights issues. One of the interesting findings of our study is that motives (e.g., selfinterest) that were viewed as legitimate causes of state aggression by some participants were viewed quite critically by other participants. Such differences in worldviews are consistent with the debates within the country regarding the dispatch of troops to the Iraq war.51 On the other hand, better alternatives and negative consequences of war were mentioned only by respondents who totally or strongly disagreed that

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countries have a right to invasion. It has been suggested that people from countries that have directly experienced war within their borders are more likely to be aware of its negative consequences and focus on better alternatives and peace.52 Similarly, regarding peace education, Birgit Brock-Utne53 also argued that people who have experienced suffering and know what it means to be deprived will fight against oppression and for liberation more eagerly than those who live in an affluent society and just read about the inequity. The fact that views opposed to a governmental right to invasion were found in a country that has experienced considerable armed conflict has implications for the development of peace education programs. Such programs should include educating people about the negative consequences of war and not just focus on the concepts of peace, human rights, respect for diversity, and positive interaction strategies. Educators should be encouraged to use audiovisual aids to help people who live in an affluent society know what it really means to have war at hand and indirectly experience emotions that may be felt by people who have directly experienced war. Storytelling by those who have experienced war (like the story that began this chapter) could be used, as well. In the responses to the item concerning a potential state right to torture prisoners of war, there was a tension between responses implying increased tolerance for inhumane actions within the context of the unusual circumstance of war and responses that put priority on the dignity of prisoners as human beings or their human rights. This tension may reflect the modern history of Korea, a period in which the suppression of the human rights of ordinary Koreans was described as justified in the propaganda of colonial and autocratic military regimes that emphasized not rights but sacrifice and duties in the name of collective interests. To our best knowledge, and consistent with the responses to this study, many Koreans use the terms human dignity and human rights interchangeably, perhaps because of the same contextual influences. Human rights started being widely recognized by ordinary Koreans only after the late 1980s.54 The emphasis placed by several participants on lawful measures of dealing with prisoners may reflect a tendency of many Korean governments to place themselves above the law. Under Japan’s ‘‘Public Order and Police Law of 1900,’’ enforced during colonial Korea, and under Korea’s National Security Law, which presupposes armistice between North and South Korea,55 there have been many incidents of unlawful state violence. Although the constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, rules regarding arrest and detention and the standard for what constitute ‘‘endangering the existence or security of the state’’ under the National Security Law are arbitrary.56 The Truth and

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Reconciliation Commission of the Republic of Korea is working to rectify cases related to state abuses inflicted since the colonial period. With respect to the meaning of peace, positive definitions of peace and negative definitions of peace at the macro level appeared most frequently. Most of the participants who defined peace at the macro level referred to ‘‘all citizens’’ or ‘‘all people in the world,’’ which implies a highly collectivistic perspective, as does ‘‘living together by bring into harmony ideologies and natural resources among countries’’ (a 30-yearold male). Ninety-three percent of the respondents endorsed a belief in all human beings’ basic right to peace. These results could be explained through the suggestions of Barbosa et al.57 that people living in countries being exposed to tension from possible conflicts are more likely to endorse both basic rights to peace and human rights. Many of the themes relating to this item focused on peace at an individual micro level, such as ‘‘fundamental for happiness,’’ although some responses incorporated a theme of equality, which is a more macro level concept of peace. The theme of responsibility to create and maintain peace also emerged, reflecting the concept of peace as a process. Despite endorsement of a basic right to peace by a large portion of the sample, half of the respondents either expressed no opinion or did not believe that world peace could be achieved. For the ways to achieve world peace, the major themes were social inclusion based on human rights, eliminating hegemonism and materialism, and positive interaction strategies. The idea of achieving peace by social inclusion is congruent with a proposition of peace psychologists. Christie, Tint, Wagner, and Winter58 proposed that ‘‘positive peace is promoted when political structures become more inclusive and give voice to those who have been marginalized in matters that affect their well-being.’’ Regarding the rights to protest against war and in favor of peace, 90 percent endorsed the right. Several of the participants who totally endorsed this right voiced the theme of civic responsibility. This orientation may prove to be a crucial element for future peace education programs. The most frequent justifications for this right include the role of protest as a fundamental principle of democracy, ‘‘freedom of assembly and demonstration,’’ and its importance as an indicator of a peace orientation. Several respondents commented that peace protests must be nonviolent. Many Koreans have observed clashes between police and demonstration participants, so their views may be derived quite directly from personal experience. The participants who shared their views on war and peace in this study are ordinary Korean citizens, who are living in the past and the

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present and also moving forward. Their survey responses provide a window into the implicit theories that underlie public debates in this area and a basis for understanding the different uses of language and concepts from both sides. Social problems do not exist as problems until they are socially constructed and become recognized through media, education, and discourses. The findings of the current study could provide an empirical basis for developing peace education programs geared specifically to the experiences and implicit theories of modern Koreans, as well as helping to expand the social recognition of problems related to the violation of human rights and peace.

11

Japan Alice Murata, Michelle Murata, and Shiho Takagi1

Peace is . . . ‘‘A right that is given to each and everyone in the world that cannot be changed’’ (Japanese female, 25); ‘‘the ability to coexist with all, understanding we all have differences but that does not make one person more right than the other’’ (Japanese American female, 57). War is . . . ‘‘A dispute between two countries, where the brainless statesmen of one country use their military power to protest their rights and compel the other country for something (which is why they go into dispute)’’ (Japanese female, 20); ‘‘Something necessary in order to defend one’s lifestyle or religion, etc., in order to unify one area for an improvement in economics or politics, etc.’’ (Japanese American male, 23). The cataclysmic dropping of atomic bombs in Japan ended World War II and was the only time nuclear weapons were used against people. The number of resulting deaths exceeded 236,000 in Hiroshima and 140,000 in Nagasaki. These catastrophes led Japan to seek world peace and take an antinuclear stand.2 In this chapter, we start with a brief review of Japan’s history of war and peace, and then highlight the experiences of the Japanese immigrants who settled in the United States, and finally provide an analysis of Japanese and Japanese American responses to the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS). BRIEF HISTORY OF JAPAN According to legend, at one time heaven and earth were one. The Sun Goddess, Amaterasu Omikami, founded the islands of Japan and sent

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her grandson, Ninigi, to rule over the Japanese islands with a sword, a curved jewel, and a mirror. Ninjgi’s great-grandson, Jimmu Tenno, became the first emperor in 660 BCE.3 The Yamato clan rulers began the imperial dynasty that continues to occupy the throne today. The Shinto religion, which developed between 300 and 100 BCE, identified divine forces in nature and valued loyalty and wisdom in people.4 To establish a peaceful society, the emperors, while practicing Shinto, made Buddhism the state religion. Since 1333, Zen has also been practiced.5 The early Japanese were a Mongoloid race from China, Korea, and Manchuria. Chinese and Korean influence in the areas of rice cultivation, metalworking, and pottery changed the Japanese from Stone Age hunters to a male-dominated society of clans that fought to increase acquisition of property and money.6 During the Heian Period (the Golden Age of Peace), from 794 to 1185, Japanese culture flourished. Written Japanese language developed in addition to the Chinese characters already being used. Artistic developments in the Edo period (1603–1867) included woodblock printing, and kabuki and Bunraku theaters. Famous works for koto and shakuhachi (bamboo flute) were composed.7 Politically, the period from 1185 to 1853 was considered the era of the shoguns (commanders of the army). During this period, political and military power lay primarily in the hands of daimyo (provincial clan leaders/warlords) and their samurai (upper-class warriors), who gradually gained control over broad areas of China as the power of the emperors declined. Invasions by the Chinese Emperor Kublai Khan were repelled in 1274 and 1281. Internal fighting lasted more than a hundred years. In the mid-16th century, Western influences entered Japan. Europeans arrived to trade and introduced new weapons. Missionaries also came and rivalries emerged among Christian groups. Suspecting foreigners of being forerunners of military conquest by European powers, the Japanese attacked the Christians and expelled them in 1637. Exceptions were made for Dutch traders once a year. Then Japan entered an age of national isolation for more than 250 years. In addition, in the 16th century, Daimyo Oda Nobunaga (1534–1582) unified much of Japan through warfare.8 Unification continued with Toyotomi Hideyoshi, with the prevalent practice of uniting family members through marriage and adoption to form alliances and kinships to heighten political accord.9 Children, heirs of daimyo allies, remained for years as hostages with the unifiers as adoptive members of their households.10 The daimyo remained faithful by rewards of land and money from the rulers.11 Japan was forced opened in 1854 by Commodore Matthew Perry and his Black War ships. Previous requests by the United States and other nations to trade had failed because Japan chose to remain isolated. Too

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weak to resist Perry’s second request, the Tokugawas signed the Treaty of Peace and Amity with the United States. Within five years, similar treaties were forced on Japan by other Western nations. The Japanese considered these treaties to be unfair and set a goal to be viewed differently from the other Asian nations and as one of the big, powerful, firstclass nations.12 During the Meiji Period (1868–1912), the emperor was restored to power with foreign backing, and the feudal system was abolished. Modernization became the goal, and the best and brightest young people were sent to the foreign countries to bring back the latest developments in military, technology, industry, economy, manufacturing, trade, and educational practices. As had been feared, the Western powers were engaged in building colonial empires. Afraid of its vulnerable position, Japan adopted the ‘‘line of advantage’’ to extend its power beyond its borders and help repel foreign aggression. Desiring to win colonies the way European nations did and using the same methods Perry and the United States used on them, the Japanese precipitated the Sino-Japanese War in 1894–1895 to gain control of Korea and Formosa. With assistance from the European nations, they next declared war on Russia. The Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) resulted in Russia’s acknowledgment of Japan’s rights to Korea and the southern half of Sakhalin Island. During World War I, Japan prospered economically and politically. They declared war on the Central Powers and seized the German colonies of the Marianas, Caroline, and Marshall Islands. Japan tried to modernize its military but lacked modern equipment such as heavy machine guns, artillery pieces, tanks, and aircraft.13 Its strength was in employing infantry. At Versailles in 1919, Japan was recognized as one of the Big Five Powers,14 and in the 1920s Japan became increasing militaristic. In 1931, they invaded Manchuria and created a puppet state. The Japanese considered Manchuria and Mongolia as their lifelines (seimeisen) in both military and economic strategic ways15 and sought to secure oil and raw materials in Southeast Asia.16 As support from other countries vanished in the face of this militarism, Japan resigned from the League of Nations in 1933—in response to international condemnation of their expansionism and as part of their determination to free Asia from white colonial rule.17 Many Japanese at this time viewed the League of Nations as a ‘‘stratagem in the hands of the strongest powers to suppress the second rank countries like Japan.’’18 Japan joined the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936 and the Axis Pact in 1940. In retaliation for its invasion of French Indochina, the United States imposed sanctions on Japan, barring them from vital resources such as aviation fuel and scrap iron. Instead of curbing Japan’s

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aggression, the oil embargo increased their desire to make new acquisitions.19 The Japanese knew they could not defeat the United States in a war; however, having won previous wars against Russia and China, both much larger and more powerful, they attacked Pearl Harbor. In response, the United States immediately declared war on Japan. Initially victorious, Japan extended its empire over much of the Pacific, taking control of Hong Kong, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines.20 The American Navy stopped Japan at the Battle of the Midway in June 1942, destroying any possibility of a Japanese invasion of the United States. America bombed Tokyo, Osaka, and Yokohama daily and then dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima (instantly killing 66,000 people) and Nagasaki (instantly killing 30,000), with thousands more deaths occurring in the aftermath. Only 150 Japanese military personnel were killed, but more than 10,000 children died; the rest of the casualties were old, sick, and wounded civilians.21 Postwar Japan Reforms followed the war. A new constitution with democratic rules was passed in 1947, formulated under the guidance of the Allied occupation authorities. The emperor was transformed from a divine ruler to ceremonial head of state. His power was limited and the Japanese nobility dissolved. A new legislature and Supreme Court system were established. Legal equality between sexes was proclaimed, giving women the right to vote, own and inherit property, and marry or divorce by choice.22 Also included was Article 9, the peace clause. Forever renouncing war, Japan was stripped completely of its military might and lost all of its overseas possessions.23 In 1951, Japan and the Allies signed an official peace treaty, and Japan simultaneously signed a security treaty with the United States, permitting American forces to be stationed in Japan to safeguard international peace and security.24 Long before this peace treaty was signed, U.S. Navy personnel and Japanese residents were developing a close working relationship, especially in Yokosuka, where part of the U.S. Pacific Fleet continues to be based. Ongoing U.S. Navy presence was considered the least costly and most practical way to preserve Japan’s security.25 Moreover, America came to consider Japan an important ally, especially during the Cold and Korean Wars. Without military bases in Japan, the United States and the United Nations could not have fought the Korean War. In turn, Japan was able to achieve economic prosperity quickly because America purchased war supplies such as military trucks, made in the Oppama section of Yokosuka.26

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Japan experienced a strong economy from the 1950s to the middle of the 1980s, especially in the steel, car-manufacturing, and electronics areas.27 The economic bubble caused by the strong yen and low interest rates fueled an investment boom in property values. Although the U.S. government felt threatened by a strong economic Japan, they realized assisting Japan created political stability in Asia.28 When the boom ended in 1991, unemployment grew and confidence in government declined, resulting in numerous changes in political leadership. Between 1992 and 2002, Japan’s economy stagnated; nonperforming loans and scandals exposed the unethical behavior of bankers.29 Currently, Japan is viewed as a country that has failed to capitalize on its economic power but still wants to ensure peace and economic stability. Peace and the Military For decades following the end of World War II, the Japanese people viewed themselves as peace ambassadors with an obligation to refuse war and help others. Starting in 1980, they were the largest provider of foreign aid among the major industrial nations, peaking at $16 billion in 1997.30 Japan has offered $870 million worth of economic aid to Palestine, the third largest after the United States and the European Union. They helped with technical assistance, constructing a development plan, and forming a solid base for economic development. Their reasoning is that peace and prosperity can come only with economic development and democracy. Moreover, it is in Japan’s self-interest to maintain stability in the Middle East because more than 90 percent of their crude oil comes from this area.31 In 1991, controversy over Japan’s role in the international community emerged. Many Japanese wanted to follow the 1947 peace constitution, remain pacifists, and resist requests from the United States to raise troops.32 Nevertheless, in 2001, Japanese law was revised so that the Self Defense Forces (SDF) could participate in UN peacekeeping military operations and use weapons. This change has been viewed as shifting Japan’s stance from one of defense to one of aggression.33 Even though the Japanese military is known as the Self Defense Forces (SDF), their budget is now the fourth largest in the world at around $46 billion annually.34 After the United States invaded Iraq, the Japanese Parliament agreed to send 1,000 soldiers of the Japan Self Defense Forces to help Iraq with reconstruction. In October 2004, a Japanese hostage was taken and beheaded when Japan did not remove its forces.35 Although Japan is not interested in dominating others or changing how the world works, the Japanese are concerned that there are nine countries with nuclear arsenals and over 40 more countries capable of

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producing them.36 There is concern that the Keidanren (Japanese association of business organizations) wants to change laws to permit Japan to export arms or weapons related technologies. Currently, the law forbids such exports to countries already at war.37

THE LEGACY OF WORLD WAR II Although Japan has expressed a desire since World War II to be viewed as a peaceful nation, they have not acknowledged the aggressive acts they committed during the war, such as the massacre of civilians at Nanjing, which resulted in 300,000 casualties.38 The ways in which Japanese history is depicted in school textbooks and conveyed in museums is objectionable to some, who think the historical fact of Japanese aggression is being overlooked.39 The Chinese want compensation for forced labor prostitution during World War II.40 Korea has raised the question of the comfort women system, which violated international and domestic laws.41 Within Japan, the Hiroshima Peace Museum has displays showing the Japanese as victimizers as well as victims, but the war museums fail to provide evidence of Japan’s misdeeds.42 The Japanese American Experience with War and Peace What makes Japanese Americans unique even among Asian Americans is their placement behind barbed wire in concentration camps during World War II. Victims of racism, they were intensely committed to proving their loyalty and are strong defenders of civil rights, especially for minorities during times of stress. In the next section, we provide some background information concerning the experience of Japanese immigrants to the United States, before presenting the major themes found in Japanese and Japanese American views on governmental aggression and peace. History of Japanese Americans in the United States On May 17, 1868, the first shipload of Japanese entered Hawaii from Yokohama as contract laborers to work on the sugar plantations.43 For the following decades, boatloads of men followed with the intent of working and returning to Japan. The work was tough and described as similar to slavery. Strikes and demonstrations followed to protest for better work conditions and wages. Although many Japanese returned to Japan as planned, some chose to make America their home. Thousands came to the West Coast from Japan and Hawaii to settle. They tended to be young males who found work on railroads, in lumber mills,

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canneries, mining, meatpacking, and farming. By 1890, there were 3,000 student laborers in San Francisco working to earn money to attend school. Labor was restricted. State laws and local ordinances prevented Japanese Americans from entering many trades and professions.44 Living and working in America was very difficult, poverty among the immigrants was rampant, and racism permeated the legal system. In 1790, citizenship was granted to whites who had resided in the United States for two years, and in 1873 it was extended to ‘‘persons of African nativity or descent.’’45 When Takeo Ozawa attempted to become a full citizen in 1922, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that he was ‘‘in every way eminently qualified under the statutes to become an American citizen except one, he was not white.’’46 The exclusion of the Japanese from citizenship until the 1952 passage of the McCarran Bill contributed to decades of isolation of Japanese Americans from the mainstream of American political and social life, reinforced by the belief that they could not be assimilated. From 1913 to the end of World War II, Alien Land Laws prohibited aliens ineligible for citizenship from purchasing land. It also restricted leases to three years and prevented land already owned from being bequeathed.47 The issei (first-generation Japanese Americans) had the arduous task of preparing marginal land for farming and then moving in three years to repeat this process. By 1920, the amended Alien Law prohibited even leasing or sharecropping by Japanese immigrants and prevented issei from acting as guardians for the property of Americanborn children. The last Alien land Law was repealed in 1966 by Washington State.48 Japanese Americans were also victims of segregation, and equal accommodations in public places were not available.49 In 1906, the San Francisco Board of Education passed a resolution to segregate Japanese children and have them attend the school in Chinatown. The Japanese government became concerned and entered into sensitive negotiations with President Theodore Roosevelt, which resulted in the 1907 Gentlemen’s Agreement. This ended Japanese entry into the United States and stopped immigration from Hawaii, Mexico, and Canada. A 1924 immigration law prohibiting all Japanese immigration remained in effect until 1952, when it was changed to permit limited entrance. A 1940 U.S. Nationality Law stipulating that American citizens of foreign parents can lose their citizenship if they lived abroad for more than six months and engaged in activities such as voting, working for a foreign government, or serving in a foreign military was focused on nisei (secondgeneration Japanese Americans) going to school or working in Japan.50 A number of laws specifically addressed women. For example, a loophole in the Gentleman’s Agreement permitted picture brides to

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enter and marry. The Cable Act passed by Congress in 1922 took citizenship away from female citizens marrying aliens ineligible for citizenship. If the marriage ended through death of the spouse or divorce, citizenship could be regained unless the woman was Nisei.51 At one time, 30 states forbade mixed marriages. The last of these laws was repealed in 1960. Pearl Harbor and World War II The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, dramatically changed the lives of Japanese Americans. The following day, President Roosevelt declared war against Japan. The FBI arrested 2,192 Japanese American community leaders, including church leaders, association heads, language school officials, and newspaper writers, as potentially dangerous without search warrants or any charges brought against them. Family members were not permitted to visit. Many spent the duration of the war in enemy alien internment camps run by the Justice Department in places such as Crystal City (Texas), Fort Missoula (Montana), and Fort Lincoln (North Dakota), as well as other places. Many Japanese Americans lost their jobs after Pearl Harbor. For example, the Union Pacific Railroad in Wyoming let 75 workers go under suspicion of sabotage,52 and many state civil service employees were dismissed. University students were forced to stop their education before the end of the academic year and were not permitted to participate in graduation. Bank accounts were frozen. Curfews were enacted and limits imposed on how far Japanese Americans could travel. Houses were searched and possessions were taken, sold, stolen, or lost.53 In 1941, President Roosevelt authorized the Munson report, which found that ‘‘the vast majority (of Japanese Americans) was loyal to America. Most of all, those Nisei who belonged to the highly patriotic Japanese American Citizens League appeared to be pathetically eager to show this loyalty.’’54 Still, Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942, which permitted military authorities to exclude anyone from anywhere without trial or hearing; this order set the stage for mass evacuation of Japanese Americans from the coast. Concentration Camps Based on race and place of residence, more than 120,000 Japanese Americans were evacuated from the West Coast by August 1942 under orders from the euphemistically labeled War Relocation Authority (WRA) and placed into assembly centers hastily formed from horse stalls. More than two-thirds of them were U.S. citizens, and none of them had done anything warranting detention. No charges were filed

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against them. In violation of their civil rights, they were moved to 10 concentration camps located in remote areas of deserts, wilderness, and swamplands.55 There, within barbed wire fences, they lived in armytype barracks with approximately 200 people crowded into each block. Restrooms lacked privacy. Pay for work was $12, $16, and $19 a month.56 Men were no longer the major breadwinners, as wives and children earned the same pay. Despite establishing their own schools and recreational activities to keep their youth positively engaged, the residents became disillusioned and insecure, experienced pervasive economic and psychological damage from the forced evacuations, and developed a deep sense of shame, even though they had done nothing wrong. Not a single charge of espionage was ever filed. One detainee, Mitsuye Endo of Sacramento, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming confinement was unlawful. On December 18, 1944, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that detention of Japanese Americans was invalid and ordered Endo’s unconditional release. All nine judges agreed that WRA had no right to detain loyal American citizens in camps. On January 2, 1945, the commander of the Western Defense area revoked the West Coast mass exclusion orders.57 Military Experience Despite their experiences of discrimination and exclusion, Japanese American men have been enlisting in the American armed services for over 100 years. Hizako Hamada, the first Japanese member of the U.S. military forces, served as an interpreter for the American Consulate in Kanagawa, now Yokohama, in 1862. Two Japanese men graduated from the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1877. Nine Japanese Americans were on the navy battleship, USS Maine, when it was blown up in 1898. Even though Japanese residents of the United States were denied citizenship for many generations, they have served in every American war since the Spanish American War (1898–1901).58 When Pearl Harbor was attacked, there were 1,500 Nisei military recruits in Hawaii. On December 10, they were all disarmed and confined to quarters, guarded by machine gun-carrying military men. Washington ordered the Hawaiian Territorial Guard to release all men of Japanese ancestry, and they did so; however, when additional troops were needed, Japanese Americans were recruited and ultimately nearly 35,000 of them served in the U.S. Army during World War II.59 A segregated military unit, the 442nd Regimental Combat Team was formed in 1943 to fight in Europe. This unit of 3,000 men earned 18,142 medals and was known as the Purple Heart Battalion because so many were killed in action.60 The 442 are best known for their rescue of the Lost

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Battalion of Texas, who were cut off and surrounded by German troops. To save 211 men, the 442nd suffered 814 casualties and 141 deaths.61 Overall, the record of the Japanese American soldiers as the most decorated and distinguished combat unit for its size in World War II serves as proof of their strong loyalty to the United States, and the blood they shed opened the way for equality in civilian life.62 In addition to fighting in Europe, more than 6,000 Japanese Americans worked in intelligence in the Pacific theater, not only with American troops but also with Australian, British, Canadian, Chinese, Indian, and New Zealand forces. General Willoughby, General MacArthur’s Chief of Intelligence stated the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) was a valuable resource and credited the Japanese Americans with shortening the war by two years.63 Resettlement After January 2, 1945, when the detention of Japanese Americans ended, the internees were issued identification cards and given $25 to leave camp for new lives. Because it was not legally possible for them to return to the West Coast, they looked eastward for opportunities. Moving to where jobs existed, Japanese Americans dispersed to big cities such as Chicago, New York City, Cleveland, Minneapolis, and Detroit.64 The WRA was assisted in resettling the internees by churches and private organizations, all aimed at assimilating the Japanese Americans. In Chicago, the Church of the Brethren opened their hostels to Japanese Americans arriving from camp. The church provided guidance on how to find jobs, how to dress, how to behave, and how to secure permanent places to live, advising the Japanese Americans to avoid ‘‘going about town in groups of more than two or three.’’65 Because housing was critically short in Chicago, building codes were altered to permit division of apartments into smaller units. Despite efforts to help them, Japanese Americans faced open discrimination in their search for housing and were forced to live in WRA-designated areas serving as buffer zones between the white and African American communities. Public housing, which was being built at that time, was unavailable to minorities. Ethnic networks developed to help internees find housing.66 Despite their contributions to the World War II effort, race continued to limit Japanese Americans. When they could find jobs, barriers and prejudice persisted in the workplace. In Cincinnati, some places of employment were not open to them, and although the University of Cincinnati accepted some Japanese American students, they were not allowed into the engineering program.67 Many Japanese Americans participated in sports for the sake of assimilation. ‘‘Losing is winning’’ is a

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well-known Japanese saying. As one newspaper article said at the time, ‘‘Success on the ball field was not the primary goal. In spite of defeats, the nisei team has accomplished its purpose of creating good will and fellowship among the opposing teams and the spectators through good sportsmanship.’’68 Because a great deal of shame existed, nobody talked about the camp experiences. The only reason for such punishment was race, so being Japanese American was considered terrible. They had a great desire to be seen as Americans and considered everything Japanese to be forbidden.69 Redress In 1948, the former internees were awarded token compensation that did not begin to cover the actual financial losses suffered. Losses were paid at an average of ten cents on the dollar in a process that was not concluded until 1965.70 The redress movement led by the third-generation Japanese Americans (sansei) began with their disbelief that their parents and grandparents were ever in camps. Searching for self-identity, they asked their parents and the community questions such as ‘‘Why didn’t you fight?’’ This younger generation was unaware of the war hysteria that existed during the prewar years. Now considered a model minority, they did not know of their parents’ sacrifices. They viewed their nisei parents as 200 percent American, which still implies not seeing them as typical Americans.71 In 1976, President Ford repealed Executive Order 9066 and offered a sort of apology, which was considered inadequate and led to a movement for full apology with reparations. In 1981, the Commission on the Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians held hearings in numerous cities across the United States; 750 witnesses, evacuees, government officials, and others gave testimonies.72 In 1988, President Reagan signed the Civil Rights Act of 1988. A formal apology and checks for $20,000 were sent to those detained. With government’s acknowledgment that evacuation was wrong and that Japanese Americans were always loyal Americans, nisei for the first time talked about their experiences.73 What is important to Japanese Americans is preventing what happened to them from ever happening again. Championing the cause of civil liberties, Japanese Americans demonstrate a strong desire to battle against discrimination and violation of civil rights, especially against minorities. They are concerned about immigrants caught between laws and racism and about the treatment of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians who are rounded up, detained, deported, and placed in federal prisons without charges being filed—frightening echoes of the experiences they

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and their families had during World War II. They do not want the spirit of the Constitution to be violated once again because of racism and mass hysteria.

RESPONSES TO THE SURVEY OF JAPANESE AND JAPANESE AMERICAN ATTITUDES As part of an international study being conducted by the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace, Japanese and Japanese American participants anonymously completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) online in either English or the Japanese language. They provided definitions for peace, war, and torture and responded to items on the rights of people to live in peace and to protest against wars, as well as items on issues such as a governmental right to invade or torture people. They indicated their level of agreement on a seven-point scale from totally disagree to totally agree and then explained the reasoning behind their rating scale responses. Demographics The participants for this study were recruited through informal networking in universities, community agencies, and organizations. Through this snowball method, a relatively small and nonrepresentative sample of 86 participants (50 females and 36 males) was recruited, 28 from the United States and 58 from Japan. In the first segment of the survey, participants provided information on age, gender, marital status, place of birth, place of parents’ birth, place of residence, religion, social class, education employment status, military service of self and family members, and engagement in war protests or other forms of activism. Ninety percent of Japanese Americans were born in the United States, and 91 percent of the Japanese group were born in Japan. In the Japanese American sample, 60 percent of the mothers and 64 percent of the fathers were born in the United States, and 39 percent of the mothers and 29 percent of the fathers were born in Japan. In the Japanese sample, 93 percent of the mothers and 90 percent of the fathers were born in Japan. The Japanese and Japanese American samples were quite similar on almost all demographic variables except religion, with the Japanese having a higher percentage of Buddhists. Specifically, 33 percent of the Japanese group and 11 percent of the Japanese Americans indicated that

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they were Buddhists, 12 percent of the Japanese and 32 percent of the Japanese Americans were Christians, and the remaining participants identified themselves as either atheist or not having a religious affiliation. Buddhism is not as much a religion as a way of life. Buddhists believe it is wrong to harm any living creature and that it is essential to overcome hatred by love, and evil by good—beliefs that are quite different from the dictum of ‘‘an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.’’ Age ranged from 18 years to 74 years, with a mean of 34 years; the group tended to be largely either quite young or quite old, with very few in their thirties and forties. Fifty-seven percent of the Japanese American sample and 69 percent of the Japanese sample were single, approximately 25 percent of each sample were married, and the remaining participants were either widows/widowers or divorced. Social class and educational levels were relatively high in both samples, although social class was somewhat more variable in the Japanese sample than in the Japanese American sample. In the Japanese sample, one participant was lower class, 12 percent were working class, 31 percent were middle class, 40 percent were upper-middle class, and 3 percent upper class. The social class distribution of the Japanese American sample was 11 percent working-class, 54 percent middle class, 29 percent upper-middle class, and one participant upper class. The educational level of the sample also tended to be higher than in the population at large. In regard to education, 14 percent of the Japanese American sample and 22 percent of the Japanese sample had completed high school, 14 percent of the Japanese Americans and 22 percent of the Japanese had completed some college, 29 percent of the Japanese Americans and 29 percent of the Japanese had completed college, 32 percent of the Japanese Americans and 14 percent of the Japanese had completed a master’s degree, and two Japanese Americans and one Japanese had completed a PhD degree. Forty-three percent of the Japanese Americans declared they were Democrats, 21 percent were Republicans, and 18 percent identified with other groups such as Independent, NDP, Freak Power, and Front National; the remainder did not indicate any preference. In the Japanese sample, 16 percent indicated they were Democrats in general, 10 percent supported the Liberal Democratic Party, 9 percent supported the Democratic Party, and others identified with groups such as the Social Democratic Party, the Japanese Communist Party, and Independent, or were nonaffiliated to any political party/position. Seventy-nine percent of the Japanese Americans had not served in the military. Of the three respondents who had served, one had served in the army, one in the army reserve, and one in the ROTC program. Sixty-four percent of them had family members who had served in the

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military: 23 percent grandfathers, 13 percent daughters, 10 percent brothers, and 7 percent fathers; the remaining relatives who had served were a grandson, an uncle, and a cousin. In the Japanese sample, only one participant indicated having served in the military. In the Japanese American group, 20 percent had participated in some sort of Peace Education Program. Two were part of the Model UN program and one completed a peace Education course. Thirty-four percent of the Japanese sample had participated in a peace-promoting program, including education in primary, secondary, and high school, university courses, and Model UN program, and watching documentary films. In the Japanese American sample, 43 percent had protested against war, 23 percent had signed petitions against the war in Vietnam or Iraq, 7 percent had demonstrated in peace marches, 13 percent had attended a Viet Nam rally, 13 percent had protested against the Iraqi war, and 7 percent protested against dropping atomic bombs in Japan. Only 16 percent of the respondents in the Japanese sample had participated in war protests, specifically to object to the Gulf War or Iraqi war; several had participated in the Stop Hate March (meetings for victims of the Atomic Bombing in Hiroshima) and the Burmese Candle Vigil or had signed petitions for peace and against the Vietnam War.

PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENTAL AGGRESSION Definitions of War ‘‘[War is] a battle against two opposing parties over conflicting beliefs or desires’’ (Japanese American female, 23); ‘‘An ugly fighting that occurs due to differences of religion, culture and different opinions (thoughts)’’ (Japanese female, 27). In our sample, 52 percent of the definitions of war were classic definitions identifying it, for example, as an ‘‘armed fight between two countries or more’’ (74-year-old Japanese male) and ‘‘a conflict between two political ideas, norms, race, etc’’ (22-year-old Japanese male). Of the remaining definitions, 15 percent included a moral judgment as part of their definition, stating that war is wrong and should never be considered a solution: ‘‘It is something that should not be done’’ (32-year-old Japanese female) and ‘‘a word, an act, a meaning that should be erased from the whole world forever’’ (25-year-old Japanese female). A 21year-old Japanese male focused on the negative outcomes of war in his definition: ‘‘Lapse in intelligence, to the point of illogical, unnecessary loss of innocent life.’’ Two individuals defined war as a matter of

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defense or protection; for example, ‘‘Something necessary in many means, in order to defend one’s lifestyle, religion, and so forth’’ (23year-old Japanese American male). One respondent included historical references in his definition, suggesting that war is sometimes necessary to protect the citizens of one’s own country, as was the case in World War II or the ‘‘War on Terrorism.’’ Sixteen percent of the responses included a reference to motivations for war: ‘‘some communities are fighting for different benefits’’ (21-year-old Japanese female), ‘‘a violent way to solve a problem’’ (28-year-old Japanese male), and ‘‘a political tool to gain more power for the aggressor nation-state’’ (18-year-old Japanese male). Although 98 percent of the sample identified war as a negative phenomenon, one respondent indicated that not only is war sometimes inevitable but that it can lead to a desirable and positive outcome. Right to Invade ‘‘Each country should respect one another, and should have no right to invade’’ (Japanese female, 19); ‘‘Yes [there is a state right to invasion] but only to help, not to take over that country and destroy its people and culture’’ (Japanese American female, 19). Responses arguing for and against a state right to invade other countries were fairly equally balanced. Forty percent supported the right to invade with qualifications, indicating that such a right might be acceptable if it would provide benefit to the country, help, improve, or protect them; for example, ‘‘Yes, if it will benefit the general public in that country and other countries’’ (73-year-old Japanese American male). Some used the word ‘‘improvement’’ as a reason why invasion was sometimes a right. Examples include ‘‘sometimes it’s to improve the country’’ (21-year-old Japanese female) or ‘‘Some countries improve through invasion’’ (21-year-old Japanese female). Six percent agreed to invasions to protect citizens: ‘‘Sometimes—if the people are suffering under an oppressive government and the intervening country knows it can make a difference’’ (20-year-old Japanese American female) and ‘‘to protect its citizens’’ (32-year-old Japanese American female). There was a difference between Japanese and Japanese Americans with respect to the responses to this statement. The number of Japanese respondents who disagreed with the right to invade was 79 percent in comparison to only 20 percent of the Japanese American respondents who disagreed. Perhaps this difference can be explained by looking at the history of the two countries. Japan has not had many experiences with being invaded or invading other countries. The Mongols invaded

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Japan in 1019 and in 1274 and 1281. In 1592, Toyotomi Hideyoshi invaded Korea with the intent of conquering Ming China but withdrew troops by 1598. Not exactly through an invasion, Commodore Perry in 1854 used threats of war to force Japan to end its isolationist policy and open its doors for trade. This was the beginning of Japan’s aggression, which ended with World War II. The United States not only invaded Japan but also occupied it after the war from 1945 to 1951. Since then, Japan has not been invaded and has not done any invading. The United States is a much younger country than Japan but has engaged in invasions many, many times over its history. Not including invasions during World War I or World War II, the United States invaded Canada in 1775, 1812, and 1813, Mexico in 1846, Korea in 1871, Hawaii in 1893, Spanish Cuba in 1898 and 1961, Puerto Rico in 1898, Philippines in 1898, Haiti in 1915 and 1994, South Vietnam in 1962, Dominican Republic in 1965, Cambodia in 1970, Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, Kuwait in 1991, Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in 2003. The only time a foreign country invaded the United States was in 1812. Thus, a difference in the responses of Japanese and Japanese Americans is understandable. The histories of the two countries vary, and residents of each tend to support their own country’s position, regardless of ethnic heritage. It was primarily the Japanese participants, who indicated their commitment to peaceful resolutions without employing military tactics or force, who provided arguments against a state right to undertake invasions. Some responses were reassertions of the item: ‘‘No country should invade another country’’ (61-year-old Japanese female), but others expressed strong moral judgments concerning invasion; for example, ‘‘I cannot forgive actions that lead to the conquest of the world’’ (27-year-old Japanese female). Eleven percent of the responses focused on the negative consequences resulting from invasions, such as the endless cycle of wars: ‘‘Because countries have this right to invade, war never stops occurring in this world’’ (63-year-old Japanese female) or ‘‘[Invasion] makes wars and produces hatred between people’’ (23year-old Japanese female). Seven percent of the responses suggested other ways to resolve conflict, such as ‘‘Countries should attempt to use diplomacy whenever possible’’ (23-year-old Japanese female) or ‘‘Peaceful resolutions should always be top priority’’ (29-year-old Japanese American male). Torturing Prisoners of War ‘‘Torturing of an individual, whether it’s during the time of war or not, is not humane and is a behavior that’s not consistent with being in a

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society of civilized individuals’’ (Japanese American male, 34); ‘‘I know it’s not good, but I think that torture is woven into a professional soldier’s duty. And if the torture is to gain information for one’s own country’s safety/people’s safety, then I can’t really say that torture is all that bad’’ (Japanese male, 28). Torture is not acceptable to most people. Our respondents argued that ‘‘It is written, as an international law, that torture should not be allowed’’ (19-year-old Japanese female), and ‘‘Geneva Conventions & UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human Rights) etc. prevent nationstates from doing this. Completely inhumane’’ (20-year-old Japanese female). These statements reveal support for modern ethical and legal codes specifying that torture is morally wrong and a violation of human rights. Throughout most of history, from Roman times to the present, torture has been used in interrogations. Japan is known to have used torture on World War II prisoners, but since that time has followed a path of peace and has not used torture on anyone. Modern human rights documents have declared torture to be a violation of such rights. Nevertheless, in its ‘‘war on terrorism’’ following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government adopted official and unofficial policies allowing the secret use of torture on a ‘‘need to know’’ or ‘‘don’t ask, don’t tell’’ basis. Some Americans, such as Alan Dershowitz and Mirko Bagaric, argued that the need for information outweighs the moral and ethical arguments against torture.74 During the Bush administration, the Pentagon assumed the right to detain ‘‘enemy combatants’’ for years without making charges of any crime(s) committed and attempted to keep secret their use of isolation and sensory deprivation to obtain information. Disclosure of these activities at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere led to outrage both within the United States and around the world. One of the first actions of President Obama following his inauguration in January 2009 was to stop the torture practices authorized in the Bush administration. Many Japanese Americans know what it is like to be detained without charges and punished by the American government for crimes they did not commit; for example, after Pearl Harbor, when the FBI rounded up community leaders suspected of spying and sabotage and kept them prisoners without any charges for the duration of the war. It was later acknowledged that they did not engage in any subversive activities or commit any crimes. This may be one reason why Japanese Americans oppose the current detaining of Middle Easterners without charges. Only when crimes are committed is detention justified. Torture to most Japanese and Japanese American respondents is considered inhumane, unacceptable, and something that should never be

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tolerated. As both Japanese and Japanese-Americans have suffered during World War II and its aftermath, they have strong distaste for violent acts and torture of prisoners. Seventy-two percent of the qualitative responses to the torture item disagreed with any governmental right to torture prisoners, emphasizing principles and morals (23 percent), human rights (15 percent), and general disagreement with the act itself (9 percent). Some very strong comments made were ‘‘I believe torture is the most horrible act, that makes one suffer physically and psychologically’’ (22-year-old Japanese male), ‘‘There should be no exceptions! It is not right to harm others’’ (19-year-old Japanese American female), and ‘‘This should never be tolerated’’ (57-year-old Japanese American female). Nine percent of the responses raised the question of whether torture was effective in gaining something: ‘‘Does it even work?’’ (42-year-old Japanese male), ‘‘pragmatically, the confessions under torture are dubious’’ (70-year-old Japanese American female), and ‘‘most often not effective’’ (21-year-old Japanese American female). One participant pointed out that there should be alternative methods to torture; ‘‘The government should have the process to gain information, etc. without torture’’ (58-year-old Japanese American male). Of the 17 percent of the responses that did agree to a right to torture prisoners, many included qualifications such as the need to have ‘‘strong evidence that shows a person has vital information for the safety of the people’’ (20-year-old Japanese female). Six percent revealed ambivalence about the act of torture, but indicated that it was necessary or vital for a greater good, such as saving people’s lives. Some responses to the torture item included negative feelings toward war itself and suggested that torturing prisoners of war would not even have to be an issue if there was no war: ‘‘I think it is not right that there is war in the first place and a prisoner’’ (25-year-old Japanese female), and ‘‘If we didn’t have war there would be no need for torture’’ (73year-old Japanese American female). One 25-year-old Japanese female argued, ‘‘Even having a prisoner should not be allowed.’’ What Is Terrorism? ‘‘[Terrorism is] a word for people doing things you don’t like. And an excuse to go to war. Terrorism, Axis of Evil, and Communism are all synonyms’’ (Japanese male, 21); ‘‘Sometimes terrorism is right, resistors during Nazi occupations were attacking military and administrative targets’’ (Japanese American male, 23). There are strong similarities in how the Japanese and Japanese-Americans defined terrorism. Fifty-seven percent of the responses emphasized the

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violence and destructiveness (e.g., ‘‘maiming’’) of terrorism, and 32 percent focused on its intents (e.g., to cause fear and chaos). One 74-year-old Japanese participant incorporated both of these themes in his response, defining ‘‘terrorism’’ as ‘‘indiscriminant killing or destruction in order to bring fear and chaos to the society that they want to make a claim to.’’ Fifteen percent of the responses incorporated value judgments concerning terrorism—identifying it as an unnecessary act of violence directed against innocent people who should never have had such violence inflicted on them. ‘‘I cannot think anything of terrorism as anything but selfish’’ (49-year-old Japanese female); ‘‘It should definitely not be forgiven’’ (60-year-old Japanese male); and ‘‘Cowardice’’ (25-year-old Japanese female). Both Japan and the United States have been fighting a war on terrorism since the attacks on September 11, 2001, and both have implemented tactics to prevent innocent killings of their citizens. Nevertheless, some of the Japanese and Japanese American responses indicated that terrorism might include a positive ideological element: ‘‘an ideal concept that uses force in an attempt to gain an ideal ending’’ (21-year-old Japanese American male). Some terrorism in both Japan and the United States has been carried out by their own citizens. In 1995, the Aum Shinrikyo, a religious cult, released sarin gas in the Tokyo subways killing 12 and injuring 54. Several domestic terrorism attacks have also taken place in the United States, such as the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, killing 168 people and injuring 800. Other domestic attacks of terrorism in the United States include anthrax attacks, abortion attacks, and lynchings. The international attack that dramatically changed lives worldwide was the 9/11 surprise attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon causing 2,974 deaths of innocent people. Following these horrendous criminal acts, the United States embarked on the War on Terrorism and invaded Iraq. Japan has not been subjected to a lot of international terrorism, although North Korea abducted Japanese citizens from 1977 to 1983. The official count for the number of citizens abducted is 16, with the 17th case currently under evaluation. The unofficial count is closer to 80. Their most recent international incident involved the beheading of Shosei Koda on November 3, 2004, when the Japanese government did not remove its forces from Iraq as requested. Civilian Casualties ‘‘No one has the right to take another person’s life, especially an innocent one’’ (Japanese American female, 19); ‘‘If someone is innocent why are they being killed? That doesn’t seem justifiable to me at all’’ (Japanese American female, 23).

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Seventy-eight percent of the responses expressed disagreement with the item ‘‘Sometimes the heads of government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism.’’ Forty-two percent of the responses expressed the conviction that the government does not have a right to kill anyone, let alone an innocent civilian. A 25year-old Japanese female held that ‘‘Whatever the reason may be, no one has a right to kill another person.’’ A 35–year-old Japanese male considered the killing of civilians avoidable, ‘‘With the development of technology, it should be possible to attack the particular place without involving innocent civilians.’’ Twelve percent of the responses indicated that the act of killing was not going to solve anything; for example, ‘‘There is nothing that comes out of that act. They have no such right to do that’’ (18-year-old Japanese male). Many emphasized the word ‘‘innocent’’ and argued that innocent people should have the right to be protected by the government and never be killed for any cause or reason. One 23-year-old Japanese woman said, ‘‘Government should protect people no matter what.’’ Another respondent wrote, ‘‘‘Innocent civilians’ is the clue—no one ‘innocent’ should be made to pay the price for someone else’’ (73-year-old Japanese American female). Although only 8 percent of the responses agreed with a governmental right to sacrifice the lives of innocent civilians in the fight against terrorism, 4 percent made qualifications to their answers such as ‘‘Governments have the responsibility to protect the safety of its citizens, but there may be situations where casualties of innocent civilians would become necessary to protect the larger majority. It’s a situation that I’m not comfortable with, but it is a possibility’’ (34-year-old Japanese American male). This argument accepts the point of view that civilian deaths may have to occur to achieve a greater good. Six percent of the responses indicated that killings might be unavoidable, ‘‘Should not actively kill civilians; however, collateral damage might occur’’ (20year-old Japanese female). Japanese men and women living both in the United States and in Japan are well aware of the extent to which acts of terrorism can lead to the loss of many innocent lives. The number of civilians’ lives lost in the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was catastrophic. The number of innocent lives lost in the 9/11 attacks was horrific.

PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE AND PROTEST ‘‘[Peace is] love and respect for all and maintaining harmony’’ (Japanese American male, 29); ‘‘The ultimate human goal’’ (Japanese male, 22).

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Definitions of Peace Peace is a state in which most people would like to live. Forty percent of the Japanese responses provided positive definitions of peace, defining it, for example, as a state of well-being (4 percent) such as ‘‘the world where everyone is satisfied with everything’’ (21-year-old Japanese female), coexistence (4 percent), respect (3 percent), or harmony (4 percent). Two responses indicated that it is a natural human ‘‘right and cannot be changed.’’ Other positive ways of looking at peace included identifying it with cooperation (‘‘The world together should make efforts,’’ 60-year-old Japanese male), understanding (‘‘a state of non-violence and agreement within the community,’’ 22-year-old Japanese female), and security (‘‘the fact that liberty and safety is guaranteed,’’ 19-year-old Japanese female). Seven percent of the responses described peace as an ideal, identifying it as the ‘‘ultimate human goal’’ (22-year-old Japanese male) while a few indicated that peace is a state that is ‘‘impossible to achieve.’’ Fifty-one percent of the responses were negative definitions of peace, such as absence of violence, infringement, conflict, war, torture, and terrorism. The most typical examples of negative definitions (37 percent) focused on peace as a lack of conflict. Sample negative definitions include ‘‘A world where we can live without any worries and without any conflict’’ (32-year-old Japanese female), ‘‘free from fear. Free from violence’’ (19-year-old Japanese female), ‘‘a period of time when there is no conflict’’ (21-year-old Japanese male), and ‘‘lack of strife’’ (65-yearold Japanese man). Thus, a substantial portion of both the Japanese living in Japan and the Japanese Americans living in the United States appear to see peace as the state of things when their nation is not at war. Right to Peace ‘‘It is obviously normal to feel that one wants to live peacefully, in a peaceful world’’ (Japanese female, 19); ‘‘war destroys lives, livelihood, economies, family structures that form the foundation of peace in a country’’ (Japanese female, 63). Japanese and Japanese Americans are peace lovers. Only 7 percent of the entire sample gave a negative response to the statement ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace,’’ whereas 71 percent of the participants affirmed this right. A few participants qualified their affirmation with some pessimistic comments; for example, ‘‘they have a basic right to peace but humanity is intrinsically linked to violence’’ (20-year-old Japanese female) or, rather sarcastically, ‘‘like it can happen’’ (24-year-old

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Japanese American male). Twenty-nine percent of the respondents provided general agreement in their qualitative responses, such as ‘‘Of course’’ (28-year-old Japanese male) or ‘‘I completely agree’’ (20-year-old Japanese American female). Another 29 percent largely reemphasized components of the item: ‘‘Yes everyone deserves this’’ (19-year-old Japanese American female) and ‘‘All humans equally have that right to peace’’ (25-year-old Japanese female). The exposure of Japanese people to atomic bombs in World War II may contribute both to their rejection of state violence and their strong endorsement for a right to peace. Continued health concerns from the bombs still plague people today. Since the bombings, the Japanese people have worked toward world peace; their constitution, under Article 9, supports peace and does not permit military activities. Many Japanese people consider peace to be a governmental responsibility, ‘‘Of course people want peace and if that right is not given, then they have the right to blame the nation. And the nation has the responsibility to provide the people with peace’’ (49-year-old Japanese female). Another participant included the Japanese constitution in his response, stating, ‘‘I believe that all human rights exist with the condition that the ‘right’ exists where there is peace. Especially in Japan, through the Japanese Constitution, it is accepted that citizens are given the right to live in a peaceful society’’ (74-year-old Japanese male). Responsibility for peace can be seen as resting not only with the government but with the people as well. Five percent of the respondents indicated that the right to peace carries with it some responsibility—that is, people need to work to attain peace. Examples include ‘‘All human beings should have the opportunity to receive and work for peace’’ (58year-old Japanese male), ‘‘Everyone should have the opportunity to work to their potential and add their part to improve mankind’’ (73year-old Japanese American male), and ‘‘Everyone has the right to peace, but everyone has the responsibility to deal with any trouble that they cause’’ (42-year-old Japanese male). Despite this strong commitment to peace, one 18-year-old Japanese female participant said she is ‘‘skeptical that we can achieve peace.’’ Is World Peace Achievable? ‘‘As the world’s economies develop, populations become better educated, and as democracy and free enterprise spreads, the world can enjoy world peace’’ (Japanese American male, 73); ‘‘[Peace is achievable] as long as countries, races, people understand each other’s differences, respect each other, care for each other and help each other to go towards the goal of world peace’’ (Japanese female, 25).

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In response to the item asking if world peace could be achieved, 17 percent of the answers were affirmative, and another 26 percent indicated that world peace is possible under certain conditions; thus, a total of 43 percent of the responses indicated some optimism concerning the possibility of achieving world peace. Some of the qualitative responses focused on the importance of striving for world peace, even in the face of doubts: ‘‘Without that belief, effort would be worthless’’ (70-year-old Japanese American female), and ‘‘I want it to happen, but I think it would be very difficult’’ (35-year-old Japanese male). A 25-year-old Japanese woman thought world peace was possible if ‘‘human beings keep progressing.’’ Four percent of the responses indicated a belief that effort can make a difference: ‘‘I believe if we work hard towards it, it can be achieved’’ (61-year-old Japanese female) and ‘‘[Peace can be achieved] with work and a world injection of good will and optimism’’ (73-yearold Japanese American male). Thirty-four percent of the responses revealed a conviction that world peace could not be achieved: ‘‘I believe this world will come to an end (because no resources) before that can be achieved’’ (27-year-old Japanese female). Reasons given for this pessimism included beliefs that human nature makes achieving peace impossible: ‘‘Unfortunately, there are too many who are power mongers and we have not reached the point allowing us to have our differences and accepting them’’(57-yearold Japanese American female), ‘‘Humans are the type of living beings that exclude (remove) others for their own survival’’ (28-year-old Japanese male), ‘‘world peace is not achievable because of mankind,’’ ‘‘world peace goes against human nature’’ (28-year-old Japanese male), humans are ‘‘inherently sinful’’ (55-year-old Japanese American female), and it is ‘‘impossible to please everyone’’ (34-year-old Japanese American male). Nine percent of the responses indicated that achieving world peace is difficult; for example, ‘‘it may be possible, but very hard to achieve’’ (23-year-old Japanese female). Although committed to world peace after World War II, Japan has had difficulty maintaining this stance. Discouragement may exist because in spite of continued efforts toward this goal, much armed conflict and violence still exists between people and countries. After a long debate and pressed by world powers, especially the United States, the Japanese constitution was changed to allow an increase in their ability to provide manpower for wars. In 2004, Japan was legally permitted for the first time to send military troops to Iraq. Japan’s idea of how to participate and cooperate with world powers to maintain peace has evolved and changed over time, and there most likely will again be opposition if the request to take up arms again resurfaces.

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Right to Stage War Protests ‘‘Regardless of whether it is your own country or not, everyone has a right to protest against war’’ (Japanese female, 25); ‘‘To express one’s opinion/will is also an obligation as a citizen’’ (Japanese female, 25). Over 90 percent of the responses agreed to an individual right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace. Forty-nine percent of the responses were general statements such as ‘‘We all have the right to voice our own opinion’’ (22-year-old Japanese female) and ‘‘People should have the rights to voice their thoughts and beliefs’’ (73-year-old Japanese American male). Thirty-eight percent of the responses qualified this right, suggesting that protest should be done in a peaceful manner without violence: ‘‘We should have the right to protest war but do so peacefully’’ (57-year-old Japanese American female) and ‘‘Only if it’s peaceful. Violent protests against war are like burning food to fight world hunger’’ (18-year-old Japanese male). Adding emphasis to the importance of keeping protests peaceful, this respondent even suggested that if protests are violent, they could add to and intensify the war. Only a few responses indicated concern about the consequences of protest, ‘‘The only problem with protests is those who are protesting believe they are right. It’s this dichotomy that creates hatred and animosity. It’s through understanding of one another, through discourse, that true peace can be attained’’ (20-year-old Japanese female). Prior to World War II, protests in Japan were rare. People tended to follow the Bushido Code, which emphasized the importance of loyalty to the leader. There was no democracy and therefore citizens did not have a voice. Since World War II, Japan has had protests against wars and especially against the use of nuclear power. War protests in the United States are an accepted way to voice opinions. Even in the first war, the Revolutionary War, wartime dissent was present. Subsequently, in every war that followed from the War of 1812, the MexicanAmerican War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and especially during the Vietnam and Iraqi wars, large groups of Americans have protested their leaders’ calls to war. Antiwar movements are considered to have made positive contributions to American political and social thinking. Peace organizations emerged from dissenters of the Spanish-American War that led to reforms in the penal system, new opportunities for women, public education, and abolition of slavery in some states.75 At the end of World War I, the American Civil Liberties Union was formed, and increased protections for free speech resulted. The anti-Vietnam war protesters

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convinced President Johnson not to seek a second term and eventually persuaded President Nixon to reduce troops. The antinuclear campaigns after World War II were staged against the nuclear arms race and nuclear war. Japanese American respondents are aware of their right as United States citizens to ‘‘freedom of speech,’’ as mandated in the U.S. Constitution. Thirteen percent of the respondents made specific reference to the right to freedom of expression. ‘‘In the US, we have the right to do so—freedom of speech’’ (20-year-old Japanese American female); acknowledging free speech was a right that had been granted to them. Japanese respondents were less likely to view the right to protest as given from the state, but rather to view it as a human right. ‘‘It’s right of freedom for humans’’ (19-year-old Japanese female) or ‘‘Not only should they have the right to protest against war, every human being should have the right to express their opinion and attitude’’ (49-yearold Japanese female). Is National Security Essential for Family and Individual Security? ‘‘I don’t think individual security can be achieved without national security, so national security is necessary, but government officials should never use the own personal judgment or favoritism and do politics’’ (Japanese female, 25); ‘‘if the nation is not safe, then of course the family’s safety will not be secured’’ (Japanese female, 27). Since 1951 and the Security Treaty, Japan and the United States have partnered to safeguard national security by assessing the intentions and actions of other countries. Fifty percent of the responses agreed that national security is essential to individual and family security, ‘‘because an individual’s safety only comes after the safety of the nation itself (national security)’’ (18-year-old Japanese female). Five percent of the responses indicated that it is the country’s obligation to protect its citizens. ‘‘It the responsibility of the country to bring security for its citizens, and therefore, national security is a must’’ (74-year-old Japanese male). Another respondent considered national security important to protect one’s own security against external threats, ‘‘Because when a country is in war, the citizens may receive damage from such things as bombings, and also, the freedom to their views/beliefs will become limited’’ (19-year-old Japanese female). Twenty-four percent of the responses placed specific conditions on maintaining national security, such as ‘‘not if it results in loss of rights’’ (65-year-old Japanese male) or ‘‘On the presumption that family and individual goals/interests are congruent with national government’s goals and interests’’ (71-year-old Japanese American male). Other

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conditional responses indicated that although national security is important, it needs to be monitored: ‘‘They just have to make sure of national security; there is no need to butt into other country’s business’’ (19-year-old Japanese female). One participant commented that a person ‘‘should not have to live in fear or risk of danger’’ (19-year-old Japanese American female). In this sample, only 10 percent of the responses disagreed with an emphasis on national security, arguing, for example, that it is ‘‘sometimes . . . at odds with family or individual security’’ (19-year-old Japanese female). For another respondent, national security is an illusion, just ‘‘another one of those catch phrases to make people hate ‘terrorists’’’ (21-year-old Japanese male).

CONCLUSION The Japanese and Japanese American sample cannot be assumed to be representative of the Japanese population in either Japan or the United States This sample was younger, better educated, and had a higher social class than the Japanese population in either country. This sample was heavily single, perhaps because of their young age. A high percent were Buddhists, who live life in a nondualistic manner, with a premium placed on protecting every living thing. Although the majority of the participants had not served in the military, 70 percent had family members who did. Despite these limitations, the participants provided thoughtful comments regarding issues of governmental rights to aggression and individual rights to peace and protest. Moreover, their views make sense in light of their experiences within both countries. The majority of the sample defined war as conflict between two countries or different ideas, and identified it clearly as a negative situation. Only one respondent thought war could be a beneficial way to protect citizens. Although consistent in their responses to many items, Japanese and Japanese Americans differed somewhat in their views on invasion. A reflection of each country’s history can be seen in their responses. Only 20 percent of the Japanese sample favored invasion, which seems consistent with the fact that Japan has not invaded or been invaded in the past almost 60 years. By contrast, 79 percent of the Japanese Americans could envision some benefits achieved by invasions. This tolerance for invasion seems consistent with the extensive military incursion of the United States since 1945, in countries including Cuba, South Vietnam, Dominican Republic, Cambodia, Grenada, Panama, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The majority of this sample took a moral stance on torture, indicating that it is inhumane. Some,

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however, suggested that torture might be necessary for the greater good or to save lives. About 90 percent of the sample defined terrorism as objectionable, because of its violence and destructiveness as well as the intent of creating chaos. They considered terrorism to be selfish and cowardly, an excuse for doing evil things. Ninety-two percent were opposed to sacrificing civilian lives for any reason, even during disagreements between nations or wars. They expressed outrage at the idea of harming or killing innocent people for any reason. Ninety percent wanted national security in place to protect citizens against the world. Nobody wants to live in fear or danger. More of the participants gave a negative definition of peace than gave a positive one. Absence of violence, conflict, and war were cited as often as the ideas of understanding and cooperation. An overwhelming 93 percent of the sample endorsed the statement that ‘‘All human beings have a right to peace,’’ and peace was seen as ‘‘the ultimate human goal’’ (22-year-old Japanese male). This endorsement of a right to peace was expected, because after the devastating atomic bombs ended World War II, Japan was stripped of its military might and embarked on a mission of world peace. A high hope exists that world peace on earth will be achieved even as some remain skeptical because of the nature of human beings. Over 90 percent of the Japanese and Japanese American sample agreed that individuals have the right to protest against war and in favor of peace. Japanese tended to view protest as a human right, whereas Japanese Americans tended to view it more as part of their freedom of speech. The U.S. Constitution provided the right to expression on any topic including war, and wartime dissent can be traced to the Revolutionary War and every war following that one. In regard to personal actions, 43 percent of the Japanese Americans had protested against the war, whereas only 16 percent of the Japanese respondents had done so.

12

An Integrative Conclusion for Volume 4 Sherri McCarthy

It is extremely important to understand the various perspectives of ordinary citizens around the world concerning war, peace, protest, security, terrorism, and torture. Human rights extend to all of us. But do we all value and understand human rights in the same way? Or is our understanding of these rights colored by the societies in which we grow up, the experiences we have had, and the experiences and expectations of those around us? If, as social scientists generally assert and the authors of this volume believe, the latter is true, then it is important to understand the views of each group of people on the planet rather than to assume that everyone subscribes to an absolute ideal of human rights. Toward this end, the books in this set have described the views of people in countries around the world, and this particular volume has set forth the views of people in several Asian and Pacific Rim countries. Over a century ago, Theodore Roosevelt claimed that ‘‘the Atlantic era is now at the height of its development and must soon exhaust the resources at its command. The Pacific era, destined to be the greatest of all, is just at its dawn.’’1 His prediction seems to have been realized, and now that the Soviet Union has collapsed and the Cold War ended, the Pacific era is likely to be led by China, a global power since even before the days of the ancient Silk Road. As the authors of the China chapter in this volume note, China has the oldest continuous civilization on the planet, with a written history going back more than 3,500 years and trade ties within Asia extending even beyond that time frame. Despite the colonial ties of many Asian countries to France, England, Holland, Portugal, Spain, and the United States, China has again become the heart of the region. ‘‘It’s not just on our maps, it is in our

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minds; China is the center of all the action here,’’ explains a Singaporean journalist.2 China is at the core of the most populous and economically dynamic region in the world, touching on Russia’s Far East, Japan, the Korean peninsula, India, southeast Asia, and the Pacific islands, including Australia and New Zealand. Although some Americans may believe it is their own presence that guarantees Asian freedom and stability, the half of the world population who live in Asia does not agree. ‘‘America can come and go,’’ a Thai diplomat explained recently, ‘‘but our fate ultimately hinges on China.’’3 It has for millennia. As far back as 1968, scholar A. F. K. Organski predicted that China would soon supplant the United States as the world’s leading power. For many years, the United States has had alliances and trade agreements such as ANZUS (explained in the chapter on Australia in this volume) and strong bilateral economic ties to several Asian countries, including Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Australia, and South Korea. The United States has exercised military control in the area since it seized the Philippines from Spain over a century ago, and during the last century, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos experienced the effects of a U.S. military presence. The U.S. Pacific Command is by far the largest military force in the region, greater than all the others combined. ‘‘We are still waiting to hear what America means when it says ‘strategic interests’ require it to menacingly park a fleet of aircraft carriers and destroyers in our seas,’’ a Chinese military analyst in Beijing recently remarked. ‘‘We in the region can manage our own affairs, but we worry it is America that will overreact.’’4 To avoid such overreaction, understanding the perspectives of the people in the region regarding their own affairs—specifically, war, peace, security, invasion, and human rights—is essential. Because of historical and geographical proximity, perhaps China is again the major influence in the region. There is no doubt that Chinese links have rekindled across political borders. Historical ties of China’s northeast with South Korea and Japan, the Pearl River Delta region with Hong Kong, the Yangzi River Delta with Taiwan, and the southeast with the Mekong subregion all form natural economic territories that transcend war and peace. ‘‘Guns have fallen silent in the region,’’ points out Singaporean diplomat Kishore Mahbubani, ‘‘due to a tidal wave of common sense in which Asians are rejecting the Western historical pattern of militarism in favor of shared prosperity.’’5 Perhaps this perspective, too, will eventually spread to the rest of the world. The EU’s influence, seeking evidence of human rights and quality of life in the countries that join the union, also has a positive effect in this direction. The notion of shared prosperity and cooperation rather than a long interplay of the conquering and the conquered would be a refreshing change of focus

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for the world as a whole during this century. It does appear to be the preferred model within the countries in Asia. Although most rising powers become increasingly belligerent, this seems not to be so with China. The more confidant China has become in the region, the more cooperation it has shown with other Asian countries. ‘‘They have learned what lines cannot be crossed,’’ a Malaysian strategic analyst asserts. ‘‘Asian nations gradually perceive China as less of a threat, especially since the rise of the country creates major economic opportunities for each of them, and has become a rallying point of Asian cultural pride.’’6 Thus, many of the countries considered in this volume are connected to China, making it especially important to note the attitudes and trends within that country, and the similarities and differences of those attitudes with the other countries in Asia. It is unfortunate that the sample for China summarized here was small and gathered from Chinese nationals in the United States, but it is a beginning. Centuries before the Westphalian nation-state system in Europe, referred to in the introductory chapter for this set, was established, Asia was governed by a royal family and kingdom-based imperial hierarchy, with China as the central heart to which all other kingdoms paid tribute. Trade and diplomacy were synonymous. Loyalty was bought, and then earned. Stability and wealth were—and remain—the main concerns of Asia. These concepts are important to understanding how war, peace, and human rights are viewed and defined in this part of the world. So are the various religious philosophies common in the region, as well as the concept of collectivism. Because collectivism is so ingrained in most Eastern cultures, individual rights are not understood in the same way as in the Western world. The collectivism of many Eastern countries, combined with the patchwork of religions (Islam, Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and Hinduism, most of which encourage peace, introspection, acceptance, and passive resistance) is likely to lead to different perspectives regarding war and peace than may be common in the rest of the world. Indeed, as the chapters here have demonstrated, they do. Although over 90 percent of respondents in most Western countries represented in this series asserted that peace was a basic right, only 60–70 percent of the Japanese and Chinese respondents shared this view. Peace was instead viewed as a choice for humanity, or one of many aspects of God’s will. Peace also was generally defined collectively rather than individually and tied to prosperity and stability for society in most Asian countries. Still, as in the rest of the world, the various histories and experiences of countries in the region seem to influence the views of the citizens, providing a variety of responses and attitudes throughout Asia. There is by no means a ‘‘homogenous’’ view in this diverse region of the world.

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How do citizens in Asian countries conceptualize global issues such as war, terrorism, and torture? Are their views country-specific, or are there patterns that emerge throughout that region of the world? Do Asians think a peaceful world is possible or is peace unattainable? And how are these views tied into the history of the region and the long passion play of Eastern religious ideals and the historical interplay of invaders and invaded, conquerors and conquered? Volume 4 included summaries of PAIRTAPS data from countries in Asia and the Pacific Rim, most with a long and tumultuous history of colonialization and invasion. Countries included in the chapters in this volume were: Afghanistan, Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, and South Korea. Some were invaded and colonized by Western powers such as England, France, Portugal, Spain, Holland, and the United States during the last centuries; others were invaded by other Eastern powers such as Japan. Most have experienced both. Some of the countries, such as China and Japan, did their own colonizing. During the Cold War, the Communist Party was a major influence on politics in several countries. Now, some of the countries, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indonesia, are directly involved in the ‘‘war on terrorism’’ declared by the Bush administration. Others, such as China and Japan, have had minimal involvement with terrorist activities or counter activities. Views from citizens in each country regarding war, peace, terrorism, security, and related issues have been summarized in this volume. Comparing these views among countries, however, is a challenging task. As noted in the introduction to this volume, each chapter began with a profile describing the country’s recent history of involvement in armed conflict, the extent to which it has colonized, invaded, and occupied other countries historically and since World War II, the extent to which it has been involved in internal (e.g., political, religious, or ethnic) armed conflicts, and its current political status. All of these contextual factors have been demonstrated to be relevant to the perspectives of citizens on war, peace, and security. Following a description of the sample recruited in the particular country being described, each chapter then focused on the views of participants as expressed in PAIRTAPS survey responses. These views were then linked to the country’s previous and current experiences with war and peace. Chapter authors were asked to focus on verbal explanations given as to why respondents agreed or disagreed with the following statements: l l

Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country. The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war.

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l l

l l

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Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism. All human beings have a basic right to peace. Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace. I believe that world peace can be achieved. National Security is essential for individual and family security.

Definitions for war, peace, and terrorism were also provided and these definitions were analyzed, based on a grounded theory approach, for common themes. Although most chapter authors analyzed responses to most if not all of the items listed above, some also focused on specific items of interest to citizens in their countries. A discussion on the value of peace education in modern Korea is an example of this. Sections on attitudes toward reconciliation in chapters on India and Afghanistan are another example. Essentially, each chapter stands alone, and the best way to understand the views of the people is to read each chapter and understand the data in the context of the country from which it is derived. Still, it is also interesting to look at the extent to which views seem to vary across countries, in hopes of unraveling clues as to which social forces may most encourage a focus on establishing peace and human rights. METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS Chapter structure in each volume is based on the assumption that historical differences regarding relative power and experiences with aggression may have led to different views within different national groups. There are important differences as well as similarities among the countries addressed in this volume in regard to their experiences with governmental and other forms of aggression. For example, as previously mentioned, some of these countries such as Japan and China have invaded other countries. Many but not all were involved in World Wars I and II, during which, interestingly, the parts of Asia invaded by Japan were referred to as ‘‘the greater Asian co-prosperity sphere.’’7 Most have some level of involvement in the ‘‘war on terrorism.’’ As in the previous volumes, the chapter authors in Volume 4 endeavored not just to provide historical and political context for contemporary perspectives on governmental peace and aggression in their countries but also to share the views of citizens from those countries who responded to our survey, the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS). Most authors make no claim

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of having recruited nationally representative samples. Thus, making cross-national comparisons of the data presented in this volume is impossible, except in a very general sense. A range of sample sizes, convenience sampling, and mixed data-analytic strategies, to name only a few concerns, hamper the ability to make straightforward and clear-cut comparisons. Nonetheless, an integration of the findings from the chapters in this volume is a unique opportunity to understand the views of everyday people from a number of Asian nations, with an emphasis on the underlying themes that emerged. In this integrative chapter, I briefly highlight some of the major themes that surfaced in response to the selected PAIRTAPS items addressing issues of war, invasion, and governmental aggression, including torture, terrorism, and national security. I provide a similar analysis for themes related to peace and the right to protest. I present descriptions of the percentages of responses from each country where data were available on the items discussed regarding themes that emerged. I leave it to readers to draw their own conclusions regarding the patterns that are evident and the possible explanations for these.

PARTICIPANTS AND RESPONSES Participants from all countries completed the Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS). In most cases, the PAIRTAPS instrument was translated into the official language of the country prior to administration, and then answers were back-translated. In a few cases (e.g., China), the surveys were completed in English by students or other individuals living in the United States. As is true of much qualitative research, samples from most of the countries, including Japan and China, consisted of fewer than 100 respondents. Some countries had samples of fewer than 50. On the other hand, samples from Malaysia, South Korea, Philippines, and Australia exceeded 100 participants, with the largest samples coming from Australia (272 participants) and the Philippines (240 participants). The surveys in some countries were available online. In other countries, such as Malaysia, only paper-and-pencil surveys were distributed; in the case of Malaysia, the surveys were completed by a sample with an ethnic and religious distribution that was proportional to the distribution of ethnicity and religion in the country’s overall population. Some countries provided both online and paper-and-pencil surveys; some chapters also included data from immigrants to the United States from the particular country discussed. In the case of Laos, only immigrants to the United States completed the survey, and this was done orally at a community center.

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Researchers described their particular methodology in each chapter. There were many variations, although convenience sampling and snowball techniques, where participants were asked to recruit others they knew, were most common. University students and faculty were overrepresented in many cases. Despite these concerns, a picture of the perspectives that can be found in each country, as well as patterns of similarity within Asian countries in comparison to the rest of the world, emerges from the data and provides a unique opportunity to see how people from a range of different countries respond to the exact same survey items related to potential governmental rights to aggression and potential individual rights to peace. The survey included many items and required Likert-type sevenpoint ratings of agreement to statements (from strongly disagree to strongly agree), written explanations of ratings, and definitions of terms. Responses to items addressing the following issues were considered here: definitions of war, peace, and terrorism; assumptions concerning potential governmental rights to invasion, torture, and killing innocent civilians in the fight against terrorism; assumptions concerning the extent to which everyone has the rights to experience peace and engage in protest; views on the achievability of world peace, and beliefs about the extent to which national security is important to individual and family security. The qualitative, written explanations and definitions are discussed, in most cases, more than the quantitative data regarding level of agreement. This is important to note for at least three reasons. First, some cultures tend to be more verbal than others, just as some individuals are. Long, detailed explanations may come more frequently from citizens in some countries than in others. Second, based on historical experiences, respondents in some countries may be more forthcoming and willing to honestly share perspectives than respondents from other countries. Third, and most important, if you are not aware of how percentages are used to describe answers throughout the chapters, you may find the description of findings relatively confusing and even misleading. When analysis is based on percentage of answers to rating scale items (e.g., in the Afghanistan chapter where average scores of 1.9 or 6.5 are given), the data refer to the total number of respondents who completed the item on the survey and gave a rating—in most cases, the total number of people who completed the survey. In cases where definitions or explanations are described, though, the percentages do not refer to the number of respondents who completed the survey, but rather to the number of ‘‘codable units’’ in the answers that were given. This is an important distinction. The GIPGAP group at Boston University who analyzed most, but not all, of the data for countries represented in this

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chapter, developed coding manuals (from the responses of a diverse international sample) for each item based on particular concepts or words that occurred in answers. Because of back translations and issues of cultural understanding that affect verbal responses, this is problematic in and of itself, though still a valuable tool. The coding manuals determined how answers were broken down into ‘‘codable units.’’ The answer to a particular question from one person may have had six codable units, whereas three other people may not have provided an answer at all or provided an answer with no codable units. The percentages used refer to the number of codable units (generally referred to as ‘‘responses’’ rather than ‘‘answers’’) within the verbal explanations given, not to the number of overall respondents who completed the survey. For example, of 100 respondents, perhaps only 40 completed a particular qualitative explanation. From those explanations, perhaps only 30 of the answers had codable units, but there may have been a total of 50 codable units in those answers. The percentage given will then be the percent out of the 50 codable units that fell in a particular category. Thus, careful reading is required to determine just what is being presented. Because of this, as well as because of the variation in sample sizes and sampling techniques, the comparative information below is descriptive in nature and is intended only to highlight particularly obvious differences among countries in responses to certain items, in light of the considerations described above and the historical and social frameworks within that country compared to others. The selections of excerpts from responses provided are meant to serve this same purpose.

DEFINITIONS OF PEACE, WAR, AND TERRORISM A cross-national comparison of participants’ personal definitions of these terms revealed that there were many commonalities across countries; however, there were also differences that appeared consistent with what might be expected due to particular historical and political circumstances. Many participants provided synonyms or dictionary-type definitions of peace, or described it as a lack of conflict between one or more groups or countries. Another major definitional category that emerged included explaining peace as either the presence of certain desirable qualities such as happiness, prosperity, and stability (identified as ‘‘positive’’ definitions of peace) or as the absence of certain unpleasant qualities such as destruction, pain, chaos, or death (defined as ‘‘negative’’ definitions of peace). In Malaysia, responses were relatively

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evenly divided between positive definitions of peace (47 percent) and negative definitions (43 percent). In China, 51 percent of the responses were coded as positive and 41 percent as negative. Indeed, in all of the Asian countries, more positive than negative definitions of peace were provided, in some cases markedly so. In Afghanistan, for example, 80 percent of the definitions were positive. The exception to this pattern was Australia, arguably the most Western and individualistic as opposed to collectivistic country described in this volume; in Australia, 38 percent of the replies were positive definitions of peace, whereas 51 percent were negative. Perhaps people in Asian countries with recent or ongoing exposure to the devastation of war prefer not to focus on it. Indeed, sharing only ‘‘good news’’ with strangers is perhaps a form of hospitality existing in many of the cultures described here. ‘‘Putting one’s best face forward’’ in order not to shame family and country is important. This is one of many possible explanations for this trend toward positive definitions, especially since the trend in Western countries seemed to be in the opposite direction, with respondents who had most recently experienced war on home soil giving more negative definitions. Table 12.1 compares the number of positive versus negative definitions of peace from countries included in this volume where these data were available. Keep in mind that the percentages are based on codable units, and they will not always add to 100 percent because not all of the coded responses fell clearly into one or the other of the two categories examined. A third theme that emerged in the definitions was that of an ideal state of affairs to which humanity should aspire. Because coding was based on a grounded theory approach, not all countries listed had responses in every Table 12.1 Positive and Negative Definitions of Peace in Asian Countries Country Malaysia Indonesia China Japan Korea Afghanistan Pakistan India Laos Philippines Australia

Positive

Negative

Ideal

47% 57% 51% 59% 67% 80% 59% * 50% * 38%

43% 25% 41% 24% 29% * 30% * * * 51%

3% 6% 13% 10% 2% * 10% * * * 5%

*Designates that no information on these categories was provided by the chapter author.

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category discussed in this chapter. There were also additional categories for some countries that were not present in others and are not included in this discussion. See each chapter for the specific categories used for the definitions of peace coded for that particular country. It is interesting to speculate on why a war-torn country such as Afghanistan has citizens so likely to emphasize the positive qualities of peace while a country such as Australia, where citizens enjoy most of the positive qualities mentioned in the Afghanistan definitions on a daily basis, is more likely to emphasize the absence of negative qualities. Certainly, many theories in psychology could account for this difference, but I will leave it to you, the reader, to choose which you prefer. Another comparison of interest regards definitions of war. Although not evident in all countries, one relatively common coding strategy for definitions of war was based on whether the impact of war referred to in the definition was more centered on individual affects or collective, state, or societal effects. It is not surprising that, from cultures traditionally defined as collectivist, far more definitions focused on war as a state or group issue, rather than on taking a more individualistic perspective, by defining war in relation to personal moral judgments. By contrast, in regard to definitions of terrorism, it was participants from countries with large Muslim populations (e.g., Malaysia and Indonesia) who appeared to be more likely to condemn acts of terrorism on moral grounds (49 percent of the responses in Malaysia and 40 percent in the Philippines), compared, for example, with Japan (15 percent). Another common definition of terrorism focused on its ‘‘destructive, violent behaviors’’ a category into which 63 percent of the Chinese and 57 percent of the Filipino responses fell, as well as 46 percent of the Pakistani responses and 39 percent of the Malaysian responses.

CAN AND SHOULD WE ACHIEVE WORLD PEACE? Citizens of all of the countries discussed in these volumes seem to be in favor of peaceful, prosperous societies. A few Asians defended the rights of countries to go to war, and many were skeptical about world peace ever being achieved and not even certain if that would be an appropriate goal. ‘‘There will always be a state of conflict, especially as the natural resources of the world become more scarce with the progression of time,’’ wrote an Afghan respondent. According to an Australian respondent, a right to peace would ‘‘place unreasonable demands upon the population of the world.’’ ‘‘It is a choice, not a right,’’ pointed out a Malaysian respondent. A prosperous, stable society aimed at the collective good seemed to emerge as the ultimate goal

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Table 12.2 Can World Peace Be Achieved? Country Malaysia Indonesia China Japan Korea Afghanistan Pakistan India Laos Philippines Australia

Yes (with or without conditions) 60% 69% 54% 59% 64% 43% 26% * 44% 100% 52%

No 18% 23% 30% 33% 36% 57% 50% * * 46%

*Designates that no information on these categories was provided by the chapter author.

for citizens from most of the countries described in this volume, however. The responses were overwhelmingly in favor of a right to peace, with some countries, such as Indonesia and Afghanistan, demonstrating 100 percent support for such a right. Table 12.2 compares ‘‘Yes’’ and ‘‘No’’ answers to the question ‘‘Can world peace be achieved?’’ Again, keep in mind that coding categories varied from one country to another. The percentages of respondents who indicated that peace could be achieved with or without the meeting of specified conditions are summarized in the ‘‘yes’’ category, and the others are summarized in the ‘‘no’’ or ‘‘disagreement’’ category. Percentages do not equal 100 percent, because some answers were uncodable or simply ‘‘I don’t know’’ or ‘‘I am not sure.’’ Some sections are left blank due to unavailable data. As in the other tables, percentages may not equal 100 because of additional categories included in the analysis for specific countries. Obviously, there are contrasts in whether peace is viewed as attainable. Nearly 80 percent of the responses from the Philippines agree that peace is achievable, compared to lower levels of agreement in, for example, Japan (43 percent) and Pakistan (26 percent). One possible explanation for this contrast is that most of the Filipino respondents were Christian and often referred in their answers to peace being achieved at some time in the future through belief in God. Another possibility is that, in the Philippines, citizens are currently optimistic about peace being achieved due to political efforts within that country at present. Also of interest is that Laotian responses fell only into the ‘‘conditional’’ category.

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246 Table 12.3 Do We Have a Right to Peace? Country Malaysia Indonesia China Japan Korea Afghanistan Pakistan India Laos Philippines Australia

Yes

Other

No

88% 100% 68% 71% 85% 100% 87% 79% 100% 89% 75%

11% 0% 24% 22% 12% 0% 13% 17% 0% 8% 0%

1% 0% 6% 7% 2% 0% 0% 4% 0% 2% 25%

Another item related to peace stated, ‘‘All people have a right to live in a world of peace.’’ The major themes emerging from the responses were that peace is ‘‘a necessity,’’ ‘‘desirable,’’ ‘‘a conditional right,’’ and ‘‘an ideal.’’ It is surprising that a few people indicated that peace is NOT a right (6 percent in China and 7 percent in Japan). Table 12.3 shows the percentage of codable responses and agreement with an unequivocal and irrevocable right to grow up in a peaceful world. Percentages in the ‘‘other’’ category included answers that did not address the question and those indicating that the respondent was unsure.

DO COUNTRIES HAVE A RIGHT TO INVADE? Most countries with participants who responded to the item ‘‘Sometimes one country has the right to invade another country’’ have had some form of direct experience with invasion, having been occupied, having invaded another country, or both. With the exception of the samples from Australia and China, the majority of participants from countries represented in this volume disagreed with the premise that a country has the right to invade another country. In Australia, 65 percent of the responses supported a state right to invasion, and in China, 68 percent of the responses supported this right. In some countries, such as Japan and Pakistan, responses were fairly evenly divided between those supporting a right to invade and those arguing against it. In Japan, 40 percent said it is a right and 41 percent said it is not. In Pakistan, 47 percent said it may be a right, while another 50 percent said it is not. All of the other Asian countries included in this volume were

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clearly against invasion. Only 15 percent in Malaysia, 33 percent in India, and 17 percent in Indonesia said invasion may be a right under certain conditions, generally related to preserving stability. Between one-fourth and one-third of the responses in the remaining countries accepted invasion as a right under certain conditions. ‘‘If the political leaders of a country are useless,’’ wrote a 27-year-old male Filipino respondent, ‘‘it is better to turn it over to someone who can lead properly, productively and peacefully.’’ ‘‘It can be done to provide peace and security,’’ wrote a Malaysian respondent. In Malaysia, however, 80 percent said invasion absolutely is not a right. Table 12.4 compares responses to this item. Common themes present in the qualitative responses across most countries included: general denouncements of invasion, violence, and coercion; assertions concerning each country’s right to sovereignty; stated preferences for peaceful or diplomatic alternatives to invasion; and identification of adverse consequences of invasion. Some participants questioned the invaders’ motives. Many emphasized that a country’s borders or physical boundaries should be respected. ‘‘Invasion of another country is prohibited by international law,’’ wrote a Japanese respondent. ‘‘However, intervening in a humanitarian way is not considered invasion.’’ Although the majority of participants from most countries disagreed with a governmental right to invasion, as in previous volumes describing other parts of the world, some participants from almost every country identified circumstances that might justify an invasion. Some such justifications included self-defense, deterring an actual or potential attack on one’s own country, and responding to humanitarian demands. Table 12.4 Does a Country Have the Right to Invade Another Country? Country

Yes

Other

No

Malaysia Indonesia China Japan Korea Afghanistan Pakistan India Laos Philippines Australia

15% 17% 68% 40% 16% 33% 47% 33% 27% 24% 65%

5% 11% 5% 19% 9% 41% 3% 0% 29% 7% 10%

80% 72% 27% 41% 72% 26% 50% 60% 45% 69% 25%

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It is interesting that the citizens from the countries with the most recent long-standing experiences with invasion and colonialism (Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, India, and Korea) are the least likely to support the right of a country to invade another and the most likely to argue for the value of sovereignty. Those currently experiencing some form of invasion, such as Afghanistan, are most likely to avoid answering the question. Those with little or no experience of being invaded and colonized multiple times in recent history, such as China and Australia, are most likely to support the right to invade. On the other hand, those who have experienced invasions personally seem to have no desire to subject others to the experience.

RIGHT TO PROTEST WAR When countries do invade and go to war, do citizens have the right to protest? As with other items, opinions are mixed, but the vast majority support the right to protest any country’s involvement in any war. Many qualify the right, noting that it must be peaceful, it must not threaten society, it must not violate local or national laws, or it must not disrupt business. Chinese respondents were especially likely to note that there were limits to the right and it must be appropriate and legally sanctioned (61 percent of the responses). Some, especially in Indonesia where 25 percent of the responses fall into the not sure category, are unsure if this should be a right, but very few oppose it. The country with the highest percentage of arguments in opposition to the right to protest is Malaysia, and this opposition probably dates back to the relatively recent riots related to protests in the 1960s and 1970s, combined with Malaysia’s long-standing efforts to maintain racial tolerance within her borders. These factors have given a very negative social connotation to the idea of protests of any type and made some types of protests illegal. Still, most Malaysians were strongly supportive of a right to protest, many even seeing it as a civic duty, but stressing the need for peaceful protest. ‘‘This is obligatory,’’ wrote one Malaysian. ‘‘It is not just a right, but a duty,’’ said another. ‘‘It is very important that democratic countries allow citizens to voice their opinions because that can improve the problems in that country,’’ said a third. ‘‘It is the moral duty of every individual to stage protest against war,’’ asserted an Indian respondent. ‘‘Peace brings prosperity,’’ wrote a respondent from China, a country from which none of the participants opposed the right to protest, although many qualified it. ‘‘Freedom of speech [is a right] as long as they are protesting without disrupting others,’’ said another Chinese respondent.

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Table 12.5 Do Citizens Have the Right to Protest War? Country

Yes

Qualified

No

Not Sure/Other

Malaysia Indonesia China Japan Korea Afghanistan Pakistan India Laos Philippines Australia

59% 75% 34% 49% 90% 90% 39% 41% 50% 88% 72%

11% 0% 61% * * 5% 48% 51% 50% * 28%

15% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% *

14% 25% 6% 8% 9% 5% 13% 0% 0% 5% 0%

*Designates that no information on these categories was provided by the chapter author. Note: Due to rounding or uncodable responses within data summaries, not all the percentages for each country total 100 percent.

Table 12.5 summarizes responses to the statement ‘‘Individuals have the right to stage protests against war and in favor of peace.’’ Responses coded as ‘‘qualified’’ were those indicating that protest was acceptable only under certain conditions. These conditions were generally related to not disturbing the peace, not impairing business interests, or not breaking the law. Because of recent U.S. military actions in this part of the world, it could be argued that the country that has had the most recent ongoing interaction with occupying U.S. troops is Afghanistan. Consequently, it is worth noting that citizens there are the most supportive of the right to protest war. Whether the influence of U.S. troops draws their attention to the right to speak freely in a democracy or simply makes them more aware of a desire to protest war is unclear. ‘‘Politicians are corrupt and we as commoners should protest against what is not right,’’ wrote one Afghan. ‘‘If protests help in stopping war and bringing peace to a country, I agree,’’ said another. ‘‘Otherwise, in conditions like Afghanistan where protest doesn’t have any impact, I disagree.’’ Except in Malaysia, where there have been relatively recent riots, violence, and civil unrest related to public protests, and a strong emphasis on tolerance for various perspectives, no countries opposed a right to protest war. In Malaysia, one respondent who disagreed with such a right wrote ‘‘It is only a right in countries where citizens are legally given that right. It is up to each country to choose, and protests must always be peaceful and approved.’’

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TERRORISM, TORTURE, AND NATIONAL SECURITY The countries considered in this volume have had divergent experiences in relation to terrorism, with some but not all of the countries having been directly affected. Recently, India and Indonesia have been victims of terrorist attacks. Afghanistan and Pakistan experience the U.S. ‘‘war on terrorism’’ on a daily basis. Definitions of terrorism were mentioned briefly earlier in the chapter, but many definitions spoke of terrorism as violence used for political purposes. ‘‘Terrorism is the use of violence and threats to intimidate or coerce, especially for political purposes,’’ wrote an Afghan respondent. It is ‘‘violence performed by a savage that can be harmful to the country and is a national threat,’’ explained a Malaysian. In response to the statement ‘‘Sometimes the heads of a government have the right to kill innocent civilians in order to fight international terrorism,’’ the majority of participants addressing this question disagreed. Common themes included arguments that killing innocents constitutes ‘‘sin,’’ emphasis on the innocence of the civilians as the reason why governments do not have a right to kill them, and a preference for nonviolent methods of countering terrorism. A few respondents, especially in Australia, China, Afghanistan, and Korea, indicated it was acceptable to kill innocent civilians to save others if that was the only way. ‘‘Ending terrorism is for the benefit of all people in the world,’’ wrote an Afghan. ‘‘Therefore, some innocent people should be sacrificed.’’ ‘‘To kill innocent people will only lead to disaster’’ was a sentiment expressed by many Malaysians, echoing the sacred covenant of leadership described in that chapter that has long governed the rulers there. ‘‘It is totally wrong,’’ and ‘‘if this must happen, the war on terrorism is flawed’’ were common sentiments from Indonesia. ‘‘If fighting terrorism requires killing innocent civilians, then do not fight terrorism,’’ said a 22-year-old Indian male. ‘‘In no case should a government kill innocent civilians.’’ Overall, countries in Asia that have experienced ongoing terrorist attacks are still strongly opposed to endorsing any type of ‘‘war on terrorism’’ that results in civilian deaths. ‘‘The government should not kill innocent civilians for any reason.’’ said a 27-yearold Japanese female. ‘‘Whatever the case, no one has the right to kill another person,’’ wrote another Japanese respondent. This type of response was common in all the Asian countries (Table 12.6). ‘‘It is a violation of basic human rights, against common sense, morality, rationality and intuition,’’ says a 25-year-old Pakistani male. Respondents from all countries in this volume were generally strongly opposed to any state right to kill innocent civilians in the interest of stopping terrorism. Most respondents from Malaysia who reject

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Table 12.6 Do We Have A Right to Kill Innocent Civilians to Fight Terrorism? Country

Yes

Qualified

No

Not Sure/Other

Malaysia Indonesia China Japan Korea Afghanistan Pakistan India Laos Philippines Australia

4% 15% 15% 8% 14% 15% 6% 8% 0% 3% 16%

6% 0% 15% 4% 0% 15% 0% 0% 0% 3% *

80% 85% 69% 78% 80% 69% 94% 78% 100% 85% 75%

8% 0% 0% 10% 6% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 0%

*Designates that no information on these categories was provided by the chapter author. Note: Due to rounding within data summaries, not all the percentages for each country total 100 percent.

such a right are also strongly opposed to the idea of a right to torture prisoners in order to gain information, or for any other reason, many noting that this was opposed by the Prophet or citing the right of all human beings to be treated with dignity, ‘‘even if they are enemies.’’ In other countries, even though there was strong opposition to killing innocent civilians, attitudes toward a right to torture were mixed. A relatively large percent of responses (one-fourth to one-third) in all countries except Malaysia, Japan, and the Philippines were in support of such a right, at least conditionally. In Korea and Pakistan, more supported such a right than opposed it. Means-end arguments were most commonly given, such as ‘‘Yes, if the information needed is critical to the war’’ (from a Laotian male respondent) and ‘‘If there is important information the government needs to get, it may be reasonable’’ (Chinese female). Those in opposition cited inefficiency as frequently (‘‘This is not the best way to get accurate information,’’ Japanese male) as they cited inhumanity (‘‘This should not be done because it violates human rights,’’ Malaysian male). Perhaps on this question, collectivism, expressed as the desire to do what is best for the society rather than the individual and protect the country, accounts for the responses (Table 12.7). In addition, especially in Laos, the Philippines, and Korea, a large number of respondents were unsure about the question or did not answer. The authors of the Laos chapter hypothesize that this may be due to personal experiences with torture and a reticence to pass judgment or to discuss it. No data were available from the Indian sample on this item.

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Table 12.7 Do Governments Have a Right to Torture Prisoners of War? Country

Yes

No

Not Sure/Other

Malaysia Indonesia China Japan Korea Afghanistan Pakistan India Laos Philippines Australia

10% 33% 26% 17% 32% 29% 46% * 27% 9% 30%

77% 58% 63% 72% 49% 71% 44% * 43% 41% 59%

12% 8% 11% 10% 20% 0% 10% * 30% * 11%

*Designates that no information on these categories was provided by the chapter author. Note: Due to rounding and uncodable responses within data summaries, not all the percentages for each country total 100 percent.

Regardless of country or religion, the majority of participants from most of the countries in this volume disagreed with the statement ‘‘The government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war,’’ although their level of disagreement varied to some extent. In addition to general denouncements of torture, common reasons given for disagreeing with a right to torture included identifying it as contrary to international laws or treaties, a violation of human rights, disregarding the value of human life, having negative effects, violating ethical or moral principles, and lacking efficacy as an interrogation technique. Across countries, the participants who supported the right to torture prisoners of war noted that torture can be justified in cases where it is useful in obtaining needed information; in addition, some participants noted that proof of guilt or wrongdoing on behalf of the prisoner can justify the use of torture. Common justifications for a governmental right to torture included the government’s need for information from prisoners for strategic purposes, to save lives, or to achieve other social benefits. Some participants stated that torture is justified because it may be necessary for national security. Consistent with this line of reasoning, the majority of participants from countries where data were available agreed with the statement ‘‘National security is essential for individual and family security.’’ Not all researchers asked this question, some even being unsure how to translate the concept accurately in the sense it was intended on the PAIRTAPS. In Table 12.8, responses that were conditionally supportive of the statement concerning the importance of national security are combined

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Table 12.8 Is National Security Essential for Family and Individual Security? Country

Yes

No

Not Sure/Other

Malaysia Indonesia China Japan Korea Afghanistan Pakistan India Laos Philippines Australia

73% 90% 88% 74% * * * * 80% 70% 66%

2% 10% 3% 10% * * * * 20% 6% 17%

17% 0% 9% * * * * * 0% 24% 17%

*Designates that no information on these categories was provided by the chapter author. Note: Due to rounding within data summaries, not all the percentages for each country total 100 percent.

with those that were in total agreement. Only responses that clearly opposed the notion are summarized in the ‘‘no’’ column. It is interesting that Laos and Australia are the two countries with the highest percentage of ‘‘no’’ responses, but their responses had very different tones. The Laotian respondents stressed the duty of the family to provide security, whereas the Australians were more concerned with a family right to privacy that national security issues may infringe upon. A secondary thread in the Australian responses was a preference for approaching issues of security as ‘‘global’’ rather than ‘‘national’’ to avoid wars. Basically, it can be safely concluded from the comments that, although nearly everyone in the sample values safety and security, if war, torture, and death are the means required to insure it at the national level, most participants would prefer to provide for their own security at a family or community level.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION As the authors of previous integrative chapters have noted, ‘‘war’’ and ‘‘peace’’ have been with us throughout history and people have engaged in endless debates about governmental uses of aggression. The social and political climates in which we live influence how we feel and think about these issues. In our world, with almost universal access to media, even those living on remote parts of the planet get ample exposure to the current ‘‘war on terrorism’’ and national security issues. The

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chapters in Volume 4 give us a glimpse into the history and current state of affairs regarding these issues in several Asian countries, as they give voice to ordinary citizens on these issues. The intent of this concluding chapter was to summarize and highlight the similarities and differences in patterns of responses and themes across the countries presented here. The responses indicate that freedom of speech and the right to peaceful protest were strongly supported in all of the Asian countries included in this volume. The democratic decision-making process may look slightly different in Asian countries, but it is alive and well, and the people do have a voice in their own affairs. Definitions of the terms ‘‘war,’’ ‘‘peace,’’ and ‘‘terrorism’’ varied somewhat from country to country, but the respondents valued peace and opposed war and terrorism. In Asian countries, positive rather than negative definitions of peace prevailed, whereas Australians stressed negative definitions. When defining terrorism, many participants in Asian countries made negative moral judgments and discussed the destructiveness and violence of terrorism, whereas Australians were more likely to address conditions that they thought might give rise to terrorism. These differences may be due to a difference in Eastern and Western perspectives, or perhaps are explainable just by specific Australian experiences. Australia has generally supported the United States in war efforts over the past century; indeed, a striking 64 percent of the Australian sample reported a family member who had served in the military. In addition, the IRA and terrorist actions within Ireland may have been fresh in the minds of Australian respondents, many of whom are of Irish descent. Despite personal experiences with terrorists in many of the countries covered here, such as Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, participants showed no tolerance for a ‘‘war on terrorism’’ that might result in the deaths of innocent civilians. Instead, an emphasis on ‘‘rehabilitation’’ surfaced, with a desire to correct the misperceptions of those who would choose to engage in such antisocial acts. Some commonalities that these countries shared with countries from other parts of the world, as described in previous volumes, were a general denouncement of war and terrorism and a rejection of the rights of anyone or any country to engage in invasion, torture, or the killing of innocent civilians. Despite the fact that many survey participants have lived through or been directly or indirectly affected by different forms of aggression, they generally placed a very high value on peace, cooperation, and human rights. They generally endorsed nonviolent or diplomatic solutions to conflict over forceful or violent ones. Quality of life, prosperity, and social obligation were all highlighted. These findings support a universal reverence for life, inspiring hope for peaceful

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conflict resolutions to create a more peaceful, stable, prosperous, and livable world in the future. This seems to be good news. All of humanity, regardless of station, culture, language, or country, seems to value peace, harmony, and human rights to health, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It is my hope that the information shared in this work will help to guide us all along that path.

An Integrative Conclusion for the Set Michael Corgan, David Young Oh, and Kathleen Malley-Morrison

The landscape in which the elements of power and force play their often deadly games has changed dramatically in the past 60 years or so. Although there have always been exceptions, national states and their subsidiaries have been the primary wielders of the instruments of power and coercion for centuries—and have generally claimed the right to sovereign control over the tools of aggression. Since the end of World War II, however, many new actors, such as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), have come into existence and wielded influence in a way that challenges the continued preeminence of the state-centric Westphalian Order. Even beyond formal and durable organizations, movements such as the antipersonnel land mines campaign compel all peoples and their leaders to address issues related to the control of instruments of destruction. Still, the states remain powerful and that portion of the Westphalian order is likely to prevail for a while. It is often regarded as virtually the definition of the modern state that it is the formal entity of people living together that has a monopoly on the instruments of coercion or violence. That is, the state controls the army and the police, whose functions are, in theory, to provide security for the state against external actors and threats and ensure the domestic order against the violent or criminal elements to be found in any society. It follows logically that those holding power within the state would be more likely than others to have a propensity to favor the use of instruments of force to carry out their sworn duties to the people they represent and/or lead in the manner they deem best. This propensity

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would likely be strong even in leaders who, before having responsibility for conducting political affairs, saw themselves as essentially peace loving and nonviolent and even stronger in individuals with more personal motives for desiring to control the instruments of power. As far back as Shakespeare, we find a monarch advising his son (Henry IV) that one solution to social unrest is to engage the people in foreign wars: ‘‘Therefore, my Harry, Be it thy course to busy giddy minds With foreign quarrels. . . .’’1 By contrast, a great number or majority of ordinary citizens could be expected to prefer lives of some order and regularity. Resort to force and violence by anyone challenges and often shatters those expectations. The Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) was conducted among ordinary people around the world to provide baseline data regarding how such people view aggression, war, and the use of force and violence purportedly undertaken on their behalf. We expected that there would be a gap between the leaders and the peoples about use of compulsion and force. Such gaps would seem logical even though many governments—and, in certain circumstances, perhaps any government—will promote and defend its use of force and compulsion for various presumed public benefits on behalf of the people. We were also interested in providing baseline data on the extent to which ordinary citizens and subjects around the world believed they have a right to peace and the right to protest against wars—rights that states may not always be motivated to ensure. Indeed, it can be argued that the leaders of states and other units of power are much more concerned with the rights of states than with individual human rights. Nevertheless, in recent decades, many IGOs have actively promulgated statements on the rights of humans, including a right to peace. The founding principle of the United Nations was to create a covenant to protect future generations from the scourge of war and allow them to live in a world of peace. A basic premise of the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stated in the preamble of the Declaration, is that: ‘‘[R]ecognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.’’ The argument that humans have an inherent right to peace is more explicitly codified in the United Nations Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace, approved by General Assembly Resolution 39/11 on November 12, 1984. Moreover, a human right to engage in peaceful protests against wars and in favor of peace is codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 20, which says, ‘‘Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.’’ Because many people around the world are

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probably unaware of these declarations and yet desirous of peace, we were interested in the extent to which they nevertheless believe that they have human rights to peace and protest. Given that ordinary people in general prefer peace and stability and states are desirous of retaining control over all methods that they deem essential to pursuing their objectives, techniques of public relations, propaganda, and information control are widely used by governments to justify the resort to force or means of compulsion in defending state interests or public order. Governments have powerful resources at their disposal to ‘‘sell’’ violence, aggressive behavior, or methods like torture addressed in the PAIRTAPS. Thus, in some measure, this survey tells us about the extent to which respondents from different countries are ‘‘sold’’ on the use of force on their behalf, as well as providing some insight into their perceptions on such matters. One of the ways in which the popular view of the necessity of force in the world tends to converge with governmental views is occasioned by what is called the ‘‘security dilemma.’’ The underlying assumption of the security dilemma is that in an anarchic world, what one state does to provide for or enhance its own security is likely to be interpreted by another (often neighboring) state as threatening to its interests. This idea is as old as Thucydides’ ‘‘History of the Peloponnesian Wars’’ and the account of the wall built by Athens that helped convince Sparta that the Athenians meant them ill. More recently, John H. Holt was among the first to elaborate on this idea as he considered not innate human qualities but the anarchic situation of the world’s nations.2 The emerging bipolar world order of the Cold War era only heightened the difficulty. Subsequent writings by Barry Buzan and Robert Jervis, among others, refined the ideas inherent in the dilemma and invoked game theory, including the well-known ‘‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’’ games, to elucidate the structure of U.S.-USSR relations. The irony of the security dilemma is that the threat they see, perhaps irrespective of their government’s pointing it out to them, is one they themselves might have exacerbated by previously calling for measures to make themselves more secure. On the other hand, as many responses to the PAIRTAPS show, a number of ordinary people see a way out of this dilemma, or at least a possibility to break the cycle of threat and counterthreat, however unintended some of these perceived threats may have been. As indicated in the introduction to this series, the samples recruited in each country were not randomly selected and their responses cannot be assumed to be a fully accurate representation of all the views in their countries. Moreover, many of the samples are relatively small, and in a few instances, they were refugees, expatriates, or students from

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countries where completing surveys such as ours within the country might have been a source of concern for the respondents. For these reasons, caution is important both in our discussion of the patterns we found in the survey responses and in the inferences you draw. The use of relatively small samples is quite characteristic of qualitative research, which is a labor-intensive process both for the respondents who are sharing their views in their own words and for the researchers who must develop ways to code the responses reliably and validly. The strengths of qualitative research methodology include the following: (a) it provides respondents a much fuller opportunity to explain their thinking on important issues than is provided in rating scale or true/false and agree/disagree formats; (b) it taps more deeply into the reasoning processes that may underlie the more superficial attitudes that may be assessed in typical restrictive format surveys; (c) it has the potential for capturing the strong emotional responses that may accompany verbal responses to items focusing on life and death issues; and (d) it is a useful format for garnering information that may prove valuable in generating theories and hypotheses about how people think and feel about major issues such as war and peace. In discussing the patterns we saw in the responses of individuals from different countries around the world, we typically provide the percentages of responses falling into particular categories, not because we believe that the exact same breakdown of responses by percentages would be found in another sample from that country, but because we believe that (a) considering the pattern of responses may lead to further valuable theorizing and research, and (b) it is remarkable how consistent some of the patterns are across countries, samples, and recruitment strategies. As we expected, in our samples of ordinary people from around the world, endorsement for individual human rights to peace was much stronger and more consistent than endorsement of states’ rights to pursue their agendas using violence. The majority of participants from all countries except for one (Spain) supported the statement ‘‘All human beings have a basic right to peace.’’ Indeed, in half of the countries (19 of 38), more than 90 percent of the responses asserted that everyone has a basic right to peace.3 In seven of these countries (i.e., Afghanistan, Brazil, Indonesia, Iraq, Laos, Nicaragua, and Pakistan), all of which have suffered considerable aggression in recent decades, 100 percent of the responses indicated full agreement with the principle that people have a right to peace. In all of the remaining countries except for Spain, the majority of the responses endorsed the right to peace, whereas in Spain, which had the lowest level of agreement with a basic right to peace, only 48 percent of the responses endorsed that right.

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In regard to a state’s right to invasion, there were only five countries in which a majority of the responses were supportive of such a right— the United States (including both the European American and ethnic minority samples), China (68 percent), Sweden, Canada, and Great Britain; it is interesting that all of these are Western countries except for China, and none have been themselves subjected to an invasion since World War II. In another five countries—Japan, Pakistan, Israel, Russia, and Australia—arguments for and against a right to invasion were relatively evenly split. For example, in Japan, 40 percent of the responses were arguments in favor of such a right, and 41 percent were arguments against the right. In all of the other countries in which views on that item were analyzed (30 of 42), the majority of the responses argued against a state right to invasion. The lowest levels of support were in Turkey and Iraq; in both of those countries, only 6 percent of the responses supported such a right. In regard to the item ‘‘the government has the right to order the torture of prisoners in time of war,’’ the majority of responses in all 39 countries rejected such a right; in more than 24 of 37 countries,4 arguments in favor of a state right to torture were found in fewer than 20 percent of the responses. The lowest level of support was found in the responses from Iraqi, Kuwaiti, and Spanish participants; in each of those samples, only 6 percent of the responses showed any tolerance for a right to torture. Respondents from 15 of the 37 countries showed a bit more tolerance for such a right, with more than 20 percent, but fewer than half of the responses indicating some support for the right. The highest level of approval for a state right to torture POWs came from Pakistan, where 46 percent of the responses supported the right. Of the three state aggression measures, the state’s right to kill innocent civilians to fight international terrorism garnered the least amount of support. In the responses of 29 of the 375 countries in which the authors reported on this item, fewer than 20 percent of the responses supported a state right to sacrifice innocent lives in the fight against terrorism. In both Laos and Kuwait, there was not a single response providing any support for such a right. In the remaining eight countries, there were some responses justifying state tolerance for the loss of innocent lives, with the most support found in responses in Great Britain, Russia, and Sweden; in each of these countries, around 40 percent of the responses supported that state right. Although there was less support for states’ rights to aggression than for individual rights to peace and protest in our responses, the percentage of those supporting the governmental right to invade another country was much higher than the percentages supporting the other two governmental aggression measures: right to kill civilians and the right

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to torture prisoners of war. The highest level of agreement for a right to invasion was 82 percent (U.S. ethnic minorities) with most of the highest level of support falling around 60 percent. The highest levels of support for rights to torture and kill innocent civilians was 46 percent (Pakistan) and around 40 percent (Great Britain, Russia, Sweden), respectively, with strong support for either right found in less than 20–30 percent of responses. As can be seen, in addition to stronger support for an individual’s right to peace than for a state’s right to commit aggression, responses from all over the world also tended to show stronger support for invasion than for torture or for justifying the loss of innocent lives under the banner of fighting terrorism. Moreover, a higher proportion of responses showed tolerance for torture than for killing innocent civilians. Invasion may be the form of aggression that states work hardest to justify, with torture and killing innocent civilians being seen as subsidiaries to war. The thinking may be that once you get people to agree to fight for you (in the name of their own interests, such as security), you don’t have to worry too much about the squeamishness people may feel at the idea of torture or killing innocent civilians. The pattern indicating the highest level of tolerance for a right to invasion and the lowest level of tolerance for a right to kill innocent civilians, with tolerance for a right to torture in the middle, may also reflect the level of the respondent’s ability to imagine each particular form of government aggression happening to him or her personally. Participants may find it easier to think of their own innocence as civilians than to think of themselves as prisoners of war or as having any responsibility for invasion of another country. Since World War II, and particularly during the Cold War, many states raised the specter of threats to ‘‘national security’’ to convince their citizens of the need for a strong and aggressive defensive stance (admittedly an oxymoron). In all the countries in our sample in which a majority of the responses indicated a tolerance for a state’s right to invasion, half or more of the respondents strongly agreed that national security was essential for individual and family security.6 Despite the high level of agreement in all countries that there is a basic human right to peace, many participants from around the world were pessimistic concerning the probability of world peace being achieved. In 26 of the 33 countries for which responses patterns were available,7 only about half or less than half of the responses expressed a belief in the achievability of world peace. In general, it was the Westernized, developed, and richer countries that were less optimistic about world peace, and one might well ask why. Is it because their governments more strongly emphasize the need to invade other nations to

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preserve peace at home? It is interesting that the country with the lowest level of optimism concerning the achievability of peace was Pakistan (13 percent), which was also the country with the highest level of support for the right to torture and the highest level of endorsement for the belief that peace is a basic human right (100 percent). In regard to India and Nigeria, the two countries with the highest levels of endorsement of the achievability of world peace (over 90 percent), the chapter authors discuss the many political, economic, and social problems that continue to face those nation-states. Why, with all the problems their countries face, do these respondents show such strong faith in the achievability of peace when so many individuals from Western developed nations seem so pessimistic? Is ‘‘faith’’ (e.g., religious faith) a component of this optimism? A related issue is the justifications provided for a state’s right to invasion by respondents showing a tolerance for that right. In general, the most frequent arguments offered by respondents were the need for self-defense and defense of others (e.g., humanitarian aid and helping ensure human rights). Have governments learned that these are the most persuasive arguments for rallying their citizens behind state aggression? If there is to be any hope for world peace, people around the world need to have a deeper understanding of at least four issues: (1) the extent to which ordinary people from extremely diverse nations and cultures share a desire for peace and security; (2) the near universal effectiveness of rationales for government aggression to which people in different countries are susceptible; (3) the success of political leaders in transmitting those rationales through the mass media; and (4) the remarkable susceptibility to such rationales in nations (such as the United States) whose people have suffered less from invasion and torture on their own soil. We hope this set of books provides considerable food for thought regarding these issues.

Notes

Set Introduction 1. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, 1945. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1. 2. Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 894. 3. Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, ‘‘Armed Conflict and Its International Dimensions, 1946–2004,’’ Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 5 (2005): 623–35. 4. Human Security Centre (2005), Human Security Report 2005 Fact Sheet. (Vancouver, BC: University of British Colombia), http://www.humansecurityreport.org/press/Armed_Conflict-Factsheet.pdf. 5. Robert M. Sapolsky, ‘‘A Natural History of Peace,’’ Foreign Affairs 85, no.1 (2006): 104–20. 6. ‘‘Peaceful Societies: Alternatives to Violence and War,’’ Encyclopedia of Selected Peaceful Societies, http://www.peacefulsocieties.org:80/Society/intro.html. 7. Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Palgrave, 2000). 8. Office of the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights, ‘‘Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,’’ http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cat.htm. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984, entry into force 26 June 1987, in accordance with article 27 (1). 9. Office of the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights, ‘‘Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace,’’ http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/peace. htm. Approved by General Assembly resolution 39/11 of 12 November 1984. 10. Office of the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights, ‘‘Convention on the Rights of the Child,’’ http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, entry into force 2 September 1990, in accordance with article 49.

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11. United Nations, ‘‘Charter of the United Nations,’’ http://www.un.org/ aboutun/charter/. 12. United Nations, ‘‘Charter of the United Nations.’’ 13. United Nations, ‘‘Charter of the United Nations.’’ 14. C. Enemark and C. Michaelsen, ‘‘Just War Doctrine and the Invasion of Iraq,’’ Australian Journal of Politics and History 51, no. 4 (2005): 545–63. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2000). 15. Enemark and Michaelsen, ‘‘Just War Doctrine and the Invasion of Iraq.’’ 16. Laurie Calhoun, ‘‘Legitimate Authority and ‘Just War’ in the Modern World.’’ Peace and Change 27, 1 (2002): 37–62. 17. Nicholas Rengger, ‘‘On the Just War Tradition in the Twenty-First Century,’’ International Affairs 78, 2 (2002). 353–63. 18. In our view, ‘‘race’’ is a social construct lacking a biological basis. 19. Kathleen Malley-Morrison, International Perspectives on Family Violence and Abuse (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004). 20. A. Strauss and J. Corbin, ‘‘Grounded Theory Methodology: An Overview,’’ in Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry, ed. N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1998), 273–85. 21. Johan Galtung, ‘‘Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses,’’ Journal of Peace Research 22, no. 2 (1985): 141–58.

Introduction to Volume 4 1. The Economist. ‘‘The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy 2008.’’ http://a330.g.akamai.net/7/330/25828/20081021185552/graphics.eiu. com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf.

Chapter 1 1. Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Background Note: Afghanistan, November 2008, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm. 2. The World Factbook, ‘‘Afghanistan,’’ Central Intelligence Agency, https:// www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/af.html (accessed December 18, 2008). 3. Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Background Note: Afghanistan. 4. Background Note: Afghanistan. 5. Background Note: Afghanistan. 6. Dr. Charles Norchi, presentation, Honolulu, Hawai’i, January 13, 2009. 7. Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Background Note: Afghanistan. 8. Central Intelligence Agency. 9. Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, Background Note: Afghanistan. 10. Background Note: Afghanistan. 11. Background Note: Afghanistan. 12. Background Note: Afghanistan.

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13. Background Note: Afghanistan. 14. Background Note: Afghanistan. 15. Background Note: Afghanistan. 16. Background Note: Afghanistan. 17. Background Note: Afghanistan. 18. Bernt Glatzer, ‘‘The Pashtun Tribal System,’’ in Concept of Tribal Society, eds. G. Pfeffer and D. K. Behera (New Delhi: Concept Publishers, 2002), 265–82. 19. Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, ‘‘No Sign until the Burst of Fire,’’ International Security 32 (2008): 11. 20. Personal correspondence with Afghan expatriates. 21. Valentine M. Moghadam, Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 123. 22. Interviews by the author in Kabul, Afghanistan.

Chapter 2 1. There is substantial scholarly literature on the role of critical historical and recent events in shaping attitudes and differentiating the role of generation, age, and life-cycle effects in public opinion. For a discussion of these effects in a developing country context, see Mark Tessler, Carrie Konold, and Megan Reif, ‘‘Political Generations in Developing Countries: Evidence and Insights from Algeria.’’ Public Opinion Quarterly. Summer 2004 (68:2): 184–216. 2. Various accounts attribute this description to a 1998 communication between Bruce Riedel and President Bill Clinton. See the following: Trudy Rubin, ‘‘Bruce Riedel: We Need to Make the War against Al Qaeda Pakistan’sWar, not Just America’s War,’’ in Academy Blog (Washington, DC: American Academy of Political and Social Science Blog, 2008); Seymour M. Hersch, ‘‘The Deal (Why Is Washington Going Easy on Pakistan’s Nuclear Black Market?)’’ New Yorker, March 20, 2004; and, more recently, Ron Moreau and Michael Hirsch, ‘‘Where the Jihad Lives Now,’’ Newsweek, October 29, 2007. The phrase is often repeated by Vice President Joseph Biden and the global media. The Pakistani press and active ‘‘blogosphere’’ as well as some foreign experts question this view. See, for example, Patricia Smith, ‘‘The Most Dangerous Nation in the world? A Nuclear-Armed U.S. Ally, Pakistan Has Been in Turmoil for Months: Why Washington, and the World, Are So Worried about What Lies Ahead,’’ New York Times Upfront, February 11, 2007; ‘‘Pakistan Is World’s Most Dangerous Country, The Times of India, August 20, 2008; Jill Lawrence and Nicole Gaudiano, ‘‘As Pakistani Crisis Unfolds, Biden Steps Up on Issue,’’ USA Today, December 30, 2007; Hugh Sykes, ‘‘How to Take a Holiday in Pakistan,’’ in BBC News (Islamabad, Pakistan: BBC World Service); United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ‘‘U.S. Assistance for Pakistan’’ (remarks prepared for delivery as testimony by Wendy Chamberlain, President, Middle East Institute), June 25, 2008. 3. See, for example, Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam (London: Hurst and Co., 2004), 322 and Aryn Baker, ‘‘The Truth About Talibanistan,’’ Time, March 22, 2007.

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4. Laura King, ‘‘Mumbai attacks put spotlight on Lashkar-e-Taiba.’’ Los Angeles Times. December 5, 2008. 5. See, for example, Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam. (London: Hurst and Co., 2004); Ahmed Rashid. Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. New York, (NY: Viking Press, 2008). 6. Ben Arnoldy, ‘‘Why the Taliban Won’t Take over Pakistan.’’ Christian Science Monitor, June 7, 2009. 7. Awab Alvi, ‘‘Orkuting in Pakistan, Teeth Maestro Blog, April 21, 2007, http://teeth.com.pk/blog/2007/04/21/orkuting-in-pakistan. 8. Pakistani observers of the ‘‘madrasa phenomenon’’ often stress that Pakistanis from all classes often send at least one of their male children into these seminaries for some or all of their education, to learn the Qur’an and some Islamic jurisprudence. Some say every parent in Pakistan hopes to have one son who becomes a religious scholar, or, at least, a hafiz al-Qur’an (one who can recite the Qur’an by heart, using proper tajweed, or intonation), another an army officer, and another a doctor or engineer. It is not accurate to characterize all madrasas as extremist breeding grounds; rather, most are benign. Nevertheless, the links between a relatively few madrasas (particular ones that played a CIAand Saudi-funded role in training militants to fight the Soviets in the NWFP and Balochistan) and rising young adult militancy in the region are not a coincidence. 9. Oskar Verkaaik, ‘‘Cosmopolistan: Culture, Cosmopolitanism and Gender in Karachi, Pakistan,’’ in Gendered Cities, eds. Martina Rieker and Ali Kamran. (Houndsmill: Palgrave, 2008). 10. Harvey Wallbanger and Tijuana Taxi. Cosmopolistan: Toasting a city that never sleeps . . . at least in cyberspace [Blog], January 21, 2008 [cited January 27, 2009. Available from http://cosmopolistan.blogspot.com/2008/12/aboutcosmopolistan-and-insolent-minds.html]. Creators have given themselves pseudonyms. 11. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Statistics, Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey, 2006–2007 (Islamabad, Pakistan: Statistics Division, Government of Pakistan, 2007). 12. Bruce Loudon, ‘‘Pakistani ‘Black Coats’ Lead Democracy Fight.’’ The Australian, November 8, 2007. 13. Huma Yusuf, Old and New Media: Converging During the Pakistan Emergency (March 2007–February 2008) (Boston, MA: Massachusetts Institute for Technology Center for Future Civic Media, 2009). 14. Khalid Qayum. ‘‘Pakistani Opposition, Lawyers to Revive Protests for ExJudges.’’ Bloomberg.com, January 29, 2009. 15. Benjamin Genocchio, ‘‘On the Verge: Pakistan Report.’’ Art in America (January 2009): 59–62. 16. Amelia Gentleman, ‘‘Now Playing in India: A Rare View of Pakistan,’’ The New York Times, April 16, 2008. 17. Richard Wilke, ‘‘View from Pakistan: Before Bhutto’s Assassination, Public Opinion Was Increasingly Opposed to Terrorism,’’ in Pew Global Attitudes Project, ed. Pew Research Center (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2007).

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18. Megan Reif, Voter Education Survey: Pakistan National and Provincial Elections (2007/2008) (Islamabad: The Asia Foundation). 19. Imdad Hussain Sahito. Decade of the Dacoits (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005). 20. Akhtar Hassan Khan Gorchani. The Sindh Police: Brief History and Developments (1947–1997) (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007). 21. Amin Gadit. ‘‘Analysing Pakistan’s gang and dacoit mafia.’’ The News International, September 22, 2008. 22. Daniel Lak. ‘‘Pakistan’s heroin victims.’’ BBC News, October 15, 2001; Huzaima Bukhari and Ikramul Haq. ‘‘Cynicism Amongst Pakistani Youth.’’ Chowk, http://www.chowk.com/articles/13541; John F. Burns. ‘‘Heroin Scourges Million Pakistanis.’’ The New York Times, April 5, 1995. 23. See, for example, Mansoor Khan. ‘‘Unemployment, police excesses created Lyari gangs.’’ The Nation, September 17, 2008. 24. Lak, 2001. 25. Khan, 2007. 26. A. H. Nayyar and Ahmad Salim, eds., The Subtle Subversion: The State of Curricula and Textbooks in Pakistan. A Civil Society Initiative in Curricula and Textbooks Reform. (Islamabad, Pakistan: Sustainable Development Policy Institute, 2003). 27. See, for example, Kai Friese. ‘‘Hijacking India’s History.’’ The New York Times, December 30, 2002; and Manjeet Kripalani. ‘‘Why India’s New Ruling Party is Flirting with Disaster.’’ Business Week, August 10, 1998. 28. A.Q. Nomani, ‘‘Muslims—India’s new ‘untouchables’’’ (Opinion), in Los Angeles Times, December 1, 2008. 29. Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004); Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research Centre of Excellence, Quaid-i-Azam University, 2007). 30. Ainslee Embree, ‘‘The Discovery of Pakistan in American Academia,’’ in New Perspectives on Pakistan: Visions for the Future, Saeed Shafqat, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 31. See, for example, M. D. Zafar, ‘‘A Textbook of Pakistan Studies,’’ in The Subtle Subversion: The State of Curricula and Textbooks in Pakistan. A Civil Society Initiative in Curricula and Textbooks Reform, A. H. Nayyar and Ahmed Salim, eds. (Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute, 2003); Pakistan. Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research Centre of Excellence, Quaid-i-Azam University, 2007); Aitzaz Ahsan, The Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). See also discussions in F. S. Aijazuddin, ‘‘Two Halves Did Not Make a Whole: Pakistan Before and After Bangladesh,’’ in Developing Cultures: Case Studies, L. E. Harrison and P. L. Berger, eds. (New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2006), 199–216; and S. A. Kochanek, ‘‘The Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan (Book Review),’’ Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 36 (1) (1998): 126–7. 32. Andrew Lawler, ‘‘Indus Collapse: The End or the Beginning of an Asian Culture?’’ Science: 320 (2008): 1280–3. For a discussion about controversies

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surrounding the origins of Hinduism, see also Guy Welbon, ‘‘Hindu Beginnings: Assessing the Period 1000 BCE to 300 CE,’’ Education About Asia 9(2) (2004): 31–8. 33. Alan Palmer, ‘‘Cradle of Civilisation,’’ in Insight Guide: Pakistan (Discovery Channel), ed. T. Halliday (Long Island City: APA Publications, 2007). 34. Andrew Lawler, ‘‘Boring No More—A Trade-Savvy Indus Emerges,’’ Science 320 (2008): 1276–81. 35. Palmer, ‘‘Cradle of Civilisation.’’ 36. Shamim Akram, ‘‘Antiquities from 1st Century AD Discovered in Pakistan,’’ in Pakistan Times, November 24, 2004. 37. Palmer, ‘‘Cradle of Civilisation.’’ 38. Phillippa Vaughan, ‘‘History of Islam in the Indian Subcontinent,’’ in Islam: Art and Architecture, eds. M. Hattstein and P. Delius (Cologne, Franc: K€ onemann Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, 2004), 454. 39. Thomas W. Lentz and Glenn D. Lowry, Timur and the Princely Vision: Persian Art and Culture in the Fifteenth Century (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989), 25; Phillippa Vaughan, ‘‘History of Islam in the Indian Subcontinent,’’ in Islam: Art and Architecture, eds. M. Hattstein and P. Delius (Cologne, Franc: K€ onemann Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, 2004). 40. Lentz and Vaughn. 41. Lentz, 28. 42. Lentz, 30. 43. ‘‘Mughal’’ means ‘‘Mongol’’ in Arabic and Persian and refers to a branch of the Mongol empire. 44. Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research Centre of Excellence, Quaid-iAzam University, 2007), 16. 45. Vaughn, 563; Khan, 5. 46. Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 20. 47. Waseem, 60. 48. Khan, 6–7; Cohen, 13. 49. Khan, 7. 50. Cohen, 24. 51. Waseem, 64. 52. Waseem, 30. 53. David Page, 17. 54. Saeed Shafqat, ‘‘Introduction,’’ New Perspectives on Pakistan: Visions for the Future (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 55. Cohen, 25. 56. An Indian Muslim living in Cambridge, England, Choudhary Rahmat Ali presented a concept of a separate Muslim state and came up with the name ‘‘Pakistan,’’ which means ‘‘land of the pure,’’ in Persian but was an amalgamation of letters of the provinces that had large Muslim Populations: Punjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Balochistan. See Cohen, 26. 57. Sikandar Hayat, ‘‘Jinnah, Charisma, and State Formation in Pakistan,’’ in New Perspectives on Pakistan: Visions for the Future ed. Saeed Shafqat (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 27.

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58. Sikandar Hayat, ‘‘Jinnah, Charisma, and State Formation in Pakistan,’’ in New Perspectives on Pakistan: Visions for the Future, ed. Saeed Shafqat (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 27. 59. Waseem, 789. 60. Nayyar, 36. 61. Sanaullah Baloch. The Balochistan Conflict: Towards a Lasting Peace (Bradford, UK: Pakistan Security Research Unit of the University of Bradford Department of Peace Studies, 2007). More than 5,000 Baloch militants and at least 3,000 military personnel were killed in the 1973–1977 insurgency; International Crisis Group. Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan (International Crisis Group, 2006). 62. Kashmiris have criticized this agreement for failing to acknowledge the possibility of independence for Kashmir rather than allegiance with either neighbor. See Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and its Resolution (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998). 63. Ahsan, in Page. 64. Tariq Rahman, Language and Politics in Pakistan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 65. Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005). 66. Khan, 467–73. 67. Mukulika Banerjee, The Pathan Unarmed: Opposition & Memory in the North West Frontier (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 2000). 68. Statistics Division of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Statistics, Pakistan National Census (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1998). This is among the world’s largest refugee populations in the world. The current population of Afghan refugees in Pakistan is now estimated at over three million; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Census of Afghans in Pakistan. (Islamabad, Pakistan: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2005). 69. Frederic Grare. ‘‘Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism.’’ In South Asia Papers: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006. 70. Scholars of Pakistan and Pakistanis usually refer to Pakistan’s Pushtuns as ‘‘Pathans,’’ the term used by the British during the colonial period. However, ethno-nationalist movements aimed at unifying the tribes as ‘‘Pushtunistan’’ use the former term, and with the strengthening of cross-border ties with Afghanistan, it seems that Pakistani Pathans increasingly use the term ‘‘Pushtuns’’ to describe themselves. 71. Mukulika Banerjee. The Pathan Unarmed: Opposition & Memory in the North West Frontier (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press, 2000). 72. Aryn Baker, ‘‘The Truth About Talibanistan.’’ TIME, March 22, 2007. 73. Jamal Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan (Lahore, Pakistan: Vanguard Books, 1996). The number of madrasas was 137 at independence in 1947 and had reached anywhere from 13,000 to 45,000 by 2001, with an enrollment of 1.7 million. See Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (Lahore: Vanguard Books and Singer, 2007); Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education Not Jihad, Analysis Paper 14 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution).

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74. An Argentine company, Bridas, and a consortium of companies from the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Japan, and South Korea, led by the American company, UNOCAL, competed for contracts as early as 1996, until growing international outrage at Taliban policies, particularly its sheltering of Osama bin Laden after the Al-Qaeda bombings of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and the regime’s treatment of women, made the deal untenable. See, for example, Neamatollah Nojumi, The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 198–9. 75. See, for example, Nazish Brohi. The MMA Offensive: Three Years in Power 2003–2005 (Islamabad: ActionAid International-Pakistan, 2006). 76. Clay Ramsay, Steven Kull, Stephen Weber, and Evan Lewis. Pakistani Public Opinion on the Swat Conflict, Afghanistan, and the US (Washington, DC: University of Maryland Program on International Policy Attitudes, 2009). 77. Shamila N. Chaudhary. ‘‘Foreign Feminists: The Role of Feminists and the Women’s Movement in Pakistan.’’ In New Perspectives on Pakistan: Visions for the Future, ed. S. Shafqat (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007: 238–251). 78. Amjad Mahmood Khan. ‘‘Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan: An Analysis Under International Law and International Relations’’ (Harvard Human Rights Journal 16, 2003: 217–244). 79. The Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) was developed by Boston University psychology professor, Dr. Kathleen Malley-Morrison, and a group of international researchers whose chief interest is investigating and assessing international and cross-cultural perspectives on various forms of aggression. See http://people.bu.edu/jdgmnts/ for further information. 80. ‘‘Hong Kong-Based Rights Body Urges UN Human Rights Council to Act as Thousands Remain Forcibly Disappeared in Pakistan,’’ in Pakistan Press International, September 4, 2007.

Chapter 3 1. Burton Stein, A History of India (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 38. 2. Thomas Thompson, ‘‘An Ancient Stateless Civilization: Bronze Age India and the State in History,’’ The Independence Review 5 (Winter 2006): 365. 3. Thompson, 367. 4. Stein, 38, 49. 5. Stein, 16, 38. 6. Stein, 38. 7. Stein, 59. 8. Stein, 67. 9. Stein, 38. 10. Stein, 65. 11. Sagarika Dutt, ‘‘Identities and the Indian State: An Overview,’’ Third World Quarterly 19 (September 1999): 423.

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12. Dutt, 415. 13. Stein, 78. 14. Stein, 15, 75. 15. Stein, 38. 16. Stein, 78. 17. Stein, 38. 18. Stein, 90. 19. Stein, 38. 20. Stein, 17, 96. 21. Dutt, 416. 22. Stein, 106. 23. Dutt, 416. 24. Dipankar Gupta, ‘‘Citizens versus People: The Politics of Majoritarianism and Marginalization in Democratic India,’’ Sociology of Religion 68 (2007): 29. 25. Dutt, 417. 26. Stein, 27. 27. Stein, 106. 28. Peter Ackerman and Jack Duvall, ‘‘India: Movement for Self-Rule,’’ in A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 67. 29. Ackerman and Duvall, 68. 30. Stein, 106. 31. Ackerman and Duvall, 68. 32. Sumit Ganguly, ‘‘Wars without End: the Indo-Pakistani Conflict,’’ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 541 (September 1995): 169. 33. D. L. Sheth, ‘‘Democracy and Globalization in India: Post-Cold War Discourse,’’ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 540 (July 1995): 26. 34. Dutt, 418. 35. Stein, 230. 36. Dutt, 418. 37. Stein, 32. 38. Dutt, 419. 39. Stein, 230. 40. Dutt, 418. 41. Stein, 230. 42. Dutt, 418. 43. Ackerman and Duvall, 72. 44. Ackerman and Duvall, 65. 45. Howard Spodek, ‘‘On the Origins of Gandhi’s Political Methodology: The Heritage of Kathiawad and Guajarat,’’ The Journal of Asian Studies 30 (February 1971): 361. 46. Ackerman and Duvall, 62. 47. Spodek, 372; Ackerman and Duvall, 72. 48. Ackerman and Duvall, 87. 49. Stein, 230. 50. Stein, 32.

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51. Stein, 230. 52. Ackerman and Duvall, 109. 53. Stein, 230. 54. Sheth, 27. 55. Sheth, 28. 56. Stein, 230. 57. Sheth, 27. 58. Stein, 230. 59. Dutt, 426. 60. Stein, 230. 61. Gupta, 38. 62. Stein, 230. 63. Runa Das, ‘‘Postcolonial (In)Securities, the BJP and the Politics of Hindutva: Broadening the Security Paradigm between the Realist and AntiNuclear/Peace Groups in India,’’ Third World Quarterly 24 (February 2003): 77–96. 64. Sheth, 27. 65. Alexander Murphy, ‘‘Historical Justifications for Territorial Claims,’’ Annals of the Association of American Geographers 80 (December 1990): 539. 66. Michael Beibert, ‘‘The Struggle for Kashmir (Continued),’’ World Policy Institute 24 (Spring 2007): 24. 67. Shakti Bhatt, ‘‘State Terrorism vs. Jihad in Kashmir,’’ Journal of Contemporary Asia 33 (2003): 216. 68. Ganguly, 170. 69. Beibert, 24. 70. Ganguly, 170. 71. Beibert, 24. 72. Albert Cantril, ‘‘The Indian Perception of the Sino-Indian Border Clash,’’ The Public Opinion Quarterly 28 (Summer 1964): 234. 73. Ganguly, 172. 74. Ganguly, 173. 75. Ganguly, 174. 76. Ganguly, 168. 77. Ganguly, 175. 78. Ganguly, 176. 79. Beibert, 24. 80. Dutt, 420. 81. Sheth, 28. 82. Dutt, 428. 83. Sheth, 30. 84. Dutt, 431. 85. Sheth, 29. 86. Sheth, 24. 87. Stein, 230. 88. Dutt, 425. 89. Sheth, 25; Ackerman and Duvall, 70. 90. Dutt, 421, 427.

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91. Dutt, 423. 92. Deepa Reddy, ‘‘The Ethnicity of Caste,’’ Anthropological Quarterly 78 (Summer 2005): 544. 93. Reddy, 548; Dutt, 424. 94. Sheth, 25; Dutt, 422; Gupta, 29. 95. Reddy, 544. 96. Dutt, 413. 97. R. C. Adhikary, ‘‘The Present Religious Situation in India,’’ The Journal of Religion 6 (March 1926): 165. 98. Adhikary, 163. 99. Dutt, 413. 100. Adhikary, 171. 101. Stein, 65. 102. Stein, 67. 103. Adhikary, 171. 104. Stein, 17. 105. Adhikary, 168. 106. Stein, 17. 107. Sheth, 26. 108. Adhikary, 169. 109. Adhikary, 170. 110. Stein, 17. 111. Murphy, 536. 112. Dutt, 417. 113. R. K. Raghavan, ‘‘The Indian Police: Problems and Prospects,’’ Publius 33 (Fall 2003): 123. 114. Dutt, 427. 115. Bhatt, 215. 116. Beibert, 24, 117. Raghavan, 122. 118. Raghavan, 125. 119. Raghavan, 120. 120. Raghavan, 120; Beibert, 24. 121. Dutt, 427. 122. Beibert, 24. 123. Tess Eastment and Saeed Ahmed, ‘‘Group Claims Responsibility for India Blasts,’’ http://www.cnn.com, May 15, 2008. 124. Ganguly, 173. 125. Dutt, 420. 126. Raghavan, 125. 127. Dutt, 420. 128. Murphy, 543. 129. Gupta, 27. 130. Gupta, 28. 131. Murphy, 545. 132. Amartya Sen, ‘‘Gandhi Values and Terrorism,’’ ETC 65 (January 2008): 77.

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Chapter 4 1. The authors acknowledge the survey translators (Cora Lalu Santos, Marco Anlano V. Lopez); data translators (Ernesto Paul Gongora, Paz Mendoza, and Alpha Paradela); student assistants (Camila Nacpil, Ma. Cristina Taroy); recruitment team (Jose Estuar, Justina Esguerra, Brother Jody Magtoto, S.J.; Brother Raymond Sanchez, S.J.; Aimee Avancena, OFW group); and James Hanmi Oh. 2. Damon L. Woods, The Philippines, A Global Studies Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2006), 1–3. 3. Nyryan E-V. Nolido, ‘‘Republika ng pilipinas, the Philippines’’ in International Perspectives on Family Violence and Abuse: A Cognitive Ecological Approach (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004), 339–40. 4. Tomas D. Andres and Pilar Corazon B. Ilada-Andres, Understanding the Filipino (Quezon City, Philippines: New Day Publishers, 1987), 3. 5. Woods, 27–31. 6. Woods, 34. 7. E. J. R. David and Sumie Okazaki, ‘‘Colonial Mentality: A Review and Recommendation for Filipino American Psychology,’’ Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology 12(1) (2006): 1–16. 8. Guena€el Mettraux, ‘‘U.S. Courts-Martial and the Armed Conflict in the Philippines (1899–1902): Their Contribution the National Case Law on War Crimes,’’ Journal of International Criminal Justice 1(1) (2003): 135–50. 9. Luzviminda Francisco, ‘‘The Philippine-American War,’’ in The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance, eds. Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1987), 17–9. 10. Francisco. 11. Francisco. 12. Mettraux, 148. 13. Mettraux, 153. 14. Eric Weiner, ‘‘Waterboarding: a Tortured History,’’ NPR, November 3, 2007. 15. Stephen R. Shalom, ‘‘Counter-Insurgency in the Philippines,’’ in The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance, eds. Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1987), 117–20. 16. Shalom, 123. 17. Nadeau, 68–9. 18. David Joel Steinberg, ‘‘Philippine Collaboration in World War II,’’ in The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance, eds. Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1987), 76–9. 19. Woods, 67–9. 20. Nadeau, 83. 21. Nadeau, 85. 22. Woods, 71.

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23. Nadeau, 86. 24. Nadeau, 90–1. 25. Nadeau. 26. Nadeau, 104–6. 27. Nadeau, 108. 28. The United Nations, ‘‘United Nations 2008 Statistical Update: Philippines,’’ United Nations, http://hdrstats.undp.org/2008/countries/country_fact_sheets/ cty_fs_PHL.html. 29. United Nations. 30. N.L. Abaya, ‘‘Democracy, National Security and Foreign Policy: A Philippine Perspective’’ (paper presented at the annual international meeting for the Institute for National Strategic Studies: Pacific Symposia, Washington, DC, June 8–10, 2005). 31. Woods, 73. 32. Margarita M. Frederico, ‘‘Building Community Following Displacement due to Armed Conflict,’’ International Social Work 50(2) (2007): 171–84. 33. Woods, 159–61. 34. Nadeau, 107. 35. Amnesty International, ‘‘The Human Cost of Armed Conflict in the Philippines,’’ Amnesty International, http://www.amnestyusa.org/all-countries/ philippines/page.do?id=1011222. 36. Woods, 73, 75, 87. 37. Andrew Marshall, ‘‘A Philippine Shame,’’ Time, http://www.time.com/ time/magazine/article/0,9171,501061127-1561201,00.html. 38. Amnesty International. 39. Asian Human Rights Campaign, ‘‘Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines,’’ Asian Human Rights Campaign, http://www.pinoyhr.net/list_killed.php. 40. Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘‘For Sixth Straight Year, Iraq Deadliest Nation for Press,’’ http://cpj.org/reports/2008/12/for-sixth-straight-year-iraqdeadliest-nation-for.php. 41. Marshall. 42. Alberto Thea, ‘‘Melo: Commission Report ‘Complete’,’’ Philippine Daily Inquirer, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php? article_id=49657. 43. Marshall. 44. Thea. 45. Frederico, 180. 46. Amnesty International. 47. T. N. Headland and J. D. Headland, ‘‘Limitation of Human Rights, Land Exclusion, and Tribal Exclusion: the Agta Negritos of the Philippines,’’ Human Organization 56(1) (1997) 79–90. 48. Frederico, 177. 49. Frederico, 178. 50. Miriam Coronel Ferrer and Antonette Raquiza, ‘‘Motions for Peace: A Summary of Events Related to Negotiating Communist Insurgency in the Philippines 1986–1992,’’ Metro Manila, 1993.

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51. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, ‘‘State of the Nation Address of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,’’ The Official Website of the Republic of the Philippines, http://www.gov.ph/sona/sonatext2006.asp. 52. Lira Dalangin-Fernandez, ‘‘Arroyo Signs Amnesty Proclamation for Communists,’’ Philippine Daily Inquirer, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/ nation/view_article.php?article_id=87233. 53. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, ‘‘State of the Nation Address of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,’’ The Official Website of the Republic of the Philippines, http://www.gov.ph/sona/sonatext2007.asp. 54. Macapagal-Arroyo, 2007. 55. Jerome Aning, ‘‘Protesting Sumilao Farmers Reach Manila,’’ Philippine Daily Inquirer, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/regions/view_article.php?article_id=104586. 56. GMANews.TV, ‘‘CARP Still Alive Even without Funding, DOJ Chief Says,’’ GMA News TV, http://www.gmanews.tv/story/142298/CARP-stillalive-even-without-funding-DOJ-chief-says. 57. Nadeau, 107. 58. Daniel J. Christie et al., ‘‘Peace Psychology for a Peaceful World,’’ American Psychologist 63(6) (2008): 543, 546. 59. Kathleen Malley-Morrison and Denise A. Hines, Family Violence in a Cultural Perspective: Defining, Understanding, and Combating Abuse (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004), 20. 60. Guy Elcheroth, ‘‘Individual-Level and Community-Level Effects Of War Trauma On Social Representations Related To Humanitarian Law,’’ European Journal of Social Psychology 36(6) (2006) 907–25. 61. Cristina Jayme Montiel, ‘‘Political Psychology of Nonviolent Demoncratic Transitions in Southeast Asia,’’ Journal of Social Issues 62(1) (2006), 173–90. 62. Ed Garcia, Ed Legaspi, and Karen Tanada, ‘‘Waging Peace in the Philippines: Looking Back, Moving Forward,’’ Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institue (GZOPI) and United Nations Development Programme, Metro Manila, 2003.

Chapter 5 1. Richard Elson, The Idea of Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 2. Max Lane, Unfinished Nation: Indonesia Before and After Suharto (London and New York: Verso, 2008), 11, 12. 3. Adrian Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), 10. 4. Lane, 11, 12. 5. Vickers, 36. 6. John Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 296. 7. Vickers, 100. 8. Robert Cribb, The Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966: Studies from Java and Bali. (Melbourne: Monash University Press, 1990), 1–43.

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9. Cribb, 7. 10. Vickers, 158. 11. Vickers, 163. 12. Vickers, 171. 13. Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Bumi manusia (Melak: Wira Karya, 1981); Anak semua bangsa: sebuah roman (Jakarta: Hasta Mira, 1980); Jejak langkah (Jakarta: Hasta Mira, 1985); Rumah kaca (Kuala Lumpur: Wira Karya, 1990). 14. Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights. Volume 1. The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism (Sydney: Hale and Ironmonger, 1980). 15. John Saltford, The United Nations and the Indonesia Takeover of West Papua, 1962–1969: The Anatomy of Betrayal (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 141–77. 16. Robin Osborne, Indonesia’s Secret War: The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1985). 17. Clinton Fernandes, Reluctant Indonesians: Australia, Indonesia and the Future of West Papua (Melbourne: Scribe Short Books, 2004), 115, 116. 18. Colin Brown, A Short History of Indonesia: The Unlikely Nation? (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2003), 242. 19. Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, The War Against East Timor (London: Zed Books, 1984), 15–95. 20. Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR), Chega! The Final Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in Timor Leste. (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2006), 54–111. 21. Brown, 203. 22. Michael Morfitt, ‘‘The Road to Helsinki: The Aceh Agreement and Indonesia’s Democratic Development,’’ International Negotiation 12(1) (2007): 111–43. 23. Syafuan Rozi Soebhan, ‘‘Mendorong Gerakan Multikultural di Indonesia’’ (Encouraging the Multicultural Movement in Indonesia) Jurnal Masyarakat Indonesia 29(1) (2003): 79–99. 24. H. Schulte Nordholt, ‘‘A Genealogy of Violence,’’ in Roots of Violence in Indonesia, ed. F. Colombijn and Th. Lindblad (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002), 33–61. 25. United Nations General Assembly, Declaration of the Right of Peoples to Peace, resolution A/39/11 (New York: UNGA, 1984). 26. Brown. 27. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, New Edition (London and New York: Verson, 2006).

Chapter 6 1. We would like to thank Kathie Malley-Morrison and the GIPGAP research team at Boston University for their assistance with data analysis. 2. Dougald J. W. O’Reilly, Early Civilizations of Southeast Asia (New York: Altimira Press, 2007), 27–63.

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3. Barbra Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, A History of Malaysia (New York: St. Martins Press, 1982), 9. 4. O’Reilly, 36. 5. C. C. Brown, ‘‘Sejarah Melayu or Malay Annals,’’ JMBRAS 25 (2) (1952): 12. 6. Tome Pires, Francisco Rodrigues, and Armando Cortes~ ao, eds., The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires (London, England: Laurier Books Ltd., 1944). 7. I. A. MacGregor, ‘‘Notes on the Portuguese in Malaysia,’’ JMBRAS 28 (2) (1955): 5–125. 8. KA 3446 OB 1780 Gov. of Melaka to Batvia, 12 Feb. 1778. This is an official archived report from the Governor of Malaka to a consulate in Batvia written in 1778. It is archived in Malaysian historical documents. 9. Surah, 13:11. 10. Khoo Kay Kim, ‘‘Sino-Malay Relations in Penninsular Malaysia before 1942,’’ JSEAS 12 (1) (1981): 98–106. 11. Cheah Boon Keng, The Masked Comrades: A Study of the Communist United Front in Malaya, 1945–1948 (Singapore: Times Book International, 1979), 5. 12. R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia (Vancouver, Canada: Times Book International, 1978), 131. 13. Mahatir Mohamad, longtime leader of UMNO and a critical force in developing modern Malaysia, often cited this concept. For example, in his welcome speech at the 3rd International Seminar on Islamic Thought in Kuala Lumpur during the early 1980s, he said, ‘‘Allah does not change the fate of a society unless they make an effort to change it for themselves. Malaysia is built upon the power of learning, the quality of thrift and, above all else, the dignity of work.’’ Kho Bhoo Teil, Paradoxes of Mahathirism: An Intellectual Biography of Mahatir Mohamad (Singapore: Oxford Press, 1995). 14. CIA World Fact Book: ‘‘Malaysia,’’ https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/my.html (accessed December 22, 2008). 15. Jas Jaafar and Charlie Lewis, ‘‘Cultural and Individual Flexibility in Malay Adolescents’ Moral Reasoning’’ (paper presented at the 2nd International Conference on Child and Adolescent Mental Health, June 6–10, 2000). 16. Ben Thirkell-White, Chapter 4, ‘‘Political Islam and Malaysian Democracy’’ in Democratization in the Muslim World, eds. Frederic Volpi and Francesco Cavatorta (London: Routledge, 2007).

Chapter 7 1. United Nations Development Progamme, Human Development Report (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, for the United Nations Development Programme, 2007, 2008). 2. Michael H. Agar, The Professional Stranger: An Informal Introduction to Ethnography (New York: Academic Press, 1980). 3. Kenneth Boulding, Three Faces of Power (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1989), 150, 151.

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4. David H. Lawrence, Kangaroo (London: Penguin Books, 1981), 27. 5. James S. Page, ‘‘Is Mateship a Virtue?’’ Australian Journal of Social Issues 13(2) (2002): 193–200. 6. Australia. National Inquiry into Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families, Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families, Commissioner Ronald Wilson (Sydney: Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 1997). 7. Mabo and Others v Queensland (No.2)[1992] HCA 23; (1992) 175 CLR 1 (June 3, 1992). 8. Kevin Rudd, ‘‘Apology to Australia’s Indigenous Peoples’’ Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). House of Representatives, Commonwealth of Australia, February 13, 2008, 167–77. 9. Allan W. Martin, Robert Menzies: A Life. Volume 1: 1894–1943 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press), 284. 10. Thomas B. Millar, Australia’s Defence, 2nd ed (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965), 183. 11. Charles E. W. Bean, The Official History of Australians in the War of 1914– 1918, Volume 2: From 4 May 1915 to the Evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula (St. Lucia: Queensland University Press, 1981), 910. 12. Jock Phillips, ‘‘War Memorials,’’ in The Oxford Companion to Australian History, ed. Graeme Davison, John Hirst, and Stuart MacIntyre (South Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 675. 13. Ken Inglis, Sacred Places: War Memorials in the Australian Landscape, 3rd ed. (Carlton: University of Melbourne Press, 2008). 14. Michael McGirr, Bypass: The Story of a Road (Sydney: Picador Pan Macmillan, 2004), 245–6. 15. Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. 9 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), 322. 16. Lewis F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity (New York: Quadrangle, 1960), 232. 17. United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, resolution 260 A III (New York: UNGA, 1948). 18. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (San Francisco: United Nations, 1945). 19. United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace, resolution A/39/11 (New York: UNGA, 1984). 20. Douglas Roche, The Human Right to Peace (Ottowa: Novalis, 2003). 21. Seville Group, Seville Statement on Violence (Paris: UNESCO, 1989). 22. United Nations General Assembly, Programme and Declaration of Action for a Culture of Peace, resolution A/53/243 (New York: UNGA, 1999). 23. James S. Page, ‘‘The Australian National Commission for UNESCO: Some Proposals for Reform,’’ Australian Journal of Public Administration 61(3) (2002): 106–12. 24. Judith Ryan and Chris Wallace-Crabbe, eds., Imagining Australia: Literature and Culture in the New New World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).

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Chapter 8 1. Nancy Donnelly, Changing Lives of Refugee Hmong Women (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994). 2. U.S. Bureau of the Census. Educational Attainment, Data Set: Census 2000, Summary File 4. Prepared by the Housing and Household Economic Statistics Division, Bureau of the Census, Washington, DC, 2000. 3. Keith Quincy, Harvesting Pa Chay’s Wheat: The Hmong and America’s Secret War in Laos (Spokane: Eastern Washington University Press, 2000). 4. Quincy, Harvesting, 126. 5. Jane Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans and the Secret War for Laos, 1942–1992 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993). 6. Keith Quincy, Hmong: History of a People. (Spokane: Eastern Washington University Press, 1988), 101. 7. Quincy, Hmong, 80–1. 8. A. Kagee, ‘‘Conducting Research with South African Survivors of Human Rights Violations: Some Considerations,’’ International Journal for the Advancement of Counseling 26 (2) (2004): 191–202. 9. Donnelly, 73. 10. Donnelly, 73. 11. Donnelly, 31–2. 12. Donnelly, 93–4. 13. A. Kagee and A. V. Naidoo, ‘‘Reconceptualizing the Sequelae of Political Torture: Limitations of a Psychiatric Paradigm,’’ Transcultural Psychiatry 41 (1) (2004): 46–61. 14. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 2000).

Chapter 9 1. John King Fairbank, China: A New History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). 2. Fairbank. 3. Department of State, ‘‘Country Background Notes,’’ www.state.gov, updated October 2008. 4. Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2004). 5. Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1991), 416. 6. Spence. 7. Dali Yang, Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change Since the Great Leap Famine (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 38.

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8. Lorenz M. L€ uthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). 9. Lieberthal. 10. Lieberthal. 11. Department of State, ‘‘Country Background Notes,’’ www.state.gov, updated October 2008. 12. Spence, 417. 13. Department of State, www.state.gov. 14. Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower: How China’s Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 15. Yingyi Qian, Remarks at the opening dinner of the 57th plenary meeting of the Group of Thirty, Hangzhou, China, April 27, 2008. 16. Yingyi Qian. 17. Dingxin Zhao, The Power of Tiananmen: State-Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001). 18. Department of State, ‘‘Country Background Notes,’’ www.state.gov, updated October 2008. 19. Department of State, www.state.gov. 20. Department of State, www.state.gov. 21. Department of State, www.state.gov. 22. Department of State, www.state.gov. 23. Air Force Historical Research Agency, ‘‘The US Air Force’s First War: Korea 1950–1953,’’ http://afhra.maxwell.af.mil/korean_war/korean_war_chronology/kwc_october1950.html. 24. Kathleen Malley-Morrison, Maria Daskalopoulos, Julia Gefter, Julia Wenger, and Kyleen Hashim, ‘‘International Perspectives on War and Peace,’’ Peace Psychology 15, no. 1 (2006): 6–7. 25. Edward Cody, ‘‘China Grows More Wary Over Rash of Protests: Cell Phones, Internet Spread the Word, Magnify Fallout,’’ The Washington Post, August 10, 2005, online edition. It should be noted that the article stresses that these protests are often over smaller scale economic demands, rather than broad political protests. 26. Howard W. French, ‘‘News Analysis: In China, Anti-Japan Protests Echo Past: Demonstrations Revive Cultural Revolution Strife,’’ International Herald Tribune, April 22, 2005, online edition.

Chapter 10 1. Mi-Sung Kim’s grandmother, aged 79, recalling her war experiences. 2. John Feffer, North Korea/South Korea: U. S. Policy at a Time of Crisis (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003), 21; Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War before Vietnam (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986), 3–17, 36. 3. Geir Helgesen, Democracy and Authority in Korea (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 43–5.

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4. Gi-Wook Shin, Won Park Soon, and Yang Daqing, eds., Rethinking Historical Injustice and Reconciliation in Northeast Asia (New York: Routledge, 2007), no page assigned. The idea comes from the editors’ introductory comments. 5. Andrew C. Nahm, ‘‘Korea. Tradition and Transformation,’’ in A History of the Korean People (Elizabeth, New Jersey: Hollym Publishers, 1988), as cited in Helgesen, Legacies, 22–3. 6. Man-gil Kang, A History of Contemporary Korea (Kent: Global Oriental, 2005), 11–7. 7. Kang, 20–2. 8. Kang; C. Sarah Soh, ‘‘Japan’s National/Asian Women’s Funds for ‘Comfort Women’,’’ Pacific Affairs 76 (2003): 209–33. 9. Feffer, 27. 10. Feffer, 20. 11. Feffer, 30. 12. Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Death of the Republic of Korea, A Hard Journey to Justice: First Term Report by Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths of the Republic of Korea (Seoul: Samin Books, 2004), 35–8. 13. Feffer, 57. 14. Roy Richard Grinker, Korea and Its Futures: Unification and the Unfinished War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 225–55. 15. Tai-hwan Kwon and Wan-sang Han, ‘‘Changing Situational Perceptions and Social Transformation in Korea: A Comparative Analysis of Two Recent Surveys on Socio-Political Issues,’’ Korean Journal 29, no. 9 (1989): as cited in Helgesen, Legacies, 45. 16. Kwon and Han. 17. Feffer, 48–50; Kun Young Park, ‘‘Engagement Policy and Thawing of Cold War Structure on the Korean Peninsula,’’ in Korean Politics: Striving for Democracy and Unification, ed. Korean National Commission for UNESCO, 529 (New Jersey: Hollym Corporation, 2002). 18. Sungho Kim, ‘‘Change and Prospects of Inter-Korea Exchange and Cooperation: Policy Data,’’ North Korean Transport Monitor 5, no. 1 (2007): 8–15. 19. Feffer, 50–1. 20. Helgesen, 72. 21. Helgesen, 91–3. 22. Helgesen, 42. 23. Presidential Truth Commission, 53–5. 24. Presidential Truth Commission, 55–8. 25. Presidential Truth Commission, 59; Jong C. Kim, ‘‘Long-Term Prisoners as the Non-converted from Communism and Democratization Activities,’’ Shindonga, August, 2004, http://www.donga.com/. 26. U. S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ‘‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices–2007: Korea, Republic of,’’ http://www.state.gov/ g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100525.htm. 27. Republic of Korea, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, http://jinsil.go. kr/intro/index.asp.

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28. Mikyung Jang and Mi-Sung Kim, ‘‘Korea,’’ in International Perspectives on Family Violence and Abuse, ed. Kathleen Malley-Morrison (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004), 304. 29. James Sterngold, ‘‘South Korea’s Vietnam Veterans Begin to Be Heard,’’ The New York Times, May 10, 1992, online edition. 30. ‘‘South Korean Troops’ Involvement in Vietnam War,’’ http://www.vetkor.com/vietkor.html. 31. Sterngold. 32. Korean National Archives Portal Service, ‘‘Involvement in the Vietnam War and Veterans Affairs,’’ http://contents.archives.go.kr/. 33. ‘‘Korean Veterans of the Vietnam War,’’ http://mcel.pacificu.edu/as/students/koreavet/home. 34. Sterngold. 35. White Badge, VHS, directed by Ji-yeoung Jung (Seoul: Daeil Film, 1992). 36. South Korean Ministry of National Defense, ‘‘The Fact of the Dispatch of South Korean Forces Overseas,’’ http://jcs.mil.kr/views/html/dispatch/ dispatch.html. 37. Eul Chul Lim, ‘‘South Korean Distress of Sending Its Troops to the Iraq War,’’ Hankyoreh 21, no. 378 (2001), http://h21.hani.co.kr/section021037000/ 2001/09/021037000200109260378065.html. 38. Kyung R. Kim, ‘‘Opinion Poll on the Reduction of U.S. Forces in Korea and the Dispatch of Korean Troops to the Iraq War,’’ Pressian, June 9, 2004, http://www.pressian.com/scripts/section/article.asp?article_num=20040609090751& s_menu=percentEFpercentBFpercentBDpercentC4percentA1. 39. Christopher W. Hughes, ‘‘Why Japan Could Revise Its Constitution and What It Would Mean for Japanese Security Policy,’’ Orbis 50 (2006): 725–44. 40. Howard W. French, ‘‘North Korean Nuclear Talks Fail to Set Disarmament Timetable, but Yield Agreement on Goals,’’ The New York Times, July 20, 2007, online edition. 41. Hyun-back Chung, recorded by Jei Hun Lee, ‘‘Discourse for building a Peace Museum,’’ The Internet Hankyoreh, November 5, 2003, http://www.hani. co.kr/section-005000000/2003/11/p005000000200311052150059.html; S. Min Do, ‘‘8 of 10 Korean Teachers Thought That Current Reunification Education Is Problematic,’’ Voice of America, November 7, 2005, http://www.voanews.com/ korean/archive/2005-11/2005-11-07-voa8.cfm. 42. Do. 43. S. Ho Bae, ‘‘On the Way Going to Education of Peace Reunification Beyond Anti-communism.’’ Korea University Graduate News, May 30, 2007, online edition. 44. Bae; Do. 45. Young S. Lee, ‘‘New Trend in Public Education: Namwon Middle School,’’ Jeminilbo, July 20, 2007, http://www.jemin.com/news/articlePrint. html?idxno=176781. 46. Myung H. Kim and Hwa S. Shin, ‘‘Pragmatic Approaches to Peace Education Programs in Kindergarten: With Focus on Montessori Theory,’’ Journal of

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Montessori-Education 7 (2002): 39–61; Hwa S. Shin, ‘‘Analysis of Kindergarten Teachers’ Level of Recognition of Peace Education Programs for Young Children: With Focus on Montessori Peace,’’ The Journal of Korea Open Association for Early Childhood Education 7 (2002): 297–341; Minsoo Choi and Kyungsook Moon, ‘‘The Effect of Peace Education Programs for Kindergarteners,’’ Journal of Future Early Childhood Education 11 (2004): 177–98; Jeong A. Ohm and Jisong Ahn, ‘‘Analysis of the stories related to peace education in the 5th and the 6th Curriculum for Early Childhood Education,’’ Korean Journal of Early Childhood Education 24 (2004): 33–53. 47. Hong-goo Han, recorded by Lee, November 5, 2003. 48. In S. Hwang, recorded by Lee, November 5, 2003. 49. Sam Y. Lee, ‘‘Philosophy of Peace Education and Its Implementation,’’ in Understanding of Modern Philosophy of Peace (Seoul: Hankilsa, 1992), 265–94; Byungheon Ko, ‘‘Tasks and Prospects of Peace Education,’’ in Symposium on Peace Education, Seoul (Seoul: Korean Education Research Institute, 1993), 50–70. 50. Johan Galtung, ‘‘Editorial,’’ Journal of Peace Research 1: 1–4. 51. Lim. 52. Mariana Barbosa, Carla Machado, Raquel Matos, Ana Barbeiro, Mi-Sung Kim, and Ting Wu, ‘‘Moral Disengagement in War and Peace: Portugal, the U. S., and Korea,’’ in Kathleen Malley-Morrison and Michael Corgan (Co-chairs), Moral Disengagement and Social Injustice-War and Peace, symposium at the meeting of American Psychological Association, Boston, MA, August 2008. 53. Birgit Brock-Utne, ‘‘Peace Education in an Era of Globalization,’’ Peace Review 12, no. 1 (2000): 131–8. 54. Dong Jin Jang, ‘‘Human Right Organizations and Movements in Korea,’’ Journal of Twenty-First Century Political Science Association 10, no. 2 (2000): 45–60. 55. National Association for Annulment of the National Security Law, http://freedom.jinbo.net. 56. U. S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, March 11, 2008. 57. Mariana Barbosa et al. 58. Daniel J. Christie, Barbara S. Tint, Richard V. Wagner, and Deborah DuNann Winter, ‘‘Peace Psychology for a Peaceful World,’’ American Psychologist 63, no. 6 (2008): 547.

Chapter 11 1. We thank very much Ciemone Rose, Northeastern Illinois University graduate assistant, for help with the library search and editing endnotes, and to Matt Grace, Stephanie Pavlos, Jeremy Peterman, Elizabeth Planje, and Danielle Rutigliano for help with coding and summarizing responses. 2. Kenneth Henshall, A History of Japan from Stone Age to Superpower (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999). 3. Don Nardo, Traditional Japan (San Diego: Lucent Books, Inc., 1995), 16. 4. Ask Asia.org, ‘‘Japanese History,’’ Asia Society, . 5. Ask Asia.org.

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6. Henshall, 5. 7. Department of Asian Art, ‘‘Art of the Edo Period (1615–1868),’’ in Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History (New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art 2000), http://metmuseum.org (accessed October 2003). 8. Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present (New York: Knopf Publishing. 1964), 63–64. 9. Mary Elizabeth Berry, ‘‘Public Peace and Private Attachment: The Goals and Conduct of Power in Early Modern Japan,’’ Journal of Japanese Studies 12, no.2 (1986): 259. 10. Berry, 261–2. 11. Berry, 264–5. 12. Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present (New York: Knopf Publishing, 1964), 110–1. 13. Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan: Japan against Russia, 1939 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), 1009. 14. Reischauer, 140–1. 15. Wilson, 369. 16. Douglas Ford, ‘‘The Best Equipped Army in Asia? U.S. Military Intelligence and the Imperial Japanese Army before the Pacific War, 1919–1941,’’ International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21 (2008): 86 (accessed August 2008). 17. Eric J. Sundquist, ‘‘The Japanese American Internment: A Reappraisal,’’ The American Scholar (2001): 536. 18. Sadao Asada. ‘‘Between the Old Diplomacy and the New, 1918–1922: The Washington System and the Origins of Japanese-American Rapprochement,’’ Diplomatic History 30, no. 2 (2006): 213. 19. Ford, 91. 20. Rex Shelley, Teo Chuu Yong, and Russell Mok, Cultures of the World: Japan (New York: Benchmark Books, 2001), 23. 21. Lindsley Cameron and Masao Miyoshi, ‘‘Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the World Sixty Years Later.’’ Virginia Quarterly Review 81, no. 4 (2005): 28, 46. 22. Jennifer A. Winther, ‘‘Household Renumeration in National Discourse: Three Moments in Modern Japanese History,’’ Social Science History 32, no. 1 (2008): 35–6. 23. Reischauer, 205. 24. ‘‘Atomic Bombing of Japan Ends World War II,’’ World News Digest (1945), http://www.2facts.com. 25. Roger Dingman, ‘‘Anchor for Peace: The United States Navy in the Shaping of the Japanese Peace Settlement,’’ Japan Forum 15, no. 3 (2003): 384. 26. Dingman, 385. 27. Edward J. Lincoln, ‘‘Japan: Using Power Narrowly,’’ Washington Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2003): 112. 28. Richard Katz, ‘‘Helping Japanese Economic Reform,’’ The Washington Quarterly 23, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 135–8. 29. Lincoln, 118. 30. Lincoln, 119.

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31. Kansuke Nagaoka, ‘‘Views from the Far East on Middle East Peace,’’ Palestine–Israel Journal of Politics, Economics & Culture 13, no. 4 (2007): 65–7. 32. Cameron and Miyoshi, 40. 33. ‘‘North Korea says Japan using UN Missions for ‘Overseas aggression’,’’ Central Broadcasting Station (January 31, 2002): 45, http://www.monitor.bbc.co.uk. 34. Cameron and Miyoshi, 40. 35. ‘‘Foreign Affairs: Terms to Japan.’’ 36. Cameron and Miyoshi, 42. 37. Cameron and Miyoshi, 42. 38. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, ‘‘The Nanking 100-Man Killing Contest Debate: War Guilt Amid Fabricated Illusions, 1971–75,’’ Journal of Japanese Studies 26, no. 2 (2000): 307, http://www.jstor.org/stable/133271. 39. ‘‘Chinese Agency Decries Japanese Premier’s ‘Divine Nation’ View,’’ Xinhua News Agency Domestic Service-Beijing (May 22, 2000): 1, http://www.monitor.bbc.co.uk/. 40. ‘‘Foreign Affairs: Terms to Japan,’’ World News Digest (July 31, 1945), http://www.2facts.com. 41. Hirofumi Hayashi, ‘‘Disputes in Japan over the Japanese Military ‘Comfort Women’ System and Its Perception in History,’’ The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 617 (2008): 123–32, http://ann.sagepub. com/cgi/content/abstract/617/1/123. 42. Roger B. Jeans, ‘‘Victims or Victimizers? Museums, Textbooks, and the War Debate in Contemporary Japan,’’ Journal of Military History 69, no. 1 (2005): 149–50, 167. 43. Brian Niiya, ed., Japanese American History: An A-to-Z Reference from 1868 to the Present (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1993), 26. 44. Eric J. Sundquist, ‘‘The Japanese American Internment: A Reappraisal,’’ The American Scholar (2001): 530–1. 45. Niiya, 25. 46. Ronald T. Takaki, Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1989), 208. 47. Kitano, 18–9. 48. Niiya, 41. 49. Roger Daniels, ‘‘Incarceration of the Japanese Americans: A Sixty Year Perspective,’’ The History Teacher 34, no. 3 (2002): 35. 50. Niiya, 52. 51. Niiya, 52. 52. Niiya, 55. 53. Daniels, 304. 54. Sundquist, 541. 55. Daniels, 301. 56. Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (Washington DC, 1982), 166. 57. Kitano, 80. 58. Alice Murata, Japanese Americans in Chicago (Charleston SC: Acadia Publishing, 2002), 43.

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59. ‘‘Activism against Racial Injustice in Times of War,’’ Asian American Policy Review 13 (2004): 2. 60. David J. O’Brien and Stephen Fujita, The Japanese American Experience (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1991), 66. 61. Murata, 43. 62. Personal Justice Denied, 3. 63. Personal Justice Denied, 256. 64. Allan W. Austin, ‘‘Eastward Pioneers: Japanese American Resettlement during World War II and the Contested Meaning of Exile and Incarceration,’’ Journal of American Ethnic History 26, no. 2 (2007): 59. 65. Austin, 64. 66. Alice Murata, ‘‘Taking Root: Japanese Americans in Chicago,’’ RE-generations: Rebuilding Japanese American Families, Communities, and Civil Rights in the Resettlement Era (Los Angeles, CA: Japanese American National Museum, 2000), xxxv–xxxvi. 67. Austin, 64. 68. ‘‘Hy Spots on Sports,’’ Cincinnati JACL (August 19, 1946): 6. 69. Yasuko I. Takezawa, ‘‘Children of Inmates: The Effects of the Redress Movement Among Third Generation Japanese Americans,’’ Qualitative Sociology 14, no.1 (1991): 42, http://search.epnet.com. 70. Sundquist, 530. 71. Takezawa, 53. 72. Personal Justice Denied, 1. 73. Spickard, 156. 74. Mirko Bagaric and Julie Clarke, ‘‘Not Enough Official Torture in the World? The Circumstances in Which Torture is Morally Justifiable,’’ University of San Francisco Law Review, vol. 39, no, 3 (spring 2005): 581–616. 75. Daniel Greenberg, ‘‘Advise and Dissent: How anti-war protest movements have made the U.S. stronger.’’ It was published in Slate Magazine on March 26, 2003, www.slate.com/id/2080735.

Chapter 12 1. Parag Khanna, The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order (New York: Random House, 2008), 257–321. 2. David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005). David C. King, ‘‘Heirarchy, Balancing and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations,’’ International Security 28(3) (Winter 2003–2004), 165–80. 3. Robert Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils (Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). 4. Muthiah Algappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), x–xi; Bertrand Fort, ed., Overcoming Vulnerability: Managing New Security Challenges in Asia and Europe (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005), 30–2.

Notes

290

5. Eric Ringmar, The Mechanics of Modernity in Europe and East Asia: The Institutional Origins of Social Change and Stagnation (London: Routledge, 2004), 2. 6. Parag Khanna, The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order (New York: Random House, 2008). 7. Hikita Yasuyuku (ed.), Nanpo Kyoeiken: Senji Nippon no Tonan Ajia Keizai Shihai [Co-Prosperity Sphere in the Southern Regions: Japanese Economic Rule in Wartime Southeast Asia], Tokyo: Taga Shuppan, 1995, pp. 704–787.

An Integrative Conclusion for the Set 1. Henry IV, Part 2. Act IV, scene v, lines 212–5, in The Arden Shakespeare, ed. A. R Humphreys (London: Thomson), 155; 2003 reprint. 2. John Herz, ‘‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,’’ World Politics 2 (January 1950). 3. Countries omitted from this analysis because of unavailability of data included Egypt, Great Britain, Kuwait, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, and Turkey. 4. Countries omitted from analysis on this measure included Egypt, India, Israel, Peru, Saudi Arabia, U.S. (ethnic minority), U.S. (European majority), and Serbia. The authors of the chapters on these countries did not report actual percentages for the different types of argument, but they did indicate that the majority of respondents did not endorse a state’s right to torture. 5. Countries omitted from analysis on this measure included Egypt, Greece, Israel, Nicaragua, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and U.S. (ethnic minority). 6. For Great Britain, Sweden, U.S. (ethnic minority), Pakistan, and Israel data were not available on the national security measure. 7. Countries omitted from analysis on this measure included Egypt, France, Great Britain, Greece, Iraq, Nicaragua, Peru, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, and U.S. (ethnic minority).

Index

ABRI. See Angkatan Bersenjata Republic Indonesia (ABRI) Aceh War, 104 Act of Parliament (1858), 30 Act on Rehabilitation and Restitution for Persons Victimized in Connection with Democratization Movements, 189 Afghanistan, 17–19, 254; British relation with, 4; demographics, 3–4; independence, 4–5; invasion, public opinion on, 10–11; killing innocent civilians, public opinion on, 11, 15, 250; Mujahidin in, 6; peace, public opinion on, 13, 243, 244; reconciliation, public opinion on, 16–17; right to peace, public opinion on, 14; right to protest, public opinion on, 16, 249; Soviet Union and, 5–6; Taliban rule in, 6–7; terrorism, public opinion on, 10, 250; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 9–10, 11–12; tribal terminology and structure, 7–8; war, public opinion on, 9, 12–13; world peace, public opinion on, 14–16, 244 Agent Orange, 190 Agta (tribe), 85

Ahmad Badawi, Abdullah bin, 129 Akali Dal, 58 Alexander the Great, 3, 27, 53, 124, 125 Alien Land Law, 213 Alienation of Land Act (1900), 30 Al-Qaeda, 7, 68, 83, 89 ‘‘Alternative to Violence Project’’ workshops, 192 Amanullah, King, 4, 5 American Civil Liberties Union, 230 Amin, Hafizullah, 5 Amnesty International, 84, 90, 161 Amnesty Proclamation 1377, 86 Angkatan Bersenjata Republic Indonesia (ABRI), 102 Anglo-Afghan Wars, 4 Anti-Comintern Pact (1936), 209 Anzac Day, 140 ANZUS (Australian New Zealand and United States) Treaty, 141, 236 Aquino, Benigno, Jr., 82 Aquino, Corazon, 82 Armed Services of the Philippines, 82, 84 ARMM. See Autonomous Region of the Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Arthashastra, 53 Asian Human Rights Commission, 84

292 Aum Shinrikyo, 225 Australia, 109, 111, 137–8, 152–5, 240, 254; aboriginal people in, 139; culture of peace, 154; Gallipoli invasion, 140, 141; invasion, public opinion on, 144–5, 246; involvement in war, reasons for, 141–2; killing innocent civilians, public opinion on, 250; national security, public opinion on, 149–5, 253; need for peace education in, 153; participation in wars, 139; peace, public opinion on, 151–2, 243, 244; peaceful image of, 138–139; peacekeeping commitments of, 139–40; right to peace, public opinion on, 146–8, 152; right to protest, public opinion on, 148; terrorism, public opinion on, 146, 151; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 145–6; war, public opinion on, 150–51; world peace, public opinion on, 149, 244 Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, 140 Autonomous Region of the Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), 77, 83, 84, 97 Awami League, 35 Axis Pact (1940), 209 Balochistan, 23, 31–32, 36 Balochistan Liberation Army, 32 Bangladesh, 21, 60, 66 Banjarmasin War, 104 Battle of the Midway, 210 Bengali Language Movement, 35 Bhagavad Gita, 53 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 27, 58, 61, 63 Bhutto, Benazir, 22 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, 35, 60 bin Laden, Osama, 7, 26 BJP. See Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Blue Star Operation (1984), 67 Boer War (1899–1902), 139

Index Bonn Agreement, 7 Bougainville, 140 Boulding, Kenneth, 138 Bringing Them Home Report, 139 British: relation with Afghanistan, 4; relation with Pakistan, 29–30; rule in India, 54–56; rule in Malaysia, 125, 126, 128 British Raj, 4, 30, 54, 55, 56 Brown, Colin, 108, 119 Brown Memorandum (1966), 190 Buddha, Siddharta Gautama, 53 Buddhism, 27, 28, 53, 63, 64, 122, 208, 219, 237 Bushido Code, 230 Buzan, Barry, 259 Cabinet Mission Plan, 56 Cable Act (1922), 214 Cambodia, 140, 161, 175 CCP. See Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Charter of the United Nations, 145 Chiang Kai-shek, 171 China, 169, 183–4, 235–7, 240; dynastic period in, 169–70; economic growth, 173–4; end of dynastic period, 170–71; establishment of People’s Republic of China, 171; foreign relations, 175–6; Great Leap Forward, 171–2; human rights issue in, 174–5; invasion, public opinion on, 178, 246; killing innocent civilians, public opinion on, 179, 250; peace, public opinion on, 180, 243; Post-Mao, 173–4; relation with India, 59; relation with Malaysia, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128; relation with United States, 175–6; right to peace, public opinion on, 181, 246; right to protest, public opinion on, 181–2; Sino-Soviet Split, 172–3; terrorism, public opinion on, 179–80; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 178–9; war, public

Index opinion on, 179, 244; world peace, public opinion on, 182 China’s One Child Policy, 175 Chinese Civil War, 181 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 126, 128, 171, 173 Chinese Nationalist People’s Party, 171 Chomsky, Noam, 107 Christianity, 63, 64, 83, 88, 112, 123, 208 Civil Rights Act (1988), 217 Civil War (1971), 21 Cold War, 58, 67, 188, 235, 238, 259, 262 Commission for the Restoration of Honor and Compensation to Activists of the Democratization Movement, 189 Commission on the Wartime Relocation, 217 Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), 81 Community Agrarian Reform Program (1990), 87 Community and Family Services International (CFSI), 85–86 Conflict Resolution Peace Education Program, 192 Constitutional Jirga, 7 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 145 ‘‘Cosmopolistan,’’ 23, 24 CPP. See Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) CTBT, 58 Cultural Revolution, 171, 172–173, 181 Dalits, 63 Daoud, Sardar Mohammad, 5 Darfur, 140 Declaration on the Right of the Peoples of the World to Peace, 146 Deng Xiaoping, 173, 174

293 Dostam, Abdul Rashid, 6 Dowry Prohibition Act (1961), 57 Durand Line Agreement, 4, 36 Durrani, Ahmad Shah, 3, 4, 36 East India Company, 29, 30, 54 East Pakistan, 21, 31, 34, 35, 60 East Timor, annexation of, 109–10 Edo period, 208 Emergency Loya Jirga (2002), 7 Estrada, Joseph, 82, 95 Executive Order 9066, 214, 217 Federal Security Force (FSF), 35 Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), 23, 36 Filipino, 78–80, 82, 83, 85, 87–88, 92, 93, 96, 97, 99, 244, 245 First Indochina war, 160 442nd Regimental Combat Team, 215–16 Free Aceh Movement (GAM), 110–11 Free Papua Movement, 108 FSF. See Federal Security Force (FSF) Gandhi, Indira, 58, 60, 67 Gandhi, Mohandas, 31, 55–57, 70, 75 Gandhi, Rajiv, 58 Gallipoli peninsula, 140, 141 Geneva Accords, 6 Geneva Conventions, 43, 89, 98, 145, 223 Gentlemen’s Agreement (1907), 213 Ghaznavid Empire, 4, 28 GIPGAP. See Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP) Glenn, Edwin F., 80 Golkar, 107 Government of India Act, 55, 56, 73 Great Leap Forward (1958–1961), 171–2 Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. See Cultural Revolution Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 104

294 Green Revolution (1960), 57 Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP), 131, 241 Guantanamo Bay, 42, 223 Gulf War, 139, 190, 220 Habibie, Bacharuddin Jusuf, 109 Hankook Daily Newspaper, 191 Harappan civilization, 27, 52 Hawaiian Territorial Guard, 215 Heian Period, 208 Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin, 6 Helsinki Agreement, 110 Hindu Marriage Act (1955), 57 Hinduism, 52–53, 63, 122, 123 Hiroshima, 207, 210, 212, 220, 226 Hizako Hamada, 215 Hmongs: emotional response in witnessing violence, 167; French rule of, 160; invasion, opinion on, 162–3; killing innocent civilians, opinion on, 163; national security, opinion on, 164–5; origin of, 159; peace, opinion on, 164; reconciliation, opinion on, 164; right to peace, opinion on, 163; right to protest, opinion on, 164; torture, opinion on, 165–7; torturing prisoners, opinion on, 163; in United States, 159–60 Ho Chi Minh Trail, 160 Holt, John H., 259 Hu Jintao, 174 Hu Yaobeng, 174 Human Rights Practices and International Religious Freedom Reports (2007), 174 Hyundai Corporation, 188 INC. See Indian National Congress (INC) India, 51, 75, 254; caste system in, 62–63; colonial history, 54–56; economic development, 62; environmental factors in, 64–65; first Indo-Pakistani war, 58–59;

Index fourth Indo-Pakistani war, 60; invasion, public opinion on, 65–66, 247; killing innocent civilians, public opinion on, 67–69; political/social/economic context in, 61–64; postcolonial history, 57–58; precolonial history, 52–54; reconciliation, public opinion on, 73–74; right to peace, public opinion on, 70–71; right to protest, public opinion on, 71–72; second Indo-Pakistani war, 59–60; Sino-Indian war, 59; terrorism in, 67–68; third Indo-Pakistani war, 60; war, public opinion on, 69–70 Indian Constitution, 56, 57, 61, 71 Indian National Congress (INC), 30, 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 62 Indian Peace Keeping Force, 66 Indo-Aryan Vedic society, 53 Indonesia, 101–3, 254; confrontation war with Malaysia, 105–6; demographics, 102; East Timor, annexation of, 109–10; European colonialism, 103–4; Free Aceh Movement, 110–11; governmental violence and, 101; invasion, public opinion on, 113–14, 247; Japanese occupation in, 104–5; killing innocent civilians, public opinion on, 114–15, 250; landscape of, 102; mass killings (1965–1966), 106–7; national security, public opinion on, 118; peace, public opinion on, 118–19; promise of reform era, 111–12; religion, 102; as resourcerich country, 103; right to peace, public opinion on, 116; right to protest, 117; Suharto dictatorship in, 107; terrorism, public opinion on, 115–16, 250; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 114; violence and terrorism in, 112; war, public opinion on, 115; war of independence, 105; West Papua, incorporation of, 107–8; world peace, public opinion on, 117–18

Index Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), 106 Indo-Pakistani war: first, 58–59; fourth, 60; second, 59–60; third, 60 Indus Valley Civilization, 27, 52 Inglis, Ken, 140 International Humanitarian Law, 98 Internment of Civilians, 217 Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), 36–37 Iqbal, Allama Muhammad, 31 Iraq War, 12, 132, 191, 203 Irian Jaya, 108 ISI. See Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Islam, 3, 28, 29, 63, 64, 102, 112, 122, 123–5, 136 Islam Hadhari, 136 Islamic Jihad Council, 6 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 3, 7 Iskandar Syah, 124 Jainism, 53, 63, 64 Japan, 207, 233, 240; concentration camps, 214–15; invasion, public opinion on, 221–2, 232, 246, 247; killing innocent civilians, public opinion on, 225–6; military and peace in, 211–12; national security, public opinion on, 231–2; occupation in Indonesia, 104–5; occupation in Philippines, 80; peace, public opinion on, 227, 232; postwar, 210–11; right to peace, public opinion on, 227–8, 246; right to protest, public opinion on, 230–231, 232; terrorism, public opinion on, 224–5, 232; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 222–4, 251; war, public opinion on, 220–21, 232, 244; western influence in, 208; world peace, public opinion on, 228–9; World War I and, 209; United States and, 209–10; See also Japanese Americans Japanese American Citizens League, 214

295 Japanese Americans: experience with war and peace, 212; military experience of, 215–16; Pearl Harbor and World War II, 214; redress, 217–18; resettlement, 216–17; in United States, 212–14 Java War, 104 Jervis, Robert, 259 Jiang Zemin, 174 Jihad, 6, 37 Jinnah, Ali, 31, 33, 55, 56, 59 Kabul, 5, 6, 7, 18, 37 Kahn, Nadir, 5 Karmal, Babrak, 5–6 Karzai, Hamid, 7 Kashmir, 22, 32, 59–60, 67, 73 KCIA. See Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) Khan, Liaquat Ali, 33 Khan, Syed Ahmad, 30 Khel, 8 Khilafat movement, 55 Khrushchev, Nikita, 172 Khuda Ke Liye (In The Name of God), 24 Kim Young Sam, 189 Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), 187, 188 Korean War, 139, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 203, 210 Korea’s National Security Law, 204 Kshatriyas, 53 Kuala Lumpur, 125–126, 127, 128 Kuomintang (KMT). See Chinese Nationalist People’s Party Lahore Resolution (1940), 55 Lane, Max, 102 Laos, 159–168, 240, 253. See also Hmongs Lashkar-e-Taiba, 22 Lawrence, D. H., 138 League of Nations, 209 Lin Biao, 173 Linggadjati Agreement (1946–1947), 105 Lok Sabha, 61

Index

296 Macapagal-Arroyo, Gloria, 82, 83, 84–85, 86–87, 89, 90, 95 Madman’s War, 160 Mahabharata, 53 mahajanapadas, 52, 53 Mahavira, Vardhamana, 53 Malay Chinese Association (MCA), 128 Malayan Democratic Union Party, 127 Malayan Union Plan, 127 Malaysia, 240; British rule in, 125, 126, 128; constitutional monarchy in, 129–30; culture, history of, 123–8; Dutch rule in, 125; economy, 128–9; flag, 130; geographical features of, 121–2; human trafficking in, 130–31; Indonesia’s confrontation war with, 105–106; invasion, public opinion on, 132–3, 247; Islamic influence in, 123–5; Japanese invasion of, 127; legal system in, 130; linguistic diversity in, 123; military service in, 130; moral reasoning in, 131; national security, public opinion on, 133; peace, public opinion on, 135, 242–3; Portuguese rule in, 125; relation with China, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128; religion in, 122, 131; right to peace, public opinion on, 134–5; right to protest, public opinion on, 135–6, 249; terrorism, public opinion on, 133; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 133, 134, 251; war, public opinion on, 132, 244; world peace, public opinion on, 134–5, 244 Mandal Commission (1980), 63, 73 Mansoor, Shoaib, 24 Mao Zedong, 171, 172, 173 Marcos, Ferdinand, 78, 81–82, 83 Marshall Plan, 105 mass killings (1965–1966), 106–7 MCA. See Malay Chinese Association (MCA)

McCarran Bill, 213 McGirr, Michael, 140, 141 Meiji Period, 209 Melaka, 123–5 Melo Commission, 84, 85 Mexican-American War, 230 Ming dynasty, 170 Ministry of National Defense of South Korea, 190 MNLF. See Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) Mohammad, Ghulam, 33, 34 bin Mohamad, Mahathir, 129 Mohenjo Daro, 27 Mojadidi, Sibhatullah, 6 Montague-Chelmsford Report (1918), 55 Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), 83 Motions for Peace, 86 Mujahadin, 6, 18 Musharraf, Pervez, 24, 25, 37, 38 Muslim League, 30, 31, 33, 34, 56 Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, 38 Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States, 190 Nagasaki, 207, 210, 226 Najibullah, Muhammad, 6 Nanjing, 212 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 70 Netherlands, 103, 104, 105, 107–8 New People’s Army (NPA), 84, 85, 86 Nian rebellion (1852–1868), 170 9/11, 12, 37, 38, 68, 223, 225, 226 Nobunaga, Daimyo Oda, 208 Non-Proliferation Treaty, 58 North India, 53–54 NPA. See New People’s Army (NPA) Obama, Barack, 223 Open Door Policy, 173, 186 Opium Wars, 170, 173 Orde Baru/New Order, 107 Organski, A. F. K., 236

Index Padri War, 104 PAIRTAPS. See Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS) Pakistan, 254; centrifugal forces and partition of, 34–35; demographics, 21; education in, 23; extremist group in, 22–23; film industry, 24; institutional problems in, 32–33; invasion, public opinion on, 44–45, 246; Islamization and, 35; killing innocent civilians, public opinion on, 41–42; national identity, 26; peace, public opinion on, 45–46; police, 25; postpartition history of, 31–34; precolonial history of, 27–29; prepartition history of, 29–31; reconciliation, public opinion on, 48–49; relation with Afghanistan, 4; relation with British, 29–30; right to peace, public opinion on, 46; right to protest, public opinion on, 47–48; Talibanistan, 35–38; terrorism, public opinion on, 25, 40–41; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 42–43, 251; war, public opinion on, 25, 39–40; world peace, public opinion on, 46–47; youth population in, 23, 24 Pakistan Movement, 31 Pakistan People’s Party, 35 Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province, 23, 31, 34, 35, 36, 38 Pashtoon (tribe), 4, 8 Pashtunwali, 17, 18 Pathet Lao Communist government, 160 PDPA. See People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) Pearl Harbor, 80, 210, 214, 215, 223 People Power Revolution (1986), 78 People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), 5 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 175 People’s Republic of China (PRC), 171, 172, 174, 175, 181

297 Perry, Mathew, 208, 209, 222 Personal and Institutional Rights to Aggression and Peace Survey (PAIRTAPS), 9, 26, 38, 42, 52, 78, 97, 112, 131, 136, 138, 142, 161, 162, 167, 169, 176, 193, 207, 218, 238, 239, 240, 252, 258, 259 Pew poll (2006), 25 Philippine Republic, 80 Philippine Revolution (1896), 77, 79 Philippines, 77, 97–99, 240; challenges faced by, 85; imperialism in, 78; insurgency in, 84–85; invasion, public opinion on, 92–94; Japan, occupation by, 77, 80; killing innocent civilians, public opinion on, 89–90; peace, public opinion on, 95; peace and education activities, 85–87; post World War II, 80–82; right to peace, public opinion on, 95–96; right to protest, public opinion on, 94–95; Spain, occupation by, 77, 78–79; terrorism, public opinion on, 91–92; terrorism in, 83–84; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 89, 251; United States, occupation by, 77, 79–80; war, public opinion on, 91; world peace, public opinion on, 96–97, 245 PKI. See Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) PLA. See People’s Liberation Army (PLA) POTA. See Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) Pramoedya Ananta Toer, 107 PRC. See People’s Republic of China (PRC) Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), 68 Public Order and Police Law (1900), 204 Pukhtoonwali, 8 Purple Heart Battalion, 215

298 Pusat Tenaga Rakjat (Centre of People’s Power), 104–5 Pushtun (tribe), 31, 34, 36, 39 qawm, 7–8 Qing dynasty, 170 Quaid-i-Azam See Jinnah, Ali qualitative research methodology, strengths of, 260 Queen Elizabeth I, 54 Queen Elizabeth II, 137 Queen Victoria, 55 ‘‘Quit India’’ movement, 56 Rabbani, Burhanuddin, 6 Rajya Sabha, 61 Ramayana, 53 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), 26 redress movement, 217–18 Rehman, Mujibur, 35 Rehman, Sheikh Mujibur, 60 Renville Agreement (1948), 105 Returned Services League (RSL), 144 Richardson, Lewis, 141, 142 Rig Veda, 52 Roem-van Royen Agreement (1949), 105 Roosevelt, Theodore, 186, 213, 214, 235 Round Table Conferences, 56 Rowlatt Act (1917), 55 Roxas, Manuel, 81 Royal government, 160 RSL. See Returned Services League (RSL) RSS. See Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) Russo-Japanese war, 186, 209 San Francisco Board of Education, 213 satyagraha, 56 Sayyaf, Abu, 83, 89 Second Indochina War, 160 security dilemma, 259 Security Treaty, 231 Self Defense Forces (SDF), 211

Index Sen, Amartya, 75 Shah, Mohammad Zahir, 5 Sharif, Nawaz, 37 Shia Islam, 28, 29, 38 Sikhism, 63, 64 Singh, Maharaja Hari, 59 Sino-Indian war, 59 Sino-Japanese War, 209 Sino-Soviet Split, 172 Smith, Lane, 18 Solomon Islands, 140 Somalia, 140, 190 Souphanouvong, Prince, 160 South India, 53 South Korea, 185, 203–6, 240; current issues in preventing armed conflicts, 191; democracy, public opinion on, 188; divided Korea, 187–8; historical background, 186–7; human rights, 188–9; invasion, public opinion on, 194–5, 204; involvement in armed conflict, 189–91; killing innocent civilians, public opinion on, 199–200, 250; peace, public opinion on, 200–201, 205; peace education in, 192; relation with Japan, 186–7; right to peace, public opinion on, 201–2, 205; right to protest, public opinion on, 202–3, 205; terrorism, public opinion on, 197–9; torturing prisoners, public opinion on, 196–7, 204, 251; United States relation with, 190; war, public opinion on, 193–4, 203; world peace, public opinion on, 202, 205 Souvannaphouma, Prince, 160 Soviet Union, 5, 37, 60, 171, 175, 235 Spain occupation in Philippines, 77, 78–79 Spanish-American War, 77, 79, 215, 230 Special Act to Reveal the Truth regarding Suspicious Death, 189 Stalin, Joseph, 172 Stop Hate March, 220

Index Straits Settlements, 125 Sudan, 140, 176 Sudan War (1885), 139 Sudras, 53 Suharto, General, 102, 106, 107, 108, 109–10, 111, 117 Sukarno, President, 104, 105, 106, 115, 117 Sun Yat-sen, 126, 170, 171 Sunni Islam, 3, 29, 37, 38 TADA. See Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA) Taiping rebellion (1850–1864), 170 Taiwan, 171, 175 Taliban, 6–7, 10, 22, 23, 25, 35–38 Taraki, Nur Muhammad, 5 Tarikat Islam, 126 Task Force Usig, 84 Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), 102 Terengganu rebellion, 126 Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA), 68 Tiananmen Square incident, 175 Timor Leste, 140 TNI. See Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) To’ Janggut uprising (1915), 126 Toynbee, Arnold, 141, 142 Toyotomi Hideyoshi, 208, 222 Treaty of Peace and Amity, 209 Treaty of Rawalpindi, 4 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the Republic of Korea, 189, 204–5 T’ung Meng Hui, 126 two-nation theory, 31 Tydings-McDuffie Act (1934), 80 UMNO. See United Malays National Organization (UMNO) UN Peace Keeping Operations, 190 UNESCO Seville Statement on Violence, 154 Union Pacific Railroad, 214 United Malays National Organization (UMNO), 127–8, 129

299 United Nations Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace, 258 United Nations General Assembly, 119, 146 United Nations Programme and Declaration on a Culture of Peace, 154 United Nations Security Council, 32, 60 United States, 109, 111; Hmong people in, 159–60; involvement in Iraq, 12; Japanese Americans in, 212–14; occupation in Philippines, 77, 79–80; relation with China, 175–6; relation with Japan, 209–10; relation with South Korea, 190 United States Naval Academy, 215 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 223, 258 Upanishads, 52 U.S. Nationality Law, 213 U.S. Open Door Policy, 173, 186 U.S. Pacific Command, 236 USS Maine, 215 Vaishyas, 53 Vickers, Adrian, 106–7 Vietnam War, 139, 160, 161, 189, 190, 220, 230 War of 1812, 230 War on Terrorism, 22, 24, 82, 89, 115, 141, 221, 223, 225, 238, 239, 250, 253, 254 War Relocation Authority (WRA), 214, 215, 216 ‘‘water-cure,’’ 80 West Pakistan, 26, 34, 35, 60 West Papua, incorporation of, 107–8 White, Ben Thirkell, 136 White Badge, 190 Women’s House of Peace, 192 The World Factbook, 129 World War I, 4, 55, 56, 139, 142, 209, 222, 230

Index

300 World War II, 77, 80, 104, 127, 139, 142, 171, 185, 187, 207, 211, 212–18, 222, 228, 230, 257 WRA. See War Relocation Authority (WRA) Xinjiang, 170, 180

Yuan Shikai, 170–71 Zardari, Asif Ali, 22 Zhou Enlai, 173 Zia-ul-Haq, Muhammad, 35, 36 Zoroastrianism, 63

About the Editor and Contributors

EDITOR Kathleen Malley-Morrison, Ed.D., Director of the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace (GIPGAP), is a Professor of Psychology at Boston University. Early in her career, with the support of grants from the NIMH, she conducted several studies of family relationships, with a particular focus on the transition from late adolescence into adulthood. She has also conducted extensive research on family violence, starting when she was a postdoctoral fellow on the family violence team at Children’s Hospital in Boston in 1979–1980. She regularly teaches undergraduate and graduate courses focusing on the family and on family violence, as well as a course on the psychology of war and peace. She is the first author of several books, including Treating Child Abuse and Family Violence in Hospitals, with Eli Newberger, Richard Bourne, and Jane Snyder, and Family Violence in a Cultural Perspective with Denise Hines. She is the editor of the book International Perspectives on Family Violence and Abuse: A Cognitive Ecological Approach. She is coauthor, with Denise Hines, of Family Violence in the United States and, with Anne Copeland, of the Sage book Studying Families. Her current focus is primarily on cross-cultural and international perspectives on governmental aggression and peace.

CONTRIBUTORS Michael Corgan, Ph.D. (B.S., U.S. Naval Academy; M.P.A., University of Washington; Ph.D., Boston University) was a professor of national security affairs, U.S. Naval War College, 1991–1993, and is currently an

302

About the Editor and Contributors

associate professor of international relations at Boston University. He is a specialist in international security, Icelandic government, and politics, and American governmental institutions. He has extensive government service in political and military planning (especially NATO) and is a media analyst on security and political affairs. He is also adjunct faculty in political science at the University of Iceland. Ma. Regina E. Estuar, Ph.D., assistant professor and graduate program director in the department of information systems and computer science, is also the senior project manager for Blue Blade Technologies at Ateneo de Manila University. She has published in the Philippines Journal of Psychology, as well as presented at various professional conferences, such as the annual conventions of the Psychological Association in the Philippines, Development Academy of the Philippines’ Commission on Higher Education, and ICT for Developing Countries Conference. Dr. Estuar’s current areas of research interest include technology, society and social change, and social computing and mobile applications. Asifa Hasan, M.S., is an assistant professor at the National Defence University (NDU) Islamabad, Pakistan, and holds an M.S. in global affairs from Rutgers University. She assisted in establishing the department of governance and public policy at NDU, which was expected to be operational in September 2008. She is engaged in conducting a research study of the growing trends of talibanisation as a result of the decimation of governance structures in the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. Recently, Asifa worked as editor reports at Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN), Pakistan, and authored some of the weekly preelection monitoring reports for the General Election 2008. She also coauthored the final Election Monitoring Report, covering all phases of the General Election 2008. Previously, Asifa worked as a research fellow at Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre, Islamabad, where she researched various aspects of political and economic governance in South Asia. Asifa has also taught a graduate course on political governance in South Asia as a visiting faculty member in the department of international affairs at the International Islamic University, Islamabad. Jas Jaafar, Ph.D., is associate professor in the department of anthropology and sociology at the University Malaya. She has published two books, Adolescent Psychology (Lumpur, 2002) and Child and Adolescent Psychology (Lumpur, 2002) in addition to articles in various journals including Asia Pacific Journal of Social Work and Development, The Malaysian Journal of Social Administration, and Journal of Cross Cultural

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Psychology. Her areas of expertise are adulthood and aging, adolescent psychology, and child psychology. Mikyung Jang, Ph.D., from Korea, received her Ph.D. in psychology from Boston University. Her dissertation, under the supervision of Professors Deborah Belle and Kathleen Malley-Morrison, focused on parenting styles and social support networks. She has published several articles in the area of elder abuse and social support networks and has worked most recently as a research associate at the Research Institute of Human Behavior at Yonsei University in Seoul, Korea. Janice E. Jones, Ph.D., is assistant professor in the College of Education and Leadership at Cardinal Stritch University as well as research associate at University of Wisconsin-Madison, where her current research focus is on work/family conflict in collaboration with researchers in Israel, Korea, Italy, and Portugal. Dr. Jones has had extensive teaching experience in all areas of psychology, including research psychology, educational psychology, and counseling psychology. She has also published in various journals including, Journal of Multicultural Counseling and Development, PsychCRITIQUES-Contemporary Psychology, Career Development Quarterly, and has contributed chapters to Encyclopedia of Positive Psychology (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) and Psychology (2008, 2nd edition). Andrea Jones-Rooy, a political science Ph.D. candidate at the University of Michigan–Ann Arbor is completing her dissertation on politics and security in the energy supply market. She received her B.A. from Connecticut College in international relations, economics, and Chinese language and literature, with a minor in ballet. In 2007, she received admission and full funding to attend the Joseph E. Stiglitz Advanced Graduate Workshop on Poverty, Development, and Globalization, at the University of Manchester in the United Kingdom, and was invited to return as teaching assistant in 2008. She has also presented at various conferences including the annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association and the American Political Science Association. Mi-Sung Kim, M.A., from Korea, has an M.A in child psychology and education, from Sung Kyun Kwan University, Seoul, Korea, 2000. Her thesis focused on mother-child interaction and emotional understanding. She received another M.A., in both family studies and health psychology, from the psychology department at Boston University in 2002. Currently, she is studying for her doctoral degree in social work at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey. Before transferring her

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About the Editor and Contributors

major to social work, she studied attachment theory in the department of human development and family studies at University of WisconsinMadison (2002–2005). She is a coauthor, with Mikyung Jang, of the Korean chapter in International Perspectives on Family Violence and Abuse: A Cognitive Ecological Approach. Her research interests primarily include children’s mental health/well-being, social policies, and intervention services with a focus on poor families, foster care, and adoption, as well as issues of human rights. Sherri McCarthy, Ph.D., is a professor of educational psychology, counseling and human relations at Northern Arizona University. Her research spans a variety of areas, including forensic, developmental, and peace psychology. She is the author of several books, including Coping With Special Needs Classmates; A Death in the Family; Teaching Psychology Around the World; Preventing Teen Violence; and Building Asian Families and Communities in the 21st Century. She has also written several book chapters, including the chapter on adolescence in Psychology of Terrorism (Greenwood, 2002), chapters on drug courts and crack kids in Treating Abusers in Correctional Settings, (2003), and chapters on grief and bereavement counseling and program evaluation in Handbook of Practice-based Research (2004). Her articles have appeared in several journals, including Peace Psychology, Teaching of Psychology, Korean Journal of Thinking and Problem Solving, Psychologie Practiques, and others. She spent a year in Russia as a Senior Fulbright Scholar and three years in Brazil as a CNPq scholar. She has also been a visiting professor at the University of Malaya and is currently on the board of directors for the Asian Psychological Association and the International Council of Psychologists. Haslina Muhamad, M.A., is completing her Ph.D in psychology at Monash University, specializing in personality psychology. She is a faculty member at the University of Malaya in the department of anthropology and sociology and an active member of the Asian Psychological Association and the Association for Positive Psychology. Haslina has presented her research at several conferences, including the International Council of Psychologists Convention, the Asian Psychological Association Conferences, and the Association of Asian Social Psychology. She has several ongoing strands of research, which include happiness and quality of life comparisons in countries around the world and the effects of media on behavior. Alice Murata, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist as well as school counselor, has had extensive teaching experience as professor in the

About the Editor and Contributors

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department of counselor education at Northeastern Illinois University, where she also served as department chairperson from 1997 to 2000. She is the author of Black Rain (Akron Ohio, 1996), as well as contributing author to the Images in America Series: Japanese Americans in Chicago (Arcadia Press, 2002). She has also presented at various professional conferences and contributed to several exhibits including, but not limited to, the Air and Space Museum’s exhibit, Of American History (2006) and Japanese American Service Committee’s Origins of Now: Rebuilding Community, Resettlement of Japanese Americans in Chicago. Dr. Murata is currently a board member of the Chicago Japanese American Historical Society. Michelle Murata, B.A., graduated from James Madison University with a bachelor of arts degree in psychology in May 2008. She has worked with special education preschool students, volunteered at a rehabilitation center for seniors, and worked with a victim/witness program for the Commonwealth Attorney’s Office. Currently, she is studying for her doctoral degree in clinical psychology. David Young Oh, M.A., is of Korean ancestry and was born and raised in New Orleans, Louisiana. He has also spent significant time in Argentina, Korea, and Spain. He received his undergraduate and graduate degrees in psychology from Boston University. His research interests include cross-cultural attitudes of the self and identity development. James (Jim) Page, Ph.D., is an Australian academic working with Southern Cross University. Dr Page has taught within the field of peace and conflict studies and holds a Ph.D. in peace education. He has also published widely in peace research and education, including the book Peace Education: Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations (Information Age Publishing, 2008). In-Jin Park, M.A., from Korea, has an M.A. in psychology from Boston University, and has been a member of the GIPGAP research team for several years. Ellora Puri, M.Phil., is an assistant professor/lecturer in the department of political science, the University of Jammu, India. She did her graduate work at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and has an MA/ M.Phil in political science. Her research interests primarily include issues of political violence, identity politics, and gender, specifically in the context of South Asian politics.

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About the Editor and Contributors

Jeremy Peterman, B.A., majored in International Relations as an undergraduate at Boston University. He is currently a graduate student in psychology at Boston University. He has worked as a research assistant in the Center for Anxiety and Related Disorders, and is interested in becoming a clinical psychologist with a focus in childhood and adolescent anxiety disorders. Elizabeth Planje, B.A., majored in Psychology and French at Boston University. She is currently Assistant Lab manager for the Group on International Perspectives on Governmental Aggression and Peace and is pursuing a master’s degree in clinical counseling at Lesley University with the goal of becoming a licensed mental health counselor. Paul E. Priester, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor in the Counseling and Human Psychology program at North Park University. Dr. Priester completed his doctorate in Counseling Psychology at Loyola University, Chicago. His research interests explore the interconnections between the integration of religion in psychology, culturally responsive clinical services, and addiction. He has three children (Caitlin, Paul, and Margaret) and an ever-tolerant wife (Kathy). Nisha Raj, from India, is completing a combined program in psychology and neuroscience at Boston University. Megan Reif, M.A., holds an M.A. in political science from the University of Michigan and a B.A. from Wake Forest University, where she was a research assistant for three years under the director of the American Institute of Pakistan Studies. She is currently a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of Michigan, completing a dissertation in comparative politics on election intimidation and violence and a certificate in spatial analysis and Geographic Information Systems (GIS). A minor in world politics with a cognate field in Middle East and Islamic studies, she conducts research on relationships between institutions, democratization, and political violence and terrorism. She has conducted dissertation fieldwork in Algeria, Pakistan, and Newark, New Jersey. As part of her dissertation research, Reif collaborated with Pakistan’s Free and Fair Election Network in its election violence media monitoring and Parallel Vote Tabulation during the 2008 National Assembly election. Kamala F. Smith, B.A., graduated from Boston University in 2008 with a major in psychology and a minor in economics. She is currently a research technician at the Women’s Health Sciences Division of the

About the Editor and Contributors

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National Center for PTSD, supporting numerous studies related to PTSD. Her research interests include the development and transmission of posttraumatic stress disorder, the intergenerational transmission of family violence, and international perspectives on violence. She plans to complete a doctoral program in clinical psychology and pursue a career in helping individuals and families who have suffered from domestic violence and other trauma-related issues. Lane L. Smith, M.S., is completing his 38th year of international and domestic development assignments, beginning with his service as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Nepal. Since 2005, he has been the Program Design and Implementation Advisor for the United States Agency for International Development in Kabul, Afghanistan. His work there has included capacity building, deployment of information technology, higher education alliances, civil-military coordination, sub-national governance, participant training, and activity tracking and reporting. Syafuan Rozi Soebhan, M.S., received his master’s degree in political science from the University of Indonesia and is currently conducting research at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences’ Research Center for Politics. He has coauthored the book, Age in Motion, Bureaucracy Reconstructed: Landscape Bureaucracy and Politics in Indonesia (Pustaka Pelajar, 2006) and has published in several journals including Agustus, Academic Papers for Political Acts Amandement, Jurnal Masyarakat Indonesia Jilid, and Jurnal Analisis CSIS. Shiho Takagi, MSW, from Japan, received her MSW from Columbia University School of Social Work in 2007 and has her B.A. in psychology from Boston University. She previously worked in the area of Japanese, Korean, and Taiwainese sibling abuse research and presented research findings at the Eastern Psychological Association Convention in 2005. Cher Vang, MSc., received his MSc. in education from the University of Wisconsin-Platteville and is currently a counseling psychology Ph.D. candidate and teaching assistant at the University of Wisconsin– Milwaukee. He has been a licensed psychotherapist since 2000 and has provided individual therapy sessions at the Sebastin Family Psychology Practice in Wisconsin and the Milwaukee Health Service Systems II. In addition, he has presented at the 2006 Teachers and Learners: CrossCultural Perspectives Conference in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and the 2005 annual American Psychological Association Conference.

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About the Editor and Contributors

John M. Whiteley is Professor of Social Ecology at the University of California, Irvine. His most recent scholarship involves the peace building implications of the transboundary ethnic/national disputes in the Caucasus region of the former Soviet Union. His teaching focuses on the problem of peace in the nuclear age, the nuclear environment, and the issues of global sustainability associated with the interrelationship of health and environment. He is the coauthor (with Russell J. Dalton, Paula Garb, Nicholas P. Lovrich, and John C. Pierce) of Critical Masses: Citizen, Nuclear Weapon Production, and Environmental Destruction in the United States and Russia (MIT Press). He is an editor and contributor to Water, Place, and Equity (MIT Press). He is the creator of the ‘‘Quest for Peace Project,’’ a comprehensive set of interviews on the problems of achieving peace in the nuclear age. This project is available electronically at http://www.lib.uci.edu/quest/. Ting Wu received her B.A. from Boston University in the philosophy and psychology joint concentration and biochemistry molecular biology. She has presented at the 2008 annual convention of the American Psychological Association for Division 52. Her areas of interest in research include psychology of international aggression and infectious diseases. Tanvi Zaveri, M.A., received her M.A. in international relations and B.A. in psychology and sociology from Boston University. Her master’s thesis focused on moral disengagement and perspectives of invasion, torture, killing civilians to fight terrorism, and breaking international law from Peru, the United States, and Lebanon. She has also researched and presented papers on cross-cultural attitudes toward family violence, governmental aggression, and peace. She is currently in law school at American University.