Sorry Lads, but the Order Is to Go: The August Offensive, Gallipoli, 1915 [1 ed.] 9781742230788, 9781742230771

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‘SorrY, LadS, BUT

THE ORDER IS TO GO’ DAVID W CAMERON is a biological anthropologist and is a Canberrabased author. He previously held an Australian Research Council QEII Fellowship in the Department of Anatomy and Histology, University of Sydney and an Australian Research Council Postdoctoral Fellowship in the School of Archaeology and Anthropology, Australian National University. He has conducted research and fieldwork in Europe, the Middle East, Asia and Northern America. In 2003 he conducted a preliminary archaeological survey of the Anzac Gallipoli battlefields and subsequently held many discussions with Turkish and Australian government officials about conservation issues relating to the Anzac area. Cameron is the author of 25 April 1915 (2007, Allen & Unwin), which focuses on the first 24 hours of the Anzac landing. He is currently completing his third book on Anzac, which examines the final battles and the evacuation of Anzac in December 1915.

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This book is dedicated to my much loved parents Lloyd and Doreen Cameron

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‘SorrY, LadS, BUT

THE ORDER IS TO GO’ THe aUGUST oFFenSive, GaLLiPoLi: 1915

d av i d w. c a m e r o n

UNSW PRESS

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A UNSW Press book Published by University of New South Wales Press Ltd University of New South Wales Sydney NSW 2052 AUSTRALIA www.unswpress.com.au © David W Cameron 2009 First published 2009 This book is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission. Inquiries should be addressed to the publisher. National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Author: Cameron, David Wayne, 1961– Title:  ‘Sorry, lads, but the order is to go’: the August offensive, Gallipoli 1915/ David W. Cameron. ISBN: 978 1 74223 077 1 Notes: Includes index. Subjects: Australia. Army. Australian and New Zealand Army Corps – History.           World War, 1914–1918 – Campaigns – Turkey – Gallipoli Peninsula.           Gallipoli Peninsula (Turkey) – History, Military – 20th century. Dewey Number: 940.426 Design Josephine Pajor-Markus Cover Gallipoli Peninsula, Turkey: Australian troops relax inside a captured Turkish trench at Lone Pine (AWM G01126) Printer Ligare

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Conte n t s

Acknowledgments Introduction PART 1: Preparation 1 ‘Casualties, what do I care for casualties?’ 2 ‘The most important point in our defences and the most inadequately manned’ 3 ‘… it hurts when one of the old hands get hit’ 4 ‘Poor devils must have been terror-stricken’ 5 ‘All hands were busy sharpening bayonets’ PART 2: 6 August 1915 6 ‘Giving a leg into eternity’ 7 ‘Hope to get through alright’ 8 ‘They are Turks all right’ 9 ‘For God’s sake send bombs’ 10 ‘Ka mate, ka mate – Ka ora, ka ora’

vii xii 2 15 23 39 52 62 72 84 104 124

PART 3: 7 August 1915 148 11 ‘I knew how hopeless was the job’ 159 12 ‘The Heads got a bit mixed’ 13 ‘Goodbye, I don’t think I’ll be coming back from this one’ 177 14 ‘Who’ll come with me?’ 202 223 15 ‘How’s she going mate?’ PART 4: 8 August 1915 16 ‘Signalers, fix bayonets’ 17 ‘Everything is a muddle’ 18 ‘Like a battle of savage beasts at the bottom of a pit’

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232 242 259

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19 ‘… it was just plain open slaughter’ PART 5: 9 August 1915 20 ‘If only Abdul had known how few were left’ 21 ‘For most conspicuous bravery at Lone Pine trenches’ PART 6: 10 August 1915 22 ‘He’ll never let you down’ Epilogue Notes References Index

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270 290 307 326 339 346 358 362

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Acknowle d g m e n t s

It would be impossible to approach any history of Gallipoli – Anzac – without having relied on the works of a few key researchers and historians. I and many others owe a debt to Charles Bean (Australian Official History series), CF Aspinall-Oglander (British Official History series) and Christopher Pugsley (Gallipoli: The New Zealand Story). More recently (and Christopher Pugsley is among them), a number of researcher historians have made significant contributions which this author has also relied on. In my opinion the best single volume covering the entire Gallipoli campaign is Steel and Hart’s 1994 book Defeat at Gallipoli. It is the approach taken by Steel and Hart that I have taken in this book (and my previous book): a narrative style, with the men themselves telling much of the story through their diaries, letters and later interviews – my job is to place these writings within a firm historical, tactical and strategic context. A close second is Tim Travers’ 2001 book Gallipoli, 1915, which has a wealth of material from the Turkish side. Both of these books are destined to be classics. Also a number of noteworthy books have recently been published focusing on the Anzac battlefields. I mention these books as they have contributed to my research. From the Australian side of things, James Hurst’s 2005 book Game to the Last: The 11th Australian Infantry Battalion at Gallipoli is a must-have for anyone interested in Gallipoli, especially the fighting of the first day (25 April) and at Leane’s Trench. Another is Wes vii

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Olson’s 2006 award-winning book Gallipoli: The Western Australian Story. Peter Stanley’s 2005 book Quinn’s Post is a must-have. Harvey Broadbent’s 2005 book Gallipoli: The fatal shore, provides a wealth of first-hand material, including accounts from across the trenches by the Turks. The same applies to his earlier work The Boys Who Came Home: Recollections of Gallipoli (1990). Peter Williams’ 2007 book The Battle for Anzac Ridge provides a detailed analysis and narrative of the battles for Second Ridge during 25 April 1915. Greg Kerr’s fascinating 1998 book Lost Anzacs: The story of two brothers tells what happened to his grandfather and great uncle during their battles at Anzac. His uncle landed on the first day and was never seen again, while his grandfather was captured during the fighting of the August offensive and survived the war. The ongoing publication of Ron Austin’s numerous battalion histories are a significant contribution to Australian World War One studies in general. From across the Tasman, two books particularly stand out: Richard Stowers’ Bloody Gallipoli: The New Zealanders story, which provides a wealth of first-hand accounts (and photographs), and Terry Kinloch’s 2005 Echoes of Gallipoli: In the words of New Zealand’s Mounted Riflemen, a significant contribution to the history of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles and their battles at Anzac. A big thank you must go to those men who published their Battalion Histories in the 1920s and 1930s that are listed in the reference section of this book. They provide a wealth of material – some humorous, some very tragic. I must thank Brigadier Chris Roberts AM, CSC who read the whole manuscript and made a significant contribution in terms of comments and historical and military corrections. I would also like to thank Brett Still and Garth Sheedy who read a number of chapters and provided valuable comments. They, however, cannot be blamed for any errors that may have crept into the history – the author takes full responsibility. Like all researchers I am indebted to those soldiers who not only kept a record of their experiences (see notes for details) but also unselfishly donated their precious documents, writings and curios to numerous viii

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a c k n o w le d g m e nts

research institutions for others to study. This also applies to relatives who have provided similar valuable records. For those copyright holders I was unable to locate, I trust that the material quoted meets with your approval. I am especially indebted to Dr Margaret Heese, the daughter of then Lance Corporal Cyril Lawrence, for allowing me to quote from her father’s diary. His diary (held at the Australian War Memorial and published by Melbourne University Press in the early 1980s) is a detailed account of one man’s experience during the Gallipoli Campaign. I would also like to thank Mrs M McPherson for allowing me to include a photograph of her grandfather, Colonel Alexander White (ALH). I would like to thank the following institutions for supplying and/ or permitting me to quote material in their care: Alexander Turnbull Library, Auckland; Australian National Library; libraries at the Australian National University, Australian War Memorial, Imperial War Museum, London and the Kippenberger Military Achieve, Army Museum Waiouru, New Zealand. At UNSW Press I would like to thank my publisher Gabriella Sterio for taking on this book, along with managing editor Heather Cam and my editor Kerrie Mann, who have been a joy to work with. Finally, I thank my wife Debbie for her encouragement, support, advice and love, as well as Emma, Anita and Lloyd who seemingly at the right time bring Dad back to the 21st century.

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Main topographical features at Anzac

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Q = Quinn’s Post; C = Courtney’s Post; S = Steele’s Post; T.Q. = Turkish Quinn’s; G.O.T. = German Officers’ Trench; W.F. = The Wheatfield; L.T. = Leane’s Trench (Turkish Despair Works)

Main topographical features at Old Anzac

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Introdu c t i o n

By the end of the first few weeks of the Gallipoli invasion in 1915, most had resigned themselves to a stalemate. Only the senior British and French commanders at Helles – with their reputations at stake – insisted on trying to break through, using the lives of their men to help salvage the campaign – and perhaps their careers. At Anzac, the commanders had more than enough on their hands just trying to defend their precious 200 hectares – the idea of breaking through and beyond Third Ridge was a long way off. The Turkish commanders during the first few months desperately tried to throw the enemy back into the sea, but they too had failed. They at least learnt from their efforts and by June–July had decided that they could defeat the enemy by keeping them bottled up in their respective zones: they didn’t need to break into the enemy positions, sacrificing large numbers of their men in the process – the enemy had to break out; stalemate meant defeat for them. It was also during June–July that the British senior commander, Ian Hamilton, decided to switch his focus of breaking out from Helles, which had been spectacularly unsuccessful up to then, and try to do so further north at the Anzac sector. This would also involve a landing just beyond the Anzac beachhead further north at Suvla Bay by a British army corps of two divisions. The main attack, however, would be against the Sari Bair Range along North Beach at Anzac. The Anzacs, along with British and Indian troops, were assigned the objective of capturing xii

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i ntr o d u cti o n

the dominating heights from Hill 971 in the north all the way down to The Nek in the south. A number of feints at Anzac would be launched from Second Ridge and 400 Plateau, the largest being the attack on the Turkish position at Lone Pine. The British landings at Suvla would also capture the immediate heights beyond the broad expanse of lowlands, but it was a secondary operation to help keep Turks pinned down away from the Anzac sector and to link up with the ‘old’ Anzac sector to expand the area for future operations. The main force that was assigned the key roles in attacking the Sari Bair Range was the Anzacs – the men of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. It would require a long night march, through a complex series of uncharted tangled gullies and spurs, up to the highest peaks of the range within a matter of hours. Fit troops with accurate maps in broad daylight with no enemy shooting at them would have found this an almost impossible task in the time allotted. These men not only had to do it with no maps and no information of what lay ahead, they also had to undertake it heavily laden with ammunition, machine guns, shovels and picks, wire and all manner of stores, and they had to do it in near total darkness. Additionally, the Anzacs were already largely a spent force, battle weary, fatigued and disease ridden, having fought in the cramped beachhead for the last four months. After accomplishing all this (within a matter of hours), they were then expected to do battle with the Turks for the spine of the range. It was an overly ambitious and highly optimistic task for any troops to undertake, let alone troops already worn down with sickness and fatigue; however, they, along with British and Indian troops, almost managed to pull it off. As in my previous history of the first 24 hours at Anzac, this history is focused entirely on trying to document what happened to those involved, principally the rank and file. The account is aimed at trying to interpret and document in detail the efforts of these men, Anzac, Turk, British and Indian, during the five days that defined the August Offensive at Anzac. This offensive resulted in some of the bloodiest battles for the xiii

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Gallipoli Peninsula – the battles for Lone Pine, The Nek, Chunuk Bair, Hill Q and Hill 971, along with a number of feints along Second Ridge, Turkish Quinn’s, German Officers’ Trench and the Chessboard. It is a narrative; I am not concerned with a revisionist history or debating the ‘what ifs’, although the epilogue attempts to summarise the main failings and success of the offensive. Overall the book is focused on trying to tell the story of the campaign as it unfolded from the viewpoint of the men directly involved.

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PART 1

PREPARATION

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1 ‘Casualties, what do I c a re fo r c a s u a l t i e s ? ’

Major General Esat Pasa, the Turkish commander at Anzac, was pleased. The enemy had been crammed into the ridges and gullies just beyond the cove for about three months now. The Turks held the high ground and any bloke who was stupid enough to stick his head above the parapet for a peek was certain to catch a bullet long before getting a guernsey into no-man’s-land. Not that that had stopped some from trying. The deaths of General Bridges, Brigadier MacLaurin and Brigade Major Irvine by Turkish fire early on put paid to that, even if they had been careless in exposing themselves to prove a point to the men. ‘It’s my business to be sniped at’, retorted Irvine to the men who yelled at him to ‘get down’ just seconds before he was killed. To paraphrase the historian Peter Pedersen, if nothing else he certainly got job satisfaction. Ten minutes later, standing in full view of the Turks, MacLaurin was also killed.

The British commander-in-chief of the Gallipoli Campaign, General Sir Ian Hamilton, was well aware that he had to fight his way out of the stalemate at Helles and Anzac. Just weeks after the invasion, Hamilton cabled Secretary of War Lord Kitchener in London on 10 May: ‘If you could only spare me two fresh Divisions organised as a Corps I could push on 2

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with great hopes of success both from Helles and Gaba Tepe; otherwise I am afraid we shall degenerate into trench warfare with its resultant slowness.’1 He sent another cable to Kitchener a week later on hearing that the promised Russian offensive against the Turks had been indefinitely postponed: ‘If, however, the present situation remains unchanged and the Turks are still able to devote so much exclusive attention to us, I shall want an additional army corps, that is, two army corps additional in all.’2 Kitchener cabled back: ‘Are you convinced that with immediate reinforcements to the extent you mention you could force the Kilid Bahr position and thus finish the Dardanelles operations?’ Hamilton replied: ‘I believe the reinforcements asked for … will eventually enable me to take Kilid Bahr and will assuredly expedite the decision.’3 On 7 June Hamilton’s request for reinforcements to ‘finish the job’ was approved. This decision meant that Hamilton would now receive the 10th, 11th and 13th Divisions. A week later the 53rd and 54th Territorial Divisions were added to the list.4 There was no room for these reinforcements on the peninsula so Hamilton would have to station them on the neighbouring islands of Lemnos, Imbros and Tenedos. He intended to ‘keep the bulk of them on the islands, so as to throw them unexpectedly against some key position which is not prepared for defence’.5 Hamilton could now ‘think big’ but with this came another problem: where should these troops be used? He had only two serious options: Helles or Anzac.

At Helles there was only one way to manoeuvre – head on – and previous attacks by the British commander General Hunter-Weston had been spectacularly and tragically unsuccessful. Indeed, not short of what might be called enthusiastic mismanagement, Hunter-Bunter (as his men called him) had, since the first day of the landing, ordered numerous bloody and futile ad hoc suicidal charges in broad daylight against the Turkish lines.

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p r e pa r ati o n

Three days after the landings at Helles, the First Battle of Krithia began with 8000 British and 5000 French troops thrown forward from their toehold at the bottom of the peninsula. Krithia was a small village that lay below the foothills of Achi Baba and had been a first-day objective. They briefly captured the high ground just forward of the beaches, although still well short of Krithia itself. A Turkish counter-attack resulted in the troops being forced back, the British and French collectively suffering 3000 casualties. Captain Farmar of the 86th Brigade later recalled: Both sides were now firing at the wood, and nothing could be seen of the British, everyone had gone back … It took more than a month and many lives to regain the ground which was ours on this day, and all of this time the Turks were digging and transforming the slopes of Krithia into the outworks of the Achi Baba stronghold.6

On 1 May the Turks responded with a massive attack of their own against the Helles garrison. The attack went forward, achieving nothing except shattering eight Turkish battalions, and any ground momentarily gained was lost in a British and French counter-attack, which resulted in another 3000 Allied casualties. At the end of the affair both sides licked their wounds in the same trenches they had occupied before the attacks. May 6–8 witnessed another pointless and mismanaged affair by Hunter-Weston known as the Second Battle of Krithia. This attack not only included British and French troops but also men from the Australian 2nd Brigade and the New Zealand Brigade brought down from Anzac. As later recorded by the official war correspondent for the Times, Ashmead-Bartlett: The Australians, with the New Zealanders, advanced over coverless ground, facing a tornado of bullets, and being enfiladed by a machine gun from the right, which our artillery was unable to repress. The manner in which the Australians went forward

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will never be forgotten by those who witnessed it. They advanced steadily … sometimes doubling, sometimes walking. They melted away under the dreadful fusillade, but their reserves filled the gaps till the point was reached beyond which it was impossible to advance. In the circumstances, they lay down and attempted to reply to the enemy’s concealed fire. Then they entrenched themselves where they lay … It was obvious that Krithia could not be taken by direct assault.7

This offensive resulted in around 7000 more casualties with little to show for it except a slight ‘straightening’ of the line – nowhere had the Allies gained more than 600 metres. The Turkish casualties were probably of a similar number, but they still held the high ground while the Allies remained boxed in and deprived of achieving any of their objectives. While it was clear to Ashmead-Bartlett and just about everyone else that such head-on attacks in broad daylight were pointless, it would never occur to Hunter-Weston who for another two months insisted on mounting frontal assaults in broad daylight.8 Indeed, on 4 June he launched another massive and bloody attack against Krithia. This attack included 30 000 British and French troops. As recalled by Able Seaman Macmillan of the Royal Naval Division: Maintaining a steady double, we soon reached Achi Baba Nullah … Here the scene beggared description. The Turks did not seem to be taking any notice of our battery on the Nullah’s edge. They knew that our reinforcements would pass that way and they blasted the place with high explosive shells. We were now part of a long line which kept running on. As we ran, man after man was brought to the ground and we had to jump over their bodies. On each flank streams of our wounded were making for the rear in a pitiable plight. Some were falling exhausted and there was none to help.9

It didn’t stop here. Another three major attacks were launched between

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21 June and 12 July. The total cost of this butcher’s bill amounted to around 13 000 additional casualties. The latter two attacks were particularly gruesome affairs. On 28 June the already battered and exhausted 29th Division supported by a brigade from the newly arrived 52nd Division fought its way up Gully Ravine resulting in around 4000 British casualties.10 Private William Begbie of the 7th Royal Scouts later recalled: [After] a short halt during which the supporting waves closed up, the advance on the final objective was begun. By this time the Turks … delivered such a terrific fire that our Company fell in bundles. Halfway across Major Sanderson dropped and Captain Dawson and Lieutenant Thomson were killed as they neared their goal. By now men were falling on my left and right. I then felt as if a horse had kicked my right thigh. I felt and when I got up I had no feeling in my leg so I fell again. When I felt where the pain was I saw my hand was covered with blood. When I started to move I heard bullets striking the ground. I lay still. I did not feel very much pain, but the sun high in the sky threw down intense heat on the sand, which was crawling with insects of every shape and size. The worst thing was the craving for water – mouths were so parched by heat and sand that tongues swelled. From the time we left our trench the enemy bombarded us with everything they had. When I fell for the second time I must have turned my arm because I found I was lying on my rifle with the butt about a foot from the front of my head. I was wondering what would be the best thing to do when I felt the rifle rocking and when I looked up I saw the butt had a piece of shrapnel embedded in it. I turned around and crawled back passing men of our Company, some dead, and some with ghastly wounds were obviously dying.11

On 12 July Hunter-Weston committed the remainder of the 52nd Division into a pointless attack to capture the Turkish trenches east of Seddel-Bahr-Krithia Road – the division was all but destroyed as a fighting

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force with one man in three either killed or wounded.12 Yet again, Krithia lay well behind the Turkish lines. At this point Hamilton finally decided to stop paying the butcher’s bill at Helles, although if Hunter-Weston had had his way he would have kept ‘pushing on’. Indeed, just after one of these pointless assaults General Paris, commander of the Royal Naval Division, was bitterly counting the number of dead from his division in terms of thousands. He turned to Hunter-Weston and asked about the casualties suffered by the 29th Division. Hunter-Weston’s ambivalent reply was: ‘Casualties, what do I care for casualties?’ Fortunately for the troops under his command at Gallipoli, Hunter-Weston also became a casualty of the Dardanelles, not by enemy fire but through illness. In late July he, along with his golf clubs and his two lounge chairs, was evacuated from the peninsula, never to return.13 He would, however, soon reappear on the Western Front having learnt nothing from his experiences or failures at Gallipoli. It is not reported whether his golf clubs and furniture accompanied him to France.

Hamilton came to the conclusion that attempting a break-out from Helles was impossible: there was no way that the assigned reinforcements could effectively be used in the confines at the tip of the peninsula. Recent reconnaissance, however, had shown that the Turks were concentrating their reserves at Helles, leaving the Sari Bair sector just north of Anzac lightly defended. The Turks realistically considered that the tortuous nature of its terrain made any attempt to capture the northern heights from the beaches below impossible. Thus an element of surprise presented itself, which was crucial for a successful allied attack.

At Anzac, a number of attacks and counter-attacks had taken place during late April and early May, although an all-out effort to break out

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had not been attempted since the failures of the first day. The Anzacs were too busy just trying to cling to the beach head established. On the second day of the invasion, 26 April 1915, the Australians positioned along 400 Plateau were ordered to conduct a limited advance to straighten out their front line. Somehow the orders were misinterpreted and men along the southern half of the plateau advanced obliquely, with Australians on their left and Turks on their right. The men captured Lone Pine and moved on towards Johnston’s Jolly, but the Turkish enfilade was too severe and the men were forced back to their original lines. The misinterpretation resulted in hundreds of casualties.14 On 2 May the Australian 4th Brigade and the New Zealand Brigade were assigned the task of attacking Mortar Ridge, running off Baby 700 into the valley below and in front of the Anzac position along Second Ridge. The troops, after capturing the ridge, were to push on up the spur and capture Baby 700 above. The Australians charged into a storm of bullet and shell. The New Zealanders arrived too late to affect the outcome but were still pushed into the attack. At the end of the fighting nothing had been achieved except a body count in the hundreds. Two days later on 4 May men of the Australian 11th Battalion under the command of Captain Leane attempted a reconnaissance mission in force against the fortified position of Gaba Tepe, south of Anzac. The capture of Gaba Tepe had been one of the first day’s objectives but on landing too far north its capture had been relegated to history. This landing had shades of 25 April all over again; indeed the men who volunteered for the mission had been among the first to land at Gallipoli the week before. Now they approached by boat just as dawn was breaking and were met with intense machine-gun fire before reaching the beach. The survivors who made it ashore took cover against a low embankment. There was no way forward. Individually or in groups of twos or threes men tried to make their way back to the Anzac lines as best they could by crawling through the wire and hugging the scrub and embankments leading north. The Turks allowed the Royal Navy to land some boats 8

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and withdraw the dead and wounded from the beach – holding their fire while this was done.15 The Turks had conducted a series of piecemeal attacks against the enemy lines that had failed to penetrate any of the Anzac positions; what they did achieve was suffering over 14 000 casualties. With the arrival of the Turkish 2nd Division at Anzac in mid-May, it was decided that the time had come for a concentrated all-out attack that would finally throw the enemy back into the sea. On 18 May reports spread among the Anzacs that ‘something was up’. The continued Turkish rifle and machine-gun fire of the past three weeks had suddenly ceased. Soon word reached the troops that airmen had observed newly arrived Turkish reinforcements massed in the valleys just behind the Turkish lines. It was clear from the Anzac leadership down that the next day would see a Turkish attack against their lines – but at which point? At 3  am the Anzacs were waiting on the firing steps of the trenches after having spent most of the night preparing their positions for the expected attack. Twenty minutes later, masses of Turks streamed across Legge Valley yelling ‘Allah – Allah’ with bugles and horns blaring; the Anzac’s reply: ‘Come on you bastards.’ They came over in two great waves from their trenches, great hulking masses shouting ‘Allah’ and blowing trumpets, whistling and shouting like schoolboys. As they got closer within nice rifle range we had the order to fire. We opened with rapid fire and brought them down in hundreds. Hundreds fell. The attack slackened off and they got back to their trenches. I should think when the attack was over there would be anything from 2000 to 3000 dead or dying in front of our brigade.16

It was essentially all over by 5  am. The Turks suffered around 10 000 casualties, at least 3000 of whom were killed. Anzac casualties were around 600 – one of them was Jack Simpson Kirkpatrick, the ‘man with the donkey’. As Simpson arrived to carry a wounded Anzac down to the

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beach, he heard a strange sound coming from over the other side of the ridge; he could hear it even above the din of machine-gun and rifle fire. ‘That’s right mate’, a nearby soldier nodded to him, ‘they’ve [the Turks] got a flamin’ brass band out there. Been playing for hours. Wouldn’t have believed it if I hadn’t heard it with me own flaming ears.’ Simpson replied in his thick British Tyneside accent: ‘Well Aa hear it [and] Aa still divint believe it.’17 Simpson was heading down the valley with the wounded soldier on the back of his donkey, Duffy, when a warning voice called out from the side of the track: ‘Watch out for that machine-gunner. He’s got a couple of blokes here this morning already.’ Simpson waved him off in acknowledgment. Moments later, ‘the force of the bullet picked him up and carried him like a massive punch in the back. He ended up face down in the dirt. The donkey, frightened away at first by the firing, came back, and stood near its master.’18 Simpson was dead. A major problem with the Turkish offensive was that the attack was launched against the whole Anzac line instead of focusing on just one or two tactical points. As such, the Turks were never strong enough at any one point to succeed in breaking through, although at a few positions they came close. Lance Corporal Albert Jacka was awarded Australia’s first Victoria Cross of the war when he single-handedly drove Turks out of Courtney’s Post. When the enemy broke into the front trenches Jacka climbed out into no-man’s-land in broad daylight and crept up behind the Turks. Without waiting he jumped into the trench and shot five dead and bayoneted another two. As his commanding officer approached, Jacka was having a well-earned smoko. ‘Well, I managed to get the beggars, sir.’19 Quinn’s Post, just north of Courtney’s, was also in danger of being overwhelmed: There was one, he came over bawling some Moslem phrases and he was shot by me and the fellow next to me – two or three shots at the same time – he came through practically on top of my bayonet, right on top of me. He was a very big man and none of us could lift him out. He was too heavy to lift three feet while you

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kept down out of fire. Literally, I sat on that Turk for two days, ate my lunch sitting on him!20

The Turkish casualties were so great that there was a real risk of an epidemic breaking out due to the mass of rotting and stinking corpses strewn across no-man’s-land. Both sides agreed to an armistice to bury the dead on 24 May. It was the only official armistice ever to occur at Anzac. A British Intelligence officer, Captain Herbert, serving with the Anzacs later recorded his experience during the armistice. We mounted over a plateau and down through gullies filled with thyme, where there lay about 4000 Turkish dead. It was indescribable. One was grateful for the rain and the grey sky. A Turkish Red Crescent man came and gave me some antiseptic wool with scent in it … The Turkish captain with me said: ‘At this spectacle even the most gentle must feel savage, and the most savage, must weep’ … One saw the results of machine-gun fire very clearly; entire companies annihilated – not wounded, but killed, their heads doubled under them with the impetus of their rush and both hands clasping their bayonets … I talked to the Turks, one of whom pointed to the graves. ‘That’s politics,’ he said. Then he pointed to the dead bodies and said: ‘That’s diplomacy. God pity all of us poor soldiers …’ At 4 o’clock the Turks came to me for orders. I do not believe this could happen anywhere else. I retired their troops and ours, walking along the line. At 4.07 pm I retired the white-flag men, making them shake hands with our men … About a dozen Turks came out. I chaffed them, and said they would shoot me next day. They said, in horrified chorus: ‘God forbid!’ The Albanians laughed and cheered, and said: ‘We will never shoot you.’ Then the Australians began coming up, and said: ‘Goodbye, old chap; good luck!’ And the Turks said: ‘Smiling may you go and smiling come again.’21

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Fifteen minutes later both sides had withdrawn to their trenches, a single shot was fired and the war started all over again. A week later on 29 May the Turks tried to capture Quinn’s Post. They set off a mine under the firing line and succeeded in capturing a part of Quinn’s for a few hours at least. An Australian later recalled: ‘For a while it was hell … The enemy had blown up our first line of trenches and before anyone had time to do anything they were in it in dozens. They got into our bomb proofs which commanded the main road to the trenches and for some time held up all the reinforcements which were pouring up from the valley.’22 It was impossible, however, for the Turks to be reinforced and they were driven out by an Australian counter-attack by men of the 4th Brigade and a few light-horsemen. One of the Australians killed in this counter-attack was Captain Hugh Quinn for whom the post had previously been named. On 29 June the Turks launched their last major offensive at Anzac. Masses of Turks left their trenches at The Nek in an attempt to capture Russell’s Top; predictably the attack against one of the most heavily defended positions at Anzac failed. If any example or warning was needed that such attacks against heavily manned and fortified positions were doomed to failure, this attack should have been it. As recorded by Captain Austin of the 8th Light Horse Regiment: At a quarter of an hour after midnight the Turks sprang out of their trenches and made a fierce rush, but were immediately met with a withering fire. Their numbers must have been 1000 strong and in such a small area were tightly massed. Our hail of bullets wrought great execution and had the effect of making the line swerve to the left. This pressure forced those on the right into some of our secret saps where they were promptly accounted for by bayonets and bombs. A terrific din went and flares lit up the scene, making all as plain as day.23

It would be this same bottleneck that the troopers of the Australian

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Light Horse would charge across at dawn a month later in an attempt to capture The Nek but this attack would be in broad daylight and consist at any one time of a line of just 150 men. Indeed, after this bloodletting on 29 June the Turks recognised that these attacks were achieving nothing but a growing list of casualties. From that date the Turkish High Command decided on a defensive strategy. No longer would they try to push the Anzacs back into the sea: they would now sit back and let the enemy do all of the attacking; let them do all the dying in mass suicidal charges across the deadly killing field of no-man’s-land. Turkish trenches, barbed wire, machine guns and artillery now dominated the Anzac perimeter, with thousands of troops available to man the Turkish defences. Each Turk was armed with a rifle, bayonet and what seemed to the Anzacs an endless supply of those damned small but deadly cricket ball-like grenades. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, they were defending their homeland and they had a fighting spirit equal to the Australians and New Zealanders. Also the Turks didn’t need to break into the Anzac perimeter; the Anzacs had to break out. A month earlier Turkish Captain Mehmet Tevfik wrote to his parents.

Monday, May 31, 1915 Ariburnu To my beloved father and mother, Dear father, Beloved mother, During the first terrible battle I fought at Ariburnu [Anzac], a bullet grazed my right side and passed through my trousers. God be praised, I was spared. But, I do not hope to survive future battles in which I will fight. I am writing these lines so you will have something to remember me by. I thank God that he enabled me to become a soldier and reach this rank. You, as my parents, did all you could to raise me and

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make it possible for me to serve my country and my people. You are my heart, you are my soul, and you are the inspiration to my life. I am eternally grateful to God and to you. Beloved Father, dearest mother, I entrust my beloved wife Munevver, and my dear son Nezih, first to God and then to your protection. Please do for them whatever is possible. Please help my wife in raising my son and providing him with the necessary education. I know that we are not wealthy or people of means. So, I know I cannot ask for anything more than what is possible. To ask would be quite in vain. Please give the enclosed letter addressed to my wife into her own hands. She will be devastated, so please do what you can to console her grief. She will weep and mourn; please comfort her … Dear relatives, beloved friends and comrades, farewell to you all. All of you please bid me farewell and pray for my soul. I will pray for yours. Beloved father and mother, I eternally entrust you to God. Farewell. Your son Mehmet Tevik 24

Captain Tevik’s premonition came true a few weeks later.

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2 ‘T he most important p o i n t i n o u r d e fe n c e s and the most inade q u at e ly m a n n e d ’

Lieutenant General William Birdwood, commander of the Anzac force, and his chief of staff Lieutenant Colonel Skeen had since mid-May been planning a break-out from Anzac at the very point least expected by the Turks – the Sari Bair Range. As early as 30 May they had discussed their plans with Hamilton. The main thrust of Birdwood’s plan was a night advance from Anzac to capture the heights of Chunuk Bair. Following this would be the capture of Battleship Hill, Baby 700 and 400 Plateau. By the third day the Anzacs were to seize Third Ridge and then advance on a broad front to occupy Mal Tepe and Gaba Tepe.1 Birdwood estimated that one division would be sufficient to successfully carry out the offensive.2 Hamilton immediately saw the possibilities that this plan offered. He reported to Birdwood in mid-June that ‘I am gradually forming the conclusion in my mind that ANZAC is even more important – and immediately important – than it had appeared in my original concept … I will not put more on paper; it is too dangerous. But we must have a talk soon.’3 He wrote in his diary on 11 June: ‘… he [Birdwood] wants three new brigades; with them he engages to go through from bottom to top of Sari Bair. Well, I will give him four; perhaps five! Our whole scheme hinges on these crests of Sari Bair which dominate Anzac and 15

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Maidos, the Dardanelles and the Aegean.’4 Hamilton now turned to Birdwood and the Anzacs to spearhead an all-out attack, the first major Allied offensive at Anzac since the landing two months earlier – a break-out to the north, which would finally enable the Allies to dominate the peninsula. In order to assist the planned offensive, Hamilton had by 27 June decided to include the 9th Corps in a landing ten kilometres further north at Suvla Bay. The 9th Corps’ objective was to seize the semicircle of hills six kilometres inland – this was a secondary operation – the main break-out was slated for Anzac. The landing at Suvla would, however, not only help alleviate pressure along the Anzac front by drawing Turks away from that sector, it would also expand the area of operations, enabling larger numbers of troops to be landed for future operations.5 The landing at Suvla would also enable a secure base for the navy, which had, since the appearance of the German U-boat U21, forced the ships to evacuate their anchorage off the Gallipoli coastline and take up a new position within Mudros Harbour at the Greek island of Lemnos. In May the U21 had torpedoed and sunk the HMS Majestic and HMS Triumph; in response a torpedo net about a kilometre long had recently been obtained which would enable Mudros (or Suvla Bay) to be cordoned off from a submarine attack, rendering the navy relatively safe.6 Birdwood and staff set to work on drafting a detailed plan to break out of Anzac. Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Bauchop, commander of the New Zealand Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment, while stationed north of Anzac Cove noted in his diary on 12 July that Major General Walker and Lieutenant Colonel Skeen had been viewing the northern heights from his position: ‘From a chat in the trenches anticipate no early move; Staff Officers of Div ought to arrive to carry out landings-seizure of ground 971 and Baby always to the front. Skeen says he wants to go up in a balloon! Our work [of sapping forward] going on very quietly and surely.’7 Bauchop was not to know that within less than a month he and his men would be playing a major part in opening up the lower northern 16

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‘Th e m o st i m po rta nt po i nt i n o u r d e f e n c e s . . .’

heights for the attacking force in their attempts to take these very hills. For many, including Bauchop, it would be their last fight. The planned offensive marked a third phase in the Gallipoli Campaign. The first had been the landing itself, the second comprising Hamilton’s thrust from Helles had closed, and the third, an attack directed north of Anzac, was about to begin.8

Earlier, Major Percy Overton of the New Zealand Canterbury Mounted Rifles had confirmed that the northern heights just beyond Anzac were only lightly defended. I have been out on two occasions on reconnaissance outside our outposts and through the Turkish lines. The first time I took Corporal Denton and we had a great day together and gained a lot of valuable information for which General Godley thanked me. The last time I was out for two nights and a day and took Trooper McInnes and Corporal Young. We had a most exciting and interesting time dodging Turkish outposts. I was able from what I saw of the country to make a map and gain much information as to the movements of the Turks, and would not have missed the experience for the world.9

While it was reported that the ground was extremely rough and posed a difficult obstacle for manoeuvring, Overton found passable routes by which the heights could be approached. These were via three valleys, the Sazli Beit Dere, Chailak Dere and Aghyl Dere. These gave access to two major ridges, Rhododendron Spur and Damakjelik Bair, which themselves lay respectively below the summits of Chunuk Bair and Hill 971, although the more northern ridge called Abdel Rahman Bair would ultimately be slated for the approach to Hill 971. Indeed, Overton on one occasion was able to climb Rhododendron Spur, almost reaching the summit of Chunuk Bair, and confirmed that capturing this posi17

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tion would indeed place the Anzacs behind the main Turkish defences at Battleship Hill, Baby 700 and The Nek. Overton also reported that Hill 971 was not an isolated summit as previously thought but was also part of the Sari Bair Range and as such it would now become a key objective of the revised plan for the pending offensive.10 It was not only Major Overton who had conducted reconnaissance missions within this area. Sergeant Thomas McCarroll of the Auckland Mounted Rifles had often led small parties into and among the gullies and ridges of the lower inland slopes. Indeed, on one occasion the Turks had spotted them as they went out beyond No. 2 Outpost and needed the support of an Indian Mountain gun to cover their return back to the Anzac lines after dawn.11 While most of these patrols had been undetected by the Turks, some activity had been noted. This combined with unauthorised attempts by New Zealand commanders to capture the Turkish Old No. 3 Outpost (which lay like an island between the Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere) alerted the Turks to the possibility of an attack against their northern sector. To help lull the Turks back into a false sense of security regarding this sector, orders were issued that no activity was to be conducted there. It was believed that only five battalions of Turks occupied the area between Suvla Bay and the main area of the northern heights beyond the Anzac Sector.12 In reality, however, there were only three battalions, one squadron of cavalry and four batteries, totalling nineteen guns. This probably amounted to fewer than 3000 men spread over some considerable distance.13 In early July Birdwood produced his final plan for the Anzac Offensive. The main objective was to be the capture of the Sari Bair Range from Hill 971 in the north through to The Nek in the south. The original plan to push onto Third Ridge and Mal Tepe had now been dropped; their capture would now wait until a later date. To achieve the capture of the Sari Bair Range, four assaults at Anzac were planned, attacking distinct positions from different directions – the success of one dependent on the success of the others. The whole pack of cards would collapse 18

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‘Th e m o st i m po r ta nt po i nt i n o u r d e f e n c e s . . .’

if any of the attacks failed – timing, communications and coordination were everything.14 The element of surprise was crucial; Birdwood would launch his attack against the northern heights on the night of 6 August as the moon would not rise until about 10.30 pm.15 While optimistic of success, Birdwood was aware of the difficulties. It is quite possible, even with the Indian Brigade, I may not be able to effect all I want, as, though it looks like a tiny bit on the map, when you come to look at it from the coast, you realise what a great long stretch of montain [sic] it is, and even if I get it, it may be almost more than I can hold, for I fancy it would be sure to be attacked heavily.16

Most members of the Turkish High Command were confident that the only logical place for an all-out assault against their lines at Anzac was against the flat and relatively uncomplicated terrain to the south at Gaba Tepe. It was for this reason that the area immediately south of this headland was occupied by two Turkish divisions, along with an additional two regiments in reserve. Only the commander of the 19th Division, Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) seemed concerned that the enemy might attempt a break-out by attacking the northern heights, specifically Chunuk Bair and the poor excuse for a valley leading up to it, Sazli Beit Dere. The dere was more like a narrow gully choked in thick scrub; it was difficult by any stretch of the imagination to justify calling it a ‘valley’. Even so, Kemal seemed concerned that these heights beckoned to the enemy. To make matters worse, Sazli Beit Dere was the Turkish boundary separating the sectors under the direct command of Kemal south of the dere and German Lieutenant Colonel Wilmer to its north. The weakest point of any defensive line is the boundary of command and responsibility. Kemal tried to argue the point with Esat Pasa:

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DUZTEPE, 18 July 1915 To the Northern Group Commander Although it is known in the division that the southern boundary of the ANAFARTALAR area has been extended to include SAZLIDERE [Sazli Beit Dere], it is not known whether or not this is realised by Colonel WILMER who has recently been appointed to the command of the ANAFARTALAR area. It is requested that an order be issued clarifying the matter so that there may be no cause for misunderstanding between us and so as to be able to cooperate as the situation demands. Signed Col. M Kemal Commanding, 19th Division17

Major General Esat Pasa replied. 18 July 1915 To the 19th Division Commander The boundary between the two areas has previously been shown as SAZLIDERE and a liaison post stated as being found by your division at SAHINSIRT [Rhododendron Spur] to the north of SAZLIDERE. Little valleys like this cannot be inclusive or exclusive of either side. The southern slopes are in the 19th Division area, the northern slopes in the ANAFARTALAR area. The upper part of SAZLIDERE is within the area occupied by you. The mouth of the valley, on the other hand, is in enemy hands. The valley is the dividing line between the two areas and each area observe down the valley bottom. They can each maintain contact with the other … Signed ESAT, Commanding Northern Group18 20

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Kemal replied in detail the same day, with admirable insight adding that: ‘… the enemy could try a night assault by an assault group directed up SAZLIDERE onto KESKINTEPE, SAHINSIRT or further east onto CONKBAYIRI [main ridge including Chunuk Bair and Hill 971] … or while the whole 19th Division was fully occupied on the ARIBURNU front [Old Anzac], he could at any time move on CONKBAYIRI from the main SAZLIDERE direction … The small liaison and observation detachment at SAHINSIRT and to the west of it which would be exposed to such an enemy attack could get no help from the 19th Division’s reserve in the valleys to the south of DUZTEPE [Battleship Hill] … although the 19th Division will completely secure the south of SAZLIDERE it [cannot] secure SAZLIDERE itself … I consider it necessary not to regard SAZLIDERE as an imaginary dividing line, but to regard it as a valley suitable for the advance of small but bold reconnaissance parties building up for a main threat by which an assault group could advance without taking advantage of darkness. I consider that it should be made the responsibility of a commander who would clearly realise the importance of his task. A commander who will assume the task of protecting this valley and who will have sufficient reserves situated at CONKBAYIRI, AGIL [Aghyl Dere] and the head of CATLAKDERE [Chailak Dere].’19

The Major General and his chief of staff decided to see for themselves what all the fuss was about and they arrived at Kemal’s headquarters on Battleship Hill. Seeing this view the Chief of Staff of the Corps said, ‘Only raiding parties could cross this ground.’ The Corps Commander turned to me and said, ‘Where will the enemy come from?’

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Pointing with my hand in the direction of ARIBURNU along the whole shore as far as SUVLA. ‘From there’ I said. ‘Very well, suppose he does come from there, how will he advance?’ Again pointing towards ARIBURNU, I moved my hand in a semicircle towards KOCACIMENTEPE [northern heights]. ‘He will advance from here’, [pointing towards Sazli Beit Dere] I said. The Corps Commander smiled and patted my shoulder. ‘Don’t you worry, he can’t do it’, he said. Seeing that it was impossible for me to put over my point of view I felt it unnecessary to prolong the argument any further. I confined myself to saying, ‘God willing sir, things will turn out as you expect.’20

While Esat Pasa agreed to strengthen the lower slopes around Sazli Beit Dere, he refused to reinforce Chunuk Bair itself. Kemal later wrote bitterly: ‘the most important point in our defenses and the most inadequately manned’.21

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3 ‘… it hurts when one of t h e o l d h a n d s ge t h i t ’

General Birdwood was much liked and respected, not only by his officers but also by the Anzac rank and file. The same, however, could not be said for the commander whom Birdwood placed in charge of the northern break-out, Major General Sir Alexander Godley. Sir Alexander was the commander of the New Zealand and Australian Division and had been on loan from the British Army. While Godley could tolerate the New Zealanders, he detested the Australians and overall felt that his talents were being wasted – much better that he be put in charge of a British division. To make matters worse, while training the men in Egypt he had brought out his wife and, during an inspection parade, Lady Godley is alleged to have ‘ordered’ Sir Alexander to ‘Make ‘em run, Alex!’ Whether Godley obeyed his wife is unrecorded. Godley soon became known to his troops as ‘Make-‘em-run Alex’ and had little if any respect from his men.1 Indeed Lady Godley further ‘endeared’ herself and her husband to the men when later visiting the wounded troops in Egypt, where she is reported to have been agitated when the wounded refused to lie at attention when she entered the hospital wards. Given Godley’s performance in the forthcoming offensive, the men’s low opinion of him seems to be more then justified. While Godley’s headquarters during the offensive would be suitably located close to the area 23

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of operations at No. 2 Outpost, he would seldom if ever leave it except to embark on a destroyer to watch the battles from off shore, aided by a pair of binoculars and a picnic lunch.2

The plan for the offensive was complex and highly ambitious. The main offensive was to be undertaken in two separate areas. Firstly, Godley’s New Zealand and Australian Division, with the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade and a British and Indian brigade, were to break out of the Anzac beachhead on the night of 6–7 August and advance through the tangled and ravine-riddled country with the object of capturing Chunuk Bair, Hill Q and Hill 971. From Chunuk Bair, Godley’s New Zealanders were to advance down the range to Baby 700 and link up with an attack across The Nek at dawn on 7 August by troopers of the Australian Light Horse. Secondly, during the night of 6 August the British 9th Corps was to land at Suvla Bay around ten kilometres distant. These men were to seize the Chocolate and W Hills to help protect the left flank of Godley’s operation. In addition, several feints would be conducted along the Old Anzac line with the aim of drawing Turkish forces away from the main offensive. The first of these diversions was to be against Lone Pine on the evening of 6 August, followed by an attack against German Officers’ Trench at midnight and attacks from Quinn’s Post, Pope’s Hill, and the head of Monash Valley in the early morning hours of 7 August to assist the Australian Light Horse troopers’ attack against the bottleneck at The Nek.

The first attack of the offensive would be made by the 1st Brigade of Major General Walker’s 1st Australian Division against the Turkish trenches at Lone Pine along the southern part of the Anzac line. It was 24

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designed as a feint to draw Turkish reserves away from the northern heights. Walker and his staff argued strongly against this attack. It would undoubtedly result in a large number of casualties, and they believed it had little prospect of success, as all attacks to date had failed and all feints had been ‘shockingly expensive’.3 They argued that the best time to attack Lone Pine would be after the northern heights had been captured. Birdwood, however, insisted on this diversion before the main thrusts to the north as its objective was to keep the Turks tied down along his southern sector, away from the main attacks further north.4 Walker had only been in temporary command of the 1st Division and on 24 June Major General Legge took over command. Legge, however, was even more strongly opposed to the attack. Indeed Birdwood, perhaps fearing that his heart wasn’t in it, appointed Legge to command the 2nd Australian Division then being formed in Egypt. On 26 July Walker was reinstated as commander of the division. While he remained opposed to the Lone Pine attack he nonetheless committed all his energies into its planning. The attack would be launched from the Australian lines immediately opposite Lone Pine known as the Pimple. The defences here consisted of a single front-line trench with a number of communication saps running to the rear. There was simply no room for reserve trenches on the plateau as the front line was positioned close to its western edge. As such, it had been decided earlier to advance the Australian front line at the Pimple by constructing a secret underground firing line underneath no-man’s-land.5 This underground trench would now be used as the staging point for the first wave of the attack against Lone Pine. The secret underground trench ran generally parallel to the Turkish trenches at the Pine. Immediately to the front of this line a number of recesses were dug which, when the time came, would be opened up to create the firing step for the new advanced works. Lance Corporal Cyril Lawrence (2nd Field Company, Australian Engineers), who recorded in his diary a detailed and fascinating day-by-day account of his experience on the peninsula (and who would somehow survive Gallipoli and the 25

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Western Front) was working on one of these tunnels known as B5 and recorded in his diary on 1 July that: Our tunnel is still being driven ahead but today it was decided that a new firing line was to be formed along a front ninety feet in front of the firing line, and with this in view we started two tunnels running right and left on the ninety feet mark in the main B5 tunnel. I have charge of the tunnel running towards the left and have four infantrymen under me … The tunnel itself will be left covered, protecting the men in it from shrapnel and bombs – the only men exposed at all being those up in the firing recess observing. Today in the … tunnels these recesses were commenced. When this firing line is complete it will bring us nearer the enemy by ninety feet.6

The tunnels were also at this early stage used to provide some temporary relief to the men, as recorded by Iven Mackay of the 4th Battalion: ‘Those who served at Gallipoli will recall how cool these underground passages were and how they were used for rest and sleep or escape the plague of flies – at its height in July.’7 In front of the Turkish works at Lone Pine the Turks had constructed strong wire entanglements as well as trench head covers of pine logs to protect the men from shrapnel. An artillery bombardment was planned over a three-day period just before the attack to help destroy the wire and overhead covers. This bombardment was pitiful by Western Front standards, but judged against previous bombardments at Gallipoli it was impressive. It was to involve a slow rate of fire from 4–6 August. One of the batteries involved was allocated a ‘grand total’ of 125 shells for the three days: a combination of high explosive and shrapnel. This was to support the attack of a whole division. By comparison, a year later on the Western Front a trench raid by 60 Australians was supported by a number of batteries firing a preliminary bombardment of 3000 shells over a few hours.8 The ‘bombardment’ at Lone Pine was to be followed 26

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on the third and final day by an hour’s ‘intensive’ shelling by all available guns just before the infantry attack. This effectively amounted to eight guns focusing on Lone Pine, with around double that number shelling the flank and rear positions.9 Three-and-a-half hours after the infantry attack against Lone Pine had commenced, the landings at Suvla Bay, ten kilometres north of Anzac, would begin; the British 9th Corps was to land at 9 pm and occupy the surrounding hills to the north of Anzac known as Chocolate and W Hills. These hills had been of concern to the Anzac forces for some time as the Turks had established a number of artillery batteries there. Any attempt to take the northern heights, especially Hill 971, would be open to enfilade from these batteries so it was crucial that they be silenced. Once these hills had been taken, the British would link up with the Anzacs.10 Back at Anzac the main thrust towards the northern heights would have commenced. Initially, to protect the northern flank of Godley’s break-out, it was necessary to clear the ridge beyond Aghyl Dere known as Damakjelik Bair – Major General Cox was in overall command of this ‘left hook’ to the attack. The British brigades of the 13th Division, one of Kitchener’s New Army Divisions raised in the heady days of recruitment in late 1914, was to clear the lower hills of enemy troops before the attacking force went into action. The 4th Australian Brigade under the command of Colonel John Monash and Cox’s own 29th Indian Brigade as the attacking force were assigned the capture of Hill 971 and Hill Q. They were to advance along North Beach guided by Major Overton and some local guides. The troops would then make their way a kilometre up the Aghyl Dere where two of the four Australian battalions would be thrown out to its northern flank to form outposts guarding the approach. The rest of the men would continue the hard climb through the rough and tangled country until reaching its main fork, where two of the Gurkha battalions would continue up the dere to attack and occupy Hill Q. The rest of the Australians and Indians would continue north27

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The immediate objective of the August Offensive at Anzac was to capture the heights including the key positions Chunuk Bair, Hill Q and the highest point Hill 971 by the early hours of 7 August. Coverging attacks from the Australian Light Horse at The Nek and NewZealanders from Chunuk Bair would then capture Battleship Hill and Baby 700.

Objectives of the northern thrust against Anzac, 7 August

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east, climbing over Damakjelik Bair and then down into Asma Dere, before reaching Abdel Rahman Bair itself. From here they would advance another kilometre to capture Hill 971 – the highest peak of the range.11 This was a highly ambitious task to be undertaken through very broken and difficult uncharted country in darkness. At the same time that the Australian and Indian brigades would start their approach to Hill 971 and Hill Q , Godley’s New Zealanders and two battalions of Major General Shaw’s 13th New Army Division (the ‘right hook’ of the attack) were slated to begin their operation against Chunuk Bair, south of Hill Q. There is no doubt that the crucial objective of the whole offensive was the capture of Chunuk Bair and the heights south of it to link up with the Old Anzac positions at Russell’s Top. Old No. 3 Outpost would need to be captured before the assaulting troops could make their attempt to reach the summit. The capture of this post and other ‘bothersome’ Turkish outposts blocking immediate access to the northern heights was assigned to the New Zealand Mounted Rifles. It was estimated that the enemy would be cleared from the foothills by 11 pm. The way would then be open for the infantry to begin their approach to the northern heights. Three battalions would advance up Chailak Dere, while another battalion would advance along Sazli Beit Dere. They would join up on Rhododendron Spur and take Chunuk Bair.12 After the northern heights had been occupied, the Australian 3rd Light Horse Brigade would leave their trenches in front of The Nek at dawn on the morning of 7  August. The New Zealanders at this time should be advancing down the ridge in strength to attack Battleship Hill and Baby 700 from the rear. As stated in the 3rd Light Horse Brigade diary, our ‘force will advance to meet the forces approaching from the direction of CHUNUK BAIR [New Zealanders], and assist in the operations involving an advance down the spurs to the East of BATTLESHIP HILL and the consequent and necessary clearing of the ground East of our present position’.13

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As the main attacking force against the northern summits was getting away just before midnight, another diversion would be launched against German Officers’  Trench to the south. It was hoped that the capture of this position would assist in capturing The Nek as well as assisting any subsequent attack against Johnston’s Jolly. Earlier Birdwood had wanted the attack at Lone Pine to include an attack against the Jolly but Walker argued against this plan – his already fatigued and depleted division could not hope to have any reasonable prospect of capturing the whole plateau. Indeed, Johnston’s Jolly was thought to be even more heavily fortified than Lone Pine. Walker had argued that an attack against the Jolly ‘would require another brigade, which was not available’.14 He also argued that if German Officers’ Trench could be captured along with Lone Pine, a later attack against the Jolly could be achieved with reduced effort and far fewer casualties.15 While agreeing, Birdwood did not completely rule out an attack against Johnston’s Jolly on the first day of the offensive if the attack against Lone Pine failed. Additional feints to assist the attack against The Nek would be launched from Quinn’s Post against Turkish Quinn’s, Pope’s Hill against the Chessboard, and from the head of Monash Valley against the area between The Nek and the Chessboard. The attacks from Quinn’s and Pope’s Hill would be launched at the same time as the troopers charged The Nek – 4.30 am, while the attack from Monash Valley was scheduled to occur once the first-line trenches at The Nek had been captured.

If this offensive was successful, the capture of the heights would theoretically enable the Anzac and British artillery to dominate the Turkish guns currently barring the French and British fleets from the straits. It would prevent the Turks from using the Dardanelles as a means of transportation, effectively cutting communications north and south, starving

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the southern Turkish force of men and supplies. It was an ambitious and very complex plan relying on coordinated timing and equal degrees of advance from the different avenues of assault. It was ambitious given that there was little information regarding the lay of the land that was to be negotiated. A number of other factors mitigated against success even at the planning stage. No-one seems to have been concerned that the very rough-and-tumble nature of the terrain would seriously impede the progress of even the most fit, lightly equipped men in daylight, let alone sick and fatigued men carrying rifles, machine guns, ammunition, tools, water and all manner of equipment in near-total darkness. The country which these columns of men would have to traverse has been described as: … mad country. Watercourses change direction, seemingly gentle slopes conceal a precipitous and treacherous surface under the scrub, there is no method in anything … One ravine is very much like another, the levels are all wrong, and without a compass or the summits to guide one, it is surprisingly easy to scale a tortuous ravine only to find oneself farther away from the summit than one began.16

For the 4th Australian Brigade and the Indian Brigade, which had the furthest to advance within a very tight time frame, this was a major obstacle they had to overcome. Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, on first hearing of the intended offensive in mid-July, stated that he was ‘filled with alarm’ and that ‘to me it is an utterly impracticable operation of war … which will only lead to fresh reverses and enormous losses. I have never heard of troops being asked to perform such a strange feat of arms before … How can the Australians successfully debouch from … Anzac and storm these hills?’17

Not that the Turks had it easy. Colonel Kannengiesser of the Turkish 9th

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Division later wrote regarding his men that: … rice and meat are a luxury for him. The emergency ration, if there is one at all, consists of a slice of bread and some olives, the latter wrapped in the corner of a rather dubious looking handkerchief. In the morning he has gruel, late in the afternoon he has another soup, sometimes with meat, but always with oil. His basic dish is Bulgur … squashed wheat cooked mostly in rancid oil and served cold … Clothing of the troops was incredible … summer and winter cloth mixed colorfully, torn and tattered. Footwear was quite varied, often only a piece of hide held together by string. Often string had to replace leather in relation to equipment.18

Even so, the Anzacs were worse off overall than their Turkish counterparts. Since day one they had little chance of getting fresh food or any rest away from the front lines. They were always within close proximity to the stinking, rotting corpses that lay just beyond their trenches in no-man’sland. Congregations of flies and the maggots seemingly brought the dead back to life as millions of the bloody things fed and reproduced in the rotting corpses, making them gently heave, and the escaping gas appearing to make them sigh. Men fired into the bloated corpse just to let the gas escape, rather than taking the risk of having the bodies explode, not necessarily from a hit by a Turkish shell, but from laying exposed for days on end under the heat of the sun. Corpses all too often instantaneously burst into flame or exploded, throwing the putrefying remains into the nearby trenches. Jacko could at least theoretically, if not always in reality, escape beyond Third Ridge for a break from this hell. The Anzacs had no chance of escape, only a ‘blighty’ would get you off the peninsula. ‘Light’ wounds, sickness and fatigue were merely to be tolerated – death meant you would never get off. First fatigue, then disease, took its toll on the men; soon it switched and diseases became the major factor followed by fatigue; by early August

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you couldn’t distinguish between the two. As recorded in the Official Australian Medical History: In June and July the troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula were swept by a wave of intestinal disease, predominately fly-borne; of which the nature and cause were only gradually recognised by the regimental and divisional staffs, and more slowly still by G.H.Q … A desire to retain slight cases at the front for military reasons increased the spread of infection, and when the nature and cause were realised the outbreak was beyond control. A flood of sick poured into the hospitals, the fighting ranks were gravely thinned and, when the crisis of the campaign arrived, a large percentage of the men who remained on duty were fit only for a short-lived effort … The history of disease at Anzac [was], indeed, in no small measure the history of the flies … their access to food and to latrines was, for the practical purposes of infection, unrestricted … the efforts to restrict the access of flies to excreta in the latrines [was ineffective]. Few latrines at Anzac were not exposed to direct or indirect fire, and many men were killed or wounded there. The plight of the unfortunate dysenteric, forced to relieve himself every half-hour or so, may be imagined … [the flies] fed from the same dish with general and private alike. The warmth that hatched the flies incubated the disease germs also. For lack of water, ‘dixies’ and mess-tins were unwashed. The life-cycle of the infecting agent was complete. Each infected man acted in turn as a fresh focus of disease, of which the indefinite spread was limited only by the resistance of the individuals exposed.19

General Hamilton’s director of medical services, Surgeon General Birrell, was determined to avoid the medical shambles of 25 April, where

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hundreds of men died from wounds that could have been treated if only there had been enough medics and hospital ships to attend to them. Birrell now drew up detailed plans for the speedy evacuation of the wounded. His plans enabled the removal of around 30 000 men from the Anzac and Suvla sectors over a three-day period. Hamilton, on receiving the plans, thought that Birrell was being overly pessimistic and ordered that his plans be revised down to accommodate 20 000 men. Birrell estimations were to prove much nearer the mark and Hamilton’s order assured that another medical shambles was in the making.20 His downsizing of the medical plans designed to alleviate as best as possible the suffering of his wounded has left history to judge his actions as inexcusable.

In July work began in constructing additional dugouts and shelters for the arrival of the twenty British reinforcing battalions at Anzac. They were to hide in the newly constructed earthworks during the daylight hours so that the Turks were not aware of the sudden influx of men, which amounted to around 25 000 troops, including large numbers of animals, guns and ammunition. Additional field dressing stations and headquarters were built. Work also increased on trying to complete the tunnels and subterranean firing line running out from the Pimple towards the Turkish works at Lone Pine.21 Later describing the preparations, Hamilton wrote in his dispatch: The local preparations reflect the greatest credit not only on General Birdwood and his staff but on the troops, who toiled like slaves to accumulate food, drink and munitions. The accommodation of the extra troops to be landed entailed immense work in pairing concealed bivouacs and making interior communications. The Australians and New Zealanders worked entirely at night without complaint. The efforts of these muchtired troops are as much to their credit as their heroism in the following battles.22

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Water was always at a premium at Gallipoli. There was never enough of it. A second-hand pump had been brought over from Egypt and installed. Pipes were laid leading to newly constructed storage tanks installed below the edge of Plugge’s Plateau, Walker’s Ridge and up the gullies behind the front lines of Second Ridge. The tanks had been hauled by troops up the slopes by parties of over a hundred men using drag-ropes and filled by pumping water from the lighters off the beach with the water having been sourced from Alexandria in Egypt. On 29 July the pumping began but unfortunately the engineers were never able to work out the intricacies of the temperamental machinery and it never completely performed as required.23 To make matters worse, sometimes the assigned water lighters failed to arrive and extra rations had to be urgently sourced from Tenedos. When one of these lighters again failed to arrive Birdwood was forced to telegraph Hamilton that ‘unless water-boats turn up immediately, shall have to abandon major part of programme for landing; have had to refuse to receive hay and forage tonight – all available men required for water fatigues; our wells have dried up and the pump is not working; 9000 men already on fatigues irrespective of sappers.’24 By the next day the pump was again working, but the lighter had still not arrived – Anzac was pumped dry. An ad-hoc system of getting water to Anzac was soon in place with supplies from Imbros. It was not long, however, before the pumping was again interrupted, this time by Turkish shelling of the beach. The water-lighter from Alexandria eventually arrived a week later on 5 August – it was a close-run thing. Even when water was available, most parts of Anzac still relied on fatigue parties making their way to the beach, waiting in a long line, pouring their rations into old petrol cans and then making the long and dangerous way back up to the firing line. The water was never clean and smelt and tasted of petrol. Some even reckoned that they could tell which brand of fuel the cans originally contained.25 Others thought it was unwise to light up a cigarette after having drunk from one. 35

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All of this activity was going on within an area of less then 200 hectares and at its deepest point the Anzac position was only 1000 metres from the beach. It soon became clear to the men at Anzac, if not the Turkish rank and file, that a big push was on. In mid-July Australian Sapper Carnell wrote in his diary: ‘I heard there were 25 000 troops on Imbros waiting for the move so that they can attack Hill 971.’26 Many of those now entrenched at Anzac; especially those veterans who had survived the landing of the 25th, were concerned that they had already pushed their luck too far. Charles Bean later wrote: On the tried, gaunt men who nine months before had left Australia and New Zealand with such enthusiasm and with visions of returning full of experience – to march through cheering crowds in their home towns, and regale their families with strange tales and “souvenirs” – on these troops this realisation [of the offensive] had a perceptible effect. On many there dawned for the first time the fact that for them the prospect of return was vanishing.27

Jack Turner (11th Battalion) wrote to his mother on 23 July: Things here are very much the same as when I wrote last week, except of course that some one or another is always getting hit and so one misses a familiar face for a while, perhaps forever. You know the few of the old platoon that are left are like brothers, and it hurts when one of the old hands get hit more than the new ones. Perhaps it should not do so, but it does … Now Mother I must close. Letters are supposed to be short ones, but this will suffice to let you know that I am well so far. Trust that all at home are well. With love to all, I will say again “au revoir”. From your loving son. JACK28 36

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Jack was killed a few weeks later in the Turkish attack to retake Leane’s Trench on 6 August, the first day of the offensive.

By mid-July the German General Liman von Sanders who commanded the defence of the Gallipoli Peninsula had heard rumours that the enemy were planning a new offensive. He did not know where or precisely when the offensive would begin but a report arrived via Salonika on 16 July that spoke of around 50 000 of the enemy now being stationed on Lemnos, with around 140 support and transport vessels at anchorage.29 He also received a communication from the chief of the general staff of the General Field Army based in Berlin: General Headquarters 22 July 1915. To the military attaché. From reports received here it seems probable that at the beginning of August a strong attack will be made on the Dardanelles, perhaps in connection with a landing in the Gulf of Saros (Xeros) or on the coast of Asia Minor. It will be well to economise ammunition. Sgd von Falkenhayn30

Von Sanders later recalled that there was also: … alarming news from Constantinople about an imminent new great landing … The adjutant of the military mission informed me from a reliable source that the success of this new enemy enterprise was counted on with certainty [and] that already windows were being rented in Pera Street for the entry of the British troops and that the British Embassy was being put in order

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and the beds newly covered. I merely replied that I requested him to order a window for me too in Pera Street.31

Von Sanders held the high ground around Anzac with three Turkish divisions (5th, 16th and 19th) amounting to around 20 000 rifles and 76 guns. Unknown to him, Birdwood would soon have around 37 000 rifles and 72 guns. Von Sanders ordered a number of reconnaissance flights to be conducted at both Anzac and Helles and from 31 July until 5 August he sent out aircraft in daily flights above Anzac, sometimes in the early dawn. Aircraft dropped bombs on Quinn’s Post and nearby positions along Second Ridge on several occasions, but the airmen returned with little if any worthwhile intelligence.32

Two weeks before the offensive, the Turks had begun to establish a position on Holly Ridge, soon to be known as the Turkish Despair Works. Holly Ridge, a major subsidiary spur running off Bolton’s Ridge, represented part of the southern flank of the Anzac position just south of 400 Plateau. Seeing an opportunity to further distract the Turks’ attention away from the northern heights, Birdwood agreed to an attack against the newly constructed Turkish position. This attack would be a prelude to the August Offensive a week later.

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4 ‘Poor devils must have b e e n t e rro r- s t r i cke n’

Running off 400 Plateau, Bolton’s Ridge follows the coastline, gently terminating within the Gaba Tepe plain just three kilometres away. Located on this ridge and just south of the area known as the Wheatfield was a complex series of trenches called Tasmania Post, dug along the inland spur of Holly Ridge. The veterans of the 3rd Brigade manning these trenches had been among the first to land on the beaches of Gallipoli on 25 April. The trenches were located on the crest of the ridge and those occupying the position could not see into the Valley of Despair just beyond. The Australians here had a short field of fire that extended only to the edge of the shallow slope – in all about 30 metres. A series of short tunnels had been driven out from the front lines towards the gully to help counter this blind spot. These were used as ‘bombing holes’ or listening posts and were partly protected by barbed-wire entanglements.1 Turkish troops could be heard at night scurrying unseen within the valley less then forty metres away. In mid-July it became evident that the Turks were up to something just below the Australian position. Lieutenant Colonel Hilmer-Smith (12th Battalion), on ordering that scrub to their front be cleared by burning, now observed a 100-metre long enemy trench whose parapet of mud brick and sandbags could now be seen from the Australian lines. 39

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On 21  July Hilmer-Smith passed on a request to his brigade commander, Colonel Sinclair-MacLagan, to capture and incorporate the Turkish works into his own position. Sinclair-MacLagan discussed the possibilities with Lieutenant General Birdwood who seized on the idea as it offered an opportunity for a demonstration that would force the Turkish commanders to focus their attention onto their southern sector. The attack against Turkish Despair Works was scheduled for 31 July – a week before the planned offensive. The position was to be taken by men of the 11th Battalion, who had just relieved the 12th Battalion at Tasmania Post.2 The 3rd Brigade orders for the attack stated that: An assault supported by artillery fire is to be made tonight [31/7/1915] on the enemy work known as TURKISH DESPAIR NORTH. The assault will be preceded by the exploding of mines in the mine saps running out from TASMANIA POST. The signal for the mines to be fired and [the] operation to commence will be a red flare burned for 15 (fifteen) seconds in the top of the old trenches in rear of TASMANIA POST. Time for signal is moonrise as seen from TASMANIA POST. The assault is to be carried out by the 11th Bn [Battalion] plus engineers details to both of whom special instructions have been issued. Howitzer shelling of the southern end of SNIPERS RIDGE for a length of about 60 yards … [and] shelling of new enemy trenches on the low range … ENE [east north-east] of TURKISH DESPAIR WORKS. During the later infantry assault against Turkish Despair itself a bombardment of shrapnel fire would focus on SNIPERS RIDGE; shrapnel fire down VALLEY OF DESPAIR; shrapnel fire on enemy forward trenches on HARRIS RIDGE + ECHELON TRENCHES; [and] shrapnel fire onto SNIPERS RIDGE N + LONESOME PINE.3

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The Pimple

400 Plateau

Brown’s Dip

Allah Gully

Cooee Gully

Silt Spur

Sniper’s Ridge

The Wheatfield

Bolton’s Ridge

Tasmania Post

Holly Ridge

Valley of Despair

Knife Edge

Turkish Despair Works Ryrie’s Post

Position of the Australian 3rd Brigade, defending the southern flank at Anzac along Bolton’s and Holly ridges on the night of 31 July

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The attack would be made by 200 men split into four parties under the command of Captain Leane. From north to south, each party would be led by Captain Jackson, Lieutenant Franklyn, Lieutenant Puckle and Captain Rockliff. A reserve force of two parties was to be positioned on each flank under the commands of Lieutenants Darnell and Potter. The attack itself would consist of two waves; the first would break into the trenches using rifles, bombs and bayonets, while the second would bring across sandbags and entrenching tools to help consolidate the position. To assist the attack, the 9th and 10th Battalions positioned further north along Bolton’s Ridge and the 7th Light Horse Regiment (2nd Light Horse Brigade) located south would provide suppressing fire. The orders stated that the 10th Battalion would provide ‘bursts of m’gun [machine gun] fire down VALLEY OF DESPAIR and on to the DESPAIR communication trenches’. The 9th Battalion would offer a ‘burst of rifle fire on E PINE RIDGE and SNIPERS RIDGE WORKS opposite 9th Battalion lines’. Finally a strong ‘demonstration by 2nd LH Brigade. The signal for opening fire will be at the opening of artillery fire.’4

Meanwhile, towards the end of July the local Turkish commanders were informed that a major offensive at Anzac was believed to be close and they were ordered to intensify their efforts to make ready their defences. The commander of the 16th Division, Rushdi Bey, ordered his men of the 48th Regiment on 27 July to urgently complete the Turkish Despair Works on Holly Ridge in anticipation of such an attack.5

As the moon began to rise on the night of the battle, the veterans of the 11th Battalion stood poised on the firing step. It was now around 10.30 pm. Like all others at Anzac, they were suffering from poor nutrition, lack of water, constant strain and sleep deprivation. In addition to this,

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most now suffered from dysentery and any other number of ailments. The red flare signalling the start of the attack went up from behind Tasmania Post and at the same time the engineers of the 3rd Field Company detonated the mines. Each of the flanking mines exploded but the two middle mines remained silent. For a split second Leane and his men remained on the firing step of Tasmania Post unsure of what to do. Leane and his men had no choice – they ‘scrambled from the trenches and flung themselves’ down the slopes of no-man’s-land towards the Turks.6 Leane, who was with Lieutenant Franklyn’s party, was halfway across when the southern of the two centre mines exploded to his right. Leane was ‘hit in the arm … and another large piece just missed my head but other than shaking up a few of the men the mine did no harm to us’.7 The fourth mine, which should have shattered the trench section to his front, remained silent – unknown to them it was a dud. As the men charged across the empty space of no-man’s-land, Turkish rifles and machine guns opened up, cutting down many. ‘Private Edwards “poor lad” was hit a few seconds after leaving the trench, while others found themselves tripped up by barbed wire just 10 yards from the Turkish trench. Billy Hungerford was “hit all over” by machine-gun bullets and killed, while James Waters died alongside him.’8 The Australian covering fire was able to suppress a great deal of the supporting Turkish response, although the machine guns of the 33rd Turkish Machine-gun Company located on the southern slopes of Lone Pine were turned against the Australians.9 Leane’s men lined the parapet of the trench, firing down into the enemy. The surviving Turks were ‘jabbering and scrambling, and staring up in an amazed manner’.10 The assigned bombers flung their bombs over the rear of the trench into the gully beyond. Private Roy Charman, on nearing the centre of the Turkish Despair works, saw a number of enemy bayonets in front and threw himself to the ground. Taking up a position with a clear view to one of the communication trenches leading down into the Valley of Despair, he proceeded to shoot any Turk that presented himself.11 It was not long before: 43

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a heap of their dead piled up in the gap and they had to get over them to get past with the result that the pile got larger and they had to drag them away to get past … They tried hard to locate me, which shouldn’t have been hard considering I am lying in full view about ten yards off and my rifle giving forth a sheet of flame in the moonlight every time I fired … The poor devils must have been terror-stricken at the least.12

There were a number of witnesses to Charman’s efforts that night and he was recommended for exposing ‘himself clear of all cover … and … in shooting some twenty of the enemy’.13 Within seconds the Australians jumped into the trench. Private Davies later reported that he and his mates had taken their section of the trench with the bayonet.14 The northern party of 50 men under the command of Captain Jackson crossed no-man’s-land to discover that they had overshot the length of trench, as it now petered out into a northern washaway. Some of Jackson’s men occupied the extreme left of the trench while others including Jackson found themselves in the southern part of the Wheatfield. Jackson’s working party failed to arrive and he sent Lance Corporal Taylor into the captured part of the trench to find out what had happened. ‘Only succeeded in getting some sandbags and tools, most of which were thrown into the washaway and had to be dived for by my men and myself.’15 Jackson then sent Taylor back to Tasmania Post to try and make contact with his lost party. They were not to know that most members of the working party were either dead or wounded in no-man’s-land and those that had made it to the Turkish works were taking cover behind its parapet. Sergeant Combs was with this group and later recalled that ‘the second lot had to go through a hell which it proved to be, for very few of us arrived there unhurt … [The] new captured trench was fairly full of our men, so some lay up on top of the trench keeping the enemy off with their counter-attack, while the remainder of our men set to work to build our parapet, and by jove we worked jolly hard.’16 As Taylor made his dash back to Tasmania Post, Jackson and his men 44

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began to dig rifle pits as best they could with the few tools at hand. Sergeant Richardson established an observation post on the extreme left. Soon fire from the 33rd Turkish Machine-gun Company began to target Jackson’s men in the Wheatfield. It was not long before about ‘half a dozen more diggers joined [them], they brought the total in his party [killed or wounded] up to about 12 men’.17 The same machine guns were also playing down the length of the northern part of the trench, but its deadly effect was soon countered by blocking the entrance with sandbags.18 Leane, believing that the northern and central parts of the trench were secure, began to move down the works to make contact with those to the south. He came across a small group of Australians attempting to construct fire steps on the reverse side of the trench. Unseen Turks, however, were picking them off one by one. Leane ordered Lance Corporal Smith to gain contact with the southern parties but Smith soon reported back to Leane that this part of the trench had been barricaded and was still full of Turks.19 The south-central party of Australians under the command of Lieutenant Puckle had been unable to clear the trench of these Turks. It was the mine in their sector that had exploded late and caught them crossing no-man’s-land, burying not only a number of Turks but also some of his own men. Most of Puckle’s survivors had become disorientated and jumped into the northern sector of the trench. The newly promoted lieutenant was killed, ‘riddled with bullets’, as were some of his men as they tried to capture the position.20 The explosion had also affected Puckle’s working party. Corporal McNamara who was in charge of this group found himself isolated and leapt into the enemy trench. To his left were large numbers of Turks; he moved down the southern passageway and came across a badly wounded cobber, Private Bertie Prentice. McNamara dressed his wounds as best as he could and ordered him back to Tasmania Post. This must have been a horrifying ordeal for Prentice who was now blind as a result of his wounds. McNamara continued on and found that the southern end of the trench was blocked, so he crawled up and over

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and found the continuation of the trench now being captured by the southern-most party led by Captain Rockliff. Rockliff and his men reached the southern end of the Works just as the surviving Turks were escaping down three communication trenches that led into the Valley of Despair. The Australians proceeded to dig ‘the few remaining Turks … out with the bayonet’ and scrambled in.21 They quickly began tearing down sandbags and bricks into the communication trenches. However, the Turks had not retreated down the full length of these saps and, no longer fearing another explosion, began to move back up in an attempt to retake their position.22 The barricading of the communication trenches had hardly begun when the Turks started throwing grenades into the main trench bay. It was not long before Rockliff ’s four bombers had exhausted their total supply of thirty-two percussion bombs. A box of jam-tin bombs was also to have been brought across with each working party but so far the box had not turned up. Rockliff called for the party’s machine gun to be set up to enfilade the communication trenches, but no sooner had Sergeant Wally Hallahan set up his machine gun when it was blown out of his hands by a Turkish bomb. The gun was completely wrecked and Hallahan seriously wounded. The machine-gun ammunition belts were quickly emptied to provide additional ammunition for the rifles. Just before reaching the Turkish trenches, one of the machine-gun ammunition carriers, Private Allison, had been hit in the head and he was last seen alive wandering dazed and aimlessly past the southern flank of the Turkish works. He was later seen laying dead in one of the communication trenches which had been full of Turks.23 Soon yells of ‘… “Turks on the left!”24 and “Turks are in a trench in the center and have split our line” were heard’.25 Large numbers of grenades were thrown at the Australians – the situation could not last long as casualties were mounting. It was at this point that Rockliff noticed just above the parapet (at what was now the rear of the trench) a box of ammunition and to his relief he found that it was in fact the box 46

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of jam-tin bombs. They were let loose at the Turks: ‘Clumsy though they were, their effect was decisive. The Australians threw one after another, the dust and smoke becoming so thick that there was some anxiety lest the enemy might creep round under cover of it and attack the trench from the rear.’26 This jam-tin bombing attack completely succeeded in driving the Turks far down the communication trenches and into the valley below. Rockliff and his men completed the work of blocking the communication saps. Rockliff now turned his attention to his northern flank. McNamara, who had previously crawled over to this section of trench, told him that this part of the line was not cut through to the rest of the trench by about four metres and that the continuation of the trench was still full of Turks. Indeed some of these Turks had crept out into no-man’s-land between Tasmania Post and the Turkish Despair Works and were firing into the backs of his men who were focusing on the gully to their front. Rockliff later reported that looking northwards he could see the ‘flashes of the enemy’s rifles, firing over the rear of the trench, and occasionally the Turkish uniforms lit up by flashes; farther north the Australian rifles in the opposite direction’.27 Independent messages from both Leane and Rockliff had by now arrived at battalion headquarters back along Bolton’s Ridge with the news that Turks were in no-man’s-land (i.e. between Tasmania Post and Turkish Despair Works) and that others were still occupying parts of the trench. Meanwhile, Leane decided that he was going to oust the Turks from the position himself. Lieutenant Franklyn and a dozen men were ordered to rush the Turks behind them in no-man’s-land and suppress their fire. In doing so, Rockliff ’s men, unaware of this attempt, continued to fire at the Turks to their rear and so inadvertently must have fired on Franklyn’s men. All that could be seen in the dark were red flashes of the rifle shots; there was no way of telling friend from foe. The attempt failed and Franklyn and his survivors were driven back to the northern part of the trench.28 47

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Signaller Boddington was with Rockliff ’s party and later recalled that he: was pumping lead into the Turks … when our captain gave me an electric torch and told me to signal the stretcher-bearers to come out for our wounded. As it was unlikely that anyone was on the lookout for morse signals from us and I was sure to have my hand shattered flashing a torch with the Turks so close, I suggested running the gauntlet. He agreed and I raced over getting merely a scratch over the right eye in the journey. I got back OK and later made another trip to say that he wanted bombs and machineguns sent out.29

Shortly after, the commander of the 11th Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Johnston, ordered Lieutenant Potter with his reserve platoon of 25 men located at Tasmania Post to oust the stubborn Turks. The condition of the trenches in the front firing line of Tasmania Post was in a shambles as wounded men were now coming in and medical assistants and stretcher-bearers were congesting the narrow passageways, making it difficult for Potter to launch his assault. These men on charging were guided to the Turks’ position by a small burning pine tree behind that part of trench still full of Turks. The charge was met with heavy fire and eight of the fifteen with Sergeant Ringwood were hit before reaching the trench. Ringwood’s survivors could not possibly capture the position and still more were killed and wounded in the attempt. Only a few could make their way to the northern part of the trench occupied by Leane and his men.30 By now Signaller Boddington had made a number of additional trips across the southern part of no-man’s-land. Having made three trips safely, I suppose I got careless of my direction going back until I was brought to my senses by cries of ‘Allah Allah’ right under my nose. I looked up and nearly died of fright to see I had run within five yards of the wrong trench

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packed with Turks with fixed bayonets. It occurred much quicker than I can write. I saw a chap just in front of me throw up his rifle to fire and not having time to fire myself just threw my rifle at him to put him off his aim. However, his shot bowled me over like a skittle and … I lay very still to pretend I was killed but kept a good watch on them out of the corner of my eye. After a few minutes I saw another poor mug making the same mistake as myself and … gave a yell to warn him and broke all records for our own trench.31

Meanwhile a supply of jam-tin bombs had reached Leane’s position. Within minutes the Australians were throwing the clumsy but effective bombs. In the confined space the results on human flesh and bone were devastating. The attackers tore down the barricade, while others stood above the parapet firing down into the Turks: ‘… every opportunity was given to them to surrender but they ‘refused’ and fell fighting as the brave men that they undoubtedly were … We found a number of our own dead when we drove the Turks out.’32 It was now around 11.45 pm and the length of trench had finally been taken. Three of the four tunnels – excluding the tunnel containing the unexploded mine – were now being cleared and expanded to act as communication tunnels to connect Tasmania Post to Turkish Despair Works. Lieutenant Croker of the 3rd Engineers was supervising this work. The tunnels would not be completed until after daylight and during the rest of the night men had to traverse in the open. Corporal Bernie Walther, after the wounding of Sergeant Hallahan, now found himself in charge of the machine-gun section and just after midnight he was ordered forward with the No. 2 Gun to help defend the newly captured works. Walther and three men dashed down what had been no-man’s-land and prepared a gun pit in the captured trench. After this the machine gun and equipment were brought over, taking several trips: ‘… soon had the gun and all equipment in order. Let go half a dozen belts to the joy of our boys and demoralisation of the Turks.’33 49

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By 1.30 am the gap in the trench that had separated Rockliff ’s party from the rest of the Australians had been dug through and within two hours the trench was ‘passable and defensible’.34 As this was going on, Captain Brennan, medical officer of the 11th Battalion, and his men at great personal risk were attending to the wounded in the trenches as well as in no-man’s-land. Work continued all night in constructing traverse bends against enfilade with well-recessed fire bays between, making fire steps and loopholes, deepening the trench and dismantling the former parapet and setting it up on top of the eastern wall, which now represented the Australian front line. The Turkish trench was ‘on the edge of a drop, so we pushed the dead Turks over and let them fall down to where their own mates could bury them’.35 Sergeant Louch and others realised that at first light the Turkish artillery would focus on the newly captured works: ‘… instead of improving the Turkish trench I urged my party … to dig fire bays which would give shelter from the bombardment when it came. This meant more and harder work, but it was worth it.’36 With daylight came the expected Turkish artillery barrage. The men were worn out with strain, absence of sleep, and heavy labour; when at dawn the Olive Grove batteries opened strongly upon the post with high-explosive, they were subjected to a severe trial of their nerve. Again and again the parapet was blown in. Part of the garrison was accordingly withdrawn into the tunnels, and most of the Wheatfield party was brought into the trench.37

Leane and many others were wounded: ‘… stopped to speak to an observer and a shell struck him, taking off his head. I was wounded in the head and face and my observer Lance Corporal Smith in the face.’38 Walther and his machine-gun team had earlier constructed a wellbuilt gun emplacement with overhead cover; within an hour of being completed it was hit by a shell. Fortunately this did not damage the gun, which had been dismantled at dawn as a precaution against the antici50

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pated bombardment. At 5.30 am the bombardment ceased, but no Turkish counter-attack followed.

On the evening of 1 August a company from the 12th Battalion relieved the men of the 11th Battalion in the captured Turkish Despair Works, now called ‘Leane’s Trench’ by the Australians. The fight to keep the Turkish command’s attention focused to the south had cost the lives of 36 Western Australians of the 11th Battalion and left a further 73 seriously wounded. On the Turkish side the losses of the 48th Regiment were even worse and while the exact numbers remain unknown it was said that only 90 men out of around 250 answered their names the next morning.39

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5 ‘All hands were busy s h a r p e n i n g b ayo n e t s ’

Birdwood was pleased with the successful attack against Leane’s Trench and was keen to carry out another diversionary operation along his southern flank; he was anxious to keep the attention of the Turks ‘riveted there by a further feint’.1 It was decided that the best place to launch another attack was against the Turkish trench just south of Leane’s Trench, along Holly Ridge. This Turkish trench was opposite the 7th Light Horse Regiment’s trenches known as Ryrie’s Trench separated by 30 metres of no-man’s-land. Birdwood gave orders that the 1st Division was to take these trenches on 5 August – the night before the offensive.2 Major General Walker and Lieutenant Colonel White (Walker’s chief of staff) were both reluctant to attack this position. It would be more difficult than the attack against Leane’s Trench as it was positioned on a lower and more exposed part of the spur and would be strongly covered by Turkish fire. However, they passed the orders down to Colonel Ryrie of the Light Horse. Ryrie referred them to Major Clogstoun who was commander of the 3rd Field Company, and was mostly responsible for the defences at the southern flank of Anzac and would be in charge of tunnelling towards the Turkish works from Ryrie’s Trench. Clogstoun, however, was concerned there was no time to dig the required tunnels by the nominated date of the attack and even so it would be impossible

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for any party that captured the position to hold it, given that the Turks looked down into the trench and could pour concentrated fire into it. Ryrie passed this information up the line, adding his own concerns. This would have been of no surprise to Walker, who had already indicated that he was reluctant to carry out the attack; the order to do so was subsequently cancelled.3 Birdwood was still keen, however, to make sure that the Turks’ full attention was focused to the south. He ordered that on the night before the offensive troopers from the 2nd Light Horse Brigade (7th Regiment) would conduct a raid in force against the Balkan Gun Pitts, located south of the Anzac flank along Harris Ridge, a continuation of Bolton’s Ridge. It was later rescheduled for 6 August, but before this raid could commence events would overtake Birdwood’s plan.4

On 2 August the officers who were to lead the attacks against Hills Q and 971 were taken aboard a destroyer so that they could see for themselves the lay of the land above North Beach. For the first time most gazed upon the steep hills and washaways from the sea using binoculars, bringing into focus the enormity of the task. They were also for the first time briefed on their objectives. The immediate reaction by most was disbelief. British Major Allanson of the Gurkhas was present and later recalled: ‘the more the plan was detailed as the time got nearer the less I liked it, especially as in my own regiment there were four officers out of seven who had never done a night march in their lives’.5 Between the nights of 2 and 4 August the British 38th, 39th and 40th Brigades, totalling around 12 000 men, landed with their divisional commander Major General Shaw and staff. On the night of the 4th two battalions of the 40th Brigade were guided up to bivouacs at Russell’s Top and Monash Valley. The other two battalions of this brigade were already taking shelter to the south in White’s Valley just behind 400 Plateau. The four battalions of the 38th Brigade were taken to Victoria Gully and Bridges’ Road – also behind 400 Plateau – while the 39th Brigade was

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positioned further north in Rest Gully. On the night of 5 August the British 29th Brigade and the Indian 29th Brigade were also stepping ashore. The British brigade was positioned with the 38th Brigade at Bridges’ Road before dawn. The Indian brigade was still landing, however, as dawn broke and the Turks opened with a heavy bombardment of the beach. Most of the Indians made it safely ashore and bivouacked in Reserve Gully. During these same few days around 4000 Anzac reinforcements also arrived from Egypt. Within the small confines of Anzac, which was not fit for a herd of mountain goats, were now 37 000 men.6 Beach masters and military landing officers disembarked the New Army troops assigned to the Anzac sector. Meanwhile, those Anzacs who had already suffered three months on the peninsula and now represented a depleted and exhausted bunch of veterans looked on the new arrivals in wonderment – had they ever looked so young, fresh and well fed? The ambitions of civil life had been given up; men’s keenness now was for the A.I.F [Australian Imperial Force] … Yet, as the hour for this later offensive approached, there did come over most Australian troops – even over the young infantry officers who knew that their chances of surviving three or four such battles was almost nil – keenness to make another stroke for the Allies’ success … So, as the appointed day, August 6, drew near, and young British troops in their pith helmets and cotton uniforms began to land by night and camp on the ledges, the Anzac sick parades diminished; men already evacuated tried to ‘desert’ back from ship, hospital or base; and few of the thin, much-tried garrison doubted that one more hard fight would bring them into control of the Narrows.7

The British journalist Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett reported that Anzac was always a pleasure to visit compared to Helles because ‘it is the one spot where the army has confidence in its general [Birdwood], who is immensely popular with the men’. He added that the Australians had

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just about shed all of their clothing, while the British Tommy (at Helles) carried around with him all his worldly goods, sitting in trenches with his pack on; it was extremely rare to find an Australian or New Zealander in anything more than a pair of shorts.8 While the Australian Light Horse had yet to be involved in any ‘serious’ fighting, they had suffered casualties from Turkish snipers, bombings, sickness and the odd ‘skirmish’. The troopers were keen to get at the Turk but there was disappointment when a few weeks before the offensive they were issued with infantry webbing and, while they accepted the reality that their horses had to remain in Egypt, they were not happy to surrender their most distinctive remaining status symbol – their ninety-round leather bandoliers.9

The Turkish High Command had been deeply troubled by the loss of Turkish Despair Works. It went against the principle of giving ground to the enemy. But while they now refused to launch all-out attacks to drive the enemy from their entrenchments, the Turkish commanders refused to give any additional ground to the enemy. Any position lost had to be retaken, regardless of the cost. The two company commanders of the 48th Regiment who were held responsible for the loss of the works were court-martialled, one being sentenced to death. A third volunteered to retake the trench and expressed his willingness in the event of failure to ‘allow the Turkish machine guns to be turned upon himself and his men’.10 He would be taken at his word. The Australian attack against the Turkish works was viewed by most of the Turkish senior officers as the first stage in an Anzac attack to the south and confirmed Esat Pasa’s belief that the Allied objective would almost certainly fall against his southern flank in the vicinity of Gaba Tepe. The Turks now turned their attention to recapturing the Despair Works and in the process regaining the initiative from the Anzac commanders. The Turkish attack was to be supported by artillery fire from Third Ridge and machine-gun fire from the Turkish 47th Regiment located

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further north on the heights of 400 Plateau and Snipers’ Ridge. In addition, the 77th Regiment and the reserves of the 48th Regiment who were not directly involved in the attack would offer covering fire against the Australian trenches on Bolton’s and Holly ridges. Indeed, the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Rushdi Bey to the men of the 48th Regiment stated in part that if the Turkish troops failed to stand firm or retreated the Turkish machine guns were to fire on them. The trench was to be initially destroyed by artillery fire overnight, and the infantry attack was to start at dawn on 6 August.11

On 4 August the first of the slow bombardments that were to ‘soften up’ Lone Pine had begun – it consisted of a total of just 24 high-explosive and 11 shrapnel shells. The infantry reported that the guns had ‘opened fire with lyddite on enemy’s wire entanglements on front of LONE PINE. Not much damage done so far as can be seen from our observation posts.’12 The next day an increased number of shrapnel shells were used, set to burst on percussion against the ground. This barrage was to continue until the wire entanglements were destroyed. The mission of cutting the wire at Lone Pine had been assigned to the 1st Battery of New Zealand Field Artillery positioned on Russell’s Top. An observation officer was stationed at the Pimple with a direct telephone line to the guns and helped direct their fire. By 3 pm he informed the gunners that most of the wire was now destroyed to the infantry’s satisfaction. During the night of 5 August, star shells were fired around Lone Pine to ensure that the Turks were unable to repair the damage. The night of 5 August was a busy one for everyone at Anzac. Not only were reinforcements still landing but the last stores were being hurried to their advance dumps close behind the points of the attacks. Elsewhere, officers and NCOs were studying plans and attending briefings while the troops who were to make the various attacks prepared themselves while also attempting to get at least some sleep. In the secret 56

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underground Australian galleries running out from the Pimple, engineers and men were removing the sandbags that had been used to buttress the roof of the subterranean recesses in no-man’s-land. The Australian attack from this advance trench against Lone Pine would lead the offensive at Anzac. The Victorians of the 2nd Brigade relieved those of the 1st from the Pimple, in order that the men from New South Wales might get some rest ‘out of the line’ before their attack. During this momentary rest the men were allowed the rare luxury of drinking as much water as they wanted. They were provided with a meal of boiled rice and tea supposedly flavoured with rum.13 They also had to sew onto the back of their shirt a square of white calico, and a broad white armlet on either arm to make it easier for the commanders at the rear as well as the artillery officers to identify their position. Captain Charles Duke of the 4th Battalion later recalled: All hands were busy sharpening bayonets, making slow matches to light jam-tin bombs, and sewing white patches on back and sleeves of tunics. To look back on Lone Pine now one can only wonder how it was possible to have emerged alive. My particular chum was Simpson … and we slept the night before Lone Pine in the dugout. Simpson was one of the gamest chaps I ever met, and if ever a chap had a premonition of death, he had it that night. I rallied him about it, but he knew that he was for it, and sure enough he was killed the next day.14

While all this activity was taking place, Ian Hamilton was penning a letter to British Prime Minister Asquith stating that his force was ‘on the brink of the unknown sure only that big events are coming up’.15 Meanwhile, at a conference on the eve of the offensive, Colonel John Monash, commander of the Australian 4th Brigade who, with the Indian Brigade, was charged with arguably the most difficult task of the offensive (attacks 57

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against Hill 971 and Hill Q) asked his medical officers whether his men were fit for the operation. Three of them thought that the majority were not, the fourth considered that, while they were unfit, any change from the present conditions would be welcome, and that the stimulus of active operations would call out reserve powers. This view, without doubt, reflected the situation. The men, though diseased and not fit, were capable of responding for a short time to a supreme stimulus.16

Lieutenant Colonel William Malone, the commanding officer of the Wellington Infantry Battalion that would eventually lead the attack against Chunuk Bair, wrote on 4  August: ‘We are to move out soon, round left flank … No movement all day 6th and go out on night with rest of brigade to take Chunuk Bair in a big combined movement against [Hill] 971, Koja Temen Tepe. We are pleased to be moving, but the men are rundown and the reinforcement men are in a big majority, so I am not too sanguine about what we can do.’17

At 6 pm on 5 August the Turkish Batteries along Third Ridge opened fire against Leane’s Trench. The night before, men of the 11th Battalion had again relieved those of the 12th Battalion. Among these men was Captain Rockliff who had originally been involved in the desperate fighting that captured the trench the week before. Also present were Australian reinforcements who had just landed from Egypt. Rockliff had carefully distributed the men alternatively, old soldier – replacement – old soldier – replacement. While the Turkish bombardment was one of the heaviest ever conducted at Anzac, the trajectory of most shells was too flat and the shells merely blew in the sandbag parapets. While Turkish artillery also enfiladed from the Olive Grove, its fire was not so heavy. An hour later when the bombardment ceased only two men had been 58

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wounded. Surprisingly to Rockliff no Turkish infantry attack followed.18 Rockliff ’s men started to repair the trench; all were concerned that the Turks might be quietly approaching their position from the valley below but the noise from the repair work made it difficult to hear. Rockliff ordered the men to stop work while he tried to detect any Turkish activity – all was quiet. It was not long before Captain Aarons relieved him at midnight and ordered the work to recommence.19 Meanwhile, the Turks of the 48th Regiment who were slated to retake the trench had begun to move out into the Valley of Despair. They needed to be in position before first light.

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PART 2

6 AUGUST 1915

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6 ‘Giving a leg i n t o e t e r n i t y ’

At first light on 6 August a Turk was heard to yell something from the valley below Leane’s Trench. With this, Australians opened fire while others threw a couple of jam-tin bombs into the valley. The Turks replied, lobbing their own grenades. Turkish rifle and machine-gun bullets tore into the newly reconstructed parapet and, unlike the bombardment of the night before, this barrage was effective. Combined with the Turkish grenades almost all the Australians in the southern part of the line, which bore the brunt of the attack, were killed or wounded. With the lifting of the artillery bombardment, the Turks positioned in the communication trenches scrambled over the barricades into the trench. In the fighting, Private ‘Combo’ Smith was forced into the southern communication tunnel connecting Leane’s Trench to Tasmania Post. He made his way to the Post and gathered a number of reinforcements and within seconds he and a number of men had moved back through the dark tunnel towards Leane’s Trench. Less than halfway through Smith and others heard the click of a rifle bolt along with Turkish ‘gibberish’. The Turks were in the tunnel. Combo and his mates took up a position to prevent the Turks penetrating any further.1 Meanwhile, other Australians from Tasmania Post were collected by Lieutenants Darnell, Morris and Robertson and sent over to Leane’s 62

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Trench using the central and northern communication tunnels. Morris later recalled: ‘When I got there … the Turks were right up to the edge of the parapet, and a few men had even got into the trench on the right.’2 Reinforcements found the trench in a shambles. [The] southern end of it was paved with killed and wounded. The bags on the parapet had been cut to ribbons by machine-gun fire, and the sand and gravel poured into the trench. To show a head above the parapet was certain death. The Turks, however, had only entered its southern end; another party was so close to its central sector that their bayonets could be seen above the parapet, as could their hands as they flung their bombs. The Australians had at this juncture only eight jam-tin grenades and no matches; an automatic cigarette lighter was obtained from Captain Boyd Aarons, and as the last of the bombs was flung, a further supply came to hand.3

A few Australians had taken a position close to one of the transverse bends in the trench and stopped the Turks as they tried pushing further up the line. Sergeant Wallish, a miner before the war, started to pull down any debris he could find to block the trench from the approaching Turks. Close by, the former geologist, Lieutenant Robertson, was killed. His cobber Lieutenant Morris later wrote that as ‘near as I can make out, he was hit in the head by a piece of bomb exploding in the trench; he then got up on the parapet and emptied his revolver into the oncoming enemy … From the time he jumped on to the parapet there was no hope for him, as Jacko was ‘raining’ bullets into us.’4 Wallish, although wounded, fought on until his leg was shattered by a Turkish grenade. Morris was in the thick of the fighting: My revolver was discarded very early in the fight and I used a rifle and bayonet afterwards. At one point a pick handle that I found in the trench came in very useful. At this point, in front of our parapet was a sheer drop for a short distance. Several of

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the enemy attempted to enter the trench by scaling the parapet and my trusty iron-shod pick handle did some good work … You cannot imagine what it is like to be running up and down a section of trench, trampling over dead bodies, with men beside you being blown to atoms, the tops of their heads blown off or both arms and feet missing. It is horrible … potting a Turk and then dodging down just in time to miss a bullet. Very often a man doesn’t dodge down quick enough and then he falls backwards.5 [Private Veitch] was holding the end of an enemy communication trench, and his rifle did some splendid work. All our boys were very cool about it … For about two hours it was a real bomb fight, the enemy bombs doing a lot of damage in our lines, while we were continually giving a leg into eternity … Each Turk seemed to be carrying a number of bombs – both of ‘cricket ball’ or ‘jam tin’ variety. They each had a striker attached to tunic.6

Aarons was soon wounded while trying to smother a Turkish grenade by throwing a blanket (and himself) over it; his wristwatch was shattered stopping at 5.45 am.7 Private Haslam recorded that the men in the trench: had a bad time. They were all very proud of their cook … Andy Graham … I hope he reads these few lines … and learns with what admiration his fellow fighters of the 11th Battalion regard him. While the battalion was fighting its hardest, Andy made some tea and carried it up to the fighting and distributed it to the many wounded and dying pals about – and there were many. He went back for more, and on his return a shell fell near him and buried two soldiers. He put down his tea, and worked until he nearly dropped to extricate the poor unfortunates. He did get them out, but he strained his heart in the doing of it. Undaunted, he picked up his tea and went on with self-appointed job. Many a dying soldier drank of our good cook’s tea, many a wounded one,

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too, and when they were satisfied he gave to the men still fighting. I believe that those who … were in the fighting will never be able to pass Andy Graham without grasping his hand – no need to say anything – I know I can’t.8

It was now 6 am and the Turks still held the southern end of the line. Colonel Sinclair-MacLagan, commander of the 3rd Brigade, proceeded to Tasmania Post and ordered an immediate counter-attack. Meanwhile two parties of about twenty-five men each had been organised by Lieutenants Prockter and Franklyn. Sinclair-MacLagan ordered Prockter’s party to charge from Tasmania Post to the southern part of Leane’s Trench, while Franklyn’s men were to stand ready to support the attack.9 Prockter and his men must have known that their chances of survival were slim at best; the Turks along the southern edge of Lone Pine and those along Snipers’ Ridge and Pine Ridge, not to mention the artillery along Third Ridge, were all waiting. On Prockter’s command his men scrambled out of the forward trench into no-man’s-land and were cut to pieces. A few somehow made it across the deadly space, wounded but alive. Unfortunately for most it was a momentary reprieve, as most of these men overshot the southern part of the trench because of the smoke, dust and confusion and found themselves in the southern gullies of the Valley of Despair – gullies still full of Turks. The Australians and Turks fought a furious hand-to-hand fight but Turkish numbers made it an uneven struggle. Like so many others, their bodies were never to be recovered. The few wounded survivors who avoided the gully managed to reach the trench and flung themselves behind the rear parados; they were far too few to assault the trench directly. Prockter almost made it to the trench when a shell exploded ‘right alongside him’, shattering his left leg close to the trunk and blowing out half his side.10 Two new reinforcements, Privates Johns and Morrison were seen ‘coolly rising and firing rapidly into the trench or the gully and then sheltered again’.11 Another man, Private Roper, was near them, firing in a kneeling position: ‘each

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time they fired they had to stand up and expose themselves to a hail of bullets when they might have laid behind the parados in comparative safety. Their action was cool and gallant to a degree.’12 Roper somehow managed to re-cross no-man’s-land back to Tasmania Post but in the attempt he was seriously wounded. On reaching Tasmania Post he asked that the survivors of his party be reinforced.13 Sinclair-MacLagan now ordered Franklyn and his men to support what was left of Prockter’s men. Poor ‘old’ Franklyn, aged well beyond his nineteen years – this would be his third attack across no-man’s-land separating Tasmania Post from Leane’s Trench within less then a week. Like Prockter before him, an exploding shell mortally wounded him as he made his way to the parados. Those who made it to the rear of the trench stood for a moment firing down into the crowded bay then the survivors of both Prockter and Franklyn’s parties jumped into the trench and killed the surviving Turks. John Morrison and others fought to the death in taking the trench, their bodies later found among the Turkish dead. Both parties had suffered terribly in recapturing the position; of Prockter’s party of twenty-six, eight were killed and all the rest wounded.14 Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Johnston had ordered Combo Smith, who had been blocking the Turks in the southern communication tunnel, to retire and build a barricade at its entrance. Johnston watched and later recorded how Combo would fire at the enemy as he ‘coolly and courageously kept at least six Turks at bay and erected a barricade keeping them at bay for some time until the tunnel was recaptured and the … Turks taken prisoner in it. His conduct was cool and gallant throughout.’15 By 7 am the whole of Leane’s Trench and the communication tunnels were back in Australian hands. A number of Turks still clung to the central and northern slopes immediately below the trench. They were in a precarious position as the Australians located further north along Silt Spur completely enfiladed the Valley of Despair, while earlier the Anzac artillery had also started to shell the area. There was little cover for the Turks and they were taking casualties at an appalling rate. Only those 66

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who had managed to make it into the former communication trenches (which had become open graves) had some protection from the bullets and shells now pouring into the valley. Privates Cocking and Moran, however, had established loopholes that enabled them to fire into the saps. With this even these Turks were now being picked off – one by one. It was noticed by some of the Australians that when Turks tried to break off in twos or threes back towards their own lines, Turkish machine-gun fire cut them down.16 If nothing else, the commander of the Turkish 48th Regiment could be taken at his word. Even so, there was still a worrying number of Turks just below Leane’s Trench. Within an hour the Australians started to hear the sound of digging; most believed that the Turks were attempting to drive a mine beneath their position (although it was more likely they were digging for shelter from the shelling and small-arms fire now crisscrossing the valley). Major Clogstoun of the engineers was called for. On hearing the sound he ‘endeavoured to discover what the Turks were about. In doing so he daringly leant over the parapet and was at once shot through the windpipe.’17 Sinclair-MacLagan, on hearing that the Turks were up to something, crossed over to Leane’s Trench using one of the communication tunnels to see for himself what was happening. Boyd Aarons was still in command even though wounded and he later recalled his conversation with the colonel: [He asked] ‘how [are] things … going’ and I said ‘I think they, the Turks are going to rush the trench. Every time I lift up a periscope … I can see them gathering and before I see much they shoot the periscope out of my hand. I have had six shot that way now and I haven’t another periscope in the trench. ‘Alright, Boyd’ said the general, ‘I hope they do come.’ I said ‘I have only five yards of fire sir.’ The general said ‘I know – I hope they do come – throw some guncotton.’ Peck said ‘Alright Aarons, I’ll send you some periscopes.’ ‘Come on Peck, let’s get out of here’ said the general.18

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Sinclair-MacLagan’s advice to try ‘some guncotton’ was put into effect (guncotton was a powerful explosive used by engineers for demolition work). A small box of explosive was rolled over the parapet. The resulting explosion killed half-a-dozen of the troublesome Turks and the digging stopped.19 Unfortunately the commander of the 11th Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Johnston, had earlier devised his own way of dealing with the same Turks. This involved a suicidal charge from Tasmania Post by twenty-five men under the command of Lieutenant Sydney Hall through the Wheatfield into the gully still full of Turks. As they started their charge, Turkish rifle, machine gun and battery fire poured into them. Hall was hit and flung headlong down into the Valley of Despair and a dozen of his men threw themselves down after him; all of those who jumped into the valley were killed with one exception. In their brave but futile fight these Australians forced a number of Turks to withdraw and in doing so the Turks were again cut down by their own machine guns. Lieutenant Morris later recalled that ‘Lieutenant Hall, from what I can hear, was last seen standing over the bodies of two of his men who were wounded. His revolver was then going strong.’20 Morris went on to recall that a shell burst over his head and it: Daze[d] me for some time. I cannot recollect all that happened during the next few hours. I know there were mangled remains of my boys all around me, and those of us who were left were praying to God that the shrapnel bursts would either be too far over, or fall short of our trenches. I can remember talking to one of the men – I think he had come in with the 6th Reinforcements – and we were considering the best means of bolstering up our broken parapets, when something burst just above us. I was just deafened for a few seconds, but the other chap had both legs blown off and the back of his head blown off. He said to me ‘I’m done sir; goodbye.’ Something else took my attention from him, but I believe I went crazy after that.21

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The second battle for Leane’s Trench finally ended at around 10.30 am. While there were a few more half-hearted attempts to take the trench, most of the Turks made their way as best they could back to their own firing lines trying to avoid Australian and Turkish fire. The Australians lost 55 men and over 100 wounded. The Turkish casualties were estimated to be similar to that of the Australians; in reality they were probably significantly higher as at least forty of their dead lay in open view.22 Leane’s Trench was now a complete wreck. Parapets had been smashed and blown in, with dirt and gravel filling the trench. Dead bodies and wounded lay everywhere and the stretcher-bearers were hurriedly trying to remove the wounded. Turkish high explosive and shrapnel shells along with rifle and machine-gun fire also swept the area.23 About half an hour after Hall’s brave but futile charge, one of the men in Leane’s Trench was looking through a periscope at the wreckage of the lieutenant’s party when he noticed one of Hall’s men slowly and obviously painfully moving one of his limbs. A medical orderly named Winzar volunteered to creep out in broad daylight while the Turkish bombardment was still in progress and bring the wounded man in. Winzar made his way into the valley from Leane’s Trench, dressed the man’s wounds and managed to attach a rope around the wounded man and somehow single-handedly dragged him back into Leane’s Trench, saving his life.24 A month after the attack against Leane’s trench, Captain Macfarlane received a letter from Jack Turner’s father requesting information regarding the circumstances of his son’s death. Young Jack had previously written to his mother telling her how bad it hurt when one of the ‘old hands’ (like himself) got hit. Macfarlane wrote:

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S. Turner, Esq., Dear Sir – I am in receipt of yours 2/9/15, and take this opportunity now of giving particulars of Private J. Turner’s death. On morning of 6 August the enemy advanced against our position and hurled a number of bombs into our trench. Your son did great work on that morning, and I am sure you would be proud to know that he and a comrade were instrumental in repulsing a number of the enemy who were attempting to get into our trenches. By means of bombs he and a comrade kept the enemy at bay till they were reinforced. Unfortunately the enemy’s bomb throwers threw into this small party and your son fell. Your son was a good and reliable soldier and was a favourite among his comrades. He was with me from the time he enlisted, and I much regretted his death. No doubt we are fighting for the supremacy of civilization against brutality, and the peace of the world; but poor W.A. [Western Australia] is paying a big price as her share in the loss of so many of her noble sons, one of whom was your son, Private J. Turner. Accept my deep sympathy in the loss of your son and my regrets in the loss of a gallant comrade, because all my boys are my comrades – I am, yours sincerely, A.H. MACFARLANE, Captain O.C. A Company25

A few hours after the second battle for Leane’s Trench had ceased, in the distance from Helles could be heard the sound of the massive preliminary bombardment. The navy and land-based artillery were shelling the 70

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Turkish positions just before the British and French troops were to ‘hop the bags’ to storm the Turkish positions at the Vineyard; this was part of a feint to keep the Turkish forces there pinned down. It was hoped that this attack would keep the Turks worried enough about Helles not to send any of their troops from this sector to the battles soon to be raging to the north. Looking in that direction from Anzac, a dense yellow cloud could be seen over the southern hills.

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The Turkish front line on 400 Plateau consisted of sandbags, mud bricks and earthen embankments which snaked around the eastern edge of the plateau defining Johnston’s Jolly and Lone Pine. Owen’s Gully separated the northern part of the Pine from the Jolly, although communication trenches running down into the gully connected the two. Each was defended by a number of frontline and secondary trenches as well as supporting and communication trenches. The length of the Turkish front line at Lone Pine from Owen’s Gully including the southern spur of Snipers’ Ridge was less than 400 metres. The centre of the Turkish firing line was set back from both flanks, allowing enfilade to be brought to bear on any attempt to carry the centre of the position. The centre of the line was not as heavily entrenched as the flanks and its main purpose could be thought of as providing communications between each flanking stronghold. In all, the frontage of the Turkish frontline trenches to be attacked by the 1st Brigade was probably around 250 metres. Two battalions of the Turkish 47th Regiment were defending Lone Pine itself, while its third battalion was stationed along Snipers’ Ridge. The headquarters of the 47th Regiment was located in The Cup. Just north, the 125th Regiment was holding Johnston’s Jolly, while the 48th Regiment was holding its southern flank along Pine Ridge, a major 72

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Cup

Front line

50 metres

Turkish trenches at Lone Pine, 6 August (Adapted from Bean, 1938, p. 506)

inland extension of the plateau running south towards Gaba Tepe.1 The Australian lines ran along the length of 400 Plateau short of Owen’s Gully and represented a continuous front in a rough north-south axis. It was at the salient known as the Pimple that the Australian trenches came closest to Lone Pine. It was from here and the underground saps and recesses now running from it underneath no-man’s-land that the Australians would launch their attack against the Turkish position. For

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months now both sides had watched each other as they dug and expanded their defensive works. No-one on either side had any clear idea about what lay beyond the enemy’s front line. It was not until June that aerial reconnaissance by British aircraft finally produced a photograph of the Turkish trench system at Lone Pine, but even so, interpretation of aerial photographs at this point was still in its infancy. Many details that would later be easily recognised by trained intelligence officers went unnoticed, including the degree to which the Turks had constructed head covers over their trenches, especially those along the southern half of the position. Major King later recalled to Charles Bean: Prior to the attack on Lone Pine we knew that certain of the trenches were covered over with heavy bulks of timber, but the limited facilities for observation made it impossible to get a clear idea of the lay-out of the trenches, so we asked Divisional Headquarters to try and get a decent [aerial] photograph taken. One photograph was sent up to us and it really was too hopeless … The attack had to be based on the sketch that we had built up during the previous months.2

From this crude map and other intelligence information, Major General Walker defined the limit of the assault against Lone Pine to be led by the men of the 1st Brigade. Because the Pimple could not accommodate the whole brigade, only three of its four battalions would initially be deployed. The 3rd Battalion was tasked with capturing the centre of the position, while the 2nd Battalion would attack and capture the southern flank and the 4th Battalion the northern flank. The 1st Battalion would be held in reserve. The general plan was to capture the main part of Lone Pine and not to be drawn down into the saps and communication trenches that lead off the plateau into the gullies below. As soon as the attack was launched, the central tunnels would be opened up and extended to the Turkish front line supplying communications between the Pimple and Lone Pine.

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20 metres

Plan of attack from the Pimple, also showing the underground firing line (From Bean, 1938, p. 498)

The divisional staff had planned that the initial attack would be launched in three waves, one following closely behind the other. Each wave would be a company strong (around 200 men) from each respective battalion. The first wave would consist of men from the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battalions attacking simultaneously along the whole front, with the second and third waves doing likewise. The first wave would be from the secret ‘underground firing line’. At its closest point it was less than 50 metres from the Turkish trenches. The second would launch their charge from the front firing line at the Pimple, while the third wave, just behind the second, would launch their attack from the same trench. The men of the third wave were to also bring up picks and shovels as well as their rifles to help consolidate the position from the inevitable Turkish counter-attack. The 1st Battalion would be brought out to Lone Pine as

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required. This also applied to the men of the 7th and 12th Battalions who would be released from their respective positions at Johnston’s Jolly and Tasmania Post on request from the commander of the 1st Brigade, Colonel Smyth. The men would leave their packs behind; the only things they were to take with them were their rifles, bayonets, 200 rounds of ammunition, one day’s iron rations, a full water bottle, two empty sandbags and a respirator.3 Each battalion had a bombing party of four NCOs and twenty men. Bomb throwers were ‘only [to] carry 50 rounds of ammunition in addition to their explosives’.4 While the total number of bombs allotted to the 1st Brigade for this attack amounted to around 1200, it was known before the attack that this would be insufficient. An Operational Order issued on 4 August stated that ‘men should be told to remove the bombs from the dead and wounded whenever possible’.5 Six sappers were to be used to blow up any obstructions, including overhead timbers known to be covering some of the Turkish frontline trenches.6 Finally Operational Order No. 3 stated that ‘machine guns will be carried forward with each assaulting column, 3500 rounds being taken for each gun’.7

By 2.00 pm on 6 August the last Australian engineers were withdrawing from tunnels B26, B27 and B37 leading out from the Pimple and half an hour later three mines exploded short of the Turkish front lines. No-man’s-land was relatively flat and it was hoped that the explosions would break up the surface and offer some cover for the men who would charge across the field in three-and-a-half hours’ time. The men of the 1st Brigade were making their way forward from the rear of 400 Plateau towards the Pimple up through Brown’s Dip as the mines exploded.8 The day before, Walker, along with his chief of staff, Colonel Brudenell White, had positioned their divisional headquarters at the head of White’s Valley, while on the morning of the offensive Colonel Smyth made his brigade headquarters in Brown’s Dip a few hundred

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metres south. White wrote in his diary on 5 August 1915: ‘Moved HQ to head of WHITE GULLY. Busy with prelim. arrgts [preliminary arrangements].’9 It was also here that the 1st Battalion took up their position as the brigade reserve. Passing the 1st Battalion, the men of the attacking force filed their way up to 400 Plateau and into the trenches above, each battalion taking a separate route to avoid congestion. Some of the men not assigned to the attack were so keen not to miss out on the ‘final push’ that guards had to be posted at the rear of the line to ensure that no unauthorised men attempted to take part.10 Indeed, officers and NCOs could be seen ordering men from any number of battalions away from the area if they had no business being there. Many of the men being ordered out had been trying to secretly join in the attack. Some who actually belonged to the 1st Brigade but had been considered too unfit to join in the attack had also tried to sneak back to their sections and platoons, many of them being successful as their NCOs and cobbers turned a blind eye. Even some of the 1st Brigade’s sick and wounded from Lemnos, on hearing of the attack, had sneaked back on ships and had also managed to join their mates in time for the attack. Such was the lure of mateship and action after months of stagnation. Private Ernest Scott (4th Battalion) wrote: About 3 o’clock we handed our section of trench to the 7th Battalion and marched round to trenches opposite Lone Pine. Then the worst of the whole show commenced, we had to stand packed in the trenches for an hour and a half, while the artillery and the guns from the warships bombarded the Turks’ position. I can tell you it was no joke waiting to get over to go for your life. It made a chap sort of feel sea sick, as it drew near the time to charge, and to see mates in front with drawn faces having perhaps a last handshake. Every old hand knew that if one out of three got through they would be lucky.11

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At 4.30 pm the final and heaviest allied bombardment started hitting the Turkish trenches at Lone Pine as well as its flanks, with the 1st New Zealand Field Artillery on Russell’s Top concentrating on the Lone Pine trenches. Bombardier Arthur Currey was a member of a New Zealand forward observation post and later recorded: Our battery was to smash down the barbed wire in front of the Turkish trenches at all costs. At 4.30 pm on 6 August all guns were to bombard Lone Pine until 5.30 pm and then the 1st Brigade of Australian Infantry were to charge … At 4.30 all guns opened fire … I was watching the effect when a Turkish shell topped our sandbags, smashed my periscope and knocked it out of my hands. As I stooped to pick it up another shell smashed into our station and blew our walls to pieces … two men next to me were knocked out but I still missed injury.12

The guns of the British cruiser HMS Bacchante joined in and fired at the Turkish batteries and positions located further to the rear along Third Ridge. Two field guns were also run up onto the plateau two hundred metres from the Turkish front – one succeeding in firing around 60 rounds directly at the Turkish parapets of the Pine, while the other firing at Johnston’s Jolly was soon put out of action by a direct hit by a Turkish shell. Lance Corporal Lawrence of the Australian Engineers was located at his post with his ear to the telephone, listening to the orders being given to a battery that was part of his telephone line: ‘No. 1 gun fired, Sir. No. 2 gun ready, Sir.’ He recorded in his diary: … every one of our batteries was sending its screeching message on to its target-field guns with their roar, howitzers with their mighty rushing sound and mountain battery guns with their bark, a bark too loud for a gun four times their size. The enemy were not behind in getting their guns busy and in no time the air was just a tumult of screech from flying shells, of banging explosions, the whine of flying nose caps and fragments and the noise of

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empty shell cases travelling everywhere. For a solid half hour this lasted … the din was indescribable.13

While the Anzac preliminary bombardments of Lone Pine were light by Western Front standards, initially it resulted in heavy losses to the Turks manning the open and crowded trenches. While the head covers had provided suitable cover against shrapnel, it had dreadful consequences for those beneath if hit directly by a howitzer’s high explosive shell. When this occurred the thick timbers fractured and exploded into thousands of deadly splinters that in the crowded and restricted passageways below left men writhing in agony, if not reduced to outright pulp. Lieutenant Mehmed Fash of the 47th Regiment recorded in his diary, while positioned at Lone Pine (Bloody Ridge) towards the end of the campaign in October, the effects of such an explosion: A group of agitated soldiers approached our camp. Ask them what had happened. Mahmud Can has been hurt. He has injuries to an arm, a leg, his chest and face, and he is encrusted with sand. Run over and cut off his boots, pants and socks. The poor fellow is in bad shape, but being brave. We bandage him up and send him to the rear. His foot and arm are seriously hurt. He was hit during relief of machine-gun crew. After he is taken away, the Captain and I go to inspect damage to our trenches. Machine-gun emplacement (where Mahmud Can was hurt) is below ground, at the end of a path. The gun is fired from a narrow slit facing the enemy. As if tossed in by hand, an enemy shell penetrated the position from this aperture. The carnage it caused is awful. Six dead lie there. Dismembered, parts of their bodies are intermingled. Blood has drained out of bodies, and chests and arms look like wax. Shins and legs, seared by the explosion, are purple. Some bones have been stripped of flesh. The men’s features are unrecognizable … First-aid men are collecting bits and pieces. The men’s

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comrades have gathered. Waiting to help carry their dead friends away. Alas! … This is impossible … The machine-gun stand has been smashed to bits. Its various components are covered with blood and bits of human flesh. Mud is everywhere … Shredded underwear from the dead is encased in the most inaccessible parts of the gun.14

Similar tragedies must have occurred during the August bombardment along 400 Plateau and elsewhere. Indeed, in late July and early August the head covers at Johnston’s Jolly were removed, and still further north along parts of Second Ridge and along Baby 700 some officers refused to cover their trenches as they were considered to be doing more harm then good, although at Lone Pine they remained covered.15 To help counter the effects of this bombardment the Turks had taken cover, since the shelling of 5 August, in their own mine tunnels that lead into no-man’sland from their front lines, only to emerge when the bombardment had lifted. This is what most of the 500 or so Turks manning Lone Pine were doing during the bombardment of the afternoon of 6 August. The nearby supporting 500 or so Turks were taking cover towards the rear trenches.

Major Zeki Bey, commander of the 1st Battalion, 57th Regiment, had been defending German Officers’ Trench for the previous forty-five days when, at the start of the final intensive bombardment of Lone Pine and its flanks (including his own position), he was relieved by a battalion of the Turkish (Arab) 72nd Regiment. Just before leaving German Officers’ Trench, one of his positions took a direct hit from a high explosive shell. He later recalled to Charles Bean that ‘there was a head cover blown in, and the men lying smashed up and dead. I was very frightened.’16 On finally leaving German Officers’ Trench with his exhausted survivors, he made his way to his regimental headquarters. 80

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I was with the regimental commander at Edirna Sirt [Mortar Ridge], and we could see the bombardment, which was still going on. We could see that both large and small shells were concentrating on Kanli Sirt (Bloody Ridge, Lone Pine). My battalion had just come out and was at the moment assembled behind Edirna Sirt, and I ordered the officer-in-charge at once to be ready to reinforce, as they were the nearest reinforcements to Kanli Sirt. From the regimental headquarters at the back of Edirna Sirt you could see clearly. There was a lot of dust raised by the shells at Kanli Sirt. I could not see through it.17

In the firing line at the Pimple, Major King was positioned at the opening of the main tunnel (B5), which led to the underground firing line into no-man’s-land. King kept the men moving into the tunnel in a steady and orderly fashion. In one hand he held his whistle, in the other his watch. At the other end of the same tunnel now ending at a T-intersection was Major McConaghy of the 3rd Battalion also with a whistle – ready to instantly repeat the three short blasts that would announce the attack. He directed the men left and right to their assigned places. The movement of these battalions went like clockwork and by 5 pm they were in position. … only one doubt obsessed the regimental officers – whether the men, sick with diarrhea and strained with lack of sleep and heavy work, could sustain prolonged fighting or marching … Whatever their previous feelings, the actual filling and dumping of their packs, the march through the trenches, and the imminence of the advance after months of trench life, provided an excitement which put new vitality into the troops. As they waited in the crowded bays, there was not the least sign of nervousness in face, speech, or action … Some belated messenger hurried along the trench to find his platoon, and, in passing, recognised a friend. “Au revoir,

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Bill” he nodded, “meet you over there.” “So long, Tom,” was the answer; “see you again in half-an-hour”.18

The Anzac shelling continued as the men readied themselves. Both trenches at the Pimple and the underground ‘secret sap’ in no-man’s-land shook and shuddered with the ongoing barrage. Those in the underground trench were continuously rained on by dirt as the topsoil just above their heads was shaken loose from the roots of the scrub above, these roots now dangling above their heads. To help reduce congestion within the underground trench, a number of recesses had been dug and when the time came the earthen roof would be opened up, forming the trench firing step. As the last few men filed into the underground sap, others who had been crouching in these recesses now started to remove the topsoil and vegetation with their bayonets and small spades while others were yanking down the unseen overhead vegetation by the roots dangling above their heads. The secret underground firing line was soon open with light flooding into the trench for the first time. Around 600 men tensely looked up, seeing the plumes of smoke and dust showering and enveloping the Pine – anxiously waiting for the bombardment to lift. They knew as soon as it did that the whistles would be blown and they would charge across the 50 to 75 metres of no-man’s-land to the Turkish trenches. Men privately smoked, talked among themselves or remained silent in their own thoughts, probably just wishing that the waiting would end. One man was heard to ask, minutes before hopping the bags: ‘Can you find room for me beside Jim here? Him and me are mates an’ we’re going over together.’19 Charles Bean had made his way into the heart of the Pimple minutes before the charge and recorded in his diary: As [I] went along [the] trench, heard an officer telling men, ‘Look out for enemy wire’ etc., giving last hints. About 5.25 as I reached convenient point in trench S. of Brown’s Dip, after having tried a good many, I arrived at recess near no. 9 [?5] Tunnel. It was crowded with 3rd Bn. Men were chaffing one another – seemed

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to be quite eager to go out and do something. About five were on the fire step – a little officer crouched in corner – and about five or six in trench below. I saw not the slightest trace of nervousness. Men all had packs with some sort of tucker or knick-knacks in. Presently order came: pull down top bags in recess – so as to make it easier to get over. Whole trench looked suspiciously ragged.20

Hours before, officers had twice checked their watches and all now kept an intense eye on the minute hand as it moved towards the 30-minute mark. ‘Five twenty-seven, get ready to go over the parapet’, said Captain Moore of the 3rd Battalion as he himself crouched in the corner of a firing step, clenching his teeth and staring at his watch. Private Cecil McAnulty, aged twenty-six, of the 2nd Battalion at this point was with his cobbers finishing his entry into his diary. Their artillery are replying now and shells are beginning to rain on us. They are getting the range now, shelling the support trenches. Men are beginning to drop. Howitzer shells are dropping about 30 yards from us digging great holes where they land. The fumes are suffocating, the shrapnel is pouring all round us getting chaps everywhere. This is hell waiting here … Word given to get ready to charge … must finish, hope to get through alright.21

As recorded later by Charles Bean, an ‘Officer took [a] whistle from wrist, ‘prepare to jump out’ he said. Put whistle between his teeth … presently he blew whistle.’22 At precisely 5.30 pm the Anzac bombardment lifted and three blasts from the whistle of Major King announced the attack. Simultaneously along the whole Anzac line opposite the Pine could be heard the high pitch of the whistles of other officers. With a loud chorus that could be heard above the sound of exploding Turkish shells, the three waves of the 1st Brigade, 1800 men strong, left purgatory and charged into hell.

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‘Three short whistle blasts sounded and it was taken up along the line. Our men cleared the parapet and left the recesses in the new firing line instantly and attacked with vigor.’1 Second Lieutenant Wren (3rd Battalion) later described how the ‘… shells came shrieking. One came to decapitate a bugler – the headless body ran on for several yards before it stopped and dropped.’2 Lieutenant Colonel MacNaghten, commander of the 4th Battalion, led his men across as part of the second wave. When he and his men charged through the relatively flat exposed ‘tennis court-like’ Daisy Patch, they presented an excellent clear field of fire for the Turks, especially for the artillery on Third Ridge who could clearly see the waves of Australians charging across the distinctive field.3 Private Bendrey of the 2nd Battalion recalled: ‘Talk about shrapnel, it sounded for all the world like blanky hail … the bush … [around] the daisy patch (no-man’s-land) caught alight and showed us up beautifully to the Turkish machine gunners … The fire was simply hellish, shell rifle and machine-gun fire and I’m hanged if I know how we got across the daisy patch. Every bush seemed to be literally ripped with bullets … our luck was right in.’4 The Turkish artillery and machine guns tore into the ranks as they charged and stumbled across no-man’s-land. Lieutenant Merivale (4th 84

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Battalion) recalled that ‘they went like a pack of forwards charging down a field after a football and in an instant hundreds of rifles turned upon them and shells (both shrapnel and high explosive). And those awful hoses of lead, the machine guns – they fell in tens but the remainder dashed on.’ Corporal Neil of the 2nd Battalion was part of the initial charge and later recalled: ‘I glanced upwards to see nothing but a sheet of fire or smoke caused by bursting shells of all sorts and machine gun fire. The next moment I felt a bump and my rifle fell to pieces in my hand.’ Private Gammage also charged and ‘fell over a lump of barbed wire when halfway across … The machine [gun] bullets were falling around me like rain but lucky again.’5 Private James Holt of the 4th Battalion described how he lost a bet with Lance Corporal Charlie Allerdice about who would get to the Turkish lines first: ‘… we sprung over the parapet and started on that wild rush to the Turks’ trench. I seemed to have lost sight of Charlie altogether. It was on approaching the first Turkish trench that I happened to look down, and there was Charlie. He had kept his word and won the bet, but in doing so had lost his life. It was only a few yards further on that I was wounded myself, but managed to get into the trench.’6 The bulk of the killing would occur underground, within the heart of the Pine. The men of the Australian 2nd Brigade to the north opposite Johnston’s Jolly immediately opened up with a fusillade of machine-gun and rifle fire against the Turkish parapets to help cover the southern attack against Turkish fire from Johnston’s Jolly. The men of the 3rd Brigade and 2nd Light Horse were also firing along the Turkish positions south of the Pine to help suppress their fire. Trooper Oliver Hogue of the 2nd Light Horse later wrote to his wife: ‘the irregular khaki line charged with reckless indifference to the hail of shrapnel and rifle fire and machine guns. A well-trained regiment of Gay Gordons or Grenadiers or Fusiliers would have charged in a beautiful line – and probably would have been mown down like wheat before the scythe. But our chaps don’t fight that way. They raced forward as individuals, not as a battalion. Each man’s initiative 85

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spurred him on … But for this casualties would have been far greater.’7 Lieutenant Traill and his machine guns of the 8th Battalion were positioned along the frontline trenches of the plateau and offered covering fire for the attackers. He later recalled that ‘when parties got down into the trenches, they went through the Turks like ferrets down a rabbit burrow. There would be parties of Turks that would get trapped and they’d leap out and try to run back to their reserve trenches across open ground. Then it was our turn … It was like potting bunnies in a rabbit plague. I don’t think I missed too often.’8 Charles Bean recalled the charge of the men of the 3rd Battalion; among them was his brother John, a medical officer. Colonel went in with the second rush. Turkish shrapnel got on our trench and later onto space between trenches, but wonderfully few men were hit. Men used to trip in barbed wire and fall, but got up again. Clouds of dust [in no-man’s-land] in beautiful evening sunlight. Shrapnel clouds yellow with shell smoke. Two machine guns traversing over trench. Our men standing along Turkish front trench perplexed by overhead cover. Saw one man standing and firing at the Turks running away just as if he was firing at a rabbit.9

All along the Anzac line, from the northern heights of Russell’s Top to the southern flanks running down Bolton’s Ridge, men turned their attention to the attack against Lone Pine. Lance Corporal Lawrence of the Australian Engineers was still located near the Pimple listening to the telephone line when the whistles blew and the men bolted from their trenches: … suddenly it ceased [Anzac artillery barrage] and almost as suddenly the rattling crackle of rifle fire broke out. Turkish fire! The boys had ‘hopped out’. Golly, how my heart thumped and jumped, did anything but what it was intended for. How were they faring? The phone was silent, our wires were down, cut by

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shrapnel … The rifle and machine gun fire lasted perhaps five minutes and then died away. Is it because our boys are in their trenches and the bayonet is at work? Yes, it must be; one cannot bring himself to imagine that they have failed. Our boys fail? Never, of course not; it’s impossible.10

The troopers of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade, who would soon be called on to charge The Nek and Baby 700, witnessed from the heights of Russell’s Top to the north the charge of the 1st Infantry Brigade. They watched excitedly, as did others along Second Ridge, as the figures in khaki seemed to be in the process of capturing the position. They undoubtedly hoped that their own attack against the heavily defended Turkish positions at dawn the next day would be equally successful. Indeed, Second Lieutenant Hugo Throssell of the 10th Light Horse was enjoying the late afternoon sunshine when they heard the yells as the men of the 1st Brigade stormed the Pine. With him was his brother Ric, as well as their two mates Ross and Lindsay Chipper. They were sharing a bottle of whisky that had been ‘half-inched’ from Major Todd. For many, including brothers Ross and Lindsay, it would be their last sunset. Hugo himself would survive the charge, only to be severely wounded a few weeks later in the battle for Hill 60 in which he would earn himself the Victoria Cross.11

The Turkish commander at Anzac, Esat Pasa, at his headquarters along Scrubby Knoll was immediately aware of the attack – he had a ringside seat. All Turkish batteries available were now ordered to shell no-man’sland in front of Lone Pine. The 19th Division to the north under the command of Mustafa Kemal was immediately ordered to throw in its sole reserve – the 1st Battalion of the 57th Regiment under the command of Major Zeki Bey.12 German Lieutenant Colonel Wilmer to the north (along the Anafartalar Front) was ordered to provide Kemal’s 19th Division

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with a replacement battalion to reinforce his position along Battleship Hill – it was not long before Wilmer’s 1st Battalion of the 14th Regiment was making its way south.13 Major Zeki Bey and his regimental commander at Mortar Ridge had climbed to a high ledge above their headquarters to try and get a better view of what was going on – the increased volume of fire clearly indicated that something unusual was happening just south of their position. They immediately noticed that all the Turkish batteries at Kemal Yere (Scrubby Knoll) were concentrating their fire on no-man’s-land in front of the Pine.14 Looking southwards they saw Lone Pine covered with smoke and dust of shells, and at that moment the heavy reports of the guns gave place to a patter of rifles (‘as, after thunder, you hear the rain begin,’ said one of them later). The regimental observer remarked that he could see men running across no-man’s-land … A few minutes later there arrived the order, telephoned from Mustafa Kemal, for the 1/57th to move to the Pine. The battalion was then ready, and Zeki Bey ordered it to move at the double down Legge Valley, fixing bayonets as it went, while he himself, having told the leading company commander to meet him in Owen’s Gully, ran ahead and turned into that valley.15

On reaching the Turkish frontline trenches the Australians of the first wave found that the trenches were mostly covered with thick timbers and earth. Most expected some overhead cover but none expected the degree to which it was built. The head covers rested on massive timbers and below and to the front of these were a number of loopholes from which the Turks poked their rifles and fired into no-man’s-land. Men of the second and third waves were killed or wounded by this fire, but it was quickly suppressed as Australians poked their rifles into the same holes, 88

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firing into the Turks at point-blank range.16 The men of the second and third waves had quickly joined those from the first at the Pine. For all intents and purposes the Australians now represented a single mass of men, each trying to get at the Turk. Some attempted to get into the covered frontline trenches from above, while most continued beyond and jumped into the rear uncovered trenches and saps. Those trying to break through the overhead covers found that the timbers consisted mostly of four-by-six, but some were as thick as four-by-nine – far too heavy to lift. Some managed to claw at some of the smaller timber obstacles and slowly drag them aside. There were also openings blown in by a direct hit by high explosive shell, but the position was mostly still intact. Some entrances leading into no-man’s-land used by Turkish patrols were discovered and men funnelled through them into the dark interior of the frontline trenches. At other places there were open spaces between the overhead cover and men lined these openings firing into the darkness below; Turks replied in kind from the darkness within.17 Major Carl Jess of the 2nd Brigade recalled: Our first line dashed over the front line of enemy trench while the second line engaged [the] front trench, third line reinforcing. Overhead cover was very little hurt so that men were hopping about on top trying to pull the logs off to get into the Turks, poking their rifles into the loopholes and firing, the whole under shrapnel and rifle fire from the north. Once they got in the slaughter was tremendous.18

Men individually or in small groups jumped into any opening they could find. Those who were the first to dive into these dark holes were often killed immediately from Turkish fire or bayonets, but soon a number of men had managed to penetrate the line and were now on a rampage. Now any number of frenzied and violent hand-to-hand struggles occurred within the semi-darkened subterranean galleries. At this point it was not only the rifle and bayonet that was used – facing death men used knives, 89

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spades, fists, feet and teeth if it gave them an advantage. Men cursed, swore and yelled insults at each other in a foreign language out of fear and frustration. Flashing and momentary images of friend and foe could be seen from the vertical shafts of light that in some places pierced the darkness; horizontal flashes of rifle fire sent bullets hurtling out into the darkness and if they did not hit flesh and bone they smacked with a continuous thud into the trench wall or the pine supports. Undoubtedly there would have been cases of Turk killing Turk and Australian killing Australian in bitter desperation in the near-total darkness and confusion. At this point about half of the Turkish frontline troops were still in the tunnels that led out beneath no-man’s-land, having taken refuge from the artillery barrage. A Turkish sergeant rushed to the tunnels as the Australians started to fight their way into the works and ordered the men out, but only those near the entrance managed to scramble out in time – the majority were now trapped within the dark, humid, claustrophobic tunnels. The Australians began to get the upper hand in the struggle and Turkish resistance within the foul and hot underground stronghold started to slacken as the Turks were either killed or wounded or withdrew further down the communication saps. Australians began to push their way out of the underground chambers into the daylight beyond, having to stumble over the dead and dying. Others continued to fight their way left and right under the covered trenches, hunting down any surviving Turk.19 Meanwhile, those Australians who had been unable to penetrate the Turkish works had run left or right following the front line in order to find an opening. Indeed the very centre of the Turkish front line for about 50 metres was uncovered and those men of the 3rd Battalion who had charged this part of the line had already jumped into these trenches. It was not long before this section of the Pine became unduly crowded as men tried to get into the Turkish trenches from the narrow frontage. The men who jumped into this part of the line found that the trenches here quickly and unexpectedly descended into a branch of Owen’s Gully 90

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– later known as The Cup. The men had been ordered not to advance down into the gullies and ridges and so the attack here quickly ran into a dead end. These men followed the trenches and saps along the northern and eastern edge of the Pine.20 Captain Duke recalled: I got to this trench absolutely exhausted and was gaining my breath when a big Turk came charging along being pursued by two Australians; as he passed me I shot him in the back. Immediately we met more Turks and I made an attempt to bayonet one but my bayonet stuck in his leather equipment and as he was about to shoot me, he himself was shot by a rifle fired over my shoulder. I fired at a dark head peering from around the transverse and two bombs came back in reply. I was paralysed with fear waiting for them to explode but none of us was seriously hurt. We got on the firestep to face Turks apparently about to attack when enfilade fire hit us all, killing six and leaving two of us wounded.21

Those further south that had pushed on over the front line and headed for the exposed rear trenches and communication saps were firing into the Turks who were now bolting down the avenue of trenches and saps. It was not long before these men jumped into the trenches, turned back and made their way towards the covered front lines. Turks who had taken up positions covering the numerous transverse bends in the passageways killed many as they were warned of an approaching Australian by his protruding rifle, giving plenty of time to shoot the man himself as he appeared. In several places dead Australians lay four or five deep at such bends. It didn’t take long for the Australian’s to realise that they had to keep their rifles upright and close to the body if they were to attempt to surprise the Turks. While a few jam-tin bombs in these circumstances could have effectively cleared these positions, those of the bombing parties were not always present where they were most needed – through no fault of their own. To make matters worse, when approaching a corner or bend one was never sure that the person just beyond was friend or foe.

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Major Morshead was approaching a trench corner when one of his men, believing that Australians were around the next corner, went forward to warn them of their approach; he quickly returned: ‘They are Turks all right’, he said quietly, ‘and they got me in the stomach.’ He sat down and proceeded to die.22

The Australians were now entering the heart of Lone Pine. Lieutenant Giles and his men of the 4th Battalion were the first to reach the northern flank of the position, which was also heavily timbered over. They pushed on a further ten metres to reach the second line of entrenchments that had suffered a direct hit by an explosive shell that had torn the sap apart. At this point they were moving down into Owen’s Gully – their object was clearly not on the top of the plateau as they had thought; the map they had studied had no contour lines marked. It was their mission to barricade the northernmost section of the trench to prevent Turks from Johnston’s Jolly reinforcing Lone Pine – into the valley they reluctantly descended. They passed a covered sap to their left that led to the front line; it was then that shots rang out. Giles and, in quick succession, a number of his men were killed as they tried to pass. Soon a party of jam-tin bombers arrived and attempted to bomb the Turks out. At the same time Captain Milson of the 4th Battalion arrived and, believing that the bombers had succeeded in at least suppressing the Turkish fire, moved forward – he too was killed trying to pass the sap, falling on the body of Giles. The bombers renewed their attack and presently the Turks surrendered. As a Turkish officer and thirty of his men were taken prisoner, Lieutenant Seldon, also of the 4th Battalion, approached; one of his eyeballs had been shot away and pieces of it were plastered onto his cheek. He refused to go to the rear and took command of the men. Seldon ordered Lance Corporal Aylward, Private Haywood and a number of other men to push on past the sap to their left that they had just captured and enter the next sap to their left. They were to clear

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Northern sector of Lone Pine (4th Battalion) (Adapted from Bean, 1938, pp. 506 & 510)

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the covered front line of any Turks. Seldon and a few other men would continue down the trench to clear it of Turks. Going first himself, Seldon reached a point where the support and front line joined and descended sharply to the bed of Owen’s Gully. Here a Turk from the Jolly shot Seldom dead. Aylward recalled many years later: Lieut Seldon, with his eye shot away, came round from the support trench and ordered us to advance along the front line and clear out the enemy, who were preventing his party from reaching the CT [communication trench] leading to the Jolly. We were now joined by two other Diggers, and, realising that the Turks were holding the transverse trench in strength, we attempted, but without success, to drive them out by firing round the bend … we hunted around and found a few bombs, which we threw into the trench, shouting and cheering as we followed up with rifle fire. The ruse succeeded, the Turks retreating across the CT into the jolly.23

Major Mackay and his men of the 4th Battalion were about fifty metres south of Aylward’s party. They too had ignored the front trench and had pushed onto the second line. They skirted the edge of Owen’s Gully and The Cup, heading for what they believed to be their objective. They ran beside one of the rearward-running saps, firing down into the Turks below who were heading for the rear, although a few Turks turned and fired, killing Sergeant Griffiths and mortally wounding Lieutenant Merivale. Mackay saw up ahead a point where the sap he was currently following intersected with another originating from Owen’s Gully below; this was his objective. He jumped into the sap and ran along, stopping just short of an intersection. He took up a position and shot a number of Turks as they passed by, running along the other trench. He waited for a minute or two and as no other Turks passed he leapt across the intersection when a shot rang out to his right, just missing him. One of his men, twentyyear-old Corporal Mills, was not so lucky and was killed when he jumped over the same intersection; two more men following Mills shared his fate.

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Mackay found himself alone. This part of the Pine was clearly a major traffic hub leading to various points of the line. It formed a large, well-constructed, open position about ten metres long, running down the slope of Owen’s Gully. The sides had been neatly revetted with a fire step (now facing in the wrong direction). Mackay had just taken up his position when three of the enemy appeared in the lower part of the bay. Mackay attempted to fire his rifle but the trigger merely clicked – the magazine was empty.24 He later recalled what happened next: Then I lunged with the bayonet, and just about scratched the front man’s chest as he was jumping back, after which they turned and ran the way they had come. My men behind, who could see well, said these Turks were unarmed and had come to surrender. I was sorry, but could not help it, and it is things like this, I suppose, which create the impression that we do not take prisoners; certainly these men would be justified in spreading such a report.25

Mackay ordered the line of men just beyond the intersection to start blocking the trench to their right with sandbags. The Turk positioned down this sap was still firing in an attempt to keep the Australians from rushing his position. As the men started to throw sandbags across the sap entrance, another Turk approached from the sap leading up to Mackay’s position from Owen’s Gully. Mackay shot the man dead. Soon one of Mackay’s men took up a position behind the sandbag barricade and fired back at the Turk in the rear sap and with this the approach was cleared. Mackay’s men joined him and together they started to block the other sap running down into Owen’s Gully. Fire steps were constructed and it was not long before Mackay and his men established a defensive position that ‘… formed the north-eastern angle of the new Australian position in Lone Pine’.26 Between the positions held by Aylward and Mackay, Lieutenant McDonald and his men took up a position halfway along a sap running 95

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just below Mackay’s post. Their position was forward and higher then that occupied by Aylward, but not as far forward and was lower than that held by Mackay. From this position they could offer enfilade fire to the position being held by Aylward and his men while Mackay would be able to offer similar supporting fire to McDonald. It was debatable, however, whether any of these parties were aware of the others’ presence. In capturing this position McDonald bayoneted a Turk, but was also wounded. He refused to go to the rear and stayed to supervise the barricading of the sap. While his men began sandbagging the position, McDonald went forward to an angle of the trench and fired into the Turks as they tried to push the Australians out. He then asked his men to throw him jam-tin bombs with the fuses already lit, which he caught and proceeded to throw at the Turks below. As he did this, the barricade behind him was growing in height and only when he considered it a defendable position did he scramble over the top of it to his men.27 Captain Lloyd and his men, also of the 4th Battalion, had earlier reached the Turkish front line just south of where Mackay had crossed the Turkish works. Lloyd: rushed ahead by himself, and reached a point where a howitzer shell had broken down the side of the … trench, rendering access to it easy. He looked down on a number of Turks, who scattered round the bend on either side as he jumped in. As they attempted to return, he watched first one side and then the other and shot several. Presently, realising that he had fired the last cartridge in his magazine, he dropped and feigned death. Turks brushed against him, passed over him, handled his rifle, but did not tread upon him.’28

It was around twenty minutes later that men of the 3rd Battalion came down the line and Lloyd realised that this part of the position was in Australian hands. He now led a number of men out of the covered trenches into the open exposed part of the line. To his front and left were

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Solid bars = barricades constructed

Other positions in the northern sector at Lone Pine (4th Battalion) (Adapted from Bean, 1938, pp. 512 & 513)

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two communication trenches falling into The Cup and Owen’s Gully respectively. At the end of the trench to his left he could see a group of Australians barricading a major intersection; these were Mackay and his men. Indeed, this trench supplied a direct north-south communication between Lloyd and Mackay’s positions. It would soon be known as Traversed Trench. With Mackay occupying the lower northern end of the trench it was vital that Lloyd hold the other to protect Mackay’s flank. Lloyd now set to work barricading the communication sap to his front. This position would soon be known as Lloyd’s Post. Just beyond his barricade was another length of trench that ran parallel with the front line. This trench would later be known as Sasse’s Sap and was then being occupied by men of the 3rd Battalion.29

Meanwhile, one of the two Turkish battalion commanders, a namesake of Mustafa Kemal, who had been holding part of the Pine now believing that his battalion ceased to exist (which for all intents and purposes it had), moved off the plateau, down from The Cup, passing his battalion headquarters and continuing into Owen’s Gully. It was not long before Turks down in Owen’s Gully and The Cup saw three Australians being led by an officer as they moved quickly down a track from the Pine towards the Turkish headquarters in The Cup. These men did not get far and were all killed by a hail of Turkish bullets. This was the furthest point reached by any Australians that day and the identity of these men remains unknown.

As Mackay and Lloyd were each reinforcing their part of the line, the men of the 3rd Battalion had already started to occupy Sasse’s Sap. This sap would help form the central defensive line held by the Australian’s at Lone Pine. At this point, however, Lloyd’s Post and Sasses’ Sap were not connected, as Lloyd’s barricade was forward of the northern entrance

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of Sasse’s Sap and men of the 3rd Battalion had built their own barricade short of where it made contact to the communication trench now protected by Lloyd’s Post – the space between these two positions was open to the Turks. Sasse’s Sap was uncovered and was among the first positions to be occupied by the Australians of the first wave. Captain Moore, Lieutenant Garnham and their men had approached this second trench from the covered flanks and were now firing down into the Turks as they tried to escape from the front lines. Moore ordered his men into the trench. Soon Lieutenant Brown arrived and proceeded to set up a machine gun of the 4th Battalion on the surface just behind Sasse’s Sap; the other three machine-gun crews of the 4th now lay dead and wounded in no-man’sland. Men of the 3rd Battalion climbed out of the trench and occupied a defensive position around the machine gun to help protect the gun crew. Directly north of their position they could see, across Owen’s Gully and only about 200 metres away, a communication trench on Johnston’s Jolly packed with Turks. This gun’s enfilade tore up the trench and it was now blocked with the dead and dying. However, no sooner had the gun ceased firing when it became a magnet for Turkish fire and within minutes most of the machine-gun crew and men around the gun were hit by fire from Johnston’s Jolly – a Turkish shrapnel shell from Third Ridge brought the argument to a close. Brown survived and brought the gun down into Sasse’s Sap and tried to repair the damage. The Turks to the front of Sasse’s Sap had not yet given up and were attempting to retake this part of the Pine but the Australians managed to beat them back. They now hurriedly barricaded the communication saps and began to construct firing steps into what had been the rear of the trench.30 At the southern end of Sasse’s Sap ran an oblique east-west communication trench from which three additional trenches ran off at right angles, leading into The Cup. These three trenches ran roughly parallel with Sasse’s Sap. Lieutenant Woods and his men soon occupied the first of these trenches and other Australians took up positions in the

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1. Aylward’s Post

6. Goldenstedt’s Post

2. McDonald’s Post

7. Tubb’s Corner

3. Mackay’s Post

8. Youden’s Post

4. Lloyd’s Post

9. Cook’s Post

5. Woods’s Post

Established posts at Lone Pine around 6 pm (Adapted from Bean, 1938)

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other two. The trench in front of Woods’s position was actually a track running up onto the surface of the Pine. The stump of the famous ‘lone pine’ could clearly be seen next to it. The final trench, which ran parallel with, and forward of, the track terminated close to the eastern edge of the plateau and was occupied by twenty-five men under the command of Sergeant Major Goldenstedt. The southeast-running sap (which represented a backbone to the other saps) connected all of the southern ends of these trenches and terminated on the plateau just south of the edge of The Cup. It was at this point that a small party of the 3rd Battalion under the command of Lieutenant Pinkstone tried to establish a defensive position by expanding and deepening this end of the trench. Pinkstone’s position (later called Tubb’s Corner) now represented the extreme right flank of the 3rd Battalion.31

The men of the 2nd Battalion were assigned the capture of the southern flank of Lone Pine. Here the Turkish frontline trenches were more completely covered than elsewhere. As such, many of the men from this battalion were exposed to ongoing Turkish machine-gun and shrapnel fire as they searched for a way to penetrate the covered works. Indeed, the view from the Australian frontline trenches of the southern part of the Pine was now: entirely obscured by the clouds of yellow smoke and dust floating by under the rays of the setting sun. The position of any man outside the trenches was evidently becoming precarious, and the remnant of the crowd by the parapets began to jump into the Pine via the rear-uncovered trenches. Only on the right did a line of men still lie in the open. Not until an hour later did onlookers realise that they were dead.32

Captain Pain and his men reached the southern part the Pine and pushed on beyond the frontline trench. His men jumped into the first open sap

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they came across and as they pushed on into a support trench ‘three shots rang out, and they all fell dead’.33 Others found to their right an exposed deep sap beyond the frontline trenches running in a north-easterly direction towards the edge of The Cup. This sap was the objective of the men of the 2nd Battalion. This post was to define the southern flank of the Australian position at Lone Pine. Parallel with it, and at one point only five metres north, was a shallow sap, either unfinished or abandoned. The front line from which these communication saps originated was covered in thick timbers and descended abruptly to the south along Snipers’ Ridge. The first to reach the deep sap was Lieutenant la Touché and his men but Turks quickly killed them as they crossed the first transverse bend. Meanwhile Major Morshead, Lieutenant Youden and their men managed to push down the south-eastern branch of the sap, firing at some of the enemy who were trying to make their way to the rear. Youden and his men passed an intersection encountering no Turks and continued down the deep sap, close to the head of The Cup as it cut through Lone Pine. It was here that a party of Turks located further along the sap stopped their advance. The Australians started to tear down sandbags, mud bricks and anything else that came to hand to construct a barricade. This would become known as Youden’s Post. A little further south was Captain Cook and his men who had reached the same intersection passed by Youden and his men, but instead of following them, turned into the communication trench running in a south-westerly direction. They also found themselves being sniped at by Turks and they too started to tear down the surrounding sandbag and mud-brick parados to help barricade the sap. This position became known as Cook’s Post. While there was now some form of continuous line connecting the forward parties of 4th Battalion to the north with those of the 3rd Battalion at the centre, the men of the 2nd Battalion to the south were isolated from their sister battalions. The closest that the forward parties of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions came in contact was at the position held by Pinkstone at Tubb’s Corner and Youden near the head of The Cup. 10 2

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They were separated by about twenty metres. These forward positions were still far from secure against any coordinated Turkish counter-attack and if they fell, the very heart of the Pine would be lost. It must have seemed to them like a lifetime ago that these men had launched their attack against the Pine. Those who had time to look at their watches (if they had brought them) must have been shocked to realise that less than 30 minutes had passed since they had ‘hopped the bags’.

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9 ‘For God’s sake s e n d b o m b s ’

As the Australians were capturing the heart of Lone Pine, Major Zeki Bey reached the inner recesses of Owen’s Gully and found the commander of one of the battalions of the 47th Regiment along the lower slopes of Johnston’s Jolly. The moment we turned into that valley we came into fire from [the enemy] at the head of it … Near there I met the commander of one of the battalions which had been holding the centre of the Kanli Sirt front … I asked ‘What has happened?’ But he was clearly very shocked. He kept on saying, ‘We’re lost, we’re lost!’ I said, ‘I want you to tell me what the situation is and what you wish me to do.’ He said, ‘The situation is critical. My whole battalion remained in shelter of the trenches after the bombardment. I’m waiting here for the remnants of it – I have no-one now under my command. If any survive, I’m here to stop them and take them under my command.’ But there was no-one there except him. I saw it was useless to ask for information from him, and I didn’t want to lose time, so I asked him where was the commander of his regiment. He

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said that the C.O. had withdrawn into the zone of the 125th Regiment – that is Kirmezi Sirt, Johnston’s Jolly, on the north side of Owen’s Gully – and was at the rear shoulder of that hill, where he could see well what was happening.1

Zeki Bey found the regimental commander along the slopes of Johnston’s Jolly and approached the Colonel: ‘Don’t be anxious, Tewfik Bey; I have come with my battalion, which is very well rested and calm. We’ve come from rest (it was not true of course), and we’ll do whatever you want.’2 The colonel ordered that he take his men to the headquarters of the two battalions located below the head of The Cup. The commanding officer present would direct him to where he was most needed. They both climbed down into the valley and Zeki Bey realised that his battalion had got ahead of him; they had already started to approach the heights of Lone Pine using the communication saps.3 The Turkish survivors of the 47th Regiment still located on the Pine were clinging to the eastern edges of the plateau. Officers had been able to rally some men and tried to hold the end of numerous saps from the advancing Australians. As Zeki Bey reached the top of the plateau he found that his battalion had been pushed into the line by officers of the 47th Regiment. One group of Turks was holding the eastern end of the same sap now barricaded by McDonald and his men. Others were in the eastern sap that had originally intersected with the position held by Mackay and his men, the same sap that had earlier been held by the Turkish soldier who had killed Corporal Mills. This sap was now ‘held at about thirty-five yards from The Cup by a party of the 1/57th under its Hoja Mufti. This ‘priest’, a brave cool-headed man, was occupying an old, somewhat broken-down bay in which lay several dead … .’4 The mufti told Zeki Bey as he approached: ‘behind this place there are English’. The situation was ‘evenly balanced there, although from somewhere in the north a small cannon was enfilading any of our men who didn’t know their way about and exposed themselves to it’. The mufti stated to Zeki

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Bey: ‘Don’t be anxious about this flank – I’ll remain here.’5 Zeki Bey pushed on through a communication sap heading south – the situation when he arrived at the centre was extremely precarious as the Australians had managed to push close to the very edge of The Cup. At a corner of this sap he met a young officer who stated that the ‘communication trench is held by the Australians’.6 Indeed, just beyond the next traverse bend could be seen their bayonets. At this point the Turks were busy throwing cricket-ball grenades while the Australians were throwing back jam-tin bombs. The Turks continued to move along the available saps not occupied by the enemy. Zeki Bey could see that ‘the spirit of his supporting troops was shaken by their having to pass over wounded and dying men in order to reach the scene of the fighting’.7 He also later recalled: ‘the bombs were going over from both sides. In the trench behind me were dead and wounded, and the soldiers were stepping over them. This increased the emotion of the troops; they were in a state of high strain.’8 Before leaving to see what was happening at the most southern part of the line, he turned to the young officer: ‘You will bar this trench with your fire until we see what is happening elsewhere.’9 Zeki Bey continued on to the southern part of the line. He went out: … round to the left, to the extreme end of the gully; it was the highest part and the most important. On my way, as I emerged from the communication trench I met some NCOs and soldiers and asked: ‘What is the position? What has happened?’ They said: ‘the English reached even here – see, there are three of their dead here’, and I saw an Australian lying beside me.10

This position was now being defended by a handful of Turks in disconnected rifle pits; the enemy now occupied all the saps and trenches in this area.11 To help encourage the officers and men, Zeki Bey told them: ‘The trenches aren’t empty – we hold enough of them. Come with me and show me where these Australians are.’ The young officer took me to the point that I had just visited. I showed him that

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we had enough troops there ready with bayonets … from the back of the trenches I again looked towards the head of the gully. There were soldiers in the valley there, crowded in the same way as in the other approaches; so instead of going there I went up the central communication trench towards the same point I had visited before, and met there the officer commanding that section … An NCO reported that he could see a man putting up a flag apparently some distance farther along the trench. He asked: ‘It must be an Englishman.’ So he fired at him. The attack was at a standstill by then – at that very moment. It was obvious that the situation was critical. If any further attack came, we should lose the whole position. The only trench that we held running across the front was a very deep communication trench, running across the three other communication trenches, but without a fire step from which men could shoot over the top. I said: ‘Leave everything else, and quickly put fire steps in this trench so as to give us a definite line.’ So with bayonets and entrenching tools they began this at once. I ordered the NCO: ‘Tell your men in this trench to fire even if they don’t see the English, so as to make a barrage.’ The same thing was being done by soldiers on their own initiative, and thus a front line was established facing roughly from the Hoja’s position on the right to the head of the gully [The Cup] on the left … My whole battalion had by [now] been absorbed into the trenches and there was no reserve.12

The Turks now held just the rearmost positions of their old works. Only a few saps remained in their hands and it seemed that just one concerted effort by the enemy would push them off the plateau into the valley below. However, the Australians had no intention of doing so as they had gained their objectives and were now digging in to hold them.

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By 6 pm the Australians were manning the communication trenches on both flanks of the Pine and in the centre they occupied seven or eight isolated posts connected by as many communication saps. Major Zeki Bey’s men of the 1/57th Regiment along with the survivors of the 47th Regiment were already firing from their precarious positions along the landward edges of 400 Plateau to keep the enemy from trying to make a further advance to capture the whole of Lone Pine. Those Australians occupying the northern trenches of the Pine could see Turkish reinforcements coming in continuous lines along the floor of Owen’s Gully. Directly opposite at the Jolly a Turkish officer could be seen surveying the Pine through binoculars and he appeared to be dispatching orders to those in Owen’s Gully below.13 By contrast, however, the Turks now clinging to the rear of the Pine could see from their previous trenches any number of Australian trench periscopes silhouetted against the skyline. Major McConaghy, momentarily in charge of the 3rd Battalion, was located in the heart of Lone Pine. He sent a message back to the Pimple that reinforcements were urgently needed. This request was originally attempted using a ‘morse periscope’ but only the word ‘reinforcements’ was deciphered as the Turkish artillery fire against no-man’s-land meant the whole area was covered in dust and smoke. Fifteen minutes later, the signaller himself dashed across no-man’s-land with the message that the men of the 1st Battalion were needed to reinforce the line. Meanwhile, two other messages had also reached the Pimple. Lieutenant Colonel MacNaghten of the 4th Battalion who was at the Pine stated that he and his men had ‘penetrated 200 to 300 yards from the front trench, but that his left was weak, the Turks were massing to attack it, and reinforcements were required’. This was soon followed, however, by a contradictory message from MacNaghten: ‘Left safe. Centre wants a few men.’14 Confusion was to be the norm. Meanwhile, there was no place safe for the wounded. Nineteen-yearold Private Humphreys, who had attacked the Turkish works less than an 10 8

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hour before, had been wounded at the centre of the Pine. I lasted until about 6.30 pm when I was wounded. I looked around to see if I knew anybody alongside me and noticed that my chum and friend McClure was also wounded. I had started to bandage him when I felt dizzy – I suppose on account of loss of blood and he said ‘Lay down, sonny, and when you feel better you can bandage me up.’ I lay down and he said, ‘We are fairly safe here.’ And a shot came past me and killed him instantly.15

Colonel Smyth, commander of the 1st Brigade and in charge of the attack, was standing at the entrance of B5 tunnel at the Pimple from where he had been receiving messages and reports. He now started to send parties of men to reinforce the captured position. It was impossible given the urgency of the situation, however, to send these men through the tunnels, which were now choked with wounded and with working parties that were trying to push the tunnels and saps towards the captured works. The reinforcements would have to advance in the open across no-man’sland – still being torn up by Turkish shells and swept with enfilading machine-gun and small-arms fire. Captain Jacobs and his men ‘went over the top’ and dashed towards the southern part of the Pine. It was around 7 pm.16 Private Frederick Cherry was wounded while trying to cross the Daisy Patch and later recalled his experiences in trying to get back to the Pimple after dark as star shells burst directly above him: ‘I stood still and looked around and it was just as if it had been snowing. All our lads lying there dead, it was awful.’17 Charles Bean recorded in his diary that the men of the 1st Battalion began to ‘go over and reinforce … Enemy’s machine guns always told when our men were going forward. Not a man came back. Attempts to signal – telephone carried by two men came rushing back. Dropped into a hole. They took one line over, another line back. It got cut by shrapnel.’18 Lance Corporal Lawrence already knew that the lines were down. He was anxiously waiting for the line to be repaired when a runner

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came back from the Pine, jumping into the forward trenches and between breaths announced that “we’ve got five trenches and are still holding them, and trying to consolidate our gains”. Now the concern was can they hold them?’19 It was not only the telephone lines connecting the Pine to the Pimple that were being hit by Turkish fire. Lines between the 1st Brigade Headquarters at Brown’s Dip and those of the 2nd Brigade at Steele’s Post had been cut. Signalmen James McKinlay who had been watching the attack had returned to his dugout to have a rest when he heard the cry ‘Linesmen!’ He reported immediately to the signals office and was ordered to trace the line and repair it. McKinlay later wrote to his mother: After a few hundred yards we came to Artillery Road and it was here that our troubles grew fast, for the parapet along the road had been blown in and the Turkish shells were still trying to find our guns there. At one time there had been a dressing station on this road, but it had been blown to pieces … In a recess in the side of the road we passed an 18-pounder out of action. Shrapnel had killed the gun crew, who were lying alongside the gun. On arriving at our destination we found that nothing could be done … so we decided to return to our own brigade and run out a new line. While we were at 1st Brigade Headquarters it was being shelled heavily from all sides, and to make matters worse their wounded were returning from the firing line, half of them having little idea where they were … .20

At about this point a brushfire broke out in the dry scrub of no-man’sland and ‘moved remorselessly towards the stricken men. The yells and screams were plainly heard above the din of battle. The mental torture of their mates, forced to look on and listen while bombs and ammunition exploded in the equipment of the dying men, was hellish.’21

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Jacobs and his company had now reached the southern part of the Pine and Lieutenant Colonel Scobie, commander of the 2nd Battalion, positioned them in the right-flank sap. At this point Captain Sasse, with another company of the 1st Battalion, had arrived at the centre of the Pine and with men of the 3rd Battalion tried to bridge the gap between them and the men of the 2nd Battalion to the south. By 8 pm Lieutenant Colonel MacNaghten reported that ‘Turks were massing in OWENS [sic] GULLY … Colonel Brown reports OWENS [sic] GULLY full of Turks.’22 It was also at this point that the brigade advised that ‘2nd Bn holds enemy line to top of hill on right. Ammunition and bombs asked for to strengthen our position. Bde advised that we are in touch with 3rd Bn on left and that we have been reinforced by about 50 of 1st Bn … again asked for … bombs.’23

Lone Pine is connected to the Pimple by communication saps and tunnels sometime after midnight (Adapted from Bean, 1938)

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The two remaining companies of the 1st Battalion were funnelled in small groups through B5 tunnel to reach Lone Pine. Most of these men would be positioned to help reinforce the northern and central parts of the Pine. By 8.30 pm the whole of the 1st Battalion was occupying the works. The next reserve, men of the 12th Battalion, were making their way to Gun Lane on the Pimple and were summoned to stand ready for their advance to the Pine. Earlier Private William Tope of the 12th Battalion was looking at the original charge of the 1st Brigade through a telescope. ‘I observed the Lone Pine attack through my telescope, I saw them pulling the overhead trees that the Turks had put over parts of their trenches. It was about that spot where I got caught with a hail of bombs two or three nights later, and it was the pile of bodies there that sheltered me, otherwise I wouldn’t be here today.’24 By now the condition for both Australian and Turk was desperate, especially for the wounded. As recalled by Private John Gammage of the 1st Battalion when he entered the works: The moans of our own poor fellows and also Turks as we trampled on their wounded bodies was awful. We rushed them out of their 2nd and third line of trenches in half an hour. The wounded bodies of both Turks and our own in the 2nd and 3rd line, especially the third, were piled up 3 and 4 deep … the bombs simply poured in but as fast as our men went down another would take his place. Besides our own wounded the Turks’ wounded lying in our trench were cut to pieces with their own bombs. We had no time to think of our wounded … their pleas for mercy were not heeded … Some poor fellows lay for 30 hours waiting for help and many died still waiting.25

As the fighting raged in and around Lone Pine, back behind the main Australian lines cooks were working urgently to ensure that those about

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to go over to reinforce the position as well as those few returning would at least be supplied with a good hot cup of tea and stew. As recalled by Lance Corporal Lawrence: The cooks at the bivouac are boiling water for tea and trying, whilst dodging shells, bullets and fragments, to make a decent stew for tea. This will be carted up to the men (our Engineers) in the firing line. What they have gone through during the last hour has been Hell let loose and as soon as darkness falls, they will be called upon to dig trenches across to those of the enemy that we have just captured – digging away out in the open between the two lines, never knowing when the Turks may counter-attack, up what valley they’ll come, nor at what moment one may be singled out by a stray bullet either one of our own or of the enemy because they are flying across in all directions. The tea is now ready with seven men to carry it up. The shells are still flying over in scores, but when these fellows come down again we shall have a better idea of what is going on and what has been done and accomplished.26

While the luxury of a good hot cup of tea and stew was not possible for those fighting for their life in the Pine, one man had a mission to try and bring some relief to these men. The night before the attack, a colonel in a discussion regarding the issuing of the rum ration successfully argued that while its ‘issue will be a good tonic to the men in their present condition … I do not like the idea of giving it to men just before they go into action. We will have one issue in the morning and the other after the fight is over.’27 It was about two hours after the initial assault when a cobber with a demijohn full of rum on his shoulder came along to the entrance of a tunnel that would take him across to Lone Pine. The brigadier himself [Smyth] was at the mouth of the sap receiving messages, and, incidentally, trying to clear the sap to let some of the most urgent traffic through. All the traffic had

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to pass through 30 yards of narrow, pitch-dark tunnel, and then out over the heath, facing the gauntlet up to the parapet of the Turkish trench. Endless lines of men with ammunition, men with bombs, men with water, men with picks, shovels, sandbags, signallers, messages, engineers, stretcher-bearers, were filing at funeral pace into it, and the whole tunnel was constantly blocked, while they carried one or two poor badly wounded fellows back. I remember one pitiful procession that emerged from it, after at least 10 minutes’ struggle through the dark interior – first a seriously wounded man in a folding cane stretcher, next an army medical man, and after him, crawling on hands and knees out of the tunnel and down the trench towards the rear, another wounded man. Only those men whose presence was urgent were allowed to go through afterwards. ‘What are you carrying?’ ‘Bombs, sir.’ ‘Well, put them down here a moment, and stand by until that tunnel is clearer.’ ‘And what are you carrying, my man?’ ‘Third Battalion’s rum, sir.’ ‘What?’ ‘Third Battalion’s rum sir. Colonel put me in charge of it, and told me to see the …’ ‘Well, put it down here, and stand by.’ ‘The colonel told me to take it through, sir.’ ‘Well, put it down here for the present.’ ‘The colonel told me …’ ‘Look here! Never mind what you were told; put it down there at once!’ The rum-carrier put his heavy load down on the first fire step, and retired, obviously unsatisfied, for the moment. The colonel had told him the men would want their rum, and it was his duty

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to see it through. For a couple of minutes he watched the brigade staff dealing with infinitely important messages, and then the first time the brigadier looked up, he stepped forward again. ‘How about the Third Battalion’s rum, sir?’ ‘Oh, well get along with you,’ answered the brigadier, amusedly; and so he shouldered it and trudged out contentedly towards the heath and towards the bullets, and, I suppose, the Third Battalion got its rum.28

Major Zeki Bey had returned to the western edge of Kanli Sirt and had made his way through the few communication trenches still held by the Turks. It was now that he observed that one trench, just a few metres from the very edge of the plateau, was still being defended by his men. A communication trench running off the plateau down into Legge Valley below crossed each flank of this trench. It was this trench that would form the core of the Turkish defences at Lone Pine. Zeki Bey immediately put his men to work expanding the trench. At this point it didn’t even have a firing step so he at once ordered the men in this area to ‘leave all other work and, by digging fire-steps with bayonets, entrenching tools, or any available implement, to convert the sap into a fire-trench facing the Australian front’.29 By now the men of the Turkish 47th Regiment as well as the men of the 1st Battalion, 57th Regiment, had begun to establish an irregular defensive line consisting of what had previously been narrow communication trenches protecting the head of The Cup as well as the landward edges of Kanli Sirt just above Legge Valley. Zeki Bey had been supervising the defences of Lone Pine now for close to two hours and had put into the line all of his reinforcements. He realised that the Australians appeared to be digging-in rather than preparing to attack. As there was nothing more for him to do at this point, he moved off the Pine and headed for the headquarters of the 125th Regiment on Johnston’s Jolly to report the situation. Indeed, Zeki Bey had been wondering 115

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why relatively few reinforcements had been sent to him from the 125th Regiment. He later told Charles Bean after the war in 1919: My reason for going to Kirmezi Sirt was to ask the commander of the 125th Regiment there, Abdul Rasak Bey, who could see the situation very well from his headquarters, to turn fire on Kanli Sirt (Lone Pine) and demoralise the assailants there … At this headquarters I found the regimental commander of the 47th (which had been holding Lone Pine) and all his battalion commanders. Abdul Rasak said that the Australians [7th Battalion] on his front too were active – some of the sandbags had been taken down in their trenches (often a preliminary to going over the top) and they were firing heavily on his trenches and he thought he would be attacked. I said that things were more critical at Kanli Sirt – would he do at all costs what I asked? At the same time I noticed that Tewfik Bey, the commander of the 47th, was writing a report to the commander of his division (the 16th) in which he said: ‘After the attack by the enemy, the soldiers who have remained under my command have been pushed up again, and have retaken the front lines in my position; but they cannot hold on there – they need large reinforcements, and the troops who have gone up there are not enough.’ After seeing him sign this, I asked: ‘Major, what front line are you speaking of ? If you mean the trenches I’ve just left, the situation there is … ’ and I told him what I knew. From what he then said I inferred that he was speaking of the trench running along the side of Djemal Dere (Owen’s Gully) – a trench which was never occupied by the Australians. What had happened was that he had received a report from an officer or NCO there: ‘We have advanced (along that trench) up to the front line.’ But this was only on the extreme right, in Djemal Dere. I said ‘I will go back and do all I can, but you too, on your part, do all you can.’30

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The attack against 400 Plateau confirmed to Esat Pasa that the southern flank was where the enemy offensive was about to fall – if it hadn’t started already. Indeed, if the Allies were to attack at Anzac they had no choice – no-one would be mad enough to commit men to taking the northern heights. As stated by General Liman von Sanders: ‘The open space between the Ari Burnu front and the southern front [Helles] was the source of the greatest anxiety of the Fifth Army because a landing in that space would have endangered the rear of the southern front.’31 It was for this reason that German Colonel Kannengiesser and his Turks of the 9th Division had earlier been sent to cover the area south of Gaba Tepe. From this headland to just beyond the northern end of 400 Plateau were positioned the men of the 16th Division. Located between them and Battleship Hill were the battalions of the 19th Division and beyond them, to the north, were small parties of men from the 5th Division. This area was defended by the men of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 14th Regiment, who were scattered below the seaward side of the main ridgeline connecting Chunuk Bair and Hill 971; most were actually positioned down along the lower seaward slopes.32 Esat Pasa’s sole reserves at Anzac consisted of just three regiments. The Turkish 15th Regiment was positioned a little way south within the Kurt Dere (among the steep gullies about a kilometre inland from Chunuk Bair); the 13th Regiment was located further south within the valley of Kojadere (about a kilometre south-east from Scrubby Knoll). Immediately behind Mortar Ridge within the Anzac sector itself were two battalions of the 72nd Arab Regiment of Mustafa Kemal’s 19th Division; its third battalion had already been sent to German Officers’ Trench to replace Zeki Bey’s battalion who were now fighting at Lone Pine. Esat Pasa was now totally focused on reinforcing his southern flank – the expected offensive against Gaba Tepe and perhaps even Kilid Bahr

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Plateau itself had apparently begun. The first reserves to be ordered to retake Kanli Sirt were those of Lieutenant Colonel Ali Riza Bey and his men of the 13th Regiment. Indeed, he had been ordered by Esat Pasa to take command of the forces now around Kanli Sirt – he was to attack as soon as possible and retake the frontline trenches.33 It was now 8.30 pm. Soon afterwards the 15th Regiment was ordered to leave the relative quiet and safety of the northern area and reinforce the southern flank of Anzac. Not happy with this, Esat Pasa also ordered the 9th Division, located south near the Kilid Bahr, to march north to assist in the attack against Kanli Sirt.34 Birdwood’s plan appeared to be working – perhaps too well. The Turkish commander was indeed reinforcing the southern flank of Anzac with forces protecting his northern heights but he was also bringing up two regiments of the 9th Division from the south to the Anzac sector. This would provide him with a large number of reserves ready to be fed into any part of the Anzac sector at risk, including the Sari Bair Range.35

Since the very beginning of the attack against Lone Pine, the Australians of the 2nd Field Company and infantry fatigue parties had been digging furiously to push forward tunnels B5, B6 and B8 to link up with Lone Pine. Parties of engineers went forward immediately after the initial waves to begin digging communication trenches back to link up with those being driven forward from the old Australian line. Lieutenant Playne, who was with the 10th Australian Light Horse until a couple of days before the attack against Lone Pine, was transferred to the engineers a day or so prior to the attack. He dashed forward during the assault and entered the Turkish lines with the task of commencing one of these communication saps – he was killed that evening. His cobber Trooper Humfray Hassell, also of the 10th Light Horse, would be killed hours later at The Nek.36 By 9 pm the southernmost of these tunnels, B5, had been pushed 118

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out sufficiently into no-man’s-land and an opening made so that the men had only a relatively short space to cross in order to reach Lone Pine. By 1 am the tunnel itself would be connected to the Pine by an open sap. The central tunnel, B8, was also connected to Lone Pine by an open sap by 4  am.37 Tunnel B6 was the northernmost of the tunnels, and while some progress had been made in connecting it to the Pine, accurate Turkish sniper fire from Johnston’s Jolly and fromTurks who had crept into no-man’s-land inflicted such casualties that this sap had to be abandoned.38 As these essential communication saps were being pushed out towards the Pine, the Turks launched a number of localised attacks in attempts to retake at least some of their trenches. Indeed, these small-scale attacks were the beginning of the first phase of the ‘long and dreadful counterattacks for which the Battle of Lone Pine is chiefly famous’.39 The first of these focused on the southern parts of the Pine, against men of the 2nd Battalion. Sometime after 8.30 pm Captain Nash, who was located somewhere forward of the main Australian lines, sent a message for grenades. ‘For God’s sake send bombs.’ This was the last that anyone ever heard from him or his men. The details of their fate, or even the location of their deaths, was never established.40

Back at the Pimple, Lance Corporal Lawrence looked over at the Pine; he couldn’t see much except the continued flash of Turkish grenades and Australian jam-tin bombs as they fleetingly lit up a small deadly space. He could certainly hear what was going on: ‘… it was dark and there is almost continually a deafening roar and crackle of rifle fire from both sides. It is only by maintaining a continuous rifle fire that the position can be held. Louder and deeper sounding you can hear the bombs bursting as they are thrown between the trenches.’41 It was after dark that two companies of the 12th Battalion that had been standing to at the Pimple were sent over to reinforce the Pine. One was under the command of Major Lane, the other under Captain Mullen.

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.

Private Allan Thwaites of the 12th Battalion had no sooner arrived at the Pine when he was hit. I got hit right on my chest. Oh, it was an awful feeling! It was like a kick, and with that I felt I was in serious trouble. I could feel it had penetrated my lung and come out my back, and blood was coming out of my nose and mouth, and I was in a sorry state. I stayed in that dugout for two days … trying to breathe – I only had one lung you see – till the stretcher-bearers came and carried me down to the hospital ship. Then I went to Malta. The ship was a sorry plight. There were dying galore there. They’d got all the casualties from Lone Pine and the other attacks. That was very sad, to see some of the poor fellows lying beside you there and the hospital so full with seriously wounded … But it was remarkable, after a couple of days the wound seemed to heal over, and my lung seemed to come back and I was able to breathe.42

The diary of the 2nd Battalion recorded that by 9.30 pm: our wounded lying all over the trenches, and are hampering movement. Efforts being made to evacuate them. Our MO [Medical Officer] Captain AY Fullerton with two of the Bn’s AMC [Australian Medical Corps] units followed the last platoon over, and were doing good work. Enemy dead everywhere and we can’t avoid walking on them as they are so thick. Star shells being fired by artillery at regular intervals. Picks, shovels and sandbags are badly needed to prepare position for defence … Enemy’s bombing causing a number of casualties.43

Meanwhile the 7th Battalion, manning the trenches opposite Johnston’s Jolly, waiting for the order to ‘go over the top’ against this position were finally being informed that it was a ‘sacrifice’ that was probably no longer required, given the success of the Lone Pine attack. This seemed to have been confirmed when earlier (around 8 pm) an order from 2nd Brigade

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Headquarters reached Lieutenant Colonel ‘Pompey’ Elliott requesting him to send a company of his men to Brown’s Dip to help man the trenches previously occupied by the men of the 1st Brigade who were now fighting at the Pine. Later a couple of platoons had also been sent north to assist in the digging of the communication trenches that were needed in the imminent attack against German Officers’ Trench by the 6th Battalion.44 As such, the men of the 7th Battalion probably started to relax a little. It would be only a momentary reprieve as they would soon be called on to reinforce the Australians fighting for their lives at the Pine. Indeed, four Victoria Crosses would be awarded to men of the 7th Battalion for their actions over the next few days at Lone Pine.

Other small-scale Turkish attacks at Lone Pine fell on the two posts established by Cook and Youden, each defending the southern flank of the Australian’s position. Turks just below the head of The Cup continued a bombing campaign – the Australians themselves were throwing jam-tin bombs in reply. Men behind each ‘thrower and observer kept cutting fuses so that they would light quickly, but as the slow matches issued for lighting the fuses failed to work, pieces of sandbag were kept smouldering for the purpose, although when daylight came, the smoke from these gave away the positions and invited showers of bombs from the Turks.’45 It was not long before both of these forward posts were surrounded. Given that the Australians were on higher ground, they were able to provide enough covering fire to keep the Turks at bay – at least for the moment. Meanwhile, Captain Sasse and his men of the 1st Battalion had began a new trench leading from Tubb’s Corner towards Youden’s Post, which would further bridge the gap between these posts and the head of The Cup. Further north, overlooking Owen’s Gully, another bombing campaign was going on between Major Mackay and the Turks under the command of their mufti. Both communication trenches that ran

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down into the gully below allowed the Turks to surround three sides of Mackay’s position. He and his men were in an even worse situation then those at Tubb’s Corner as the communication bay was so large that the Turks could not miss when lobbing their grenades into the position. The Australians either picked up the grenades and attempted to throw them back or threw sandbags on them, but casualties from both dubious methods were fast accumulating. Replacements were being brought into the position as the men were either killed or wounded, lining up along the northern communication trench awaiting their turn to take up a position in the communication bay. The rear trenches were too full to allow the wounded to be evacuated and the replacements stumbled over the casualties as they took their place at the firing step. Many of the men who died here could have been saved if only they could have made their way to the beach. Mackay was under a great deal of stress and was becoming concerned that the position he was holding ‘possessed no importance commensurate to the losses among the men who had to be crowded into it’.46 He sent an urgent message to Lieutenant Colonel MacNaghten, commander of the 4th Battalion, that the position currently being held should be given up. Not long after sending this message, Mackay was wounded while throwing a sandbag (and himself) onto a grenade, the resulting explosion throwing him into the air. MacNaghten, on reading Mackay’s message and hearing that he had been wounded, sent Lieutenant Massie to assess the situation and to make sure that Mackay was sent to the rear for medical attention. Massie was not long in the post when he was himself seriously wounded, not by a bomb but by a bullet. He was stooping down to help a wounded man when a Turk suddenly popped up over the parapet, took a quick shot, hit Massie and then disappeared. Massie was carried out of the post, while Mackay refused to leave his position. Dawn would find him still there with his few survivors.47

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With each passing hour the Turks were massing their reserves to retake Lone Pine. It was also at this point that the Anzac, Indian and British troops who were to attack the Sari Bair Range began to push out onto the lower hinterland of North Beach towards the lower slopes and gullies of Chunuk Bair, the twin peaks of Hill Q and the highest peak of all – Hill 971.

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The plan for the main offensive from Anzac comprised four operations during the dark hours between 6–7 August. The Right Covering Force, comprising the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, would clear Turkish outposts from the northern foothills of the main range, capturing Old No. 3 Outpost, the Table Top, Destroyer Hill, Walden Point and Bauchop’s Hill. This would open the way for the Right Assaulting Column, the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, which would then push through the covering force, advance up Rhododendron Spur and capture Chunuk Bair on the main range. This was to be accomplished by 1 am on 7 August. After consolidating Chunuk Bair the New Zealanders were to advance south to capture Battleship Hill and Baby 700, meeting up with the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade who would attack The Nek just as the New Zealanders were attacking the same position from the rear. As the New Zealand Mounted Rifles were capturing the Turkish posts on the foothills, the Left Covering Force, two battalions of the British 40th Brigade, would advance along the coast, bypassing Walden Point, and clear Turkish positions within the Aghyl Dere and on the lower slopes of Damakjelik Bair. This would clear the way for the Left Assaulting Column, the 4th Australian Brigade and the 29th Indian Brigade. This column would pass around Walden Point and advance up 124

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the Aghyl Dere to a point where the 4th Australian Brigade would detach two battalions to protect its left flank further up Damakjelik Bair. The remainder of the column would continue until reaching the main fork in Aghyl Dere where two battalions of the 29th Indian Brigade would be detached to capture Hill Q just north of Chunuk Bair. The remainder of the column would climb over Damakjelik Bair into the next valley, Asma Dere, and up onto another ridge, Abdel Rahman Bair, which led to their objective – Hill 971. Both Hill Q and Hill 971 were to be captured by 1 am, the same time as the Right Assaulting Column would capture Chunuk Bair.

At 8.30 pm the Right Covering Force under the command of Colonel Andrew Russell began their task of clearing the Turks from the lower slopes of North Beach, including Old No. 3 Outpost below Chunuk Bair. Also assigned were two Maori platoons under the command of Captain Hastings. When night came on, the Maoris, like the old Scottish Covenanters and Cromwell’s soldiers, gathered for a religious service on the eve of battle. They mustered silently at the ‘Maori Pa’, as their camp at no. 2 was called, and there Captain Henare Wainohu, chaplain, addressed them. His brief earnest exhortation breathed the spirit of the warrior chief quite as strongly as that of the spiritual leader. ‘Whatever you do’, said the padre, ‘remember you have the mana, the honour and the good name of the Maori people in your keeping this night. Remember, our people far away in our native land are watching you, waiting eagerly, anxiously, to hear how you have behaved yourselves in battle. In a few minutes perhaps many of us may be dead. But go forward fearlessly, with but one thought. Do your duty to the last, and whatever comes, never turn your backs on the enemy. Go through with what you have to

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do, to the very utmost of your powers. Do your duty, uphold the ancient warrior name of the Maori.’ The reverberating thump and crash of artillery, the noise of shells overhead, the bursting of shrapnel, gave the touch of deadly realism to the padre’s speech.1

Trooper Noel Trolove of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles recalled: Of course every man realised that we were booked for one hell of a fight. The little problem allotted to our Squadron looked tough enough to suit anybody, I assure you. [Before we left] my section buried a few extra eatables we had, such luxuries as a half bottle of Lea & Perrin’s [Worcestershire sauce], a tin of condensed milk and some personal belongings, beside a scrub bush, with the understanding that if any of us came through they should dig them up and post the letters etc addressed to relatives. Incidentally I was the only one left to perform this duty for the other three, which I did a fortnight later.2

For six weeks now the British destroyer HMS Colne had come close to shore along North Beach, shone her search lights on Old No. 3 Outpost and at 9 pm precisely gave the Turkish position a 30-minute salvo as part of a ruse. By now most Turks expecting the shelling had either evacuated the post or those whose turn it was to man the position during the bombardment took what shelter they could. Just before the expected bombardment the Mounted Rifles began to file out of No. 2 Outpost in the darkness and began to move up the southern gully of Sazli Beit Dere towards the well-fortified and defended Old No. 3 Outpost, less then 500 metres away. Only the bayonet was to be used. As had now become the ritual, the destroyer at 9 pm turned her searchlights on Old No. 3 Outpost and gave her ‘what for’.

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As the bombardment began, the leading squadron of the Auckland Mounted Rifles took up positions just below the southern slopes of the post – just behind the wall of flame enveloping the position. The 11th Squadron was positioned on the left, the 3rd on the right and the 4th Squadron positioned behind them in reserve.3 Sergeant Ken Stevens of the 11th Squadron later recalled: ‘The shells seemed to have a very nasty crack and crash, above our heads, into the trenches and I could not help feeling that one would fall short on us.’4 By now the two Maori platoons under the command of Captain Hastings had been sent out ahead to destroy barbed-wire entanglements in the Sazli Beit Dere. Midway through the bombardment, small parties of selected men, picked for their skill with the bayonet, began to slowly creep up the slopes in anticipation of the rush to capture the position as soon as the shelling ceased at 9.30  pm.5 In so doing, a picket of four Turks were bayoneted, while some of the New Zealanders involved were wounded in

500 metres

Right covering force – Auckland Mounted Rifles (Adapted from Bean, 1938)

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the melee. The troopers of the Mounted Rifles had now crept up towards the trenches of Old No. 3 Outpost; no alarm had been raised and even if one had, it would not have been heard above the crescendo of the shelling that enveloped the post. As arranged, the destroyer’s shelling now started to burst on the slopes to the rear of the post, although its searchlight still focused on the position itself. At 9.30 pm the light was extinguished and the shelling ceased. The New Zealanders let out a deafening cheer and stormed into the post.6 Sergeant Stevens recalled: Harry Mackesy and the bombing squad scrambled up the cliff face … half the squad went with Harry and I, with the other half, went straight ahead to cut the Turks off at the rear … In the pitch black darkness I fell into the first trench on top of the cliff and then ran on falling across two narrow trenches, but I did not stop until I reached the high ground on the far side of [Old] No. 3 Outpost.7

The front of Old No. 3 Outpost was well constructed and resembled the defences of Lone Pine with overhead covers and wire covering the approach. Overhead timbers, however, did not cover the flanks, and given that the two attacking squadrons charged the southern flank, they were able to jump into the very heart of the post. Eight Turks, in a ‘detached post, were bayoneted almost before they were aware of the presence of danger, and the troopers, without slightest hesitation, dropped down through openings in the overhead cover into the absolute blackness of the trench … some desperate hand-to-hand fighting took place in the dark.’8 They also killed a Turk who was manning a switchboard connected to twenty-eight box-mines that guarded the front of the post. The Turk was killed before he could detonate them. Within minutes the New Zealanders had captured the position. Stevens now found himself alone, most of his mates had charged on after the fleeing Turks. There was ‘rifle fire and bombs exploding back where Harry and his party went, and shortly after I heard men scuttling

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through the scrub up the hill, but I did not know whether they were friends or foes. I lay low as I was not game to go back or I may be shot for a Turk.’9 Most of Stevens’ comrades had moved to the rear of the post, near the slopes that led up towards the Table Top, and it was here that most of the Turkish garrison had taken shelter during the bombardment. The New Zealanders charged, bayoneting and bombing the Turks out. The enemy had been taken completely by surprise and most were forced to retire up the slopes from the ferocious attack. A Maori contingent followed closely behind the Aucklanders. About a hundred yards further on up the difficult slope of the ridge they were confronted by a long crescent-shaped trench. Captain Dansey, Captain Tahwiri, Lieut. Hiroti and one or two men (including the bugler, Corporal H Tahiwi) jumped into the trench and worked down it in advance of their men; it was impossible to keep closely in touch in the darkness. The Turks still held this trench further on, and the Maoris could hear their voices. The advance party worked towards them, and Captain Dansey said ‘Let’s charge them!’ This the little party did. They yelled as they went, with bayonets at the charge. ‘Ka mate, ka mate!’ ‘Ka ora, ka ora!’ – the ancient Maori battle-song. It was taken up with tremendous voice by the men following them. On they went for the Turks; there was no breath to finish the chant; they needed it to push the bayonet home. The lads hurled themselves at the foe like a band of destroying angels; with bayonet and rifle butt they cleared the trench; only the dead and dying remained.10

Around 100 Turks now lay dead and dying; the New Zealanders lost Lieutenant Mackesy and six other men, with fifteen wounded. By 10 pm the Auckland Mounted Rifles along with the Maori contingent had subdued all resistance and occupied the position and began to transform

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Old No. 3 into a New Zealand stronghold. A major obstacle to the capture of Chunuk Bair had been overcome.11

Rhododendron Spur falls gently from the summit of Chunuk Bair with three offshoots. The northernmost, Cheshire Ridge, leads to Bauchop’s Hill and ultimately down to Walden Point, while its central spur terminates abruptly at Table Top and falling down to Old No. 3 Outpost. The southernmost offshoot is defined by Destroyer Hill. Immediately south of Destroyer Hill, the main wadi is defined by Sazli Beit Dere, which itself leads steeply up to Chunuk Bair. A tributary of the gully leads to the northern side of Destroyer Hill and then forks; between them is the towering Table Top.12 As the Auckland Mounted Rifles and the Maori contingent stormed into Old No.  3 Outpost, the Wellington Mounted Rifles, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Meldrum, who had been waiting at the entrance of the Sazli Beit Dere, now moved up the gully, pushing on past the battle to their left. Their objective was the capture of Table Top that dominates Old No. 3 Outpost. The post could not be held without also capturing the small but high plateau. The Wellington Mounted Regiment had the unenviable task of storming the almost sheer cliffs of Table Top; but before doing this they also needed to capture a communication trench to their right, located along Destroyer Hill. The British destroyer had not yet departed; she again flicked on her searchlight at 9.40 pm, focusing on Table Top. With this, her guns, along with the shore-based British howitzers, opened up on the position and would do so until 10 pm. Trooper Clutha Mackenzie later described the bombardment: ‘The overhanging crag, her summit rent by inferno of shell fire, her inaccessible escarpment lit by the lurid glow of scrub fires, and the fantastic smoke clouds eerily revealed by the searchlight, made altogether a wild night battle scene of weird glory.’13 The plan was that both Destroyer Hill and Table Top would be captured and occupied by 130

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Right covering force – Wellington Mounted Rifles (Adapted from Bean, 1938)

the troopers of the Wellington Mounted Rifles sometime before 11 pm. In the lead was the 6th Squadron, with the 2nd close behind, who had the task of taking Table Top, while the 9th Squadron was to hold it afterwards.14 Accompanying the regiment were linesmen dragging their telephone lines up the gully. Major Charles Dick, in charge of the 6th Squadron of the Wellington Regiment, now cried out ‘Come on, boys’15 and he and his men charged the trench on Destroyer Hill. While the Turks defending the position let loose a fusillade against the attackers, the New Zealanders did not return fire – they had been ordered to use the bayonet. In the charge, four of the major’s men were killed, and he along with seven others were wounded, but the trench was captured. Parties of New Zealanders proceeded to climb up from Destroyer Hill towards the immediate ridge above, Rhododendron Spur, which overlooked Table Top. As they reached the ridge and began to fan out they encountered a number of Turks, bayo-

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neting around twenty and capturing eight. They proceeded to occupy the trenches along the spur. Meanwhile other troopers of the same squadron had captured the lower parts of the communication trench which led to Old No. 3 Outpost, while the two remaining squadrons moved further up Sazli Beit Dere and by 10.30 pm had approached the foot of Table Top from the seaward slopes.16

From the lower slopes of Sazli Beit Dere, Table Top and Rhododendron Spur represented significant features. At this point the Sazli Beit Dere divides into two main gullies. The southern and southeast-running gully has its origins from Rhododendron Spur, while the northern and northeast-running gully (later called Hughes’ Gully) has its origins from Table Top. The New Zealanders were supposed to approach Table Top from the southern gully, however, Lieutenant Colonel Meldrum later explained: … it could be seen that a mass of scrub and dwarf trees ran for some distance up the slope. As it would prove very difficult, and certainly noisy, to go through this, after a few minutes’ discussion with the Squadron Leaders Majors Elmslie and Chambers, I altered the plan of attack and decided to penetrate right up to the blind end of the dere, where a ridge running from Old No. 3 Post joined onto the north-west end of Table Top, to scale the ridge near the junction and to make the attack on Table Top from behind its right shoulder. This did not take long and we went on up the Dere. Hereabouts we had a very awkward five minutes. We realised that any moment we might be fired on either from the trenches on Table Top above us on the right or from the Ridge on the left. But the darkness was all in our favour. But suddenly when we were halfway along the Dere an incendiary bomb went off on top of the Ridge about 100 yards behind us on the left and set

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fire to some scrub. Word was sent back along the line to lie down. For fully five minutes the scrub blazed, lighting up both the Ridge and Table Top. We expected any moment to be seen but the low bushes along the side of the Ridge must have thrown a shadow across the Dere which kept us out of sight. As the fire died down we rose and moved forward again until we reached the blind eye of the Dere. Here we halted for five minutes to select a route and still in single file we started to climb the steep face. Major Elmslie led, using an entrenching tool to cut steps where needed. The hillside here was dry clean earth, free from stones and no sound was made by the falling earth as the steps were cut. On getting over the top of the Ridge, a halt was made and some 20 men had assembled. With bayonets fixed these went on up the hill to the trench at the rear of Table Top. A small Turkish outpost was overpowered and silenced.17

The troopers of the 6th Squadron had successfully stormed onto Table Top and to their surprise found very few Turks occupying the position. Those that were there were quickly killed with the bayonet. Most of the Turkish garrison had earlier moved down Chailak Dere on hearing the attack against Old No. 3 Outpost. In addition to the men of the 6th Squadron attacking the position, a platoon of Maoris had crept quietly up Chailak Dere. In the gully between ‘Bauchop’s Hill and Old No. 3 Outpost a party of Turks fired on the Maoris, who saw red and slew the Turks to a man. Chasing the enemy up the gully, the Maoris never stopped until they were round the back of Table Top, and were only with great difficulty restrained from tackling Sari Bair by themselves!’18 Table Top proved to be a small flat plateau about a hectare in size, with a trench overlooking Sazli Beit Dere. The men of the 9th Squadron now joined up with their cobbers of the 6th Squadron. 133

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Patrols of the Wellington Regiment were immediately sent out to protect the northern approach. These men soon found along the northern slopes of the razor edge a well-worn track connecting Old No. 3 Outpost to Table Top. A number of men were placed along this track as a picket. Within half an hour around twenty unsuspecting Turks were captured as small parties tried to cross the track. It was now around 11.30 pm.19

Earlier, as the HMS Colne’s searchlight had turned on Table Top, the Otago and Canterbury Mounted Rifles, along with a platoon of Maoris, located near the entrance to Chailak Dere began their advance north. The Otago Mounted Rifles, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Bauchop, advanced northward until it reached the nearest southern spur leading onto Bauchop’s Hill. From here they were to climb onto the ridgeline and continue their advance along the ridge towards the heights above. The Canterbury Mounted Rifles, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Findley, moved further north; their objective was the capture of the Turkish position at Walden Point, located close to where Bauchop’s Hill terminates into the coastal plain. After capturing the position, most of the regiment would advance up Bauchop’s Hill and join up again with the Otago Regiment. It was known that a number of Turkish outposts were located along the slopes of Bauchop’s Hill, some containing machine guns. The New Zealanders had spent the last two months carefully observing these positions from their own trenches.20 One of these was on Wilson’s Knob located close to the beach, just north of No. 2 Outpost. This machinegun post completely enfiladed the entrance to Chailak Dere, which was also screened by a wall of barbed wire. During the last few days, it had been noticed that small naval Nordenfeldt guns had also been positioned behind Bauchop’s Hill as well as a pair of highly accurate 75-mm field guns. These had been firing the odd salvo at the Anzacs located at Nos. 134

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Right covering force – Canterbury Mounted Rifles (From Bean, 1938)

1 and 2 Outposts. Lieutenant Hargest of the Otegos recalled: Machine guns traversed the flat and caught the troops in enfilade. The trenches in front poured in a tremendous fire, assisted by Nordenfeldts, and at least one mortar. The first mortar bomb set alight a huge bush opposite our line of march, lighting up the little valley like day. Worse still, the destroyer, for a few moments, turned its searchlight full on us as we doubled across the small flat. On the left, within a few yards, a small fortified post called the Coronet fairly belched fire as we passed, and one marvels now that any survived. The leading troop passed comparatively safely, but the three following suffered terribly, and it is to their everlasting credit that they went straight on, though each lost its leader in the first few minutes.21

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In addition to these obstacles, it was also known that a Turkish bivouac was positioned along the northern slopes of Bauchop’s Hill within the Aghyl Dere. It was the job of the Otago and Canterbury mounted regiments to sweep these Turks off Bauchop’s Hill as well as clear them from Chailak and Aghyl deres. Engineers accompanying these regiments were assigned to demolish the enemy’s barbed wire blocking the Chailak Dere. Some of the Otago Mounted Rifles avoided the wire entanglements by climbing Bauchop’s Hill from forward spurs. This approach, however, was covered by the Turkish fire on Wilson’s Knob. The advance of the Otago troopers had been observed by the Turks along Bauchop’s Hill and soon the regiment was suffering casualties from the Turkish fire. The 12th Squadron turned inland and forced its way onto the seaward side of the Hill near Wilson’s Knob; the Turks by now had heard the cheering of the Aucklanders as they captured Old No. 3 Outpost. The Maoris there performed a haka that could be heard as far away as Table Top and each of the other Outposts, with everyone else joining in with three hearty cheers.22 Not surprisingly this rattled the Turks and they started to evacuate the lower slopes, including those of Bauchop’s Hill. The 12th Squadron soon overran a number of trenches and found themselves about 200 metres along the ridgeline. Lieutenant Hargest wrote: At the crest of the first rise we came on the enemy, and with contact came our revenge. There was a fierce scramble in the trench, loaded rifle versus bayonet, and we gathered ourselves together and went on. Higher up, almost by instinct, we made the required half-turn right, then on again. Five times in all we came on the enemy trenches, and the procedure was the same – a rush in the dark, a fierce struggle, the gathering up of the reduced force, and on again.23

Meanwhile most of the troopers from the Otago 5th and 7th Squadrons had come up against the barbed-wire entanglements stretched across Chailak Dere, which was also enfiladed by fire from the Turks on

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Bauchop’s Hill. Trooper Murray Richards and his mates of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles were moving ‘into the creek but the Turks must have had wind of our intended attack; just as we got into the creek they opened fire … we did not fire a shot as we went out without any cartridges in our rifles. We were told to take the place with the bayonet and by jove we did in great style … two Turks came around a bush and I got them both.’24 Lieutenant Twisleton took charge of clearing the wire. ‘A section of the Field Troop of New Zealand Engineers, gallantly led by their subaltern, attacked the wire with great determination and, after sustaining many casualties, succeeded in opening the dere to the men of the Otago Regiment and Maoris who pressed on up the gully towards their objective.’25 The engineers cut the wire into sections and hauled it away using grappling hooks. When the engineer’s officer was wounded, Twisleton himself went out to attach grappling hooks to the wire half-a-dozen times and, although under rifle and machine-gun fire, somehow survived.26 With the wire cleared, the troopers of the 5th and 7th Squadrons as well as the Maori platoon met up with those of the 12th on Bauchop’s Hill. At the point near the Turkish bivouac, however, the enemy’s resistance stiffened. It was now probably sometime just after 11 pm.27

Meanwhile the Canterbury Regiment had been pushing further north along the beach towards the Turkish position at Walden Point. Two squadrons advanced, with a third squadron and a platoon of Maoris following behind in reserve. Scouts had been sent and during their advance a number of isolated Turkish pickets were killed with the bayonet. As they advanced, the bulk of the men passed beneath the destroyer’s searchlight and were spotted and fired on by the Turks garrisoning Walden Point about 500 metres north. The flashes of at least two machine guns could be seen originating from the post. With this burst of machine-gun fire, Lieutenant Colonel Findley, commander of the regiment, was shot through the thigh.28 Trooper Noel Trolove recalled:

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… word passed for the No. 3 of each Section, who carried the Section’s wire cutters, to report in front. As my No. 3, Trooper R Lusk, passed me he grabbed my hand and whispered ‘Goodbye old man, I won’t see [you] again.’ I said, ‘Rot, Bob.’ ‘No! Something tells me I’m for it’, he said and was gone in the dark. Sure enough, he was right, for next morning he was found dead before the muzzle of one of the machine guns on Walden’s with his wire cutters still in hand … Trooper F Jarman also handed me a letter at this time, saying he thought that I would come through, but he wouldn’t. He was right too, for he was mortally wounded five minutes later.29

The 10th Squadron rushed up the lower slopes leading straight to Walden Point and took up a position behind the trench parapets, while the 1st Squadron moved around the right of the position. Noel Trolove continues: Luckily the guns on the top could not depress far enough to harm us as we came close under the hill … we made our way up the slope and gathered under the parapet of the trench which ran along the lip, and lay there for what seemed a long time, to get breath back, while the Turk garrison who could not see us poked their rifles over the parapet and fired at random. Some of our fellows caught the rifles as they came over and had a tug-ofwar. We lay there probably only a minute or two, with the whole countryside away back to Anzac in an uproar. Then a whistle blew and we were over the parapet with a rush and in among the garrison. Those Turks died hard, and we lost a lot of splendid fellows around those two guns … Most of the garrison were bayoneted as no prisoners were to be taken that night. Troopers chased Turks over the flat top of the hill, some of the Turks squealing, and one in particular as he dodged and twisted and turned with several men after him. It wasn’t a pleasant sound.30

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Meanwhile, the 1st Squadron had successfully advanced to the right and approached the Turkish position through a narrow pass soon to be known as Taylor’s Gap, which separated Walden Point from the northwestern end of Bauchop’s Hill: ‘Tap, tap, tap’ went the gun [machine gun], exacting a heavy toll; but a subaltern, named Davidson, who gained the ridge higher up, collected a few ardent spirits, and with fixed bayonets, charged straight down the slope. The dirt thrown up by the angry bullets flicked in their faces as they ran straight for the gun. Down tumbled the subaltern, killed leading his men, but the remnants of the party fell upon the gun crew. The keen bayonets did their silent work, and the gun ceased its death-dealing tapping.’31

Having seized the position along with four other trenches on Walden Point, the troopers of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles turned inland, crossing Taylor’s Gap and silently moving up Bauchop’s Hill to rendezvous with the Otago Regiment. ‘The ground was so broken, the twists in the gullies so confusing, that all cohesion was lost. But the troopers knew that their duty was to press on up the hill, so up the hill they went.’32 It would not be long before advanced parties of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles on their way up the hill would join with Lieutenant Colonel Bauchop and his men from the Otago Mounted Rifles. Stubborn Turkish resistance further up the hill near the Turkish bivouac was causing more delay. The troopers needed to clear the way ahead for the infantry – there was only one thing for it, the Canterbury and Otago men would have to charge with the bayonet. Back at Colonel Russell’s Headquarters at No. 2 Outpost, Captain King recorded in his diary: ‘we heard a lot of fighting going on by Bauchop’s Hill, so concluded Canterbury and Otago had … arrived. But had evidently run into something pretty solid from the row going on – also from the fact that the Turks over the way opened up with a 75-mm gun and a 6-inch bomb thrower which started peppering the hill we were on.’33

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Immediately after the Canterbury troopers had come up on the left, Bauchop let out a yell ‘Come along, boys, we’ll charge!’34 In the charge he was mortally wounded through the spine, but the position was taken. Private Peter Tahitahi, advancing with the combined South Island mounteds, later recorded that there were ‘dead Turks in the trenches, some of them were half dead, just laying there – you could feel it when you tramped on them – breathing. We just turned the bayonet with the rifle round and finished them off.’35 Trooper Jack Young of the 12th Squadron, Otago Mounted Rifles, later recorded: ‘Not a shot was fired as we had orders to do it all with cold steel and empty rifles. The Turk trenches were up to eight feet deep and covered with heavy timber in many places. Falling into one, my main concern after the Turks fled was not to be shot by fellow diggers, mistaking me for a Turk. I was soon hauled out by clinging there to the end of a friendly rifle.’36 Trooper James Fyfe of the Otago Mounted Rifles recorded the next day in his diary: ‘Turks retire in a hurry leaving all their gear behind. Silver swords, silk quilts etc … We camped on the hill for the night, and entrenched in the morning. Colonel Bauchop seriously wounded. Several men have been sniped and some of them killed.’37 Captain Buck, medical officer for the Maori contingent, later recorded in his diary: News came through that Colonel Findlay, of the Canterbury’s, was wounded, I offered for service and went out with my stretcher-bearers. We met Findley on the way, shot through the thigh. I sent him in and went on to pick up the Canterbury wounded on the left of our position (Walden Point). Saw the Australian infantry passing through in the valley near Canterbury Ridge. They had captured half-a-dozen Turks who had been left behind and had them ringed around with bayonets. We passed to the foot of Walden’s ridge and picked up several Canterbury wounded. Some were very bad, shot through the lungs, some with broken legs. We did our best for them and sent some in with our stretcher-bearers. Saw five or six dead lying about, including a

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Turk. We went up the ridge to the Turkish trench captured and saw two wounded and two killed; did what we could. There was a captured machine gun in the trench. Came down, saw the Canterbury stretcher-bearers, and located Captain Guthrie, who had established an aid post in the same gully but had been working the other ridge. Meanwhile Gurkhas and other troops were passing through the valley and passing inland. We went thoroughly over the ridge that we had partly done, and whilst exploring it for wounded we were nearly shot at by Gurkhas; the General considered there was nobody on their left. Before this we could hear our men doing splendidly. Rattle of musketry, then silence, and the loud English cheer, followed by a Maori haka. Owing to the Maoris being distributed, the hakas came from every ridge. Everybody is pleased with our men.38

Gradually the Turks gave way and the few survivors receded up the hill towards the northern heights, their positions only given away by the crack of their rifles and the flash as bullets left their chambers. The way was now clear for the Right Assaulting Force; it was now approaching 1 pm – the offensive was now already two hours behind schedule.

Just as the Right Covering Force of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles was launching its assault against the lower slopes, the Left Covering Force consisting of the two battalions from the British 40th Brigade, 4th South Wales Borderers and the 5th Wiltshire, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Travers, began their mission of clearing the Turks from the Aghyl Dere and the major spur known as Damakjelik Bair. This would enable the Left Assaulting Column, under the command of Major General Cox, to push on and capture Hill 971 and the twin peaks of Hill Q. The lower part of Aghyl Dere is broad and shallow; further inland

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it is defined by a tangled mess of tributaries and dead ends. Its sides are steep and rugged, forking into two main tributaries. The southern of these valleys leads to a 100-metre-high plateau, known as The Farm just below Chunuk Bair. The northern valley leads up to the inland heights of Damakjelik Bair. This major spur is represented by a cluster of steep and roughly parallel ridges that fall abruptly from the main spur near the peaks of Hill Q and Hill 971.39 At 9.30 pm, when HMS Colne had first turned off her lights against Old No. 3 Outpost, the British 4th South Wales Borderers in front began to move up the shoreline towards Aghyl Dere and Damakjelik Bair. Near Chailak Dere there was delay as a result of some intermixing of some parties of the Australian 13th Battalion, who had reached that point a little ahead of time. The British continued on as fighting erupted to their right; the New Zealanders and Turks were now in the thick of it. The British troops continued on, bypassing Walden Point then being captured by the New Zealanders, and soon came across the opening into the Aghyl Dere. On approaching the dere, however, they could see in front the outline of a trench blocking their way. The British rushed the position and the few Turks present retreated. They pushed on and by 11 pm, with the 4th South Wales Borderers under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Gillespie still in front, began climbing the southern slopes of the Damakjelik Bair. Lieutenant Napier of that battalion recalled: When we moved out to assault Damakjelik Bair, which was supposed to be held by the Turks, I don’t think anybody had any idea as to what we would come up against. One knew nothing and saw nothing you might say. As far as I was concerned there was no difficulty in getting up, it was a straight run in the dark, with my troops. It wasn’t particularly dark, but you couldn’t see much because the country was so encrusted with nullahs, hills, steep ravines and so on. I was the left platoon of the whole of the Left Covering Force. We went up this slight rise and there were some trenches at the top. Very indifferent ones, the Turks were not

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there in any great force. I saw a few Turks but they gave, as far as I was concerned, no trouble. Having arrived at the point which we were due to get to I was standing there in the dark waiting to see what was to happen. Suddenly a bomb went off, not far from me, which lit up the whole scene around me. I was looking back towards our line and I saw one of my fellow platoon commanders, Taffy Jenkins, charging straight at me with a rifle and bayonet. I remember saying: ‘Hello Taffy, where are you going?’ I happened to make this casual remark because his platoon should have been some way off. Some days later Taffy rather hesitantly said: ‘You know Joe, that evening I was just going to bayonet you, if that bomb hadn’t lit the atmosphere and you hadn’t said, ‘Hello Taffy’, I think you’d have been a dead man much to my regret!’40

By 1.30 pm the British Left Covering Force had achieved its objective and occupied much of Damakjelik Bair. In the process they had taken around 200 Turkish prisoners. Along with the New Zealanders they had cleared much of Aghyl Dere. The British now started to dig in along Damakjelik Bair.41 The New Zealanders and British had done an outstanding job of clearing the lower foothills. Charles Bean later wrote: ‘this magnificent feat of arms, the brilliance of which was never surpassed, if indeed equalled, during the campaign, almost the entire Turkish defence north of Anzac was for the moment swept aside and the way cleared for the infantry to advance up the valleys to Chunuk Bair’.42

Earlier, the British 9th Corps had, at around 9.30 pm, started to land further north at Suvla Bay. Within 30 minutes they had managed to get four battalions ashore without suffering a single casualty. The landing was a complete surprise and the troops walked ashore facing no opposition. The main offensive had started all the way along the line. The Turkish commanders were still focusing all their energies on reinforcing 143

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their southern flank at Lone Pine. The northern heights and inland hills around Suvla Bay lay open for the taking. At 1st Australian Divisional Headquarters just behind the Pimple, Lieutenant Colonel White recorded in his diary on 6 August: ‘Battle of LONE PINE. Successful attack on enemy trenches. Big losses. Up all night. Great deal of shell fire. Enemy rigorously counter-attacked.’43

Earlier, a Light Horse Brigade Intelligence Officer Lieutenant Tom Kidd wrote in his diary on the night before their attack against The Nek that ‘sleep is almost denied and the work is arduous’. He was privy to the arrangements for the charge against the Turkish position just 30 metres away and wrote: Preparations for the advance are now complete. Operation orders are to the following effect. An attack is to be launched against the enemy positions on Baby 700 @ daybreak tomorrow (the 7th inst). The assault to be made in four lines: 1st Line

8th Light Horse

2nd do

8th Light Horse

3rd do

10th Light Horse

4th do

10th Light Horse

Supports –

9th Light Horse

Reserves –

British Territorials

No jackets to be worn, all ranks to charge in shirtsleeves, each individual to wear large patch of white cloth on his back. No magazines to be charged and rifles unloaded. Regimental bombers to accompany each front line of their own unit. Water bottles filled, emergency rations, in addition to 24 hrs

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rations to be carried. Each line to carry marker flags to denote position to artillery. Ladders to be taken by 1st line.44

It was now time for the second stage of the attacks against the northern heights to commence. Johnston’s New Zealand Infantry Brigade, which formed the right assaulting column, was to make its two-pronged advance to Chunuk Bair. The Canterbury Battalion was to leave No. 2 Outpost and make their way up Sazli Dere. Meanwhile the Otago, Wellington and Auckland Battalions, along with the 1st Field Company of New Zealand Engineers, the 26th Indian Mountain Battery and a contingent of Maoris moved out from north of No. 3 Outpost and up the Chailak Dere. The leading battalions, the Otago and Canterbury, were scheduled to reach the head of Rhododendron Spur by 2.30  am and from there they were to immediately charge up the ridge to the summit of Chunuk Bair. Major General Cox’s left assaulting column, consisting of Monash’s 4th Australian Brigade, his own 29th Indian Brigade, along with the 2nd Field Company of New Zealand Engineers and the 21st Indian Mountain Battery were now marching north along the beach. They were to pass Walden Point and turn into the Aghyl Dere. On reaching a track about 1500 metres into the gully, the 13th and 14th Battalions of Monash’s brigade were to detach and take up covering points on Damakjelik Bair, extending their northern flank. Another 270 metres beyond the track, Aghyl Dere forks and here the 6th and 10th Gurkhas were to detach, making their way up the right to storm the twin peaks of Hill Q that lay above, while the remainder of the troops would proceed up the left fork to Abdel Rahman Bair, about a kilometre distant. As the Gurkhas were capturing Hill Q , the rest of the Australians and Indians would be storming up the ridge of Abdel Rahman Bair to capture the highest peak of the range – Hill 971. 145

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Both assaulting columns had less than three hours of darkness left in which to traverse the steep gullies and ridges and then launch their attacks against the entrenched enemy above. This was a daunting task by any stretch of the imagination as it had taken almost six hours just to clear the lower slopes and this was relatively easy country compared to the heights yet to be climbed, attacked and conquered.

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PART 3

7 AUGUST 1915

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11 ‘I knew how hope l e s s wa s t h e j o b ’

Just as the lower slopes of the northern heights were being cleared of Turks, to the south along Second Ridge the first of the feints to assist in the capture of Baby 700 and The Nek was about to commence: the attack against German Officers’ Trench. The Trench was positioned on a slight knoll and just south of it was the isolated post known as Snipers’ Trench, each connected by a communication sap running along the landward slope of the ridge. It was impossible to hold the lower position of Snipers’ Trench while the Turks held Johnston’s Jolly. Only German Officers’ Trench was to be captured. Snipers’ Trench was to be cleared of Turks and the trench back-filled where possible.1 Charles Bean described German Officers’ Trench before the attack: … it appears innocent enough – nothing more than a few sandbags and pieces of timber protecting a yard-wide cutting in the hillside. It runs irregularly in many directions however, and the saps form an X where they join the front line directly opposite Steele’s Post. It was the scene of hard fighting just after the landing, but since then the enemy have not let a day pass without adding to its strength in some way, and they have placed machine guns at every possible point to sweep its approach in the event of

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the Australians attempting to make a surprise attack by night or day.2

The attack against German Officers’ Trench was to be launched from ‘tunnelled trenches’ pushed out under no-man’s-land towards the Turkish position from Steele’s Post, numbering six in all. The underground tunnels and trenches were originally designed as a defence measure against the Turks. The ‘roof ’ had been thinned so that anyone passing over it would fall through – a secret waterless moat. Like Lone Pine it was decided to use a secret trench system as the jumping-off position for the attack. The trenches were to be opened just before the attack.3 Four hundred men of the 6th Battalion were allocated to the attack under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Bennett. Three mines were positioned close to German Officers’ Trench. The men were not to occupy the other tunnels until after the mines had exploded – there was concern that the shock waves might cause the tunnels to collapse. The attacking

50 metres

Attack against German Officers’ Trench, midnight 6 August (From Bean, 1938)

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force was divided into two groups, the first consisting of 300 men under the command of Captain Prisk. His men were to attack German Officers’ Trench while 100 men under the command of Captain Yeoman would launch their attack from Union Trench to clear Snipers’ Trench.4 The group attacking German Officers’ Trench was further subdivided into three groups. Captain Daly and his covering party of 50 men had the task of capturing the rear trenches and saps; Captain Prisk and his men were to attack and capture German Officers’ Trench; and Lieutenants Hall and Jackson would each protect the flanks of Daly’s party with blocking parties.5 Prisk was assigned a number of bombing parties, each consisting of one rifleman, two bomb throwers, one carrier with a basket of jam-tin bombs, one NCO and a spare man. Once the position had been captured, ‘two machine guns of 6th Bn will move forward by way of D24 and be set up in best position to sweep approaches. Captured MGuns [machine guns] and mortars are to be withdrawn to our lines or if not possible they will be destroyed.’6 Casualties and prisoners were to be taken to the northern part of the works, where the wounded would be evacuated by stretcher-bearers. The men were to consolidate the position by putting down firing steps and rearranging parapets.7

Earlier, as the men of the 1st Brigade stormed Lone Pine at 5.30 pm, the Turkish artillery including 6-inch howitzers and 75-mm guns not only ‘let rip’ against Lone Pine but also targeted Steele’s Post. The Australian trenches were badly damaged and a number of casualties had to be evacuated. At 7.30 pm the fifty men of the covering party entered the ‘underground trenches’ and began opening up a number of trench bays. All around, these men could feel the concussive force of the Turkish barrage smashing into the rear trenches and into no-man’s-land all around. The first mine was to be detonated at 11 pm, the second at 11.30 pm and the third at 11.40 pm. It was expected that by distancing the explo150

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sions the first mine would catch the Turks by surprise and result in a large number of enemy casualties and perhaps the second would do the same. The third would hopefully see the trenches evacuated as they feared another explosion, giving the men of the 6th Battalion enough time to enter the tunnels and charge across no-man’s-land against the empty Turkish trenches. The infantry were to launch their attack at midnight. The Turkish reaction was swift and heavy with the detonation of the first mine. Turkish shelling increased in volume against Steele’s Post as did the small-arms fire from Turkish Quinn’s and Johnston’s Jolly. A similar increase in intensity occurred with the second and third explosions. No small-arms fire, however, could be detected from German Officers’ Trench itself.8 While the concussive force of the exploding mines caused little if any damage to the underground trenches, the Turkish barrage had caused one of the tunnels to collapse. Just after 11.40 pm, men tried to push through and clear the passage, resulting in confusion and congestion. The men made their way through the dark, crowded and narrow tunnels trying to reach the trench bays that led out into no-man’s-land and the waiting Turks. It soon became clear that the collapsed tunnel (D7) could not be cleared. They were forced to make their way back to Steele’s Post in order to try another tunnel; soon a long line of men were waiting to enter the remaining tunnels. It was now sometime after midnight. Turkish shells continued to pound the position and machine-gun and rifle fire crisscrossed no-man’s-land and slammed into the parapets of Steele’s Post.9 Back at 2nd Brigade Headquarters, Colonel Forsyth and staff awaited word of the attack. Lieutenant Colonel Bennett’s adjutant, who was not connected to Bennett’s position at D2 by telephone (and was therefore not aware of the hold up), rang brigade headquarters and informed them that ‘everything was arranged and correct’.10 Later, as their watches ticked past midnight and still no word concerning the attack had reached them, Major Jess, who had helped plan the attack, telephoned Bennett, who 151

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informed Jess of the situation. Upset by the delay, an order was sent to Bennett from brigade headquarters as recorded in the brigade diary: ‘0010 – Message to 6th Bn: Tell Bennett to move’; another was sent at 12.30: ‘Message from Division: Order 6th to move at once.’11 At 12.35 am Bennett was informed that his men were in position – he signalled for the attack to begin. In all, fewer than twenty-one trench bays were now available and, while the openings of the trench bays in most cases were large enough for around half-a-dozen men to exit from, the tunnels themselves were so narrow that the men were in single file and no ‘mass assault’ was possible. Bennett later wrote in the battalion diary: Immediately our men emerged from the trench [the] enemy opened a heavy rifle and machine-gun fire on us. The wounded men attempted to retire through the openings they had just left … Capt PRISK – the leader – was hit in both arms immediately he emerged from the trench. I then sent Sergeant MARSHALL to carry on in his place if no other officer was in charge. Communications along this forward firing line was impossible owing to the darkness and to the block caused by wounded and dying men coming back from the front.12

Men were hit as they clambered out of the exits, falling back into the tunnels and forcing their cobbers to try and push on over them; others were killed and piled up just metres from the opening. Lieutenant ‘Teddie’ Spargo almost made it to the Turkish parapets before being killed – that was as far as anyone got to either German Officers’ Trench or Snipers’ Trench. Within minutes the dead and wounded completely blocked the openings. A long line of men were now stalled in the dark, claustrophobic and humid tunnels, not knowing what was happening above ground. A staff officer described the situation in these tunnels at the time: ‘The scene in the tunnel I shall never forget – men leaning against the walls in the darkness without a word, and what their thoughts must have been God only knows, but they must have been 100 times worse than mine,

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and I knew how hopeless was the job – with no chance of surprise in it.’13 At any one time only a dozen or so men could be launched against the Turks – it was utterly hopeless. The attack which had been days in the planning and organisation was swept away in a matter of seconds. Private Leo Garland recalled: The Turks shouting (Amshee Alla), which means Go Away, and our boys shouting back ‘We’ll give you Amshee Alla, you black …’ – The sight is one I could never describe … Rockets and grenades flying about, overhead it was as light as daytime. Now we’re 10 yards off the trench, as we are met with Rifle Fire, Machine Guns, Bombs. Our boys are going down like hay before a Harvester, but still they go on … I was with another chap named Sells [the two Sells brothers, William and Samuel, were both killed in the attack] carrying a big fellow out. I got hit on the leg … We had just got back when Sells sung out, ‘Come on boys, into them’, when a bomb from the enemy’s trench caught him and he went up in pieces. It was an awful go, it was a perfect hell.14

Colonel Forsyth, commander of the Australian 2nd Brigade, was informed by Bennett at around 1 am that the attack had failed. ‘I [Bennett] found that to rush sufficient men in in the hopes of getting enough to capture the GERMAN OFFICERS’ TRENCH was impossible – there being practicably no recesses clear for the men to set out from. I stopped the attack – it had already stopped automatically and [I tried to] report by phone from 6th Bn. to Bde. H.Q. that the attack had failed. My communication wire to Bde. H.Q. had been broken by the shells during the bombardment.’15 Forsyth passed on Bennett’s message to 1st Divisional Headquarters. Major General Walker, undoubtedly pleased with his success at Lone Pine, believed that the failure to take German Officers’ Trench was due to poor organisation by local commanders. Indeed, Lieutenant Colonel White angrily insisted that the attack be resumed immediately. He would later admit to Charles Bean that he always regretted

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insisting on the renewal of the attack. Walker ordered the 6th Battalion to be quickly reorganised and another attack to be launched at once. It was now 1.10 am. German Officers’ Trench had to be taken before dawn. It would take some time, however, to extricate the dead and wounded that now blocked most of the ‘open’ trench bays and crowded tunnels.16 Captain Daly later recalled: ‘The groans of the wounded who were still in the recess, and the awful blackness and silence were enough to take the heart out of anyone.’17

Meanwhile there had been no let up at Lone Pine and the Turkish commanders were pushing every available man into its defence. The commander of the 13th Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Ali Riza, had taken over command of the forces at Kanli Sirt and was attempting to organise a counter-attack against the Australian positions. At about ‘midnight Ali Riza ordered a night attack to be made. He had divided the front into three, each section under a battalion commander, right, centre and left. I [Zeki Bey] asked the C.O. if I could remain in the central sector, because I didn’t know the left (the head of The Cup) but I did know the centre, whereas the new man whom he was putting in the centre knew neither. Throughout the night there was great congestion and disorder in the valley and the trenches.’18 To their front the Turks could see any number of flares of differing colours, including brilliant white star-shells originating from the Anzac positions and falling close to the newly established Turkish front line along Kanli Sirt. In addition, an Australian machine gun was firing across the head of The Cup and a steady supply of jam-tin bombs were being lobbed into the same position. Among all this activity the Turkish officers started to push their way forward through the crowded saps and trenches in order to organise their men for the counter-attack, but the confusion and crowding made for slow progress and, to the frustration of all involved, the attack would still be some hours yet in coming.19

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News had reached von Sanders and the local Turkish commanders that strong columns of enemy troops were making their way along North Beach. Von Sanders later recorded that: ‘Immediately upon receipt of the forgoing report I telephoned to the 7th and 12th Divisions at the upper Saros [Xeros] Gulf, ordering that they be alarmed and made ready to march at once. About an hour later [1 am] orders were sent to start both divisions at once in the general direction of Usun-Hisirli east Anafarta Sagir [area between Suvla Bay and Hill 971].’ It was estimated that it would take between 36 and 48 hours for the 7th and 12th Divisions to reach the Anzac sector.20

At around 1 am the communication saps had been dug through to Lone Pine. It was now finally possible to bring out the wounded and the Turkish prisoners. Moonlight made it possible to identify movement in no-man’sland. Even so, two medical officers, Majors Dunlop and Fullerton, along with their men were still searching the killing zone for the wounded and when they found them they brought them in to the main Australian lines. In the Pine, however, the dead lay so thick that: [the] only respect which could be paid them was to avoid treading on their faces. The troops were too busy and too weary to carry them to the rear, nor would there have been room in the congested trenches to perform the work. In several sectors, in order to gain space, the bodies were piled in unused communication trenches or dugouts until some of these were completely filled. Where possible, the wounded were cleared, although to any man wounded through the intestines such movement was probably fatal.21

Major Mackay and his men were still holding the main communication hub (later called Mackay’s Post) overlooking Owen’s Gully; he later recorded: All through the night the Turks counter-attacked and took a

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heavy toll of our men with bombs. Our fire trenches were far too crowded and the communication trenches were worse. We thinned down the fire trench garrison, replacing casualties from the crowds waiting in the communication trenches. There was no chance of clearing the wounded quickly, and the poor fellows had just to wait where they were till communications could be opened up. Most of our casualties were from Turkish bombs, many of which we nullified by dropping half-filled sand-bags on them before they could harm. A comparison of the bombs used by us and the Turks is all in favour of the Turks. Our jam-tin bombs were made on the beach and in the warships and were difficult to ignite, the process of ignition with slow match or lighted cigarette sometimes taking minutes. On the other hand, the Turks had a spherical bomb with a fuse, the end of which was prepared as a match tip. All the enemy had to do was rub this tip on his trousers and throw the bomb. If only we had had plentiful supplies of the Mill’s bomb at Lone Pine, a different story might have been told.22

At German Officers’ Trench the Turks were primed and waiting for the next Australian attack. As recorded in the 2nd Brigade diary: ‘0220 – Div [Division] Hd Q. instructed that 3 lines of 100 men each to be put into the attack.’23 Bennett recorded: ‘I had casualties cleared from forward firing line and garrison was again distributed. This was easier this time as I had fewer men to place. I saw that all the various parties were in position … .’24 The attack was to be led by Captain Daly and Lieutenant Guilfoyle on the right flank, with Captain Yeoman, Lieutenants Fairclough and Jackson on the left. In this attempt, it was German Officers’ Trench only that was to be attacked – Snipers’ Trench would have to be dealt with at some later time. At 3.55 am the attack against German Officers’ Trench recommenced. Private Walter Dyer wrote in a letter to his father:

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Three of us got out by the same hole, I carried one in again, he got about a yard. The other was shot dead. I crawled behind some mud thrown up by a shell, all I could see was some dead lying around. The Turks were firing at us from German Officers’ Trench and from Mortar Ridge. The bullets fairly sang over me, I could see defeat printed across the sky. I lay out for a few minutes, but could not see another living soul. I crawled back into the sap and was told to go along and see if I could get any wounded in. I found one fellow lying half out of the trench shot through the stomach. I got him in and he yelled something awful every time I shifted him. Poor fellow died about an hour afterwards.25

The end result was never in doubt and a fresh pile of dead and wounded surrounded the openings into no-man’s-land. ‘Bombs, rifle and machinegun fire made the ground between our trench and that of the enemy impassable. Again the wounded crowded back into the recesses almost as soon as they left them – in fact, a large number were hit before quite clear of the recesses.’26 Men kept charging out in ones and twos. A few ‘here or there succeeded in running forward, but these were never seen again. Among them was Lieutenant Fairclough. Although his nerve had been severely shaken in the first attack, he had assisted Bennett in reorganising the troops and had then charged forward with them. Another … Lieutenant Jackson, stood outside the trench and walking up and down, beckoned to the men to come forward with him. He was hit first by a bullet and then by a bomb.’27 By 4.10 am it was all over. Bennett, on seeing the failure of the second wave, sent Major Jess to contact brigade headquarters to explain just how hopeless the situation was. It is recorded in the brigade diary that Jess reported ‘that attack had failed. Impossible to reorganise without withdrawing 6th Bn right out of trenches. O/C Bde reported to GOC by phone that another assault without reorganisation, impracticable.’28 Meanwhile, brigade commander Colonel Forsyth contacted the divisional headquarters direct, informing them of the failure. Major General 157

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Walker ordered him to push on with a third attack. ‘0415 – Div H.Q. instructed O/C to personally supervise reorganisation and another attack forthwith.’29 Major Jess later recorded: ‘I shall never forget his [Forsyth’s] face. He knew as well as I did that the men were by this time unnerved, had been for about 36 hours without sleep, and to attempt such an attack in daylight was slaughter.’30 On hearing that another attack was being ordered, Bennett exploded in frustration, informing Forsyth in no uncertain terms that the attack was hopeless. He then told Forsyth that ‘I shall lead the attack myself ’.31 Hours ticked by and it wasn’t until around 8 am that Major Glasfurd, who had been sent over to Steele’s Post by divisional headquarters, confirmed to Walker that the situation was hopeless. Walker contacted Birdwood who agreed to cancel the attack. Indeed, there was no longer any reason for it as the attacks against The Nek, the Chessboard and Turkish Quinn’s were, sadly and tragically for all concerned, already over.

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12 ‘The Heads got a b i t m i xe d ’

Not long before the first attack against German Officers’ Trench, the infantry assaulting columns had begun their final advance to their objectives – Chunuk Bair, Hill Q and Hill 971. All troops participating in the assault were to travel ‘light’. Kits and tunics were discarded and most only wore trousers, short sleeves shirts and webbing equipment, with a rifle and fixed bayonet. They were also required to carry 200 rounds of ammunition, rations and water bottles while others were to bring up jam-tin bombs, picks, shovels and empty sandbags. The men ‘may not have looked uniform, but they were animated with a spirit that would dare anything’.1 The delay in clearing the lower slopes, however, meant that by the time the infantry approached their jumping-off positions there was only three hours of darkness left. It was not until after 1  am that the head of the New Zealand assaulting battalion – the Otago Battalion – moved into the Chailak Dere towards the immediate objective of Rhododendron Ridge. They were to clear the upper parts of the dere for the Auckland and Wellington battalions that were following closely behind. Also with this later column was the 26th (Jacobs’s) Indian battery – less one section, and No.  1 Field Company, New Zealand Engineers. The Canterbury Infantry Battalion was to link up with the Otago Battalion 159

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on Rhododendron Ridge (via Sazli Beit Dere) before all would then push on to capture Chunuk Bair. As recalled by Lance Corporal Henry Skinner of the Otago infantry: We crept through a gap cut by our engineers in the barbedwire entanglement and stood confused in the dark amongst the stubble of a little field, spurs on either hand and the Turkish trench spitting fire at us less than a hundred yards ahead. There was hesitation and various orders. We extended in an uneven line across the gully. Someone shouted ‘charge’ and we rushed forward yelling … The Turks blazed at us till we were right on top of them … I left my spade, jumped into the trench and ran down with others towards the right … Those on the left shouted that there were Turks in the riverbed. There was much rushing about and screaming.2

As the leading company of the Otago Battalion under the command of Major Statham pushed further into the dere, around 200 Turks came out of a nearby bivouac and surrendered. The prisoners were taken down to the beach (and this took up more precious time) and the infantry moved on, joining up with the Wellington Mounted Rifles on Table Top at around 2  am. From here Lieutenant Colonel Meldrum of the Wellington’s pointed out Rhododendron Ridge, separated from Table Top by a short and easily passable neck. Statham led his men along this land bridge onto the ridge. From here Chunuk Bair lay less than 1000 metres away, the grade of the approach relatively easy. inexplicably the commander of the New Zealand Brigade Colonel Johnston called on those along Rhododendron Ridge, including Statham and his men, to halt. He insisted on waiting for the arrival of the Canterbury Battalion before pushing on, even though Birdwood’s orders to all had been to advance – push on regardless of delays.

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The Canterbury Infantry Battalion had a shorter distance to cover and had been ordered to leave after the other three battalions. While the distance was shorter, it was a far more difficult, complicated and steeper approach then that taken by their sister battalions. By 2 am the advance had been thrown into confusion as Lieutenant Colonel Hughes lost his way. After proceeding into the dere, the Canterbury was to take the northern fork that led towards Table Top; instead they took the southern fork (later named Hughes’ Gully) heading south of Destroyer Hill. As recalled by Private Hunter: ‘Came around to the valley between No. 1 and No. 3 outpost, advanced up there for nearly a mile and then came back again. The Heads got a bit mixed.’3 Corporal Hardey of the Canterbury’s later recalled: Eventually we swung into our particular gully in good order, the battalion moving in column of fours, our company leading. We were being guided by a scout on whose knowledge of the country everything depended. By this time we were free of our outposts, and were moving towards the enemy’s country. The sensation was somewhat uncanny … We marched right to the head of the gully, where we were checked by a cliff that rose perpendicular before us. It was then that the guide made the discovery that we were lost … Due to deliver an attack at a prearranged time, and here we were bushed in the enemy’s country.’4

Upon realising the guide’s mistake, Hughes attempted to get the men moving in the right direction. He was now faced with a major dilemma: … the whole success of the push depended on us doing our job in time. I was marching at the rear of the advance guard, and immediately passed the word to halt. We had a couple of engineer details with us who had been trailing a [telephone] wire from the beach; I told them to put me through to headquarters. The Chief of Staff, in reply to my query, ‘What am I to do?’ said, ‘Occupy the hills where you are’. I retorted, ‘I don’t know where I am and

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may be behind enemy lines.’ I was cut off … I decided to disobey orders and take the battalion back to the beach, and so save it intact to fight another day … I gave the order to retire. At the spot where we halted, the ravine was so narrow that the advance guard, now the rear guard, had to pass me in single file.5

Corporal Hardey described what happened next. The long snakelike line wended its way back amidst a silence one could almost feel. Thro’ creek beds, up steps cut in the rock by the Turks, slipping and scrambling. Presently someone slipped and fell, dropping a shovel with a noisy clatter. The noise rang clear in the stillness, the line involuntarily paused and listened. Immediately from the right hand arose a jabbering we realised was Turkish. We had run into an outpost. But for once fortune smiled upon us. A New Zealand Mounted Rifles patrol had been stalking this particular outpost and just as the Turks discovered us, they themselves were discovered.6

400 metres

Line of march for the Right Assaulting Force (New Zealand Brigade) against Chunuk Bair, 6–7 August (From Bean, 1938)

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The Mounted Rifles cleared out the Turks and directed the infantry in the right direction. They continued on and soon Hughes came across Lieutenant Colonel Moore of the Otago Battalion. They made their way onto Table Top and rendezvoused with the leading parties of the Otago Battalion on Rhododendron Ridge. Meanwhile two companies of the battalion, which included the 60 men of the Canterbury Infantry machine-gun section carrying their four machine guns, continued on their way back to the beach as originally ordered. On eventually realising that the rest of the battalion had found their way, they headed back into the dere; they would not join up with the rest of the battalion until well after dawn.7

The Wellington Infantry Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Malone, had earlier entered Chailak Dere at about midnight, behind the Otago Battalion. They bypassed Table Top and pushed further up the dere. Their objective was to secure Cheshire Ridge overlooking Aghyl Dere to the left. It was just before dawn that Malone’s two leading companies scrambled from the dere onto Rhododendron Ridge. Below them and to their right they could see in the moonlight the men of the advanced parties of the Otago and Canterbury battalions occupying the lower parts of the same ridge. It was at this junction that Cheshire and Rhododendron Ridges diverged, forming a small pocket of ground that was concealed from the northern heights. This feature would soon become known as the Apex and was just then being occupied by a small number of Otago men. It lay less than 500  metres from the summit of Chunuk Bair. Further below still in Chailak Dere was the Auckland Battalion accompanied by the brigade headquarters staff. It was now close to 4.30 am and Chunuk Bair lay just ahead of the New Zealanders now strung out along Rhododendron Ridge and those even higher up at the Apex. At this point there were only about 20 sleeping Turks ‘guarding’ two mountain guns located between Chunuk Bair

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and Battleship Hill – Chunuk Bair was ready for the taking, but no-one was willing to take it. This failure to keep the impetus of the attack going was to be felt most tragically by the troopers of the Australian Light Horse, who were at this point about to charge the entrenched Turks at The Nek. However, rather than the New Zealanders assisting the light horsemen in their attempt to capture The Nek, the tables had turned and the light horsemen were now being called on to attack The Nek so that they might assist the New Zealanders in capturing the largely empty summit of Chunuk Bair.

Further north, the left assaulting column had started their approach towards Hill Q and Hill 971. It was led by the 4th Australian Brigade, followed by the 29th Indian Brigade. This column also consisted of the 21st (Kohat) Indian Mountain Battery (less one section) and No. 2 Field Company New Zealand Engineers. Charles Bean recorded in his diary: 11.15 I heard at A.C. Headquarters … that N.Z.M.R. were held up on Table Top and were late. But Monash and Gurkhas were starting out in spite of this … N.Z. were not clear of the sap when I got to Godley’s H.Q. [No. 2 Outpost] but fortunately Monash and Gurkhas were ahead. Monash had gone along [the] beach. Indians a little further inland parallel. I walked down through dark and struck Gurkhas and later Sikhs marching in fours about 100 yards below N.Z. Post … It was clear that attack was getting much behind time.8

As the troops moved along North Beach, Private Arthur Millar of the 16th Battalion turned to his mate Stan Iffla and asked him to swap places. Stan later asked Arthur why he had wanted to change positions. ‘I promised your mother I would look after you, and now if a bullet comes it’s got to go right through me before it can hit you’ was his reply.9 Guiding this column was Major Overton and his scouts. As stated by the British

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official historian, the: task of the Left Assaulting Column was very much more arduous than that allotted to General Johnston’s force. The route to be traversed was far more intricate and confusing; it was more than twice as long, and only a small fraction of it had been previously reconnoitred. But once the low foothills were clear, little further opposition was expected, and, as an offset against the difficulties of the route, the column would be led by Major Overton himself.10

Godley had intended that the assaults against the summits would occur ‘well before dawn’.11 Monash’s men who were to spearhead the attack against Hill 971 had been provided with a detailed provisional timetable, which concluded that they should be on Abdel Rahman Bair and making their final advance towards Hill 971 at around 1.40 am, with the capture of their final objectives by 3 am. Indeed, Godley had provided his timetable to his Staff Captain Eastwood who would accompany the leading companies of Monash’s brigade to ensure that the timetable was adhered to as much as possible.12 Bean provides a vivid description of the advance along North Beach towards Aghyl Dere: The march … was a strangely exciting experience for men who for months had been confined in trenches and hidden in valleys. To the right front the hilltops were brilliantly illuminated by the destroyer’s searchlight, which once or twice touched the moving column with the lowest rim of its beam. When the head of the 4th Brigade reached No. 2 Outpost, it had to halt while the 40th Brigade moved from seaward across its path at the crossing of the Chailak Dere. The Australians lay down, but stray bullets fell somewhat thickly, and men in each column were hit. The delay allowed some of the belated detachments in the rear to close up and gain their breath. After half-an-hour the front cleared, and about 11 o’clock Cox’s column moved forward.

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After a short, brisk advance the troops at the rear of that column … found the pace checked, some obstacle evidently hampering the advance guard. The march became a shuffle, slower than a funeral, with innumerable halts. More than once movements, doubtless originating at the head of the column when it struck opposition, passed far down its length … Shells from the warships’ broadsides went rumbling overhead, their subsequent explosions lighting the side of the distant range. A white flare shot up occasionally from some Turkish post inland. The crackle of musketry was incessant on the hills to the right, but the column, though at a snail’s pace, gradually drew away from the sound.13

The reason for the delay was due to a local Greek guide who was accompanying Major Overton. The guide insisted that he knew a short cut that would bypass the need to move around Walden Point before entering Aghyl Dere. Overton was told that Walden Point was not part of Bauchop’s Hill but was separated from it by a gully. This gully led directly into the dere. The Greek insisted that this was the way the locals traversed the area – it would cut around an hour off the intended line of march. Keen to make up for lost time, Overton adopted the route. The head of the column turned in a northeast direction and moved into the gully separating Walden Point from Bauchop’s Hill (later called Taylor’s Gap). No sooner had they entered the narrow scrub-filled gully when the column was fired on by Turks to their right. Overton ordered the nearest platoon to charge up the slope to their right to clear out the Turks while another was ordered to scout the top of Walden Point itself, now to their left. It wasn’t long before the Turks occupying the lower parts of Bauchop’s Hill were silenced, while the platoon pushing up Walden Point quickly came across a group of New Zealanders occupying the summit. Meanwhile, Overton and the column pushed on further through the ‘cutting’.14 The further the column moved into the ‘gorge’ the narrower it became, and the narrower it became, the more it was choked with thick prickly 16 6

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Line of march into the Aghyl Dere – Left Assaulting Force (Australian and Indian Battalions) against Hill 971 and Hill Q, 6–7 August (From Bean, 1938)

undergrowth. Added to this the men soon found themselves climbing. The column was now being forced to push through this track in single file. Soon even this was impossible and pioneers from the 13th Battalion were sent forwards to hack a passage. Adopting this ‘short cut’ was quickly becoming a bad idea. Finally Overton and the leading elements of the column found themselves looking down into the Aghyl Dere. It was now that the platoon to their right, which had originally silenced the Turks, requested additional men as more enemy troops were nearby. Overton sent the remaining two platoons of the leading company forward and as he did so they came under Turkish rifle fire from the dere. ‘A platoon was detailed to clear each side; the men went in with the bayonet and nothing was heard but a few shrieks and some prisoners were immediately brought in … Our native guide and interpreter were continually being apprehended by our covering party and stood in imminent peril of their lives.’15

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Part of the second company of the 13th Battalion was now sent down into the dere to assist with clearing the way forward, while the remainder of the same company were sent directly across the valley floor to scale the southern slopes of Damakjelik Bair to their front in order to silence the Turkish artillery thought to be located there.16 Lieutenant Colonel Tilney now had no troops in reserve as the bulk of the column was still pushing its way through the narrow track in single file. It was not long, however, before the commander of the 4th Brigade, Colonel Monash, managed to push his way through the overcrowded scrub-covered track to reach the head of the column at the gap, now looking down into the Aghyl Dere. He later wrote: ‘I found that the column was halted because one (or two) platoons of the 13th had been sent forward … and had not yet reported back! I found Overton, Eastwood and Tilney conferring and arguing, and apparently unable to decide what to do. I vividly remember saying, “What damned nonsense! Get a move on, quick.”17 Monash ordered the men down into the dere and to push on towards the dominating heights and their objectives. Though the track was only 600 metres long, it had taken the two leading battalions over two hours to pass through. It was now close to 2 am.18 Meanwhile, the tail end of the Indian brigade following behind the Australians was still filing past Godley’s headquarters at No. 2 Outpost. It was not until after 3 am that the last of the Indians passed by. The plan had dictated that these troops would be capturing Hill Q by now – yet through no fault of their own most were still either moving along the beach or just entering Aghyl Dere. The schedule of the offensive was clearly already shot to pieces. Earlier Charles Bean had made his way back to Godley’s headquarters and shared a glass of whisky with the general. He didn’t stay long and was soon heading north in search of Monash’s column. Bullets were whipping into the sand in front of Godley’s H.Q. at No. 2 Outpost. I decided to stroll along and see if I could

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get some news of Monash before daybreak, which if it overtook me might make it difficult to get back. So I strolled along by the Indian Column which had been passing for about 2 hours, and was still passing just inland to the sand hills. It would halt – shuffle on a few paces – halt again … . I went off past our boundary out along the fields – the Indian Column beside me. Moon just getting up: the troops were wandering, slower than a funeral, along a bank with a path running along it. By the side were several Australians and an Englishman – wounded by strays or shrapnel. A few strays were lisping into the ground … The column turned in towards the dark hills on the right. Occasionally some shots came from there. I thought Monash was further to the left, and was just starting to stroll off towards the left when I heard some very distant firing ahead of me. It must be the landing of the British. I was moving on again when something gave me a whack (like a stone thrown hard) in the upper part of the right leg. I could feel it whack the right side of the leg and bruised the inner part of the left side. I was pretty sure I had been hit by a stray which had gone in on the right and not come out, but I couldn’t feel any blood, and so thought it might not have penetrated at all. Some of the stones from shell bursts had hit me quite hard earlier this day – but presently I felt my hand greasy [with blood] in my pants – so I knew I must go back. I could limp along pretty well. As I went a good deal of the fire burst out in one of the gullies to the N. of me – either Indians or Monash’s clearing out opposition. Monash’s men had orders only to use bayonet till daybreak, so shots were probably enemy’s.19

Bean eventually made his way back to Godley’s headquarters and was provided with another whisky. It was going to be a long night.

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As the men emerged from the narrow confines of Taylor’s Gap, they found themselves on the stubble field of the valley floor.20 The moon was rising and soon Turkish rifle fire to their right began to score hits. Another company of the 13th and part of the 14th were sent out to silence the Turks.21 Overton stood in the valley floor; he was now not sure how far into the valley they had penetrated. He estimated that the area immediately north (the slope to their left) was the area to be occupied by the men of the 13th and 14th Battalions who were assigned the mission of covering the flank of the main assault. Monash ordered Tilney, commander of the 13th Battalion, to lead the remaining men of the 13th and 14th Battalions out along this spur, which would ultimately place them along the main ridgeline of Damakjelik Bair. This would enable them to cover the advance of the Australian 15th and 16th Battalions and the Indian 6th Gurkhas and 14th Sikhs who were to capture Hill 971, and the two remaining battalions of the 29th Indian Brigade, the 5th and 10th Gurkhas, who were to continue further up the dere to capture Hill Q. By now Lieutenant Colonel Cannan, commander of the 15th Battalion, had emerged from Taylor’s Gap with the leading elements of his battalion. Monash, who had established his headquarters in the dere about 500 metres beyond, ordered him to start moving up towards the northern heights. He would push on the 16th Battalion and 29th Brigade as they emerged from the tangled mess of Taylor’s Gap. At some point, and no-one was really sure where, the 15th and 16th Battalions were to climb out of the Aghyl Dere onto Damakjelik Bair and then cross into Asma Dere before climbing onto Abdel Rahman Bair, which would finally take them to the summit of Hill 971. After advancing about ‘200 yards across an open clearing, fire was opened on us from a gully running parallel to our front, this was assaulted with the bayonet and taken and [the] advance continued. At this point a Turkish telephone wire was [also] picked up and demolished.’22 Just as these Turks were silenced, more fire erupted to the left, right and centre of Cannan’s men. It is likely that this fire came from leading 170

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Bold Line intended line of march – dotted actual line of march A = Australian 13th and 14th Battalions – Objective covering flanks A/I = Australian 15th and 16th Battalions & Indian 6th Gurkhas and 14th Sikhs – Objective Hill 971 G = 5th and 10th Gurkhas – Objective Hill Q 971 = Hill 971 Q = Hill Q CB = Chunuk Bair BH = Battleship Hill

Intended line of march to objectives and actual line of march – Right Assaulting Force, 6–7 August

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elements of Major Wilmer’s men of the 1st Battalion, 32nd Turkish Regiment, who had, at the start of the attack against Lone Pine, been ordered south to help defend the lower slopes of the northern heights. The leading company of the 15th Battalion under Captain Moran was forced to deploy. A second company was sent forward to reinforce, while another was pushed out to protect his right flank. It was now approaching 3 am. At this point Cannan believed he must be close to the northern fork that would lead them out of the dere towards Abdel Rahman Bair. He sent word for Major Overton to join him so that he could point out the exact route to be taken. Overton ‘closely questioned the [Greek] guide and interpreters and then indicated to myself and my officers the direction of our objective which the guide said was a quarter of an hour away’.23 By now the Turkish resistance had ceased and Cannan reformed his deployed companies for the advance. He sent word back that the 16th Battalion was to follow closely behind and with this he turned half-left up the next spur. Major Overton headed back to direct the two Indian battalions who were to capture Hill Q. The Turks had not completely retreated, however, as Cannan later recalled as he and his men began their climb. ‘Our line of advance now took us over rough broken stony ridges, densely covered with low prickly undergrowth in which the Turks had taken cover and were obstinately disputing every yard of our advance; control was hard to maintain, officers and NCOs had to take exceptional risks in collecting commands and keeping them in hand so as to get the assault vigorously pushed on and to keep the enemy in retreat.’24 The spur they were climbing was seen to peak with a knoll about 100 metres high and it was here that the retreating Turks made a stand; dawn was now breaking. A number of men from the 15th and 16th Battalions, under the command of Captain Chabrel, were assigned the task of capturing the position. They did so, but Chabrel was killed in the attempt. Private Frank Clune was part of the attack. We got to the foot of the hill, and then started along a little valley about a hundred yards long, and about thirty yards wide,

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when down on us came an avalanche of shot and shell … The Turks were on both sides of us, and in front of us, and were raining down bombs, shrapnel, high explosives, and were also enfilading us with machine-gun fire. Whenever I saw Turks I threw my bombs, and then started after them with the bayonet, but a bomb came whizzing over and blew the face off a Ghurka [sic] a yard away from me, and spattered me with his brains and blood. I was just congratulating myself [on not sharing the same fate] when I got one, and down I went. Everything was black for a long time, and then started to get clearer … I cautiously felt my right side and cut my finger on my water bottle, which had been blown to bits … I felt upward and down my legs, and could only get a little blood, so I stood up and found out I was all right.25

The senior commander on the scene, Lieutenant Colonel Pope, now mistakenly believed that they were already on Abdel Rahman Bair. Looking down along the ridgeline towards the beach below, he saw the Australians of the 13th and 14th Battalions and beyond them men of the original covering force from the British 40th Brigade. In reality he was still on Damakjelik Bair. The 15th and 16th Battalions now occupied the next major spur running off Damakjelik Bair, parallel and in front of the one now occupied by the 13th and 14th Battalions. The intervening gully was later called Australia Valley. Cannan pushed a part of the 15th Battalion across to the head of Australia Valley to help consolidate the position and in the process drove out about 50 Turks who had been hiding there. With the continued fighting up the gullies and spurs, fatigue had set in; the men of the Australian 4th Brigade had fragmented into a number of sub-units and were no longer in a marching column. Captain Durrant of the 13th Battalion later recalled to Charles Bean that ‘the sudden burst of physical effort necessary for the night march, heavily laden, against unknown enemy localities, could not be expected to last. Excitement and

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a rum issue bucked them up, but a reaction, an anti-climax must have set in. The spirit was willing but the flesh was very weak.’26 Cannan and Pope were now both convinced that the men could no longer carry on any further, given their utter exhaustion and the nature of the terrain. They ordered the men to dig in. Monash, still located in Aghyl Dere, had earlier sent out linesmen to connect him with his two assaulting battalions. Sometime after 5 am he was informed by Pope that the 15th and 16th Battalions were beyond Asma Dere on a spur leading to Abdel Rahman Bair, when in reality they were overlooking the Kaiajik Dere – the Asma Dere lay beyond the next ridge (defined by Hill 60), that is, they were a dere – a ridge – short. Monash passed this incorrect information onto Godley’s headquarters at No. 2 Outpost. Cox, who was with Monash, ordered him to leave half a battalion on his present line and, with the 14th Sikhs, he was to attack Hill 971 at 11 am.27 The Indian 29th Brigade was now following closely behind the 4th Brigade with the 5th Gurkhas in front, followed by the 10th Gurkhas, the 6th Gurkhas, No. 2 Field Company New Zealand Engineers, the 21st Indian Mountain Battery, and finally the 14th Sikhs. It was still dark and Overton took up position to direct the Indian battalions as they approached. In almost all of his directions, however, he was mistaken. It was while standing on some unnamed and unknown spur of the Aghyl Dere, somewhere near The Farm, just as dawn was breaking that the brave New Zealand officer was killed by a Turkish bullet.28 As dawn broke, the Indian column, like that of the Australians, had broken down and had become fragmented. Three companies of the 5th Gurkhas had reached the lower slopes of Hill Q but they had suffered badly from Turkish rifle fire and most of their officers were now dead. The fourth company of this battalion, along with two companies of the 10th Gurkhas, had taken a wrong turn, heading further south then intended, and found themselves close to the New Zealanders along Rhododendron Ridge and the Apex. The 6th Gurkhas found themselves sandwiched in between their two sister battalions, while the 14th Sikhs 174

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Dotted line represents Anzac perimeter before offensive; dashed line (and insert) are approximate position of units at first light; solid line was the proposed position (objectives) at first light.

Proposed and actual position of units, early morning 7 August (Adpted from Bean, 1938, p. 594)

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found themselves along the next northern spur of Damakjelik Bair in front of the Australian 15th and 16th Battalions. Undoubtedly the confusion and fragmentation of these battalions was not only due to the appalling nature of the terrain but perhaps more importantly to trying to navigate through it in the dark. Also the incorrect positioning of the Australian 4th Brigade would have caused some confusion, which itself was a result of the same appalling conditions. The objective of the 5th and 10th Gurkhas, Hill Q , was south of the Australian objective, Hill 971. As such, the Gurkhas were approaching what they believed to be Hill Q , however, it was actually Chunuk Bair. Mustafa Kemal, who had all along feared for Chunuk Bair, was still unsure of what was happening and just before 4 am he issued a rather vague order. It is probable that the enemy will attack our front in the morning. Owing to the close distance and in order to be able to repel at once any sudden attack, it is essential that troops are awake and the men ready to use their weapons. Therefore I request officers to encourage the men to keep awake and maintain the highest degree of readiness at all times as demanded by the delicacy of the tactical situation.29

It was now close to 4.30  am and the small group of Otago infantry positioned at the Apex, below Chunuk Bair, would have had a clear view to their right of no-man’s-land between the Australian trenches along Russell’s Top and the Turkish position at The Nek. From this vantage point they would have seen the Anzac and British shells pounding the Turkish front lines. At some point they would have also possibly seen the sandbag parapets along the Australian front being removed and replaced by a wall of protruding rifles and bayonets. At 4.30 precisely the shelling stopped.

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13 ‘Goodbye, I don’ t t h i n k I ’ l l b e coming back fro m t h i s o n e ’

The planned ‘converging attack’ against Baby 700 by the New Zealanders from the rear and the Australian Light Horse from the front could no longer be realised. If the attack by the troopers was to go ahead as planned, it would be a simple but deadly frontal charge against The Nek. As stated by Charles Bean: Birdwood and [his chief of staff] Skeen [now] pictured the New Zealand infantry struggling upwards near the height in performance of the last stage of this difficult task. Success in that operation was vital, and they had therefore no hesitation in ordering any action which could assist it. ‘It is not the Light Horse I am anxious about’ said Skeen ‘… I think they will be all right. What I hope is that they will help the New Zealanders.’ Consequently the operations against Baby 700, Pope’s, and Quinn’s were allowed to be launched at the hour provisionally fixed.1

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The number of troopers assigned to the charge against the bottleneck was 600 men and, given the restricted space available (the length of the Australian front line was just 90 paces or so), they would need to attack in four waves, each consisting of just 150 men.2 The first and second waves would be troopers from Victoria while the third and fourth lines would be the men from Western Australia. These small parties of Light Horsemen were assigned the task of capturing lines of trenches in front and several to the flank and rear, comprising in all at least forty separate trenches and saps covered by any number of enfilading machine guns. Even taking into account hindsight, this was optimism on a tragically grand scale, given that at the time the commanders knew just how well protected The Nek was. The troopers had been: warned in orders that the garrison maintained by the enemy in his trenches appeared of late to be ‘not light’, that machine guns were believed to exist in five positions, all commanding the approach to The Nek, and that the fighting might disclose others. The five suspected gun-positions were widely scattered, and with the exception of one [covering the head of Monash Valley] were all 200 yards or more beyond the Turkish front. They could not therefore be seized and silenced at the first rush.’3

The order of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade stated that the men were to take with them ‘shirt sleeves, web equipment, [sun] helmets, 200 rounds, field dressing pinned right side inside shirt, gas helmet, full water bottle, 6 biscuits, 2 sandbags, (4 periscopes per each line and gas sprayers to be carried by fourth line), wire cutters, rifle (unloaded and uncharged), bayonet fixed’.4 Each squadron of troopers carried forty-eight jam-tin bombs, with a reserve of 400 more to accompany each wave. In addition, the first line had two scaling ladders for crossing or clambering out of the Turkish trenches; and with each line were four small red-and-yellow marker flags, to be erected in the captured trenches as a sign to the artillery and staff of their progress.5 To assist in the attack, the ongoing artil-

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Australian 3rd Light Horse Brigade charge at The Nek, 7 August (Adpted from Bean, 1938)

lery barrage that had started the night before would rapidly increase in intensity during the last 30 minutes before the attack and would culminate in all available guns firing at The Nek.

To assist the attack, two squadrons of troopers (totalling 200 men) from the 1st Light Horse to the south were assigned to clear the trenches along Dead Man’s Ridge and then go on to reach the more complex trench system just beyond at the Chessboard. If successful, this would enable the attacking troopers to suppress Turkish enfilade against their cobbers as they charged The Nek. They would also occupy the trenches that overlooked Mule Valley, a major route for any Turkish reinforcements attempting to reach Baby 700. These troopers would have to charge across a steep and rugged gully that separated Pope’s Hill from Dead Man’s Ridge. The Turks had four tiers of trenches looking down into this gully, blocking any approach. Beyond Dead Man’s Ridge was

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the Chessboard, each position connected by any number of communication saps. The upper part of this gully exposed any attacking force to Turkish fire. The lower part of the same gully was even more rugged (if possible) and quickly fell away into Monash Valley. During the odd thunderstorm, water was observed to cascade down the gully, giving it the name of Waterfall Gully. The attack would be split into two parties; the first, under the command of Major Glasgow, would climb around the foot of Pope’s Hill into the mouth of Waterfall Gully and be in position before 4.30 am; the second party, under the command of Major Reid, would, at 4.30 precisely, charge across the upper part of the broad gully straight towards the northern part of Dead Man’s and carry that part of the works just as Glasgow’s men were capturing its southern end.6 Another attack by two squadrons of Queenslanders from the 2nd Light Horse Regiment against Turkish Quinn’s was also set for the same time. The attack was to be by four consecutive lines of 50 men rushing the position. Officers and men were aware that the likelihood of success was not great, even if German Officers’ Trench just south had been silenced (which if wasn’t). Like Lone Pine and German Officers’ Trench, a secret underground trench would be used to shorten the length of killing field to be crossed. This sap originated from the extreme left of Quinn’s out towards the Bloody Angle. The attack was to focus on the northern part of Turkish Quinn’s and not the whole position itself. The secret sap had been opened up the night before and those to the right of the line had spent much of the night removing the overhead covers and bomb-proof wiring that had been constructed in the main part of the position during the last few months to offer some relief from the daily round of bombing attacks. The signal for the first line to attack would be the explosion of a mine under the northern end of their objective.7 All previous attempts by either side to capture these positions had ended in bloody defeat. The difficulty of any attack against Turkish Quinn’s was fully realised by General Birdwood himself as he stated that, for any attack to commence, three conditions had to be met: German Officers’ 18 0

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Trench had to be taken; the New Zealanders needed to be descending the backbone of the main ridge to attack Baby 700 from the rear; and Turkish Quinn’s had to be ‘blown apart’ by an artillery barrage. In the end, none of these pledges would be honoured. Jim Ashton, a stretcherbearer of Major Tom Logan’s squadron, which would be part of the initial charge, recalled a conversation he had with the major the night before the attack. The major said: ‘It’s our turn tomorrow. How do you think we’ll go?’ Before Jim got a chance to reply, the major admitted ‘it didn’t look good.’8

Having been informed by Brigade Major Antill at around 4  am that his troopers were to launch their attack against The Nek even though German Officers’ Trench to the south and Baby 700 to the north were still firmly in Turkish hands, Lieutenant Colonel White, commander of the 8th Light Horse, decided that he would lead his men from the front. Antill later wrote: ‘White heard the divisional final order, and in reply to a suggestion that he should best superintend the advance in the rear, he said that as he was in charge of the business, he elected to decide his own position. He then shook hands and said goodbye to the brigadier and brigade major.’9 He would die leading from the front. During the final three-minute ‘intensive’ bombardment of the Turkish trenches at The Nek, the first two waves of the 8th Light Horse were waiting in the front line. It was later said, however, that: … the Regiment was quietly standing to arms, waiting the promised battering in the Turkish defences by our artillery in conjunction with the naval guns. A destroyer, steaming close inshore, opened fire with a single gun in the direction of the Nek, and maintained, with as great a degree of accuracy as could be reasonably expected under such precarious conditions, a brisk fire till the half hour had expired. Beyond this, as far as could be

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ascertained, although there was much noise in the vicinity, the expected artillery preparation had not been forthcoming, certainly not with any effective result. The bombardment, such as it was, ceased at 4:30 am and immediately a furious enemy rifle and machine-gun fire was opened on our parapets.10

Because the Australian trench was relatively deep, pegs had been driven into the wall and niches cut for footing to help the men scramble out of the trench. Standing beside those of the first wave were their cobbers of the second, who would also give them a leg-up if necessary – before they too would go over the top minutes later. A signaller of the 10th Light Horse, John Brown, recorded in his diary, just before attacking The Nek: ‘Packs, blankets, coats and tunics handed in. Going to charge Turkish trench soon. Issued with white calico to sew on our backs and arms so that the artillery may distinguish us from the enemy. Signallers are all brigaded for orderly and dispatch work.’11 Lieutenant Tom Kidd, who would command the extreme left of the third line, was standing in a reserve trench and took the opportunity to observe the Turkish lines through a trench periscope. Looking over the parapet before the charge impressed one with the immensity of our job. To my mind it looked an utter impossibility that we could succeed, unless providing a vigorous attack elsewhere drew off a considerable number of their garrison. We knew the enemy possessed numerous machine guns covering every piece of ground which we would have to traverse and that the trenches were fully manned. Owing to the conformity of the ground, we had one firing line only whereas the enemy had parallel and well-secured trenches, each trench overlooking the one in front … To assault their position it was necessary for attacking parties to converge, leaving a dense mass of men trying to squeeze through a neck about 50 yards wide, whilst about a dozen machine guns played on them from the front and right …12

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As the Victorians readied themselves on the firing step, the bombardment against the forward trenches at The Nek suddenly ceased at 4.23 am – according to the watches of the officers manning the firing step. The watches of the artillery officers, however, showed 4.30  am. A lone destroyer continued to bombard the rearmost positions along Baby 700 as arranged. Those anxiously waiting to charge The Nek now heard to their right an eruption of rifle and machine-gun fire as the troopers from their sister regiments stormed across Quinn’s and Pope’s Hill to attack the Turks just south of their position. Minutes ticked past and still there was no artillery fire against the trenches at The Nek. One of the few officers to survive the next few minutes was Lieutenant Robinson, who later wrote to Charles Bean: For a few moments no-one spoke. Then the Col. said: ‘Come along Dale …’ I remarked to Redford: ‘What do you make of it? There is seven minutes to go.’ He replied: ‘They may give them a heavy burst to finish’. For three minutes hardly a shot came from the Turks and then a scattered rifle fire broke out, above which could be heard distinctly the rattle of about 10 shots as each Turk machine gun was made ready for action. I got my men ready and shook hands with Major Redford a few seconds before he leaped out. He remarked as he did so: ‘See you later Robbie.’13

The watches of the Light Horse officers now ticked over to 4.29 – still nothing; the timepieces of the artillery officers ticked over to 4.36.

Minutes earlier, Major Reid’s men positioned at Pope’s Hill made a brave charge across the steep re-entrant separating them from Dead Man’s Ridge. Charging through rifle and machine-gun fire, some managed to reach the front Turkish trench, including Reid. Even though wounded, 18 3

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Reid continued to lead his men and was last seen ‘amid the bomb-smoke in the enemy trench’.14 Trooper Garratt later recalled: ‘We knew we hadn’t a ghost of a chance but we charged. A Turkish machine gun right in front of our group gave us a lot of trouble. Several bombers tried to get it but they were pinged off the instant they got over the parapet. Carr crawled up to within five yards of the gun, stood up, threw two bombs at it, put it out of action, saving scores of lives. He got no mention at all.’15 The other attacking party stormed out of the head of Waterfall Gully. These men managed to capture the southern part of the front line and proceeded to ‘bomb out’ the Turks in the second; this too they managed to occupy. Major Glasgow was with his men in the second trench when he saw ‘a white hand and arm waving above the third trench, into which his men were then throwing bombs. Realising that a party of Australians must have reached it, he clambered over the parapet and, leading his men to the third trench, found that Lieutenant Harris and his troop had entered it in a previous rush.’16

Feints to assist Australian Light Horse and New Zealanders capture Baby 700 – attacks against the Chessboard and Turkish Quinn’s, 7 August (From Bean, 1938)

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Just south of Pope’s Hill, the Light Horsemen located at Quinn’s looked at their watches as they ticked over to 4.30 am, but the explosion of the mine that was to signal the attack was not heard. What was noticed was that the bombardment against The Nek had ceased, while they distinctly heard the noise of their cobbers to their left as they attacked Dead Man’s Ridge. The men waited and within minutes the engineer in charge of the mine came down the line letting the men and officers know that the mine had been detonated. Major Bourne, who was commanding the operation, later described it as making ‘as much noise as a jam-tin bomb’.17 Bourne ordered the first line to charge. The line of 50 men crumbled under the fire of the waiting Turks as they left the trench. Not only were they hit by a fusillade of rifle fire but they were cut down by at least one machine gun firing directly in front, two from Dead Man’s Ridge to their left and another from German Officers’ Trench to their right. Lieutenant Burge, leading the left, fell dead when ten yards out. Trooper Marson, who followed him, had his leg practically severed with machine-gun bullets. With one exception every man of the first [line] was killed or wounded, the majority before they had gone six yards. Many owed their lives to the fact that they were struck when on the parapet and fell back wounded into the trench. The four machine guns at Quinn’s, although all firing at Turkish positions on the flank in order to cover the attack, could affect no apparent diminution of the enemy’s fire.18

As recorded in the brigade diary: ‘The first line was mowed down and no-one reached the enemy’s trenches.’19 Major Bourne saw the line of troopers being cut to pieces and knew to order the next line of 50 men into the wall of bullets was nothing short of murder. He ordered the second line to stand down. Chaplain George Green started to tend to the wounded (and the dead); he later recorded that he was ‘so thankful Major

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Geo Borne [sic] did not go out and that his action stayed further slaughter’. He also noted, however, that Bourne was very depressed. Indeed Bourne, in writing a letter to Major Tom Logan’s wife Beatrice to tell her of Tom’s death in the charge, ended with: ‘I’m sick of it all.’20 Another reason for halting the bloodbath was that, if the remaining three lines of men were committed to the pointless attack against Turkish Quinn’s, there would be less than 30 men to garrison Quinn’s Post itself. Quinn’s was a key position at Anzac – if it fell to the Turks, they could not only flank the Australian positions along Second Ridge but could – if reinforced in time with sufficient strength – storm down into Monash Valley; the Anzac line would crumble – the results did not bear thinking about. Realising the danger, the order to stand down was confirmed by the commander of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Stodart and subsequently by his superiors.21

Lieutenant Colonel White had no choice as his watch ticked to 4.30 am; seven minutes after the Anzac bombardment had ceased he merely yelled ‘Go!’ The other officers blew their whistles and White, along with his men, simply went over the top and charged towards The Nek. White was dressed like his men and it was noticed that around his neck he ‘wore a chain and locket with his young wife and infant baby’s photo’.22 Lance Corporal Lawrence of the Australian Engineers, who was still positioned on 400 Plateau to the south, noted when looking towards Russell’s Top to the north: ‘[At] 4.29  am … The roar is at its highest pitch. When suddenly and without warning there is a dead silence, a silence simultaneous and deathly. Perhaps one could say ‘one!’, but certainly not more, before there is the most unearthly din imaginable. Our guns are temporarily silent but those of the enemy are still roaring away unheard … What did it mean? Well, simply that the boys in that section had ‘hopped out’ as ours had done the night before.’23 Hundreds of Turkish rifles along with any number of machine

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guns (each spitting out 600 rounds a minute) were all levelled at the 150 troopers as they attempted to bolt across the forty metres or so of no-man’s-land towards The Nek. Most fell dead before making ten metres. Sergeant Cliff Pinnock wrote to his father: ‘I was in the first line to advance and we did not get ten yards … They were waiting ready for us and simply gave us a solid wall of lead. Everyone fell like lumps of meat … all your pals who you had been with for months blown and shot out of recognition.’24 As the troopers charged The Nek, the wounded Charles Bean was making his way back to his dugout along the seaward slope of First Ridge at Anzac Cove; he was then passing below Russell’s Top and he later recorded that: … there burst from the ridge above a sudden roar of musketry and machine-gun fire, like the rush of water pouring over Niagara. I knew clearly what it was; our Light Horse up there had charged and this was the fire poured on them by the Turks … The roar of Turkish fire presently died down and ended. But one had very slight hope that this meant success. A few minutes later a second dreadful roar, as full as the first, broke out. Except in the first few moments one could distinguish no individual shot in that uproar … I was possibly not more than 600–700 yards from the scene, and have often since thought that, if I had watched it, I might have discerned, even without my glasses, at least the silhouette of the charging figures against the sky … I had little hope that our men could have succeeded against that fearful outburst.25

Another recorded that ‘the noise was appalling, the air was filled with venomous hissing and crackling of bullets and the swish swish of machine guns as they traversed to and fro searching for victims’.26 Trooper Lionel Simpson, who would be the last veteran of the charge, recalled in 1987: We were in the front trench and line going out, carrying a plank to throw over the barbed wire … and a lot of them got knocked over straight away. I was in the lead holding one end of this

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plank and another cobber was on the other end. And I pulled it away from him because I wondered why it was so heavy, and he’d got shot in the leg, in the knee. In fact, I could see his kneecap coming out where the machine-gun bullets had gone into it. Well, I was going along and a bullet hit me in the left shoulder, went right in the point of the shoulder, but that didn’t stop me, because it went in and it bounced out. It never broke a bone in my shoulder … Then I was knocked over by a bullet grazing my head. The men seemed to be falling behind me, and poor Wilson, my officer, he was killed. I was out in front and he was one of the first to go over. He just waved and said ‘Come on, boys, for God’s sake, come on, come on!’ And that was the end of him, shot down dead. You see, I was in front and the chap about three yards up from me, he fell down, and I thought, ‘It’s time to get out!’27

The Turks collectively appear to have taken pity on Simpson as they didn’t fire at him as he turned and, in a daze and alone, stumbled back to the Australian lines. Remarkably three troopers made it to the extreme right of the Turkish parapet and, while it was pointless to fling themselves into the crowded Turkish trenches, they did have with them some jam-tin bombs which they flung into the crowded saps before managing to escape down into Monash Valley. At the opposite flank, Lieutenant Wilson was also observed to reach the enemy parapet but while encouraging his men to join him, he was killed by a Turkish grenade. The ‘lucky’ few troopers who had been wounded and knocked back into the trench by the storm of lead were all that remained of the first wave. Within 30 seconds of the charge, White, his officers and most of his men lay dead or dying just beyond the parapet. By now the second line of Victorian troopers were lining the frontline firing step, with their hands clasping the pegs dug into the trench wall.

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They hadn’t seen the slaughter but they had heard it and saw the pitiful remains of the few wounded being sent back down the line. As they looked up they also saw the boots of their dead cobbers. Orders could not be heard above the roar of the Turkish fire and within minutes of the first wave having hopped the bags, officers of the second were observed by their men to be scrambling out of the trench. The men immediately followed and, like those before them, they didn’t get far. The few survivors of this second charge later recalled passing most of the first, all apparently dead, lying just metres in front of their own parapet. Major Dale, who commanded the second line, was one of the few officers to survive. He wrote to his commanding officer just hours after the attack: ‘The second line speedily overtook the first, which had been practically wiped out, as every man seemed to be dead or wounded. My own line came under a most deadly hail of machine-gun, bomb and rifle fire, and the men fell all around me. No man hesitated, yet I had none to carry further. I fell on my face and, taking the cover of the nearest depression in the ground, managed to get together – or rather speak to – about 8 or 10 men not yet shoot.’28 Trooper Vernon Boynton, despite being seriously wounded, lived to record that ‘… we made a dash for it. We had to trample over the dead bodies of our first line. I got within about six yards of their trench when I seemed to be hit everywhere through my right leg, my right forearm, my right hand, the first finger of which was hanging off and blood pouring everywhere’.29 Captain George Hore wrote in a letter to his mother: I passed our first line, all dead or dying it seemed, and went on a bit further, and flung myself down about 40 yards from the Turkish trenches. I was a bit ahead of my men, having got a good start and travelled lighter. I looked around and saw them all down, mostly hit. I did not know what to do, the dirt was spurting up all around like rain from a pavement in a thunderstorm … The trench ahead was a living flame, the roar of musketry not a bit

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diminished. I was protected by a little, a very little fold in the ground and by a dead Turk dead about six weeks.30

It was now that someone in the trenches along Russell’s Top, looking through a trench periscope at the slaughter, claimed to see a yellow-andred marker flag in the extreme southern point of the Turkish trenches. With this sighting, the next wave of 150 troopers were ordered to prepare to attack. The Horsemen of Victoria had given their all and now the 8th Light Horse basically existed in name only. The regimental diary merely recorded that: ‘Owing to a deadly machine-gun fire, the attack failed to get home.’31

Back at Dead Man’s Ridge, the troopers of the 1st Light Horse continued to suffer terrible losses – casualties were growing with the passing of every minute. Of the officers still alive, few remained unwounded. Both Australian and Turk were involved in a continuous bomb fight. The Turks had a decided advantage in this as they had no shortage of grenades; the Australians, however, had only a limited supply of jam-tin bombs, which was soon depleted. From Pope’s, three troopers – Keys, Tancred and Barrow – ‘displayed great bravery in carrying bombs to the storming party over ground swept by Machine Gun and Rifle fire’.32 By now the original parapets had been reassembled, facing the Turks just above the newly captured trenches. The troopers could now do little but ‘watch the sky above the parapet in order to watch and dodge the enemy’s missiles. While so doing they found occasional grenades bursting about their feet. It was presently discovered that these were being rolled by the enemy down one of several tunnels, which connected the position with the trench above it. This stratagem was checked by a light horseman firing his rifle up the tunnel.’33

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Corporal Henry Foss of the C Troop of the 10th Light Horse recorded in his diary what happened as the Western Australians were fed into the rear line just before the 8th Light Horse hopped the bags. ‘My troop sat down in a fire trench waiting orders, while D Troop of A Squadron filed passed us. I spoke to Gres Harper and Wilfred, Bob Lukin, Hassell, and Geoff Lukin, and some others I knew. They were cheery and confident, and soon passed on. A few minutes later a terrific fire told us our first line had gone. There was a short lull of scattered fire then another burst more furious than the first signalled the second line had moved.’34 The Western Australians of the 10th Light Horse Regiment, who represented the third and fourth waves, had by now taken up their position in the frontline trench along Russell’s Top. In addition to the ongoing rifle and machine-gun fire, now two Turkish artillery pieces began to fire shrapnel shells over no-man’s-land, spraying it with deadly fragments of sharp, hot, jagged pieces of Constantinople scrap metal. The saps were crowded with dead and wounded Victorians who had been shot back straight from the parapet and were being carried or helped to the rear. Amongst the Western Australians, who occasionally halted to let them pass, every man assumed that death was certain, and each in the secret places of his mind debated how he should go to it. Many seem to have silently determined that they would run forward as swiftly as possible, since that course was the simplest and most honourable, besides offering a far-off chance that, if everyone did the same, some might at least reach and create some effect upon the enemy. Mate having said good-bye to mate, the third line took up its position of the fire step.35

Major Todd, who commanded the third line, was acutely aware that any attempt to reach the enemy frontline trench, let alone carry it, was impossible. He reported as much to his regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Noel Brazier, who didn’t need any convincing. He looked into

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no-man’s-land using a trench periscope. It was now fully daylight and he clearly saw the carpet of dead and dying troopers in bloodied khaki lying out in no-man’s-land. It was at this point that a staff officer from brigade headquarters appeared to ask the lieutenant colonel why the third line had not attacked. Brazier went back to brigade headquarters at 4.40 am to argue the point. The brigade commander, Colonel Frederic Hughes, however, had left his headquarters to watch the attack from an observation post; the only senior officer present was the brigade major, Antill (called ‘Bull Ant’ by the men – for good reason). Brazier got nowhere with Antill who, on hearing that a marker flag had been spotted in the Turkish trenches, insisted that another charge was needed. ‘Just … carry [the] enemy trenches’, was his reply.36 He ordered this without referring the matter to divisional headquarters or the commander of the brigade, Colonel Hughes, who he knew was close by. Brazier had no choice and returned to the front line gravely announcing to his officers ‘I am sorry lads, but the order is to go’.37 Most having seen the results of the first two waves had expected the attack to be cancelled. They now solemnly shook hands and said goodbye to each other and quietly took up their places with their men. It was not only the officers who were aware that they were facing almost certain death. Trooper Harold Rush turned to his mate beside him and said, just before going over the top to meet his death: ‘Goodbye cobber, God bless you’. Trooper Humfray Hassell turned to his cobber Trooper Harold Smith saying: ‘Goodbye, I don’t think I’ll be coming back from this one.’ He was right; Smith himself was wounded but survived to tell Humfray’s nephew Bill, in the early 1960s, of his uncle’s last known words.38 It was now 4.45 am and an eerie silence had fallen over no-man’s-land as the Turks conserved their ammunition for the next attack. The men of the third wave rose above the parapet; the silence swelled into a roar as bullets and shrapnel poured down on the 150 troopers as they tripped and fell. Corporal Hoops recalled: We charged but they dropped like flies. We did not advance

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further than the first line. I can tell you it looked terrible to see your chums toppling over on the ground and lying in all sorts of attitude. I dropped down and a chum put out his hand and shook hands and said ‘Good-bye’ as he said he was done. He was shot through the lungs and bleeding from the mouth, but he got back into the trench and is in hospital here now. As soon as I had shaken hands with him I heard someone calling me and discovered it was Geoff Howell, a particular chum of mine. He desired me to shoot him as he said he was settled … Poor fellow, he got a bullet through the head a little later. I was lying down alongside Captain McMasters and he got two bullets through the head … a piece of nickel [bullet jacket] struck me full above the right eye, but it was only a scratch. The bullets were still falling like rain, the bombs were lively, so I thought it time to get back into the trench. This I succeeded in doing and I could see Leo Roskams lying wounded just over the trench. I took off my puttees and put a stone on the end and threw them out. Someone pulled, so I started to haul in – who should it be but Jack Linto, a Yorkite. I was just throwing it out again when Leo, who must have become suddenly deranged, stood up for a second facing the Turkish trenches and he got one in the eye which laid the poor fellow out …39

It was with the earlier sighting of the marker flag that the staff of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade gave word to the British troops now waiting at the head of Monash Valley to commence their attack against the Chessboard. Earlier, one company of the Royal Welch Fusiliers had moved up a steep washaway to the right while the other moved straight ahead along the main gully. At 5.10 am Lieutenant Colonel Hay of the regiment received ‘a message … that the Australian Light Horse were holding the ‘A’ line of trenches, and I [was] instructed to move forward at once’.40

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British attack against the Chessboard from the head of Monash Valley, 7 August (From Bean, 1938)

Meanwhile, the left attacking force of troopers from Pope’s Hill now had a clear view of the southern parts of The Nek and witnessed the ‘third line of the 3rd Brigade run forward and sink to the earth’.41 These same men would soon witness the brave but futile charge of the Royal Welch Fusiliers just to their north as they tried to advance through ‘the dust haze caused by bombs and bullets until their first two lines fell almost in a heap, apparently killed or wounded, at the foot of a cliff ’.42 Major Glasgow’s men occupying the southern part of Dead Man’s Ridge were in a position to see the assault against Turkish Quinn’s by the troopers of the 2nd Regiment, which appeared to have stalled.

Lieutenant Colonel Brazier was determined that enough was enough. Indeed, shortly after the third wave stormed out onto no-man’s-land, a

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scribbled note from Major Todd had made its way from no-man’s-land back to Brazier. It stated that the third wave was pinned down and asked for further orders. Brazier again approached Antill with Todd’s note. Brazier later recalled: The message was on a bit of pink paper. I took it back to Antill who refused to listen to me, and ordered me to push on again. I made him write it on the paper. On getting back to the trench again – only 15 or 20 yards – there was a similar message from Major Scott, on the right flank, asking for instructions. I would not go to Antill again as he had never left his trench, and [I] looked for the Brigadier. After explaining the position and telling him it was murder to push on he said ‘try Bully Beef Sap’.43

Bully Beef Sap originated from Russell’s Top and led down into Monash Valley. It was being debated that maybe the fourth line should join up and support the attack of the Royal Welch Fusiliers at the head of Monash Valley. For thirty minutes the men of the fourth wave remained on the firing step while the commanders debated whether the attack should proceed. Trooper Jack Cox was waiting in the fourth line convinced that he was about to die. He recalled: ‘[I was] lost in my own thoughts, thinking about my wife with whom I had never really known the joys of married life …’.44 At this point the telephone rang and he watched as an officer had an intense conversation before putting down the receiver. The officer looked down the line at his men and breaking into a smile shouted: ‘Stand down, men!’45 It was now that an officer to the extreme right of the line (no-one knows who), ordered the men to charge. Apparently an officer on hearing Antill’s last order to ‘push on’ had arrived at the right flank and asked why this officer and his men had not left the trenches. Believing this to be an order to attack, he waved his hand, which tragically sent the fourth wave into a tornado of bullets, grenades and shrapnel. Major Scott, standing in the centre of the line, said in dismay: ‘By God, I believe the right has

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gone!’46 The troopers to the right bolted up and over, creating a domino effect along the whole line as those to their left also charged. Scott managed to stop some men from leaving the trench but most ‘hopped the bags’. Trooper Bain recalled: ‘We were not ordered out of the trenches as orders to cancel the fourth-line attack in view of the massacre reached us just in time. I was soon told my brother [who had charged as part of the fourth line] had been brought in dying. I didn’t get to him in time and all there was left for me to do was to bury him and write to his wife.’47 Bain was interviewed by Chris Roberts in the early 1980s and when asked why the troopers had charged to their deaths he ‘looked at me indignantly and said, “Well they didn’t want people to think they were cowards”’.48 Sergeant Sanderson was part of the fourth charge, and recalled to Charles Bean: The rhododendron bushes had been cut off with machine-gun fire and were all spikey. The Turks were two-deep in the trench ahead. There was at least one machine-gun on the left and any number in the various trenches on the Chessboard. The men who were going out were absolutely certain that they were going to be killed, and they expected to be killed right away. The thing that struck a man most was if he wasn’t knocked in the first three yards. Tpr. Weston on Sanderson’s right fell beside him as they got out of the trench, knocked back into the trench [killed]. Tpr. Biggs also fell next to him. Sanderson went all he could for the Turkish trench. Tpr. HG Hill, running beside him, was shot through the stomach, spun round, and fell [died of wounds]. Sanderson saw the Turks (close) in front and looked over his shoulder. Four men were running about ten yards behind, and they all dropped at the same moment.49

Those who attacked from the left and not killed outright had a better chance of surviving as there was a slight dip which provided some cover. This area was known as the ‘secret sap’ even though it wasn’t a sap as

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such. The others lying in the centre and to the right had little chance as they were exposed to ongoing rifle and machine-gun fire. Major Love, on seeing Captain McLaurin and Major Todd, managed to crawl over to them. They were close to the secret sap. All three had a brief discussion on what to do next as the bullets flew just above their heads. They decided it was ‘impossible for men to move forward a yard and live with such a hail of well-aimed and distributed rifle and machine-gun fire so returned with Major Todd and placed the problem before the Bde HQ and then received orders to withdrawal [sic] and support troops attacking up Monash Valley’.50 It was not long, however, before this extremely questionable order to attack from Monash Valley was abandoned. Indeed, the battle for the head of the valley and the Chessboard was by then already lost. Corporal Henry Foss and his men had earlier been assigned to the attack against The Nek and had tried to make their way to the front line close to the secret sap. He recorded in his diary, however, that: we found the bottom of the trench fairly littered with wounded men trying to get back for aid. With difficulty we passed them only to be blocked again, and word came back that some of the 8th LH were in the trench in front. A third burst of fire, followed by a fourth and fifth, told us our chaps were still moving. Still we were blocked. A few men trickled past belonging to the 8th LH. A few minutes later came the order ‘about turn’, and we filed out again.51

As the fourth line of Light Horsemen charged The Nek, Lieutenant Colonel Hay and his company from the Royal Welch Fusiliers launched their attack from the head of Monash Valley against the Chessboard. Given the thick undergrowth and the steepness of the terrain, only small parties of around ten men at a time could attack in piecemeal fashion.

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The Turks still held their positions and had no trouble stopping the attack, as they merely rolled grenades down on top of the Fusiliers as they struggled to fight their way up the slopes of the valley. Added to this, the approach was covered by at least two machine guns. The Australian troopers positioned at Pope’s Hill could see Turks running forward from their trenches throwing grenade after grenade down on the Fusiliers. The leading parties of the Welshmen were quickly shattered and the attack was over almost before it begun. In their excitement, some Turks launched a number of bayonet charges against the Fusiliers but they were cut down quickly by the Australian fire from Pope’s Hill. Meanwhile, the second company under the command of Captain Walter Lloyd was also cut down by the Turkish machine guns; among those killed was Lloyd. The Cheshires, who had been held in reserve to reinforce the Light Horse after capturing The Nek and Baby 700, were now ordered to assist the Royal Welch Fusiliers in their attacks but Lieutenant Colonel Hay had no choice but to call off the attack and it was finally abandoned.

Ultimately, with the failure of the battles to secure Baby 700, the head of Monash Valley and Quinn’s Post, the Turkish machine guns now turned their full attention against the small number of troopers holding the forward trenches along Dead Man’s Ridge as well as no-man’s-land separating them from Pope’s Hill. The continued bombing attack by the Turks had been devastating and only a small number of men now occupied a short length of the third-line trench. On either side of them Turks were trying to break into their position. Lieutenant Weir commanded a small party of men who were protecting the right flank, while Lieutenant Harris, whose back ‘had been torn by a bomb’52, covered the left approach. Large numbers of Turks from the Chessboard were now being funnelled directly into the battle. ‘Owing … to a heavy counter-attack by bomb, rifle and machine-gun fire, Major Glasgow … was obliged to retire.’53 They had to withdraw across no-man’s-land back to Pope’s Hill 19 8

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before they were completely cut off. Major Glasgow, along with Lieutenant Harris and four of his men, remained behind to cover the men as they attempted to retire to Pope’s Hill. Most of the wounded were carried out but the losses of the regiment were truly appalling. Of the two hundred men who had assaulted Dead Man’s Ridge from Pope’s Hill, over three-quarters were casualties, with every officer except Glasgow having been hit.

Meanwhile at The Nek, the order was being yelled for those in no-man’sland to retire. The navy assisted by increasing their bombardment of Baby 700. Under the cover of this bombardment Sanderson, now wounded, started to crawl back to the Australian lines and noticed a badly wounded officer who had been carrying a supply of bombs, one having exploded as a Turkish bullet tore into it – the officer was lying in agony, his hip smashed by the explosion. Sanderson and another trooper managed to drag him back to the secret sap but the officer died minutes later. Sanderson was stunned to see that the entire sap was full of dead and dying troopers. He now forced his way through the sap to the frontline trench to discover that ‘fifty yards had not a man in it except the dead and the wounded – no-one was manning it’.54 At about the same time, Syd Livesey made a mad dash from no-man’s-land back to the Australian trenches. When I got within 6 ft of it I made a rush on all fours, like a rat, and tumbled in head-first … The trench was in a terrible state with dead and wounded men lying everywhere. Some were lying dead half in the trench; some got a yard away. Some got more; some were killed trying to get out. About 10 yards away … they were lying in rows and heaps. It was awful. We could not get many of the poor chaps in, and they had to stay there and rot. Most of them were never buried … 55

Corporal William Hampshire risked his life several times to bring in the 19 9

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wounded. On at least five separate occasions he ventured into no-man’sland in broad daylight and brought in his wounded cobbers. It was noticed that the Turks refrained from shooting him as he brought in the badly wounded. In the end, however, Sergeant MacBean was forced to physically restrain him in order to prevent him too from becoming a casualty.56 It was all over – The Nek and Baby 700 remained firmly in Turkish hands, suffering few if any casualties. Of the 8th Light Horse, half of the Victorians involved in the attack had been killed outright and most of the rest had been wounded – many mortally. It was a similar story for the Western Australians of the 10th Light Horse. For the survivors, however, the ordeal had just begun. As recalled by Lieutenant Robinson of the 8th Light Horse to Charles Bean: ‘I tried to discuss the affair with the survivors of my regiment. Some seemed half stunned and dazed. One was sobbing like a lost child three years of age …’57 Another stated that ‘[m]any of the men on the cliff face were so shaken that they were almost helpless and the evacuations during the ensuing days from shock were heartbreaking’.58 Sergeant Pinnock wrote: ‘There was no chance whatsoever of us gaining our point, but the roll call after was the saddest, just fancy only 47 answered their names of close on 550 men. When I heard what the result was I simply cried like a child.’59 Trooper McGregor recalled almost 70 years later that the survivors of his squadron ‘were shattered, absolutely shattered. It was the hardest [time] of the whole war. Later looking out on the dead was horrible. We were in a sort of coma – dopey. We never discussed it later. We couldn’t.’60

The attacks should never have gone forward after it became clear that German Officers’ Trench could not be taken and that the New Zealanders’ attack against Chunuk Bair had stalled. Second Ridge was the most heavily defended position at Anzac, screened by large numbers of supporting rifle and enfilading machineguns, as well as artillery. How 200

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was a charge by a few hundred men going to keep the Turks pinned down let alone require the Turkish commanders to rush reinforcements from the northern heights to these ‘threatened’ positions. Such was the ‘result for which the light horse gave themselves. During the long hours of that day the summit of The Nek could be seen crowded with their bodies. At first here and there a man raised his arm to the sky, or tried to drink from his water bottle. But as the sun of that burning day climbed higher, such movement ceased. Over the whole summit the figures lay still in the quivering heat.’61 A number of similar tragic scenes were playing themselves out at Lone Pine, Steele’s Post, Quinn’s Post, the Chessboard and along the head of Monash Valley. The 8th Battalion had been positioned along Second Ridge at Courtney’s Post, sandwiched between Quinn’s Post just to the north and Steele’s Post to the south. At dawn the men of this battalion witnessed the pitiful results of the attack against German Officers’ Trench. Private John Turnbull wrote: ‘We saw one of our wounded lying against the Turkish parapets and we were watching him. We saw a rifle barrel come up over the parapet. With the telescope we saw a water bottle hanging from the bayonet, which our man reached. We did not fire on that loophole today.’62

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At daybreak Monash’s 4th Brigade was more than a kilometre short of Hill 971 and, even worse, was on the wrong ridge. The Indian Brigade had been thrown out of alignment by the incorrect positioning of Monash’s brigade and now found itself dispersed between two ridges, neither of them leading directly to Hill Q. The Australians and Indians were still trying to make sense of the steep ravines, spurs and ridges in which they were now stranded. Meanwhile, the New Zealanders had stalled just short of their objective – Chunuk Bair. There was still a chance that with quick and decisive action the New Zealanders could storm up the slopes and capture the heights largely unopposed. This would help the Indians and Australians in achieving their objectives. It was for this very reason that the slaughter at The Nek had gone ahead – to assist the New Zealanders in taking Chunuk Bair. But as the troopers charged The Nek, and ‘the shells of the fleet and land-batteries were at that moment thundering against Baby 700, temporarily impeding the enemy’s reserves’1, the New Zealanders were mostly stationary – most having been ordered to have their breakfast. Major General Godley finally realised that the attacks by both assaulting columns had stalled and by 6 am he decided to reinforce these forces with reserve troops in order that they might help carry the attacks 20 2

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forward. These troops were originally to be used to help consolidate the newly captured positions. Four of the six British reserve battalions under the command of Colonel Cayley (39th Brigade) were sent to reinforce the Indians, while the remaining two reserve battalions (8th Battalion, the Welch Regiment and the 6th South Lancashire) under Lieutenant Colonel Bald were to reinforce the New Zealanders. Cayley had by 7 am sought out Major General Cox, who ordered his battalions to assist the Indians in capturing Hill Q. Cayley now moved up Cheshire Ridge to observe what was happening along Rhododendron Ridge – he planned to send his troops up Chailak Dere but soon realised on looking down into the dere that there would be no room for his troops there and he decided to push on up the Aghyl Dere instead. On returning from his reconnaissance, he was astonished to discover that his troops were already on their way to Chailak Dere. He sent runners out to bring them back. All received the order, except the 7th Gloucestershires who had been leading the column (they would eventually join up with the New Zealanders in Chailak Dere). The remaining three battalions retraced their steps back towards the Aghyl Dere, but they would not reach their assigned position until very late in the afternoon. The plan of continuing to press the Indian attack by means of ‘fresh’ reserves would come to nothing.

Meanwhile, the 6th Gurkhas, with a portion of the 5th Gurkhas, were approaching Chamchak Punar, a very steep spur leading to Hill Q. ‘Finding it impossible to get on’, wrote their commander Major Allanson, ‘we swung to the right and attacked Chunuk Bair ridge up the nullah just south of Chamchak Punar’.2 Allanson later commented that he found the Australians ‘hopelessly stopped by a big precipice in front …’; they were hopelessly ‘tied up in impossible country …’ but he had ‘tremendous luck in striking good country … The reason we got forward much better than anybody else was largely due to the fortune of the route we chose.’3 At 20 3

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this point they were not far from the New Zealanders on Rhododendron Ridge. By 7.30 am they had ‘got successfully to within about 500 yards of the top of the ridge with few casualties’. To the brigade staff, however, watching north of their position, it appeared that they were ‘hung up by the enemy now in position on top of the main ridge’. They were recalled to prepare an outpost position for the night, close to the last fork of the Aghyl Dere at the foot of the range.4

By 6.30  am Turkish reinforcements had arrived at Battleship Hill and Chunuk Bair. Advance parties from Colonel Hans Kannengiesser’s 9th Division who had, hours earlier, been informed that they were no longer needed at Lone Pine, began to arrive along the northern heights as directed by the local Turkish commanders. When Kannengiesser and staff arrived at the main ridgeline overlooking the Anzac position, they found that the area was mostly unoccupied. Moving forward to reconnoitre, he came across the Turkish battery with its officer asleep and about twenty men scattered around who seemed completely oblivious to the current danger. Kannengiesser ordered these men to man the ridgeline and open fire on the New Zealanders below.5 Suddenly the enemy infantry actually appeared in front of us at about 500 yards range. The English [New Zealanders] approached slowly, in single file, splendidly equipped, very tired, and were crossing a hillside to our flank [the Apex], emerging in continually increasing numbers from the valley below. I immediately sent an order to my infantry – this was the twenty-man-strong artillerycovering platoon – instantly to open fire. I received this answer: ‘We can only commence to fire when we receive an order from our battalion commander.’ This was too much for me altogether. I ran to the spot and threw myself among the troops, who were lying in a small trench. What I said I cannot recollect, but they began to open fire and almost immediately the English lay down without

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answering our fire or apparently moving in any other way. They gave me the impression that they were glad to be spared further climbing.6

At this point additional reinforcements arrived from Mustafa Kemal. From his headquarters at Battleship Hill, Kemal had earlier seen enemy troop movement in the Sazli Beit Dere and along Rhododendron Ridge. His worst fears were being realised – the enemy appeared to be making an assault against Chunuk Bair. He requested reinforcements to occupy the heights between his own position all the way through to Hill 971. A regiment from the 4th Division, which had left Helles the night before, was now ordered to Hill Q; soon after, another regiment from the same division would be ordered to occupy Hill 971. Kemal released his sole reserves consisting of the 1st Battalion, 14th Regiment and two companies from the 2nd Battalion, 72nd (Arab) Regiment. These men were to create a skirmish line defending the positions between Hill 971 through to Battleship Hill. The defence of the northern heights was now under the command of Colonel Kannengiesser. Just as advanced parties from his own division began to arrive at Chunuk Bair, Kannengiesser was wounded in the chest by machine-gun fire from the Apex and sent to the rear.7 Soon the bulk of his men from the 25th and 64th Regiments (9th Division) arrived and by 10 am they had been fed into the Turkish defences overlooking the Anzac approaches to the northern heights. The men of the 25th reinforced the two companies of the 72nd Regiment, while those of the 64th reinforced the two companies from the 14th Regiment.8

Earlier, at around 8 am, Lieutenant Colonel Malone of the Wellington Battalion and Lieutenant Colonel Young of the Auckland Battalion met up with the brigade commander, Colonel Johnston, at the Apex. Looking left, they could see that the Australians and Indians appeared to be 20 5

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digging in rather than continuing their assault. Two companies of the 10th Gurkhas who were to assault Hill Q were now close to parties of New Zealanders at the Apex. The majority of men now occupying the Apex were from the Auckland and Wellington Battalions. Most men of the Otago Battalion were scattered down within the gullies and spurs running off Rhododendron Ridge. The Apex itself was now partly covered by three Otago machine guns positioned further down along Rhododendron Ridge. Turks along Battleship Hill and Baby 700 now began to concentrate their fire against the New Zealanders; with this, the New Zealanders began to be picked off – one by one. Turkish artillery from Anafarta now joined in and shrapnel began exploding around Rhododendron Ridge and the gullies either side of it. Captain Wallingford was on the spot and recalled: ‘The shrapnel starts and by the lord it is a butcher’s shop in no time.’9 Men had to get off the ridges and take shelter where they could within the gullies. At around 9  am Johnston sent a message to Major General Godley announcing that, since the Light Horsemen had ‘failed’ to capture Baby 700 and that the left assaulting column was digging in, they too should do likewise. Godley was alarmed by this communiqué and ordered Johnston to attack at once.10 Johnston now ordered his reserve battalion, the Aucklanders, along with the two companies of the 10th Gurkhas, whose officer had offered to cooperate with the New Zealanders, to capture the summit. Lieutenant Colonel Young, who commanded the Auckland Battalion, attempted a reconnaissance around the Apex. He quickly discovered that any movement resulted in a hail of fire from the enemy. The frontage of the attack was also extremely narrow and the attack would have to go in piecemeal fashion, which was bound to result in large casualties with little or no prospect of success. Young requested that the attack be put off until nightfall. He was supported by Captain Wallingford, the brigade machine-gun officer, who requested at the very least more time to bring up the machine guns to the Apex to offer some supporting fire to the attackers – all he needed was 20 minutes. Johnston would not have a bar 20 6

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of it. Wallingford pleaded to Johnston: ‘But I can cover your advance and put troops up there without casualty.’ Johnston shouted back: ‘Stand back, I will deal with you later. Stand back.’11 Johnston had lost it. Major Samuel Grant, second in command of the Auckland Battalion, at this point came over to Wallingford and begged for the guns. Earlier, with darkness and surprise in his favour, Johnston had refused to budge – now in broad daylight with the Turks fully prepared, he was determined to act. Meanwhile, Turkish reinforcements marching behind Battleship Hill and Chunuk Bair had been spotted by Australians further south at Anzac. Artillery observers requested that their guns be turned against the Turkish columns. Shells began to fall among the Turks, driving many of them back down the inland slopes for cover. This fire seriously impeded any Turkish movement along the upper inland slopes of Chunuk Bair and Battleship Hill. At 11 am the Aucklanders charged over the rise of the Apex and up the slope towards the summit of Chunuk Bair. By now there were close to 500 Turks manning the ridgeline.12 Had the charge occurred hours earlier, attackers would have met little resistance, but now Chunuk Bair had been heavily reinforced. Within seconds the New Zealanders were lost to sight in the dust that was torn up by the machine-gun bullets. Every platoon that followed ‘met the same fusillade and went down like a swathe before the reaper’.13 Almost immediately a Turkish mountain gun located on Abdel Rahman Bair to the north let loose with a barrage of shrapnel shells. Around 300 men now lay dead or wounded along the upper slopes of Chunuk Bair, but around 100 men from the three companies of the Auckland Battalion managed to reach an empty Turkish trench that lay halfway between the Apex and the summit of Chunuk Bair. This trench was christened the Pinnacle. Captain Algie of the 15th North Auckland Company recalled: And of course directly we appeared over the crest the machine guns opened on us and mowed us down. We went forward in lines of platoons about 25 yards apart … A gully half way gave

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us a spell as we were all pumped, then on again. Our fellows kept dropping as we went but a number reached the trench. When I got in I found I was the senior … We mustered 106 and 5 officers and were packed like sardines. We daren’t stand up so digging in was very slow. Every time a shovelful of earth went over it drew shells from a mountain gun so it was decidedly interesting.14

Meanwhile the Gurkhas had been delayed in launching their supporting attack and on storming out of the head of Chailak Dere were forced by concentrated Turkish fire to swerve to the left, taking cover within the head of the Aghyl Dere just beneath a small plateau known as The Farm. From here the Gurkhas attempted another charge but were beaten back suffering heavy casualties. Some Gurkhas had been forced to the right into the head of the Sazli Beit Dere, eventually making it along the upper slopes of Battleship Hill – these men were never seen again. Throughout these attacks Colonel Johnston had ‘stood on the crest of Rhododendron Ridge cheering his men on. [He] had to be removed almost by force’ by his staff.15 After the disastrous attack, Johnston relented to Wallingford’s earlier request and within 20 minutes the four machine guns of the Wellington Battalion were positioned at the Apex. The Turks were now forced to keep their heads down. Johnston had not yet given up on his attempt to carry the heights. At 12.30  pm Johnston ordered the Wellington Battalion to charge Chunuk Bair. Lieutenant Colonel Malone flatly refused. Malone’s discussion with Johnston and his brigade major was heard by some of the men, as recalled by Lance Corporal Charlie Clark: ‘… So these two colonels and Colonel Malone had a big row over it … Malone said … “My men are not going over in daylight – but they’ll go over at night time and they’ll take that hill.” He said, “Wellington Battalion come away from the ridge” and so we did. Malone said, “I will take the risk and any punishment. These men are not going until I order them to go. I’m not going to send them over to commit suicide.”’16 Lieutenant Colonel Hughes, commander of the Canterbury Battal-

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ion, was now ordered to carry out the attack. As two companies of the Canterbury men made for the Apex, a Turkish battery located on Hill Q brought fire to bear along Rhododendron Ridge. For a quarter of an hour the shells burst shrapnel over the backs of the troops. Eventually four officers and around fifty men reached the Apex. Another Canterbury company was ordered to advance but, as they proceeded to move out from their positions in the Sazli Beit Dere, they were met with devastating fire from entrenched Turks who had recently reinforced Battleship Hill. Major Cribb reported that the ‘fire was so heavy that it was impossible to bring the troops out’.17 The fifty or so Canterbury men who had managed to reach the Apex were now ordered to take Chunuk Bair. In contrast to the Aucklanders charge, the men kept low and tried to take advantage of any available cover – it made no difference in the end, as they too were cut to pieces and the few survivors stumbled back. Undeterred, Johnston wanted another attack to go forth, this time a combination of men from the Canterbury and Wellingtons. However, on receiving Johnston’s earlier report concerning the failed attack by the Aucklanders, Godley realised that there was no hope of carrying the heights during daylight hours. He sent out orders by telephone that all offensive actions were to cease. The order reached Johnston before he had time to issue orders for his third suicidal charge against Chunuk Bair. Johnston now withdrew the Canterbury survivors from the Apex. Looking from his position, he would have been able to see hundreds of casualties lying along the upper slopes – Canterbury men lying at or near the Apex, while Aucklanders and Gurkhas lay within no-man’s-land between the Pinnacle and the Apex. Private Edward Baigent of the Canterbury Infantry lay wounded with shrapnel in his leg and later wrote: Several of the slightly wounded were doing their best to attend to the seriously wounded. One helped to dress my leg and then we tried to put a splint of bayonet scabbards on another who crawled in with a leg shattered below the knee. Water was the cry from the wounded.

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During the afternoon six of the slightly wounded earned the highest decoration by giving their lives trying to get back for water. They had to run across about 50 yards of open ground to get back. The first man started out with three or four water bottles and was shot before he got halfway across. Then the second and third tried, only to met a similar fate. The cries and moans for water were terrible. Half an hour later the fourth man gave it a go and also met his death. Lieutenant Lawrie, who was also wounded, then forbade any more from trying, but the cries for water were so piteous that two more men decided to give it a go together, hoping that if one got over, return fire may be arranged to enable water to be sent back. The first man joined the other dead about half way across and hopes were high that the second would succeed, but alas he went down within a few yards of shelter. Tobacco and the approach of night was the only comfort. We rolled dozens of cigarettes to be handed on and lit for those unable to roll their own. We now had no idea of how the battle was progressing. Artillery and rifle fire was still raging with heavy black smoke towards Suvla Bay. As soon as it was dark I crawled back until I came to a trench where a voice called out with an unkind enquiry as to whether I was a Turk.18

At Lone Pine, all along the line Turkish bombing increased but, unknown to the Australians, the Turks were still far from ready to launch an all-out counter-attack. The Australians had captured all of their main defensive works. The Turks, with their backs to Legge Valley, were also cut off from their southern force along Snipers’ Ridge as the Australians had driven a wedge between the two and it was difficult for the Turkish commanders to organise a concerted attack. As such, those attacks that were launched during the early morning hours were piecemeal and uncoordinated affairs

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that were repulsed by Australian machine-gun fire.19 When it became light, the Turkish commanders, to their horror, realised that the Australians were looking down into their reserve position in The Cup using trench periscopes. Zeki Bey recalled at this point that one of his men asked him ‘Aren’t those our men?’ ‘Of course not,’ I said. ‘Can’t you see – we haven’t those things!’20 It was absolutely critical that these positions at the very least be recaptured. The Australian red-and-yellow artillery marker flags could also be seen – indicating to the Australian gunners that any points beyond these flags were ‘fair game’. The Australian posts that were of greatest concern to the Turks were those soon christened Goldenstedt’s Post, Tubb’s Corner, Youden’s Post and Cook’s Post. In order to attack these posts with any chance of success, it was necessary for a combined attack from the Turkish forces at The Cup and those along Snipers’ Ridge. The Turks immediately began to dig trenches around the Australian front line to connect the two. Zeki Bey later recalled to Charles Bean in 1919: ‘I ordered my working party into the sap to begin the work … The moment they got into it with their picks they were fired on from the direction of Mirmezi Sirt by a mall gun … It got fairly in among them – two or three men were wounded more or less badly, and the rest came tumbling back to the right of my sector.’21 For the time being the attempt to make contact with their comrades along Snipers’ Ridge was abandoned.22

At the extreme north of the Australian line at Lone Pine, Lance Corporal Aylward (4th Battalion) and his men still manned the barricade looking down into Owen’s Gully. It was not long before the Turks attempted to bomb them out. By 10  am Aylward had been wounded and Private Kelly mortally wounded – now just two men remained to hold the post. It seemed that the position was about to fall, when at the last moment reinforcements arrived and a machine gun was soon in place. The Turks were forced to withdraw. 211

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Just south of Aylward’s Post, the wounded Major Mackay was still commanding his post. The main trench bay was a death trap and Mackay, with permission from his superiors, was withdrawing his men from the position. He ordered the two communication trenches to his rear to be barricaded while he himself remained ‘… waiting rifle in hand, for the appearance of any of the enemy, while Captain Scott of the 4th and Lieutenant Howell-Price, adjutant of the 3rd, organised the work on the new barricades. When they had blocked the Traversed Trench and partly blocked the other, all three withdrew to the latter and completed the barricade. Mackay next arranged that a short north-south tunnel should be driven to connect the two trenches, which the new barricades had separated.’23

During the morning of 7 August, Lance Corporal Lawrence had been positioned at the Pimple but had now ‘got himself assigned’ to a small party of men who went across to Lone Pine via B5 tunnel. They soon reached the newly constructed firing line in the middle of no-man’s-land. Lawrence later recorded in his diary: ‘daylight is coming in through the opened-up recesses, through which the first line hopped out, and lying all along it are the forms of fellows killed even before they had got into the open; lying beside them on the floor of the tunnel are empty shell cases that have come clean through the openings, evidence of the excellent shooting of the enemy artillery.’24 On finally reaching the end of the tunnel that had been pushed forward of the firing line, Lawrence emerged into the open. Here he climbed into an open sap that had been dug hours before and made his way towards the Pine; as he progressed he noticed ‘the smell of dead bodies … getting very strong and unpleasant’.25 He soon found himself climbing down into what had been one of the Turkish tunnels, which led directly to the old Turkish front line:

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In this tunnel are lying dozens of dead of both sides, whilst almost all the rest of the room is taken up with the wounded. These fellows have been crouched up in here all night; some of their wounds are awful yet they sit there not saying a word. Certainly not complaining and some have actually fallen off to sleep despite their pain. One has been shot clean through the chest and his singlet and tunic are just saturated with blood, another has his nose and upper lip shot clean away … [they] were sitting there, cold, thirsty, weak and half dead, yet quite happy as long as things were going well … Lying beside them a man asleep. He had been wounded somewhere in the head and as he breathed the blood just bubbled and frothed at his nose and mouth, truly a most unpleasant sight.26

Lawrence climbed out of the tunnel back into the sap. His job was to help widen and deepen the passage. It was not long, however, that while digging he broke into the roof of another tunnel. [By now] the trench was about three feet deep and the earth on the bank gave you another foot, making four feet protection, but as yet it was impossible to stand up or even to straighten one’s back. Occasionally I would forget and go to stand up but the way in which bullets hit the bank all round, directly and slightest portion of my hat showed up, soon convinced me that it would pay to keep low … The whole way across is just one mass of dead bodies, bags of bombs, bales of sandbags, rifles, shovels and all the hundred and one things that had to be rushed across to the enemy trenches. The undergrowth has been cut down, like mown hay, simply stalks left standing, by the rifle fire, whilst the earth itself appears just as though one had taken a huge rake and scratched it all over. Here and there it is torn up where a shell has landed. Right beside me, within a space of fifteen feet, I can count

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fourteen of our boys stone dead … Thank God their loved ones cannot see them now – dead, with blood congealed or oozing out … The major is standing next to me and he says ‘Well we have won’. Great God – won – that means a victory and all those bodies within arms’ reach – then may I never witness a defeat. Just where we have broken into their tunnel there is one of our boys lying with his head and shoulders hanging into the hole; the blood is drip, drip, drip into the trench. I sit watching it – fascinated; the major has just sat down too on the step into the tunnel and it is dripping on his back. I wonder who this poor devil was. I will look at his identity disc. It is under his chin and his face hangs downward into the trench. Each time I lift up his head it falls back; it is heavy and full of dirt and ugh, the blood is on my hand – a momentary shudder – but one is used to these sights now, and I simply wipe my hands upon the dirt in the trench. Lying right against the trench (I could get him if it was worthwhile) lies another; his back is towards me, and he is on his side. From the back of his head down his neck runs a congealed line of dark red, but that is not what I notice; it is his hands. They are clasped before him just as though he was in prayer. I wonder what that prayer was. I wonder if it will be answered, but surely it must. Surely the prayer of one who died so worthily (he was right on the parapet of the Turkish trench) could not fail to be answered.27

Earlier at Lloyd’s Post, Lieutenant Colonel Brown, 3rd Battalion (who would soon be fatally wounded by shrapnel and replaced by his second in command Major McConaghy), positioned a number of men along Traversed Trench, but was now concerned with the gap between Lloyd’s Post and the northernmost part of Sasse’s Sap. He ordered a number

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of men to climb out into the open beyond Lloyd’s Post while it had still been dark so as to continue the line across the depression between these two positions. With daylight, however, it became obvious to these men that they were completely exposed to Turkish fire from Johnston’s Jolly and, before they were spotted by the Turks, they withdrew into Lloyd’s Post. Just as the bombing battle for Aylward’s Post was reaching its climax, a number of Turks had managed to creep into the depression between Lloyd’s Post and Sasse’s Sap and let loose with a hail of grenades at Lloyd’s Post. Lloyd had no jam-tin bombs with which to reply and so evacuated the post. He remained with an NCO and both manned the position by running to the rear as a grenade landed and exploded – each would then return to the Post. This cat-and-mouse game went on for close to two hours before a supply of jam-tin bombs finally arrived and the Turks were cleared. What was needed above all were bombs, more bombs. Later that afternoon a request was put through at 4:50 pm from the 1st Division to the bomb makers on the beach, asking for another 400 bombs for the 1st Brigade and a further ‘two to four thousand required tomorrow’. The reply a few hours later was that ‘250 bombs sent to 1st Inf. Bde just now … the bomb factory is working 54 men and no room for more to work. We will have 500 more ready by 12 o’clock tonight.’28 Bombs alone seemed to keep the Turks at bay. In addition, the reinforcements were inadvertently helping to choke the arteries of supplies. Lloyd approached Lieutenant Colonel MacNaghten and obtained permission to clear the trenches of wounded and, to assist, the companies of the 1st Battalion and two of the 12th were withdrawn back to the Pimple. After clearing the wounded and returning to his post, Lloyd found that the Turks had launched another bombing attack against Traversed Trench and his own position. The men had been driven back from Lloyd’s Post. Lloyd led them back to occupy the position, but shortly afterwards, while he was absent, another heavy bombing attack drove the men back and another barricade was set up further back, completely cutting off those manning 215

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The withdrawal from Traversed Trench and Lloyd’s first barricade, Lone Pine (From Bean, 1938)

Traversed Trench who had no idea that those protecting their southern flank had retired.29 On hearing that Lloyd’s Post had been evacuated, Lieutenant Colonel MacNaghten ordered Captain Scott to reoccupy the positions before the Turks realised it was empty. Scott came up to the new barricade and called to the men, ‘Who’ll come with me?’30 and, without waiting for a reply, he jumped the barricade and reoccupied Lloyd’s Post further along the line. He came across the party of Turks who were still attempting to lop grenades into the position. Scott managed to shoot three of the Turks, causing the rest to retire into the bend of the trench to the right. Scott then sent two men to keep the Turks from returning by occupying the entrance to the trench that they had retreated down. The Turks kept throwing bombs and as each of the Australians was killed or wounded, another would take his place guarding the trench entrance. Meanwhile Scott was throwing bombs across no-man’s-land at the same Turks. Lloyd’s Post was now effectively isolated as a Turkish machine 216

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gun at Johnston’s Jolly enfiladed Traversed Trench. Bombs and ammunition had to be thrown to Scott and his men from the rear and from the survivors in Traversed Trench. The bomb fight continued until one of the jam-tin bombs finally found its target. Traversed Trench, however, was quickly becoming a death trap and, now that it couldn’t be manned, it was impossible for Lloyd’s Post to be held. Scott ordered that the barricade to the rear be heightened and strengthened. When this was completed, he gave the order for the survivors in Traversed Trench and at Lloyd’s to ‘make a dash for it’ as soon as the machine gun stopped firing. As they did so they expected the machine gun to kick back into life – but luck was on their side and the machine gun, for whatever reason, remained silent and most threw their rifles and themselves over the barricade. It was now just after midday.31 Just south of Sasse’s Sap at Woods’s Post, which represented the centre of the Australian position, a number of Turks had made a brave but futile charge from The Cup passing directly in front of Goldenstadt’s Post without attacking it. The previous night a machine gun had been positioned at Woods’s Post and within seconds the Turks lay dead and dying in no-man’s-land between these two posts. The Turks didn’t try this again, but they did respond with grenades and throughout the day the bomb fight intensified.32 Along the southern part of the Australian defences, a number of Turks had taken up a bombing position within a shallow trench or depression between Tubb’s Corner and Youden’s Post. The Australians soon ran out of bombs and they tried to keep the Turks at bay with rifle fire. Casualties were soon mounting. The Turks were content at bombing and did not try to directly assault either position. Just to the south at Cook’s Post, other Turks tried to scout around their flank, but within seconds concentrated rifle fire resulted in a large number of Turkish casualties. A white flag was raised, ‘but since there was no opportunity of capturing them, Major Morshead of the 2nd ordered the firing to continue, evoking a strong protest from one of his juniors, Lieutenant Harkness, who 217

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had newly arrived at the front’.33 Some time later in the day, a Greek from this group stuck a white flower in the muzzle of his rifle and managed to crawl to the Australian lines and give himself up.34 Only at the extreme southern flank where Jacobs’s Post bent back towards the original Turkish front line did the Turks attempt to launch an all-out attack in an attempt to recapture the position. From here it was noticed by the Australians standing to that the Turkish trench opposite was bristling with bayonets. Almost at once two lines of Turks charged but were quickly cut down by rifle fire. In the lull that seemed to follow this counter-attack, Lieutenant Colonel Scobie, commander of the 2nd Battalion, with Brigade Major King, went around this part of the line. Youden’s and Cook’s positions were still not connected and he ordered that work continue on bridging the gap between their two positions. Soon a large number of Turks were observed rushing up trenches to their right – it looked like the Turks were about to renew their attack against Jacobs’s Post. Now Turkish artillery along Third Ridge also opened fire against this area – it was around 11 am. The same guns enfiladed the communication trenches leading to Cook’s and Youden’s Posts, but not the posts themselves. By noon the Turkish battery fire was severe and casualties were accumulating. Along with artillery fire, the Turks let loose with large numbers of grenades. The Australians had no response. Lieutenant Hacking took a quick look across no-man’s-land to ascertain what the enemy were up to – he was immediately killed. Within minutes, Cook himself tried the same and was seriously wounded in the head, while Lieutenants Youden and Cotton who were standing together were also hit. The garrison was now being bombed from several directions.35 An unnamed soldier of the 2nd Battalion recalled how ‘a snowy-headed youth – he could not have been more than twenty – catching the cricket ball bombs the Turks were throwing and tossing them back. I did not see him at the finish – he must have fumbled a catch!’36 Lieutenant Colonel Scobie moved forward and quickly realised that the isolated position at Youden’s and Cook’s Posts could not be held 218

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50 Metres

1 Aylward’s Post

5 Sasse’s Post

9 Youden’s Post

2 McDonald’s Post

6 Woods’s Post

10 Cook’s Post

3 Mackay’s Post

7 Goldnstedt’s Post

11 Jacobs’s Post

4 Lloyd’s Post

8 Tubb’s Corner

12 Pain’s Post

Posts held by Australians, midday 7 August, Lone Pine (Adapted From Bean, 1938, p. 541)

under the present conditions and ordered that the men retire to the main line via their communication trenches. Scobie himself remained in the sap ‘while his men were withdrawing from it. He had sent for one of the large improvised bombs, which he intended to throw with his own hands in order to cover the retirement, and was above the parapet, heaving it, when he fell back dead’ – killed by a Turkish grenade.37 The attack against Jacobs’s Post and Pain’s Post was also intensifying. It wasn’t long before the Australians ran out of jam-tin bombs and men relied on rifle fire to force the Turks to keep their heads down. By 219

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1  pm, with the Turks having now occupied the vacated Youden’s and Cook’s Posts, the attack seemed to be reaching its climax. Jacobs was not aware of the withdrawal of the Australians from these posts and only became aware of it on seeing the Turkish bayonets protruding beyond their parapets. Jacobs realised that the Turks were now moving down the communication saps trying to reach their original front line. He hurried with the news to 2nd Battalion Headquarters – it looked as if the southern part of the line was about to fall to the enemy. Major Stevens, who was in temporary command of the battalion, took steps to counter the Turkish advance, while Jacobs returned to his position. Jacobs’s Post was now three deep in dead and dying and the men on the exposed flank were being driven in. Bean later recorded that: There was no barrier across the trench except the bodies of the dead. Consequently, having obtained a number of captured Turkish grenades, Jacobs went with Sergeant Wicks to the flank and threw them, while his men began to build a barricade. The bombs, however, quickly ran out, and in spite of the urgency, no more could be obtained until Wicks, recollecting that he had seen a supply in the trench evacuated by the 2nd [he] volunteered to search for it. This errand would take him, if not among the Turks, at any rate into a curve of the trench in which their bombs were constantly bursting. He nevertheless went forward, and, though wounded, found the grenades, and in three journeys recovered them. This additional supply enabled Jacobs to continue throwing while his men barricaded the trench.38

Meanwhile Major Stevens had sent Captain Pain to bring a machine gun into action to help support Jacobs’s Post. Pain hurried to the ‘nearest machine-gun position to take the gun to the new post designated by Stevens, and on reaching it met with a gruesome sight. A shell had landed near the gun, killing the crew, who were lying in a heap, but the gun itself was unharmed. Directing some men to carry the gun and follow him,

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Pain reached the trench junction where he was to come into action, but the situation was too critical to allow time to prepare a position, so he decided, without hesitation, to set the gun in the open, and while standing exposed breast high, to fire on the Turks crowding the flank.’39 Pain set up the machine gun in the open, in the angle between the two trenches, which commanded an excellent view of all the Turkish positions. In order to increase the sweep of the gun, Pain placed the legs of the tripod on the shoulders of three of his men (Privates Nichol, Montgomery and Goudemy). The Turks began firing and throwing bombs in reply and it wasn’t long before the machine gun’s water jacket was pierced, and Pain himself wounded; he nevertheless continued to fire the machine gun with scalding water pouring upon the men below, causing them to laugh and swear.40 Montgomery was soon hit (later dying of his wounds) and the gun by then was too damaged to fire. Pain was sent down to the beach, but he and his men had, at the most critical point in the fight, brought the Turkish attack to a standstill. The Turks were now out of spirit as they fired blindly into the air.41 Now the men of the 1st Battalion, who had earlier been sent back to the Pimple, were again brought into the Pine. Some of these men, under the command of Major Davidson, along with some men of the 12th Battalion under Major Lane and Captain Rafferty, were hurried to the southern flank immediately behind Jacobs.42 His position ‘was only the butt … of the original south-flank trench, the rest of which had now been retained by the Turks, and most of the original line on the south flank having thus been lost, men of the 2nd and other battalions were set to deepen the shallow disused trench which … ran parallel with it, and in parts almost touched it. By this means a continuous fire-trench was re-established along the whole southern flank, now reaching from the old Turkish front line to Tubb’s Corner.’43 Sergeant Elgar Hale (12th Battalion) was with this group of men and later wrote to his sister: The beggars nearly got me with a bomb, I had quite a nice job

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chasing bombs as they lobbed in the trench and dropping a bag of sand on them, so as to localise their explosion. I saw one coming through the air, and was bending down picking up the bag to drop on it, but it exploded just behind my back and knocked me over. A chap, a friend of mine who was with me, told me afterwards that he looked for me as the smoke and dirt cleared away and saw me with the bag of sand on top of me and a chap lying across me. All I know is that I struggled out with my eyes and mouth full of sand and my ears buzzing, and very deaf. About half an hour after I was as good as gold again.44

By late afternoon the Turks increased their bombing campaign along the whole line. They attacked Goldenstedt’s Post, but by now the men here had been supplied with a number of jam-tin bombs, which checked the attack. It was, however, on the southern flank that the Turks again appeared to be trying to force the issue. Fortunately for the Australians, the Turks were spotted as they moved along the southern parts of the plateau to take up their position for an attack. Lieutenant Ross’s guns of the 7th Battery on Bolton’s Ridge began to tear into them, despite the efforts of Turkish counter-battery fire along Third Ridge. The Turks continued to attempt to bomb the Australians out of the southernmost position. By now Captain Jacobs had momentarily been evacuated from the Pine with a head wound, while Lane and Rafferty took command of the forward positions with their 12th Battalion men. An urgent message was sent from the front line that experienced bombers with bombs were urgently needed. With this, all of the trained bomb throwers of the 7th Battalion, thirty-two in all, were sent forward into the Pine just after 6 pm.45

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15 ‘How’s she go i n g m at e ? ’

With Godley’s earlier order to cease all offensive actions against the northern heights, emphasis was now placed on reconnoitring the surrounding areas during the remaining daylight hours. Godley set about redrafting the plan to capture the heights. An attack along the whole line would commence at dawn the next morning and would be preceded by a 45-minute bombardment starting at 3.30 am. During this bombardment the Australian, Indian and New Zealand battalions were to approach their objectives and, as soon as the bombardment finished at 4.15 am, they would launch their attacks and capture the three summits. Some units that had fared badly during the day would be placed in reserve and fresher troops would take their place. The Auckland and Canterbury Infantry Battalions especially were in need of rest and would be replaced by the Otago and Wellington Infantry Battalions – these two battalions would lead the attack against Chunuk Bair at dawn. The Indian Brigade had already been reinforced by Cayley’s 39th Brigade, while the New Zealanders had been reinforced by the two British battalions under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Bald. The Gloucestershire Battalion of the 39th Brigade, which had continued up the Chailak Dere while the rest of the brigade made their way back into the Aghyl Dere, was allowed to stay with the New Zealand Brigade, while 223

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Bald’s 6th South Lancashire was sent to reinforce Cayley’s brigade. Bald’s remaining battalion, the 8th Welch, moved up the Chailak Dere to reinforce the New Zealanders. In addition, the Auckland Mounted Rifles and Maori half-battalion moved up to support the New Zealand infantry. Birdwood, realising that Godley had been forced to use all of his reserves in the scheduled dawn attack, provided him with the British 38th Brigade from the corps reserves, which were placed near No. 2 Outpost. Meanwhile, Arthur Carbines of the Wellington Battalion had been busy all day trying to treat the New Zealand wounded on Rhododendron Ridge. He recorded in his diary that night: Indians with mules bring up water and other provisions. We are very busy with the wounded as our guns attack with a heavy bombardment, that it is decided to shift the dressing station near to the top of the hill … One thousand wounded are left all day under shell fire, for we cannot get to them until dusk. Very hard work getting through the scrub and then the track, with bullets still whizzing around. Wake up the Canterbury ambulance to look after their men after a very hard job of bringing Frank Hagenson down off the hill. Enjoy a good sleep after two days’ work.1

Arthur would need it – within hours he would find himself fighting for his life on the summit of Chunuk Bair. With night, the New Zealanders at the Apex were ordered to dig and by midnight a trench line had been dug, with additional machine guns from the Canterbury Battalion distributed along the line. The Otago men were now withdrawn to reorganise for their assault against Chunuk Bair, scheduled for 4.15 am. Turkish snipers were active throughout the night but this didn’t stop the brave stretcher-bearers from bringing in, wherever possible, the wounded along Rhododendron Ridge and the surrounding gullies and spurs. Meanwhile, Monash’s troops had begun to entrench around the head of Australia Valley. Cox’s earlier order to assault the heights with the

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14th Sikhs at midday, which was already running well behind schedule, had now been cancelled. Turkish troops had occupied the ridge immediately north of Damakjelik Bair and during the day had inflicted numerous casualties as Monash’s men attempted to dig in. The Gurkhas were now called on and, taking their kukris (curved cut-throat knives), they would disappear into the scrub and each would ‘soon emerge to wipe his knife on the bushes and again disappear after another, thus soon clearing out these pests of snipers’.2 In some places it was impossible to dig, as the slightest movement resulted in concentrated rifle and artillery fire – these men had no choice but to retire into the southern slopes of the Bair to gain some cover. Private Percival, 15th Battalion, recalled that: One man was caught through the side of the head, severing his right ear, but not killing him. He lay … in a dangerous position – right in line of a point from which some snipers were potting our lads as they passed across a bit of a rise … A man crawled out of our shallow trench and wormed his way along the ground to a position within a couple of yards of this man. Ping! Zipp! Zipp! Bullets hit the ground in little spurts of dust all round the rescuer’s body. ‘Bob down!’ yelled one of our boys – he was the would-be-rescuer’s brother. But the rescuer worked his way snakewise until he got to the wounded man. Clumsily turning the man over, he shouted, ‘How’s she going mate?’ there was no answer. He yelled. ‘Strike me pink the poor bugger’s just about outed’, and began to drag him towards a bluff of rock and bush-studded earth nearer them but away from us. He got a bullet through his ankle but managed it at last, and we all cheered him. He looked over and grinned. He bound the wounded man’s head up but didn’t bother about his own wound.3

Monash asked Cox for another battalion in light of the fact that his troops were completely exhausted. Monash now planned to attack Hill 971 with the 14th, 15th and 16th Battalions. Cox passed on the request

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to Godley who released the 6th King’s Own Royal Lancaster Regiment (38th Brigade) which, with the 13th Battalion, would hold the line during the dawn attack. Having also received at 7  pm his final orders from Cox regarding the assault for the next morning, Monash assembled his battalion commanders together and explained the situation. The 15th Battalion was to lead the column. They were to move out at 3 am and cross the Asma Dere to the north and then onto Abdel Rahman Bair and from there capture Hill 971 – at no later than 4.15  am. Monash had by now realised that they were on the wrong ridge – but even so, he still misinterpreted the terrain. What Monash and staff now believed to be the Asma Dere was a relatively short gully that cut through Damakjelik Bair (known as Kaiajik Dere) – the true Asma Dere lay beyond this gully. As such they mistook Hill 60 as an offshoot of Abdel Rahman Bair. The real Asma Dere was on the far side of Hill 60, hidden from Monash’s view, with the wild spurs and outstanding heights of Abdel Rahman rising 500 metres beyond that.4 The complexity and difficulty of the terrain, the near-total lack of reconnaissance and the appalling physical condition of the troops were again working against the Anzac breakout. Private Percival later stated that: of the whole of those good comrades who were with me I can honestly say that these lads performed deeds of heroism and utter fearlessness, bravery sufficient to warrant the issue all round of VCs, but nobody of high enough military rank saw them. We, their mates, saw it all. On the following day we buried some of our dead under whatever shelter the unoccupied ranges near us afforded. We crept on, scrambling and slipping on rugged slopes and across huge crevices in whose depths were often reposed the unheeded bodies of the dead, enemy and friend mixed, the result of that bloody struggle up steep hill-sides exposed to the spray of machine-gun bullets and shrapnel.5

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Just after 7  pm Mustafa Kemal at Battleship Hill sent a report to the Northern Group commander stating that all available reserves not required elsewhere should be sent to reinforce the Sari Bair Range. He stated that ‘I find the situation on the right [northern] flank critical and I request that suitable forces be sent up to the division [9th Division] as reserves’.6 Later that night Turks from the 11th Regiment (4th Division) arrived to help reinforce Chunuk Bair and soon five machine guns were in position covering the approach to the summit.7 In addition, Liman von Sanders now ordered that all troops on the Asiatic side not in the line should be sent immediately to Chanak where they were to cross the Dardanelles by boat and await further orders.8

As darkness set in on Lone Pine, Esat Pasa was still committed to retaking his lost position. The Turkish dead from the first 24 hours of fighting were moved off the Pine wherever possible to make room for the living – the dead were laid out beside the tracks leading from the plateau. The reinforcing Turks found themselves passing rows of their dead comrades, laid out four deep, on their left-hand side – a ‘column of dead men’, as a Turkish officer described it.9 As they neared the top ‘there were the Australian periscopes looking over at them’. ‘These troops’, the officer said, ‘were in bad condition and came to a bad situation.’10 It was later that night, having been blamed by his superiors for the loss of Lone Pine, that the commander of the 47th Regiment, Tewfik Bey, ordered an attack against Jacobs’s Trench (an extension of Jacobs’s Post). He said: ‘Well, I’ll take the troops myself and we’ll do something whatever it costs.’11 He led from the front and was one of the first killed in the pointless attack. While the Turks had failed to retake their frontline trenches, they had driven the 2nd Battalion from the head of The Cup and had recaptured most of the south flank, which had given the Australians a commanding view of not only The Cup itself but also parts of Legge Valley. Such views, however, were still available from that portion of trench being held 227

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by Pain and Jacobs’ men, and one post, Goldenstadt’s Post, which still provided a direct view into The Cup. To the north the Australians had also been forced to evacuate Traversed Trench and this part of the Pine was defended by only a number of isolated posts at sap-heads. The Turkish commander of the 13th Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Ali Riza, along with Zeki Bey of the 1/57th Regiment who was now his chief assistant, realised that a new tactic had to be adopted if they were to succeed in capturing the rest of the Pine. Earlier, Zeki Bey had approached his men manning the edges of Lone Pine and asked them: ‘Why can’t you counter-attack over the top here?’ One of his junior officers replied: ‘but can’t you see – there are all those men lying on the top who tried to make an attack over the top there. They were caught by fire the moment they got over. You can’t go there.’ Zeki Bey looked up and ‘there was a complete line of dead along the top’.12 Ali Riza and Zeki Bey knew that their artillery could not provide sufficient support to assist an all-out infantry assault; the best approach was to cover their attack with covering fire. Marksmen and others were soon taking up positions along various points of the Pine as well as along Johnston’s Jolly, with orders to force the Australians to keep their heads down. The bombing war continued at Lone Pine during the rest of the night, especially at Jacobs’s Post, which was quickly becoming the ‘Quinn’s Post’ of Lone Pine. Because of officer casualties, Jacobs had to be summoned back to take command of the post. The position by now was so badly crowded with men from the 7th Battalion that the men could not dodge the enemy’s grenades; the trench was literally floored with dead and dying, in places several deep, and the fight, which was never ending, had to be carried on over their bodies. By 9 pm it was recorded in the 2nd Battalion diary: ‘We are sustaining a very large number of casualties from bombs. Two bomb screens [however] have been erected and [are] serving very useful.’13 Jacobs now also ordered that the garrison be thinned out to help avoid casualties. The southern flank was being defended at around ten posts – each now defended by two or three men. As one man fell he 228

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was replaced by another further down the line. At some point during 7 August, Lieutenant Charles Lecky of the 2nd Battalion had been in the thick of the fighting for the southern flank of Lone Pine for what, to him at least, seemed like days. Coming to a communication trench, he ‘felt tempted to sneak down a little way, and have a rest. However, an undaunted chaplain was there administering to the wounded and dying. He looked at me. One look was enough, and I went round to the new position with the survivors, without any more inclination to quit the job. That chaplain was ‘Fighting Mac’, the Salvationist.’14 Back at Australian Divisional Headquarters, Major General Walker’s chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel White, entered in his diary for 7 August: ‘Operations towards SUVLA BAY – Ships guns firing as on 25  April! Progress slow. LONE PINE continually counter-attacked. Place like a charnel house.’15 Private Cecil McAnulty of the 2nd Battalion, who had confided in his diary just before going over the top to attack Lone Pine that he ‘hoped to get through alright’, was still in the thick of the fighting. He not only survived the charge but also the ferocious hand-to-hand fighting in the dark and crowded galleries of the Turkish front line. He and his mates were now somewhere in the heart of the Pine. He was fastidious about keeping his diary up to date. At some point during the fighting for Lone Pine, he took a minute off to update his diary. He reached into his breast pocket and took out his battered diary, which consisted mostly of backs of envelopes and any other pieces of scrap paper he could lay his hands on, and scribbled: I’ve pulled through alright so far, just got a few minutes to spare now. I’m all out, can hardly stand up … when we got the word to charge Frank and I were on the extreme left of the charging party. There was a clear space of 100 yards to cross without a patch of cover. I can’t realise how I got across it, I seemed to be in a sort of a trance. The rifle and machine-gun fire was hellish. I remember

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dropping down when we reached their trenches, looked round and saw Frank and 3 other men alongside me. There was a big gap between us and the rest of our men … [who] were behind the shelter of the Turkish parapet … We were right out in the open … I yelled out to the other chaps, ‘This is suicide boys. I’m going to make a jump for it.’ I thought they said alright we’ll follow. I sprang to my feet in one jump … 16

Cecil McAnulty was killed in mid-sentence.

Thousands of dead and wounded men now lay scattered out in the vast length of no-man’s-land spreading from the northern heights, along Second Ridge and down to 400 Plateau. The situation at Lone Pine was especially horrific. An unknown Australian later wrote ‘They [the dead] have made the sand-bags all greasy. The flies hum in a bee-like cloud … Of all the bastards of places; this is the greatest bastard in the world. A dead man’s boots have been dripping grease on my overcoat, and the coat will stink forever.’17

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PART 4

8 AUGUST 1915

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16 ‘Signalers, fi x b ayo n e t s ’

On the night of 7 August, further south on 400 Plateau, Lance Corporal Lawrence had made his way back from Lone Pine to Brown’s Dip. At first light the next morning he updated his diary. Sunday – gloriously fine again. God’s day of rest – Hell, what a mockery! The air fairly quivers with the reports of guns – big, small and indifferent. They have not ceased firing the whole night. The sea is just covered with boats, cruisers, torpedo boats, monitors, mine sweepers, pinnacles and barge-loads of men. The rifle fire is incessant and almost as bad is the bursting of the bombs – just dull thuds. They are just pouring troops over into Suvla Bay position, whilst the warships are giving them all the assistance they can and shell is flying over in the direction of Anafarta by the ton. Yet something seems to brood disaster in that quarter. We only hear rumours of course but we see other things, and it breeds disquiet. The whole thing seems to lack dash … Off our position are no less than seven hospital ships where one usually sees but one … we have just received news that mail from Australia has been torpedoed. No-one has had a wash or shave for days; half of us don’t know how many days have passed. It

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seems all a blurred moving picture – something doing all the time and going too quickly for the mind to grasp its significance or immensity.1

Indeed, Lawrence was right in his estimation of the Suvla landings as recorded by the British Times correspondent, Ashmead-Bartlett, who was observing the Suvla operation. He recorded privately that ‘the troops were hunting for water, the staff were hunting for their troops, the Turkish snipers were hunting for their prey’.2 The Suvla landings had truly developed into a chaotic shambles.

Further north, along the seaward slopes and gullies of the northern heights, the Empire troops had been awoken at around 2 am. Men of Monash’s 15th Battalion were guided by Captain Locke off Damakjelik Bair down into the Kaiajik Dere, which they mistakenly took for Asma Dere. Here they found the slope leading up to the next northern ridge far too steep to negotiate and so moved down the gully. Not far from Hill 60 they found a gutter leading to the top of the ridge. All believed this to be the foot of Abdel Rahman Bair; beyond they mistakenly believed lay Hill 971. In reality this ridge was just a northern spur (called Yauan Tepe by the Turks) of the same ridge they had just climbed off – Damakjelik Bair. Abdel Rahman lay beyond the next northern gully, Asma Dere – again they were a ridge short. The naval bombardment had already started to hammer Hill 971, Hill Q and Chunuk Bair.3 The leading platoons moved along Yauan Tepe and came across a large cultivated oat field further along the ridge, which had been cleared. As they crossed, dawn was breaking, throwing a pale light across the stubble that was crushed under boot – it was now 4.15 am. According to the schedule, the naval bombardment was about to cease and these troops should be located just below the summit of Hill 971. As stated by Charles Bean, however: ‘the distance had been underestimated, the

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locality mistaken, and the start made hours too late … the column, having to pass through several narrow places, had strung out into single line. And the pace was that of a funeral. Consequently when the head of the 15th came out upon the [oat] field, the 14th was only beginning to enter the Kaiajik Dere, while part of the 16th was still behind the previous day’s trench-line.’4 As the leading platoon of the 15th Battalion pushed beyond the oat field, the naval bombardment ceased and they ran into Turkish sentries of the 14th Regiment. The Turks fired a few shots in warning before scurrying up the slopes through the thick scrub. At almost the same time,

Broken arrow indicates route of he 14th and 15th Battalions; solid arrow indicates route taken by the bulk of the 16th Battalion A = Platoon detatched to right B = Platoon detatched to left

Advance of the Australian 4th Brigade, crossing Damakjelik Bair to Yauan Tepe (close to Hill 60) towards Hill 971 – 8 August (Adapted from Bean, 1938)

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Captain Moran was leading his company through the stubble of the oat field when to his left four Turkish machine guns opened fire. These guns were located along the upper slopes of Abdel Rahman Bair, precisely where the Australian and Indian troops were supposed to climb onto that ridge. Now a Turkish field gun located close to Hill 971 opened fire against the advancing Australians; within minutes the navy was able to put the Turkish gun out of action. The machine guns, however, continued to pour lead into the oat field and casualties were heavy as platoon after platoon made a mad dash across the killing field.5 A large number of Turks located along Abdel Rahman Bair, who until now had been silent, opened up with flanking fire. Lieutenant Colonel Cannan detached half a company to deal with the Turks to his left. By now men of the 14th Battalion had reached the oat field and were trying to rush across the ‘paddock’. Most managed to reach the scrub beyond by taking advantage of the southern slopes. They and the survivors of the 15th Battalion who had managed to cross the oat field were now located at the junction of the spur just crossed and Damakjelik Bair at Hill 100. To their left, across Asma Dere, was Abdel Rahman Bair and the Turkish machine guns. The men of the 15th Battalion opened fire but the return fire from the Turks forced them to ground. Meanwhile, the 16th Battalion had moved up Kaiajik Dere, avoiding the slaughter at the oat field and pushed onto the top of Yauan Tepe after bypassing the field. Most of the 14th Battalion and at least half of the 16th had managed to push on further up the Tepe, while the 15th Battalion was scattered below, the dead and wounded laying across the oat field; others were in Asma Dere and the southern slopes of Abdel Rahman Bair trying to push the Turks off the ridge. It was later recalled by an unknown soldier how ‘the men fell under furious fire. It was terrible; the men were falling like rabbits. Many were calling for mothers and sisters. They fell a good way, in many cases, from the Turkish lines. Sgt McKinley … did good work … during the advance. He was never seen again.’6 Cannan and his staff were located below the oat field, but 235

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he managed to get a message to those beyond to assist his half-company that was attacking the Turks along Abdel Rahman Bair. He also ordered those of the 16th Battalion below his position to move up the slopes of the Kaiajik Dere and join him along the southern part of the ridge. The survivors of the 15th Battalion were now ordered off the ridge, to take shelter within Kaiajik Dere.7

Earlier that morning the Turks of the 14th Regiment had been pushed out into the Asma Dere to help protect Hill 971. As these Turks were taking up their position, reinforcements from Helles arrived at Hill 971 and were ordered to advance down Abdel Rahman Bair to reinforce the 14th Regiment. Also, the men of the 11th Turkish Machine Gun Company took up a position on the small hill of Abdel Rahman (later known as Regiment Hill), which overlooked the approaches to Hill 971. It was these machine guns that were now sweeping the Australians off Yauan Tepe.8 While the half-company of Australians from the 15th Battalion managed to rout most of the Turks in Asma Dere, the Turks of the 11th Regiment stubbornly remained entrenched and would not budge. Liman von Sanders, along with his adjutant Captain Prigge, had arrived on the hills just north of Hill 971 to watch an attack he had ordered hours before. He arrived at his observation post just as the naval bombardment ceased against the northern heights. Von Sanders had been informed that night that the men of the 7th and 12th Divisions that he had ordered from Bulair to Anzac had begun to arrive. On hearing this, he ordered them to be thrown into the battle and attack the coastal strip between Suvla Bay and Anzac, in the vicinity of the Azmak Dere. While von Sanders witnessed the fighting along Abdel Rahman Bair and Yauan Tepe, no attack eventuated along the coastal plain to the north. It was only now that he was informed that the troops of these divisions were still some way from Anzac. The divisional commanders had begged 236

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their commanding officer, Fevzi Bey, to delay the attack so that their men could rest before being committed to battle. Fevzi Bey contacted von Sanders by telephone, stating that the ‘Divisional commanders said that an attack was impossible. LIMAN PASA [von Sanders] said in reply “You are the Group commander, what do you say?” FEVZI BEY replied, “I am of the same opinion.” Thereupon he was immediately superseded.’9 Von Sanders was forced to postpone this attack until nightfall.10

The fighting along Abdel Rahman Bair and Yauan Tepe was reaching its climax. The Turks along the southern part of Abdel Rahman began to push into the southern parts of Asma Dere, threatening the rear of the Australians. It was only with the commitment of reinforcements from the 16th Battalion that the Turkish counter-attack was blocked. The men of the 14th Battalion were now ordered to take shelter in the Kaiajik Dere. A dressing post had been established in a fold of the reverse slope and it was here that Cannan found the headquarters of Lieutenant Colonel Pope. The organisation of the battalions was truly in a shambles – communications with platoons, let alone companies, was shot to pieces. The 15th Battalion especially had suffered terribly – among those killed was Cannan’s brother.11 Located around Hill 100 at the head of Kaiajik Dere, Major Dare of the 14th Battalion now found himself in command of a mixed party of Australians. As these men dug in, Dare was able to make contact with men of the 14th Sikhs on his right, positioned along the main ridgeline of Damakjelik Dere. He was confident that any Turkish attempt to storm Yauan Tepe from Abdel Rahman Bair could now be stopped by the combined flanking fire from his position around Hill 100 and with the supporting fire of the men of the 14th Sikhs. Numbers of Turks were appearing on the farther borders of the oat field and the battle for Hill 971 was quickly degenerating into a battle of survival along the lower slopes of the northern heights. 237

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Colonel Monash had been out of contact with his battalions since early dawn, as the telephone lines had been cut by Turkish shell fire. The line was not reestablished until after 7 am and by then it was clear that his brigade was far from approaching Hill 971, let alone taking it. It was a time like this when a brigade commander needed to lead from the front. The Turks had established a number of artillery batteries that were now pounding the Australian positions with shrapnel, and additional machine guns had been put in place. Casualties were accumulating at an appalling rate. As soon as communications were reestablished with Monash’s headquarters, Pope made it clear that there was no way they were going to take Hill 971 – they had only managed to reach about one-third of the distance required and that was the relatively uncomplicated part of the march – the most difficult still lay some way off (not to mention that they were on the wrong ridge that didn’t even lead to Hill 971 anyway). Indeed, Abdel Rahman Bair itself was now occupied in strength by the Turks. It became clear to Monash and Cox that the men had to be brought back as there was no chance of advance and to even dig in and defend the northern flank from this position was hopeless. Monash ordered his commanders to withdraw as best they could.12 The Turks were now approaching the oat field and began to counterattack in force. Sergeant Major Warburton of the 14th Battalion, who was positioned near Pope’s headquarters, ordered: ‘Signalers, fix bayonets’. Just then the 4th Brigade machine-gun sections arrived under the command of Captain Rose, with the 16th Section under Lieutenant Percy Black and Sergeant Harry Murray – each of whom would later be awarded a Victoria Cross for separate actions on the Western Front.13 They set up their guns along the crest of the ridge, two on each side of the makeshift dressing station, and opened fire on the advancing Turks, breaking them up and forcing them off the ridge.14 The machine gunners, along with a rear guard of around fifty men under the command of Captain Harwood and Lieutenant Day, covered the withdrawal of the battalion from Yauan Tepe. The battalion took up a defensive position

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on the heights around Australia Valley. By 8.30 am it was all over. During the next few hours, men continued to make their way down the Kaiajik Dere to the line held by the 13th Battalion and the King’s Own Royal Lancaster Regiment around Australia Valley. The King’s Own were keen to go up and assist the Australians in bringing in their wounded, but those that could be recovered had already been brought in – the rest had long since been in enemy hands.

Very few of the wounded left in Turkish hands survived. Most were either shot or bayoneted outright. Private Calcutt was bayoneted to death, and when his wounded cobber Private O’Connor yelled in protest, the same Turk walked over to him, picked up a large rock and proceeded to bash him over the head until unconscious. Later he awoke with a fractured skull and a group of Turks targeted him for more treatment, dragging him towards a nearby gully, but just then a German officer appeared and the Turks bolted.15 Corporal George Kerr of the 14th Battalion had been shot through the left thigh and right arm. His grandson Greg Kerr later recorded his grandfather’s experiences. As he lay bleeding, he attempted to relieve himself using his right hand, and a Turkish soldier who saw him drew his bayonet and threatened to finish him off. The soldier shouted angrily in a tongue the corporal could not understand, but he thought he heard the word ‘Allah’ a few times and had the presence of mind to switch hands, guessing that Muslims regard it offensive to use the ‘clean’ right hand when urinating. It was enough to appease the offended soldier, who moved his attentions elsewhere. … an old Turkish soldier approached … where Cpl Kerr lay. The old soldier was dressed slightly better than his younger comrade, although his uniform was too small for him. A large dagger in scabbard compensated a little for his slightly pathetic appearance. The greying hair around his temples gave him a

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sympathetic demeanour, but only the next moments would tell whether that was true to character. The Turk leant down to inspect Kerr’s wounds. He stood back up and hesitated a few seconds; the corporal did not like to think what his adversary might be thinking. With that the Turk pulled his dagger out. The corporal sensed his time had come, but he did all he could to remain outwardly calm. Suddenly, though, the Turk’s fiery dark eyes honed in on something beyond. To the corporal’s surprise, he walked over to a nearby Aleppo pine and used his ample arms to break off a limb, which he hastily whittled down to a crutch with the dagger. He returned to Kerr … Cpl Kerr rose gingerly to his feet, transferring most of his weight to the crude staff, and took his first tentative steps as a prisoner.16

Lieutenant Colonel Pope wrote a few days later, regarding the survivors: ‘The boys were very worn and depressed … men … miserably despondent’. Cox, however, had not given up and was even on 9 August contemplating a renewal of the attack, but fortunately for all concerned it was never repeated. By then the landings further north at Suvla Bay were truly a shambles as few, if any, of its inland objectives had been taken. By nightfall of 8 August the Turks of the 7th and 12th Divisions had arrived and occupied in strength the surrounding hills and gullies. The door to Hill 971 and the heights to its north were now firmly and decisively bolted shut.

Just south of the Australians, the Indian Brigade and British 39th Brigade were not faring any better. The force that was to take Hill Q had earlier been divided into three columns, which attempted to approach the heights from the deep gullies and steep spurs, sandwiched between the

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New Zealanders and Australians. The northernmost of these columns, consisting of the 14th Sikhs followed by the 5th Gurkhas, attempted to advance on the right flank of Monash’s advance; however, the terrain made such an advance impossible. These troops also witnessed the Australians falling back from Yauan Tepe, leaving their flank exposed to the Turks who could now be seen occupying that ridge. The southernmost column of Indian and British troops, who should have been approaching the northern slopes of Chunuk Bair, instead found themselves, shortly after dawn, lost and occupying the small plateau called The Farm and its adjoining spurs and gullies. The 6th Gurkhas managed to advance up the slopes and gullies a few hundred metres north of them. Led by Major Allanson, they had by 9.30 am advanced to a position just 250 metres below the northern slopes of Chunuk Bair. These troops courageously continued to cling on to this position throughout the day, even though they were taking a steady stream of casualties from the Turks now entrenched just beyond their precarious position. At one point, Allanson went back personally in search of reinforcements; in a deep ravine he found a company from the 7th North Staffordshire and a party of men from the 6th South Lancashire, who he now led back to his men just below the ridgeline of Sari Bair. Soon Lieutenant Slim, seeing Allanson and his Gurkhas above his position, ordered his men of the 9th Warwickshire to join them. Not long after, Slim and Allanson were sharing a snack of raisins – no doubt at some point they (and many others that day) saw the magnificent view of the fleet at anchor in Suvla Bay about eight kilometres north and, while battles were raging all around their position, at Suvla things seemed to be relatively quiet.17

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17 ‘Everything i s a m u d d l e ’

The Wellington and Otago Battalions, reinforced with the 7th Gloucestershire, 8th Welch, Auckland Mounted Rifles and Maoris, had renewed their attack against the key objective of the whole campaign – Chunuk Bair. The plan of assault was for the 7th Gloucestershire and the Wellington Battalions to lead the assault against the summit. Artillery would fire on the crest from 3.30 until 4.15 am. The cessation of the barrage would be the signal for the men to launch their attack. The Gloucestershires were to form up on the left and attack the northern slopes of the hill, while the Wellington would form up on the right and assault its southern shoulder. Following closely behind would be the Welch in support, with the Auckland troopers and Maoris following closely behind. Once all three lines had gone forward, the Otago infantry would move up to the Apex in reserve. Captain Wallingford, the New Zealand Brigade’s machine-gun officer, was determined that this time the men would be well supported with covering machine-gun fire and had by zero hour established twelve machine guns along the crest of the Apex and slopes of Cheshire Ridge. As the barrage fell upon the heights, the men who were to take Chunuk Bair checked their webbing, fixed bayonets, and waited for the artillery to cease firing. Lance Corporal Charlie Clark of the Wellington Battalion 242

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The capture of Chunuk Bair – 8 August (From Bean, 1938, p. 667)

later recalled: ‘Chunuk Bair was just a mass of flame from exploding shells – every shell from the warships, from the batteries at Anzac itself, just concentrated on that’.1 The artillery ceased firing but the Wellingtons and Gloucestershires were late in starting their advance and they didn’t move out of the Apex towards the Pinnacle until dawn was breaking. Indeed, the bulk of Gloucestershires ended up behind the advance which was led by the New Zealanders, as it was impossible to advance two battalions along the narrow front. As the Wellington men pushed over the Apex, the Auckland infantry who had been holding that position now strained their eyes in the early morning light to watch their advance, all waiting for the inevitable opening volley of rifle and machine-gun fire from the summit above that would tear into their ranks. The increasing narrowness of the frontage now forced the two leading companies to advance two platoons up, with each platoon in fours – lines each of sixteen men.

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Major Cunningham, second in command of the Wellington Battalion, later wrote of the advance: Some distance had been traversed before the leading platoons were able to open out at all, and it was less than 150 yards from the top of Chunuk Bair … The two leading companies, closely followed by the other two, swept in line in a final dash to the top, to find to their amazement the position was unoccupied. Certainly a small Turkish picket was overwhelmed, without firing a shot, in a small trench on the seaward slope some distance from the top, but where were the Turks who had shattered the Auckland attack?2

The assaulting troops met very little resistance. Some came across a machine-gun post overlooking the head of the Sazli Beit Dere, but remarkably the Turkish machine gunners were asleep. Further up they came across a narrow communication trench leading towards the summit – a couple of Turks attempted to throw grenades but were killed, while the remaining Turks along with a German officer surrendered. They continued to move up the slope and within minutes their outline could be seen against the crest of Chunk Bair – no shots rang out – then remarkably the first line disappeared over the summit. Charlie Clark remembered that ‘we walked over – we walked right up to the hill and there wasn’t a shot fired … The Turks, there were pretty few of them there, they scooted, and there was one old fellow there – he had a beard – about 70 – he pulled his rifle on us … The poor old joker, somebody shot him.’3 Running along the summit on its southern shoulder was a trench occupied by about twenty Turks. The trench was rushed, with most of the Turks being killed. From this trench the New Zealanders looked out over a gently falling grassy hilltop, which dipped at a hundred metres distance into steep and rugged inland gullies. Below the seaward slope, known as Su Yatagha by the Turks, were some empty artillery gun pits. From here they could also see the northern flank of the Anzac position along Russell’s Top, as well as looking down the rear lines of the Turkish

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defensives along Battleship Hill and Baby 700. For the first time since Captain Tulloch and his men of the Australian 11th Battalion had been forced off the eastern slopes of Battleship Hill during the morning of 25 April, Anzacs could again see the glittering waters of the Narrows – the lifeline that enabled Turkish supplies and troops to be quickly fed into the battles for the Gallipoli Peninsula; it was also the passage that would enable the British and French fleet to sail through and place Constantinople under the heavy guns of the navy – the original objective of the campaign. To the south at Old Anzac, the observers of Caddy’s Battery took the New Zealanders for Turks and directed the guns to fire on the summit. Almost immediately the yellow-and-red marker flags could be seen waving from the summit – the battery ceased fire. Chunuk Bair had been taken almost without a shot being fired. Meanwhile the troops of the 7th Gloucestershires were still waiting for the last of the Wellington Battalion to clear the Apex. Only then were the British troops able to fall in behind them; they too moved out – two platoons up, in columns of fours.4

Meanwhile, near the head of Sazli Beit Dere, the wounded Edward Baigent of the Canterbury Infantry awoke to find that the gully was ‘literally speaking … packed with dead and wounded men. An English padre was doing all he could for the seriously wounded and dying. He then helped me on to an Indian dressing station. They were far too busy for the likes of me. I heard the padre pleading with them to give morphine to some of the worst cases of wounded Turks, of whom there were quite a number. The doctor said that ‘they must wait’. An Indian came and gave some of us a mug of Bovril which bucked me up.’5

The reason for the absence of Turkish troops on Chunuk Bair remains

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a mystery. For whatever reason, with darkness most of the troops had taken the opportunity to evacuate the hill the previous night and withdraw into the landward valleys below. While the summit of the hill was now bare of Turkish troops, along either flank a large number of Turks were still entrenched and ready to retake the summit if ordered to do so. Even so, for the first few hours of daylight, confusion reigned supreme for the Turkish commanders along this sector. Mustafa Kemal, who was commanding the position just south of Chunuk Bair, received two worrying reports almost simultaneously. The first read: An attack has been ordered on CONKBAYIRI. To whom should I give this order? I am looking for the Battalion Commanders but I cannot find them. Everything is a muddle. The situation is serious. At any rate someone who knows the ground must be appointed. There are no reports and no information. I am confused as to what I should do. In this connection the order can be given to the commander of the 64th Regiment who is the most senior. If this is possible let us cooperate.6

The second report stated: At the front there are men from the 14th Regiment, the 64th Regiment and the 25th Regiment, in fact from various Battalions. They are all mixed up together. No officers can be found. I am in the position where the previous Regimental Commander was hit. I have received no information about what is going on. All the officers are killed or wounded. I do not even know the name of the place where I am. I cannot see anything by observation. I request in the name of the safety of the nation that an officer be appointed who knows the area well.7

Later another report arrived, sometime before 5.40 am from a Turkish divisional engineer, that he had observed troops retreating from Chunuk Bair, although he could now see a large number of men entrenching along

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the summit. He was not sure whether they were friend or foe. Kemal sent a number of his officers to Chunuk Bair to assess the situation. It was not long before he received word from the survivors that the enemy had captured Chunuk Bair. Kemal recalled: ‘I myself [now] saw from my Headquarters at Hill 180 that the two opposing sides were intermingled at CONKBAYIRI and in its vicinity. Rifle fire was coming from CONKBAYIRI towards my Headquarters, in fact I was told that some of the Headquarters’ personnel had been hit.’8 Kemal quickly ordered Lieutenant Colonel Kemal Bey to take two battalions of the 10th Regiment (which had been sent to him the previous day as a reserve) to help retake Chunuk Bair. Turks from these battalions were soon observed advancing from Battleship Hill along its inland shoulder towards Chunuk Bair. Caddy’s guns, along with three other batteries, now focused on stopping their advance, which they quickly did, forcing the Turks to retire back to Battleship Hill. To the north of Chunuk Bair, the Turks of the 4th Division could now see in broad daylight the men of the 7th Gloucestershires climbing up to support the New Zealanders on the summit. These Turks laid down heavy enfilading machine-gun and rifle fire; Turkish artillery also poured down a storm of shrapnel. About half of the Gloucestershire Battalion made their way to Chunuk Bair – some by moving to the right to avoid the enfilade, pushing onto the summit via the Sazli Beit Dere (southern approach), although this was far from safe as the Turks along Battleship Hill and Baby 700 now began to sweep this area with similar fire. Things were even worse for the men of the Welch Battalion who had been following behind the Gloucestershires. Most were slaughtered in their attempt to reach Chunuk Bair. The few survivors made their way into the ‘shelter’ of the gullies leading off the main ridgeline in either the Aghyl Dere or Sazli Beit Dere. Remarkably, however, some managed to reach the summit and took up a position with the Gloucestershire men. It was also now that Captain Wallingford ordered four machine-gun teams (two from the Wellington Infantry Battalion and two from the Auckland 247

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Infantry Battalion) to reinforce the summit. These men were hit with the same fire that shattered the Welch. Sergeant Daniel Curham was among these men. Word came down … for the machine guns to go up to Chunuk Bair. We leaped out of the trench. I was carrying a gun and it was steep and hard going … we got a little distance from the Apex when we were really into a hail of bullets from 971 … We were sixteen there, at least two guns, and they began to fall and we couldn’t run … with the load we had and other men were carrying boxes of ammunition and it was a deadly volley, the ground just spurted up with dust around our feet and we tried to get through this great volley of bullets. Men fell all over the place. I just saw them fall … I got to the top of the hill … and there was a terrific fight going on because the Turks had reinforced and come back and although they couldn’t dislodge our chaps they were creeping up the reverse side of the hill … and lobbing bombs over … I spent till dark that night there, and you can imagine the appalling time it was.9

Eventually three machine guns made it to the summit (very few of the machine gunners were as fortunate) – but they had all been hit and made useless. The guns, however, were cannibalised and from the surviving parts, one was made serviceable. In addition, the captured Turkish machine gun was brought up and made ready for service.10 The original plan had been for the Wellington Battalion to secure the crest of Chunuk Bair south to where it fell away towards Battleship Hill. The 7th Gloucestershire was to be positioned to the left of Lieutenant Colonel Malone’s New Zealanders and hold the northern slopes facing Hill Q. The second line, defined by the 8th Welch and Otago infantry, would then fan out to cover the flanks – the Welch to occupy Su Yatagha while the Otagos would protect the northern approach along the saddle connecting Chunuk Bair with Hill Q.11 This was clearly no longer

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possible, with less than half of Malone’s assigned troops isolated on the summit and Hill Q still in Turkish hands. The northernmost flank of the position occupied by the New Zealanders was close to the head of Sazli Beit Dere and actually below the summit. Occupying the eastern and northern shoulders of the summit would result in annihilating fire to be brought to bear, causing heavy casualties, with nothing to show for it – indeed it would greatly weaken Malone’s already overstretched defences. Malone posted a thin defensive line of around 100 men within the shallow trench running along the summit to act as a screen against an enemy attack. This trench was relatively straight without any transverse bends and was only about two feet deep. Men of the Gloucestershire occupied the northern part of this trench; just behind them in support were the few men of the Welch Battalion who had somehow managed to reach the summit. The remainder of the trench was occupied by the New Zealanders. British and New Zealander alike began to deepen the trench in preparation for the inevitable Turkish counter-attack. Malone’s extreme southern flank was occupied by a number of his Taranaki men who lay beyond the trench, extending the defensive line down to the southern crest, taking cover in the available scrub – the ground being too stony to dig through. These men overlooked the shallow slope of Su Yatagha. Malone also sent out a number of small groups down the eastern slopes to occupy the empty gun pits as a covering force. Charlie Clark was with one of these parties. ‘We went out and we went down … into the valley … and there were the gun pits there … they were howitzer gun pits and the howitzer guns was [sic] taken away … I forget how many men there were … might have been 12, but we decided we were going to have a game of cards – playing poker – with two men on view [sentry] and we were happy, quite happy … it’s a strange thing when a person is going into battle – they lose that fear.’12 The bulk of Malone’s men were digging in behind the summit along the seaward slopes of Chunuk Bair. He planned that this secondary trench would be connected to the forward position by at least two saps.

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Placing the bulk of his men just behind the summit was not only to help protect them from Turkish fire, but was in accordance with orders issued to him from Colonel Johnston, who stressed that he must at all costs hold the forward position from where the saddle linking the Pinnacle to Rhododendron Ridge joins with the main Sari Bair Ridge, that is, a position about 50 metres south of the highest point of Chunuk Bair.13 No sooner had the survivors of the Gloucestershire begun to dig in when Turkish snipers from Hill Q and forward of it picked off the officers who were directing the men in their efforts. This rattled the raw recruits of Kitchener’s New Army, and this part of the line quickly disintegrated as the men withdrew from the northern crest back towards the position held by the bulk of the Wellington Battalion, along the upper seaward slopes of Chunuk Bair. Meanwhile, to the south, the Turkish infantry assault to retake the summit had begun. As remembered by Charlie Clark: ‘We were playing cards when the Turks made their attack – we never saw them coming.’ Sergeant Harvey Johns, who was somewhere near Clark’s position, recalled: I could see this [Turkish] transport way down the road. Well that’s good enough for shooting and I tried myself out and I had about six shots at it. I must have been getting onto it, because they got in round the brow of a hill and stopped there and then I decided I had better get back to the men and all of a sudden on my left a Turk came out and lay down and started firing at me, then I had to back move the whole time while I fired at him. Then another one came out, and another and another until I had about 6 men firing at me, while I am back moving. My only chance is to fire for number one, fire for number six, back to number three, number four, make the fire erratic and that’s the only way I got back and I got back to report it to the officer. I said, ‘They are coming over … now Mr Jardine’ … Things from then on started to move … about 55 Turks on the left flank were attacking … But this time at least half a dozen Turks had got over to our right flank and

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got behind a hedge and they were pumping away at us and having quite a glorious time. They were hard to see, and the only way you could detect them was by the shaking of the leaves as they fired and that was the only place you could fire at, making allowances for the distance between the point of his rifle to where the man would be … Mr Jardine said ‘Come on then boys, we will have to get stuck in [dig in further]. We had no time for that. So they dropped their picks and shovels and grabbed their rifles, it was so quick, it was just as well they did.14

Charlie Clark had thrown down his cards, picked up his rifle and with the rest of his mates was making his way at breakneck speed for the New Zealand lines along the crest above. Following closely behind was a long line of Turks from the 25th and 64th Regiments. They had bolted out of the inland gullies and spurs and were now storming across the Su Yatagha heading for the summit of Chunuk Bair. Clark recalled: ‘On the top I flopped right in where Lieutenant Jardine was and the Turks had … followed us right in, because I had just got down … when he said well you can prepare to charge and I thought, ‘Well this is it.’ I was never too keen on a bayonet charge I don’t mind admitting. I seen one or two bayoneted and I didn’t like it … If I were faced with a joker coming at me with a bayonet I’d have shot him straight away.’15 The New Zealanders entrenched along the crest of the summit opened fire, trying to avoid hitting their cobbers as they scrambled back from the gun pits to their own lines. Most of the Turks were able to fall into dead ground below a crest which hid them from view. The crest was being manned by less than 100 men and flanking fire was taking a rapid toll on the survivors. Charlie Clark looked around to see that those left and right of him were either dead or wounded. ‘I heard thump, thump, thump and it was fellows falling around me. Nine or ten of them, suddenly wounded or dead, all the jokers I’d been playing poker with just a minute or two before. I couldn’t see where the bullets was [sic] coming

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from. Then I sighted a Turk, just standing up, shooting amongst us … I pushed my rifle over a sandbag, got a sight on this Turk, and shot him in the face.’16 While most of these Turks were now out of view to the New Zealanders along the crest of Chunuk Bair, they were seen by the artillery observes south at Old Anzac. These batteries began to sweep the area with shell, forcing the Turks to take cover as best they could. Meantime most of the Taranaki men occupying the southern flank in the scrub were forced to retire back to the main line established behind the summit in the spoon-shaped hollow in which the Sazli Beit Dere originated on the southern shoulder of Chunuk Bair. Now the Turkish gunners turned their full attention onto the seaward slopes of the summit. Turkish flanking rifle fire also began to pick off men as they tried to entrench, forcing them to abandon any attempt to do so. Malone and his men were now isolated from the rest of the division below – the intervening space was swept by Turkish machine-gun fire and shrapnel. Lieutenant Colonel Jordan, commander of the Gloucestershires, took up a position with Malone near the junction of the saddle from Rhododendron Ridge with Chunuk Bair. Captain Ernest Harston, adjutant to Malone, later recalled that it ‘was the fire from Hill Q that did the damage. It enfiladed the whole position. The Turks had a clear field of fire not only along the crest but also along the forward slope and over a considerable part of the reverse slope. In a very short time, probably about 8.00 am, we had been pretty well wiped out. We had no telephone lines and were not sure whether reports sent back by the wounded had reached brigade headquarters.’17 Meanwhile the Turks along Su Yatagha had managed to gradually occupy the scrub area vacated by the Taranaki men. It was now around 6.30 am. Soon they also began to occupy the inland slopes of the Chunuk Bair – picking off one by one the New Zealanders still occupying the trench along the crest of Chunuk Bair – the situation for these men was now truly desperate. They were pinned down, they couldn’t stand 252

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in the shallow trench to fire as it would mean almost certain death, and they had no bombs. Soon the remaining part of this trench was full of dead and dying. The New Zealanders managed somehow to hold their position until around 9 am, when they received orders to retire back to the main line on the seaward slope of the summit. Major Cunningham remembered the desperate struggle for the forward trench: ‘no longer able to hold the forward line, a few un-wounded men were able to dash in safety to the reverse or seaward slope of the hill. The unfinished shallow forward trenches afforded no real cover, but their defenders put up a gallant fight against great odds, and a few managed to return to the reverse slope.’18 In all, five attempted to escape, with only one officer and a badly wounded soldier surviving the attempt – the rest in the trench were either dead or too badly wounded to move. After surviving three years of captivity, Private Davis recalled how he was captured. A Taranaki man named Surgenor was the only man left firing besides myself at the end of about half an hour. Besides the rifle fire of the enemy they threw bombs in all along the trench, and their machine guns which were situated on either flank were able to enfilade our position. Private Surgenor was hit in the head somewhere, but kept on firing with his face streaming with blood, until he got another hit in the head, which dazed him for a time, knocked him back in the trench. This time I thought he was killed, but he partly came to soon after and loaded rifles for me to fire. At that time I was using three rifles and each was burning hot … on my left I was not able to see how many were left, but the firing had practically died away there. On the right of my position I was able to see about thirty yards of trench in which all our men were wounded or dead. The time I was actually firing is very hard to gauge, but I think it was well over an hour before I was hit by a bullet on the right elbow while firing. It knocked me back into the trench on top of a dead sergeant. Private Surgenor bound my wound up, and we waited for the Turks to take possession of the

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trench, wondering whether our reinforcements would arrive before that time. About half an hour after I was hit, the Turks put in their first appearance in the trench on my extreme right. After throwing bombs into the trench to ensure against a ruse, three men made their appearance first and bayoneted every New Zealander they came to or else used the butts of their rifles. It was soon my turn and the foremost Turk thrust at me four times with his bayonet, and each time I was able to grab it with my left hand, and thrust it away. The fifth time I was not quick enough and he drove his bayonet through my left arm. I was then at his mercy, but instead of using the bayonet, he loaded his rifle and pointing at me, was about to pull the trigger, when a crowd of Turks came in and someone in charge gave him an order for he stood up on the trench and fired towards our second line. Soon after that my captors made motions for me to get over the trench and I was taken prisoner.19

Taken prisoner with Davis was Private Surgenor, who himself recalled: ‘Every man in that trench was killed or wounded including myself … The Turks got into the trench and bayoneted or clubbed every man wounded except myself and Davis … one or two of the wounded men made attempts to get up and they were immediately clubbed to death or bayoneted.’20 A small part of the southernmost crest was still being held by a small party of New Zealanders who occupied a support trench, angled to take advantage of the ground; on the right it ran along the top of the ridge at the junction of the southern crest of Chunuk Bair and Su Yatagha. Here the New Zealanders had about 100 metres of open ground and were also protected to some degree from enfilading from Hill Q. The few men defending this position would do so for most of the day before being forced to retire. Meanwhile, Malone’s two machine guns had been sited forward from his reserve position and had been positioned just below the crest 254

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line. With the capture of the forward trench, the machine gun teams attracted Turkish rifle fire and bombers from all directions. ‘At about 1000 [10 am] the crews of our two machine guns were all casualties. The enemy bombed the guns heavily putting them out of action.’21 With the near-collapse of Malone’s front line, the Turks south along Battleship Hill began to move further down the upper seaward slopes of that position to fire into the backs of the enemy, now crammed into a shallow depression just below the summit of Chunuk Bair, and began to try and surround the right flank. This Turkish advance was soon spotted and the New Zealanders managed with concentrated fire to beat back the attack. Soon a similar attempt was made along the left but was also checked. It was not only the flanks that were being attacked; now the Turks in their recaptured trench along the summit began to attack the centre of Malone’s defence. Small parties of Turks attempted to creep down under the cover of a barrage of hand grenades. As recorded by Major Cunningham: ‘When the forward trench had been abandoned the Turks crept up close enough to the crest line to hurl showers of egg bombs among the men on the reserve slope. These had long fuses, and were promptly thrown back before they exploded. Bolder and bolder, the Turks essayed a bayonet charge, but were promptly stopped by a few well-directed volleys at point-blank range.’22 Similar attacks occurred throughout the morning and on more than one occasion Malone ordered his men to charge with the bayonet. The men would rise over the parapet and charge a dozen metres and fire a volley. The Turks would then fall back to their trench above. Losses to the New Zealand and British troops during these charges were heavy – but they managed to repel each of the attacks. Captain Wallingford and his machine-gun teams near the Apex added supporting fire to Malone. As described by Wallingford: Four guns protected his [Malone’s] right rear by engaging the Turks on Battleship Hill. We were in shallow emplacements on

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the forward slope. For a few minutes all went well but suddenly rifle fire opened onto us obliquely from the left of Battleship Hill and within a few minutes two guns were almost destroyed and several men killed and wounded. The right gun (Maori) lost nine. I ordered the men to leave the gun and slide over the rise. In this case we were over the rise and slightly down the forward slope. Had I put the guns slightly behind the crest we would be enfiladed from the left of Chunuk Bair. After that the particular face was protected by four [Otago Infantry] guns further along the spur. From there they did excellent work with few casualties.23

Earlier, at around 7.30 am, Mustafa Kemal was called to the telephone – it was Lieutenant Colonel Nuri Bey, commander of the 24th Regiment (8th Division). He had been dispatched from the Southern Army group to attack Chunuk Bair. Nuri Bey stated to Kemal: ‘I have received an order from the Group Commander to advance on Conkbayiri and to attack the enemy there. From what I can learn there are various units there. I requested information about this and especially about the command. The commander [Esat Pasa] who was in a nervous state and his Chief of Staff said there was no need to elaborate this. Please enlighten me about the situation there, there is no commander anywhere!’ Kemal, who was an old friend of Nuri Bey, replied: ‘Advance at once to Conkbayiri. Events will appoint a commander.’24 Not long afterwards, Kemal called the 3rd Army Headquarters at Kemal Yeri and warned them of the critical situation that was developing at Chunuk Bair. He was still not sure whether the enemy had occupied the whole position but his officers had reported that the ‘enemy was filling sandbags to improve their lines. The survivors of the 25th and 64th Regiments were about 25–30 metres away from the enemy there’.25

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At Chunuk Bair, Malone was in desperate need of reinforcements. Malone had sent Major Cunningham to the Pinnacle to request that the Auckland Mounted Rifles and Maoris be brought up. These men had previously attempted to reach the summit but the Maoris, on the left, had been forced (like the Gurkhas the day before) to retire into the Aghyl Dere to try and avoid the hail of fire coming from around Hill Q. They now found themselves with the British and Indians holding the line on and around The Farm. The Auckland Mounted Rifles attempted a brave dash by ‘eights’ across the saddle separating the Apex from the Pinnacle but ‘near that point the whole regiment was pinned by the enemy’s fire into the shelter of a slight rise for some hours’26 – that slight rise was now being targeted by Turkish artillery. The surviving New Zealanders and British troops on Chunuk Bair were cut off from their comrades. They would have to hang on until nightfall – only then would there be any chance of reestablishing contact with them – but could they hang on that long?

Earlier, stretcher-bearer Arthur Carbines of the Wellington Infantry Battalion, who had for days now been rescuing the wounded on and around Rhododendron Ridge, had finally managed to get a few hours well-earned sleep. He recorded in his diary: 8 August 1915. Sunday. Awakened by our doctor at 5 am to attend to wounded at the top of the hill and was kept going hard for a few hours. It is a long and tedious carry to the 4th Australian Field Ambulance at the bottom of the hill where we had to take them. Wellington Infantry Regiment charge [Chunuk Bair] led by Colonel Malone and do great work. We expect to be busy right to dusk. Welsh and the Gloucester regiments have also taken part and

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we assist with their wounded. Sergeant Cook gives me a cup of tea and it is the best I have ever enjoyed. The number of wounded causes the Fourth Australian Field Ambulance to be crowded out. All our provisions are covered with branches to hide them from aeroplanes. The Maoris are putting up a great fight and race the Gurkhas to the top of the hill. One wounded Maori came in for a dressing saying ‘Don’t know what I am wounded for. All the other fellows have gone over there.’27

This was Carbines’ last entry – within hours he would be killed standing alongside Colonel Malone on the upper slopes of Chunuk Bair.

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18 ‘Like a battle o f s ava ge b e a s t s at the bottom o f a p i t ’

On first light of 8  August, an attack by a company of Turks against Jacobs’s Post, representing the southern flank of the Australian position at Lone Pine, was beaten back. Captain Sasse, in command of the post, organised the work of clearing the Australian dead by placing them in unused saps, shelters and tunnels. As this work was progressing, the Turks launched another attack at around 5 am against Jacobs’s Post and those just north of it, including Tubb’s Corner. Major Stevens, who was manning Tubb’s Corner with his men, got up to look over the parapet ‘whence he found himself gazing along a trench full of Turks on the right. Shouting to his men, Stevens got about a dozen of them on to or over the parapet, and, regardless of bombs, these poured rapid fire into the massed enemy.’1 Meanwhile, at Jacobs’s Post the Turks succeeded in blowing apart the barricade that had been blocking their approach and began pouring fire into the narrow passage – threatening an advance to capture the trench. Sasse, on hearing the attack, quickly returned to the post and tore down the sandbag parapets forming a low barricade and proceeded with a rifle to coolly drop any Turk that tried to advance. With this the post was again made secure. A Turkish attack against the centre of the line was also a near-run

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thing. Goldenstedt’s Post was heavily bombed as it was now the only Australian position overlooking The Cup. The post which was originally held by 30 men was now down to just four, with Sergeant Major Goldenstedt in command – with no bombs. He tried to obtain reinforcements from Major Morshead, whose headquarters was next to him at Tubb’s Corner. However, Morshead had no reserves to spare – Goldenstedt would have to make do with what he had. There was no way that the post could be held. Zeki Bey later described what happened next from a Turkish perspective: ‘I saw bombs being thrown and then some young Turks get into the trench with the bayonet.’2 The Turkish ‘advance was an easy one; they said they came upon several young Australian dead in the communication trench, with their rifles broken. The Turkish bayonets could be seen advancing ten or twelve yards from the head of the gully … the Australians then lost the [last] position from which their periscopes had stared down the head of The Cup.’3 Now there was a brief lull in the fighting from both sides. Men endeavoured to clear the trenches of dead and wounded, not only to make passage easier but also for their own health and wellbeing. Ralph Goode of the 2nd Field Ambulance was sent over to help and later recorded in his diary: ‘… the Turks have been burying their dead in the trenches and its [sic] like walking on a spring mattress in some parts … rotten things these hand bombs made of nails, slugs and stones put in a jam tin with a stick of dynamite … they make a horrible mess of a chap … practically plug him full of holes.’4 Another, Major Curry of the New Zealand Artillery, eventually made his way into Lone Pine: ‘there were all sorts of wounds, one fellow was shot in the neck and with protruding eyes was gasping for breath … Hard biscuits, bacon and jam were the fare, and this had to be eaten in the midst of 700 dead Turks and a lot of our own dead.’5 Colonel Smyth realised that he had to relieve his physically and mentally worn-out troops, especially those men who had been holding the southern part of the Pine – it was here that the fighting had been the heaviest. Private Les de Vine wrote about his experience on 8 August – it 26 0

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would have been an all-too-common episode for both sides. The stench of the dead bodies now is simply awful, as they have been fully exposed to the sun for several days, many have swollen terribly and have burst … many men wear gas protectors … there has been no attempt up to the present to either remove or bury [the dead], they are stacked out of the way in any convenient place, sometimes thrown up on the parados so as not to block up the trenches, there are more dead than living … [and] we have been too busy to do anything in the matter.6

To help alleviate the situation, the men of the 5th Connaught Rangers, who had been stationed at the Pimple as a reserve, were now called on to help drag the bodies of the Australian dead to Brown’s Dip for burial. There now came across the men who had been fighting non-stop for the past 36 hours the realisation that they were physically and mentally spent. Once the removal of ‘tension and excitement allowed them to relax they were practically incapable of forcing themselves to a renewal of effort. The nauseating stench and ghastly sights which surrounded them everywhere were sufficient to have dampened the ardour of the freshest and most hardened troops … Lone Pine was a frightful hand-to-hand struggle, like a battle of savage beasts at the bottom of a pit … .’7 Private Bendrey of the 2nd Battalion, close to Jacobs’s Trench, recalled how the dead ‘were lying everywhere, on top of the parapet … in dugouts and communication trenches and saps, and it was impossible to avoid treading on them. In the second line the Turkish dead were lying everywhere, and if a chap wanted to sit down for a spell he was often compelled to squat on one of ‘em.’8 During the midday hours of the 8th, Major McConaghy, who was now commanding the 3rd Battalion in the centre of the Pine, began to organise the digging of trenches to connect his isolated sap-head posts. Work began on connecting Sasse’s Sap and Woods’s Post with a transverse trench. Lieutenant McLeod was sent over to Sasse’s to supervise

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the work, while Lieutenant Woods would do likewise from his position. While trying to communicate the progress of his section of the trench to Woods, McLeod was killed with a shot to the head. Work continued and soon the posts were connected and a new front line established. It was now that someone using a trench periscope observed a number of Turks creeping up from The Cup towards the newly constructed works. Woods now only had three survivors of his party. One of these, Corporal McGrath who had earlier survived the battles for Goldenstedt’s Post, ‘instantly got the reserve machine gun into action, and joking and laughing as he worked, swept away the attack’.9 It is likely that these Turks were the same men Major Zeki Bey had organised to attack the Australian lines at around this time: ‘On the third day I sent a company to attack and it disappeared altogether; I didn’t know if it was captured or killed, or if it got involved in a panic that happened on the left.’10 With the capture of the heart of Lone Pine, the plan to attack Johnston’s Jolly with the men of the 7th Battalion was now dropped and these men were to be funnelled into the southern part of the Pine to relieve the men of the 1st and 2nd Battalions. The men of the 3rd and 4th Battalions were to remain and hold the northern and central sectors, along with those from the 12th Battalion who had been sent over previously. At around 1.30 pm the men of the 7th Battalion made their way into the southern part of the garrison and by 3 pm they had replaced the dazed and fatigued men of the 1st and 2nd Battalions. The 1st Battalion had gone into the battle with twenty-one officers and 799 other ranks; seven officers and 333 men had become casualties. It was even worse for the 2nd Battalion. It had gone into the battle with twenty-two officers and 560 other ranks; on coming out no fewer than twenty-one officers and 409 other ranks had become casualties.11 Many of those who did walk out of the Pine with wounds were not included in the casualty list nor did it take into account the psychological scarring that many would carry for life. Lance Corporal Leonard Keysor of the 1st Battalion was one of the

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1 Aylward’s Post

6 Woods’s Post

2 McDonald’s Post

7 Goldnstedt’s Post

3 Mackay’s Post

8 Tubb’s Corner

4 Lloyd’s Post

9 Jacobs’s Post

5 Sasse’s Post

10 Pain’s Post

7th Battalion brought over to relieve 2nd Battalion along southern sector, Lone Pine – afternoon, 8 August (Adapted from Bean, 1938)

men relieved. He would later be awarded the Victoria Cross for his actions between 7 and 8  August. He waged his own bombing war against the Turks, even though wounded on 7 August and, while helping to defend Jacobs’s Trench on the 8th, he bombed the Turks out of a position which had made the trench vulnerable, and was wounded a second time – again he refused to leave.12 His citation read:

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For most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty at Lone Pine trenches, in the Gallipoli Peninsula. On August 7, 1915, he was in a trench which was being heavily bombed by the enemy. He picked up two live bombs and threw them back at the enemy at great risk to his own life and continued throwing bombs, although himself wounded, thereby saving a portion of the trench which it was most important to hold. On August 8, at the same place, Private [sic – Lance Corporal] Keysor successfully bombed the enemy out of a position from which a temporary mastery over his own trench had been obtained and was again wounded. Although marked for hospital, he declined to leave, and volunteered to throw bombs for another company which had lost its bomb-throwers. He continued to bomb the enemy till the situation was relieved.13

Back along the beach at Anzac, Charles Bean recorded in his diary an unfortunate ‘prank’ played out against Turkish and German prisoners. I have just seen as caddish an act as I ever saw in my life. About 100 Turkish prisoners and two Germans were sitting in the pen … Some chap had poured out a tin of kerosene on the ground in front of it and laid a trail of kerosene … Some chap put a light to the trail, it flared along and when it reached the kerosene there was a huge flare of fire uncomfortably close – if not dangerously – to the Turks. The wretched prisoners rushed to the far corner of the pen like a flock of sheep rounded up by a dog, and fellows looking on laughed. There were both Australians and Britishers there amongst the onlookers. I wondered someone hadn’t the decency to hit the man who did it straight in the face … Three Turkish officers are among the lot … [and] were sent off under an Indian sentry to a vacant shell of a dugout in

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Australian Divisional lines. They were sent there in the morning and absolutely forgotten. No food or water was sent to them. Our divisional interpreter happened to be passing in the afternoon, when these Turks told him. He went to the APM [Assistant Provost-Marshall] of Army Corps, whose business it was. APM said he was too busy – would the interpreter get some other officer to do it. The interpreter saw another officer who said he would have bully beef and biscuits sent up. Interpreter said he wouldn’t take bully beef and biscuits up – the Turks wouldn’t give our officers bully and biscuits if their own officers were feeding better. The officer saw things in this light and sent up a decent meal. The Turks had some tea but no-one provided them with any water. Interpreter had to go round for that and couldn’t find any. They are there now in a bare dug out, no blankets, no water-proof sheet, no comfort of any sort … 14

By 3 pm most of the 7th Battalion had taken up their positions in the southern sector of the Pine. By now, however, their assigned bombers, who had been sent over to Lone Pine the night before, had been either killed or wounded. The battalion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Elliott now numbered just over 500 men, with a reserve force under Lieutenant Tubb located at Brown’s Dip. Elliott moved around his sector assessing the situation – it was not good. Saps and trenches were crowded with Australian and Turkish dead and dying. It was impossible at places not to walk on them and even the veterans found it hard to stomach, not only the sight but the sickening stench that prevailed everywhere. The position here was mostly defined by about ten posts represented by barricaded sap-heads. The men representing the southernmost flank were supported by two machine guns of

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the 2nd Battalion – the crews so worn out that it appeared that these men must surely be about to collapse from exhaustion. Elliott divided his front between two companies. The northern sector, under the command of Lieutenant Symons, took over the newly relocated Goldenstedt’s Post and Woods’s Post. The southern sector was defined by Jacobs’s Trench, which was almost completely isolated from the rest of the Australian lines. Elliott placed Lieutenant Dyett in command of this area and established a number of defensive positions along Jacobs’s Trench. One of these was placed at its head, which was screened by wire netting to help protect the men from Turkish grenades. Fifteen metres back, another post was established where the original head cover remained. A third post was located at the next bend of the trench. It was at the first and third positions that the two machine guns of the 2nd Battalion had been established. All three of these positions gave a clear field of fire over the lower ridges and gullies leading off Lone Pine to the south.15 While Elliott was still establishing his defences word reached him that the Turks were yet again massing below Jacobs’s Trench. From this position Lieutenant Fisher and Private Erikson, both expert shots, were sniping away at the Turks. Turkish artillery began to bombard the trenches here, resulting in heavy damage. The men in this part of the line were mostly fresh reinforcements to the battalion and were rattled by the bombardment. Elliott went among them, steadying their nerves. He later wrote to his wife Kate: I had … to try and keep everybody cool and steady and send reinforcements where, only just sufficient and no more so as to spin them out as long as possible, and when men came to me to implore me for bombs which I hadn’t got and for reinforcements I could not spare (or they could not hold out) to tell them to go back and fight with bayonet and rifle until they were dead, and they did that … I had about 170 raw recruits shoved in just before the fight, most of these fought like demons but a few broke down. I found one fellow wandering about without a rifle,

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all trembling. I took him to a place which had a dark tunnel in it, and told him to watch that and if he moved an inch I would blow his brains out. It really led to our own lines and there wasn’t a Turk anywhere near it, but he didn’t know. After about an hour he got alright, and I sent him back to the fight. Another came back trembling all over so that he couldn’t hold his rifle. I told him if he couldn’t fight to fill sandbags. He went at it like a madman – you never saw a man work like him – but it pulled him round. Later I saw him fighting as well as the rest.16

The barrage soon lifted and was replaced by a grenade attack from the Turks below. The casualties from both attacks were severe. A man fighting next to Elliott was hit by a bullet that ‘smashed his head like an egg shell’. Elliott was ‘splashed from head to foot with [his] blood and brains’.17 The trenches were congested with men as all expected an immediate charge by the Turks to take the position. Elliott, seeing the result of the crowding, ordered that the position be thinned out, placing men in reserve under those parts of the position covered with pine logs. The grenade attack ceased but no Turkish infantry attack was launched.18 Private Dick Gardiner of the 7th Battalion later recalled: When we went in to relieve the 2nd Btn, the trenches we[re] piled 4 and 5 high with dead and the stench was simply awful, they told us that the position was fairly safe, but afterwards we found decidedly unsafe and also unhealthy. Everything was quiet until about 5 o’clock when Abdul started to bomb us and all the cry was for bombs – more bombs and stretcher-bearers and it lasted until well after dark when things began to quiet down. All the time this was on I had 8 men just beside the trench waiting to go in and fix up the parapets (Alf [Dick’s brother Killed in Action 8/9 August 1915] was with me at the time) and as the stretcherbearers were busy, we were bandaging the chaps as they came out.19

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From 3  pm until 7  pm the Turks launched a number of intermittent attacks along the whole line, however, with darkness most Turkish attacks focused on the southern flank, that is, Jacobs’s Trench, Tubb’s Corner and the relocated Goldenstedt’s Post. At Jacobs’s Trench, the Turks launched a number of attacks and it was not long before reinforcements were requested. Lieutenant Tubb and half of his reserve company were brought over from Brown’s Dip. By now Lieutenant Dyett at Jacobs’s Post had been badly wounded and replaced by Lieutenant John West. Elliott decided, with the arrival of Jacobs and his men, to split his sector into three command groups. Jacobs would now be sandwiched in between the sectors controlled by West and Symons. As the original men of the 7th Battalion manning the posts along Jacobs’s Trench were either killed or wounded, West ordered others to take their place. It was not long before he was calling for additional men from Jacobs’s sector to help reinforce the threatened position. By 10.30 pm the fighting along Jacobs’s Trench had died down. The same could not be said for the attacks just north of their position at Goldenstedt’s Post.20 No sooner had Lieutenant Symons and his men relieved the original defenders of Goldenstedt’s Post than the Turks began to shower it with grenades. The Turkish bombers could not be dislodged as they took shelter from thick timber beams that had been used by Goldenstedt and his men in the defence of the original post. Australian losses were heavy and the Turks succeeded in forcing their way over the barricade into the main position. Symons, however, kept his reserve bombers and other supports in a small dugout nearby – its entrance partially protected by wire netting. These men would counter-charge the Turks as they broke into the main position. Hand-to-hand fighting ensued and eventually the Turks would be ejected. The same process went on for hours and it was not until 2 am the next morning that the Turks were finally driven out and the position made secure. Earlier, at around 8.00 pm, an order was issued from the commander of the 1st Australian Division: ‘White armlets ordered to be removed, 26 8

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back patches to be retained.’ Following closely was another communiqué to the 1st Brigade headquarters as noted in its war diary: ‘20:25 received congratulations for 1st Bn. from Gen. Walker.’21

Earlier Major Zeki Bey, after having witnessed the capture of Goldenstedt’s Post by his men, moved off towards the northern part of the Pine, close to where the mufti had been commanding the survivors of the original attack against Lone Pine – it is not recorded whether the brave mufti survived. After the war Zeki Bey recalled to Charles Bean that he now sought to ‘collect the relics of my own battalion (1/57th) … The situation at Kanli Sirt was now better, and it was well known that the danger was elsewhere. Indeed all these days I looked over my [right] shoulder seeing your shells bursting on the rear slope of Chunuk Bair. Although the situation at Kanli Sirt was critical, I could scarcely keep my eyes on it – I knew things must be happening at Chunuk Bair … which were more critical by far; and if you succeeded there, what use would be our efforts at Kanli Sirt?’22

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19 ‘… it was just pla i n o p e n s l a u g h t e r ’

At the Apex, two parties of signallers had earlier attempted to establish communications with Malone’s men on Chunuk Bair using telephone lines. One of these parties was led by Corporal Bassett who, much later in life, recalled: We had to make short, sharp dashes under enemy fire. Mostly rifle fire from snipers. It was pretty tough, and I think that when we got about 100 yards McLeod was wounded. He was able to get back to headquarters without any help … I suppose we had got about 300 yards and I saw a very nice clump of friendly looking trees [scrub] that would afford good shelter, so I made for that with my boys. I was leading, and I think two of the boys were carrying the drum of wire, and the man who was supposed to be pulling out the wire was wounded. While we were getting ready for the next dash along came a squadron or maybe more, of Auckland Mounted Rifles. The commander commandeered my telephone. He wanted orders from Brigade … We contacted them at the foot of the hill, where they had run out the wire … We contacted them [second party led by Sapper Dignan] at the foot of the hill, where they had run out of wire. At this stage I reorganised the gangs and sent Dignan, Whitaker, Edwards

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and McDermid up to report to the adjutant of the Wellington regiment on the hill [Chunuk Bair]. I thought it was only fair that since Dignan had got there first he should have the honour of reporting.1

Bassett and one of his men, Birkett, lay in a depression near the head of Sazli Beit Dere repairing the broken wire and trying to untangle knots in the line. Bassett recalled: ‘The valley was full of dead and wounded. It was a heart-rending sight; people wanting water and that sort of thing.’2 About an hour later, Dignan came running down from the summit – the line had been broken somewhere below. Bassett went in search of where the line had been cut. I followed our line all the way to a point where I could see some shelling, and I happened to come across three breaks in the line. Two of them were very close together and the other was 12 ft to 15ft away, towards Brigade [Headquarters]. I had no trouble mending the first two breaks, but the other was causing me a lot of trouble. It was in the open, and I thought to myself that if I had to go there, I was going to be sniped. But it had to be done and while I was putting the last knot in this break he [a Turk] got on to me with his sniping. I was face down and belly down, as near as I could get to mother earth, and he gave me a lot of fright. I’m not saying how many bullets he put over – I didn’t count them. I edged my way back to where the ground sloped to some good cover and rolled onto the cover – so I managed to beat him to it.3

Bassett was awarded the Victoria Cross for his actions on 8 August. His citation read that throughout the day with: [the] approach swept by rifle and machine-gun fire, with the Turkish field artillery from Abdel Rahman mercilessly searching the slopes, Bassett dashed and then crept, then dashed and crept

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again, up to the forward line on Chunuk. These lines were cut again and again, but Bassett and his fellow linesmen of the signals went out day and night to mend the broken wires. No VC on the Peninsula was more consistently earned. This was not for one brilliant act of bravery, but for a full week of ceaseless devotion.4

After the war, Bassett sadly commented that, while he got the Victoria Cross, all that his mates got were wooden ones. Major Schofield and his men of the Auckland Mounted Rifles had earlier set about reinforcing Chunuk Bair. Groups of troopers crawled up the saddle for a short distance, before dropping into the Sazli Beit Dere. From here most managed to reach the head of the valley, which was now being used by the wounded of Malone’s men who could make their way off the summit into the dere for shelter – they were still exposed to the Turkish artillery shells and the blazing sun. Earlier Charlie Clark had made his way there after having been wounded in both legs: one of his legs had a large gaping hole, the bone completely smashed. Charlie, with his wounded mate Sergeant Harvey Johns, waited for the day to end. Harvey later recalled: ‘There were about 300 wounded lying in the gully … we lay there in the sun … each man looked after himself … and you would speak to a man, one of your own men and later on you would get no reply, they were dying, dying out as the day went on.’5 Charlie Clark was still laying there when the troopers of the Auckland Mounted Rifles began to arrive. ‘One of them was Lieutenant Henderson. He belonged to a family that I knew from childhood … I stopped him and we shook hands and his last words to me were “Is my brother Jack with you?” I said “No … He left about four days previous on a hospital boat.” … Well he says, “Thank God for that.”’6 At the head of Sazli Beit Dere, Schofield began to deploy his men as they arrived in dribs and drabs. From here they would still need to charge in half-squadrons up the remaining 200 metres of exposed slope to Malone’s position just beneath the summit of Chunuk Bair. It would

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be some time before all of Schofield’s troopers would be in position to attempt to reinforce Malone’s men. At some time close to 2 pm Schofield began to send parties of troopers over to Malone’s position. Sergeant Ken Stevens later recalled: We lined up, about ten men at a time and ran across a bulletswept area towards Chunuk Bair. George McKenzie was killed in the line in front of me … Shrapnel seemed to be bursting everywhere amongst us. A dead man named Carter, Auckland Infantry Battalion, whose identification disc I had a look at, had been killed the day before and I was lying alongside him and I pushed him on higher ground and got under him for shelter. Sandy McKay and Sgt ‘Boukau’ McKay of Waipu were killed close to me … Eventually we were glad to move up over Rhododendron Ridge by crawling through the prickly scrub under enemy fire and then down into an eroded gully with steep sides and then up the floor of it to within one hundred yards of the top of Chunuk Bair.7

Most of the troopers of the Auckland Mounted Rifles who managed to make their way onto Chunuk Bair took up a position on the crest to the right, which was still in the hands of the New Zealand infantry. As recalled by Major Cunningham: ‘Timely aid in the shape of reinforcements arrived shortly after 2 pm, the Auckland Mounted Rifles gallantly advancing across the bullet-swept zone between the Apex and Chunuk Bair, and taking up a position on the right flank of the rapidly thinning line.’8 Stevens wrote: The sky was cloudless, the sun was scorching and the air was dead calm and filled with acrid fumes from exploding shells, bombs and rifle fire … The air seemed to be electrified with the crackle of bullets and the Turks were bombing our men, some of whom I was surprised to see pick up live bombs with fuses burning and threw them back at the enemy, and when the first bounced alongside me I did not have to think twice what to do with it.

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After a little experience we found it surprising the length of time we had to dispose of their bombs. They had an eight-inch fuse and evidently a very slow-burning one … As well as returning Turkish bombs we threw all the stones we could reach and any we could dig out of the side of the trench with a bayonet … Our line was L-shaped and about 200 yards long, the short sections being on my left extending about 50 yards and rising up to the rest of Chunuk Bair … Straight in front of us from three to twenty-five yards was dead ground unless we stood up and made targets of ourselves for the enemy that was practically on three sides of us. The plan of Turkish attack was to assemble in the dead ground in front, then a group would attack us with bombs then charge, while another group would scramble up to our left on top of Chunuk Bair … When the enemy charged us everyone stood up and it was just plain open slaughter, shooting as fast as possible at them running towards us … When we halted a charge by the enemy, what were left of them dropped down into short scrub just in front of our trench and we got down out of sight as much as possible. Then we both started sniping at each other … The number of casualties caused by bombs was only a small fraction of that from the deadly rifle fire which was from a range of three yards to less than one hundred … As we had no sandbags I piled a couple of dead men on my left to block the view of me from the enemy on the hill … As the day wore on the scrub was all cut away by bullets and bombs … My throat was parched, my lips and tongue were sticky and the sun seemed so slow going down that I wished it would drop out of the sky and let them bring water up to us. Perspiration was streaming down my face and my sweat rag was saturated and it was getting difficult to see on account of the salty perspiration in my eyes … A bullet broke my bayonet off, but as

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there were plenty of Turkish rifles and ammunition I used one of theirs and it was a blessing as it did not kick like ours and my shoulder was very sore.9

Malone’s men were exhausted – physically and mentally. The slopes behind the bulk of the Wellington Battalion were littered with the dead and dying, most too badly wounded to make their way to the head of Sazli Beit Dere. They lay there exposed, being wounded again and again, not only by shell and rifle fire but also by the never-ending stream of Turkish grenades that were now bring lobbed from the trench running along the summit. The New Zealanders’ supply of bombs had long since been exhausted and ammunition for their rifles was running dangerously low. The wounded laying all around the hill cried out for water, while the living now searched the webbing and pockets of the dead and wounded for ammunition. A few men from the Auckland Battalion positioned at the Pinnacle somehow managed to supply Malone’s men with two boxes of ammunition using the Sazli Beit Dere, then dashing and crawling the remaining 200 metres to the summit. Malone, from his position, overlooked the slopes leading down to The Farm. He must have realised that they could expect no help from this direction as the forces there were pinned down in impossible country. All that afternoon Malone gave the orders for counter-charge after counter-charge as the Turks attempted to sweep over the top of them – but each time Malone and his men repelled the attacks – just. On more than one occasion it seemed that the Turkish attacks must succeed. The Turks would initially attack from the centre, but then also creep forward on both flanks causing Malone’s men to split their fire. The same occurred when they launched what appeared to be flanking attacks – the Turkish centre would minutes later attempt to charge from their centre while Malone’s men were focusing on the flanks. In such cases the only way to repel the attack was with the bayonet. Malone led a number of these counter-attacks and, when Cunningham protested that he should

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not lead from the front, Malone merely replied like a father to his son: ‘You’re only a kid – I’m an old man.’10 Major Norman Hastings recalled that ‘twice it looked very bad so with Colonel M[alone] we joined the lads in front. I had my revolver and a handful of cartridges and Col. M seized up a rifle and bayonet. The Wellingtons seemed to rise up each time from nowhere and the Turks were hurled back. In the first of these attacks the bayonet on Col. M’s rifle was twisted by a bullet, so after this he kept it with him, as he said it was lucky.’11 At one point Malone seemed to accept the inevitable as the Turks yet again charged down the slopes to their position. ‘Come on’ he said to his staff ‘they’ve done it this time – we may as well be in it’, but yet again the Turks were beaten back.12 Sergeant Stevens later recalled: ‘There I saw the bravest man I ever saw, Colonel Malone, who was doing the jobs from Lance Corporal to Brigadier General.’13

Meanwhile, the wounded Private Edward Baigent, who had been enjoying a mug of Bovril below the heights of Chunuk Bair, was considering his options I had now rested some time and was considering moving further down. My leg was giving a good deal of pain and was very swollen. Sergeant Major Norris came along on his way to the beach. He got me on his back and carried me to a dressing station near No. 3 Outpost. There an orderly took my particulars, gave me an injection in the arm and pinned a ticket on my coat. Every sheltered spot was packed with wounded. All walking cases were moving on to the beach about half a mile away. A few shrapnel shells were bursting around No. 3 post and the mouth of the gully. With the assistance of two chaps wounded in the arm and hand we made an effort to reach the beach. Once there I felt that there was every chance of being taken to a boat.14

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Later that night he was transferred to a ship and taken to Lemnos and the 3rd Australian Field Hospital.

Well before midday Godley recognised that his second attempt to capture the Sari Bair heights had failed. He was now devising his third plan. The northern flanking manoeuvre aimed at capturing Hill 971 had completely broken down and Godley jettisoned that part of his scheme. He focused on capturing the heights between Battleship Hill and Hill Q. As such, the New Zealanders were to consolidate their position on Chunuk Bair as well as extend south towards Battleship Hill. The British and Indian troops located below the crest connecting Chunuk Bair and Hill Q were to capture that ridge. At the same time a totally fresh composite British brigade would make their way up to Chunuk Bair during the night and from there strike along the northern ridgeline at dawn and attack and capture Hill Q. The reserve force to be used to spearhead the attack against Hill Q would consist of the 6th East Lancashire (38th Brigade), which had been positioned at No. 2 Outpost during 7 August. He now recalled the 5th Wiltshire (40th Brigade), which had been helping to protect the northern flank. Birdwood also supplied two reserve battalions, both from the 29th Brigade: the 6th Royal Irish Rifles and the 10th Hampshire. Godley ordered a conference to be held at 3  pm at the Apex to outline his new plan. If he himself could not make it, he would send his chief of staff Colonel Braithwaite. Johnston was ordered to prepare an observation post from which they could look out over the terrain from Chunuk Bair to Hill Q. Colonels Cooper and Baldwin, who were in command of the reserve battalions that made up the composite brigade (Baldwin being in overall command), made their way to the Apex around 3.30 pm. Earlier, Godley had also ordered the 6th Loyal North Lancashire to move up to the Apex to support the New Zealanders. They too were now placed under the command of Baldwin. Both colonels had 277

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Dark arrows = logical approach for Baldwin’s Brigade to attack Hill Q via the Apex, the Pinnacle and Chunuk Bair Dashed arrows = complicated route in terms of terrain advised by Johnston and adopted by Baldwin Open rectangles = Turkish units (approximate) Dashed lines = Australian 4th Brigade and British 40th Brigade covering northern flank Open triangle = Allanson’s mixed Gurkhas and British units just below ridge connecting Chunuk Bair and Hill Q (to assist Baldwin’s force in taking Hill Q)

Proposed attack against Hill Q – 8–9 August

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already drafted their orders regarding their troop movements, stating that their left flank would rest on The Farm. On seeing the terrain that their troops would need to negotiate, however, they realised that their original orders were hopeless – there was no way of approaching Hill Q from The Farm. Indeed, one of the colonels looking at the surrounding country remarked: ‘How on earth can we do it?’15 The only ‘sane’ approach was from the Apex using the Chailak Dere and then climbing onto the saddle connecting it to that currently held by Malone and his men just below the summit of Chunuk Bair. To do this the dere would need to be free of traffic, as it would take the better part of the night to bring up the troops using this narrow scrub-choked valley. This was likely the very route that Godley had intended to use and it was also recommended by a number of New Zealand officers present at the briefing. Johnston, however, was firmly against this approach, and both colonels had been ordered to confer with Johnston regarding the best approach to take.16 At dusk, the 10th Hampshire and 6th Royal Irish Rifles were to move into the Chailak Dere, where the 5th Wiltshire and 6th East Lancashire were already positioned. They were then to make their way further up the dere. Baldwin had been informed that it would be completely open for his advance. Keeping the dere clear would not be an easy task. New Zealander Lance Corporal William Hill had only arrived at Anzac that morning (direct from New Zealand) and was already being pushed up the dere to reinforce the attack against Chunuk Bair. He described the ‘march’ up the dere: ‘Dead, nothing but dead men, New Zealanders, Maoris, Englishmen, Australian and Turks. Hundreds upon hundreds of them lying in all sorts of attitudes, some badly marked, others mangled out of all hope of recognition, and swarming over all, the flies. Further up [behind the Apex], where the Turkish fire was still hot, the wounded lay with dead, some had been there for hours, would lie there for further hours, would lie there until stretcher-bearers, heroes every one of them, would under cover of darkness attempt their removal.’17 Private Cecil Malthus of the 279

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Canterbury Battalion, who had been evacuated weeks before with dysentery, returned to Anzac on that day and was moving up the dere, looking for his platoon: ‘… what terrible changes those weeks had brought! Nearly all my old friends were gone. Some of them killed the day before, and many more sick and wounded. Amongst the 5th Reinforcements, who had just arrived an hour before me, I was a total stranger, and of the old hands I could hardly find an acquaintance among the handful of survivors. All the men left showed signs of heavy strain … Heavy fighting still continued, but at our part of the line it was mainly confined to rifle fire between the half-entrenched lines on either side.’18 Neither Godley nor Braithwaite bothered to appear for the meeting at the Apex. While the commanders awaited their arrival in vain, Johnston invited the two British colonels into his dugout to discuss the matter further. By now Johnston was clearly physically and mentally exhausted. He advised Baldwin against the proposed line of march suggested by Godley and others, instead stating that it would be better to approach Hill Q by climbing out of the Chailak Dere to the left (instead of the right), climbing over Cheshire Ridge, dropping into the Aghyl Dere and then climbing the far side to Chunuk Bair and then Hill Q. This line of march on a map was indeed the shortest and it impressed Baldwin. However, it was manifestly more complicated and a far more physically demanding approach. Johnston’s officers who were present tried to argue against this tortuous route. But Johnston would not budge and Baldwin agreed that it was far less circuitous. Johnston’s approach was adopted. It was now that a message from Godley arrived stating that neither he nor Braithwaite could make it to the briefing and that orders would soon be issued. These orders would leave the approach to Hill Q in the hands of the local commanders. Consequently, the course laid down in Godley’s orders, finally issued at 7 pm, was ‘that which Baldwin had been led by Johnston to adopt – the “short” route through the Aghyl Dere’.19

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Meanwhile on Chunuk Bair, all afternoon news was passed among the New Zealanders and British troops to ‘hang on – the Gurkhas are coming’, but Malone at least knew that this certainly would not be the case. Even so, at around 4 pm Major Schofield and about 130 troopers charged out from the head of the Sazli Beit Dere up towards Chunuk Bair. The survivors of this charge, on reaching Malone’s position, found the New Zealand and British troops defending an impossible position: the firing line was ‘only three-and-a-half feet in depth [and] now so full of dead and dying that the men had to leave it and endeavour to scratch another trench immediately behind it’.20 As the troopers of the Mounted Rifles began to occupy the southern part of Malone’s position, those men protecting the northern flanks reported seeing a continuous line of Turkish troops reinforcing the southern portion of the crest. These were Turks from the 24th Regiment, which had left the defences at Helles and hurried northwards to reinforce the survivors of the Turkish 25th and 64th Regiments. It was also now that the Turkish artillery batteries focused all their attention on shelling the southern seaward slopes of Chunuk Bair being reinforced by the New Zealand troopers. It was almost immediately followed by another Turkish infantry attack, which was repulsed at the point of a bayonet. It was not only the Turkish artillery that was now blasting the hill. The red-and-yellow marker flags that had been planted around the perimeter of the New Zealand position had by now each been shot down. The Anzac artillery officers, seeing no flags, believed that the Turks must have recaptured the summit and they poured fire onto the upper slopes until the survivors still clinging to the slopes somehow managed to salvage the flags and erect them again, using whatever came to hand, including broken rifles. The shelling from Anzac ceased. The last salvo from this barrage, believed to be from a British destroyer, slammed into the hill, killing the gallant Malone. The Wellington War Diary states that: ‘About 1730 Lieutenant Colonel WG Malone, Officer Commanding the Battalion, was killed by a piece of shell.’21 Standing with Malone was Major 281

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Schofield, who was seriously wounded in the lung. Major Cunningham took over command of the position for a few minutes until he was wounded, passing command over to Captain Harston. With Schofield out of action, command of the Auckland Mounted Rifles was transferred to Captain Wood.22 At dusk the New Zealanders and British were still holding their position just below the seaward slopes of the summit and with darkness things eased for the stranded garrison. Parties from the Apex and the Pinnacle were now able to approach Malone’s position via the Chailak Dere, carrying water, bombs and ammunition. The only casualties suffered that night were from a mistaken order issued to the 4th Squadron of the Wellington Mounted Rifles who were bringing up supplies. They were ordered to charge through the northern line held by the Turks – the charge was beaten down by Turkish fire. At around 10.30 pm the exhausted New Zealand and British survivors were finally reinforced by the men of the Otago Infantry Battalion and the Wellington Mounted Rifles. Trooper Finlayson wrote in his small diary: What hell we went through … no-one that did not see it can ever imagine, even on a small scale. Men piled dead all around me, hands, legs, heads, bodies, equipment and rifles in the air, slung there by high explosive shells, how a man came out of it, God alone knows. Poor old Sandy was killed on Sunday [8 August] by a shell. He was literally blown to pieces. George Palmer was killed by the same shell. Ludlow and Don Durham were killed late Sunday night. Ludlow by a shell and Don was shot. The poor old Auckland Mounted Rifles is almost wiped out, the eleventh suffered the worst, as our squadron was the strongest and is now by far the weaker. We started out on Friday night with 124 men and only 16 answered roll call this morning and only two officers left to the Regiment. I was never so absolutely deadbeat and tired as I was getting in last night and I am just useless today. Sore all over and as miserable as a man can be. Poor dead boys. I had a lot

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of friends amongst them and old Sandy and I were mates from the start.23

At around 11 pm as the survivors of the summit were leaving, all heard the yells of ‘Allah, Allah, Allah’ and with this the Turks to their front and along the northern flank again attempted to sweep them off Chunuk Bair – but this attack, like all others, was beaten back. Finally the survivors of the Wellington Infantry Battalion and the 7th Gloucestershire and 8th Welsh Battalions were withdrawn. Losses were truly horrific – of the 760 of the Wellington Battalion who occupied the heights that morning only ‘70 unwounded or slightly wounded’ came out; ‘their uniforms were torn, their knees broken. They had had no water since the morning; they could only talk in whispers; their eyes were sunken; their knees trembled; some broke down and cried like children.’24 The Welch had lost 417 men and the Gloucestershire 350 – most of the British casualties were associated with the initial attempts to reach the summit earlier that day. Charles Bean later stated that: Malone and his Wellingtons [and the Gloucestershire and Welch] had opened for the Anzac commander one obvious opportunity – namely, to make use of the foothold gained during August 8 for launching a third powerful attack upon the crest … on the night of August 8 the position was such that troops and ammunition could be brought without the enemy’s interference to within fifty yards of the crest-line of Chunuk Bair. Such hindrance as existed during the hours of darkness was in all far in rear, in narrow defile of the Chailak Dere, up which moved supplies and reinforcements for Chunuk Bair, while the wounded and relieved troops passed down.25

Below, within Chailak Dere, Baldwin’s force assigned to capture Hill Q was making its way through the still-crowded dere. Just below the Apex, still in the Chailak Dere, was to be the assembly point before taking the complicated route of pushing over Cheshire Ridge, into the Aghyl 28 3

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Dere, and then climbing towards the ridge connecting Chunuk Bair and Hill Q. To ensure there was no confusion about the route to be taken, the relatively easy and straightforward route leading from the Apex to the Pinnacle and to Chunuk Bair was now deliberately blocked, forcing Baldwin’s troops to take the designated route. The barricade was in place before the advance columns of Baldwin’s troops approached. Also at about this time Sergeant Wild and Private Gordon of the New Zealand Canterbury Infantry Battalion conducted a daring act of bravery to help the naval artillery spotters in identifying enemy positions. They crept out into no-man’s-land to place a battery-operated lamp on the northern corner of The Farm. They succeeded in placing the lamp in position, which only shone towards the sea – the Turks remained oblivious to its existence. The navy reported that the light was placed exactly as required and greatly assisted them in directing their barrage.26

Meanwhile, just north of Chunuk Bair, Major Allanson with his men of the 6th Gurkhas and parties of the 6th South Lancashire and 9th Warwickshire lay just below the saddle between Hill Q and Chunuk Bair. The major later recalled: ‘I lay without moving till 6  pm, with every conceivable shot flying in the air about me, shrapnel, our own maxims, rifles, and our own high explosives bursting extremely close, which told me how near we were to the top. I lay between two British soldiers; the man on my left had a bible, and read it the whole day; the man on my right I found to be a corpse. I wondered if I ought to make good resolutions for the future, and did not. The sun on one’s back was most trying.’27 Nearby were the bulk of 9th Warwickshire, 10th Gurkhas and the Maoris who had dug in around The Farm. Aubrey Herbert was a British intelligence officer serving at Anzac and commented on the fighting in this area: ‘… they went forward in parties through the beautiful light, with the clouds crimsoning over them. Sometimes a tiny, gallant figure would be in front, a puff would come, and they would be lying still.’28 With darkness, they

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managed to advance another 100 metres closer towards their objective.

By dusk, on a frontage of around 5000 metres, there were at least 5000 Turks, two mountain batteries and a dozen machine guns manning the heights.29 With the passing of every hour more Turkish troops were being massed just behind the landward slopes of Sari Bair from Hill 971 all the way down to Battleship Hill. The Turks were determined that they would sweep the enemy off Chunuk Bair at dawn. Meanwhile Mustafa Kemal had emphasised to Kiazim Bey (von Sanders’ chief of staff) the necessity to put all of the northern troops under one command. Indeed, he went on further to state that, with the dismissal of Fevzi Bey, ‘there was no other course remaining but to put all available troops under my command. “Won’t that be too many?” he [Kiazim Bey] said. “It will be too few”, I replied.’30 A few hours before midnight, Mustafa Kemal received orders from the commander of the Northern Army Group that he was to proceed to Camlitekke immediately and take over command of the Anafartalar Army Group (16th Army Corps). This group was responsible for operations around Suvla Bay. He was ordered to conduct an attack against the British troops early the next day. Before leaving, Kemal appointed Lieutenant Colonel Aker, commander of the 27th Regiment, to take over command of the 19th Division. His regiment had been defending the area around Baby 700 and the upper parts of Second Ridge and Mortar Ridge.31 Aker and his men had been among the first to confront the Australians on 25 April as they occupied 400 Plateau – he had spent that day trying to push the Australians back into the sea. Ever since then his regiment had been allocated to Kemal’s 19th Division. Aker would now spend the next day, 9 August, attempting to help push the New Zealanders off Chunuk Bair. Before leaving for the northern front Kemal issued the following farewell to the men of his former division:

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I am leaving to take over command of the Anafartalar Group. The commander of the 27th Regiment, Sefik Bey, has been appointed acting commander of the division. I bid you farewell with greatest confidence that the success which you made me gain with your efforts and self-sacrifice up to today will be completed in the new duty which I am undertaking with your love and confidence.32

Within 24 hours Kemal would succeed in containing the British at Suvla Bay and would find himself back with his former troops directing the final battle to retake Chunuk Bair.

As on the previous days, the wounded and dead lay all along the slopes, gullies and beach of Old Anzac, others were trapped at the Pine, while many others lay below the ridgeline of the Sari Bair range in nameless, scrub-choked gullies and eroded spurs. Many bled to death waiting for help. Some of the wounded took days to be evacuated just a few hundred metres – and when they finally made it to the beach things were not much better. The Australian Official Medical History recorded: The medical arrangements were deplorable, and rescue work sadly ineffective. The 3rd Light Horse Field Ambulance bearers learned of the attack [on Monash’s 4th Brigade] only in the morning. When their commanding officer, on going up to the lines, found the remnants of the battalions getting back to the trenches. The 4th Field Ambulance had not regained touch. The little carrying that was done was chiefly by regimental bearers. By a little after 5 am most of the regimental bearers had left the aid posts with wounded, and, in the absence of ambulance bearers, most of them carried right through to the beach. Here exchange of stretchers was again withheld and the bearers returned without any. Except for the machine-gunners covering the retirement, RMOs and bearers were the last to leave – ‘each with a wounded man on his

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back’. From forty to fifty severely wounded were got in; some others were carried by comrades; but in the retreat the battalions did not cover the same ground as in the advance, and this involved the abandonment in the scrub of many wounded who might have been picked up.33

Private Burton, of the New Zealand Medical Corps located somewhere off North Beach in the lower slopes of the heights, witnessed the plight of some 300 wounded. No-one appeared to be responsible for them. Their wounds were uncared for and in the heat some were in a shocking state. They had no food and no water … Many were hit a second and third time as they lay helplessly … Many died there – some able to see the hospital ships with their green bands and red crosses no distance out to sea … I saw nothing more dreadful during the whole war than the suffering of those forgotten men.34

Even though a jetty had been constructed (Embarkation Pier) at the beach below Chunuk Bair to take the wounded to the hospital ships, the pier was now being used to bring in supplies. Turkish batteries were also shelling the area and the wounded had to somehow make their way back to Anzac Cove, struggling down the ‘long sap’. It didn’t end when they were eventually loaded aboard lighters that ferried them to the waiting ships, as later recalled by medical officer Lieutenant Wilson: … it was a shock to me when four lighters pulled up alongside and we saw the poor shattered figures, with bloody bandages, grimy faces and dirty cloths … men were dying every minute … lighters kept coming alongside with their burden of suffering humanity and the man in charge would shout – ‘For God’s sake take this lot, we’ve been going about from ship to ship and noone will have us, and more men are dying.’ We worked, one and all, until we could no longer tell what we were seeing or doing,

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all day and all night, picking out the cases where the dreaded gangrene had set in … Even the clean open decks stank with the horrid smell of gangrenous flesh … The operating room … was a bloody shambles.35

It was 25 April all over again.

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PART 5

9 AUGUST 1915

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20 ‘If only Abdul had know n h o w fe w we re l e f t ’

In spite of the best efforts to keep the Chailak Dere free of downward traffic, many of the wounded continued throughout the night to struggle down from the heights to get to the beach. Units lost cohesion and soon became separated in the narrow and choked gully. As midnight approached, the leading part of Colonel Baldwin’s column found itself at the foot of Cheshire Ridge where the agreed-on barricade stopped the column in its tracks. Baldwin pushed his way to the head of the column and climbed up to Johnston’s headquarters. He was provided with a number of guides who would lead him over Cheshire Ridge into the Aghyl Dere and to their objective – the northern slopes of Chunuk Bair. The guides, however, quickly lost their way in the dark trying to negotiate the tangled spurs and gullies. Baldwin was now forced to turn the column around and climb back into the Chailak Dere and take the easier route into the dere by climbing into it from Bauchop’s Hill below. Precious hours were lost. The New Zealand Official Medical History later recorded the plight of the wounded in the valley: With the tramp and dust of Baldwin’s men assailing his jaded senses, Colonel Manders sits at his dugout door powerless to help. His last reserves of stretcher-bearers are in, his hands all tied by

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the necessities of the military needs. About him is a dust-grey welter of wounded, half naked, hungry, thirsty and forlorn, the tiny handful of the 40th Field Ambulance quite inadequate to help even a moiety of these sufferers of all races – water even is scarce. Blankets, there were practically none; most of the Anzacs, lying out on stretchers without shelter, had fought all day in their shirts; the night was chilly; many had been lying there for over 24 hours.1

At around 4 am, with dawn breaking, the leading battalion, the 6th East Lancashire, with the 10th Hampshire following behind, was only now approaching The Farm from the Aghyl Dere. Further back in the same valley were the 6th Royal Irish Rifles. By 5.15 am, when they should have been in position to begin their attack against the ridgeline, the bulk of Baldwin’s column was still struggling well below its objective. Captain Hicks, 10th Hampshires, recalled seeing two New Zealanders close to The Farm bringing in four Turkish snipers they had just captured. They were taking them towards the rear where they would be shot: ‘The Turks caught us by the hand and begged for mercy. But we weren’t feeling very merciful to snipers just then.’2 Meanwhile, the Otago Infantry and Wellington Mounted Rifles who had taken over the summit were trying desperately to deepen the trenches in the stony and hard ground, while fighting back half-hearted attacks by the Turks to take the summit. Just before midnight Lieutenant Colonel Moore of the Otago was wounded and command passed to Lieutenant Colonel Meldrum of the Wellingtons. Meldrum’s force was a small one. It consisted of just 170 troopers from his own regiment along with around 400 men from the Otago Infantry, and a handful of men from the Wellington Infantry. Eighty-five of the surviving 248 troopers of the Auckland Mounted Rifles who had reached Chunuk Bair that afternoon remained on the summit for now, but just before dawn these survivors were ordered off the hill. Just before daybreak Meldrum

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commanded less than 600 men. Even if Baldwin’s force successfully attacked and captured the ridgeline connecting Chunuk Bair to Hill Q , it was a small force to hold their position at Chunuk Bair – let alone sufficient to attack the Turks entrenched along Battleship Hill (as it was expected to do). Having said that, it is doubtful whether more troops could have occupied the small space effectively – it was crucial that the New Zealand gains be expanded to include the ridgeline to the south and north. During the early-morning hours of 9 August, Turkish rifle fire on the summit was active, as recalled by Lance Corporal Skinner of the Otago Battalion. On our right front, some twenty yards away, was a little fire … I decided to crawl forward and put it out, and Gus [Levett], for some unknown reason, insisted on coming too … I went out on hands and knees, Gus with me. I found that the fire was a dead man burning. His middle was burning away and the flames lit up the clenched fists and wild eyes staring at the stars … One body the snipers set alight with an explosive bullet, the cartridges in his equipment went off one by one as the flames reached them.3

Trooper Clutha Mackenzie, from the Wellington Mounted Rifles, described the scene of Chunuk Bair that night. Within hours he would be blinded for life. Lit fantastically by flickering flames, which were licking slowly through the scrub, was a small, ghastly, battle-rent piece of ground, not one hundred yards in width … The Turks lined the far edge, their ghostly faces appearing and vanishing in the eerie light, as they poured a point-blank fusillade at the shattered series of shallow holes where the remnants of the New Zealanders were fighting gallantly. Sweeping round to the left was the flashing semicircle of the enemy line, bombs exploded with lurid glare … Above the rendering of the bombs, the rattle and burr of the rifles and machine guns and the crash of shells, sometimes sounded

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faintly men’s voices – the weird ‘Allah, Allah, Allah’ of the enemy in a chanted cadence, and the fierce half-humorous taunts of the attackers. Everywhere lay dead and dying men – mostly the former … Equipment and rifles were strewn in the greatest confusion over the torn earth, and all the time the creeping flames cast weird lights upon the passing drama.4

Captain Wallingford sent up seven machine guns along with several thousand rounds of machine-gun ammunition to help consolidate the position. Meldrum, however, sent three of the guns back down the slopes (although keeping their ammunition) as there were not enough officers and machine gunners to operate them.5 Machine guns were high maintenance, they needed to be oiled, and the guns frequently jammed and/or needed repair. To keep a Maxim machine gun working required training and experience – it was not just a matter of feeding it ammunition and squeezing the trigger. At 4 am on 9 August the Turks launched their first major attack of that day to retake the summit. Meldrum’s force alone had to deal with this attack, as Baldwin’s column was still well below in the Aghyl Dere. At around 5 o’clock, at the height of this attack, three British howitzer high-explosive shells exploded on the summit among Meldrum’s men, killing Major Statham and his brother along with several others who were fighting in the front trench. Trooper Harry Browne of the Wellington Mounted Rifles wrote in his diary: A man was blown thirty feet into the air by a naval shell, his limbs outspread, his whole body silhouetted against the sky. Yet another shell and the charred trunk of another man’s body fell near us. Simultaneously the enemy attacked fiercely, his hand grenades taking deadly effect … One moment they were working their rifles like men possessed, and shouting defiance, and the next they lay crumpled up in the trench. Two only survived from the trench … Some New Zealanders left their positions and ran back down

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the hill. In the midst of it all I was shouting ‘Come back the 6th’. And ‘Come on you black cow’ to the Turks … A_ [unnamed soldier] suddenly cried ‘Come on boys, retire’. I turned on him ‘you cow, I’ll put a bullet in you’ I said through the din; Sandy shouted ‘You … coward, I’ll bayonet you’. He knew it was meant and subsided … [A]nother British shell landed right amongst the boys. In the flash of the explosion we saw them hurled backwards from it. Poor old Hughie Pringle was killed, his throat ripped by a piece of it and presently there came groping past us Clutha McKenzie [sic] blinded, young Mel Bull his jaw smashed and another unrecognisable. As they passed us their faces were covered in blood and seemed to hang in tatters. Physical fear is a strange thing. While all are more or less affected by it in a tight corner, most manage to contain it, but in some cases it causes them to lose all control over themselves.6

At this point the defence of the summit had reached a crisis point, but Meldrum and his adjutant, Captain Kelsall, along with Major Elmslie, rallied the men. Elmslie, already wounded in the shoulder and the neck, led a number of troopers from his regiment back to the front line. He made his way to the front trench: ‘I’m afraid I can’t help you much further boys, but you’re doing well – keep on …’ he said and died.7 Kelsall also led a number of men back to the front line and was killed shortly afterwards by a Turkish grenade. At some point Meldrum passed a wounded Wellington trooper who had been hit in the forehead, severing an artery, blood spurting from his wound. The trooper picked up his rifle and kept firing. ‘Are you able to carry on?’, asked Meldrum. The trooper replied: ‘Yes sir, I am going to stick to my mates.’ The officer tied a handkerchief round the wounded man’s head. The trooper was killed moments later.8 While Meldrum and his men were desperately fighting just to hold their position on Chunuk Bair, Godley’s plan dictated that the New Zealand, British and Indian troops should be launching a pronged attack to retake the summit of Chunuk Bair, along with capturing Hill Q just north of 29 4

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it. Again the attack against the northern heights refused to follow the general’s plans. As Meldrum and his men were fighting for their lives at Chunuk Bair, and the central attacking force of Baldwin’s battalions was negotiating the Aghyl Dere, the left attacking force represented by Cox’s British and Indian troops, which were already at The Farm and beyond, had not succeeded in gaining the heights during the British bombardment of the ridgelines. The southern part of Cox’s force, consisting of the 10th Gurkhas and most of the 9th Warwickshire at The Farm, along with a number of Maoris, still lay 100 metres below the ridgeline. On two knuckles further north, the 6th Gurkhas and the three companies of the 6th South Lancashire, who the day before gained a position just 50 metres from their objective, had, during the bombardment, crept further up the slopes and were less than twenty metres from the ridge when the bombardment finished. As it did, Major Allanson led his men in a charge up the slopes and took the ridge connecting Chunuk Bair to Hill Q – the bombardment had earlier succeeded in driving the Turk’s off the ridge into the valley below; it was now around 5.30 am. Success beckoned. Allanson with his Gurkhas and Lancashires now occupied about 600 metres of the saddle connecting the two positions. Ahead was a deep valley; to their right front just north of Chunuk Bair was a gentle slope that fell into a deep ravine; further south could be seen the slope of Su Yatagha. Within minutes of capturing the saddle they saw a large body of Turks immediately in front, some in a trench while others were climbing up to re-occupy the ridgeline, unaware that their former position had been captured. Rifle fire from Allanson’s men made it clear that the enemy now occupied the position. Allanson recalled what happened next: ‘Le Marchand was down, a bayonet through the heart, I got one through the leg, and then, for about ten minutes, we fought hand to hand, we bit and fisted, and used rifles and pistols as clubs; blood was flying about like spray from a hair-wash bottle. And then the Turks turned and fled, and I felt a very proud man; the key to the whole peninsula was ours, and our 29 5

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losses had not been so very great for such a result. Below I saw the Straits, motors and wheeled transport on the roads leading to Achi Baba.’9 To their right, however, about 200 Turks were climbing out of the deep ravine onto the shallow slope just north of Chunuk Bair. These Turks were occupying the position that Baldwin’s men had been tasked with capturing, but they were nowhere to be seen. It was now that highexplosive shells from British warships began to fall on the saddle. Allanson recalled: ‘As I looked round I saw we were not being supported, and I thought I could help best by going after those who had retreated in front of us … I saw a flash in the bay and suddenly our own Navy put six 12-inch monitor shells into us, and all was terrible confusion; it was a deplorable disaster; we were obviously mistaken for Turks, and we had to get back. It was an appalling sight; the first hit was a Gurkha in the face; the place was a mass of blood and limbs and screams …’10 To add to this, Turkish artillery from Abdel Rahman Bair also fired on the ridgeline on realising that it had been captured by the enemy. The Turks who had been spotted earlier along the slope to Allanson’s right had observed that the bulk of British and Indian troops were withdrawing from the ridgeline and now advanced towards Allanson’s mixed battalion. The major, aware that staying was folly, gave the order to retire. The Gurkhas and Lancashires now consolidated their position below the saddle – the ridgeline reoccupied by the Turks. An officer of the South Lancashire, G Mott, recalled on retiring that ‘my watch pocket had been shot through and my watch cut off [at] the leather chain, also a small bottle of citronella sent to me for flies, shattered to pieces … my equipment on the right side cut away badly and my putties ripped in two pieces’.11 Baldwin’s New Army battalions were still nowhere to be seen. It wasn’t until about 8  am that the leading companies of Baldwin’s column, assisted by the Maoris who had been positioned at The Farm, attempted to reach the northern face of Chunuk Bair. They took the approach using the Aghyl Dere, bypassing The Farm on their left and the Pinnacle on their right. As they began to reach the area just below 29 6

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the Pinnacle, Turkish enfilade broke out just to their left from Turks entrenched along the summit and northern slopes of Chunuk Bair. Soon Turkish artillery was raining shrapnel down onto the head of Aghyl Dere. Medical officer, Captain Buck, of the Maoris recalled: ‘A whole lot of Tommies were advancing up into the firing line, but owing to taking the wrong gully they arrived three hours late and started their attack in the daytime. It was slaughter.’12 The British and Maoris could make no headway and for the rest of the day they tried to dig in and hold the position gained, taking heavy losses in the process. The central attacking force had stalled 300 metres short of their objective. Meanwhile, the men of the 6th East Lancashire attempted to charge the slopes from The Farm but were also beaten back by the Turkish fire. The 6th Royal Irish Rifles now reinforced those men digging in on the small plateau. A trench had been dug along the seaward side of The Farm and it was here that Baldwin and his staff positioned their headquarters. Any attempt to rush towards the landward side of the plateau was not possible during the day as the Turks above swept the main areas of the plateau with machine-gun and concentrated rifle fire. As the Irish took up a position along the seaward edge of The Farm, an order came to one of their company commanders that they were to advance across the plateau towards the slopes leading to Chunuk Bair. ‘Surely you won’t do it – it can’t be done’, said an officer of the Maoris who was taking cover next to a British officer. ‘I’m going – I’ve been told to’, was the reply. According to the testimony of the Maori officer, he led his men out – none came back.13 Lieutenant Watson, 6th East Lancashire Regiment, was part of this advance and later wrote: ‘I’ve never heard, or imagined it was possible to hear such an inferno – I can’t describe it nor yet compare it to anything. You’ve heard the expression a sea of lead – well I realised then what it meant. We had about 400 yards open flat [The Farm plateau] to cross before getting under cover of the hill and it was broad daylight. I for one did not get across it and I am afraid only comparatively few did out of our battalion.’14 297

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The third all-out assault against the northern heights had failed, yet the New Zealanders still clung to the seaward slopes of Chunuk Bair – and while they did so, all was not lost. Godley and Birdwood now started to consider the possibilities for a fourth attack. The reserve forces at Anzac had, however, been exhausted, with only two ‘fresh’ battalions remaining. Just after 9 am, Birdwood sent the 6th Leinster to Godley to form the sole fresh reserve, which was placed along Rhododendron Ridge, while the other, the 5th Connaught Rangers, were still positioned at the Pimple on 400 Plateau to the south. The idea of launching another assault against the heights was ignoring the condition of the men and the number of men available. Even if the New Zealanders could hold Chunuk Bair until night, they would need to be relieved with fresh troops. By mid-morning Godley had ordered all battalions to now consolidate their positions. To help with communications, he had established two sectors; everything north of The Farm was to be commanded by Major General Cox, while The Farm and everything south of it (including Chunuk Bair) was to be commanded by Major General Shaw, commander of the 13th Division. At about midday, General Hamilton and Commodore Keyes, who had spent the morning at Suvla Bay, arrived at Godley’s headquarters to see for themselves the results of the Anzac breakout. Along with Birdwood, Godley and Shaw they lunched at No. 2 Outpost where they had a ‘grand outlook over the whole Suvla area and across to Chunuk Bair … we ate our rations and held an impromptu council of war’.15 Both Hamilton and Keyes had been dispirited by the operation at Suvla, which lacked any sense of urgency and had already bogged down well short of their objectives. Hamilton, along with Birdwood, believed that there was still a chance that the Anzac breakout could succeed. Feeling that the Anzac commanders were still confident of success to the same degree that the British commanders at Suvla were convinced of

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failure, Hamilton offered the Anzac commander his last reserves on the Gallipoli Peninsula – the 54th (East Anglian) Division, a Territorial Army formation. Water rations, however, were low and they believed new troops couldn’t be accommodated. Perhaps more importantly as far as Birdwood and Godley were concerned, they wanted to launch a new assault within the next 24 hours for they believed they couldn’t afford to wait for these troops to be shipped up to Anzac – and thus they declined the offer. Hamilton wrote: ‘These Anzac generals are in great form. They are sure they will have the whip hand of the Narrows by tomorrow … [they] were keen … that the Essex [East Anglian] Division should go to Stopford [Suvla Bay] so that he might at once occupy Kavak Tepe and, if he could, Tekke Tepe. All that the Anzacs have seen for themselves or heard … leads them to believe that the Turkish reinforcements to the Suvla theatre came over the high shoulder of Tekke Tepe [heights above Suvla] or through Anafarta Sagir [northern Anafarta] about dawn this morning.’16 Indeed, earlier the Turks had finally been able to launch the 7th and 12th Divisions against the Suvla landings and in between the British landings and the northern flank of the Anzac breakout. Von Sanders had ordered this attack 24 hours earlier and, because the commander had failed to do so, had placed Mustafa Kemal in command of this sector. The 12th Division launched a number of attacks which drove the British attempts to occupy the surrounding heights to a standstill. The 7th Division was directed against the Anzac northern flank in an attempt to make sure that the forces at Suvla and those at Anzac did not meet up. The division was to wedge itself between these two forces and occupy the Damakjelik Bair and Bauchop’s Hill. They launched their attack from the Asma Dere, attacking the three battalions defending this line of approach – the British 4th South Wales Borderers on Damakjelik close to the beach, with the Australian 13th Battalion and the British 6th King’s Own Royal Lancaster further along the bair.17 At 5.40  am the 6th King’s Own reported that a large number of 29 9

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Turks were attacking along their whole line, while the Australians located between the two British battalions also reported their line under heavy attack. The South Wales Borderers too were attacked but they drove off the Turks with a successful counter-attack by three of their platoons. By now the attack against the Australians had also been driven back. The Turks now focused on pouring machine-gun enfilade against the 6th King’s Own from Alai Tepe and Hill 100. The British battalion called for artillery support but there was confusion, as the artillery officers believed that Hill 100 was still in their possession. By early afternoon the concentrated Turkish machine-gun and rifle fire had broken the back of the 6th King’s Own, which had suffered heavy casualties. The battalion was withdrawn and replaced with the already battered Australian 14th Battalion. The Turkish commanders believed that they had pushed back the northern Anzac flank, as their troops now occupied the northern slopes of Hill 60 and the area between Anzac and the Suvla perimeters was empty of enemy troops. The bulk of this area, however, had never been occupied by either the British or the Australians.18

The Turkish attack against Chunuk Bair was now under the command of Ali Riza Pasha, commander of the 8th Division, who was himself under the command of Mustafa Kemal. The first Turkish attack that morning was carried out by bombing parties, but the defenders stubbornly fought on. The Turks along either flank had to expose themselves to throw their grenades and they were shot down, while others made suicidal charges against the entrenched New Zealanders, throwing their bombs – they too were cut down. Soon the Turks adopted a new approach: placing their bombs in socks and, with a skirmish line in front, they would charge down the slope and, as the riflemen dropped to offer covering fire, they would sling their bombs against the enemy trenches. Like all previous attempts, the Turkish attackers were shot down. Added to this, the Anzac artillery batteries were laying down heavy fire against the rear slopes of 300

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Chunuk Bair, causing heavy casualties. Nevertheless, the New Zealanders were feeling the pressure as casualties begun to mount among their small garrison. In order to make room for the wounded, officers and men took up positions behind the trench, firing over the parados, with many of these men themselves being killed or wounded as a result.19 By mid-morning at least half of the New Zealanders defending their position on the upper slopes of Chunuk Bair had become casualties. Lieutenant Colonel Meldrum had twice sent back a message to Johnston’s headquarters asking for reinforcements. No word had come back, but at about 10 o’clock he and others saw a movement of troops along the slopes below. The word was soon sent along the line that reinforcements were on the way and at midday about fifty men of the 6th Loyal North Lancashire, who had been occupying the Apex, were led by a major up to Meldrum and his men. The vast majority of the major’s company, however, had been killed or wounded in the attempt. The reinforcements, however, were a great relief to the New Zealanders and, while they were few in number, they at least confirmed that they were not completely isolated. The Turks continued to conduct small-scale bombing attacks against the defenders; but they appeared to have lost heart, while the defenders were gaining confidence as they fought off the attacks. Meldrum now felt that he could hold the line until dusk – unless they were heavily attacked. Trooper Harry Browne later recorded in his diary: We were standing on our own mates but they wouldn’t mind and we were too exhausted to lift them out … If only Abdul had known how few were left in that gap, but there, he didn’t and possibly he was as exhausted as ourselves … in the little neighbouring trench over which no Turk had come alive, the only sign of life among the many there was the stump of an arm which now and then waved feebly for help and a voice which called ‘New Zealand’ to four listeners, who could give or get aid to him. On

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the parapet above lay a hand. That hand had been throwing back Turkish bombs.20

Back at the brigade and divisional headquarters plans were quickly being drafted to replace the defenders at Chunuk Bair as well as the Auckland Infantry Battalion that had been holding the advanced support-line at the Pinnacle. Shaw was informed by Meldrum that two battalions would be required to hold Chunuk Bair once they were relieved, more than double his own strength. The two battalions that could best fulfil this role were the remainder of the 6th Loyal North Lancashire – still at the Apex – and the 6th Leinster, which had earlier left Rhododendron Ridge and had been marched up the Chailak Dere. Shaw, however, had been ordered by Godley that he was to avoid, if possible, using their only fresh reserve and so the 5th Wiltshire, part of Baldwin’s column, was drafted as the second relieving battalion for Chunuk Bair.21

Sometime late on 9 August Private Gordon, this time accompanied by Private Tavender, again ventured out into the darkness of no-man’s-land to The Farm to retrieve the electric light that he had placed there the night before. As it was battery generated it had to be brought back so that the battery could be replaced. After this was accomplished, they both ventured back to the darkness to place the lamp at The Farm to assist the navy in targeting the Turkish positions.22

The relief of the New Zealanders was to begin immediately after dusk – 8  o’clock. At this hour Colonel Johnston, on hearing that the Wiltshire could not come up until at least 1 am, asked for the 6th Leinster, which was already close by, to be sent up to support the 6th Loyal North

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Lancashire instead. Permission was denied and the 6th Loyal under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Levinge was sent up alone. In itself, most had no concerns as the 6th Loyal was still relatively fresh and was stronger in number than Meldrum’s force had been when it occupied the slopes the previous morning. Also, the Wiltshire was expected to be in position alongside the 6th Loyal well before dawn. With darkness, water, ammunition, entrenching tools and medical officers accompanied by stretcher-bearers were sent up to Chunuk Bair. New Zealand officer Captain Baigent recalled that some of his men, who had been in the thick of the fighting, were now called on to help bring down the wounded from Chunuk Bair who had by now been moved to the Apex: ‘some of these stout fellows are tasting the full bitterness of war in carrying their mangled comrades back to the beach. Lieut. Col. Begg at 11 pm asked for 100 of these men to carry 50 stretchers to the Apex; the party was immediately dispatched.’23 Before leaving the summit, Meldrum briefed the British commander about information gained by a New Zealand patrol led by Lieutenant Cuthill of the Otago Infantry Battalion that had just returned. Cuthill confirmed that the Turks were massing for an attack just behind the summit. Meldrum emphasised that the British troops should dig in and prepare for a mass attack.24 Added to this, Lieutenant Bishop also provided the British commanding officer with some advice as the British soldiers began to settle down for a sleep: ‘You are making a great mistake.’ They piled arms and men laid down to go to sleep. I said ‘You have got to dig, the only chance to save your lives is to dig.’ He said, ‘No, my men are too tired.’ Well, I said ‘We have been fighting for several days now and we can hardly move and you are making a big mistake.’ So he said ‘I know what I am doing, I am commanding this battalion.’ Well, I said ‘You will be wiped out in the morning’ and as I turned round I said, ‘You are not fit to command pigs, let alone men, if that is

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the way you are going to treat them’, and with that I went back to Brigade Headquarters.25

By 11 o’clock all the New Zealanders had been evacuated from the slopes of Chunuk Bair and the Pinnacle. It appears the sound advice gained by experience was ignored and most of the British troops, rather than digging in, went to sleep.26

Meanwhile, Allanson and his men had lain below the saddle just north of the New Zealanders and British. He later recalled: ‘I was now left … much crippled by the pain of my [bayonet] wound, which was now stiffening, and loss of blood. I saw the advance at Suvla Bay had failed … I now dropped into the trenches of the night before …’.27 The battalion medical officer of the 6th Gurkhas, Major Selby Phipson, soon found himself the only officer of the regiment left unwounded or killed and Allanson was forced to pass command of his men over to him as he needed to get medical attention. Phipson recalled: “Well Phippy, there’s no-one left to hand over to but you [said Allanson]. Do all you can to help Gambirsing Pun (the Sergeant Major), he’ll never let you down.” … Left to myself and feeling rather lonely, I started to take stock of the situation. My first thought, oddly enough, was that I must cease to claim the protection (if any) of the Geneva Convention, and so I removed my Red Cross brassard, and put it in my haversack. I might, I thought, have to deal with combatant officers of other units, and although I held no combat commission myself, I thought it was, perhaps, just as well to look as if I did … The night of August 9/10 was harassed by constant sniping apparently from our flanks, and desultory rifle fire along the whole of our diminished front, but the Turks never approached nearer than 20–30 yards. I borrowed a rifle and took my place in the firing line and dealt

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with a Turk who had wriggled up unnoticed to about 15 yards from our line.28

Allanson, on returning to ‘Old Anzac’ for medical attention, later recalled: ‘The nullahs on the journey back were too horrible, full of dead and dying, Maoris, Australians, Sikhs, Gurkhas and British soldiers, blood and bloody clothes, and the smell of the dead now some two days old … I left that battlefield a changed man; all my ambitions to be a successful soldier have gone; knowing all I now know, I feel the responsibility, the murderous responsibility, that rests on the shoulders of an inefficient soldier or one who has passed his prime to command.’29 The casualties that the New Zealanders had suffered in their brave and stubborn defence along the upper slopes of Chunuk Bair were truly appalling. The Otago Infantry Battalion had lost 17 officers and 309 men. The Wellington Mounted Rifles, which had gone into the fight with 183 men, now came out with 73, with many of them wounded. The Auckland Infantry Battalion who had defended the Pinnacle lost 12 officers and 308 men. At the start of the August offensive just four days before, the New Zealand Infantry and Mounted Rifle Brigades had gone into the fight with around 3000 and 1550 men respectively – now they were down to 1700 and 960, again many of them suffering wounds of varying degrees.30

Earlier, as darkness set in, Mustafa Kemal arrived at Chunuk Bair to see how the battle for the summit was progressing. Ali Riza was as anxious as Kemal was confident. Reconnaissance of the enemy positions along the seaward slopes of the hill was impossible and he had no real idea of where the enemy was entrenched or how many occupied the upper slopes. He had, however, already decided that the situation was becoming too grave and that the summit had to be retaken without delay. Kemal took over command of the battle for Chunuk Bair and collected as many men

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as possible. He would launch a massive assault consisting of multiple waves of troops over the ridges to attack the enemy defenders. The attack was to be launched at dawn using the bayonet only; this would force them to push on and sweep away the enemy from the heights, without getting bogged down in a fire fight.31

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21 ‘For most conspi c u o u s b rave r y at Lone Pin e t re n ch e s ’

Just behind the Pimple, Lance Corporal Lawrence awoke and recorded in his diary: ‘Another glorious day. The smell is getting very strong now. Ugh! it’s simply awful; seems to hang to everything, strong and sickly.’1 As dawn broke over Lone Pine, Turkish troops were seen at several posts to be advancing from The Cup in preparation for a major assault. The Turkish front line appeared to be full of troops, so much so that numbers of the enemy took up positions behind the parados of their trenches. As stated in the 3rd Battalion Diary: ‘About 4 am the anticipated attack developed and the enemy attack showed great determination.’2 On the fourth and final day’s struggle for the possession of Lone Pine, the Australian 4th Battalion still held the northern flank, the 3rd Battalion the centre, and the southern flank was held by the 7th Battalion. This latter sector was by far the largest and Lieutenant Colonel Elliott maintained three commands, one under each of Lieutenants Symons, Tubb and West. To help further defend West’s almost totally isolated position at Jacobs’s Trench, a supporting post had been established within a sap that ran just north and parallel with Jacobs’s Trench. This post had been cut into the southern wall of the trench and was on a slightly higher elevation, allowing some covering fire to be brought to bear in support of 307

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the southernmost position held by the Australians just 20 metres away. This would turn out to be a tragic mistake for all concerned. Turkish machine-gun and rifle fire in front, as well as from Johnston’s Jolly, began sweeping the Australian positions along the Pine. Corporal Richard Gardiner of the 7th Battalion recalled: We went into the firing line and were filling sandbags and fixing up loopholes, also standing to at intervals just before dawn, when old Abdul started to make it very unhealthy for us, by showering bombs on us by the dozen, of course that settled the sandbagging as far as we were concerned. I devoted my time to keeping the men on their posts and keeping their ammunition up. Alf [Dick’s brother] got up on a post when a chap got shot early in the fight and saw no more of him [Alf], as I was busy with a blanket and overcoat smothering bombs as they fell into the trench (an overcoat keeps the explosion down). This went on for an hour or two, chaps getting outed all the time and the bombs falling thicker.3

Trench periscopes were shot out of the hands and those resting against the trench wall with exposed rifles and bayonets beyond the parapet found them broken or bent from the hail of fire. The sandbag parapets themselves were split open, contents pouring into the trench, and every available man was used to help fill and replace them and repair the parapet where possible. Now lines of Turks dashed from their trenches and in other cases they scrambled over the barricades that separated Australian from Turk. The northernmost part of the assault fell on Sasse’s Sap, at the junction between the 3rd and 4th Battalions, while the southernmost fell on Jacobs’s Trench and the men of the 7th Battalion. At first the Turks were able to bomb the men out of Sasse’s Sap, but within minutes a counter-attack using jam-tin bombs recaptured the position. Another attack was soon launched, with Turks storming over the four-foot-high barricade that separated the sap from their own posi-

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tion – again the Turks forced their way in, pushing their way into the very heart of Lone Pine, close to the headquarters of the 1st Brigade located near the entrance to B5 Tunnel and the 3rd Battalion headquarters close by.4 Lieutenant Howell-Price, adjutant to the 3rd Battalion, now saw a stream of Turks heading straight for their headquarters. He turned to Lieutenant Wren, Sergeant Adams and Privates Ward, Perkins, Jenkins and Hamilton and ordered them to man the parapet and fire on the attackers. He himself moved into Sasse’s Sap, quickly followed by Brigadier General Smyth (who had won the Victoria Cross fighting the Dervishes in Kitchener’s conquest of the Sudan), Major McConaghy and one of the brigade staff. They fired almost at point-blank range into the Turks. One Turk fired at Howell-Price and somehow missed, while another who had a lit grenade was shot by Ward – the Turk dropped the bomb which exploded, killing a number of his comrades. Other Australians had now crawled out into no-man’s-land and, overlooking Sasse’s Sap, began to fire into the crowded sap. During the attack, 19-year-old John Hamilton, who was part of Lieutenant Wren’s party, coolly got up above the parapet and shot down the Turkish bombers as they attempted to bomb the Australians from Sasse’s Sap. He remained in no-man’s-land for about six hours, taking cover behind a couple of sandbags, At the high point in the attack he yelled instructions to an officer who was throwing jam-tin bombs at the Turks in the rear. Eventually the Turks were driven out of the sap. The attack along this part of the line now stalled. For his actions Hamilton was awarded the Victoria Cross.5 His citation read: For most conspicuous bravery on 9 August 1915, in the Gallipoli Peninsula. During a heavy bombing attack by the enemy on the newly captured position at Lone Pine, Private Hamilton, with utter disregard of personal safety, exposed himself under heavy fire on the parados, in order to secure a better fire position against the enemy’s bomb-throwers. His coolness and daring example had

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an immediate effect. The defence was encouraged, and the enemy driven off with heavy loss.6

Just south, along Woods’s Post, Lieutenant Edwards (of Symons’s company) managed to shoot down at least eight Turks and, while standing clear of the parapet, continued to fire into the attacking Turks until he was killed. Symons himself was fighting for his life along with his men at Goldenstedt’s Post, further south. Here Symons temporarily managed to stop the onslaught by throwing Lotbiniere bombs (made from slabs of guncotton tied to a small board shaped like a hairbrush). At this point Elliott ordered Symons out of the post, to help defend Jacobs’s Post. Symons was replaced by Lieutenant Tubb, who until then had been at Tubb’s Corner. Tubb was now responsible for defending Symons’s Post at the barricaded entrance of Goldenstedt’s Trench.

Tubb’s Corner, Lone Pine – 9 August (From Bean, 1938)

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Tubb had ten men defending the position: eight men were on the parapet and barricade pouring fire into the attacking Turks while Corporals Webb and Wright were running along the trench floor trying to catch and throw back Turkish grenades that were being thrown into the position from all directions. If they couldn’t catch them, they threw Turkish greatcoats and sandbags on top of them to help smother the explosion. Turks screaming ‘Allah! Allah!’ came charging towards their barricade, charging along the other side of Goldenstedt’s Trench, but they were cut down by fire from Tubb and his men. Tubb stood exposed behind the barricade, firing his revolver into the mass of Turks who tried to charge the position as well as those attempting to cross no-man’s-land. Soon his men were doing the same. ‘Good boy!’ he shouted at one of his men who stood beside him above the parapet, firing into the Turks as they charged or tried to take shelter. The same soldier later stated: ‘With him up there you couldn’t think of getting your head down.’7 Those throwing back grenades were mutilated one by one in the process. Just as Wright caught one it exploded in his face, killing him instantly. His mate Webb soon had both of his hands blown off and, while he managed to walk out of the Pine, he died of his wounds shortly after at Brown’s Dip. Wright was later mentioned in dispatches, while Webb was awarded the DCM (Distinguished Conduct Medal).8 Lieutenant Colonel Elliott wrote to Wright’s sister in 1916: ‘I recommended all these boys for the VC – Tubb, Dunstan and Burton got theirs and Webb the Distinguished Service Medal. No doubt, had your brother lived, he would have got the DCM if not the VC. There are so many brave deeds that it is almost impossible to receive recognition for them … Why they didn’t give anything to your brother I cannot say … Capt Tubb [a later promotion] could not speak too highly for the splendid work your brother did for him.’9 At one point, several grenades exploded simultaneously, killing or wounding four men; a fifth was blown down off the parapet with his rifle smashed. Tubb, who was now bleeding from previous grenade wounds 311

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to his arms and head, continued to fight until only two of his men were left, Corporals Dunstan and Burton. It was then that a large explosion shattered the barricade blocking the entrance to the post; the men were thrown back and parts of the parapet collapsed into the trench. Tubb immediately regained his feet and drove the Turks out while Dunstan and Burton rebuilt the barricade. A bomb fell between them, killing Burton and temporarily blinding Dunstan. Tubb obtained additional men from the next post (Tubb’s Corner) but by now the enemy had had enough and the attack petered out. They continued to bomb and fire their rifles, but they no longer tried to charge the position. As a result of their actions Tubb, Burton and Dunstan were each awarded the Victoria Cross.10 The citation for Tubb stated: For most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty at Lone Pine trenches in the Gallipoli Peninsula, on 9 August 1915. In the early morning the enemy made a determined counter-attack on the centre of the newly captured trench held by Lieutenant Tubb. They advanced up a sap and blew in a sandbag barricade, leaving only one foot of it standing, but Lieutenant Tubb led his men back, repulsed the enemy, and rebuilt the barricade. Supported by strong bombing parties the enemy succeeded in twice blowing in the trenches, but on each occasion Lieutenant Tubb, although wounded in the head and arm, held his ground with the greatest coolness and rebuilt it, finally succeeding in maintaining his position under very heavy bomb fire.11

The citation for Burton and Dunstan stated: For most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty at Lone Pine trenches in the Gallipoli Peninsula, on 9 August 1915. In the early morning the enemy made a determined counter-attack on the centre of the newly captured trench held by Lieutenant Tubb, Corporals Burton and Dunstan, and a few men. They advanced up a sap and blew in a sandbag barricade, leaving only one foot of it

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standing, but Lieutenant Tubb, with the two corporals, repulsed the enemy and rebuilt the barricade, although Lieutenant Tubb was wounded in the head and arm and Corporal Burton was killed by a bomb while most gallantly building up the parapet under a hail of bombs.12

The struggle to defend Jacobs’s Trench was just as fierce. The newly constructed fire step that was to help defend that position was a tragic failure. No sooner was it manned when Turkish enfilade from behind at Johnston’s Jolly killed all those holding the position. Elliott recalled: In one place a line of dead men with their bayonets still over the parapet held about 20 or 30 yards of trench. In the early morning a machine gun swept that part of the line and killed every man at that spot – the trench slopes forward and as they died, each man so suddenly, that he simply leaned forward on the parapet and in many cases their hats and bayonets could be seen standing steadily behind the parapet and curiously enough that part of the line was avoided by the enemy. I had supports in the rear ready to rush anyone who came in there but I did not replace the men owing to the fact that the trench was shallow and exposed to fire from the left rear of the position while the Turks still had a position with machine guns and these men were all shot through the back of the head but apparently the Turks in front of these did not know this nor that they were dead.13

Jacobs’s Trench was again isolated and vulnerable. Lieutenant West, who was commanding the trench, was soon wounded and Private Tim Shadbolt found himself alone, holding the position until Lieutenant Young and a few others were sent in by Elliott. For a time the Turks were kept back, but it wasn’t long before all of these men were either killed or wounded from Turkish grenades, Private Shadbolt losing an eye. Lieutenant Young, the battalion’s marksman, wrote of Tim Shadbolt’s gallantry, which went unrecognised by authorities: 313

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Jacobs’s Trench, Lone Pine – 9 August (From Bean, 1938)

One of the bravest of the many brave men in our battalion. On August 9 at Lone Pine, when the Turks made so desperate an attempt to dislodge us from our trenches that had been captured by the 1st Brigade the previous Friday (6 [August]), Tim showed such bravery as should have gained him the VC. About 4.30 on that unforgettable morning the enemy launched his furious counter-attack, killing and wounding most of the men in that part of the trench. Those of our fellows still unscathed (and George Holland was conspicuous in that gallant band) held and fought on magnificently until at last the Turks, too strong in numbers and weapons, forced a withdrawal. I was round with [Lt] Colonel Elliott at the time, and he immediately sent me off with six men to try and recapture the post. When we got there, we found one

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man standing holding out on his own, and that man was Tim Shadbolt. But for him, the trench must have fallen, and goodness knows what would have happened [to] my small party then. As it was, we were able to hang on against heavy bombing – with no bombs of our own with which to reply – until in the end we were all casualties, Tim losing an eye.14

Young wrote to his brother: ‘My God, it was awful … they bombed us till there were only two of us left. Then my mate got one right in the face. I held on … shooting four of them with my revolver. I got hit with a bomb, a couple of bits in my elbow, some hits on the forehead, three flesh wounds on my leg, and two in [the] right arm.’15 Earlier, Lone Pine had been reinforced with men from the 12th Battalion as the Turkish attacks intensified up and down the line. Now a platoon from the 12th, under the command of Lieutenant Woodhouse, was rushed from the northern part of the Pine to Jacobs’s Trench. Before arriving, however, Woodhouse was killed. By now the Turks had entered parts of Jacobs’s Trench. Elliott sent his own adjutant, Lieutenant Bastin, along with Sergeant Major Smith, to lead these men into the fight to retake the position, which they duly did. Bastin was wounded in the attack, as recorded by Elliott: ‘My Adjutant had his arm shattered by a bullet after a hand fight with a Turk who jumped into the trench and tried to bayonet him but whom he shot with his revolver in the stomach. As he fell, his friends threw a bomb over which burst and blew [the Turk’s] head to pieces and so saved further trouble.’16 It was not long before Elliott was informed that the Turks had recaptured the trench. Elliott, handing his own revolver over to Lieutenant Symons, now ordered him to retake Jacobs’s Trench. Elliott turned to the young officer: ‘I don’t expect to see you again, but we must not lose that post.’17 Symons drove the Turks out of Jacobs’s Trench, shooting two of them with the revolver; he and his men then rebuilt the barricade. The Turks attacked again from three sides – the post couldn’t be held. Symons asked permission to evacuate this part of the line while he 315

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still had time, Elliott ordered them out. With this they withdrew to the Second Post, just underneath the overhead cover, leaving 15 metres of open trench to the Turks. The enemy continued their attack; time after time Symons led his men out to drive them back. At one point the Turks were able to set fire to the pine log covers – again Symons drove the Turks out and managed with his men to put out the fire. When Harold Schuldt brought up a bag of jam-tin bombs, he found Symons, together with two other men, still holding the position and keeping the enemy at bay.18 Attempts by the Turks to surround their position were beaten back with supporting fire from the Pimple and positions close by within the Pine itself – Jacobs’s Trench remained in Australian hands. For his leadership during the battle Symons was awarded the Victoria Cross. His citation stated: For most conspicuous bravery on the night of August 8–9 1915, at Lone Pine trenches in the Gallipoli Peninsula. He was in command of the right section of the newly captured trenches held by his battalion, and repelled several counter-attacks with great coolness. At about 5.00 am on 9 August a series of determined attacks were made by the enemy on an isolated sap, and six officers were in succession killed or severely wounded; a portion of the sap was lost. Lieutenant Symons then led a charge and retook the lost sap, shooting two Turks with his revolver. The sap was under hostile fire from three sides, and Lieutenant Symons withdrew some 15 yards to a spot where some overhead cover could be obtained and in the face of heavy fire built up a sand [bag?] barricade. The enemy succeeded in setting fire to the fascines and woodwork of the head cover, but Lieutenant Symons extinguished the fire and rebuilt the barricade. His coolness and determination finally compelled the enemy to discontinue the attacks.19

At around 6 am, Major General Walker went forward to Lone Pine. At 6.30 the 4th Battalion reported that the Turkish attack had failed in their

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part of the line. Soon after word reached him that the southern flank was holding its own. Walker now ordered up the 1st Battalion, with the aim of counter-attacking, but any chance of doing so quickly evaporated in the reality of the chaos that enveloped Lone Pine. At about 8.30 am, the 1st Battalion was brought back into Lone Pine to help consolidate and to relieve the 3rd Battalion.20 Private John Gammage of the 1st Battalion wrote in his diary: ‘I got one most daring Turk from 12 yards off who was throwing bombs … We felt like wild beasts but were calm and never fired reckless but deliberate … Bombs all day. Our bomb throwers nearly all dead or wounded … 11 am nearly blinded but men are scarce so I must not throw the towel in. Only scratches from gravel and dirt thrown up by bombs. This was an awful place.’21 Around midday the Turks launched another attack and managed to again capture part of Sasse’s Sap. Captain Sasse was determined to clear his position. Taking a rifle, he arranged for three men to carry sandbags, with others following closely behind. They soon came across the Turks who were busy fighting back an attack from another direction. Sasse shot down more than a dozen by firing behind the sandbags that his men had thrown down for cover. A barricade was quickly built. Scribbled in the 1st Battalion Diary for that day is the comment: ‘Captain Sasse cleared enemy who attacked S-W angle by communication trench. Captain Sasse surrounded and killed 20.’22 Soon Sasse decided to go one further and, with Captain Shout and about eight men (carrying sandbags and jam-tin bombs) they broke down the previous barricade and advanced down the rest of the trench, the two officers running abreast with Shout throwing bombs and Sasse shooting. Yells and the scuffle of arms and accoutrements round the next bend informed them of the effect upon the enemy. They advanced in this manner for several short stages, rebuilding a barricade at the end of each, and had just sighted a suitable point for the final barrier when Shout, who was fighting with a splendid gaiety, lit

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three bombs at once as a prelude to making the final dash. The third burst in his hand, destroying it and shattering one side of his face and body. Carried to the rear, still cheerful, he sat up and drank a pannikin of tea, vowing that he would soon recover; but his brave life ended on the hospital ship.23

Captain Shout was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for his actions. Lance Corporal Alex McQueen later wrote that ‘Captain Shout said to me before we went over at Lone Pine: “We’ll make a name for ourselves tonight Mac.” Well I was outed in the early part of the night, but he made a name for himself alright. He was lieutenant when going in to the charge, made a captain next day, gained the VC the next, and the following eternity.’24 Captain Shout’s citation for the VC states: For most conspicuous bravery at Lone Pine trenches in the Gallipoli Peninsula. On the morning of 9 August 1915, with a very small party, Captain Shout charged down the trenches strongly occupied by the enemy, and personally threw four bombs among them, killing eight and routing the remainder. In the afternoon of the same day, from a position gained in the morning, he captured a further length of trench under similar conditions, and continued personally to bomb the enemy at close range, under very heavy fire, until he was severely wounded, losing his right hand and left eye. This most gallant officer has since succumbed to his injuries.25

Fighting occurred all day for Sasse’s Sap but it was never fully recaptured. Private Gammage must have been close by and wrote: ’12 am hit again and put out of action. It is not sore [leg wound] but bled freely. My rifle was blown to splinters … Since Friday food was turned off. All I had was taken from dead comrades’ haversacks but it’s all for a good cause. Didn’t my comrades envy me being carried out with only a flesh wound. Today I left some of the best men ever God put breath in.’26 Private de Vine of the 4th Battalion also commented about the lack of food: ‘Rum and tea

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is served out pretty freely which is practically all the nourishment we have received for the last three days.’27 After this attack, the 4th Battalion was relieved by the men of the 2nd Battalion along with a squadron of the 7th Light Horse.28 Reverend Talbot, a chaplain with the 1st Brigade, recalled: ‘I shall never forget as long as I live, seeing the 4th Battalion coming out of the trenches. The men looked like a thin line of spectres. One officer who knew me well stared at me with glassy eyes.’ Another officer wrote: ‘The battalion was decimated beyond recognition – a mere handful of men.’29 Private de Vine was among the survivors: ‘this was the tightest corner that I have ever been in. Marvellous how I managed to get out without a scratch.’30 At about the same time the 5th Battalion began to relieve the truly bloodied 7th Battalion. A bomb thrower from the 5th Battalion who was sent to the Pine commented: ‘… the first person I seen [sic] was Pompey Elliott [Lieutenant Colonel Elliott] … You could say anything to him in the line, but not a word out … I said to him “Where’s this great 7th Battalion?” … He said “You’ll find them lad, they’re in there, you’ll find them as you go in.” They were in there all right, there was nobody alive. They’d blown the end of the trench down and enfiladed them. Dead Australians, all 7th Battalion.’31 Elliott himself scratched in the Battalion Diary: ‘5  pm. Back in bivouac at Phillips Top. Men and officers who survived are utterly exhausted.’32 The 5th Battalion Diary merely stated: ‘… trenches are [in a] bad state as dead men all over the place and beginning to decompose. Enemy bombing heavily all night.’33 Bombing continued throughout the afternoon and night, as ever the southern part of the position was the focus of Turkish attempts to drive the Australians out of the Pine. Captain Hooper of the 5th Battalion was killed in similar circumstances to that of Captain Shout, as he too attempted to bomb Turks out of stubbornly held positions. Trooper Idriess of the 5th Light Horse later arrived and wrote in his diary: ‘The stench is something awful, dead men, Turks and Australians, lying buried and half-buried in and about the trenches. The flies are thick and trouble319

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some. No wonder they can only keep men in here for a 48-hour shift. The first Turkish sap is 15 feet from us, we can see right into the top of it. But they cannot hold it, nor can we. But they slink up it during the night and sling bombs into our trench.’34 Lieutenant Colonel Elliott wrote to a close friend after the events of Lone Pine that the ongoing attacks by the Turks throughout were: sufficient to prevent us attending properly to the wounded and from removing the dead. The weather was hot and the flies pestilential. When anyone speaks to you of the glory of war picture to yourself a narrow line of trenches two and sometimes three deep with bodies and think too of your best friends – for that is what these boys become by long association with you – mangled and torn beyond description by the bombs and bloated and blackened by decay and crawling with maggots. Live amongst this for days in spite of taking advantage of every night to work with respirators endeavouring to remove them – this is war and such is glory – whatever the novelists may say.35

As ever, the stretcher-bearers were risking life and limb in their brave efforts to get the wounded out of Lone Pine. Private Robert Bates of the 7th Battalion Medical Section was later awarded the Military Medal for his efforts during the battle. The stretcher-bearers: were kept busy evacuating the wounded and Pte Bates had in consequence to do practically the whole work bringing the wounded under cover from the firing line and rendering first aid. He carried out his work repeatedly and fearlessly under heavy bombing. During the enemy’s counter-attack on the morning of 9 August, Pte Bates continued the same work while the attack lasted. His first-aid work was also of a very high order.36

A year later in France at Pozieres he would be awarded a bar to his Military Medal.

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With the fall of night on 9  August the Turkish attempts to retake Lone Pine ended. Orders were given that all attacks were to be called off and the men were to focus on consolidating their position on the easternmost parts of the plateau. The real danger lay to the north. Zeki Bey and his men of the 1/57th Regiment who had been fighting at Lone Pine for the last four days without rest were finally ordered to withdraw from the

Solid lines represent captured trenches and those eventually dug by Australians at Lone Pine on and after 10 August. Trenches to the left lead back to the original Australian front lines at the Pimple.

Australian positions, Lone Pine – 10 August (Adapted from Bean, 1938, Map 14)

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plateau. They were to take up a bivouac position behind Mortar Ridge, where they had originally bivouacked on the afternoon of 6 August after having manned German Officers’ Trench for over a month without break – just before the opening of the offensive.37 Within 48 hours the men of the 7th Battalion were back in the trenches at Lone Pine. Elliott wrote to his wife Kate: ‘The dead still lay and putrefied where they had fallen, and the first thing I did was to dig huge pits in the bottom of the trenches and simply stack them in as they were. The poor fellows engaged in this awful work had to be fortified with liberal doses of rum to keep them going. It was splendid how they worked too. The sight and smell often made them retch and vomit but they kept on, and now the trenches are habitable and getting nearly as strong as our original position.’38 Behind the Pimple, Lance Corporal Lawrence wrote in his diary that ‘the boys are still holding what they have gained, but at an awful cost … they have simply been cut to pieces by bombs. There is just one continuous stream of wounded down from the trenches, most flesh wounds caused by bombs. Awful sights, nearly all soaked in blood, perhaps half a leg blown away, a hand or jaw missing and yet one just looks and forgets all about it. The hospital ships only stay here about a couple of hours now, whereas before this a week or a fortnight passed before they moved off.’39

The 1st Australian Division’s battle for Lone Pine resulted in 2277 Australian casualties. Most were the result of hand-to-hand fighting, including grenades, bayonets and small-arms fire. Unlike most battles of the First World War, few casualties were from artillery fire. The Turks lost more men, with the 16th Turkish Division’s casualties estimated at just under 7000; around 5000 were believed to be directly associated with the fighting at Lone Pine. Clearly the attack kept a large number of Turkish troops pinned down along the southern flank for a number of 322

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days, but the attack had no real negative impact on the distribution of troops along the northern heights, which were already largely vacated. Indeed, this demonstration against Lone Pine pushed more troops into the Anzac sector from the south, many of whom then became free to reinforce the northern heights at the most critical time.

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PART 6

10 AUGUST 1915

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22 ‘He’ ll never l e t yo u d o w n’

Just before midnight, Chunuk Bair was entirely in the hands of the men of the 6th Loyal North Lancashire. Birdwood and Godley had come to the realisation that it would be impossible to launch an offensive to take the summit and surrounding ridges. The British manning the upper seaward slopes of Chunuk Bair had orders to dig in and consolidate. At this point the 6th Loyal North Lancashire had to hold both Chunuk Bair and the Pinnacle. The 6th Leinster held the Apex. During the previous nights the Auckland infantry had been extending a trench from the Apex up towards the Pinnacle. By now the trench had finally reached the Pinnacle, although it was still only about a metre deep and relatively narrow. Another trench, half completed, had been started from the left of the Pinnacle down the steep slope of the Aghyl Dere to where the men of the 10th Hampshire were positioned, just below the southern slopes of The Farm – the Pinnacle was becoming incorporated into the extended Anzac perimeter.1 Sometime after 2 o’clock about two-and-a-half companies of the Wiltshires reached the Apex; from there they were guided by Privates Tavender and Gordon (who had earlier placed the lanterns at The Farm) up to Chunuk Bair. Lieutenant Colonel Cardine of the Wiltshires met Lieutenant Colonel Levinge of the 6th Loyal North Lancashires and 326

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they reviewed the situation. Both officers agreed that the Wiltshires should not try and occupy the crowded trench but should take up a position to the rear at the spoon-shaped hollow at the head of Sazli Beit Dere, that had days before been used by the wounded troops who had occupied Chunuk Bair. The Wiltshires took up position, being told that they would be sheltered from Turkish fire in the depression. Now they waited for the remainder of the battalion to arrive. At dawn they would be forced to hurriedly attempt to entrench as Turkish rifle fire began to inflict casualties.2 Just behind the summit, Mustafa Kemal, who had arrived from the Suvla Bay sector, was busily preparing a mass attack designed to sweep the enemy once and for all off the heights. Men of the 24th Regiment were manning the frontline trenches on the summit and just behind them were the men of the 10th and 23rd Regiments (8th Division). Scattered among these regiments were the survivors of the 9th Division, which had largely disintegrated over the last few days. Not far to their right were also men from the 4th Division, most located along Abdel Rahman Bair and around Hill 971. Of these regiments only the 23rd was in good order and relatively fresh. Not long before the attack, another relatively fresh regiment – the 28th – arrived from the Cape Helles sector. Kemal decided to use both the 23rd and 28th Regiments to spearhead the attack to recapture Chunuk Bair. When Kemal explained his plan for an all-out attack against the summit, the chief of staff of the 8th Division, Galip Bey, responded: ‘We have been attacking for two days but all the attacks have been futile and there may be another disaster.’3 Kemal insisted that the attack would go ahead regardless. The 23rd Regiment was positioned on the right (north), while the 28th was placed on the left (south) – each just below the landward side of the summit. Sometime after 3 am a screen of Turkish bombing parties began to advance over the summit as well as over the saddle just north of it, which connected Chunuk Bair to Hill Q. The British troops along the upper slopes just beyond The Farm, along with the Gurkhas and British further 327

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north (under the former command of Major Allanson), found themselves under a bombardment of Turkish grenades and rifle fire. During the early hours, General Cox had brought forward some of Colonel Cayley’s men from the 39th Brigade to assist Allanson’s men. From right to left were two companies of the 9th Royal Warwickshire, the survivors of the 6th Gurkhas and the 6th South Lancashire and, covering the left flank, the 9th Worcestershire. During the bombing, the left flank withdrew, exposing the flank of the 6th South Lancashire, which was forced itself to partially retire. The main Turkish infantry attacking force, however, was waiting for first light just behind the summit and ridgeline. Just as dawn was breaking, Turkish artillery fire began to smash into the upper seaward slopes of the heights occupied by the British and Gurkhas. Mustafa Kemal recalled: It was early in the morning, on the tenth of August, the dawn was about to break … and I could see all the men. The time was 4.30 am. I was worried about my men waiting in thick infantry lines. If the enemy opened fire on these thick lines, it would be disaster. I immediately ran to the front to greet and inspect the men and said ‘soldiers! I am sure that you will defeat the enemy, you do not hurry, let me go first, when you see my whip go up, you all go together’. Then they walked with the commanding officers. All the men were in attack position, one step forward, rifles with fixed bayonets, officers with revolvers or swords in hand, turned in for my signal as a single heart [forgetting] everything but the signal with the utmost care.4

The 6th Loyal North Lancashire troops occupying the frontline trench on Chunuk Bair were firing at the Turkish bombing parties as first light approached when a mass of Turks swept over the summit, all charging with the bayonet, behind them another line, and another behind that – in all over 22 lines, each consisting of around 300 Turks, poured over the summit and down towards the British troops. The Turks of the 24th

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Turkish counter-attack, Chunuk Bair – 10 August (From Bean, 1938)

Regiment who had been manning the front lines joined in on the charge. More Turks could be seen originating from Battleship Hill just south of their position, while to their left hoards of Turks were pouring over the saddle, charging down the slopes to The Farm, while other Turks charged against Allanson’s former command just north of The Farm. Leading the attack, Mustafa Kemal was hit in the chest, smashing a watch in his pocket, saving his life and leaving him only slightly injured.5 Few survived the avalanche of the Turkish attack. The New Zealanders below heard a tremendous outburst of British rifle fire. The British, completely surprised (even though the New Zealanders had warned them), scrambled back from the summit down the slopes towards the Pinnacle and the Apex – few survived. The Turks were following closely behind and flooded over the top of the defenders of the Pinnacle. The 5th Wiltshire, who had been digging at the head of the Sazli Beit Dere, seeing line upon line of Turks charging down towards them along with the broken line of their comrades attempting to escape the slaughter,

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also panicked, bolting down the valley. Corporal Scott of the Wiltshires recalled: As daybreak dawned … everyone thought themselves safe, and we were just beginning to dig ourselves in again, when our covering party scouts came in and said the Turks were coming up on all sides in thousands and before we had time to prepare to meet them we were under heavy fire with shrapnel and machine guns and the men began to fall … ‘A’ and ‘C’ companies [were] nearly all done for in no time … caught in the open and killed before we had time to get our rifles even, but ‘B’ and ‘D’ were more fortunate, as they were in a small trench, and they made a good fight for it … I think I must have been dazed by a shell exploding, as I can’t remember anything after till I found myself in the Gully with a lot more, some wounded, some not!6

It was now that the British warships, having seen the collapse of the line, began to pour high-explosive shells into the hoards of Turks flooding down from upper seaward slopes of the heights. These slopes were now enveloped in clouds of smoke, dust and earthen debris as the shells slammed into the hillside. Within seconds the Anzac land-based batteries began to shell the inland slopes of the hill. Trooper Noel Trolove of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles recalled: ‘They seemed to come in double lines, shoulder to shoulder, right across the spur. Every ship in the bay opened fire; every machine gun within range opened up. The spur was one mass of bursting shells, and the lines seemed to melt away before they reached the Apex.’7 Major Wait of the New Zealand Engineers later wrote that Captain Wallingford’s machine guns tore into the ranks of the advancing Turks, enfilading those attacking The Farm. … the four machine guns of the Canterbury Battalion were on the left front of the Apex, and the two remaining guns of the Auckland Battalion were on the Apex itself: two guns of the Wellington Battalion were back on Rhododendron with the Maori

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gun and the flank gun of the Otago Infantry – these four could fire over the heads of the guns on the Apex, and commanded the whole of the approaches from Chunuk Bair … The gunners had already attended to their guns at the first streak of day. A Canterbury gunner, finding his gun difficult to adjust, reported to the NZ Brigade Machine Gun Officer, who was sighting the gun on to the ridge when the first line of the Turkish attack came over at that very point. This gun had the range at once, and followed by keeping the sights a little in advance of the enemy. The other guns quickly took up the rat-a-tat; the range was sent to the other five guns. The NZ Mounted Brigade machine guns on Table Top and Bauchop’s Hill also found a good target at extreme range … The Turkish line consisted of from 250 to 300 men about one pace interval. By the time they reached a point immediately in front of the guns, the whole of the NZ machine guns were concentrated at that point in accordance with the orders hurriedly issued. Thus was created a death zone through which the enemy could not pass. They fell over literally like oats before a reaper. Twenty two lines came down, each as true and steady as the first. They moved at a jog trot with their rifles at the port. The machine gunners with assistance of the Navy and Field artillery mowed down line after line until the Turkish effort was spent.8

Sergeant Daniel Curham of the Wellington Infantry Battalion was operating one of these machine guns and recalled a ‘… great mass of Turks coming over the hill … I had my gun trained on the very spot and all I had to do was press the trigger and, of course, they fell all over the place’.9 The slopes were now littered with Turkish and British dead and wounded, but the Turks had achieved what was expected of them: they had taken back Chunuk Bair and pushed the enemy back from the heights. Turkish Major Izzettin recalled: ‘At dawn we started attacking Conk Bayiri [Chunuk Bair] and pushed back the enemy. The crisis has been overcome – Kemal’s energy and effectiveness have borne fruit. We

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have all breathed a deep sigh of relief. The enemy is subjecting Conk Bayiri to intense shelling from ships and shore mortars and field guns. At least 15 000 shells have been fired. Our soldiers have fought heroically under this infernal fire … Still tired and disorientated. I hope I’ll be able to snatch some sleep … tonight.’10 On Rhododendron Ridge small parties of Turks continued to attack, at one point approaching Johnston’s headquarters at the Apex, where Captain Wallingford and others pushed back the attackers. Wallingford later recalled: I looked up and sure enough there was a Turk … He was the leader of a counter-attack and was standing up on the skyline 30 yards from me. Everyone seemed to be dumbstruck … I reached down for a rifle but one of the men reached his up. I pushed off the safety catch, took aim at his middle and most deliberately pulled the trigger. Down the poor beggar dropped. I now ran forward … put down the rifle and my binoculars … while … signalling up the men from the trench on my right, then crawling up I reached over and blew one chap’s brains out [with a revolver] … I then shot one on my left through the heart and turned round and polished off another also through the heart. At this the remainder who were down the slope bolted.11

Now men of the 6th Leinster and the Auckland Infantry Battalion charged the Turks with fixed bayonets, clearing the Turks away from the Apex. By now the Turks had reoccupied the Pinnacle in strength; from here The Farm was exposed to enfilade, while further north Turks were approaching Allanson’s men, now under the command of Major Phipson, from numerous spurs and gullies and they soon occupied the position formerly held by the 9th Worcestershire and the 6th South Lancashire. The companies of the 9th Royal Warwickshire were soon forced to retire, but the 6th Gurkhas remained bravely holding their position. They would eventually be ordered to retire hours later.12 Their retirement was orderly

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and organised, as recalled by Phipson: I sent another salaam to the Sergeant Major [Gambirsing Pun], read the order to him and asked him how the retirement should be carried out. Fortunately we could both converse in Hindustani of a sort, and it soon became apparent, to my relief, that he knew the drill from A to Z, and I marvelled at the precision with which he described the different phases of the retirement and the proper precautions to be taken, such as the removal and disposal of the bolts and rifles which could not be taken; the disposal of surplus ammunition, collection of stores, destruction of equipment which could not be carried, and the timing of the movement itself – and what a movement. To retire 900 feet down a rocky declivity, intersected by deep and narrow gullies, many of them choked with corpses, and the infinitely difficult job of carrying down the wounded – all Gambirsing Pun, whose knowledge and competence seemed complete and indefeasible. I recalled Allanson’s words, “He’ll never let you down.”13

Meanwhile the southern approach to The Farm was protected by the few brave survivors of the 10th Hampshire and 5th Wiltshire, numbering less than a hundred all told. They still clung to the slopes beneath the Pinnacle, while at The Farm the Royal Irish Rifles were still clinging to the hillside at 10.30 am. Colonel Baldwin had been killed near his headquarters at The Farm sometime in the morning; command passed to Colonel Cooper, who was almost immediately seriously wounded in the chest. Lieutenant Colonel Bradford of the Royal Irish now took command and was also soon seriously wounded as was his second-in-command who was shot in the face; both remaining majors of the Irish were also seriously wounded. Command eventually fell to Staff Captain Nugent of the 29th Brigade, but he was killed leading an attack against a party of approaching Turks. Lieutenant Colonel Bewsher of the 10th Hampshire, even though wounded in the head, took command of the position. It was

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now sometime before 11 am. Bewsher decided that the position had to be evacuated. At the foot of the plateau, however, Captain Street, staff captain of the 39th Brigade, along with New Zealand staff officer Major Dodington, had managed to reform a number of troops who had been taking cover in the gullies and spurs leading off The Farm. Street now led his men back towards the plateau, but was killed before reaching it and with this the troops he had formed withdrew to Cayley’s headquarters near the easternmost fork of the Aghyl Dere. Hearing that Chunuk Bair had fallen and that The Farm was now vacated, Birdwood rushed the last remaining reserve battalion, the 5th Connaught Rangers, towards the threatened position. Just before midday they arrived at Cayley’s headquarters and from here they were ordered to The Farm, which they accomplished suffering few casualties. These troops were, however, soon isolated, as earlier the last of Allanson’s men north of The Farm had been ordered to retire, while supplies and reinforcements that had to struggle up the Aghyl Dere were now under fire from the Turks at the Pinnacle. The Farm could not be held. The Connaught Rangers held the position until dusk so that the wounded could be withdrawn and were then ordered to evacuate the position. The British troops retired to a line running across the lower hills at the foot of the range, with their right on Cheshire Ridge and the Apex and their left adjoining the 4th Australian Brigade. A few days later the Turks reoccupied The Farm and surrounding gullies, now covered with over 1000 Commonwealth dead, their remains not recovered until after the armistice of 1919 – if at all. Overall, many New Zealanders were upset that they (and let’s not forget with the help of a number of British units) had captured and defended Chunuk Bair for over 48 hours, but within hours of Kitchener’s New Army men taking over the position it was lost. While understandable to some degree, Terry Kinloch perhaps sums up the reality of the situation: ‘Had the New Zealanders still been on Chunuk Bair on the morning of 10 August, they would have put up a better fight, but they still would have been wiped out.’14 334

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Meanwhile the Turks from the 7th Division had renewed their attacks against the northern flank at Anzac. The first attack had commenced just before 3 am and was beaten back by the Australians of the 13th and 16th Battalions. All day long the Australians observed parties of Turks moving across their front, heading towards the beach. In the afternoon the Turks launched an attack against a gap in the line on the flank of the 13th Battalion but the attack was cut down. Towards the southern end of the line, along the northern spur that terminates at Hill 60, however, the Turks launched a successful attack that captured the position. A few weeks later the Anzac and British troops would launch a major attack to recapture Hill 60; it would be the last offensive move conducted at Anzac, and like Lone Pine it would be a bloody affair – a battle of individuals using bayonets and bombs, killing would be very personal and it would be days before the battle would be decided.

To the south at Lone Pine, Lance Corporal Lawrence, who had gone back to Lone Pine for a quick inspection, soon returned to Brown’s Dip. He wrote in his diary: It was most weird in the dark, crawling along a maze of unknown trenches through dark holes into their tunnels, without lights, over dead men, the stench something awful, never knowing at what moment you might be cracked by a bullet or caught by a bomb. Oh, yes most decidedly it was weird. I was glad to get out again, I can assure you. The dead were still in these trenches and as you stood on them in the dark, perhaps half a cheek would attach itself to your boot or you would tread on his stomach and his insides just squeezed out of his mouth. This is not fiction, I swear, but absolute fact; and the smell – Oh!!!15

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Solid lines represent approximate Anzac perimeter after the August Offensive (well below objectives of Battleship Hill, Chunuk Bair, Hill Q and Hill 971); dotted line represents the Anzac perimeters before the battles of August

Final disposition of Allied forces at Anzac – 12 August 1915

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Nineteen-year-old Private Stan Jury of the 4th Battalion wrote home from a hospital bed in Malta: ‘It was terrible hard fighting … living hell dead laying five and six days in the trenches in fact you could not walk without treading on the dead when you put your foot down you feel the body quiver under your feet it was horrible, I was lucky I was hit on the shoulder both feet and stomach thank God it was not serious I expect to be back at the Turk in a month as long as septic don’t set in.’16 Another from the 4th Battalion, W  Graham (rank unknown), recalled that ‘the weather was hot, the sky cloudless, and no breeze reached us in those deep trenches. The flies swarmed over us from fast decomposing bodies and the lice worried us as never before, for we dare not yet remove our clothing. At night men vomited in the visible miasma which enveloped us.’17 Back at Brown’s Dip behind the Pimple, about half of the packs left behind before the men stormed Lone Pine days before remained unclaimed. John Gammage, 1st Battalion, believed that ‘their owners lay at Lone Pine, and the maggots dropping from their bodies there were swept up by the bucket full’.18

The August Offensive had failed. All along the northern heights Turkish and Commonwealth dead and wounded lay scattered. Further south at The Nek, down Second Ridge and on 400 Plateau it was the same sorry story. Many men were left to die a lonely and painful death, most to be buried by the elements, only a few to be found and buried after the war many years later. It had been a close-run thing, as for a brief time the northern heights almost lay in Birdwood’s hands, but Mustafa Kemal snatched it back. British Empire troops would spend another five months on the peninsula, biding their time, before sanity prevailed and the powers that be in London called a halt to the madness, ordering the peninsula to be evacuated. Indeed, the evacuation of the Anzac, British, Indian and French troops from the Peninsula beneath the very noses of the Turks would be the only real success of the entire Gallipoli Campaign. 337

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With the horrific casualties and lack of progress, the senior commanders gave way to the grim reality – Gallipoli had become the Western Front all over again, albeit on a smaller scale – stalemate had set in. The men too were aware of the appalling casualty figures but to them it was much more personal. It was their cobbers who now lay scattered between the lines, within the narrow space of no-man’s-land at Old Anzac and among its broader expanse further north defined by tortuous rugged gullies, spurs and ridges. They too realised – hoped – that the end was near. Something too had changed in the psyche of the men of Anzac, as recorded by Ashmead-Bartlett: They no longer carry themselves with that confident air of assurance formerly so marked amongst the men from ‘Down Under’. Anzac seems to have gone through some terrible illness and to have aged. Everyone looks older and drawn. They have the air of men resigned to their fate, but who are determined to see the matter through. There is still the grim decision, but the hope and expectancy has altogether vanished.19

Within weeks, many of the survivors from this offensive would be forced to face the meaningless horrors of Hill 60.

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Epilo g u e

The Anzac breakout was doomed to failure if the whole ridgeline from Hill 971 to Chunuk Bair could not be captured and held – in doing this it would have made capturing Battleship Hill and Baby 700 a real possibility. Holding Chunuk Bair, or any other summit on its own, was not going to be of any tactical significance and if they could be held (which was probably doubtful) would merely be a drain on limited resources. The commanders knew full well that the whole range needed to be taken. Was it an overly ambitious and optimistic plan? The turn of events tell us that it clearly was. Trying to capture Hill 971 and Hill Q using the left hook of the Australian and Indian battalions, even with hindsight, was too big an ask. This was by far the most demanding objective placed on any of the troops engaged. It required a long night march, through a complex series of tangled gullies and spurs, up to the highest peak of the range within a matter of hours. Fit troops with accurate maps in broad daylight with no enemy shooting at them would have found this a near-impossible task in the time allotted. These men not only had to do it with no maps and no information of what lay ahead, they also had to undertake it heavily laden with ammunition, machine guns, shovels and picks, wire and all manner of stores, and they had to do it in near total darkness. Additionally, the Australians were already battle weary, fatigued and disease ridden having fought in the cramped beachhead for the last four months.

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After reaching the heights they were then expected to do battle with the Turks for the highest peak along the range. It was an overly ambitious and highly optimistic task for any troops to undertake, let alone troops already worn down with sickness and fatigue, and this ought to have been evident to those planning the operation. This is not to understate the tasks allocated to other troops, including the New Zealanders on Chunuk Bair who would have to fight against the main Turkish line as they came down the main range. The same applies to the Indian troops (and later ad hoc combination of Indian and British units) who were expected to take Hill Q and the saddle connecting it to Chunuk Bair from terrain that can at best be described as cliffs. The only real chance of gaining Hills 971 and Q was an advance from Chunuk Bair (once it had been taken) and launching assaults against these peaks from there in bite-and-hold operations. It still may not have been possible to capture Hill Q and Hill 971, but it would have been a much simpler operation, and some degree of coordination may have been possible. Given the objectives, the lay of the land, poor communications and the poor physical and fatigued state of the troops involved, the plan needed to be as simple and straightforward as possible. The high tide of the August Offensive occurred during the morning of 9 August – if only for a few minutes all seemed possible. The New Zealanders were still clinging onto Chunuk Bair, while Allanson and his mixed battalion of Gurkhas and British had captured the saddle between Chunuk Bair and Hill Q. The Turks at this point seemed dispirited, as only half-hearted attempts had been made to push the New Zealanders off Chunuk Bair and few troops confronted Allanson’s mixed battalion. If the navy had not blasted them off the ridge, and if Baldwin’s troops had been pushed up to Chunuk Bair via the Apex and the Pinnacle (instead of the difficult and complex route via Aghyl Dere), it is possible they would have been in a position to push through the Turkish forces to link up with Allanson as well as forming a continuous line with the New Zealanders. 340

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This failure was principally due to Colonel Johnston, Major General Godley and ultimately Lieutenant General Birdwood. Johnston, who had shown on the morning of 7  August to be incapable of commanding troops in the field, had the next day argued that Baldwin’s force should take the difficult and circuitous route via Chailak Dere, Cheshire Ridge and Aghyl Dere. Godley, who was the overall commander of this part of the offensive, failed to take command and he let the local commanders dictate terms. At the very least Godley should have gone up to survey the area and confer with his commanders, but during the battle for the heights he seldom left his headquarters at No. 2 Outpost. Birdwood, who was the overall commander, failed to manage his resources and his subordinate commanders; he allowed himself to become an almost silent spectator. Importantly also is the fact that Birdwood and Godley failed to control or direct the battle when it was needed, in sharp contrast to Mustafa Kemal. Unlike the Turkish commanders, the Commonwealth leaders tended to direct from rear positions rather than going forward and directing operations based on a proper understanding of the situation at hand and on the ground. When Allanson’s battalion was forced off the saddle by friendly fire, any chance of the offensive succeeding was gone. Even if the British troops could have held out against the mass Turkish onslaught against Chunuk Bair on 10 August, the writing was already on the wall. Chunuk Bair would have to be abandoned that night. There were no fresh troops to occupy the position and, with Suvla Bay now well and truly shut to any British advance, the Turks were free to focus all their attention on the small area occupied by the British on the upper seaward slopes of Chunuk Bair. As such, the August Offensive was essentially over by the early morning of 9 August. Poor leadership at brigade and divisional level was also a major factor that contributed to failure. The British and Anzac chain of command seems to have completely broken down, with no ongoing review of the offensive as it progressed; the whole campaign degenerated into ad hoc 341

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individual battles. The very nature of the terrain and the over-ambitious objectives set the troops, combined with the primitive communications, made the ‘fog of war’ a crucial factor. Coordination just wasn’t possible and as such the plan disintegrated before the eyes of commanders at all levels within a matter of hours. It was an impossible task to keep unit integrity within the gullies and spurs, let alone launch a coordinated attack in conjunction with other units believed to be nearby – somewhere. When faced with difficulties the answer was merely to throw more men into the meat grinder. As already stated, most brigade commanders led from the rear when, given the conditions, they needed to lead from the front. The attack against Lone Pine, while a tactical success, actually assisted the Turks in forcing them to bring up reserves from the south earlier than expected and they were then free to assist in the defence of the real objectives of the offensive: the heights from Hill 971 down to Battleship Hill. Success had beckoned earlier during the early hours of 7 August when Johnston could have occupied the summit of Chunuk Bair in darkness and with little loss. He only chose to act when the door had been slammed shut – attacking in daylight with Turkish enfilade machine-gun and rifle fire, along with shrapnel cutting his men to pieces. With this failure the attack against The Nek by the troopers of the Australian Light Horse in broad daylight should have been abandoned, as the New Zealanders at this point were due to be attacking the Turks from the rear. As it was, the plan now turned on its head and the attack by the Light Horse had become a feint to ‘assist’ the New Zealanders in taking Chunuk Bair, rather than a two-pronged attack to capture Battleship Hill and Baby 700 from the front and rear. With the failure at German Officers’ Trench earlier, the whole purpose of the attack, a feint, was also doomed to failure and should have been cancelled, as should have the attacks against the Chessboard and Turkish Quinn’s – they now served no tactical purpose. The Turkish command for the first few days didn’t react quickly to the unfolding battles along the Anzac front and almost gave away the 342

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heights to the enemy. Indeed, to some degree the Turkish commanders, like their British and Anzac counterparts, seemed to be operating individually and were not able to coordinate a response to the unfolding attacks; for the first few days at least, they were victims to unfolding circumstances. However, the Turkish command did lead mostly from the front and were able to call on fresh reserves that had been rushed to the Anzac sector because of the attacks against Lone Pine (as well as Suvla Bay). Even so, it wasn’t until Mustafa Kemal took command of the Suvla Bay operations that some sense of urgency finally took hold. While Mustafa Kemal was ultimately responsible for driving the British troops off Chunuk Bair and its upper slopes on 10 August, by then the offensive was already over. The August Offensive to a large extant was lost by British and Anzac commanders, rather than having been defeated by a rapid coordinated Turkish response. Finally, it must be questioned whether the capture of the Sari Bair Range would have actually led to a collapse of the Turkish lines along Second Ridge and the Sari Bair itself. While Turkish batteries occupied Third Ridge as well as those located north along the peaks of the Anafarta Hills to the north, it would not have been impossible to occupy the landward side of the range, as Malone correctly identified on occupying Chunuk Bair during the early morning hours of 8 August. It was very much the same way that the Anzacs and Turks both occupied Second Ridge further south. As such it is likely that the front line would merely have extended further north along Sari Bair itself, with the Commonwealth troops occupying the seaward side of the range, to avoid being blasted off the ridge by Turkish artillery, while the Turks would have entrenched along the landward side – neither side being able to shell the enemy off the ridges with shell fire due to the close proximity of their respective trenches: stalemate yet again.

One of the greatest wrongs perpetrated on the Commonwealth troops 343

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was that of Major General Godley. Not only did he fail his men in leadership, he made matters worse by failing to recognise the bravery of the troops under his command. While seven Victoria Crosses were deservedly awarded to Australians for the success of Lone Pine, only one was awarded for the actions on Chunuk Bair. It is not clear how many men under Godley’s command were put forward (if any) for the Victoria Cross by their unit commanders. Even if none had been recommended – many of the officers who would have witnessed such acts were now dead – surely Godley should have pressed his surviving unit commanders for recommendations. As Christopher Pugsley concludes in relation to Godley: ‘The New Zealanders saw the mediocre rewarded and the dead blamed (including the gallant Lieutenant Colonel Malone). They laughed at Johnston’s “excellently conducted” operations and spoke of the VCs that should have been awarded’.1 The same could be said of Allanson and his Gurkha, Indian and British troops who maintained a position below the ridge connecting Chunk Bair and Hill Q and who for a brief time captured the position before being shelled off it by the guns of the navy. There can be no doubt, however, about the bravery and commitment of the men. Even given the failures of command from various levels, the unit officers and men themselves did not give up; they did all in their power to make the plan work – even when faced with certain death they pushed on so that others might succeed. As acknowledged in General Hamilton’s Special Order to the men at Anzac: The Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force desires formally to record the fine feat of arms achieved by the troops under the command of Lieutenant General Sir WR Birdwood during the battles of Sari Bair. The fervent desire of all ranks to close with enemy, the impetuosity of their onset, the steadfast valour with which they maintained a long struggle – these will surely make an appeal to their fellow countrymen all

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over the world. The gallant capture of the almost impregnable Lone Pine trenches by the Australian Division and the equally gallant defence of the position against repeated counter-attacks are exploits which will live in history. The determined assaults carried out from other parts of the Australian Division’s line were also inestimable service to the whole force, preventing, as they did, the movement of large bodies of reinforcements to the northern flank. The troops under the command of Sir AJ Godley, and particularly the New Zealand and Australian Division, were called upon to carry out one of the most difficult military operations that has ever been attempted – a night march and assault by several columns, in intricate mountainous country strongly entrenched and held by numerous and determined enemy. Their brilliant conduct during this operation and success they achieved have won for them a reputation as soldiers of whom any country must be proud. To the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, therefore, and to those who were associated with that famous corps in the Battle of Sari Bair – the Maoris, Sikhs, Gurkhas, and the new troops of the 10th and 13th Divisions from the Old Country – Sir Ian Hamilton tenders his appreciation of their efforts, his admiration of their gallantry, and his thanks for their achievements. It is an honour to command a force numbering such men as these in the ranks, and it is the Commander in Chief ’s high privilege to acknowledge that honour.2

The same sentiments can be said for ‘Jacko the Turk’.

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Not e s

Chapter 1 1 2 3

4 5 6

7 8

9 10

11 12

13

Hamilton I, (1920) Gallipoli Diary, Vol. 1, Edward Arnold, London, p. 216. Ibid, p. 232. Bean CEW , (1938) Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Vol. II: ‘The Story of Anzac: From 4 May 1915, to the evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula’, (7th edn), Angus & Robertson, Sydney, p. 434. Steel N & Hart P, (1994) Defeat at Gallipoli, Papermac, London. Hamilton, 1920, p. 267. Creighton O, (1916) With the 29th Division in Gallipoli, Longmans, Green, London, pp. 186–87. Ashmead-Bartlett E, (1915) The Times. Austin R, (1989) The White Gurkhas: The Australians at the Second Battle of Krithia, Gallipoli, McCrae, Australia; Bean, 1938; Steel & Hart, 1994. Quote from Steel & Hart, 1994, p. 197. Chambers S, (2003) Gully Ravine – Gallipoli, Battleground Europe Series, Leo Cooper. Ibid, pp. 92–93. Aspinall-Oglander CF, (1929) Military Operations: Gallipoli, Vol. 1, Imperial War Museum, London; Bean, 1938; Steel & Hart, 1994. Olsen W , (2006) Gallipoli: The Western Australian story, University of Western Australia Press, Perth.

14 Bean, 1938. 15 Ibid; Hurst J, (2005) Game to the last: The 11th Australian Infantry Battalion at Gallipoli, Oxford University Press, Australia. 16 Private Walter Stagles, IWM (Imperial War Museum), London, interview 4240. 17 Curran T, (1994) Across the Bar: The story of ‘Simpson’, the man with the donkey: Australia and Tyneside’s great military hero, OGMIOS Publications, Brisbane, pp. 358–59. 18 Ibid. 19 Bean, 1938, p. 150. 20 Private Henry Barnes, IWM interview 4008. 21 Herbert A, (1919) Mons, Anzac and Kut, Arnold, London, pp. 138–42. 22 Quote from Robertson J, (1990) Anzac and Empire: The tragedy and glory of Gallipoli, Hamlyn, Australia, pp. 96–97. 23 Captain TS Austin, AWM (Australian War Memorial), Canberra, 224. 24 Quote from Ornek T & Toker F, (2005) Gallipoli: Companion to the featurelength documentary, Ekip Film, Turkey, p. 117.

Chapter 2 1 2 3

Aspinall-Oglander, 1929. Hamilton, 1920, p. 277. Quote from Travers T, (2001) Gallipoli, 1915, Tempus, South Carolina, p. 115.

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n ote s to pa g e s 16–33

4 5

6 7

8 9

10

11

12 13

14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21

Hamilton, 1920, p. 288. James RR, (1999) Gallipoli, Pimlico, UK; Steel N, (1999) Gallipoli, Leo Cooper, Yorkshire. James, 1999; Stee1, 1999. Quote from Glen F, (2004) Bowler of Gallipoli: Witness to the Anzac Legend, Australian Military History Publication, Australia, p. 89. Bean, 1938, p. 472. Quote from Pugsley C, (1998) Gallipoli: The New Zealand story, (3rd edn), Reed, Auckland, p. 214. Original quote contained in Major PJ Overton’s letters held in New Zealand National Achieves. Kinloch T, (2005) Echoes of Gallipoli: In the words of New Zealand’s Mounted Riflemen, Exisle, Auckland; Bean, 1938; Pugsley, 1998. Stowers R, (2005) Bloody Gallipoli: The New Zealanders’ story, David Bateman, Auckland. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929; Bean, 1938. Von Sanders L, (1927) Five Years in Turkey, (1st English edn), Bailliere, Tindall & Cox, London; Steel & Hart, 1994. Broadbent H, (2005) Gallipoli the Fatal Shore, Penguin, Australia. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929; James, 1999. AWM 3DRL/3376 item 11/5. Ataturk’s Memoirs of the Anafartalar Battles, (English translations), Imperial War Museum, (undated, K35413), pp. 24–25. Ibid, p. 25. Ibid, p. 26. Ibid, p. 28. Quote from James, 1999, p. 255. Also see Danisman HB, (2007) Gallipoli 1915 Day One Plus … 27th Ottoman Int Regt Vs ANZACS, based on account of Lt Col Sefik Aker Commander of 27th Inf Regt, Denizler Kitabevi, Istanbul.

Chapter 3 1 2 3

4 5

6

7

8 9 10 11 12

13 14 15 16 17 18 19

James, 1999; Hickey M, (1995) Gallipoli, Jon Murray, London. James, 1999. Bean C, (1957) Two Men I Knew: William Bridges and Brudenell White founders of the AIF, Angus & Robertson, Sydney. James, 1999. AMM (anonymous), ‘Lone Pine’, Journal of the Royal Military College of Australia, 7 (13), June 1920. pp. 13–18.; Wren E, (1935) Randwick to Hargicourt: History of the 3rd Battalion AIF, Ronald G McDonald, Sydney, p. 97. Lieutenant Cyril Lawrence, AWM PR86/266 (2nd Field Company, 1st AIF). Also see East R (ed), (1981) The Gallipoli Diary of Sergeant Lawrence of the Australian Engineers – 1st AIF 1915, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, pp. 26 & 39. Quote from Austin R, (2007) The Fighting Fourth : A history of Sydney’s 4th Battalion 1914–1919, Slouch Hat, McCrae, Australia, p. 66. Bean CEW , (1952) Gallipoli Mission, Australian War Memorial, Canberra. Bean, 1938; Lawrence, 1915, AWM. Bean, 1938. Robertson, 1990; Bean, 1938; Broadbent, 2005. Waite F, (1921) The New Zealanders at Gallipoli, Whitcombe & Tombs, Auckland; Bean, 1938; James, 1999; Pugsley, 1998. AWM4 10/3/7. Bean, 1957, pp. 103–104. Travers, 2001. James, 1999, p. 237. Quoted from Robertson, 1990, p. 116. Kannengiesser H, (1927) The Campaign in Gallipoli, Hutchison, London, p. 133. Butler AG, (1938) Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services 1914–1918, Vol. 1, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, pp. 228–41.

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20 Hickey, 1995, p. 247. 21 Waite, 1921; Bean, 1952; Lawrence, 1915, AWM. 22 Quote from Cowan J, (1926) The Maoris in the Great War: A history of the New Zealand Native Contingent and Pioneer Battalion, Gallipoli, 1915, France and Flanders, 1916–1918, Whitcombe & Tombs, Auckland, p. 35. 23 Bean, 1938. 24 Bean, 1938, p. 449. 25 Ibid. 26 AWM PR 83/87. 27 Bean, C, (1948) Anzac to Amiens, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, p. 141. 28 The Drill of the Foot-Hills, No. 9, August–September, Western Australia, 1916, p. 31. 29 Von Sanders, 1927, p. 104; Bean, 1938, p. 486. 30 Von Sanders, 1927, p. 81. 31 Ibid, p. 82. 32 Bean, 1938.

Chapter 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Bean, 1938. Ibid; Hurst, 2005. 3rd Brigade Orders, AWM 31/7/15. Ibid. Bean, 1938. AWM 3DRL8042 item 15; AWM 2DRL301. AWM 3DRL8042 item 15; Hurst, 2005, p. 130. Hurs t, 2005, p. 130. Bean, 1938. Ibid, p. 477. Hurst, 2005. Quotes taken from Hurst, 2005, p. 132. Ibid. Bean, 1938. Hurst, 2005, pp. 135–36. Comb’s Diary, quoted from Hurst, 2005, p. 136. Jackson, AWM, 3DRL8042 item 15. Bean, 1938; Hurst, 2005.

19 Bean, 1938. 20 Ibid. 21 Rockliff WH Captain, ‘After Action Report on Capture of Turkish Trench during the Night of 31 July 1915’, 11th Battalion War Diary, AWM. 22 Bean, 1938. 23 Bean, 1938; Hurst, 2005. 24 Bean, 1938, p. 480. 25 Hurst, 2005, p. 137. 26 Bean, 1938, p. 481. 27 Ibid. 28 Bean, 1938. 29 Boddington FE, (undated) letter, Powerhouse Museum, Sydney. 30 Bean, 1938; Hurst, 2005. 31 Boddington, (undated) letter. 32 AWM 3DRL8042, item 15. 33 Walther BH Captain, ‘11th Battalion Machine Gun Section report on Leane’s Trench’, 3rd Brigade War Diary, AWM. 34 Bean, 1938, p. 483. 35 Facey B, (1981) A Fortunate Life, Penguin, Australia, p. 344. 36 Quote from Hurst, 2005, pp. 141–42. 37 Bean, 1938, p. 484. 38 AWM 3DRL8042, item 15. 39 Bean, 1938; Hurst, 2005.

Chapter 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Bean, 1938, p. 486. Bean, 1938. Ibid. Ibid. Quote from James, 1999, p. 256. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929; Bean, 1938. Bean, 1952, p. 143. Quote from Brenchley F & Brenchley E, (2005) Myth Maker: Ellis AshmeadBartlett – the Englishmen who sparked Australia’s Gallipoli legend, Wiley, Australia, p. 150. 9 Olson, 2006. 10 Bean, 1938, p. 489. 11 Ibid. 12 AWM4 23/19/6.

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13 Taylor FW & Cusack TA, (1942) Nulli Secundus: A history of the Second Battalion, AIF, 1914–1919, Swanbourne, WA (1992 reprint). 14 Quote from Austin, 2007, p. 68. 15 Quote from Robertson, 1990, p. 116. 16 Butler, 1938, pp. 252–53. 17 Malone WG Lt Col, letters and papers, QEII Army Museum, Waiouru, NZ. 18 Bean, 1938. 19 Ibid.

Chapter 6 1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24 25

Bean, 1938. Bean, 1938; Hurst, 2005, p. 151. Bean, 1938, p.491. Quote from Hurst, 2005, p. 153. Bean, 1938, p. 480. Rockliff Report, 11th Battalion War Diary (quote taken from Hurst, 2005, p. 153). Bean, 1938; Hurst, 2005. Belford WC Captain, (1940) Legs Eleven: Being the story of the 11th Battalion (AIF) in the Great War of 1914–1918, Imperial Printing, Australia, p. 139. Bean, 1938, p. 492. Jackson, AWM 3DRL8042 item, 15. Bean, 1938, p. 492. Quote from Hurst, 2005, p. 155. Bean, 1938. Ibid. 3rd Brigade War Diary 1915, AWM. Bean, 1938. Bean, 1938, p. 494. Boyd-Aarons, AWM 3DRL8042 item 15. Bean, 1938; Hurst, 2005. Rockliff Report, 11th Battalion War Diary (quote from Hurst, 2005, p. 159). Quote from Hurst, 2005, p. 161. Bean, 1938. Ibid; Hurst, 2005. Bean, 1938. The Drill of the Foot-Hills, 1916, p. 32.

Chapter 7 1 2 3

4 5 6 7 8 9

10 11 12 13 14

15

16 17 18 19

20

21 22

Bean, 1938. Bean, AWM38 3DRL/8042, item 19. 1st Infantry Brigade War Diary, July– December 1915, AWM4 23/1/8 Part 2. Ibid. 7th Infantry Battalion War Diary, August 1915, AWM4 23/24/6. Ibid; Taylor & Cusack, 1942, p. 124. AWM4 23/1/8 Part 2. Lawrence, 1915, AWM. Quote from Derham R, (2000) Silent Ruse: Escape from Gallipoli, Oryx, Melbourne, p. 17. Moorehead A, (1956) Gallipoli, Ballantine. Quote from Austin, 2007, p. 69. Quote from Pugsley, 1998, p. 271. Lawrence, 1915, AWM; also see East, 1981, p. 61. Danisman HB, (1997) Gallipoli 1915 Bloody Ridge (Lone Pine): Diary of Lt Mehmed Fasih, 5th Imperial Ottoman Army Gallipoli 1915, Denizler Kitabevi, Istanbul, pp. 31–32. Bean, 1938; Danisman HB, (2007) Gallipoli 1915 Day One Plus … 27th Ottoman Inf Regt Vs ANZACS, based on account of Lt Col Sefik Aker, Commander of 27th Inf Regt, Denizler Kitabevi, Istanbul. Bean, 1952, p. 183. Ibid, p .184. Bean, 1938, p.502. Quote from Pedersen P, (2007) The Anzacs: Gallipoli to the Western Front, Penguin Viking, Australia, p. 89. Quote from McCarthy D, (1983) Gallipoli to the Somme: The story of CEW Bean, John Ferguson, Sydney, p. 170. Cecil McAnulty, diary, AWM 1DRL042. Quote from McCarthy, 1983, p. 171.

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Chapter 8

33 Ibid, p. 508.

1

Chapter 9

2 3 4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20 21

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

2nd Infantry Battalion War Diary, August 1915, AWM4 23/19/6. Wren, 1935, p. 101. Bean, 1938. Quote from Gammage B, (1974) The Broken Years: Australian soldiers in the Great War, Penguin, Australia, p. 69. Quotes from Robertson, 1990, pp. 120–21. Quote from Austin, 2007, p. 71. Hogue O, (1916) Love Letters of an Anzac, Melrose, London. Quote from Austin, 1997, p. 97. McCarthy, 1983, p. 171. Lawrence, 1915, AWM; also see East, 1981, p. 61. Olson, 2006. Bean, 1938. Atatürk’s Memoirs of the Anafartalar Battles, (undated), IWM, K35413. Bean, 1938; Bean, 1952. Bean, 1938, pp. 527–28. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929; Bean, 1938. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929. Jess C General Sir, IWM DOCS, transcription of diary, 6 August 1915. Bean, 1938; Fewster K, Baüsarın V & Baüsarın H (2003) Gallipoli: The Turkish story, Allen & Unwin, Sydney. Bean, 1938. Quote from Liddle P, (1976) Men of Gallipoli: The Dardanelles and Gallipoli experience August 1914 to January 1916, Penguin, UK, p. 205. Bean, 1938, p. 508. Quote from Austin, 2007, p. 72. Bean, 1938. Quoted from Broadbent, 2005, p. 197. Bean, 1938, p. 512. Ibid, p. 513. Ibid, p. 508. Ibid; Austin, 2007. Bean, 1938. Ibid. Ibid, pp. 504–505.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24 25 26 27

28

Bean, 1952, p. 185. Ibid, p. 187. Bean, 1938. Ibid, p. 528. Bean, 1952, p. 189. Ibid. Bean, 1938, p. 529. Quote from Ornek & Toker, 2005, p. 91. Bean, 1952, p. 189. Ibid, p. 190. Bean, 1938; Bean, 1952. Bean, 1952, p. 191. Bean, 1938. Ibid, p. 519. Adam-Smith P, (1991) The Anzacs, Penguin, Australia, p. 121. 1st Infantry Battalion War Diary, August 1915, AWM4 23/18/3. Cherry F, AWM 2DRL/0302. Quote from Fewster, 2007, pp. 183–94. Lawrence, 1915, AWM; also see East, 1981, p. 61. McKinlay J, (1995) Bring Decent Signallers, Royal Australian Corps of Signals Committee, Watsonia, p. 36. Rule J, (1933) Jacka’s Mob, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, p. 6. 1st Infantry Brigade War Diary, August 1915, AWM4 23/1/2 Part 1. 2nd Infantry Battalion War Diary, August 1915, AWM4 23/19/6. Quote from Broadbent, 1994, p. 94. Private John Kingsley Gammage, AWM PR82/003. Lawrence, 1915, AWM; also see East, 1981, p. 61. Cavill HW , (1916) Imperishable Anzacs: A story of Australia’s famous First Brigade from the diary of Pte Harold Walter Cavill N. 27 1 Bn, William Brooks, Sydney, pp. 90–91. Ibid, pp. 91–92.

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29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

45 46 47

15 16 17 18 19

Bean, 1938, p. 529. Bean, 1952, pp. 191–93. Von Sanders, 1927, p. 80. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929. Bean, 1938, p. 530. Ibid, p. 523. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929; Bean, 1938. Christopher Roberts, personal comment to the author, 2008. Bean, 1938. Ibid. Ibid, pp. 532–33. Bean, 1938. Lawrence, 1915, AWM. Also see East, 1981, p. 62. Broadbent, 1994, p. 94. AWM4 23/19/6. Austin R, (2004) Our Dear Old Battalion: The story of the 7th Battalion AIF, 1914–1919, Slouch Hat, Victoria. Taylor & Cusack, 1942, p. 134. Bean, 1938, p. 534. Bean, 1938.

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

Chapter 10 1 2

3 4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Cowan, 1926, p. 37. Trolove N, (undated) The Battle of Sari Bair, 6–10 August 1915, Alexander Turnbull Library of New Zealand, Wellington. Bean, 1938. Stevens KM, (1973) Maungatapere: A history and reminiscence, Whangarei Advocate, NZ, p. 100. Waite, 1921. Bean, 1938. Stevens, 1973, p. 100. Liddle, 1976, p. 207. Ibid. Cowan, 1916, pp. 40–41. Waite, 1921; Aspinall-Oglander, 1929; Bean, 1938. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929. Mackenzie CN, (1921) The Tale of a Trooper, John Lane, London, p. 160. Waite, 1921.

34 35 36

37 38 39 40

41 42 43 44

Ibid, p. 208. Bean, 1938. Quote from Pugsley, 1998, pp. 273–74. Waite, 1921, p. 210. Pugsley C, (2004) The Anzac Experience: New Zealand, Australian and Empire in the First World War, Reed, Auckland; Bean, 1938; Kinloch, 2005. Waite, 1921. Quote from Stowers, 2005, p. 150. Ibid. Ibid. Liddle, 1976, p. 209. Waite, 1921. Kinloch, 2005. Bean, 1938. Bean, 1938; Kinloch, 2005. Trolove, (undated) The Battle of Sari Bair. Ibid. Waite, 1921, pp. 11–12. Kinloch, 2005, p. 202. King GA, NZSC, Lt Col, diaries, QEII Army Museum, Waiouru, New Zealand. Bean, 1938, p. 575. Quote from Pugsley, 1998, p. 274. Quote from Townsend C, (2000) Gallipoli 1915: From the uttermost ends of the earth, Patricia Townsend, Pareroa, New Zealand, p. 96. Ibid, p. 150. Cowan, 1926, p. 43. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929. Interview of Joseph Napier, IWM, London, SR 7499, taken from Steel & Hart, 1994, pp. 232–33. Bean, 1938; Steel & Hart, 1994. Bean, 1938, p. 576. Quote from Derham, 2000, p. 17. Tom Kidd diary, Battye Library, Perth, MN 1570 4949/6.

Chapter 11 1 2

Bean, 1938. The Argus, Melbourne, 14 October 1915.

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3 4 5 6 7 8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

Bean, 1938; Bean, 1957. 6th Infantry Battalion War Diary, 1915, AWM4 23/23/4. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Bean, 1938. Austin R, (1992) As Rough as Bags: The story of the 6th Battalion, 1st AIF 1914– 1919, McCrae, Australia; Bean, 1938. 2nd Infantry Brigade War Diary, August 1915, AWM4 23/2/6. AWM4 23/2/6. AWM4 23/23/4. Quote from Austin, 1992, p. 115. Ibid, p. 120. AWM4 23/23/4. Bean, 1957; Austin, 1992. Quote from Austin, 1992, p. 115. Bean, 1952, p. 193. Bean, 1938, p. 531. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929, p. 181. Bean, 1938, p. 532. Quotefrom Austin, 2007, pp. 73–74. AWM4 23/2/6. AWM4 23/23/4. Dyer WL, AWM PR84/211. AWM4 23/23/4. Bean, 1938, p. 605. AWM4 23/2/6. Ibid. Quote from Austin, 1992, p. 116. Ibid.

Chapter 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Waite, 1921, p. 205. Quote from Stowers, 2005, pp. 153– 54. Quote from Liddle, 1976, p. 210. Hardey, QEII New Zealand Army Museum, Waiouru, RV1328. Hughes JG, Reveille, RSL, 1932. Hardey, RV1328. Stowers, 2005. Quote from Fewster, 2007, p. 184. Quote from Olsen, 2006, p. 224.

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

Aspinall-Oglander, 1929, p.191. Bean, 1938, p. 584. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929; Bean, 1938. Bean, 1938, pp. 585–86. Bean, 1938. Quote from Liddle, 1976, p. 212. 13th Infantry Brigade War Diary, August 1915, AWM4 23/30/10. Quote from Pedersen P, (1992) Monash as Military Commander, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, p. 101. Bean, 1938. Quote from Fewster, 2007, pp. 18586. Bean, 1938, p. 589. 14th Infantry Brigade War Diary, August 1915, AWM4 23/31/11. 15th Infantry Brigade War Diary, August 1915, AWM4 23/32/10. Ibid. Ibid. Clune F, (1917) Anzac Memorial, pp. 277–80. Quote from Pedersen, 1992, p. 102. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929; Pedersen, 1992. Waite, 1921. Kemal M, (undated) Atatürk’s Memoirs of the Anafartalar Battles, IWM, K35413, p. 31.

Chapter 13 1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8

9

Bean, 1938, p. 606. Bean, 1938. Bean, 1938, pp. 608–609. 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade War Diary, August 1915, AWM4 10/3/7. Bean, 1938. 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade War Diary, August 1915, AWM4 10/1/13 Part 1; Bean, 1938. Ibid. Quote from Stanley P, (2005) Quinn’s Post: Anzac Gallipoli, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, p. 139. AWM38 3DRL 7953/27.

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n ote s to pa g e s 18 2–207

10 Olden, A, (1921) Westralian Cavalry in the War: The story of the 10th Light Horse Regiment, AIF in the Great War 1914– 1918, pp. 47–48. 11 Brown, John, diary, Army Museum of Western Australia, PD 208. 12 Kidd, T, diary, Perth. 13 AWM38 3DRL 8042 Item 25. 14 Bean, 1938, p. 626. 15 Quote from Adam-Smith, 1991, p. 122. 16 Bean, 1938, p. 626. 17 Quote from Stanley, 2005, p. 139. 18 Bean, 1938, p. 630. 19 AWM4 10/1/13 PART 1. 20 Quotes from Stanley, 2005, p. 141. 21 2nd Australian Light Horse Regiment War Diary, August 1915, AWM4 10/7/6; Bean, 1938. 22 AWM38 3DRL 7953/27. 23 Lawrence, 1915; see also East, 1981, pp. 63–64. 24 AWM 1DRL 547. 25 Quote from McCarthy, 1983, p. 174. 26 AWM 224. 27 Quote from Broadbent, 1990, pp. 98–99. 28 AWM4 10/3/7. 29 Quote from Burness P, (1996) The Nek: The tragic charge of the Light Horse at Gallipoli, Kangaroo Press, Victoria, p. 103. 30 Quoted from Hamilton J, (2004) Goodbye Cobber, God Bless You: The fatal charge of the Light Horse, Gallipoli, August 7th 1915, MacMillan, Australia. 31 AWM4 10/13/4. 32 Ibid. 33 Bean, 1938, p. 627. 34 Foss H, diary, AWM 1 DRL 298. 35 Bean, 1938, p. 616. 36 10th Australian Light Horse Regiment War Diary, August 1915, AWM4 10/15/4. 37 Quote from Hamilton, 2004, p. 309. 38 Chris Roberts, personal comment to author, 2008 – re Harold George

39 40 41 42 43 44

45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62

Smith to H Hassell circa 1960. Olden, 1921, p.38. Bean, 1938, p. 622. Ibid, p. 627. Ibid. AWM38 3DRL 7953 Item 27. Quote from King J, (2003) Gallipoli Diaries: The Anzacs’ own story day by day, Kangaroo Press, Victoria, p. 142. Ibid, p. 143. Bean, 1938, p. 619. Quote from Liddle, 1976, p. 207. Chris Roberts, personal comments to author, 2008. Bean, 1938, p. 619. AWM4 10/15/4. Foss, diary, AWM 1 DRL 298. Bean, 1937, p. 627. AWM4 10/1/13 PART 1. Bean, 1938, p. 619. Albany Advertiser, 5 July 1916. Olsen, 2006. AWM38 3DRL 8042 Item 25. AWM 224. AWM 1DRL 547. AWM PR 90/137. Bean, 1938, p. 633. Quote from Austin, 1997, p. 97.

Chapter 14 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9 10 11 12 13

Bean, 1938, p. 637. Ibid, pp. 635–36. Quote from Pedersen, 1992, p. 105. Bean, 1938, p. 636. Kannengiesser, 1927. Ibid, p. 207. Kannengiesser, 1927. Celik K, (2000) Gallipoli: The August Offensive – A Turkish view of the August Offensive, (unpublished), AWM. Quote from Stowers, 2005, pp. 157– 58. Pugsley, 1998. Quote from Stowers, 2005, p. 159. Travers, 2001. Bean, 1938, p. 639.

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n ote s to pa g e s 20 8–243

14 Algie CS Captain, diary, 7 July 1915, Alexandrer Turnbull Library, Wellington, MS 1374. 15 Quote from Pugsley, 1998, p. 283. 16 Ibid. 17 Bean, 1938, p. 641. 18 Quote from Townsend, 2000, p. 39–40. 19 Bean, 1938. 20 Bean, 1952, p. 194. 21 Ibid, p. 196. 22 Bean, 1938. 23 Ibid, p.538. 24 Lawrence, 1915, AWM; also see East, 1981, p. 66. 25 Ibid, p. 68. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid, pp. 68–69. 28 AWM38, 3DRL/8042, item 20. 29 Bean, 1938. 30 Ibid, p. 540. 31 Bean, 1938. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid, p. 543. 34 AWM4 23/19/6. 35 Bean, 1938. 36 Taylor & Cusack, 1942, p. 135. 37 Bean, 1938, pp. 545–46; Taylor & Cusack, 1942. 38 Bean, 1938, p. 547. 39 Taylor & Cusack, 1942, pp. 137–38. 40 Bean, 1938. 41 Ibid. 42 AWM4 23/19/6. 43 Bean, 1938, p. 549. 44 AWM 2 DRL0103. 45 Bean, 1938; 1st Infantry Brigade War Diary, April–August 1915, AWM4 23/1/2 Part 1.

Chapter 15 1 2 3

Quote from Townsend, 2000, pp. 73–74. Ibid, p 127, Quote from Adam-Smith, 1991, pp. 122–23.

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Bean, 1938. Quote from Adam-Smith, 1991, p.122. Kemal, (undated) Atatürk’s Memoirs, p. 34. Celik, 2000. Von Sanders, 1927, p. 85. Bean, 1938, p. 550. Ibid. Bean, 1952, p. 197. Ibid, pp. 195–96. AWM4 23/19/6. Quote from Austin, 2007, p. 74. Quote from Durham, 2000, p. 17. McAnulty diary, AWM 1DRL042. Quote from James, 1999, p. 267.

Chapter 16 1 2 3

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

15 16 17

Lawrence, 1915, AWM; also see East, 1981, p. 73. Quote from Brenchley& Brenchley, 2004, p. 155. Longmore C, (1929) The Old Sixteenth, (reprint 2007, Hesperian Press, Perth); Bean, 1938. Bean, 1938, p. 656. Bean, 1938. Ibid. Ibid. Kemal, (undated) Atatürk’s Memoirs, p. 41. Bean, 1938; Steele & Hart, 1994. Bean, 1938. Bean, 1938; Pedersen, 1992. Hatwell, 2005. Beam, 1938; Hatwell, 2005. Kerr G, (1998) Lost Anzacs: The story of two brothers, Oxford University Press, Melbourne. Kerr, 1998, pp.99–101. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929; Bean, 1938, 1952. Bean, 1938; 1952.

Chapter 17 1

Quote from Pugsley, 1998, p. 285.

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n ote s to pa g e s 244–28 4

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Cunningham WH, Reveille, RSL, 1932. Quote from Pugsley, 1998, p. 286. Bean, 1938; Pugsley, 1998. Quote from Townsend, 2000, p. 40. Kemal, (undated) Atatürk’s Memoirs, p. 34. Ibid, pp. 34–35. Kemal, (undated) Atatürk’s Memoirs, p. 35; Danisman, 2007. Quote from Pugsley, 1998, p. 296. Bean, 1938; Stowers, 2005. Pugsley, 1998. Quote from Pugsley, 1997, p. 288. Pugsley, 1998. Quote from Pugsley, 1998, pp. 289– 90. Quote from Pugsley, 1998, p. 291. Quote from Carlyon, 2001, p. 439. Quote from Pugsley, 1998, p. 294. Cunningham, 1932. Davis RJ, Statement of capture by the Turks at Anafarta, Gallipoli Peninsula, dated 29 August 1919, New Zealand National Archives. Quote from Stowers, 2005, p.172. Ibid, p. 173. Ibid. Ibid, p. 183. Kemal, (undated) Atatürk’s Memoirs, p. 36. Celik, 2000, p. 5. Bean, 1938, p. 676. Quote from Townsend, 2000, p.74.

Chapter 18 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Taylor & Cusack 1942, p. 141. Bean, 1952, p. 198. Ibid. Quote from Olson, 2006, p. 252. Quote from Travers, 2001, p. 117. AWM 1 DRL240. Taylor & Cusack, 1942, p. 141. Quote from Gammage, 1974, p.71. Bean, 1938, p. 554. Bean, 1952, p. 198. Bean, 1938.

12 Snelling S, (1995) Gallipoli: VCs of the First World War, Wrens Park, UK. 13 Ibid. 14 Quote from Fewster, 2007, pp. 189– 90. 15 McMullin R, (2002) Pompey Elliott, Scribe, Melbourne; Austin, 2004; Bean, 1938. 16 AWM 2DRL 513/7-9. 17 AWM 2DRL 513-46. 18 Bean, 1938; McMullin, 2002. 19 Quote from Austin, 2004, p. 93. 20 Bean, 1938. 21 AWM423/1/2 Part 1. 22 Bean, 1952, pp. 198–99.

Chapter 19 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

The New Zealand Herald, 12 August 1978. Ibid. Ibid. Waite, 1921, p. 223. Quote from Pugsley, 1997, p. 296. Ibid, p. 298. Stevens, 1973, p. 104. Quote from Stowers, 2005, p. 175. Stevens, 1973, p. 104–11. Bean, 1938. Quote from Pugsley, 1998, p.298. Bean, 1938. Stevens, 1973, p. 104. Townsend, 2000, p. 40. Bean, 1938, p. 689. Bean, 1938. Quote from Stowers, 2005, p. 181. Malthus C, (1965) ANZAC: A retrospective, Whitcombe & Tombs, Auckland, pp. 104–105. Bean, 1938, p. 691. Bean, 1938, p. 678. Quote from Stowers, 2005, p.178. Stowers, 2005. Quote from Stowers, 2005, p. 180. Bean, 1938, p. 679. Ibid, p. 681. Stowers, 2005.

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n ote s to pa g e s 28 4–319

27 Quote from Steele & Hart, 1994, p, 238. 28 Quote from James, 1999, p. 284. 29 Aspinall-Oglander, 1929. 30 Kemal, (undated) Atatürk’s Memoirs, p. 40. 31 Turkish Official History of the Gallipoli Battles, (reprint 2002, in Turkish), Ankara, maps 50–51. 32 Kemal, (undated) Atatürk’s Memoirs, p. 43. 33 Butler, 1938, pp. 301–302. 34 Quote from Pugsley, 1998, p. 305. 35 Quote from Carlyon, 2001, p. 443.

Chapter 20 1

2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Carbery (1924) The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914–1918, Whitcombe & Tombs, Auckland, p. 93. Quote from Travers, 2001, p.133. Quote from Stowers, 2005, p. 185. Mackenzie, 1921, p. 172. Quote from Stowers, 2005. Browne HE, diary, MS Papers 3519, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington. Bean. 1938, p.693. Quote from Stowers, 2005, p. 192. Quote from James, 1999, p. 289. Ibid, p.290. Quote from Liddle, 1976, p. 213. Quote from Cowan, 1926, p. 49. Bean, 1938, p. 699. Watson TP Captain, IWM DOCS ms letters, letter dated 15 August 1915. Hamilton, 1920, Vol 2, p. 80. Ibid, p.81. Bean, 1938; Aspinall-Oglander, 1929. Ibid. Bean, 1938; Pugsley, 1998; Kinloch, 2005. Browne diary, MS Papers 3519. Bean, 1938; Aspinall-Oglander, 1929. Stowers, 2005. Carbery, 1924, p. 96.

24 25 26 27 28

Pugsley, 1998. Quote from Stowers, 2005, p. 191. Pugsley, 1998. Quote from James, 1999, p. 290. Phipson ES Colonel, typed article ‘Thoughts on a Royal Inspection’, IWM DOCS, pp. 3–4. 29 Quote from James, 1999, p. 297. 30 Bean, 1938. 31 Ibid; Celik, 2000.

Chapter 21 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

Lawrence, 1915, AWM; also see East, 1981, p. 73. AWM4 23/20/6. Quote from Austin, 2004, p. 93. AWM4 23/1/2 Part 1. Bean, 1938; Snelling,1995. Snelling, 1995, p. 161. Bean, 1938, p. 561. Austin, 2004. Quote from Snelling, 1995, p. 158; Austin, 2004, p. 94. Bean, 1938; Snelling 1995. Quote from Snelling, 1995, p. 158. Ibid. AWM 3DRL3328. Quote from Austin, 2004, p. 95. Albany Advertiser, 15 September 1915. AWM 3DRL3328. Bean, 1938, p. 562. Austin, 2004. Quote from Snelling, 1995, p. 154. AWM4 23/18/3. AWM PR82/003. AWM4 23/18/3. Bean, 1938, p. 565. Quote from Adam-Smith, 1985, p. 121. Quote from Snelling, 1995, p. 164. AWM PR82/003. AWM 1 DRL240. AWM4 23/19/6. Quotes from Austin, 2007, p. 80. AWM 1 DRL240. Quote from McMullin, 2002,

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n ote s to pa g e s 319–345

32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

pp. 163–64. AWM4 23/24/6. AWM4 23/22/6. AWM 1DRL0373. AWM 3DRL3328. Quote from Austin, 2004, p. 97. Bean, 1952. AWM 2DRL 513/7-9. Lawrence, 1915, AWM; also see East, 1981, p. 75.

Chapter 22 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Bean, 1938; Aspinall-Oglander, 1929. Ibid. Quote from Celik, 2000, p.6. Ibid, p. 7. Bean, 1952. Scott AG, IWM DOCS ms letter dated 1 December 1915. Trolove, (undated) The Battle of Sari Bair. Waite, 1921, pp. 226–27. Quote from Pugsley, 1998, p. 309.

10 Quote from Mango A, (1999) Ataturk, John Murray, London, p. 152. 11 Quote from Stowers, 2005, p. 198. 12 Aspinall-Oglander, 1929. 13 Phipson ES Colonel, IWM DOCS, typed article ‘Thoughts on a Royal Inspection’, p. 4. 14 Kinloch, 2005, p. 228. 15 Lawrence, 1915, AWM; also see East, 1981, pp. 77–78. 16 Quote from Austin, 2007, p. 81. 17 Quote from Crawley R, (2006) Perspectives of Battle: Lone Pine, August 1915, Honours Thesis, University of Wollongong, p. 62. 18 AWM PR82/003. 19 Brenchley& Brenchley, 2005, p. 157.

Epilogue 1 2

Quote from Pugsley, 1998, pp. 311– 12. Quote from Kearney, 2005, p. 145.

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Refere n c e s

This selected bibliography lists published literature only. All unpublished materials referenced within the text are documented in the Notes. Adam-Smith P, (1991) The Anzacs, Claremont, Melbourne Aspinall-Oglander CF, (1929) Military Operations: Gallipoli: Inception of the Campaign to May 1915, Vol. 1, Imperial War Museum, London —— (1932) Military Operations: Gallipoli: May 1915 to Evacuation, Vol. 2, Imperial War Museum, London Austin R, (1989) The White Gurkhas: The Australians at the Second Battle of Krithia, McCrae, Australia —— (1992) As Rough As Bags: The history of the 6th Battalion, 1st AIF, 1914–1919, McCrae, Australia —— (1997) Cobbers in Khaki: The history of the 8th Battalion, 1914–1918, McCrae, Australia —— (2004) Our Dear Old Battalion: The story of the 7th Battalion AIF, 1914–1919, Slouch Hat, Melbourne —— (2007) The Fighting Fourth: A history of Sydney’s 4th Battalion, 1914–1919, Slouch Hat, Melbourne Bean CEW , (1937) Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Vol. I: ‘The Story of Anzac: From the outbreak of war to the end of the first phase of the Gallipoli Campaign, May 4 1915’, (7th edn), Angus & Robertson, Sydney —— (1938) Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18, Vol II: ‘The Story of Anzac: From 4 May, 1915, to the evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula’, (6th edn), Angus & Robertson, Sydney —— (1948) Anzac to Amiens, Australian War Memorial, Canberra —— (1952) Gallipoli Mission, Australian War Memorial, Canberra —— (1957) Two Men I Knew: William Bridges and Brudenell White – Founders of the AIF, Angus & Robertson, Sydney Belford W , (1940) ‘Legs-eleven’: Being the story of the 11th Battalion (AIF) in the Great War of 1914– 1918, Imperial Printing, Perth Blair D, (2001) Dinkum Diggers: An Australian battalion at war, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne Brenchley F & Brenchley E (2005) Myth Maker: Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett – the Englishman who sparked Australia’s Gallipoli legend, Wiley, Australia Broadbent H, (1990) The Boys Who Came Home: Recollections of Gallipoli, ABC Books, Sydney —— (2005) Gallipoli: The fatal shore, Penguin, Australia Burness P, (1996) The Nek: The tragic charge of the Light Horse at Gallipoli, Kangaroo Press, Victoria Bush EW , (1975) Gallipoli, Allen & Unwin, London Butler AG, (1938) Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services 1914–1918, Vol. 1,

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references

Australian War Memorial, Canberra Cameron DW , (2007) 25 April 1915: The day the Anzac legend was born, Allen & Unwin, Sydney Carbery AD, (1924) The New Zealand Medical Service in the Great War 1914–1918, Whitcombe & Tombs, Auckland Carlyon L, (2001) Gallipoli, Pan Macmillan, Australia Cavill HW , (1916) Imperishable Anzacs: A story of Australia’s famous First Brigade from the diary of Pte Harold Walter Cavill N. 27 1 Bn, William Brooks, Sydney Celik K, (2000) Gallipoli: The August Offensive – A Turkish view of the August Offensive, (unpublished), Australian War Memorial, Canberra Chambers S, (2003) Gully Ravine: Gallipoli, Battleground Europe series, Leo Cooper, South Yorkshire, UK Chasseaud P & Doyle P, (2005) Grasping Gallipoli: Terrain, maps and failure at the Dardanelles, 1915, Spellmount, Staplehurst Cowan J, (1926) The Maoris in the Great War: A history of the New Zealand Native Contingent and Pioneer Battalion, Gallipoli, 1915; France and Flanders, 1916–1918, Whitcombe & Tombs, Auckland Crawley R, (2006) Perspectives of Battle: Lone Pine, August 1915, Honours thesis, University of Wollongong Creighton O, (1916) With the 29th Division in Gallipoli, Longmans, Green, London Curran T, (1994) Across the Bar: The story of ‘Simpson’, the man with the donkey, Australia and Tyneside’s great military hero, Ogmios, Brisbane Danisman HB, (2001) Gallipoli 1915: Bloody Ridge (Lone Pine) Diary – Lt Mehmed Fasih, 5th Imperial Ottoman Army, Gallipoli 1915, Danizer Kitabevi, Istanbul —— (2007) Gallipoli 1915: Day One Plus … 27th Ottoman Inf Regt vs ANZACS, based on Account of Lt Col Sefik Aker, Commander of 27th Inf Regt, Danizer Kitabevi, Istanbul Derham R, (2000) Silent Ruse: Escape from Gallipoli – A record and memories of the life of General Sir Brudenell White KCB KCMG KCVO DSO, Oryx, Melbourne East R (ed), (1981) The Gallipoli Diary of Sergeant Lawrence of the Australian Engineers – 1st AIF 1915, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne Erickson EJ, (2001) Ordered to Die: A history of the Ottoman Army in the First World War, Greenwood Press, Connecticut Fewster K, (1983) Gallipoli Correspondent: The frontline diary of CEW Bean, George Allen & Unwin, Sydney —— (2007) Bean’s Gallipoli, Allen & Unwin, Sydney Fewster K, Baüsarın V & Baüsarın H, (2003) Gallipoli: The Turkish story, Allen & Unwin, Sydney Gammage B, (1972) The Broken Years: Australian soldiers in the Great War, Penguin, Australia Glen F, (2004) Bowler of Gallipoli: Witness to the Anzac Legend, Australian Military History, Australia Hamilton I, (1920) Gallipoli Diary, Vol. 2, Edward Arnold, London Hamilton J, (2004) Goodbye Cobber, God Bless You: The fatal charge of the Light Horse, Gallipoli, August 7th 1915, MacMillan, Sydney Hatwell J, (2005) No Ordinary Determination: Percy Black and Harry Murray of the First AIF, Fremantle Arts Centre Press, Fremantle Herbert A, (1919) Mons, Anzac and Kut, Arnold, London Hickey M, (1995) Gallipoli, John Murray, London Hogue O, (1916) Love Letters of an Anzac, Melrose, London Hurst J, (2005) Game to the Last: The 11th Australian Infantry Battalion at Gallipoli, Oxford University Press, Australia

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‘S o r ry, l a d s, b ut th e o r d e r i s to g o’

James RR, (1999) Gallipoli, Pimlico, London Kannengiesser H, (1927) The Campaign in Gallipoli, Hutchison, London Kearney R, (2005) Silent Voices: The story of the 10th Battalion AIF in Australia, Gallipoli, France and Belgium during the Great War 1914–1918, New Holland, Sydney Kemal M. (undated) Atatürk’s Memoirs of the Anafartalar Battles, Imperial War Museum, K35413 Keown AW , (1921) Forward with the Fifth: The story of five years’ war service, Speciality Press, Melbourne Kerr G, (1997) Lost Anzacs: The story of two brothers, Oxford University Press, Sydney Kinloch T, (2005) Echoes of Gallipoli: In the words of New Zealand’s Mounted Riflemen, Exisle, Auckland Liddle P, (1976) Men of Gallipoli: The Dardanelles and the Gallipoli experience August 1914 to January 1916, Penguin, London Lock C, (1936) The Fighting 10th: A South Australian centenary souvenir of the 10th Battalion, AIF, 1914–1919, Web & Son, Adelaide Longmore G, (19297) The Old Sixteenth: Being the record of the 16th Battalion, AIF, during the Great War 1914–1919, Perth (2007 facsimile, Hesperian Press, Western Australia) McCarthy D, (1983) Gallipoli to the Somme: The story of CEW Bean, John Ferguson, Sydney McKinlay J, (1995) Bring Decent Signallers, Royal Australian Corps of Signals Committee, Watsonia, Western Australia McMullin R, (2002) Pompey Elliott, Scribe, Melbourne Mackenzie CN, (1921) The Tale of a Trooper, John Lane, London Malthus C, (2002) ANZAC: A retrospective, Reed, Auckland Mango A, (1999) Ataturk, John Murray, London Moorehead A, (1956) Gallipoli, Ballantine, New York Newman S, (2000) Gallipoli: Then and now, After the Battle Publications, London Newton LM, (1925) The Story of the Twelve: A record of the 12th Battalion, AIF during the Great War of 1914–1918, 12th Battalion Association, Hobart Norman H, (1941) From Anzac to the Hindenburg Line: The history of the 9th Battalion, AIF, 9th Battalion AIF Association, Brisbane Olden A, (1921) Westralian Cavalry in the War: The story of the 10th Light Horse Regiment, AIF, in the Great War, 1914–1918, Alexander McCubbin, Melbourne Olson W , (2006) Gallipoli: The Western Australian story, University of Western Australia Press, Perth Orrnek T & Toker F, (2005) Gallipoli: Companion to the feature-length documentary, Ekip Film, Turkey Pederson PA, (1985) Monash as Military Commander, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne —— (2007) The ANZACS: Gallipoli to the Western Front, Penguin, Australia Perry A, (1916) ‘The Men of Anzac’, The Anzac Book, Cassell, London Perry R, (2004) Monash: The outsider who won a war, Random House Australia, Sydney Pugsley C, (1998) Gallipoli: The New Zealand story, Reed, Auckland —— (2004) The ANZAC Experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War, Reed, Auckland Robertson J, (1990) Anzac and Empire: The tragedy and glory of Gallipoli, Hamlyn, Australia Robson LL, (1970) The First AIF: A study of its recruitment 1914–1918, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne Rodge H & Rodge J, (2003) Helles Landings: Gallipoli, Battleground Europe Series, Leo Cooper,

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references

South Yorkshire Rule J, (1933) Jacka’s Mob, Angus & Robertson, Sydney Snelling S, (1995) Gallipoli: VCs of the First World War, Wrens Park, Gloucestershire, UK Stacy B, Kindon F & Chedgey H, (1931) The History of the First Battalion, AIF, 1914–1919, 1st Battalion AIF Association, Sydney Stanley P, (2005) Quinn’s Post, Anzac, Gallipoli, Allen & Unwin, Sydney Steel N, (1994) Gallipoli, Battleground Europe series, Leo Cooper, Yorkshire Steel N & Hart P, (1994) Defeat at Gallipoli, Papermac, London Stowers R, (2005) Bloody Gallipoli: The New Zealanders’ story, David Bateman, Auckland Strachan H, (2001) The First World War, Vol. I: ‘To Arms’, Oxford University Press, Oxford —— (2003) The First World War, Simon & Schuster, London Taylor FW & Cusack TA, (1942) Nulli Secundus: A history of the Second Battalion, AIF 1914–1919, Swanbourne, WA (1992 reprint) Townsend C, (1999) Gallipoli 1915: From the uttermost ends of the earth, Patricia Townsend, Paeroa, New Zealand Travers T, (2001) Gallipoli, 1915, Tempus, South Carolina Tyquin M, (1993) Gallipoli: The medical war – The Australian Army Medical Services in the Dardanelles Campaign of 1915, UNSW Press, Sydney Von Sanders L, (1927) Five Years in Turkey, (1st English edn), Bailliere, Tindall & Cox, London Waite F, (1921) The New Zealanders at Gallipoli, Whitcombe & Tombs, Auckland Wakefield A & Moody S, (2004) Under the Devil’s Eye: Britain’s forgotten army at Salonika 1915– 1918, Sutton, UK Williams P, (2007) The Battle for Anzac Ridge, Australian Military History Publications, Loftus Wren E, (1935) Randwick to Hargicourt: History of the 3rd Battalion AIF, Ronald G McDonald, Sydney Wrench C, (1985) Campaigning with the Fighting 9th (in and out of the line with the 9th AIF) 1914– 1919, Boolarong, Brisbane

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Index

400 Plateau 8, 15, 38–39, 53, 56, 72–73, 76–77, 80, 108, 117, 186, 230, 285, 298, 337 Aarons, Captain Boyd 63, 67 Abdel Rahman Bair 125, 145, 165, 170, 172–74, 207, 226, 233, 235–38, 271, 296, 327, Achi Baba 4–5, 296 Adams, Sergeant W 309 Aegean 15, aerial/aircraft 38, 74, Aghyl Dere 17, 21, 27, 124– 25, 136, 141–43, 145, 163, 165–68, 170, 174, 203–04, 208, 223, 247, 257, 280, 283, 290–91, 293, 295–97, 326, 334, 340–41 aid post, see medical Alai Tepe 300 Aker, Lieutenant-Colonel Sefik 286 Alexandria, see Egypt Algie, Captain 207 Allanson, Major 53, 203, 241, 284, 295–96, 304–05, 328–29, 332–34, 340–41, 344 Allerdice, Lance-Corporal Charlie 85 Allison, Private 46, ammunition, see supplies Anafarta Sagir 155, 299, 343 Anafartalar 20, 87, 285–86 animals 9–10, 34 Antill, Brigade Major 181, 192, 195, Anzac 2–4, 7–24, 27, 29–36, 38, 42, 52–58, 66, 71, 79, 82–83, 86–87, 117–18, 123–24, 134, 138, 143,

154–55, 176, 186–87, 200, 204–05, 207, 226, 236, 243–45, 252, 264, 279–87, 291, 298–300, 305, 323, 326, 330, 335, 337–38 Anzac artillery Anzac Corps 1st Australian Division 24, 144, 268, 322, 345 Battalions 1st 74–75, 77, 109, 111–12, 121, 215, 221, 262, 317, 337–338 2nd 74, 83–84, 85, 101–02, 111, 119–20, 218, 220, 227–29, 262, 266, 319 3rd 74, 81, 83–84, 86, 90, 96, 98–99, 101–02, 108, 111, 117, 214, 261, 307, 309, 317 4th 26, 57, 74–75, 77, 84–85, 92– 93, 96, 99, 102, 108, 122, 211, 262, 307–08, 316, 319, 337 5th 319 6th 121, 149, 151, 154 7th 77, 116, 120–22, 228, 262, 265, 267–68, 307– 08, 319–22 8th 86, 201 9th 42 10th 42 11th 8, 36, 40, 42, 48, 50–51, 58,

64, 68 12th 39–40, 51, 58, 76, 112, 119– 121, 221–22 Brigade 1st 24, 72, 74, 76–78, 83, 87, 109–10, 112, 121, 150, 215, 269, 309, 314, 319 2nd 4, 57, 85, 89, 110, 120, 151, 153, 156 3rd 39–40, 65, 85 Australian Light Horse 12–13, 24, 29, 42, 52–53, 55, 85, 87, 118, 124, 144, 164, 177–87, 190–1, 193, 197–8, 200–1, 206, 286, 319, 342 Australian Medical Corps 120, 277, 286, 291, New Zealand and Australian Division 23–24, 345 Battalions 13th 142, 145, 167–68, 170, 173, 226, 239, 299, 335, 14th 145, 170, 173, 225, 235, 237– 39, 300, 15th 170, 172–73, 225–26, 233–37 16th 164, 170, 172– 74, 176, 225, 235–37, 335 Auckland 145, 159, 163, 205–07, 209, 223, 243– 44, 247, 273, 275, 302, 305, 326, 330, 332 Canterbury 145, 159–61,

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163, 208–09, 223–24, 245, 280, 284, 330–31 Otago 145, 159–60, 163, 176, 206, 223–24, 242, 248, 256, 282, 291–92, 303, 305, 331 Wellington 145, 159, 163, 205–09, 223–24, 242– 48, 250, 257, 275–76, 281, 283, 291, 330 Brigades 4th Australian 8, 12, 57, 165, 168, 173, 174, 176, 202, 238, 286 New Zealand 4, 8, 160, 242 Contingent Maori 125–30, 133, 134, 136–37, 140–41, 145, 224, 242, 256, 257–58, 279, 284, 295–97, 305, 350, 345 New Zealand Mounted Rifles 16–18, 29, 124– 30, 134–41, 224, 242, 257, 270–73, 281– 82, 291–93, 305, 330 Anzac Cove 16, 187, 287 Apex 163, 174, 176, 204–09, 224, 242–43, 245, 248, 255, 257, 270, 273, 277, 279–80, 282–84, 301–02, 326, 329–32, 334, 340 Ari Burnu (Ariburnu) 13, 21–22, 117 artillery 4, 13, 18, 26–27, 30, 40, 42, 50, 55–58, 62, 65–66, 71, 77–78, 83–84, 86–88, 90, 108, 10, 120, 126, 145, 150, 168, 178, 181–83, 191, 200, 202, 204, 206–07, 210–12, 218, 225, 228, 238, 242–44, 247, 252, 257, 260, 266, 271–72, 281, 284–85, 287, 296–97, 300, 322, 328, 330–331 Asma Dere 29, 39–40, 43–49, 62, 68, 76, 125, 170, 174, 226, 233, 235–37,

299, 337 Atatürk, see also Kemal 19–22, 87–88, 98, 117, 172, 176, 205, 227, 246–47, 256, 285–86, 299–300, 305, 327–31, 337, 341, 343 Ashmead-Bartlett, Ellis 31, 54, 84, 110 Ashton, Jim 181 Asquith, British Prime Minister 57 Austin, Captain 12 Australia Valley 173, 224, 239 Aylward, Lance-Corporal 92–93, 95–96, 211–12, 215 Aylward’s Post 212, 215 Baby 700 8, 18, 24, 29. 80, 87, 124, 144, 148, 177, 179, 181, 183, 198–200, 202, 206, 245, 247, 285, 339, 342 Bacchante HMS 78 Baigent, Private Edward 209, 245, 276 Bain, Trooper 196 Bald, Lieutenant-Colonel 203, 223–24 Baldwin Colonel 227, 279–80, 283–84, 290–93, 295–97, 302, 333, 340–41 Balkan Gun Pitts 53 Barrow, Trooper 190, Bassett, Corporal Cyril (VC) 270–72, Bastin, Lieutenant 315 Bates, Private Robert 320 batteries, see artillery Battleship Hill 15, 18, 21, 29, 88, 117, 124, 164, 204– 09, 227, 245, 247–48, 256, 277, 285, 292, 329, 339, 342 Bauchop, Colonel Arthur 16–17, 134, 139–40 Bauchop’s Hill 124, 130, 133–34, 136–37, 139, 166, 290, 299, 331 Bean, Charles 36, 74, 80, 82–83, 86, 109, 116, 143, 148, 153, 164–65, 168–69, 173, 177, 183, 187, 196, 200, 211, 220, 233, 264, 269, 283

Begbie, Private 6 Bendrey, Private 84 Bennett, Lieutenant-Colonel 149, 151–53, 156–58 Bewsher, Lieutenant-Colonel 333–34 Biggs, Trooper 196 Birdwood, Lieutenant-General 15–16, 18–19, 23, 25, 30, 34–35, 38, 40, 52–54, 118, 158, 160, 177, 180, 224, 277, 298–99, 326, 334, 337, 340, 344 Birkett, sapper William 271 Birrell, Surgeon-General 34 Bishop, Lieutenant Allan 303 Black, Lieutenant (VC) 238 Bloody Angle 180 Boddington, Signaler 48 Bolton’s Ridge 39, 42, 47, 222 bombs (jam-tin), see also grenades 12, 26, 38–39, 42–43, 46–49, 55, 57, 62–64, 70, 76, 91, 92–93, 96, 104, 106, 110–12, 114, 119–22, 128–29, 132, 135, 139, 143–44, 150, 153–54, 156–57, 159, 173, 178, 180, 184– 85, 186, 188–89, 190, 193–94, 198–99, 210–11, 213–22, 228, 232, 248, 253–55, 259–60, 263–68, 270–75, 282, 292, 300– 02, 308–13, 315–20, 322, 327–28, 335 bombardment 26, 40, 50–51, 54, 56, 58, 62, 69, 71, 78–83, 104, 126–27, 129, 150, 153, 181–83, 185– 86, 199, 223–24, 233–34, 236, 266, 295, 328 Bourne, Major 185–86 Boynton, Trooper 189 Bradford, Lieutenant-Colonel 333 Braithwaite, Colonel 277, 280 Brazier, Lieutenant-Colonel 191–95 Brennan, Captain 50 Bridges, General 2 Bridges’ Road 53–54 British Battalion/Regiment 4th South Wales

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Borderers 141– 42, 299 5th Connaught Rangers 261, 298, 334 5th Wiltshire 141, 277, 302–03, 326–27, 329– 30, 333 6th East Lancashire 277, 279, 297 6th King’s Own Royal Lancaster Regiment 226, 299 6th Leinster 298, 326, 332 6th Loyal North Lancashire 277, 301–03, 326, 328 6th Royal Irish Rifles 277, 279, 291, 297 6th South Lancashire 203, 224, 241, 284, 295, 328, 332, 7th Gloucestershire 203, 283 7th North Staffordshire 241 7th Royal Scouts 6 8th Welch Regiment 224, 248, 283 9th Warwickshire 241, 284, 295 9th Worcestershire 328 10th Hampshire 291, 326, 333 Royal Welch Fusiliers 193, 194–95, 197 Brigade 38th 53–54, 224, 226, 277 39th 53, 203, 223, 240, 328, 334 40th 53, 124, 141, 165, 173, 277 86th 4 Corps 9th 16, 27, 143

Division 10th 3, 345 11th 3 13th 3, 27, 298, 345 29th 6–7 53rd 3 54th 3, 299 Royal Naval 5, 7 Brown, Lieutenant 99 Brown. Lieutenant Colonel 111, 214 Brown, Signaler John 182, Browne, Trooper Harry 293, 301 Brown’s Dip 76, 82, 110, 121, 232, 261, 265, 268, 311, 335, 337 Buck, Captain Peter (MO) 140, 297 Bulair 236 Bull, Trooper Mel 294 Bully Beef Sap 195 Burge, Lieutenant 185 Burton, Corporal (VC) 311– 13 Burton, Private Ormond 287 Caddy’s Battery 245, 247 Calcutt, Private 239 Cannan, Lieutenant-Colonel 170, 172–74, 235, 237 Carbines, Arthur 224, 257–58 Cardine, Lieutenant Colonel 326 Carnell, sapper 36 Carr, Private 184 casualties 5, 7, 9, 11, 46, 55, 66, 69, 86, 119–20, 122, 136, 150, 156, 190, 206, 209, 217–18, 225, 228, 235, 238, 241, 267, 274, 282–83, 301, 305, 322, 338 Cayley, Colonel 203, 223–24, 328, 334 Chabrel, Captain 172 Chailak Dere 17–18, 29, 133–34, 136, 142, 145, 159, 163, 165, 203, 208, 223–24, 279–80, 282–83, 290, 302, 341 Chambers, Major 132 Chamchak Punar 203 Charman, Private 43–44 Cherry, Private 109

Cheshire Ridge 163, 203, 290, 334, 341 Chessboard, The 30, 158, 179–80, 193, 196–98, 201, 342 Chipper, Lindsay 87 Chipper, Ross 87 Chocolate Hills 24, 27 Chunuk Bair 15, 17, 19, 21–22, 24, 29, 58, 117, 123–25, 130, 142–43, 145, 159–160, 163–64, 176, 200, 202–09, 223– 24, 227, 233, 241–58, 269–87, 290–305, 326– 28, 331, 334, 339–44 Clark, Lance-Corporal Charlie 208, 242, 244, 249–51, 272 Clogstoun, Major 52, 67 Clune, Private 172 Cocking, Private 67 Colne HMS 126, 142 Combs, Sergeant 44 Commonwealth (troops) 334, 337, 343–44 communications, see also telephone/telephone lines 30, 56, 66, 72, 74, 78, 86, 88, 109–10, 131, 151–52, 155–56, 161, 170, 195, 209, 237–38, 252, 256, 270, 298, 340, 342 Conkbayiri 21, 246–47, 256, Constantinople 37, 191, 245 Cook, Captain 102, 121, 218 Cook, Sergeant 258 Cook’s Post 211, 217–18, 220 Cooper, Colonel 277, 333 Cotton, Lieutenant 218 Courtney’s Post 10, 201 Cox, Major General 27, 141, 145, 165, 174, 203–04, 225–26, 238, 240, 295, 298, 328 Cox, Trooper Jack 195, Cribb, Major 209 Croker, Lieutenant 49 Cunningham, Major 244, 253, 255, 257, 273, 275, 282 Cup, The 72, 91, 93, 98–99, 101–02, 105–07, 115, 121, 154, 211, 217, 227– 228, 260, 262, 307 Curham, Sergeant 248, 331

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Currey, Bombardier 78 Curry, Major 260 Cuthill, Lieutenant 303 Daisy Patch 84, 109 Dale, Major 183, 189 Daly, Captain 150, 154, 156 Damakjelik Bair 17, 27, 29, 124–25, 141–43, 145, 168, 170, 173, 176, 225– 26, 233, 235, 237, 299 Dansey, Captain 129 Dardanelles 3, 15, 30, 227 Dare, Major 237 Darnell, Lieutenant 42, 62 Davidson, Major 211 Davidson, Subaltern 139 Davies, Private 44 Davis, Private John 253–54, Dawson, Captain 6 Day, Lieutenant 238 Dead Man’s Ridge 185, 194, 198–99 Denton, Corporal 17 Destroyer Hill 130–31 Dick, Major 131 Dignan, sapper Brian 270–71 disease, see medical Dodington Major 334, dressing station, see medical Duke, Captain 57, 91 Dunlop, Major 155 Dunstan, Corporal (VC) 311–12 Durham, Lance Corporal 282 Durrant, Captain 173 Dyer, Private 156 Dyett, Lieutenant 266–68 Eastwood, Captain 165, 168 Edirna Sirt 8, 81, 88, 117, 157, 285, 322 Edwards, Lieutenant 310 Edwards, Private Tom 43 Edwards, Sapper Ballington 270 Egypt 23, 25, 35, 54–55, 58 Elliott, Kate 322 Elliott, Lieutenant-Colonel ‘Pompey’ 121, 265–68, 307, 310–11, 313–16, 319–20, 322 Elmslie, Major Engineers 25, 35, 40, 43, 49,

57, 67–68, 76, 78, 86, 113–14, 118, 136–137, 145, 159–60, 164, 174, 186, 330 Erikson, Private 266 Fairclough, Lieutenant 156–57 Farm, The 142, 174, 208, 241, 257, 275, 279, 284, 291, 295–98, 302, 326– 27, 329–30, 332–34 Farmar, Captain 4 Fash, Lieutenant Mehmed 79 fatigue, see medical Fevzi Bey, Colenel 237, 285 Findlay, Lieutenant-Colonel 140 Finlayson, Trooper 282 firing line 12, 25–26, 34–35, 48, 69, 72, 75, 81–82, 84, 110, 113, 152, 156, 182, 212, 281, 297, 304, 308, 320 firing step 9, 25, 42–43, 82, 90, 115, 122, 150, 183, 188, 195 Fisher, Lieutenant 266 food, see supplies Foss, Corporal 191, 197 Forsyth, Colonel 151, 153, 157–58 Franklyn, Lieutenant 42–43, 47, 65–66 French (troops – fleet) 4–5, 71, 245, 337 Fullerton, Captain 120 Fullerton, Major 155 Fyfe, James 140 Gaba Tepe 3, 8, 15, 19, 39, 55, 73, 117 Galip Bey 327 Gallipoli Peninsula 2, 8, 16–17, 25–26, 33, 37, 39, 245, 264, 299, 309, 312, 316, 318, 337–38 Gambirsing Pun, SergeantMajor 304, 333 Gammage, Private 85, 112, 317–18, 337 Gardiner, Corporal Richard (Dick) 267, 308 Gardiner, Private Alf 267 Garland, Private Leo 153 Garnham, Lieutenant 99

Garratt, Trooper 184 Geneva Convention 304 German Officers’ Trench 24, 30, 148–59, 180–81, 185, 200–01, 322, 342 German U-Boat (U21) 16 Giles, Lieutenant 92 Gillespie, Lieutenant-Colonel 142 Glasfurd, Major 158 Glasgow, Major 180, 184, 194, 198–99 Godley, Major-General 17, 23–24, 27, 29, 164–65, 168–69, 174, 202, 206, 209, 223–24, 226, 277, 279–80, 294, 299, 302, 326, 340, 343–45 Goldenstedt, Sergeant-Major 101, 260, 268 Goldenstedt’s Post 211, 260, 262, 268–69, 310 Goode, Ralph 260 Gordon, Private 284, 302, 326 Goudemy, Private 221 Graham, Private Andy 64–65 Graham W. 337 Grant, Major 207 Green, Chaplin George 185 grenades (cricket ball), see also bombs 13, 46, 62–63, 106, 119, 122, 153, 190, 195, 198, 215–20, 228, 244, 255, 266, 268, 275, 293, 300, 311, 313, 322, 328 Guilfoyle, Lieutenant 156 Gully Ravine 6 Gun Lane 112 Gun Ridge, see Third Ridge Gurkha battalion, see Indian Guthrie, Captain 141 Hacking, Lieutenant 218 Hagenson, Frank 224 Hale, Sergeant 221 Hall, Lieutenant, R.A. 150 Hall, Lieutenant, Sydney 68–69 Hallahan, Sergeant 46, 49 Hamilton, General Ian 57, 298–99, 344–45 Hamilton, Private John (VC) 309

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Hampshire, Corporal 199 Hardey, Corporal 161–62 Hargest, Lieutenant 135–36 Harkness, Lieutenant 217 Harper, Trooper 191 Harris, Lieutenant 198–99 Harris Ridge 40, 53 Harston, Captain 252, 282 Harwood, Captain 238 Haslam, Private 64 Hassell, Trooper 118, 191–92 Hastings, Captain 125, 127 Hastings, Major 276 Hay, Lieutenant-Colonel 193, 197–98 Haywood, Private 92 health, see medical Helles 2–4, 7, 17, 38, 54–55, 70–71, 117, 205, 236, 281, 327 Henderson, Jack 272 Henderson, Lieutenant James 272 Herbert, Captain Aubrey 11, 284 Hicks, Captain 291 Hill 60 87, 174, 226, 233, 300, 335, 338, Hill 100 235, 237, 300 Hill 180 247 Hill 971 17–18, 21, 24, 27, 29, 36, 58, 117, 123, 125, 141–42, 145, 155, 159, 164–65,170, 174, 176, 202, 205, 225–26, 233, 235–40, 277, 285, 327, 339–40, 342 Hill Q 24, 27, 29, 58, 123, 125, 141–42, 145, 159, 168, 170, 172, 174, 176, 202–03, 205–06, 209, 233, 240, 248–50, 252, 254, 257, 277, 279–80, 283–84, 292, 294–95, 327, 339–40, 344 Hill, Lance-Corporal 279 Hill, Trooper 196 Hilmer-Smith, Lieutenant Colonel 39–40 Hiroti, Lieutenant 129 Hogue, Trooper 85 Hoja Mufti (A) 105, 107, 121, 269 Holland, Sergeant 314 Holly Ridge 38, 42 Holt, Private 85

Hooper, Captain 319 Hoops, Corporal 192 Hore, Captain 189 hospital/hospital ship 23, 33, 54, 120, 193, 232, 264, 272, 277, 287, 318, 322, 337 Howell, Trooper 193 Howell-Price, Lieutenant 212, 309 Hughes, Colonel Frederic 192 Hughes, Lieutenant-Colonel 161, 163, 208 Hughes’ Gully 161 Humphreys, Private 108 Hungerford, Billy 43 Hunter-Weston, General 3–7 Idriess, Trooper 319 Iffla, Stan 164 Imbros 3, 35–36 Indian (troops) 54, 57, 123–25, 145, 159, 164, 168–70, 172, 174, 202– 03, 205, 223–24, 240–41, 245, 257, 264, 277, 294– 96, 337, 339–40, 344 Brigade 29th 54, 170, 174 Gurkhas 53, 145, 170, 174, 176, 203, 208–09, 225, 241, 257–58, 281, 284, 295–96, 304–05, 327–28, 332, 340, 344–45 5th 170, 174, 176, 203, 241, 6th 145, 170, 174, 203, 241, 284, 295, 304, 328, 332, 10th 145, 170, 174, 176, 206, 284, 295, Sikhs 164, 170, 174, 225, 237, 241, 305, 345 14th 170, 174, 225, 237, 241 Irvine, Brigade Major 2 Izzettin, Major 331 Jacka, Lance-Corporal Albert 10 Jackson, Captain 42, 44–45 Jackson, Lieutenant A 150,

156–57 Jacobs, Captain 109, 111, 220–21, 228, 268 Jacobs’s Post 218–20, 228, 259, 268, 310 Jacobs’s Trench 227, 261, 263, 266, 268, 307, 308, 313, 315 Jardine, Lieutenant 250–51 Jarman, Trooper 138 Jenkins, Lieutenant Taffy 143 Jenkins, Private T 309 Jess, Major Carl 89, 151–52, 157–58 Johns, Sergeant Harvey 250, 272 Johns, Private Benjamin 65 Johnston, Colonel Francis 48, 66, 68, 145, 160, 165, 205–09, 250, 277, 279– 80, 290, 301–02, 332, 340, 342, 344 Johnston’s Jolly (and Jolly) 8, 30, 72, 76, 78, 80, 85, 92, 99, 104–05, 115, 119–20, 148, 151, 215, 217, 228, 262, 308 Jordan, Lieutenant-Colonel 252 Jury, Private Stan 337 Kaiajik Dere 174, 226, 233–39 Kanli Sirt, see also Lone Pine 81, 104, 108, 115–16, 118, 154, 269 Kannengiesser, Colonel Hans 31, 117, 204–05 Kelly, Private 211 Kelsall, Captain 294 Kemal, Lieutenant-Colonel Mustafa 19–22, 87–88, 117, 176, 205, 227, 246–47, 256, 285–86, 299–300, 305, 327–29, 331, 337 Keskintepe 21 Kerr, Corporal George 239–40 Kerr, Greg 239 Keyes, Commodore Roger 298 Keys, Trooper 190 Keysor, Lance Corporal (VC) 262, 264 Kidd, Lieutenant 144, 182 Kilid Bahr Plateau 3, 117

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King, Captain 139 King, Brigade Major 74, 81, 83, 218 Kinloch, Terry 334 Kirkpatrick, Simpson 9–10 Kitchener, Lord 2–3, 309 Kitchener’s New Army 27, 250 Kazim Bey 285 Kocacimtepe (Kocacim Tepe) 22 Kojadere Dere 117 Krithia 4–7 Kurt Dere 117 la Touché, Lieutenant 102 Lane, Major 119, 221–22 Lawrence, Lance-Corporal 25, 78, 86, 109, 113, 119, 186, 212–13, 232–33, 307, 322, 335 Lawrie, Lieutenant 210 Le Marchand, Lieutenant 295 Leane, Captain 8, 42–43, 45, 47–50 Leane’s Trench 37, 40, 51–52, 62, 65–70 Lecky, Lieutenant Charles 229 Left Assaulting Column 27, 164–65, 206 Legge, Major-General 25 Legge Valley 9, 88, 115, 210, 227 Lemnos 77, 277 Levett, Trooper Gus 292 Levinge, Lieutenant-Colonel 303, 326 Linto, Trooper Jack 193 Livesey, Trooper Syd 199 Lloyd, Captain E.A 96, 98–99, 214–15 Lloyd, Captain W. 198 Lloyd’s Post 98–99, 214–17 Locke, Captain 233 Logan, Beatrice 186 Logan, Major Tom 181, 186 Lone Pine (Lonesome Pine) 8, 24–27, 30, 34, 40, 42–43, 48, 56–57, 65, 72–83, 85–92, 95, 98–105, 108–23, 128, 140, 144, 149–50, 153–56, 172, 180, 201, 204, 210–12, 221–22, 227–30, 232, 240, 259–69, 286, 307– 23, 335, 337, 342–45 Louch, Sergeant 50

Love, Major 197 Ludlow, Trooper 282 Lukin, Trooper Bob 191 Lukin, Trooper Geoff 191 Lusk, Trooper 138 McAnulty, Private 83, 229–30 McCarroll, Thomas 18 McConaghy, Major 81, 108, 214, 261, 309 McDermid, Sapper 271 McDonald, Lieutenant 95–96, 105 McGregor, Trooper 200 McGrath, Corporal 262 McInnes, Trooper 17 McKay, Sergeant (Boukau) 273 McKay, Trooper Alexander (Sandy) 273 McKenzie, Trooper George 273 McKinlay, Signalmen James 110 McKinley, Sergeant 235 McLaurin, Captain 197 McLeod, Lieutenant 261–62, 270 McMasters, Captain 193 McNamara, Corporal 45, 47 McQueen, Lance-Corporal 318 MacBean, Sergeant 200 Macfarlane, Captain 69–70 Mackay, Major 26, 93, 95–96, 98, 121–22, 155, 212 Mackay’s Post 96, 155 Mackenzie, Trooper Clutha 130, 292, 294 MacLaurin, Colonel 2 Macmillan, Able Seaman 5 MacNaghten, LieutenantColonel 84, 108, 111, 122, 215–16 Mackesy, Harry 128–29 Majestic HMS 16 Mal Tepe 15, 18 Malone, Lieutenant-Colonel 58, 163, 205, 208, 248– 49, 252, 254–55, 257–58, 270, 272–73, 275–76, 279, 281–83, 343–44 Malthus, Private 279 Maori, see Anzac

Marshall, Sergeant 152 Marson, Trooper 185 Massie, Lieutenant 122 medical 30–35, 55, 58, 77, 81, 118, 140–141, 155, 173, 186, 245, 257, 260, 262, 265, 267, 280, 286–87, 290, 297, 303–08, 320, 339–40 Meldrum, Lieutenant-Colonel 130, 132, 160, 291, 293–95, 301–03 Merivale, Lieutenant 84, 93 Mills, Corporal 93 Milson, Captain 92 mines (explosive) 40, 43, 76, 128, 149, 151 Mirmezi Sirt 211 Monash, Colonel John 27, 57, 145, 164–65, 168–70, 174, 225–26, 238 Monash Valley 24, 30, 53, 178, 180, 186, 188, 193, 195, 197–98, 201 Montgomery, Private 221 Moore, Captain, D.T. 83, 99 Moore, Lieutenant Colonel 163, 291 Moran, Private 67 Moran, Captain 172, 235 Morshead, Major 92, 102, 217, 260 Morris, Lieutenant 62–63, 68 Morrison, Private 65–66 Mortar Ridge, see Edirna Sirt Mott. G. 296 Mudros 16 Mullen, Captain 119, Murray, Sergeant (VC) 137, 238 Napier, Lieutenant 142 Nash, Captain 119 Neil, Corporal 85 Nek, The 12–13, 24, 29–30, 87, 118, 124, 144, 148, 158, 164, 176–87, 194, 197–202, 237, 342 Nichol, Private 221 Norris, Sergeant Major 276 North Beach 27, 123, 164–65, 287 northern heights, see Sari Bair Range Nugent, Staff Captain 333

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Nuri Bey, Lieutenant-Colonel 256 O’Connor, Private 239 oat field 233–38 Old No. 3 Outpost 18, 29, 125–26, 128–34, 136, 138, 142, 145, 161 Olive Grove 50 Outpost No. 1 161 No. 2 164–65, 168, 174, 224, 227, 298, 341 Overton, Major 17–18, 27, 164–68, 170, 172, 174 Owen’s Gully 72–73, 90, 93, 98–99, 104–05, 108, 121, Pain, Captain 101, 220–21, 228 Palmer, Trooper 282 Paris, Major General 7 Pasa, Major-General Esat 2, 19–20, 22, 55, 87, 117– 18, 227 Pedersen, Peter 2 Percival, Private 225–26 Perkins, Private 309 Phipson, Major 304, 332–33 Pimple, The 25, 34, 56–57, 73–76, 81–82, 86, 108– 10, 112, 119, 144, 212, 215, 221, 261, 298, 307, 316, 322, 337 Pine Ridge 42 Pinkstone, Lieutenant 101–02 Pinnacle, The 207, 209, 232, 243, 250, 257, 275, 282, 284, 296–97, 302, 304– 05, 326, 329, 332–34, 340 Pinnock, Sergeant 187, 200 Playne, Lieutenant 118 Pope, Lieutenant-Colonel 173–74, 237–38, 240 Pope’s Hill 24, 30, 179–80, 183, 185, 194, 198–99 Potter, Lieutenant 42, 48 Puckle, Lieutenant 42, 45 Prentice, Bertie 45 Prigge, Captain 236 Pringle, Trooper 294 Prisk, Captain 150, 152 Prockter, Lieutenant 65–66 Pugsley, Christopher 344

Quinn, Captain 12 Quinn’s Post 10, 12, 24, 30, 38, 186, 198, 201, 228 Rafferty, Captain 221–22 Rasak Bey, Abdul 116 Redford, Major 183 Reid, Major 180, 183–84 Reserve Gully 54 Rest Gully 54 Rhododendron Spur (Ridge) 17, 20, 29, 124, 130–32, 145, 159–60, 163, 174, 196, 204–06, 208–09, 224, 250, 252, 257, 273, 298, 302, 330, 332 Richardson, Sergeant 45 Right Assaulting Column 29, 125, 145 Ringwood, Sergeant 48 Riza, Lieutenant-Colonel Ali 118, 154, 228, 300, 305 Roberts, Chris 196 Robinson, Lieutenant 62–63 Rockliff, Captain 42, 46–48, 50, 58–59 Roper, Private 65–66 Rose, Captain 238 Roskams, Trooper 193 Ross, Lieutenant 222 Rush, Trooper 192 Rushdi Bey, Lieutenant-Colonel 42, 56 Russell, Lieutenant-Colonel 125, 139 Russell’s Top 12, 29, 53, 56, 78, 86–87, 176, 186–87, 190–91, 195, 224 Ryrie, Colonel 52–53 Ryrie’s Trench 52 Sahinsirt 20–21 Salonika 37 Sanderson, Major 196, Sanderson, Sergeant 196, 199 sappers 35, 76 Sari Bair Range (northern heights) 1, 7, 15–19, 18, 22, 25, 27, 29, 38, 86, 117–18, 123, 133, 141, 144–45, 148, 163, 170, 172, 201, 204–05, 223, 227, 230, 233, 236–37, 250, 277, 285–86, 295, 298, 323, 337, 343–45

Sasse, Captain 111, 121, 259, 317 Sasse’s Sap 98–99, 214–15, 217, 261, 308–09, 317–18 Sazli Beit Dere 17–22, 29, 126–27, 130–33, 145, 160, 205, 208–09, 244–45, 247, 249, 252, 271–72, 275, 281, 327, 329 Schofield, Major 272–73, 281–82 Schuldt, Private 316 Scobie, Lieutenant-Colonel 111, 218–19 Scott, Private Ernest 77 Scott, Captain, A.H. 212, 216–17 Scott, Corporal A.G. 330 Scott, Major, J.B. 195–96 Scrubby Knoll 87 Second Ridge 38, 80, 87, 148, 200–01, 230, 285, 343 Sedd-el-Bahr-Krithia Road 6 Seldon, Lieutenant 92–93 Shadbolt, Private 313–15 Shaw, Major-General 29, 53, 298, 302 Shout, Captain Alfred (VC) 317–19 Sikhs, see Indian Simpson, Trooper Lionel 187–88 Sinclair-MacLagan, Colonel 40, 65–68 Skeen, Lieutenant-Colonel 15–16, 177 Skinner, Lance-Corporal 160, 292 Slim, Lieutenant 241 Smith, Lance-Corporal 45, 50 Smith, Private ‘Combo’ 62, 66 Smith, Sergeant-Major 315 Smith, Trooper Harold 192 Smyth, Colonel (VC) 76, 109, 260, 309 Snipers’ Ridge 40, 42, 56, 65, 72, 102, 210–11 Snipers’ Trench 148, 150, 152, 156 Spargo, Lieutenant 152 Statham, Major 160, 293 Steele’s Post 151, 158, 201 Stevens, Sergeant 127–29, 273, 276

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index

Stevens, Major 220, 259 Stodart, Lieutenant-Colonel 186 Stopford, Lieutenant General 299 Street, Staff Captain 334 stretcher-bearers 48, 69, 114, 120, 140–41, 150, 224, 267, 279, 286, 290, 303, 320 supplies 32–33, 46, 76, 110– 11, 114, 159, 192, 217, 248, 265, 275, 282–83, 287, 293, 303, 308, 318, 333, 339 Surgenor, Private 253–54 Suvla Bay 16, 18, 22, 24, 27, 34, 143–44, 155, 210, 232–33, 236, 240–41, 285–86, 298–300, 327, 341, 343 Symons, Lieutenant (VC) 266, 268, 307, 310, 315–16 Table Top 129–30, 132–33, 136, 160, 163–64, 331 Talbot, Reverend 319 Tahitahi, Peter 140 Tahiwi, Corporal 129 Tahwiri, Captain 129 Tancred, Trooper 190 Tasmania Post 39, 43–44, 47–48, 62, 65–66, 68, 76 Tavender, Private 302, 326 Taylor, Lance-Corporal 44 Taylor’s Gap 139, 166, 170 telephone/telephone lines, see communications Tekke Tepe 299 Tenedos 3, 35 Tevfik, Captain 13 Tewfik Bey, Colonel 105, 116, 227 Thomson, Lieutenant 6 Third Ridge (Gun Ridge) 15, 18, 32, 55, 58, 84, 99, 218, 343 Throssell, Lieutenant (VC) 87 Throssell, Ric 87 Thwaites, Private 120 Tilney, Lieutenant-Colonel 168, 170 Todd, Major 191, 195, 197 Tope, Private 112 Traill, Lieutenant 86

Traversed Trench 212, 214– 17, 228 Travers, Lieutenant-Colonel 141 Triumph HMS 16 Trolove, Trooper 126, 137–38, 330 Tubb, Lieutenant (VC) 265, 268, 307, 310–13 Tubb’s Corner 101–02, 121–22, 211, 217, 221, 259–60, 268, 310, 312 Tulloch, Captain 245 tunnels 26, 34, 39, 49–50, 52, 63, 66–67, 74, 76, 80, 90, 109, 118–19, 149, 151–52, 154, 190, 212, 259, 335 Turkish Army 5th 117 Company 33rd Turkish Machinegun 43, 45 11th Turkish Machinegun 236 Corps 16th 285 Division 2nd 9 4th 205, 227, 247, 327 5th 117 7th 299, 335 8th 256, 300, 327 9th 117–18, 204–05, 227, 327 12th 155, 236, 240, 299 16th 42, 117 19th 19–21, 87, 117, 285 Regiment 10th 247 11th 227, 236 13th 117–18, 154, 228 14th 88, 117, 205, 234, 236, 246 15th 117–18 23rd 327 24th 256, 281, 327–28 25th 205, 246, 251, 256, 281 27th 285–86

28th 327 47th 55, 72, 79, 104–05, 108, 115, 227 48th 42, 51, 55–56, 59, 67, 72 57th 80, 87, 108, 115, 228, 321 64th 205, 246, 251, 256, 281 72nd 80, 205 77th 56 125th 72, 105, 115–16 High Command 13, 19, 55 Turkish Despair Works see Leane’s Trench Turkish Quinn’s 151, 158, 180–81, 186, 194, 342 Turkish Red Crescent 11 Turnbull, Private 201 Turner, Jack 36, 69–70 Twisleton, Trooper 137 Valley of Despair 39, 42, 65, 68 Veitch, Private 64 Victoria Cross (VC) 10, 87, 121, 238, 263, 271–72, 309, 311–12, 314, 316, 318, 344 Victoria Gully 53 Vine de, Private Les 260, 318–19 Vinyard, The 71 von Falkenhayn, General 37 von Sanders, General Liman 6, 37–38, 117, 155, 196, 199, 227, 236–37, 285 W Hills 24 Wainohu, Captain 125 Wait, Major 330 Walden’s Point (Ridge) 124, 130, 134, 137–40, 142, 166 Wallingford, Captain 206–08, 242, 247, 255, 293, 330, 332 Wallish, Sergeant 63 Walker, Major-General 16, 24–25, 30, 52–53, 74, 76, 153–54, 158, 229, 269, 316–17

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‘S o r ry, l a d s, b ut th e o r d e r i s to g o’

Walker’s Ridge 35 Walther, Corporal 49–50 Warburton, Sergeant-Major 238 Ward, Private 309 water (sourcing water) 6, 31–33, 35, 42–43, 57, 76, 113–14, 144, 159, 173, 178, 180, 187, 209–10, 224, 233, 265, 271, 274–75, 282–83, 287, 291, 299, 303 Waterfall Gully 180 Waters, James 43 Watson, Lieutenant 297 Webb, Corporal 311 Western Front 7, 26, 79, 338 Weir, Lieutenant 198, West, Lieutenant 268, 307, 313 Weston, Trooper 196 Wheatfield, The 39, 44–45,

50, 68 Whitaker, sapper 270 White, Lieutenant-Colonel Brudenell 52, 76–77, 144, 153, 229 White, Lieutenant-Colonel, Alexander 181–82, 186, 188 White’s Valley 53, 76 Wicks, Sergeant 220 Wild, Sergeant, Richard 284 Wilfred, Trooper 191 Wilmer, Lieutenant-Colonel 19–20, 87–88 Wilson, Lieutenant Eliot 188 Wilson, Lieutenant N 287 Wilson’s Knob 134, 136 Winzar, medical orderly 69 Wood, Captain Ferdinand 282 Woodhouse, Lieutenant 315 Woods, Lieutenant P.W. 99,

101, 262 Woods’s Post 217, 261, 262 Wren, Lieutenant 84, 309 Wright, Corporal 311 Yauan Tepe 233, 235–38, 241 Yeoman, Captain 150, 156 Youden, Lieutenant 102, 121, 218 Youden’s Post 121, 211, 217–18 Young, Corporal Robert 17 Young, Lieutenant H.H. 313, 315 Young, Lieutenant-Colonel 205–06 Young, Trooper Jack 140 Zeki Bey, Major 80, 87–88, 104–06, 108, 115, 117, 154, 211, 228, 260, 262, 269, 321

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