Southern Thailand: The Dynamics of Conflict 9789812308887

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Southern Thailand: The Dynamics of Conflict

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Policy Studies 50

Southern Thailand: The Dynamics of Conflict John Funston

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Copyright © 2008 by the East-West Center Southern Thailand: The Dynamics of Conflict by John Funston East-West Center in Washington 1819 L Street, NW, Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel: 202-293-3995 Fax: 202-293-1402 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.eastwestcenter.org/washington Online at: www.eastwestcenter.org/policystudies This publication is a product of the project on Internal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia. For details, see pages 65–81. The project and this publication are supported by a generous grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Center. Hardcopies of publications in the series are available through Amazon.com. In Asia, hardcopies of all titles, and electronic copies of Southeast Asia titles, co-published in Singapore, are available through: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Road Singapore 119614 E-mail: [email protected] Website: ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Funston, John. Southern Thailand : the dynamics of conflict. (East-West Center Washington policy studies ; PS50) 1. Insurgency—Thailand, Southern. 2. Thailand, Southern—History—Autonomy and independence movements. 3. Islam and politics—Thailand. 4. Conflict management—Thailand. I. Title. II. Series : Policy studies (East-West Center Washington) ; 50. DS51 E13P no. 50 2008 ISBN 978-981-230-887-0 (soft cover) ISBN 978-981-230-888-7 (PDF) ISSN 1547-1349 (soft cover) ISSN 1547-1330 (PDF) Typeset in Singapore by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd Printed in Singapore by Seng Lee Press Pte Ltd

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Contents List of Acronyms

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Executive Summary

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Introduction

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Muslims in Southern Thailand

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Sociodemographic Background

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Contested History

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Islam in Southern Thailand

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Peaceful Decades

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Return of Violence

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“Traditional” Southern Problems

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The Disorderly Border

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John Funston Thaksin’s Impact on Traditional Southern Problems

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Post-Coup Policies

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Religion and the Insurgency

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Islamic Education and Reformation

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International Islam, 9/11, and the U.S.-led War on Terror

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Millenarian/Sufist Uprising?

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Separatists, Terrorists, and Militants

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Which Organizations Are the Most Important?

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How Are They Organized?

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When Did the Insurgency Become Active?

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What Are Insurgent Objectives?

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How Much Support Do Insurgents Have?

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Conclusion

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Endnotes

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Bibliography

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Appendix: Major Incidents in Southern Thailand since December 24, 2001

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Project Information: Internal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia

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• Project Purpose and Outline

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Southern Thailand

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• Project Participants List

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• Background of the Conflict in Southern Thailand

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• Map of Southern Thailand

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List of Acronyms BERSATU BNPP BRN BRN-C BBMP CEO CPM 43 DPP GAMPAR GMIP HuJI ICG IED IPS

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Barisan Bersatu Kemerdekaan Patani (United Front for Patani Independence) Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (National Front for the Liberation of Patani) Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National Revolutionary Front) BRN-Coordinate Barisan Bersatu Mujahideen Patani (Mujahideen United Front of Patani) Chief Executive Officer Civilian-Police-Military Command 43 Dewan Pembebasan Patani (Council for Patani Independence) Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya (Association of Greater Patani) Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani (Patani Islamic Mujahideen Movement) Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islam International Crisis Group improvised explosive device Islamic private school

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John Funston ISOC JI MP NAP NRC OIC PAS PCIA PULO Pusaka RKK SBPAC SBPPC TRT UNHCR

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Internal Security Operations Command Jemaah Islamiyah Member of Parliament National Aspiration Party National Reconciliation Commission Organization of the Islamic Conference Parti Islam SeMalaysia (Islamic Party of Malaysia) Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs Patani United Liberation Organization Pusat Persatuan Tadika (Central Organization for Tadika [elementary Islamic schools]) Runda Kumpulan Kecil (small armed guerilla force) Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center Southern Border Provinces Peacebuilding Command Thai Rak Thai Party (Thais Love Thais) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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Executive Summary On December 24, 2001, coordinated attacks on police posts in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat Provinces killed five police officers and one defense volunteer and marked a return to violent conflict in a part of southern Thailand that had been relatively peaceful for two decades. The conflict escalated further after a raid on a weapons armory on January 4, 2004. Since then more than 3,000 lives have been lost in a tragic and often brutal conflict known by Thais as the “Southern Fires.” Numerous reports and analyses of these events have been published by academic specialists on Thailand and others from the field of terrorism studies. The Thai government also has invested enormous effort in understanding the conflict, making its views known in official statements and intelligence briefs to selected members of the media and academics. Nonetheless, no consensus exists on what caused the resumption of violence or on the nature and objectives of insurgents opposing Bangkok. Academic explanations of southern violence focus mainly on the activities of militant groups in the region. Violence has occurred because militant groups have resumed armed opposition against the national government after lying low for several years. Some accounts link these groups to the growth of militant Islamic ideologies associated with Wahhabism or Salafism, Islamic schools in southern Thailand, or international Muslim organizations such as Al-Qaeda or Jemaah Islamiyah. Such analysts agree that although

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John Funston insurgents are essentially home grown, they are more Islamist than their predecessors and in some cases give priority to this identification over ethnonationalist concerns. A second explanation is that entrenched historical, economic, social, and political discrimination is to blame for the violence. Southerners have rebelled against Bangkok’s maladministration regularly in the past, and the current violence is in essence no different than previous episodes. A third explanation emphasizes mishandling by former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra: his excessive reliance on security measures to resolve problems rather than ensuring strict implementation of the law; his ill-considered abolition of key conflict-resolution bodies, particularly the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) and the Civilian, Police, Military Command 43; and his unsuccessful efforts to micromanage the south according to his CEO model of political control. Some accounts cut across these approaches, giving importance to two or even all three, but most give priority to only one. Outside this mainstream, other explanations focus on the millenarian/sufist characteristics of southern violence or possible support from neighboring Malaysia. Official accounts—together with those by retired Thai military personnel with southern experience—share much in common with the first of the above understandings. Indeed many academic works written in support of this terrorism perspective have relied on official sources to provide the “evidence” to build their case. Compared to most academic accounts, however, government sources express greater certainty about the nature of militant groups. They assert that insurgents have been preparing for violence since the 1990s and have a 1,000-day plan, now nearing completion, to establish an independent Patani Islamic government. Official accounts also often link insurgent activities with an elaborate range of conspiracies involving both criminal elements and local politicians. Malaysia’s unwillingness to act against training and planning activities by insurgents on its territory, to stop insurgents crossing the border at will, and to put an end to dual nationality are also deemed critical to insurgent successes. In both academic and official accounts there is much disagreement over which organizations lead the insurgency and what their objectives are. By late 2006, consensus had firmed over the centrality of the National Revolutionary Front-Coordinate, although without any agreement on who leads it or how it operates. The reluctance of insurgents to claim responsibility for violent incidents or systematically set out their demands has added to the puzzle.

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Southern Thailand This monograph begins by setting out the social, economic, historical, and political background of the Malay Muslim area of southern Thailand, arguing that after a long period of conflict, a modus vivendi between this region and Bangkok was achieved in the 1980s and 1990s. It then analyzes why conflict revived in late 2001, arguing three basic propositions. First, entrenched historical, cultural, economic, social, and political problems have fueled the current opposition to Bangkok—particularly in the area of the former Patani Sultanate, which comprises the provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala, and Malay-majority districts in Songkhla. Neighboring Satun is almost 70 percent Malay Muslim but has experienced no violence at all. An important aspect of these traditional problems has included a “disorderly” border region, where criminality, local power struggles, and bureaucratic rivalries have been rife. These problems have been compounded by a porous border with Malaysia. Critically, Thaksin turned back the clock and revived traditional feelings of discrimination. He dismantled institutions that had achieved some success in integrating Muslims and keeping the peace—notably the SBPAC—relied on heavyhanded, often extrajudicial methods to assert control, constantly reshuffled key security officials and structures in the region, and failed to identify and arrest the perpetrators of violence. Second, Islamic reform beginning around the 1970s has had a critical influence on the subsequent conflict. It heightened feelings of cultural distinctiveness from Buddhist neighbors and intensified religiosity— strengthening not only Islamic orthodoxy but also Sufist and millenarian beliefs. Islamic teachers influenced by these developments have been key organizers of the insurgency. The adoption of cell-based structures by regional dakwah organizations—notably Malaysia’s Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement)—perhaps provided a model for new organizational forms of resistance. In addition, the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, including the so-called war on terror, heightened Muslim feelings of separateness and of being under siege. Thaksin’s strong identification with U.S. policies toward the Islamic world aggravated Muslim concerns. Third, insurgent organizations have played a key role by constantly expanding and intensifying operations after 2004. Although details of the major insurgent organizations remain sketchy, their structure and objectives are relatively clear. They are cell-based and loosely structured, without a clear hierarchy. They are indirectly influenced by Islamist violence abroad,

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John Funston but not beholden to international jihadist ideology or organizations, and driven more by ethnonationalism than Islamism. Central to their concerns is greater autonomy if not independence for Muslims in the three southern provinces, although claims of a 1,000-day master plan for independence lack credibility. Although a small minority, these insurgent organizations have been strengthened by Thaksin’s mistakes and those of his successors and will retain a capacity for destructive violence until this legacy has been decisively rejected.

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Southern Thailand

Southern Thailand: The Dynamics of Conflict At the turn of the twenty-first century, Thailand’s Muslim minority seemed well integrated with the country’s Buddhist mainstream. Muslim politicians were represented in parliament, and some had achieved even higher political office. A violent insurgency active in the 1960s and 1970s had seemingly faded away. Proposals for greater decentralization under the 1997 constitution offered more prospects for self-determination for Muslim-majority The period since [2001] areas in the south. Thailand was, arguably, a success story, and contrasted notably has been a time of with neighboring Philippines’ failure to unprecedented violence integrate a similar-sized Muslim minority in its south. Muslim Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan (1997–2001) negotiated Thailand’s observer status with the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1998, according international recognition to integration efforts. However, the political trajectory of Thailand’s Muslims underwent an abrupt change in 2001. The period since has been a time of unprecedented violence. The current conflict began on the evening of December 24, 2001, with coordinated attacks on police posts in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat Provinces that killed five police officers and one paramilitary village defense volunteer. Over the next two years, several attacks occurred similar to this one that resulted in some fifty-six deaths (see Appendix for details of major incidents

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John Funston since December 2001). In what appears to have been largely a dispute between members of different security services, thirty-nine of the fatalities were police officers, thirteen were military personnel, and four were from paramilitary units (Ball and Mathieson 2007: 217). During this time, no civilians were reported to have been killed, although three other incidents pointed to broader conflicts. On October 29, 2002, arsonists torched five public schools, a Buddhist temple, and a Chinese shrine; subsequently, other symbols of the Thai state and of Buddhism were regular targets of attack. On April 26, 2003, three police officers, mistakenly believed to be members of a criminal gang, were attacked by over 1,000 angry villagers in Narathiwat Province, and two were killed. Attacks on security officials and other government officers––generally spontaneous in response to a perceived injustice rather than staged by militants––were repeated on a number of occasions in subsequent years. And on April 28, 2003, insurgents attacked marine bases in Yala and Narathiwat, killing five marines and stealing thirty rifles. Similar attacks were mounted regularly in the following years. Conflict escalated dramatically on January 4, 2004, when some 100 insurgents raided an arms depot of the Fourth Army Engineers in Narathiwat, killing four Buddhist soldiers and seizing a cache of 413 light infantry weapons and 2,000 rounds of ammunition. As diversionary moves, they also torched twenty public schools, burned rubber tires, and planted fake explosives in neighboring Yala Province. The scale of the January 4 attack was unprecedented and shocked the government. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra immediately widened the coverage of martial law,1 criticized the soldiers for negligence—declaring emotionally that the victims “deserved to die”—and demanding that those responsible be caught within a week. Security forces followed up with mass arrests, disruptive searches of Muslim homes and schools (almost invariably turning up no incriminating evidence), and detention of large numbers for indefinite interrogation. Several of those detained were tortured, and many “disappeared.” On March 12, Thailand’s best-known Muslim lawyer, Somchai Neelaphaijit, who was acting on behalf of several arrested southerners, disappeared near Bangkok while in police hands. Government leaders subsequently admitted that he had been killed, but his body has never been found and no one has been charged with his murder. Two further conflict milestones occurred in 2004. On April 28, around 200 insurgents attacked eleven police and military posts in Pattani, Yala,

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Southern Thailand and Songkhla. Five security officials and 107 rebels were killed in what was one of the bloodiest days in modern Thai history. During this incident, thirty-two Muslims were killed inside the historic Krue Se mosque (or in Malay, Kru-Ze) after controversial General Panlop Pinmanee defied instructions to avoid the use of force. Another nineteen casualties in Songkhla also appeared to be extrajudicial executions, attracting critical attention of local and international human rights groups. Even more disturbingly, on October 25 police killed seven when they fired on a large crowd protesting the detention of six village defense volunteers whose shotguns had been stolen by insurgents. After 1,300 protestors were detained, seventy-eight suffocated during transportation in crowded trucks from the protest site in Narathiwat’s Tak Bai District to an army camp in Pattani. In both cases, government-commissioned independent reports acknowledged that security forces had employed a “disproportionate” amount of force.2 Throughout 2004 insurgents also stepped up the intensity of their attacks. A religious aspect was highlighted with the brutal killing of three Buddhist monks late in January, the first time monks had ever been killed in the south. Innocent civilians were also targeted: improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were used to bomb a nightclub at Sungei Golok in late March and a Narathiwat food market in August. In another regional first— soon to become a regular practice—an elderly Buddhist was beheaded in late May. The first high-ranking official, a judge, was killed in September. And throughout the year there were regular assassinations of junior government officials, school teachers, self-defense forces personnel, and informants—in many cases targeted by motorcycle assassination squads— and arson attacks against schools and other government properties. The conflict grew in intensity over the next two years, acquiring an even more sectarian form. From June to July 2005 nine Buddhists were beheaded; in October 2005 a monk and two temple boys were killed during an arson attack on a Pattani temple; and in March 2006 a late evening attack on two Buddhist villages killed five. In May 2006 two female Buddhist teachers were separated from Muslim colleagues and severely beaten while angry villagers demanded the release of two men arrested earlier in the day for alleged insurgent activities. In what became a cause célèbre, one of the teachers—twenty-seven-year-old Juling Pangamoon, a northern Thai teacher who had developed a strong personal identification with the south—remained in a coma until finally dying on January 8,

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2007. In November 2006 over 200 Buddhists from three villages in Narathiwat and forty from a village in Yala fled to temples in a nearby district, where most remained for the next year. Muslims, on the other hand, still felt discriminated against by the state and continued to organize against security forces. In August 2005 Muslim villagers protested the killing of a local religious leader, claiming security forces were responsible; shortly thereafter, 131 of them fled to Malaysia, where most remain to this day. In September 2005 two marines were taken hostage in the Narathiwat village of Tanyong Limo and beaten to death after villagers accused them of killing two local Muslims. Although Muslims remained suspicious of the government, they also increasingly became victims of insurgent violence. Muslims associated in any way Muslims…also increasingly with the government had been targeted earlier, but the assassination of three became victims of respected Muslim teachers in June 2005 insurgent violence marked a new focus. More than half of those killed by insurgents since 2004 have been Muslim. The most notable development in the insurgency from 2005, however, comprised increasingly more audacious and well-planned operations that featured IEDs in simultaneous attacks on dozens of targets. Some of the bombs used became larger, increasing in weight from 1–2 kilograms to 10–15 and even over 20 kilograms. Often attacks had an economic focus— government infrastructure, private companies, and even rubber tappers. On April 3, 2005, three bombs targeted the southern region’s economic capital, Hat Yai, including one at the international airport (causing one death) and another at the entrance to a Carrefour supermarket. On July 14 synchronized attacks on multiple targets were carried out by up to sixty attackers in Yala Province. Power was blacked out, a cinema complex and hotel café bombed, and shops and another hotel torched. One soldier was killed and nineteen injured. The government used this as an excuse to introduce an emergency decree giving draconian powers to the prime minister to act as he saw fit. In late August and early September 2005 dozens of bombings and ambushes rocked the Deep South, killing three and injuring twenty-six. Similar operations occurred in October and November, and the following January, March, and June. At the beginning

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Southern Thailand of August 2006 as many as one hundred incidents took place in Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat, and Songkhla Provinces. In September, businesses in Hat Yai were again targeted, with the first Western victim (Canadian) among the five fatalities. More conciliatory policies were announced after a coup on September 19, 2006. Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont promised to give priority to noncoercive measures and made a notable apology to southern Muslims for the policy of his predecessor, but in practice military actions still had priority. Insurgent attacks reached their most intense level to that time: attacks on security forces became increasingly effective, sectarian aspects of the conflict escalated further, levels of brutality reached new heights, and arson attacks on schools increased exponentially. On May 9, 2007, seven soldiers were victims of a powerful roadside bomb then shot execution-style by attackers at point-blank range—the largest number of casualties suffered by security forces in a single incident to that point. In similar attacks, twelve more soldiers were killed on May 31, and seven on June 15. More aggressive military actions on the ground, including greater use of paramilitary rangers and village defense volunteers, led to regular incidents in which Muslim deaths were blamed on the government and insurgents then exacted revenge by killing Buddhists. Both Muslims and Buddhists staged regular demonstrations demanding the government protect their communities. The killings of nine Buddhist commuters in mid-March, shot at point-blank range after rebels armed with assault rifles forced a minibus off the road, marked yet another escalation in brutality. Teachers were killed in front of students in June and August 2007, and arson attacks were carried out on thirty-eight schools in less than three months between March and May (compared to thirty-seven for all of 2006). A newly-elected government took power in January 2008, but it had other preoccupations and did not attempt to change policy. By July 2008, there had been no reduction in the number of civilian or military casualties or any change in the overall trajectory of the conflict. Although southern Thailand has often been an arena of conflict in the past, violence in recent years has been qualitatively different. Casualty numbers have been far greater. Statistics are not precise (indeed often conflicting), but around 400 people were killed in 2004, 500 in 2005, 900 in 2006, and 870 in 2007. Total fatalities passed 3,000 in March 2008, and casualties are higher than in any other current conflict in

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John Funston Southeast Asia, including in the troubled southern Philippines. More social groups have been targeted than before: Whereas at one time the focus was on security forces, informants, and low-level officials, casualties now include Buddhist clergy and the general public. Insurgent operations have become much more coordinated and complex, involving as many as 200 insurgents and including simultaneous targets in up to three or four provinces. The regional economy has been severely disrupted, including in the main economic center, Hat Yai. The educational system has been devastated. Over seventy teachers and school administrators have been killed, and arson attacks made on 200 schools. Atrocities against both Muslims and Buddhists have shattered community relations. Although more Muslims have died at the hands of insurgents than Buddhists, on a per capita basis Buddhists have suffered more and have also sustained more injuries (they are more likely to be victims of IEDs than targeted assassinations). Remarkably, no organization has claimed responsibility for the violence, and much uncertainty remains about which organization(s) play key roles.

Muslims in Southern Thailand Conflict in southern Thailand has been profoundly influenced by local history and the social, cultural, and economic differences that separate Malay Muslims from the Thai Buddhist majority. Conflict Conflict in southern Thailand has between Malay Muslims and Bangkok has gone on for been…influenced by… centuries, and especially since differences…[between] Malay 1902 when the Muslim south was incorporated into Siam (the Muslims…[and] Thai Buddhists name of the country before “Thailand” was adopted in 1939). Above all, the place of Malay Muslims in Thailand has been influenced by their religious faith. Sociodemographic Background The focus of this study is on an area that Bangkok Thais call the “Deep South.” Often this is equated with the three southernmost provinces (Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala). At other times it includes neighboring

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Southern Thailand Satun and four Muslim-majority districts of Songkhla (Saba Yoi, Thepha, Chana, and Na Thawi). Muslims are a minority in a country where more than 90 percent of the population is Buddhist. Muslims live throughout the country, but most reside in the Deep South. These ethnic Malays are divided from other Thais not only by religion but also by broader cultural differences. With the exception of many Thai speakers in Satun, most share the culture and language of their neighbors in Malaysia.3 The exact number of Muslims in Thailand has long been contested, with media and academic accounts often more than twice as high as official statistics. One of the highest estimates comes from then-Foreign Minister Kantathi Suphamongkhon at an OIC foreign ministers meeting in June 2005, when he put the Muslim population at 7.5 million (12 percent).4 The 2000 census, however, puts the Muslim population at 2,815,900, or 4.6 percent of the total population—up from 4.1 percent in 1990.5 In the four southernmost provinces, 77 percent of the population is Malay Muslim. Narathiwat has around 546,450 Muslims (82 percent of the population), Pattani 482,760 (81 percent), Yala 286,005 (69 percent), and Satun 168,640 (68 percent); Songkhla also has 291,392 Malay Muslims, although they comprise less than 25 percent of the provincial population. In total, Malay Muslims in the five southernmost provinces number around 1,775,247, and 2,345,800 in the fourteen southern provinces as a whole. Pockets of Muslims live in other parts of the country, particularly around Bangkok and in the north, but those in the south account for over 80 percent of Muslims in Thailand. The three southernmost provinces are the most agricultural in the country. A large percentage of the Muslim population works in small-scale agriculture or fisheries, either self-employed or as laborers. Other opportunities are limited for a group in which only 9 percent has completed secondary school and 1.7 percent goes to university (compared to 13 percent and 9.7 percent for local Buddhists). Only 2.4 percent of employed Muslims are government officials compared with 19.2 percent of Buddhists (Srisompob and Panyasak 2006: 103–06). Although absolute poverty is not as great as in some of the northeastern provinces, the three provinces are considerably poorer than other southern provinces and poor compared to the northeast as a whole. In the poorest southern province, Narathiwat, average household income in 2002 was only 7,603 baht, compared to

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John Funston 9,279 baht in the northeast. In 1990 and 2000, poverty in the three provinces was worse than in any other region of the country, and over this period the gap widened. Overall, southern poverty declined from 46 to 21 percent, but the rate of decline was slower than elsewhere. Unemployment was the highest in the country in 2004, and tens of thousands sought seasonal employment in neighboring Malaysia (Warr 2005: 12–13). Contested History The known history of the region extends back to the kingdom of Langkasuka around the first century AD. The three southern provinces became known as Patani, or Patani Raya (Greater Patani), around the fifteenth century. This name is still used by Malays supporting autonomy or independence for the region. (Patani is not to be confused with the current Province of Pattani, spelt with a double t.)6 Secessionist claims sometimes extend to Satun Province and Malay-majority districts in Songkhla Province, although Satun was previously linked to Kedah, not Patani, and its more integrated, Thai-speaking population has never been the center of violent resistance to Bangkok. In extreme cases, irredentist claims have extended north beyond Patthalung and south to the Malaysian states of Kelantan and Terengganu (Bonura 2002). After its founding, Patani became a trading power, one of the leading centers of Islam in Southeast Asia, and a major player in the politics of the Malayan Peninsula. However, its main relationship was with the powerful Siamese kingdoms of Ayutthaya and, from the late eighteenth century, Bangkok. Siam’s army crushed Patani in 1786, and despite several rebellions gradually began to assert strong influence over local affairs. Malay nationalist accounts of Patani trace loss of independence to this date. In the late nineteenth century, King Chulalongkorn introduced a policy of administrative centralization, and in 1902 Patani came under direct Thai rule, an arrangement confirmed by the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 in which Thailand ceded neighboring Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Terengganu. Conflict with governments in Bangkok continued and sometimes intensified after 1902. In the early years, Patani opposition was led by the ousted royal families and charismatic Islamic leaders. The frequency and intensity of conflict varied with the extent to which governments in Bangkok sought to impose Thai cultural norms on the region. The introduction of

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Southern Thailand compulsory state education in 1921, and reports of closing traditional Islamic schools, led to fierce rebellions in the next two years. The ultranationalist policies of the first Phibunsongkham government (1938– 44) (generally shortened to “Phibun”) saw attempts to ban Malay dress and language, to redefine Malays as “Thai Muslims,” and, in the final year, to close Islamic courts. This caused bitter clashes, and thousands fled to neighboring Malaysia. After the Second World War, many Patani Malays sought unsuccessfully to merge the four southern provinces with Malaya, establishing the Malay Association of Greater Patani (Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya, or GAMPAR) to pursue this end. At about the same time, a Patani People’s Movement was founded by charismatic religious leader Hajji Sulong bin Abdul Kadir to pursue autonomy rather than secession. In April 1947 Hajji Sulong issued his famous seven demands, urging devolution of power to Muslims in the four southern provinces.7 He was soon arrested. Then on April 8, 1948, Phibun returned for a second term after a coup, and the Dusun Nyior uprising followed around April 28. Dusun Nyior remains shrouded in controversy— by some accounts it was based entirely on a misunderstanding, or began as preparation for jihad (holy war) against Chinese communists—but as many as 400 Malays and 30 police were killed, and it is engraved in southern Thai memory as a heroic uprising against an oppressive regime (Chaiwat 2006). Hajji Sulong was released in 1952, then killed while in police custody in August 1954, and remains an icon of the southern Malay struggle. Conflict intensified after the 1957 coup led by Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat and gave birth to new forms of resistance. Sarit strengthened assimilationist policies, resettled ethnic Thais in the region, and tried to assert control over Islamic schools (pondok or ponoh). In response, Malays formed several unstable, covert organizations, all broadly committed to independence for the south. Three major groups were National Front for the Liberation of Patani (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani, or BNPP, 1959), National Revolutionary Front (Barisan Revolusi Nasional, or BRN, 1960), and the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO, 1968).8 In broad terms, the BNPP represented a coalition of the aristocracy and conservative Islamic class; the BRN had a more radical Islamic “republican” orientation, with its base in the pondok; and PULO focused more on secular nationalism than Islam (although from time to time also emphasized

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John Funston Islam). All split and were reorganized in the 1980s. One section of the BNPP formed the Mujahideen United Front of Patani (Barisan Bersatu Mujahideen Patani, or BBMP) in 1985, and perhaps became or merged with Patani Islamic Mujahideen Movement (Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani, or GMIP) ten years later. In 1989 PULO and BRN formed a loose coalition known as United Front for Patani Independence (Barisan Bersatu Kemerdekaan Patani, or BERSATU [United]), which a PULO breakaway (New PULO) and GMIP may have joined at some stage (International Crisis Group [ICG] 2005: 6–16; National Reconciliation Commission [NRC] 2006: 13). These separatist groups benefited from foreign assistance. Their main operational centers until the 1980s were in Malaysia. Middle Eastern Islamic charities provided financial support, while countries such as Libya, Syria, and, in the mid-1980s, Afghanistan provided military training (Che Man 1990: 103–4). Besides the more extreme attempts at Thai assimilation noted above, a perception that Muslim Malays had been “colonized” by Siam, treated as second-class citizens, and regarded as inferior by ethnic Thais who dominated the southern bureaucracy also sustained resistance to Bangkok. The remoteness of the region from the capital (around 1,000 kilometers), rampant criminality, and use as a dumping ground for incompetent or outof-favor bureaucrats helped sustain such perceptions. So also did the Thai use of the term khaek to describe southern Malays. This word has two meanings in Thai, “guest” or “dark” (used to describe Indians, Arabs, and others), but among Malay Muslims is invariably interpreted as a demeaning reference to them as guests. At their peak in the mid-1970s, separatists had around 1,500 fighters under arms. They were implicated in such incidents as the 1977 bombing of Bangkok’s international airport, a 1977 bombing attempt during a royal visit to the south, and the 1980 bombing of the Hat Yai train station. Government in the mid-1970s, buildings, particularly schools and police separatists had around stations, were often key targets, as were state school teachers and government 1,500 fighters under arms officials (Surin 1985: 240–43; ICG 2005: 6–16). Separatist opposition to Bangkok was not, however, simply a royalistIslamic response to Thai-ification. Writing in the late 1980s, Ruth McVey

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Southern Thailand argued that more inchoate forms of peasant resistance and millenarianism were also a factor: “Chiefly leadership has been disrupted and partially transformed; religious leaders have been divided and inclined to compromise with an encroaching modernity; … The real energy of the violence has lain elsewhere, with peasant unrest.… The Muslim insurgency calls on much the same forces as have fuelled the broader rural unrest in Thailand, those engendered by rapid economic development unaccompanied by a real increase in administrative capability or in political and social integration” (McVey 1989: 47–48). Nonetheless, security problems eased considerably in the 1980s and 1990s in parallel with the expansion of democracy throughout Thailand and with governments that devised administrative and security policies that showed greater sensitivity to Muslim cultural needs. Islam in Southern Thailand Islam arrived in Thailand from different sources. In the south, after the Patani court converted to Islam around the fifteenth century, itinerant Sufi preachers spread the faith to villagers. Southern Muslims are mainly Sunni of the Shafii school, although like their counterparts in Southeast Asia, older animist influences remain important. Millenarian and invincibility cults, sometimes associated with Sufism (tariqah), have also attracted support. “In the context of Southern Thailand,” Surin Pitsuwan notes, “the word tariqah connotes involvement in the study and practice of sorcery, witchcraft and black magic. Members usually believe that they have supernatural power to defend themselves against enemy attack” (Surin 1985: 252–53). Such groups were prominent during the Dusun Nyior Rebellion in 1948 (Chaiwat 2006: 19–22, 29–30) and, arguably, on April 28, 2004. From the outset, Malay Muslims in the tri-border region have tended to move in different directions than Thailand’s other Muslims. Beyond this region, a common language helped others merge culturally with the wider Thai community. In the sixteenth and seventeenth century capital of Ayutthaya, Persians from a Shia background were an influential trading group and took over the new office of Chularajamontri (titular head of Muslims) when it was established in the early seventeenth century. They were soon outnumbered by Sunni Muslims, but the Shia have remained a significant minority, even establishing a limited foothold in the south.

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John Funston Islamic Institutional Arrangements Except for a few months in 1946 under Phibun, the south has had special arrangements for the practice of Islamic law since 1902. Each province has two Muslim judges, selected by competitive examination, with jurisdiction over Muslim family and inheritance cases, although for many Muslims these arrangements are problematic since the judges are under civil law authorities. The national framework for administration of Islamic affairs is not specifically designed for the southern region, but with such a high concentration of Thailand’s Muslims located there, its impact is keenly felt. It is a highly centralized arrangement, part of the Thai bureaucratic system, under the Ministries of Interior and Culture. At its apex is the office of the Chularajamontri (or Shaikh al-Islam), elected by provincial Islamic officials. An elected thirty-six-member National Council of Islamic Affairs assists. The Chularajamontri is appointed for life, advises the government on all Muslim matters, issues fatwa (authoritative religious rulings), and has extensive powers to regulate Islamic affairs. All Chularajamontri (only four since an element of election was introduced in the 1940s) have been from Bangkok or Ayutthaya; election arrangements have allowed other provinces to out-vote southern Muslims, even though a southerner played a major role in drafting a new law in 1997. The office has often been ignored by southern Muslims, who appear divided in their attitude toward the current incumbent. The current Chularajamontri has, however, worked closely with some leading Islamic figures in the region, such as the sometimes controversial head of Yala Islamic University, Professor Ismail Lutfi Jakapiya.9 Provincial Councils for Islamic Affairs (PCIA) are established in any province with at least three mosques. There are currently thirty-six, each with nine to thirty members selected by local mosque council heads (imams). Their functions include advising provincial governors, supervising mosques, resolving disputes regarding family and inheritance issues in accordance with Islamic law, and issuing fatwa. Many Muslims are concerned about the subordination of the PCIAs to the state, but southern PCIAs are held in high regard. Hajji Sulong was head of the Pattani PCIA in the 1940s. In the field of education, the south has for centuries had its own notable pondok schools—named after the small huts in which students reside. Using Malay (and occasionally Arabic) as the medium of instruction, some of the pondok have become famous throughout Southeast Asia and

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Southern Thailand are a great source of pride for southern Muslims. As noted, Prime Minister Sarit sought to force them under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Education in the 1960s. In return for some financial assistance, they were converted into Islamic private schools (IPSs), using Thai as the medium of instruction. Most teach normal secular subjects alongside Islamic ones. In practice, a number of pondoks continued to exist. Worried about possible security risks from schools outside the purview of the education ministry, at the beginning of 2004 the government again made pondok registration compulsory. Some 214 registered by the May deadline, and that figure has since increased to over 300 (Ibrahem 2006: 156). Around 15,000 students attend these schools. There are also around 300 IPSs, and these enroll 70 percent of Malay Muslim students at the secondary level. Graduates can go on to secular or Islamic higher education (available locally at the state-run College of Islamic Studies in the Prince of Songhkla University, Pattani campus, and private Yala Islamic University). IPS institutions have gradually gained Muslim acceptance, and now they “gain more respect than pondoks” (Ibid.: 143). Although IPSs are much more popular at the secondary level, the Thai state has had some success integrating Malay Muslims into the mainstream public education system in the three provinces. At the primary level, 184,890 (88 percent of all students) study in state schools, and only 22,200 are educated privately.10 That has had the important effect of spreading bilingualism to the extent that in the current conflict many insurgent pamphlets and banners are written in Thai. Islamic Reform Muslims throughout Thailand have long been influenced by international developments. Southern Muslims have traditionally gone for education in Malaysia and Indonesia, and preachers from these countries have taught in the south. Muslims have also gone in large numbers to the Middle East on pilgrimages and for advanced Islamic education. In the 1960s as many as 30,000 Patani Muslims lived in Saudi Arabia (Che Man 1990: 110). And as pressures on pondok education increased from the 1960s, more pursued Islamic education in neighboring countries, Pakistan, and the Middle East. Islamic reform in Thailand has followed regional trends since its beginnings. Hajji Sulong was among its early proponents after returning from studies in Mecca in the late 1920s (Surin 1985: 147–48). The dakwah

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John Funston phenomenon—a movement to revitalize Islam through a stricter adherence to orthodox prescriptions—reached Thailand in the 1970s. It was brought by Muslims studying abroad who, as Raymond Scupin notes, were influenced by the writings of “Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad Iqbal, Abdul Ala Maududi, Ali Shariati, Muhammad Asad, and Hasan al-Turabi as well as other Southeast Asian Muslim leaders such as Anwar Ibrahim of Malaysia” (Scupin 98: 254). Dakwah was further strengthened by international developments such as the Iranian revolution and money from Middle Eastern and Iranian charities that poured into schools and proselytizing activities. As in other Southeast Asian countries, the last three decades of the twentieth century were a time of ferment and heightened religiosity. Malaysian developments were particularly relevant—the growing strength of political Islam, the activities of the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, or ABIM, established in 1971 by Anwar Ibrahim, who later became Malaysia’s deputy prime minister), and the revitalization of the Islamic the last three decades of the Party of Malaysia (Parti Islam twentieth century were a time SeMalaysia, or PAS) in neighboring Kelantan in the 1990s.11 Nik Aziz, of [religious] ferment Kelantan’s state leader and PAS spiritual adviser, was a regular and revered visitor to southern Thailand, where he conversed in the local dialect and reportedly led prayers at a mosque next to the Thai royal family’s palace in Narathiwat at the Queen’s request.12 New religious organizations flourished, including those essentially orthodox (Tablighi Jama’at) and others less so (such as the Malaysian Darul Arqam). Islamic Politics Since the tentative beginnings of open politics after the overthrow of Thailand’s absolute monarchy in 1932, Muslims have played at least a limited role in national politics. Four members of the small People’s Party that led that coup were Muslim (Thanet 2004: 19), although they were “assimilated Muslims,” whose politics have always differed from those in the southern provinces. Nonetheless at least a few Malay Muslim representatives have been returned in all national elections and included in appointed assemblies. They also have a long history of representation through the Democrat Party since it was established in 1946. However, in

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Southern Thailand 1986 southern Muslims formed their own wadah (unity) faction within the party, which left the Democrats two years later, joined the National Aspiration Party (NAP) in 1992, and then the ruling Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais, or TRT) when the parties merged in 2002 (Daungyewa 2005). Muslims also gradually gained a voice in Thai cabinets. A Malay Muslim from Satun, Che Abdullah Langputeh, was named education minister in 1954. Later, acting through the wadah faction of the NAP, Den Tomeena (son of Hajji Sulong) became a deputy minister in the powerful Ministry of Interior (1992–95), and in 1995 Wan Muhamad Nor Matha became the first Malay from the three provinces to hold a full ministerial portfolio (Transport and Communications); he was subsequently parliamentary speaker and president (1996–2001), then until the 2005 elections held ministerial portfolios in Transport and Communications, Interior, Agriculture and Cooperatives, and as Deputy Prime Minister. Former Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan (1997–2001) is also a Malay Muslim; and although he does not speak Malay and comes from Nakhon Si Thammarat Province outside the Deep South, he has made a special study of the community, including writing a doctoral dissertation on it. The 1997 constitution provided further opportunities for Malay Muslim representation. It established the first-ever elected upper house (senate)— based on provinces—and strengthened local government. As a consequence, as Wattana Sugunnasil notes, “In the deep South, Muslims dominated provincial legislative assemblies, and several southern municipalities had Muslim mayors” (Wattana 2006: 122). The 2007 constitution is similar in these respects, although half the senate is now appointed.

Peaceful Decades From the early 1980s to the end of the 1990s, violence in southern Thailand declined dramatically. Insurgent movements divided, their numbers contracted, and hundreds took advantage of a government amnesty offer. Violent incidents never ceased [In the 1980s and 1990s] completely but were greatly violence in southern Thailand reduced. In August 1993 thirty-four schools were torched, and according declined dramatically to statistics provided by former Prime Minister Chuan, seventy “violent incidents” took place in 1997, thirty-seven in 1998, fourteen in

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John Funston 1999, eight in 2000, and twenty-eight in 2001.13 The total number of incidents of political violence during 1993–2000 has been estimated at around 467—which contrasts with 283 incidents between 2001 and 2003 and 1,843 incidents in January 2004–January 2005 (calculated from Srisompob and Panyasak 2006: 96). A combination of factors contributed to this positive change, including new conflict resolution institutions, more conciliatory security doctrines, democratic expansion, new doctrines of cultural pluralism, more understanding government leaders, and improved relations with Malaysia. Two important initiatives in the early 1980s were the establishment of the Civilian-Police-Military Command 43 (CPM 43) and the SBPAC on November 6, 1980, and April 5, 1981, respectively. Both covered the five southernmost provinces. Yala-based CPM 43 was established to reduce military preeminence and give civilians and the police greater security roles. It was, however, part of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), a somewhat shady organization established under the Supreme Command in 1965 (known as the Communist Suppression Operations Command until 1974) to ensure coordination of civilian, police, and military security programs and military primacy over all security matters (Panomporn 1984: 323).14 The SBPAC was created out of a Centre for Coordination of Southern Affairs in Yala Province (within the Ministry of the Interior) but gained enhanced powers. In its early years, it remained very much under the influence of the Fourth Army commander. It had, for example, power to recommend discipline against public servants, including transferring them out of the region on short notice, but transfers had first to be approved by the head of the Fourth Army (Ibid.: 324–48). These arrangements were changed in 1996 (Prime Minister’s Order 56/2539, April 23). The SBPAC was placed directly under civilian control and headed by a deputy permanent secretary (in charge of security) in the Ministry of the Interior. CPM 43 remained under the Fourth Army. Above both organizations a national policy board, chaired by the prime minister, was established. The SBPAC institutionalized consultation with southern Muslims, organizing numerous seminars in which hundreds of Muslim leaders participated. It also provided new administrators to the region with training in Malay Muslim language and customs. It did not, however, always act reasonably in the interests of the southern Muslims—one program to

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Southern Thailand change the names of villages to Thai names caused considerable resentment.15 And its effectiveness may also have begun to decline in the years immediately prior to its dissolution in 2002 as a result of corruption and a reduction in resources for its sister organization, CPM 43 (Askew 2007: 49–50). These new southern institutions complemented broader changes in military doctrine during the term of Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond (1980–88). Directed initially against communists, Prime Ministerial Decree 66/2523 (1980), later followed by 65/2525 (1982) and 47/2529 (1986), emphasized the need to give primacy to political rather than military solutions and included generous amnesty offers. A similar policy aimed specifically at the south, Tai Rom Yen (Peaceful, Calm South) was announced in 1981 (Decree 751/2524). At the same time, attitudes toward ethnic minorities also began to change, with a shift from assimilation toward integration. A new understanding of “Thai-ness” emerged that extolled the virtues of localism— celebrating cultural differences, local history, and local knowledge in areas such as health, crafts, and agriculture. In southern Thailand in the early 1990s, radio and television began broadcasting in the local Malay dialect. At the same time, representation of southern Muslims on national television became more positive (Hamilton 2005: 8–12). Greater religious freedom was extended in such areas as allowing women to use head coverings in schools, government institutions, and offices, permitting greater use of Islamic names, and creating prayer rooms in public places. Even the National Security Council proclaimed the virtue of cultural diversity in its 1999– 2003 security policy for the southern border provinces (Chaiwat 2006: 26). Malay Muslims also began to make progress in mainstream politics, as noted, and national governments during this period also tended to be headed by prime ministers who had some understanding of the south. Prem Tinsulanond (1980–88) was a native of Songkhla and the architect of new southern security policies and institutions. Chuan Leekpai, prime minister for much of the 1990s (1992–95 and 1997–2001) was from the south; Chuan also headed the Democrat Party, which had its main power base there. And Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchiayut (1996–97) had many ties with the south, particularly through the wadah faction that was then part of his NAP. The monarchy also supported efforts to integrate Malay Muslims into the nation, building a palace in Narathiwat in 1972 which the king and

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John Funston queen visited regularly. Informally, members of the Privy Council, particularly General Prem after he ended his time as prime minister in 1988, continued to influence the SBPAC and southern administration more broadly (McCargo 2006: 43). Although Malay Muslims have never seen the monarchy in the same semi-divine light as their Buddhist fellow citizens, many do regard it as an institution deserving high respect.16 A change of Malaysian policy also helped contain insurgents. Malaysian cooperation was constrained for a long time by concerns that Thai officials were not extending full support in efforts to suppress the Thailand-based Communist Party of Malaya. When the Communist Party of Malaya surrendered in 1989, Malaysia became more willing to assist and deny Muslim groups permission to establish operational headquarters or even sanctuary. In 1998 it cooperated in arresting and handing over four or five senior PULO separatist leaders who had taken shelter in that country.

Return of Violence What then caused a return to violence in 2001? Traditional factors— meaning both Muslim perceptions of discrimination and problems associated with a disorderly border region—were part of the problem. Policy errors and a hard line security approach by Prime Minister Thaksin were critical in reinforcing Malay perceptions. Religious factors also played a role, particularly the changes brought by the dakwah movement and Islamic reform from the 1970s, some aspects of Islamic schools, post-9/11 Islamophobia, and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Finally, separatists or terrorists have increasingly seized the initiative and shaped the trajectory of this conflict.

“Traditional” Southern Problems

To

To many Thais, the underlying causes of southern violence have not changed in centuries. Officials see conflicts linked to “influential many Thais, the…causes of figures,” bureaucratic power southern violence have not rivalries, entrenched criminality, and Malaysian tolerance or even changed in centuries support of insurgents. For their part, Malay Muslims perceive themselves as second-class citizens because of discriminatory policies imposed

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Southern Thailand from Bangkok—in areas such as justice, the economy, education, culture, and political representation—and discriminatory practices by ethnic Thai officials in the region. Both perceptions are partly true. Problems of a disorderly border are real and complicate current challenges, although they probably did not play a major role in igniting them. For Muslims, the historical perception of injustice has been powerfully exploited by insurgents. The depth of this feeling is reflected in the fact that neighboring, ethnically similar Satun has not been caught up in this conflict, or indeed in earlier conflicts with Bangkok. Muslim concerns were at least partially addressed during the 1980s and 1990s, but Thaksin’s policies overturned these reforms. The Disorderly Border The Thaksin administration saw southern problems largely as a result of local rivalries, bureaucratic sabotage, and disorder, a view some analysts have supported (Askew 2007). Thai police saw criminality as the most serious problem in the south, and Prime Minister Thaksin (himself a former police officer) often endorsed this view. He initially described those involved in the January 4, 2004, raid on the Fourth Army arms depot in Narathiwat as mere “bandits” (although he later linked them to the GMIP).17 Similarly, he claimed those involved in the April 28, 2004, attack on military posts in the southern provinces were local gangs involved in smuggling and drug trafficking. He blamed militants for the Tak Bai incident, but nonetheless opined that “many of the protesters appeared to be in a drug-induced state similar to those militants involved in the Krue Se Mosque incident in April.”18 In reality, no evidence exists that large numbers of perpetrators had taken drugs.19 Others endorsed the prime minister’s view. In August 2005 Deputy Prime Minister and Justice Minister Chidchai Vansathidya (also a retired senior policeman) said many of the killings linked to the insurgency were the result of criminal vendettas. “Of all the murders that have happened in the deep south, I think no more than a third are related to the unrest,” he claimed.20 The Narcotics Control Office maintained that the violence was mainly caused by drug rings that had given money and drugs to others to incite chaos.21 And such beliefs were not confined to officials and government leaders. Chair of the government-appointed independent advisory group, the National Reconciliation Commission, Anand Panyarachun, said that

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John Funston perhaps half of the violence resulted from illegal smuggling, business disputes, and the illicit drug trade,22 and the Chularajamontri made similar claims.23 At times the police linked top Malay Muslim political leaders to criminal activities and the insurgency. In a dramatic March 2004 press conference, police officials alleged that two members of the ruling Thai Rak Thai Party in the house of representatives and a southern senator were key organizers of the January 4 attacks. However, only one case was brought to court, that of Member of Parliament (MP) Najmuddin Umar, and the case was dismissed in December 2005.24 Why Muslim leaders who had made it to influential political positions might embark on such risky ventures was never clarified. Nonetheless, in the conspiracy-driven world of Thai politics, intelligence agencies and political leaders were strongly predisposed toward complex explanations of the southern violence that included “dark influences” of various kinds. A ninety-seven-page intelligence document prepared in 2004 provides a detailed account of different groups attached to local elites in the south and unconvincingly blames the January 4 incident on an opposition Democrat member backed by sections of the military (Ibid.: 15–26). There is no doubt that criminality is entrenched in the south, as successive governments have acknowledged, and is responsible for some of the violence. Islamic militants and criminals have been linked in other regional conflicts, and this may be true in the south. However, insurgents do not seem to require extensive funding, and a definite link has never been demonstrated—even in the case of the October 2007 seizure of 30 million baht of alleged drug money, which officials and the media said proved collaboration between drug trafficking, organized crime, and the insurgency.25 Moreover, it is not apparent why this might have caused violence to escalate after 2004. Those who give priority to criminality have not provided evidence that there has been a change in this area that explains increased violence. Malaysia: Witting or Unwitting Insurgent Supporter? When violence in the South resumed in December 2001, it was not long before Malaysia fell under suspicion. In March 2002 Prime Minister Thaksin threatened to withdraw the citizenship of any separatist with dual nationality and claimed that violence could be quelled if more control existed over

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Southern Thailand migration, because existing arrangements allowed insurgents to cross the border and evade capture.26 In subsequent months, several Thai officials expressed concern about separatists in Malaysia planning violence. Nonetheless, the two sides initially worked cooperatively together, holding the first-ever joint cabinet meeting in December 2002 and concluding a new military cooperation agreement in May 2003. After the January 4, 2004, raid, Thaksin again highlighted the importance of dual nationality. Registration of all dual nationals was included as part of a package announced in February to end the southern problems within three years.27 Malaysia agreed to cooperate, claiming it did not allow dual citizenship (although this practice for southern Thais is a poorly held secret). In subsequent months Thaksin and senior Thaksin…allege[d] that security officials continued to address issues Malaysia refused to of dual nationality, complain that separatists used Malaysia as a base for cooperate in opposing planning separatist activities and training, separatists and allege that Malaysia refused to cooperate in opposing separatists, particularly in relation to eighteen names and addresses of suspected militants given to them in 2004.28 And if the federal government in Malaysia was viewed as uncooperative or prepared to turn a blind eye to separatists, the Islamist PAS state government in neighboring Kelantan was considered to be actively in cahoots with separatists.29 Bilateral relations grew in complexity as the events at the Krue Se mosque and Tak Bai raised alarm in Malaysia. Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi’s strong response following both incidents—particularly his offer of refuge to Malay Muslims after the former—provoked a fierce reaction from Thaksin.30 Another incident that complicated relations was the appearance of Wan Kadir Che Man at a public seminar in Kuala Lumpur in May where he acknowledged that he was chairman of BERSATU. Thai officials also highlighted the involvement of a Malaysian author with a proseparatist tract Berjihad di Patani (Holy War in Patani) found on one of those killed in Krue Se. The author was subsequently arrested by Malaysian authorities but was not handed over because he held Malaysian citizenship.31 Finally, Thaksin created a minor diplomatic drama in December 2004 when he

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John Funston announced that separatist “ringleaders” had been identified who had trained local Muslim youths in “militant training in jungle camps in Thailand and in Kelantan state, Malaysia.”32 He was careful to say he believed training had been done “without the knowledge or support of the Malaysian government,”33 but still the Malaysian government interpreted his words as implying its support for insurgents. A further deterioration in relations occurred when, as mentioned earlier, 131 southern Muslims fled across the border to Kelantan on August 30, 2005. Thailand’s annoyance increased when Malaysia allowed the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to interview the group and then moved them further from the border to Terengganu. A heated exchange followed, although tensions had eased somewhat by December 2005 when Malaysia returned one of the group who had an insurgent past. At the end of 2005, Thailand went along with mediation efforts by former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad after they had been proposed by NRC head Anand and endorsed by the Thai king. It sent two senior military officials to meetings with insurgent groups, but Bangkok chose to interpret these as a personal rather than Malaysian initiative, and ultimately used tensions between Mahathir and Prime Minister Abdullah as a pretext for not pursuing mediation further—even though on this issue Mahathir and Abdullah appear to have held identical views. Concern over Malaysian intentions remained high and continued even after the government of Prime Minister Surayud moved to improve bilateral relations.34 The border with Malaysia is, of course, porous, and southern Muslims frequently cross over it for a wide range of reasons, including fear of security actions in their region. It is manned at only a few points along its 647 kilometers and can easily be crossed outside official check points.35 Dual nationality makes this easier but is not essential. Some 200,000– 300,000 southern Muslims work in Malaysia, and tens of thousands or more—the figure is disputed—hold dual citizenship. This ensures that any attempt to monitor border crossing is extremely difficult and provides opportunities for insurgents to cross over when they choose. But violence and unrest in southern Thailand is not something that Malaysia might benefit from, and indeed Kuala Lumpur worries about the prospect of violence spilling across the border. There has been no evidence of direct support to the insurgency in Thailand by national or Kelantan governments since separatist bases closed down after the Communist Party

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of Malaya surrendered. It is possible that limited insurgent training occurs without Malaysia being aware of it, but Malaysian intelligence has a welldeserved reputation for closely monitoring Islamic groups throughout the country, and nothing on a large scale is conceivable. Malaysia did hand over a number of insurgents on request, though according to coup leader General Sonthi Boonyaratglin many of these were killed by the Thaksin government.36 Thaksin’s Impact on Traditional Southern Problems Although the traditional problems discussed above had some impact on southern violence, more important were Thaksin administration policies, which had the effect of exacerbating bureaucratic rivalries between Thaksin…policies…strengthen[ed] the police and military and strengthening Muslim perceptions Muslim perceptions [of that central authorities discrimination] discriminated against them. Central to these issues were Thaksin’s decision to abolish the SBPAC and CPM 43 in May 2002, his ineffective attempt to impose CEO-style rule on the south, and his use of hard-line security policies as the major tool for containing conflict. Thaksin closed down the SBPAC and CPM 43 largely on the advice of the police, although the army agreed that insurgency no longer existed and did little to oppose the closures. Although there are dissenting views,37 most analysts agree that disbanding these institutions in May 2002 was a disaster. It meant that the army was replaced by the police— feared even more than the military by southern Muslims—in the leading security role. And once given primacy over security issues, the police moved to entrench their influence by killing long-standing Muslim informers with close military ties (McCargo 2006: 55–56). The “war on drugs” in early 2003 provided further opportunities for this. By most estimates, around 2,500 people were subject to extrajudicial execution, and according to Surin Pitsuwan, over 200 of these were in the Muslim south. This led, he argues, to young men banding together in villages to try and counter the “official violence.”38 Such incidents stirred deep resentment in Muslim communities. They also intensified a long-running conflict over influence in the south between

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John Funston the police and military. As noted, most of the fifty-six deaths in 2002 and 2003 appeared to be the result of conflict between the police and military, especially paramilitary Rangers. Military-police rivalry continued after this and impacted adversely on prosecution of the conflict. But after 2004, police were no longer the main victims of violence. In addition, the disbanding of the SBPAC removed an important social, cultural, and political forum for consultation with Muslims. Its replacement with appointed provincial governors reporting directly to Thaksin, and Thaksin’s failure to push forward other plans for decentralization, emphasized Muslim disenfranchisement even further. Thaksin sparked more opposition by failing absolutely in attempts to impose his own CEO-style solutions to southern security. Thaksin, Duncan McCargo has argued, saw southern bureaucratic officials as slow and unreliable (and sympathetic to political rivals). Thaksin felt that problems could be solved by visionary “new thinking.” He could make decisions quickly, but to do so he needed to appoint the “right” official to give advice. Additionally, from his background as a former policeman, Thaksin often saw complicated social problems as a matter of criminality that could be solved by firm application of the law (Ibid.: 46). All this predisposed Thaksin to hard line policies. It also led him to implement a rapid turnover of officials—four changes of leadership to the Fourth Army in less than two years, and a similar number of defense and interior ministers. This proved counterproductive in terms of addressing the southern security situation. But it did give the public the impression that he was being decisive and earned popular support. A further illustration of Thaksin’s interventionist and ineffective management style can be seen in the regular turnover of institutions established to address southern violence. When the conflict escalated at the beginning of 2004, officials were quick to fault a lack of coordination between government agencies. The Southern Border Provinces Peacebuilding Command (SBPPC) was formed as a result on March 24, 2004. However, in the next three years the SBPPC underwent two major reorganizations and other modifications (see table 1), giving it no chance to address security issues effectively. While Thaksin remained in power, the primary focus of government efforts to contain the southern insurgency relied on harsh security measures. Kasian Tejapira described it as based on three approaches:

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Southern Thailand Table 1. Southern Security Structures May 2002 SBPAC and CPM 43 abolished May 1. Security regarded as a police matter. January 2004 Expansion and effective implementation of martial law gave military (Fourth Army) the leading security role. March 2004 Southern Border Provinces Peacebuilding Command (SBPPC) established March 24 by prime ministerial order (68/2547) under ISOC, at the initiative of General (Ret.) Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, ISOC director and deputy prime minister. In Bangkok, the SBPPC was headed by Chavalit and included the major securityrelated government agencies, while a military-led forward command in the south was headed by ISOC deputy director General Panlop Pinmanee. After the April 28, 2004, incident, General Panlop was ordered back to Bangkok after defying Chavalit’s order not to attack those inside Krue Se mosque. The forward command then became inactive. October 2004 Prime Minister Thaksin reorganized the SBPPC (PM’s Order 260/2547). Thaksin replaced Chavalit as the head of the Bangkok policy agency and reportedly intended to work through the National Security Council. He put Deputy Supreme Commander General Sirichai Tanyasiri in charge of the forward command. The forward command had both military and civil responsibilities, including full authority over all security operations and powers to remove inefficient security or civilian officials swiftly. May 2005 SBPPC again reorganized (PM’s Order 200/2548). The new organization featured a Bangkok-based Committee on Southern Border Provinces Peacebuilding Policy headed by Deputy Prime Minister Chidchai Vanasatidya, a close ally of the prime minister. (In October Thaksin relieved Chidchai of other responsibilities to devote full attention to southern unrest.) Its members included the country’s top security officials, while General Sirichai headed a special strategy office under the prime minister. The commander of the Fourth Army became director of the SBPPC in the South. Media reports said the new body would give civilians a greater say in SBPPC security operations, with southern governors having a mandate for direct coordination with the new SBPPC southern director. Civilian control also flowed from an enhanced role for the Bangkok committee, charged with meeting twice weekly and directing security policy. July 2006 Thaksin changed track yet again, announcing he was handing absolute decisionmaking power in the south to army Commander-in-Chief General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, declaring that being a Muslim the general would understand the situation. In practice, however, Sonthi never gained control over the police or civilian bureaucracy. October 2006 Post coup government announces that a strengthened ISOC (modeled on the U.S. Department of Homeland Security) would have the main security responsibility for the south. The SBPAC and CPM 43 were reinstated, and SBPPC remained in place. This arrangement was confirmed by a new internal security bill passed in December 2007.

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John Funston Firstly, state terror – blacklisting, round-up, torture, detention-cumpolitical re-education, the forced disappearance of at least 160 local people, and extra-judicial killings of captured insurgents, local religious leaders, teachers and in some instances whole families of alleged separatists. Secondly, authoritarian legislation – first martial law and then successive declarations of a state of emergency – which have had the effect of suspending constitutional rights for Thai citizens in the affected provinces without improving the security situation. Thirdly, militarization: some 20,000 soldiers are now deployed in the deep South, most of them ethnic Thai or Laotian Buddhists who do not speak the local Malay dialect and know nothing about Islam or Malay culture, yet were authorized by martial law to wield wide-ranging powers over the local population. (Kasian 2006: 31)

The practice of state terror was, as argued previously, closely linked to the transfer of security responsibilities from the army to the police in May 2002. Whether disappearances totaled 160 as alleged is difficult to assess, but a figure in excess of 100 is certainly widely believed in the south. Human Rights Watch (2007a) has documented twenty-two disappearances and argues that absolute numbers would be much higher. High profile Muslim lawyer Somchai Neelaphaijit was the most prominent to have disappeared. But excessive brutality was not a monopoly of the police. This was highlighted by the two major incidents of 2004, on April 28 and October 25, in which the military had the lead role. It is hard to overemphasize the importance of these incidents in turning southern Muslims against the central government. As noted, in both cases government-established independent commissions acknowledged security forces had used “disproportionate” force. Scenes of brutal military actions against unarmed demonstrators at Tak Bai were shown around the world on television, on the Internet, and later on video compact disc. Compounding these tragedies was strong initial government support of military actions, prolonged prosecution of alleged instigators, reluctance to take action against security excesses—eventually imposing the lightest disciplinary action conceivable— and inadequate or nonexistent compensation for the victims and their families (Ukrist 2006). Implementation of authoritarian legislation began with the gradual extension of martial law throughout the three southern provinces in 2004

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Southern Thailand then to two districts of Songkhla in November 2005.39 In addition, the government declared an executive decree against terrorism in August 2003 then an emergency decree in July 2005 replacing martial law. The latter gave the prime minister absolute emergency powers and included a provision granting government officials legal immunity for any action undertaken. In the words of NRC head Anand, Muslims might well have perceived this as a “license to kill.”40 Militarization increased rapidly after the January 2004 weapons raid. The army quickly doubled its forces to more than 7,000 and announced deployment of another 7,000 troops in September. In January 2005 Prime Minister Thaksin announced a new division (12,000 troops) would be created in the south.41 The increase in police personnel is more difficult to track, but the numbers have been similar to the army, and by early 2007 the police force was reportedly around 21,000 strong (Davis 2007). Another problematical aspect has been expansion of various paramilitary forces in the south. Ball and Mathieson (2007) report the following: Village Defense Forces increased from 24,300 in mid-2004 to 47,400 by the end of 2005; Territorial Defense Volunteers (attached to interior ministry district offices) went from 654 in 2002 to 4,900 in 2005; special village defense volunteers initiated by the queen numbered 2,500 in mid-2004 and had increased to 9,541 by October 2005; a “teacher protection battalion” was established by 360 teachers in early 2005, with plans to increase the battalion to 2,840 in 2006; and Army “Rangers” went from 1,791 in 2002 to 2,576 in 2006. Many of the paramilitary forces had particularly bad human rights records, and guns handed to Village Defense Forces became a primary target for insurgent theft. The primacy given to the use of force, together with the brutality behind the disappearances and events of April 28 and October 25, 2004, and the unavailability of effective legal redress, created an environment in which many Muslims could not trust the government. Each incident was followed by an increase in insurgent violence, which the government was powerless to resist. However, tough policies were welcomed by the general public, and Thaksin’s popularity increased after each escalation.42 Nonetheless, it would be incorrect to say that the government only tried tough security solutions to solve the problems in the south. In late January 2004 Thaksin commissioned Deputy Prime Minister Chaturon Chaisaeng to investigate and recommend a possible alternative approach.

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John Funston In a quixotic scheme that December, 80–100 million paper origami birds— meant to reflect peace—constructed all over Thailand were dropped from the air on the king’s birthday. In February Thaksin announced the appointment of the independent NRC, chaired by respected former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun, and in March permitted a parliamentary debate on the south during which he promised a change to a more conciliatory policy. However, conciliatory initiatives never lasted very long. Thaksin initially accepted the far-reaching Chaturon and NRC reports in principle but quickly set them aside.43 Other aspects of Thaksin’s rule had a mixed impact on Muslim perceptions of the government in Bangkok. On economic issues, Thaksin spoke often about improving the southern economy to remove underlying conditions conducive to insurgency but encouraged mega-projects of limited benefit to the agrarian pursuits of most Malay Muslims. He introduced job-creation schemes run by the military, which provided some additional income for southerners, but those who accepted jobs often became targets for insurgents. Allied with this were environmental policies that impacted adversely on the Muslim economy (Supara 2004: 23, 67–69, 70, 83, 244, 248). Indeed, the NRC notes that nearly half the “red” villages (villages under substantial insurgent influence) in the three southern provinces “have had conflict of some kind over natural resources, specifically the overlapping of national forest lands with lands that villagers used to make their living” (NRC 2006: 26). Thaksin policies also created unintended cultural conflict. The popular village fund, providing 1 million baht per village for loans, conflicted with Muslim prohibitions on interest. Similarly, legalization of the underground lottery in early 2003, provision of education scholarships from lottery proceeds, and mooted legalization of casinos and prostitution conflicted sharply with Islamic teachings.44 Malay-language and Islamic radio broadcasts faced greater restrictions.45 On educational issues, Thaksin’s government began to introduce bilingual schools that used Malay as the medium of instruction in early grades before switching to Thai—an issue that educators believed important in assisting Malay Muslims achieve greater educational success. Its priority, however, was to ensure that Islamic schools were closely controlled and fit into state developmental needs. One aspect of this that particularly irritated southern Muslims involved requests to Malaysia to provide assistance and advice on Islamic education. Southern Muslims saw this as an insult to

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Southern Thailand their proud tradition of Islamic education.46 In a related area, Thaksin was quick to dismiss the NRC recommendation that Malay be recognized as a “working language” in the south.47 Overall Thaksin was highly insensitive in dealing with southern problems. He showed a lack of empathy for Muslim victims such as those at Krue Se and Tak Bai, in marked contrast to sentiments when violence occurred against ethnic Thais. He made culturally insensitive remarks such as blaming fasting for deaths at Tak Bai and advising the OIC secretary general to read the Koran more carefully. He proposed depriving insurgentdominated “red zones” of all government assistance, although he eventually backtracked in the face of a public outcry. He ordered security raids on Islamic schools and mosques, ignoring Islamic requirements of cleanliness, and enforced compulsory reeducation at military-run boot camps where participants were given an approved version of Thai history—which claimed Bangkok had always ruled over the south—and forced to sing patriotic songs.48 Such policies, together with the hard line approach to security, alienated large numbers of southern Muslims and provided evidence to reinforce a perennial message of separatists, that Malay Muslims were under a form of colonial rule. Post-Coup Policies After the September 2006 coup, the government made some attempts to correct hard-line policies. Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont publicly apologized for the violence under Thaksin;49 his government dropped court cases against Muslims arraigned under dubious pretexts, promised to abandon insurgent “blacklists,” improved Prime Minister Surayud… relations with Malaysia, and stressed apologized for the violence the importance of resolving conflict by peaceful means. The SBPAC and CMP under Thaksin 43 were quickly reestablished. However, at the same time, the government increased the number of paramilitary forces with dubious human-rights records (expanding the Rangers in early 2007 by at least ten companies to around 6,000 troops),50 placed the SBPAC under the controversial ISOC, brought the discredited General Panlop back as an ISOC adviser, and eventually strengthened the ISOC by giving it a dominant security role under an internal security bill passed in December 2007. After

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John Funston General Anupong Paojinda became head of the army in September 2007, he supported a further increase in paramilitary forces and a huge increase in regular forces—increasing battalion numbers from eighteen to thirtythree (to match the number of districts), and assigned each of Thailand’s four regional armies responsibility for one province in the Malay Muslim region.51 Perhaps even more significantly, in mid-June 2007 the military initiated a massive round-up of villagers under the emergency decree. Those detained were forced to undergo reeducation courses (allegedly “vocational training”) and ordered to remain outside the three southern provinces for six months until in late October 2007 a court ruled against such practices. Human rights groups protested against abuses, particularly torture of detainees, and local advisers to the SBPAC complained that their attempts to warn against the use of military force had fallen on deaf ears.52

Religion and the Insurgency Other explanations for the resumption of southern insurgency focus on religious issues. From this perspective, Islamic education and reformation and Islamophobia related to the U.S. response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks played a role. Some analysts have also focused on direct intervention by groups such as Al-Qaeda and associated organizations Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islam (HuJI), although insurgent organizations seem largely to have acted independently. Finally, one account sees the violence during the April 28 uprising as a Sufistinfluenced millenarian revolt. Islamic Education and Reformation Nearly all accounts of the southern insurgency stress the important role of Islamic schools. In many cases these are also linked with the spread of fundamentalist or extremist Islamic teachings associated with Wahhabist Nearly all accounts of the… and Salafi ideas. Historically, Islamic schools have insurgency stress the…role of played a major role in opposition to Islamic schools central authority, particularly in the activities of the BRN. That seems to remain the case, even though many arrests of Islamic teachers have not been supported by credible evidence.

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The focus of many officials and analysts has been on the pondok schools. Shortly after the January 4, 2004, insurgent attack on the Fourth Army arms depot in Narathiwat, Prime Minister Thaksin described them as “breeding grounds for Muslim militants.”53 He promised draconian measures to prevent more from opening and to require existing schools to register and come under government supervision, and warned that those not flying the national flag would be considered to be committing treason. Security forces also launched a series of heavy-handed raids against pondoks, making few arrests but alienating many in the Muslim community. The focus on the pondoks seems to have been misplaced. The main schools that officials have linked to insurgent activities are all Islamic private schools—not pondoks—namely Thamma Witthaya School in Yala, where the alleged top BRN-C leader, Sapaeing Basoe, was principal; Samphan Witthaya School in Narathiwat, where another alleged BRN-C leader, Masae Useng, was a teacher; and Islam Burapha in Narathiwat, which authorities closed down in July 2007. Concerns about the spread of fundamentalist doctrines also have some validity. The growth of the dakwah movement from the 1970s highlighted differences between Muslims and non-Muslims. Numerous media reports mention that social interaction between Muslims and Buddhists has become more complicated by, for instance, Muslim concerns that Buddhist food might not be halal. Attendance at Buddhist festivals also became problematic. This created tensions that needed careful handling. In addition, dakwah groups may have followed the example of Malaysia’s ABIM or similar organizations and formed themselves into cells, perhaps contributing to the organizational structures later adopted by the insurgents. Nonetheless, it cannot be assumed that the spread of Islamic reforms would lead directly to violence, as the exact link between growing orthodoxy and violence remains elusive. Region-wide, it remains unclear whether the strengthening of doctrines such as Salafism is linked to an links…between… fundamentalism increase in violence. In the Indonesian context, the ICG and the…insurgency are (2004) has made a strong case problematic that Salafism is generally in opposition to extremism. Other links made between the growth of fundamentalism and the southern insurgency are problematic. Wattana Sugunnasil argues that by

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John Funston 2004 many separatists had shifted their focus from nationalism to a radical Islamist call for jihad against the Thai state, its local agents, and its Muslim allies. This had grown out of the spread of Islamic radicalism in the 1980s and 1990s and was boosted by the return of veterans of the Afghanistan mujahideen. The expansion of Islamic education marginalized traditional Islamic leaders, who in any case were divided over their response to this influx of new teachings. This led to a “radical shift in the discursive practice of separatist groups” (Wattana 2006: 120) reflected in the pages of proseparatist tract Berjihad di Patani. Thai official sources and terrorism analysts held similar views. At one point in mid-2003, Thai leaders claimed that a spate of terrorist attacks were due to a “new” sect known as Wahhabi.54 Many focused on the rector of Yala Islamic University, Professor Ismail Lutfi Japakiya, who studied in Saudi Arabia and whose university has received assistance from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries. Analysts frequently describe him as a Wahhabist (Davis 2003 and 2004; Gunaratna 2005: 52; ICG 2005: 31–32). Also, the education and welfare agency Pusaka (Pusat Persatuan Tadika) was often identified as a body that channeled foreign assistance to Islamic schools and contributed directly to radical movements. Thaksin made specific claims of a link between insurgent leaders and education in Indonesia. “Many of the suspects,” he claimed, “studied Islam in Indonesia, where they fell under the spell of extremists. Linked by religious, family and friendship bonds to their Indonesian counterparts, they tried to foment Islamic extremism in the deep South.”55 However, these various charges have not been substantiated. No more specific claims have been made against Wahhabi groups, and most now agree that Ismail Lutfi has had no involvement in southern violence. Indeed, the ICG (2005: 32) notes, “He has been reasonably cooperative with police and is actively courted by the Bangkok political elite to lend his name to boards and projects.” He was also a member of the NRC, the author of a widely distributed booklet—translated into Thai and Malay from the Arabic original—entitled “Islam: a Peaceful Religion,”56 and an ally of the Chularajamontri in teaching “correct” Islamic doctrines— including rejection of Berjihad di Patani. The debate over jihad is also more complex than alluded to in the analysts’ accounts above. Contrary to the implication in many of these writings, the concept of holy war has been around for some time. Jihad was

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Southern Thailand declared in 1948 during the Dusun Nyior uprising (Chaiwat 2006: 18, 20) and was stressed by all separatist groups in the 1960s and 1970s (Che Man 1990: 105). Still, then and now, southern opposition groups have emphasized nationalist concerns rather than extremist Islamic doctrines. In a survey southern opposition groups of over thirty Islamic schools and one hundred teachers, Joseph Liow found have emphasized nationalist no instance where southern violence concerns rather than was “explained in classrooms as jihad qital (defensive jihad). In fact, the vast extremist Islamist doctrines majority refused to acknowledge any religious content to the violence whatsoever” (Liow 2006: 59fn68). Other reports on recruitment of insurgents through study groups organized by religious teachers also maintain that the main message conveyed in training focused on Patani history. Regarding other analyst claims, Pusaka, is well known for providing welfare directed at Islamic preschools. Some evidence has arisen that one or two of its leaders have insurgent connections, but that would not seem strong evidence to condemn the group as a whole. With regard to claims of an Indonesian connection, Indonesian-educated Islamic teachers have had some links with the BRN for many years, but there is no evidence that this group of foreign-educated Malay Muslims have been particularly prone to extremism. International Islam, 9/11, and the U.S.-led War on Terror The process of Islamic reform from the 1970s was reinforced by the impact of international Islamic developments. Palestinian upheavals, the Iranian revolution, and the Afghan mujahideen’s fight against the Soviets caught the attention of Southeast Asian Muslims and acquired a new urgency with greater media coverage, expansion of television, and later audio and video tapes, video compact discs, and the Internet. It is reasonable to assume that the acts of violence carried out by extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda and JI—examples of which were shown on video compact discs and the Internet—provided a model that Thai insurgents would want to emulate. Afghanistan also proved a critical training ground and solidarity-building experience for some Southeast Asians, with JI emerging largely out of the alumni of this conflict. Some GMIP leaders had experience in Afghanistan,

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John Funston although the numbers were small, and no links seem to have been established between GMIP and JI leaders at this time. Liow (2006: 45) notes that accounts claiming up to 2,000 Thai Muslims fought in Afghanistan seem greatly exaggerated; a figure of less than fifty would seem more accurate.57 But the successful defeat of a superpower undoubtedly inspired southern Muslims, as it did others in the region. September 11 heightened tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims throughout the world. Although many Muslims initially sympathized with the United States, this quickly evaporated when Washington responded in a manner widely interpreted not as a war against terror but a war against Islam. The subsequent U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq united Thai Muslims. They organized demonstrations up to 50,000-strong in the south, boycotted Coca-Cola and other products produced by U.S. and British companies, and sold Osama bin Laden T-shirts to raise funds for humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. Fiery speakers strongly denounced Jews and the United States, praised the bravery of suicide bombers, and called for violent jihad against the West.58 The Thai government’s support for Washington and dispatch of Thai troops to the two war zones exacerbated Muslim concerns (Chaiwat 2004: 158–67). In this environment, conspiracy theories flourished, and many Muslims blamed southern problems on the United States, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency.

the

Jemaah Islamiyah and Al-Qaeda Besides the indirect consequences of international Islamic developments, some analysts have found direct intervention by external Islamic organizations in the southern insurgency—specifically in relation to evidence for a direct role Al-Qaeda and JI, the Al-Qaeda-linked Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islam, and groups [by external Islamic in Aceh. But although the indirect organizations] is far less influence of external organizations seems likely, the evidence for a direct persuasive role is far less persuasive. A series of international media reports from November 2002—beginning with an Asian Wall Street Journal report on November 7 saying JI had used southern Thailand as a “pivotal planning area” for the Bali bombing—made claims about JI activity in Thailand (Solomon and Hookway 2002). Initial reports were that a meeting

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Southern Thailand in southern Thailand in January 2002 had been the occasion for planning the Bali bombing. The time and place of this meeting was soon amended to February in Bangkok, but other articles followed expressing concern that JI and Al-Qaeda were active in Thailand and probably were playing a role in troubles in the south.59 What these reports made clear is that Al-Qaeda and JI were using Thailand as a place of refuge, transit, and planning. Although details remain obscure, subsequent reports emerging from sources such as the Bali trials show that an important JI meeting did take place in Bangkok— although it probably did not discuss detailed planning for Bali—around February 2002. The arrest of Singaporean and Malaysian JI members in southern Thailand in May 2003 and JI operational head Hambali in August in Ayutthaya (near Bangkok) highlighted the organizations activities in the country. Further evidence on Al-Qaeda activities have subsequently become available from The 9/11 Commission Report in the United States, published in July 2004, which details several visits to Bangkok by those who carried out the September 11 attacks. These accounts do not, however, indicate a substantial link between such organizations and Thai insurgents. Indeed, although arrested in Thailand, Hambali seems not to have succeeded in attracting Thai support.60 To demonstrate a close relationship between JI and Thai insurgents, several terrorism analysts have pointed to Thai participation in the JI-led regional alliance, Rabitatul Mujahideen, and JI links with the aforementioned Professor Ismail Lutfi. Their case seemed to have been strengthened by the arrest of four Thais with alleged JI connections in June and July 2003, reportedly after a tip from the Singaporean JI detained in May. Thai officials also linked JI to two of the key events in the escalation of violence in southern Thailand in 2004—the arms raid on January 4 and the April 28 attacks on police and military posts throughout southern Thailand. After initially blaming bandits for the January 4 incident, Thaksin and others soon linked it to the GMIP, which in turn was allegedly tied to Malaysia’s JI-linked Kumpulan Mujahideen/Militan Malaysia.61 In the April 28 attacks, one of the insurgents wore a T-shirt that appeared to have the letters JI on the back, and officials speculated that some unclaimed corpses might be Indonesian.62 Again, however, such events failed to make a strong case for direct JI involvement with Thai insurgents. There is confusion over which group might have participated in Rabitatul Mujahideen, but as it only met on

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three occasions—between 1999 and 2000—it can at best be regarded as an aborted attempt. Alleged links between Ismail Lutfi and JI do not seem credible because of his close cooperation with authorities noted earlier, and indeed Liow states categorically that Ismail rejected JI overtures (Liow 2006: 47). As to the alleged Thai JI members, the circumstances under which they were arrested—just hours before Thaksin met with U.S. President George W. Bush for a meeting expected to focus on shortcomings in Thailand’s support for the war on terror—immediately raised Muslim doubts. The court case progressed slowly and was eventually dismissed in June 2005 because of a lack of evidence against the accused. The key suspect, Dr. Waemahadi Waedaoh, was later elected to the senate in 2006 and the house of representatives in 2007. As to claims of JI involvement in the January 4 raid and Krue Se mosque killings, these have not been sustained. In the Krue Se case, all victims’ bodies were eventually accounted for and found to be Thai, and absent any tradition of JI wearing uniforms, the T-shirt claims never were convincing. In the light of these developments, together with the failure hitherto to demonstrate that any Thais have become JI members, most analysts no longer think Jemaah Islamiyah plays a significant role in southern problems. However BERSATU chairman Wan Kadir revived the issue during an interview with Al Jazeera in November 2006 in which he claimed some most analysts no longer think activities of younger separatists were facilitated by JI, which now had a Jemaah Islamiya plays a “presence” in the south.63 Since then, significant role [in the south] regular media reports citing intelligence or security officials have asserted or implied that Al-Qaeda or JI have a part in the conflict.64 In all cases, however, there has been a lack of specific information to back up these claims. Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islam Although less reported on than Jemaah Islamiyah, some analysts allege association between Thai insurgents and South Asian groups, in particular Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islam, an alleged Al-Qaeda-linked organization found in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Kavi Chongkittavorn in The Nation claimed

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Southern Thailand that eighty-one Thais had been trained in Pakistani schools run by this and a related organization since March 2002.65 More detailed accounts are provided by Gunaratna, Acharya, and Chua (2005: 64–67) and Raman (2004). This case, however, is mainly based on perceived similarity of tactics between HuJI and southern insurgents but fails to make any case that the insurgents needed such training. Nor have any references to HuJI appeared in reports of Thai interrogations of insurgent suspects. Indonesian groups Thai officials have also alleged links, from time to time, between insurgent groups in Thailand and those in Indonesia (in addition to JI). Some reports have cited links with the Free Aceh Movement, but more recent accounts report training in Aceh for the “military wing” of the BRN-C, (Runda Kumpulan Kecil, or RKK), without specifying which Indonesian group has provided the training.66 The term RKK itself is said to be an Indonesian term; it is readily translatable as small mobile unit, but no recognizable Indonesian group or activity goes by this name. Details provided by officials are vague, and in the circumstances of the recent incorporation of the Free Aceh Movement into Indonesia’s official administration, it seems unlikely that Aceh would currently be the venue for such training. Millenarian/Sufist Uprising? A final variation on the Islamic theme is an analysis by Nidhi Aeusrivongse (2005), which carries forward work by Ruth McVey (1989) for an earlier period, arguing that violence in the April 28, 2004, incident represents a form of millenarian peasant unrest. Such uprisings, he argues, seek to defend a traditional pattern of resource use against encroachment from the outside. The last few decades have seen profound changes that have led villages to lose control over resources. Coconut plantations have changed to shrimp farms, large fishing trawlers have disrupted traditional fishing grounds, and outsiders have been buying rubber plantations. The leaders of the April 28 insurgent attacks, Nidhi argues, came from modest rural backgrounds and were “victims of the disintegration of rural society.” They could not be linked to the traditional elite, insurgent leaders, or even religious teachers.

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John Funston Nidhi also argues that supernatural beliefs, forbidden in Islam but common in millenarian movements, played a key role in this conflict. He cites media accounts that note the militants wore white beads, an indication of Sufism that mainstream Sunni adherents do not generally approve of. One television channel reported a sacred verse on the body of one of the dead militants. This was believed to give the owner powers of invulnerability, and such beliefs gave the militants courage to undertake the April 2004 attacks. It thus differed from earlier resistance movements, except perhaps the Dusun Nyior incident of 1948. The choice of April 28 for the date of the militants’ operation may have been made to coincide with the Dusun Nyior uprising. If so, it would strengthen the case that the 2004 action was a “millenarian rebellion,” because the Dusun Nyior incident was certainly that (Nidhi 2005). Nidhi’s analysis makes a powerful case that millenarianism and Sufism were important factors in the April 28, 2004, attacks. An additional fact supporting this analysis is that the copy of Berjihad di Patani found on one of the militants was not professionally published but a hand-written tract— a traditional Sufist practice.67 Beliefs in invincibility and magic, sometimes linked to aspects of Sufism, remain an important part of Southeast Asian Islam, despite the more orthodox teachings spread through the region in recent decades. Indeed the increase in religiosity noted above may also have strengthened the attractiveness of such beliefs. Nonetheless, it may be premature to link millenarianism with other instances of southern violence. There have been occasional reports of insurgents drinking consecrated water and following other Sufist rituals before launching attacks. But these have been infrequent, and no subsequent attacks have occurred in which insurgents appeared to have believed themselves invincible.

Separatists, Terrorists, and Militants The explanations offered so far have all played some role in the current southern violence but do not provide the whole story. The level of violence is far higher than any previous conflict in Thailand, so traditional factors alone are an insufficient explanation. Errors by Thaksin and his successor and religious factors could not account for such violence either, unless resistance were well organized. Antigovernment operations, particularly since 2005, have achieved a rather high level of coordination. In addition,

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Southern Thailand research by Srisompob Jitpiromsri and Panyasak Sobhonvasu demonstrates that following initial skepticism, southerners soon overwhelming accepted that “militants or insurgents”—and not agents of the state or external agents—were behind the violence (Srisompob and Panyasak 2006: 114). If so, which organizations are involved? How are they organized? When did they become active? What are their objectives? And how much support do they have? The independent importance of southern insurgent groups has been emphasized by prominent international terrorism authors such as Rohan Gunaratna (particularly in his 2005 book on southern Thailand coedited with Arabinda Acharya and Sabrina Chua), Zachary Abuza (2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2008), and Anthony Davis in Jane’s Intelligence Review (2003, 2004, 2005, and 2007). Work by the ICG (2005) also gives some importance to insurgent groups, though its analysis is perhaps more focused on government mishandling of the problem. Several Thai intelligence agencies, too, particularly those associated with the military, emphasize the critical role of insurgent movements—as revealed in occasional briefings to the local and foreign media. Other Thai proponents of such a view are a former head of the southern-based Fourth Army, General Kitti Rattanachaya, who was appointed security adviser to the prime minister in early 2004 (Kitti 2004, 2005), and General Panlop Pinmanee, the controversial deputy director and later adviser of ISOC and leader of the attack on Muslims in the Krue Se mosque. Which Organizations Are the Most Important? All of the above-mentioned authors identify a number of specific insurgent groups. Although specialists differ, they most frequently identify BRN-C, PULO, New PULO, GMIP, BERSATU, Pusaka, Pemuda (Youth), and RKK. Increasingly the RKK is recognized as the military wing of BRN-C— current media reports almost invariably refer to any clash with insurgents as involving the RKK and Pemuda (reportedly BRN-C’s youth wing). There is, however, considerable caution in listing organizations. Gunaratna, for example, focuses particularly on BRN-C and Pusaka but also mentions others, and warns that resistance might be led by “free-floating cadres actually owing allegiance to none of the groups” (Gunaratna 2005: 45). After a long period of indecision, a new consensus emerged in late 2006 over the centrality of BRN-C. Its role is mentioned frequently in

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John Funston media reports and discussed at length in a report by Human Rights Watch (2007b: 18–28) that includes several interviews with BRN field leaders. Human Rights Watch also commented on the role at the village level of BRN-linked Pejuang Kemerdekaan Patani (Patani Independence Fighters). Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism (2007) argues that the BRN-C leadership role derived in part from the weakening of PULO caused by the Malaysian handover of four leaders in 1998 and by the combat deaths of two other leaders in 2000. The report nevertheless concludes that PULO, which reunited in 2005, remains the second strongest insurgent organization. Nonetheless, consensus on the leading role of BRN-C is not unanimous. Following detention of alleged insurgent spies in January 2008, a Fourth Army source was quoted as saying: “All these years we were only thinking of the BRN-Coordinate group, believing that it was the one spearheading the insurgency. But now we know it isn’t.” The source did not specify exactly who was providing leadership, but asserted, “There are also other insurgent groups outside the country that are playing a big part in the regional violence and have the same objective—separatism.”68 Many unanswered questions remain about the BRN-C. Government leaders acknowledge that they have no understanding of who actually leads the organization or of the relative importance of exiled leaders as opposed to those on the ground in Thailand. Nor is there a clear picture of the BRN-C’s relations with other insurgent groups. The general consensus is that when major operations are undertaken, the BRN-C will coordinate with other organizations such as New PULO and GMIP—by some accounts through a Council for Patani Independence (Dewan Pembebasan Patani, or DPP).69 Despite claims to the contrary, Thai security officials remain very much in the dark about insurgent activities and leadership. Only a handful of cases have gone to court and secured convictions, and government Thai security officials remain statements on insurgent groups are often inconsistent and very much in the dark about unconvincing. In March 2007 insurgent activities Defense Minister Boonrawd Somtas said, “We do not know them. We do not know who is working against us.” And an unidentified “source” said the army had only learned about

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Southern Thailand low-level supporters of the insurgency, such as those who hinder authorities by laying spikes and other obstructions: “So far we have not been able to reach the leadership and their thinking.”70 Perhaps all that can be concluded is that the BRN-C appears to be the most important organization in the insurgency, but other groups such as PULO, GMIP, and BERSATU also play a role. How Are They Organized? By broad consensus, insurgent groups are not hierarchically organized but based on cells. Coordination is therefore difficult, even at the organizational level. As noted, only loose cooperation exists between the different groups, with the BRN-C or DPP seen as the key coordinator. Although such arrangements have proven sufficient to organize logistically complex operations such as the January 4, 2004, attack, no overarching chain of command has been identified. As noted earlier, insurgent groups also have had some links to international Islamic movements such as Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. But linkages are loose, and international organizations are not directing the insurgency. When Did the Insurgency Become Active? A common theme in most works is that insurgents deliberately laid low in the 1990s, building up their support base before renewing attacks after 2001. In doing so they were following a seven-point, or 1,000-day, plan— now nearing completion—to establish an independent Patani Islamic state. A Malay language (jawi script) handwritten version of the plan, allegedly discovered by security forces in a 2003 raid, is even shown in a Human Rights Watch report (2007b: 19). The “plan” is mentioned by Gunaratna (2005: 32–33, 46, 170) and in a more nuanced way by Askew (2007: 22, 24–25). The Thai-language media has covered it, and the writings of General Kitti represent that the plan demonstrates a credible and imminent threat (Kitti 2004, 2005; Connors 2006: 165–66). If this view is correct, then resumption of insurgency could entirely be explained by the systematic implementation of this plan. That would of course absolve Thaksin from any blame, which is one reason for skepticism. Moreover, although the plan allegedly has been known to Thai intelligence since mid-2003, its importance seldom has been highlighted. If taken seriously by Thai intelligence experts, it should surely have been the focal

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point of their analysis. Finally, the seven points in the plan are all of a general nature and involve raising public awareness, recruitment and training, and spreading ideology.71 They are the sort of policies one would expect long-established insurgents to pursue but do not comprise a comprehensive road map for action. Insurgent violence began slowly in the years 2002–03 and then accelerated beginning in 2004. Its onset coincided with heavy-handed police actions—associated with the abolition of the SBPAC and with [The] onset [of insurgent the war on drugs—and insurgency expanded after the intensification violence] coincided with heavyof security actions after the January handed police actions 4, 2004, arms raid and the events at Krue Se and Tak Bai. It seems more probable, therefore, that the beginning of insurgent violence was linked to these developments and broader resistance to Thaksin policies than to any seven-point plan. What Are Insurgent Objectives? Most accounts emphasize insurgent commitments to establishing an independent Islamic state (Patani Darussalam). In the absence of formal pronouncements, considerable attention is given to Berjihad di Patani. Gunaratna notes that this work has some jihadi elements but concludes it is mainly a nationalist appeal for independence. Zachary Abuza, by contrast, acknowledges nationalist elements in calls for the restoration of the Patani Sultanate rather than a pan-Islamic caliphate, but he sees the emphasis on martyrdom and the alleged threat to Islam from Muslims who do not follow the correct teachings as evidence of a strong fundamentalist (Salafi) influence. Abuza extends this analysis more broadly, claiming militants are more concerned about imposing a fundamentalist form of Islam than about securing independence. In his words, it is “not an insurgency about physical space, but an insurgency about mental space” (Abuza 2006a). If Berjihad di Patani can be accepted at face value, it does seem to represent a traditional call for independence for Patani replete with a hereditary sultanate. It is clothed in more Islamic garb than earlier such demands, but this is of a traditional kind: there are no references to international jihad, and it calls for implementation of law based on the Shafi’i school only. However its authenticity is questionable, as it was

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Southern Thailand written by a Malaysian “hired gun” and a Thai who now works for the Thai government with the current task of converting “rogue militants” (Connors 2006: 169). Pamphlets and banners left by presumed southern insurgents— sometimes mentioned in the media and discussed in the Human Rights Watch report (2007b)—also frequently call for independence for Patani. In addition, they warn Muslims against cooperation with Thai authorities and threaten retaliation killings of Buddhists when security forces kill Muslims. Nonetheless, whether independence is the real objective or a negotiating ploy is yet to be tested. Groups such as PULO and BERSATU once argued uncompromisingly for independence but more recently have called for autonomy. Groups that took part in negotiations mediated by former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in December 2005 and early 2006—which included the GMIP and some BRN elements (not BRN-C)—argued for greater autonomy and justice rather than independence.72 How Much Support Do Insurgents Have? Obtaining clear statistics on insurgent support is a daunting challenge. It does seem, however, that active supporters make up only a small minority of southern Muslims. Some accounts make no attempt to estimate the size of insurgent groups, and those that do vary greatly. Gunaratna mentions only a handful of members in major organizations but claims that 500–1,000 radicals have emerged from Pusaka and joined various groups. He also notes Thai reports that up to 300 religious teachers (ustaz) may be active (Gunaratna 2005: 45, 54). Abuza estimates the total involved in the insurgency at around 1,000 (Abuza 2006b). Davis suggests that “while as many as 3,000 youths might have undergone rudimentary training in the years leading up to 2004, probably only 300 to 400 graduated as so-called ‘commandos’ and might be intermittently active today…. The pool of popular acquiescence in which these fish swim is clearly far bigger” (Davis 2005). Thai sources cite larger membership in these organizations. A southern army source in November 2005 said 825 villages had 3–4 militants in each supported by around 10,000 sympathizers (Connors 2006: 165fn56). Various military sources claim that of some 1,580 villages in the Deep South, 257 are “red,” meaning essentially under the control of militants.73 An unidentified intelligence officer in May 2006 reportedly claimed there

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John Funston were 10,000 active insurgents.74 By 2007 several government leaders, including Prime Minister Surayud, were claiming some 20,000 militants.75 However, commenting on the RKK, the supposed armed wing of the BRN-C, Surayud stated: “We don’t even know who the group’s leader is. And it would be an exaggeration if I say I know how big the group is.”76 Junta leader General Sonthi claimed as many as 5,000 militants were actively instigating violence under the command of the BRN-C.77 Most accounts see fundamentalist, jihadist preachers associated with local pondok schools as the key organizers. The main supporters have generally been young, underemployed students or graduates of Islamic schools who were recruited into cells and indoctrinated with Patani nationalist ideology. As with other Islamic groups such as JI, taking an oath of loyalty to the cause (sumpah) was an important means of cementing group loyalty. Much anecdotal evidence suggests that the general Muslim population has supported the insurgents out of fear more than attraction to the cause. Insurgents consciously have sought to influence by fear, often warning Muslim victims twice or more before carrying out assassinations. The strongest evidence that most southern Muslims would prefer to seek political aims through established institutions has been provided by a consistently high voter turnout for national elections. In 2005 many speculated that turnout would be low in view of hostility toward the Thaksin government and worries about security at election booths. However, over 70 percent in the three southernmost provinces voted, which equaled the overall figure for the country. Muslims passed their judgment on the Thaksin administration by voting out all Thai Rak Thai candidates in a region where ten of the eleven incumbent candidates had been from the governing party.

Conclusion No single factor can explain why violence resumed in southern Thailand in 2001. Traditional conflicts that emerged centuries ago from the expansion of Siamese No single factor can influence over the south, and particularly after direct rule in 1902, have convinced many explain why violence Malay Muslims that they are second-class resumed…in 2001 citizens, discriminated against economically, socially, legally, and politically. These entrenched attitudes were reinforced by Thaksin government actions such

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Southern Thailand as the abolition of the SBPAC and hard-line security policies. Conflict was sometimes also associated with local power struggles, bureaucratic rivalries, criminality, and a porous border with culturally similar Malaysia—all aspects of a disorderly border region. From 2002 to 2003 rivalries between the police and military dominated violence in the region. International and local changes in Islamic teaching and practice also added to the complexity of these traditional influences. Since the 1970s, a process of Islamic reform (the dakwah movement) heightened religiosity and conservatism and made Malay Muslims more conscious of their separate identity. The dakwah movement also included the idea of organizing in cells, a change that later was extended to insurgent movements. The growing influence of international events on Islamic communities everywhere, the growth of Islamophobia after the 9/11 attacks in America, and the U.S.-led attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq followed by the sending of Thai troops to both countries were deeply felt in the south and led to mass protests. Radical teachers educated abroad spread a message of opposition to non-Muslims, although the main message in Islamic schools and study groups continued to focus on Patani nationalism. Malay Muslims sympathized with groups such as Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah but had limited contact with them and acted independently. These developments strengthened not only orthodoxy but religiosity generally, as shown by the growth in adherents of sufism and invulnerability cults. Consequences of the latter were manifest in the attacks of April 28, 2004. Insurgents started from a position of weakness in 2001, with forces numbering perhaps one to two hundred. There is, however, a common view that prior to 2001 movements had gone underground and were preparing a comeback, guided by a seven-point, or 1,000-day, plan to seize power. But the plan is not a specific road map for action, and whether it exists or not, insurgent gains could not have been made easily without the missteps of Thaksin. Since 2005 the insurgents have gained momentum, increasing the frequency of their attacks, launching sophisticated operations across three or four provinces, targeting economic infrastructure, and increasing sectarian attacks (although, as noted, more Muslims than Buddhists have died in this conflict). They have stepped up their offensive since the coup against Thaksin—targeting security forces more directly, increasing attacks on schools and teachers, increasing the number of fatalities, and raising the level of brutality.

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John Funston Where is the conflict likely to proceed from here? After four years of intense conflict, violence has become entrenched. Following the September 19, 2006, coup, the new government made initial efforts to change course, apologizing After four years of intense for the past violence and promising to seek a resolution of the conflict by peaceful conflict, violence has means. But it soon reverted to hard-line become entrenched security policies. With large-scale sweeps and arrests since June 2007, the peaceful approach has been abandoned. This latest tactic seems to have curtailed large-scale insurgent operations, but the killing and violence shows no signs of abating. A new government headed by Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej came to power at the end of January 2008 on a platform of continuing Thaksin’s policies. Samak started badly in the south by reiterating Thaksin’s claim that deaths at Tak Bai were accidental and caused by weakness due to fasting.78 He has shown little interest in southern affairs, taking three months to visit, making few comments on the topic, and effectively handing matters over to the military by delegating all powers over the Internal Security Operations Command to army chief General Anupong and giving him a full mandate to deal with the insurgency.79 Thailand’s intense political conflict between factions loyal to and opposed to Thaksin has gathered further momentum since the September 2006 coup, and the southern conflict has become a secondary issue. This is not an environment in which policies of moderation and compromise, such as those advocated by the National Reconciliation Commission, are likely to make headway. And without such a change, the current level of violence seems destined to continue.

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Endnotes My thanks to Dr. Muthiah Alagappa and the participants at the Southern Thailand study group meeting on Internal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia, held in Bangkok in July 2006, and the anonymous reviewers. Additional thanks to Dr. Satu Limaye for his comments and for shepherding the manuscript through the review process. All made important contributions to my understanding of southern Thailand. In addition, I am deeply grateful for the discussions and exchanges I have had over recent years with Thai researchers working on the south. I have benefited particularly from the wisdom of Dr. Chaiwat Satha-Anand and academics at the Pattani campus, Prince of Songkhla University. 1. Martial law had in fact existed in parts of the three southern provinces for several years. After conflicts in April 2003, martial law was imposed in fourteen districts (“Dead or alive, just catch them or face the music, says Thaksin,” Bangkok Post, May 1, 2003). A Bangkok Post report on January 6, 2004 (“New command post to be set up”) noted, “For more than 10 years, martial law has been in effect in six districts of Narathiwat: Chanae, Cho Airong, Rangae, Waeng, Si Sakhon, and Sukhirin; and five districts of Yala: Than To, Bannang Sata, Yaha, Betong, and Kabang. However, the military did not enforce it seriously in the past. Martial law has now been expanded to four more districts of Narathiwat: Rueso, Bacho, Takbai, and Sungai Kolok; and another district in Yala: Raman.” The Nation then reported on February 4, 2004 (“Martial law throughout 3 provinces”), “Martial law is now being enforced throughout the southernmost provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat. The move was a response to the continued lawlessness in the area and the recent murders of innocent people, military sources said yesterday. Martial law previously covered 19 districts in the three provinces, but was now being enforced in all 32 districts. Fourth Army commander Lt-Gen Pongsak Ekbannasing signed the order on Thursday [January 29], the sources said.”

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John Funston 2. Official reports on the Kru Se and Tak Bai incidents were released by the National Reconciliation Commission on April 24, 2005. Full reports in Thai were placed on the NRC Web site and English language summaries were produced by The Nation. See www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/takbai/p1.htm and www.nationmulti media.com/specials/takbai/p2.htm. 3. Some parts of this section are drawn from Funston 2006a. 4. “Govt keen to promote Muslim community,” Bangkok Post, July 2, 2005. 5. Census details have been taken directly or calculated from www.nso.go.th/ pop2000/finalrep_e.htm (accessed December 2004). 6. The spelling difference originally reflected transliteration preferences from Malay and Thai languages, but have come to represent different regions. According to McVey, “The Thai provinces that were once part of old Patani are Narathiwat, Yala and the present Pattani. Satun, which has played little active part in the rebel movement, never belonged to it; nor did Songkhla, whose one-third Muslim population has also not engaged significantly in the revolt. The Muslims of those states have not the same sense of historical pride and unwillingness to adapt to alien rule nor are the same lineages recognised as legitimate sources of leadership. Coupled with this, particularly in Satun, is the more relaxed Islam of the Malayan west coast. There are only a very few religious schools in that province, and its people have been relatively willing to send their children to such Thai government schools as were established. Moreover, the Muslims of Satun have moved almost wholly, and those of Songkhla considerably, to the use of Thai rather than Malay” (McVey 1989: 35). 7. The seven points were: (1) The appointment of a high commissioner to govern the Greater Patani Region with full authority to dismiss, suspend, or replace all government officials working in the area; the individual must be a native of the region and be elected by the people in general election held for that specific purpose; (2) Eighty percent of government officials serving in the region must be Malay Muslims (so as to reflect the proportion of the population); (3) Malay and Siamese shall be accepted as official languages; (4) Malay shall be taught in primary schools; (5) Muslim law shall be applied in the region with separate Islamic courts independent of the government’s judicial system; (6) All revenue collected in the region shall be expended only for the welfare of the people in the region; and (7) The Provincial Islamic Council shall be given full authority over Islamic legislation on all Muslim affairs and Malay culture under the supreme authority of the high commissioner referred to in point number 1 (Surin 1985: 152). 8. There are minor differences regarding the dates these organizations were established. For instance, although most accounts say the BRN was established on March 13, 1960, Che Man (1990: 99) places the founding in 1963. 9. Dr. Ismail Lutfi has gone on visits to the Middle East with the Chularajamontri and served on committees set up by the Chularajamontri to draft statements emphasizing the peaceful nature of Islam. 10. Chularat Saengpassa, “Bilingual curriculum could break down language barrier in the South,” The Nation, April 26, 2007. 11. For an overview of Islamic developments in Malaysia, see Funston 2006b: 51–61. 12. Nadzru B. Azhari, “The crisis in the South – a Kelantanese perspective,” The Nation, May 14, 2004.

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Southern Thailand 13. “Stay strictly within law, warns Chuan,” Bangkok Post, November 11, 2002. See further details of violent incidents in Ball 2004: 105–11. 14. I am grateful to Matt Wheeler for bringing this point to my attention. 15. Public opposition to the renaming of local villages was mentioned to me by several academics at the Prince of Songhkla University, Pattani, in September 2004. 16. Malaysia’s former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has had a long association with southern Thailand and described Thai Malay affection for the king as “so profound that I find it very difficult to understand…. You cross the border and you talk to a (person whom you think is a) Kelantanese but he is full of praise of the king.” Arfa’eza A. Aziz, “Q&A: Be transparent on ties with separatist groups, gov’t told,” Malaysiakini, December 2, 2004. 17. “Troops mass for security and manhunt,” The Nation, January 6, 2004. 18. “PM: Deaths due to religious fasting,” The Nation, October 27, 2004. 19. See for instance “Shadowy network unfolds,” The Nation, May 1, 2004; and Wassana Nanuam, “Drug rings ‘behind unrest,’ ” Bangkok Post, August 31, 2005. 20. “Dozens of fighters to surrender,” The Nation, August 28, 2005. 21. Wassana Nanuam, “Drug rings ‘behind unrest,’ ” Bangkok Post, August 31, 2005. 22. “Anand on Southern Unrest: Not all violence down to insurgency,” The Nation, May 8, 2005. 23. See for instance comments that although the southern problems had many causes, they were mainly due to trade in smuggled Persian Gulf oil and other illegal pursuits (Chakkrit Waewklaihong, “Muslim leader says oil mafia hires killers, sows unrest,” Bangkok Post, October 7, 2004). 24. “Court acquits ex-TRT MP,” Bangkok Post, December 16, 2005. 25. “Unholy trinity behind violence,” Bangkok Post, October 15, 2007. 26. “Thaksin issues threat to revoke citizenship of Islamic separatists,” The Nation, March 18, 2002. 27. “Development plan mapped out for South,” The Nation, February 17, 2004. 28. Reports on this variously date the handing over of this evidence as April or October 2004. (See, respectively, Wassana Nanuam, “Malaysia agrees to arrest suspects,” Bangkok Post, July 26, 2004, and Don Pathan, “Deep south insurgency puts strain on thai-malay relations,” The Nation, April 26, 2008). However Defence Minister Chettha Thanajaro admitted that incomplete and out of date information supplied by Thai authorities on the militants was responsible for Malaysia’s lack of action. (Wassana Nanuam, Bangkok Post, July 26, 2004.) A reporter for The Nation also noted that Thai intelligence provided only very basic biodata—names of suspects and blurry pictures of them and their spouses, parents and relatives—and that none of these materials offered any convincing evidence linking the suspects to the southern violence. (Supalak Ganjanakhundee, “Analysis: Thaksin’s blame game backfires,” The Nation, December 23, 2004.) 29. Following the Tak Bai incident in October 2004 Prime Minister Thaksin said terrorist and separatist networks could not be easily destroyed as core leaders moved freely between Thailand and Kelantan. (Kamol Hengkietisak, “Thaksin and his ministers in damage control,” Bangkok Post, October 31, 2004.) When the Malaysian parliament debated Tak Bai that November, unanimously condemning Thai security actions, Thai comments on this focused on the fact that the parliamentary motion had been proposed by PAS—though the four PAS speakers

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30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35.

36. 37.

38. 39. 40. 41.

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were supported by four from the ruling party. (Hata Wahari and Azman Ismail, “Parlimen Malaysia kutuk pembunuhan di Tak Bai,” Utusan Malaysia, November 24, 2004.) Further suspicions fell on PAS when a senior figure from the ruling UMNO claimed that PAS had channelled funds to the separatist PULO through the Muslim charity Perkim. (Bangkok Post and Reuters, “Islamic group trust funds ‘went to Pulo,’ ” Bangkok Post, December 10 and “It’s uncharitable to fund terrorists,” Bangkok Post, December 14, 2004.) The UMNO leader subsequently withdrew his charge. “PULO funding: Annuar Musa backtracks on statement,” Harakah, December 10, 2004), but this does not appear to have been acknowledged in Thailand. “Ties with Malaysia: A gesture of cooperation,” The Nation, May 3, 2004. Wassana Nanuam, “With a little help from Malaysia,” Bangkok Post, September 18, 2004. “Premier fingers Indonesians,” The Nation, December 19, 2004. “M’sian opposition up in arms over ‘slur,’ ” The Nation, December 20, 2004. Bilateral relations were put on a cooperative footing after Surayud made Malaysia his first port of call for overseas visits in mid October 2006, and Prime Minister Abdullah visited Bangkok the following February. Malaysia declared its confidence that the Surayud government would restore normality to the south. Still, misgivings remained apparent on the critical issue of Malaysian mediation. The Thai foreign minister initially denied that Thailand would request this (Post Reporters, “Nitya denies seeking KL’s help to be mediator with rebels”, Bangkok Post, February 15, 2007) only to be publicly contradicted by his prime minister two days later ([no author] “PM accepts M’sian offer to broker peace talks,” The Nation, February 17, 2007). By June Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar made it clear that no request for mediation had been made. (Achara Ashayagachat, “KL denies arranging talks with insurgents,” Bangkok Post, June 30, 2007.) Journalist Don Pathan later wrote that: “At the heart of these difficult relations is the lack of a consensus among Thai officials as to how significant a role Thailand is prepared to afford Malaysia in what it continues to insist is a domestic affair.” (“Deep south insurgency puts strain on thai-malay relations,” The Nation, April 26, 2008.) A recent report on Thai workers in Malaysia noted that in 2006, 1,468 crossed the border legally at Sadao and Padang Besar, while at least 50,000 entered Malaysia illegally (“NLA to help illegal workers in Malaysia,” The Nation, February 25, 2007). “Former govt kill insurgents handed over by M’sia: Sonthi,” The Nation, November 27, 2006. See particularly Askew 2007: 38–50. Askew makes some telling points about the decline in SBPAC effectiveness in the immediate years prior to its dissolution in 2002, but acknowledges that its symbolism may have remained important to Malays (p. 40), and does not address directly the importance of giving the police rather than the military the dominant role in southern security. “Creating a climate of impunity,” The Nation, November 6, 2004. On the extension of martial law to two districts in Songkhla, see “Martial laws issued for Songkhla’s Chana and Thepha districts,” The Nation, November 3, 2005. Tulsathit Taptim, “Discussion on South was a study in contrasts,” The Nation, July 30, 2005. “A new division in the South,” Bangkok Post, January 6, 2005.

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Southern Thailand 42. Even shortly after the Tak Bai incident, Thaksin was able to cite an opinion poll that showed his popularity had increased, including in the south. Mongkol Bangprapa, “Southern crisis has not harmed TRT,” Bangkok Post, October 31, 2004. 43. Both Chaturon and the NRC recommended radical changes in policy. Chaturon’s recommendations included an end to dispatching soldiers and police from outside the region, as their presence had created a “climate of fear”; amnesty for suspected Muslim separatists; a review of the plan to regulate Islamic boarding schools (pondok) and extend support to them instead; lifting martial law where possible and ensuring prevention of human rights violations where it was not ensured; desisting from a planned crackdown on dual citizenship; and revising the 12 billion baht development project, since it was drawn up without local participation. (See Pradit Ruangdit, “Six-point plan to be tabled later this week,” Bangkok Post, March 29, 2004; “Report urges sweeping changes,” Bangkok Post, April 5, 2004; Pradit Ruangdit, “Govt set to make policy U-turn,” The Nation, April 5, 2004; Samatcha Hunsara, “Police root cause, says Chaturon,” Bangkok Post, April 8, 2004.) After initial support in principle, Thaksin reportedly told deputy prime ministers that the plan reflected the viewpoints of local Muslims and did not cover all aspects of the problem; if the government followed Chaturon’s proposals it would have to revoke all plans of security agencies, which would make them very unhappy (Piyanart Srivalo and Samacha Hunsara, “PM ‘backs away’ from plan,” The Nation, April 10, 2004). The NRC’s far-reaching proposals to promote respect for local traditions, engage local residents in decision-making, and ensure justice (NRC 2006) drew no immediate comment from Thaksin, although he reportedly instructed that they be implemented immediately “if possible” (“PM agrees to NRC’s solutions to unrest,” Bangkok Post, June 7, 2006). His only subsequent public statement was in support of former Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda’s view that the NRC’s proposal to make Malay a “working language” was unacceptable (“Govt backs Prem against use of Malay in South,” The Nation, June 27, 2006). 44. Surin Pitsuwan, “Struggle is for souls, not some arms cache,” Bangkok Post, January 8, 2004. 45. Thirasant Mann, “The news, as we’d like to hear it,” Bangkok Post, January 3; and “Restoring peace in the far South,” Bangkok Post, February 3, 2004. 46. Don Pathan, “A legacy of failure in the deep South,” The Nation, August 6, 2004. 47. “Govt backs Prem against use of Malay in South,” The Nation, June 27, 2006. 48. A report of one such forty-two-day training camp notes, “They sing the national anthem loud before the Thai flag at 8am, and are taught nationalism and Thai history.” This history included the view that “the former Pattani state did not belong to Muslims but Hindus.” Wassana Nanuam, “Winning over separatists not an easy job, says army,” Bangkok Post, August 27, 2004. It presumably also reflected the military belief that the south has always been Thai. 49. Prime Minister Surayud’s apology was not, however, offered as enthusiastically as sometimes is implied. A member of the audience told this author that the apology was not part of the prepared speech. It was added only after Surayud was challenged to apologize. 50. Most accounts mention an increase of ten companies, or around 3,500 troops. At least one report, however, puts the number at twenty companies. “1,700 new rangers sent in to battle insurgency,” Bangkok Post, March 28, 2007.

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65. 66.

67.

68. 69. 70. 71.

72. 73.

74. 75.

76.

Post, November 21, 2007). In January 2008 a government spokesman declared that the violence had intensified because insurgents “received money from overseas, from the international terror organisation al-Qaeda,” although Prime Minister Surayud subsequently rejected this (“Al-Qaeda funding Thai separatists,” The Australian, January 18, 2008). Later that month a “security source” was reported as saying that insurgents probably received funding from and shared their ideology with international terrorist groups (Wassana Nanuam and Muhammad Ayub Pathan, “Source: Int’l terrorists financing rebel groups,” Bangkok Post, January 30, 2008). Kavi Chongkittavorn, “As the South burns, Thaksin fans the flames,” The Nation, May 3, 2004. See for instance the article by Paisarn Ratana and Supichar Jantapar, “Parparn BRN sum ‘fai tai’ amnart son … soo rat Patani” [BRN plans to ignite the “southern fire”; a new force to fight for a Patani state], Kom Chad Luek, April 21, 2007, apparently based on an intelligence briefing that claims selected members of the RKK are sent to Aceh for training. “Chavalit warns media to tread carefully,” The Nation, May 7, 2004. I am grateful to Professor Wowawit Baru for drawing my attention to this and the association of such a hand-written text with Sufism. Wassana Nanuam and Waedao Harai, “Chances of unmasking core rebel leaders rise,” Bangkok Post, January 13, 2008. Nirmal Ghosh, “Mystery Group Runs Insurgency in Thai South,” Straits Times, July 25, 2005. “Support for rebels now at 10,000,” Bangkok Post, February 23, 2007. Human Rights Watch (2007b: 18–19) reports the alleged seven-point plan as follows: “1. Creating public awareness of Islam (religion), Malay (nationality) and Patani homeland, invasion/occupation [by the Thai state] and the struggle for independence. 2. Creating mass support through religious teaching [at various levels, including tadkika, ponoh, private Islamic colleges and provincial Islamic committees]. 3. Setting up a secretive organizational structure. 4. Recruiting and training [ethnic Malay Muslim] youth to become militants, aiming to have 3,000strong well trained and well disciplined troops. 5. Building nationalist and independence struggle ideology among government officials [of ethnic Malay Muslim origin] and ethnic Malay Muslims [of the southern border provinces] who went to work in Malaysia. 6. Launching a new wave of attacks. 7. Declaring a revolution.” (Brackets in original.) “Dr M: Ball’s in Thai court,” The Star, October 7, 2006. Several media accounts list the number of villages in the Deep South as 1,580, although the NRC report says there are 1,638 in Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani (NRC 2006: 26). MaxMilian Wechsler, “Closing the net on terror,” Bangkok Post, May 28, 2006. Yuwadee Tunyasiri and Assawin Pakkawan, “PM: Crackdown on rebels has been a success,” Bangkok Post, September 17, 2007. For an earlier claim of 10,000–20,000 militants by the prime minister’s security adviser, General Wattanachai, see Boonradom Chitradon, “Southern extremists learning from bin Laden,” Bangkok Post, March 22, 2007, and “Al-Qaeda influences seen in South,” The Nation, March 22, 2007. “Surayud: We have to negotiate,” Bangkok Post, March 16, 2007.

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John Funston 77. “CNS chief says southern militants well organised,” The Nation, May 17, 2007. 78. “Samak condemned for distorting facts,” Bangkok Post, February 26, 2008. 79. “Prime minister appoints Anupong as ISOC chief,” The Nation, March 26, 2008.

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Bibliography Abuza, Zachary. 2003. Militant Islam in Southeast Asia. Crucible of Terror. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. ———. 2005. “A Conspiracy of Silence: Who is Behind the Escalating Insurgency in Southern Thailand?” Terrorism Monitor 3(9). www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/ article.php?articleid=2369684]. ———. 2006a. “Alternate Futures for Thailand’s Insurgency.” Terrorism Monitor 3(3). www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369876]. ———. 2006b. “Southern Thailand Still Suffering from Insurgent Violence.” Terrorism Monitor 3(21). www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370013]. ———. 2008. Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand and its Implications for Southeast Asian Security. United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C. Askew, Marc. 2007. Conspiracy, Politics, and a Disorderly Border: The Struggle to Comprehend Insurgency in Thailand’s Deep South. Policy Studies 29. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center in Washington. Ball, Desmond. 2004. The Boys in Black. Bangkok: White Lotus. Ball, Desmond, and David Scott Mathieson. 2007. Militia Redux. Or Sor and the Revival of Paramilitarism in Thailand. Bangkok: White Lotus. Bonura, Carlo Jr. 2002. “Location and the Dilemmas of Muslim Political Community in Southern Thailand.” Paper presented at the First Inter-Dialogue Conference on Southern Thailand. Pattani: June 13–15. Chaiwat Satha-Anand. 2004. “Praying in the Rain: The Politics of Engaged Muslims in Anti-War Protest in Thai Society.” Global Change, Peace & Security 16(2): 151–67. ———. 2006. “The Silence of the Bullet Monument: Violence and ‘Truth’ Management, Dusun-nyor 1948, and Kru-Ze 2004.” Critical Asian Studies 38(1): 11–37.

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John Funston Che Man, W. K. 1990. Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand. Singapore: Oxford University Press. Connors, Michael K. 2006. “War on error and the Southern Fire: How terrorism analysts get it wrong.” Critical Asian Studies 38(1): 151–75. Daungyewa Utarasint. 2005. “Wadah: The Muslim Faction in Thai Political Party.” Paper presented to the Ninth International Conference on Thai Studies, Northern Illinois University, April 3–6, 2005. Davis, Anthony. 2003. “Thailand faces up to southern extremist threat,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, October 1. ———. 2004. “Southern Thai insurgency gains fresh momentum,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 22. ———. 2005. “No end in sight for southern Thailand’s escalating insurgency,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, October 1. ———. 2007. “Village violence: Thai insurgents heighten communal tensions,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 1. Funston, John. 2006a. “Thailand.” In Fealy, Greg, and Virginia Hooker, eds. 2006. Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A Contemporary Sourcebook, 77–88. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. ———. 2006b. “Malaysia.” In Fealy, Greg, and Virginia Hooker, eds. 2006. Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A Contemporary Sourcebook, 51–61. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Gunaratna, Rohan, Arabinda Acharya, and Sabrina Chua, eds. 2005. Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish. Hamilton, Annette. 2005. “Broadcasting, the South and the State.” Paper presented to the Ninth International Conference on Thai Studies, Northern Illinois University, April 3–6, 2005. Human Rights Watch. 2007a. “‘It Was Like Suddenly My Son No Longer Existed’: Enforced Disappearances in Thailand’s Southern Border Provinces.” Human Rights Watch 19(5) (C). http://hrw.org/reports/2007/thailand0307/. ———. 2007b. “No One is Safe. Insurgent Attacks on Civilians in Thailand’s Southern Border Provinces.” Human Rights Watch 19(12) (C). http://hrw.org/reports/2007/ thailand0807/. International Crisis Group. 2004. “Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix.” Asia Report, no. 83 (September 13). ———. 2005. “Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad.” Asia Report, no. 98 (May 18). www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3436&l=1, accessed May 20, 2005. Ibrahem Narongraksakhet. 2006. “Educational Change for Building Peace in Southern Border Provinces of Thailand.” In Imtiyaz Yusuf, and L. P. Schmidt, eds. 2006. Understanding Conflict and Approaching Peace In Southern Thailand. Bangkok: Konrad-Adenauer-Stitung e.V. Jane’s, World Insurgency and Terrorism. 2007. “Patani United Liberation Organisation.” November 20. Kasian Tejapira. 2006. “Toppling Thaksin.” New Left Review 39 (May–June): 5–37. Kitti Rattanachaya. 2004. Jut fai tai tang rat Patani [Igniting the south, establishing the Patani State]. Bangkok: S. Pichitrkarnpim. ———. 2005. Dap fai tai kap rat Thai [Putting out the southern fire with the Thai state]. Bangkok.

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Southern Thailand Liow, Joseph Chinyong. 2006. Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology, and Politics. Policy Studies 24. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center in Washington. McCargo, Duncan. 2006. “Thaksin and the resurgence of violence in the Thai South: Network monarchy strikes back.” Critical Asian Studies 38(1): 39–71. McVey, Ruth. 1989. “Identity and Rebellion among Southern Thai Muslims.” In A. Forbes, ed. 1989. The Muslims of Thailand. Vol. 1, Politics of the Malay-speaking South. Gaya: Center for Southeast Asian Studies. Nasir Abas. 2005. Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah [Exposing Jemaah Islamiyah]. Jakara Selantan: Penerbit Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu. National Reconciliation Commission. 2006. Overcoming Violence Through the Power of Reconciliation. Bangkok: National Reconciliation Commission. Nidhi Aeusrivongse, 2005. “Understanding the Situation in the South as a ‘Millenarian Revolt.’” Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, no. 6. kyotoreview.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp/issue/ issue5/index.html, accessed May 15, 2005. (Appeared originally as “Morng sathannakarn phaktai phan wæn ‘kabot chaona.’” Special report in Matichon 25[8] [June 1, 2004]: 110–24.) Panomporn Anuragsa. 1984. “Political Integration Policy in Thailand: The Case of the Malay Muslim Minority.” Ph.D. diss., The University of Texas at Austin. Raman, B. 2004. “Thai dilemma over Muslim anger,” Asia Times. www.atimes.com/ atimes/Southeast_Asia/FK03Ae08.html). Originally published as “Muslim anger: The Thai Dilemma.” www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers12%5Cpaper1156.html. Scupin, Raymond, 1998. “Muslim Accommodation in Thai Society.” Journal of Islamic Studies 9 (2): 229–58. Solomon, Jay, and James Hookway. 2002. “Militant Used Thailand as Base for Bali Attack,” Asian Wall Street Journal, November 7. Srisompob Jitpiromsri, with Panyasak Sobhonvasu. 2006. “Unpacking Thailand’s Southern Conflict: The Poverty of Structural Explanations.” Critical Asian Studies 38(1): 95–117. Supara Janchitfah. 2004. Violence in the Mist. Bangkok: Kobfai Publishing Project. Surin Pitsuwan. 1985. Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of the Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand. Bangkok: Thai Khadi Research Institute, Thammasat University. Thanet Aphornsuvan, 2004. Origins of Malay Muslim “Separatism” in Southern Thailand. Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, WPS 32, October. www.ari.nus.edu.sg/publication_details.asp?pubtypeid=WP&pubid=529. Ukrist Pathmanand. 2006. “The Failure of Hawkish Approaches in the Thai South.” Critical Asian Studies 38(1): 73–93. Warr, Peter. 2005. “Thailand’s Paradoxical Recovery.” Southeast Asian Affairs. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Wattana Sugunnasil. 2006. “Islam, Radicalism, and Violence in Southern Thailand.” Critical Asian Studies 38(1): 119–44.

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Appendix Major Incidents in Southern Thailand since December 24, 2001 • • • • • •

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December 24, 2001 – Five police officers and a village defense volunteer were killed in coordinated attacks on police posts in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat Provinces. March 12–15, 2002 – Another five police officers in Yala and Pattani died after gunmen fired on booths and checkpoints. October 29, 2002 – Insurgents set fire to five public schools in Songkhla Province and bombed a Buddhist temple and Chinese shrine in Pattani. April 26, 2003 – Two police officers, mistakenly believed to be members of a criminal gang, were killed by 3,000 angry villagers in Narathiwat. April 28, 2003 – In attacks on marine bases in Yala and Narathiwat, five marines were killed and thirty rifles stolen. January 4, 2004 – Around 100 insurgents raided an arms depot of the Fourth Army Engineers in Narathiwat, killing four soldiers and seizing a cache of 413 light infantry weapons and 2,000 rounds of ammunition. As diversionary moves, they also torched twenty public schools, burned rubber tires, and planted fake explosives in neighboring Yala Province. January 22 and 24, 2004 – Three Buddhist monks were killed (one each in Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani), and two others injured—the first time ever monks had been targeted. March 12, 2004 – High profile Muslim lawyer Somchai Neelaphaijit, acting on behalf of several southerners, “disappears” near Bangkok while in police hands. March 27, 2004 – A motorcycle bomb explodes in front of a hotel and nightclub at the border village of Sungei Golok, Narathiwat—widely seen as the first time militants had targeted civilians and an imitation of the Bali, Indonesia, bombing, albeit on a smaller scale March 28–29, 2004 – Thirty-nine government buildings in Pattani, Songkhla, and Yala were torched in a coordinated attack. March 30, 2004 – A huge volume of explosives was stolen from a quarry in Yala: 1.4 tons of ammonium nitrate, 56 sticks of dynamite, and 176 detonators.

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April 28, 2004 – Around two hundred Muslims attacked eleven police and military posts in Pattani, Yala, and Songkhla Provinces. In what was one of the bloodiest days in modern Thai history, 107 rebels and five security officials were killed. A government-appointed Independent Fact-Finding Commission later described the killing of thirty-two Muslims in Pattani’s historic Krue Se mosque as involving “disproportionate” use of force. Most victims were young and had attacked security posts armed only with knives and parang. May 16, 2004 – Three separate explosions went off almost simultaneously in three Buddhist temples in Narathiwat. May 29, 2004 – Suspected separatists beheaded an elderly Thai villager in Narathiwat, leaving a note threatening to kill more “innocent Buddhists.” August 26, 2004 – A bomb exploded in an outdoor market in Sukhirin, Narathiwat, killing one person and wounding at least thirty-one, including eight children. September 17, 2004 – A judge in Pattani became the first high-ranking official killed by suspected insurgents. October 25, 2004 – Police fired on a large crowd protesting the detention of six village defense volunteers whose shotguns had been stolen by insurgents, killing seven. Police detained 1,300 protestors, and 78 suffocated during transportation in crowded trucks from the protest site in Narathiwat’s Tak Bai District to an army camp in Pattani. February 17, 2005 – A powerful car bomb left at least six dead and about fifty injured in Sungei Golok (outside the same hotel targeted on March 27), the first ever car-bomb attack on Thai soil. April 3, 2005 – Three bombing attacks occurred in Songhkla, including at Hat Yai international airport (one death) and the entrance to a Carrefour supermarket. June 20, 2005 – Three religious teachers (ustaz) were killed while praying in Pattani. June 24, 2005 – A female school director in Narathiwat was shot and killed. June–July 2005 – Around nine people were beheaded (compared with total of three in the previous seventeen months). July 14, 2005 – Synchronized attacks took place on multiple targets in Yala by up to sixty attackers, causing power blackouts and chaos. Insurgents bombed a newly opened cinema complex and a hotel cafe and set fire to another hotel, a warehouse, and a row of shops. One soldier was killed and nineteen injured. (These attacks were used as justification for passage of an emergency decree on July 16.) August 5, 2005 – Threats of violence against people who worked on Fridays—said to be in breach of the Koran—brought businesses in Yala and Pattani to a standstill. In downtown Yala City, 80 percent of shops closed and buses plying between Yala and Pattani and some outlying districts halted services. The Friday business shut down continued for several weeks thereafter. August 30, 2005 – Villagers in Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi District claimed that officials had killed their religious leader. Nearly 100 villagers gathered in front of the village to condemn government officials and barred police from reaching the crime scene. (The protest was followed by the exodus of 131 villagers to Malaysia.) September 2, 2005 – About twenty bomb blasts and ambushes rocked the Deep South. Three people were killed and at least twenty-six injured. September 20, 2005 – Two marines taken hostage in Tanyong Limo Village in

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Narathiwat Province were beaten to death after villagers accused them of killing two village members. The villagers insisted on talking to Malaysian reporters only; six reporters were on their way as the killing happened. October 16, 2005 – An elderly monk was hacked to death, two temple boys shot dead, and a temple set ablaze in Pattani’s Panare District. October 26, 2005 – Coordinated raids took place in the three southernmost provinces. Attackers, split into teams of four to five men, raided sixty-three locations between 7:00 and 8:00pm. They derailed a train, killed four, and made off with ninety-two firearms, mostly shotguns, seized from members of village security teams. October 30, 2005 – Another temple in Pattani was set ablaze. November 2, 2005 – A bomb blacked out the center of Narathiwat City for three hours as Muslims prepared to mark the end of Ramadan. Bombs also were found at seven other locations. (Martial law was declared in two Muslim-majority districts in Songkhla.) November 16, 2005 – A Muslim family of nine was gunned down in Narathiwat. December 18, 2005 – Nearly 1,000 villagers from two separate groups in Narathiwat’s Sungai Padi District seized two schools briefly and held teachers hostage in return for the release of two villagers detained by police. January 18–19, 2006 – Arsonists set fire to more than forty cell phone transmission stations and aerials and other targets across four provinces (Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and parts of Songkhla). Other attacks killed a policeman and injured two teachers and three soldiers. March 2, 2006 – More than twenty locations across Songkhla and eighteen in Pattani were set on fire. March 6, 2006 – Insurgents attacked two village communities late at night, killing five. Some observers saw the attack as a possible shift from point-blank assassination to attacking soft targets in Buddhist communities. May 19, 2006 – Two female Buddhist teachers were separated from six Muslim colleagues and severely beaten by villagers during a tense stand-off, while sixty villagers demanded the release of two men arrested earlier in the day. Teacher Kru Juling eventually died from her injuries in January 2007. June 15, 2006 – Bombs in Narathiwat (20), Pattani (18), and Yala (12) killed at least three people and injured scores of state workers and civilians. At least ten police installations and outposts were attacked, in one case with an M79 grenade launcher. Bombs exploded inside the main buildings of four city halls, two provincial offices, two district police stations, and two municipality offices. August 1–2, 2006 – About 100 incidents of violence occurred simultaneously in the four southernmost provinces—bombs were thrown into state offices and civilian residential areas, tire spikes were planted on many roads, and tires burned. August 31, 2006 – One person was killed and twenty-four injured as more than twenty small bombs exploded almost simultaneously inside commercial banks across Yala Province. September 16, 2006 – Five people were killed, including the first Westerner (Canadian), and about sixty injured in a series of six explosions in Hat Yai’s business center. Bombs went off at roughly five-minute intervals, starting around 9:00pm when the area was crowded with tourists and locals. November 4–5, 2006 – A new wave of arson attacks in the three southernmost

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provinces claimed at least six lives and left four schools torched. Forty-nine schools closed for several weeks. November 8, 2006 – Nearly 100 Buddhists (later rising to over 200) from three villages in Yala’s Than To and Bannang Sata Districts fled their homes and sought refuge at a temple in a nearby district amid growing fears of more insurgent violence. Most returned by November 2007. November 26, 2006 – All schools in Pattani were closed for several weeks following increasing attacks on teachers. December 31, 2006 – Bombings in Bangkok left three dead and forty wounded. Government leaders generally played down possible links to the south, but police and other intelligence sources alleged a connection. February 17–19, 2007 – Simultaneous bomb and arson attacks occurred across four southern provinces. Targets included electricity transformers, department stores, karaoke bars, gas stations, police stations, schools, and a mosque. Eight were killed and forty-nine wounded. March 14, 2007 – Rebels shot three men and six women, including two girls ages 14 and 15, all Buddhists, at point-blank range after rebels armed with assault rifles forced a minibus off the road in Yala. In an apparent revenge attack, a bomb soon after was thrown into a crowded mosque. May 9, 2007 – A powerful roadside bomb killed seven soldiers. Most were believed to have died from the explosion, but some were shot execution-style in the head at point-blank range by the attackers. This was the highest number of casualties suffered by the army at the hands of Muslim insurgents in a single incident. The attack was quickly followed by the similar killing of twelve soldiers (and nine others) on May 31 and seven more soldiers on June 15. May 31, 2007 – About 2,000 Muslim university students and local residents gathered in the Pattani Central Mosque to demand the government pull out all troops from the Deep South, lift a curfew imposed on various locations in the restive region, and ensure justice for four Muslim women allegedly raped and killed by Rangers the previous week. The event was unprecedented, as previous public demonstrations had only been carried out at the village level by local residents. Protestors later increased to 5,000, and the demonstration ended after four days when the government promised to investigate. June 11, 2007 – Nearly 100 public schools in the southernmost province of Narathiwat were closed after three teachers were brutally shot to death in Si Sakhon and Rangae Districts. Two were women teachers shot inside a library in front of students. June 20–25, 2007 – Under an emergency decree, 160 suspected insurgents were arrested and detained. Regular search and arrest of villagers began. July 1, 2007 – Five hundred policemen and soldiers raided an Islamic private school, Islamburapha, in Narathiwat. The school was affiliated with Samphan Withaya, an Islamic school run by alleged BRN-C leader Masae Useng. Seven were detained (only one a student), and the government then closed the 600-student school. July 30, 2007 – The Bangkok Post reported 1,930 insurgent suspects had been caught since security authorities changed strategy to searches and arrests. The military claimed about 300 were leading insurgents.

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August 1, 2007 – Bombings and shootings throughout south—believed to be in retaliation for military round-ups—killed nine. August 8, 2007 – Insurgent gunmen forced their way into a sub-district health station in Pattani’s Yarang District and shot dead two health workers, one a women—the first time a health station had been targeted. October 2, 2007 – Police released video clips found on mobile phones during a raid in Bannang Sata District, Yala, on September 29 showing the beheading of a soldier and a civilian. The beheadings were seen as evidence of foreign connections. October 9, 2007 – Police announced the discovery of baht 30 million in cash stuffed inside PVC pipes, along with a pistol and shotgun, buried in the backyard of a house in Narathiwat. They linked the weapons and cash to narcotics traffickers and insurgents. November 5–7, 2007 – Newspapers reported seven assassination-style killings by insurgents, followed by a bomb explosion injuring twenty-eight at a market in Yala, the shooting of two public school teachers in Narathiwat, and the deaths of three border patrol officers due to a bomb in Pattani. Violence in the first two weeks of November was the worst in eleven months. November 29, 2007 – Alleged insurgents shot and crucified a Muslim man for cooperating with the military and then drove home the intimidation attempt by beheading two Buddhist fish sellers. December 4, 2007 – Six died and twenty-four were injured in the bombing of a roadside restaurant in Pattani’s Muang District. January 1, 2008 – Two hotels in Narathiwat’s Sungai Kolok Town were hit by five bomb blasts injuring thirty-two, two of them critically. January 8, 2008 – Nine police were reportedly arrested for allegedly spying for insurgents. January 14, 2008 – Eight soldiers were killed when their Humvee was ambushed in Narathiwat’s Chanae District (the deadliest attack since June 2007). The following day forty-four people were injured, six seriously, in a bomb blast at a morning market in Yala City. March 15, 2008 – A powerful car bomb exploded at Pattani’s popular CS Hotel, killing two and injuring at least fourteen. The hotel had been considered a “neutral” zone for meetings of officials, journalists, NGOs, politicians, and others, so the bombing was seen as a new chapter in southern violence and a warning that no location was safe. March 20, 2008 – Police announced that the number of those killed since 2004 now exceeded 3,000. March 21, 2008 – A popular imam died after three days in military custody, reportedly after being tortured. Narathiwat Puea Pandin MP Waemahadi Waedaoh later told parliament that torture by security forces was widespread.

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Internal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia Project Information

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Project Rationale, Purpose, and Outline Project Director: Muthiah Alagappa Principal Researchers: Morten Pedersen (Burma/Myanmar) Saroja Dorairajoo (southern Thailand) Mahendra Lawoti (Nepal) Samir Kumar Das (northeast India) Neil DeVotta (Sri Lanka) Rationale Internal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia is part of a larger East-West Center project on state building and governance in Asia that investigates political legitimacy of governments, the relationship of the military to the state, the development of political and civil societies and their roles in democratic development, the role of military force in state formation, and the dynamics and management of internal conflicts arising from nation- and state-building processes. An earlier project investigating internal conflicts arising from nation- and state-building processes focused on conflicts arising from the political consciousness of minority communities in China (Tibet and Xinjiang), Indonesia (Aceh and Papua), and southern Philippines (the Moro Muslims). Funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, that highly successful project was completed in March 2005. The present project, which began in July 2005, investigates the causes and consequences of internal conflicts arising from state- and nation-building processes in Burma/Myanmar, southern Thailand, Nepal, northeast India, and Sri Lanka, and explores strategies and solutions for their peaceful management and eventual settlement. Internal conflicts have been a prominent feature of the Asian political landscape since 1945. Asia has witnessed numerous civil wars, armed insurgencies, coups d’état, regional rebellions, and revolutions. Many have been protracted; several have far-reaching domestic and international consequences. The civil war in Pakistan led to the break up of that country in 1971; separatist struggles challenge the political and territorial integrity of China, India, Indonesia, Burma, the Philippines, Thailand, and Sri Lanka; political uprisings in Thailand (1973 and 1991), the Philippines (1986), South Korea (1986), Taiwan (1991) Bangladesh (1991), and Indonesia (1998) resulted in dramatic political change in those countries.

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68 Although the political uprisings in Burma (1988) and China (1989) were suppressed, the political systems in those countries, as well as in Vietnam, continue to confront problems of legitimacy that could become acute; and radical Islam poses serious challenges to stability in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. The Thai military ousted the democratically-elected government of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006. In all, millions of people have been killed in the internal conflicts, and tens of millions have been displaced. Moreover, the involvement of external powers in a competitive manner (especially during the Cold War) in several of these conflicts had negative consequences for domestic and regional security. Internal conflicts in Asia can be traced to contestations over political legitimacy (the title to rule), national identity, state building, and distributive justice––that are often interconnected. With the bankruptcy of the socialist model and transitions to democracy in several countries, the number of internal conflicts over political legitimacy has declined in Asia. However, the legitimacy of certain governments continues to be contested from time to time, and the remaining communist and authoritarian systems are likely to confront challenges to their legitimacy in due course. Internal conflicts also arise from the process of constructing modern nation-states, and the unequal distribution of material and status benefits. Although many Asian states have made considerable progress in constructing national communities and viable states, several countries, including some major ones, still confront serious problems that have degenerated into violent conflict. By affecting the political and territorial integrity of the state as well as the physical, cultural, economic, and political security of individuals and groups, these conflicts have great potential to affect domestic and international stability. Purpose Internal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia examines internal conflicts arising from the political consciousness of minority communities in Burma/Myanmar, southern Thailand, northeast India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Except for Nepal, these states are not in danger of collapse. However, they do face serious challenges at the regional and local levels which, if not addressed, can negatively affect the vitality of the national state in these countries. Specifically, the project has a threefold purpose: (1) to develop an in-depth understanding of the domestic, transnational, and international dynamics of internal conflicts in these countries in the context of nationand state-building strategies; (2) to examine how such conflicts have affected

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69 the vitality of the state; and (3) to explore strategies and solutions for the peaceful management and eventual settlement of these conflicts. Design A study group has been organized for each of the five conflicts investigated in the study. With a principal researcher for each, the study groups comprise practitioners and scholars from the respective Asian countries, including the region or province that is the focus of the conflict, as well as from Australia, Britain, Belgium, Sweden, and the United States. The participants list that follows shows the composition of the study groups. All five study groups met jointly for the first time in Washington, D.C., on October 30–November 3, 2005. Over a period of five days, participants engaged in intensive discussion of a wide range of issues pertaining to the conflicts investigated in the project. In addition to identifying key issues for research and publication, the meeting facilitated the development of cross-country perspectives and interaction among scholars who had not previously worked together. Based on discussion at the meeting, twenty-five policy papers were commissioned. The study groups met separately in the summer of 2006 for the second set of meetings, which were organized in collaboration with respected policy-oriented think tanks in each host country. The Burma and southern Thailand study group meetings were held in Bangkok, July 10–11 and July 12–13, respectively. These meetings were cosponsored by The Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University. The Nepal study group was held in Kathmandu, Nepal, July 17–19, and was cosponsored by the Social Science Baha. The northeast India study group met in New Delhi, India, August 9–10. This meeting was cosponsored by the Centre for Policy Research. The Sri Lanka meeting was held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, August 14–16, and was cosponsored by the Centre for Policy Alternatives. In each of these meetings, scholars, and practitioners reviewed and critiqued papers produced for the meetings and made suggestions for revision. Publications This project will result in twenty to twenty-five policy papers providing a detailed examination of particular aspects of each conflict. Subject to satisfactory peer review, these 18,000- to 24,000-word essays will be published in the East-West Center Washington Policy Studies series, and

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70 will be circulated widely to key personnel and institutions in the policy and intellectual communities and the media in the respective Asian countries, the United States, and other relevant countries. Some studies will be published in the East-West Center Washington Working Papers series. Public Forums To engage the informed public and to disseminate the findings of the project to a wide audience, public forums have been organized in conjunction with study group meetings. Five public forums were organized in Washington, D.C., in conjunction with the first study group meeting. The first forum, cosponsored by The Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, discussed the conflict in southern Thailand. The second, cosponsored by The Sigur Center for Asian Studies of The George Washington University, discussed the conflict in Burma. The conflicts in Nepal were the focus of the third forum, which was cosponsored by the Asia Program at The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The fourth public meeting, cosponsored by the Foreign Policy Studies program at The Brookings Institution, discussed the conflicts in northeast India. The fifth forum, cosponsored by the South Asia Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, focused on the conflict in Sri Lanka. Funding Support The Carnegie Corporation of New York is once again providing generous funding support for the project.

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Project Participants Project Director Muthiah Alagappa Director, East-West Center Washington (from February 2001 to January 2007) Distinguished Senior Fellow, East-West Center (from February 1, 2007)

Burma/Myanmar Study Group Morten B. Pedersen United Nations University Principal Researcher Mary P. Callahan University of Washington

Martin Smith Independent Analyst, London David I. Steinberg Georgetown University

Christina Fink Chiang Mai University

David Tegenfeldt Hope International Development Agency, Yangon

Saboi Jum Shalom Foundation, Yangon

Mya Than Chulalongkorn University

Kyi May Kaung Freelance Writer/Analyst, Washington, D.C.

Tin Maung Maung Than Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Tom Kramer Transnational Institute, Amsterdam

Ardeth Thawnghmung University of Massachusetts, Lowell

Curtis Lambrecht Yale University

Meredith Weiss East-West Center Washington

David Scott Mathieson Australian National University

Khin Zaw Win Independent Researcher, Yangon

Win Min Chiang Mai University

Harn Yawnghwe Euro-Burma Office, Brussels

Zaw Oo American University

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Southern Thailand Study Group Saroja Dorairajoo National University of Singapore Principal Researcher

Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana National Institute of Development Administration, Bangkok

Thanet Aphornsuvan Thammasat University

Duncan McCargo University of Leeds

Marc Askew Victoria University, Melbourne

Celakhan (Don) Pathan The Nation Newspaper, Bangkok

Suchit Bunbongkarn Chulalongkorn University

Surin Pitsuwan MP, Thai House of Representatives

Kavi Chongkittavorn Nation Multimedia Group, Bangkok

Thitinan Pongsudhirak Chulalongkorn University

Neil John Funston Australian National University

Chaiwat Satha-Anand Thammasat University

Surat Horachaikul Chulalongkorn University

Vaipot Srinual Supreme Command Headquarters, Thailand

Srisompob Jitpiromsri Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus Joseph Chinyong Liow Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Wattana Sugunnasil Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus Panitan Wattanayagorn Chulalongkorn University Imtiyaz Yusuf Assumption University, Bangkok

Nepal Study Group

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Mahendra Lawoti Western Michigan University Principal Researcher

Lok Raj Baral Nepal Center for Contemporary Studies, Kathmandu

Itty Abraham East-West Center Washington

Surendra Raj Bhandari Law Associates Nepal, Kathmandu

Meena Acharya Tanka Prasad Acharya Memorial Foundation, Kathmandu

Chandra Dev Bhatta London School of Economics

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Krishna Bhattachan Tribhuvan University

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73 Sumitra Manandhar-Gurung Lumanthi and National Coalition Against Racial Discrimination, Kathmandu Harka Gurung (deceased) Transparency International, Nepal Dipak Gyawali Royal Nepal Academy of Science and Technology, Kathmandu Krishna Hacchethu Tribhuvan University Susan Hangen Ramapo College, New Jersey Lauren Leve University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Prakash Chandra Lohani Former Finance Minister, Nepal

Anup Pahari Foreign Service Institute, Arlington Rajendra Pradhan Social Science Baha, Kathmandu Shree Govind Shah Environmental Resources Planning and Monitoring/Academy of Social Justice & Human Rights, Kathmandu Saubhagya Shah Tribhuvan University Hari Sharma Social Science Baha, Kathmandu Sudhindra Sharma Interdisciplinary Analyst (IDA), Kathmandu Dhruba Kumar Shrestha Tribhuvan University

Pancha Narayan Maharjan Tribhuvan University, Kirtipur

Seira Tamang Centre for Social Research and Development, Kathmandu

Sukh Deo Muni Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

Bishnu Raj Upreti National Centre of Competence in Research, Kathmandu

Northeast India Study Group Samir Kumar Das University of Calcutta Principal Researcher

Dipankar Banerjee Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi

Sanjay Barbora North Eastern Social Research Centre, Assam

Kalyan Barooah Assam Tribune

Sanjib Baruah Center for Policy Research, New Delhi Bard College, New York

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M.P. Bezbaruah UN – WTO (World Tourism Organization), New Delhi Pinaki Bhattacharya The Mathrubhumi, Kerala

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74 Subir Bhaumik British Broadcasting Corporation, Kolkata

Sukh Deo Muni Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

Bejoy Das Gupta Institute of International Finance, Inc., Washington, D.C.

Bhagat Oinam Jawaharlal Nehru University

Partha S. Ghosh Jawaharlal Nehru University Uddipana Goswami Center for Studies in Social Science, Kolkata Sanjoy Hazarika Centre for North East Studies and Policy Research, New Delhi Anil Kamboj Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi Bengt Karlsson Uppsala University, Sweden Dolly Kikon Stanford University Ved Marwah Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi Pratap Bhanu Mehta Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

Pradip Phanjoubam Imphal Free Press, Manipur V.R. Raghavan Delhi Policy Group Rajesh Rajagopalan Jawaharlal Nehru University Swarna Rajagopalan Chaitanya––The Policy Consultancy, Chennai E.N. Rammohan National Security Council, New Delhi Bibhu Prasad Routray Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi Ronojoy Sen The Times of India, New Delhi Prakash Singh Border Security Force (Ret’d.) George Verghese Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

Sri Lanka Study Group

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Neil DeVotta Hartwick College Principal Researcher

Sunanda Deshapriya Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo

Ravinatha P. Aryasinha American University

Rohan Edrisinha Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo

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75 Nimalka Fernando International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination & Racism, Colombo Bhavani Fonseka Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo Mario Gomez Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies, Colombo Air Vice Marshall Harry Goonetileke Colombo Anberiya Hanifa Muslim Women’s Research and Action Forum, Colombo Dayan Jayatilleka University of Colombo N. Kandasamy Center for Human Rights and Development in Colombo S.I. Keethaponcalan University of Colombo

Darini Rajasingham Centre for Poverty Analysis, Colombo John Richardson, Jr. American University Norbert Ropers Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies, Colombo Kanchana N. Ruwanpura Hobart and William Smith Colleges, New York P. Sahadevan Jawaharlal Nehru University Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo Muttukrishna Sarvananthan Point Pedro Institute of Development, Sri Lanka Peter Schalk Uppsala University, Sweden Asanga Tilakaratne University of Kelaniya

N. Manoharan Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi

Jayadeva Uyangoda University of Colombo

Dennis McGilvray University of Colorado at Boulder

Asanga Welikala Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo

Jehan Perera National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, Colombo Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam MP, Sri Lanka

Jayampathy Wickramaratne Ministry of Constitutional Affairs, Sri Lanka Javid Yusuf Attorney-at-Law, Colombo

Mirak Raheem Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo

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Background of the Conflict in Southern Thailand The three “southern border provinces” of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat have an ambiguous status within the Thai nation and state. Officially part of Siam since 1909, the region roughly corresponds to the former Malay sultanate of Patani. The area remains around 80 percent Malay-speaking and Muslim, and has never been properly incorporated culturally or psychologically into Buddhist-dominated Thailand. Bangkok has largely pursued a policy of assimilation and standardization, making few concessions to the distinctive history and character of the region. Like the rest of Thailand, the southern border provinces are administered mainly by officials dispatched from the distant capital. The region has a long tradition of resistance to the rule of Bangkok, and political violence has emerged at various junctures in modern history. Some of this violence was perpetrated by the Thai state. Landmark events included the 1948 Dusun-yor incident (in which dozens, perhaps hundreds, of Malay-Muslim villagers were killed in Narathiwat) and the 1954 arrest and “disappearance” of prominent Islamic teacher Haji Sulong at the hands of the Thai police. Radical “separatist” elements began waging a guerrilla war against the Thai state in the 1960s, and fighting reached its most virulent stage during the late 1970s and early 1980s. A number of groups were behind the fighting, including the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN). By 1980 as many as 1,000 insurgents were carrying out regular attacks in the south, and had even staged a number of bombings in Bangkok. But the Prem Tinsulanond government (1980–88) successfully reined in the violence, granting amnesties to former militants and setting up new security and governance arrangements in the area, coordinated by the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC). Prem’s policy was to co-opt the Malay-Muslim elite with a combination of political privileges and development funds, much of these brokered by the army. Though far from perfect, these policies were broadly effective for about two decades. During the first term of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (2001– 2005), however, the security situation in the south deteriorated sharply. An overconfident Thaksin dissolved the Prem-era special administrative arrangements and placed the highly unpopular police force in charge of security in the Deep South. These politically motivated policy blunders

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78 coincided with a sharp rise in militancy and the reemergence of violent resistance to the Thai state. On January 4, 2004, more than 50 militants staged a daring raid on an army camp, seizing a large cache of weapons and scoring an enormous propaganda victory. In the three years that followed, almost 2,000 people were killed in political violence in the region. The two worst days of violence were April 28, 2004, when more than 100 men died in simultaneous attacks on a series of security posts, culminating in a bloody siege at the historic Krue Se mosque; and October 25, 2004, when 78 unarmed protestors died in Thai military custody, apparently mainly from suffocation, following mass arrests at Tak Bai, Narathiwat. These two incidents greatly undermined the legitimacy of the Thai state and boosted the militant movement. Nevertheless, the origins and character of the political violence in the south remained a highly contentious issue. At least some of the killings in the region were popularly attributed to extrajudicial murders carried out by, or on behalf of, the Thai security forces, while others were undoubtedly revenge killings or simply ordinary criminal acts. The militant movement has declined to make public statements of responsibility or to issue any demands, thus contributing to a growing climate of fear. Although there seems every reason to believe that the majority of incidents are being perpetrated by people with militant sympathies, the nature of the militant movement remains somewhat unclear. Some analysts insist that the movement is essentially a reconfigured version of earlier groups such as BRN-Coordinate, while others see the movement as a shadowy and largely ad hoc network. Whereas earlier political violence in the region used mainly “separatist” rhetoric, drawing on notions of Malay identity and history, anonymous leaflets circulated since January 2004 have invoked explicitly “jihadist” sentiments. Most analysts of the conflict remain skeptical about claims that the southern Thai violence is linked with transnational networks such as Jemaah Islamiya (JI); the causes of the conflict seem overwhelmingly homegrown. Thaksin’s mishandling of the south was one factor contributing to the September 19, 2006 military coup d’Ètat. Ironically, though Thaksin had favored security-based solutions to the violence, many senior army commanders advocated political solutions such as those advanced by the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC)—a high-level body established by Thaksin to propose new policies to address the southern

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79 violence, but whose conclusions the prime minister had spurned. The new military-backed Surayud Chulanont government adopted a more conciliatory approach to the conflict from October 2006, yet the violence continued unabated, and much vaunted “dialogue” with the militants failed to produce results.

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Map of Southern Thailand

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