State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma 9789812304803

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State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma

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Policy Studies 36

State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma Martin Smith

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Copyright © 2007 by the East-West Center Washington State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma by Martin Smith East-West Center Washington 1819 L Street, NW, Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel: (202) 293-3995 Fax: (202) 293-1402 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.eastwestcenterwashington.org Online at: www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications The Policy Studies series contributes to the East-West Center’s role as a forum for discussion of key contemporary domestic and international political, economic, and strategic issues affecting Asia. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Center. This publication is a product of the East-West Center Washington project on Internal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia. For details, see pages 71–90. The project and this publication are supported by a generous grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. First co-published in Singapore in 2007 by ISEAS Publishing Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Road Singapore 119614 E-mail: [email protected] Website: ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Smith Martin. State of strife : the dynamics of ethnic conflict in Burma. (East-West Center Washington policy studies, 1547-1349 ; PS36) 1. Ethnic conflict—Burma. 2. Burma—Ethnic relations—Political aspects. 3. Burma—Politics and government—1948-. I. Title II. Series: Policy studies (East-West Center Washington) ; 36. DS1 E13P no. 36 2007 ISBN 978-981-230-479-7 (soft cover) ISBN 978-981-230-480-3 (PDF) ISSN 1547-1349 (soft cover) ISSN 1547-1330 (PDF) Typeset in Singapore by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd Printed in Singapore by Seng Lee Press Pte Ltd

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Contents List of Acronyms

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Executive Summary

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Introduction

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A Land Trapped in Conflict

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The Greed and Grievance Debate

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Dilemmas of Unity in a Land of Diversity

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The Traditions of Rebellion

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Insurgency as a Way of Life

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Militarization of the State

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A Failed State, a Weak State, or a Shadow State?

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The Cycles of Conflict

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Post-Colonial Failure of the State: A Country Goes Underground (1948–58)

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Martin Smith Military Government and the Reshaping of Conflict (1958–67)

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Internationalization and the Intensification of Civil War (1968–75)

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National Impasse and State Decline (1976–88)

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New Strategies and New Deadlocks: Military Government Renewed (1988–2006)

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The Contemporary Landscape

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The Ethnic Response and Burma’s New Constitution

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Humanitarian and International Dilemmas

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Conclusions

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Endnotes

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Bibliography

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Appendix: Status of Ethnic Parties, 2006

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Project Information: Internal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia

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• Project Purpose and Outline

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• Project Participants List

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• Background on Burma/Myanmar’s Ethnic Conflicts

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• Pre-1989 and Post-1989 Names

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• Map of Burma: Ethnic Groups with Ceasefire Arrangements

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Policy Studies: List of Reviewers 2006–07

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Policy Studies: Previous Publications

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List of Acronyms AFPFL ASEAN BIA BSPP CIA CPB KaKweYe KIO KMT KNLP KNPP KNU KNUP MTA NCGUB NCUB NDF NDUF NEC NGO NLD

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Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League Association of Southeast Asian Nations Burma Independence Army Burma Socialist Programme Party Central Intelligence Agency Communist Party of Burma Government home-guard militia in late 1960s to early 1970s Kachin Independence Organization Kuomintang Kayan New Land Party Karenni National Progressive Party Karen National Union Karen National United Party Mong Tai Army National Coalition Government Union of Burma National Council Union of Burma National Democratic Front National Democratic United Front Northeast Command nongovernmental organization National League for Democracy

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Martin Smith NMSP NULF PDP PNO PVO SLORC SNLD SPDC SSA SSA-S SSNA SUA SURA Tatmadaw U.K. UN UNA U.S. USDA UWSA

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New Mon State Party National United Liberation Front Parliamentary Democracy Party Pao National Organization People’s Volunteer Organization State Law and Order Restoration Council Shan Nationalities League for Democracy State Peace and Development Council Shan State Army Shan State Army-South Shan State National Army Shan United Army Shan United Revolutionary Army national armed forces of Burma United Kingdom United Nations United Nationalities Alliance United States Union Solidarity and Development Association United Wa State Army

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Executive Summary Since independence from Great Britain in 1948, Burma has been the scene of some of the longest-running and most diverse ethnic insurgencies in the contemporary world. Such struggles have transcended all three eras of postcolonial government, becoming one of the most dominant characteristics of a country where political life in both government and opposition has become deeply militarized. The very durability of this impasse, which has seen Burma decline to become one of the world’s poorest countries, raises fundamental questions about the nature of conflict, nation-state formation and the drivers of socio-political change if the country and its longsuffering peoples are to achieve peace and democracy. This study analyzes the dynamics of conflict that have caused the conditions of internal war to become so uniquely entrenched in one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Asia. It highlights the fact that, while ethnic and political grievances have fueled conflict in every governmental era, there have been corollary factors underpinning the twin phenomena of insurgency as a way of life and the militarization of the state in postcolonial Burma. A historic inter-mix of cultural, military, socio-economic and international causes has been integral to sustaining Burma’s conflict environment at different times. This monograph is organized into three main sections. Through the spectrum of conflict analysis, the first, “A Land Trapped in Conflict,”

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Martin Smith examines the factors behind Burma’s long-standing structures of conflict and their socio-political consequences. While Burma reflects elements of the modern “greed and grievance” debate, it can be better characterized as a land in a “conflict trap.” The dilemmas of national unity and traditions of armed struggle date back to the colonial era, and they have found new expression in every political era since independence. For this reason, Mark Duffield’s paradigm of “emerging political complexes” rather than “complex political emergencies” is an apt characterization of how different societies and armed movements have been able to adapt and survive. This does not mean that post-colonial Burma has remained on the point of state disintegration. However, against this backdrop of conflict, the consequences for nation-state formation have been extremely debilitating, with the contemporary state displaying different elements of a “failed,” “weak” and “shadow” state. The second section, “The Cycles of Conflict,” details the political landscape and evolution of Burma’s ethnic struggles during the six decades following independence. In every era, political disaffection with the central government has continued, and armed opposition movements have controlled large territories where they have adjusted their strategies to changing geo-politics and military conditions. The conflicts in Burma have never been static, and in every era new factors have arisen sustaining armed struggle. Five main cycles of conflict stand out: • the outbreak of violence in the parliamentary era after the British departure; • the militarization of government under Gen. Ne Win; • the international escalation of conflict around Burma’s borders from the late 1960s; • the decline of Gen. Ne Win’s “Burmese Way to Socialism” to final collapse in 1988; • the present-day era of the military State Peace and Development Council. Throughout these political transitions it is impossible to separate ethnic politics from national politics and the problems of instability in the country at large. Over the decades there have been important influences on ethnic insurgent movements by the Communist Party of Burma as well as by

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State of Strife different pro-democracy forces. In the late 1960s, the deposed Prime Minister U Nu took up arms with former ethnic opponents in the eastern hills. International interventions along both the China and Thailand borders have also been important in sustaining armed opposition, while Burma’s thriving black market economies have long been pivotal in the financing of insurgencies on a countrywide scale. The issues of conflict and illicit narcotics, especially, have become closely inter-linked. The study argues that during the past two decades a greater understanding has developed among leading stakeholders about the need for fundamental change. A majority of ethnic nationality parties have modified their political stands from often separatist demands in their formative years to pro-federal positions today. Democratic aspirations in Burma were also confirmed by the victory of the National League for Democracy in the 1990 general election, and there is general recognition among both the country’s peoples and the international community that sustainable solutions can only be achieved through peace and dialogue. A detrimental feature, however, of Burma’s conflict trap is how rarely and slowly processes of national reconciliation have been initiated or sustained. Military-based government has continued. The third section, “The Contemporary Landscape,” therefore examines the current socio-political situation, including the ethnic ceasefires initiated by the SPDC. Decades of conflict have caused a legacy of deep poverty and humanitarian suffering, with indicators of serious health crisis in the country and growing numbers of refugees abroad. Burma’s transitional challenges are, in turn, creating dilemmas for the international community. For while the West has largely concentrated on promoting human rights and isolating the military government, Asian neighbors are proving more influential in sociopolitical trends and intergovernmental relations with Burma by maintaining economic engagement in the field. Indeed, with Asian investments in infrastructure and energy accelerating in the borderlands, the study argues that the political economy may well become the key in determining Burma’s political future. Formidable challenges continue to face Burma, including ethnic peace, democratic reform, demilitarization, economic progress and addressing humanitarian needs. In Burma’s conflict trap, these issues can not be divided into different hierarchies or prescriptive fields. In particular, the country’s troubled history since independence has long since

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Martin Smith demonstrated that ethnic and political inclusion are vital if the cycles of conflict are to be ended. The study thus concludes that conflict resolution—supported by an integrated approach in the international community—will remain an essential need in the 21st century in the formation of a stable and modern nation-state where all Burma’s peoples enjoy equal rights and peace.

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State of Strife

State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma The enduring cycles of conflict and militarization are among the most defining characteristics of socio-political life in post-colonial Burma (Myanmar).1 Such conditions of ethnic and political strife have transcended all three eras of government since independence from Great Britain in 1948: that of parliamentary democracy (1948–62), the autarchic “Burmese Way to Socialism” of Gen. Ne Win (1962–88), and the post-1988 military regime of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC: initially conflict and militarization State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC]). Over the years, an are among the most extraordinary diversity of different state, defining characteristics quasi-state, and militant organizations have maintained arms in pursuit of of…post-colonial Burma claimed goals that have reflected every side of the political spectrum—from communism to democracy and from ethnic secession to pluralistic federalism. In the process, insurgencies have become virtual ways of life, and military politics have come to dominate in national government as well as among opposition movements. The evidence is incontrovertible. In 2006, over 25 different ethnic forces maintained ceasefires with the ruling SPDC, while another dozen

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remained in armed struggle against a central government that has itself been under military control for over four decades (see Appendix: “Status of Ethnic Parties, 2006”). In contrast, the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), which won the 1990 general election, appeared to be marginalized and facing the threat of political extinction. This diversity of conflicts, however, has rarely suggested that modernday Burma is on the point of national break-up. In fact, the very durability of so many armed movements is a striking example of the fact that, rather than causing societal collapse, the conduct of internal conflicts in the postcolonial world can be very structured between the different stakeholders and socio-political elites in the field. Over the decades, many of the leading actors and perpetuating forces of conflict in Burma have been remarkably adaptive to the changing political and economic environments. This, in turn, raises fundamental questions about the nature of “civil war” in the country, nation-state formation, the drivers for conflict, and the objectives of all the leading protagonists. Burma’s challenges are urgent. Whatever the ideologies of the leading parties, the sufferings of the peoples have been profound against this uninterrupted backdrop of conflict. At independence, Burma was regarded as potentially one of the most prosperous countries in Asia. Six decades later, it has declined to Least Developed Country status at the sufferings of the peoples United Nations (UN) and is one of the world’s poorest.2 In the meantime, have been profound an inter-linking spiral of humanitarian emergencies has continued to mount, including refugees, internally-displaced persons, illicit narcotics production and the spread of such preventable diseases as HIV/AIDS and malaria. Due to international isolation, the underlying scale of ethnic conflict and state failure has often been overlooked. But in 2006 research by the UN Country Team concluded that the humanitarian situation in Burma had fallen below that of neighboring Cambodia—a country “emerging from 30 years of civil war and an auto-genocide.”3 The parallels could not be starker. In the 21st century, the need for ethnic peace and justice is clearly paramount if Burma is to have any prospect of a stable and democratic future.

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State of Strife

A Land Trapped in Conflict The Greed and Grievance Debate Despite their extent and duration, the ethnic struggles in Burma are among the least examined in conflict analysis on the international stage. Far from being unique, however, they share many characteristics with other conflicts in the post-colonial world where analysis has been developing in contemporary debate over the balance between “greed and grievance” as the causes of modern wars (Berdal and Malone 2000; Ballentine and Sherman 2003). In particular, since the ending of the Cold War there has been a concentration on the phenomenon of “new wars” that are mostly internal, ethnic in nature, characteristic of “weak” or “failed states,” and often appear to be based more on battles for control of natural resources than on political ideologies in their day to day forms (Duffield 2001; Keen 2001). At first glance, modern-day Burma fits easily into these analytical models. Since 1988, especially, the struggle for control over Burma’s natural resources has intensified. However, as research by the International Peace Academy demonstrates, it is important not to confine conflict analysis to issues relating to the control of resources or territory; “resource wars” should not be isolated as a “new type of insurgency” (Ballentine and Nitzchke 2005: 4). Four factors highlight why Burma’s conflicts have roots that are much deeper than the contemporary “new wars.” First, with histories of political and ethnic violence that date back to independence, the dynamics of armed struggle cannot be simply attributed to modern grievances or conditions. Second, over the decades a diversity of nationality movements has evolved, each with individual traditions of identity and legitimacy. Third, there is a continuing legacy of international linkages and “regional conflict complexes” in the sustenance of armed struggle, in which foreign actors have also played critical roles.4 Finally, a legacy of deep social and humanitarian crises has built up during the past six decades in which it has long been impossible for any stakeholder group—whether in government or opposition—to single out any issue for effective action on the scale that is required. For the above reasons, Burma stands out as a pre-eminent example of a post-colonial state subsumed in what development analysis describes as a “conflict trap” (World Bank 2003). In such a country, no single issue can be considered to be the cause of conflict, which has its roots in the state’s

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complex geo-politics and history. Equally important, two elements are essential to sustain such long-standing conditions of conflict: first, the “root causes” of the initial resort to violence; and, second, the military organizations that become the “perpetuating forces” in Burma stands out as a pre-eminent the field (Ibid.: 53). By every example of a post-colonial state...[in] definition, post-colonial Burma is a land entrapped a “conflict trap” in such a state of conflict since the mid-20th century. Burma’s internal wars have by no means been static. Distinctive passages of history include the attempt to seize power by excluded parties (both political and ethnic) similar to those that occurred in many other post-colonial states after independence; revolutionary ideologies ranging from ethnic separatism to Maoist “People’s War”; super-power involvement by both the United States and the People’s Republic of China; and an internal dynamic of violent action and counter-reaction between the government and opposition movements that has, to date, peaked in three main confrontational waves (post-1948, post-1962 and post-1988) and witnessed three military coups (in 1958, 1962 and 1988). Against this backdrop of strife, the lines between legitimacy and illegitimacy have frequently been blurred, the politics and economics of self-survival have come to dominate, and predatory warlordism has often been rife on all sides of the conflict-zones. What, then, is perhaps the most remarkable feature of Burma’s internal wars is the extent to which so many conflicts have become almost selfsustaining in one of the most isolated nations in the post-colonial world. For example, the Karen National Union (KNU), which began armed struggle in 1949, still controls small base areas in the Thai borderlands today without ever achieving peace with any central government in the intervening decades. Similarly, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), which was formed in 1961, fought against three different systems of government in Rangoon before agreeing to a 1994 ceasefire that has endured with the military SLORC-SPDC for over a decade without progressing to a definitive conclusion.5 Because of this duration, it is necessary in analysis of Burma’s conflict trap to follow such political scientists as David Keen in moving beyond the

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State of Strife idea of war as “breakdown,” which generally held sway in the 20th century, to an understanding of how communities, political elites and military groups continuously adapt to the conditions of conflict in the field. Indeed leading protagonists may have vested reasons, including those of selflegitimacy and economic advantage, for sustaining war rather than seeking resolution. As Keen has argued, war “is not simply a breakdown in a particular system, but a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection” (Keen 1998: 11). This perspective of war as a policy preference by some, at least, of the different protagonists is not to underestimate the political and humanitarian dimensions of conflict. But in Burma’s case it is important to point out that, while there have often been internal collapses or splits among the different insurgent forces, there are no real examples of any major ethnic movement being defeated by military means alone during the past six decades. Consequently, there have been no final winners or losers on the battlefields—only a growing militarization of many aspects of life in the country and socio-political adaptation by activists and communities to the conditions of struggle. This paradox of apparent stability in Burma’s patterns of conflict raises the question as to whether the armed confrontation between competing groups in the country should be considered to be “social regression” or “social transformation” in conflict analysis (Duffield 2001: 136). It is a key distinction. In support of the idea of war as social regression, there was initially much analysis at the Cold War’s end about the phenomenon of “complex emergencies” that can combine to create “new wars” and selfperpetuating conditions of conflict in “failed states,” especially in postcolonial Africa. Many of these same destabilizing trends have long existed in Burma, including ethnic-based wars, refugees, disease, and internallydisplaced persons. Such an analysis led to calls in the early 1990s for humanitarian ceasefires to address what the UN described as Burma’s “silent emergency” (Carriere 1997). However, although humanitarian crises are urgent reflections of the conflict environment in Burma, they do little to explain the longevity of armed struggles or the complexity of ethnic and political movements that have continued to evolve in the field. For this reason, Mark Duffield’s paradigm of “emerging political complexes” rather than “complex political emergencies” is a more apposite explanation of how political and ethnic life

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Martin Smith has unfolded in Burma in the absence of an inclusive rule of law (Duffield 2001: 161). In 2007, the ethno-political landscape of Burma continues to reflect a diversity of “political complexes” seeking to emerge. In addition to the de facto military government of the SPDC, there is the de jure 1998 Committee Representing the People’s Parliament (CRPP) organized by the NLD, the nine parties of the United Nationalities Alliance (UNA) that also stood in the 1990 election, 28 ethnic ceasefire groups that administer their own territories with the SPDC’s agreement, and a dozen more ethnic forces that remain in armed conflict with the central government (see Appendix: “Status of Ethnic Parties, 2006”). On the surface, this might appear to be a land in socio-political breakdown. But in reality, it reflects a surprisingly durable pattern of selforganization in the field, in which key actors have long been more concerned with managing the daily crises of conflict than seeking inclusive solutions. Equally important, notions of statebuilding have not been completely state-building ha[s] not been derailed by decades of violence. This echoes the paradox identified by completely derailed by Charles Tilly that, while armed conflict decades of violence undermines fragile states, the responses and alignments by different stakeholder groups can, conversely, also lead to the emergence of institutions that build states (Tilly 1975). Indeed the very durability of conflict in post-independence Burma has caused the political scientist Robert Taylor to ask “whether 50 years of civil war has created a nation from the fragments that previously fought over what kind of nation to conceive?” (Taylor 2005: 265). Finally, there remains the question of balance in the “greed and grievance” debate between political and economic factors in the continuity of armed conflict in Burma. As argued above, not every conflict issue can be reduced to the subject of “resource wars,” and the following section (“The Cycles of Conflict”) will highlight that political grievance and the denial of ethnic rights have been instigating causes of conflict in every governmental era since independence. But in Burma’s case, special mention also needs to be made of the extraordinary economic conditions that have flourished in many areas, becoming integral elements in the structures of conflict as the decades have passed by.

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State of Strife In the 21st century the political economy could well become the key in determining Burma’s socio-political future. In particular, since 1988 many of the ground rules in armed confrontation have changed significantly under the SLORC-SPDC. Through an admixture of regional policy changes, government ceasefires, and/or military offensives, there has been a dramatic increase in population movement as well as an escalation in cross-border trade and transactions in everything from timber and illicit narcotics to natural gas and hydroelectric production.6 Against this backdrop, opposition groups believe that the changes in Burma’s political economy could be providing the “greed and grievance” dynamics for a new generation of conflict. Indeed the outcome of such competition is likely to be pivotal for the control of any national government in the country—whether in Rangoon or the newly-created capital at Nay Pyi Taw. In one of the fastest developing regions of the world, the economic stakes have become extremely high. As yet, there is no evidence of definitive outcomes. Since 1988, Burma has remained in a state of deep political crisis during which hopes have continued for democratic change that will transform the long-standing cycles of conflict. But for the moment the legacies of Burma’s conflict trap remain. After decades of conflict, a culture of fear and caution is starkly engrained in which too many leading stakeholders on the different sides– –whether in government or opposition––are averse to moves that might threaten long-standing positions of ideology or authority. In such circumstances, as Keen has warned, “prolonging a war may be a higher priority than winning it” (Keen 2001: 2). It is a bleak prognosis, but one that reflects Burma’s often bitter past. Dilemmas of Unity in a Land of Diversity Burma’s failures in nation-state formation did not begin under military government but are rooted in the turbulent history and very make-up of the country. The continuing legacy is what the political scientist Josef Silverstein labeled three decades ago as the “dilemma of national unity” (Silverstein 1980). Since independence, key protagonists have only rarely met together to discuss ethnic and political issues, and until the present day some very different perspectives about Burma’s history continue to fuel many aspects of conflict within the country.7 Many of these differences are intrinsic to Burma’s political geography. Located on a strategic crossroads in Asia, Burma is one of the most

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Martin Smith ethnically diverse countries in the world. Over 100 languages and dialects have been identified among the country’s 55 million population, among whom ethnic minority peoples constitute about one third. In general, the ethnic Burman majority is concentrated on the plains in the Burma is one of the most center of the country, while the non-Burman minorities inhabit the ethnically diverse countries upland borderlands adjoining five neighboring states: Bangladesh, China, India, Laos, and Thailand. However although distinctive nationality regions exist, few areas can be considered ethnically homogenous. Rather, much of Burma’s population map resembles an ethnographic mosaic. Perhaps surprisingly, conflict studies suggest that such diversity does not, in itself, increase the risk of warfare in a multi-ethnic state; indeed “fractionalization” may actually reduce it (Collier 2000: 98). What, however, does increase the risk of conflict is a multi-ethnic society where one nationality group forms an absolute majority. In such countries (e.g. Sri Lanka or Ethiopia), the risks of internal conflict are increased by 50 percent (World Bank 2003: 57). Certainly, post-colonial Burma can be interpreted as an example of an “ethnocratic” state where one ethnic group—in this case, the Burman—has come to dominate in both government and the national armed forces since independence (Brown 1994: 33–65). Such domination by the Burman majority contrasts sharply with the colonial era when ethnic minority peoples were often favored by the British for positions in governmental service, especially in the colonial Burma army. Burma, of course, was not alone in suffering political and ethnic violence in the fall-out from colonial rule. But there are a number of reasons why the difficulties of achieving post-colonial unity were especially acute in Burma’s case. First, state-building was never a colonial goal. Instead, British Burma was administered until 1937 as a province of India, from which massive immigration took place. This triggered outbreaks of communal violence in the 1930s and resentment among young Burman nationalists who subsequently took up arms to fight for independence. Indian and Muslim minorities (who are often perceived as the same) remain the most discriminated against in contemporary Burma.8 Equally important, the

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State of Strife methods by which the British colonized the territories that became British Burma undercut many traditional structures of governance in the Burman heartlands. This left a vacuum in both central government and national society state-building was at independence that has never—with the broader exceptions of the Buddhist sangha a colonial goal (clergy) and national armed forces—been filled (Myint-U 2001). Second, British Burma was unequally administered under a diarchic system of government, separating “Ministerial Burma” where the Burman majority live and where a semblance of parliamentary home rule was introduced, from the ethnic minority “Frontier Areas” which remained under the nominal authority of their traditional rulers. The “pax Britannica” was, as Michael Aung-Thwin wrote, a system of “order without meaning” (Aung-Thwin 1985). The result was to establish two ethnically-based territories on largely different routes of political and economic development that have never been truly reconciled. This leads to a third damaging inheritance from colonial division: the precedent of inter-ethnic conflict. World Bank research has identified that newly-independent countries with a legacy of weak institutions, low incomes, and “decolonization wars” are ten times more likely to face a risk of conflict than other states (World Bank 2003: 98). This very much matches the experience of Burma. Prior to independence, the country was devastated as one of the major theaters of combat during the Second World War. But while Aung San and the nationalists of the Burma Independence Army (BIA) initially joined on the side of Imperial Japan, the Karens, Kachins, Indians, and other minority peoples mostly stayed loyal to the British, suffering the worst in communal clashes that broke out in several areas. For actors on all political sides it was a bitter but formative experience in intra-societal conflict that has endured, in some cases, until the present day. Aung San and the BIA movement did eventually change sides before the war’s end to support the Allied invasion. However many minority peoples never forgot what they regarded as their “second-class” treatment by Burman leaders under the Japanese occupation. Equally divisive, nationalist propaganda has unhelpfully lingered on in Burman political circles that only the BIA won the country’s liberation, while such minorities as the Karens and Indians were colonial “collaborators.” Indeed in May

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2006, the state-controlled media again accused the Karen National Union of being led by “foreign masters” and having a “look West” policy.9 In the run-up to independence, Aung San called for “unity in diversity” as the way to heal ethnic differences and build the new Union. Tragically, however, Aung San and five Cabinet colleagues were assassinated in July 1947 by the gang of a political rival. The death of Aung San—perhaps the one national leader who might have achieved inter-ethnic unity—was a poignant reminder that conflict in Burma should never be interpreted as simply a Burman-majority versus ethnic minority affair. Even before the British departure, “Red Flag” communists had moved underground in lower and northwest Burma, while armed nationality movements were mobilizing among both the Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim communities in Arakan. Then in March 1948, less than three months after independence, the insurrection of the mainstream “White Flag” Communist Party of Burma (CPB) broke out and the country’s national armed forces, known as the Tatmadaw, were almost brought down by mutinies. As fighting escalated, armed conflict quickly spread to the Karens and other nationality groups, including the Karenni, Mon, and Pao. Burma’s post-colonial state of strife had begun. The final legacy of the colonial era was the countrywide resort to arms during 1947–49, which consolidated the conditions for future ethnic conflict in Burma. As David Keen has warned, “Conflict generates ethnicity” (Keen 2001: 8). Community divisions, the struggle for control of natural The final legacy of the resources, the interventions of foreign governments, and even the ways that colonial era was the journalists describe divisions in countrywide resort to arms “immutable” terms rather than examining how they have been caused—all can during 1947–49 combine to ethnicize socio-political issues against the backdrop of war (Ibid.: 7–8). Indeed so enduring have conflict-driven divisions become in Burma that David Brown argues that “ethnicity,” in many respects, represents an ideology in the politics of the modern state (Brown 1994: 1, 33–65). For their part, Burma’s present-day military leaders maintain that there is no more homogenous and inclusive nation in Asia. “Thanks to the unity and farsightedness of our forefathers, our country has existed as a united and firm Union and not as separate small nations for over 2,000 years,” the

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SPDC chairman Senior-General Than Shwe claimed in 2002.10 The reality, however, is that even in the 21st century there are borderland areas where central government authority has never reached. Most obviously, there remain armed opposition “liberated areas” and ceasefire territories among a dozen nationality peoples where very different ideologies and perceptions of identity are still sustained. As the KNU’s official history claims, “The Karens are much more than a national minority. We are a nation.”11 Importantly, too, the predominance of Buddhism in Burma has not reduced the ethnic dimensions of conflict in a country where over 85 percent of the population practices the Theravada faith. The Christian religion has undoubtedly played a significant role in the development of modern identities for such minority peoples as the Chin, Kachin and the predominance of Karen. In consequence, Western missionaries have sometimes been Buddhism...has not reduced the accused by Burman leaders of ethnic dimensions of conflict fueling ethnic divisions (Smith 1999: 45–46). However there have also been armed movements among Buddhist-majority groups as well, including the Mon, Palaung, Pao, Rakhine, and Shan. Indeed a 1994 breakaway group from the KNU is known as the “Democratic Karen Buddhist Army,” reflecting the paradoxes of identity and militarism in the country. Burma’s dilemma of national unity thus remains. Ironically, it was in the hills of northeast Burma that Edmund Leach carried out his pioneering studies in ethnicity, demonstrating that, far from being innate or primordial, ethnic identity is constantly adaptive as a result of cultural and political interchange (Leach 1954). For such reasons, Burma once enjoyed the reputation as an “anthropologist’s paradise.” That, however, was over a half a century ago before the conditions of ethnic conflict had become so engrained. Instead, as Robert Taylor has warned, a very different paradigm has emerged in Burma’s highly militarized environment since independence: “Ethnic politics is the obverse of the politics of national unity” (Taylor 1982: 7). The Traditions of Rebellion Many other states in Asia were also swept by periods of post-colonial insurgency that followed national independence. But whereas in most

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Martin Smith countries such struggles have long since ended or metamorphosed into modernized forms, in Burma both the root causes and generating forces of conflict have been sustained through succeeding political eras. Equally crucial, despite their perennial failures to overthrow government, many of the principal insurgent forces in Burma have remained well-established and directed during their long years of armed struggle. Utilizing widespread conditions of anti-government disaffection, leaders of such ethnic forces as the KIO, KNU, Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), New Mon State Party (NMSP), and Shan State Army (SSA) have continued to maintain “liberated zones” of their own for over four decades. These territories, however, have not been simply guerrilla zones with shifting front lines. Rather, they have often been politically administered, with networks of schools, health clinics, and regular armies. Indeed some of the larger territories controlled by armed opposition groups have been modeled on quasi nation-states: e.g., for the KIO, Kachinland; for the KNU, Kawthoolei. The fact that over 20 such groups still control territories in the 21st century is, in many respects, an extraordinary phenomenon and achievement that reflects much about the state failures of post-colonial Burma and the enduring conditions of ethnic conflict after the British departure. The emergence of “political armies” in Burma, however, did not simply originate in the political turbulence after independence.12 Instead, many armed movements drew on experiences sparked in the colonial era that have continued to fuel perceptions of legitimacy and armed struggle into the 21st century. In particular, in many parts of Burma there was a tradition of forming local “tats” or “pocket armies,” which found renewed expression during the anti-colonial struggles against both the British and Japanese. The 1930–32 Saya San rebellion, led by a Buddhist monk, was an especial inspiration to the Burman nationalists of the Dobama Asiayone (“We Burmans Association”), while communists, socialists, and activists in other emerging movements all formed militias during the pre-independence years. Undoubtedly the most important was the Burma Independence Army, formed in 1941 after Aung San, Ne Win and the renowned “Thirty Comrades” went underground to gain Japanese support. The mobilization of such “tats” continued after the Second World War, the largest of which, the People’s Volunteer Organization (PVO), was formed by Aung San for BIA veterans to try to put pressure on the British to hasten their departure. Growing to a 100,000-strong force in the countryside, the PVO fractured

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State of Strife after independence, with the “White Band” PVO forces joining in the insurrections until the mid-1950s. Other armed movements were politically based from the outset, notably the CPB, which remained inextricably inter-linked with insurgent politics in Burma until the 1990s. After independence, the CPB’s objective was nothing less than the seizure of state power from the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) government headed by U Nu, with four of the Thirty Comrades joining the party’s cause. Other veterans of the anticolonial struggle supported the PVO insurrection, while the [Communist Party of Burma]’s three more of the Thirty Comrades joined the objective was nothing less than the deposed Prime Minister U seizure of state power Nu in the late 1960s when, in a dramatic change in alignments, his insurgent Parliamentary Democracy Party (PDP) allied with the KNU and other ethnic forces in the Thai borderlands. Another proliferation of armed political movements swept the country at the collapse of Gen. Ne Win’s Burma Socialist Programme Party government in 1988. As a result, until the present day, the notion of “going underground” to achieve government change has remained dominant in many political circles. This is a romanticized concept that the post-1988 student leader Min Zin dates back to the independence struggle and the experience of mobilizing mass resistance.13 It was in this deeply militarized environment in national politics that the first ethnic forces emerged in Burma around the time of independence. Three factors, especially, caused many armed groups to form along nationality lines among non-Burman peoples and to become so rapidly embedded in the local communities. First, the British formulation of the colonial Burma army along “class” (i.e. ethnic) lines, with separate Chin, Kachin, and Karen battalions, had already created the precedent for ethnic-based forces. To try and foster Tatmadaw unity, Karen officers were appointed heads of both the army and air force at independence. However with communal violence spreading and Gen. Ne Win deposing Gen. Smith Dun as army chief in January 1949, all the Karen and some of the Kachin units mutinied overnight. This provided a powerful boost to the momentum of the anti-government

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Martin Smith insurgencies, and well into the 1980s there were KNU leaders who had been veterans of both the British army during the Second World War and the Tatmadaw at independence. Second, as the insurgencies began to spread to other ethnic groups, they were often supported by local leaders who could draw on traditional systems of patronage that had survived through the years of colonial rule. In the Shan and Karenni states, especially, relatives of the hereditary sawbwa families joined the insurrections. Prominent members of royal households who organized insurgent movements after independence include Sao Shwe who led the first rebellion in the Karenni state; Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, who was son of Sao Shwe Thaike (Burma’s first president) and co-founder of the SSA; the late Palaung leader Chao Nor Far; and the present-day Wa National Organization president Maha San.14 In Arakan, meanwhile, the first Rakhine insurgency was instigated by U Seinda, a leading Buddhist monk. This leads to the third key factor in the entrenchment of ethnic insurrection: the ability of political elites to transform their parties from disaffected popular movements into rural-based insurgencies. It was a vital switch. For with the government regaining control of urban areas, by the early 1950s the different opposition forces had little choice but to regroup in the countryside. Here they quickly found fertile ground for sustaining armed struggle. In his study of peasant rebellions, Why Men Rebel, Ted Gurr identified three main conditions for spontaneous uprisings: deprivation blamed on the central government rather than the local elite; deep discontent among ordinary people; and the loss of a population’s economic security (Gurr 1971: 13, 177–92, 341). Without organization and the involvement of the local elite, such rebellions, he believed, would remain localized and eventually fail. But if they are not suppressed before gaining new support, they can quickly escalate into what he called “internal wars.” There have been many internal wars and spontaneous rebellions in the rural societies of Burma since independence. Present-day examples include the Kayan New Land Party, which began as a local uprising after Gen. Ne Win demonetized the Burmese currency in 1964; the Lahu Democratic Front which originated from a 1972 rebellion by a Lahu spiritual leader; and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army which has passed through several military incarnations among the Kokang population in the northern Shan state. Many other rebellions have been much more shortlived, including the messianic “God’s Army,” led by boy-twins, which had

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State of Strife a brief but violent life among local Karen villagers in the Tenasserim division in the late 1990s. In such complexity lies the fractionalization that has always prevented anti-government groups from achieving unity or state power. At the same time, alienation from central government has provided continuity in the conditions under which ethnic opposition groups have been able to maintain armed movements in the countryside. Indeed in the conflict zones it is very often the armed opposition groups that have been popularly supported— not the state authorities which may be perceived as both intrusive and coercive by local villagers. Against this volatile backdrop, many of the insurgent causes that began almost spontaneously at the time of independence in 1948 have been able to find renewed expression up to the present day. In succeeding decades, insurgency and military politics became virtual ways of life in a country riven by internal divisions. Insurgency as a Way of Life When Burma descended into political violence in the mid-20th century, there were few predictions that its post-colonial instabilities would outlast those of all its Asian neighbors. Certainly, as will be shown in the following sections, the continuity of political grievance can be identified in every governmental era since independence. But grievance alone does not initiate or sustain rebellion—nor does it explain the creeping militarization of the state. Instead, six further conditions need to be identified as underlying causes that have supported the extraordinary ability of armed opposition groups to maintain what have, in effect, been parallel authorities to the central government for so long. The first cause was the legacy of military experience and inter-ethnic conflict initiated during a decolonization war. Not only KNU supporters, but leaders of the CPB and many other opposition movements as well, applied these lessons to rebellion. For example, perhaps the most famous fighter in Burma’s civil wars, the Kachin commander Naw Seng, first battled on the British side during the Second World War; was a Tatmadaw officer at independence; led the short-lived Kachin “Pawng Yawng” rebellion in 1949; and subsequently became commander of the CPB’s Northeast Command that invaded the Shan state from China in the late 1960s. It was a remarkable military career spanning over three decades on different war fronts in 20th century Burma.

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Martin Smith The second factor has been the organizational transformation of opposition groups from civilian parties and local militia into revolutionary forces. Over the years there has been much interchange in the “liberated zones” between different insurgent forces, and this has stimulated the tactical development of movements. Three relationships have been especially important: those by ethnic forces with the CPB (1948–89), with U Nu’s PDP (1969–78), and with pro-democracy parties (after 1988) in the present-day National Council Union of Burma (NCUB). In their exchanges, the main discussions have been over such political issues as the rights of secession or federalism, but many strategies of armed struggle have also been learned along the way. In particular, although most nationality parties always rejected communism, Mao Zedong’s “On Protracted War” and “On Guerrilla Warfare” became influential among ethnic insurgent leaders during the 1950s and 1960s because of their tactical emphasis on organizing the rural population (Smith 1999: 150–51). “People’s war” became a popular slogan, and this saw the rise of such left-wing movements as the nowdefunct Karen National United Party, and still lives on in such peoplebased parties as the Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front and the Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization. Communist influence was also important in the setting up of “vanguard” revolutionary movements that can survive the hardships of civil war. In many areas, centralized organizations were established with political and military wings reaching down to the village levels. Until the present day most ethnic opposition forces are administered under central committee and central executive committee (or politburo) systems that operate as the effective governments of their movements, holding full party congresses only when conditions allow. In the 21st century, many ethnic leaders would downplay or deny any communist-related legacy. However even the contemporary goal of many ethnic parties—“national democracy” (as opposed to the CPB’s “people’s democracy”)—is a communist term that reflects discussions during earlier political eras (Ibid.: 298). Similarly, the continuing primacy of “united front” tactics advocated by such alliances as the present-day NCUB also has its roots in Mao’s strategies for protracted war. The ability of ethnic forces to effectively organize leads to the third and fourth factors in their sustainability: the country’s unique geography and international geo-politics. The deep forests and rugged highlands of Burma have been ideal terrain for waging guerrilla war. With support from local

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communities and government infrastructures frequently non-existent, until the 1990s insurgent groups were able to move around relatively freely in as much as one third of the country. Since the mid-1970s, ethnic forces have largely been confined to the borderlands. But here The deep forests and rugged they often enjoyed one crucial advantage over the central highlands...have been ideal...for government: their generally waging guerrilla war accommodating relationships with the authorities in neighboring countries. This has meant that, whatever their fortunes in central Burma, armed opposition groups have been able to maintain headquarters and family lines in borderland sanctuaries from which they can continue mobilizing their struggles. The international dimensions of Burma’s conflicts have often been overlooked in political analysis of the post-colonial state. In part, this is due to the isolationist policies of successive Rangoon governments. Most obviously, Burma did not join the British Commonwealth of Nations at independence and, under the hermetic “Burmese Way to Socialism,” Gen. Ne Win even withdrew the country from the Non-Aligned Movement. However behind this security curtain, Burma has continued to play an important role in different “regional conflict complexes” in changing passages of history during the past six decades.15 The first key intervention was by the CIA-backed Kuomintang (KMT) remnants that invaded the Shan state in 1949 after Mao Zedong’s victory in China. Settling in the Thai borderlands, they became influential actors in insurgent politics and elevated Burma’s illicit opium trade to its lucrative international dimensions (McCoy 1972). Subsequently, the KMT was utilized by successive Thailand governments under a policy of supporting border “buffer states” whereby such insurgent groups as the KNU, KNPP, and SSA were recognized as the de facto authorities on the other side of the frontier, as long as they blocked the advance of communist forces. Legacies from this policy still exist today, with such forces as the KNU, KNPP, NMSP, and SSA-S (Shan State Army-South) remaining important actors in the border landscape. Along the East Pakistan and (later) Bangladesh border, armed opposition forces were likewise tolerated, including Buddhist Rakhine and “Rohingya” Muslim groups.16 Only along the Indian border did any neighboring

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Martin Smith government consistently seek to block insurgent groups from Burma. But here the situation was equally advantageous to insurgent forces, with various Naga and Mizo-Zomi (Chin) movements often carrying out their struggles on both sides of the frontier in tandem. Undoubtedly the most explosive situation, however, developed along the China border where from 1968 the CPB enjoyed a decade of full-scale military backing from Beijing. With this support, CPB forces were able to seize control of vast swathes of territory along the Yunnan province border. Only with the 1989 mutiny of ethnic minority troops from the CPB’s 15,000-strong People’s Army did China’s support finally end. In the meantime, the boost to the conditions of insurgency within Burma had been incalculable, with cross-border influences of continuing importance in the Shan and Kachin states today. The closeness of these international relationships highlights why the fifth factor in the sustenance of insurgencies—that of arms supplies—has not, until recent years, been an insuperable problem for most antigovernment groups. Into the 21st century, opposition forces have remained relatively well-equipped, with such ethnic armies as the KNU, KIO, SSA, and, more recently, United Wa State Army (UWSA), capable of organizing brigade-style structures in the field. Such sizable forces underscore why the Tatmadaw, under successive governments, has never been able to win knock-out victories—with only one obvious exception: the clearance, by the mid-1970s, of insurgent groups from the Irrawaddy Delta and Pegu Yoma regions of central Burma from which there was no back-door retreat. Military mathematics explains the importance to opposition groups of being able to arm large numbers of supporters. In counter-insurgency operations, a ratio of ten to one in a government’s favor is usually considered essential for military suppression. However with estimates of an average 40,000 opposition troops under arms in the borderlands during recent decades, the central government has never been able to assert military dominance, even with the doubling of the Tatmadaw since 1988 to over 400,000 troops today. Over the decades, military supplies have consistently been found by opposition forces from a diversity of sources, including Second World War stockpiles, seizures from the government, Chinese supplies through the CPB, and Vietnam (later Cambodian) war surplus that remained available through the Thailand black market into the 1990s. This leads to the final factor in the maintenance of ethnic insurgencies: the economic. During Burma’s parliamentary era, most armed groups were

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State of Strife largely self-sustaining. However the economic aspects of conflict took on much greater importance following Ne Win’s 1962 coup. The abrupt nationalization of industries, the expulsion of most foreigners (including many Chinese and Indians who were essential in business), and the autarchic dogmas of Ne Win’s “Burmese Way to Socialism” paved the way for the collapse of the state economy. As black markets boomed, it was insurgent groups that controlled most frontier posts and were in strategic position to benefit. Every day such imported products as medicines, motors, and luxury items crossed through insurgent checkpoints, while cattle, opium, jade, and other raw materials flowed out of Burma the other way. On the surface, the trade may have looked small, but the sums involved could be huge. By 1987, when Burma’s economy had declined to Least Developed Country status at the United Nations, it was estimated that as much as U.S.$3 billion or 40 percent of the gross national product annually changed hands on the black market (Smith 1999: 98). Profitable trades emerged in every region of the country upon which different insurgent groups thrived. Especially notorious was the lucrative trade in illicit opium in the Shan state. As the KMT Gen. Tuan Shi-wen once commented, “To fight you must have an army, and an army must have guns, and to buy guns you must have money. In these mountains, the only money is opium.”17 However, so important did these economic dynamics become that they provoked drug wars of their own.18 In essence, control of the black market trade became the key to both military and political control. Against this backdrop, the lines between legality control of the black market and illegality were often indecipherable in the field trade became the key to both (Yawnghwe 1987). With front-lines military and political control and loyalties often shifting, no single organization could ever expect to win. Rather, leading actors on all sides became more concerned with the demands of maintaining their own territories than working for political solutions. As the KNU’s veteran strategist Skaw Ler Taw once commented, “Of all the problems the Karen National Union faced—military, political or financial—warlordism was the greatest.”19 Under the SLORC-SPDC, the political and economic landscape has changed once again. In particular, the post-1988 government has targeted

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Martin Smith the economy for control and market-oriented reform and, through an admixture of ceasefire agreements and rapprochement with neighboring countries, gained greater access to more areas of Burma than any previous administration. Against this backdrop, valuable new trades have escalated in everything from “legal” natural gas production to “illegal” logging and narcotics trafficking in the ethnic minority borderlands.20 Political reform, however, has yet to be achieved and, with ethnic opposition forces still active or in control of some key borderland areas, many underlying structures in the political economy of conflict remain. The question, then, remains whether political reforms and economic cooperation will finally bring to an end over six decades of insurgency or whether new economic policies will, conversely, instigate a new cycle of rebellion. Burma’s troubled history since independence has long since shown that the political and economic dimensions of conflict can never be completely separated. Militarization of the State In analysis of the ethnic and political aspects of conflict, it is often overlooked that post-colonial Burma has become one of the most militarized states in the world. The militarization of government, however, has developed parallel to the culture of insurgencies, with the bullet rather than the ballot box becoming the way to political power in the country. The consequences have been profound. Burma has remained under Tatmadaw-controlled government since 1962; ethnic politics have also been dominated by military leaders; and ex-Tatmadaw officers have achieved senior-most positions in the contemporary NLD. For such reasons, joining military forces in Burma can be historically identified as career choices for personal advancement as well as duty for combatants enlisting on the different sides. Equally damaging, such militarized politics have had a deeply divisive impact on nation-state formation in a country where non-Burman peoples feel excluded from a government and national armed forces that have become increasingly Burman-centric as the years have gone by. Prior to the British departure, the dangers of ethnic division in Burma’s armed forces were recognized by independence leaders. At the 1945 Kandy conference Aung San and national representatives agreed to amalgamate the BIA, Karen, Kachin, and other military units from the Second World War into a new Burma army. In essence, this meant integrating troops from two very different backgrounds and traditions: the Japanese-trained BIA

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State of Strife who were mostly Burmans (sometimes known as the “nationalist” wing) and the British-trained ethnic minorities (the “colonial” forces). The endeavor, however, was largely unsuccessful, setting the scene for many of the future polarizations in politics and society. The 1948–49 mutinies, especially, by pro-CPB, Karen, and Kachin units from the fledgling Tatmadaw became pivotal events in the traumas of modern-day Burma, and they nearly brought about government collapse. Against this backdrop of national implosion, Mary Callahan has identified how the contemporary Tatmadaw evolved from what was essentially a localized environment of different militia forces during the independence struggle, to its institutional dominance by the late 1950s, and to taking on what presentday SPDC officers regard as their “state-building” duties in the 21st century (Callahan 2003). It was an eventuality that no political actor foresaw during the socio-political chaos of the 1940s. However, the exclusive legitimacy that officers claim from the Tatmadaw’s role in the conflicts of these years remains the bedrock upon which military governments continue to base their validity. “Our Tatmadaw is an indispensable patriotic Tatmadaw which was initially formed during the period of struggle for independence,” stated Senior General Than Shwe in March 2006.21 Callahan, however, rejects the traditional academic literature to the effect that the Tatmadaw is a “political movement in military garb.”22 Instead, her research points to a more troubling reality: that the soldiers who have come to dominate the government and country since independence are “war fighters, first and foremost” (Ibid.: 2). This, it must be emphasized, has mainly been in fighting civil wars among the country’s own peoples. There has been only one major exception: the Kuomintang. Indeed it was the shock caused by the KMT invasion in late 1949 that may well have proven the decisive moment in causing Gen. Ne Win and his beleaguered Tatmadaw remnants to find unity as the nation’s guardians against the many competing militia and quasi-state organizations active at that time. Ethnic opposition forces, in contrast, sometimes allied with the KMT, while the CPB sought the AFPFL government’s downfall. Callahan thus argues that, to analyze the characteristics and emergence of military government in Burma, it is vital to understand the Tatmadaw’s war-fighting perspective which has been constantly reinforced during six decades of conflict. Indeed in Callahan’s view, war and state-building have become so interrelated in Burma as to produce the “most durable incarnation of military rule in history” (Ibid.: 3, 174). A similar conclusion is shared by

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the military analyst Andrew Selth who has dubbed the Tatmadaw a “virtual state within a state” because of its extraordinary dominance in Burma’s national life (Selth 2002: 270). Troop numbers doubled from 200,000 to over the Tatmadaw is today the 400,000 during the 1990s alone. In consequence, the Tatmadaw is today the th 18 largest armed force 18th largest armed force in the world, the in the world second largest in Southeast Asia, and has by far the largest military expenditure in national budget terms (generally estimated at about 40 percent) of any country in the region (Ibid.: 253). “Only if the Armed Force is strong, will the Nation be strong,” is the regime’s “nationbuilding” dictum (Swe 1991: 155). Such militarization in national politics has had serious consequences in such an ethnically-divided and conflict-torn country as Burma. In particular, the primacy of civil war and military rule have created a long-standing balance in relations between state and society that Charles Tilly terms “coercion-intensive” (Callahan 2003: 2–3). Beginning with the Public Order Preservation Act in the 1950s, heavy-handed security tactics have been employed by successive governments that have inflamed rather than addressed popular discontent. An especial grievance is the continuing “Four Cuts” campaign under which entire communities have been forcibly relocated since the 1960s in order to deny insurgent groups operational space in the rural countryside (Smith 1999: 258–62). Related to this, accommodationist policies never truly took root in 20th century Burma. Coercion, as Callahan demonstrates, was also a principal feature of the colonial state which the British “transplanted” from India (Callahan 2003: 24–31). However, unlike in such post-colonial countries as India and Malaysia, this lack of societal inclusion has continued in the “winner takes all” politics after Burma’s independence. Diverse opposition groups have rebelled; government leaderships have consisted of small groups of friends (primarily socialists pre-1962, military officers post1962); and since 1958 there have been three military coups. In this adversarial culture, peace talks between the leading combatants have been remarkably few and far between: notably, in 1949 with the KNU; the 1958 “Arms for Democracy” initiative of U Nu; the 1963–64 Peace Parley; 1980–81 talks with the CPB and the KIO; and the present ceasefires under the SLORC-SPDC that began in 1989.

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State of Strife Against this backdrop, democratic systems of governance—as well as notions of ethnic pluralism—have not become institutionalized or accepted since independence. Even political actors who have not taken up arms have been accused of “terrorism” or threats to break up the Union.23 Instead, rather than being the political solvers of conflict, Tatmadaw officers have become the managers of conflict in Burma’s coercion-intensive environment. It is an unending enterprise, with extensive intelligence and security infrastructures established to ensure that the Tatmadaw’s control of government is not threatened. Over the years, the post-1962 Burma Socialist Programme Party (now National Unity Party) and contemporary Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) have been established as civilian support to run parallel to the Tatmadaw administration. But this has never disguised the underlying military basis of government. In the conflict-zones, too, a plethora of local “home-guard” forces have been set up as auxiliary support for the government. These include the Sitwundan during the parliamentary era, the KaKweYe of the 1960s–70s, and a new generation of local Pyithusit (people’s militia) and “peace forces” today, ensuring the continuing primacy of military over civilian politics. The cohesion of society in Burma has paid a heavy price for such continuing military pre-eminence on the different sides. This is reflected not only in economic and humanitarian failures but in the increasing exclusion of minority peoples from participation in government. At independence, there were non-Burman cabinet ministers and senior Tatmadaw commanders. In the 21st century, it is hard to find any nonBurman in senior positions at all. In particular, the mutiny—or ousting— of both Karen and pro-communist officers from the Tatmadaw leadership within two years of it is hard to find any nonindependence removed important Burman in senior positions sources of alternative influence from central government, setting the scene for Ne Win’s reformation of the Tatmadaw along totalitarian lines. In this process, a key step was the removal of officers from the British military tradition, bringing the colonial legacy of the “two-wing” army to an end. Ne Win’s supporters were especially critical of what they called the “Karenisation of the Tatmadaw” and the influence of “Rightists” (Myoe 1998: 2–3). Instead, a unified structure of command was built around a nucleus of troops from Ne Win’s

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Martin Smith old regiment, the 4th Burma Rifles, many of whom were sympathetic to the Socialist Party. Some form of structural integration was sooner or later inevitable: the continuance of ethnically-separated units within the Tatmadaw was unsustainable. However, as fighting raged in different ethnic communities around the country, heavy-handed behavior and the increasing predominance of Burman officers only furthered the deepening sense of ethnic exclusion and conflict. In the following decades, as David Steinberg has written, “Burmanization” was to become “one of the major social changes under the military” (Steinberg 2001: 73). A Failed State, a Weak State, or a Shadow State? As a final legacy of conflict, consideration needs to be given to its negative consequences for state-building in Burma. Without doubt, the post-colonial experiences of nationwide insurgencies and the militarization of the state have been immensely debilitating. In the 2006 “Failed States Index” of the Fund for Peace, for example, Burma is estimated to have declined to 18th position in the world.24 Such a “failed state” categorization, however, does not explain the apparent stability of many societal and administrative organizations on different sides of the conflict lines—nor how many communities have remained surprisingly resilient throughout the hardships of war. For this reason, contemporary Burma represents a better example of the postcolonial phenomenon known as “weak state” and “strong societies.” By every criterion of political scientists such as Barry Buzan and David Brown, the evidence of strong societies in Burma—whether ethnic (e.g. Kachin, Mon, Shan), religious (Buddhist, Christian, Muslim), military-political (e.g. KNU, SSA, UWSA), or even business (Chinese, Indian)—has long contrasted with the structural weaknesses of the post-colonial state (Brown 1994: Buzan 1989). In key respects, therefore, Michael Aung-Thwin’s notion of “order without meaning” under the British colonial government has become a landscape of “disorder with meaning” after independence. In particular, such long-standing phenomena of conflict in Burma as “military coups,” “guerrilla movements,” “secessionist movements,” “mass uprisings,” and “political factionalism” can all be regarded as indicative of “weak states” where “national security” is perceived not so much as protection from

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State of Strife external threats (as in strong states), but rather as a response to internal threats (Buzan 1989: 19). As Barry Buzan has written: “Weak states either do not have, or have failed to create, a domestic political and social consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing element in the domestic political life of the nation” (Ibid. 1983: 66–67). Burma has long been such a land. There is a further paradigm to be considered: that of the “shadow state” (Reno 2000). As in other countries in conflict, decades of violence have had a profound effect on political culture and the formation of institutions in Burma. From independence through to the contemporary SLORC-SPDC, the state has often been administered on the basis of crisis-management, with different actors struggling to maintain their dominant positions— whether in government or in armed opposition. As a result, reforms in Burma have been introduced only in ad hoc form; democratic governance has never become established; and unregulated economies and insurgent movements have all flourished in a state that, in many respects, has remained only “shadow” in form.25 Such failures, however, do not imply the consequential breakdown of the state. Instead, political culture and the very system of government can evolve around the conditions of conflict in a shadow state. In particular, as William Reno has argued, rulers in shadow states prefer “weak formal and informal institutions” to prevent the emergence of organizations that can challenge their authority (Ibid.: 53). Similarly, power becomes personalized among military and socio-political elites who “fence off” local populations from participation in decision-making (Ibid.: 56–57). Equally pertinent, conflicts are fostered in the community by rulers since this is likely to encourage local leaders to seek the patronage of the state ruler rather than resolve disputes, as they formerly would have, among themselves (Ibid.: 49). As with the “failed” and “weak” state legacies, there is much in the “shadow state” paradigm that is recognizable in the experiences of postcolonial Burma. In the first decade of the 21st century, power is personalized in both government and opposition, military government and armed opposition movements continue, and the politics of inclusion are yet to take root. Trapped in a spiral of such long-standing malaise, the peoples of Burma clearly face formidable challenges in reconciliation and nation-state formation if sustainable peace and democratic reforms are ever to be achieved.

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Martin Smith

The Cycles of Conflict Given their longevity, the ethnic conflicts in Burma have often been regarded as a continuous flow. KNU supporters, for example, call the Karen struggle the “father to son” war, while the entire rationale of the present-day SPDC is built around the self-perception of the Tatmadaw as the only protector of the country against the post-independence threats of internal sedition, external invasion and “neo-colonialism.” Concentration, however, simply on a fractious landscape of such durability in its divisions can conceal that over the years there have been important changes in stakeholder strategies, international interventions and conflict peaks and troughs during which the cycles of conflict have been variously revitalized or subdued. Five different political eras stand out that have seen Burma transform since independence from a fledgling democracy deemed to have a respected future in the international community of nations to one of the most militarized and inward-looking states in the world. In every era, the dynamics of ethnic conflict have been integral to the country’s underachieving fate. Post-Colonial Failure of the State: A Country Goes Underground (1948–58) Political failure and the outbreak of insurgencies at independence were to have the most traumatic consequences for all the peoples of Burma. Even at this initial stage in nation-state formation, alienating patterns of confrontation and political exclusion from government were established that are yet to be resolved. Prior to the British departure, hasty efforts were made to achieve reconciliation. Most famously, a conference was held at Panglong in February 1947 at which the ethnic principles for a future Union were agreed on with Aung San. However only leaders of the Chin, Kachin and Shan peoples attended, and subsequently the KNU, then the most powerful nationality party in the country, boycotted elections to the constituent assembly at which Burma’s independence constitution was drawn up. The result was a constitution undermined by anomalies that reflected many of the “order without meaning” inconsistencies during British rule. A Karenni state and a Shan state, for example, were created with the right of secession after a 10-year period, while a Kachin state was also established

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but without this unusual right. However the Chins received only a “special division”; there was no ethno-political recognition of such groups as the Mon, Palaung, Pao, Rakhine, and Wa; and the exact demarcation of rights or territory for the Karens was left to be concluded until after independence. Even the democratic intention of the new constitution was open to interpretation for, although appearing federal in its principles, this was not explicit in its language (Silverstein 1980: 185–205). Aung San’s untimely assassination in July 1947 only added to the gathering storms. From this inauspicious start, Burma’s future conflict path was set. The combined outbreaks of the CPB and PVO insurgencies in 1948—and which then spread to such ethnic groups as the Karen, Karenni, Mon, Aung San’s...assassination Pao, and Rakhine by early 1949—could not have been more serious in their impact. in July 1947 only added to Vast swathes of the country fell under the the gathering storms control of a confusion of embryonic insurgent forces, including Mandalay, Pakokku, Thaton, and Insein on the very doorstep of Rangoon. No records were kept, but the human cost may well have reached as many as 60,000 deaths and over one million made homeless from conflict-related causes during the first two years of fighting (Smith 1999: 119). The wonder, then, is that the fledgling state endured. But out of such conditions of emergency, a transformation was taking place from which new political complexes emerged and future patterns of militancy took root. Importantly, neither the “aboveground” nor “underground” parties to the conflicts made reconciliation a priority; rather, the capture of power and holding on to government in Rangoon was the ultimate prize. Indeed a brief pause in fighting in April 1949, during which KNU leaders met with Prime Minister U Nu and Gen. Ne Win, marked the only peace talks of any consequence during the first years after independence. It is a failure in conflict resolution that veterans from these days came to regret. According to Saw Alfonzo Soe Myint, a former KNU commander and present-day peace intermediary, “Everyone—the communists, the socialists, the KNU—was spoiling for a fight in 1948. So perhaps the violence that took place could not have been avoided, but after two or three years it should have all been stopped.

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Martin Smith Among the people, the situation in the 1950s was not that bad. But it was our failure to achieve peace at that time which set the scene for everything that has followed.”26

Instead, the armed conflicts were allowed to drift on into the 1950s, while the competing parties sought to organize themselves in different communities across the divided country. For its part, the AFPFL government emphasized its ambitious “pyidawtha” (welfare state) program. The plan, however, was ultimately doomed, adding economic to political grievances in sustaining sympathies for insurgent causes during the parliamentary era. In the rural countryside, quasi-states proliferated under different armed opposition groups. During this impasse, such ethnic forces as the KNU and their Karenni, Mon, and Pao allies began to reorganize on revolutionary footings, setting up administrative structures that, in some cases, have continued into the 21st century. The confidence of ethnic leaders remained high, and the controversial renaming of the Karenni state as “Kayah” in 1951 and the delay until 1952 of the delineation of a Karen state only heightened militant feeling.27 The new Karen state did not include even one-quarter of the Karen population in Burma. In the actual “liberated zones,” however, the challenges of creating a united sense of identity and purpose were considerable for all the different insurgent forces. For example, ethnic Karens from around 20 sub-groups inhabit various parts of Burma and had never been administratively united under British rule. Similar challenges in cohesion existed among the Chin, Kachin, and other ethnic minority groups. In addition to different dialects and religions, there were significant social and economic disparities in some of the most impoverished regions of the country. Furthermore, as the 1950s progressed, armed ethnic leaders found that, while fighting the AFPFL government, they often had to deal with two equally pressing challenges to their local authority: one from the left—the CPB; and one from the right—the KMT. Such demands steadily eroded the ability of ethnic forces to sustain energy and momentum. Unlike their rivals, ethnic minority forces had no external support. In consequence, selfsufficiency and self-defense became the daily objectives of many armed opposition commanders, marking the beginnings of the “insurgency as a way of life” culture in the country. Eventually, recognizing the importance of “united front” political theory, the KNU, KNPP, PNO (Pao National Organization), and Mon

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People’s Front came together during 1956–58 to form the first interethnic alliance, the Democratic Nationalities United Front. It marked an important change in tactics. Although they still controlled large areas, insurgent groups no longer posed an immediate threat to government security in Rangoon and the main conurbations. Rather, ethnic insurgent forces formed just one element in the failed state landscape of Burma in the 1950s where political power was fragmented and characterized by ad hoc alliances between what Mary Callahan has described as “Rangoon elites and upcountry political bosses, guerrillas and black marketers” (Callahan 2003: 145). Many competing authorities were raising taxes and imposing their own laws across the country. According to Mika Rolly, then a KNU organizer in the Irrawaddy Delta, “Any man with three gunmen and a fish-pond could become a chief.”28 Burma was no longer on the brink of collapse. But critically, while parliamentary and insurgent leaders continued their rivalries, they failed to notice that another institution was emerging at precipitate speed: Ne Win’s Tatmadaw. On the different battlegrounds, the perspective had been growing among government commanders that the Tatmadaw was the “savior” of the country. In contrast, politicians and ethnic leaders were regarded as people who would destroy the Union and could not be trusted.29 Burma’s armed forces were about to assume state control. Military Government and the Reshaping of Conflict (1958–67) In historical terms, a new era in Burmese politics is usually adjudged to have begun with Gen. Ne Win’s 1962 military coup and the “Burmese Way to Socialism.” However Ne Win’s seizure of power was, in many respects, the culmination of a train of events set in process a few years earlier. The clearest warning of these trends was Ne Win’s “military caretaker” administration during 1958–60 Ne Win’s seizure of power when U Nu’s AFPFL government [in 1962] was...the culmination briefly stood down. Certainly, as Mary Callahan has shown, the of a train of events Tatmadaw’s own records refer to the 1958 takeover as the first coup and the 1962 coup as the second or “definitive” assumption of state power.

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Martin Smith The transition of government soldiers from “warriors” to “state builders” now appeared complete (Callahan 2003: 184–206). Ironically, 1958 had begun with one of the quietest periods in insurgent history. Under U Nu’s “Arms for Democracy” peace initiative, several thousand guerrillas officially “entered the light” from the Arakan People’s Liberation Party, Mon People’s Front, Pao National (Liberation) Organization, and short-lived Shan State Communist Party. Government negotiators reportedly offered the creation of Mon, Pao, and Rakhine states in return (Smith 1999: 168–69).30 At this critical moment, however, factional struggles within the AFPFL leadership between the “Stable” and “Clean” groupings left the door open to Ne Win to take control of government. Ostensibly, Ne Win’s takeover was only temporary and to prevent the communists from obtaining power. But the accession to prime minister by Burma’s supreme commander proved a landmark step in Burma’s modern history, from which there has been no real turning back. Almost unnoticed, Ne Win’s Tatmadaw had grown rapidly during the 1950s from just 2,000 loyalists in 1949 to over 100,000 troops a decade later. In the process, the Tatmadaw had become the largest commercial organization in the country, with interests in everything from banking to transport. Parallel with this institutional growth, senior officers increasingly put the blame on the country’s political parties, both aboveground and underground, for the ramshackle economy and failure to end such perennial strife. Under the “military caretaker” administration, in contrast, there was a marked toughening up in tactics. Hundreds of dissidents were arrested and the government claimed over 1,800 insurgent deaths against just 520 Tatmadaw losses during a 14-month period.31 Similarly, the hereditary Sawbwa leaders in the Shan and Kayah (Karenni) states were pressured into signing away their traditional rights. Both territories had been granted the right of secession after a 10-year period in the 1947 constitution, which was an eventuality that Ne Win was determined to prevent. Burman and AFPFL political leaders, however, did not try to halt the growing imminence of military rule. Ne Win’s handing back of power to U Nu after the 1960 general election had mostly quietened their concerns. Reaction, in contrast, was much more urgent in ethnic politics where distrust with the central government was palpably growing. Three responses were triggered in different ethnic networks across the country.

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State of Strife First, in the insurgent “liberated zones” the impetus towards “united front” tactics accelerated. This was symbolized by the 1959 formation of the National Democratic United Front (NDUF), which allied the CPB with the Karen National United Party faction of the KNU, the KNPP, the newly-formed NMSP, and the short-lived Chin National Vanguard Party. Their goal was to try and mobilize mass resistance to bring down the central government. The second response was the emergence of the “Federal Movement.” This was an aboveground initiative among nationality leaders who had become increasingly frustrated by political and economic marginalization in the new Union. Spearheaded by Burma’s first president Sao Shwe Thaike (an ethnic Shan), the Federal Movement advocated a looser “federalized” form of constitution in which powers would be equitably balanced between the ethnic minority and Burman-majority territories. These Burman-majority areas, in turn, would have to be reconstituted as one nationality state to ensure equality in ethnic representation throughout the country. The third reaction, however, was perhaps the most ominous: a growing radicalization of opinion among non-Burman peoples at the community level, especially among the young. In particular, following the 1958 formation of the Noom Suik Harn (“Young Warriors”), a new resistance movement spread rapidly among the Shans. Subsequently the Kachin Independence Organization was established in 1961 in northeast Burma, where tensions had been exacerbated by U Nu’s untimely attempt to declare Buddhism Burma’s state religion (most Kachins are Christians). Neither the Federal Movement nor the new generation of ethnic militants could be accused of responsibility for the political chaos after independence. Indeed Kachin and Shan leaders were signatories to the Panglong agreement, and for the previous decade they had stayed loyal to the Union, remaining apart from ethnic conflicts elsewhere in the country. Ne Win, however, rejected any discussion about pro-federal change. In March 1962, as Federal Movement leaders readied to meet with U Nu, Ne Win seized power, claiming, “Federalism is impossible; it will destroy the Union.”32 The leaders of the Federal Movement, U Nu and his cabinet were all arrested, and most remained for the next five years in jail where Sao Shwe Thaike died shortly afterwards. Burma’s brief era of parliamentary democracy had been brought to an abrupt end.

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Martin Smith Any expectations that Ne Win’s assumption of state control would end the insurgencies or bring ethnic peace were quickly confounded. An odd mixture of Buddhist, Marxist, and nationalist principles, the monolithic dogmas of Ne Win’s “Burmese Way to Socialism” were always likely to prove disastrous in a country of such diversity. As he sought to establish one-party rule under the new Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), Ne Win made only one public attempt at political inclusion. This was during the 1963–64 “Peace Parley” to which the NDUF (CPB, KNUP, KNPP, and NMSP), “Red Flag” CPB, KIO, KNU, the newly-formed Communist Party of Arakan, Noom Suik Harn, and other fledgling Shan forces sent representatives. In the various meetings, none of the ethnic parties formally demanded secession, although they continued to claim this conceptual right—a principle they equated with that of self-determination. But there was no real exchange of political views, with ethnic delegates later complaining that, in effect, they were only called upon to surrender. Ne Win, in particular, said that he was worried that formal ceasefires could lead to the partition of Burma, as had happened in Korea (Smith 1999: 210). Against this backdrop, only one ethnic force agreed to lay down its arms: a KNU faction led by Saw Hunter Tha Hmwe who said that he was weary of the constant “rightist” versus “leftist” arguments in the different insurgent camps. It was another quarter of a century—until the present-day era of the SLORC-SPDC—before such an inclusive process of peace talks was considered again. Following the Peace Parley breakdown, fighting immediately flared up around the country. Ne Win’s strategy was to isolate Burma from the world, while establishing a centralized system of government under parallel Tatmadaw and BSPP structures that would radiate out Win’s strategy was to isolate from Rangoon into the ethnic minority borderlands. The response, Burma from the world however, was a new generation of insurgent resistance. From the mid1960s, new armed ethnic movements proliferated, including the Kayan New Land Party, Rohingya Patriotic Front, Palaung State Liberation Party and three Shan forces, the Shan State Army, Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA), and Shan United Army (SUA). Meanwhile many Mon, Pao, and Rakhine veterans, who had given up their weapons during U Nu’s

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State of Strife “Arms for Democracy” initiative in 1958, disappeared back into the insurgent maquis. By the end of the 1960s, the deposed Prime Minister U Nu himself joined them with some former parliamentary colleagues. Under Ne Win’s BSPP, no place was to be allowed for compromise or dissenting views. As stark evidence, during 1965–67 the Tatmadaw first unveiled the draconian “Four Cuts” campaign, designed to cut all links in food, funds, intelligence, and recruits between insurgent groups and the civilian population. A virtual “free-fire” zone policy similar to the American “strategic hamlet” operations in Vietnam, it was an ominous warning of the worsening cycles in violence. Conflict in Burma was about to escalate again in intensity to a scale not seen since the darkest days of 1948–50. Internationalization and the Intensification of Civil War (1968–75) The years between 1968 and 1975 witnessed some of the fiercest battles in all six decades of armed conflict in Burma. The failures of the “Burmese Way to Socialism,” the new severity in Tatmadaw tactics, and the nationalization of all schools, media, and many businesses only increased ethnic alienation against a military government whose real objective, The years between 1968 and nationality leaders feared, was 1975 witnessed some of the “Burmanization.” In addition, many citizens regarded the BSPP fiercest...armed conflict government as illegitimate, as it had seized power and revoked the 1947 constitution. Indeed, with the suppression of all electoral parties, insurgent groups in the “liberated zones” were now the only opposition organizations in open existence. Ne Win, however, pushed on regardless. Following a much-disputed referendum, a new constitution was introduced in 1974 under which a new symmetry was created for Burma’s ethno-political map. In the future, there would be seven “divisions,” where the Burman majority mostly live, and seven ethnic “states” for the largest minorities: the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah (Karenni), Mon, Rakhine, and Shan. But such re-delineations did little to suppress dissidence, and armed resistance only continued to grow. It was against this worsening backdrop that international influences played a dramatic role in the intensification of Burma’s internal wars. Two major new fronts emerged.

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Martin Smith The first serious escalation came in 1968 with China’s decision to provide open support to the CPB against what the Beijing media termed Ne Win’s “fascism.”33 This followed anti-Chinese riots in Rangoon the previous year during which a number of deaths were reported. With Chinese military supplies, the CPB’s new Northeast Command (NEC) was able to seize control of much of the trans-Salween region adjoining Yunnan province by the early 1970s. Ultimately, the CPB was to run into as much opposition from local ethnic forces as from the Tatmadaw. But China’s support initially appeared to revive the CPB’s fortunes, disguising, in many respects, the serious losses that the party’s headquarters sustained in central Burma during the same period. By 1975, the CPB and its KNUP ally had been completely uprooted from the Pegu Yoma highlands and the Irrawaddy Delta in lower Burma. In contrast, in the Shan and Kachin state borderlands the CPB was building roads, extending its “liberated zones,” and even ran a radio station with China’s backing. The result was that the CPB, which was mainly led by ethnic Burmans, gained an influence in ethnic politics that was out of proportion to any popular support or party capabilities. By the mid-1970s, the CPB claimed to have “liberated” over 500,000 ethnic minority villagers in the NEC under its party organization. The human costs, however, were appalling, leaving a legacy of humanitarian emergency and resentment that still lingers on in the 21st century. In the 1970 Mongsi battle alone, the Tatmadaw claimed to have killed over 500 communist troops that were using human tidal wave tactics, while between 1968 and 1973 CPB commanders estimated to have killed or wounded over 11,000 government troops in pitched battles that went virtually unreported in the outside world (Smith 1999: 254–56). Of civilian casualties, there are no reliable records. The second major front was in southeast Burma where successive Thai governments continued to strengthen their border “buffer state” policies during the 1960s and 1970s in defense against communist insurgencies then rife in the region. Initially, the main beneficiary appeared to be the deposed Prime Minister U Nu and his insurgent Parliamentary Democracy Party after he took up arms with the KNU, NMSP, and the short-lived Chin Democracy Party in the National United Liberation Front (NULF: 1970–74). However U Nu’s alliance with his former ethnic opponents was always uneasy. The goal of the NULF was a “federal union republic,” but KNU and NMSP leaders always demanded the constitutional right of secession. This U Nu

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State of Strife adamantly refused, precipitating the NULF’s early collapse. For his part, the KNU’s veteran president Bo Mya described the whole NULF experience as “hopeless.”34 Despite these failures, the NULF’s foundation provided a powerful boost to insurgent politics in southern Burma. At first, U Nu enjoyed quasi-CIA backing in his bid to regain state power from bases in the Thai borderlands. Subsequently, with the PDP’s decline, the Thai authorities simply continued their “buffer state” tolerance of such ethnic forces as the KNU, KNPP, NMSP, SSA, SURA, SUA, and “Chinese” KMT along the 1,304-mile frontier. The Thai intention, which was largely successful, was to block China’s military assistance from reaching the Communist Party of Thailand. Indeed the family lines of many ethnic forces actually lay inside the Thai borders, where they were regarded as performing the role of a “foreign legion.” Such tacit support from Thailand—combined with Burma’s burgeoning black market—set up a new political dynamic in the southeast of the country that was quite different from the military socialism of Ne Win in Rangoon or the CPB’s “people’s war” in the northeast. A new chapter was opening. Almost unnoticed in the outside world, the different ethnic forces had become significant national players in their own right. Indeed by the mid-1970s the KNU’s political leader Mahn Ba Zan argued that the conflicts in Burma had taken on a triangular shape: i.e., between the BSPP, the CPB, and the different national minorities.35 After thirty years of armed struggle, Burma’s ethnic forces were about to achieve their most effective decade in military resilience and political unity since independence. National Impasse and State Decline (1976–88) From the late 1970s onwards, Burma’s decline towards socio-economic collapse was inexorable. After the introduction of the 1974 constitution, national life entered a time warp and government practices rarely changed. The BSPP was dominated by serving or retired military officers, with government increasingly subject to Ne Win’s whim. In one softening of policy, an amnesty was announced in 1980 under which U Nu and a number of PDP and CPB veterans returned home. Unsuccessful peace talks were also held with the CPB and (separately) the KIO during 1980– 81. But such face-to-face contacts between battlefield opponents very much marked the exception.

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Martin Smith Against this backdrop of stalemate, government offensives continued in the different states and divisions. But the systematic tactics that had cleared armed opposition forces from central Burma by the mid-1970s proved far less effective in the borderlands. Here government lines were over-stretched and insurgent groups controlled frontier sanctuaries where they could retreat. Fueling resentment, too, government troops were seriously under-resourced, and their behavior became increasingly predatory towards local villagers. Forced labor and the ransacking of villages for food were commonplace. Since many non-Burman villagers in the borderlands do not speak Burmese, the ethnic dimensions of conflict were also exacerbated. A particularly notorious action was the heavy-handed Nagamin census operation in the northern Rakhine state during 1978 which caused over 200,000 Muslim inhabitants to flee into Bangladesh.36 Somewhat paradoxically, the last decade of BSPP rule marked an almost halcyon period for insurgent groups. Buoyed by the booming black market and anti-government disaffection, many ethnic forces grew markedly in strength. Armed opposition organizations controlled virtually the entire eastern borders of Burma, from the Tenasserim division in the south to the Kachin state in the far north. The three strongest ethnic forces, the KNU, KIO, and SSA, each maintained over 5,000 troops in the field and, like the CPB’s People’s Army, were capable of fighting the Tatmadaw in the fixed positions of conventional war, which was vital for the defense of border strongholds and trading posts. Crucially, however, even at this high point in the insurgency cycle, opposition forces were unable to seriously threaten government control. As in previous political eras, there was no single reason for their failures. Rather, in the “insurgency as a way of life” culture that had developed, a complex admixture of factors pertained, including geo-politics, factionalism, and differing ideological goals. In particular, not only were ethnic forces in competition with both the BSPP and CPB, but there were also local rivalries among ethnic organizations which, despite occasional guerrilla attacks, had no territorial designs on Rangoon or the Burman heartlands. For their part, Tatmadaw strategists sought to keep opposition divisions on the boil. In 1973 the pro-government KaKweYe militia had been dismantled in the Shan state due to their opium-trafficking activities. But many members simply returned underground, with the most important of these forces, the SUA (Loimaw) faction of Khun Sa, swiftly becoming a sizable thorn in the side of other insurgent groups upon Khun Sa’s 1976

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State of Strife release from jail. By attacking the PNO, SSA, and other ethnic forces along the Thai border, Khun Sa built up the 15,000-strong Mong Tai Army (MTA) during the 1980s and, on his own admission, took control of two thirds of the narcotics trade with Thailand.37 Unlike ethnic nationality and communist forces, however, Khun Sa’s troops rarely fought with the Tatmadaw. In many respects, Khun Sa was always a maverick operator, as his 1996 “surrender” to the SLORC-SPDC government later showed, and his extraordinary rise during the 1970s and 1980s was more a symptom of Burma’s conflicts than a cause. Certainly, it was not only in the Shan state that insurgent groups and vested interests were making sizable fortunes at this time. As the KNU leader Mahn Ba Zan warned in 1981, “The Karens can survive poverty, but I am not so sure they will be able to withstand prosperity” (Smith 1999: 395). In general, however, from the late 1970s onwards it was the political questions of ideology and strategy that preoccupied the leaderships of the main ethnic parties. In particular, the long-standing rivalry with the CPB finally came to a head during these years. Not only had the CPB gained control of many borderland regions, but a number of ethnic movements had split over ideologies (notably the Karenni, Lahu, and Pao), with breakaway factions allying with the CPB. In response, leaders of the KNU, KNPP, and many other ethnic parties remained strongly opposed to the CPB. Adding to the political momentum for change, the demise of U Nu’s PDP and the NULF had created a new vacuum in united front relationships. As ethnic leaders recognized, in the triangular battle with the BSPP and CPB there was no singular voice for the ethnic nationality cause. These reflections led in 1976 to the formation of the nine-party National Democratic Front (NDF). This was the first alliance of any countrywide weight between the main ethnic forces in three decades of combat. Subsequently, the NDF parties agreed in 1984 to adopt common federal goals, dropping any secessionist demands in a bid to win both international and Burman-majority support. Declared the NDF: The NDF does not want racial hatred. It is struggling for liberty, equality and social progress of all indigenous races of Burma because Burma is a multi-national state inhabited and owned by all.38

Following this 1984 agreement, a new sense of purpose appeared in ethnic politics. Joint NDF battalions were set up on three different fronts in Burma; NDF delegations began lobbying abroad; and in March 1986 an

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Martin Smith NDF delegation traveled to the CPB’s headquarters at Panghsang on the China border where an NDF-CPB military accord was signed. For the first time in the history of the insurgencies, a joint alliance existed between all the major anti-government forces in Burma. Shortly afterwards, the KNU’s veteran president Gen. Bo Mya, a staunch anti-communist, disowned the agreement. But the symbolic importance of the moment was still clear. After a quarter century of international isolation, the winds of change were gathering. Burma’s disparate ethnic forces appeared on the ascendancy; China’s backing for the CPB was in decline; and, following two demonetizations of the Burmese currency in 1985 and 1987, it was Ne Win’s “Burmese Way to Socialism” that was on the brink of collapse. The gravity of the situation was brought home to all citizens in late 1987 when Burma was admitted to Least Developed Country status at the UN. Subsequently, Ne Win resigned in July 1988 against a growing backdrop of student unrest, and the country was immediately convulsed by mass [By] late 1987...Burma...[had pro-democracy demonstrations declined to] Least Developed that brought down the BSPP government. In September that year Country status a younger generation of Ne Win loyalists forcefully suppressed the protests in scenes that shocked the world and re-assumed Tatmadaw control in the new State Law and Order Restoration Council. “I saved the country,” claimed Gen. Saw Maung, the first SLORC chairman.39 Burma’s second era of post-colonial government was over, and it had also ended in a military takeover. During a turbulent passage in world history that witnessed both the ending of the Cold War and the dramatic events of China’s Tiananmen Square, Burma’s long-suffering peoples watched expectantly to see what would happen next. New Strategies and New Deadlocks: Military Government Renewed (1988–2006) Following the 1988 upheavals, Burma’s political landscape initially appeared transformed. Three seemingly epoch-shaping events stood out in quick succession: the 1988 pro-democracy protests that brought down the BSPP government; the 1989 ethnic mutinies which witnessed the CPB’s collapse

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and emergence of the UWSA and three other nationality forces in northeast Burma; and the 1990 general election that resulted in a landslide victory for the NLD and 19 newly-formed nationality parties. Within just three years, the two main parties—the BSPP and CPB—that had dominated national politics for the previous quarter century had fallen. Instead, a completely new party had victoriously appeared on the scene, headed by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of the late independence hero Aung San. It was, she said to massed crowds in Rangoon, Burma’s “second struggle for national independence.” In this volatile environment, the prospects for Burma’s armed ethnic organizations appeared enhanced by the 1988 events. Following the SLORC takeover, thousands of students and political activists fled into the NDF “liberated zones,” where a new cycle of insurgencies was cemented by the 1992 formation of the National Council Union of Burma (NCUB). This 30-party alliance brought together the existing nine NDF parties with Following the SLORC takeover, exile NLD MPs-elect from the National Coalition Government thousands of students and Union of Burma (NCGUB) and a political activists fled plethora of new underground movements among the Burman majority. As Josef Silverstein argued, there were now “two centers of politics” in Burma, and it was to the NDFKNU’s “border area capital” at Mannerplaw that the center was moving (Silverstein 1997: 129). During 1988–92 fierce fighting once again raged in several border regions, with the numbers of refugees and exiles for the first time beginning to rise into the hundreds of thousand figures, including large diasporas in Thailand, Bangladesh, India and countries further abroad. From this crisis point, however, momentum faltered and events started to move in directions that were not widely predicted during the 1988 upheavals. Certainly, socio-political life was never moribund in Burma. In particular, the three-cornered conflict between the BSPP, CPB, and NDF during the Ne Win era was swiftly replaced by a new triangular formulation: the Tatmadaw government of the SLORC-SPDC; the prodemocracy movement led by the NLD; and the country’s diverse ethnic minority groups. This three-sided equation attracted widespread attention, including by the UN which during the 1990s began trying to foster peace

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Martin Smith and democratic transition in Burma through the notion of “tri-partite dialogue.” Such an inclusive process of discussion, however, never occurred. Instead, the legacies of conflict and militarization remained dominant, and it was actors within military-based circles, rather than aspirations expressed through democratic forms, that continued to determine the political and economic direction of the country. Neither the NLD nor the different ethnic opposition groups were able to initiate national agendas for change. Rather, four very different dynamics came to characterize the reformulation of politics and conflict during the SLORC-SPDC era: the ethnic ceasefires, the political economy, actions taken by Asian neighbors, and the Tatmadaw’s own agendas for change. The first new dynamic, the ethnic ceasefires, was a policy initiated by the Military Intelligence chief, Gen. Khin Nyunt, in 1989 in the aftermath of the ethnic mutinies from the CPB. It was the first peace initiative on such scale since 1963–64. Significantly, peace talks were never offered by the SLORC-SPDC to any Burman-based groups under arms, including the All Burma Students Democratic Front which initially grew rapidly in the 1988–89 period.40 Critics have therefore always made the accusation that the post-1989 ceasefires were offered simply as a way to buy the military government time when it was under maximum pressure from democracy groups in urban areas and when it appeared that the UWSA and CPB mutineers might join with the NDF in the ethnic borderlands. Despite these suspicions, the ceasefire agreements gradually spread from a slow beginning to involve 17 main groups by the mid-1990s, including not only the CPB mutineers and the Mong Tai Army of Khun Sa but such important NDF members as the KIO, PNO, NMSP, and SSA (see Appendix: “Status of Ethnic Parties, 2006”). Among veteran forces, only the KNU and KNPP (both of which also had talks) failed to conclude terms. In general, such non-ceasefire groups, most of which are based around the Thai border, remained heavily linked with exile and underground fronts, principally with the NCUB. The one major exception was the SSASouth, which was formed by Shan units that rejected the MTA’s 1996 “surrender” and returned to armed struggle. Ceasefire leaders, in contrast, argued that the peace agreements provided a valid opportunity to re-enter national politics after so many years in the insurgency wilderness. In their view, no surrender or loss of legitimacy was implied by the ceasefires. As they pointed out, the terms offered were

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State of Strife straightforward: the ceasefire groups would be allowed to maintain their arms and territories until a new constitution was introduced. In addition, insurgent leaders were very conscious that, although they often had close links with the new electoral parties, they had not been able to stand in the 1990 general election themselves. Thus if armed opposition groups were to really represent their peoples, they argued that they had to be on the inside process of reform discussions in the cities which, many assumed, the NLD would sooner or later join. Adding to this peace dynamic, the ceasefires were widely welcomed in many war-weary communities where leaders from such religious-based organizations as the Kachin Baptist Convention and Catholic Bishops Conference played intermediary roles. As the UWSA announced on its radio station before its ceasefire, “Every year the burden of the people has become heavier. At such a time, what can the people of all nationalities do?”41 In particular, many nationality leaders noted that, by the early 1990s, very few among the Burman population were actually continuing armed struggle against the military government. This fueled the perception that, once again, it was the non-Burman peoples who were suffering the most for the political failures in the country at large. As a result, disillusion quickly spread toward many of the new Burmanbased groups and factions that had entered the ethnic “liberated zones” after 1988, echoing the failures with both the insurgent CPB and U Nu’s PDP in earlier political eras. The NLD leadership, too, included former Tatmadaw officers, such as ex-Gen. Tin Oo, whom ethnic commanders knew from opposing sides on the battlefields. A saying thus developed among ceasefire leaders that, if negotiations were needed, it was better to deal with Burman leaders who actually had power—not those in exile or without influence. Despite such arguments, as the years passed by some very different opinions came to be voiced about the real value and intentions of the ceasefires. By the mid-1990s, a complex change in relationships was underway between former adversaries and stakeholders on different sides of the conflict zones, and this blurred the alignments in national politics even more in the operational field. Against this background, the second dynamic—that of Burma’s political economy—became increasingly dominant in transforming the national landscape. At the time of the original peace agreements, which were mostly unwritten, few concrete discussions had taken place about economic issues.

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Martin Smith Negotiators generally believed that development programs, notably the government’s Border Areas Development Program (started in 1989 and upgraded into a ministry in 1992), would help support peace and reconciliation until substantive political talks could begin. It quickly transpired, however, that neither the government nor ceasefire groups had sufficient resources for the enormous tasks of community rehabilitation that were needed. All Western development aid had been cut off to Burma in 1988 in protest at the SLORC’s assumption of power, and into the 21st century the regime continued to be treated as an international pariah by many governments and aid organizations in the West.42 In this economic vacuum, the ceasefires came to provide the backdrop for a new era of wheeler-dealing as many key stakeholders in Burma’s shadow economies emerged into new light. Initially the best-known enterprise was the Asia World company connected to the family of the former Kokang KaKweYe leader Lo Hsing-han, which soon became one of Burma’s biggest conglomerates with interests in everything from hotels to road construction. With personal patronage the order of the day, ideologies appeared dropped and “resource wars” instead became the new competition between leading figures on both the government and armed opposition sides. Burma’s internal conflicts indeed took on many of the aspects of the “new wars”—dominated by the political economy—in the post-Cold War age (Duffield 2001, Keen 2001). As in previous political eras, the lines between legality and illegality were often unclear. In particular, Burma’s illicit opium trade in the Shan state rapidly escalated again to become, at one stage, the world’s largest. But even when crop substitution programs were introduced by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in the Kokang and Wa illicit opium trade...rapidly hills, a lucrative new trade in methamphetamines appeared, escalated again to become...the using many of the same Chinese world’s largest trafficking syndicates. From the turn of the century, there were estimates of over 700 million tablets smuggled into Thailand annually. This sparked, in turn, new border wars between the ceasefire UWSA and nonceasefire SSA-South, with all sides trading accusations of culpability (Jelsma, Kramer, and Vervest 2005).

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State of Strife The drugs trade, however, was only the most notorious example. With the abandonment of the “Burmese Way to Socialism,” competition increased in every commercial field. New economic complexes including government departments, trading companies, ceasefire organizations, and non-ceasefire groups all became involved in such financial ventures as logging, gemmining, and dredging for gold. In the Kachin state, for example, the SLORC-SPDC gradually took over authority for most of the jade trade previously controlled by the ceasefire KIO. Another new source of “greed and grievance” was the timber trade, with widespread deforestation occurring first in the Thai borderlands in the late 1980s before sweeping up to the Kachin state borderlands with China by the turn of the century (Global Witness 2005). In their defense, ethnic leaders argued that these were the only sources of available income to provide for their war-damaged communities. The real profits, however, were not being made by the people or even by many of the armed organizations themselves. Instead, it was government-backed groups and Asian neighbors who had the business networks and infrastructure to gain maximum benefit from the opening of Burma’s doors to international trade. This leads to the third factor in the reshaping of conflict dynamics after 1988: the actions of Asian neighbors. In a country in such turmoil, Asian backing proved to be the military government’s most vital lifeline. Far from rejecting the SLORC-SPDC, all neighboring governments gradually changed their policies of tolerance or support for opposition groups to a new strategy of “constructive engagement” with the regime. This began with China and Thailand during 1988–89 and included Bangladesh and India by the 21st century. In a major geo-political shift, China became the largest source of foreign military supplies to the SLORC-SPDC,43 bringing post1988 Burma very much within China’s orbit after it cut its support to the CPB. Another benchmark moment was Burma’s 1997 membership in ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), highlighting the end of Ne Win’s isolationism. The reasons for such epoch-shaping changes in Asian policies cannot be simplified to a few narrative events. All of Burma’s neighbors have long had to engage with complex security and humanitarian challenges along what remain some of the least regulated borders in Asia. For the most part, neighboring authorities have generally remained sympathetic to cross-

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Martin Smith border realities after 1988; this has included allowing refugee in-flows and voicing support for democratic change. At the same time, they also privately made clear to ethnic opposition leaders their desire to improve governmentto-government relations with what they have always regarded a troublesome neighbor. This priority seems set to continue in the 21st century.44 In the actual front line, however, there was also a less altruistic motive: that of economic opportunism. Since the 1950s, business networks in neighboring countries had remained key players in Burma’s borderland economies and, under the post-1988 “open door” policies, they were well-placed to move in. In contrast, Western governments, which mainly concentrated on the issues of democratization, underestimated the importance of regional dynamics and changes in Burma’s political economy. In media terms, it has been the new gas pipelines to Thailand through territory previously controlled by the KNU that attracted most international attention, becoming the subject of lawsuits in the U.S. against the oil company Unocal for alleged human rights abuses against local Karen villagers (EarthRights International 2000). In response to such concerns, from 1997 the U.S. government banned future American investments in Burma, subsequently passing the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act in 2003. But Asian neighbors rarely felt such cautions, and from the early 1990s cross-border trade and investments steadily continued to grow. Statistics are often unreliable, and, in the absence of transparent reforms, the same “licit-illicit” complexity in many of the natural resource trades has continued from the BSPP era. The largest projects are in the energy field, with new gas pipelines expected to come online during the next decade from the Rakhine state coast to both China and India as well as major hydro-electric projects involving Chinese and Thai investors along Burma’s Salween river.45 Other businesses, however, were much harder to account for. As new business elites emerged, fortunes were clearly being made somewhere along these new economic routes, both in-country and abroad. During 2004–05 for example, forest products were estimated to constitute Burma’s second most important source of “legal” foreign exchange, but “about 98 per cent” of China’s recorded imports of timber from Burma in 2003 was “illegal” (Global Witness 2005: 9). Indeed it was over alleged corruption that the ceasefire architect and later prime minister, Gen. Khin Nyunt, was himself purged along with many senior officers in 2004 when

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State of Strife a major profiteering racket was reported on the China border. The entire Military Intelligence Service was shut down and dozens of military officers received long jail terms. Few observers, however, believed that this was either the complete cause of their downfall or the extent of corruption. In the changing economy since 1988, the reputations of all military groups in Burma have been tainted because of political failures and apparent business priorities. Such criticisms further deepened because of in-fighting among a number of ethnic movements. Clashes between the ceasefire UWSA and non-ceasefire SSA-S as well as the 1994 split between the KNU and breakaway Democratic Karen Buddhist Army are only the most-publicized examples.46 In addition, fighting has periodically erupted in several border areas between the SLORC-SPDC and the remaining non-ceasefire forces, especially with the KNU, KNPP, and the SSA-South. In these operations, the control of resources has also become an important source of conflict. By 2006, for example, the Thailand Burma Border Consortium estimated that there were half a million internally-displaced persons in eastern Burma alone, due to a combination of “conflict-induced” and “developmentinduced” causes.47 But caught between powerful regional and government dynamics, many local peoples and community groups felt unable to act or have their voices heard. From outside of Burma, therefore, the socio-political landscape may often have looked chaotic. However, as Jake Sherman has noted, the SLORC-SPDC was able to gain significant advantage after 1988 through its concentration on the political economy (Sherman 2003). In particular, the government’s utilization of both offensive military and informal ceasefire tactics against the different ethnic forces has long since achieved its primary objectives—those of preventing effective alliances between non-Burman and Burman opposition groups; achieving a “durable” way of reducing hostilities; and generating revenue for both the ceasefire groups and government as an interim measure (Ibid. 2003). “In this respect, Burma more closely fits the historical pattern of state formation, whereby peripheral areas are incrementally incorporated through a mixture of coercion and cooptation,” Sherman concluded (Ibid.: 246). In essence, the Tatmadaw’s tactics may have appeared ad hoc. But by prioritizing the political economy, they have generally proved effective in reducing conflict and threats to the government at a time of instability and political change.

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Martin Smith This leads to the final dynamic in the re-shaping of Burma’s conflict landscape since 1988: the military government’s own agenda for political change. With the ceasefires in place and cross-border support from Asian neighbors, Senior General Than Shwe and the post-1988 leaders were able to concentrate on the consolidation of Tatmadaw-based government into the 21st century. In justifying military control, the legacy of armed conflicts remains integral to the regime’s self-perception, with the Tatmadaw designated the only organization that can maintain national peace and stability. On this basis, three “national causes”—national defense, national security, and national unity—are declared the historic prerogatives of the Tatmadaw in its post-1988 transition from a socialist to a “nationbuilding” role in the creation of a “new democratic state” (Swe 1998: 153–61). To consolidate this primacy, the leading role of the Tatmadaw in “national political life” must be incorporated as a main principle in Burma’s future constitution. The result is a political paradox. At a time of proclaimed bridgebuilding towards peace and democracy, the Tatmadaw doubled in size during the SLORC-SPDC era. Meanwhile the NLD and other prodemocracy parties were repressed, and military offensives launched against ethnic opposition forces that did not agree to ceasefires. At the same time, a new civilian movement was built up, the Union Solidarity and Development Association, which, with over 20 million members, is expected to become a political party at some stage in the future. Moreover, with the 2005 establishment of the new capital at Nay Pyi Taw, the SLORC-SPDC era began to take on an increasingly dynastic shape, with nationalist echoes of Buddhist kingdoms during the pre-colonial era. The question, however, remained as to how the military government would deliver on its oft-repeated promises of democratic reforms. Having side-stepped the 1990 election result, a National Convention was started by the government in 1993 to draw up a new constitution with selected representatives from eight different classes and organizations in national society, including the ceasefire groups.48 The NLD, too, was initially represented, although it later pulled out in 1995 in protest against restrictions on freedom of expression. It then took until August 2003 for a “seven-stage roadmap” towards “disciplined democracy” to be announced by the government, providing the first indication of a reform schedule.49 In mid-2004 the National Convention eventually resumed. But once again, the trends in national politics became divergent and exclusive.

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State of Strife Aung San Suu Kyi was not released from house arrest so the NLD did not rejoin convention meetings; Prime Minister Khin Nyunt was purged shortly afterwards along with many leading pragmatists in government; Tatmadaw operations were stepped up against the KNU, SSA-S, and other non-ceasefire forces; and the first pressures started on the ethnic ceasefire groups to be ready to disarm. This, in turn, increased speculation as to what the different ethnic forces would decide if deadlines were enforced for giving up their arms: would they return to armed struggle or would they continue their policies of compromise when a new constitution is introduced? This time, however, it was not only inside the country that concerns were expressed about Burma’s political crisis. In September 2006, after 15 years of failed UN attempts to support democratic transition, Burma was placed on the formal agenda of the UN Security Council on the basis that continuing conflicts and humanitarian In September 2006...Burma was emergencies might cause a “threat” to international placed on the formal agenda of the peace and stability. This UN Security Council decision was reached after intensive lobbying in the United States, 50 and a Security Council resolution was subsequently vetoed by both China and Russia. But even among Asian neighbors diplomatic support for the SPDC was showing signs of waning. Asian governments did not agree with international isolation as a way to bring about socio-political change. However they are very well-informed about realities on the ground. As one community leader privately summarized Burma’s impasse, “We have ceasefires, but we do not have peace.”

The Contemporary Landscape The Ethnic Response and Burma’s New Constitution In Burma’s contentious landscape after 1988, four different groupings emerged as new complexes in ethnic politics during the SLORC-SPDC era (see Appendix: “Status of Ethnic Parties, 2006”). Reflecting Burma’s “weak state-strong societies” paradigm, most of these networks were well rooted in

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Martin Smith their communities. Despite periodic outbreaks of rivalries, many parties were also quietly interconnected in the local regions.51 The first grouping was the ethnic ceasefire forces which, following various splits and defections, had increased to 28 organizations or militia recognized by the SPDC at the National Convention’s resumption in 2004. In general, these forces could be distinguished by three main outlooks or legacies: the former National Democratic Front groups; the ex-CPB members and allies; and local defense and business-focused militia who had emerged in the new “get rich quick” economy after 1988. Despite such political recognition, however, only half the ceasefire groups—largely the NDF and CPB-related parties—could be considered representative of their peoples in either organization or size. The second ethnic grouping was the non-ceasefire forces. Although such insurgent organizations as the KNU and KNPP also had peace talks with the SLORC-SPDC, they had not reached sustainable agreements. On paper, over a dozen non-ceasefire groups remained active in the borderlands in 2006, most of which remained inter-linked with the NDF and National Council Union of Burma that advocate a federal Union. But without such ethnic forces as the ceasefire KIO, PNO, and SSA, the NDF and NCUB organizations had become shadows of their former selves. Instead, in terms of international publicity, the diaspora from Burma was becoming increasingly important among both Burman and non-Burman organizations in the borderlands, including the consultative Ethnic Nationalities Council (founded 2001). Insurgent activity inside Burma, in contrast, was much reduced. Only four non-ceasefire groups maintained military forces of any strength, and they all represented ethnic minorities: the KNU, KNPP, SSA-S, and Chin National Front.52 In northwest Burma, especially, insurgent forces among both the Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim communities had collapsed since the mid-1990s in the face of sustained Tatmadaw operations and pressures from the Bangladesh and India authorities. The third grouping, in contrast, was an entirely new entity: electoral parties that took part in the 1990 election when 19 nationality parties won seats. Most were allied in the 1988 United Nationalities League for Democracy, forming the second largest block of victorious candidates after the NLD. They also supported the formation of a federal union of Burma, and several joined with the NLD in the 1998 Committee Representing the People’s Parliament. Subsequently, the United Nationalities Alliance (UNA) was formed in 2002 to support political focus on the ethnic nationality

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State of Strife cause during the continuing stand-off between the military government and the NLD. In particular, veteran nationality leaders said that they wanted to ensure that the marginalization of ethnic views during both the parliamentary and BSPP eras did not repeat itself under the SLORCSPDC.53 In this respect, the UNA’s advocacy role has echoes of the Federal Movement in the early 1960s. Finally, the fourth grouping consists of the community-based organizations. With the ceasefires and the prospect of humanitarian relief in the conflict-zones, many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) sprang into new life. This community resurgence fitted in with a national pattern observed by international aid workers (both UN and NGO), who were allowed to return to the country in increasing numbers from the mid1990s. Indeed by one calculation the 1990s witnessed the fastest decade of NGO growth in Burma’s history (Heidel 2006). At first, many of these networks were religious-based, such as those supported by the Myanmar Council of Churches. But subsequently, indigenous NGOs were set up in local communities, including the Metta Development Foundation, the Shalom Peace Foundation, and the Karen Development Network. In these developments observers saw the potential re-emergence of a previously dormant civil society without which peace and democracy are unlikely to be sustainable (Burma Center Netherlands 1999: Hlaing 2004: Steinberg 2006). Along Burma’s frontiers, too, foreign donors aiding refugee and borderland groups also supported the promotion of grass-roots initiatives as a parallel “civil society” track to support democratic transition. Such groups multiplied from the early 1990s, especially in advocacy and research.54 Thus Burma’s ethnic landscape gradually but significantly changed under the SLORC-SPDC government from Ne Win’s BSPP days. As in other political eras, the situation remained fragmentary on the surface. But what was striking about most parties in the new groupings was not their diversity but, rather, the private unity of their views: the need for peace and democratic reforms to achieve equal rights for all the different peoples of the Union. As ethnic leaders maintained, where political divisions occurred, they were very often due to the exigencies of self-survival in communities that were suffering from the debilitating consequences of decades of war. In terms of political strategy, only two outlooks predominated: first, among those organizations, notably the ceasefire and community-based groups, which advocated a process of “peace through development”; and second, among parties that advocated a principle of “political solutions”

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Martin Smith first. This latter grouping included such veteran forces as the KNU and KNPP who argued that anything less than a political settlement would be a betrayal of the many sacrifices made by their peoples in the struggles since independence. The NLD, too, maintained a “political solutions” line, based upon democratic principles and the legitimacy of the 1990 general election. But despite these differences, by the turn of the century nearly all the different opposition groups and networks came to support the UNbacked concept of a “tri-partite” solution to bring peace and democracy to Burma. The only real questions were when and how such a “tri-partite” dialogue might begin. After much behind-the-scenes lobbying, hopes eventually came to focus on the resumption of the National Convention in mid-2004 to finish drawing up the principles for Burma’s new constitution. With the backing of the special envoy of the UN Secretary-General, private discussions took place between government and opposition officials in the preceding year. These discussions suggested that not only all the ceasefire groups and the NLD would join the National Convention, but even non-ceasefire representatives if new truces could be agreed. Such hopes were dashed with the government’s failure to release Aung San Suu Kyi in May 2004 and the subsequent arrest of Prime Minister Gen. Khin Nyunt, the ceasefire architect. In early 2005, a number of prominent Shan leaders, including Hkun Htun Oo of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy and Hso Ten of the ceasefire SSA, were also arrested and sentenced to jail terms of up to 106 years for alleged sedition. Such actions cast a huge shadow over the country, reminiscent of the detention of Prime Minister U Nu and the leaders of the Federal Movement during Ne Win’s 1962 coup.55 Despite these clampdowns, the ethnic ceasefire groups continued to attend the National Convention following its 2004 restart, with nationality representatives constituting over half the delegates. In general, the ceasefire groups presented their demands in two main blocks: a 13-party group led by ex-NDF parties which sought a federal union of Burma; and a fourparty ex-CPB group that proposed autonomous regions similar to those in China. However as the sessions continued through 2006, ethnic parties voiced concerns that many of their views were not being accepted into the final draft. Seven major areas of disagreement emerged, principally over defining terms for: the legislative powers of the ethnic states, residuary rights, state constitutions, cultural and ethnic rights, defense and security,

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State of Strife foreign affairs, and resources and taxation. In essence, the main difference was between a “unitary” system advocated by military government supporters and a “union” system proposed by pro-democracy groups. Amidst these discussions, the semblance of a new constitution was completed during 2006. In one innovation, some smaller ethnic nationalities that had not been recognized in Burma’s two previous constitutions would gain their own territories in the the semblance of a new constitution form of a “self-administered division” for the Wa and was completed during 2006 “self-administered districts” (or zones) for the Danu, Kokang, Lahu, Palaung, and Pao in the Shan state and for the Naga in the Sagaing division. But the continued dominance of the Tatmadaw in national politics would be assured, with at least 25 percent of all seats in a future parliament, as well as key ministerial posts in the government, reserved for military candidates. In return, all other assembly representatives would be elected, the government would be civilianized, and there would be some rights of local decision-making for the divisions, ethnic states, and new ethnic regions. Whether, however, such a constitution will really bring peace and stability to Burma remained very open to question. As Tin Maung Maung Than has written, there is an inherent contradiction between a “highly centralized unitary state” under military dominance and the allowance of selected local rights of self-governance for certain ethnic groups in a system of “illiberal democracy” that permeates the nation-state (Than 2005: 96– 8). Despite such concerns, the ceasefire groups stayed with the constitutiondrafting process on the grounds that, after decades of conflict without “power-sharing” rights among the people, “any constitution” marks a step forward from “no constitution.”56 Ceasefire leaders based their hopes on two eventualities: first, that the announcement of a new constitution, with a referendum and a general election to follow, would provide the basis for government by the rule of law and continuing reforms by democratic means; and second, that the military government would recognize, even at this late stage, that lasting peace and stability can only be achieved by nationwide ceasefires and the inclusion of the NLD, UNA, KNU, and all other representative organizations in the processes of reconciliation and reform in the country.

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Martin Smith Other observers remained much more cautious. In the first decade of the 21st century, Burma remains one of the most militarized states in the world. With the relocation of the capital to Nay Pyi Taw and speculation growing about leadership succession after Senior General Than Shwe, important decisions for the country continued to be made behind a security curtain. Moreover, as ethnic leaders frequently warn, without real evidence of economic progress and socio-political reforms, it will be difficult to maintain support for peaceful advocacy in the long term. At the grass-roots level, a new generation of grievances has been building. Equally uncertain, even as a new constitution goes ahead, the ceasefire groups will face formidable challenges in the disarmament of their troops and their integration back into the local communities. Indeed in 2005 the majority of troops from one ceasefire force—the Shan State National Army— resumed armed struggle, joining with the SSA-South on the Thai border. Subsequently, the SPDC resumed military operations against KNU base areas in the northern Karen state in early 2006, effectively ending a “gentleman’s truce” that had existed for the two previous years. Within months, over 20,000 villagers had been internally displaced along the Thai border, causing six UN special rapporteurs to issue a joint statement of concern.57 Other estimates put the total number of displaced villagers in eastern Burma at over 80,000 during the previous twelve months.58 Once again, low-intensity warfare appeared to be escalating, with the use of landmines by both government and anti-government groups a particular cause of casualties.59 Splits and in-fighting also continued among a number of armed ethnic groups, including both ceasefire and non-ceasefire forces. Such events provided warnings of all the worst scenarios in Burma’s deeply-troubled history since independence. Disillusionment was becoming widespread in many communities, echoing the growing restiveness among pro-democracy supporters in the towns where the “White Expression” movement was launched by the 88 Generation Students during 2006. Despite nearly two decades of ceasefires, many aspects of Burma’s conflict trap remained. In a study of other internal conflicts around the world, David Keen once asked, “War and peace: what’s the difference?” (Keen 2001). It is a question that the long-suffering peoples of Burma might well also ask. Humanitarian and International Dilemmas For the present, it remains difficult to make definitive judgments about the political future of Burma. Since 1988 the country has often appeared on

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State of Strife the brink of epoch-shaping change. Precedent, however, suggests many reasons for caution. Six decades after independence, the sustaining cycles of political grievance, state failure, and militarization in Burma’s conflict trap are not decisively broken. Military-based government continues; the modern nation-state still has a greater variety of armed ethnic opposition forces than perhaps any other country in the world; and political transition appears likely to be undertaken by military government without the participation of the NLD and ethnic nationality parties that won Burma’s first general election in three decades. Against this backdrop, humanitarian crises have only continued to mount. Given the scale of societal divisions, evidence about social and economic conditions in different parts of Burma is often patchy and anecdotal. But a snap-shot of humanitarian data can provide an apposite impression of the sufferings that all the peoples have endured, and explain why conflict resolution remains so urgent. On the estimate of Gen. Saw Maung, the first SLORC chairman, it is likely that over one million people have died due to conflict-related causes since 1948.60 Burma is presently estimated to have at least 540,000 internally-displaced persons, the highest number in any Southeast Asian country.61 In addition, there are over 155,000 refugees in official camps along Thailand’s border alone, where up to two million illegal and legal migrants have also arrived since 1988. In Burma itself, many of the worst humanitarian indicators remain in ethnic minority areas, especially in the conflict zones. Notable regions of vulnerability include the northern Rakhine state, where 200,000 Muslims were resettled after fleeing into Bangladesh during 1991–92, as well as the Chin, Karen, Kayah (Karenni), Naga, and Shan borderlands. Instability and poverty are, in turn, reflected in national health statistics. Burma has one of the fastest spreading HIV-AIDS epidemics in Asia; such preventable or treatable illnesses as malaria and TB are endemic; and, according to the UN, during the late 1990s there were around 500,000 households in the country involved in poppy cultivation in some way.62 In consequence, Burma has among the highest infant and maternal morality rates in the Asia-Pacific region, with malnutrition rates of more than 30 percent among children under five in the country. However, as the UN Resident Coordinator warned in 2006: “Humanitarian access to conflict and nearby zones is extremely limited. Protection needs are acute.”63 All such factors continue to fuel the sense of discrimination against ethnic minority peoples. For such reasons, the SLORC-SPDC has remained

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Martin Smith one of the most condemned governments in the international community since the ending of the Cold War. During the past decade, there has been a UN special rapporteur on human rights to Burma, a special envoy of the UN secretary-general and an investigation into forced labor by the International Labor Organization. These concerns reached a new peak in 2006 when the UN Security Council placed Burma on its formal agenda. The international community, however, remains deeply divided as to how to engage with Burma and its peoples. In particular, many governments and campaign groups in the West have continued a two-pronged strategy: maintaining economic sanctions against the military government inside Burma, while providing humanitarian funds for refugees and democratization causes on the outside. However, as Mark Duffield and other political analysts have pointed out, relief-based policies in other internal wars around the world generally address the symptoms of conflict but not their underlying causes (Duffield 2001; Berdal and Malone 2000). In essence, since the ending of the Cold War, aid has become a Western response to conflict. By contrast, China, Thailand, India, and other neighboring governments in Asia have displayed few hesitations about political and economic engagement in Burma. Since 1988, new relationships have multiplied with Burma’s military government, business companies and ceasefire organizations, while, in some cases, neighboring authorities have also maintained discreet contacts with non-ceasefire forces as well. In consequence, Asian governments remain much more influential among leading stakeholders on the ground, and they have welcomed the muchreduced scale in fighting along most borders since 1992. This does not mean that Asian and ASEAN diplomats have been more effective in hastening political transformation. But it does explain why China and Asian governments (as well as Russia) rejected the U.S.-U.K. bid at the UN Security Council in January 2007 to condemn the political and humanitarian situation in Burma as a “threat” to international stability.64 For such reasons, many political actors in Burma believe that the U.S. and Western governments, for all their focus on human rights, have never come to terms with the challenges of Burma’s conflict trap.65 Ceasefire leaders, especially, have expressed frustration that their organizations and peoples never received any Western aid when fighting the central government—and they never received any aid after making peace.66 Official international assistance inside Burma remains one of the world’s lowest

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figures, estimated in 2006 at just U.S.$2.50 per capita as compared to U.S.$47 for Cambodia and U.S.$63 for Laos.67 Ironically, many ethnic opposition parties have long maintained pro-Western outlooks. Official international But as minority peoples squeezed between the interests of the assistance...[to] Burma remains Burmese state and the neighboring one of the world’s lowest powers of China, India and Thailand, they have to adapt to realities. As ethnic leaders realize, with cross-border investments and co-operation increasing rapidly in the 21st century, it is much more likely to be the actions of these regional giants that ultimately determine Burma’s future.68 At the heart of these dilemmas over engagement are the questions of legitimacy and illegitimacy raised in any armed conflict in the world (Steinberg 2006). As Phil Williams and John Picarelli argue, addressing the “crime-conflict” nexus always presents difficult challenges to international responses which, although intended to be pragmatic, may appear to condone human rights violations and criminal behavior. There are rarely easy choices in the front lines of conflict: thus “flexibility” and “humility” are needed (Williams and Picarelli 2005: 148). Roland Paris, too, has advised of the need to work with local cultures and realities, proposing what he terms “institutionalization before liberalization” in war-torn states as the most stable foundation for legality and inclusive reforms (Paris 2004). Similarly, Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper stress the importance of “regional-level” initiatives in the transformation of conflict economies. This is not only because regional support can help local actors to construct “alternative” and “novel” mechanisms of regulation but also because they can provide stronger civil society influence through collective actions within the region (Pugh and Cooper 2004: 213). In Burma’s case, the greatest proportion of international aid has continued to be based outside and around the country’s borders. But from the mid-1990s UN agencies followed international NGOs inside Burma in attempting to bring humanitarian aid into the conflict zones. There remained, however, many inconsistencies. For example, although some U.S. funds were supporting UN crop substitution programs in the Wa hills, in January 2005 U.S. law enforcement authorities indicted UWSA

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Martin Smith leaders for alleged drug-trafficking just at the moment that they were promising to introduce a total ban on poppy cultivation. Similarly, despite long-standing words of support for the Karen refugees in Thailand, in early 2006 their applications for asylum in the U.S. were held up on the grounds that they might have contacts with a “terrorist” organization, i.e. the KNU.69 Equally confusing, in 2005 the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria abruptly halted its fledgling U.S.$100 million program in Burma in response to concerns about its ability to deliver aid impartially. Subsequently, in late 2006 a new “Three Diseases Fund” was set up, supported by the European Commission and other Western donors, to try and address this serious humanitarian vacuum. As such confusions show, international organizations have always felt that, to engage in Burma’s affairs, they must be sensitive to signals of support that they appear to send out to the different sides. There is also pressure on international actors to acknowledge the positions of different national governments as well as advocacy groups.70 The result, however, is often a large gap between international intentions and local realities. Since 1988, in a country where “non-accommodationist” policies have long lain at the root of conflict, many international organizations have simply reflected the polarizing tendencies in Burma’s conflict trap: i.e., Asian neighbors have largely supported the military government; Western governments have championed the NLD; and many Western donor groups focused on links to refugees, the NCUB and other opposition causes around the borders. This triangular equation has become a very unhelpful paradigm. If even international actors cannot agree on coherent policies, there has been little incentive among front-line protagonists to decisively change. In consequence, non-accommodationist viewpoints continue, including among those who have left from the country. Indeed, as Burma’s diaspora grows, it is possible that hard-line attitudes, which are often typical of organizations in exile, will match those of regime diehards, becoming an increasing influence in the international tone of discussions about the country’s future. However unlikely, this creates the specter of internationally-enforced regime change that some officers in the present military government genuinely appear to fear.71 The mentalities and impasse of Burma’s conflict trap thus continue. To date, neither domestic nor international initiatives have achieved the scale

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Conclusions At the beginning of the 21st century, the political and humanitarian situation in Burma remains delicately poised. Conflict experience demonstrates that lasting solutions can only be achieved by the peoples of Burma themselves. In this respect, despite frequent disappointments and regressions, both the lasting solutions can only international community and many organizations in the country have come a be achieved by the peoples long way since 1988 in terms of recognizing of Burma the need for peace and reconciliation. “Myanmar” today is not Ne Win’s “Burma” that existed back in 1988. However, in one of the fastest-developing regions in the world, it is imperative that long-essential reforms are undertaken now if the country and its peoples are to avoid being left even further behind. The post-1989 ceasefires, the 1990 general election, and Burma’s 1997 membership in ASEAN should all have been benchmarks that helped raise the country out of its conflict trap and the impasse of socio-economic decline. Hopes, therefore, are by no means ended. But failure to achieve real peace and reform now, when so many different parties and ethnic groups say that they are willing, is only likely to condemn the country to more years of internal conflict, international opprobrium and nation-state underachievement. In conflict transformation, nothing is ever entirely prescriptive in achieving solutions. Armed conflict in any country or region of the world has its own dynamics and dimensions, and many recommendations can be made. But in Burma’s case, five policy areas stand out that have long needed to be recognized and addressed. First, as part of Burma’s process of reforms, priority must be given to conflict-resolution strategies. To achieve a sustainable peace, the central issues of ethnic conflict, democratic transition, demilitarization and economic progress cannot be separated or placed in different hierarchies of needs. These fundamental challenges have long been inter-linked in Burma’s state of crisis.

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Martin Smith Second, reforms in Burma must be pluralistic and inclusive to reflect the political and cultural diversities of the country. Burma’s legacies of conflict demonstrate that only through such inclusion can lasting solutions be achieved. Third, integrated approaches to Burma’s socio-political transition are essential, in which political, ethnic, humanitarian, human rights, economic, educational, environmental, and other social imperatives are recognized and addressed together. As in any other modern state, all such rights and responsibilities are integral to democracy, social stability, and national development. Fourth, inclusion and consultation with the peoples and conflictaffected communities of Burma must be conducted by analysis on the ground—not on the basis of policy prescriptions from the outside looking in. In the post-Cold War era, experience demonstrates that it is only in the front-line field that ethnic and political complexities can be understood and addressed in countries in conflict. Finally, the United Nations and international community must develop coherent and focused policies towards Burma that make conflict resolution a priority. Humanitarian aid will play a vital role. But in the 21st the United Nations and century the importance of the political economy must also be international community must factored in. The regional develop coherent...policies dimensions, especially, cannot be considered a separate theme. towards Burma Instead, regional geo-politics have to be addressed in conjunction with other international, political, humanitarian, and economic issues in meeting the challenges of nation-state formation.

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Endnotes 1. Burma was re-titled Myanmar by the military government of the SLORC-SPDC in 1989. In the Burmese language, the terms can be considered alternatives. However, although recognized by the United Nations, Myanmar is not common English language usage. In this analysis, Burma will be retained for historical consistency and style. In English, “Burman” is mostly used for the majority ethnic group and “Burmese” for citizens, language and as a general adjective for the country. There have also been controversies about such terms as “indigenous,” “tribe,” and “ethnic minority” to describe “non-Burman” peoples. This study follows the general practice in Burma of using ethnic “nationality” which can refer to any ethnic group, including Burman. “Ethnic minority” is used when distinguishing from the Burman-“majority.” 2. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2005. Statistical Profiles of the Least Developed Countries. Geneva: United Nations: 7, 42. 3. Charles Petrie, UN Resident Coordinator. 2006. An Understanding of the Humanitarian Situation in Myanmar. Brussels: Presentation Burma Forum, March 28. 4. The term was coined by Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg; Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1998. 5. Several other armed ethnic movements also have histories or lineages dating back to the parliamentary era, including the KNPP, NMSP, PNO, and SSA. 6. See, e.g., Global Witness 2005; Jelsma, Kramer and Vervest 2005; EarthRights International 2000. 7. For a historical analysis of the ethnic and political conflicts by this writer, see, e.g., Smith 1999. For a more contemporary overview, including humanitarian aspects, see Smith 2002a. For a discussion of problems in analyzing Burma’s history, see Chain 2004. 8. See, e.g., Andrew Selth. 2003. Burma’s Muslims: Terrorists or Terrorised? Australian National University: Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.150.

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Martin Smith 9. New Light of Myanmar, May 31, 2006. 10. SPDC. 2002. Information Sheet, Yangon, Myanmar. C-2103 (1), January 30. 11. The Government of Kawthoolei. 1984. The Karens and their Struggle for Independence. KNU Publishing, p. 3. 12. For an analysis of the phenomenon of political armies in Burma, see Smith 2002b. 13. Min Zin. “Working Underground to Plant the Seeds of Civil Society,” The Irrawaddy, June 1, 1999. 14. For Chao Tzang Yawnghwe’s autobiography, see Yawnghwe 1987. It can be added that when the KNU took up arms in 1949, its political leaders were hardly revolutionaries but mostly lawyers, teachers, and other community leaders. 15. See note 4. 16. The ethnic term “Rohingya” for Muslim identity in the Rakhine state is controversial in Burma’s politics. It is not doubted that there has been a longstanding Muslim population. However both the government and Buddhist Rakhine parties claim that many Muslim families in the former Arakan are settlers from the Chittagong region, only immigrating since the days of British rule. 17. Weekend Telegraph (London), March 10, 1967. 18. Many of these complexities are portrayed in The Heroin Wars (Channel Four Television UK: 1996), filmed in the Shan state by director Adrian Cowell over three decades. 19. Interview, March 17, 1988. 20. See note 6. 21. New Light of Myanmar, March 28, 2006. For an official explanation of the Tatmadaw’s continued duties against insurgent groups through subsequent political eras, see e.g. “Fine national political traditions of Tatmadaw,” New Light of Myanmar, March 27, 2006. 22. Guyot, Dorothy. 1967. “The Burma Independence Army: A Political Movement in Military Garb.” In Silverstein, Josef, ed. Southeast Asia in World War II: Four Essays. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies. 23. See, e.g., Brig-Gen. Kyaw Hsan, SPDC Minister of Information. “NLD has connections with expatriate groups, terrorists and destructive groups. The government has firm evidence to declare the NLD unlawful.” New Light of Myanmar, April 28, 2006. 24. www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex2006.php. 25. International actions can also support shadow state formulations since by recognizing de facto governments in countries in conflict, they may well overlook political and ethnic instabilities that need urgent attention. 26. Interview, February 12, 1998. 27. Kayah is the name of only the largest sub-group among the peoples collectively known as Karenni. It was presumed that the government wanted to be rid of a name regarded synonymous with earlier “Karenni” independence as well as to separate the Karenni from their rebellious Karen cousins. 28. Interview, January 26, 1987. 29. See, e.g., “No way or destination in sight,” New Light of Myanmar, July 29, 2003. 30. In Arakan, 500 “Rohingya” Mujahid guerrillas also surrendered in 1961, briefly bringing an end to the Muslim insurgencies on the northwest border. 31. Government of the Union of Burma. 1960. Is Trust Vindicated? Rangoon: Ministry of Information, p. 31.

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State of Strife 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

45.

46.

47. 48.

49. 50.

51.

The Times (UK), March 3, 1962. See, e.g., New China News Agency, August 15, 1967. Interview, January 12, 1987. Far Eastern Economic Review, June 25, 1976. For a human rights report in the late BSPP era, see Amnesty International, Burma: Extrajudicial Execution and Torture of Members of Ethnic Minorities, May 1988. Interview, January 19, 1987. National Democratic Front, “Statement Issued by the Third Plenary Central Praesidium Meeting,” October 30, 1984. Asiaweek, January 27, 1989. Government officials say that they considered them too small and factionalized. Quoted in British Broadcasting Corporation, Survey of World Broadcasts, May 2, 1989. For a discussion, see, e.g., International Crisis Group. 2002. Myanmar: the Politics of Humanitarian Aid. Brussels: ICG. See, e.g., Selth 2002: 137. Generalizations about the policies of Burma’s neighbors since 1988 are difficult. In conflict terms, only along India’s frontier, where armed opposition groups operate on both sides, have the insurgent dynamics largely continued from the BSPP era. Following its cut-off in aid to the CPB, China has stressed policies of “noninterference” in Burma’s affairs, closening relations with the SPDC and supporting ethnic forces to make peace. Thailand has also improved relations with the government, but it has allowed refugees and political exiles into the country and continued pragmatic dealings with different ethnic forces along its border. From 2005, however, the Bangladesh authorities began security operations against both Muslim and Rakhine insurgent camps along the northwest border, while India started counter-insurgency cooperation with the SPDC. See, e.g., EarthRights International. 2004. Another Yadana: The Shwe Natural Gas Pipeline Project (Burma-Bangladesh-India). Washington: ERI; Shan Sapawa Environmental Organization. “Warning Signs: An update on plans to dam the Salween in Burma’s Shan State,” September 2006; Denis Gray, “Burma dam plan causes flood of concern,” Associated Press, June 10, 2006. In early 2007, the KNU was further weakened by the defection to make a ceasefire of its veteran 7th brigade commander who set up a rival KNU/KNLA Peace Council. Other internal conflicts include the 1991 breakaway of the Kachin Defense Army from the KIO; the 2001 split of the Hongsawatoi Restoration Party from the NMSP; and the continuing disunity among different SSA, former MTA, and Shan nationality factions. Thailand Burma Border Consortium, Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma: 2006 Survey, November 2006, pp.16–22. The eight categories were: elected representatives, political parties, peasants, workers, intellectuals, public servants, national races, and other specially invited guests (which included the ceasefire groups). New Light of Myanmar, August 31, 2003. See, e.g., Havel, Vaclav and Bishop Desmond Tutu. 2005. Threat to the Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma. Washington, D.C.: DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary. The analyses in this section are based on interviews by the author since 1988 with a

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52. 53. 54. 55.

56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63. 64. 65.

66.

67. 68. 69. 70.

71.

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diversity of ethnic leaders in Burma representing different armed opposition, electoral, religious, and community-based groups. The Chin National Front (formed 1987–88) was mostly active on the India border. Interview with Hkun Htun Oo, SNLD chairman and UNA spokesman, November 3, 2002. E.g., Human Rights Foundation of Monland, Karen Office for Relief and Development and Shan Women’s Action Network. For a contemporary UN view, see, e.g., “Situation of human rights in Myanmar: Report of the Special Rapporteur, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro.” Commission on Human Rights: 62nd session, Item 9, February 7, 2006. Interview with Dr Tu Ja, KIO National Convention delegate, April 1, 2006. UN Daily News, May 16, 2006. Thailand Burma Border Consortium. Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma: 2006 Survey, November 2006, p. 2. International Campaign to Ban Landmines. 2006. Landmine Monitor Report 2006: Toward a Mine-Free World. Ottawa: Mines Action Canada. Working People’s Daily, January 10, 1990. Norwegian Refugee Council, Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2005, March 2006, pp. 6, 10, 79. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2005. Myanmar: Opium Survey 2005: 29. The figure has since fallen in response to drug eradication programs. But challenges in achieving food security and crop substitution have intensified. See note 3. See, e.g., Warren Hoge, “US rebuke to Myanmar is defeated by UN vetoes,” The New York Times, January 16, 2007. For an analysis of how Western discourse on democracy and human rights has affected and even stereotyped ethnic and opposition politics in Burma, see Lisa Brooten. 2004. “Human Rights Discourse and the Development of Democracy in a Multi-Ethnic State.” Asian Journal of Communications 14 (2): 174–91. While international aid has gradually increased from inside Burma to ceasefire areas since the mid-1990s, UN and other international aid organizations have remained reluctant to provide aid to ceasefire groups or territories directly. The main exception later developed in anti-narcotics programs in the Shan state. See note 3. See, e.g., Shawn Crispin, “Burma shakes Western noose.” Asia Times Online, November 3, 2006. Rachel Swams, “Provision of Antiterror Law Delays Entry of Refugees.” New York Times, March 8, 2006. For different perspectives on the international aid dilemmas, see, e.g., International Crisis Group, “Myanmar: New Threats to Humanitarian Aid,” Asia Briefing No.58, December 8, 2006; and Yeni and Edward Blair, “ICG Burma Briefing Distorts and Misleads, Says OSI President,” Irrawaddy, January 23, 2007. See, e.g., an SPDC press conference alleging exile and U.S.-backed support to the KNU, New Light of Myanmar, June 12, 2006.

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Martin Smith Collier, Paul. 2000. “Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective.” In Berdal and Malone 2000. Duffield, Mark. 2001. Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security. London: Zed Books. EarthRights International. 2000. Total Denial Continues. Washington, D.C.: ERI. Global Witness. 2005. A Choice for China: Ending the destruction of Burma’s northern frontier forests. Washington, D.C.: Global Witness Publishing. Gurr, Ted. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Heidel, Brian. 2006. The Growth of Civil Society in Myanmar. Bangalore: Books for Change. Keen, David. 1998. The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars. Adelphi Paper 320. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies. ———. 2000. “Incentives and Disincentives for Violence.” In Berdal and Malone 2000. ———. 2001. “War and Peace: What’s the Difference?” In Adebajo, Adekeye and C.L. Sriram, eds. Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century. London: Frank Cass Publishers. Hlaing, Kyaw Yin. 2004. “Burma: Civil Society Skirting Regime Rules.” In Alagappa, Muthiah, ed. 2004. Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Jelsma, Martin, Tom Kramer, and Pietje Vervest, eds. 2005. Trouble in the Triangle: Opium and Conflict in Burma. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books. Leach, Edmund. 1954. Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structures. London: G. Bell & Son. McCoy, Alfred. 1972. The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. New York: Harper Torchbacks. Myint-U, Thant. 2001. The Making of Modern Burma. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Myoe, Maung Aung. 1998. Building the Tatmadaw: The Organisational Development of the Armed Forces in Myanmar, 1948–98. Working Paper No.327. Australian National University: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. Paris, Roland. 2004. At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pugh, Michael and Neil Cooper. 2004. War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges of Transformation. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Reno, William. 2000. “Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars.” In Berdal and Malone 2000. Selth, Andrew. 2002. Burma’s Armed Forces: Power Without Glory. Norwalk: Eastbridge. Sherman, Jake. 2003. “Burma: Lessons from the Ceasefires.” In Ballentine and Sherman 2003. Silverstein, Josef. 1980. Burmese Politics: the Dilemma of National Unity. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. ———. 1997. “The Civil War, the Minorities and Burma’s New Politics.” In Carey 1997. Smith, Martin. 1999. Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. London: Zed Books. ———. 2002a. Burma/Myanmar: the Time for Change. London: Minority Rights Group International. ———. 2002b. “Army Politics as a Historical Legacy: the Experience of Burma.” In

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Appendix Status of Ethnic Parties, 2006 1. Main ceasefire groups at National Convention Name in state media

Usual name/other details

Burma Communist Party (Rakhine State Group)

Communist Party of Burma (Arakan)*

Kachin State Special Region-1 Kachin State Special Region-2

New Democratic Army-Kachin* Kachin Independence Organization**

Kayah State Special Region-1

Kayah State Special Region-3

Kayan National Guard (splinter group from KNLP) Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front* Kayan New Land Party* **

New Mon State Party

New Mon State Party**

Shan State (North) Special Region-1

Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang)* United Wa State Army* Shan State Army (ex-Shan State Progress Party)** National Democratic Alliance Army (eastern Shan state)* Kachin Defense Army (1991 split from KIO 4th brigade) Pao National Organization** Palaung State Liberation Party**: “disarmed” 2005

Kayah State Special Region-2

Shan State (North) Special Region-2 Shan State (North) Special Region-3 Shan State (East) Special Region-4 Shan State (North) Special Region-5 Shan State (South) Special Region-6 Shan State (North) Special Region-7

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1995 split from MTA: 2005 split, some units to SSA-S 2005, local Pao split from SSNPLO*

* Former ally or breakaway group from CPB ** Former National Democratic Front member

2. Splinter ceasefire groups at National Convention from larger ethnic forces (a) From the Karen National Union (non-ceasefire) Democratic Kayin Buddhist Association (DKBA) Democratic Karen Buddhist Army: 1994 split Haungthayaw Special Region Group Karen Peace Force (ex-KNU 16th battalion): 1997 split Nyeinchanyay Myothit (Phayagon) Group 1998 split: in Pa-an district (b) From the Karenni National Progressive Party (non-ceasefire) Kayinni National Democratic Party Dragon 1996 split (Naga) Group Kayinni National Progressive Party (KNPP, Hoya) 1999 split: in Hoya district Kayinni National Solidarity Organization 2002 split (Mawchi region) (c) From the defunct Mong Tai Army (1996 “surrender” ceasefire) Homein Region Development and Welfare Group Shwepyi Aye (MTA) Group Manpan People’s Militia Group

Homong, southern Shan state in Pekhon township, southern Shan state in Tangyan district, northern Shan state

(d) From the National United Party of Arakan (non-ceasefire) Arakan Army (AA)

Ex-armed wing in NUPA: 2002 split

(e) From the New Mon State Party (1995 ceasefire) Mon Peace Group (Chaungchi Region) Mon Nai Seik Chan Peace Group

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Mon Army Mergui District: 1996 split 1997 split

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State of Strife 3. Ethnic parties from 1990 General Election at National Convention Lahu National Development Party Mro-Khami National Solidarity Organization Shan State Kokang Democratic Party Union Kayin (Karen) League Union Pao National Organization Wa National Development Party

4. Ethnic parties from 1990 election in 2002 United Nationalities Alliance (not at National Convention) Arakan League for Democracy Chin National League for Democracy Kachin State National Congress for Democracy Kayah State All Nationalities League for Democracy Kayin (Karen) National Congress for Democracy Mara People’s Party Mon National Democratic Front Shan Nationalities League for Democracy Zomi National Congress

5. Main non-ceasefire groups (not at National Convention)*** Arakan Liberation Party** Arakan Rohingya National Organization Chin National Front** Hongsawatoi Restoration Party Karen National Union**

2001 split from NMSP 1995–96 peace talks broke down: resumed 2003 1995 ceasefire broke down

Karenni National Progressive Party** Lahu Democratic Front** Mergui-Tavoy United Front* National Socialist Council Nagaland (Khaplang faction) National United Party of Arakan Rohingya Solidarity Organization Shan State Army-South ex-MTA; reinforced 2005 by SSNA split Wa National Organization** 1997 talks broke down * Former ally or breakaway group from CPB ** Present or former National Democratic Front member *** A number of other small groups also exist in name on the borders. Most are affiliated to the National Council Union of Burma or Ethnic Nationalities Council, but they do not generally have broad or active organization inside the country. (Source: Smith 2005: 78–80.)

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Internal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia Project Information

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Project Rationale, Purpose, and Outline Project Director: Muthiah Alagappa Principal Researchers: Morten Pedersen (Burma/Myanmar) Saroja Dorairajoo (southern Thailand) Mahendra Lawoti (Nepal) Samir Kumar Das (northeast India) Neil DeVotta (Sri Lanka) Rationale Internal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia is part of a larger East-West Center project on state building and governance in Asia that investigates political legitimacy of governments, the relationship of the military to the state, the development of political and civil societies and their roles in democratic development, the role of military force in state formation, and the dynamics and management of internal conflicts arising from nation- and state-building processes. An earlier project investigating internal conflicts arising from nation- and state-building processes focused on conflicts arising from the political consciousness of minority communities in China (Tibet and Xinjiang), Indonesia (Aceh and Papua), and southern Philippines (the Moro Muslims). Funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, that highly successful project was completed in March 2005. The present project, which began in July 2005, investigates the causes and consequences of internal conflicts arising from state- and nation-building processes in Burma/Myanmar, southern Thailand, Nepal, northeast India, and Sri Lanka, and explores strategies and solutions for their peaceful management and eventual settlement. Internal conflicts have been a prominent feature of the Asian political landscape since 1945. Asia has witnessed numerous civil wars, armed insurgencies, coups d’état, regional rebellions, and revolutions. Many have been protracted; several have far-reaching domestic and international consequences. The civil war in Pakistan led to the break up of that country in 1971; separatist struggles challenge the political and territorial integrity of China, India, Indonesia, Burma, the Philippines, Thailand, and Sri Lanka; political uprisings in Thailand (1973 and 1991), the Philippines (1986), South Korea (1986), Taiwan (1991) Bangladesh (1991), and Indonesia (1998) resulted in dramatic political change in those countries.

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74 Although the political uprisings in Burma (1988) and China (1989) were suppressed, the political systems in those countries, as well as in Vietnam, continue to confront problems of legitimacy that could become acute; and radical Islam poses serious challenges to stability in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. The Thai military ousted the democratically-elected government of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006. In all, millions of people have been killed in the internal conflicts, and tens of millions have been displaced. Moreover, the involvement of external powers in a competitive manner (especially during the Cold War) in several of these conflicts had negative consequences for domestic and regional security. Internal conflicts in Asia can be traced to contestations over political legitimacy (the title to rule), national identity, state building, and distributive justice––that are often interconnected. With the bankruptcy of the socialist model and transitions to democracy in several countries, the number of internal conflicts over political legitimacy has declined in Asia. However, the legitimacy of certain governments continues to be contested from time to time, and the remaining communist and authoritarian systems are likely to confront challenges to their legitimacy in due course. Internal conflicts also arise from the process of constructing modern nation-states, and the unequal distribution of material and status benefits. Although many Asian states have made considerable progress in constructing national communities and viable states, several countries, including some major ones, still confront serious problems that have degenerated into violent conflict. By affecting the political and territorial integrity of the state as well as the physical, cultural, economic, and political security of individuals and groups, these conflicts have great potential to affect domestic and international stability. Purpose Internal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia examines internal conflicts arising from the political consciousness of minority communities in Burma/Myanmar, southern Thailand, northeast India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Except for Nepal, these states are not in danger of collapse. However, they do face serious challenges at the regional and local levels which, if not addressed, can negatively affect the vitality of the national state in these countries. Specifically, the project has a threefold purpose: (1) to develop an in-depth understanding of the domestic, transnational, and international dynamics of internal conflicts in these countries in the context of nationand state-building strategies; (2) to examine how such conflicts have affected

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75 the vitality of the state; and (3) to explore strategies and solutions for the peaceful management and eventual settlement of these conflicts. Design A study group has been organized for each of the five conflicts investigated in the study. With a principal researcher for each, the study groups comprise practitioners and scholars from the respective Asian countries, including the region or province that is the focus of the conflict, as well as from Australia, Britain, Belgium, Sweden, and the United States. The participants list that follows shows the composition of the study groups. All five study groups met jointly for the first time in Washington, D.C., on October 30–November 3, 2005. Over a period of five days, participants engaged in intensive discussion of a wide range of issues pertaining to the conflicts investigated in the project. In addition to identifying key issues for research and publication, the meeting facilitated the development of cross-country perspectives and interaction among scholars who had not previously worked together. Based on discussion at the meeting, twenty-five policy papers were commissioned. The study groups met separately in the summer of 2006 for the second set of meetings, which were organized in collaboration with respected policy-oriented think tanks in each host country. The Burma and southern Thailand study group meetings were held in Bangkok July 10–11 and July 12–13, respectively. These meetings were cosponsored by The Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University. The Nepal study group was held in Kathmandu, Nepal, July 17–19, and was cosponsored by the Social Science Baha. The northeast India study group met in New Delhi, India, August 9–10. This meeting was cosponsored by the Centre for Policy Research. The Sri Lanka meeting was held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, August 14–16, and cosponsored by the Centre for Policy Alternatives. In each of these meetings, scholars and practitioners reviewed and critiqued papers produced for the meetings and made suggestions for revision. Publications This project will result in twenty to twenty-five policy papers providing a detailed examination of particular aspects of each conflict. Subject to satisfactory peer review, these 18,000- to 24,000-word essays will be published in the East-West Center Washington Policy Studies series, and

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76 will be circulated widely to key personnel and institutions in the policy and intellectual communities and the media in the respective Asian countries, the United States, and other relevant countries. Some studies will be published in the East-West Center Washington Working Papers series. Public Forums To engage the informed public and to disseminate the findings of the project to a wide audience, public forums have been organized in conjunction with study group meetings. Five public forums were organized in Washington, D.C., in conjunction with the first study group meeting. The first forum, cosponsored by The Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, discussed the conflict in southern Thailand. The second, cosponsored by The Sigur Center for Asian Studies of The George Washington University, discussed the conflict in Burma. The conflicts in Nepal were the focus of the third forum, which was cosponsored by the Asia Program at The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The fourth public meeting, cosponsored by the Foreign Policy Studies program at The Brookings Institution, discussed the conflicts in northeast India. The fifth forum, cosponsored by the South Asia Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, focused on the conflict in Sri Lanka. Funding Support The Carnegie Corporation of New York is once again providing generous funding support for the project.

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Project Participants Project Director Muthiah Alagappa, Ph.D. Director, East-West Center Washington (from February 2001 to January 2007) Distinguished Senior Fellow, East-West Center (from February 1, 2007)

Burma/Myanmar Study Group Morten Pedersen United Nations University Principal Researcher Mary Callahan University of Washington

Martin Smith Independent Analyst, London David I. Steinberg Georgetown University

Christina Fink Chiang Mai University

David Tegenfeldt Hope International Development Agency, Yangon

Saboi Jum Shalom Foundation, Yangon

Mya Than Chulalongkorn University

Kyi May Kaung Freelance Writer/Analyst, Washington, D.C.

Tin Maung Maung Than Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Tom Kramer Transnational Institute, Amsterdam

Ardeth Thawnghmung University of Massachusetts, Lowell

Curtis Lambrecht Yale University

Meredith Weiss East-West Center Washington

David Scott Mathieson Australian National University

Khin Zaw Win Independent Researcher, Yangon

Win Min Chiang Mai University

Harn Yawnghwe Euro-Burma Office, Brussels

Zaw Oo American University

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Southern Thailand Study Group Saroja Dorairajoo National University of Singapore Principal Researcher

Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana National Institute of Development Administration, Bangkok

Thanet Aphornsuvan Thammasat University

Duncan McCargo University of Leeds

Marc Askew Victoria University, Melbourne

Celakhan (Don) Pathan The Nation Newspaper, Bangkok

Suchit Bunbongkarn Chulalongkorn University

Surin Pitsuwan MP, Thai House of Representatives

Kavi Chongkittavorn Nation Multimedia Group, Bangkok

Thitinan Pongsudhirak Chulalongkorn University

Neil John Funston Australian National University

Chaiwat Satha-Anand Thammasat University

Surat Horachaikul Chulalongkorn University

Vaipot Srinual Supreme Command Headquarters, Thailand

Srisompob Jitpiromsri Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus Joseph Chinyong Liow Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Wattana Sugunnasil Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus Panitan Wattanayagorn Chulalongkorn University Imtiyaz Yusuf Assumption University, Bangkok

Nepal Study Group

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Mahendra Lawoti Western Michigan University Principal Researcher

Lok Raj Baral Nepal Center for Contemporary Studies, Kathmandu

Itty Abraham East-West Center Washington

Surendra Raj Bhandari Law Associates Nepal, Kathmandu

Meena Acharya Tanka Prasad Acharya Memorial Foundation, Kathmandu

Chandra Dev Bhatta London School of Economics

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Krishna Bhattachan Tribhuvan University

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79 Sumitra Manandhar-Gurung Lumanthi and National Coalition Against Racial Discrimination, Kathmandu Harka Gurung (deceased) Transparency International, Nepal Dipak Gyawali Royal Nepal Academy of Science and Technology, Kathmandu Krishna Hacchethu Tribhuvan University Susan Hangen Ramapo College, New Jersey Lauren Leve University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Prakash Chandra Lohani Former Finance Minister, Nepal

Anup Pahari Foreign Service Institute, Arlington Rajendra Pradhan Social Science Baha, Kathmandu Shree Govind Shah Environmental Resources Planning and Monitoring/Academy of Social Justice & Human Rights, Kathmandu Saubhagya Shah Tribhuvan University Hari Sharma Social Science Baha, Kathmandu Sudhindra Sharma Interdisciplinary Analyst (IDA), Kathmandu Dhruba Kumar Shrestha Tribhuvan University

Pancha Narayan Maharjan Tribhuvan University, Kirtipur

Seira Tamang Centre for Social Research and Development, Kathmandu

Sukh Deo Muni Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

Bishnu Raj Upreti National Centre of Competence in Research, Kathmandu

Northeast India Study Group Samir Kumar Das University of Calcutta Principal Researcher

Dipankar Banerjee Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi

Sanjay Barbara North Eastern Social Research Centre, Assam

Kalyan Barooah Assam Tribune

Sanjib Baruah Center for Policy Research, New Delhi Bard College, New York

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M.P. Bezbaruah UN – WTO (World Tourism Organization), New Delhi Pinaki Bhattacharya The Mathrubhumi, Kerala

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80 Subir Bhaumik British Broadcasting Corporation, Kolkata

Sukh Deo Muni Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

Bejoy Das Gupta Institute of International Finance, Inc., Washington, D.C.

Bhagat Oinam Jawaharlal Nehru University

Partha S. Ghosh Jawaharlal Nehru University Uddipana Goswami Center for Studies in Social Science, Kolkata Sanjoy Hazarika Centre for North East Studies and Policy Research, New Delhi Anil Kamboj Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi Bengt Karlsson Uppsala University, Sweden Dolly Kikon Stanford University Ved Marwah Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi Pratap Bhanu Mehta Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

Pradip Phanjoubam Imphal Free Press, Manipur V.R. Raghavan Delhi Policy Group Rajesh Rajagopalan Jawaharlal Nehru University Swarna Rajagopalan Chaitanya––The Policy Consultancy, Chennai E.N. Rammohan National Security Council, New Delhi Bibhu Prasad Routray Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi Ronojoy Sen The Times of India, New Delhi Prakash Singh Border Security Force (Ret’d.) George Verghese Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

Sri Lanka Study Group

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Neil DeVotta Hartwick College Principal Researcher

Sunanda Deshapriya Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo

Ravinatha P. Aryasinha American University

Rohan Edrisinha Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo

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81 Nimalka Fernando International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination & Racism, Colombo Bhavani Fonseka Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo Mario Gomez Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies, Colombo Air Vice Marshall Harry Goonetileke Colombo Anberiya Hanifa Muslim Women’s Research and Action Forum, Colombo Dayan Jayatilleka University of Colombo N. Kandasamy Center for Human Rights and Development in Colombo S.I. Keethaponcalan University of Colombo

Darini Rajasingham Centre for Poverty Analysis, Colombo John Richardson, Jr. American University Norbert Ropers Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies, Colombo Kanchana N. Ruwanpura Hobart and William Smith Colleges, New York P. Sahadevan Jawaharlal Nehru University Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo Muttukrishna Sarvananthan Point Pedro Institute of Development, Sri Lanka Peter Schalk Uppsala University, Sweden Asanga Tilakaratne University of Kelaniya

N. Manoharan Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi

Jayadeva Uyangoda University of Colombo

Dennis McGilvray University of Colorado at Boulder

Asanga Welikala Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo

Jehan Perera National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, Colombo Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam MP, Sri Lanka

Jayampathy Wickramaratne Ministry of Constitutional Affairs, Sri Lanka Javid Yusuf Attorney-at-Law, Colombo

Mirak Raheem Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo

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Background on Burma/Myanmar’s Ethnic Conflicts One of the ethnically most diverse countries in the world, Burma (Myanmar) has suffered continuous armed ethnic conflict since independence in 1948. A series of ceasefires since the late 1980s has significantly reduced the levels of fighting across the country, but the legacies of hostility run deep, and the achievement of sustainable peace remains a major challenge in the twentyfirst century. The lands constituting the modern union-state of Burma have a turbulent history. From the foundation of Anawrahta’s empire at Pagan in the eleventh century, political authority often fluctuated in wars between different Burman, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan rulers in Buddhist city-states on the plains. Meanwhile Chin, Kachin, Karen, and other ethnic groups in the hills were only nominally brought under control of the various dynasties and kingdoms. On a major crossroads in Asia, a diversity of cultures proliferated and survived. Colonization by the British in the nineteenth century temporarily imposed external authority over this complex ethnic mosaic, but at the same time exacerbated existing ethnic cleavages. While Central Burma was subjected to British administrative and legal institutions, the non-Burman Frontier Areas were mostly left under the traditional rulers. This division compounded political and economic differences during a time of rapid social change. The British policy of recruiting hill peoples into the colonial army and the conversion of many to Christianity only fuelled interethnic suspicions. During the Second World War, Burman nationalist forces in the Burma Independence Army initially fought on the side of Imperial Japan, but eventually turned against the Japanese and cooperated with the returning British Army. However, atrocities committed during the early months of the war by Burmans against Karen and other minority groups loyal to the British had dangerously increased ethnic tensions. At the 1947 Panglong Conference, Chin, Kachin, and Shan representatives agreed to join a new Union of Burma in return for the promise of full autonomy. However the leaders of other ethnic groups were not included in these discussions, and the Karen national union boycotted the 1947 elections. Burma’s first constitution deepened these emerging fault lines by granting unequal rights to different ethnic groups and

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84 territories. During the hurried British departure, conditions were being created for conflicts that would endure for decades to come. The first major group to take up arms against the government after independence was the Communist Party of Burma in March 1948. As violence escalated, armed struggle rapidly spread to the Karen, Mon, Karenni, Pao, Rakhine, and other nationality groups. The invasion by Chinese Nationalist Kuomintang remnants into the Shan State in late 1949 aggravated the breakdown of the embattled central government. By the late 1950s, the mood of rebellion had spread to the Shan, Kachin, and other ethnic groups, frustrated by what they perceived as governmental neglect. In 1960, Shan and other nationality leaders organized a Federal Movement that sought, by constitutional reform, to replace the centralized system of government with a genuinely federal structure. Their efforts were aborted though, when the national armed forces under General Ne Win seized power in March 1962. Parliamentary democracy was brought to a complete end. For a quarter of a century, Ne Win attempted to impose his isolationist “Burmese Way to Socialism” on the country. Confronting intensive counterinsurgency operations, armed opposition groups were gradually pushed out of the central plains into the surrounding borderlands. Here, however, insurgent forces were able to maintain control of their own “liberated zones,” financing their struggles out of taxes on Burma’s flourishing black markets that included illicit opium. Against this unending backdrop of war, Burma became one of the world’s poorest countries. The post-Cold War period has brought major changes to Burma, but no definitive solutions. The new military government, which took power after quelling pro-democracy protests in 1988, refused to hand over power to the newly-formed National League for Democracy (NLD) that won the 1990 general election by a landslide. Instead, following the collapse of the insurgent CPB, the regime forged ceasefires with a relatively large number of armed ethnic opposition groups, while massively expanding the national armed forces. In these endeavors, the military government was helped by neighboring countries that change their policies of de facto support for opposition groups to close economic relations with the post-Ne Win regime. This decisively shifted the military balance in favor of the central government, which continued to be largely boycotted by Western nations. New

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85 infrastructure and economic projects were started in many areas previously contested by insurgent groups, with central government authority extending further than ever before. In contrast, opposition groups became steadily weakened, divided over tactics between militant forces, ceasefire groups, pro-electoral organizations, and those that sought broader alliances. In the twenty-first century, Burma’s future remains delicately poised. A few insurgent groups have continued largely defensive guerilla warfare, but with little apparent hope of reasserting their authority by military means. However, the ceasefire groups similarly fear that the country’s new constitution will provide few concessions to ethnic aspirations. Additionally, ethnic parties that stood in the 1990 election have been excluded—like the NLD—from constitutional discussions. Against this backdrop, conflict and human rights abuses have continued in several border regions, sustaining ethnic anger and resentment. The desire is widespread for peace through dialogue. But the sentiment that future generations will take up arms again to continue the cycles of political violence cannot be discounted.

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Pre- and Post-1989 Names

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State/Division Names Pre-1989

State/Division Names Post-1989

Chin State Irrawady Division Kachin State Karen State Karenni State (pre-1951) Magwe Division Mandalay Division Mon State Pegu Division Arakan Division Rangoon Division Sagaing Division Shan State Tenasserim Division

Same Ayeyarwady Division Same Kayin State Kayah State Magway Division Same Same Bago Division Rakhine Division Yangon Division Same Same Tanintharyi Division

City/Town Names Pre-1989

City/Town Names Post-1989

Bassein Myitkyina Bhamo Paan Pagan Moulmein Taungoo Prome Pegu Akyab Rangoon Lashio Taunggyi Pangsang Tavoy Mergui

Pathein Same Same Hpa-an Bagan Mawlamyine Toungoo Pyay Bago Sittwe Yangon Same Same Panghsang Dawei Myeik

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Map of Burma

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Ethnic Groups with Ceasefire Arrangements (2006)* 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

Communist Party of Burma (Arakan) New Democratic Army––Kachin Kachin Independence Organization Palaung State Liberation Party Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang) Kachin Defense Army United Wa State Army National Democratic Alliance Army (eastern Shan state) Shan State Army Shan State National Army Pao National Organization Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization Mong Tai Army Kayan National Guard Karenni National Democratic Party (Dragon Group) Kayan New Land Party Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front Democratic Karen Buddhist Army New Mon State Party Mon Peace Group Chaungchi Region

*The locations marked are the headquarter bases of the main ceasefire groups recognized by the government. However there are great differences in the sizes and territories of the various organizations. Some forces are organized in extensive rural areas (e.g. the Kachin Independence Organization, Pao National Organization, and United Wa State Army), whereas a number of smaller breakaway factions exist in only a few villages (e.g. Kayan National Guard).

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List of Reviewers 2006–07 The East-West Center Washington would like to acknowledge the following, who have offered reviews of manuscripts for Policy Studies. Itty Abraham East-West Center Washington

Greg Fealy Australian National University

Jaya Raj Acharya United States Institute of Peace

David Finkelstein The CNA Corporation

Vinod K. Aggarwal University of California, Berkeley

Michael Foley The Catholic University of America

Muthiah Alagappa East-West Center Washington

Sumit Ganguly Indiana University, Bloomington

Edward Aspinall Australian National University

Brigham Golden Columbia University

Marc Askew Victoria University, Melbourne

Michael J. Green Center for Strategic and International Studies Georgetown University

Sanjay Barbora Panos South Asia, Guwahati Upendra Baxi University of Warwick Apurba K. Baruah North Eastern Hill University, Shillong Sanjib Baruah Bard College

Stephan Haggard University of California, San Diego Natasha Hamilton National University of Singapore Farzana Haniffa University of Colombo Rana Hasan Asian Development Bank

Thomas Berger Boston University Ikrar Nusa Bhakti Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta C. Raja Mohan Nanyang Technological University Mary P. Callahan University of Washington Richard Chauvel Victoria University, Melbourne

M. Sajjad Hassan London School of Economics Eric Heginbotham RAND Corporation Donald Horowitz Duke University Chinnaiah Jangam Wagner College

T.J. Cheng The College of William and Mary

S. Kalyanaraman Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi

Chu Yun-han Academia Sinica

Bengt Karlsson Uppsala University

Ralph A. Cossa Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu

Damien Kingsbury Deakin University

Neil DeVotta Hartwick College

Mahendra Lawoti Western Michigan University

Dieter Ernst East-West Center

R. William Liddle The Ohio State University

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92 Satu P. Limaye Institute for Defense Analyses

James Scott Yale University

Joseph Chinyong Liow Nanyang Technological University

Amita Shastri San Francisco State University

Owen M. Lynch New York University

Emile C.J. Sheng Soochow University

Gurpreet Mahajan Jawaharlal Nehru University

John Sidel London School of Economics

Onkar S. Marwah Independent Consultant, Geneva

Martin Smith Independent Analyst, London

Bruce Matthews Acadia University

Selma Sonntag Humboldt State University

Duncan McCargo University of Leeds

Ashley South Independent Consultant

Donald McFetridge Former U.S. Defense Attaché, Jakarta

Robert H. Taylor University of London

Udayon Misra Dibrugarh University

Tin Maung Maung Than Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Pratyoush Onta Martin Chautari

Willem van Schendel Amsterdam School for Social science Research

Andrew Oros Washington College

Jayadeva Uyangoda University of Colombo

Morten Pedersen United Nations University, Tokyo

Meredith Weiss East-West Center Washington

Steven Rood The Asia Foundation, Philippines

Thongchai Winichakul University of Wisconsin, Madison

Danilyn Rutherford University of Chicago

Wu Xinbo Fudan University

Kanchana N. Ruwanpura University of Southampton

Harn Yawnghe Euro-Burma Office, Brussels

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Policy Studies Previous Publications Policy Studies 35

Policy Studies 27

Rebellion in Southern Thailand: Contending Histories Thanet Aphornsuvan, Thammasat University

Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism: Implications for Japan’s Security Strategy

Policy Studies 34

Paul Midford, Norwegian University for Science and Technology, Trondheim

Creating a “New Nepal”: The Ethnic Dimension

Policy Studies 26

Susan Hangen, Ramapo College of New Jersey

Policy Studies 33 Postfrontier Blues: Toward a New Policy Framework for Northeast India Sanjib Baruah, Bard College

Policy Studies 32 Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Changing Dynamics Jayadeva Uyangoda, University of Colombo

Taiwan’s Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and “Taiwanese Nationalism” Shelley Rigger, Davidson College

Policy Studies 25 Initiating a Peace Process in Papua: Actors, Issues, Process, and the Role of the International Community Timo Kivimäki, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Copenhagen

Policy Studies 24

Policy Studies 31 Political Authority in Burma’s Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation, and Coexistence

Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology, and Politics

Mary P. Callahan, University of Washington

Joseph Chinyong Liow, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore

Policy Studies 30

Policy Studies 23

Legalizing Religion: The Indian Supreme Court and Secularism Ronojoy Sen, The Times of India, New Delhi

The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance Marcus Mietzner, Political Analyst

Policy Studies 29 Conspiracy, Politics, and a Disorderly Border: The Struggle to Comprehend Insurgency in Thailand’s Deep South

Policy Studies 22

Marc Askew, Victoria University, Melbourne

Baldev Raj Nayar, McGill University

India’s Globalization: Evaluating the Economic Consequences

2006

Policy Studies 21

Policy Studies 28

China’s Rise: Implications for U.S. Leadership in Asia

Counterterrorism Legislation in Sri Lanka: Evaluating Efficacy

Robert G. Sutter, Georgetown University

N. Manoharan, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi

(continued next page)

These issues of Policy Studies are presently available in print and PDF. Hardcopies are available through Amazon.com. In Asia, hardcopies of all titles, and electronic copies of Southeast Asia titles are available through the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore at 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang Road, Singapore 119614. Website: http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/ Online at: www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications

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Policy Studies Previous Publications continued Policy Studies 12

2005 Policy Studies 20 The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh? Edward Aspinall, Australian National University

Sino-Tibetan Dialogue in the Post-Mao Era: Lessons and Prospects Tashi Rabgey, Harvard University Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, Independent Journalist

Policy Studies 11

Policy Studies 19 Nine Lives?: The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan J. Patrick Boyd, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Richard J. Samuels, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Policy Studies 18 Islamic Radicalism and Anti-Americanism in Indonesia: The Role of the Internet Merlyna Lim, Bandung Institute of Technology, Indonesia

Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent Gardner Bovingdon, Indiana University, Bloomington

Policy Studies 10 Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution? Rodd McGibbon, USAID, Jakarta

Policy Studies 9 The HDC in Aceh: Promises and Pitfalls of NGO Mediation and Implementation

Policy Studies 17

Konrad Huber, Council on Foreign Relations

Forging Sustainable Peace in Mindanao: The Role of Civil Society

Policy Studies 8

Steven Rood, The Asia Foundation, Philippines

Policy Studies 16 Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies

The Moro Conflict: Landlessness and Misdirected State Policies Eric Gutierrez, WaterAid, U.K. Saturnino Borras, Jr., Institute of Social Studies, The Hague

Evelyn Goh, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore

Policy Studies 7

Policy Studies 15

Elliot Sperling, Indiana University, Bloomington

The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse

Policy Studies 6

Arienne M. Dwyer, The University of Kansas

The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics

Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment

Policy Studies 14

James Millward, Georgetown University

Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaptation

Policy Studies 5

Richard Chauvel, Victoria University, Melbourne

The Papua Conflict: Jakarta’s Perceptions and Policies

2004

Richard Chauvel, Victoria University, Melbourne Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Jakarta

Policy Studies 13 Plural Society in Peril: Migration, Economic Change, and the Papua Conflict Rodd McGibbon, USAID, Jakarta

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These issues of Policy Studies are presently available in print and PDF. Hardcopies are available through Amazon.com. In Asia, hardcopies of all titles, and electronic copies of Southeast Asia titles are available through the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore at 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang Road, Singapore 119614. Website: http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/ Online at: www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications

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Policy Studies Previous Publications continued Policy Studies 4 Beijing’s Tibet Policy: Securing Sovereignty and Legitimacy Allen Carlson, Cornell University

Policy Studies 3 Security Operations in Aceh: Goals, Consequences, and Lessons Rizal Sukma, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta

Policy Studies 2 The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization Kirsten E. Schulze, London School of Economics

2003 Policy Studies 1 The Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed Edward Aspinall, University of Sydney Harold Crouch, Australian National University

These issues of Policy Studies are presently available in print and PDF. Hardcopies are available through Amazon.com. In Asia, hardcopies of all titles, and electronic copies of Southeast Asia titles are available through the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore at 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang Road, Singapore 119614. Website: http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/ Online at: www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications

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